State Failure in the South Pacific and its Implications for
New Zealand Security Policy

A thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the degree of

Master of Philosophy
in
Defence Studies

at Massey University, Palmerston North,
New Zealand

Stuart I. J. Wootton

2007

Abstract:

The concept of state failure is complex, encompassing many aspects of the decline in a state, from its institutional and political capacities, to its social cohesion and economic performance. In the South Pacific, the term "failing" has been used to describe the Solomon Islands before the regional assistance mission RAMSI intervened. Its continued use to describe other countries in the region, such as Papua New Guinea or Fiji is controversial, mainly because the states of the South Pacific are generally considered much more peaceful than those in other regions labelled failing. Importantly, the geographical nature of the region itself provides a vastly different strategic context to African and European failing states which are often situated in landlocked geographies. It follows on that if Pacific Island states do experience aspects of failure (as opposed to being completely collapsed or failed) then their incapacities would breed unique security implications for the South Pacific region. This thesis aims to discern what those implications are for New Zealand policy in the South Pacific region. The method used will be to assess seven countries (Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu) and their degree to which they measure up against twelve indicators of state failure. These indicators have been borrowed from the Fund for Peace's annual Failed States Index (with their permission) and they provide the structure for the assessment.

Contents:

List of Illustrations:

Figures:

Tables:

Graphs:

List of Acronyms:

ABG	Autonomous Bougainville Government
ADB	Asian Development Bank
AFP	Australian Federal Police
ANU	Australian National University
ASF	Australian Conservation Foundation
ASPI	Australian Strategic Policy Institute
BFF	Bougainville Freedom Fighters
BRA	Bougainville Revolutionary Army
CELCoR	Centre for Environmental Law and Community Rights
ECP	Enhanced Cooperation Programme
EU	European Union
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
FLP	Fijian Labour Party
GCC	Great Council of Chiefs
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNI	Gross National Income
HIES	Household Income and Expenditure Survey
HPI	Human Poverty Index
HRPP	Human Rights Protection Party
IFF	Isatabu Freedom Fighters
IFM	Isatabu Freedom Movement
IMF	International Monetary Fund
MAP	Mutual Assistance Programme
MDF	Me'ekamui Defence Force
MEF	Malaita Eagle Forces
MFAT	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
MOD	Ministry of Defence
NGO	Non-Government Organisation
NIS	National Integrity System
NPF	National Provident Fund
NZAID	New Zealand's International Aid and Development Agency
NZDF	New Zealand Defence Force
ODA	Official Development Assistance
PIC	Pacific Island Country
PIF	Pacific Islands Forum
PNG	Papua New Guinea
PNGDF	Papua New Guinea Defence Force
PPF	Participating Police Force
PPP	Purchasing Power Parity
RAMSI	Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands
RFMF	Royal Fijian Military Forces
RSIP	Royal Solomon Islands Police
SDUP	Samoa Democratic United Party

SHP	Southern Highlands Province
SNDP	Samoa National Development Party
SOPAC	South Pacific Applied Geoscience Commission
SPC	Secretariat of the Pacific Community
TI	Transparency International
TMC	Tuvalu Media Corporation
TPA	Townsville Peace Agreement
UNAIDS	Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCAP	United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
UNESCO	United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UN-Habitat	United Nations Human Settlements Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission on Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNIFEM	United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
USA/US	United States of America
USD	United States Dollars
VMF	Vanuatu Mobile Force
VPF	Vanuatu Police Force
WHO	World Health Organisation
WHP	Western Highlands Province

Executive Summary:

- This paper aims to identify the aspects of state failure within South Pacific states and to distinguish their implications for New Zealand's security policy in the region.

- The framework for this investigation is part of the Fund for Peace's methodology for their Failed States Index – namely their 12 indicators

- The countries included in this investigation are Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu. These countries have been chosen for the wide variety of cultures and societies they represent in the Melanesian and Polynesian sub-regions. They also represent different political and economic situations that provides contrast among the countries in the research.

- Overall, the indicators show that the assessed South Pacific countries are weakened by various levels of corruption, and poor performing economies that are vulnerable and dependent on ODA and in most cases remittances.

- This carries over into state performance; as state institutions are weakened and become more prone to corruption, the delivery of public services becomes uneven or deteriorates, and there is a general inability to contain the detrimental effects of population growth, demographic pressures, or alleviate poverty.

- In Melanesian countries like the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea, a mixture of demographics, poverty, cultural and political factionalism, corruption and state institutional incapacity provide a

social milieu where violence and conflict has become (or was) a staple of life.

- In countries such as Vanuatu and Fiji, there are significant, and in some cases growing, indicators of poverty and poor government administration. Both states have had, or are currently having problems between civil and military establishments.

- Tonga and Samoa both rate relatively highly when it comes to development indicators, and both are very stable politically. However, their heavy dependence on remittances as well as aid (like other PICs) underlines weak and stagnant economies. Furthermore, Tonga's violent and destructive riots of November 2006 destroyed an illusion of peace and demonstrated that Polynesian populations do have the capacity for violence on the scale seen in Honiara of April 2006.

- Tuvalu paints a different picture of a state struggling with its demographic and geographical realities. Poverty levels have increased over the years, and poverty in regards to infrastructure and opportunities characterise the nature of the development challenges facing the small Tuvaluan government, which itself is subject to bouts of low-level factionalism and political instability.

- These indicators have a cyclical and cumulative effect upon one another, where, for instance, corruption and poverty will facilitate and exacerbate increasingly unstable social and political environments, which in turn will exacerbate corruption and poverty, resulting in an increasingly weakened state.

- The key regional security concerns that stem from these aspects of failure within these states are:

- Internal instability and humanitarian emergencies stemming from conflict or natural disasters.
- Increasing transnational criminal activities in the region, including illegal drug manufacturing and trafficking, people smuggling, and illegal fishing, carried out by extra-regional criminal organisations and terrorist groups.
- The proliferation of guns.
- Political instability from strained civil-military relations having political and economic effects for the wider region.

- Subsequently, the fear of state failure has driven states such as Australia and New Zealand towards a new paradigm in assessing threats to regional security, focusing more upon state capacity building as means to address these threats. This does call upon greater involvement in the region by New Zealand and Australia, but this involvement has to be balanced against respecting countries sovereignty and constitutionalism.

- Intervention is an indication of the extent to which New Zealand and Australia are willing to get involved in situations of conflict in PICSs, but it is an extremely drawn out and expensive commitment that is fraught with risks, as has been demonstrated by the Solomon Islands experience.

- Regionalism is becoming an increasingly important vehicle for regional capacity building and this is evident in the wide scope envisaged in the Pacific Plan. But regionalism also involves heavy engagement from New Zealand and Australia, because without them there would be no impetus or resources to allow regional initiatives to achieve full implementation.

- Other important aspects of capacity building are New Zealand's bilateral development and governance assistance programmes which are targeted at structural capacity building as a means to resolve conflict peacefully and to alleviate poverty. While ODA has been a significant pillar of New Zealand engagement in the South Pacific for decades, the drivers behind it, its delivery, and its aims have evolved over recent years to meet the change in security perceptions.

- The implications for New Zealand's defence policy have meant a broadening in the role of the NZDF in the South Pacific, as well as requiring that New Zealand's own defence forces go through capacity building. Additionally, cooperation programmes are increasingly important in improving the professionalism and discipline in PICs' defence and police forces in order to lessen their potential as sources of political and social instability.

- Police are becoming much more needed in the region, and New Zealand's capacities and programmes will need to gradually reflect this evolution.

- More research needs to be done on the social, economic and political impacts of Asia in the region. In particular, the impacts from the influence of the two China's bidding for South Pacific countries' recognition, the impacts from Asian criminal organisations spreading into the region, and also the impacts of foreign investment from these countries' companies, particularly in regards to the extent they facilitate corruption and social instability.

Introduction:

2006 proved to be an eventful year regionally and domestically for Pacific Island countries (PICs). For instance, there were the Solomon Islands riots in April after the Parliamentary elections. The riots destroyed most of Chinatown in Honiara and were blamed on Taiwanese influence. In September, King Tupou IV of Tonga died, his seat has been taken over by his son, the controversial Crown Prince. In November, there were riots in Tonga, that destroyed a large portion of Nuku'alofa and were perceived to be caused when Parliament had been closed for the end of the year without addressing the important issue of democratic reform. Finally, the whole world watched the Fijian coup unravelling in Fijian time, hesitantly but inevitable.

These events have played out against a number of complex trends and issues that have been festering and subverting development and political progress in PICs for years. In some academic and political discussions, PICs have come to be seen as reflecting trends and issues that are found in other struggling states around the world, so that terms like "Africanisation" and "failing" have been used to describe the region and particular states. The use of such dramatic terms has stimulated discussion over the development challenges and governance issues prevalent in many PICs.

The term "failing state" has gained a high level of credence in academic circles world wide and has been used to describe the condition of a number of countries around the world such as Somalia, Bosnia, and Haiti. The concept of state failure is complex, encompassing many aspects of the decline in a state, from its institutional and political capacities, to its social cohesion and economic performance. Failed or completely collapsed states can be effectively conceived as empty borders. No single authoritative administration holds sole territorial control, but instead warring factions compete for control within borders that remain internationally recognised. For other countries,

1

failed and failing states are widely perceived as security concerns, particularly if one is a neighbour with such a state. In the South Pacific, the term "failing" has been used to describe the Solomon Islands before the regional assistance mission RAMSI intervened. Its continued use to describe other countries in the region, such as Papua New Guinea or Fiji is controversial, mainly because the countries of the South Pacific are generally considered much more peaceful than those in other regions labelled failing. Importantly, the geographical nature of the region itself provides a vastly different strategic context to African and European failing states which are often situated in landlocked geographies. It follows on that if Pacific Island states do experience aspects of failure (as opposed to being completely collapsed or failed) then their incapacities would breed unique security implications for the South Pacific region. This thesis aims to discern what those implications are for New Zealand policy in the South Pacific region. The method used will be to assess seven countries (Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu) and their degree to which they measure up against twelve indicators of state failure. These indicators have been borrowed from the Fund for Peace's annual Failed States Index (with their permission) and they provide the structure for the assessment.

To present this research, this thesis has been split into three sections with the first briefly outlining the central tenets of the concept of state failure followed by a literature review of the discussion of state failure in the South Pacific. In this first section there will also be a brief explanation of why the seven countries have been chosen, a brief outline of the twelve indicators, and a note on the sources used. The second section will be structured into twelve separate parts, as per the twelve indicators. Each part will have an explanation of the indicator, the research involved, and the importance of the findings. The third section will start with a brief summary of the findings of the indicators, as per country, followed by an account of the region's insecurities that can be put down to aspects of failure with South Pacific states. Finally, this thesis will go

into the implications these insecurities have for New Zealand policy and aspirations in the region.

Section 1

1.1 State Failure

Defining state failure is an exercise in identifying the symptoms or the commonly agreed attributes that failing states exhibit and share with other failing states. On a basic level, state failure can be perceived as the state losing its "monopoly on the legitimate use of force" within its claimed territory.[1] A successful state not only maintains this facet of statehood but provides its citizens with the security and welfare that enables it to remain "legitimate" in their eyes. On the other hand, an unsuccessful or failing state loses either or both of its monopoly of force (such as through the dominant presence of warlords, militias or even agents from other countries and other countries themselves) and its legitimacy with the people.

On another level, the term is often used to imply that a state has reached a phase in decay that renders it ineffective. It is unable to uniformly enforce its laws due to high rates of crime, excessive corruption at the bureaucratic and political levels, judicial impotence, deliberate military interventions in civil politics, extensive informal (black) markets, and clashes between the enduring authority of traditional tribal structures and that of the state.

An important aspect of failure can be seen as a state's ability to react and rebuild after experiencing trauma, such as conflict or a natural disaster. For example, though the nature of the conflicts going on in Iraq and Lebanon differ, the extent to which they can be said to be failing is determined by how quickly the rebuilding process is carried out (both physically and psychologically as a nation) and, more importantly, how effectively any lingering grievances are addressed and reconciled. Previously, Lebanon has shown an ability to rebuild after the trauma of its civil war, while Iraq teeters

---

[1] From the oft-quoted Max Weber in *Politics as a Vocation*, 1918, that can be found at www2.pfeiffer.edu/~Iridener/DSS/weber/polvoc.html

on the brink of such conflict three years after the US-led intervention force entered in 2003.

Even developed nations may suffer from aspects of failure—2005's Hurricane Katrina left thousands of United States citizens stranded for days as state institutions scrambled to gather together an effective response. In the same year, violent riots in France brought the country's cities to a standstill while exposing tensions that had been slowly festering between French society and Muslim immigrants.

In recent years, the label of "failed state" has been given to many states that have been perceived as failing and since 2005 the Fund for Peace has provided a *Failed States Index* (FSI) which attempts to rank countries according to their vulnerability to failure and internal conflict. The 2005 index ranked the Ivory Coast as the most at risk of failing, followed by the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, Iraq, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Chad, Yemen, Liberia and Haiti. The 2006 index saw the Ivory Coast and the Sudan switch places as well as the inclusion of Zimbabwe (fifth), Pakistan (ninth) and Afghanistan (tenth) into the top ten. The image on the following page provides the scope of the Index's 2006 findings on a global scale.

However, one must be wary when attempting to group these examples under one label of "failed". Each case may be perceived as experiencing the process or result of state decay yet yield different outcomes. For instance, the Sudan is at the top of the index because of an enduring internal conflict, and alleged systematic ethnic cleansings that have led to its poor ratings in dealing with group grievances and human rights.[2] The Democratic Republic of Congo and the Ivory Coast follow close behind the Sudan because their governments, for a long time, have been unable to control vast regions of their territory.

---

[2] "Sudan Report" *Fund for Peace Failed States Index*, retrieved from http://www.fundforpeace.org/programs/fsi/fsiprofiles.php on 28/08/06.

Figure 1 – Failed States Index Map of the World

Source: www.fundforpeace.org/programs/fsi/

Similarly, one should be cautious when emphasising state failure as a regional phenomenon. Such generalisations would be easy to make considering that eleven of the top twenty failed states can be found in Africa. For instance, Zimbabwe saw its rating in the 2006 index climb ten places to fifth due to increasingly poor governance and widespread corruption, while close neighbour South Africa has proven relatively stable in comparison.[3] Similarly, despite sharing a notoriously porous border with Somalia and experiencing corruption scandals, Kenya has improved since last year's ratings.[4] Ghana continues to be perceived as one of the most promising states in West Africa, regardless of the decline in its neighbour Nigeria who, despite moves towards economic and human rights reform, has been unable to conciliate its various regional and religious tensions that threaten to overwhelm its fragile state infrastructure.[5]

---

[3] "South Africa Report" and "Zimbabwe Report", ibid.

[4] "Somalia Report" and "Kenya Report", ibid.

[5] "Ghana Report" and "Nigeria Report", ibid.

1.2 Literature Review of State Failure in the South Pacific:

Questioning the stability of states in the South Pacific is not especially new to the discussion of security in the region. The concept of state failure in the South Pacific has steadily increased over the last decade and has almost entirely focussed on the events in Bougainville, the Solomon Islands, and to a lesser extent Papua New Guinea and Fiji. Central to this academic debate is the very controversial assertion that the region is undergoing an "Africanisation", a term coined by Australian academic Ben Reilly. It is because of this assertion that in this part of the thesis the debate will be given specific attention.

In recent years, discourse on the South Pacific has been partially characterised by the debate over the general decline in stability– or as Ben Reilly terms the "Africanisation" – of the region. In his article, *The Africanisation of the South Pacific*, Reilly asserts that the South Pacific is undergoing a "progressive 'Africanisation'" whereby "four inter-related phenomena that have long been associated with violent conflict and the failure of democratic government in Africa:

- the growing tensions in the relationship between civil regimes and military forces;
- the intermixture between ethnic identity and the competition for control of natural resources as factors driving conflicts;
- the weakness of basic institutions of governance such as prime ministers, parliaments and, especially, political parties; and
- the increasing centrality of the state as a means of gaining wealth and accessing and exploiting resources."[6]

---

[6] Ben Reilly, "The Africanisation of the South Pacific", *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 54, No.3, 2000a, pp. 262-263. 261-8.

In relying upon such resources as Paul Collier's World Bank Report[7] on the prediction of civil war, Freedom House's 1999 *Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties* and the United Nations Human Development Index (HDI), Reilly draws parallels in the incidence of political instability and conflict behaviour between Africa and the South Pacific. He concludes that "Fragile, multi-ethnic, post-colonial states encompassing different languages, ethnic groups, islands, and torn between the rival claims of tradition and modernity, raise serious questions about the viability of current state structures and their ability to manage internal conflicts."[8] However, Reilly's analysis often only draws upon evidence from his doctoral work in Papua New Guinea where the case for Africanisation is strongest. Only passing regard is given to other Polynesian and Melanesian members of the South Pacific and this lack is a major weakness in his thesis.

Reilly has followed this article with subsequent theses focussing particularly on ethnic fractionalisation of Papua New Guinea and its effects on democracy, governance and conflict in the region.[9] Most relevant here is his *State Functioning and State Failure in the South Pacific* (2004) which attempts to build upon his past assertions. In this article, he assesses the relative gaps in state performance between the regions of Melanesia and Polynesia. Drawing upon the same analytical tools as used to identify relationships between ethnic fragmentation, human development, and the attributes of poor state performance in Africa, Reilly believes that the ethnically heterogeneous nature of populations in Melanesia are accountable for the instability of the region. As a contrast in comparison, Reilly refers to the relative stability of

---

[7] See Paul Collier, *Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and Their Implications for Policy*, Washington, DC: World Bank, 2000.

[8] Ibid, p.267.

[9] See Ben Reilly, "Democracy, Ethnic Fragmentation, and Internal Conflict: Confused Theories, Faulty Data, and the 'Crucial Case' of Papua New Guinea", *International Security*, Vol. 25, No.3, 2000b, pp.162-185; Ben Reilly, "Ethnicity, Democracy and Development in Papua New Guinea", *Pacific Economic Bulletin*, Vol. 19, No.1, 2004a, pp.46-54; and Ben Reilly and Robert Phillpot, " 'Making Democracy Work' in Papua New Guinea: Social Capital and Provincial Development in an Ethnically Fragmented Society", *Asian Survey*, Vol. XLII, No. 6, 2002, pp. 906-927.

ethnically homogeneous states like Samoa in Polynesia that have benefited from many years of stable democratic governance since independence.[10] He concludes that different types of ethnic structure are associated with specific economic and political outcomes, including variation in political stability, economic development, and internal conflict from country to country. More specifically, it is the combination of ethnic diversity and resources in Melanesian states such as Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu that have generated "particular pathologies of governance, with a focus on rent-seeking by ethnic interest groups, and below par economic performance."[11]

In another article, *Internal Conflict and Regional Security in Asia and the Pacific*, Ben Reilly examines the impact of "increasing intra-state conflict in the Asia Pacific on domestic, regional and international security."[12] In a study that extends to the trouble spots of Southeast Asia, Reilly continues to build upon his assertions of Africanisation, incorporating the importance of modernisation and democratisation and the changing nature of international norms regarding the creation of new states. With Elsina Wainwright, Reilly has also contributed his ideas to the growing academic rhetoric surrounding the world-wide phenomenon of failing and weak states in the book *Making States Work*. In this piece, the important question of state viability is lightly touched on. Indeed, Reilly and Wainwright argue that throughout the South Pacific there are cases "in which the gap between juridical sovereignty and effective statehood is yawningly wide."[13] Of particular importance to some Pacific Island countries is their long-term viability in the face of global

---

[10] Incidentally, Samoa was one of the examples Ben Reilly used to illustrate the 'Africanisation' of the South Pacific in his 2000 article;eg. see Ben Reilly, "State Functioning and State Failure in the South Pacific", *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 58, No.4, 2004b, p. 480 Reilly, 2000a, *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, p. 262.
[11] Reilly, 2004b, p.490.
[12] Ben Reilly, "Internal Conflict and Regional Security in Asia and the Pacific", *Pacifica Review*, Vol.14, No.1, 2002b, p. 7.
[13] Ben Reilly, Elsina Wainwright, "The South Pacific", Simon Chesterman, Michael Ignatieff, Ramesh Thakur (eds.), *Making States Work: State Failure and the Failure of Governance*, New York: United Nations University Press, 2005, p.131.

warming and rising sea levels specifically to low lying atoll states and territories such as Tuvalu and Tokelau, though this issue is rarely, if at all, thoroughly addressed.

Elsina Wainwright has also written the article *Responding to State Failure – the Case of Australia and the Solomon Island's* (2003). Wainwright reinforces the perceptions of the Solomon Islands deterioration as failure, indeed, whether it was a properly functioning state in the first place. Certainly a view backed by the Australia Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) in its paper *Our Failing Neighbour*, where again there is a focus on applying the failed state paradigm to the South Pacific – a region where many of the states are "to a greater or lesser degree, failing." [14] It is widely believed that this particular paper has been instrumental in Australia's decision to get involved with the Solomon Islands.[15] On the contrary, Stephen Hoadley writes that it has been argued that the Solomon Islands government, while weak "was far from 'failed' in 2004, and what appears as 'failure' may be manifestations of traditional island ways of governance, unorthodox to Western eyes but authentic in their own context."[16] Differing from their Australian counterparts, New Zealand observers and academics have been slightly more reserved in applying the "failed state" or "Africanisation" label to specific cases in the South Pacific let alone the entire region.

Peter Wallensteen is notable for his work on state failure, the incidence of armed conflict and also its prevention.[17] He contributed to the 1990 cease-fire arrangements for the Bougainville conflict and, in a speech given to the

---

[14] Australian Strategic Policy Institute, *Our Failing Neighbour: Australia and the Future of the Solomon Islands*, June 2003, p. 1.

[15] However, despite this papers very good analysis of the Solomon Islands situation, there is good reason to suspect that Australia was already looking at ways it could help out; Interview with Peter Noble, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Wellington, 27/4/06.

[16] Stephen Hoadley, "Pacific Island Security Management by New Zealand and Australia: Towards a New Paradigm", *Working Paper 20/05*, Wellington: Centre for Strategic Studies, 2005, p.13.

[17] See Wallensteen.

Conference on Securing a Peaceful Pacific, believes that "global patterns of conflict are mirrored in the South Pacific."[18] With a cursory glance at the twenty political entities that inhabit the region, Wallensteen finds some "disturbing elements:

- The three most populous independent states – PNG, Fiji and the Solomon Islands – have all ended up in protracted and difficult internal conflicts.
- Two non-self ruling areas – West Irian/West Papua and New Caledonia – are beset with troubles, which at time has included use of deadly weapons and killings.
- Two states – Vanuatu and Nauru – are under severe strain, threatening the political fabric of the society."[19]

Accordingly, this provides "five actual trouble-spots and two potential situations… five or seven tense societies out of 20 is, indeed, a full agenda."[20] Wallensteen's arguments have much in common with Reilly's Africanisation thesis in that he continues to make linkages between how he perceives the situation in the South Pacific and the issues and areas he has studied throughout the rest of the world. Many of these have to do with strategic considerations of conflict in the region such as conflict behaviour spilling over into surrounding states or even developing into inter-state armed conflict among neighbours – "this phenomenon has been observed elsewhere… Stemming from one single conflict, entire regions may be destabilised."[21]

However, there are arguments that strive to negate the propagation of such negative views of the South Pacific. Stewart Firth, in *A Reflection on South Pacific Regional Security*, agues against the Africanisation thesis. Firth takes issue with the labelling of the South Pacific in such a way as if it were one undifferentiated entity, when in fact many of the Africanised qualities that

---

[18] Peter Wallensteen, *Conflict Prevention and the South Pacific*, Plenary Address given at the conference on Securing a Peaceful Pacific, Christchurch, October 15-17, 2004, p.1.
[19] Ibid, p.2.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Ibid, p.3

have been listed should only have been applied to the Melanesian states – if at all. Firth additionally doubts the efficacy of basing such conclusions on the United Nations Human Development Index and also assumptions on the origins of ethnic based conflict particularly in Papua New Guinea and Fiji. However, Firth acknowledges that the South Pacific faces a much more immediate threat from the "globalisation agenda" that is being sold throughout the developing nations of the region.[22] Though not rejecting Reilly's thesis altogether, he believes explaining developments in "'South Pacific' terms alone may be to miss the wider regional context, Southeast Asian and Pacific, in which they are best understood."[23]

Jon Fraenkel provides the most comprehensive argument against the Africanisation thesis. In his 2003 article *The Coming Anarchy in Oceania?*[24], Fraenkel draws upon both African and South Pacific literature to not only argue that Reilly's conclusions of the Pacific are unfounded but also many of the key assumptions that Reilly relies upon to make up his "four inter-related phenomena". In consideration of Melanesia, Fraenkel admits that while many of the sub-region's states face considerable underlying tensions, the crises that do arise are "localised, episodic and obedient to very specific historical causes which are not adequately explained by the loose and rather ill-informed analogy with Africa."[25] In going over data covering Gross Domestic Product (GDP) *per capita*, literacy, schooling and life expectancy, Fraenkel finds little evidence for the claims of comparison between the two regions. Parallels with African standards of living were unfounded and there are only a few areas of north-west Melanesia that have HDI indicators close to levels found in sub-

---

[22] Stewart Firth, "A Reflection on South Pacific Regional Security, mid-2000 to mid-2001", *The Journal of Pacific History*, Vol.36, No.3, 2001, pp. 281-283.

[23] Ibid, p.283.

[24] An allusion to Robert Kaplan's 1994 article on the problems exhibited in Sierra Leone being transformed into a global phenomena, see Robert Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy", *The Atlantic Monthly*, February 1994.

[25] Jon Fraenkel, "The Coming Anarchy in Oceania? A Critique of 'Africanisation' of the South Pacific Thesis", *USPEC Working Paper*, Fiji: The University of the South Pacific Economics Department, No. 2003/2, February 2003, p.2.

Saharan Africa. Similarly, Reilly's use of Collier's World Bank model for predicting civil conflict was discriminatory and inconsistent particularly concerning the treatment of Papua New Guinea's ethnic diversity as a factor.

Fraenkel's critique of the Africanisation thesis not only serves as a caution in putting generalised labels to such a diverse region as the South Pacific, but also demonstrates the difficulty in transplanting the trends that have developed from one region's political, social and economic experiences directly onto another region half a world away. No useful understanding can be obtained by resorting to what he terms "Afro-Pacific catastrophism", particularly when attempting to formulate effective policy responses to recent crises.

Jon Fraenkel has also written further on the idea of state failure in the South Pacific in his *Political Instability, 'Failed States' and Regional Intervention in the South Pacific* (2004). He contests the contemporaneously popular claims of state failure being applied to the region, specifically in regards to the Solomon Islands and Fiji, are "not particularly helpful, either as a tool for understanding what happened in the past or as a guide for determining regional policy in the future."[26] He also argues that by investigating the reasons for the "lack of any conclusive case of state failure in the Pacific provides better guidance for regional or foreign policy responses than overplayed claims about state collapse and 'petri-dish'-style breeding grounds for transnational threats."[27] In this second half, Fraenkel uses Robert Rotberg's indicators for state failure as a basis for his arguments against using the label in the South Pacific. Though he succeeds in demonstrating that Fiji was far from failed after or during its coups, the same cannot be said for the Solomon Islands. While the point is not overtly made, Fraenkel's examination of Rotberg's failed state indicators in the Solomon Islands reveals a state that

---

[26] Jon Fraenkel, "Political Instability, 'Failed States' and Regional Intervention in the Pacific?", Paper presented at *Redefining the Pacific: Regionalism: Past, Present and Future, University of Otago, 25th-28th June 2004*, p.1.

[27] Ibid, p.2; the "petri-dish" scenario is another particular consequence of recent events and the discussion of state failure in the South Pacific, see

essentially was failing before intervention (this will also be shown in a closer examination in the second section of this thesis). In this article however, it is Fraenkel's concern that when planning third party intervention, as in the case of the Solomon Islands, discussion is often too "black and white". For instance, it is too often concluded by outside observers that democracy and reform are foreign concepts that must be brought in and installed as opposed to the nurturing of peaceful domestic methods for change. He advocates "bottom-upwards" models for growth and development as opposed to the "top down overseas models-based approaches to reform."[28]

It has only been in the last twenty or so years, that academic literature has really taken a hard look at specific regional security concerns in the South Pacific. The end of the Cold War demanded the acknowledgement of existing problems in the South Pacific, specifically the vulnerability of so many small states in such a large and challenging security environment. It is at the start of the new century that we see new demands placed upon how security concerns of the world are translated into regional perspectives. The world-wide discussion of state failure for a while now has figured as a major topic and has also become a topical concern now in the South Pacific. Though of limited selection, the literature discussing the state failure in the South Pacific is of reasonable depth and it is not at all one way. The Africanisation topic, despite its weak foundation of conceptual and empirical analysis, is important because of its dramatic effect upon perceptions of the South Pacific, illustrating similarities with trouble spots in Africa that have suffered (though to a far greater extent) the experiences ascribed to Oceania. Those who were more inclined to agree with the declining degree of stability in the region have given to expanding on the idea of state failure and state weakness and also possible paths towards policy reconciliation. The example of the Solomon Islands seems to have vindicated many commentators on this subject and for many it has been an opportunity to apply a label that has gained increased

---

[28] Ibid, p.12.

15

currency in academic circles and political think tanks around the world. The continued discussion around the events in the Solomon Islands has led to the "failed state" label being applied to the country not only by academic elites like Elsina Wainwright and Ben Reilly but also Australian political think tanks such as ASPI. It is these papers that have led to the concept being taken up by the Australian government so that now the prevention of state failure has become a keystone in the country's counter-terrorism policies in the South Pacific, more of which will be discussed later in the thesis.

As noted before, however, there are two sides to this argument, the authors of which prove that to make the case for Africanisation or state failure in the South Pacific there has to be a detailed and comprehensive analysis of any evidence that suggests the existence of the concept's underlying issues in the region. Given recent events and trends – both regional and global – it is more than easy to make generalisations regarding the general decline in state stability in the region. However, it must be remembered that the South Pacific is one of the most geographically and ethnically diverse regions in the world and has also been, over the last half a century, one of the most stable. Logical debate demands that we determine whether there is a decline of stability in the region, if it is happening at all.

1.3 The South Pacific Context:

The Pacific Ocean is dotted by about 25,000 islands which equates to around 8.5 million square kilometres and it is estimated that the region is home to over 31 million people (2002) at approximately 3.7 people per square kilometre.[29] The region is divided into three regions: Melanesia, Polynesia and Micronesia. The geography of the islands is also classified into two groups: high islands, which are formed from volcanoes and generally support more people and have a more fertile soil; and low islands, which are generally formed from reefs or atolls and are quite small.

Figure 2 – Map of the South Pacific

Source: CIA World Factbook

Europeans first encountered the region about four-hundred years ago, and gradually through a process of colonisation exerted their dominance over the resources and peoples of the Pacific. With far more effective technology (including weapons), as well as literacy, control of commerce, and a religion

---

[29] "Oceania", *Wikipedia*, retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oceania, on the 29/05/06.

17

that most Pacific Islanders accepted as superior to their own, Europeans soon became dominant in many areas, including establishing and controlling governments on a larger scale than anything the region had experienced before.

Colonial intervention drew seemingly arbitrary lines between islands and regions. At the same time, this intervention altered power balances within these regions as the colonisers played games of "divide and rule" whereby those regions and groups that were in favour with the visitors, advanced often at the expense of those that resisted.[30] To the islanders the colonisers were external forces affecting their lives and environments on an unprecedented scale. The Europeans brought with them religion, weapons, metals, tools, foods, commerce and diseases, each and every one changing the nature and fabric of the Oceanic societies. The large number of ships that regularly visited from European navies and corporations also enabled a larger and faster mode of transport for peoples between islands. Indeed, it enabled the mass migration of peoples from across the world as in the case of Fiji and its Indian migrants brought in to work on the British sugar plantations, giving birth to the strong ethnic nationalism prevalent in indigenous Fijian society today.

During the beginning of the twentieth century, the colonial powers began to accept a wider range of responsibilities to those they had taken over, if only to make it easier for themselves to extract resources. Centralised governments were installed, medical facilities were marginally improved, roads and services were expanded and low-level mission education was supplemented. Aspects of British law and government were absorbed, as with French, Chilean, German or Japanese in their colonies.[31]

---

[30] Binayak Ray, *South Pacific Least Developing Countries: Towards Positive Independence*, Kolkata: Progressive Publishers, 2003, p.97.
[31] Ron Crocombe, *The South Pacific*, Suva: The University of the South Pacific, 2001, p.420.

The decolonisation process started in the 1950s, the first independent national government being Western Samoa in 1962. The process is seen to have imposed alien governing institutions onto Pacific Island communities, institutions which had incidentally taken European powers centuries of individual historical processes to develop. These developments were new for Pacific Island communities, each one comprising a myriad of cultures, languages, values and customs that were, at the time, still struggling to come to terms with a European presence. Some island colonies attained self-government while still wishing to retain beneficial links like citizenship, through "free-association" ties with former colonisers.

The South Pacific (or the Pacific Islands or Oceania) of today encompasses 22 jurisdictions: twelve independent states (all of whom are members of the United Nations), three United States territories, one dependency of the United Kingdom, three French territories, and New Zealand has one territory (Tokelau) and is freely associated with two other states (Niue and the Cook Islands). The region holds very few natural resources; those that are exploited are found on Melanesian islands like Papua New Guinea and Fiji. However, since the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) Pacific Island countries have gained extensive real estates from their 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zones (EEZ), which entitle them to the rights of fish stocks and potential mineral deposits within these zones.

Despite this, countries in the area face a generic problem from a lack of human, fiscal and economic resources. Consequently, they suffer from an inability to develop state infrastructures or better their socio-economic situations. All Pacific Island states are developing countries, though some are facing more dire situations than others. Four (Kiribati, Samoa, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu) are classified as "least developed" (LLDCs) from the sub-group of the less developed countries (LDCs) that were initially identified by the UN General Assembly in 1971 as having negligible economic growth, low literacy

rates and per capita GDPs less than $1000.[32] For many in larger island countries such as Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands, local economies operate within an indigenous subsistent context.

The economies of Pacific Island nations are still largely dependent on the primary sector. Income is commonly accrued from cash crops such as copra, forestry, sugar, bananas; from services such as tourism and more recently offshore financial activities; and from their marine resources in their EEZs. Eight South Pacific states have preferential access to the European Union, though the benefits from this are diminishing in the face of dropping general tariff levels. Although industrial activity is minimal, New Zealand and Australia give preferential access to small manufacturing sectors in Fiji and Samoa. The reliance on primary commodities as a staple for their economies has left Pacific Island countries vulnerable to declining prices for their products in world markets. This vulnerability is exacerbated by the region's isolation from international markets, susceptibility to natural disasters such as tropical cyclones and drought, and social tensions, particularly in Melanesia.

South Pacific economies have come to be known as MIRAB (Migration, Remittances, Aid, and Bureaucracy) economies. This term was coined by Geoff Bertram and Ray Walters to identify how migration processes, massive aid flows, remittances and the large part governments play in many small Pacific Island economies. These shared characteristics include remittances sent from a considerable proportion of an island-born labour force that have migrated and found work overseas; a reliance on aid as a supplement of the nation's GDP; the government as the largest source of domestic employment, and the government budget as the largest domestic source for cash incomes.[33] MIRAB economies can be identified by their small size, their openness, they

[32] "Appendix B", *CIA World Factbook*, retrieved from
http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/appendix/appendix-b.html on the 29/05/06.
[33] Geoff Bertram, "MIRAB Economies", Brij V Lal, Kate Fortune (eds.), *The Pacific Islands: An Encyclopedia*, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000, pp. 397-398.

are import-orientated and also politically integrated. However, South Pacific academic Ron Crocombe believes that the applicability of the MIRAB paradigm is limited, particularly, as he writes "over 90% of Pacific Islanders live in economies where these are not the major issues."[34]

Nevertheless, foreign aid (or Overseas Development Assistance (ODA)) has played a significant role in South Pacific states' economies throughout the twentieth century and, in many cases, has equated into a legacy of dependency in the twenty-first century. In the immediate years after decolonisation, former colonial powers took it upon themselves to maintain economic assistance to their former colonies in order to ensure the growth and consolidation of the new post-colonial state. Aid was seen as fundamental to political stability in the region, particularly with regards to strategic and commercial value to donor countries.[35] The Cold War added a dimension of superpower competition to ODA in the region as the ANZUS coalition competed with the USSR for what Bernard Poirine termed "geostrategic services" in return for aid.[36] All that was required of the recipient was to not deal with the donor's enemies. Crocombe provides examples of when the PICs used the situation to their advantage by playing either side off against each other for increases in aid—at the same time they increased their own dependency on these external sources of income.[37]

Today, the Cold War has gone and aid levels have dropped considerably, however the dependency remains and this is indicated by the proportion of aid that makes up a nation's Gross National Income (GNI), though it does vary between territories and the independent states in the region. Poirine has shown

---

[34] Crocombe, *The South Pacific*, p.396 (though this statistic may be slightly skewed by one of the accepted exceptions to the MIRAB paradigm, Papua New Guinea, whose population comprises approximately 63% of the region's population).
[35] See, Sandra Tarte, "Foreign Aid", Brij V Lal, Kate Fortune (eds.), *The Pacific Islands: An Encyclopedia*, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000, pp.393-397.
[36] See Bernard Poirine, *Two Essays on Aid and Remittances*, Pacific Studies Monograph 19, University of New South Wales, Sydney, 1995, pp. 45-80.
[37] Crocome, *The South Pacific*, pp. 388, 392-393.

21

that aid to the dependent territories in the South Pacific on average exceeds their GDPs (116%), and states that have associated ties with former colonial powers average 62%, while the constitutionally independent countries average 39%.[38]

Undeveloped countries with vulnerable and dependent economies provide a context to the myriad of issues that challenge South Pacific states' ability to maintain their stability or viability. Current issues that threaten this stability or viability include weak and frequently corrupt governance; internal discord, particularly in Melanesia, which has strained civil and military relations and in some cases manifested into armed coups; demographic pressures with increasing populations placing pressure on land, food and water supplies, and the environment; and the emergence of criminal elements, both from local and from foreign sources.

The democratic institutions inherited by most South Pacific states from the departing colonial powers have been considered inappropriate because they were not generated by or designed for the conditions that faced the newly independent countries. Reilly comments that political party structures – particularly those within adopted Westminster models – have been "weak, fragmented, amorphous and increasingly irrelevant."[39] The result is significant and increasing weakness in the basic institutions of the region's governments leading to incompetence and lack of faith from the people. Additionally, political parties in the region have never enjoyed a high degree of establishment within local level politics.[40] In some countries, this has led to a

---

[38] Bernard Poirine, "Should We Hate or Love MIRAB?", *The Contemporary Pacific*, Vol.10, No.1, 1998, pp.92-95.

[39] Reilly, 2000a, p. 461.

[40] See Jon Fraenkel, "Political Consequences of Pacific Island Electoral Laws", *State, Society and Governance in Melanesia: Discussion Paper*, Canberra: Australian National University, 2005; Peter Larmour, "Westminster in the Pacific: A 'Policy Transfer' Approach", *State, Society and Governance in Melanesia: Discussion Paper*, Canberra: Australian National University, 2001; and Graham Hassal, "Governance and Corruption", Peter Cozens (ed.), *Engaging Oceania With Pacific Asia*, Wellington: Centre for Strategic Issues, 2004, pp.43-53.

precarious arena for local politics and a high turnover of national leaders. Indeed, states in Melanesia have found it especially hard to reconcile traditional decision making values and processes with the confrontational nature that is one of the main characteristics of the adopted Westminster system.[41] One consequence of this is unstable government. Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and Tuvalu suffer from parliamentary politics driven by "no-confidence" challenges by opposition MPs. These situations can have the effect of severely impeding reconstruction and development programmes, as well as the durability of economic reforms. Introduced institutions and their incompatibility with indigenous ones have produced problems such as: the challenging of the rule of law by the claims of custom, or personal and clan ties; property rights are often unprotected against the claims of traditional owners; and individual human rights (a central part in democratic theory), particularly the right to free movement, do not have much support.[42]

The effects of globalisation in the South Pacific can be viewed with equal ambiguity but its discussion has raised some very interesting issues. Stewart Firth in *The Pacific Islands and the Globalization Agenda* defines globalisation as "characterised by huge increases in flows of capital across the world, rapid growth in trade, the emergence of new kinds of trade in services, a technological revolution in communications that makes the globe itself the site of operations for major companies, and the growing influence almost everywhere of market forces."[43] However, poor developing nations who lack capital, technology and developed infrastructures – like those in the South Pacific – find it difficult to compete with the developed industrial nations.

---

[41] Asofou So'o, "Westminster in Oceania: A Samoan Perspective", John Henderson, Greg Watson (ed.) *Securing a Peaceful Pacific*, Christchurch: Canterbury University Press, 2005, pp.245-251.

[42] Peter Larmour, "Westminster in the Pacific: A 'Policy Transfer' Approach", *State, Society and Governance in Melanesia: Discussion Paper*, Canberra: Australian National University, 2001, pp. 1,2.

[43] Stewart Firth, "The Pacific Islands and the Globalization Agenda", *The Contemporary Pacific*, Vol. 12, No. 1, Spring 2000, p.179.

Poor countries are disadvantaged because the wealthier countries "insist on barriers to immigration and agricultural imports... and poor nations have been unable to attract much foreign capital".[44] Furthermore, "opportunities for growth in the world market have shifted from raw or semi-processed commodities toward manufactured goods and services – and within these categories, toward more knowledge intensive segments. This trend obviously favours rich countries over poor ones".[45] It has been argued further that the economic problems in developing nations were created by Western domination and capitalist exploitation during the colonial era, and that post colonial nations have been struggling to emerge from the backwater of colonialism.[46] The new governments usually lacked the resources to expand or even maintain the rudimentary material and social infrastructure inherited from the departing colonial power. When Papua New Guinea attained independence in 1975, for example, only a very few citizens had access to post-primary education, average life expectancy at birth was less than fifty years, and no roads existed to travel from the capital city, Port Moresby, to any other urban centre.[47]

There are fears that globalisation will undermine South Pacific states' abilities to control capital and financial institutions, and even those things that are integral to a state's duties: environmental conservation, ecology, security, the well-being of people, and food security.[48] Ceding political autonomy to foreign multilateral bodies that can undermine national law can lead to the loss of the credibility of governments amongst their peoples – particularly when such actions lead to the denial of access to state services or when a

---

[44] Bruce Scott, "The Great Divide in the Global Village", Michael Jackson (ed.), *Global Issues 02/03*, Connecticut: McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 2002, p. 75.
[45] Ibid.
[46] Victoria Lockwood, "The Global Imperative and Pacific Islands Societies", Victoria Lockwood (ed.), *Globalisation and Culture Change in the Pacific Islands*, New Jersey: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2004, p.5.
[47] Gerard Finin, Terence Wesley-Smith, "Crises and Conflicts: The Pacific Way?", *East-West Center Working* Papers, Honolulu: East-West Center, 2000, p.16.
[48] James Laki, "Transnational Issues Linking Oceania and Southeast Asia", Peter Cozens (ed.), *Engaging Oceania With Pacific Asia*, Wellington: Centre for Strategic Issues, 2004, p. 112.

democratically elected government fails to act in the interests of its people. Once the role of the state is undermined "confidence is lost, credit rating disappears and government institutions are weakened, as international forces of change [globalisation] take effect."[49]

---

[49] Ibid.

1.4 A Note on the Countries Selected, the Fund For Peace's Twelve Indicators and Sources Used:

The Countries:

The countries assessed in this thesis are the Melanesian countries Fiji, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu; and the Polynesian countries of Samoa, Tonga, and Tuvalu. It is obvious that due to the extent of the research needed more than seven countries would be excessive. The reason behind the choices of the countries include:

- Their geological proximity to New Zealand;
- Their cultural, historical, political and strategic ties with New Zealand;
- And the wide diversity of the respective countries' populations, cultures, and social, economic and political situations.

Their links with New Zealand are important for the third part of this thesis where it is discussed how the indicator findings have implications for New Zealand's security policy in the region.

The Fund For Peace's Twelve Indicators:

The twelve indicators used in this thesis are directly borrowed from the Fund for Peace's (FfP) Failed States Index. The FfP is a research organisation that has been assessing state failure around the world and collating the data into their Index since 2005. To date, they have only assessed 148 of the world's states (of which Papua New Guinea is the only Pacific Island country assessed). It has increased its profile through publishing its yearly findings in *Foreign Policy Magazine* and by having its findings easily accessible on the

internet.[50] The Index's rankings is based on a systematic, peer-reviewed and widely employed system that has been developed and refined over the last ten years, and sources its data from more than 11,000 publicly available sources.

The twelve indicators are divided into three categories: social, economic, and political/military. The social indicators encompass demographic pressures, refugees and massive internal people displacements, legacies of group grievances, and the incidence of human flight or brain drain. Economic indicators cover any uneven development along group lines and any sharp or severe economic decline. The political and military indicators include the delegitimisation of the state in the eyes of its citizenry, failure to provide public services, incidents of human rights violations, the security apparatus acting as a state within a state, factionalised political elites and the degree of external intervention. The indicators will be explained in more detail in the next section (or see Appendix One for more details).[51]

A Note on Sources:

Effort has been made in the indicators to stick to the most up-to-date and relevant information available, in an effort to provide a much more relevant analysis on current issues from 2005 to 2006 and early 2007 in the case of events after Fiji's coup in December 2006. In other places, it has been felt necessary to include historical information to provide context to current issues or cite examples of past incidences that have set precedents that reflect the potential for future trends. The point that must be stressed is that this is not a detailed historical analysis of the assessed countries' post independence

---

[50] See http://www.fundforpeace.org. Appendix 2 contains the FfP's 2006 Failed States Index, and Appendix 3 contains a table of example countries for each scoring of the twelve indicators, that has been compiled by the FfP.

[51] It must be noted that although permission has been granted to the author to use the entire methodology, this would not fit into the limits of this thesis, and was reluctantly decided to be excluded. In saying this, any mistakes of the author's in interpreting the twelve indicators or any other aspect of the FfP's Failed States methodology are completely the fault of the author and should not reflect negatively on the organisation's thorough and reputable work.

histories, but an analysis of current trends measured against part of a conceptual framework for the prediction of state failure.

In saying this, sources of current information on specific conditions in PICs have proved to be difficult, inaccessible, inconsistent, or non-existent. This is reflected in some places in the thesis where there may be gaps in tables or there is not enough information to form solid conclusions.

Section 2

2.1 Mounting Demographic Pressures:

The presence of mounting demographic pressures upon a country's society provides an important insight to social conflict, whether it be the source of that conflict or the conflict is exacerbated by the demographic problems. Another important reason why this indicator needs to be carefully looked at is that demographic stresses indicate either unwillingness or inability on the part of the state to be able to deal with the problems that are causing such stresses. These can include high population density coupled with high population growth, rapid urbanisation, youth bulges, unemployment, the spread of diseases, and the effects of divergent rates of population growth among communal groups. In addition, the patterns of group settlements is also seen as an important factor in aggravating inter-communal tensions as they can affect freedoms to "participate in common forms of human and physical activity, including economic productivity, travel, social interaction, [and] religious worship."[52] Other pressures from group settlement patterns may also include disputes over land and borders, access to transportation infrastructure, the control over culturally important sites, or the proximity of groups to hazardous environmental concerns.

As can be seen in Table 1, population growth is high in all South Pacific countries bar Samoa, particularly when compared to more developed nations where growth is much lower – often figuring between 0.1 and 1.0 percent.[53] These high growth rates in the South Pacific countries are driven primarily by high fertility rates that have been sustained in the region over a number of decades.[54] Population growth throughout the group has been much higher in

---

[52] Pauline Baker, *The Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST): An Analytical Model for Early Warning and Risk Assessment of Weak and Failing States*, Washington D.C.: Fund For Peace, 2006, p.8 or see Appendix 1.

[53] For examples see United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), *Human Development Report 2006—Beyond Scarcity: Power, Poverty and the Global Water Crisis*, 2006, p.297.

[54] Total fertility rate is the total number of children an average woman will bear in the absence of mortality. Monitoring this indicator is especially relevant to trends in population growth amongst low-income countries with young populations. These developing countries typically have high fertility rates while developed countries have fertility rates of around 2; see Asian Development Bank (ADB), *Development Indicators Reference Manual: Concepts and*

30

urban than rural areas, reflecting a rapid urbanisation trend that has been evident in the region over the last decade due in most part to sustained rural flight. In a number of countries such as Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu, their rural populations overwhelm those living in urban areas. Nevertheless, their high rates of urban growth mean that they are set to double their urban populations within 13 to 23 years. The urban centres in these countries cannot keep up with existing rates of rural to urban migration (see chapter 2.8) and there is a high probability that if these issues are not dealt with they will have significant social and environmental implications in the years to come.

Table 1: National population and urban growth statistics

	Pop. (000) 2006 est.	Pop. Growth (%) 2006 est.	Urban pop. (%of total pop.)	Annual urban growth rate (%) 2000-2010 est.	Annual rural growth rate (%) 2000-2010 est.	Total Fertility Rate 2005
Fiji	905	1.4	51.5	2.34	-0.59	2.8
PNG	5,670	2.21	13.2	3.75	1.83	3.8
Samoa	176	-0.2	22.4	1.88	0.17	4.2
Solomon Is.	552	2.61	16.8	5.84	2.48	4.1
Tonga	114	2.01	33.8	1.27	-0.08	3.3
Tuvalu	11,810	1.51	52.2	2.83	-0.73	3.7*
Vanuatu	208	1.49	23.3	4.25	1.91	3.9

Source: Compiled from the *CIA Factbook 2006*; the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat), *The Challenge of Slums: Global Report on Human Settlements 2003*, London and Sterling: Earthscan Publications, 2003, pp.251-255; UNICEF Country Statistics from http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/eastasia.html, on the 3/6/06; * Tuvaluan Total Fertility Rate from Government of Tuvalu Central Statistics Department, 2002 Health Statistics, http://www.spc.int/prism/country/tv/stats/Social/health_new.htm, on the 3/6/06.

As will be discussed later, high national and urban population growths have become problems as growth has outstripped states' capacities to develop and

---

Definitions, Economics and Research Department and Policy Research Division, November 2004, p.11; and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), *Human Development Report 2006—Beyond Scarcity: Power, Poverty and the Global Water Crisis*, 2006, pp. 297-300.

provide basic provisions for their citizens' welfare, or to provide the environment that would engender economic and employment opportunities that would form a foundation for a prosperous and cohesive society. Significantly, rapid urbanisation has contributed to the rise of squatter settlements, most noticeably in the Melanesian countries where, as they grow, they are posing problems of integration and development within these small states' societies. A 1996 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) summary of the key issues facing Pacific Island urban areas still retains value:

- Land shortages and conflicts where traditional systems come into contact with modern ones;
- Rapidly increasing informal settlements, and a lack of affordable and relevant private housing;
- Incomplete, inadequate, and failing infrastructure and services;
- Inadequate institutional capacity and human resources to deal with social issues.[55]

For example, in Papua New Guinea it has been estimated that the total urban population will reach four million in the year 2030, nearly half of whom will reside in informal settlements.[56] Over the last few years the squatter problem has become a source of crime and ethnic tension around major cities such as Port Moresby, Lae and Madang (see chapter 2.3).[57] There have also been

[55] United Nations Development Programme (UNDP),*The State of Human Settlements and Urbanisation in the Pacific Islands*, Regional Report for the United Nations Conference on Human Settlements (Habitat II), Istanbul, June 1996.
[56] "PNG Urban, Total Population to Double by 2030", *The National*, 8/9/03, retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2003/september/09%2D08%2D18.htm, on the 3/06/06.
[57] R. Sikani, "The Criminal Threat in Papua New Guinea", in Beno Boeha, John McFarlane (eds.), *Australia and Papua New Guinea and the Bilateral Relationship*, Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre, 2000, p.38. See also "PNG Urban Squatters Breed Crime", *The National*, 30/3/05, retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2005/march/03%2D31%2Ded2.htm, on the 4/06/06; and a recent example of ethnic tension stemming from an urban squatter settlement see Freddy Gigmai, "Tribal Skirmish Halts Port Moresby Transit", *The National*, 18/8/06, retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/august/08%2D21%2D05.htm, on the 2/11/06; "Tribal Violence Resumes In PNG's Capital", *The National*, 28/8/06, retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/august/08%2D28%2D10.htm, on the 2/11/06; and

incidences in which squatters have been forcibly ejected by government security forces.[58]

Fiji is another example of a small Pacific Island country with a problem with squatter settlements. It is now believed that there may be up to 90,000 squatters in and around Suva and Nausuri.[59] They are believed to be primarily made up of Indian families, often former labourers in the sugar industry, but evicted from the land they tended by indigenous Fijian owners who have chosen not to renew leases. However, statistics in 2005 suggested that there were also a significant number of indigenous Fijians in squatter settlements who have moved to urban centres such as Suva in search for income to support their families.[60]

The Solomon Islands has the highest urban growth rate of the assessed group and there is evidence of a growing squatter problem particularly in and around Honiara. It was perceptions of illegal group settlements in and around Honiara and Guadalcanal that played a key part in the initial decline of the Solomon Islands state.[61] In the aftermath that followed the intervention it seems that a lack of progression in the delivery of public services such as housing and negligence on the part of the government has contributed and compounded to the present problem of informal settlements being re-established. The scope of the issue is illustrated by a recent government survey of Honiara that shows

Peter Korugl, "Angry PNG Villagers Threaten Lae Over Killing", *The National*, 4/10/06, retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/october/10%2D05%2D11.htm, on the 2/11/06.

[58] One particular incident involved local police burning down 96 homes in a squatter settlement outside Lae in 2002 leaving more than 100 families homeless. That settlement and others like it have been linked to rises in violent crime in the centres that are located nearby, and the government has used similar methods to remove them; see "96 Homes Gutted in Lae Evictions", *The National*, 28/1/02, retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2002/january/01%2D29%2D04.htm, on the 3/06/06.

[59] *Pacific Magazine*, 4/11/03, retrieved from http://www.pacificislands.cc/news/2003/11/14/fiji-dollar-a-day-squatters-in-suva on 10/8/06.

[60] Amelina Naivaluwaqa, "Indigenous Fijians Dominate Squatters", *Fiji Sun*, 13/3/05, retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2005/march/03%2D14%2D10.htm, on the 10/8/06.

[61] Fraenkel, 2004c, pp.53-62.

that about 17,000 of its 50,000 residents are illegal squatters on Government land.[62] Additionally, unauthorised settlement is growing at a rate of 26 percent a year, forcing the government to consider legalising squatters' occupation of government land.[63]

In Vanuatu, the majority of the population live in rural areas, however, its urban growth rate is second highest in the group. Vanuatu's squatter problems similarly centre on its capital, Port Vila and also the main urban centres such as Luganville on the outer islands. Of the group, Vanuatu has the second highest urban growth rate and a 2002 report on the state of the country's housing illustrated the extent of informal settlements with growth of the urban population being much larger than the number of officially approved new dwellings.[64]

Though the Polynesian states do have smaller urban growth rates, they are significant in relation to their smaller national and rural growth rates and they experience the same problems associated with urban growth when it is not counter-balanced with development and management initiatives. Tonga and Samoa, to a lesser extent than the Melanesian countries, have issues of overcrowding and areas of unofficial housing within their capitals of Nuku'alofa and Apia, where urban development has suffered because of poor town planning.[65]

Overcrowding has become a problem particularly for small Polynesian island states like Tuvalu where land is extremely limited (26 square kilometres) and urban growth is high. Indeed, as Tuvalu's main island, Funafuti is home to

[62] *Pacific Island Report*, 17/7/06, retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/july/07%2D17%2D10.htm on 10/8/06.
[63] Ibid.
[64] Margaret Chung. David Hill, *Urban Informal Settlements in Vanuatu: Challenge for Equitable Development*, November 2002, p. v.
[65] United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP), *Managing the Transition from the Village to the City in the South Pacific*, 1999, retrieved from http://www.unescap.org/huset/pacific/pacific1.htm on 10/8/06.

more than fifty percent of the national population, but it is only 11 percent of the country's combined land mass—equal to 1610 people per square kilometre.[66]

Food Security:

There are obvious food security concerns in Tuvalu, where there is such high density of people, a limited capacity to locally produce food, and a high vulnerability to tropical storms and high tides that would further hinder food producing capabilities. However, other Pacific Island nations face the same realities and subsequently impose a heavy reliance on imported foods.[67]

Natural disasters present the biggest threats to food security and livelihoods to all South Pacific nations. Of the seven Asian Development Bank's Pacific developing member countries, Vanuatu ranks as the most vulnerable to natural disasters, and in the 1999 Pacific Human Development Report, is ranked highly vulnerable to seven categories of natural disaster, namely: cyclones, river flooding, tsunami, earthquake, landslides, volcanic eruption and coastal flooding.[68] In a country where approximately 70 percent of exports over the last five years have been from the agricultural sector, a high vulnerability from natural disasters means that the country's main economic sector (and also source of subsistence crops) is constantly at risk from being damaged or destroyed.[69] This risk also deters potential foreign investment in the sector.

---

[66] Statistics from 2002 Population Census figures from Tuvalu Central Statistics Division, retrieved from http://www.spc.int/prism/country/tv/stats/Social/census_02_new.htm on the 20/10/06.
[67] The importation of food also accounts in most parts for many Pacific Island countries' high trade deficits.
[68] Asian Development Bank (ADB), *Vanuatu: A. Assessment of Poverty and Hardship; B. Strategies for Equitable Growth and Hardship Alleviation*, Discussion Paper, Pacific Regional Department, October 2002, p.19.
[69] Ibid, p.20.

An example of real impacts of natural disasters is provided by Cyclone Ami's effects on Fiji in 2003. It cost the country F$66 million in its agricultural sector, including subsistence and commercial crops as well as the loss of infrastructure and arable farmland.[70] A different example comes from Papua New Guinea where the drought of 1997 hit Papua New Guinea particularly hard. Approximately 500,000 people were threatened with starvation.[71] When government assistance was not forthcoming this environmental threat to food security and water supply translated into a threat to social security as people moved into the towns, bringing urban centres under stress.[72] The drought also stopped production at some key PNG mines and threatened the water and hydro-power supplies of the capital. In a working paper Greg Fry writes that the "lack of an effective response by the PNG state has shown up the way in which poor governance can further threaten security of the people... the drought has also shown the vulnerability of this situation to natural disasters particularly when government is ineffective."[73] These risks to food security and stability in these countries are still high as there has been an inability to organise efficient response to natural disasters. This is demonstrated by a continued reliance on foreign powers to provide aid and emergency relief in times of calamity.[74]

One last issue that is becoming increasingly important as a factor in food security is sustainability of fishing. As all the countries in the group have extensive EEZs, the rights to fish and search for mineral deposits within these zones hold great worth as existing and potential sources of income. They also provide a fundamental foundation for the subsistent livelihoods of many

[70] K. L. Sharma, *Food Security in the South Pacific Island Countries with Special Reference to the Fiji Islands*, Research Paper 2006/68, United Nations University, June 2006, p. 3.
[71] Greg Fry , "South Pacific Security and Global Change: The New Agenda", *Department of International Relations: Working Papers*, Canberra: Department of International Relations, 1999, p.31.
[72] Ibid.
[73] Ibid.
[74] AusAid, *Economic Impact of Natural Disasters on Development in the Pacific*, Vol. 1 Research Paper, May 2005, p.10; and *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment: Oceania*, Issue No. 8, Surrey: Jane's Information Group Limited, 2005.

islanders. However, fish stocks have come under pressure as foreign fishing vessels, both licensed and illegal, fish indiscriminately. Furthermore, there are reports that local operators may be involved in illegal fishing alongside foreign fishing vessels.[75] There is no hard evidence to support this though, only anecdotal evidence from local fishermen.[76]

Group Settlement Patterns:

The available information on group settlement patterns within most of the group countries is limited as data regarding the different ethnic/language groups and their locations and interactions, particularly in regard to other ethnic/language groups is sparse. Nevertheless, there are broad issues worth looking at, particularly in Melanesian countries. Language and culture provide a major basis for social differentiation and fragmentation in the South Pacific and has led one commentator to label it the "region of the world's greatest linguistic complexity."[77] Melanesia is perhaps one of the most ethnically diverse areas in the world, with the population of Papua New Guinea alone being made up of nearly 800 language groups, and Vanuatu 100 language groups. Most of these language groups are spoken by small communities, many of less than 1,000 people.[78] Perhaps due to its larger population, abundance of resources, or large land mass, Papua New Guinea experiences greater social fragmentation than Vanuatu. Inter-clan relations have been characterised by intractable tribal warfare that has escalated in recent years due to the introduction of high-powered weapons (see chapter 2.3).[79]

---

[75] For example see *Pacific Fish –February 2006*, retrieved from
http://www.ecsiep.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=578&Itemid=64, on the 4/06/06.
[76] See for example "Pacific Leaders Push Island Worries at World Food Summit", 13 June 2002, retrieved from http://www.converge.org.nz/pma/cra0576.htm, on the 20/10/06.
[77] Crocombe, p.114.
[78] Ibid, p.101.
[79] See Philip Alpers *Gun Running in Papua New Guinea: From Arrows to Assault Weapons in the Southern Highlands*, Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2005.

Group settlement patterns were one of the primary catalysts in the Solomon Islands crisis, in which the combatants were split into two ethnically based groups: Malaitans and Guadalcanalese. Malaitans (from the island of Malaita) had settled in and around the capital of Honiara (on the island of Guadalcanal) during the colonial and post-colonial phases of the country's history. Over time they had become increasingly entrenched in the country's civil services and in positions of power such as office holders and as landholders.[80]

Tensions had been brewing for a number of years between the relative success of Malaitans as opposed to the local Guadalcanalese and during the crisis many Malaitans had been forcibly ejected from their homes and land.[81] Now, after the crisis and with the help of the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI), Malaitans are being resettled into their old lands and a process of reconciliation has been initiated.[82] Whether this reconciliation process will have any lasting effect, particularly once RAMSI has gone, is an unknown. A recent report from the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) found that there was a high risk of violence between men and their distrust of other ethnic groups and that there was a general fear in the public of reprisals from those who were sent to prison.[83]

Another country of concern is Fiji where group tensions are racially based between indigenous Fijians and Indo-Fijians. Frequent reports of attacks on Indo-Fijian Hindu shrines as well as the riots of 2000 after the May coup indicate a propensity for the indigenous Fijian population to lash out at the Indo-Fijian community. Immediately after the coup looting and destruction of property in the Suva city area was carried out almost exclusively by

---

[80] Denis McLean (ed.), *Solomon Islands—Report of a Study Group*, Wellington: New Zealand Institute of Affairs, 2001, pp.13-15.
[81] Ibid, pp.17-18.
[82] United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), *Monitoring Peace and Conflict in the Solomon Islands*, Gendered Early Warning Report No. 1, August 2005.
[83] Ibid, p.8-10.

indigenous Fijians and aimed at Fijian Indians.[84] This was followed by days and weeks of further acts of violence and intimidation against Fijian Indians in rural areas.[85]

The factor that carries the greatest potential for conflict generation surrounds the ownership and access to land, particularly in Melanesian countries. In the Solomon Islands, after the civil violence and evictions, there is still a high degree of tension surrounding contentious land issues and many still fear that their land will be taken from them as happened during the crisis.[86] In Papua New Guinea, land ownership is tangled up in complex arrangements of tenures that have led to violence between different clans and has also led to clashes between the people and the government.[87] Successive government attempts to register land have met with opposition because of perceptions that land registrations would lead to a loss of customary ownership, sparking pre-election riots in 1997 and riots in Port Moresby in 2002, in which a number of university students were killed.[88]

Disputes over land ownership and access in Fiji are equally divisive. Present examples of issues between Fijians and Indo-Fijians concern the renewing of land leases for the production of sugar cane, an industry that accounts for 80 percent of country's agricultural output, 30 percent of GDP and employs approximately 80 percent of the Indo-Fijian population.[89] With numbers set to increase as more leases expire and are not renewed, an influx of people from

---

[84] Stephanie Lawson, "Security in Oceania: Perspectives on the Contemporary Agenda", in Jim Rolfe, Eric Shibuya, *Security In Oceania In The 21st Century*, Honolulu: Asia-Pacific Centre for Security Studies, 2003, pp. 15-16.

[85] Tupeni Baba, Michael Field, Unaisi Nabobo-Baba, *Speight of Violence: Inside Fiji's 2000 Coup*, Auckland: Reed Publishing, 2005, pp.181-186.

[86] Ibid, pp. 6-7.

[87] See Alpers, 2005, pp. 92-94.

[88] Michael Manning, "Papua New Guinea Thirty Years On", *Pacific Economic Bulletin*, Vol. 20, No. 1, May 2005, p. 153.

[89] *Economic Affairs (Fiji)*, Europa World online. London: Routledge. Massey University. Retrieved from http://www.europaworld.om.ezprozy.massey.ac.nz/entry/fj.is.52, on the 7/12/06; Rukmani Gounder, "Fiji's Economic Growth Impediments: Institutions, Policies and Coups", *Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy*, Vol. 9, No. 3, 2004, p. 321.

the rural sugar belt region coming into urban areas will be placing greater strain on the country's underdeveloped urban infrastructure. On another level, land disputes are divisive between various groups of ethnic Fijians. This has been illustrated by the controversy over the "Qoliqoli Bill" which aimed to return customary fishing grounds (qoliqoli) to their indigenous owners. At present, the Fijian state retains ownership of all qoliqoli and leases out access, mainly to foreign owned hotels.[90] Indigenous owners have been angered about their restricted access to their traditional fishing grounds and concerned about the environmental damage that the building of nearby resorts and hotels are causing. For instance, in 2005 landowners in Nadi district threatened to disrupt the building of a new hotel because of the damage to their nearby qoliqoli.[91] On the other hand, if the bill were to pass it would compromise present and future foreign investment, particularly in the tourism industry which is a cornerstone of then Fijian economy.

Many of the issues of land and the settlement of groups that trouble Melanesian societies can also be found in Polynesia, however they are a lot less likely to lead to violence. The populations of the Polynesian countries encompass more homogenous societies than Melanesian countries, and they also have had very separate historical experiences, important reasons that have been used to explain the difference in group-based violence.[92] While issues of land ownership are divisive in Polynesian countries, most disputes are resolved peacefully and there is little call to violence.

Youth Bulge:

In all the Pacific societies within the group, a high proportion of their populations are between the ages of 15 to 24 and the median ages for males

[90] Alumita L Durutalo, "Melanesia in Review: Issues and Events 2005 – Fiji", *The Contemporary Pacific*, Vol.18, No.2, 2006, p.399.
[91] Ibid.
[92] See for example Reilly, 2004b, pp.479-493.

and females are 20 and 21 respectively (Figure 3). Some recent commentators are seeing this youth bulge as a potential factor in contributing to social instability. Helen Ware writes "that the difficulty arises where the economy is not growing fast enough to provide employment for the members of the bulge, with negative per capita GDP growth (as happened in the Solomon Islands) being a harbinger of disaster."[93] This social instability is often linked to concentrations of unemployed youths in urban centres; one study found that countries with a youth bulge of 40 percent of the adult population was more than twice as likely to experience civil conflict.[94] This was reflected in the 15 to 24 age group that disproportionately made up the numbers of the contending militias in the Solomon Islands crisis.[95] It will continue to pose a problem as 37 percent of the adult population in the country is within the 15 to 24 cohort still largely without opportunities of employment that would make them productive – as opposed to disruptive.[96]

---

[93] Helen Ware, "Pacific Instability and Youth Bulges: The Devil in the Demography and the Economy", Paper prepared for the 12th Biennial Conference of the Australian Population Association, 15-17 September 2004, Canberra, p.2.
[94] D. Anastasion, R. Cincotta, R. Engelman, *The Security Demographic: Population and Civil Conflict After the Cold War*, Washington, DC: Population Action International, 2003.
[95] UNIFEM, p. 11.
[96] Ibid.

Figure 3 – Pacific Population Pyramid

Pacific Population 2006

Males   Females

Age		
75+		
70-74		
65-69		
60-64		
55-59		
50-54		
45-49		
40-44		
35-39		
30-34		
25-29		
20-24	Median age 20.7	Median age 21.5
15-19		
10-14		
5- 9		
0- 4		

8   6   4   2   0   2   4   6   8

Percentages

Source: Secretariat of The Pacific Community, *Addressing the Youth Challenge – From the Pacific Youth Charter to Implementation: A Coordinated Approach*, Thirty-Sixth Meeting of the Committee of Representatives of Governments and Administrations, Noumea, New Caledonia, 13-17 November 2006, p. 2.

Similar trends can be found in Papua New Guinea with its *Raskol* gangs where the country's problem of youth bulges combined with unemployment and urbanisation have created fears that the social fabric of the country may be undermined by these issues. A recent National Assessment report has concluded that "the country will have serious problems if employment constraints in the private and public sectors fail to successfully absorb the majority of youth coming through the secondary education system."[97] In the report, recent figures show that 43 percent of young men and 25 percent of young women in urban areas are unemployed, with almost all of them educated and in the 15 to 19 age group.[98] Even the peaceful and stable Polynesian nation of Samoa faces increasing social problems from a youth

---

[97] Albert Nita, *Papua New Guinea National Assessment Report*, prepared for United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Commission for Social Development, New York, June 2006, pp. xv.
[98] Ibid.

bulge and potential large scale unemployment as 5,000 school leavers and dropouts enter the country's limited labour market every year.[99]

However, Papua New Guinea and pre-RAMSI Solomon Islands seem to be the exceptions rather than the rule in the Pacific countries, as no other country's urban centres experience to the same extent the escalating lawlessness that the movement of the young and unemployed seem to engender in Honiara and PNG's towns and cities (see chapter 2.8). Generally speaking, the public services in Pacific Island countries provide the most opportunities for employment in urban centres, though this is declining as countries seek to downsize their excessive civil services as a part of ODA driven reform.[100] In Fiji, the other major employer apart from the civil service, particularly for men, is the armed forces, which has a large proportion of its personnel overseas on peacekeeping duties.[101] In the other countries, much of the potential for any immediate social unrest is mitigated by emigration acting as a vital release valve for unsettled segments of the population to move overseas in search of jobs and opportunities and to send back remittances (see chapter 2.4). For example, in Fiji approximately 20,000 male Fijians applied for employment overseas in April of 2005, mostly for construction and security work in Iraq and Kuwait.[102]

Diseases:

The diseases that are most associated with urbanisation in the Pacific Islands are non-communicable diseases (NCDs) such as diabetes mellitus, coronary and vascular diseases and obesity, conditions that are related to lifestyle.[103]

---

[99] Asian Development Bank (ADB), *Country Strategy and Program Update – Samoa 2005-2006*, August 2004, p.1.
[100] ADB, *Poverty: Is it an Issue in the Pacific?*, March 2001, pp.20-21, 26-27, 42, 47.
[101] *Jane's*, 2005, p.129.
[102] Durutalo, p. 398.
[103] Christine McMurray, *Morbidity and Mortality Patterns in the Pacific*, Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, Seminar on Emerging Issues of Health and Mortality, 27-29 September 2004, p.3.

While subsistent lifestyles are still the basis for living in rural areas, the advent of the cash economy in urban areas has led to an increased consumption of imported foods and a reliance on fatty cooking methods. McMurray writes "the negative impact of modern urban lifestyles on health is clearly evident in that the incidence of early onset NCDs tend to be lower in the outer islands and remote areas where traditional foods are consumed and people engage in subsistence agriculture and food gathering."[104]

In addition, although overall HIV/AIDS infection rates are low in the Pacific Islands, there are concerns that current demographic and social trends are producing an environment that is conducive to a serious epidemic such as high poverty levels, illiteracy, sexual exploitation of children, and the prevalence of unsafe sex practices such as a reluctance to use condoms.[105] Hence, the importance of infection rates as an indication of social conditions. There were an estimated 7,100 (3,400±54,000) people that were infected by the HIV virus in Oceania in 2006, bringing the number of people living with the virus to 81, 000 (50,000±170,000), three quarters of whom are living in Papua New Guinea, where in recent years infection rates have been growing.[106] A recent report by the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) says that at least 2,000 new HIV infections are reported annually since 2002, with prevalence among urban populations being as high as 3.5 percent.[107] Apart from New Zealand and Australia (which both have lower infection rates than PNG) none of the other countries or territories in the region have reported more than 300 HIV cases since testing was initiated, though a 2004 study suspects that there may be up to 2000 undiagnosed cases in Fiji.[108] However,

---

[104] Ibid, p.9.
[105] United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), *Country Information*, retrieved from http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/, on the 20/10/06.
[106] UNAIDS, *Aids Epidemic Update: Special Report on HIV/AIDS*, December 2006, p.61.
[107] Ibid.
[108] Ibid, p. 62. For an assessment of Fiji's susceptibility to the HIV/AIDS epidemic see UNAIDS, *UNGASS Country Reports – Republic of Fiji Islands*, 2006.

there continues to be a lack of knowledge and safe practice regarding the prevention of HIV transmission.[109]

Environmental Stress:

Environmental stress can be created by overcrowding, as mentioned previously in regards to Tuvalu, or through unsustainable resource exploitation and development. Developing countries with an abundance of resources are often faced with what has been termed the "resource curse" which means the exploitation of natural resources in developing countries can be a major source of social, political, economic and environmental woes as well as an income.[110] Of the environmental problems, Papua New Guinea is a prime example of how such stresses have hindered human development and generated conflict. The conflict in Bougainville is one example where pollution from the Panguna copper mine was one of the reasons used to mobilise support for the insurrection that led to the mine closing in 1989.[111] Similar problems of environmental damage involve the Ok Tedi Mine in Western Province and there is potential for conflict to flare up also in Goilala in Central Province and Misima Island in Milne Bay Province.[112] In some cases the problem stems from unethical practices by transnational companies contracted to carry out the resource extraction. For instance, hundreds of people in 2003 in Kianantu protested against the mining company Highland Pacific because of its poor environmental practises and inadequate offer of

---

[109] UNAIDS, *Aids Epidemic Update*, 2006, p. 62.

[110] For example, see Paul Collier, *Natural Resources, Development and Conflict: Channels of Causation and Policy Interventions*, World Bank, April 2003; Halvor Mehlum, Karl Moene, Ragnar Torvik, *Institutions and the Resource Curse*, March 2005; and Graham Davis, John E. Tilton, "The Resource Curse", *Natural Resources Forum*, Vol. 29, Issue 3, August 2005, pp.233-242.

[111] See V. Böge, L. Garasu, "Papua New Guinea: A Success Story of Postconflict Peacebuilding in Bougainville", in Annelies Heijmans, Nicola Simmonds, Hans van se Veen (eds.), *Searching for Peace in Asia Pacific: An Overview of Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities*, Lynne Rienner Publishing: London/Boulder, pp.565-566.

[112] Lawrence Kalinoe, "Environmental Damage and Socio-Political Instability", in Henderson and Watson, 2005, pp.336-337.

45

compensation.[113] Local groups continue to protest against the practices of these companies and the lack of fair share of royalties or compensation for damage to the environment and their livelihoods. Similar situations involve Papua New Guinea's logging industry where a handful of Malaysian logging companies are exploiting and destroying the countries forests at an unsustainable rate and causing the destruction and contamination of food and water sources.[114]

Problems of unsustainable logging can also be found in the Solomon Islands where the industry is infamous for "unscrupulous Asian companies extracting unsustainable quantities, damaging the environment, evading taxes and avoiding payments to landowners and using unfair transfer pricing mechanisms to disadvantage the economy."[115] Although one of the country's biggest earners, the logging industry in the Solomon Islands is being maintained at an unsustainable rate, and if continued is believed to wipe out the entire stocks by 2015.[116] In many cases villages have taken the fast and easy cash logging companies offer, only to be left with bare, infertile, undeveloped land and polluted waterways and lagoons that are unable to sustain them or their future generations.[117] Already in some provinces such as Makira there have been reported attempts by villagers putting themselves in harm's way in order to stop logging activities, actions taken because the few

---

[113] Burt Jenkins, "Environmental Security", in Henderson and Watson, 2005, p.324.
[114] Australian Conservation Foundation (ASF), Centre for Environmental Law and Community Rights (CELCoR), *Bulldozing Progress: Human Rights Abuses and Corruption in Papua New Guinea'sLarge Scale Logging Industry*, July 2006, pp. 15-17.
[115] Masalai i tokaut, "Solomons – Logging Corruption Ruins a Nation", *Scoop*, 27/4/06, retrieved from http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/HL0604/S00334.htm, on the 30/06/06.
[116] Central Bank of Solomon Islands (CBSI), *Annual Report 2005*, May 2006, pp. 8, 89; and "Solomons Group Says Too Many Logging Permits", *Solomon Islands Broadcasting Corporation (SIBC)*, 15/06/06, retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/june/06%2D16%2D19.htm, on 30/06/06.
[117] Toktaem, Moffat Mamu, "Fighting Temptation to Cash in on Solomons Resources", *Solomon Star*, 2/03/06, retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/march/03%2D03%2Dft.htm, on 30/06/06.

benefits the villagers have obtained do not out weigh losing their entire forests.[118]

In all of the countries one of the most important problems is the issue of waste management and the pollution caused from untreated sewerage and poor sanitation infrastructure. Waste management problems are directly attributable to recent and rapid population growth. The facilities for disposing of toxic waste and sewage are often not well developed, leading to low quality drinking water. Furthermore, the rapid population growth of the last twenty years, combined with increased urbanisation has led to "rapidly increased land-based, biological and chemical pollution"; marine life has disappeared and beaches have become unswimmable because of faecal pollution.[119] Common environmental problems as outlined by the South Pacific Applied Geoscience Commission (SOPAC) for Fiji, PNG, the Solomon Islands, Samoa and Tonga include coastal and marine resource mismanagement, degradation and pollution due to agricultural activities and sewerage, coastal erosion and a lack of environment protection legislation and enforcement.[120] These are all issues that impact on the human development of these countries' citizens, affecting food sources and health, as well as being potential grounds for group grievances (see chapter 2.3).

---

[118] "Makira Protest Shines New Light on Solomons Logging", *Solomon Star*, 12/1/06, retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/january/01%2D13%2Ded1.htm, on 30/06/06.
[119] J-F. Dupon, *Urban Growth versus the Environment in the Pacific Islands*, Noumea: South Pacific Regional Environment Program, 1993, p.4.
[120] See the South Pacific Applied Geoscience Commission (SOPAC) website and individual member country *Current Issues Summaries* at http://www.sopac.org.

2.2 Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons:

A refugee is someone who has been forced to move from their home in order to escape well-founded fears of persecution or violence and is either unable or unwilling to avail of themselves the protection of their native state due to these fears.[121] While refugees are usually associated with the movement across borders, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) are people that have crossed no borders but have been forced or compelled to move from their homes due to the same fear of persecution and violence; in essence, the difference is merely legal status. The presence and movement of both refugees and IDPs are a key indication of social insecurity and also a factor in escalating demographic and population pressures. "Massive refugee movements create cycles of human disasters" and have the potential to decline into regional crises through competition for resources such as food, water and land, and the overspill of conflict across borders.[122] Examples are illustrated throughout Africa, from Sudan to the Great Lakes region in Central Africa.

Since the 1980s, Papua New Guinea has been experiencing a small but significant flow of West Papuans crossing its border with Indonesia, seeking sanctuary from the violence that continues to rack Indonesia's province of Papua. Between 1984 and 1986, more than 12,000 West Papuan asylum seekers crossed into Papua New Guinea from Papua. During the 1990s, some of these people accepted voluntary repatriation and were sent back across the border; more than twenty years later, however, there are still thousands of West Papuans living in official and unofficial camps along the border.

From the latest available figures from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), there are 7627 refugees and another 198 asylum

---

[121] "Refugee", *Wikipedia*, retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Refugee, on the 8/10/06.
[122] John Ausink, Pauline Baker, "State Collapse and Ethnic Violence: Toward a Predictive Model", *Parameters*, Spring 1996, pp.19-31 (html format, i.e. no page numbers can be referenced from this web based article), retrieved from http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/96spring/baker.htm, on the 14/2/06.

seekers whose cases are being processed.[123] Nearly half of this refugee group are children under the age of 18.[124] By early 2005 there were 2677 West Papuans at the East Awin camp in Western Province , 138 "stateless persons" in Daru, Western Province , another 5400 people dispersed in five unofficial camps along the border, and a small number of refugees in various urban centres.[125]

The presence of these refugees has provided many problems for the PNG state, such as straining already stretched state finances as well as being a potential source for instability. Importantly, the issue of refugees has been an ongoing source of tension in PNG-Indonesia relations. The Indonesian military has been known to have made frequent raids into PNGs territory in pursuit of West Papuan insurgents and there are recent rumours regarding further raids being planned.[126] These raids are adding to a continuing problem that the state of Papua New Guinea has neither the funds nor the military capacity to deal with.

In the past, the Solomon Islands is the only other country in the group to have been severely affected by the movements of internally displaced persons for fear of violence and persecution. In 1999, it is estimated that there were 20,000 displaced people, mainly Malaitans, who were evicted from their homes on Guadalcanal.[127] Since RAMSI, most of this number has been resettled. However, recently after the April riots in which most of Honiara's Chinatown was burnt to the ground, 89 Chinese refugees were flown back to

---

[123] United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR), *Statistical Yearbook Country Data Sheets—Papua New Guinea*, 21 August 2006, retrieved from http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/STATISTICS/44e5c78811.pdf, on the 8/10/06.

[124] Ibid.

[125] Nic Maclellan, *Australia Policy Online*, March 2006, retrieved from http://westpapuaaction.buz.org/the-article-archives/Refugees%2006.htm, on the 8/10/06.

[126] For information on recent rumours see Nick Chesterfield, *West Papua Border Mission*, Security Assessment and Intelligence Profile, Free West Papua Campaign Pacific, May/June 2006.

[127] Tarcicius Tara Kabutaulaka, "Crowded Stage: Actors, Actions and Issues", in Henderson, Watson (ed.), *Securing a Peaceful Pacific*, 2005, p.413.

China on a Beijing chartered aircraft.[128] After having their livelihoods destroyed many of the Chinese, a number of them Solomon Islands citizens, felt that the Solomon Islands state could not guarantee their security any longer, particularly in the face of such ethnic tension.[129]

In the near to mid-term future the South Pacific will play host to a new type of refugee—those that have been displaced by environmental change. The first example seen in the Pacific occurred in the Carteret Islands, part of Papua New Guinea. With a total land area of 0.6 square kilometres and just 1.5 metres above sea-level, rising sea levels have effectively made the islands uninhabitable for the 980 residents, with high tides washing away houses, destroying crops and placing the locals in great danger. In November of 2005, the Papua New Guinea government decided on a plan to relocate the Carteret Islanders to Bougainville, ten families at a time; the evacuation is expected to be finished by 2007.[130] By 2015 it is expected that the six atolls that make up the Carteret Islands will be completely submerged.

Tuvaluans are also at high risk from environmental change destroying their livelihoods and submerging their country altogether. At just 26 square kilometres and 5 metres above sea-level, the group of small atolls is particularly susceptible to changes in sea levels and tropical storms that hit the islands at full strength. SOPAC's Environmental Vulnerability Index rates the country as Extremely Vulnerable to not only rising sea-levels, but also to other environmental problems such as overcrowding, poor coastal

---

[128] *St. Petersburg Times Online*, 23/4/06, retrieved from http://www.sptimes.com/2006/04/23/Worldandnation/Chinese_refugees_flow.shtml, on the 8/10/06.
[129] Ibid.
[130] John Vidal, "Pacific Atlantis: First Climate Change Refugees", *The Guardian*, 25/11/05, retrieved from http://www.guardian.co.uk/climatechange/story/0,12374,1650406,00.html, on the 8/10/06; and "Carteret Islands", *Wikipedia*, retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carteret_Islands, on the 8/10/06.

management and waste management.[131] The exact causes and extent to which sea-levels are rising are open to debate, but Tuvaluans believe that flooding from high tides has been gradually getting worse, and a 2002 study from a climatologist from the University of Tasmania found that sea-levels around Tuvalu were rising by up to 1.2 mm a year.[132] Within fifty to a hundred years, rising sea-levels could make the island chain uninhabitable.

Abandonment of the islands is inevitable, but according to Tuvalu's Prime Minister, Maatia Toafa, the problem is not a priority at the moment. However, they are looking at contingency plans which include either buying land in Fiji, Australia or New Zealand in order to relocate and continue with their livelihoods and culture, or to gradually evacuate the population to either Australia or New Zealand. [133]

---

[131] South Pacific Applied Geoscience Commission (SOPAC), *Environmental Vulnerability Index*, 2005, retrieved from
http://www.vulnerabilityindex.net/EVI%20Country%20Profiles/TV.pdf, on the 8/10/06.
[132] For Tuvaluan opinions on rising sea-levels see Samir Patel, "A Sinking Feeling", *Nature*, Vol. 440, April 2006, pp. 734-736; for a look at the study of rising sea-levels, see John Hunter, *A Note on Relative Sea Change at Funafuti, Tuvalu*, Antarctic Cooperative Research Centre, Tasmania, 2002.
[133] *Tuvalu News*, 21/2/06, retrieved from
http://www.tuvaluislands.com/news/archives/2006/2006-02-21.htm, on the 8/10/06.

2.3 Legacies of Vengeance Seeking and Group Grievances:

Legacies of vengeance and grievances between groups are the core tensions that underscore volatile relations between groups that have the potential to lead to violent conflict. There can be any number of reasons that would lead to the initiation of violence between different groups; each case of inter-group tension is unique, there are often many different layers of tensions and reasons that motivate different individuals and sub-groups into action, thus:

"each case must be evaluated on its own merits… Recurrent violence may be rooted in imperial or colonial histories, or in cycles of group revenge, predisposing a society toward conflict. There may be more recent 'controllable' factors, such as demographic pressures, unequal resource allocation, discriminatory government policies, and irresponsible political elites who 'play the ethnic card.' What is important to underscore is the fluidity and diversity of ethnic conflict, features that make analysis and prediction all the more difficult."[134]

A look at the countries of the South Pacific in relation to these issues reveals various examples of tension that indicates that groups within some areas and sub-regions are more prone to conflict than others.

Historically, the Papua New Guinea state has been beset with an inability to mediate or resolve the various grievances that different clans and tribes have had between themselves and with successive governments. As mentioned in the previous chapter, conflict is often sparked by disagreements over resources and borders. Between clans especially, grievances can be longstanding and sit within entrenched cultures of cyclical vengeance seeking and violence.[135] According to Alpers, this culture, as well as tribal power

---

[134] Baker, 2006, p.5-6.
[135] See for example Sinclair Dinnen, "Law Order and State in Papua New Guinea", *State, Society and Governance in Melanesia*, Discussion Paper No. 97/1, Canberra: Australian National University, 1997; Michael Goddard, "The Rascal Road: Crime Prestige and

structures, attitudes towards killing and the frequency of fatalities, has been changed by the increasing proliferation of small arms and geared towards a gun culture.[136] LeBrun and Muggah found that the proliferation of guns exacerbates unresolved tensions in the province, and that ongoing hostilities coupled with the stalling of protracted compensation negotiations in "the absence of a visible state security presence combine to make the Southern Highlands a potentially explosive situation."[137] The relatively easy access to firearms and the cultures of violence and payback have made the highlands provinces especially lawless, with the state unable to contain or mediate outbreaks of violence. In 2006 for instance, the government declared a state of emergency in the Southern Highlands Province (SHP), suspending the local government there and sending in extra personnel from the police and Papua New Guinea Defence Force (PNGDF) and also declared the province of Enga a "fighting zone" because of the widespread tribal fighting in all but one of its districts.[138] In come cases, tribal tensions have led to atrocities being committed, such as the Tete Massacre of 2003 in which the group from the Southern Highlands attacked a settlement at Gerehu, killing nine people in retaliation for the suspected murder of one of their own.[139]

A pattern has emerged where since the state has little ability to protect its citizens from warring tribes with guns, other tribes and clans have taken it upon themselves to provide their own protection by obtaining their own guns and mercenaries, so that guns and those that know how to use them have

Development in Papua New Guinea," *Contemporary Pacific*, Vol. 7 No. 1, 1995, pp. 55-80; and also James Weiner, "Conflict in the Southern Highlands, PNG", in "Aspects of Conflict in the Contemporary Papua New Guinea Highlands", *State, Society and Governance in Melanesia*, Canberra: Australian National University, 2002, pp. 1-6.

[136] Alpers, 2005, pp.33-36, 81-94.

[137] LeBrun, Muggah, 2005, p.xvi.

[138] Julia Daia Bore, "State of Emergency in Troubled PNG Province Extended", *The National*, October 18th, retrieved from http://pidp.eastwestcenter.org/pireport/2006/October/10-19-13.htm, on the 2/11/06; and James Apa Gumuno, "Tribal Fighting 'Zone' Declared in PNG", *The National*, 20/4/06, retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/april/04%2D21%2D11.htm, on the 10/08/06.

[139] Clifford Faiparick, "PNG Police Try to Head Off Tribal War", *The National*, 22/11/03, retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2003/october/10%2D23%2D16.htm, on 10/8/06.

become sought after commodities.[140] Indeed, because of this growing security dilemma, there does not appear to be a cooling in inter-tribal tensions in these provinces. In fact, there is an indication that violence could flare up around the 2007 elections—since the 2002 elections elected officials have been handing out guns to their constituents (clans) in return for votes and political support.[141] Leading up to the elections, the country's MPs have been expressing increasing concern over the government's lack of action fearing repercussions worse than that of the 2002 elections.[142]

Throughout 2006 there have been numerous reports of tribal related killings: 16 people were killed in separate tribal fights in the Western Highland Province (WHP) in January; in the same month and province, a former banker was shot dead and chopped into pieces in a retaliatory attack from a different tribe because the same had been done to one of theirs a week before; in April five people were killed and four villages were completely destroyed in tribal fighting that involved guns brought in from the SHP; it was the same month that Enga province was declared a "fighting zone"; and the aforementioned state of emergency in the SHP has been extended into 2007.[143]

---

[140] Alpers, 2005, pp. 95-98.

[141] Ibid, pp. 99-102. The 2002 elections in the Southern Highlands were characterized by voter intimidation by various clans competing for office, violence, hostage taking and electoral fraud. For an indication of how intractable the nature of the tensions between tribes in the Southern Highland province, see Emile LeBrun, Robert Muggah, *Silencing Guns: Local Perspectives on Small Arms and Armed Violence in Rural Pacific Island Communities*, Occasional Paper 15, Geneva: Small Arms Survey, June 2005, pp. 15-18.

[142] Daniel Korimbao, "Guns Threat to 2007 PNG Elections", *The National*, 16/6/06, retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/june/06%2D19%2D09.htm, on the 10/8/06.

[143] "Tribal Feuds Claim 16 in Papua New Guinea", *PNG Post-Courier*, 5/1/06, retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/january/01%2D05%2D12.htm, on the 10/8/06; "Highlands Man Chopped up in PNG Tribal Feud", *PNG Post-Courier*, 31/01/06, retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/january/01%2D31%2D20.htm, on the 10/8/06; James Apa Gumuno, "Five Dead, Villages Destroyed in PNG Tribal War", *The National*, 6/4/06, retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/april/04%2D10%2D17.htm, on the 10/8/06; James Apa Gumuno, "Tribal Fighting 'Zone' Declared in PNG", *The National*, 20/4/06, retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/april/04%2D21%2D11.htm, on the 10/08/06; Julia Daia Bore, "State of Emergency in Troubled PNG Province Extended", *The National*, October 18th, retrieved from http://pidp.eastwestcenter.org/pireport/2006/October/10-19-13.htm, on the 2/11/06; these are just a few examples of tribal tensions, many instances of violence are not reported leaving final tallies of the lives these conflicts have affected to be only estimates.

The ethnic rivalry that characterises conflict in the provinces has reached the main centres where it has resulted in a number of deaths throughout 2006 and in some cases has led to the stopping of public services. In August, skirmishes broke out in Port Moresby between tribes from WHP and Tari in SHP, resulting in five deaths and the shutting down of the city's bus and taxi services that were mostly operated by Western Highlanders.[144] They demanded that the national government intervene and remove all squatters in the city that had come from Tari.[145] Later that same month in Port Moresby, fighting broke out between two tribal groups from Enga Province.[146] In October in the country's second largest city, Lae, the transit system was also brought to a halt as the Western Highlanders who operated it withdrew their services in fear of the 300 angry and armed Engans that had marched into town demanding compensation for the killing of one of their tribesman by a bus driver from the WHP.[147] There is potential for situations like these to engulf whole urban areas, as those who flock to city centres in search of employment still retain old ethnic rivalries and tensions while continuing to propagate violence through cultures of payback. The stresses placed upon the country's security forces is increasing as both PNGDF and police personnel are posted to the drawn out crises in the highland provinces of SHP, WHP, and Enga while having to face emerging inter-tribal tensions in the cities and urban areas.

Grievances against the state are also a source of conflict, often centring upon the unsustainable exploitation of resources, the unequal distribution of profit

[144] Freddy Gigmai, "Tribal Skirmish Halts Port Moresby Transit", *The National*, 18/8/06, retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/august/08%2D21%2D05.htm, on the 2/11/06.
[145] Ibid.
[146] "Tribal Violence Resumes In PNG's Capital", *The National*, 28/8/06, retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/august/08%2D28%2D10.htm, on the 2/11/06.
[147] Peter Korugl, "Angry PNG Villagers Threaten Lae Over Killing", *The National*, 4/10/06, retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/october/10%2D05%2D11.htm, on the 2/11/06.

from those resources, environmental impacts from the resource exploitation, and the lack of adequate or any compensation for the environmental impacts. Bougainville is a primary example where a separatist movement of ethnic Bougainvilleans was started over a number of issues concerning the exploitation of the Panguna copper mine. Before the outbreak of violence, the copper mine was reported to contribute up to forty percent of the country's export earnings, little of which was reinvested back into Bougainville communities.[148] The mention of Bougainville is important for the rest of Papua New Guinea because it set a precedent for tribal-state relations where local groups see violence or the threat of violence as a viable option in forcing the cessation of controversial activities and resource exploitation, or opening forums to have their disputes and grievances met and compensated for.

There is potential in other provinces of the resource rich country for local groups to choose to use or threaten to use avenues of violence to air their grievances with the state and companies that are exploiting resources. The logging, oil, and mining industries in particular are the sources of many such grievances stemming from environmental damage, subsequent compensation disagreements, the lack of redistribution of profits from those resources, and arguments over land ownership. In January 2006, vandals destroyed power lines and stopped operations at the Porgera gold mine in SHP; in February, landowners from SHP threatened to shutdown the oil project in the Gobe oil fields if the government and the contracted company did not address their grievances.[149] A week later landowners in Tari blocked access to government officials to the Hides Gas Field.[150] In April of 2006, the newly opened

[148] "Polity IV Country Report: Papua New Guinea", *Minorities at Risk*, Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland, 2003, retrieved from http://www.cicdm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/Png1.htm, on the 31/8/06.
[149] "Porgera Gold Mine in PNG Stymied By Vandals", *PNG Post*-Courier, 31/1/06, retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/february/02%2D01%2D08.htm, on the 10/8/06; Andrew Alphonse, Daniel Korimbao, "PNG Landowners Threaten to Shut Oil Project", *The National*, 3/2/06, retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/february/02%2D06%2D02.htm, on the 10/8/06.
[150] Alphonse, Korimbao, 2006.

Kainantu gold mine in the Eastern Highlands province was briefly closed due to threats of violence from local clans disputing land ownership.[151] In July, there were further reports of disgruntled landowner groups in SHP and Gulf province also threatening to put a stop to a gas pipe project, while in August villagers in the Eastern Highlands Province temporarily hijacked and shutdown a hydro-power station in order to press demands for the government to address their grievances.[152] In another instance, a tribe in SHP is seeking US$39.4 million in compensation from the state for the alleged losses suffered following the violence of the 2002 elections.[153]

In the logging industry, many tribal grievances stem from human rights abuses carried out by contracting companies and the state. There are reports that logging companies are involved in illegal appropriation of land, massive local and national level corruption, the contamination of food and water sources, the destruction of historically and culturally important sites, excluding landowners from the logging of their land and ignoring their claims of compensation for accrued grievances.[154] There are reported cases where guns have been used to intimidate, harm and kill landowners and those who have attempted to mediate disputes.[155] Personnel from the PNGDF and the country's police force are alleged to be moonlighting as security guards for logging companies in areas such as Sandaun Province to quell landowners' protests and protect logging operations.[156] The apparent lack of will on the part of the government to step in, mediate disputes and properly regulate the

---

[151] "Landowners Force Closure of Newly Opened PNG Mine", *PNG Post-Courier*, 13/04/06, retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/april/04%2D14%2D12.htm, on the 10/8/06.

[152] Freddy Gigmai, "PNG Landowners Threaten to Block Gas Pipeline Project", *The National*, 17/7/06, retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/july/07%2D18%2D06.htm, on the 10/8/06; and "Power Restored at Hijacked PNG Station", *PNG Post-Courier*, 9/8/06, retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/august/08%2D09%2D05.htm, on the 10/8/06.

[153] "PNG Tribe Seeks $39 Million Compensation", *The National*, 19/6/06, retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/june/06%2D20%2D16.htm, on the 10/8/06.

[154] ASF, CELCoR, 2006, pp. 3-4, 23.

[155] Ibid, pp. 24-25.

[156] Ibid.

industry coupled with the relatively easy availability of firearms has meant that frustrated locals are tempted to arm themselves and turn to violence.[157]

Few, if any, countries in the Pacific region at present experience similar numbers of grievances between groups within the population and with the state. Neither do they face the same potential for such grievances to turn into violent conflict, for they are mediated through traditional and institutional justice and reconciliation processes. The conflict in the Solomon Islands during the height of its crisis was primarily driven by recent and longstanding ethnic tensions and grievances between the Guadalcanalese and Malaitans. A recent report from Oxfam suggests that despite reconciliation efforts, grievances continue to be a source of inter-group tensions.[158] While a significant enabling factor for the continuing present peace is the presence of RAMSI and its effective weapons disposal programme, there are fears that ethnic tensions may arise again once RAMSI has gone.[159] Indeed, there are fears, particularly amongst women, of reprisals from those who have been jailed for crimes committed during the tensions, that they may instigate violence once they are out.[160] In addition, surveys indicate that not only is there amongst men (as the primary combatants) a significant amount of distrust between ethnic groups, but also a continuing "high risk" issue regarding "informal negative discourse" – or "street-level gossip" – which was prevalent before and during the crisis and is considered to be one of the triggering phenomenon of conflicts.[161]

---

[157] Ibid.

[158] Nancy Kwalea, Anne Lockley, Nic Maclellan, Forrest Metz, Anna Powles, Paul Roughan, *Bridging the Gap Between State and Society: New Directions for the Solomon Islands*, Oxfam International Solomon Islands Office, July 2006, pp. 10-12.

[159] 65 percent of respondents to a survey conducted believed that widespread violence would return if RAMSI were to depart soon; Rowan Downing, Peter Heijkoop, Lawrence Posner, Norman Olsen, *Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands Annual Performance Report 2005/2006*, Performance Assessment Advisory Team, CAMRIS International, July 2006, p. 2.

[160] UNIFEM, p. 9.

[161] Ibid, pp. 9-11.

The April 2006 riots in Honiara suggest that, despite RAMSI's presence and its work, there are still tensions and forces at work within society that are able to mobilise violent responses to unpopular and emotional issues. Chinese and Taiwanese shops were allegedly targeted specifically by rioters and looters that were, according to some sources, steered by political elites with their own agendas, (see chapter 2.11). It indicates that there are still subversive elements within Solomon Islands society and the government's political elites, and that they are not adverse to treating naturalised immigrant groups as scapegoats for political expediency.

In Fiji's case, a cursory glance of Fiji's recent history would point to the uneasy and divisive political and social relationship between indigenous Fijians and Indo-Fijians as a main source of grievances. For instance, there have been three coups conducted in the name of maintaining indigenous Fijian political paramountcy, and the Fijian versus Indo-Fijian social split has often been used to polarise both politics and society. Despite attempts by a few political parties to bridge the divide, race continues to be an important factor in determining political allegiances. "The inevitable result of this preoccupation" Lal writes, "is that… Ethnic fears and prejudices are cynically exploited for political purposes during elections." For Fijians, problems stem from popular insecurities centring on the fears of economic and political displacement within their own country. The 2000 coup was and still is one of the most significant events in revealing these insecurities and how quickly racial discord can be stirred up amongst the indigenous population. Brij V. Lal writes that "In 2000, the mobs had free reign… armed and energised by Speight's racial rhetoric, terrorising the rural Indian countryside for food and fun".[162]

---

[162] Brij V. Lal, *Islands of Turmoil: Elections and Politics in Fiji*, Canberra: Australia National University E Press and Asia Pacific Press, 2006, p. 189.

Certain elements within the Methodist Church of Fiji, the institution to which most Christian Fijians subscribe to, have used their positions in the Church to propagate and fortify concepts of indigenous paramountcy. The Church is extremely powerful in Fiji with the majority of ethnic Fijians belonging to it, as well as many chiefs from the Great Council of Chiefs (GCC). It supported both the coups in 1987, and in 2000 the head of the Church sent George Speight, the figurehead of the coup, a letter expressing his intention to use the Methodist Church as a platform for uniting all the ethnic Fijian political parties for the 2001 elections and creating Fiji into a Christian state.[163] During the coup, the pulpit was often used to foster support from the ethnic Fijian population for the coup plotters and the church provided forgiveness and absolution to those involved in the looting of Suva and surrounding countryside.[164] Additionally, there are elements within the Church that appear to push fundamentalist agendas, bordering on hate speech. In 2005, the general secretary of the Methodist Church openly expressed his concerns to the *Fiji Times* that the practice of Hinduism in Fiji would incur the wrath of God.[165] At present however, though racially based violence does exist, particularly in the form of vandalism and destruction of property, it is sporadic and the relationship between both ethnic groups is not characterised by cycles of vengeance and payback.

Similarly, the disputes that rise between the various factions of indigenous Fijians rarely reach the point to which violence is perceived as the only viable option for redress. Again, like most other PICs, land is a seemingly unending source of grievances and disputes. As in every other PIC, land is traditionally important to indigenous Fijians livelihoods and culture, disputes over land ownership, leases and access to resources such as qoliqoli (traditional fishing

---

[163] United States Department of State, *International Religious Freedom Report – Fiji*, 2003, retrieved from http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2003/23828.htm, on the 10/8/06.
[164] Tupeni Baba, Michael Field, Unaisi Nabobo-Baba, *Speight of Violence: Inside Fiji's 2000 Coup*, Auckland: Reed Publishing, 2005, pp.150-153.
[165] *Fiji Times*, 27/3/05, retrieved from http://www.christianaggression.org/item_display.php?type=NEWS&id=1112408217, on the 10/8/06.

grounds) have the potential to be sources of longstanding grievances. However, Fijians have a number of avenues for dialogue and dispute resolution through either traditional channels or district and provincial councils and the Fijian administration. While most disputes have been taken to court to be mediated, there are instances in 2005 and 2006 where landowners have decided to take more provocative actions, often in frustration at the lack of impetus from Fijian institutions such as the Native Lands Trust Board. For instance, in 2005 a village chief was murdered over fishing rights and throughout 2006 a number of schools in Western Fiji had to be shut down because landowners had shut off their water supplies due to disagreements over expired leases.[166]

In Tonga, Vanuatu, Samoa and Tuvalu, there is little evidence of grievances amongst different ethnic and tribal groups that have the potential to evolve into race based violence. However, though the Tongan riots in November 2006 were generally thought to be caused by popular dissatisfaction at the lack of democratic reform, many of the shops and businesses that were targeted were owned by Chinese, fuelling speculation the violence was provoked and directed by people using the democracy protest as veil for their own agendas.[167]

---

[166] "Chief Killed in Fishing Grounds Dispute", *Fiji Times*, 15/3/05, retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2005/march/03%2D16%2D15.htm, on the 10/8/06; "Fiji School Kids Bear Brunt of Land Disputes", *Fiji Times*, 29/6/06, retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/june/06%2D30%2Ded2.htm, on the 10/8/06.
[167] "Employer says Tonga Riots were Designed to Wipe Out Traders", *Radio New Zealand*, 21/11/06, retrieved from http://www.radionz.co.nz/news/latest/200611211341/employer_says_tonga_riots_were_desig ned_to_wipe_out_traders, on the 4/12/06.

2.4 Human Flight:

As a factor in state failure, human flight is required to be "massive, chronic, and sustained".[168] On one level it refers to the cross-border flows of refugees—"the most identifiable human index of internal conflict."[169] On another level, human flight encompasses the diaspora of a country's human capital. It can take the form of what has come to be known as the "brain drain" which refers to the emigration of highly skilled people such as professionals, scientists, technicians, and intellectuals. It can also be seen in the sustained exit of entrepreneurs, business professionals, skilled craftspeople and other economically productive elements of society. Reasons for emigration may include the fear of being persecuted, the lack of local opportunities for employment and money-making, or due to economic deterioration.

Throughout the small and large countries of the South Pacific region, however, emigration is largely viewed as an important release valve from which population and unemployment pressures may be released. Often population problems in these South Pacific countries stem from urban drift, a youth bulge, and endemic rural and urban unemployment, coupled with undeveloped economies, infrastructure and labour markets, and in some places like Tuvalu, massive overcrowding. Emigration is often the only outlet for these pressures and the only source for viable job opportunities with career advancements.

The graph below (Graph 1) gives an indication of the migrant stock percentages of countries within the group in the year 2000.[170] Samoa, Tuvalu, Fiji and Tonga have the highest proportions of migrants within their populations. For Tuvaluans, the global shipping trade offers the most

---

[168] Ausink, Baker, 1996 (no page numbers available for reference).
[169] Ibid.
[170] In practically all recent reports on global migration and "brain drain" trends it is figures from the year 2000 that are most drawn upon. Recent statistics are few, particularly from Pacific Island countries.

opportunities for overseas employment with 417 working as seamen on merchant vessels around the world.[171] Conversely, whilst many Samoan and Tongan migrants are labourers that staff factories and construction sites, or pick fruit in Australia and New Zealand, an increasing number are skilled and trained professionals moving to find better opportunities. For example, a recent 2006 World Bank study on global migration trends points out that 76 percent of all skilled Samoan workers and 75 percent of all skilled Tongan workers emigrate, intensifying the "brain drain" trends within these countries.[172]

Graph 1

Percentage of Migrants in Pacific Group Populations 2000

Source: United Nations Population Division, *International Migration 2002*, United Nations Publication, 2002.

A similar trend has been gradually building in Fiji where 62 percent of skilled workers emigrate, there are more than 1000 Fijians acting as truck drivers,

[171] Stephen Boland, Brian Dollery, *The Economic Significance of Migration and Remittances in Tuvalu*, Working Paper No. 2005-10, University of New England School of Economics, 2005, p.11.

[172] Frederic Docquier, Abdeslam Marfouk, "International Migration by Education Attainment, 1990-2000", in Caglar Ozden, Maurice Schiff, *International Migration, Remittances, and the Brain Drain*, Washington: World Bank and Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, p. 175.

security guards and labourers in Iraq and Kuwait, and there are 2-3000 Fijian soldiers that have been absorbed into the British Army.[173] Fiji is also the most important case of "political migration" in the South Pacific; the coups of 1987 and 2000 have acted as considerable push factors as thousands of members from the Indo-Fijian community have emigrated. These pressures stem from ongoing political insecurity and calls for constitutionalised indigenous Fijian paramountcy by some Fijian nationalists. These pressures are reflected in the country's emigration trends:

- Between 1978 and 1986 there were approximately 20,700 emigrating Fijian citizens—an average yearly rate of 2,300;
- From 1987 to 1996 there was an increase to 50,050 Fijians who chose to emigrate—an average yearly rate of 5,005; a further 16,800 left between 1997 and 2000.[174]
- Since 2000 emigration has been a constant factor, and though the rate of emigration for professional and technical workers decreased by 2.8 percent, the number emigrating from the services sector rose by 28.2 percent.[175]
- Additionally in 2003 there was a 6 percent increase in the overall number of emigrants in 2003, a disproportionate number of which were professionals from the education and health sectors.[176]
- The Indo-Fijian population were the majority (48.7 percent) in the population prior to the 1987 coup, they now make up approximately 38 percent.[177]

---

[173] Robbie Robertson, *Forum Metropolitan Countries and Regionalism in Oceania*, Paper presented at the Second Oceanic Conference on International Studies, 5-7 July 2006.
[174] Brij V. Lal, "Fiji Islands: From Immigration to Emigration", Migration Immigration Service, April 2003.
[175] *Economic Affairs (Fiji)*, Europa World Online. London: Routledge. Massey University. Retrieved from http://www.europaworld.com.zproxy.massey.ac.nz/entry/fj.is.52, on the 7/12/06.
[176] Ibid.
[177] Author's calculations based on projections from statistics of Fiji Islands Bureau of Statistics.

Emigration seemed to peak again after the political unrest of 2000, and the estimated cost of the human capital lost, including the cost of education, health provision, annual income forgone and savings per migrant, has been calculated to F$44.5 million per year—equivalent to 4.7 percent of the Fiji government's overall revenue.[178]

Other uncertainties that may contribute to increased migration in the near future include the expiration of land leases operated by Indo-Fijians, particularly in the declining sugar cane industry where ongoing preferential access to key overseas markets are facing uncertainty; and the recent coup led by Commodore Bainimarama and the subsequent effects it will have on foreign and trade relations, ODA and an already fragile economy.

Though the proportion of Papua New Guineans is seen to be one of the lowest in the group, it has the largest migrant stock. With 23,000 emigrants in 2000, Papua New Guinea has more than twice the whole amount of migrants from Polynesia, the Solomon Islands had 4,000 migrants, and Vanuatu had 1,000.[179] Most of these emigrants are well educated and skilled as these are the most sought after by foreign companies and the most acceptable for visas by receiving nations. For instance, in Papua New Guinea many professionals with education up to masters levels, particularly engineers, are being recruited by Australian mining companies that are offering much more attractive contracts than the PNG government could ever hope to afford.[180]

While there is considerable emigration of teachers, professionals, trades people and rugby players, the loss of doctors, nurses and other medical professionals is placing a huge strain on the development capacity of these

---

[178] Calculations by M. Reddy, M. Mohandy, and V. Naidu, cited in Vijay Naidu, "Under-Development and Conflict", in Henderson and Watson (ed.), *Securing a Peaceful Pacific*, 2005, p. 373-374.

[179] Approximate figures from United Nations Population Division, *International Migration 2002*, United Nations Publication, 2002.

[180] "Brain Drain from Gov't", *PNG Post-Courier*, 30/1/06, retrieved from http://www.postcourier.com.pg/20060131/tuhome.htm on the 12/6/06.

countries health systems.[181] Some countries like Fiji are debating over whether the country should train an excess of health workers for export.[182]

While human flight is both a consequence and further contributing factor of an undeveloped or deteriorating economy, the effects are mitigated somewhat by large inward flows of remittances that, in some cases, provide large sources of income for developing island economies. For instance, in Tuvalu remittances accounts for 15.5 percent of the country's GDP, almost 50 percent of all households receive some form of remittance more or less regularly, and they have become increasingly important as a source of income for households on outer islands.[183] Remittances often account for around 20 percent of GDP in Samoa while in Tonga remittances accounted for about 50 percent of GDP in 2002, and 31 percent in 2004 (this is the highest dependency rate according to the World Bank).[184] Similarly in Fiji, as emigration has become a larger factor for the country, there has also been a considerable increase in the amount of incoming remittances over the last few years from US$29 million in 1999 to US$261 million in 2004.[185]

The income from overseas remittances is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, these considerable sums of money have created a dependency upon which these countries rely to make up significant portions of GDP. They

---

[181] See for example John Connell, *The Migration of Skilled Health Personnel in the Pacific Region*, Manila: World Health Organisation, 2004; and Frederic Docquier, *Brain Drain and Inequality Across Nations*, Paper prepared for conference on "Migrations and Development", Paris November 8 2006.

[182] Nic Maclellan, Peter Mares, *Remittances and Labour Mobility in the Pacific*, Working Paper, Pacific Labour and Australian Horticultural Project, Institute for Social Research, Swinburne University of Technology, 2006, p.8.

[183] Fakavae Taomia, *Remittances and Development in Tuvalu*, Employment Labour Market Studies Programme, University of the South Pacific, 2006.

[184] For information on Samoa see *Economic Affairs (Samoa)*, Europa World Online. London: Routledge. Massey University. Retrieved from http://www.europaworld.com.ezproxy.massey.ac.nz/entry/ws.is.33, on the 15/9/06. For information on Tongan migration and remittances see David Dixon, Cathy Small, "Tonga: Migration and the Homeland", *Migration Information Source*, February 2004, retrieved from http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?ID=198, on the 15/9/06; and also World Bank, *Global Economic Prospects: Economic Implications of Remittances and Migration*, Washington: The World Bank, 2006, p.90.

[185] *Economic Affairs (Fiji)*.

provide income for many households in Pacific Island countries that would normally be living within or below subsistent levels; they are also a source for development funds at the village level; and on a national level they are important sources of foreign exchange.[186] On the other hand, the sustainability of such sources of income will become vulnerable to the erosion of the traditional family obligations that emigrants feel obliged to meet. As successive generations of emigrants become naturalised to their new countries, time will erode traditional family ties and structures and subsequently sending money overseas will become less of an obligation.

---

[186] World Bank, 2006, p. 88.

2.5 Uneven Development:

Uneven economic development along group lines essentially provides a context for any potential triggers that may create political or social factionalisation and conflict. Group lines are nearly always ethnic based, with certain groups being denied employment opportunities, housing and essential public services while others enjoy them. In other circumstances, uneven development may come up as disparities between rural and urban areas, or commonly in the South Pacific region, between a country's main islands and its outer islands. If unchecked, the gap between the rich and the poor or those with power and those without grows wider. The extent to which this indicator can be assessed within a country can come from many sources and a number of identifiable symptoms such as poverty levels, access to water and sanitation in rural areas, access to education, the existence of discriminatory legislation and state services that hinder access to opportunities, and the prevalence of informal squatter settlements (slums and ghettos). The tension that these situations create between groups can stimulate the "rise of communal nationalism based on real or perceived group inequalities" that threatens to evolve into inter-group violence.[187]

In the Pacific, most uneven development occurs between rural and urban populations, or between main and outer islands. Economies are generally under-developed while governments make attempts at reforms and infrastructure development that is often instigated by international agencies or other countries' aid programmes. In most cases, PICs lack the capital to initiate any development that extends further than urban centres, meaning that outer areas and islands fall behind. Similarly, the distribution of wealth is largely limited to urban areas, and even in these centres there can be high unemployment. In rural areas most populations rely upon subsistence

---

[187] Baker, 2006, p.9 or see Appendix 1.

agriculture and fishing. Much of this results in varying degrees of poverty within the countries of the group.

The disparities, real or perceived, between rural areas and urban areas, or between inner and outer islands, has led to rapid urbanisation, as people see the relative wealth in the urban centres and perceive that more opportunities are to be found there (see chapters 2.1 and 2.8). For most of the Pacific nations in this thesis, these changes in demographics have resulted in the proliferation of informal squatter settlements in and around urban centres. These settlements often lack basic infrastructure services such as the provision of clean water and sanitation. There are few jobs to be found resulting in a number of unemployed, and for at least Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands, they have proved to be fertile grounds for inter-group tension and violence, while there is increasing potential for the same in Fiji and Vanuatu.

Inequality:

The distribution of income and wealth within a country's various earning groups gives a basic insight into the degree to which inequality prevails between the rich and the poor. High poverty levels mean that there are large portions of populations enduring hardship and are being excluded from the benefits of the national economy while a minority reaps the larger share. The graph below is aggregated from information gathered from the various countries' Household Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES); it demonstrates that across the countries, the poorest quintile of the population rarely acquire more than 6 percent of income within their country, while the wealthiest quintiles often have access to more than 40 percent of the country's monetary economy.[188] Though the discrepancies are small, the poorest quintiles in the Melanesian countries, bar Fiji, have the least access to income despite the fact

---

[188] Data is based on varying years between countries and their most recent House, Income and Expenditure Surveys. Comparison is based on the assumption that demographic and economic/social trends have not changed adversely.

that these countries are typically more resource rich than the Polynesian countries, suggesting that the income from the exploitation of these resources is not being channelled back into fostering development and opportunities at the local level. In Papua New Guinea, the villages and clans in the resource rich provinces in the Highlands and Momase regions have been shown to be the least developed in the country, with the worst, such as the Southern Highlands province, typically plagued by armed violence.[189] The problems in the SHP is thought to be compounded somewhat by the belief of villagers that they were not sharing in the economic benefits that were to be found in the north-west and south-west of the province where mining concessions are located.[190] Fighting has led to the shutting down of schools and medical centres, subsequently, services are said to be minimal and unreliable, while the presence of police or other security personnel is non-existent.[191] The lack of services has impacted on quality of life—women and children show signs of malnutrition and there are stories of premature deaths due to the loss of medical services.[192] Forty percent of Papua New Guineans live on under US$1 a day, 85 percent of which live in rural areas where subsistence agriculture provides for everyday life.[193] The country's high population growth rate, particularly in the undeveloped provinces, further offsets any small scale attempt to provide a balance of economic opportunities and access to services. A report of the PNG Law and Justice Sector Programme concluded that: "It is clear that increasing levels of social and economic marginalisation and inequality are contributing to escalating lawlessness."[194]

---

[189] UNDP, *Papua New Guinea—Millennium Development Goals Progress Report*, Port Moresby, 2004, p.39; Alpers, 2005, and

[190] LeBrun, Muggah, 2005, p,15.

[191] Ibid, p.10.

[192] Ibid, p.15.

[193] Katherine Januszeska, Quillan Nagel, Shauna Qureshy, Toby Schwartz, *Papua New Guinea Risk Assessment Brief*, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, February 2006.

[194] Papua New Guinea Government, *Poverty Reduction Analysis*, Law and Justice Sector Program, Canberra: Independent State of Papua New Guinea, with the Government of Australia (AusAID), January 2004, pp. 18-19.

Graph 2

Distribution of Income per Country

%of Income

- Poorest 20%
- Wealthiest 20%

Fiji | PNG | Samoa | Solomon Islands | Tonga | Tuvalu | Vanuatu

Source: Abbott, Pollard, p.28; United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 2006*, pp.340-341; Fiji Islands Bureau of Statistics, "Urban Household Income and Expenditure Survey 2002/3", *Statistical News*, No.70, 18/12/03; Solomon Islands Statistics Office Department of Finance and Treasury, *Household Income and Expenditure Survey 2005/6 National Report*, September 2006, p.3.

In Fiji, the 2002/03 HIES report found that in rural areas 43.1 percent of Indo-Fijians lived in poverty compared to 38 percent of indigenous Fijians, and in urban areas 29.1 percent of Indo-Fijians lived in poverty compared to 27.2 percent of Fijians.[195] Of the 90,000 squatters in and around Suva and Nausori, 39 percent are though to be living on an income of less than $2 a day, while 12 percent live on $1 a day.[196]Sixty-one percent of rural Fijians and 37 percent of all rural Indo-Fijians stated that they were subsistence workers, while 25 percent of urban Fijians and 14 percent of urban Indo-Fijians also said they were engaged in subsistence living. Indigenous Fijians have increased their share of total household income from 45 percent in 1991 to 51% in 2002.[197]

[195] Fiji Government, *Strategic Development Plan 2007-2011*, Suva, 2006, p. 6.
[196] Siddharta Sharma, "Resettling Fiji Squatters Would Cost $144 Million", *Fiji Sun*, 20/6/06, retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/july/07%2D21%2D17.htm, on 28/6/06. *Pacific Magazine*, 4/11/03, retrieved from http://www.pacificislands.cc/news/2003/11/14/fiji-dollar-a-day-squatters-in-suva on 3/6/06.
[197] Fiji Government, 2006, p.7.

As mentioned previously, much of this growth can be attributed to the exit of Indo-Fijians from the country as well as the raced based affirmative action policy adopted by the Fijian government that favours Rotuman and indigenous Fijians. On the face of it, affirmative action is about "removing inequality and injustice", attempting to address the social and economic gaps that are perceived to hold indigenous Fijians back from realising their full potential, in the name of "promoting long-term peace and stability."[198] Though the aims of the policy are similar to what happens in other developed and undeveloped countries, it has been criticised for equating to unashamedly pushing indigenous interests over and at the expense of Indian citizens.[199] Although the Fiji Labour Party, led by ousted Prime Minister Mahendra Chaudhry, had supported the policy prior to the 2000 coup, it now strongly disapproves of it alongside Commodore Bainimarama and his interim government, who are allegedly planning to abolish it.[200]

The Solomon Islands' most recently published HIES report found that rural areas experienced wider inequality than urban areas.[201] The UNIFEM report of the Solomon Islands found that while the overall threat risk from perceived economic inequality was low, male respondents to the report's survey replied that it was an important factor in their insecurity.[202] A 2006 Oxfam report found that there was a "pervasive sense of inequality among different regions throughout the country", particularly between Honiara and the provinces, whereby development and economic activities are often centred in Honiara

---

[198] Laisenia Qarase quoted in "Affirmative Action Addressing Education Inequality", *Fiji Government Online Portal*, 31/8/05, retrieved from http://www.fiji.gov.fj/publish/page_5309.shtml, on the 18/7/06.

[199] Lal, 2006, pp.ix-x, 34, 247; and see John Davies, "Ethnic Competition and the Forging of the Nation-State of Fiji", *The Round Table*, Vol. 94, No.1, January 2005, pp. 53-55, 57, 59, 61.

[200] Fiji Government, *Progress Report on Implementation of Affirmative Action Programmes Under the Social Justice Act: 2002-2003*, Suva, 2003, p.1; and Meri Samisoni, "The Case for Affirmative Action", *Fiji Times*, 19/1/07, retrieved from http://www.fijitimes.com/story.aspx?ref=archive&id=55477, on 24/1/07. Chaudry is also a member of the interim government.

[201] Solomon Islands Statistics Office Department of Finance and Treasury, *Household Income and Expenditure Survey 2005/6 – National Report*, Honiara, September 2006, p. 6.

[202] UNIFEM, pp.7-8.

while rural and provincial areas are neglected.[203] Indeed, leaders of Ontong Java in the Malaita Outer Islands were preparing a petition in 2006 calling for their immediate secession because they were tired of being neglected by the central government for so long.[204] Meanwhile, the report says that there is also a similar sense of inequality within Honiara itself stemming from the dissatisfaction of locals believing that opportunities and land are being handed to those from other provinces.[205]

In Vanuatu, there are high income inequalities between rural and urban areas, with rural households enjoying only one third of the national average income but making up nearly 80 percent of the population (see Table 1), while in the capital, Port Vila, average household incomes exceeded the national average by twice as much.[206] The same applies between inner and outer islands where a similar incident to what happened in the Solomon Islands also happened in Vanuatu where the poor province of Torba has been neglected for years due to corruption in public service deliveries.[207]

The countries of Polynesia typically show smaller gaps of inequality between regions, and a glance at Table 6 reflects these governments ability to provide basic services to a wide scope of their populations, particularly in comparison to Melanesian governments. However, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) believes that there are "pockets of poverty", that go overlooked by central governments. For instance, in Tuvalu there are disparities between the main island, Funafuti, and the country's smaller outer islands, where primarily the old, very young, and women reside, as those of working age move to the main island in search of employment. These disparities are reportedly increasing

---

[203] Kwalea et al, 2006, p. 9.
[204] "Malaita Outer Islands Want to Secede from SI", *Solomon Star*, 12/7/06, retrieved from http://www.solomonstarnews.com/?q=node/9187, on 17/8/06.
[205] Ibid.
[206] Asian Development Bank, *Millennium Development Goals in the Pacific: Relevance and Progress*, March 2003, p. 54.
[207] "Poor Vanuatu Province Threatens to Secede", *Vanuatu Daily Post*, 16/10/06, retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/october/10%2D17%2D20.htm, on the 30/11/06.

with over 90 percent of households in the lowest earning quintile being in the outer islands.[208] The latest 2005 HIES figures show that in Funafuti itself 44.6 percent of the island's population live below the Basic Needs Poverty Line, compared to 22.5 percent in the outer islands (Table 2). Similar pockets of poverty are considered by the ADB to be emerging in Samoa's island of Savaii, but like Tonga, Samoa enjoys a relatively high—if not universally enjoyed—score of human development in the region, more so than the Melanesian countries.[209]

The regional variations in the delivery of essential services such as water, sanitation and education provide an insight into whether state run development initiatives are being spread evenly throughout the population (see chapter 2.8, Tables 5 and 6). In all of the countries, the provision of these basic amenities have been improved over the last few decades. However, some countries still show wide gaps between urban and rural areas. For instance in PNG in 2000, 68 percent of the country's rural population lived without access to an improved source of drinking water, compared to only 12 percent in urban areas. Similarly in 2000, 48 percent of Vanuatu's rural population did not have access to an improved source of water, compared to 14 percent in urban areas, while in the Solomon Islands 35 percent of the rural population is without an improved water source.

Access to adequate sanitation is of a comparable state, where large proportions of rural populations in the Solomon Islands, PNG, Vanuatu and Fiji are similarly neglected when it comes to the provision of such facilities.

---

[208] Ibid, p.51; ADB, *Country Strategy and Program Update – Tuvalu 2004-2006*, July 2003, pp.1-2.
[209] ADB, *Country Strategy and Program Update – Samoa 2005-2006*, August 2004, pp. 1-2; ADB, *Country Strategy and Program Update – Tonga 2005-2006*, August 2004, pp. 1-2.

Poverty:

Table 2	Population Below the Basic Needs Poverty Line[210]			
	National	**Urban**	**Rural**	**Survey Year**
Fiji	34.4	31.8	38.1	2002/3*
PNG	53.5	16	41	2003**
Samoa	20.3	23.3	17.9	2002
Solomon Islands	---	---	---	---
Tonga	22.3	23.6	22.8	2002
Tuvalu	34.8	44.6	22.5	2005*
Vanuatu	40			1998

Source: Source: Abbott, Pollard; UNDP, *Human Development Report 2006*; *
Provisional results from respective countries unpublished HIES reports, obtained
from Abbott, 2006; ** Projected figures from ADB, *Millennium Development Goals in
the Pacific*, 2003, p. 25.

Defining poverty in South Pacific nations and subsequently trying to
determine levels of it can be a contentious pursuit. For instance, take one of
the more accepted means of assessing poverty levels, the Basic Needs Poverty
Line (BNPL). The BNPL measures hardship by combining the cost of a basic
family diet to an allowance needed to meet the costs of basic non-food
expenditures that each individual or household needs to maintain a basic
standard of living.[211] Households are considered below the poverty line when
their household income cannot meet this requirement. However, living below
this line does not necessarily mean that these people are going without a
proper nutritional diet, for—as has already been discussed— there are
substantial numbers of South Pacific countries' populations that engage in
subsistence agriculture and fishing as a lifestyle or to supplement their income.
Nevertheless, such figures do have value as indicators of relative conditions
between regions and countries. Table 2 provides the latest available figures for

---

[210] In many cases, data from HIES reports must be taken with caution as they rely heavily on
public participation which for some countries, such as Vanuatu and Samoa, has not led to
reliable income and expenditure figures—Vanuatu's was heavily biased towards urban
centres, while Samoa's has not been endorsed by the national government; see ADB, *Vanuatu:
A. Assessment of Poverty and Hardship; B. Strategies for Equitable Growth and Hardship
Alleviation*, Discussion Paper, Pacific Regional Department, October 2002, p. 5; and ADB,
Millennium Development Goals in the Pacific, 2003, p. 38.
[211] Abbott, Pollard, 2004, p. 25-26.

the assessed countries' BNPLs, and though some sources may be a little out of date, they give a general idea as to the extent of poverty levels in the studied Pacific Island countries. In all cases, more than 20 percent of the national population live below the Basic Needs Poverty Line (BNPL) and in Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu the figure gets closer to 40 percent. In Papua New Guinea, estimates of the percentage of the country's population under the poverty line have gone from 37.5 percent in 1996 to 53.5 in 2003.[212]

Table 3

Pacific Human Poverty Index (HPI)

	2006		1998	
	HPI Value	HPI Rank	HPI Value	HPI Rank
Tonga	4.8	1	5.9	2
Samoa	5.8	2	8.6	7
Fiji	8.9	5	8.5	6
Tuvalu	9.9	6	7.3	4
Vanuatu	23.8	11	46.6	13
Solomon Islands	36.1	12	49.1	14
PNG	43.2	13	52.2	15

Source: Abbott, 2006.

Similarly, the periods between the last and most recent HIES reports in Fiji and Tuvalu have seen rises in poverty levels. In Fiji, the national poverty level in 1990/91 was recorded at 25.5 percent, by 2002/03 it had risen to 34 percent; in rural areas it rose from 22 percent to 38 percent; and in urban areas it rose from 27.6 percent to nearly 32 percent.[213] Conversely in Tuvalu, it was poverty in urban areas that dramatically increased from 23.7 percent in 1994 to 44.6 in 2005, and the national level rising from 29 percent to 34.8. These countries downward poverty trends are also reflected in their 2006 Human Poverty Index (HPI) values (Table 3).[214] While other countries have improved

---

[212] Ibid, p.28.

[213] David Abbott, *Poverty in the Pacific: Definitions, Trends and Issues*, 2006, retrieved from http://www.regionalcentrepacific.undp.org.fj, on the 14/12/06.

[214] Human Poverty Index is a composite index measuring "deprivations in the three basic dimensions captured in the human development index—a long and healthy life, knowledge and a decent standard of living." UNDP, *Human Development Report 2006—Beyond Scarcity: Power, Poverty and the Global Water Crisis*, 2006, p. 407, see also p.395.

in their HPI scores between the period 1998 to 2006, Fiji and Tuvalu have been gradually increasing their poverty ratings.

In most of these countries, the effect of poverty on individuals is mitigated by traditional social safety nets, such as *wantoks*[215] in Melanesian societies. As these social systems are gradually eroded by increasing monetisation, the gaps between the rich and the poor will become more pronounced, as there will also be increased pressure on governments to provide social welfare benefits that they will not be able to afford.

---

[215] "*Wantok* literally means *one talk* and conveys common linguistic or kinship bonds, but is frequently also used to mean 'belonging to the same island'", Jon Fraenkel, *The Manipulation of Custom: From Freedom to Intervention in the Solomon Islands*, Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2004a, p.206. "'In popular usage it refers to the relations of obligation binding relatives, members of the same clan or tribe, as well as looser forms of association.' Sinclair Dinnen cited in Alpers, 2005, p.34. Alpers continues "In rural areas in particular, obligations to *wantoks* are at the core of an enduring, robust gift economy that links reciprocity, socio-economic obligation, status, and prestige often just as acceptably within criminal activity as in legitimate commerce", p.34.

2.6 Sharp and/or Severe Economic Decline:

The decline of a state's economy can have many implications for its overall stability. According to Baker and Ausink, the "survival of weak states is often contingent on the ability of ruling elites to manage the economy and to improve the standard of living of the people."[216] Often such decline can be tracked by standard measures such as GDP per capita, external debt, poverty indicators, drops in revenue from foreign investment, trade, debt servicing and the growth or failure of businesses. Countries that base a sizeable proportion of their trade revenue on primary commodities are often vulnerable to fluctuations in international markets. This vulnerability can be increased when a country suffers from a collapse or serious devaluation of its currency. Research has also shown that these countries are typically vulnerable to violent internal conflict and are generally undeveloped.[217] Political shocks such as military takeovers or violent civil unrest will often deter potential investors and may also result in the destruction of critical infrastructure such as roads and communications. As the economy declines, poverty levels and unemployment among the population will rise, placing further stress on a society that may already face poverty and hardship. Countries with such economic dispositions may present statistics regarding their performance, but such data does not necessarily provide the full picture of a country's economy. In collapsing societies there may arise a parallel or hidden economy where illicit transactions and undisclosed expenditures such as drugs or gun running, smuggling, diverted state assets or illegal capital flight are not reported in open sources and such actions need to be taken into account when attempting

[216] Ausink, Baker, 1996.

[217] For example, see Paul Collier, *Natural Resources, Development and Conflict: Channels of Causation and Policy Interventions*, World Bank, April 2003; Halvor Mehlum, Karl Moene, Ragnar Torvik, *Institutions and the Resource Curse*, March 2005; and Graham Davis, John E. Tilton, "The Resource Curse", *Natural Resources Forum*, Vol. 29, Issue 3, August 2005, pp.233-242.

[217] See V. Böge, L. Garasu, "Papua New Guinea: A Success Story of Postconflict Peacebuilding in Bougainville", in Annelies Heijmans, Nicola Simmonds, Hans van se Veen (eds.), *Searching for Peace in Asia Pacific: An Overview of Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities*, Lynne Rienner Publishing: London/Boulder, pp.565-566.

to evaluate economic decline.[218] As such conditions progress, the government will become increasingly unable to pay state employees or the armed forces their salaries, to pay financial obligations such as pensions or welfare, or continue to service their overseas debt.[219]

Graph 3

GDP Per Capita (USD)

Source: Country Fact Sheets, Market Information and Analysis Section, Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2006.

The graph above (Graph 3) indicates how small South Pacific economies are, with the economies of Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands only just exceeding US$500 GDP per capita. The highest is Fiji's, indicating the most developed economy within the group, while the Polynesian countries tend to fair better than their Melanesian counterparts. The economies of South Pacific countries are largely dependent on primary commodities such as agriculture, mining and fishing—industrial activity is minimal. In most countries subsistence agriculture and fishing provide basic levels of living for a large proportion of people, particularly in micro-states such as Samoa, Tonga and Tuvalu. Most Pacific Islanders are subsistence farmers and fishers. On some of the larger islands, plantation agriculture, mining, and forestry are also important commercial activities. Tourism and cash remittances from the many

---

[218] Ibid.
[219] Baker, 2006, p. 9

79

citizens who live abroad are also increasingly important sources of foreign revenue. Regionally, the ADB has picked 2006 and 2007 to be years of growth as the organisation's *Outlook 2006 Update* predicts the aggregate GDP for the Pacific economies to expand by 3.3 percent in 2006 and by 3.4 percent in 2007.[220] However, the ADB sees the major struggle facing each of the countries in the region will be the enabling of private sector-led economic growth that is essential in providing employment and generating revenue for governments to be used to enhance public service delivery and investment.[221]

Graph 4

Real GDP Growth in Melanesia (% Change)

Source: Country Fact Sheets, Market Information and Analysis Section, Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2006.

Fiji, it seems, faces a hard economic future if the suspension of democratic governance is to last through the three to five years estimated by its instigator and head of the armed forces, Commodore Voreqe Bainimarama.[222] Already, many ODA providers are threatening to withdraw their aid and development programmes, worth an estimated NZD$96 million dollars from Australia,

[220] Asian Development Bank, *Asian Development Outlook 2006 Update*, 2006, p.37.
[221] Ibid.
[222] "Fiji Coup Leader Warns of Slow Return to Democracy", *Asian Pacific News*, 30/1/07, retrieved from http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/view/255512/1/.html, on 2/2/07.

New Zealand and the EU.[223] Australia, New Zealand, and the United States have cut aid and worker exchange programmes, as well as placed travel sanctions upon Fiji's military and members of the new interim government, while the UN, the EU and the Commonwealth are also considering ODA cuts.[224] At the time of writing, sanctions have not yet extended to Fiji's trade, and at the moment it is uncertain whether any will be forth coming.

Graph 5

Real GDP Growth in Polynesia (% Change)

Source: Country Fact Sheets, Market Information and Analysis Section, Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2006.

Each of the other three previous coups of the last two decades has shaken Fiji's developing economy, and the continuing political instability will undoubtedly deter foreign investment for the foreseeable future. After the May 2000 coup there was a 10 percent reduction in the economy as

---

[223] Phil Taylor, "Fiji: Alone Under the Gun", *New Zealand Herald*, 6/12/06, retrieved from http://www.nzherald.co.nz/section/2/story.cfm?c_id=2&objectid=10414033, on 13/12/06.
[224] See NZAID, *Fiji Coup: Sanctions*, retrieve from http://www.nzaid.govt.nz/programmes/c-fiji.html, on 13/12/06; Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT), *Republic of the Fiji Islands*, retrieved from http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Countries/Pacific/Fiji.php, on 8/1/07; Australia Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), *Republic of the Fiji Islands Country Brief*, January 2007, retrieved from http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/fiji/fiji_brief.html, on 8/1/07; and "Fiji Coup Leader Warns of Slow Return to Democracy", *Asian Pacific News*, 30/1/07.

investment and tourist numbers dropped sharply and an estimated 7500 jobs were lost as a result.[225] Following the recent coup in December 2006, tourist numbers have reportedly dropped 40 percent and about 800 people within the hospitality industry have been laid off.[226] What is ironic is that one of the purported reasons Commodore Bainimarama overthrew Laisenia Qarase's government was because of a controversial "Qoliqoli Bill" that threatened to upset the future of the tourism industry (see chapter 2.1). However, the present Interim Government is attempting to rebuild the industry, realising that tourism is the key to a quick revival of the country's economy.[227]

The debilitating effects of the present coup have come on the back of other shocks to the country's economy. The sugar cane industry, the major cash crop of Fiji that normally accounts for 80 percent of the country's total agricultural production and approximately 30 percent of GDP, has experienced many problems in recent years and the future of the sector does not look positive.[228] As well as being upset by the political instability of 2000, the sugar industry suffered from a drought and the end of preferential pricing to European markets in 2003. Fijian farmers continue to receive preferential prices from the US, but the future of the industry is in a state of flux as the expiry of many land leases lead to ownership reverting back to indigenous Fijian control, where it is alleged that in a number of cases the land is not being used for production.[229] A consequence of the lease expiries has been the movement of thousands of former sugar cane workers and their families, mostly Indo-Fijian, to Suva and Lautoka in search of employment, only to

---

[225] "Economy of Fiji", *Wikipedia*, retrieved from
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_Fiji, on the 21/11/06.
[226] Malcolm Brown, "Fears of Financial Collapse Grow in Isolated Fiji", *Sydney Morning Herald*, 9/12/06, retrieved from http://www.smh.com.au/news/world/fears-of-financial-collapse-grow-in-isolated-fiji/2006/12/08/1165081155111.html, on 13/12/06.
[227] "Fiji Military Plan March to Boost Tourism", *Fiji Live*, 7/2/06, retrieved from http://pidp.eastwestcenter.org/pireport/2007/February/02-08-fj03.htm, on 8/2/06.
[228] *Economic Affairs (Fiji)*, Europa World online. London: Routledge. Massey University. Retrieved from http://www.europaworld.om.ezprozy.massey.ac.nz/entry/fj.is.52, on the 7/12/06.
[229] Ibid.

find none. This phenomenon has contributed significantly to the rise of squatter settlements surrounding these towns and the unemployment and poverty that can be found in them (see chapter 2.8). Fiji's textile industry has also fallen on hard times as in 2005 preferential access to US markets was ended and the ADB is predicting the industry to contract further in the future due to stiffer competition from Asian producers in Australian and New Zealand markets.[230] Emigration will also continue to hinder the development of the economy as skilled and professional personnel leave for lack of opportunities or because non-indigenous groups such as Indo-Fijians leave due to social pressures (see chapter 2.4). Overall, there are many evolving issues that are undermining progress and revealing vulnerabilities in the country's key economic sectors. It is affecting the general population where poverty levels since 1991 have risen greatly from 25 percent to just over 34 percent in 2002/03 (see chapter 2.5 and Table 2).

Recent years have seen Papua New Guinea's economy stabilise and grow slightly, though it is unlikely to become any less dependent on foreign aid or the export of its primary commodities in the near future. Since 2003, high world prices for minerals and oil have buoyed PNG's economy with increased productivity meeting global demand. The ADB predicts continuing growth of 3.5 percent which should be helped by expanding agricultural and construction sectors.[231] Despite this growth, stagnation in the economy is a problem as a lack of transparency and accountability provide opportunities for the misdirection and misappropriation of public assets and funds that could be used to enable economic development (see chapter 2.7). Levels of corruption within the government, along with the severe lack of infrastructure have hindered the country's economic growth from being translated into a higher standard of living for the general population. Population growth is

---

[230] ADB, 2006, p.39.
[231] Ibid, p.38; and *Economic Affairs (Papua New Guinea)*, Europa World online. London: Routledge. Massey University. Retrieved from http://www.europaworld.com.ezproxy.massey.ac.nz/entry/pg.is.67, on the 7/12/06.

outstripping economic growth with many from rural areas coming into urban centres to find work, yet statistics show that unemployment is up to 80 percent in urban areas.[232] Poverty levels continue to rise, with an estimated 37 percent of the population below the Basic Needs Poverty Line in 2002 and subsistent agriculture is estimated to provide either a full or partial livelihood for up to 80 percent of the population (see chapter 2.5, Table 2).[233] Subsistent agriculture actually accounts for a sizeable proportion of PNG's economic activity, conducted within an informal economy where the government has little control.[234] The country's formal economy "provides a narrow employment base, consisting of workers engaged in mineral production, a relatively small manufacturing sector, public sector employees and service industries including finance, construction, transportation and utilities."[235] Political instability, general lawlessness, endemic corporate and governmental corruption and the severe lack of even basic infrastructure in many parts of the country, has not made Papua New Guinea attractive to foreign investment.

The political insecurity that the Solomon Islands had experienced prior to RAMSI has had a marked effect upon the country's economy. Gross Domestic Product contracted by 14 percent in 2000, 9 percent in 2001 and by a further 1.3 in 2002.[236] With the help of regional and international assistance, recovery has been enabled, as demonstrated by GDP growth since 2003 (Graph 4). An increase in law and order has undoubtedly helped to bring back Solomon Islanders' confidence to engage once again in economic productivity and activity. Additionally, the reopening of businesses in large scale agriculture such as palm oil plantations and the expected opening of the Gold Ridge mine in 2007 will provide opportunities of employment and impetus for further

---

[232] *CIA Factbook.*
[233] Abbott, 2006; and Nita, 2006, p.1.
[234] *Economic Affairs (Papua New Guinea)*, Europa World online.
[235] Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), *Papua New Guinea Country Brief – November 2006*, retrieved from http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/png/png_brief.html, on the 7/12/06.
[236] DFAT, *Solomon Islands Country Brief – October 2006*, retrieved from http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/solomon_islands/solomon_islands_brief.html, on the 29/11/06.

economic growth. The logging industry has also been a boon to the Solomon Islands' economy, responsible for most of its present growth. However, there are concerns that it is neither sustainable nor legal and most of the timber is shipped straight to Southeast Asia, so there is little value added for any local wood manufacturing industries.[237]

Full economic recovery for the Solomon Islands is a long way off. The International Monetary Fund forecasts that it will take at least 27 years of 4.5 percent growth to reach pre-conflict GDP levels.[238] The Solomon Islands has the lowest GDP out of all of the PICs, with the gap between the better performing PICs almost doubling in the last twenty years (Graph 4).[239] Rebuilding is a priority, as much of the country's infrastructure on Guadalcanal was damaged or destroyed during the fighting, in addition to other parts of the country that have seen no development at all, and a large proportion of the population living in poverty. Information on actual poverty levels in the Solomon Islands is sparse, but the 2006 Performance Review of RAMSI indicates that while GDP growth is the highest in the South Pacific region, few positive aspects of this growth have filtered down to the general population where perceptions of their economic situation for the next two to three years are negative.[240] Furthermore, poverty has been exacerbated by the Solomon Islands high growth rate and high rates of urbanisation and unemployment. It is estimated that only 20 percent of the population between the ages of 15 and 54 are in full-time work and that each person who is working supports another 20-25 people within their *wantok*.[241]

Vanuatu is the archetype of South Pacific economic vulnerability. A high susceptibility to a wide variety of natural disasters, weak public sector

[237] CBSI, 2006, p.8.
[238] International Monetary Fund, *Solomon Islands: 2005 Article IV Consultation – Staff Report; and Public Information Notice on the Executive Board Discussion*, IMF Country Report No. 05/365 2005, p.4.
[239] Ibid.
[240] *RAMSI Annual Performance Report 2005/2006*, July 2006, p.31.
[241] *Jane's*, p. 470; and *CIA World Factbook*.

institutions, political instability and a high dependency on foreign aid means that the archipelago nation has been hitherto unable to develop a sustainable economy. The early 2000s saw negative GDP growth, but since 2003 there has been real growth (Graph 4) which, according to the ADB, has largely been driven by an expanding retail and services sector that accounted for 76.8 percent of GDP in 2003.[242] However, Vanuatu's agricultural sector is the mainstay of the country's formal and informal economies with an estimated 80 percent of the population involved in agricultural activities; only 35 percent of that number is employed in the labour force, meaning that a large proportion of agricultural activity is subsistent in nature.[243] The large reliance on agriculture (15 percent of GDP in 2003[244]) leaves the economy vulnerable to the many natural disasters and adverse weather conditions that regularly bother the islands (such as Cyclone Ivy that hit in February of 2004) as well as fluctuating world market prices. Diversification has been inhibited by the lack of job-training opportunities, skill shortages and poor infrastructure (see chapter 2.1). Also, political instability and uncertainty has continually provided an insecure environment for foreign investment.[245] As in the other Melanesian countries, undeveloped economies have hindered the reduction of poverty and overall human development. For instance, Vanuatu ranks 119th on the UNDP's Human Development Index, out of 177 countries, is ranked 49th in the Human Poverty Index out of 102 countries, and 40 percent of the population is without sustainable access to an improved water source.[246]

The Polynesian countries of the group experience the same problems as those in Melanesia, though with less political instability. Yet, characterised by

---

[242] ADB, *Country Strategy and Program Update – Vanuatu 2006-2009*, August 2006, pp. 1-3; and *Economic Affairs (Vanuatu)*, Europa World online. London: Routledge. Massey University. Retrieved from http://www.europaworld.com.ezproxy.massey.ac.nz/entry/vu.is.44, on the 12/9/06.

[243] *Economic Affairs (Vanuatu)*; and "Economy of Vanuatu", *Wikipedia*, retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_Vanuatu, on the 12/9/06.

[244] *Economic Affairs (Vanuatu)*.

[245] See ADB, *Country Strategy and Program Update – Vanuatu 2006-2009*, August 2006, pp. 4-5.

[246] *Human Development Report (HDR) 2006*, pp. 283-294.

limited available land, small populations, remoteness, limited resources, narrow economic bases and vulnerability to external forces, these countries also struggle to develop sustainable economies. They are typically dependent on agriculture, fishing, development aid and remittances from overseas. They lack many of the physical resources of the Melanesian countries, none more so than Tuvalu who's economic capacity is hampered by geographical realities. At approximately 26 square kilometres, the small country has few natural resources, few industries and a small export base. It is estimated that 30 percent of the population are actually involved in the labour force earning a formal wage, most being employed in the public sector, while the remaining 70 percent are involved in subsistent fishing and agriculture.[247] Youth unemployment is high and there are few opportunities to create income or find employment. The country's physical remoteness and lack of amenities have impeded the development of a tourism industry while its small agricultural sector, both formal and informal, is extremely vulnerable to high tides, bad weather, and fluctuating prices in its main export of copra. Aside from economic staples such as development aid and remittances, Tuvalu makes modest revenue from selling its internet domain ".tv" and income from the prudently managed Tuvalu Trust Fund provides some money for development projects. While these are commendable initiatives, there is no hiding the fact that Tuvalu's economy is vulnerable and unsustainable without a large degree of outside assistance.

Both the larger Polynesian economies of Tonga and Samoa rely heavily on their agricultural sectors as staples for their exports and a number of their populations are either involved in agricultural production for export or it forms the basis for a subsistent livelihood.

---

[247] *Economic Affairs (Tuvalu)*, Europa World online. London: Routledge. Massey University. Retrieved from http://www.europaworld.com.ezproxy.massey.ac.nz/entry/tv.is.29, on the 12/9/06; "Economy of Tuvalu", *Wikipedia*, retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_Tuvalu, on the 20/9/06.

Tonga's growth has been positive in the last five to six years, reaching 3.2 percent in 2003, though the ADB sees it dropping to 1.9 percent for 2006.[248] 22 percent of the population live below the national poverty level (Graph 5), though the standard of living is relatively high in Tonga, and this is reflected in its ranking of 55th in the 2004 Human Development Index, the highest in the South Pacific.[249] However, the recent riots of November 2006 that caused nearly US$60 million worth of damage to Nuku'alofa's CBD and left 697 people unemployed will have, not least, a damaging effect on the country's small businesses and industries for a while to come.[250] The small island nation has had a number of other blows to its economy over the years though, many stemming from the ruling royalty's naïve and rarely successful attempts to increase national revenue. There was the controversy over the late King Tupou IV's court jester, Jesse Bogdonoff, who lost US$26 million— approximately half of Tonga's annual income—in failed overseas investments; and the failing of the Royal Tongan Airlines in 2004 due to the holding of a long term charter on an unusable Boeing 757.[251] There have also been a number of get rich quick schemes that have often proved more trouble than they were worth. For instance, searching for oil; considering making Tonga a dump site for nuclear waste; selling passports; claiming geo-orbital satellite spots (the revenue of which belongs to the Princess Royal, as opposed to the state); approving a factory for exporting cigarettes; building an airport and a proposed casino with an Interpol-accused criminal; and registering foreign ships which later proved to be engaged in illegal activities, including carrying shipments for al-Qaeda.[252]

In recent years Samoa has enjoyed high economic growth and the ADB forecasts 4 percent over the next year, helped by construction for the 2007

[248] DFAT Country Factsheet 2006—Tonga; ADB 2006, p.40.
[249] *HDR 2006*, p.284.
[250] "New Tally: $60 Million Damage in Tonga Riot", *Matangi Tonga Online*, 6/12/06, retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/december/12%2D07%2D02.htm, on 13/12/06.
[251] "Tonga", *Wikipedia*, retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tonga, on 6/12/06.
[252] Ibid.

South Pacific Games, strengthening of the tourism industry, and the inflow of remittances.[253] Cyclone Heta in 2004 destroyed much of Samoa' infrastructure and agricultural sector, but the rebuilding process has helped buoy the economy and created new jobs for many that would have been otherwise unemployed.[254]

[253] ADB 2006, p.40.
[254] *Economic Affairs (Samoa)*, Europa World online. London: Routledge. Massey University. Retrieved from http://www.europaworld.com.ezproxy.massey.ac.nz/entry/ws.is.33, on the 12/9/06.

2.7 Criminalisation and/or Delegitimisation of the State:

This chapter outlines the extent to which countries are affected by massive and endemic corruption by political elites and their resistance to meet popular demands for political representation, transparency and accountability.[255] Excessive and pervasive corruption coupled with political resistance to the aforementioned demands can provide the impetus for popular dissatisfaction with the ruling elites. If it does not incite indignant feelings within the population, then it at least risks the dissatisfaction of various groups within the country's society. Such situations provide fertile grounds for group grievances against the state. Additionally, the misuse of state assets, such as misappropriated funds and the unequal distribution of resources between groups, undermine crucial development initiatives and facilitates economic decline and the deterioration of public services.[256] Such a political environment may also provide a breeding ground for criminal activities that are linked to ruling elites, or may prove easily manipulated by external groups with criminal intentions.

Corruption:

All Pacific Island countries have experienced scandals of political and official level corruption. In recent years, Transparency International (TI) has carried out National Integrity Systems (NIS) surveys on these countries, as a means for assessing problems of corruption, the strength of a country's capacity for transparency and accountability, and the success of anti-corruption initiatives. Based on reports and questionnaires returned from experts, academics and former officials of the countries assessed, the NIS Pacific Island Country Study essentially creates a basis for understanding corruption in the region and possible paths to reform.

---

[255] Ausink, Baker, 1996.
[256] Baker, 2006, p.23.

90

From a regional perspective, the principle findings in all countries' reports reveal that corruption exists in many forms and at various levels in all states. However, from a social viewpoint, there is a general confusion and disagreement over the definition and relative importance of corruption, whereby it might be culturally regarded as the presenting of gifts as opposed to being a means for obtaining favours.[257] Nevertheless, from many countries there are reports of abuses of power, particularly in the form of ministerial and official travel, nepotism in the public sector, and legislators deriving direct benefits from expenditure they authorise.[258] Additionally, the reports found that the most vulnerable sectors to corruption were the police and customs, land and titles administration, forestry and fisheries, health and education, retirement funds, tendering, offshore banking, and the selling of "tokens of sovereignty (passports, internet domain names)".[259] The latter has been especially prevalent in recent times where instances of illicit payments to officials in order to obtain illegal work permits, visas, citizenship certificates and passports have occurred in PNG, the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, and Fiji.[260]

Corruption in Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands has always been a problem. In PNG, numerous reports from internal and external observers list the extent to which the rot exists. As one of only two countries in the South Pacific that have been assessed by Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (the other being Fiji), PNG has consistently scored low since its inclusion in the index in 2003. As a comparison, PNG's scores for

[257] Peter Larmour, "Culture and Corruption in the Pacific Islands: Some Conceptual Issues and Findings from Studies of National Integrity Studies", *Policy and Governance Discussion Papers*, Canberra: Australian National University, 2005, p. 7-11.
[258] Peter Larmour, Manuhuia Barcham, "National Integrity Systems in Small Pacific Island States", *Policy and Governance Discussion Papers*, Canberra: Australian National University, 2005, p.3.
[259] Ibid, pp.3-12.
[260] C. Skehan, "Chinese Gangs in Pacific Now Real Regional Threat", *Port Vila Presse*, 20/02/05, retrieved from http://www.news.vu/en/news/RegionalNews/050220-Chinese-gangs-in-Pacific.shtml on the 1/09/06.

2005 are on par with the likes of Burundi, Cambodia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan and Venezuela.[261]

Table 4

TI 2005 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)

Country rank	Country	2005 CPI score	2004 CPI score	2003 CPI score
2	New Zealand	9.6	9.6	9.5
9	Australia	8.8	8.8	8.8
55	Fiji	4.0	N/A	N/A
130	Papua New Guinea	2.3	2.6	2.1

Source: *Transparency International*, retrieved from
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2005, on 12/9/06.

Most problems of corruption in PNG concerns official corruption and abuse of power at high political levels and throughout the civil service. In some instances, it is the nature of existing governance systems that have created opportunities for, or led to, the criminalisation of the state. For example, the issuing of "slush funds" for Members of Parliament for the purpose of providing desperately needed services to Members' electorates because the bureaucracy has consistently proved inadequate. However, since their inception in 1984 where each Member was given K(ina)20,000, the amount quickly rose to K1,500,000 by 1999, until they were finally reduced to K500,000 in 2001 by Prime Minister Mekere Morauta.[262] They have

---

[261] These states also figure in the FSI, their rankings: Burundi 15th (categorised as Critical); Kyrgyzstan 28th (Critical); Cambodia 47th (Borderline); Georgia 60th (Borderline); and Venezuela 64th (Borderline); in comparison to PNG's 49th (Borderline) placing; see Fund for Peace, *Failed States Index 2006*, http://www.fundforpeace.org/programs/fsi/fsindex2006.php, on 12/9/06.
[262] "Justify Raise in Slush Funds", Transparency International (PNG), Media Release, 04/10/05, retrieved from
http://www.transparencypng.org.pg/press_releases/pr_justify_slush_funds.pdf, on 12/09/06.

essentially become vehicles for corruption, cronyism and non-accountability, and done little good for the people they are intended for. Indeed, increases in slush funds appear to correlate with the decline in Papua New Guinea's human development and GDP per capita.[263] Other recent instances of corruption include alleged incidents of corruption in the Attorney General's Office, the illegal selling of land by a government housing agency resulting in the loss of up to K250 million, and the alleged loss of up to K30 million through a massive finance and tax fraud involving heads of government departments and other state institutions.[264] In addition, political interference at all levels of government is considered to be a chronic problem in the country which has created an environment where job insecurity and a lack of commitment have facilitated an inefficient public service.[265] The referral of twelve current national Members of Parliament to the Leadership Tribunal, including six senior Ministers and 2 provincial Governors, indicates the scope and scale of corruption in PNG.[266] A further number of MPs look to be referred to the public prosecutor for prosecution by the Ombudsman in 2007, while current investigations by the Parliamentary Accounts Committee has revealed blatant levels of corruption and abuse of power by senior bureaucrats, some of whom have been referred to police for prosecution.[267]

Recent investigations into the Southern Highlands, Chimbu and East Sepik provinces have revealed extensive incidents of corruption from all levels of government, mainly white-collar crime, with particular reference to payroll

---

[263] Ibid.
[264] "PNG: Allegations of Corruption in Attorney General's Office", *Pacific Magazine*, 7/2/05, retrieved from http://www.pacificmagazine.net/news/2005/02/07/png-allegations-of-corruption-in-attorney-generals-office, on 11/9/06; "PNG: Claim Quarter-Billion Lost Through Corruption", *Pacific Magazine,* 10/5/05, retrieved from http://www.pacificmagazine.net/news/2005/05/10/png-claim-quarter-billion-lost-through-corruption , on 12/09/06; and "PNG: Public Servants 'Real Culprits' In Corruption", *Pacific Magazine*, 28/09/05, retrieved from http://www.pacificmagazine.net/news/2005/09/28/png-public-servants-real-culprits-in-corruption, on 12/09/06.
[265] Nita, p.26.
[266] Ibid.
[267] Ibid.

fraud and the theft, misuse and abuse of state property.[268] Corruption in the Southern Highlands has been a key factor in the deterioration of public services, infrastructure and law and order in the province and precipitated the present state of emergency (see chapter 2.3).

Allegations of corruption also tend to revolve around PNG's infamous logging industry, where a recent report reveals that Asian logging companies are "buying" up logging licences from local officials, bypassing the proper legal processes and local groups' consents.[269] The report indicates that logging companies are also a large source of funds for political parties and politicians, enabling them to wield a large amount of influence with donations, media ownership, lobbying, and through direct cash payments or promises of infrastructure development.[270] Furthermore, there been instances where threats of violence, theft and arson have been used in order to stop or undermine investigations into instances of corruption within the industry.[271]

Another recent report has also argued that Chinese organised crime groups have infiltrated and corrupted senior members of the PNG Police Force.[272] The report alleges links between 16 of PNG's senior police and Asian criminals implicated in people smuggling, money laundering, prostitution, illegal gambling, fraud and theft. PNG's Minister of Police, Bire Kimisopa, noted that "Chinese mafia have bought off officials throughout the system… they are operating illegal businesses, they are siphoning money out, corrupting

---

[268] "PNG Southern Highlands a 'Jungle of Corruption'", *PNG Post-Courier*, 19/10/06, retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/october/10%2D20%2D10.htm, on 25/10/06; "Corruption 'Rampant' in PNG's East Sepik", *PNG Post-Courier*, 9/6/06 retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/june/06%2D12%2D19.htm, on 25/10/06; and James Apa Gumuno, "PNG Provincial Officials Face Uncertain Arrest Over Funds", *The National*, 8/2/06, retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/february/02%2D09%2D21.htm, on 25/10/06.
[269] Australian Conservation Foundation (ASF), Centre for Environmental Law and Community Rights (CELCoR), *Bulldozing Progress: Human Rights Abuses and Corruption in Papua New Guinea's Large Scale Logging Industry*, July 2006, p.23.
[270] Ibid, p.22.
[271] Ibid.
[272] "Chinese Mafia Infiltrate PNG Police", *Pacific Islands Report*, 22/02/05, retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2005/february/02%2D22%2D03.htm on the 12/09/06.

Government officials, colluding with police and making attempts to kill officials as well."[273]

The Solomon Islands has also had serious problems with corruption. While the problem was at its worst during the tensions before RAMSI's intervention, corruption remains entrenched within the country's political and social culture. Nearly a year after the intervention of 2003, resident political commentator Paul Roughan believed that corruption was reaching a crisis point and the cost was not only in the loss of vast amounts of state revenue, but also in the political displacement of Solomon Islanders.[274] The 2005 UNIFEM survey found that the greatest risk to stability in the country still comes from government level corruption.[275] The potential for political instability is increasing as RAMSI's anti-corruption investigations extend into senior levels of the country's society and national politics. Some of these high profile figures were among the people that originally invited RAMSI into the Solomon Islands.[276] In 2005 a RAMSI investigation into corruption revealed that millions of dollars had been lost through poor management, corruption, fraud and non-compliance with existing systems of transparency and accountability.[277] One sector that has a bad reputation for having a high level of corruption is the Solomon Islands' forestry industry. When RAMSI had arrived in the country in 2003, the sector was rife with corruption, abused by politicians and had been carried out at an unsustainable level since the early 1990s.[278] A 2005 audit of the industry by the Solomon Islands Department of Natural Resources found that large amounts of tax were not being paid by

---

[273] Ibid.

[274] "Solomon Islands: Research Highlights Corruption at Crisis Point", *Pacific Magazine*, 15/06/04, retrieved from http://www.pacificmagazine.net/news/2004/06/15/solomon-islands-research-highlights-corruption-at-crisis-point , on 12/09/06.

[275] UNIFEM, 2005, p.4.

[276] Elsina Wainwright, "How is RAMSI Faring: Progress, Challenges and Lessons Learned", *Strategic Insights*, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, No.14, 2005, p.5.

[277] "Solomon Islands: Millions Lost Through Bad Management, Fraud and Corruption", *Pacific Magazine*, 06/06/05, retrieved from http://www.pacificmagazine.net/news/2005/06/06/solomon-islands-millions-lost-through-bad-management-fraud-and-corruption , on 12/09/06.

[278] Fraenkel, 2004a, pp.38-39.

logging companies as they routinely bribed politicians for their illegal exemptions. Even after RAMSI's involvement in the country's running, these logging companies nearly trebled their exports of timber while the amount of tax foregone rose from SI$10 million in 2003 to SI$30 million in 2004.[279] Corruption on levels such as these continue to undermine RAMSI's ability to rebuild the Solomon Islands to a sustainable entity. From a 2005 progress report on how RAMSI has faired so far, an implication is that one of the intervention force's greatest challenges will be the eradication of corruption.[280]

Fiji, Vanuatu and Tonga all suffer from corruption, but not to the extent of Papua New Guinea or the Solomon Islands. Fiji, in its first inclusion in the CPI, came 55th alongside the likes of Colombia and Bulgaria.[281] A survey carried out by Transparency International in Fiji in 2001 found that perceptions of corruption in the country portrayed the civil service as rife with petty corruption such as taking kick backs and "palm greasing", and also officials being involved in nepotism and cronyism.[282] On a larger scale, corruption in the civil service is thought to involve powerful social or political figures using their influence over decision-makers to provide a service in their favour. There are also issues involving the unfair or unethical decisions made concerning public procurement, and also the misuse and abuse of public funds.[283] The public sector is equally perceived to be corrupt. One common complaint is the bribery of officials supervising major road or housing contracts where contractors get away with using substandard materials in their work. There are also complaints surrounding Fijian companies that are exempt from taxes but who indulge in overpricing their imports, despite the purpose

---

[279] Ministry of Natural Resources, *Forestry Department Audit Report*, 2nd March 2005, p. 36.
[280] Wainwright, 2005, p.5.
[281] The FSI rankings for these states are: Colombia 27th (critical); Bulgaria 103rd (Borderline); *FSI 2006*.
[282] Olaks Consulting Services, *National Integrity Systems Country Study Report: Fiji 2001*, Transparency International Fiji, p.5-7.
[283] Ibid, p.8.

for their exemption is so that they can afford to reduce their prices.[284] Many prominent figures in Fijian society have denounced the corruption in the country's private and public sectors. The chief executive of Airports Fiji Limited, Ratu Sakiusa Tuisolia—recently a senior official in the PMs Office—has labelled corruption, nepotism and cronyism as major diseases at all levels of government, public enterprises and the private sector.[285] Similarly, TI Fiji chairman, Hari Pal Singh, says that corruption in Fiji is acting like a cancer, hidden from public view and killing society.[286] With his new interim government and in his new role as Prime Minister, Commodore Bainimarama has pledged to "clean up" Fiji politics and the public service, predicating his military takeover upon the assertion that the Qarase government was riddled with corruption.[287]

There are conflicting reports on the extent to which Vanuatu suffers from corruption. For instance, Freedom House's country report on Vanuatu states that it is a problem, but not pervasive or endemic.[288] On the other hand, other reports indicate that corruption has been rife since independence and still is a major problem.[289] In 1998 for example, civil riots broke out in Port Vila provoked by reports of misuse of the country's National Provident Fund (NPF) by its own directors for their own gain.[290] Due to the subsequent public furore and distrust, the government ended up having to pay out most of the NPF's

---

[284] Ibid, p.9.

[285] "Fiji: Airports Chief Says Corruption Rife", *Pacific Magazine*, 28/10/03, retrieved from http://www.pacificmagazine.net/news/2003/10/28/fiji-airports-chief-says-corruption-rife, on 12/09/06.

[286] "Fiji: Listed on Global Index of Corruption", *Pacific Magazine*, 19/10/05, retrieved from http://www.pacificmagazine.net/news/2005/10/19/fiji-listed-on-global-index-of-corruption , on 12/09/06.

[287] "No Need For Coup, Just "Clean –Up": Bainimarama", *Fiji Live*, 19/11/06, retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/november/11%2D20%2D07.htm, on 22/11/06.

[288] "Freedom in the World: Vanuatu Overview (2005)" Freedom House, retrieved from www.freedomhouse.org/inc/content/pubs/fiw/inc_country_detail on 31/8/06.

[289] See Helen Hughes, Gaurav Sodhi, "Annals of Aid: Vanuatu and the United States Millennium Challenge Corporation" *Issue Analysis*, Centre for Independent Studies, No.69, 5th April 2006, p.10.

[290] ADB, *Vanuatu*, 2002, p.28.

funds, which took 14 percent of the country's GDP and almost precipitated a national economic crisis.[291]

A significant point that a Transparency International Survey makes is that a large proportion of the general population do not know what corruption is, as it is effectively just another foreign term that does not have direct relevance for their day to day lives.[292] Former Ombudsman and present President for TI Vanuatu made comments in 2005 about increasing levels of corruption and allegations of mismanagement reaching the non-government organisation's (NGO) desks, which she believes boils down to the clash between traditional value systems and democratic values.[293]

Tonga is faced with similar clashes between traditional and modern democratic values and these clashes are often the basis for allegations of corruption within all levels of the public and private sectors.[294] Additionally, the outdatedness and inefficiency of Tonga's bureaucratic and regulatory agencies add to an environment whereby corruption either goes unnoticed or has developed into being an integral part of the system. One example that was brought to the media's attention in 2005 involved corruption in Tonga's Customs Service where it has been estimated that at least NZ$50 million is lost every year.[295]

Corruption in Samoa is relatively rare compared to the previous countries discussed. According to a TI survey carried out in 2004 there has been no

---

[291] Ibid.

[292] Tess Cain, Anita Jowitt, *National Integrity Systems Transparency International Country Study Report: Vanuatu 2004*, Transparency International Australia 2004, pp. 5, 10-11.

[293] "Vanuatu: Mismanagement and Corruption Mounting-TI", *Pacific Magazine*, 13/09/05, retrieved from http://www.pacificmagazine.net/news/2005/09/13/vanuatu-mismanagement-and-corruption-mounting-ti , on 12/09/06.

[294] See Kerry James, Taniela Tufui, *National Integrity Systems Transparency International Country Study Report: Tonga 2004*, Transparency International Australia 2004, pp. 10-11, 13.

[295] "Tonga: Customs Corruption Alleged by NZ Inquiry", *Pacific Magazine*, 10/08/05, retrieved from http://www.pacificmagazine.net/news/2005/08/10/tonga-customs-corruption-alleged-by-nz-inquiry, on 12/09/06.

"concrete evidence of widespread or persisting corruption in any particular area in Samoa."[296] However, this is not to suggest that it does not exist at all, as there have been a number of allegations of corruption levelled at the government and individuals within the government and the civil service. While there is the normal grey area surrounding the difference between "gift-giving" and bribes to government officials, most incidences of recorded petty corruption are often linked to Samoa's Customs and Police, and on the odd occasion other ministries.[297] The public perception of corruption in Samoa is often associated with the almost absolute power of the executive, which carries a two-third majority in parliament, leaving a general belief that the ruling party (the Human Rights Protection Party (HRPP)) has too much concentrated power that enables it to do anything.[298]

Tuvalu suffers from many of the same problems found to foster acts of corruption in other PICs. It is perceived to happen at all levels, from MPs who over-indulge in travel accounts and conflicts of interests in infrastructure development programmes, to petty acts of nepotism, embezzlement and the misappropriation of funds.[299] Like Samoa though, there is no concrete evidence to suggest it is as prevalent or pervasive as its neighbours.

Transparency, Accountability and Political Representation:

All the Pacific Island states discussed in this thesis, apart from Tonga, are constitutionally democratic with variations of unicameral and bicameral Westminster style legislatures. However, as of 5th of December 2006, Fiji apparently temporarily dispensed with political representation. The interim government believes this is necessary in order to "clean up" the country's

---

[296] Le'apai Asofou So'o, Ruta-Fiti Sinclair, Unasa Va'a, Sonny Lameta, *National Integrity Systems Transparency International Country Study Report: Samoa 2004*, Transparency International Australia 2004, p. 11.
[297] Ibid, pp. 12-13.
[298] Ibid, pp. 11-13.
[299] Tauaasa Taafaki, *National Integrity Systems Transparency International Country Study Report: Tuvalu 2004*, Transparency International Australia 2004, p. 14-15.

politics and strengthen its institutions' capacities for transparency and accountability.[300]

In PNG, the ability to remove corruption from its politics and civil service has, according to Freedom House, been unable to move past political rhetoric and into actual implementation of any significant reforms that would increase transparency and strengthen accountability.[301] There has been resistance to becoming completely transparent or accountable; two Bills were put forward in 2005, one was an attempt to exempt MPs from dismissal for breach of the Leadership Code (a code of ethics for politicians), and the other was to raise the Electoral Support Grants (slush funds) by K1 million for each MP.[302]

Nevertheless, there are attempts at reform and there has been progress in decreasing the extent to which the state is criminalised. For example, 2005 saw the passing of the Proceeds of Crime Act that ensured that anyone who has been found guilty of corrupt practices will have their stolen gains forfeited to the state, where previously they been allowed to keep it. However, Papua New Guinea does not lack for the laws or systems that advance transparency and accountability, but instead needs them to be enforced.

The Solomon Islands is slowly rebuilding and with the help of RAMSI is attacking the sources of corruption. Throughout 2005 public-sector reforms had been enacted and near the end of the year the Auditor General released two reports to the public revealing the extent to which massive corruption and

---

[300] Press Statement of Commodore Voreqe Bainimarama, 5/12/06, Suva, Fiji, retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/december/12%2D12%2Dst1.htm, on 13/1/07; Fiji Government Online Portal, *Commodore Bainimarama's Acceptance Speech as Interim Prime Minister*, 6/1/07, retrieved from http://www.fiji.gov.fj/publish/page_8177.shtml, on 13/1/07.
[301] "Freedom in the World: Papua New Guinea Overview (2005)" Freedom House, retrieved from www.freedomhouse.org/inc/content/pubs/fiw/inc_country_detail on 31/8/06.
[302] "CCAC to Focus on 2007 National Elections", *Media Release By Community Coalition Against Corruption*, 08/11/05 Transparency International (PNG) retrieved from www.transparencypng.org.pg/press_releases on 19/09/06.

mismanagement had been going on in government departments for years.[303] Doing so has engaged public awareness as to the criminalisation of past governments—an important aspect in normalising ethical political behaviour in the eyes of Solomon Islanders.

Successive Vanuatu governments have tried to either throw away or limit the powers of various political processes that enable accountability and transparency over the years. Most notably has been the 1997 parliamentary motion to repeal the Ombudsman Act along with other bills that were aimed to weaken the Ombudsman and reduce the position's independent standing vis-à-vis the government.[304] Nevertheless, the position has remained and has continued to investigate allegations of corruption and misuse of power.

Tonga is the only country in the Pacific that has an absolute monarchy as a government. In October of 2003 there were changes made to the constitution giving the King greater powers and also bringing the media under state control.[305] However, with the recent passing of the old King Taufa'ahau Tupou, there may be more pressure to increase popular representation in government, particularly in the face of a growing pro-democracy movement and increased international pressure.

Samoa's constitution provides for a strong party system which has resulted in the present ruling party, the HRPP, dominating party politics since independence. The HRPP's control over the country's parliament has led to a situation whereby the government has been able to make changes to the constitution and pass laws with only limited debate.

---

[303] Tarcisius Tara Kabutaulaka, "Melanesia in Review: Issues and Events 2005 – Solomon Islands", *The Contemporary Pacific*, Vol. 18, No.2, 2006, p. 428.
[304] "Vanuatu: 2006 Country Review", *Country Watch*, retrieved from http://www.countrywatch.com on the 5/06/06.
[305] *BBC News*, 11/09/06, retrieved from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/country_profiles/1300771.stm on 1/09/06.

Throughout the other South Pacific countries there is a general consensus that issues of corruption are significant obstacles to enabling better governance. However, Transparency International's NIS reports on the region found that the greatest impediment to accountability and transparency was the lack of political will that backs up the political elites' rhetoric.

Popular Confidence and Political Representation:

Notions of widespread loss of popular confidence in state institutions around these Pacific countries range from peaceful public demonstrations to acts of outright civil disobedience and armed insurgencies. Once again, Papua New Guinea has experienced the worst as a result of the gradual erosion of people's confidence due to years of poor governance especially for areas outside of urban centres and in previously mentioned provinces (see chapters 2.3 and 2.10). Increasing violent crime, inter-tribal tensions and an easy availability of firearms has provided both motive and means for groups to take the law into their own hands as opposed to the increasingly perceived corrupt police force.

In April of 2006, the Solomon Islands experienced incidences of civil disobedience targeting the Chinese sector of the capital city Honiara. While the riots burnt most of the city's Chinatown to the ground, the immediate causes were linked to the election of Snyder Rini as PM and rumours that members of the Chinese community paid large sums of money to MPs as a means to secure a government that would be favourable to their interests.[306] Rini later resigned as PM prior to a no confidence vote in Parliament and was replaced by Manasseh Sogavare.

In 2005, Tonga saw two powerful and widely supported public demonstrations. The first occurred in July and became a six-week strike with

---

[306] Michael Field, "Asian Communities Face Backlash in Pacific", *Islands Business Magazine*, 22/5/06, retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/june/06%2D01%2Dcom.htm, on 1/9/06.

more than a thousand public sector employees in protest over new pay structures, who later organised a massive march with supporters.[307] The strike took a turn for the worse as tensions erupted and arsonists set alight four government cars and a beach-house owned by the royal family; threats of arson against Government buildings were also made.[308] The second public demonstration was a massive march of 10,000 Tongans wanting democratic reform which presented a government representative with a petition signed by over 20,000 people—a fifth of Tonga's population.[309] The November 2006 riots can also be viewed as expressions of popular discontent. The event started out as a peaceful pro-democracy protest at the adjournment of the Legislative Assembly of Tonga (the majority of which are appointed by the King) without having made any advancements towards democratic reform. However, it progressed from peaceful protest to car-tipping, and then to looting and burning of buildings, causing damage of around US$60.5 million, with 697 job losses and the deaths of seven people.[310]

In Fiji, where democracy has seemingly been momentarily abrogated, the initial coup was met with indignant objections from the Great Council of Chiefs telling the Commodore's soldiers to stand down and return to their villages, and from the Methodist Church calling the instigators of the coup the "manifestation of darkness and evil."[311] Demonstrations of popular dissatisfaction have been sparse as the military has been keeping security tight,

[307] *New Zealand Herald*, 05/09/05, retrieved from
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/location/story.cfm?l_id=104&ObjectID=10344017 on the 1/09/06.
[308] *New Zealand Herald*, 25/08/05, retrieved from
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/location/story.cfm?l_id=104&ObjectID=10342371 on the 1/09/06.
[309] *New Zealand Herald*, 06/09/05, retrieved from
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/location/story.cfm?l_id=104&ObjectID=10344297 on the 1/09/06.
[310] "Over 400 Suspects Charged in Nuku'alofa CBD Destruction", *Matangi Tonga Online*, 5/12/06, retrieved from
http://www.matangitonga.to/article/tonganews/crime/suspects011206.shtml, on 13/12/06; and "New Tally: $60 Million Damage in Tonga Riot", *Matangi Tonga Online*, 6/12/06, retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/december/12%2D07%2D02.htm, on 13/12/06.
[311] "2006 Fijian Coup d'etat", *Wikipedia*, retrieved from
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2006_Fijian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat_attempt, on 13/1/07.

especially in the light of the looting and violence that accompanied the coup in 2000.

By contrast, Samoa, Vanuatu and Tuvalu have experienced few, if any, events that demonstrate or indicate any popular loss of confidence in their governments in the last few years. However, Samoa has experienced some public dissatisfaction over a prolonged doctors strike that has seriously affected health services but there has been nothing on the scale such as what occurred in Tonga.[312]

Crime Linked to Ruling Elites:

International crime has been relatively rare in the South Pacific, though the region's states have been cited as vulnerable to exploitation by transnational crime networks, and according to number of sources, it is of growing concern to Australia and New Zealand.[313] Moreover, their links to ruling elites is very tenuous and is more often associated with official level corruption within public sectors and state institutions such as the police, as noted above in the case of Papua New Guinea. However, the capacity is there as was demonstrated when the Solomon Islands was facing collapse, where many of the country's politicians were involved with—or directly motivating—the armed gangs that were fighting amongst each other and plundering the state.[314] It could even be of a more subtle degree as has happened in Tonga

---

[312] *Pacific Magazine*, retrieved from http://www.pacificislands.cc/almanac/profile/18 on the 1/09/06.
[313] Greg Urwin, Address Given at the Australian Federal Police Pacific Team Leaders Conference, 4/05/05, *The Brown Pages*, retrieved from http://www.brownpages.co.nz/news_forum20050405.htm, on the 2/5/06; also Interview with Huntley Wright and Francis Van Der Krogt, Ministry of Defence, Wellington, 27/9/06; and Interview with Peter Noble, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Wellington, 27/4/06.
[314] Interview with Peter Noble, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Wellington, 27/4/06; and ASPI, 2003, p.24; and Fraenkel, 2004a, pp.131-159.

with the registering of foreign owned ships that were caught being used to transport weapons, explosives and terrorists around the world.[315]

---

[315] "The Ships that Died of Shame", *Sydney Morning Herald*, 14/1/03, retrieved from http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/01/13/1041990234408.html, on 18/9/06.

2.8 Progressive Deterioration of Public Services:

This indicator essentially describes the disappearance of the state apparatus that serves the people.[316] As a symptom of poor or non-existent governance, the deterioration of public services indicates a government that is either unable or unwilling to appropriate resources towards the welfare of its citizenry. Either case provides a basis for the failure of the state, particularly where regional decline instils disillusionment within the population and can possibly give birth to more widespread disruption in the future.

Human Security:

One of the most important aspects of this indicator is the notion of human security. Rotberg outlines this as the state's prime function: "to prevent cross-border invasions and infiltrations, and any loss of territory; to eliminate domestic threats to or attacks upon the national order and social structure; to prevent crime and any related dangers to domestic human security; and to enable citizens to resolve their disputes with the state and with their fellow inhabitants without recourse to arms or other forms of physical coercion."[317] When applied to the assessed South Pacific countries there is a shortfall in their capacities to be able to provide security in many aspects. For instance, only PNG, Fiji and Tonga have defence forces that can be called on to meet domestic or extraneous security needs and emergency relief, while Vanuatu has a small paramilitary wing. This leaves Samoa, the Solomon Islands, and Tuvalu to be heavily reliant on the goodwill and generosity of their metropolitan neighbours to provide defence type security, particularly when it comes to patrolling their extensive EEZs. Despite their defence forces, the other nations rely heavily on Australia and New Zealand to also help patrol their EEZs as well as provide military aid and cooperation. In some cases,

---

[316] Ausink, Baker, 1996.
[317] Rotberg (a), p.3.

106

both militaries and police forces have been the cause of domestic problems, such as being sources of corruption and also high powered weaponry that has been used in inter-group fighting, such as in PNG and the Solomon Islands. They can also be sources of political tension, such as kidnapping politicians and instigating coups, as in Vanuatu and Fiji. In other circumstances, some of these nations' security forces have proved unable to contain outbreaks of civil instability and conflict, such as in many of PNG's conflict torn provinces, and when Tonga experienced violent riots in November 2006 and Australian and New Zealand troops were called in.

Papua New Guinea has been the most prominent example of failure to provide a reasonable level of security for its citizens, from escalating levels of crime to acts of inter-group violence and the secessionist revolt in Bougainville. The state of emergency that was declared in the Southern Highlands Province in August 2006 is an extreme example of what can happen when the state loses its ability to project its authority into its provinces. While inter-group fighting stretches the resources of the PNGDF and village communities outgun local police; teachers and health professionals have fled for safety and schools and health services have fallen into disrepair and neglect, leaving the province without education or healthcare.[318] The national government has stated that the state of emergency would be enforced for an indefinite period on the basis that the "community was suffering from deprivation of services on such an extensive scale that those services essential to life had deteriorated at a rapid rate."[319]

Crime in PNG is world renowned, in 2004 the Economist Intelligence Unit rated it out of 130 cities to be worst to live due in part to its high rate of

---

[318] "State of Emergency in PNG to Last To More Months", *The National*, 10/8/06, retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/august/08%2D10%2D19.htm, on 2/11/06.
[319] Julia Daia Bore, "State of Emergency in Troubled PNG Province Extended", *The National*, 18/10/06, retrieved from http://pidp.eastwestcenter.org/pireport/2006/October/10-19-13.htm, on the 2/11/06.

violent crime.[320] Exact levels on crime are hard to ascertain. In 2000, the UN put it at 13,000 reported crimes every year, approximately 2.4 crimes per thousand people, giving the country a rank of 57 out of 60 countries in regards to highest reported crime rates.[321] However, in a country where the police force is notorious for its human rights abuses and the public fear reporting crimes more than the criminals themselves (see Chapter 2.9) PNG's low statistics compared to higher rated developed countries may only indicate how little crime is actually reported. Many other sources suggest that PNG's crime rates are much higher. For instance, Alpers reveals that the murder rate in PNG has risen to six times that of Australia, and Port Moresby's murder rate is 42 times that of Sydney's.[322] Most crimes occur in urban centres and stem from the peripheral squatter settlements and from unemployed and uneducated gangs of young men called "Raskols". Violent crime has become especially bad in urban centres such as Port Moresby, Lae, Mt Hagen, and several settlements and villages in the Southern Highlands.[323] State highways have also become targets for various groups as in one three week period there were five confirmed vehicular hold-ups on the Southern Highway.[324]

Human security in the Solomon Islands has improved markedly since RAMSI has helped to restore law and order to the country. General lawlessness and internecine fighting between various armed groups had previously been destroying the state and people's livelihoods, particularly around the areas of the capital Honiara, in Auki, and in the rural areas of Guadalcanal and Malaita

---

[320] David Fickling, "Raskol Gangs Rule World's Worst City", *The Guardian*, 22/9/04, retrieved from http://www.guardian.co.uk/population/Story/0,,1309839,00.html, on 3/11/06.
[321] Retrieved from http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/cri_tot_cri_percap-crime-total-crimes-per-capita, 3/11/06.
[322] Alpers, 2005, p.27.
[323] Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, "Travel Advice: Papua New Guinea", retrieved from http://www.smartraveller.gov.au/zw-cgi/view/Advice/Papua_New_Guinea, on the 1/07/06; New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *Papua New Guinea*, retrieved from http://www.safetravel.govt.nz/countries/png.shtml, on the 1/07/06; United States Department of State, "Consular Information Sheet: Papua New Guinea", retrieved from http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/cis/cis_996.html, on the 1/07/06.
[324] "Armed Thugs Rule PNG Highlands Highway", *The National*, 11/4/05, retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2005/april/04%2D12%2Ded1.htm, on 1/7/06.

provinces. There has been a relative peace in these regions, but, as demonstrated by the April riots in 2006, there is a large amount of unpredictability and uncertainty regarding social and political stability and whether or not RAMSI and the RSIP are prepared for whatever future challenges that surface. There may also be elements within Solomon Islands society that remain armed and who are opposed to the presence and work of RAMSI, as illustrated by the fatal shooting of an Australian Federal Police Officer in Honiara in 2004 in an incident specifically targeting a RAMSI police vehicle.

There are reports of increases in petty and street crime, particularly in Honiara. House and vehicle break-ins occur, with expatriates particularly targeted. Some recent episodes have involved violence and the use or threatened use of knives. There has also been an increase in gang-based criminal activity in and around the Burns Creek area in East Honiara, including in the nearby Ranandi industrial centre.[325]

In Fiji, during the 2000 coup the country's police force struggled to contain the lawless bands of Fijians looting and destroying property in Suva, or the days and weeks of further acts of violence and intimidation against Indo-Fijians in rural areas.[326] However, the December 2006 coup was a tightly controlled affair with RFMF patrolling the streets in the police's stead, the security situation making a stark contrast to what happened more than six and half years before.

---

[325] Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, "Travel Advice: Solomon Islands", retrieved from http://www.smartraveller.gov.au/zw-cgi/view/Advice/Solomon_Islands on the 1/07/06.

[326] Stephanie Lawson, "Security in Oceania: Perspectives on the Contemporary Agenda", in Jim Rolfe, Eric Shibuya, *Security In Oceania In The 21st Century*, Honolulu: Asia-Pacific Centre for Security Studies, 2003, pp. 15-16; see also Field et al., 2005, pp.181-186.

Housing:

Housing is also an important part of this indicator as it looks for the evidence of squatter settlements and slums as a corollary of uneven development and failure of the state to provide adequate housing for the poor. It also indicates a measure of unsustainable rapid urbanisation as a city swells with unemployed rural populations coming into urban centres looking for either jobs, food and water, or they have been displaced from their lands. "Informal", or squatter, settlements are formed when the new arrivals cannot afford proper housing, or housing is simply not available; consequently, these people often have to make do with the land surrounding urban centres. They are known as peri-urban settlements and are distinguished by the poor quality of their housing, the poverty of the inhabitants, the poor integration of the inhabitants into the broader community, its lack of opportunities, and a deficiency in basic public services such as water and sanitation. Inhabitants of squatter settlements also rate far lower on human development indicators than other urban residents. They have more health problems, less access to education, social services and employment, and most have very low incomes. The key conditions that have been identified as inhibiting the development of these settlements concern the failure of the housing and land markets as demonstrated by: the high cost of housing; the lack of affordable credit; the small amount of land available for urban housing; poor infrastructure services and the high cost of their establishment and maintenance.[327]

The issue of squatter settlements and urban growth is dealt with in chapter 2.1 (Mounting Demographic Pressures). However, it does need to be reiterated that squatter settlements are a corollary of rapid and unsustainable urbanisation. They have become increasingly prevalent in South Pacific states,

---

[327] United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, *Pacific Regional Workshop on Urban Management*, Nadi, 1-4 December 2003, pp. 3-4, retrieved from www.unescap.org/pdd/prs/ProjectActivites/Ongoing/PacificIsland/NADI-final.pdf on 2/07/06.

most noticeably in Melanesia, but also to a lesser extent in Polynesia. As populations are set to grow in the South Pacific, the vast majority of that growth will be seen in and around urban centres (see Table One, chapter 2.1) and rural areas will experience a relative depopulation. Consequently, the increasing growth and number of peri-urban informal settlements seems inevitable, and Pacific Island states will continue to struggle to contain and meet the demands of such population growth.

Water and Sanitation:

Water and sanitation, along with human security and housing, are particularly important to the well-being of a country's population. Everyone needs access to water, because everyone needs water to live. Often however, the issue is not about access to water but whether the supplies of water are safe, sufficient for their needs, regular (regarding its availability 24 hours a day and throughout the year), whether it is convenient (piped to their homes or close by) and available at a price that is affordable.[328] Similarly for sanitation, the issue is not whether there is provision for sanitation, but rather what measure of quality there is. This includes the convenience of the provision for all household members and whether it is affordable and eliminates any possibility of human contact with the waste whether through water and food or through living conditions within the house and wider neighbourhood.[329] The rise of informal settlements is linked to the inability of governments to adequately provide these basic services to growing urban populations. However, in many instances in the South Pacific, governments do not have the capacity to provide these basic services to their citizenry, whether they reside in slums or not. Table 2 indicates not only the dearth of information regarding this matter, but also that there is a difference in the delivery of water and sanitation services in the Melanesian countries compared to the Polynesian countries,

---

[328] UN-Habitat, *Water and Sanitation in the World's Cities: Local Action for Global Goals*, London, Sterling: Earthscan Publications, 2003, p. 2.
[329] Ibid.

and also that there are pockets of the population where these governments are failing to reach, particularly in rural areas. For instance, in Fiji, one of the more supposedly developed nations of the PICs, 53 percent of the total population are without access to an improved water source, and in Papua New Guinea the proportion is 61 percent. Additionally, the low number of total Papua New Guineans that had access to drinking water in 2004 suggests that either no new facilities have been added or population growth has outstripped the government's ability to provide facilities. This also appears to be the case in Samoa as well.

Table 5 - Access to Improved Water Sources

	Access to improved water sources (est. % of pop.)				
	Urban		Rural		Total
	1990	2000	1990	2000	2004
Fiji	---	43	---	---	47
PNG	88	88	32	32	39
Samoa	99	95	89	100	88
Solomon Islands	---	94	---	65	70
Tonga	100	100	100	100	100
Tuvalu	92	94	89	91	
Vanuatu	93	86	53	52	60

Source: Compiled from UN-Habitat, *The Challenge of Slums*, 2003 p.259; and World Health Organisation (WHO), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), "Coverage Estimates: Improved Drinking Water", and "Coverage Estimates: Improved Sanitation", *Joint Monitoring Programme for Water Supply and Sanitation*, June 2006, retrieved from www.wssinfo.org on 10/8/06; and UNDP, 2006, pp.306-307. [330]

Though there are no available statistics on Tuvalu, the small island state possibly faces one of the more dire predicaments. Indeed, there are reports that Tuvalu faces an uphill battle in managing its sewerage and solid waste, partly because its water resources are limited to water lenses which are easily

---

[330] The author used these three sources for tables 6 and 6 because they all provide information that the other does not. Though both the WHO and UN-Habitat are credible institutions for providing primary statistics, their estimates and projections have been sometimes very far apart in their figures. In such circumstances the author has followed the WHO's figures as they are backed with a more comprehensive source list than UN-Habitat's.

polluted from faecal contamination and salt water intrusion from rising tides.[331]

Table 6 – Access to Improved Sanitation

	Access to improved sanitation (est. % of pop.)				
	Urban		Rural		Total
	1990	**2000**	**1990**	**2000**	**2004**
Fiji	87	87	55	55	73
PNG	67	67	41	41	44
Samoa	100	100	98	100	100
Solomon Islands	98	98	---	18	31
Tonga	98	98	96	96	96
Tuvalu	83	90	74	81	
Vanuatu	---	78	---	42	50

Source: Compiled from UN-Habitat, 2003, p.259; and World Health Organisation (WHO), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), June 2006; and UNDP, 2006, pp.306-307.

Most of these Pacific countries' urban centres enjoy reticulated water systems along with improved access or household connections to the majority of the urban population. The rural areas of PNG, the Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu are often neglected, and in most cases access to water is restricted to bore holes which can be of dubious quality.[332] In other places there are issues of overuse such as in Samoa which has one of the highest water consumption rates in the world; or inadequate basic sanitary conditions that can contaminate water supplies.[333] Similarly, levels of access to improved sanitation differ from rural to urban areas. The fact that in many cases people are living with poor sanitation and water services combine to create socio-demographic problems; for instance, the lack of permanent clean water and

---

[331] Angela Gregory, "People of Tuvalu Face Uphill Battle", *The New Zealand Herald*, 8/10/05, retrieved from
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/location/story.cfm?l_id=500604&ObjectID=10349195 on the 7/8/06; and UNESCAP, *Managing the Transition from the Village to the City in the South Pacific*, 1999.
[332] *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment: Oceania*, pp. 368, 444, 534.
[333] UNESCAP, *Managing the Transition from the Village to the City in the South Pacific*, 1999.

basic sanitary conditions are thought to contribute to the Solomon Islands'
high child mortality rates and the spread of infectious diseases.[334]

Health and Education:

Graph 6

Physicians and Hospital Beds per 1000 capita

■ No. of hospital beds (per 1,000 population)
■ Physicians (density per 1,000 population)

Source: WHO, *World Health Statistics 2006*; *The World Health Report 2006*.

Health services vary widely throughout the group, where in many cases those
living in rural areas often do not have access to good treatment or there is a
severe lack of existing health services due to a shortfall in trained personnel,
equipment and funding. In most of the South Pacific countries health services,
going by such statistics as numbers of hospital beds and physicians per 1000
people, are on par with other low income countries around the world, the
lowest being Papua New Guinea's that has approximately 0.05 physicians for
every thousand of the population (Graph 6) – similar to the likes of Rwanda
and Somalia.[335]

---

[334] "Solomon Islands" *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment: Oceania*, p.444.
[335] WHO, *The World Health Report 2006: Working Together for Health*, Geneva: WHO Press, 2006, pp.192-198.

114

Graph 7

Infant Mortality per 1000 capita (under 1)

- 1990
- 2005

(Categories: Fiji, PNG, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu)

Source: UNICEF Country Statistics Website.

In every country infant and child mortality estimates are on the decrease (Graph 7), however Papua New Guinea's indicators are highest on both counts: infant (younger than one year old) mortality is, by the World Bank's measure, 68 deaths for every thousand live births, while child mortality by the WHO's estimates is 93 deaths for every thousand.[336] In perspective, this means that Papua New Guinea's infant mortality rate is more than twice the East Asia and Pacific average (29 deaths per thousand) and just less than twice the average for child mortality rates (37 deaths per thousand).[337] The graph below reflects the variations in infant mortality where Fiji and Tonga have rates that are not far off from the under 10 deaths per live births of more developed countries, followed by Samoa and the Solomon Islands.

---

[336] World Bank, *Health, Nutrition and Population (HNP) Statistics*, retrieved from http://devdata.worldbank.org/hnpstats/HNPSummary/comparative/comparativeRegRpt.asp, and WHO, *The World Health Report 2006*, p. 172. Figures vary from source to source regarding these statistics as different organisations' and countries' methods of calculating differ based on the way they define live births. However, infant and child mortality rates are still very important as high levels correlate very closely with state decline and failure, particularly in the area of effective healthcare delivery (see Gary King and Langche Zeng, "Improving State Forecasts of State Failure," *World Politics*, Vol. 53, July 2001, pp.623-658).
[337] World Bank, *Health, Nutrition and Population (HNP) Statistics*.

115

Education is important as a provision of the state because it is supposed to act as a social mobility enabler for society—the distribution of personal incomes over their lifetimes is strongly related to the amount of education people have had.[338] A well educated society may translate into "higher rates of innovation, higher overall productivity and faster introduction of new technology" as well as ultimately better economic conditions.[339] Education indicators for the group paint a picture of progression for each country, though again Papua New Guinea stands out as least developed, particularly in adult literacy rates (Graph 8). In 2004 it was estimated to be at 57 percent of adults over the age of fifteen, a level often found in least developed countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia.[340] Figures brought out in 2006 from PNG's government Education Department indicate that adult illiteracy rates are set to increase in the future as population growth outstrips the state's ability to reduce illiteracy rates.[341] A recent "report card" from the Asian South Pacific Bureau of Adult Education places PNG 12th out of 14 other countries from Asia and the Pacific, getting its worst marks from the government's lack of reform and initiative to remove gender inequity and to improve the quality of access and quality overall.[342] The other Pacific country to receive a report card, the Solomon Islands, was ranked 13 out of 14 other countries, mainly due to poor access to primary and secondary education, particularly in remote rural areas, compounded by a poor ratio of trained teachers per pupil—59 pupils to one trained teacher.[343]

---

[338] UNESCO, Education For All (EFA), *Global Monitoring Report: The Quality Imperative*, 2005, p.40.

[339] Ibid, p.41.

[340] World Bank, *Health, Nutrition and Population (HNP) Statistics*.

[341] Daniel Korimbao, "PNG Literacy, 56 Percent, Losing Ground", *The National*, 13/9/06, retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/september/09%2D14%2D14.htm, on 19/10/06.

[342] Asian South Pacific Bureau of Adult Education, retrieved from http://www.aspbae.org/PDF%20Files/PNG%20card.pdf, on 19/10/06.

[343] Asian South Pacific Bureau of Adult Education, retrieved from http://www.aspbae.org/PDF%20Files/solomon%20isl%20card.pdf, on 19/10/06; and see also Moffat Mamu, "Solomon Islands get 'F' on Education Program", *The Solomon Star*, 18/7/05, retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2005/july/07%2D19%2D15.htm, on 19/10/06.

Graph 8

Adult literacy rate (%), (age 15+) 2004

Source: UNESCO, Education For All (EFA), *Global Monitoring Report: The Quality Imperative*, 2005.

Infrastructure:

Failing states, according to Rotberg, are typified by deteriorating or destroyed infrastructure as a result of political elites siphoning funds from the state, stealing the capital required to pay for workers, equipment, and raw materials, or from internal violence.[344] In some of these Pacific Island countries, progressive deterioration of public works and state infrastructure is not so much the important issue as is the actual building and development in the first place. As mentioned previously, departing colonial powers often left these countries with barely established urban and rural infrastructures. This includes road networks that link rural and urban areas and enable the smooth progression of goods and people to and from. Roads are the most visible manifestation of infrastructure weakness and deterioration and in the South Pacific, with Papua New Guinea providing one of the best examples. Of the

---

[344] Rotberg, 2003a, p.7.

117

19,600 km of road in the country, 686 km (3.5 percent) is paved.[345] Most of the country's interior is inaccessible by road, there are still no significant cross-country linkages between the capital and other areas, and damaged bridges, slips and landslides close what few roads there are on a regular basis. Even those roads that are needed for the logging industry deteriorate quickly once they are not needed anymore. As in many cases the original construction would be of variable quality and afterwards little money is spent to upkeep and maintain them.[346] This lack of infrastructure development does have an adverse effect on PNG's ability to develop its own internal infrastructure. For instance, economic development on even a basic level such as cash cropping is hindered by lack of linkages from rural production areas to urban economic hubs and it also hinders rural populations' access to services such as schooling and healthcare.

Furthermore, a recent report by Australian Conservation Foundation (ASF) and the Centre for Environmental Law and Community Rights (CELCoR) found that due to the lack of government services in rural areas, communities in these areas often relied upon logging companies to build schools, health clinics, and roads in return for logging concessions.[347] To a large extent, the impact resource companies have had on PNG's forests can be attributed to the government's inability to provide services to rural areas and communities; a problem that is compounded by little or no information and no other alternatives for rural communities.

The roads of Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands are similarly underdeveloped, and in a general sense, what paved roads there are amongst theses countries often do not extend further than either the main urban centres or the main island, such as in Tuvalu. Of the group, Samoa has the most developed and extensive road network—where most villages are accessible by sealed road—

[345] 1999 estimates in "Papua New Guinea", *CIA Factbook*, 2006.
[346] "Papua New Guinea", *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment: Oceania*, 2005, p.372.
[347] ASF, CELCoR, 2006, p.15.

followed by Fiji where the overstretched Public Works Department often struggles to maintain existing roads, particularly the highway circling Viti Levu. In the Solomon Islands, although the country was underdeveloped before its civil strife, the insurgency contributed to the destruction of much of the existing roads, bridges, water supply and sanitation facilities. The rebuilding of the Solomon Islands infrastructure has been significantly aided by an emergency loan from the Asian Development Bank (ADB), help from RAMSI, and aid from other countries. Generally speaking, infrastructure development in these countries is more often than not underpinned by aid contributions and development projects from donor countries such as Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and the European Union.

2.9 Human Rights:

This indicator assesses the level of rights that the population of a state enjoy and the extent to which they are guaranteed by legislation. There are three groups of individual's rights that are looked at: political rights, civil rights and liberties, and human rights.

Table 7 – Freedom House Political Rights and Civil Liberties Scores

	Political Rights	Civil Liberties	Status
Fiji	4	3	Partly Free
PNG	3	3	Partly Free
Samoa	2	2	Free
Solomon Islands	3	3	Partly Free
Tonga	5	3	Partly Free
Vanuatu	2	2	Free
Tuvalu	1	1	Free

Source: Freedom House, Freedom House, *Freedom House: Freedom in the World – Country Reports (2006)*, retrieved from http://freedomhouse.org/inc/content/pubs/fiw/inc_country_detail.cfm, on the 25/10/06.

Political Rights:

Political rights include those rights that allow a population to participate freely in the state's political processes, to vote freely in legitimate elections, and to have representatives that are accountable to them. In all but one of the states within the group (Tonga), the choice of political leadership and representation as expressed through the popular will is a right that is constitutionally guaranteed. In Tonga, political life and a large part of the economy is dominated by the king, the nobility and a few prominent commoners through their dominant numbers in parliament and substantial landholdings. The citizens of Tonga are unable to determine their system of government or change their leaders democratically; the king appoints his own prime minister and cabinet which are responsible for major policy decisions, although nine Peoples' Representatives are elected to the Legislative Assembly. However,

120

the impetus for democratic reform seems to be gaining. The March 2005 elections for the seats open to voters showed strong popular support for pro-democracy candidates, with many elected into parliament. Additionally, the country's first official political party, the pro-democracy People's Democratic Party, was registered as an incorporated society in July 2005, and in 2006 the late King Tupou IV appointed the first commoner to the position of prime minister. After the large demonstrations in September 2005, parliament commissioned a committee to consult the population with regards to possible political changes. The Committee's final report recommends that greater authority be given to the elected members of parliament to appoint the Prime Minister and a majority of the cabinet, while still retaining some of the traditional rights and powers given to the nobles and king.[348] It is also believed that after the late King Tupou IV's death, the new king, George Tupou V, thought by some to be a "military fetishist, cybervisonary, crazy genius, Machiavelli-like schemer, jet-setting bachelor and playboy", will help to see in a new era of democratic reform.[349]

What electoral processes there are in Tonga and also those conducted throughout the rest of the group are generally free and fair according to election observer groups. However, in the past the capacity for electoral fraud within individual electorates and even whole regions was demonstrated in the 2002 elections in Papua New Guinea. The 2002 elections in the Southern Highlands region saw fraud, voter intimidation, theft of ballot boxes, and

---

[348] From a press release from Tonga's first commoner appointed Prime Minister: Feleti V Sevele, *Government's Roadmap for Political Reform*, Government of the Kingdom of Tonga, 23rd October 2006, retrieved from http://www.pmo.gov.to/artman/publish/article_196.shtml, on the 29/10/06.

[349] Jane Phare, "The Madness of King George of Tonga", *New Zealand Herald*, 17/9/06, retrieved from http://subs.nzherald.co.nz/search/story.cfm?storyid=0004F582-CA59-150C-B58B83027AF1010E on the 3/10/06; for expectations of the new king with regards to political reforms see Angela Gregory, "Bachelor King Inherits Nation Thirsting for Change", *New Zealand Herald*, 12 September 2006, retrieved from http://subs.nzherald.co.nz/search/story.cfm?storyid=00023A52-4394-1505-8CCC83027AF1010E and Angela Gregory, "Democracy on the Boil", *New Zealand Herald*, 16 September 2006, retrieved from http://subs.nzherald.co.nz/search/story.cfm?storyid=000A3306-74F5-150A-948683027AF1010F, on the 3/10/06.

121

violence—including rape and murder—lead to polls in six electorates in the Southern Highlands being declared failed.[350] With finance from Australia, supplementary elections were successfully held the next year and these were, by contrast, associated with little violence and thought to be generally free and fair.[351]

In Samoa, political rights issues arise as a result of clashes between custom and individual rights, both of which are upheld constitutionally. These tensions seem most often to manifest at elections where the individual rights of the voter can frequently go against village instructions to vote for a preferred candidate. A number of these types of cases were a problem in the 2001 election, often leading to individuals and their families being expelled from their villages.[352]

During 2006 there were other countries within the group that went through elections (Fiji, the Solomon Islands and Tuvalu). On the whole international observers, including in some cases those from Australia, New Zealand and the Commonwealth Secretariat, concluded that each country had held elections that were free and fair and allowed a general expression of the population's political rights. However, in Fiji and the Solomon Islands there were notable incidents tied to their elections. In Fiji, the Commonwealth Secretariat observers noticed only small electoral irregularities, while in the Solomon Islands the appointment of Snyder Rini as Prime Minister sparked off the racial riots that destroyed a large part of Chinatown in Honiara.[353]

---

[350] United States State Department, *Papua New Guinea – Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2005*, released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, March 8, 2006, retrieved from http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61623.htm, 29/9/06.
[351] Ibid.
[352] Freedom House, *Freedom House: Freedom in the World – Country Reports (2006)*, retrieved from http://freedomhouse.org/inc/content/pubs/fiw/inc_country_detail.cfm, on the 25/10/06.
[353] For an account of the Commonwealth Observer Group's report see: K. D. Knight, "Statement on the Counting and the Electoral Process as a Whole", *Commonwealth Observer Group Fiji Islands General Election May 2006*, 19 May 2006, retrieved from

Civil Rights/Liberties:

Civil rights and liberties encompass the ability to exercise such freedoms as freedom of the press, of speech and expression, assembly, association, religion, and movement. Some of these rights are legislated for and against, others are not legislated at all, and sometimes they can clash with traditional prejudices, particularly when they may not be known as an individual's rights. For instance, no Pacific state has legislation that protects their citizens' right to official information; an important facet of democratic transparency, and something that is taken for granted. In other cases, such as Papua New Guinea, government legislation limits freedom of assembly in the form of marches and demonstrations, while in Samoa village chiefs have resorted to murder, whippings, burning down homes and banishing whole families because of belonging to a different church—although the last such instance was in 1999.[354] Perhaps the most controversial freedom that has caused many headaches for Pacific Island politicians is the freedom of the press, particularly since it is a right that is lawfully guaranteed within every country of the group and in most cases it is very well exercised.

However, governments are not entirely innocent in their attempts to limit these rights in order to censor sensitive material. For instance, one of Bainimarama's first actions after he overthrew the Fijian Government was to restrict and censor the media in its broadcasting of coup events, though the reason given for sending troops to Fiji's media newsrooms was to protect staff from "dissidents".[355] A few days after media outlets were stormed, the

http://www.thecommonwealth.org/document/151556/fiji_islands_general_election_may_200
6__statement.htm, on the 4/10/06.
[354] Crocombe, 2001, p.142.
[355] International Federation of Journalists, "Crackdown on Press Freedom in Fiji Coup", *News Release*, 6/12/06, retrieved from
http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/december/12%2D07%2Drel1.htm, on 9/12/06.
"Troops Shut Down Media, Streets and Towns", *Asia-Pacific News*, 5/12/06, retrieved from

military government stated that it was not going to interfere any more in the freedom of the media, although their have been allegations of continued threats and censorship.[356]

Legislature effectively gives the Fijian Minister of Information the power to force newspapers to retract or publish "correcting statements" and individuals can be arrested for publishing false or "malicious" material, though these provisions have never been used in the past.[357] Issues of government pressure to censor are often in regard to the printing of sensitive articles, such as those to do with race issues in Fiji; the censorship of political issues in Samoa and Tonga, and more generally issues relating to corruption. In Tuvalu media is controlled by the Tuvalu Media Corporation (TMC), a public corporation, with the bulk of its funding coming from the government and its chair being the secretary of the government. The TMC has been heavily criticised by human rights activists and groups for the self-censoring of content considered to be in opposition to the government.[358] In countries such as Fiji, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu, there have also been reported incidences of politicians or their supporters harassing and threatening journalists.[359]

---

http://news.monstersandcritics.com/asiapacific/news/article_1229832.php/Troops_shut_down_media_streets_and_towns__Roundup_, on 9/12/06.

[356] "Military Says No More Interference With Media", *Fiji Times*, 7/12/06, retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/december/12%2D07%2D01d.htm, on 9/12/06.

[357] Freedom House, *Freedom House: Freedom of the Press – Country Reports (2006)*, retrieved from http://freedomhouse.org/inc/content/pubs/pfs/inc_country_detail.cfm, on the 25/10/2006.

[358] Freedom House, *Freedom House: Freedom of the Press – Country Reports (2006)*; and also United States State Department, *Tuvalu – Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2005*, released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, March 8, 2006, retrieved from http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61630.htm, on the 29/9/06. Recently government interference in the media in Tuvalu has decreased.

[359] Freedom House, *Freedom House: Freedom of the Press – Country Reports (2006)*.

Human Rights:

The concept of human rights is based on the idea that all human beings have universal rights, regardless of where they are, where they are from, their ethnicity, nationality, religion, sex or sexual preference. They are enshrined within the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights and are conceptualised as being based on an inherent human dignity giving them a universal and inalienable character.

In most cases, states and their various executive apparatuses within the group respect their citizens, human rights. Violations are rare or isolated and they are usually followed up by investigations and prosecutions. The country that is the exception to this is Papua New Guinea, which has had an increasingly infamous record when it comes to human rights violations carried out by its police forces. Over the last two years Human Rights Watch have been documenting instances where police have been engaging in often arbitrary acts of extreme violence and abuse of their power. There have been widespread reported acts of excessive use of force, sexual violence and torture particularly involving children and teenagers and also against those seeking help. One of the more recent and publicised incidents involved police opening fire on unarmed school children, some as young as seven, who were protesting the arrest of their principal in October 2005, leaving three dead and 28 seriously injured.[360] Child abuse and sexual violence is also a serious problem within the prison system. This includes illegal conditions of detention in which young children are frequently placed in danger of being abused by adults, where the prisons are in a general dilapidated condition and prisoners also have to wait inordinately long periods to receive a fair trial.[361] Offending

---

[360] "PNG Police Robbed School Before Shootings", *The National*, 2/11/05, retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2005/november/11%2D03%2D01.htm, on the 29/9/06.
[361] Freedom House, *Freedom House: Freedom of the Press – Country Reports (2006)*.

police and prison officials enjoy an enduring immunity from both discipline and prosecution, and this has significantly affected public confidence.[362]

Prison conditions in other parts of the group vary from very basic down to deteriorating as most prisons are old and overpopulated, having been originally made for smaller populations. In Fiji, courts have actually released prisoners early on bail due to a reluctance in exposing prisoners to the unhealthy conditions and lack of essential services in its prisons.[363] Vanuatu's prisons suffer from chronic overcrowding and facilities are not able to cope with incidences such as the 1998 state of emergency when 300-500 suspects were held in Port Vila's prison which only has a maximum capacity of 63.[364]

Cases of group discrimination of Indo-Fijians by indigenous Fijians has manifested within the Fiji's government, legislatively and communally. Fiji's 1997 constitution ended the Fijian's guaranteed majority within parliament, but various laws and policies give preferential treatment to Fijians while discriminating against non-indigenous Fijians. While the constitution does note that "the composition of the state service at all levels should reflect as closely as possible the ethnic composition of the population," it also specifies the "paramountcy of Fijian interests" as a protective principle.[365] One perceived example of this regards the race-based affirmative action campaign directed at getting more indigenous Fijians into public service positions, improving their education, and increasing their opportunities.[366]

---

[362] Human Rights Watch, *Still Making Their Own Rules: Ongoing Impunity for Police Beatings, Rape and Torture in Papua New Guinea*, Vol. 18, No. 13, 2006, retrieved from http://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/png1006/1.htm#_Toc149536898 on the 2/11/06.
[363] United States State Department, *Fiji – Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2005*, released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, March 8, 2006, retrieved from http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61608.htm, on the 29/9/06.
[364] *Janes*, p.540.
[365] "Constitution of the Fiji Islands", *Wikisource*, retrieved from http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Constitution_of_the_Fiji_Islands, on 29/09/06.
[366] Lal, 2006, pp. ix-x, 74, 143, 237, 247-248; see also Davies, 2005.

2.10 Security Situation:

This indicator assesses the nature of security apparatuses or entities within the state and their relationship with the state and the degree to which these entities resemble a "state within a state".[367] They can be either institutions affiliated with the state such as a defence force or a police force, or they could be militias, guerrilla forces and private armies that politically oppose the government.[368] The emergence of guerrilla forces and armed militias politically opposed to the government are indications of a strong level of grievance between certain groups and the government and also the government's declining ability to ensure both the human and territorial security of the country. The state's monopoly on legitimacy and authority within its boundaries is subsequently challenged either through violence or the mere presence of another entity claiming the legitimate use of force.

However, this threat can also come from within a state's own defence force and police. In one instance, this threat may emerge from the establishment of a "praetorian guard," essentially an army within an army that either serves the interests of the military or political elite—such as the *Schutzstaffel* (SS) in Nazi Germany—or, such as the original namesakes, are actively involved in the determining of government heads, as in the days of ancient Rome. If a state's security apparatus already exercises this degree of power over the country, it can also be seen as developing its own autonomy separate from the state. In a democratic country, civilian control of the military is subverted, along with the authority and the monopoly of force that civil government needs for the basis of its authority and which the military provides.

---

[367] Baker, 2006, p. 10.
[368] Ibid.

127

Militias:

In the Solomon Islands crisis between 1998 and 2003, rival militias engaging in violent conflict with each other created an environment where the population was not safe from violence, crime and ethnic tension. Intimidation from rival ethnic militias created large flows of refugees into other areas of the country, generating further pressure and tension in these surrounding regions. The overthrowing by the Malaitan Eagle Force of the government in the 2000 coup effectively caused the collapse of civil control over the state and was followed by an outflow of expatriates and the closure of the Goldridge Mine resulting in debilitating blows to the economy. Since 2003, RAMSI has achieved much in dealing with the initial problems that led to the crisis. For instance, a high profile gun amnesty at the beginning of the intervention led to the surrender of 3,317 home-made, commercial and various military weapons.[369] Of the two militias that caused much of the violence, the Isatabu Freedom Movement (IFM) and the Malaitan Eagle Force (MEF), all indications suggest that their main instigators have either been convicted or are facing trial. Additionally, the strong presence of RAMSI provides a semblance of security and the two militias have, for all intents and purposes, ceased to exist. However, in mid-2005 another group in north Malaita claiming to be made up of former MEF members and also claiming to possess a number of high-powered weapons made themselves known. They alleged that the Australian contingent of RAMSI was discriminatory against Malaitans and they also threatened violence if the Prime Minister (at the time Sir Allan Kemakeza), the Premier of Malaita, and all politically appointed Malaitans, did not resign.[370] However, the movement lacks popular support among the locals of Malaita, particularly from citizens who only want peace

---

[369] Fraenkel, 2004a, p.170.
[370] See *PNG Post Courier*, 19/5/05, retrieved from http://www.postcourier.com.pg/20050519/pacific01.htm, on the 20/11/06.

and development.[371] Additionally, in August 2005 the Malaitan rebel that had sent the letters was arrested and later convicted in November 2006 for fraud charges after the 2000 coup, and also faces charges of threat and intimidation.[372]

Militias in Papua New Guinea' highland provinces are creating pockets of instability similar to the Solomon Islands experience. Armed groups forming along clan lines regularly engage in outbreaks of fighting and there have been incidents of atrocities being committed as described previously. Clashes can often be protracted and involve many people over a number of days. For instance, in Chimbu Province in April of 2005 over 2,000 tribal members were involved in violent confrontations that lasted for several days, in the process closing many businesses, causing USD300,000 worth of property damage and displacing around 5,000 people.[373] In some parts of the country, the situation has deteriorated so badly that a senior politician has described the main protagonists as "warlords" particularly in regard to the Southern Highlands Province.[374] The Southern Highlands has also been involved in threats of secession, with proponents often using the example of Bougainville as precedent. One example was immediately after the 2002 election where polling in the SHP was marred by violence and interference by armed groups, and candidates waiting for results from the central government threatened

---

[371] *Solomon Star*, 6/6/05, retrieved from http://www.solomonstarnews.com/?q=node/3022 on the 20/11/06.

[372] Ibid, 16/11/06, retrieved from http://www.solomonstarnews.com/?q=node/11489 on the 20/11/06.

[373] "Tribal War Takes Heavy Toll in PNG Province", *PNG Post-Courier*, 27/5/05, retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2005/april/04-27-06.htm, on the 5/09/06; and also "Papua New Guinea", *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment: Oceania*, Issue No. 8, Surrey: Jane's Information Group Limited, 2005, p.376.

[374] It was Cabinet Minister Sir Peter Barter who made the remark, referring specifically to the Southern Highlands Province, see *The National*, 24/5/05, retrieved from http://www.thenational.com.pg/0527/column3.htm on the 7/7/06. The state of emergency in this province was extended to December 23rd in October 2006, see Julia Daia Bore, "State of Emergency in Troubled PNG Province Extended", *The National*, October 18th, retrieved from http://pidp.eastwestcenter.org/pireport/2006/October/10-19-13.htm, on the 2/11/06.

secession, revolt, violence, and the destruction of state assets.[375] The continued state of emergency in the province (mentioned in chapter 2.3) reflects the inability of the state to contain increasing levels of violent crime and conflict in the region, or act as an intermediary that would help groups to resolve disputes peacefully.

In Bougainville, despite the halting of mass hostilities and the election of an autonomous government in 2005, the island continues to have problems with armed militias challenging the authority of the Papua New Guinea state and of the newly elected Autonomous Bougainville Government (ABG). As the ABG seeks to gain greater official authority over its domestic affairs, there is an open question regarding whether the new government can maintain stability while in the midst of state-building, and also while there are still dissident groups throughout the island that have never been fully disarmed. From the ending of hostilities in 1997 to the end of 2006, a splinter faction of the original Bougainville Revolutionary Army, the Me'ekamui Defence Force (MDF), remained active and enforced a "no-go" zone in central Bougainville, setting up a separate state calling itself the Kingdom of Papala (an unrecognised entity) with the MDF as its own defence force. The kingdom was established by the man who led the original rebellion against PNG, Francis Ona. In 2005 Ona died and was replaced as King of Papala by Noah Musingku, a known con-man who had swindled millions of dollars from numerous Pacific Islanders. Musingku then allegedly hired ex-Fijian soldiers to act as body-guards and to train and arm his private militia.[376] Throughout 2006 there had been concerns regarding the threat to stability and the peace process Musingku and his army may pose as armed attacks and clashes between police and Musingku's forces sparked fears of another civil war.[377]

---

[375] "Poll Frustrations Lead to Calls for Secession", *PNG Post-Courier*, 11/8/02, retrieved from http://www.postcourier.com.pg/20020809/news02, on 2/11/06.
[376] "Fijian Mercenaries in Bougainville", *Wikipediea*, retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fijian_mercenaries_in_Bougainville, on 2/11/06.
[377] "Bougainville Leaders Wary of Musingku Faceoff", *The National*, 15/5/06, retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/may/05%2D16%2D03.htm, on 2/11/06.

While the ABG had made attempts to arrive at a peaceful resolution, in May 2006 it engaged the services of a group of thirty former combatants and armed them with weapons to assist the Bougainville police in flushing out Musingku, his followers and the Me'ekamui forces.[378] In November 2006, the group, calling themselves the Bougainville Freedom Fighters (BFF), executed a dawn raid on Musingku and his forces, reportedly killing a number of them and wounding Musingku himself.[379] Since then, a number of Musingku's followers have turned themselves in while Musingku and what remains of Me'ekamui fighters are hiding out in the south of Bougainville.[380]

Loss of Civilian Control Over the Military:

Political stability is also challenged when the civilian apparatus of government loses its control over the military, whereupon the military has developed its own autonomy, formulating its own policy while also enforcing its decisions upon the state. Historically, this has occurred in many newly independent states in Africa and Asia in the wake of decolonisation in the twentieth century and most often manifested in the form of military coups and mutinies. Of the group being examined only four have military or paramilitary forces (Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Tonga, and Vanuatu) and from this four only Tonga has had no conflict with its military (see Table 7).

---

[378] Aloysius Laukai, "Bougainville to Use Force to Flush Out Musingku", *The National*, 12/5/06, retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/may/05%2D15%2D05.htm, 2/11/06.

[379] "PNG Conman Musingku Shot By Freedom Fighters", *PNG Post-Courier*, 22/11/06, retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/november/11%2D23%2D01.htm, 29/11/06.

[380] "Fiji Fails to Extricate Soldiers From Bougainville", *Fiji Times*, 27/11/06 retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/november/11%2D28%2D02.htm, on 8/12/06; "Musingku Henchmen Surrender in Bougainville", *The National*, 30/11/06, retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/december/12%2D01%2D04.htm, on 8/12/06.

Table 8 – Incidences of the breakdown between civil-military relationships[381]

Date	Event
1987 May	Military coup in Fiji
1987 September	Second military coup in Fiji
1996	Vanuatu para-military revolt; President kidnapped
1997	Mutiny of PNG military over "Sandline Affair"
2000 May	Civilian coup in Fiji supported by elements within the military
2000 July	Fijian military mutinies at Sukanaivalu Barracks, Labasa
2000 November	Fijian military mutinies at Queen Elizabeth Barracks, Suva; eight die
2001	PNG military mutiny at Port Moresby barracks
2002	PNG army mutinies at Moem barracks in West Sepik Province
2002	Vanuatu police mutiny
2006	Military coup in Fiji

Since the first coup in May of 1987, Fiji's military has been developing its own political disposition separate to that of the state, demonstrating the military's capacity to intervene in domestic politics and hindering the development of any form of stable civil-military relations. The 2006 coup instigated by the defence force's chief, Commodore Bainimarama, is the latest manifestation of how the civilian control over the state does not extend to the Royal Fijian Military Fore (RFMF). It seems that a major enabling factor for this capacity is derived from the calibre of leadership within the military. Lieutenant-Colonel Sitiveni Rabuka's leadership in the country's first two coups had the support of most of the RFMF while also having the wider support of the indigenous Fijian public and ethno-nationalist movements which allowed him to circumvent the authority of his superiors and to directly involve himself with the country's domestic politics and constitutionalism. George Speight, though not a military man, enjoyed the support of the Fijian military's elite Counter Revolutionary Warfare Unit and also a large proportion of the indigenous Fijian population, though as events played out Speight and his demands exposed wider divisions within Fiji's society and political arena (see chapter 2.11). More recently, Commodore Bainimarama appears to enjoy wide support within the armed forces, particularly after replacing all officers who would not swear personal loyalty to him after the

---

[381] Henderson, in Henderson, Watson (eds.) 2005, pp.6-7.

failed assassination attempt at the Queen Elizabeth Barracks in Suva six months after the May 2000 coup.[382] This support was demonstrated in 2006 when, while the Commodore was away from the country, the government tried to have him replaced. The intended replacement, however, did not feel he would be able to command the same support from the military as Bainimarama does.[383] This support has allowed Bainimarama to overthrow Laisenia Qarase's government and to throw off police investigations of sedition into him and his senior officers.

It is evident that a coup culture is prevailing in Fiji, whereby those who can justify their actions by appealing to group based sentiments, or those who have the most firepower behind them, are able to oust any democratically elected government that they do not agree with. As mentioned previously, Bainimarama intends to eventually restore democracy, though the timeline is uncertain. However, even if democracy is restored, the military elite's lack of respect for the country's democratic processes cannot leave many in or outside of Fiji with much faith that such another coup will not happen again. Furthermore, what will happen when a civilian government attempts to curtail the military's power, such as undertaking a phased downsizing of the military establishment?

Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu have also experienced troubles with their security forces in keeping them subordinate to civilian control and policy. The mutinies in the PNGDF have largely been against successive government attempts to retrench the military.[384] By mid-2005, the poorly equipped, low-morale, and largely ineffective defence force was entering its second phase of restructuring, which is being largely driven and funded by Australia, and will

---

[382] John Henderson, Paul Bellamy, "Will There Be More Coups in Melanesia?", in Henderson, Watson, (ed.) *Securing a Peaceful Pacific*, Christchurch: Canterbury University Press, 2005, p. 230.
[383] "Fiji Military Refuses to Sack Commander", *New Zealand Herald*, 1/11/06, retrieved from http://subs.nzherald.co.nz/section/2/story.cfm?c_id=2&objectid=10408604, on 22/11/06.
[384] Greg Watson, "Conflict Overview", in Henderson, Watson, pp. 454,456.

see force levels drop to around 2,000 (from 3,800) as well as attempting to rebuild the force to meet current security needs.[385] The PNGDF's capacity to act as a "state within a state" or an "army within an army" is diminished by its very divisiveness, a lack of united leadership and political will to tackle the various complexities of implementing policy.[386]

Vanuatu has no regular military force, but the Vanuatu Police Force (VPF) includes a paramilitary wing, the Vanuatu Mobile Force (VMF), which acts independently. Both have histories of being involved in corrupt practices, and as noted in the Table 8, have demonstrated the capacity to overstep their constitutional authority and intercede in the political affairs of the government. They are also considered to be the largest threats to the stability of governance.[387] This is not to say that a coup is imminent. Both forces have been receiving assistance from overseas organisations and governments such as Australia and Transparency International in promoting proper policing practices and combating corruption. Additionally, successive Vanuatu governments have made a point of obtaining recruits for the country's security forces from all over the country in order to ensure that a wide cultural diversity is reflected and that it is also difficult for one particular ethnic group to gain influence over the military.

The Proliferation of Small Arms:

As mentioned previously in this thesis, a significant enabling factor in the rise and threat of militias in the South Pacific is the proliferation of small arms. This factor has proved pivotal in the escalation of conflicts and to the power of these militias. For instance, in Papua New Guinea the wider proliferation of firearms has facilitated the rise of separatist movements (such as in

---

[385] *Janes*, p. 385.
[386] Henderson, Bellamy, pp.230-231; see also Ron May, *The Changing Role of the Military in Papua New Guinea*, Australian National University: Canberra, 1993, p.75.
[387] *Janes*, p.552.

Bougainville and the Southern Highlands) with the firepower to rival that of the state. It has escalated traditional tribal warfare from its traditional bow and arrow origins to something much more violent and harmful to PNG's society. In the Solomon Islands the two main militias initiated their own micro-level security dilemma trying to obtain guns and ammunition from police stockpiles, in turn escalating the violence and increasing their ability to take the government hostage. Indeed, the robbing of the Rove police station armoury by the MEF was an enabling factor in allowing them to overthrow the government and two days later starting an "all-out-war" on the IFM.[388] However, since RAMSI has intervened, approximately 3,700 weapons have been handed over and destroyed.[389]

Guns in Papua New Guinea, Bougainville and the Solomon Islands still pose a problem. As has been noted, the most significant source for high-powered weapons in these conflicts have been police and military armouries. Two recent studies have debunked the idea that guns are routinely smuggled into the region in exchange for drugs, instead they have been either stolen from government stocks or those with the keys to the armouries are directly complicit in the selling and distribution of these weapons.[390] This is another reason why in the South Pacific many commentators view the very presence of armed forces as dangerous.[391]

---

[388] Capie, 2003 *Under the Gun*, p.98; Fraenkel, 2004a, p.90.
[389] Fraenkel, 2004a, p.170.
[390] See, David Capie, *Under the Gun: The Small Arms Challenge in the Pacific*, Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2003, pp.12-14; and Alpers, *Gun Running in Papua New Guinea*.
[391] For example, Crocombe, 2001; Capie, 2003; and Alpers, 2005.

2.11 Factionalised Elites:

The rise of "factionalised elites" underlies a decline in the general political cohesiveness of the state. The term refers to the divisiveness inherent in the political classes in such states as Somalia, the Cote d'Ivoire and Iraq.[392] In these countries, political leadership is characterised by warlordism, repressive autocracies, and militias backed by factional leaders. Political alliances and state institutions are often split along group lines, and the ruling elites often use nationalistic rhetoric as a platform for their popular support.[393] There are varying degrees of factionalism that on the one hand range from weak and fractious political classes that have high-turnovers of governments, to the formation of fragile alliances that struggle to maintain constitutionalism. Factionalisation among elites can create competitive social and political environments that engender group-based nationalism and communal irredentism. Such situations can have the potential to lead onto instances of violent conflict or "ethnic-cleansings", as has happened in Bosnia and Rwanda.

The importance of this indicator exposes the underlying issues that are hindering political and social development and the development of a national consciousness, as opposed to local political loyalties taking precedence in national politics. This attitude not only results in unstable and constantly changing national leadership, but also filters down to the local level where society is not able to identify with – or take ownership of – the state and its health. In the South Pacific, the states being assessed in this thesis have varying degrees of factionalisation and in most of the Melanesian states there is a lack of a national identity that transcends local loyalties, effectively placing a glass ceiling on the degree of political development these countries and societies are able to attain.

---

[392] These examples are from the FfP's own country assessments, see Appendix 3 for their examples of countries that score differently amongst the indicators.
[393] Baker, 2006, p.11 or see Appendix 1.

Instability is a large feature of Papua New Guinea's political environment, as no government has ever served its full five-year term, though the present Somare government looks to be the first. Tribal loyalties have diminished and undermined the stability and power of parliaments and cabinets over the years. National elections have become "vehicles for the articulation of clan rivalries… Parties proved, at most, loose associations, which politicians were readily willing to ditch in pursuit of ministerial portfolios."[394] Because political positions have come to be seen as valuable ways to gain access to income, positions in parliament have become highly sought after and there is a subsequently a glut of candidates that vie for election. As a result of this, there is a high turnover of incumbents, reaching 75 percent in the 2002 elections.[395] The lack of consistency in MPs means there is a regular lack of experience in dealing with national politics. The high level of competition has also resulted in the use of guns by candidates and their supporters to intimidate voters and steal ballot boxes in the Southern Highlands and Simbu provinces.[396] There have also been strong rumours that political leaders from the Southern Highlands are amassing illegal weapons for use in the 2007 elections.[397]

However, there are a number of recent measures that are aimed at combating PNG's factionalism, such as the "Organic Law on the Integrity of Political Parties and Candidates" which was designed to put a stop to the regular votes of no-confidence that often lead to frequent changes in government.[398] Another measure has been the changing of the electoral system to a new Limited Preferential Voting System that has been designed to bring into parliament MPs with a broader support base and greater appeal to wider constituencies (thus greater consistency and stability) while also encouraging

---

[394] Fraenkel, 2005, p.5.
[395] Ibid.
[396] Alpers, 2005, pp. 99-100.
[397] Ibid, p. 102.
[398] Fraenkel, 2005, p.5.

a more party-based political culture; this measure will be tested in the 2007 elections.[399]

There is also tension between PNG's national and provincial governments, resulting in the dividing of bureaucrats' loyalties between respective actors within the two levels of government, in addition to tensions over the allocation of wealth to provinces that host large resource projects.[400] These tensions and factionalism have resulted in little cohesion between the two levels of government and has inhibited the implementation of legislation and development projects.[401]

In the Solomon Islands, it is widely believed that the factionalisation of the country's national politics was a root cause of the crisis that led to RAMSI's intervention. This factionalisation continues to hinder the post-conflict progression of the country and it has been suggested that the 2006 April riots were "specifically linked to the machinations of Solomon Islands parliamentary politics."[402] The riots happened after the Prime Ministerial elections in which Snyder Rini was elected PM. One of the suggested reasons for the outbreak of violence was that Rini represented the "Old Guard" of politicians associated with corruption and money politics, taking over from Sir Allan Kemakeza, both of whom have been implicated in allegations of maladministration and corruption.[403] It has also been suggested that Rini secured his support in parliament through the funds of Honiara's wealthy Chinese business clique.[404] Whether or not these rumours were true, the result was the razing and looting of a sizable portion of Honiara where Chinese owned shops were specifically targeted. The fact that pro-opposition elements within the mob were also seen to be carrying petrol cans and fire bombs

---

[399] Ibid, pp.5-6.
[400] Nita, 2006, p.48.
[401] Ibid.
[402] Michael Morgan, Abby McLeod, "Have We Failed Our Neighbour?", *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol.60, No.3, 2006, p.416.
[403] Ibid, p.420.
[404] Ibid, p.421

suggests that the violence was planned as a tool for political gain.[405] The specific targeting and looting of Chinese owned shops also reveals that the immigrants are ready targets for mobs, as they are seen as relatively better off than many discontented Solomon Islanders, without putting some of that wealth back into local communities.[406]

There had been hopes leading up to the elections in April of 2006 that there would be a change to the way the country's leaders would tackle the important issues of post-conflict reconstruction and development.[407] Solomon Islands politics, however, have continued to be characterised by loose and fragmented party structures, where MPs are more concerned with keeping their constituencies happy at the expense of implementing positive and constructive national policies. Parties are not bound by ideological outlooks and party members frequently swap allegiances for personal rather than political or ideological reasons and even in return for cabinet positions.[408] RAMSI has had little effect in changing the unstable nature of Solomon Islands politics so far, and as investigations progress into the incidents of corruption that led to the armed violence, increasing numbers of the political and social elite appear to have been instigators in it, including some that invited RAMSI into the country.[409] In response to this high-level scrutiny, there were a number of Cabinet papers in 2005 proposing to "call off RAMSI" as investigations got closer.[410]

---

[405] Ibid, pp.421-422.

[406] Ibid, p.422.

[407] Kabutaulaka, 2006, pp.423-424.

[408] For greater detail of the nature of Solomon Islands party system see Jon Fraenkel, "Political Consequences of Pacific Islands Electoral Laws," *State Society and Governance in Melanesia*, 2005/8, Canberra: Australian National University, 2005; and Fraenkel, *The Manipulation of Custom.*

[409] Morgan, McLeod, 2006, pp. 416-417;

[410] Terry Brown, "RAMSI Sniffing Closer to Solomons 'Big Fish'", *Solomon Star*, 31/1/05, retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2005/february/02%2D01%2Dcom.htm, on 22/3/06.

Another source of fragmentation is the continuing tension between some regions and the central government. The prime example is the island of Malaita, where in 2005 there emerged the Ma'asina Forum – a social movement championing Malaitans' interests. It was initially a forum for discussing development issues on the island, but those discussions have alternatively been turning towards issues of independence.[411] In another instance, in July of 2006 leaders of Ontong Java in the Malaita Outer Islands put forward a petition to the Solomon Islands Government calling for independence because of the neglect the central government has shown towards them for so long.[412]

Ethnicity has always been a defining and divisive factor in Fiji's politics. The primary division is between indigenous Fijians who dominate positions in the armed forces, government and the public service, and the Indo-Fijians who form an integral part of the economy. The contentious questions surround the extent to which the rights of indigenous Fijians should be entrenched in constitutional and institutional processes and to what extent the political system should reflect the country's ethnic divisions. The former government of Laisenia Qarase believed that a stable Fiji is one that is led by the indigenous population with Qarase arguing that "the country won't enjoy stability and hence peace, progress and prosperity unless Fijians remain on top politically. That is the way it is in Fiji. It will remain so until indigenous Fijians feel confident about their place in a land where they are now nearly 54 percent of the population, having recovered from a minority position."[413] Through affirmative action policies, the education system is perceived to actively fosters ethnic nationalism, in the end inhibiting the development of an

---

[411] Kabutaulaka, 2006, p.426
[412] "Malaita Outer Islands Want to Secede from SI", *Solomon Star*, 12/7/06, retrieved from http://www.solomonstarnews.com/?q=node/9187, on 17/8/06.
[413] Cited in Alumita L Durutalo, "Melanesia in Review: Issues and Events 2005 – Fiji", *The Contemporary Pacific*, Vol.18, No.2, 2006, p.397.

140

allegiance to a broader encompassing concept of Fiji nationalism.[414] As mentioned previously, land tenure is also divisive, particularly in the context of the country's sugar cane industry. Presently in Fiji over 80 percent of land is held by indigenous Fijians under the collective ownership of the traditional Fijian clans, while Indo-Fijians produce more than 90 percent of the country's sugar crop from leased titles of land as they are prohibited from owning or buying the land they work.[415] This has left many Indo-Fijians with a sense of insecurity, particularly in the wake of many leases not being renewed recently, causing many to move to Fiji's urban centres to find work only to end up in squatter settlements (see chapters 2.1 and 2.8). Issues such as these have been widely used by both indigenous and Indo-Fijian political leaders, and ethnic issues typically characterise national elections, and in some cases they have helped to justify subsequent coups.

The 2006 General Election revealed how entrenched ethnic polarisation is in Fijian national politics. The election was described as a "knife-edge" result in which Laisenia Qarase's received 45 percent of the vote including all 23 seats reserved for the indigenous Fijian population, while the Fijian Labour Party (FLP) received 39 percent of the vote including all nineteen seats reserved for Indo-Fijians.[416] Although after the military coup of December 2006 the results of the general elections are irrelevant, they do indicate the ethnically partisan voting preferences amongst the general population.

Meanwhile, relations between the various tribes of Fiji have been equally divisive, often stemming from power struggles over the presidency and within the Great Council of Chiefs (GCC). The 2000 coup revealed much of this, where the nationalist rhetoric is still claimed to have been a political ploy to

---

[414] Tupeni Baba, "Institutionalised Conflict: A Nation Adrift", Henderson and Watson (ed.), pp. 367-369.
[415] "Politics of Fiji", *Wikipedia*, retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_Fiji, on the 30/11/06.
[416] Akuila Yabaki, "Fiji: Which Way Forward", *Pacific Media Watch*, 20/5/06, retrieved from http://www.pmw.c2o.org/2006/fiji4946.html, on the 6/8/06; Elections Office of Fiji, retrieved from http://www.elections.gov.fj/index.html, on the 6/8/06.

attract indigenous Fijian supporters, while the instigators of the coup, both open and hidden, were in reality seeking power and money.[417] While the coup dragged on, western chiefs of the main island Viti Levu threatened to secede; this was followed by a declaration of partial autonomy by the Cakaudrove province, which proposed to establish a separate Tovata state.[418] The 2006 coup is likely to drive further division amongst indigenous Fijian politics, particularly as it is without the premise of ensuring indigenous rights. A number of chiefs have already asked their people within the military not to support Commodore Bainimarama's coup and to return to their villages, to little avail, while individual villages have shown support for the military takeover.[419] Bainimarama seems intent to disregard the chiefly authority of the GCC, particularly when dismissing his own High Chief from his Vice-President's official residency, drawing criticisms from a number of chiefs of the GCC.[420]

Throughout 2005 and 2006 the May 2000 coup continued to overshadow and be a divisive factor in national politics. One contentious issue was the proposed Reconciliation, Tolerance and Unity Bill which was effectively going to grant amnesty to coup offenders, including those who had already been convicted as well as those awaiting trial. Apart from being widely opposed by the public, opposition parties, and civil society groups, the military strongly opposed the bill and it was one of the contributing factors to the tension and instability that led to the military takeover. Also, the ongoing trials of those involved in the coup and the lenient treatment given to them once they were convicted has continued to erode both the public's and military leadership's confidence in the government.[421]

---

[417] Brij V. Lal, "Chiefs and thieves and Other People Besides: The Making of George Speight's Coup", *Journal of Pacific History*, Vol. 35, No. 3, December 2000, pp. 281-293.
[418] Lal, 2006, p.188.
[419] Tarcisius Tara Kabutaulaka, "Fiji Coup: Things Fall Apart", *Pacific Islands Report,* 10/1/06, retrieved from http://pid.eastwestcentre.org/pireport/2007/January/01-10-comm1.htm, on the 17/1/07.
[420] Ibid.
[421] *Jane's*, p.98.

When Vanuatu attained independence in 1980, its legislature was essentially a two party system, but since 1991 the number of parties has proliferated to ten parties and nine independents in the most recent election in 2004. Political instability over the last fifteen years has resulted in a culture where by governments are more focused on consolidating their support bases rather than formulating and implementing policies that would aid in the development of the country. Since the 2004 elections, however, national politics have been relatively stable. The present government is made up from a twelve party coalition, however, eleven of which are presently in government. This has resulted in ineffectual government. A 2006 ADB report has found that the situation has: "(i) created uncertainty for foreign investors and development partners, (ii) derailed various reforms, and (iii) drained government finances through gratuity payments for outgoing members of parliament and their political advisors."[422] Furthermore, the ability of the government to address important national issues is undermined by the lack of coordination between the diverse coalition parties who are often trying to compete for what is best for their constituencies. The eleven party coalition, led by Ham Lini, has survived a number of no-confidence votes though there have been a number of cabinet reshuffles due to the constant switching of party allegiances and power politicking, in addition to rumours of further reshuffles in the future.[423] The political manoeuvring at the national level has affected politics at municipal levels throughout the country as the Municipal Councils of Port Vila, Luganville, and Sanma deal with political divisiveness and allegations of gross mismanagement.[424] The politically fractious nature of Vanuatu's politics has meant that remote regions suffer from neglect through lack of funding and development. The poor province of Torba to the north reportedly considered changing their alliance to the Solomon Islands rather than have their

[422] ADB, *Country Strategy and Update Report—Vanuatu 2006-2009*, August 2006, p.1.
[423] Anita Jowitt, "Melanesia in Review: Issues and Events 2005 – Vanuatu", *The Contemporary Pacific*, Vol.18, No.2, 2006, p. 431.
[424] Ibid, pp. 433-435.

inhabitants' economic and social development stunted by divisiveness and corruption in the national and provincial civil services.[425]

Tonga's political stability has traditionally stemmed from the homogenous and hierarchical nature of Tongan society, reinforced by the church and extended family structures. While criticism of the monarch has traditionally been contrary to Tongan culture, dissent about the current political situation and its lack of progress towards democratic reform has slowly been stoking dissatisfaction amongst popular democratic reform groups. Furthermore, the rise in educational opportunities has stimulated political awareness amongst the commoner class, in turn stirring some dissent towards the noble class. The recent November Riots of 2006 demonstrated the extent of the growing tensions between the noble class and the proponents of democratic reform as the targets of the riots mostly involved the burning and looting of government buildings, and stores and businesses that belonged to members of the royalty.[426] The aftermath of the riots also demonstrated division within the democratic movement with some proponents going on Tongan radio and declaring the riots a victory for the movement, while others proclaimed it as a great loss and that all instigators needed to face justice.[427]

By general Pacific standards, Tuvalu is also a very peaceful and stable state. However, in recent years it has suffered political instability from successive no-confidence votes in the country's fifteen-seat parliament that have prevented successive administrations from finishing their four-year terms, changing Prime Ministers eight times between 1999 and 2006. Much of this

---

[425] "Poor Vanuatu Province Threatens to Secede", *Vanuatu Daily Post*, 16/10/06, retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/october/10%2D17%2D20.htm, on the 30/11/06.
[426] A large proportion of Chinese owned shops were also destroyed."2006 Tonga Riots", *Wikipedia*, retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2006_Tonga_Riots, on the 30/11/06.
[427] Pesi Fonua, "The Rule of the Mob", *Matangi Tonga*, 28/11/06, retrieved from http://www.matangitonga.to/article/rul_mob281106.shtml, on the 30/11/06; and Siosiua Lafitani Tofua'ipangai, "Finger Pointers Should Resign From Politics", *Matangi Tonga*, 29/11/06, retrieved from http://www.matangitonga.to/article/letterslafitani291106.shtml, on the 30/11/06.

minor instability can be put down to the absence of any established political parties which has made it difficult for Prime Ministers to form a stable support base. Political loyalties are determined by geography as MPs have close associations with the islands they represent. Northern islands in the archipelago compete against the southern islands; the centre group of islands usually hold the balance of power.[428] At the village level, traditional chiefs still hold influence over island affairs, particularly in the outer islands. However, long-held distinctions between chiefs and commoners are slowly disappearing and this can be seen in more chiefs being selected on merit rather than birth.[429]

Samoa is the yardstick for political stability and consistency in the region. The country is led by a unicameral parliamentary democracy and has three main parties: the Samoa National Development Party (SNDP), the Samoa Democratic United Party (SDUP), and the Human Rights Protection Party (HRPP). The HRPP has been the most dominant party in the country's politics and has been in government since 1982, except for a short stint between 1986 and 1987. At the parliamentary level, however, Samoa's stability has been criticised as lacking in open and public debate and discussion has been so stifled as to reduce the legislature to little more than a "rubber-stamping institution".[430]

---

[428] "Politics of Tuvalu", *Wikipedia*, retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_Tuvalu, on the 30/11/06.
[429] Ibid.
[430] *Jane's*, p.406.

2.12 External Intervention:

External intervention can take many forms, such as the existence of foreign agents or powers that "affect the internal balance of power" or the resolution of any conflict that may be within the country.[431] It may also come in the form of dependence on an external entity—such as a UN mission—that takes over the day to day running of the state, or provides development assistance in the form of funding fixed capital formation or gives assistance through political, economic or institutional means. In this indicator, the focus is on external intervention that affects the seven countries through the degree of dependence on ODA, through military cooperation, and through the presence of foreign personnel within their security apparatuses and civil service as advisors or in-line staff.

Official Development Assistance:

Graph 9

Sources: OECD, retrieved from
http://www.oecd.org/countrylist/0,2578,en_2649_34447_25602317_1_1_1_1,00.html, on 12/10/06; World Bank, retrieved from
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/0,,contentMDK:20394658~menuPK:1192714~pagePK:64133150~piPK:64133175~theSitePK:239419,00.html, on 12/10/06.

---

[431] Baker, 2006, p.11 or see Appendix 1.

Foreign aid in the form of development assistance is important to the ongoing task of preparing these countries for self-sustaining development. The highest donors to the regions usually include Australia, New Zealand, Japan, the European Union, the United States, and France, along with various NGOs such as UNICEF and the UNDP. The allocation of such funds vary from being project based to being allocated to sectors, such as health, education, and infrastructure development, in most cases designated by the donors. Graph 9 details aid as a percentage of the countries' gross national incomes (GNI) and indicates the extent to which ODA is relied upon as a steady and significant source of income. Tuvalu relies upon it heavily because it has few resources to draw upon, limited land space, and a small population. For the foreseeable future Tuvalu will continue to be dependent on aid; and to a lesser extent this also applies to the other countries in the graph. Fiji's aid, though small when seen as a percentage of GNI, is nevertheless still significant and when total amounts are compared in Graph 10, Fiji's incoming aid is considerably large making it one of the highest recipients of the group. However, due to the 2006 coup, Fiji has experienced and faces further aid cuts from donors such as Australia, New Zealand and the EU, particularly if there is no forthcoming timeline from Commodore (and Prime Minister) Bainimarama guaranteeing the return of democracy and democratic elections within the foreseeable future. Aid cuts for Fiji will have detrimental effects for the country's critical services such as health and education and as the tourism industry has experienced significant drops, the new interim government will struggle to keep the country afloat at a time when it was just picking itself up from the 2000 coup.

Conversely, in March 2006 Vanuatu qualified for a US$65 million five-year aid package from the US Millennium Challenge Corporation.[432] It is aimed at "institutional strengthening" in the Ministry of Public Works and at developing the countries transport infrastructure that previous aid grants have

---

[432] Hughes, Sodhi, 2006, p.2.

147

failed to maintain.[433] The package has been criticised for not including policy reforms believed essential for economic growth, nor is it believed to greatly affect the lives of the Vanuatu people outside of Port Vila.[434]

Graph 10

Total ODA (USD million)

Sources: OECD; World Bank.

The Solomon Islands leads the way in ODA as a percentage of GNI, and will see continued contributions of aid aimed primarily at state-building and through RAMSI's work, which is projected to be needed for at least another ten years.[435] This means that there will not only have to be a continued commitment from RAMSI and donor countries to provide large amounts of aid and personnel, but also a commitment from the Solomon Islands government and people to accept these countries' involvement in the running of their country as a requirement of the aid and the rebuilding process. For the foreseeable future, RAMSI will also be integral to the maintenance of security in the country and the keeping of peace between competing groups. To back this view, surveys conducted during 2006 by UNIFEM and by RAMSI's annual performance review found that RAMSI's presence is perceived by the general public to be of significant importance in the reduction of crime and is

---

[433] Ibid.
[434] Ibid.
[435] Retrieved from www.ramsi.org/node/2, on the 12/10/06

also considered necessary in keeping potential hostilities between conflicting groups from escalating into violence again.[436] Along with rebuilding the Solomon Islands institutions of law enforcement and justice, RAMSI aims to re-establish the country's machinery of government and instil economic governance within government and regional institutions and administrations. Out of all the countries, Papua New Guinea has the greatest potential to economically excel with its large population and abundance of land and natural resources. As indicated by the two graphs however, Papua New Guinea receives the greatest amount of aid out of all the countries, though its comparative percentage of GNI is relatively low. Like the Solomon islands, much of this aid is programme based, meaning that donors designate where and how aid is allocated. This has resulted in a political backlash from both countries into increased perceptions of Australian interventionalism as a condition of aid. Australia is increasingly seen as interventionist in its approach to the developing nations of the South Pacific, even to the extent to being labelled "arrogant" and "disrespectful" by PIC governments at the 2006 South Pacific Forum.[437] However, Australia's contribution of aid to PNG and the Solomon Islands for the period 2006 to 2007 is significant; around $223 million goes to the Solomon Islands and approximately $332 million will go to PNG.[438] Australian Prime Minister, John Howard, reaffirmed their right to place conditions on their government's aid saying "If you want Australian aid, you've got to reduce corruption... you've got to improve governance... you've got to have a better approach to economic management. It's not a question of forcing countries to do things, it's a question of defending the operations of the rule of law in Australia."[439]

---

[436] UNIFEM, 2006, pp.8-9; Downing et al.,2006, p. 14.

[437] These comments were made in the context of the Julian Moti affair and the raiding of the office of the PM of Solomon Islands around the time of the 2006 Forum. "Howard Tries to Cool Escalating Melanesian Backlash", *Australian Broadcasting Corporation*, 24/10/06, retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/october/10%2D24%2D01.htm, on the 4/11/06.

[438] Retrieved from http://www.ausaid.gov.au on the 1/12/06.

[439] Steve Marshall, "Australia Threatens to Pull Solomons, PNG Aid", *Australian Broadcasting Corporation*, 16/10/06, retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/october/10%2D17%2D02.htm, on the 1/12/06.

Despite this firm tone, Australia, was exceptionally conscious of avoiding interventionist and neo-colonial labels when preparing for RAMSI's intervention into the Solomon Islands. Key to this was obtaining regional and international consent as well as an invitation from the Solomon Islands Government. Secondly, RAMSI is intended to be an assistance package, it has no legal rights, it is subject to yearly reviews, and the Solomon Islands government can ask it to leave when it sees fit.

In terms of security, the Solomon Islands is still heavily dependent on foreign RAMSI personnel. Indeed, RAMSI's presence is considered by both the general public and politicians to be integral to their ongoing security. A survey amongst the general population found that sixty-five percent of respondents believed that widespread violence would almost certainly return if the mission were to leave anytime soon.[440] At present, there are approximately 250 to 300 personnel from fifteen contributing countries making up the Participating Police Force (PPF), headed by an Australian, it is presently maintaining security and overhauling the Royal Solomon Islands Police (RSIP).[441] The military contingent is made up of a platoon of military personnel from each of Australia, Fiji, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea and Tonga. This military contingent provides support and security for both the RSIP and PPF and is also headed by an Australian. These forces have effectively become the pillar of security for the country, and there are fears that Solomon Islanders may come to rely on the visitors more than what was anticipated, as illustrated by the local saying "Weitim olketa RAMSI bae kam stretem" (wait for RAMSI to come and fix it).[442]

---

[440] Downing et al., 2006, p. 2.
[441] Retrieved from http://www.ramsi.org/node/5 on the 1/12/06.
[442] Tarcisius Tara Kabutaulaka, "Australian Foreign Policy and the RAMSI Intervention in Solomon Islands", Vol. 17, No.2, 2005, p.284.

There is also a concern that a "culture of dependency" may be taking place in the RSIP. For example, Australian officers, frustrated at the lack of quality and impetus from the RSIP, often take on tasks themselves such as the RSIP annual report for 2003 and 2004.[443] Additionally, the overwhelming scale of RAMSI and speed with which the RSIP are expected to transform their policing culture into something more "traditional" but ultimately much more foreign, may only prove to undermine the very institution the PPF is attempting to rebuild, and instead risking RSIP resentment and resistance to the changes and RAMSI.[444]

As well as the police and military contingents there are also a number of mainly Australian and New Zealand advisors and in-line personnel placed with the Solomon Islands judiciary, government ministries, and development assistance programmes strengthening the country's machinery of government, economic governance, and justice and law. These personnel and their work have also drawn criticism, such as from Solomon Government officials who feel that they do not have sufficient input in regards to the placement or secondment of RAMSI officers.[445] MPs have also complained at their marginalisation from day-to-day government decision making such as when appropriation bills are passed by parliament and are later changed and amended by RAMSI line officers working in the Department of Finance.[446]

Recently Australian and New Zealand military forces have also been called on to provide security in the aftermath of the pro-democracy riots in Tonga in November 2006. Both countries' contributions to the Combined Task Force have left Tonga, but the incident does demonstrate the need for the metropolitan powers to provide security in small island states when local

---

[443] Gordon Peake, Kaysie Studdard Brown, "Policebuilding: The International Deployment Group in the Solomon Islands", *International Peacekepping*, Vol. 12, No, 4, Winter 2005, p.526
[444] Ibid.
[445] Downing et al. 2006, p.26.
[446] Morgan, McLeod, 2006, p.420.

forces become overstretched. All of the countries within the examined group rely on Australia and New Zealand to provide assistance in maintaining the security of their Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs). Most countries within the group have only token patrol capabilities, such as Samoa, Tuvalu, Vanuatu each having one patrol craft, the Solomon Islands has two, Tonga has three, Fiji has nine, while Papua New Guinea maintains four coastal patrol boats.[447] These countries rely mainly upon Australia, and to a lesser extent New Zealand, to supply and fund these assets as well as train the crews that work them.[448] Additionally, both Australia and New Zealand provide funding and training support to the militaries of Fiji (presently suspended), Tonga, PNG, and Vanuatu's para-military through their respective defence programmes.[449] Of the militaries in the region, Fiji's is least dependent on foreign aid, is highly regarded for its peacekeeping duties which bring in significant revenue, and is considered the most capable in the region.

Each of the other Pacific nations' police forces receives training, aid, and support and advise for seconded advisors and in-line personnel as well, though Australia, and to a lesser extent New Zealand, are more involved in countries that have significant law and order problems, such as the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea. Since December 2003, as part of Australia's new active role in the region, began working with Papua New Guinea on an Enhanced Cooperation Programme (ECP). It planned to have 210 Australian police deployed to work in-line with PNG's police force to support them in strengthening law and order and sixty-four Australian officials to work in-line and in advisory roles within key government agencies.[450] However, in May 2005 the PNG Supreme Court ruled that elements of the implementing

---

[447] *Jane's*, pp. 133, 392-393, 431, 463, 492, 521, 553.
[448] Ibid.
[449] As of the recent coup on 5th December 2006, New Zealand and Australia have effectively halted all defence cooperation with the Fijian military.
[450] Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *Papua New Guinea: Enhanced Cooperation Program (ECP)*, retrieved from http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/png/ecp.html on the 7/12/06.

legislation were unconstitutional and most Australian staff were withdrawn, leaving approximately forty civilians who work in advisory positions.[451]

---

[451] Ibid.

Section 3

Section 3 – Implications For New Zealand Security Policy:

This section relates the findings of the last section to the broader implications for New Zealand's foreign and defence policies. The first part of this section will briefly go over the main issues for the assessed states, followed by how these states' problems are the root causes for many regional insecurities. These insecurities provide the context from which New Zealand has to formulate its policies regarding foreign affairs, defence and development assistance in order to secure the country's interests. Subsequently, the last part of this section will look at how these insecurities will affect New Zealand's stance and reactions to events in the region, focussing primarily on intervention, regionalism, development assistance, and defence policy.

3.1 Country Summaries:

The indicators of state failure illustrate the situations and challenges that the seven assessed countries are facing. However, to apply the label of state failure to describe a state's decline, can have negative and even damning connotations world-wide. State failure implies absolute and pervasive poverty, social factionalisation and conflict, and the absence of a singular politically autonomous entity that can effectively provide services to the state and its people. Corruption and conflict have a habit of driving foreign investment away, other countries are hesitant in committing to trade deals, while neighbouring states can be swamped with refugees or become embroiled in the conflict itself.

So it is with some caution that the label should be applied to countries in the South Pacific region. From the Solomon Islands to Samoa, from Papua New Guinea to Tuvalu, the region, indeed the countries in this thesis, face many and varied challenges, some are gradually beginning to get ahead while others are faltering; all are grappling with internal social issues while attempting to

155

make a space for themselves on the world stage. They do not paint a picture of a region in the throws of failure or general decline, but neither are they progressing past the quagmires of traditional power structures, institutions, tribal practices versus modern democratic ones, as well as divisive ethnic nationalism in most of the Melanesian countries. Such issues are fodder readily manipulated by political and social elites to support their own personal political agendas or undermine their enemies. Corruption at political and bureaucratic levels stymies development and fosters notions of pointlessness among outlying regions in regards to remaining loyal to the central state. These dramas are played against a backdrop of undermining vulnerability to natural disasters, macro economic and political changes, and the insidious spread of transnational crime (considered to be one of the more destabilising forces in the region, which will be addressed later). Most of all, there is an inherent inability for these nations to attain the unified political will that would enable them to help themselves out of their development ruts.

The Solomon Islands will go down in history as the Pacific's first "failing state", where social stability had deteriorated with armed groups engaging in violent fighting, where the government and the police force were factionalised and corrupt, where the economy had fallen steeply because of a few years neglect, and where many people who were not involved in the violence and graft suffered and continue to suffer. The state is still fragile, the conflict and corruption that racked the country continues to have effects on politics and society today, and will do so for long into the foreseeable future. The security situation is still tenuous as demonstrated by the April riots, RAMSI's presence alleviates the insecurity to a degree, but that same presence is fostering dependency and the potential for further political tensions in the form of resentment in the continued and increasing intrusions into the running of the state. Economic recovery is a long way off for both the country and its people, and there is still a rift between Malaitans and Guadalcanalese. People still feel

insecure about the land they live on and their futures in general, particularly when RAMSI leaves.

In Papua New Guinea, the indicators suggest that the country is not far away from being the region's next failing state. Troubled by high levels of inter-group violence, crime and corruption in the cities and rural regions, PNG is gaining a reputation worldwide as a state in danger of succumbing to these internal pressures. This is evident in the lack of development throughout the country, whether it is human, social, economic, political, or access to public services. The country's police force has a reputation for corruption and gross abuse of power and is widely distrusted by the general public, while the PNGDF does not have the numbers to meet the demands of the existing security contingencies mentioned previously, particularly in the face of current downsizing. However, Somare's retention of the PM position can be seen as a positive step in establishing consistent leadership, and while the factionalisation that besets society and politics continues to be a problem, that same factionalisation hinders the formation of a more unified entity that could potentially rival and destabilise the position and authority of the central government.

The coup that happened in Fiji on the 5th of December 2006 seemed inevitable in the lead up to it, even when the Prime Minister had acquiesced to the Commodore's demands. It is another chapter in the significant part the military has played throughout the country's political history illustrated by four coups and a number of interim administrations either led by the military or installed with leaders of their choosing. Whether it is a veneer of good intentions justifying a grab for power or a genuine concern for the welfare of morality within the country's politics, it is uncertain that the new interim government's anti-corruption campaign and equality reforms can effectively resolve the deeply intractable ethnic issues between Fijians and Indo-Fijians. In the meanwhile, the resulting downturn in investor and tourist confidence

will increase the short term likelihood of an economic downturn from their previous growth, and possibly a growth in poverty levels. However, the degree of success this new interim government will have in carrying out its reforms of equality and poverty reduction, and whether or not it will come up against any opposition, remains to be seen.

Tuvalu epitomizes the vulnerability of the Pacific's small island states, with a small population, the limited availability of resources and a high susceptibility to natural disasters – or even high tides – restricting the capacity for growth and development. Demographic pressures are particularly high, and they have the potential to get worse as population and urbanisation trends continue to outstrip the provision of basic needs such as safe water and adequate sanitation. Additionally, despite the fact that Tuvalu does the best with what it has, and has been particularly original in its ventures as well as prudent in the management with the Tuvalu Trust Fund, the small country will continue to be heavily reliant on external aid.

Vanuatu, as an archipelago state situated on a fault line is similarly vulnerable, particularly with natural disasters, such as flooding, volcanoes and earthquakes. As in Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and Fiji, squatter populations in Vanuatu are increasing, posing development challenges to the state, particularly in the provision of services such as water, education and healthcare. Vanuatu's economy is still very undeveloped, it lacks the resources that other Melanesian countries rely upon to bolster their exports, it does not have the same infrastructure as Fiji to develop and support a similar tourist industry, and it does not enjoy the same political stability as Polynesian countries.

The riots in Tonga in November 2006 demonstrated that Polynesian societies are susceptible to mob violence on a large scale. This violence was surprising because, despite the lack of democracy, the population enjoys the second

158

highest literacy rate of the PICs, high rates of other social and economic indicators such as the UNDP's human development index, a high GDP per capita, and good access to improved sources of water, sanitation and healthcare, as well as relatively low poverty levels. In fact, the monarchy has provided a much more stable government than democracy has in many other Pacific countries. Nevertheless, the riots indicate the level of emotion and support that surrounds the democratic movement in Tonga and the amount of enmity the population feels at their disenfranchisement; on the other hand, it may also indicate the ability of opportunistic political leaders to manipulate such emotions amongst the populace and also the opportunism of individuals amongst the general public to take advantage of such situations to indulge in destruction and theft. Parallels can be drawn with the April riots in the Solomon Islands; on the face of them, they have been based on popular dissatisfaction with contemporary political situations, specific shops were targeted, there have been allegations of mob manipulation, and both countries required personnel from Australia and New Zealand to be called in.

Lastly, Samoa provides a stark contrast to the extreme case of Papua New Guinea, with its strong political system, relatively low levels of corruption and poverty, comparatively high levels of public service delivery, the highest literacy rate, stable economic trends and little evidence of group based violence. The inclusion of Samoa is important to this thesis as a point of balance compared to the likes of Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands, providing an example of the diversity that South Pacific states represent in a regional security analysis. Nevertheless, like all the others Samoa is still a developing country, heavily dependent on foreign assistance, migration and remittances, and still coming to terms with how to accommodate their traditional values and customs with adopted western institutions and practices.

3.2 Regional Security Issues and Root Causes:

When applying a state failure model to these South Pacific nations, it is important to keep in mind that the aim is not to identify or label failing states. Indeed, the decision to start labelling any PIC as "failed" or "failing" may be necessary from a point of view of determining regional security priorities, but the reality for governments applying it to foreign countries may not be politically expedient or politically correct. It is viably arguable that Pacific Island governments may not take well to being labelled "failed" or "failing" and may only serve to limit Australia's and New Zealand's available approaches in cooperating with PICs in order to secure their regional interests. Instead, it is important to use the component parts of the model to identify and understand the root causes that ultimately create security challenges for these countries, as well as the implications for their neighbours. In the general sense, these root causes are of a development or governance nature. Development challenges in the context of the indicators of the previous section, the South Pacific countries assessed, and this thesis, encompass pressures upon the state from: the decline or lack of provision of public services; demographic stresses; uneven development; economic decline; and can be triggering or exacerbating factors of human flight, the movement of refugees and even inter-group violence. In the same way, governance encompasses the leadership of political elites and the government's ability to maintain a strong, transparent, accountable and equitable state. Poor governance and leadership weaken states and governments to a point where central authority can be challenged or even subverted by government agencies such as militaries or police forces, or from outside groups. Important factors in this process are the deterioration or unequal distribution of public services and the public perceptions of corruption and delegitimisation in regards to the state and the government.

As is obvious from the findings of the indicators of the previous section, the level of a country's development and quality of leadership and governance are

160

important vectors of state stability and failure. The interdependent relationship between the various social, economic and political issues create a nexus whereby internal challenges for developing countries translate into foreign policy and security challenges for other states.

Figure 4: Cycle of Cumulative Impact

**Characteristics of
Pacific Islands region**
⟩ Geographical isolation
⟩ Political instability
⟩ Poverty
⟩ Socioeconomic factors
⟩ Cultural diversity
⟩ Weak law enforcement
  capacity

**Exacerbated
by corruption**

**Facilitated
by corruption**

**Transnational
crime response**
⟩ Drug transhipment
⟩ Wildlife trafficking
⟩ Money laundering
⟩ Identity crime
⟩ Electronic crime

Source: Rob McCusker, "Transnational Crime in the Pacific Islands: Real or Apparent Danger?", *Trends and Issues in Crime and Justice*, No. 308, March 2006, p.3.

An increasingly important example of this is rise of the threat of transnational crime in the South Pacific, which has been identified as a high priority within Australian and New Zealand governments.[452] Transnational crime can encompass the trafficking of illicit drugs, people, arms and wildlife, illegal immigration, passport scams, money laundering, identity and electronic crime. As is obvious from the previous section, the assessed PICs, indeed all PICs,

---

[452] Interview with Huntley Wright and Francis Van Der Krogt, Ministry of Defence, Wellington, 27/9/06.

161

are made vulnerable to such activities by deeply intractable corruption within their civil services which is seen to both facilitate crime's infiltration into the region while also exacerbating the problems highlighted in the indicators (Figure 4). Other vulnerabilities such as poor legislation and governance, weak enforcement capabilities from police and customs agencies and defence forces, and the geographical nature and proximity to East Asia and South America as primary sources of criminal activity.[453] Furthermore, it is also thought that the PICs inherent economic weakness and its corollaries in terms of poverty, infrastructure and instability may increase the region's appeal to transnational crime syndicates.[454] Already, Chinese organised crime syndicates have been blamed for a flood of gambling dens, prostitution problems, illegal drug and arms dealings and "Mafia-style" killings.[455]

Drug trafficking can be seen as a measure for transnational crime in the Pacific.[456] The manufacturing and trafficking of drugs was evident in the high profile drug bust in Fiji in 2004, where it is posited that nearly US$560 million worth of methamphetamines were to be cooked and sent onto the US, Australia, New Zealand and Europe.[457] It was a Chinese based criminal organisation that was the instigating force behind the drug manufacturing in Fiji, and it is widely suspected that Asian drug trafficking groups have established other methamphetamine laboratories within the region.[458] It is also speculated that such drugs are transported principally through existing commercial sea and air routes and possibly even using non-commercial vessels, concealing the drugs on any of the numerous uninhabited islands in

---

[453] Rob McCusker, "Transnational Crime in the Pacific Islands: Real or Apparent Danger?", *Trends and Issues in Crime and Justice*, No. 308, March 2006, p.4.
[454] Ibid, p.2.
[455] Ema Golea Tagicakibau, "A Pacific Conflict Transformation Network?", in Henderson, Watson (eds.), 2005, p.195.
[456] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), *Pacific Islands: Regional Profile*, 2003, p.7.
[457] "Fiji Drug Bust Raids Net 13 Suspects Across Region", *Radio New Zealand*, 10/6/04, retrieved from http://www.rnzi.com/pages/news.php?op=read&id=10452, on the 21/2/07; and Elizabeth Feizkhah, "Ice: From Gang to Bust", *Time*, 21/6/04, retrieved from http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,501040628-655460.html, on the 21/2/07.
[458] McCusker, p.5.

the region, however, there is no concrete evidence of the extent or reality of these activities.[459]

Money laundering has been a significant problem in the past for many PICs, notably Vanuatu amongst the assessed group. After 2005 however, no PIC remains on the Financial Action Task Force's Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories list, but these countries are still vulnerable due to their legislature, weak banking systems and a lack of research into money laundering trends in these countries.[460] The lack of information also extends to the extent to which the other crimes such as electronic and identity crime, and trafficking in people, arms, and wildlife.

Illegal fishing is also a major problem for PICs, as mentioned earlier in the thesis, posing a serious threat to these countries revenue, particularly if it were to continue unchecked.

From the indicators, it is obvious that Papua New Guinea is the region's primary focus in the movement of small arms; but the country is also a target for people smugglers with the PNG Foreign Minister in 2005 estimating that 10,000 mainly Chinese illegal immigrants had been smuggled into his country.[461] Fiji is also believed to be host to a growing number of migrants, with official estimates at 2000 Chinese, while unofficial estimates put the number to 20,000 Chinese just in Suva, with a large proportion of those staying illegally.[462] The sale of passports in the past by some PICs, notably Tonga but also Nauru and the Marshall Islands, has also elevated fears of illegal immigrants using these passports and PICs as transit points on their way to Australia and New Zealand.[463]

---

[459] UNODC, 2003, pp.9-11.
[460] McCusker, 2006, p.3.
[461] Ibid, p.5.
[462] UNODC, 2003, p.23.
[463] Ibid, pp.23-24.

The implications of future infiltration of transnational crime syndicates for Australia and New Zealand are obvious, particularly in regard to the trafficking of drugs, as these countries are the region's main markets for them, similarly for the smuggling of people and illegal immigrants. However, crime in any form is subversive to a country's internal stability, particularly if that country is developing or facing political instability or economic decline.

As discussed in the previous section, demographic pressures are significant underlying factors for the proliferation of crime. Combined with ethnic tensions and the progressive decline of public services and the rule of law, these pressures can easily translate into self-perpetuating situations of instability and conflict. This has been demonstrated in the Solomon Islands during the tensions and can be seen in the discussed provinces of Papua New Guinea. The violent conflict in the Solomon Islands was not a direct threat to either Australia or New Zealand, or for that matter any other country in the region. Indeed, the effects of any conflict that would normally be experienced by neighbouring countries in landlocked regions are greatly mitigated by PICs geographical isolation from each other which acts as an insulator from conflict spill over and refugee flows generated by conflict and humanitarian emergencies. This is not to say that the region is immune from the effects of conflict, because there were instances during the conflict where Bougainville refugees arrived in western districts of the Solomon Islands and BRA members often ventured into the Solomon Islands in search of Second World War weapons caches.[464] Research has also indicated that the smuggling of arms went both ways over the strait between Bougainville and the Solomon Islands.[465] However, these instances may serve to be the exceptions rather than the rule in the Pacific, due to Bougainville and the Solomon Islands geographical closeness and ethnic and cultural similarities between their peoples.

---

[464] Greg Watson, "Solomon Islands Conflict Overview", in Henderson, Watson (eds.), 2005, p.402.
[465] See Capie, 2003, pp.81-83.

Other than conflict, refugee flows may arise out of natural disasters in which homes and livelihoods are destroyed, forcing people to relocate where they can find shelter and food. In circumstances such as these, governments of PICs which have been afflicted by natural disasters and are faced with the resulting social stresses either ask for help or are offered help by Australia and New Zealand. As natural disasters such as tropical cyclones are frequent occurrences in the Pacific region, instances of assistance from these two countries have also become frequent and will continue to be frequently needed as PICs would not be able to sufficiently rebuild infrastructure and provide for their people without such assistance.

As indicated in the previous section, the proliferation of guns in Melanesia, particularly Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands, have been the single most important factor that has escalated the violence of group conflict in these states to such a point that has demanded intervention. For the intervening forces, gun proliferation provides a variety of challenges, not least of all avoiding gun battles with natives and escalating the violence further. So the proliferation of guns also provides intervening countries with a set of immediate priorities in the form of disarmament. And in the examples of Bougainville and the Solomon Islands, gun proliferation also steered the intervening countries of Australia and New Zealand towards taking a conciliatory approach towards seeking peace between the conflicting groups. In both Bougainville and the Solomon Islands, the intervention process was initiated with a consultative process whereby help was either offered or asked for and then representatives from Australia and New Zealand consulted with the various armed groups, essentially asking for their cooperation in the disarmament and peace processes and paving the way for a police-led, as opposed to military-led, intervening force.[466]

---

[466] Interview with Peter Noble, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Wellington, 27/4/06.

The resulting political instability from strained and deteriorating civil-military relationships, again in the Melanesian countries of Fiji, Papua New Guinea, and to a lesser extent Vanuatu, has effects that reverberate around the Pacific region. Military coups and insubordination to government policies foster uncertainty amongst the respective country's population and also amongst the wider regional community as the recent December 2006 coup in Fiji demonstrated very clearly. The uncertainty will manifest most evidently in the country's short-term economic performance, and as Fiji acts as a sort of economic hub for many other PICs, the uncertainty will be felt in their economies as well. Australia and New Zealand, while trying to distance themselves from the new interim regime, are also affected by Fiji's coup, certainly as trading partners, but also because Fiji a popular holiday destination for both metropole populations, and there are significant numbers of expatriates shared amongst the three countries.

Transnational terrorism is often associated with transnational crime, and failing states are often associated with both. It seems logical that as terrorist groups such as al Qaeda have been involved in transnational criminal activities around the world in order to secure finances, the South Pacific region may also be seen, or already is seen, as a target for terrorist groups in search of opportunities. These opportunities may range from raising of funds through illegal avenues or, as has already been discussed, the use of flags of convenience, such as Tonga's, on ships to ferry around explosives and arms. As noted above, PICs lack the enforcement capability that would enable them to contain such activities from either criminal or terror groups, and as noted, such activities will also affect these developing countries and ultimately Australia and New Zealand. However, a distinction must be made between the involvement of terrorist groups actively involved in criminal activities for monetary gain, and the threat posed by terrorist attacks and the establishment of terrorist bases. Opinions vary on the probability of the latter threats, for instance ASPI has suggested that Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands

166

and Vanuatu have the potential to be used as bases for terrorist groups.[467] On the other hand, academics such as Fraenkel and May believe that the geographical, political and social natures of PICs and their respective situations are too dissimilar to other areas in the world where failed states and their attendant internal challenges provide the right conditions, opportunities and targets for terrorist groups to operate and thrive.[468] This divergence in opinion is reflected in the differing of perspectives between Australia, which sees PICs as vulnerable to "exploitation by terrorist networks and even terrorist attacks", and New Zealand which believes that there is a very low likelihood.[469]

---

[467] ASPI, *Beyond Bali: ASPI's Strategic Assessment 2002*, 2002, pp.28-29.
[468] Fraenkel, 2004b; Ron May, *A Brief Overview of Pacific Security Issues*, SSGM Conference Papers, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, paper presented at the *National Security Workshop*, Port Vila, 30 March-1 April, 2004.
[469] Australian Government, *Transnational Terrorism: The Treat to Australia*, 2004, p.72.

3.3 Implications for New Zealand Security Policy:

New Zealand has always had a relationship on some level with South Pacific countries. As a developed and long-standing participant in regional politics, New Zealand has been deeply involved in the development and security of these countries. In often – but not always – close concert with Australia, New Zealand has helped a number of PICs through to independence, provided aid for development projects and to help supplement governments' budgets, provided emergency relief in times of disaster and military assistance in times of insecurity, as well as playing a significant part in establishing and maintaining bilateral and regional cooperative forums, programmes and agreements.

In almost every case where a Pacific Island government asks for help, New Zealand will assist, or if help is not asked for then New Zealand offers.[470]

New Zealand involvement in the Pacific is not a new thing. However, there has been a definite shift in how New Zealand has perceived the region, from a stance that reflected a benign perspective, to one where countries in the South Pacific are seen to be inherently vulnerable and as likely to be overwhelmed by outside forces and actors as they are to be by their own internal problems. This shift has no doubt been steered by the conflicts in Bougainville, the Solomon Islands and to a lesser extent the problems in Papua New Guinea. The aspects of failure that have culminated in armed violence in these countries have been acknowledged as being present to a greater or lesser extent in other PICs. The conflicts of Bougainville and the Solomon Islands demonstrate the inherent danger of these problems if they are ignored or kept at arms length by developed nations like Australia and New Zealand. Subsequently, these aspects of failure have proved to be significant drivers for New Zealand's present formulation of policy towards the South Pacific, determining our level of engagement in the area, in setting present security

---

[470] Interview with Peter Noble, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Wellington, 27/4/06.

priorities and with building upon our capability to project ourselves into the region by shaping our defence forces with the Pacific theatre in mind.

This part of section three will discuss New Zealand's interests in the region and also both present and future implications of regional developments upon New Zealand's level of engagement in the South Pacific, focusing upon interventions, regionalism, development assistance, and defence.

New Zealand's Interests:

New Zealand's interest in the South Pacific is immediately obvious for the geographical proximity and the close historical ties and social links with communities in New Zealand. New Zealand's trade interests in the region are significant, totalling approximately NZ$1.3 billion, comprising 17 percent of New Zealand's overseas trade.[471] We have constitutional obligations to the Cook Islands, Tokelau and Niue that include aspects of external relations and security. There are similar expectations from other PICs, particularly those without defence forces, which look to both New Zealand and Australia for their security and the security of their assets (such as EEZs), but even those with forces require external military assistance as demonstrated in Tonga's November riots. Without any of the assistance that either New Zealand or Australia provide, PICs would be facing far greater development and security challenges and subsequently would be more prone to aspects of state failure. From a diplomatic point of view, maintaining and building upon present levels of assistance is also in New Zealand's interests as it enables a degree of leverage in discussions with South Pacific countries and also demonstrates a level of inclusiveness in regional and individual country politics which is significant in continuing New Zealand's interests. In addition, helping South Pacific states with their social, economic and political challenges, aiding them

---

[471] Statistics New Zealand, Overseas Trade Statistics for December 2006, retrieved from http://www.stats.govt.nz/products-and-services/ext-trade-stats/default.htm, on 21/1/07.

in providing human and territorial security, and generally building their capacities so that they can develop into self-sustaining and functioning states will ultimately lessen the risk of regional security threats to New Zealand and Australia's interests.

Failing states, or aspects of failing states, such as the indicators of the previous section, have affected New Zealand's and especially Australia's defence and foreign policies. As the only metropolitan powers with extra-regional linkages of a different sort from those of the Pacific Islands, and enough resources to look after themselves, Australia and New Zealand are increasingly defining their security and political interests in relation to the stability of their lesser well-off northern counter-parts. This has recently been demonstrated by both countries' increased activism in the South Pacific.

Engagement Through Intervention:

Interventions have been the most significant and visible change in New Zealand's stance towards problems of conflict and insecurity within PICs, the notable examples being Bougainville and the Solomon Islands. Indeed, the failing states concept was a rationalising argument for the decision to intervene in the Solomon Islands, and since then has underpinned New Zealand and Australian perceptions of security threats in the region and their resulting increased activism. Through the important part played in mediating the cease-fire and the Truce Monitoring Group in Bougainville, New Zealand's shifting policy towards active involvement in the South Pacific can be seen as an evolution over the 1990s, where the aforementioned successes were only a culmination of attempts at mediation and peace restoration. New Zealand's role was especially significant given that Australia's involvement and motives were distrusted by the Bougainvillians for the support given to the PNG defence and police forces during the conflict. This instilled in the locals of Bougainville a distrust of Australian motives particularly when it

170

came to any provision of "good offices" in the rebuilding process.[472] In light of this, New Zealand stepped in and offered itself as an "honest broker" in the mediation process.[473] New Zealand also initially led the subsequent Truce Monitoring Group that was supported by Australia and the South Pacific forum and was also made up of unarmed army and police from Tonga, Fiji and Vanuatu.

Similar hopes may have been placed upon the Townsville Peace Agreement (TPA) to provide the same impetus for peace in the Solomon Islands as it did in Bougainville. Previous to this, one month before the coup that overthrew the government, the Prime Minister Bart Ulufa'alu asked for assistance from Australia and New Zealand only to be declined. In response to an obvious policy failure, the TPA provided for an International Peace Monitoring Team to oversee disarmament in the islands but this proved to be weakened by the absence of a strong military presence that would back up the unarmed peacekeepers. It also failed to address important issues such as the movement of arms and fighters between Bougainville and the Solomon Islands.[474]

The Townsville Peace Agreement proved that a minimum approach to peace mediation in a conflict situation such as the Solomon Islands was not going to provide significant results or the impetus for the locals to make their own peace. RAMSI was to be significantly different, it was to be extremely well resourced and continues to be resourced to a level that has meant that Australia and New Zealand have had to forgo their distance and become actively involved to ensure that their investment is being properly spent. Indeed, RAMSI has turned from being an intervention peacekeeping force to being a state building process, and as a result the focus has shifted (not

---

[472] Jim Rolfe, "Peacekeeping the Pacific Way in Bougainville", *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 8, No. 4, Winter, 2001, p.239.
[473] Fry, p.30.
[474] Fraenkel, 2004a, p.101.

entirely) from security to development and governance in an effort to make security more sustainable.

Despite this, both Australia and New Zealand are still reluctant to intervene into PIC's internal affairs, and there is still a huge reluctance to be involved in the use of force against any people in the region. Fiji is one recent example that demonstrates the obvious limits to how much Australia and New Zealand will intervene when they declined to provide military assistance to Qarase as part of his request to stop the military from overthrowing his government.[475] In the case of Fiji, a military intervention going up against arguably the best disciplined and trained defence force in the Pacific Islands would obviously be out of the question. Firstly, there is a very real threat that violence could spark and deliver a number of casualties for all parties involved. In such a situation, any development gains made by New Zealand and Australian aid agencies could be destroyed and set back many years. Furthermore, as Fiji's population is relatively small, any casualties would be felt sorely throughout the local population, engendering a negative feeling from the general public towards the intervening parties and their peoples, putting at risk any expatriate communities and effectively scuttling the country's mainstay of the economy, tourism. At the end of it all, it would be ordinary Fijians who would wear the brunt of any conflict. Many families would be forced under the poverty level due to destroyed livelihoods, adding to internal security issues as a largely embittered and unemployed population increases its potential to split into ethnic divisiveness. Finally, such a response would never hold ground regionally, internationally, or even within the intervening countries' own populations. Such implications are vital in considering the limitations placed upon New Zealand and Australian increased activism and involvement in the South Pacific.

---

[475] "NZ, Aussie Reject Qarase Plea For Troops", *Newswire*, 5/12/06, retrieved from http://www.newswire.co.nz/main/viewstory.aspx?storyid=349759&catid=0&m=print, on the 2/2/07.

The April riots in the Solomon Islands demonstrated this when Australia was hesitant to engage the violent mob that was destroying a large part of Honiara, instead letting the violence eventually run down over two days. An aggressive approach to such a situation would have only made the violence much worse considering that previous to the April riots some trouble makers had taken to pelting RAMSI vehicles with stones in an indication of a growing undercurrent of resentment towards the mission's presence.[476] Indeed, the violence could well have turned upon RAMSI personnel more than it did (17 Australian officers were injured[477]) and could have ultimately resulted in the Solomon Islands government sending RAMSI out of the country even though they are still direly needed, as ironically demonstrated by the riots.

Following on from this is the fact that there are awkward decisions on how much countries like Australia or New Zealand should be getting involved, and in some respects, interfering with the internal policies of PICs. This is particularly apparent in trying to rebuild the Solomon Islands into a sustainable state. When ASPI did their original report on the Solomon Islands, *Our Failing Neighbour*, their conclusion was to put in a type of transitional authority that shared power alongside the Solomon Islands government.[478] Such an overt capture of a state's authority, although may produce results more effectively and faster, would never hold either with the Solomon Islands government, or with other South Pacific countries, particularly with fears of Australian led neo-colonialism playing a significant part in how PICs perceive Australia's interests and motives in the region.[479] The obvious problems concern issues of control and the violation of the sovereignty with which PICs are characteristically so proud of. Given this, interventions can easily be manipulated and subverted by local political elites and ultimately the whole

---

[476] McLeod, Morgan, 2006, p.420.

[477] Ibid, p.412.

[478] Specifically, the proposed Solomon Islands Rehabilitation Authority would effectively control aw and order and financial management, other functions would have continued to be operated by the Solomon Islands government; ASPI, 2003, p.48.

[479] Interview with Peter Noble, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Wellington, 27/4/06.

173

undertaking could be counter-productive. Subsequently, it is necessary that any regional interventions or assistance missions into troubled states such as the Solomon Islands will have to be governed by these restrictions. As it is, there is an increasing enmity towards RAMSI, and particularly Australia, from Solomon Islander political elites who are feeling that their positions are being undermined by Australia's influence in the policy making process. RAMSI's and Australia's position in the Solomon Islands is also still vulnerable to manipulation by the same politicians and others who were responsible for the old corrupt system and wanted to perpetuate it. These factors may yet remove the mission prematurely.

Another significant issue in the event of a Solomon Islands type assistance mission regards the duration of engagement and the so-called "red zone".[480] The "red zone" is a theoretical zone where RAMSI, for instance, has the Solomon Islands functioning to a point where it appears to be a self-sustaining state again. In light of this, political will for the continued presence of RAMSI, in both the Solomon Islands and in contributing countries to the mission, dissolves and subsequently RAMSI is ordered to leave. However, at the operational level of rebuilding the state, sustainability would still be a long time away, and would revert in short order back to a dysfunctional conflicting state if RAMSI were to leave. It is necessary for an assistance mission to get past the red zone, particularly if countries like Australia who are leading the mission and suggesting it remain, but also wanting to avoid being labelled neo-colonial as a consequence.

In regards to involvement in regional interventions and assistance missions, New Zealand will always be needed as a partner to Australia, in a supporting role, or as an alternative to Australia – particularly in mediation. As ASPI indicated in its 2003 report, Australia would have been able to resource and

---

[480] Ibid.

174

carry out the assistance mission by itself.[481] Nevertheless, New Zealand's involvement is important obviously for spreading the costs of personnel and reconstruction, but also for its political strength and regional appeal, similar to the support the UN and EU lend to the assistance mission in an international sense. New Zealand does not have the resources to engage the Pacific on the level that Australia does, nor is the New Zealand government willing to involve itself in the affairs of PICs as Australia does. New Zealand has displayed a much more reserved outlook in this regard, perhaps because it does place the same imperatives on regional security threats as Australia does and that is most likely a consequence of differing geostrategic outlooks. Nevertheless, this places New Zealand as an alternative to Australia's extrovert policies which PICs would in some circumstances find easier to relate to, and which is ultimately still productive to both countries.

From looking at the indicators in the previous section, the only country that would need a peacekeeping intervention mission is the obvious case of Papua New Guinea. The government is clearly unable to contain violence or construct effective mechanisms that would pre-empt, circumvent, or dissolve the need to resort to violence. Once again however, any intervention force would have the same constraints with sovereignty and regional and international consent as with the Solomon Islands. The previously mentioned ECP was to help provide some semblance of security development in Papua New Guinea's trouble spots, but the fact that certain clauses were unconstitutional meant that the majority of the policing force had to return to Australia indicates the importance of bending to the constraints of sovereignty. The extent of New Zealand involvement would vary depending on the circumstances; because of Australia's and PNG's proximity to each other and their close relationship since independence, Australia would take primary responsibility as it has done in the Solomon Islands. The size of Papua New

---

[481] ASPI, 2003, p.40.

175

Guinea and scope of its problems would be a daunting task for any intervening force, so New Zealand's support would no doubt be welcomed.

Engagement through Regionalism:

Since the early 1990s, regionalism has also become a means of meeting the various challenges that are inherent in, and also come out of, the developing states of the Pacific. A number of landmark documents have come from the Pacific Islands Forum that provide for regional cooperation on security issues:

- The 1992 Honiara Declaration on Law Enforcement Cooperation
- The 1997 Aitutake Declaration on Regional Security Cooperation
- The 2000 Biketawa Declaration
- The 2002 Nasonini Declaration on Regional Security

Each declaration has been a step in regional acknowledgement of the vulnerabilities of the region and their root causes. The Honiara Declaration was a result of PICs leaders' fears of the potential impacts transnational crime would have on their countries and the region. It addressed such concerns as mutual assistance in criminal matters, a review of national extradition legislation, issues involving customs cooperation, the illegal trafficking of drugs and money laundering.[482] It also aimed to provide a regional legal response to transnational crime, noting the "need for a more comprehensive, integrated and collaborative approach to counter these threats" and impact of transnational crime.[483] The 1997 Aitutaki Declaration built upon the Honiara Declaration and widened the region's security agenda to include threats from "natural disasters, environmental damage, and unlawful challenges to national

---

[482] *Declaration by the South Pacific Forum on Law Enforcement Cooperation,* Annexed to the Forum Communiqué from the 23rd South Pacific Forum, Honiara, Solomon Islands, 8-9 July 1992; see http://www.cbsi.com.sb/SIFIU/Honiara%20Declaration.pdf, for a copy of the Declaration.
[483] Ibid.

integrity and independence".[484] It also provided for the development of regional mechanisms deal with such circumstances. The Biketawa Declaration included these regional response mechanisms into its lines, acknowledging "the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of another member state", but state that in "the time of crisis or in response to members' request for assistance, for action to be taken on the basis of all members of the Forum being part of the Pacific Islands extended family."[485] In doing this the declaration provides for a regional security framework and its importance was demonstrated when it was used to justify and legitimise the intervention into the Solomon Islands. It also noted that Forum members had to confront the underlying causes of unrest in the region, such as ethnic tensions, inequalities of wealth, lack of good governance, land disputes and the erosion of cultural values, all of which need a greater understanding and action.[486]

The Nasonini Declaration built on the previous declarations and echoing with the ramifications that the terrorist attacks of 9/11 had on global security perceptions. After being left out of the two previous declarations, terrorism was back on the regional security agenda and committed Forum members to the counter-terrorism measures that were outlined by the Financial Action Task Force and the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373.[487] To a greater degree it builds upon the Honiara Declaration encouraging the cooperation in law enforcement matters, but noted that the implantation of declarations legislation had not been completed by Forum members.[488]

---

[484] *Aitutaki Declaration on Regional Security Cooperation*, Annexed to the Forum Communiqué from the 28th South Pacific Forum, Aitutaki, Cook Islands, 17-19 September 2007, retrieved from
http://www.forumsec.org/_resources/article/files/1997%20Communique.pdf, on 15/11/06.
[485] *Biketawa Declaration*, Attached to the Forum Communiqué from the 31st Pacific Island's Forum, Tarawa, Kiribati, 27-30 October 2000, retrieved from
http://www.geocities.com/pacpoc2003/docs/Biketawa.PDF, on the 15/11/06.
[486] Ibid.
[487] *Nasonini Declaration on Regional Security*, Annexed to the Forum Communiqué from the 33rd Pacific Island's Forum, Suva, Fiji Islands, 15-17 August 2002, retrieved from
http://www.cbsi.com.sb/SIFIU/Nasonini%20Declaration%20on%20Regional%20Security.pdf, on the 15/11/06.
[488] Ibid.

While these declarations are important to implementing an effective regional security framework, an Eminent Persons' Group Review of the Pacific Islands Forum in 2004 criticised them for having "no clear and efficient mechanism by which their words can be given teeth."[489] The report also advocated a much more rapid and effective engagement in the face of destabilising emergencies, and a greater regional involvement in such engagements, aside from Australia and New Zealand.

In light of these declarations, there is great expectation put on the Pacific Plan to provide the comprehensive regional framework that the previous declarations were aimed at. Its goals are to "Enhance and stimulate economic growth, sustainable development, good governance and security for Pacific countries through regionalism."[490] Security is recognised as a necessary component of the Plan especially in enabling the economic growth, good governance, human development and sustainable development. The Plan is viewed as the Pacific leaders' "new Vision", and it suggests a much more intimate relationship between Australia and New Zealand and Forum members and promises to address underlying issues, mentioned in the previous section that have been made into a regional imperative.

The Pacific Plan is a strong move forward for the region, and demonstrates again the extent to which Australia and New Zealand have committed themselves to regional development in order to achieve their regional security interests. Both countries are the principle drivers of regional cooperation, funding up to 87 percent of regional organisations core budgets.[491] One regional commentator has argued that regional cooperation 'can be mobilized

489 Eminent Persons' Group Review of the Pacific Islands Forum, April 2004, retrieved from http://www.pacificplan.org/tiki-download_file.php/?fileId=41, on the 12/1/07.
490 Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, *The Pacific Plan for Strengthening Regional Cooperation and Integration*, October 2005, p.3; Regionalism is defined as "countries working together for their joint and individual benefit", p.4.
491 Asian Development Bank-Commonwealth Secretariat Joint Report to the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, *Toward a New Pacific Regionalism*, Manila, ADB, 2005, p.10.

in practice only if it is perceived by Australia and New Zealand to be in their interests... [that] they tend to have a prominent role in defining when and where cooperation should take place."[492] In any case, PICs do not have the resources or the sustained political will to be able to implement such a massive undertaking. Subsequently, the cost and responsibility of initiative of the Plan will fall on the two metropolitan countries, and they will have to have deeply involved stakes in both regional organisations and PICs internal affairs in order to build the framework and the enforcement capacity to see it implemented.

Engagement with Development and Governance Assistance:

New Zealand's bilateral development and governance assistance programmes are significant factors in individual PIC capacity building, and will play a significant part in helping to meet goals of the Pacific Plan. Aside from this, engagement with aid is central to New Zealand's relationship with PICs, but it has changed over the years due to changed perceptions of the region. With the acknowledgement of the regions challenges, aid delivery has had to evolve over the last decade or so to become more efficient and to become less vulnerable to being drained due to misappropriation. An important step for New Zealand's aid delivery in this regard was the establishment of NZAID (New Zealand's International Aid and Development Agency) after a review of New Zealand's ODA in 2002. NZAID was set up as a semi-autonomous agency within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, but with its own budget and Minister. The primary strategic focus is the Pacific Islands, with 47 percent of the agency's total aid budget concentrating on governance and poverty alleviation in the region.[493] Additionally, in the 2004 NZAID policy paper, *Preventing Conflict and Building Peace*, it is evident that recent

---

[492] A.V. Hughes cited in Robbie Robertson, *Regionalism in the Pacific: A New Development Strategy*, 2005, retrieved from www.usp.ac.fj/fileadmin/files/Institutes/piasdg/dev_studies/papers/robertson_regionalism_pac ific.pdf, on the 7/1/07, p.5.
[493] NZAID, *The Pacific: Factsheet*, October 2004b.

troubles regarding instability in the South Pacific have to some extent shaped policy approaches, where perceptions of instability have provided an imperative for NZAID to get more involved in the region and reduce the pressure from the perceived underlying causes, such as poverty, that precipitate conflict. In particular, the policy paper emphasises the importance of "building structural stability" and capacity within states and communities so that they may be able to resolve internal conflicts peacefully, and address the triggers and root causes of instability and violence.[494]

Furthermore, aid delivery has also become much more "hard-headed", meaning it has moved away from inadvertently fostering dependency mentalities and tempting misappropriation. This has led to a redirecting and reprioritising of aid funded programmes, particularly where ODA delivery has been extended further than the basic "water tanks in villages" approach (although water tanks are a crucial underpinning of health) and infrastructure grants towards a much more "strategically targeted intervention."[495] In PIC communities, this means reintroducing or building upon basic public services and restoring confidence in the state to be able to provide for and protect its citizens, as well as addressing any after-effects of conflict, including reintegrating conflict-affected groups and supporting the processes of justice and reconciliation.[496]

In many cases, these functions require a coordinated multi-agency approach, so that NZAID is only one of many government and non-government agencies within New Zealand concerned with development assistance, equating in a whole of government or "broad spectrum" approach.[497] While this is a measure of New Zealand's level of engagement, it is also increasing bureaucratic and policy linkages with PICs. This in turn has meant that there

---

[494] See NZAID, *Preventing Conflict and Building Peace*, October 2004a, pp.4-5, 9-14.
[495] Interview with Peter Noble, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Wellington, 27/4/06.
[496] Beverly Turnbull, "ANZAC Aid: The New Zealand Experience", in Henderson, Watson (eds), 2005, p.351.
[497] Interview with Peter Noble, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Wellington, 27/4/06.

is no way New Zealand or Australia can revert to previous levels of engagement (due to policy changes or funding cutbacks) without leaving large gaps in PIC institutional capacities. Additionally, capacity building is long term, particularly with all the vagaries of history, politics and everything else mentioned in this thesis tending to subvert progress, so that in reality the implementation of South Pacific policy is more of a "broad spectrum grind" as PIC bureaucracies are slowly evolving to meet the demands of the new ODA environment.[498] Meanwhile, New Zealand's own bureaucracy has to evolve to meet the challenges of the whole of government approach, and an important question is whether New Zealand will be able to stay the course of this change as well as maintain the political will to sustain it.

One more important note on New Zealand's hard-headedness in regards to aid delivery is that it has also carried over and been used as a tool of coercion. The December coup in Fiji has been the most recent case. New Zealand, alongside other countries, cut military ties and aid, some development aid, and also imposed diplomatic sanctions.[499] These sanctions may be in place for some time, especially given that after the May 2000 coup New Zealand did not normalise relations with Fiji until December of 2003.[500] It is obvious that the threat or reality of such measures has had little effect in deterring Bainimarama from his course of action and further sanctions would only harm the Fijian people. Subsequently, the future effectiveness of targeted aid sanctions is questionable, also given that they have had little success in other areas around the world. In the South Pacific, the proud sovereignty of Pacific Island governments and New Zealand's adherence to its doctrines of democratic governance essentially boils down to all parties attempting to save face while standing for their principles.

---

[498] Ibid.
[499] MFAT, *Republic of the Fiji Islands*, 2006, retrieved from
http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Countries/Pacific/Fiji.php, on the 7/1/07.
[500] Ibid.

181

Implications for New Zealand's Defence Policy:

The South Pacific has always been a significant theatre for New Zealand defence engagement. Indeed, the South Pacific can be seen as New Zealand's second international defence relations priority, after Australia. Additionally, the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) has played a constructive role in the region for many years in a number of capacities. Indeed, many aspects of New Zealand's present level of defence engagement have been longstanding. As a result they have become integral to existing diplomatic and military relationships with PICs and play a central role in demonstrating regional security commitments.

While New Zealand's longstanding commitments in the South Pacific, such as maritime surveillance, search and rescue and so on, have more or less stayed the same, the drivers that have driven the policy behind those commitments have changed. One important example of this is New Zealand's maritime surveillance commitments that include 320 hours of maritime surveillance a year by the Royal New Zealand Air Force's P-3 Orions—more than any other country in the region and a significant cost to New Zealand.[501] The Royal New Zealand Navy also goes on patrols in the region. These patrols have generally become more important to ensuring security, as the imperative to monitor illegal fishing has carried over to include the illegal movement of people, drugs and any other criminal activity that is using the vast waters of the region as a medium for travel.

This shift in drivers can also be seen in the broadening of the role of the NZDF in the Pacific region. For instance, throughout the latter half of the twentieth century the nature of New Zealand's military activities abroad have been largely peacekeeping in nature. Recent history has seen those same

---

[501] Interview with Huntley Wright and Francis Van Der Krogt, Ministry of Defence, Wellington, 27/9/06.

lessons and experiences learned around the world come into use in the Pacific region, now a significantly more important theatre for NZDF personnel to engage in, with peacekeeping operations and interventions marking the change. In differing to operations around the world however, the vanguard in the South Pacific peacekeeping and intervention forces have largely been unarmed police forces from around the region. This is because as the problems of instability have been identified as problems of law and order, unarmed police are considered the best way to provide and strengthen the rule of law. There are other logical aspects of this approach, including the fact that it is not as confrontational as using armed military forces (akin to an invasion) and there is less call on poorer regional contributors to provide expensive military commitments and stretch their already small forces.[502] Instead, disciplined forces have been the armed backup behind the police presence as well as providing other support.

Another aspect of the broadening role of the NZDF regards engagement with PICs disciplined forces. As noted in this thesis, PICs disciplined forces have been a source of political instability in countries like Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu, Solomon Islands and Fiji. In 2002, the Ministry of Defence (MOD) *Review of New Zealand's Pacific Defence and Security Policy* also noted this saying that "Disciplined forces in the region are characterised generally by low morale, poor training and equipment, inadequate pay and funding, weak leadership, and declining standards of professionalism, low public esteem, mismanagement and corruption" concluding that "Elements of the disciplined forces [in the region] have therefore often been part of the problem and not the

---

[502] The decision to intervene in Bougainville and the Solomon Islands with unarmed police also involved a lot of the ground work from MFAT staff talking to local groups, including armed factions such as the BRA, discussing the various aspects of the interventions with the general population and building ties of confidence and trust that would ensure the visiting police officers safety in the peace and disarmament processes; Interview with Peter Noble, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Wellington, 27/4/06.

solution."[503] The report has advocated a greater degree of engagement with these forces in order to increase their professionalism, training and capacity building. New Zealand's engagement in this way with Pacific armed forces has been provided for some time now by the NZDF's Mutual Assistance Programme (MAP), which encompasses training and capacity building, while Australia's MAP also addresses these issues, but also provides equipment such as patrol boats and infrastructure such as buildings.

New Zealand sees its engagement as providing a good role model for professionalism for PIC forces to follow, as well as providing an example of the appropriate constitutional role of military forces.[504] Another aspect of MAP is advice on weapons security and discipline, because as noted earlier in this thesis, most weapons used in South Pacific conflicts come from police or military armouries and have been key factors in the intensity and escalation of violent conflict in Bougainville, the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea. However, this may prove to be one of the more intractable problems in places like Papua New Guinea where the scope of the problem is widespread over the large country and the underlying issues such as corruption and poor funding will not be easily solved in the short term. Additionally, while building and strengthening capacities within PIC armed forces, it has to be balanced by matching military capabilities to the needs of the country. Therefore it is important that New Zealand and Australia do not build capabilities that the region does not need, cannot sustain, or which could undermine security.

Additionally, similar engagement with PIC police forces is also important. As first line enforcement agencies of their states, PICs' police forces' capacities are crucial to the state's executive powers, and if their capacities do not meet

---

[503] MOD, MOD, *New Zealand and the Pacific Islands: Security through Partnership – Review of New Zealand's Pacific Defence and Security Policy*, March 2002b (Unpublished), p.30
[504] Interview with Huntley Wright and Francis Van Der Krogt, Ministry of Defence, Wellington, 27/9/06.

the demands of internal security, then they ultimately undermine regional security as a failing agency of the state. As noted in the previous section, Papua New Guinea's police force does have elements within it that can be described as unprofessional at best, but the country's high crime rates, particularly in urban centres suggests a lack of law enforcement capacity on a whole. Papua New Guinea is an extreme example of poor police professionalism and capacity, but other countries' police capacities are undermined by similar underlying trends, such as poor training and funding. The NZDF's MAP is the sole source of interaction for New Zealand with Pacific Island police forces and it is attempting to address the aforementioned issues through training and capacity building.[505] However, there is a feeling that this will change and evolve over time from being military to police engagement, to police on police engagement, because it is believed that it is more effective to have the appropriate counter-part agencies interact with each other.[506]

New Zealand's Defence Capability:

In regards to defence capability in the Pacific, New Zealand has identified a number of gaps that have meant that the NZDF has been unable to implement policy requirements in the region. For instance, for a while now the NZDF has had a capability gap in regards to tactical sealift and the ability to deploy land forces and equipment into areas without port facilities, a gap that has often been filled by Australian assets in South Pacific peacekeeping deployments. Other gaps that have been identified in New Zealand's South Pacific capability include fisheries and border protection (as opposed to surveillance), offshore search and rescue, mine counter-measures and clearance diving support, and maritime counter-terrorism.[507] In light of these gaps, the need for New Zealand's own adequate capability to fulfil policy requirements is

---

[505] Ibid, and MOD, 2002b, pp.30-33.
[506] Ibid.
[507] MOD, *Maritime Forces Review: Key Findings*, January 2002a, p.21.

obvious. This will be the case especially in times of emergency where New Zealand is required to take action independently of its usual strategic partners, particularly when they have their assets committed elsewhere, such as with Australia's commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan. The government has been aware of these policy gaps with regard to New Zealand's commitments to the South Pacific for a number of years now and they have been an underlying factor behind such purchases as the Project Protector Fleet, new helicopters to replace the Iroquois, and upgrades for the Air Force's C-130s and P-3 Orions.[508]

Australia:

Despite the title on this thesis saying that it is about implications of state failure to New Zealand security policy, New Zealand is rarely mentioned without Australia being mentioned in tandem. This has an important implication for the formulation and implementation of New Zealand security policy in the South Pacific. Australia does share the same strategic space, but their strategic outlook is tinted by its geographical proximity to Indonesia. The bombings in Bali and a strong alliance with the US can be seen as driving factors in Australia's increased activism in the region. In fact it has increased to a degree that far outstrips New Zealand's involvement in the region. This can be viewed in perspective, where Australia can afford such a level of engagement because of the size of its population and the wealth of its resources. An example of this is the major presence of the Australian Federal Police in every PIC, involved in a range of police capacity building programmes, as well as supplying police commissioners and a number of other personnel.[509] Whether by intention or not, Australia has subsequently assumed an informal position of leadership in the region, becoming the central

---

[508] Ibid, pp. 12-17, 22-27; MOD, 2002b, 25-28; and MOD, *Defence Long-Term Development Plan: 2006 Update*, 2006, pp.17-20, 23-28.
[509] Interview with Huntley Wright and Francis Van Der Krogt, Ministry of Defence, Wellington, 27/9/06.

driver of regional change through its increased involvement. As Australia's closest regional ally and most developed neighbour in the region, New Zealand has an important role to play in Australia's strategic outlook, and vice versa. So, it is in both countries' interests to complement and engage each other on their priorities and their defence capabilities. This is reflected in the alliance and relations between the two countries, which are pillars of regional security maintenance. Both countries have to work very closely on a number of high and low policy and political levels in order to remain on top of regional matters, as to go in different directions in the region would result in undermining or needlessly replicating each other's efforts.

Conclusion:

The importance of state failure is not to present an analysis of states in absolute terms, labelling them healthy, failed, or even failing. Instead, the importance lies in identifying what challenges developing states are facing, how their institutions are not working, and what the issues are that are impeding the progress of development and governance. Subsequently, this thesis has focused on the degree to which PICs suffer from aspects of state failure, and what implications these aspects of failure have for regional security, particularly New Zealand's security concerns.

The literature review of state failure in the South Pacific highlighted the growing concern over recent years regarding the perceptions of state instability and subsequent security concerns surrounding that instability. Discussions have largely focused on the decline of social and economic conditions, and the instability of countries political situations, in some cases seeing parallels with beleaguered African countries. In other cases, security concerns, such as terrorist organisations, which have been associated with failing states around the world, are considered viable threats in the South Pacific because of the perceived failing of many of the region's states. However, there are arguments against these propositions, that the region is neither failing nor comparable to African conditions.

The indicators for state failure in the second section demonstrate what has been known for a number of years; that for Melanesian countries like the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea, a mixture of demographics, poverty, cultural and political factionalism, corruption and state institution incapacity provide a social milieu where violence and conflict has become a staple of life. In Papua New Guinea, there have also been serious instances of human rights abuses carried out by the police force. These have dissolved public confidence in an institution which purports to be a pillar of the state's ability to provide

188

human security. In countries such as Vanuatu and Fiji, there are significant and in some cases growing indicators of poverty and poor government administration. Both states have had, or are currently having, problems between civil and military establishments, and as demonstrated by Fiji, once the military has proven its ability to take over the government, it is much more likely to do it again because there is nothing to stop it. One would wonder, given a much more cohesive and larger paramilitary force and without the mitigating influence of Australia, whether the Vanuatu government would face similar challenges.

The countries of Polynesia were assessed in this thesis to provide a contrast in stability. For the most part they have, Tonga and Samoa both rate relatively highly when it comes to development indicators, and both are very stable politically. However, their heavy dependencies on remittances as well as aid (like other PICs) underlines weak and stagnant economies. Furthermore, Tonga's violent and destructive riots of November 2006 destroyed an illusion of peace and demonstrated that Polynesian populations do have the capacity for violence on the scale seen in Honiara of April 2006. Meanwhile, Tuvalu paints a different picture of a state struggling with its demographic and geographical realities. Poverty levels have increased over the years, and poverty in regards to infrastructure and opportunities characterise the nature of the development challenges facing the small Tuvaluan government, which itself is subject to bouts of low-level factionalism and political instability.

The analysis in the second section also illustrates how the various issues highlighted by the indicators are interconnected, and their coming together are often the key factors in the incidence of violent conflict and a state's overall weakness. For example, demographic pressures such as unsustainable urban growth, group settlement patterns, youth bulges and high unemployment levels are not enough to spark conflict by themselves. However, when coupled with social diversity and the unequal distribution of resources or opportunities

189

along group lines, an environment of competition is created amongst ethnic groups. Competing ethnic groups in this situation are readily manipulated by political leaders looking to subvert stability for their own agendas. This does provide an environment where there is the potential for violence, but again it does not mean that violence is inevitable. One facilitating factor in the violent conflict in societies such as Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands has been indigenous cultures often centring upon retribution and payback, and the intensity of the fights has been escalated by the increased access to both legal and illegal firearms. These firearms may be legal or left over from the Second World War, but there are also an increasing number of illegal weapons that have come from police and military armouries, from which they have either been stolen or sold. Additionally, it is evident that PIC defence and police forces that are ill-disciplined and corrupt enough to have their armouries emptied are not going to be able to contain the threat of emerging militant groups, or any rises in violent crime.

These indicators have a cyclical cumulative effect upon one another, where, for instance, corruption and poverty will facilitate and exacerbate increasingly unstable social and political environments, which in turn will exacerbate corruption and poverty, resulting in an increasingly weakened state. There are a number of key regional security concerns that stem from these issues. These include the risk of state failure and humanitarian emergencies due to internal conflict and natural disasters, the proliferation of guns, and political instability from strained civil-military relations having political and economic effects for the wider region. There is also risk from increasing transnational criminal activities in the region, including illegal drug manufacturing and trafficking, people smuggling, and illegal fishing, carried out by extra-regional criminal organisations and terrorist groups.

From these regional security concerns, this thesis then outlined the implications for New Zealand's engagement and security policy in the South

190

Pacific, in four specific areas – namely intervention, regionalism, development assistance, and defence and police engagement. In all of these areas, the fear of state failure and its subsequent effects on regional security have driven states such as New Zealand and Australia to become more active in the region and approach the security problems from a capacity building perspective. In other words, if states are stronger and more self-reliant in the South Pacific, then the better they will be at handling internal and extraneous sources of insecurity. However, one problem with this is how to help build South Pacific states' capacities without becoming too involved in their internal affairs and without appearing to subvert PICs' sovereignty and independence, and engendering notions of neo-colonialism. Such notions can easily become the source of instability and become counter-productive to what is trying to be achieved.

Interventions and regionalism are becoming increasingly important vehicles for the realisation of capacity building. This is evident from the mission in the Solomon Islands and also the wide scope of development and security issues covered by the Pacific Plan. However, interventions and regionalism also involve heavy engagement from New Zealand and Australia, because without them it is fair to say that there would be no impetus or resources to follow regional initiatives through to full implementation.

Other important aspects of capacity building are New Zealand's bilateral development and governance assistance programmes. Run by NZAID, New Zealand's ODA is targeted at building states' structural capacities in order to enable the peaceful resolution of conflict and to alleviate poverty. While ODA has been a significant pillar of New Zealand engagement in the South Pacific for decades, the drivers behind it, its delivery, and its aims have evolved over recent years to meet the change in security perceptions.

Another area that has always been a staple of New Zealand's engagement in the South Pacific is its defence commitments. Many defence commitments have remained unchanged, but similar to the delivery of ODA, the imperatives behind the policies of the commitments have evolved to reflect the region's changing security concerns. Changed security perceptions have also meant a greater involvement through cooperative programmes such as MAP that aim to strengthen militaries and police forces around the region, to instil greater professionalism and discipline in them so that they do not pose threats to their countries' stability and constitutionalism. The NZDF have also experienced a general broadening in their roles in the region, bringing their experience from peacekeeping around the world to bear on the South Pacific's trouble spots. This has been in concert with growing police involvement, as they spearhead intervention forces.

To sustain old commitments and meet new ones, New Zealand has had to build its own capacity, so that in some emergencies it is able to act independently of Australia, or just to be able to complement Australia's capabilities better. Additionally, New Zealand's relationship with Australia is a cornerstone for South Pacific development and security, where what each other does has to be complementary and supportive. Both countries will need to keep their internal resolve and political will high, as the problems they are tackling in the South Pacific are heavily intractable, requiring years of patience and investment in order for the region to realise its peaceful potential.

Unfortunately, this thesis has not been able to cover all the extraneous influences that have the potential to affect state stability in the South Pacific, primarily because of scope – as this thesis focused on states' internal issues – but also because accessible research and data are limited. As a closing recommendation, this paper suggests that more research be carried out in this area, for the most part in regards to the social, economic and political impacts of Asia in the region. In particular, the impacts from the influence of the two

China's bidding for South Pacific countries' recognition, the impacts from Asian criminal organisations spreading into the region, and also the impacts of foreign investment from these countries' companies, particularly in regards to the extent they facilitate corruption and social instability.

Appendix 1

FUND FOR PEACE'S TWELVE INDICATORS FOR STATE FAILURE:[510]

SOCIAL INDICATORS

1. Mounting Demographic Pressures:
- Pressures deriving from high population density relative to food supply and other life-sustaining resources
- Pressures deriving from group settlement patterns that affect the freedom to participate in common forms of human and physical activity, including economic productivity, travel social interaction, religious worship
- Pressures deriving from group settlement patterns and physical settings, including border disputes, ownership or occupancy of land, access to transportation outlets, control of religious or historical sites, and proximity to environmental hazards
- Pressures from skewed population distributions, such as "youth or age bulge", or from divergent rates of population growth among competing communal groups

2. Massive Movement of Refugees or Internally Displaced Persons Creating Complex Humanitarian Emergencies:
- Forced uprooting of large communities as a result of random or targeted violence and/or repression, causing food shortages, disease, lack of clean water, land competition, and turmoil that can spiral into larger humanitarian and security problems, both within and between countries

3. Legacies of Vengeance-Seeking Group Grievance or Group Paranoia:
- History of aggrieved communal groups based on recent or past injustices, which could date back centuries
- Patterns of atrocities committed with impunity against communal groups
- Specific groups singled out by state authorities, or by dominant groups, for persecution or repression
- Institutionalised political scapegoating
- Public scapegoating or groups believed to have acquired wealth, status or power as evidenced in the emergence of "hate" radio, pamphleteering and stereotypical or nationalistic political rhetoric

4. Chronic and Sustained Human Flight:
- "Brain Drain" of professionals, intellectuals and political dissidents fearing persecution or repression

---

[510] Baker, 2006, pp.8-11. These indicators and the rest of the Fund for Peace's methodology for its Failed States Index can be found at their website: http://www.fundforpeace.org/programs/fsi/fsindex.php.

- Voluntary emigration of "the middle class", particularly economically productive segments of the population, such as entrepreneurs, business people, artisans and traders, due to economic deterioration
- Growth of exile communities

ECONOMIC INDICATORS

5. Uneven Economic Development:
- Group-based inequality, or perceived inequality, in education, jobs, and economic status
- Group-based impoverishment as measured by poverty levels, infant mortality, education levels
- Rise of communal nationalism based on real or perceived group inequalities

6. Sharp and/or Severe Economic Decline:
- A pattern of progressive economic decline of the society as a whole as measured by per capita income, GNP (gross national product), debt, child mortality rates, poverty levels, business failures, and other economic measures
- Sudden drop in commodity prices, trade revenue foreign investment or debt payments
- Collapse or devaluation of the national currency
- Extreme social hardship imposed by economic austerity programmes
- Growth of hidden economies, including the drug trade, smuggling, and capital flight
- Increase in levels of corruption and illicit transactions among the general populace
- Failure of the state to pay salaries of govt employees and armed forces or to meet other financial obligations to its citizens, such as pension payments

POLITICAL/MILITARY INDICATORS

7. Criminalisation and/or Delegitimisation of the State:
- Massive and endemic corruption or profiteering by ruling elites
- Resistance of ruling elites to transparency, accountability and political representation
- Widespread loss of popular confidence in state institutions and processes, eg. widely boycotted or contested elections, mass public demonstrations, sustained civil disobedience, inability of the state to collect taxes, resistance to military conscription, rise of armed insurgencies
- Growth of crime syndicates linked to ruling elite

8. Progressive Deterioration of Public Services:
- Disappearance of basic state functions that serve the people, including failure to protect citizens from terrorism and violence and to provide essential services, such as health, education, sanitation, public transportation

- State apparatus narrows to those agencies that serve the ruling elites, such as security forces, presidential staff, central bank, diplomatic service, customs and collection agencies

9. Suspension or Arbitrary Application of the Rule of Law and Widespread Violation of Human Rights:
- Emergence of authoritarian , dictatorial or military rule in which constitutional and democratic institutions and processes are suspended or manipulated
- Outbreak of politically inspired (as opposed to criminal) violence against innocent civilians
- Rising number of political prisoners or dissidents who are denied due process consistent with international norms and practices
- Widespread abuse of legal, political and social rights, including those of individuals, groups or cultural institutions (eg. harassment of the press, politicilisation of the judiciary, internal use of military for political ends, public repression of political opponents, religious or cultural persecution)

10. Security Apparatus Operates as a "State Within a State":
- Emergence of elite or praetorian guards that operate with impunity
- Emergence of state-sponsored or state-supported private militias that terrorise political opponents, suspected "enemies", or civilians seen to be sympathetic to the opposition
- Emergence of an "army within an army" that serves the interests of the dominant military or political clique
- Emergence of rival militias, guerrilla forces or private armies in an armed struggle or protracted violent campaigns against state security forces

11. Rise of Factionalised Elites:
- Fragmentation of ruling elites and state institutions along groups lines
- Use of nationalistic political rhetoric by ruling elites, often in terms of communal irredentism (eg., a "greater Serbia") or of communal solidarity (eg., "ethnic cleansing" or "defending the faith")

12. Intervention of Other States or External Political Actors:
- Military or para-military engagement in the internal affairs of the state at risk by outside armies, states, identity groups or entities that affect the internal balance of power or resolution of the conflict
- Intervention by donors, especially if there is a tendency towards over-dependence on foreign aid or peacekeeping missions

Appendix 2 - Source: Fund for Peace

Indicators	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
1. Demographic Pressures	Zimbabwe	Kenya Bangladesh	Sri Lanka Nigeria	Philippines Israel	Azerbaijan Ecuador	Greece Kazakhstan USA	Japan South Korea	Sweden Chile	Oman	New Zealand
2. Refugees or IDPs	Sudan	Chad	Sri Lanka	Rwanda	Malawi USA	Haiti	Bolivia	Kazakhstan Poland	Equatorial Guinea Mozambique	New Zealand Oman
3. Group Grievance	Iraq	Afghanistan	Somalia	Liberia	Tajikistan France	Turkmenistan UK	Argentina Bulgaria	USA Oman	Switzerland Canada	Ireland New Zealand
4. Human Flight		Sudan Zimbabwe	Kenya Cambodia Papua New Guinea	Peru Ethiopia	Burma Cuba	North Korea Angola	Argentina Kazakhstan	Singapore Italy	New Zealand UK	Australia Oman USA
5. Economic Development		Nigeria Zimbabwe	Indonesia Afghanistan	Saudi Arabia Israel	Kuwait USA	France UK	Chile Portugal	Ireland	Denmark Oman	
6. Economic Decline	Zimbabwe	Sierra Leone Cote d'Ivoire	Bhutan Ethiopia	Papua New Guinea Uzbekistan	Cambodia Dominican Republic	India El Salvador	Ghana Italy	France Iran	Thailand Saudi Arabia	UK South Korea
7. Legitimacy of the State	Cote d'Ivoire Somalia	Bangladesh Equatorial Guinea	Eritrea Sierra Leone	El Salvador Vietnam	Turkey Mexico	Estonia Panama	Greece South Korea	Uruguay	Japan	Sweden New Zealand
8. Public Services	Somalia	Liberia Chad	Dominican Republic Papua New Guinea	Venezuela Israel	Thailand Philippines	Serbia Lebanon	Cuba Uruguay	Kuwait Greece	Costa Rica	USA France
9. Human Rights	Burma Sudan	Syria China	Paraguay Ethiopia	Vietnam Israel	Azerbaijan Senegal	USA Turkey	South Africa Hungary	Czech Republic Japan	UK	
10. Security Apparatus	Somalia Sudan	Nepal Colombia Burma	Iran Peru Cuba	Philippines Sierra Leone	Mexico Honduras	Bhutan Rwanda	Cyprus Mauritius Botswana	Ukraine Uruguay	Argentina Poland	USA South Korea
11. Factionalized Elites	Cote d'Ivoire Somalia Iraq	Nepal Russia Nigeria	Afghanistan China Cuba	Peru Vietnam	Guatemala	Mongolia	Singapore South Africa	South Korea UK	Austria France	Norway New Zealand
12. External Intervention	Iraq Haiti Afghanistan	Cyprus Pakistan	Zimbabwe Chad	South Korea Israel	Venezuela Turkey	Peru Libya	Kuwait Panama	Singapore Chile	UK Oman	USA Switzerland

Bibliography:

Primary Sources:

- *Aitutaki Declaration on Regional Security Cooperation*, Annexed to the Forum Communiqué from the 28th South Pacific Forum, Aitutaki, Cook Islands, 17-19 September 2007, retrieved from http://www.forumsec.org/_resources/article/files/1997%20Communiq ue.pdf, on 15/11/06.
- *Biketawa Declaration*, Attached to the Forum Communiqué from the 31st Pacific Island's Forum, Tarawa, Kiribati, 27-30 October 2000, retrieved from http://www.geocities.com/pacpoc2003/docs/Biketawa.PDF, on the 15/11/06.
- *Declaration by the South Pacific Forum on Law Enforcement Cooperation,* Annexed to the Forum Communiqué from the 23rd South Pacific Forum, Honiara, Solomon Islands, 8-9 July 1992, retrieved from http://www.cbsi.com.sb/SIFIU/Honiara%20Declaration.pdf, on 15/11/06.
- Interview with Peter Noble, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Wellington, 27/4/06.
- Interview with Huntley Wright and Francis Van Der Krogt, Ministry of Defence, Wellington, 27/9/06.
- *Nasonini Declaration on Regional Security*, Annexed to the Forum Communiqué from the 33rd Pacific Island's Forum, Suva, Fiji Islands, 15-17 August 2002, retrieved from http://www.cbsi.com.sb/SIFIU/Nasonini%20Declaration%20on%20Re gional%20Security.pdf, on the 15/11/06.

Secondary Sources:

- Abbott, David, Pollard, Steve, *Hardship and Poverty in the Pacific: Strengthening Poverty Analysis and Strategies in the Pacific*, Manila: Asian Development Bank, 2004.
- Abbott, David, *Poverty in the Pacific: Definitions, Trends and Issues*, 2006, retrieved from http://www.regionalcentrepacific.undp.org.fj, on the 14/12/06.
- Alger, Chadwick, "Failed States and the Failure of States: Self-Determination, States, Nations and Global Governance," paper presented at the Failed States Conference *Failed States and International Security: Causes, Prospects and Consequences*, Purdue University, West Lafayette, 25-27 February 1998.
- Aloi, Daniel, Manning, Michael, Mellam, Albert, *National Integrity Systems Transparency International Country Study Report: Papua New Guinea 2003*, Transparency International 2003.

- Alpers, Philip, *Gun Running in Papua New Guinea: From Arrows to Assault Weapons in the Southern Highlands*, Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2005.
- Alphonse, Andrew, Korimbao, Daniel, "PNG Landowners Threaten to Shut Oil Project", *The National*, 3/2/06, retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/february/02%2D06%2D02.htm, on the 10/8/06.
- Anastasion, D., Cincotta, R., Engelman, R., *The Security Demographic: Population and Civil Conflict After the Cold War*, Washington, DC: Population Action International, 2003.
- Asian Development Bank (ADB), *Poverty: Is it an Issue in the Pacific?*, March 2001.
- ADB, *Vanuatu: A. Assessment of Poverty and Hardship; B. Strategies for Equitable Growth and Hardship Alleviation*, Discussion Paper, Pacific Regional Department, October 2002.
- ADB, *Country Strategy and Programme Update – Tuvalu 2004-2006*, July 2003.
- ADB, *Millennium Development Goals in the Pacific: Relevance and Progress*, March 2003.
- ADB, *Development Indicators Reference Manual: Concepts and Definitions*, Economics and Research Department and Policy Research Division, November 2004.
- ADB, *Country Strategy and Programme Update – Samoa 2005-2006*, August 2004.
- ADB-Commonwealth Secretariat Joint Report to the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, *Toward a New Pacific Regionalism*, Manila, ADB, 2005.
- ADB, *Country Strategy and Programme Update – Vanuatu 2006-2009*, August 2006.
- ADB, *Asian Development Outlook 2006 Update*, 2006.
- Asian South Pacific Bureau of Adult Education, *Papua New Guinea*, retrieved from http://www.aspbae.org/PDF%20Files/PNG%20card.pdf, on 19/10/06.
- Asian South Pacific Bureau of Adult Education, *Solomon Islands*, retrieved from http://www.aspbae.org/PDF%20Files/solomon%20isl%20card.pdf, on 19/10/06.
- *Asia-Pacific News*, 5/12/06, "Troops Shut Down Media, Streets and Towns", retrieved from http://news.monstersandcritics.com/asiapacific/news/article_1229832.php/Troops_shut_down_media_streets_and_towns_Roundup_, on 9/12/06.
- *Asia-Pacific News*, 7/12/06, "New Fiji 'PM' Says Coup Illegal, Election Up to Two Years Away", retrieved from

http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/view/245775/1/.html, on the 13/12/06.

- *Asian-Pacific News*, 30/1/07, "Fiji Coup Leader Warns of Slow Return to Democracy", retrieved from http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/view/255512/1/.html, on 2/2/07.

- Australian National University (ANU) Enterprise P/L, Australia National University, *Solomon Islands People's Survey Pilot 2006*, 2006.

- Asofou So'o, Le'apai, Sinclair, Ruta-Fiti, Va'a,Unasa, Lameta, Sonny, *National Integrity Systems Transparency International Country Study Report: Samoa 2004*, Transparency International Australia 2004.

- AusAID, *Pacific Profiles 2003-2004*, Canberra, February 2004.

- AusAid, *Economic Impact of Natural Disasters on Development in the Pacific*, Vol. 1 Research Paper, May 2005.

- *Australian Broadcasting Corporation*, 24/10/06, "Howard Tries to Cool Escalating Melanesian Backlash", retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/october/10%2D24%2D01.htm, on the 4/11/06.

- Ausink, John, Baker, Pauline, "State Collapse and Ethnic Violence: Toward a Predictive Model", *Parameters*, Spring 1996, pp.19-31 (html format), retrieved from http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/96spring/baker.htm, on the 14/2/06.

- Australian Conservation Foundation (ASF), Centre for Environmental Law and Community Rights (CELCoR), *Bulldozing Progress: Human Rights Abuses and Corruption in Papua New Guinea's Large Scale Logging Industry*, July 2006.

- Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), *Country Fact Sheets,* Market Information and Analysis Section, 2006.

- DFAT, *Papua New Guinea Country Brief – November 2006*, retrieved from http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/png/png_brief.html, on the 7/12/06.

- DFAT, *Republic of the Fiji Islands Country Brief*, January 2007, retrieved from http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/fiji/fiji_brief.html, on 8/1/07

- DFAT, *Solomon Islands Country Brief – October 2006*, retrieved from http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/solomon_islands/solomon_islands_brief.html, on the 29/11/06

- DFAT, "Travel Advice: Papua New Guinea", retrieved from http://www.smartraveller.gov.au/zw-cgi/view/Advice/Papua_New_Guinea, on the 1/07/06.

- DFAT, "Travel Advice: Solomon Islands", retrieved from http://www.smartraveller.gov.au/zw-cgi/view/Advice/Solomon_Islands on the 1/07/06.

- Australian Government, *Transnational Terrorism: The Treat to Australia*, 2004.

- Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), *Beyond Bali: ASPI's Strategic Assessment 2002*, 2002.
- ASPI, *Our Failing Neighbour: Australia and the Future of the Solomon Islands*, June 2003.
- Baba, Tupeni, Field, Michael, Nabobo-Baba, Unaisi, *Speight of Violence: Inside Fiji's 2000 Coup*, Auckland: Reed Publishing, 2005.
- Baker, Pauline, *The Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST): An Analytical Model for Early Warning and Risk Assessment of Weak and Failing States*, Washington D.C.: Fund For Peace, 2006.
- *BBC News*, 11/09/06, retrieved from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/country_profiles/1300771.stm, on 1/09/06.
- Boeha, Beno, McFarlane, John (eds.), *Australia and Papua New Guinea and the Bilateral Relationship*, Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre, 2000.
- Boland, Stephen, Dollery, Brian, *The Economic Significance of Migration and Remittances in Tuvalu*, Working Paper No. 2005-10, University of New England School of Economics, 2005.
- Bore, Julia Daia, "State of Emergency in Troubled PNG Province Extended", *The National*, 18/10/06, retrieved from http://pidp.eastwestcenter.org/pireport/2006/October/10-19-13.htm, on the 2/11/06.
- Brown, Bruce, McGhie, Gerald, *New Zealand and the Pacific: Diplomacy, Defence, Development*, Papers presented at a seminar arranged by the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs (NZII) at Victoria University of Wellington, 19 July 2002.
- Brown, Malcolm, "Fears of Financial Collapse Grow in Isolated Fiji", *Sydney Morning Herald*, 9/12/06, retrieved from http://www.smh.com.au/news/world/fears-of-financial-collapse-grow-in-isolated-fiji/2006/12/08/1165081155111.html, on 13/12/06.
- Brown, Terry, "RAMSI Sniffing Closer to Solomons 'Big Fish'", *Solomon Star*, 31/1/05, retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2005/february/02%2D01%2Dcom.htm, on 22/3/06.
- Cain, Tess, Jowitt, Anita, *National Integrity Systems Transparency International Country Study Report: Vanuatu 2004*, Transparency International Australia.
- Capie, David, *Under the Gun: The Small Arms Challenge in the Pacific*, Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2003.
- Carment, David, "Assessing State Failure: Implications for Theory and Policy", *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 24, No.3, 2003, pp.407-427.
- Center for International Development and Conflict Management, "Polity IV Country Report: Papua New Guinea", *Minorities at Risk*, University of Maryland, 2003, retrieved from http://www.cicdm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/Png1.htm, on the 31/8/06.

- Central Bank of Solomon Islands (CBSI), *Annual Report 2005*, May 2006.
- Chesterfield, Nick, *West Papua Border Mission*, Security Assessment and Intelligence Profile, Free West Papua Campaign Pacific, May/June 2006.
- Chesterman, Simon, Ignatieff, Michael, Thakur, Ramesh (eds.), *Making States Work: State Failure and the Failure of Governance*, New York: United Nations University Press, 2005.
- Chung, Margaret, Hill, David, *Urban Informal Settlements in Vanuatu: Challenge for Equitable Development*, November 2002.
- *CIA World Factbook*, retrieved from http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook.html, on the 29/05/06.
- Collier, Paul, *Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and Their Implications for Policy*, Washington, DC: World Bank, 2000.
- Collier, Paul, *Natural Resources, Development and Conflict: Channels of Causation and Policy Interventions*, World Bank, April 2003.
- Connell, John, *The Migration of Skilled Health Personnel in the Pacific Region*, Manila: World Health Organisation, 2004.
- Connor, Walker, "Self Determination: The New Phase," *World Politics*, Vol. 20, Issue 1, October 1967, pp. 28-53.
- *Country Watch*, "Vanuatu: 2006 Country Review", retrieved from http://www.countrywatch.com on the 5/06/06.
- Cozens, Peter (ed.), *Engaging Oceania With Pacific Asia*, Wellington: Centre for Strategic Issues, 2004.
- Crawford, Beverly, Lipschutz, Ronnie (eds), *The Myth of Ethnic Conflict*, Berkeley, CA: University of Berkeley Press, 1999.
- Crocombe, Ron, *Pacific Neighbours: New Zealand's Relations with Other Pacific Islands*, Christchurch: Macmillan Brown Centre for Pacific Studies, 1992.
- Crocombe, Ron, *The South Pacific*, Suva: The University of the South Pacific, 2001.
- Davies, John, "Ethnic Competition and the Forging of the Nation-State of Fiji", *The Round Table*, Vol. 94, No.1, January 2005, pp.47-76.
- Davis, Graham, Tilton, John E., "The Resource Curse", *Natural Resources Forum*, Vol. 29, Issue 3, August 2005, pp.233-242.
- Dearth, Douglas, "Failed States: An International Conundrum", *Defense Intelligence Journal*, Vol. 5, 1996, pp.119-130.
- Dinnen, Sinclair, "Law Order and State in Papua New Guinea", *Society and Governance in Melanesia*, Discussion Paper No. 97/1, Canberra: Australian National University, 1997.
- Dixon, David, Small, Cathy, "Tonga: Migration and the Homeland", *Migration Information Source*, February 2004, retrieved from http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?ID=198, on the 15/9/06.

- Docquier, Frederic, *Brain Drain and Inequality Across Nations*, Paper prepared for conference on "Migrations and Development", Paris November 8 2006.
- Downing, Rowan, Heijkoop, Peter, Posner, Lawrence, Olsen, Norman, *Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands Annual Performance Report 2005/2006*, Performance Assessment Advisory Team, CAMRIS International, July 2006.
- Dupon, J-F., *Urban Growth versus the Environment in the Pacific Islands*, Noumea: South Pacific Regional Environment Programme, 1993.
- Durutalo, Alumita L, "Melanesia in Review: Issues and Events 2005 – Fiji", *The Contemporary Pacific*, Vol.18, No.2, 2006, pp. 396-399.
- Elections Office of Fiji, retrieved from http://www.elections.gov.fj/index.html, on the 6/8/06.
- Eminent Persons' Group Review of the Pacific Islands Forum, April 2004, retrieved from http://www.pacificplan.org/tiki-download_file.php/?fileId=41, on the 12/1/07.
- *Encarta World English Dictionary*, Microsoft Corporation, 2004.
- Europa World Online, *Economic Affairs (Fiji)*, London: Routledge. Massey University, retrieved from http://www.europaworld.om.ezprozy.massey.ac.nz/entry/fj.is.52, on the 7/12/06.
- Europa, World Online, *Economic Affairs (Papua New Guinea)*, London: Routledge, Massey University, retrieved from http://www.europaworld.com.ezproxy.massey.ac.nz/entry/pg.is.67, on the 7/12/06.
- Europa World Online, *Economic Affairs (Samoa)*, London: Routledge. Massey University, retrieved from http://www.europaworld.com.ezproxy.massey.ac.nz/entry/ws.is.33, on the 15/9/06.
- Europa World Online, *Economic Affairs (Solomon Islands)*, London: Routledge, Massey University, retrieved from http://www.europaworld.com.ezproxy.massey.ac.nz/entry/sb.is.39, on the 15/9/06.
- Europa World Online, *Economic Affairs* (Tonga), London: Routledge. Massey University, retrieved from http://www.europaworld.com.ezproxy.massey.ac.nz/entry/to.is.36, on the 12/9/06.
- Europa World Online, *Economic Affairs (Tuvalu)*, London: Routledge. Massey University, retrieved from http://www.europaworld.com.ezproxy.massey.ac.nz/entry/tv.is.29, on the 12/9/06.
- Europa World Online, *Economic Affairs (Vanuatu)*, London: Routledge. Massey University, retrieved from http://www.europaworld.com.ezproxy.massey.ac.nz/entry/vu.is.44, on the 12/9/06.

- External Assessment Bureau, *Strategic Assessment 2000*, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Wellington, 2000.
- Faiparick, Clifford, "PNG Police Try to Head Off Tribal War", *The National*, 22/11/03, retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2003/october/10%2D23%2D16.htm, on 10/8/06.
- Feizkhah, Elizabeth, "Ice: From Gang to Bust", *Time*, 21/6/04, retrieved from http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,501040628-655460.html, on the 21/2/07.
- Fickling, David, "Raskol Gangs Rule World's Worst City", *The Guardian*, 22/9/04, retrieved from http://www.guardian.co.uk/population/Story/0,,1309839,00.html, on 3/11/06.
- Field, Michael, "Asian Communities Face Backlash in Pacific", *Islands Business Magazine*, 22/5/06, retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/june/06%2D01%2Dcom.htm, on 1/9/06.
- Fiji Government, Press Statement of Commodore Voreqe Bainimarama, 5/12/06, Suva, Fiji, retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/december/12%2D12%2Dst1.htm, on 13/1/07.
- Fiji Government, *Progress Report on Implementation of Affirmative Action Programmes Under the Social Justice Act: 2002-2003*, Suva, 2003.
- Fiji Government, *Strategic Development Plan 2007-2011*, Suva, 2006.
- Fiji Government Online Portal, 31/8/05, "Affirmative Action Addressing Education Inequality", retrieved from http://www.fiji.gov.fj/publish/page_5309.shtml, on the 18/7/06.
- Fiji Government Online Portal, "Commodore Bainimarama's Acceptance Speech as Interim Prime Minister", 6/1/07, retrieved from http://www.fiji.gov.fj/publish/page_8177.shtml, on 13/1/07.
- Fiji Islands Bureau of Statistics, "Urban Household Income and Expenditure Survey 2002/3", *Statistical News,* No.70, 18/12/03; Solomon Islands Statistics Office Department of Finance and Treasury, *Household Income and Expenditure Survey 2005/6 National Report*, September 2006.
- *Fiji Live* (Suva), 7/2/06, "Fiji Military Plan March to Boost Tourism", retrieved from http://pidp.eastwestcenter.org/pireport/2007/February/02-08-fj03.htm, on 8/2/06.
- *Fiji Live* (Suva), 19/11/06, "No Need For Coup, Just "Clean –Up": Bainimarama", retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/november/11%2D20%2D07.htm, on 22/11/06.

- *Fiji Times* (Suva), 15/3/05, "Chief Killed in Fishing Grounds Dispute", retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2005/march/03%2D16%2D15.htm, on the 10/8/06.
- *Fiji Times* (Suva), 27/3/05, retrieved from http://www.christianaggression.org/item_display.php?type=NEWS&id=1112408217, on the 10/8/06.
- *Fiji Times* (Suva), 29/6/06, "Fiji School Kids Bear Brunt of Land Disputes", retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/june/06%2D30%2Ded2.htm, on the 10/8/06.
- *Fiji Times* (Suva), 27/11/06 "Fiji Fails to Extricate Soldiers From Bougainville", retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/november/11%2D28%2D02.htm, on 8/12/06;
- *Fiji Times* (Suva), 7/12/06, "Military Says No More Interference With Media", retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/december/12%2D07%2D01d.htm, on 9/12/06.
- Finin, Gerard, Wesley-Smith, Terence, "Crises and Conflicts: The Pacific Way?", *East-West Center Working* Papers, Honolulu: East-West Center, 2000.
- Firth, Stewart, "The Pacific Islands and the Globalization Agenda", *The Contemporary Pacific*, Vol. 12, No. 1, Spring 2000, pp.178-192.
- Firth, Stewart, "A Reflection on South Pacific Regional Security, mid-2000 to mid-2001", *The Journal of Pacific History*, Vol.36, No.3, 2001, pp. 277-283.
- Fonua, Pesi, "The Rule of the Mob", *Matangi Tonga*, 28/11/06, retrieved from http://www.matangitonga.to/article/rul_mob281106.shtml, on the 30/11/06.
- Fortune, Kate, Lal, Brij V (eds.), *The Pacific Islands: An Encyclopedia*, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000.
- Fraenkel, Jon, "The Coming Anarchy in Oceania? A Critique of 'Africanisation' of the South Pacific Thesis", *USPEC Working Paper*, Fiji: The University of the South Pacific Economics Department, No. 2003/2, February 2003.
- Fraenkel, Jon, *The Manipulation of Custom: From Freedom to Intervention in the Solomon Islands*, Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2004a.
- Fraenkel, Jon, "Political Instability, 'Failed States' and Regional Intervention in the Pacific?", Paper presented at *Redefining the Pacific: Regionalism: Past, Present and Future, University of Otago*, 25th-28th June 2004b.

- Fraenkel, Jon, "Political Consequences of Pacific Island Electoral Laws", *State, Society and Governance in Melanesia: Discussion Paper*, Canberra: Australian National University, 2005.
- Freedom House, *Freedom House: Freedom in the World – Country Reports (2006)*, retrieved from http://freedomhouse.org/inc/content/pubs/fiw/inc_country_detail.cfm, on the 25/10/06.
- Freedom House, *Freedom House: Freedom of the Press – Country Reports (2006)*, retrieved from http://freedomhouse.org/inc/content/pubs/pfs/inc_country_detail.cfm, on the 25/10/06.
- Freedom House, "Freedom in the World: Papua New Guinea Overview (2005)", retrieved from www.freedomhouse.org/inc/content/pubs/fiw/inc_country_detail on 31/8/06.
- Freedom House, "Freedom in the World: Vanuatu Overview (2005)" retrieved from www.freedomhouse.org/inc/content/pubs/fiw/inc_country_detail on 31/8/06.
- Fry, Greg, "South Pacific Security and Global Change: The New Agenda", *Department of International Relations: Working Papers*, Canberra: Department of International Relations, 1999.
- Fund for Peace, *Failed States Index 2006*, http://www.fundforpeace.org/programs/fsi/fsindex2006.php, on 12/9/06.
- Gigmai, Freddy, "PNG Landowners Threaten to Block Gas Pipeline Project", *The National*, 17/7/06, retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/july/07%2D18%2D06.htm, on the 10/8/06.
- Gigmai, Freddy, "Tribal Skirmish Halts Port Moresby Transit", *The National*, 18/8/06, retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/august/08%2D21%2D05.htm, on the 2/11/06.
- Gounder, Rukmani, "Fiji's Economic Growth Impediments: Institutions, Policies and Coups", *Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy*, Vol. 9, No. 3, 2004, pp. 301-324.
- Goddard, Micael, "The Rascal Road: Crime Prestige and Development in Papua New Guinea," *Contemporary Pacific*, Vol. 7 No. 1, 1995, pp. 55-80.
- Gregory, Angela, "People of Tuvalu Face Uphill Battle", *The New Zealand Herald*, 8/10/05, retrieved from http://www.nzherald.co.nz/location/story.cfm?l_id=500604&ObjectID=10349195 on the 7/8/06.
- Gregory, Angela, "Bachelor King Inherits Nation Thirsting for Change", *New Zealand Herald*, 12/09/06, retrieved from

http://subs.nzherald.co.nz/search/story.cfm?storyid=00023A52-4394-1505-8CCC83027AF1010E on the 3/10/06.

- Gregory, Angela, "Democracy on the Boil", *New Zealand Herald*, 16/09/06, retrieved from http://subs.nzherald.co.nz/search/story.cfm?storyid=000A3306-74F5-150A-948683027AF1010F, on the 3/10/06.

- Gros, Jean-Germain, "Failed States in the New World Order: Decaying Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda and Haiti", *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 17, No. 3, 1996, pp. 455-471.

- Gumuno, James Apa, "PNG Provincial Officials Face Uncertain Arrest Over Funds", *The National*, 8/2/06, retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/february/02%2D09%2D21.htm, on 25/10/06.

- Gumuno, James Apa, "Five Dead, Villages Destroyed in PNG Tribal War", *The National*, 6/4/06, retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/april/04%2D10%2D17.htm, on the 10/8/06.

- Gumuno, James Apa, "Tribal Fighting 'Zone' Declared in PNG", *The National*, 20/4/06, retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/april/04%2D21%2D11.htm, on the 10/08/06.

- Gurr, Ted (ed), *Handbook of Political Conflict: Theory and Research*, New York: The Free Press, 1980.

- Heijmans, Annelies, Simmonds, Nicola, van de Veen, Hans (eds.), *Searching for Peace in Asia Pacific: An Overview of Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities*, Lynne Rienner Publishing: London/Boulder.

- Helman, Gerald, Ratner, Steven, "Saving Failed States", *Foreign Policy*, No. 89, Winter 1992-1993, pp. 3-20.

- Henderson, John, Watson, Greg (ed.) *Securing a Peaceful Pacific*, Christchurch: Canterbury University Press, 2005.

- Herbst, Jeffrey, "Responding to State Failure in Africa", *International Security*, Vol.21, No.3, pp120-144.

- Heywood, Andrew, *Politics*, London: Macmillan Press, 1997.

- Hoadley, Stephen, "Pacific Island Security Management by New Zealand and Australia: Towards a New Paradigm", *Working Paper 20/05*, Wellington: Centre for Strategic Studies, 2005.

- Holm, Hans-Henrick, "The Responsibility that will not go away: Weak States in the International System", paper presented at the Failed States Conference, Purdue University, West Lafayette, 25-27 February 1998.

- Hughes, Helen, Sodhi, Gaurav, "Annals of Aid: Vanuatu and the United States Millennium Challenge Corporation" *Issue Analysis*, Centre for Independent Studies, No.69, 5th April 2006.

- Hunter, John, *A Note on Relative Sea Change at Funafuti, Tuvalu*, Antarctic Cooperative Research Centre, Tasmania, 2002.

207

- Human Rights Watch, *Still Making Their Own Rules: Ongoing Impunity for Police Beatings, Rape and Torture in Papua New Guinea*, Vol. 18, No. 13, 2006, retrieved from http://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/png1006/1.htm#_Toc149536898 on the 2/11/06.
- International Federation of Journalists, "Crackdown on Press Freedom in Fiji Coup", *News Release*, 6/12/06, retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/december/12%2D07%2Drel1.htm, on 9/12/06.
- International Monetary Fund, *Solomon Islands: 2005 Article IV Consultation – Staff Report; and Public Information Notice on the Executive Board Discussion*, IMF Country Report No. 05/365 2005.
- Jackson, Michael (ed.), *Global Issues 02/03*, Connecticut: McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 2002.
- Jackson, Robert, *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
- James, Kerry, Tufui, Taniela, *National Integrity Systems Transparency International Country Study Report: Tonga 2004*, Transparency International Australia.
- Januszeska, Katherine, Nagel, Quillan, Qureshy, Shauna, Schwartz, Toby, *Papua New Guinea Risk Assessment Brief*, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, February 2006.
- *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment: Oceania*, Issue No. 8, Surrey: Jane's Information Group Limited, 2005.
- Jowitt, Anita, "Melanesia in Review: Issues and Events 2005 – Vanuatu", *The Contemporary Pacific*, Vol.18, No.2, 2006, pp. 430-438.
- Tarcisius Tara Kabutaulaka, "Australian Foreign Policy and the RAMSI Intervention in Solomon Islands", Vol. 17, No.2, 2005, pp.283-308.
- Kabutaulaka, Tarcisius Tara, "Melanesia in Review: Issues and Events 2005 – Solomon Islands", *The Contemporary Pacific*, Vol. 18, No.2, 2006, pp. 423-430.
- Kabutaulaka, Tarcisius Tara, "Fiji Coup: Things Fall Apart", *Pacific Islands Report,* 10/1/06, retrieved from http://pid.eastwestcentre.org/pireport/2007/January/01-10-comm1.htm, on the 17/1/07.
- Kampmark, Binoy, "The Solomon Islands: The Limits of Intervention", *New Zealand International Review*, Vol. 28, Issue 6, November/December 2003, pp.6-9.
- Kaplan, Robert, "The Coming Anarchy", *The Atlantic Monthly*, February 1994.
- Kaufmann, Daniel, Kraay, Aart, Mastruzzi, Massimo, *Governance Matters IV: Governance Indicators for 1996-2004*, Washington DC: World Bank, 2005.

- King, Gary, Zeng, Langche, "Improving State Forecasts of State Failure," *World Politics*, Vol. 53, July 2001, pp.623-658.
- Knight, K. D., "Statement on the Counting and the Electoral Process as a Whole", *Commonwealth Observer Group Fiji Islands General Election May 2006*, 19 May 2006, retrieved from http://www.thecommonwealth.org/document/151556/fiji_islands_general_election_may_2006__statement.htm, on the 4/10/06.
- Korimbao, Daniel, "Guns Threat to 2007 PNG Elections", *The National*, 16/6/06, retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/june/06%2D19%2D09.htm, on the 10/8/06.
- Korimbao, Daniel, "PNG Literacy, 56 Percent, Losing Ground", *The National*, 13/9/06, retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/september/09%2D14%2D14.htm, on 19/10/06.
- Korugl, Peter, "Angry PNG Villagers Threaten Lae Over Killing", *The National*, 4/10/06, retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/october/10%2D05%2D11.htm, on the 2/11/06.
- Kwalea, Nancy, Lockley, Anne, Maclellan, Nic, Metz, Forrest, Powles, Anna, Roughan, Paul, *Bridging the Gap Between State and Society: New Directions for the Solomon Islands*, Oxfam International Solomon Islands Office, July 2006.
- Lal, Brij V., "Chiefs and thieves and Other People Besides: The Making of George Speight's Coup", *Journal of Pacific History*, Vol. 35, No. 3, December 2000, pp. 281-293.
- Lal, Brij V., *Islands of Turmoil: Elections and Politics in Fiji*, Canberra: Australia National University E Press and Asia Pacific Press, 2006.
- Larmour, Peter, "Westminster in the Pacific: A 'Policy Transfer' Approach", *State, Society and Governance in Melanesia: Discussion Paper*, Canberra: Australian National University, 2001.
- Larmour, Peter, Barcham, Manuhuia, "National Integrity Systems in Small Pacific Island States", *Policy and Governance Discussion Papers*, Canberra: Australian National University, 2005.
- Laukai, Aloysius, "Bougainville to Use Force to Flush Out Musingku", *The National*, 12/5/06, retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/may/05%2D15%2D05.htm, 2/11/06.
- LeBrun, Emile, Muggah, Robert, *Silencing Guns: Local Perspectives on Small Arms and Armed Violence in Rural Pacific Island Communities*, Occasional Paper 15, Geneva: Small Arms Survey, June 2005.
- Lockwood, Victoria (ed.), *Globalisation and Culture Change in the Pacific Islands*, New Jersey: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2004.

- Maclellan, Nic, *Australia Policy Online*, March 2006, retrieved from http://westpapuaaction.buz.org/the-article-archives/Refugees%2006.htm, on the 8/10/06.
- Maclellan, Nic, Mares, Peter, *Remittances and Labour Mobility in the Pacific*, Working Paper, Pacific Labour and Australian Horticultural Project, Institute for Social Research, Swinburne University of Technology, 2006.
- Mamu, Moffat, "Solomon Islands get 'F' on Education Program", *The Solomon Star*, 18/7/05, retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2005/july/07%2D19%2D15.htm, on 19/10/06.
- Manning, Mike, Windybank, Susan, "Papua New Guinea on the Brink", *Issue Analysis*, Centre for Independent Studies, No.30, 12 March 2003.
- Manning, Michael, "Papua New Guinea Thirty Years On", *Pacific Economic Bulletin*, Vol. 20, No. 1, May 2005, pp. 145-158.
- Marshall, Steve, "Australia Threatens to Pull Solomons, PNG Aid", *Australian Broadcasting Corporation*, 16/10/06, retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/october/10%2D17%2D02.htm, on the 1/12/06.
- *Matangi Tonga Online*, 5/12/06, "Over 400 Suspects Charged in Nuku'alofa CBD Destruction", retrieved from http://www.matangitonga.to/article/tonganews/crime/suspects011206.shtml, on 13/12/06.
- *Matangi Tonga Online*, 6/12/06, "New Tally: $60 Million Damage in Tonga Riot", retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/december/12%2D07%2D02.htm, on 13/12/06.
- May, Ron, *The Changing Role of the Military in Papua New Guinea*, Australian National University: Canberra, 1993.
- May, Ron, *A Brief Overview of Pacific Security Issues*, SSGM Conference Papers, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, paper presented at the *National Security Workshop*, Port Vila, 30 March-1 April, 2004.
- McCusker, Rob, "Transnational Crime in the Pacific Islands: Real or Apparent Danger?", *Trends and Issues in Crime and Justice*, No. 308, March 2006.
- McLean, Denis (ed.), *Solomon Islands—Report of a Study Group*, Wellington: New Zealand Institute of Affairs, 2001.
- McMurray, Christine, *Morbidity and Mortality Patterns in the Pacific*, Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, Seminar on Emerging Issues of Health and Mortality, 27-29 September 2004.
- Mehlum, Halvor, Moene, Karl, Torvik, Ragnar, *Institutions and the Resource Curse*, March 2005.

- Ministerial Review Team, *Towards Excellence in Aid Delivery: A Review of New Zealand's Official Development Assistance Programme*, March 2001.
- Ministry of Defence (MOD), *The Government's Defence Policy Framework*, June 2000.
- MOD, *Maritime Forces Review: Key Findings*, January 2002a.
- MOD, *New Zealand and the Pacific Islands: Security through Partnership – Review of New Zealand's Pacific Defence and Security Policy*, March 2002b (Unpublished).
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT), *Republic of the Fiji Islands*, retrieved from http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Countries/Pacific/Fiji.php, on 8/1/06.
- MFAT, *Papua New Guinea*, retrieved from http://www.safetravel.govt.nz/countries/png.shtml, on the 1/07/06.
- Ministry of Natural Resources, *Forestry Department Audit Report*, 2nd March 2005.
- Morgan, Michael, McLeod, Abby, "Have We Failed Our Neighbour?", *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 60, No.3, 2006, pp. 412-428.
- Naivaluwaqa, Amelina, "Indigenous Fijians Dominate Squatters", *Fiji Sun*, 13/3/05, retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2005/march/03%2D14%2D10.htm, on the 10/8/06.
- *The National* (Port Moresby), 28/1/02, "96 Homes Gutted in Lae Evictions", retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2002/january/01%2D29%2D04.htm, on the 3/06/06.
- *The National* (Port Moresby), 8/9/03, "PNG Urban, Total Population to Double by 2030", retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2003/september/09%2D08%2D18.htm, on the 3/06/06.
- *The National* (Port Moresby), 24/5/05, retrieved from http://www.thenational.com.pg/0527/column3.htm, on the 7/7/06.
- *The National* (Port Moresby), 30/3/05, "PNG Urban Squatters Breed Crime", retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2005/march/03%2D31%2Ded2.htm, on the 4/06/06.
- *The National* (Port Moresby), 11/4/05, "Armed Thugs Rule PNG Highlands Highway", retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2005/april/04%2D12%2Ded1.htm, on 1/7/06.
- *The National* (Port Moresby), 2/11/05, "PNG Police Robbed School Before Shootings", retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2005/november/11%2D03%2D01.htm, on the 29/9/06.

- *The National* (Port Moresby), 15/5/06, "Bougainville Leaders Wary of Musingku Faceoff", retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/may/05%2D16%2D03.htm, on 2/11/06.
- *The National* (Port Moresby), 19/6/06, "PNG Tribe Seeks $39 Million Compensation", retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/june/06%2D20%2D16.htm, on the 10/8/06.
- *The National* (Port Moresby), 10/8/06, "State of Emergency in PNG to Last To More Months",retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/august/08%2D10%2D19.htm, on 2/1106.
- *The National* (Port Moresby), 28/8/06, "Tribal Violence Resumes In PNG's Capital", retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/august/08%2D28%2D10.htm, on the 2/11/06.
- *The National* (Port Moresby), 30/11/06, "Musingku Henchmen Surrender in Bougainville", retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/december/12%2D01%2D04. htm, on 8/12/06.
- *Nationmaster*, "Total Crime per Capita" Retrieved from http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/cri_tot_cri_percap-crime-total-crimes-per-capita, 3/11/06.
- *Newswire*, 5/12/06, "NZ, Aussie Reject Qarase Plea For Troops", retrieved from http://www.newswire.co.nz/main/viewstory.aspx?storyid=349759&cat id=0&m=print, on the 2/2/07.
- *New Zealand Herald* (Auckland), 25/08/05, retrieved from http://www.nzherald.co.nz/location/story.cfm?l_id=104&ObjectID=10 342371 on the 1/09/06.
- *New Zealand Herald* (Auckland), 05/09/05, retrieved from http://www.nzherald.co.nz/location/story.cfm?l_id=104&ObjectID=10 344017 on the 1/09/06.
- *New Zealand Herald* (Auckland), 06/09/05, retrieved from http://www.nzherald.co.nz/location/story.cfm?l_id=104&ObjectID=10 344297 on the 1/09/06.
- *New Zealand Herald* (Auckland), 1/11/06, "Fiji Military Refuses to Sack Commander", retrieved from http://subs.nzherald.co.nz/section/2/story.cfm?c_id=2&objectid=1040 8604, on 22/11/06.
- Nicholson, Michael, "Failing States, Failing Systems", paper presented at the Failed States Conference *Failed States and International Security: Causes, Prospects and Consequences*, Purdue University, West Lafayette, 25-27 February 1998.

- Nita, Albert, *Papua New Guinea National Assessment Report*, prepared for United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Commission for Social Development, New York, June 2006.
- NZAID, *Preventing Conflict and Building Peace*, October 2004a.
- NZAID, *The Pacific: Factsheet*, October 2004b.
- NZAID, *Fiji Coup: Sanctions*, retrieved from http://www.nzaid.govt.nz/programmes/c-fiji.html, on 13/12/06.
- Olaks Consulting Services, *National Integrity Systems Country Study Report: Fiji 2001*, Transparency International Fiji.
- Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), retrieved from http://www.oecd.org/countrylist/0,2578,en_2649_34447_25602317_1_1_1_1,00.html, on 12/10/06.
- Ozden, Caglar, Maurice Schiff, *International Migration, Remittances, and the Brain Drain*, Washington: World Bank and Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.
- *Pacific Fish,* February 2006, retrieved from http://www.ecsiep.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=578&Itemid=64, on the 4/06/06.
- Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, *The Pacific Plan for Strengthening Regional Cooperation and Integration*, October 2005.
- *Pacific Islands Report*, 22/02/05, "Chinese Mafia Infiltrate PNG Police", retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2005/february/02%2D22%2D03.htm on the 12/09/06.
- *Pacific Island Report*, 17/7/06, retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/july/07%2D17%2D10.htm on 10/8/06.
- *Pacific Magazine*, "Pacific Almanac", retrieved from http://www.pacificislands.cc/almanac/profile/18, on the 1/09/06.
- *Pacific Magazine*, 11/4/03, "PNG: Government Makes Land Available For Madang Settlers", retrieved from http://www.pacificmagazine.net/news/2003/04/11/papua-new-guinea-government-makes-land-available-for-madang-settlers, on 3/6/06.
- *Pacific Magazine*, 28/10/03, "Fiji: Airports Chief Says Corruption Rife", retrieved from http://www.pacificmagazine.net/news/2003/10/28/fiji-airports-chief-says-corruption-rife, on 12/09/06.
- *Pacific Magazine*, 4/11/03, "Fiji: Dollar a Day Squatters in Suva", retrieved from http://www.pacificislands.cc/news/2003/11/14/fiji-dollar-a-day-squatters-in-suva, on 10/8/06.
- *Pacific Magazine*, 15/06/04, "Solomon Islands: Research Highlights Corruption at Crisis Point", retrieved from http://www.pacificmagazine.net/news/2004/06/15/solomon-islands-research-highlights-corruption-at-crisis-point, on 12/09/06.

213

- *Pacific Magazine*, 7/2/05, "PNG: Allegations of Corruption in Attorney General's Office", retrieved from http://www.pacificmagazine.net/news/2005/02/07/png-allegations-of-corruption-in-attorney-generals-office, on 11/9/06.
- *Pacific Magazine*, 10/5/05, "PNG: Claim Quarter-Billion Lost Through Corruption", retrieved from http://www.pacificmagazine.net/news/2005/05/10/png-claim-quarter-billion-lost-through-corruption , on 12/09/06.
- *Pacific Magazine*, 06/06/05, "Solomon Islands: Millions Lost Through Bad Management, Fraud and Corruption", retrieved from http://www.pacificmagazine.net/news/2005/06/06/solomon-islands-millions-lost-through-bad-management-fraud-and-corruption , on 12/09/06.
- *Pacific Magazine*, 10/08/05, "Tonga: Customs Corruption Alleged by NZ Inquiry", retrieved from http://www.pacificmagazine.net/news/2005/08/10/tonga-customs-corruption-alleged-by-nz-inquiry, on 12/09/06.
- *Pacific Magazine*, 13/09/05, "Vanuatu: Mismanagement and Corruption Mounting-TI", retrieved from http://www.pacificmagazine.net/news/2005/09/13/vanuatu-mismanagement-and-corruption-mounting-ti , on 12/09/06.
- *Pacific Magazine*, 28/09/05, "PNG: Public Servants 'Real Culprits' In Corruption", retrieved from http://www.pacificmagazine.net/news/2005/09/28/png-public-servants-real-culprits-in-corruption, on 12/09/06.
- *Pacific Magazine*, 19/10/05, "Fiji: Listed on Global Index of Corruption", retrieved from http://www.pacificmagazine.net/news/2005/10/19/fiji-listed-on-global-index-of-corruption , on 12/09/06.
- Papua New Guinea Government, *Poverty Reduction Analysis*, Law and Justice Sector Program, Canberra: Independent State of Papua New Guinea, with the Government of Australia (AusAID), January 2004.
- Patel, Samir, "A Sinking Feeling", *Nature*, Vol. 440, April 2006, pp. 734-736.
- *Peace Movement Aoteroa*,"Pacific Leaders Push Island Worries at World Food Summit", 13/6/02, retrieved from http://www.converge.org.nz/pma/cra0576.htm, on the 20/10/06.
- Peake, Gordon, Studdard Brown, Kaysie, "Policebuilding: The International Deployment Group in the Solomon Islands", *International Peacekepping*, Vol. 12, No, 4, Winter 2005, pp.520-532.
- Phare, Jane, "The Madness of King George of Tonga", *New Zealand Herald*, 17/9/06, retrieved from http://subs.nzherald.co.nz/search/story.cfm?storyid=0004F582-CA59-150C-B58B83027AF1010E, on the 3/10/06.
- Phillpot, Robert, Reilly, Ben, "'Making Democracy Work' in Papua New Guinea: Social Capital and Provincial Development in an

Ethnically Fragmented Society", *Asian Survey*, Vol. XLII, No. 6, 2002, pp. 906-927.

- *PNG Post-Courier* (Port Moresby), 11/8/02, "Poll Frustrations Lead to Calls for Secession", retrieved from http://www.postcourier.com.pg/20020809/news02, on 2/11/06.

- *PNG Post Courier* (Port Moresby), 19/5/05, retrieved from http://www.postcourier.com.pg/20050519/pacific01.htm, on the 20/11/06.

- *PNG Post-Courier* (Port Moresby), 27/5/05, "Tribal War Takes Heavy Toll in PNG Province", retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2005/april/04-27-06.htm, on the 5/09/06.

- *PNG Post-Courier* (Port Moresby), 5/1/06, "Tribal Feuds Claim 16 in Papua New Guinea", retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/january/01%2D05%2D12.htm, on the 10/8/06.

- *PNG Post-Courier* (Port Moresby), 30/1/06, "Brain Drain from Gov't", retrieved from http://www.postcourier.com.pg/20060131/tuhome.htm on the 12/6/06.

- *PNG Post-Courier* (Port Moresby), 31/1/06, "Highlands Man Chopped up in PNG Tribal Feud", retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/january/01%2D31%2D20.htm, on the 10/8/06.

- *PNG Post*-Courier (Port Moresby), 31/1/06, "Porgera Gold Mine in PNG Stymied By Vandals", retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/february/02%2D01%2D08.htm, on the 10/8/06.

- *PNG Post-Courier* (Port Moresby), 13/04/06, "Landowners Force Closure of Newly Opened PNG Mine", retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/april/04%2D14%2D12.htm, on the 10/8/06.

- *PNG Post-Courier* (Port Moresby), 9/6/06, "Corruption 'Rampant' in PNG's East Sepik", retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/june/06%2D12%2D19.htm, on 25/10/06.

- *PNG Post-Courier* (Port Moresby), 9/8/06, "Power Restored at Hijacked PNG Station", retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/august/08%2D09%2D05.htm, on the 10/8/06.

- *PNG Post-Courier* (Port Moresby), 19/10/06, "PNG Southern Highlands a 'Jungle of Corruption'", retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/october/10%2D20%2D10.htm, on 25/10/06

- *PNG Post-Courier* (Port Moresby), 22/11/06, "PNG Conman Musingku Shot By Freedom Fighters", retrieved from

http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/november/11%2D23%2D01. htm, 29/11/06.

- Poirine, Bernard, *Two Essays on Aid and Remittances*, Pacific Studies Monograph 19, University of New South Wales, Sydney, 1995.
- Poirine, Bernard, "Should We Hate or Love MIRAB?", *The Contemporary Pacific*, Vol.10, No.1, 1998, pp.65-105.
- *Political Corruption*, retrieved from www.transparency.org/global_priorities 12/09/06.
- Posen, Barry, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict", *Survival*, No.1 Spring 1993, pp. 27-47.
- *Radio New Zealand*, 10/6/04, "Fiji Drug Bust Raids Net 13 Suspects Across Region", retrieved from http://www.rnzi.com/pages/news.php?op=read&id=10452, on the 21/2/07.
- *Radio New Zealand*, 21/11/06, "Employer says Tonga Riots were Designed to Wipe Out Traders", retrieved from http://www.radionz.co.nz/news/latest/200611211341/employer_says_t onga_riots_were_designed_to_wipe_out_traders, on the 4/12/06.
- Ray, Binayak, *South Pacific Least Developing Countries: Towards Positive Independence*, Kolkata: Progressive Publishers, 2003.
- Reilly, Ben, "The Africanisation of the South Pacific", *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 54, No.3, 2000a, pp. 261-8.
- Reilly, Ben, "Democracy, Ethnic Fragmentation, and Internal Conflict: Confused Theories, Faulty Data, and the 'Crucial Case' of Papua New Guinea", *International Security*, Vol. 25, No.3, 2000b, pp.162-185.
- Reilly, Ben, "'A Reflection on South Pacific Regional Security': A Rejoinder", *The Journal of Pacific History*, Vol.37, No.3, 2002a, p.323-324.
- Reilly, Ben, "Internal Conflict and Regional Security in Asia and the Pacific", *Pacifica Review*, Vol.14, No.1, 2002b, pp. 7-21.
- Reilly, Ben, "Ethnicity, Democracy and Development in Papua New Guinea", *Pacific Economic Bulletin*, Vol. 19, No.1, 2004a, pp.46-54.
- Reilly, Ben, "State Functioning and State Failure in the South Pacific", *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 58, No.4, 2004b, pp. 479-493.
- Robertson, Robbie, *Regionalism in the Pacific: A New Development Strategy*, 2005, retrieved from www.usp.ac.fj/fileadmin/files/Institutes/piasdg/dev_studies/papers/rob ertson_regionalism_pacific.pdf, on the 7/1/07.
- Robertson, Robbie, *Forum Metropolitan Countries and Regionalism in Oceania*, Paper presented at the Second Oceanic Conference on International Studies, 5-7 July 2006.
- Rolfe, Jim, "Peacekeeping the Pacific Way in Bougainville", *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 8, No. 4, Winter, 2001, pp.38-55.

- Rolfe, Jim, Shibuya, Eric, *Security In Oceania In The 21st Century*, Honolulu: Asia-Pacific Centre for Security Studies, 2003.
- Rotberg, Robert (a) (ed), *State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror*, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2003.
- Rotberg, Robert (b), *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences*, John F. Kennedy School of Government, September 24th 2003, retrieved from http://web.mit.edu/ssp/seminars/wed_archives_03fall/rotberg.htm on 11/05/06.
- Rowley, John, "Population Pressure", *Microsoft Encarta Encyclopedia Standard 2005*, Redmond: Microsoft Corporation, 2005.
- Samisoni, Meri, "The Case for Affirmative Action", *Fiji Times*, 19/1/07, retrieved from http://www.fijitimes.com/story.aspx?ref=archive&id=55477, on 24/1/07.
  Secretariat of The Pacific Community, *Addressing the Youth Challenge – From the Pacific Youth Charter to Implementation: A Coordinated Approach*, Thirty-Sixth Meeting of the Committee of Representatives of Governments and Administrations, Noumea, New Caledonia, 13-17 November 2006.
- Sevele, Feleti V, Press release from Tonga's first commoner appointed Prime Minister: *Government's Roadmap for Political Reform*, Government of the Kingdom of Tonga, 23rd October 2006, retrieved from http://www.pmo.gov.to/artman/publish/article_196.shtml, on the 29/10/06.
- Sharma, K. L., *Food Security in the South Pacific Island Countries with Special Reference to the Fiji Islands*, Research Paper 2006/68, United Nations University, June 2006.
- Sharma, Siddharta, "Resettling Fiji Squatters Would Cost $144 Million", *Fiji Sun*, 20/6/06, retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/july/07%2D21%2D17.htm, on 28/6/06.
- *Solomon Islands Broadcasting Corporation (SIBC)*, "Solomons Group Says Too Many Logging Permits", 15/06/06, retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/june/06%2D16%2D19.htm, on 30/06/06.
- Solomon Islands Statistics Office Department of Finance and Treasury, *Household Income and Expenditure Survey 2005/6 – National Report*, Honiara, September 2006.
- *Solomon Star* (Honiara), 6/6/05, retrieved from http://www.solomonstarnews.com/?q=node/3022, on the 20/11/06.
- *Solomon Star* (Honiara), 12/1/06, "Makira Protest Shines New Light on Solomons Logging", retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/january/01%2D13%2Ded1.htm, on 30/06/06.

- *Solomon Star* (Honiara), 12/7/06, "Malaita Outer Islands Want to Secede from SI", retrieved from http://www.solomonstarnews.com/?q=node/9187, on 17/8/06.
- *Solomon Star* (Honiara), 16/11/06, retrieved from http://www.solomonstarnews.com/?q=node/11489 on the 20/11/06.
- South Pacific Applied Geoscience Commission (SOPAC) *Current Issues Summaries* at http://www.sopac.org/tiki/tiki-index.php.
- SOPAC, *Environmental Vulnerability Index*, 2005, retrieved from http://www.vulnerabilityindex.net/EVI%20Country%20Profiles/TV.pdf, on the 8/10/06.
- *St. Petersburg Times Online*, 23/4/06, retrieved from http://www.sptimes.com/2006/04/23/Worldandnation/Chinese_refugees_flow.shtml, on the 8/10/06.
- Statistics New Zealand, Overseas Trade Statistics for December 2006, retrieved from http://www.stats.govt.nz/products-and-services/ext-trade-stats/default.htm, on 21/1/07.
- *Sydney Morning Herald* (Sydney), 14/1/03, "The Ships that Died of Shame", retrieved from http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/01/13/1041990234408.html, on 18/9/06.
- Taafaki, Tauaasa, *National Integrity Systems Transparency International Country Study Report: Tuvalu 2004*, Transparency International Australia 2004.
- Taomia, Fakavae, *Remittances and Development in Tuvalu*, Employment Labour Market Studies Programme, University of the South Pacific, 2006.
- Tofua'ipangai, Siosiua Lafitani, "Finger Pointers Should Resign From Politics", *Matangi Tonga*, 29/11/06, retrieved from http://www.matangitonga.to/article/letterslafitani291106.shtml, on the 30/11/06.
- Tokaut, Masalai i, "Solomons – Logging Corruption Ruins a Nation", *Scoop*, 27/4/06, retrieved from http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/HL0604/S00334.htm, on the 30/06/06.
- Toktaem, Moffat Mamu, "Fighting Temptation to Cash in on Solomons Resources", *Solomon Star*, 2/03/06, retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/march/03%2D03%2Dft.htm, on 30/06/06.
- Taylor, Phil, "Fiji: Alone Under the Gun", *New Zealand Herald*, 6/12/06, retrieved from http://www.nzherald.co.nz/section/2/story.cfm?c_id=2&objectid=10414033, on 13/12/06.
- Transparency International, *Transparency International 2005 Corruption Perceptions Index*, retrieved from http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2005 16/09/06.

- Transparency International (PNG), "Justify Raise in Slush Funds", *Media Release*, 04/10/05, retrieved from http://www.transparencypng.org.pg/press_releases/pr_justify_slush_fu nds.pdf, on 12/09/06.
- Transparency International (PNG), 08/11/05, "CCAC to Focus on 2007 National Elections", *Media Release*, retrieved from www.transparencypng.org.pg/press_releases, on 19/09/06.
- Tuvalu Central Statistics Department, 2002 Census Data, retrieved from http://www.spc.int/prism/country/tv/stats/Social/census_02_new.htm, on the 20/10/06.
- Tuvalu Central Statistics Department, 2002 Health Statistics, retrieved from http://www.spc.int/prism/country/tv/stats/Social/health_new.htm, on the 3/6/06.
- *Tuvalu News* (Funafuti), 21/2/06, retrieved from http://www.tuvaluislands.com/news/archives/2006/2006-02-21.htm, on the 8/10/06.
- Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), *Aids Epidemic Update: Special Report on HIV/AIDS*, December 2006.
- UNAIDS, *UNGASS Country Reports – Republic of Fiji Islands*, 2006.
- United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), *Country Information*, retrieved from http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/, on the 20/10/06.
- UNICEF, Country Statistics from http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/eastasia.html, on the 3/6/06.
- UNICEF, "Coverage Estimates: Improved Drinking Water", and "Coverage Estimates: Improved Sanitation", *Joint Monitoring Programme for Water Supply and Sanitation*, June 2006, retrieved from www.wssinfo.org on 15/7/06.
- United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), *Monitoring Peace and Conflict in the Solomon Islands*, Gendered Early Warning Report No. 1, August 2005.
- United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), *The State of Human Settlements and Urbanisation in the Pacific Islands*, Regional Report for the United Nations Conference on Human Settlements (Habitat II), Istanbul, June 1996.
- UNDP, *Papua New Guinea—Millennium Development Goals Progress Report*, Port Moresby, 2004.
- UNDP, *Human Development Report 2006—Beyond Scarcity: Power, Poverty and the Global Water Crisis*, 2006.
- United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP), *Managing the Transition from the Village to the City in the South Pacific*, 1999, retrieved from http://www.unescap.org/huset/pacific/pacific1.htm on 10/8/06.
- UNESCAP, *Pacific Regional Workshop on Urban Management*, Nadi, 1-4 December 2003, retrieved from

www.unescap.org/pdd/prs/ProjectActivites/Ongoing/PacificIsland/NA
DI-final.pdf, on the 2/7/06.

- United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation
(UNESCO), Education For All (EFA), *Global Monitoring Report: The
Quality Imperative*, 2005.
- United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR), *Statistical
Yearbook Country Data Sheets—Papua New Guinea*, 21 August 2006,
retrieved from
http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/STATISTICS/44e5c78811.pdf, on the
8/10/06.
- United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat), *The
Challenge of Slums: Global Report on Human Settlements 2003*,
London and Sterling: Earthscan Publications, 2003.
- UN-Habitat, *Water and Sanitation in the World's Cities: Local Action
for Global Goals*, London, Sterling: Earthscan Publications, 2003.
- United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), *Pacific Islands:
Regional Profile*, 2003.
- United Nations Population Division, *International Migration 2002*,
United Nations Publication, 2002.
- United States State Department, "Consular Information Sheet: Papua
New Guinea", 2006, retrieved from
http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/cis/cis_996.html, on the
1/07/06.
- United States State Department, *International Religious Freedom
Report – Fiji*, 2003, retrieved from
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2003/23828.htm, on the 10/8/06.
- United States State Department, *Fiji – Country Reports on Human
Rights Practices 2005*, released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human
Rights, and Labor, March 8, 2006, retrieved from
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61608.htm, on the 29/9/06.
- United States State Department, *Papua New Guinea – Country
Reports on Human Rights Practices 2005*, released by the Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, March 8, 2006, retrieved from
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61623.htm, 29/9/06.
- United States State Department, *Samoa – Country Reports on Human
Rights Practices 2005*, released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human
Rights, and Labor, March 8, 2006, retrieved from
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61625.htm, on the 29/9/06.
- United States State Department, Solomon Islands – Country Reports
on Human Rights Practices 2005, released by the Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, March 8, 2006, retrieved from
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61627.htm, on the 29/9/06.
- United States State Department, *Tonga – Country Reports on Human
Rights Practices 2005*, released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human
Rights, and Labor, March 8, 2006, retrieved from
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61629.htm, on the 29/9/06.

- United States State Department, *Tuvalu – Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2005*, released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, March 8, 2006, retrieved from http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61630.htm, on the 29/9/06.
- United States State Department, *Vanuatu – Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2005*, released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, March 8, 2006, retrieved from http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61631.htm, on the 29/9/06.
- Urwin, Greg, Address Given at the Australian Federal Police Pacific Team Leaders Conference, 4/05/05, *The Brown Pages*, retrieved from http://www.brownpages.co.nz/news_forum20050405.htm, on the 02/05/06;
- Van de Goor, Luc, Rupesinghe, Kumar, Sciarone, Paul (eds), *Between Development and Destruction*, London: Palgrave, 1996.
- *Vanuatu Daily Post* (Port Vila), 16/10/06, "Poor Vanuatu Province Threatens to Secede", retrieved from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/october/10%2D17%2D20.htm, on the 30/11/06.
- Vidal, John, "Pacific Atlantis: First Climate Change Refugees", *The Guardian*, 25/11/05, retrieved from http://www.guardian.co.uk/climatechange/story/0,12374,1650406,00.html, on the 8/10/06.
- Wainwright, Elsina, "How is RAMSI Faring: Progress, Challenges and Lessons Learned", *Strategic Insights*, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, No.14, 2005.
- Wallensteen, Peter, *Conflict Prevention and the South Pacific*, Plenary Address given at the conference on Securing a Peaceful Pacific, Christchurch, October 15-17, 2004.
- Ware, Helen, "Pacific Instability and Youth Bulges: The Devil in the Demography and the Economy", Paper prepared for the 12th Biennial Conference of the Australian Population Association, 15-17 September 2004, Canberra.
- Weber, Max, *Politics as a Vocation*, 1918, retrieved from www2.pfeiffer.edu/~Iridener/DSS/weber/polvoc.html 11/05/06.
- Weiner, James, "Conflict in the Southern Highlands, PNG", in "Aspects of Conflict in the Contemporary Papua New Guinea Highlands", *State, Society and Governance in Melanesia*, Canberra: Australian National University, 2002, pp. 1-6.
- *Wikipedia*, "2006 Fijian Coup d'etat", retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2006_Fijian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat_attempt, on 13/1/07.
- *Wikipedia*, "2006 Tonga Riots", retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2006_Tonga_Riots, on the 30/11/06.
- *Wikipedia*, "Carteret Islands", retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carteret_Islands, on the 8/10/06.

- *Wikipedia*, "Economy of Fiji", retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_Fiji, on the 21/11/06.
- *Wikipedia*, "Economy of Vanuatu", retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_Vanuatu, on the 12/9/06.
- *Wikipedia*, "Economy of Tuvalu", retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_Tuvalu, on the 20/9/06.
- *Wikipedia*, "Fijian Mercenaries in Bougainville", retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fijian_mercenaries_in_Bougainville, on 2/11/06.
- *Wikipedia*, "Oceania", retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oceania, on the 29/05/06.
- *Wikipedia*, "Politics of Fiji", retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_Fiji, on the 30/11/06.
- *Wikipedia*, "Politics of Tuvalu", retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_Tuvalu, on the 30/11/06.
- *Wikipedia*, "Refugee", retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Refugee, on the 8/10/06.
- *Wikipedia*, "Snyder Rini", retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Snyder_Rini, on the 3/12/06.
- *Wikipedia*, "Tonga" retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tonga, on 6/12/06.
- World Bank, *Global Economic Prospects: Economic Implications of Remittances and Migration*, Washington: The World Bank, 2006.
- World Bank, *Health, Nutrition and Population (HNP) Statistics*, retrieved from http://devdata.worldbank.org/hnpstats/HNPSummary/comparative/comparativeRegRpt.asp, on 7/8/06.
- World Bank, retrieved from http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/0,,contentMDK:20394658~menuPK:1192714~pagePK:64133150~piPK:64133175~theSitePK:239419,00.html, on 12/10/06.
- World Health Organisation (WHO), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), *Joint Monitoring Programme for Water Supply and Sanitation*, June 2006, retrieved from www.wssinfo.org on 10/8/06.
- WHO, *The World Health Report 2006: Working Together for Health*, Geneva: WHO Press, 2006.
- WHO, *World Health Statistics 2006*, Geneva: WHO Press, 2006.
- Yabaki, Akuila, "Fiji: Which Way Forward", *Pacific Media Watch*, 20/5/06, retrieved from http://www.pmw.c2o.org/2006/fiji4946.html, on the 6/8/06.