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A thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Masters of Arts in History at Massey University.

Laurie W. Brocklebank
1994.
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I would like to thank the following for their support and assistance: John Battersby, Des Cairns, Kerry Howe, Ian McGibbon, Jock Phillips, David Thomson, James Watson, the many contributing Jayforce veterans who are too numerous to mention individually, and finally my wife Michelle.
## Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AA</td>
<td>Anti Aircraft.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGH</td>
<td>Australian General Hospital.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASC</td>
<td>Army Service Corps/ Army Support Company.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aust</td>
<td>Australian.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AWL</td>
<td>Absent Without Leave.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCAIR</td>
<td>British Commonwealth Air Group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCOF</td>
<td>British Commonwealth Occupation Force.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bde</td>
<td>Brigade.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIE</td>
<td>British-Indian Element.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bn</td>
<td>Battalion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOD</td>
<td>Base Ordnance Depot.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRINDIV</td>
<td>British-Indian Division.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bty</td>
<td>Battery.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C in C</td>
<td>Commander in Chief.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Commanding Officer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coy</td>
<td>Company.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSDIC</td>
<td>Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Centre.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDT</td>
<td>Dichloro Diphenyl Trichloroethane.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DET</td>
<td>Detachment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Div Cav</td>
<td>Divisional Cavalry.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPC</td>
<td>Field Punishment Centre.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FUP</td>
<td>Forward Unit Position.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMS</td>
<td>His Majesty’s Ship.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Head Quarters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hrs</td>
<td>hours.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCOSA</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff Australia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt-Col</td>
<td>Lieutenant-Colonel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCO</td>
<td>Non-Commissioned Officer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>Number.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZEF</td>
<td>New Zealand Expeditionary Force.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mls</td>
<td>miles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MMG</td>
<td>Medium Machine Gun.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OC</td>
<td>Officer Commanding.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCTU</td>
<td>Officer Cadet Training Unit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offrs</td>
<td>Officers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OR</td>
<td>Other Ranks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pdr</td>
<td>pounder.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIAT</td>
<td>Projector, Infantry, Anti-Tank.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pln</td>
<td>Platoon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POW</td>
<td>Prisoner Of War.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRO</td>
<td>Provost.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAAAF</td>
<td>Royal Australian Air Force.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAF</td>
<td>Royal Air Force.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regt</td>
<td>Regiment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>---------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RIAF</td>
<td>Royal Indian Air Force.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RNZAF</td>
<td>Royal New Zealand Air Force.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCAP</td>
<td>Supreme Commander Allied Powers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIB</td>
<td>Special Investigation Branch.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tps</td>
<td>troops.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VD</td>
<td>Venereal Disease.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAAC</td>
<td>Women's Auxiliary Army Corps.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WE</td>
<td>War Establishment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YMCA</td>
<td>Young Men's Christian Association.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNRRA</td>
<td>United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
British Commonwealth zone of occupation and disposition of national forces, southern Japan 1946.

INTRODUCTION.

The impetus for an MA thesis on 'New Zealand and the Military Occupation of Japan 1945-48' came from discussions with individuals at Massey University, Internal Affairs Historical Branch, and the New Zealand J Force and BCOF Veterans Association. It became clear that this episode in New Zealand history had not previously been studied in depth, yet opportunities were diminishing for with the passing of time veterans' written and oral recollections and personnel papers were being lost. An ideal and somewhat urgent avenue for original historical research emerged.

New Zealand's role in the military occupation of Japan had two interconnecting sides, political and military. This thesis will examine both, and the relationship between the political and military parts, as well as the overall relevance of this slice of New Zealand history. A central question is 'was participation in the occupation of Japan important as a political or military event, or both'?

New Zealand's relations with Japan prior to 1945 were firstly distant then intensely hostile. Between 1902-21 Britain was allied to Japan under the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, yet New Zealand had little to do with its defacto ally, as cultural and political contacts were virtually non-existent and commercial ties very limited. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s New Zealand, along with Australia, lobbied Britain hard for the construction of a naval base at Singapore to protect against possible Japanese aggression. Between 1941-45 the two nations were at war and Japan directly
threatened New Zealand’s security for a time, nevertheless the New Zealand military focus was to remain on Europe and the Middle East as it had done prior to 1941. This changed with the surrender of Germany, and New Zealand planned to participate in an invasion of Japan with a two-brigade division and up to seventeen RNZAF squadrons. An unexpectedly quick unconditional surrender from the Japanese during the second week of August 1945 halted these plans.

Following the surrender a strong military and political focus on Japan remained. New Zealand participated in the occupation of Japan between March 1946 and November 1948, with approximately 12,000 men and women serving in either an army brigade group or an RNZAF fighter squadron. Most were based in the Yamaguchi Prefecture at the far south-western tip of the island of Honshu, a poor and rural part of Japan with approximately 1.4 million inhabitants.\(^1\) The New Zealand force, commonly known as Jayforce, participated as part of a British Commonwealth Occupation Force (BCOF) that at its peak consisted of over 40,000 military personnel from Australia, Britain and India. Even so, BCOF was dwarfed by the American military forces which occupied the rest of Japan. Importantly, Jayforce was New Zealand’s most significant post-war military commitment until the advent of the Korean war in 1950, and this was the first time New Zealand has been part of a multinational peace-time military occupation force.

\(^1\) See Appendices One, Two and Three for details of Jayforce shipping, deployment and commanding officers.
Published commentary on New Zealand’s role mostly pertains to political factors. The most significant work, Ann Trotter’s *New Zealand and Japan 1945-52. The Occupation and the Peace Treaty*, devotes one chapter to the military occupation, though the focus is on politician and diplomat activities and her end notes reflect this, being dominated by *Documents on New Zealand External Relations, 2. The Surrender and Occupation of Japan*, (Ed. Robin Kay). In turn this substantial collection has been a major primary source for this thesis. Other published works make a briefer reference, they include Ian McGibbon, *New Zealand and the Korean War*, 1; *New Zealand in World Affairs*, 1; *Official History of New Zealand in the Second World War 1939-45. Documents*, 3, (Ed. M.C. Fairbrother); and *Undiplomatic Dialogue*, (Ed. Ian McGibbon). Sir Alister McIntosh’s ‘Working with Peter Fraser in Wartime: Personal Reminiscences’, in *The New Zealand Journal of History*, 10:1, 1976, has been useful on the enigmatic Peter Fraser.

Published literature on New Zealand’s military force, Jayforce, has been more limited. Publications from the Official History series on the Second World War mostly have only a cursory post-script, though Oliver A. Gillespie’s *Official History of New Zealand in the Second World War 1939-45. The Pacific*, is one notable exception. This offers an introduction into but not detail on the essential events and problems that the force encountered. The other exception is T. Duncan and M. Stout, *Official History of New Zealand in the Second World War 1939-45. War Surgery and Medicine*, which provides brief yet valuable information on venereal disease infection amongst Jayforce soldiers. W. David McIntyre, *New Zealand Prepares for War*; John McLeod *Myth and Reality. The New Zealand Soldier in World War II*; and Jock Phillips *A Man’s
Country? The Image of the Pakeha Male, have been useful for background on life in the New Zealand military forces. Two auto biographies complete the relevant literature, Brian Cox, Too Young to Die, and Frank Rennie, Regular Soldier. A Life in the New Zealand Army, recount their individual experiences in Jayforce as a small part of their military careers.

Unpublished material on Jayforce is abundant, with veterans having provided a substantial number of personal papers and contemporary recollections. A resource base consisting of twenty-four recorded interviews, twenty-four contemporary written recollections, and twenty-five private papers collections has been accumulated. The New Zealand J Force and BCOF Veterans Association has also provided access to written and oral records. Finally an array of files in the EA and WA sections at National Archives Wellington have been examined, they mostly relate to the army brigade.

Unpublished sources on political aspects of the occupation have been less substantial, though still decisive. The Labour Party Caucus Minutes and the McIntosh Papers have shed new light on political decision-making. An examination of the EA series at National Archives resulted in some material not covered by Kay coming forth.

It is regretted that a number of sources have not been available. This has included the RNZAF files from the Air Department list missing from National
Moreover, financial and time restraints have meant that some potentially valuable personal papers, written and oral recollections, and overseas archival sources have not been tapped.

The central theme for this thesis will be that participation in the military occupation of Japan was a political exercise designed to maintain Britain as New Zealand’s security defender. Though this was a traditional New Zealand external relations objective, the means of achievement - a military occupation force - was new. These political circumstances were to result in extraordinary problems for Jayforce, and to its general unsatisfactory nature as a military operation.

The first two chapters concern political aspects of participation, that is, why New Zealand politicians wanted to be involved in the military occupation of Japan and the causes of a five-month gap between agreement in principle and full agreement. As such they focus on Peter Fraser, not just because as Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs he was dominant, but also for the way he implanted his views on the formulation of policy. A British High Commissioner to New Zealand noted,

Mr. Fraser alone determines the policy of the New Zealand government on every question of foreign affairs. No other member of cabinet is knowledgeable about or interested in such matters. Mr. Fraser rarely consults his colleagues upon these subjects and quite frequently does

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2 Published literature includes Ian Nish’s article ‘Britain and the Occupation of Japan - Some Personal Recollections’ from Proceeding of the British Association of Japanese Studies; Major-General R.N.L. Hopkin’s article ‘History of the Australian Occupation of Japan 1946-50’ from Journal of the Royal Australian Historical Society; Lieutenant-Colonel F.J.C. Piggot’s article ‘Occupying Japan’ from Army Quarterly; and The British Commonwealth and the Occupation of Japan, (Ed. Ian Nish).
not even inform them when he has taken important decisions.... Thus New Zealand’s policy on international political issues is as personal as that of any dictatorship.³

Trotter concludes that "... Fraser was an idealist taking a high moral line and defining problems in black and white."² McIntosh seems to contradict this, describing Fraser as being above all else a ‘realist’. He also describes him as a very skilful politician, a bully to his cabinet colleagues and as someone who liked to get his own way.⁵

The reasons for participation have been examined by Trotter in New Zealand and Japan 1945-52. The Occupation and the Peace Treaty, and she sees a desire for long-term peace in the Pacific, and British Commonwealth co-operation and solidarity, as New Zealand’s motives. Chapter One, ‘The Rationale’, re-examines motives for participation through a further study of the source material used by Trotter and by the introduction of new material. While her reasons are agreed with as far as they go, additional motives relating to New Zealand’s defence relationship with Britain are brought to the fore and new conclusions drawn. Whether or not this was a typical external relations activity for New Zealand or something new is also discussed. Chapter Two, ‘Hesitation and Delay’, again explores an area previously examined by Trotter, and again by using both old and new source material a greater insight into this...

³ Snelling to Addison, 31 Aug 1949, PRO DO 35/3761, quoted in Ann Trotter, New Zealand and Japan 1945-52. The Occupation and Peace Treaty, London, 1990, p.23. Note, unless deemed absolutely necessary, spelling and grammar errors in quotations have not been adjusted or marked [sic].

⁴ Trotter, New Zealand and Japan, p.23.

issue is achieved. In this case the issue of reluctance, promoted by Trotter as being the reason for the five month period of uncertainty, is challenged.

By contrast, Chapters Three to Five are military in their focus. As a further contrast the New Zealand force in Japan has not been covered in any depth by others, and no secondary sources exist around which this work can develop. Primary sources form an almost exclusive source base.

In 1945 New Zealand’s armed forces were in a state of rapid transition. After the cessation of hostilities military personnel were wanting to return to civilian life quickly, to accomplish this the military authorities obliged with a speedy demobilisation. Military equipment was also being accumulated, stored, moved, or sold. It was in this difficult environment that Jayforce was born.

Chapter Three, entitled ‘Organisation’, concentrates on the move to Japan and the first few months in Japan for Jayforce. It examines the organisational problems encountered, as well as exploring how good or bad organisation was. The chapter size reflects the enormity of this subject. Among the relating topics discussed are soldier’s expectations of Japan, the packing and shipping of stores and equipment, command jurisdiction, soldier’s attitudes, and the state of living conditions and channels of supply in Japan. Moreover, the process of improvement over time is studied.

The next two chapters separately examine the official and unofficial activities soldiers did once in Japan. In a number of respects developments were determined by
issues discussed in Chapters One and Three. Chapter Four, ‘Tasks and Leisure’, looks at the pre-determined military tasks arranged for Jayforce and examines how and why they very quickly came to be over-shadowed. This change in turn impacted on the development of leisure and recreation and the emergence of boredom and monotony. Chapter Four leads into Chapter Five, ‘Misdemeanour and Crime’, in which an examination of the prominent forms of illegal activity and an assessment of their causes among the New Zealand force is undertaken. It weighs the extent of this activity, within the context of the time and circumstances. Though once again this chapter is large, this reflects the scale of this kind of activity amongst Jayforce personnel.

Chapter Six, ‘Retention or Withdrawal’, studies how the tide turned against participation. Only a small number of sources have been found, and as in Chapters One and Two a re-interpretation of Trotter’s work is completed by a re-examination of her source material, in conjunction with new primary information. While Trotter states that withdrawal resulted because the political reasons for the original participation no longer existed, little weight is placed on British actions. This chapter argues that they were paramount.

Conclusions on the relevance of participation in the military occupation of Japan in New Zealand’s history have varied. Ann Trotter calls the occupation force "... a ‘unique experiment’ in Commonwealth co-operation ...", while Dean Stout
describes the period as "... an unremarkable two and a half years." Veterans are equally disparate in their opinions, some calling it a holiday, some an ordeal, and others a forgotten episode. The following study will draw its own conclusion by tying together the various aspects of participation.

Some military unit titles referred to in the text require explanation. The official and commonly recognised titles for the New Zealand army brigade to Japan varied between 9NZ Brigade, 2NZEF (Japan), and Jayforce, though the most commonly recognised title was Jayforce and this will be the title used. It is not clear whether the term Jayforce should properly cover No. 14 RNZAF squadron as it mostly existed as a separate entity. However the experiences in Japan of the two branches were frequently the same, and in official documents they are often both referred to under the name of Jayforce. Hence it is difficult and sometimes pointless to differentiate between the two, and except where necessary the term Jayforce will refer to both contingents.

As well, a number of Jayforce units underwent name changes during 1946-48. Most significantly, 22 and 27 Battalion changed on 7 August 1947 to 2 Battalion and 3 Battalion respectively. Any reference to these military formations clearly prior to or after this date will be made to the proper designated title. Any reference pertaining to an issue that spans this date will list both titles.

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CHAPTER ONE.

The Rationale.

Why did New Zealand want to take part in the British Commonwealth Occupation Force to Japan? Initial agreement in principle to participate came quickly in response to a request from Britain. However, New Zealand’s motives lay much deeper than a mere complying with a request, and reflected historical as well as contemporary considerations. Also, political rather than military factors guided the decisions.

New Zealand’s participation in BCOF originated most directly in a telegram from British Prime Minister Attlee to New Zealand Prime Minister Fraser on 13 August 1945. It stated in part

... [w]e trust that we may rely on your assistance ... and indeed we regard your assistance as indispensable.... A British Commonwealth force shall take part in the occupation of Japan. We suggest that it should be formed from one brigade group each of Australian, British, British-Indian, Canadian and New Zealand troops with a tactical airforce contingent.

The New Zealand War Cabinet agreed to participate in the occupation at their final meeting on 21 August. This was only an agreement in principle, and no decision was made on how New Zealand would participate. New Zealand’s right to involvement

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1 P. Fraser was a Labour Party Prime Minister of New Zealand 1940-49 and Minister of External Affairs 1943-49.

was legitimised from another direction. The Potsdam Proclamation, forged by Britain and the United States (in agreement with China) in July 1945, indicated that the occupation forces to Japan would be made up from Allied nations, though no one nation was singled out. There is no information to indicate how great an impact the Proclamation had on New Zealand thinking.

Participation was undoubtably motivated most significantly by a wish to maintain British Commonwealth defence ties. This essentially meant pledging continued support for the defence of Britain as the core foundation element of the British Commonwealth. As McGibbon explains

... Fraser noted in 1948 in terms no different than those used by Massey, Coates, or Forbes before him, if Britain were to fall, 'it would only be a question of time before New Zealand fell too'. Commonwealth strategy ensured a European orientation, since Britain was the 'centre, focus, and force of the British Commonwealth of Nations', upon whose security the whole edifice depended.  

Yet even though New Zealand largely equated its security with the continued well-being of Britain, at least some emphasis was placed on regional defence, for in return for helping Britain, New Zealand expected that country to act as its security guarantor. The British direct defence focus on other areas, most notably the south-east Asia region via the Singapore strategy of the 1920s and 1930s, was an obvious expression of this. From the late 1940s this approach was to continue, with strategy concepts such

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as ‘forward defence’ and planning arrangements such as ANZAM that tended to concentrate once again on south-east Asia.

A number of basic concerns underpinned the thinking behind New Zealand’s need for a big power security guarantor. New Zealand (along with Australia) was a geographically isolated, under-populated and relatively un-industrialised nation. As a consequence "... neither Australia nor New Zealand, separately or jointly, ... [were] ... capable of ensuring the defence of their own territories."4 It was in the interests of both New Zealand and Australia to foster and maintain defence relations with a nation willing and able to defend the region. Further considerations were racial, cultural and political compatibility. Only Britain, as far as New Zealand’s decision makers were concerned, fitted the bill.5

Moreover, Britain had always been New Zealand’s security guarantor. Imperial conferences and councils, which New Zealand had attended from 1887, provided a platform for airing security views and for drawing Britain into Australasian involvements. British Empire defence arrangements were co-ordinated and encouraged in London from 1904 until the beginning of the Second World War by a British governmental body known as the Committee of Imperial Defence. New Zealand was both familiar and comfortable with the continuance of similar arrangements in 1945.

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5 Paper on Post-War Security Prepared by the War Cabinet Secretariat ..., Jan 1944, DNZER, 1, pp.60-61.
As McGibbon states "... within the Commonwealth system, New Zealand leaders had tried and trusted channels of communication with British authorities who they believed ... were sympathetic with their country’s security requirements." Given New Zealand’s geographical status, the Royal Navy had been the branch of the British armed services most focused on by New Zealand as a security guarantor, and the protection of the Royal Navy in the advent of an external threat had always been promised by Britain. Although in late 1941 and early 1942 the Royal Navy’s efforts against the advancing Japanese had failed dismally, by 1945 the Royal Navy was still the world’s second biggest naval force. These together with other factors to be discussed presently, discouraged New Zealand transferring its allegiance to any other defence power.

The only other nation that might have been acceptable in this role, the United States, was a less appropriate choice for New Zealand. First, there had never been a pledge to defend New Zealand from the United States, and second, diplomatic relations between the two nations had at times been rocky. Closer physical contact with the United States during the Pacific War did not lead to stronger political and defensive ties. Instead the "... American commitment ... was seen as a reinforcement of, rather than as a replacement for, Commonwealth security arrangements." Initial post-war defence thinking continued in this vein, and there is no evidence that New

---


Zealand actively courted American security pledges. Agreement to participate in the occupation of Japan, I will argue, was not motivated by a desire to obtain American security guarantees against possible future Japanese aggression. The fact that New Zealand was not prepared to participate in the occupation force to Japan under initial American terms, as will be discussed in Chapter Two, would also seem to support this conclusion.

The fledgling United Nations Organisation, in its guise as a global peacekeeper, was also an unacceptable security guarantor for New Zealand. Disillusionment centred on the right of veto given to the so-called big five nations who had permanent seats on the Security Council: China, France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States. The right of veto meant that United Nations action required their unanimous agreement and could not be relied upon as being guaranteed. New Zealand’s defence planners drew this conclusion early on. In October 1944, after the initial round of discussions on the structure of the United Nations had taken place at Dumbarton Oaks, they decided that their faith at this time was better placed in the solid foundations of Imperial and Commonwealth defence.

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10 By contrast, attempting to obtain American defence pledges seems to have been a major consideration in Australia’s motives for participation in the occupation of Japan. See David A. Day, ‘Promise and Performance: Britain’s Pacific Pledge, 1943-5’, *War and Society*, 4:2, 1986, p.86.

However some difficulties existed in reconfirming Britain as New Zealand’s security guarantor in 1945, for Britain was struggling to maintain its obligations as a leading world military power. The Second World War had drained financial reserves, and belt-tightening had seen planned commitments to the Pacific theatre, timed to occur following the defeat of Germany, being steadily watered down from 1944: a more pressing consideration was the reconstruction of the devastated British homeland. This trend continued in the immediate post-war period, much to the consternation of some New Zealand officials. One noted that

... [t]he occupation forces [to Japan] offered by Britain are so small as to suggest that, for a number of reasons, she is not willing to make heavy commitments for Far Eastern and Pacific security; this present indication is a significant indication of future policy.¹²

They felt Britain needed re-assurance and support to continue to be committed to Pacific defence, and it followed that New Zealand "... should invite rather than decline opportunities of Commonwealth cooperation."¹³

Assisting Britain to keep up its security pledges to New Zealand in 1945 was nothing new, having been a major focus of New Zealand ‘external’ relations from the late nineteenth century.¹⁴ Large amounts of money had earlier been given to British military projects, so that its military forces would be in a better position to provide for New Zealand’s security if the need should arise. The two most important examples

¹² Corner to G.M., 21 Aug 1945, EA1 268/9 Japan-Allied Control.


¹⁴ Relations with Britain were probably only considered ‘external’ in the broadest sense only given the nature of British-New Zealand political ties at least until the adopting of the Statute of Westminster in 1947.
of this strategy were the 1909 agreement to gift one million pounds to pay for a battle-cruiser for the Royal Navy, HMS *New Zealand*, and a 1927 agreement to contribute another one million pounds for the building of the naval base at Singapore.

Outside political/military spheres, other factors encouraged closer ties between New Zealand and Britain in the immediate post-war period. Economic considerations drew New Zealand to Britain, as that nation continued to be New Zealand's closest trading partner by far. At war's end generous and extensive contracts in meat, wool and dairy products were still in place. Harland explains that New Zealand's "... overriding economic dependence upon Britain ... made her more conservative and less ambitious [than for example Australia] in international affairs." At the same time economic factors hampered New Zealand's relationship with the United States. Wall Street financiers and their plans were of some concern. McKinnon has noted

American proposals for a new [post-war] international world order were greeted with a great deal of suspicion by conservatives because aspects of them seemed to portend an American takeover of the British Empire.... Labour worried about its impact on the economic experiment in New Zealand.

Sentiment was another factor influencing close ties with Britain. British-New Zealand relations were bound up in a history of very strong and generally satisfactory defence, political, cultural and economic association. Participation in British Empire/Commonwealth defence had been virtually unqualified and enthusiastic. Moreover,

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New Zealand had been a British colony from 1840 to 1907, it was populated primarily by British peoples and had traded almost exclusively with Britain. These bonds were felt very powerfully in 1945. The Statute of Westminster, the means by which political ties with Britain could be substantially loosened, had still not been taken up by New Zealand even though it had been introduced as a policy option to the Dominions by Britain as early as 1931. By contrast Australia, Canada, Eire and South Africa had all quickly adopted the Statute of Westminster.

New Zealand’s pro-British sentiment did not just apply to Britain alone, but encompassed the British Empire/ Commonwealth as a whole. The continued cohesion and strength of this organisation was seen as important, and New Zealand played an active part in trying to maintain this throughout the 1940s. This outlook paralleled New Zealand’s desire to help prop-up Britain’s position as a leading world military power.

In the immediate post-war period then, New Zealand was very keen to continue with Britain as a security guarantor and to participate in British Commonwealth defence arrangements to achieve this. As early as May 1944 Fraser made known New Zealand’s attitude during a Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ conference in London. He suggested the resurrection of the Committee of Imperial defence, suspended in September 1939. However, the only other Dominion to share this enthusiasm was Australia, and Fraser’s plans went no further. This rebuttal did not dampen Australasian enthusiasm for joint Commonwealth defence relations nevertheless, as

\[17\] McIntyre, ‘Peter Fraser’s Commonwealth’, p.41.
Australian Prime Minister Curtin explained, "I will go on with what I can get. If ... I cannot have four brethren and can have three, well, three's better than none."  

Attlee was almost certainly appealing to this sense of loyalty by calling in his telegram of August 1945 for a British Commonwealth military force to partake in the occupation of Japan. It was originally envisaged that BCOF would be a truly representative grouping of Dominion states, consisting of detachments from Canada, South Africa, Australia, Britain, India and New Zealand. A joint military force was probably perceived as a means to add a practical and high-profile dimension to British Commonwealth activities, as well as to show how this organisation was developing as a functioning entity in world affairs.

Developments in post-war Japan caused concern to New Zealand because of this. The occupation was in danger of becoming an all-American affair, which New Zealand did not want to happen because of the damage this exclusivity would do to the prestige of the British Commonwealth as a major world power. An External Affairs official noted

"... [w]e could not ... approve a result which left on the Japanese mind an impression that the USA was the only power they had to deal with. The interest, and the union, of the other powers in maintaining the occupation must be manifest to the Japanese people."  

As such, a role in the occupation by New Zealand was probably also motivated out of loyalty to the British Commonwealth, as it would be a means to redress an

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18 Quoted in *The Round Table*, 136, 1944, p.315.

imbalance and at the same time to promote the standing of this body. This motive has also been pushed by Trotter as a reason for New Zealand participation. The prestige of the British Commonwealth was almost certainly a more important consideration for Fraser than for the leaders of Australia and Britain (see Chapter Two).

New Zealand’s attitude towards its newly-defeated enemy Japan was also a factor in the decision to participate in the occupation force. Almost from the beginning of the twentieth century New Zealand’s politicians had viewed Japan with great suspicion. This was partially because of its military might, dating from victory in the Russio-Japanese war of 1904-05, which McGibbon states "... propelled Japan into the front rank of naval powers." Suspicion emerged despite an Anglo-Japanese Alliance between 1902-21, and Japan’s siding with the Allied cause during the First World War. Concern was heightened by the relative geographical proximity of Japan as compared to other potentially threatening naval powers. New Zealand encouraged and assisted the building of a Royal Navy base at Singapore in the 1920s and 1930s in the hope that it would have the dual effect of acting as a deterrent against Japanese aggression, and would allow Royal Navy capital ships to operate in the Asia-Pacific region long-term. The threat from Japan was taken seriously because it was thought New Zealand was a very attractive target to Asian nations, being sparsely populated.

20 Trotter, New Zealand and Japan, pp.52-54.


22 McGibbon, Blue-Water Rationale, pp.11-12; W. David McIntyre, New Zealand Prepares for War, Christchurch, 1988, p.36.
and a high output food producer. By contrast Asia was perceived as being vastly over-populated and unable to feed itself. In addition, Asians were viewed with suspicion on racist grounds, and Asian migration to New Zealand had been discouraged by a whites-only policy.

New Zealand’s fears were fully realised during the 1941-45 Asia/Pacific war. Japan’s military thrust southwards was only halted on the approaches to Australia. A number of Australian towns and cities were directly attacked, and Japanese aircraft and submarines were reported to have been sighted within New Zealand territorial waters.

It was only natural, then, that the stance taken by New Zealand’s officials toward a post-war Japan was harsh, and conceived to ensure that Japan could never be a threat to New Zealand again. "In ... [A.D. McIntosh’s] view, endorsed by Fraser, the Allies would need to go beyond the mere removal of the fruits of aggression - The Japanese Empire - to impose the most rigorous security control on Japan itself." The complete dismantling of the social and political hierarchy, along with the demilitarisation and subjugation of Japan was called for. An intensive and

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23 Note that the focus on the Japanese during the Pacific war was predominantly shown by government officials. General public interest, except for a time in 1942, was minimal. McKinnon, pp.45-50.

24 Trotter, *New Zealand and Japan*, p.26 and pp.52-54.

25 McIntosh to Corner, 30 Mar 1953, MERT, McIntosh Papers, COR1, quoted in McGibbon, *New Zealand and the Korean War*, pp.23-24. A.D. McIntosh was Secretary of External Affairs 1943-66 and the Permanent Head of the Prime Minister’s Department 1945-66.
long occupation was considered necessary to attain these goals. This view generally corresponded with the Australian outlook though was more flexible on some initial issues such as retaining the Japanese Emperor on the throne as a temporary expedient.  

Following the Japanese surrender in August 1945 New Zealand wanted its views on Japan to be heard and acted upon. This was a new strategy for New Zealand, which had formerly had little to say about Japan, yet it reflected directly the traditional and close-felt security concerns towards Japan. It originated in the Canberra Pact, forged with Australia in January 1944, and was implied in the section of that Pact marked ‘Armistice and Subsequent Arrangements’. The view was advocated more forthrightly and directly linked to participation in the occupation of Japan in November 1944 at the Australia-New Zealand ministerial conference in Wellington.  

New Zealand was concerned that its views on Japan be taken into consideration in particular because jurisdiction over Japan had by September 1945 become solely an American responsibility. This was worrying to New Zealand officials for it was thought that the Americans may take too soft a line on Japan. Participation in the

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26 T.C.L. to Shanahan, 19 Jan 1946, EA1 106/3/31 Nomination of Emperor of Japan, Hirohito, as a Far Eastern War Criminal.


28 This was because the United States was determined to fulfil this role and had the forces readily available at the time of the Japanese surrender.

29 Footnote 4, DNZER, 2, p.59.
occupation of Japan was a way to alleviate this anxiety, as it was believed that the promotion of harsh measures would be taken more seriously by the Americans if words could be backed up with a preparedness to act. This point was made by Carl Berendsen, New Zealand's appointee to the Far Eastern Commission who "... was in favour of a long occupation, harsh peace terms and, predictably, a commitment to the enforcement of such terms."\(^{30}\) The consequences of failing to act harshly were pointed out by Fraser in a statement on 1 October 1945; "... [i]f ... the peace settlement with Japan should fail, New Zealand may well be one of the first countries to suffer."\(^{31}\)

New Zealand's wish to be heard in future plans for Japan was also part of a wider national assertion in world (and most especially Pacific) affairs. The spur for this had been the Cairo Declaration of 1 December 1943, which addressed Allied plans for post-war Japan. New Zealand and Australia had not been informed of the meeting, let alone invited, and the first they knew of the Declaration was via the press. Both nations were angered at being kept in the dark on issues of such importance, and "... [i]t left both countries more determined to express their views on post-war requirements in their own area."\(^{32}\) Therefore "... much of New Zealand's [foreign] policy since late in 1944 ... [was] ... aimed toward impressing upon the United States that the Dominion of New Zealand had ideas of her own in the Pacific and that she


\(^{31}\) Fraser to Addison, 30 Sep 1945, DNZER, 2, p.1288.

wanted these to be heard. "\( ^{33} \) Sharing in post-war occupation responsibilities was one way this could be achieved.

Yet this motive for participation was probably a lesser consideration to that of maintaining Britain as New Zealand’s security guarantor, for a series of factors emerged in 1945 that reduced the potential short and medium-term risk from Japan. First, Japan was to lose its North Pacific Island territories to the United States, and the distance between New Zealand and Japanese territory had thereby been increased considerably. Second, the United States was planning to establish a number of permanent military bases in the Pacific, creating a fortuitous protective military umbrella over the south-west Pacific. Third, Japan was utterly incapable of contemplating offensive action, having been economically crippled and its people mentally drained by the war. Fourth, US troops occupied the Japanese homeland and the US Navy completely dominated the world’s oceans, being larger than all other fleets combined. \( ^{34} \) As a consequence "... Fraser could well accept that New Zealand was ‘safer than ever’. "\( ^{35} \)

\[ ^{33} \text{Bernard K. Gordon, } New Zealand Becomes a Pacific Power, Chicago, 1960, p.249. \]


\[ ^{35} \text{COS(48)179th Mtg, 15 Dec 1948, PM156/1/22, quoted in McGibbon, New Zealand and the Korean War, p.25.} \]
Perhaps a minor consideration in participating in the occupation was a rationale promoted by Australia. This maintained that those who bore some of the responsibility for fighting and defeating Japan during the Second World War had gained the right to take part in the peacemaking. Once again the origins of this approach lay in the Canberra Pact and the ministerial conference in Wellington in November 1944.  

Australia’s Minister for External Affairs, Dr. Evatt, fervently pushed this viewpoint in the international arena during 1944-45. New Zealand’s role was mainly one of acquiescence rather than initiative or instigation, and it is doubtful if it acted as a significant motivating factor. Compared to the American and even Australian roles in the Pacific theatre, New Zealand’s contribution had been small and was unlikely to have been perceived as a serious justification for participation.

While concerns for long-term security and promoting British Commonwealth prestige motivated New Zealand participation in the occupation of Japan, immediate military considerations probably played no part. Fraser was aware that any contribution made by New Zealand would be dwarfed by the American presence, for within a matter of weeks of the Japanese surrender half a million United States military personnel had been deployed in Japan and Korea. Furthermore, shortly after becoming Supreme Commander of the occupying forces in Japan, General MacArthur had announced that most of the military tasks required of the occupation forces in Japan.

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36 WAIi, 21/19B, War History Narrative, Patricia Lissington, ‘Allied Control of Japan’, 1, p.2; Berendsen to McIntosh, 9 Nov 1944, Undiplomatic Dialogue, p.84.

37 Dr. H.V. Evatt was Australia’s Minister for External Affairs 1941-49.
Japan were expected to be completed by mid-October 1945.\textsuperscript{38} It was almost certainly known there was no material need for New Zealand military participation.

Though Trotter lays some emphasis on BCOF in Japan being an experiment in British Commonwealth military co-operation, it is unlikely that Fraser laid much emphasis on this as a military consideration but rather saw it in political terms.\textsuperscript{39} In other words, he saw the joint force as a means to promote British Commonwealth prestige only, rather than as a practical working entity. There is no indication in External Relations documents that this was so, and throughout the time Jayforce was part of BCOF it operated as independently as possible within the confines of this organisation.\textsuperscript{40}

Thus, it is likely there was a contradiction in New Zealand’s outlook towards British Commonwealth co-operation in the military occupation of Japan. As much as Fraser was keen to advocate and be seen to be partaking in joint British Commonwealth ventures such as BCOF, actual co-operation when the time came was minimal. This point is also made by McIntyre in relation to New Zealand external


\textsuperscript{39} Trotter, \textit{New Zealand and Japan}, p.70.

\textsuperscript{40} It is however possible the British placed some importance on BCOF as an experiment in British Commonwealth military co-operation. See Parkinson to Weir, 28 Jan 1947, \textit{DNZER}, 2, p.1435.
relations in the 1940s as a whole, and the outlook in regards to the occupation of Japan was probably typical.⁴¹

Sending a military force on a strictly political duty was a new direction in New Zealand external relations policy. Previous to this large numbers of New Zealand military personnel had only ever been sent abroad on three occasions, and that was to fight wars. Yet the nature of this exercise combined with the specified request from Britain meant that the sending of a military force was probably perceived as necessary.

In two respects post-war security guarantees were the major consideration in New Zealand wanting to participate in the occupation of Japan. First and foremost, New Zealand wished to stand by Britain so that Britain would be prepared to reciprocate. Contrary to what others have said, the United States as well as the United Nations were not wanted as security guarantors. It is also significant that supporting Britain in this way had been undertaken in the past, though financial incentives were used previously. This time a military force was sent, even though there was no military necessity, and this was a unique strategy for New Zealand. Second, Japan had been a direct threat to New Zealand’s security, and the Government was anxious to avoid a repetition. It was not enough that Japan had surrendered, but a real say in Japan’s continued post-war suppression was desired. Beyond this, promoting British Commonwealth prestige was also an important factor encouraging participation, essentially because of the importance placed in this body by New Zealand. A lesser consideration concerned the fact that having borne some responsibility for defeating

⁴¹ McIntyre, ‘Peter Fraser’s Commonwealth’, pp.41-42.
the Japanese, New Zealand had gained the right to occupying Japan. Military considerations on the other hand played no part in the decision to take part in the occupation.
CHAPTER TWO.

Hesitation and Delay.

After New Zealand had made a swift decision in principle to participate in the British Commonwealth Occupation Force to Japan, a five month period of delay ensued before full agreement. Two factors which emerged between August 1945 and January 1946 were to blame, the failure to recruit the brigade group destined for Japan from volunteers and difficulties in obtaining American approval for British Commonwealth participation on a basis acceptable to New Zealand. Trotter has argued that the delay was evidence of a reluctance to participate, but this chapter argues otherwise.¹

From the outset there were protracted problems over the make-up of the proposed New Zealand army brigade group. Initially Fraser was adamant that the force should consist only of volunteers and not include conscripted soldiers. His outlook reflected personal as well as Labour Party ideology, compulsion had been anathema to the Labour Party, and was opposed rigorously in the late 1930s when there were calls to have compulsory conscription introduced.

Fraser's initial proposal was sent to Lieutenant-General Freyberg on 21 August, it was for a 5000 strong army brigade to be drawn from single men volunteers of the

¹ Trotter, New Zealand and Japan, p.29 and pp.44-52.
11th through to the 15th reinforcements of 2NZEF, based in Italy. These reinforcement groups were under consideration because they were the last drafts sent from New Zealand before the armistice on the Italian front on 2 May 1945, subsequently they had been away from New Zealand the shortest amount of time.

Freyberg, based in London, was equally adamant that a voluntary force was not possible. He replied the next day that the total number of single men making up these reinforcement drafts was only 7500, and he was doubtful of obtaining 5000 volunteers from a pool this small. He also doubted if the appropriate number of trained and specialist personnel could be obtained from these drafts alone.

Fraser then enquired if the appropriate numbers of volunteers could be obtained from all categories of men in the 11th-15th reinforcement drafts, not just single men. Once again Freyberg replied in the negative, this time he cited war-weariness as precluding volunteering. At no stage were the men from these reinforcement drafts directly approached to volunteer, Freyberg’s reasoning was "... should we fail as I feel we should it would prevent the subsequent detailing of these men as an ordinary military duty." On 29 August Fraser bowed to Freyberg’s reasoning and cabled

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2 Lieutenant-General Sir B.C. Freyberg was General Commanding Officer 2NZEF 1939-45. He vacated this position on 22 Nov 1945.

3 The first part of the 11th Reinforcement group had left New Zealand on 12 Jan 1944, with a second group leaving on 31 Mar 1944. The 12th Reinforcements left on 29 Jun, the 13th on 28 Sep, the 14th on 5 Jan 1945, and the 15th on 21 Apr. Footnote 3, DNZER, 2, p.1268.

4 Freyberg to Fraser, 25 Aug 1945, DNZER, 2, pp.1268-69.

5 Freyberg to Fraser, 22 Aug 1945, DNZER, 2, p.1268.
Attlee that the New Zealand Government agreed to the sending of a conscripted army brigade.

This was a premature move, for two days later Fraser was obliged to rescind the notification of agreement. He had sent notice in anticipation of Labour Party Caucus acquiescence, but instead found there was considerable opposition among his colleagues to a conscripted force. Consultation was undertaken because Fraser was a firm believer in consensus politics, and decisions relating to 2NZEF were included in this approach. It is significant that Caucus opposition was over how the army brigade should be chosen, while participation itself was not discussed which would seem to indicate it was not an issue.

Once more Fraser was obliged to cable Freyberg and request him to explore ways of raising a force with volunteers only. Freyberg also undertook the unpleasant task of informing the British authorities of New Zealand’s change of heart. Freyberg’s reaction to this political turn-around was one of frustration and annoyance, as he stated in his reply to Fraser, "... [a]ll necessary and possible arrangements for shipping and movement and organisation of Brigade Group [to Japan] have been made. I must now inform War Office that no final decision has been taken...".

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6 The vote was 16 in favour to 14 opposed with approximately half a dozen abstentions. An adjournment of almost six hours was required to discuss this matter, which implies a considerable amount of hard bargaining had been necessary to win even a thin majority. Labour Party Caucus Minutes, 30 Aug 1945.

7 McIntosh, ‘Working with Peter Fraser’, p.12; McIntosh to Berendsen, 22 Apr 1943, Undiplomatic Dialogue, p.20.

8 Freyberg to Fraser, 30 Aug 1945, DNZER, 2, p.1272.
How did this embarrassing turnabout occur? Crucially and unusually, Fraser gave notice of a Parliamentary decision before it had been made. Why he should do this is not absolutely clear, though a number of factors may help an explanation. First, he had unquestionably expected Caucus agreement, and he was usually a shrewd in-house political manipulator who had in the past stood against his colleagues and won them over. Second, Fraser was a realist and it would have become obvious to him, with the aid of Freyberg’s logic, that a voluntary force was not going to be obtained. In accordance, he would most likely have expected his Caucus to bow to this logic as well. Third, the War Cabinet on 21 August and the full Cabinet on 29 August had agreed in principle to participation, and it is probable that Fraser believed the Caucus would feel the same. Finally, for the sake of British Commonwealth prestige there may have been an urgency to have BCOF in Japan as quickly as possible.

On the other hand, the degree of caucus opposition was perhaps the result of members’ concern over the forthcoming 1946 general election. Caucus may have sensed the potential mood of the general electorate more acutely than Fraser. Their concerns were not un-founded, as there are indications of some public opposition to a New Zealand military occupation force chosen by compulsion.

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10 McIntosh, ‘Working with Peter Fraser’, p.20.

11 For example, one newspaper editorial stated "... many of the people think the force should be a voluntary - not a compulsory - one." Manawatu Evening Standard, 2 Oct 1945, p.4.
The next day (31 August) Caucus met once more. They agreed almost unanimously to the sending of a force to Japan, though on the basis that it be a voluntary one. Fraser indicated that Freyberg would be re-approached over the matter, and if a voluntary force was once again ruled out the matter would be re-discussed.

On being informed, Freyberg decided to resolve this issue once and for all. On 3 September he travelled to 2NZEF Headquarters in Italy from his base in London to confer with his immediate subordinates. He also took with him the new Fraser initiative that was hoped would induce a full complement of volunteers, it proposed that the volunteers from Italy would only undertake a six month tour of duty in Japan. Freyberg was doubtful of its value as an incentive and his doubts proved to be correct, New Zealand’s senior officers in Italy were of the opinion that at the very most no more than 2,500 volunteers would come forward. It is noteworthy that Freyberg also approached British army officers for their opinion. They thought only one thousand volunteers would be obtained from the British Army in similar circumstances. The point was that a shortage of volunteers was not a condition peculiar to the New Zealand forces and reflected other factors, most notably war-weariness and a desire to return home now that the war was over. On 5 September Freyberg notified Fraser of the results of his visit.

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12 The vote was 36 for, to 1 against. Labour Party Caucus Minutes, 31 Aug 1945.
13 Freyberg to Fraser, 5 Sep 1945, *DNZER*, 2, pp.1275-77.
However Freyberg’s visit to Italy resulted in another proposal which he hoped would be more acceptable to New Zealand’s politicians. It in part stated

... with the shortage of shipping at least 9000 of the latest reinforcements will not get back to New Zealand until March or April. These men will therefore remain where they are for at least another six months in the knowledge that there will be little to do.... If they volunteer they will join the occupational force for Japan ... [and] ... be back in New Zealand about the end of July 1946....

In essence Freyberg was stating that by serving in Japan personnel would only be prolonging their homecoming by approximately three months, yet he still wasn’t hopeful of getting the appropriate numbers of volunteers. To counter this he proposed whittling down the size of the force to 4000 men and limiting conscription to the single men from the 13th to 15th reinforcement drafts alone.

At this point Fraser threatened the British with withdrawing from participation in the occupation of Japan altogether, though for a particular ulterior motive. On 7 September he sent a cable to the new Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, Viscount Addison.

... I wish to know whether or not the United States have actually been advised of the proposed British Commonwealth force and if so whether they have signified agreement to this form of participation in the occupation of Japan. As you will appreciate we do not wish in view of the difficulties [in obtaining agreement from Caucus] already confronting us to go ahead with our arrangements if the proposal to send a British Commonwealth force should not prove acceptable.

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14 Freyberg to Fraser, 6 Sep 1945, EA1 87/11/2 Recruitment of Forces; also DNZER, 2, p.1276.

15 Fraser to Addison, 7 Sep 1945, DNZER, 2, pp.1278-79. Viscount Addison was Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs/ Commonwealth Affairs 1945-1947, he had replaced Lord Cranborne on 3 Aug 1945.
Addison took Fraser’s threat seriously enough to cable him almost immediately with the news of American agreement in principle to British participation, adding "... [w]e greatly hope that we may count on New Zealand participation...."\(^{16}\)

What was Fraser’s motive for sending this cable? The timing indicates the probable answer, for he was in a political tight spot, having stuck his neck out for participation which had in turn placed him off-side with his Labour Party colleagues. The cable to Addison was a means to obtain ammunition to force an about-turn in the minds of his Party colleagues, either by shock tactics in threatening the drastic action of withdrawing from the occupation force completely, by reassurance in the form of notice of American acquiescence and British pleas for New Zealand to remain, or by the cumulative weight of both strategies. Importantly Addison was repeating information conveyed to the New Zealand Chiefs of Staff in a cable from the New Zealand Staff Mission in Washington on 18 August. If Fraser was aware of this cable, which is probable, then it only reinforces the view that his cable to Addison was a political ploy only.

This communiqué is revealing in other ways as well. Fraser, by cabling Addison instead of the Americans, was wanting to appeal to pro-British and British Commonwealth leanings in the New Zealand Government. By going through the British to obtain American approval he was also indirectly calling for a re-confirmation of British views on New Zealand participation, in fact British approval may have been more important in appeasing Caucus than was American approval.

\(^{16}\) Addison to Fraser, 7 Sep 1945, \textit{DNZER}, 2, p.1279.
Fraser's cable of 7 September does not point to reluctance to participate in the occupation, but instead to the high political stakes involved in the compulsion versus volunteering issue for Fraser, and his desperation for success. He needed immediate notification of American and British acquiescence to New Zealand participation to achieve this.

Once more Fraser approached the Labour Party Caucus to obtain their approval for a conscripted force. The issue was raised towards the end of a series of meetings held over 8-10 September. Though the fact that Freyberg had ruled out a voluntary brigade was liable to count against him, Fraser had Freyberg's alternative plan and Addison's telegram as favourable counter-weights. The strategy worked, and Caucus continued to agree to participation with only a slightly reduced majority.\(^\text{17}\)

Fraser then approached the Opposition National Party on or about 12 September to obtain their approval for a conscripted occupation force. He was unsuccessful. In fact Fraser's determination to consult with the Opposition only provided their leader, Holland, with valuable political ammunition which he used to vigorously attack Fraser and the Government.\(^\text{18}\) Political point scoring was probably Holland's aim, for he recognised here an opportunity to tap into public opposition to compulsion. As with the Labour Party Caucus, the Opposition never questioned

\(^\text{17}\) The vote was 34 for participation and 2 against. Labour Party Caucus Minutes, 8-10 Sep 1945.

\(^\text{18}\) S.G. Holland was a National Party member of the New Zealand Parliament 1935-57 and Leader of the Opposition 1940-49.
whether New Zealand should be participating or not, but only how New Zealand was to participate.

In mid to late September Fraser abandoned consensus politics in respect to this issue. He approved the formation and preparation of a conscripted brigade to go to Japan, without agreement from the Opposition. The major factor in this was probably that "... it would not be possible to organise the force in time on any other basis."\(^\text{19}\)

Australian notification of agreement to participate in a joint British Commonwealth force, received on 22 September, had almost certainly made it plain that it was important to begin organising the force immediately.\(^\text{20}\)

By contrast, there were no immediate problems in agreeing to send a RNZAF squadron to participate in the occupation of Japan. For "... [i]n the context of shrinking opportunities for flying in post-war New Zealand, the provision of an airforce squadron made up of volunteers did not present a problem and the New Zealand government immediately agreed to [participation]...."\(^\text{21}\)

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\(^{20}\) Initially the Australians wanted to send an independently operating occupation force to Japan, that is one operating outside the sphere of the British Commonwealth. New Zealand was concerned about this as a representative and unified Commonwealth force was preferred. Nevertheless there is no indication that New Zealand participation was conditional on Australian participation in a joint Commonwealth force. WAI 21/19B, War History Narrative. Patricia Lissington, ‘Allied Control of Japan’, 1, p.33.

\(^{21}\) Trotter, *New Zealand and Japan*, pp.46-47. Also see J.J. De Willimoff, oral recollections.
Freyberg was informed of the decision to send a force to Japan on 25 September. In accordance with his plan of 5 September the army brigade was to be drawn from single men of the 13th-15th reinforcements. On 1 October Fraser released a press statement outlining New Zealand’s participation in BCOF, and eagerly awaited approval from the Americans. On 28 November 1945 he was informed that they had agreed in principle to British Commonwealth participation in the occupation of Japan. The cable also stated the intention to integrate BCOF operationally into the United States forces.

The American policy of integration had been conceived following the recent advent of Soviet and Western Power tensions. They feared that if they allowed an independent British Commonwealth force to take part in the Japanese occupation, they would set a precedent for independent Soviet participation. The Americans were anxious to avoid a repeat of developments in Germany where occupation zones had served to aggravate Soviet and Western power antipathy. If participation was made conditional on integration into the United States forces, then Soviet interest in participation was likely to vanish.

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22 On numerous occasions in October and November Fraser enquired from both Evatt and the New Zealand representative in Washington, Carl Berendsen, as to when American approval would be forthcoming.

23 Evatt to Fraser, 27 Nov 1945, EA1 87/11/12 Provisions of New Zealand Fighter Squadron. Also see DNZER, 1, pp.1306-07.

But while the Australian and British governments were prepared to accept operational integration Fraser wasn’t, since he was worried that the unity and cohesion of BCOF would suffer. One of Fraser’s fundamental reasons for New Zealand participation, fostering British Commonwealth prestige, was at stake. This point was of such importance that he was prepared to place New Zealand’s participation on the line, and on 10 December he stated to Evatt "... we do not feel able to accept participation on the basis proposed by the United States Government..." 

Thus it seems that Fraser was more particular over how New Zealand participated and more sensitive to Commonwealth prestige than either Australia or Britain. To them representation in the military occupation of Japan over-rode all other considerations. It may also indicate a disparity in the New Zealand and Australian/British attitude towards maintaining good relations with the Americans, though there is no evidence for this. The result was that New Zealand participation in the occupation of Japan was once more on hold. 

Australia and Britain proved not to be intransigent. Fraser’s threat of 10 December brought a swift response, probably as he had intended. Negotiations with the Americans over the nature of British Commonwealth participation were entered into at the next available opportunity, which was talks in Tokyo in mid-December between MacArthur and the Commander-Designate of BCOF, Lieutenant-General

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25 For the same reasons the Australian and New Zealand Army Chiefs of Staff were also unhappy with this arrangement.

26 Fraser to Evatt, 10 Dec 1945, DNZER, 2, p.1312.
Northcott. A settlement was quickly reached and New Zealand was satisfied in that BCOF was not to be broken up and was to operate independently within its own area of responsibility. On 19 December Fraser agreed to New Zealand participation, though still only provisionally. He would not give full and final agreement until the American Government had responded favourably to British Commonwealth participation on the basis of the MacArthur-Northcott Agreement, and this necessitated approval from the American State Department.

Meanwhile, on advising Evatt of New Zealand approval of the MacArthur-Northcott Agreement Fraser had added a tersely-worded passage.

We would be less than frank, however, if we did not say that, in view of the time which has elapsed since the first tentative announcement was made regarding the provision of this force and the way in which negotiations have dragged, enthusiasm for it has flagged very considerably in New Zealand. There is a general feeling that this force is not needed ... [as] ... it appears questionable whether, in the circumstances, it is likely to yield any increase in British Commonwealth prestige. We are, however, willing to go on....

Though this cable implies a disinclination to participate, Fraser again probably had an ulterior motive, this time to put pressure on the Australians to hurry along State Department approval. It was sent within a matter of days of Fraser having received the terms of the MacArthur-Northcott Agreement, and notification of an agreement

27 Lieutenant-General J. Northcott was Commander-in-Chief of BCOF from the creation of this position in Oct 1945 until Jun 1946.

28 The Hiroshima Prefecture was agreed upon as being the British Commonwealth Occupation Force area of responsibility. MacArthur was satisfied with the arrangement in that the British Commonwealth force came under the operational command umbrella of the Eighth United States Army.

29 Fraser to Evatt, 19 Dec 1945, DNZER, 2, p.1323. In reply Evatt continued to encourage New Zealand participation.
favourable to New Zealand should have been encouraging to Fraser, not discouraging. Therefore it is likely that this cable, as with that of 10 December, reflected impatience rather than unwillingness. If it is to be taken on face value and hence did reflect reluctance, then it is clear that it emerged as the result of delay and was not a cause of it.

Fraser probably wanted full American approval quickly because of pressure from the media, to which he was particularly sensitive.\textsuperscript{30} After the official announcement of 1 October on participation the New Zealand Government had clamped a veil of silence on BCOF, which was in accordance with an understanding between the British Commonwealth participants. Yet press leaks in Australia on the formation of BCOF had filtered through to the New Zealand press. The New Zealand Government in keeping within the agreement would not comment, leading "... to very strong criticism ... [from the press which left the Government feeling] ... greatly embarrassed."\textsuperscript{31}

State Department approval was however frustratingly elusive, for as 1946 dawned no word had been received. At the same time Fraser’s stand on the basis for British Commonwealth participation continued to be threatened. Australia was impatient for an official announcement to be made on 5 January regarding the nature of British Commonwealth participation, while New Zealand would have none of it. Fraser had based agreement to participate in the occupation force on the provisions

\textsuperscript{30} McIntosh to Berendsen, 11 Aug 1944, \textit{Undiplomatic Dialogue}, p.78.

\textsuperscript{31} Fraser to Evatt, 4 Jan 1946, \textit{DNZER}, 2, p.1339.
of the MacArthur-Northcott Agreement and he was not prepared to see this compromised. A public announcement that anticipated State Department approval would leave the New Zealand Government in an awkward position if this was not then obtained. In consequence, even though arrangements for shipping New Zealand’s brigade group to Japan had begun, contingencies were prepared in case State Department approval was not forthcoming. State Department approval of BCOF participation in Japan on the basis of the MacArthur-Northcott Agreement eventually came on 24 January, and an official announcement followed on 1 February.

The fact that there was so much hesitation and delay is not an indication that New Zealand was a reluctant participant in the occupation of Japan. If Fraser had been genuinely reluctant it is likely he would have pulled New Zealand out of participation at the earliest opportunity, rather than continue with negotiations. Hesitation and delay reflected Fraser’s determination that New Zealand would only participate in the occupation of Japan within certain acceptable guidelines. Participation itself was never in question, but only how New Zealand was to take part. The conscription versus volunteering issue was prolonged by Fraser’s view that a parliamentary consensus was necessary. He ultimately had to compromise when opposition from the National Party proved immovable, and external pressure for an immediate decision was probably mounting. While Fraser was prepared to compromise over conscription, the independence of the British Commonwealth force for Japan was not-negotiable, and Fraser was adamant the Americans could not immerse the British Commonwealth force into their own armed forces. He was not prepared to give full and final

32 Stewart to Jones, 31 Dec 1945, DNZER, 2, p.1336.
agreement to New Zealand participation until the US State Department had done likewise for British Commonwealth participation under the terms of the McArthur-Northcott Agreement. In this respect he revealed a stubbornness absent in Australia and Britain. As such, the dilemma over conscription and initial American terms for participation were real obstacles, but not excuses brought on by an unwillingness to participate.
CHAPTER THREE.

Organisation.

Lapses in organisation are a familiar part of military life for all kinds of military forces in all sorts of circumstances. The New Zealand military occupation force to Japan was no different. Yet there are indications that the move to Japan by the Italian-based New Zealand army brigade was more poorly organised than normal. The most significant sign of this was the convening of a board of enquiry in New Zealand in late 1946 to examine this issue. Comments by Northcott, as well as some New Zealand military personnel, and comparisons with other BCOF units also seem to confirm the gravity of this problem.¹ The purpose of this chapter is to examine both the strengths and weaknesses of organisation, in the move to Japan and during the first few months that the New Zealand force was located there.

New Zealand’s brigade-sized army contingent, which was given the name Jayforce, came into being on 15 October 1945 within the structure of 9NZ Infantry Brigade based in Italy. While assembling in Florence in late 1945 and early 1946 it did not receive a clear single picture on conditions in Japan, for contradictory information came from a number of directions. Official sources painted a rosy picture, originating from a discussion between Northcott and the New Zealand cabinet on 9 January 1946. The report on this noted that

¹ WA-J 67/16 Board of Enquiry; Dispatch by Lieutenant-General Northcott ..., 25 Jul 1946, DNZER, 2, p.1388.
The area in Japan selected by the British Commonwealth was an excellent one. Situated in the south, on the Inland Sea and [with] one good port, it was ideal for the purpose.... Barrack accommodation was available for the whole of the British Commonwealth Force. This had been either built or reconstructed by the American Forces. The fittings were of a high standard, even including sockets for electric razors. There were refrigerators, model kitchens and good dining rooms....

The commanding officer of the New Zealand army brigade, Brigadier Stewart, reiterated this view to his charges at the end of January 1946.

However press reports at this time painted a rather different picture, as one serviceman noted.

Some English correspondent went out to the Hiroshima area to find out what he could about the movements of the force and even from MacArthur's headquarters he could learn absolutely nothing. Apparently the British zone of occupation is very mountainous, economically poor and at the moment, snowbound.... The people, so the article states, are living like vermin, and in such conditions that they will be driven by desperation to riots etc later.

This report was not an isolated one, for several similar follow-up articles were written by the English press and read by at least some Jayforce soldiers in Italy.

There are a number of possible reasons for the contradictions. Northcott's portrayal almost certainly had an ulterior motive. In early January 1946 there

\[1^{2}\] Note of the Discussion in Cabinet with Lieutenant-General Northcott, 9 Jan 1946, DNZER, 2, pp.1342-43.

\[1^{3}\] F.W. James letters, 30 Jan 1946. Brigadier K.L. Stewart was commanding officer of the New Zealand brigade to Japan Nov 1945-Jul 1946.

\[1^{4}\] B.C.H. Moss diaries, 17 Jan 1946.

continued to be concern within the Australian Government that New Zealand might withdraw from participation in the occupation force, and Northcott's briefing of the New Zealand Cabinet was principally designed to shore up participation. It is also possible that the English newspaper articles contained an element of speculative sensationalism in painting a gloomier picture of conditions in Japan than was fair, though this would be difficult to verify.

Information on Japan also came from other sources. In Florence on 7 November 1945 "... [a] Japanese-American lectured to troops ... on JAPAN and conditions likely to be met there ...", and company commanders had been issued a book on Japan at the end of January 1946. On board the Strathmore, the troopship which carried the main brigade contingent from Italy to Japan in February-March 1946, the Army Education Service issued a booklet entitled 'Destination Japan', and Major Hudson, commanding officer of 5NZ Engineer Company, gave unit lectures on his experiences in Japan in the 1930s. The information supplied by these was pre-war, speculative and very general, and was most likely of only marginal relevance.

Confusing information on conditions in Japan seemed to result in Jayforce dividing into two schools of opinion. Some sources reveal that soldiers were uncertain

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6 Evatt to Fraser, 19 Dec 1945, DNZER, 2, p.1325; Dispatch by Lieutenant-General Northcott ..., 25 Jul 1946, DNZER, 2, p.1387.

7 WA-J 67/3 Historical Narrative of 2NZEF Japan, p.5; G.G. Fahey diary, 7 Nov 1945; B.C.H. Moss diaries, 31 Jan 1946.

8 26 Feb and 4 Mar 1946, WA-J 17/4-17/5 22NZ Infantry Battalion/ 2 Battalion NZ Regiment: Original War Diaries.
over what to expect, "I don’t know whether I will be pleased to get there or not.... We
don’t know what the conditions will be like ... or how we will be received." The way
in which Jayforce command in Italy prepared for occupation duties in Japan also
seems to indicate a prevailing feeling of uncertainty.

As it was uncertain what type of conditions would be met in JAPAN
and what the Japanese civil reaction would be the Force was designed
to be in the position to fight if necessary.... Weapons to meet any
emergency were provided for and included 25 pdr Guns, 6 pdr Anti
Tank Guns, MMG’s and PIAT Mortars. Fighting vehicles included
Universal Carriers, Wasps and Scout Cars. Uncertainty is also shown by the packing of bivouac tents and the fact that fresh water
carried in two gallon tins were also taken to Japan. But other sources indicated that
the New Zealanders had clear, if false expectations of Japan.

It is clear that the troops from the reports they had received, both
official and unofficial, expected that in Japan they would find superb
quarters and accommodation, and first class amenities of all kinds....

Those having high expectations for conditions in Japan because of over-optimistic
reports were to feel badly let down by what they found.

The move itself from Italy to Japan by Jayforce was poorly organised, and the
mismanaged acquisition and movement of Jayforce stores and equipment to the port
of Bari, prior to their shipment to Japan, was largely to blame. The most likely reason

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9 R.T. West letters, 24 Feb 1946. Also see F.W. James letters, 30 Jan 1946.

10 WA-J 67/3 Historical Narrative of 2NZEF Japan, p.2.

11 Potter to Weir, 8 Oct 1946, DNZER, 2, p.1416.

12 Undated report by Lieutenant-Colonel W.B. Thomas, WA-J 67/16 Board of
Enquiry.
for mismanagement was haste, for advice to depart for Japan came from the War Office only in late December 1945, and stores and equipment were moved by road convoy to Bari from 12 January 1946 for loading onto five merchant ships.\(^{13}\) Haste may have occurred because of the necessity to undertake planning, as well as the actual tasks themselves, all within this two week span.

There are at least four possible reasons why Jayforce administrators had just these two weeks. First, and perhaps most important, speed was motivated by a desire to become part of the occupation force in Japan as quickly as possible, for reasons we have already discussed.\(^{14}\) Second, the brigade may have been hamstrung by the limited number of ships plying the Europe to Far Eastern routes, which would have meant there was no other immediate option but to make use of the vessels that were available at this time at Bari.\(^{15}\) Third, the undertaking of planning before notification of a departure date was almost certainly difficult because by late 1945 the Allied forces presence in Italy was rapidly winding down, and stores and equipment levels at ordnance depots were in a constant state of flux. It would have been impossible to plan to acquire supplies if there was a likelihood they may not be in store when the time arose to make the acquisition. Fourth, until the War Office notification in late

\(^{13}\) Stewart to Jones, 31 Dec 1945, *DNZER*, 2, p.1336; WA-J 67/3 Historical Narrative of 2NZEF Japan, p.8.

\(^{14}\) Evatt to Fraser, 29 Dec 1945, *DNZER*, 2, p.1326.

\(^{15}\) Stewart to Jones, 31 Dec 1945, *DNZER*, 2, p.1336.
December 1945 there was some uncertainty as to whether Jayforce was going to Japan at all, which would have further precluded detailed planning before this time.\textsuperscript{16}

Hurried planning, acquisitioning and moving had serious consequences. Stores and equipment failed to be properly checked, and instead faith was placed in the suppliers which was to be a costly mistake. Clothing had been obtained from a British ordnance depot in Naples that was in the process of closing down and was not fully stocked. It was also mainly staffed by Italians who were reportedly very unreliable and responsible for large-scale thieving from the depot.\textsuperscript{17} Discrepancies in clothing supplies were discovered once in Japan. There were found to be shortages in trousers, shorts, and shirts, especially in popular sizes, clothing was sometimes in a worn condition, women’s clothing had been issued instead of men’s, and in some cases styles did not match New Zealand clothing requirements. For example, the trousers supplied were made to be worn with braces, while Jayforce personnel had belted trousers as standard issue.

The dispatching of over 700 cases of vehicle parts from Italy was also carried out badly. On their arrival in Japan it was found that there was no bills of lading for any of them, and each case had to be opened and inventoried. This was to be a huge task as the head of 16NZ Workshops pointed out, for "... [i]n many instances cases when unpacked revealed a state of complete chaos, consisting of a conglomeration of

\textsuperscript{16} Undated report by Lieutenant N.L.G. Baker, 4NZ BOD, WA-J 67/16 Board of Enquiry.

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid.
many and varied makes and types of spares, obviously shovelled in...." In another example, No. 1 NZ Hospital equipment was hurriedly transported from Florence to Bari to be shipped to Japan, when No. 3 NZ Hospital equipment, probably unknown, was already in store at Bari! This additional journey contributed to breakages.

The movement of stores and equipment from Italy to Japan was very slow, which was to create further difficulties for Jayforce in Japan. The five merchant vessels were supposed to arrive before the Strathmore, but the first did not arrive until 31 March 1946, twelve days after the troopship. The worst example was the Fort Erie, which left Bari on 28 February 1946, six days after the Strathmore, and did not arrive in Kure until 9 May, fifty-one days after the arrival of the New Zealand force. The captain's apathetic attitude, which saw the Fort Erie spend on average two weeks at every port of call, was mostly to blame, though part of the problem was also that it was held back two weeks at Bari while port authorities decided whether or not the vessel was seaworthy.

Moreover, on the eventual arrival of the five merchant ships in Japan it was found that on three stores had been pilfered. Cigarettes, spirits, rations, medical

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18 Undated report by Major J.M. Wilson, 16NZ Workshops, p.4, WA-J 67/16 Board of Enquiry.

19 Medical Establishments 2NZEF (Japan) report, 22 Sep 1946, WA-J 67/16 Board of Enquiry.

20 Undated report by Lieutenant N.L.G. Baker, 4NZ BOD, WA-J 67/16 Board of Enquiry.
so supplies and canteen goods were missing from the stores transported on the *Empire Celia*. Goods transported on the *Fort Erie* and the *Sam Shee* suffered the same fate.\textsuperscript{21}

Stores and equipment headaches for the New Zealand force had other causes. Jayforce was obliged to requisition stores and equipment from New Zealand military stockpiles in Italy first and foremost, the reason for this being that "... [u]niformity was to be aimed at in order to facilitate repair work...."\textsuperscript{22} The short-comings of this policy were soon realised. For instance, it was reported to a Board of Enquiry later in the year that the best 2NZ Division vehicles were denied to Jayforce for the reason that

... [t]he better class of Heavy vehicle as required, were in operation carrying out the English Leave then underway, and Units were reluctant to make available the better vehicles remaining on their charge and in use. Also vehicles from Returned Vehicle Park Assissi were being handed over to UNRRA.\textsuperscript{23}

This saw Jayforce having to make do with vehicles that were both old and battle-scarred, which was to contribute to the need for constant maintenance once in Japan and hence to exacerbate vehicle shortages. For likely similar reason the weapons allocated to Jayforce were also old and in worn condition. Moreover, low stores levels in Italy contributed to the ironic circumstance of Jayforce being organised as a combat

\textsuperscript{21} WA-J 70/6 Reports Pilfering Cargo Ships.

\textsuperscript{22} WA-J 67/3 Historical Narrative of 2NZEF Japan, p.2.

formation, yet personnel departed Italy with only five rounds of ammunition each.\textsuperscript{24}

It was fortunate that neither weapons or ammunition were called into use in Japan.

Inadequate consultation between Jayforce command in Italy and JCOSA was also relevant. For instance, three main types of truck had been chosen by Jayforce in Italy for use in Japan, the Dodge 15 cwt 4x2, Chevrolet 3 ton 4x4, and Dodge 3 ton 4x2. They proved to be poor choices because spare parts for BCOF trucks in Japan came from Australia and the Australian forces used different vehicles. Spares for the Jayforce trucks were not kept.\textsuperscript{25} New Zealand vehicle mechanics were obliged to cannibalise trucks for their parts, further adding to vehicle shortages in Japan in 1946.

On the other hand, some facets of the move by Jayforce indicate careful planning. For example, officer recruitment was undertaken thoughtfully in that a core of experience was retained for service in Japan. A fellow officer noted that

\ldots\ [w]e will keep a fair crowd of the old officers in the new force - the CO [Stewart], Titch, Cliff Newlands, Smithy ... are all definite. The single 10th [reinforcement] officers hung in the balance for about a week and were finally drawn in to it...\textsuperscript{26}

Another sign of good planning was that uncertainty about what to expect in Japan led to bivouac tents being stored on the \textit{Strathmore} and soldiers ordered to take two gallon tins of fresh water. While the tents proved to be unnecessary the water was

\textsuperscript{24} Untitled and undated newspaper clipping, New Zealand J Force and BCOF Veterans Association, Palmerston North.

\textsuperscript{25} Undated report by Captain W.P. Hayes, Force Transport Officer of 2NZEF(Japan), p.1, WA-J 67/16 Board of Enquiry.

\textsuperscript{26} B.C.H. Moss diaries, 4-10 Oct 1945.
very useful, for initially some water supplies were found to be undrinkable.\textsuperscript{27} Furthermore, 22 Battalion anticipated the need for intensively organised shipboard entertainment during the voyage to Japan, and appointed an officer to every company specifically to arrange this kind of activity.\textsuperscript{28} Throughout the journey on the Strathmore a regular and varied recreation and entertainment programme was organised.

Even so, in comparison to the separate move to Japan by No. 14 RNZAF squadron in March 1946, the army brigade move looks to have been very badly organised. The move by the RNZAF was carefully planned from Auckland, with the squadron to be self-supporting in every way. As well as pilots all possible ground-support staff travelled to Japan, from instrument machinists through to mess waiters. In addition to twenty new Corsair aircraft, a very comprehensive quantity of stores and equipment was also packed, including vehicles, spare parts, tools, canteen and medical supplies, clothing, and amenities.\textsuperscript{29} For New Zealanders from the Italy Draft, the excellent amenities of the RNZAF were viewed with envy.

They have a great canteen, fully stocked (ours is practically empty except for beer, toothpaste & soap). They also brought over 3500 doz bottles of Double Brown beer for distribution to NZ soldiers. But it didn’t come off & they are drinking the lot. The hounds.\textsuperscript{30}

\textsuperscript{27} D. Mason, written recollections, pp. 3-4.

\textsuperscript{28} 1 Feb 1946, 22NZ Infantry Battalion/ 2 Battalion NZ Regiment: Original War Diary.

\textsuperscript{29} Brian Cox, \textit{Too Young to Die}, Auckland, 1987, p.187 and p.192; G. Sutton, oral recollections.

\textsuperscript{30} F.W. James letters, 30 Apr 1946.
However, a comparison with No. 14 squadron must also be qualified in that it was advantaged over Jayforce in a number of respects. The move of men and equipment was made entirely on one vessel, the aircraft carrier HMS *Glory*. Moreover the RNZAF detachment was very small, consisting of approximately 280 personnel as compared to 4200 personnel in Jayforce. They may have also been helped by a greater awareness of conditions in Japan, less need for haste, and access to a more sizeable and better quality pool of equipment.

Comments by Northcott also help confirm that the move to Japan by the New Zealand army brigade was poorly undertaken. Northcott seems to have singled the brigade out for censure, especially in regards to the slow arrival and poor condition of equipment. In contrast, the moves to Japan by the Australian, British, Indian, and RNZAF units were praised. For example,

... No. 14 Squadron RNZAF travelled from NEW ZEALAND in HMS "GLORY", complete with their 24 Corsairs, stores, transport and canteen supplies for the NZ component. An excellent practical example of inter-service co-operation.... The RAF and RIAF Spitfire Squadrons brought their aircraft to JAPAN in the same manner, stowed on HMS "VENGEANCE", an excellent, effective means of moving such formations.

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31 The poor condition of vehicles for both New Zealand and Australian units was noted by Northcott. Dispatch by Lieutenant-General Northcott ..., 25 Jul 1946, *DNZER*, 2, p.1388.

Confusion and haphazardness continued beyond just the move to Japan for the New Zealand army brigade. Almost immediately upon arrival in Japan internal BCOF supply arrangements contributed to shortages and led to frustration. The problem was the system of procurement, the rudiments and pitfalls of which were summed up in a report by Stewart, the New Zealand army commander in Japan, in August 1946.

The term "Procurement" was applied to the process of obtaining materials, land, buildings, furniture etc. from local resources. Before anything whatever could be obtained from the Japanese, elaborate procurement demands with blue prints had to be prepared and submitted to HQ BCOF for approval. In many cases, HQ BCOF had in turn to submit them to HQ 8th US Army, and in some cases to SCAP. Endless delays and irritation were inevitable under this system.33

Once items had been procured the occupying forces had restricted leeway on what they could do with them. For example, if a house and contents were procured the chattels had to remain with the house, and could not be used separately.

In addition, the administration of this system was troubled. Stewart was to blame inexperienced staff at BCOF HQ for procurement difficulties, while his subordinates placed some blame closer to home, on "... the [New Zealand] Brigade administration ... [being] ... sluggish & nit-picking in dealing with procurements."34

Resource depletion in Japan was a major reason for procurement difficulties, and disparities between procurement demand and the ability to supply were perhaps the root cause of problems. The Australian, British, Indian and New Zealand units

33 Stewart to Conway, 20 August 1946, DNZER, 2, p.1412.

making up BCOF all arrived in Japan within a short space of time, from February through to April 1946, and they all struck similar problems as they all drew on this system for the same things at approximately the same time. Yet in early 1946 Japan was still economically devastated from the war, and BCOF and SCAP had only limited access to Japanese raw and manufactured building materials.

In regards to imported materials, initial BCOF guidelines for distribution tended to disadvantage Jayforce, thus exacerbated shortages for the New Zealanders. For the first six months stores and equipment were issued on a first-come-first-serve basis, which meant Jayforce tended to miss out being located so far away from the port area of Kure where this material was unloaded.\(^{35}\)

Bottle necks within supply distribution channels were also a factor in shortages. Concern was voiced by Stewart’s replacement, Brigadier Potter, in October 1946:

The goods brought from New Zealand by the CHITRAL on its second trip were handled by BCOF Base Ordnance Depot. The CHITRAL departed from Kure after unloading on 24 August 46. At the time of writing (one month later) NZ Base Ordnance Depot has still NOT received the essential items of the issue, that is to say, some 2/3 of the shipment.\(^{36}\)

Shipping between New Zealand and Japan presented problems during the first few months in Japan. The movement of replacement troops was the responsibility of JCOSA, though shipping company schedules also had to be taken into account because


of the limited availability of troopships in New Zealand waters. This created some uncertainty over the exact timing of the dispatching of replacement drafts, which could lead to planning hiccups for Jayforce.\textsuperscript{37} For instance, the unexpected early departure of the first part of the First NZ Relief Draft, known as the Wanganui Draft, from Wellington on 29 May 1946 on the \textit{Empire Pride}, resulted in the posting of a Guard Battalion to Tokyo having to be cancelled. It seems that an advanced date of arrival for the incoming draft was seen as equating to an advanced date of departure for returning a draft to New Zealand, which would have brought about a clash of dates with the Tokyo assignment.\textsuperscript{38} A further implication of an early departure date for the Wanganui Draft was that soldiers arrived in Japan under-trained, and an unanticipated period of basic training was necessary before they could undertake designated duties.\textsuperscript{39}

One aspect of shipping uncertainty was felt acutely - delayed departure dates for drafts returning to New Zealand. Many soldiers were impatient to leave Japan after their allocated time, and this included both the Italy Draft conscripts and later drafts which were made up from volunteers. For these individuals delayed departure dates

\textsuperscript{37} Broadcast by the Minister of Defence, 5 Feb 1946, \textit{DNZER}, 2, pp.1362-63.

\textsuperscript{38} 28 May 1946, \textit{WA-J 17/6 22NZ Infantry Battalion/ 2 Battalion NZ Regiment: Original War Diary}.

\textsuperscript{39} R. Corney diaries, 17 Jun 1946; \textit{WA-J 17/7 22NZ Infantry Battalion/ 2 Battalion NZ Regiment: Original War Diary}. 
were resented, as is aptly revealed by the following passage; "... [t]old that we weren’t going home till July 4th[,] wild...."  

Initial confusion went beyond troubles over systems of movement and supply. On the arrival of Jayforce in Japan BCOF HQ attempted to assert its authority over the New Zealand brigade beyond limits acceptable to Stewart. On his arrival in Japan approximately two weeks after the arrival of the main body of Jayforce, Stewart "... found that HQ BCOF had issued orders to most of my services, which were tantamount to relieving them from my command."  

Mis-understanding and poor-communication was perhaps mostly to blame. BCOF HQ was of the view that all national units were to be placed under their command umbrella as part of a policy known as ‘integration’, while Stewart was of the view that he was to have virtual independent command over the New Zealand brigade in direct consultation with the New Zealand government, which was similar to the system that had operated for 2NZEF during the Second World War.  

A series of cables ensued between Japan, New Zealand, and Australia. The eventual outcome was that the New Zealand government ordered "... units of 9 New Zealand Infantry Brigade Group should remain under direct command of brigade

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41 Stewart to Weir, 7 Apr 1946, DNZER, 2, p.1371.

42 Footnote 1, DNZER, 2, p. 1304; Stewart to Weir, DNZER, 2, pp.1370-71.
commander." Moreover, in October a new directive from the New Zealand Chiefs of Staff established more clearly defined lines of authority between BCOF and Jayforce.

The most significant result of confusion over command related to medical services for Jayforce. BCOF HQ wanted to amalgamate 6NZ General Hospital with 130 Australian General Hospital at Eta Jima Island, so as to form a joint Anzac hospital serving both the New Zealand and Australian zones. Though Eta Jima Island was a considerable distance from most New Zealand camps, it was planned that immediate medical attention would be catered for by a small camp hospital at Yamaguchi, with patients then being transferred to Eta Jima.

From a New Zealand perspective the BCOF HQ plan was unacceptable because the distance to Eta Jima was seen as being a major handicap. The Jayforce Advance Party medical representative, Dr. Weston, had argued this viewpoint well before the arrival of the *Strathmore* on 19 March 1946. His words fell on deaf ears amongst the BCOF hierarchy, and progress was not achieved until the arrival of the Jayforce commanding officer.

[Stewart]... refused categorically to carry out this arrangement.... [H]e maintained that this [a joint Anzac Hospital at Eta Jima] would prejudice heavily the adequate medical and surgical treatment of New Zealand personnel. The Brigadier had many stormy interviews with the C-in-C and finally obtained his permission to set up a full-sized General Hospital in the New Zealand area. This reluctant and grudging permission was never confirmed in writing.

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The decision to fight against initial BCOF HQ plans and establish an independent New Zealand hospital was soon vindicated in New Zealand eyes. For "... the lives of at least four New Zealand soldiers were saved ... [who] ... could not possibly have stood the long and arduous journey from Yamaguchi to Eta Jima." 45

Indifferent attitudes by personnel towards their official duties added to a state of disorganisation between March and July 1946. For instance, an apathetic attitude shown by vehicle mechanics contributed to vehicle shortages.

[The mechanics] ... knew that they were to be relieved within a brief period, and ... adopted the attitude that the vehicles were worn out anyway, [and] were most apathetic about maintenance.... They were a team who had lost interest in their work and grumbled incessantly.... 46

The poor state of clothing was also partially blamed on apathy among the New Zealand soldiers of the Italy Draft by the commanding officer of 19NZ Army Support Company, Major Barnett.

I concur that the issue [of summer clothing] was not of the best in quality or quantity but in the past troops of the NZ Div have, even without the assistance of tailors and in the worst of operating conditions been able to turn themselves out like soldiers and be a credit to the name of the Division. With J Force none of the old initiative was shown and clothing came to a bad state of repair because in the main personnel would not fend for themselves.... 47

45 Kiwai Magazine of 6NZGH, Japan, 1947, pp.4-5.


This problem can be directly attributed to Fraser’s strategy which demanded that New Zealand have a contingent of troops readily available to be part of BCOF at short notice throughout 1945. Being perceived as the most conveniently available body of troops, the 13th-15th reinforcements in Italy were made ready to participate in the occupation force. However, these troops were an inappropriate choice, for they included greater than usual numbers of reluctant conscripts and as a consequence a significantly higher number of unmotivated soldiers.

A shortage of recruits with specialist skills also led to some disruption. A lack of foresight in Italy was to contribute to a low standard of OR medical personnel initially in Japan. This was because all experienced New Zealand Medical Corps ORs in Italy at the end of the Second World War had been returned to New Zealand, and none were retained for Jayforce.\(^{48}\)

Recruitment problems were to continue after the departure of the Italy Draft. When volunteers were called in New Zealand for service in Japan, attracting trained specialised people in technical and professional fields was nearly impossible because of a post-war labour shortage.\(^{49}\) Too few doctors was the most serious result of recruitment shortfalls. Only seven doctors arrived with the two parties of the First NZ Relief Draft, nine short of the required number of sixteen, and ultimately volunteers

\(^{48}\) Medical Establishments 2NZEF (Japan) Report, 22 Sep 1946, WA-J 67/16 Board of Enquiry.

\(^{49}\) Appendices to the Journals of the House of Representatives, H.19, 1946, p.19.
had to be sought in Britain.\textsuperscript{50} At times Jayforce units were forced to compromise which sometimes led to highly inappropriate postings, as occurred to 6NZ General Hospital in mid-1946. "The radiographers were a private and a sergeant posted to the department with no relevant knowledge of anything whatsoever, except that the sergeant was good at "wireless"...."\textsuperscript{51} The cause of these problems was the Labour Government's insistence that except for the Italy Draft, later drafts were to consist of volunteers only.

Factors within Japan itself also led to a confused situation for the New Zealanders on initial arrival. There were immediate problems in finding desirable permanent base camps for some units. This was because Yamaguchi Prefecture was mostly a poor rural district as compared to other parts of Japan, and it had not traditionally been a location for a large military force. As a consequence there were not always tailor-made base-camp facilities to cater for the large numbers of New Zealanders who arrived in March 1946.

Accommodation shortages were to see 22 Battalion temporarily barracked in dormitories for factory workers from the Kobe Steel Works, which proved a very inappropriate choice for a military force. There was no parade ground area which meant this unit was obliged either to train out on the street or to march one mile away

\textsuperscript{50} Kiwai Magazine, pp.6-7.

to the closest suitable site. In addition, soldiers had to be transported to an aerodrome six miles distant at Ozuki for sports. 2NZ Divisional Cavalry Regiment was initially to be based at Hagi, a strategically located town on the far north-western coast of Yamaguchi Prefecture, but barrack accommodation proved too small. As a result the Regiment, on disembarking from the Strathmore on 23 March 1946, was temporarily located at a naval academy at Eta Jima until a decision was made on deployment. On 9 April it was finally agreed to barrack the Regiment at a former submarine base at Mizuba, with the move taking place from 15 April.

For similar reasons finding a site for 6NZ General Hospital was fraught with difficulties. After an extensive search throughout April by the first commanding officer of 6NZ General Hospital, Lieutenant-Colonel Archer, a run-down tuberculosis sanatorium at Kiwa was chosen because there was no suitable alternative. Very extensive renovations were necessary to get the sanatorium up to acceptable military hospital standards.

When base camps were secured for Jayforce units, living conditions were often found to be lamentable. Open drains, limited washing facilities, primitive and non-functioning toilets, and poor hygiene, combined with crowding, created major headaches in a number of camps. Yamaguchi camp, the base for 27 Battalion, was

52 Undated report by Lieutenant-Colonel W.B. Thomas, WA-J 67/16 Board of Enquiry; WA-J 17/5 22NZ Infantry Battalion/ 2 Battalion NZ Regiment: Original War Diary.

53 WA-J 6/5 2NZ Divisional Cavalry Regiment: Original War Diary.

54 Kiwai Magazine, p.5.
one of the worst. When this unit moved into the camp in March 1946 no piping had been connected and there were limited washing facilities. Some soldiers were obliged to use an old transportable shower unit when it was periodically sent to the camp.\textsuperscript{55} 11NZ Provost Company, which also had a detachment based at Yamaguchi, was very critical of the conditions found. A report noted that "... [i]nsofar as DET PRO COY YAMAGUCHI is concerned it can be stated that situation is totally unsatisfactory.... FPC guards have accommodation which would barely do justification as an ancient prison."\textsuperscript{56} There were similar poor conditions at other camps, such as Ebisu camp in Tokyo, which were commented on in October 1946 by a soldier who was part of the first New Zealand Guard Battalion. "When we arrived the place was filthy, there is practically no drainage, the water for the showers is more often than not cold, & the sanitary arrangements are extremely poor."\textsuperscript{57}

Conditions in Japan were to add to disorganisation in other ways. Poor quality Japanese construction materials sometimes caused disruption. "Contractors who installed pipe-leads from boilers to showerhouses etc will have to be recalled as all the welded joints are breaking open...."\textsuperscript{58} Japanese roads were often pot-holed, corrugated, narrow, and unsealed, with road surfaces consisting of a clay and shingle covering which was very slippery in wet conditions. Vehicle springs and shock

\textsuperscript{55} C. Newlands, oral recollections.

\textsuperscript{56} Quarterly general report, 30 Sep 1946, WA-J 35/4 11NZ Provost Company: Original War Diary.

\textsuperscript{57} S. Blow letters, 22 Oct 1946.

\textsuperscript{58} 9 Nov 1946, WA-J 21/13 9NZ Brigade Company Army Support Company/19NZ Army Support Company: Original War Diary.
absorbers were placed under great strain and an increased number of accidents occurred, all further raising the numbers of Jayforce vehicles out of service.  

Japanese food was also denied to Jayforce personnel. The food supply throughout Yamaguchi Prefecture had mostly broken down in the immediate post-war period. Local Japanese could barely feed themselves, let alone supply the New Zealanders with popular meals such as steak and eggs, which was something they had regularly been able to enjoy in Italy. Moreover, the food most commonly available could not be consumed, since the use of human excreta by the Japanese for fertilising gardens made locally grown vegetables unacceptable to Jayforce personnel.

Nonetheless, the initial first few months in Japan were not all clouded by chaos and confusion. In some respects supply and movement was undertaken competently at this time, despite difficulties. Many sources indicate that ration quantities were adequate and that basic personal amenities were quick to arrive as the soldiers moved into their camps. For example, one soldier noted on the day after disembarking from the Strathmore "... [w]e are on Australian rations and they are both more plentiful and better than the British rations we were drawing in Florence.... The beds that were promised for the men arrive today, and proved to be a type of camp stretcher."  

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60 B.C.H. Moss diaries, 22 Mar 1946. Also see N.E. Coop letters, 22 Mar 1946; undated report by Captain C.M. Taylor, ASC, WA-J 67/16 Board of Enquiry.
Just as organisation within the BCOF military framework had good aspects, so the Japanese environment did not always work against the military occupiers. Some units and individuals were to benefit from what they found on moving into camp in Japan. For example, some aspects of Yamaguchi camp suited 25NZ Field Battery very nicely. Unit records noted "... space for recreation rooms, gun stores M.T. [motor transport] sheds etc. [a] lathe, buffer and grinder and power drill left in MT workshop...."  

Others were equally impressed with what they found at Yamaguchi camp.

We were able to take stock of the camp today and I think it is better suited to our purposes than any place we have been in since leaving Maadi [in Egypt].... No one is cramped at all and there is electric light throughout the buildings, and also washbasins and showers.  

Some other Jayforce camps were also found to be well organised for the arrival of units. This was the case within the area of the Kobe Steel Works allocated to 19NZ Army Support Company;  

... [t]he office had five real office desks as well as several other desks, plenty of windows, built-in cupboards, and linoleum and carpeting on the floor. The sleeping quarters were also much better than we had known previously. A number of partitions had been put in the building so that there would only be about four men to a room. There was electric lighting throughout and a number of big electric heaters.... Hot and cold water was on tap to beautiful white basins and the showers were first class. There was a good mess room and cookhouse.

61 22 Mar 1946, WA-J 9/5 25NZ Field Battery: Original War Diary.


63 D.L. Fyfe, written recollections, p.10. Also see K. King, written recollections.
Varying conditions found within camps and between camps on the New Zealanders moving in was dependent on previous use and what had been left behind. 19NZ Army Support Company had been allocated a site used for administration and as sleeping quarters for the Kobe Steel Works, and they were fortunate in that many of the interior fittings had been retained. 27 Battalion based at Yamaguchi was fortunate in that they inherited a tailor-made camp, that is a former army base consisting of eight large barrack buildings surrounding a parade ground, a luxury denied 22 Battalion at Chofu.

Rank, of course, could also be a determinant of conditions that soldiers had to put up with on arriving at their Japanese camps. Within a military formation it was standard for privilege to be tied to professional standing, and hence officers would have been allocated a better standard of accommodation as the following account indicates.

We are well & truly into Winter now having our first fall of snow a week ago, when it was bitterly cold.... However we are quite cosy in the [officers'] barracks, they being all steam heated & we have had a huge open fire place constructed in the officers' lounge. Some of the troops' barrack rooms are not steam heated but they have oil heaters in their Mess Rooms & Recreation rooms altho' their sleeping quarters are icily cold.^[64]

The Japanese environment advantaged Jayforce in other ways also. The railway system was comprehensive, ordered, and offered a high standard of passenger comfort. In Italy 2NZEF soldiers at times travelled in cattle wagons, while in Japan the occupying forces had their own designated carriages with interior fittings that were

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^[64] C.A. Baynes letters, 16 Dec 1946.
often viewed as opulent. One soldier remarked very favourably on the "... padded seats, [and] lavatories that work...."\textsuperscript{65} For longer distances, the occupying powers had their own trains which were both fast and luxurious. The passenger comforts offered included both catering and sleeping facilities, and the journey from Yuda to Tokyo for example could take only twenty-four hours; on normal Japanese passenger trains this journey could take two days. Jayforce was also fortunate in that on its arrival an infrastructure was in place for the hiring of Japanese labour to work in the camps.

How good or bad was organisation for Jayforce during the initial few months in Japan? In a number of respects organisational difficulties were no worse than in other BCOF units. Some were the result of factors beyond anyone’s control and hence were just as likely to affect other forces. This applied to the system of procurement and the Japanese environment, for the British and Indians also struck sub-standard accommodation and had difficulties in obtaining building materials for renovations throughout 1946. Shortages in imported amenities and stores and equipment adversely affected BRINDIV and the RAF as well.\textsuperscript{66} Command authority disputes also occurred between BCOF HQ and BRINDIV, which were to result in tension as well as communication and co-operation difficulties.\textsuperscript{67}

\textsuperscript{65} R. Schofield letters, 23 Mar 1946, p.4. Also see R.T. West, oral recollections.


\textsuperscript{67} Jeffrey Grey, \textit{The Commonwealth Armies and the Korean War}, Manchester, 1988, pp.53-54.
There are problems in making a judgement on organisation based on comparative evidence. Jayforce personnel rarely had contact with other forces except at leave hostels, and they did not see the camps of other national units. The comparative evidence is slim. Nevertheless, it would seem that overall the New Zealand force fared comparatively badly throughout the first few months in Japan. First, there are indications that it became the ‘poor man’ of BCOF in that the New Zealanders had to beg or borrow stores and equipment from other BCOF units.\(^{68}\) Jayforce soldiers who did see the amenities of other forces were often astounded with what they found. One soldier commented "... the Australians are far better off than what we are it is a disgrace to see the way we live ... seeing there way they have plenty of everything & we just get the bear amount."\(^{69}\) Second, a number of accounts condemn the attitude of the New Zealanders from Italy as compared to other BCOF personnel, which may perhaps hint at lower standards. For instance one soldier based at Kiwa recorded

... [t]he Australian men around this hospital & including some Aust. R. [Royal] Engineers are all very fine chaps & quite a contrast to the rough & dirty Kiwis amongst the 6G.H. crew who are with some exceptions the worst bunch of NZ’s we ever been with.\(^{70}\)

Moreover, a New Zealand officer who spent some time on secondment to the Cameron Highland regiment based on Shikoku recalled being very impressed with their standard of discipline as compared to the New Zealanders.\(^{71}\)


\(^{69}\) S.G. Breeze letters, 26 Jan 1947. Also see former serviceman who wishes to remain unidentified diary, 21-27 Oct 1946.

\(^{70}\) R.H. Stonyer letters, 27 Mar 1946.

\(^{71}\) H. Bleasdale, oral recollections.
Furthermore, the instigation of a Board of Enquiry in New Zealand towards the end of 1946 would seem to indicate that the state of organisation was more troublesome than usual. Those responsible for tasks such as command leadership, policing, supply and transportation were invited to explain aspects of disorganisation as it applied to them both in the move from Italy and once in Japan.\textsuperscript{72} It is not certain what the outcome was, but a letter by Potter in October 1946 that outlined improvements in Japan may have diminished concern in New Zealand.\textsuperscript{73}

Poor organisation in the move to Japan and during the initial stages of occupation was to result in numerous and varied implications for Jayforce. A high incidence of disease and sickness, especially gastro-intestinal infections, occurred in the camps with poorer conditions. A June 1946 medical report noted the link between camp conditions and health.

\ldots 2 NZ Div Cav [based at Mizuba] with a strength of 923 personnel has on two weeks 22-29 Jun respectively shown 64-34 cases reporting sick; 27 NZ Bn with a strength of 981 in the same two weeks showed 108 and 151 reporting sick. The Div Cav Regt have an excellent camp site and good barracks, whereas 27 Bn is living in an old Japanese barracks where sanitation is far from satisfactory.\textsuperscript{74}

Poor hygiene and sanitation also caused periodic outbreaks of scabies (pediculosis); in April 1946 this disease accounted for 60\% of Jayforce hospital admissions.\textsuperscript{75}

\textsuperscript{72} WA-J 67/16 Board of Enquiry.
\textsuperscript{73} Potter to Weir, 8 Oct 1946, \textit{DNZER}, 2, pp.1423-26.
\textsuperscript{74} Monthly report, Jun 1946, p.2, WA-J 69/8 Medical - Monthly Reports. Also see S. Blow letters, 14 Sep 1946.
\textsuperscript{75} Monthly report, Apr 1946, WA-J 69/8 Medical - Monthly Reports.
Poor organisation led to poor achievement for Jayforce as a functioning military formation. One of the biggest single consequences was vehicle shortages, which remained throughout 1946. A number of accounts mention a temporary ceasing of official tasks at various times for this reason. For example, "... [w]e were supposed to have gone on a patrol but no transport was available so we didn't go." Mobility was also disrupted by regular vehicle breakdowns. Camp renovation and construction suffered. 5NZ Engineer Company was hamstrung by a shortage of dump trucks and through having no suitable trucks for transporting long lengths of timber. The non-arrival of Jayforce vehicles was one reason for delays in the distribution of bread in March 1946 to outlying units from the bakery at Yamaguchi. This saw bread sometimes having to be consumed that was three or four days old.

Other initial stores and equipment shortages also had an impact. The late arrival of an X-Ray machine saw 7NZ Camp Hospital staff having to make do with an old Japanese model which by April 1946 could only be used in the most urgent cases. Not until 28 May 1946 did the X-Ray machine packed in Italy finally arrive at the hospital. The operation of 7NZ Camp Hospital was also adversely affected by

76 R. Corney diaries, 8 Aug 1946. Also see weekly report, 9-15 Jun 1946, WA-J 35/2 11NZ Provost Company: Original War Diary.

77 G.G. Fahey diary, 17 Jul 1946.

78 WA-J 67/16 Board of Enquiry; footnote 2, DNZER, 2, p.1449.


80 R.H. Stonyer letters, 28 Apr 1946.
equipment breakages in transit from Italy.\textsuperscript{81} 16NZ Workshops could not fully operate until 29 May 1946 because of the non-arrival of tools from Italy, thus limiting its ability to properly maintain vehicles and weapons.\textsuperscript{82} No proper cooking equipment saw cooks having to use old Field (Hydra) burners for heating food and 44 gallon drums as ovens, and this partially accounted for an initial poor standard of cooked food.\textsuperscript{83} In June 1946 the acting commissioner of the NZ YMCA reported that his organisation could only supply to soldiers one cup of tea every third day because of very limited tea supplies through BCOF supply channels.\textsuperscript{84}

The slow arrival of clothing from Italy combined with clothing discrepancies was to contribute to an initial deterioration in the appearance of personnel. One soldier reported:

I have seen men walking around our camp wearing gumboots or sandshoes or anything they could get because their boots were worn right through and they could not get replacements for them. We only had one change parade (for clothing) all the time we were there, and that was just before we came on this ship [to return to New Zealand]...\textsuperscript{85}

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{81} Medical Establishments 2NZEF (Japan) report, 22 Sep 1946, WA-J 67/16 Board of Enquiry.

\textsuperscript{82} O.C. 16NZ Workshops to H.Q. BCOF, 20 Dec 1946, WA-J 34/1 16NZ Workshops: Historical Records.

\textsuperscript{83} B.C.H. Moss diaries, 12 Apr 1946.

\textsuperscript{84} Undated report by A.K. Thompson, Acting Commissioner of NZ YMCA, p.1, WA-J 67/16 Board of Enquiry.

\textsuperscript{85} New Zealand Herald, 23 Jul 1946, p.6.
\end{footnotesize}
Furthermore, the commanding officer of 22 Battalion, Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas, was to comment in mid-1946 that "... [a]t present no platoon can parade without at least three varieties and shades of shirts." \(^{86}\)

Procurement delays influenced Jayforce under-achievement as well. They resulted in some units simply having to make do with whatever they could scavenge, which could result in delays and a ramshackle finished product, as the following account illustrates.

The [YMCA] hut at Chofu was practically finished only when the second returning draft left for New Zealand in August [1946]. The hut had been made from materials salvaged from a Japanese building which had suffered bomb damage.\(^{87}\)

Other units had to be resigned to waiting, a situation that could be extremely frustrating. "The utter impossibility of obtaining necessary materials through normal channels, particularly in those early days, had to be experienced to be believed."\(^{88}\)

Uncertainty over what to expect in Japan resulted in some equipment and specialist units being found on arrival to be surplus to requirement. None of the heavy weapons taken to Japan were ever fired in anger, but were mostly kept in storage, and 25NZ Field Battery spent much of its time in Japan acting as a quasi-infantry unit before being disbanded on 22 May 1947.

\(^{86}\) Undated report by Lieutenant-Colonel W.B. Thomas, WA-J 67/16 Board of Enquiry.

\(^{87}\) Untitled, undated, newspaper clipping, New Zealand J Force and BCOF Veterans Association, Palmerston North.

\(^{88}\) Kiwai Magazine, p.6.
Last, the dispute between Jayforce and BCOF HQ delayed the provision of a comprehensive military hospital for the New Zealand brigade. Instead, for the first three months in Japan the brigade was served by a series of stop-gap measures. A temporary 100 bed camp hospital, known as 7NZ Camp Hospital, was set up at Yamaguchi to cater for those units based in the south-western parts of the Prefecture.\(^89\) Those based closer to Hiroshima Prefecture, mostly from 2 Divisional Cavalry Regiment, were cared for by 130 Australian General Hospital at Eta Jima and 92 Indian Hospital at Kure.\(^90\) 6NZ General Hospital finally opened at Kiwa on 28 June 1946.

Poor organisation was also a leading contributor to a decline in morale among many Jayforce soldiers. This point was made by Potter to Major-General Weir on 8 October 1946.\(^91\) A decline in morale manifested itself in a number of ways. One prominent form was an intense desire to return to New Zealand as soon as possible, which became a pre-occupation for Jayforce personnel. One soldier spoke for many when he noted "I’m only longing for the days to speed by now till we’re home again, but if they don’t get the first lot away pretty soon, God knows when we’ll get home."\(^92\) Poor morale probably contributed to some incidences of misdemeanour and crime (see Chapter Five). It is noteworthy that poor morale remained a problem for

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\(^{89}\) Ibid, pp.4-5.

\(^{90}\) Monthly reports, Apr-Jun 1946, WA-J 69/8 Medical - Monthly Reports.

\(^{91}\) Potter to Weir, 8 Oct 1946, DNZER, 2, pp.1416-18. Major-General N.W.M. Weir was the New Zealand Chief of the General Staff 1946-49.

\(^{92}\) R.H. Stonyer letters, 15 Jun 1946. Also see W.R.A. Burns diary, 12 May 1946.
some even when conditions for Jayforce began to improve from the latter half of 1946.\textsuperscript{93} This was because poor morale was not only a reaction to poor organisation, but could also be linked to factors such as uninteresting duties.

There were however some positive results of poor organisation. Ingenuity was brought to the fore among Jayforce personnel, leading to small-scale and localised improvements. This was the case with delays with procurement. Some were lucky or resourceful enough to find ways of circumventing the system, as one officer recalled.

\ldots\ [W]ith the acquisition of timber through local sources (nothing was available through the Army stores) we built some new rooms & made a few cupboards & wardrobes\ldots\ We were really forbidden by Tokyo command to take any food or other things from the Japs other than by use of "PROCUREMENT DEMAND" - a paper war subject to Allied Military Government approval which was largely American. This of course was not the N.Z. way of getting things done.\textsuperscript{94}

One soldier called upon civilian work experience to improve camp conditions at Yamaguchi.

Made makeshift shower of half oildrums and jerry built oilburner, having been a locomotive fireman employed by N.Z. Railways prior to enlistment helped in designing and building a relatively simple and safe unit. Carried 20 Jerry cans of water about 80 Galls for shower and had a glorious shower at 1730 hrs.\textsuperscript{95}

5NZ Engineer Company records state that in April 1946 a number of stoves found at a prize war store dump at Tokuyama were installed for use at Yamaguchi camp, and

\textsuperscript{93} N.S. Whitla letters, 7 Sep and 14 Nov 1946, 31 Jan 1947.

\textsuperscript{94} M. Murray, written recollections, p.78.

\textsuperscript{95} J.G. Saunders diary extracts, 24 Mar 1946, p.4. Also see 10 and 12 Apr 1946, p.4.
that a Japanese bath house next to this Company’s base buildings was converted into a camp shower house.\textsuperscript{96}

The implications of poor organisation were also felt in New Zealand, which in turn was to result in some help for Jayforce. Soldiers from the Italy Draft made known their displeasure especially in regards to poor supplies of rations, stores and equipment in letters to New Zealand newspapers. A newspaper debate was opened in mid-1946, with the newly replaced Stewart vigorously defending the way in which the brigade had been organised.\textsuperscript{97} In the wake of this controversy some efforts were made using New Zealand resources to improve conditions for Jayforce personnel. For instance the press announced on 5 August 1946 that canteen supplies consisting of chocolate biscuits, tinned food, beer, and toheroas would be sent direct to Japan from New Zealand.\textsuperscript{98}

The degree of disorganisation for Jayforce gradually diminished through 1946. Bottlenecks within BCOF supply channels eased, and in September 1946 the system of stores and equipment distribution in Japan was changed. "Purchase of amenities from the BCOF depot has, by arrangement with the Commander-in-Chief, been put

\textsuperscript{96} Monthly summary, Apr 1946, WA-J 13/5 5NZ Engineers Company: Original War Diary.

\textsuperscript{97} For example \textit{New Zealand Herald}, 23 Jul 1946, p.6. and 24 Jul 1946, p.8.

\textsuperscript{98} Ibid, 5 Aug 1946, p.6.
on a satisfactory footing ... the available supplies are now made available pro rata."\textsuperscript{99}

A greater flow of stores and equipment saw problems with Japanese living conditions begin to be redressed. In August 1946 primitive and unhygienic toilets at 19NZ Army Support Company camp at Chofu were replaced by more acceptable army-style lavatories.\textsuperscript{100} At the end of August more freezers were made available to BCOF which improved the supplies of fresh food to the various national units including the New Zealanders.\textsuperscript{101} A new field bakery building was completed at Chofu at the end of 1946, considerably improving the quality of bread production.\textsuperscript{102} A greater supply of sports equipment came available at this time, and personal chattels and comforts were also improved. One soldier based at Chofu noted at the end of 1946 that "... [v]ery gradually amenities are coming to hand & this week each man received a duralium barrack box in the form of a trunk, & a metal wardrobe. It is hoped shortly to have sheets, pillows & slips on issue."\textsuperscript{103}

Substantial improvement also came from within Jayforce. Vegetable gardens were grown by most units incorporating fertilisation methods like compost that were more acceptable to the New Zealand palate, with the produce used to supplement


\textsuperscript{100} 6 Aug 1946, WA-J 21/10 9NZ Brigade Company Army Support Company/19NZ Army Support Company: Original War Diary.

\textsuperscript{101} JCOSA progress report No.2 ..., 23 Mar-31 Aug 1946, p.7, EA1 87/11/17 Progress Reports from New Zealand Representative, JCOSA; undated report by Lieutenant-Colonel W.B. Thomas, WA-J Board of Enquiry.


\textsuperscript{103} S. Blow letters, 9 Dec 1946.
mundane army rations. By the autumn of 1946 most Jayforce units were recording that cosmetic improvements to camps were under way, for example interior painting, pathway sealing and the creating of sports grounds. From mid-1946 there were earnest attempts to eradicate indifferent attitudes with the introduction of NCO and OCTU courses. It was hoped that these courses would raise officer and NCO professional standards which in turn would carry through to the lower ranks. 

Vehicle shortages were eased with the arrival of 600 newer and more compatible trucks from New Zealand in early 1947. Motivation was much better from amongst soldiers of the First NZ Relief Draft, as Potter recorded;

... with the departure of the last of the troops from Florence the atmosphere among the troops changed overnight. As one Unit Commander accurately observed "the dogged determination to do as little as possible and to be as troublesome as possible has disappeared."

Yet despite improvements a limited state of unwarranted poor organisation endured throughout late 1946 and well into 1947. For no apparent reason the supplying of stores and equipment remained erratic and ill-timed. Haphazard barrack heating continued into the winter of 1946-7, with some having to suffer the consequences. "In our barracks at Chofu there is no heating at all in our rooms over

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104 Ibid, 23 Jun 1946.

105 Radio Pacific talkback: Jayforce.


107 British and Indian troops based on Shikoku also had to continue to put up with up with poor living conditions into 1947. Footnote 2, DNZER, 2, p.1438.
the winter. It is perishing cold! Most of us sleep with extra clothing and socks."\textsuperscript{108} To add insult to injury, the issuing of warm bedding did not occur until late-January, which was over half-way through winter.\textsuperscript{109} For at least a number of units mattresses, proper beds, and crockery did not appear until the end of 1947.\textsuperscript{110} Shortages in the food supply remained ongoing into 1947 also, as the following report amplifies.

The lack of fresh vegetables and "Quick Freeze" vegetables is bringing many complaints from all troops. This is quite understandable as it is considered that the supply should be ample for a force which has been in Japan for a year.\textsuperscript{111}

Irregularities in New Zealand saw the Wairarapa Draft, which arrived in Japan in August 1947, come without personal weapons and in some cases equipment that was ill-fitting.\textsuperscript{112}

Some procurement delays continued. The root cause was probably on-going building material shortages within Japan, which contributed to renovation and construction work being undertaken only haphazardly and slowly. Ozuki camp, built especially for 22/2 Battalion from mid-1946, was not ready for occupation until September 1947 and even then there was major construction work still to be

\textsuperscript{108} S. Blow, written recollections, p.6.

\textsuperscript{109} N.S. Whitla letters, 31 Jan 1947.


\textsuperscript{111} Fortnightly report, 17 Feb 1947, WA-J 21/16 9NZ Brigade Company Army Support Company/ 19NZ Army Support Company: Original War Diary.

\textsuperscript{112} Fortnightly general report, 28 Jul-11 Aug 1947, WA-J 17/22 22NZ Infantry Battalion/ 2 Battalion NZ Regiment: Original War Diary.
completed. In December for instance, it was observed that "... [a]ll around us buildings are going up to complete the camp - a picture theatre and medical centre just behind us and all kinds of landscaping, ditching etc." 22/2 Battalion was not alone, 27/3 Battalion records mention extensive improvements to the camp at Yamaguchi remained on-going in November 1947. Furthermore, it was not until the autumn of 1947 that a fully heated and self contained barrack building for ORs at Kiwa hospital was completed.

Disputes with BCOF HQ continued to haunt Jayforce, creating disruption that should normally have been avoided. On one occasion BCOF HQ intransigence disrupted the setting up of a Jayforce radio station at Yuda over the winter of 1946-47. They would only approve a 10 watt station, which was not powerful enough to reach all the New Zealand camps within Yamaguchi Prefecture. Persistent BCOF HQ inflexibility eventually saw Potter ignoring their stipulations, as was noted by one soldier. "The Commander ... requested that we carry on with our plans to build a 500 watt transmitter while he negotiated at a higher level for the requisite authority to increase the power of the station." Disputes also arose over the issuing of summer clothing and the printing of a Jayforce newspaper.

115 K.I.T. Collier, oral recollections.
116 Station AAFA, Yamaguchi, p.1, New Zealand Broadcasting Unit Japan, correspondence, monthly reports, etc., 1946-48.
Some forms of poor organisation simply could not be remedied. This applied, for example, to the disruption of mail delivery, which occurred throughout the whole time New Zealand’s military force remained in Japan. The mail was flown by No. 41 RNZAF transport squadron to Iwakuni from New Zealand once a week, but a number of obstacles periodically delayed this service, including bad weather and aircraft malfunction. The latter occasionally resulted in mail having to be jettisoned. The non-arrival of mail, which could last weeks, was felt acutely by Jayforce personnel "... [n]o mail this week again, life is grim."  

Nevertheless, most of the worst aspects of disorganisation within Jayforce had been cleared by the end of 1947. Conditions found by personnel of the Second NZ Relief Draft, who arrived in Japan in August and September 1947, tended to be the subject of high praise. The sergeants’ quarters for 2 Battalion at Chofu were described as being very spacious "... with 2 tables, 6 easy chairs, a piano and gramophone...."  

Unit records for NZ WAACs also commented very favourably on their quarters. "The magnificent quarters allotted to us were something none of us visualised and the NZ WAAC Mess, a gracious rambling house set in a typical Japanese walled garden with its fishpond, is a joy to visit." By the end of 1947 the food served at the mess was something that could be boasted about, as was done in relation to the 5NZ Engineer Company officers’ mess at Bofu. "Some of our food

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117 R.H. Stonyer letters, 2 Jun 1946.

118 B. Crowley, written recollections, p.152.

would make you envious - tinned salmon, sardines, peaches, pears, apricots, soups, peas, lobsters, bully beef; not every day of course, but quite often....”\textsuperscript{120} Finally, by January 1948 19NZ Army Support Company was at last reporting that ”... [t]he condition of clothing is excellent, with very few deficiencies.”\textsuperscript{121}

The way in which Jayforce was organised both in its move to and arrival in Japan was never any better than it was for the other members of BCOF, and often probably worse. It is also beyond doubt that the degree of disorganisation was unacceptable to the New Zealand Government. Uncertainty, confusion and haphazardness were on the one hand generated by factors within military circles, including misleading information, poor planning, supply and movement deficiencies, and bad communication. The circumstances of participation as formulated by Fraser, which dictated that the New Zealand force be prepared to move to Japan as quickly as possible, were important and compounded difficulties within military circles. They contributed to hasty planning, a poor choice of troops for occupation duties, and recruiting difficulties. External environmental elements were also instrumental, as Japanese conditions and shipping played a prominent part. The implications were both varied and substantial, and most were of a negative nature: discomfort, sickness and disease, under-achievement, low morale, and low prestige. These factors were to impact adversely on the ability of the force to undertake its duties and on the level of misdemeanour and crime. Though organisation improved gradually from 1946, for

\textsuperscript{120} S. Dawson letter extracts, 8 Dec 1947, p.91.

\textsuperscript{121} 15 Jan 1948, WA-J 21/27 9NZ Brigade Company Army Support Company/ 19NZ Army Support Company: Original War Diary.
inexplicable reasons some aspects of confusion and haphazardness were to remain on-
going.
CHAPTER FOUR.

Tasks and Leisure.

The three pre-determined tasks for the New Zealand military force were mapped out well before the army brigade and airforce squadron arrived in Japan. They originated from two sources. First, the role was defined in December 1945 by the MacArthur-Northcott Agreement, which stated it as being the "... [m]ilitary control of [a designated] area and demilitarisation and destruction of equipment, arms and other defences...."¹ In addition MacArthur wanted the British Commonwealth forces to pass on democratic ways to the Japanese.² Second, promotion of British Commonwealth prestige was designated a high priority, with Peter Fraser being a major instigator of this policy. However once in Japan these pre-determined tasks were quickly overshadowed and other activities became dominant.

Searching for and collecting military equipment within Yamaguchi Prefecture was a major designated activity. Varying numbers of soldiers, not usually in units greater that a platoon, were given a particular district to search almost as soon as Jayforce had arrived in Japan. The three infantry formations, 22 and 27 Battalions and 2 Divisional Cavalry Regiment, were usually assigned patrolling duties. Sometimes other units, most notably 25 Field Battery which became a quasi-infantry unit in

¹ Evatt to Fraser, 15 Dec 1945, DNZER, 2, p.1320.
² Note on the discussion in Cabinet with Lieutenant-General Northcott, 9 Jan 1946, DNZER, 2, p.1341.
Japan, also undertook these tasks. Depending on the distance from base camp, a patrol would travel either in vehicles or on foot. Patrols were usually accompanied by a Japanese or CSDIC interpreter, and sometimes by Japanese policemen. Furthermore, No. 14 RNZAF squadron participated in searches for Japanese military equipment, thus adding an aerial perspective. On locating anything deemed suspicious, ground troops would be directed to the site.

Military equipment was found in numerous places. From the time of the Japanese surrender local police stations had acted as collecting points, and it was here that patrols would often find material. For example at Toyoura Police Station in early April 1946 a patrol under Lieutenant Walsh came across a radio, bundles of air rifles, ammunition, and flame bombs. Other prominent locations were former military camps or installations. At a former Japanese airforce base at Ozuki partially destroyed aircraft engines, mortars, and machine guns were found. The greatest amount of equipment was found buried along the Inland Sea coastline in the vicinity of Mizuba and Hikari. This is where cottage industry workshops serving the naval base at Mizuba were located, and at the surrender the parts and munitions they had been manufacturing were disposed of by burial. Patrols were obliged to probe the sand with long metal rods to locate the material. If anything was found, Japanese labourers would be called in to dig the equipment up. War material found was disposed of by

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3 Patrol report, 5-6 Apr 1946, WA-J 68/9 Patrol Reports, 22NZ Infantry Battalion.

4 Patrol report, 18 Apr 1946, WA-J 17/6 22NZ Infantry Battalion/ 2 Battalion NZ Regiment: Original War Diary.

5 R.H. Cameron, oral recollections.
a BCOF unit known as DEE, or Disposal of Enemy Equipment section, which had been set up in April 1946.\(^6\)

Yet the most common single item of military equipment confiscated was not in the strictest sense 'military' at all. This was the Japanese family samurai sword, which acted as a valuable heirloom and genealogical symbol, and patrols were directed to call into private homes to collect them. They had no practical military value and confiscation was a symbolic act designed to strike a psychological blow. This action was probably more damaging to the Japanese than the confiscation of genuine military equipment.

Genuine findings of military equipment were sporadic, because American troops who had occupied Yamaguchi Prefecture before the arrival of Jayforce had been given the job of locating, collecting, and destroying military equipment as well. They had completed their tasks reasonably thoroughly, as New Zealand patrol records noted. "4 Coy patrol proceeded by launch to the Island of SEN-SHIMA.... A/A guns, rangefinders, and searchlights demolished by Japanese under the supervision of the American Navy were reported."\(^7\) Many of the finds made by patrols were of small quantities of material forgotten or missed by the Americans. At Ishimaru for instance "... a small store containing ammo pouches, magazines and haversacks [was discovered at the police station having been] collected on American direction, but no


\(^7\) 21 Jun 1946, WA-J 18/8 27NZ Infantry Battalion/ 3 Battalion NZ Regiment: Original War Diary.
orders given for disposal. Moreover, Yamaguchi Prefecture was a pre-dominantly rural district and had not been a major location for military forces or installations during the war. Comparisons with other BCOF zones illustrate this. For example, Australian forces occupying Hiroshima Prefecture could boast locating 480 ‘targets’ by May 1947, while the New Zealand brigade could lay claim to only 107.

Military equipment finds slowed to a trickle by mid-1946, and the finds that did occur were mostly military in the broadest sense only. A typical report on a find would read "... searching of areas where military materials have been concealed revealed quantities of oil, radio equipment and other miscellaneous equipment. Swords and arms have been located on very rare occasions during searches." Material of this nature had probably not been considered military by the Japanese themselves, and had therefore not been handed in for collection. On the whole, patrol reports would be marked ‘nil’ in the ‘military equipment found’ section from this time.

Patrols also had other tasks as part of enforcing military control. A survey and inventory of almost everything Japanese was conducted. Buildings and their uses, roads and roading conditions, power and water supplies, and employment and living conditions were all noted and recorded. Materials and conditions of potential danger for the occupying forces were checked, including explosives for mining and hunters'
gun permits. Anything that could be of use to Jayforce was assessed, such as the suitability of school buildings for accommodation.\textsuperscript{11}

With tasks completed quickly, patrolling began to change and a concentration on policing duties became the norm. Post-war Japan was economically devastated and food and clothing was in short supply, creating an ideal environment for blackmarketing. Attempting in conjunction with local Japanese police to break Japanese and Korean blackmarket rings became the most prominent form of operational patrolling from mid-1946. Unit diaries recorded the character of anti-blackmarket operations.

A check on Black Market activities in YAMAGUCHI was made by the Bn. Bren Carriers were stationed as road blocks on the four main roads leading to YAMAGUCHI and patrols from Supt Coy with Japanese Civil Police searched vehicles and persons passing the road blocks.\textsuperscript{12}

This kind of work was not customary for infantry units for long. As the year progressed patrolling of this sort increasingly became the preserve of small, specialist, investigative units such as 11NZ Provost Company, Field Security, and SIB.

Other initial designated duties were also short-lived. During the first few weeks Jayforce was in Japan a specific number of infantrymen had to be on constant standby to confront any dangerous situation. "We had to have our packs ready at all times in case we where [were] called out within minutes. We had one such call out, which was

\textsuperscript{11} WA-J 68/9 Patrol Reports, 22NZ Infantry Battalion.

\textsuperscript{12} 30 May 1946, WA-J 18/7 27NZ Infantry Battalion/ 3 Battalion NZ Regiment: Original War Diary.
false." Such a high degree of readiness ceased once it was realised that the local Japanese had peacefully submitted to the authority of the New Zealand force, just as they had also done to the Americans following the August 1945 surrender.

However, some aspects of military control did remain ongoing, including the overseeing of two repatriation centres by small detachments. One company from 22 Battalion was sent to Senzaki immediately on disembarking from the Strathmore, and one squadron from 2 Divisional Cavalry Regiment was posted to Otake on 1 August 1946. Senzaki acted as a processing camp for Korean deportees and returning Japanese servicemen and civilians, while Otake dealt only with returning Japanese. Troops were directly responsible for security, as well as overseeing the DDT spraying, inoculating, and searching of deportees and repatriates by Japanese employees at the centres.

Security was of most concern at Senzaki where it had to be maintained stringently over reluctant and sometimes aggressive Korean deportees. The 22 Battalion company was responsible for mounting picquets and hut searches to deter escape attempts, and the following soldier’s account is an indication of the need for vigilance.

The Compound I found to be a veritable rabbit warren of tunnels in true P.O.W. style - all of which were filled in.... Next day I took 12 men with 20 Jap Police & carried out a surprise raid on No 2 Hut. We ... [rounded] ... up the Koreans for a roll call & thoroughly searched the building finding an axe, several razors, dozens of flat iron slabs for tunnelling, knives & fifteen tins of our cigarettes!!

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13 D. Mason, written recollections, pp.6-7.
14 M. Murray, written recollections, p.87.
At first the repatriation centres were very busy, though by August 1946 there was a marked decline in numbers passing through, and especially of returning Japanese. This eventually led to the closure of the Otake repatriation centre on 26 June 1947. A detachment remained at Senzaki almost until the final withdrawal of the New Zealand force, for the numbers of Korean deportees remained high because significant numbers continuing to be smuggled into Japan. Smuggling only ceased during the worst winter months.

A number of activities were undertaken in conjunction with the Senzaki repatriation centre. Patrolling the north-western coastline between Shimonoseki and Hagi was an ongoing responsibility for the 22 Battalion company based at Senzaki, as well as a company from 27 Battalion based at Hagi. Because this coastline was the closest part of Japan to Korea and Koreans were keen to continue living and working in Japan, attempts to smuggle Koreans into this region by sea were frequent and continual. Patrols were carried out both on foot and by motor-launch, and occasionally liaison would occur with Royal Indian or United States Navy vessels as well as British Commonwealth airforce patrols. A detachment of soldiers from Senzaki would sometimes guard the Korean deportees on their ship-bound journey from Senzaki to Korea. The guarding of trains carrying Korean deportees was a frequent task for small numbers of soldiers from either 27 Battalion or 2 Divisional Cavalry Regiment.

15 WA-J 68/5 Operation Reports.
16 Brigadier (retired) L.W. Wright, oral recollections.
At times there were other specified occupational tasks relating to military control, often following the issuing of orders by higher commands such as SCAP or BCOF HQ. Operation ‘Foxum’ originated from SCAP and involved the searching of schools for militaristic or ultra-nationalist material, Shinto doctrine, and material derogatory to Allied powers. Finds were rare. One soldier recalled "... I lifted floor boards & searched the Heads [Headmaster’s] own house where we uncovered 200 war pamphlets, several other banned books, some hastily stuffed in a rubbish bin.... I was the only one to uncover so much material."17

The withdrawal of British and then Indian troops from 1947 resulted in a modest increase in the tasks of Jayforce infantry units, ironically at a time when the size of the force had dropped from approximately 4,200 to 2,400 personnel. In September 1947 military responsibility for Shimane Prefecture, immediately to the north of Yamaguchi Prefecture, was allocated to Jayforce following the departure of 268 Indian Brigade.18 Units were periodically deployed to this district for various duties, for example,

... [o]n 6 May 48, a coy of 5 Offrs and 96 ORs left CANTERBURY CAMP for MATSUE, SHIMANE Prefecture. The object of this operation was to act as a "show of force" and if necessary intervene in any disturbances caused by the Koreans at their Mass Meeting.19

Other tasks outside Yamaguchi Prefecture from 1947 involved regular tours of guard duty at Eta Jima (BCOF HQ), Kaitachi, Kobe, and Kure.

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17 M. Murray, written recollections, p.81.
18 Footnote 3, DNZER, 2, p.1459.
Promoting and maintaining BCOF prestige, the second significant pre-designated task for the New Zealand force, continued throughout Jayforce’s life. Two formal strategies were followed, involving extensive shows of force, and ceremonial guard duties. The former were begun within a matter of days of the brigade arriving in Japan. Battalion and company-sized ceremonial marches through city, town, and village centres were made by infantry units, and these were to continue periodically. They were designed to impress upon local Japanese the presence of Jayforce and the occupation forces generally. Marches were elaborately orchestrated, as the following account records.

On Wednesday 4th Sept the whole Battalion marched through the city of Shimonosaki with fixed bayonets. There was a huge crowd of civilians out to watch the march. The Brigadier took the salute from a platform in the main street. Behind the platform were three flagpoles bearing the Union Jack, NZ Ensign and the Stars & Stripes.\(^20\)

In Shimonoseki, a city with a high Korean population, the marches were also designed to act as a deterrent against local Japanese and Korean hostility.

From October 1946 a ceremonial guard battalion was sent to Tokyo regularly for a period of one month, rotating this assignment with other BCOF units. It was considered a very important public relations exercise, for the New Zealand force was being thrust into the public limelight, and preparations were therefore intense. Those chosen to go underwent very thorough parade ground training for up to three weeks, initially at Mizuba and from the end of 1947 at Yamaguchi. One participant revealed that "... [f]or a week I learned more about rifle drill and polish than I thought was

\(^{20}\) P. Rodgers diary extracts, 4 Sep 1946.
possible to learn."^21 In Tokyo, the main duties were to guard various important sites, for example the Emperor's Palace, the Canadian Legation building, and the Radio Tokyo building. Other duties included roving piqueting, hoisting flags, checking passes for entry, and escorting Japanese war criminals to war trials hearings. Until 1948 the Guard Battalion was a composite grouping made up of a cross-section of Jayforce units and sometimes RAAF or RNZAF detachments. From 1948 either 2 or 3 Battalion as a whole was sent. Now and then smaller detachments took part in ceremonial anniversary parades in Tokyo, for example to commemorate American Independence Day held on 4 July and Empire Day on 28 May.

Maintaining contact with local Japanese on a close and informal scale was another means to bolster BCOF prestige. This kind of public relations was considered to be especially important in outlying areas, which had little regular contact with the occupying forces. It was typical for this kind of activity to be undertaken by small patrols. One soldier recollected that,

"... the format was to call on the chief of Police in the town, share a beer or green tea with him & if staying the night billet ourselves at the local school. We would call a meeting of the Mayor or Headman and solicit any problems they were having in surviving."^22

By meeting in the appropriate cultural manner, social prestige or 'face' for both the Japanese and the New Zealanders was deemed to have been given due respect.

^21 R. Schofield diary extracts, 30 May 1946, p.104.

^22 M. Murray, written recollections, p.76.
A limited number of social activities with the Japanese were organised, with the informal promotion of BCOF prestige a major motivation. Perhaps the most prominent event of this nature was running Christmas parties for local Japanese children. Most units organised such parties.

For No. 14 RNZAF squadron, prestige was also maintained by excellence in appearance. With this policy in mind all personnel had been supplied with uniforms that were both new and properly fitting prior to departing for Japan. The Corsair aircraft supplied to the squadron as well as equipment were also brand new, where possible.23

There is no evidence to indicate whether the third pre-determined task, the passing on of democratic ways to the Japanese, was ever directly attempted. This probably reflects the poor qualifications of a military force to undertake a job of this sort, with the exception of the Army Education Service.

Nonetheless, a couple of Jayforce undertakings may have indirectly helped in the teaching of democracy. One was the supervision of Japanese local and national elections in April 1946, when small groups of soldiers were posted to polling booths to guard against voter intimidation. The other was the establishing of a Provost Court, a legal body which tried criminal cases involving Japanese and either the occupation forces or foreign nationals. The democratic procedures of the Provost Court were noted by Potter;

23 G. Sutton, oral recollections.
... the greatest care is exercised in running the proceedings so that the fullest possible effect of dignity and justice is obtained. British rules of law and procedure are applied as far as possible and the Legal Dept always appoints an officer to defend all the accused....

In contrast, the Americans were well organised in this respect. Most large cities in the American occupation areas had Civil Information and Education sections run by the US Army. This probably reflects the disparity in resources and preparedness between the US occupation forces and Jayforce, as well as a different sense of democratic mission.

Outside the sphere of occupation duties infantry, or designated infantry personnel had everyday routine jobs to perform. Camp security was the most important, and this was a continual responsibility for company or smaller sized detachments. The major security concerns were sabotage, theft, and fire, with roving picquets and static sentry duty the forms of security implemented. Deployment occurred at the major campsites at Chofu, Kiwa, Mizuba, Ozuki, and Yamaguchi. Camp security was very tight at the outset, reflecting uncertainty over dangers to expect in Japan, and experiences in Italy where thieving by local civilians was very widespread. Security was quickly scaled down, except for occasions when it was temporarily tightened as a response to a specific threat. This occurred most when there

24 Potter to Weir, 8 Oct 1946, DNZER, 2, p.1419.
25 M. Kawakami, written recollections.
26 R. Corney diaries, 18 and 26 Apr 1946.
were spates of fire outbreaks, as in April 1947 at Yamaguchi camp when a barrack building was burnt down by Japanese arsonists.  

On the whole, the pre-determined occupation tasks to be undertaken were inadequate to employ Jayforce infantry and infantry-designated troops. For the most party they involved only small detachments of soldiers, usually of company-size (approximately 120 personnel) or even less. Yet until mid-1947 numbers in the three infantry battalions and 25NZ Field Battery totalled close to 3000 soldiers, or nearly three-quarters of all of the New Zealand army brigade. From mid-1947 infantry numbers in Jayforce still consisted of at least 1800 soldiers out of a total of 2400. The implications of the disparity between numbers of soldiers and jobs to do will be discussed below.

A short-fall in tasks for infantry and artillery personnel was in marked contrast to the experience of support units. In general, support units in any military formation are employed fully because their tasks are to maintain the structure as a functioning military entity, no matter what the current role or standing. Yet in Japan many support units were even more occupied with their assigned duties than they would have normally expected.

Disorganisation during the first few months in Japan was partially to blame for this. For example 16NZ Workshop vehicle mechanics had to maintain old and worn

27 G.L. Bertram diaries, 3-4 Apr 1947.
out trucks, jeeps, and cars which had been shipped to Japan from Italy. Moreover, at times the mechanics had to cope with chronic spares shortages. The situation was most critical in April and May 1946, which resulted in the necessity for drastic measures... owing to absolutely no supply of spares beyond Unit holdings cannibalization was practised to a large degree to keep vehicles available for purpose of building Camps and such domestic requirements. Support through Ordnance channels was non-existent... These two factors made vehicle mechanics very busy and at times they could not keep up with the workload, which led to Japanese mechanics being hired.29

Poor organisation also caused problems for other support units. The initial non-arrival of ovens from Italy limited bakers to "... working with only one oven, an electric type with which they were not familiar." This in turn meant bakers had to work twenty-four hour shifts to meet daily bread requirements.30

The Japanese environment increased the amount of work to be done by support units. Conditions and facilities that were tolerated by the Japanese were not acceptable to the New Zealand military, and 5NZ Engineer Company had a multitude of tasks to undertake immediately on arriving in Japan. Building, electrical, plumbing, and

28 OC 16NZ Workshops to HQ BCOF, 20 Dec 1946, WA-J 34/1 16NZ Workshops Historical Records.
30 Bakery platoon return, Mar 1946, WA-J 21/5 9NZ Brigade Company Army Support Company/ 19NZ Army Support Company: Original War Diary.
infrastructural conditions were very often dilapidated, and nearly all camps needed renovation to some degree.

Some of the work of support company personnel was supervisory, for manual tasks were often completed with the help of Japanese labourers. Nevertheless, construction and renovation work was both long-term, intensive and extensive. At the site of 6NZ General Hospital in Kiwa, the work extended "... from the rehabilitation of wards, messes, quarters and recreation rooms to the building of new kitchens and workshops, with, as a final gesture, adequate heating facilities for wards and anterooms."\textsuperscript{31} The Engineers started work at Kiwa in May 1946 and were still working there in 1948. A completely new camp for 22/2 Battalion was built at Ozuki, but although work was started in mid-1946 it was not ready for occupation until September 1947. Rough Japanese roads were an ongoing contributor to vehicles breakdowns, which in turn increased the workload of 16NZ Workshop vehicle mechanics.

Preventing disease contributed further to the duties of Jayforce. Of most concern were two types of fatal disease-carrying mosquito, the Anopholine which was a malaria carrier, and the Culicine which carried Japanese B Encephalitis. The extensive inoculating of New Zealand personnel was introduced by 6NZ General Hospital medical staff to combat this problem. In addition mosquito eradication programmes were instigated from May through to October of each year. Small groups of soldiers were formed into anti-mosquito squads, with the task of locating and

\textsuperscript{31} Kiwai Magazine, p.6.
spraying DDT or Malarial on mosquito breeding grounds (still or slow moving bodies of water) in or near campsites.³²

Local hazards also had to be prepared against. A common exercise was fire drill, for fire was the most immediate and constant danger. Japanese buildings constituted a ready fire hazard because of the flammable materials used in construction, including dangerous electrical wiring and poorly built open chimneys. Disaster relief exercises were also carried out occasionally, such as Operation ‘Duck’ in October 1947. This kind of exercise was necessary because Japan was prone to earthquakes and typhoons.

A short-fall in occupational tasks for infantry or infantry-designated soldiers resulted in many finding they had little to do. The following account was perhaps typical, "... [o]ut for breakfast at 7. Had a clean up then waited to see if I had a job [,] none.... Rested in the afternoon and did a bit of washing [,] very boring."³³ Furthermore the few tasks that did have to be fulfilled, such as sentry duty and basic army drill, were very monotonous. However, while the dilemma of inactivity came to be addressed that of monotony was not, for with nothing else to fall back on basic military training became very frequent. This training consisted of parade ground drill,

³² WA-J 68/5 Operation Reports.

³³ W.R.A. Burns diary, 27 Mar and 6 Apr 1946.
weapons instruction, and route marching. Route marches of up to 100 miles and lasting five days were sometimes completed.

The monotony came to be detested. One soldier noted "... [t]he infantry has about had Japan as all we do is guard duty or the same drill over & over again...." For units which had been undertaking occupational assignments, a return to basic army training or routine was loathed. "The Company moved across the mountains 96 mls to Chofu and we settled into the monotony of route marches, guard duty, and general inactivity - a far cry from our interesting life at Senzaki." Rotating units to the occupation duties that remained, such as the Senzaki repatriation centre, was one of the few ways of breaking the cycle of monotony.

Military exercises and manoeuvres took on greater significance among the New Zealand military force in the absence of sufficient occupational duties. No. 14 RNZAF squadron particularly emphasised these activities. "... [O]ur flying duties included armament and combat training. Apart from bombing and strafing exercises a new innovation for us was rocket firing...." Unofficial exercises with other occupation force squadrons were also common, especially with the compatible Kittyhawks of the RAAF, consisting of aerial dogfights or aerobatics. Jayforce had been assigned

34 N.E. Coop letters, 31 Mar and 24 Jun 1946; R. Corney diaries, Apr-Jun 1946; S. Dawson letter extracts, 10 Feb 1948; WA-J 17/15-17/16 22NZ Infantry Battalion/2 Battalion NZ Regiment: Original War Diaries.
36 M. Murray, written recollections, p.86.
37 Cox, p.221; J.J. De Willimoff, oral recollections.
particular tasks in the case of a military emergency, such as a Japanese uprising against the occupying forces and rehearsals for such an emergency were occasionally performed. "At 0930hrs 22Bn in conjunction with other 2NZEF units in the CHOFU Area practised manning the CHOFU Defence Perimeter. C Coy went to OZUKI to defend the aerodrome...." 38 Both small and large-scale military manoeuvres were undertaken by infantry units. For example, in November 1946 22 Battalion carried out large-scale manoeuvres at Ozuki aerodrome. Accounts indicate that it was not taken seriously:

Rollo had to direct Coys from Bn area to F.U.P.’s for night attack and Lyn & I to lead them from there to the start line after we had erected the start line with boundary flags & a couple of aldis lights before H hour. Needless to say, it was a balls-up. Companies led by O.C.’s drunk on the rum ration went up too soon, without our guidance got utterly mixed up and broke the start line." 39

This is indicative of attitudes towards manoeuvres of at least some personnel, who saw them as little more than bothersome time fillers.

In an attempt to counter-act tediousness and to further alleviate inactivity, sport and recreation became prominent. The organising of events and facilities was designated a high priority for unit commanders, the Army Education Service, and the YMCA. 40 Part or whole days throughout the week were regularly set aside for sport and recreation. Moreover, almost everyone from the first and second New Zealand

38 16 May 1946, WA-J 17/7 22NZ Infantry Battalion/ 2 Battalion NZ Regiment: Original War Diary.

39 Former serviceman who wishes to remain unidentified diary, 11-17 Nov 1946.

40 WA-J 21/6 9NZ Brigade Company Army Support Company/ 19NZ Army Support Company: Original War Diary; Potter to Weir, 8 Oct 1946, DNZER, 2, pp.1424-25.
Relief Drafts was allocated one week's leave at hostels established at popular pre-war tourist sites such as Beppu, Kobe, Kyoto, Nikko, and Tokyo to cater for all BCOF troops.

Many different sports were organised. Not unexpectedly rugby was the sport played and followed most enthusiastically, with an inter-unit competition for the Freyberg Cup the centre-piece of the rugby season which occurred from late winter to early spring. Other popular sports included athletics, cricket, hockey, and tennis, and again inter-unit as well as BCOF-wide competitions were held. In addition, the Japanese environment dictated the sports played. Baseball and basketball games were frequent, for they were popular sports in Japan and equipment and venue facilities were more likely to be readily available to the New Zealanders.

Organised social and recreational activity took many forms. The Army Education Service based at Yuda was responsible for organising young farmers clubs, carpentry courses, camera clubs, Japanese language classes, dancing lessons, and reading and record libraries. Other popular and regular ventures included dances, tramping, and sight-seeing. Some recreational activities were seasonal, with boating, sunbathing, and swimming popular in the warmer months at unit rest camps. Annual festivities such as Christmas and New Year saw the organising of elaborate banquets and parties. Visual entertainment included periodic tours by Australian, British, Japanese, and New Zealand concert parties as well as movies shown at camp cinemas.

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41 S. Blow, written recollections, p.5.
while a radio station especially for the New Zealand force operated at Yuda from 15 January 1947.

Yet as much as personnel had activities organised for them, evidence seems to indicate that the most popular forms of social and recreational activity were informal. This concerned the consumption of alcohol and associated socialising such as card games or simply 'yarning'. Even when there were plenty of other recreational interests on offer, these remained the preferred choice. An Army Education Service officer found this to be the case, to his consternation, in Tokyo. "I have arranged quite a few trips for the troops on their off-days but it is difficult to get a response - they are more interested in doing the beer halls rather than any sight seeing." When the weather stopped outdoor activities, drinking became the most accessible form of social and recreational activity. One soldier wrote "... I have been having plenty of booze its the only thing a man has got to do. Other wise a joker would go mad."  

Decision makers recognised the importance of drinking, and placed a priority on the speedy arranging of facilities such as rank-divided clubs. For example the 'Blue Duck Inn' was opened in Chofu for 22 Battalion on 20 April 1946, and was run along the lines of an English tavern. It was usual for ORs to have a beer ration of one quart bottle a day, while officers had a spirits ration. Alternative venues were run by

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42 W.V. Hadfield letters, 19 Jul 1948. Also see B. Crowley, written recollections, p.163.

43 N.S. Whitla letters, 18 Jan 1947.

44 20 Apr 1946, WA-J 17/6 22NZ Infantry Battalion/ 2 Battalion NZ Regiment: Original War Diary.
the YMCA which set up canteens where personnel could relax during off-duty hours, purchase hot and cold non-alcoholic drinks and snack-type foods.

Despite the development of sporting, recreational, and social activities both on a formal and informal basis, boredom remained a constant problem. Poor organisation of sports and recreation contributed to this. Part of the problem was inconsistent interest in organising, for one observer noted in early 1948 "... [t]he handful of officers left here are tackling the job of keeping the boys busy and interested in a very fine way - it should have been done long before." Lack of resources could also hamper initiatives, as was indicated by the following unit report; "... this unit is now faced with the problem of fielding 4 football teams and 2 hockey teams with enough football boots for only half that number." Isolation sometimes frustrated the efforts of unit commanders in smaller outlying camps. As well, surroundings could be inhibiting. 22 Battalion's initial base, worker accommodation barracks for the Kobe Steel Works, had no open area for sports. This necessitated transportation to Ozuki aerodrome over six miles away. Severe Japanese winters and torrential rain during monsoon seasons could halt outdoor recreation and sport for days or even weeks on end.


47 S.G. Breeze letters, 19 Nov 1946; N.E. Coop letters, 7 Apr 1946; Major-General (retired) R.H.F. Holloway, oral recollections.
All these factors saw the amount of sport and recreation available vary considerably throughout 1946 to 1948, from camp to camp and seasonally. This state of affairs was lamented sorely. "Amenities & conditions from what I have seen of them are really appalling, much worse than anything in N.Z. as there is absolutely nothing to do & nowhere to go when off duty." Part of the problem lay with personal attitudes. For many, staying within the confines of the camp and consuming alcohol remained the only interest. Such a narrow outlook and focus of interest was only likely to increase boredom.

In the context of army life in general boredom and monotony were typical experiences, and what Jayforce personnel went through was not a unique experience. As McLeod indicates in relation to the Second World War "... [d]espite the promise of many exciting adventures in faraway lands, soldiering was generally a dreary if not boring, lifestyle, punctuated by occasional periods of combat...." The difference for Jayforce was the absence of combat, and the fact that occupation duty in Japan was a peace-time assignment. Boredom may have been an acceptable part of wartime, yet during peace-time it probably wasn’t.

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50 B. Crowley, written recollections, p.145; ‘Home Was Never Like This’, New Zealand Army Education Service booklet, 1947, p.1.
The implications of having fewer occupational tasks than expected, and the inability or unwillingness of personnel to fill spare time, were far-reaching. One was that a high degree of monotony and boredom that resulted was to contribute to misdemeanours and crime, the subject of the next chapter. Furthermore, inactivity came to be one of the major reasons for deciding to reduce the size of the army brigade from mid-1947.52 Those units with the least to do, the infantry and artillery, were most at risk of disbandment and it was probably no shock that 25 Field Battery and 2 Divisional Cavalry Regiment suffered this fate on 22 May and 4 September 1947 respectively.

52 Footnote 3, DNZER, 2, p.1459.
All military forces endure a degree of misdemeanour and crime, and New Zealand's military force to Japan was no different. Blackmarketing and sexual relations with Japanese women were perhaps the two most prominent forms. This chapter will examine the nature, extent and reasons for this kind of activity in Japan, as well as attempt to assess its prevalence.

It is probable that blackmarketing was the most widespread form of illegal activity undertaken by New Zealand military personnel between 1946-48. Many sources state that throughout the whole two and half years the New Zealand force was in Japan nearly all personnel were involved to some degree. For example, one serviceman noted in letters home that participation "... is almost universally done.... [O]ne can make a 500% profit on them [cigarettes] by illegal trading - and everyone else does it, majors and all."¹ This point was also made within official circles, for instance by Potter to Weir in October 1946.² The scale is perhaps further illustrated by the fact that it came to be a celebrated aspect of life for the New Zealand force in Japan, for example in poetry.

¹ S. Dawson letter extracts, 3 Sep 1947, pp.50-51. Also see for example S. Blow, written recollections, p.2; B. Crowley, written recollections, p.195; G.G. Fahey diary, 24 May, 13 Jun, 18 Jul 1946.

² Potter to Weir, 8 Oct 1946, DNZER, 2, pp.1422-23; undated report by Lieutenant-Colonel W.F. Titchener, WA-J 67/16 Board of Enquiry.
Dickory, dickory, dock,
The Kiwi went out to hock;
The clock struck one
And back he's run
With binoculars, camera, clock.\(^3\)

Three factors most encouraged the high degree of blackmarketing. First, the Allied occupation authorities in Japan had set an artificially low currency exchange rate of sixty yen to one pound sterling in 1946 for BCOF, so as not to encourage already rampant inflation in Japan.\(^4\) However, among the general Japanese populace a rate at least five times higher was accepted. An ideal atmosphere for blackmarketing by soldiers was created, since it was the one way in which the low exchange rate could be circumvented and large amounts of yen accumulated. Second, ideal goods for the blackmarket were provided by military regulations, in that soldiers had to purchase a weekly allocation of goods through camp canteens that would usually include cigarettes, chocolate, soap, and boot polish. As canteen supplies became more plentiful supplementary purchases could be made. Last, the deprived economic circumstances of the Japanese led to a high demand for occupation force consumer goods.

The Japanese, so acutely short of such essentials as clothing, sugar, tobacco, matches, soap and bread, willingly gave more than the market value for these commodities, which brought one hundred times their value when sold surreptitiously....\(^5\)

\(^3\) Kiwai Magazine, p.30.

\(^4\) WA-J 67/16 Board of Enquiry.

Demand from the Japanese, combined with a willingness to supply from the New Zealanders, resulted in many and varied opportunities and strategies for blackmarket exchanges. Japanese shopkeepers were frequent dealers, as were workers in New Zealand camps. Personnel were sometimes approached in the street. One soldier recalled transactions taking place on a journey to Tokyo, "... [r]ather enjoyed trip, what with trading on the marketo through the train window at all stops!" A number of sources indicate that regular Japanese contacts were dealt with, for example "... [a]fter tea, Dave Barney & I went down to our "customer" to do a bit of trading with cigs & tinned milk...." At times the New Zealanders would target areas where it was known the best prices could be attained, usually in big cities where economic deprivation was worst. One serviceman recalled a visit to Hiro, in the Australian sector, where it was found that "... prices were almost double what we could get in Ozuki or Yamaguchi, we hocked just about everything in sight, including some army blankets belonging to the Aussies." Blackmarketing was probably heightened just prior to personnel returning to New Zealand. One serviceman explained the logic of this as being "... [k]nowing we could not take Japanese currency with us, we spent freely."
Yet sources suggest that the amount of blackmarketing pursued by most New Zealanders individually was small-scale. In these cases transactions would only involve the sale of canteen goods not personally used, for instance cigarettes from someone who didn't smoke. The following soldier's note in a letter home was typical and gives a further indication of the money that could be made at even this level. "Over here I am getting rich and I have only drawn £2-10/- from my paybook since I left NZ & then I didn't really need it. The occasional cigarettes that I get rid of keep me going in pocket money."  

Less frequently blackmarketing by Jayforce personnel was pursued on a more deliberate and elaborate level. Some soldiers recorded that they had prepared to partake in illicit trading before arriving in Japan. For example, just prior to departing Naples on the Strathmore one individual noted "... [c]ashed some Egyptian money that I had kept as souvenirs and spent it at the Canteen, buying cigarettes to sell in Japan." 11 This was also done by soldiers departing from New Zealand in later drafts. 12 Another venture was to have lightweight food items such as saccharine posted to Japan from New Zealand to be sold. 13 One serviceman recalled an arrangement with an RNZAF pilot to purchase and fly in a bulk load of American

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11 G.G. Fahey diary, 20 Feb 1946.
12 S. Blow, written recollections, p.2; M. McNee, oral recollections.
13 Former serviceman who wishes to remain unidentified diary, 20-26 Jan 1947, p.73; R.D. Yearbury, oral recollections.
cigarettes to sell in Hiroshima. The load was so great that the demand for and the price of cigarettes in this city was suppressed for a time.\textsuperscript{14}

Moreover, there were cases of large scale misappropriation or theft of stores and equipment, usually by those with a legitimate access to this material. For instance "... [s]ome huge "rackets" have been worked by some units involving thousands of pounds.... [For example] ... some of the officers in the Engineers have made quite a pile of money by taking out contracts with the Nip & using Army equipment."\textsuperscript{15} In another example, "... [f]our guards at one camp went up on a Court of Enquiry for hocking over £12,000 worth of clothing for 6,500,000 yen. Nothing could be proved however." This was because in schemes of this extent care was usually taken to eliminate any implicating evidence. One method was to deliberately light fires, a highly effective method of destruction of Japanese buildings as well as a plausible occurrence.\textsuperscript{16}

The yen accumulated could be used in a number of ways. Expensive Japanese luxury goods such as china, pearls, samurai swords, silk, and tea sets became affordable and were a popular item of purchase from Japanese retailers. It was the norm for these items to be posted to family and friends in New Zealand as gifts. For example, one serviceman recalled buying "... imitation pearls, silks, lacquer ... beautiful little wooden puzzle toys and the like, which delight my family and friends

\textsuperscript{14} G. Sutton, oral recollections.

\textsuperscript{15} W.V. Hadfield letters, 7 and 14 Mar 1948.

\textsuperscript{16} B. Crowley, written recollections, p.203.
at home."\(^{17}\) In addition, until regulations were tightened up in early 1947 (see below), illicitly acquired yen could be used to purchase personal comforts such as beer and saki from the Japanese, beer at unit wet messes, and further canteen goods to supplement rations or to again re-sell to the Japanese. There are also indications that some hoarded their money, probably to be used on returning to civilian life. For example it was recalled in mid-1948 that "... [o]ne private in 3 battalion had actually amassed 6 million yen [approximately £5660] and deserted...."\(^{18}\)

Various means were implemented by the New Zealand military authorities to curb blackmarketing. The monitoring of yen expenditure was introduced in March 1947 with some success. One soldier noted that the outlets for spending blackmarket yen had been reduced as "... we now have to draw out of our pay books for canteen and beer ration."\(^{19}\) Over time policing became more sophisticated. In 1947 provost investigations would include checking the amount of money held by an individual against paybook withdrawals.\(^{20}\) Surprise barrack and kit inspections occasionally occurred. Also in 1947-48 the contents of parcels had to be verified by an officer before posting to New Zealand. The success of this depended on the diligence of the officer, for if the parcel was returned to the soldier for posting, the opportunity arose to secrete further items into it.\(^{21}\)

\(^{17}\) S. Blow, written recollections, p.3. Also see K.I.T. Collier, oral recollections.

\(^{18}\) B. Crowley, written recollections, p.203. Also see G. Sutton, oral recollections.

\(^{19}\) N.S. Whitla letters, 12 Mar 1947.

\(^{20}\) A.F. Drew, oral recollections.

\(^{21}\) K.I.T. Collier, oral recollections.
Nevertheless, counter measures by blackmarket traders could be just as sophisticated. Regular and legitimately accessible contacts, often Japanese middle men or women who were workers in New Zealand camps, would only be dealt with. This cut out the risk of having to be outside camp boundaries with either goods to sell or large amounts of yen. The risk of being caught by the provosts was thus placed more heavily on Japanese dealers. Some Japanese retailers were also prepared to organise the posting of parcels to New Zealand for their customers, so that soldiers could avoid having illicit goods discovered.

SCAP and BCOF HQ acted to limit blackmarketing among occupation troops, but again success was limited with the New Zealanders. The official rate of exchange was raised from sixty yen to one hundred and twenty yen for one pound sterling in mid-1947, then to one thousand and sixty yen in early 1948, although they still did not match rises in the true inflation rate. The replacement of yen by BCOF money on 6 May 1947 as the currency to be used by Jayforce also proved ineffectual. One serviceman recalled that it only served as a additional means to accumulate yen, because Australian troops would exchange BCOF currency for yen at a very favourable rate.\(^2\)\(^2\) Another strategy by BCOF authorities concerned the instigation of a travelling gift train, selling Japanese souvenir items at very reasonable prices to the various BCOF units. Because one of the motivations for blackmarketing was to accumulate yen to buy these sorts of items through Japanese retailers, it was hoped that by BCOF selling them as well the motivation for blackmarketing would be reduced. It is conceivable that this may have occurred, though only to an extent. This

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\(^2\) C.A. Webby, oral recollections.
was because the gift train could not meet the demand for Japanese souvenir items, and a lottery system and rationing had to be introduced.

Overall, measures by both Jayforce as well as BCOF HQ and SCAP authorities to reduce blackmarketing failed. Their strategies did not substantially address any of the root causes of the problem, that is a continuing disparity between the value of sterling and yen, high Japanese demand for consumer goods, the means and willingness of New Zealand personnel to supply these goods, and opportunities to spend ill-gotten gains. The most telling indication of this failure is that sources from 1947-48 are just as adamant on the scale of personnel involved in illicit trading as there were for 1946.23

Blackmarketing was not the only frequent form of illegal activity which was pursued by servicemen and troubled the New Zealand military authorities, for sexual liaison with Japanese women was prevalent as well. This could take the form of consenting sex, which was not just with prostitutes but also regular Japanese partners with whom a personal relationship had been established, and non-consenting sex involving the rape of Japanese women by New Zealand servicemen; there are no known cases of Japanese or New Zealand men raping New Zealand servicewomen. It is not clear how prevalent sexual relations were initially, though it came to be a major issue by 1948. An appeal by 6NZ General Hospital in April 1948 for all those

23 For example K.I.T. Collier, M. McNee, and R.D. and R.J. Yearbury, oral recollections.
who had partaken in sexual intercourse to come forward for VD tests, gives a conservative indication of the scale at this time. 748 men presented themselves for examination, approximately one-third of the entire New Zealand army brigade at this time.24 This figure is conservative because a significant number of servicemen had regular and exclusive sexual partners who had become girlfriends.25 It is unlikely that all of these individuals would have presented themselves in April 1948 as they would not have thought they were vulnerable to infection.

There are no means to gauge the total extent of sexual links between Japanese women and New Zealand servicemen for all of 1946-48. Perhaps because of its personal nature, oral and written recollections rarely touch on this subject. Official VD infection rate figures exist, yet it is clear that they reflect only the 'tip of the iceberg'. The statistics for April 1948 reveal this, for while at least 748 men reported themselves as having had sexual intercourse at about this time, only 152 or 20% were found to have VD.26 Therefore, VD statistics can not be used in formulating a conclusion on the extent of sexual relations as a whole. Even so, these statistics were used as the major indicator on sexual activity by the New Zealand military authorities, and therefore are a guide to their reaction to the problem. Information on reported cases of rape also exist, which at least give some indication of the extent of this activity as well.


25 S. Dawson letter extracts, p.26; M. McNee, oral recollections; Stout, p.609.

26 Stout, p.610.
Intimate contact between Japanese nationals and soldiers could be illegal in three ways. First, it was an offence under fraternisation rules that were formulated in vague guidelines by Northcott prior to the arrival of Jayforce in Japan.\textsuperscript{27} These guidelines were to be more clearly stated by Potter on 20 July 1946, who said that outside work relations with the Japanese were to be limited to specified cultural occasions.\textsuperscript{28} The reasoning was that fraternisation would have an adverse affect on the prestige of the occupation forces in the eyes of the Japanese. Second, being diagnosed with VD was a breach of military regulations. A high level of VD infection had major implications in that it led to a significant number of troops requiring hospitalisation, which in turn depleted manpower and resources. High VD infection rates were furthermore an embarrassment to the prestige and reputation of the force as well as being morally disagreeable. Third, the most serious criminal offence of a sexual nature was rape.

Circumstances within Japan made the forming of sexual relationships with Japanese women easy. Relationships were likely to develop for NCOs and officers because of every-day and intimate contact with Japanese women in their capacity as hired labour in New Zealand camps. Officers had a housegirl to themselves while NCOs had to share. Japanese law, attitudes and economic conditions encouraged fraternisation as well, for brothels and prostitution were designated legal institutions and activities. Urban centres, especially those with a traditional military presence,

\textsuperscript{27} \textit{DNZER}, 2, pp.1365-67.

\textsuperscript{28} Fraternization policy and memorandum issued by the Commander 2nd NZEF (Japan) ..., 20 Jul 1946, WA-J 49/1 2 Echelon, 2NZEF (Japan): Office Files. General Orders; \textit{DNZER}, 2, p.1379.
tended to have well established brothels. The economic plight of many Japanese was of further significance. Japan had been devastated by the war, unemployment was very high, and street prostitution was one of the few openings for income. As a consequence sexual relations with Japanese women began almost immediately after the New Zealand military forces arrived and could take place at numerous locations including bath house-brothels, camp barracks, private homes, and even in the street.29

The likelihood of VD infection in Japan was great. A shortage of drugs for treatment meant there was a high rate of infection amongst the Japanese population as a whole. In theory Japanese prostitutes should have been ‘clean’, and were often considered to be so by soldiers because under Japanese law they had to be regularly checked by doctors. In practice this was not always the case as check-ups were infrequent, infection by brothel clients was common, and all were affected by the drug shortage.30

Once in Japan, general regulations and policing strategies were introduced by the New Zealand military authorities to act as a deterrent against liaisons with Japanese women. Provost patrols would regularly check bathhouse-brothels, hotels, private houses, and the streets. Road blocks would be set up and ‘out of bounds’ signs erected in the vicinity of prohibited areas, which would also be publicised in routine

30 Stout, p.609.
orders. Perhaps the best example of this was the whole city of Shimonoseki, which was designated ‘out of bounds’ because of the density of brothels. Regulations included designated evening curfew times to encourage soldiers to stay in their camps at night, and the forbidding of Japanese women passengers in Jayforce vehicles.

Yet tackling VD infection specifically was the most focused activity by the New Zealand military authorities in attempting to combat the problem of sexual association with Japanese women as a whole. This was so for three reasons. VD infection was the most readily apparent sign of sexual liaison, the physical affects of infection meant that the prohibiting of sex for this reason could be logically understood, and finally it had the most serious consequences from a military point of view. The authorities were well aware of the implications after experiencing a very high infection rate in Italy, and they were determined that this would not be repeated once in Japan. With this in mind, there were constant lectures on the dangers of VD infection for the Italy-based draftees, both prior to leaving for Japan as well as on board the troopship Strathmore.

On arriving in Japan some units applied a flexible outlook to fraternisation in general for the sake of combating VD infection. Although brothels were officially out of bounds, 27 Battalion for instance developed a pragmatic approach and accepted the inevitability of their patronage. They adopted a large bath house-brothel at Youda for the exclusive use of all BCOF forces based in the immediate vicinity, and had it

31 C.A. Baynes letters, 16 Dec 1946.

32 Stout, p.608; Dr. J. Weston, oral recollections.
guarded by a provost detachment to keep Japanese patrons away. The head of the VD unit at 7 Camp Hospital based at Yamaguchi, Dr Weston, was assigned the task of checking for and treating VD among the Japanese prostitutes. The advantages of this arrangement were two-fold. As well as keeping those soldiers using the brothel free from infection, it was also likely to keep them away from casual or street prostitutes, for knowing that the bath house at Youda was 'clean' was a powerful incentive to use this establishment only. This approach was successful, and contributed significantly to a virtually nil VD infection rate amongst the New Zealand forces based at Yamaguchi in March and April 1946.\textsuperscript{33}

This unofficial sanctioning of the ‘International Club’ ended in April because of the opposition of army chaplain Ian Dixon. His actions were noted by an officer in 27 Battalion at this time.

He wrote a letter on the subject to the SCF [MacArthur?] who brought it to the Brig’s [Stewart] attention, with the result that Brigade can now no longer pretend the Club is not patronized. Consequently a Brigade order directs that the Club be enforced out of bounds.\textsuperscript{34}

Dixon’s view was that the sanctioning of the Youda bath house-brothel encouraged sexual promiscuity among the New Zealand troops and was morally wrong. One highly placed source indicates, perhaps surprisingly, that Dixon was not supported by other New Zealand army chaplains.\textsuperscript{35}

\textsuperscript{33} B.C.H. Moss diary, 10 Apr 1946; C. Newlands and Dr. J. Weston, oral recollections.

\textsuperscript{34} B.C.H. Moss diary, 10 Apr 1946.

\textsuperscript{35} C. Newlands, oral recollections.
Dixon’s actions were extremely unpopular. The same 27 Battalion officer recorded that

... [t]he C.O. [of 27 Battalion] interviewed Ian and apparently lost his temper to the extent of abusing him, calling him a narrow-minded b____d. Then the Brig came up on a visit and dressed Ian down again.... The Brig said he would hold Ian personally responsible for every case of VD which occurred in Yamaguchi. 36

Nevertheless the ban remained, the exclusive use of the ‘International Club’ by BCOF units ended, and monitoring of prostitutes was returned to a local Japanese doctor.

No matter how short lived some strategies were, the initial efforts to limit the spread of VD were successful, for the low rate at Yamaguchi was representative of all of Jayforce at this time. "In Japan the rate dropped to about a quarter of that which had [been] obtained in Italy...." 37

The low VD infection rate did not last, and it is likely that Potter’s more precise guidelines on fraternisation were partly to blame. They left no room to turn a blind eye to brothel patronage, and a more vigilant enforcement against brothels pushed servicemen away from monitored brothels to street prostitutes, who were less likely to be ‘clean’. 38 A spiralling cycle of infection had been set in motion. As the VD infection rate rose, so provost vigilance increased, resulting in more New Zealand personnel turning to street prostitutes. 39 Street prostitutes responded to the new

36 B.C.H. Moss diary, 10 Apr 1946.
37 Stout, p.608.
39 M. McNee, oral recollections.
demand. Provost reports in April 1947 noted that "... [t]he practice of young girls leaving prohibited areas and loitering in the Vicinity of Barracks has grown of late...."  

Other factors were relevant in the increase in the VD infection rate. In July 1947 it was reported that a large number of Japanese hotels and cafes dealing in blackmarket goods were closed down, with many women employees being forced into street prostitution to survive.\(^41\) Hence the availability of street prostitutes to servicemen was almost certainly increased. Furthermore, supplies in penicillin and sulpha drugs for Japanese hospitals to treat VD grew more scarce in 1947-48.\(^42\) A perceived decline in the seriousness of infection by some soldiers, in turn facilitating recklessness, may also have been partly to blame. This came about because of the reputation gained by penicillin in Italy as a relatively painless and total cure.\(^43\)

Drastic measures were implemented by New Zealand military authorities to halt this trend. For example 2 Battalion records noted that at Ozuki Camp in March 1948 "... [a]ll leave was stopped and check parades carried out every 2 hrs to ensure that no troops were out...."\(^44\) Also at this time a soldier commented that "... the V.D.

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\(^{40}\) Monthly report, Apr 1947, WA-J 37/10 11NZ Provost Company: Unit Files.


\(^{43}\) Stout, p.615; Dr. J. Weston, oral recollections.

\(^{44}\) 8 Mar 1948, WA-J 17/29 22NZ Infantry Battalion/ 2 Battalion NZ Regiment: Original War Diary.
rate in our battalion was 25%, high enough for a temporary curtailing of all leave.... To toughen things up, the C.O. doubled the roving picket, and instituted a password system. In addition, lectures on the dangers of VD were stepped up and punishments were increased. Being diagnosed with VD became a court martial offence.

One soldier indicates that these measures were still not totally effective. At Ozuki, soldiers "... merely went down to the aerodrome and strolled out of camp, rather than coming and going through the main gate where ... passes could be checked."46

Despite attempts to combat VD infection the rate continued to rise slowly but steadily until October 1947 when it suddenly trebled (see Appendix Four), and continued to increase until soldiers started to be returned to New Zealand in mid-1948.47 Ultimately VD became the overall major cause of hospital admission for Jayforce in Japan. Stout blames this increase on a decline in disciplinary standards (see below), though it seems doubtful if this alone could account for such a dramatic increase.48

45 B. Crowley, written recollections, p.195.
46 Ibid.
47 Based on a calculation of monthly infection rates as a percentage of the total force. Stout, p.610.
48 Stout, p.608-09.
The incidence of reported rape were very few as compared to the consenting forms of sexual liaison. This is not to say rape did not occur, though evidence indicates that there were probably no more than a dozen confirmed cases throughout the whole time the New Zealand force was in Japan.  

Other forms of misdemeanour and criminal activity, both minor and major, were committed. The most common form throughout 1946-48 was careless driving due to excessive speed. The seriousness of this problem can be seen from the number of accidents involving Jayforce vehicles. In the three months of January to March 1948 for example, there were thirty-four reported accidents resulting in ten cases of injury to Japanese civilians, five of them fatal. Habitual serious crime was absence without leave, arson, assault on Japanese civilians, robbery, and wilful damage. The frequency of serious crime varied. As with blackmarketing, incidence tended to be worst in the months immediately before drafts of soldiers returned to New Zealand. For example, a provost report in April 1947 stated

... there was a sharp decline in the discipline of the New Zealand troops during April and a large number of more or less serious crimes were committed by 2 NZEF troops. A few A.W.L’s were reported but with one exception, all have been arrested and returned to their units.... There were three cases of attempted rape reported, one at Hikari, Kiwa and Otake. Assault and robbery was reported by Civilians on no less than 12 occasions, the incidents being spread all over the Brigade area.

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49 BCOF provost weekly and monthly resume of serious incidents, Oct 1946-Jun 1948, WA-J 37/10 11NZ Provost Company: Unit Files; M. Kawakami, written recollections.

There were two cases of Arson verified as having their origin from N.Z. troops.\textsuperscript{51}

Reports for the months immediately prior to the departure of drafts in 1946 and 1948 also indicated that a heightened crime wave took place.\textsuperscript{52} It is not certain why this was so, though it may have reflected soldiers going on a ‘final fling’ before their departure.

How great was the incidence of misdemeanour and crime among the New Zealand military forces in Japan? Comparisons with other BCOF forces in Japan give a limited indication. In one aspect it can be concluded definitely that the New Zealanders had a much lower misdemeanour and crime rate. This applies to the VD infection rates of 1946 and most of 1947, which were statistically the lowest within BCOF.\textsuperscript{53}

But in other ways the levels of misdemeanour and crime were probably rather worse than for the others. In contrast to 1946-47, by 1948 VD figures were far outstripping Australian figures (the British and Indians had mostly withdrawn by this time), with a BCOF conference on VD noting that "... [t]here were more patients in the NZ hospital at the moment with their 2000 tps, than in 130 AGH catering for

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\textsuperscript{51} Provost newsletter, Apr 1947, p.20, WA-J 37/3 11NZ Provost Company: Unit Files.


\textsuperscript{53} Stout, p.608; monthly report, Apr 1947, WA-J 37/10 11NZ Provost Company: Original War Diary.
about 7 or 8000 tps. The amount of serious crime in general within Jayforce was most likely high in early to mid 1947, for the New Zealand military authorities were obliged to instigate over twice as many court martial proceedings as for any other BCOF unit between April and June 1947. This conclusion can be drawn with some confidence because of available statistical information and because the unit with the next highest figures, 34 Australian Infantry Brigade, was almost certainly of a similar size to the New Zealand army brigade.

Nonetheless, court martial figures for April-June 1947 must be qualified to an extent, for the disparity in figures may not necessarily be fully indicative of the disparity in crime rates between BCOF units. This could be because of differing interpretations over what constituted a court martial offence, fewer or greater numbers of offenders being caught by each of the national military forces, or because Jayforce instigated a higher number of court martials over this period than did the others.

It is difficult to draw a conclusion on crime as a whole outside of the period early-mid 1947. First, comparable court martial statistics have not been found. Second,

54 Minutes of conference-control of VD, 5 Apr 1948, p.2, WA-J 24/6 VD Correspondence.

55 BCOF court martials held 1 Apr-30 Jun 1947:

- 34 Australian Infantry Brigade 26.
- British Commonwealth Base 25.
- 2NZEF (Japan) 54.
- 268 Infantry Brigade Group 9.
- BCAIR 6.
- HQ BCOF 1.

WA-J 69/5 Discipline - Confidential.
though BCOF resumes of serious incidence indicate that between October 1946 and June 1948 the committing of robbery and assault was most frequent amongst the Australian forces, this source is problematic, since over twice as many Australians than New Zealanders were part of BCOF between 1946 and mid-1947, and over three times as many from mid-1947. Definitions over what constituted a serious crime may also have varied.

Furthermore, evidence hints at some serious Jayforce crime being down-played within official BCOF circles. One high-ranking officer in Japan in 1946 explained that regular-force officers at this time would in some circumstances deal with serious crime ‘in-house’, rather than apply strictly correct disciplinary procedures. This was because the reporting of serious crime within a unit could act as a black-spot on the unit commanding officer’s service record. This was of greater concern than usual in 1946 because officer’s ranks were temporary, being based on their standing in the much enlarged wartime New Zealand Army. A black-spot could adversely affect their soon-to-be-re-adjusted peace-time rank as well as future promotion prospects. Other evidence also points to down-playing in mid-1946. A provost report in September stated that just prior to the departure of the first part of the Italy Draft for New Zealand "... a few others who would normally have received long sentences were dealt with summarily to avoid the trouble of retaining them for Court Martials...."  

57 C. Newlands, oral recollections.  
A comparison with other New Zealand Army forces in the 1940s, both during and after the Second World War, may also be useful in forming a judgement on the level of misdemeanour and crime. The incidence of VD infection, at least in 1946 and the early part of 1947, was much lower than it had been for 2NZEF in Italy in 1945; by 1948 it had risen to match the highest levels achieved by 2NZEF in 1945.\textsuperscript{59} Blackmarketing was considerably reduced in Japan in 1946 as compared to that of 2NZEF in Italy in 1945, but it is not known if there was a rise in blackmarketing from 1946-47 to parallel VD infection increases.\textsuperscript{60} On the other hand it seems that the amount of crime within Jayforce was much higher than levels for the home-based New Zealand Army between 1946-48. Court martial cases in 1946-7 within all of the New Zealand Army illustrate this, for most originated from Japan even though at this time the New Zealand brigade represented approximately only half the total number of soldiers in the New Zealand Army.\textsuperscript{61}

We might ask to how a level of ‘normality’ for misdemeanour and crime is to be judged? It is doubtful if comparison with 2NZEF in 1945 is entirely appropriate, as wartime standards and circumstances varied considerably from the peacetime occupation situation in Japan. Judgements should perhaps be two-fold, first based on comparison with the other BCOF forces and second with peace-time military standards. This being the case, misdemeanour or crime only predominated for certain within Jayforce as compared to other BCOF units in the rate of VD infection in 1948,

\textsuperscript{59} Stout, p.608; Dr. J. Weston, oral recollections.

\textsuperscript{60} H. Bleasdale and C. Newlands, oral recollections.

\textsuperscript{61} AJHR, H19, 1947, pp.5-6.
and crime in general in early-mid 1947. The level of misdemeanour and crime was likely to have been substantially higher overall than was normal by New Zealand peace-time military standards.

The level of crime and misdemeanour in Japan was promoted by a breakdown in some aspects of discipline within the New Zealand army brigade throughout 1946-48. Sources indicate that a poor standard of leadership among some officers was the fundamental underlying cause of this. Poor leadership resulted in a failure to instill and maintain an expected level of military behaviour within lower ranks. This failure was pivotal because many direct causes of misdemeanour and crime among ORs, including drunkenness, boredom and attitude problems were not addressed when they probably should have been.

The link between poor officer leadership and misdemeanour and crime was often commented upon. A provost report from September 1946 is illustrative of this, stating "... [d]iscipline was of a very low standard and little was done to improve the situation." Another provost report from early 1948 also highlighted this link. "Dress of leave personnel is always poor and it is a hopeless task for this unit to combat it. There is NO doubt about it that dress is a unit responsibility as it reflects on their

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standard of discipline.\textsuperscript{64} Stout lays the blame on the jump in VD infection rates in 1948 on poor officer standards. "The rate will be reduced only when Unit Commanders and officers make a determined effort to raise the standard of discipline and take a personal interest in their troops' welfare."\textsuperscript{65} Furthermore, a company commander noted this problem in relation to his subordinate officers in April 1946. "The standard within platoons varies as with the platoon commander. Johnny Higgins' platoon is always the best, while John Herman who has no real interest in his blokes, has a show several grades below."\textsuperscript{66}

Poor standards of leadership among some officers probably stemmed from their being unsuitable to be officers in the first place. A number of sources hint at unsuitability. For example in September 1947 one serviceman recalled

... one gets fed up with this beer business - they get squiffy and fuddled and some have to be handled gently in case they get pugnacious - and then afterwards they get sorry for themselves. One would expect something better from officers but their lives are so aimless that they haven't anything better to do."\textsuperscript{67}

The conduct of some high-ranking officers may also have exacerbated the situation. There is evidence that a number did not always act in a manner that would encourage subordinates to improve their standards. This may even have applied to the

\textsuperscript{64} Quarterly report, Jan-Mar 1948, WA-J 35/23 11NZ Provost Company: Original War Diary.

\textsuperscript{65} Stout, p.609.

\textsuperscript{66} B.C.H. Moss diary, 13 April 1946.

\textsuperscript{67} S. Dawson, letter extracts, 15 Sep 1947, p.47. Also see W.V. Hadfield letters, 14 Mar 1948; M. Murray, written recollections, p.89; N.S. Whitla letters, 17 Sep 1946.
Commanding Officer of the New Zealand brigade, for one officer described Potter as "... being brusque, introspective and exercising command through authority. There was an almost immediate clash [on his appointment in July 1946] between Potter and the experienced Middle East unit commanders...." The commanding officer of 22/2 Battalion from November 1946, Lieutenant Colonel G.M. McCaskill, was also not popular with some subordinates, one serviceman was particularly frank in his opinions.

Today our 2bn colonel arrives from NZ leave - he’s been away several months. I can’t say I’m glad, as he’s a very moody difficult man.... Diminutive, whisky drinking egotist is not a nice description of a fellow man, but that’s [what] he is. 69

Poor officer standards originated in Italy towards the end of the war. At this time there was "... wholesale commissioning [of officers] from the ranks." 70 As well, officer training was often incomplete, resulting in "... too many officers ... who unwittingly undermined discipline by wearing their rank but never understanding the responsibility attached to it." 71 Nonetheless, why some officer standards should remain low after mid-1946 is not clear, for nearly all Italy Draft officers left Japan on either 6 July or 24 August 1946 as part of two returning drafts to New Zealand. Efforts were also made to improve officer standards with the instigation of OCTU training courses in Japan, and the replacement of as many war-service-only or Japan-only officers as possible with regular army officers and officer cadets. Continuing low

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68 Rennie, pp.101-102.


70 McLeod, p.168.

71 McElroy, Kippenberger Questionnaire. Quoted in McLeod p.168.
standards may perhaps have reflected recruiting difficulties in New Zealand, in turn brought about by an overall poor quality of volunteers for service in Japan, which once again can be attributed to political factors relating to participation. However there is no evidence to prove this.

In addition to officer standards, the conscripting of Italian based soldiers for service in Jayforce in late 1945 as the most convenient New Zealand force available was to be an indirect cause of ill-discipline between March and August 1946. As mentioned previously, their recruitment was tied to Peter Fraser's political strategies. Though the soldiers of the 13-15th reinforcements had been away from New Zealand a short time and had seen relatively little or no fighting in Italy, they were a poor choice for occupation duties. As end-of-war conscripts to Italy in the first place, there were significantly higher numbers of reluctant and unmotivated soldiers than usual. Their major interest lay not in serving in Japan, but in returning home as soon as possible.\textsuperscript{72} This outlook was maintained once in Japan, as a provost report noted.

The whole outlook of the troops was confined to the number of days that would elapse before a boat came to take them to New Zealand. This attitude was not only noticeable among O.R.'s but was apparent in the ranks of officers of all ranks with exceptions among most of the senior ones.\textsuperscript{73}

Only the Italy Draft was made up from conscripts, for later drafts from New Zealand consisted of volunteers who tended to be better motivated.

\textsuperscript{72} C. Newlands, oral recollections; undated report by Lieutenant-Colonel W.B. Thomas, WA-J 67/16 Board of Enquiry; Potter to Weir, 8 Oct 1946, \textit{DNZER}, 2, pp.1414-15.

Inadequate policing by 11NZ Provost Company was also perhaps an element in bringing about poor discipline. The nature of provost duties meant that the unit was despised by other servicemen. Recruits were often hard to come by, and when found were sometimes unacceptable for provost duties. The Commanding Officer of 11NZ Provost Company in late 1946, Major Hollis, reported in October "I am still endeavouring to weed out the unsuitable members and have reccomended the immediate transfer of two members as [they are] useless to me in PRO duties. The shortage of staff is most pronounced...."74 New Zealand provosts were described by some as too lenient in enforcement and punishment, as well as perpetrators of the crimes they were supposed to be preventing.75 Some historians also argue that New Zealanders were unsuited temperamentally for provost duties, and this may have been a factor underlying provost inadequacies.76 Thus, 11NZ Provost Company was not as effective a deterrent against illegal activity as it should have been.

The persisting of poor discipline within Jayforce encouraged the emergence of more direct causes of misdemeanour and crime. Throughout 1946-48 probably the most prominent was alcohol abuse by Jayforce personnel. The beer ration to servicemen (apart from officers who had a spirits ration) tended to be one bottle per person per day, which was unlikely to cause drunkenness, though the issue often consisted of Japanese beer which was of a higher alcoholic level than New Zealanders could tolerate.
were used to. This situation was exacerbated if, as sometimes happened, the beer ration was allowed to be saved up to be consumed in one go. It was also possible to purchase surreptitiously such traditional Japanese high-alcohol beverages as saki.

A number of sources connect drunkenness with a high degree of misdemeanour and crime. For example, one unit record in late 1946 stated "... damage done by drunken personnel who delighted in smashing most of windows in the bakehouse - these men will be severely dealt with at a later date when the SIB have finished their interrogation of the matter."\(^\text{77}\) The damaging of leave trains to Beppu as the result of drunkenness became a major problem in early 1947.\(^\text{78}\) Some sources indicate that alcohol abuse was responsible for the majority of offenses committed at any one time. One soldier recalled in 1948 that "... [o]ur guard house was often full with offenders waiting to come up on charge for various offenses, mostly relating to drunkeness."\(^\text{79}\) When a New Zealand Guard Battalion was sent to Tokyo, alcoholic abuse was often blamed for increases in crime, and ready access to the many beer bars in the city was probably the cause.\(^\text{80}\) Moreover, part of the punishment for VD infection was a barring from camp wet-messes and beer bars, commonly for 15 days. This suggests that military authorities may have linked liaisons with prostitutes to alcohol abuse.

\(^{77}\) 4 Nov 1946, WA-J 21/13 9NZ Brigade Company Army Support Company/19NZ Army Support Company: Original War Diary.

\(^{78}\) 14 Jan 1947, WA-J 64/2 BCOF Holiday Hostels Beppu: Original War Diary. Also see 23 Aug 1946, WA-J 9/7 25NZ Field Battery: Original War Diary.

\(^{79}\) B. Crowley, written recollections, p.197.

\(^{80}\) Tokyo guard duties, 1 Apr-1 May 1948, WA-J 18/31 27NZ Infantry Battalion/3 Battalion NZ Regiment: Original War Diary.
Alcohol abuse may not have happened to such a high degree if the overseeing of consumption had been better and military regulations had been tighter.

An open disregard for military regulations by some Other Ranks also resulted from ill-discipline. Though New Zealand soldiers had a tradition for this from the Second World War, it remains significant that this attitude was allowed to be maintained beyond wartime conditions into the peace-time New Zealand army.\textsuperscript{81} Disregard for regulations re-appeared in Japan in a number of ways, most notably via a willingness to partake in blackmarketing and sexual relationships with Japanese women. Minor forms of misdemeanour relating to poor dress standards, such as omitting to fasten the top button of the winter battledress or failing to keep sleeves rolled down, were often a complaint in provost reports.\textsuperscript{82} Insubordination such as neglecting to salute officers and speaking out of turn were commonly reported disciplinary misdemeanours as well. As mentioned above, dis-interest from officers in attempting correction was probably the major factor in the extent of attitude problems.

Misdemeanour and crime had some major implications. Most notably clothing and equipment shortages endured by the Italy draft when in Japan were partially due to the wholesale selling of these items by New Zealand soldiers on the blackmarket.

\textsuperscript{81} Phillips, pp.203-11.

in Italy. Some were bitter about shortages and reported the matter to the press on their return to New Zealand. In turn questions were raised in the New Zealand Parliament and an enquiry held. On arrival in Japan, clothing and equipment shortages meant Jayforce had to call upon scarce Australian supplies, much "... to the irritation of the [BCOF] Commander-in-Chief, Lieutenant-General Northcott." It is possible that this was one catalyst to sometimes poor co-operation and co-ordination between the New Zealand and Australian military forces in Japan.

Throughout 1946-48, the most widespread forms of misdemeanour and crime within the New Zealand military force to Japan were blackmarketing and sexual relationships with Japanese women. Factors in the Japanese culture and environment, and within the military occupation forces opened opportunities for involvement. Attempts to combat these activities proved to be largely ineffective, and in some cases they aggravated the levels. Other significant misdemeanours and crimes included careless driving, absence without leave, assault and robbery. Gauging the overall prominence of misdemeanour and crime when compared to other BCOF units is difficult, though it can be safely concluded that in early-mid 1947 serious crime levels and by 1948 the VD rate were respectively very high. By contrast, the VD rate in

83 C. Newlands, oral recollections; WA-J 67/16 Board of Enquiry.

84 New Zealand Herald, 23 Jul 1946, p.6.


86 Trotter, New Zealand and Japan, p.56.

1946 and much of 1947 was low. As compared to the home-based New Zealand Army between 1946-48 however, the rate of crime on the whole was probably excessive. The magnitude of this activity was most likely caused by ill-discipline, a major underlying reason for this being inadequate leadership from officers, though poor policing and an initial poor choice of recruits were also relevant. Ill-discipline in turn brought on the direct causes of misdemeanour and crime which were manifested in alcohol abuse and an indifference towards military regulations. Factors in Japan and within military circles, and the confusing political circumstances of New Zealand participation, all contributed to a high level of poor behaviour.
CHAPTER SIX.

To Stay or to Leave.

Thoughts of withdrawal from the military occupation of Japan came less than a year after Fraser had made the full commitment to send a force. Almost another year was to pass before a decision to withdraw was reached. What were the factors determining whether New Zealand continue or abandon participation in the occupation? Trotter emphasises that political factors led to withdrawal, and this chapter will expand on her work and present new conclusions.¹

Withdrawal by New Zealand was first considered in November 1946, sparked by a British decision to extract its army brigade of 3,500 soldiers because of their urgent need elsewhere.² Fraser was informed of the British decision on 12 November 1946, and McIntosh was to comment "... [t]he Prime Minister’s attitude, which has not yet been made known to the UK authorities is that NZ should also withdraw."³

The most likely explanation for Fraser’s opinion was that by late 1946 supporting Britain had become more clearly still the predominant motive for New

¹ Trotter, New Zealand and Japan, pp.66-70.

² Approximately 6,500 British military personnel were to remain in Japan as part of BCOF.

³ Addison to Fraser, DNZER, 2, pp.1428-31; McIntosh to Berendsen, 18 Nov 1946, Undiplomatic Dialogue, p.112. It is noteworthy that in public Fraser stated the opposite. Trotter, New Zealand and Japan, p.59.
Zealand involvement in the occupation. However, Britain made clear that New Zealand's withdrawal was not encouraged. The New Zealand Liaison Officer in London sent the New Zealand Chief of General Staff a communique in January 1947, consisting of information from the War Office which was designed to end New Zealand thoughts of withdrawal. A particular emphasis was placed on explaining Britain's actions while also giving some hope for the future of British participation in the occupation of Japan. It stated in part that "... it is with the greatest regret and only under the most urgent operational necessity that the British element of BIE of BCOF has been temporarily withdrawn."4

Resentment by Fraser at the way Australia dominated BCOF may also have influenced his outlook on withdrawal. No direct evidence for this point has been found, though Trotter, quoting Buckley, hints at dissatisfaction. She states that Fraser "... regarded BCOF as serving no sufficient purpose in Japan today, where the Australians rule the roost anyhow and ride roughshod over the members of the British Commonwealth force."5 Fraser's dislike of Australian domination of joint security and military ventures at this time is a point that has also been made by McGibbon.6

4 Parkinson to Weir, 28 Jan 1947, DNZER, 2, pp.1434-35.


6 McGibbon, New Zealand and the Korean War, pp.32-33.
Fraser changed his mind about withdrawal in early 1947. McIntosh recorded in March 1947 "... [w]e are not withdrawing our troops."\(^7\) This about-turn was relatively sudden, for on 24 January McIntosh had noted "... both the Prime Minister and Nash see no necessity for keeping our troops there [in Japan]."\(^8\) It is not clear what caused Fraser's sudden change in mind, though the previously mentioned New Zealand Liaison Officer's cable probably had some impact. It was sent on 28 January 1947, in between the two comments by McIntosh, and it stated that the British withdrawal was only to be temporary, which may have reassured Fraser over the future British commitment to BCOF.

Thoughts of withdrawal were not put aside by Fraser for long, as pressure to leave Japan began to mount from within New Zealand in 1947. Perhaps the most significant and persistence advocates were employers' and employees' associations, concerned at the loss of labour to Japan at a time of severe labour shortages for industry in New Zealand. In the immediate post-war period there had been a significant rise in demand for consumer goods in New Zealand, which local industry could not meet. This inability was primarily blamed on qualified labour shortfalls.\(^9\)

In February the manager of the Metal Trade Employer's Association remarked

... [i]t is with amazement that we read of the Government's intention to recruit for 18 month's service with J-Force another 4000 of the youth of the country.... Industry, he added, was of the opinion that the

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7 McIntosh to Burton, 31 Mar 1947, Sir A.D. McIntosh letter extracts, 1945-47.
8 McIntosh to Berendsen, 24 Jan 1947, Sir A.D. McIntosh letter extracts, 1945-47.
9 For example, it was reported there were only 140 qualified applicants available to fill 23,500 vacancies in industry in December 1946. Dominion, 7 Feb 1947, quoted in footnote 1, DNZER, 2, p.1437.
constitution of the J-Force was a mistake in the first place because it so seriously affected the training of apprentices.... Reports from overseas indicate that the British Occupation Force is now being withdrawn and we can therefore reasonably question the necessity for the New Zealand force....

In another example, the New Zealand Labourers' Federation publicly called for New Zealand troops to return from Japan in September.

A growing unpopularity or apathy towards participation in the occupation by the New Zealand general public may also have encouraged Fraser to re-think the issue of withdrawal. This trend is revealed by difficulties in attracting sufficient volunteers in the first half of 1947 to go to Japan in July and August 1947. Close to 4000 volunteers were wanted initially for the 2nd Relief Draft, but only 2000 appropriate recruits were forthcoming.

Furthermore, many of the original purposes for New Zealand participating in the occupation were becoming irrelevant throughout 1947. First, Fraser knew that the British Commonwealth had not gained a voice in the moulding of a post-war Japan. He had communicated to Evatt in February 1947 that

... the existence of the force does not afford to any of the participating governments any share in the military government of Japan and an opportunity, therefore, of influencing directly the development of democratic institutions and a way of life in Japan which will not be a menace to the future security of the Pacific.

10 Dominion, 7 Feb 1947, quoted in footnote 1, DNZER, 2, p.1437.


12 Fraser to Evatt, 22 Feb 1947, DNZER, 2, pp.1439-40. Also see footnote 2, DNZER, 2, p.1438.
Second, the promoting of British Commonwealth prestige was clearly shown not to have been achieved by 1947. Addison, the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, made known this point to Fraser in February also.

... [C]onfinement to the present area of occupation, which is of only secondary importance in the economic, social and political life of the country, not only deprives the influential sections of the Japanese public of the advantages of our impact upon them but must inevitably tend to make them underrate or overlook our value as a factor in developments in the Far East.\footnote{Addison to Fraser, 12 Feb 1947, DNZER, 2, p.1443.}

This conclusion was reiterated in the \textit{Evening Post} on 2 May 1947, and is central to Trotter's argument.\footnote{Footnote 1, DNZER, 2, p.1445.}

Yet Trotter fails to consider all factors, for it had also become apparent to Fraser by mid-1947 that the military tasks of Jayforce were completed. His first speculative acknowledgement of this came in February 1947. "It seems to us that purely military tasks must be reducing...." In light of this he suggested that British Commonwealth participation in the occupation of Japan should be reviewed.\footnote{Fraser to Evatt, 22 Feb 1947, DNZER, 2, p.1439.}

Fraser's feelings were confirmed by a BCOF report in May on the disposal of war equipment which stated that "... [t]he destruction of all enemy equipment and war potential has been finalised in the 20,000 square miles of BCOF territory in Japan...."\footnote{British Commonwealth Occupation Force Report on Disposal of Japanese War Equipment Material, 22 May 1947, DNZER, 2, pp.1454-57.}
With the New Zealand outlook now being that military tasks in Japan were completed, the view taken by New Zealand government officials on the work still to be done in Japan was modified. External Affairs staff agreed that the means of Japanese aggression had been removed, though doubts continued as to whether the will of aggression had also been removed. As a consequence though a military presence was no longer perceived as being required, some form of civilian control and re-education of the Japanese was considered necessary.\textsuperscript{17} These views were reiterated at the British Commonwealth Conference on the Japanese peace settlement held in Canberra between 26 August and 1 September 1947.

More importantly, it was unofficially indicated at this conference that the New Zealand military force "... would not continue in Japan beyond June [19]48."\textsuperscript{18} Mid-1948 had been stated by MacArthur to Major-General Cawthorn, Commander-in-Chief of BRINDIV, as the earliest date a Japanese Peace Treaty would be signed and he had also indicated that he did not want a complete BCOF withdrawal until this time. It seems likely then that this was a request New Zealand was prepared to comply with and use as a timetable guiding Jayforce withdrawal.\textsuperscript{19}

\textsuperscript{17} Powles to Cunningham, 14 May 1947, EA2 1947/46C Japanese Peace Settlement. Control Machinery and Occupation Force.

\textsuperscript{18} Duff to Shanahan, 13 Oct 1947, DNZER, 2, p.1464. Though Trotter mentions this statement, she fails to draw the same significance from it. Trotter, \textit{New Zealand and Japan}, p.68.

On 28 September the British announced they were withdrawing the rest of their military contingent, effective immediately.\(^{20}\) This probably does not indicate that New Zealand was one step ahead of the British in deciding to withdraw, for the text of the announcement of British withdrawal indicates that New Zealand (and Australia) was well aware of an imminent British pull out. For Addison had stated

> I have already sent you messages regarding our general financial position and I do not expect that in the light of what I have told you it will come as a surprise that we have reached the conclusion that we ought to withdraw forthwith....\(^{21}\)

As such, it is likely the New Zealand announcement at the Canberra Conference in August was made with the imminent British announcement in mind. The pattern of New Zealand shadowing the moves of Britain was continued.

Moreover, if New Zealand felt uncomfortable with Australia’s dominance of BCOF, as already suggested, it is likely this was also a consideration in the August 1947 decision to withdraw.\(^{22}\) The British Commonwealth military presence in Japan was about to become even more greatly dominated by the Australians. In addition to the expected complete British pull out, the Indian contingent had also decided to withdraw fully following independence, resulting in the division of the sub-continent into two states and a decision to follow a non-aligned foreign policy. In consequence, if New Zealand had decided to remain part of BCOF it would have stood alone with Australia in Japan.

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\(^{20}\) Note: some British military administrative personnel remained in Japan until relieved by Australian replacements.

\(^{21}\) Addison to Fraser, 28 Sep 1947, *DNZER*, 2, p.1460.

\(^{22}\) This point is also made by Trotter, *New Zealand and Japan*, p.68.
The Australians had no intention of withdrawing, and attempted to retain a semblance of a 'British Commonwealth' presence in BCOF in late 1947 and early 1948. Lieutenant-General Robertson, Northcott’s successor as Commander in Chief of BCOF, suggested that a small New Zealand battalion of 700 men be retained in Japan at a meeting with the New Zealand cabinet on 4 February 1948.\textsuperscript{23}

New Zealand was not interested. The military were opposed on the grounds that retention had no military value for the New Zealand Army, and that a force of this size would be dependent on the Australians for support services which Weir, the New Zealand Chief of the General Staff, stated "... might prove inadequate and unsatisfactory in practice." Weir was also concerned that the standard of discipline and health amongst troops may suffer and that the financial cost would be excessive.\textsuperscript{24} Weir recommended on 5 February that Robertson’s proposal should not be approved. Based on this assessment, Fraser concluded that continued participation depended "... primarily on political considerations."\textsuperscript{25} Yet he almost certainly doubted whether any advantageous political considerations for New Zealand still existed. It is no surprise

\textsuperscript{23} Lieutenant-General H.C.H. Robertson was Commander-in-Chief of BCOF from Jun 1946 until the demise of this force.


then that Fraser concurred with Weir's recommendation. On 21 April 1948 the New Zealand cabinet also approved the decision to withdraw completely.

Preparation for the departure from Japan by Jayforce was trouble-free, probably because there was adequate time to complete the necessary tasks. Military campsites were handed back to the Japanese or handed over to the American military, and equipment was returned to New Zealand or destroyed. Material in the latter category included all the Corsair aircraft of No. 14 RNZAF squadron, which were destroyed in a bonfire at Bofu airbase. Jayforce began departing Japan from July 1948, with the rear party consisting of 332 army and RNZAF personnel returning to Auckland on the Westralia on 11 December 1948.

By the end of 1946 the major reason for continued New Zealand participation in the occupation of Japan was to stand by the British contingent. Hence the catalyst for the New Zealand decision to withdraw from the military occupation in August 1947 was the British decision to leave. This conclusion is given added credence by the fact that the British decision to partially withdraw almost a year earlier first made New Zealand reconsider its position. However the British exodus was probably not the only reason, for it is probable that New Zealand disliked being subservient to the Australians in Japan, and this perhaps influenced the events of November 1946, August 1947, and February 1948. Less significantly, the impetus for pulling out of Japan also came from four factors that emerged from late 1946. Two participation foundation stones, promoting British Commonwealth prestige and gaining a voice in determining Japan's post-war future were found to be unobtainable by mid-1947.
Pressure was brought to bear from within New Zealand by employees' and employers' groups, and also possibly by a general growth in unpopularity or apathy towards participation. Furthermore, the only practical military reasons for participation, demilitarisation tasks, had been completed. The accumulation of these factors meant that a last minute attempt by Australia to resurrect New Zealand participation in early 1948 was probably doomed from the outset.
CONCLUSION.

Taking part in the military occupation of Japan represented a familiar attempt by New Zealand to enhance its long-term external security, though in an unusual way. Participation was motivated most significantly by a political stratagem designed to retain Britain as New Zealand’s security guarantor, and to enhance the British Commonwealth. However, the use of a military force in a purely political role was new, and had detrimental consequences for the military force.

Negotiating with Britain for acceptable security arrangements had always been the key aspect of external relations for New Zealand. In return Britain had always been New Zealand’s security guarantor and in 1945 New Zealand preferred that this remain so. Nevertheless, British power was waning and New Zealand felt it should assist in military tasks so that a British commitment to security in this region would continue. In the past New Zealand had provided financial aid for British military power, but this time support was in the form of a military force which for the first time New Zealand sent on a purely political errand. Given the American presence in Japan and the tasks they had completed, there was no need in military terms for New Zealand participation in the occupation of Japan: the goal was Britain’s continued commitment in the Far East.

A political basis for participation affected Jayforce by triggering and compounding many difficulties. In two ways an uncertainty over participation until early 1946 caused problems, especially when combined with the necessity to be in
Japan as soon as possible once the decision finally came. First, this resulted in hasty planning and the inept movement of the army brigade group from Italy to Japan. Once in Japan stores and equipment discrepancies and breakages were found to have occurred, in turn creating shortages and unnecessary hardship. Second, the 13th-15th reinforcement drafts, because the most readily available and least utilised army formations, were initially chosen to make up Jayforce. Yet they included higher numbers of reluctant and unmotivated soldiers than normal, and they exacerbated difficulties for Jayforce with poor workmanship, poor leadership skills, and illegal activities.

Political stipulations meant that later Jayforce drafts had to be made up from volunteers. Nonetheless, because of labour shortages in New Zealand this system of recruitment resulted in shortfalls of specialised and qualified personnel, most notably with doctors. As well, the army authorities probably had a poor pool from which to recruit officers. This impacted on standards of discipline within the force in general, which was a major underlying reason for periodic high levels of misdemeanour and crime.

In addition, Jayforce found it had no substantial military tasks to do. On-going military tasks occupied only a minority of soldiers, and this led to the introduction of time filling monotonous tasks, recreation and sport. Yet the onset of boredom could not be alleviated, which in turn again heightened the degree of misdemeanour and crime.
However, political circumstances were not alone in acting against Jayforce. The war-ravaged state of Japan had a bearing on poor living conditions, procurement difficulties, blackmarket opportunities, and the level of prostitution. The poor and rural nature of Yamaguchi Prefecture worsened accommodation and vehicle shortages. Military and occupation regulations raised the level of crime by creating conditions that encouraged blackmarketing. Actions by the military did the same in respect to placing more prostitutes on the street.

This thesis, as well as addressing the neglected military aspects of Jayforce’s history, also adds to the current historiography on this topic which has been dominated by Trotter. First, New Zealand participation was not motivated primarily by a desire to obtain security guarantees for the South Pacific. Evidence suggests that Fraser felt New Zealand’s short-medium term position was relatively safe in 1945. Instead the primary reason, as previously mentioned, was to retain Britain as New Zealand’s security guarantor in the post-war world.

Second, New Zealand was not a reluctant participant in the occupation of Japan. Though there was a five month gap between the initial agreement to participate in late August 1945 and final agreement in late January 1946, this gap was a reflection on Fraser’s approach to the details of participation. He did his upmost to attain a political consensus on sending a conscripted New Zealand army brigade group from Italy. He was also determined not to bow to American terms of participation if they compromised the promoting of British Commonwealth prestige.
Third, and in contrast to Trotter, this thesis argues that Britain’s withdrawal was the key factor in New Zealand following suite. This would seem to confirm the paramountcy of supporting Britain in New Zealand’s decision to participate in the first place. Antipathy towards Australian domination of BCOF was perhaps also an important reason behind deciding to pull out of Japan.

If the essential aim of participation in the military occupation of Japan was security, was the aim achieved? In the short-term the answer was yes, for Britain continued to be New Zealand’s security guarantor. New Zealand played an active part in British Commonwealth defence strategies that continued to focus on other parts of the world, though they were still perceived as indirectly guaranteeing New Zealand security. Contingencies centred on Cold War scenarios from the late 1940s, with for instance New Zealand pledging to send a division to the Middle East in the event of war with the Soviet Union. Closer to home regional defence once again focused upon south-east Asia, perhaps most notably reflected via the ANZAM planning arrangement. As well, compulsory military training was introduced by the Labour Government in 1949 to better enable New Zealand to undertake these commitments if necessary. Therefore, facets of participation in the occupation of Japan paralleled later activities, and as such it was probably part of a post-war trend in British Commonwealth security arrangements that remained on-going throughout the late 1940s.

Ultimately however New Zealand’s political stratagem was a failure, though through no fault of New Zealand. For despite British Commonwealth military contingency plans, in reality Britain had become progressively less able to fulfil the
role of a world power, a fact that was to become apparent in the 1950s.
APPENDIX ONE.

Shipping of Jayforce Personnel.

Note: Dates and numbers varied slightly according to source.

**Italy Draft** - to Japan.

Advance Party (1st stage) -
- departed: Naples on 25 Jan 1946.
- arrived: Bombay on 9 Feb 1946.
- vessel: *Georgic*.
- numbers: 48.

Advance Party (2nd stage) -
- departed: Bombay on 9 Feb 1946.
- arrived: Kure on 28 Feb 1946.
- vessel: *Cheshire*.
- numbers: 40 (*).

Main Draft -
- departed: Naples on 21 Feb 1946.
- arrived: Kure on 19 Mar 1946.
- vessel: *Strathmore*.
- numbers: 4239.

**Italy Draft** - to New Zealand.

Clutha Draft -
- departed: Kure on 6 Jul 1946.
- arrived: Lyttleton on 23 Jul 1946 (**).
- vessel: *Chitral*.
- numbers: 1930.

Wanaka Draft -
- departed: Kure on 24 Aug 1946.
- arrived: Wellington on 8 Sep 1946.
- vessel: *Chitral*.
- numbers: 1936.
RNZAF Draft - to Japan (***).

First Draft -

departed: Auckland on 8 March 1946.
arrived: Kure on 23 March 1946.
vessel: Glory.
aircraft: 24 FG-1 Corsairs.

First New Zealand Relief Draft - to Japan.

Wanganui Draft -
departed: Wellington on 29 May 1946.
arrived: Kure on 12 Jun 1946.
vessel: Empire Pride.
numbers: 1611.

Rotorua Draft -
departed: Lyttleton on 30 Jul 1946.
arrived: Kure on 18 Aug 1946.
vessel: Chitral.
numbers: 2592.

First New Zealand Relief Draft - to New Zealand.

Waitaki Draft -
arrived: Lyttleton on 5 Jul 1947.
vessel: Dunera.
numbers: 1879.

Mataura Draft -
vessel: Dunera.
numbers: 1473.

Mataura Draft (Rear Party) -
departed: Kure on 16 Sep 1947.
arrived: Auckland on 30 Sep 1947.
vessel: Kanimbla.
numbers: 257.
Second New Zealand Relief Draft - To Japan.

Wairarapa Draft -
- arrived: Kure on 1 Aug 1947.
- vessel: Dunera.
- numbers: 1784.

Wairarapa Draft (Rear Party) -
- arrived: Kure on 12 Sep 1947.
- vessel: Kanimbla.
- numbers: 182.

Second New Zealand Relief Draft - To New Zealand.

Lift One -
- departed: Kure on 24 Jul 1948.
- vessel: Duntroon.
- numbers: 566.

Lift Two -
- departed: Kure on 31 Jul 1948.
- vessel: Westralia.
- numbers: 534.

Lift Three -
- departed: Kure on 17 Sep 1948.
- arrived: Auckland on 4 Oct 1948.
- vessel: Duntroon.
- numbers: 549.

Lift Four -
- departed: Kure on 25 Sep 1948.
- vessel: Westralia.
- numbers: 404.

Rear Party -
- arrived: Auckland on 11 Dec 1948.
- vessel: Westralia.
- numbers: 332 (***)

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(⁎) The variation in numbers was due to eight personnel being left in Bombay with some of the Advance Party's transport.

(⁎⁎) The New Zealand port name listed does not necessarily denote the only port of call, as in some cases the vessel carried on to another New Zealand port to disembark soldiers.

(⁎⁎⁎) After this initial shipment, the transference of RNZAF personnel between New Zealand and Japan was made by C-47 transport aircraft of No. 41 RNZAF Squadron. The exception to this was a rear party on the Westralia on 25 Nov 1948 (see above and below).

(⁎⁎⁎⁎) Numbers included RNZAF personnel.¹

APPENDIX TWO.

Major Locations of Jayforce Units in Japan.

**Bofu** - Former Japanese Airforce Base.

No. 14 Squadron RNZAF (from March 1948).

**Chofu** - Kobe Steel Works.

9NZ Brigade Headquarters.
Field Security.
Intelligence.
Signals Company.
WAACS (Welfare) (from August 1947).
4NZ Base Ordinance Depot.
11NZ Provost Company.
16NZ Workshops.
19NZ ASC Company.

**Chofu** - Former Kobe Steel Workers’ Dormitories.

22NZ Infantry Battalion/ 2NZ Infantry Battalion (until Sep 1947).

**Eta Jima** - Former Japanese Naval Academy.

2NZ Divisional Cavalry Regiment (until May 1946).

**Iwakuni** - Former Japanese Air Naval Training Station.

No. 14 Squadron RNZAF (until March 1948).

**Kiwa** - Former Sanitorium.

6NZ General Hospital (from Jun 1946).

**Mizuba (Hirao)** - Former Japanese Naval Submarine Base.

2NZ Divisional Cavalry Regiment (until Sep 1947 when disbanded).
Ozuki - Newly Constructed Army Camp, on site of Former Airforce Base.

2NZ Infantry Battalion (from Sep 1947).

Tokyo - Ebisu, Former Japanese Naval Submarine Barracks.

NZ Guard Battalion (periodically for one month from Oct 1946).

Yamaguchi - Former Japanese Army Barracks.

5NZ Field Engineer Company.
7NZ Camp Hospital (disbanded Jul 1946).
25NZ Field Artillery Battery (disbanded 22 May 1947).
27NZ Infantry Battalion/ 3NZ Infantry Battalion.

Yuda (Youda) - Former School Buildings.

Army Education Service/ Education and Rehabilitation Service.
Radio Broadcasting Unit.

Note: Many locations for support units such as 5NZ Field Engineer Company, 11NZ Provost Company, Signals Company, and WAAC (Welfare) refer to their headquarters, detachments were spread around many locations.
APPENDIX THREE.

Commanding Officers.

BCOF.

Lieutenant-General J. Northcott.
Lieutenant-General H.C.H. Robertson (from 16 Jun 1946).

NEW ZEALAND ARMY BRIGADE.

Major-General W.G. Gentry.
Brigader K.L. Stewart (from 15 Nov 1945).
Brigader L. Potter (from 6 Jul 1946).
Brigader L. Potter (from 23 Sep 1947).

INFANTRY SUB-UNITS.

2 Divisional Cavalry Regiment.

Lieutenant-Colonel D. McIntyre.
Lieutenant-Colonel J.A. Worsnop (from 28 Jun 1946).
Lieutenant-Colonel R.B. McQueen (from 3 May 1947).

22 Infantry Battalion/ 2 Infantry Battalion.

Lieutenant-Colonel W.B. Thomas.
Lieutenant-Colonel G.M. McCaskill (from 29 Nov 1946).

27 Infantry Battalion/ 3 Infantry Battalion.

Lieutenant-Colonel G.P. Sanders.
Lieutenant-Colonel W.F. Titchener (from 16 May 1946).
Lieutenant-Colonel R.C. Hollis (from 31 Mar 1947).

RNZAF.

No. 14 Squadron.

Wing-Commander J.J. de Willimoff.
Wing-Commander D.F. St George (from April 1947).
APPENDIX FOUR.

Jayforce VD Infection Rate (as a percentage of total size).²

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Italy

1st NZ Relief Draft
2nd NZ Relief Draft

Percentage Averages

2.25%  0.76%  1.02%  3.21%

Note: Only figures for the months the size of Jayforce was stable have been incorporated into percentage averages. Using figures based on periods of significant coming and going could be misleading and have therefore not been used.

² Stout, p.610.
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