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The Colonial Imperative and the Transformation of the Taranaki Landscape

A thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Philosophy in Geography at Massey University

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ABSTRACT

This study is an historical cultural geography of colonial Taranaki. I argue the history of colonial Taranaki can be better understood by focusing on the notions that underpinned the actions of the settler Government towards Maori, and the Taranaki landscape. The notions of 'civilisation', 'progress', 'savages', and 'order', are some of the concepts that were complicit in shaping the settlers' understanding of their 'reality'. These notions structured the settlers' own identity as 'civilised', and that of Maori as 'savages', and constituted the Taranaki landscape as 'wasted' and unproductive in the hands of Maori. In this context, both the landscape and Maori were constructed as needing 'culturing', to transform them from a state of 'savagery', to a state of 'civilisation'.

I argue that these notions constituted a context in which the dispossession of Maori land was constructed as 'just' and natural'. Maori land was alienated through war, confiscations, the compensation process, and the 'rule of law'. A legislative framework was set up to include Maori within its authority, based on the notions above. Maori resistance to the assertion of that authority was greeted as further proof of the 'savageness' of Maori. The settler Government maintained a paternalistic attitude towards Maori, and indirectly caused war and injustice through their refusal to deal with Maori as equals.

The identity of the settlers, and of Pakeha today, is based on a conventional history that represents the colonisation of New Zealand as a benevolent and beneficial process for Maori and Pakeha. I argue that by challenging this history and asserting the existence of other historical experiences, unseen by the conventional history, the politics of 'being Pakeha' and 'being Maori' can be engaged in. This engagement is crucial to the ability of New Zealand society to move beyond colonialism, to a state of post-coloniality.
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CHAPTER ONE - HEGEMONIC DISCOURSES AND THE COLONIAL IMPERATIVE

This thesis is an historical cultural geography of the transformation of the landscape, and of the social relations between settlers and Maori in colonial Taranaki. The predominantly British settlers ranked themselves as superior to Maori and regarded the subjugation of Maori and the taking of their land as both inevitable and acceptable. These two facets are central to what I call the colonial imperative. I argue that this transformation of a new land and its inhabitants was informed by a number of notions, or social constructions, framed within a set of discourses. Discourses are clusters of assumptions and meanings that structure our understanding of our immediate surroundings.

I argue that in colonial Taranaki there existed a set of dominant or hegemonic discourses that shaped the settlers' understandings of their reality in colonial Taranaki by positing a number of notions that were constructed as common-sense, 'natural', and therefore beyond questioning. Notions of the racial superiority of Europeans over Maori, the inherent righteousness of creating a 'productive' and 'ordered' landscape out of the 'unproductive', 'chaotic' landscape that the settlers saw existed in Taranaki, and the inherent goodness of spreading 'civilisation' and 'progress', were all ideas that shaped the settlers' understandings of themselves, the Maori, and the Taranaki landscape. These notions are based on dualisms with one opposite valorised at the expense of the other. For example the civilised-savage dualism constructed the concept of 'savage' which defined by negative contrast the identity of 'civilised' settlers. The ideas contained within this dualistic structure framed colonial discourses and dictated the relationship between the colonised and the coloniser (i.e. dominant and subordinate). Other dualisms such as developed-undeveloped; modern-non-modern; Christian-Heathen, are all examples of dualisms originating within the colonial period. The aim of my study is to deconstruct some of these dualisms that were central to colonial discourses, and expose them as social constructions.

This study is about how power and discourses are implicated in shaping history in colonial Taranaki. A view of the past that is critical and questioning is crucial to gaining an understanding of the social relations of contemporary Taranaki. I am
offering a different way of seeing the past based on discourse analysis. My aim is to understand how the hegemonic construction of colonial Taranaki became dominant and what made it powerful?

I divide the colonial discourses into two categories, relating to identity and the landscape. Identity discourses are the ideas that structured how the settlers saw themselves in relation to Maori, and the social relations of colonial Taranaki. Landscape discourses are how the settlers constructed the Taranaki landscape. The two were inseparable in colonial Taranaki because of the centrality of land in the assertion of authority, and both were complicit in the transformation of colonial Taranaki.

Taranaki since colonial times has been a place where discourses have been reconstituted and contested through time and across space. In understanding these meanings, it is possible to gain insights into the history of colonial Taranaki. I am interested in the historical colonial debates on land and Maori sovereignty, as a 'window' into understanding colonial New Zealand society. A set of notions structured by a discursive framework provided taken-for-granted frameworks of meaning within which people construct their understandings of everyday relations between the different social groups of colonial Taranaki (Berg and Kearns, 1996). This discursive framework was influential in shaping the colonisation of Taranaki and constituted a set of spatial manifestations. This included confiscation of Maori land, war, and the perpetual lease scheme.

Amidst present day attempts by Maori to settle the land disputes created during this colonial period, the perpetuation of colonial relations in present-day Taranaki becomes very evident. The claim of Taranaki iwi to the Waitangi Tribunal in 1996 is based on the confiscation of Maori land in Taranaki last century, and the way the promised reserves were returned with only nominal ownership. Maori reserves were leased perpetually to settlers last century to provide further land for European settlement. The land is now some of the richest farming land in New Zealand, and the sums involved are immense. The Government is proposing to return land to the control of Maori over a sixty-year period. However, farmers, almost all of them Pakeha, and many who have farmed on that land for generations, are concerned about the lack of compensation being proposed.
The process of colonisation had a devastating effect on Taranaki iwi (Waitangi Tribunal, 1996; Riseborough, 1989). The need for compensation for Maori because of the social dislocation arising from the process of land alienation is acute. Not just as a way of righting past injustices, but also to allow New Zealand society to move towards post-coloniality. This cannot happen while this legacy of the colonial period has not been dealt with. The status quo is still based on the 'solutions' constructed during the colonial period that were informed by colonial discourses.

This study is about how the current debate on the reform of this system highlights the pervasiveness of notions about the landscape and identity that have antecedents in the colonial period. I argue the present-day politics surrounding this debate are still heavily influenced by a hegemonic history that glorifies New Zealand's colonial past. The debate for many people is still bounded by 'colonial' notions.

I use the concepts of discourse and social constructions, as an analytical tool for viewing the history of Taranaki. It is useful in explaining the direction of change in colonial Taranaki. While not discounting completely more materialist meta-narratives for theorising colonial situations, I have focused on the development and change of ideas. They provide an important part of the context for historical events and processes. The history of the transformation of the Taranaki landscape, and of the dispossession of Maori land and the social dislocation associated with it, as well as the contemporary debate surrounding the leased land, can all be usefully analysed by focusing on discourses.

By using a form of discourse analysis, I attempt to show how these hegemonic notions are not natural or universal but specific to European thinking during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. My approach is about challenging taken-for-granted concepts like the goodness of 'civilisation' and 'progress', and the colonial constructions of Maori as 'savages' who lived on 'empty', 'wasted' and unproductive lands, which I argue are central to the conventional hegemonic histories that Pakeha identity is based on. I want to show that these ideas are not 'natural' in any sense, but located in a specific time and place, and with political implications. These notions constituted the context in which European settlers were constructed as benevolent 'civilisers', and continue in different forms to perform the same purpose today.

My aim is to challenge the commonly accepted ideas about New Zealand society, and ask questions about the power relations and hegemony that construct and
maintain notions as universal and 'natural'. This study is part of the process of attempting to 'pull to pieces' the foundations of Pakeha society to understand how hegemonic constructions have become dominant in New Zealand society and what gives them their power and cohesiveness. The aim is ultimately to contest the hegemony of these discourses and show the multiplicity and contradictions of 'Pakeha' identity. A critical and contextual approach that accepts that a multiplicity of histories and geographies exists, and that recognises its own subjectivity and partial perspective, is crucial in giving a voice to those that would be denied through a modernist 'scientific' approach.

The colonial imperative is a key concept in my work. Pawson (1987:306) summarises this concept by arguing that "many nineteenth century immigrants saw their mission as the taming of the wilderness and the civilising of its native inhabitants". Based on a conception of Eurocentric morality the British felt it was their divinely inspired duty to master 'nature' and direct Maori towards the goals of 'civilisation' (Pawson, 1987). Christianity, and I would add a belief in the 'rule of law', gave the British an unswerving faith in their own identity as 'civilised', and that of their task of 'civilising' others.

![SUPERIORITY/Fear](Superiority_Fear.png)

SUBJUGATION ~ SEPARATION

Figure 1: The Colonial Model of Order

Source: Pawson (1987)
Subjugation is the second element of the colonising imperative. Racial amalgamation was considered best achieved through the submission of Maori to British authority and the mixing of the two races. The communal land tenure system of Maori, and any show of autonomy was constructed as prejudicial to this objective (Pawson, 1987).

The third element of the colonising imperative is that of separation. To conquer 'nature', the detachment between 'culture' and 'nature' had to be maintained. The settlers had to jealously guard against 'falling back into barbarity'. Likewise the Maori had to be separated from their 'natural' instincts, to raise them to a level of 'civilisation' (Pawson, 1987).

This nineteenth century ideology is what Berg (1993) calls traditional conservatism. This ideology was based on ideas about 'proper' land use and a 'natural' hierarchy of order. "The dominant ideology allowed many settlers to rationalise that they were helping Aboriginal people by giving them religion, civilising them, teaching them about agriculture, and elevating them in the social hierarchy" (Berg, 1993:139). Within this framework of understanding, the dispossessing of the land from Maori, unlocked the productive potential of Taranaki and would begin the 'racial progression' of Maori to a more 'civilised' state. It was in everyone’s best interests that this be achieved. In simple terms, Maori possessed all the land, the settlers felt it was their divinely inspired duty to take it in the name of ‘progress’ and ‘civilisation’, and ways were then found for the land to be alienated. These social constructions clearly have political and material implications and are inextricably linked to power relations in society. Through both war and the imposition of the ‘rule of law’, these discourses became hegemonic in New Zealand society. However, these hegemonic discourses are not total and universal, and have always been challenged in a variety of ways throughout New Zealand’s history. By shaping understanding and meaning, discourses are influential but not deterministic, in constituting change.

With the arrival of European settlers, a new spatial arrangement or geography was imposed over the Maori geography. Through a process of discovery, mapping, and naming, Taranaki became part of both the British Empire and the European consciousness. It was colonised both metaphorically and materially. From the time the mountain that dominates the Taranaki landscape was sighted and written about by Abel Tasman in 1642, Taranaki became a part of the European consciousness. In
colonial narratives, the region was noted for its lush forests, rugged beauty, and the presence of a large Maori population. It was perceived as an area high in agricultural potential and therefore suitable for colonisation. The landscape was seen as ripe for exploitation, a land to be conquered (Johnston, 1979, 1981). The Maori, a people constructed as 'savage', yet were ranked higher than most 'savages' by the British (Sorrenson, 1975). Taranaki became what Pratt (1992) calls a contact zone. In this contact zone, both the landscape and Maori, were constructed discursively, as the Other. The features of the land were re-inscribed by Europeans through discourse, in European concepts, and ceased to exist, at least in the dominant histories, independent of those discourses.

Taranaki was also colonised in a more 'real' sense. It was explored and mapped, with places renamed, and a new settlement and resource-use pattern imposed. A colonial geography was created, based on capitalism, Protestant Christianity, and the notions of 'progress' and 'civilisation'. The pre-European Maori geography was not destroyed, but submerged beneath the transformed Taranaki landscape.

By challenging the hegemony of supposedly common-sense ideas, spaces for alternatives are opened up. The existence of more than one history and geography can therefore be acknowledged. In the New Zealand of the 1990s, a contemporary or 'post-colonial' landscape exists imbued with cultural meanings and reflecting the social constructions of New Zealand colonial society. The landscape is a visual ideology that can be 'read' like a 'text' to understand the society that produced it (Cosgrove, 1989). The charred stumps that once (and in places still do) litter the landscape, say something about that colonial society. This geography is a statement about New Zealand society, past and present.

I word of explanation is needed on the terminology employed in this study. Taranaki is used to refer to the region, not the tribal area of the Taranaki iwi. By the term colonial I am referring to the period when Taranaki was contained in European narratives of New Zealand, beginning with Abel Tasman's sighting of Mt. Egmont/Taranaki in 1642, rather than the actual colonisation of Taranaki per se. The term settler Government refers to the responsible government set up in 1858. Before this date I use the term Government to mean the Crown Colony administration which
was operated through a Governor appointed by the British Government. The term settlers refers to the people who emigrated to New Zealand and those who were born in New Zealand, of European descent. Finally the terms 'rebel' and 'loyal' Maori describe the views of the Europeans who bestowed the terms and not those on whom they were bestowed.

In my study I find it useful to use terms like settler and Maori, although I am explicit about the problematic nature of using these terms in a robust manner. Within ‘Maori’ and ‘settler’ society, there was clearly divisions based on gender, class, ethnicity (tribal divisions for Maori, and ‘home country’ for settlers) that problematise any broad description of these groups. ‘Maori’ were far from being homogenous with diversity based on iwi and hapu differences are important distinctions. Some hapu fared worse than others due to a number of factors, and it is wrong to assume homogeneity among the historical experience of Maori. Various hapu joined the Taranaki Wars at different times and in different capacities. Some hapu were not involved at all, or in support of the Government. Animosity may still exist based on whether hapu were kaupapa (pro-Government) or not, and the part each played during the colonial period. Within Maori society there were also class and gender differences that constituted a more fragmented historical experience. I argue that the assumed homogeneity of ‘Maori’ is due to their construction as the ‘Native Other’, an artificially homogenous category based on assumed characteristics which serve to reinforce the group identity of ‘settlers’.

**THE POWER OF HISTORY IN CONSTRUCTING THE PRESENT**

An historical narrative of colonial Taranaki is useful in providing the background to the remainder of my work. However first I want to make some points about how historical narratives are written. There is a ‘real’ historical past where people lived,
died, and fought, and where historical events unfolded. However no historian can ever write historical narratives that mirror that past. The subjectivity of the historian and the multiplicity of historical perspectives, many of which are hidden to most people, mean that the task is an impossible one. Histories can never be more than representations of the past. A history therefore does not merely reflect but re-constitutes that past.

In the construction of representations of colonial Taranaki, writers have constituted what ‘colonial Taranaki’ was like. This historical record is based on narratives written at the time, and revisionist histories that attempt to re-evaluate the past and construct a ‘truer’ picture. History is constructed by people who live in a time and place, and the history they construct therefore reflects the historian’s positionality as much as the past being written about. It is about creating representations of the past, and therefore there can be more than one representation, and more than one history. Barnes and Duncan (1992) argue that when we ‘tell it like it is’ we are also ‘telling it like we are’. Likewise I am unable to construct the ‘truth’ because of my own subjectivity. I cannot separate myself from the social relations that I work in but in recognising this I can become more accountable to my position.

Constructing history is far more than just a description of past events, it is an inherently political activity. As Shurmer-Smith and Hannam (1994:19) argue, “the past is not a fixed thing, not just for the obvious reason that the present is constantly slipping into it, but also because the present, itself in movement, keeps on constructing the preferred past”. They go on to argue that “history is not just the traces of the past, but is the outcome of a dialogue between the present and the past; the present itself being many-voiced” (Shurmer-Smith and Hannam, 1994:44).

In this framework Taranaki becomes a place where meanings are re-constituted and contested. It is a contact zone between two cultures and a site of resistance against the hegemonic culture. Carter (1987) discusses how ‘Australia’ has simply become a ‘stage’ where history occurred in conventional Australian histories. In this conception history is reduced to a theatrical performance and spatiality to a passive background. He argues that historians do not just narrate the historical events, but clarify, order, and I would add, prioritise them. What I call the conventional hegemonic history of colonial Taranaki has treated the landscape and history in just this way. Taranaki has been reduced to another passive backdrop to the British imperial enterprise.
I do not accept that history is just history, and the 'facts' speak for themselves. Wishart (forthcoming) argues that the 'facts' cannot 'speak' until they have been 'asked' and it is the questions asked that shape the answers. What constitutes those 'facts' in writing about colonial Taranaki, is largely constructed through the hegemonic colonial discourses. Yet this history cannot be called 'false' it is merely constructed given a certain set of assumptions or discursive formations, just as any history is.

Below is a more recent example of a person articulating the sort of conventional hegemonic history that I have been discussing. 'History' is viewed as an impartial, objective, apolitical, and singular, 'true' record of events. Also interesting to note is that the writer associates 'progress' with the status quo and any challenge to the conventional hegemonic history is treated as divisive and retrogressive, with the assumption that conflict is being caused by 'rabble-rousers' and not through genuine grievances:

"History is just that, history. We don't indict individual Germans today for World War II. We welcome Japanese visitors. The clinging to grudges held by radicalised part-Maori against our shared colonial ancestors is hindering the progress of the country. Promoting separateness on grounds of race, and encouraging ethnic politics for special advantage is not progress. It is a regression which can do nothing but promote more injustices, disharmony, and national divisiveness" (The Daily News, 'Rewriting history', 1996).

How the past is represented is crucial to our understandings of our contemporary world because how we represent our history says as much about the present as it does the past. Whether aspects of the past are ignored, considered irrelevant, hidden, or celebrated, is highly significant because it tells a story about how we construct ourselves. The current debate over Maori claims for compensation is inextricably linked to how we view the history of colonial Taranaki. If the European settlement of New Zealand is constructed as essentially positive for all involved then Maori calls for the righting of injustices carries less weight. This hegemonic history is outlined below:
"The standard ideology say that Maori/Pakeha relations in New Zealand are the best in the world, rooted as they are in the honourable adherence to the outcome of a fair fight. Mutual respect for each others' strengths and tolerances of idiosyncrasies has integrated the Maori people into a harmonious, egalitarian relationship with the more recent arrivals; the whole working constructively for the common good" (Nairn and McCreanor, cited in Berg and Kearns, 1996:106).

This history constructs the settlers as benevolent creators of a society that is better than what existed before their arrival. William Pember Reeves' work, *The Long White Cloud* (1898) is typical of this hegemonic history. He proclaimed the efficacious benevolence of the New Zealand state and celebrated the progressive development of the country (Gibbons, 1992). Another example is Skinner's *Taranaki, Eighty Years Ago*. In this narrative he states that "it is also due to our grand old forebears, the foundation layers of the social and material fabric of this Dominion, to place on record ... some few at least of the dangers and trials that it was their lot to face and overcome" (Skinner, 1921:1).

However, if the settlement of New Zealand is constructed differently the representation of the past changes. The revisionist history is that the Treaty of Waitangi has been largely ignored in New Zealand politics and through war and legal means, Maori have been dispossessed of most of their land. Since the colonial period Maori have struggled for recognition of their rights with only limited success. This struggle has been reflected in a resurgence of Maori cultural forms and calls for self-determination (Berg and Kearns, 1996). Within this construction Maori calls for compensation and for greater autonomy are more likely to be received more favourably.

Both the hegemonic histories and the revisionist histories operate on the principle that a single history exists. In discussing Belich's book, *The New Zealand Wars* (1986), Berg (forthcoming) argues that Belich still works with a concept of history that accepts the notion of the existence of a singular 'impartial' historical truth which underlies representation.

I argue that there is not a single history of colonial Taranaki but numerous ones. Rather than trying to construct a more accurate history, it is my aim to ask how the
conventional dominant history was constructed, how it is maintained, and what the manifestations of these constructions in contemporary New Zealand are. Much of the historical writing is still based on the hegemonic colonial discourses that I have been discussing. For example many historians still refer to the settler wars against the Maori as the Maori Wars, subtly shifting responsibility of the war onto Maori. Also the term Land Wars are sometimes used, yet this misses the full significance of the wars. I use the term New Zealand Wars to avoid this, to acknowledge the wars were being fought over issues of self-determination as well as land, and to signal the importance of this war in shaping contemporary New Zealand. I argue that colonial discourses still structure the debates surrounding Maori-Pakeha relations to this day. By focusing on these discourses I believe it will enable me to understand and interpret New Zealand’s colonial history in a different and insightful way.

AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF COLONIAL Taranaki

For centuries before European arrival Maori had heavily populated Taranaki. There was a ‘pre-European’ Maori geography based on resources (food gathering sites, gardens, pa) and settlements, with systems of tracks linking them. The landscape was dotted with sites of significance, and a comprehensive system of placenames existed. Settlements and cultivations were mainly on the coast with the forested interior largely uninhabited.

New Zealand Company agents arrived in New Zealand in 1839, before the Treaty of Waitangi, and from that time made a series of land transactions with Maori. In Taranaki the early land dealings were conducted with a single hapu, which did not have authority to sell much of the land it subsequently traded to settlers. The colony of New Plymouth was founded in 1841 by the New Zealand Company on the land they
had 'bought'. Settlers moved on to their lots both in and around the town of New Plymouth. Those outside the town on farming lots, were inside the New Zealand Company deed but in the territories of hapu who had not agreed to the sale. Conflict was inevitable, both between Maori and settlers, and between Maori who were sellers and those who were opposed to sales. Maori acted with restraint in responding to 'illegal' sales of their land and settler encroachment. Although property was damaged, no settlers were injured during this period (Waitangi Tribunal, 1996).

Governor FitzRoy investigated the land transactions of the New Zealand Company and declared them null and void due to the absence of many Maori from the area due to war at the time of cession. FitzRoy arranged with the local hapu that only a small area of the land claimed to have been bought would stand as sold, on the basis that European settlement in the area would expand no further.

A process of land settlement was never agreed upon by the Maori and government due to an arrogant and paternalistic attitude by the government. The situation worsened when Governor Grey was appointed in 1845. On instructions from the British Government, he was determined to recover the remainder of what the New Zealand Company had 'bought'. Grey ignored the chiefs, who clearly spelt out that they wanted no further land sales, and dealt instead with individuals who favoured sales. This both skirted around, and undermined, tribal authority. In this way he bought a further 70,000 acres between 1847 and 1859. This, despite widespread and increasingly violent opposition by Maori who were losing their ancestral land (Waitangi Tribunal, 1996).

With the Governorship of Gore Browne, the situation turned into open conflict. Sorrenson (1992) argues that Governor Browne did not have the same flair of dealing with Maori as Grey, and left it up to his aid Donald McLean. However McLean began to deal in secret with a few collaborative chiefs rather than all claimants to the land. This inevitably caused conflict and eventually led to the problems with the Waitara purchase where one chief 'sold' the land without the consent of Wiremu Kingi, the most powerful chief in the area who also had a claim to the land. This incident sparked off the tension that already existed and war broke out between the settlers and Maori in 1860.
Figure 2: Tribal boundaries in Taranaki.
The tension was a result of settler pressure for more land for settlement, and the Government’s bungled attempts to secure land from Maori. Gardner (1992) argues that by 1860 many settlers saw war against Maori as a necessary condition of breaking what they saw as an economic deadlock. The inability of the Government to purchase more land was leading to conflict between land-hungry settlers and Maori reluctant to sell. Gardner (1992) suggests that the policy of confiscation that was instituted in 1863 through the New Zealand Settlements Act was motivated by economic as much as punitive reasoning.

By the late 1850s, the settler population outnumbered the Maori population for the first time. While it would be easy to over-estimate the importance of this in shaping ideas, it was certainly a factor in shaping the self-perception of settlers and their perception of Maori. The settler population were becoming less dependent on the Maori for food, and the survival of colonies like New Plymouth became more secure. The underlying notion of the racial superiority of British settlers over Maori ‘savages’ became more openly expressed and was a factor in influencing the Government towards a more determined stance on breaking Maori autonomy.

War was becoming increasingly inevitable due to the pressure being exerted by continuing land sales undertaken without tribal assent. The ‘sale’ of the Waitotara block in South Taranaki served to unite all iwi in Taranaki against further sales. The Waitangi Tribunal (1996:59) states that “the Government process was that the Government alone could decide who owned Maori land and that it could deal privately with a few, and not publicly with all”. The Government’s attempted acquisition in 1860 of the Pekapeka block at Waitara, coupled with the Waitotara block, was the last straw in a process that had been going on for nearly 20 years. Maori frustration over the Government’s refusals to consult and deal with Maori as equals and the infringing of rights guaranteed by the Treaty of Waitangi, led to war in 1860. (Waitangi Tribunal, 1996).

The settler Government needed land for continued European settlement. I argue the discourses of landscape and identity that were hegemonic in colonial New Zealand, created a situation where the righteousness of taking the land from Maori to enable further settlement was unquestionable. The ends justified the means. While confrontation was not chosen by the Government as a solution, Maori resistance was interpreted in this discursive context as a further reason why the Maori were in need of
'civilising'. Maori were constructed as a barrier to bringing 'progress' and 'civilisation' to New Zealand, and their opposition was only interpreted as meaning harsher methods were required. A questioning of the righteousness of the Government's actions was never considered. A situation of what Bodley (1990) calls territium nullius, or 'unoccupied waste' territory that is legally free for the taking, was needed to fulfill the discursive imperative of the settlers, that of transforming the Taranaki landscape and unleashing its 'productive' potential, and of 'civilising' the Maori. The former could not be done when the land was in Maori hands, the latter was supposedly only able to be done by breaking down the tribal bonds of Maori society and integrating them through intensive contact with the settlers.

In this discursive context, Maori were constructed as a problem. Maori tribal authority was a challenge to the settlers' hegemony and seen as 'primitive and communistic'. Likewise the Maori King movement represented a challenge to the settlers' ability to assert their hegemony over the Maori. After initial enthusiasm for European settlement, it seems that many Maori were alarmed by the extent of settlement and the hunger for land associated with it. Maori attempted to control the extent of British settlement by limiting land sales. However this served to invite conflict from a settler Government bent on promoting colonisation at an ever increasing rate. "The decline of land-selling and the rise of the King Movement, however, put a stop to the process by which Maori independence was being gradually and peacefully eroded" (Belich, 1990:79).

The war in Taranaki broke down concerted Maori resistance by justifying the taking of their land, and asserting the authority of the Government to decide all things relating to Maori (Riseborough, 1989). From the settlers' perspective this process needed to continue, even if it took war to do it. The Government of the day portrayed the Taranaki War as divided into two parts and admitted responsibility for the first but blamed Maori for the second. The hegemonic histories of Taranaki have generally reinforced this idea of two wars, and limited their discussion to the direct causes of both. However the war should not be seen as an isolated event but instead as a inevitable result of the actions of the Settler Government. The first war was sparked off by the dispute at Waitara and began with the Government assault on Wiremu Kingi's Te Kohia Pa on 17 March 1860, and ended with a truce on 18 March 1861. The second war is generally considered to have started with a Maori assault on a
British escort at Oakura on 4 May 1863 and continued intermittently until March 1869. The escort was on Maori land when it was ambushed, and involved in the reoccupation of a block of land that was being held by Maori as a set-off for land at Waitara that was occupied, pending an inquiry into the Waitara purchase.

The confiscations were based on the second war, with the Maori deemed to be 'rebellious'. However, I argue that the two wars cannot be separated because they are both linked to the Government forcing land sales by dealing with individuals, not tribal leaders, and the subsequent undermining of tribal authority. Therefore despite the direct cause of the 1863 outbreak of violence being the assault on the British escort, the causes of both the wars are the same. It is convenient for the Government to abdicate responsibility for the second war and label the Maori as 'rebels'. The truce that was agreed to in 1861 (but not agreed to by many hapu), was broken by the Government by attempting to reoccupy disputed land. The 1926 Sim Commission's findings were that Maori were not to blame for the 1863 outbreak of hostilities, but that it was a continuation of the first war (cited in Riseborough, 1989). The armed occupation of the Tataraimaika block was, in the circumstances, a declaration of war against the Maori, and it forced them into the position of being 'rebels' (Waitangi Tribunal, 1996). Though Maori at times launched on to the offensive, their military actions were justified, and in the main based on self-defence. They were responding to Government aggression.

The position of the Government at the time was that because Maori had 'rebelled' they were liable to have their lands confiscated. The reasoning behind this policy is complex but it seems that it was about the settler Government asserting their authority over Maori, and as a punishment to prevent further resistance. However almost all Maori in Taranaki were labelled 'rebels' and all had their land confiscated, despite the localised direct causes of the 1863 outbreak. Confiscations also extended well beyond tribal boundaries, and included lands of hapu that were not involved in the fighting. The only way Maori could prove they were not 'rebels' was to fight on the side of the Government. Some did this, yet these kupapa troops found themselves treated as badly as the 'rebels' and in many cases still had their land confiscated. It is also wrong to assume that hapu fought as homogenous units. Within hapu there were differences of opinion, and not all fought on the same side. This situation was
complicated by hapu rivalries and the Government's method of buying land through dealing with individuals.

The 'ambush incident' was pounced upon by the Government as a justification to deal more harshly with all Taranaki Maori. Both direct military confrontation and the imposition of the 'rule of law' were used to achieve this end. The 1861 truce, and the resumption of widespread hostilities in 1863 were part of the same process of forcing Maori to submit to settler Government.

The colonial imperative was being achieved through the assertion of the 'rule of law', the individualisation of Maori land title, and through war. The tide of colonisation was becoming unstoppable and must have been alarming to Maori who now felt their rights as guaranteed them under the Treaty of Waitangi were being systematically stripped from them. Throughout the war settlement was becoming more permanent and more expansive.

"While a constant tension was evident throughout the nine-year course of the wars, there were lulls in the fighting and civilian activities never ceased to expand. As stockades were built, farms were settled, lands were surveyed, roads and (eventually) railways were built, courts sat, and provincial councils deliberated. The infrastructure of European settlement and officialdom was being established" (Waitangi Tribunal, 1996:92).

Also during this time legislation like The Native Lands Act 1862, The Native Rights Act 1862, The Suppression of Rebellion Act 1863, and The New Zealand Settlements Act 1863 were being passed. These Acts served to encapsulate Government activities like confiscation within a legal framework, and to bring Maori within the British legal system. The significance of this process is great because it meant that Maori could not ignore the Government and live outside it's sphere of control. All land was now subject to British law and rights of 'ownership' had to be proven before settler courts.

If peace is conceptualised as the presence of justice and fairness, then peace did not exist between the truce of 1861 and the outbreak of further hostilities in 1863, nor did it exist in the events leading up to the invasion of Parihaka, and has never existed since that time. Even though there was not outright war, there was never peace during this period. The investment boom associated with Vogel's settlement
schemes in the 1870s provided further impetus to settlement and pressure by the settlers for more land, and the Government’s own agenda of furthering colonisation meant there was continued pressure on the Maori to dispose of more land. There was also pressure on the Government by settlers to force Maori to part with their land. A very explosive situation thus evolved (Gardner, 1992).

The violent conflict did not end in Taranaki until the invasion of the last bastion of Maori sovereignty, Parihaka, in 1881. The resistance of Maori continued in peaceful forms under the guidance of Te Whiti and Tohu in the settlement of Parihaka. Maori under Te Whiti and Tohu, were resisting the settlement of land that had been confiscated in 1865 but then never settled. Promised reserves for Maori were never set aside and as Riseborough (1989) argues it was generally agreed by both Maori and the Government that the confiscation in Central Taranaki was abandoned. The reoccupation of the Waimate plains and the Parihaka block was illegal in that The New Zealand Settlements Act had expired by 1881 and the process as outlined in that Act was not followed.

The invasion of Parihaka by 1500 Government troops in 1881 marked the end of military force used against Maori. Sorrenson (1992) argues that the invasion of Parihaka was about imposing authority on Maori, and not merely a dispute over land. However to assume that Maori resistance ended in 1881 is to grossly misread the situation. Maori, though largely dis-empowered, have struggled in small but significant ways against Government policy, and the hegemonic social constructions of New Zealand society.

Land acquisition by fair means or foul, was the inevitable result of the discursive formations that were brought from Europe and re-constituted in New Zealand. Land was needed to enable the settlers to fulfil the colonial imperative of ‘civilising’ the Maori, and transforming the landscape into the productive utopia it was perceived to potentially be by the early settlers (Fairburn, 1989).

By the 1880s Maori resistance was effectively quashed, through war and the subsequent land confiscations, and the imposition of the ‘rule of law’. The Native Land Court, The Native Rights Act 1865, and the confiscation compensation process, all served to undermine tribal authority and customary practices. Tribal authority was often ignored, and customary rights were repeatedly interpreted inappropriately through European perspectives (for example the various Land Claim Commissions that
recommended individualisation of Maori title). The settler Government caused and exacerbated tribal warfare through the method of land dealings it employed, with individual Maori being used as sellers and thus bypassing Maori systems of tribal authority. This created the situation where all Maori had to prove they had an interest in the land and the only form of interest that was legally recognised was individual ownership. This served to encourage, whether accidentally or not, conflict between hapu with competing claims, within hapu between Chiefs and individuals, and between Maori who were sellers or non-sellers.

Yet as the following passage indicates, the settlers had little understanding of their role in causing this conflict.

"That the possession of these wasted lands entails on the natives continual disputes, because the tribes which claim them are but the disorganised remains of a once numerous people ... That the discord, rivalry, and conflicting claims of this broken people, who have lost all respect for the authority of ... their hereditary chiefs, has prevented them from acting in concert for the disposal of the lands they collectively claim; although many sections among them are most anxious to dispose of a species of property, which is unproductive of any real benefit to them, and retards their progress in civilisation" (Humphries, 'The Memorial of the Province of New Plymouth', AJHR, 1858, G-3).

Injustices proceeded from "the Crown's desire to obtain a certain area on a wrongful presumption of some moral right, with the result that the practices were overly pressured and unfair, and the steps necessary to protect Maori interests were not maintained" (Waitangi Tribunal, 1996:54). I argue this 'moral right' is based on a set of hegemonic notions that structured the settlers' understanding of colonial Taranaki. The colonial imperative strongly influenced the Government's actions. These social constructions were so pervasive that the righteousness of those objectives was rarely seriously questioned, although there may have been debate about the methods to be employed. It is likely that the settler Government saw the maintenance of tribal authority as a threat to continued land sales and deliberately undermined that authority. The tribal authority and customs were both constructed as 'primitive' and
therefore it is likely it was a deliberate attempt to get land and knowingly challenging tribal authority.

The individual Acts of Parliament passed during this period can be viewed as being part of a coherent process that severely prejudiced Maori through loss of land, life and the methodical destruction of tribal structures of authority. I suggest that this legislation was used to achieve the political objectives associated with the colonising imperative. Government policy which resulted in war cannot be seen as a failure, because in fact it succeeded very well. Harmonious relations between settlers and Maori, and the respect of Maori tribal authority and customs, was always subordinated to other imperatives. The policies pursued by the Government were always going to either force Maori to submit passively, or provoke confrontation. The military was used to force compliance where necessary and maintain the status quo.

THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE TARANAKI COLONIAL LANDSCAPE

Once access to the land was secured in Taranaki, Through the individualisation of Maori land title, the confiscation of land, and the way the reserves were leased on perpetually, the land was made available in sufficient quantity for continued European settlement and the scene was set for economic change and the transformation of the Taranaki landscape. By 1881 the ‘Maori problem’ had been solved to the extent that Maori were now unable to prevent the settlement of the remainder of Taranaki land. During 1865, some 1,199,622 acres of Taranaki was confiscated. Though mostly covered in bush, almost all of this was available for settlement. The 1880s through to the 1930s was a period of expansion in the dairy industry in Taranaki based on a process of land acquisition and clearing of the bush to make way for pasture, over hundreds of thousands of hectares of what had been Maori land. The dates on the facades of the dairy factories at the rural crossroads in Taranaki tell of the expansion
of the dairy industry: Kaponga (1888), Ohangai (1895), Oeo (1898), Tokaora (1904), Rahotu (1907), Riverdale (1917) (Roger, 1996). The pace of settlement increased with the clearing of the bush, and building of roads. Refrigeration technology in the 1880s provided a further boost to dairying. Markets in Britain and Australia were now far more accessible to producers in Taranaki. The development of port facilities in New Plymouth and the development of the railways to Wellington and Auckland during this period also aided in this process.

Figure 3: By 1885 transport networks by road, rail and sea, had been developed improving the access of Taranaki farmers to markets in Australia and Britain. This provided further impetus to the settlement of Taranaki and the need for more land. Source: Arnold, 1994
This period can be conceptualised as that when the landscape was transformed, re-made along a British model, based on nineteenth century constructions. The most monumental aspect of this was the clearing of the bush. Through burning and cutting, the bushlands were slowly replaced by introduced grasses growing amongst the stumps of what had been dense forest. Between 1880 and 1930 thousands of acres of land was converted from bush to pasture. With the coming of the settlers a new iconography was created in Taranaki based on these discourses and the imperatives of settler capitalism. An ordered, Europeanised pastoral landscape resulted from this period, where straight lines (in the form of fences and roads) became predominant. The pre-colonial Maori geography was submerged beneath this new iconography. The contemporary landscape is a reflection of the transformation that took place during this period and the discursive formations that underpinned it.
Farms and homes were cut out of the bush. A very labour intensive process, and often it was years before the land could be run as a profitable farm.

Source: McAllister (1976)
The middle stages of the transformation process. The bush is felled and burnt, and pasture is sown immediately among the still smouldering stumps.

Source: Taranaki Museum
This panoramic shot shows the retreat of the bushline. The construction of fences is a further step towards a fully fledged pastoral landscape.

Source: Taranaki Museum
Lost amid the desolation of burned bush and new pasture is a relatively sophisticated settler's house, nestled in the shadow of Taranaki. This property shows the conditions endured by farmers in the newly cleared areas of Stratford and Inglewood during 1900-30. Many farm houses of the period were sparse two-roomed baches with non-existant facilities.

Source: Lambert and Lambert (1983)
Straggling settlements grew slowly as the bush frontier retreated. The township of Inglewood two years after its founding in 1874. A rich carpet of new grass surrounds the decaying logs and the cottages of the town's early settlers. Transport by road in the high rainfall areas west of Mt Egmont/Taranaki was a continuous problem, but the rail connection between New Plymouth and Inglewood in 1877 eased problems considerably.
Source: Lambert and Lambert (1983)

Transport networks were crucial to the settlement of the North Island bushlands. This photo taken in 1875 of the Rimutaka Hill Road illustrates the enormity of the task
Source: Binney, Bassett, and Olssen (1993)
William Greenway's cowshed at Punihou. The rugged character of the landscape and the lack of capital made it difficult to have large herds. The farming tended to be economically marginal, small-scaled, and labour-intensive.

Source: Taranaki Museum
The Crown Dairy factory, c1890. One of the many factories built during the period 1880-1930. The refinement of refrigeration technology during the 1880s provided further impetus to the felling of bush and transformation to a pastoral landscape. The development of infrastructure: roads, railway, settlements and dairy factories, all contributed to the further development of this process.

Source: Taranaki Museum
CHAPTER TWO - A ‘NEW’ CULTURAL GEOGRAPHY OF COLONIAL TARANAKI

The principle aim of this chapter is to outline my theoretical approach, and examine more closely the features of hegemonic discourses of identity and the landscape in colonial Taranaki. Where did they come from, what made them powerful, and how are the discourses complicit in the transformation process? How strong an influence were they in shaping the settlers’ understandings of their relationship with the Taranaki landscape, and of Maori? I argue that the hegemonic colonial discourses underpinned the transformation of Taranaki within a set of colonial relations and shaped the relations between Maori and the settlers during that period. I also argue that land is the key to the imposition of hegemonic settler discourses. The control of land is inextricably linked to sovereignty and the ability to impose social constructions on to another people. The settler Government’s actions were motivated by asserting authority over Maori more than merely the acquisition of land and the promotion of further colonisation (Riseborough, 1989).

My research is primarily archival. I examined historical maps, newspapers and archives held in the Taranaki museum, and the Appendices to the Journal of the House of Representatives, the New Zealand Parliamentary Debates and the New Zealand Statutes proved to be a rich source of information on the period 1858 to 1881. I also read a number of contemporary narratives and found them a useful source of colonial rhetoric. During 1996 I collected articles relating to issues surrounding the Waitangi Tribunal claim of the Taranaki iwi, and the perpetual leases of Maori land in Taranaki in the daily Taranaki newspaper The Daily News. The ‘Letters to the Editor’ section was also useful as an indicator of public feeling towards the issues surrounding the history of Taranaki and the perpetual lease scheme. A large proportion of historical information has come from The Taranaki Report, Kaupapa Tuatahi: Waitangi Tribunal Report 1996 (Waitangi Tribunal, 1996) which resulted from the Waitangi Tribunal claim of Taranaki iwi against the Government.

My work is based on a set of conceptual tools which I have applied to a place in a specific time, that of colonial Taranaki. In a sense I am telling a story about colonial
Taranaki by presenting my own historical narrative. But my story is also about how histories are written. I do not attempt to offer a revisionist alternative to that history, and recognise the impossibility of writing anything more than a partial history. In this study I emphasise the links between power and knowledge, and the inherently political nature of writing about the past (Harris, 1991). How we represent history, informs our conceptualisation of the present. Colonial Taranaki is a place where meanings are produced and continually re-constituted. Clearly these meanings are contested, so ‘colonial Taranaki’ is also a site of resistance, where the subordinated Maori Other, challenges the legitimacy of the hegemonic settler Self. My own work is aimed at destabilising hegemonic constructions and showing their subjectivity and political locatedness.

I use the concept of culture to emphasise diversity and partiality rather than truth and wholeness. Culture is not only socially constructed and geographically expressed, but is also spatially constituted (Jackson, 1989). The settlers in colonial New Zealand were therefore partly defined by their environment. Duncan and Ley (1993) emphasises power and ideology in their discussion of culture by arguing “society is constituted by a plurality of cultures, some dominant, some marginal. A dominant or hegemonic culture is rarely passively internalised; commonly it is negotiated, resisted or selectively appropriated” (Duncan and Ley, 1993:11). Culture is not something external to human experience that simply exists but is specific to a time and space, and expressed and re-constituted through landscape, dress, institutions, language, and ideas. Anderson (1992:40) states that “landscapes and the other elements of a culture are used to define membership in a social group through reaffirmation of members’ values, and exclusion of non-members. This process not only involves conscious socio-political action, but also the unintended consequences of collective actions based on unarticulated, ‘taken-for-granted’ values”. In colonial Taranaki settler identity was constructed in opposition to the ‘savage’ features of ‘Maori’, and the concept of ‘civilisation’ was used to demarcate what it meant to be a ‘British settler’ in colonial New Zealand.

Robinson (1989) argues that culture is too coarse a concept regarding place saying that classes have different experiences. In colonial Taranaki, Maori, settler women, settler homosexuals, wealthy and poor, would all have had very different colonial experiences in Taranaki. By using the terms and ‘Maori’, and ‘settler’, I want
to emphasise discontinuity and diversity and not homogeneity. They are useful explanatory terms, but only if they are used in a critical and contextual way. In my work I aim to destabilise the concepts of 'settler' and 'Maori' by showing the internal incoherence of these 'natural' categories.

In challenging the hegemonic colonial history, I aim to expose the limited truths that it possesses. By doing this I am opening up the possibility of other truths becoming more widely known. In this way I am not trying to replace it with a more 'true' revisionist or alternative history, but am instead acknowledging the multiplicity of histories, and geographies, that exist.

My theoretical approach is based broadly on the 'new' cultural geography (see Lees and Berg (1995) for an explanation of this approach) which draws from the writings of post-structuralism (Haraway, 1991; Harley, 1988, 1992; Rose, 1993); and some ideas from post-colonial theory (Pratt, 1992; Said, 1978, 1993; Spivak, 1988; Spurr, 1993). The 'new' cultural geography is a geographical approach infused with concepts from social theory. Post-colonialism is useful in studying colonialism and colonial discourse, because it does so in a way that challenges the dominant history and hegemonic discursive constructions. The post-structuralist critique of 'truth' and knowledge, and the conceptual tools of discourse, social construction and text, are also very useful.

Post-colonialism draws largely on literary and historical sources to examine colonial discourse and rhetoric to gain insights into colonial and post-colonial societies. I am using the term post-colonialism to mean the study of processes and manifestations of colonialism on the colonised and marginalised. It is moving beyond colonialism in a sense, because it is studying it from a different perspective, a post-colonial viewpoint, that challenges rather than reinforces, colonial discourse. So while the standpoint of post-colonialism has moved to looking from a post-colonial situation, it is still colonialism that is the subject of inquiry. Jackson and Jacobs (1996:3) summarise this by saying that "the term 'post'-colonialism does not mark a movement beyond colonialism but is a reminder of its very persistence and the need for an ongoing political engagement with its effects". The geography that I am writing is geared towards undermining the legitimacy and hegemony of the social constructions that were dominant historically, and exposing their present-day form and manifestation.
Derrida's work on deconstructionism comes from the debates surrounding post-modernism and post-structuralism. While the term post-modernism is highly contested (Berg, 1993b) it is generally used in social theory to mean an attack on the rationality of the modernist epistemology, and a rejection of totalising meta-narratives that search for universal truth and meaning. Through deconstruction the basis of the privileged position claimed by modernist epistemology can be challenged. The authority of the disembodied, but all-seeing, 'master subject' (Rose, 1993), is questioned, as is the way language is used to maintain hegemonic discourse (Dear, 1988).

Deconstruction breaks the assumed link between 'reality' and representation. It challenges the autonomy of all modes of representation and exposes them as cultural texts grounded in power relations (Harley, 1992). Texts (using this term in its widest sense to include all forms of representation) are worldly in that they do not merely reflect the 'real world', but constitute it, and are in turn constituted by it (Said, cited in Driver, 1992). Knowledge and representations are both necessarily situated, embodied, and partial, and can never be universal, disembodied and total, as conceptualised in the modernist epistemology. Said (cited in Driver, 1992:30) insists that “texts cannot be isolated from the circumstances which made them possible and which render them intelligible”. In this way social theory leads away from universal knowledge towards contextual, culturally-specific studies.

Deconstructive tactics, enable us to interrogate taken-for-granted ideas and categories. Dear (1988:266) states that “since no textual system can be complete and fully self-validating, deconstruction focuses on showing us how to ‘read for absences’ in the text”. The process of representation becomes problematised when the naturalness and innocence of a text is subverted. The locatedness, and social constructedness of representations become obvious. Objectivity, disembodiment, and other authoritative scientific principles, lose their privileged position when they are shown to be merely legitimating ideological weapons. Concepts like ‘truth’ and ‘reality’ become problematic, and the ability to know, the concept of a totalising knowledge, is able to be challenged. Language, discourse, representation, and text, are all therefore important sites of political struggle.

Narratives and rhetoric are important concepts in the re-production of hegemonic social constructions through representation. Rhetoric that articulates with or
challenges hegemonic social constructions are contained in the form of narratives, from newspapers, settler diaries, novels, myths, and Government sources like proclamations, legislation, debates, and other 'official' sources. Berg (forthcoming) examines how Governor Grey justified his invasion of the Waikato in 1863 with a proclamation. This proclamation incorporated rhetorics that articulated with wider discourses of 'race' which produced particular understandings of Native rebels, and discourses of gender and class which affirmed hegemonic discourses. This rhetoric was effective because it corresponded to beliefs and values that are pervasive already in colonial New Zealand. They serve to affirm and re-produce a pre-existing hegemonic bourgeois European masculinity, rather than produce social constructions (Berg, forthcoming).

Rhetoric can also reconstruct an event in a certain way to fulfil political objectives to reaffirm social constructions. Belich (1986) argues that this was done with exaggerated accounts of British victories and distorted casualties figures during the New Zealand Wars. The distinction between 'civilised' and 'savage' was maintained through narratives of British victories over Maori.

I have selected a number of representative books to illustrate how the hegemonic history of colonial Taranaki has been written, and to provide examples of colonial rhetoric: Seffern's (1896) Chronicles of the Garden of New Zealand Known as Taranaki, Skinner's (1921) Taranaki, and Butler's (1942) Early Days, Taranaki. Though from different periods, they all represent the characteristics that I suggest are fundamental to understandings of the colonisation of New Zealand. They tend to be uncritical, primarily descriptive accounts, that are celebratory of British imperialism, and that romanticise and glorify settler achievements. They reproduce and re-constitute meanings that are structured by the colonial discursive framework I have outlined, and therefore also their hegemonic status.

Not all narratives of the period are uncritical of the settler Government's actions however. In 1860 the former Chief Justice Sir William Martin wrote a book called The Taranaki Question, which challenged the Government handling of the Waitara land deals. He explains the background to the dispute in a way that is more sensitive to Maori culture and customs, but still is based around the civilised-savage dualism that I argue is key to understanding the way relations were structured in colonial Taranaki. For example in referring to Maori communal land holdings he says that "Englishmen
seem often to find a difficulty in apprehending such a condition of things. Yet it is in fact the natural and normal condition of a primitive Society" (Martin, 1860:7). He reiterates the sanctity of the colonising imperative but also reminds that there is an obligation.

"Here in New Zealand our nation has engaged in an enterprise most difficult, yet also most noble and worthy of England. We have undertaken to acquire these islands for the Crown and for our race, without violence and without fraud, and so that the Native people, instead of being destroyed, should be protected and civilised. We have covenanted with these people, and assured to them the full privileges of subjects of the Crown. To this undertaking the faith of the nation is pledged. By these means we secured a peaceable entrance for the Queen's authority into the country, and have in consequence gradually gained a firm hold upon it. The compact is binding irrevocably. We cannot repudiate it so long as we retain the benefit which we have obtained by it" (Martin, 1860:82).

He concludes by saying that the Maori believed that they had no option but to fight. Unlike most of his contemporaries Martin does not seem to condemn the response of Maori believing their resistance was understandable and justified.

Further examples of rhetoric are provided in two memorandum presented to Parliament in 1861 and 1864 by Charles Heaphy (Statistical Notes Relating to the Maoris and Their Territory, AJHR, 1861, E-1c; Memorandum by Charles Heaphy, AJHR, 1864, E-9). In these works he presents statistics about the extent of land held by Maori and the link to their involvement in war. He disputes that Maori were engaged in a war for the preservation of their land, by presenting figures to show that they still had ample for their needs. He argues:

"an examination into the circumstances of the numbers of the Natives, their extent of territory, and the amount of land acquired by the Europeans, will I think, proves that, however jealous the Maoris have been of the increase of the whites, no fear of being dispossessed of their lands, or of being driven on each other could have actuated them in having recourse to arms" (AJHR, 1861, E-1c, p3).
Heaphy goes on to cite figures to show that the Rarawa and Ngatiwhatua tribes have sold large proportions of their land and are potentially 'hemmed' in between the sea and European settlement, yet they are "busily engaging in supplying the markets ... with their produce [and] seem to be perfectly satisfied with the neighbourhood of the white man to whom they have sold a moiety, at least, of their lands" (AJHR, 1861, E-1c, p3). Heaphy then compares them to the Ngatiawa of Taranaki by saying:

"the tribes that commenced and fed the rebellion are all in possession of very extensive territories, and some with but an insignificant fraction of their land alienated to the British... Their country is very fertile ... and on which the white people have never shown any intention of encroaching. The Taranaki and Ngatiruanui tribe's ... population is about 2,049; and of a territory which comprises 1,236,480 acres, they have sold 152,320 acres, leaving them 1,084,160, or rather more than 529 acres to each person" (AJHR, 1861, E-1c, p3).

In his 1864 work, Heaphy makes similar comments. Heaphy rejects comments that war has been caused by apprehension by Maori of Pakeha dispossessing them of their lands.

"By an inspection of the map it will be seen that the green tint - indicating the rebel territory - extends, almost exclusively, over districts where no settlements have been formed by the Government, Taranaki being the only exception ... To the North of the Manukau about half the whole country, it will be seen, has become white property. In these districts agrarian pressure might, if anywhere, be supposed to exist, but from these districts no Natives have joined in the war" (AJHR, 1864, E-9, p1).

Contemporary maps showed areas with European names, boundaries, roads and farms, constructed as 'ordered', and 'cultured', juxtaposed with areas outside settler influence constructed as 'natural','chaotic', and 'unordered'. These areas were usually blank spaces on the map representing an 'emptiness' in European eyes. The 'empty' spaces served an ideological purpose of constructing areas outside of European control as 'lacking', 'unordered', 'chaotic', and therefore needing European
intervention. Maps privilege some aspects of 'reality' while others are silenced (Harley, 1988).

Harley (1988) describes these silences as an active human performance that is complicit in maintaining the political status quo. In Taranaki this meant that the complexity of the Maori geography was silenced, and thus privileged the impact of the settlers on an 'empty' landscape. In the discursive framework I have outlined, anything that is not 'civilised' is the opposite, and therefore is 'empty' in a metaphorical sense. Clearly for Maori these areas are not nothing, they were filled with pa, settlements, food sources, systems of tracks, and boundaries.

The purpose of showing this rhetoric is to display how seemingly harmless statistics and words, are in fact ideologically charged statements with serious political manifestations. Both of these narratives were written during the New Zealand Wars at a time when debate was raging as to the merits of various policy towards the Maori. Heaphy is constructing an argument, based on statistics and maps, to show that the cause of war is the lack of European settlement in some areas. He argues that where tribes have sold land, that they benefit from being close to European settlement and that they achieve material prosperity and share the benefits of 'civilisation'. For Heaphy the way to achieve peace is to promote the individual and tribal prosperity of Maori by increasing the amount of European settlement on previously Maori land. Clearly he is advocating the use of the New Zealand Settlements Act 1863 to confiscate land to promote settlement in areas where there is little or no settlement. Given that Heaphy was presenting these papers to Parliament his argument had a large measure of influence on the parliamentarians during the early 1860s. This rhetoric serves to reaffirm the righteousness of the colonial imperative and calls for more efforts to achieve this end. Shrouded by the unchallenged 'objectivity' of the map and statistics, Heaphy makes a very strong political argument.

The key point is that all rhetoric serves ideology by either reinforcing it, reconstituting it, or challenging it. All forms of representation, whether maps, writing, landscapes, statistics, paintings, or photographs, are inherently political because they either reaffirm or challenge hegemonic discourses (Barnes and Duncan, 1992; Matless, 1992; Harley, 1992, 1988).
Figures 4 and 5: Below are the two maps drawn by Charles Heaphy and presented to Parliament in 1861 and 1864. Both contain what Harley (1988) describes as active silences. The 'emptiness' of Maori lands is emphasised, and the footholds of European colonisation is juxtaposed against the vast extent of Maori land.
The Crown Office on the map in the vicinity of the Nordenham Harbor indicates that as the common-borne of hostilities, were occupied by Natives violating an agreement and were, according to General regulations, had been removed with the Natives. A part of the inland territory of the territory of Auckland were, then, assigned to the Government. In their hands, living within the war frontier or within the Western, exclusive area, and were, according to the regulations of the Government, within the Western and inland territory were engaged in trading and purchasing goods at the Nordenham Harbor. It was from the latter that the Nordenham Harbor or its vicinity within the war frontier. They claimed the latter source.
Likewise, the notion that artistic representations can be 'true' reflections is also problematic. Representations of Maori in European art during the colonial period also articulate with colonial ideology (Bell, 1992). The artistic representations involve the fashioning of realities rather than merely reflecting it. Maori were classified and compared with European values, beliefs, and classificatory systems. Maori, or rather several versions of 'Maori', were constructed by the settlers, in colonial narratives and artistic representations. All forms of representation reflect more about the author or artist than the subject being represented.

Representations serve to reinforce pre-existing notions about the subject and cannot be divorced from the social relations that it was constructed within. The illustration below is an obvious example of this. However even apparently neutral and 'true' representations are filled with ideology and meaning.

Drawn during Tasman's visit to New Zealand in 1642. This artistic representation of Maori, drawn by a European shows the inability of an artist to create a mimetic or 'authentic' representation of Maori.

Source: Bell (1980)
Artistic representations also relied upon specific notions about Maori and Europeans. European habitations and cultivations were sometimes juxtaposed with Maori and their villages in the bush to emphasise the dichotomy of 'civilisation' and 'savagery'. Bell (1992:62) comments that the "synonymity of forest and savage [was] long-standing in European culture and thought". Both forests and the Maori were constructed as 'uncultured', and thus in need of 'culturing'. This form of rhetoric subtly reinforces notions about the paternalistic role of the settlers in the development of New Zealand.

From Samuel Brees, *Pictorial Illustrations Of New Zealand*, 1847, contrasting the forest, the habitation of those at a 'primitive' stage of social evolution, with signs of the European will to order and control.

Source: Bell (1992)
The types of representations were also influenced by what was happening with settler-Maori relations at the time. For example much of the art produced in the 1860s, at the height of the New Zealand Wars, served to reinforce hegemonic ideas about 'savage' Maori and 'civilised' British peoples, and thus served to justify the war. The artistic representations clearly did far more in colonial Taranaki than merely reflecting 'reality', they also constituted the 'reality'.

Much of my method is based on Foucault's work on the relations between discourse, knowledge, representations and power (Barnes and Duncan, 1992; Matless, 1992; Harley, 1992, 1988). Discourse analysis examines how discourses are constituted and continually re-constituted, and the discursive constructs that arise from this process. Berg and Kearns (1996) argue that discourse analysis relies upon the skills and perspective of individual analysts, and that there is no singular way of reading texts, nor is there a single 'truth' to be 'discovered'. This can be a very powerful tool for studying history. Instead of favouring one 'truth' over another, discourse analysis enables the analyst to understand how 'truths' are created. Given that all knowledge is socially constructed, and that knowledge can never be anything more than partial and subjective (see Haraway, 1991), my aim is not to uncover the 'truth' or produce 'right' answers, but to provide insights into the power of discourse in shaping social relations and geographies in colonial New Zealand society. I also want to go beyond studying discourse to get to the spatial implications of the social constructions, and their manifestations in present-day New Zealand society.

Foucault uses the term discourse to mean the frameworks that encompass “particular combinations of narratives, concepts, ideologies and signifying practices, each relevant to a particular realm of social action” (Barnes and Duncan, 1992:8). A discourse is a cluster of meanings, or a framework of understanding that structures beliefs and naturalises 'common-sense' meanings. Foucault’s method was to ask:

“what rules permit certain statements to be made; what rules order these statements; what rules permit us to identify some statements as true and others as false; what rules allow the construction of a map, model or classificatory system ... what rules are revealed when an object of discourse is modified or transformed ... Whenever set of rules of these kinds can be identified, we
Philip (cited in Harley, 1992) defines discourses as a system of possibility for knowledge. As Barnes and Duncan (1992) argue, discourses are both enabling and constraining, because they determine answers to questions, as well as the questions that can be asked in a specific discursive context. Discourses provide frameworks that structure the understandings that people have of the social relations that they live in. Barnes and Duncan (1992) also state that discourses have a naturalising power that makes some ideas and social relations seem obvious and common-sense, a 'natural' pre-given part of life. "A discourse constitutes the limits within which ideas and practices are considered to be natural" (Barnes and Duncan, 1992:8). If something is considered to be natural, it is not questioned or challenged. For example the 'fact' that Europeans were inherently superior to 'black' people was a largely unchallenged part of nineteenth century colonial life.

The value of Foucault's work is that texts are grounded in social relations and material conditions. He uses the concept of discourse to show how ideas are linked to socio-political realities. In creating 'truths' these ideas cannot be separated from the material realm. Foucault argues that representations of 'reality' should not be considered as an image derivative of, or subordinate to, an underlying 'reality'. He treats representations as a presentation of knowledge that could be either reinforcing or challenging that 'reality'. Either way, knowledge is not merely subservient to power, but is itself, powerful. Foucault uses the term power-knowledge to conceptualise the relationship of the two arguing that the way that knowledge is constructed and represented is linked to power so strongly that they are inseparable. "Power produces knowledge, and knowledge presupposes and constitutes relations of power" (Matless, 1992:46). Given this idea, no distinction can be made between 'truth' and 'falsehood' because both are linked to power relations and therefore neither can claim objectivity.

Hegemony is another useful concept for discursive analysis. In colonial New Zealand there were some very powerful and pervasive discourses on identity and the land. Their power comes from the way knowledge is constructed and represented in Western society. Hegemony involves constructing 'common-sense' ideas about society that are accepted as a true reflection of everyone's reality, and as being
natural', 'the way things are' (Gramsci, 1971). Hegemony is clearly linked to the distribution of power, but not in the sense of force or coercion, but in the sense of shaping behaviour through ideology by re-constituting what the 'reality' is. I use the concept of hegemony mainly in terms of hegemonic discourses. There could be a number of competing discourses, but only a single dominant or hegemonic discourse. This dominant discourse excludes others by constructing itself as total, universal and all-encompassing. Both, other discourses and the subjectivity of the hegemonic one are hidden by this totalisation. Cosgrove and Domosh (1993:29) argue that “theories of hegemony suggest that this occurs through a process of naturalising specific discourses, suppressing others and thus legitimising uneven distributions of power”. Yet paradoxically, by recognising that a discourse is hegemonic, we are also implicitly acknowledging the existence of other marginalised discourses, because the identity of something as hegemonic relies on the subordinate for that dominant positionality. I am not suggesting that hegemony is uncontestable, because it is always contingent and contested, but that it gains power by being constructed in that way (Berg, 1994).

For Foucault, power is productive rather than merely destructive (Matless, 1992). It produces reality, it produces domains of what can be 'truth'. The concept of power used by Foucault, is enabling, and exercised rather than possessed, neither institution, structure or strength, but a 'complex strategic situation' which is constantly and locally shifting (Matless, 1992). "Power is everywhere, not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere" (Foucault, cited in Matless, 1992:46). Discourses, and the 'truths' they construct, will vary according to positions related to ethnicity, class, gender. So while there may be dominant hegemonic discourses, the 'truths' and 'realities' produced, will be contested.

Michael Mann (cited in Harris, 1991) conceptualises power as being distributive in the sense that it affects the allocation of fixed amounts of power among people, diffused, meaning a spontaneous, unconscious, decentred form of power, that is extensive in its organisational reach. Likewise Harris (1991:678) states that "social power is no longer conceived apart from its geographical context. Such power requires space, its exercise shapes space, and space shapes power". I find this conception of power very useful in theorising the relations of colonial Taranaki.

The value of this idea is how it makes theorists think about change in society. In theorising the dispossession of Maori land in colonial Taranaki, Government
legislation, troops, Constabulary, surveying parties, road-makers, and Maori agents, are some of the more obvious expressions of power. However Harris (1991) argues that underlying such manifestations of power are cultural assumptions that are more powerful and pervasive than any of those above. Also it is these cultural assumptions, what I have called social constructions, that have created the need for the manifestations of power named above. It is because Maori were constructed as inferior to the settlers, and the land constructed as 'unproductive', 'chaotic' and 'wasted' under Maori stewardship, that the legislation was enacted and the troops brought in to impose it. These discursive constructs are therefore the most important manifestations of power in colonial Taranaki, and that is why I have focused on ideas rather than events. The events contextualise the ideas, but the ideas are the key to understanding the relations of a time and place.

Spatiality and locality are also important discursive concepts in terms of discourse. Discourses and social constructions are dynamic, and specific to time and place, not universal and aspatial. I conceptualise space as the medium through which social life is produced and re-produced, not merely as an arena in which social life unfolds (Gregory, cited in Rose, 1993). Therefore the characteristics of particular times and spaces, in this case of colonial Taranaki, are influential in shaping the changing discursive constructs. Settler discourses, and social constructions that derived from them, came from Europe but changed in significant ways due to the specific conditions that existed in colonial New Zealand. New Zealand's physical and social environment was very different to that of Britain, and consequently the ideas were far from static. The discourses became specifically New Zealand colonial discourses by reconstituting the British imperial discourses. Gibbons (1992:308) summarises this point by saying "many of these British social attitudes and cultural values atrophied in a colonial framework ... British ideas were often developed by the colonists in new and peculiar ways". Therefore New Zealand was not a replica of Britain but similar in some respects. Thus it is inappropriate to take discourses out of the place and time in which they emerged, and indeed their historicism and spatiality are important for understanding them.

Discourses, and the social constructions that derive from them, inform and shape understandings of reality, but do not determine reality in an absolute sense. I argue that the hegemonic or dominant environmental discourse in colonial Taranaki
was that the land was of vast potential wealth that was being only partially utilised by
the Maori with much land 'wasted'. Only agriculture was considered a good productive
use of that sort of land in this discourse. The European tradition of private property
rights, domination of nature, and a utilitarian view of the environment, is very strong in
colonial discourses. So when the settlers came to Taranaki in the 1840s, they brought
with them social constructions that structured their understandings of the New Zealand
colonial situation. The communal land tenure system of Maori was constructed as
'backward' and 'primitive', and they saw the landscape as lacking 'civilisation' with the
bush as an obstacle to 'culturing' the landscape. These things were thus constructed
negatively in colonial narratives and rhetoric.

Discourses do not determine history in a cause and affect relationship. Instead
they are complicit in constituting individuals' 'realities' by shaping their understanding of
their world through these ideas. In colonial Taranaki, the settlers' reality was
constituted through discourse (rather than by discourse). Likewise, historical events
and processes, emerged from, rather than were caused by, discourse, and are
inevitably caught within the social relations. The people of that time and space lived
within social relations that defined that discourse. Their understandings of their
'reality' were constructed within the frameworks of meaning of those discursive notions,
what Foucault (cited in Harley, 1988) calls an episteme. This term can best be
understood in terms of being an "historical a priori which in a given period, delimits ...
the totality of experience of a field of knowledge" (Harley, 1988:59). For the settlers of
colonial Taranaki, their conceptualisations of themselves, of Maori, and of the
landscape, were all constituted through an episteme that was part of a set of
discourses about identity and the environment. Discourses are not 'super-organic' in
that they do not determine individual's thoughts and actions, but does influence the
shaping of their 'realities' by presenting them as 'natural' and common-sense, and
therefore beyond questioning.

The concept of the lifeworld is similarly useful. Habermas (cited in Harris, 1991)
argued that the lifeworld is the pre-understood context of action, the background
against which communication unconsciously takes place and action unfolds, where the
whole is continually reproduced through each individual action. Thus rhetoric and
social constructions are constituted by this preunderstood context, and are in turn re-
constituting that context.
The term social construction emphasises that notions about the landscape and identity are not natural and universal but are culturally produced. It is to misconstrue the role of social constructions to say that they justified the actions of settlers and the settler government in the dispossession of land from Maori and the subsequent transformation of the Taranaki landscape. Rather than providing a justification, these social constructions produced a context where the ideas and actions seemed 'just' and 'natural'. However at times moral and rhetorical gymnastics were required to maintain these social constructions. For example to construct the Maori as 'backward primitive savages', despite the skill and tactical brilliance shown by some warriors against overwhelming odds during the New Zealand Wars, became a problematic task. Belich (1986) describes how the descriptions of battles were distorted to maintain certain ideas. The British in battle narratives were always outnumbered, and always won inflicting heavy losses on the enemies. Where this was not the case, casualties rates were distorted and battle descriptions were changed to emphasise British 'skill', and Maori 'primitiveness'.

Discourses are powerful through the way objects and subjects are constructed and positioned as dualisms (i.e. opposites). Discourses do this through essentialising the characteristics, and constructing the categories as 'natural' and unalterable. Essentialism is where key features, or the 'essence', of an object or subject are selected and taken to be representative of all in that 'group'. This undeniable 'natural', 'essential' characteristic, is what constructs meaning and structures social relations. A group is identified and marked by these 'essential' characteristics. In colonial Taranaki the Maori were marked in this way as being inferior and 'savage', the opposite to the way the settlers constructed themselves as 'civilised' and progressive. Identity is thus relational with the Self constructed as opposite to the Other.

Dualisms such as these became entrenched in Western thought during the Enlightenment. Logic, rationality and scientific thought, became to be seen as the key to the pursuit of knowledge and 'truth'. Much of this thought was based on the formal logical thought of Aristotle. There are three rules of logical thought as outlined by Aristotle (Berg, 1994). The first is the Principle of Identity (if anything is A, it is A). The second is the Principle of Contradiction (nothing can be both A and not-A). The third is the Principle of the Excluded Middle (anything, and everything, must be either A or not-A). This logic is exclusionary in that it delimits what is knowable in the terms of the
Same (Rose, 1993). Berg (1994:248) makes the comment that "one is forced by such logic to conceptualise the 'somewhat different' as the 'absolutely other' - there is no room for middle ground or shared identities here".

Applying this to colonial discourse in New Zealand we find European settlers are constructed as being opposite to Maori. Notions of settlers as hard-working, 'progressive' and 'civilised', as opposed to Maori who are constructed as 'backward', 'uncivilised' 'savages', incapable of doing a hard day's work. In this way, both 'Maori' and 'settlers' are compared to the hegemonic construction of the pioneer. Maori can by definition never fit it and therefore are always constructed as the opposite. Some settlers do not fit it, for example the feminised 'new chum'. These were people who lived a 'soft' life based on receiving cheques from Britain. These people were mocked in nineteenth century writing and they served to define by negative contrast the qualities of the colonial male (Phillips, 1987). While the 'new chum' are not constructed as the absolute other of the 'pioneer', it is still constructed in relation to the hegemonic notion of what 'true' settlers are like. The subject position of the 'new chum' is contradictory in that it reinforces by negative contrast the dominant construction of the 'pioneer', yet by being British men, it also subverted it by not fulfilling the stereotype of 'manliness'.

In this form of dualistic thinking homogeneity is emphasised at the expense of diversity. Position and identity are based on positive and negative features ascribed to each opposite. This relational identity does not have equal epistemological status, which might be represented as A and B. Instead the relationship is hierarchical, where one is dominant and superior, the other subordinate and inferior. The relationship is A and not-A. Yet in line with the formal logic outlined above, Maori (not-A) are not slightly different, but completely different, the opposite of the settlers (A). Therefore, everything that is considered positive the settlers possess while Maori are constructed as everything that the settlers are not (Rose, 1993). In colonial rhetoric the opposites are described in terms of 'civilisation' and 'savagery'. To be 'civilised' is to the complete opposite of 'savagery' and constructed as superior and progressive, with savagery constructed as inferior and traditional.

Describing the Other thus becomes an exercise in self-definition for the dominant sector of society. The integrity of a unified subject identity is maintained through the construction and maintenance of an Other. Kristeva (cited in Spurr 1993) calls this
process abjection. She argues that by constructing an abject Other, the boundaries of the Self are reinforced and maintained. Berg (forthcoming) argues that the debasement of Maori is more than a rhetorical justification for the exercise of raw power, but is an attempt to maintain the masculine European Self. The Other is represented as violent and irrational, as opposed to the European Self which is depicted as rational and 'civilised'. An individual in colonial Taranaki would be positioned as either a 'settler', and therefore with positive features, or a 'Maori' with subsequent negative features, despite the obvious problematic nature of this dichotomy (because of the gender, ethnic, class and sexuality differences within the discursive categories 'settler' and 'Maori'). The key features of the two groups are ascribed by the more dominant group in society, which in colonial Taranaki was the European settlers. The Maori were constructed as the Other, which defined by negative contrast the positive, superior features, of settlers. The maintenance of these ideas requires the constant reproduction of the negative features through rhetoric, as a justification for European intervention and action. Spurr (1993) names this trope debasement (Spurr, 1993).

'Blacks' and women have traditionally been constructed as the Other in Western thought. "White masculinist scientific epistemology - that is the basis of Western thought - has been constructed within a set of conceptual dichotomies that gives 'man' dominance over the natural world: mind is separated from body, culture from nature, reason from emotion, knowing from being, self from others, objectivity from subjectivity" (Ware, 1992:237). Rose (1993) calls this construction of knowledge masculine because it relies on a disembodied rationality that is legitimated by a contrast with an irrational essentialised femininity. Rose (1993:10) describes the master subject (the disembodied rational Self) as "not only masculine but white, bourgeois and heterosexual". Despite representing itself as objective and exhaustive, it is instead subjective and partial, that excludes other ways of 'seeing'.

Rose (1993) calls for a move beyond hegemonic space to destabilise that hegemony by acknowledging the existence of other spaces. By deconstructing the discursive dualisms, and displaying the discursive constructs as socially constructed, geographers have the opportunities to expose the subjectivity of the way New Zealand’s colonial history has been written, and begin the process of rewriting it. This new geography needs to be explicit about its own subjectivity to avoid the same
totalising tendencies. The aim of this study is to acknowledge the multiplicity of knowledges and histories, and not to attempt to construct a monolithic, universal knowledge.

By emphasising diversity within the categories ‘settler’ and ‘Maori’, and problematising notions about those groups, I believe I can be effective in challenging the hegemonic constructions. For example by viewing settlers as both colonisers of a new land, and as colonials, a more sophisticated conceptualisation of what it means to be a ‘settler’ is possible. By discussing the ambiguity of settler women as belonging to the dominate group in colonial Taranaki, yet also as subordinated in terms of gender relations within settler society, I am able to destabilise the hegemonic constructions of the term ‘settler’. Vron Ware (1992) discusses how women can be positioned differently in discursive binaries in specific situations.

“Civilisation ... is the other side of savagery. In some contexts, white women might indeed be associated with the idea that female nature is inherently uncivilised, primitive when compared to men, and lacking in self-control. In the context of imperialism or modern racism, the dominant ideology would place white women firmly in the civilised camp, in opposition to non-European women whose lack of social and political rights are to be read as a mark of cultural savagery” (Ware, 1992:237).

The settlers constructed themselves as the opposite to the ‘primitive’ and ‘savage’ Natives, possessing the superior features of ‘civilised’ people. This civilised-savage dualism has constituted the relationship between Europeans and indigenous peoples. Indigenous peoples were conceptualised as ‘savages’, the ‘wayward children’ of Nature as opposed to Europeans who were constructed as ‘civilised’ (Bodley, 1990). Gibbons (1992:309) argues that the New Zealand colonists considered themselves the
"pick of the stock, equal to the best of the British, better than the worst, and certainly clean of the convictism that tainted neighbouring Australians". From within this context New Zealanders felt they had a special destiny, what I call the colonial imperative. A set of hegemonic discourses existed that constructed 'Britishness' as the opposite of 'Nativism'. There is an inherently hierarchical relationship here with European settlers constructed as superior to Maori.

This notion was strong in colonial rhetoric. In describing Maori, the parliamentarian Brodie stated that "the Natives could not be dealt with as civilised people" (NZPD, 1863:790). Maori were considered "irredeemably savage with no alternative other than extinction or amalgamation with the settler population" (Richmond, Memorandum, 29 September 1858, AJHR, 1858, E-1). The settlers' world was largely understood through these 'natural' ideas and reinforced and re-constituted through rhetoric. Military victories by Maori over colonial troops were downplayed and descriptions and figures distorted to maintain the 'superiority' of 'British' over 'Native' (Belich, 1986). The social constructions were actively maintained and re-constituted by settler 'experience' in New Zealand which supposedly found 'evidence' to support the dualistic assumptions of superiority.

The foundations of the hegemonic colonial discourses in colonial New Zealand came from within European derived systems of knowledge. The earliest known identity discourse is from classical Greece where a distinction was made between themselves and the barbaros (Said, 1993; Spurr, 1993). Barbaros included anything that is foreign to Greece, and came to mean peoples that were constructed as lesser and inferior to Greeks. Those that spoke foreign languages, or were 'babblers' were constructed as irrational and unable to reason, and thus less human than themselves.

This idea of 'Self' and 'Other' was developed further during the Enlightenment period in Europe where scientific principles for understanding the world were established. Voyages of discovery to the 'New World' proved a fertile ground for the further development of these ideas that later proved so pervasive in New Zealand. 'Civilisation' and 'progress' were constructed as universal goals to which all of humanity should be striving. Brantlinger (cited in Ware, 1992:132) describes this ideology by saying that "by the 1830s, developing ideologies of racial and cultural supremacy in England had led to a belief that those beyond the reach of Western civilisation needed rescuing from their own primitive customs and religions". When
Europeans encountered peoples of other parts of the world, they constructed them in relation to themselves, as being less ‘civilised’ and lacking the ability of rational thought and reason.

Ware (1992:236) comments that “nineteenth century European evolutionism tried to rationalise the supposedly innate superiority of ‘white’ males by categorising humans according to perceptible difference”. She discusses how skin colour, skull shape, and other physical characteristics were used as ‘evidence’ of racial difference, and therefore also justifying different treatment. Europeans constructed themselves as having a duty to ‘civilise’ the ‘savages’ they encountered in the ‘New World’. For example, in the Parliamentary debate surrounding the Native Lands Bill in 1862, Francis Dillon Bell asserted the righteousness of “bridging the gulf that separates the civilised man and the barbarian” (NZPD, 1862:611).

This exercise of racial differentiation served to reinforce European notions about themselves as ‘civilised rational beings’. Duncan (1993:44) states “such binary oppositions between us and them serve the dual purpose of reinforcing and defining group identity while simultaneously ordering complex difference into a simpler, homogenous entity which is more easily appropriated”. Even though the specific content of these discursive constructions have changed, the structure and general purpose have remained the same. Difference is seen from an unacknowledged site, denying its own historical and cultural specificity.

In this European discursive framework, ‘nature’ was theorised as something that is both external and universal to the human realm. Smith (1984) describes the concept of an external nature as the realm of extra-human objects and processes existing outside society. External nature in this conception is “pristine, God-given and autonomous” (1984:2). Smith (1984) emphasises how capitalism internalises nature in the process of the social production of nature. In this view nature exists to be transformed into usable resources for the good of society, to be dominated and transformed from ‘nature’ to ‘culture’. In this conception it becomes the duty of ‘civilised man’ to master ‘nature’.

Universal nature is the internal human naturalness of certain behaviour and social orders. In this conception ‘nature’ exists within all humans (i.e. human nature) but is countered by the ‘civilising’ forces of ‘culture’. This dichotomy also reinforces the idea of a ‘nature’ external to the human realm. ‘Culture’, the human realm is
constructed as the opposite of 'nature', with 'culture' being constructed as superior. In this conception 'nature' is static and unchanging as opposed to 'culture' which is progressive and dynamic. Indigenous peoples were constructed as closer to 'nature'. Non-European peoples were constructed as savages, and considered to be wild and untamed, reminders of 'man's' past where the 'laws of nature' ruled. 'Civilised man' has been constructed as moving beyond this point to where society rather than 'nature' was central to shaping behaviour. 'Nature' could thus be controlled. Both the 'natural' instincts that were so apparent in women and non-European peoples, and the 'wilderness of nature'. Thus 'nature became something that had to be dominated in order for it not to overwhelm 'culture', which was thought to distinguish humans from the rest of the natural world' (Ware, 1992:246).

This paradox of nature as both external and internal to humanity is key to much of the colonial discourses that served to construct identity in European consciousness in the nineteenth century. The idea of a 'natural order' served to legitimate and 'explain' inequality in power relations and the enslavement of peoples. It works at deeper levels in the form of discourses that provide a framework of understanding in which ideas like the superiority of 'white' peoples over 'blacks', 'men' over 'women', and rich over poor, appears 'natural' and unalterable. This dualism is thus racialised and gendered, and caught up in notions of class difference. To be 'cultured' was valued highly in nineteenth century European thought. In this discursive framework, rich, educated, white men were deemed to be the most 'cultured'.

While these conceptions of 'nature' are not absolute, they are very powerful in colonial discourses. The settlers constructed themselves as superior, more 'civilised', than the Maori 'savages'. Maori were constructed as representing the more 'natural' features of humanity, what Europeans had been before they had become 'civilised and rational'.

Descartes, an Enlightenment philosopher, linked ideas about nature and reason with what is known as the mind-body dualism (Anderson, 1995). For Descartes what differentiated Europeans from everyone else and enabled them to attain a state of 'civilisation' was their ability to reason. Descartes hypothesised that the body was associated with feeling, emotion and passion, whereas the mind was based on reason and rationality. The body was also associated with nature, and was thus coded negatively with women and non-Europeans constructed as being closer to nature and
less able to reason rationally. In this conception, a hierarchy was constructed that pitted 'nature' against, and inferior to, 'humanity', and justified 'nature' as an object to be used for human purposes (Anderson, 1995; Katz and Kirby, 1991). This gendering, and subsequent subordination, is summarised by Rose (1993:74). "Knowledge, the social, the theoretical - all these are associated with the masculine and with the cultural and the scientific, the work of Man. The bodily, the specific, the private, the relational - these are feminine, and are associated more with the natural, separate from Man". Smith (1984) argues that it is "striking that the treatment of women in capitalist society parallels the treatment of nature. As external nature, women are objects which mankind attempts to dominate and oppress, ravage and romanticise; they are objects of conquest and penetration as well as idolatry and worship" (1984:13-14). In this conception of 'nature', both women and the landscape, are something to conquer and control, towards achieving the goals of 'progress' and 'civilisation'.

Gregory (1994) discusses what he calls the sexualisation of colonial landscapes in terms of two master tropes. The first is that of a rich and fecund virgin land that is available for fertilisation. The second is that a libidinous and wild land has to be forcefully tamed and domesticated. Both these themes are strongly evident in New Zealand colonial narratives. For example Governor Hobson, in a despatch to the Marquis of Normanby, described Taranaki as the 'Garden of New Zealand', the "wilderness of sweets, where nature wantoned as in her prime, and played at will her virgin fancies" (cited in Seffern, 1896:1). The second trope is also evident, especially regarding constructions of the bush in colonial New Zealand. Phillips (1987) describes how bush was a symbol of wild adversity to be tamed, against which the masculinity of the settler male could be affirmed. Fairburn (1975) discusses how the rural landscape became coded more feminine once it had been cleared of bush and was under cultivation. To be tamed and domesticated was constructed as both positive and feminised, as opposed to the 'unnurtured nature' of the bush, and the filth and decay associated with the city. Different landscapes were therefore gendered, and meanings constructed based on the discursive framework I have been describing.

Maori were described by Europeans using imported understandings and projected notions. Maori tended to be constructed in narratives in negative ways, as a 'problem' that needed to be dealt with. Berg (forthcoming) argues that Maori were positioned as aggressive, lawless, and rebellious. Spoonley (1988) notes that in
colonial rhetoric the settlers were 'massacred' or 'plundered', where as the Maori were merely 'killed' by the settlers. Heaphy (AJHR, 1861, E-1c) discusses the murder of 'unarmed settlers and boys' and conveniently excludes mention of atrocities committed against Maori by settlers. This sort of rhetorical representation serves to reinforce dichotomous notions of Maori as irrational 'savages' and settlers as rational and 'civilised'. Given this discursive background it is impossible for an individual Maori to move beyond the social construction of what 'Maori' are. The only way a Maori could become a 'good Maori' in this discursive framework was to reject his or her own culture and become Europeanised, and thereby attempt to shift discursively.

'Civilisation' is another important concept. It is linked to what Fairburn (1989) describes as the Victorian imperative of material progress and moral growth. To be Christian was to be 'civilised'. It was one of the defining features of 'civilised man'. To be Maori was by definition to be savage and heathen, the antithesis of 'civilised man'. Stocking (cited in Shurmer-Smith and Hannam, 1994:18) states that the construction of the category of 'savage' in the 1800s served to:

"justify not only the imperialism which was assumed to bring about their civilisation, but the continued denial of civil rights at home to those who were presumed to fall between the categories of animality and civilisation, namely the labouring classes, children and women, all of whom were frequently compared to 'savages'."

This dichotomy structures much of the debate surrounding Maori. The Native Lands Bill is an interesting example of a piece of legislation with its explicit aim to aid in 'civilising' Maori. In this case it was regarding land tenure. The preamble to the Act states "it would greatly promote the peaceful settlement of the Colony and the advancement and civilisation of the Natives if their rights to land were ascertained defined and declared" (New Zealand Statutes, 1862:196).

'Progress' was another key concept. Racial progression was based on the idea of a ladder, with savagery at the bottom and civilisation at the top. Variations on this theme permeated much of the anthropological literature of the past 150 years (see Keesing, 1981, for an example of an anthropological text that still relies implicitly on this idea). The rungs of the ladder differ, based on types of economy (hunter-gatherer
to capitalism), social organisation (nomadic bands and tribes to states), and other 'measures', but all with the basic structure of a series of levels with the top being assumed to be more desirable than the lower levels. Forms of this idea of racial progression were part of the hegemonic discourses in colonial Taranaki. In the Parliamentary debate on the Native Lands Bill, Gillies stated that Maori "would not be trodden down, but raised, humanised, and civilised; they would not be overwhelmed, but absorbed by the progress of civilisation" (NZPD, 1862:633). In 1865 there was concern in the House of Representatives that "the Natives had ceased to progress, and that they were slowly degenerating in the scale of civilisation" (FitzGerald, NZPD, 1865:322).

Also linked is the way Maori customs and culture is constructed as belonging to the past, 'backward', 'traditional' and static. They were even described as obstacles to racial progression needing to be replaced by 'modern' beliefs. In referring to the setting up of a school for Maori in the Waikato, Francis Dillon Bell in a memorandum to the Governor said that the school would be an example that:

"the Queen's Government was able to give physical comfort and civilisation in exchange for the barbarous independence which is cherished by them in spite of the misery and lawlessness which it involved (Memorandum to Governor Grey, 'Native Disturbances at Te Awamutu', April 30 1863, AJHR, 1863, E-1).

An example is provided by a book published by a Dr Thomson in 1859 called The Story of New Zealand: Past and Present - Savage and Civilised (cited in Crosby, 1986). The author is articulating with wider discourses of 'race' and identity when he uses that dichotomy in his title. This says something about both the context that the author is writing in, and the discourses underlying that writing. As outlined above there is no space between the two sides of the dichotomy, and there is clearly an implied hierarchical relationship in the binaries. Needless to say that the past, and the savage is associated with the Maori, being used to define by negative contrast the superiority of the European settlers. The settlers are constructed in this discourse as being in the present, as progressive, whereas the Maori are constructed as being traditional and backward, and by association, having no place in the present.
Any show of resistance by Maori against the settlers’ attempts at ‘civilising’ were described negatively. Cannibalism and Maori spiritual movements like the Pai Marire are two examples of aspects of Maori culture that were particularly harshly described in colonial discourse. FitzGerald (NZPD, 1865:322) described Pai Marire or ‘Hauhau’ as a ‘superstition’ that leads to ‘universal anarchy’:

“As amongst animals and vegetables a sickliness of constitution seems to produce the most noxious forms of parasitic life, so it seems that the tendrils of this horrible insanity are extending themselves over the whole surface of the country, and at once indicate and cause the decay of the whole social life of the Natives”.

The term fanatics was often used in colonial narratives in relation to the Pai Marire. Organisations of this type were used to reinforce social constructions about Maori as violent and savage, who were ready to fall on Pakeha settlements mercilessly, raping and pillaging. In particular, hysteria was whipped up after the murder of the Reverend Volkner, allegedly by ‘Hau Hau fanatics’ in 1865 (see AJHR, 1865, E-5). This incident was used by the Government to deal more harshly with ‘subversive’ movements like Pai Marire. The alleged culprit were hung despite a lack of evidence as to who exactly was responsible. This was despite Pai Marire being an organisation arising as a response to the destruction of Maori culture, and devoted largely to passive resistance.

The fear of the settlers regarding the Pai Marire seems to have been based more on the factor of the unknown and that they represented the ‘wild’ and heathen antithesis of civilisation, rather than any real threat they posed to European settlement. Te Whiti, the leader of passive resistance at Parihaka was described as having ‘supernatural powers’ and ‘fanatical followers’. The Native Minister at the time of the invasion of Parihaka, John Bryce, described Te Whiti’s intentions as follows:

“He was to recover the Waimate Plains for the Maori. He was to recover the whole of the confiscated lands in New Zealand. The white man was to be dispossessed of even the lands he had acquired by purchase. Te Whiti was to become the supreme ruler of the West Coast, of the whole of New Zealand, indeed of the whole world: nay, not only a ruler, but a prophet, a king, a god” (Memorandum on the Causes Which Justify the Detention of the West Coast Maori Prisoners, AJHR, 1881, G-7, p6).
While Bryce’s summation may be overstating Te Whiti’s ambition, it is a credit to the success of the passive resistance that Te Whiti encouraged that such huge efforts to discredit him were made. Imagination and exaggeration characterised much of the rhetoric regarding Te Whiti and the Maori at Parihaka. The local press stated “the ploughing party and most of the natives at Oakura are in a state of excitement, having donned war mats embroidered with red, daubed themselves with war paint and decorated their heads with feathers” (Editorial, Taranaki News, 31 May 1879, cited in Riseborough, 1989). A public meeting in New Plymouth declared that as long as the government allowed the ‘nest at Parihaka to remain’ there would be no peace. Maori at Parihaka were described as “fanatics whose mode of action they had no knowledge of” (Taranaki Herald, 2 June 1879, cited in Riseborough, 1989). The Patea Mail (7 June 1879, cited in Riseborough, 1989) argued that:

“perhaps ... the present difficulty will be one of the greatest blessings ever New Zealand ... experienced, for without doubt it will be a war of extermination. Justice demands these bloodthirsty fanatics should be returned to the dust ... The time has come, in our minds, when New Zealand must strike for freedom, and this means the death blow to the Maori race”.

These statements and others like it, were constituting the context in which an invasion of a peaceful settlement like Parihaka seemed necessary. The term fanaticism was used as a rhetorical device to ignore the justness of grievances more than as a genuine description. The concepts of justice and freedom were also appealed to in the last passage, concepts I discuss in more detail in the following chapter.

Other powerful Maori leaders who resisted settler domination were also denigrated. Te Rauparaha was described as leading a ‘wicked life’ and Te Kooti’s men were labelled ‘savages’ (Gibbons, 1992). The settler Government did not wish to acknowledge the mana of these chiefs by meeting with them. This meant that their was no communication, and the intentions of the chiefs was misunderstood and open to attack.

Good versus evil was a powerful trope used quite frequently. FitzGerald (NZPD, 1865:325) argues that the “nature of man is to stand between two opposite elements - the elements of evil and the elements of good”. Richmond (Memorandum on the Native
Territorial Rights Bill, AJHR, 1860, E-1, p7) referred to ‘the striking out these evils’. This idea is also captured brilliantly in the following quote by FitzGerald in a parliamentary debate: “The nature of man has been depicted in all ages and amongst all nations ... as standing between two opposite influences and possessing within itself two opposite elements - the elements of evil and the elements of good” (NZPD, 1865:325). An interesting feature of this quote is how this is depicted as natural and universal. Clearly ‘evil’ is being meant to mean anything that stands in opposition to the colonising imperative. This rhetorical trope is drawing on Christian ideas of good and evil to reinforce the righteousness of the colonising mission.

Communal land tenure was held up as one of the main barriers to the advancement of Maori from ‘savages’. In moving the Native Lands Bill in 1862, Tancred (NZPD, 1862:683) described the jealousy felt by Maori at their lands being ‘locked up’, as an ‘evil’ that should be removed. The settlers were unable to comprehend how the communal land system worked:

“Communism in land is admitted to be the great obstacle to the social and material advancement of the Maori people. It is very certain that under the present system of tenure the Natives will never be induced to give up their low Maori habits and to adapt themselves to the requirements of a superior civilisation” (Buller, Final Report on the Partition and Individualisation of the Kaiapoi Reserve, AJHR, 1862, E-5, p11).

In a memorandum to the Government in 1860, the Parliamentarian Richmond stated that the “communistic habits of the Aborigines are the chief bar to their advancement” and that “individual holdings are indispensable to the further progress of this people”. Maori villages and pa were described as containing “waste, filth, and moral contamination” (Memorandum on The Native Rights Bill, AJHR, 1860, E-1, p7). In the preamble to The Native Lands Act 1865 it states that the aim is “to encourage the extinction of such proprietary customs and to provide for the conversion of such modes of ownership into titles derived from the Crown” (New Zealand Statutes, 1865: 264). Clearly this was constructed as being unquestionably righteous, with the retention of customary Maori methods of land tenure constructed negatively.
Regarding the individualisation of Maori title, the parliamentarian C.W. Richmond (Memorandum on the Native Territorial Rights Bill, AJHR, 1860, E-1, p7) argued that:

"the subject has two aspects; the one relating to the civilisation of the Natives, the other to the promotion of the settlement of the country by Europeans. Ministers hold that these two objects, truly viewed, are ultimately inseparable. The purpose of the measure is however, to place in the hands of the Government a new and powerful instrument for the civilisation of the Natives, and by no means to increase the immediate facilities for the acquisition of land by Europeans".

The individualisation of Maori land title and the perpetual lease scheme both served to further undermine the tribal communal basis for land holdings in Maori society. Thus it is linked to the efforts by the Government to 'civilise' Maori.

The debate over the decline of the Maori population is an interesting example of rhetoric on 'civilisation' and 'savagery'. What was known as 'fatal impact' theory was very prevalent in colonial discourse. It posited that indigenous peoples, constructed as inferior, would inevitably die out as a result of contact with Europeans (Belich, 1986). The advent of Social Darwinism in the 1870s gave fresh impetus to these ideas. It was assumed that just as the introduced species of plants and animals became dominant in much of New Zealand's natural environment, due to a supposed superiority, it was also thought that Maori were destined for a similar fate. Crosby (1986:265-6) notes that "the parallel between the widespread usurpation of New Zealand's biota and the decline of the Maori was not one missed by the indigenes". The correlation of the Polynesian rat's extinction due to competition by European species of rats, was perceived as a forerunner to the fate of the Maori. Indeed this fear was played on by the settlers. Crosby (1986:266) notes that "Pakeha lumbermen, when angered with the Maori, told them that the whites would eliminate them just as the new rat had the old rat".

War was also posited as causing a loss of hope among Maori leading to death by demoralisation after defeat. Implicit is the suggestion that there was a naturalness to it (Sorrenson, 1956). The Maori mortality figures of late last century seemed to provide evidence for the validity of these conclusions. Crosby (1986) cites figures
showing that Maori were very susceptible to measles, small pox, tuberculosis, and venereal disease. The Maori population decreased from at least 120,000 in 1840, to 40,000 in 1891 (Crosby, 1986). This all provided 'evidence' for the Social Darwinist theories on 'race'. As Crosby (1986:267) notes, "the result was both inevitable and tolerable". Assimilation with a 'civilised' people was constructed as the only hope to avoid the inevitable decline.

The 'extinction' of the Moriori from the Chatham Islands was seen as another example of the same trend. King (1990) notes how in rhetoric the traditional aspects of Moriori life were emphasised rather than the reasons for the disappearance. King (1990) argues that this is because the idea of a 'dying race' is more seductive and reassuring than the harsh realities of ethnic extermination. It also perpetuated the idea that cultural authenticity is directly related to bloodlines. King (1990) argues that the death of the 'last Moriori', Tommy Solomon, was irrelevant because much of the culture had disappeared long before his death, and there were at least one hundred descendants who considered themselves Moriori.

Sorrenson (1956) argues that the decline in Maori population was not due to the inferiority of Maori, and that there was nothing 'natural' about what happened to Maori society. Instead he argues that through the confiscations and forced land sales, the Government caused the disintegration of Maori society. Population decline was one of the indicators of this disintegration. I would argue that the dualisms that I have been discussing are complicit in this process of cultural extermination. The Government's conception of the 'problem', based on the dualisms I have been discussing, meant the 'solutions' proved very destructive to Maori society.

In this discursive framework, the 'uncivilised' nature of the landscape and of Maori 'needed' to be 'remedied'. The 'rule of law' and Christianity were constructed as the keys to 'civilisation' with anything else constructed negatively. Christianity was central to how nineteenth century Europeans rationalised their world. It was though God that the colonial imperative was ordained. The concepts of 'civilisation' and 'nature' were both linked to Christian ideas. 'Civilisation' was constructed as the means to achieving 'progress', and 'nature' as the source of material wealth through which civilisation could be achieved. Both 'civilisation' and the transformation of 'nature' were for the Glory of God. However I do not wish to imply that the activity of
the Missionaries and Christianity were negative influences on Maori, because they were important in advocating Maori rights to land and resources. Instead I am arguing that some ideas derived from Christianity were incorporated within the discursive framework I have been describing.

Sorrenson (1975) argues that the three agents of civilisation were commerce, Christianity, and colonisation. I would also add to this list, the imposition of the 'rule of law'. It was thought that Christianity would do for Maori what it had supposedly done for the 'barbarous' inhabitants of Britain. Christianity was often glorified in colonial discourse as the following example demonstrates. "We have heard how, in ancient times, the nations of Christendom went out to fight the heathen with the sword in one hand and the cross in the other" (NZPD, 1865:325). C.W. Richmond in a memorandum to the Government urged that the Government take a more forceful stand over the Maori land issue saying that "such an action might involve a certain amount of risk, that surely ought not to deter a great Christian Population some effort to avert the shame and sin of remaining ... the passive witness of murderous affrays between Her Majesty's citizens" (AJHR, 1860, E-1,p7). As Ballara notes, the settlers "condemned what they saw because their own scales of value seemed to them absolute ... For them, the Christian theology was Truth: British law, civil and criminal was Good, and anything that differed was by definition Bad, savage, uncivilised, and inferior" (Ballara, cited in Wyatt, unpublished: 9).

The 'rule of law' was reified in colonial discourse as what differentiates Europeans from the Other. In this discursive context, without this unifying force lay only anarchy. Pawson (1987:306-7) argues that the 'rule of law' was constructed as saving the settlers from slipping backwards into the 'barbarity' of their surroundings. 'Law and order' was to be held together at all costs in colonial New Zealand, and there was never any question that it was in the benefit of Maori to submit. In the debate on The New Zealand Settlements Act 1863 the Auckland businessman and parliamentarian Frederick Whitaker stated that it was "absolutely essential to the future welfare of the Natives themselves, that we should teach them unmistakably that we were the stronger" (NZPD, 1863:869). The parliamentarian FitzGerald stated in 1865 that "I can conceive that great benefit may arise from subjecting large bodies of Natives to the authority of English discipline, and in teaching them the advantages arising from acting in concert with civilised men" (NZPD, 1865:322). The contradiction
between the 'rule of law' and the injustices perpetrated under it do not seem to have been noticed by the colonial Government or in most of the colonial narratives.

Colonial discourse is inextricably linked to the formation of national consciousness and solidarity in settler societies like New Zealand. Fairburn (1989) argues that there were few bonds and community structures in colonial society, so the key unifying factors were the discursive constructions of themselves and the righteousness of the colonising imperative. Solidarity is achieved through a process of constructing myths and idealised images of settlers that represent them as a homogenised group. Settlers were given characteristics that they were all supposed to share - a 'pioneering spirit'. These features define what it is to be settlers. They are found frequently in travel writing, colonial promotions, newspapers and settler accounts. Jock Phillips (1987) discussed these features in his book *A Man's Country?* The ability to work hard for many hours was central to the construction of pioneers. Phillips states that "almost all work was physically hard, demanding tremendous strength and manual dexterity. In this environment a respect for strenuous muscular performance became a central element in the male culture" (1987:17). 'Roughing it' is another admired characteristic of settlers. The ability to live and work in harsh weather conditions with no home comforts was one of the things that defined settlers and set them apart from others. Versatility was a further feature. Pioneers were seen as jack-of-all-trades, with the ability to make anything and improvise. Phillips summarises the importance of this social construction in shaping the identity of the settlers.

"The rigours of such an existence bore important consequences in shaping the identity of the New Zealand male. Faced with the extreme nature of his environment, the colonial male held intellectual skills and book-learning in low regard. His own masculinity was bound up with physical prowess and his versatility made him suspicious of undue specialisation and the technical learning that might underpin it" (Phillips, 1987:24).

Berg and Kearns (1996:104) argue that "in rural rhetorics, the farm is associated with Man's productive transformation of nature into (horti)culture". This is something much admired in colonial discourse because of the dualisms I have been discussing.
Masculinity and the 'pioneering spirit was also affirmed through this process of transformation.

These discursive constructs of Maori as inferior and less worthy of occupying and utilising the land than European settlers was very powerful in shaping Maori-Pakeha relations in New Zealand's colonial history. The social relations of colonial Taranaki were a recursive relationship in that they were constituted by these dualisms but these dualisms were in turn re-constituted by the social relations of colonial Taranaki. In the discursive context I have outlined Maori were seen as being an obstacle to 'progress' due to their 'communal and primitive' (i.e. different) system of land utilisation, and who were in need of 'civilising'. These polarised differences were constructed as 'natural', thus giving these discourses a powerful explanatory and justificatory power. Given this context, Maori culture was not valued as a living dynamic process, and no effort was put into preserving it other than as an object of museum antiquities and quaint historical traditions.

The metaphor of landscape as 'text' that can be read is an important concept in the 'new' cultural geography. Text here means any form of representation, from paintings, maps, the printed page, and landscapes, as well as social, economic and political institutions. They are all signifying practices that are read actively in the sense that they are rewritten as they are read and thus their meanings are not fixed but related to the positionality of the reader. Such signifying practices are intertextual in the sense that they embody other texts, with no text able to stand in isolation of other texts, and the social relations that it was constituted in. Both are therefore communicative and productive of meaning (Barnes and Duncan, 1992).

Landscape is conceptualised as being more than just an empirical object to be studied, it is also imbued with cultural meaning. Cosgrove (1985) sees it as a 'visual ideology' in that it is bound up in social relations and therefore also power relations, and represents the partial world view of the embodied and situated reader. However it is accepted that there is no inalienable 'truth' within the landscape, it is merely a cultural production based on a set of relations between society and the land (Cosgrove and Daniels, 1988). While those cultural meanings can be interpreted by social scientists, the knowledge gained is still subjective and partial. My own subjectivity is therefore very important in what I 'see' in texts of colonial Taranaki.
A landscape is a cultural image. "They may be represented in a variety of materials and on many surfaces - in paint on canvas, in writing on paper, in earth, stone, water and vegetation on the ground. A landscape park is more palpable but no more real, nor less imaginary, than a landscape painting or poem" (Cosgrove and Daniels, 1988:1). By reading the colonial landscape of Taranaki, through historical photographs, narratives, maps, and contemporary histories, I am able to gain insights into the settler society that created it. The landscape and the social relations of colonial Taranaki both re-constitute and reflect colonial discourse. By reproducing the social constructions and rhetorics in the narratives of the colonial period, those discourses were also being re-constituted. Changing situations required new justifications and in some instances moral and rhetorical gymnastics were required to keep up with the shifting situation, especially regarding Maori and identity discourses. Discourses cannot therefore be separated from the social relations in which they are re-constituted.

Landscapes and places are socially constructed through a contested process of cultural (re)production (Berg and Kearns, 1996). Places and meaning do not simply exist as material realities, but are instead reproduced through complex constellations of power-knowledge. Discourse and power-knowledge therefore have both political and spatial manifestations in this production process. The landscape thus becomes something through which symbolic meanings and power relations are inscribed, and re-constituted (Lees and Berg, 1995; also see Cosgrove and Daniels, 1988; Duncan, 1990; Barnes and Duncan, 1992; Duncan and Ley, 1993). The landscape of colonial Taranaki is a cultural (re)production in the sense that it is based on nineteenth century British notions about landscape, but also that it re-constitutes that British model. In colonial narratives the theme of New Zealand being the 'Britain of the South Seas' is quite powerful, and is linked to notions of 'progress' and 'civilisation'. Britain is constructed epitomising those notions with its cultured landscape, and scientific and industrial strength. 'New Zealand' and 'Maori', were in comparison constructed as lacking the features of 'civilisation'. The colonising mission of 'culturing' both the landscape and Maori was to make it more 'British'. The building of roads, clearing of bush, draining of swamps, and construction of settlements, as well as the economic benefits, can all be seen as contributing to the 'Europeanising' of the landscape.
The colonial landscape paintings, above and below, both contrast the uncultured, wilderness of Maori, to the civilised, 'cultured' landscape of the settlers. The subtle signification of meanings are complicit in re-constituting the constructions of 'Maori' and the 'settlers'.

Source: Bell (1992)
For the settlers land was something to conquer, to dominate in the name of 'progress', 'civilisation' and God (Spurr, 1993; Rose, 1993). 'Nature' became a source of material goods from which a society can be created. Pawson (1987) argues that life in colonial New Zealand was so tough that 'nature' seemed in opposition to the settlers' goals and therefore needed to be conquered for the settlers to survive and prosper. I argue that the productive side of land is more important than the spiritual in New Zealand colonial discourse due to these factors. However there do exist intangible and non-monetary values also such as the concept of the 'family farm'.

Taranaki was described as the 'Garden of New Zealand (Seffern, 1896) and New Zealand as the 'Garden in the South Pacific' and 'Eden of the Southern Seas' (Johnston, 1981). The promotional literature was full of accounts of the lush New Zealand bush, with its extraordinary size and 'tropical luxuriance'. In colonial discourse these features were "assumed by all writers to be not only proof of the extreme fertility of the soil but also evidence of a climate favourable to growth and agricultural development (Earp, cited in Johnston, 1981:20). Binney, Bassett and Olssen (1990) in discussing artworks make the comment that there was a considerable market for art that displayed nature as benevolent, tame, and awaiting cultivation. The 'mission' of the settlers was to harness this benevolence and 'culture' the landscape towards a state of 'progress' and 'civilisation'.

The Taranaki landscape became a site of representation and meaning. These meanings were informed by the hegemonic discourses and articulated through narratives and rhetoric. From Tasman's first voyage round the area in 1642, to the present, these meanings have been contested continually since that time. Clearly these representations are charged politically and have material manifestations. The hegemonic representation in colonial Taranaki was that the landscape was chaotic and unordered, and the Maori were 'primitive' and lacking the 'industriousness' to transform the landscape. A recurring motif in European representations of colonial New Zealand was the opposition of fernland and pasture, and an emphasis on the aesthetic, as well as the economic 'improvement' of the landscape (Bell, 1992). William Fox, leading colonial politician and amateur artist stated that:
"muirland has given place to meadowland; unenclosed wastes to rich and securely hedged pastures, and where formerly the eye fell sad upon a dense and profitless heath, it now revels delightfully amidst brilliant sweeps of luxuriant emerald clover" (cited in Bell, 1992).

Both the landscape and Maori were in need of being 'cultured'. This discursive context had profound implications for change through the settlers landscape transformation from largely bush-clad to pastoral, and for the social relations in colonial Taranaki.

Two of the most important dualisms in colonial discourse relating to landscape are that of productive-unproductive, and order-chaos. Land held by 'savages' is constructed in colonial discourse as in chaos, derelict or under-utilised and in need of assistance by Europeans to become ordered and productive. As I discussed above, the landscape left in its 'natural' state was not valued highly by nineteenth century Europeans. It was labelled 'wildlands' and was constructed as chaotic and lacking 'order', the antithesis of 'civilisation'. For example the New Plymouth Provincial Council stated that land held by Maori in communal ownership was "unproductive of any real benefit to them, and retards their progress in civilisation" (The Memorial of Provincial Council of New Plymouth, AJHR, 1858, G-3, p2). The settlers who, coming from the period that had constructed some of the great gardens of Europe such as Versailles and Hampton Court, valued the heavily modified 'cultured' landscape far more highly than less modified environments like that of pre-colonial Taranaki. Therefore leaving the land in Maori hands was constructed negatively, whilst Europeans gaining control and imposing order was constructed as 'progress' and one of the necessary steps in the onset of 'civilisation' in the area. This is captured by the parliamentarian Colenso when he stated regarding Maori lands, that "the great benefit to the Natives was the advantage arising from civilisation and colonisation, through which one acre of their lands was made to be worth more than ten thousand acres originally" (NZPD, 1862:637).

Much of the legitimacy of the colonisation of New Zealand was derived from the notion that there were 'waste lands' available for colonisation. This was land that was not being intensively used by Maori for gardens or any other obvious use, yet was still crucial to the economy for hunting, sources of water, and defence. The Waste
Lands Acts of the 1850s through to the 1870s were formulated based on a set of discursive constructs about land use. Roche (unpublished:30) in discussing the waste lands legislation, makes the point that "this title in itself reveals the prevalent attitude of administrators and settlers to unoccupied lands: they were to be turned to freehold and put to 'productive' use". The term 'unoccupied' was used to refer to any lands that did not contain Maori gardens, pa or any other obvious sign of habitation. The 'waste lands' issue was more of a lack of understanding by the settlers of different types of economic systems rather than a sign of backwardness and savagery as it was constructed in colonial narratives. Land in Maori hands was constructed as 'wasted' and 'unproductive', an idea captured in the following extract from a parliamentary speech made in 1862:

"It is contended that, in an unreclaimed country, in which there are none but erratic natives, incapable of occupying the whole, they cannot be allowed exclusively to appropriate to themselves more land than they have occasion for, or more than they are able to settle and cultivate ... and that the people of Europe, too closely pent up at Home, are lawfully entitled to take possession of the waste and settle it with colonies" (Richmond, NZPD, 1862:630).

In the same speech, a Dr. Arnold was cited as saying that "civilised nations never have scrupled to take possession of countries inhabited only by tribes of savages - countries which have been hunted over, but never subdued or cultivated" (NZPD, 1862:630). The New Plymouth Provincial Council (The Memorial of the Provincial Council of New Plymouth, AJHR, 1858, G-3, p2) stated that:

"the Natives even when at peace with each other, are unable to occupy more than a very inconsiderable portion of the extensive country they inhabit. They have no flocks of sheep, and their horses and cattle bear no proportion of the extent of country over which they range".

In The Taranaki News (18 April, 1879, cited in Riseborough, 1989) it was stated that settlers "demand that these lands should no longer be retained by turbulent, semi-
barbarous people, too idle to put them to any good use". These statements encapsulate the notions I have been discussing. To occupy land in this discursive context means to utilise it in a way that is consistent with European methods of land use. A landscape that is uncultivated, is also by definition 'uncultured' and 'savage'.

One of the defining elements of the notion of 'civilisation' is the ability to subdue or conquer 'nature', to make the land 'productive'. Conversely 'savagery' is linked to 'wasting' land and using it 'unproductively'. The example below from The Daily News illustrates the pervasiveness of this idea in New Zealand today:

"Finally, it should be remembered the perpetual renewal of the leases was the critical factor which encouraged farmers to invest $180 million in developing what was previously swamp and bushland into some of the most productive dairy land in the country" (The Daily News, 'Setting lease record straight').

In this discursive framework, it becomes 'just' and 'natural' for the wasted lands of non-Europeans to be acquired in the name of progress and civilisation. In fact not only is it just, it is treated as a divinely inspired duty. This idea is exemplified by William Fox, a key figure in drafting The New Zealand Settlements Act 1863, a four-time Premier, and later a member of the West Coast Commissions:

"Districts which in the hands of the colonists might maintain millions of industrious and civilised men lie absolutely unoccupied and put to none of the uses which the Creator intended them. The colonists do desire to people these districts, to create out of them a flourishing country instead of a barren uninhabited desert ... Every acre occupied by Europeans in New Zealand has been bought and at prices quite equivalent to any value the land had or ever could have had if we had not gone there to give it value by our capital and labour" (Fox in 1866, cited in Driefuss, date unknown:2).

These social constructions about the land were very prominent in colonial historical representations, and my research indicates they were made without regard to the existence of Maori. This is surprising given that Taranaki was a heavily populated area
of New Zealand, and had been inhabited for hundreds of years, with people living off that land and putting it to productive use. However it is less surprising given the discursive framework I have been outlining. The Other (i.e. indigenous peoples) are constructed as ‘savages’, and therefore inherently incapable of using the land in a productive way. All evidence to the contrary is ignored with the positive qualities of the settlers being once again affirmed by using the Maori as the negative opposite of the dualism. Though Maori are not mentioned, there is an implicit attack. Maori are hidden in this rhetoric yet are central to the thrust of it. Clearly the above statement has serious political implications for the social relations of colonial New Zealand.

Shepard (1969:4) discusses the way the ‘natural’ landscape and the Maori were constructed as being the same. “The heathen and the wild land were interrelated ... wilderness and paganism were part of the same context”; both needed ‘civilising’. The land was constructed as a burden to Maori with the ‘solution’ seen as taking the land from Maori to establish European settlements among Maori. The member of Parliament Tancred stated “settlements of Europeans will insinuate themselves into Native districts which, up to that time, have been uncivilised. They cannot fail ... to counteract those Native habits, and to introduce and make familiar to the people the habits and customs of civilised life” (Tancred, NZPD, 1862:683). In this discursive environment it became ‘wrong’ to leave any land in the hands of Maori.

“The Ministers believe that nothing has been or can be more pernicious to the native race than the possession of large territories under tribal titles which they neither use, know how to use, nor can be induced to use... [The possession of such land] has, in the opinion of the Ministers, been the principal cause of the slow progress and in some respects (particularly in their physical condition) of the actual retrogression and decay of the race” (Fox to Aborigines Protection Society, 5 May 1864 AJHR, 1864, E-2, p20).

The land speculator and parliamentarian reputedly believes ‘that any man who gets land out of the hands of the Natives and cultivates it is a public benefactor’ (cited in Riseborough, 1989:72).

These and similar ideas about identity and the environment were articulated repeatedly in colonial narratives and rhetoric. Maori use of land was considered to be
poor compared to the use the settlers could put it too, and was also linked to narratives about the progression of 'races' from 'savages' to 'civilised'. Pastoral expansion, in the North Island forest lands, like Taranaki was equated with the 'improvement' of the land. Roche (unpublished:30) says that in this discursive context "the natural landscape and its resources existed to be developed and made fit for occupation". Here occupation is equated with 'civilisation'. The key to Maori making progress, is mixing with Europeans and learning from them. The progression of Maori as a 'race' within colonial discourse is therefore linked to the 'improvement' of the land.

Maintaining the tribal cultural base of Maori was never valued. This position was again articulated by the parliamentarian F.A. Whitaker in 1877:

"it is absolutely essential, not only for the sake of ourselves, but also for the benefit of the Natives, that the Native titles should be extinguished, the Native customs got rid of, and the Natives as far as possible placed under the same position as ourselves" (NZPD, 1877, vol. 24, pp 253-254).

This constant assumption that change was needed in Maori society was very powerful in shaping policy and actions towards Maori by the Government. This is an example of the diffuse nature of power where the ideas that structure understanding are incredibly powerful in shaping social relations.

Parsonson (1992) argues that conflict between Maori and the settlers was inevitable:

"Maori and British had different world views, different concepts of their relationship with the land, different ideas as to how communities should be organised and authority exercised in them, and different expectations of what the coming of British Government would mean ... The British settlers ... had come to make new lives in a 'new' country. They expected to find Maori, even to meet certain humanitarian obligations to them, but they did not expect them to play much of a role in the development of New Zealand" (Parsonson, 1992:167).
Public meetings passed proclamations stating that “an exhibition of power of the Government ... with armed men would do more to make the natives act as peaceable subjects than any Civil action in a Court of law ... dealing with quasi rebel natives who by force dispossess peaceable subjects of land held under Crown grant” (cited in Riseborough, 1989). In this context, Maori were seen as obstructing the ‘natural progression’ of New Zealand towards the unleashing of its productive potential. Communal land ownership and a reluctance to sell land was constructed as ‘backward’ and ‘primitive’. War was not seen as unjustified to break this obstruction by the majority of settlers and by the Government. War, though avoidable, became inevitable.
In this chapter I discuss the complicity of the hegemonic colonial discourses. I argue that the 'rule of law' became an ideological weapon, used by the colonial government to dispossess the Maori of their land, and attack the power base of Maori society. Fairness and goodwill, principles that are both key to the Treaty of Waitangi and the Western concept of justice, were both subordinated to these political objectives. I examine the legislative background to the transformation of the Taranaki colonial landscape and the implicit political objectives that the legislation served. Within the discursive framework I have been discussing, the settlers did not question the wisdom of dispossessing the Maori of their land, to put it to more 'productive' use, and to 'civilise' the Maori through assimilation. The righteousness of the colonising imperative was unquestionable within the set of social constructions that were hegemonic in colonial Taranaki. The legislative framework that was set in place was a means to achieving these ends. It enabled the colonising imperative to be undertaken by alienating the land from Maori and by bringing Maori within the authority of British law.

I also take a closer look at the background to the perpetual lease reserve land issue. 214,675 acres were returned to Maori as compensation for land confiscated, but due to cultural assumptions that Maori were unable to manage their own lands and that Maori land could be taken for European possession without Maori consent, the land was returned in the form of leased land. The reserved land is only a 'nominal' ownership in the sense that Maori have no control over its use or the length of the lease period. Due to the patronising and paternalistic settler government, the control and use of this land is in the hands of the lessees, not the owners. I attribute this to the discursive constructions I have discussed earlier. The continuation of this situation is not so much a colonial relic, but an indication that New Zealand society is still a colonial society. Over the past few decades there has been a slow increase in the sensitivity towards customary Maori ideas about communal land ownership, as
embodied in the Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993 (Maori Land Act) and the Maori Reserved Land Bill.

I have argued in this study that a set of dualisms have structured the relations between Maori and settlers in colonial New Zealand. The relationship between the two groups was characterised by paternalism, righteousness, and arrogance towards Maori. The relationship towards the landscape was similarly coloured by the need for ‘culturing’ overwhelming any admiration or appreciation of intrinsic value that might have existed. Bell (1992) notes this in his discussion of a book written in 1884 entitled Our Maoris. He states that “the possessive may seem quaint, naive, except that its common use by Europeans points to the proprietorial drive fundamental to the colonial enterprise; the will to shape, control, and possess not just the land and resources of the ‘new’ country, but also the present, future and past of the indigenous people” (Bell, 1992:6). It was this drive, what I call the colonial imperative of spreading ‘civilisation’ and ‘progress’, that had such devastating affects on Maori through its construction of them as ‘savages’.

The conquest of Ireland in the twelfth century was Britain’s first colonial experience. As in New Zealand a discursive framework existed that constructed the coloniser and the colonised in distinctive ways. The Irish were constructed as dumb and unable to govern themselves and so this discursive context meant the British were able to rule them while easing their own consciences about the righteousness of the conquest. However the nineteenth century movements for slavery abolition and fairer treatment of indigenous peoples became so strong in Britain that they were incorporated into Britain’s colonial policy. It is clear that the British tried to institute a system of governance in New Zealand that would protect Maori, through the Treaty of Waitangi, the right of Government pre-emption of land dealings with Maori, and the British Government having responsibility for Maori policy rather than the colonial Government. However I argue that the dualisms I have described structured the way the British conceived themselves, the Maori, and the Taranaki landscape. There was a paternalism that assumed that the Maori were inferior to Europeans and needed to be instructed on the ways and means of ‘civilisation’. It is my thesis that the colonial relations both reflect and are constitutive of this. The settlers that came to New Zealand in the nineteenth century came mostly from Europe, and in particular Britain, and brought with them ideas and traditions that shaped their conception of the New
Zealand landscape and Maori. These social constructions, along with the imperatives of capitalism, shaped the subsequent settlement of New Zealand. This settlement saw the creation of a new 'Europeanised' environment, dominated by the 'opening up' of the bush and the introduction of European methods of farming.

The present day landscape is a cultural landscape in the sense that it is filled with meanings from the past. The landscape has been colonised both figuratively and materially. Figuratively in the sense that New Zealand was incorporated into European maps and consciences, and places within it renamed. The Maori themselves were colonised, though this was and still is strongly contested. Maori are in many senses 'Europeanised' now, having adopted many of the discursive constructs originating from the settlers. The way land is owned and transferred has been colonised, as have the way natural resources are now managed. Taranaki was also colonised materially with the landscape transformed from a predominantly bush-clad region to one dominated by agriculture and horticulture. I have argued that this reflects the imposition of a set of European discursive formations, through a process of subjugating the indigenous Maori population through war and legislation. Relationships of power are therefore important in this process.

This process also re-constituted new social constructions of the relationship between the settlers and the land, that was in part shaped by the realities of settlement in New Zealand. The settlers were wrenched away from their cultural hearths, and developed a 'garrison mentality' (Pawson, 1987). I believe that it was the discursive constructions that held the settler society together. In the new environment the discourses inevitably changed, and indeed had to, to maintain their hegemony. Harris (1977:469) identified that "customs, values, and ideas were mobile, and a remarkable range of them entered most colonial settings; there they experienced strong selective pressures that emphasised some tendencies and atrophied others". The New Zealand colonial environment exerted pressures causing some change in these discourses. It seems likely that the discursive formations changed in New Zealand in ways quite different from those found in other parts of the world. So when discourses shift geographically, they are re-constituted by their new environment.

The concept of 'discovery' is crucial in this process. 'Discovery', along with mapping and naming, is linked to the appropriation of an area, and the subsequent re-constitution of European derived hegemonic discourses (Harley, 1992, 1988).
Taranaki became enclosed as a part of Europe discursively even before the first European, Abel Tasman, sighted the area. Important in the European consciousness during the period of 'discovery' in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was the idea that Terra Australis Nondum Cognita, or unknown southern continent, existed. This mystical land full of natural abundance was one of the things that drew European explorers to the southern Pacific. In the search for this land, Australia and New Zealand were 'discovered', and the process of mapping and naming places began. European conceptions of these 'new' lands was shaped by this idea of a great southern continent, so that 'New Zealand' as a place, already had meaning for Europeans even before it was explored. It was therefore mapped and named most importantly in a metaphorical sense by imposing meanings on a place. The landscape was emptied metaphorically by being constructed as chaotic and unproductive by the British. The unknown spaces of New Zealand were constructed as the Other, mysterious, and feminine, to be discovered and penetrated (Gregory, 1994). Pratt (1992) discusses how the apparently neutral act of imposing a Western 'order' on chaos, by means of scientific description and mapping serves to extend hegemony and power into what was conceived of as unknown. Mapping and naming is thus linked to the appropriation of an area. The British constructed themselves as the benevolent 'civilisers' who create 'order' from 'chaos', and harnessed the productive potential of the New Zealand landscape. To achieve this the Taranaki landscape was emptied in a more real sense, through war, land confiscations and the imposition of the 'rule of law'.

Mapping landscapes and naming places are ways that space can be 'written' and given meaning (Carter, 1987). Through maps, the social construction of notions of 'empty lands' available for colonisation, are constituted (Blunt and Rose, 1994; Harley, 1988, 1991). Place-names are key to this process because they are the primary way empty spaces on maps are filled (Berg and Kearns, 1996).

It is necessary to make the distinction between spaces that are real, imaginary and symbolic (Keith and Pile, 1993). All spaces are 'real' in the sense that they have physical material landscapes. However they are also 'real' through the construction of meaning. As I discussed, both Maori and the environment, existed as physical realities (i.e. real) but more importantly in my discussion they were re-constituted through discourses as imaginary and symbolic. When I discuss 'Maori' and the 'settlers', I am meaning how they were positioned in colonial discourse, not Maori and Pakeha per se.
Taranaki is thus simultaneously all three types of spaces. It is ‘real’ in the sense that it exists as a physical reality beyond human experience. It is also an imagined place through discourse, as a place of abundance but lacking ‘civilisation’. Finally it a space filled with symbols imbued with meaning. Spatiality thus becomes a mode through which the contradictions of social life are normalised, naturalised, and neutralised (Keith and Pile, 1993, 224).

The European explorers and settlers both established and relied upon pre-existing European ways of seeing the landscape. They constructed imaginative geographies - in the form of images, fantasies, ‘truths’ and meanings, about this new landscape and the people that inhabited it. The meanings of Taranaki as a place in European discourse began to be re-constituted at the point of ‘discovery’ and ‘exploration’ as further narratives are written by explorers and settlers. Those meanings in broad terms are as a place of natural abundance and vast potential, but with the backwardness and communal land ownership of the Maori, and the heavily bush-clad landscape constructed as a barrier to achieving this potential.

As a place, Taranaki has been written about by Europeans since Abel Tasman first sighted Mount Egmont/Taranaki in 1642. From that time, Taranaki has been constructed as a place within European discourse by explorers, seaman, and later, settlers. It has become a discursive site where meanings and discursive formations are re-constituted. The meanings have always been contested, with the Taranaki Wars and the events surrounding Parihaka being the most obvious, though not the only examples.

Landscapes like Taranaki were compared by the settlers to the familiar landscapes of Britain. Although broadly similar, some features, especially the vegetation was seen as exotic and ‘wild’. Taranaki was described as an area of vast potential, the ‘Garden of New Zealand, with dense ‘wild’ forests. Likewise the Maori were described in ambiguous ways but always in relation to Europeans. The British had come into contact with many ‘black’ peoples so they were not new in that sense. Non-Europeans were generally described as ‘exotic savages’ in nineteenth century European literature (Pratt, 1992; Young, 1995; Ware, 1992). Maori were constructed by Europeans as being at a higher stage of evolution than Africans or Australian Aborigines, yet were still the Other in colonial narratives (Sorrenson, 1975). Sorrenson (1992) states that Maori were respected as warriors and were cultivators
rather than hunters and gatherers, thus putting them further up nineteenth century European 'scales of evolution'. They had in the view of contemporary observers demonstrated a rare capacity for civilisation (Sorrenson, 1992).

When James Cook sighted Taranaki in 1770, he immediately began the process of mapping and renaming. The most prominent feature, the mountain, was renamed by Cook to Mount Egmont after a British imperial figure. From that time onwards Taranaki was mapped and re-named by Europeans. Through this renaming, and the process of colonisation of Taranaki, the pre-colonial Maori geography became submerged beneath a colonial geography with different resource utilisation and settlement patterns. Spurr (1993) notes that the domination of one culture over another begins in the act of naming. The most obvious manifestation of the process of mapping, naming and ultimately dispossessing, was the transformation of the landscape from predominantly bush-clad except around the coast, to a pastoral landscape.

Roger (1996) states that the place names and the road signs tell of the completeness of the Pakeha conquest: Kitchener, Cardiff, Monmouth, Pembroke, London, Bedford, York, Erin, Oxford, Stratford, Dover, Leith, Durham, Norfolk, Kent, Albion, Argyll. Berg and Kearns (1996:100) argue that naming places reinforces claims of national ownership, state power, and masculine control. Place-names are signifiers of place in that they transmit symbols, images, and meaning, and are integral in what Cosgrove and Daniels (1988) call the iconography of landscape.

The Maori had very different discursive constructions of the meanings about Taranaki, yet through a process of subjugation, settler names and their construction of space became hegemonic. "The process of conveying (primarily) European names to places was part of a larger process of Europeanising the landscape [Harley, cited Berg and Kearns, 1996] and seizing control of Maori lands" (Berg and Kearns, 1996:108). Taranaki became 'European' space through the process of naming places and mapping landscapes.

This process has been very destructive of Maori cultural structures and has always been strongly contested by Maori in many varied ways. The Maori had a pre-colonial spatiality or geography with a different set of cultural codes based on Maori society, that was sophisticated and complex. It consisted of iwi and hapu boundaries, patterns of tracks, settlements, and resource utilisation, as well as named features of
the landscape. Yoon (1980) states that Maori named almost every landscape feature in places where they lived. However if this was recognised, apparently it was still assumed in the European discursive context that it was 'empty' and 'unordered'. During the colonial period the settlers became increasingly dominant in technology, organisation, military power, and by the 1860s in numbers, a new colonial cultural landscape was able to be imposed on the pre-colonial landscape. This pre-colonial Maori landscape, was never totally erased, and still lives in the hearts, minds and practices of Taranaki Maori:

"Every nook and cranny of those lands was redolent with ancient history and meaning, and the silent land spoke loudly to them of their ancestors and their own dispossession. They were confronted by a new landscape, peopled by military settlers and grid-ironed with forts and redoubts. They had to contend with new layers of authority, exercised by local, provincial, and central government officials. All came to supplant the rangitiratanga of their chiefs, who were submerged by colonisation" (Waitangi Tribunal, 1996:105-6).

**THE 'RULE OF LAW'**

Kelsey (1984) and Blomley (1994) discuss how laws and their implementation were constructed as apolitical, impartial and value-free, not based on self-interest, racism or power. In their radical conception, the 'law' is not beyond social relations but complicit in maintaining and defending those relations. Rooting the contemporary law in the determinate values of 'our forefathers' or the Magna Carta, the law acquires a stability that protects it from attack (Blomley, 1994).

What Kelsey (1984:31) calls legal imperialism is complicit with the "conversion of colonial political power into intrinsically valid, abstract, legal principles ... elevated political legislation to the level of the divinely-inspired ... It reified all things British and
implicitly denigrated all things Maori". The legal system in colonial New Zealand was shrouded in mystique and symbolism to present a facade of justice and virtue, to hide the naked political power inherent in the 'law' (Kelsey, 1984). All legal activity occurs within particular historical and spatial contexts, and therefore cannot be separated from that context (Blomley, 1994). The social construction of 'reality' in a society is achieved partly through the 'law'. Categories are created and reinforced through the 'law', for example the concept of 'rebels' and 'loyals' in colonial Taranaki. Clearly legal decisions can, and in colonial Taranaki did, have profound spatial implications. To be labelled 'rebels' in nineteenth century Taranaki meant to be excluded from the protection of the 'rule of law'. 'Rebels' were able to be stripped of their land and resources, in a way that was legitimated, naturalised, and normalised by the notions of 'justice' and 'freedom'. Such legal interpretations served to actively produced space in colonial Taranaki.

The British were unable to achieve the transfer of control in New Zealand through force, due to the small settler population, lack of military forces, and a strong Colonial Office position against a confrontational approach (Kelsey, 1984). She suggests the process of legal imperialism where the hegemony of the rule of law was extended to Maori, and became the tool to serve this purpose. However I suggest that this is too deterministic and simplistic. In contrast, I argue that the hegemonic discourses constituted a context where the actions of the colonial Government to confiscate land from Maori, and promote the 'culturing' of the landscape and Maori, became just and righteous. A reified 'rule of law' was one of the means this was achieved. The settler Government's actions during the 1860s through to the 1880s represent a concerted campaign to diminish chiefly mana and force Maori to submit to 'European law', which in fact meant European supremacy (Riseborough, 1989). The following quote demonstrates how the concept of 'justice' became subordinated to political objectives and become a ideological tool. When referring to the constabulary's ability to effect arrests of Maori who were peaceably resisting the surveying of the Waimate plains, the Native Minister William Rolleston said "you take the men and the government will find the law" (cited in Waitangi Tribunal, 1996:230). The failure to make reserves was a reflection of a deeply rooted view that the settlers could do what they liked, and that their actions were in the interest of the colony, and therefore also of the Maori people. "Parliamentarians, government officials, surveyors,
and interpreters were all of the opinion that it was injurious to the Maori for them to hold large areas of land in common" (Riseborough, 1989:55).

Due to the hegemony of the social constructions, the righteousness of the settler Government’s actions was rarely questioned. This does not indicate a conspiracy but instead a discursive framework in which those actions seemed ‘right’ and ‘natural’. It was merely a ‘civilised’ people helping a ‘savage’ people, and this could therefore never be ‘wrong’ regardless of the means employed.

The imposition of European values and social constructions was partly done through the legal system in colonial Taranaki. What Blomley (1994) calls the law-space-power nexus is critical to our understanding of this process. Law and power are inextricably linked and are played out in localities, but are also shaped themselves through this encounter. In colonial New Zealand, a legal system was imposed based on the British model, but became a distinctly New Zealand legal culture very quickly. The New Zealand legal system cannot be divorced from the struggle over meanings and material interests that took place in colonial New Zealand. A reified ‘rule of law’ is strongly complicit in how the colonising imperative was achieved.

The following quote by Judge Blackwood captures the idea of the reified ‘rule of law’ that I have been discussing:

“However offended these defendants may have felt, that does not entitle them to take the law into their own hands ... They chose to operate a type of lynch-law, a concept unacceptable to our law, and, I believe, unacceptable in any civilised society ... Every civilised society has rules by which it lives and it makes those rules of necessity so that the society may survive; without those rules the law of the jungle would operate ... The rule of law is that every citizen of this country, irrespective of his colour, creed, sex, or status is equal before the law, but is equally subject to that law ... If the rule of law is not upheld, we have anarchy. If we have anarchy then civilised society will perish” (R. v Dalton, unreported, Auckland Magistrates Court, June, 1979, per Blackwood S.M.).

This reified ‘rule of law’ is presented as universal to all societies with the concepts of law and civilisation treated uncritically. The most interesting thing about this quote is that is not from the colonial period but from 1979 and therefore cannot be dismissed as
an historical relic. The extent to which New Zealand society has moved towards post-coloniality is very questionable.

THE NEW ZEALAND SETTLEMENTS ACT 1863

The New Zealand Settlements Act 1863 (and the subsequent amendments 1864, 1865, 1866) was the primary instrument for the confiscation of Maori land in Taranaki (Waitangi Tribunal, 1996). Enacted during the Taranaki War, it provided a legislative framework for the legal continuation of a process that was begun with bad land dealings and war. The Act instituted a process whereby rebellion was declared to exist by the Governor in a district, without the need for an independent review. Land was then to be set aside as 'eligible sites' within the 'rebellious district' for the settlement of military settlers. The purpose of the Act was the placing of settlers on the land for the maintenance of peace. The motive was ostensibly 'peace', not 'land grab', punishment or profit.

The parliamentary debate on this legislation indicates that the Members of Parliament saw the settlement of military settlers on land confiscated from 'rebel' Maori as the most effective method of maintaining 'law and order'. Any injustice from the compensation process was to be dealt with through a compensation court which was to be set up and reserves were promised for both 'rebels' and 'loyals'. The Act therefore served the colonising imperative of the settlers to bring 'civilisation' to New Zealand by the acceleration and financing of further colonisation.

However, the way the Act was subsequently applied, the purpose of the Act, the 'establishment and maintenance of law and order', became subordinated to the taking of Maori land, regardless of whether they were in rebellion or not, for the furthering of colonisation (Waitangi Tribunal, 1996). The legislation was used in ways that did not follow the process outlined in the Act. The result was that more land was taken than the law allowed. Instead of setting aside small areas of land for such numbers of settlers as might be sufficient to keep the peace in the district as a whole, the whole of
Figure 6: Land Confiscations in the 1860s under The New Zealand Settlements Act 1863
Taranaki was confiscated. The legislation was not unlawful, but the confiscations themselves were because they did not comply with the statute’s terms (Waitangi Tribunal, 1996). Firstly, land was confiscated before the Act was passed, and therefore contrary to section 4 which required that the Governor be satisfied on certain matters before land was taken. Secondly, land was taken from tribes who were not proved to be in rebellion. Section 2 requires that the Governor is satisfied that the tribes of an area or a considerable number of them are in rebellion before their land can be included in a confiscation district. It appears that often the information given to the Governor was hearsay and rumour, and no inquiry was ever undertaken to ascertain who was in rebellion. Thirdly, extremely large districts were confiscated and declared ‘eligible sites’ for settlement by settlers. This was contrary to the process outlined sections 2-4, where only small areas suitable for achieving peace were to be taken.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Locality</th>
<th>Area originally confiscated</th>
<th>Area purchased</th>
<th>Area returned</th>
<th>Area finally confiscated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taranaki</td>
<td>1,275,000</td>
<td>557,000</td>
<td>256,000</td>
<td>462,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waikato</td>
<td>1,202,172</td>
<td>314,264</td>
<td></td>
<td>887,908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tauranga</td>
<td>290,000</td>
<td>240,250</td>
<td></td>
<td>49,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opotiki</td>
<td>448,000</td>
<td>6,340</td>
<td>230,600</td>
<td>211,060</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Commission did not include the area of land that was in effect confiscated on the East Coast under the East Coast Lands Investigation Acts, 1866 and 1867. Nevertheless the total area finally confiscated appears to have been small — some 50,000 acres in Poverty Bay and a small area at Wairoa. See Report of the Native Land Claims Commission, AJHR, 1921–22, G–5, pp. 14–20.

Source: Royal Commission on Confiscated Lands, AJHR, 1928, G–7, pp. 6–22

Figure 7: Land Confiscated from Maori (in acres)
Fourthly, the confiscation of central Taranaki was unlawful because the purpose of the Act was redundant (i.e. there was no rebellion in that area) when, a decade later, it was implemented as though it could still apply.

A further problematic feature of this Act is the distinction between 'loyal' and 'rebel' Maori. Berg (forthcoming) discusses how 'friendly Natives' severely tested settler conceptualisations of the Maori Other (i.e. they had both positive and negative attributes and so did not fit the usual conceptualisation of Natives as irrational and violent). However, as Berg (forthcoming) argues, the settler rhetoric required the existence of friendly Natives, because unfriendliness is reliant - both rhetorically and materially - upon an opposing notion of friendliness. These notions of friendly and unfriendly, loyal and rebel, existed first discursively, then legislatively with the New Zealand Settlements Act 1863. This distinction becomes very important when compensation is decided on the basis of whether an individual or tribe was 'in rebellion' or not. Although the Confiscated Lands Act 1867 enabled the Governor to make reserves for 'rebels' who surrendered at his discretion, to be labelled a 'rebel' was severely prejudicial to a hapu or individual's chances of getting compensation.

Some lands had already been occupied by British troops and therefore the Bill was also needed to validate past actions and contracts already let. Regarding the public debate, the prospect of cheap land and the repayment of war loans from Maori land had much appeal. Clearly the priority was not the welfare of Maori, nor was it based on principles of goodwill or justice: in effect "an Act that was passed for the maintenance of peace was converted into an Act for the furtherance of colonisation. The ostensible objective of the Governor was to settle sufficient numbers to keep the peace; his actual purpose was simply to take the land" (Waitangi Tribunal, 1996:130). While it is always difficult to speculate on intentions, the way the Act was applied would suggest the Government used it to make available as much land as possible for settlement. Also the tendency is to use it as a means of punishment rather than to promote peace. Arguably this is what happened in this case.

A final point worth noting regarding this Act is that in an 1866 amendment all "orders, proclamations, and regulations, and all grants, awards, and other proceedings of the Governor, or of any Court of Compensation, or any Judge ... are hereby declared to have been and to be absolutely valid and none of them shall be called in question" (Statutes, 1866:150). This legal 'covering of tracks' is clearly designed to
maintain the status quo and is not geared towards concepts of justice or goodwill. The Waitangi Tribunal (1996:131) states “that this does nothing more than validate illegalities arising from want of proper process and form, and that it did not make lawful the actions of the Governor that were fundamentally outside the authority of the statutory scheme”. Also in considering compensation for Maori in the 1990s, the fact that it was unlawful at the time is far more significant than whether it was made lawful later.

The Act itself was contrary to the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi. Peace terms were practicable without confiscation, and good grounds did not exist for the suspension of the guarantees given under the Treaty of Waitangi (Waitangi Tribunal, 1996).

**LEGISLATION PREJUDICIAL TO CIVIL RIGHTS**

Other pieces of legislation together formed a coherent framework for the dispossession of Maori land. They are all share similar characteristics and are based on the set of discursive constructions that I outlined in the previous chapter. The Native Lands Act 1862 was promoted as an Act that would more clearly define the issue of who owned Maori land. However through the system of individualisation of titles it introduced, Maori tribal authority and customary practices were dismissed. The Act made two important assumptions, both of which were key issues during the 1860-1 conflict. Firstly that the Government could decide all matters relating to rights in Maori land, and secondly that the tribal basis for managing land should disappear. These assumptions served to further effect a major confiscation of tribal rights and facilitated the acquisition of more Maori land. The Native Lands Act 1865 reinforced these provisions by introducing a Native Land Court to determine titles in the case of dispute (Waitangi Tribunal, 1996).

Further examples relate to the raising and apportioning of money. The New Zealand Loan Act 1863 facilitated a three million pound loan to pay for colonisation
costs and the war waged against Maori. The intention seemed to be that the loan be redeemed from the sale of confiscated land, and the use of the loan for colonisation costs, made it likely, as proved to be the case, that Maori land would be confiscated for financial purposes, and not merely to keep the peace. Likewise The New Zealand Loan Appropriation Act 1863 apportioned the loan to competing provinces to pay local development costs. Again, the provinces understood the loan would be repaid by the sale of confiscated land (Waitangi Tribunal, 1996).

The Public Works Act 1864 was the first Act to allow Maori land to be taken for public works. Compensation was never given to ‘rebels’ who had land taken through this piece of legislation. This Act seemed to have been used as a both a way of securing land for public works, and as a further form of punishment through confiscation.

The Native Rights Act 1865 took from Maori the rights to determine certain domestic matters themselves. It made it clear that both Maori and their property were subject to British law. This made any Maori resistance ‘unlawful’ and transformed Maori who were fighting for their rights as guaranteed under the Treaty of Waitangi, into common criminals.

All of these pieces of legislation served in various ways to further the twin objectives of transforming the landscape and of transforming Maori. They were all based on the dualistic assumptions I discussed in the previous chapter. Maori were constructed as ‘primitive’ and ‘backward’, in need of assistance by ‘civilised’ Europeans. The settlement of New Zealand and the imposition of British social values was constructed as positive for Maori. In this discursive context, any sign of Maori independence or authority was quickly quashed through the imposition of ‘the rule of law’. This legislation was enforced by military might where it was resisted by Maori.

Another aspect of the legislative framework that is worthy of note is a number of Acts passed between 1879 and 1882 that were prejudicial to the civil rights of Maori. Ten years after the war had finished, the settler Government argued that it was necessary in ‘the name of law and order’ and to ‘keep the peace’, that the right of Maori to trial be suspended. The area of Central Taranaki was confiscated under the auspices of the New Zealand Settlements Act 1863.
Figure 8: The confiscation abandonment of Central Taranaki

However it was never settled or surveyed, and Riseborough (1989) argues that both Maori and the settler Government that the confiscation had be informally abandoned, and Maori continued to live there. With the boom associated with Vogel's public works and assisted immigration policies, the demand for land grew. The settler Government was also strapped for cash due to servicing the loans needed for public works. In these conditions the settler Government decided to survey and sell the lands of Central Taranaki for settlement in 1878. This action was unlawful because The New Zealand Settlements Amendment and Continuance Act 1865 made the Act of 1863 perpetual, provided that no powers of reserving or taking land for settlement were to be exercised after 3 December 1867. Eligible sites for settlement had never been marked or surveyed in this area, and under the terms of the 1865 Act, could not be done after 1867. However despite the questionable legality the settler Government decided to proceed assuming that Maori would agree to the settlement of the area provided adequate reserves were made. The Waitangi Tribunal (1996:202) stated that "this was a remarkable conclusion considering that the leading Maori were never consulted". The desire for land, informed by the discursive constructions I have discussed elsewhere, seemed to have overridden any legal or moral considerations that may have led to the questioning of the settler Government's actions. Indeed the 'morality' of leaving the land in the hands of Maori was considered worse, both for Maori and for the land.

Peaceful resistance was based around the settlement of Parihaka. The Native Minister John Bryce, "initiated such further provocative actions as might goad a warlike response and justify his (the Government's) army's retaliation" (Waitangi Tribunal, 1996:201). However the Maori proved well disciplined and responded with ploughing of 'settler land' and erecting fences, all actions aimed at reinforcing that the lands around Parihaka belonged to Maori. The settler Government arrested many Maori protesters and instituted a series of legislation designed to prevent further resistance. The usual legal formalities for arrests and trials were replaced by martial law. The Suppression of Rebellions Act 1863, The Maori Prisoners' Trials Act 1879, The Confiscated Lands Inquiry and Maori Prisoners' Trials Act 1879, The Maori Prisoners' Trials Act 1879, The Maori Prisoners' Detention Act 1880, The West Coast Settlement (North Island) Act 1880, and The West Coast Peace Preservation Act 1882, all subordinated the law to political objectives. The Waitangi Tribunal (1996:201) argues
that these laws merely emphasise "how remote that regime had become from the promises made at Waitangi in the Queen's name and how fragile the rule of law was in New Zealand at the time". The legislation, "being in several important respects contrary to the normal standards of law, is indicative not of the times, in our opinion, for those outside New Zealand could view these laws with abhorrence, but of the state that Parliament had got into" (Waitangi Tribunal, 1996:229). Clearly promoting 'peace' through furthering colonisation, were the priority with principles of justice and fairness subordinated. Many of the civil rights of Maori were suspended. The ability to meet in a large group, the right of fair trial, the right to passively resist encroachments on their own land, were all suspended by one or more of the pieces of legislation listed above. The 'rule of law' seemed to have been transformed from being a bulwark against arbitrary State power, to becoming an instrument of the use of that power. The righteousness of the Parliament's actions was never unanimous but was always strong. There seemed to be a perception among the parliamentarians that while Maori did have grievances, further European settlement of south and central Taranaki was the best way to 'heal the sore' (Riseborough, 1989). The link between further settlement and the alienation of Maori land was not a major point in the debates. Justice for Maori regarding the promised reserves was secondary.

THE COMPENSATION PROCESS

A compensation process was included in the New Zealand Settlements Act 1863 to ensure that 'loyal' Maori were able to have their land returned through a Compensation Court. Successive settler Governments promised Maori, both 'loyal' and 'rebels', that reserves would be made for them which would ensure their survival. However due to a variety of factors, the reserves were not demarcated. There was the practical difficulty of who was to have what land. The land had never been surveyed and when it was, land for sale to settlers took precedence because of the revenue
involved. Dissension between the Native and Survey Departments exacerbated the problem. Lack of money for Maori purposes meant it was a slow process. However the background to all these factors is a reluctance by the settler Government to allow Maori to live separate from the settlers. Riseborough (1989) argues that the settler Government wished to deny Maori their lands as promised them to diminish mana motuhake. By not giving Maori land, it forced them to submit, to become dependent on the settler Government.

“As long as the Maori held large blocks of land on the west coast, whether on original native title or on crown grant, they could retain an independence and a physical and spiritual distance from the European world which Europeans could not tolerate. The Maori were to be civilised by having Europeans live amongst them. Inalienable reserves or those with communal title could frustrate this objective” (Riseborough, 1989:57).

In this context the surveying of land for Maori reserves was a very low priority. The result was that little land was ever returned through the Compensation Court process. In 1880, the West Coast Commission found that there had been 518 determinations of the Compensation Court for nearly 80,000 acres, but only 3,500 acres had been issued in Crown grants, and of that, 38% of the promised land had not been identified on the ground (Waitangi Tribunal, 1996). Maori in many cases relied on the Governor to make ‘awards’, especially those excluded from the Compensation Court process. This executive action had the effect of subordinating the Court, and the judicial process became subservient to executive whim.

The Compensation Court was “quasi-judicial and mainly bureaucratic ... [and] had the elements of a lottery. Its main effect was to exclude hundreds from land interests because they were absentees, did not attend court, were rebels, or did not complete claims” (Waitangi Tribunal, 1996:145). The Compensation Court was not obliged to follow its own rules (all determinations of the court were deemed valid and beyond judicial scrutiny by section 15 of the New Zealand Settlements Act 1863), and the process of getting reserves was confusing and long because of the bureaucratic process. A distinction was made between ‘entitlement’ (an entitlement to compensation), ‘certificates’ (showing the claimants entitlement to a piece of land),
'awards' (defining the land, persons entitled, and their shares), and 'Crown grants' (where the Governor issues a title for the award and it is surveyed). The status of the work was always unclear because it was uncertain whether lands said to have been awarded had in fact been surveyed on the ground and awarded. The Court also decided who was eligible for reserves. Maori collaborators effectively became judges in that it was mainly hearsay whether individual Maori were 'rebels' or 'loyals'.

In many cases 'awards' that had clauses declaring them inalienable were struck out, so that three-quarters of the land had passed to settlers. In all but a few cases, the reserves that were 'awarded' were done so in name only and had little affect in righting the injustice of the confiscations. When reserves were granted, they were almost always individualised titles, serving to further destroy tribal authority, and facilitate the gradual selling of individual Maori titles. This process of holding back on Crown grants and individualising titles lent itself to the sale of Maori land and the destruction of Maori tribal structures, not the ostensible purpose of providing the promised reserves for Maori.

THE WEST COAST COMMISSIONS AND THE PERPETUAL LEASE SCHEME

The West Coast Commission was set up in 1879 to investigate the numerous complaints of broken promises, and to provide for as many reserves as possible where reserves had been promised by the Compensation Court. The first commission was made up of Sir William Fox, Sir Francis Bell and Hone Tawhai. Tawhai, the only Maori member resigned in protest over the alleged bias of the other two commissioners. The first West Coast Commission investigated the actions of the Compensation Court, described the reserves it thought were needed, and recommended that a second commission be set up as soon as possible to create those reserves. The second West Coast Commission, comprised Fox and Bell, until Bell resigned to concentrate on other
parts of his career. This left Sir William Fox, the parliamentarian who had introduced
the confiscation legislation, in sole charge of investigating the compensation
procedures. As a commissioner, Fox admitted Taranaki Maori had legitimate
grievances and were entitled to the reserves that had been repeatedly promised them.
As a politician, he was prepared to pass legislation which would hold them without trial
for protesting those grievances (Riseborough, 1989:106-7). The West Coast
Commission was seen at the time as window-dressing and Riseborough (1989) argues
that it was aimed at making an impression in Britain rather than about dealing with the
grievances of Maori. The commission displayed concern towards Maori, yet continued
the process of land alienation and the promotion of further European settlement.

The second West Coast Commission had the power to take evidence and to
survey reserves for Maori. Effectively it did the job of the Native Land Court in
Taranaki by establishing who was entitled to reserves. The commission urged that
nothing be done to survey or sell land in Taranaki, until reserves had been identified
on the ground. Despite this, John Bryce the Native Minister continued the surveying and sale of
disputed land. When the second commission reported in 1884, it had made sufficient
reserves to cover most of the Compensation Court awards and other promises.
However, the titles were individualised and the management of the reserves were then
vested in the Public Trustee to be managed on behalf of Maori. The land was then
either leased perpetually to settlers to be farmed, or sold. Regardless, the control of
Maori land was taken out of the hands of Maori at this point (Waitangi Tribunal, 1996).

Not surprisingly the commission was not an effective instrument in alleviating
Maori concerns about land alienation. Instead of looking at areas where reserves were
desperately needed, the commission concentrated on making reserves in central
Taranaki so the remainder could be taken for settlement. The commission could and
should have been a body bringing justice and relief to a sorely oppressed people. It
was in fact part of the Government's machine to ensure the further alienation of Maori
land, in line with the colonising imperative.

The system of perpetual leases set up by the Government under the auspices of
The West Coast Settlement Reserves Act 1881, The West Coast Settlement Reserves
Act 1892, and its subsequent amendments. Described by the Waitangi Tribunal (1996)
as the 'unkindest cut of all' Maori have been denied the control and possession of the
reserves, as guaranteed them by the Treaty of Waitangi. The West Coast Commission did not see any conflict between protecting the interests of Maori, and promoting further European settlement. The idea behind the scheme was that settlers needed the security of long-term leases to encourage them to put their capital and labour into the land to improve it and make it more productive. This system served the Government's purposes admirably. It delivered sections of land that could be leased to settlers to be put in 'productive' use, and fulfilled the aim of dispossessing Maori from their land in Taranaki and thus encouraging the 'culturing' of Maori and the Taranaki landscape. Also the value of the land would increase due to the improvements and thus the Maori 'owners' would receive long-term benefit. I would argue the scheme was devised more to provide more farming land for settlers and had less to do with Maori needs or justice. Leases were bought and sold at prices almost as high as for freehold except that this value was never reflected in the rents that the Maori owners received.

The scheme operated through the reserves being managed by the Public Trustee, who would allocate to Maori such land as was thought necessary for their own needs and lease the balance to Europeans generally on perpetual terms, with rents reviewed every 21 years (Te Puni Kokiri, Ministry of Maori Development, 1993). The land was thus taken out of the hands of Maori, and had the effect of creating a reliance on rents. The rents were always low, especially with the 21 and in some cases 30 year rent reviews. The rents were often low at the beginning of the rent period, but near the end with inflation and rising land prices, the real returns from the rents were eroded. Further legislation changed the lease terms and the way the rents were calculated, resulting in terms even less favourable to Maori over time. Consent was never given by Maori for the scheme to be set up. Maori, though the nominal 'owners', were reduced to respondents to Government initiatives.

I have conceptualised the perpetual lease scheme as a relic of the colonial period. It is a system of land tenure that was constituted during a time of conflict between Maori and the settlers, as a way of promoting further settlement and breaking down the autonomy of Maori in Taranaki. The scheme originated out of a discursive context in which Maori were constructed as 'needing' help to become 'civilised'. The Maori communal land tenure system was constructed as being a barrier to the 'progress' of Maori. Thus the perpetual lease scheme served to break the link
between Maori and their land, and advance the ability of Maori to be assimilated into settler society. The furthering of colonisation and the helping of Maori were deemed by the Government to be best achieved through individualisation of Maori land title and schemes like the perpetual lease scheme (which further individualised title by calculating rents on an individual basis).

Underpinning these notions are attitudes towards the ability of Maori to manage their own resources. The Public Trustee, the body that was entrusted with managing the reserved land, stated that a Maori was not “as a rule ... qualified to be a successful occupant of a highly improved farm” (cited in Waitangi Tribunal, 1996:265). This statement sums up the arrogant and paternalistic attitude shown towards Maori. As I discussed earlier, Maori are constructed as belonging to the past, and unable to adapt to the present without abandoning their culture to ‘civilisation’. In this discursive context it was in the best interest of Maori that their land be taken for European settlement, to avoid the separateness of the two peoples. Assimilation or extermination were the only options Maori were considered having.

Given this context the following figures are not surprising. Initially, the reserves returned by the West Coast Commission totalled 214,675 acres. Under the management of the Public Trustee, by 1912, 138,510 acres had been leased to settlers, most on perpetually renewable terms and only 24,800 acres were farmed by Maori. The remainder was sold to the Crown, most of that being on-sold to lessees. In 1976, about 25 percent of the reserved land, being the whole of the leased land remaining, was passed to Maori management through the PKW Incorporation (a Government agency set up to manage all Taranaki reserved land as a single estate). Less than 5%, around 10,000 acres, is owned by Maori people today as Maori freehold land in Taranaki (Waitangi Tribunal, 1996).

These figures demonstrate that the process of land alienation has never stopped. The perpetual lease scheme has been perpetuated by more recent pieces of legislation. The Maori Reserved Land Act 1955 and The Maori Affairs Amendment Act 1967 have served to reinforce rather than change the system. Government Commissions during the 1970s accepted that a problem existed and that the Maori owners have been unfairly treated by the scheme (Te Puni Kokiri, Ministry of Maori Development, 1993). In 1991 a Review Team began the process of reforming the system to make it fairer. In 1994 a set of proposals were released for public
Figure 9: Maori reserve perpetual leases
consultation. A move to market rentals with seven year rent reviews was proposed, abandoning the perpetual leases that exist currently. The Maori owners have first right of refusal to purchase the improvements of the land from the lessees, and the lessees have the first right of refusal to purchase the land from the owners if offered for sale. Compensation of between 1.85% and 2.9% of the unimproved value of the land will be paid to lessees as compensation for the loss of perpetual right of renewal.

Figure 10: Maori land in 1884 when the second West Coast Commission recommended the reserves that were to be set aside.

Figure 11: Maori land in 1996. This only includes land in Maori control and therefore excludes the land on perpetual lease. The extent of land loss since 1884 is almost total due to reserves being promised but never surveyed, reserves sold or leased, and the fragmentation of title due to individualisation of Maori land title.

This study has been based on the idea that an historical approach is crucial in gaining a fuller understanding of the present. By using the concepts of discourse, social construction, rhetoric and hegemony, I have approached the subject of the history of colonial Taranaki in a different way by focusing on how ideas shape reality. My argument is that a reality was shaped for the settlers through an episteme, in which a set of colonial discourses shaped the meanings and understanding of their environment. By de-constructing the hegemonic history in this way, I have attempted to re-construct an historical narrative of colonial Taranaki in a way that is informed by a critical approach that is sensitive to the asymmetrical power relations. In this chapter I want to argue that the dualisms I have been discussing have re-produced patterns of domination in the setting of colonial Taranaki and continue to do so in present-day New Zealand society.

The value of the concept of discourse is that it avoids the question of ideas justifying actions in an overly simplistic way. It instead posits that a discursive framework exists, and that certain notions are constructed as common-sense, natural and righteous, in that context. To say that the settlers knowingly enacted legislation that would benefit them is too deterministic. While arguably it was in their best interests to reinforce ideas about the inability of Maori to use land 'productively' and to help Maori achieve a state of 'civilisation', thus justifying the need for settler paternalism towards Maori, I believe this is overly simplistic. Instead the discursive framework that I have been discussing, based on a set of key dualisms, meant that those ideas seemed 'just' and 'natural'. Certainly they benefited from those ideas becoming naturalised, but a simple cause and effect relationship does not exist. Wealth was generated for the settlers by the manifestations of these hegemonic constructions but a person's reality is constructed through the intersection of many processes of which almost all are beyond the control of individuals. Once these social constructions become hegemonic, they can be drawn on in rhetoric and narratives to naturalise, explain, and maintain, the status quo.
This settler 'reality' constructed Maori and the landscape in certain ways that had profound implications for the history of colonial Taranaki. Maori were constructed as 'savages' who lacked 'civilisation', and the land was deemed to be 'wasted' and 'chaotic' left in their hands. I have argued that this provided a context where it was considered unquestionably in the interests of all, including Maori, for colonisation to continue. European superiority, both military and racial, had to be asserted for land sales and prosperity to continue. Thus reserves for Maori were often promised but rarely set out on the ground, and much of the reserved land that was demarcated was held on behalf of Maori by the Public Trustee through the perpetual lease scheme. Though this seems paternalistic and arrogant in today's context, in the discursive framework I have described, it was 'natural' and righteous.

However, this sort of discourse is not confined to last century. Maori are still accused of being not 'authentic Maori' if they display characteristics that do not fit within the hegemonic parameters of the Other. 'Maori' culture is still constructed as traditional and unchanging, and any sign of change is seen as cultural inauthenticity. To be 'Maori' is to be un-modern and retrogressive, the opposite to how Pakeha construct themselves. The 'colonial' dualistic notion of identity is still very pervasive. From The Daily News is a classic example of a person articulating with 'colonial' discourses of 'race' and difference. 'Authentic' Maori culture is constructed as 'backward', 'traditional' and static, as opposed to that of Pakeha which is constructed as progressive and superior:

"I sincerely trust that when Mr Nuku travels to the court that he does so using traditional Maori mode of travel using Maori 'roads'... I feel that should Housing New Zealand agree that its houses are, in fact, on Maori land - which I doubt - they will no doubt be happy to remove the houses and all other service connections from this land and let the hapu get on with it" (The Daily News, 'Hope Nuku shuns all things Pakeha', 1996).

Similarly when traditional 'Maori' culture is commodified for the tourist industry, it is based on similar discursive constructs. The plastic tikis, and small dolls of Maori women dressed in grass skirts, represent this idealised and traditional construction of 'authentic' Maori culture. Throughout New Zealand's colonial history, 'savages' have
been constructed as belonging to the past, incompatible with modernity and thus justifying appropriation. The only contexts in which Maori culture tends to be celebrated, are museums and the tourist industry, both of which serve to further inscribe Maori culture to the past, rather than to illuminate their position in the present.

Clearly, the historical colonial discourses are not historical in some senses. They are still pervasive and still structure many peoples' understandings of their reality in present-day New Zealand. I would argue that the public perception of communal Maori land is still that it is 'unproductive', 'traditional', and a haven for criminals. This perception is no different from that of Parihaka in the 1880s. The same dualistic assumptions underpin both.

To what extent is the present-day landscape in Taranaki post-colonial? The landscape that was re-shaped by the settlers was clearly colonial. Through a process of land alienation, the settlers were able to fulfil the discursive imperative of colonising the landscape, and leading the Maori towards 'civilisation'. By the 1930s, the resulting landscape of Taranaki, dominated by farmlands and small rural service towns, each with its own dairy factory, was clearly inscribed. The Maori pre-settler geography became overwhelmed by a settler colonial geography. Now in the 1990s, the geography has changed once more. The farming industry has changed, and the small dairy factories have closed and the co-operative diary companies have merged, replaced by a single company with a single factory. The dairy industry still dominates the local economy, but other industries, especially those based around the energy industry have diversified the Taranaki economy. Many of the smaller towns have withered with most of their functions having been centralised in larger provincial towns. Yet the pastoral landscape still looks substantially the same as it did in the 1930s with its grassy paddocks, hedgerows and fences.

The farming land is almost totally owned by Pakeha, with only a small fraction owned by Maori in freehold. The majority of Maori land in Taranaki is held in perpetual leases and farmed by Pakeha farmers. The legislation that dispossessed Maori of their land was set up between 1865 and 1892, and provided the promised reserves for Maori, but only in the form of the perpetual lease system. Amendments to the perpetual lease scheme continued in to this century, most of them making the leases more favourable to the tenant farmers, not the Maori 'owners'. The Maori Reserved

I believe the present-day Taranaki landscape is still colonial in the sense that it is based on the 'solutions' found last century. Maori have never been sufficiently compensated for the confiscation of land last century. The compensation procedures that were set up, have served to further dispossess Maori of their land and sovereignty. Maori tribal authority is weak and fragmented due to the success of these measures.

For a post-colonial New Zealand to exist, Maori would need to have their customary relationships to land recognised in law, and their rights to language and culture protected. The Treaty of Waitangi needs to be given its full status as the founding document of the state of New Zealand. The Treaty of Waitangi and the draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples provide useful starting points for de-colonisation. The Maori Affairs Amendment Act 1974 was the first piece of legislation that was aimed at keeping Maori land in Maori control (Waitangi Tribunal, 1996). All prior policy, despite its ostensible purpose, was directed towards the alienation of Maori land. The Waitangi Tribunal and the Maori Land Act 1993, also represent possible beginnings in the decolonisation of New Zealand society because to a greater extent they recognise and adopt customary Maori ideas towards land and tribal authority when dealing with Maori issues.

What would a post-colonial landscape in Taranaki look like? I would like to briefly sketch an outline of what a post-colonial landscape in Taranaki might look like. Firstly, the perpetual lease scheme would need to be reformed to allow the Maori 'owners' to exercise their rights of ownership. The ability to determine whether the land should be rented, and the terms of that rent, is one of those rights. The perpetual lease scheme is the spatial expression of the colonial discourses I have been discussing. The aim of the reserves was never to allow Maori culture to thrive, but to encourage change in the direction considered most desirable by the settler Government. Maori culture as it was constructed by the settlers was not worth saving. It was constructed as 'backward', 'primitive', and lacking. An assimilationist model was adopted that made assumptions about 'progress' and 'civilisation', and that made the calculated dispossession of land, cultural destruction and genocide, seem
'righteous' and 'just'. Maori not only lost their resource base, but also their ability to control their own destiny.

Clearly compensation issues for farmers needs to be resolved, and in such a way that does not create further injustice. The leased land need to be in the control of Maori, within a legislative and resource management framework that is sensitive to Maori 'needs'. These 'needs' should be defined through consultation and partnership, rather than the paternalism that has dominated the relationship between Maori and the Government to this point.

The resolution of this situation is going to be very complex with numerous interest groups and issues. The resolution of the issue is not my purpose per se. My concern is what this issue says about the state of New Zealand society, and to what extent New Zealand has moved from being colonial to post-colonial. The issues from the Maori owners' point of view are threefold. Firstly, Maori in Taranaki have never been adequately consulted regarding the leased land issue. Decisions have been made on their half by paternalistic Governments, and until recently, land was sold to tenants without the consent of all the landowners. The Public Trustee and more recently Parininihi Ki Waitotara have ignored the communal land customs with its spiritual as well as economic and political connections, and sold land as a commodity.

Secondly, the land belongs to Maori yet they are not able to exercise the usual rights of ownership. Under the current law many of the owners will never be able to occupy their land again because the tenants can continue to renew their leases for as long as they like. The ownership has effectively been a 'shadow' or nominal ownership.

Thirdly, the lease terms have been inappropriate and the rents have not reflected the market value of the land. The rent formula originally set may have been fair at the time, however as the value of the land went up, the real return on the leases went down. Rents have been calculated on the unimproved value of the land, with the improvements (the farming infrastructure) owned by the tenants. The perpetual nature of the leases have meant the owners have never been able to change the lease structure to increase the benefits to them. Short of buying the leases themselves (and thus the improvements on the land), the Maori owners were hamstrung by the system.

Many of the tenants have held leases for several generations and have developed strong emotional ties to the land they farm. Also long term planning has
been done based on the current lease arrangements. If these arrangements are changed, or if the value of the improvements drops significantly due to uncertainty regarding the leases, incomes and lifestyles are threatened. Many farmers (as indicated by the 'Letters to the Editor' section in The Daily News) feel also that the leases are legal contracts guaranteeing them the use of the land for as long as they wished. Many paid near freehold prices as the arrangement was almost as good as ownership. If the Crown now breaks these legal contracts, compensation should be paid to the tenants to ensure they suffer no personal loss.

All parties seem to agree that there has been an injustice with the confiscation of Maori land, and the perpetual lease scheme. However the debates start over the resolution of this issue. Currently the farmers pay rental on the unimproved value of the land with them owning the farming infrastructure on the land. In many cases the unimproved value of the land is matched or even exceeded by the value of the infrastructure. The farmers, through the West Coast Settlement Reserves Lessees' Association, have argued that in ending the perpetual lease, they should either have first option to buy the land, or to be compensated for the value of the infrastructure that cannot be removed from the land. The compensation proposed by the Government is between 1.85% - 2.90% of the unimproved value of the land, regardless of the value of the infrastructure. The dispute is therefore between the Government and the farmers over compensation, and between the Government and hapu over control of the land.

The discourses I discussed earlier are clearly implicated in shaping the way all issues relating to Maori land have been viewed in nineteenth century Taranaki. They bounded the debate, and set parameters in which 'solutions' were able to be found. The sense of duty felt by the settlers towards transforming the landscape and 'civilising' the Maori meant that the debate in Parliament and within settler society was about means. I argue that it is this discursive context that provides the background for understanding the actions of the settler Government. Leaving large amounts of land in the hands of Maori was not seen as an option because it left tribal authority intact, and did not promote the 'civilisation' of Maori. In this context, there was no question that land was needed for European settlement, and clearly the Maori possessed all of the land in Taranaki.
The Treaty Of Waitangi never seemed to feature in the thinking of the settler Government, they essentially had a free hand to do what they wanted. War was blundered into by the settler Government with legislation passed in anticipation of war, indicating that the Government's intentions were towards the forceful imposition of the rule of law. Land was the key to both prosperity for settlers, and for the Government imposing authority over Maori. The Waitara dealings seemed to have been aimed at asserting that authority and undermining Wiremu Kingi's authority. Subsequent legislation that individualised land titles, excluded absentees from compensation proceedings, the declaration of Maori as 'rebels', the buying of land from individuals rather than hapu, legislation favouring certain types of land-use over others (e.g. Waste Lands Acts enacted from the 1850s), and ignoring customs when deciding issues relating to Maori. All were directed towards challenging tribal forms of authority, and substituting a new authority. These moves all aided in achieving both aims of the colonising imperative.

The Compensation Court, West Coast Commissions, and the Native Land Court, all contributed to the process of land alienation, even though they existed ostensibly for the benefit of Maori. The numerous commissions and inquiries set up to look into either the confiscations, compensation procedures, or the reserved land issue, have generally been critical of Government policy, yet have served to further perpetuate the injustices. They have been more about the easing of consciences and cleaning the slate by acknowledging past injustices, rather than real changes in Government policy. Compensation became part of the strategy of imposing the settlers' objectives. The priority was to secure land for European settlement. All of the legislation had this intention in mind, despite the ostensible purpose of the establishment and maintenance of peace. Punishment for offences was never cited as a reason for confiscation, it was always merely to 'promote peace'. The Government, under pressure from settlers for more land, and keen to assert their authority over Maori, perceived taking land from Maori as a way of doing both (Riseborough, 1989). The taking of Maori land for European settlement became a solution to the 'Native problem'.

Another indicator of a shift towards post-coloniality would be placenames. I have argued placenames are indicative of the dominance of a group in a society, and can
therefore be one way in which the 'hidden' Maori geography can be expressed. For example the mountain is now named both Mt. Taranaki and Mt. Egmont. This recognises the contested history of Taranaki, and that names are one way through which this contestation takes its form. By renaming places, it challenges the totality of appropriation, the hegemony of the status quo, in that it illustrates that there is a multiplicity of histories, and a multiplicity of geographies. Through further debates over the naming of sites of significance to Maori, this challenging can continue. Contestation can begin with small instances like over place-names, but can soon extend over much wider terrain. Linked to place-names are representations of the past, and the present uses and appropriation of territory by the hegemonic groups (Shurmer-Smith and Hannam, 1994). So in Taranaki this contestation has already led to debate over the future of the perpetual lease of Maori reserved land and this process will continue further to question the legitimacy of other aspects of the status quo.

The social constructions from colonial discourses need to be challenged to move towards a post-colonial society. Multiplicity, and diversity, would replace totality and homogeneity in how we construct identity and difference. The signs and sites of resistance that have always existed in Taranaki need to be emphasised and given further expression. As Devalle (1992) states, these signs are more subtle than the reality of oppression. It is my aim to make a contribution to illuminating the oppression, and furthering the expression of resistance.

NEW ZEALAND - A POST-COLONIAL SOCIETY?

New Zealand is still a colonial society. In 1840 Governor Hobson stated that 'we are one people'. This became the founding myth of an emergent state, yet it signalled the beginning of the invisibility of Maori, not power-sharing and respect for
each other (Pearson, 1984). That is not to say that changes are not being made and progress achieved. Momentum is building but there is a long way to go. I say this based on a number of indicators. Over the next few decades the issue of Pakeha ethnicity will come to the fore. What does it mean to be a Pakeha in the New Zealand of the late twentieth century? I believe that for the settlers identity was less of an issue. Settler identity was defined in opposition to their construction of Maori. They saw themselves as everything that the Maori were not. They constructed themselves as 'civilised', and progressive, as opposed to Maori who were 'savage' and 'backward'. Identity was therefore defined through characteristics rather than ethnicity. Berg and Kearns (1996:116) argue that “Pakeha culture is often invisible, taken for granted as the norm, progress, modernity, a time and place from which Maori culture is seen to deviate. As 'heritage', Maori culture is unchanging tradition, referring back to the past rather than ahead to the future”.

Similarly for the Pakeha of today, there is no single shared ancestry or ethnicity that distinguishes them. Diversity is more of a feature than homogeneity. Spoonley (1988) calls Pakeha identity a minus-one definition. This means that for the dominant groups of society, ethnicity is constructed as what other groups have Maori, peoples from Asia and the Pacific Islands, they are constructed as have an ethnicity, a culture. In this conception Pakeha only have an identity based on an opposition to other 'ethnic' groups. However Pakeha do have an identity, it is just shrouded in myth and hegemonic notions of New Zealand's colonial history. Pakeha identity is based on the hegemonic construction of New Zealand history. The settlers glorified and romanticised as pioneers, who brought 'progress', Christianity and capitalism to an otherwise static and traditional country. Pakeha identity is so submerged within nationalistic ideas about New Zealand's heroic colonial past, that it is not perceived by most Pakeha to be based on a distinctive culture. It just exists! Celebrated, unchallenged, unidentified, hidden by its own assumption of existence.

Pakeha identity has always been defined as that which it is not. Just like the settlers, identity is defined in relation to something else. Spoonley (1991:153) argues that "Pakeha live their culture without having to think about it. Others are much more conscious of what makes Pakeha different". All identities are based on cultural creation, they are all constructed. While they may be based on different things: ethnicity, shared histories, language, they are all equally constructions of society.
Pakeha culture is based on history. The key uniting factor is the hegemonic history of New Zealand. That the European settlement of New Zealand was essentially benevolent and beneficial to Maori, and that Maori have been treated well, is central to the identity of Pakeha. Berg and Kearns (1996:115) in their discussion of a debate over placenames, cite a submission that celebrates Pakeha “who have helped to make New Zealand what it is”. The past is what defines Pakeha today through the discursive politics of contemporary New Zealand.

Decolonisation is therefore not something that just Maori do, it involves both Maori and Pakeha. Pakeha have also been colonised in the sense that they are constructed as a homogenous group with a single history. Pakeha identity, and New Zealand’s history, needs to be challenged and questioned critically. Spoonley (1988) argues that some Pakeha groups are minorities also. Differences in Pakeha society based on gender, class, ethnicity, sexuality, locality, are all important. So the label Pakeha is oppressive in the sense that it constructs and perpetuates ideas about what it means to be ‘Pakeha’. The category of ‘Pakeha’ excludes many people due to the singular nature of the definition. However the label ‘Pakeha’ can be challenged in this way also. By emphasising diversity, the category can be destabilised, opening up spaces for a fuller debate on the politics of being ‘Pakeha’. The dichotomous thinking of ‘us’ and ‘them’ identity, that has structured ethnic relations throughout the colonial period and continues to this day, needs to be challenged if any progress is to made towards achieving a post-colonial New Zealand. Young (1990) argues that instead of focusing on distribution, a conception of justice should instead begin with the concepts of domination and oppression. This has been the aim of this thesis. To illuminate and challenge the hegemonic subject position and the way it structures our understandings of New Zealand society, in both the past and the present.

One way of challenging the status quo is through identifying the weaknesses of the hegemonic subject position. As I discussed earlier, naming can be part of a process of appropriation of land and the subsequent legitimisation of a spatial politics. However the sanctity of placenames can also be challenged to open up the possibility of attacking the hegemony of the spatial politics. Many names are not as immutable as is generally thought. This can be clearly demonstrated through looking at the historical record. For example the North and South Islands are the dominant names given to the two main islands of New Zealand. However during the colonial period they
have also been called New Ulster and New Munster, the Northern Island and the Middle Island (with Stewart Island being the South Island), as well as the Maori names Te Ika a Maui and Te Wai Pounamu. So the current names are the latest in a line of names, and far from being the only names. There is a seemingly indestructible inertia with these sorts of 'historical names'. The names are part of the hegemonic history of New Zealand and they serve to reproduce the universality of hegemonic relations.

A Taranaki example relates to the mountain. Seffern (1896) describes how some Maori called it Pukehaupapa, though generally it is known by Maori as Taranaki. James Cook erased the Maori names and named it in 1770 Mount Egmont after a contemporary British figure. Marion du Fresne named it in 1772 Le pic de Mascarine after his ship. Due to British hegemony the British name has stood. But this shows how names are less stable than is generally thought. If we accept that "names are part of both a symbolic and a material order that provides normality and legitimacy to those who dominate the politics of (place) representation" (Berg and Kearns, 1996:99), then by challenging the immutability of place-names, the hegemony and meanings attached to places can also be challenged.

The debate surrounding the voyage of the replica of James Cook's ship, Endeavour, is interesting in what it tells us about New Zealand society. The aim of the project was as a celebration of the 'discovery' and settlement of Australia and New Zealand. The importance of this issue is based on the contestation of meaning. In the hegemonic history Cook was a heroic figure who laid part of the foundation of the creation of New Zealand. This history is based on a romanticised, sanitised version of events which ignores the unsavoury side of the colonisation of New Zealand. That numerous Maori were killed by Cook's crew, and that the Endeavour is a symbol of oppression for some Maori seemed to have been forgotten in the 'celebration'. Clearly for many Maori the Endeavour has very different meanings, and only through protest were these meanings able to get expression. That is not to say that the voyages of the Endeavour should not be celebrated, because they are a crucial event in New Zealand's history. The point is that meaning and history are still constructed as universal. Berg and Kearns (1996:117) states that "the specific interests of a hegemonic Pakeha masculinity are asserted as universal national interests applicable to all New Zealanders. In this sense, Pakeha masculinity becomes the norm by which all Others are measured". There is more than one history, and more sensitivity is
needed regarding the different meanings that exist. The way this issue was handled indicates that Pakeha society has still not come to grips with its ambiguous place in history, and that a single history that celebrates the settlers' achievements is hegemonic, but not universal. Clearly the thinking has not shifted substantially from the colonial period.

The paradox is that because Pakeha identity is so intimately linked to the hegemonic construction of history, that as that history is being challenged by Pakeha revisionist historians and a new wave of Maori academics, notions of what it means to be Pakeha cannot help but be challenged also. By rewriting New Zealand history, we are rewriting Pakeha identity. Other histories, previously 'hidden' beneath the apparent exhaustiveness and totality of the hegemonic history are now beginning to be expressed. Histories of settler women, homosexual settlers, Maori tribal histories, histories about settlers from different backgrounds, and the urban frontier, are all getting expression. This serves to challenge the immutability of the dichotomous thinking so dominant in New Zealand's colonial history. It breaks out of the old categories of 'settler' and 'Maori' by showing that these categories are not simple homogenous entities.

In this study I argue that settler identity is based on a set of constructions about 'us' and 'them', Self and Other. These categories structured the relations between these two groups in colonial Taranaki and still structures many people's understandings today. Until the political affects of this dichotomous notion of identity are engaged with, this cannot be changed.

Maori lack of achievement in present-day New Zealand society is a fact. The history I have described is not an excuse or a justification for it, but it does provide the context in which it is happening. The two are clearly connected. Also this situation is not unique to New Zealand. In settler societies like New Zealand, indigenous peoples all over the world are over-represented in poverty statistics and are generally at the bottom of the socio-economic scale. Australian Aborigines, Native American Indians of North and South America, indigenous African groups in South Africa, are all struggling to succeed in industrialised market economies (see Bodley (1990) for a fuller discussion on this point). Berg (1993) comments that under the liberal ideology that has been dominant in most of the Western world since the Second World War, 'social' problems are reconstituted as 'personal' problems. This ideology based on
individualism and personal freedom, hides the structural inequality that is created through historical processes like the one I have described in Taranaki.

By challenging the 'naturalness' of the dualistic assumptions that I argue have been very powerful in shaping Taranaki history, we can begin to break out of the dichotomous notions of identity. We can also begin to discuss the politics of difference, and the politics associated with constructing identity. Jackson and Penrose (1993) argue that it is the apparent 'naturalness' and immutability of ideological constructs, that enables them to operate so effectively. So by exposing their constructedness and the specificity of their origins, the political aspect can be revealed and engaged with.

There are a multiplicity of dimensions to identity. What is needed is room for them to be identified and allowed to flourish in a new cultural politics of difference that recognises the importance of place and change in identity politics. If this happens, issues like the reserved land debate can be resolved in ways that are inclusive rather than exclusive. Post-coloniality can become a reality in this country through the development of these and other ideas. I believe it is crucial for the future of harmonious relations in New Zealand that this happens.


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