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ABSTRACT
Timothy Williamson, a necessitist, argues that ‘necessarily everything is necessarily something’. However his claim is ambiguous regarding the kind of modal structure it endorses, with each structural candidate resulting in distinct metaphysical stakes. In this piece I outline each of the structural candidates and analyse them — both logically and metaphysically— within and against Kripkean first-order free logic. I show that the problems Williamson raises with contingentist logic similarly cause problems inside necessitist models. I conclude with a surprising suggestion: a modal logic that treats variables as individual-world pairs, along with a radical form of necessitism that treats quantification as metaphysically primitive.
# Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION AND A WORD ON METHOD ................................................................. 4

MODAL LOGIC ............................................................................................................. 13
  MODAL SYSTEM K ................................................................................................. 16
  OTHER NORMAL SYSTEMS ..................................................................................... 17

LOWER PREDICATE CALCULUS ................................................................................. 19
  A STANDARD AXIOMATISATION OF LPC ............................................................ 20

DERIVING NECESSITISM IN CLASSICAL QML ...................................................... 23
  THE ARGUMENT FROM PROPER NAMES ............................................................ 24
  THE ARGUMENT FROM THE CONVERSE BARCAN FORMULA ............................. 25
  THE ARGUMENT FROM THE BARCAN FORMULA ............................................... 26
  CONTINGENTIST OPTIONS .................................................................................... 29

FREE LOGIC ................................................................................................................ 30

MODELS OF NECESSITISM ....................................................................................... 35

METAPHYSICAL S5 MODALITY ................................................................................ 45

WILLIAMSON'S NECESSITIST METAPHYSICS ....................................................... 48

THE VAGUENESS OF WILLIAMSON'S METAPHYSICS .......................................... 52

FIXED-NECESSITIST METAPHYSICS AND GROUNDING ...................................... 58

UNION-NECESSITIST METAPHYSICS AND GROUNDING ...................................... 64

TRANS-NECESSITIST METAPHYSICS AND GROUNDING ...................................... 70

THE BEING CONSTRAINT ......................................................................................... 74

CONTINGENTIST TROUBLES WITH THE BEING CONSTRAINT ............................... 79

BEING CONSTRAINT CASE STUDIES ....................................................................... 87
A PAIRED STRUCTURE FOR QML ................................................................. 94
FORMALISING PAIRED QML ................................................................. 100
CONCLUSION ....................................................................................... 104