Why, when the image of the French in the New Zealand Press 1900-1914 was a divided one, did New Zealand enter World War I allied to France?

A thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in History at Massey University, Albany, New Zealand.

Alistair Clive Watts
2015
Acknowledgements

I suspect that the more that is written in any preamble the less is read. Acknowledgements sound so clichéd but I now read them based on my new-found admiration for my teachers and supervisors. The brevity of this acknowledgement to Associate Professor Kirsty Carpenter and Professor Peter Lineham, both of the Massey University School of Humanities, for their supportive supervision, patience and forbearance is therefore a product of my wish that this acknowledgement is read, not a sign of any lack of gratitude on my part.

Dr Geoff Watson also of the Massey History Department provided welcome suggestions and probing questions while Professor Michael Belgrave guided me towards some helpful but hitherto overlooked references.

My wife Karen has in common with the partners of so many post-graduate students sat patiently and waited.

Alistair Watts 2016
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Preface

There was fear of French domination of the islands themselves, and also an acute awareness of the strength of France in the Pacific, the imperialistic attitude of her missionaries, the isolated position of New Zealand, and a corresponding desire to stop further French progress.¹

From the earliest days of colonisation French designs upon British (and later New Zealand) interests in the Pacific were poorly defined and non-specific but they were often cited as a motive for action or reaction as circumstances required. The strategic placement of French Catholic missions was interpreted as an underhand path to sovereignty and as a threat to British colonisation. The French were seized upon as a convenient scapegoat for Governor Fitzroy’s Northern War problem and their colonial gains in the Pacific conflicted with the Seddon-led Liberal policy of a greater New Zealand.² As a result a prejudicial, anti-French attitude developed, dating from the earliest colonial European contacts. The mainly British colonists and their New Zealand descendants maintained a latent distrust of the French as a nation. As the entente cordiale between France and Britain metamorphosed into an alliance in the early twentieth century, these prejudicial attitudes were suppressed but not forgotten.

I have used the term ‘alliance’ in its everyday sense of a loose agreement or understanding. Historical (non-legal) scholarship varies on the status of the Anglo-French entente cordiale. Keiger has argued that the entente was neither an alliance nor a treaty but simply a settlement of various differences over empires and colonies. He concluded that the British acted as if there was an alliance while claiming that there was not; the French ignored British denials and claimed that an alliance existed, using Anglo-French military consultation as evidence.³ As Germany threatened France during the Moroccan crisis of 1905 Britain’s warning in support of France, reinforced by the private assurances various British officials gave, was misread by the French as evidence of an alliance. As a result not one member of the French Cabinet present at its meeting on 6 June 1905 doubted Great Britain’s commitment to the

² “French and German Aggression: Importance of South Sea Possessions,” Auckland Star, 10 February 1906, p.9.
French cause. A later exchange of letters (November 1912) obliged the parties to consult if there was a mutual threat but freedom of action was still reserved. The British Government wanted to be able to tell their parliament there was no binding obligation. The British Generals (who despised civilian controls and political interference) militarized the *entente* and turned it into an alliance. As a result New Zealand participated in World War I as part of the British Imperial Alliance. This study investigates and reflects my own curiosity as to how this seemingly unlikely alliance came about.

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Introduction

Why, when the image of the French in the New Zealand Press 1900-1914 was a divided one, did New Zealand enter World War I allied to France?

But history consists entirely of contemporary references that have gone out of date ...

The generally accepted view of New Zealand’s entry into the Great War is one of enthusiastic participation alongside the Empire. King, drawing on John A. Lee’s recollections, describes a fervently positive response to the news of war with Germany. Although Sinclair’s description is more circumspect the conclusions are similar; the Dominion was keen to participate and do its collective duty. The moral certitude that came from doing the right thing by the Old Country and bolstering the collective defence of the Empire put the matter beyond doubt. The initial enthusiasm of the volunteers and their supporters was real and something no Government would have wanted to dampen or conceal. There were however concerns within the political sphere, reported in the press, regarding New Zealand’s involvement. These concerns had been raised at Imperial Conferences and discussed in the news of the day well before the war began so they do not fit well with the popular view of unsuppressed public enthusiasm. After war was declared Massey still had to brush aside the almost plaintive questions of MPs when asked when the troops would leave, where they were going, and by implication what they going to do once they got there. (Massey had both Imperial secrecy requirements and the safe passage of the troops to consider.) I believe these concerns, although without any prospect of preventing New Zealand involvement, were based on well-founded apprehension as to the consequences of involvement in a European war. The evidence in this thesis suggests that these trepidations were strongly influenced by traditional antagonism that weakened the case for assisting the French against Germany.

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This is not a history of New Zealand’s entry into World War I, nor is it a revision of the Dominion’s attitudes towards and interaction with Germany. This is a study of the France–New Zealand interface in the relevant years 1890-1914 as it was presented to the public through the press. It adds to the picture, but it is one hue in the palette, not the complete spectrum of colours. It is nonetheless important for two reasons. Firstly, notwithstanding the use of the Belgium invasion as justification, it provides an insight into the nation’s participation in a war that was arguably not its immediate concern. Secondly it adds a further layer of complexity to the evolution of New Zealand as an independent nation by looking beyond a war-centred nation-building narrative.

New Zealand’s political relationship with France in the twenty pre-World War I years has not been studied in detail probably because there were no official direct interactions with France or indeed with any other power apart from Britain. Seddon, Ward and subsequently Massey chose to work from within the Imperial framework rather than to challenge its authority despite New Zealand’s ambition for Pacific colonisation clashing with both French aspirations and British Empire priorities. Watson, although writing of Massey in the post-War years expressed it thus: ‘While there was a general coincidence of aims between New Zealand and Britain, there were also differences that reflected the particular interests of a small ‘White’ Dominion on the other side of the world from London’. The common argument that there was no alternative overlooks the evidence that other Dominions, especially Canada, were showing every sign of developing an independent national stance particularly on defence matters. Thus at the same time as the misplaced New Zealand dreadnought

10 New Zealand assumed any war would be fought in the northern Hemisphere, it would be brief and it would be won by the Royal Navy.
11 W. H. Oliver and Massey University College of Manawatu., The inadequacy of a dependent Utopia : the Anderson memorial lecture ([Hamilton, N.Z.]: Published by Paul's Book Arcade for the Massey University of Manawatu, 1964). p.6. Oliver made the point that complete independence in the sense of a nation without interactions with others is not possible in the modern world; he also pointed out that this does not necessarily imply a loss of national identity.
12 This is not ignore the many extra-Imperial interactions such as the rejected proposal to become part of the Australian Federation and attempts to build a greater New Zealand presence in the Pacific through annexation and Treaty.
14 W. David McIntyre and Canterbury History Foundation., When, if ever, did New Zealand become independent? , The Jim Gardner lecture 2002 (Christchurch, N.Z.: Canterbury History Foundation, 2002). pp.5-6. Although foreign affairs were controlled by London, the dominions could not be taxed or compelled to fight.
offer was being reluctantly accepted by the British, the Canadians were planning to have a separate Navy. New Zealand’s place, as she saw it, was alongside Britain and by implication alongside France. New Zealand attempted to influence policy from within the Empire culminating in Ward’s abortive efforts during the 1911 Empire Conference to introduce a Round Table-like constitution. Any suggestion of official dissent was consequently muted but New Zealand clearly had the desire for an independent Pacific policy even if she lacked the will to challenge the British and implement it. As well as this suppressed desire the French Pacific presence itself was a prompt and a reminder – an aide-mémoire – of past deceits from the earliest colonial days. New Zealand swallowed hard and did not press her case or act. As a result New Zealand was enrolled by default in the Empire’s war alongside a colonial competitor. The subsequent military action of France, Britain, New Zealand and others pushed any concerns aside.

**Sources**

Secondary sources of New Zealand origin tend to overstate the importance of New Zealand within the Empire and to treat the New Zealand colonial project as if New Zealand was always aiming to become an independent nation. This history is quite Whiggish as it charts New Zealand’s ‘progress’ towards nationhood and assumes that a path to independence was the objective. These sources also tend to understate the dominant influence of the imperial link when considering the local impact of events that took place outside New Zealand’s borders. Conversely texts about the Empire assign New Zealand a minor role both politically and economically in keeping with its geographic remoteness and the small size of the country. Existing studies of British diplomacy concentrate on a personality or on a bilateral relationship, with a few notable exceptions. The historiography of British foreign policy between the Crimean War and World War I also reflects the dual nature of British power based as

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15 While the New Zealand-British relationship has been the subject of numerous studies both in New Zealand general histories and as a leading theme in political biographies, the British-based historiography tends to an extensive analysis of the Franco-British link without considering the implications for New Zealand.


it was on two strategic blocks. The interaction of the six great powers imposed ‘systemic’ constraints through Treaties and Alliances on British actions within European affairs. Great Britain was perceived to be the most powerful of the six due to the extent of her Empire and the Royal Navy. The other strategic block was based on the Anglo-Indian axis. Russia was the most persistent and long-term enemy, challenging Great Britain in both Europe and in Asia-Pacific. This had implications for New Zealand.\textsuperscript{18}

I have used newspapers as a primary source (alongside published Government documents) to reconstruct contemporary opinion. While the Appendices to the Journals of the House of Representatives provided much useful information, the Hansard records proved less fruitful owing to the lack of any direct New Zealand government role in Imperial foreign policy beyond the adjacent Pacific. The Imperial Conferences and the relaying of information that followed them provided an official forum for discussion. Newspapers can be easily dismissed as biased and in some cases, an incorrect version of the truth, but they provide a contemporary record of views at the time of publication. The utility of the local newspapers therefore lies in the immediacy of their day-to-day reporting. They reflect the importance of current events without the benefit of time for introspection and closer examination. The reporters and editors were neither chroniclers nor historians writing for posterity. They were reporting events for tomorrow’s reader in the belief that the content would be discarded the day after. A brief reprise of the development of the newspaper industry in New Zealand gives context to these conclusions.

The early British settlers understandably looked to London for news of Home. The only medium for mass distribution of reports on current events, apart from word of mouth and private correspondence, was the newspaper. Being widely disseminated, the news shaped public opinion either through re-edited versions of the printed word shipped from the United Kingdom or through local content.\textsuperscript{19} In a pattern

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., pp.8-9.
\textsuperscript{19} Hannah-Lee Benbow, “I Like New Zealand Best: London Correspondents for New Zealand Newspapers, 1884-1942” (A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in History in the University of Canterbury, 2009), pp.9-11.; David Hastings, \textit{Extra! Extra! : how the people made the news} (Auckland, N.Z.: Auckland University Press, 2013). p.69.Hastings re-quotes Creighton (the Editor of the \textit{Southern Cross} in 1862) that at 3p per copy, less discounts, the newspaper was available to the “poorest working man”.

9
recognisable today through the innovation of the internet the introduction of wired transmission allowed wider and quicker news circulation. Truncated news reports were quickly transmitted across the country as the network rapidly expanded in the early 1870’s; after 1876 New Zealand could receive more timely international news telegraphed via Australia from London. The introduction of the rotary press in 1888 and linotype machines in the 1890s meant papers could be rapidly mass produced. Because telegraphic transmissions were priced on a word count basis they were expensive and therefore brief. The main New Zealand newspapers shared the cost through the United Press Association and its predecessors. Although reliance on a common news source tended to mean there was less differentiation between the mastheads, divergent editorial stances and selections from the voluminous hard copy papers shipped to New Zealand led to variation. This discretion did not give editors a completely free hand as it was limited by commercial realities. Hastings repeatedly makes the point that newspaper publishing was a business venture and so editors had to publish content that was of interest to their readers. Papers that ignored this reality or pushed only their editors’ points of view often failed commercially.

To compete newspapers had to develop their own theme or character. One important implicit conclusion from the success of this market segmentation (as it is now called) is that New Zealand newspaper readers were not the homogeneous, classless population that is sometimes assumed. The battle between the Herald and the Star

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20 Extra! Extra! : how the people made the news: pp.165-166.
21 Glen O’Hara, “New Histories of British Imperial Communication and the ‘Networked World’ of the 19th and Early 20th Centuries,” History Compass 8, no. 7 (2010): p.609. Early telegraphy was not an early version of the modern internet. Transmissions were not only ‘expensive (but also) patchy (and) unreliable’. Letter writing and physical transmission of paper remained an important conduit for news.
24 Hastings cites The Echo as a paper founded to push proprietorial views with the mistaken belief that the public could be persuaded to the owner’s view. Ibid., p.142.; Tom O'Malley Michael Bromley, "Introduction," in A Journalism Reader, ed. Tom O'Malley Michael Bromley (London: Routledge, 1997), p.2.
25 Hastings, Extra! Extra! : how the people made the news: p.139. As early as 1874 the Star was involved in a libel action that clearly positioned the paper as the champion of the less well off – there was no suggestion that New Zealand was without class.
in Auckland was the classic example. A morning versus afternoon/evening publication had implications for the timely delivery of local news. The *Herald* was opposed to Seddon and the Liberals’ agenda while the *Star*, although not radical, was more favourable. The *Star* championed the causes of the less well off. In addition anonymous letters, written in some cases by newspaper staff, were a familiar ruse to push views that may have sat less comfortably on the editorial pages. In the search for readers the press naturally sought out titillating stories such as the Dreyfus fiasco or the Fashoda debacle.

Overseas correspondents were an important source for foreign news content and style. London-based New Zealand journalists filled the gaps between the London newspaper reports, telegraphed news and UPA (United Press Association and its predecessors) filings. News received by mail still remained extremely important; moreover the UPA did not have a monopoly on telegraphed news. News reports consequently evolved into a hybrid of mailed correspondence from journalists, copy extracted from London papers and telegraphed headlines. This had two important implications. Firstly a logical chronological sequence of reporting must not be assumed. As editors looked for ‘fillers’ and more detail, issues were revisited and earlier reports reprised and amplified. Secondly in a search for relevance the news developed a nationalistic theme; looking for and then highlighting news about New Zealand inflated the national sense of self-importance. These observations are revisited later in this thesis because they provide context to the interpretation of the events analysed through newspaper content. Reports from *The Daily Mirror* have also been compared with their New Zealand equivalents to demonstrate these points. Finally local advertising provided an important counterpoint to the news. Advertising copy demonstrated what was publicly acceptable and what was not as an indicator of societal norms.

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26 Ibid. p.14, 103, 139, 185, 191, 227-228, 238
28 Benbow, “I Like New Zealand Best: London Correspondents for New Zealand Newspapers, 1884-1942,” p. 12. This tendency is still prevalent today as editors seek a local connection for apparently independent events elsewhere in the world.
29 Trinity Mirror PLC, "Our Company," http://www.trinitymirror.com/our-company/history. *The Daily Mirror* has been chosen because of its frequent use of photographs, a feature missing from the local press over much of the period under study, and because in its metamorphosis from an experimental journal for women into a popular news source it became a peoples’ paper.
Statistics and Trading Relations

It is easy to generalise in the absence of specific knowledge or first hand experience. Negative attitudes were easy to maintain because New Zealanders did not know the French as a people. Generalised characterisations help to make sense of a complex world but in so doing the nuances of the individual and their circumstances are lost.

The table below shows the proportion of people of French nationality, by gender, present in New Zealand at the time of the Censuses of 1911, 1906, 1901 and 1896.

**Selected Census Results: 1896-1911**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender as a % of Total</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Females</th>
<th>% of Total Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1911</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL FRENCH</td>
<td>647</td>
<td>422</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By Gender: French</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationality (%)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZ Population (%)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1906</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL FRENCH</td>
<td>624</td>
<td>417</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By Gender: French</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationality (%)</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZ Population (%)</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1901</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL FRENCH</td>
<td>609</td>
<td>409</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By Gender: French</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationality (%)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZ Population (%)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1896</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL FRENCH</td>
<td>698</td>
<td>494</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By Gender: French</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationality (%)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZ Population (%)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Regardless of residential status, the total number of French nationals present was only between six hundred and seven hundred on each occasion. They constituted less than 0.1% of the population count meaning less than one person in every one thousand present on census day was French. The gender bias in favour of males was greater than that for the overall population. This suggests that the few French nationals present in New Zealand were more likely than not to have been present in some

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capacity other than residency, be it as seamen, visitors, religious personnel or in other transient occupations requiring their temporary presence.

Year Book data from 1892 to 1914 recorded a cumulative total of 6,161 naturalisations between 1892-1914. Just under 160 French nationals became New Zealand citizens in the same period.\(^{31}\) The French thus compromised a miniscule 2.5% of the total foreign residents who became naturalised citizens.

There were so few French citizens resident in New Zealand that the probability of a New Zealand resident knowing a French man or woman on a personal basis was low. The thousand or so French residents in New Zealand were not a community and had quickly ‘merge(d) into the populace’ and assumed a New Zealand identity.\(^{32}\) By 1914 trade with France - another point of contact and a source of mutual knowledge - still comprised less than 1% of New Zealand’s imports and exports. Yet, despite antipathy at ‘man-in-the-street’ level and an absence of recorded trade, French retail goods were still freely available in retail outlets.\(^{33}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Natives of France</th>
<th>ALL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1892</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1893</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>596</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1894</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1895</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1896</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1897</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1898</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1899</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>651</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1902</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1903</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1904</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>607</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>572</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>526</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Past 20 years</strong></td>
<td><strong>159</strong></td>
<td><strong>6161</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\(^{32}\) "A report from the French Consul to the Minister in France," in 60 Years Ago : Celebrating The Anniversary Of Diplomatic Relations Between New Zealand And France (Wellington, N.Z.: The French Embassy, 2005), p.29.

Jessie Munro, "Mother Aubert," in New Zealand and the French : two centuries of contact, ed. John Dunmore (Waikanae: Heritage Press, 1997, 2nd., Updated ed), p.93. For New Zealanders the occasional glimpses of the Sisters of Mother Aubert’s Order with their prams collecting goods for the poor are touching in their simplicity and convey a sympathetic French-related image.

\(^{33}\) "A report from the French Consul to the Minister in France," pp.29-36. New Zealand Government, "New Zealand Official Yearbook," (Wellington1915). Trade statistics from 1914 are reflective of the pattern seen in the preceding twenty years. The vast bulk of the £26,261,447 of New Zealand exports went to the United Kingdom (£21,383,891 or 81%). Imports from the United Kingdom, valued at £11,985,946, were 56% of the total. Additional trade via the United Kingdom hub was not recorded.
There was no three-way liaison between France, Britain and New Zealand. Instead three bilateral relationships evolved concurrently and changes in any one of the interactions influenced the third country. Perceived distance and size were important contextual elements.

**A Conceptual View of the World from a New Zealand Perspective**

Although France and Britain are geographically equidistant from New Zealand, for the colonising British New Zealanders, France was culturally and racially distinct whereas Britain and New Zealand were close neighbours. Distance therefore had dimensions that pre-World War I New Zealand failed to reconcile. The emotional, subjective distance between Britain and New Zealand was small. This New Zealand was an island adjacent to the British homeland but far from France. Felicity Barnes’ work neatly encapsulates the essence of it when she refers to London as a New Zealand metropolis.\(^\text{34}\) On the other hand while the telegraph arguably shrank the world it also increased the importance of those metropolitan centres, such as Auckland, where the cable news was received.\(^\text{35}\) Despite cable communication and modern shipping the geographic distance between New Zealand and both France and


\(^{35}\) O’Hara, ”New Histories of British Imperial Communication and the ‘Networked World’ of the 19th and Early 20th Centuries,” p.612.
Britain remained vast. New Zealand was not a British offshore island. Belich makes the point with his description of the Pacific as an impediment between Britain and New Zealand. The geographical distance that made Europe seem of little relevance to New Zealand could not be ignored by Britain, an island nation in the North Atlantic with a clear view of continental France across the English Channel.

Mutual distrust had been a feature of pre-entente political relations between Britain and France. Anglophiles were a definite minority amongst the French public, intellectuals, and the power elite. Distrust of England was fuelled by ‘Napoleonic nostalgia’ and the colonial situation. Arguably the only real threat to the British Empire between 1856 and 1918 had been the possible emergence of a ‘Napoleonic superstate’. Keeping Europe quiet, if not unsettled, became a British objective because a continental power attempting to attack the peripheries of the British Empire would be vulnerable at home. The Royal Navy could therefore secure both Home and Empire. The success of this strategy is shown by the absence of any significant attack on British interests between 1814 and 1914.

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36 Frances Steel, *Oceania Under Steam: Sea Transport and the Cultures of Colonialism, c.1870-1914* (New York: Manchester University Press, 2011). p.9. Steel refers to the possibility of further examining ‘...the ways in which transport operations were vital to the formation and maintenance of regional colonial history’. I would put it more broadly to include the idea that innovations in communications were what counted. Trade was a by-product or indeed a volumetric gauge of the magnitude of bi-lateral relationships.


39 Otto, “The Foreign Office and the Defence of Empire 1856-1914,” pp.10-11. New railways in Europe undermined the importance of sea transport and therefore British trade pre-eminence built on a merchant navy protected by the Royal Navy. The United Kingdom was left with an insignificant army (c.f. the conscripted armies of Europe) and a consequent reduction in the ability of the Royal Navy to apply pressure.


Trade displays and exhibitions from the mid-nineteenth century onward provided a visual metaphor for the developing Franco-British engagement. The Great Exhibition of 1851 had been a highpoint for the United Kingdom that set the benchmark for judging technical supremacy compared to others. Thereafter exhibitions were used to simultaneously measure national progress and impress rivals. When the United Kingdom won only ten out of ninety category prizes at the 1867 Paris Exhibition this failure, as it was seen, became linked to wider societal ills leading to a religious revival and an obsession with morals, sex and drinking. Despite the festive mood occasioned by the Queen’s Diamond Jubilee celebrations, when the 1897 Colonial Conference was held, fears of foreign rivalry particularly from Germany, France, and Russia were in the ascendant. So too were concerns about industrial and diplomatic competition from the United States. From the French viewpoint the reasons for the assumed Anglo-Saxon superiority were varied. The education system came in for scrutiny, particularly what was seen as French concentration on theory in comparison with the English emphasis on practical skills, teamwork, and self-reliance. Leftish French opinion saw hope for social reform in France in the way England had reformed itself. Building on the past through evolutionary, long-term, inter-generational change rather than destruction through more or less continual revolution would advance the French nation.

44 Brian P. Farrell, "Coalition of the Usually Willing: The Dominions and Imperial Defence, 1856-1919," in *Imperial Defence: The old world order 1856-1956*, ed. Greg Kennedy (London: Routledge, 2008), p.264; Brooking, Richard Seddon : King of God's Own : The Life and Times of New Zealand's Longest-serving Prime Minister: p.65.; Edwards, The Role Of International Exhibitions In Britain, 1850-1910: Perceptions Of Economic Decline And The Technical Education Issue: pp.1-13. Seddon was an advocate for technical education and night classes. Victorian-era 'Technical Educationists’ blamed an under valuing of technical and scientific education for the failure to maintain supremacy. There were however alternative opinions that suggested British supremacy was coincidental, rather than by design, and that free trade was just as important, if not more so, than education.
46 Charle, "French Intellectuals and the Impossible English Model (1870-1914)," p.244. This thinking followed Max Leclerc’s ideas. The conservatives trusted and controlled the institutions of both state and church. To change France and French thinking these leading institutions needed to reform. Therefore the leading conservative French bourgeoisie had to change. By changing family relationships and schooling, the bourgeoisie would change and then be receptive to (and available for) reform of the state’s institutions.
By the time of the joint London Exhibition of 1908 the display of goods and cultural harmony was being used as a symbol of entente inspired goodwill (although the idea came from the French not the free-trading British). Some interpreted the emblematic joining of France and Britain in friendship as a deliberate distraction from the major issues of the day. This interpretation suggests more forward planning would have been required than the volatile political environment of the times suggests was possible. Conversely the idea that Exhibitions were United Kingdom-centric and focused on the Home market overlooks the importance of the French presence and the display of industrial power for the observation of envious rivals.

The assumed superiority of Britain over France extended to their respective colonization projects. A common view was that France as a nation was colonizing to improve the lot of humanity whereas the Anglo-Saxons directed their nationalism to improvement through practical goals that profited nation and individual. The truth lay somewhere between the two. Exploitation and commercial gain was veneered with the benevolent benefits of civilization for the indigenous population. The ultimate destiny for a French colony was becoming part of France itself, whatever the geographical distance between the lands of colonizers and colonized. For the British an independent state was the logical colonial outcome.

Furthermore, the Empire carried within it from birth an ideological bacillus that would prove fatal. This was Edmund Burke’s paternalistic doctrine that colonial government

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47 “The Franco-British Exhibition”, *Nelson Evening Mail*, 21 December 1907, p.2.; “London Chat,” *Otago Daily Times*, 6 June 1908, p.4. The Olympic Games were held nearby with a new railway capable of bringing seventy-five thousand visitors per hour to the London site. Armand Fallières, Président de la République visited the Exhibition from 25-29 May 1908. Three thousand French children were brought to England to view the Anglo-British exhibition. The intent was to impress the youngsters with the ‘charming’ English, thus reinforcing their perceptions of the entente.

48 Martyn Cornick, “The White City, 1908,” in *Cross Channel Currents: 100 Years of the Entente Cordiale*, ed. Richard Mayne, Douglas Johnson, and Robert Tombs (London: Routledge, 2004), pp.17-21. The Irish question, reform of the House of Lords, social inequality, and women’s emancipation were cases in point for the British while for France there were the riots and related strikes of July and August 1908 (violently suppressed by Clemenceau).


was a trust. It was to be exercised for the benefit of subject people that they would eventually attain their birthright – freedom.52

The relationship between France and Britain was irrevocably altered in the twenty years prior to World War I by a numerically small but highly influential power elite.53 Although it seems unlikely that Otte is correct when he asserts that most British cabinet members did not know or did not care about foreign policy in general it was true that only a small number of politicians were involved. Only eleven served as British Foreign Secretary from 1856-1914.54 Sir Edward Grey was in office from 1905-16. With a small group of supporters and confidantes, as well as general Conservative support, the Liberal Grey could pursue his course independently and dictate Imperial foreign policy with the Prime Minister’s approval.55 Although relations between the British Foreign and Colonial Offices were not intimate they were not distant either and the two could work in tandem, thus extending Grey’s influence.56

From 1905-16 France had fifteen Ministers of Foreign Affairs so power was effectively in the hands of the Quai d’Orsay as the high turnover of ministers and factional strife within the cabinet left senior French officials with a free hand. Sensitive information was ‘rarely’ passed on to senior cabinet ministers and sometimes not even the President was informed.57 Poincaré has been quoted as saying that only ‘… two or three ministers…’ were aware of the major foreign policy issues arising in the Balkans. In the absence of central direction French Ambassadors grew more powerful and made policy themselves.58 Grey’s ambiguity in public about

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53 Brooking, *Richard Seddon* : *King of God's Own : The Life and Times of New Zealand's Longest-serving Prime Minister* : pp. 300-301.p.309. Brooking refers to Seddon establishing links with the ‘ruling classes’ during his UK visit. The latter apparently had doubts about the ability of Seddon and his colonial brethren to govern others.
56 Otte, "The Foreign Office and the Defence of Empire 1856-1914," p.15. For example the Colonial Office ‘worked’ on the Australian Government to accept the Anglo-French agreement made by the Foreign Office to settle the New Hebrides’ dispute.
British support for France leading up to 1914 added a further complication. While publicly disavowing commitment, Grey was privately giving assurances to France. This was not an independent initiative. Asquith’s secret talks with France began in 1905, but neither the Dominions nor most of the British cabinet were aware of this until 1911.\footnote{Brian P. Farrell, "Coalition of the Usually Willing: The Dominions and Imperial Defence, 1856-1919," in Imperial Defence: The old world order 1856-1956, ed. Greg Kennedy (London: Routledge, 2008), p.278.}

Théophile Delcassé the French Foreign Minister for six years after the Fashoda confrontation believed that Germany and not Britain was the real threat to France.\footnote{Christopher M. Andrew, Théophile Delcassé and the making of the Entente Cordiale: a reappraisal of French foreign policy 1898-1905 (London: Macmillan, 1968). pp.203-205.} His insight was that colonial rivalry did not prevent a friendship in Europe between France and the United Kingdom. Germany’s Naval Law of 1900 was a threat to both countries on separate fronts. A strengthened Germany simultaneously challenged French colonial aspirations and Britain’s isolationist stance secured by the Royal Navy.\footnote{Keiger, "How the Entente Cordiale Began," p.5.} While France wanted the security of an alliance as a deterrent to Germany the British wanted to avoid an open-ended commitment to a possible European conflict. Each therefore operated within the loose agreement of the entente to achieve their objectives while avoiding the final step of a treaty-like agreement. While denying an alliance the British acted as if there was one while the French ignored Great Britain’s claims to the contrary and comforted themselves that there was an agreement based on war planning conducted out of the public gaze. French insistence on a written version of whatever was agreed contrasted with the British resolve to rely on verbal assurances. This has been interpreted as a lack of British commitment.\footnote{Ibid., pp.8-9.} The British leadership avoided forcing the issue for fear of provoking public protest both at Home and within the Empire, especially given the concerns of New Zealand and the other Dominions (see Chapter Four) regarding potential involvement in a European conflict. Public displays of fraternal affection and joint military demonstrations with France were one thing - positioned as they were to achieving peace through strength. An alliance with the explicit threat of a European war if certain pre-conditions were met was quite another. Moreover a direct acknowledgement of an alliance would have
simply provoked Germany to even more vigorous militarization, the very chain of events that Britain and France were hoping to avoid.

The conventional and most misleading view of the British Empire was that used in the mid-late nineteenth century: that of a ‘… tightly knit power resting on free association’. From this interpretation came the common but incorrect New Zealand-centric view of New Zealand as a significant Dominion at the heart of a firmly managed pre-War Empire. On the contrary most scholarship now argues that New Zealand was not significant and the Empire was not tightly controlled.

… when we talk about the British Empire we are really referring to a loose and often accidental association of units, embodying in their disorganization the worst features of the feudal and federal systems.

It has been said with at least the spirit of truth that the British Empire was founded in a fit of absence of mind, and that the largely ad hoc development of the overseas extensions of Britain owed more to traditional British pragmatism than to any master plan emanating from the corridors of Whitehall.

The Empire was based on an ad hoc mix of British stock, moral purpose and free trade. Certainly some initiatives were planned, such as pre-World War I colonisation in Africa, but elsewhere actions were largely ad hoc. It was Lord Roseberry who had called it a ‘… commonwealth of nations’. There were many unanswered questions about the status of the members as far as nationality and allegiance were concerned. Especially concerning was the issue of whether the members could remain neutral in the event of war. The Empire was at best a loose association of interests with a variety of agendas beneath a coating of solidarity.

If the ‘… tightly knit power …’ version of the Empire was never true the image certainly stayed. The Empire was neither cohesive nor a well-ordered organization heading towards economic independence as the description suggests. It was the opposite of all those things, but it would be unreasonable to blame British Governments of whatever political persuasion for that being the case. Colonisation

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was most likely to be the result of private enterprise (as was the case for New Zealand) or penal settlement (in the Australian example) or the pursuit of strategic defence interests. As a consequence the Empire lacked a comprehensive purpose. Once this collection of historical sovereignty claims, private ventures and conquests from indigent inhabitants was established its reasons for being were justified by a mix of emotive appeals and self-serving interests. *Post hoc* justifications for colonization included social engineering, ridding Britain of her surplus population and protecting the local inhabitants whether indigenous or colonists. Raw materials for industrialisation were sourced from extractive enterprises. Whatever the intent, the collective result was a geographic pattern of trade best likened to radii originating from London through which flowed the collective wealth, both physical and economic, of the world’s greatest industrial and financial power. Attempts to retain this Empire included developing a British culture and character within the (white-ruled) Dominions and Colonies. There were organisations for just this purpose. As a result of these initiatives intra-Empire trade and defence of the Empire became central concerns of British foreign policy. In that sense British diplomacy was not so much orientated towards achieving a specific goal as it was about preventing the collapse of the system. As Seddon said, ‘Our first duty was preservation of the Empire’. The opposing foreign pressures for change were reactive. Externally there was envy and a desire to equal or exceed British power and prestige. Russia, France and Germany were particularly (at different times) so motivated. Internally the forces for change were potentially equally damaging for the Empire as the domestic pressure

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68 Claire Tomalin, *Samuel Pepys: The Unequalled Self* (London: Penguin, 2002). p.144, p.335. Samuel Pepys’ diaries provide an insight into a case of the latter in Tangiers. Pepys was part of the expedition sent to destroy and abandon the colony and naval base that he had helped establish there, in favour of a better Mediterranean alternative: Gibraltar.


70 George Peden, “The Treasury and Defence of Empire,” in *Imperial Defence: The old world order 1856-1956*, ed. Greg Kennedy (London: Routledge, 2008), pp.73-74. This argument was self-fulfilling as during World War I the Empire did prove to be a strategic asset for the supply of raw materials, manufacturing capacity and manpower.

71 Unattributed, ”The Queen's Empire: A Pictorial and Descriptive Record (1897) “ in *Politics and Empire in Victorian Britain: A Reader*, ed. Antoinette M. Burton (New York: Palgrave, 2001), pp.278-279. This essay promoted the model of Englishmen (sic) scattered throughout the world. One day they may become a separate race but that would be far in the future owing to the ‘ingrained … qualities inherent in the blood …’ Other races and cultures were simply a pleasant diversion to the mono-Anglo culture.


at Home for social reform, wealth redistribution and universal suffrage grew. From 1867 to 1928 as the number of electors in the United Kingdom rose from 1.4 million to 28.5 million the rulers were forced to govern for the many, not the few.\textsuperscript{74}

The argument that New Zealand was a child expressing almost filial piety towards England misses these points.\textsuperscript{75} Some historians argue New Zealand was so entangled with Empire and Home there was no viable alternative.\textsuperscript{76} On the other hand, having rejected Chamberlain’s 1902 vision of a closed trade bloc governed by a Round Table-like arrangement New Zealand, along with the other Dominions, was left without alternatives when the crisis came. It had rejected shared governance and it did not seek independence. Angus Ross \textit{et al} gave a good summary of this view when describing New Zealand’s concerns at the turn of the nineteenth century as those of isolated islands located in the Pacific but desiring some kind of federation with Britain as protection from a non-specified Asian or European threat.\textsuperscript{77} In that sense the Pacific was a geographic impediment between New Zealand and London, the metropolitan centre of the British world. Through increased domestic enfranchisement and the influence of world events the United Kingdom was moving on from a parental role regardless of New Zealand’s wishes. The problem was exemplified when the 1889 Naval Defence Act introduced the Two Power Standard as a strategic benchmark to assess British naval strength. This raised the issue as to

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\textsuperscript{74} Keith McClelland and Sonya Rose, "Citizenship and empire, 1867-1928," in \textit{At home with the empire: metropolitan culture and the imperial world}, ed. Catherine Hall and Sonya O. Rose (Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp.175-176.

\textsuperscript{75} King, \textit{The Penguin History of New Zealand}: p.281. King talks of New Zealand as the most loyal of ‘Britain’s children’, while Sinclair of the ‘… most dutiful of Britain’s daughters’. The difficulty New Zealand and to a lesser extent Australia faced in having a say in their own destiny was their relative unimportance to Britain, compounded by British disinterest in the South Pacific in general. The rich mineral wealth of South Africa, the strategic location of Egypt, the exotic prestige, produce and manpower of India and the potential of Canada as a second chance for an American success were all self-evident. While not without a few of these advantages, location did not make the Antipodes an easy substitute for any of them. Britain was therefore not particularly interested in the Pacific and France was similarly minded, probably owing to the British lack of interest. Sinclair’s depiction of a troublesome, expensive and un-needed colonial appendage is an appropriate summary. Sinclair, \textit{A History of New Zealand}: p.215.

\textsuperscript{76} Brooking, \textit{Richard Seddon: King of God's Own: The Life and Times of New Zealand's Longest-serving Prime Minister}: pp.284-285. Brooking makes the important point that Britain cannot be studied in isolation from the Empire. New Zealand’s pre-war history is firmly rooted in that of the Empire. Any nation seeks to maximise its position within existing alliances and so too did pre-World War I New Zealand.

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whether or not this included the Empire and therefore whether the Empire was de facto a closely tied ‘constructionist’ Federation. The ‘constructionist’ viewpoint was of an Empire that was planned and directed as against a traditional, liberal, free trade model based simply on common moral values and bonds. The conflict in the historiography on these points arises because the argument was never clearly defined at the time and therefore went unresolved. The events of 1914 overtook the debate meaning it never had to be decided. By extension the impasse between the Liberal ideal of colonial (dominion) defence forces controlled by their domestic Governments and the Federationalists’ view - that central control was preferable - was in a continual state of flux.78

The South African (Boer) War served as a test-run for the Empire’s governance and defence arrangements. French (and German) sympathies were with the Boers. The latter were idealized as simple sons of the land without intellectual pretensions confronting an English force, armed with new weapons, using massacre and torture to oppress a small, morally pure nation.79 The French saw the Boer resistance as a fight against tyranny, oppression and rampant capitalism. If successful the Boer rebellion would destroy the United Kingdom’s power in South Africa and shake the supposed British position as the predominant world power. Conversely a British win would help build an Empire strong enough to withstand any rival power with or without France. The 1902 British victory did strengthen the Empire and its links with Australia, New Zealand and Canada. France needed such a power as an ally not an adversary. Although Britain now controlled the Cape sea route what looked impressive from the outside was in fact militarily vulnerable and expensive to defend.80

The general lessons the British learned from the Boer War and the reaction of New Zealand and the other dominions to it were sobering. Firstly the lack of intelligence in the military sense was a major shortcoming that needed to be urgently addressed.81

Secondly fighting wars in distant lands was costly and therefore a significant drain on the public purse. This should have sounded a warning for New Zealand: if fighting in southern Africa was expensive for the British (and for New Zealand) then the cost for New Zealand sending troops to Europe would be even more so. Thirdly, notwithstanding the Royal Navy’s power, prestige, and cost, the navy could not win against a land-based force employing predominantly guerrilla tactics. Fourthly, diplomacy was a necessary component of war if only to prevent other powers intervening. Fifthly the Dominions would help by active participation but their assistance would be subject to their own circumstances. While the British establishment had cause to reassess, New Zealand was gleeful at the outcome. Despite criticism of the British tactics from within the United Kingdom what little opposition there was in New Zealand was ‘diverse and ineffective’. Isolated incidents of dissent, such as the exchange between Seddon and the Chief Hansard reporter who in his capacity as a private citizen questioned the legitimacy of New Zealand’s role in the Boer War, (or the views of the M P Tommy Taylor) were exceptional.

New Zealand’s interests then were to preserve a strong Great Britain that would continue with the undefined Imperial project. The Boer war increased the colonial sense of self-importance as well as New Zealand’s pride in the Empire. Seddon was ‘profoundly moved’ that the United Kingdom would commit to war to defend a colony. Perhaps more importantly the Boer War established the precedent of New

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86 Farrell, "Coalition of the Usually Willing: The Dominions and Imperial Defence, 1856-1919," p.267. ‘Imperial duty forced New Zealand to act’. Seddon in Brooking’s view, ‘… had little alternative but to support the British case…’ The motivation was both an enhanced standing for New Zealand and economic (trade) while currying support for New Zealand’s Pacific ambitions. Brooking, Richard Seddon : King of God's Own : The Life and Times of New Zealand's Longest-serving Prime Minister: pp.304-306.
Zealand involvement in wars beyond the immediate national interest to ‘… uphold imperial power …’. 88

So with the British Government controlling diplomacy and external relations on behalf of her colonies and dominions, New Zealand entered a state of friendship with France when the entente began. 89 The lack of direct contact highlighted both the New Zealand dependence on British diplomacy and the reciprocal redundancy of any French approaches. From the French point of view New Zealand’s opinion of the entente would have been irrelevant. The frustration with this situation, as it applied to New Zealand interests in the Pacific, goes some way to explaining the New Zealand reaction to events because a residual Francophobia, based (as discussed below) on imported thinking from Britain persisted. A fear of further French colonization in the Pacific became an on-going theme in the New Zealand narrative. 90 This inherited background of continual paranoia, described as a ‘… central tenet of the British Empire, unthinking hostility toward the French’, had to be abandoned virtually overnight, even at the geographical fringes of the Empire, when the entente came into being. 91 While considerable effort was put into establishing an engaging public façade for the entente in Britain and France, this was not done in New Zealand. Hence the importance of newspaper reports in creating an image of the enthusiasm shown at ‘Home’. 92

The Agent-General in London was the nearest New Zealand had to a representative diplomat during the period under study. Francis Dillon Bell, who was French born and fluent in the language, appears to have been the only incumbent who engaged in direct diplomacy with France prior to 1900. 93 On the other side of the world French

88 King, The Penguin History of New Zealand: p.286. King, in common with other general New Zealand histories, does not address what constituted defending a colony as opposed to suppressing what could be seen as either a colonial rebellion or a fight for independence.
92 Chapter Three contains a fuller discussion of this issue.
Consular representation in the Pacific was based on the volume of trade.\(^{94}\) In 1890 the French Consul made a detailed report to his Minister, mainly lamenting a lack of resources. His report characterized New Zealanders as practical people who purchased goods based on need rather than on country of origin. He was unable to give trade figures because ‘… almost all of the trade items pass via London …’. However many French goods were in the shops that ‘… return 25 million (Francs) in the North Island alone …’.\(^{95}\)

Although direct diplomatic contact was miniscule the New Zealand newspapers made what they could of the little there was. A British report in the *Daily Mirror* for example announced the arrival of British M.P.s and the Agents-General of the Colonies in Paris for an exchange visit.\(^{96}\) The anticipated program included a banquet with the Premier and a speech by the French Foreign Minister on the *entente cordiale*. The party numbered 197, including wives. *The Times* report listed the participants, including the Empire Agents-General, without commenting on the New Zealand absence.\(^{97}\) The *Auckland Star* covered the event nearly a month later under the headline ‘Personal Notes From London (From Our Special Correspondent)’. The title and description fit the scenario of the newspaper’s own correspondent or their ‘stringer’ as the source but the copy was dated 13 November. It was therefore apparently prepared before the United Kingdom equivalent but owing to being mailed or perhaps on the whim of the editor it was not published until much later. The article content was clearly adapted to reflect the New Zealand angle in an attempt to convey relevance and interest. The invitation was to the New Zealand Agent-General
Reeves) but mentioned the likelihood he would not participate. The latter point is stated from first-hand knowledge (“I understand …”) suggesting communication between Reeves and the writer. The King is reported as being pleased that the invitation includes the Agents-General and by implication the New Zealand Agent-General. To the New Zealand reader New Zealand’s invitation was a central feature whereas for his or her British equivalent the Empire representatives’ inclusion was a minor point.

The New Zealand Press had fulsome praise for the 1908 Anglo-French Exhibition.\(^98\) It was seen for what it was, namely highly significant in the context of the *entente* with the symbolism of the two great countries working side by side to create an event that reflected the camaraderie between them. More important than the commercial success of the venture was the public demonstration, presumably for those below the political elite, of the newly ‘allied’ nations. Noteworthy in the context of the developing relationship was the use of the word ‘allied’ for a relationship that was not formally recognised as such.

The earliest recorded New Zealand Exhibition in Dunedin in 1865 included an exhibit by France.\(^99\) After various provincial efforts another exhibition was held in Dunedin to commemorate the national Jubilee in 1889-1890. Given New Zealand’s propensity to follow Britain’s lead, especially under Ward’s premiership, it was not surprising that New Zealand replicated the earlier Dunedin Exhibition with another in Christchurch in 1906-7. A year earlier an envoy (T. E. Donne) had reported to Parliament the results of his visits to establish support for an International Exhibition opening in November 1906 in Christchurch. His report noted that France and Germany, amongst others, had been approached to attend. Pamphlets had also been distributed from the New Zealand Pavilion at the Crystal Palace Exhibition.\(^100\) The New Zealand Exhibition preceded the 1907-08 Franco-British event. It was the

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subject of an extremely detailed report by Cowan.\textsuperscript{101} The value of French goods for display was recorded as £2,924, Germany as £3,853 and Britain as £178,107.\textsuperscript{102} Despite the \textit{entente} there was no special emphasis given to the French exhibit. Other French-related activity in New Zealand was sparse and occasional, based on the volume of newspaper articles. It was claimed that there were 2,000 French speakers in New Zealand, as well as several French clubs.\textsuperscript{103} A Monsieur L. Duflou gave a well-attended lecture on \textit{‘L’entente Cordiale’} to the Wellington French Club. He referred to the harmony shown during the 1908 Exhibition in London and the subsequent cordiality between the two nations but regretfully any further substance from his talk was not reported.\textsuperscript{104} With the war threat incipient France’s 1914 National Day was celebrated at the French Consulate with the \textit{entente} duly praised and noted.\textsuperscript{105}

French writers, artists and intellectuals visited New Zealand to observe, record and write. The significance of their work lies in the impact of any direct observations (typically through interviews) reported while they were here. There is also the contemporary impact of their finished work on New Zealanders’ self-perceptions. This aspect seems largely unexplored, possibly because of the language barrier. The public record from this period has little on the first point and virtually none on the second. Rognvald Leask writes of four French visitors: Albert Émile Métin, Louis Vigouroux, Pierre Leroy-Beaulieu and André Siegfried. The latter visited during his 1898 world tour to see for himself the Liberal reforms occurring in New Zealand. His views are preserved in \textit{Democracy in New Zealand (La Démocratie en Nouvelle-Zélande)}. In Leask’s view, Siegfried saw New Zealand as a living museum of democracy whose governing system had developed on practical foundations. New Zealand politics were adaptive and shaped by events, rather than through strictly adhering to a political theory. He considered New Zealanders to be well informed, interested in current affairs and having newspapers of good quality that were well

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\item[102] Ibid., p.113. Also see ‘Preface’
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If so, the lack of debate on Imperial Foreign Affairs seems even more exceptional. Hamer has a slightly different interpretation of Siegfried. New Zealand was ‘already a nation’ and ‘looking to the Pacific’ but still very attached to England. Siegfried, using the themes of the period, was fascinated by the dynamism of the Anglo-Saxon race as exhibited in New Zealand and wanted to know why it was so. In Hamer’s words, Siegfried found in New Zealand ‘… English forms animated by a new spirit’. The people were somewhat naïve but practical; not daunted by problems but nonetheless with a predilection for appealing to the State for help. Siegfried saw middle-class aspirations in those he classified as working class. They did not fit the political theory, as they were not socialists in the European sense, being a practical people apparently without class jealousy.

The interest in these observations lies in the disjuncture between the rugged, independent, national individuality that was shaping domestic policy and New Zealand’s reputation for almost slavish conformity and adherence to British foreign policy. Of the last three pre-war Prime Ministers, Seddon personified the former psyche both physically and politically but remained an Imperialist. Ward took the second, more loyalist stance while neither advancing nor repudiating the homegrown, independent, Liberal domestic agenda. Massey straddled the two poles. His domestic political conservatism was consistent with his first muted Parliamentary reaction that revealed a dutiful rather than an enthusiastic response to a new Imperial adventure, World War I (see Chapter Four). The events described in the following two

109 Ibid., pp.112-114.
110 History Group of the New Zealand Ministry for Culture and Heritage, "New Zealand Premiers and Prime Ministers," in Biographies (2012). The brief tenures of Mackenzie and Hall-Jones are insignificant in this context.
Watson, W.F. Massey : New Zealand: p.41. Massey was probably as much uncertain as he was unenthusiastic. ‘Despite his long apprenticeship in opposition, Massey was very much a newly
chapters are set against this background of mixed New Zealand opinions of France and an emerging national self-awareness of a unique identity and the possibility of independent policy.

This thesis has four Chapters that discuss in chronological order selected events relating to the question posed. Chapter One uses the Fashoda incident as an example of New Zealand newspaper reporting of an event involving French colonial activity that conflicted with Empire ambitions. All such incidents have their own unique circumstances but Fashoda has been selected because it involved direct intervention by the British and it immediately preceded the *entente*. The same or similar world circumstances and many of the more influential politicians were involved in both Fashoda and the *entente* and the juxtaposition of the two reveals how attitudes changed within just five years. The one-sided views of colonial France presented to the New Zealand public in the press as a result of Fashoda shaped New Zealand’s views of France as a colonial competitor in the Pacific and thereby justified objections to French ventures long after bilateral British-Franco discussions resulting in the *entente cordiale* had decided the outcome.

Chapter Two is based on the extensive local press scrutiny of the Dreyfus Affair. The French were depicted as culturally and politically dissimilar to the British races. They were rendered as a people apart from the sturdy, reliable, and temperamentally stable Anglo-Saxon stock from which the pre-World War I colonial New Zealanders of British origin were derived. A decline in the French birth-rate and an increase in

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111 Although largely overlooked, the Fashoda incident resulted in local preparations for a possible war with France. See: "War Preparations," *New Zealand Herald*, 26 October 1898, p.5.
112 In selecting Fashoda I am mindful that any example must be typical of others. Fashoda includes all the relevant factors in support of my argument whereas other possibilities build the case but are less comprehensive. The uproar over the French annexation of Tahiti was largely contained within the Pacific while the brutal suppression of the Algerian rebellion was widely reported but had little local relevance. "Algeria," *Thames Star*, 24 October 1881, p.2.; Newbury, "Aspects of French Policy in the Pacific, 1853-1906," p.36-39.; Tombs and Tombs, *That Sweet Enemy: the French and the British from the Sun King to the Present*: pp.341-342. The controversy over the New Hebrides is a background theme in Chapters Two and Three.
113 Such views were common. Although, for example, Brooking did not believe that Seddon was a Social Darwinist, Leask re-quoting Andre Siegfried who in turn was quoting Seddon from Tregear has Seddon saying, “…we are the dominant race…” Brooking, *Richard Seddon: King of God's Own: The Life and Times of New Zealand's Longest-serving Prime Minister*: p.312. Leask, "Britain's Watchdog' in the Pacific? Seddon's Imperialism as Seen by the French," p.29. Papers Past has seven exact matches to this phrase, none of which are attributed directly to Seddon:
‘decadence’ were evidence of a ‘demographic decline’ and loss of national vitality compared with the German and British races. This diagnosis had distinct Darwinist overtones, as if the French were a separate species on the path to decline and extinction. The disorderly state of French domestic politics in the 1890s was symptomatic. Such views were not restricted to editorial opinion. In academic and political circles race (in a genetic sense) was misinterpreted as a cause of cultural and political difference. Although these interpretations raised severe doubts as to the suitability of France as a potential imperial ally, the shocked comments of various academics visiting from France belied the popular portrayal of France in decay.

Chapter Three covers the re-alignment amongst the major powers as a result of the entente and discusses how this was presented within New Zealand. Post-1904 a major colonial competitor and potential enemy became an imperial ally. Despite the outward manifestations of the entente in the Northern Hemisphere – joint Exhibitions, reciprocal visits by the heads of state, and military displays - there was no replication in New Zealand of the considerable effort put into selling the entente in France and Britain. France remained (in New Zealand eyes) a threat to local colonial ambitions. New Zealand stifled her local interests for the greater good but the dissonance from the issue aroused early, fragile thoughts of a more independent New Zealand stance.

http://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/cgi-bin/paperspast?a=d&cl=search&d=WT18811101.2.12&srpos=5&e=-------10--1-byDA---2we+are+the+dominant+race--

114 Elisa Camiscioli, "Reproducing the "French Race": Immigration and Pronatalism in Early-Twentieth-Century France," in Bodies in contact: rethinking colonial encounters in world history, ed. Tony Ballantyne and Antoinette M. Burton (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2005), p.220-222. Civilization apparently led to declining birth rates while the fecundity of the ‘uncivilized’ races appeared to increase unabated. Apparently the falling birthrates in pre-War France were a result of greater civilization, thus leaving the French and other civilized nations vulnerable to the less developed nations.

115 Charle, "French Intellectuals and the Impossible English Model (1870-1914)," pp.235-236. For the English, Victorian-era ideas around natural characteristics, culture, civilization, and what constituted progress was often judged by comparison with France. The use of comparisons did not cease with the end of the period under study.

Lipson, The Politics of Equality: New Zealand's Adventures in Democracy: p.49. First published in 1948, Lipson has eleven entries in the Index, many of which use France as a reference point. For example: ‘The weaknesses that have beset the French Republic and other continental European democracies could be paralleled from mid-nineteenth-century New Zealand’.

116 "Ministers on Tour: Mr. Massey and Mr. Allen at Milton,” Evening Post, 19 June 1913, p.10.
Chapter Four considers New Zealand’s interaction with the Empire prior to 1914. Defence and governance were frequently debated although the *entente* itself was not. Despite the dreadnought-related defence scare of 1909 the overall tone suggests an implicit certainty that the Empire was secure. The lack of British support for Ward’s Empire Federation and joint governance initiative and the distinct unease with New Zealand’s attempts at competitive colonisation in the Pacific suggests that New Zealand was a less than essential Empire member slightly out of step with the British direction. It must have been a relief to Britain that New Zealand (and to a lesser extent Australian) concerns about the Empire’s relationship with France manifested as issues of local interest within the Pacific, such as colonisation in the New Hebrides and other islands states. Because the Southern Pacific hemisphere was relatively unimportant to both the British and the French these concerns could be placated or ignored.
Chapter One: Fashoda

From a contemporary assessment the Fashoda confrontation appears as a farcical episode of nineteenth century colonial rivalry acted out in a remote location that was of little immediate value to either France or Britain. At the time however it was a significant influence on both foreign policy and public opinion in France and England. The actions of France and the United Kingdom involved an important premise of the period; that colonisation was an essential activity for industrialised states. In the aftermath of the depression of the 1860’s colonies were seen as potential export markets although national prestige was not overlooked as a further motivation. ‘Conquest’ followed by ‘exploitation’ was the colonialists’ mantra. Recent historiography is divided on the legacy of the Fashoda confrontation. One view holds that French colonial expansion in Africa was simply a failed policy of Gabriel Hanotaux, the immediate predecessor of Foreign Minister Delcassé. Hanotaux’s initial confidence in new colonial ventures was based on his belief that the Franco-Russian alliance would preserve European peace and thus allow France to pursue her overseas ambitions. This view attributes the Fashoda occupation to an ill-judged initiative resulting from the disarray in French foreign policy rather than being a colonial venture based on sober reflection with a realistic objective. In this version the French occupation was easily thwarted by a coherent and adroit British response.

2 A better understanding of demography, economic growth and technological progress now shows that the world is not a zero sum system wherein one country’s progress must be equalled by another’s territorial losses.
3 Andrew, Théophile Delcassé and the making of the Entente Cordiale: a reappraisal of French foreign policy 1898-1905: p.27.
4 Ibid., p.31.
The failure was interpreted as a signal that confronting the British Empire was futile.\textsuperscript{7} Once this was apparent the obvious solution for the French was to simply withdraw. This however raised domestic political complexities since the Government of the day depended on Colonial Party support. France, desperate to save face, did seek German backing for her African claims but was told that the price was acceptance of the status quo in Alsace-Lorraine.\textsuperscript{8} That was too much for any French Government to accept and effectively forced a politically isolated France to order Marchand to retire. Thereafter the Colonial Party was less keen to confront the British and in that respect the door for the entente was opened although the venture ‘…left hostility towards Britain … (that) endued for most of the pre-war period.’\textsuperscript{9}

The alternative view links this simplified narrative to the concurrent domestic turmoil in France caused by the Dreyfus affair. Out of the tangled strands of anti-Semitism, anti-Dreyfus sentiment and anti-British emotions the Fashoda expedition leader (Marchand) emerged as a success, positioned in the French press as a victim whose withdrawal was simply a temporary setback on the path to eventual French colonial glory.\textsuperscript{10} He was, in this version, a Napoleon-like hero, acting in the best interest of France without self-interest. In the same month (October, 1898) that Esterházy was exposed as the true traitor of the Dreyfus Affair (and ironically retreated into exile in England), and Madam Dreyfus launched a further appeal on her husband’s behalf, Marchand’s public status progressed from hero to ‘martyr’. He bravely traversed Africa (rather than retreating down the Nile through British territory) on his way back to France. He was welcomed home, acclaimed as a victor and championed by both political right and left as a unifying distraction from the domestic political turmoil surrounding the Dreyfus matter.\textsuperscript{11}

The press in both France and Britain had an extensive part in developing their respective national narratives of the Fashoda confrontation. Victorian press commentators were not naive and realised that the new telegraphic technology could spread lies as well as truth through the press. Aside from publishing their own version

\textsuperscript{10} Berenson, “Fashoda, Dreyfus, and the myth of Jean-Baptiste Marchand,” p.131.  
\textsuperscript{11} Ibid., pp.131,132,137-138.
of very newsworthy stories that would be popular with their readers, the press narratives were themselves subject to manipulation by ‘jingoes’ and politicians.12 For the British, Fashoda was reported as a vindication of her territorial ‘rights’ in Africa, an exhibition of Britain’s excellent colonizing ability, and a demonstration of her military superiority. The French withdrawal, under threat from the British, was reported as a humiliating backdown.13 As Kitchener advanced up the Nile towards Fashoda he built both railway and telegraph lines. He therefore controlled the information flow: even the isolated Marchand depended as much on Kitchener’s sources as he did on his own for information. Kitchener in that respect held all the cards.14 Although Kitchener found a well-resourced and confident Marchand at Fashoda his reports stated the opposite - that he had found a demoralised expedition in a hopeless position that he then ‘saved from massacre’. Kitchener gave the French expedition some Paris newspapers filled with the ‘… terrible Dreyfus affair …’. Their isolation and demoralization was complete.15

When there was no news there was speculation, rehashed stories and opinion to fill the gaps. Without direct access it was therefore possible for Marchand to be recast by the French press as a hero in a country desperate for a unifying figure. In the cultural vacuum between the revolutionary ideal of a nation of equals and the reality of individual achievement Marchand assumed the ‘mythic image’ of a hero of French imperialism and glory.16 He became the personification of France herself just as Kitchener’s image embodied all the self-assigned characteristics of the British. Given that the disputed African claims were settled just four months after the crisis had passed the evidence suggests that the Fashoda incident assumed a significance in the press far beyond its immediate geographic implications.17

13 In that respect the narrative succeeded as the term ‘Fashoda’ was used extensively in advertising thus perpetuating memories of the incident beyond the immediate events.
Despite being headline news in New Zealand it is doubtful whether many newspaper readers knew exactly where Fashoda was or what the implications of its possession by France may have been. However the African location did lend a certain exotic element enhanced by a dramatic plot, a hero (the British Army under Kitchener) and a villain (France). The New Zealand audience received a locally re-written selection of Fashoda news sourced from both the British and French press. The content suggested inept French colonial politics, an inability to successfully annex territory and a lack of fortitude to match that of the British. Having been presented with this version of the British response to the French actions in Africa, the New Zealand public’s support for Liberal (anti-French) attempts to emulate those positions in the Pacific is understandable. Because news editorials treated the New Zealand identity as synonymous with that of the British, the incident reinforced the common citizenship and protection of the Empire. Moreover, since colonial and diplomatic actions in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were generally interpreted as competitive, not unlike a representative sports event, the competitors were ‘us’ against ‘them’ without (in this case) local costs or sacrifice. New Zealand was a partisan spectator. The news reports illustrate the paradigms the Victorians and Edwardians used to view foreign colonisation, race and culture. The prejudices aroused against the French eventually had to be reversed for King Edward’s visit to Paris in 1903 to become a celebration of unity between Paris and London because popular support in the United Kingdom would be a necessary precursor if the entente cordiale was to succeed.

The evidence suggests that the case presented in New Zealand in favour of the entente (to be discussed in Chapter Three) was not delivered with nearly the vigour that was

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18 Hobson’s announcement at Waitangi in 1840 can probably be interpreted in this context: ‘now we are one people’ meant (in his century) one people within the British Empire but each in their ordered place socially and geographically, not only in New Zealand, but elsewhere in the world.


20 The indigenous population were either irrelevant bystanders or victims of French barbarity in the news reports. After the Indian Mutiny (1857) and ‘New Zealand Waikato Wars’ (1863) (sic) there was a tendency to hold a more combative and less tolerant attitude toward indigenous people amongst settler populations. The consequences were a shared culture/political base between colonial settlers and the metropolitan middle-class British to the exclusion of ‘natives’ and the ‘undeserving poor’. McClelland and Rose, "Citizenship and empire, 1867-1928," p.272.
used for the anti-French Fashoda and Dreyfus reporting. In part this was due to New Zealand editors (using British news sources) struggling to add a local flavour that gave relevance for their readers.\(^{21}\) In settling on the perspective of New Zealand as an anti-France supporter of Empire colonial expansion they inadvertently created a political setting inherently mistrustful of the *entente*. Moreover, this promoted a sense of identity for New Zealanders as subjects of the Empire, rather than as citizens of an independent country, thus forestalling thoughts of more independent thinking and action. In promoting this anti-French sentiment the press employed five themes to compare the French initiative with British responses. These were the treatment of local inhabitants, the legitimacy of competing colonial claims, nationalism and military capability, competence as a coloniser, and domestic political reactions and consequences.

An important aspect of the colonisation movement was the moral justification for territorial claims beyond the more honest explanations of economic self-interest, resource exploitation, and acquiring living-space.\(^{22}\) This argument depended on a self-perception as to which nation was the better coloniser, a characteristic attributed to the cultural and national-ethnic features of various races. By implication the indigenous occupants of territory destined for colonisation would either have the good fortune to be colonised by the British or the misfortune for others to do the same with (often) brutal results. In this case the French expedition came into direct conflict with the indigenous inhabitants. One article included the news that the natives of ‘Ilasha’ had defeated the French who were crossing the British hinterland.\(^{23}\) French troops were reported as burning towns that were supposedly under British protection. The British claimed the native ‘Shillooks’ had helped the French in the mistaken belief that they were allied with the British.\(^{24}\)


\(^{22}\) For example, M. Delcassé was quoted as refuting suggestions that Marchand was acting for the French Government; he was ‘… merely an emissary of civilisation’. "An Assurance," *Nelson Evening Mail*, 11 October 1898, p.2; "Editorial Notes and Comments," *Oamaru Mail*, 12 October 1898. p.1.

\(^{23}\) ‘British and French Interests,’ *Marlborough Express*, 12 November 1897, p.2. The use of the term ‘native’ is a deliberate reflection of the language of the times, and is not used to provoke cultural sensitivities.

Such ‘don’t-know, don’t care’ attitudes, and uncertainty as to the identity and loyalties of native populations was reported as (French) callous brutality. An editorial in the Star quoted extensively from a letter written by a French Army NCO serving in Africa. ‘The author of the letter gives a graphic account of his own part in the brutal work (of the expedition)’. The letter included comments such as “… it was difficult to slaughter everybody” (a second-hand quotation) not in the context of inhumanity, but owing to the logistics involved in so doing. The New Zealand editor commented that “… the unhappy natives have good reason to doubt the advantages of civilisation as they were exemplified by the adventurous citizens of the liberty-loving Republic’. Another editorial in the Press in a similar vein referred sarcastically to the natives lapsing into cannibalism, ‘…in spite of the gentle influence of French civilisation shed by their leader’. This editorial collectively accused France, Germany and Belgium of annexation exemplified ‘… with deeds of the foulest tyranny and brutality …’. Armed struggle with the locals and general destruction of their property were not uncommon by-products of colonial ventures. That such a description could have been applied to any one of a number of British colonial adventures from those during the New Zealand Land Wars through to the destruction of the Summer Palace in China in1860 was an inconsistency overlooked in the New Zealand reporting.

Moreover Kitchener did not, in French eyes, hold the moral high ground as he had ‘mercilessly slaughtered 15,000 Islamic soldiers.’

The unquestioned threat of force against the French - albeit through a newspaper report - as a justifiable means for the British to achieve their ends suggests little doubt on the part of the editorial writers about righteousness of the British cause. Significantly New Zealand newspapers advocated British action without any local involvement or threat. At least as far as foreign affairs were concerned the newspapers saw themselves as part of a broader British nation with a legitimate right to offer comment. French colonial interests in Africa were in direct conflict with Britain’s claims although the legitimacy of both was arguable. Any thwarting of British action led to domestic pressure for a response. As a consequence of the British failure to immediately intervene to stop the French expedition, ‘Conservative organs’

28 Berenson, "Fashoda, Dreyfus, and the myth of Jean-Baptiste Marchand,” p.137.
called for ‘a policy of surrender to France’ to stop. Further comment stated that the French were expected to soon withdraw from Fashoda because it ‘… will not suit her to enter into hostilities with the Mother Country…’ The (New Zealand) *Daily Telegraph* said France had no right to Fashoda and her actions were ‘inexplicable’. The generally anti-establishment views of the *Telegraph* with regard to the concentration of land ownership in New Zealand were irrelevant as far as foreign affairs were concerned: there was neither room for another viewpoint nor for a more considered approach. Despite the bellicose stance in the local press, Balfour was reported to have made a speech mentioning negotiations with France over ‘the Niger difficulty’. This was one of many examples where popular opinion led by the newspapers appears to have been out of step with the British political leadership. It opens speculation as to which was leading and which was following.

Another report asserted that France had intended to claim the Upper Nile region. In this version the French and Belgians were in a race with the British for the White Nile. The British tactic was to prevent two French expeditions linking up and thus cutting off Britain’s aim of contiguous territory from Cairo to the Cape. A terse report quoting *Les Debats* stated the (French) position: Marchand was legally occupying Fashoda and the matter must be settled by diplomacy. The response from the British Ambassador to Paris (Sir Edmund Monson) was that Britain claimed all the captured territory in the Sudan and Egypt by right of conquest. The French justification was that Marchand was merely an ‘emissary of civilisation’ and there had

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30 Typically the public was not invited to consider other points of view, an approach that was to subsequently become useful when it became expedient to change the status of France to that of a friend. See: "The Outside World," *The Daily Telegraph*, 3 January 1898, p.2.; *The Daily Telegraph* was described as a paper with ‘a liberal political stance (advocating) equal rights and opportunities for all’ See: "Daily Telegraph (Description),” in *Papers Past* (Wellington: National Library).
32 “Home and Foreign,” p.3.
34 “Home and Foreign Cables,” *Oamaru Mail*, 21 September 1898, p.3. Selective re-quotes from French news sources were common but it is not clear whether they in turn came via news from Britain or direct from the French originals.
35 “The Fashoda Incident,” *West Coast Times*, 12 October 1898, p.2. An example of Ambassadorial power at the time and the ability of local representatives to make sweeping policy statements, with or without their Home Government’s approval.
been no risk of war as a result of his expedition. Salisbury pointed out that in 1894 the French had taken the same position as the current British stance - that Egypt was the rightful possessor of Fashoda. France was reported as having said in rebuttal that occupation of Fashoda by either France or the British would not be mutually exclusive. Britain’s public position was that the French had taken a grave risk in believing that the ‘… ancient spirit of Great Britain was dead’. Occupying Fashoda was presented as a gamble that France had lost. The diplomatic intricacies were reported from a British perspective, but the overall message - Britain has the right – was unambiguous.

Despite a discernably more diplomatic stance at higher levels the public received a very adversarial account of conflicting interests. In the pre-World War I period national pride was inextricably linked to military prestige in a seemingly reckless fashion.

Two great nations are running one of the strangest races of modern time. Its prize is the rule of a continent. England and France are the contestants, and whichever gets to Khartoum first will get possession of the great central portion of Africa. It is a race worthy of the prize, and six separate expeditions are engaged in it.

Less than fifteen years before the start of World War I with British ambitions for African domination under threat, war with France in another continent was not beyond contemplation. Thus it was claimed that fear of war with France should not stop Britain from recovering the Sudan. One report, re-quoted in the Star from the London Standard, summarized a situation in Africa that local editorial opinion construed as preparing the (British) public for the possibility that Britain might have to dislodge the French from Fashoda by force. In the same month it was reported that the French expedition to Fashoda had ‘failed’. Other editorials belittled the French, talking of ‘greed and dishonesty’ amongst the ruling elite. The Queen made

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36 This position is consistent with the contemporary view of colonisation as a civilising activity.
37 "The Fashoda Incident," p.2. De facto control passed to Britain with Egypt under British governance.
43 Home and Foreign Cable News," Oamaru Mail, 10 March 1898, p.3.
her annual visit to southern France.\textsuperscript{45} This suggests the public received a significantly different, more adversarial interpretation of events than the socially elite and the political leadership believed or experienced.

In September 1898 the Paris newspapers were exuberantly reporting Marchand’s successful arrival at Fashoda.\textsuperscript{46} These reports were understandably very nationalistic with military resistance again suggested as likely at any suggestion of a threat to the French position through British action against Marchand.\textsuperscript{47} In keeping with the characterisation of the French as an emotional people the French newspapers were described as being ‘tremendously excited’. It was suggested in the New Zealand press that the Marchand expedition was a private venture, rather than Government sanctioned. A \textit{Daily Telegraph} report raised the former possibility and therefore the opportunity for the incident to be treated as the action of a single French subject, Captain Marchand, over-reaching his hand in British territory. Although patronising in tone it implied that France had an opportunity to withdraw without dishonour. It was unlikely that a ‘great nation’ such as France would go to war just because of the action of one individual.\textsuperscript{48} On the other hand, some of the New Zealand press treated denials of (French) Government involvement as ‘sheer lying’.\textsuperscript{49}

About this time Kitchener enters the narrative with the editorial comment that it must be ‘mortifying’ for France to be confronted in Africa by someone of his abilities. Kitchener’s task was maintaining British prestige through the retention of territory necessary for a road from Alexandria to the Cape.\textsuperscript{50} He reportedly gave Marchand an ultimatum to quit Fashoda.\textsuperscript{51} It was late September 1898 when reports that the British had garrisoned Fashoda without conflict arrived. The French were reported as awaiting instructions from Paris.\textsuperscript{52} The local press did not match French diplomatic restraint:

\textsuperscript{45} “Cable News,” \textit{Grey River Argus}, 15 April 1898, p.2.
\textsuperscript{46} “Fashoda Incident,” \textit{Poverty Bay Herald}, 14 September 1898, p.2.
\textsuperscript{47} “British and Foreign,” \textit{West Coast Times}, 19 September 1898, p.2.
\textsuperscript{48} “At Home and Abroad,” \textit{The Daily Telegraph}, 17 September 1898, p.2.
\textsuperscript{49} ibid., Issue 9287.
\textsuperscript{50} “The French in the Soudan (sic),” \textit{The Colonist}, 19 September 1898, p.2. During his Egyptian service Kitchener is often referred to as the “Sirdar” a local native military rank, rather than by name.
\textsuperscript{52} “The Soudan Campaign,” \textit{Marlborough Express}, 27 September 1898, p.2.
The success of the British army has caused a thrill of pride over the whole Empire, but the action of the French expedition, under Captain Marchand, at Fashoda has appeared to be ominous to a certain extent.\textsuperscript{53}

A British-sourced editorial stated that Kitchener’s conquest of the Soudan (sic), including Fashoda, had been a ‘service’ for the rest of the civilised world as well as for Egypt. While giving some credit to Marchand personally this piece again mentioned the possibility his actions might have provoked a war.\textsuperscript{54} Under the by-line ‘France’s Weakness at Fashoda’ it was reported that ‘… the complications of France…’ were under discussion within the Triple Alliance.\textsuperscript{55} Obviously basking in the ease with which Fashoda had been occupied another leader writer mused as to what the next colonial action of the French would be, given the disturbed domestic situation that was characterised as being dogged by ‘… anti-Semitism and Army scandals…’\textsuperscript{56} The smug tone reflected a belief in British invincibility backed by being in the right both morally and legally. New Zealand’s resident imperialists reading such copy must have been impressed and proud. Moreover with the Boer War barely twelve months away enthusiastic reporting and editorial comments add credence to the idea that New Zealand was likely to be an enthusiastic participant. Wars in Africa were, if not bloodless, then apparently not difficult to win and the threat of British action seemed sufficient to induce compliance if not supplication from opponents. One piece even lamented the likelihood of diplomacy settling the Fashoda issue. The British were failures in this regard because Lord Salisbury was ‘too honest’, compared to the French and the Russians.\textsuperscript{57}

The British and New Zealand press characterised the French as incompetent colonisers. This opinion was a neat fit with New Zealand’s ambitions to override France’s Pacific claims. Specifically France had not exploited her colonies nor had she been capable of establishing ‘true’ colonies. Although her population was at best steady if not decreasing, she harassed Britain in various places around the world while

\textsuperscript{53} “Summary Notes,” The Colonist, 27 September 1898, p.2.
\textsuperscript{54} “Editorial Notes and Comments,” Oamaru Mail, 28 September 1898, p.1.
\textsuperscript{55} “France's Weakness at Fashoda,” Evening Post, 28 September 1898, p.5. The Triple Alliance consisted of Germany, the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Italy. The three Powers no doubt observed with interest the bumbling French performance, both diplomatically and on the ground.
\textsuperscript{56} “French Claims to Fashoda,” Thames Advertiser, 30 September 1898, p.2.
her South Seas possessions were a threat to Australia and Fiji. Thus although war (with Britain over Fashoda) would result in France losing her colonies they were an ‘intolerable burden’. A defeat by Britain might result in a strong French leader emerging who could create a secure, workable, continental France. A stronger well-led France, without colonies, was seen as a desirable outcome even if it were only brought about by war with Britain.

While the latter hypothesis seems unlikely there was questioning of the conventional attitudes towards colonisation, at least where the French were concerned. It was not suggested that the same case applied to British colonies. This issue would resurface during the British Imperial Conferences (see Chapter Four) at a much broader level, raising doubts about the worth of the whole colonial movement and whether there was a net benefit to the coloniser. However this point was not yet under question in the press. The British view was that Britain was the ultimate coloniser, much of the world was destined to come under British rule, and the world would be all the better for it.

Here are a few rectifications (sic) of the map that are waiting, and have long been waiting, for the next French war. For their sake the inevitable, when it comes, may even be welcomed.

Although this comment was followed by regret at the British habit of returning colonies to the French after the French had been defeated from a British point of view any suggestion that France had military options seemed far-fetched. Delcassé, who inherited the situation, was aware that Marchand’s puny force was no military match for Kitchener’s and there was no prospect of a successful fleet action against the Royal Navy. France had no military options.

Marchand’s mission was seen as the provocation it was by British Foreign Secretary Grey. It had little chance of succeeding but it became a matter of national pride for France and England. As Salisbury commented, Governments had to deal with public expectations raised in the press to the point where they were always expected to win, any way.

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38 The need for living space for a growing population justified colonisation. Hence with a falling population the legitimacy of French colonial ambitions was in question. “Pater Chats With the Boys,” Otago Witness, 6 October 1898, p.57.
39 “As You Like It,” Taranaki Herald, 26 September 1898, p.3.
60 “Passing Notes,” p.2.
thereby limiting options for compromise. In this context the issue of local defence and what, if any, direct challenges New Zealand might face and how it could respond with its limited resources was raised. Several New Zealand newspapers picked up the possibility of war as a French diversion from the ‘funk’ that domestic French political life was in, owing to the Dreyfus issue, rather than arising from a diplomatically insoluble difference. One included the casual comment that ‘… by this time next week we may be at war with France’. Although clearly a New Zealand authored piece, this editorial is noteworthy for the use of ‘we’ despite no direct New Zealand involvement or implications. The same issue included a report describing in considerable detail local defence preparations. The Governor, Premier Seddon and the French Consul awaited word of the situation with the telegraph and cable stations kept open at night for this purpose. Preparations for war in New Zealand included placing a gun in the Wellington Botanic Gardens and cancellation of leave for members of the Permanent Artillery. It was proposed to use (merchant) steamers to lay mines at the entrance to Wellington Harbour. Such defensive measures were militarily absurd and merely highlighted the improbability of a French attack and the impossibility of New Zealand defending itself. ‘Zamiel’ showed some sense of the farcicality of the situation in a brilliant, sarcastic article ‘Random Shots’. War could be declared at any moment, the first notice for New Zealand being the telegraph cables cut! After outlining the perfect defensive scenario, were the French to invade at the time and place the planners anticipated, the writer runs through the many possible alternatives of ‘beastly low subterfuges’ that the French might use. These included arriving at night, coming up the main channel too quickly for the guns to score hits, sneaking around Motutapu Island to arrive via the back door at Auckland or invading New Zealand elsewhere along the undefended coastline. The likelihood of a French invasion let alone the possibility of resisting was exposed for the absurdity it was. Signs of the heat going out of the situation came with news that the ships on stand-by

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63 Andrew, Théophile Delcassé and the making of the Entente Cordiale: a reappraisal of French foreign policy 1898-1905: p.102. There was no prospect of France winning a naval war with England as Delcassé himself admitted privately.
64 “Passing Notes,” p.2.
65 “War Preparations,” p.5.
at Wellington would no longer be kept with steam up night and day, while the cable
stations would not be kept open around the clock.68

68 “At Last,” North Otago Times, 28 October 1898, p.2.
Fashoda in Popular Culture

The New Zealand public, by the time of the Fashoda confrontation, could be taken to mean the enfranchised, newspaper reading population. In the United Kingdom this definition would have described a much more exclusive group of predominantly middle and upper class voters. No single newspaper could claim to represent this group’s views geographically or politically. It is therefore often impossible to determine within the complex interaction between the press, the public and politicians who led and who followed. In addition, as noted earlier, the interaction changed over the period under study as newspapers became cheaper, more widely distributed and therefore more widely read. The politicians adapted their craft to use the press to develop, test and promote their own agendas with the public as well as to put pressure on other politicians. On the other side the ‘public’, however defined, could use the press to push a Government to act.

In the early nineteenth century politicians (and newspaper proprietors) took the view that the public were unaware of where the country’s interests lay and as a result it was their task to educate and inform so they made the right decisions. This assumed that there was public interest in the issue under debate and that an informed public came to the correct conclusions. Influential proprietors and journalists, such as Repington at The Times or Blatchford writing in the Daily Mirror, became an important element in political activity. Close, mutually influential personal relationships between journalists and politicians developed. In some instances information, such as the Foreign Office Blue Books that should have been publicised was not as government

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69 Potter, "Jingoism, public opinion, and the new imperialism: Newspapers and imperial rivalries at the fin de siècle," pp.40-41. One definition of ‘the public’, prior to the widespread distribution of newspapers, was everyone except manual labourers.


71 Caroline Sumpter, "The cheap press and the ‘reading crowd’," Media History 12, no. 3 (2006): pp.239-240. The role of the press in debating and developing opinion was much discussed in the late nineteenth century as was the issue of who led opinion and who followed on issues of the day.

72 Guymar, "Pressing the French and defending the Palmerstonian line: Lord William Hervey and The Times, 1846-8," pp.131-133. Although from an earlier period the Spanish Marriage issue is a fascinating case study of three loci (within the debate) of press, public and politicians.

73 Ibid., p.125,p.133

departments decided what was in the public interest.\textsuperscript{75} In other cases confidential information was deliberately leaked to achieve some political end. Sharing selectively was a common method of influencing the news and cultivating relationships with journalists. All of these factors contributed to our current perception, often unquantifiable, of what the public knew or believed.

Historical writing when relying on newspaper reports depends on such sources without any certainty as to the extent or depth of feeling on what inevitably become yesterday’s news for the public. Hence while the archival record can confirm historical facts, and newspaper reports the diffusion of information, the impact of events within the general population remains largely unknown. Reports of mass uprising, public events and meetings are the exception. Lesser events are often briefly noted but the scale of any direct impact remains uncertain. One possibility is to examine the publicly available record to determine whether the event had any impact beyond the day to day reporting of the news. In this case the incidence of advertising including the term ‘Fashoda’ has been used as a surrogate measure of the impact the events in North Africa had within New Zealand on a day-to-day basis.

Since no illustrations accompanied any of the cited news articles public impressions created through advertising would have been extremely important because they augmented the readers’ mental images.\textsuperscript{76} The term ‘Fashoda’ occurs 6,432 in the New

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\begin{tabular}{|l|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Year ended 31 December:} & \textbf{Count} \\
\hline
1897 & 1 \\
1898 & 103 \\
1899 & 503 \\
1900 & 133 \\
1901 & 24 \\
1902 & 7 \\
1903 & 1 \\
1904 & 9 \\
1905 & 3 \\
1906 & 1 \\
1907 & 0 \\
1908 & 2 \\
1909 & 8 \\
\hline
\textbf{Total} & \textbf{795} \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Advertisements Mentioning Fashoda 1897-1914}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{75} Keith M Wilson, \textit{Empire and Continent: Studies in British Foreign Policy before 1914} (London and New York: Mansell, 1987). p.31,36. Despite a Technical Note (sic) to the contrary the Foreign Office restricted access to the 1881 Blue Books but granted preferential access to official papers and communications to the (presumably favourable) \textit{Daily Mail} and \textit{Daily Express}.

\textsuperscript{76} A search similar to the above using the ‘illustration captions’ options gave a nil result.
Zealand Papers Past database across all content types. Advertising mentioning Fashoda was about 12% of the total and largely restricted to the years 1898-1900 inclusive. This suggests that unlike the Dreyfus Affair (see Chapter Two) the impact was short-lived and restricted to the years of the event. Advertising was most frequent in Auckland (Auckland Star), the West Coast of the South Island (Grey River Argus), Hawkes Bay (Hastings Standard), and the upper half of the South Island (Marlborough Express and Nelson Evening Mail). The Fashoda name did not therefore have a general cachet throughout New Zealand and its use was geographically limited to the named publications’ circulation areas implying uneven pockets of top of mind awareness.

The advertising tactics used were threefold: the attention grabbing mention of Fashoda simply to attract the reader, an association of the name with the victorious Empire and the colonial values of the British, and finally a more nuanced use suggestive of statistical chance either through a grab for treasure (gold claims) or a less fortunate outcome (a lower grade tea and a poorer quality boarding house). All would have contributed to the impression formed by the reader of the French national character.

77 To replicate the count of the total mentions of Fashoda:
http://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/cgi-bin/paperspast?a=q&hs=1&r=1&results=1&t=0&txq=Fashoda&pbq=&dafdq=01&dafmq=01&dafyq=1897&datdq=31&datmq=12&datyq=1914&tyq=&o=10&sf=byDA&ssnip=&x=29&y=10&e=01-01-1897-31-12-1914--1--1-byDA---0Fashoda-ADVERTISEMENT-+.
### Count of Newspaper Advertisements Mentioning Fashoda (1897-1914)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Auckland Star</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bruce Herald</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clutha Leader</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonist</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evening Post</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grey River Argus</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hastings Standard</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawera &amp; Normanby Star</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawkes Bay Herald</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inangahua Times</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lake Wakatipu Mail</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marlborough Express</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mataura Ensign</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nelson Evening Mail</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand Herald</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Advocate</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oamaru Mail</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohinemuri Gazette</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Otago Daily Times</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Otago Witness</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty Bay Herald</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Press</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Star</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taranaki Herald</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thames Star</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timaru Herald</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waimate Daily Advertiser</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wanganui Herald</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Coast Times</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>796</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

78 In some cases mentions classified as advertisements in the Papers Past data search results are in fact written articles. These have been automatically but incorrectly classified as advertisements within the Papers Past search engine because they appear in a column categorized as containing (predominantly) advertising. For example there are three ‘advertisements’ in the Ashburton Guardian between 1 January 1897 and 31 December 1914 mentioning Fashoda but all are articles.
**Auckland Region**: *New Zealand Herald* and *Auckland Star*

The *New Zealand Herald* advertising featured a boarding house, including rooms to rent as offices, in Grey Street. The name may have been intended as a metaphor for temporary occupation. It does not appear to have been a destination for those who could afford better. An advertisement from one tenant using this address read:

> Jewish Widow would place daughter aged 13 with Jewish family; services in return for home and clothes – Mrs. Myers, Fashoda. Upper Union st (sic).

Other *Auckland Star* advertising included persistent references to *Hazell’s Annual* for 1899. This featured an article on the Sudan and Fashoda. The tone is neutral.

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81 “Booksellers,” *Auckland Star*, 16 May 1899, p.3.
NOTWITHSTANDING the fact that the Fashoda incident has been happily settled and the German Emperor —by the way the greatest man of his day—has returned safely and with honors to Fatherland.

LUTZ BROS., Announce that they have a choice selection of BEEF, LAMB, VEAL and SMALL GOODS for the festive season, and in doing so wish their numerous customers.

THE COMPLIMENTS OF THE SEASON.

One hundred and thirty-five of the one hundred and forty-five relevant ‘hits’ were advertisements in the Grey River Argus for the Lutz Brothers, butchers. Presumably of German extraction, the Lutz Brothers linked Fashoda and praise of the German Emperor with festive season meat sales. It seems in their view the Emperor resolved the crisis. Apart from the Fashoda linkage the association with Germany was clearly not deemed as detrimental to sales.  

82 “Advertisements,” Grey River Argus, 21 December 1898, p.3.
Advertising included frequent repetitions of this ‘advertorial’ style linking the news with branded product advertising. Presumably the advertiser hoped that having attracted a reader’s eye the commercial message would be absorbed. Again the link with Fashoda was positive, presumably based on the victorious British result.83

83 “A Sensational Week,” Hastings Standard, 2 November 1898, p.3.
Upper South Island: Marlborough Express and Nelson Evening Mail

Advertising covered both a gold mining claim and a brand of tea. The use of the Fashoda name for a gold claim is suggestive of a lucky strike or opportunistic gain.  

APPLICATION FOR SPECIAL CLAIM.

Marlborough, December 18, 1898.

To the Warden at Havelock.

I HEREBY apply for a Special Claim for gold-mining purposes under the provisions of "The Mining Act, 1891," and amendments thereof, of the lands herein-after described, which have been duly marked in accordance with the mining regulations.

Signature of Applicant:

LOUIS BRIGHT.

No., and date of Miner's Right:

3655.

Name and address in full of applicant—

Louis Bright.

Style under which it is intended to conduct the business—Fashoda Goldmining Company.

Locality where the land applied for is situated—On a spur between Top Valley and Arm Chair Creeks. On the west of the Trocadero claim and north of the Albion claim.

Extent of land applied for—100 acres.

Amount of capital proposed to be invested—£20,000.

Proposed mode of working the land—Quarrying.

Term for which license or special-claim grant is required—21 years.

General Remarks—Placed out at 8 a.m. on the 10th December 1898. Page marked XX—.

Fashoda tea was a frequently advertised brand in the upper South Island. There were at least one hundred and fifty-four results in the *Marlborough Express* between the selected dates for Fashoda tea. Often the advertising was in the context of four brands: Soudan, Fashoda, Khartoum and Omdurman. Prices were tiered from the cheapest (Soudan brand) to the most expensive (Omdurman). Presumably this was a reflection of the British prowess exhibited in each case with Omdurman the ultimate.\(^{85}\)

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**THE NELSON TEA PACKING COMPANY**

**Advertisements,** *Marlborough Express*, 26 June 1899, p.4.

**THE NELSON TEA PACKING COMPANY'S**

**PURE BLENDED TEAS.**

---

**SOU DAN BRAND.**

*Best in the Market*

at 1s 10d.

---

**FASHODA BRAND.**

Unequalled at 2s.

---

**K H A R T O U M BRAND.**

Can't be approached at 2s 4d.

---

**O M D U R M A N BRAND.**

Price 8s.

---

**UNRIVALLED AT ANY PRICE.**

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One variation on the tea theme attributed the unfortunate Marchand's performance to a lack of Fashoda tea for his men.⁸⁶

⁸⁶ Ibid., Volume XXXIV Issue 114: p.3.
Another mining claim used references to both Fashoda and Omdurman to describe parts of the claim.\footnote{Ibid., Volume XXXV Issue 235.}

\begin{center}
\textbf{SCHEDULE.}

Class and subdivision of claim.—A special dredging claim.

Style under which claim is to be worked.—The Phœnix.

Proposed mode of working.—By dredging.

Proposed term of license.—42 years.

Locality where land is situated, with its boundaries, measurements, and area.—All that portion of river banks and terraces abutting on the Sink to Rise claim, being Crown lands, in Top Valley Creek mining district of Marlborough, containing approximately sixty acres; bounded towards the north by the Omdurman, the Omdurman banks, and the Fashoda S.D. claim, peg and peg, and partly by supposed unoccupied Crown lands, towards the south partly by the Electric S.D. claim, peg and peg, and partly by supposed unoccupied Crown lands, towards the east partly by the Milner S.D. claim and partly by supposed unoccupied Crown lands, towards the west wholly by supposed unoccupied Crown lands; the Phœnix application surrounds towards the east and west Mr T. Fowler's Sink to Rise S.D. claim.

Signature of Applicant:

H. L. JACKSON.
\end{center}
Fashoda was clearly a popular name for gold claims in Nelson as well.\textsuperscript{88} Tea advertisements still made up most (one hundred and sixty-three of the two hundred and nineteen relevant) advertisements.\textsuperscript{89}

\begin{quote}
\textbf{AN EASY ONE.}

Why are the Nelson Tea Packing Company's Teas bound to become popular favourites?

Anyone guessing the above in one guess can go to their grocer and get one pound of Bondan Tea for 1s 10d. Anyone guessing it in twice can get one pound of Fashoda Tea for 2s. Anyone guessing it in thrice can get one pound of Khartoum Tea for 2s 6d. Anyone not guessing at all can get one pound of the unrivalled Omdurman Tea for 3s.

Can be procured from any Storekeeper in Town or Country.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{88} "Advertisements," \textit{Nelson Evening Mail}, 21 December 1898, p.3.
\textsuperscript{89} "Advertisement," \textit{Nelson Evening Mail}, 3 May 1899, p.3.
Drapery was sold in the southern region using an advertorial style to attract readers’ attention. All but one of the relevant advertisements was of this type.  

As with the advertising, the political crisis quickly passed. By mid-November 1898 Lord Salisbury was quoted as saying French withdrawal from Fashoda had ‘… relieved Europe from a very dangerous and threatening storm’. Chamberlain attributed the same result to a ‘… united nation’. There had undoubtedly been a danger of war between Britain and France into which New Zealand would certainly have been drawn by the ties of Empire. Despite the suggested recourse to diplomacy amongst the political leadership on both sides of the channel the New Zealand Press wanted no part of a peaceful resolution. This was a good story that could be perpetuated with additional drama and suspense in the telling. Colonial competitiveness and Imperial pride would not allow France or any other power a share in the spoils of North Africa. Nor would it permit any disruption to British aspirations for a north to south continuum within that continent. National pride

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90 “Advertisements,” Oamaru Mail, 26 September 1898, p.2.
91 “Disquieting Cables,” The Wanganui Chronicle and Patea-Rangitikei Advertiser, 16 November 1898, p.2. Peter T. Marsh, “Chamberlain, Joseph (1836–1914),” in Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, ed. Lawrence Goldman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). Chamberlain was Secretary of State for the Colonies. While both he and Salisbury had ambitions for Britain in Africa, Chamberlain was the more hawkish and confrontational towards French ambitions. Hence he is attributing the French retreat to a united front whereas Salisbury attributes the same result to his more diplomatic methods. In fact both approaches played their part.
similarly forced France to sanction Marchand’s actions, perhaps aided by the opportunistic hope that his unofficial adventure might succeed with the side benefit of a major distraction from the Dreyfus affair and domestic unrest within France. British faith and confidence in the might of the Royal Navy was yet to be tested but the threat of its use in the latter part of the episode seemed to vindicate its perceived strength and invincibility. In the eyes of both the British and New Zealand public the failings of France as a coloniser, her shortcomings in national character, her insecurity and lack of restraint in continually annoying the British had all been exposed. A few (political and diplomatic) voices recognised that a stable, well lead France could be an essential part of the British future. They were becoming aware that Britain’s destiny might have more to do with Europe than with the Empire, the dominions and especially the Pacific region. These voices were in the minority and overwhelmed by the expressions of hubris from the opposing point of view that saw New Zealand’s place as firmly in the Empire with France simply a Pacific colonial competitor.
Chapter Two: The Dreyfus Affair

If the events at Fashoda lacked direct relevance for New Zealand newspaper readers the misfortunes of Captain Dreyfus were even less germane. It was a fascinating, newsworthy story with sensation, intrigue, the French state as villain (again) and Mme Dreyfus as the heroine. The theme of idealised heroism with the innocent Dreyfus repeatedly pleading his case to the (French) state while stoically facing his many setbacks was a neat fit with the Victorian ideal of innocent heroes popularised through events such as the charge at Balaclava (romanticised in Tennyson’s famous poem) and Gordon’s death at Khartoum.\footnote{“Editorial: The Charge of the Light Brigade,” *The Times*, 13 November 1854.} Dreyfus was assigned the qualities of British self-sacrifice and heroism while the French state became the oppugnant. New Zealand newspapers saw the weakness of the French authorities’ case as obvious but the conundrum was that French culture and society did not allow France to admit it. France was a civilised nation that had failed and lapsed into political chaos. Need more evidence be required there was now confirmation of the fiascos caused by the French state and judiciary, the flaws in the French character and the blessing of being a British dominion safe within the institutions of Empire and Home. The Dreyfus persecution was a further example of all that was wrong with France.

> It is most difficult for people of our race to penetrate the secret springs of action that sway the collective mind of the French people…. somehow French public opinion has gone all wrong …\footnote{“Untitled Leader,” *Otago Daily Times*, 22 September 1899, p.4.}

The broad outline of the Dreyfus affair as it was described in the New Zealand press closely followed the British version.\footnote{Charlotte Lea Klein, “The Dreyfus affair in the British press,” *Patterns of Prejudice* 12, no. 2 (1978): pp.33-39.} Articles that appeared in late 1894 recorded that Captain Dreyfus had sold military secrets to Italy, Germany and Austria.\footnote{“Home and Foreign Cable News,” *Oamaru Mail*, 2 November 1894, p.2.} Dreyfus was described as a traitor and treasonous.\footnote{“A Traitor to His Country,” *Feilding Star*, 2 November 1894, p.2; “Treason,” *Daily Telegraph*, 2 November 1894.} As events moved on alternative opinion appeared but by the time Dreyfus was finally sentenced and his appeals heard his guilt had been assumed in most New Zealand reports. As doubts arose the newspaper reports and editorials concentrated on various aspects of the affair, each showing from...
the British and New Zealand perspective the deficiencies of the French nation that had to be overcome for an alliance to be formed. The French Government stubbornly maintained an indefensible position apparently to save face. Even though the evidence incriminating Dreyfus as a German spy was shown to be forged, a French army court refused to accept his innocence and he was ultimately only exonerated by Presidential pardon. The matter dragged on for five years from 1894 to 1899 with the volume of press reports ebbing and flowing as various phases were played out.

The misfortunes of Captain Dreyfus led to considerable public disquiet in France followed by social disorder and political instability. The reasons for this have been much debated and analysed. At the time opinions were strongly held throughout French society. The intellectual elites proved to be just as susceptible as the mob to adopting common positions although in a more nuanced way within.

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7 Crowds, psychology, and politics, 1871-1899: p.210. An important precursor that does not feature in New Zealand press reporting was Les Deux Frères (par Louis Létang) published before Dreyfus became a cause célèbre. This was a fictional tale that closely followed the real-life story of Dreyfus. It has been suggested that some of those involved were following this script, whether deliberately or through unconscious assimilation, in the controversy that followed.
practitioners of the emerging discipline of psychology sought answers in crowd behaviour and what would now be commonly referred to as self-reinforcing ‘group-think’. The psychologists proved no more impartial in their observations than the lawyers, many of whom also had their own opinion on the affair despite maintaining an air of legal impartiality. The British Ambassador in Paris (Sir Edmund Monson) reported that the weakness of the legal case against Dreyfus was known within diplomatic circles in France but the French did not want to officially recognise the fact for fear of exacerbating civil unrest and anti-Semitism.

The French leadership was unable to shut the matter down, notwithstanding the damage it was doing both domestically and to what little regard there was for France within the British sphere of influence. In the New Zealand newspapers’ narrative an ugly gash was opened in French society prior to the establishment’s capitulation. Several public figures openly took up the Dreyfus cause although mob condemnation of Dreyfus made political support difficult. For the extensively reported dissenting minority within the French intelligentsia the treatment of Dreyfus gave tacit support to their positive view of English values. England would have, by implication, handled the matter less clumsily. For the French military establishment seeking to defend their position, Dreyfus exposed the external (German) and internal (subversive, Jewish) threats that their nation faced.

The affair ended the civilian-military status quo of the Third Republic but in so doing it created a new political climate in which the entente could exist. The outcome

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8 Ibid., p.214.
10 Prochasson, "Fashoda and the Boer War," pp.264-265.: A perception that France was under siege over the matter would not have been helped by allegations of British funding for the Dreyfus defence, an accusation that had some truth. Tombs and Tombs, That Sweet Enemy : the French and the British from the Sun King to the Present: p.426. It can be nothing more than speculation, but Gladstone’s bequest to Madame Dreyfus of £6,000 may have been a tacit signal across the channel. Gladstone was a complex and controversial politician who was no shrinking violet when it came to publicity. He was displaying both his liberalism and reformist zeal in his public support for a French woman in such circumstances. See: "A Sympathetic Bequest," Hawera and Normanby Star, 6 September 1898, p.2.; H. C. G. Mathew, "Gladstone, William Ewart (1809–1898)," in Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, ed. Lawrence Goldman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
therefore had consequences for France itself, for the major European power alliances and, through Britain, for New Zealand. Within France Dreyfus became far bigger than the original event: it was a struggle between conservative and progressive political forces in France with the potential for conflict over national control between the civilian and military authorities. The Military lost moral authority as their actions were exposed as reactionary and their creed as pro-clerical. On the left the Radicals benefited from Dreyfus and emerged as a strongly anti-clerical ‘decisive force’. By subsequently implementing an agenda of general social reform the left achieved a secular republic with strengthened civilian control.\textsuperscript{12} The anti-clerical laws passed post-1902 under the Combes Ministry were part of the push for separation of Church and state.\textsuperscript{13} No small part of the Radicals’ agenda was a hoped for revenge against Germany for 1870.\textsuperscript{14} These changes gave Britain a stronger, independent continental partner less concerned about building a competitive Empire and more focussed on European affairs. This France, revitalised and refreshed, could help Britain counterbalance growing German assertiveness.

Recent historiography has extended consideration of the Dreyfus affair to the role of the press. In the mid to late nineteenth century awareness of the influence of the proprietors, the papers’ editorial staff and the public in determining news coverage grew. Then, as now, there was uncertainty as to which led, which followed, and where the responsibility lay for deciding which news topics to report. The functions of each party were far from clear and were further complicated by advocacy of differing points of view from the proprietors and editors of the publications. The influence of public interest, mass contagion by the press and suggestions coming from the masses overlapped. It was unclear which was the legitimate point of view of Dreyfus, if indeed such an ideal existed.\textsuperscript{15} The Times as just one case in point adopted the conceited slant of the British way being best, a theme also prevalent in New Zealand coverage. The whiff of anti-Semitism was another \textit{Times} theme.\textsuperscript{16} What constituted a

\textsuperscript{12} Clark, \textit{The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914}: pp.216-217.
\textsuperscript{13} McMillan, \textit{Twentieth Century France: Politics and Society 1898-1991}: p.16. Combes had been rejected by the Church as a candidate for the priesthood. The Left’s agenda was a final repudiation of Napoleon Bonaparte’s \textit{concordat} with the Church.
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., p.7-8; pp.13-14.
legitimate news story and what content was simply a welcome but frivolous divorce from the humdrum reality of day-to-day life was complicated by such inherent biases.\textsuperscript{17}

New Zealand news of the Dreyfus affair relied on secondary press coverage from English and French papers. The position of the press and its veracity as a source was however very different in France compared to England during the pre-War period. France had a history of repressing journalists and the press through legal and administrative rules. These effectively thwarted free market mechanisms that would have otherwise have seen the number of titles and circulation grow as printing technology developed. From 1877 onwards the controls were relaxed but journalists, who were unregulated, sought gain where they could. It has been estimated that between 1871-1913 the French Government spent between one and two million francs annually bribing journalists. Politicians and political parties also offered bribes. Any reading of the French press as anything approaching an impartial source must therefore be treated with great caution. In the United Kingdom the various controls and taxes on the press were progressively removed between 1855 and 1861. Industrialisation resulted in large, relatively homogenised markets within defined geographies. As the price per copy fell from 7p to 1p a daily newspaper came within the financial means of the masses.\textsuperscript{18} Hence both the sources and the audience in France were very different from those in England and care is needed in assessing both.

The following table compares the main themes identified in the British press with those that I have identified as predominating in the New Zealand coverage. Three themes broadly align but the British coverage had stronger lines of French Anglophobia and Catholicism associated with Dreyfus’ detractors. Where possible local relevance was achieved by links, however tenuous, to New Zealanders or the Pacific region. Although this suggests that the New Zealand press reported Dreyfus as a remote news event without immediate domestic consequences, it did mean that reporting was often anti-French and any subtleties that may have softened the generic

\textsuperscript{17} Sumpter, "The cheap press and the 'reading crowd'," p.242.
anti-French demeanour were missed. The reporting therefore simply added to the overall New Zealand anti-French bias. This explains the bewildered dissonance when French visitors comments on Dreyfus were reported first hand.

**Main Themes: Newspaper Reporting on Dreyfus**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>United Kingdom (Tombs(^{19}))</th>
<th>New Zealand (Watts)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lack of judicial impartiality and objectivity</td>
<td>The French judicial system was unable to correct an obvious mistake</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France was a homogeneous entity and collectively to blame</td>
<td>The difficulties of resolving Dreyfus lay in the nature of the French as a race</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The failings of the French as a nation were ethical</td>
<td>The French were an easily led people who believed generalised slurs and readily joined the mob</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dreyfus detractors were also enemies of Britain by implication</td>
<td>New Zealand connections and interpretations had to be made</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Dreyfus sentiment was linked to Catholicism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The difficulties of resolving Dreyfus lay in the nature of the French as a race. As a result reforms would take place thereby neutralising France as a colonial competitor, a role to which the British race were best suited. Reform, in the

\(^{19}\) Tombs, "'Lesser breeds without the law': The British Establishment and the Dreyfus affair, 1894–1899," pp.500-506.
British view, was self-evidently needed because the French judicial system was apparently unable to correct an obvious mistake while intellectual opinion was simply ignored or attempts made to shut it down.\(^\text{20}\) This was based on the ‘… great doubts (that) exist amongst\textit{ Englishmen} (emphasis added) concerning the guilt of Dreyfus…’. Support for French jurisprudence from the French Press and public showed that neither had a sense of due legal process or ‘decency’.\(^\text{21}\) By comparison (as one article put it), ‘…we certainly manage this sort of thing better under English law….‘.\(^\text{22}\) The French system was derided as ‘peculiar’ and based on ‘strange ideas of justice’.\(^\text{23}\) The comparison between French and British justice implied a superiority that may not have stood closer scrutiny but was not subjected to such by the local newspapers.

The following précis of the reporting illustrates both the language employed and the opinions expressed, as delivered to New Zealand readers. After the dismissal of Dreyfus’ first appeal his wife petitioned the President of the Chamber of Deputies for a review on the grounds that neither Dreyfus nor his lawyer had been shown the evidence used to convict him. When the appeal was rejected Mme Dreyfus went beyond the French establishment and petitioned the Emperor of Austria, the Czar and the Pope.\(^\text{24}\) As a result of this external pressure a re-trial was proposed.\(^\text{25}\) Following this success a prominent figure in the scandal, a Count Esterházy, was separately accused of conspiring to falsely inculpate Dreyfus and was court-martialed for ‘misconduct’ and acting ‘dishonourably’.\(^\text{26}\) Reports of Esterházy’s trial gave the impression that he was accused of treason so his acquittal was taken as evidence of Dreyfus’ guilt, leading to New Zealand predictions of further trouble for France.\(^\text{27}\)

\(^\text{20}\) “The Dreyfus Case: A Travesty of Justice,” \textit{The Daily Telegraph}, 12 February 1898, p.3.;
\(^\text{22}\) “The Degradation of Dreyfus,” \textit{Tuapeka Times}, 6 March 1895, p.6.;
\(^\text{24}\) “French Judicial Methods,” \textit{Wanganui Herald}, 4 March 1898, p.2.;
\(^\text{27}\) “At Home and Abroad ”, \textit{The Daily Telegraph}, 13 January 1898, p.2.
Tellingly Esterházy, once acquitted, was reportedly greeted with public acclaim.\textsuperscript{28} Pressure from the French public on both the (French) judiciary and the Government was an important influence with another by-line reading: ‘A Parisian mob vindicate French justice by threatening to kill and rob’.\textsuperscript{29} Although Dreyfus, ‘… that unfortunate victim of a gang of scoundrels…’ had his rank and uniform restored in early June 1899 he was (re)-convicted by a five-two majority verdict. This was reported as ‘cowardly’ and a disgrace to the ‘brave and gallant’ French people.\textsuperscript{30} Such reporting subtly shifted the collective blame from the French people onto judicial shoulders. It was September 1899 before Dreyfus was ‘quietly’ released.\textsuperscript{31} A re-cap summed the affair up as being ‘… not the idea of British justice’.\textsuperscript{32}

The Dreyfus Affair permeated all layers of French life and was raised in speeches at events from funerals to school prize-giving ceremonies. Even a simple mention of Dreyfus was interpreted as taking a position on the issue. Consequently Government and military officials were forbidden from speaking at such events. Since no state authority was apparently capable of independently reviewing Dreyfus, France had forfeited any ‘… claim to be a leader of the civilized world’.\textsuperscript{33} One plausible explanation for the debacle was a fear that the army could take control of French politics if a powerful enough leader emerged.\textsuperscript{34} Another view blamed the reluctance of politicians to criticize the army for fear of undermining its authority with respect to conscription.\textsuperscript{35} A third opinion held that maintaining the status of French military tribunals trumped the need for justice. Thus even a demonstrably wrongful conviction would not be overturned for fear of damaging faith in the tribunals and courts.\textsuperscript{36} The impression from the colonial newspaper reports was that the French establishment needed to protect its Army, bearing in mind the contemporary events surrounding Fashoda, colonial competitiveness and of course the German relationship. Other

\textsuperscript{28} “The Dreyfus Case,” \textit{New Zealand Herald}, 13 January 1898, p.5.
\textsuperscript{29} “The Dreyfus Scandal,” \textit{The Daily Telegraph}, 22 February 1898, p.3.
\textsuperscript{31} “The Prisoner of France,” \textit{Hawke's Bay Herald}, 22 September 1899, p.3.
\textsuperscript{33} “The Week,” \textit{Hawera and Normanby Star}, 30 September 1898, p.2. The implication of this comment in respect of the use of ‘civilised’ needs to be read in the context of racial views predominant at the time.
\textsuperscript{34} “France and It's Army,” \textit{Evening Post}, 26 September 1898, p.4.
\textsuperscript{35} “The French Army Scandal,” \textit{Marlborough Express}, 10 January 1898, p.4.
perceived problems such as the dominance of the military establishment over the
civilian state, over-taxation to support the army, the consequent poverty, and tariff
protection were contrasted with the opposite virtues of the British whether these were
simply ideals or reality. There was also mention of a foreign war as a ‘safety valve’
but unfortunately France could not use this outlet to relieve her stresses without the
assistance of a more willing ally than Russia.\footnote{Clark, \textit{The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914}: p.394.; David A. Bell, "Global
Oxford University Press, 2015), p.650. The view that wars relieved tensions were not unusual in pre-
war Europe. Reasons advanced for Austro-Hungary later going to war were to relieve international
tensions and to unite the State against a common foe.}

Involvement of intellectual opinion on behalf of Dreyfus proved self-defeating. An
association of ‘… influential university and professional men …’ petitioned for a re-
trial.\footnote{“News by Cable,” \textit{Oamaru Mail}, 10 February 1898, p.1.}

Bernard Lazare, the French Jewish intellectual, produced a pamphlet drawing
attention to the injustices of the Dreyfus case.\footnote{“The Truth About the Dreyfus Case,” \textit{Otago Witness}, 15 July 1897, p.58.; Nelly Jussem-Wilson,
"Bernard Lazare's Jewish Journey: From Being an Israelite to Being a Jew," \textit{Jewish Social Studies} 26,
no. 3 (1964).}

Émile Zola, the most prominent intellectual involved, denounced Esterházy’s Court-Martial and suggested the
conspiracy charges against Esterházy were obstructing attempts to prove Dreyfus’
innocence. Zola was quoted as saying the whole affair was a ‘judicial mistake’ and
therefore the honour of the Army was not at risk provided the error was accepted and
rectified. He also identified sensational press reporting as being unhelpful in finding a
solution.\footnote{“Notes and Comments,” \textit{New Zealand Herald}, 17 January 1898, p.4.}

Despite suggesting such a rational approach Zola was prosecuted for his
accusations against the army.\footnote{“The Dreyfus Scandal,” \textit{Evening Post}, 15 January 1898, p.5.}

Although well resourced he was apparently prepared for an impartial, judicial trial (i.e. English style, as the papers would have it) rather
than for entering a political dispute. Zola was convicted with his appeal dismissed
soon thereafter.\footnote{“The Dreyfus Sensation: M. Zola’s Appeal Dismissed,” \textit{Evening Post}, 8 August 1898, p.5.}

In the aftermath of the trial there was further vitriol and reports of
punishment for witnesses testifying for Zola.\footnote{“The Dreyfus Case,” \textit{Marlborough Express}, 28 February 1898, p.2.}

Commenting on Dreyfus-related
events and the failure of Zola’s appeal in particular, the \textit{Otago Daily Times} claimed
that France (‘… a highly civilized state …’) had descended from Olympus to ‘the
depths of Avernus’.\footnote{“Current Topics,” \textit{Otago Daily Times}, 3 September 1898, p.4.}
referring to degenerate criminals in the ‘highest circles’ and the need for them to be purged if France was to avoid the decadence seen in Spain. 

From a distance judicial events in France appeared chaotic.

While anti-Semitism was used as a further cause for local criticism of France, in the broader context the whole Darwinian-based cultural-difference model was racially based. So too were New Zealand views of the French and the Chinese races. In the popular narrative the French were an easily led people who believed generalised slurs and readily joined the mob. Anti-Semitism was a factor in the formation of a committee on that basis to oppose Dreyfus’ release. 

A reprinted Spectator editorial included a claim from Esterházy that he was the real victim - of a Jewish conspiracy. 

Reports concluded that the Parisian public was against Dreyfus, partly due to outright anti-Semitism and partly because they believed there was a conspiracy between the Triple Alliance, Albion and Jewish financiers. The Evening Post reported anti-Semitic riots and the ‘excitement’ surrounding the Dreyfus case. The conservative elements were keen to keep the facts of the case secret and were using anti-Semitism as a means to maintain Dreyfus’ guilt. Continent-wide anti-Semitism was driving Jews, together with their wealth, to move to England. 

Reference was made to the ‘… insane anti-Semitism that occasionally seizes upon the Continental peoples …’. An Otago Daily Times columnist noted that ‘… the conduct of most affairs in France leaves a good deal to be desired’. He/she described the Dreyfus affair as an opéra bouffe noting that the inevitable duel, described as ‘theatrics’, had taken place. Quelling the riots was ‘selfish’; the French people should be allowed to express their views in this way. The ‘mob’ was on the side of the Judge and the Generals.

45 “Current Topics,” Otago Witness, 8 September 1898, p.3.
46 “The French Scandal,” Wanganui Herald, 17 January 1898, p.2.; Ginneken, Crowds, psychology, and politics, 1871-1899: p.209. The “discovery” in France in the late 1800’s that several ‘prominent (French) bankers’ were Jewish and that Jews were, according to racial theory, a “parasitic people” exacerbated Dreyfus’ situation.
49 “The Powers and the Colonies,” Evening Post, 20 January 1898, p.4. Ironically and rather too neatly, it was claimed Jewish wealth was aiding expansion of the British Empire.
50 “The Outside World,” Daily Telegraph, 29 March 1895, p.3.
The French army and establishment’s arguments for Dreyfus’ guilt used innuendo, including earlier suspicions, as supporting evidence. Dreyfus’ Alsatian origins became a feature of the reporting. Despite his protestation of innocence and loyalty the slurs stuck - he was called a German, a Jew and a coward. Several very detailed accounts of the public humiliation of Dreyfus by ‘la belle France’ described his public degradation - a particularly humiliating aspect of his treatment. The favourable reaction of the mob and army personnel to this event were again accompanied by comments that in England it would have been handled differently. An inquiry based on Dreyfus’ brother’s accusation against Count Esterházy showed that public opinion was on the latter’s side, as Mathieu Dreyfus was ‘… hissed and execrated …’.

The difficulties of resolving Dreyfus, it was claimed, lay in the nature of the French as a race. The Minister of War’s assurances that there was no case were ‘absolutely Gallic’. Another report hypothesized that France was due for one of its (periodic) revolutions, sarcastically linking public reaction to Dreyfus with the need to relieve the pressure induced by a surfeit of revolutionary activity. The cause was ‘The poison in the blood…’. Further commentary drew attention to the French, especially Parisians, ‘ … jumping on a man when he is down…’. No doubt this was meant to contrast the French reactions with the British sense of fair play. The problem of resolving Dreyfus’ case lay in the ‘… unfortunate excitability and ingrained suspicion of the French race …’. French journalism was said to be of a sensationalistic nature. The French Government was advised to be open and hold a public enquiry, despite the short-term discomfort such a course of action might involve.

53 “Hero or Traitor?," Hawke's Bay Herald, 11 May 1895, p.6.; "Hero or Traitor?," North Otago Times, 15 April 1895, p.2. A typical example of repetition, based on the same original Pall Mall Gazette report.
54 “Notes and Comments,” New Zealand Herald, 3 January 1895, p.4.
56 Dreyfus was ritually defrocked with his epaulettes, badges and other adornments cut from his uniform in a public ceremony.
60 “Passing Notes," Otago Witness, 3 March 1898, p.3.
62 “The Personal Premier (Headline but not relevant to this extract).”, Evening Post, 17 January 1898, p.4.
Locally an officer from a French warship visiting Wellington took umbrage at a newspaper article that used ‘poltroonism’ and ‘scoundrelism’ to describe the French Government and Army. Despite demanding satisfaction the French officer received none and was forced, by the departure of his ship, to leave with his pride still injured. Locals saw the affair as amusing.\(^63\)

It must always be remembered that Frenchmen love their army, and will see nothing evil in its doings. That is why crowds parade the streets of Paris crying: “Vive l’Armee, mort aux Juifs!” \(^64\)

The Grey River Argus noted that:

… the French are a queer people. They are as susceptible to change as a column of mercury to the weather. The object of their devotion just now is the army and the abomination of their detestation of the Jews. But neither can for long possess a nation with public opinion so unstable.\(^65\)

This editorial asserted that Frenchmen of ‘intelligence’ were collectively responsible for the Dreyfus debacle. Redemption through exoneration of Dreyfus was in their hands. This would require more than a shrug of the shoulders, as the writer put it. France had been shamed and needed to wear ‘sackcloth and ashes for a while’.\(^66\) The French public opinion and press were so absorbed by Dreyfus and Zola that they had no time to be ‘… bating (sic) England’ nor ‘… in lashing the public mind to frenzy over the aggressions of perfidious Albion …’ in Africa.\(^67\)

While the French were described as ‘… honourable and chivalrous when not under the influence of passion …’ they had in this case ‘blundered terribly’. France was weak, her law disgraced, and she was exposed to the contempt of the world. This contrasted with the God-fearing and Emperor-fearing Germans.\(^68\) From a New Zealand perspective these reports reinforced a niche view of the French people and nation. Even stronger comment referred to the ‘… lying, fraud, forgery, bribing, and general all-round rottiness (that) are about to be sheeted home…’, but to who is not clear. Attempting at least some balance, a favourable comment on Madame Dreyfus

\(^{64}\) “Current Topics: The Dreyfus Case,” Star, 19 July 1898.
\(^{65}\) “Untitled,” The Grey River Argus, 3 September 1898, p.2.
\(^{66}\) Ibid.
\(^{67}\) “Editorial,” The New Zealand Herald and Daily Southern Cross, 24 February 1898, p.4.
\(^{68}\) “The Dreyfus Case,” Wairarapa Daily Times, 6 September 1898, p.2.
was included: ‘… we sometimes forget the ideal wife and mother may come from France…’. The French action was even likened to the inquisition for:

Without national Stability she (France) froths and bubbles up similarly to a geyser, down the orifice of which a foreign body has been dropped.

New Zealand perceptions were enhanced with Oceania-related news and comment wherever possible. There were very detailed Press descriptions of Dreyfus’ fate in a penal colony, a direct reminder of French penal interests in the Pacific. As early as 1884 the Presbyterian Church had petitioned Gladstone to block such settlements in the New Hebrides and there are numerous pages of like-minded correspondence in the Appendices to the Journals of the House of Representatives. A very detailed and sympathetic description of the suffering of Dreyfus while imprisoned on île du Diable would have reinforced New Zealand concerns about his treatment and the presence of such institutions in the Pacific. The Captain of a supply ship provided one account of the (reportedly) appalling conditions of Dreyfus’ imprisonment.

Dreyfus-related reporting, while emotional and passionate, was detached until a theatrical performance that included a scene based on Dreyfus’ public humiliation toured New Zealand. Entitled One of the Best, the play was initially staged at the Princess Theatre in Dunedin. It was widely seen with one review stating that the show was very popular with people turned away. The apparent popularity of the drama suggests considerable interest in Dreyfus within the colony. Sympathies in Australia were apparently also with Dreyfus. In September 1898 a boycott of French

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69 “Dunedin Notes,” Tuapeka Times, 10 September 1898, p.3.
71 “Worse than Siberia: The Horrors of a Penal Colony, Fate of Captain Dreyfus,” New Zealand Herald, 16 March 1895, p.2.
72 “Confederation and Annexation. New Hebrides Group and French Convicts,” (Wellington: Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representative, New Zealand Government, Session I, A-03f, 1884), pp.1-8. This petition had one of the better summaries of the issues from the Antipodean point of view. The original petition from the Rev. A.J. Campbell, First Convener of the Heathen Mission Committee of the Presbyterian Church of Victoria to Mr Gladstone was re-printed in the New Zealand A to Js, New Caledonia is further discussed in Chapter Four.
74 “Dreyfus,” Auckland Star, 21 October 1898, p.3.
75 “Princess Theatre,” Otago Daily Times, 20 September 1897, p.3.; “George Edwardes 1852-1915,” in The Oxford Companion to Theatre and Performance (Oxford University Press); “Seymour Hicks (1871-1949),” (Oxford University Press); This production was attributed to George Edwardes and Sir (Edward) Seymour Hicks, United Kingdom-based theatre promoters and show producers.
76 “Theatre Royal,” Press, 13 November 1897, p.5.; “Theatre Royal: “One of the Best”,” Hawkes Bay Herald, 11 February 1898. This report from the Hawke’s Bay Herald is typical. Although staged in a different theatre, the production had the same promoter and title.
goods and services by the Jewish population of Broken Hill was reported. A ‘…
hatred of the Jew …’ was a national characteristic of Russia, France and Austria.
Drawing a tenuous conclusion the Russian Press campaign for a revision of the
Dreyfus case was taken as evidence that anti-Semitism there was on the wan. (In
fact Russia was concerned about the instability of her closest ally). Under the headline
‘Turbulent France’ there was the claim that ‘(the French people)… have a morbid
craving for political excitement not unlike a diseased appetite engendered by powerful
drugs’. There were numerous reports of a possible military coup. A sarcastic poem
included the lines:

To Dreyfus' guilt I pledged my word
A Frenchman's word, a trusty un!
Denial therefore is absurd,
And argument but fustian

More nuanced intellectual opinion was rare. The President of the French Literary
Society, M. de Montalk, gave a ‘careful exposition’ of the Dreyfus affair following
which there was discussion of both his and Zola’s trial. Unfortunately what was
said was not reported. One particularly critical article was published in September
1898. Edith H. Grossman’s article is significant because she was a contemporary
scholar and her views were consistent with the national characteristics paradigm then
in academic fashion. The American: In Peace and In War was a review of two
books, one written by an Englishman and the other by a Frenchman. Grossman’s
compared and contrasted the views each took of the American character. In
Grossman’s view, ‘disaster and crises’ revealed a ‘nation’s soul’. To make her point
she referred to the violence of the French revolutions, the Dreyfus affair and gave two
other instances (“fire at the charity bazaar” and “the sinking of … Bourgogne”) of
French ‘callous brutality’.  

77 “The Anti-Semitic Movement: Australian Retaliation,” Marlborough Express, 29 September 1898,
p.2.
78 “At Home and Abroad,” The Daily Telegraph, 29 September 1898, p.2.
80 “Crisis in France,” New Zealand Herald, 17 October 1898, p.5.
82 “Table Talk,” Auckland Star, 24 February 1898, p.1.
Encyclopedia of New Zealand (1993). Edith Grossman B.A., M.A. (Hons), nee Searle, was one of the
earliest New Zealand female scholars. She had strong feminist views, wrote extensively and was,
amongst other occupations, a free-lance journalist.
An interview with Professor Louis Vigouroux, a visitor from the Musée Social, gave a French point of view. He was apparently shocked by the tone of local reporting on France and Dreyfus. He pointed out (correctly) that English views of the French were based on cable messages reported in the newspapers. These were misrepresentations as they were skewed by ‘national bias’. He saw England and France as having much in common beyond simply geographic proximity, and he blamed newspapers for the ill will between the two nations. Differences between nations were no more nor less than those between individuals within any one nation. However, English newspaper reports inevitably tried to show British superiority whatever the subject. In the Antipodes he found much evidence that the locals were learning from foreigners (French wine-making was one of the examples pointedly given, textiles another) but editorials and lead articles in the same publications had nothing good to say of French virtue, honesty or freedom. Vigouroux drew attention to an article that he said misrepresented the nature of local Government in France. In a gently chiding comment he said central Government in France would not allow the ‘tyranny’ of a local board establishing prohibition. No doubt referring to the New Zealand temperance movement’s extreme stance, he said ‘… the French are a temperate people and we don’t require prohibition’. The irony appears to have been missed by the reporter.

Vigouroux also pointed out that invariably only Paris newspapers were quoted in the local Press; the French provincial Press, with different views, was not.

85 Vigouroux was one of the many social scientists that visited and studied New Zealand as if it were a social laboratory. Described as a representative of the Musée Social of Paris he was part of a mission gathering data on the industrial classes of the world with the objective of developing the emerging social science disciplines into “… an exact science”. His immediate objective was to analyse and exhibit the results of his studies, which included data from South Africa, Australia and New Zealand as well as the USA, at the Paris Exhibition in 1900.

86 French diplomats had also been ‘surprised’ by press reaction in the United Kingdom to Dreyfus. "A Noted Political Economist: Professor Vigouroux on His Way to Paris With Data Concerning Labor Problems," San Francisco Call, 18 November 1898, p.2.

he reflected the common view of foreign affairs of the period when he said it was unlikely that a vote for war would be opposed because diplomatic matters were far more complex than a few cables could explain. In other words, such matters were best left to well-informed statesmen. Conscription in his view militated against war because compelling men to fight was a considerable incentive for them to keep the peace. This view was somewhat contradictory to the previous one. If only the elite could instigate war, what chance had an uninformed, conscripted proletariat of opposing it? Vigouroux circumspectly did not offer an opinion on Dreyfus but he doubted the French military was biased to the extent claimed. Civil authority was not under the control of the military in France.  

There was also the opinion of Professor Albert Métin, another ‘intelligent’ Frenchman, also gathering information about New Zealand’s social and political legislation. He claimed the Dreyfus affair was political in nature and reflective of the divide between the Liberal and Radical factions ranged against the Catholic and Conservative wing. Métin saw the case as purely military in nature. Oddly, after appearing to defend the conviction, Métin said the results of the new court-martial would be universally accepted, regardless of the result, but the result must be for an acquittal. It is unclear, but very likely, that the certainty of acquittal was Métin’s view rather than the reporter’s bias. Métin also believed that the various political currents, particularly anti-Semitism, were ‘magnified’ in the local publications. France wanted neither a Dictator nor to disturb the peace in Europe. These were simply misbeliefs of the English press. Despite these views there is no evidence that there was any reassessment of either the Dreyfus affair or of general opinions of France in the press.

Although not an official communication, since New Zealand had no independent stance on foreign affairs, it was reported that all members of the New Zealand House of Representatives, with five exceptions (one of them being the Premier) signed a cable of sympathy to Madame Dreyfus. Curiously, given the enthusiasm with

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88 Chalaby, ”Twenty years of contrast: the French and British press during the inter-war period,” p.146; ”France and the French: English Ignorance, A Frenchman's Opinion,” p.3.
90 “New Zealand Sympathy for Dreyfus,” Hawke's Bay Herald, 14 September 1899, p.3.
which the whole sorry Dreyfus affair had been covered by the press, a note declining publication of a letter appeared in the *Wanganui Herald*.

‘A Sympathiser of Dreyfus’ –
Your letter is declined, as we have no intention of opening our columns to a sectarian dispute, which would only lead to great bitterness of feeling.\(^91\)

Were the cause of Dreyfus’ release to be in any doubt the *Ohinemuri Gazette*, a Paeroa based journal, was able to report that the nearby town of Te Aroha had ‘… put the climax on the job by burning the French flag’. As news of this brave act reached Paris, it continued, Dreyfus was released post-haste. Retaliation was forthcoming: the *Gazette* facetiously claimed that the French nation was to hence voluntarily abstain from using the Te Aroha Sanatorium.\(^92\) By late September the French Government was clearly trying to shut the matter down. The Minister of War was reported as advising the President to grant Dreyfus clemency, the Army ordered to consider the matter closed and there were to be no further reprisals. Dreyfus’ conditional acceptance of a pardon, however, depended on his freedom to prove his innocence.\(^93\)

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\(^92\) “Why Dreyfus was Released,” *Ohinemuri Gazette*, 23 September 1899, p.2.  
\(^93\) “Dreyfus Case: A Policy of Clemency and Oblivion Advocated,” p.2.
Dreyfus in Popular Advertising and Culture

Dreyfus related advertising was longer lasting and more frequent than was the case for Fashoda. In addition to the tabulated results, relevant advertising was recorded on a further one hundred and ninety-four occasions prior to the outbreak of World War II (1 January 1910 to 1 January 1939). The comparative count for Fashoda was just sixteen times. This suggests a carryover affect long after any direct impact had faded. Reminders of the relevant events, whether factually true or not, would have increased top of mind awareness and this would have kept the memory alive.

The geographic spread of the advertising was broadly reflective of population distribution and newspaper circulation, in contrast with Fashoda. (Titles have been omitted where there were no relevant records)

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94 Search for ‘Dreyfus’ filtered for ‘Advertising’ in selected issues: to replicate the search results use the following link: http://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/cgi-bin/paperspast?a=q&hs=1&r=1&results=1&t=0&txq=Dreyfus&pbq=&dafdq=31&dafmq=12&dafyq=1894&datdq=31&datmq=12&datyq=1909&tyq=ADVERTISEMENT&tyq=ILLUSTRATION&o=10&sf=&ssnip=&x=43&y=3&e=01-01-1894-31-12-1909--10--1-----0Dreyfus-ADVERTISEMENT%2CILLUSTRATION--
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Thames Star</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Timaru Herald</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tuapeka Times</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wairarapa Daily Times</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wanganui Chronicle</td>
<td>171</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wanganui Herald</td>
<td>64</td>
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<tr>
<td>West Coast Times</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>912</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

While advertisements were common, illustrations were not. One advertisement for *Illustrated Press* of 7 September 1898 included ‘Dreyfus’ as a topic but the
illustration could not be found. The following reproductions appeared in the *Auckland Star* of 5 November 1898. Whether the simple normality of the French visages was a surprise or not remains unknown.

Ashburton Guardian
Advertising for the *Illustrated London News* (somewhat pompously denoted in “Years of the Glorious Reign” of Victoria) included reference to an advertisement for ‘Five Years of My Life (Dreyfus)’. There were several repetitions.

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Advertisements for the New Zealand Graphic (a weekly illustrated supplement of the Star) appeared. These promoted a cartoon of ‘L’Affaire Dreyfus’, a copy of which is as yet untraced.98

The Star advertised the same article or book by Dreyfus that was also referred to in the Ashburton Guardian: ‘His Own Story’.99 (Left). They appear to be the same publication with differing emphasis.

Dreyfus’ wife’s story was also extensively advertised under the title ‘Five Years of My Life’.100

The first of many examples of advertising linking a product, in this case soap, to Dreyfus.101 Presumably the advertiser hoped that the Dreyfus name would draw attention to the copy. The link (‘imprisoned’) between Dreyfus and soap is at best tenuous but presumably would not have been used if the advertiser had not believed it would attract interest. There was clearly no concern that the negative aspects of the Dreyfus case would reflect upon presumed product quality.

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100 Ibid., Volume XXXIII Issue 158: p.7.
Colonist

One of the curiosities of layout caused by the typesetters’ dilemma as to how best use space was the appearance of non-commercial material in the advertising columns. In this case the report is of a sermon, Dreyfus being the subject. Reference is made to both France having to ‘… answer to God …’ and to the ‘… character of the nation …’. 102

THE DREYFUS CASE.—At the Presbyterian Church last evening the Rev. J. H. MacKenzie chose as his text the eleventh chapter of St. John’s Gospel, verses 49 and 50, from which he gave an able address dealing with the Dreyfus case, and giving a lucid review of the facts. The Rev. gentleman strongly condemned the character of the nation, which has thus added another blot on its fame. He concluded with the expression of the belief that though France might pass by the judgments of the nations, she would have to answer to God for this thing.

There was also advertising in the Colonist for a book ‘The Tragedy of Dreyfus’ by Steevens (sic, elsewhere the author is referred to as ‘Stevens’). 103 A rather pompous advertisement under the strapline ‘Important Announcement’, by-lined from The Times (London), promoted the release of the latest Encyclopaedia Britannica (thirty-five volumes in instalments) including a description of the Dreyfus case as an example of its recent publication. 104

103 Ibid., Volume XLIII Issue 9660: p.2.
104 Ibid., Volume XLVI Issue 11014: p.3.
The Dreyfus name was used to draw attention to a clearing sale of furniture by referring to the inclusion of ‘… French literature by Dreyfus …’. The Post also advertised a series of public events and meetings featuring various aspects of the case as shown below.

Illustrated publications, such as *Dreyfus the Martyr* that included ‘… over 100 illustrations …’ were actively advertised as was a wax works exhibition with a series of tableau and a kinematograph display featuring Dreyfus.

105 "Advertisements," *Evening Post*, 31 January 1899, p.8
As well as numerous uses of Dreyfus to advertise ‘Flora Soap’, as was the case in Wellington, the name was also linked to branded tea.\textsuperscript{109}

The book by Steevens (sic) was frequently advertised in Feilding.

\textbf{Grey River Argus}

An even more dubious link was drawn between ‘Dreyfus’ and drapery sales! (Top right, next page)\textsuperscript{111} The Argus advertised a theatre show including a feature billed as ‘The Escape of Dreyfus’ (Top left, next page).\textsuperscript{112} Hellers’ Shows were live performances of musical acts and light drama.\textsuperscript{113}

\begin{itemize}
    \item \textit{POOR DREYFUS would not have suffered so acutely while in prison had he been able to know the comfort of C.T.C. Tea.}\textsuperscript{108}
    \item (Left) Another angle was the use of political opinion to attract attention, in this case to fashion-wear.\textsuperscript{110}
    \item An even more dubious link was drawn between ‘Dreyfus’ and drapery sales! (Top right, next page)
    \item The Argus advertised a theatre show including a feature billed as ‘The Escape of Dreyfus’ (Top left, next page).
    \item Hellers’ Shows were live performances of musical acts and light drama.
\end{itemize}

\begin{footnotes}
\item \textsuperscript{108} “Advertisements”, \textit{Feilding Star}, 28 August 1899, p.3.
\item \textsuperscript{109} “Advertisements,” \textit{Feilding Star}, 27 September 1899, p.2.
\item \textsuperscript{110} “Advertisements,” \textit{Grey River Argus}, 23 September 1899, p.3.
\item \textsuperscript{111} Ibid., Volume LVII Issue 10349 p.2.
\item \textsuperscript{112} Ibid., Volume 07 Issue 10177 p.3.
\item \textsuperscript{113} “Heller's Wonders,” \textit{New Zealand Herald}, 15 November 1870, p.2.
\end{footnotes}
Advertising for Flora soap and for the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* also featured.

**Other Provincial Newspapers**
Flora’s Soap was frequently mentioned in the *Hawera and Normanby Star* making up over the half the references. A hurdle horse named Dreyfus was advertised for sale.

The (presumably) same animal was also advertised in the *Manawatu Standard* and the *Manawatu Times*. Nearly all the advertising in the *Nelson Evening Mail* was for the book ‘*Five Years of My Life (Dreyfus)*’.
A Hoyt’s production at the Opera House featuring ‘The Dreyfus Incident (One of the Best)’, a meeting of the French Literary Society to discuss the case and linkage to branded water (left) were all promoted with the Dreyfus name.\textsuperscript{114}

Various booksellers advertised ‘Dreyfus, Five Years of My Life’ on at least twenty-eight separate occasions.\textsuperscript{115}

Fuller’s Waxwork Tableaux of the Dreyfus incident was exhibited in Dunedin.\textsuperscript{116} The advertising placed the Dreyfus affair as akin to a circus act or fairground attraction rather than a matter of serious political consequence.

The ability to stretch the Dreyfus linkage to products as obscure and apparently unrelated as an indigestion cure was quite bizarre.  

Poverty Bay Herald
Various theatrical performances featured the Dreyfus incident, including ‘One of the Best’. There was also the Hellers production in the Theatre Royal, this one titled ‘The Escape of Dreyfus’. The usual books and pamphlets were also publicized.

Press
Advertisements were dominated by the newspapers own index and publicity for the Weekly Press, one issue of which included illustrations of Devil’s Island where Dreyfus was held. Theatre, books and kinematograph exhibitions as earlier described were all featured.

Star
Several advertising columns in the Star were dominated by the Star’s own index referring to Dreyfus’ articles. There were also meetings and talks:

Unfortunately, as was often the case, the content of the talk was not recorded, nor were the credentials of the speaker(s). Fuller’s waxworks advertising was featured.

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117 Ibid., Issue 11434: p.2.
118 "Advertisements," Poverty Bay Herald, 20 October 1898, p.3.
Taranaki Daily News and Taranaki Herald

Zola’s book *Truth* was advertised nearly forty times during 1903. The Taranaki Herald had about sixty repetitions.

\[\text{Advertisement image}\]

Wanganui Chronicle

The *Chronicle* had one hundred and seventy-one relevant ‘hits’. Again some of the mix was of dubious relevance to the main Dreyfus case as this example shows.

\[\text{Advertisement image}\]

Further comment from the pulpit in Wanganui (right).

Religious comment was not unique to New Zealand.

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120 “Advertisements,” Taranaki Daily News, 6 May 1903, p.3.
121 “Advertisements,” Wanganui Chronicle, 17 May 1899, p.3.
122 “Advertisements,” Wanganui Chronicle, 16 September 1899.
Flora’s Soap was not overlooked and was frequently advertised.124 (Left)

Various books and poems featured, especially ‘The Transvaal and Dreyfus’ (a poem) by A.Y.T., 3d.125

In the vicinity of one hundred and fifty plus advertising insertions, of ‘The Tragedy of Dreyfus’ by Stevens (sic) appeared but with a more extensive explanation.126 The balance of the advertising was mainly for the hurdle horse, ‘Dreyfus’.

124 “Advertisements,” Wanganui Chronicle, 27 September 1899, p.3.
125 Ibid.
126 Ibid., Volume XLIII Issue 15000
1 January 1910 until 1 January 1939

Dreyfus related advertising appeared one hundred and ninety-four times during this period, contrasting with just sixteen times for Fashoda.

The case of Adolph Beck featured at the 'pictures’, the story being billed as that of the English Dreyfus. (Left)

Further use was made of the name for both horses and a pedigree Jersey Bull. As would be expected this perpetuated the use of the name in stud references. (Below)

Oddities, such as these, continued to appear in the advertising columns from time to time.\textsuperscript{129}

\begin{quote}
Quenay de Beaucaire, the judge who presided over the famous Dreyfus case in France nearly a generation ago, is now an inmate of a poorhouse. He resigned from the judgeship in 1899, when a movement was started to reverse his Dreyfus decisions. By so doing he lost all claim to the Government pension. Members of the Paris Bar are raising a subscription fund to aid him. He is a commander of the Legion of Honour.

\textit{For Children's Hacking Cough, Woods' Great Peppermint Cure.—Advt.}
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
An American weekly journal of standing notes with interest that Alfred Dreyfus, hero of the greatest criminal trial of modern times, is now fighting with the French army, and has been on active service since the beginning of the war.
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
A Zola monument was unveiled in Paris in the presence of M. Berthel and all the members of the Cabinet. Many thousands of citizens were present. Speeches paid tribute to the work of M. Zola on behalf of Captain Dreyfus. There were other demonstrations at the Panthéon, where Zola is buried.
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
The most extraordinary tattooing idea ever carried out was that of a French coachman, who at the time of the Dreyfus trial had his body covered with no fewer than 120 illustrations of the case, including portraits of the leading personages. The work occupied nearly two years.

\textit{For Bronchial Coughs take Woods' Great Peppermint Cure, 1/2, 8/9}
\end{quote}

Dreyfus was the subject of a motion picture set on Devil’s Island.\textsuperscript{130} (Below, left) There was also a film directly about the Dreyfus affair, with an ‘all-British cast’.\textsuperscript{131} (Below, right). The latter was extensively advertised from October 1931, before its ‘run’ started and then whilst it was screening until December 1932. Note the review from the British Film Society.\textsuperscript{132} (Bottom, left)

\textsuperscript{130} “Advertisements,” Evening Post, 28 July 1927, p.2.

\textsuperscript{131} “Advertisements,” Auckland Star, 20 October 1931, p.16.

\textsuperscript{132} Ibid., Volume LXII Issue 250: p.24.
A reference to Dreyfus in a children’s encyclopaedia – bottom left of this advertisement.133

133 Ibid., Volume LXIV Issue 295.p.24
There were also books on Dreyfus-related subjects, such as on handwriting expertise with the link to the disputed hand-written evidence used to convict Dreyfus. Editorials still appeared perhaps stimulated by the motion picture.

Zola was the subject of a film in his own right. 134 Again there was advertising throughout 1937-38.

The public record of advertising, stage shows, film and literature suggests that the consequences of the Dreyfus affair were in the public mind long after the event. 135 Indeed the Dreyfus name was still used post-World War I to attract attention. Two Dreyfus-related motion pictures enjoyed extended seasons between the wars (even allowing for the time lapse required for physical distribution of the films across provincial cinemas). Collectively the evidence supports the view that Dreyfus made a considerable impression locally, creating attitudes that could not be easily dismissed or ignored. Dreyfus was not used directly as a brand name after World War I perhaps because this would be seen as an inappropriate linking of a wartime ally to commercial goods.

135 Despite the extensive news coverage, advertising and illustrations related to Dreyfus made up just 5% of the total relevant newspaper content count. To replicate the count:
http://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/cgi-bin/paperspast?a=q&hs=1&r=1&results=1&t=0&txq=Dreyfus&pbq=&dafdq=31&dafmq=12&dafyq=1894&datdq=31&datmq=12&datyq=1909&tyq=ADVERTISEMENT&tyq=ILLUSTRATION&o=1&sf=&ssnip=&x=23&y=9&c=01-01-1894-31-12-1909--10--1----0Dreyfus-ADVERTISEMENT%2CILLUSTRATION-
Unlike the Fashoda triumph Dreyfus was a human tragedy that evoked sympathy at a personal level rather than connotations of success for the Empire. Despite some evidence of dissent and alternative views, mainstream reporting suggested a homogenous French population, chaotically led, largely devoid of dissent, and bent on establishing the guilt of Dreyfus. Even a superficial reading of the forgoing accounts cannot have left much doubt in the minds of less discerning New Zealand readers as to the flaws in the French character, military, justice system, government and race. The absence of alternative voices from the English political establishment is suggestive of a British leadership content to let the discomfort of an old enemy increase. The New Zealand case is similar: there are no references in the index of the September-October 1898 New Zealand Hansard record of Parliamentary debates over Dreyfus or Fashoda or France. Despite intense media reporting the Government and Parliament could remain aloof from these issues (apart from the cited resolution).\textsuperscript{136}

There was no hint of a rapport with France developing, in fact quite the opposite. The concurrent events surrounding Fashoda suggest that at a time when France was vulnerable and may have needed friends whether political, diplomatic or military, she had isolated herself on all grounds. The logical explanation is the need of the French establishment under the perceived threat from Germany to maintain some coherence domestically, while securing the continued support of the army. This requirement outweighed the risks of cutting off potential allies, Russia excepted. These comments have to be seen against a background in which French military planners assumed a war against Britain, with Germany remaining neutral, was the most likely scenario. These plans were only abandoned in 1907; three years after the \textit{entente} came into being and four years after Germany herself had been identified as the decisive enemy.\textsuperscript{137}

There is a tone of smug superiority in the reporting. It ignored the differing domestic agenda and international pressures another nation might face. As a result of the Liberal reforms of the late nineteenth century and New Zealand’s description as a social laboratory, it was easy to dismiss other viewpoints. Characterising the French as emotionally unstable and excitable, susceptible to conspiracy theories and

\textsuperscript{136} "New Zealand Parliamentary Debates 104: September 13 - October 13," (Hansard, 1898). The index of the cited volume, that covers the period when both events were at their height, was checked.

collectively anti-Semitic was a simple way to explain Dreyfus especially as New Zealand had no wide-spread anti-Jewish history on the scale of the anti-Chinese sentiment.\(^{138}\) The French politicians were apparently at loggerheads, a majority of the population seemed prepared to back the Army whatever the case for re-consideration and the very British ideal of ‘fair play’ was conspicuously absent. The French state was failing.

France has been guilty of many dark deeds, but surely never fouler plot than that against Captain Dreyfus has been hatched in the darkest history of the great Republic.\(^{139}\)


Chapter Three: Reconciliation and the Path to the Entente Cordiale

As a political entity the Empire was financially vulnerable, unsustainably expensive to fully defend and lacking cohesion and purpose. Despite various attempts to overcome these obstacles there was no viable alternative suggested or conclusion as to the Empire’s purpose reached. Protection of the Empire became, by default, an objective in itself. What were New Zealand’s obligations in meeting this objective and how did that conflict with the national distaste for the French? Simply put, New Zealand saw her interests served by contributing to the military strength of the Empire through a defensive screen behind which economic activity (i.e. trade with Britain) could continue. The (principally naval) shield required a system of bases that had to be defended. Securing the Empire was therefore a ‘constantly evolving’ task, not only due to changing strategic and diplomatic considerations but also as a result of developments in resources, funding, technology and domestic politics. Telegraph linkages were improving and shipping technology advancing so that the elapsed time for the movement of messages and physical goods greatly decreased. New metropoles, such as Auckland and Sydney, resulted thus raising the question as to whether a London-centric Empire was needed in a clichéd ‘shrinking world’.¹

Defending the increasingly important telegraph network became an objective for the Empire, as did building the infrastructure in advance of the French and other competitors.² The policy-makers in London had to take account of these factors and needed to be careful that defence costs did not consume resources to the point that they undercut the Empire’s viability.

Defence has been covered in other work but its importance is shown in both the volume of literature and its ubiquity in virtually all other Empire-related topics. In practical terms defence meant ‘command of the sea’ through the Royal Navy, protecting

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² As well as the general histories of Sinclair and King the following were particularly useful: W. David McIntyre, *Dominion of New Zealand: Statesmen and Status 1907-1945* (Wellington: New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, 2007); Brian P. Farrell, “Coalition of the Usually Willing: The Dominions and Imperial Defence, 1856-1919,” in *Imperial Defence: The old world order 1856-1956*, ed. Greg Kennedy (London: Routledge, 2008).
the United Kingdom, defending trade routes to the peripheries and ensuring the local security of the Dominions and Colonies. These categories were neither easy to define nor logically divisible when it came to apportioning costs. Settlements and agreements with the United States and Japan assisted with defence but were clearly insufficient to address the imbalance that the British felt existed between the Empire and the European powers, particularly as far as land power was concerned. The Empire therefore had to seek a defensive partnership with one or more European states if it was to have any chance of survival. France was the chosen partner and the entente cordiale was the backdoor means to achieve an alliance.

The strength of the phrase entente cordiale lay in its vagueness since it could be interpreted as the user saw fit. The Oxford Dictionary defines the term as ‘A friendly understanding or informal alliance between states or factions’. For those in favour of an accommodation between the United Kingdom and France it meant an open-ended friendship. Frustratingly for opponents it meant nothing more than a hint across the channel. The very imprecision inherent in the words removed the grounds for objection. At the national level an expression of non-hostile intent directed at France was as unobjectionable as doing the same with any other nation of a similarly non-threatening, Western-orientated disposition. The use of a French expression served a secondary purpose. In the lingua franca, entente cordiale became an expression meaning an unspoken understanding. The phrase entered the vernacular and was widely used beyond the British-French national relationship to describe agreement and harmony.

4 George Peden, “The Treasury and Defence of Empire,” in Imperial Defence: The old world order 1856-1956, ed. Greg Kennedy (London: Routledge, 2008), p.74. Terminology as a diplomatic signal in more recent times include détente (with China) as well as glasnost and perestroika co-opted from their Russian roots to describe a new phase of Soviet-US relations.
6 Other examples include Sir Joseph Ward being asked about the possibility of an entente cordiale with the USA, an agreement between Japanese Government and Opposition being so described and
the King, it was a signal that a competitive phase of Anglo-French relations had ended. Admiring French culture, custom and learning were no longer activities best kept within the upper classes. For Francophobes the accord marked the end of a long running hostility and, in British eyes, consolidation of English supremacy. Public demonstrations of military co-operation and political exchanges showed from this interpretation that France was under control.  

A state of *entente* became normal.

Commenting on emerging Pacific nationhood Peter Munz made the point that ‘… nationhood and independence, self-government, responsible government and an independent foreign policy were all linked together …’ The progression from colony to independence through responsible government and thence to self-government carried the unspoken inference of increasing democratic control. By extension an independent foreign and defence policy becomes symbolic of self-determination in a democracy. The link is tenuous: democracy is not an easily defined concept depending as it does on both the extent of the franchise and the controls the voters have over the branches of Government through the constitution. Of the three Governments considered in this thesis New Zealand’s could arguably be considered the most democratic based on its much-lauded extension of voting rights to women in 1893. France had, after a varied electoral rights history, granted universal voting rights to men in 1848 but this was not extended to women until 1944. In Britain on the other hand less than a third of the adult population were entitled to vote even after

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7 A belief that France was at least under strong British influence is shown in Foreign Secretary Grey’s offer to Germany to ‘… keep France neutral …’ in British exchanges with Germany just prior to the war beginning. "Personal Notes," *Bay of Plenty Times*, 5 June 1912, p.4.


the Reform Act of 1884 and this was not significantly extended until World War I ended.\textsuperscript{11} This simple comparison brushes over further complexities: New Zealand had an upper chamber of nominated members; Britain had its House of Lords and France tried various combinations of legislative and executive control. The degree to which these Governments could be considered democratic and the control they could exert varied greatly and made the simple idea of accountability and leading change less clear-cut than is often assumed. A Government might well follow the popular will of the people to either preserve itself electorally or it might do so to stave off the demands for a vote of the disenfranchised.

The importance of popular opinion became clear as the \textit{entente} was introduced. The press was a significant factor in creating and disseminating opinions between the public and politicians.\textsuperscript{12} The emergence of the popular press, then, created a major precondition for the emergence of modern pub\(l\)ic (sic) opinion: not the elite opinion that liberal and other theorists had long postulated as a key to democratic functioning, but a true mass opinion. It communicated new moods to the public of a whole city or an entire country. The political consequences of this new situation were far-reaching.\textsuperscript{13}

To some extent this role substituted for the varying degrees of control the publics involved had over their respective governments through the ballot box. France, which could have been considered more democratic than Britain based on the degree of (male) enfranchisement, suffered from so many changes of Foreign Minister in the pre-war period that control effectively moved from the elected politicians to the civil service.\textsuperscript{14} The public vilification of Dreyfus as a metaphor for any German or Jewish threat was a powerful signal of the popular mood within a less than robust


\textsuperscript{13} Ginneken, \textit{Crowds, psychology, and politics, 1871-1899}; p.204. The error in spelling ‘public’ is in the original text.

constitutional democracy. The British experienced more political stability but despite being less democratic their foreign policy under Grey still enjoyed a good deal of support as demonstrated during the Fashoda crisis, the Boer War, enthusiasm for dreadnought construction and for the entente. The disenfranchised had in these cases their own voice through popular expression. By contrast the public of the most democratic country, New Zealand, had the least say over, and involvement with, the formalities of foreign policy. Despite this, outside of immediate concerns such as Pacific colonisation, possible federation with Australia and participation in the Boer War they were arguably the most apathetic when it came to external policy beyond the Pacific hinterland.

The infrequent and shallow New Zealand Parliamentary debates on foreign policy show a detachment from European affairs with little cognisance of how they might entangle New Zealand in a continental land war. During a debate concerning local defence, the volunteer force needed and the equipment required to arm the troops T. Wilford (MHR, Hutt), said that the ‘… next war would be fought in European waters’, the significance lying in the strong pre-disposition as to the location and nature of any impending conflict.\(^\text{15}\) In the debate the scenario of a naval engagement in the English Channel was specifically mentioned.\(^\text{16}\) The consensus was that New Zealand’s contributions, whether local or by subsidy to the United Kingdom, would be puny. To give credit it was Ward, the great Imperialist, who believed his opponents were overlooking the benefits of the entente. The debate was short, shallow and did not consider alternative policies.

Other views were expressed outside the formal political process. In May 1909 a lengthy letter to the editor of the Nelson Evening Mail rebutted earlier correspondence on the arms race issue. The writer, who was clearly of socialist tendencies, challenged the assumption that Britain would have to protect the Dominions in the event of war. ‘Pickup’ made the point that if the ‘two plus ten per cent’ advantage was still not enough to defeat the German Navy, as his opponent


\(^\text{16}\) “New Zealand's Defence,” Poverty Bay Herald, 29 July 1908.p.5
contended, then nothing would be and so the Royal Navy itself was pointless.\(^{17}\)

‘Pickup’ saw Germany’s rearmament as a direct result of Britain isolating her through the *entente* with France. ‘Pickup’ also pointed out the dubious economics of heavily indebted colonies borrowing to give gifts to the lenders. The King’s visit to Germany, ‘Pickup’ went on, made it clear that Germany and England were not conflicted, that there was still goodwill between them and that European peace was assured as long as these two remained at peace. The writer pointed out that the advocates of the mainstream view of defence were still prepared to buy German goods if they were cheaper than the British equivalent. A socialist approach would alleviate starvation by improving demand in the domestic market through raising the purchasing power of the locals, rather than producing more dreadnoughts.\(^{18}\)

Jesse Boothroyd speaking at a Lodge Meeting also condemned the military arms race.\(^{19}\) His main point was that rearmament as a means to keep the peace was both a moral contradiction and a financial problem. He concluded that New Zealand needed to contribute to, and be protected by, another Royal Navy cruiser deployed locally. The latter point seems to be attached to an otherwise very pacifist point of view and was perhaps included as a means to deflect the accusation of being soft. Three points are worth quoting in full.

> The competition that was going on between the leading nations for military and naval supremacy was calculated to call into operation the feeling of rivalry and mutual distrust that it was essential we should seek to avoid.

> … Germany in increasing her navy was only following our lead.

> The diplomacy of King Edward had finally disposed of the *hereditary* (emphasis added) ill-feeling … between France and England … and the “entente cordiale” was likely to be a lasting bond between us.\(^{20}\)

The choice of the word ‘calculated’ suggests Boothroyd felt that rearmament was of itself a means to induce hostility between the powers and Britain was the instigator. The *entente* demonstrated alternative means by which nations could overcome long-held hostility. There was a path to peace, as well as to conflict. Another correspondent


\(^{19}\) “Primitive Methodist Church,” *Taranaki Herald*, 15 January 1886, p.2. Jesse Boothroyd was a well known identity who preached as a Primitive Methodist Minister.

took a similar view in pointing out the hostile coverage Germany was receiving in contrast with that of the Triple Entente partners. Peace rested with the Teutonic races and the world would be better were it ruled by England, Germany and America. 21 This invites the question as to why, given the dislike of the French, the New Zealand public seemed not to care about the entente. The answer is a function of the geographic divide that separated the peoples of British tribal affiliation, the substance of the reported news and the limited promotion of the entente to New Zealand. 22

The theme of distance between nations, whether based on race, culture, geographic or social differences and how it could be overcome remained unresolved. Distance was the everyday manifestation of the Victorian cultural difference model and it kept ‘us and them’ apart. 23 The same nations whose citizens were engaged in convivial exchanges were concurrently supporting or at least acquiescing to rivalry through increasing military capability although not without local critics. While an obvious geographic fact the closeness of Britain and France was demonstrated through reciprocal Heads of State visits in 1903. In England and on the Continent the entente that these visits symbolised was one of the more significant events in foreign affairs over the decade prior to 1914. The mid-nineteenth century had been a period of ‘... crises, war scares and preparations for war on both sides...’ of the Channel. The mutual royal visits in 1843 and 1844 were a brief interlude. The 1870 Franco-German War resulting in Napoleon III’s defeat and the loss of Alsace-Lorraine reversed the prevailing anti-French sentiment amongst the British and prompted some British sympathy. 24 The public unveiling of the entente between France, the United Kingdom and by extension New Zealand began with the King Edward’s state visit to Paris in 1903.

22 Joan Beaumont, “‘Unitedly we have fought’: imperial loyalty and the Australian war effort,” International Affairs 90, no. 2 (2014): p.400. Race as well as culture and identity were all elements that separated ‘us’ from ‘them’.
"Topics of the Day: Europe en Famille," Evening Post, 24 June 1909, p.6. noted that despite the friendly interactions between the European nations re-armament continued.
21 “Channel Tunnel," Poverty Bay Herald, 9 February 1907, p.6. The importance of physical isolation was not as extraordinary as it sounds today. France, it was reported in 1907, was in favour of a channel tunnel with all its benefits of rapid transport, tourism and economic growth. The English, this re-quoted French newspaper leader claimed, were not in favour because there would be an influx of French people eager to come to London. As a consequence there would be interbreeding and thus the Anglo-Saxon race would be transformed with a deleterious affect on the British race.
No British monarch of recent times came to the throne better equipped to play a constructive role in foreign affairs. The king was well travelled and well connected. He was accustomed to spend part of each year in Germany and France, and as King he continued to do so. He could speak in public in French and German. … The King's easy public manner made him a natural ambassador, though his ministers, accustomed perhaps to Victoria's hostility to public engagements, were slow to take advantage of this.25

Exactly what had initiated the diplomatic formalities is uncertain but it seems that Théophile Delcassé (French Foreign Minister for six years after the Fashoda incident) was a key individual.26 He realized that Germany, not Britain, was the real threat to France. Germany’s Naval Law of 1900 was a menace to both France’s colonial aspirations and Britain’s isolationist stance.27 Delcassé also perceived that France and the United Kingdom could be friends despite their colonial rivalry. The diplomatic moves that were about to follow were clearly signalled. Edward’s public reception in Paris, described as ‘tumultuous enthusiasm from enormous and eager crowds’, ‘a continuous ovation’ and enjoying ‘crowds … similar to those in London on Coronation night’ indicate a very warm public welcome.28 King Edward duly praised France and talked of ‘mutual prosperity’ as well as ‘friendship and admiration’ between the two countries. Past rivalries and differences were to be forgotten through ‘… (an) advance together in the path of civilization and peace’.29 Another editorial said the King’s remarks had been plainer than was normal for diplomatic language and they hinted at a ‘practical issue’ to be announced.30 This appears to be anticipating a Treaty or some other official communiqué arising from the visit.

26 Christopher M. Andrew, Théophile Delcassé and the making of the Entente Cordiale: a reappraisal of French foreign policy 1898-1905 (London: Macmillan, 1968). pp.203-207. His position appears to have been heavily influenced by the success of the Egypt-Morocco trade-off in the aftermath of Fashoda although the ‘… traumatic experience of the Boer War’ was a decisive influence from the English side.
"King Edward in Paris,” Wairarapa Times, 4 May 1903, p.3.
"The King's Tour," Bay of Plenty Times, 4 May 1903, p.2.
29 “The Royal Tour,” Marlborough Express, 4 May 1903, p.2.; "His Majesty's Visit to France," Wanganui Herald, 2 May 1903, p.5.
30 “King Edward in Paris,” p.3.
The French President’s return visit to London shortly after Edward’s visit was astutely timed. It signalled that the diplomatic overtures were initiated on an equal and mutual footing. Citizens of both countries were able to see the public greeting extended to their respective leaders. French visitors were in London in unprecedented numbers, ready for their President’s visit. Platitudinous speeches by the King and the President included the French President’s woefully inaccurate prediction that the friendship would ‘… guarantee the peace of the world’. French was spoken in the streets of London and used for day-to-day greetings as well as to order in restaurants. French hawkers sold French newspapers to the visitors. Britain and France were now apparently as closely allied as their physical proximity implied.

Following the King’s visit, reports of an Anglo-French agreement being signed received generally favourable coverage in New Zealand. The friendship displayed during the Royal visit and other entente-related events was contained in third-hand reports extracted from second-hand British news. As discussed in the Introduction, these reports were further nuanced by editorial whim. Oddments such as four hundred French Marines being allowed to sightsee in Singapore, the French garrison in Madagascar entertaining the crew of HMS Fox and the Australian Government sending a message of goodwill to New Caledonia were published. The British and French flags were raised in Australia, thereby signalling that President Loubet was a guest of the Empire, not just of Britain. Editorial comment, attributed to reports from Europe, claimed that Loubet was ‘… exactly the sort of Frenchman to be popular with English people’, accompanied by the claim that the French had lost most of their Anglophobia. The importance of cross channel trade (an issue of potential significance for New Zealand) was mentioned. Even the attitude of the French Press

31 “The French President’s Visit To England,” Wanganui Herald, 1 July 1903, p.5.
32 “President Loubet’s Visit to London,” Marlborough Express, 8 July 1903, p.3; “King and President,” Wairarapa Daily Times, 8 July 1903.
34 Tombs and Tombs, That Sweet Enemy : the French and the British from the Sun King to the Present: p.442.; "Anglo-French Agreement," Otago Daily Times, 31 October 1903, p.9. Owing to differences in publication dates and news being received from Britain there is ambiguity in the public record as to exactly what was agreed and when.; the Entente was not signed until 8 April 1904.
36 “The Empire’s Guest,” Wanganui Herald, 8 July 1903, p.5.
during the South African War was now excused. Peace and goodwill existed between the ‘… two great powers of Western Europe’. 37

The favourable British lead was generally followed in New Zealand although press opinion ranged from a cynical disbelief that the diplomatic initiative was anything more than an uneasy truce through to confidence that it was the start of a genuine friendship. There was also outright dissent, the Ashburton Guardian finding it necessary for example to rebut negative views of the visit in what it described as the ‘gutter press’. 38 The Berlin Post, re-quoted in the Feilding Star, said the entente would not last, as colonial competitiveness between France and Britain would lead to differences. 39 The Oamaru Herald was less than effusive in welcoming the new friendship. It suggested French affection for the King was shallow and would be short lived as it was based on cynical commercial interests. 40 The Free Lance was critical of the Times for attaching significance to the Australian flag-raising act and more so for treating it as newsworthy enough to be cabled back to the Antipodes. This paper cast a jaundiced eye over the visit and the theatrics involved. 41 One well informed correspondent saw it as ‘incorrect’ to consider the entente an alliance but nevertheless welcomed the reduction in tension owing to a more secular and peace-minded French Government. One consequence of the new relationship was the reduced threat of a German-Franco alliance against the British Empire. The writer referred to the hopes, as he saw it, of the German Government for ‘a successful war…’ with England and the counter-balancing needed to hold this off through whatever defensive alliances were available. 42 The local newspaper reader, if so inclined, would therefore have been well informed on the general implications of the entente. 43

37 “France and Great Britain,” Marlborough Express, 9 July 1903, p.2.
41 “It is Significant: Cable Coddling,” Free Lance, 11 July 1903, p.8.
According to the Papers Past Website: ‘The Free Lance was one of New Zealand’s most popular weekly, pictorial newspapers. It was first published in Wellington in 1900 by Geddis and Blomfield as a spin-off from their successful Auckland weekly, the NZ Observer and Free Lance. The publishers split the title, with the Auckland paper becoming the NZ Observer and the Wellington paper taking the name Free Lance’.
42 Mervyn J. Stewart, “Correspondence: Splendid Isolation,” Bay of Plenty Times, 1 June 1903, p.2
43 “Untitled,” Press, 1 June 1912, p.10. During a visit to Auckland the British Ambassador to the USA (Rt. Hon. James Bryce) commented that New Zealanders ‘… know more about what is happening at Home than the Home people do about colonial affairs …’.
Despite Dreyfus and Fashoda the *entente* provoked little public objection. In that respect Dominion indifference and dutiful acceptance was probably as favourable a reaction as the Home Government could have hoped for, given the past hostility and vilification of France. Even when press reports suggested war in Europe was a possible outcome of the *entente* the general population did not seem, so far as can be seen from the newspaper reports of the day, unduly perturbed. Local repercussions included a change in attitude on the part of the French Colonial Party with regard to competing colonial interests. This, it was hypothesized, would lead to a more favourable climate for peaceful settlement of conflicting Pacific colonial ambitions. The only competition in the future should be ‘friendly’ and restricted to trade and industrial rivalries.44

One editorial, re-quoting *Le Temps*, noted that Anglo-French disputes were often related to colonial matters and were complicated by the British colonies themselves who were carrying ‘more weight … in the policy-making of the Empire’.45 The *Press*, in summarizing the various regions of conflict, drew attention to the New Hebrides as a territory that was of ‘… special interest to inhabitants of this part of the world …’.46 In the aftermath of Edward’s tour there was a suggestion from Henri Lorin that colonial differences between France and the British could be settled by direct contact between France and the relevant ‘autonomous’ colonies. Moreover, as it was still an issue, the exiling of convicts to the Pacific could be conditionally ended.47 There were other suggestions to settle old colonial disputes by negotiation.48 The spirit of the *entente* was being extended into the Pacific.

The new agreement was reported as marking an end to wars, defensive military arrangements and colonial antagonism. It was further noted that the *entente* would

45 “London Letter,” *Poverty Bay Herald*, 27 August 1903, p.1. This editorial quotes the *Spectator* and unnamed Paris Journals. In a wide-ranging review of current affairs the Irish question and British antagonism towards Germany also received considerable comment.
47 “British and Foreign,” *Wanganui Chronicle*, 16 May 1903, p.5. Lorin was a prominent left-leaning Catholic and Professor who had the ear of the French Government of the day. Re-quoted in the *Chronicle* from the *Depeche Colonial*.
have significant implications for the system of continental treaties and partnerships. On both sides of the channel there was talk of the *entente* progressing to a more formal agreement covering any outstanding matters and providing a framework for resolution of future disputes. Britain believed she had achieved two objectives through the *entente*. Firstly, she had neutralised the eternal European power plays. Britain could prosper and grow alongside her Empire, sheltered behind an understanding with France and the powerful defensive screen of her navy. In fact the *entente* formally entangled the Empire and thereby New Zealand in the fate of Europe. Secondly the *entente* resolved outstanding Anglo-Franco colonial disputes. On several occasions during the so-called century of peace war might have broken out with France over colonial disputes – Tahiti, Fashoda, Egypt. While with hindsight they were never enough to have justified the threat of a full-scale war, at the time this seemed possible. The French knew they could not win such a war as long as Britain had the Royal Navy so a settlement made sense. Peaceful co-existence meant trade, cultural exchanges, growth, tourism and of course mutual protection for the two western hemisphere powers.

Despite Britain’s re-engagement with Europe an increasingly out-of-step Chamberlain continued to push his Empire-centric alternative. In proposing tariffs on cheap foreign imports to preserve British jobs Chamberlain’s opinion was that there was nothing that the ‘… reserve of sons overseas’ could not provide to England. His view went to the heart of the debate about the purpose of the Empire. Was it to be a loose association of interests or an integrated economic federation? It could not be both.

49 “Anglo-French Entente Cordial: The Recent Commercial Treaty," *Evening Post*, 16 November 1903, p.6. The primary source of these opinions is unclear. The piece is by-lined from San Francisco on 19 October, nearly a month before the NZ publication date. It was received by telegraph but per the S.S. Sierra ‘at Auckland’. The most probable links are by telegraph to a San Francisco paper and thence to New Zealand as hard copy.


The *Paris Journal* pointed out the inconsistency between Chamberlain’s views and the spirit of *entente*. 54

The newspaper reports show that the broader diplomatic implications arising from the enthusiastic engagement between France and Britain only gradually emerged. Germany was clearly side-lined by the new relationship and the British cabinet, as far as it was involved, did not apparently foresee the impact. This was to have consequences when Britain supported French claims to a protectorate in Morocco. There was also still potential for Anglo-French conflict. Russia’s aggressive expansionism in the Far East could have led to conflict with Britain’s ally, Japan. France, allied as it was with Russia, could conceivably have been on the other side. 55 With neither a formal alliance nor a treaty between the two new collaborators war was still a possibility based on their historic Treaty obligations. At least one editorial comment was therefore cynical as to the authenticity of the current goodwill were another dispute, such as Fashoda, to arise. 56

The *entente* came with implicit French recognition of the dominance of the Royal Navy that trumped the land power of Russia. The Royal Navy was an extremely significant military counterbalance to any German threat to France. The *entente* was therefore reinforced by a well-publicized confluence of the British and French Navies. 57 Captioned illustrations of the British Fleet’s visit to Brest included reference to ‘A living demonstration of the “entente cordiale” ’ and ‘A friendly invasion of Brest …’. The symbolic visit conditioned public opinion through an impressive demonstration of the combined strength of the two powers and the willingness of the old enemies to work together was repeated in Portsmouth. 58 Clark has drawn attention to this almost routine use of military displays, with generals and monarchs frequently appearing in uniform, in the pre-World War I years. 59

The New Zealand reports

54 “Imperial Fiscal Question,” *Southland Times*, 10 October 1903, p.2. This article, in various forms, was printed in at least twenty New Zealand newspapers: “Search Results: *Entente Cordiale*,”  (1903).

55 “International Situation: Russia, China, and Japan,” *New Zealand Herald*, 22 August 1903, p.5.

56 “Britain and France,” *Clutha Leader*, 1 April 1904, p.7.

57 “The Atlantic Fleet at Brest ”, *Daily Mirror*, 14 July 1905, p.8. The symbolism is apparent in the newspaper reports cited hereafter. The joint fleet gathering would be better described as a regatta than a display of maritime military manoeuvres. The *Daily Mirror* used captioned photographs to illustrate the point.

58 “Under Two Flags - French Fleet's Visit to Portsmouth,” *The Daily Mirror*, 7 August 1905, p.8,9. The return event was “… a formal visit to celebrate the “entente cordiale.”

repeated the British content including an interview with French Foreign Minister Delcassé in which he drew attention to British naval power and concluded that the *entente* ‘… makes it impossible for Germany to make war upon us’. Praise for Delcassé in the British Press added to the perception of a closer relationship. Grey, the British Foreign Secretary, reaffirmed the *entente* and the alliance with Japan as Liberal Party policy. The front page of the *Daily Mirror* of 14 July 1905 had five photographs from a domestic tragedy: the previous day’s colliery disaster. The same edition had a two-page centre-spread of pictures of which about a quarter were related to the British Fleet’s visit to Brest. Although important, the Fleet visit did not outweigh the newsworthiness of the local catastrophe. The hierarchy of newsworthiness appears to have been similar in New Zealand. A comprehensive summary of the fleet visit did not appear until 26 August in the *Evening Post* so it probably came from an unattributed hard copy source rather than by telegraph. The significant omission compared to the *Daily Mirror* version is the lack of photo-standard illustrations. Indeed there do not appear to have been any illustrations in any New Zealand newspapers relating to the British visit to Brest.

61 “Personal Notes,” *Otago Witness*, 4 October 1905, p.80. This page number is that given in Papers Past for this article. The original source is given as Mr Frederick Lees, writing in the *Pall Mall Magazine*.
62 “Britain and Her Allies,” *Star*, 16 October 1905, p.2.
64 “The Atlantic Fleet at Brest; King Edward and Queen Alexandra at Sheffield,” *Daily Mirror*, 14 July 1905 pp.8-9.
A living demonstration of the "entente cordiale." French and British tars fraternising at Brest. Notwithstanding a prevailing ignorance of each other's language, they got on splendidly together. The Frenchmen made it their business to see that their British guests enjoyed their visit.

A snapshot taken at Brest. The French naval attaché to the Embassy in London with one of the senior officers of the British Fleet.

Friendly invasion of Brest by British blue-jackets. Five hundred handymen and marines off on leave from the Atlantic Fleet on their way to have a good time ashore.
Later *Daily Mirror* illustrations of the reciprocal visit by the French to Portsmouth were of similarly quality to those above.\(^{66}\) The earliest New Zealand images relevant to the fleet visits were from the Portsmouth visit. A sketch representation was used rather than photographs.\(^{67}\) More importantly, the New Zealand illustrations lacked the pictures of British and French sailors interacting and socialising during their respective shore-leave visits. It was these important images, missing from the New Zealand reports, which reduced the racial and cultural divide between France and Britain by showing that ‘they’ were people like ‘us’.

To give context a thumbnail of the full page of the relevant edition is shown on the following page.


\(^{67}\) “The Arrival of the French Fleet and the Opening of Cowes Yachting Week,” *New Zealand Herald*, 27 September 1905, p.1. This was a supplement to the New Zealand Herald of the same date. The balance of the content is not relevant to this subject.
While the lower quality New Zealand illustrations were clearly a result of technical limitations in transmission and reproduction, the fact remains that New Zealand readers received a far less impactful version of the joint Anglo-Franco alliance. The visit’s significance was understated and with it the opportunity to highlight the combined strength of the two fleets. This contrasts with the extensive coverage of the visit of the American Great White Fleet in August 1908. Editorial comment then
included the pointed remark that no fleet of warships of a similar size had been seen in New Zealand let alone been based in the South Seas but followed with the comforting thought that they would not be needed as New Zealand’s fate would be decided not in ‘… the Tasman Sea but in the English Channel’. 68

Although France and to a lesser extent the United Kingdom had a military (mainly naval) presence in the Pacific prior to World War I it was 1911 before a French frigate, the Kersaint, finally visited Auckland. An issue arose related to foreign sailors from an unallied power disembarking in New Zealand. Although quickly resolved it resulted in an apology to our ‘French visitors’ and an editorial description of the entente as ‘… only less than an alliance…’ 69 It was an unfortunate contrast with the enthusiasm for the reciprocal naval visits between France and Britain in the previous decade, as well as with the welcome extended to the United States Fleet in Auckland in 1908. It also made the important (albeit inadvertently raised) point that the entente was not an alliance.

From mid-1906 the frequency and depth of entente reporting abated. The few reports that were published were contradictory. At one extreme the French General Bonnal said that a Franco-German war was inevitable. Given this certainty he claimed that England only allied with France to forestall an alternative alliance based on repossessing Alsace-Lorraine emerging, rather than to prevent a European war. 70 This positioned the entente as an alliance. Less publicly the English Army’s General French reportedly observed army manoeuvres in France where, it was reported by the French press, ‘… he is destined to fight…’ 71 As the outward displays of friendship progressed the entente was converted (out of the public view) into a military alliance in all but name. The official line - that sharing information and tactics did not amount to a promise of a cooperation – was at the most forgiving interpretation a half-truth: when taken at face value (as it was by the French) it was just less than a guarantee of

68 “The American Fleet,” Lake Wakatip Mail, 4 August 1908, p.4.
As noted earlier the majority of the British Cabinet was unaware of the significance of this development as were their New Zealand counterparts. Publicity surrounding the displays and contacts was not inadvertent; the Generals and their Cabinet supporters were well aware of the importance of conditioning the public in case, in time of war, support for military action was needed. The newspapers were part of the process and had an ‘…active role in raising the profile of each other’s army …’ with *The Times* correspondent (Repington) a key player in this process. Foch was well aware that British Liberal Ministers were at best ambivalent with regard to supporting France but although they were ‘… indecisive when it came to foreign policy (they) would bow to public opinion.’ At the other extreme the German Chancellor, Bulow, was reported as saying that while Germany’s intent was peaceful she had as much right as any nation to build ships for defence. German naval strength would never equal that of England. The entente, in his view, did not therefore preclude Germany and the United Kingdom from having a friendly relationship.

The French politicians were reportedly divided as to whether there were any military obligations arising from the entente. Clemenceau stated in the Chamber of Deputies that ‘… he did not think …’ there was a military agreement between Great Britain and France. The Paris correspondent of the *London Express* commented that a French source had told him that there was in fact a written but unsigned ‘military convention’ between Britain and France. Were either to be threatened, as France felt she was over Morocco, the other was ‘… bound to help…’ By 1908 the cross-channel discussion on the shape of a Franco-British alliance, all faithfully covered in the New Zealand press, was becoming more prescriptive. The implication was that the entente had rather more military substance than hitherto admitted. The tone implied that a war, while not wanted, might be inevitable and preparation rather than prevention should

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76 "France and Britain: The Entente Cordiale," *Star*, 22 November 1906, p.3.
77 "Fighting Alliance With France," *Star*, 5 January 1907, p.4.
be the objective. Based on reprints in the New Zealand papers the British press was much more cautious and circumspect than the French although neither seemed enthused. Le Temps pointed out that were the entente to be formalized as an alliance Britain would be obligated to maintain an army of sufficient strength to assist France. L’Éclair, in its own words, ‘… alone advises caution …’ so as not to provoke Germany. English newspapers similarly urged restraint in varying degrees by saying the entente was sufficient for now and there was no need for a conscripted army. The circumspection may have been due to the self-described frailties of the respective entente forces namely the weak French Navy, then ranked fourth or fifth in the world, and the British Army.

New Zealanders probably lacked a clear understanding of the French perspective. In 1912, as statues of Victoria and Edward were being unveiled in France, reports suggested the entente should become an alliance. Opinions ranged from an entente being described as a better deterrent than an alliance through to an alliance being termed a destabilizing influence. French views were described as ‘cautious’ although one report said that any increased commitment required compensation, presumably because of the increased military expenditure this would entail. M. Poincaré, the French PM, was reported locally as claiming that an alliance between Britain and France would be a ‘mistake’ and that Franco-German relations were ‘loyal and cordial’. In so doing he stressed the friendly Franco-German relationship. This conciliatory approach was out of step with Lloyd George’s although Poincaré’s views were orientated for his French audience, not for New Zealand. Poincaré had also said that while the entente was ‘… not written on parchment …’ it enjoyed support in both nations. In the same newspaper his Minister for Marine announced a redeployment of destroyers that it was ‘presumed’ would leave French ships under British

80 “Austrian Naval Progress,” Nelson Evening Mail, 29 September 1910, p.4. There were concerns about the outlay required and the apparent slowness of French ship construction.
83 As would be the case with the famous Belgian ‘Scrap of Paper’ references to what was written or unwritten would later be intensely scrutinised by historians when the coming War’s causes were investigated.
command. Lloyd George was meanwhile stressing Liberal support for France. Press reports typically rely on more than intuition or supposition and it seems likely that various interests were testing the waters with different positions to gauge the reaction. Given that control of Foreign Affairs was in the hands of a small elite it would not be surprising if intra-Government positions were contradictory. Previous positions could be sincerely and plausibly denied. If the overall policy was unclear within the European context it must have been even more so to the New Zealand Government and voters.

By 1913 concerns were growing. The Ashburton Guardian attempted to ease fears with a review of the European situation. The apprehension was due to a ‘… wave of patriotism …’ that was evident in France as various reports of a possible war between two or more powers were received. The Guardian pointed out that patriotism could be a positive sentiment when manifested as a desire to defend one’s homeland. Conversely, it became a negative sentiment if turned to attacking another’s mother country. In this case it was the former as France watched Germany’s growing land power and England her growing sea power. With German diplomacy not going well Germany might, it was speculated, be looking for an excuse for war. This analysis supposed that Belgium, as well as France, had something to fear from Germany. The former was described as being ‘… lulled into apathy…’ by the guarantee of others to preserve her territorial integrity. This editorial specifically stated that Germany was likely to enter France through Belgium and that England would be asked for help. While recognizing that the entente was not an alliance, an ‘understanding’ requiring mutual aid was believed to exist.

The Ashburton Guardian article drew heavily on the ideas of racial characteristics to predict possible outcomes. There are references to ‘Teutonic patriotism’ and ‘the excitable French’ while the British show a ‘calm assurance of superiority’. If the entente was formalized as an alliance the ‘excitable French’, it was speculated, might be so emboldened as to invade Germany. The German patriotic spirit was more

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measured and calculating but this could lead to arrogance, based on power. The British were ‘strongly defensive’ and less easily aroused. Although calmly assured, were they imbued with a little more enthusiasm their army would be in better shape. Hopefully this lack of British vigour would lessen the likelihood of war. From a French viewpoint Lloyd George was described as ‘impulsive’ and having ‘too much ardour’, a characteristic of the Celtic races. He was trying to lessen the burden of military expenditure while ‘weakening’ on the entente. To add to the uncertainty there was disagreement between Churchill and Lloyd George over the Navy estimates. All this was reported and (as noted) appeared to provoke little comment or concern in New Zealand.

The public displays of solidarity and cooperation continued on the eve of war. The British fleet visited Toulon in 1914 with salutes, banquets, toasts and speeches. Again the entente was referred to, in this case by the Maritime Prefect of Toulon, who said it was more than a ‘vague word’ but without specifying its meaning. Either everyone knew what was meant, which was clearly not the case, or people continued to use their own interpretation. One opinion was that after ten years of the entente and the Triple Entente the agreements ‘… remain the solid and abiding guarantee of European peace’ with the former preventing war in 1905, 1908 and 1911. During another visit to Paris by King George and Queen Mary the King’s speech was reported to have pronounced ‘… in the clearest terms the unshakeable solidity of the Entente …’. As one newspaper mistakenly commented, ‘no nation can take umbrage at its celebration as the Entente threatens nobody’. On the same day (22 April 1914) the French Foreign Minister was quoted as saying there was no formal agreement but relations

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88 “International Matters: Impulsive British Chancellor,” Marlborough Express, 14 January 1914, p.5. This brief P.A.-sourced article re-quoted an interview from France with M. Briand (Leader of the Social and Democratic Union Party in France) who explained the behaviour of Lloyd George as due to ‘… excesses of the virtues of the Celtic race …’.

89 “Lloyd George Policy,” Poverty Bay Herald, 14 January 1914, p.3. A faction within the Liberals believed that given British superiority it was unreasonable to continue the build-up. The confusion is hardly surprising given the lack of a clear measure of superiority. Although the navy was traditionally measured in ship numbers, guns, and men Churchill himself had created additional uncertainty with his comments on obsolescent.


91 “The World’s Press,” Sun, 2 June 1914, p.6. is typical. Wilson, “The making and putative implementation of a British foreign policy of gesture, December 1905 to August 1914,” p.255. has an alternative view – that the Imperialist cabal within Cabinet brought the United Kingdom close to war in 1906, 1908, 1909 and 1912.

92 “Entente Cordiale,” Mataura Ensign, 21 April 1914, p.5.
were well established based on ‘… cordial mutual understanding’. Confusingly no further ‘amplification’ was likely but a ‘…clearer definition may be expected’. Lest there be questions of the relevance for New Zealand readers, the comment that ‘Doubtless the New Hebrides question will be discussed’ was included. These remarks were very similar to those of a year earlier when Poincaré visited London. The sop to New Zealand then was Grey’s promise to discuss the New Hebrides although the only resolution that would suffice locally was British sovereignty. The main content was of the ‘…two great colonial Powers’ coming closer together in ‘… progress, civilization and the maintenance of peace’. These statements were irrefutable owing to their vagueness. The public message for New Zealand was that the entente was in place and it was working by preventing conflict.

The Taranaki Daily News pointed out that were Britain to become involved, the colonies ‘… would have to sink or swim…’ with her. It was noted that the ‘war spirit’ was now too deep seated to allow a diplomatic resolution of the conflict.

What the real nature of the entente cordiale is no one outside the diplomatic circles can say. For a considerable time past, British Liberal newspapers have been apprehensive of the existence of a secret condition compelling Britain in certain circumstances to render assistance to France and Russia. If the fears have any foundation, then the immediate future cannot be viewed other than with alarm.

As we now know, the scenario that played out was foretold with remarkable accuracy. The failure to define the meaning and the possible consequences of the entente left room for reinterpretation by all those involved as circumstances changed. The vagueness also meant the various powers could not assume a benevolent interpretation of the entente as an instrument of reassurance and conflict avoidance. They therefore had to plan for the worst. Hence Asquith’s statement in March 1913 that the United Kingdom was under no obligation to assist France in Europe led Le Temps to propose an increase in French military resources while a French Socialist Deputy was concurrently suggesting a three-way entente inclusive of Germany. The two positions could be taken as complementary or contradictory depending on the

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93 "Entente Cordiale: French Press Pleased With King’s Speech," Manawatu Standard, 23 April 1914, p.5. (The second article appears without a separate by-line and is simply dated from ‘London, April 22’).
96 Ibid., p.7.
reader’s point of view. It is not surprising that the French newspaper responses appeared divided over whether Asquith’s interpretation of the entente was good for France or not. Germany, no doubt pleased by the confusion, welcomed Asquith’s statement.  

New Zealand Newspapers: German Perspectives

Following the 1910 British elections Lloyd-George had forcefully rebutted the suggestion that the Liberals were less sympathetic towards the French than the Conservatives. He highlighted the increase in British naval expenditure. A German Admiral pointed out that such an increase could not be ignored by other naval powers. In trying to assuage his political attackers Lloyd George provoked Germany in another example of foreseeable consequences that were not mitigated by political caution. The broader issue was the apparent enthusiasm of both British Liberals and Conservatives to be seen as supporting France apparently without concern for the consequent German reaction.

The contradiction between rearmament and an apparent Anglo-German conviviality was extensively reported. The same Evening Post issue mentioned numerous non-Government contacts between the competitive European powers indicating a lack of animosity at a personal level. Comment on Germany was non-hostile and covered four main themes. Firstly there were anecdotal comments from first-hand interactions that demonstrated the contradiction between national characteristics and personal experience. Personal contact led to the concerns of the times, particularly the idea of limiting factors such as land, economic opportunity and resources in a world with a rapidly growing population, being discussed. Secondly German interests were recognized as broadly legitimate and not dissimilar to those of Britain, France and Russia, even if they were competitive with them. Thirdly there was a strong thread of common cultural identity related to the Anglo-Saxon origins of the British and Germany stock that suggested the two nations had more in common than not. One

98 “Mr George on the Navy,” Evening Post, 6 February 1911.
100 “German at Home,” Timaru Herald, 1 August 1908, p.2.
common issue in all three perspectives was the absence of Anglophobia on the part of the Germans. There was similarly no strong pre-war anti-German sentiment in New Zealand press reports. Finally there were various analyses, often very detailed, that speculated on possible outcomes from the hostile diplomatic environment. An insightful editorial reviewing the Anglo-German relationship was illustrative in showing that any attempt at objectivity can only exist within the context of the debate at the time. The international situation of the previous decade was attributed to the hostility of Anglo-German relations marked by events such as the Boer War and the rise of the German Navy. The press was (again) blamed for inflaming the situation. The evolution in Anglo-Franco relations to an entente was presented as a model for improving co-operation. The editorial demonstrated New Zealand’s limited options for influencing foreign policy let alone developing her own. There was no suggestion as to how New Zealand might respond differently.101

In a pamphlet published in Germany (re-published in The Evening Post) a German “officer of high rank” claimed the entente was anti-German because it prevented Germany from acquiring territory in Africa.102 French and British interests now came first. The author claimed the English played one power off against another. The point was made that it was the sheer strength of the British that overcame the Boers. Skill alone was insufficient to win wars; material strength was also needed. It would thus be a mistake to underestimate the importance of the United Kingdom’s sea power as the guardian of Empire commerce and trade. Germany consequently needed a strong navy and with it came the possibility of a battle in the North Sea. Meanwhile Britain sought only advantage for herself to the detriment of others. The writer told of French émigrés being forced into the British army in 1796 and then abandoned in Brittany when their invasion failed.103 The Napoleonic wars were characterized as a series of British perfidies with others acting to the benefit of Britain but ultimately to the detriment of their own interests. After the humiliations of Fashoda, the entente with

101 "Britain and Germany," Evening Post, 26 December 1911, p.6.
102 "Supremacy": The German Point of View, Dominon, 19 February 1913, p.6.
France was struck because France was then ‘ripe’ for it. However France was herself now ‘duped’ because Spain acquired territory in North Africa rather than France.

**France: An Imperial Ally in the Pacific?**

The Empire’s shift from enmity to *entente* required a re-orientation of both New Zealand’s Pacific policies and her political distaste of France. Neither was immediately forthcoming owing to New Zealand’s preoccupation with the French colonial presence in the Pacific. The New Zealand-centric view of the world just prior to World War I would have been similar to that shown in the following 1884 Admiralty map.¹⁰⁴ New Zealand’s sense of isolation and the possibility of a threat emanating from foreign-held territory would have seemed very plausible at the time with France the closest competitive power.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>Blue</td>
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<tr>
<td>British</td>
<td>Pink</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German</td>
<td>Yellow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish</td>
<td>Red/Orange within a blue border</td>
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Despite this, the New Zealand leadership never grasped, or more probably never wanted to recognize, the relative unimportance to the British Empire of New Zealand, Australia and other Pacific territories in comparison with Africa and India.\textsuperscript{105} As penal colonisation and the exploitative phase of wealth extraction wound down the remote British Antipodean outposts came under responsible Government and so could not be directed. At the same time they demanded protection and influence as a birthright. As the \textit{entente} implicitly turned British attention towards Europe and away from her former Pacific colonies, the Antipodes struggled to remain relevant within the framework of the Empire and Britain’s broader foreign policy.\textsuperscript{106} The awkward New Zealand antagonism towards the French in the Pacific demonstrated the problem. Both relationships had to be managed by Britain without offending either.\textsuperscript{107}

Lord Selborne, in a Memorandum presented to the 1902 Imperial Conference, but clearly not written for their first-hand consideration, wrote:

> The Commonwealth of Australia and New Zealand would be forced to remember (by political and geographic factors) that France in New Caledonia, and Germany in New Guinea, are near neighbours.\textsuperscript{108}

The Cape Colony and Natal were similarly to be reminded of the French presence in Madagascar. This viewpoint was reprised when the French presence in the Pacific was discussed towards the end of the 1907 Imperial Conference.\textsuperscript{109} Australia and New Zealand saw the French Pacific presence as provocative and competitive. Britain (understandably) offered limited moral support but little else. The familiar arguments in favour of access to colonial raw materials and new markets, civilisation through


\textsuperscript{107}W. P. Morrell, \textit{The Great Powers in the Pacific}, Revised ed. (London: Historical Association, 1971), p.21. Morrell made the point that New Zealand had expectations that the United Kingdom could ‘impose her will’ with respect to colonisation in the Pacific. As far as the various ambitions for annexation of Cook Islands, Samoa and so on went this was not the case either practically or in British intent.

\textsuperscript{108}First Lord of the Admiralty (Selborne), "Memorandum by the First Lord of the Admiralty,“ (Wellington: Conference Between The Secretary Of State For The Colonies And The Prime Ministers Of Self-Governing Colonies (Papers Relating To A), June To August, 1902., 1903), p.17.

\textsuperscript{109}Aldrich, "European Expansion in the Island Pacific: A Historiographical Review," p.89, p.93. The Pacific had been apportioned largely by mutual agreement amongst the major European powers and the United States over the decades from the 1840s to the 1890s. British behaviour suggested little interest beyond Australasia. Given British interests and colonies in Africa and India, her trading presence in the Far East and the alliance with Japan this was understandable but it was vexatious to the Dominions.
religious missions and strategic bases for replenishments of war shipping were too vague and non-specific.

Two emotional appeals were probably the stronger reasons for the New Zealand and Australian stance. Firstly, the French colonisation objective was assimilation and incorporation of territories into a greater France, the antithesis of the United Kingdom’s approach. Thus if France succeeded, New Zealand and Australia were faced with France herself in their own backyard.\textsuperscript{110} A second and rather more cynical interpretation is that France was motivated by liberalism and republicanism, knew what was best for the uncivilized world and was setting out to put matters to rights.\textsuperscript{111} Such a view would have outraged Antipodean sentiment. It was for these reasons that Deakin attempted to rally support for greater British engagement in the Pacific during the 1907 Imperial Conference. He stated the obvious: the Pacific was ‘extremely important’ to Australia and New Zealand. While he could understand that it was ‘remote’ and carried relatively little traffic from a Home point of view, he cleverly argued that as one body all Empire members had an equal interest in the region. The importance to New Zealand and Australia of securing the Cooks, Fiji and other remote islands for the British flag were unappreciated by the United Kingdom.\textsuperscript{112} The New Hebrides was yet again cited as an example. The British attitude in 1887 had been to let these islands go to France but ‘vigorous (colonial) opposition’ saved them. New Zealand and Australia were not consulted over subsequent British action with respect to these islands and their disposal. Matters between France and the United Kingdom were settled by a Convention signed in London, of which Australia and New Zealand learned from newspaper cables. Australia had wanted to allow preferential tariffs on certain goods from New Hebrides to ‘…encourage British settlement …’ but was told it could not apply these because it would breach treaty obligations.\textsuperscript{113}

\textsuperscript{110} Ibid., p.94.
\textsuperscript{111} Tombs and Tombs, \textit{That Sweet Enemy : the French and the British from the Sun King to the Present}; p.444.
\textsuperscript{112} "Colonial Conference, 1907 (Minutes of Proceedings of the)," (Wellington: Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives Session I, A-05, 1907), p.549. The perennial issue of the Letters Patent issued to Governor Philip referring to ‘adjacent islands’, was submitted as evidence. Colonially interpreted as referring to Tahiti and the New Hebrides, the latter was regarded as part of New Zealand by some until this claim was abandoned in 1840.
\textsuperscript{113} Ibid., pp.550-556.
Joint governorship in the New Hebrides conflicted with the popular Liberal Party policy of a greater New Zealand, as Seddon had made very clear in earlier times.\textsuperscript{114} He seemed to have decided, on balance, that the issue was not worth the risk of upsetting France but he was clearly reluctant to abandon it, as ‘A greater New Zealand was the settled policy of the Liberal Party’.

Seddon believed that ‘Every opportunity should be embraced to bring those (other Pacific) islands into the Empire’.\textsuperscript{115} Despite this there was press criticism of Seddon for taking a metaphorical swing at the French as colonisers while Grey and the Foreign Office were attempting to negotiate a settlement. The \textit{Press} said this was ‘unfortunate’ given the friendly relationship under the \textit{entente cordiale}.\textsuperscript{116} Later British opinion articulated in an article re-quoted from the \textit{Sydney Daily Telegraph} compared the \textit{entente} to an unwritten Treaty. The \textit{entente} had made co-governance of the New Hebrides possible, thereby avoiding a possible Fashoda.\textsuperscript{117} Compromise was possible: Britain and France with bigger issues to consider were determined that is should be so. Despite Antipodean discomfort there was to be no further annexation or colonisation, at least in competition with France, once the \textit{entente} was in place.

\textbf{New Zealand’s Options}

The \textit{entente} may not have been justified to the New Zealand public because there was no immediate security threat but there are hints that the public mood had shifted from acquiescence to disquiet. Prime Minister Massey and James Allen, the Minister of both Defence and Education (and later of Finance) spoke at a public meeting in Milton in mid-1913.\textsuperscript{118} No particular reason for the meeting has been identified but it followed Allen’s trip to England during which the defence situation had been discussed. Allen’s notes reveal the diverging interests of Britain and her erstwhile colony. On the one hand the Home Government wanted information on the


\textsuperscript{116} ”Mr Seddon and the New Hebrides,” \textit{Press}, 4 June 1906, p.5.

\textsuperscript{117} ”Under Two Flags,” p.8.

\textsuperscript{118} Ian McGibbon, ” Allen, James,” in \textit{Dictionary of New Zealand Biography: Te Ara - the Encyclopedia of New Zealand} (Wellington),p.2; ”Sir James Allen,” \textit{New Zealand Herald}, 29 July 1942. Allen was reportedly an able administrator and capable minister without the charisma of Massey (or Ward) but very competent as his senior Ministerial postings indicate. Milton was a town in the South Otago electorate of Bruce. Allen was the local MP.
availability of New Zealand troops for off-shore deployment and on the status of public works required to expand Auckland as a naval base. New Zealand wanted a coaling station in the Pacific to utilise the new sea route through the Panama Canal (due to open in 1914), the appointment of a British Agent in Tonga no doubt in anticipation of annexation and, rather cryptically, increased ‘weight’ for Empire diplomatic initiatives in the Pacific. Britain’s concerns clearly related to the northern hemisphere and the threat of war; New Zealand’s to her Pacific interests, securing her trade routes and greater local control of defence.¹¹⁹

Upon Allen’s return, Allen and Massey clearly aimed to assuage public concerns within Allen’s Milton electorate. Dealing with public concern is essential in any democracy but it was especially so in one with an extended electoral franchise such as New Zealand’s. Massey and Allen had to justify a British Pacific defence policy that hinged on the ‘slender thread’ of the entente cordiale. Their comments made clear how unpalatable such an arrangement was for New Zealand. Massey pointed out that the political price of the Empire’s reliance on France was the constraint on the ‘Mother Country’ (and therefore New Zealand) from doing anything in the Pacific vis-à-vis French interests for fear of disrupting that relationship. As an alternative New Zealand should be preparing for ‘manhood’ as a nation.¹²¹ The constraint comment was probably a reference to Allen’s quest in London to secure a coaling station on Rapa Island ‘… now held by the French.’¹²² Allen went so far as to state that there were ‘… questions relating to the New Hebrides that could be faced … without repudiating the entente’.¹²³ Allen also said that ‘… the time has come when the statesmen of this Dominion and of Australia must have something to say in regard to the diplomatic questions in the Pacific’, another issue on the London agenda. Editorial comments referred to the unsatisfactory nature of relying on alliances owing to the unpredictability of the demands that may be made upon those in them and the

¹¹⁹ See Appendix I: Allen’s Visit to London
¹²⁰ "General Election Results 1890-1993,” (Wellington 2013). Massey’s Parliamentary majorities were only emphatic on one occasion and he was therefore acutely aware of the need to maintain electoral support.
¹²¹ "Ministers on Tour: Mr. Massey and Mr. Allen at Milton,” Evening Post, 19 June 1913, p.10.
¹²² J Allen, “Ministerial Files - English trip 1913, notes of interviews,” (1913), pages not numbered. Allen’s bid for a coaling station was rebuffed because ‘The whole matter rests on acquiring Rapa from the French …’
¹²³ Archives NZ notes: ‘The papers were discovered in a packing case in the Carpenter's Shop under Parliament Buildings where presumably they had been since Allen retired from office.’
¹²⁴ “Ministers on Tour: Mr. Massey and Mr. Allen at Milton,” p.10.
tendency of the participants to ‘neglect’ their own defence. The nation therefore needed to do more than paying the mother country to defend her.

The consequences of alignment with a major power were clearly outlined but as with all the World War I protagonists the potential obligations were understated. The main defence need publicly identified by Allen and Massey was that of the Empire collectively rather than protecting New Zealand territory. This was a task for the Royal Navy that was receiving a New Zealand contribution. This conflicts with the private position in Allen’s memo written prior to his visit in which he outlined a much more independent direction for New Zealand policy. The common sentiment seemed to be that ‘isolation’ or what we would now call an independent foreign policy would be ‘too costly’. It is notable that the idea could even be aired thus giving credence to the possibility that at that time New Zealand’s choices were not of immediate concern to the United Kingdom. Embracing defence as a joint obligation alongside the Empire assumed there was risk a threat to New Zealand (even if indirect), a circumstance that was clearly not then immediate even if it was of concern. The Wairarapa Times noted that Anglo-German alienation had occurred since the Boer war. Notwithstanding the ties of (royal) kinship and common ideals that previously existed with Germany, Britain had ended up in an alliance/entente with two nations (i.e. France and Russia) previously considered to be enemies and with which there was little in common ‘…racially and politically and temperamentally…’. The implications, the editorial went on, for Australasia were unclear. It was an unfortunate consequence of a complex British policy that Imperial defence in the Pacific also depended on the Japanese alliance. This pointed to the need for New Zealand to one day have a greater say in foreign affairs. It would be in the meantime be preferable to settle Pacific issues with France as a friend and work through the Home Government rather than upsetting the European balance of power. New Zealand should consider the greater good. Allen’s comment on the need to provide manpower to share in defence of the Empire was noted. Was he, after his

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124 James Allen, ”Minister of Defence - Naval Defence matters - Memoranda from Hon. James Allen to Ministers (R222319686),” (1912). See also Appendix: Allen had the availability of troops on his United Kingdom trip agenda.
discussions overseas, preparing the ground for the possibility that fighting in Europe was defending New Zealand’s interests?125

Just why these reservations and nascent signs of independent thinking were not acted upon remains uncertain. Loyalty to the Empire was unquestionable, at least in public, but Germany, hitherto a friendly power, was no immediate threat while France was a non-hostile Pacific competitor. New Zealand was a global minnow and unlikely to be of any consequence in numerical strength.126 That could be interpreted as suggesting either that no defence arrangements were necessary or that the obverse argument applied and alignment was necessary since the country was unguarded. Even assuming the latter view there were serious reservations raised by various public identities as earlier noted. The entente had not been as successfully promoted to the New Zealand public as it had to the British and this was an impediment to general acceptance of the French. Loyalty to the Empire overrode other concerns but at the time there were no immediate threats to New Zealand’s security and global security issues were seen as continental problems. Probably New Zealand went along with London’s policy because there was no foreseeable threat and whatever fighting there was would be dealt with quickly by the Royal Navy in Northern hemisphere waters.127 There may have been small gains from repudiating the entente locally but there was a significant risk to New Zealand’s position within the Empire if that course were chosen.

126 The United Kingdom population in 1914 was about forty-six million; the French some forty million, Germany sixty-seven million and New Zealand’s just over one million. History Group of the New Zealand Ministry for Culture and Heritage, "New Zealand History," http://www.nzhistory.net.nz/.
127 "Our Merchantmen and Trade Routes," Dominion, 3 August 1914, p.9. A contemporary view on what was likely to happen if war broke out can be deduced from an a priori discussion on trade. New Zealand in 1914 was, as it is now, reliant on exports and therefore dependent on maritime free-passage. Generally those concerned with commerce take a hard-headed, financially conservative view of threats to their businesses rather than assuming an emotional over-optimistic mindset. The consensus from various (unnamed) industry figures was that in the event of a European war, trade would be curtailed since there would be fewer ships available. Much of the speculation centred on the seasonal nature of the trade. ‘New Zealand’s busy season as far as her export trade is concerned, does not commence till the end of October or November, and it was held that by that time the supremacy of the seas would probably be settled for many years to come.’ Winter being a quieter period it was assumed that any war would be contained in the Northern Hemisphere and it would be naval, decisive and brief. Although dated 3 August 1914 this article was written in the future tense, thus implying it pre-dated the outbreak of hostilities.
Chapter Four: New Zealand within the Empire

New Zealand’s position within the Empire became increasingly difficult to define during the first decade of the twentieth century. Being part of the Empire removed direct responsibility for defence and foreign relations and so New Zealand did not have the ministerial advice and policy infrastructure associated with these key tasks of an independent state. Discussions with the British on defence and foreign relations were therefore one-sided as far as information and policy alternatives went.¹ To gather information Ministers, such as Allen, had to travel to the United Kingdom and visit, by appointment, relatively junior British Ministers and bureaucrats. Without expert advice they had to weigh those opinions, develop options and make decisions. This tension showed as a desire to be an integral part of the British demesne (personified by Ward) was counterbalanced by both a rapidly emerging national identity (‘Farmer Bill’ Massey having a more rustic image than the apparently urbane Ward) and domestic political changes that suggested the future lay elsewhere.² Despite New Zealand’s pleading for greater British involvement in the Pacific the Home Government dragged its heels, settled inter-colonial disputes by compromise, and thwarted New Zealand’s colonial pretensions.³ The British attitude seemed to confirm Adam Smith’s diagnosis that colonies in the Pacific were a cartel ‘… for the benefit of the mercantile classes …’. They cost money (and lives) to defend, paid no taxes and diverted investment from the domestic economy.⁴ There was no British

¹ Watson, W.F. Massey : New Zealand: pp.38-39, 42.; Massey’s 1912 Government had major domestic concerns, depended on rebel Liberal MPs to survive and Massey himself had ‘…previously shown little interest in foreign affairs…’
² Michael Bassett, Sir Joseph Ward : A Political Biography (Auckland, N.Z.: Auckland University Press, 1993). pp.151-152. Pacific matters were an exception but even then British interests were global rather than reflective of New Zealand’s immediate concerns.
³ Aldrich, “European Expansion in the Island Pacific: A Historiographical Review,” p.10; p.95. Angus Ross, New Zealand Aspirations in the Pacific in the Nineteenth Century (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964). p.299. Brendon, The Decline and Fall of the British Empire, 1781-1997: p.91. Britain needed to offset the desire of New Zealand and Australia for more territory against the aspirations of France and Germany; Britain could not afford to be offside with both her dominions and her European counterparts. Further territorial claims would have increased European tensions while the Antipodean Colonies seem to have remained almost willfully unaware of the costs of supporting annexations. This should not have been the case. New Zealand was well aware that the taking of Maori lands at the UK’s cost had been very expensive and ultimately resulted in Britain withdrawing her troops, a move that generated a feeling of betrayal amongst the colonists.
grand plan for the Pacific and there did not need to be. The region was increasingly irrelevant and by the mid-nineteenth Century most of the French and British possessions in the Pacific were already secured.\textsuperscript{5} There was therefore little British Pacific policy with direct implications for New Zealand in the mid to late nineteenth century (1860-1882).

Much of the explanation for New Zealand’s willingness to join with the Empire in World War I rests on the lack of any alternatives. Despite the proclamation of Dominion status in 1907 little changed in the relationship with Britain and there were no material changes within either New Zealand’s Government or in its responsibilities. Anglo-New Zealand relations of this period are often referenced in familial terms with Britain in \textit{loco parentis} and New Zealand as the child, typically of the female gender. Despite votes for women and examples of strong female characters in the public sphere the status of the latter was still generally that of the obedient, weaker and fairer sex. Whether this characterisation was accurate or not the roles assumed by both countries fit the model. Britain appointed the Governor and it was through that office (the father figure of Britain personified) that official communications with London were sent and received.\textsuperscript{6} This, for instance, was the procedure when New Zealand was ‘invited’ to attend the 1909 Naval Conference in London.\textsuperscript{7}

Both Britain and New Zealand willingly adopted their familial roles at Imperial Conferences without detaching from them and considering the overall configuration of the Empire and the broader world context that influenced it. As a result, rather than using an adult-to-adult dialogue New Zealand (and Australia) toned their requests to London as pleadings. Thus Sir W. Lyne’s requests for action over merchant shipping are like a child’s request to a parent rather than a precatory inter-adult conversation.\textsuperscript{8}

Britain’s pronouncements to New Zealand exampled by Lord Selbourne’s comments on the French presence in the Pacific are those of a parent chiding an unruly offspring.⁹ For her loyal post-colonial satellites Britain’s role was unambiguously parental. Having accepted the role of the dutiful child New Zealand (more than the other dominions) had no bargaining position from which to negotiate any alternative. New Zealand protests raised en famille lacked any threat of dissonance leading to action.

A class of bureaucrats ran the Empire both as public servants and as politicians.¹⁰ A sense of belonging, control and importance was engendered in the colonial politicians by summoning them to London and allowing them to join this clique as ex officio members. Many of the issues discussed and the conclusions reached were seemingly innocuous. The agenda from the 1911 imperial conference demonstrates Joyce’s point that the routine operation of the state (Empire) provides clues as to how it functioned.¹¹

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⁹ First Lord of the Admiralty (Selborne), "Memorandum by the First Lord of the Admiralty," (Wellington: Conference Between The Secretary Of State For The Colonies And The Prime Ministers Of Self-Governing Colonies (Papers Relating To A), June To August, 1902., 1903), p.17.


¹¹ “Imperial Conference, 1911 (Minutes Of Proceedings Of The),” (Wellington: Government Printer, Wellington.—1911.), p.ii.
The prominence given to communications amongst the topics discussed provides a clue as to the means of control; a common language (not just in the linguistic sense but in the vernacular) was needed as was a consistent system of weights and measurement; a postal service was essential to move documents and the new
telegraphic technology required systematic planning. Civil servants could have dealt with these issues. Perversely new technology meant greater communication and thus more control that counterbalanced any inclination towards more independent thinking. Caring for her colonial issue meant a further intertwining of the affairs of Britain with those of the dominions. Shared citizenship embodied the ideal of ‘noble sacrifice’. The paradigm was military-based and masculine with patriotism as a core value. Any British concern for the working class was simply to realize their potential as mothers and soldiers of the Empire rather than to see them as freeborn citizens pursuing their own interests under the benevolent guardianship of Empire or dominion.12

Another bond that was of great significance to the Empire was the gold standard through which the British pound was (in theory) valued in gold. Owing to a fixed exchange rate the New Zealand pound was similarly tied. Abandonment of the standard and a fixed exchange rate was beyond orthodox economic theory. The money supply could therefore (in theory) only grow at the same rate as London’s gold reserves accumulated. As well as the obvious dependence on market prices for primary produce in London, New Zealand’s economic growth was thereby tied to England’s.13

Seen in this context British indifference to Australian and New Zealand concerns regarding French activities in the Pacific is understandable. The important issue for the French was trade but when the hoped for commercial development of Tahiti and New Caledonia did not eventuate French political interest withered. The French Pacific possessions eventually became as dependent on the British and American markets as they were on those of France. Secondly consolidation of French rule in the territories of interest was achieved and settled notwithstanding British and German competition. Thirdly under the Third Republic the French Navy was no longer asked to support the Catholic Church missions. The navy was therefore left with no pretext for intervention on behalf of French religious ‘interests’.14 New Zealand’s repeated

13 Ed Conway, The Summit (London: Little, Brown, 2014). pp.54-63. The standard was only abandoned by Britain and by the Empire at the start of World War I but the implied link through a fixed exchange rate remained. See McClelland and Rose, “Citizenship and empire, 1867-1928.”pp.175-176, pp.284-85, p.287 This provides an excellent history of the gold standard and its consequences leading up to the Bretton Woods agreement.
attempts to raise these issues as late as the 1907 Imperial Conference must have been a continual irritant for a London Government attempting to deal with matters of far greater importance. The child continued to question the parent despite repeatedly receiving the same answer.

The 1902 Imperial Conference: Empire Structure and Governance

The gradual separation of New Zealand interests from those of Britain - a trend abruptly reversed by World War I - can be followed through the successive Imperial Conferences. These tended to be administrative – hardly worthy of full participation by the various Premiers, Prime Ministers and Cabinet Members – and tediously detailed.

On Tuesday morning the Colonial Conference kept him (Seddon) employed all the morning. The conference discussed contracts for the army and navy, the reduction of postal rates for newspapers and periodicals throughout the Empire, the metric system, and other odds and ends.15

The 1902 Colonial Conference was the last such gathering before the entente cordiale came into being. Joseph Chamberlain, Secretary of State for the Colonies, chaired the working sessions. Three main topics were discussed: political consultation and leadership, commercial and trade activity, and defence. They are intertwined to the extent that it is almost impossible to discuss one without the other. The Empire was represented by five European-governed colonies all in various stages of developing their own national identity. The non-self governing colonies and possessions were absent. India would have been the most significant participant had she been self-governing and thus represented. Retention of India was uppermost in the Home Government’s Empire-related concerns at the time.16

As racially and culturally homogeneous as the Governments represented may have been, they were geographically dispersed, economically disparate and unrepresentative of the Empire as a whole. There was a mis-match between British interests and those of the Empire representatives present both collectively and individually. A shared culture and emotional bond as well as finance and trade were

the main adhesives that kept the predominantly white-ruled colonies and dominions together. Propaganda and emotion, rather than substance and fact, ultimately proved the more powerful influence. Just as Barnes has described London as a New Zealand metropolis, so it was that the ‘old country’ as an entity seemingly inseparable from New Zealand. For the represented colonies/dominions the ‘Empire’ was as much a construction as it was a reality.

In his speech of welcome Chamberlain spoke in favour of ‘... political federation of the Empire …’ which he saw as a ‘...possibility...’. Tacitly recognising the lack of formal structure he acknowledged the invisible, non-binding links that held the empire together. He thanked the conferees for their contributions to the (Boer) War, valued as much for moral support as for anything material. He also made a specific request for a sharing of the ‘...burdens of the empire...’. This would be rewarded with a voice at the table in policy making. Defence costs, in British eyes, were being unfairly borne by the British taxpayer. Defence in this context meant protecting trade between the United Kingdom and the colonies. Chamberlain therefore made a proposal for integration of trade and limited political federation within a formalised governance structure. It was an opportunity rejected by the self-governing dominions that would at later conferences appeal for just such arrangements without success.

Chamberlain’s analysis was extremely prescient and went to the nub of the relationship between the United Kingdom and the Empire. Parsing Chamberlain’s

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17 Lance E Davis, *Mammon and the pursuit of Empire: The political economy of British imperialism, 1860-1912*. The financial viability of the Empire, the identity of its beneficiaries and its purpose are still actively debated. Griffiths, *Imperial Culture in Antipodean Cities, 1880-1939*. Griffith’s work provides useful background on the emotional bonds used to construct an integrated Empire. Unattributed, "The Queen's Empire: A Pictorial and Descriptive Record (1897) " in *Politics and Empire in Victorian Britain : A Reader*, ed. Antoinette M. Burton (New York: Palgrave, 2001) Other races were a diversion from the mono-Anglo culture and seen as a ‘pleasure’.


Griffiths, *Imperial Culture in Antipodean Cities, 1880-1939*.
Oliver and Massey University College of Manawatu., *The inadequacy of a dependent Utopia : the Anderson memorial lecture*: p.7.Oliver used the same language: ‘London has been our sole metropolis: …’ in the context of further cities still to be added.


20 “Imperial Conference, 1911 (Minutes Of Proceedings Of The),” p.67.
words, he firstly recognised the lack of a formal structure as an impediment to developing the Empire in a more prescribed manner. Secondly he politely pointed out that the colonies’ contribution to the Boer War was worth little beyond providing moral support. As has been discussed earlier, the Boer War had raised serious questions within the British political and defence establishments by exposing the fact that there were land-based conflicts that the Royal Navy, no matter how powerful, could not win. Despite outward appearances the British Army had significant weaknesses in both tactics and logistical support. Britain was coming to the realisation that a stand-alone island fortress committed to free trade and defended by the Royal Navy but without a Continental ally was not a viable proposition in the face of colonial rivalry from Russia in the Far East and European powers in the West. Britain either had to engage with a continental power or embrace the Empire.

Chamberlain’s suggestion of the latter course - political federation - later to become a hobbyhorse of Sir Joseph Ward’s - was quickly dealt with. Chamberlain’s proposed Governing Council was not adopted but periodic consultation was readily accepted with provisions made for additional meetings were such required. The need for the Colonies to be consulted on Foreign Treaty making was neatly sidestepped by the Home Government’s agreement to do so ‘…consistent with the confidential negotiation of treaties with foreign Powers …’. The Commercial and Defence suggestions were less easily dealt with. Chamberlain asserted, backed with statistics, that the Empire had sufficient resources to be self-supporting. The United Kingdom could thus reduce or cease trading with foreign countries. The potential gains for the colonies were huge since the United Kingdom’s foreign trade was greater than that of the Empire with the mother country. However, Chamberlain also noted that while colonial exports to the United Kingdom had been increasing, the colonies’ imports from foreign states had also been growing. The United Kingdom was the loser on the latter dimension. Moreover more foreign trade meant a greater volume of shipping

21 A Watt Smyth, Physical Deterioration (1904), ed. Antoinette M. Burton, 1st ed., Politics and Empire in Victorian Britain : A Reader (New York: Palgrave, 2001). "Imperial Conference, 1911 (Minutes Of Proceedings Of The)," p.67. This was recognised at the time. A contemporary statistical evaluation of the British stock led to a diagnosis of weakness based on poor physical condition as was exposed during the Boer War.
23 Ibid., pp.26-27.
was now in foreign hands with a consequent loss of control.\textsuperscript{24} Despite this the Conference diplomatically rejected federation.

The discussion revealed a very strong feeling amongst the Prime Ministers in favour of making some definite advance towards establishing closer trade … But the circumstances in different colonies differed so widely that it was apparent that no arrangement applicable to all could be devised …(so) Prime Ministers should meet the President of the Board of Trade privately, with the view of considering such separate arrangements as could be devised…\textsuperscript{25}

The result of these informal meetings was summarised in Point Two of the notes attached to the general resolution in favour of Free Trade within the Empire.

That this Conference recognises that in the present circumstances of the colonies it is not practicable to adopt a general system of free trade as between the Mother-country and the British dominions beyond the seas.\textsuperscript{26}

There was much talk of further negotiations but the conclusion was clear. The Colonies felt they had too much to lose by abandoning other trade ties and tariffs in favour of exclusive trade within the Empire. They collectively rejected the United Kingdom’s overtures and any thought of a closed free-trade block with political federation.\textsuperscript{27} The United Kingdom would therefore remain open to free trade and thus to the need for military alliances elsewhere. The dominions did not seem to realise the consequences of their decision. In rejecting a closed trading block (or Imperial Preference in a more diluted form) they were also questioning the purpose of the Empire and by implication the defence relationships it required. As Chamberlain had made clear, the defence burden fell disproportionately upon the British taxpayer. If there was no closed trade block within the Empire what was there to defend and, more importantly still, why would the British taxpayer underwrite the Empire’s security?

It was not simply isolation that made Chamberlain’s proposal impractical. The self-governing colonies and dominions were showing nascent signs of their emergence as fully independent sovereign states well before the events of 1914-18. While the perception of the Pacific Ocean as an impediment between the United Kingdom and Australasia seems plausible it overlooks the benefits that being in the Pacific brought

\textsuperscript{24} Ibid., pp.7-10.
\textsuperscript{25} Ibid., p.27.
\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., p.28, pp.22-23.
\textsuperscript{27} W. David McIntyre, \textit{Dominion of New Zealand: Statesmen and Status 1907-1945} (Wellington: New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, 2007). p.37.
to the latter. As the consultation at the 1902 Conference makes clear, there were local advantages such as alternative trade opportunities that New Zealand and Australia were already exploiting. There was also the potential annexation and colonisation of neighbouring islands. The Pacific Ocean was not therefore, as has also been suggested, irrelevant in the relationship between Britain and her Dominions. In fact it was an important part of the evolution that was taking place. Far earlier than World War I and the Gallipoli Campaign, a nation was already gestating.

Publicly Chamberlain made a brave face of what was a major failure. He acknowledged the inability of the Conference to ‘strengthen the links’ through either ‘…Imperial defence or through Imperial Trade’. His explanation that he knew these could not be accomplished, ‘… all at once, or with a single step’, rang hollow given his opening speech to the Conference. In acknowledging Britain’s leading role in building and maintaining the Empire he committed his countrymen to a burden greater ‘… than may be arithmetically their due …’. Quoting a London paper, the Evening Post claimed Chamberlain’s speech was an admission that ‘… the Colonial Conference has been a failure’. Britain would approach the next colonial conference in 1907 with a vastly changed Empire outlook. The entente cordiale would be in place, and with it Britain’s re-engagement in the mainstream of European affairs. The colonial burden remained with its uncertain benefits. While it would be a step too far to suggest that the outcome of the 1902 conference led to the entente, one alternative from the dwindling options available to Britain was gone.

1907 Imperial Conference: Trade, Defence and Shipping

The 1907 Conference brought into sharp relief the irreconcilable objectives first exposed in 1902 of acting together and preserving the Empire while the autonomy of each dominion grew. Chamberlain the Imperial constructionist was gone and Ward, a fervent advocate in 1911 for an Imperial Parliament and Council, had replaced Seddon. The press had a somewhat jaundiced outlook on the proceedings. After

29 Howe, "Two Worlds?," p.50.;
30 “A Notable Speech: Mr Chamberlain on the Empire," Evening Post, 24 September 1902, p.9.;
"Colonial Conference Conclusions," Auckland Star, 29 September 1902.p.2 Such sentiments seem to have been the generally accepted public version of events.
Ward’s arrival in London the *Evening Post*’s London correspondent noted that ‘most’ papers had articles on the Premier’s well-known views in favour of an Imperial Council but ‘… they contained nothing new or worth quoting’. The Conference formalised the timing and format for future Conferences and agreed to establish a Secretariat under the control of the Secretary of State for the Colonies but went no further, neither centralising control under an Imperial Council nor further delegating to the dominions and Colonies.

It was not until Day Nine of the 1907 Conference that Asquith, Chancellor of the Exchequer and soon to be Prime Minister was present and the dominions, taking up Chamberlain’s 1902 theme, argued for preferential trade within the Empire. In response Asquith delivered a dose of reality to the Dominion/Colonial leaders. He pointed out that the dominions were not prepared to let British manufacturers compete with their domestic industries on an equal basis. The dominions were using their financial independence and autonomy to impose restrictive tariffs: Britain was proposing to use her rights to pursue a free-trade policy. Asquith made the point that the ‘burden’ of establishing and maintaining the Empire fell upon the forty-three million citizens of the United Kingdom. They were dependent upon off-shore supplies of food and raw material to exist. Maintenance of Britain’s position as a world leader depended upon her superiority in the production of goods (industry), a free market with London as the hub (finance) and trade (shipping). Any restriction on these would strike a ‘deadly blow’ at the foundations of Britain’s economic well-being. This was a complete reversal of Chamberlain’s position in 1902. Lest there be any misunderstanding, Asquith made it clear that there was no chance of Britain abandoning free trade in favour of tariff preferences within the Empire.

33 The issue had been decided at the previous general election and Asquith had a clear electoral mandate for his policy.  
Defence

Although one of the original purposes for establishing colonies i.e. preferential trade was gone, Britain still had the legacy of the Dominions’ foreign affairs and defence. The dominions and colonies tended to see defence as a local issue, sheltered as they were under the overall protection of the Royal Navy. As late as 1909 Ward was still unable to answer the explicit defence-related question asked of him by Massey during the extra-Parliamentary meeting called to approve Ward’s travel to that year’s Conference.

... would ... the right honourable gentleman ... tell us what is the defence policy of this country. Does anyone know it? Have we a defence policy?36

The full implication of this question was not considered, and thus it went unresolved. The British interpretation of the Empire, and its defence of it were different. The Home government saw an Empire that was based on a ‘... major internationalist capitalist economy with a powerful navy’. It was not simply geographic or economic. Land itself was relatively unimportant. This Empire had two major structural explanations that underpinned its being. Strategically it was based on retaining assets such as India that were centrally ruled. Economically it was capitalist and controlled from the City. These two foundations provided resources for manufacturing together with the trade and finance associated with traded goods and services.37 What mattered were markets - markets to be served by free trade and defended by the Royal Navy.38

As Lord Tweedmouth, First Lord of the Admiralty put it:

Now, there is, after all, only one sea that laps around all our shores. The sea is the link that joins us together, it was the reason of your up-springing (sic). It is our first defence. It is the origin of our great commerce.

It is the outlet and inlet of our exports and our imports, and it is to us in these islands the channel through which we get the food and raw material which are so necessary to our vast population. There is one sea, there is one Empire, and there is one Navy, and I

37 Rhoda Desbordes, "Representing ‘Informal Empire’ In The Nineteenth Century,” Media History 14, no. 2 (2008): p.121. Information that was of little interest to the public but of great relevance to particular industries or businesses was circulated within the free trading environment thus adding a further layer of complexity and separation between those with that knowledge and the others.
38 Lambert, "The Royal Navy and the Defence of Empire, 1856-1918.” pp.27; 111; 123.
want to claim in the first place your help, and in the second place authority for the
Admiralty to manage this great service without restraint.39

Tweedmouth went on to hammer home the point that there must be one naval strategy
and one command - notwithstanding local sensibilities. Contributions of small
warships – for local coastal defence and to act as a trained reserve for the RN - were
welcome. However British naval strategy depended on the ability to concentrate the
new dreadnought class of capital ships in order to fight a fleet action where and when
the Royal Navy chose. Defending the Empire through local efforts in each theatre was
simply too expensive. The dominions could contribute coaling facilities and docks for
repairs to the fleet (Auckland was proposed as one facility – See Appendix I) but it
made little sense to have the fleet dispersed. Australia and New Zealand were
concerned about resource allocation between local defence, local Imperial defence (a
fine differentiation) and Imperial defence on the high seas. Ward at the time preferred
the idea of New Zealand meeting the cost of ships operating in local waters rather
than contributing an untagged lump sum to collective defence.40 The upshot of these
discussions was a consensus to end the collective defence agreement of 1902 so the
dominions could establish their own forces. New Zealand did not choose defence
independence and instead offered a subsidy for the Royal Navy. Tweedmouth was in
favour of this proposal but as a means to establish and assist local defence.41

The Imperial conference deliberations lacked knowledge of confidential discussions
with the French.42 A pro-Empire faction of British Ministers believed that
engagement with Europe in support of France was necessary to preserve the United
Kingdom and the Empire and by implication the interests of New Zealand and the
other Dominions.43 The discussions, begun under Campbell-Bannerman, concerned
both the extent of British support for France and planning for military deployment if
France was attacked by Germany. Within the Asquith Cabinet only Asquith himself,

40 Ibid., pp.132-136.
41 Ibid.pp.476; 477; 482 Although Ward made it clear that New Zealand could not support its own
navy, somewhat bizarrely there was interest from New Zealand in the latest defence fashion of
submarines, presumably as a cheap option.
42 Farrell, "Coalition of the Usually Willing: The Dominions and Imperial Defence, 1856-1919,” p.278.
43 Wilson, “The making and putative implementation of a British foreign policy of gesture, December
1905 to August 1914,” pp.228-229. Grey authorised the early military contacts such as those of
General Henry. After the 1909 naval scare Churchill, Seely and Lloyd George became supportive
members of this inner cabinet circle but the majority of Cabinet were not informed.
Haldane the Defence Secretary and Grey were fully supportive of the *entente* and they were responsible for the early collaborative defence initiatives.\(^{44}\) The secrecy had significant implications. The importance of the *entente*, as far as defence policy was concerned, was apparent to only a select few in the French and United Kingdom inner circles. So too was the prescient anticipation that Germany would be the enemy and that this scenario was under active military planning. The dominions, although engaged in apparently open discussions during the Imperial Conference(s), were not consulted. Any disclosure would have split the Home (Liberal) Government between those for whom social reforming Liberalism was the priority and the Imperialists for whom preservation of the Empire was the primary concern.\(^{45}\) Aside from the need for military secrecy the public reaction, both in the Dominions and at Home, to an alliance rather than a simple, vague, *entente* with France was presumably anticipated to be adverse. During the 1906 Moroccan crisis, for example, Grey was sensitive enough to public opinion to realise that this was not an issue over which the British public would support military assistance to France.\(^{46}\) Grey *et al* realised that they would get neither public support nor that of Parliament and so they chose to bypass both and act in secret.

**Trade**

Throughout the debate there was extensive use of comparisons with France and Germany on relative size of population, economy, treatment of colonies, export volumes, costs and virtually any other metric. The Dominions argued in favour of preferential trade on two grounds. Firstly, there was the fairness angle - another example of child-to-parent pleading. France and Germany were cited as examples of colonial powers favouring their own colonies. Australia (and others) were shut out as a consequence of these restrictive tariffs.\(^{47}\) Secondly, there were the presumed benefits to the British people, if the Home Government were to take a similar stance. The Australian Prime Minister Alfred Deakin made this case with eloquence. Arguing from an assumed British point of view he claimed that the trade imbalance Britain had

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\(^{44}\) Ibid., p.232.
\(^{45}\) Gerry Docherty and James McGregor, *Hidden History: The Secret Origins of the First World War* (Edinburgh: Mainstream, 2013). eBook: Page numbers omitted The fears were well founded. During a Cabinet meeting on 15 November 1911 the contacts were revealed and ‘There was a furious row in Asquith’s Cabinet …’.
\(^{46}\) Wilson, “The making and putative implementation of a British foreign policy of gesture, December 1905 to August 1914,” pp.239-240.
with Germany and the United States meant that the United Kingdom made net payments to foreign farmers, to foreign railways to cart the goods over land and to foreign fleets to ship the goods. Meanwhile the collective purchasing power of the Empire that could provide leverage to influence foreign countries went unused.48

The arguments used to press the dominions’ trade case were augmented by an emotive plea in favour Empire sourced trade from Sir W. Lyne, representing Australia.

Twenty years ago as one looked over the vast expanse of Sydney Harbour you saw the British flag … last month a great proportion of the shipping in the harbour was foreign … a great proportion of it was from France (emphasis added) … Huge German steamers (that) … carry products … liberally subsidised by their Government.

For good measure Lyne reiterated the link between mercantile and naval strength, going so far as to point out that some of the larger vessels could be converted into armed cruisers. He used statistics to illustrate how far Britain’s share of the trade had fallen.49 The presumed loss of power and influence globally gave rise to both direct and indirect threats. The increasing dependence on foreign i.e. non-British imports and foreign export markets by the Empire was a major concern for the dominions.50 However, even statistics laced with emotion were insufficient to win the debate.

Dr Smart (Cape Colony) recognised the dilemma. More than tradition and ancestry would be needed to bind the Empire together. He acknowledged that successive generations had fewer first-hand links with Great Britain so other ties would be needed. Smart suggested that a Great Britain dependent on Continental wheat supplies could be vulnerable in times of a European war. The dominions could theoretically provide food security if were they encouraged. However, even with Naval supremacy to ensure transport of the crop, the dominions could not help the United Kingdom with grain supplies if they were not encouraged to develop their capacity now. Churchill dismissed such a hypothetical scenario as only resulting from a ‘curious (continental) alliance’. However with the entente in place and a partnership for the British with Russia already consequent upon it, as well as the opposing Triple

48 Ibid., p.251-255.
49 Ibid., p.328.
50 Ibid., p.330.
Alliance in place, these circumstances existed. Churchill cut off further debate on the issue, despite the emotional pleas. A system of preferential tariffs would never happen because the British public would never support it. Moreover the self-governing territories were not prepared to extend such preferences to the whole Empire or even, in some cases, to the extent of their own boundaries. An unrepentantly parental tone was palpable when towards the end of the conference attention turned to the French presence in the Pacific. Deakin stated the obvious, that the Pacific was ‘extremely important’ to Australia and New Zealand. He could understand from a United Kingdom’s point of view that it was ‘remote’ and carried relatively little traffic, but he cleverly argued that as one body all Empire members had an equal interest in the Pacific. Britain nonetheless showed little interest despite these Antipodean frustrations.

Much more was discussed, but those issues were peripheral to New Zealand’s eventual Alliance with France in World War I. The points of difference were clearly laid out in 1907, little was added in subsequent Empire Conferences and differing viewpoints were not reconciled but left in abeyance. In part this was because the 1907 Conference lacked both clear objectives and purpose. The emotional bonds, explored in work such as Barnes’, dominated without rigorous examination of the Empire and its objectives. Technology that might have been used to communicate more effectively and make the Empire functional as an entity was ignored. Churchill acknowledged distance as ‘…one of the most difficult facts…’ with regard to

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51 Ibid., p.345.
53 Government, "Colonial conference, 1907 (minutes of proceedings of the)." pp.401-402, p.408
54 Government, "Colonial conference, 1907 (minutes of proceedings of the)." pp.548-549; pp.550-556. The perennial issue of the Letters Patent issued to Governor Philip referring to ‘adjacent islands’, was submitted as evidence. Interpreted as referring to Tahiti and the New Hebrides, the latter was regarded as part of New Zealand by some until this claim was abandoned in 1840. The importance to New Zealand and Australia of securing the Cooks, Fiji and other remote islands for the British flag went unappreciated by the United Kingdom.
55 "Colonial Premiers in England: Discussion on Preferential Trade," Otago Daily Times, 6 May 1907, p.5 There was no secrecy as far as the differing views were concerned. The Premiers and Home Government Ministers discussed the issues publicly and there were regular newspaper reports of the Conference proceedings.
56 McIntyre, Dominion of New Zealand: Statesmen and Status 1907-1945: pp.45-47.
administering the Empire notwithstanding the rapid deployment of telegraphy.\textsuperscript{57} Such views are those of an Empire of the past unwilling to face the realities of the present. The difficult issue of British engagement with the continent and her new relationship with France were left in abeyance, and the new realities facing the Dominions went unreconciled. The British (understandably) would not have wanted to raise the issue while the dominions lacked the courage to do so.

\textsuperscript{57} Government, "Colonial conference, 1907 (minutes of proceedings of the)," p.559. Bassett, \textit{Sir Joseph Ward : A Political Biography}: p.178. Ward was still pushing for the Pacific cable to be completed in 1909 although his motivation was obtaining better Press coverage for his visit.
1909: New Zealand MPs Debate Ward’s Attendance at the Imperial Defence Conference

Collective defence depended on co-operation rather than centralised control.\textsuperscript{58} During the 1902 Imperial Conference provision was made for ‘emergency’ Special Conferences to provide nominal continuity in the intervals between full Imperial Conferences.\textsuperscript{59} The British Government proposed that just such an Imperial Defence Conference be held in July 1909.\textsuperscript{60} New Zealand had just offered funding for the dreadnought battleship(s) whilst the Canadian Parliament had passed a resolution on 29 April in favour of discontinuing regular defence contributions to the Imperial Treasury and establishing a Canadian ‘naval service’. The meeting was intended to discuss these differences and achieve a consistent approach to Imperial Defence. Ward asked London for a timing change owing to domestic political difficulties.\textsuperscript{61} Since London could not accommodate him he needed to alter the sitting of New Zealand’s Parliament through a non-parliamentary gathering of MPs.\textsuperscript{62} Ward’s


\textsuperscript{59} Government, "Conference Between The Secretary Of State For The Colonies And The Prime Ministers Of Selfgoverning Colonies 1902 (Papers Relating To A)," p.2. Government, "Colonial conference, 1907 (minutes of proceedings of the)," p.v. Clause I & II. Imperial Defence Conferences had an overlapping role with the British Cabinet’s Committee of Imperial Defence (C.I.D.). This entity had an \textit{ad hoc} membership consisting of just the five or six key British cabinet ministers involved in foreign policy and defence. Dominion representatives were to be invited to attend as needed but so infrequently were they present that they were effectively honorary members only. Thus much of the C.I.D.’s business was conducted in private and was unknown to both the full British Cabinet and their Dominion counterparts. The Imperial Defence Conference was therefore effectively side-lined. It would have made sense, given the reliance on the naval defence strategy, for the Imperial Defence Conference to have had a permanent secretariat in London. However the British objective was \textbf{not} to make it effective so this had been rejected. On the one hand the British feared a dilution of control over Imperial forces while on the other the Dominions were concerned that such a body would imply a ceding of control to London. There was to be a secretariat but its role was dissemination of information only. Defence or other consultation under this protocol was reconfirmed in 1907.


\textsuperscript{61} Bassett, \textit{Sir Joseph Ward: A Political Biography}: pp.158-168; pp.198-201. King, \textit{The Penguin History of New Zealand}: pp.278-279. Despite winning the 1908 election the Liberals were in considerable difficulty as the Seddon-era coalition crumbled over the issues of land tenure and industrial relations, amongst other concerns. The Liberal town and country constituency was being eroded from both left and right with Massey and Reform emerging as a viable alternative Government.

\textsuperscript{62} Government, "Imperial Naval Conference (Proceedings Of Informal Meeting Of Members Of The House Of Representatives On The Question Of The Representation Of New Zealand At The)," pp.5-7. There are no Cabinet Minutes. Archives NZ advised:

\textsuperscript{Archives NZ advised:

A search of \texttt{www.archway.archives.govt.nz} shows that the series \textit{Cabinet minutes [record group]} (18646) does not contain relevant material. The same appears to be the
dilemma was that he wanted to attend the 1909 London Conference but he did not want Parliament to sit in his absence owing to the frailty of his Government. His opening statement positioned the London conference as a matter of ‘… grave imperial importance…’.63 His proposition was that normal Parliamentary procedure and business for the next scheduled session would be disrupted by his absence. A further difficulty that Ward was less keen to highlight was that the Conference had been summoned after Ward’s Cabinet had proposed providing a ‘…Dreadnought or two …’ to the Royal Navy. The dreadnoughts so casually referred to were to be funded by borrowing between £ 1.75 M and £ 2.0 M for each at 3%.64 There had been no formal acceptance apart from an expression of general appreciation from the British who wanted the 1909 Conference to take place first. Ward had staked his position on the dreadnought offer. As he said in a memo to his cabinet, quoted in the extra-Parliamentary Minutes:

(The offer) would proclaim to the world that the overseas dominions, gradually growing into nationhood, were prepared to help to preserve the power and greatness of the Empire which … would have been impossible in the absence of the British navy.

… the refusal of Parliament to sanction it … (would require) … the retirement of the Government or an appeal to the people … 65

To give some urgency to the situation, Ward quoted extensively from a recent speech of Sir Edward Grey’s in the Commons:

It is right to view the situation that is created by the German programme as grave. … Germany will have thirty-three Dreadnoughts. That imposes on Britain the necessity of re-building her whole fleet. Two things might produce a conflict

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63 Ibid., p.1.
64 Ibid., p.3-4. Bassett, Sir Joseph Ward : A Political Biography: pp.174-175. The New Zealand population wanted to see visible signs that they were defended. Press reports of external threats, together with investment in defence, validated local fears. Paranoia stimulated anxiety and anxiety stimulated defence spending. In the absence of visible action the populace assumed they were undefended. Hence, the Seddon Government’s placement of artillery in the Wellington Botanical Gardens at the height of the Fashoda crisis made sense domestically and politically even if it were militarily ridiculous. In this case Bassett attributes the Ward offer to domestic political considerations and a desire to boost his standing within the Empire.
65 “Imperial Naval Conference (Proceedings Of Informal Meeting Of Members Of The House Of Representatives On The Question Of The Representation Of New Zealand At The).”, p.4.
An attempt to isolate Germany (or) isolation of Britain in an attempt by any continental power to dominate and dictate the policy of Europe. I am glad that the colonies, such as New Zealand, recognise that their national existence is one with ours.  

Oddly but probably reflecting the lack of professional advice available to a New Zealand Prime Minister Ward relied on Blatchford as a further source. Blatchford’s articles lamented (alleged) British weakness and warned of German strength and militaristic ambition. These views had aroused great disquiet within the United Kingdom and Empire. Having made his case Ward moved on to the procedural motions and constitutional arrangements needed for him to attend without contravening the previous arrangements made for Parliamentary sittings. He refused, however, to give specifics on what he might propose and commit to in London.

Massey made some excellent points in his response.

I would ask … any member of this house … to tell us what is the defence policy of this country … what is the defence policy of this Government. … when the next war-cloud comes along we should be able to do something better for the Empire than offering a dreadnought … that we have to ask Britain for the money to pay for.

Massey wanted Ward in Parliament to answer for his Government’s domestic performance but he was prepared to forgo this ‘pleasure’ for Ward to attend the Conference. However, Parliament should not be postponed for this reason. It was Parliament that should be discussing the dreadnought offer. Moreover, given that it was proposed to borrow to fund the warships, it was highly likely that New Zealand would be paying interest and repaying capital for fifty years on a ship long since obsolete and out of date. T.E. (Tommy) Taylor M.P. alleged that no reply to the

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66 Ibid., pp.10-11.
68 “Imperial Naval Conference (Proceedings Of Informal Meeting Of Members Of The House Of Representatives On The Question Of The Representation Of New Zealand At The).”, p.11. By the end of the second week of December 1909 Blatchford had written ten daily articles for the Daily Mail warning of the German menace.
70 Ibid., p.18.
71 McIntyre, Dominion of New Zealand: Statesmen and Status 1907-1945: pp.48-51. ‘We want eight and we won’t wait’ was the popular British slogan. Two dreadnoughts were offered by New Zealand but in the event only one was built. The gift was still being debated on the outbreak of WWI.
dreadnought offer had been received or it had been kept confidential because the offer was an embarrassment to the Home Government. Taylor also echoed the United Kingdom debate by questioning whether the threat was as grave as it had been made out to be.\footnote{Government, "Imperial Naval Conference (Proceedings Of Informal Meeting Of Members Of The House Of Representatives On The Question Of The Representation Of New Zealand At The)." pp.18-23.} Ward’s response was to raise fears that Parliament might agree to something contrary to what was being decided at conference if it met in his absence.\footnote{Ibid., p.28, p.31.} F.M.B. Fisher M.P. (Wellington Central) neatly put it that if such were the case it would be better for Ward to be present in the New Zealand Parliament and ready to respond. Moreover, Fisher pointed out, both Lord Beresford (a very senior Admiral) and Grey himself were in favour of the dominions adopting an independent defence policy. Embarrassingly for Ward, Grey had specifically advised against purchase of battleships in favour of vessels that could be used to defend their own trade routes. Fisher quoted Grey, ‘… there is no need to panic’.\footnote{Ibid., pp.34-35.} Ward’s visit and the delay in Parliament sitting were agreed by the weight of government numbers.\footnote{Ibid., p.27, p.50.}

Three important points arose from this parliamentary oddity, some of which were still current and being debated upon the outbreak of war in 1914. Firstly and most significantly there is no reference to France. By now the entente had been in full flourish and in the public eye for some six years. The United Kingdom’s alignment and point of continental engagement was clear. France was a friend and so by extension was her fleet. Germany was obviously the threat. Even a cursory reading of the newspapers would have made this clear, yet the New Zealand Government under Ward positioned the Empire as a friendless solus entity. Either the Government was genuinely unaware of the entente’s implications or it chose to maintain silence. The former seems the more likely explanation. Secondly, the United Kingdom Ministers had stressed that dominion interests were best served by protection of trade routes rather than reinforcing the capital fleet in home waters. No doubt this was a result of the understanding with France as to the deployment of their respective fleets although the New Zealand Government was apparently unaware of this. Thirdly, the Ward Ministry did not address the muddled thinking (referred to by Taylor, Massey and Fisher) as Ward failed to define New Zealand’s defence policy.
1909 Conference: The Outcome

Apart from a cameo appearance by Asquith, Ward was the only Head of Government to attend. His presence thus seems rather incongruous given the low-key Conference outcome. Lord Crewe rather than Asquith was in the Chair for most of the meeting.\(^76\) The decisions taken were so obvious that they that the crisis had clearly either passed or a resolution found before the attendees met.\(^77\) The overall guiding principles were to maintain superiority at sea with each territory providing its own local security and collective mutual support when required.\(^78\) It was agreed by a military sub-Conference held at the War Office that the respective dominion armies were to standardize equipment, procedures, staffing and training. Each force could then either be used for local defence or it could function as units within one Army.\(^79\)

The naval arrangements were more flexible. Australia and Canada would develop their own navies as long as they conformed to Royal Navy practices to enable exchanges and interaction. Such an approach was consistent with that of having one Empire-wide foreign policy while retaining some degree of local flexibility.\(^80\) There was to be a Pacific Fleet to which New Zealand and Australia were each to contribute an armoured cruiser. While the overall naval strategy required one fleet under one command, political reality meant local conditions and perceived needs had to be considered, a point explicitly accepted by the military leaders present. The dominion

\(^76\) "Naval And Military Defence Of The Empire (Conference With Representatives Of The Self-Governing Dominions On The), 1909," p.17.
\(^77\) Matthew Seligmann, "Intelligence Information and the 1909 Naval Scare: The Secret Foundations of a Public Panic," War in History 17, no. 1 (2010): pp.37-59. There is a credible argument that the Admiralty view that Germany was secretly expanding shipbuilding in advance of their previously declared position was genuinely held i.e. it was not a ruse to encourage naval expansion. The evidence was used to push for additional British shipbuilding.
\(^79\) Ibid., p.19.
\(^80\) McIntyre, The Britannic Vision: Historians and the Making of the British Commonwealth of Nations, 1907-48: p.23. Arthur Keith, a civil servant in the Colonial Office who later became an academic and historian, outlined the framework for such thinking in 1909. He gave a speech in which he made the case for centralised control of Foreign Affairs. Keith claimed that such control was "inevitable and justifiable". Such an approach went hand in glove with a combined Defence policy. However, despite Keith's eloquence there was still an unreconciled disparity between the theory and the execution. The Dominions were supposed to manage their own coastal and land defence, while making a contribution to the Royal Navy. As simple as the strategy sounded, local exceptions meant it was not executed as Keith envisaged.
fleets would therefore be units of the Royal Navy. The New Zealand funded vessel was to be the flagship of the China Unit. It was obviously important to Ward, given the political capital he had spent on the issue, to position the outcome as conforming to his original stance: a strong united navy including a New Zealand-funded dreadnought. He therefore summarised the outcome for New Zealand in a letter to McKenna, now First Lord stressing New Zealand’s favoured one navy policy with her donated dreadnought as flagship on the China station. New Zealand’s local naval defence would depend upon the Australian navy unit(s). In times of peace, Ward wanted the China-Pacific ships deployed locally with the flagship making regular visits.  

The 1911 Conference

This was to be the last meeting before the outbreak of World War I. It was as long and tedious as its 1907 predecessor. From this study’s point of view the most significant issues were those relating to future governance of the Empire. The views expressed by Ward and indeed by Asquith (who was in the Chair) were very Whig-like. References were made to ‘development’ and to the Empire ‘… having reached a stage…’. What ‘development’ meant was not made clear. The word implies progress but no objective or endpoint was articulated. If development equated with further independence in the foreign policy of the dominions and had the French Alliance been an agenda item the implication would clearly have been signalled as limited British disengagement from the Empire and re-engagement with Europe, a change that was already underway. The topic was not raised and the British would presumably have promptly closed any debate on foreign policy. The concern over defence is nevertheless self-evident. Asquith in his opening address made the point there was an issue ‘… of even greater moment (than the organisation and administration of the Empire) – that of Imperial Defence’.


82 "Colonial conference, 1907 (minutes of proceedings of the)."; "Imperial Conference, 1911 (Minutes Of Proceedings Of The)." The 1907 Conference met for 15 working days between 15 April 1907 and 14 May 1907 while the 1911 Conference met on 12 days between 23 May 1911 and 20 June 1911. The 1911 Conference generated 441 pages of minutes; 1907’s output was 622 pages.
It is in the highest degree desirable that we should take advantage of your presence here to take stock together of the possible risks and dangers to which we are or may be in common exposed; and to weigh carefully the adequacy and the reciprocal adaptiveness of the contributions we are respectively making to provide against them.  

The Conference did neither since the entente was clearly out of bounds. Ward’s proposal in one of his tedious and repetitive contributions recommended the establishment of an Imperial Parliament/ Defence Council. Ward’s ideas were an adaptation of those espoused by the Round Table Movement. Ward seized on their creed as a workable intellectual base for his own belief in political union as a means to control the Empire’s defence and foreign policy. His complaint that the dominions had ‘… no voice in questions of foreign policy, international law, foreign treaties (other than commercial), and the vital decision of peace or war’ was correct. Ward’s concern, as it had been in 1907, was the possibility of war without New Zealand consultation. In that respect he was far-sighted and acutely aware of the dangers of blind loyalty to King and Empire but he failed to address the French alliance. New Zealand concerns regarding France, so often discussed in the press in the absence of the British parental presence, were not raised in London. Ward’s remedy went far further than his immediate concerns required. His speech, with interjections, ran over two days and generated thirty-one pages of minutes. His key proposals were for an Imperial Council of State to be established, a clear demarcation drawn between the self-governing colonies and the dominions, and for the Colonial

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83 “Imperial Conference, 1911 (Minutes Of Proceedings Of The),” Ward, pp.3-4. Asquith, pp.22-23
84 McIntyre and Canterbury History Foundation.,  *When, if ever, did New Zealand become independent?:* p.9. McIntyre’s assessment was accurate: With his (Ward’s) ‘… long-winded harangue he baffled his hearers …’
85 W. David McIntyre, “Civil Society Centenaries, 2009-10,” *New Zealand International Review* 34(2009): pp.7-8. The Round Table movement, founded in September 1909 by Lord Milner and ten ‘… young Oxford graduates…’ was based on the principles of ‘… equality and Anglo-Saxonism …’. The movement advocated Empire unity to counter the German naval buildup. This would be achieved by the inclusion of the Dominions in an Imperial Government elected by the citizens of the Empire. Lionel Curtis, who had once described New Zealand as ‘… a fragment … of England’, was the ‘prophet’ of the movement. See:
87 Ibid., p.5.
88 “Imperial Conference, 1911 (Minutes Of Proceedings Of The),” pp.36-67 McIntyre and Canterbury History Foundation., *When, if ever, did New Zealand become independent?:* p.9. With his ‘… long-winded harangue he (Ward) baffled his hearers …’
Office to be reformed. At the end of his speech Ward’s amended resolution was moved:

That the Empire has now reached a stage of Imperial development which renders it expedient that there should be an Imperial Council of State with representatives from all self-governing parts of the Empire, in fact and in theory advisory to the Imperial Government on all questions affecting the interests of His Majesty’s Dominions Overseas.  

Sir Wilfred Laurier (Canada) immediately pointed out that Ward’s proposed two-tier structure was at variance with his speech. It would cede control to a British-dominated Imperial Council whereas his concern was that the ‘overseas democracies’ did not have influence in the choice between war and peace. The proposed elected legislature could authorise expenditure but not generate revenue. Its membership was to be set in proportion to the European/white population numbers of the constituent dominions. The proposal was dead before a fuller debate began for without Canadian backing there could be no chance of arriving at a consensus. Fisher, the Australian Prime Minister, made certain of the Ward resolution’s failure. He said that Ward’s was ‘… not a practical scheme …’. That was so, but the idea of having a say in foreign policy and defence were legitimately raised by Ward. His means of so doing and his reluctance to directly raise the French question as a case in point made his proposals all too easy to reject but he made the irrefutable point that the ‘… treaties … (made by Britain have) a very large bearing on the possibility of troubles affecting all portions of the Empire.’ He also said ‘… today in reality the overseas Dominions are helpless’ and ‘… they know nothing’ with respect to defence matters.

89 "Imperial Conference, 1911 (Minutes Of Proceedings Of The)," p.67.
90 Heinz Klug, Constituting Democracy: Law, Globalism and South Africa's Political Reconstruction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); "History of elections in South Africa," http://v1.sahistory.org.za/pages/governance-projects/elections/; "Australia Politics," http://australianpolitics.com/; "Elections Canada," This raised further issues. At one extreme New Zealand and Australia already had votes for women and at the other the new South African constitution would soon deliberately disenfranchise the black majority. The concept of what would constitute an elected democracy was a political quicksand.
91 "Imperial Conference, 1911 (Minutes Of Proceedings Of The)," pp.67-68.
92 Ibid., p.61,62.
1914: The Aftermath of the 1911 Imperial Conference

Notwithstanding the events taking place in Europe, the New Zealand Parliamentary record contains little of relevance to the unfolding situation. Ward’s clumsy 1911 efforts to gain some influence had failed and there was little constitutional room for formal local discussion. The Hansard index shows that defence occupied a very small portion of Parliamentary business both in the period leading up to the outbreak of war and immediately thereafter. Any debate was as much concerned with re-litigating Ward’s initiatives at various Imperial Conferences as it was about contemporary defence and foreign relations. On June 30th 1914 Ward - now Leader of the Opposition - outlined the strategic problem New Zealand faced. It was possible that an (unspecified) non-European power could threaten the Pacific without having had to confront the Royal Navy in Home waters. Hence New Zealand needed a local naval shield. He was very specific in stating, ‘New Zealand’s danger is not from Europe…’. Thus local arrangements for defence came into play. If the Royal Navy were defeated in Home waters whatever naval force New Zealand might have would be woefully insufficient to defend New Zealand. Ward quoted a statement from Churchill (reported in the Times) to reinforce his point. Any threats would have to be dealt with by the Royal Navy, acting as one unit and deployed under one command. Ward made the point that although under the relevant Defence Act New Zealand was permitted to have its own navy, in the event of war the United Kingdom had the legal right to take command of those ships and personnel. Thus New Zealand’s lot was entirely with that of Britain.

D. Buick M.P. (Reform, Palmerston) criticised Ward’s reference to New Zealand’s ‘toy navy’. Gifting a dreadnought had merely substituted funding from Britain to funding by New Zealand without increasing the total strength of the navy. The ‘Old Country’ had plenty of money for dreadnoughts. Buick (wrongly) believed that the 1909 crisis used to justify the gift had not in fact existed. Finally, Buick claimed that two smaller cruisers for a nascent New Zealand Navy would have been better. H. M.

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94 Ibid., pp.494-503. For example, E.W. Lee (Oamaru) ridiculed Ward’s role and his suggestions for an Imperial Parliament and/or Council. Lee likens the suggestion as akin to taxation by an unrepresentative Imperial Parliament, mirroring the situation that lead to the “loss” of the USA in similar circumstances.
95 Ibid., pp. 114-118. The quote regarding the threat from Europe appears on p.115.
96 See Footnote 77
Campbell M.P. (Hawkes Bay) attacked Ward on the same points and also on New Zealand’s reliance on the Anglo-Japan Alliance that brought New Zealand under the protection of a ‘yellow race’. 97

**War Declared**

On 28 July 1914, the date usually taken as being the first day of the World War I, Prime Minister Massey read to the House a telegram received by the Governor from H.M. Government. He was able to tell the House ‘His Majesty’s Government has not received any intimation of the outbreak of war’. Massey commented: ‘It was to be hoped, even now, that war would be averted’. 98 Massey, when asked later about the provision of troops replied that there was ‘… no occasion for serious alarm…’. If however they were required, he was confident of sufficient volunteers being available to make up an Expeditionary Force based, he hinted, on an ‘understanding’ of Imperial needs. 99

On August 8th Massey read to the House a summary of Asquith’s speech given in the Commons when war broke out. The opening part of the message referred to the German offer to renounce territorial gains from France in mainland Europe in exchange for a free hand to take French territories elsewhere, provided the United Kingdom stayed neutral. Belgium and Holland were referred to but the main message for New Zealand related to the Pacific. With French colonial possessions in New Zealand (and Australia’s) backyard potentially becoming territory of Germany the stakes for New Zealand were raised. 100 Massey was asked on August 8th 1914 for more information regarding war matters:

> The Government have got to cope with an exceedingly difficult position. We are to a certain extent in the confidence of the Imperial authorities, though we are only in the confidence of the Imperial authorities so far as New Zealand and the defence of the Pacific are concerned. We act on the advice and the recommendations, and sometimes on the instructions (emphasis added), of the Imperial authorities.

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99 Ibid., p.369.
Massey made clear that communications received via the Governor were for specified recipients. On ‘several occasions’ only the Prime Minister was to be told, on others only the Minister of Defence was also included.101 With troops on board two ships in Wellington Harbour, the date of departure and destination were of much interest but in that regard Massey stated:

> The only information I can give is that the troops are now under the control of the Imperial authorities and they will not sail until the Imperial authorities give the word. I do not know when the word will be given. It is quite impossible for me to say. In the meantime we have complied with the instructions of the Imperial Government in placing the men on the two ships that will convey them to their destination.

102

The New Zealand men were already beyond the control of the New Zealand Government. The Prime Minister was following his instructions. This point was reinforced when Massey, answering queries about troop deployment, stated that they would go to Europe as ‘… Imperial troops in every sense of the word and under Imperial authority.’103 New Zealand’s Defence and Foreign policy was as firmly under Imperial control as it had been in 1900, despite Ward and others attempting to gain some influence, if not control.

A very lengthy editorial in *Truth* commented unfavourably when war was finally declared.104 There was a greater cause to the war than the assassinations in Bosnia and *Truth* derided the public anti-German demonstrations along with the ‘statesmen’ giving such displays political support. *Truth* claimed nobody of sound mind wanted war with Germany, not because they feared her but because German was a civilized,

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102 Ibid., p.553.
103 Ibid., p.498.

"New Zealand Parliamentary Debates," 104: September 13 - October 13(1898): p.517. There was precedent for this taciturn approach. An example of the paucity of information that was available or indeed released came when the Boer War began. Seddon told Parliament that the Press Agency was reporting the Governor of NSW as “… intimating that war (in South Africa) had broken out, and that, possibly, hostilities had commenced”. Seddon was unable to confirm this because the Governor of New Zealand was at Waikanae and “… the wires are down”. Readers will be aware that Waikanae was, as it still is, just 65km north of Wellington. "New Zealand Parliamentary Debates,” p.498.

"New Zealand Parliamentary Debates," 113: August 16 - September 13(1900): pp.639-640. Seddon on another occasion used Imperial authority as a reason to withhold information. He excused the failure to release various redacted despatches from South Africa on the probable impropriety of allowing publication of such, even from a New Zealand officer, if he were serving under Imperial command.

104 Redmer Yska and Louise Belcher, *Truth : the rise and fall of the people's paper* (Nelson, N.Z.: Craig Potton Pub., 2010). pp.54-55. "New Zealand Truth (Description),” in *Papers Past* (National Library). The Australian publisher John Norton launched *Truth* in 1905. Opinionated, controversial and popular over the period 1913-22 it was socialist in outlook and worker orientated. *Truth’s* anti-conscription, anti-military and anti-compulsory military training stance was impossible to maintain once war was declared. By positioning itself as supportive of the troops in the field *Truth* could change its editorial opinion while continuing as a champion of the working man.
cultured, and progressive nation with ties to Britain. In *Truth*'s view Britain’s ‘secret’ treaties with France and Russia were to blame. It was Russia, in this narrative that had provoked Germany and this being the case the United Kingdom was under no obligation to assist. While Germany’s invasion of France was aggressive, *Truth* accepted that the Germans saw it as defensive. New Zealand’s aid for France was seen as better than entering the war simply to assist Russia, of which the editorial took a particularly grim and critical view. *Truth* questioned Britain’s foreign policy and particularly the anti-German views of Grey. Given the circumstances the French made ‘worthy allies’ and the cause of defending France was just. *Truth* concluded that foreign affairs must in future be open to (New Zealand) parliamentary and public scrutiny.¹⁰⁵

Conclusions

Responsible colonial government aimed to loosen the governance bonds and encourage greater solidarity and mutual dependence within the Empire. In fact as the dominions became more engaged in defence and foreign policy matters within their own regions it exposed conflicts of interest that had to be resolved by negotiation rather than through direction from London. Improvisation rather than planning was the result - as reflected in the incoherent British Empire defence arrangements during the Boer War. The subsequent effort put into morale building through Trafalgar Day and Empire Day as well as the formation of the Committee for Imperial Defence belied the apparent strength and coherence of Empire as a unified, self-sufficient entity. Such activity would have been superfluous unless there was an assumption that it would one day have to act as a unified and coherent unit. While the *entente cordiale* was a necessary veil to cover the defensive fragilities of Britain and her Empire it was irreconcilable with New Zealand’s persistent and pervasive negative sentiment towards France, and matters French, in the pre-war years. The French nation as it was presented to New Zealand newspaper readers was anti-Semitic, temperamentally Gallic, and politically chaotic with a corrupted judiciary. Fashoda confirmed just how bad the French colonisation model was and exposed the French race as unsuitable rulers, actual or potential, for Pacific territories adjacent to New Zealand. The Dreyfus Affair added to the public sentiment: it exposed to New Zealand a France without British decency and values.

The press, the public and the politicians made easy bedfellows. Each used the other two as much as they were in turn used. The press wanted news that would sell. Since the news therefore had to be of interest to the public, stories that the editors may have privately considered to be in the public interest were not always published. It cannot be assumed that the public sought factual reporting of events: they preferred news that in content and format related to their own lives and beliefs and that is what they got. While the public was not a homogeneous group, the increasing

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availability of newspapers meant public opinion could be more extensively publicised by the press and delivered to the politicians who completed the feedback cycle: they received an undifferentiated mix of public and press views through the news and then reacted to it. All three played their respective roles within the context of their own prejudices and priorities. The Fashoda incident and the Dreyfus affair were classic examples of this mechanism in practice despite there being no recognised role for New Zealand politicians. Political silence was a function of the absence of any formal local involvement in foreign affairs as well as the geographic and cultural distance of France. Opinion, such as it was, therefore came from local and (reprinted) overseas editorials and political comment. The extensive advertising exploiting Fashoda and Dreyfus reveals that both events caught the public eye. Having attracted attention the advertisers had to be sensitive to the public viewpoint. On that basis both used a negative orientation that reflected poorly on the French nation.²

Despite the extensive press coverage, the dislike might have faded if France and New Zealand had not persisted with their conflicting colonial ambitions in the Pacific. The old enemy, France, was the main impediment to New Zealand’s Seddon inspired colonial aspirations that repeatedly clashed with the Empire’s (British) interests. The early years of the twentieth century saw both British and French intellectuals and politicians if not changing their minds, at least adapting their ideas about their opposites. From the French side of the channel the rise of non-British imperialism, an emerging Franco-British rapprochement and a more active British working class implied much that was believed by the French intelligentsia about England was untrue. If the revolutionary events in France between 1848-1851 ‘...demolished the orthodox liberal view that France and Britain were following converging paths...’, then the early 1900s showed that they had indeed now converged to face similar destinies.³ The truth slowly dawned that the English were facing the same issues that the French were.⁴

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² Algeria was another case in point that received extensive negative coverage. "Algeria," p.2.; "The French in Algiers [From the Morning Chronicle, July 14.]," New Zealand Spectator and Cook's Strait Guardian, 20 December 1845, p.3.
³ Tombs and Tombs, That Sweet Enemy : the French and the British from the Sun King to the Present: p.351.
⁴ Charle, "French Intellectuals and the Impossible English Model (1870-1914)," p.247. This was not new. British Radicals observing the French Revolution had come to the same conclusion: Great Britain at the time was facing many of the same issues as the French.
For the politicians and the military, a policy and strategy re-think was needed. In the pre-War years New Zealand and the other Dominions attempted to take a middle course towards a more autonomous stance from within the Empire. As early as 1907 Ward, arguably the strongest of the New Zealand political supporters of the Empire, was raising reservations.

Our country is very anxious and willing to assist the Old Land in the event of trouble arising, to do so voluntarily by men or by money, and, I think, always would be ready to do its share in fighting for the defence of the Motherland in any portion of the world. We want to keep clear of the possibility of being drawn into what one might term Continental troubles with England itself. We want to have a distinct line of demarcation drawn in that respect between the responsibility we accept of our own free will and the responsibility that may be imposed upon us without our having had any opportunity of conference or discussion with regard to it.5

Three points arise from Ward’s statement. New Zealand explicitly requested input into any decisions related to a possible Continental War.6 This was promised but never delivered. Secondly New Zealand was prepared to ‘do its share’ as was the case in the Boer War. Thirdly Ward’s position did not provoke British threats of coercion to encourage conformity. The British ignored the first point, and noted the second. They needed to do no more. New Zealand’s own resources were too little to make an independent defence policy possible, and her aspirations could be managed as long as she did not challenge the wisdom of Empire membership.

The unilateral introduction of the entente and the secret negotiations that followed as it evolved into a de facto alliance, showed the weakness of the dominions’ position. Successive pre-war New Zealand leaders had exuded confidence - almost smugness - when dealing with the British leadership. This came from being praised as the world’s most democratic social laboratory, geographically isolated from Europe and sheltered behind the Empire’s foreign policy and defence arrangements. Adopting the behaviour of a favoured child introduced familial roles in which both New Zealand and Britain felt comfortable. The writing of Morrell, Sinclair and King all reflect this historiographical perspective. They wrote of New Zealand as a new nation still in gestation. New Zealand did seem naïve, but like the majority of Asquith’s Cabinet and the British public, her political leadership and public were kept ignorant of the true state of Britain’s relationship with France despite British assurance to the contrary. Many of the British advisers

5 "Colonial Conference, 1907 (Minutes of Proceedings of the)," p.32.
and politicians that New Zealand’s leaders contacted would also have been unaware of the covert militarisation of the *entente*. Moreover New Zealand’s politicians lacked their own professional foreign policy advice that may have helped them probe and question during the Empire Conferences. This perspective absolves New Zealand from responsibility for the Empire’s foreign affairs and raises questions around conscious intentions.

Geographic distance was equated with political isolation from European affairs, and so despite pre-War European diplomacy and its possible consequences being reported in great detail in New Zealand by and large the broader implications were ignored except by a few of less conventional opinion. As a result the much admired and studied strong, independent, resourceful New Zealand character that had an empirically derived solution for social and economic problems still to be addressed elsewhere in the world, was not applied to international affairs. Barnes with her reference to London as a New Zealand metropolis and Brooking, who points out that New Zealand history is intertwined with that of the Empire, show that it was not an option to be either in or out on a case by case basis: New Zealand was either an Empire member and had to accept the consequences or it had to opt out as the United States had done over a century earlier. The consequence of accepting Empire membership with little reservation was the alliance with France.

It is clear that the imperial exactions placed on the British taxpayer enabled the colonists and residents of the dominions and the dependent Empire to pay fewer taxes and to devote a substantial proportion of the taxes they did pay to a variety of projects that did not include defense and interest. The Empire was a political system …

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Appendix I: Allen’s Visit to London

Allen listed five objectives for his 1912-13 trip to London. These were (quoted as he listed them in the original):

1. Defence of N.Z. from attack.
2. Protection of the Mercantile Marine.
3. Protection of Trade Routes.
4. To be in a position to assist other parts of the Empire (emphasis added) by dispatching an Expeditionary Force ...
5. To enable the Empire to speak with undoubted weight on any diplomatic questions which may arise in the Pacific or elsewhere. The importance of this object has not been sufficiently pressed. I believe most earnest consideration should be given to it.

Allen noted on the same page that the Home Authorities had asked about the number of New Zealand troops available for off-shore deployment. Allen proposed ten thousand men but he pointed out that under New Zealand law they would have to volunteer since territorials could not be compelled to serve outside New Zealand. Commenting on sea power Allen said that the Empire alone should be sufficiently resourced to maintain freedom of shipping but even if it depended on alliances to do so it should still have the resources to ‘… make the Empire strong in Diplomacy …’ and to keep ‘… the ocean ways open.’ Allen also wanted to raise the issue of control, specifically shared responsibility with a ‘Board’, for deployment of naval units locally. There are several documents related to progress on the proposed expansion of the Auckland Naval base. Sea power and support facilities for the Navy were the uppermost consideration as considerable notes and addenda are attached relating to estimates for the naval construction in Auckland. Exactly what this presaged is unclear but it appears to be linked to possible naval unit (re-) deployment and this in turn was related to the need for adding ‘weight’ to the Empire’s diplomatic initiatives in the Pacific.

Interviews conducted during Allen’s trip include a note dated April 11th 1913 in which he recorded he had declined permanent New Zealand representation on the Imperial Defence Committee. No specific reason is given. Allen ‘called at the Admiralty’ (7th April 1913) to investigate possible coaling stations for ships using the

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1 Allen, "Minister of Defence - Naval Defence matters - Memoranda from Hon. James Allen to Ministers (R222319686),” pages are not numbered.
Panama Canal on the voyage to New Zealand. He was told by the Assistant Secretary of the Naval Department and the Assistant Hydrographer that there was only one possibility, Rapa Island, but that was ‘… now held by the French … and ‘The whole matter rests on acquiring Rapa from the French …’. New Zealand was urged during the same visit to undertake an ‘urgent … Geological Survey of her Oilfields …’ It was anticipated that any reserves of oil ‘… will ultimately be valuable’ Allen also had an appointment with the Secretary of State for the Colonies (Lewis Harcourt) who told him that appointing a British Agent in Tonga would require annexation and that would only happen if the (Tongan) King died or he took some act ‘… which could be taken exception to’.

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3 J Allen, "Ministerial Files - English trip 1913, notes of interviews," (1913). Archives NZ notes: ‘The papers were discovered in a packing case in the Carpenter’s Shop under Parliament Buildings where presumably they had been since Allen retired from office.’