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COLONISER DISCOURSES
IN CAPITAL TELEVISION
NIGHTLY NEWS,
WAITANGI DAY 1996.

A thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the degree of Masters of Philosophy
in Development Studies at
Massey University.

Jenny Alison Collett
1996
Coloniser's discourses which attempted to justify and redeem many of the devastating processes of colonisation around the world have been (re)constructed and repeated in Aotearoa since the 1840's. They include notions of 'progress', 'civilisation', 'social evolution', and the categorisation of bodies into 'races' and 'genders'. These discourses have shaped many of the identities of people living in Aotearoa as well as the political, economic and social developmental path of this country. In 1996 I argue many of these coloniser discourses are repeated and reinforced through the television current affairs and news coverage of Waitangi Day 1996.

This being so I argue that imagery is a vital area for academic study because it is through images that we present ourselves to ourselves. Following Clifford and Foucault I approach the 1996 Waitangi Day television news coverage as (re)presentations and constructions of 'truth'. I argue these 'truths' always involve a (re)production of certain political, economic and social discourses at the expense of others. I use theorists such as Irwin, Evans, Dyer and hooks to explore and explain the ways in which different discourses and experiences, some of which may be called anti-colonial, are marginalised by coloniser discourses and journalistic conventions.

Using a post structuralist discourse analysis I identify how discourses of 'race' and 'gender' are deployed in Wellington's Capital Television nightly news coverage on 1996 Waitangi Day. In this programme, which claims to present an unmediated 'truth' surrounding the events of 1996 Waitangi Day, I argue that certain voices and experiences are given legitimacy while others are silenced and marginalised. I conclude that generally it is European/New Zealand and male voices which are heard at the expense of Māori and women. I argue that those who do wish to highlight the legacy of colonial ideas in the television media, through legitimate protest, for example Māori sovereignty groups and Pākehā supporters, are marginalised as 'protesters' and 'stirrers' disconnected from their communities and from 'real New Zealanders' on this particular day.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

There are so many people I have to thank who have supported me in different ways throughout the writing of this thesis. Special thanks must go to my two supervisors Lynne Star and Barbara Nowak who constantly offered support and advice both sound and inspirational, and who waded through my creative spelling and often lengthy sentences. Then there are my Mum and Dad who have always taught me to value education and who have supported and encouraged me in every way possible throughout. Thanks also to my flatmates and dear friends Patrick and Kim who put up with my fluctuating moods throughout the final months of my thesis. Big thanks also to Steven Collett who ended up videoing the text I examined in this research and who was always ready to offer comments on anything political! And also to Harumi who managed to install Māori Times font on the computer for me and in doing so succeeded where everyone else had failed. Thanks also to Graham Slater who instructed me in the art of editing and who unjammed the video machine and rescued my tape! Warm thanks also to the friendly staff and students in Development studies who made the graduate room a pleasant place to study. And finally thanks to all of my other friends, especially Hannah and Ellen, who have consistently supported (and humoured) me throughout the writing of this thesis.
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<td>Aotearoa</td>
<td>Literally translated means ‘Land of the long white cloud’ and refers to the nation state of New Zealand.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aroha</td>
<td>Love, concern, pity, empathy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>haka</td>
<td>An aggressive type of action song and ‘war dance’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hapū</td>
<td>Clan or section of tribe.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heitiki</td>
<td>Greenstone neck ornament.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hongi</td>
<td>Traditional form of greeting (pressing of noses).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iwi</td>
<td>Bone, nation, ‘tribe’, strength.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kapa haka</td>
<td>Māori cultural performance group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karakia</td>
<td>Prayers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>karanga</td>
<td>Women’s Welcoming call given at the beginning of a Powhiri.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kaumātua</td>
<td>Elders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kawa</td>
<td>Protocol.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kāwanatanga</td>
<td>Government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kōhanga reo</td>
<td>Literally translated these words mean ‘language nest’ and describe pre-schools conducted entirely in Māori according to Māori customs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kūpapa</td>
<td>Turncoat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kura kaupapa māori</td>
<td>Primary and Secondary Schools set up and run by Māori. Teaching is done in Māori and the school is organised according to Māori custom.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mana</td>
<td>Influence, prestige.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Māori</td>
<td>Literally this word means ordinary, ‘normal’ and has come to refer to the indigenous people of Aotearoa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Māoritanga</td>
<td>Māori culture.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>marae</td>
<td>The open area of land infront of the whare nui.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
marae ātea  The space between the hosts and the visitors during a pōwhiri.

matakite  Divination, second sight, a seer.
moko  Tattooing.
Ngāi/Ngāti  Prefix denoting ‘tribe’ or clan.
noho a tahi  Staying together.
pā  Fortified village.
Pākehā  Literally this word means foreign and has come to refer to descendants of Western European colonials.
Pākehātanga  Pākehā culture.
poi  A light ball attached to flax string used by women in kapa haka groups.
pōwhiri  Ceremonial welcome.
raupatu  Confiscation. Raupatu iwi are those communities which had their land confiscated by the Government after the land wars in the 1860’s for example Waikato iwi.
tāne  Man
Tangata Whenua  Literally translated means ‘people of the land' and refers to the host people and original inhabitants of an area. In Aotearoa the Tangata Whenua are Māori.
taxonga  Possessions, valuables, treasures.
Tauiwi  Other tribe, can be used to refer to all non-Māori in Aotearoa.
Te Puni Kokiri  Ministry of Māori Affairs and Development.
Te Reo Māori  The Māori language.
tika  Correct.
tikanga  Custom, practice.
Tino Rangatiratanga  Dominion, Māori sovereignty. This wording is contained within the Māori language version of the Treaty of Waitangi.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tohunga</th>
<th>Priest, expert.</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Utu</td>
<td>Concept of reciprocity, to make return for anything.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wahine</td>
<td>Woman.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waiata</td>
<td>Songs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waka</td>
<td>Canoe.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whaikōrero</td>
<td>Formal speech, oratory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whakapapa</td>
<td>Genealogy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whānau</td>
<td>To be born, family in a broad sense.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whare nui</td>
<td>Meeting house on a marae.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ORTHOGRAHY

The ten consonants in Māori:

h, k, m, n, p, r, t, w, ng, wh

The first eight are pronounced as in English. The last two are diagraphs, ng being pronounced as the ng in singer, wh as wh in whale, or as f.

The five vowels:

a, e, i, o, u.

They are pronounced in two ways, short and long.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Short</th>
<th>Long</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a as u in but</td>
<td>a as a in father</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e as e in pen</td>
<td>e as ai in pair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i as i in bit</td>
<td>i as ee in feet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o as o in fort</td>
<td>o as o in store</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>u as u in put</td>
<td>u as oo in boot</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Long vowels are indicated by a macron, e.g. Māori, in which the a is long.
Diphthongs are elided, e.g. ai (ah-ee) is sounded as i in high.
[From Reed and Karetu 1984: x].
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

In Aotearoa/New Zealand Waitangi Day, focuses attention on the 1840 signing of the Treaty of Waitangi between many Māori leaders and representatives of the British Crown\(^1\). This event shaped (and continues to shape) the specific colonial history and development of this country. It was not until 1973 after much lobbying and protesting from Māori sovereignty and land activists that a national holiday, 'New Zealand day', was declared for February 6th through Parliament. Further protest saw the name of this national holiday changed to 'Waitangi Day' in 1976. Since 1973 Waitangi Day has been a day of protest, a day of celebration, a day of commemoration, a day off work or a combination of these depending on a person’s particular view of Aotearoa’s colonial history. These often contradictory views were and are influenced by images of this land and the people living in it constructed by politicians, family, school, Church and, now more than ever, the print and television media. A study of how the television news media attempts to cover the diversity of opinion and action surrounding 1996 Waitangi Day throws light on many of these discourses about sovereignty, our colonial histories, future developmental paths, the Treaty of Waitangi, 'race', and 'national identity' in contemporary Aotearoa.

\(^1\) See appendix 1 for the text of the Declaration of Independence (1835) and appendix 2 for the Treaty of Waitangi (1840). The Declaration of Independence, signed by the 'United Tribes of New Zealand' is an international declaration of the sovereignty of Māori people. It was witnessed by James Busby and recognised by England's King William in 1835 and ratified in the House of Commons in 1836. The Treaty of Waitangi was signed between the British Crown and over 500 Māori Chiefs and leaders. There are at least four versions of the Treaty in both English and Māori (the majority of Māori signed the Māori version) and contemporary debates revolve around the difference in meaning between the English and the Māori versions. There is particular debate over the translation of the word 'sovereignty' contained in article one. The English text maintains that Māori ceded 'sovereignty' to the British Crown where as the Māori text grants the British Crown 'kawanatanga' or limited governance over their own people in Aotearoa. Article two in the English version confirms existing property rights of Māori communities where as in the Māori version this is also extended to Māori control over cultural, social and economic resources. Article three is basically the same in both versions and grants Māori people British citizenship and the rights and responsibilities that went with this. It also guaranteed them Royal protection. Article four ensures the right to religious freedom in Aotearoa. Under the international law of contra preferentum where there is a dispute over a treaty it is the indigenous version which is recognised as valid [see Durie 1994 and Orange 1987 for historical detail and analysis].
1996 Waitangi Day official commemorations: A break with tradition

The approach of the National government (1990-1996) to the 'celebrating' of 1996 Waitangi Day signalled a break with tradition. Government ministers such as Prime Minister Jim Bolger decided to hold the 'official celebrations' in Government House, Wellington (invitation only) instead of at Waitangi marae, Northland (traditionally open to everyone who wished to attend). The reason given for this split was the non-violent direct actions of Māori sovereignty protestors which 'disrupted' the official proceedings at Waitangi in 1995.

Protest action on Waitangi Day traditionally highlights the ways in which the Treaty of Waitangi has been contravened and how it continues to be sidelined by successive Aotearoa governments. Protests at Waitangi by Māori sovereignty groups, such as Te Kawariki, and other individuals, question the status of the Treaty in Aotearoa law. Gatherings to discuss the shape of Māori sovereignty and strategies to achieve meaningful political and social change in Aotearoa have also been a part of Waitangi Day protest in recent years. Waitangi day is a chance for Māori sovereignty activists to focus national and international media attention on the situation of Māori in contemporary Aotearoa as well as on historical and contemporary issues of colonisation in this country. Protest action by Pākehā groups such as Pākehā Treaty Action on 1996 Waitangi Day, supported the calls for Māori sovereignty and objected to the Crown moving the official commemorations from Waitangi marae to Government House. The ways in which these events and issues were treated, and the (re)presentation of the 'protestors' in the text I examine highlights contemporary attitudes to colonisation and development in Aotearoa.

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2 The phrase 'the Crown' literally refers to the sovereignty of the British Monarch who is represented in Aotearoa by the Governor General. After each election the Governor General delegates the power to govern this country to the elected Parliament (this is more symbolic than anything in that it is unlikely for the Monarch to interfere with the election process through the Governor General). Aotearoa is a 'constitutional monarchy'. Unless I have specifically stated otherwise, I use the phrase 'the Crown' to refer to Parliament in Aotearoa. The use of 'the crown' in news reports on Waitangi Day is discussed in chapter five on page 39.
Methodology

In this study I examine the television news and current affairs coverage of 1996 Waitangi Day which (re)presents the issues and events referred to above. I collected extracts concerning the events of Waitangi Day, and the debates that took place around them, from Television One, TV3 and Capital Television (a subsidiary of TVNZ) for one month surrounding February 6th 1996. I choose to focus my detailed analysis on the panel discussion screened on Capital Nightly News on the 6th of February 1996 at 7.00pm because the programme purported to deal specifically with the issues central to this thesis which are colonisation, the Treaty of Waitangi and the future shape of development in Aotearoa. I have also referred to clips from the 6pm One Network News and Three National News programmes which many people in Aotearoa would have seen on that night. An edited tape of these examples accompanies this thesis.

I have conducted a discourse analysis of these examples. Put simply, a 'discourse' is a well bounded area of knowledge which is expressed and reinforced through words actions and images, in this case on television news [Foucault 1967;1981;1995;Sheridan 1980]. A discourse can be both emerging and continuous. I examined how the discourses of 'race' with their roots in colonial expansion were (re)presented in 1996 Waitangi Day television news coverage. I argue that many of these discourses can be read as colonial redemptive metahistorical narratives [Clifford 1988], that is as ideas which have been deployed by Western European elites to justify and redeem many of the barbaric processes of colonisation throughout the world.

Definition: Pākehā versus European/New Zealander

Historically the word Pākehā was coined to describe the new settlers in Aotearoa in the 1800s. It literally means stranger. The word Māori which signifies those descended from the indigenous populations literally means

---

3 In 1996 AGB McNair (the company which measures television ratings in Aotearoa) reported the number one programme watched in Aotearoa during that year was One Network News with 33.6% of audience share. Three National News rated 78th with 17.0% of audience share [AGB McNair in Listener 1997: 36-37].
normal or humankind. These words centre the indigenous populations linguistically and perhaps reflect the forty to one Māori to Pākehā ratio in the 1840s [Larner and Spoonley 1995:42]. The literal translation of both terms has given way to a very different meaning of the words Māori and Pākehā which reflects the changing nature of colonial relations in Aotearoa. Today the predominant use of Pākehā signifies only those descended from white colonial settlers and tends to exclude those of Chinese, Pacific Island and other ethnic backgrounds who have also settled in this country. The word 'Māori' still refers to those descended from the indigenous populations of Aotearoa.

In this thesis I separate out the terms 'Pākehā' and European/New Zealander. I use Pākehā to describe those European colonial descendants who claim an identity based in Aotearoa which acknowledges Māori sovereignty claims and the Treaty of Waitangi [Abel 1992; King 1985; Larner and Spoonley 1995]. I use European/New Zealander to refer to those colonial descendants who refuse to acknowledge the importance of the Treaty of Waitangi and Māori sovereignty claims. Thus while all Pākehā are European colonial descendants not all European/New Zealanders are Pākehā. I found it necessary to do this to fully explain how the narrative of 'national unity and togetherness' operated in the 1996 Waitangi television news coverage to silence people who represent different political possibilities. I explore this argument further in Chapter Five.

Aims of thesis
My aim in this thesis is to explore the discourses of the colonising culture and to suggest their deployment as representations of certain configurations of

---

4 Pākehā as I use it above excludes those of non-European heritage who acknowledge the Treaty of Waitangi and Māori sovereignty claims and who claim an identity from within this country. There are several reasons for this. Firstly I wish to retain the focus of this thesis on those who come from the dominant colonising culture in Aotearoa, that is those predominantly descended from Western European cultures. Secondly in the television text I examine 'Pākehā' refers only to those readily identifiable as having Western European heritage (ie those who appear to have 'white skin'). Thirdly those with Samoan, Niuean, Indian, Tongan, Malaysian etc. heritages do not often (if at all) use Pākehā to refer to themselves, perhaps for the very points raised in this footnote. The etymology of this term is discussed further in Chapter Three.
personal and group identity in 1996 Waitangi Day news coverage. I also explore how these colonising discourses have effected the social and economic development of different communities in this country. I believe it is essential to look at the discourses of the colonising culture because far too often they are ignored and assumed by many people both within and outside it, to be commonsense and even 'normal' ways of organising the country.

I also aim to demonstrate how the study of development can and should include studies of imagery and different media. Television is an increasingly influential industry and the historical development of its technologies are far from politically neutral. Therefore I argue it is important to understand how images are created and how they operate to (re)create and (re)present certain ideas about different communities, human history and development while repressing or silencing other possibilities.

I hope this thesis will prompt people to question 'commonsense' assumptions about the history of Aotearoa and issues surrounding sovereignty. I also wish to highlight the political, social and economic origins and present day uses of some of the identities reinforced through television media which many of us have come to cherish. To this end I present and explain in this study analytical tools which may be used to critically read news media in anti-colonial ways. I acknowledge that my reading of the text is done from a certain positionality within Aotearoa which I represent in an initial way here as a Pākehā woman with a beginning knowledge of Te Reo Māori who is engaged in formal study at Massey University. This means, among other things, that I will have emphasised certain themes and missed others in the coverage which others from different locations within the culture would pick up on. I encourage people to take this thesis as a point from which to develop other readings

---

5 David Pearson argues that 'commonsense' is nothing more than a "consensus among a majority that its own institutions and ideas are superior to those of other cultures" and that "commonsense will dictate that ethnocentric strategies will be consistently upheld as in everyone's interests" [1990:178]. In Aotearoa this means that 'commonsense' can be read as rooted in European/New Zealand ethnicity and cultural values which may not be inclusive of Tikanga Māori.

**Structure of thesis**

Chapter Two outlines the theoretical framework for the study. I concentrate on the Foucauldian notions of bio-power and anatomo-politics as large, overarching configurations of discourses which have shaped many of the identities many people now take for granted. I also outline my understanding of what constitutes a discourse which involves a discussion of power/knowledge and the concept of the redemptive metahistorical narrative.

In Chapter Three I apply these ideas to an historical overview of the emergence of colonial discourses and redemptive metahistorical narratives of ‘race’, social evolution and ‘development’. I also explore the role of imagery and (re)presentation in the construction of binary notions of ‘self’ and ‘Other’, ‘savage’ and ‘civilised’ and evolutionary ideas of ‘progress’ and ‘development’.

Chapter Four reviews Fiske’s triangulation model which outlines how meaning is produced from media messages. This model outlines three fundamental areas involved in the mass communications process: production/ownership, programmes/texts and audiences/readers. I examine the three areas separately in relation to the television media in Aotearoa.

Chapter Five looks at the *Capital Nightly News* panel discussion as a (re)presentation of whiteness/control. I argue that a study of ‘whiteness’ as an ethnic discourse is essential in order to decentre and denaturalise it from the position of power it has achieved thorough the processes of colonisation. I argue the style of presentation of this programme with its focus on the Crown, silences diversity, demonises difference and disempowers legitimate protest.
In Chapter Six I argue that the intersecting discourses of ‘race’ and binary gender serve to exclude women, especially Māori but also Pākehā from commenting on the continuing effects of colonisation and the future direction of development in Aotearoa.

The concluding chapter reviews the main arguments and offers some implications for both the study of development and television watchers in Aotearoa. I also suggest other important areas for future study which fell beyond the scope of this thesis.
CHAPTER TWO

THEORY

This chapter outlines the main theoretical tools I use throughout this thesis to read television news coverage of 1996 Waitangi Day. The theorists discussed in this chapter are Michel Foucault and James Clifford whose work allows me to approach certain universal ‘truths’ of the history of colonialism in Aotearoa from something approaching a critical anti-colonial perspective. Two particular areas I focus on throughout this study are the construction of the discourse of ‘race’ and how different strands of this intersect with discourses of binary gender in a text which includes a *Capital Nightly News* Waitangi Day panel discussion and news bulletins from *One Network News* and *Three National News*.

Discourses of ‘race’ and ‘gender’ are larger disciplinary technologies of the ‘self’ and part of Foucault’s notion of bio-power and technologies of the body. Explained simply, technologies of the ‘self’ allow us to believe ourselves to be certain things which we enact in certain ways. They mean for example that we think of ourselves as ‘Māori’ or ‘European’ or ‘male’ or ‘female’ and so on. These technologies constrain us to other ways of talking about and knowing ourselves. Technologies are inclusive cultural apparatuses of power/knowledge, ways of believing, seeing and knowing which produce multitudes of discourses in our social world. Under modernism, Foucault argues, one prevalent and overarching epistemic regime is the so-called ‘will-to-truth’ [Foucault 1972; Sheridan 1980] ie the desire to discover and tell ‘universal truths’ about people, nature and so on. One of the main ways of knowing and discovering ‘the truth’, privileged in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, is through sight and the idea that to ‘see’ a person is to ‘know’ the ‘truth’ about that person. Lalvani (1993) calls this ‘occular-centric’ knowing which involves the surveillance of bodies through technologies such as photography, film and television which inscribe such things as ‘race’ and ‘gender’ onto different bodies.
Foucault’s ideas surrounding bio-power and anatamo-politics, grand inclusive configurations of discourses, which arose at the end of the 1700’s and through the 1800s in Western Europe and throughout the ‘colonies’, were first outlined in his *The History of Sexuality* (1981). Foucault argues that during the Nineteenth Century power over life focused itself into two forms which interacted with each other. The first, bio-power, concerned the regulation of life processes of entire human populations made more possible by the collection of certain information about them, for example statistics on sex, marital status, income, age and ethnicity. Bio-power is also linked with the concept of ‘governmentality’ which suggests that people accept these boxes without coercion, and begin to view themselves, their ‘self’, in light of these categories [Burchell et al (eds):1991]. The second, anatomo-politics concerns the disciplining of individual bodies and involves the ascendance of the visual encapsulated in Foucault’s concept of ‘the positive unconscious of vision’ [Foucault 1995]. These two forms of power/knowledge resulted in the organisation and conceptualisation from the late Seventeenth Century, of human bodies and groups of human bodies into specific categories such as ‘race’ and into binary genders, male or female. While these concepts are intertwined and (re)inforce each other I will consider them separately for the sake of clarity.

**Bio-power**

Find out more about your citizens, cried the conservative enthusiasts, and you will ameliorate their conditions, diminish their restlessness, and strengthen their character [Hacking 1982:281].

In 1996 this quote seems to be the rule when considering the most effective way to ‘govern’ people. Only this year people living in Aotearoa completed a census form which probed into our age, marital status, taxes, income, heritage and sex. We were told by government officials, Statistics New Zealand, and various television and radio campaigns that this information is vital for the future planning and development of communities in Aotearoa. It seems to be a
reasonable assumption, after all how can a government govern if they don’t ‘know’ us and anticipate our future needs?

To a vast majority of people living in Aotearoa it seems absolutely commonsensical to define yourself in terms of your sex, sexuality, gender, class and ethnicity. Moreover it seems as if these categories are natural and have meant much the same thing throughout history. It comes as a shock to discover that these categories and identities and the ways in which they operate in official and private discourses emerged only during the last two hundred years and are a direct result of the desire to ‘normalise’ and thus control people and our relationships to other people as well as to ourselves. Foucault describes this desire to categorise bodies and behaviour as bio-politics. He explains it as a fundamental shift from pre-1800’s conceptions of power and the ‘rule of the sovereign’. Lois McNay writes that the fundamental difference between the rule of the sovereign and bio-power is that:

for the Prince, sovereignty is exercised over territory and, consequently, over the subjects that inhabit it. In contrast, in the definition of governmentality, power is exercised over a complex of men (sic) and their ‘relations to things’ [1994:115].

The aim of this type of government is to make human bodies and work more productive and efficient, a concept discussed further in the section concerning anatomo-politics. Another important difference between the power of the sovereign and bio-power is that while the sovereign ultimately had the right to say who died and when (s/he could kill a single person often with impunity) bio-power operates in a more fundamental way and decides who gets the chance to live.

Foucault uses bio-power to describe the emerging concern of governments and people with the direction of life itself during the 1800’s in Western Europe. The thrust of bio-politics is the desire to ‘know’ and control populations through the gathering of information, often in the form of statistics, about individual people. Hacking (1982) argues the first statistics (collected in the
late 1700's and early 1800's in Western Europe) were concerned with the taxation process and counted not bodies but permanent household fixtures. However this changed in the following decades (as urbanisation and industrialisation increased) and people were more rigorously categorised on the basis of class and wealth. He suggests that “one can tell the story of biopolitics as the transition from the counting of hearths to the counting of bodies” [Hacking 1982:281]. ‘Life’ during this period, through disciplinary apparatuses and technologies became the object of power/knowledge. Discourses about bodies are generated by the use of observation, examination and the use of statistics and data to record knowledge about individual bodies. These in turn create new perceptual possibilities:

Life became not only an object of thought but an object of power: it was not merely individual living persons who might be subjected to the orders of the sovereign but life itself, the life of the species, the size of the population, the modes of procreation [Hacking 1982:151].

The bio-politics of populations gave rise to hundreds of statistical models and interventions aimed at the collective regulation of people, their health, mortality and birth rates. Concerns with the reproduction of the population were also linked to concerns of ‘racial’ purity, especially in the colonies. These concerns gave rise to such things as the ‘eugenics movement’ which originated in Britain and spread around the 'British Empire' between 1900 and 1930. Eugenicists were concerned with what was seen by many social workers, biologists, doctors and legislators of the time as the decline of the Anglo-Saxon 'race' and British 'manhood' caused by urbanisation and industrialisation. Evidence of this decline was taken to be the supposedly growing numbers of 'deviants' such as the mentally ill, drunkards, criminals and imbeciles. Eugenicists such as Baden Powell (the founder of Scouting), Truby King (who founded Plunket in Aotearoa) and organisations such as the New Zealand Eugenics Education Society (founded in 1910) declared that ways to overcome this 'racial decline' were through regular organised sports, physical exertion and other proscribed methods such as cold baths and particular diets [Fleming 1982; Phillips 1996; Star 1993: 145-147]. Stoler
(1996) argues the concern with the sexual and reproductive activities and rates of the empire were played out in child health campaigns and in organisations like Plunket in Aotearoa, which encouraged colonial expansion through population growth and strong robust and 'fit' youth.\(^6\)

The normalising impulses of bio-power were first studied by Foucault in the realms of discourses of sexuality and madness as they emerged in France. He maintains that discourses of normalcy, pitted against those of 'perversion', exploded in the medical and psychiatric fields during the last half of the Nineteenth Century. While certain ways of being have probably always been punished Foucault argues it is only in the last century that these have been studied, written down, photographed and transformed into data in the minutest detail. These records were then used as checklists with which to classify people and their behaviour (see Foucault 1967; 1981; 1995; Lalvani 1993; Sennett and Foucault 1981)\(^7\).

The introduction of a regular census furthered this normalising impulse throughout the 'Empire'. The first census occurred in Aotearoa in 1857/58 and was primarily concerned with counting the numbers of indigenous people versus the numbers of 'settlers'. In the very early years Māori communities were enumerated on a separate census form to the colonising settlers. This type of counting helped to formulate the concept of 'a Māori population' (as opposed to iwi\(^8\) communities) and a 'Non-Māori population' (as opposed to

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\(^6\) For a history of The Plunket society in Aotearoa see Parry (1982). For an inside look at the organisation through the eyes of Plunket nurses see Lambert (1994).

\(^7\) Hacking writes that even ways of dying have been listed in World Health Organisation international documents and that to die in any way other than those is considered illegal [1982:280].

\(^8\) I have not italicised or translated Māori words and expressions in the text because Māori was the first language spoken in this country and is one of two official languages of Aotearoa. The other official and predominant language is English. As historian Michael King wrote in the preface to his book *Being Pakeha* italics and translation are "traditionally reserved for 'exotic' or 'foreign' languages" [1985:13] of which Te Reo Māori is neither. English has become the most predominant language in this country due to the processes of colonisation which have caused much individual and collective suffering. Children who spoke Te Reo Māori in the Missionary and later State school classrooms of the late Nineteenth and early Twentieth centuries were beaten and ridiculed as a result of racism and the discourse of 'civilisation'. One of the outcomes of this was a decline in the numbers of fluent Māori speakers, the devaluing of Te Reo Māori which manifests itself in the continuing lack of funding for Māori
Chinese, Irish Catholic, Irish Protestant, English, Scottish, Dutch...)\(^9\). The definitions of who exactly constituted a ‘Māori’ person and more importantly who did not, fluctuated according to political expediency and settler greed for land [Durie 1994]. It also furthered the process of statistical assimilation of individual Māori people with mixed European heritage into ‘European civilisation’. Ann Laura Stoler (1996) argues that bio-political concerns with populations, ‘racial purity’ and health have been used to justify the wholesale genocidal slaughter of communities throughout the colonial world. The ways in which bio-power was transferred around the world through the colonial project and how this resulted in the construction and manipulation of ‘races’ of people is looked at further in Chapter Two and identified in the news coverage of 1996 Waitangi Day in Chapters Four and Five.

Hacking writes that the faith invested in statistics and records, information and data by governments who believe it vital to the effective planning and development of populations and nations is rarely warranted. He says the real power of bio-politics is the way the categories which were counted have become commonsense and even ‘natural’ to many people and have: “set the stage of categorisation in which we still live” [Hacking 1982:289]. Foucault argues that this in effect means many people no longer have to be policed to language teaching and the creation of a largely monolingual society. This pattern of repression of indigenous languages through the colonial school system was also seen in countries such as Kenya, America and Australia. Language recovery is an important political issue facing many Māori communities because the proportion of fluent Māori speakers is low. However advocacy, activism and the Kohanga Reo preschool movements have led to “the establishment of a Māori language commission, recognition of Māori as an official language, some funding for Māori radio and more access to the language through a variety of educational opportunities” [Mahuta 1993:106]. In this study I identify continuing colonial discourses in the television news media on 1996 Waitangi Day so it seems appropriate that while doing this I attempt to recognise the mana of Te Reo Māori, the first language of this country, by allowing it to be read on its own without any reference to English. Often the meanings of the words and phrases can be picked up in the context of the sentence and paragraph and then checked with the conventional translation in the glossary found at the end of this thesis. For me personally, an academic student of Te Reo Māori (a real beginner), the use of Te Reo Māori without instant translation into English is a way of acknowledging the efforts of my patient Māori language teachers throughout Intermediate school, Highschool and at University who constantly encouraged us to think in Māori so that in the end ‘iwi’ means ‘iwi’ and ‘tribe’ just doesn’t sound right!

\(^9\) See Pool (1991) for a review of early census data in Aotearoa and how it was used politically.
ensure we fall into these categories because most of us happily tick the boxes on the census and other forms ourselves. This is discussed further in the next section concerning anatomo-politics. The total reliance on these scientific and statistical discourses which tend to marginalise other experiences, information and ways of knowing can lead to disastrous results for individual people and communities who may not fit (or even wish to be associated with) the categories most commonly counted. This is discussed in more detail in Chapter Six in relation to the construction of European/New Zealand, Pākehā and Māori women in the 1996 Waitangi Day news coverage.

Anatomo-politics

Anatomo-politics describes the technologies of disciplining and regulating individual bodies. Foucault (1981) argues that the precise movements of bodies became consistent areas of attention and regulation since the late 1700's and through the 1800's due in part to the increase in urban drift and capitalist development in Western European countries. He writes how this process began with the disciplining of soldier's bodies and moved into schools, churches, psychiatric hospitals, prisons and factories. Gyorgy writing about anatomo-politics and fashion in Western European and Anglo-American cultures maintains that this system is intensifying and that “there is literally no movement or posture of the body that remains unaffected by normative control, by the hysterical compulsion to conform” [1996:43]. This notion of control is central to my analysis of the ethnic discourse of ‘whiteness’ in the Capital Nightly News Panel Discussion in Chapter Five and the impact of fashion and discourses of beauty are looked at in more detail in Chapter Six.

Suren Lalvani writes about the origins of anatomo-politics with regards to the way body movements of workers in the 1800's were studied with the use of photography. The aim was to minimise movements and increase workers output and thus profit:
At the New England Butt Company, employees were ushered into what was referred to as 'the betterment room', which resembled a typical workshop organised for the manufacture of dress-braid machines ... The camera recorded the worker's initial performance which was then played back to the worker while Gilbreth, pointer in hand, instructed the worker on how to minimise certain motions and how to do away with others altogether. After this reorganising of the worker's body, the worker's performance on the task was once again recorded to register the improvements [1993:459].

Bodies were studied in minute detail helped by increasing quality and clarity of photographic technologies and the knowledge gained from them was rationalised into an ordered and efficient model which was then taught to other workers. Merely showing factory workers how to make their bodies more efficient was only part of the job. The other part was ensuring they followed their instructions. Architecture was adjusted to make the job of surveillance more effective.

Foucault's discussion of surveillance in the disciplining of prisoners illustrates this point. Previous to the late 1700's prisoners were imprisoned in a dark dungeon as punishment for their crimes. While this seems a horrible fate, the darkness perhaps afforded some protection or privacy for the prisoner who was not constantly subjected to the watchful gaze of the prison guard. Foucault argues this situation changed in the 1800's with the English philosopher, Bentham's, architectural design called the Panopticon and the treatises he wrote concerning its justification [Bentham 1787/1791/1995]. While this 'super prison' was never built, for Foucault the design and the desire behind it, captures the essence of the disciplinary and normalising society. The Panopticon's architectural structure has a round, surveillance tower with windows at the centre of a compound with a row of individual cells circling it. Each cell has a window at either end, with one inmate separated from all communication with other inmates. The central tower has a clear vision of each cell. It is in here that the guard keeps watch over every inmate, alone in their individual cells. The inmates are readily seen from the surveillance tower because of the light which flows through the windows at both ends of their
cells. Because the inmates cannot see when the guard in the tower is watching them (or even if the guard is still there) they start to police and discipline their own behaviour. The effect of the panoptic mechanism is to: “induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power, each becomes to himself his (sic) own jailer” [Foucault in Nowsa 1996:95].

The development and rapid popularisation of photography in the 1800’s in Western Europe and North America had much the same effect as the panopticon on human bodies in that it isolated and made visible every minute movement of the object of its gaze which was then subject to manipulation and control. The power of anatomo-politics is intricately linked with technologies of surveillance, not just through the camera but also surveillance of others and the self. It is also concerned with the primacy of the sense of vision over other ways of knowing. Lalvani (1993) demonstrates this in the discussion of the history of the development of photography and how a picture became invested with the idea of ‘truth’ and ‘reality’. I discuss the construction of this perception of ‘reality’ in filmic and photographic images with regards to television news in Chapter Four, pages 85-87.

One consequence of the development of the “nineteenth century visual order” [Lalvani 1993:461] which I wish to touch on here is the way in which portraiture and pictures of people, and indeed the very appearance of any person anywhere was increasingly taken as (among other things) the essence of that person’s social class, gender and ‘racial’ category:

photography simultaneously and in overlapping fashion, operating on an axis delineated by the inverse trajectories of honorific and repressive portraiture, assisted in making visible and constituting the bourgeois body as subject of moral value and social meaning. In all these cases, the body isolated, made visible and individuated, is in turn transformed into an object or subject of knowledge and power. Photography in the Nineteenth Century was thus embedded in the larger visual discourse - ‘a positive unconscious vision’ - of the period, characterised by practices which sought, in their specificity, to make visible the social order through the isolation and individuation of bodies for the purposes of deterrence,
As indicated in this quote the Nineteenth Century visual order offered easy ways in which to assess ‘character’ in an increasingly urbanised and mechanised environment. Moral worth came to be assessed through physical appearance; a person must have the ‘right’ kind of body and present themselves as ‘healthy’ and ‘decent’ to be considered respectable and ‘normal’. Lalvani (1993) refers to this as ‘ocular centric’ knowing, or the idea that the way people began to ‘know’, was primarily through sight. This idea was intertwined with the development of technologies of photography from 1840 onwards. Photography was turned to a multiple of chores in the Eighteenth Century. It was used by police in the identification of criminals, by scientists to classify the physical features of ‘racial’ groups and, through family portraits to present the values of the middle classes. However far from being a ‘window on reality’ these photographic images were heavily inscribed with the discourses of the times. Photographs/images were (as they are now) cropped, posed, lit, mediated, political constructions which reinforced certain ideas at the expense of others. For example the people in the crime shots and the classificatory photographs of ‘racial’ groups’ had to face the full glare of the camera without any of the soft lighting reserved for portraiture. This pose was designed to make the features of the person fully visible in all their ‘natural bluntness’ and ‘unsophisticated nature’ to the police or the researcher. Those appearing in portraits on the other hand were allowed to pose, a thing which signified leisure, often the preserve of the upper classes\(^\text{10}\). Thus cultural meanings were inscribed onto the images and influenced the ways in which they were then used. Lalvani argues that the portraits of middle and upper class families and individuals were presented as examples of virtue, morality and healthy living to the working classes: “photography, by displaying a

\(^{10}\) Portraiture in the nineteenth century included two vital elements, the head and hands. Lalvani argues that this conveyed an underlying bourgeois belief in manifest destiny which was that “the world may be civilised by the appropriate combination of head and hand” [1993:448].
pantheon of bourgeois moral exemplars, provides both an inspirational source and a moral standard to which the working classes can aspire” [Lalvani 1993:448-449].

This coded function of photographic images has another consequence in that any people who wished to sit for a portrait (and towards the end of the century the technology of photography was becoming more accessible to the working classes in Western Europe) were addressed by bourgeois values through the posing and positioning of their bodies before the camera. The camera and imagery were not neutral in their (re)presentation of people or scenes. The fact that some people still believe in the unmediated reality of photographic images and the continued ascendance of ocular centric knowing in televisual media saturated societies suggests Foucault’s (1995) idea of the ‘positive unconscious of vision’. This is an idea which outlines how in any period only certain things can be seen at certain times, and how what can be seen is dependent upon the flows of power/knowledge: “There is much more constraint in what we can see than we suppose. To see is always to think, since what is seeable is part of ‘structures thought in advance’”[Rachman in Lalvani 1993:446]. This concept is developed further in the discussion of discourse power/knowledge but first I will outline the way this theory is relevant and applied in my thesis.

This idea has several implications for my thesis. Firstly it means an acknowledgment that my reading of the 1996 Waitangi Day news coverage is already influenced by my ‘structures thought in advance’. Therefore what I offer here is not to be taken as the ‘truth’ about the ‘real’ meanings in the coverage, indeed, that was never my aim. As suggested in the introduction what I present in this study is one way in which to read the images which is open to other interpretations.

To me the concept of ‘ocular-centric knowledge’ also indicates the importance of looking at a brief history of some of the ideas and images which attempted
to justify the colonial project and particularly the colonisation of Aotearoa. I do this in Chapter Three.

**Discourse, power/knowledge**

I use the term ‘discourse’ in this study to refer to a group of ideas and ways of knowing about any given subject. Discourses make sense of everything in our social world and are always emerging, intersecting and discontinuous. Some discourses are dominant and some are marginalised, some seem to be everywhere while others are harder to access. This idea can be described in terms of hierarchies of discourses. For example discourses generated by academics and theorists are often repeated in many places and as such they assume a legitimacy and appear to be ‘true’, more ‘true’ than discourses generated by many of those from outside of the academy, for example children and prisoners (there are many more). The discourses which concern this thesis are generated from within, and as, technologies of the 'self'. Power is always involved with the social production of discourse and in a given period we can only see, think, write or speak about certain things in certain ways ie power and knowledge are imbricated. One implication of this for research is the necessity to look at the way the creation of knowledge is enmeshed in the networks of power/knowledge operating in all human affairs, and to grasp that:

> knowledge of all sorts is thoroughly enmeshed in the clash of petty dominations, as well as in the larger battles which constitute our world. Knowledge is not external to these fights; it does not constitute a way out of, or above, the fray...it is simultaneously part of the danger and a tool to combat that danger [Foucault in Rabinow; 1991:6-7].

This approach necessitates a recognition that my position in 1996 Aotearoa is created from many cultural and personal battles (physical, spiritual, academic) over what constitutes the ‘truth’ and which include discourses of ‘race’, ‘gender’, ‘class’, ‘sexuality’, ... and an awareness that all of these things will effect the creation and presentation of my study in ways which of course I cannot ultimately ever be fully conscious of. It also demonstrates a need to investigate the history and genealogy of certain discourses. This sort of
investigation exposes the dangers inherent in generalisations about the actions and beliefs of groups of people as ‘Māori’ or ‘Pākehā’ or ‘European/New Zealanders/Kiwis’ throughout history and problematises all essentialist ‘truth claims’ (see Belich 1996). This approach follows the ideas of Michel Foucault and his concept of the ‘will to truth’ which is foundational to the development of modernity and to the creation of technologies of the self. To recall the earlier discussion technologies of the self are ways in which people answer the question ‘who are you?’. The answers to this question, for example I am a ‘man’, a ‘woman’, ‘Māori’, ‘Pākehā’, ‘gay’, ‘straight’ and so forth, appear ‘natural’ and transparent, but have arguably emerged at a specific historical point in time, often at the expense of other ways of knowing and are specific to the interests of certain groups.

These ideas necessitate an approach which questions and critiques all discourses (colonial and potentially anti-colonial). As such it can potentially be used by people from all political positionalities to discredit ideas. It also seems to stop short of proposing solutions, in fact this approach is very suspicious of totalising solutions. Therefore political decisions also have to be made about when to adopt this approach. For example in the face of institutionalised racism and barriers which prevent recognition of the Treaty of Waitangi it is important to take a firm stand which denies the ‘truth’ and justice of certain ideas and which firmly promotes the centrality of this document to the organisation of institutions, places of work and study etc. in Aotearoa.

Michel Foucault (1967,1981,1995) develops and uses the concept of discourse to displace and question the ‘naturalness’ of essential truths involved in the construction, categorisations and deployments of such things as sexuality, the nuclear or ‘normal family’ and the medicalisation of notions of ‘health’ and ‘madness’. Foucault also looks at how the production of discourse and knowledge in the social world is inextricably linked by power which is both a constraining and enabling force.
Alan Sheridan in his discussion of Foucault’s “archaeological theory of knowledge” [1980: 89-110] outlined three of the rules of formation which Foucault suggests create discourse. Using the example of the emergence of the medicalised discourse of ‘madness’ Sheridan illustrates these three rules. The first is that there be ‘surfaces of emergence’ which are certain cultural areas and units (such as the family) where the discourse first emerges. These groups have their own rules about ‘reasonable’ (sane) and ‘unreasonable’ (mad) behaviour. The second rule was practiced by ‘authorities of delimitation’ which includes any institutional body which was “…possessed of a certain knowledge and authority recognised by public opinion” [Sheridan 1980:98] for example the government and Law. The third rule of formation is ‘grids of specification’ which are systems whereby different behaviours are classified and related to one another, for example, in psychiatric discourse (bio-power).

‘Truth’ is always a contested area in English-speaking societies. The production of truth is involved with power and the suppression of other discourses. Michel Foucault in an interview printed in Rabinow (1991) argued that ‘truth’ is produced not through the discovery of essential features but through the labelling of certain discourses as ‘true’ or ‘false’ and the political and social power which is attached to discourses labelled ‘true’. This process is “a matter not of a battle ‘on behalf’ of the truth, but of a battle about the status of truth and the economic role it plays” [Foucault in Rabinow; 1991:74] and demonstrates the inextricable link between power and knowledge:

Power produces knowledge ... Power and knowledge directly imply one another ... there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations. Power and knowledge are two sides of the same process. Knowledge cannot be neutral, pure. All knowledge is political not because it may have political consequences or be politically useful, but because knowledge has its conditions of possibility in power relations [Sheridan 1980:220].
This idea relates particularly well to the production of colonial and colonising discourses of ‘race’. The discursive apparatus of ‘race’ was shaped by the detailed examination and observation of other lands and people by English, French, Portuguese, Spanish and Dutch colonial sailors. The discourses which constitute the apparatus of ‘race’ can therefore be described as of Eurocentric origin, and under neo-colonialism, tend to remain so. These colonial observations of different and complex social organisations and widely diverse people were expressed as, and reduced to, statistics, records, measurements, ledgers, accounts and inventories. In the metropole these observations were published in novels and found in other key texts throughout the period of colonial expansion. I discuss this further in Chapter Three. This information was used in an attempt to create certain populations which, through disciplinary strategies and technologies, could be governed and controlled for the social and economic gain of colonial administrators in the colonies and the metropole.

With this in mind, this study is concerned with the representational process in television and print media which has seen certain of these Eurocentric discourses, many of which were justifications for and about colonisation, take on the mantle of ‘truth’ while others are marginalised. In this study I refer to these discourses as redemptive metahistorical narratives which I discuss in the following section. I will also look at the historical development and representation of certain ‘truths’ about colonisation in Aotearoa which have stemmed from the major agendas of colonial conquest ie economic gain and political domination, the desire on the part of the colonisers to escape poverty and joblessness in their home countries and to create a ‘classless society’ in their new homes, while others aimed to make a new England in the South Pacific.

Moving to a new colony demographically dominated by men from the working classes in Britain and the landless peasantry of Ireland and Scotland often promised the chance to own land which was denied them in their home countries. This opportunity to own land tantalisingly offered by Edward Gibbon Wakefield’s New Zealand Company (established 1838) promised the hope of a classless society (among the Europeans at least). However often upon arrival these immigrants found that the land they had bought belonged to local iwi and was never the property of the New Zealand Company to sell. Meanwhile the colonial
Redemptive metahistorical narratives

In this thesis I identify certain discourse as examples of James Clifford’s (1988) theory of the redemptive metahistorical narrative. Redemptive metahistorical narratives treat Western European stories about 'progress' and 'evolution', 'health', 'race' and 'gender' which were involved in the colonising process, as European elite self serving narratives. Literally a redemptive metahistorical narrative is a story positioned above and beyond history (ie ‘true’, ‘just the way things are’) by certain institutional and political forces. Redemptive metahistorical narratives are the justifications and explanations colonisers use to conceptualise, explain and 'know' the concrete manifestations and deployments within the technologies of 'race' and 'gender'. For example the discourses of 'race' within a neo-colonial setting such as Aotearoa affect conceptions of 'self' often on an unconscious level. On a more conscious level discourses of 'race' also affect architecture, methods of teaching, examinations, law systems, land tenure, physical enactments and so forth. The full extent of these discourses, (re)produced as part of and through the disciplinary technologies outlined earlier, may never be fully consciously registered by all of those living in Aotearoa. However power/knowledges involved in the (re)production of discourses of 'race' do become apparent through the assertion of other discourses from the people whose colonised and subordinated knowledges and epistemes are excluded from institutions and conceptions of 'self'. Hierarchies of discourses mean that these subjugated knowledges are given less outlets for expression and must compete with those discourses generated from privileged 'truth making' institutions such as governments,

administration of the times tried to regulate the type of immigration into Aotearoa. They wanted:

genteel, respectable and decent English, Scots and Protestant Irish; moneym, or else young, healthy and rural; with a balance of men and women. They wanted decent working people among these migrants to desire social promotion to respectability above all, but to be willing to serve a substantial apprenticeship as labourers and servants [Belich 1996: 313].

This focus was an attempt to (re)inforce the class system, based on the English model, and to make Aotearoa a 'Britain of the South Seas'. For further discussion see Jeanine Graham in Sinclair (ed) (1990) for a discussion of the life and aspirations of colonial pioneers to Aotearoa between 1840-1870 and Belich (1996).
Universities and so on. However sometimes these subjugated knowledges do appear to challenge the 'truth' of official discourses. When these subjugated discourses become louder, for example the discourse of Māori sovereignty, and present challenges to dominant notions of 'truth', repetitive justifications from those attempting to (re)inforce dominant cultural ideas arise. In a neo-colonial context these justifications include universal ideas of 'progress', 'civilisation', 'evolution', as well as certain conceptions of development as discussed in Chapter Three. Following Clifford (1988), in this study I refer to these latter ideas as redemptive metahistorical narratives.

So in summary, while many technologies of the 'self' are often unconsciously inscribed onto our bodies by other people and internalised by ourselves, redemptive metahistorical narratives can be viewed as primarily conscious attempts to explain and justify, redeem the realities of these technologies of the 'self' (see Figure 1, page 29, for an overview of the theory in this thesis).

James Clifford formulated his idea of the redemptive metahistorical narrative through the study of the assumptions and actions of western ethnographers, anthropologists, museumologists, curiosity hunters and colonial administrators which explained and attempted to justify their collection of different peoples' stories, art and other cultural products which were then displayed in American, English, French and other Western European museums.

The museum and art gallery displays of indigenous cultural products up until the 1980's highlight some Western European and Imperial redemptive metahistorical narratives important to this study such as the entrenchment of the binary categories of 'traditional' versus 'modern', 'Self' versus 'Other', the existence of a clear distinction between 'reality' and the representation of 'reality', the linear progression of time, the importance of salvaging the past and the 'primitive' for curiosity and academic value and a belief in the existence of an 'objective' positionality from which academics, journalists etc. can speak the 'truth' about the world.
Clifford argues that the Western European ‘art and culture’ system with its processes of collection and selection removed cultural products such as a bowl, shrunken head, spoon, carving, from their original contexts, purposes (political and social) and meanings and through a system of display and classification constructed the ‘truth’ of an indigenous culture from a Western European and Eurocentric point of view:

‘Dead’, decontextualised objects...can be restored to ‘life’ by surrounding documentation (descriptions, drawings, photos). The links tying any object or institution to the ‘ensemble of society’ can thus be reconstituted and the truth of the whole elicited scientifically from any one of its parts [Clifford 1988:67].

As part of this metahistorical narrative an ethnographic object was presented as an objective and reliable witness to the ‘truth’ and ‘essence’ of a culture, sometimes even taken as much more reliable, than the ‘subjective’ testimony of a member of that culture.

The effect of attributing the label of ‘authenticity’ to a particular cultural product or style of art from a particular time was to negate the further possibilities of the development of those art forms. Because museum displays have limited room a process of selection was employed which often saw the omission of certain objects which problematised the created cultural ‘truth’ or the cohesion of an exhibition. For example a carving which showed an absorption of different artistic styles (such as those imported from colonising powers) contradicted the idea that traditional art from a certain culture was dying out, incapable of adaptation and therefore in need of preservation in a museum display. These displays and other initiatives such as the documentation of indigenous communities and their customs by ethnographers such as Margaret Mead [1942,1943], Charles Seligman [1957] and James Stack [1898] often demonstrated the importance to these people of recording and somehow keeping ‘alive’ the traditional cultures of the peoples they studied which were threatened by the processes of colonisation. This way of thinking
though often well intentioned, denied the dynamic nature of human and
cultural development and allowed the relegation of ‘tribal’ peoples and
cultures to the past by colonial administrators and institutions such as the
museum. Within this framework ‘tribal’ people were believed to be incapable
of adapting to and existing in the modernising and changing world in a way
particular to their own cultures. Their destiny was to assimilate into the ‘more
advanced’ and ‘superior’ culture of the colonisers:

‘Entering the modern world’ their [indigenous peoples’] distinct histories
quickly vanish. Swept up in a destiny dominated by the capitalist West
and by various technologically advanced socialisms, these suddenly
‘backward’ peoples no longer invent local futures. What is different about
them remains tied to traditional pasts, inherited structures that either resist
or yield to the new but cannot produce it [Clifford 1988:5].

One excellent example of this way of thinking in Aotearoa was contained
within the 1995 Fiscal Envelope Proposal\(^\text{12}\). This proposal claimed that Māori
had no rights to natural resources except those they used in 1840. This
proposal, if accepted by Māori, would effectively disallow any future claims to
the Waitangi Tribunal under the Treaty of Waitangi. This clause in the Fiscal
Envelope implies that Māori people in Aotearoa have not contributed to the
development of natural resources such as coal, oil, exotic forests and
viticulture since 1840 and that they would not have used them had the
colonisers not arrived in Aotearoa.

These Eurocentric ideas suggest the planning and implementation of
development was to be the preserve of Western European nations (and later,
Anglo-Americans) alone. The only way ‘forward’ for indigenous peoples, it
seemed to a majority of colonial administrators, was for them to assimilate into
the culture of the colonising Western European nations and to become

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\(^{12}\) The official name of this document produced by the National government in 1995 is the
Crown Proposals for the Settlement of Treaty of Waitangi Claims. It outlined a process
whereby all Treaty of Waitangi (see appendix) claims would be settled within a definite period
of time, before the year 2000 and within a fiscal cap of one billion dollars. This proposal was
universally rejected by Māori iwi at hui around the country in 1995. See Pihama (ed.),(1995)
for essays analysing the ‘Fiscal Envelope’ and its relationship to Tino Rangatiratanga and the
Treaty of Waitangi.
'civilised' and later 'developed'. This redemptive metahistorical narrative which intersects with developmental theories of Modernisation, Underdevelopment and socio-biological discourses of ‘race’ (discussed further in Chapter Three) was deployed by many colonial administrators, academics and politicians to justify colonial policies which interfaced with and destroyed indigenous languages, economic systems, religions and ways of life.

The theory of the redemptive metahistorical narrative acknowledges the created nature of cultural ‘truisms’ and is a useful way of approaching the cultural ideas which led to, and attempted to rationalise, the colonisation of countries around the world. Redemptive metahistorical narratives are typically important components of larger technologies and discursive configurations around bodies, 'truth' and so on. Key redemptive metahistorical narratives such as 'social evolution', 'progress' and 'civilisation' reinforced, justified and became part of emerging discourses of race and gender in the Nineteenth century. As such redemptive metahistorical narratives became part of Foucault's 'will to truth' in the context of Western European imperialism.

Clifford’s work with this concept in relation to museums acknowledges the destructive effects on indigenous cultures of such global and homogenising processes as economic freemarketerism and consumerist culture but his emphasis is on opening up space for cultural futures. He contends that 'traditions' are merely reactions to today’s realities and that all cultures are in a constant state of flux and reinvention. This idea can focus attention on the way indigenous people and indeed all people draw on symbols, foreign media and languages to make sense of their position in the world today (discussed further in Chapter Four). However Clifford’s assumption that tradition is always in relation to the new seems to retain a Western European and linear view of time and may silence “local narratives of continuity and recovery” [Clifford 1988:15]. So while Clifford’s approach allows for agency on the part of all people (including indigenous people which was traditionally denied them in the colonial imagination (Clifford 1988)) it also has to be tempered with an
analysis of the devastating effects of colonial rule on certain communities and how this may limit their ability to resist the impacts of colonisation through the (re)creation and (re)living of their own culture. It is important to acknowledge ideas such as 'civilisation', 'primitivism', 'race' as redemptive metahistorical narratives and discourses meanwhile recognising their concrete effects in the social world:

I believe in the recognition of devices as devices - but I also believe in the reality of those devices. In one century men choose to hide their conquests under religion, in another under race. So, you and I may recognise the fraudulence of the device in both cases, but the fact remains that a man who has a sword run through him because he will not become a Moslem or a Christian - or who is lynched in Mississippi or Zatembe because he is black - is suffering the utter reality of that device of conquest. And it is pointless to pretend that it doesn't exist - merely because it is a lie...[From Lorraine Hansberry's play Les Blancs in hooks 1992:27].

**Applying the redemptive metahistorical narrative to a study of Television texts**

The theory of the redemptive metahistorical narrative is very useful for an analysis of print and television media which everyday deal with the selection and representation of 'truths' and 'reality' regarding national identities and histories in Aotearoa. For many people living in this country the print and television media are the main sources of information they will get about sovereignty issues, the Treaty of Waitangi and the debates over national identities. For many European/New Zealand people they are clearly the dominant sites for representations of Māori people. If that individual has little first hand knowledge of tikanga Māori or Māori people themselves then these representations (especially in the news) tend to be substituted for lived experience. This process of the selection, classification and presentation of news items about Māori in Aotearoa has elements in common with the selection, classification and display of Māori cultural 'artefacts' in British and colonial museums in that these representational processes are inextricably linked with the flow of power and the creation of colonial knowledge about certain people and communities.
The model on this page (Figure 1) is a summary and overview of the theoretical tools discussed in this chapter and used throughout this thesis.

Figure 1: Overview of Theory used in this thesis.
CHAPTER THREE

REPRESENTATION AND COLONISATION

Colonisation in Aotearoa

The process of colonisation in Aotearoa involved the imposition of a diverse and complex set of cultural values and institutions on the indigenous populations. It saw the arrival of many thousands of immigrants who brought with them their own ways of life, language, idiosyncrasies and expectations. The survival and development of these people relied on the resources of indigenous iwi. At first local iwi, especially around the Wellington, Bay of Islands and Wairau areas, shared their resources freely and often this assistance was the only thing which kept early settlers alive. Although interactions between local iwi and early European sailors, sealers, whalers, traders (from the 1790's) missionaries (from 1814) and other immigrants (a huge influx between 1840 and 1870) were often uneasy and always unpredictable the mutual interests of both groups meant that by 1830 several European settlements were accepted by local iwi:

It was an uneasy racial partnership: Māori would accept Europeans only if they proved useful or harmless. At any time they possessed the power to drive Europeans out or to destroy them. Europeans however could withdraw from or avoid the country, which would deprive Māori of useful goods. There were, then, checks and balances [Orange 1990:24].

The rapid influx of European settlers since the signing of The Treaty of Waitangi in 1840 saw competing interests, ideologies and cultures clash and the resources of the indigenous people taken from them by settlers through legislation, trickery, armed force and other factors such as disease\(^\text{13}\). Thus the

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\(^{13}\) Māori communities had come into contact with European diseases such as dysentery, influenza, measles, whooping cough, cholera, venereal diseases, tuberculosis and streptococcal infections since Captain Cook's voyages in the Eighteenth Century. The introduction of these diseases in Aotearoa did not seem to be an intentional strategy to wipe out local populations, nevertheless the devastating effects of European diseases upon indigenous communities combined with the lack of food during the wars of the 1860's and the alienation of land, rivers and forests worked to the material, economic and social advantage of the rapidly increasing settler population. Epidemics of European diseases were also used by Missionaries in an attempt to further debase Māori traditions and customs in the first half of the Nineteenth
development of the institutions and cultural values prevalent in 1996 Aotearoa relied on the alienation of land, water, fisheries and other taonga and the suppression of the institutions and cultural values, of the Tangata Whenua.

Professor Vine Deloria Jr argues that colonisation is a process which sees the people and laws of one land take over the culture, land and laws of another. This take over is achieved through war or rapid immigration and is based on the coloniser’s belief that they have an inherent right to do this. Furthermore this belief is expressed through religion and in racism and is validated in law [Deloria Jr 1996:85-111]. This definition describes the 1996 realities of life in Aotearoa where the violent history of this country and the ownership of resources has, in the minds of many people, European/New Zealand and Māori alike, been validated and justified through numerous official and informal institutions, and discourses including, but not limited to, the law. However the historical process of colonisation has not only involved the imposition of one people’s ‘culture’ on another it was, and is, also inextricably linked with the creation of that very notion of culture as something which can be classified, defined, collected, controlled and transplanted.

Imagery and the colonial project

Colonisation was an attempt by Western European nations such as Portugal, France, Spain, Holland and England in the period after Columbus’s voyage in 1492 to enforce a certain type of economic and social order on different groups of people which facilitated the extraction of wealth from their lands.14 This wealth was then used to develop the nation states of Europe. To the

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14 The voyage of Christopher Columbus to the Americas in 1492 is referred to as the start of “the European conquest of the world” by author Kirkpatrick Sale cited in an issue of the New Internationalist magazine which commemorated the 500th anniversary of Columbus’s voyage in 1992. One of the contributors to this issue Wayne Ellwood described the “middle aged Italian” sailor’s journey as a “haphazard voyage across the Atlantic [which] set in motion the colonial era” [Ellwood 1991:7].
colonisers, the amount of territories, wealth, subjects and converts a colonial nation could boast increased its prestige and power not only in the minds of those colonised but also and more particularly in the minds of other imperialist Western European nations with whom they were vying for economic and political supremacy.

The colonial voyages and conquests of Sixteenth Century merchants and sailors from different European nations and the tales of interactions with indigenous cultures were represented and documented in courtly poems, plays, popular novels and merchants accounts of the Sixteenth, Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century voyages and ‘conquests’, and later added to by newspapers, letters, postcards from the colonies, tourist brochures, photography, newsreels and films\(^\text{15}\) in the Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries (see Appendix Three for detailed examples).

The camera came to Aotearoa in about 1850 and was used by European settlers and visitors to photograph the landscape and Māori people previously drawn and sketched by European artists such as Isaac Gilseman (a sailor on Abel Tasman’s ship) and William Hodges (an artist on Cook’s second voyage to Aotearoa). The first films were made in Aotearoa in 1898 and generally focused on the tourist spots, scenery and primary industries. John Grierson, an important member of the British documentary movement commented upon this on his visit to Aotearoa in 1940:

\begin{quote}
You see, over in England, we seem to see and hear a lot about New Zealand but never anything about the human beings that live in it. I knew about your mountains and glaciers, your tree ferns and your sheep country. I knew a dozen times over from your films how butter was made and a dozen times over that it always seemed to be called “Solid Sunshine”. I knew that you had a lot of Māoris (sic) who staged shows for rich tourists, and that you had mud that bubbled, and hot water on tap from out of the
\end{quote}

\(^{15}\)For a comprehensive list of Aotearoa film titles from the late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries and for a discussion of the fledgling National Film Unit established in 1941 see Dennis (1981). For a more in-depth and analytical discussion of certain feature films made in Aotearoa such as *The Te Kooti Trail, Rewi’s Last Stand*, and *Broken Barrier* see Dennis and Bieringa (eds) (1992).
earth. I also knew that Taupo trout were the biggest in the world; but nobody had shown me so that I would remember it the face of a New Zealander ... You may make very pleasant scenic pictures but it just is not enough to appear before the world as a mere tourist resort plus a butter factory [Grierson in Dennis 1981: 21].

This quote is revealing in two ways, firstly it accurately sums up the subject matter of films made about Aotearoa in the early Twentieth Century and secondly Grierson’s phrase “I knew you had a lot of Māoris” leaves no doubt who he and the filmmakers he came to speak to, thought were in charge of national image making and filmic technology. Furthermore Māori people were mentioned in the same breath as bubbling mud, mountains, butter exports and glaciers and other 'objects' always present to the camera's gaze. Grierson's exhortation to 'New Zealand filmmakers' to turn the cameras on the face of a 'real New Zealander', ie a European colonial descendent, was a frightening challenge for it involved being the object of investigation and surveillance rather than the subjective producer of images as discussed in Chapter Two. It was perhaps politically safer for New Zealand European colonial descendants to turn the cameras away from themselves and the colonial histories of Aotearoa towards others. It is, after all, a much more powerful activity to watch and study than to be watched and studied. This is discussed further in Chapter Five on page 105.

The literary, pictorial, filmic and photographic representations of colonial voyages to different lands and of different people, were key texts in the creation of the identities of both the indigenous peoples as ‘conquered’ and later ‘colonised’ and the European as ‘conqueror’ and later ‘coloniser’. The earliest colonial voyages linked European and Non-European together in the formation of European identities and the notion of culture and this was first played out in the literature of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries:

In these books, Europe first saw the other, but here it also first saw itself interacting with that other and thus first saw itself as an other - other, that is, than it had been or had thought of itself as being before [Helgerson 1992:27].
The creation of national and individual identities in Western European imperialist countries was often based on the individual acquisition of wealth, knowledge, memories, experiences, objects, territories, converts, etc. The things that were acquired were used to further enhance and define the identity and status of the collector. James Clifford (1988) suggests that the process of assembling around yourself material objects which express the identity of yourself and the people you belong to (which is marked off from those objects which are different from you) is a common human experience. However the idea that this process of collecting is for the accumulation of possessions and wealth which belong specifically to the individual rather than a community is a uniquely European one.

Early and tentative colonial knowledge of different peoples, lands and cultures became the fuel for further colonial strategies. A people and a place could not be conquered and colonised until they were ‘known about’ and marked as ‘colonisable’ and Other to the ‘civilised’ English, Portuguese, Dutch or French ‘self’. In the case of Australia, the indigenous peoples were not recognised as human beings. The colonisation of this land, and legislation which followed, was justified in European and colonial courts and Parliaments by the legal fiction of Terra Nullius, i.e.; that the land was unoccupied before European ‘discovery’ 16. The ‘savages’ and ‘primitives’ ‘discovered’ by Western European colonisers became the Other of ‘civilisation’. Non-European people’s customs, life, styles of dress and particularly different cultural attitudes towards sexuality were taken as proof of ‘depravity’ and as confirmation of an ‘inferior morality’:

16 This principle also justified the wholesale genocidal attack on Aboriginal populations in Australia such as the indigenous populations in Tasmania who were hunted and shot by white bushrangers as “meat for their dogs” [Franklin 1976:30] in the early 1800’s. The recent Mabo decision of 1992 (Mabo v Queensland) challenges this assumption legally in recognising native land titles to land owned at the time Captain Cook first bumped into the Australian coastline, over two hundred years ago. However there are still problems with this decision which has “left unresolved the definition of native title rights and the questions of which lands are subject to native titles and which indigenous people are the legitimate holders of native title rights. No compensation is payable for native titles lost prior to the decision, and titles to remaining lands can be extinguished in various ways” [Miller 1993:72].
The person of the savage was developed as the Other of civilisation and one of the first ‘proofs’ of this Otherness was the nakedness of the savage, the visibility of its sex. This led Europeans to assume that the savage possessed an open and frank and uninhibited ‘sexuality’ - unlike the sexuality of the European, which was considered to be unfettered by the weight of civilisation [Mercer and Julian 1988: 107].

The expanding colonial empires in the Nineteenth Century, which meant interaction with very many different thoughts, perceptions and people, led to the (re)construction of Western European identities in relation to and separated from the Other (indigenous peoples). Homi Bhabha (1994) argues that an important part of the process of Othering is the fixing of cultural, sexual and ‘racial’ difference onto colonised peoples. He suggests the negative traits projected onto the Other are in fact the repressed desires and aspects of the ‘self’ which have to be constantly denied. This denial is apparent in the “anxiously repeated” [Bhabha 1994: 66] racist and sexist stereotypes which attempt to (re)create the binary between self and Other. The constant repetition of these negative stereotypes suggests that this distance is hard to achieve and maintain. This concept is developed in relation to 1996 Waitangi Day news coverage in Chapters Five and Six.

**The ascendance of ‘high’ culture**

One of the ways in which the division between self and Other was created and (re)inforced was through the emergence of a new definition of culture in the Nineteenth Century. This rigid definition of ‘culture’ came to signify the “most elevated, sensitive, essential and precious” [Clifford 1988:234] things in society. This meaning of ‘culture’ signalled a change from the Eighteenth Century when the word primarily meant an inclination to grow and change naturally and was used in relation to humans and agriculture (O’Connor and Downing 1995). These changing meanings meant that the notion of ‘culture’ in the Nineteenth Century was used as the “...final court of appeal against threats of vulgarity and levelling” [Clifford 1988:234] and appeals to protecting and maintaining cultural standards became an antidote to the forces
in Western European Imperial and Colonial societies which could lead to 'anarchy'. This new understanding of the cultural order also resulted in the elevation of the art works and customs of mainly Western European upper class men and excluded and marginalised the work and pastimes of women, the peasantry and indigenous societies. In 1957 Roland Barthes challenged the high and low art/culture distinction this notion of culture generated.

However there are still many who believe in this hierarchy which places such 'high-minded' pursuits as the Opera (once also considered vulgar and popular) orchestral music and certain forms of art work at the 'top' and the production and study of such things as popular and tourist art, women's 'crafts' such as weaving and quilting, television and 'mainstream' popular film at the 'bottom'.

The construction of this rigid cultural order in the late Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries needed art, objects, possessions and customs to define itself against. In order to be perceived as “rational, beautiful and normal” Western European culture needed that which was ‘irrational’, ‘ugly’ and ‘abnormal’ and these things were thought to be found in indigenous cultures and were referred to as the ‘primitive’ and the ‘exotic’.

**Competing redemptive metahistorical narratives of colonising powers**

This pursuit and accumulation of knowledge about other lands and people has its roots in the Enlightenment period when 'discovery' and 'reason' were pursued wholeheartedly by academics, merchants, sailors, scientists and other sections of the population. Nicholas Dirks asserts that colonialism “...provided a theatre for the Enlightenment project, the grand laboratory that linked discovery and reason” [1992a:6]. In other words the ‘discovery’ of

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17 Some of these potentially radical forces which could challenge the existing power structures in Western European countries and their colonies were the suffrage movements, the abolition of slavery, the inter-marriage and close proximity of indigenous populations and ‘white’ populations, the contradictory feelings colonial settlers felt for their new natural environments like the bush, jungle etc., the writing of Karl Marx and working class unrest and resulting organisations.

18 See also MacCabe et al (1986) for a review of the high/low culture debates in popular culture.

19 See Memmi (1965) for a detailed discussion of this idea.
territories, knowledge and people, was accompanied by a discursive explosion of sciences designed to map, sort and classify these new wonders. Many of these ‘new knowledges’ gathered through colonial ‘discovery’ serve to represent the rest of the world and indeed the colonial mission through European eyes on European terms.

However there are different European justifications for and stories surrounding the motives for colonial endeavours. Richard Helgerson’s (1992) study of Portuguese literature (in particular the Portuguese national poem “The Lusiads”) shows that representations of colonial missions highlighted the honour of conquest and the spreading of Christian Faith over any commercial motives. English literature on the other hand embraced and valued the merchants and trading aspects of colonial conquests. Helgerson suggests that much debate and handwringing over the ‘correct’ and ‘real’ motives for colonial voyages (which reflect on the identity of the colonising nation) have surrounded colonialism from the outset. Helgerson states that Europe underwent “a constant if uneven, process of practical and ideological adaptation to the new conditions discovered or created by its own expansionist activities” [Helgerson 1992:27]. Political views, discursive power/knowledge relations in the metropole were effected by ‘discoveries’ in the ‘new world’ and vice versa.

These tensions were also present in English representations of colonialism, but another factor which played a part in these texts was England’s attempt to distinguish its style of colonial exploration and rule from that of the Portuguese who were branded as ‘barbaric’ and ‘cruel’ by other European nations. In the English literature of the time it appeared that the “...pursuit of trade rather than conquest becomes a sign of England’s virtuous difference” [Helgerson 1992:53]. Thus the commercial trading aspect of colonial

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20 The ‘civilised’ and ‘genteel’ colonial rule of the British is a well known and entrenched colonial narrative. It is a story which has become a central redemptive metahistorical narrative in this country amongst certain communities. Often it is used to justify the continued dominance of European/New Zealand institutions and people in Aotearoa society. When the more barbaric acts of British colonisation in Aotearoa are raised the retort is often similar to
voyages was emphasised and by the end of the Eighteenth Century celebrated. Helgerson’s study of Elizabethan popular literature showed that it was often the merchants who were portrayed as heroic and who were represented as performing with dignity in foreign lands. Everything such as conversion and the spread of Christianity was to serve the interests of commerce. Merchants were also the source of some of this literature. Works such as The Principal Navigations, Voiages Traffiques and Discoveries of the English Nation... by Richard Hakluyt (1589/1907)\(^{21}\) and Voyage aux Regions Equinoxiales... (1852-1853) by Sailor and scholar Alexander Humboldt served to represent the world as numerous trade links, full of collectable and valuable commodities (precious metals, cloths, wood, land, art, people) and their instant worth was quantified in the prices placed upon them.

In the Eighteenth century English social theorists, most notably Adam Smith, argued that it would make more economic sense to establish trade with sovereign nations than to try to administer and control conquered people. In An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776/1976) Smith devoted a chapter to exploring the benefits to England of establishing and supporting other strong sovereign nations which England could trade with. To him this was preferable than spending the money to establish and maintain direct colonial rule in ‘conquered’ territories. Smith argued that the prosperity of nations comes from ‘free trade’ rather than monopolistic economic and political control of different colonies. This argument which seems to run

\[^{21}\text{For more discussion of the life and work of Richard Hakluyt see D.B.Quinn (ed) (1974).}\]
counter to the Imperialist acquisition of different territories did not, however, curb the desire to build an English ‘Empire’ which as history shows has led to the acquisition of territories all over the world, one of the last being Aotearoa. It also failed to interrogate the fact that this view of world trade relied upon one of the most influential European colonial exports, that is, the idea of the nation state.

These examples suggest that discourses and redemptive metahistorical narratives which are proffered as explanations or motives or justifications for colonisation and the multifarious activities, exchanges, conquests, battles that took place within the colonies are produced just as much by politics, disagreements (and attempts to bridge them) within the metropole as the ‘reality’ and circumstances of life in the colonies. It also shows that disagreements over the reasons for colonisation were rife in the preceding centuries just as they are now.

Bio-politics, social evolution and development

The ‘development’ of nations and people became a concern of colonisation and colonial administrators. Colonial bio-political preoccupations with gaining and collecting knowledge about Others, which could be used in turn to govern them, meant that the definition of ‘development’ emerged in a certain way. This idea of what constituted ‘development’ evolved: “...out of colonial concerns that the state monitor production, collect revenue, assemble data, and manage the economy” [Dirks 1992a:20]. The ‘civilisation’ of colonial territories, defined in relation to the values and aspirations of certain Western European classes, was seen by colonial administrators both in the colony and the metropole as having to replicate the experience of Western European nations which were assumed to be at the apex of human development. This idea is a Eurocentric redemptive metahistorical narrative deployed to justify many processes which denigrated and then usurped indigenous socio-political and economic systems. The idea of lineal progressive evolution filtered into

\[22\] See Helgerson 1992 for further discussion.
all areas of Western European academic thought which were concerned with the explanation of human affairs in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries. In essence Darwin’s (1856/1975) theory of evolution put forward that there were endless variations amongst individual members of a species. Of these only a fraction who are born survive to reproduce. There is a struggle for existence amongst members of the species during which the ‘fittest’ members survive long enough to genetically transmit their characteristics to the next generation. Thus over many generations Nature ‘selects’ those who best adapt to their surroundings (Crain 1992:29). While Darwin never specifically talked about humankind in his work his ideas profoundly influenced the fields of psychology, Christianity, geography, history, anthropology and many more (Bratchell 1981; Buschbaum (ed) 1967; de Beer 1963).

Social evolution is a broad term used to describe the use of Darwin’s concepts of evolution, natural selection and survival of the fittest, in human affairs. Aspects of social evolution can be seen as redemptive metahistorical narratives which were used to justify all manner of power relations in human affairs such as colonial relationships, inequalities between classes, and the massive disruptions and changes brought about by the industrial revolution in Western European countries. The idea of social evolution shaped and in turn was shaped by the changing discursive conception of ‘race’ and was deployed to explain all of the processes referred to above in terms of biological essentialism, natural evolution and ‘progress’.

One of the basic premises of social evolution is that human life is in a constant state of movement forward from a barbaric and primitive beginning to a more

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23 Darwin’s *The Voyage of the Beagle* which documented his observations from the now famous voyage to South America and across the Pacific (1831-1836/1906) was a Victorian best seller.

24 Darwin formulated his theory of evolution through a study of the Galapagos Finches and the evolution and adaptation of certain groups within animal species. In the concluding chapter of *On the Origin of the species* (1856/1975) he commented that his findings may have important effects on the study of the biological origins of humankind (De Rooy 1990:11). One of the most influential and controversial idea from Darwin’s work is the assertion that creation did not take place over six days as in the Christian doctrine but that it was a long and continual process.
civilised and whole (evolved) society. Within this framework individuals from certain communities or even entire ‘populations’ who were considered incapable of adapting and assimilating into ‘Western civilisation’ would be culled in the relentless movement ‘forward’. As mentioned in the previous pages the way ‘forward’ was defined by groups within Western European nations. This cull is achieved through the competition for resources and it is only the strongest group, community, ‘race’ who are able and worthy enough to claim their share, reproduce and thus survive. This way of thinking is evident in the eugenics movement of the early 1900’s which I discussed in Chapter Two, pages 11-12. Any inequalities between groups of people were often justified by the phrase ‘survival of the fittest’:

inequality of groups - of peoples, nations, classes, races ... may seem harsh, since in the struggle for survival the weak are the losers. But if one takes a loftier view one will note that those who survive are stronger and better: ‘the survival of the fittest’. Precisely because the tares are weeded out, noble plants are given space to grow and flourish. This explains the tremendous Western growth of technology and science, wealth and culture. From this it is but one step to the thought that the elite are rightly in power, that certain countries are legitimately in a position of hegemony, that Western colonising is correct, even if it implies suppression or perhaps extinction of indigenous populations [De Rooy 1990:9].

Bio-political concerns with the regulation of life and the future development of ‘populations’ and ‘races’ gave rise to these redemptive metahistorical narratives which, taken in their extreme, attempted to justify colonial genocidal practices in many nations around the world. The Nineteenth Century discourse of ‘race’ was a way of introducing fundamental and supposedly biological divisions between rulers and ruled and even those who can live and those who can die\textsuperscript{25}. Furthermore Stoler argues that the theory of

\textsuperscript{25} These ‘biological differences’ have been explained by Anthony Appiah (1986) in terms of genetic differences between all human beings. He suggests that the biological difference between ‘races’ of people is only marginally higher than those within these same ‘races’ and is much less significant than the genetic structures we all commonly possess as humans (eg the ability to acquire language, smile etc.). He concludes that ‘race’ therefore is “relatively unimportant” [Appiah 1986:31] in explaining biological and cultural differences between people: “The truth is that there are no races, there is nothing in the world that can do all we ask ‘race’ to do for us. The evil that is done is done by the concept and by easy - yet impossible - assumptions as to its application [35-36]”. See also Stepan (1982) for an historical analysis of how the discourse of ‘race’ has been deployed by British scientists in scientific fields.
social evolution contains within it the notion that: "the more you kill and let die, the more you will live" [1996:84] which establishes a positive relationship between the continuation of life and the right to kill. Within this framework killing is more than eliminating an enemy, it is regenerating your own life. These redemptive metahistorical narratives were intertwined with the deployment of the larger discourses of 'race' which reverberated throughout the Nineteenth and Twentieth centuries. They have had very concrete and tragic effects in colonial Australia and Aotearoa, in Nazi Germany, Rwanda, Zaire and the former Yugoslavia.

The hierarchical social evolutionary perspective which placed Western European technology, culture and 'civilisation' at the top end of the 'chain of being' with non-western, indigenous populations at the bottom, was developed in much fictional and academic literature of the Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries. Social evolutionary writers such as Lewis Morgan (1877/1974), Herbert Spencer (1876-1896/1975), John Lubbock (1913) and George Romanes (1888) intimated that indigenous populations were at a more primitive evolutionary stage and thus on a lower scale than European civilisations and people. These discourses were used to justify the colonisation and control of many indigenous communities by European people. The redemptive metahistorical narrative of human evolution was used to explain the rapid decline of some indigenous populations in Africa in terms of 'survival of the fittest'. Benjamin Kidd (1894) wrote in Social Evolution that:

The Anglo-Saxon has exterminated the less developed people's (sic) with which he has come into competition ... through the operation of laws not less deadly [than war] and even more certain in their result. The weaker races disappear before the stronger through the effects of mere contact ... The Anglo-Saxon driven by forces inherent in his own civilisation, comes to develop the natural resources of the land, and the consequences appear inevitable [1884:46].

This idea of 'fatal impact' ie that the 'inferior race' would naturally give way to the 'superior European race' merely through contact was also popular in
colonial Aotearoa especially between 1870-1900. In 1881, A.K. Newman in a study of the causes of Māori depopulation wrote:

> taking all things into consideration, the disappearance of the race is scarcely subject for much regret. They are dying out in a quick, easy way, and are being supplanted by a superior race [Newman cited in Belich 1986: 299]

These arguments were used to justify and explain such things as the slave trade from Africa and the establishment of direct colonial rule in Aotearoa, Australia, Nigeria, Kenya, Canada etc. Typically the varying shades of skin colour and visible 'difference' of indigenous populations determined the level of 'evolution' attributed them by European scholars and colonial administrators. Thus the "civilised man, who had acquired the appearance of superiority in his Aryan manifestation" [Breman 1990:1-2] declared himself the master of people with darker skin tones who, within this framework were not considered far removed from animals [Haeckel 1883]. These arbitrary and pseudo-scientific notions of 'biological racial difference' attempted to rationalise the inequalities between the colonisers and the colonised - those who were 'destined' to be in control and who were more 'civilised' or 'evolved', and those who 'needed' to be controlled:

> In the nineteenth century ... race becomes the organising grammar of an imperial order in which modernity, the civilising mission and the "measure of man" were framed. And with it, "culture" was harnessed to do more specific political work; not only to mark difference, but to rationalise the hierarchies of privilege and profit, to consolidate the labour regimes of expanding capitalism, to provide the psychological scaffolding for the exploitative structures of colonial rule [Stoler 1996: 27].

The Nineteenth Century discourses of 'race' and redemptive metahistorical narratives of social evolution, 'civilisation' and 'fatal impact' theories, were used to legitimate the processes of European colonisation which involved the
suppression and destruction of indigenous communities in the name of 'progress' and 'development'.

Development paradigms - Modernisation and Underdevelopment

Academic, governmental and organisational theories of 'Development' were linked with the establishment of the nation state and the furthering of capitalism. They were thus concerned mainly with economics, the spreading of industrialised technology and 'progress' and European systems of democracy, liberty and justice. These things were thought to be incompatible with 'traditional' ways of life. Western ideas of 'primitivism' contributed to a push for change and 'development' which would transform the 'tribal' peoples into 'civilised people' (i.e., no longer 'heathens') just like their 'western' selves. This colonial desire to change Others, often thought to be 'for their own good', highlights one of many reasons why the experiences of colonised people could never totally replicate those of people from Western European countries. For example, the desire for Western European 'development' (as defined above) came from forces within the Western European nations themselves, whereas similar development programmes and this type of change were in the early stages largely imposed upon indigenous communities by outsiders. Furthermore, some of the theoretical underpinnings of ideas to do with development came from Western European thinkers such as Emile Durkheim.

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26. The physical manifestation of 'race' never coincided with the importance and centrality of the discourse of 'race' in legislation and social and cultural interactions due to the intermingling and interaction of different groups. The criteria which related to who qualified as a 'European' also changed with political circumstances in the colonial context and did not rely solely on ethnic origin:

In the Netherland Indies during the early twentieth century, the legal category of 'European' included within it Japanese, Jews, Arabs, Americans, Filipinos, naturalised Javanese, the Sudanese wives of Dutch-born bureaucrats, the recognised children of mixed marriages and Christian Africans, among others... To acquire European legal equivalence in 1884, one had to (1) be Christian, (2) speak and write Dutch, (3) have a European upbringing and education, and (4) demonstrate a suitability for European society [Stoler 1992:339].

27. 'Development Theory' refers to a distinct area of inquiry and pool of literature which developed after World War Two in North American and Western European universities. The main concern of many developmental theories is to find ways to theorise both 'development' and 'underdevelopment'. These theories were and are influenced by, and influence, the overlapping spheres of politics, culture, technology and economics discussed further in chapter four on page 6. Development theories are important because they influence the practice of many development workers and the design of developmental projects.
and Max Weber who both studied the type, pace, motivations for and effects of Western European industrialisation and development. For example Durkheim's rigid and dichotomous conception of 'traditional' versus 'mechanical' ('modern') societies (1893/1966) is repeated and developed further in the works of Modernisation theorists such as Rostow (1956). Weber's (1904/1976) argument that capitalist development took place in Western societies due to the rationalisation of capital and through the desire for rationality in legal systems, science, bureaucracies and belief systems is elaborated in McClelland's (1970) work concerning the 'correct' psychological approach to development. Thus Development theories were in some ways shaped by and have, to some extent, become part of the technology of 'race'. Development theories also contain within them, and arguably in the case of Modernisation, continue to rely upon, many of the redemptive metahistorical narratives already outlined in this chapter.

The Modernisation paradigm of development focuses on economic development which, Modernisation theorists claim, can only occur when human communities move from what is characterised as 'traditional' society to what is characterised as 'modern' society. Rostow and McClelland (both North American) following Durkheim and Weber write of 'traditional society' as consisting of strong kinship systems, 'simple' and 'traditional' technologies, subsistence farming, the use of human and animal power, village and rural existence around which the social and political were organised and the importance of traditional knowledge, labelled as 'superstitions' and 'religious' beliefs, to the organisation of the community. A community which fitted these descriptions was considered to be in a state of 'underdevelopment'. 'Modern' society within the same framework was

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28 The classifying of the traditional knowledge and technologies of indigenous populations as 'simple' and 'primitive' was not only due to colonial arrogance but also to the fact that these technologies often had dimensions to them which were out of the awareness of first world colonising nations. There are moves now within the scientific world and also among indigenous peoples who have lost much of their traditional knowledge through colonisation to go back and reassess the value of these knowledges previously labelled 'primitive'. However there is often a neo-colonial flavour to the explorations undertaken by First World scientists, especially those funded by multi-national corporations in the age of intellectual property rights.
distinguishable because of the gradual appearance of nuclear families which lived mainly in urban areas in the industrialising nations, the application of ‘scientific’ knowledge to ‘advanced technology’ and the commercial production of agricultural goods (specialisation in cash crops etc.). Industrialisation involved people working for wages in factories and with machines. In ‘modern’ society the ‘superstitions’ of the ‘traditional’ societies have allegedly been replaced (and also apparently disproved) by ‘science,’ and secular beliefs hold sway in governmental systems characterised by systems of suffrage and democracy, political parties, and the civil service [Smelser 1966:119-120]. A community such as this was considered ‘developed’. Therefore the process of development was confined to a movement from the socio-political and economic organisations of ‘traditional’ societies to the socio-political and economic organisations of ‘modern’ society²⁹.

A basic premise of Modernisation theory is that the ‘Western’ development path can and should be used as a blueprint for the development of other nations. Generally Modernisation theories did not have an historical analysis of the effects and even necessity of colonisation on and for the level of ‘Western’ economic development. Modernisation developmental plans for former colonies did not take into account the fact that much of the raw materials (coal, wood, gold, tin) used to fuel the industrial revolution in England and other Western European countries was extracted from colonies such as South Africa, Kenya, Indonesia, India and Aotearoa. Both the economy³⁰ and infrastructure³¹ of these colonies were developed to facilitate

²⁹ See Friedman (1975) and Novak (1982) who are both contemporary Modernisation theorists.

³⁰ When the British colonial administrators arrived in India there was a thriving indigenous cloth and textile trade which rivaled that in Britain. Through different pieces of legislation such as the Navigations acts and trade barriers of the 1800’s this industry was virtually destroyed and India was turned into the supplier of raw materials for the English textile industry. Meanwhile the goods made from these raw materials in British factories were reimported to India:

In Gujarat, the cultivation and export of raw cotton became an outstanding symbol of the colonial economic influence...India was drawn during the Nineteenth Century into an international division of labour where she was largely relegated to the status of a supplier of raw materials in exchange for manufactured products from the advanced (sic) capitalist countries [Lakha 1988:46, 55]
the efficient extraction and shipping of natural resources to the metropole. Local industry and trade were also directed to the ‘Mother’ country which often meant that colonies ended up trying to sell the same primary products to the same metropole nations. This meant the prices for food and natural resources were kept low for Western European entrepreneurs and industrialists while at the same time their products had guaranteed markets in the colonies.

The colonies were also considered to be the breeding ground of robust, strong and masculine men who could be relied upon and used in war to defend the social, political and economic interests of the ‘Empire’. Within the framework of eugenics, popular in the first forty or so years of the 1900’s (see pages 11-12), the wide open spaces, fresh air and supposedly rural and physical lifestyle in colonies such as Aotearoa were considered perfect conditions to produce an endless supply of soldiers. Furthermore Phillips argues that within Aotearoa war was taught as one of the main ways in which a man was to demonstrate his masculinity:

By 1914 Pākehā men had been taught that war was the acid test of their masculinity. Indoctrinated in the military values of the English public school, they had been told that a disciplined heroism in the battles of the Empire was a defining male experience. In the example of the Boer War and even the conquering All Blacks they had learnt that because of their pioneering past New Zealand men had a special contribution to make in these Imperial struggles [1996:158].

Aotearoa sent many men both Māori and European/New Zealand to fight in the ‘Great War’ of 1914-1918 and ‘World War Two’ between 1939-1945. Often the colonial soldiers were used as front line troops in some of the bloodiest

31 The construction of the Kenyan railway (made possible by the 1896 Land Acquisitions Act allowing the colonial authorities to take land at will for the Railway) both facilitated the ‘white’ settlement of inner Kenya and the freighting of resources from inner Africa to the port of Mombasa where they were shipped back to England and other metropole countries. The railway came to symbolise the triumph of British and European technology and bravery (to the white settlers) and the tyranny and cruelty of British rule and colonisation (to many indigenous people in Kenya). Infrastructural development is often cited as one of the altruistic and positive legacies of colonisation. These discourses often overlook the real economic reasons for the development of a territory’s infrastructure and the hardship encountered by indigenous peoples who were forced to work on railways and roads and who lost more and more land as a result of their construction.

32 The All Blacks are the national rugby team of Aotearoa.
battles of both wars such as Gallipoli in 1915. The participation of Māori in these wars was encouraged by leaders such as Sir Apirana Ngātā who described their efforts as "the last demonstration of the highest citizenship" [Gardiner 1992: 179]. He and his contemporaries hoped that the formation of the Māori battalion and its participation and bravery during the fighting would translate into acceptance, tolerance and government assistance at home. But upon returning to Aotearoa these soldiers were not provided with the same developmental assistance (mainly economic) offered to European soldiers and their communities. Both of these wars which were arguably about the maintenance of colonial Empires, were defining events in the social, cultural and economic development of Aotearoa.

The legacy of Aotearoa’s colonial economy and developmental path was made apparent to certain colonial descendants in the 1970s when Great Britain joined the European Economic Community. This move saw Britain turn its attention away from its former ‘Empire’ in the South Pacific towards neighbouring Europe. In economic terms this meant farmers in Aotearoa were no longer guaranteed their traditional markets in Europe. It signalled a need for exporters and farmers in Aotearoa to see themselves as a South Pacific Nation rather than as an ‘England in the South Seas’ and to search for, and cultivate, markets in both the Pacific and throughout Asia.

The redefinition and realignment of nations is always involved with political and economic motives and followed up with various programmes of persuasion aimed at creating acceptance amongst different people for these new alignments. Claudia Bell argues that the Labour government’s (1984-1990) efforts in the 1980s to assert Aotearoa’s South Pacific identity, outlined in the political document “Towards a Pacific Island Community”, were met with “little enthusiasm” [1996:6-8]. The recent assertions by the conservative National government (1990-1996) that Aotearoa is part of Asia has also been resisted by Māori and European/New Zealand and Pākehā communities alike.
and these tensions are often played out in the schools and on the streets. This very recent switch in Aotearoa’s political and economic emphasis from Britain to the South Pacific region and Asia has been seen and talked about in different ways. In the early 1970’s Great Britain’s move was seen as a betrayal of ‘New Zealanders’ who had provided the ‘Mother country’ food and men during both world wars. This betrayal was especially felt by World War Two veterans, their families and colonial descendants who still referred to England as ‘home’. In the early 1980’s certain groups started talking about these shifts in terms of a process of economic and psychological decolonisation which saw the cutting, or at least weakening, of links with the metropole as necessary to further development in Aotearoa. Donna Awatere (1984) argued this in her book entitled *Maori Sovereignty* where she also questioned which communities benefited from capitalist development and ties to Britain in the first place.

Debates surrounding the (re)alignment of nations and questions about who capitalist development and Modernisation really benefited/benefits, had also been raging in the wider colonial world. In the 1960s and 1970s decolonisation movements in countries such as Indonesia, Nigeria and Kenya, and the apparent failure of many Latin American and so called Third

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34 Bell (1996) writes that in one prominent Auckland school a group of parents, concerned at the top marks and prizes going to ‘Asian’ students, are lobbying for the assurance of ‘Pakeha cultural safety’. Many racist discourses are also expressed in debates surrounding the amount of resources needed to integrate non-English speaking Asian students into the school system. Acts of anti-Asian racial violence also increased in early 1996 after New Zealand First leader Winston Peter’s sustained attack on the levels of Asian immigration through the print and television media and at public meetings throughout the country.

35 In Indonesia at the end of the Nineteenth Century there were mass demonstrations against Dutch colonial powers which led to the formation of groups such as the Volkraad People’s council and the Gabusan Politik Indonesia. These groups formed to defend the rights of the indigenous populations. They demanded democracy, autonomy and national unity. Indonesia was invaded by Japanese forces in the WW2 and in 1945 when the Japanese surrendered, they gave nationalist leader Sukarno the power to establish an autonomous government. The Dutch fought to regain control of the archipelago, but surrendered by 1949. In 1954 Indonesia became fully independent. Nigerian independence from British colonial governments, gained on October 1st 1960, brought the Northern People’s Congress to power in an alliance with the National Council of Nigerian Citizens. In Kenya 1944 Jomo Kenyatta and the Kenyan African Union (KAU) organised strikes and mass demonstrations against the British colonial powers. At around the same time the Mau Mau (a political and religious group) whose aims were self government, the restitution of lands, wage parity and the rejection of Christianity launched a guerrilla war against colonial powers and Kikuyu loyalists. In 1952 the British declared a State of Emergency in an attempt to quell the rebellion and imprisoned leaders such as
World 36 countries to develop along the lines of the Western European capitalist model gave voice to a new set of development theories. These ideas, which are generally referred to as ‘Dependency’ or ‘Underdevelopment’ theories, concentrated on the removal of the capitalist monetary system. They also offered an historical analysis of development which included the study of the effects of colonisation (see Frank 1972). From here emerged understandings and definitions of ‘exploitation’ and how it was seen to work on a world-wide economic scale to stunt the ‘development’ of certain nations (Wallerstein 1979). Some of the conclusions drawn by these theorists were that the levels of economic development of countries such as America, Britain, France and Germany etc. directly correlated to the levels of so-called ‘underdevelopment’ of countries in Latin America, Africa and some parts of Asia. Frank’s famous quote sums up this position:

Economic development and underdevelopment are the opposite sides of the same coin. Both are the necessary result and contemporary manifestation of internal contradictions in the world capitalist system. Economic development and underdevelopment are ... [each] caused by its relation with the other [1972:9].

Dependency theory conceptualises capitalist economics as a globalised system of exploitation which only benefits the core countries, suggesting it is impossible for development to occur in the peripheral countries under a

Kenyatta without trial. By 1960 the KAU was legalised, Kenyatta was released in 1961, became Prime Minister in 1963 and President of the independent Kenya in 1964 [Bissio 1992].

36The terms “Third World” and “First World”, “Developed” and “Underdeveloped”, “Western” and “Non Western”, “North and South” are all problematic and reduce global difference to binary oppositions. These terms also erase the fact that within any “Third World” country there are communities with the resources and living styles and standards of “First World” countries and vice versa. These binary categories also suggest a very European (and evolutionary) way of looking at the world and not surprisingly Western European nations (and Australia, Aotearoa, The United States and Canada) place themselves within the most desirable categories such as “Developed” and “First World”. These binary terms pass over huge differences not only within countries but also on a national level as we are expected or invited to view countries as different and distinct as Malaysia and Nigeria or Aotearoa and America under a single frame. For more discussion of the difficulties involved with the use of these terms see During (1992). Having said this, sometimes it is useful to use these terms to signpost the discussion of certain dominant discourses (“Western”, “Developed” etc.) or marginalised discourses (“Non-Western”, “Developing” etc.) in order to link into and identify many of the common understandings conveyed by the use of them. This study will problematise these terms.
capitalist system. Therefore a socialist revolution and the cutting of ties with the capitalist world are necessary before Third World countries can share in the 'world's bounty' and achieve economic development [Baran and Sweezy 1966; Frank 1972].

One of the common criticisms of Dependency theories which were based on Frank's supposition was their lack of concrete policy initiatives to both correct the 'ravages' of Modernisation and to offer other ways forward. Critics of Dependency theory also point to the economic development of many Asian countries (often referred to as NICs or Newly Industrialising Countries), and the 1973 OPEC decision to raise oil prices, which supposedly demonstrated the political and economic power of Third World nations [Harris 1987; Novak 1982; Seers 1981]. When looking at 'development' in Aotearoa it is also possible to see the inability of this totalising theory to explain the different levels of economic development amongst different communities within one nation. For example 'race', gender and class all affect the levels of development between and within Māori and European/New Zealand and Pākehā communities in this so called First World country. As Trinh T Minh-Ha (1986) says: "There is a Third World in every First World, and vice-versa". Moreover by condemning the Modernisation paradigm outright Frank overlooks the ways in which indigenous populations in this country (and others) have appropriated the language, art, technologies of the colonisers for their own developmental ends.\(^{37}\)

**Applying power/knowledge to development**

Two things that both the Modernisation and Dependency theories of development have in common are their preoccupation with defining 'development' exclusively in economic terms and their focus on 'top down,' government directed and controlled development plans. This focus and belief in the centrality of government's role in formulating the direction of development to which the entire country and all of the communities within it

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\(^{37}\) See Panoho (1992) which looks at the incorporation of European/New Zealand technologies into Māori art and culture.
have to conform, presupposes a structuralist approach to power. To some extent the entire issue of development is about power and the way it operates in different communities. Often power is investigated in terms of who has 'it' and who does not, who controls resources and who does not. This structuralist approach can mean two things; firstly that the power to change is conceived of as residing in the hands of dominant groups and institutions alone, at all times, and in all social interactions (such as ‘white’ people and governments) and secondly that power is considered negative, destructive and restrictive. Often the very simple fact that the state and its agents, especially in the field of development, needs people and communities in order to achieve anything, is lost in the drawing up of ‘top down’ development plans. The failure of many grand Modernisation projects\(^{38}\) suggests that the narrow definition of development and the idea that power resides only within the state, inadequately theorises both the actual engagements of people with state development plans and projects, and the ever changing ways people operate in, construct and relate to their communities and environments.

Foucault’s post structuralist approach suggests that the huge focus on the way the state wields power ignores other power relations which are part of and indeed create everyday social interactions:

I don’t want to say that the state isn’t important; what I want to say is that relations of power, and hence the analysis that must be made of them, necessarily extend beyond the limits of the state. In two senses: first of all because the state, for all the omnipotence of its apparatuses, is far from being able to occupy the whole field of actual power relations, and further because the state can only operate on the basis of other, already existing power relations. The state is superstructural in relation to a whole series of power networks that invest the body, sexuality, the family, kinship, knowledge, technology, and so forth [Foucault in Rabinow 1991: 64].

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\(^{38}\) Some examples of Modernisation projects which have not worked and which have caused huge environmental damage and increased the poverty and hardship of many communities are the Sardar Sarovar Narmada River Valley dam project in India jointly sponsored by the Indian government and the World Bank [Ellwood 1990:15]. Another example is the Alimentos Congelados Monte Bella project in Guatemala [Swift 1988:10-11]. See also Wolfgang Such (1992) for further examples of failed development projects and for critiques of aid and ideas of ‘progress’. 

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According to this Foucauldian reconceptualisation, if development is about the operations of power and knowledge in human affairs then the fields of study must necessarily extend beyond an analysis of GDP and other economic factors in Third World countries to such things as the media and popular culture, school curriculums and institutions such as the Church, local government, small businesses, multinationals, and ideas of the 'self' 'race', gender and nationality all of which are conditioned by, and condition, the flow of power and the creation of knowledge in communities. Thus the definition of development must also change to incorporate such issues as empowerment, participation, sustainability, environment, gender, ethnicity, sexuality and mobility. When this happens tools for development multiply dramatically.

Such reconceptualisation had already started to occur in Development Theory in the late 70s with the participatory approach starting to shape the face of many smaller scale developmental projects. Often these 'people centred' approaches arose from development workers themselves and from the people traditionally targeted by development projects such as small farmers, crafts people and those involved with cottage industries, community food groups and soup kitchens 39. Some of the issues which this 'people centred' approach has given particular attention to are the need to involve women in the development process and the importance of gender and culture on the viability of any development project. Other important areas which have been and continue to be theorised are the areas of sustainable environmental development, the influence of geographical location on developmental processes in development and the need for appropriate technology 40. A closer look at all of these issues has served to broaden the definition of 'development'.

39 An example of these development workers and their projects is the Green zones in Mozambique which surround the capital of Maputo. These areas are farmed cooperatively by women and the vegetables and grains they grow feed the community during war [See Brazier 1992: 10-11]. For more examples of grassroots development workers and projects and for a discussion of the ideas behind them see Ekins (1992).

Incorporating the idea of empowerment into development practice has also captured the imagination of some developmental theorists. John Friedmann (1992) argues that empowerment moves beyond the idea of participation in development (potentially defined and controlled by elite groups and governments) by individuals and communities, to the level of control of the development process by these groups. Therefore development needs are identified by those directly affected as are the solutions to these needs. Within this model poverty is defined as disempowerment and it will be the disempowered who, upon reflecting on their position, work to empower themselves. This is a model which needs a State flexible and receptive enough to listen to the traditionally disempowered. If this model is to work the State needs to be open to implementing policies and freeing up and channelling resources to communities for the processes they themselves have defined as necessary for their community's development. As I suggest in Chapters Five and Six this is not the conception nor representation of development in the Capital Nightly News Panel Discussion.

Nevertheless these new perspectives offer the possibility of a critique of the structuralist notion of power and the centrality of the state and state apparatuses in development plans. These new approaches offer this critique through their focus on the skills, technologies and experiences of often silenced and marginalised peoples (indigenous and women) which can be used and sometimes combined with other technologies to aid the spiritual, economic and social 'development' of their communities41. This focus on the

41 Some examples of these approaches and specific development projects which follow these ideas are the 'stone damming' and 'energy efficient oven' projects developed in Burkina Faso. Soil erosion is one of the main problems facing farmers in Burkina Faso. Oxfam in 1973 - 1974 worked with the people of this region to (re)create the traditional knowledge surrounding the use of stone dams for soil and water conservation. The knowledge gained was passed onto other farmers who constructed the stone dams on their farms. The use of this traditional knowledge has improved the millet yield in the region and has started to halt soil erosion. The Burkina Institute of Energy and Development instigated a project which looked at designing a simple clay, millet chaff and dung oven which burnt wood more efficiently. The simple design was easily followed by the women who were in charge of the food preparation and their new ovens (which burn wood more slowly) reduced the amount of time taken to gather wood and also slows down deforestation. Both of these projects used appropriate technology, valued local knowledge, did not rely on cash (which eliminated the prospect of debt) and showed immediate benefits for the people involved in them [Harrison 1988: 20-21].
very people historically ignored in the drawing up of development plans and in other nation building discourses, was a very political act. It highlighted the possibilities for resistance to overarching 'universal' and colonial 'truths' such as the centrality of the nation state and the ideas of social evolution and 'progress'.

The Foucauldian idea that power is exercised by, on and through people in every aspect of their lives further lessens the importance and centrality of state power/knowledge and politics over everyday human interactions. Foucault saw power as a productive force which both constrains and enables:

What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it doesn’t only weigh on us as a force that says no, but that it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse. It needs to be considered as a productive network which runs through the whole social body, much more than as a negative instance whose function is repression [Foucault in Rabinow 1991:61].

The potential break down and blurring of boundaries between constructed binaries such as the ‘private’ and the ‘political’, the ‘essentially powerful’ and the ‘essentially powerless’, the ‘developed’ and ‘underdeveloped’ this theory of power necessitates, can be seen as a threat to the conceptual centrality of so called institutional power structures in structuralist theory. Trinh T Minh Ha, a Vietnamese theorist of post-colonialism, argues that in colonised cultures a post-structuralist approach to power allows greater scope and flexibility for theorising complexities:

Oppositional practices which thrive on binary thinking have always worked at preserving the old dichotomy of oppressor and oppressed, even though it has become more and more difficult today to establish a safe line between the government and the people, or the institution and the individual. When it is a question of desire and power, there are no possible short cuts in dealing with the system of rationality that imprisons both the body politic and the people, and regulates their relationship. There are, in other words, no 'innocent people', no subjects untouched in the play of power [Trinh T, Mihn-Ha 1991:92-93].
This conception of power as a multitude of forces which permeate communities, which produce our identity and shape the way different people construct and view the world, suggests that the dominant and repressive power relations in societies cannot simply be changed by changing state governments through elections or revolution.

**Implications of a postmodern theory of power/knowledge in Aotearoa development**

The above approach has repercussions for people in Aotearoa who are struggling with the present of our colonial past. It means that moving our communities in Aotearoa away from colonising ways of thinking and organising requires a multifaceted resistance to racism and imperial ideas on theoretical and personal as well as more organised levels. The articulation and deployment of these types of challenges to colonial discourses is not always, or even mostly easy in particular circumstances, due to embedded exclusionary practices which operate in and around the production of discourse: "in any society the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organised and redistributed according to a number of procedures whose role is to avert its powers and its dangers, to master the unpredictable event" [Foucault in Sheridan; 1980:121]. Therefore it is important to keep in mind when studying wider 'power' relations the ways in which the State, the Army, the Police, Universities, Schools, Television and other institutions contribute to and become part of the disciplinary technologies of the self through such things as physical violence, census keeping, the use of certain statistics in social policy making, also through (re)presentations in the print and television media.

**Repressive colonial power**

In Aotearoa the repressive and punishing use of power/knowledge was evident in the processes of colonisation and the establishment of direct colonial rule. This type of power was exercised by the British military and colonial government in the invasion of the Waikato (1863) ordered by Governor Grey and carried out by Colonel Cameron and his troops and the bloody campaigns
such as those waged by Major McDonnell around the Taranaki coast in the 1860's which culminated in the sustained attack and siege of Parihaka in the 1880's\(^{42}\). The history of land acquisition in Aotearoa is full of many other similar examples of colonial aggression, coercion and rule. These actions and displays of destructive power were legitimated through law and legislation such as the Land Claims Ordinance Act (1841) which deemed all 'waste' land (ie no one living on it) Crown land, the Native Land Act (1862) which individualised land titles, the Suppression of Rebellion Act (1863) which allowed for the confiscation of land from any iwi that was in 'rebellion', the New Zealand Settlements Act (1863) which allowed the confiscation of land from any iwi where "a considerable number of Māori were believed to be in rebellion", The Māori Prisoner's Trials Act (1879) which allowed Māori people to be imprisoned without trial, The West Coast Peace Preservation Act (1882) which meant that Māori people could be imprisoned indefinitely without trial, such as Parihaka's leaders Tohu and Te Whiti and their followers, and it also gave settlers indemnity from any offences they may commit against Māori people while dealing with the Taranaki 'difficulties' and the Tohunga Suppression Act (1907, repealed 1964) which outlawed the spiritual and educational role of the Tohunga and made it an offence to 'prophesise' Māori futures. These are just a few of the acts which attempted to legitimate and legalise settler power over Māori and upon which our 'great farming heritage' (among others) is predicated (Orange 1987; Scott 1987; Sharp 1990).

**Ruptures in and resistance to repressive colonial power/knowledge**

This repressive use of power, which provided the foundation of the nation state many now refer to as 'New Zealand', was not however uniform or universally supported by colonial people or universally resisted by 'Māori'. For example the phenomenon of the kupapa or 'Queenites', 'friendly natives',

\(^{42}\) See D.Scott (1987) for a detailed account of the events in Parihaka and how colonial legislation attempted to legitimate the false sale and acquisition of over three million acres of Māori land in the Taranaki, Waikato and Bay of Plenty areas. In his work Scott investigates how the passive resisters in Parihaka pā were finally forced off their cultivated land by a combination of legislative and military force.
'loyalists' during the British military campaigns waged against certain iwi in the 1860's, shows the way certain Māori and iwi constructed and negotiated their relationships with the colonial settlers, government and military with considerable complexity. Belich suggests the reasons for Māori collaboration with the British in these land wars were never straightforward:

The motives of the kūpapa groups varied enormously, as did their degree of commitment to the British cause. The one common factor was that this commitment was never complete. The kūpapa did not share British aims; they had their own, which seemed to them to be honourable and in their best interests. It was a matter of their aims intersecting with the British at certain points [1986:212].

Reasons for colluding with the British crown included the wish to retain economic links with settlers as in the case of the Ngāti Kahungunu and the Napier settlement, while some individual Māori joined up for money especially around the Wanganui area. Other iwi, such as Te Arawa, supported the British because they were increasingly alienated from neighbouring iwi and needed their government alliances in order to survive. Often the commitment of the kūpapa to the British cause of the time fluctuated and adapted to changing circumstances and iwi politics. An example of this is the Ngāti Porou kūpapa who half heartedly pursued Te Kooti (Rongowhakaata) who was the military and spiritual leader of the Ringatu movement and hunted by the government between 1868-1872. However when they discovered that he had killed some of their relations they pursued him with more vigour than the colonial troops [Belich 1986: 213-215].

Dirks (1992a) suggests that colonial rule was multifarious and diffuse in all colonised countries around the world and that colonial power was often exercised in multiple historical and geographical locations even within one area. He suggests this very lack of a systematic and co-ordinated exercise of power can be seen as one of the reasons why the system of colonisation was seemingly so successful at least in the first 100 years:
the power of colonialism as a system of rule was predicated at least in part on the ill-co-ordinated nature of power, that colonial power was never so omniscient nor secure to imagine itself as totalising, and that while colonial rulers were always aware that their power was dependant on their knowledge, they themselves were never similarly aware of all the ways in which knowledge was, in any direct or strategic sense, power [Dirks 1992a: 7].

The diffuse and often contradictory nature of colonial power, and institutions means two seemingly contradictory things. Firstly it meant that effective overall resistance to colonial rule was hard to channel because there were so many areas in which it had to be challenged simultaneously in order to make any difference, secondly and perhaps paradoxically this very dispersion meant that resistance was able to be organised and mounted in spaces where colonial power was not at its most repressive. Some examples of the contradictions inherent in colonial situations and institutions which provided space for the mounting of resistance are found in the law which was based on the notions of "fairness" and "justice" for all but which treated indigenous people unequally and which in Aotearoa nullified the Treaty of Waitangi in 1877.

Another example is the Anglican Church which preached tolerance for all of 'God’s children' while acquiring huge tracts of iwi land and pushing for the abolition of traditional spirituality and Tohunga in the Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries. Today, the Anglican Church is very much involved with the incorporation of the Treaty Of Waitangi in its ministries. The colonial education system which taught the values of ideas such as 'liberty', 'democracy' and 'justice' while caning Māori children for speaking their own language and discouraging and excluding Māori children (and women) from learning certain subjects is another instance. The Kōhanga Reo pre-school movement of the late 1970’s emerged in opposition to, and as a result of, the contradictions and

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43 The Treaty of Waitangi was declared a legal 'nullity' in 1877 by Chief Justice James Prendergast. He was able to do this because the Treaty was not made part of any law passed by Parliament [Orange 1987].
inadequacies of the monolingual and monocultural school system which had its roots in colonialism.\(^{45}\)

These examples suggest that much of the opposition and resistance to colonial ideas came from the recognition of bitter ironies and the disjunctions between what was said and what was practised. They also suggest that just as the exercise of colonial power and the creation of colonial discursive knowledge is (and was) diverse so too are (and were) the forms of resistance to these powers and the knowledge and ‘truths’ generated from these.

**The role of Aotearoa television and print media in debates about our colonial past**

Over the last twenty years, with the establishment of the Waitangi tribunal in the 1975 Treaty of Waitangi Act and the 1985 amendment which allowed claims to be laid against the Crown back to 1840, the climate within which ‘race’ relations are discussed in Aotearoa has changed. The role of the media in representing and constructing debates surrounding these changes has been crucial, Paul Spoonley describes this situation:

> The issues have become politically charged as notions of identity and the distribution of resources based on those identities are renegotiated ... In this charged and emotive environment, the media play an important role as the most significant channels of information. They can continue to reinforce the prejudice of the Pākehā, or they can help challenge the ideas and opinions [1990:36].

Certain viewpoints have been repeatedly aired in the print and television media while others have been ignored. The most vociferous discourses appear to protect and promote the status quo including the interests of the Business Roundtable and the very wealthy in Aotearoa.\(^ {46}\) This perhaps reflects the

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\(^{45}\) See Bodley [1990:103-105] for cross cultural examples of indigenous communities and their experiences with colonial school systems.

\(^{46}\) The explosion of ‘money news’ on *One Network News* and *Three National News* shows the importance viewers are supposed to place on the stock exchange, money markets, inflation and overseas currency for the well being of Aotearoa and all the people in it. The way in which these stories are often linked with narratives surrounding anti-user pays and perhaps centre left parties such as The Alliance shows the (right wing) political bias of many news reports. For
ownership of print and television media which is fast consolidating into the hands of a very small group of extremely rich international businessmen of Western European origins such as Britain's Rupert Murdoch, Canada's Conrad Black and Australia's Kerry Packer. The next chapter will deal with the issues of media production/ownership, messages/texts and audiences/readership in more detail.

example the release of the Alliance Telecommunications policy was followed by reports of Telecom shares losing value and political commentators speculating about the loss of foreign investment should the Alliance gain any power. Although the decline in Telecom share prices would only immediately affect very few, very rich people in Aotearoa it is presented as a National rather than a business concern.
CHAPTER FOUR

TELEVISION AND DEVELOPMENT

Television and Development
The explosion of television into many households around the globe and its continuing expansion is a phenomena few can ignore. Television as a form of communication has huge possibilities and implications for the discursive representations of human history and development. The structuralist approach to mass communication industries sees television as lying at the centre of four overlapping forces, the political, the economic, the cultural and the technological (Figure 2).

Figure 2: The media at the centre of four overlapping spheres of influence [adapted from McQuail 1994:156].

The Foucauldian discursive approach sees these four forces not as separate spheres but as interactive, constantly emerging and mutually reinforcing discourses of which media institutions are an integral part.

The study of Development is concerned with these discourses and how they interact, in what contexts and with what results. Therefore a study of the products of television media industries, which are created and developed through the interaction of these four main influences, is an important part of Development Studies. Furthermore television technology is increasingly used by governments around the world to send out messages concerning the shape
of economic and social development. Sometimes these messages are overt, such as the anti-smoking campaign advertisements in Aotearoa, and sometimes their cultural, political, economic origins are disguised by the operation of other discourses within the discourse of television. I argue in the following chapter that the latter is part of what is happening in the *Capital Nightly News* panel discussion.

While television remains mainly the preserve of countries classified as ‘developed’ the technologies which make television a reality are increasingly seen by political leaders as important instruments to promote economic and social development in African and Asian countries. This is shown in the 1985 Yamousoukrou declaration by African leaders reported in a 1996 International Bureau of Infometrics report:

One of the main keys to solving Africa’s development problems lies in mastering the rational management of information in all its forms. This is therefore not only a positive force for regional and continental integration but also an essential condition for the survival of Africa within the community of nations in the 21st Century [Hamelink 1995: 296-297].

This statement highlights political issues of ownership intimately involved with the mass communications industries and their products. Issues of ownership also involve the issue of access to resources, which is in turn linked to economics, and these are relevant development issues both between and within countries. This will be discussed further in relation to Aotearoa in the section concerning production on page 69.

Television is a result of ever changing technologies and, as is suggested in Figure 3, these technologies are not neutral. They are often made to serve/reinforce old purposes and ideas as well as to promote change.

The effects of technologies on social and cultural ideas depends on the way in which they are applied. The historical development of broadcast media has
had specific links with colonial projects. The Transatlantic Wireless Telegraphy Service which was set up in the early 1900s and which relied heavily on the development of radio telegraphy by Italian, Guglielmo Marconi, in 1895, led to the British government’s idea of a network of stations linking and serving the British Empire [Lewis and Pearlman 1986]. The development of international news services such as Reuters also sent news of colonial wars and ‘progress’ around the world and allowed the broadcasting of the English language and world views through radio and, later, television programmes produced by the British Broadcasting Corporation (founded in 1927) ⁴⁷. Price writes that language and media communications technologies were used in colonial situations to influence the development of certain ‘nations’ - itself an exported colonial notion:

Both those in control of the state and those in charge of broadcasting have had strong ideas about the role that the media could play in altering or reinforcing proper habits of speech. For decades, the BBC was an instrument of elocution enhancement, a blanket of propriety, with the specific intent of influencing the way a population conducted itself. In some settings radio and television language was the language of empire, present or past: Russian throughout the Soviet Union; French in francophone Africa; English in the Celtic lands...[1995:9]

⁴⁷ For a history of Reuters and other news agencies and wire services see Tunstall (1991).
...and English in Aotearoa. Early television and Radio broadcasters were trained to BBC standards and it is only in the last two decades that the distinctive local way of speaking English in Aotearoa has been seen and heard on television and radio (Gordon 1989). Within Aotearoa the use of English in broadcasting has seriously marginalised Te Reo Māori. It is only in the past ten years that Te Reo is heard more often on television and radio programmes. Even then it constitutes a fraction of available airtime and tends to standardise the speaking of Te Reo. This can result in the subjugation and loss of dialects and pronunciation which carry with them the specific history and heritage of an area.

The experimental possibility of television had been present for as long as radio but the research of many scientists around the world did not come together until after the second world war. Television allowed the broadcasting of images of different people and places to different parts of the world. The visual nature of the medium has influenced the way political, social events are perceived and remembered in ways that theorists are only latterly coming to terms with and which, ultimately it is fair to say we do not yet understand. The emphasis on the visual in television saturated cultures means that any political event or decision which makes it onto TV is reinforced while others are ignored. For example political campaigns organised around television coverage become spectacle:

Henceforth, all discussion of what the world's rulers do is organised through the spectacle, through the unilateral and unidirectional communication via the mass media of the results of decisions that have already been made. Only that which is recognised by the spectacle has historical validity; only those consecrated by the spectacle are entitled to speak with authority...[Raboy and Dagenais 1992:4].

48 In 1907 Rosing (a Russian inventor) designed a cathode ray receiver which converted light passing through a rotating disc (patented by Paul Nipkow in 1884) into electrical signals. These signals moved up and down a light sensitive screen at the end of the tube and created a set of images. Schoenberg improved on this technology as head of EMI in England and eventually designed the electronic scanning screen used by the BBC. The work of Zworkin who emigrated from Russia to the United States followed very closely that of Schoenberg and is credited with the creation of American television [Lewis and Pearlman 1986: 85-89].
Televised political 'shows', rallies and speeches create a feeling of the 'real' amongst television viewers while the physical event itself can seem like a staged reproduction to the people there. Baudrillard (1992) calls this phenomenon at its broadest, the 'society of the spectacle,' where the space between 'the real' (the signified) and the image (the signifier) has disappeared. The explosion of signifiers in the media in the last fifty years, with the increasing development of mass communications technologies, means that images, products, objects and events are simulations and models which generate a "real without origin or reality - a hyperreal" [Baudrillard 1992:203]. Television reinforces this idea constantly with its often spectacular images (re)presented as 'the real' but which involve a whole host of filmic techniques, lighting, sound and clever editing.

The explosion of satellite communications which followed the advent of satellite technology in America and the USSR in the 1960's has facilitated this process further and has allowed television global news networks such as CNN to appear in the 1980's and 1990's. By 2010 Aotearoa will be under the 'footprint' of thirteen satellites. Along with the increasingly high costs of being involved in this satellite technology, it is perhaps the radical potential of these media which has meant that broadcasting has been controlled by governments and elite private interests since its inception. However images of protest and revolt, and the operation of governments agents around the world, particularly during dramatic times, such as wars and disasters, have also been televised and have at some points undermined these forces. The development of microtechnologies such as portable camcorders, cell phones, fax modems and the internet have allowed the recording of alternative images and can be and have been used as revolutionary tools in places like Hungary, Nicaragua, Philippines, China and East Timor49.

49 Footage from home video recorders of the revolutionary movement in Hungary 1989 was often shown on international news broadcasts. Chinese students involved in the 1989 Tianamen Square rally used fax machines to broadcast their views on democracy and their reports about resulting government brutality [Downing, Mohammadi, Sreberny-Mohammadi 1995:ix-xii]. The Zapatistas in Mexico also used the internet to publicise and gain support for their revolutionary movement. John Pilger's documentary Death of a Nation filmed secretly in East Timor has also served to focus more international attention on the occupation of that land by the Indonesian army and the war that continues.
The emerging trend of broadcasting towards the global is incongruous with the borders of existing countries defined as 'nations'. This promises the forging of new transnational alliances and loyalties amongst communities within and across countries. However the expensive nature of many mass communications technologies means that the area is globally dominated by American and Western European News and Entertainment sources. The programmes these companies produce reflect these social, economic and political roots and undoubtedly have a cultural impact on communities around the globe [Price 1995:18].

**Fiske's model of triangulation in media communication**

The mass communications process can be broken into three parts: production, programmes/texts and audiences/readers' reception. The creation of 'meaning' results from the interaction between these three areas as indicated in Figure 4. I will look at each of these separately.

**Figure 4: An interactive model of how meaning is constructed [Fiske 1982:4].**

![Diagram](image)

This model outlines the importance of both producers and viewers in the construction of meaningful media texts. It indicates the role of producers in the shaping of the media product and the encoding of certain ideas into a text.
However without audiences these texts would not be able to realise their potential for meaning. As viewers, we bring to our interaction with media a diverse set of experiences which open up possibilities for the production of multiple readings. Very simply the existing values, knowledges and experiences a person brings to a text and the social environment in which it is received, primarily effect what meanings that person takes from the text.

When applying a discourse analysis to media texts this model needs to be adjusted to show the way in which the producers and receivers of media messages operate within the flows of power/knowledge to (re)create and (re)produce certain discourses about the social world. The meanings viewers take from these media products are similarly influenced by a multitude of discourses (which may or may not intersect with those of the producers) which have created their identities and which constitute the ‘real’ for them. Figure 5 demonstrates this idea with particular regard to the 1996 Waitangi Day news coverage:

![Figure 5: A discourse analysis model applied to 1996 Waitangi Day television news and current affairs [expanding on Fiske 1982:4].](image-url)
In the particular study of television these models raise certain key questions. What economic, political, social forces and gendered and ethnic positions are involved in the production of media texts? What discourses are (re)presented by and through television to communicate meaning to audiences? How can these meanings be read? How do these meanings interact with audiences or, what do audiences do to make meanings? A thorough exploration of all of these issues is beyond the scope of my study. What I present here is one way to read the discourses used by news workers in the presentation of ‘fact’ and identity on Waitangi Day 1996. As such this thesis focuses on the message/text corner of the triangle from my positionalities as a ‘viewer’ and an analyst. As referred to on page 5, these positionalities include my gender, Pākehā ethnicity made up of mixed heritages and my level of education. However none of the corners of Fiske’s model can be considered in isolation from the others and so this chapter will briefly outline my understanding of how they operate in relation to Waitangi Day television news and current affairs coverage.

Producers
There are two aspects to this section, the first involves economic ownership and the second involves the news workers within the institutions and the professional standards they follow in the production of news and current affairs texts. The interaction between these two aspects of production is an area of much contention. The question of whether an owner’s economic, political and cultural interests are encoded, either consciously or unconsciously, into the media products and how this may occur, has been the subject of much debate (see Biagi 1996; Fox 1988, 1992; McGregor 1992). Some of these arguments are discussed further in relation to Aotearoa under the section on foreign ownership, page 74-76.
A brief history of television broadcasting ownership and control in Aotearoa

Television broadcasting in Aotearoa developed under a state monopoly in the 1960's. One television channel ‘TV ONE’ monopolised the television industry until 1975 when ‘TV 2’ was launched. Up until 1989 most of the broadcasting services in Aotearoa were provided by the government. The late 1980's have seen the moves to deregulate and privatise most state owned assets in Aotearoa including the broadcasting industries.

The deregulation of state owned assets is an important political and economic philosophy to look at in relation to colonisation in Aotearoa. Some European/New Zealand, Pākehā and Māori have welcomed the ‘freeing up’ of state assets which has, among other things, allowed some iwi to reacquire the control of certain resources. However it is seen by others as a whittling away of the Crown’s ability to adequately settle current and future Treaty of Waitangi claims. This anxiety is intensified by successive Labour and National governments which have tended to sell previously state owned assets to foreign companies. For example Telecom is American owned, as are the Railways, and the cutting rights to Kaingaroa Forest was sold to Chinese business interests by the Bolger National government in 1996. Up to this point it has been very difficult and unpopular with many people in Aotearoa to settle claims with private land or resources. Thus the selling of Crown assets into private hands concerns many sovereignty groups and iwi yet to have their claims heard and adjudicated by the Waitangi Tribunal. Arguments surrounding the fate of the state owned broadcasting resources are no different.

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50 See Smith (1996: 1-14) for a full account of the launching of the second television channel in Aotearoa.
51 See Kelsey 1993 for a study of the implementation and effects of privatisation in Aotearoa.
52 The Waitangi Tribunal was set up through the (1975) Treaty of Waitangi Act, it's resources were increased under the 1985 amendment to this act. This tribunal hears claims made by Māori iwi to do with breaches of the Treaty of Waitangi by the Crown and Crown agents. Once a claim is heard the tribunal produces a report on the claim with recommendations, to the government. These reports are also published. The government is not legally bound to follow any of the recommendations. For a list of claims lodged with the Tribunal up to 1990 see Oliver (1991), for more information about the Tribunal see Temm (1990).
Television broadcasting developed as a hybrid of commercial and public service broadcasting. While commercial television is about selling advertising and competing for audience share, the concept of public service broadcasting has as its basis three major principles: education, information and entertainment. Smith [1996:15-16] argues the framework of public service broadcasting within the British context also includes several other principles which were exported and adapted by broadcasters in Aotearoa during the 1960's and 1970's. For example a public service broadcasting system should be funded by the body of users (through a universal license fee) as such they should be able to broadcast to the whole population. Programme line-ups should have a 'universal' appeal which caters for a wide range of tastes. There is also a responsibility to cater for 'minorities' in some way, especially those that are disadvantaged.

These principles developed in certain ways in Aotearoa which marginalised and further colonised Māori people, values and culture. For example these principles do not have at their core the Treaty of Waitangi. They allow therefore the marginalisation of Māori as a 'minority' group, and a denial of their status as Tangata Whenua. While more programmes have been made in the last ten or so years to 'cater' for this 'minority' they are relegated to relatively inaccessible time slots and are severely under resourced. The prime time slots are reserved for those shows thought to appeal 'universally' or at least to the majority, who are European/New Zealand. The consequences of this and Māori initiatives partly in reaction to these ideas are discussed in more detail on pages 79-84.

Because of the small population in Aotearoa television has been and is still, funded by both advertising and a universal television license fee. Small audiences and high production costs contribute to the amount of overseas content seen on television in Aotearoa. The vast majority of programmes on both TVNZ channels and TV3 were (and still are) imported from Britain and
America53. This reflects Aotearoa’s colonial, political, economic and military alliances with English speaking ‘western countries’ and places us firmly in the category of ‘developed’ world.

Over the past decade the concept of public service broadcasting has been replaced by radical reforms which have seen the broadcasting industry in Aotearoa become one of the most deregulated in the world [Smith 1996: 103]. The concept of public service began to be dismantled in the late 1980s when the fourth Labour government turned the Broadcasting Corporation of New Zealand (BCNZ) into two state owned enterprises (SOE’s). This move was explained by the then Minister of Broadcasting, Richard Prebble,54 as an attempt to “increase economic efficiency” [Zwart 1996: 237] by opening up the broadcasting market to competition.

The 1988 Broadcasting Amendment Act (2) dissolved the BCNZ into Radio New Zealand (RNZ) and Television New Zealand Limited (TVNZ). As SOE’s these two corporations are charged with running commercially successful communications businesses first and foremost. The public service criteria of promoting and fostering a national identity through the production of local programmes that also cater for underrepresented groups was consistently pushed aside throughout the late 80’s and up to the present day and replaced with the doctrine of the freemarket. The 1989 Broadcasting Act which raised advertising limits, replaced the Broadcasting Tribunal with the Broadcasting Standards Authority and established the “underfunded” Broadcasting Commission (now known as “New Zealand on Air”) was devoid of any philosophical guidelines or aims for broadcasters. The 1989 Radiocommunications Act followed closely on its heels and replaced the now

53 Television New Zealand Channels One and Two source their overseas content through companies like Columbia Tristar, Paramount, Warner Bros, 20th Century Fox, the BBC, Granada, LWT, Central television and Thames. News and current affairs programmess are sourced by satellite [Zwart (ed) 1996: 239].

54 After losing his Auckland Central seat to the Alliance’s Sandra Lee in the 1993 general election Richard Prebble gave up formal politics for a few years. He resurfaced again in 1995 as a member and later leader of ACT NZ a new right political party which advocates the sale of all state assets and the privatisation of health and education. In 1996 Richard Prebble stood in the Wellington Central electorate and was elected to parliament.
defunct Broadcasting Tribunal’s way of allocating warrants for frequencies with a market based bidding system. These three acts taken together ensured that any remaining vestiges of public service broadcasting principles amongst broadcasters were overtaken by freemarket ideas. This in effect meant that those with money could access the airwaves and those without could not.

In the mid 1980’s the concept of the development of Regional television was central to the minds of broadcasters and government. In 1985 the Broadcasting Tribunal called for applications for a third channel to apply for regional warrants. This signalled the first appearance of TV3. TV3’s bid won a warrant in 1987 over other bids which included the Aotearoa Broadcasting Systems a proposal put together by Māori broadcasters. This bid will be discussed in the Māori media initiatives section page. TV3’s plans to set up four regional stations were stopped by two significant events. The first was the stock market crash of 1987 which wiped out some of the capital required to develop the stations. The second, unforeseen, event was the restructuring of the broadcasting industry in Aotearoa which presented the possibility of unlimited competition for television audiences. Both of these circumstances precipitated a decision by privately owned TV3 to broadcast nationally from Auckland. Backed by American network giant NBC and a corporate line up of lawyers, merchant bankers and broadcasters TV3 was launched on November 26, 1989.

During this period TVNZ picked up the development of regional stations such as Capital Television in Wellington which broadcast the panel discussion on Waitangi Day which is the subject of Chapters Four and Five. Faced with the better resourced TVNZ, TV3 went into receivership on the 2nd of May.

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55 Capital City Television is one of four regional stations controlled by the Horizon television company which is based in Auckland. Horizon Television is in turn 100% owned by TVNZ. The four regional stations broadcast news programmes from the BBC and One Network News from TVNZ. Capital City television also has its own small news team which produces a half hour local news and current affairs programme for the station (Capital Nightly News). Much of the film of Waitangi Day used during this bulletin on February 6th 1996 was also used by the nationwide One Network News on the same night.
1990. They were only saved by a further change in government and resulting changes in broadcasting legislation in 1991.

**Issues of foreign ownership in Aotearoa broadcasting**

The 1990 National government introduced the 1991 Broadcasting Amendment Act which lifted any restrictions on the amount of foreign ownership of broadcasting industries in Aotearoa. An amendment to the 1986 Commerce Act contained within the 1991 Judicature Amendment Act also removed the obligation of corporations to apply for permission to merge or take-over any companies in Aotearoa. Together these amendments opened the way for a possible 100% foreign ownership of broadcasting. Judy McGregor (1992) writes about the same trends in media ownership in the Aotearoa print and magazine industries viz.: concentration and increased foreign control. She argues that these trends, which have caused so much debate elsewhere have rarely been acknowledged in public circles or in the press itself. The consequences of a completely deregulated media industry were only debated (or perhaps realised) by the majority of people in Aotearoa when SKY outbid TVNZ for exclusive coverage of the 1992 All Black tour to South Africa and again in 1996 when all of the rights to the All Black games were brought up by the pay TV network. These moves, so understandable and correct within the ‘freemarket’ doctrine, can be seen as triggering the realisation amongst many living in Aotearoa that we live in “an era of information haves and have nots...” [Smith 1996: 104].

The prospect of further consolidation of media ownership into fewer hands raises issues of abuses of power whereby media moguls such as Rupert

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56 Smith writes that these government policies were greeted with incredulity by overseas broadcasters and magazines: “Variety magazine, the bible of international show business reported: ‘For sale: entire broadcasting industry of compact English-speaking market. Established audience and ad revenue base. Excellent European/production/sales links. Highly competitive radio interests. Some renovation required. Interested? Call New Zealand’” [Smith 1996: 101].

57 At a 1991 Broadcasting summit the National government’s minister of Broadcasting Maurice Williamson commented on the same thing when he said that the complete deregulation of the broadcasting industry had “generated as little public interest as ‘Chinese fossil studies’” [Williamson in McGregor 1992: 28].
Murdoch, who owns INL and half the newspapers in this country, and those reliant on him for employment, may push certain agendas through his media. These agendas include capitalism, business and corporate culture and a ‘freemarket’ all of which may not coincide with the interests of under represented and under resourced communities in this country. The promotion of a type of globalised media and information culture through the empires of people such as Murdoch means the marginalisation of cultural differences, histories and languages within small countries like Aotearoa. Keane argues: “The Murdoch empire, in which everything is English-language related, has been created by buying indigenous communications systems and linking them globally” [1991:74]58. This statement can also be applied to other media moguls, such as Black and Packer, and their empires and continues the earlier patterns of colonisation and dominance in the vitally important telecommunications sphere.

McGregor (1992) argues that ‘proof’ of an actual abuse of power and the fact that the potential for this sort of abuse exists through the ownership structures of such empires are equally important. She argues that within these ownership structures there are two interacting levels of control, allocative and operational. Allocative control concerns the higher levels of management and such decisions as the scope of the media’s activities, allocation of resources and hiring and firing of editors. Operational control concerns the day to day running of a media industry for example which stories to cover, the angles and where they are placed in newspapers and bulletins. This second area of control operates around decisions different news workers such as journalists and editors make. In the context of Aotearoa it is up to these people to inflect

58 The use of the word ‘indigenous’ in Keane’s quotation is different to the way I have used it throughout this thesis. Keane uses the word to refer to a nationally developed media system within a nation state which may not have much if any involvement or ownership by the indigenous (Tangata Whenua) people of the area. However the use of the word ‘indigenous’ in this phrase indicates to me the links these types of multinational business ventures have with earlier colonial expansion. For example a political and economic force takes over an already existing system which is often of a much smaller and locally based constitution. This ‘indigenous’ system is then fashioned to service the multinational company (the metropole) and resources are siphoned off and relocated to protect the global assets (territories) of the multinational empire.
the increasingly globalised news formats with issues facing people in this country.

**Journalists and news values in the production of news and current affairs**

News values are one of the most opaque structures of meaning in modern society. All ‘true journalists’ are supposed to possess it: few can or are willing to identify and define it. Journalists speak of ‘the news’ as if events select themselves. Further, they speak as if which is the ‘most significant’ news story, and which ‘news angles’ are most salient, are divinely inspired [Hall 1973:181].

The ‘news values’ Hall refers to far from being universal, have specific roots in Western European and Anglo-American culture. However this cultural specificity is often obscured by the journalistic stance of objective, impartial and unbiased reporting. The results of this are discussed in the following two chapters.

Because of the commercial imperative and values, journalists operate under severe time restrictions and deadlines in television and print media news production. On the television news, each story has to be told in under a minute, with visuals, voice-over and other sound tracks. The small amount of time in which to explain a complex issue in a news story has been met with the sort of short hand which often resorts to the use of stereotypical narratives, characters and pictures. The pressure of offering an instant analysis of news events may also lead to journalists from different papers and stations to offer similar views and conclusions. Biagi calls this “consensus journalism” [1996:268]. ‘Consensus journalism’ portrays a very limited range of angles and opinions on any event. It can be seen in the themes of ‘togetherness’ and ‘unity’ and the reporting of protests during 1996 Waitangi Day news coverage discussed in the next chapter.

The ‘news values’ which journalists use to pick a ‘good news story’ were studied by Galtung and Ruge (1973). They can be seen as redemptive metahistorical narratives which allow journalists to negate any personal
responsibility for the representations they produce of and about different people and events. Galtung and Ruge's study identified the criteria for a 'good news story' as threshold (the story has to be 'big' enough to count), negativity ('bad news' is 'good news'), and reporting on elite nations and persons (for example the United States and Britain over Nigeria and Fiji and a celebrity over a person without a media profile). A further study conducted by Herbert J Gans in the United States identified eight other criteria US journalists use either unconsciously or consciously to pick a 'good' news story. These are ethnocentrism, altruistic democracy, responsible capitalism, small-town pastoralism, individualism, moderatism, order, and leadership [Gans in Biagi 1996: 269-270].

Gans’s concept of ‘ethnocentrism’ as a news value is important to my study of the Capital Nightly News Waitangi Day panel discussion and other news coverage of Waitangi Day in Aotearoa. Briefly, ethnocentrism is the attitude that some cultural values are superior to others. An ethnocentric journalist would judge the importance of events by criteria specific to their own culture. This would mean that certain things are seen and reported on while other angles are obscured. This leads to different cultural and social values being ignored or misrepresented in news bulletins. The “New World Information and Communications Order” [Biagi 1996: 363] is a term coined to describe how ethnocentrism operates through the news media between countries. Many governments in the Pacific Islands, Asia and Africa protest against the unbalanced flow of information between their countries and places like America and England. This imbalance sees a lot of information about American and European countries produced and shown globally while information from and about other countries is ignored. In addition the values contained within the news coverage from sources such as American CNN and the English BBC are described as containing “political, economic, Judeo-Christian religious and other social values that are not universal” [Biagi 1996:364] which influences the way news is covered and presented59.

59 See also McQuail [1994:178-181].
Sue Abel (1992) in her study of television news coverage of the 1990 Waitangi Day commemorations outlined specific aspects of ethnocentrism which operate structurally in news production in Aotearoa. This is, broadly, the lack of knowledge of Māoritanga and Te Reo Māori on the part of a majority of European/New Zealand people working in newsrooms. This lack of knowledge leads to a monocultural bias in news representation which is seldom acknowledged. It also facilitates the inclusion of certain voices and the exclusion of others. When other voices or perspectives do appear in the print and television media it is mainly within the mode of address and organisation of the news rooms and media institutional practices which have therefore already shaped the outcome of a story.

It is already well established that in Aotearoa, stories about Māori in dominant commercial media such as TVNZ, RNZ and newspapers like Wellington’s The Dominion tend to appear only when they are seen to ‘encroach’ on the European/New Zealand ‘world’ (Fox 1988, 1992; Webber 1990; Wilson 1990). Moreover the vast majority of these stories are negative, reinforcing and relying on stereotypes. Wilson writing of what he terms ‘Māori bashing’ in the dominant print and television media says journalists, the majority of

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60 Sue Abel used Gramsci’s theory of hegemony to deconstruct 1990 Waitangi Day coverage on both Three National News and One Network News. Her thesis also contained interviews with journalists who had covered the day. She concluded that lack of knowledge of Māoritanga on the part of many news workers and institutions themselves, meant that news bulletins overwhelmingly contained a European/New Zealand version of events which were not acknowledged as such.

61 Abel argues that this monoculturalism can be overcome by individuals who are personally committed to representing an Aotearoa inclusive of both Māori and Pākehā cultures but concludes that these infrequent news stories often occur despite the news institutions, rules, editors and not because of them.

62 For example in European/New Zealand media such as Wellington’s The Dominion there is a focus on reporting of ‘Māori’ crime which impacts on the European/New Zealand world while positive stories about educational, economic and political initiatives within Māori communities such as Kura Kaupapa Māori and certain business investments are not given the same attention. Similarly Treaty of Waitangi claims are reported on in terms of the amount of resources recommended by the Waitangi Tribunal for settlement. Very little space is given to detailing the historical reasons for the settlement. These stories often imply that the resources used to settle are ‘given’, not returned to Māori at the expense of the wider population and European/New Zealand.
whom are European/New Zealand are constantly (re)presenting an inadequate picture of Māori communities:

they bungle Māori news in all sorts of ways - playing down big issues, missing the implications in other issues, ignoring stories completely, quoting people who aren’t authorities and neglecting those who are, blowing up negative stories and getting them wrong, then denying they got them wrong [1990:49].

The inadequacy of many ‘mainstream’ media products to adequately reflect and serve Māori communities has seen the growth of Māori media networks and the establishment of alternative information sources (see Stuart 1995).

Māori Media Initiatives

When a presence on radio and TV is denied to one culture, to one people, in the land where that culture and people uniquely belong, they become invisible. They are made dependent and weak. This is one possible future for the Māori people. For many that future has already arrived [New Zealand Māori Council 1991: 7].

The television industry in Aotearoa has a damning record of neglect of Māori audiences and issues since its inception. Māori broadcaster, Derek Fox (1992), outlines this lack of commitment on the part of BCNZ and TVNZ and RNZ in the areas of resourcing Māori programmes, recruitment, training and development of Māori staff:

There is no willingness to really commit resources. If you look at the biggest operators in the coverage of Māori news, the state owned broadcasting organisations, the picture is pathetic - TVNZ has some Māori-speaking journalists on its staff servicing the Te Kare re programme. In their newsroom they do not have one bilingual person [Fox 1992:176].

The battle to establish and produce Te Karere (a daily twelve minute TV news programme in Te Reo) and its scheduling at 4.45 on weeknights and 7.50am on weekdays, well away from ‘prime time viewing’ is continuing evidence of the lack of priority given to Māori programming by TVNZ (see Fox 1993).

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63 See Lealand’s survey of journalists working in Aotearoa (1994).
Furthermore during summer *Te Karere* is often replaced by sporting events such as cricket matches. Similarly *Marae*, the two hour long magazine and news show for Māori is screened on Sunday mornings at 11.00am. Fox argues that in some estimates Māori make up 25-30% of the total population in Aotearoa and yet there are less than 1% of Māori related programmes on television [1993:126].

The failure of the public service broadcasting model to cater for Māori needs on television manifested itself in a Māori bid from Aotearoa Broadcasting Systems for the warrants to set up local television in 1985. The bid was financially supported by BCNZ and if successful would have seen the stations broadcast a majority of television programmes in Māori with programmes from other indigenous producers around the world helping to fill the schedule. The bid was defeated by TV3 in 1987 largely due to the sudden withdrawal of financial support by TVNZ’s new Director (see Smith 1996). However the venture proved to be a catalyst for the future rapid developments in Māori media.

The deregulation of broadcasting in the late 80’s has seen state owned broadcasting resources become available for acquisition by private interests. This ‘freeing up’ of state resources has also provided opportunities for the development of Māori media. These opportunities have been pursued through the Waitangi Tribunal, legal and legislative avenues. The process has been long and expensive for those heading the bids. Derek Fox writes of the process involved with the Māori broadcasting claims:

A clause in the new State Owned Enterprises Act required the government to pay heed to the Treaty. I was part of a group of people, the New Zealand Māori Council and Ngā Kaiwhakapumau I Te Reo (guardians of the language), who took out an injunction restraining the Crown from handing over its broadcasting assets until provision was made to ensure adequate time and resources for Māori broadcasting. We went to the Waitangi Tribunal and championed the case for the Māori language being a taonga, a treasure, and therefore, under the terms of the Treaty, something the Crown had a duty to protect and guarantee. The Tribunal
found in our favour, but the case is still proceeding because the government has so far refused to accept its decision [Fox 1993: 134].

To date this case has been heard by the New Zealand Court of Appeal, who did not rule on it because they claim the status of the Treaty is still uncertain in New Zealand law, and has been sent to the Privy Council in London.

The 1989 Radio Communications Act reserved a number of radio frequencies for the use of Māori iwi and the promotion of Māori language and culture throughout Aotearoa. These stations quickly spread and there are now up to 21 iwi based stations around the country. Fox (1993) argues that radio broadcasting is an important medium through which the oral culture of Māori communities can be (re)presented. However issues of adequate training and under resourcing, legacies of the BCNZ, are still evident:

There’s a whole range of complaints about the public broadcasting system and how it has failed the Māori listenership and viewership. But my biggest complaint is in the uneven way in which they’ve hired and developed Māori staff over the years. Because what they’ve done is deny the Māori broadcasting system staff and skilled people. To make the current investment in Māori tribal radio worthwhile you need professionals or semi-professionals to deliver the services [Fox 1992:177].

This strategy prevents the deployment of competing discourses about Aotearoa’s history and future development within the neo-colonial context of Aotearoa.

The desire for Māori perspectives and media has also been met by Māori newspapers and magazines and this year has seen further forays into a Māori television channel, Aotearoa Television [Fox 1993; Te Awa 1996; Zwartz 1996]. Aotearoa television was launched in Auckland earlier this year with money from State government to produce and screen programmes in Te Reo

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64 The first Māori newspaper Te Karere o Nui Tirenī was published in 1842 and ran for four years. In recent years there has been a resurgence of tribally based Māori newspapers such as Ngāti Kahungunu, Te Karaka: the Ngāi Tahu magazine and New Plymouth’s Te Maunga. There are also national magazines such as Te Kuiti based Kia Hiwa Ra, Auckland based Te Māori News and the glossy Mana Magazine [Zwartz 1996:245].
Māori. However what has been described by television, newspaper reports and Labour MP Helen Clarke as 'financial mismanagement' has meant the withdrawal of further government funding. This places the future development of the channel under serious threat.

A national Māori news service, Mana News Limited, has been set up to provide hourly news bulletins to the 21 iwi based radio stations, a seven minute segment for morning report on National Radio and other services to the network television stations. Te Awa (1996) in her study of the Mana News service identifies two pertinent differences in their production of news from other news sources\(^6\). The first is the application of different news values without the emphasis on negativity. In Māori newspapers and magazines such as Mana and Kia Hiwa Ra the majority of stories concern successful Māori cultural and business ventures and successful individual Māori people. Some examples of these positive stories are “Zoology student awarded scholarship” [Staff writer, Kia Hiwa Ra February 1996a: 4] which is about a successful Massey scholarship student; “Marae to expand development mix” [Staff writer, Kia Hiwa Ra February 1996b: 4] concerning an iwi based forestry employment scheme; “What makes them sound so great?” [Staff writer, Mana Autumn 1996c: 15-23] which explores the distinctiveness and success of contemporary Māori musicians; and “Cameras rolling at Aotearoa television network” [Staff writer, Te Māori News 1996d:4] about the running of the Aotearoa Television Network. With iwi owned papers focusing on issues facing their people, certain events are reported in significantly different ways around the country. For example the Sealord’s Fisheries deal\(^6\) in which

\(^6\) Joanne Te Awa’s 1996 Massey University Masters thesis attempted to define the differences between the news produced by Mana News from news presented by other news organisations in Aotearoa. She used participant observation in the Mana News room to understand the decisions that went into the final news text and complemented that with a content analysis of the final products.

\(^6\) The Sealord’s Fisheries deal is one of the most controversial issues in Aotearoa today. The deal saw the government and Māori negotiators (mainly Graham Latimer for the NZMC, Tipene O’Regan Ngāi Tahu, Matiu Rata Muriwihenua and Bob Mahuta Tainui) sign a deal which legislated away Māori fishing rights under the Treaty of Waitangi in return for a significant proportion (but still much much less than “full and undisturbed possession” as guaranteed in the English version of the Treaty and “Tino Rangatiratanga” as in the Māori version) of fishing quota to be distributed on an iwi basis.
influential members of Ngāi Tahu such as Sir Tipene O'Reagan have a substantial stake, is presented in a more favourable light by *Te Karaka* while newspapers owned and operated by Northern iwi look at the deal from different and often more negative angles.

The second difference is the use of different sources in their bulletins. Generally these different sources have standing in Māori communities rather than European/New Zealand communities which means they are often overlooked and ignored by European/New Zealand reporters working in RNZ and TVNZ newsrooms. For example journalists working in these newsrooms focus on information gained from ‘official’ sources such as government ministries and MPs. This marginalises Māori people who do not work within these circles, such as Tuwharetoa leader Sir Hepi Te Heuheu and Dame Mira Szasy from Te Aupouri and Te Rarawa. It is very rarely that these and other people are asked to comment on stories such as immigration, the direction of economic policy and so on, which affect the people they represent. Furthermore the other work that they do is similarly omitted from many TVNZ and RNZ bulletins and news pages around the country.

The creation of alternative Māori media institutions has followed the ‘developmental’ model of media outlined by Biagi (1996). While Biagi only writes of this model as something relevant to the ‘Third World’ in my view many of the principles fit the Māori media organisations in Aotearoa. Under Biagi’s developmental theory the media is formed and used to “promote ... social and economic goals and to direct a sense of ... purpose” [1996:352]. The promotion of Te Reo Māori through iwi radio is in keeping with this theory. Commenting at a Palmerston North public meeting organised by CORSO on September 27 1995 Māori activist Ken Mair reflected on the political and economic role Māori broadcasting could play in the realisation of Māori sovereignty. Similarly the desire to reflect Māori language and culture through broadcasting is contained in statements from the NZMC and the Waitangi Tribunal:
Bicultural transmissions increase the cultural pride, ethnic identity and status of minority groups. They enable native languages and traditional customs to be preserved and to contribute to the development of a national culture and identity. We are convinced that the broadcasting media, radio and television, plays a key role in the maintenance or loss, development or stagnation of language and culture, not only by what they do, but by what they do not do. The virtual absence of Māori language from radio and television has been a potent factor in the decline in the number of fluent speakers of Māori over the last forty years, to the point where its survival is problematic. This must be rectified [Waitangi Tribunal 1990:623].

The Māori media initiatives briefly outlined above were born of frustration with a broadcasting system which consistently ignored, underrepresented (and often also misrepresents) Māori communities. Alternative news services highlight that there are an infinite number of perspectives on news stories and more than one way to approach the production of news texts in Aotearoa.

The television news text

A text is different to a TV programme. A programme is something with a start and a finish and is one fragment of the continual output of television. A programme is produced by media workers to convey a certain set of meanings. These preferred meanings are encoded into the programme through cultural and filmic codes. A code is a: “rule-governed system of signs, whose rules and conventions are shared amongst members of a culture” [Fiske 1987:4] and they are used to convey meanings within that culture. The codes in media programmes therefore provide possible links between producers' texts and audiences. However a programme is polysemic in nature which means that it has the potential for many other, including oppositional meanings, regardless of the preferred meaning, which can also be drawn out by viewers. Television texts are also ‘intertextual’. This means that other cultural products and texts such as books, newspapers, songs and so on influence the way people read television [Bakhtin 1975/1981; Kristeva 1984]. A text is reliant on a viewer and is to a large extent the production of that viewer. Fiske writes that a programme is transformed into a text “at the moment of reading, that is, when its interaction with one of its many audiences activates some of the
meanings/pleasures that it is capable of provoking” [1987:14]. Due to the ‘flow’ of television viewing a text need not start and finish with a programme and can include anything (such as advertisements) which interact to produce meanings and pleasures [Williams 1990].

Fiske argues that central to this notion of flow is the technology of television itself which consists of a: “continuous succession of images which follows no laws of logic or cause and effect” [1987: 99]. Contributing to the ‘flow’ of television news are 24 hour news channels, the news reader’s ‘chatter’ which locks otherwise unrelated events into a narrative flow, the widespread availability of television remote controls which enables a viewer to quickly switch between programmes, and the blurring of distinctions between the news, drama, entertainment and other genres67.

The text I analyse in the following two chapters focuses on a panel discussion screened during 1996 Waitangi Day on Capital Television. It also includes news segments from One Network News, Three National News and the Holmes68 show which covered the ‘events’ of the day. While news and current affairs are two distinct genres many of the colonising discourses and redemptive metahistorical narratives I identify in the panel discussion were reinforced in the news coverage. By approaching my study in this way I was able to see how many different news programmes, stories and segments reinforce and (re)present particular views of ‘reality’ regarding the history of Aotearoa and the events of 1996 Waitangi Day.

The construction of ‘reality’ in television news texts
A coded sense of ‘reality’ is at the very heart of a news programme. The authority and credibility of news and current affairs is reliant upon the

67 This can be seen in the way ‘factual’ programmess such as Crimewatch use dramatic reconstructions and the way ‘fictional’ programmess such as NYPD Blue use hand held, grainy photography reminiscent of ‘on the scene’ documentary and news photography.
68 The Holmes show is a half hour current events programme which is screened on Channel One at 7.00pm after the main news. The show’s host is Paul Holmes. He introduces segments and stories and conducts interviews mainly with people who appeared in the evening news on that particular day.
'realness' of their version of the news. The masking of news conventions like editing, scripting, the selection of panellists, the suppression of the interviewer's subjective beliefs and the fictions of 'balance' and 'objectivity' helped create the feeling that viewers were watching unmediated 'real life' events on our TV screens as they happen elsewhere. The idea that television is a 'window on the world' creates the notion that the presentation of news and current affairs programmes are the logical and perhaps only way these issues can be presented. This belief in the 'liveness' of television is sustained in part because of the unique technological makeup of television and the television image which, Jane Feuer argues, is in its essence processual:

The ontology of the television image ... consists in movement, process 'liveness' and presence [the] equation of 'live' television with 'real life' is to ignore all those determinations standing between the 'event' and our perception of it - technology and institutions to mention two [1983: 13].

The intent is to confirm the idea that what is being shown can and is happening in the 'real' world in the minds of viewers. This belief in the inherent 'liveness' of certain news stories limits other possible readings and closes down debates over how different presentations of the same events can yield very different meanings. This indicates to me the value of Baudrillard's ideas (briefly outlined on page 66) in the study of 'realism' in television: analysing 'realism' in television news is not about measuring how a representation corresponds to a 'real event' elsewhere but about simulations, hyperreality, and, following Foucault, the deployment of particular discursive 'truths' above others. Thus in this study I am more concerned with studying how shot selection, editing, points of view, lighting, sound and images construct and organise a 'reality' for an implied viewer. I am also concerned with identifying the political, economic and cultural discourses these representations of 'reality' reinforce and the way they are used and circulate in different communities.

The commonsense belief that television news (especially pictures) can capture and reflect 'real life' without the influence of its own political, cultural,
technological, historical and economic structures is understandable when considering the lengths studio producers, performers, interviewers, writers... go to (re)create this 'live reality'. Robert Stam suggests this creation of a sense of 'reality' and 'live' television offers gratifications and pleasures for the viewer and are in fact qualities associated closely with news, current affairs, sports and talk shows:

Live transmission makes possible real, as opposed to fabricated, suspense ... Unlike the cinema, television has to tell us, by superimposed captions, whether it is live or recorded ... Although live transmission forms but a tiny proportion of programming, that tiny proportion sets the tone for all of television [1983:24-25].

This imminent reaction and reality is part of the pleasure of watching television news and current affairs programmes. Louis Lapham as quoted in Morse (1985) explains the pleasures of television news as an “advertisement” for dominant reality:

People like to listen to stories, to believe what they are told, to imagine that the implacable forces of human history speak to them with a human voice ... The media thus play the part of a courtier, reassuring their patrons that the world conforms to the wish of the presiding majority ... By telling people what they assume they already know, the media reflect what society wants to think of itself [1985:14-15].

While this does explain the way in which the peculiar set-up of news programmes and panel discussions work to and can appear as normal and commonsensical ways of presenting the issues it must be remembered that there are points in the programmes narrative in which this 'reality' and 'naturalness' are ruptured and exposed. It is also important to recall that the people watching the texts can draw diverse and oppositional meanings from the programmes.

**Audiences/viewers/readers**

People using the television media do not all passively and uniformly absorb the dominant messages encoded into programmes by media producers. There
is no such thing as 'the television audience' which implies a passive homogenous mass of identical people. To talk of 'the audience' is to fail to account for unlimited differences amongst people. We all bring to our viewing different social, ethnic and gendered positions which allows us the possibility of creating many meaningful texts from one programme. In order to adequately convey this idea the term ‘audience’ needs to be pluralised: 'audiences'.

As outlined earlier programmes are encoded with multiple meanings by producers. This polysemic potential of television programmes is necessary in order for them to appeal to the widest range of television viewers. Moreover it is unavoidable when considering the nature of discourse and the diversity of television viewers. However as Fiske argues this polysemy is: “neither boundless nor structureless: the text delineates the terrain within which meanings may be made and proffers some meanings more vigorously than others” [1987:16].

The concept of reading media news programmes is a way in which these agendas set by journalists, editors etc. can be challenged. A reader is someone who actively makes meanings from television programmes. It is a skill which can be learnt formally or informally and can be a way of resisting sexist, racist and other colonising discourses in television programmes. Oppositional readings are, however, only contingent on the availability of, or exposure to, different points of view and sets of ideas. This is why the section on ownership and control of media production in this country is so important.

In this thesis I provide a reading of a text which draws upon my education, training, work and other cultural experiences as a Pākehā woman in Aotearoa. I present what I saw in the Waitangi Day Capital Nightly News presentation as one way, certainly not the only way, of reading Waitangi Day news coverage in Aotearoa.
CHAPTER FIVE

CAPITAL NIGHTLY NEWS

WAITANGI DAY PANEL DISCUSSION:

A (RE)PRESENTATION OF WHITENESS/CONTROL

The panel discussion I analyse represents half an hour of television coverage devoted to events and issues surrounding Waitangi Day, the Treaty of Waitangi and 'race' relations in Aotearoa, broadcast on Waitangi Day, 1996.

In this chapter I consider the discourses of ‘Pākehātanga’, unity and togetherness as elements in an overarching discourse which I refer to as whiteness/control.

‘Pākehā’ versus ‘Whiteness/control’

I separate the terms ‘pākehā’ and ‘whiteness/control’ in an attempt to theorise the way television employs the discourses of unity/togetherness and the labels ‘Māori’ and ‘Pākehā’ to control the presentation of different voices. To me the term Pākehā describes a person of European descent who claims an identity from within this country based upon an understanding of the Treaty of Waitangi and acknowledges Māori sovereignty rights. Michael King’s (1985) book Being Pākehā is an important text in the definition of what ‘Pākehā’ has come to mean to these people. Larner and Spoonley write that the term can now serve to: “invoke a particular form of politics; one which recognised Māori claims to sovereignty in some form, was built on a particular revisionist conception of New Zealand’s colonial history and was sensitive to claims of institutional racism within New Zealand society” [1995:52]. This is how I use the term. However this is not the way ‘Pākehā’ was used during the panel discussion and coverage of Waitangi Day activities around the country. The term was used to describe all non-Māori people assumed to be of Western European descent, irrespective of their politics or ethnic backgrounds thus draining and subverting the term’s political possibilities. I indicate the places I think this is happening with quotation marks around the term ‘Pākehā’. This
all-encompassing use of Pākehā overlaps with the often pejorative way in which many Māori people also use the term. Pākehā in both these latter circumstances is often defined by skin colour and applied to those ‘white’ skinned, people, assumed to be descended from Western Europeans.

I use ‘Whiteness/control’ in this chapter to describe an overarching discourse with deep roots in colonialism. It is a discourse which assumes the legitimacy of the formal political organisation in Aotearoa which was based on the assumption of political sovereignty by the British Crown throughout the 1800’s through war and legislation. This assumption of sovereignty has seen the establishment of a capitalist economic system, different state institutions such as state education, the health system, social welfare, taxation and land tenure at the expense of indigenous systems and resources. I use the concept of control as central to the notion and representation of ‘whiteness’ because it was/is crucial to the project of colonisation. Control not only of the self (body and mind) but also of the Other was an important discourse in the establishment of direct colonial rule: “The fear of one’s own body, of how one controls it and relates to it and the fear of not being able to control other bodies, those bodies whose exploitation is so fundamental to capitalist economy, are both at the heart of whiteness” [Dyer 1988:63].

With regards to the medium of television whiteness/control can be described as a discourse which allows certain things to be seen and filmed and said at the expense of other things. It can be identified in the genre of the panel discussion and the way in which news is presented, styles which are repeated world-wide due in part to the homogenisation of media ownership. Notions of balance, impartiality and objectivism often operate to obscure ‘whiteness/control’ as a system.

The many versions of ‘whiteness’ throughout the world have similarities because of their common colonial origins and Western European heritage. However despite the globalisation of media images (thanks to satellites and
advanced media technologies such as cyberspace and virtual realities), what it is to be ‘white’ in Aotearoa is not automatically the same as ‘whiteness’ in North America, England, and Australia. In Aotearoa the differences are due in part to the remote island location in the South Pacific, different histories and the interaction between the Polynesian heritage and milieu and coloniser communities, as well as the different reactions to (re)presentations of other ‘white’ communities from other countries. While elements of a global consumerist, capitalist and individualist culture importantly influence what it means to be ‘white’ in Aotearoa, Waitangi Day, is a key ceremonial occasion when the distinctive discourse of ‘whiteness’ in this country as opposed to other places becomes apparent. The ritual exploration of what it means to be a ‘New Zealander’ on this day, particularly a ‘white New Zealander’ is done within the boundaries of ‘white’ representations which locates ‘Others’ in certain ways during the news and current affairs programmes I look at. This is the process and these are the representations I refer to as ‘whiteness/control’.

**Why study whiteness/control?**

Representations of whiteness/control are often passed off as normal or commonsense ways of organising institutions, representations and communities. This naturalisation and centralisation of the discourses of whiteness/control may be interpreted as colonial redemptive metahistorical narratives used to deny the impact of ‘white’ culture on the indigenous communities of Aotearoa. Donna Awatere, writing in 1984, argued that the naturalisation of ‘whiteness’ is reinforced through such things as school

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69 There are however interesting parallels between Waitangi Day and other holidays celebrated by communities descended from colonisers around the world such as American Thanksgiving and Australia Day. For example as part of these holidays ritual depictions of ‘national unity’ (discussed further on pages ), especially amongst indigenous peoples and the dominant colonising culture, are often found in the national media of these three countries. The focus on the theme of ‘unity’ operates to disguise and marginalise the historical and ongoing violence, both physical and symbolic, used in the establishment and continuation of these ‘unified nation states’. Perhaps the main difference between American Thanksgiving, Australia Day and Waitangi Day is that the latter was established after considerable pressure from Māori activists in the 1970's and was not ostensibly initiated by communities descended from the dominant colonising culture. The change of the name from 'New Zealand day' ('New Zealand' being a name given to this country by colonial voyagers and adopted by colonial settlers) to Waitangi Day, further emphasises the treaty, a document both central and essential in the Māori struggle for Tino Rangatiratanga.
history curriculums which teach the “British colonial past [which asserts that] New Zealand begins with Cook [and means] before and after that the indigenous people are treated with amnesia” [1984:66]. This amnesia about other versions of the colonial and pre-European contact history of Aotearoa, which centres the experiences of those people descended from the white colonial settlers, means that:

white people do not see themselves as part of a culture. Full stop. They do not see that this culture has its roots in Britain. ‘Culture’ to white people is about art galleries, opera, ballet and not picking your nose. It’s not about land alienation, cultural imperialism, trade unions, agriculture, voting, the alphabet and sewage systems based on water ... They see this culture as being so normal and all other cultures as being so abnormal, less advanced, barbaric [Awatere 1984:59].

Awatere’s argument highlights the way ‘culture’ to ‘white’ people is restricted to or recognised as ‘high’ culture while fundamental structural ways of organising communities are regarded as merely ‘natural’. On the difficulties of and necessities for studying representations of whiteness in North American and British popular culture Richard Dyer (1988) agrees with Awatere’s assertion that ‘whiteness’ has its links in a specific culture. He argues that this culture reproduces its power by passing its representations off as normal. Dyer points out that the study of representations of Othered groups, such as in this instance, Māori people, which focus on the part these images play in the subordination and marginalisation of these groups, while necessary and enlightening, tends to reinforce the construction of Māori as different or in Awatere’s words “abnormal”:

Looking with such passion and single-mindedness, at non-dominant groups has had the effect of reproducing the sense of oddness, differentness, exceptionality of these groups, the feeling that they are

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70 Dyer’s use of the term ‘whiteness’ tends to elide many other potential cultural, ethnic and national identities. However he argues that identifying commonalities amongst representations he refers to as ‘whiteness’ is important because part of their power resides in the fact that they appear to be nowhere, thus invisible and ‘commonsense’ while they are actually everywhere in reality. And being so pervasive and powerful they should therefore be studied as a system which works to marginalise and suppress other peoples.
departures from the norm. Meanwhile the norm has carried on as if it is the natural, inevitable, ordinary way of being human [Dyer 1988:44].

This centralisation of whiteness also operates linguistically. English, the only language used on the Capital Nightly News panel discussion and during the news bulletin, employs a notion of colour that places different values on ‘black’ (biblically associated with evil and the devil) and ‘white’ (associated with purity and heaven). Such linguistic binaries influence our thinking about ethnicity. ‘Black’ is always a marked colour, a definable entity and identity, whereas ‘white’ has a mercurial quality which is not able to be grasped or defined. These ideas were part of the processes in which ‘whiteness’ becomes invisible and powerful: “white is not anything really, not an identity, not a particularising quality because it is everything - white is no colour because it is all colours” [Dyer 1988:45].

Discussing ‘whiteness’ as a system, culture and ethnic discourse starts to displace it from a powerful position of invisibility. Activist Bell hooks (1990) who identifies as a ‘black’ American feminist, argues that the continual denial of the existence of what she terms a ‘white’ supremacist patriarchal system means that ‘white’ people are often oblivious of the effect of ‘whiteness’ on peoples of colour. She argues that an investigation of how representations of ‘whiteness’ are (re)constructed, how they operate and impact on others will allow ‘white’ people to see this as a system of exclusion and control which can act to marginalise and terrorise people of colour (particularly Māori in this thesis). Once seen as a system which is (re)inforced through images and representational codes in the print and television media, people can start to identify discourses of ‘race’ as colonial and understand how they operate to forestall the development and empowerment of certain communities, without also seeing all ‘white’ (descendants of Western Europeans) people as bad and wrong and consequently all ‘black’ or ‘brown’ (Māori) people as good and right. In this country the term Pākehā can potentially separate ‘white’ representations from the idea of normality since the word itself comes from Te Reo Māori. Similarly the exploration of a Pākehā identity for ‘white’ people
descended from colonial settlers invokes the existence of indigenous Māori communities and their claims to sovereignty.

**Racial tagging in the Aotearoa television media**

As discussed in the introduction on pages 3-4, the changing history and meanings of the terms Māori and Pākehā can be read as reflecting the changing nature of colonial relations in Aotearoa. To recap, the word 'Pākehā' (stranger) was used to refer to all the immigrants arriving in Aotearoa in the 1800's. The word 'Māori' (normal) was used by Māori and Pākehā as a word for the indigenous people. In contemporary print and television press and in some official statistics the word 'Pākehā' has come to refer to those assumed to be of Western European descent (in other words those with 'white' skin). Māori still refers to those descended from the indigenous populations but is sometimes prefaced with a numerical fraction (half, quarter, eighth...) or a percentage (90%, 20%...). This way of labelling people draws upon the colonial biologicist discourse of 'race' which questions the purity of a person’s ‘blood’. Phrases such as ‘full-blooded Māori’ and questions focused on whether a person has any ‘Māori blood’ reduce Māori to more animal than ‘civilised’. This implies that being Māori is no longer central. Meanwhile the other half or 10% which is often assumed to be of British colonial settler descent remains unnamed and the implication is that this is because it is obvious, natural and normal, in no need of definition. A good example of this was during the *Capital Nightly News* bulletin on the Waitangi Day ‘celebrations’ at Frank Kitts park in Wellington where the voice over claimed that “Tangata Whenua, Pākehā and ethnic groups performed dances” during the day. The distinction between ‘Pākehā’ and ‘ethnic groups’ is significant in that it seems to deny that “Pākehā” people are part of an ethnic group or groups. A further example of this is the absence of labels such as ‘half-Pākehā’, or ‘45% Pākehā’ in the print and television media.

Abel’s (1992) study of news coverage of Waitangi Day in 1990 identified that the people most willing to refer to themselves as ‘Pākeha’ were those most
sympathetic to Māori sovereignty issues. She argued that this willingness to be identified as separate from the overarching concept of a ‘New Zealander’ gave space for other people especially those who identified as Māori to assert their differences and their rights based on those differences within Aotearoa.

The use of, and need for, the labels 'Pākehā' and 'Māori' are passionately debated in Aotearoa by people from all political backgrounds and these debates often (re)produce and reflect the colonial discourses of nation building. The terms were products of colonial contact and tend to homogenise diverse groupings of people. The label ‘Pākehā’ is particularly contentious. ‘New Zealander’ and ‘Kiwi’ which are often used as substitutes deny any ethnic label of identification that the term Pākehā implies. The label Pākehā is rejected by those who wish to see a homogenous national identity and who reject the use of Te Reo Māori, but it is embraced by others who see in the term an identity with its roots in Aotearoa as opposed to Europe. The term Māori is contested by those who wish to be identified with their iwi and hapū and also by those who wish to be viewed as New Zealanders. ‘New Zealander’ and ‘Kiwi’ are used as a way of presenting an identity to other countries and tend to bridge and/or deny the differences between the people who identify as Māori or Pākehā and other ethnic groups living in this country. Paul Spoonley writes that the phrase ‘We are all New Zealanders’ can work to “imply a unity where none exists, now or in the past, and provides a relatively underhand means of expressing old forms of prejudice” [1990:30]. The term ‘New Zealander’ then can be seen as part of a redemptive metahistorical narrative which contains within it the idea of unity between all people living in this country and which is used to hide disparity and grievances amongst these people. Nonetheless most people living in Aotearoa will no doubt identify with or be identified with one or more of these labels at different stages and situations in their lives. For example I referred to myself as a ‘New Zealander’ while working abroad, am called a ‘Kiwi’ by people from different countries.

71Letters to the editor often debate the need for this word and there have even been calls from MPs to ban it completely. Stories abound as to the translation of the term Pākehā and range from ‘white ghost’ to ‘white pig’.
both within and outside Aotearoa and now, if asked, identify as Pākehā with a mixed heritage. This suggests a fluidity to these labels and diverse meanings that are seldom explored in print and television media coverage. In the panel discussion that is the subject of this study it is my contention that ‘Pākehā’ and Māori were often merged into ‘New Zealanders’, and ‘Pākehā’ was collapsed onto representations of whiteness/control.

**Framing Waitangi Day: Capital Nightly News panel discussion**

While using the term ‘Pākehā’ can be a way of acknowledging difference, it can also be a way of setting up a certain kind of difference which is able to be managed and controlled and which excludes other differences and discussions. This use of ‘Pākehā’ and Māori is apparent in this *Capital Nightly News* panel discussion where the interviewer, Liz Gunn, asserted that the programme had brought “Māori and ‘Pākehā’ together to talk about the relevance of Waitangi Day...”. The six people participating in the discussion could have been identified in a myriad of other ways: gender, profession, political background, age or a mixture of all of them, but were not. This sets the agenda for Waitangi day as the relationship between Māori and ‘Pākehā’ that emphasises just how far these two categorical groupings have ‘come together’ since 1840; a theme reiterated throughout the news bulletin.

Framing the meaning of Waitangi Day in this way does two things. Firstly it decentralises the Treaty of Waitangi. This can be seen when I consider that the topic of the panel discussion could have been something like ‘how successfully have successive governments honoured the terms of the Treaty of Waitangi?’ and in the exclusion of any discussion or referral to the actual text of the Treaty of Waitangi itself by interviewers and news reporters. Secondly this construction of the panel discussion excludes other cultural groups within Aotearoa such as Chinese, Samoan, Niuean, Indian, Tongan, Malaysian... from commenting on future directions for this country.
The panel discussion was broadcast on a local Wellington television station as part of an extended news bulletin, mainly devoted to Waitangi Day news, on February 6, 1996. Many people participated in the construction of this show, six as panellists and one as interviewer in front of the cameras with a support team of producer, director, editors, camera operators, researchers etc. The interviewer, Liz Gunn's appearance and accent coded her as a 'New Zealand' woman of Western European descent. The three panellists referred to as 'Pākehā' were introduced on the show as Doug Graham the Crown Treaty Negotiations Minister, Peter Munz, an Historian and John King, a Reporter. The three panellists referred to as 'Māori' were introduced as Doctor Ngatata Love, a spokesperson for the local Te Atiawa iwi, Matiu Rei from Ngāti Toa and Shane Jones, an urban Māori advocate from the Te Aupouri iwi.

This panel discussion was filmed in a studio. Panellists and interviewer were arranged in a V-shape, Liz Gunn at the head, with the 'Pākehā' men fanning out to her right, the viewer's left, and the 'Māori' men fanning out to her left, our right (Figure 6).

Figure 6: The V-shape layout of the Capital Nightly News panel discussion. [Capital Nightly News February 6, 1996].

From these positions the panellists fielded specific questions and discussed issues such as sovereignty, race, class, the Treaty of Waitangi, colonisation and the future of Aotearoa.
Certain decisions were made before and throughout the filming. These included the decision to have the debate in a panel format, the selection of participants, the research and scripting of certain questions, the choice of venue, the way in which it was recorded and edited, the actual shots chosen during filming and the positioning of the finished product within the *Capital Nightly News* bulletin on Waitangi Day. All of these decisions shaped the construction of meanings in the text and its reception. A change in any of these decisions would have seen a corresponding change in meaning, yet none of the actual processes that went into the production of this show were foregrounded. For example the *Capital Nightly News* panel discussion is taped and edited beforehand (we see an edited excerpt from the middle of the discussion used as a teaser before the actual panel discussion is broadcast) but this is not acknowledged by anyone in the programme and is contradicted by the intersegmental ‘chatter’ between newsreader Grant Walker and interviewer Liz Gunn. The idea of the flow and filming of this discussion in ‘real’ time is also apparent in the way in which advertisement breaks are verbally introduced:

Grant Walker in news studio set:...but first we have a Capital edition Waitangi Day Special with Liz Gunn.  
Liz Gunn: Thanks Grant. Tonight we bring Māori and Pākehā together to talk about the relevance of Waitangi Day and the way government is handling Māori issues in 1996. That after the break in Capital Nightly News...  
...  
Liz Gunn in studio: Now back to Grant Walker with the rest of the news.  
Grant Walker: Thanks Liz as I...

The props used are employed to break down the barrier between the studio (with its connotations of staging) and the ‘outside world’. The picture of Wellington Harbour which hangs directly behind Liz Gunn is used to signify ‘us’ out there in the audience whom Liz Gunn represents in her role as interviewer and facilitator (see figure 7). Morse argues that this type of background or ‘wallpaper’ is a convention used to symbolise “an ideal space or a nowhere where information is gathered” [1985:7].
Other little “reality effects” [Stam 1983: 32] employed by news broadcasters and current affairs people include the shuffling of paper by interviewers/presenters like Liz Gunn. This movement suggests her part in the programme’s research process and creates the idea that she must make last minute adjustments to her notes before going out live. In fact most of the questions and the order in which they will be asked have been scripted beforehand, and are also able to be read off the TelePrompTer.

Figure 7: Liz Gunn speaking to camera with photo of Wellington Harbour behind her. [Capital Nightly News February 6, 1996]

This text shares many of the conventions of news reporting but is more properly referred to, and was presented as, ‘current affairs’. Brennon Wood argues in his study of New Zealand political television that the distinction between news and current affairs centres around the journalistic distinction between ‘fact’ and ‘comment’:

Whereas news is principally supposed to establish ‘the facts’ of given situations, current affairs deals with varying ‘opinions’ interpreting problematic events and issues ... while news creates unitary meanings, current affairs explores diverse meanings ... current affairs does more than
merely represent diversity. It also contextualises events and actively investigates them [1984:101-102].

According to Stuart Hall the aim of a current affairs show is to place events in an historical context, to explore them in depth and to provide “informed speculation ... with the objective of promoting a ‘rational’ understanding of the issues involved” [Hall et al 1976:56].

In this text the apparent diversity of meaning and ‘in-depth’ coverage of ‘the facts’ is constructed and signified in specific ways. For example it is given a half hour time slot rather than the thirty or so seconds allocated to other news items, it has six people commenting on issues at length, rather than the normal one or two sources in news stories and their six second sound bites. The placement of this text within the more standard Capital Nightly News programme and it’s introduction as a “Capital Nightly News Waitangi Day Special” also sets it apart from the rest of the bulletin and signals a switch from the ‘fact’ of the news items to the ‘informed comment’ of the ‘expert’ panellists.

The medium of a panel discussion with which to explore the issues surrounding Waitangi Day allows for a very controlled and to some degree predictable representation of certain issues. Predictable in the sense that the topic is defined, the questions scripted, the participants selected according to the positions they hold and the people or discipline they apparently represent. This selection process and the invitation of ‘well known’ people, or ‘experts’ who have aired their views before, means that the discussion which takes place on the programme can be anticipated to a large extent by the directors, writers and the interviewer. In this particular panel discussion even the somewhat unpredictable element of an audience with potential hecklers or people who might ask ‘difficult questions’ was eliminated because no studio audience was invited. Who are these ‘experts’?

72 The Holmes Leader’s Debate and Fraser election specials which involved the interviewing and questioning of politicians by journalists and audience members in the run up to the October 12th 1996 election showed both the attempted control and unpredictability of live
A Crown Minister, an Historian, a journalist and three Māori

My reading was that the panellists have all been involved with Crown and government approaches to Waitangi Day and the Treaty of Waitangi and that it was these experiences alone which were targeted by the interviewer's questions. This meant that other experiences and meanings of Waitangi Day and the Treaty of Waitangi were marginalised throughout the panel discussion. The Crown, and National government focus of the panel discussion, worked to frame any debate surrounding Tino Rangatiratanga within the current political framework of parliamentary democracy, with its roots in colonisation. On the 'Pākeha' side were Doug Graham, the National party Minister of Treaty Negotiations, who represented the Crown, Professor Peter Munz a Victoria University Historian who continually sidelined the significance of the Treaty and did not question the shape of the political institutions themselves and John King a Journalist who stated that in the end sovereignty probably rests with who controls the army and police (although he felt that most 'New Zealanders' would feel uneasy about this). The Māori panellists, represented as the 'other side' of the debate, featured Doctor Ngatata Love (Te Atiawa), the head of Te Puni Kokiri, Matiu Rei, (Ngāti Toa), who is (among other things) a Crown consultant on Māori Health issues and Shane Jones, (Te Aupouri), a staunch supporter of the fiscal envelope and who was heavily involved in the controversial Sealord’s deal and one of thirteen commissioners on the Waitangi Tribunal Fisheries Commission. The professional identities of the

audiences. In both of these shows the audiences were vetted and selected (on the Holmes leaders debate audience members were selected for their political party allegiances i.e. 50 Alliance, Labour, National and NZ First supporters and 50 'undecided) and their questions known to and presumably selected by the interviewers and television stations beforehand. However this careful selection process did not eliminate the hecklers in both shows who attempted to disrupt and subvert the question and answer format. Their disruptions were not as marked in the Fraser show because they were filmed in large halls and only the question podium and the speakers were miked. The Holmes show was filmed in the studio however so the producers had to control the hecklers in different ways. One person who attended both shows noted:

In the first Holmes debate no one got told off, in the second one they said they would remove people if it got too bad - no one was removed it wasn’t as bad as the first one for heckling as people got the message from Paul Holmes when he said we should shut up during the programme. They used security guards to intimidate people and a few people got a rough talking to [Collett 1996: Personal correspondence].
'Pākehā' panellists were mentioned, while none of the professional and political backgrounds of the Māori panellists were explicitly stated. Instead, within a conventional reading frame, the selection of the panellists was organised around and reduced to their 'ethnicity':

Liz Gunn to camera in segment before the panel discussion: Tonight we bring Māori and Pākehā together to talk about the relevance of Waitangi Day and the way the government is handling Māori issues in 1996.

However the (re)assertion of 'Pākehā' and Māori ethnicities during the course of the programme was not uniformly executed. Through captions designed to identify the qualifications of the panellists, the Māori members of the panel were identified as coming from their iwi, thus reinforcing their 'ethnicity' for non-Māori. But when it came to the 'Pākehā' panellists ethnic categories were augmented with an identification of professions such as "Crown Treaty Negotiator", "Historian" and "Journalist". This served to delegitimise the Māori panellists by ignoring their professional backgrounds. Using an iwi affiliation as a way of identifying people is a Māori way of introducing people because it allows others to locate the person speaking within a certain hapū and iwi and emphasises whakapapa links. However within the context of the panel discussion which attributed ethnic and professional status to the 'Pākehā' panellists I read this Māori dimension as subjugated and perhaps lost to many non-Māori viewers. On the other hand it could have been paramount for Māori viewers.

Iwi identifications are used on programmes such as Marae and Te Karere, but they are often combined with the professional identities of people. These programmes also identify the ethnicity of non-Māori interviewees, for example they may identify a person as 'Pākehā' or Samoan and so forth.

A possible reading of this inconsistency can be found in Dyer who suggests that one difficulty theorists encounter in identifying and categorising a representation of 'whiteness' is because "any instance of white representation

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is always immediately something more specific” [1988: 46]. That is to say a person on a programme like this will rarely be labelled a ‘Pākehā’ from Blenheim without reference to some other professional category. Similarly the film “Smash Palace” [Dir: Roger Donaldson 1981] might be thought of as a film about relationships and the life of a ‘man alone’ type character in rural Aotearoa before it is thought of by European/New Zealanders and Pākehā as a film about ‘white’ people coming to terms with themselves and their lives in this country. Thus representations of whiteness/control can appear to break down into a myriad of other categories which makes whiteness/control per se hard to analyse because there appears to be no stereotype, no typical representations which are returned to again and again:

The colourless multi-colouredness of whiteness secures white power by making it hard, especially for white people and their media, to ‘see’ whiteness ... [which means] white people - not there as a category and everywhere everything as a fact - are difficult, if not impossible to analyse qua white. The subject seems to fall apart in your hands as soon as you begin [Dyer 1988: 46].

For majority culture viewers the different labelling of the Māori and ‘Pākehā’ panellists during the Capital Nightly News panel discussion additionally emphasised the individuality of the ‘Pākehā’ men through their professional titles and the homogeneity, of the Māori men as Māori. This was filmically enforced in the shots of Dr. Ngatata Love, Matiu Rei and Shane Jones which framed them together five times (Figure 8) throughout the panel discussion whereas Doug Graham, Peter Munz and John King were shown in this way only once, during the introductions.

This homogenisation of the Māori men seems to fulfil a coded desire that Māoridom speak with one voice (or at least should attempt to) so that ‘we’, the ‘New Zealand’ viewer will know what ‘they’ want once and for all. Leonie Pihama describes this as the “Māori have to get their act together discourse”[1995:28] and identifies it in the speeches of prominent politicians
such as 1993-1996 Minister of Māori Affairs, John Luxton. She argues that the results of this type of European/New Zealand and government thinking completely neglect the diversity and complexity of iwi and hapū politics and can be found “at both the level of Treaty claims and at the level of ideas” [Pihama 1995:28]. Such consensus is not asked of European/New Zealand and Pākehā people however (it is perhaps assumed) who in reality continue to disagree vociferously!

Dyer contends that ‘white’ domination has been so successful at maintaining power because ‘white’ people have “colonised the definition of normal” [1988:45]. ‘Whiteness/control’ as an unmarked category can lead to assertions, from those who do not see ‘whiteness’ as a system that they are

73 This colonisation of the ‘normal’ operates in the way Colonial powers and settlers historically (re)defined and (re)named the lands and the peoples they colonised. The English place names on many maps of Aotearoa and indeed the world demonstrate this. Names such as ‘Poverty Bay’ and ‘Murderer’s Bay’ (renamed Golden Bay in the recent past) in Aotearoa tell the story of contact between Captain Cook and the local communities from the perspective of the colonial voyagers. The labeling of the Western and Eastern and Southern hemispheres relates back to the positioning of the Western European metropole countries often in the centre and certainly at the top of world maps. The (re)naming of countries has often resulted in a centering of the colonising people’s culture, language and customs and the marginalisation of the colonised. For example the British renamed Cymru ‘Wales’ and the populations within it ‘Welsh’ which is derived from an Old English word for foreigner; the Island of Eire was renamed ‘Ireland’ and the people within it ‘Irish’ a word which is often used to describe illogical or ludicrous behaviour [Sinclair 1991: 815, 1726, 1743].
best able to be objective, universal and impartial about issues to do with the marked 'Other'. This stance or point of view invokes for me the actions of colonial administrators and scholars who studied and represented (painted, wrote about, photographed) their colonial subjects from their own cultural location which was then erased from their work:

The point of view was not just a place set apart, outside the world or above it. Ideally, it was a position from where, like the authorities in Bentham's panopticon, one could see and yet not be seen. The photographer, invisible beneath his black cloth as he eyed the world through his camera's gaze, in this respect typified the kind of presence desired by the European in the Middle East, whether as tourist, writer, or, indeed, colonial power ... The ability to see without being seen confirmed one's separation from the world, and constituted at the same time a position of power. The writer, too, wished to see without being seen. The representation of the Orient, in its attempt to be detached and objective, would seek to eliminate from the picture the presence of the European observer [Mitchell 1992:306].

This idea of the unseen or unmarked observer creating knowledge about other people who are marked and seen, is useful when considering the role of the interviewer Liz Gunn. She is positioned as the 'impartial' mediator between the 'Māori panellists and the 'Pākehā' panellists. It is her role as the interviewer/presenter to facilitate a 'balanced' and 'objective' presentation of the issues.

Balance, and impartiality as mechanisms/manifestations of whiteness/control

The notion of 'balance' is constructed within the text through shot choice, tone of interviewer, tone of questions and speaking times. 'Balance' is employed by television producers, editors and Directors and tends to be most evident when the issues dealt with on a programme are contentious. Throughout the programme balance was evident in the way Liz Gunn ensured each panellist had a chance to answer one or two questions and the uniform medium close-up (head and shoulders) shot of panellists speaking.
The panellists were also lit in the same way and each person was assigned an unencroachable physical space on the set from which they would not venture. There was also very little interruption of panellists by other panellists. Interruption was the prerogative of the interviewer who employed this technique in order to more evenly distribute the speaking time. While all of these linguistic and filmic devices helped convey the idea of balance in this text Wood (1984) argues that the most important aspect of its creation is the acceptance of these conventions by the people taking part in the discussion. This “shared norm of reasonable behaviour” [Wood 1984:110] meant that nobody stood to speak (as you would to whaikōrero), nobody challenged the right of the interviewer to curtail their speech or the choice of participants and so on.

‘Balance’ is a very seductive idea politically and when employed in a text like this panel discussion it can act to stave off accusations of bias from different audiences. It is also used as a way of signifying that the ‘status quo’ is open to diversity. However in a country where the baseline is a lack of political power balance, and where certain discourses about Waitangi Day, the Treaty of Waitangi and Aotearoa’s colonial history are repeated far more frequently than others and have access to more forums, this presentation of ‘balance’ has conservative political outcomes. Stuart Hall (1977) contends that the idea of balance and inclusion of different discourses is in fact a way of reinforcing the power of dominant groups who are continually successful because they “strive and to a degree succeed in framing all competing definitions of reality within their range, bringing all alternatives within their horizon of thought” [Hall 1977:323].

A ‘balanced’ report, or a ‘balanced’ panel discussion implies that all sides outside the text have had a chance to speak equally within the text. Yet the selection processes which go into this type of programme (i.e. who speaks and who doesn’t, which questions are asked and which are neglected) means it is quite possible to have an overtly balanced representation of views from people
taking part within the show while at the same time completely neglecting or ignoring many other people and views from outside the show.

The impartiality of the interviewer is another premise upon which this text is based and is reminiscent of the objectivist and invisible standpoint desired by the colonial tourist, administrator and authors etc. referred to on page 105. Impartiality is the apparent lack of commitment to any particular political viewpoint on the part of the interviewer. An example of how Liz Gunn demonstrated this impartiality can be seen in the extract which follows where Matiu Rei is speaking about the denial of Māori rights:

**Matiu Rei:** They’re actually being denied rather than ignored - I mean
**Liz Gunn (interrupting):** How are they being denied?
**Matiu Rei:** My viewpoint is that Māori rights are being denied, we’re being denied access to a whole host of things as it says in the Treaty of Waitangi. Access to our forests for example, our lands have been taken, right, for 150 years our seas have been taken, our harbours have been taken...We’re actually actively being denied access to our rights and if you’re talking about a vision for the future, how can you talk about a vision for the future when someone is sitting at the gate stopping us getting through to the future.

**Liz Gunn:** But how can you say you are being denied access when look the government has been so generous in offering one billion dollars to settle the claims.

**Matiu Rei:** I think from our tribal perspective we lost say five million acres. What’s one billion dollars in today’s terms?

**Liz Gunn:** It is fairly small isn’t it Minister in terms of the actual turn over for the government which is millions and millions a year.

In this segment Liz Gunn seems to do a complete about face in her take on the issues and this is accepted because of her ‘impartiality’, which means she is to present both sides ‘equally’. Her even tone of voice and body language throughout the show, regardless of the questions or the panellist she is interacting with, also allows her to ‘change sides’ without the danger of being labelled ‘biased’.
The use of a panellist's 'own words', or quotes, in her questioning of the participants also reinforces interviewer 'impartiality' (and that of the show's producers) for example:

**Liz Gunn**: Now, Peter Munz, you said talking about the underclass and the poverty in New Zealand one of your interesting quotations from last year was that that Mike Smith, who of course attacked the tree on One Tree Hill, you said could have made better sense if he had taken his chainsaw to one of the legs of the Business Roundtable. What did you mean by that?

This type of questioning serves to (re)present issues in the same way as they have already appeared elsewhere in the print and television media. It allows broadcasters to distance themselves from these views which they are seemingly merely repeating rather than creating. However it is apparent that this quote of Munz's has already been through a process of journalistic selection and presentation which saw the marginalisation of other voices such as that of Mike Smith. By re-using this quote Liz Gunn reinforced the anti-protestor version of the protest action on Maungakiekie at the expense of others. Through this type of questioning the European/New Zealanders, who already had greater access to the print and television media, such as Crown Minister Graham, Emeritus Professor Munz and Journalist King got to reiterate their points reinscribe coloniser discourse and to some extent set the agenda for further discussion. It is significant that Gunn frequently uses Graham's words, sometimes uses Munz's and never uses the 'well-known' words of the Māori panellists, perhaps because they're not 'well-known' in the places she and her research team gather their information.

The discourses of impartiality and balance were employed in this text to signify an equal weighting of arguments from 'Māori' and 'Pākehā' participants

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74 Maungakiekie is the original Māori name for One Tree Hill. Mike Smith attempted to fell the lone pine tree on Maungakiekie in early 1995 as a gesture of defiance against colonisation. Around a hundred years earlier drunken European men had toppled an ancient Totara tree sacred to the local people, which grew on Maungakiekie. An exotic Pine Tree was planted in its place. Unlike Mike Smith these European men were not arrested and charged for their deed.
about the relevance of Waitangi Day and the Treaty of Waitangi. However, these ideas merely resulted in a reinforcement of the way these issues are framed and discussed elsewhere and actually served to exclude other voices. In short: “through impartiality television obscures its specific interventions ... Like the practice of balance it neither ‘sees’ nor critically challenges the interests served by this prestructuring” [Wood 1984:127]. Through the journalistic redemptive metahistorical narratives of impartiality and balance Gunn and her production team negated any responsibilities their organisation, filming, editing and scripting of the panel discussion had, in the centralisation of Graham and National Party policies concerning the Treaty and development in Aotearoa. These redemptive metahistorical narratives also negated responsibility for the difficulties Love, Rei and Jones encountered in presenting and exploring alternative Māori approaches to the Treaty and development throughout the programme.

The centralisation of Doug Graham and the Crown

Cinematically, the left hand side is the most powerful side of the screen. This is where the ‘Pākehā’ panellists sat. The eyes of those people who are literate in English (the vast majority of people in Aotearoa) are trained to automatically go to the left hand side of the screen first and then scan to the right, as we do when we read, numerous other cultures do not read in this way. Graham who sat to the top of the left hand side of the screen, next to the interviewer (the right hand of God75), occupied an even more dominant position which again indicates the importance placed upon him and his job as Crown Minister by the show’s producers. This positioning alone gave him unconscious (dominant) cultural authority. Indeed the centralisation of Graham operated throughout the panel discussion; in the number of questions he was asked to field, and in that he was featured in more reaction shots than any of the other panellists. My argument is not that this centralisation of

75In many Western European Christian paintings within patriarchal art traditions to be positioned at the right hand side of God is very powerful, Leonardo Da Vinci’s ‘The Last Supper’ is an example. The left hand side is considered to contain evil. These discourses are continued in contemporary political discourses such as Prime Minister Bolger’s phrase ‘Doug is my right hand man!’ etc.
Graham necessarily worked to his personal advantage or meant that everyone agreed with him, that he managed to say exactly what he wanted or even that he got the last word, although in some cases this did happen. My argument is that this way of organising the panel discussion, and indeed of even having a panel discussion as part of Waitangi Day coverage, demonstrates certain cultural values and can be read as a discursive representation of whiteness/control.

Graham was asked by Gunn to open, and close the discussion. The order in which each panellist was asked to sum up their arguments at the end of the debate reinforced the prestige of Graham in his position as Crown Treaty Settlements Negotiator. The first people asked to sum up were King and Munz - 'Pākehā' people not officially 'attached' to the Crown. Then the Māori panellists were given the opportunity to sum up, one after the other. Unlike Munz and King they were asked by Gunn if they agreed with one another's comments. Then Graham was asked to comment on all that had gone before him. Graham was allowed to speak for considerably longer than the two sentences allocated to the other panellists. During his summary he was also interrupted by Gunn who asked him to clarify some of his statements:

**Gunn:** It's a very large brief Minister what do you say?

**Graham:** Well I think they’re very constructive comments. I think that we have to be more tolerant, we have to be more understanding. We have to find out what was wrong and learn from the past. But we've got to look ahead so we have to try and resolve those matters that were in the past, that were wrong. And then we do have to do what Dr Love was saying and that is concentrate on development of people, Māori people everybody in New Zealand and education of course is one of the critical things...

**Gunn (interrupts):** Behind all of that are you really prepared to change the government's approach quite substantially from this time...

**Graham:** No! I don't think there's anything wrong with the government's approach...

Gunn’s question could perhaps be interpreted as somewhat sceptical of Graham’s comments. Nonetheless the point is, that the way he was given extra time and was able to speak last, centred his comments and implied that
of all the panellists he was the one who had the most important things to say. His featuring in 'reaction shots' while Māori panellists were speaking also reinforced his paramount positioning. Furthermore as shown in Figure 9, Graham was often framed within the same shot as the three Māori panellists when one of them was speaking.

Figure 9
Doug Graham's 'reactions' to the Māori panelists. [Capital Nightly News February 6, 1996]

This suggested not only that all of the Māori panellists' comments were directed at him but also that any of his possible reactions are more important or significant than Love's, Munz's or Rei's etc. The only other person who was individually featured in reaction shots in this way was Gunn who within the text was able to comment on everyone's opinions, to distribute speaking times and to interrupt.

The position of the other two 'Pākehā' panellists is interesting because they barely featured at all. In fact, these two men were very much marginal members of the panel discussion. This suggests the equation of 'Pākehā' opinion with the Crown or perhaps that 'Pākehā' political opposition is closer to the government's position than the political stance of many Māori groups and organisations such as Te Kawariki, the Māori Women's Welfare League and others. The 6th February 1996 Three National News coverage of the 'Pākehā Treaty Action Group' protest (Figure 10) outside Government House
in Wellington which was broadcast on their national news programme at 6.00 p.m., one hour before the Capital Nightly News, reinforced this idea through reporter Sean Plunket’s ‘live’ report which asserted that the “mainly Pākehā” people involved did not “look like the hard-core protesters of recent years”.

Why? Because they were Pākehā.76

Figure 10: The Pākehā Treaty Action Group, not the hardcore protestors of recent years?. [Capital Nightly News February 6, 1996].

This division of political and Treaty based issues down ‘racial’ lines pictorially reinforced in the oppositional seating arrangements for the panel discussion, ignores the diversity of political opinion between and amongst Māori and European/New Zealand and Pākehā. Meanwhile Pākehā opinions are equated with the Crown and Māori televisually invited to align themselves with ‘The New Zealand People’ uniting together to ‘celebrate’ Waitangi Day around the country, which differing news reports assured ‘us’ were the vast majority of ‘New Zealanders’, are symbolically aligned against the ‘protesters’ up North (reported as small in number and support). Abel (1992) suggests this division of Māori people in news coverage of Waitangi Day is also between those represented as ‘good Māori’ and those constructed as ‘wild Māori’. ‘Good Māori’ are shown ‘celebrating’ the day through cultural performances and are also those who speak of ‘togetherness’ and ‘national unity’. Meanwhile ‘wild

76 This type of reporting inaccurately and misleading implied that Pākehā have not in the past been protesting over pro-Māori issues. It neglects the involvement of Pākehā in the ‘No Māori No Tour’ protests of 1969 for example which demanded a cancellation of a rugby tour to South Africa because the South African Rugby Union asked the All Blacks to select an all ‘white’ team.
Māori’ are represented as the 'protestors' and 'spoilers' who disrupt everyone else’s 'celebrations'.

The use of the word ‘Crown’ in many stories about the settlement of Treaty Claims and the development of good ‘race’ relations in Aotearoa operate to negate the responsibility on the part of every European/New Zealander and Pākehā person to familiarise themselves with the Treaty of Waitangi and our colonial history. The focus on the Crown in this panel discussion also suggests that ‘development’, both Māori and European/New Zealand, is to be directed by government often with scant reference to the Treaty of Waitangi. However as discussed in Chapters Two and Three if real change towards an honouring of the Treaty of Waitangi is to occur it must come from many levels. Debates surrounding these issues should be seen as vital for everyone living in Aotearoa because they involve and effect us all.

The location of the viewer in the text

Viewers were interpolated into the panel discussion through two main modes of address. The first, ‘direct address’ occurs when the viewer is “explicitly acknowledged as the subject to whom the programme is addressed” [Nichols in Wood 1984:147]. This direct address can happen when individuals within the programme “representing their social roles outside the text” [1984:148] (for example MPs, journalists, iwi spokespeople) address the audience, or when narrators or interviewers or other people “representing the point of view of the programme itself” address the viewer [1984:148]. The second mode of audience address is ‘indirect address’ which describes when the viewer is unacknowledged in the text.

In the Capital Nightly News Panel Discussion the first mode of address is employed by interviewer/presenter Gunn. She is the only person who speaks directly to camera and thus to ‘us’ the viewers. From this position she explains the purpose of the programme and introduces the other participants. Gunn also addresses the camera before and after advertisements. She asks the
viewer to “stay with us” before the break and then “welcomes” us back after the break. None of the other participants directly address the camera in this way. They look towards her or at each other while speaking.

When Gunn addresses the camera her language addresses ‘us’, the equation of the camera with the viewer positions the audience as individuals, unseen observers of the issues and debates, rather than as active participants either individually or as part of organised groups. Therefore as viewers ‘we’, through our alignment with the interviewer and the camera are united within and by the text as impartial and neutral observers who seek a balance of information about these issues from both sides of the panel.

‘Togetherness and unity’ in Waitangi Day television coverage

Gunn’s opening remarks and use of personal pronouns like ‘we’ and ‘us’ sets the panel discussion up as one which will explore the myriad of different opinions on Waitangi Day from people living in Aotearoa:

Like it or not Waitangi Day in 1996 is still an occasion where we are reminded of our differences rather than of the things which unite us as a nation. The past twelve months can only be remembered as one of the most divisive periods in our nation’s recent history. The fiscal envelope, the billion dollar deal that went sour. The protests at Moutoa gardens and the torching of the school up North. To talk about where we are and where we’re heading Treaty Negotiations Minister Doug Graham,...[goes on to introduce the rest of the panellists]

This introduction suggests that these differences and ‘difference’ per se will be treated in a particular way in this text. The phrase “Like it or not” suggests a negativity towards the very existence of difference which is placed in opposition to the unity of ‘our’ nation. It appears as if difference is something to be tolerated. This idea is reinforced throughout the bulletin which emphasises togetherness and unity and which, either positions those with ‘other’ opinions as ‘protesters’ (such as those people at ‘Moutoa gardens’)

77 The occupation of ‘Moutoa gardens’ was designed to highlight the taking of 86 000 acres of land in 1848 from Māori around the Wanganui area. It also highlighted the continuing processes of colonisation in Aotearoa which prevents Tangata Whenua from asserting their
and who “torched the school up North”) or ignores them completely. Gunn’s remarks acknowledge the existence of dissenting opinions, and the panel discussion offers the promise of an exploration (or airing at least) of some differences and the possible meanings which flow from them. But this exploration is contained and controlled within the overall narrative flow of the news bulletins which described Waitangi Day “New Zealand’s most important day” with often repeated phrases, such as “largely trouble-free” with a “special spirit and feeling of togetherness,” as a day “marked more by relaxation and togetherness” than protest and division. The protests that did occur throughout the day were also reported within this framework and were described as “relatively peaceful” (in Wellington), while ‘tensions’ on the Waitangi bridge (in Northland) only ever ‘threatened to boil over’. The news pictures that accompanied the coverage of Waitangi events in Wellington reinforced these messages and were full of people from every sort of group laughing, sitting in the sun, listening to music, picnicking, singing, dancing and generally ‘celebrating’.

Togetherness and unity were emphasised in the vox pop segments where ‘ordinary New Zealanders’ spoke of the significance of Waitangi Day to them. A Māori woman said Waitangi Day was a day when “we can all be one”, a Pākehā woman said it is “a time for all New Zealand people to get together ... immerse ourselves in New Zealand culture” and in answer to the interviewer’s question “Do you think we are coming together as a nation?” a man with an obvious British accent answered “we’re definitely coming within iwi boundaries. This action was an attempt to reassert Tino Rangatiratanga over the two acres of land (Moutoa gardens) now under the control of the Wanganui City Council. The occupation of this area lasted for over a month. The people who occupied these gardens referred to their Marae as Pakaitore and refused to use the name ‘Moutoa’. One reason for this is because Moutoa is a site where one Wanganui hapū protected European settlers by battling with another Wanganui hapū. Tariana Turia a spokesperson for Pakaitore during the occupation (and now a Labour MP) spoke at the 1996 Aotearoa Peace Workshops held in the Manawatu about the particularly painful meanings associated with the name ‘Moutoa’ for Wanganui Māori. Therefore the use of the name ‘Moutoa’ by Liz Gunn suggests a particular European/New Zealand standpoint especially when the history of the naming of these gardens by European/New Zealanders, and the battle that that name commemorates are considered.

78 The full Latin phrase is vox populi and translated means ‘voice of the people’. Thus in the case of news media this term refers to snippets of film which show ‘ordinary people’ answering a question such as “what does Waitangi Day mean to you?” on film.
together as a nation, it'll take more time but yes" (see Figures 11, 12 and 13 on page 117).

These people were used to signify the ‘ordinary kiwis’ in the television audience. The words ‘us’ and ‘we’ were used to confirm the overall narrative flow of the news bulletin with its focus on nation building, celebration, shown through the pictures, and unity. The presentation and use of vox pop as a device which ‘reflects’ rather than creates ‘public’ opinion disguises the very real possibility that those who had answered in a negative way or who had answered outside of the interviewer’s question were not included in the story.

The positioning of the panel discussion within this narrative of ‘togetherness’ and ‘harmonious unity’ made it difficult for ideas which differed from this view of Aotearoa to be given weight and credibility. Any opinion which highlighted the divisions within Aotearoa, or which suggested separate Māori development as a way to overcome political and social inequalities was set apart from the start. Any ideas that unity of a different sort to that of European/New Zealand nationalism, for example amongst iwi and sovereignty groups and supporters from different backgrounds, resulting from the very events which Gunn first refers to as ‘divisive,’ were silenced. Both of these discourses were separated from the ‘we’ created through the vox pop, news bulletin and her opening remarks.

In other news coverage the representation of a ‘united nation’ was graphically reinforced through the use of a Wellington College choir who performed a song entitled ‘Noho a tahi’. This song was covered in Capital Nightly News, One Network News, Three National News and Holmes segments as part of their 1996 Waitangi Day coverage. On Holmes [5th February 1996] the song was described as the "official Waitangi Day song" for the nation. Holmes ended his Waitangi Day show (which also rounds off Channel One’s news and
Figure 11: Waitangi day a day when "we can all be one" [Capital Nightly News February 6, 1996].

Figure 12: Waitangi Day a day to "celebrate New Zealand culture" [Capital Nightly News February 6, 1996].

Figure 13: "yes we're coming together as a nation" [Capital Nightly News February 6, 1996].
current affairs evening segment) with images of the multi-cultural students, joined by professional singers, performing their song in both English and Māori:

Harmony, you and me, like a band, working together.
Face to face, every race, across the land, working together.
Take a look around you, its time we got together, let's work it out in sweet harmony.
The wind, the sky, the sea, its clear to see the nation, working side by side so why can't we, come on and join with me.
Harmony...

"Unity in diversity" or assimilation?

Munz: If I were the government I would make intermarriage compulsory and in three generations the whole problem would disappear.

Comments such as this from Munz (Figure 14) during the panel discussion, and the history of various assimilationist government legislation in Aotearoa since 1840 throws into question the nature of the 'unity' presented by the Waitangi Day television news coverage.

Figure 14: 'Pākehā' panelist and Historian Peter Munz [Capital Nightly News February 6, 1996].
Various forms of assimilation have been tried in Aotearoa since colonisation. Different efforts to make the indigenous populations and customs disappear were designed to free up land and resources for European settlement and European-style development - which Māori could be a part of, in designated ways, if they joined the 'mainstream'. These policies include shifting legal definitions of what it is to be 'Māori' which were arguably employed to statistically eradicate communities and thus divest them of their rights to land, education, resources and cultural heritage [see Margaret Stewart-Harawira (1993) and Durie 1994:125-128]. During the 1950's urban drift the government's housing policy, referred to as 'pepper potting' in the 1961 Hunn Report, saw rural Māori settled amongst already established urban European families in the hope that the Māori would soon 'integrate'. The corporal punishment and humiliation of children who spoke Māori in schools during the late 1800s and early 1900s also contributed to the government's drive to 'assimilate' Māori into European/New Zealand life and values. All of these policies have contributed to huge suffering amongst Māori people and often a loss of identity. Munz's comments can be read as a continuation of the discourse of assimilation. To me Munz's remarks reiterated, in an extreme form, the style of Waitangi Day coverage and the discourses of unity and togetherness employed by news workers to explain the diverse feelings, commemorations and celebrations the day evokes. Is it a type of unity that merely makes the discourse of assimilation seem more acceptable in 1996 Aotearoa or is it a unity strengthened by diversity and which embraces Tikanga Māori and Māori communities as Treaty partners?

There have been many definitions and models of biculturalism since 1840 in the development of Aotearoa. Māori communities have consistently proposed different options to assimilation which would have seen the development of separate, autonomous institutions. It is only in the past twenty years that these voices have come to the fore in particular institutions and organisations. As a result differing models and levels of biculturalism can be found in the parallel

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79 See Bodley (1990) for cross cultural examples of the effects of similar colonial policies on indigenous communities elsewhere, for example in Africa and Australia.
development of Māori Women's Refuge, the Tikanga system of the Anglican Church, bilingual units in schools, cultural safety programmes in nursing and government departments such as Social Welfare. Mason Durie in his study on Māori Health Development (1994) asserts that despite the vast range of models and ideas (not to mention commitment to) ideas surrounding biculturalism, all the discussions return to two broad types: "One gave recognition (but little else) to the cultural traditions of two peoples, Māori and Pākehā; the other favoured a redistribution of resources to Māori" [1994:102]. Durie puts forward a continuum of bicultural goals (figure 15) and of bicultural structural arrangements (figure 16) which are useful tools to understand the type of 'unity' projected by the Waitangi Day television news coverage.

**Figure 15: A bicultural continuum of bicultural goals**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cultural skills knowledge</th>
<th>Better awareness of the Māori position</th>
<th>A clearer focus on Māori issues and Māori networks</th>
<th>Best outcomes for Māori over all activities</th>
<th>Joint ventures within agreed upon frameworks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

[Durie 1994: 103]

For me the panel discussion moved between the first and second goals (from the left) of biculturalism outlined in Figure 15. Gunn and her team of researchers had learnt the meaning of certain Māori words and phrases and had researched issues to do with the position of Māori in Aotearoa in 1996. However the presentation of some of these issues and the assumptions inherent in them did not move away from their presentation elsewhere in mainstream television and print media. For example she reiterated the importance of land and money to the settlement of Treaty grievances despite protestations from Dr. Ngatata Love and Shane Jones that the issues of colonisation and the development of anti-colonial strategies went much wider:

**Ngatata Love**: The land is an issue but it is a minor issue in terms of the progress we’ve got to make. When you look at it the real issues revolve
around the disparity in some areas which we’ve got to address. And they can only be addressed through both the existing systems and systems which Māori have developed...

**Gunn:** So wait a minute you’re saying this whole issue is much, much wider than just land, settling land claims.

**Ngatata Love:** Well of course it is and the government has recognised that, it is recognised the question of disparity and moving ahead on a broader front. The land issue, although journalists, with due respect, like to highlight that, is not really where the change is going to come, its going to come through the progress that can be made in the areas of education, health and to eliminate the difficulties we have with the justice system.

**Gunn:** Is the key to that getting money for the land claims you have, so that you can plow that back into education?

**Ngatata Love:** No! I must say, that is a minor part.

Similarly Gunn’s focus on the ‘fiscal cap’ of one billion dollars to settle all Treaty of Waitangi Claims which was contained within the 1995 ‘Fiscal Envelope’ reflected the main preoccupation of mainstream television, print media and people of European colonial descent. Debates raged over whether the one billion dollars was enough or too much and the constant revisiting of this issue excluded other Māori and Pākehā concerns with the proposal. Some of these other concerns included the inadequate consultative process between the Crown and Māori, the status of the Treaty of Waitangi in Aotearoa legislation and culture, if it was accepted, and the ruling out of claims to do with fossil fuels and similar natural resources. Thus while Gunn and her research team had an understanding of the issues, the panel discussion scarcely demonstrated a ‘clearer focus on Māori issues and Māori networks’.

The panel discussion’s focus on balance and impartiality or the need to ‘hear all sides equally’ did not have as its main concern the "best outcomes for Māori over all activities"[Durie 1984:103]. Certain comments from Graham and Munz tended to generalise a sense of grievance to ‘all New Zealanders’. In that they expressed the idea that to redress certain Māori grievances and to honour the terms of the Treaty of Waitangi would be to treat certain other ‘New Zealanders’ unfairly. This view stemmed from both the decentralisation of the Treaty of Waitangi (and the idea of partnership inherent in its text), and a linear European conception of time. As a result the specific and ongoing
effects of colonisation on Māori was sometimes ignored. For example Munz questioned the focus on ‘race,’ and suggested that the ‘real issue’ facing all ‘New Zealanders’ is ‘class,’ which allowed him to disregard the importance of the Treaty of Waitangi:

Munz: I feel that from a historical point of view people have made far too much of the Treaty. And the treaty if you look at it very carefully, was sort of formulated and signed, in order to get over a sort of political and social hiccup in the 1830’s. And so from that point of view I’m sure it was a very good thing at the time. But my view is that the people who signed the Treaty are no longer here.

The Western European linear conception of time demonstrated in this comment does not easily sit with Māori conceptions of the intermingling of past, present and future (see Awatere 1984; Hakiwai 1996:52-55). It is a way for descendants of European colonial settlers to deny our continuing responsibilities under the Treaty of Waitangi in 1996 Aotearoa. It is also a way to deny the legacy and effects of colonisation inherited from our ancestors on Māori especially.

Durie’s second model (Figure 16) deals with the structural arrangements of institutions and the different ways in which biculturalism can be organised, from a monocultural ‘mainstream’ institution to an Independent Māori institution.

**Figure 16: A bicultural continuum of structural arrangements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unmodified mainstream institution</th>
<th>A Māori perspective</th>
<th>Active Māori involvement</th>
<th>Parallel Māori institutions</th>
<th>Independent Māori institution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

[Durie 1984: 104]

Within this framework The *Capital Nightly News* panel discussion moved between the first two boxes. There was a Māori presence and perspective (the three panellists) but it was arguably a stage managed presence in that the
invited panellists had identifiable perspectives which were often easily assimilated into the overall (re)presentation of whiteness/control.

In the actual news coverage of Waitangi Day the appearance and participation of Māori was employed to signify diversity in Aotearoa. However the images chosen to convey the sense of “unity in diversity” can be read as those practices (waiata, kapa haka) considered not so threatening to the political status quo. The positioning of kapa haka groups and in particular Māori women in the overall narrative of 1996 Waitangi Day coverage is discussed fully in the next chapter.

Images of Māori people directly challenging the sovereignty of the government were labelled as 'protest actions' and 'protesters' and their actions were reported on at the expense of their political views and messages. In other words these ‘protesters’ were shown marching to the Waitangi Marae, blocking the Waitangi Bridge, facing off with the police and throwing stones. They were not interviewed about their reasons for marching, their ideas about Māori sovereignty and how to achieve it or the significance of Waitangi Day to their group (see Figures 17 and 18 page 124).

Meanwhile certain figures such as Mick Brown (a Māori family court judge) described as “the keynote speaker on Waitangi Marae” in an interview with Holmes, was asked to comment on the protesters, their views and tactics (see Figure 19 page 124). Those designated ‘protesters’ were never given the chance to comment on him, his views and tactics.

Brown reinforced a sense of separation between ‘right thinking’ ‘ordinary’ people, and ‘protesters' who were equated with another group of extremists.

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80 During the interview Mick Brown expressed his preferences for Māori to work and develop within, rather than outside of, ‘mainstream’ institutions.
Figure 17: 'Protestors throwing stones' on the Waitangi Bridge in Northland [Capital Nightly News February 6, 1996].

Figure 18: 'Protestors' marching to Waitangi marae, Northland [Capital Nightly News February 6, 1996].

Figure 19: Judge Mick Brown, keynote speaker for the commemorations on Waitangi marae, 1996. [Holmes, February 6, 1996].
opposed to any sort of settlement process:

**Brown:** We really need, I think, more New Zealanders to participate in this [debates about sovereignty] and perhaps better communication, otherwise you abdicate it to the fringe groups at either end of the...

**Holmes:** Yes, you feel I think the debate is conducted too much at the moment by the extremists...

**Brown:** Absolutely...

**Holmes:** For want of a better word the loonies on both sides.

**Brown:** Well, you said it but ummm (giggles), certainly the extreme elements.

The equation of sovereignty protesters and conservative elements in Aotearoa ignores the fact that one group wants a wider discussion of these issues while the other group generally denies that there are issues to be addressed.

This type of comment, which implies that protest actions are nothing more than 'trouble making' by a disparate group of disaffected individuals, isolates the protesters and ignores links and support the people involved have with and from their communities. Thus it appears that whereas 'we' can tolerate diversity of some sort, ‘we’ cannot tolerate political differences or a political system markedly different from the one we have at the moment. Thus, calls for parallel and autonomous Māori political institutions/systems were marginalised in the television news coverage of Waitangi Day.

**A Convincing Coverage?**

To me the reiteration of 'togetherness and unity' tried much too hard to present a harmonious nation. If 'we' all believed 'we' were a united country which valued difference then surely it would not have to be stated so often, so loudly and at such length.

While muted by the discourses of whiteness/control in the television news coverage, certain acts and images of political resistance and assertions of sovereignty allowed space for anti-colonial readings of the events of 1996 Waitangi Day. The next two examples from within the same text held out
possibilities of things to come and aired the voices of Māori, and some Pākehā, who were denied a chance to present their views through news bulletin interviews and participation in the Capital Nightly News panel discussion. The first example is the geographical division between the government and Governor General’s celebrations in Wellington, and Māori sovereignty activists and local people in Waitangi. This split contradicted the idea of harmonious ‘race’ relations in Aotearoa (see Figures 20, 21, 22 and 23 page 127).

The absence of the Crown and ‘official’ celebrations from Waitangi was claimed as a certain type of victory by Te Kawariki members on a Three National News bulletin [February 5, 1996, TV3]. Hone Harawira stated that the absence of the crown was “no great loss” to Māori and in fact gave them a chance to talk over the issues of sovereignty and the Treaty of Waitangi amongst themselves. This attitude decentred the Crown’s importance to Waitangi Day commemorations while raising the Mana of the other Treaty partners.

Despite the Crown’s official absence from Waitangi, the police action to block the Waitangi bridge can be read as a symbolic assertion of Crown sovereignty. The police blocked the bridge to prevent the ‘protesters’ marching onto the actual Treaty grounds. However even this assertion of State power was subverted by people who swam under the bridge carrying the Māori sovereignty flag - a powerful symbol of both previous political realities and future political possibilities (Figure 24. page, 128).

The second example is the fact that the ‘protesters/troublemakers’ stayed on the Waitangi Marae with local people, while the army and traditional waka crews moved into a nearby motor camp. This belied the idea that sovereignty activists have no support or legitimacy amongst wider Māori communities. Within the framework of whiteness/control this decision to

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81 On the dawn of Waitangi Day waka are launched into the sea by waka crews as part of the commemorations.
Figure 20: Dignitaries arriving at the 'official' Wellington 'celebrations' held behind closed doors at Government House on Waitangi Day [Capital Nightly News February 6, 1996].

Figure 21: Te Kawariki leading a march to Waitangi marae, Northland, for the commemorations held there on Waitangi Day [Capital Nightly News February 6, 1996].

Figure 22: Dame Catherine Tizard (Governor General of Aotearoa) toasting Queen Elizabeth II at Government House, Wellington [Capital Nightly News February 6, 1996].

Figure 23: Karakia on Waitangi marae, Northland [Capital Nightly News February 6, 1996].
Figure 24: Te Kawariki members and other passers by swimming under the blocked Waitangi Bridge to reach Waitangi marae [Capital Nightly News February 6, 1996].

house the activists and not the waka crews and army was presented in One Network News and Holmes bulletins as a ‘take over’ of Waitangi by protesters at the expense of other more ‘authentic’ Māori groups and traditions. The ‘take over’ narrative was reinforced through interviews with members of the waka crews, an emphasis on the break with tradition, and the conspicuous lack of comments from anyone in Te Kawariki who were staying on the Marae. The discourse of whiteness/control in these bulletins operated to centre the waka and waka crews as ‘authentic’ Māori cultural pursuits which everyone in Aotearoa can relate to. At the same time it marginalised the cultural/political activities of Te Kawariki . However this explanation of the situation did not alter the fact that Kaumatua and other Māori people supported the actions and sentiments of sovereignty activists on Waitangi Day.

These two breaks with tradition and the attention they received on the news signalled rifts and differences amongst and within communities in Aotearoa for those able to interpret them in this way. They also highlighted the
inadequacy of the discourse of 'national unity' which news workers employed
to describe the myriad of different occurrences on Waitangi Day.
CHAPTER SIX

CAPITAL NIGHTLY NEWS WAITANGI DAY COVERAGE:

THE STRUCTURED ABSENCE OF WOMEN

The panel discussion was a gendered presentation which served to reinforce many 'traditional' gender roles. For example women were absent as commentators on political issues and on the question of the future direction of Aotearoa. No women, Māori or Pākehā or European were included on either side of the panel.

Liz Gunn, a European/New Zealand woman, appeared in an ambiguous role. As interviewer she had power in that she could interrupt the panellists, ask questions and speak directly to the viewer. This power and authority most often associated with male interviewers in Aotearoa was also signified by her severely tailored dark business jacket and suit. But at the same time her role was to smooth over differences amongst panellists, act in a facilitator's role between the two 'sides' of men, listen quietly and draw out the ideas of the male participants, a traditional feminine performance, reinforced by her make up, long blonde hair and jewellery.

The men on the other hand were entrusted with commenting on the political happenings of the nation and were expected to map out the future course of the country between them, on behalf of all 'Pākehā' and Māori. Their dress suited the solemnity of this occasion with only Shane Jones and Peter Munz declining to wear a jacket, suit and tie, Jones wore jeans and a collared shirt and Munz wore dress trousers and a collared shirt.

For example Brian Edwards, Lindsey Perigo and their contemporaries Paul Holmes, Ian Fraser and Bill Ralston all of whom have or have had a current affairs show of their own, often named for them. While women interviewers and journalists anchor news and current affairs programmes (Louise Wallace on 20/20, Judy Bailey on One Network News) and occasionally fill in for people such as Paul Holmes, they are yet to host their own shows.
White women and 'civilisation', progress and development

The symbolism of the 'white' woman has often been used by 'Western' elites to signify virtue, progress, and civilisation. Rey Chow (1991) argues that in popular narratives such as King Kong, and in European and Anglo-American cultural icons such as the statue of Liberty, the image of the white woman has/is being used as a tool in the project of civilisation and development (see Figure 25), and as a symbol it acts to mediate between Western European and indigenous cultures:

The white woman becomes the hinge of the narrative of progress, between enlightened instrumental reason and barbarism-lurking-behind-the -Wall. The white woman is what the white man ‘produces’ and what the monster falls for. If her body is, in filmic language, the place of ‘suture’, what it sews together - what it 'coheres' - are the white man’s production and the monster’s destruction [Chow 1991:84].

I will examine these ideas in relation to two examples. Firstly the location of Dame Catherine Tizard in a news item concerning the removal of 'official celebrations' from Waitangi to Wellington and secondly in relation to the role of Gunn in the Capital Nightly News panel discussion.

Figure 25:
The Aotearoa Coat of Arms, featuring a 'white' woman and a Māori man.

Dame Catherine Tizard hinging the narrative of 'civilised' behaviour

Dame Catherine Tizard is often presented as the kindly and caring "Queen
Mum" of the nation, a "national symbol of the best that we can be"
[Chamberlain and Rogers 1996:81] someone we should want to emulate and
someone we need to revere and respect. In the coverage of the Waitangi Day
celebrations at Frank Kitt's park in Wellington (Capital Nightly News and One
Network News) she was filmed talking with children of all 'races,' which
reinforced her motherly image. As governor-general Dame Catherine is also a
Pākehā woman who represents another 'Pākehā' woman - the Queen of
England. Her image and reputation were used by National Politicians such as
Prime Minster Bolger and Deputy Prime Minister (1990-1996) Don
McKinnon to justify the National Government decision to stay away from
Waitangi marae. The often cited reason for the move in the coverage on
Capital Nightly News, Three National News and One Network News was the
treatment of the Governor General Dame Catherine Tizard and other
'dignitaries' the year before by 'Māori radicals'. The emphasis was on the
moment when activist Tame Iti (Tuhoe, Te Arawa, Ngāti Wairere and Ngāti
Haua) spat at the feet of Dame Catherine Tizard (Figure 26).

Figure 26:
1995 footage of
Tame Iti
spitting at the
feet of Dame
Catherine
Tizard, Jim
Bolger and
other
dignitaries,
Waitangi Day.
[Holmes
February 6,
1996].

This emphasis constructed her as the main (and 'innocent') 'victim' of the
protesters. Thus the news coverage and explanations focused around the
safety and 'honour' of Dame Catherine Tizard, the first women governor-
general in Aotearoa rather than on the reasons for the protest itself.
In the *One Network News* 1995 story (replayed on *Holmes* in 1996) Tame Iti was positioned by the narrative of the news story and the position of the camera as a menacing physical threat to Dame Catherine. This feeling of physical threat was extended to the viewers through the positioning of the camera behind Dame Catherine Tizard, facing Tame Iti. Thus it appeared as if Tame Iti was also spitting at 'our' feet, and therefore insulting 'us'. In effect the coverage constructed him as spitting at the 'whole nation' through Tizard. This act of defiance and contempt for the Crown, which she symbolises, was described by various commentators in both 1995 and 1996 as 'abhorrent' and 'disgusting'.

The archival footage of Dame Catherine being jostled and spat at and jeered, at Waitangi in 1995 by sovereignty activists was aimed at (and succeeded in) inciting the horror and disgust of 'middle New Zealand' for two years running. The fact that the person who spat at her feet was Tame Iti whose moko has seen his face described as “the manifestation of every Pākehā’s worst nightmare” [Staff writer, *Mana* 1995:18] further links the news coverage to colonial fears of the ‘savage other’, threatening ‘our’ women and thus civilisation. The heckling and jostling of Prime Minister Bolger didn’t really feature in the archival footage of the infamous 1995 Waitangi Day commemorations used in 1996 Waitangi Day coverage. This pictorially suggests that Dame Catherine Tizard’s need of protection is more than his. This is probably the complete opposite considering the discontent with the policies of Jim Bolger’s conservative National government amongst activists like Mike Smith, Tame Iti

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78 The moko was roundly despised by European colonisers and had all but disappeared in the early to mid 1900’s. It is now making a comeback especially amongst Tuhoe. To me the footage of Tame Iti’s protest against colonialism (which involved a strong woman Dame Catherine Tizard) and the use of his facial moko in the news programmes to incite fear against protesters is also a poignant reminder of the specific role of some European women in the degradation of this tradition. The suffragette movement of the late 1800s demanded Māori women revoke and denounce their traditional moko before they could join the Women’s Christian Temperance Movement which finally achieved universal suffrage in 1893 [see Evans 1994 and Rei 1993].
and Annette Sykes and which has been echoed in statements by Dame Cath herself. As a representative of the English Queen she is a legitimate target for protest on Waitangi Day but usually it is Prime Minister Bolger, and the National Government who come in for much more serious criticism from Māori and Pākehā alike. Nonetheless the emphasis on the protests against her and the spectacle of a Pākehā woman being jostled and spat at is possibly more alarming and sensational to some viewers than pictures of an unpopular European/New Zealand Prime Minister being spat at. The editorial emphasis on the treatment of Dame Cath created an idea of the common enemy (protesters) which all ‘reasonable’ New Zealanders could unite to reject. It also served to legitimise the decision of the National government to stay away from 1996 Waitangi commemorations at Waitangi. Protesters were the scapegoats used to bring the rest of the country together, the new ‘common enemy’ - the "fringe groups", the "loonies", the "extreme elements" [Judge Mick Brown and Paul Holmes February 6th 1996:Holmes] who commit "repugnant acts" which are rejected by European/New Zealanders and "the overwhelming majority of Māori" [Winston Peters to Bill Ralston Feb 5th 1996:Three National News].

Gunn 'hinging' the narrative of 'progress'
Gunn’s role as a journalist and the traditional feminine role of peace maker and facilitator intersect in the Capital Nightly News panel discussion where it is her job to “bring Māori and Pākehā together to talk” without her ‘subjective’ opinions intruding on their discussion. Following Chow (1991) Gunn can be read as a hinge between the ‘Pākehā’ men and the Māori men and a mediator between the discourse of the ‘developed civilisation’, traditionally the preserve of the Crown, and ‘savage primitivism’, a discourse used to suppress Māori communities since 1840. The topic facilitated by Gunn, is the direction of development in Aotearoa or more appropriately how Māori people can

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79 For example the “Fiscal Envelope” proposal which was roundly rejected by iwi, and finally discarded by the New Zealand First - National Party coalition deal after the 1996 election. The 1990-1996 National government's economic policies and introduction of the 'user pays' philosophy in education and health has also impacted severely on Māori communities as have the 1991 benefit cuts.
develop (or be developed?) in a way which will bring 'the nation' closer together and cement over 'our' differences. All participants in the discussion were focused, through Gunn's questions, on how best to achieve this 'coming together'. The general consensus, mainly arrived at through repetitive questions to the Māori panellists about resources, was that the key to Māori development lay solely with the devolution of some resources to Māori. This process would then 'hopefully' rid 'them' of any sense of 'grievance':

**Doug Graham**: we have to do what Dr. Love was saying and that is concentrate on development of people, Māori people everybody in New Zealand ... My task is to solve the grievances of the past, I'm trying to do that and we're making good progress. Until we do that we won't get anywhere at all because they have this sense of grievance...

Throughout the panel discussion 'development' was, in short, desirable, and the type and shape of the development that has/is occurring was not questioned. Considering the history of the development of and in Aotearoa over the last 156 years, which has been oriented towards capitalist economic modes, or Modernisation, this lack of investigation into other developmental paths reinforces or at the very least leaves unquestioned the status quo encapsulated by MP Doug Graham. Furthermore the political and professional leanings of the participants on the panel suggests the importance placed on the discourses of those people who work with the Crown and the official discourses of the Crown, to the exclusion of other voices. Any different development paths or alternative indigenous ways of organising the economy or approaching the Treaty were not explored, partly because of the decision to approach these issues in a 'balanced' panel discussion format which necessitated the selection of only a few people to participate. As Chow (1991) writes, the "savage primitivism" or different ways of approaching and organising the world were effectively effaced in the discussion of 'progress'. The people who participated on the panel did have interesting and diverse opinions but they came from a certain pool of people who work with or against, but always in relation to, the Crown. These experiences were the only ones explored and validated by the panel discussion. Other experiences,
stories and histories, of the Māori panellists in particular, were never able to be explored due to time limits, the type of questioning and the focus of the panel discussion. For example both Dr. Ngatata Love and Matiu Rei are descended from Topeora (Ngāti Toa, Raukawa) who signed the Treaty of Waitangi. This gives them valuable insights into, as well as direct links to, the Treaty of Waitangi, which were never brought out by Gunn and her team of researchers and writers.

Those European, Māori and Pākehā who work in relation to the Crown are increasingly turned to by print and television media to speak about the Treaty of Waitangi. The constant referral to these groups of people by television journalists means that people who choose to, or are forced to, work outside of the Crown’s circle are excluded, this is especially true of Māori women:

The greatest neglect by mainstream broadcasting over the years has been the lack of coverage given to the role Māori women have played at both the practical and political levels in almost all programmes that have been successful ... the focus on men is due to the laziness of the media in relation to actually looking at leadership structures of Māori communities [Evans 1994: 61-62].

The ambitious claim that the panel discussion brought together the generic categories of ‘Māori’ and ‘Pākehā’ to talk about the future direction of development in Aotearoa is suspect in the light of the absence of women’s voices, especially Māori women’s voices. Ripeka Evans argues that the absence of Māori women from the presentation of these sorts of debates is becoming increasingly common. This absence seems to go hand in hand with the marginalisation of Māori women in many Crown-centred Māori development programmes. For example the Māori Development Corporation set up in 1987, which is owned 50/50 by government and iwi authorities, has one woman Director on the Corporation and one woman trustee on the Poutama trust, and no women managers. This trend is also seen in the Crown

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80 Thanks to Lorna Kanavatoa (Victoria University Women's Studies) who shared this information with me at the 1997 Women's Studies Association Conference 7th to 9th Feb held at Massey University.
Forestry Rental Trust, The Federation of Māori Authorities and the Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission. Evans writes that these influential organisations, lauded as the key to Māori development by government Ministers and some Māori leaders, are hard if not impossible to access for Māori women:

The assets and interests held by these organisations total in excess of $1 billion dollars. The power and decision making process of these organisations is in the hands of a small oligarchic menagerie of Māori men, politicians, bureaucrats and lawyers. Māori women are ‘on the outside looking in’ ... [Evans 1994:64].

The continual emphasis on economic development to the exclusion of all else privileges the discourse of Modernisation and silences the actions of those people working in their own particular fields and communities for development of a different sort. This directly contravenes the empowerment model of development [Friedmann 1992] outlined in Chapter Three on page 54. To recall that earlier discussion, the empowerment model sees the knowledges and involvement of those traditionally silenced by the Modernisation process (Māori and often women in Aotearoa) as essential to any sustainable and meaningful dialogue about development. This was obviously overlooked in the selection of an all male panel. Furthermore the conception of development underpinning the panel discussion elevated the economic aspect of The Treaty of Waitangi (arguably the foremost concern of Modernisation theorists see Chapter Three pages 44-47) to the exclusion of other spiritual and political threads contained within it. The ‘white’ backlash

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81 The Crown Forestry Rental Trust was established in 1987 to hold land rentals which could be used for future Treaty settlements. Interest from the Trust’s investments is used for administration and to assist the research of claimants to the Waitangi Tribunal. No Māori women are on the rental trust but they occupy secretarial positions on the administrational staff. The Federation of Māori Authorities was set up in 1986 and comprises of the majority of Māori Trusts and Incorporations (set up under the Māori Affairs Act). The Federation does not supply gender specific statistics about the management and shareholding of the federation trusts “save for the odd woman here and there” [Evans 1994:63]. The Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission which oversees the disbursement of the funds from the Sealords fisheries deal has only two women commissioners out of thirteen: “During the violated process for the appointment of iwi mandated nominees to the Commission, there was an active collusion of Māori and non-Māori self interest which ensured that Māori women were blocked from appointment to the Commission” [Evans 1994:63].
already witnessed towards the return of some of the Māori resources wrested from iwi throughout the 1800’s and 1900’s suggests that without real discussions of these other elements, subordinated histories and other developmental possibilities, this solely economic approach to the Treaty will not be politically sustainable. Furthermore, the processes which work to exclude Māori women from the benefits of Māori economic development are ongoing injustices which cannot be ignored by anyone committed to an equitable and peaceful future in Aotearoa. Over centuries, Māori women leaders have shown themselves to be formidable leaders, organisers, intellects, athletes and activists as celebrated in all iwi traditions, especially when it comes to securing the future of their communities before and during colonialism. Shane Jones hinted at this power during the panel discussion when he said: “we will regret the day we allowed a permanent brown underclass to take root in Aotearoa because in time to come they’ll be back to collect, possibly in a more disruptive way, what they believe is theirs”. I think he is right.

The panel discussion on Capital Nightly News would have done a much greater service to Aotearoa if the producers had flung their net wider. They might have drawn in the opinions of such women as critical academics (Jane Kelsey, Ngahuaia Te Awekotuku, Claudia Orange), artists (Robin Kahukiwa, Kura Te Waru Rewiri), kōhanga reo and kura kaupapa workers (Heni Sunderland, Patricia Johnson), activists (Annette Sykes, Sue Culling, Eva Rickard, Hana Te Hemara), health workers (Phillada Bunkle, Paparangi Reid), educators (Kathie Irwin, Project Waitangi workers) filmmakers (Gaylene Preston, Merata Mita), environmentalists (Ella Henry, Jeanette Fitzsimmons), singers (Moana Maniapoto-Jackson). All of these people have contributed to a

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82 For example Te Rau o te Rangi (Te Whanau Wharekauri and Ngāti Toa) who swam from Kapiti island to the mainland with her baby on her shoulders to warn her people about invaders from Kapiti. She also signed the Treaty of Waitangi. Also Eva Rickard a long time sovereignty activist and advocate for the rights of Māori people as Tangata Whenua see Brown (1994) and Irwin and Ramsden (1995) for biographical stories and political hopes and aspirations of other prominent Māori women.
wider understanding of the Treaty of Waitangi, the significance of Waitangi day, identity issues and the past and future of Aotearoa, in their work. Absence of European/New Zealand and Pākehā women's voices

European women have contributed to the developmental path of Aotearoa since the 1800's when they were recruited to travel and 'settle' in Aotearoa by the colonial office, colonial governments, philanthropic societies and private companies such as the New Zealand company. Their presence in Aotearoa was supposed to "moderate the reputation of colonial societies as brash [and] unsophisticated" [Porter et al 1996:6]. Many women came to Aotearoa to secure themselves a 'better life'. However their stories were very rarely recorded in the 'official history' of Aotearoa up until the 1970's. This often meant that the contribution of women to the development of Aotearoa remained unacknowledged. However the 1970's saw a growth in the study and publication of women's histories often neglected in the "traditional repositories which had concentrated on 'the great men' of history" [Porter et al 1996: 10]. Many of these collections started to recognise and document the contributions of women to the development of Aotearoa. The 1970's also saw the establishment of women's studies courses in Universities and later in other Tertiary institutions around Aotearoa, which have promoted the importance and the validity of women's diverse experiences in every aspect of life in Aotearoa [Morris-Matthews 1992]. The complete absence of women on either 'side' of the Capital Nightly News panel discussion completely neglects and rejects the feminist knowledges and insights generated from these and many other sites. The complete absence of 'Pākehā' women voices adding different perspectives and ideas to the panel discussion reinforces the patriarchal discourse which relegates women to facilitators and supporters of men, the role filled by Gunn. Within this framework certain men, for example politicians, middle and upper classes, European, are considered the real 'developers', 'nation builders' and 'shakers and movers' in society who have the

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83 I would think that government Ministers would also do much better if they adopted the same widespread approach to policy making.

authority to speak for and on behalf of everyone. This becomes clearer if I consider that a panel discussion made up of women alone, Pākehā and Māori, which tackled the same topics would probably not be made at all and certainly not considered and presented by programme designers as having the same 'universal' appeal to mainstream target audiences.

While Māori women were absent from this panel discussion altogether (discussed in more detail on the following pages) Pākehā women were physically 'represented' by Liz Gunn albeit in a way which precluded meaningful participation in a discussion of the issues. To me, this symbolises the way Pākehā women occupy a different socio-historical space to Māori women, which often allows Pākehā women more freedom, albeit constrained, to speak and/or appear in certain culturally central places than Māori women. This can explain Gunn's appearance in the interviewer's seat. She has been able to get the education and training to become a journalist which may have been denied other women, particularly Māori. However, equally significant is the fact that there are Māori women journalists (such as Maramena Roderick who appeared in a Holmes segment on the same night) who could have fulfilled the role of interviewer. In fact their presence could have been used to send out messages about Capital Television's sensitivity to issues of balance and bias from Māori cultural perspectives. However, from a European neocolonial perspective, due to the issues of race and racist discourses discussed in Chapters Two, Three and Four, Maramena Roderick's 'marked ethnicity' might have meant she would not have been perceived as 'balanced' and 'impartial' by programme designers or mainstream (European/New Zealand) target audiences. Within this framework Gunn as a woman and a Pākehā is the perfect choice for the appearance of an impartial mediator. As a woman she balances the equal numbers of Māori men and 'Pākehā' men on either side of her. Her ethnicity, while marked is never explicitly identified. The invisibility of 'whiteness', her 'whiteness' in particular, which operates in this

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85 There are currently no Māori women working as newsreaders or as in-studio interviewers (like Bill Ralston TV3, Holmes and Susan Wood Channel One) on the main news and current affairs programmess on channels One, Two or Three. Māori women tend to be confined to Māori programmes.
programme, allows her to assume the desired viewpoint equivalent to that of the colonial photographer, academic and government official as described by Mitchell (1992) and referred to in the previous chapter, page 105. Within the colonial discourses of binary gender and 'race', and the televisual discourses of balance and impartiality, a person coded as a woman and 'white', 'Pākehā' is the only one able to fulfil the role of interviewer. This locks Māori women out of the presentation. As women they were not given the chance to participate on either side of the panel and as Māori they were precluded from the interviewer's seat because of a possible perceived racial bias by the shows Producers and target audiences. As Māori women they were silenced entirely.

The absence of Māori women
The absence of Māori women from the panel discussion and news coverage of 1996 Waitangi Day is not a simple physical absence. To leave the argument there is to ignore the full impact of colonisation on the spiritual, economic and social positions of Māori women within both the wider European/New Zealand and Māori communities. From my perspective as a Pākehā feminist pointing to the lack of a women's voice on either side of the panel conveys volumes about the position and value of women and their opinions in Pākehā society, because the ability to speak in these forums is valued in my culture. However this political position is not necessarily transferable onto all possible readings of the absence of Māori women. For example it could be argued that the presence of Māori women is adequately represented and invoked through the three Māori men who carry with them the concept of the Mana Wahine/Mana Tāne relationship. This concept is central to the work of many Māori women (see Awatere 1984; Brown (ed) 1994; Irwin and Ramsden (eds) 1995; Te Awekotuku 1991) and describes a relationship of complementary difference which, among other things, manifests itself in the differentiation of roles between men and women. One of the places where the different roles of men and women are most noticeable to people from a European/New Zealand cultural perspective is on the Marae atea during formal occasions, where the karanga is the preserve of women and the right to whaikōrero is assigned to
men. This one facet of Marae protocol has often been a site of misunderstanding and debate amongst Pākehā and European/New Zealand people including feminists. It has contributed to the idea of Māori women as powerless in Māori communities before colonisation and has served to partially eclipse the mana and importance of the roles of Māori women during these occasions [see Irwin 1993; Papesch 1996]. Te Aroha Anderson argues that this view of the position of Māori women is a particularly European/New Zealand interpretation:

I'm truly amazed at the number of people who think that the traditional role of Māori women has been subordinate ... People say, ‘What about the fact that they don’t speak during the formal part of powhiri? Your women don’t stand to whaikōrero, Aroha.’ My answer is, ‘Why do you think that is a role of Mana? Why do you think that to whaikōrero gives the woman status? How come you don’t realise that everything the man says means nothing, unless a woman stands to sing for him? ... They don’t know what to say. I tell them, ‘It’s because Pākehā men stand and talk at business conferences, and Pākehā men are the Prime Ministers. People in this country feel that when a man talks he is the be-all and end-all of things. You have let a Pākehā concept tell you what is Mana. But in a Māori world, whatever a Māori man says will not be heard by the dead, unless a Māori women’s voice is heard.’ The woman’s voice tells the dead to listen, and the dead whisper to the living what they should or should not do. That’s what I was taught. So when people jump up and down and say that Māori women should have the right to speak on the Marae, I think it would be nice, but it’s unnecessary because the real Mana of whaikōrero is the waiata and the karanga, because the dead will not know anything’s happening on the Marae unless they hear that karanga, and the dead dictate what the living are saying [Anderson 1994: 12-13].

Irwin argues that the misunderstandings surrounding the issue of speaking rights has often been used by “public servants” [1993:9] to deny Māori women access to such things as jobs, research grants and other resources. In other words: “Tikanga which are supposed to pertain to the Marae ātea only are being applied to situations off the Marae ātea over which they cannot exercise the same cultural power” [Irwin 1993: 17]. This is a direct result of the

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While this is generally true of most Marae there are noticeable differences for example amongst Ngāti Porou and Ngāti Kahungunu where some women do have speaking rights on many Marae. Other parts of the powhiri are practiced by both men and women, for example the hongi and waiata.
misinterpretations of cultural practices by European colonisers and their descendants.

The arrival of European women in Aotearoa in the 1800's saw the introduction of Western European cultural notions of how a woman was to behave, dominant group 'ideals' of feminine roles and notions of European beauty. These included the idea that women were little more than chattels for men, that femininity was associated with the body more than the intellect, that women's role was to take care of the 'private' realm of family and 'civilised' moral values. While these Victorian ideas about femininity were tempered with the need for colonial women to do back-breaking work in order to survive in this 'foreign' land, the gender relations largely from aristocratic Victorian Britain, were transplanted into Aotearoa. Cultural ideas surrounding gender were part of the process of colonisation and were foisted onto the indigenous communities. These discourses worked to undermine the concept of Mana Wahine, the traditional Polynesian roles of Māori women and notions of beauty (discussed further on pages 153-154). The interpretation of Māori communities through the eyes of the colonising Victorian culture and through these gender roles has, to some extent, resulted in a partial eclipse of Mana Wahine for non-Māori. It has also seen the devaluing, misinterpretation and (re)presentation of Māori women's discourses throughout different media and the news bulletins devoted to 1996 Waitangi Day, in a way which reinforced colonial and Victorian discourses of 'race' and gender. These intersecting discourses of 'race' and gender serve to "further entrench Māori girls and women in marginalised positions" [Johnson and Pihama 1995:82] in Aotearoa. For example the racist evolutionary discourse which defined indigenous peoples as 'uncivilised savages' in the 1800s and early 1900s, intersected with the patriarchal discourse which interpreted women in opposition to men as inferior, passive and emotional, as previously discussed.

One resulting interpretation of non-western women was as servile and 'savage beasts of burden'. This redemptive metahistorical narrative attempted to
justify the colonial ‘civilising processes’ directed at both Māori men and women which, it was assumed, would among other things raise Māori women to the ‘enviable’ status of their ‘white’ colonial counterparts. However while all women were educated in state schools to be homemakers and housewives the specific education of Māori women was aimed at making them domestic servants for European colonial women: “Māori women were deemed inferior not only to Pākehā men and Māori men but also to Pākehā women” [see Johnston and Pihama 1994: Pihama 1993:36; also Tuhiwai Smith 1992].

Māori women in Aotearoa then, were perceived as both ‘savages’ and sexual objects with little power in or over their communities in the official discourses of European colonial administrators, Missionaries and academics. This construction of women as passive, not involved in decision making and as ultimately conservative in their approaches to community life was constructed in the descriptions of indigenous peoples by male, European ‘explorers’ and missionaries from the 1700’s. The cultural and gendered positions which influenced their work, had lingering and tangible effects on some ethnographic methods and models through into the 1900’s. Mona Etienne and Eleanor Leacock writing in 1980 argue that this anthropological ‘inheritance’ has meant that to some extent the:

conceptual framework of anthropology and, as a result, the data on which generalisations are based, suffer from ethnocentric and male-centred bias. The ‘society’ that elaborates belief systems, relations between the sexes, and relations of production is conceived of as a society of men. The view of men as social actors and of women as both peripheral and passive has long determined not only theorising, but also the perception, the selection, and the organisation of data. Either dissenting research has been obscured by the dominant trend or its results have been rationalised into meaninglessness [1980:4].

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87 The domestication of women, particularly Māori women through the formal school system is documented in official Ministry of Education reports since the 1880’s. For example an 1882 report stated that: “Hukarere and Mangakahia perhaps stand first amongst schools for excellence in needlework. I think that in future all girls that are not fully up to the very moderate standard requirements in this subject should be sent back, no matter how well their own work other work may have been done” [James H.Pope cited in Johnston and Pihama 1994:93].

88 See Leacock (1978) for further elaboration of this argument and critiques of specific ethnographies where she argues this process occurred and see Williams (1995) for a reflexive
The fact that the people writing the ethnographies of Māori women in the 1800's and early 1900's were both male and European meant their accounts of Māori women and Māori communities were generally interpreted through European cultural stories and expectations.\(^{\text{89}}\)

The redemptive metahistorical narrative of evolution which suggested the linear development of 'civilisations' and larger discursive bio-political concerns with populations and 'races', meant that the diversity of Māori communities and people within them were reduced to a "a unity of common measure" [Young cited in Johnston and Pihama 1994: 83]. The common measure was European society which occupied the position of norm from which Māori people were defined. When considering gender this process occurred with 'men' occupying the norm and 'women' defined in opposition as different and Other. The differences attributed the 'Othered' group which are (re)created through schooling, media representations and other official discourses become the measure by which a person is presumed to be a part of that category or group. Māori women, at the centre of discourses of race and gender were constructed as the 'other' twice over. 'Other' in terms of 'race' and gender (see Pihama 1993).

Within this framework the differences attributed to Māori communities and Māori women especially were those linked to inferiority of mind, body and spirit. The discourse of 'race' and the fixity of binary genders are concepts widely used by European/New Zealand, Pākehā and Māori from all political spectrums. Both 'race' and 'gender' have been used to demarcate those destined to 'rule' from those destined to be 'ruled' as discussed in Chapter account of her struggle to use anthropology in a way which does not reinforce and reinscribe ethnocentric and male bias.

\(^{\text{89}}\) Historian Ann Salmond gives the example of Surville and his French crew who witnessed what was most probably an expression of contempt from Māori women. However they interpreted it as sexual availability: "The women now approached the sailors 'making all the gestures that are not made especially not in public, going as far as drawing aside the bird skin that covers their nakedness and showing everything they have'. This behaviour was interpreted by the French as 'lasciviousness', but under the circumstances of extreme hostility it was more likely to have been the whakapohane, an expression of intense derision and contempt" [1992:330].
Three. Ironically these discourses have also been used in a majority of Māori and feminist identity-based political movements. These categories, with their modern roots in colonial flows of power/knowledge, are assumed by groups traditionally dispossessed by racism and sexism who now argue for the more equitable distribution of resources based on ethnicity and gender. As such I argue that these categories are still useful ways which help people to organise for meaningful change. Lynne Alice writes that it is important not to fully deconstruct the notion of ‘race’ or to simply substitute it for the word ‘ethnicity’ because:

the common use of the term ‘race’ as well as racist attitudes and behaviour have not changed. We still need the notion of ‘race’ because of the persistence of racism based on colour [1991:65].

For example strong political Māori leaders are constantly undermined in television and print media by questions and insinuations to do with the amount of ‘Māori blood’ they have. Margaret Stewart-Harawira writes how Chairman of Ngāi Tahu Trust board, Tipene O’Regan’s ancestry became cause for public speculation from some European/New Zealand businessmen after the Waitangi Tribunal findings regarding Ngāi Tahu fishing rights:

The chairman of a Christchurch based fisheries company is quoted as saying: ‘After all, what is he? I’m not sure whether he’s got an eighth or a 10th Māori in him (sic) - we’re endeavouring to find out’ [1993:32-33].

Conversely people with Māori ancestry who are unsympathetic to Māori sovereignty claims are given space in European/New Zealand print and television media to extol the virtues and benefits of the developmental path in Aotearoa. An example of this is the coverage given to writer, Alan Duff, whose Māori ancestry is seen as a validation for his attacks on affirmative action programmes and other structures designed at installing a certain amount of equity to institutions in Aotearoa. This example demonstrates to me the importance of approaching ‘race’, ‘gender’ and the labels ‘Pākehā’, ‘Māori’, ‘man’ and ‘woman’ as ongoing “issues of inquiry” [Prakash 1992:373] instead
of as some sort of ‘essential truths’. It is important to study how these identities are used, and circulate in the social world.\(^\text{90}\)

Denese Henare (1994) argues that these sexist and racist discourses are inappropriate ways of viewing the role of Māori women within their communities. She writes that Rangatiratanga was exercised by Māori women in their communities prior to 1840 and that this is something which has been regularly sidelined in formal education, through Christianity and the health system and in legislation. A good example of this is the fact that a large number of Māori women were actively barred from signing the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840 by colonial officials. The fact that women did sign it at all is also little known. The names of women who signed the Treaty include Erenora (Ngāti Kahu) wife of the chief of Nopera, Rangi Topeora (Ngāti Toa and Raukawa) a strategist in Te Rauparaha’s army, Rere O Maki a high ranking woman from Wanganui and Te Rau o Te Rangi (Te Whanau Wharekauri and Ngāti Toa) [see Evans 1994:56 and Sykes 1994:16]. An acknowledgement of the Rangatiratanga of Māori women and how Crown actions have attempted to erode it is one of the main issues within the Māori women’s claim to the Waitangi Tribunal. The claimants include the Māori Women’s Welfare League and all its past Presidents, Awatere, Paparangi Reid and Rose Henare from Ngāti Hine. It aims to ensure the consultation processes between the Crown and iwi will include Māori women and organisations such as the Māori Women’s Welfare League as a matter of course; to ensure that Māori women participate in decision making; and more widely to enhance the full social participation of Māori women (See Evans 1994: 64-65; Henare 1994: 21-22; Johnson and Pihama 1995: 82-83).

The reality of the effects of colonisation in this country which has seen the partial eclipse of Mana Wahine means that the participation of the Māori men in this panel as ‘representatives’ of Māoridom has to be looked at critically. Many Māori women authors have written about their concerns that Māori men

\(^{90}\) See Dentan (1976) for a discussion of this fluidity of labels, especially concerning ethnicity in Southeast Asia.
have replaced the Mana Wahine/Mana Tāne relationship with the superior/inferior gender relationships of patriarchy in their effort to gain certain privileges accorded them under the system of their colonisers. This has happened in numerous colonial situations around the world where:

A divide and rule policy characterised colonial domination ... Those groups or individuals who had the opportunity to alleviate their exploitation tended to take advantage of it. Because the overall effects of colonisation were detrimental to women, a situation they did not accept passively, it was inevitable that antagonism between the sexes should develop and that, in a short term perspective, the interests of women and men should not always coincide. In a long term perspective, however, the forms of resistance adopted by colonised women corresponded with the interests of colonised men, whose advantage over women was only relative to their own oppression [Etienne and Leacock 1980:22].

This situation has arisen throughout the last 156 years and continues through certain Treaty claims, most notably the Sealords deal, where the process of negotiation saw “Māori women as having less value than young Māori males or, even worse, Pākehā males” [Henare 1994:22] As mentioned previously, Shane Jones is a firm supporter of the Sealord’s deal. Other Māori women point to the way certain Marae kawa has been adjusted to the benefit of European/New Zealand and Pākehā men and often at the expense of Māori women:

What concerns me about the current patterns of changes being made to our culture is that they are accommodating men and patriarchy, not about culture. They’re about Pākehā and Māori men getting together and saying, ‘Okay brother, you can speak because you’ve got a whistle.’ I don’t think that’s a very good reason for dishing out speaking rights! I’d rather people could speak because they are native speakers or because they are the leaders of the groups ... In a Post-European context, where the ‘rules’ of the Marae are being redefined, we need to be careful that the redefinition is based in Māori culture, and not something else [Irwin 1994:78].

This example highlights the way in which women in many colonial situations often function as a “metaphor for the nation” [Mohanram 1995:77]. Women are given the job of preserving the cultural traditions which make their communities distinctly different. Their traditional roles are (re)inscribed while
the roles of men often change. Partha Chatterjee explains how this happens within the context of the rise of Indian nationalism. He argues the specific cultural roles women had in the maintenance of their indigenous spiritual systems intensified under colonial rule:

the ‘spirituality’ of her character had also to be stressed in contrast with the innumerable surrenders which men were having to make to the pressures of the material world. The need to adjust to the new conditions outside the home had forced upon men a whole series of changes in their dress, food habits, religious observances and social relations. Each of these capitulations now had to be compensated by an assertion of spiritual purity on the part of women. [Chatterjee cited in Mohanran 1995: 76. Italics in the original]91

The dynamic nature of cultural development is denied by this process. It does not allow that women participate in the redefinition of their cultures, because they are supposed to embody it. Irwin (1993) and Te Awekotuku (1991) write that this idea means that Māori women are often delegitimised within their communities if their way of being a Māori woman does not coincide with a rigid interpretation of tradition92.

The denial of the right to whaikōrero on the Marae ātea during formal occasions has lead people such as Te Awekotuku to seek different ways of expressing themselves for example through articles, painting, books and other pursuits. Irihapeti Ramsden writes how the influences of the colonising culture and colonial gender relationships can result in the physical, emotional and spiritual abuse of Māori women:

91 See Nowak (1979) for a discussion of this process in relation to Iroquois society in North America.
92 Te Awekotuku (1991) gives an example of the tourism and guiding industry developed by Te Arawa in the 1800’s and 1900’s as an example of the innovation of Māori women and the attitudes they encountered because of it from both Māori and European/New Zealand men and women. While Te Awekotuku explains the women guides as ‘cultural brokers’ moving between the Māori and European/New Zealand worlds other people have accused their commercial guiding as ‘selling out’ Te Arawa culture for the tourist dollar. She acknowledges that the processes of colonisation and the sheer physical proximity of European people and culture (through tourism and later compulsory schooling and other factors) have impacted on and changed the Te Arawa way of life but she denies these changes have made her or her female forbears any less Te Arawa or any less ‘Māori’ women.
Many Māori men are beginning to refuse the traditional ancestral hongi to other Māori who happen to be women. Passive acceptance of that abuse by Māori women is becoming common. Yet those same Māori men will accord the Mana of the hongi to the male descendants of their colonisers [1995: 111].

The denial of the Mana Wahine/Mana Tāne relationship by some Māori men concerns Māori women such as Irwin who argues that these attitudes will result in Māori culture becoming yet another “hybrid version of international patriarchy” [Irwin cited in Larner and Spoonley 1995:54]. It can also result in a definition of what it is to be Māori, male and female, which ignores distinctly female cultural dimensions of Māori ethics. Rosemary Wyse (1992) traces the basis for Mana Wahine and the Mana Wahine/Mana Tāne relationship through tales about powerful ancestors such as Hine Titama/Hine Nui Te Po, Hine Ahu One, Papatuanuku and others. She concludes that a distinctively female approach to Māori ethics and decision making is not merely desirable but is required: “...it is tika (appropriate or correct) for Māori women to follow in the steps of their female ancestors and those who do so will in turn be remembered, their deeds related, identifiable as ethical models” [Wyse 1992:6]. Some of the precedents set by the female ancestors are flexibility, aroha, peacemaking, leadership and the right to be consulted and to give advice as the keepers of particular knowledges. Wyse argues that these values are not just the preserve of women and male discourses as embodied by male ancestors are not just to be the preserve of men. An important thread in the creation narratives and ancestral stories is the dynamic relationship in which male and female aspects both have strengths and weaknesses. This balance is also seen in the idea that everything has a male and female component which are regarded as different but equal. Thus Māori men must

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93 These are just three famous Māori female ancestors. Briefly Hine Ahu One was the first woman on earth. Hine Titama first the dawn, later became Hine Nui Te Po the Goddess of Death, who lives in the after world. There are many stories about her wisdom, cunning, bravery and intellect. Papatuanuku is the earth mother and her husband is Ranginui the sky father. See Wyse (1992); Robin Kahukiwa and Patricia Grace (1984); and Ranginui Walker (1978) for further information.

94 See Leacock (1978) for a discussion of the customary status of indigenous women in some Montagnais - Naskapi, Australian Aboriginal and Iroquois communities. In this article Leacock argues that these women often had an autonomy relative to that of men, and that roles which were assigned to each gender complemented each other and were often equally valued.
at times take cues from their female ancestors and Māori women from their male ancestors:

If everything is to be in balance, male ethical behaviour ought to incorporate female ethical ideals and vice versa. When reciprocity is valued, this allows sexual difference to be appreciated while avoiding the tensions which arise between (socially constructed) gender roles [Wyse 1992: 74-75].

The recognition of these female components and images throughout history has also long been a concern of Western European, Pākehā and Anglo-American feminists. For example the work of Mary Daly (1985) explores how female images of God were systematically eliminated from the Christian records when the bible was written. Hinemoa Awatere (1995) argues that this Christian patriarchal discourse through which Māori communities were often interpreted has resulted in the marginalisation of Māori women matakite and spiritual leaders. These discourses, rooted in Western European Christian and cultural traditions were able to gain a foothold in Aotearoa because they were similar on some levels to certain attitudes of certain iwi regarding women, land and warfare:

Māori society was a warrior society, and strife over land between those coveting, claiming, or caring for it was highly institutionalised. Warfare was glamorous - land, and women, were its spoils; pillage, rape and bloodlust were its practices. Both prizes are female: the land being fecund, Papatuanuku, a primal mother Goddess whose consort was Ranginui, the sky; and woman, being herself. As ravaging of the land - squabbling for its possession and striving to dominate, albeit in custodianship - was and is a masculine indulgence, so is the abuse of women and violence against them. This strong undercurrent in Māori society was a natural avenue for the infiltration of Western attitudes towards land and women; with sophisticated technology and industrial 'civilisation', any semblance of pre-contact holistic balance promptly vanished. Female values were entirely eclipsed and chaos was unleashed [Te Awekotuku 1991:69].

Thus the lack of Māori women on this panel has to be seen in the context of the reduction of the female Māori voice through colonisation, in many spheres on many levels. This colonial history also casts doubt on the mandate of the
Māori men on this panel to speak for ‘all Māori’ because perhaps these men are not so much mandated by Māori women to speak as they are by European/New Zealand men.95

This panel discussion and the news bulletin surrounding it as representations of whiteness/control are not conducive to and are perhaps even hostile to particular traditional discourses of Māori women and Mana Wahine. However there are very capable Māori women who deal with these kinds of situations daily and who use them to broadcast and explore their own messages and visions on the past, present and future in Aotearoa. For example women such as Alliance MP Sandra Lee, and Lawyer and Sovereignty activist Annette Sykes, and Sovereignty activist Eva Rickard, and Suzanne Sarich (a media worker specifically on Kia Hiwa Ra), and Professor of Māori at Victoria University Ngahuia Te Awekotuku (the list is endless) could have participated in the discussion and were participating in the commemorations. However these women were not (re)presented in the television news coverage of 1996 Waitangi Day. The exclusion of Māori women, their voices and ideas from this panel can be read as a (re)presentation of intersecting racist and sexist colonising discourses which have shaped and scared communities in Aotearoa.

Visible Māori women

The place where Māori women did appear in the text was in the coverage of the ‘celebrations’ held all over Aotearoa. In these segments the traditional discourses of Māori women, the karanga and waiata, are framed within the colonial discourses of gender and race and presented as aesthetic spectacle often drained of power and politics. The many kapa haka groups which

95Sandra Lee and other Māori women express a healthy suspicion of men who work closely with the Crown. Lee writes of them as men “with very expensive suits who frequent the halls of Parliament and purport to be our leaders” [Sandra Lee 1994:36] and Ngahuia Te Awekotuku writes that she doubts whether their dealings will benefit the wider Māori communities: “I’d like to think that the proceeds of the Sealord’s deal will go to Māori women in the refuge movement, will go to kids with glue ear at kōhanga reo ... but you know will it? I see all these late model corporate cars with personalised Māori plates cruising Queen Street or Lambton Quay, and I truly do wonder” [Te Awekotuku 1994:29].
performed on Waitangi Day were filmed in a way which tended to focus on young Māori women to the exclusion of older Māori women and the men in the groups. The framing of these single performers within the television shot separates them out from their kapa haka group and perhaps whānau, hapū and iwi. It reinforces an individuality which may not be important or even desirable to the person concerned (Figure 27).

![Figure 27: Close up of a single Maori woman performer reinforcing an individuality which may not be important or even desirable to the woman involved [Capital Nightly News February 6, 1996].](image)

Often the women featured in these shots are young and slim, two conventionally attractive features for women in Western European and Anglo-American beauty discourses. Ngahuia Te Awekotuku writes that the impact of these notions of beauty on the style and presentation of waiata and dance which is often endorsed by audiences foreign to the meanings of the dances, and pan tribal judges (and their manuals) has a negative impact on the self esteem of Māori women who do not fit the Western European and Anglo-American feminine and beauty ‘ideal’:

the Māori ideal of large, graceful, buxom women, has been completely eclipsed ... these days, fineness, and fairness, make the front row, along with an affected delicacy of movement and presentation. Younger women are no longer trained in the more forceful dance styles, unless they ask,
and on the concert stage many women assume a dainty stance [1991:92-93].

She writes that these aesthetic ideals have lead to low self esteem and self hatred among some extremely talented Māori women "‘too fat’, ‘too black’, ‘gotta shave my legs’, ‘gotta grow my hair’, ‘gotta get the tats taken off’" [Te Awekotuku 1991:133]. In light of today's fashion industry these feelings of low self esteem and poor body image take on even more serious consequences when considering the development of permanent body altering operations and 'treatments' by the multi-billion dollar fashion industry. Such things as skin bleaching, breast enlargements, liposuction and multitudes of 'crash diets' can have medically and psychologically devastating effects on the women (and men) who use them. The emphasis on the 'look' of the body which is thought to reveal the worth of a person means the body has become the "social structure of industrial design ... [caught] in the crossfire of supervision and political intervention" [Gyorgy 1996:43]. The consequences of this for women who do not appear to fit the 'racial' and gendered categories which are currently in vogue and considered beautiful, can be disastrous. It may mean, among other things, that their energies are directed towards the manipulation of their bodies in an effort to conform rather than at the achievement of their educational, political and professional goals. Gyorgy argues that fashion has such a hold in 'Western' media saturated communities because: "fashion is not merely an option to be either followed or ignored; rather, fashion is the global social semiotic system of a world ruled by Vision" [1996:43]. Anatomo-politics has now become an inescapable reality.

Images of youthful and 'graceful' Māori and Polynesian women have been used as erotic and exotic images of the Pacific for over one hundred years (see Figures 28 and 29 on page 155). Glynnis Paraha (1993) argues that these paintings and photographs have historically decontextualised Māori women. The art work of Nineteenth century painters in Aotearoa took images of Māori women from within their own communities and then recontextualised them within Western European Neo-classical and Romantic painting paradigms.
Figure 28: Tourist Postcard with the caption "Māori Maidens"

Figure 29: A Maori woman performing in Frank Kitt's park, Wellington, on Waitangi Day 1996. Pictures of Maori women have been used as erotic and exotic images of the Pacific for over 100 years [Capital Nightly News February 6, 1996].
These ways of portraying Māori women often glossed over the very real and devastating social and economic effects of colonisation on their lives. This also occurred in the 1996 Waitangi Day news coverage where the traditional and ancestral dances performed by Māori men and women were objectified on some levels and often drained of their political element in the representational process. For example the haka, poi, waiata and karanga are shown for their aesthetic qualities rather than their political ones.

Filmmaker Merata Mita (1992) writes that Māori people embraced photography in the 1800’s because of its ability to capture the likeness of a beloved ancestor. These portraits can be seen adorning the walls of many whare nui throughout Aotearoa. However the technology of photography and filmmaking has largely remained in the hands of European colonials and their descendants. This has particular consequences for the representation of the Tangata Whenua and their culture:

From those first years it became obvious that the camera was an instrument held by alien hands - a Pākehā instrument, and in the light of past and present history another reason for mistrust. It is clear that as early as 1930, the screen was already colonised and had itself become a powerful colonising influence, as Western perspectives and stereotypes were imposed on indigenous peoples [Mita 1992: 42-43].

During the news coverage of Waitangi day on Capital Nightly News, One Network News and Three National News the karanga, was used as ambient backdrop to the journalist’s voice over which related the ‘important’ events of the day (Figure 30). In a Marae situation the karanga is the crucial first lone and political voice to be heard on the Marae, and without the call nothing can proceed. In these news bulletins the karanga seems to be used as an aesthetically pleasing atmospheric device.

Waiata have often been used to express and remember political grievances and triumphs of the past. They are a place of protest and a way of reasserting certain discourses which may not be circulating elsewhere.
Voice Over: There was a special spirit and feeling of togetherness at the Frank Kitts Park Waitangi Day commemorations as local Tangata Whenua, Pākehā and ethnic groups performed hakas, songs and dances...[Capital Nightly News February 6, 1996].

Figure 30: The karanga, the first, lone voice heard on the marae before a pōwhiri...drowned out by a journalist's voice over Capital Nightly News February 6, 1996.

However for the viewer who does not speak or understand Māori this aspect to the waiata is subsumed beneath the voice over of the journalists who link the brightly costumed kapa haka groups with words such as “celebration” and “unity amongst diversity”. Throughout the Waitangi Day news coverage, these performers are linked with the ‘celebrations’ in Wellington and the crown rather than with the divisive ‘protesters’ at Waitangi. The protesters at Waitangi also use waiata to get their point across and it is possible for people to hear either, the same, or specially composed, songs from different groups of people and thus make links between them and their politics. However the fact that the men and women who take part in the kapa haka groups at the Crown’s garden party and at Frank Kitt’s park Wellington may share the same political ideas as the ‘protesters,’ is silenced or at least muted through the demonisation of the protesters. Thus the visible cultural differences of Māori women in the kapa haka groups was permissible and even celebrated by the television news coverage but the political/cultural differences of Māori women who chose to protest on Waitangi Day were not. Donna Matahaere (1995) describes this process as reinforcing a concept she calls ‘benevolent bi-culturalism’ where
certain Māori cultural differences from European/New Zealanders and Pākehā are allowed and even encouraged as long as these differences reassert the distance between the two cultures. These fixed differences then become the measure of an authentic identity:

For Māori to maintain a legitimate role as Treaty partners, to be acknowledged as a valid culture entitled to its own forms of representation, we must embrace an identity which misrepresents the contemporary reality of our lives. We are allowed to be Māori, are in fact encouraged to be Māori, as long as we remain 'different'. Anything else is highly suspect, ambiguity will not be tolerated ... Rather than creating an environment for cross-cultural tolerance, where a multiplicity of identities can flourish, it privileges the one perceived as less threatening to its own 'superior' position within modernity [Matahaere 1995:20-21].

The presentation and selection of Māori cultural images and Māori men and women to reinforce the European/New Zealand mythologies of unity, harmony and equality in Aotearoa has often occurred throughout the last 156 years. Some examples are the koru on the tail of Air New Zealand, the appearance of the Heitiki on anything from a green stone pendant to a tea towel and the much performed haka written by Te Rauparaha and made internationally famous by the (multi-cultural but not bi-cultural) All Blacks. However the use of these symbols throughout the first half of the Twentieth Century was done in very different socio-historical contexts. Thus what could now be called a misappropriation of a Māori motif may then have been an odd sort of tribute or recognition at least of the Tangata Whenua. This means that:

All commentary on matters of 'appropriation,' if it is to be more than a fundamental moralism, must pay due account to time and place - to the historical context of the 'appropriative' act ... For a European artist to use Māori motifs at any time between the 1930's and the 1970's was not the same as it is now, in a time daily described by both Māori and Pākehā commentary as that of a Māori renaissance when Māori voices, speaking for themselves, may increasingly be heard in what was once an all but completely monocultural space [Pound 1994: 122-123].

This cultural exchange has also often been a two-way thing with Māori communities using and incorporating European/New Zealand technologies,
symbols and art forms into their own lives ever since European-Māori contact [see Dunn 1993; Craw 1993; Nicholas and Kaa 1986; Panoho 1992; Starzecka (ed) 1996]. One noticeable example in 1996 Waitangi Day news coverage was the use of a flag as a statement of political identity (Figure 31).

![Tino Rangatiratanga Flag](image)

**Figure 31: Tino Rangatiratanga Flag** *(Capital Nightly News February 6, 1996)*.

Pound (1994) argues these types of examples demonstrate how sometimes colonial and indigenous discourses are interactive rather than always oppositional. However within the context of colonial power relations these cultural exchanges have often disadvantaged Māori political aspirations to the benefit of European/New Zealand. The commodification and objectification of some aspects of indigenous culture such as the waiata and karanga does not challenge the system of ‘white/control’ representation if those cultural symbols are just used as “spice [to] ... liven up the dull dish that is mainstream white culture” [hooks 1992:14]. Or in other words where Māori or any indigenous group is still having to struggle to realise tino rangatiratanga over any aspects of their lives this selective use of Māori images and culture in 1996 Waitangi Day news coverage has the hallmarks of colonial misappropriation [see Alice 1993].
In 1996 these issues have been highlighted and debated at length amongst Māori communities. Māori media workers and commentators such as Derek Fox, Cathy Dewes, Te Awekotuku, Irwin and politicians such as Tukoirangi Morgan, Sandra Lee and filmmakers Barry Barclay (1990) and Merata Mita (1992) as well as many other people, have expressed concerns over television media’s representations of Māori communities. People such as these have also declared their desire for Māori to control and produce their own images of themselves and of Aotearoa\textsuperscript{96}. Therefore it is time for European/New Zealand and Pakeha people involved in the representational business to become up to date with these arguments and to start to reassess, and where necessary, adjust their practices accordingly.

The location of Māori women in the kapa haka groups and not on the panel discussion, in the clips of speeches made on the Marae, or commenting on events at Waitangi or in Wellington, reinforces the colonial discourses of ‘race’ and gender which have marginalised Māori women over the last 156 years. The political leadership and movements of Māori women were completely absent from this panel discussion and will continue to be if the focus of debate continues to centre around the Crown, formal politics and the current direction and conception of development remains unscrutinised.

\textsuperscript{96} See Beattie (1996) for an annotated bibliography of writing on this, and other issues, by and about Māori documentary, film and video makers.
CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSIONS

Summary of thesis
In this thesis I view colonisation as a collection of processes which accumulatively stunted the development of indigenous people to the benefit of the metropole and the colonising culture. I explored how within the paradigm of 'Modernisation' this relationship is often ignored in favour of a linear progressive and evolutionary view of historical development. I argued both the paradigms of Modernisation and Dependency theories focus on development in economic terms and do not engage with the historical and ongoing effects of colonising discourses contained in many different areas of life. To me neither of these theories adequately explain the range and type of development occurring throughout the world.

I argued the post-modern construction of power/knowledge outlined and applied in my thesis is another possible approach to the study of development. To view power/knowledge as both constraining and enabling, and present in all people, highlights the importance of studying the indigenous communities and their knowledges traditionally ignored in overarching, governmentally-driven development plans. These ideas gave me an understanding that for every colonising discourse there are many discourses which have either been suppressed or ignored. Some might be given anti-colonial status. The reasons for this silencing vary and I could only focus on a few in this project. Anti-colonial discourses and perspectives, especially those often expressed by Māori women, are hard to access and (re)present for journalists who work within a framework of 'whiteness/control'.

Aotearoa is often talked about as a post colonial nation and yet my results identify that many of the discourses which arose in colonial times are still (re)created in television news discourses. Moreover these ideas are presented as natural and normal, which suggests the colonial project is and has been
successful in most areas in this country. The two specific discourses I looked at were the binary and often oppositional categories of 'race' and gender. I focused on how they were reinforced and interacted throughout the 1996 Waitangi Day television news coverage and the *Capital Nightly News* panel discussion. Those who chose to be different to the expectations which went along with these categories were assimilated or silenced. For example if you are 'Pākehā' you were presented as silently supporting the Crown or demonised as a 'protester', if you were descended from the Tangata Whenua you were labelled Māori before any iwi affiliation, and represented as agreeing with one another. These narrow representations completely disregarded the socio-political complexities amongst Māori and 'Pākehā'. Māori women were further disempowered by rigid and static conceptions of politics and identity. Historically in both the discourses of 'race' and binary genders Māori women were constructed in a negative way as the 'other'. Within the 1996 Waitangi Day news coverage the intersection of these discourses worked to silence Māori women and then to justify and redeem this silence.

People are often put into these categories through sight, i.e. 'brown' skin equals Māori, 'white' skin equals 'Pākehā' and so on. The privileging of the visual sense over any other is entwined with the development of photography during the late 1800's. It is continued through television news bulletins which work hard to cover the nature of their construction. The results are a belief in 'live' television and the ability for news reporters to present accurate, objective and unbiased accounts of events and feelings on Waitangi Day. These discourses combine to create the feeling that what is shown on the television news is the only way in which the stories can be presented and conveyed as 'truth'.

This study has endeavoured to outline the ways in which visual imagery and media were used in the colonial project to construct the binary identities of ruler and ruled, coloniser and colonised. These divisions were essential in justifying and attempting to redeem many military, educational, legal acts of colonisation. I argued that the study of imagery and cultural ideas and stories
are an important part of development studies because they are ways in which people construct and make sense of their positions in the world. As such they are rich with ideas about development and identity in Aotearoa. Furthermore the ownership of media resources in Aotearoa offers insights into continuing colonial assumptions about who can or should speak for the future imaging of the nation. Māori people and organisations have expressed a determination to own and control media institutions. These, like educational and health resources are perceived by many as fundamental to the future development of iwi. As such they are important sites of study for students of development in this country.

Some implications for research in Aotearoa

Despite the media coverage we are still a long way off from being ‘one people’, if indeed this is an appropriate goal under the Treaty. The possibility of diversity amongst our communities reflected or (re)presented in media coverage should not be such a scary thought. In order to achieve this however we need to reassess our colonial history and how it is still influencing and channelling our present direction. In this year’s television news coverage the cracks are beginning to show as the Crown ‘celebrated’ Waitangi Day in Wellington while Māori sovereignty groups and other individuals commemorated it on Waitangi Marae in Northland. A representation of the diversity in Aotearoa necessitates a wider reporting of these issues which should include the ideas of educationalists, artists, movie makers and all sorts of other people.

The colonial legacy is to my mind the number one developmental and social issue facing Aotearoa. People other than those surrounding the crown need to

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97 This is a trend set to continue as the National/New Zealand First government intend to have the ‘Pākehā’ Ministers at government house in Wellington where the ‘official’ 1997 Waitangi Day ‘celebrations’ were held again, while some of the Māori MP’s spent part of their day at Waitangi. This seems to be an abdication of responsibility on the part of government ‘Pākehā’ MPS who perhaps assume that after the 1996 election and coalition deal (which saw the five Māori seats move into the National/New Zealand First government) they can abdicate their responsibility to attend Waitangi and face up to Māori, and other people, in the place where the treaty was signed.
be discussing it wherever and whenever possible. Discussions of these sorts necessitates a widening of our history to include many previously ignored voices. The formal educational system is a key site for this to occur and many educationalists and education groups such as CORSO have taken up the challenge. These initiatives need to be encouraged and supported both economically and otherwise. Likewise media education which highlights some of the issues discussed in my thesis could equip people with the theoretical and practical tools to read media texts in anti-colonial ways.

In my opinion the news media texts I studied are not serving this process well. News values which rank the importance of a story and the validity of a person’s opinion according to their professional status alone will always marginalise or exclude the views of those engaged in non-violent direct action and the majority of community workers. It is past time to question the ownership structures of the media and to refuse to accept their messages as gospel truth. More people must use the Broadcasting Complaints Authority, ringing Television stations and newspapers to voice their opinions about the style of news presentation. We must also seek out and support the media initiatives of people committed to change, justice and equity. There are wide and varied films, pamphlets, newsletters which explore anti-colonial issues and which at the very least offer differing opinions. For example there is Merata Mita’s film Patu, the CORSO publication Overview, the Auckland Unemployed Workers Right’s newspaper Mean Times, feminist magazine Broadsheet and the peace movement’s AYN to name a few.

**Implications of research for the study of development**

The discussion of bio-power and anatomo-politics in chapter one suggests to me that the study of development must continue to range wider than the collection of data and statistics about the performance of economies. Students of development must also acknowledge the flows of power/knowledge within and amongst different communities which means that overarching theories of development may not be all that is needed to achieve social or economic
justice. The post-modern conception of power seems to encourage the fledging developmental approaches which value the traditional knowledges and technologies of people. These approaches often aim to involve and empower those (especially women) participating in developmental projects.

Students of development must continue to question what exactly we mean when we talk of ‘development’ and when we place the vast diversity of communities and countries into categories such as ‘developed’ and underdeveloped’, ‘third world’ and ‘first world’. To consistently use these categories as if transparent is to both silence the experience of those people who do not fit these ‘commonsense’ categories within ‘developed’ countries, and to somehow play down the privilege of those who have benefited from the development industry within the underdeveloped world often at the expense of other communities. Therefore we need to explore more thoroughly what we mean when we use these terms and in what context, and to look at the specific socio-historical context of the project or community we endeavour to study in any part of the world. These ideas give us space to research the impacts of colonisation on the development of different communities within first world nations such as the Tangata Whenua in Aotearoa. It also challenges us to look at our own cultural assumptions.

In chapter four I used Richard Dyer’s argument that the study of ‘whiteness’ as a category was important because otherwise it remains unmarked and perceived as 'normal'. Furthermore the proliferation of studies concerned with traditionally ‘Othered’ groups such as peoples of colour and women, reinforces the idea that these groups are somehow essentially ‘abnormal’. This concept is vital to development studies. Those of us who are part of a colonising and dominant culture should consider the implications of constantly studying traditionally ‘Othered’ groups while leaving our own assumptions and culture unquestioned. Furthermore all too often we study those people who we can access easily for a number of economic and social reasons. For example there are few studies of rich people because they can afford to keep
researchers out with a whole range of expensive security toys. Meanwhile there is a proliferation of research on beneficiaries (easily accessible) school children ‘criminals’ and the like. Matahaere argues that in Aotearoa this process occurs with Māori people who are treated as “objects for enthusiastic information-retrieval…”[1995:18]. This is not to suggest that all of these kinds of studies are exploitative, far from it, but these issues are certainly important to keep in mind when considering issues of equity and social justice in any academic study.

**Areas for future study**

One area which I have not looked at in any great depth is the identification of television media discourses which can be read as anti-colonial in Aotearoa. A study devoted entirely to this would be fascinating and would have very practical uses for those wishing to enter the television media industry in this country. A study such as this could look at the debates already raging in Aotearoa about what constitutes a misappropriation of a cultural image versus a translation of a cultural image. This leads into issues surrounding the freezing of indigenous cultures in the colonial imagination and debates over what constitutes Māori art versus any other sort of art and Pākehā art versus European or American art etc..

A study of what constitutes an understanding of sovereignty in Aotearoa would also be fascinating. Is it, as John King said, whoever controls the army and the police or can it still be based upon the Treaty of Waitangi and become something more consensual peaceful and equitable? These issues need to be raised in a study of development and are fundamental to understanding the Treaty of Waitangi in Aotearoa. How and where discourses of sovereignty appear in television media could be a place to start this study.

A further study of how television and other visual media can be used, or are being used in development projects in different countries around the world would also be valuable. I argued throughout this thesis that the discourses of
television, especially news programmes, carry with them a particular cultural viewpoint which either assimilated or silenced differing perspectives. With this in mind a study which investigated how to overcome the intertwined nature of colonial expansion and the technological development of photography would be invaluable. A place to start could be the circumstances where this technology is in the hands of indigenous people and how (or if) the end products are markedly different to other more ‘mainstream’ usage.

The use of imagery on posters and in printed material specifically surrounding development may also yield interesting results. What sort of development do these images reinforce? For example an advertisement in a 1996 edition of the Massey University Students' Association student newspaper, *Chaff*, for a development studies course in Waikato, pictured a ‘white’ man crouching near an open cast mine in a hard hat. This image created a stir in the Development Studies graduate room. The consensus was that this sort of representation reinforced the Modernisation paradigm of development to the exclusion of all others. We felt this image tended to undermine the efforts of our department to move beyond this narrow conception of development into other perhaps more people centred areas such as gender and development and other cultural and environmental approaches. This small example shows to me how important imagery is to unpack. We need to keep making and repeating our own discourses about what constitutes development and development studies. In order to do this effectively and to prevent ourselves falling into the same traps we need to appreciate how images operate in our social world.
APPENDIX ONE

THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE OF NEW ZEALAND
28 OCTOBER 1835

(Text supplied by Māori Congress and distributed by Federation of WEA's in Aotearoa in alliance with Network Waitangi Otautahi).

1) We the hereditary chiefs and heads of the tribes of the Northern parts of New Zealand, being assembled at Waitangi, in the Bay of Islands, on this 28th day of October, 1835, declare the Independence of our country, which is hereby constituted and declared to be an Independent State, under the designation of the United Tribes of New Zealand.

2) All sovereign power and authority within the territories of the United Tribes of New Zealand is hereby declared to reside entirely and exclusively in the hereditary chiefs and heads of tribes in their collective capacity, who also declare that they will not permit any legislative authority separate from themselves in their collective capacity to exist, nor any function of government to be exercised within the said territories, unless by persons appointed by them in Congress assembled.

3) The hereditary chiefs and heads of tribes agree to meet in Congress at Waitangi in the autumn of each year, for the purpose of framing laws for the dispensation of justice, the preservation of peace and good order, and the regulation of trade, and they cordially invite the Southern tribes to lay aside their private animosities and to consult the safety and welfare of our common country, by joining the Confederation of the United Tribes.

4) They also agree to send a copy of this declaration to His Majesty, the King of England, to thank him for his acknowledgement of their flag, and in return
for his friendship and protection they have shown, and are prepared to show, to such of his subjects as have settled in their country, or resorted to its shores for the purposes of trade, they entreat that he will continue to be the parent of their infant State, and that he will become its protector from all attempts upon its independence.

**Preamble**

Victoria, the Queen of England, in her kind (gracious) thoughtfulness to the Chiefs and Hapūs of New Zealand, and her desire to preserve to them their chieftainship and their land, and that peace and quietness may be kept with them because a great number of the people of her tribe have settled in this country, and (more) will come, has thought it right to send a chief (an officer) as one who will make a statement to (negotiate with) Māori people in New Zealand. Let the Māori chiefs accept the governorship (Kāwanatanga) of the Queen over all parts of this country and the Islands. Now, the Queen desires to arrange the governorship lest evils should come to the Māori people and the Europeans who are living here without law. Now, the Queen has been pleased to send me, William Hobson, a Captain in the Royal Navy, to be Governor for all places of New Zealand which are now given up or which shall be given up to the Queen. And she says to the Chiefs of the Confederation of the Hapūs of New Zealand and the other chiefs, these are laws spoken of.

*This is the First*

The Chiefs of the Confederation, and all these chiefs who have not joined in that Confederation, give up to the Queen of England forever all the Governorship (Kāwanatanga) of their lands.

*This is the Second*

The Queen of England agrees and consents (to give) to the Chiefs, hapūs, and all the people of New Zealand the full chieftainship (rangatiratanga) of their lands, their villages and all their possessions (taonga: everything that is held
precious) but the Chiefs give to the Queen the purchasing of those pieces of land which the owner is willing to sell, subject to the arranging of payment which will be agreed to by them and the purchaser who will be appointed by the Queen for the purpose of buying for here.

This is the Third
This is the arrangement for the consent to the governorship of the Queen. The Queen will protect all the Māori people of New Zealand, and give them all the same rights as those of the people of England.

William Hobson
Consul and Lieutenant-Governor

Now we the Chiefs of the Confederation of the Hapūs of New Zealand, here assembled at Waitangi, and we the Chiefs of New Zealand, see the meaning of these words and accept them, and we agree to all of them. Here we put our names and our marks.

The Fourth Article (oral)
Two churchmen, the Catholic Bishop, Pompallier, and the Anglican Missionary William Colenso recorded a discussion on what we would call religious freedom and customary law. In answer to a direct question from Pompallier, Hobson agreed to the following statement. It was read to the meeting before any of the chiefs had signed the Treaty:

The Governor says that the several faiths (beliefs) of England, of the Wesleyans, of Rome, and also Māori custom shall alike be protected by him.
APPENDIX THREE

Travel literature became increasingly popular in England with the advent of the printing press at the end of the seventeenth century. Dampier’s book A new voyage around the world (1667/1937) started the trend and was reprinted five times in six years. Many other writers who liked to think of themselves as ‘buccaneer’s’ were to follow his lead and publish their own travel memoirs in which the factual and fictional elements of their journeys intertwined [Cameron 1987:112]. Two examples of pure fiction are Daniel Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe (1719/1975) and Jonathan Swift’s Gulliver’s Travels (1726/1971) which was a direct parody of Dampier’s voyages. European views of the explorable world also appeared in Shakespeare’s play The Tempest (1670/1968) the character Caliban widely read as the exotic and clever savage who can never really be ‘civilised’ or trusted, Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s poem Rime of the Ancient Mariner, (1797/1971), George French Angas’s The New Zealanders Illustrated and Savage Life and Scenes in Australia and New Zealand (1844-46/1969) and Captain Sir Richard Burton’s prolific writing about his exploits in India and Africa which included The First Footsteps in East Africa (1856/1966). Victorian literature about European ‘hero-authors’ which portrayed the peoples of Africa as amusing objects of curiosity or dangerous obstacles to ‘progress’ such as Missionary Travels (1857/1913) by the colonial explorer Livingstone, and Through the Dark Continent, or, The Sources of the Nile... (1878) by Henry Stanley were also best sellers in their time and “exerted an incalculable influence on British culture and the course of modern history” [Brandtlinger 1986: 195]. The land and people of the Pacific, the Americas, Africa and Asia also appeared in the notes, observations and sketches of colonial voyagers such as Tasman, Cook, Columbus and many others. For more titles of colonial literature relating to Aotearoa see T.M. Hocken (1909) A Bibliography of Literature Relating to New Zealand.
The written accounts of the extremely lucrative and mercantile aspects of the voyages of Sir Frances Drake were often intertwined with stories of his exploits in foreign lands. For example he is said to have singed the beard of the Spanish King and to have finished a game of bowls before sailing out and defeating the Spanish Armada off the coast of Plymouth. Often these stories now overshadow the importance of the immense wealth Drake acquired on his journey around the world, to the acquisition of the English colonial empire. J.M. Keynes wrote:

The booty brought back by Drake may fairly be considered the fountain and origin of British foreign investment. Elizabeth paid off, out of the proceeds, the whole of her foreign debt and invested part of the balance in the Levant company; largely out of the profits of the Levant company was formed the East India Company, the profits of which during the seventeenth and eighteenth century were the main foundations of England’s foreign connections [Keynes in Cameron 1987:109].

The prolific writing of Richard Hakluyt (1552-1616) in the later part of the sixteenth century also detailed the merchants records of their journeys around the world. Hakluyt and defenders of the British empire who followed him saw his work as “not only a means of keeping in remembrance brave and noble deeds for the emulation of posterity - though this in itself was a good and sufficient reason for his labours - he saw also the great importance of the information thus preserved, to the sailor, the merchant and the colonist” [Markham 1896:7].

See Stanley Stembridge (1982) for a discussion of the role British and colonial newspapers such as The Times, Spectator, Edinburgh Review and The Globe played in both constructing and reflecting the interest of their reading publics in Nineteenth Century arguments surrounding the ongoing acquisition and rule of colonies.

See Favret (1993) for a discussion of letters as a political vehicle for English women writing about their experiences travelling abroad and living in the colonies. Favret argues that letter writing is a feminine genre, also apparent in
the fictional novels of women writing in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, used to challenge both women’s legal and social status as men’s chattels and the idea that women were silent and passive objects in history. Letters and diaries tend to be one of the richest written sources of settler women’s experiences in colonial Aotearoa however few collections have been published. An exception would be those books devoted to the life and correspondence of Katherine Mansfield who was born in Wellington in 1888, see The Collected Letters of Katherine Mansfield edited into three volumes by Vincent O’Sullivan and Margaret Scott (1984). More collections of letters by male colonial administrators have been published however and offer insights into certain aspects of life in colonial Aotearoa to both those living now and those who lived in England in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries. See for example Wakefield (1849) who published the correspondence between himself and “a colonist” on “the art of colonisation”.

One of the most influential people in the development of tourism was Thomas Cook who in 1869 organised a package trip to Egypt for wealthy Victorians. Travel prior to this was the preserve of aristocrats but Cook’s cheaper package tourist trips opened the opportunity for travel to the newly moneymed middle classes during the ‘High Colonial’ period. Rughani (July 1993) writes that this first Thomas Cook trip contributed to the packaging of Egypt as an ‘exotic Other’: “the process of knowing, defining ‘The Orient’ reinvented Egypt as entertaining erotica for the pleasure of the tourists’ colonial gaze...Like the colonial officer, each tourist required some exchange with the native to confirm her/his position as ‘ruler of all surveyed’”[Rughani July 1993: 7]. In Aotearoa tourism flourished in the Nineteenth Century especially around the geothermal areas of Taupo and Rotorua. This contact between the local iwi and European tourists was not always negative especially when the tourist ventures and jobs, such as guiding, were controlled and operated by the local iwi. See Ngahuia Te Awekotuku’s (1991) account of the experiences of Te Arawa women such as Rangitiaria Dennan ‘Guide Rangi’ who acted as guides for tourists around the Whakarewarewa thermal areas. The tourist industry today has its basis in colonisation and certain aspects of the industry seem to
(re)inforce it's colonial roots. Some forms of tourism prove to be not only a nuisance for certain communities but also very harmful. For instance in Goa, India water is not readily available for the locals due to the flush toilets demanded by tourists; racism, sexism and other prejudices about Asian women are used to advertise 'sex tours' throughout Asia in Europe, Australia, Japan, America and Aotearoa; and tourist demands for hot showers contribute to the rapid deforestation of South America see Rughani (July 1993). For a further discussion of the role of tourist curios such as postcards in the (re)construction and commodification of myths and the way these images of other lives, people and traditions are 'authenticated' see Tom Selwyn (ed) (1996).
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