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**THE QUEST FOR RESPONSIVENESS:  
MAORI POLICY ADVISERS AND THE STATE**

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment for the  
Degree of Master of Arts

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February 1992

## Abstract

This thesis examines the relationship between Maori and the state. In the last quarter of a century, Maori have sought to recover their economic resources and revive their political structures. Gaining access to both the resources and the power of the state have been increasingly seen as important ways in which Maori can do this. This thesis has focused in particular, on Maori policy advisers within the state sector. Through a set of semi-structured interviews Maori policy advisers' views of the state, their role within it and their practices have been explored. The Maori advisers participating in this study maintained a strong relationship to Maori groups outside of the state and a commitment to kaupapa Maori. The tensions this raised and the practices that were used to address those are a central part of this thesis.

## Acknowledgements

Many people have contributed to the development of this thesis over the last two years. Within the Sociology department I would like to express my thanks in particular to the following people. My supervisors, Associate Professors. Paul Spoonley and Andrew Trlin, through their involvement and the supervision they have provided over this period have both contributed to the production of this thesis. Paul's interest and confidence in my ability to undertake this research has always been appreciated while Andrew's support, encouragement and commitment to my research has been invaluable over the last twelve months. I would also like to thank Professor Greg McLennan, for his assistance which allowed me to complete this thesis within the required time period.

Chris Wilkes and Brian Ponter have also encouraged me to pursue this research and always were willing to discuss issues and contribute ideas. My sincere thanks to you both. Paul Green kindly took on my teaching responsibilities when my research commitments clashed with my classes and to him I am also very grateful. I would like to express my sincere thanks to Matthew Ratumaitavuki for his friendship and encouragement over the last two years.

The following friends have also kindly read and commented on various drafts of this thesis, and contributed to its final presentation. I thank you all. Rod Morine and Nicky Champion have always been supportive of me and maintained a constant interest in this research project. Wiebe Zwaga and Carol Slappendel also have been supportive and encouraging over this period. Anne Marie O'Neill has been a good friend over the last few years, while Sharon Priest has also provided me with sound advice and friendship since I entered the Masters programme. Please accept my warmest thanks.

I also want to especially thank Gaye Payze who has been a source of constant friendship and encouragement over the whole period of this thesis, particularly during the last few difficult months.

My flatmates have also had to bear the burden of my highs and lows over a two year period. To Teri Ranginui-Marks, Roger Thomas and Judy Eliassen thank you all for your tolerance and friendship. My special thanks to Roger for making the science of word processing intelligible to a sociologist and for his skills with the Macintosh, which have been put to excellent effect in the production of this thesis.

To Bev James and Kay Saville-Smith, who have always encouraged me to pursue this topic from its inception, I offer my sincere thanks. As good sociologists, Kay and Bev have always challenged me to extend my analysis, to read widely and to discuss my ideas. They also taught me to appreciate the value of fieldwork in doing sociological research. Their friendship support and expertise throughout the research has contributed to my development as a sociologist. I thank you both.

Finally to those Maori and Pakeha advisers who participated in this study I offer my sincere thanks. Many advisers gave up their valuable time to allow me to interview them and these interviews contributed not only to this thesis but to my own understandings of the state and kaupapa Maori. I thank you all for your contribution.

With so many people who have supported and encouraged me I must however take sole responsibility for any of the flaws or inconsistencies contained in this thesis.

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# Chapter One

## Introduction

In the last quarter of a century, the state's relationship with Maori has undergone an important transformation as Maori have attempted to re-negotiate their access to economic resources and political decision-making. The upsurge of Maori political activity has been frequently characterised as a Maori cultural and political renaissance or a Maori political resurgence. Many of its aspects have been the subject of sociological and historical investigation over recent years (Greenland, 1984; Pearson, 1988; 1990; Spoonley, 1989; Walker, 1987; 1989; 1990). This thesis has arisen out of that tradition, but it departs from it somewhat in the sense that it focuses specifically on the relationship between Maori and the state rather than the Maori political renaissance. Nor, unlike Kelsey (1990) or Sharp (1990a), does this thesis focus on the constitutional debates over Maori sovereignty and the Treaty of Waitangi. Rather, it addresses the position, practices and understandings of Maori policy advisers within the state. This does not suggest that either the nature and the causes of the Maori political renaissance, or the Treaty of Waitangi are irrelevant. On the contrary, the Treaty of Waitangi transforms the Maori political renaissance from being one social movement among many into something the state cannot ignore.

Sissons (1990) argues that the Maori political renaissance is simply a social movement like a variety of other movements in New Zealand such as the women's liberation and environmental movements. Like those movements, he argues, the recent Maori resurgence has focused on a political mobilisation which began in the early 1970s under the influence of similar movements overseas (Sissons, 1990:1). What Sissons fails to recognise, however, is that unlike the women's liberation and

environmental movements, Maori politicisation has been sustained and anchored in a unique constitutional claim in the Treaty of Waitangi. The Treaty has been a potent instrument in driving the state towards accepting Maori policy as a substantive area of policy development during the last decade. The recognition of Maori policy as one effect of this, has facilitated the entry of Maori into the higher occupational levels of the state bureaucracy as policy advisers.

This thesis explores the relationship between Maori and the state by focusing on the place, perceptions and activities of Maori policy advisers who are at the nexus of the relationship between Maori and the state. More specifically, it examines Maori policy advisers working in the state sector. Maori policy advisers are not only a new presence within the state sector, they are also an important locus in relations between iwi or Maori interests and the state. In many departments, they are still absent while in other departments Maori policy advice has been a recent introduction. Do Maori policy advisers represent a Maori intervention within the state? What relationship do they have with Maori outside the state? What is it about Maori policy advisers that makes them a unique group within the state? What difficulties do they encounter? What is it about Maori policy advisers which suggests they can illustrate an aspect of this unfolding relationship?

The expansion of Maori policy positions in the state reflects the Maori desire to ensure that state legislation and policy be consistent with the principles of the Treaty. It also reflects the state's need for Maori expertise in its attempts to deal with Maori claims for the devolution of state resources for iwi and the more responsive delivery of state services to Maori users. It is they who mediate, and advocate (some would argue they fail to advocate), Maori interests within the state. Obviously, a study of Maori policy advisers raises a number of questions, in particular about the relationship between the effect of the Maori political renaissance as a social movement and the way in which Maori attempt to use the state as a vehicle for obtaining the wider goals of the Maori political renaissance.

Maori policy advisers have become a particularly important presence within the state in the last three years, especially since the adoption in the state sector of Te Urupare Rangapu. To date, Te Urupare Rangapu

has been the most significant undertaking by the state, in recognition of its obligations under the Treaty of Waitangi. The desire of Maori for the creation of a responsive and bicultural state sector reflects Maori dissatisfaction with the way in which the state has historically marginalised their economic and political institutions and created the high levels of Maori dependency on the state. It is within this context that Maori policy advisers have emerged and sought to work into the state a Maori kaupapa.

The state in New Zealand has always been a significant social and economic agent. For Maori, however, the state has rarely acted in their interests and instead has had the major role in divesting Maori of both their political institutions and economic base. The election of the Labour Government in 1984 was an important turning point in this relationship with the state. In a seven year period, Maori policy and issues relating to the Treaty of Waitangi not only attained prominence, but also reflected a vigour on the part of Maori groups to reassert their mana Maori motuhake through the state.

This thesis arises out of my attempts to understand these changes and the ways in which the state can be used by groups in society to effect change. Particularly since the mid-1980s, the dialogue between the state and Maori has appeared to increase and has produced a number of significant policy developments. My interest in this process arises from issues that emerged with the implementation of a major Maori policy initiative in the government department where I was formerly employed in the mid-1980s. The main issue, in particular, was whether the state could be representative of Maori interests. The acceptance within the state that the Treaty of Waitangi is the basis for the development of Maori policy has been one of the most important outcomes of this dialogue. Not only is this an issue of importance which effects both Maori and Pakeha in New Zealand, but it also is of particular importance to sociologists. A study of certain aspects of this development between Maori and the state may provide a greater understanding of the nature of the state and its role within New Zealand society. Because Maori policy advisers are at the forefront of developing Maori policy within the state, they were selected to be the focus of this study. Their role within the

state sector in advising, developing and implementing policy was seen to be both important and also, as this study shows, significantly innovative.

Accordingly, this thesis examines the perceptions and understandings that Maori advisers have of the state and their potential to facilitate state sector responsiveness to Maori needs. The study is based largely on discussions held with Maori advisers in the state sector in 1991, between the end of May and early August.

### **The Aims of the Study**

This study attempts to demonstrate that Maori advisers as a group are important in shaping a new relationship between Maori and the state, and that they actively pursue kaupapa Maori within the state. The investigation brings into sharp focus the importance of sociological theorising, in particular those theories which attempt to explain why social groups either do, or do not attempt, to use the state to effect societal change. This thesis does not adopt a single theoretical perspective from which to best explain the position or the functions of Maori policy advisers. Many sociological traditions, which focus on different aspects of the state have extended our understanding of the state in society. This study draws on a number of these different theories to broadly explain Maori engagement with the state. These include pluralist theories, instrumentalist and elite theories of the state, neo-marxist theories and organisational theory. All of these theories can, to some extent, illustrate the relationship between Maori advisers and the state and thus make a contribution to understanding the role and practices of Maori policy advisers. They also draw attention to particular problems that Maori policy advisers encounter within the state. However, as this thesis argues, some of these theories provide a more convincing explanation of the role of Maori policy advisers within the state. Therefore, this study of Maori policy advisers and the state addresses important sociological questions about the role of the state in society and the way in which different groups attempt to use it as a vehicle for social and political change.

This study also attempts to be of some relevance to Maori people, particularly those who are involved in policy development within the state sector. It does not simply describe the practices of Maori policy advisers but also outlines how they make sense of the state and develop strategies from which to pursue kaupapa Maori within the state. The differences between the practices of the Maori advisers, and their Pakeha counterparts<sup>1</sup> which are discussed in this study, also provide an important contrast between the two groups of policy advisers and highlight the tensions that Maori policy advisers experience working in the state sector. This study thus seeks to extend Maori understandings of the state as being a set of institutions which may, under certain conditions, be used to effect social and political change. Not only does it provide an account of the practices that Maori policy advisers adopt within state sector organisations but it may also provide a basis for the further development of such practices across the state sector. In these ways, this study seeks to contribute to a growing and important body of Maori research on the state.

### **The Structure of the Thesis**

Chapter Two provides a brief historical overview of Maori engagement with the state over the last one hundred and fifty years. It includes both the role of the state in the creation of Maori dependency and some of the ways in which Maori have responded to the state over this period. This chapter also discusses the immediate events which have been responsible for the creation of Maori advisory positions within the state.

Chapter Three is a broad theoretical discussion of the state and the role of Maori advisers within it. In particular, it focuses on the four theoretical perspectives which are employed within the thesis. These are:- (a) the pluralist tradition, which emphasises the permeability between the state and social groups; (b) instrumentalist and elite theories, which view the state as acting in the interests of a dominant class or elite; (c) those semi-autonomous, or neo-marxist views of the state which see it as a contradictory formation; (d) and finally, organisational theories which

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<sup>1</sup> The Pakeha advisers in this study were also engaged in developing Maori policy.

tend to view the state as a complex set of organisations and thus focus on organisational relationships within the state sector.

The methodological issues involved in doing Maori research and the research methodology used are discussed in Chapter Four. Because of the political debates surrounding Maori research within sociology over the last decade, a substantial part of this discussion is given over to the importance of such issues in relation to this particular study. The chapter then moves from a discussion of methodological issues to one of methods employed in this study before concluding with an introduction to the Maori advisers who participated in this study.

Chapters Five and Six deal with an analysis of the Maori advisers in this study. These chapters discuss the Maori advisers' views of the state and their practice of Maori policy advice. In particular, these chapters discuss the various understandings that the Maori advisers had of the state and the practices which they adopted within the state. Where appropriate, attention is given in the discussion to the theoretical issues that were raised in the second chapter. Chapter Seven discusses the perceptions and practices of two Pakeha advisers who participated in the study and who were responsible for Maori policy in their state sector organisations.

Finally, the significant issues that have been raised throughout the discussion, both theoretical and methodological, are addressed in a concluding chapter. In particular, the practices which Maori policy advisers adopt within the state sector and their pursuit of policy goals are examined in relation to their understandings of the state. The theories of the state that have been discussed in the thesis are explored in relation to the practices and understandings of the Maori policy advisers.

## Chapter Two

### Maori Engagement with the State

This chapter focuses on the development of the new and complex relationship between Maori and the state by, firstly, examining the role of the state in determining the particular direction of Maori development in the post-war period. Secondly, it examines specifically the state response to Maori claims for state representation. In this context, Government refers to the elected body of representatives and Government policy refers to policy which is driven primarily through the goals of the government. The state refers to both elected government and the public sector bureaucracy.

#### The State and Maori Development

The state has had a critical role in directing Maori urbanisation and the incorporation of Maori into the secondary labour market that is the unskilled work-force<sup>1</sup>. Until the early 1950s, the Maori and Pakeha populations in New Zealand were geographically and socially separate.

There were in effect, two New Zealands; Pakeha New Zealand served and serviced by comprehensive systems of national and

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<sup>1</sup> Dual labour market theory (Barron and Norris, 1976) sees the labour market as being divided into two sections. A primary labour market, with well-paid skilled jobs, good conditions of work and opportunities for career advancement. The secondary labour market, in contrast, offers unskilled lower paid and less secure jobs with few prospects for career advancement (Pearson and Thoms, 1983:181).

local government administration; and Maori New Zealand largely ignored by both except when those systems wanted to appropriate something by way of land, income or manpower (King, as cited in Pearson, 1990:106).

The desire to appropriate land in particular attracted the state into a relationship with Maori from the beginning of the colonial period (Lian, 1990; Pearson, 1990:45-47). In the first instance, this involved the purchase of land, but attempts at purchase quickly descended into open warfare. After 1865, with the Native Lands Act, the appropriation of land developed into a process of systematic, enforced alienation of lands which continued until the late 1970s.

The legislative power of the state was central to the alienation of land. In addition to the Native Lands Act, the Suppression of Tohunga Act (1907) had the effect of undermining Maori cultural authority and the Public Works Act (1928) enabled the state to take Maori land for a wide range of purposes relating to the provision of public amenities. The last major legislative measure used by the state to further reduce Maori land holding was the Maori Affairs Amendment Act (1967) which gave Maori land owners the option to individualise their land titles or face confiscation (Kelsey, 1984:36).

The progressive loss of land left iwi with a depleted economic base. The effects of this were initially manifested in severe economic hardship during the Depression years but Maori unemployment and under-employment was to remain in the rural communities well after that time. Those conditions, combined with poor returns from marginal Maori land and acute Maori over-population (in relation to their natural resources), contributed to rapid urbanisation (Butterworth, 1967:18). As Pearson (1990:113) states:

Economic conditions and state policies over the 1930s and 1940s acted as a guiding hand that ushered Maori into an urban proletarian status.

Among the measures implemented by the state to facilitate Maori migration in this period were the Maori War Effort Organisation which recruited Maori labour for essential industries in the war years. The manufacturing boom that followed in the post-war period saw the

Department of Maori Affairs relocating Maori from economically retarded areas to the burgeoning urban centres in the early 1960s. Through that process of labour migration, and the urbanisation which it engendered, Maori political and social organisation was dramatically altered.

Whereas Maori had been a marginal proletariat prior to World War Two, in the boom years that followed the war, they were systematically incorporated into capitalist relations of production. This process affected not only those Maori who were already located within urban areas but also the wider Maori population that were still largely confined to the rural areas of New Zealand. However, according to Pearson (1990), this process can be explained with reference to both push and pull factors which affected the Maori population. Social and cultural change was also occurring within the rural Maori hinterlands where the Maori population historically had been concentrated. The rapid migration which occurred in the post-war period cannot be solely attributed to the high levels of Maori impoverishment which forced Maori off the land. The migration also reflected the relative raising of personal well being and aspirations among many Maori:

For (Maori) rural dwellers, particularly young people the urban scene offered possibilities of financial rewards as well as provoking thoughts of new freedoms. The elders and life around the marae provided secure guide-lines and the warmth of community, but such conditions could also be construed as unduly restrictive (Pearson, 1990:114).

However, one should not underestimate the effects of state legislation in relation to Maori urbanisation. The Manpower Act, for example in the early 1940s, was an early catalyst forcing many young Maori to leave papakainga or marae for towns or cities (Walker, 1990:197). As a result, by 1945 the number of Maori who were living in town areas had doubled since 1936 to account for nearly 20 percent of the total Maori population (Butterworth, 1967:31). Legislation drawing Maori into the towns was accompanied by legislation which made it difficult for many Maori to remain in the rural and traditional tribal areas. The 1953 Town and Country Planning Act also accelerated the process by placing major restrictions on the ability of Maori tribes to develop rural land for tribal housing or papakainga. The quality of Maori housing declined quickly and for many Maori, the only way to gain access to housing of a good

standard was to move to urban areas and get state rentals. By 1960, Maori urbanisation was occurring so rapidly that the Department of Maori Affairs was unable to provide the required levels of housing assistance. Consequently the State Advances Housing Division also began to target Maori (Trlin, 1977:111). From the late 1950s onwards Maori were increasingly becoming concentrated in state housing areas. This high level of Maori concentration in such areas was also an indication of growing Maori dependency on the state. According to Trlin (1977:124), such a degree of Maori over-representation in state housing reflected not only the immediate effects of government policy but also the widespread and long-term effects of urban migration, and the low socio-economic status of Maori.

Labour migration and urbanisation physically brought Maori into greater contact with Pakeha. By the early 1970s, both populations were predominantly urban. In the space of three decades, three-quarters of the Maori population had become urban-based and one-fifth of Maori lived in the Auckland area (Dunstall, 1981:403). It also brought Maori into greater inter tribal contact. Whereas in the rural areas, the Maori population was generally tribally-based, in the new urban environment, such groupings were unsustainable on a day-to-day basis. Maori interacted more closely with their Maori neighbours or work colleagues who may or may not have been linked to them by tribal affiliations (Walker, 1975:167).

For urban Maori one of the most apparent effects of urbanisation was that the nuclear family form rapidly replaced that of the extended whanau. Although the commitment to whanaungatanga has remained strong among Maori despite the effects of rapid urbanisation (Poole, 1991:174), these changes had a considerable impact on Maori political organisation and social processes based on whanau, hapu and iwi but this did not result in the death of these organisational forms. These were adapted and modified in the urban context. In particular, urbanisation facilitated the development of pan tribal organisational structures among urban Maori (Walker, 1975).

### State Consultation and Maori Activism

The rapid urbanisation of Maori which occurred after the Second World War, and the social problems which it engendered also forced the state to acknowledge Maori issues as a significant policy arena. It sought to develop policy in consultation with Maori groups such as the Maori Women's Welfare League and the Maori Council rather than creating an advisory capacity within the state organisation itself. The Maori Women's Welfare League, which was established in 1951 under the leadership of Te Puea, surveyed Maori housing in the Auckland area in direct response to the problems that many Maori migrants were encountering. It produced a report outlining the severe slum type conditions Maori migrants faced and then pressured the Maori Affairs Department and State Advances to extend their Maori housing programmes (Walker, 1990:202).

The Maori Council was established under the auspices of the National Government in 1962 as Maori migration had begun to increase. This was specifically designed to provide Maori advice to government. Although there were four Maori members of parliament, these were Labour Party representatives and seen to be unacceptable to the National Government. Fleras (1986:28) argues that the Maori Council served the interests of both the state and Maori in that government officials acquired some access to 'informed minority opinion' while Maori demands for inclusion in central policy-making structures were answered. Others are less generous in their assessment of the relationship between the Council and the state. Many Maori were, and have remained, openly suspicious that the Council was, and has remained, a lobby for the National Party among Maori. Its hierarchy (although not necessarily its regional councils) has always been of a conservative persuasion. Despite this, the Council's deliberations have frequently been driven by a Maori agenda. It has included lobbying for the appointment of teachers within schools who had skills in tikanga Maori and pressed for the appointment of Maori to government appointed bodies (Walker, 1990:205-206).

The relationship between the state and Maori remained in a relative equilibrium throughout the 1950s and 1960s. By the early 1970s,

however, the first major signs of the new relationship were beginning to emerge. Against a backdrop of social unrest and the rise of ethnic struggles in many Western countries, a wave of Maori activism appeared in New Zealand. According to Greenland (1984:45-46), urbanisation was a key social process in the development of Maori activism:

[T]he developing political awareness, the enclaves of Maori and Polynesian substandard housing and the sometimes disconcerting impact of the mass media revealed more clearly and indignantly the still remaining disparity between living standards, and the social practices that maintained that disparity.

As interaction between Maori and Pakeha increased, there was a corresponding rise in Maori 'self consciousness' and the politicisation of ethnic issues resulting from increasing crime rates, under-employment and discrimination. This was symptomatic of the deep social dislocation, partly caused by urban migration. According to Pearson, the urbanisation of Maori was a significant but not sufficient factor in itself in the appearance of activist politics among Maori. Maori activism was also associated with:

[T]he emergence of a largely urban based, Western educated Maori intelligentsia, served as a 'trigger' to foster renewed pan-tribal politicisation that reflected a national social movement and the role of elites, old and new within it (Pearson, 1991:208).

Nga Tamatoa in 1970 heralded the open face of this new consciousness. It was composed of a new young generation of Maori leaders educated in Pakeha institutions who, though often unversed in Maori tradition, were articulate in their espousal of a radical political consciousness (Greenland, 1984:86). The members of Nga Tamatoa were:

[T]he children of Maoridom's elite, well versed in the ways of the Pakeha and by and large unimpressed by them (Awatere, 1984:92).

Nga Tamatoa's political style and the issues that it raised set the tone for a burgeoning of Maori activist groups and protests throughout the 1970s and early 1980s. Major political events such as the 1975 Land March and the Hikoi to Waitangi in 1984 demonstrated the ability of groups like Nga Tamatoa to draw attention to and support for Maori grievances and issues.

Nga Tamatoa was instrumental in re-articulating the historical Maori struggle around issues such as land loss and connecting that struggle to contemporary issues such as institutional racism in the state bureaucracy and the apparent inability of Maori elders to pursue effective political strategies. The emergence of Maori activism represented a new and powerful challenge by Maori to the activities of the state. In contrast to the activities of the Maori Council, activists saw the state as acting primarily in terms of dominant Pakeha interests.

For nearly two decades, Maori activist politics took the form of protests, land marches and the occupation of Maori sites, confronting the Pakeha and the state and forcing them to acknowledge their racism and to address Maori grievances. As Maori politicisation continued in the 1970s and the early 1980s, the general administrative and developmental activities of the state were focused on and challenged. Under those conditions, Maori increasingly sought to occupy powerful positions within the state and to influence the mechanisms through which state policy is formulated and implemented.

### **Maori Politicisation and the State Response**

By the early 1980s, Maori politicisation had given rise to a well developed critique of Pakeha society and the state. This was not only articulated by activists or radicals but increasingly by senior Maori leaders. The principal issues which had become a focus for Maori politics were the place of the Treaty of Waitangi in New Zealand, the return of Maori lands and a growing body of Maori opinion favouring economic and political self determination. Spoonley (1988:75) suggests that a decade of on-going Maori activism had by the early 1980s developed into a sophisticated and sustained critique of racial disadvantage, focusing on the state and its practices. In particular, this critique of institutional racism, which was widely articulated by Maori and anti-racist Pakeha groups, in particular ACORD (Walker, 1990:277-8) argued that the state through its various bureaucracies was incapable of representing Maori interests. As Sharp (1990a:189) points out, the Maori critique which had been directed towards the insensitivity of the 'Pakeha

bureaucracy' also owed much to the presence of Pakeha anti-racist groups.

But the state was not simply viewed as a racist institution. It was increasingly seen as a site of struggle. Consequently, Maori started to focus on changing the rules governing the state bureaucracy itself. A state response was forced.

The Waahi conference organised under the auspices of the State Services Commission in 1983 is a significant watershed in the state's developing response to Maori claims. The State Services Commission had been forced to consider the implications of the state sector's employment practices relating to minority groups, not only because of the Maori critique of the state but also by overseas equal employment opportunities trends. The recommendations which emerged from the Waahi conference clearly reflected the impact of the Maori critique. For example, Maori argued that the public service was dominated by Pakeha, particularly at its most senior levels. It was therefore unresponsive to, and unrepresentative of, Maori needs and issues. The Waahi conference saw the solution to this in adopting an affirmative action employment policy for the state sector. It was claimed that this would enhance the cultural context of the service and that the extension of decision-making and decision makers via increased Maori and Pacific Island's representation would improve the performance of state bureaucracies (State Services Commission, 1983: 31-32).

Significantly, Waahi had been organised to formulate desired practices within an overall policy of multiculturalism, but Maori participants succeeded in shifting the focus and commitment away from a general understanding of multiculturalism towards one which acknowledged the fundamental importance of biculturalism. The Conference report stated that 'the disadvantaged position of the Maori people needs to be recognised as a first priority' (State Services Commission, 1983:33). This recognition was based upon the state's tentative acceptance of the tangata whenua status of Maori which was increasingly articulated by Maori activism and was an important focus for growing Maori politicisation. This acceptance of tangata whenua status would be critical in the further development of policy throughout the decade,

particularly as the Treaty of Waitangi was promoted by Maori interests as a blueprint for all state policies.

The major issue identified at Waahi, and one which mirrored Maori criticism directed at the Pakeha bureaucracy, was that of state sector employment and staffing levels. Although affirmative action policies had been implemented within some state departments prior to Waahi (for example, the Department of Maori Affairs special recruitment programme at clerical and executive levels for the department), the conference recommended that this policy be extended to cover the public service in general. The issue at stake here was that although the state was a major employer of Maori labour, the overwhelming majority of Maori were confined to the secondary labour market with few prospects of career advancement or opportunities to affect state policy making. It was this recommendation which prepared the way for an expansion of Maori into policy positions.

However, while EEO policies allowed more Maori to gain access to the primary labour market, they did not necessarily address Maori policy issues and the responsiveness of state policies in relation to Maori needs. EEO was not then the single focus of Maori demands on the state.

With the election of the Fourth Labour Government in mid-1984, Maori groups throughout the country converged on Wellington to participate in a Maori economic development conference or Te Hui Taumata. This conference was convened as part of that Government's brief experiment with 'consensus' politics (Wilkes, 1990:112). Hui Taumata was important because it provided a forum for Maori to assert their mana motuhake. The paternalism of the state and its role in creating Maori dependency were criticised. The right to political and economic self determination was demanded. Hui Taumata identified iwi as the basis of that control (Fleras, 1991:179). The Government was urged to begin a process of devolving resources to Maori structures, thus giving Maori the opportunity to use such resources to develop their own economic base.

Hui Taumata was a Maori development conference and not a policy initiative by the state. Although the Government acknowledged the

recommendations from it, there was no formal requirement that the state act on these recommendations. However, Hui Taumata firmly placed onto the state's agenda the issue of mana Maori motuhake<sup>3</sup> and the devolution of state resources to Maori structures. Increasingly, state discourse was centred around notions of partnership between Maori and the state, a partnership based upon recognition of the Treaty of Waitangi.

The report of the Ministerial Committee on a Maori Perspective for the Department of Social Welfare(MACMP); Puao Te Ata Tu/Daybreak (1986), established and officially endorsed the policy of state biculturalism which applied not just to personnel policies but also in the development of policy and operations. That report arose from the activities of the Auckland-based Department of Social Welfare group, Women Against Racism Action Group (WARAG) who had produced a report which outlined the prevalence of institutional racist practices within the department (Walker, 1990:279).

Puao Te Ata Tu was important because it specifically concerned the responsiveness of a major government department, the Department of Social Welfare. Puao Te Ata Tu was unequivocal in its call for government agencies to adopt effective bicultural policies which would give Maori communities the power to direct and allocate resources which were controlled by the state. It was, as O'Reilly and Wood (1991:323), have noted:

...anti-centralist and pro-tribal, preferring resources to be distributed through tribally-based institutions, rather than the government, with accountability to Maori groups.

Included in its definition of biculturalism was the specification that state institutions must be accountable to all ethnic groups, with special importance attached to Maori. The committee's report linked their deliberations with the wider history of Maori struggle and the state. The report's explicit use of the term institutional racism to denote the practices of the department pointed to the success of Maori activist groups and Pakeha anti-racist organisations over the previous decade.

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<sup>3</sup> Maori sovereignty. Stokes (1985:5) defines this concept as Maori self-determination and having the status and the ability to be the architect of one's own destiny.

Puao Te Ata Tu, which was commissioned and publicised from within the state sector, suggests that the state was prepared not only to acknowledge the Maori critique but also to adopt parts of it to reform its own practices. Many of the decisions from Waahi were reiterated in Puao Te Ata Tu: the absence of Maori staff in critical areas of the department was cited; staff development and training were identified as being in need of a sustained Maori perspective; and an understanding of tikanga Maori was seen as a skill which the department could not do without. The adoption of an official policy of biculturalism by the Department of Social Welfare was not intended to be an isolated gesture. The importance of Puao Te Ata Tu, extended beyond the Department of Social Welfare. It was also, by implication, an indictment of the practices of other state sector service departments (Sharp, 1990b:264). As Walker (1990:281) argues, the report became influential as a charter in the development of government policies for the delivery of equity for Maori people. The expectation was that this policy would be adapted to other government departments in implementing their own bicultural responses.

Implicit within the policy initiatives outlined in Puao Te Ata Tu was the concept of limited devolution. The issues of accountability of the department to Maori communities surfaces in the report as does the suggestion of limited devolution of some funding. That policy of state devolution however would receive greater attention with the release of Partnership Response/ Te Urupare Rangapu in 1988.

The immediate basis for Te Urupare Rangapu was the Government's discussion paper, He Tirohanga Rangapu/Partnership Perspectives (April 1988). This policy discussion paper was extensively criticised by Maori for its proposals for the Department of Maori Affairs and the unclear status of the Treaty in determining Governmental policy (Kelsey, 1990:249; Sharp, 1990b:266). It was rejected at many of the hui called by the government to discuss it. However with its focus on the need for improvements in delivery, design, and the implementation of Government programmes, it echoed the criticisms which had been made at various hui and other forums since the early 1980s and which had

become stronger as the momentum for change among Maori increased during the decade.

In He Tirohanga Rangapu, the Labour Government had outlined seven objectives in relation to Maori and, despite the rejection of that policy proposal these objectives were transferred to Te Urupare Rangapu. In so doing the Government undertook to adhere to the following principles (Minister of Maori Affairs, 1988a:3):

- 1) To honour the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi.
- 2) To eliminate the socio-economic gaps between Maori and the general population, which disadvantage Maori people and which do not result from individual or cultural preferences.
- 3) To provide opportunities for Maori people to develop an economic base to promote self-sufficiency and eliminate attitudes of dependency.
- 4) To resolve justly and fairly the breaches of the Treaty of Waitangi and the grievances between the Crown and Maori people.
- 5) To ensure Maori language and culture receive an equitable allocation of resources to assist their development.
- 6) Promote forms of decision making in central government which provide opportunities for Maori people to actively participate in policy formulation and service delivery.
- 7) To encourage Maori participation in the political process.

State bureaucracies were required to review their policy development mechanisms, objectives and their delivery of services in the light of these principles. Te Urupare Rangapu (Minister of Maori Affairs, 1988b:20) stated that 'the success of all Government policies will be determined by the extent to which they reflect the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi, and specifically meet the Government's objectives in the Maori affairs area'.

As a policy statement, Te Urupare Rangapu advocated two main strategies. One was the devolution of the delivery of government programmes to iwi authorities. The second was to establish a Maori

policy capacity which was to be achieved through the establishment of a Maori policy ministry, Manatu Maori. The Ministry was to have responsibility for reviewing and monitoring policy proposals from government agencies to ensure that such proposals were consistent with the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi.

Te Urupare Rangapu also set the basis for greatly expanding the numbers of Maori employed in the policy process because it required all government agencies to work into their corporate plans the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi. This would be achieved through having Maori input in the approval of the corporate plans of government agencies by using iwi, Maori advisers, consultants and Manatu Maori. Government agencies were to be assessed on the extent to which they actively sought out opportunities for working alongside iwi authorities for contracts or agreements. Moreover chief executives were made accountable, on instruction from their ministers for the implementation of responsive policies under the provisions of both the State Sector Act and Te Urupare Rangapu. The State Services Commission and Manatu Maori were made responsible for monitoring and reporting on the responsiveness of government agencies.

There was a certain irony in these developments because at the same moment, large numbers of Maori state employees were suffering from the effects of state restructuring to a much greater degree than other ethnic groups within New Zealand because of their structural location within the secondary labour market (Manatu Maori, 1991; Shirley et al, 1990:126). In some areas, government departments (eg. Ministry of Works, the Post Office and the State Forests) had been the major employers of Maori as clerical, trades and unskilled workers. The stripping away of the commercial functions from the state meant that while some Maori were entering the primary labour market based on the provision of Maori policy advice, for others state restructuring brought redundancy. To many Maori the state became no longer an employer but the deliverer of social welfare benefits.

Perhaps the most important development to emerge from the Maori political resurgence was the resurrection of Maori organisational structures, particularly iwi. This development reflected the growing

strength and ability of the Maori revival to affect the nature of the state. This was most evident in the government's short lived Runanga Iwi Act (1990), which would have provided iwi with a vehicle for channelling government funds to its members and allowed iwi to develop their own agencies to consult with the Government (O'Reilly and Wood, 1991:326-327).

The unfolding of the Maori political resurgence has created the conditions for Maori to contest the allocation and distribution of resources through the state. Maori policy advisers emerged out of those conditions and became important players in that relationship. There has been little empirical work undertaken concerning the establishment of Maori policy positions within the state sector because Maori policy advisers, as a group, have really only become an important presence within the state sector since 1988. The reasons for this recent innovation, in part, arise from the emphasis which has been placed on policy-orientated work within the state sector as government organisations have moved away from universal service provision. In line with the Labour Government's stated aims to reduce state expenditure and to ensure equity of service delivery, departments have needed policy advice on how services should best be targeted. In general terms, there has been a demand for gifted policy analysts which has not always been matched by supply (Boston, 1991:239-240; O'Reilly and Wood, 1991:339).

The emphasis on contestable policy advice has in fact been one of the main features of state sector restructuring. For example, the establishment of policy ministries has (ostensibly) provided the state with expert advice on matters 'where previously the quality of departmental advice was patchy or where there was a gap in the bureaucratic network of advice' (Boston, 1991:254). One outcome of the emphasis on policy advice has created an institutional base within the state sector for disadvantaged groups to exert more influence on public policy-making (Boston, 1991). Within government departments other than the new policy ministries, the emphasis on policy development has also been important. Particularly since Te Urupare Rangapu, mainstream departments have been required to demonstrate delivery responsiveness to their Maori clients and improve their personnel practices and ratios. Therefore, Maori policy advice positions relating to

the delivery of external services, and also to internal personnel practices, have been established within many departments.

The need for Maori policy advice throughout the state sector can also be explained in part by the success of Maori pressure groups and activists in having their grievances and dissatisfaction with state organisations acknowledged. In particular, the consensus amongst Maori about the importance of economic self-determination expressed at Hui Taumata (1984), the acceptance by the Department of Social Welfare of Puao Te Ata Tu (1986), and more recently the rejection by Maori of the proposals in He Tirohanga Rangapu (1988) collectively signalled to the state that Maori interests lacked confidence in the state's ability to fulfil the requirements of partnership under the Treaty of Waitangi.

As such, Maori policy advisers are at the nexus of the relationship between Maori and the state, a relationship which has been developed over the last two decades. The recognition of the importance of Maori policy advice within the state reflects both the pressure which Maori have brought to bear on the state and the state's response to this. Therefore Maori policy advisers within the state constitute an important development in the state's dialogue with iwi.

## Chapter Three

### Theorising Maori Policy Advice Within the State

The question of how Maori policy advice arises out of or reflects kaupapa Maori demands a broad analysis of the state. Maori policy advisers experience the state as individuals working within a bureaucratic organisation. That position has a profound effect on the extent to which Maori attempts to have an impact on the overall direction of the state will be successful. It also effects the extent to which individuals can represent Maori interests. It is precisely those problems of agency which have been at the centre of debates over the nature of the state since sociology's earliest developments.

Many sociologists focusing on the structural arrangements of societies have dealt in some way with the state. The resulting theories fall into three categories. Firstly pluralist analyses attempt to focus on the state as representative of the people. Secondly, there are those which attempt to 'make sense' of the state by concentrating on its organisational arrangements and which are largely informed by the Weberian analysis of bureaucracy. Third, there are those which concentrate primarily on the state as an agent of economic and social interests. The Marxist tradition is most clearly associated with that perspective.

Despite differences in emphasis, certain common threads link these theories. Each has something to say about the state as agent, the state as an organisation and the state as representative of the people. By examining these theoretical debates, we can gain some insight into both the opportunities and the limits to the individual's ability to work within the state for social change.

## **Pluralism**

Pluralists argue that power is widely dispersed and democratic rather than being concentrated among a small elite (Dahl, 1967). That lack of concentration results in a society in which all groups, whether they be classes, parties or social movements, impact upon the decision-making process. Under those conditions, the boundary between society and the state is permeable. Power in society is mediated through different interest groups which act as pressure groups on an elected government and, thus, serve as a means by which individuals who share common interests can exert influence on decision makers through collective action.

The state according to this type of model plays an 'umpiring' role mediating between the interests of competing groups. It has no interests of its own. It is as if the state merely enforces a set of rules which are given and unchangeable (Marger, 1981:55). For pluralists, the state thus exists not for the narrow aims of a dominant elite or class but for the 'public interest' (Wilkes, 1984:29). Accordingly, pluralists attach little importance to bureaucrats as decision-makers. Bureaucrats are seen as having primarily administrative functions and acting to express the will of the various social collectivities which constitute modern societies. Because of this, bureaucrats are seen as largely irrelevant to the political as opposed to the administrative process. State institutions are seen only as the suppliers of authoritative rules and values for which pressure groups might strive, and cannot, in the long term at least, act in the interests of one group without alienating other sections (Dowse and Hughes, 1972:134). Under those conditions, there is little reason for any social movement to attempt to influence the state's allocative objectives through employment within its bureaucracy. Influence is far more likely to arise through the activities of pressure groups lobbying via elected officials.

From the pluralist perspective, therefore, it would appear that Maori interests are best pursued from the outside, by Maori groups external to the state lobbying elected representatives, and there is some evidence to support such an analysis. Institutionalised Maori pressure groups have always been an important mechanism in Maori attempts to direct or

redirect state objectives and practices. Both the Maori Women's Welfare League and the Maori Council (Fleras, 1986:43):

[A]ttempt to influence public policy by cultivating sustained contact with prominent officials in a style appropriate to institutionalised pressure groups.

In addition to these 'traditional' groups, there have been a number of 'issue oriented groups' which have attempted to set the policy agenda for governments. According to Fleras (1986:39-40), such groups:

...[acting on] the premise that parliamentary democracies are vulnerable to the politics of embarrassment both nationally and internationally...have succeeded in stopping things from happening, alerting the public to contentious issues that require scrutiny, and drawing attention to the necessity of reform over a wide range of issues.

For pluralists, then, one would expect the strongest links between the state and social movements to be between such movements and a government or elected representatives. Pluralists would expect only the loosest connection to exist between Maori policy advisers and the values and claims they express with those of Maori pressure groups. But this clearly is not the case. As will be shown in Chapters Five and Six of this study, Maori policy advisers share a considerable commitment to kaupapa Maori and recognise that Maori activism itself has been directed at placing more Maori into the state bureaucracy. In the mid-1980s, it was Maori activists who began the push towards 'biculturalism' in both the design and provision of state services to te iwi Maori (Sharp, 1990a:21).

### **Marxism and Elite Theory**

In contrast to pluralist theories which regard the state primarily as a neutral arbiter mediating between interest groups in society, Marxists see the state as being very much an active agent maintaining a ruling class in society. For Marxists, that role involves the state facilitating the maintenance of relations and conditions necessary for the reproduction of the capitalist mode of production. Within the broad rubric of Marxism, however, there are two main strands of thought. These are frequently

referred to as the instrumentalist state theories and the semi-autonomous state theories, respectively.

**(i) Instrumentalist Theories of the State**

If pluralists present the state as benignly acting in the public interest, instrumentalist Marxist theories present the state as primarily malignant (Payze, 1991:16). The state is portrayed as a central institution within society which represents, more than any other, that society's dominant economic interests. Rather than being the core of democracy the state is the agent of domination, exploitation and subordination (Miliband, 1969; Mandel, 1977). The state is (Marx and Engels, 1970:80):

...nothing more than the form of organisation which the bourgeois necessarily adopt for internal and external purposes, for the mutual guarantee of their property and interests.

According to Miliband (1969:23), the bourgeoisie, or the capitalist class, is the ruling class not only because it controls the means of production through ownership but because it controls the ideological, coercive and allocative power of the state. That is, it controls the instruments of legitimate power.

The state in class societies is primarily and inevitably the guardian and protector of the economic interests which are dominant in them. Its 'real' purpose and mission is to ensure their continued predominance, not prevent it (Miliband, 1969:238).

Despite the heavily collectivist tendencies of instrumentalist Marxism, the individual is a key player in Miliband's theory of the state. The way in which capitalists control the state is primarily through 'peopling' it with their own class members. According to Mandel (1977:96), the 'real' nature of the state is that it exists in perfect harmony with the bourgeoisie, through the way the state bureaucracy is recruited, its criteria of selectivity and career structure and its hierarchical method of organisation. The state recruits individuals from the capitalist class who then work within state organisations and agencies (Miliband, 1969:55).

According to Miliband, those who are located within the senior levels of these institutions are largely of bourgeois descent and maintain the hegemony of the dominant class (Miliband, 1969:162). Miliband refers here to the Gramscian concept of hegemony, which deals with the way in which a class and its representatives are able, according to Simon (1982:21), to exercise power over subordinate classes through a combination of both coercion and persuasion. The state through its agencies ensures the maintenance of the ruling ideology. Those who are located within state agencies not only succumb to the conventions of the dominant ideology they also act to reinforce it. As Miliband (1969:163) argues:

[I]n the state service, there are criteria of 'soundness' particularly in regard to politics, whose disregard may be highly disadvantageous in a number of important aspects. This applies in all walks of life, and forms a definite though often subterranean part of the political process.

Despite the trend in recent years for recruits to these elite positions to be drawn from the ranks of the working class and other social groups within society, this process does not result in the democratisation of the state. Instead, it involves the embourgeoisement of the state's employees (Miliband, 1969:60). Embourgeoisement describes the process through which individuals recruited from non-elite groups are co-opted once they enter the state so that they develop the same interests as, or act in the interests of the capitalist class. Such people are afforded a salary which gives them, as individuals, an interest in the smooth running of the capitalist economy (Mandel, 1977:96).

In relation to classes, or those social movements which seek to change society through entering the state, embourgeoisement is particularly important. If the state only represents the interests of the ruling class, then attempts by social movements to work within the state are either restricted or negated as their members, recruited by the state, abandon the pursuit of social change. Regardless of their initial position or interests they either become a part of a 'new middle class' which is more interested in pursuing its own social mobility than acting in the interests of the social movement (Sivanandan, 1982:120) or are controlled by and act in the interests of the ruling class (Bottomore, 1964; Miliband, 1969; Mandel, 1977). This is largely inevitable. The state is incapable of

representing any other interests than those of the ruling class. Those who remain in the state and are not co-opted are destined for frustration. This is either because they have been socialised in the values or the practices of the bourgeoisie since birth or because they have since been co-opted into those practices and behaviours.

Within New Zealand a number of studies have focused on the role of the state in maintaining elite or class domination (Jesson, 1987; Simpson, 1984). These have explored the impact of those senior public servants occupying elite positions within various organisations. Simpson's study of elites argues that among senior officials within the New Zealand public service, a disproportionate number were drawn from business or professional backgrounds despite official claims of neutrality and individual promotion on the basis of merit (Simpson, 1984:101). In addition, according to Simpson (1984:16):

It would be accurate to say [that] from the commencement of self-government ours has been a society ruled by an elite which has perceived access to power as an opportunity for enrichment and financial advancement, and the control of the machinery of government as a means to achieve that end.

If one applies such a model to Maori policy advisers one would expect to find individuals who are unable to either represent Maori interests or effect change within the state. Maori working within the state are seen only as auxiliaries maintaining white capitalist domination of Maori people (Poananga, 1986). For Maori working within the state, this is a common criticism which they are confronted with. As one of my informants (Makere) noted:

Maori outside the public service of course often accuse Maori who work within the public service of at the very least being ineffective. And very often they're more insulting than that!

By definition, they would only be able to represent the interests of those who control the state, the capitalist class. Maori policy advisers would thus have to be perceived of as co-opted or bourgeois Maori in a bourgeois state or as independent but frustrated and ineffective agents of non-elite interests.

**(ii) Semi-Autonomous Theories of the State**

The instrumentalist Marxist position is based on the assumption that the capitalist class is both homogeneous and unified. Many Marxists reject this assumption of internal unity. Rather than the state being the instrument of the capitalist class, some Marxists claim that while the state does have an important role in securing the long term conditions for the survival of capitalism, the state must act semi-autonomously (Poulantzas, 1973; Jessop, 1982; Wilkes, 1987). This is because the capitalist class is, in reality, not unified but is a cluster of competing class fractions and the state cannot act in the interests of all fractions simultaneously. Instead, at any instance in time, the state is forced to manage the differences existing between these fractions and to secure social cohesion (Jessop, 1982:164).

Under those conditions, the state actually embodies class and social conflict and becomes the arena for not only class struggles but popular democratic struggles. Examples of the latter include feminist, environmental and Maori struggles which reflect broader conflicts over the organisation of production and reproduction. Consequently, although the state and state power assume a central role in capital accumulation, Jessop (1977) argues that state power itself must be considered as a complex and contradictory effect of class and popular democratic struggles.

According to neo-Marxists, the state has two imperatives in modern capitalist societies. The state must provide the conditions for the long term maintenance of capitalism. At the same time, the state must ensure its own legitimacy and thus maintain itself by appearing to act in the public interest. The state must both (Wilkes, 1984:35):

...maintain and legitimate the myth of political democracy,  
and...administer a system of justice which appears to arbitrate  
evenly between citizens, while all the while maintaining a system  
of economic and political inequality.

The semi-autonomous position of the state vis-a-vis dominant elites, its legitimated powers of coercion and its ability to allocate social and economic resources makes the state a significant social and economic

actor. Because of the contradictory nature of the state, which results from the two imperatives noted above, spaces can and do occur within the state for oppositional classes or social movements to exploit or gain access to the state (Saville-Smith, 1987:208-210). Thus individuals who are not members of the capitalist class may enter and, to some degree, effect change within the state. They do not necessarily become embourgeoisied (Wright, 1978:227). Under those conditions, social movements frequently seek to place or support those with similar interests or values within the bureaucracy.

The desire to 'be in the state' is a recognition that the state has a major impact on people's lives because of its wide legislative, coercive and allocative powers. For Maori, it is the state that has been the vehicle through which they have been marginalised, exploited and made dependent (Ministerial Advisory Committee on a Maori Perspective, 1986; Lian, 1990). But it is the state, through its legislative powers which can be the means by which Maori attempt to regain power and resources. Particularly since the beginning of the twentieth century, as Lian argues (1990:88-90), Maori political movements such as that led by Ratana, have sought to use the state, not only to protect Maori lands from further alienation but to also stimulate Maori economic development.

### **Organisational Theory**

Pluralist and Marxist/elite theories essentially see the state as acting in the interest of groups external to it. Organisational theories view the state as merely a complex organisation which operates according to an internal rather than external set of imperatives. As such, an organisation is viewed primarily as a collectivity which is oriented to the purposeful pursuit of relatively specific goals. Organisations are also seen as being collectivities which exhibit a high degree of formalisation involving conscious and deliberate co-operation among its members (Scott, 1987:21). In general, organisational theories focus on the ways in which organisations operate, how divisions of labour are hierarchically organized, how decisions are arrived at and how, as a whole, a complex organisation maintains an identifiable unity.

Much organisational theory is derived from Weber's work on bureaucracy. For Weber, the essence of politics and power in modern society is its organisation through bureaucratic systems based on rational legitimacy. According to Weber, the state represents the most technically superior form of social organisation because of its adoption of a bureaucratic organisational form.

The fully developed bureaucratic apparatus compares with other organisations exactly as does the machine with non-technical aspects of production. Precision, speed, unambiguity, knowledge of the files, continuity, discretion, unity, strict subordination, reduction of friction, and of material and personal costs – these are raised to the optimum point in the bureaucratic administration...(Weber, 1948:214).

Bureaucracy, as the organisational form of the state, represents a type of social organisation in which nothing is left to chance and where the actions of the various parts are subject to clearly specified rules. Decisions affecting both people or groups in society are arrived at through the exercise of rational legal power.

While it is frequently assumed that power in western democratic society lies with those who are elected representatives of the people, this is not the case. Those who are elected to rule or govern society become increasingly dependent on skilled bodies of experts and specialists – bureaucrats (Marger, 1981:73). Bureaucracies develop a monopoly of expertise and the capacity to implement or block policies formulated by those elected to govern. The state bureaucracy is thus a power in its own right. Bureaucrats, through their possession of expertise, can attempt to control the flow of information to either an elected government or the public and thus maximise their own power. Bureaucrats may also exercise their own discretion in implementing or impeding the decisions made by political leaders (Marger, 1981:74-75).

The effect of this is a concentration of power within a non-democratic bureaucracy, which controls significant human, material, and intellectual resources (Perrow, 1979:6). Members of bureaucracies thus become an elite in themselves. Under these circumstances, it is predictable that social movements will seek to place those in sympathy with it into the bureaucracy. Not only Maoridom but feminists and conservationists have shown this tendency (Payze, 1991:23).

All social movements, however, confront a significant contradiction. That is, bureaucrats can only access and activate the power which is conferred on them through abiding by bureaucratic rules. Power is invested in the position and not the individual who holds that position (Marger, 1981:18). Individuals, therefore, must submit themselves to a system of rules and work in accordance with a system of formalized and standard procedures, or a set job description. The requirement that individuals conform to the control structure of the organisation is typically achieved through their acceptance of the common norms and values which both orient and govern their contributions to the organisation. These shared norms and values comprise an organisational culture (Scott, 1987:291).

Despite Weber's emphasis on the legal-rational character of bureaucracies, organisational theorists have also pointed to the existence of other criteria affecting decision making which are frequently employed within complex organisations. These bear little significance to the attainment of specific organisational goals. Often over time, organisational goals become displaced by a rigid adherence to rules. The observance of such rules which, although originally designed for the attainment of specific ends, can for certain organisational members become an end in itself. This suggests that the original purpose of an organisation has only limited value in explaining either the current goals of its members or the nature of the organisation (Silverman, 1970:14).

Adherence to the rituals of the organisation, which are often divorced from its organisational goals, becomes a major feature of that organisation's culture. While it is argued that the purpose of 'rituals' and ceremonies within organisations is to inculcate beliefs through the provision of collective occasions for expressing solidarity and commitment (Scott, 1987:292), such a view has been extensively criticised for its failure to recognise difference among organisational members (Perrow, 1978:87).

Across the state bureaucracy there is a broadly defined culture, the public service ethos, which permeates the public service. However, different departments or government agencies have their own distinctive philosophy and it is important that those within the organisation are

sensitive to this in order to ensure efficient practice (Beetham, 1987:40). Although the organisational culture of the state bureaucracy is in part internally generated, it also reflects the relationship of domination that exists within society. Thus, in New Zealand, state sector organisations can be seen to reflect that relationship of domination that exists between Maori and Pakeha. The organisational culture often acts as a control system within organisations against the interests Maori or other dominated groups. For individuals, the adoption of that culture, and becoming identified with it, is vital in order to achieve access to the material and status rewards within organisations (Payze, 1991:79). Indeed, the survival and the acceptance of an individual within an organisation is very dependent on an ability to adopt or become acculturated into the organisation's culture.

Ultimately, then, bureaucrats must become 'organisational men' (Whyte, 1956) or women (Kanter, 1977). This places an extraordinary strain on any link the individual within an organisation has with an external movement or organisation. For Maori policy advisers, the organisational culture poses particular problems. Because it functions as a system of control and reflects those relations of domination experienced in wider society, Maori advisers may experience difficulty in adopting an organisational culture with which they are culturally at odds. By accepting the organisational culture they may receive the rewards and status the organisation confers on its members, but this may be at the expense of becoming co-opted to such an extent that they have little credibility with Maori outside of their particular government department or the state.

Organisational theory has some points of convergence with instrumentalist and even semi-autonomous views of the state. They all point to an essentially undemocratic state. But whereas Marxists would argue that power lies in the ability of a class to rule society by controlling the administrative structure of the state, organisational theorists see the state as having an independent power base of its own. Consequently while Miliband is at pains to demonstrate that bureaucrats are in reality members of the bourgeoisie, those concerned with the state as a complex organisation are more inclined to portray those powerful within

the bureaucracy as having particular elite rather than class interests (Bottomore, 1964:69).

### **Summary**

The three models which have been discussed above all provide us with useful ways of exploring the perceptions and the practice of Maori policy advisers within the state. The theoretical models which have been outlined, may either separately or collectively enhance our understanding of the effectiveness of Maori policy advisers.

The pluralist model for instance questions the need for individual Maori to be employed within the state bureaucracy at all, as Maori policy advisers, simply because actual policy decisions are not determined within the bureaucracy but between pressure groups and governments. The pluralist view of Maori pressure groups outside of the state as being influential in decision making, assumes that Maori policy advisers as bureaucrats are largely irrelevant to this process and have little commitment to the Maori political and cultural renaissance. Because this model assumes that power in society is widely dispersed the state is not seen to be a significant area in which Maori seeking political, economic and social change need to be. There has been considerable debate over the validity of the pluralist model at both the theoretical level and the empirical level (Domhoff, 1983; Pearson and Thorns, 1983). Accordingly, in the long term at least Maori policy advisers will be unsuccessful in furthering the aims of the Maori renaissance because, quite simply, the state exists in the public interest and cannot act on behalf of any one organisation or group without creating conflict. Ultimately real change will result from the activities of those Maori groups external to the state pressuring the government to institute reforms. Maori policy advisers at best will merely enact those decisions as state functionaries. Therefore the role of Maori policy advisers in affecting decision making is seen to be peripheral to the activities of pressure groups outside of the state. One of the fundamental questions which arises in this study of Maori policy advisers concerns the extent to which they are familiar with and involved in furthering the aims of the Maori renaissance.

In contrast to pluralist understandings of a democratic state, Marxists see the state not as a neutral umpire but as an agent which acts in or for the interests of a dominant class or class fractions. In particular, instrumentalist theories reject the possibility of Maori involvement within the state as being effective because of the state's inherent bourgeois nature. Such theories which see the state as being the agent of a ruling class or elite accordingly place little importance on the role of Maori policy advisers in effecting change within society. The inevitable consequences of working within the state, according to this model, is embourgeoisement. It is argued that Maori who try to use the state to effect change will be co-opted or otherwise will have such attempts frustrated. The question which arises from this type of tradition whether or not it can be demonstrated that Maori policy advisers as a group are either ineffective or embourgeoised. This thesis examines whether such an argument can be sustained studying Maori policy advisers.

In contrast, the semi-autonomous, neo-Marxist position argues that because of the state's contradictory nature, social movements will endeavour to target the state as a site of struggle and attempt to exploit its contradictions in order to effect social change. Such theories suggest that Maori would seek to gain entry into state sector organisations to effect change in society. This raises the issue as to whether Maori policy advisers can be seen as constituting such an attempt by Maori. Although the semi-autonomous position (in contrast to instrumentalist state theories) endorses engagement within the state, such engagement must be assessed in the light of the organisational character of the state that individuals encounter.

Finally, Weberian theories of the state bureaucracy and those that see the state primarily as a complex organisation are also important. Such analyses provide us with an understanding of the micro-level of the state, in particular the exercise of power through rational-legal mechanisms and the ways in which individuals are enmeshed within sets of power relations as organisational members. These relations are of particular importance in assessing the effectiveness of Maori policy advisers within such organisations. The questions which organisational theories raise in this study, focus on the way in which Maori policy advisers practice policy advise and the pursuit of kaupapa Maori within their respective state

sector organisations. Such theories also draw attention to the organisational constraints which Maori policy advisers encounter as organisational members, and thus to the strategies which they employ to overcome or accommodate these in their day-to-day practices. Although there are problems associated with focusing on the internal workings of the state, such a model in unison with the other models which address the links between the state and social and economic groupings external to it, can be used to explain the practices of the Maori policy advisers in this study.

## Chapter Four

### Methodological Issues and Methods

This thesis explores the developing relationship between Maori and the state. It focuses in particular on the role of Maori working within the state sector who seek to create a responsive and bicultural state. Although Maori are located in many of the occupational levels of the state sector, very few of these allow those within them to have a significant effect on the development and implementation of policies. Maori policy advisers, however, do have an important role in the development of policy. They, as a new presence within the state sector, have the advantage of being a small group as a population for study, and are located centrally within the head offices of many government departments. For these reasons, Maori policy advisers were selected as the focus of the study.

The major method used in this thesis to explore the nature of the new relationship between Maori and the state was one of in-depth, semi-structured, systematic interviews with Maori policy advisers. This method was selected as the best way to gather material relating to the practices and role of Maori policy advisers for the following reasons. As a total population the number of Maori policy advisers is very small. It is estimated that there are probably less than twenty five such advisers in Wellington. It was therefore possible to interview many of these advisers over a three month time period (between May and September 1991). This method also was particularly important in meeting some of the expectations of Maori protocol, by involving participants in the study and facilitating a high level of dialogue between the participants and myself as the researcher.

This chapter addresses both methodological issues and the research method employed in this study. In contrast to many sociological discussions around the issue of research, this chapter takes as the basis for its account the methodological issues raised by research with Maori advisers. These include the issues of non-Maori doing Maori research, the purpose of Maori research, and who benefits from it, the role of the researcher and the extent to which such issues can be and have been resolved in this study. After discussing these methodological issues, the chapter then turns to the research method and its evolution following the challenges arising from the methodological issues. Finally, the chapter concludes with a brief overview and introduction to the Maori advisers who participated in this study.

### **Methodological Issues**

According to Bechofer (1974:73), the research process is not a clear cut sequence of procedures following a neat pattern but a messy interaction between the conceptual and the empirical world, with induction and deduction occurring at the same time. Methodological issues in any research project are always important. Many deductivist accounts of research begin with the formulation of hypotheses expressing the nature of the problem being investigated, and proceed to the employment of a set of technical procedures for the collection of data, and finally conclude with the analysis and interpretation of this data. Such procedures often (although not always) exclude from their accounts the contradictions between experience, consciousness and theory which are assumed to be unimportant or nonexistent (Oakley, 1981:31; Stanley and Wise, 1983:150). The difficulties that are generated through these deductivist or positivist accounts, which may regard methodological issues as essentially non-problematic, are made apparent by Cicourel (1964:40) who argues:

Researchers in the social sciences are faced with a unique methodological problem; the very conditions of their research constitute an important complex variable for what passes as the findings of their investigations. Field research...is a method in which the activities of the investigator play a crucial role in the data obtained.

These criticisms suggest that methodological issues in social science research are of critical importance to the collection of data and its interpretation. With this in mind, this discussion attempts to bring out those issues that surfaced and became critically important in this study.

My research began in the deductivist tradition and to some extent has remained within it. It, too, began with my ideas about the state and Maori involvement within it. I sought to test these ideas by studying Maori policy advisers, with a view to data analysis which would either prove or disprove my ideas about the importance of Maori policy advice within the state. However, as this discussion illustrates, the research method employed was affected by the methodological issues which arose from the subjects of this research, Maori policy advisers, and addressed what I would call the 'politics' of Maori research. These issues involved not only the participants but myself as a researcher. For the Maori advisers, I became as much of a part of the research as they were. By deciding to discuss methodological issues first, I also convey the significance and importance of these for the Maori advisers. Many of those who were interviewed saw these very issues as directly affecting the research method that I adopted. Therefore the material obtained, and the findings of this study, owe as much to these methodological issues as they do to the research method that was employed.

Three important methodological issues arose in the course of the research. These were: (a) how to get access to Maori policy advisers; (b) the issue of being a non-Maori researcher engaged in Maori research; and, (c) defining what is a Maori policy adviser.

### **Getting Access**

At the most mundane and immediate level was the problem of how, I, as a researcher with neither direct experience in the state sector nor with Maori connections, could first contact and then interview Maori policy advisers. What channels were available for me to gain entry into the state sector? Would I be able to contact Maori policy advisers through these channels?

Two Maori policy advisers in different government departments had agreed to participate in pilot interviews from which I planned to fully develop an interview schedule and gain experience of undertaking such research. Those advisers had agreed to participate in this process on the understanding that they would be able to make suggestions or voice criticisms of the questions I was using. One, a woman, was a Maori policy analyst while the other was a man who managed a Maori unit. The two participants provided an important opportunity to test, and both contributed to and improved the design of the interview schedule.

From the beginning, the research was conducted with regard to ethical issues which sociologists must consider when undertaking research. Such issues are covered within the Code of Ethics of the Sociological Association of Aotearoa and the Massey University Code of Ethical Conduct. The most important of these issues which this research addressed were:-

- 1) Participation in the research was strictly voluntary. Participants were under no obligation and all participants were free to withdraw from the study at any time.
- 2) The research attempted to avoid any possible harm to the participants by ensuring their confidentiality through the following measures. Only I as the researcher would transcribe and produce the transcripts. All identifying names would be removed from the transcript, and these transcripts would only be read by myself and my supervisors. Where quotes were used from transcripts in my work the names of the participants would be changed.
- 3) The rights of the participants to have input into the research and to be informed as to how the research would be used was also recognised. All the participants were therefore given the opportunity to make amendments to their interview transcripts as they saw fit. This process has been employed successfully in much sociological research. (See for example, Oakley, 1981:47). A consent form to that effect was completed by the participants and myself at every interview (Appendix 1).

In this chapter, where quotes are used, I have not assigned names to them in order to protect the identity of those who participated in the pilot interviews. The Maori policy advisers recommended alterations to the interview technique and constantly reminded and challenged me to think about my own assumptions and the practices of sociologists in doing research. On the basis of feedback obtained from the pilot interviews I also prepared a brief introduction about myself and the research that I was doing which I would deliver to participants prior to the interviews (Appendix 2). After conducting the pilot interviews, I was able to construct a revised interview schedule which would form the basis of all the interviews which followed (Appendix 3). Although I had begun to develop questions and explore different areas in the work and practices of Maori policy advisers, the pilot interviews and the feedback I obtained from them shaped, to a large extent, the final interview schedule.

Although initially I had very limited access to Maori policy advisers, the pilot interviews revealed a wide range of such advisers working in many more government departments and ministries than those I had initially been aware of. The pilot interviews were pivotal because the participants identified the names and locations of others who were part of their personal networks. Thus they provided me with what was to become a useful 'snowballing' technique in gaining access to Maori advisers, a technique which I was to rely on throughout the research.

I cannot over-emphasise the importance of conducting those pilot interviews. Not only did they have a major impact on how my interview schedule was presented, and how contacts were made but more immediately they prepared me for issues I could expect to encounter as a non-Maori researcher working with Maori. Had I not undertaken those initial interviews, I am sure that I would have encountered numerous problems with my interview schedule and would have acted in a culturally inappropriate manner.

### **The Issue of Ethnicity**

If the initial methodological issue was simply that of getting access to Maori policy advisers, the second issue was much more important and

difficult to resolve satisfactorily. That was the issue of ethnicity, which concerned not only the ethnicity of the participants but the ethnicity of the researcher. It was, of course, closely related to the issue of access.

**(a) Problems of Being a Non-Maori Researcher Studying Maori Issues**

I was unaware of just how significant an issue my ethnicity would be in undertaking this research. However, as James (1986:18) argues, ethnicity, like gender, is always a present feature of research, although it may only appear problematic under certain conditions. The issue of whether non-Maori should do research on Maori has been much debated within the social sciences through the 1980s. This debate has been concerned with the kinds of research that are appropriate in Maori settings and what obligations researchers should have to those whom they are researching (see Sites, Spring 1986). Some Maori have claimed that social science research about Maori subjects is essentially a form of academic imperialism (Awekotuku, 1984:247). Sociologists engaged in research with Maori people have been accused of being 'academic raiders' (Poananga, cited in Spoonley, 1986:3).

The growing criticism of Pakeha researching Maori arose because much of what is called 'Maori research' only served to reinforce existing negative stereotypes and frequently misinterpreted Maori social life. It was also seen as a means to enhance the personal prospects of the researcher. This challenge from Maori to sociology in recent years forced the discipline to rethink the aims and purposes of research. Stokes'(1985) discussion on Maori research summarises that debate and provides a guide to doing social science research with Maori people. According to Stokes (1985:6):

The purpose of Maori research should be to identify and make available knowledge of the Maori world, Maori perspectives and perceptions, Maori cultural values and attitudes in areas that are seen as significant in Maori terms...The more important and urgent function of Maori research is to direct efforts to investigating ways in which Maori resources – cultural, economic and social – can be used more positively and effectively, to work through institutional barriers, to provide avenues of guidance, set out options and communicate these in such a way that Maori

people themselves can work through the issues that confront and concern them.

This raises issues related to who benefits from the research, how research should be conducted and who should undertake research. These issues are addressed briefly below.

### **(b) Who Benefits from Doing Maori Research**

As noted above, one of the major criticisms of much Maori research undertaken by social scientists, has been that the research simply reinforces negative stereotypes. It has failed to provide Maori with guidelines for developing strategies to address social and economic matters of concern to them (Stokes, 1986:4). This issue was raised by many respondents throughout the course of my own study, who were suspicious of any social science research because of its inability to correctly interpret Maori issues:

You sociologists have got a lot to answer for, because you just put it all into a class thing without looking at the cultural implications...You look at it and you can say 'Yeah, Maoris are low income...':

Let's talk sociological theory! I said sociologists don't take culture into account until after the theory. Let's look at my very crude perceptions of Marxism. I would see Maori people fitting into that reserve army of labour. But we are not even that any more. So we certainly don't count if we are looking from your point of view.

Many policy advisers questioned the form of analysis which is basic to much of sociological research. For example, participants in the pilot interviews queried the purpose of my asking questions relating to formal educational attainment. These were seen as belonging to a value system that was not necessarily Maori. To avoid allowing the interview to reflect such a cultural value system, the respondents suggested that the interviewer be as honest as possible about the meaning of the questions and the scope of the research.

Because I was interviewing Maori policy advisers, it was absolutely essential that I think about how the research would assist Maori people

and could explain its relevance and worth to the respondents. As Stokes (1985:4) points out, Maori research is an activity undertaken to increase knowledge of topics and issues relevant and of concern to Maori people. In particular, in what ways could this research assist in the development of more effective policy within the state sector? While a researcher might gain a formal qualification from completing such research, what would the benefits be for Maori people and participants? Many participants in the research had reservations about the benefits of such research for Maori people:

Maori people are well aware that they are the most researched people in this country, but that has done little for them. What I want to know is how are Maori people going to benefit from this thesis?

This issue was never satisfactorily resolved during the research. Because the main purpose of the research was to obtain a university degree, it was misleading to suggest to the participants that the research would fulfil their possible expectations and that it would be of great assistance to participants. At the most, the research could offer Maori policy advisers an overview of Maori policy advice within the state and form a basis for the development of strategies which would make the practice of such advice more effective. I also undertook to provide each participant with a complete transcript of their interview and at the completion of the research a summary of its main findings.

### **(c) Conducting Maori Research**

Despite working for some time, in consultation with senior sociologists, on an interview schedule designed to be informally delivered and containing many open-ended questions, the participants in the pilot interviews complained that the structure of the interview schedule was too rigid for Maori. In particular, the delivery and the style of the questions were seen to be too formal and thus restrictive:

Your questions are too long and involved. They need to be loosened up more.

[With Maori people] be a little less formal, even though your questions aren't formal by any stretch of the imagination...

Maori participants, they assured me, would answer many of the questions without direct prompting by an interviewer. The pilot interview participants suggested that the questions be more open ended so as to allow respondents to talk about important issues on their own terms as Maori. Rather than ask specific and formal questions, it was recommended that I discuss themes and that the respondent as well as the researcher be allowed to develop these. One respondent said that long and involved questions tended to make Maori people wonder what purpose the research was being conducted for. The Maori response to this situation could be a feigned claim not to understand the question:

It's not because they don't understand, it's that they don't know where you are coming from...loosen them up so that people tell you what they want to tell you, not what you want to hear.

What you are going to find is that Maori are going to want to know why it is you are trying to find this out. Your biggest issue is trying to overcome that, and that will determine how they are going to answer your questions anyway.

The use of open ended-questions permitted the boundaries relating to specific issues to be determined by the participant rather than by the researcher. I found this to be a useful technique in the interviews particularly about important topics like networks where I could just say 'let's talk about networks' and the respondents then answered the way that they wanted to.

The pilot interviews also prepared me for unanticipated developments that could arise in the course of interviewing. For example, when I arrived to interview one policy adviser, she suggested that another policy adviser be present in the interview. I consented to this, although from an objective research viewpoint, it introduced a dynamic into my study which I had not anticipated or prepared for. However, as Cicourel (1964:51) points out, such unexpected interventions, although seldom reported by researchers, do occur and are an actual part of many research projects. This requires that the researcher must temporarily drop the use of scientific rationalities. In this case, the result was a combined interview with both participants elaborating on many issues which one person may not have done. This interview, and others like it

which I encountered later in the research, provided the more detailed accounts of the practices of Maori policy advisers. An important contributing factor was the high level of interaction between the participants that such a 'shared' interview encouraged.

#### **(d) Who Should do Maori Research**

The ideal researchers on Maori issues are those who have close involvement with Maori cultural, social and economic experiences, knowledge and experience in the Maori world and possess appropriate skills to investigate, articulate, and communicate the information needed to confront these issues. Such researchers may be Pakeha or Maori (Stokes, 1985:9).

As a non-Maori, I had assumed that I could 'play down' the issue of ethnicity by explaining to participants that I was studying the state and the role of Maori policy advisers within it. I was to find that it was not possible to separate the issue of being Maori from the issue of working within the state. According to the two Maori advisers in the pilot interviews, such issues cannot be divorced.

By making such a distinction, I had also hoped to avoid being challenged as a non-Maori researcher. I had assumed the issue would largely be one of non-Maori researchers doing Maori research and so I did not disclose my own Japanese ethnicity in the first pilot interview. However, as Oakley (1981:30) points out, the researcher is necessarily a part of the process of research and cannot appear to be either too objective or detached from that process. My ethnicity was seen to be as important, if not more so, to the Maori advisers than was theirs. By not voluntarily disclosing my ethnicity I had actually created an atmosphere of ambiguity about myself and therefore the purposes of the research. The participants assumed that I was Maori. When I revealed that I was not, the participants strongly suggested I make this point clear before commencing interviews. They pointed out that as Maori, it was both important and appropriate that they knew the identity of the person they were talking to:

I am saying that...it's important for us to get to know each other. You are not going to get any [worthwhile] response from us until we know about you and your intentions, whether they are honest [or not].

One participant in the pilot interviews explained to me that although he had consented to be interviewed over the phone he had only decided to proceed with the interview after meeting me and allowing his wairua to guide him in either proceeding with or abandoning the interview. This was an issue that reinforced for me, as a researcher working with Maori policy advisers, the importance of a formal meeting with each participant prior to commencing the interview. It was essential in that brief time to make it clear who I was, what my research was about and why it was important. By providing the respondents with this information, I found that the response to the interview and the discussions which flowed from it were enthusiastic and helpful. This proved, in the course of the interviews, to be a very important requirement on my part as a researcher. The participants knew who I was, a little about my background and, as a result, were much more comfortable talking about themselves and their backgrounds.

As a New Zealand Japanese, I was perceived to be different from Pakeha. In both the pilot interviews and in the interviews which followed, participants mentioned that as a Japanese person, I would have a different cultural perspective from Pakeha. To some, this was seen to be an acceptable perspective and they were therefore willing to participate in the research. I was seen to be visibly and culturally different from Pakeha. Because I was Japanese, I was not perceived to be a member of the dominant culture, despite the fact that I was New Zealand-born and 'Pakeha' educated.

### **Finding Maori Policy Advisers**

The problem of gaining access was further compounded by the nature of Maori policy adviser positions. When beginning the research I had assumed that those working within the field of Maori policy advice would be policy analysts and Maori. This was not the case and I was forced to

address the issue of who is a 'Maori policy adviser'. Are all Maori policy advisers policy analysts? Are they Maori?

Many Maori working in policy advisory roles within the state sector do not have the job title policy analyst or Maori policy analyst. The title 'policy analyst' frequently reflects organisational histories rather than functional differences. Policy analysts are more likely to be located in the policy ministries within the state sector (e.g. Ministry of Women's Affairs, Treasury). Within other government departments, although people undertake similar kinds of work, they are often not appointed as policy analysts. Some Maori are not employed specifically to work on formulating Maori policy within Maori policy units. Rather, they are working in more general or mainstream policy areas which may or may not necessarily involve formulating or advising on Maori policy.

Maori policy advisers are a relatively new development within the state sector, and although they are represented within most government departments, their numbers are few. When I was about to begin my fieldwork, I had only very limited knowledge of the nature of these positions and even less concerning the location of the personnel within the state sector. This limited knowledge was based upon passing reference to Maori policy units in literature dealing with the impact of the Treaty of Waitangi on the government and the implications of the Treaty for social policy in New Zealand (Minister of Maori Affairs, 1988b; Durie, 1989; Kelsey, 1990). Therefore, the most immediate problem encountered in this research was that of finding Maori policy advisers.

I did have some contacts in the state sector and it was these contacts who directly facilitated my entry into the field by assisting me to locate and make initial contact with a group of Maori policy advisers. They also provided a brief list of names of other Maori policy advisers that I could contact as the research progressed. These initial contacts were Pakeha and policy advisers who were not working directly within the Maori policy area. Having these contacts overcame many of the problems of entry to the state sector, and locating and gaining access to Maori policy advisers. The ability of these Pakeha policy advisers to arrange initial interviews and to provide a further list of Maori contacts indicated the

extent to which there is, within the state sector, an informal network among people working in policy advice.

I had initially limited the study to eight Maori policy advisers. This figure was based on the assumption that such policy advisers were individuals confined to positions within what were formally defined as Maori policy units. I was aware from the limited discussion that existed within the literature (Minister of Maori Affairs, 1988b; Kelsey, 1990) that there were up to eight such units within the state sector. Therefore interviews with eight participants was deemed to be a sufficient number, based on the limited understanding that I had at the time. In the course of carrying out the research, however, it became apparent that within different organisations, responsibility for Maori policy advice was distributed across a variety of positions located in many departments and ministries and that the 'net' which I had to cast was much wider.

Another important issue to consider in deciding who was to participate in the study was the place of Maori units in the state. I had assumed that Maori units were responsible for producing Maori policy advice. However not only their existence but also the type of policy advice produced within units themselves differed across departments. Some units, located within policy ministries, had a strong policy orientation and performed a major role in formulating and giving policy advice. This advice contrasted sharply to that from Maori units in some of the service departments which produced what could only be described as policy relating to internal cultural development matters, in particular, cultural awareness programmes for staff development. Policy analysts working in units within policy ministries, on the other hand, were involved in developing Maori policy responses to major pieces of legislation which related to the functions of their ministries.

Yet another methodological issue which arose in selecting respondents was that of Pakeha being responsible for Maori policy advice in some government departments. Many of the Maori advisers in this study mentioned that Pakeha were involved in Maori policy in the state sector, and that they had an approach to policy issues which was different to that adopted by Maori:

From this perspective you are going to get a very one sided result in that you are going to always put the responsibility for the performance of government, this government and any other government on the shoulders of people in positions like mine. I think that it is very important that you ensure that you interview the bosses or the management of the people that you are interviewing or even the other [Pakeha] policy analysts.

Its almost as if the total responsibility is on Maori policy analysts whereas we have only been in the game for a relatively short time as opposed to Pakeha analysts that have been in the game for a long time.

One Maori adviser provided me with a brief list of advisers responsible for Maori policy in the state sector which included Pakeha. So it seemed as if the Maori advisers themselves directed me towards interviewing Pakeha advisers. But even after interviewing two Pakeha women working on Maori policy, I had difficulty in deciding whether or not to include them in the study. Not to include Pakeha Maori policy advisers would have meant that I was ignoring the policy responses of their organisations, responses which were significant in that they purported to be complying with Te Urupare Rangapu. There were also important differences in the responses directed by the Pakeha advisers which provided an important contrast to the work of Maori policy advisers. Finally, the presence of Pakeha advisers, as a development out of the state's dialogue with iwi, indicates that the expansion of Maori policy advice within the state sector does not necessarily ensure that it will be Maori who provide this advice. Therefore, although this study is about Maori policy advice in the state, it distinguishes between two types of Maori policy adviser: those who are Maori will be referred to as 'Maori advisers' while those who are not are referred to as 'Pakeha advisers'.

### **The Research Method**

The research method employed in this study was shaped by the on-going consideration of the methodological issues discussed above and the general theories which I had about the state and Maori working within it. The theory contributed to the decision to interview Maori policy advisers and not other Maori within the state sector. Maori policy advisers, by virtue of their structural position within the state, were seen

to have a far greater impact on the state than would Maori in other positions. The design of the interview schedule employed in this study also reflected the theory which underpinned this study.

### **Designing the Interview Schedule**

The semi-structured in-depth interview format was chosen because it allowed both the researcher and the respondent to interact and maintain a dialogue, which other techniques such as a postal questionnaire survey or a highly structured interview would have prevented. Both of the latter techniques would also have been culturally inappropriate in the context of this research. In both cases the procedural requirements are incompatible with basic Maori protocol, in particular that there be interaction between the researcher and the participant, and support Maori claims that social science research is a form of cultural raiding since the techniques allow no Maori input into the research except that allowed for under a rigid survey questionnaire structure. For these reasons the highly structured survey questionnaire technique was deemed to be quite inappropriate to doing research with Maori policy advisers.

The interview schedule which became the basis of the interviews reflected, in a broad sense only, the theoretical issues that underlay the thesis. It focused in particular on aspects of the state and the practices that Maori advisers adopted in relation to these issues. The interview schedule (see Appendix 3) included six groups of questions the are addressed below.

The first group of questions covered biographical issues, including the area of tribal affiliation. The biographical backgrounds of Maori policy advisers was important for a number of different reasons. If taken collectively, this material would provide me with an indication of the career trajectories of Maori policy advisers and their patterns of social mobility. However, more importantly, a biography met the requirements of Maori protocol that a person identify themselves with reference to background and especially tribal affiliation. These questions (preceded

by concise aspects of my own biography) acted as a lead in to the interview.

The second group of questions concerned the position that the adviser held within his or her organisation, what that entailed and the kinds of skills that the participant had to have to qualify as a policy adviser. This also included specific questions on the career trajectory of the adviser and employment prior to taking up the current appointment. These questions were designed to explore the position of Maori policy advisers as a relatively new group within the state and located within the primary labour market which was an important issue in explaining how these advisers experienced the state and its significance to them.

A third group of questions concerned the significance of Maori political issues to the development of the Maori policy adviser and his or her understanding of the Maori political resurgence. Did the adviser see these as having any relation to his or her own work within the state? How important was the impact of the Maori renaissance or Maori politicisation on the development of their policy advice? Were the analyses of Maori dependency on the state which have been developed through Maori politics for example, employed by the Maori policy adviser?

The adviser's perceptions of the state was explored in the fourth group of questions. How did the policy adviser see the state? What are the implications of this on his or her role as Maori policy advisers? What problems do Maori policy advisers, as an occupational group, collectively experience through working within the state? These questions reflected the underlying importance of state theory in this study.

The issue of Maori policy units was explored in the fifth group of questions and sought to obtain perceptions of the state's response to Maori demands for state sector responsiveness. Why did some departments have units and not others? Were they the best structures for Maori policy advice to be developed in? What are their strengths or their perceived weakness?

Finally, the last group of questions were focused on the ways in which Maori policy advisers work within the state sector and their lived experience within the state. In particular, these questions explored the practices and objectives of Maori policy advice. How important were networks in the development of Maori policy advice? What were the extent of such networks within the state sector and outside of the state? What practices did advisers adopt to be effective policy advisers? What problems did they encounter working within the state?

A final question asked respondents if there were any issues that had not been raised in the interview schedule that they thought to be important and invited discussion of these. This question was designed to bring the interview to a close and at the same time to pick up any important areas that had been glossed over in the interview. This last section proved to be an important part of the interview. Often respondents took the opportunity to raise issues not covered in the interview but which they thought to be important, to discuss the purpose of the research and what I might consider also investigating or as an opportunity to ask about the progress of other Maori units or programmes within government departments. Consider the following examples:

...you need to look at survival mechanisms for Maori people in the state sector or dealing with the state sector...I think it would be really good to ask how people are coping as you interview them.

...I'd be interested to know, because you have been round a number of units what your assessment of general morale [is] and again how people feel how effective they have been or will be?

Because of the semi-structured technique that was employed, the interviews were always interactive. As a researcher, I was often questioned by the respondents for my own thoughts on issues which they had been asked to comment on. This often occurs when doing research but has seldom been acknowledged as an integral part of the interview process (Oakley, 1981:42). For example, some respondents wanted to know more about my ethnicity. Often respondents commented on questions which they thought had required them to think about aspects of their work or an issue which they had not previously considered as being important.

[that was]...a good question because I hadn't actually thought about how those things happened. Just had those little half-pie sort of ideas about it.

### **The Interview Context**

All the interviews were conducted in Wellington within the government departments where the policy advisers worked. This required me to initially contact each respondent from Palmerston North by telephone and arrange a convenient interview time. After arranging an interview time for a respondent, I then sent him or her material about who I was and the nature and subject of my research.

Many of the interviews were conducted in a relaxed informal fashion, often at the insistence of the Maori policy advisers. In some cases they took the form of an interview between a Maori policy adviser and myself followed by an informal lunchtime meal and discussion with other Maori or Pakeha staff working within a division or unit. These interviews were not only informative in generating information on the names or locations of other Maori policy advisers but were also enjoyable social gatherings after two hour interviews.

### **Making Sense of the Interviews**

The interviews were recorded on audio-cassette tape, transcribed by myself and copies of the transcripts were returned to respondents for any editing they wished to make. The production of transcripts in both hard copy and as word documents on computer had a specific purpose. By doing this, I was able to become rapidly familiar with the material I had collected, and was able to code particular groups of responses to key questions. I was also able to provide the participants with a hard copy of their interview, for their own records.

None of the respondents objected to this technique, but relying on the recording of interviews did produce some problems. In one case, for example, I was unaware that I had not correctly engaged the recording sequence on the recorder and only realised several days after

completing the interview that I had lost a portion of that interview. Because of the heavy work commitments of Maori policy advisers, it was not practical to return and re-interview this participant.

This technique also created problems in the cases where I was interviewing more than one respondent. In particular, one interview involved between four and six participants over the course of an hour and it was an almost impossible task when transcribing the tape to identify clearly which person said what. Despite this, transcripts were produced, and returned to the participants who then had the opportunity to make any amendments.

One respondent had initially been reluctant to be interviewed unless a transcript was returned to her. This was because on an earlier occasion she had been the subject of a university-based research project and had had no feed-back from it. When I assured her that not only would a transcript be provided but that she would also have the opportunity to amend it, she agreed to be interviewed. Of the fifteen participants, four made slight amendments to their transcripts.

Rather than constructing an interview schedule which reflected a determined and fixed theoretical bent, the schedule that was adopted and modified in this study reflected the importance of the material itself and the way it was gathered to inform the theory. This is, as Cicourel (1964:71) argues, a basic part of sociological research which attempts to elicit rich information:

Rather than entering the research setting with an explicit theoretical scheme and design, the field researcher frequently develops his 'theory' during the study or after the data have been collected and while writing up the findings.

This was the approach I took towards analysing the material obtained through the interviews. My theoretical perspectives have been strongly shaped from the material obtained through the interviews and through the process of interviewing. Such an analysis thus reflects both the importance of methodological issues on the research process and the usefulness of the research method. Wherever possible, I have tried to let the participants speak through this thesis in their own words. If the

overall effect is disjointed or untidy, then perhaps it reflects a reasonably accurate account of methodological issues and methods that informed this research. After all, as Bechofer (1974:87) claims, research which ties things up too neatly and leaves no loose ends should be viewed with great suspicion.

### **An Overview of Maori Policy Advisers Identifying as Maori**

Finally it is an important part of this chapter to introduce the participants in the research. The following section provides basic social and demographic data about the Maori advisers and their backgrounds. Pakeha advisers are not included here but a similar overview is provided in Chapter Seven.

Interviews were conducted in most of the major government departments which were known to have Maori policy advisers. These included so-called service delivery departments, policy ministries and control agencies within the state sector. The size of these departments varied considerably; some were major departments employing up to a thousand staff while others were smaller and employed less than one hundred staff.

All the Maori advisers in this study were located at head office levels within the state sector. Three of the advisers were located within the same government department and two were located in another department. The other seven were all in separate government departments. Five of the advisers were located within Maori units. Of those five, two worked in units which had an emphasis on cultural development and three were in units within policy ministries.

Seven of the participants were managers at different levels, including one at senior management level; the other six were managing Maori focused units. The unit managers had responsibility for small numbers of staff, in most cases less than three people.

Two participants were employed as policy analysts although another three described their roles as being equivalent to that of policy analyst

and two managers also saw themselves as Maori policy analysts. In the majority of cases the policy advisers worked within the jurisdiction of one ministry or department. However, one policy adviser was working on a research project which was jointly funded and controlled by three government departments, while another three advisers were on secondment from other departments.

Of the twelve Maori advisers who were interviewed, six were women and six were men. The high number of women in these positions appears to be indicative of the nature of the change that has occurred within the state sector with the expansion of the primary labour market and the effect of EEO policies which have permitted more women to enter this market. This also suggests that Maori women have, within the state sector, assumed a major role working between the state and Maori interests. One adviser stated simply that under the old public service structure prior to the State Sector Act, Maori women were not promoted to management.

it became obvious you weren't going to get anywhere unless you were a fluent speaking Maori male in [my former department's] Head Office so I left...

The majority of the advisers had careers within the public service of less than six years, although the length of service among all the advisers ranged from a little over two years to almost forty years. In fact, the clear majority of the women had careers spanning six years or less in the state sector.

Some of the Maori women had worked outside of the primary labour market prior to working in the Maori policy area. One senior policy analyst had been employed in the Post Office, and then embarked on a period of doing community work before obtaining her present position. Two others described their work backgrounds in the following ways:

I went to school...[in a small town], and then I went to Girls High School...and was what you could call a statistical drop-out. I left school and bummed around doing a lot of labouring type jobs like rousing, working in the freezing works and I am a mother of two children.

I started out studying Law...which I did for three years and then decided that wasn't really my cup of tea at all. So I left and really just sort of roamed around, which was possible in those days, and just sort of picked up jobs here and there.

Those two women had later attained university degrees which enabled them to obtain primary labour market positions within the public service.

In contrast, the other three Maori women interviewed had experienced unbroken and rapid career paths. They were all currently managers within their respective departments. These women had entered university after leaving school and had embarked on careers immediately afterward. One had entered the public service directly on graduation, and had moved from there to senior positions within three government departments. Another two had also experienced professional career paths.

[I] left school and went to university and did a B.A...I trained as a teacher, a primary school teacher. I'm a qualified primary teacher and used that actually overseas to get a job. I came back looked at my career choices in about mid 1975, decided from a variety of options that I was interested in [social work] and went into that.

[W]hen I was about eleven, or twelve, my father was posted overseas, so I have actually spent quite a bit of time in my teenage years overseas...then I came back to go to university here...well [I entered the Public service] straight out of university. I was literally looking for a job when I left university.

Among the six Maori men employed as policy advisers there were both contrasts and similarities between their career paths and experiences and those of the women. Two had been employed in the state sector for over twenty years and did not hold university qualifications. These two were senior public servants in terms of the positions which they held and their length of service in the state sector. Both had been educated at private Maori schools in the 1950s. One had then become a teacher and later worked in the probation area prior to taking up his current position in the last two years. The other one had entered his department back in the mid 1950s after leaving school and had worked his way through the old public service grades to his current position.

The other four men had only been in the state sector for periods of less than six consecutive years. Three advisers held university degrees but the public sector was not initially where they had worked.

I grew up in all sorts of places, my father is a school teacher so we travelled a lot. Went to University and did an honours degree...I spent some time teaching [overseas]...

I grew up in a traditional Maori home...on a farm, in a rural Maori community with a close association with the marae...I spent three years on the dole after I did my degree...I wasn't offered a job – I was told to take a job as a labourer on a PEP gang, working on the side of the road for a year.

[This] has been the second job that I have had...I graduated with a Ph.D... about four years ago...and I worked...at [a Polytechnic]...I have spent most of my life at school until about three years ago, when I finished my Ph.D. I have recently been married, and so I am having to knuckle down and do a proper job.

A fourth adviser had not yet completed his university degree. However, his background was similar to that of the other three:

My first language is Maori and Maori was spoken in the home and I guess I wasn't introduced to speaking English to any great extent until I entered primary school...From secondary school I went and spent a year at University, I had firmly fixed in view the idea of becoming a school teacher, teaching Maori language but I changed my mind pretty quickly after starting university...

After deciding not to pursue a teaching career, he had worked in the state sector, initially in the secondary labour market for about five years prior to coming to Wellington to work in the policy area five years ago. He was currently completing a university qualification.

Although all among the Maori policy advisers expressed a commitment to the general thrust of the Maori renaissance, less than half had been personally involved in Maori protest or issue groups, which many saw as having contributed to the importance of Maori policy. Two advisers expressed their understanding of these issues, as being very much external to their own immediate experiences:

So probably my awareness of those issues was not so great before I came to the [Department], because it hadn't affected my

day to day life to quite the same extent, and I think that just sort of socially, my personal background...I didn't come from an under privileged or deprived family, so probably we were sort of better off I suppose and so those issues didn't affect me personally.

Well you have to take into account that I have been away for a considerable part of that time...I noticed when I came back to New Zealand after such a long time away the difference in attitude towards things Maori and Treaty Issues. Of course there was quite a sharp contrast when I'd left, well it was the year of the Springbok tour when I'd left and things like racial questions were certainly in people's minds, [but] they were looking overseas a lot in New Zealand. When I came back, of course, the Treaty was hugely important in Pakeha eyes, it always has been in Maori eyes.

Others, who were not personally involved in those Maori issues which activist politics had re-articulated in the late 1970s and early 1980s, claimed to have a good knowledge of them. In particular, they argued that in fact these issues were not new, but rather were matters that all Maori were aware of:

[the issues are]...the same ones that they have been for the last 150 years. The Land, employment, health, education, as major sub-sets of issues. I think over-riding all of those is the issue of mana. The mana of the Maori people.

The things that have been said in the 60s and the 70s are probably the same things that were said in the 60s and 70s of the last century. And for some reason they are now being heard and being acted on.

Another group, however, had been involved in Maori issue groups prior to becoming Maori policy advisers:

I was part of the people that used to rush around with placards saying the Treaty is a fraud...

Two advisers outlined how they had adopted the aims of Maori activist groups and how this had led them to want to be involved in Maori policy:

I had become politically active, very politically active. So I got into a lot of things back then. Mostly youth work, working with unemployed, working with work trusts and gangs and also with political movements. But it wasn't till I went to university and was able to study people like Karl Marx that I began to realise the pattern of oppression perpetuated by economic and political

systems. Once I was able to use the tools provided by the major theorists...I was able to get a clearer picture of where we were at as Maori people, where our position was, in terms of New Zealand society. When I realised that we were at the brink of genocide, I woke up, I decided to put my feelings into action, positive action.

I've always known I was Maori...but never really lived it because we had quite a Pakeha upbringing with my parents wanting the best for us and that sort of thing. Maori was never spoken in the house unless Dad was on the phone or had a visitor...Donna Awatere was the psychologist working in [my area and we] were housed in the same building...Donna was writing Maori Sovereignty at the time so we'd...talk Maori Sovereignty, it was just magnificent...I read her articles and everything just sort of clicked...So I think, thinking about Maori sovereignty, thinking about Maori self determination, looking politically at society, and the way the state imposed its will on society, looking at the fact we were carrying out policies that were developed somewhere else and a lot of those policies were not very positive for my people I decided that I should do something about it.

One adviser had fully developed her commitment to Maori political aims through her experiences at university:

And really through all of that, the two years at university [my lecturers were]...pushing me on to identifying exactly what perspective I actually wanted to use in my analysis...So I had to become very succinct at describing what it is that's important to me, from that perspective. And the most important thing of course was the fact that I am Maori, and the most important thing for me to know is how Maori people are either suffering, coping, or doing well under a certain set of circumstances. And that really dictated from that point onwards what it was that I would do.

All the Maori policy advisers interviewed identified themselves on the basis of their iwi connections and many of the advisers had multiple iwi connections. For some, their iwi affiliation was particularly important in obtaining advice or feedback relating to their performance as Maori policy advisers:

I always go home. I spend at least a weekend at home once every three weeks and that primarily is to keep them in touch with things that are happening in the Department and keep them aware of programmes that are operating within the Department and how best those programmes can be presented. And I usually use some of my own people as...the presenters for the programmes that I have.

Maintaining iwi connections was therefore seen as an integral part of being a Maori policy adviser which many of the participants consciously sought to do.

When things get too depressing I just jump in my car and head home for a few days. Get back in touch with the reality of the people...

It was written into my contract...Those were the conditions under which I would come [to Wellington]. I would not lose that, not under any circumstances because I owe my allegiance to them.

[W]e have iwi huis here, that are regular monthly huis for my own tribe and we go to those. And we discuss every issue that is currently in the public eye that affects Maori people.

## **Summary**

This profile of Maori policy advisers was obtained through the processes outlined in the first part of the chapter. As a group, the majority of Maori policy advisers in this study were in their thirties or early forties, university educated and had less than ten years experience within the state sector. After working through the methodological issues of gaining access to Maori policy advisers, defining what is a Maori policy adviser and negotiating the issue of being a non-Maori researcher engaged in Maori research, I was able, with the assistance of feedback obtained through conducting pilot interviews, to interview Maori policy advisers in a manner which was culturally appropriate. These interviews provided me with material relating to the understandings and practices of Maori policy advisers in the state. My findings are presented and discussed in the following chapters.

## Chapter Five

### Maori Advisers and the State

For those policy advisers who are employed in the state to advise on Maori issues and who are themselves Maori, the relationship with the state is profoundly intimate. As Maori, they are part of a population which has been and increasingly is under current economic conditions, bound up with the state's delivery of state welfare. As part of the public service, they are integral to the development and delivery of state welfare and provision.

According to Puao Te Ata Tu (1986), the development of state institutions since the 1850s has meant for Maori a recurring cycle of conflict and tension against a backdrop of on going deprivation which:

has drained Maori spiritually and physically. It finds expression today in our atrocious levels of [state] dependency (Ministerial Advisory Committee on a Maori Perspective, 1986:5).

The level of Maori dependency on the state is illustrated across a broad spectrum of social and economic indicators. According to the New Zealand Planning Council (1989:136), the disadvantaged circumstances of the Maori community are manifest in the heavy concentration of Maori families in the lower range of income distribution, little improvement (and in cases deterioration) in home ownership rates and chronic levels of unemployment.

Maori receive a greater proportion of their total income per year through cash welfare payments than the general population. The average Maori income per head after tax for the year 1988 was \$9950 per year, compared to \$12,350 for all New Zealanders. One thousand nine

hundred and fifty dollars of the average Maori income was derived from state welfare cash payments in contrast to \$2000 for New Zealanders in general (New Zealand Planning Council, 1990:74). The average Maori household in 1989/1990 received \$122.19 per week from social welfare benefits (excluding National Superannuation) compared to \$42.55 per week for all New Zealand households (Ministerial Planning Group, 1991:28). Although these figures suggest that Maori are more dependent on the state for a greater proportion of their income than New Zealanders in general, welfare payments, however, are but one indicator of the state's impact on the lives of Maori.

Government spending on education was 42 percent higher for Maori households in the 1987/1988 year than that directed to general households (New Zealand Planning Council, 1990:75). This does not indicate that either Maori or the state are satisfied with the results of that expenditure. In 1989, 36.8 percent of Maori left school with no formal qualifications while only 12.5 percent of non-Maori left school without qualifications. Only 32 percent of Maori school leavers in 1989 attained sixth form certificate or higher, while for non-Maori the figure was 65.1 percent (Ministerial Planning Group, 1991:34).

Maori are also more dependent than non-Maori on other government services. Maori have comparatively higher rates of admission to hospital. Similarly Maori are over represented in prison admissions. In December 1988, 1670 inmates were Maori. That is nearly half of the number of all inmates, although Maori make up less than 10 percent of the total population in New Zealand (Department of Statistics, 1990:307).

Furthermore, Maori are much more likely to require state housing assistance. As the report of the Maori Women's Housing Research project team (Maori Women's Housing Research Project, 1991) noted in its study of Maori women, the issue of affordability was the biggest barrier many Maori face in securing home ownership. That report found that the majority of Maori did not turn to the private sector, but to the state for assistance instead (Maori Women's Housing Research Project, 1991:47-48). According to the New Zealand Planning Council (1990:75), the average Maori household receives more annual assistance from the Housing Corporation (\$650) than do non-Maori (\$305).

The state's involvement in Maori lives has been typified by many Maori as having few benefits (Ministerial Advisory Committee on a Maori Perspective, 1986; Evans, 1986:18-19). For Maori the effects of state policy over the last 150 years have been the deprivation of their political and economic base by or through the state. The state's role in Maori land alienation, urbanisation and the proletarianisation of the Maori population has already been discussed. The impact of the ensuing dependency has been greater than mere economic reliance. As one of the policy advisers in this study argued:

[Maori] have more than dependent stomachs. We've got dependent minds and hearts...and that's not unexpected, given the systematic erosion of practically everything that we have been able to call our own, or stand on as our own (Aroha).

Because Maori advisers<sup>4</sup> are dealing with the state's delivery to Maori, they become pivotal in the relationship between Maori and the state. They are, potentially at least, advocates and mediators of Maori interests within the state. Whether Maori outside the state recognise that is rather more debatable:

I think that so many Maori look at the policy process with disdain or with indifference without actually realising the far reaching implications of policy and processes on their lives (Marama).

Maoridom doesn't seem to appreciate the position of people that are developing policy...without Maori input there is no chance there (Geoff).

Despite this apparent popular disinterest, theories of the state emerge not simply out of an academic discourse but in popular culture as well. People socially construct the state in everyday attempts to deal with an organisation whose policies, whether interventionist or not, impact on them:

What the state does is always important...the policies of the state impinge on our everyday lives and consequently we are all engaged in 'coping' with the state. To do this, consciously or

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<sup>4</sup> 'Maori advisers' refers to Maori policy advisers in this study who are Maori. Non-Maori involved in Maori policy are referred to as 'Pakeha advisers'.

unconsciously we analyse the state, we try to 'make sense of it' (Saville-Smith, 1987:193).

If this is true of people in general, how much more pertinent it is to Maori people who have not only been engaged in a constant struggle with the state's legal and social apparatus over the last century and a half, but who have also explicitly entered into a formal, constitutional relationship with the state through the Treaty of Waitangi. In addition, if Maori in general could be expected to have a particular preoccupation with 'making sense' of the state, then Maori advisers must be so much more concerned with the nature of the state and the extent and limits of its power. This chapter explores Maori advisers' perceptions of the state. It is that understanding which informs what they believe they can achieve and how they believe they can achieve it.

This chapter is framed around two major questions. Firstly, how Maori advisers see the organisational limits and the opportunities of their position and secondly, what they believe the state is capable of as an agent. This chapter does not deal with the views of Pakeha advisers working in the area of Maori policy advice. Their views are discussed in Chapter Seven.

Even though a small number of Maori advisers participated in this study, they showed a relative diversity of backgrounds and experiences. For some of the advisers their principle experience of the state has been as state employees. Others, because of unemployment, have been dependent on the state as beneficiaries or as participants in state funded work schemes. Many of the advisers have community links which bring them directly into contact with whanau or iwi whose members are at best critical of the state and, at worst, passive recipients of state welfare. Many have been involved in Maori pressure groups which have sought to get some response from the state in relation to various issues. Nevertheless, despite this diversity, the respondents all shared an explicit commitment to kaupapa Maori<sup>5</sup> in working as policy advisers. It is in that context that Maori advisers articulate their views of the state.

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<sup>5</sup> Working to a Maori agenda

## The State as an Organisation

Rather than seeing the state as an agent, it may also be viewed as a set of complex organisations, oriented to the purposeful pursuit of relatively specific goals. Within organisations, individuals have roles and statuses. These positions determine not only rewards but also the individuals ability to make decisions.

There is broad agreement among Maori advisers that their employment by the state is associated with significant status and economic rewards which protect them from the conditions faced by the majority of Maori. In 1990, only about 14 percent of Maori were employed in the occupational categories into which the Maori advisers fall (Manatu Maori, 1991:6). The Maori advisers all recognised that those benefits which they received as Maori advisers were dependent on them taking on membership within what they considered to be essentially a Pakeha organisation with Pakeha ethos and mores.

Some of the advisers held very senior positions within their organisations and many others saw themselves as pursuing a career within the state sector. Few, however, saw the search for positions and seniority in the state sector as primarily an opportunity for personal advancement. Instead, they saw career advancement as a strategy to enable Maori to have some influence in effecting change within society. While Maori advisers recognised that the state provided them with significant opportunities, they connected this with other objectives. Most important was the ability to pursue kaupapa Maori within the state:

[I see] the Public Service as my career, but only in a particular context, in terms of creating opportunities for Maori people to take control of their own affairs. And that has really been the purpose of my whole career (Huia).

The state means to me at present a job. The state also means to me that because Maori people are so dependent on the state at present, that it is an opportunity to try and bring about some policy changes that may benefit Maori people...I would say that most Maori work for the state, because one, it is a job and it pays for bread and butter, and two, because they are trying to make the changes within the state. But it is not because they want to represent the state. Their job is to make the changes (Julie).

Some advisers felt so strongly about their commitment to effecting change through their involvement in Maori policy that they suggested they would give up a public service career if they felt they could no longer achieve that change.

I said before that I'm only working in this job, [and it is] very task oriented. I didn't join the public service as a career public servant, I've got no intention of staying for too much longer, in spite of the good pay which is much better than most of us [Maori] ever get (Matiu).

I'm really not prepared to carry on, which is just from a purely personal point of view. That is the extent to which I think it is important, and to divest myself of the salary that I have at the moment for that, I think is difficult, but I think that I have to do it (Huia).

The ability of Maori advisers to effect change within the organisation, and more importantly within society, is largely determined by three sets of factors. Firstly, the organisational culture and the extent to which that allows Maori to have influence within various organisations. Secondly, it is determined by the positional power of Maori advisers. Thirdly, it is informed by the ultimate constraints imposed by the organisation's legitimated objectives within the state. These three factors are discussed below.

### **Organisational Culture**

All organisations have an organisational culture which informs the behaviour of its members. The nature of that culture cannot be explained simply by reference to an organisation's formal structure, nor by reference to the overt stated or legitimated goals of the organisation. There is also an internal framework of groups, networks of friends and unspoken rules which are particularly influential to the maintenance of the organisation and the distribution of power within it (Perrow, 1979:177). Those common norms, values and mores, which both orient and govern the contributions of individuals to their organisation, are referred to as the organisational culture (Scott, 1987:291).

Organisational cultures tend to reflect the relations of domination within the wider society. Frequently, according to some commentators, the rituals and practices which comprise an organisational culture have very little to do with organisational goals, and very much to do with the maintenance of power relations within the organisation (Kanter,1977:194-195). According to Salaman (1979:177):

...organisational cultures are least obvious to current members of the organisation who take their confident mastery of, and competence at the culture of their employing organisation entirely for granted. So much so that it is confused with normality – with the way things are, and must be...members of the organisation go to considerable lengths to recruit new members with some apparent predisposition to the receiving culture.

Consequently, organisations frequently exclude or prevent other socially non-dominant groups from being effective within organisations (Kanter, 1975:224-225). When organisations do recruit from non-dominant groups, they tend to require specific demonstration of that individual's ability to 'fit' into the existing culture. As one adviser said:

I wasn't employed here because they think it would be good for me, or because they think it would be good for Maori people, but because they think it would be good for [my organisation]. So you have to have the academic background, you have to have the experience and the same time I think you have to be a person of integrity. Like you are not going to bum them out. Like you are not going to do anything stupid or unprofessional (Matiu).

Recruits drawn from non-dominant groups tend to be placed in low status positions within organisations. Where non-dominant groups enter high status positions they are often tokens, both 'rare and scarce', excluded from real influence or forced to take responsibility for all matters pertaining to their group without giving them any real power to pursue those responsibilities. Kanter (1977:233) describes the creation of special slots for female tokens within the organisation she studied:

Committees, task forces and other ad hoc events had a tendency, too, to develop a woman's slot for those women selected to participate. Sometimes it would take the form of giving the women areas of responsibility that were stereotypically 'female' concerns or...giving them the role in the group of 'expert on women'.

Both these tendencies have been noted in relation to Maori within the state. Kelsey (1990:24) argues that the position of Maori are at best marginal and that they are ineffective because they have no overall perspective. Maori advisers act for the state, assisting it in anticipating 'likely obstacles, to present a "bicultural" facade, to divide Maori allegiances and encourage collaboration' (Kelsey, 1991:128). The Maori advisers themselves were very aware of the desire to 'dump' responsibility on them for all Maori and treaty related issues:

[We have to ensure that we] are not the dumping ground for anything with the word Maori in it (Makere).

Not only were problems of being over-burdened identified. The problem of marginalisation and ghettoisation was also identified:

[It is important to] know that you...as a Maori...don't own the Maori issues. That its everybody's responsibility. I think when we first started, if there...was anything, any ad hoc request, that sort of remotely related to Maori people, they'd run to our desk...Yeah but to me its knowing what is your responsibility and what is the whole division's responsibility...It would have been easy for us to take ownership of every Maori issue which is I suppose like ghettoising it into our thing (Donna).

Marginalisation or ghettoisation (Barrett, 1980:150) refers to the process through which the concerns or contributions of non-dominant groups are confined to the perimeters of organisations and excluded from its core processes. Within feminism, for example, there has been much debate about the effectiveness of the women's studies paradigm. To some, it has failed to challenge the underlying structure of the social sciences. Instead, it has created a niche in mainstream academia for managing potentially disruptive and threatening theorising (Stanley and Wise, 1983:31; Bouchier, 1983:171). The establishment of women's studies departments in universities demonstrates that within such organisations, these issues can be sectioned off from the mainstream operations of the university.

Similarly, within state organisations the creation of special units for Maori may be seen as the marginalisation of Maori issues from the mainstream operations of those organisations. Such units can indeed become ghettoised.

There is little doubt about the complexity of the Maori advisers' relationship to their employing organisation. As Fleras (1989) points out, there are major difficulties associated with reconciling Maori interests within state bureaucracies. This is because the rules (and the organisational culture) that inform the constitution of acceptable behaviour within state sector organisations are often inflexible and conflict markedly with Maori cultural values:

Demands to entrench the principle of aboriginality within a bureaucratic framework pose a fundamental challenge. Bureaucratic assumptions and underlying meanings are largely impervious to changes in redefining government-client relations (Fleras, 1989:221).

Maori advisers often encounter a sense of alienation in the organisations they enter:

...you come in and you don't know the culture of the organisation and...you don't know those functions and roles. It takes a long time to work out exactly who does what and who is responsible for what...[it is difficult] for Maori people who aren't familiar with the way things are done here. You find that you have used up a whole lot of your energy focusing on the wrong emphasis, perhaps...There are guide-lines but the majority culture seems to take it for granted that you know the rules and parameters at any rate. Whether they deliberately don't tell you, or that they make assumptions that you do know it doesn't matter. The thing is that you don't know (Donna).

Maori advisers recognised the need to be familiar with the organisational culture and to be ready to give up some part of their Maori identity, even temporarily to be part of the organisation:

[For] a lot of Maori public servants at senior levels and at other areas too...you come to work you have to hang your korowai<sup>6</sup> up and you get on with being a Pakeha...How do you deal with conflicting values consistently...on a second by second basis? And I mean it is easier probably for some of us who have been grounded in the Pakeha background to deal with this system, but then there is a real dilemma about how do you bring what you learnt and know from this other whole culture into it and wondering if you are doing it right? (Marama).

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<sup>6</sup> A cloak which in this case symbolises the Maori identity.

Leaving behind Maori identity in this way is recognised as potentially dangerous for Maori, individually and collectively. For some individuals the stress can be marked:

I think it explains that number of schizophrenics we have got in mental hospitals. It is like the stress of both the Maori and Pakeha systems on you and being true to the one you are there for (Marama).

For Maori collectively, the unquestioning adoption of the organisational culture to be effective within the organisation can lead easily to being an 'organisational Maori'. In that case one acts to protect the interests of the organisation or in personal interests related to maintaining one's own position rather than effecting change for Maori people:

Quite often Maori within the state sector develop policies that please their political masters if you like. They get them promotions more quickly...(Geoff).

### **Constraints of the Position**

The influence of Maori advisers in the policy area is also constrained by the status of the positions they occupy within the organisation. As Merton (1970) illustrates, power in bureaucratic organisations is hierarchical and invested in the position rather than the individual who holds it. In any organisation, there are:

...a series of integrated offices, of hierarchized statuses, in which inhere a number of obligations and privileges closely defined by limited and specific rules...Authority, the power that derives from an acknowledged status, inheres in the office and not in the particular person who performs the existing role (Merton, 1970:47).

Therefore, individuals within organisations can activate organisational power through accessing those high status positions which permit them to exercise power. There are a number of ways to achieve that. Maori advisers may obtain the recognised accreditation to allow them entry to such positions. The majority of advisers in this study held completed or nearly completed university qualifications. As one adviser commented:

You have to have a tertiary qualification for a start, there wouldn't be any point without a tertiary qualification (Matiu).

For those advisers without formal university qualifications, another way in which Maori can obtain positions is through long service and accumulated knowledge which qualifies them for such high status positions. In Weber's (1948:215) ideal type of bureaucracy:

Individual performances are allocated to functionaries who have specialised training and who by consistent practice learn more and more.

However, holding appropriate certification or having long service do not in themselves guarantee the entry of Maori into high status positions within government organisations.

Another strategy which Maori may use to access such positions are Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) regulations which all government organisations covered under the State Sector Act (1988) must observe. The special needs of Maori are also covered under this Act. EEO is designed to assist minority groups, in particular women, ethnic minorities and differently abled, to obtain positions of authority within organisations. It is seen as an important strategy for reducing inequalities within the labour market that disadvantage such groups (RCSP Vol.3, 1988, 584-593).

For one adviser, EEO legislation had been a factor in her appointment. Because her organisation had expanded the skills base required for her position and affirmed its commitment to EEO, she had been selected above other more formally 'qualified' applicants:

Unless the applicants could demonstrate during the course of the interview, and from the application that they actually had a commitment to both biculturalism and equal employment opportunities, they would not be considered for the job (Donna).

Although EEO is one way in which Maori can obtain such positions, many of the advisers were not entirely happy with the success of such programmes within their organisations. Some argued that because Maori are tangata whenua, their claim to employment within the state sector is not simply on the basis of being a minority group amongst others. There

was a strong feeling amongst the Maori advisers that EEO did not deliver the same outcomes for Maori as it did for other groups, particularly Pakeha women. According to one adviser, although EEO should actually be compatible with Maori demands in the state sector:

[T]here is conflict and competition. Maybe the competition holds a key to it. I think there is a perception that EEO is about a number of groups who are competing for finite resources, and as a result I guess, and as the resources are diminishing, the people who are involved in EEO have to try and prioritise. And it has been my experience that women seem to be to the fore. There is also a tension as far as Maori are concerned. I have often heard people state that as far as Maori people are concerned, they are not just another disadvantaged group. They are in fact tangata whenua, as far as the Treaty is concerned. The Treaty was about partnership, power sharing and all that sort of stuff, so Maori should not be included as one of the competitors for this diminishing resource (Bill).

If Maori advisers are to be effective within their organisations, then by necessity they must be able to obtain high status positions within those organisations where effective decision-making and control resides. Only one of the advisers interviewed was in a senior management position. Another five were in the lower levels of management. The remaining six were in senior but non-managerial positions. Their advice consequently moved through a relatively long chain of managers before reaching the ultimate decision-makers. In terms of the organisation, this was usually the Director General. In terms of government decision-making, the minister.

The distance between the advisers and the decision-makers was also 'peopled' by a variety of gatekeepers. Those who could avoid, or who had a short distance between their position and those in decision-making situations, tended to have greatest influence. This was partly because there were fewer intermediary gatekeepers. But it was also because the adviser could develop a personal relationship with the decision maker.

Weber (1948:196), described the ideal type of bureaucracy as appearing to work on the basis of universal and impersonal rules. However, this is a superficial view of complex organisations. According to Merton (1970), the adherence to such impersonal rules which is such a marked feature of organisations can become an over-riding goal pursued by

organisational members without regard for the desired goals which organisations seek to achieve. Such adherence to the rules acts:

...not as a measure designed for specific purposes, but becomes an immediate value in the life-organization of the bureaucrat. This emphasis, resulting from the displacement of original goals develops into rigidities and an inability to adjust readily. Formalism, even ritualism ensues with an unchallenged insistence on punctilious adherence to formalized procedures (Merton, 1970:52).

It has also been found that the impersonal pursuit of means and ends within organisations, is also often a personal pursuit. Kanter's (1977) study of men and women in American corporations shows that personal relationships become crucial in the distribution of power and influence within organisations:

People become dependent on those who can help them make their way through the system or who provide the means to bypass rules that are behaviourally constraining or inappropriately applied. They become dependent on those with discretion over necessary resources...those who control important contingencies retain a strong basis for personal power (Kanter, 1977:171).

Indeed, Perrow (1979:14) argues that patronage or relationships based on personal loyalty within bureaucracies are an important mechanism in career movement. Mentoring can be seen as the formalised expression of the importance of personal relationships. As Ragins (1989:2) argues:

Mentoring relationships may serve a number of functions. First mentors may provide training and inside information on the organisation and its political functions. Second they may provide psycho-social support serving as counsellor...role model...[and] they may serve as a buffer between the individual and the organisation...In short, mentors may serve to provide the proteges upward mobility in the organisation, by providing support, visibility, resources and direction.

Three of the advisers had such a mentoring relationship with high status Maori advisers, and one had a similar relationship with a Pakeha Director General. One adviser's relationship had been pivotal to her rise within the state sector. She discussed this relationship at length:

So I did join the Department but I remained in Auckland for about six months and then got the sort of heavy word from [my mentor]

and the Director General to come to Wellington. So I moved to Wellington and worked in Head Office...until I got more heavy words from [my mentor] and the Director General and became a part of the [Maori] unit...the interesting thing was being able to develop relationships with senior managers in the Department and to constantly influence them to create more and more scope for Maori perspective in the Department. From that point of view it was an extremely rewarding experience, plus there was the reward of working closely for six months with [my mentor]. And in that time he was encouraging me all of the time to sort of treat the Public Service as my career, but only in a particular context, in terms of creating opportunities for Maori people to take control of their own affairs (Huia).

Another adviser maintained a mentoring relationship with her former Director General. She had gained access to a number of positions through this relationship:

So I came down and went to see the Director General and I said, look I'm here, you've got no Maori people in Head Office, and I think you need to have one, so they created a position for me and I spent the next 2 years there. That would be from '85 to the end of '87 (Marama).

Many of the advisers did not have these relationships. This was indicative of the low numbers of senior Maori within government organisations and the difficulty some advisers had with getting access to, or having such relationships with, senior Pakeha.

Personal relations with decision-makers were limited but were recognised as important. Only two of the Maori advisers currently had sustained contact with ministers, although another had been involved with advising senior cabinet ministers in his previous position:

[O]ur minister is...particularly keen on endorsing Maori information and education programmes and thrown his weight behind that. So I find that very encouraging...he has questions to ask, he takes an interest. I think we're quite lucky because I think he has an intellectual interest in the Treaty and all the issues that flow out of implementing it (Makere).

Those advisers also had close relations with their chief executives. Such relations also existed between a further three advisers and their chief executives. The role of chief executives in particular is seen as pivotal to

determining which or what functions an organisation will implement in relation to Maori policy and what priority will be accorded to these:

Clearly the key to the successful implementation of a responsive public sector is the role played by chief executives...(O'Reilly and Wood, 1991:339)

This was endorsed by many of the Maori advisers. One adviser was convinced that the success of policies which reflected responsiveness lay in chief executives being made co-sponsors of the changes which were outlined in Te Urupare Rangapu. Many attributed much of the success in developing Maori policy within their organisations to their relationship to the chief executive:

[My] chief executive who was utterly committed to that [which] certainly enhanced the likelihood of success (Aroha).

[Although] there is a small Maori network here and we have very good access to the chief executive here (Bill).

Others attributed difficulties they had experienced as policy advisers as arising out of a poor relationship with members of their senior management:

We have wanted to develop Maori policy this financial year but have been stopped by our general manger. My general frustration is that my general manager is not particularly supportive of Maori things (Marama).

### **The State as an Agent**

Irrespective of position or organisational culture, Maori advisers may find that they simply cannot influence the overall direction of the state. Ultimately, Maori advisers have to address the problem of whether the state and state policy making can do more than merely manifest sectoral interests. The broad elements of that debate in sociological analysis have been outlined in Chapter Three. But that issue is not merely of academic interest. Analysis of the role of the state preoccupies many of the Maori advisers within it. Certainly, many were clear as to the limits of their bureaucratic positions.

In contrast to Weberian theory which portrays the state bureaucracy as being the major player in the determination of state policy because elected representatives rely on bureaucratic expertise, Maori advisers identified elected representatives as controlling Maori policy:

There's a bunch of white racists over there in Government. The ones who have got the ultimate decision making on policies especially on resources are all in cabinet...I think it is just a horrible crew there and...what they believe in is not the strengthening of the iwi (Marama).

Politicians come and politicians go. Policy is worthless without implementation of it. Two years ago we had some really good [Government] policy...Today those policies are no more, they are history. So all the thought and the energy, the sweat and the blood and tears that went into creating it by Maori people has all gone to waste (Matiu).

I could develop a whole range of policies and put them over to the minister and even the minister might support them. He then goes to his cabinet colleagues and they boot it out the door...a lot of public servants don't appreciate the importance of funds and that we are constrained as to what we can do in terms of policy implementation by the amount of money we are voted (Geoff).

But even politicians do not define the direction of state policy in isolation. Social movements, according to pluralist theory, will attempt to lobby elected officials to recognise their interests. While all pressure groups attempt to persuade policy officials towards a preferred course of action, they adopt different styles in pursuit of their objectives. Lobbying can take place either in the public eye or behind the scenes. Among Maori groups, lobbying the government has tended to take either of these forms. Some Maori may engage in public lobbying around a single cause in an attempt to influence the government by arousing public indignation. Other groups may prefer to lobby behind the scenes, 'getting to know' the power figures in government, establishing a reputation for credibility and using these informal links to communicate a particular point of view without aggressive confrontation (Fleras, 1986:38-39).

Power is also exercised by dominant groups in society who reinforce cultural values and institutional practices which are inherently favourable

to their interests (Marger, 1981:25). Maori groups may attempt to lobby elected leaders to make the state more responsive through recruiting more Maori into decision making positions within government organisations, but this may conflict with the interests of dominant groups. Pakeha can and do object to Maori claims for greater state responsiveness, and Pakeha interests, according to one Maori adviser, are not receptive to Maori claims:

I have come to the conclusion that Maori policy per se, is unlikely to be successful in New Zealand government because the New Zealand society is too racist to allow it to happen and the Labour Government in the last administration grasped a lot of the concepts intellectually but moved well ahead of where the electorate was or wished to be, and I think made the mistake of not investing money in educational programmes for the community about what the government was interpreting as their responsibility under the Treaty (Aroha).

Many of the advisers perceive of the state primarily as a Pakeha state:

The state is definitely a Pakeha thing (Donna).

When discussing the state, Maori advisers argue that its interests are primarily Pakeha and that it has systematically disadvantaged Maori people. One policy adviser, while commenting on the effect of state policies on Maori dependency in New Zealand, argued that:

What the state is, and what it has been since the first gap was spotted by the early legislators and policy makers...is really an extension of Britain...we are one of the countries that has been taken over by Western colonial capitalism...[its] effects on Maori have been so severe that Maori people are on the verge of genocide and I believe we are. I still believe that we could be wiped out as a people (Matiu).

Maori advisers made frequent reference to the state's failure to actively pursue the guarantees under the Treaty of Waitangi and its active collusion in alienating Maori land and resources. All these were cited as indicative of the inherently Pakeha nature of the state. It was felt that the Pakeha state has historically acted against the interests and well-being of Maori people, creating the high levels of Maori dependency. While Maori people have been disadvantaged by the state, Pakeha people have benefited:

[T]he government or the Crown has not protected us. It has done the dirty on us for a hundred and fifty and whatever years now, and it owes us in lots of ways...(Marama).

This type of analysis is hardly surprising. There is already a body of literature within which the state has been portrayed as a Pakeha system acting against Maori interests (Awatere, 1984; Williams, 1985) thus embodying the 'colonising ethos' which dispossessed Maori of their economic resources and political structures (Walker, 1990). It is a body of literature to which most of the Maori advisers would have been exposed to and familiar with. Williams (1985:98) argues that state policies:

...while pretending to help Maori people, are in fact a disguised and subtle form of racism, since they reinforce the very system that aims totally to destroy the Maori way of life and spirituality.

The Maori advisers expressed what seems at first to be a relatively straight forward instrumentalist analysis. Just as Miliband (1969:238) argues that the state is peopled by the ruling classes, so one adviser noted that:

Most policy makers that I come across in this area, are white, middle-class, if not upper class, Pakeha people, extremely academic, they might be liberal, on the whole they really have no idea of what oppression is about (Matiu).

Maori within the state could, according to some advisers, be regarded as nothing more than co-opted or embourgeoised Maori acting in the interests, not of Maori, but for a Pakeha elite:

There are a lot of Maori public servants who have gone a hell of a long way in the state sector on the backs of their own people, ostensibly demonstrating their oneness with the people...I know there are a few people around who are like that, and who really in my opinion don't deserve to be there because the level of protection they offer to the people is negligible. They actually act as protectors of the state sector, and I have real problems with that (Huia).

This apparently strongly instrumentalist view of the state lies uneasily with the continued employment of Maori advisers within it. All the Maori

advisers saw themselves as being involved in advancing the interests of Maori:

That is why I am here. Because I believe totally in Maori mana motuhake and because I believe that the state is an area that can't be ignored if you want to try and change this society (Marama).

I often talk about being a change agent within the public service and that's what I consider myself to be, but I work on the premise that the changes that are necessary in the public service are so enormous that I [an individual]...can't effect the changes but I can certainly make a significant impact on them (Bill).

Consequently, it is probably more accurate to describe Maori advisers as believing the state to be strongly elitist but also one in an institutional 'place' which allows it to be responsive. Their analysis approaches theories of a semi-autonomous state in which the state is an arena for social struggles. Indeed, the state is considered not only as an arena where one can have an effect, but is actually one of the few places where there can be effective social change:

Now after six years down here when I look at places I think I can still have an impact or bring about change...it is still the state which presents the greatest possibilities...if you are looking at bringing about change, to me the policy arena in the state sector is still the place to be (Marama).

The potential of the state to influence the lives of everybody is of course extremely high. It has the potential to either hinder people's progress or enhance it...and I guess seeing the potential of the state is a rationale for me being able to work in the public sector (Huia).

[B]ecause Maori people are so dependent on the state at present, that it is an opportunity to try and bring about some policy changes that may benefit Maori people (Julie).

This is in contrast to the private sector where Maori involvement and influence is low in terms of investment, ownership and establishing businesses, despite Maori resource ownership in land, forests and natural resources. This lack of influence is indicative of:

...the presence of complex economic, social and cultural barriers which signify some form of market failure in terms of equity of

access, process and outcomes (Ministerial Planning Group, 1991:42).

If Maori ownership in the private sector is low, then the provision of services which Maori encounter in that sector, is even less of a cause for optimism. Maori face both discrimination in the housing markets and affordability problems (Maori Women's Housing Research Project, 1991: 25-26). Many of the advisers were critical of the private sector as being either the salvation of Maori people from state dependency or as a deliverer of appropriate services to Maori people. According to one adviser, experience of the private sector by Maori people consisted of having:

...to submit themselves to the mercy of commercial institutions which they have never had any success with in the past. So why would you believe they will be successful from this point onwards? (Huia).

Unlike the private sector where Maori had no effective constitutional status, the Crown or the state is the Treaty partner of iwi under the Treaty of Waitangi. The Treaty thus provides Maori with a strong constitutional lever with which to ensure that the state is made responsive to Maori issues and needs.

This belief in the ability to co-opt state power for the benefit of Maori lies in the adviser's recognition that the state must legitimate its own position. That legitimation resides in the state being seen as fairly allocating resources between competing interests and maintaining public order. One adviser explained state responsiveness almost entirely in terms of the pressure of the public claim:

Protest, definitely protest and only protest...I think initially if it weren't for protests we would not be any where near where we are today in terms of our own consolidation as a people and our relationship with the government. I mean, having been around in the last fifteen years, in the protest movement. Fifteen years ago the whole country was spitting on us for trying to advocate the Treaty of Waitangi, literally spitting on us. Now it is getting into legislation, not because people want to put it there, because they know it is either that or extreme social unrest (Matiu).

A smaller group of advisers articulated a view of the state which was almost precisely pluralist. The state was portrayed as acting in the public interest:

[T]he state...is largely [the] administrative part of the government which provides for the day to day needs of all the people that it represents (Peter).

They emphasised strongly the need for the state to be seen to act on behalf of the needs of the whole community rather than on one particular group. It was this that meant the interests of Maori had to be taken into account:

[The state] is the governing body that is supposed to exist for the benefit of all people. It sort of goes through to wealth good health good education. Towards the provision of things most communities would not be able to afford. That's how I perceive the state, as a governing body to produce things that people want (Hoani).

[The state] can govern this country for the protection of each individual group of people, well for our total society, eh. That was why they were put there and to provide the types of benefits where people who suffer from impediments are not able to go out and attain gainful employment for their own maintenance and sustenance. If that does not happen, then the government should in actual fact as the protector of the community be there to continue that protection and sustaining role (Paul).

Those views of the state as acting in the public interest were most strongly held by policy advisers who are long serving public servants. But while appearing somewhat conservative, they were in essence no different from those advisers who argued that the state must protect all citizens and has special obligations to Maori under the Treaty of Waitangi:

It is now public knowledge that iwi or Maoridom are saying we are a part of this nation. We are in fact the tangata whenua. We control through the Treaty of Waitangi, or should have control over these resources...(Aroha).

Thus, the state is conceived of as not merely an agent of sectoral interests but as having obligations beyond sectors which in the case of Maori is established in constitutional rights. Treaty rights have a special

status because they have been negotiated between sovereign entities. Those rights of Maori which are identified in the Treaty of Waitangi are therefore of a 'higher order' than privileges to which other sectors of society may be entitled (Boast, 1989:24-25). Thus, the basis of Maori claims within the state are particularly strong:

That offers you the opportunity to work for your people and persuade Governments if you can...that's the crux of the whole matter, that things should happen which will have the ultimate effect of Maori achieving their own will...To me we are talking equity not equality there. Equity is the issue (Marama).

### Summary

The majority of Maori advisers see themselves as change agents within the state. The state is seen by Maori as providing employment opportunities within the primary labour market but it is not limited to that. Nearly all of the advisers claim that rather than pursuing a career within the state sector, they use their positions to effect changes for the benefit of Maori or iwi interests. However, there are many obstacles which Maori encounter within a government organisation which may exclude them from being able to produce effective policy. These are frequently organisational but the advisers also have a view of the state which typifies it as an agent for Pakeha. This view is not always instrumentalist. Many of the advisers have a view of the state as being an elite state, but rather than being instrumentalist, it can be used to effect change for iwi or Maori interests:

What you have got if you like...[is] a continuum between on the one hand Rangatiratanga, which is if you like Maori sovereignty, on the other hand you've got Kawanatanga which is state sovereignty. The state is obviously at one end of the continuum, Maori interests are at the other end of that continuum. Somewhere in between there is something which may contain aspects of both, but its not possible for the one end of the continuum to represent the interests of the other end (Geoff).

Rather than being the collaborators that Kelsey (1991:128) suggests, Maori advisers attempt to exploit opportunities within the state to strengthen Maori organisational structures by bringing the state and iwi

closer together, or by ensuring a responsive delivery of services by the state to Maori groups.

The critical lever which permits Maori to be able to do this is the Treaty of Waitangi which confers special rights on Maori which the state acknowledges to a certain extent. Some advisers have claimed that as result of realising they cannot make an impact within the state, they are not prepared to be in the state in terms of just having a job. For them, the only alternative is to leave the state. The state thus provides opportunities and problems for Maori who work within it. The strategies that Maori advisers develop in relation to working in the state are examined in the following chapter.

## Chapter Six

### The Practice of Maori Policy Advice

The Maori advisers' views of the state inform the way in which they work within it. This chapter explores the approaches, strategies and practices which Maori advisers pursue within the state. Irrespective of their diverse roles within the departments, all advisers identified with the general goal of using their positions for the wider benefit of Maoridom. This was to be achieved through bringing Maori interests and those of the state closer together. According to one adviser, the role of Maori policy advice is to:

[move] the inter-face between the bureaucracy or government departments and Maori. Moving it one step closer to the clients or the recipients of these services by moving it into the realms of iwi (Bill).

Other advisers offered similar explanations:

I guess this is a reason for me being involved in the state sector. I have always believed that it is possible for the Crown's interests and Maori interests to be brought closer together. And bringing them closer together is really all that I think I can achieve in the state sector, where the interests of one don't have to be subsumed by the interests of the other (Huia).

Most Maori advisers recognised that the state faces issues of legitimacy and in particular it must guarantee Maori rights to full political and economic decision making. They argued that the state was legally bound to address those issues under the Treaty of Waitangi.

## **Approaches**

Among the Maori advisers, two main approaches of ensuring state responsiveness to Maori can be distinguished. Firstly, attempts to change the organisational culture of the state so that it is made inclusive of Maori interests. Secondly, to ensure that the state is responsive to Maori interests through what was often referred to as the 'mainstreaming' of Maori policy.

Although both these approaches were advocated by the majority of Maori advisers, individuals tended to gravitate more towards one or other of them. Those approaches are also reflected in the range of functions pursued by various organisations:

The...functions which are adopted by Maori units reflects the different priorities of government agencies. Many agencies have developed Maori units with a primarily internal 'corporate policy' focus, including the preparation of affirmative action plans and tikanga Maori courses, whereas other agencies have an external focus, such as facilitating consultation with iwi on policy and programme implementation (O'Reilly and Wood, 1991:337).

For those advisers who are responsible for providing cultural perspectives training, the approach which fitted closest to their function was to change the organisational culture. In contrast, for those advisers who are engaged in developing policy, the approach which is more strongly advocated is the mainstreaming of Maori policy. These two approaches are discussed below.

### **Changing the Organisational Culture**

The development of bicultural perspectives within government departments relies to a great extent on the education of staff within those organisations. Cultural perspectives training was the primary activity for some Maori advisers. It relies on fostering attitudinal change among organisational members.

With its emphasis on staff training, cultural perspectives training is largely confined to the human resources management of the organisation, rather

than to the area of policy development. Therefore, the opportunities for Maori advisers undertaking such duties are largely confined to developing corporate policy but not state policy. The aim for corporate policy is to make organisations more accommodating of the interests of Maori clients and staff.

According to many of the Maori advisers in this study, in particular those who are undertaking state policy development, cultural awareness training is not sufficient in and of itself to bring about a responsive state sector.

According to them, the cultural awareness approach does not benefit Maori people. One adviser argued that these practices are of more assistance to Pakeha people within the state than they are of ensuring the effective development of Maori policy initiatives:

I have an aversion to cultural development Units. I have an aversion to cultural awareness training, which a lot of those cultural development units do. I have an aversion to Pakeha people being taught Maori language, ostensibly because that will improve their relationship with Maori, or as another something or other to put on a C.V. I do have a very very real objection to that (Huia).

Many of the advisers pointed to the proliferation of specialist Maori units across the state sector, particularly those which were responsible for cultural perspectives within state sector organisations. Rather than reflecting a corporate commitment to partnership, for many Maori advisers, this demonstrated the marginalisation of Maori issues and perspectives within government departments:

The intention [to establish units] I think was positive. The implementation has not been positive and it is my perception and that of many others that the Maori units are treated by the Government departments as a sop if you like. They are saying, 'look we are being responsive look we have got a Maori unit', but the Maori unit is ignored when it comes up with recommendations. So to that extent those departments can renege on their responsibilities by just ignoring the advice that comes through. I am not aware of any Maori unit which truly believes that it has any substantial effect on the way that the Department as a whole runs (Geoff).

[A] lot depends on how effective those units are, and whether they can point to changes for example in the policies or the practices that come out of those ministries. I certainly have a feeling that the rush to have a Maori name for the organisation for example is something that's just sheer tokenism...and you could wonder whether or not some of the units that have been set up have a similar sort of regard in the organisation (Makere).

[W]ith a number of them they wind up being the repository for all sorts of Maori issues, and the organisation doesn't change at all (Bill).

I don't have much time for [cultural] units. I mean 'cultural' in the sense you know, we dance out when visitors want us and we dance back when they don't (Aroha).

Many pointed to the way in which such units were marginal to the development of any policy in their organisations to such an extent that they became a financial liability when departmental budgets were reduced:

[Units] are hiding at this point in time because it is the environment to hide. Doesn't this government sort of determine that we are all one people and what's good for the general population is good for Maoris?...And the rest of their Pakeha colleagues in those departments will not be supporting them, won't put their jobs on the line by saying 'yes we need a Maori unit'. I mean that is a generalised statement but that is the reality of it (Donna).

[Maori units] are not the in thing. In fact if you're a unit now you have to watch out especially if you're a Maori unit. You'll get chopped real quick. They're the first to go in the budget cuts. So Maori people have gone into the mainstream and I think that this is really the thrust of this government (Matiu).

These criticisms of cultural awareness training made by the Maori advisers echo criticisms within the literature about the effectiveness of such programmes. These programmes are seen as doing little to alter those basic structures which have historically produced inequality. Sivanandan (1983; 1985) has criticised the burgeoning 'race relations industry' of which such programmes are seen to be a part. The effectiveness of such programmes with their focus on changing individual attitudes and behaviours conveniently ignores 'the structures and the institutions with the power to discriminate' (Sivanandan,

1985:27). Pearson (1990) shares a similar view about programmes which are designed to effect individual change when he argues that:

[A]rguments about racism tend to concentrate on explicit individual attitudes and motives rather than on largely implicit ideologies and practices that create and maintain ideas and preferences. Ironically many people seeking to eradicate racism reinforce this tendency (Pearson, 1990:13).

The effectiveness of Maori policy in the state does to some extent reflect the pervasiveness of organisational cultures which incorporate or exclude effective Maori participation. Unless Maori can change the culture of state sector organisations, then there is little chance that effective Maori policy will be produced. However, according to many of the Maori advisers, this does not arise simply out of cultural perspectives training. Maori advisers had to demonstrate that Maori policy was one of the core responsibilities an organisation undertook so that Maori policy development would be made central to that organisation's functions. This is what Hoani meant when he talked of 'normalising' Maori policy:

One thing that I actually have a little bit of difficulty with, is the whole idea, of doing things on the basis of policy. If cultural perspectives is to exist in Government departments because of this policy, tomorrow that policy could be thrown out the door, and that existence will no longer be there. If that is the only reason for it then I think we need better justification because it is too much open to political whims...that is why I am working very hard and fast towards normalisation. Get it ingrained. Get it into one policy, so that is one that is in there and [it can] be normalised (Hoani).

Most of the Maori advisers in the policy area were opposed to Maori advisers being primarily responsible for the promotion of Maori protocol or educating Pakeha staff in tikanga Maori. Many saw those tasks as the responsibility of Pakeha staff with Maori staff only having minimal and a supportive role in this area. One organisation had established a Treaty of Waitangi group comprised of Pakeha staff, which was responsible for educating Pakeha staff on matters relating to the Treaty and tikanga Maori. Maori policy advisers had an advisory role only in relation to the functioning of this group:

There is the internal stuff as in helping the Ministry in a general way, without taking over the Treaty group, helping them in a general way to increase their knowledge of taha Maori and the

work they do in their own activities as well within the Ministry...part of the approach of this Ministry and I fully support it is that things Maori just shouldn't be dumped in the Maori area (Makere).

In contrast to primarily expanding the organisational culture to achieve responsiveness, many of the Maori advisers advocated an overall policy approach which was aimed at integrating Maori policy within the overall policy development of state sector agencies. Some spoke of this as a process of mainstreaming which was quite different to assimilation.

The terms assimilation or acculturation have been used to describe state policies in New Zealand which have attempted to integrate ethnic minorities within dominant groups (see Walker, 1972; Thompson, 1977; Spoonley, 1988). According to Mulgan (1989:26), for Maori, assimilation is seen as tantamount to the destruction of Maori culture. Maori resistance to such policies have forced the state to abandon them. Some commentators, however, see much of recent state policy as being no more than a new form of assimilation. Kelsey describes the policy of biculturalism as being 'a more culturally sensitive form of assimilation' (Kelsey, 1990:267).

However, this was not a view that the Maori advisers shared:

I think that unless there are alternate ways in looking at what our government can achieve, then we are going to continue to be a monocultural society, dispensing favours and service to those who are less able to fend for themselves. And because Maori people tend to be in the lower socio-economic classes, then they are the ones that will get dispensed services to rather than being participants in decision making about what might be best for them (Aroha).

I don't view biculturalism to be separatist. I don't view it to be Maori developing on their own, or Pakeha developing on their own. I see biculturalism being very much integrated and it is simply recognising that there is in fact another legitimate way of doing things to achieve the same end. And I think the end or outcome is what is important. I should also add that the way that those outcomes are achieved are also important (Bill).

Many of the Maori advisers argued that successful implementation of Maori policy could only be achieved through ensuring that those who do have power in the state sector, in particular chief executives and senior

management in government departments, co-sponsor Maori policy. They argued that the design and implementation of Maori policy must be developed through mainstream processes which would then protect it from neglect. Mainstreaming would eventually mean that Maori units would disappear:

My own view is that medium to long term there shouldn't be a Maori unit here, partly because I would hope to see a lot more Maori staff throughout the rest of the Ministry, so that you weren't just one or two. And partly because, one of the roles that we have here is to feed information out to iwi, and help them use it basically and I hope over the next three to five years we will be doing that job so well that eventually we wouldn't be needed to any great extent (Makere).

I have mixed feelings about Maori Units. I think to initiate things fine. They need to have a limited life expectancy (Bill).

According to one adviser, if Maori policy initiatives are to succeed, even through mainstreaming, then the organisation has to demonstrate a corporate commitment to this. In his organisation, and in others that he had been involved in, this was the strategy that he pursued:

[We are]...a small organisation with not too many Maori staff anyway. And the staff are organised around the work that exists...It is difficult to identify the Maori perspective of the work that the [department] does...it is all linked to an integrated organisation, and it is reflected in its functions and the sort of advice it gives to the Government. It is my view that if we are going to see sustainable change...right across the public service, the people who are involved in initiating the change have to own it (Bill).

Thus, for some of the advisers, Maori policy could only be effective if it was integrated within the organisation. Mainstreaming for these advisers meant making organisations more inclusive of Maori values, practices and concerns.

But while Maori advisers were critical of units they could also be critical of the alternative. Some advisers argued that while Maori policy should indeed be a concern at all the decision-making levels, mainstreaming had the potential to swamp Maori policy under a host of other competing policy agendas. Although agreeing that the outcomes of mainstreaming

Maori policy might well be beneficial, one adviser argued that adopting such a strategy mirrored the objectives of Government policy too closely:

The biggest fear that Maori people have is that it means that they will become anonymous, as clients of Government because they are now treated like everyone else. This whole issue of entitlement as tangata whenua is something which this Government is not subscribing to (Huia).

Other advisers were even less enthusiastic about this move to mainstreaming. Their view of the ineffectiveness of Maori policy within the state reflected an instrumentalist view of a state controlled by Pakeha elites. Rather than seeing mainstreaming as an effective way to ensure that the state could be used by Maori people, some advisers argued that the only agendas that the state could meet were its own. One adviser was convinced that Maori policy, no matter how it was developed within the state, would not be successful in either empowering iwi or breaking down the high levels of Maori dependency on the state:

So rather than getting into developing policy we should get into developing policy amongst ourselves...I guess the truth is that it won't be long before I get to the point where I think trying to fulfil that task by these means will be counter productive. That is the point that I am starting to come to now (Matiu).

Although mainstreaming Maori policy was an objective that the majority of Maori advisers favoured, some advisers were strongly opposed to it.

## **Strategies**

These two approaches gave rise to a number of different but related strategies adopted by Maori advisers to ensure state responsiveness. The four main strategies which are discussed below are recruitment, iwi consultation, cultural awareness training and the promotion of Maori skills.

## Recruitment

Irrespective of whether Maori advisers tended towards a cultural perspectives or mainstreaming approach, many of them, especially those who were middle managers, saw recruitment as particularly important. As one adviser argued, the most effective dialogue between iwi and the state would be one in which Maori people were in decision making positions within the state sector:

That of course requires that you have to have particular players involved and that they have to have a particular orientation and perspective...to ensure that the state does get it right, that it does its bit for providing opportunities for Maori people to participate in an informed way and make some informed choices about their own involvement in the business of government (Huia).

Another adviser argued that only by getting Maori advisers within the decision making levels of the key government departments would Maori policy have any chance of being successful:

[Maori] need to be in all the control Ministries, the Prime Minister's Department, the Treasury the SSC. We are in Women's Affairs and we are in Ministry for the Environment, and then in terms of service departments...Really as far as I am concerned we should be in the policy making areas of departments but you'll find largely we are not. Largely we are in the service end of it (Aroha).

Therefore, recruiting Maori to policy positions was a key strategy that many of the advisers considered to be of critical importance:

I aggressively tried [to] hire Maori people who had analysis skills, or who had the potential to get them while they were here...and they are Maori staff who can do the jobs. They are not Maori people who have been hired because they are Maori. That happens to be the bonus, and that's where I have targeted to get skills from (Aroha).

I personally take an interest to see whether first of all there are Maori sitting on selection panels within the Ministry, and we're starting to see that happen more. That hasn't happened very often in the past...I personally tried to push getting more Maori in under the Maori and Pacific Island recruitment scheme, before that was abolished (Makere)

Other advisers also attempted to establish a formal procedure for Maori involvement on interview panels. Many argued that within organisations, there were important positions which required that the person undertaking such roles be familiar with Maori perspectives on important issues. As one adviser commented:

[O]bviously when you think of a broad political level of Maori issues you have to realise which positions that they're appointing are going to most affect Maori and are going to be beneficial for them, You know, I mean a typist, you don't really – well I'm not begrudging the typist, its not an unimportant job. I mean they don't have Maori keyboards do they so its not likely that's going to be your input. However if they're going to have an information analyst, there's lots of information that Maori people need, so therefore your presence on an interview panel like that is more important (Julie).

However, as Maori advisers, they had also to ensure that they were not always singled out as the Maori representative on interview panels. Many of the advisers said they had been required to do too much interview work which often had little effect on the outcome of the appointment:

[I]f they'd want a panelist for interviews, you know they needed a Maori, a Maori woman was even better, you know dial-a-Maori...(Julie).

I do a lot of interviews, well I've cut it down. I try and refer people to other people but what I am trying to do is set up a process here...to ensure that we have a list of Maori people available to all managers here, so they can have Maori people available to have on call and have on panels, and the Maori people know what they are doing when they are on panels (Marama).

Another adviser shared this view that Maori could be seen as tokens on interview panels, but she argued:

[I have] been involved in interviews here...but I look at it from a professional point of view. That is; OK they might be using us to sort of put a brown face on that panel but I'm sure as hell learning the process of what they're doing. So its sort of unbeknown to the system, its a system of reciprocity except that they don't know we're extracting as much as we're putting in (Donna).

## Consultation with Iwi

Many Maori advisers in this study argued that Maori policy needed to reflect the concerns of iwi. Te Urupare Rangapu, therefore, was used as the basis and the driving force for developing Maori policy in government departments that is responsive to iwi.

One of the theories of Te Urupare Rangapu, one of the strong underlying principles was that mainstream government departments were not taking responsibility for dealing with Maori needs. And the Department of Maori Affairs had become a totally overburdened and unsuccessful vehicle for by default, trying to de-facto deliver things that it actually wasn't primarily responsible for. So a strong imperative of Te Urupare Rangapu was that mainstream government departments were to demonstrate their responsiveness to take on the responsibility of meeting Maori needs (Aroha).

[A]s far as delivery of services was concerned...[was] not meeting all of the needs of Maori people...Te Urupare Rangapu led people to think about iwi being a political force...[it] seemed to be initiating the revival of that sort of organisation and I thought that was superb (Bill).

Maori advisers do attempt to account for the needs of iwi in developing policy through consultation:

[W]e do try to ensure that what we do is consistent with what iwi want definitely. That's the whole thrust. We have lots of contact people in different iwi throughout the country that we can contact if we want things (Marama).

We also have a role of course to keep iwi up to date with what is happening, but keeping them up to date and also making sure that we're in touch with what they are thinking, and what they're wanting to start happening (Makere).

[P]art of networking is to convey information because without information our people in actual fact would be redundant in many ways, and the tribal people at home could be made redundant. Things could be lost to them (Paul).

Many Maori advisers are engaged in policy work which seeks to make the delivery of services by government departments more responsive. This requires consultation with iwi and often developing policy initiatives which are iwi-focused. Some Maori advisers consult iwi in relation to

policy which their organisations are developing as a partnership response. Other advisers work closely with iwi all over the country on specific issues, usually concerning the management of resources, and aim to develop policy which takes into account iwi thinking and preferences. Some Maori advisers are involved in researching Maori experiences of service delivery from the state and this also involves consulting iwi. Finally another group of Maori advisers are involved primarily with Treaty issues and investigating claims made by various iwi which would eventually be examined by the Waitangi Tribunal.

### **Cultural Awareness Training**

Those advisers who were responsible for cultural perspectives training focused on bicultural training designed to broaden the culture of the organisation. This contrasted to some state sector organisations which focused on multicultural as opposed to bicultural training. Maori have often argued that multiculturalism can be used to marginalise Maori issues and submerge them beneath a host of competing cultural practices (State Services Commission, 1983). Such multicultural training also failed to recognise the constitutional rights of Maori as tangata whenua.

According to one adviser, heightening the awareness of Pakeha was the main purpose of biculturalism training in the state sector. This provided Maori with the opportunity to change the way in which government organisations saw their commitment to Maori people and their Maori staff:

I was targeting primarily Pakeha people because we had felt quite strongly that there were still a lot of Pakeha people who [did not]...understand Maori and other groups within our society. And...recognise that they too have values which they practice very strongly, values that are very important to them. And for Pakeha people to recognise that (Paul).

Those engaged in this work saw it as an important process in the facilitation of partnership. According to one adviser, cultural perspectives can foster the development of partnership between iwi through its role in educating staff on the Treaty of Waitangi:

[O]ne of our policies is to make sure that everybody within the whole Department knows about the Treaty of Waitangi, before they enter into a partnership...Over the last year we've developed a package. We are more than half way through teaching our staff top to bottom, of the basic issues relating to the Treaty of Waitangi, so that there will come a point for instance when we can say 'that is the minimum level we have. We build on that.' You can't build on nothing. You can't make assumptions, that people already know (Hoani).

### **Influence Through Expertise**

Some advisers pursued a strategy which involved getting Maori into key positions on the basis of their expertise and experience of particular issues. Although getting Maori into decision making positions within government organisations is important, at the same time, those Maori have to be sufficiently skilled in the tasks they perform. One adviser commented on this necessity to have skilled Maori people within the organisation where she was located:

[W]e actually managed to bring together a high level of skill to bring to bear on issues which affect Maori peoples lives directly...suddenly there were all these people who were qualified in the sense that New Zealanders tend to regard as appropriate, and who could concentrate and focus all of their skill and expertise on issues that affect Maori people (Huia).

This did not necessarily mean that such skills are derived only from tertiary training. One Maori adviser saw this issue as comprising much more than just recruiting Maori advisers qualified in the Pakeha education system. She argued that many Maori, while not having the formal policy training which organisations require of their staff, nevertheless have well developed skills which can be successfully used within the state sector:

I found that when I was trying to recruit policy analysts that most Maori do not see themselves as being policy analysts for a start...I think that culturally we are oriented to being policy makers...the culture traditionally is based around ideas and the exchange of ideas on the marae, and the cut and thrust of debate, politicking and networking within the wharenui and outside of it in the kitchens in the bathrooms and what not... These are things that a lot of Maori people do intuitively and they don't see that those are

transportable skills into policy making. Or because the policy units of departments or divisions of departments have not been, from their point of view a welcoming kind of atmosphere they have tended to go where other Maori people work, where they feel comfortable in the work environment (Aroha).

This adviser argued that Maori have particular skills and expertise that few people within the state sector possessed, which qualifies them as technical experts in the development of policy responsive to Maori people. Pursuing the objective of mainstreaming Maori policy, she argued, requires more Maori to be recruited within the state sector. This is because Maori possess those particular skills which would ensure that Maori policy would be responsive.

This strategy is an attempt to develop Maori policy on the basis of identifiable criteria in which Maori people have particular skills and expertise. Maori concepts and practices, if they are to be successfully implemented within the functioning of state sector organisations, have to be necessarily defined as a set of identifiable criteria:

I think that has meant things like 'Stop mystifying what being Maori is about'. There are some basic principles that I certainly attribute to my Maori upbringing but which I don't have to couch in Maori terms to still make them applicable to the way I operate here. And they are principles of trying to achieve consensus, therefore there are principles of not automatically taking adversarial roles in everything. To me that is being bicultural, you take a consensus approach rather than an adversarial approach...there are really basic unsexy ways of being so called bicultural in New Zealand and it is those sorts of ways that I think need to be adopted in government departments as a natural approach that will generate greater responsiveness to Maori people rather than having carvings and things like that. I like those things for visual promise, but the promise is never fulfilled (Aroha).

Another adviser expressed similar sentiments when he argued that effective Maori policy advice was really:

...not a difficult thing. It is a technical thing (Hoani).

A similar example has been described by Sissons (1990) who argues that this constitutes an attempt by Maori to mediate between the Maori 'life-world' and the bureaucratic 'system'. Drawing on Habermas' work,

he argues that although such a pursuit may be potentially empowering, it also facilitates the colonisation of the Maori life-world by a rational bureaucratic administration (Sissons, 1990:2). This view is not shared by many of the Maori advisers. Because they saw the overlap between the state and iwi as being, in reality, only a small part of Maori life, the potential for such colonisation was not perceived as particularly great:

I have a view that so called 'bi-culturalism', or 'partnership' or whatever really is about two Venn diagrams. It's only the bit in the middle where our lives intersect, that is any business of the other party and the bulk of our lives are actually quite separate lives and are quite happy to be separate lives. But what we have to work out is the chunk in the middle, how we operate within that chunk, what the rules are going to be and how we ensure that there is going to be a sufficient spin-off for the rest of those circles to operate proficiently and efficiently (Aroha).

The translation of Maori skills into organisational skills seeks to address two issues. First, to expand the base of skills which organisations draw on when recruiting staff so that Maori skills are recognised as being a vital element in achieving state sector responsiveness. Second, as some of the advisers have referred to it, moving the interface between the state and iwi closer together by accomodating Maori practices to the rational procedures of organisations. Demystifying Maori concepts within an organisational setting requires developing a policy methodology which both Maori and non-Maori working in policy areas would be familiar with. As Aroha explained, such an approach would ensure that policy developed within her organisation would reflect Maori concerns throughout its development:

Now I set up...an iwi portfolio, and I made sure that the senior policy analyst was Maori, but I didn't require the people doing the projects within that were Maori or had any specialist need. In fact I required that everyone participated in all sorts. But to ensure that everyone's policy projects did take into account Treaty issues and equity issues and so forth, we started to develop a policy methodology...it was an on going evolving thing naturally because it is not a static approach. So we have been constantly evolving a policy methodology, whereby every policy analyst who is working on any piece of policy brings to it certain principles and considerations (Aroha).

Such an integrated approach to policy, in which Maori advisers are skilled experts rather than tokens, was seen as one way in which the objective of mainstreaming Maori policy can be achieved:

And that is certainly the approach that I am much happier with. I'm not saying I'm absolutely happy with [my organisation] its only got the basic building blocks in place, but that's much more to me, the approach I would like to see adopted across the Public Service, so that everybody has responsibility but everybody is given training and resources to make it possible for them to adopt policy approaches that are based on an informed knowledge of Maori concepts (Aroha).

One adviser described the importance in having Maori policy advice mainstreamed with reference to the practices of the organisation in which she was employed:

[I]n policy development it is expected that every person who develops policy here [and] who is part of the team developing policy will consider the implications of their policy on the Maori community...it is about having Maori people at the end and the beginning of the chain cycle (Donna).

### Practices

One of the principle challenges that Maori advisers face is the claim made by many Maori (and some Pakeha) critics that they are co-opted. The issue of state co-option is one of which Maori advisers are all aware. Co-option refers to the appropriation by dominant elites of some of the elements of social movements, usually leaders, into the elite structure. All or part of a social movement's programme may also be adopted (Marger, 1981:366).

According to Kelsey (1991:108; 110), Maori advisers in the state, some of whom were involved in activist politics, are co-opted. The state, she argues, has managed Maori demands by institutionalising them within the courts, in particular the Waitangi Tribunal, and co-opted Maori into the system. This is a criticism that many of the advisers have encountered and one which they reject. One adviser gave the following response to such claims:

I take the view...I've heard expressed by another very senior Maori public servant and I think she put it very well when she said

to a well known Maori activist, Eva Rickard. 'Well there is a role for you out there on the streets if that's how you are pushing a particular *take*,<sup>7</sup> and there's a role for us in here', because we have a job of ensuring as far as we can that the government is informed of Maori thinking in a way in which they will listen and even small developments are achievements (Makere).

However, Maori advisers within the state must not appear to be co-opted or they will be disowned by Maori groups. Maori advisers may be accused of following a state agenda rather than a Maori one:

I think philosophically we saw all sorts of challenges thrown at Maori bureaucrats as being part of the system, as I said being 'auxiliaries'. But you know if you're not in here the policies still keep on being pumped out and they still impact upon you out there...(Marama).

At the same time, they cannot be seen by the state as the tools of their iwi, or Maoridom generally. Although Maori advisers reject such claims of co-option, nevertheless, they must demonstrate to iwi that they are Maori advocates rather than state advocates. In particular, for those who favour the mainstreaming of Maori policy, they must maintain contacts with iwi and pan tribal Maori groups. Networking is particularly important in this. Maori advisers need to be accountable to Maori outside of the state to ensure that they are not co-opted. This is discussed in a later section of the chapter.

## Networks

Networks refer to the contacts, acquaintances, mentors or friends which are drawn on for advice, consultation and information sharing. Within organisational analysis, networks refer to those extensive patterned relationships which satisfy both individual survival and operational requirements, co-ordinate joint activities and achieve common goals (Olsen, 1968:94).

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<sup>7</sup> a cause.

When discussing networks with the Maori advisers, three kinds of network emerged. These are formal networks within the state sector, informal networks within the state sector and, finally, informal networks outside the state sector.

Few of the Maori policy advisers in this study were a part of formal networks within the state sector. Such formal Maori networks which had been developed within departments rather than from the 'flaxroots'<sup>8</sup> were not accorded any particular significance by Maori advisers. Some advisers mentioned the existence of a Maori public servants network but this was seen as being largely inactive. This type of network, which had originated as part of departmental EEO initiatives, was seen as having a different function to those networks required for consultation over policy development:

Well I know that the Maori public servants used to get together, I went to one meeting in the two years that I have been here. But the Maori networks that I use are more informal and they are more tribally based so they are informal Maori networks (Julie).

There is a Maori EEO co-ordinator or practitioners network of some sort, I haven't been along to that. There are EEO meetings every month, I think they have lunch, meetings that are used for networking by Maori and non Maori (Marama).

Some advisers were sceptical about the virtue of such formal networks for Maori working within the state:

Networking is a buzz word for having contacts eh? Maori people have done that all their lives but they didn't call that networking...as with all good things, Pakeha have to give a name [to it] when they think they have just discovered it- networking. I understand what the Pakeha concept of networking is, and that is maintaining links with people in other positions which may be of importance to you one day, and that you may need to use. In Maori terms it goes beyond that. It means that you would renew those links. I sometimes think that Pakehas use those network techniques purely for that, because it is a source of information or a foot in the door when you want somebody to be there. In Maori terms it means not just wanting something. Or not being there for what people want to give you. You should be there regardless. I

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<sup>8</sup> refers to Maori movements and organisations which have their origins and maintain their dynamics within iwi or among the wider Maori community as opposed to originating out of formal institutions.

don't know. I might just be being a bit harsh on Pakehas but I see it as that (Julie).

In contrast, informal networks both within and outside of the state were used by all the Maori advisers. Many of those networks included Maori and Pakeha. Advisers saw themselves as using those networks to bounce ideas around to obtain either positive or negative feedback. But perhaps more importantly some advisers used these informal networks to maintain contact in other departments and to ensure that the policy they developed was consistent with that being developed by other departments. One adviser described the purpose of such informal networks as:

[M]ixing with other departments to find out what they are doing. Those sorts of things. I think that it is there to some extent, but only in a very informal way. If I want something done and if its in another department I'll ring somebody I know and see if I can get it from there. But I don't know how much joint activity there is on a formal basis...(Geoff).

These networks were in some cases extensive and reflected the career experiences of the Maori policy advisers:

There is a network of all the contacts I know from working in different agencies over the years and working in national positions which mean I know a lot of people, or known by them around the country especially in the public service...there is also that network of Pakeha senior managers, people I have met and worked with over the years (Marama).

Informal networks outside of the state were the networks which Maori advisers favoured the most. These 'flaxroots' networks provided Maori advisers with an alternative and more attuned body of advice than could be found within the state sector. Networks of this nature also lent credibility to the policy process, in that they provided at both formal and informal levels avenues of consultation with iwi in formulating policy.

Networks demonstrate the high levels of reciprocity and exchange relationships which are a part of both the state sector and the Maori world. Although within bureaucratic organisations, tasks are supposedly allocated and performed according to impersonal rational legal procedures, exchange relationships and reciprocity do exist both within

organisations and between them (Levine and White, 1970). According to one adviser, informal networks among Maori staff in particular are vital for ensuring that where possible Maori policy advice is presented as being united:

There tends to be amongst Maori civil servants an unofficial informal network, which exists, which is very good because it helps you in your work, it helps you get things through, and invariably you are called upon to help other people with the things they want done. For instance knowing the way the system works and knowing that if you present Cabinet or the Government with contradictory advice as often as not, they are liable not to make a decision, and they will send it away for further consultation, or for one decision to come out of it. Having suffered those sorts of decisions for a long time I think that policy analysts and policy providers have gotten wise and decided that we should be promoting one thing, one view, one opinion, and so informally can we get together and work it out (Peter).

As Mauss (1970) argued, such relationships are elemental to all societies and to organisations within societies (Mauss, 1970: 2; 77). Among Maori advisers, such relationships exist within their organisations and more so outside of the state, in particular, those which exist on the basis of kinship. According to the same policy adviser, such networks are particularly important because:

You are talking about your family and your relations and yourself, and your people (Peter).

Such networking within Maori groups involved relations of reciprocity and, therefore, networks were used only on matters of importance. They were not to 'waste' nor abuse. Many referred to networking as whanaungatanga,<sup>9</sup> stressing the importance of kinship relations which permeated informal networking:

Whanaungatanga is the developing of relationships within my tribal group. Not just to my whanau, not just to my hapu, but it is to everyone within. They are principally tribal. I always use tribal people for information...my prime thrust has always been to work with my own people and discuss issues with them...I wouldn't do without it, and I think any Maori person should continue to build up a good networking system around the country...it is a way of maintaining contact, maintaining ties, keeping one's eyes and

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<sup>9</sup> literally meaning kinship or relationship, although Stokes (1985:7) defines this concept also as indicating family togetherness and communal contribution.

ears open, and...I guess one other thing that's very important is I suppose I utilise my people as my mentors, they were the ones who help to nourish me and nurture me, in things relevant to my tribal traditions (Paul).

Through my whakapapa and affiliation, I have a network. I don't have to go and create one to whom I can turn around, who also monitor my own performance from a more Maori point of view...My own whanau networks. That's what it is to me. Family. Whakapapa. My Maoriness, and all the people in it (Hoani).

Many of the Maori policy advisers regarded their informal networks as being absolutely essential for their ability to function as Maori policy advisers:

I have my own personal network, and they are people that are in the public service, other Maori public servants and people outside of the public sector. I use them for...well we use each other actually for advice, as a sounding board for ideas, and in terms of policy work it is necessary to have networks and to use them...I would go so far as to say [that networks are] essential, for surviving as a Maori public servant involved in policy work here in Wellington (Bill).

I think they are essential if you are in policy making, otherwise what do you base your policy making on? (Marama).

[T]here are some formal ones which to my knowledge hardly anyone ever uses...I mean the informal ones are much stronger and they're the people you are related to, the people you know, they're the people who have been through the same university, or schools with, people you've caught up with through Kaunihere or iwi groups people who are working in the same areas as you that you're dealing with on a regular basis (Makere).

I think that senior managers and chief executives know they exist, and although they might disapprove about some of them...and some of them do exceed the bounds that they ought to...but again it is this joint accountability. There are other reasons. You have a bigger investment in getting the policy through. As well as being a Government employee arguing your policy line, [as a Maori] you have got a bigger investment in the advice that comes out of the place. It is more significant to Maori people, so they are more interested in using the system to the advantage of everybody, and that is why some of these networks exist (Peter).

The most common informal networks outside the state sector that Maori policy advisers used include the Maori Women's Welfare League, the

Maori Council, Tribal Trust Boards, iwi and the Maori Congress. Some policy advisers also used non-Maori informal networks, especially to obtain information relating to specific policies:

My networks, if you can call them that, have developed over time, over my entire life, so networking is not something that I don't do consciously. But when I need to get to the crux of an issue I tap into a particular network, which then brings information back to me, after I have explained what it is all about (Huia).

[Networking] means knowing who does what in other government departments and whether that impacts on what you are doing. And it is about knowing who are resource people that are going to have some significance to your job. That's what networking means in the public sector...in a Maori sense networks that I would use are for the dissemination of information that I have and know is important to Maori communities (Donna)

A lack of strong kinship based networks among Maori advisers was seen as a demonstration that they are 'organisational Maori', that is, acting primarily to protect their own personal interests or those of their organisation and the state. Nevertheless, maintaining those networks made the issue of accountability to one's whanau, iwi and Maori generally, one of ongoing concern. Networks were seen to help the development of relevant policy but were also considered to potentially hinder that advice being seen as credible by decision makers.

### **Dual Accountability**

The issue for Maori advisers, if they are to be effective, is to demonstrate that their policy advice reflects Maori thinking on particular issues. The question of accountability arises out of the efforts of Maori advisers to be representative of, or at least informed by, Maori thinking outside of the state.

One of the critical and most difficult issues facing Maori advisers is that of who they are ultimately accountable to. Do they act on behalf of the state or on behalf of iwi and is this dependent on either the issue or specific situations? A common criticism made within the state sector of all Maori public servants is that they have a dual accountability in terms of being

employees of the state and in terms of their iwi affiliation. However, Maori advisers are first and foremost public servants, although many Maori public servants believe that they should operate in an environment of dual accountability (O'Reilly and Wood, 1991:337).

The Maori advisers certainly saw themselves as accountable to the organisation within which they are employed. They are aware of the chain of accountability that they adhere by working within the state:

[P]ublic servants have to realise which end they are working for. As a Maori public servant you can try moving policies towards the centre of the two but in the end you are working for the state...the bottom line is it is inappropriate for a Maori public servant...to say their principle client is Maoridom. We all do as much as we can but the problem behind us is that we work for government and everybody should recognise that. Otherwise you should be in another job (Geoff).

Are you hinting about my accountability to the community? While I am here from eight to five I am accountable to this department. If I choose not to agree with those accountabilities, I leave (Donna).

It is, nevertheless, an issue of some difficulty for Maori advisers:

Maori public servants have a real hell of a time, they have dual accountability, most of them all the time. You are accountable to your people, you are accountable to the state. And they walk the fine line of trying to compromise where that ends, and where your loyalties are (Julie).

So you have that dual accountability, that professional accountability, and that personal accountability...we have a lot of discussion with Maori people, who have certain expectations and they entrust you with some of those expectations. You have to work within the state sphere and try and get some of those things through. And it is hard, because if you are unsuccessful, you can be personally criticised. Not just professionally criticised, but personally criticised (Peter).

We are here for Maori people but we are also employed by the department. We know our boss. That just sets up inevitable conflicts all the time (Marama).

[T]here's a chain of accountability here and I always work within that, but I never do a thing, I refuse to do a thing that I think would hurt my people (Matiu).

Although Maori advisers acknowledge that the chain of accountability is first and foremost to the state, this nevertheless poses problems for them. Within some organisations, the issue of dual accountability is employed as a rationale for not employing Maori as policy advisers. The issue of dual accountability and the way in which some departments reacted to it demonstrates the difficulty Maori advisers had in adapting to the organisational culture of those departments.

## **Summary**

Working within the state poses several challenges to Maori policy advisers. Although the state is seen by many advisers as the only arena in which Maori can have an impact on effecting change within society, they are constrained by their location within organisations, and the pervasiveness of the organisational cultures they encounter.

Among Maori advisers working within the state, two central approaches have been identified. They are attempting to change the organisational culture and the mainstreaming of Maori policy. How far these can be pursued is dependent on the functions which Maori advisers have within state sector organisations.

For many Maori advisers, the state does indeed present opportunities but in order to exploit these, they must develop practices within government organisations which permit Maori policy to be an integral, rather than marginal, part of the organisation's functions. Many advisers argue that without these organisational attempts to make the state sector more inclusive, then Maori policy will not be successful. These measures must at the same time be balanced against the necessity of Maori policy advisers to be representative of iwi or other Maori interests or risk becoming 'organisational Maori'. Therefore, Maori advisers develop specific practices within the state sector to be credible to Maori outside of the state and to be at the same time effective Maori advisers.

## Chapter Seven

### The Pakeha Advisers

The previous chapters have argued that in the last twenty year period a Maori renaissance has developed and matured. At the forefront of this revival has been a unified Maori call for the state to honour its obligations under the Treaty of Waitangi. Maori have also pressed for greater state responsiveness through the involvement of Maori in policy development, both within state sector organisations and through iwi consultation. The requirement in Te Urupare Rangapu that state sector organisations demonstrate responsiveness to Maori needs has given rise to more Maori advisers within those organisations and a relative decrease in Pakeha dealing explicitly with Maori policy. However, two of the advisers participating in this study were Pakeha.

Clearly with such a small number, one must be cautious about both extrapolating their views to all Pakeha or ascribing the actions and practices of the Pakeha advisers to their personalities. Nevertheless, the influx of Maori into policy positions, the institution of equal employment opportunities and the adoption by the Government of Te Urupare Rangapu makes the position of Pakeha advising on Maori policy the subject of some debate and therefore of interest in the context of this thesis. The Pakeha advisers also held senior positions in an area where there are very few positions available. Therefore, they are significant.

Certainly Maori advisers are critical of Pakeha involved in such activities:

There is a Pakeha woman in charge of iwi development. Who's ever heard of such a thing! There's only hundreds of Maori people out there who know how to do it (Marama).

I think it is nonsense. When Te Urupare Rangapu was first approved by Ministers, the State Services Commission were given specific roles that they had to undertake. I felt that they demonstrated a singular lack of responsiveness by appointing a Pakeha to head the unit that was going to develop that response, particularly when they had Maori staff who were quite capable of doing it, or they could have advertised if they didn't feel that was the case (Aroha).

The Pakeha advisers acknowledged the potential criticism which could be directed at them:

There has been quite a lot of opposition from inside the department and most of it has been focused on me personally (Nicola).

The tensions involved in their situations raises questions about how they rationalise their involvement in Maori policy and how they practice and maintain their positions. This chapter focuses on those issues.

Both the Pakeha advisers in this study were women. They were aged under forty five years and had been in the policy levels of their organisations for less than five years. Both advisers held university qualifications. They had been involved within the state sector in Wellington for four years. Leonie had worked in three different departments before her current position as a policy analyst while Nicola had been employed by her department for a four year period. She had only recently been appointed as a manager.

Many of those characteristics, age and length of service within their organisations, the Pakeha advisers held in common with Maori advisers. Also, like the Maori advisers, the Pakeha advisers were primarily responsible for implementing their organisations partnership response to Te Urupare Rangapu. The most significant difference then, in terms of basic characteristics, was their Pakeha ethnicity.

Many of the Maori advisers have argued that Te Urupare Rangapu required Maori to be appointed to Maori policy positions and yet, many state organisations are resistant to appointing Maori advisers or involving Maori in policy development:

[T]hose Departments have gotten away with this for a hell of a long time, so they have a pattern of behaviour of exclusion which is the first thing that we have to change. That's the very first point that we have to make...I mean that was a pattern of behaviour that existed prior to Te Urupare Rangapu, and which continued after Te Urupare Rangapu. But those things continue, that pattern of behaviour continues at the same time as we were developing another one (Huia).

The perception of Maori advisers in this regard appears to be supported by the State Services Commission. Maori made up only ten percent of the public service in 1988 (State Services Commission, 1988:7). However, Maori within the state sector are apparently heavily represented within the service delivery areas and under-represented in policy divisions (State Services Commission, pers. com, 13th December 1991). Census figures indicating this will be released by the State Services Commission in 1992.

The notion that Maori should be involved in Maori policy does not imply that Maori believed Pakeha to be inherently incapable in this area, but rather that they generally would not bring the range of skills required. According to one Maori adviser, the ability to develop Maori policy is:

not genetically confined to Maori people...I have no problem with Pakeha being in management positions and analyst positions in professional support positions...[but] when Maori people already have the expertise I would rather train them to use those analytically or as managers or whatever than have a Pakeha manager try to learn how to be a Maori which has tended to be the approach that the state has done for some time now (Aroha).

Significantly, both Pakeha advisers in this study were solely accountable for implementing their organisation's response to Te Urupare Rangapu. The approaches which both those advisers pursued were of a very different nature to those followed by the Maori advisers.

The previous chapter argued that all the Maori advisers shared a common commitment to kaupapa Maori. They articulated their views of the state in the context of that kaupapa, and their practices were seen as strategic attempts to maintain that kaupapa. Among Maori advisers, there were two main approaches to achieve state sector responsiveness. Some argued that the principle approach to pushing the state towards recognising Maori kaupapa involved changing the organisational culture

of government organisations. Others argued that such recognition was better pursued through the mainstreaming of Maori policy. But irrespective of the approach, kaupapa Maori was central to the Maori advisers' understanding of their role and the nature of the state. The Pakeha advisers in this study did not identify kaupapa Maori as being a central feature in either their motivation to belong to the organisation or as the driving force for their activities.

Whereas many of the Maori advisers saw the state not so much in terms of a career but rather as providing opportunities for Maori to effect change, this view was not shared by the Pakeha advisers. Both advisers saw their involvement in Maori policy largely in terms of a career rather than as a vocation. Leonie had come to Wellington because she was unable to obtain a job where she had been living. She had entered the state sector because she had appropriate skills which enabled her to secure a senior position. Nicola had become involved in the area of Maori policy as a requirement of her job description rather than from a desire to empower iwi:

[W]hen I first started what I am doing now I was an advisory officer in Corporate Planning and this was a very minute part of the job description and it has just expanded...(Nicola).

Both these advisers saw the functions they performed as being an important part of the operation of their organisations. In contrast to many of the Maori advisers, who expressed frustration and a sense of alienation in relation to the organisational cultures they encountered, the Pakeha advisers emphasised their knowledge of and identification with the organisational culture. This balanced their distance from tikanga Maori:

You can have as many cultural [ie. Maori] skills as to be absolutely perfect. But if you don't understand and recognise the corporate culture then you are not going to get anywhere in an organisation that works like this (Nicola).

It also allowed them to argue that they were particularly able to incorporate Maori concerns within Pakeha analytic paradigms. According to Leonie this meant that as a policy adviser her skills enabled

her to work within the dominant paradigm within her organisation which was based on an economic understanding of the world:

The thinking of this [organisation] is that if you use economic analysis you are working above race...It is not my position to say that is the wrong paradigm of thought. It is a dominant paradigm which is also held by Treasury and also held by government...we try and get people in here to address issues that are different, say Maori concerns within that paradigm (Leonie).

The Pakeha advisers may well have agreed with Salaman's suggestion that:

[M]embership of, and commitment to, the organisational culture...is no optional extra. It is critical for the recruit's ability to operate 'efficiently' and reliably within [the] employing organisation (Salaman, 1979:177).

For Leonie, the pervasiveness of the corporate culture in her organisation largely determined the way she could develop Maori policy:

I have to be a different sort of political actor. I have to be an actor who acts in a conciliatory way, and who encourages a closer and closer dialogue. And if I get a busy group of [senior management] people who have their own stresses and strains backed in a corner and whipping them because they reduce some people to some position and leave them marginal...that doesn't excite them to work with me and it doesn't excite them to work with Maori (Leonie).

Organisational cultures frequently mirror the relations of domination that exist in wider society. One adviser illustrated the tension for many organisations directed to be responsive to Maori:

[The department] is not plastic...and it doesn't get a lot of touchy-feely responses...it may not have fifty-fifty Maori/Pakeha sitting on interview panels. But it knows as a set of economists and hard nose business people...[that] we actually have to put a front on now and be quite ruthless in our critique (Leonie).

I would say that basically in the beginning the reason why I have been so successful so quickly was because senior management didn't see me as a threat. They saw me as a bridge (Nicola).

Moreover, Maori, according to the Pakeha advisers, rarely have the skills required:

We would recruit Maori amongst any other person that came forward, it just so happens that outside of [our] scholarship schemes which have been schemes to foster Maori in these areas...and other related issues that this Ministry deals with [that Maori are] not necessarily applying for jobs here. There is not one policy analyst in this Ministry who does not have a degree and most of them have degrees in matters related to these divisions...Now the recruitment policy is one that has been established in networks, but still we don't get people applying (Leonie).

The apparent lack of skills of Maori advisers has already been discussed in an earlier chapter. It is a view largely rejected by the Maori advisers. As Aroha had argued:

I think that we are culturally oriented to being policy makers (Aroha).

Limited skills on the part of Maori was referred to as one of the reasons for their own appointment within Maori policy:

[Maori] may have had greater cultural and linguistic skills than I did, they certainly knew nothing about policy and had no management skills what so ever. It's a very delicate balance I think as to whether you accept that without knowing the corporate culture and without being able to work within that corporate culture, my belief is anyway you will never get anything changed (Nicola).

Being comfortable within the organisational culture and possession of appropriate skills were factors used by the Pakeha advisers to explain their effectiveness in Maori policy. Another factor was their unambiguous accountabilities relative to the complex and conflicting accountabilities of the Maori advisers. According to one Pakeha adviser, Maori public servants are:

...split in their loyalties...and they have a self interest to get to the top and be director...I don't think Maori bureaucrats represent Maori, they are hooked into the same responsibility structure that anyone else is...they might be able to give Maori views and give them well but there is always that conflict of interest and Maoridom (Leonie).

This not only led to ineffectiveness but potential disruption for the organisation:

I would say that we had quite a lot of trouble in what we were doing because we had all sorts of Maori staff with different agendas (Nicola).

According to both Pakeha advisers, state organisations are aware of the dual accountability confronted by Maori and this was a barrier to the appointment of Maori into senior positions.

While Maori advisers also recognised issues related to dual accountability, they believed themselves able to cope with them. One of the Pakeha advisers alleged that dual accountability was not addressed and negatively affected the performance of Maori staff within the organisation:

They have to be responsible to the chief executive who is responsible to the minister and their loyalty has to be as public servants, it's that way. They get themselves into quite a lot of problems personally and organisationally because they have two loyalties (Leonie).

Leonie argued that Maori policy development should not involve Maori advisers who are public servants:

[Maori advisers] might be able to give Maori views and give them well but there is always that conflict of interest...and [Maori] have told me that they believe most [Maori] bureaucrats are split in their loyalties as I have just described. They have a self interest to get to the top and be director. So the people who have less of those interests and are less split than those are actually operating in the community. So Maori have a wealth of politics of their own and I was seeking on behalf of the Ministry to get that group of decision makers and spokespersons on economic development intimately involved in the decision making process of the Ministry and that they stay outside the constraints of the bureaucracy as much as possible, and that they have an input in (Leonie).

The alleged single accountability confronting Pakeha, combined with their analytical skills, allowed Pakeha advisers to feel confident in their ability to undertake activities in relation to Maori, whether that was policy development or cultural awareness training. Neither adviser saw

themselves as having a different approach to Treaty issues arising out of their position as members of the dominant culture.

Nicola felt comfortable providing cultural awareness training. The type of cultural perspectives training pursued by her was significantly different from that pursued by the Maori advisers. The Maori advisers linked cultural perspectives training to biculturalism and the Treaty of Waitangi. In contrast, Nicola connected it to a broad multiculturalism which would lead to:

[A] better understanding by departmental staff of the fact that there are other cultures in New Zealand with different values and a better understanding by our staff that they have to treat people accordingly. And I guess one of the things also is the better perception of our department by the community, I mean to give a better service to the community...So I guess our unit's philosophy is to try and identify the needs of minority communities, and try and meet them as best we can. That also includes the Maori staff as well (Nicola).

There has been considerable debate over the relationship between multiculturalism and biculturalism (Spoonley, 1988; Sharp, 1990; Pearson, 1990). Pearson argues that the philosophy of multiculturalism is frequently used as a legitimating label for policies which celebrate cultural diversity, and yet preserve the power imbalances that exist between ethnic groups in New Zealand. Furthermore:

...dominant groups will use cultural diversity as an empty gesture to disguise the true nature of social rankings. Multiculturalism becomes a further mechanism of divide and rule (Pearson, 1990:234).

While Puao Te Ata Tu (1986) claimed that for Maori this often means that:

...policies and social objectives rooted in the concept of multiculturalism are commonly used as a means of avoiding the historical and social imperatives of the Maori situation. These should be addressed in the context of bicultural policy (Ministerial Advisory Committee on a Maori Perspective, 1986:19).

This seemed evident in the view of cultural awareness that was held by Nicola:

I'm planning to hold five focus groups of about 16 – 20 people for each region and we've got four regions and one in Head Office. And those focus groups will comprise 50 percent management and 50 percent ethnic staff, and I use the term ethnic because they won't only be Maori...What we are going to start looking at ...the other ethnic minorities in the country because the [department] touches everyone's lives. And looking at where there is a necessity to have say a Pacific Island or Kampuchean, Vietnamese or whatever people who can go and talk to their respective communities...I guess Indian or Asian...we don't know if there is a great need there and we don't know what kind of need there is but that is the way we are going to go next in that particular branch of what we are doing (Nicola).

Multicultural training avoids internal conflict within the organisation. It focuses on changing attitudes of organisational members rather than organisations' operational structures and core processes. According to Nicola, changing the attitudes of all staff was seen as being a particularly important part of cultural perspectives.

[W]e want to do something about teaching people to deal with change and what their barriers are to change, in this case cultural change and how they come to have the attitudes that they have actually got. And I think until we can get that worked through we can't actually hope to try to change the attitudes that they've got. So that is the way that we are going at the moment but of course some Maori staff think that we are going far too slowly. Some Maori staff don't think we should be doing it at all (Nicola).

Biculturalism has been acknowledged in a variety of literature as arising out of the relationship between Maori and the state embodied in the Treaty of Waitangi (Ministerial Advisory Committee on a Maori Perspective; 1986, Spoonley, 1988; Pearson, 1990; 1991).

Biculturalism for most Maori people requires honouring the Treaty and this entails the acceptance by the majority group that the tangata whenua should be represented as of right in all the major institutions in society (Pearson, 1990:234).

For the adviser involved in managing her organisation's cultural perspectives unit, the strategy to implement multiculturalism training within the organisation involves shifting the focus of the organisation away from biculturalism. Although establishing a partnership unit within the organisation had been a response to the Government's endorsement

of biculturalism as set out in Te Urupare Rangapu, there was a distancing from that policy:

[L]ast year was given to establish a unit and it was called the Partnership Response Unit. The name was changed at my suggestion in consultation with the departmental kaumatua because it was perceived that the government was going to change and I perceived it was quite possible that the policy document was going to be thrown out the door regardless of the fact that they weren't actually making anyone implement it anyway. And so we changed it and that also allowed us some room to manoeuvre and diversify and do what we wanted to do within the realms of cultural development (Nicola).

Where Maori advisers throughout this study have argued that the Treaty of Waitangi provides iwi with a constitutional lever to ensure state responsiveness and regarded it as a central part of any cultural awareness training, this was not shared by the Pakeha adviser involved in cultural awareness training:

[W]e started relatively late in this field and so we could learn by what we saw as a lot of other departments made mistakes, and a lot of them got very bogged down in Treaty issues. I have to say also that it was an easy decision for us to make because really it's got nothing to do with our department. I mean it is not as if we are involved in anything that would be going to the Waitangi Tribunal. We are outside of all that...(Nicola)

In fact, the Treaty of Waitangi did not enter into such training or organisational decision-making at all.

We have deliberately steered clear of the Treaty and so it has no effect on what we have been doing...everyone has their own opinion about the Treaty. It is very emotive, nobody can ever say what was intended or what is right and what is wrong and we have just found it is a lot easier to leave that to people's own personal opinions like religion. We do not get involved at all (Nicola).

This wide multicultural approach contrasted markedly to that adopted by the Maori advisers working in the cultural perspectives field. They argued that without an organisational commitment to biculturalism, the wider aims of multiculturalism would be ineffective:

If we were to pursue in fact what many people wanted us to do, [which] was to take a wide multicultural thrust, then what we were

saying to the Pakeha people is 'We are inviting you to failure'. Because if the Pakeha people could not understand the value of one group alone then how the hell were they going to understand the rest of our community which is made up of about 75 different community groups? And consequently that was the thrust that we pursued (Paul).

Where a Pakeha adviser did attempt to develop partnership with iwi, the failure to appoint Maori advisers meant there were problems in initiating dialogue.

Well I see it as happening in this way, which is that Maori people as treaty partners can exercise a position of authority in the decision making process and they need to decide for themselves firstly how they are going to marshal their own politics and the state could see the benefit of working in a partnership fashion with them. I don't know exactly what giant scheme we could have for doing that. I do know that if the two peoples were willing to do that we could sit round and decide something and it wouldn't be perfect and it would be open to challenge and this could begin (Leonie).

Where dialogue occurred, it was unsystematically pursued and opportunistic:

I by chance, got invited to speak at a hui on economic development and education for [name] iwi. I went along and said I am starting this job and these are some of the things that I am interested in doing. This is the Ministry, the Ministry does this, did you know? And they didn't know...would you like to take the opportunity of working in a pilot scheme with the Ministry to work out how we could best implement bigger strategies for bigger involvement of Maori?' They agreed and they agreed because I sat in the hui and took notes. When I came back I wrote them up in a report which I sent to them and my report had the recommendations to general managers. So we gradually moved together like that and worked with their economic development and then they assisted with some of our policy making processes (Leonie).

Under these conditions the mainstreaming of Maori policy was seen as most appropriate and the use of Maori units inappropriate and ineffective:

It was seen that having a Maori perspective unit in this very diverse ministry would lead them, as I perceived them having read and done my homework and research, marginalised within every organisation that they are in- the Maori perspective

units...they get anything with the word Maori dumped on their desk and they have poor resources to respond (Leonie).

This approach to partnership was close to that advocated by many of the advisers. It saw Maori iwi as exercising some authority in deciding how services that are delivered through the state sector could be better utilised by Maori. However, there were significant points of difference. While this Pakeha adviser advocated a partnership once iwi, through their own efforts were in a position to be partners, the Maori advisers argued that the state had the obligation under the Treaty of Waitangi to ensure that iwi were resourced adequately to do this:

Given the power relationship that exists at the moment and that is demonstrated time and again by various events, I think that the state sector is the partner which has the responsibility to actually bring Maori people up to speed, through information, through providing them with opportunities for analysis, and all that sort of stuff. And only then will Maori people be in a position to identify or to decide whether or not they want to be involved. The state makes the assumption, that all of the time, Maori people want to be involved but their involvement for nil result will not go on much longer (Huia).

One of the major problems with which Maori advisers contended was the issue of co-option or being seen as an 'organisational Maori' by maintaining credibility with Maori outside of the state. Co-option is not such a clear issue for Pakeha advisers but credibility and legitimacy are. Both Pakeha advisers saw their involvement in Maori policy as controversial because they were not Maori. One of them had been the subject of both professional and personal criticism from Maori staff within the organisation.

Both Pakeha advisers agreed that they had to specifically seek ways to ensure that they were credible. Neither had strong iwi connections but it was necessary for them to be seen to be in touch with Maori thinking. It is significant that neither adviser sought such legitimacy by involvement in Maori networks. One adviser was aware that such networks existed but she was not a part of them nor was she fully supportive of them:

I know there are networks, with Maori staff and public servants. We do have networks within the department and I have actively encouraged Maori staff setting them up. Most of them don't call them networks though, they call them whanau groups, and we

have encouraged them being set up throughout all the district offices. There was a Maori network in Head Office but I was invited to attend, and it was very destructive and because it was so destructive because it only focused on monocultural development and what it was doing wrong, it actually died. I've been trying to encourage my staff to reactivate it and put them on a more positive footing in what they could be actually doing and could be helpful to themselves (Nicola).

Nor did the Pakeha advisers have contacts with Maori advisers across the state sector. They saw Maori advisers as being unsympathetic to their approach:

I've heard through gossip that some people don't think it's right what we are doing. We have never had any formal opposition. They just really don't have anything to do with us, the other government departments...we've actually stayed out of the whole political arena and it's been easier to do that by not getting involved with other units in Wellington too. We've stayed as a very internal thing (Nicola).

This isolationism contrasts sharply with the practices of the Maori advisers who maintained links with other Maori advisers and Pakeha advisers across the state sector, and an interest in other organisation's Maori policy developments. This was based on the widely held belief that:

In terms of policy every issue is a Maori issue. It's the one I know best, it's the one I was employed for and I think the issues, the raising of the issues or raising the awareness about the issues sort of happens on [both] an informal and formal basis (Donna).

Because the Pakeha advisers are not part of any Maori networks or in contact with many Maori advisers in state sector organisations, it was necessary for them to develop other practices which enable them to be credible as policy advisers. Both the Pakeha advisers sought credibility by suggesting that their experiences and interests were similar to Maori.

My background happens to be catholic and happens to be Irish and a lot of the issues that I address in my life, I see Maori as addressing as well. So I don't think that there is an enormous difference in some of the value sets that we operate from (Leonie)

Another argued that her interest and understanding arose out of living in an area heavily populated by Maori:

I guess something that made a reasonable impact on me, was I moved to Auckland...and I ended up living in Otara for one and a half years, which was certainly a very different experience to anything I had ever experienced (Nicola).

Both these Pakeha advisers felt they had an understanding of the causes of structural inequality in New Zealand drawn from their academic training or their political experience which they were able to bring to their positions. In one case, this was formed through an analysis of what were seen as other forms of oppression.

Leonie, in particular, linked the oppression of women to that of Maori in New Zealand society. Although she recognised that Maori and women were differently oppressed, she identified the cause of that oppression as arising from the same source. Patriarchy oppressed both women and Maori. So there was a sense that Maori and women in New Zealand shared a common ground:

The women's studies critique also enables me to work with Maori people because a radical feminist critique is actually a very useful one to critique the establishment of patriarchal society...it doesn't just leave women disempowered. It leaves everyone disempowered (Leonie).

Both advisers drew extensively on their formal educational training which they argued gave them not only an appreciation of Maori issues but also provided them with the skills to be able to assist Maori. Maori studies, political science, sociology and women's studies were all referred to in that context.

Personal identification, consequently, became a central feature of the Pakeha advisers' search for legitimation. One went so far as to allow ambiguity in regard to her ethnicity:

[T]here are a number of our Maori staff who think that I am Maori and it doesn't matter what I tell them they have decided that I am. So people perceive what they want to perceive. Mind you a number of Pakeha managers think the same thing because they don't think that anyone would be doing this job if they weren't. So it is all a matter of interpretation and I don't bother telling anyone unless they ask (Nicola).

Another made herself indivisible, not only from the chief executive but the kaumatua:

[W]hen I talk about 'we' from now on, the 'we' is myself, the kaumatua, and the chief executive (Leonie).

This raises another important strategy. Both organisations used the appointment of departmental kaumatua to give credibility to the work of the Pakeha advisers. For both Pakeha advisers their kaumatua had proved to be important allies who had secured for them some legitimation in respect to their work practices. For Leonie's department, which employed no Maori staff in Maori policy advice, the appointment of a kaumatua was seen as one way of gaining necessary Maori approval for its actions:

[I]t became known I suppose to ourselves that a good strategy would be to have a figurehead who could monitor support and evaluate Maori thought for our chief executive and to have a well respected Maori Chief setting about advising how to consult with Maori without saying what Maori need but what needs to happen to bring about the consultation process and the strategies for that (Leonie).

According to some Maori advisers, kaumatua appointments are not only the least disruptive way for organisations to be seen to be meeting Maori demands for greater responsiveness but actually become:

[D]ial a community person (Donna).

These appointees tend to have no formal standing within the organisation, are consulted only when the organisation required them, and are very often uninformed in relation to the issue they were required to provide expertise on. According to one Pakeha adviser, a kaumatua was appointed to:

[B]e there to give us cultural advice and a cultural perspective when the department needed it or when we felt it was necessary and those are basically the terms under which the agreement is (Nicola).

More importantly, departmental kaumatua were used to shield a Pakeha adviser and her organisation from criticisms by Maori and Pakeha staff:

I guess it was felt that we needed him, because it was perceived that I was a female, and I couldn't provide that sort of level of advice. He's travelled with us quite a lot and talked to some of our more anti-Maori staff. Mind you some of our more anti-Maori staff in the past...were ringing him up at home and abusing him about me! (Nicola).

Despite this, they could still be a source of conflict within the organisation:

There has been internal conflict. The [kaumatua] is here and it just raises questions about management and who is going to be the boss around here I suppose...you open the door to consultation and the fear is that you buy yourself a Pandora's box of tricks that you can't actually cope with (Leonie).

### Summary

The Pakeha advisers in this study were clearly pursuing a different agenda to their Maori counterparts. Kaupapa Maori was largely irrelevant to their practice and, in contrast, they were driven primarily by organisational and positional concerns. They regarded Maori skills as peripheral, rather than integral to the policy process.

The Pakeha advisers had little contact with Maori advisers, and were not involved in the important networks that the Maori advisers identified. This presented particular problems for them in being seen to be in touch with Maori thinking. The appointment of departmental kaumatua was one strategy to assist in this. Overall, although the data relates to small number, there are indications to suggest that Pakeha policy advisers are an important sub-group within the wider body of Maori policy advisers. They are representative of a very different organisational response which appears to resist Maori attempts to renegotiate their relationship with the state and ensure state responsiveness. Such a study goes beyond the scope of this thesis but it is clearly vital to developing a further understanding of the relationship of Maori to the state.

## Chapter Eight

### Conclusion

This thesis has attempted to explore the relationship of Maori to the state. It is a significant relationship, given the historical role of the state in the destruction of Maori political power and the appropriation of economic resources. The state, as this thesis has argued, impinges on the daily lives of all people, but for Maori in particular which is illustrated in the high levels of Maori dependency on the state across a wide range of indicators. The state has had a major effect on Maori political development and economic well being. For over a hundred and fifty years, state policies have generated the conditions which are currently expressed in the high levels of Maori economic and social dependency. Breaking the dependency which has characterised Maori relations with the state for so long has become a major focus of the Maori renaissance.

Central to the Maori renaissance in the last quarter of a century has been the re-assertion of mana Maori motuhake. Part of that reassertion has been demands for greater access to decision-making within the state. The state, however, while drawing Maori into the process of their own policy development, has also constrained and shaped the practice of that policy development through the responsibilities that are attached to Maori policy positions.

The focus of this thesis has been that of Maori policy advisers, because they are at the nexus of this relationship between Maori and the state. As Maori, they are influenced by the social and political developments within Maoridom, especially the Maori political renaissance. But they are also accountable to the state as their employer. This thesis has attempted to unravel the tensions which arise for people in such a

situation. In order to do this, fourteen policy advisers involved in the development of state sector responses to Maori were interviewed. Twelve were Maori and two were Pakeha. Through a series of semi-structured interviews, their views of the state and their practices within it were explored.

Essentially, it has been found that all the Maori advisers involved in Maori policy development articulate their views of the state and undertake their activities within a broad framework of what they consider to be kaupapa Maori. It has not been the intention of this thesis to determine precisely what kaupapa Maori means, but it can be summarised as a widespread desire for Maori economic and political self determination. That includes the recognition of Maori organisational structures, in particular iwi, and recognition by the state of the Treaty of Waitangi as a basis for the relationship between Maori and the Crown.

The pursuit of kaupapa Maori raised for the Maori advisers a series of issues. Most significant were the issues of how the state could be made responsive to the kaupapa, and how Maori advisers could maintain links with the source of that kaupapa – whanau, hapu and iwi.

The significance of these becomes crystallised in the central issue of accountability. As public servants, Maori advisers are primarily accountable to the state. However, to pursue kaupapa Maori is in itself a recognition of an accountability beyond their organisational position. Maori advisers also see themselves and their actions as being accountable to Maori, and frequently, although not always, to particular iwi.

Maori advisers are very aware of the potential conflict. They universally acknowledge that accountability of their position must ultimately take precedent over their commitments to iwi as long as they are employed by the state. That fact, and the associated danger of organisational co-option, as well as the support that the advisers derived made keeping Maori networks a central part of keeping in touch with the kaupapa. Maori advisers maintained strong informal networks outside of the state. The most important of these were often referred to by the Maori advisers as whanaungatanga.

The Pakeha advisers in this study argued that Maori advisers were constrained to such a degree through dual accountabilities that they were often ineffective. They referred to this when explaining their own employment in Maori policy development. In contrast, the Maori advisers argued that this alleged dual accountability was actually what made them effective as Maori advisers. It was essential if they were to maintain credibility among the Maori groups. To lose this credibility with Maori would mean that Maori advisers became 'organisational Maori' who were regarded as protectors of their personal interests or those of the state. As representatives of the state, they would become increasingly distanced from the very people to which the state was attempting to be more responsive.

Maori advisers argued that they entered and remained in the state, not primarily for a personal career, but to pursue the aims of kaupapa Maori. They recognised, however, that their employment in the state sector gave them access to rewards and a status quite different to other Maori. This too was a considerable tension. It was not a tension felt by the Pakeha advisers. Conversely the Pakeha advisers saw their role in Maori policy as part of pursuing a career. The Pakeha advisers did not articulate their view of the state or their practices in the framework of kaupapa Maori. They maintained no strong Maori networks and appeared to work in isolation from Maori advisers within the state sector. They saw their accountability as lying unambiguously with their organisation and argued that this was one of the strengths they brought to Maori policy advice.

The decision to take up Maori policy development and responsiveness positions in the state made by many of the Maori advisers since the mid 1980s was also based on a belief that the state is a primary agent of change in New Zealand society. Many of the advisers in this study argued that the state, particularly through the development and the implementation of policy, presented Maori with the best opportunity to pursue the aims of the Maori renaissance. All were acutely aware of the state's historical role in creating Maori dependency and acting against Maori interests. Some viewed the state as primarily Pakeha. Nonetheless, it was an essential arena for Maori to be involved in, if they

were to attempt to reassert their mana Maori motuhake. The same power that the state had used to divest Maori of their political institutions and their resources, they argued, could be used by Maori to break Maori dependency.

Many of the Maori advisers had been in the state sector for relatively short periods of time and continued to be involved with a variety of Maori political groups and organisations. They saw their work in the state as being an extension of those activities. Some argued that if they ceased to be effective as Maori advisers pursuing a Maori kaupapa they would then leave their employing organisations.

Despite the overall commitment that the Maori advisers shared in kaupapa Maori, there was some diversity among them about the most effective approach to pursuing kaupapa Maori within the state. The two most commonly favoured approaches were cultural awareness training and the mainstreaming of Maori policy.

Cultural awareness training was the primary activity undertaken by some of the Maori advisers, although all the advisers saw it as being an important approach within the state sector. Those Maori advisers who were involved in cultural awareness training sought to change the organisational culture through focusing particularly on the Treaty of Waitangi and biculturalism. By changing the organisational culture, it was argued that organisations would not only recruit more Maori staff to senior positions, but would also be more responsive to Maori outside of the state.

The majority of the Maori advisers, while agreeing with the aims and principles of cultural awareness training, also argued that it was not an effective strategy on its own. For state organisations to be affected, not only the culture but also the goals, that is the policy of the organisation, would have to change. Frequently cultural awareness approaches were described as inadequate to that task. Many Maori advisers pointed to the way in which cultural perspectives units were often marginal to the core functions of state sector organisations and had little impact on the policy that was developed. Under those conditions, the mainstreaming of Maori policy was seen to be the more effective approach for ensuring state

sector responsiveness. Mainstreaming is an attempt to prevent the ghettoisation of Maori advisers within organisations and the marginalisation of Maori policy from core priorities of organisations. It is a strategy to make Maori and Treaty issues central to the policy process. It is not a form of assimilation. Maori advisers saw it as anchored in kaupapa Maori and a manifestation of the Crown's obligations under the Treaty of Waitangi.

These two approaches, cultural awareness and mainstreaming, rather than being polar opposites, can be seen as contingent options. Because the organisational functions that Maori advisers performed reflected either the corporate focus of some organisations or the external policy focus of others, Maori advisers used the approach which was most akin to their function. Even those most committed to the notion that the state is a social and economic agent which needs to make Maori policy an integral part of its overall policy process, also argued that the organisational cultures had to become more responsive to Maori.

The Pakeha advisers were also involved in these two approaches. But there were significant differences in their practices vis a vis those of the Maori advisers. Cultural awareness involved not the bicultural training undertaken by some of the Maori advisers, but a perspective of multiculturalism. Similarly, while the Pakeha advisers appeared to endorse the 'mainstreaming' of Maori policy this involved, in essence, the assimilation of Maori issues into economic analytic frameworks.

This debate over an appropriate approach to the state to some extent mirrors the debate in sociological literature over the nature of the state. It has been argued that within that literature, the state tends to be discussed as either an organisation, an agent or as a neutral allocative and administrative institution.

Organisational theorists see the state as being a set of complex organisations pursuing organisational goals and, consequently, best understood in organisational terms. The way in which the Maori and Pakeha advisers participating in this study viewed the state supports the notion that organisational structures and processes are significant for informing the practices of the advisers. It encourages an analysis of the

positional relations which exist within organisations, how they affect decision making and how individuals have access to positions of power.

Both Maori and Pakeha advisers identified a strong organisational culture in which they had to work. For many of the Maori advisers, that culture was seen as a barrier to the establishment of a responsive state sector. Both Pakeha and Maori advisers referred to the difficulties Maori advisers face because of that culture and the way in which it inhibited them from becoming effective organisational members. In order to overcome those barriers, many of the Maori advisers developed mentoring relationships with important organisational members.

Such mentoring relationships enabled some Maori advisers to access significant positions within the organisation. It was there that they felt they could influence policy decision making within the organisation. This is a typical response and has been identified in other studies on organisations (Kanter, 1977). Mentoring relationships also allowed Maori advisers to avoid marginalisation within their organisations. Much of the thrust of cultural awareness training was aimed at reducing such marginalisation.

Analysing the state purely as an organisation has certain limitations, however. It inherently directs the analysis to the internal workings of the state and fails to adequately address the links the state has with social and economic groupings outside of the state. For Maori advisers, those groupings are of considerable significance. They are the source of kaupapa Maori. The question is: are they as bureaucrats largely irrelevant to the dynamic relationship between Maori and the state? Maori advisers clearly do not believe so. They, like the Pakeha advisers, recognise that elected representatives have considerable power while they are limited to advice. Nevertheless, the Maori advisers saw their role as neither marginal nor detached from Maori lobby groups or the Maori renaissance, but closely connected to those wider Maori agendas. Some of the Maori advisers saw their positions within the state as arising out of the protests from Maori groups over the last decade.

The state was seen to have a major role in facilitating or hindering social change. Maori policy advisers not only consulted with iwi and other

Maori groups outside of the state, many of them belonged to such Maori groups. Maori advisers saw their role within the state as arising from and extending the aims of the Maori renaissance. Consequently, while pluralist theory might understand Maori advisers as administrative agents, their commitment to kaupapa Maori and the extensive use of networks to keep iwi informed and to seek feed-back on policy development suggests that Maori advisers are not simply administrative functionaries. Nor, however, are they 'instruments' of an instrumentalist state.

Instrumentalist theories view the state in capitalist societies as an agent of the ruling class. As Miliband (1969) argues, those who work within the state will act in the interests of that class and become embourgeoisied. Not only is the state seen as incapable of delivering social change, those working within it are presented as being incapable of seeing beyond current imperatives as defined by capital.

There is little evidence to suggest that Maori advisers have become absorbed by the agenda of capital or even a Pakeha agenda. Some Maori advisers saw themselves at risk of being seduced by the security and rewards that employment in the state seemed to offer. But all the Maori advisers articulated their role in terms of a Maori agenda within the state.

They stated a commitment to working towards the creation of a bicultural and responsive state sector. Such a commitment can hardly be seen as central to what is expected of public servants generally. Aware of the dangers of co-option or embourgeoisement, they resisted this through the maintenance of extensive informal Maori networks within and outside the state sector.

Similarly, many of the advisers in this study were well aware of the possibility of co-option and how historically the state had acted against Maori interests. Few of the Maori advisers portrayed the state as acting neutrally and appropriately. If Maori advisers have become embourgeoisied, it reflects an embourgeoisement of pocket rather than hegemony over the mind.

While the Maori advisers are critical of the state and frequently portray it as a Pakeha state, they are not crude instrumentalists. They, like many sociologists, see the state as an institution placed in a contradictory position. As semi-autonomous theories of the state argue, rather than the state being the agent of a dominant capitalist class, there are competing class fractions. The state is forced to manage those. To do so it must also ensure its own legitimacy with the public. It is this which allows classes or other groupings to gain access to the state and effect change within it. All the Maori advisers recognise the necessity for the state to maintain its legitimacy. Indeed, many argued that it has been the Crown which has taken the mana of Maori and it is the state which must recognise the reassertion of mana Maori motuhake:

What is unique about Maori people is their tangata whenua status, and what we owned and had taken away from us by illegal or unfair means. Now it seems to me that the state owes two obligations. The first is that of the basic human rights, which all its citizens have and which Article three of the Treaty guarantees to all citizens. The other obligation of the state is to honour its own impeaching of guarantees I suppose, and those it owes to Maori tribes. Not Maori individuals, not Maori peoples, not Maori communities. It owes that obligation to Maori iwi and hapu, who signed the Treaty, and that obligation is about re-dressing the grievances or its precursors visited upon us. Now both of those are functions of public policy making (Aroha).

An important challenge that many of the advisers who participated in this study confronted the researcher with, concerned the benefits of such a thesis for Maori people. This is an issue that is not easily resolved theoretically or personally. The thesis has documented to some extent some of the shared problems that Maori advisers across the state sector encounter. It has also described the importance for Maori advisers of maintaining their networks with iwi and pan-tribal Maori groups in order to be effective policy advisers.

This thesis cannot claim to provide Maori advisers with any new strategies to adopt to their practice. Its aims are very limited. However, it is nevertheless a contribution to what is an important and growing body of knowledge on the unfolding relationship between a maturing Maori renaissance and the state. This thesis provides an outsider's view and in doing so, perhaps identifies the same continuities and discontinuities

which those who have to work in state policy every day may not have time to see.

## Appendix 1

### Consent Form

Your participation in the proposed research will be protected by the following conditions.

- 1) Your participation is voluntary and you are therefore free to withdraw at any time from the research.
- 2) If you are unclear or unsure of the meaning of any of the questions, you can seek to have these clarified by the researcher.
- 3) You are assured of confidentiality which will be provided in the following ways:
  - i) The interview tapes will only be listened to by the researcher.
  - ii) The interview tape will not be released to anyone and will be erased on the completion of the research.
  - iii) Once the interview has been transcribed, your name will be changed as appropriate to protect your identity.
- 4) You will be provided with a copy of the interview and may advise the researcher of any additions or amendments that you consider to be important.
- 5) You give your consent to the researcher (Brendan Gembitsky) to use the information gained, in any unpublished or published work that may result from the research.
- 6) At the conclusion of the research a summary of the findings will be made available to you.

Participant:

Researcher:

Date:

## Appendix 2

### Letter of Introduction

I would like to introduce myself and the work that I am currently engaged in. My name is Brendan Gembitsky. I am currently working on an M.A. in Sociology at Massey University and my topic concerns the engagement of between Maori and the state and the nature of service delivery by government departments to Maori people. My thesis supervisors are Dr. Paul Spoonley and Associate Professor Andrew Trlin.

Although I am Japanese, I was born and raised in Wanganui. On leaving school I went to Massey and returned to Massey working for a year as a community social worker for the Department of Social Welfare.

My research and interest stems from my own experiences within DSW almost three years ago. At that time, the Department was attempting to implement the recommendations of Puao Te Ata Tu with only limited success. This was despite the efforts of a dedicated group of Maori staff. It brought into focus the issue of the state and in particular, how its service delivery could be made more effective in relation to Maori people.

The research that I am engaged in critically evaluates the activities of the state and it has the following task. To develop 'tools' which will provide those who work within the state or those who deal with the state (for example Iwi) with a critical understanding of the state. In recent years and more so in the near future as iwi - government relations become more important and understanding as to what the state is, and how it operates will become more critical, particularly if policy development is to become more effective.

At the completion of this research a summary of the findings will be provided to the participants.

## Appendix 3

### Interview Schedule The Policy Advisers

Biographical background of the participant:

I would like to begin this interview by asking you a few questions about yourself and your work history.

- (i) Can you tell me about where you grew up, and something about your family background?
- (ii) Can you tell about your educational history?
- (iii) What are your current living arrangements?  
Do you have children?
- (iv) What is your job title?
- (v) When did you begin work in this job?
- (vi) Were you a public servant prior to this?
- (vii) What jobs have you had prior to this position?
- (viii) What attracted you to this job?
- (ix) What experience or qualifications etc. which you can identify as assisting you in obtaining this position?
- (x) Is the position you currently hold a contract position?
- (xi) Do you usually work alone, or as a part of a team?

- (xii) Are you responsible for other staff members, who are accountable to you?
- (xiii) What are your specific duties and responsibilities.
- (xiv) Do you have any budgetary control in your position?
- (xv) What particular issues are of priority to you?
- (xvi) How do you prioritise issues?

**Familiarity with Main Themes of Maori Politics**

"I'd now like to ask you a few questions about the significance of political events in relation to the development of Maori policy within the state in the last few years".

- (i) Do you currently belong to any groups or organisations which in a very general sense have a social /political orientation or objectives?

What are these groups?

- (ii) What do you consider to have been the main political issues for Maoridom over the last ten years?
- (iii) Which of these issues do you consider yourself to be most familiar with?
- (iv) Are you currently involved in any of these issues?

If yes: How are you currently involved with these issues and what are they?

(v) Do you think that these have been significant in the development of Maori policy in recent years?

In what kinds of ways?

(vi) How do you consider to be the significance of Maori issues, and politics on your own development as a policy analyst?

### **The State**

The following questions are about how you perceive the state, and its role in responding to Maori issues.

(i) You are a State servant. In broad terms what does the 'state' mean to you?

(ii) Do you think that the state can represent Maori (iwi) interests?

(iii) Does the state do this?

If yes: How does the state represent Maori (Iwi) interests?

If no: why do you think the state does not meet these interests?

(iv) What do you see as the significance or importance of policy in meeting the priorities of Maori people?

(v) Who are you most accountable to as a policy analyst?

(vi) Have there been significant or important changes in Maori policy over the last 6 years?

If yes: Are such policies an improvement over previous policy and in what ways?

(vii) What do you find most frustrating about policy making within the state?

- (viii) Does Maori policy encounter opposition from either within your Department or from other Government Departments?
- (ix) How important do you think that it is, for Maori to have representation and input at the policy level?

**Maori Units**

(For those working within a Maori unit)

- (i) What is the title of this unit?
- (ii) When was this unit established?
- (iii) I understand that not all Maori policy analysts are attached to units, why is it that your department has one?
- (iv) What is its role?
- (v) Where do you see the direction of this unit as being over the next 5 years or so?
- (vi) What do you and your staff hope to achieve?
- (vii) What do you consider to be significant about the unit that you work in?

(Non Unit Policy positions)

- (i) I understand that in some Departments, Maori policy analysts are attached to or located within Maori policy units, or other units. Why is there not a unit in your Department?
- (ii) Do you see any advantages in being a part of a unit?

(iii) What about disadvantages?

(iv) Finally would you like to see a unit established in your Department in the future?

### **Networks**

In a number of jobs there is often a importance placed on the role of networking at both formal and informal levels. I want now to ask you a series of questions about networking in your job.

(i) Are there any formal state networks which you use in your work?

(ii) Who is involved in this network? Is it only for policy analysts or only for public servants?

(iii) Is there a formal Maori network within the Public service?

(iv) What about informal networks do these exist?

If yes: Do you rely on these?

(v) How is contact maintained within these networks? Are there for example regular meetings?

(vi) What is the extent of your involvement with the network?

(vii) Why is there a network?

(viii) Who are the key people that you consult, or seek advice from, in relation to your work as a policy analyst?

(ix) Are they also public servants?

(x) Are they also based in Wellington?

- (xi) In general, what do you see as the value of networks for people in positions such as yourself ?
  
- (xii) Do you think it would be useful to have more networks, or that you should make more use of existing ones?

**Concluding comments**

Finally is there anything else that we have not discussed or touched on this interview which you think is important and would like to discuss now?

Thankyou for your patience and your time.

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