

Copyright is owned by the Author of this thesis. Permission is given for a copy to be downloaded by an individual for the purpose of research and private study only. This thesis is not to be reproduced elsewhere without the permission of the Author.

**Introducing heterarchy: a relational-contextual framework
within the study of International Relations.**

A thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

In

Politics

At Massey University, Manawatu,

New Zealand

Brenton Beach

2017

Abstract

This thesis posits that for too long International Relations (IR) has been overly rigid and insular, discouraging cross-disciplinary cooperation within the social sciences and becoming increasingly irrelevant to policy-makers. IR academia tend to stick rigidly to their theoretical paradigms in interpreting the real world, straight-jacketing their thinking into theories that limit analysis. However, humans think relationally and contextually so why not apply this form of thinking to IR? Heterarchy, the theoretical framework presented here, seeks to overcome this silo effect, to expand IR's relevance, and encompass previously barred academic areas to the sub-discipline.

This thesis presents a new relational-contextual framework within which empirical variables can be situated to provide a different understanding of actors' actions and speech acts within the IR field.¹ Heterarchy sits in part within both foundationalist and anti-foundationalist ontologies, challenging both positivist and post-positive schools by relating the world through relational-contextual rationales. Heterarchy suggests that IR (referring to the practice of international affairs) can best be understood from a sub-systemic viewpoint where the behavior of actors can only be observed by knowing the differing contexts between 'self' and 'other', and where relations continuously form and shape each actor; hence its relational-contextual nature. These relational-contexts are initiated through certain identifiable catalysts which stimulate similarly identifiable variables to expose actor relationships to the observer. While this does have constructivist and relativist underpinnings, heterarchy differentiates itself from both in terms of its approach and methodology. Having laid out this conceptual framework, the thesis then investigates how heterarchy might work empirically by exploring the Japanese-South Korean relationship which defies conventional understandings.

¹ This capital letter acronym will refer to the academic discipline throughout the thesis.

Acknowledgements

I would like to acknowledge and thank Dr Bethan Greener for her support, advice and guidance in the conception, writing and presentation of this thesis. I especially appreciate the many various iterations of this thesis that she had to wade through for this document to see the light of day. Her comments, thoughts and knowledge on the IR subject have been invaluable to channeling and focusing my thinking in creating the outlines of heterarchy.

Secondly, I would like to acknowledge the contribution of Professor Will Fish, who asked me one simple question that provided the final piece in conceptualizing how heterarchy would function within an empirical setting.

Thirdly, I am indebted to my parents Bruce and Alice who allowed me the freedom to explore and gave me the desire for knowledge as a child, even if our ontological worlds were far apart.

Lastly, I would like to acknowledge the contribution of Dr James Ogilvy who introduced me to the idea of heterarchy through his articles at Stratfor. I hope that the conception that I present here is in keeping with his ideas, even if approaching them from a different angle, to produce 'the legs to carry heterarchy forward' as a new framework within IR.

Table of Contents

Abstract	i
Acknowledgements	iii
List of figures	viii
Introduction	1
• A brief introduction to the ontology and epistemology of heterarchy	4
<i>i Heterarchy and Ontology</i>	4
<i>ii Heterarchy and Epistemology</i>	5
<i>iii Heterarchy, Constructivism and Relationalism</i>	6
• Methodology and thesis outline	9
Chapter One: Relational-contexts within heterarchy	14
• The origins of heterarchy	14
• Heterarchy: An IR literature review	15
• How does heterarchy apply to IR?	19
• Relationalism	21
• Context	23
<i>i What is context?</i>	23
<i>ii How is context formed?</i>	25
• How can context be applied to IR theory?	27
<i>i Contextual-Variables</i>	27
• The heterarchical cycle: Practical application to empirical study	30
Chapter Two: Strusturalism and heterarchical criticisms	35

• Structuralist anarchy	36
<i>i</i> <i>Structuralist anarchy: A positivist-substantialist approach</i>	36
<i>ii</i> <i>Imposing order upon anarchy</i>	37
<i>iii</i> <i>Twin dilemmas: Measurement and diffuse variables</i>	39
<i>vi</i> <i>Non-differentiation</i>	41
<i>v</i> <i>Substantivism</i>	42
<i>vi</i> <i>Rationality</i>	44
• Heterarchical anarchy: The relational-contextual argument	46
<i>i</i> <i>Context as anarchy at a sub-systemic level</i>	48
<i>ii</i> <i>Context as rationality under the conditions of anarchy</i>	53
<i>iii</i> <i>Relationalism and patterns</i>	55
<i>iv</i> <i>Achieving differentiation</i>	57
<i>v</i> <i>Resolving the twin dilemmas: Measurement and contextual-variables</i>	59
<i>vi</i> <i>The heterarchical substructure</i>	62
• Conclusion	65
Chapter Three: Relational-context in the Japanese-South Korean relationship	68
• History and IR	69
• Why choose the Japanese-South Korean relationship to demonstrate heterarchy? .71	
• Structuralist explanations for the Japanese South Korean relationship and their critique	73
<i>i</i> <i>Convergences between Japan and South Korea</i>	73
<i>ii</i> <i>Structuralist epistemologies and their interpretation of the relationship</i>	76
<i>iii</i> <i>Relations in practice</i>	77

• Conclusion on conventional IR epistemologies in the case of Japan-South Korea ...	83
• Using history as relational-contexts to explain Japanese-South Korean relations ...	85
<i>i</i> <i>Japan and South Korea: Early background</i>	85
<i>ii</i> <i>Japanese colonization of Korea</i>	86
<i>iii</i> <i>Korean nationalism and identity</i>	87
<i>vi</i> <i>Japanese ‘normalization’</i>	88
• Answers to the above posited questions	94
• Conclusion: Heterarchy and history	96
Chapter Four: A study of a quasi-crisis in Japanese-South Korean relations	100
• How the study will proceed	100
• Quasi-crisis	101
• The Yasukuni Shrine: Multiple symbolic meanings	102
• The Ahn Museum at Harbin: Confirming and creating contexts	103
• The leaders and their motives	104
• Findings from a heterarchical point of view	106
• Reflection and Reflexivity	108
• Conclusion	109
Conclusion: Is heterarchy a viable framework for IR?	112
References	116
Appendix A: Glossary of terms	A-1
Appendix B: Policy Regimes as overarching contextual paradigms	B-1
<i>i</i> <i>Description of a policy regime</i>	B-1
<i>ii</i> <i>Hierarchies conceptualized as policy regimes</i>	B-3

iii External policy regimes.....B-7

iv Policy regime differences/conflicts.....B-8

v Policy regime thinking and expansion.....B-9

• Conclusion to Appendix B.....B-12

Appendix C: Timeline in Japanese-South Korean relations.....C-1

List of figures

Figure 1.1: Pictorial positionality of heterarchy compared to other paradigms.....	9
Figure 2.1: McCulloch’s Dromes’ of Dialels.....	16
Figure 2.2: Relations between interests, materiality and ideation.....	22
Figure 2.3: Relations between interests, materiality and ideation through contexts.....	23
Figure 2.4: Contextual-variable categories.....	28
Figure 2.5: Heterarchical cycle framework.....	31
Figure 3.1: Diagram of Waltz’s concept of interaction between the state and the IR system.....	41
Figure 3.2: Foreign Relations anarchy/relations matrix – International.....	50
Figure 3.3: Sub-actor anarchy/relations matrix – Domestic.....	52
Figure 3.4: Differentiation in contrast to Waltz’s concept in Figure 3.1.....	57
Figure 3.5: Relational-contextual reduction of IR Actor policy formation.....	64
Figure 4.1: Japan-South Korean trade data.....	75
Figure A1.1: Paradigmatic Feedback Loop model.....	A-4
Figure B1.1: Indian Kashmiri policy regime.....	B-6
Figure B1.2: Contextual filters of action and observation.....	B-9
Figure B1.3: India’s Sino-Kashmiri policy regime.....	B-11
Figure B1.4: Core and pragmatic policy regimes.....	B-12

Introduction

James Ogilvy (1977) once pondered how man mediated his relationship with human nature (p. 3). His analysis posited that man managed this relationship using politics. The question then becomes, how do humans, in managing *human* nature, conceive and conduct their relations politically? What stimulates humans in politics to act or react to the human nature around them, and to the other humans that inhabit that space? This is a fundamental question which political science has been attempting to answer since its inception. This thesis proposes to add to the debate by providing a new conceptual framework to enable deeper analysis and understanding of human nature at an international level, through the categorization and use of context. This framework is what I call heterarchy – the applied use of relational-contexts to understand IR actor relationships.

Heterarchy focuses on the contextualized perspectives of relationships in order to understand why actors behave in the way that they do. This framework allows for the input of any selected variables that can impact on IR, and/or anything that is impacted by IR in order to understand, explain and perhaps predict the future actions of IR actors. In selecting the appropriate variables, the locus of study fixates on a catalyst which in turn stimulates the variables in certain contextual ways, allowing them to be observed and interpreted from the perspectives of the actors involved. This produces relational-contexts where actors and relations are fluid, complex, often contradictory, multinodalic, polycentric and dynamic. These relational-contexts thus increase the scope of IR study and its ability to understand the real world from the perspective of each actor, even in times of change and uncertainty.

Heterarchy is a conceptual framework rather than a theory, because specific theory has become too constricting where interpreting human behavior is concerned, and is increasingly becoming unable to deal with differentiation or change (Denzin, 1970, p. 51; Ivey, 2015, p. 145). Therefore, ‘frameworks are thus a reaction to the excessively causal explanations of rational-choice and resource mobilization theories’ (Chambliss, 2005, p. 289) as set out by the IR positivists for example, which limit interpretation to a narrow range of social interaction paradigms. Frameworks study the fundamental schemes of interpretation based on ‘the multiple realities of daily life’ as understood by various actors, based on their experiences, within a structure that is coherently described (Chambliss, 2005, p. 289). This incorporates all or parts of various paradigms to give a mediated multi-disciplined interpretation and understanding (Ivey, 2015, p. 145), allowing the

appropriate variables to be identified for study (Chambliss, 2005, p. 290). Most of what passes for theory in the social sciences are mainly conceptual frameworks which produce empirical worlds that are understood systemically around a core set of problems (Denzin, 1970, p. 51).

Due to the nature of this thesis, the Introduction, Chapter One and Chapter Two proceed as a thought experiment with sources pertinent to the discussion being cited where applicable. Thought experiments explore implications of theories and conceptual boundaries, using controlled exercises of the imagination to test cases within a conceptual coherence (Lowe, 1995, p. 875). Thought experiments create fictional worlds that stand outside currently understood existing realities, giving a variety of complex and nuanced understandings to particular issues (Meynell, 2014, p. 4162), which are often accompanied by illustrative models which act as props to imagining this fictional world (Meynell, 2014, p. 4163). This makes thought experiments both destructive to old theories and constructive of new ones; forming an argument or supposition that is not justified until it can be reconstructed empirically (Praem & Steglich-Petersen, 2015, p. 2829).

Thought experiments also aim to improve the level of theoretical and practical rationality (Sorensen, 1992, p. 108). Notably, many great ideas of the natural and social sciences were thought experiments first, and were only subsequently proved empirically (Gaddis, 1997, p. 77). To aid in the understanding of this thought experiment, words or terms in the text of the discussion that have been highlighted in **bold** are defined in the glossary at **Appendix A**.

Yet one might ask, ‘why is there a need for another conceptual IR framework within a discipline that has already spawned multiple tools for understanding the world?’ In response, I use the question posed by Leggold (1998); “Is anyone listening to International Relations?” (p. 43). Leggold concluded that no one was so therefore, what use was IR? He suggested that IR theories, models and forecasts failed to relate to the real world; leading policy-makers to disregard a discipline that failed to give them accurate understandings to formulate policy, and that failed to predict incoming events that had real world effects (Leggold, 1998, p. 44), leading him to argue that IR was writing for itself while becoming irrelevant to policy-making audiences (p. 45; Mossenberger, 2013, p. 220). Therefore, a ‘persistent chasm between what suppliers of social research offer and what perspective users of this research seek’ (Sil & Katzenstein, 2010, p. 1) has opened. More recently, Rosenberg (2016) posited that; “There is no suggestion that IR has a vital

contribution of its own to make to social sciences”, in becoming disconnected from the rest of academia (p. 128). This becomes apparent with increasing compartmentalization of the social disciplines driven by conceptions that offer little in the way of complementary efforts to compare and integrate multiple paradigms – becoming instead a hindrance rather than an aid to understanding the world and environment around us (Sil & Katzenstein, 2010, p. 1). If these opinions are valid, then IR needs new ways to conceptualize the world and how actors exist or interact within it if it is to remain relevant and therefore survive.

Some IR theorists have argued that theory should be kept separate from policy-making, if only to maintain its ‘intellectual purity’ (Hill, 1994, p. 16). ‘From this perspective, the isolation of the ivory tower serves as a buffer against temptations of policy corruption and encourages a useful division of labour’ (Nye, 2008, no page number). But others such as Morgenthau, emphasized that the ‘reason d’etre of IR was not to produce theory, but to provide real world solutions and advice to policy makers’ (Guilhot, 2011a, p. 13). But however academically pure a theoretician wants to make their ideas, a theory is only ever a study or a prediction of patterns – patterns that take place within the real world (Sonda, 2014, May 5), made by real flesh and blood people, in bricks and mortar institutions, using socially constructed ideas and material actions that affect other people, institutions and ideas. Therefore, theory is most useful when it is applied to an actual situation while positing explanations and solutions to issues (Walt, 2005, p. 27), being more readily accepted if it offers simple easily understood and clearly stated argument (p. 28). This involves academia getting mucky in the trenches of policy making. Otherwise, we go back to Leggold’s question; ‘What use is IR?’ If enough people ask this question, then IR will lose relevance and may gradually fade away. Hence, heterarchy seeks to offer a way in which IR becomes useful to policy makers, to explain and allow for change within IR, and as a way of expanding IR into academic areas that have traditionally been off limits.

Turning to the subject of heterarchy directly, the rest of the introduction will step through the questions of where heterarchy might sit within ontology, epistemology and methodology – outlining where it is situated in its worldview, how knowledge is produced and the methods by which it proceeds in attempting to attain that knowledge. It will then outline the layout of the subsequent thesis.

A brief introduction to the ontology and epistemology of heterarchy

The study of IR is meant to provide us with both: a worldview – an ontology for understanding and providing fundamental beliefs about the world; and, tools for evaluating events and actors within the observer’s particular interpretation, an epistemology (Griffith, 2007, p. 1). Ontologically IR has two approaches; foundationalism and anti-foundationalism. Foundationalism employs ‘epistemic realism, whereby the world comprises material objects whose existence is independent of the ideas and beliefs about them’ (Milliken, 1999, p. 225), and ‘whose truth and meaning reside in the objects independently of any consciousness’ (Crotty, 1998, p. 42). Knowledge is derived from observation, linked to scientific empirical validation akin to the natural sciences, and absent the fact/value judgements traditionally undertaken by the social sciences from which IR arose (Langlois, 2007, p. 151). Alternatively, anti-foundationalists argue that our capacity to observe facts are governed by our perceptions of what those facts are or might be, mediated by how each individual views the world and their understanding of it (Langlois, 2007, p. 152). These value judgements and interpretations have come to increasingly play a greater role within IR, where interpretation is ‘constrained by our worldview’, while offering possibilities for progress and change (Langlois, 2007, p. 152). Heterarchy borrows from both ontologies.

i Heterarchy and Ontology

From foundationalism, heterarchy acknowledges that a thing can exist independent of a value judgement – as an independent identity all on its own, and where all actors can agree that some event has happened or that an object exists as an independent entity. For example; suppose a ship is located at a particular point in the sea. All interested actors agree that that particular ship is a physical reality located at the designated maritime location, and can acknowledge this fact absent any interpretive value judgement. This type of ‘brute fact’ I will call a **catalyst**, which from an objective perspective could be neutrally reported upon.

However, the actors also identify the ship and its location by attaching to it a value. This value then allows the actors to *interpret* the **catalyst**, taking inferences and acting upon them in reaction to that **catalyst**, which moves the ontology from foundationalism to anti-foundationalism. Referring to the ship in the ocean example, if we give the ship an identity – say it is identified as a US naval vessel, and we give its location as being inside the Chinese claimed nine-dash line in the South China Sea, then interpretations about the nature of the ship and what its location ‘says’

will differ. Thus, the ship's presence in that particular location becomes interpreted by the actors that have an interest in assigning a value to that **catalyst**, but that value is different according to the positionality of each actor leading to differentiated interpretation or a **value anomaly**. In this example; the US will say that the naval ship is asserting the right of freedom of navigation within international waters. The Chinese will assert that sailing a warship in waters that they claim is a deliberate provocation that threatens their sovereignty. Other actors that are affected by the South China Sea dispute may applaud the US action, stay silent for various reasons or condemn it. This action/reaction allows the observer to examine both the **catalyst**, the reactions of actors affected by the **catalyst**, and the reactions or **epiphenomena** of an actor to the reactions of other actors. This becomes relational-contextual as the actor interacts with both the **catalyst** and to the reactions of other actors. Hence both ontologies are observed and can be interpreted to give understandings about actor relationships.

ii Heterarchy and Epistemology

IR ontologies have provided several diverse and rich schools from which heterarchy can draw inspiration and inquiry. Indeed Walt (2011) has implored the observer to avoid attempts to impose a single method or theoretical perspective that would limit research agendas or narrow the scope of questions, while still applying methodological rigor (derived from Lamont, 2015, p. 13). Heterarchy provides a framework within which various methods and theoretical perspectives can be incorporated while borrowing from various epistemological traditions, principally from the anti-foundationalist camp. This is because under foundationalism the positivist epistemologies of neo-realism and institutional liberalism see the object of study itself as being irriductable (Rosenau & Durfee, 1995, p. 12). The positivist schools also focus on the *object*, referred to as substantivism, rather than the *relationship between the object and other objects*, and the reasons behind it. These schools are founded on continuity and stability, so have problems when dealing with change and fluidity (Rosenau & Durfee, 1995, p. 7).

So, it is to anti-foundationalism that heterarchy turns to most. Under anti-foundationalism we have constructivist and relativist epistemological approaches (Furlong & Marsh, 2010, p. 185). Heterarchy takes on some aspects of both; while rejecting others. Epistemology is a 'branch of meta-physics dealing with the nature of knowledge, its presuppositions and foundations, its extent and validity' (O'Gorman & Macintosh, N.D. p. 54), in other words the mental tools of how we

gain knowledge. These form paradigms through which theories are constructed and knowledge is understood and explained, allowing the observer to arrive at a set of beliefs about themselves and the world around them (O’Gorman & Macintosh, N.D. p. 54).

iii Heterarchy, Constructivism and Relativism

In addition to the positivists’ materiality (Reus-Smit, 1996, p. 209), constructivism claims that ‘why actors do one thing and not another is due to ideas, beliefs, norms, identities and some other interpretive filters through which the actor perceives the world’ (Parsons, 2010, p. 80; also, see Crossley, 2005, pp. 267-268). Thus, constructivists reject the positivists’ ‘rational human’, seeing humanity instead as being ‘socially embedded, communicatively constituted and culturally empowered’ allowing for greater interpretation and empirical analysis (Reus-Smit, 1996, p. 215). Heterarchy takes from structural constructivists, exemplified by Wendt, the concept of the social construction of identity by an actor domestically, which then goes on to form interests (1994, p. 387). Heterarchy agrees with Wendt (1992) that identities are relational – that is in comparing self with the other – and that they are socially constructed (pp. 397-398); but takes issue with two aspects of Wendt’s thinking.

Firstly, Wendt (1994, p. 389) suggests that the determinants of the actor are formed domestically before engaging with other IR actors. There is no discussion on the contestation of identity or interests *within* the actor itself (unlike Moravscik’s preferences based theory)² - nor about the process of how this identity-interest might be formed by factors external to the domestic process which help form the actor’s strategic-rationality (Reus-Smit, 1996, p. 223). Wendt thus produces an actor in the substantivist mold, that is already formed and therefore becomes irriductable prior to entering the IR system, where it preforms relations that impact upon itself and other actors.³ Secondly, Wendt (1994) states that the national interest is formed solely through identity formation (p. 385). Heterarchy suggests that interests can also form identity, in that interests are an understanding of needs which can lead to the forming of identity to attain or protect those needs

² Moravscik (1997) states that society was based upon a division of state-preferences, the distribution of resources and the institutional provision of resources, where the focus of study is on the first category in determining the other categories (p. 548). State-preferences become the vehicle driving both domestic and international relations, where particular preferences dominate over others observed through the causal relationships that this interaction facilitates (p. 544). Here state preferences are captured by hegemonic groups to fulfil their own preferences, *that is directing the state within the context of the dominant group* (my italics added).

³ Wendt admits that he is following Waltz in this matter (Wendt, 1992, p. 396).

(ala Moravcsik). *As the case study in Chapter Three will show, interests can spur actors to form and project certain types of identities depending on the then identified needs- interests - of the actor.*

From what might be called normative constructivism⁴, exemplified in the work of Kratochwil and Onuf, heterarchy borrows the concept of norms, which for differentiation purposes I have called ‘policy regimes’.⁵ Policy regimes are paradigms through which actors see, translate, act and problem-solve their worlds in particular patterned ways, which in turn forms frames of reference or predictive contextual patterns. Klotz (1995) states that these policy regimes can be independent of identity and interests, but alternatively can also act to form identity and interests in its own right (derived from Reus-Smit, 1996, p. 223). This leads to an understanding of the dominant paradigms within which actors’ think, act and communicate. However, policy regimes under heterarchy are bereft of the ‘modernity imperatives’ imposed by Onuf (Zehfuss, 2002, p. 187)⁶. Onuf (2005, p. 225) argues for a clear break with the past. The past however provides context, which merges with

⁴ Reus-Smit (2006) calls the two branches of constructivism, modernism and post-modernism (p. 216). However, I think it more accurate to refer to the modernists as structuralists for those who follow Wendt, because they look at the structure of interactions; while the post-modernists should be referred to as normativists because they look at how norms form, how these norms impact upon and are impacted upon by human behavior.

⁵ Policy Regimes are a more appropriate label as policy is formulated within the guidelines of the regime – that is within the defined understandings – contexts, inhibitors and enablers of the policy making apparatus. The word ‘norm’ does not adequately offer a descriptive label – only defining what is ‘normal’ without conveying a sense of context.

⁶ Onuf (2005) states that modernization imposes ‘order on the totality of human relations’ (p. 231). These are:

- The rise of ideologies and moral systems emphasizing individual autonomy, aspirations and achievements,
- Personal security and material support to fulfil individual needs over societal needs,
- Cultivation of instrumental rationality and organizational efficiency,
- The displacement of the ‘old regime’ stripping away status markers,
- Demystifying nature and the identification of the individual with clan, tribe, nation and any other ‘allegedly’ natural social arrangement, and
- Producing long term moral and material improvements as people outgrow atavistic tendencies and prejudices.

However, Onuf also says that this ‘progression’ is slow and uneven due to continuing resistance by pre-modern social formations, tensions inherent within the modernization process itself and the skepticism, dissatisfaction or alienation of the presumed beneficiaries. A criticism that heterarchy would make on Onuf, is that this new modernity seems to be irriductable – that is it is bereft of any reference to the past. Heterarchy would argue that the past informs the present – and hence the resistance, and that therefore vestiges of the old regime exist within any new modernity. Additionally, this new modernity will impose its own barriers and regimes, that is while imposing modernity on human relations in the short term may overthrow the old order, in the medium to long term this ‘modernity’ is likely to become an inhibitor to any future modernity as it becomes the status quo in which new hegemonic groups dominate, creating a new *context* within which actors exist.

the present to provide the interpretation against which relations between humans are described and understood, and therefore the past cannot be divorced from the present.⁷

From relativism on the other hand, heterarchy takes the concept of placing the ‘perspective’ (context) of the actor as the center of study. This involves observing the actor’s perception of reality, what they believe to be true – or perhaps what is in their interests to believe - as an understanding as to why the actor acts in the way that they do (Coady, 1995, p. 757). While very relevant to heterarchy, this perspective can lead to one of the biggest criticisms of relativism, in that it posits the view that ‘the actor as situated within the studied aspect is dominant and correct’ (Geertz, 1989, p. 12; Kirk, 1999, p. 37)⁸. Coady (1995, p. 757) suggests that this critique is valid, unless it is posited that relativism can only exist within contexts, and with this heterarchy agrees.

Heterarchy would argue that this context exists only in relation to that of the ‘other’, who offers an alternative paradigm against which an actor and its perspective is described and understood. This implies that an actor’s positionality within IR must be studied from both its own understanding of reality, *and* from the positionality of another actor to provide a comparison of contexts that enhances understanding and hence provides a valid interpretation of the relationship. *Therefore, it is only through the study of the relations between ‘self’ and ‘other’ that comparisons can be studied and evaluations formed, with no one view being dominant or correct but merely existing in comparison to that of another actor.*

Heterarchy therefore proposes a paradigm through which IR is understood through the study of relational-contexts between actors that operate within the system. The difference between heterarchy and most other IR approaches, is that the others function as *belief-systems that explain how their belief-systems operate, but do not provide an understanding of why they operate* (Hollis & Smith, 2009, p. 86), or conversely *are limited in understanding and cannot operate according to any given situation*. These other epistemologies therefore become ‘self-warranting’ (Hollis & Smith, 2009, p. 86). Each declares what is real and rational brought on by their own internal

⁷ This realization about the past and its influence upon modernity has the additional advantage of inducing the observer to become aware of their own past preconceived contextual-relations with their objects of study. This reflexivity allows ‘for marginalized meanings and actors to become revealed and reflected upon’ that would normally have been ignored (O’Leary, 2014, p. 238), therefore deepening the observer’s understanding.


⁸ This could lead relativism to be charged with substantivism also, where the focus is on the actor’s own belief system and not its relations with other actors.

practices, yet there is in actuality no neutral, objective external criterion for reality or rationality (derived from Winch; Hollis & Smith, 2009, p. 86).

In other words, these other frameworks can be charged with ignoring the different and varying IR contexts within which actors operate. Heterarchy seeks to understand rationality and reality through the relational-contexts of the actors themselves, and as others see them, which gives observers insights into the reasoning and methods that actors use.

This is done by adopting the methodology of hermeneutics, ‘which gives some account of how internal orderings (*of the system*) relate to reality’ (Hollis & Smith, 2009, p. 87). This is shown in Figure 1.1 which demonstrates the epistemological positioning of heterarchy within IR.

Figure 1.1. Pictorial positionality of heterarchy compared to other paradigms.



Methodology and Thesis outline

The theoretical perspective that informs this thesis methodology is relationalist, where it considers those links within and between entities that produce cause and effect. This is opposed to the structuralist prescriptions which seek to study the entity itself devoid of influencing factors

(Jackson & Nexon, 1999, p. 316; Goddard & Nexon, 2003, p. 16; Crossley, 2005, p. 267; Qin, 2016, p. 9).⁹ Relationalism avoids substantivist prescriptions by analyzing:

- A personality system – how individual actors’ actions are dictated by needs (*contexts*).
- A social system – where the interaction between two or more actors becomes the focus of study (*brought on by a catalyst*).
- A cultural system – the organization of values, norms and symbols that guides actors establishing inhibitors and enablers (Goddard & Nexon, 2003, p. 16) – *their policy regimes*.

Each actor contains its own unique and evolving structure influenced by both internal and external contexts which dictate the actions of one actor toward another allowing the observer to explore the links and reasoning for that interaction. On an empirical level this provides flexibility to incorporate different diverse material and ideational variables that can allow for a more holistic understanding of an issue (Goddard & Nexon, 2003, p. 17). This will be achieved by using ‘grounded theory analysis’ which can be ‘viewed as a series of carefully planned steps’ that develops theoretical ideas that emerges from observed data, rather than relying on other sources that may be compromised (Crotty, 1998, p. 78). This method is highly inductive, where each stage will link with the previous stage to show a progressive relationship (O’Leary, 2014, p. 315), fleshed out by real world examples – thematic research – demonstrating a particular piece of the concept in relation to IR, thereby letting the data provide the narrative (Crotty, 1998, p. 110; O’Leary, 2014, p. 315).

Chapter One describes heterarchy and its various conceptual components. This chapter explores: the origins and literature on heterarchy within IR; the concept of relationalism in forming patterns and networks; context as providing meaning to relationships, contexts as applied to IR and contextual-variable categories to produce relational-contextual paradigms. This will conclude with a construction of a heterarchical cycle explaining how heterarchy may be employed in a practical sense in empirical case studies. Qualitative methodology will be used in this chapter – as it will be

⁹ I refer to structuralists in this thesis as those who adopt a substantivist outlook where the locus of study is on the actor itself and not the relations between actors. I take this to mean the epistemologies of realism and liberalism – and their various iterations, and certain constructivist paradigms such as the structural constructivists.

in Chapter Two. Qualitative methodology is used due to the complexities of the subject (Bennett & Elman, 2007, p. 171), which is particularly prevalent in anti-foundationalism as the subject matter deals with the truth-claims (Crotty, 1998, p. 9) or relational-contexts as understood by each actor, leading to particular understandings about how the social world is constructed and reproduced (Lamont, 2015, p. 77). In thought experiments within social sciences, we are dealing with concepts that are subjective rather than objective, therefore the normal mode of analysis is qualitative. Throughout the text of this thesis the reader will find references to policy regimes which can be used by the observer to understand various actors relational-contexts. Because of the word limit to this thesis, a deeper discussion of policy regimes can be found at **Appendix B**.

Chapter Two is a critique of structuralism from a heterarchical perspective. This chapter uses discourse analysis to critically analyze and challenge the socio-historically dominant structuralist narratives (O’Leary, 2014, p. 315). Dominant narratives distort reality through language to produce one sided norms that hide truths or realities from the observer (Crotty, 1998, p. 143). Heterarchy therefore ‘compels dominant narratives to be subject to the critique of an alternative concept’ (Crotty, 1998, p. 144). This chapter uses a hermeneutic spiral to cycle through alternate viewpoints (O’Leary, 2014, p. 315), in comparing and contrasting various structuralist and heterarchical perspectives, giving a deeper understanding to paradigmatic differences. In particular it considers the problems that structuralists have with anarchy. Heterarchy then offers a counter argument, in conceptualizing anarchy within a heterarchical sub-structural description.

Chapter Three then asks; “Despite all the structuralist indicators to the contrary, why are Japanese-South Korean relations not converging or in alignment?” The purpose of this chapter is to provide an example of heterarchy at work. This chapter critiques of the conventional structuralist epistemologies in their assessments of empirical Japanese-South Korean relations, offering instead an alternative heterarchical view that looks at the relationship from a historical understanding – which heterarchy suggests is the key contextual-variable in understanding this particular relationship. As Chapter Three involves heterarchical application and modelling in the real world, a mixed methodology is used as the research is question focused and driven (O’Leary, 2014, p. 149). Qualitative methodology is the primary means of data gathering and analysis within this chapter, to deepen and contextualize understanding (Mahoney, 2007, p. 123). Quantitative data adds robustness and depth to the data gathered while increasing triangulation (Berg, 2007, p. 290).

(Note, there is also a timeline of Japanese-South Korean relations for amplification at **Appendix C**). This chapter will set the scene for Chapter Four; which will be a single limited case study using a **catalyst**.¹⁰

Having demonstrated the contextual-variable of ‘history’ as a dominant analytical tool in the Japanese-South Korean relationship, Chapter Four then demonstrates the use of **catalysts** and their effects on contextual-variables. The **catalyst** selected is Japanese Prime Minister Abe’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine in December 2012, which in turn provoked South Korea – along with China – to resurrect the 1909 assassination of Ito Harobumi by Ahn Jung-Geun as a counter-provocation, by building a memorial to Ahn at the Harbin train station. This in turn sparked a quasi-crisis between Japan and South Korea in 2013-2014 that intruded upon some of their other convergent relationships.

Finally, in the conclusion to the thesis, I will ask the reader to consider if I have proven the case for a need to produce another framework within IR; and if so, is heterarchy that concept? If this is the case I then enjoin the reader to further test heterarchy on other cases where the conventional epistemologies do not adequately explain actor relationships in the hopes of improving IR understanding, and in making IR relevant again.

¹⁰ A single case study is legitimate where conceptual innovation is being applied, or which allow ‘for the development of differentiated’ or ‘more closely focused concepts’ (Bennett & Elman, 2007, p. 178).

Chapter One: Relational-Contexts within Heterarchy.

This chapter explains heterarchical frameworks, where empirical IR examples are inserted into the framework to aid in the understanding of international situations. Firstly, this chapter discusses the origins of heterarchy and its literature as it pertains to IR. It then looks at relational-contexts through a discussion on Relationalism, describing the notion of context and how context is formed to understand how it fits into IR patterns. This chapter also makes the case that IR actors are reductable back into their domestic component parts, which impacts upon an actor's foreign policy and/or is impacted upon by IR itself. This framework therefore exposes the actor's domestic realm to IR study without which foreign policy cannot be made and IR legitimacy of the actor cannot be established within the system itself. This leads to a discussion on the criteria of what constitutes a contextual-variable. Although space in the thesis does not permit, **Appendix B** provides a deep discussion on policy regimes and how they can be used to filter contextual-variables to avoid analysis overload, and in assisting the observer in providing context for how and why an actor acts within IR.¹¹ Lastly this chapter presents the heterarchical cycle as an analytical system by which the observer can select **catalysts** and relational-contexts, and where by studying these they can reach empirical conclusions.

The origins of heterarchy

Heterarchy comes from the Greek *heterous* – ‘the other’ or ‘alien’, and *archein* meaning ‘to rule’ (Mirua, 2014, December 1). The word heterarchy first appeared in an article on brain function by biophysicist Warren McCulloch (1945) entitled ‘*A heterarchy of values determined by the typology of nervous nets*’ (Goldammer, Paul & Newbruy, 2003, August; Ogilvy, 2016, February 3), where the brain functioned in a logical cycle that did not produce hierarchically ordered thoughts, but that instead produced logical contradictions leading to **value anomalies**. For instance; suppose someone held the opinion that abortion of fetuses was wrong – considering the fetus to have a right to life, but at the same time upheld the death penalty for criminals, who for certain committed crimes had no right to life. Here we have a logically functioning brain that produces a contradiction leading to a ‘**value anomaly**’. Depending on the context presented to the brain by outside stimuli,

¹¹ A side argument can also be made that, as heterarchy deals with relational-contexts – that is the understanding of actor relations through the prism of their various contexts, so the same applies to the observer in observing the referent actors' relational-contexts – but this is a discussion for another time.

and its interpretation guided by its experience and past, depends on which of these values becomes neurally dominant at any given time. McCulloch's thinking was strongly influenced by Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason'¹² and Hegel's 'Science of Logic'¹³ from where he inherited the idea of **dialectics** and the ideas that we will call context (Goldammer, Paul & Newbury, 2003, August). In doing so, McCulloch define heterarchy as *the antithesis of hierarchy*, rather than using the more commonly accepted concept of anarchy (Ogilvy, 2016, February 3).

McCulloch's heterarchy has been transferred to various disciplines. Mathematics and Cybernetics were the first to embrace this logic (Miura, 2014, December 1). Social sciences took up heterarchy in the 1950s; Economics, Archeology, Anthropology and Organizational Studies – followed by Politics through Governance Theory. It is only very recently that the term has become associated with IR in efforts to describe the current international situation in which 'uncertainty and confusion prevails' (Ogilvy, 2016, February 3), and where the situation does not fit within the standard IR academic paradigms.

Heterarchy – an IR Literature Review

Only four articles that I have been able to find directly describe aspects of heterarchy within the context of IR – two 2016 articles by Ogilvy, and one each by Miura (2014) and Jackson (2014). I


¹² Kant (1779) said that objects, which he called phenomena, exist separate from our sensations and conceptions (2009, p. 75). The interpretation of the object is obtained by empirical consciousness based upon experience and antecedent, which he called noumena, leading to what he referred to as 'conceptus ratiocinantes' (rational conceptions) through the application of **dialectics** to arrive at a rational perception, although this 'rational perception' might not be the same for someone else (pp. 401-402). The conclusion I deduce from this is that if, as Kant says, 'all experience is different', then the observer viewing the object must do so through the contexts that experience has given them. This leads us back to the example of the ship in the South China Sea discussed in the introduction, where each actor – based on their experiences – assigns a value to the ship and its positionality that is different from that of other actors – hence a **value anomaly**.

¹³ Hegel (1812) wrote that the mind initially conceives an object objectively and abstractly – as an entity of its own, free of value judgement – the 'Pure Being' as he called it (p. 80). However, the mind then reasons about the existence – using **dialectics** to mediate meaning - to arrive eventually at a final logical conclusion about the object's meaning – that is the object becomes a 'Mediated Being'. Hegel begins this transformation by determination of an 'Other' – *the 'Pure Being' being defined by a relationship with the 'Other'* (my italics added) that is reflected upon and differentiated by identity. (Hegel, 1812, p. 85-86). But this differentiation is mediated 'on what each individual finds (sic) given in his own immediate and contingent idea' (p. 86). This last sentence to my mind means that Hegel is referring to context and hence the interpretation that the individual places upon the object – with the word '*contingent*' being the reality within which the individual conceives themselves to be in, and which may be differentiated from the 'others' reality.

will start with Ogilvy because he is the first writer who introduced the concept of heterarchy to me.

Ogilvy (2016, February 3) has a problem with hierarchy in describing IR reality, where there are too many competing hierarchies that conflate and confuse the true interpretation of the international situation. He adopted McCulloch's heterarchy in the 1970s, because 'the term recommends itself for the way it mediates the **dialectic** between hierarchy and anarchy' (Ogilvy, 2016, February 3). To illustrate this pictorially Ogilvy reproduced McCulloch's model from his original 1945 article (Ogilvy, 2016, February 19).

Fig 2.1 McCulloch's Dromes' of Diallels



In the Dromes' of Diallels model, neurons are arranged in circular configuration where A would stimulate B but inhibit C, B would stimulate C but inhibit A, and so on. However, should a new stimuli or **catalyst** occur, this would change the process whereby the neurons would stimulate and inhibit differently. Ogilvy, who had also introduced heterarchy to organizational studies, compared this model to the game of Rock, Paper, Scissors, where there were any number of combinations depending on the number of players and their interpretation of the situation at any given moment (Fairtlough, 2005, p. 28). Neither McCulloch nor Ogilvy described what the stimuli was that caused the neurons to activate or inhibit however, given the influences of Kant and Hegel in

McCulloch's ideas this could be taken to mean *contexts* – both internal and external - that would act as stimuli to trigger the appropriate responses through **dialectic change**.¹⁴

Ogilvy could not reconcile why states that formed alliances with the US, also had deep and dependent economic relations with China, hence the predictions of his realist peers for a bi or multipolar world order were not being borne out (2016, February 3; 2016, February 19), in the context of Polarity Theory. He argued that heterarchy allowed him to get a better grip on reality in explaining complex relationships of cooperation and opposition, which could be used to explain complicated situations such as Syria, the Middle East, the EU or even the US Presidential primaries (Ogilvy, 2016, February 3; 2016, February 19). He thought that heterarchical relationships between states could lead to better decision making by practitioners, rather than having to frame decisions within a hierarchical structure or base them on a disorderly anarchy. He argues that states act within their best interests in ways that 'hierarchical board charts' do not predict – reintroducing the concept of **real politik** as a way of understanding why states adopt seemingly contradictory actions to achieve limited results (Ogilvy, 2016, February 3). As he put it; "Anarchists are frustrated hierarchists, who on finding that the world does not fit into their modelled paradigms claim that the system is anarchic and therefore beyond modelling" (Ogilvy, 2016, February 19). Thus, Ogilvy (2016, February 3) claimed that heterarchy "mediated the **dialectic** between hierarchy and anarchy", allowing for prediction within the system.

However, Ogilvy provides no description to explain how heterarchy would lead to a practical conceptualization, or indeed an empirical application. In fact, he admits that attempts by himself and a colleague in the 1980s to conceptualize heterarchy did not bear fruit (Ogilvy, 2016, February 3). Ogilvy (personal communication, 2017, January 24) said that the concept was "too slippery to

¹⁴ Ogilvy was also heavily influenced by these two philosophers (Ogilvy, 1977, p. 7). Ogilvy argued that the practice of placing man within hierarchies was too limiting and hindered understanding of what was really going on. Hierarchy thus made man one dimensional and did not explain true relationships and actions that took place in reality. This 'one dimensional' notion made it easier to place man into hierarchies and to project order and stability upon the real world than was in accord with actual reality. Ogilvy argued that man – as an interpersonal self – had many personalities that individuated the self from others physically, as in boundaries within the community or something closer to personality that differentiates from the differences of others, but that can also link to a community of those with shared commonalities (p. 100). Thus, man is a person of many selves, where each self becomes apparent depending on the situation and experiences at a particular point in time. This multi-dimensionality of man makes a mockery of the imposed order of hierarchy. Although Ogilvy does not mention the word context – by stating that a manifestation of a personality becomes apparent at a particular time and space he is, in fact, referring to context which brings out this multi-dimensionality.

get their heads around” and that it did not “travel well in conceptualization”. However, what I suspect he and his colleague were trying to do was to posit a systemic theory within a realist foundationalist ontological framework using structuralist paradigms, and where they did not consider anti-foundationalist perspectives.

Miura (2014, December 1), on the other hand, defined heterarchy as ‘any unit that can govern or be governed by others depending on circumstances’. In his short article, the linkages between the units were circular rather than linear and hierarchical. He described heterarchical networks that were flexible and dynamic, where authorities were not institutionally fixed, but that changed places as situations evolved. Building on the work of Sociologist David Stark, Miura suggested that heterarchy allowed relations to form a **multicentric** network of heterogeneous actors across departments, levels and sectors to utilize resources and capabilities while adapting rapidly to change.

At an IR level, Miura took transnational networks that could solve global issues in cutting across public and private sectors from local to global levels, to constitute evidence of heterarchy. Therefore, all actors are interconnected and become dominant or passive as the situation – *context* – dictated. However, Miura did not tie heterarchy directly to state to state relations, nor did he provide a model of how we might understand heterarchy in an IR sense conceptually or empirically.

Probably the most comprehensive and empirical contribution for me has been provided by Van Jackson (2014), who located heterarchy at a regional level in analyzing how and why states within East Asia were hedging. Jackson (2014) argued that regional security uncertainty discouraged alignment incentives; leading to hedging, not only against perceived enemies, but also against allies, in what he called ‘a complex patchwork or network of relationships’ (p. 332). He dismissed realist arguments that hedging happened because of an ambiguous US-Chinese power transition leading to bi or multipolarity (Jackson, 2014, pp. 337-339). Like Ogilvy, Jackson found these arguments unconvincing and hard to reconcile with what was occurring within the region.

In his discussion, Jackson (2014) produced a ‘Network Topology’: sensitivity, where states were affected by the international and domestic actions of other states (pp. 342-344); then, fluidity, where alignments change depending on circumstances based on the uncertainty of decision outcomes (p. 344); and lastly, heterarchy. In the latter, weak states have leverage over stronger

states, submit to other states in only one dimension but not in others (**multicentricity**) and where definitions of hegemony and leadership take on differing meanings (p. 345). Here Jackson (2014) introduces two key concepts: **polycentricity** and **multinordality**, allowing for greater diversity in what constitutes an actor, interests and values within heterarchy to be studied (p. 341). This typology reveals new insights into IR and potentially allows policy to be made based on more accurate assessments (Jackson, 2014, p. 348). Jackson's work suggests a template for how heterarchy might be applied in a real-world situation, and is very influential to my thinking.

However, there appears to be error in his conceptual logic on complex networks, in how he regards heterarchy from a conceptual ontological level that leads to a clouding in his thinking. In one key phrase, in the middle of the article, Jackson (2014) describes heterarchy as "what we might loosely describe as Relationalism" (p. 341). *This lone statement changes the ontological and epistemological concept of heterarchy respectively from foundationalism and substantivism to anti-foundationalist and relationalist in nature.* Unfortunately, Jackson does not explore the implications of this statement further; that is, the claim that the study using the concept of 'patchwork networks' is relational rather than substantivist. It is almost as if Jackson, having obtained an insight into the meaning and reasoning of heterarchy, realizes the implications for his foundationalist-substantivist world-view and beats a hasty retreat onto more comfortable academic terrain. Jackson throughout the article, except in this one sentence, continues to write from a foundationalist-substantivist perspective, 'where agents are the focus as standalone and discreet entities' instead of focusing on the relations between actors (Crossley, 2005, p. 266). This perhaps explains his error in separating sensitivity and fluidity from heterarchy in his Network Typology. McCulloch and others who use the term heterarchy in various fields, apply the term to describe complete complex networks where sensitivity and fluidity are *integral* to heterarchy in allowing it to function, as demonstrated in McCulloch's Dromes' of Diallels (Fig 2.1). Had he applied a different ontology Jackson might well have conceived a practical framework for how heterarchy might work within IR.

How does heterarchy apply to IR?

In considering how heterarchy might apply to IR, I refer to Carol Crumley, who introduced heterarchy into Archaeology and Anthropology as a way of understanding the functioning of complex societies. Crumley (1979) said that heterarchy is defined – as opposed to hierarchies – as

elements that possess the potential to be ranked in many different ways depending of systemic requirements – *contexts* - at a given period of time (p. 144). This is not to say that there is no hierarchy – but Crumley (1979) defined heterarchy is a general category within which hierarchy is subsumed as a special case; where it is ideal for being used in a physical structure, as an abstract model, or as an historical narrative – all the while however explaining that hierarchy was not a reflection of how society truly functions within reality (p. 146).

Heterarchy thus explains the agency of actors within their structure, while at the same time allowing for an explanation as to why discontinuities and fundamental changes occur within the structure – *that is a change in relations brought about by a change in contexts*. Thus, heterarchy becomes a ‘natural corrective’ to ‘hierarchy which is conflated with order’ to explain true power relations between actors that are neither linear nor simple (Crumley 1987, p.157; 2005, p. 36; Ehrenreich, Crumley & Levy, 1995, p. 14). Heterarchy is non-linear and nonhierarchical – ‘where there is chaos and surprise’ (Crumley, 1987, p. 157) – that is anarchy, which creates an IR structure that is flexible, **multinodalic** and **polycentric**; both internally within the actor and externally outside of it.

Relations between actors are never simple nor ordered as prescribed by the ‘rationalist IR theories’, which straightjacket actors within hierarchical ordered structures irrespective of differences (Reus-Smit, 1996, p. 222). Heterarchy posits a framework in which differences are understood and explained, and that are then compared against the differences of other actors to explain the dynamics of their relationship. This allows for explanations about actor agency within IR. This means that sometimes an actor does exist within a hierarchy,¹⁵ in a particular aspect, if it is to that actor’s advantage (whether voluntary or coerced), but at other times and in other contexts it exists in other paradigms that are not governed by hierarchical principals. This leads to the possibility of ascribing a whole host of differentiated relationships within IR to one actor with another and/or multiple actors. *This leads to the focus of observation upon the relations between actors rather than on the actor itself.*

¹⁵ Heterarchical ideas of the use of hierarchy will be discussed in detail under Policy Regimes in **Appendix B**.

Relationalism


If this holds, then relations ‘link different aspects together to form a pattern of networks or differing figurations which are only limited by human imagination’ (Depelteau & Powell, 2013, p. xvi). This allows latitude for the observer to study a vast variety of relationships that are outside the paradigms of traditional IR schools, so long as these relationships meet the criteria of impacting on or being impacted upon by IR. This has potential for relevance in policy formation, cross-disciplinary studies and inter-collaborative research with other social and natural sciences.

Furthermore; ‘Relationalism can be studied within the actor as well as external to it, allowing us to study the internal dynamics of foreign policy formation, and the impact of IR on the domestic dynamics of the actor’ (Bogen, 1995b, p. 756; also, see Crossley, 2005, p. 267). To explain, let us assume the traditional objects of concern within the internal dynamics for IR are:

- Material aspects: The physical attributes that can be both quantified as well as qualified. This is the primary focus of the positivist schools.
- Ideational aspects: Socially constructed ideas, groupings, socially accepted interpretations and definitions of contexts; the primary focus of the anti-foundationalists.
- Interests: Leading to the key goals and imperatives of actors which may involve combinations of both material and/or ideational aspects.

We must then establish what the relationship is between these various aspects. To illustrate this, I would posit that a lump of metal is just that, unless someone has the ideation to smelt and shape it for a particular purpose or interest. A socially constructed idea on what the object to be fashioned for becomes just a notion unless someone implements it materially and links it to the interest for which it is to be used. An interest – the reason why something happens - in forming a useable object from the metal is just a thought if not linked to materiality and/or ideation to achieve its purpose. In Figure 2.2 below we see that relationalism constitutes relations between the three aspects of ideation, interests and materiality, where the object becomes the focus the three aspects.


Fig 2.2



However, while relationalism tells us that there is a link between two or more actors, objects or categories, it does not give that relationship form or motivation. It does not provide us with: a descriptive account of what that relationship would be; or, how the relationship interacts, develops and progresses; nor, the nature of its interaction in relation to other actors' or objects, and these outsider's impact upon it. In other words, there is no dynamic or **catalyst**.

The **catalyst** is what animates relations, provides the intent, description and action/interaction, and allows for the study and measurement of these relations, producing *context* – hence the reason why relations within IR must be understood as being both relational and contextual. Relational-contexts thus form a framework, where 'perceptions of what the facts might be are mediated by how each individual views the world and their understanding of it' (Langlois, 2007, p. 152), as demonstrated in the model below (Figure 2.3). The double-headed arrows represent relational-contexts where the system is influenced by each of its aspects both internally and externally, and in which the actor itself also influences and is in turn influenced by the external. This gives meaning and understanding to the relational linkages allowing for measurement, recording and interpretation. This makes the system dynamic, as indicated by the outside circling arrows, where context changes the system, changing the composition and character of the component parts – allowing for the relational to take form and produce a description for study.

Fig 2.3



Context

Heterarchy would therefore say, that without context the study and understanding of relations are meaningless. Context starts at a sub-systemic level and provides the driver and explanation for the way in which actors' act, and in the use of policies, materiality, ideation and methods that they use to achieve or protect their interests. Going back to McCulloch's Dromes' of Diallels concept (Ogilvy, 2016, February 3); it provides the enablers and inhibitors that stimulate IR activity and directs it in certain ways (Ogilvy, 2016, February 19), which can then lead to prediction if the observer can understand an actor's context in relation the **catalyst** and other actors.

i. What is Context?

This leads us to a deeper discussion about what context is. A common definition of context is the a linguistic or thought act using referent objects and concepts that convey ideas toward and about the perception of reality as understood by an actor (Stevenson, 1995, p. 160). All language and action is contextual with a referent object or concept becoming the **catalyst** upon which action is initiated. Stevenson (1995) explains; 'All theories of meaning and understanding would try to make a reality explicit, giving rules by which meaning, reference, truth-value and linguistic act can be determined' (p. 160) *in relation to a referent object or concept*. This sentence is crucial to understanding the use of context as the centerpiece for heterarchical thinking. *Thus, the catalyst exists as a standalone entity but it is shaped by the contexts in which it is referred to or conceptualized by the actor.*¹⁶ The **catalyst** will have multiple meanings due to different actors' contextual conceptions of it, which then are compared to the actors previously examined

¹⁶ That is, it ascribes a value to the object or truth-claim. Differing truth claims produce a **value-anomaly**.

differences and similarities to explain their relations with one another, and posits reasons for why actors act in certain ways.

This then leads us also to an understanding of the contexts in which other IR schools are positioned within, in interpreting the results from analyzing the data from a particular epistemology. From the positivist/substantivist tradition, scientists must state under what parameters they would abandon their theories or refute them if the ‘deviant’ conditions continued to hold (Kuhn, 1996, p. 67; Hollis & Smith, 2009, p. 53); in other words, a new and contradictory normal – that is a change in context. To my mind, the positivist/substantivist IR traditions have avoided stating these ‘deviant’ conditions by engaging in systemic theory, to avoid having to deal with context, a fact admitted to by the realists themselves (Snyder, 2011, p. 59).¹⁷

In fact, all IR theories are formed within the contexts that existed at the time of their formation. The internationalists tried to stop war by using an interpretational context of society before and during WWI; the realists, influenced by WWII and the resulting US hegemony, tried to formulate how the US should use hegemony interpreted through the new rationalist scientific intellectual fashion of the time (Guilhot, 2011a, p. 14), and liberalism became ‘influenced by Late-Victorian liberal belief in the benefits of free trade’ (Guilhot, 2011b, p. 141). In this same light, can be seen both the old and new boutique IR fashions such as globalization, human-security and feminist IR studies, which present the same issues from within particular contexts.

Yet, while they all were formed in various contextual-paradigms, these schools tend to ignore context or contort it because reality - which is formed and informed by context - does not usually conform well to theory, hence the need for new frameworks of understanding. For example, in making their systemic theory, structuralists can avoid having to make explicit rules – based on the contexts presented rather than those that structuralists would prefer - in which their theories apply and do not apply, thereby avoiding having to explain the various real life deviations from their normative positions. *This is one reason why heterarchy is based as a sub-systemic framework, because context occurs generally at the sub-structural level, and hence only then may context influence the structure.*¹⁸

¹⁷ Further discussion on the differences between heterarchy and the structuralist IR schools will be discussed in Chapter Two.

¹⁸ To be discussed further in Chapter Two.

ii *How is context formed?*

In discussing the formation of context let us start with an analogy - take a pawn in chess. A pawn has an existence of itself as a shaped piece of plastic, wood or metal that we can identify as a pawn – its neutral description, thereby forming a **catalyst**. However, its identity is formed within the rules (*contexts*) of the game in general – to establish where it is initially placed, how it can move and what its particular properties are. In addition, that identity is changed in any particular game by: its positionality on the chess board at any one time; the pieces around it; the piece within the plans of the player who owns it; the consideration of it by the opposing player; its context in the moves previously performed by itself and pieces in relation to it; and, in the moves that are to be performed by it and other pieces in relation to it in the future. The pawn's importance changes as the game progresses – as the context changes – forming and reforming its identity.

We can transfer this analogy to IR where observers study variables to establish, confirm or disprove theory. Variables often have agreed meanings as understood by the main stream within a discipline, which leads to acknowledgment of the variables as being legitimate within a certain context. Variables are formed by a set of symbols or rules where all the qualifiers are agreed as having the same domain range of meaning through social construction (Hodges, 1995, pp. 502-503). Objects exist as distinct entities - either materially or ideationally – however they are inanimate and nonresponsive. It is only when we apply context to the variables that they become an interest of study. This context is provided by the **catalyst** which make the variables dynamic, being able to be described, compared and analyzed, either as themselves or against other alike and/or differentiated variables to produce interpretation and hence an understanding.

Context explains an actor's motives, views and actions, both as an individual or object and within a contextual collective of sentiment, culture and society (Mitrovic, 2015, p. 328). Context is formulated through the different material and ideational paradigms within which the actor is formed and interacts in, to establish that actor's world view or policy regime. Individually, actors form their world view within the contexts of their experience from within their culture, society, family, education, associations, sentiments and so on that dictate meanings and conventions of language, thought, action and interaction with other individuals and groups (Kant, 1779, p. 401; Hollis & Smith, 2009, pp. 68-70). This then establishes the enabler and inhibitor paradigms

through which an actor will exist, and therefore signifies the parameters within which the actor will act in relation to other actors – the actor’s policy regime.

This in turn provides analysis of: what is the **catalyst**; what does an action or speech act in reference to the **catalyst** mean or how is it shaped; what is the intent of the actor in adopting an action or speech act with regard to the **catalyst**;¹⁹ what is the context that the actor exists in that informs the conduct of the action or speech act in reference to the **catalyst**; did the action or speech act have the desired effect, or was it interpreted by other actors in different ways to the intended intent; in what contexts did the other actors see that **catalyst** and the actor’s action or speech act, and how did these other actors respond. In turn, how did the original actor respond to the **epiphenomena** of the other actors?

Another question to be asked is what effects the **catalyst**, the actor’s own speech act or action, and the other actor actions have on the composition of the actor itself? An actor within IR is acknowledged as an entity, but it is formed by the various contexts of its component parts and therefore is reductable.

For instance, if we take Buzan’s typology of people, institutions and concept of nationhood (Heywood, 2007, p. 91), and the relationship between them; the state’s goals, interests and attitudes do not form in a vacuum but rather form in relation to those stated domestic factors or contexts provided by the sum of its parts. These can include, incidentally, contexts influenced wholly or partially by external actors or sub-actors at the time of formation contrary to what Wendt might propose. Therefore, we can say that the internal and the external are not discreet from each other. Internal contexts form the basis for interaction with other states, and external interaction forms new contexts which in turn mediates domestic paradigms, which in turn mediates the state’s external relations and so on.

Therefore, context is conceived depending on the positionality of one actor to a **catalyst**, and its positionality to other actors, but that positionality is in flux as the relations between the actors both domestically and internationally alters their positionality. It is by studying *context* from one position or another that we gain insights into relations between two or more actors. This

¹⁹ The intent maybe to inform, galvanize or even deceive. The intent has both internal and external connotations to the actor – where for instance reference to external actors may be primarily intended for domestic audiences.

positionality exposes the underlying relational-contexts that propel those relations – although these might not be made explicit in the overt speech act or action at the time²⁰, or explain what each actor is trying to achieve in their reaction to one another. From this we can discern patterns where theories emerge, based on the true contexts that are observed in the relationship, exposing underlying causal factors that have been previously diluted, hidden or distorted.

The reader may ask now however; ‘How does the observer anchor theory against context?’ This is a very valid question, for surely there are as many contexts as there are situations and actors, and heterarchy risks becoming ‘a framework of all things’.

How can context be applied to IR theory?

Context was heavily debated by the early realists, which they could not to reconcile with their paradigms, leading to theories that avoided such an issue by pitching their epistemology at the systemic level (Jervis, 2011, pp. 40-46, Snyder, 2011, p. 59). To my mind, variables define an epistemology – how we measure, compare and contrast the world of our understanding to make sense of it. It may be said that contexts form the variables into a pattern of understanding. This pattern of understanding is stimulated when a **catalyst** provokes a certain context or contexts to come into play, which in turn exposes certain variables which enable the observer to analyze the type of relations between actors. Take any IR situation and context informs what variables are most appropriate to measure and understand issues and events, the methodology selected and how this information is presented. This dynamic necessitates the need to go in to some detail into understanding of how heterarchy acts in binding the variables it considers appropriate together into a workable semblance of understanding, through contextual-variables.

i. Contextual-Variables

The first step to applying context to theory is to identify and select a **catalyst** in the relations between actors. This provides both a starting point and points the contexts in which to contrast and compare the actors in their relationship. This context thus produces the appropriate variables to be studied and to be used as a measurement. A variable is defined as a physical property such as a material aspect that has a physical real world form, or is an ideation made physical for the purposes of analysis (Crane, 1996, p. p. 896). Because contexts provide the variables, and the variables

²⁰ For a deeper discussion and diagram on this see **Appendix B** (pages B-10 and B-11).

operate within certain contextual parameters provided by the **catalyst**, then we might call these *contextual-variables*. Contextual-variables can be said to be the sum of experiences an actor has with the variables concerned, which posits how an actor might be guided in their speech acts and actions (a policy regime) within their relations with other actors. *A suitable contextual-variable will suggest itself to the observer because it impacts on, and often overrides, other types of relations between actors, and other contextual-variables to stand out as the dominant meme within the relationship.* This then sets off **epiphenomena** as various actors react to that actor's speech act or action allowing for further observation and study.

Variable-contexts provide the motivation for a variable to be either utilized or discarded by the observer, allowing the observer to subtract and reduce study to the micro-level and/or to alternatively reconstruct to the macro-level allowing for a varied level of analysis. Heterarchy within IR has a holistic and universal view on what constitutes a variable – which allows for increased cross-disciplinary collaboration and policy relevance. Again, I would postulate variables to be ‘anything that impacts on or is impacted on by IR’, allowing for the creation of variable-categories that are only limited by human imagination. Variables can be used to answer the how, why, what, where and who questions and identify the vehicle used to implement IR policy. It is the observer that must select and define the parameters and variables that they will use, which theoretically could lead to some very original studies within the field – including collaborative ventures with other disciplines.

As stated above, the list of both **catalysts** and contextual-variables may be as many as the human mind can conceptualize. For my own conceptualization, I have grouped these into six general categories – although others might conceive these differently – in Figure 2.4.

Contextual-Variables	Description	Method of measurement	As a catalyst
Material	Anything physical - provides the ‘how’ of foreign policy.	Qualitative/quantitative. ²¹	Presence and positionality at a specified time

²¹ This implies that an observer can solely rely on the positivist criteria of materiality to describe IR conditions. While this is the easiest of IR epistemologies to use, it is certainly the most limiting in terms of understanding about what is really going on – and in addition one should consider that materiality is just the physical manifestation of ideation, interests, events, individuals and institutions.

		Policy Regimes. ²²	period initiates, changes or intensifies actor relations.
Ideational	Social constructions – provides explanations on the ‘why’ within actor actions and how catalysts are handled.	Qualitative, Policy Regimes.	Concepts of reality that clash creating contexts.
Interest	‘What’ is to be achieved, providing the motivation for action within IR.	Qualitative, Policy Regime.	Initiation of catalysts leading to use of materiality and/or ideation.
Event	Events are the ‘where’ of IR, where events result from the actions of actors in response to catalysts and other actors’ actions. Events may be manmade or natural phenomena.	Qualitative/quantitative, Policy Regimes.	As a catalyst, events present a clear point of departure for a study, where some event initiates actor actions and responses.
Personalities	The ‘who’ of IR where individuals initiate or react to catalysts. They can have undue influence on their system, or alternatively be subsumed by events.	Qualitative, Policy Regimes	Can initiate and respond to catalysts either deliberately or accidentally.

²² Contextual-variables can be understood and measured within policy regimes because policy regimes provide inhibitors and enablers in how actors handle these, showing alternating differences between various actors. More on this in **Appendix B**.

Institutional	Either traditions or institutions. ²³ Provides the vehicle for policy actions and speech acts within IR.	Qualitative, Policy Regime.	Can act as a catalyst generally when there is institutional change or crisis.
---------------	---	-----------------------------	---

In heterarchy all variables can be interlinked in various ways, at various times and in various aspects through contexts, therefore spanning both the IR and domestic realms. An easy way to organize the variables that are selected for study is to think in terms of broad contexts adopted by the actors themselves into paradigms – the constructivist norms which I referred to previously as policy regimes, allowing the observer to categorize and understand variables from an actor’s perspective; showing how each variable interconnects with other variables, and how they form a coherent policy as understood by that actor, within their contexts, and in relation to other actors. As already stated a deeper conceptualization of policy regimes and how these are used by actors can be found at **Appendix B**.

The heterarchical cycle: Practical application to empirical study


Having discussed these facets of heterarchy, it is time to put meat onto the bones – how this framework should be utilized by the observer to obtain results. I conceive of IR as being cyclic rather than liner, in that relations are not consistent or permanent but that change as the contexts within which those relations take place change, altering friend to enemy or competitor and vice versa. Hence, I would conceive a diagrammatic picture to be cyclic also. I will call this illustration the heterarchical cycle (Figure 2.5).²⁴ The cycle is convenient because it allows for repeated visitations of the subject, the relations between actors and the reinterpretations that would explain change and dynamics within IR, admit to differentiation and enable evolving interpretations of the data presented. Most of all, a cycle constantly renews itself to consider new aspects that insert

²³ Traditions are habitual ways of guiding actors in dealing with issues (normative paradigms), hence these may be referred to as policy regimes. According to Keohane and Nye (2001), domestic institutions tend to be politicized while international institutions try to be apolitical (p. 29) except, I might add, where the institution is a state. However, the international institutions are compromised when actors tend to ‘shop among forums’ to get issues raised to maximize their agenda by narrowing or broadening the agenda according to their interests (Keohane & Nye, 2001, p. 29). Institutions can be subsumed by charismatic individuals or subsume the leaders themselves and can become seen as decision makers in their own right. Institutions provide the ‘vehicle’ through which IR decisions are formed and implemented.

²⁴ The basis of this model is derived from the Military Intelligence Cycle.

themselves into the process of IR, and allows for the discarding of irrelevant material that has outlived its usefulness.

Fig 2.5 Heterarchical cycle framework



1. The catalyst is selected by the observer which establishes the starting point of the study, and that activates or stimulates the actor-relations to be observed.
2. Actor-relations may be viewed as a prism through which the meaning of the catalyst is refracted to highlight the myriad contexts of differentiated actors' interpretations of the catalyst. These refractions are projected onto the contextual-variables.
3. The contextual-variables highlight the physical manifestation of the contexts in how relations between actors are played out, allowing for identification of the most appropriate variables for study. Alternatively, this also allows the observer to posit what-if scenarios by imputing other variable-contexts not currently highlighted by apparent current situations to posit future possible outcomes.²⁵

²⁵ This is useful for the purposes of possible scenario prediction or where the picture is still unclear due to the uniqueness of the situation or catalyst; for example, the election of Trump as President as a catalyst, where it was thought such an outcome improbable and has therefore upended previous anticipated regimes and outcomes. Additionally, the recentness of the catalyst may take place where a clear picture is yet to emerge and multiple possible contextual-variables could possibly come into the mix. Here the observer may select what they consider

4. The observer collects the relevant data by studying the engaged actor policy regimes in response to the catalyst and in response to other actor actions. This allows for the observation of the workings of actor policy regimes: dominant memes or policies; dominant groups and individuals; who or what is excluded and why; and, the strengths and weaknesses of the policy regime. This allows the IR observer to go into the actor's domestic situation to analyze what impacts and does not impact of an actor's foreign policy making process.
5. All relevant actors' contexts are brought together (collated) from their various perspectives to form a picture or pattern. Here the observer compares and contrasts the differing actor policy regimes to measure the effect of the contextual-variables upon each actor that the **catalyst** has stimulated.
6. The data is evaluated and a determination is made explaining why the actors act in the way that they do. This might take the form of either a specific theory or provide a general framework that can act as a guide to anticipate future actions.
7. The findings are disseminated to the relevant stakeholders.
8. The contextual-variables are then reassessed in the light of the information that has been collected, collated and re-evaluated. This is because the processes within the heterarchical cycle takes place over time.²⁶ Because of this time factor, even during the three afore

the most probable and highlight these. Alternatively, the observer may posit black swan events by throwing alternate unlikely but possible contextual-variables into the situation to look at and highlight other outcomes as warnings to policy makers that things might go in other unanticipated directions, thus helping to soften shocks within the IR system and allowing for alternative preparations. The observer may also throw in 'What if' scenarios by inserting catalysts that have yet to happen to predict likely outcomes to events. This scenario forming is guided by already extant actor outcomes predicated on existing policy regimes, personalities, capabilities and so on. This allows the heterarchical cycle to be used either premeditatively or in reaction to some catalyst.

²⁶ 'Time is the dimension of change' (Lowe, 1995, p. 875). Because the observer selects the catalyst and actors for study at Point A on a notional time line, by the time that they have disseminated their findings – and even before that - the catalyst and actors have changed and evolved their relations further along that same time line. This is because over time the actors have calibrated their actions and reacted to each other's calibration; and in addition, other catalysts, contextual-variables and even other actors have inserted themselves – or been inserted - into the process to change the issues that may have be presented in the study. As we cannot stop time, and therefore change, the observer is required to revisit their observations to bring these up to date, to establish new understandings that occurred in the intervening period. This leads to new predictions that may validate the previous findings, or alternatively posit new insights into the future.

mentioned processes, information will continue to come in that will change or confirm previous information and may be added into the evaluation process.

9. This leads the observer to a reflective process through which they assess how the information has changed their knowledge and understandings of the world. The observer also reflects upon their study and re-examines it in the light of these new understandings. The observer asks: Have actor relations changed, and if so in what way; Has the catalyst remained relevant or has it changed, and if so what impact does this have on the contextual-variables; Are the contextual-variables still relevant, and therefore my original study remains validated, or are there new aspects that need to be considered? Most importantly for the observer, is to reflect upon if there is any change then why and how has this change occurred. For the observer, if there has been a change then the cycle repeats itself to find new understandings. In theory, this process is continuous – but for practical purposes may be revisited by the observer at any time.

With the tenants of heterarchy explained and a framework presented, let us now look at where heterarchy and the other IR schools diverge on their concepts of IR. Here we go back to the question asked in the introduction about why there is a need for another IR paradigm.

Chapter Two: Structuralism and heterarchical criticisms.

This chapter discusses the concerns heterarchy has about structuralist IR schools. To begin this discussion, we need to acknowledge that humans think relationally-contextually. That is, that we – the self - are described and defined in relation to the other – that which is outside self, and within the contexts that self finds itself in. However, many theories and models constrict these relational-contexts into previously conceived paradigms formed within another context, that in turn limit and confine understandings of reality. This phenomenon I refer to as the **paradigmatic feedback loop**, which as time progresses – that is when context changes – static models become more divorced from reality. This I see as the key problem with the structuralist IR paradigms.

If it is thought reasonable that humans think relationally-contextually, then the study of IR can be said to be the study of actors' international relations with and in comparison, to one another. Therefore, these relations can only be understood within the contexts that the actors perceive those relations, and therefore within the contexts through which the observer studies them. The study of IR cannot exist without an understanding of relations within contexts, or in other words relational-contexts. If this premise is agreed upon, then we might say that relational-contexts become the focus of our understanding within IR rather than the study of the actors' themselves. This is a relationalist argument compared to that of substantialist epistemologies 'where the focus is upon the actors themselves as standalone and already formed entities' (Crossley, 2005, p. 266).

The problem heterarchy has with the structuralists begins with the concept of anarchy, of which heterarchy offers a relational-contextual interpretation – what it is, how it is formed and how actors interact within it. In this chapter I compare heterarchy's interpretation of anarchy with the structuralist arguments. Because many IR schools argue from a systemic level, we must first start by highlighting what they say systemically about their interpretations of anarchy that I find contentious. These are; 1) imposing order upon anarchy, 2) the twin dilemmas of measurement and diffuse variables, 3) non-differentiation, 4) substantivism – which includes discussions on structural constructivism, and 5) rationality. We will then posit an alternative heterarchical view of anarchy answering these issues in reverse order to arrive at a new understanding of anarchy as a clash of contexts.

Structuralist Anarchy

Neo-realist Polarity Theory and neoliberal Interdependence Theory are based on the premise that the international system is anarchic (Waltz, 1979, p. 111; Buzan, 1984, p. 622; Keohane & Nye, 2001, p. 10; Goodard & Nexon, 2003, p. 30; Hollis & Smith, 2009, pp. 26, 34). This translates to a lack of international government and shared enforceable norms, where anarchy is ‘an issue that is especially privileged and studied within the IR field’ (Goodard & Nexon, 2003, p. 12). IR theorists have explained this absence of common authority to make internationally abiding rules through ‘ironically’ imposing order upon anarchy to explain it from a rationalist-positivist perspective (Hollis & Smith, 2009, p. 72). This is along the same lines that I think Ogilvy and Jackson tried to explain their ideas on heterarchy, and this positionality explains why, in my opinion, Ogilvy admittedly failed in his attempts to achieve ‘a heterarchical theory’ (Ogilvy, 2016, February 3).

i. Structuralist Anarchy: A positivist-substantivist approach

Waltz (1979) came to provide the definitive definition of what anarchy looks like (Snyder, 2011, p. 67) from a structuralist perspective. Here he said that structure dominantly influences the agent, leading to a systemic perspective (Hollis & Smith, 2009, p. 108). Although structuralists admitted micro-factors had some impact (the influence of agents or actors within and upon the system), they could not aggregate diffuse sub-systemic actions up into a holistic systematic theory (Goodard & Nexon, 2003, p. 14).²⁷ The later neoliberal institutionalists followed this pattern set by the neo-realists for the same reason (Keohane, 1990, p. 40; Ruggie, 2001, p. 96). Both schools saw actors as seeking survival and security within this anarchic system through self-help, where rational

²⁷ Later realists tried to resolve this agent-structure dilemma. For example; Schweller (2004) said that the way states act turns on the preferences of policy elites within the state, taking into consideration more internal domestic rather than external risks, and on whether there is both a willingness and ability to do one action or another (p. 266). The domestic factors Schweller proposed were elite consensus, regime vulnerability, along with social and elite cohesion (p. 267). Therefore, he refutes Waltz by stating that there is no ‘structural-imperative’ forced upon states by which the IR system dictates to them to act in one way or another if internal conditions have not been met. While I agree with this, Schweller puts most emphasis on the elites and not on other sub-actors who may have a larger impact than he gives them credit for. He also omits the influence of outside actors to influence the elites or other actors within society – for instance the impact of communism on both Western elites and non-elites in the 20th Century. Also, there is no room for context that may change the dynamic as to when a state may disregard an action one day and as the situation changes adopt that action the next.

actors acted to protect their interests (Waltz, 1979, p. 117; Ruggie, 2001, p. 96; Goodard & Nexon, 2003, p. 13; O'Brien & Williams, 2010, p. 32).

Hence, IR came to be understood as a struggle between actors within a system that generated anarchy to varying degrees, according to their differing epistemological prescriptions. However, these perspectives generate problems in reflecting theory back on to the real world, by applying epistemological academic gymnastics in attempting to impose order upon anarchy, thereby creating a **paradigmatic feedback loop**.

ii. Imposing order upon anarchy

So, having stated that the IR system was anarchic, structuralists then needed to describe what the system itself looked like and how it facilitated the interaction of its component actor parts, in order to form theories upon which to base their studies of IR in the real world. In imposing order upon anarchy, in the form of structural hierarchies, this gave the IR system form and therefore allow for conceptualization.

Waltz (1979) compared the state - which he conceived of as being a hierarchy of power featuring order, specialization, subordination and superordinate relations between the component parts - with that of the anarchic international system (where actors' interests are paramount and who 'self-helped' themselves to ensure their interests, being primarily survival and/or expansion against other actors (p. 111; Hollis & Smith, 2009, p. 108)).

Waltz then imposed this hierarchical structure from the state onto the international system in order to make sense of it.²⁸ In Waltz's version of this 'hierarchical anarchy', he said that this 'self-help' was mainly manifest in the form of alliances predicated on a social division of labour into different tasks (Waltz, 1979, p. 115),²⁹ that is in producing a hierarchy of actors defined by their specialties.

²⁸ Psychologically hierarchy makes sense to humans, where it has a long and influential pedigree because it: provides avoidance of chaos to produce discipline and order; provides clarity and certainty; and, motivates actors to climb a ladder in competition with other actors (Fairtlough, 2005, pp. 39-41)

²⁹ Schweller (2001), quoting Schmitt, states that realists see politics and alliances as synonymous with each other (p. 239). Politics is seen as denoting degrees of association (*alliances or at least converging interests*) and separation (*enemies or diverging interests*) – with an emphasis on privileging the enemy – hence alliances are formed specifically against and only derivatively for someone or something. Therefore, according to realists, alliances demonstrate state responses to threats and opportunities that create action and reaction (derived from Liska, Schweller, 2001, p. 249). *I would say therefore that realist and neo-realist theory privileges alliances over independent individual actors operating within the IR system – to the extent of disregarding other IR relationships.*

These alliances have within them economically and militarily dominant actors, who control the particular alliance, thereby ‘limiting and restraining the sovereignty of other actors’ (Waltz, 1979, p. 115).³⁰ This allowed for a direct comparison and ranking of states for analysis within the anarchic system. The only way that the IR system could change is if there were to be a change in the distribution of capabilities – ‘a shift within the polar structure’ (Waltz, 1979, p. 131), where states would change position but the structure would remain the same. This gives neo-realist theory its stability and accounts for its longevity within IR academia.

Neoliberals also adopted hierarchies to impose an orderly explanation of anarchy. Sensitivities and vulnerabilities of actors are exposed by the actions of other actors leading to a forming of protective alliances (Held, McGrew, Goldblatt & Perraton, 1999, p. 4). These alliances were based on a division of labour - referred to as comparative advantage - where actors use what they could produce more efficiently to bind other actors, who needed the good or service being produced, to assist in their protection (Held, McGrew, Goldblatt & Perraton, 1999, p. 4). This forms interdependencies where the focus is upon those actors ‘that can set the rules of the game’ (Keohane & Nye, 2001, p. 12), that is, actors’ who are less sensitive and vulnerable to variations (p. 128). This dependency upon those actors who control the norms leads to hegemonic interdependence – a form of hierarchy - where the actors with the power to make the rules can manipulate the system to their advantage (Keohane & Nye, 2001, p. 16). This goes back to Waltz, who claimed that the structure made actors conform to what he called **selection and socialization** based on the norms set by dominant actors (Waltz, 1979, p. 131; 2000, p. 8). These were referred to as ‘structural imperatives’ (Brown & Ainley, 2009, p. 66), claims that institutional neoliberals agreed with, but taken from an international institutional rather than primarily state perspective (Keohane, 2002, p. 16).

In both cases, neo-realists and neoliberal institutionalists claim that differing hierarchies compete against each other for power or dominance – in other words they are **uninodalic**, where the focus is on the system between these groupings to explain anarchy, through the explanation of ordered conflict or competition, such as between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

³⁰ As Fairtlough (2005) points out, hierarchy focuses attention on the higher ordered actors and ‘imposes’ certain assumptions upon observers about those actors further down the hierarchy – about how they act within the hierarchy and their relations with the higher ordered actors (p. 42, also see Ogilvy, 2016, February 3).

iii. Twin dilemmas: Measurement and diffuse variables

Making the anarchic system ‘orderly’ to explain how it worked created twin dilemmas for the structuralists. Firstly, how could the structuralists measure a systemic system, and what produced that measurement? The second dilemma was how to nullify or control the diverse variations thrown up by actors within the system that were generated by context to produce action and reaction?

In answer to the first dilemma, the realist solution was to reduce the variables to ‘materialities of power’ (Goodard & Nexon, 2003, p. 14),³¹ which conveniently ignored the messy ideational variables that would cloud the hierarchical description of anarchy as an ordered and deferential system, allowing the claim to be made that they were following positivist scientific principles (Haas & Haas, 2002, p. 583). This outcome was a direct consequence of imposing hierarchy upon anarchy – producing a one dimensionality in Ogilvy’s words (1977, p. 7) – that ignored other types and patterns of relationships where **catalysts** intruded upon the system to change the dynamics and relationships between actors. The measurement of these limited variables allowed actors to be ranked in terms of hierarchies from dominant to subordinate, key to forming neo-realist Polarity Theory. These power materialities determined the locus of study as being nation-states because they were the only actors with both military and economic variables. Therefore, predicated on this materiality the neo-realists could demonstrate who was dominant, who was subordinate and who was in competition, which in turn led to predictions on how each actor would act within IR.

The liberals lowered the significance of the military aspects of the realists to concentrate on economics (Keohane, 2002, p. 1). Liberal institutionalists recognized the rising power of Multinational Corporations (MNCs), Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) and International Governance Organizations (IGOs) along-side states as actors within IR, reflecting the rise of neo-classical economics and the emphasis on markets and globalization. Here, power was no longer a measure of the number of tanks within an actor’s inventory, but the ranking of GDP scores (Hindmoor, 2010, p. 44). This focused attention on those states and institutions that had the power to set norms as the economically dominant actors, and on those that pushed against these norms

³¹ These realist materialities of power were military and economic variables.

(Keohane & Nye, 2001, pp. 15-16). In this way, the neo-liberals formed their Interdependence Theory based again on hierarchies.

As to the second dilemma of how to nullify diverse variations thrown up by actors within the system, the structuralists telescoped the established military and economic variables down into a focus on interests and power of actors, ‘leading to a parsimonious or synthetic theory’ (Goodard & Nexon, 2003, p. 13). Actors would take on the structuralist imperatives of the system as their core reason for being. Military and economic variables therefore defined the actors’ *raison d’être* for existing, in achieving and measuring their interests. This allowed structuralists to control the variables and quantify them for ordered study in stable theory forming, rather than having to deal with the messy variables of reality which defied quantitative ordered analysis. Therefore, realism spoke to what might be called ‘security-man’ just as the liberals spoke to ‘economics-man’ as the rationales for actors’ various interests, ignoring again the differing ideational and material properties of individual actors that could impact on, and might be impacted upon by IR (Singer, 1961, p. 81). This simplified the empirical research needed to form theory and produced a simplified system model that conformed to theory rather than to reality.³²


Even so, the structuralists were still confronted with the reality that actors do ‘break IR laws that can have such wide-ranging effects’ upon the system (Jervis, 2011, p. 39)? The question was what to do about this reality that upset the structuralist theories? The solution was to lead to a slavish devotion on systemic theories leading to attempts to explain away or ignore deviances creating again a **paradigmatic feedback loop**. For example; if states looked to their own interests, then why did Britain, Italy and France capitulate to Hitler at Munich; or, the US not invade North Vietnam during the Second Indo-China War? This would indicate a need to approach IR sub-systemically and within each actor’s contexts. However, the answer that the realists gave was that the leaders misperceived the situation or miscalculated what to do with their power (Hollis & Smith, 2009, p. 63), thereby avoiding contradicting theory. Furthermore, Waltz argued that to go into the sub-systemic would lead to reductivism,³³ while a discrete and irriductable systemic level

³² To my mind, this enabled the introduction of qualitative measurement into IR, so that realists and liberals of all hues could claim that Political Science – and especially IR – was positivistic, objective and therefore scientific in the sense of the natural sciences. This would then make IR a predictive tool with the near immutable laws of nature.

³³ That is where a sub-systemic theory could not be extrapolated upwards to the systemic (Goodard & Nexon, 2003, p. 22).

analysis would allow understandings that could be transferred and applied sub-systemically (Goodard & Nexon, 2003, p. 22). ‘This makes the model comprehensible and manageable requiring little sophistication or onerous empiricism’ (Singer, 1961, p. 80). Waltz thus argued for two interacting levels – the domestic and the international. The domestic was to be placed outside the international system, where foreign policy would be generated from the domestic to inform but not be part of IR (Goodard & Nexon, 2003, pp. 23-24). Liberal institutionalists argued much the same case, especially in their promotion of the importance of international institutions in forming normative paradigms (Keohane, 1990, p. 45). Goodard and Nexon produced the model below (Figure 3.1) to explain the positivist thinking on the matter. Hence actors lacked differentiation that would individuate them within the IR system and theory making could therefore be systemic – leading to grand theory analysis.

Fig 3.1: Diagram of Waltz’s concept of interaction between the state and IR system (Goodard & Nexon, 2003, p. 23)



iv. *Non-differentiation*

Realists argue that all actors are ‘rationally’ self-interested in survival and/or expansion at the expense of other actors. Actions were maximized based upon interests – where *real politik* utilizes actors power based on their materiality, leading to non-differentiation internally (Waltz, 1979, p.

117; Guilhot, 2011b, p. 3).³⁴ ³⁵ Liberals similarly see actors as unable to differentiate between predatory actors, and ‘those intent only on beefing up their security’, hence presenting a security dilemma (Wallander & Keohane, 1999, p. 91). This includes dissatisfied actors who push against the norm setters in an attempt to change norms to their advantage, if they can do so at a reasonable cost (Keohane & Nye, 2001, pp. 15-16).

In these approaches the state is hived off from the international system, making any ideational and other materiality factors irrelevant and impenetrable to the gaze of observers and other actors, hence no need for differentiation. This forces an actor to conform to a certain ‘type’ within the international system leading to predictability that therefore simplifies the theory making process, going back to the second structuralist dilemma, in negating any diverse variations that are thrown up by actors not following Waltz’s ‘structural imperatives to conform’ (Waltz, 1979, p. 128).

v. *Substantivism*

The need to measure materiality and the separation of the IR realm from the state necessitated the structuralists becoming positivist. Positivists contend that the world should be studied scientifically along the methodological lines of the natural sciences (Crossley, 2005, p. 247). The problem however, is that because social sciences deal with human interactions and relations, and because humanity is arguably a variable that does not lend itself well to the same disciplinary and measurement constraints that exist within the natural world, they cannot easily be quantified into scientific formulas.³⁶ Therefore, when Morgenthau, one of the founders of realism stated; “Politics must be understood through reason, yet it is not in reason that it finds its model”, he was noting that anarchy – created by humans and within which humans operate – that is it creates *differing*

³⁴ This is also applicable, using structuralist theory, in the IR realm where actors become clones of each other, if as posited, the internal structures of an actor are the same as that of all other actors. This then would extrapolate up easily into the IR realm for quick and standardized explanation and analysis.

³⁵ I would note therefore that this would force neo-realists to equate capabilities of materiality with intent. For example, why build a powerful military if you are not intent on using it. This thinking and observation would be in line with Schmitt’s thinking as outlined by Schweller (see p. 42, note 38).

³⁶ Both Skidelsky (2017, February 23), and Akerlof and Schiller (2009, p. 16) argue that humans are ‘often’ creatures of habit – and therefore in a sense predictable – even when it is not in their interests to do so, however, when the context changes so do human habits thus upsetting predictive models. Additionally, even within a set context not all humans are creatures of habit all the time – which makes a mockery of models – unlike in most cases within the natural sciences. Hence, humans can be contrarian in going against the habitual flow of the majority if they think it is to their advantage (from an idea derived from Dreman, 1998, pp. 27-28). The same contrarian flow can be seen in IR, where for instance, some states, organizations or leaders go against the neo-liberal hegemonic policy regime.

contexts - does not lend itself to scientific rationality (Guilhot, 2011a, p. 2). The taking of this position forced realism – and later liberals - to form foundationalist epistemologies. This led along the path to scientific rationalism (Guilhot, 2011a, p. 2), in trying to measure anarchy – a systemic environment that is by definition unmeasurable. These forced positivists to focus on the few observables which are stable and consistent, and therefore can be measured qualitatively, rather than on unstable variables formed by *context* which are considered to be metaphysical and therefore unscientific (Crossley, 2005, p. 247). This leads to substantivism.

Substantivism focuses on the object or the actor, where its core is unchanging, where it remains the same despite any new features added, old features lost or situations that may change; but where this sameness also allows it to initiate actions and causalities (Abraham, 1995, p. 858). In IR, substantivism focuses on an actor within IR because the actor is real, observable and considered stable, but whereas its relations with other actors are considered unobservable due to their continually changing nature, and where '*context of relations*' is viewed as irrelevant (Crossley, 2005, p. 266). Substantivism therefore allows the actor to be unchanged by other actors' actions – that is the actor has fixed material properties which are measurable, and yet it is able to initiate actions itself within the IR realm which because of their fluidity are supposedly immeasurable – presenting a contradiction.

Within substantivism however, must be included a brief discussion on structural constructivism. Unlike neo-realism and institutional liberalism this model, on the surface, be seen as relational nor be situated within the foundationalism. But if we take Qin's (2016) understanding of what he calls 'structural constructivism', then this epistemology becomes substantivist (p. 34). Structural constructivism's biggest champion is Wendt. He concentrated on actor identity, which was formed within the state from its component parts, which in turn defined actor interests (Wendt, 1994, p. 385; Zehfuss, 2007, p. 12). It is observed however that it is only once that actor identity is formed and goes out into the international system where it becomes mitigated by a 'self'/'other' dichotomy through collective action – a reprising of Waltz's agent-structure debate (Wendt, 1994, p. 386), Thus it becomes substantivist in nature. The already formed identity is presented to the world absent external influences and internal mediated differences that went into its creation. Wendt also does not speak of the possibility of actor identity change.

Structuralist approaches ignore the relationship between the actor and the contexts in which relations may change the actor itself, and change relationships between actors', both domestically and internationally. This suggests that relationships and 'ideational factors are merely the causal effects of materiality whose pressures on the international system override the differing forms of life or ideologies' (Hollis & Smith, 2009, p. 85). Alternatively, structural constructivists posit that identity and interests are already formed once the actor reaches the international system, and only then do events become causal effects that determine what structure will prevail (Zehfuss, 2007, p. 14). This is the opposite of relationalism, where the focus is on the relations between actors that gives identity through social construction. Lastly, because the positivist ontology is deemed to be rational, its materiality provides the motivations and incentives for actors to act within IR, establishing the reasons why IR actors act in the way that they do.

vi. Rationality

To positivists an actor was deemed to be rational in pursuing its interests in a calculated and efficient manner based on cost/benefit analysis of the available choices (Crossley, 2005, p. 238). Waltz and his disciples took their rationality from neoclassical economics in the form of Rational Choice Theory straight out of the Chicago School of Economics (Brown & Ainley, 2009, p. 43), and given the economic focus of the liberals, Rational Choice Theory was a natural fit (Kratochwil, 2006, p. 41; Roberts, 2007, p. 19; Brown & Ainley, 2009, p. 46). Here the structuralists reduced society to rational beings, which was then extrapolated and aggregated up from the individual to the state, and to state action within the IR system, leading them to posit assumptions about the nature of IR (Poast, 2016, p 396). The Rational Actor model within IR posits that units think and act rationally, each taking account of the behavior of other actors as a way of generalizing to form systemic theories, and this gives evidence about how representatives of these actors think (Hollis & Smith, 2009, p. 119) for predictive purposes. Some 'liberal rationalists' like Moravcsik (1997) maintain that this rationality lay within ascendant groups that control the actor's preferences and

shape the actor's behavior from a sub-systemic level, that is nonideological and nonutopian in nature (p. 518)^{37 38}.

Positivist rationality suggests that humans are rational and self-interested actors, being predictable in 'working from the perspective of cost/benefit analysis and amenable (*easily observable*) to casual analysis' (Crossley, 2005, p. 238). Morgenthau called for scholars of IR to understand decision-makers as maximizing their utility when acting within the IR realm³⁹, as at least a starting assumption, where IR was conceived as a market in which its moving force was maximization (Hollis & Smith, 2009, p. 76). This assumes that the actor has:

1. fully ordered preferences that are consistent;
2. that the actor has perfect information where its beliefs are rational and where it can at least subjectively – if not objectively - calculate the probability of possible consequences; and
3. that the actor processes accurate information allowing it to make both inductive and deductive inferences to come to sound decisions (Hollis & Smith, 2009, p. 75).

Structuralists contend that actors never make inferior choices, and that the actor is a bargain-hunter within IR (Hollis & Smith, 2009, p. 75) in seeking out the most cost-effective and rational outcomes.⁴⁰

How then, are these structuralist assertions understood from a relational-contextual perspective, from heterarchy?

³⁷ The state becomes a representative institution capable of capture and recapture, construction and reconstruction as different coalitions of social actors vie for power and influence. The institution forms a transmission belt by which the hegemonic coalition of the day transmits their preferences into state policy – a transfer of private preferences that are unable to be met in the private sphere elevated up to the public realm; which constrain governments due to the underlying power, identities and interests of the dominant group's preferences rather than for the good of the collective whole. In other words, this represents a policy regime.

³⁸ This in some ways mirrored by Schweller's (2004) policy elite preferences, however Schweller, unlike Moravcsik, does show elites considering domestic factors (p. 266) – that is at least some consideration of other group needs if their policies are to be successfully enacted – what Schweller refers to as social cohesion and stability.

³⁹ Morgenthau's reference to utility referred to the power of the state harnessed within IR to affect outcome.

⁴⁰ The issue here is that 'rational' is defined as what is reasonable under the circumstances (Skidelsky, 2017, February 23). Skidelsky rightly points out is that when actors are accused of being 'irrational', it is generally arrogantly assumed by the actor assigning that label to another actor – that the same circumstances the actor perceives itself to operate in exists for all actors. Hence, they fail to understand – or do not wish to contemplate - the differing contexts of other actors whose actions may be perfectly rational within their own contexts.

Heterarchical Anarchy: The relational-contextual argument

Heterarchy agrees that the IR system is anarchic. However, structuralist arguments only really make sense if the system were hierarchical (that is that the system has a law-giver and a law enforcer) rather than anarchic (Hollis & Smith, 2009, p. 89). This premise forces both realists and liberals to only focus on the systemic IR level (Buzan & Waever, 2003, p. 28), which they telescope down onto interstate relations (p. 30). In doing so, these utilitarian epistemologies do not need to consider state or domestic peculiarities and ideational factors that affect individual state interests and patterns (Buzan, 1984, p. 621; Jackson & Nexon, 1999, p. 295; Gooddard & Nexon, 2012, p. 22), in other words ‘*contexts*’. If we agree with this as an accurate interpretation of structuralist epistemologies; and if we also agree with Waltz’s (1979) contention that in the international system there can be only either be a hierarchy (that is imposed order and control); or anarchy (that is an absence of formal international governance systems) (p. 114), then depending upon which structural form we select informs the level of theory making as being *either* systemic or sub-systemic.

If it is accepted that the IR situation is hierarchical, as when Waltz telescoped his ordered state structure up to the systemic level, then it makes sense to have macro-systemic IR theories, which would be applied across the whole system with relational-contexts and **catalysts** being irrelevant. There would be very little empirical deviation leading to absolute predictability between the models and the real world. IR could then be a ‘true’ discipline devoted to studying IR systems, using positivist methodology, and would not need to study micro-theories outside this context. It would become a natural science rather than a social one.

Because of the structuralist use of hierarchy leading to the view of IR from a systemic perspective, I would argue that this has directed their studies in certain ways that constrict and inhibit alternative understandings of IR which has gone on to produce a consistent **paradigmatic feedback loop**. Firstly; a hierarchy brings the focus upon the actors and where they are positioned rather than the relations between the actors. Because of the hierarchical structure where some actors dominate over others – even if only implied - certain assumptions are made about how actors at various levels within the hierarchy act. The system becomes driven by the most ‘dominant’ actors where observers assume that lower rung actors will act accordingly to the hegemonic dictates. This then

focuses the locus of study on the top rung actors and hence the study becomes self-limiting and substantivist.

The nuances of the relationships, the subtle and not so subtle differences, the alternative power relationships and IR structures are missed or ignored. This leads to **catalysts** that cause relationship changes within IR to be missed or as being ignored as unimportant to the system and to actors as a whole. Secondly; studies will then focus on the dominant actor's materialities of power.⁴¹ This means that other variables and their influences are missed and therefore not studied, even when they have impact upon IR, if only because they fail to fit within the paradigms of the structuralists. Thirdly; hierarchy suggests that actors are unitary, that they act with one voice and have policy consistency (Rosenau & Durfee, 1995, p. 12). Lastly; hierarchy suggests stability and continuity, and therefore hierarchy does not welcome the change and chaos that occurs in real life. Rosenau and Durfee (1995) suggest that realism was founded upon continuity and stability, hence the realist models, and those of other schools that imitate them, find it hard to posit change (p. 7). In fact, one might suggest that the maintenance of hierarchy becomes the objective of the structuralists because it reinforces their paradigms and this leads to the deliberate ignoring of anything that may upset this arrangement. This forces structuralists to posit systematic formulations rather than sub-structural because hierarchy imposes systemic thinking upon its practitioners by its very nature.

Heterarchy however argues that as the system is anarchic it defies hierarchical paradigms that the structuralists wish to impose upon IR. Heterarchy instead purposes that IR anarchy can only be described 'relationally-contextually', which then changes the dynamics within which anarchy is observed and studied, transferring analysis from the structural to the sub-structure. *Heterarchy would posit that anarchy is not caused by 'self-help' interested actors colliding but instead it becomes a clash of contexts to varying degrees based on each actor's concept of reality. Those realities become dynamic when a catalyst is introduced into the sub-structure which activates, stimulates or changes the contexts within which relations take place.*

The idea that heterarchy might be descriptive of anarchy comes from Ogilvy (2016, February 19), where he said that heterarchy "mediated the **dialectic** between hierarchy and anarchy" – that is that heterarchy explains the interaction and relationship between hierarchy and anarchy. Because

⁴¹ Military and economics for the neo-realists, economics for the liberal institutionalists, identity for the social constructivists and norms for the normative constructivists.

Ogilvy (2016, February 3) in his earlier explanation on heterarchy uses the term ‘*real politik*’ in explaining how actors act within IR, I understand his concept of anarchy to mean that; he sees it as variable according to the understandings of the various actors; an idea more in accordance with Wendt’s dictum of ‘anarchy being what one makes of it’, (Wendt, 1994, p. 338). However, this anarchy can only be studied when a **catalyst** is introduced, and we can only observe its capacity within the sub-structure if we were to take a relationalist-contextualist rather than a substantivist approach. This leads to a deeper discussion of anarchy from a heterarchical perspective.

i. Context as Anarchy at a sub-systemic level

How heterarchy describes anarchy begs two questions: ‘If context produces and represents anarchy at a systemic level, does context present anarchy sub-systemically or even domestically; and, ‘If a **catalyst** is required to set off anarchy, can this occur at any level?’ The answer to both questions must be an emphatic affirmative and we must accept that anarchy is prevalent at all levels – both in relations between actors and within the constituent parts of actors themselves. At all levels the **catalyst** sets off a chain reaction, which is only becomes observed through the relational-contexts generated between actors and sub-actors.⁴² Positivists ignore the **catalyst** because their variables are a given – that is materialities of power – and hence, because they are stable and fixed – where ‘real life’ does not intrude upon them.

But anarchy itself takes different forms, conceived within the reality as understood by each actor. To illustrate this I refer to Wendt and his different levels and conceptions of anarchy - that is Hobbesian, Lockeian and Kantian in his interpretation (Wendt, 1992, pp. 408-418; Kratochwil, 2006, p. 31).⁴³ Wendt was highlighting that these anarchical conceptions dwell within the contexts as they are conceived by the actors in relations with other actors – but this is only works at a sub-systemic IR level. For instance; you can have a Kantian anarchy of relations between Australia

⁴² For example; the Tutsi tribe in Rwanda revolt against the Hutu Government. This is a **catalyst** which affects not only the relational-contexts between the two tribes domestically, but internationally sub-systemically where for instance Uganda supports the rebellion and the Democratic Republic of Congo, France and Burundi support the Government. The impending Hutu defeat then led to the genocide of the Tutsi population still under Hutu control, that then elevated this **catalyst** up to systemic level with major actors having input at the UN. But these actions could only be observed through the contexts within the relations between the various actors, and within the system itself.

⁴³ I use Wendt’s example only because the argument has already been formed and is familiar to many IR academics. There is nothing to stop anyone from formulating other types of anarchy at another time or space outside this thesis. Heterarchy would conceive this as entirely legitimate and as being within relational-contexts, entirely in keeping with both an actor’s and observer’s perceptions of reality.

and New Zealand within their contexts. At the other end of the scale of anarchy could be the current relations between Russia and the Ukraine which is very much Hobbesian. These relations change and evolve as the contexts change creating variations and changes within anarchy – that is within the contexts that actors conceive relations.


To illustrate anarchy in relations I have created a horizontal/vertical matrix which we might call the Anarchy/Relationship Matrix to aid in this understanding (Figure 3.2). This is designed to show a representational scale placing actor-to-actor relations along each axis giving an indicative ranking for how much anarchy is inherent within a given relationship – that is where various contexts clash, and where actor relations are on the relationship scale, taken from the perspective of the first actor listed within the relationship.

1. At the very low end of the scale we have the New Zealand-Australian relationship from a New Zealand perspective, which is at the extreme end of Kantian Anarchy and therefore extremely stable. However, if there were to be a large dispute over trade or defence - provided by some unforeseen **catalyst** - then the relationship might change to position 1a. At the other end of the scale you have the ISIS-World relationship which is vectored at extreme conflict (total war) and shows the extreme definition of Hobbesian anarchy – that is peace can only exist with the destruction of the one or the other actor.
2. Ukraine-Russia and Russia-US relations show differing perspectives at a chosen point in time, and as context and relations change. These pairings move up or down, left or right accordingly.
3. The Australian-Timor relationship from an Australian perspective is different from the Timorese perspective, hence the two separate vectors showing differing perspectives, allowing diffuse measurements and alternative descriptions of the phenomena. Here observers can study the underlying contexts of the differing perspectives indicating how both see a particular **catalyst** in their relationship – in this case the dispute over the oil and gas reserves in the Timor Sea stemming from the 1979 Timor Gap agreement ceding most maritime resources in the Timorese Sea to Australia in return for Australian recognition of Indonesian sovereignty of

East Timor. Even though Indonesia no longer is in control of East Timor the Australians still argue for the status-quo.

- 4. The transitional zone shows states moving from peace to conflict or vice-versa, and from one anarchy to another. This zone indicates changes are occurring in how actors view their relationship with the other actor. Actors in this zone more likely balance or hedge their relationships. In this example, the South China Seas issue and Chinese fishing encroachment on Indonesian waters is changing the relationship, as is the Apple-EU relationship over disputed taxes.

Fig 3.2



If anarchy – context - holds between actors, then it must also hold for the constituent parts of the actors themselves – especially those aspects that go into foreign policy making, and that are

impacted upon by IR. Therefore, if anarchy exists domestically for an actor then this means that the ordered Waltzian (1979) reality of the hierarchical state (p. 111) cannot be present.⁴⁴ This must mean that context between the constituent parts of an actor create anarchic conditions.

In politics, we may say that context is power, or the access to power. Whoever has control of the overriding definition of context has power. Power is contested and this creates politics allowing for conflict and/or cooperation (Heywood, 2007, p. 4). Just as in IR, different contexts of differing materiality, ideation and interests that exist within an actor can collide creating anarchy – even conflict through its reductable parts. It becomes the actor’s job to mediate and mitigate these differing contexts between its component parts as it perceives these conflicts, contexts which may have implications internationally as well as domestically. For example: democracy is anarchic, in that within the contexts presented at a certain time will define who will rule. You can never be sure that the best candidate will win – and if it is the best candidate - by whose context is ‘best’ defined as. Consider BREXIT, the recent US elections, or the hesitation of the West to support democratic projects in the Middle East where candidates the West does not like might possibly come to office. Added to this is that even the ‘best’ government with the ‘best’ policies must act within the contexts that are presented to it, which will likely distort policy, mediating it from the original intent.⁴⁵ If an actor is able to mediate the differing contexts, then you have states like New Zealand where anarchy is kept at a very low level; if on the other hand the actor fails to mediate anarchy between its component parts then you could have an actor such as Syria and its civil war. Hence, anarchy as context permeates the entire system where domestic anarchy permeates the international and where international anarchy permeates the domestic. This interaction of context as anarchy permits the observer to delve below the level of the state to divine the factors that go towards making foreign policy and to study the impacts of IR on the domestic.


⁴⁴ Heterarchy does not dispute that the state is conceptually conceived for analytical purposes as hierarchical in the structure of its governance or its society, or that there are no overarching domestic governance and law making/enforcement mechanisms; but, that it is subject to heterarchical laws on hierarchy as outlined in **Appendix B** (see page B-3). In brief, heterarchy makes the argument that sub-state actors, just like IR actors, are **polycentric** and **multinodalic**. These sub-state actors act within the contexts that they perceive **catalysts**, to create a situation between materiality, ideation and interests; which in turn leads a state to produce a need for policies to mediate issues and problems caused by the **catalysts** if the system is not to become moribund or break apart.

⁴⁵ That is the policy regimes and **catalysts** force a convergence between reality and policy. There is a saying somewhere that exemplifies this; foreign policy is what the President intends to do; foreign affairs are what results when foreign policy meets reality’ – in other words foreign policy meets differing contexts.

The same Anarchy/Relationship Matrix (Figure 3.3) can be applied to relational-contexts between the actor's various constituent parts, as described for Figure 3.2. This shows what societal, economic and cultural elements are key to the actor, and what are excluded in foreign policy formation at a given moment by examining contextual-relations prior to and after **catalysts** have occurred. This type of matrix can also be used for scenario or context forming in testing different hypotheses – that is in injecting hypothetical **catalysts** into the relational-contexts - to predict probable outcomes from possible suggested alternatives.

Let us take the current likely internal situation for all TPP signatory states in 2017, outside the US. The US will not ratify the TPP, but according to the Trump plan, will seek to negotiate a series of bilateral trade agreements. Let us assume six actors from a Government perspective for the purposes of this scenario to keep it simple; the Military, Manufacturers, Unions, Environmentalists, Nationalists and the Foreign Affairs community.

Fig 3.3



The relationships labelled 1. show the positional relations of the parties after the signing of the TPP agreement in 2016, where the Military, Manufacturers and Foreign Affairs saw the deal as beneficial within their various contexts and supported the Government position, hence their positions in the lower right quadrant. The Unions, Nationalists and Environmentalists were hostile to it in various contexts and hence reside in the upper half of the matrix.

The relationships labelled 2. evokes the position at a certain point of time in 2017. Perhaps the US has made ‘America First’ demands that are becoming increasingly untenable domestically, and the Government is resisting in the negotiations. So, the Military, which saw the TPP in strategic contexts – and might see any bilateral agreement in the same context, as did the Foreign Affairs who saw a diplomatic advantage, become less amenable to the new Government position. The Manufacturers have split into two groups, one more supportive to the Government’s negotiating position than the other as it becomes apparent that the new US demands will disadvantage some or further advantage others. The Unions and Nationalists increase their support for a tougher Government position. The Environmentalist position does not change. Therefore, the change in position will strengthen the Government stance in some respects but weaken it in others. This then leads to an interpretation of what constituent parts become more influential in the state’s foreign policy formation as the context changes compared to its original alignments.

To further deepen this train of thought, I propose to take the structuralist issues outlined in the first section of this chapter, in reverse order to arrive at a different interpretation of anarchy. This will set the scene for the next chapter to highlight empirically what has been discussed by creating a contextual-variable case study of the Japanese-South Korean relationship.

ii. Context as rationality under the conditions of anarchy

Waltz (1979), stipulated that actors were rational within their IR actions in calculating their decisions based on a cost/benefit basis (p. 118). Again, this thinking would be easily observable if the IR system was clearly hierarchical; and while hierarchies in various forms exist within the system, none impose the type of rational ordered structural system that Waltz postulates.⁴⁶ This blinds IR to accurately interpreting what is going on thereby losing relevance increasingly among

⁴⁶ This is much like economists – using Rational Choice Theory again – trying to explain why most people ‘irrationally’ pile into the Share Market when the stock price is rising, but bail out when the market drops. Both economists and structuralists ignore the physical and psychological contexts through which their subjects operate.

IR policy-makers and other social science academics (Lepgold, 1998, p. 44; Morgenbesser, 2013, p. 230; Rosenberg, 2016, p. 134). Empirical evidence such as; the Soviet Union's voluntary implosion, or Japan and Germany failing to rationally balance rather than fight the US (Brown & Ainley, 2009, p. 66) show actors acting 'irrationally' within the given motivational paradigms of the structuralists.⁴⁷ The question then becomes; 'What is rational action under the conditions of anarchy?'

Heterarchy would suggest that rational action may have as many definitions as there are actors within in the system, too many to fit into one large overarching systemic theory such as those proposed in Polarity or Interdependence theories – hence different interpretations of rational action are embedded within IR, which through differences produces anarchy. *This reinforces the conclusion that there is a need therefore for a bottom up – that is sub-systemic - rather than a systemic approach.*

The way to understand rationality is to say that actors operate within IR '*contextually*'. This is not to say that they are not rational, in the sense of there being one 'true' form of rationality, but rather that their rationality is understood within the contexts within which they perceive their reality. These contexts are brought out in observing how actors react to a particular **catalyst**. Onuf (1989) said that we live in 'a world of our making' (p. 31). He is correct in this however; it is a world shaped by the realities of contexts as we each perceive them. I see context as being differentiated, interpretive and ever-changing in that it produces non-ordered patterns of conflict and/or cooperation. This makes context systemically an inherently unstable variable within IR as differing perceptions of reality, produced by context, collide against each other that produces conflict, cooperation or a mix of the two to produce contradictions. It is in interpreting the actions and speech acts of others within our own contexts that leads to **epiphenomena** as we react to what we

⁴⁷ Some later neo-realists have attempted to explain this 'irrationality' in terms of Ontological Security – principally Mitzen (2006). She thinks that actors not only seek physical security, but also the surety needs of its members to maintain agency and distinctiveness from the 'other', where the other is assigned a role – either friendly or enemy - which also colour any apparent beneficial transactional arrangement that may take place (p. 352). This desire for identity security can override and clash with the needs of the physical security of the actor (p. 342), hence an actor could be considered to be behaving irrationally by other actors. However, Mitzen does not consider what would set off this 'irrationality' – such as a **catalyst**, and does not consider when this ontological security would override pragmatic or beneficial transactions which may take place at the same time – thus presenting a contradictory policy regime.

interpret both the **catalyst** and other actor's signals to mean, and its implications for us, which in turn generates further **epiphenomena** which allows for further observation.

How actors react and interact with other actors is clearly shaped by their perspectives, which then form the contexts or paradigms through which they perceive others.⁴⁸ It is context which provides the 'rationality' around intentions, speech acts and actions of actors within anarchy; which provide 'subjective meanings that are intelligible only when understood within the context of the ways of living or modes of social life' (Hollis & Smith, 2009, p. 83). Therefore, actors do not have fully ordered preferences that are consistent, because **catalysts** produce differing contexts as perceived by different actors. Actors cannot have access to perfect information that avoids the contextual filters of individual understanding and inclination, culture and society, their own interests, and the intentional deceptions of other actors. Finally, because information must pass through all these filters, the information cannot be processed in an objective scientific manner; being subject to the perceptions, passions and contexts of the reality within which the receiving actor exists. The actor thus reacts to **catalysts** 'rationally' within the reality as they perceive it, even if it appears irrational to other actors. This leads to heterarchy proposing that; rationality is perceived and achieved through the myriad of contexts that are presented to each actor in viewing a **catalyst**. *This implies that each actor's contexts in relation to a catalyst become the locus of IR study to gain an understanding of their actions and thinking within their relations with other actors.*

iii. Relationalism and patterns

Relationalism states that actors are not fixed entities but are constantly changing through relations with other actors (Crossley, 2005, p. 266). Actors can only be measured in comparison to another actor; for instance, 'my father is older than me', where we compare two relational objects where the link is a contextual-variable comparison, which in this case is familial and age based (Bogen, 1995a, p. 755). In addition, actors can be divided into groupings or sets, even those that are completely unrelated, where the identity of the grouping is identified by the relationship (Bogen,

⁴⁸ This leads to questions such as: what is the effect of neo-capitalism, communism, and corporatism and other ideologies upon actors' societies and how does this change their contexts on issues relating to IR? How do the locations of the Holy Sites affect Saudi relations with other Muslim states; how does Russia's Slavonic ethnicity add dimensionally to the Balkans, or Turkish neo-Ottomanism affect associations to Central Asia and China's Xinjian Province; how do the Europeans see themselves culturally and socially in comparison to each other and how do these affect relations between them, or for that matter China with East Asia?

1995a. P. 775). Within the relationship, the actors, in reacting to **catalysts**, conduct actions that generate **epiphenomena**, leading to the focus of study on the interaction which is studied and becomes irreductable in that it cannot be reduced back into its component parts (Crossley, 2005, p. 267) at that particular moment of time, unlike the actors themselves.⁴⁹


This produces different patterns of analysis. For example; Germany, France and Spain have joint political, economic and social relations within a grouping called the EU and are in a military alliance called NATO. However, a relationship between these three and the Canada, who is also within NATO but not the EU would be different. Thus Germany, France and Spain can be grouped in one relationship pattern that excludes Canada, but can also be grouped in another that includes Canada. In each case the relationship between the three remains the same within the contexts of both the EU and NATO, but different with Canada when dealing from the context of the EU. Heterarchy would posit that foreign policy, studied through contextual-variables, goes to feed that process which becomes the focus of study within IR rather than focusing on the system itself. IR after all, is meant to be the study of relations between actors within the international realm, and these relations are a result of perceived contexts which produce identifiable patterns.

Therefore, heterarchy would propose that the study of relations between actors is the study of actors functioning within the IR system, and that the locus of the study of such relations should focus on actors' foreign policy interactions, rather than upon the actor itself. Because the context of each actor is taken from a different positionality to other actors, in regarding their reactions to **catalysts**, this indicates that the actor's foreign policy will be different from that of other actors – ranging from subtle differences in emphasis to adversarial conflictual positions. This gives the observer the ability to differentiate actors within the IR system by understanding the context within which each actor operates. This could potentially aid IR as a discipline, and aid in interpreting real world issues from the perspective of each actor. This therefore increases the value of IR as an analytical tool for policy-makers in understanding the environment they operate in.

⁴⁹ This is not to say that the catalyst does not become reductable at some future date, for the purposes of analysis for example. It is only in the future that component parts may be analyzed from an event or object that occurred in the present because more information and further understanding of past context becomes available over time.

iv. *Achieving differentiation*

Fig 3.4



Because of Relationalism we can now modify Goodard and Nexon’s model (Figure 3.1) to that illustrated in Figure 3.4. The International System Structure is extended to incorporate both the foreign policy and the domestic within itself. The local is important because it informs IR, and IR is important because it informs the local. Former Congressional Speaker Tip O’Neill once said; “All politics is local” (Gelman, 2011, January 3). All state leaders, even autocrats, rely primarily on some form of domestic legitimacy for their power. Therefore, studying domestic aspects of foreign policy; that is the variable-contexts that go into it are imperative, as is the effect of IR on the domestic aspects if a truer understanding of foreign policy and hence IR is to be realized. Most of all, bringing in the domestic allows for the study of the contexts in which the actors act out their perceived rationality and exposes relational-contexts as a brute fact, as an inanimate object until galvanized by the contexts and the logic of the **catalyst**. Relationalism thus exposes the differentiation of the actors to the observer, as well as their differing intent, interests and methods to achieve their objectives.

The way that heterarchy exposes this differentiation is by using **catalysts** which acts to stimulate the various contexts of the actors. How each actor interprets and then reacts to a **catalyst** allows the observer to analyze, understand and describe the relationship in that particular context between actors and their differing or similar understandings. This allows for the identity of context in producing cooperative, conflictual and/or contradictory relations between actors, including the actor’s own component parts. Thereby the actors become differentiated to the observer and allows for a differentiated identity and analysis.

In speaking of the actor's component parts and differentiation, it is here that heterarchy must also answer to the structural constructivists' concept of identity. If, as Wendt (1994) contends, actors socially construct identity and hence interests within themselves (p. 387), then this identity must be formed by different internal actors and sub-actors who have their own notions of identity – that is a differentiated identity which exists within their own differing contexts. Society is not a single monolithic entity but made up of many varied and competing component parts. Wendt (1994) sees this formation of identity and interests as a way of differentiating actors within an anarchic world (p. 391), but where that identity is not reductable back into its component parts – that is the sub-groups that form or contest the original identity.

We must therefore go beyond Wendt to say that identity and interests are formed in relations between these actors, existing in the contexts that they perceive their own reality which may be conflictual, cooperative or contradictory variously with a myriad of other different groups – and that these group identities are changing and variable. This dichotomy may manifest itself politically, as for example in an elite-general public split, differing concepts of economics, ethnicity, nationality, geography, religion, history and so on. The actor may attempt to mediate between these identities to reach a consensus before presenting it to the world, or the actor may arbitrarily impose an identity however, in both cases it is an identity that may remain contested internally among dissenting groups. While Wendt (1994) presents identity as formed in his introduction to IR (p. 387), it is in fact ever forming and reforming as the contexts within society change, depending on the differing and evolving reactions to different **catalysts**.

Heterarchy says that at the same time as an actor is forming identity and interest, the actor, its internal actors and sub-actors must all interact with the world external to themselves which impacts on domestic identities and interests, often acting again in the role of a **catalyst**. Identity therefore becomes perceived in relation to the reality that exists – at a specific timeframe and space – therefore identity, both internally and externally, is constantly evolving and changing. Therefore, identity becomes contextual in relation to self and in relation to the other. I go so far to say that some actors form their identity deliberately in antithesis of another actor.⁵⁰ Thus, identity becomes

⁵⁰ For example; Pakistan defines identity deliberately as Muslim in antithesis of India's cosmopolitan composition, which additionally feeds into a sub-group within the Indian community – that of the Kashmiri nationalists in their bid for independence or union with Pakistan, where they have a different concept of their identity to that of most Indians. This may merge with Mitzen's Ontological Security (see p. 51, n. 46)

a set of *relational-contextual* policy regimes through which policies, speech acts and actions are regulated and understood. This further adds to differentiation.

The other way in which differentiation occurs is in the differences between the domestic/international identity of an actor, and in the multifaceted way in which actors may project identities depending on their interests.

For instance, North Korea presents its identity domestically as strong and omnipotent to ensure regime loyalty; but internationally it presents itself as needing of aid to feed its people, and yet additionally it also portrays itself as having the ability to strike back if threatened externally. It uses this threat – backed by a deliberate ‘irrationality’ - to extract aid and concessions in a form of IR blackmail, because this particular context has worked in the past.⁵¹ Multifacetedly, China offers an example where it is an ally and protector to North Korea, simultaneously a regional competitor but major trade partner to the US and Japan, a sometimes friend to South Korea depending on the issue, an economic rival to Russia in Central Asia but also promoter of Russian security interests in Central Asia that protects Chinese economic interests.⁵²

This bottom-up approach suggested by heterarchy argues that because relational-contexts between actors’ changes actors in different ways, states can be differentiated from one another through the study of internal as well as external contexts. This allows for IR to reach down and analyze the local in relation to the international extending the research range within the discipline. Yet this can only be achieved if we resolve the twin-dilemmas of the structuralists.

v. *Resolving the twin dilemmas: Measurement and contextual-variables*

If it is agreed that IR is made up of relational-contexts that provide differentiation, then there is no reason why all material and ideational issues that go into making foreign policy cannot be studied and then measured in comparison to other actors with which an actor has relations. This can only be achieved in the selection of a **catalyst** by the observer that affects two or more IR actors. The **catalyst** will indicate the range of appropriate contextual-variables from which the observer can select to conduct their study, because that is the context within which the actors themselves react

⁵¹ At the same time, North Korea tries to project a source of independent policy that is differentiated from that of China and that of the West.

⁵² This goes back to Ogilvy’s (1977) Multidimensional Man Thesis but at an international level.

to the **catalyst** and with each other. This in turn will lead to a greater understanding of the processes whereby actors' motives can be assessed within IR.

This process could also allow for the ranking of importance of various issues to various actors – depending on the interpreted context of the **catalyst**, allowing the observer to focus on the means and materiality that each actor uses to achieve their aims. For instance; Why did the US see the Second Indo-China War as a limited war, while North Vietnam saw it as a total war? While the US had much more materiality than North Vietnam, its ideational attitude to the war meant that once costs had reached a certain point, it decided to withdraw; whereas North Vietnam saw the South's fall as existentially imperative, and therefore was willing to sacrifice much more to win.⁵³ In this case, it was the measurement of particular ideational variables of how each saw the war – their strategic positionality – leading to how they each used their materiality that allows for measurement. Heterarchy states that relations can be measured by comparisons between different actors' contexts, or perceptions of reality in their relations with each other. This allows the observer to measure the importance actors place upon issues and what contextual-variables they are willing to act within to achieve their goals.

It follows therefore that heterarchy expects and welcomes diffuse variables. The fact that actors within IR often do break Waltz's 'structural imperative to conform to rules' 'continually invalidates macro-theoretical assumptions' (Brown & Ainley, 2007, p. 66), either partially or in full.⁵⁴ How these variables are handled are reflected within policy regimes brought on by **catalysts**, and in certain reactions of other actors within their relational-contexts to the initiating actor, which dictate the direction events will follow.

For example; North Korea explodes a nuclear device (the **catalyst**), leading China to give North Korea a stern warning, while South Korea and Japan increase defence preparations, and the US

⁵³ It must however be added that the US saw the war within the context of the much larger global Cold War and its impact on its global commitments to other theatres, hence the US could only ever see any conflict short of an all-out Warsaw Pact invasion of Europe as a limited war.

⁵⁴ Citing Skidelsky (2017, February 23), humans are indeed creatures of habit and their preferences do not shift from day to day exhibiting a high degree of regularity, therefore theories on human behavior can last a relatively long time. Models generally tend to project this certainty into the future and are resistant to change. However, change can cause behavior to become non-routine and 'the assurance that tomorrow will be the same as today does not hold'. This then changes human habits and creates uncertainty that models fail to account for – but which the model's adherents continue to cling to even as the new situation undermines parameters previously taken as a given. *Thereby this creates a **paradigmatic feedback loop***. (My emphasis added)

goes to the UN to increase North Korean sanctions, which invites in turn further North Korean provocations. Or the US inadvertently strikes a hospital run by an NGO in Afghanistan, which generates international criticism where the US is forced to respond; whereas Russian strikes on Syrian hospitals either elicit a Russian denial or justification to the same criticism. Here we have actors doing particular activities within IR in accordance with the paradigms or contexts within which they perceive their relations with others – that is within their policy regimes. North Korea is an ally of China, technically at war with South Korea and in a hostile relationship with Japan, and where both are allies of the US who is seen as a threat to the North Korean Regime. In Afghanistan, the US sees itself as a defender of human rights and upholder of the Geneva Conventions hence it responds to any threat that questions that paradigmatic identity. Alternatively, Russia sees the infrastructure of the rebels against their ally, President Assad, as legitimate targets and does not see human rights and the Geneva Conventions in the same light as the US.⁵⁵ What I argue here is that each actor sees its actions within the contexts that that actor exist in – which drives their interactions with other actors. This is not neo-realist ‘rational’ *real politik* – but rather a different *real politik* based on contexts and relations as understood by each actor.⁵⁶

Some actors may indeed conform to Waltz’s ‘structural imperative’, yet this will be mediated within the context of their society and culture. Others will see it in their interests to oppose either partially or fully the ‘structural imperative’, which if successful may lead to systemic structural changes. These are all diffuse variables thrown up by different actors which must be acknowledged by observers if they are to truly understand IR and its various aspects. This allows for increased variation of variables to be measured and demonstrates why the system is anarchic. This allows heterarchy to postulate that relations, or the reaction to some **catalyst**, allows for the measurement of the importance of issues to each actor through understanding of their contexts.⁵⁷ This in turn

⁵⁵ Heterarchy, unlike some of the IR paradigms, does not seek to pass moral judgement. It views all manifestations of events from all actors’ perspectives and realities, hence what is immoral to one actor is seen as legitimate by another. Heterarchy – similar to realism - would also argue that assigning moral labels to events clouds judgement and analysis by placing contextual filters or blinkers upon the observer. Assigning morality can lead to incorrect analyzation of what is really going on, moving empiricism away from objectivity towards emotive interpretation.

⁵⁶ Schweller (2004) attempts to add context of individual actors into the realist equation through their policy elites, but only in the context of the realist Polarity Theory, where states join a polarity alliance, balance or decide to opt out. This disregards context and relations outside alliance dynamics.

⁵⁷ See **Appendix B** for a deeper discussion on this issue.

enables the study of contextual-variables, leading us to describe how heterarchy would structure anarchy and therefore denoting at what level we should start our IR analysis: the sub-structural level.

vi. *The heterarchical sub-structure*

In considering international affairs through a heterarchical lens, the IR system is reductable – that is it is merely the sum of its parts, enabling empirical studies at a sub-systemic level, even down to studies of the domestic sub-actors themselves. Domestically, and like IR, these patterns change as anarchy changes due to actions by its various sub-actors acting within the paradigms of their own contexts, and in relation to other actor and sub-actor contexts. In history, it has been actors and sub-actors within the system, and not the system itself, that has established patterns, and other actors that have overthrown those extant patterns thus creating new paradigms. Therefore, various patterns observed within IR can be said to be formed by the actors within the system, acting within the contexts as they perceive their interests. This, and the above contextual-variable argument, suggests that the level of analysis needs to be aimed sub-systemically, which may give insights into patterns forming within IR as a secondary consequence, and therefore leads to IR becoming a predictive tool. This rests upon how heterarchy understands complex systems through structure, **polycentricity** and **multinodality** within the bounds of various contexts.

Structurally, heterarchy acknowledges that hierarchies can exist within its system in various forms, but also that the system contains individual nodes not conforming to hierarchies.⁵⁸ A patchwork hierarchy within IR might be the relationship between McDonalds and its various franchises; while NATO which might be understood as a traditional hierarchy, where dominant nodes within the hierarchy achieve aims most of the time over less dominant actors. Looser hierarchical structures also exist where actors can dominate according to certain contexts but not in others; as in the Euro Zone where Germany is dominant on fiscal issues, but where each member state has an equal vote and independent foreign policy, armed forces and so on. The non-hierarchical IR elements are non-aligned states such as India, or ostracized states such as North Korea, and some NGOs who have no state or IGO affiliations such as Doctors without Borders. Component parts of actors can also be IR actors such as NGOs or MNCs. For example, Monsanto, a US MNC may have an individual


⁵⁸ This is thinking derived from Miura (2014, December 1).

relationship with the Kenyan Government in a trade, development or investment context. IGOs, depending on contexts, can act as independent nodes, or within a hierarchy under a dominant actor or group of actors – such as the UN which at times acts independently while at other times is directed by the Security Council. This means that while hierarchy may exist within IR, actors within IR can act in non-and/or multiple hierarchical ways – often at the same time.

Heterarchical structure sees hierarchies as **polycentric** with many decision-making centers casually link in non-linear ways where it is hard to separate them as individual actors (Ostrom, Tiebet & Warren, 1961, p. 831; Jackson, 2014, p. 341). This has five implications.

- Firstly, **polycentricity** makes hierarchies fluid and contextually interpretive depending on the **catalysts** that are presented. For instance, Turkey has the second largest military in NATO. According to neo-realist criteria, this should make Turkey a very powerful actor within the alliance hierarchy, yet it is only ever present as a middle order power within the alliance – and is often on NATO’s periphery, or left out altogether, in **catalysts** generating aspects that are only to do with NATO’s European context.
- Secondly, actors occupy multiple hierarchies, being dominant in one area but not in others, where the positionality is based on contexts. For example, Germany has dominance within Europe economically, but plays a secondary role concerning military aspects with regards to France and Britain. Therefore, in economic contexts Germany has an outsized role because of its vast economic underpinnings within Europe, but that role is diminished in the military sphere due to its identity of itself based on its historical past.
- Thirdly, because **polycentricity** makes it is hard to separate individual actors structurally – therefore IR must move away from substantivism toward relationality (Jackson, 2014, p. 341). Only the relational-contexts between the actors can be studied in the contexts of a **catalyst**, and through this comes a separation and an understanding of the IR actors themselves. Figure 3.5 illustrates this.

Fig 3.5



- Fourthly, **polycentricity** occurs domestically as well as internationally. This gives license to the observer to study the underlying causes, issues, materiality and ideational circumstances, audiences and constituencies, leaders, opinion formers, enablers and inhibitors, and so on that effect a state's foreign policy within their contexts, in order to understand why actors do what they do within the IR field (see Figure 3.5).
- Lastly, **polycentricity** highlights the need to study the effects of an actor's policy initiatives on other actors both domestically and externally, seeking to explain changes in behavior and/or identity of the various facets within the actor, the actor itself and the relations between actors within dynamic contexts.

Multinodally actors', heterarchy suggests, interact with other actors anywhere within a particular hierarchical system that they may be included in according to their contexts, without having to submit to the rule of hierarchical deference (Arteaga, 2012, September 13; Jackson, 2014, p. 341). **Multinordality** also recognizes that actors can interact outside that hierarchy with other actors in other hierarchies and with non-hierarchical actors in various contexts. A useful example of this is Turkey, where it interacts directly with the US – the dominant NATO alliance leader, but has increasingly closer relations with Russia (an alternative hierarchy leader) and Iran (until recently an ostracized individual node), both of whom stand outside the NATO hierarchy and are to various extents hostile to the NATO organization. **Multinodality** means that hierarchies and actors are not polar opposites of each other but can be intertwined along lines established by interests – that is contexts - where interactions are based on pragmatism or *Real Politik* (Jackson, 2014, p. 341).

The consequence of all this for IR theory and practice is that it diminishes the value of systemic regimes (Argenta, 2012, September 13). This means that actors can have contradictory policies of cooperation and conflict with other actors. For example; India has territorial conflicts with China, yet China is also India's largest trading partner and largest source of foreign investment. Hence, depending on the context depends upon whether India adopts a cooperative or conflictual policy towards China at any given moment.

Conclusion

Structuralist theory does not appear to reflect most realities within international affairs and therefore the suppositions made by its adherents must be questioned. Heterarchy takes a different view of the key issues that structuralists use to support and constitute their theories. Heterarchy argues that (1) rationality is not based on scientific judgements, but is formed and initiated from within contextual paradigms generated from **catalysts**. Heterarchy therefore concludes that (2) anarchy is a clash of contexts which produce instabilities to varying degrees within the IR structure. Because this clash occurs between actors or groups of actors within anarchy, (3) this shifts the focus of study from the systemic to the sub-systemic level, which means the observer's locus is on actors' foreign policy relationships. These three factors allow for the (4) differentiation of states, that allows for the study of the domestic as well as the international within IR. Heterarchy further allows that (5) relations can be measured by comparisons between different actors' differing

interpretational contexts, or perceptions of reality in relation to **catalysts** through their relations with each other. In turn, (6) the reaction to the action of another actor allows for the measurement of the importance of issues to each actor through understanding of their contexts, and how they regard these through the study of diffuse contextual-variables generated by a **catalyst**. Lastly (7) actors can operate in various structures simultaneously, can act independently and can interact with other actors outside their normative structures depending on their contexts. This all leads to the conclusion that it is the sub-structure – that is the agent - that dominates the structure and thus the locus of IR study should be refocused sub-structurally using relational-contexts.

Heterarchy sees the structure of anarchy as allowing for different structures to exist in the same time and space. This enables actors to operate outside perceived structures as independent entities outside the perceived paradigms of other IR schools. It is now that we must turn to an empirical demonstration of this, with the example of the Japanese-South Korean relationship which will define a contextual-variable for suitable study.

Chapter Three: Relational-context in the Japanese-South Korean relationship.

According to most IR paradigms, both Japan and South Korea have reached convergence in their relationship. However, looking at the relationship from a heterarchical perspective, their shared history acts as a variable-context that continually defies conventional IR wisdom in exacerbating relations. This is caused by various **catalysts** that periodically send seismic ripples through the relationship exposing history as a dominant relational-contextual matter through the differing interpretations both states place on history. This regular insertion of differing historical interpretations leads to an '*overthrow of the holistic assumptions made by mainstream IR epistemologies*' (Glosserman & Snyder, 2015, p. 93). History is central to this study of Japanese-South Korean relations, overriding and consistently intruding upon other types of relationships between the two states, making history become the dominant contextual-variable in this study of their relationship.

This chapter sets up the contextual-variable against which the **catalyst** described in Chapter Four takes place by giving a relational-context to the relationship. This chapter first reviews the commonalities within the relationship which support structuralist theories positing a close and harmonious relationship between the two states, followed by interpreted empirical data that is at odds with structuralist prescriptions. This leads to a discussion on the historical context, from a heterarchical perspective, within which Japan and South Korea relate to each other, aided by a historical overview of the history of relations found at **Appendix C**. Events described in the text will have a bracketed number beside it linked to the respective serial in the Appendix. This description is important because it forms the key context through which South Korea views its relations with Japan, which in turn adversely affects Japan's attempt to change perceived current historical analysis internationally towards its own 'normalization'. Differing renditions of the same history have resulted in Japanese-South Korean antagonism, including going so far as to militarily hedge against each other. However, the historical relationship between the two states rarely appears as an analytical factor in mainstream IR literature.

History and IR

The academic disciplines of History and IR have an ambiguous relationship. ‘The behaviorism of ‘IR’s neo-positivist laboriticians’ banished history to the margins in supporting theories’ (Lawson, 2010, p. 204), in a ‘series of ill-fitting maps that avoid distortions of their ideological prisms rather than the shape of history itself (p. 205)’.⁵⁹ Positivists cherry picked historical-contexts to fit theories, while ignoring contexts where history changes and evolves over time (Gaddis, 1997, p. 82).⁶⁰ Kratochwil (1996) suggests that positivists have bent history to fit theory rather than letting history test or modify it (p. 215), leading to **presentism** - ‘a return to the future’ (p. 214) in projecting the stability of their theories far into the future, leading to mistaken analysis (p. 213). One might go so far as to say that the neo-positivist use of history in IR might account for their often-criticized failures to predict key IR events such as the end of the Cold War (Kratochwil, 1996, p. 213). Positivist IR schools have even been accused of being a-historical by the historically inspired English School which uses historically rich cases to test theory (Glencross, 2015, p. 414).

From a heterarchical perspective however, history is key to providing context, because the past defines present and indicates possible avenues to the future. Historical experience defines the concepts of ‘self’ and ‘other’ linking cultural/societal identity with that of the state (Wirth, 2009, p 475, p. 477).

Constructivists admittedly do consider history, from a contextual perspective in their identity formation thesis (Wirth, 2009, p. 475). Specifically, Wendt wrote of history that ‘the ability of states to create new worlds in the future depends on the old ones they created in the past’ (Wendt, 1994, p. 389). However, Wendt suffered from the same limitations discussed in the Introduction and Chapter Two of being substantivist. To paraphrase; history is a social construct made up of domestic ideations before being presented internationally. The actor forms a concept of history which is then mediated or contested within IR as part of the actor’s identity. Wendt (1994) infers that history is not reductable back into its component parts from whence it emerged – that the history of the actor is not contestable and changing within the component parts itself but that the

⁵⁹ This fits in well with my **paradigmatic feedback loop** argument.

⁶⁰ This goes back to the argument made by Lowe (1995) made at the end of Chapter One where ‘Time is the dimension of change’ (p. 875).

one ideation of actor history remains extant until exposed to and then mediated within IR (p. 388).⁶¹ More *normative* constructivists – or at least Kratochwil (1996) – instead use history to compare and contrast theory, to study the problem of change within IR, and to look at issues that affect IR that are not necessarily state-centric (p. 216). Normative constructivists are therefore prepared to look at the component parts of the state and factor this into their theory making ‘through the study underlying constructs of historical narratives’ (Kratochwil, 1996, p. 216).

Heterarchy agrees with this normative construction of history. However, Kratochwil does not specify *how* these underlying constructs of narratives are to be studied. Heterarchy looks at history as being formed through an interrelatedness which is fluid and dynamic, where actors are related by context to each other and where events happen within the contexts of both events and actors (Qin, 2016, pp. 35-36). The study of history becomes the study of relations resulting from the dynamics generated by **catalysts** – which exposes how each views their own and the ‘other’s’ history, creating interpretational contexts for other actors that generate **epiphenomena** as they respond to these interpretations. Hence, history becomes relational-contextual, and can only be understood from the positionality of the relationship between each actor, whether domestic or external, and not just within actors themselves. This means that history does change – and that IR theories last only as long as the contexts in which they were formed exist, where the future is therefore not predetermined as prescribed in structuralist IR schools.

History can also be rendered ‘*schizophrenic*’ in having different internal and external interpretations, in which the actor may present one historic version domestically, while presenting another version externally in pursuit of its interests. The other issue that heterarchy would affirm; is that history is not linear, but rather it twists and turns – today’s friends may be tomorrow’s enemies and vice versa. So, going back to Wendt’s thinking, heterarchy might ask the question; ‘Which historic version and period of the past points to the future?’ It is not necessarily the influences of the most immediate past that will most dominant a relationship, but that with which the state and its citizens most readily identify. Depending on which past has most resonance and

⁶¹ Surprisingly, this is a relativist rather than constructivist argument made by Wendt that history (within the actor) is not contestable and must therefore be accepted and correct. This ignores the contexts of the various sub-actors who often have unmediated and sometimes conflictual versions of the same history from differing perspectives.

identity thus defines the relationship, despite even the best efforts by elites to inform opinion to the contrary.⁶²

Why choose the Japan-South Korean relationship to demonstrate heterarchy?

There are three reasons to consider in selecting the impact of history upon Japanese-South Korean relations. Firstly, there is little academic IR literature on the internal relationship outside of both countries themselves (Glosserman & Snyder, 2015, June 2; 2015, p. 94). It has been suggested that Western IR literature posits one of the four following rationales for the relationship:

- Shared ties within the US ‘hub and spoke’ alliance system which suggests a Japanese-South Korean ‘**virtual alliance**’. Here US centric studies show a preoccupation with locating the Japanese-South Korean positionality within US global and national interests, and therefore do not expose factors that impact between the two states outside of the alliance explanation (Goh, 2008, p. 354; Glosserman & Snyder, 2015, p. 94).
- The rise of China, the North Korean threat, and shared Japanese-South Korean values bring the two states together where there is a threat to the status quo. This type of analysis is problem-centered and narrow focused on the issue at hand that does not reflect more nuanced issues (Frank, 2013, p. 1). Both this rationale and the one above show a mainly neo-realist bent, forming most of the IR writings on Northeast Asia (Choi & Moon, 2010, p. 346).
- Increasingly, literature originating on Northeast Asia from the liberal IR School, point to a lack of large-scale hostilities since the Korean War, and emphasize the positive shared connectivity of the free market system between states (Choi & Moon, 2010, pp. 355-356). This tends to gloss over problematic issues that would impede this nexus and hence subsumes the ideational problems under the mantle of interdependent economic prosperity (Choi & Moon, 2010, p. 358).
- The last rationale focuses on obstacles to cooperation through history and identity issues within domestic politics (Glosserman & Snyder, 2015, p. 94). This context

⁶² Both these aspects will be highlighted in the study below.

is explored by a minority of the writers, and becomes the focus of heterarchy in this study.

There are many reasons the fourth rationale is not widely reported. Firstly, the situation between the two states has only recently been highlighted within mainstream IR, brought on by relatively recent events that expose the underlying nature of nationalism and identity within South Korea and Japan. Thus, the end of the Cold War eliminated the East/West conflict freeing South Korea from its post WW II constraints, and in Japan's case from its IR and domestic certainties (Glosserman & Snyder, 2015, p. 22; p. 26; p. 60). The 1987 fall of the South Korean Military Dictatorship and subsequent democratization allowed deeper historical wounds to reappear that had been subsumed by anti-communism, the need for national unity and through repression of attitudes to history that would complicate relations with the US (Straub, 2015, p. 173) and Japan. These historical controversies have become persistent stumbling blocks between the two countries (Straub, 2015, p. 174); especially as Japan now attempts to establish itself as a 'normal nation' in response to the Cold War's end (Roehrig, Seo & Heo, 2007, p. 3; Straub, 2015, p. 187). IR academia is just catching up with this issue given the lag between observation, analysis and dissemination.

The second reason for the lack of historical relationship reporting is both the level of focus of IR and the attitude of the US – the dominant hegemon within the region, towards the relationship. The domesticity of the issue within each state and in relations between the two countries has allowed politicians on both sides of the Sea of Japan to distract domestic audiences from other festering issues (Kim, 2006, p. 192; Choi & Moon, 2010, p. 359). Under positivist IR views these constitute issues outside the purview of the discipline, and have also been little noticed against the other transforming Asia-Pacific events. This lack of reporting is further exacerbated by the US attitude to the dispute where it consistently misunderstands the depth of the issue, especially to the South Koreans, as to why the two states cannot reconcile as have former enemies in recent conflicts (Jackson, 2015, April 20). This reflects the US pragmatic tendency to separate historical views from current security aspects (Editorial Staff- ASAN, 2015, July-August, p. 174; ASAN Report, 2015, August, p. 17). Hence the US approaches the Japanese-South Korean historical issue with reticence (Sneider, 2014, January 6), short of arm-twisting, bribes and mediation (Jackson, 2015, April 20). The US had expected that these historical issues would fade with time, but this has not

been the case (Straub, 2015, p. 217). Western IR academia has tended to reflect US foreign policy preoccupations and hence has not focused on the issue as intently as it should, mirroring Washington's incomprehension within their own prescribed paradigms (Glosserman & Snyder, 2015, p. 95).

A third reason for selection is that history, national sentiment, personalities and events as variables of study between the two countries are not generally drawn upon by positivist IR schools. Positivists judge such variables as unmeasurable and therefore metaphysical, being outside the scientific quantitative realm (Crossley, 2005, p. 247). These variables do however fall within relationalism because they are defined by 'self' in relation to the 'other', mirroring the idea proposed by Wendt (Wirth, 2009, p. 475).

We therefore now turn to this case-study, identifying the similarities that the two states share, and noting why structuralist paradigms would predict a close relationship between Japan and South Korea.

Structuralist explanations for the Japanese-South Korean relationship, and their critique.

In theory, "Japan and South Korea check all the boxes that political science and sociology tell us should predict a close friendship" (Jackson, 2015, April 20), and yet this is not the case (Kim, 2006, p. 157; Goh, 2008, p. 354; Chun, 2013, p. 174; Glosserman & Snyder, 2015, p. 11; Jackson, 2015, April 20). This section discusses firstly, the convergences between these two countries - being divided into structure, economics and ideation for ease of analysis. It then considers, what neo-realism, neoliberalism and structural constructivism would predict about the relationship. Finally, it considers why Japan and South Korea have not conformed to these standard theories. This provides the reader with an empirical context against which a heterarchical approach may be measured, before moving on to Chapter Four, where a **catalyst** is added to study the relationship within a specific context and timeframe.

i Convergences between Japan and South Korea

To the structuralists, structures or institutions that are similar or that converge should mark states out as ripe for close cooperation. Structurally, Japan and South Korea are:

- Both democratic free market economies heavily integrated into the globalized system, dependent upon exports of manufactured products (Choi & Moon, 2010, 356), and having interdependent trade relations with one another (Kim, 2006, p. 215; Mukoyama, 2012, p. 3; Parker & Lindfors, 2014, March 12).
- Both are dependent on other states for imports of raw materials (Parker & Lindfors, 2014, March 12).
- Both are allied to the hegemonic US which has military assets stationed in both countries (Han, 2009, p. 54; Tara, 2016, p. 54), as part of the ‘Hub and Spokes’ system having separate but similar alliance arrangements (Glosserman & Snyder, 2015, p. 2; ASAN Report, 2015, August, p. 7). Both are increasingly integrating their forces and missions in line with US interests, which serves in turn as a cornerstone to both their respective security policies (Goh, 2008, p. 370; Swenson-Wright, 2013, p. 106; Chun, 2013, p. 167).
- Japan serves as a rear-echelon base for US forces to deploy in the event of an outbreak of war on the Korean Peninsula (Glosserman & Snyder, 2015, p. 2).
- The US has been pushing Japan for some time to ‘normalize’ and to become a more participatory partner within their alliance through rearmament and revision of its constitutional constraints (Bae, 2007, p. 423; Joo, 2007, p. 180; Doyle, 2009, p. 60; Jackson, 2014, p. 336; Analysis - Stratfor, 2016, August 18).
- Lastly; both countries support international institutions and governance as being in their best interests in upholding the rule of law to facilitate trade and negotiations (Soeya, 1998, p. 220; Choi & Moon, 2010, p. 360; Glosserman & Snyder, 2015, p. ix).

Economically, Japan and South Korea have deep ties with each other (Kim, 2006, p. 215; Parker & Lindfors, 2014, March 12). Japan sees South Korea as an important market for goods and services, while Japan remains in the top four of South Korea’s trade partners (Mukoyama, 2012, p. 7). Indeed, South Korea derived its own logic of the developmentalist state from that of Japan (Kim, 2006, p. 203; Heo, 2015, p. 357; Glosserman & Snyder, 2015, p. 98; Tara, 2016, p. 67), allowing South Korea to rise from being one of the poorest countries in Asia to become the world’s

twelfth largest economy (Bae, 2007, p. 424; Glosserman & Snyder, 2015, June 2). Japan was the first state to heavily invest in South Korea providing capital, technology and expertise (Kim, 2006, p. 188), and continues to be a major source of foreign direct investment (FDI) – 28 percent/US\$48 billion (US State Department, 2015, May). The table below (Figure 4.1) shows the current trade relationship.

2015 figures between the two states.	Japan	South Korea
Value of exports to each other 2015 (US\$)	32.2 Billion	53.7 Billion
Percentage of exports to the other	7.1% (South Korea third largest export partner)	4.9% (Japan fourth largest export partner)
Percentage of imports to the other	4.1% (South Korea fourth largest import partner)	10.5% (Japan second largest import partner)

(Percentages Source: CIA World Factbook 2016; Figures: Global Edge, 2015)

Ideationally, both states have democratic pluralist governments. Japan has a Constitutional Parliamentary system. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was in power from 1952 (**24**) until 2009, when the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) assumed power (**41**), before gaining power back again in 2012 (**42**) (Glosserman & Snyder, 2015, p. 56). Importantly, Article IX of the constitution has resulted in institutionally and psychologically self-imposed foreign policy and security constraints (Kersten, 2012, p. 31; Glosserman & Snyder, 2015, p. 27). South Korea, copied the US system separating powers between a powerful one term President, a legislative National Assembly and the Korean Supreme Court (Seok, 2009, p. 154) (**28**). Different South Korean parties have held power, both in the executive and legislative institutions at various times. Both states share the same conservative attitude to governance – despite whoever is in power – where the nature and structure of the state is hierarchical and relatively autocratic (Kim, 2006, p. 171). This makes for relatively stable policy regimes within both countries.⁶³ This similarity in democratic paradigms should make for a strong political institutional relationship between the two states.

⁶³ Although South Korea has a weak party system, like in the US, where the President may not rely on the support of members from their own party. For example, President Park only received fifty-seven votes supporting her against impeachment as opposed to sixty Representatives of her own party (Saenuri) voting in favour (Park & Kim, 2016, December 9).

Furthermore, both countries share a dominant ally – the US – with whom both publics and institutions closely identify as critical for security and cultural norms (Jiyoon et al., 2015, p. 16). Both states face a rising threat from a nuclearized North Korea, and increasingly both are wary of a rising China (Consonery, Green, Seaman & West, 2013, p. 7; McCurry, 2015, November 2).

Both partake in bilateral educational exchanges, sister-city relationships, cultural exchanges – especially in the popular youth culture with J-pop, K-pop, Manga and Anime (Kim, 2006, p. 221; Glosserman & Snyder, 2015, p. 7). There is increased internet interconnectivity, and in 2002 the two countries co-hosted the World Cup Soccer Tournament (Kim, 2006, p. 221). In South Korean schools Japanese is the most studied language after English – 636,000 students compared with 340,000 taking Chinese (Editorial Staff – Japan, 2015, p. 241). Large numbers of Japanese and South Korean citizens visit each other’s countries (Glosserman & Snyder, 2015, p. 7). In 2015, 1.8 million Japanese visited South Korea while four million South Koreans visited Japan (Tourism Japan, 2016).

ii Structuralist epistemologies and their interpretation of the relationship

Given this empirical evidence, structuralist IR theories posit that both countries should have a very close relationship.

In the neo-realist interpretation, for example, both states would move towards an alliance under the direction of the US to counter joint perceived threats. Moreover, overseen by the hegemonic power, a manifestation of regular bilateral and trilateral meetings, shared intelligence and security capabilities, integrated bi and trilateral exercises, an integrated command system and common shared defence postures would likely develop. The Korean peninsula is a natural invasion route to Japan and having the southern portion controlled by a friendly state (Tara, 2016, p. 61), would motivate Japan to seek a close partnership with South Korea. South Korea would seek closer relations with Japan because of its advantageous geographic positionality to the Peninsula, and the qualitative and quantitative materiality that it would bring to any alliance. Therefore, both Japan and South Korea are arguably ideal candidates for Realist Polarity and Hegemonic Stability theories.

According to institutional liberals, Japan and South Korea are interdependent economically. Both have similar characteristics – as market orientated liberal democracies – and shared preferences

for liberal norms and a belief in a US global dominated order. Liberals would therefore say that Japan and South Korea were a good fit for their Interdependence Theory.

Constructivism would suggest that Japan and South Korea would be ideal candidates for convergence theories, having shared similar norms that would lead to shared approaches – for instance an alliance with the US against the same perceived threats – either formally or informally. According to Wendt (1992), this occurs because the two states make reciprocal gestures that are non-threatening and this creates expectations which are further reinforced, which in turn lead towards convergence and an affinity between states (p. 405). While Wendt acknowledges that Japan and South Korea have outstanding historical issues⁶⁴ however *the cooperative relationship of the past seventy years should transcend previous historical epochs*.

iii Relations in practice

However, heterarchy would say that all described above are superficial to this relationship, with the underlying issues that occurred in the first half of the 20th Century dominating and superseding the supposed state of Japanese-South Korean relations of the last seventy years.

In terms of structural issues, while the ‘Hub and Spoke’ alliance system explains US Cold War Pacific alliances, it does not explain why this system remains in place twenty-eight years after the Cold War ended, despite US desires for a multilateralist structure (Glosserman & Snyder, 2015, p. 13). The US originally built this bilateral system to control Asian ‘strongmen’ from entrapping the US in wars that it did not desire (Cha, 2010, p. 158), however the Cold War’s end and increased democracy negated this threat. The bilateral alliances have however, not stopped the US from exploiting its Northeast Asian allies’ divisions for its own ends, (see serials (38) and (41)) (Glosserman & Snyder, 2015, p. 128). Also, if a trilateral alliance were to occur, South Korea fears being a junior rather than an equal partner (Straub, 2015, p. 104; Youngshik, 2015, p. 69), especially as South Korean interests do not always align as much with the US as does that of the Japanese (Joo, 2007, p. 171).

⁶⁴ All issues stem from the time of the Japanese occupation of the Korean Peninsula 1905-1945, and each state’s interpretation of history during and subsequent to that event. These interpretations are enumerated below and in **Appendix C**.

Significantly, despite its dominance the US has failed to impose its will upon both states (Jackson, 2015, April 20; Editorial Staff-ASAN, 2015, July-August, p. 174; ASAN, 2015, August p. 17). Both states are instead in fierce competition for the US's favour, where they seek to outdo each other, and feel slighted when the US appears to favour their competitor (Heo & Woo, 2007, p. 198; Glosserman & Snyder, 2015, p. 8).

Just as momentous, Japan and South Korea have yet to ink a single bilateral security agreement despite several attempts being made (McGrath, 2012, July 13; Geopolitical Dairy, 2016, October 27). In 2010 Japan and South Korea were slated to sign the General Security of Military Information Agreement, and an Acquisition of Cross-servicing Agreement (40) (Miller, 2015a, p. 56), with this aimed at progressing South Korean-Japanese security cooperation towards more advanced agreements; but these fell through, and failed again in 2012 (Tara, 2016, p. 76). In 2014 and 2016 respectively, both states tried to negotiate an Intelligence sharing agreement on North Korea, however South Korean domestic issues stopped the 2014 agreement, including the dispute with Japan over the Ahn memorial (43) to be discussed in Chapter Four (Park, 2015, p. 90). The current domestic political issues within South Korea will also most likely derail the 2016 attempt (Stratfor, 2016, October 27). *These events are telling.*

Both see the arms build-up of the other in terms of a security dilemma rather than as a boost to complement their own capabilities (Geopolitical Diary, 2016, March 1; Tara, 2016, p. 60; Analysis, 2016, August 18). According to one survey South Koreans (46.3 percent) see Japan as second only to North Korea (83.4 percent) as the main security threat to their state, and see the US as the main check to Japanese 'aggression' (Straub, 2015, p. 14). ASAN's 2014 survey found only 5.1 percent of surveyed South Koreans favoured improved relations with Japan. This compares poorly to 26.8 percent for improved North Korea relations and maintaining current relations with the US at 21.4 percent (ASAN Report, 2015, August, p. 18). The Japanese are persistently worried about South Korea – either in its current form, or even worse, as unified and armed with nuclear weapons as a security threat to Japan. They state their concerns about South Korean reliability in their annual Defence White Papers (Ministry of Defence, 2013, p. 2; 2014, p. 3; 2015, p. 4; Tara, 2016, p. 60). The South Korean emphasis on building up maritime capabilities, which some might see as conforming to regional US interests, is a case where the Japanese see themselves as the intended target (Goh, 2008, p. 370, Ministry of Defence 2013, p. 3).

For its part, the continued ‘normalization’ of Japan – pushed by the US – is stoking South Korean fears of Japanese military expansion which has historically occurred at the expense of itself (6, 9-21) (Analysis, 2016, August 18; Situation Reports, 2016, August 19). In 2005, the Roh administration shocked US Defense officials, by stating that Japan was South Korea’s greatest threat (38), and this perception of Japan, to one degree or another, has continued within Korean security circles (Straub, 2015, p. 217). In part, the buildup and modernization of each state’s forces is in preparing for war against the other, with only the US to restrain them. *This brings into question what might happen if that US restraining hand was lessened or removed.*

Economically both states should have a high degree of interdependence and synergy, yet this has become an area of intense competition and tension.

- Firstly, South Korea has used Japan as a measure against which to compete and compare itself within a developmentalist framework – not in friendly rivalry but as an imperative for state survival (Heo, 2015, p. 357), shaping South Korean national choice setting of economic parameters between the two states (Glosserman & Snyder, 2015, p. 6).
- Unsurprisingly in copying Japan, South Korea has moved up the value chain to now compete in the very areas where the Japanese originally had comparative advantage (Glosserman & Snyder, 2015, June 2). This worries the Japanese business community as South Korea has eroded its market share (Shapiro, 2014, December 2).⁶⁵
- More directly, Japan’s economic importance to South Korea has declined from a high of seventy percent of all trade in 1965 (Kim, 2006, p. 214), to a mere ten percent at present (Mukoyuma, 2012, p. 5). Meanwhile South Korea’s largest trade partner – China – now provides 20.8 percent of all Korea’s trade (US State

⁶⁵ According to Mukoyama (2012), the economic aggressiveness of the Koreans has forced Japanese business leaders to pressure the normally Free Trade Agreement (FTA) adverse Government into the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) – not only as a strategic imperative but as an economic one as well (p. 3). The issue is not that it would have advantaged TPP members against other TPP states – at an average of a mere one percent GDP increase for its members by 2030, but that growth in exports will come at the expense of non-TPP members (Katz, 2016, September 19), which commended this agreement to the Japanese as a way to hinder South Korean progress. Being excluded from the TPP caused immense worry within South Korea, where initially it had ten FTAs with twelve of the TPP members, and hence an initial advantage over Japan (Munday & Song, 2015, October 6).

Department, 2015, May), and closer to 30 percent if Hong Kong trade is included (Baker, 2017, April 4).

- Historically, South Korea has suffered from a thirty-year trade deficit with Japan, even as it has benefited from large trade surpluses internationally overall (Mukoyuma, 2012, p. 5; Parker & Lindfors, 2014, March 12). Mukoyuma (2012) puts this down to the inability of South Korean companies to penetrate Japanese markets (pp. 5-6), due to:
 - o European and US brands dominating the high end of the Japanese market, and China dominating the lower end.
 - o Japanese products produced offshore and imported back into Japan tend to beat South Korean products in terms of price and ‘quality’; where South Koreans face high tariffs on exports to Japan, which Japanese companies importing products produced abroad do not face (Parker & Lindfors, 2014, March 12).⁶⁶
 - o South Korean products have a reputation for being ‘cheap and nasty among Japanese of a certain age’. Additionally, South Korean products also tend to face consumer boycotts, ‘Buy Japanese’ promotions, ‘Hate Korea’ campaigns and so on that negatively impact South Korean firms (Shapiro, 2014, December 2014).
 - o Lastly, because the Japanese market has been so hard to penetrate – South Korean firms are increasingly concentrating resources on other international markets (Mukoyuma, 2012, p. 6).

⁶⁶ To add further salt to the wound, President Kim Dae Jung in 1999 unilaterally removed tariffs from Japanese goods and services imported into South Korea, with an eye towards a Japanese-South Korean FTA (35) (Kim, 2006, p. 215). This also came as the price of the Japanese providing a currency swap to the South Korean economy staggering under the effects of the 1997 financial crisis. This need for Japan to bail out South Korea, plus the lack of Japanese reciprocation on tariffs has further increased resentment within South Korea. Kim (2006) points out that this persistent trade deficit, despite its decrease over the years, is an irritant to South Koreans, who see the deficit as a deliberate attempt to shape their economy as a Japanese economic colony, thus inhibiting its technological industrial progress (p. 215).

- Mukoyuma (2012) has also highlighted that Korean dependency on Japanese ‘sophisticated raw materials’, needed in producing higher end technical export goods, may be coming to an end as the South Koreans increasingly look to autarky in this area or in diversifying their sources of supply (p. 7).
- Despite the economic history between Japan and South Korea, and an aggressive South Korean signing of FTAs around the world, both countries still do not have a bilateral FTA together nor a trilateral FTA with China. The main impediment is Japan, which as the most economically developed would gain little, whereas the economic late comer China would benefit most from free entry to Japanese and South Korean markets, and where South Korea would also gain from free entry to Japan (Choi & Moon, 2010, p. 361).⁶⁷ On the Korean side, domestic politics also intrudes on FTA negotiations, especially in areas where Japan is thought to have an advantage (Parker & Lindfors, 2014, March 12).⁶⁸
- Lastly, despite their reticence both view China as essential for their economic survival. This makes both states actions contradictory in investing and trading with China, and in Japanese attempts – along with the US – to contain China’s Asian ambitions (Miller, 2015b, p. 80).

Closer geopolitical relations have not eventuated despite the shared values and desires of the elites, in what South Korean former President Park suggested was an ‘Asian Paradox’; a disconnect between economic interdependence and lackluster political/security cooperation (Lee, 2015, July 11). For example, the last three South Korean Presidents prior to Park started their administrations by attempting to reinvigorate Japanese-South Korean relations, but ended their terms in near hostility with their neighbour (35, 38, 40). The Park Administration started from a position of hostility, and gradually moved to more tepid relations, only brought about by an increasing North Korean threat (43) (Park, 2015, p. 87). The attempts at repositioning Japanese-South Korean relations more positively were seen in the contexts of shared similarities – aka the structuralist

⁶⁷ FTAs would most likely open up Japan’s agricultural sector losing the LDP its traditional support among the rural sector – forty percent of the Japanese electorate, compared to eighteen percent for South Korea (Choi & Moon, 2010, p. 361). Given that Japanese agriculture is inefficient and expensive, opening Japan to FTAs would lead to cheaper agricultural imports spelling political suicide for the LDP.

⁶⁸ South Korea already has an FTA with China, but Japan does not.

epistemologies however, the eventual souring in each case revolved around what were considered ‘inappropriate’ Japanese actions – either domestically or within IR contexts; or in South Korean domestic political pressures which forced governments to take what the Japanese considered to be irritating actions. These problems centered around interpretations of history.

Discrepancies in history between states can make the actions of one state suspect by another. For example; the Japanese Government, pushed by the US for it to become more active in their alliance, is actively seeking a way to break with the psychological and constitutional strictures of the past, to become a ‘normal’ nation by reinterpretation of ‘collective self-defence’ more in line with the UN Charter Article Fifty-one (Miller, 2015b, p. 77). This has led to institutional reforms within Government and a buildup of Japanese defence capability, which have, instead of reassuring South Korea, in fact made it more insecure (Kelly, 2014, March 13; Kai, 2014, December 4; Jackson, 2015, April 20, Geopolitical Diary, 2015, August 16). This is because of Japan’s actions in Asia in the first half of the Twentieth Century which leads South Korea to assume the worst (Miller, 2015b, p. 81). South Korea fears:

- The potential for Japan to take military action against North Korea – which South Korea regards as an integral part of itself – and/or to potentially deploy troops on to the Korean Peninsula in ‘support’ of its US ally. South Korea has therefore warned both the US and Japan, that should either action take place it would be ‘*tantamount to an act of war against South Korea*’ (Youngshik, 2015, p. 69).
- That ‘normalization’ would mask Japanese strategic goals to build up its military with the intention to re-orientate the strategic landscape in Asia and, in exacerbating the East Asian arms race already occurring where Japan’s rearmament is in part fueling a similar buildup of South Korean forces (Analysis, 2016, August 18; Analysis, 2016, September 16). South Korea also sees the Chinese buildup, in part, as a response to Japan, which in turn is generating further nervousness in Seoul (Swenson-Wright, 2013, p. 106; Analysis, 2016, August 18).
- The impact on the South Korean-US alliance of what the Koreans refer to as ‘*Tongmi Bongnam*’ (the tactic of Japan using the US to contain South Korea), where South Korea already perceives the US as favouring Japan, which in turn

places limits upon South Korean policy options (Straub, 2015, p. 104; Youngshik, 2015, p. 69).

- Lastly, Japanese rearmament could widen the relational gap between the US and China diminishing the ability of South Korea to employ a hedging strategy (Youngshik, 2015, p. 69).

These competing historical interpretations have been made manifest also within international institutions. Instead of supposed cooperation within multilateralist institutions, the South Koreans – along with the Chinese – have opposed Japan attaining a permanent seat on the UN Security Council citing Japan’s past; and have even fought Japan over its application to register Meiji era historical buildings as world heritage sites within UNESCO because of the use of Korean ‘slave’ labour (Kim, 2006, p. 159; Jiyoon, Lee & Chungku, 2015, August, p. 11).

This South Korean antagonism has in turn fueled Japanese resentment, which in turn begets further South Korean anger. Progress between institutions and governments appears to be made based on common interests and values, only for one or the other to disrupt that progress based on unresolved historical issues, thus sending relations back to square one (Glosserman & Snyder, 2015, p. 93). This is frustrating the US and impacts on its intent to rebalance in the Pacific.

Conclusions on conventional IR epistemologies in the case of Japan-South Korea

So, what can we conclude, based on the evidence presented about structuralist views on the relationship?

1. From a neo-realist perspective, the US has not, despite its hegemonic preponderance, been able to impose a multilateral alliance or even for that matter basic defence agreements upon its allies. This calls into question neo-realist Hegemonic Stability Theory.
2. Neo-realist’s Polarity Theory is also questionable as both Japan and South Korea have links with China – the US’s ‘near peer competitor’ in Asia, leading to ambiguous policies toward China where it is neither cut-off nor contained as it was with the old Soviet Union. Neither the Japanese nor the South Koreans, despite multiple convergences and similar threat perceptions, have been able to settle their differences over history to form an alliance that fits within Polarity Theory – instead, both see the other as a security threat.

3. According to Shapiro (2014, December 2); “When old regional animosities block progress, it violates one of the unspoken rules of international affairs: “That money trumps past political conflicts”. South Korea and Japan, despite having long standing interdependent economic relations, see the other as an economic competitor. This is contrary to what the institutional liberals, using comparative advantage and Interdependence theories, would have us believe.
 - a. The South Korean ability to catch up to Japan and compete aggressively for the same markets with the same technologies calls into question comparative advantage; where states stick to what they are most efficient at producing, while interdependent on other states producing more efficiently other goods and services needed by that state.
 - b. Instead of promoting cooperation, South Korean-Japanese economic interdependence promotes conflict and resentment.

The issue of structural constructivism is more complicated and less straight forward. None of the above discusses the impact of history on IR – a weakness of the positivist historical methodologies as already discussed. One could say that heterarchy mimics structural constructivism to a certain degree however, structural constructivism has no overarching ontological concept to explain and apply historical change to its theory of identity and interests. Heterarchy agrees with structural constructivism that relations are socially constructed through experience and past interaction – through relational-contextual changes in a historical sense.⁶⁹

But instead of drawing upon structures and contemporary ideas to understand Japanese-South Korean relations, heterarchy would ask the question; ‘Which past influences each actor in their relations?’. Is it a case, as in the West ‘where the past has not been forgotten but forgiven’ so that nations can move towards mutually beneficial relations (Buruma, 1994, p. 116); or, *can a more distant past subsume and come to dominate over all the apparent indicators of a more recent*

⁶⁹ Heterarchy sees history as a description of time, where it describes the past to explain the present and posits various possible futures going forward, dependent on the impact of probable and possible **catalysts** upon contextual-variables in the future.

history? This is a conundrum that structural constructivism cannot answer in the case of these two Northeast Asian states.

This leads heterarchy to posit five questions:

- If history is convoluted and not linear, then what historical memory – *context* - of an actor comes to predominate in an actor’s relations with another actor?
- What are the motives and factors – *contextual-variables* - that drive a historical relational-context to dominate over another – even if the other history is more recent?
- Does an actor present more than one historical narrative and identity, and if so for what purpose?
- Do historical interpretations of different actors’ clash in affecting present relations between them?
- When do historical narratives change, and in what contexts do they change?

The discussion below seeks to answer these questions looking at three areas where the contextual-variable of history permeates the relationship; in the Japanese annexation of Korea, the rise of modern South Korean nationalism and in Japan’s present efforts to become a ‘normal’ nation.

Using history as relational-contexts to explain Japanese-South Korean relations

Glosserman and Snyder (2015) started their Japanese-South Korean study by acknowledging; “The promise of the future is increasingly subject to the limits of the past” (p. ix), meaning that history creates contexts through which the future exists. It is history, or their different conceptions of history - that keeps these two states apart.

i. Japan and Korea – Early background

Until the 6th Century A.D. the peoples residing in what are today Japan and Korea were considered a singular entity, with most Japanese elites having descended from Korean stock (1) (French, 2002, March 11; Bae, 2007, p. 85). However, with the issue of the Taiho Code after the first unification of Japan (2), Japanese elites started to assume a political, cultural and racial superiority over their Korean cousins in replication of the Chinese Middle Kingdom concept (Bae, 2007, p. 85). But

Japan was never able to impose its dominance over the Korean Peninsula, which gravitated into the Chinese sphere of influence (2). The Japanese became an outer on the Chinese periphery, although internally they assumed equality with the Chinese; while the Koreans assumed a cultural superiority over Japan from a Sino perspective through the tribute system (Bae, 2007, p. 89). Korean and Japanese national and ethnic identities began a divergence where each increasingly conceived themselves as ‘self’ compared to the Japanese/Korean ‘other’.

To the Japanese the geographic positionality of the Korean Peninsula offered both a threat and opportunity (Bae, 2007, p.89). When under the control of a foreign power the Peninsula became a threat to Japan (3, 15), but it offered an opportunity as a land bridge to expand into Asia when Japan had the capability (6, 9-22). In the modern era, this Japanese geo-strategic dynamic crystalized around two events; the Japanese colonization of Korea in the early Twentieth Century (14-22), and the subsequent contemporary Japanese attempts to become a ‘normalized’ nation post-Cold War.

ii Japanese colonization of Korea

After the Meiji Revolution Japan began interfering on the Korean Peninsula in 1874 (9-11) (Kim, 2006, p. 150), attempted to assimilate Korea after the First Sino-Japanese War (12), and succeeded after 1905 during the Russo-Japanese War (13-15); first as a protectorate (15), and finally in outright annexation (17-21) (Buzo, 2007, p. 14). Japan justified its control of Korea as a ‘civilizing’ mission, emphasizing the backwardness of its new Korean subjects, thus ‘perpetuating the historical inevitability of Korean annexation’ (Buzo, 2007, p. 16). The Japanese then (Hamada, 1936, p. 183; Buzo, 2007, p. 15), and many Japanese even today (Kim, 2006, p. 186; Sato, 2015, June 9; Rozman, 2015, p. 263), consider their Korean rule to be enlightened and in bringing many benefits (Kim, 2006, p. 151). Koreans retort that this came at the cost of identity genocide, where the Japanese adopted assimilationist – *Naisen Ittai* - policies in eradicating Korean culture, language, and national and familial/personal identity (15, 17, 20) (Kim, 2006, p. 186; Buzo, 2007, p. 40). The Japanese colonial period also stands accused by Koreans of having created conditions for the subsequent post-WWII division of the Korean Peninsula itself (22), the series of strongmen governments within South Korea prior to democratization (26), and a sense of national humiliation (Bae, 2007, p. 317; Straub, 2015, pp. 18-19). This outcome forms a sense of ‘grievance nationalism’ from a shared collective Korean memory (Choi & Moon, 2010, p. 359), a collective

memory that frustrates the Japanese today in achieving their interests (Kelly, 2014, March 13; Jiyeon et al., 2015, August, p. 26; Editorial Staff – Japan, 2015, p. 239).

iii Korean Nationalism and Identity

The main effect of colonization was the emergence of a modern Korean nationalism (19) (Kim, 2006, p. 151), defining the traits of the ‘good Korean citizen’ and creating the sense of ‘national self’ (Kim, 2006, pp. 152-153). This defined ‘self’ in the context of the ‘other’ - the ‘other’ being codified in the problem of that period – the Japanese, who became central to Korean national identity formation (Editorial Staff – ASAN, 2015, July-August, p. 174). The Korean ‘self’ was defined in terms of the Japanese ‘other’ as a threat to that Korean ‘self’ (Wirth, 2009, p. 479), projecting a victim mentality in which the ‘other’ is solely perceived as responsible for any reconciliation process (Wirth, 2009, p. 477),⁷⁰ but where the appropriate amount of reconciliation or contrition cannot be defined (Chun, 2013, p. 166).⁷¹ *This supports heterarchy’s contention that identity can be formed in the context of an ‘other’ which implies outside influences to identity formation of the collective, making this process purely relational-contextual and contrary to structural constructivism’s substantivist interpretation of identity formation.*

However, once liberation had occurred (21-22), this latent nationalism in the South was suppressed, first by US occupation forces, and later by the necessities of the Korean War, the Cold War, the US-South Korean alliance, anti-communism, economic development and the need to enforce political control by a series of civilian and military strongmen (Kim, 2006, p. 156). This did not stop the elites from using a controlled nationalism for nation building purposes (Kim, 2006, p. 156), or to galvanize economic development (Heo, 2015, p. 357), where Japan was used variously as threat, competitor and as an object of emulation. The 1987 democratization unleashed this suppressed nationalism; which happened to coincide with the end of the Cold War, growing domestic economic confidence coupled with the opening of China and Russia, which allowed South Koreans to look beyond the narrow confines of their Peninsula (Dormandy & Kiwane, 2014,

⁷⁰ This is along the lines of Wendt’s discussion on ‘ego and alter’, where ego interprets alter’s actions and hence this defines their relationship (Wendt, 1992, p. 404).

⁷¹ This goes back to the neo-realist ‘ontological security’ (Mitzen, 2006, p. 342). To create cognitive and behavioral certainty the actor creates routines (policy regimes), including relations with other actors which can be cooperative or antagonistic – but which offers the actor ontological security about their world view – even if this conflicts with their physical security. Therefore, it becomes very hard to reconcile self with the ontological antagonistic other, thereby overriding any beneficial transactions that may be occurring at the same time.

pp. 12-13; Glosserman & Snyder, 2015, p. 61). This new outlook made the Korean population more sensitive of the domestic and foreign policy issues within other states – most notably Japan – that had ‘emotive’ rather than ‘rational’ impacts upon them.

iv Japanese ‘normalization’

The end of the certainties of the Cold War frightened Japan leading it to conclude that it needed to become a ‘normal’ nation (Choi & Moon, 2010, p. 358). Under its former policy regime, Japan had used its pacifist constitution and its pivotal position within US power projection into the Pacific, to concentrate on post-war recovery to become the second largest economy in the world. Article IX of the Constitution was used successfully to ‘rebuff demands from third parties by imposing certain self-imposed limits’ to increased defence spending, and still have its security guaranteed by the US hegemon (Kersten, 2012, p. 30). However, the end of the Cold War presented structural policy regime weaknesses by bringing US reliability into question, coupled with a rising China and an increasingly unpredictable security environment within Northeast Asia (Kersten, 2012, p. 32; Tow, 2012, p. 148). This policy regime weakness was further emphasized by the embarrassment of Japan’s ‘chequebook’ diplomacy during the Gulf War, when Japan’s financial muscle was unable to influence outcomes when measured against states who had committed military forces (Kichan, 2007, p. 422). This brought home to Japan that the old rules of the Cold War had changed and hence the policies of the last fifty years needed to evolve. This was given additional impact after 9/11, when the US pressured and demanded that Japan do more within the alliance to meet its obligations (Roehrig, 2007, p. 98).

Coupled with the external pressures were the weaknesses of the old policy regime domestically, which made Japan ripe for change towards ‘normalization’:

- In Japan, unlike in post-Nazi Germany, the occupying powers had kept the existing pre-1945 bureaucracy and power structure virtually intact (Noble, 2008, p. 250). The occupation separated the Japanese military (the victimizers) from the civil administration and populace (the victims) in assigning guilt (Sakamoto, 2015, p. 23). This enabled the bureaucratic system to continue to function and govern, allowing former convicted war criminals and conservatives who had been

instrumental in Japanese pre-1945 expansion to continue in positions of power (Kim, 2006, p. 172).⁷²

- These same Japanese elites were motivated to exonerate themselves for their failure to achieve victory, by emphasizing only the later stages of the war as the Allies were closing in on Japan, and not the initial Japanese outward expansion (Kim, 2006, p. 171; Wirth, 2009, p. 476). Japan therefore adopted a victim complex where the blame was laid at the feet of the victims – in the South Korean case, the conception of Korea located in a Sino-centric world bent on creating instability and trouble for Japan (Noble, 2008, p. 255; Wirth, 2009, p. 476; Kelly, 2014, March 13). Hence the LDP stressed the Pacific War as defensive, emphasizing atrocities committed on Japan (Kim, 2006, p. 172). Memorials and commemorations such as Hiroshima became the public international face that Japan presents to the world, even as Yasukuni may present a more militant face domestically (Sakamoto, 2015, p. 24, Rozman, 2015, p. 264).⁷³ Domestically, any Japanese aggression was interpreted as ‘freeing Asia from Western imperialism’ thereby bringing about modern Asia (Sakamoto, 2015, p. 29). Therefore, the Japanese have a different conception of their own modern history from their Korean peers, creating contextual gaps in the collective historic memory (Jackson, 2015, April 20).
- Internationally, the Japanese assume that war issues have been resolved through the 1951 San Francisco Treaty, in normalizing Japanese relations with the rest of the US allied Asia-Pacific states **(23)** (Glosserman & Snyder, 2015, p. 40), all except for the holdout South Korea. Only in 1965 were relations between South Korea and Japan normalized, under US pressure, in a hurried and on the Korean side, desperate bid to stimulate foreign investment **(26)** (Glosserman & Snyder, 2015, p. 98). The ambiguously worded normalization agreement allowed Japan to offer South Korea aid as reparations without acknowledging them as such (Kim, 2006, p. 173), thereby leaving many issues unresolved (Jiyoon et al. 2015, August, p. 24). In

⁷² For example; Shinzo Abe’s Grandfather Kishi Nobusuke, who was an administrator in Japanese occupied Manchuria and the wartime Minister for Armaments, was incarcerated after the war as a Class A war criminal, and yet was able to become Prime Minister in 1957 (Kim, 2006, p. 172; Rachman, 2016, p. 86).

⁷³ This presents the heterarchical concepts of schizophrenic identity and history.

Japanese culture guilt and shame focus on debt or indebtedness, rather than on Western concepts of punishment, atonement and forgiveness (Okinogo, 2009, p. 22). Therefore, in Japanese eyes, the giving of aid as a method of atonement should beget reciprocity from the receiver in forgetting the offense and putting the past behind them (Leonardsen, 2004, p. 155). However, Koreans think that Japan got off lightly from the ‘crimes’ of the past, and see the repeated official annual apologies as insincere (Chun, 2013, p. 166), leading to neither agreeing upon what is the proper level of apology and restitution that Japan can offer to make historical issues disappear (Chun, 2013, p. 166).

- In terms of other important developments, Japan’s geography and lack of the existence of historical Asian naval powers, has allowed it to alternatively isolate itself from Asia at will and to intervene when it had the capacity to do so. This has produced two effects that have not been overcome despite globalization.
 - o Firstly, the 1868 Meiji Revolution brought on a Japanese identity crisis as to whether it is Asian or Western. ‘Unencumbered by burdens of geography, history and national identity’, Japan’s modernization allowed it to look and identify with the West (Kim, 2006, p. 158) – adopting Western norms as it suited, while adapting them to Japanese thinking – *the perfect example of Combined Development Thesis* (Rosenberg, 2016, p. 141; p. 46).⁷⁴ During the Cold War this Western paradigm was reinforced by only engaging other Asian states through the US prism (Funabashi, 2001, p. 76). However, Japan remains located next to Asia, and with the lifting of the Cold War Japan has found itself engaged with Asia – an Asia that is wary of it – and perhaps sees it as being non-Asian. This has been exacerbated by a loss in cultural and economic confidence as China has overtaken it economically and competes for Asian leadership, globalization fatigue, social insularity and declining birth rates, the lost economic decades and so on (Glosserman & Snyder, 2015, p. 37); with engagement being selective and constrained so

⁷⁴ Trotsky posited that developing states adopt regimes from successful states however, these are mediated by the adopting state’s cultural environment so that the policy becomes changed from its original form.

that Japanese culture does not become compromised (Glosserman & Snyder, 2015, p. 55).

- o Secondly, the Japanese are a surprisingly homogeneous people who tend to shun foreigners within their midst (Kim, 2006, p. 157; Burgess, 2016, October 13). To be Japanese is to be defined by *Kokutai* – the ‘national essence’ that differentiates itself not only behaviorally but also ethnically (Kim, 2006, p. 157). Foreigners make up only 1.7 percent of the population – including third and fourth generation Korean residents - where foreigners are not encouraged to settle and where they become scapegoats for Japan’s social ills (Burgess, 2016, October 13). This has led to purges of Korean elements within society from time to time – the large scale post-WWII deportation of up to two million Koreans trapped in Japan after 1945 (23) (Burgess, 2016, October 13), which was replicated again from 1959 through 1984 (25) (Bell, 2016, June 30).
- The increased post-Cold War Japanese insecurity saw a rise in neo-nationalism and revisionism, and an increasing public acceptance or acquaintance with it (Glosserman & Snyder, 2015, p. 28; Sakamoto, 2015, p. 27). These neo-nationalists seek to legitimize Japan’s pre-1945 actions in Asia. This has in part been stimulated by the knee-jerk reactions to Korean accusations – in what is referred to as ‘Korean fatigue’ leading to ‘Hate Korea’ campaigns and a proliferation of ‘Hate Korea’ literature and media (Editorial Staff – Japan, 2015, p. 239). This has galvanized hate speech acts – although no apparent violence – against the resident Korean community who are already discriminated against, and reflects a rising xenophobia within Japan (Daiki, 2016, May 12).
- These factors led to the emergence of Japanese politicians who are nationalistic and revisionist, and who see Japan as being under siege (Doyle, 2009, p. 56; Rozman, 2015, p. 263). The end of the Cold War meant an end to the alliance between the Conservatives and Progressives; where the Conservatives transitioned from old-style conservatism – of being protected by the US and concentrating primarily of domestic matters – to neo-conservatism, of escaping the strictures of the pacifist

constitution and becoming a ‘normal’ nation with the right to ‘collective self-defence’ (Rozman, 2015, p. 245). Rozman (2015, citing Nakano) states that the LDP had always been the home of revisionism and Japanese conservatism (p. 263). He lists three post-Cold War LDP Prime Ministers as engaging in *Kokkashugi* – Hashimoto, Koizumi and Abe (p. 265) with characteristics that manifested themselves in four contexts:

- o *Kokkashugi* represents a societal return to past values and identity (Rozman, 2015, p. 265) that trumps realism and *realpolitik* (p. 268). *Kokkashugi* transforms society; removing postwar-era restrictions on nationalistic education, the promotion of traditional Japanese societal/cultural norms of patriotism and emperor-worship, and the philosophy of ‘responsible citizenship’. *Kokkashugi* also frees the state from the restrictions of the past to allow Japan to become internationally a ‘normal’ nation, to have an IR focus on Japanese preoccupations in dealing with its own grievances; transforming Japan into a strong state, while demonizing those states that present alternative views of Japan (Rozman, 2015, pp. 260-261).
- o Both Koizumi (37) and Abe posited that enough time had passed since WW II to allow Japan to become a ‘normal’ nation (Kersten, 2012, p. 32; p. 34), and argued that Japan should take its ‘rightful’ place in the world given its economic, political and potential military power (Alam, 2005, July 12; Morris-Suzuki, 2016, December 29).⁷⁵ They argue that Japanese normalization would allow it the right to defend itself against attack in accordance with UN Charter Article Fifty-one, rather than the ambiguous

⁷⁵ Abe is the leader of nationalist Seiwakai faction of the LDP (Larsson, 2017, March 9) whose stated aim is to reclaim Japan’s military might and restore it to the preeminent position within Asia as its leading power (Geopolitical Diary, 2017, March 3). Abe is also a member of the 40,000 strong Nippon Kaigi, which lobbies for the restoration of the Emperor as head of state and to a return to the pre-1945 institution of an imperial deity. While not a mass movement, Nippon Kaigi is what I would call an elite movement where it has penetrated the highest echelons of the government (sixteen of the twenty cabinet ministers are members), the bureaucracy, media and education (Dudden, 2017, March 12). These relationships have been exposed by the twin catalysts of Trump’s accession to the US Presidency where Japan thinks it can play a larger role in the US alliance hence justifying changes in Article XI (Geopolitical Diary, 2017, March 3), and in exposing Abe’s ties to Nippon Kaigi through a scandal over a kindergarten run by the association that is tied to Abe’s wife (Larsson, 2017, March 9; Dudden, 2017, March 12).

constricting Japanese Constitutional Article IX. Abe had tried to amend the Peace Constitution during his first Administration (39) which ended in failure (Takahashi, 2016, November 21). This time around, Abe has prepared the ground more thoroughly securing overwhelming majorities in both houses of the Diet, and increased public support for change – although perhaps not Article IX itself (42) (Takahashi, 2016, November 21). Certainly, the LDP proposals as outlined in 2012, if unchanged, would have *Kokkashugi* infused throughout the constitution – although ‘the renunciation of war will likely be kept intact’ (Article IX, section one) (Takahashi, 2016, November 21).

- o This maintenance of at least the outward trappings of Article IX is crucial for Japan’s international image, where normality means that selective historic collective memories are maintained – the Japanese as victims, and the elimination of other memories – Japanese aggression (Wirth, 2015, p. 487; Sakamoto, 2015, p. 24), *again a schizophrenic foreign policy and national identity*. Therefore, the challenge of states like China and South Korea to Japan’s self-perception and propagation of its selected national image abroad rankles. If states voice opposition to Japanese normalization through their *relational-contexts* of history, then Japan feels that it cannot achieve normalcy as a state, and this hence constrains its interests.
- o Lastly, Abe has chosen to reinterpret the right to collective self-defence specified in Article IX section two (Takahashi, 2016, November 21). At present, only Japanese domestic law prevents Japan from assuming its ‘natural right’ under UN Article Fifty-one (Kersten, 2012, p. 42), which makes collective self-defence contradictory from a purely Japanese legalistic point of view (Ascione, 2016, July 24). The Abe interpretation would allow the Self Defence Force (SDF) to become a normal military force able to underpin the whole gambit of normal national objectives. Even so, the LDP has increasingly expanded the range of SDF activities in Peacekeeping, Line of Communications security and coalition support

operations, hand in hand with an increasingly ‘pro-active’ foreign policy (Analysis, 2016, August 18). Japan is increasing its military budget over the traditional self-imposed one percent GDP cap – already the fifth largest military budget in the world, and is increasingly funding and fielding primarily offensive weapons (Situation Reports, 2016, August 19).

This review of Japanese imperatives of interest for ‘normalization’ questions the structural constructivist sequence which asserts that it is identity that forms interests.

In this case, Japanese interests in an increasingly unstable post-Cold War world forms identities in pursuit of those interests, and not the other way around. These issues play out increasingly, not in material or even ideational contexts, but within contexts of history and identity – which are not considered rational and logical, but are rather emotive and are therefore beyond the understanding of the positivists. Hence the sense of victimization felt by both sides, in their different contexts and aimed at different audiences, is replayed in their relationship with each other as the past merges with the present. These are exposed as various **catalysts** intensify the relations between the two states – as in the case of Abe’s 2012 visit to Yasukuni Shrine and the countervailing Ahn memorial museum at Harbin, highlighted in Chapter Four.

Answers to the above posited questions

So, does the above study answer the posited questions of heterarchy about the Japanese-South Korean relationship in relation to structural constructivism?

- While the history of the past seventy years and structuralist fixated empirical evidence suggests that both states should come towards convergence, it is history that is dominant between Japan and South Korea in frustrating that convergence. It is not the most recent history that is dominant in relations, but that which preceded it in the first half of the Twentieth Century.
- The motives and factors for presenting histories in various ways are more usefully answered using the contextual-variable categories mentioned above. Whether it be for nation building; geopolitical reasons or a change in identity; because it is a social construct - history is used in a variety of ways that suits the interests of the actor positing that view, allowing them to emphasize certain histories over others.

- The second answer leads to answering the third question; ‘Can an actor present more than one historical narrative, and to what end?’ I think the answer is ‘Yes’. There are various views of history being perpetuated not only by Japan and South Korea, but also an outside view of the international community. In other words, we could suggest a heterarchical schizophrenic history.
 - o South Korea presents two views of history:
 - The pre-1945 view of Japan as the aggressor – a view often reinforced by contemporary Japanese actions and attitudes, as the more South Korean public perception of Japan that adversely impacts on the other view.
 - The post-1965 view of Japan as a partner. This is one that various Korean administrations and the US have attempted to promote at various times – but that have been continually frustrated by the first historical view.
 - o The Japanese present three views of history:
 - For domestic consumption, the view of Japan the victim, of the need to become a normal nation within the community of nations in an unstable geopolitical environment.
 - The second view is what Japan hopes to project internationally, of Japan the peaceful nation – the target of the world’s only nuclear attacks, seeking the normal rights granted to all other nation-states.
 - The third view might be called the elite view of history, that attempts to be kept hidden from both the Japanese public and the international community, but which has both domestic and international connotations. That is domestically a return to the pre-1945 Emperor Cult brought on by the Meiji Revolution, and internationally to attain its pre-1945 status as the dominant power in Asia and on a par with other world powers.

- Mention must also be made of the international community, who has a different conception of history from both states – that the past should be remembered, but that it should not overshadow more immediate and pragmatic matters. This is the problem that bedevils international understanding of the Japanese-South Korean relationship – that exists outside how the conceptions of history within IR are recognized and understood.
- The clash of historical interpretations affect relations between the Japanese and South Koreans. While relations on the surface seem calm and routine, regular historical interpretational **catalysts** injected into these relations by one or other of the actors sets off a chain of events that produce tensions and distrust. This occurs even when the initiating actor carries out what seemingly looks like a harmless domestic activity, that will inflame the other state.
- Can historical narratives change? Yes, Germany and its neighbours are a case in point. However, it must be noted that change is continuous – nothing in IR is immutable nor permanent. States always try to change perceptions of themselves domestically and internationally. However, this depends on the change in contexts in how different parties view history.

Conclusion: Heterarchy and history

We might now attempt to make a determination regarding the heterarchical use of history as a contextual-variable within IR, in this case study specifically, that:

History is formed out of relations between actors, which create contexts through which the ‘self’ views the ‘other’. Therefore, history is relational-contextual and becomes a fundamental part to the understanding of IR. In this case study Japan’s former shared history with South Korea subsumes a successor history to become the context through which their current relationship must be understood, pointing towards possible future scenarios.

The use of history in IR must be looked upon as relations between actors – both domestically and internationally – in a holistic sense, as the past provides prologue to the present and posits possible futures going forward. Both in Japan and South Korea, history is used domestically and within IR to present very different pictures of the same event – based on their positionality, sense of identity and in support of their interests. The use of the past forms each identity in the present, which is

manipulated as a way of guiding future interests. This then implies that ‘moments in time’ cannot be cherry picked to support theories lest they be accused of **presentism**, but must be viewed holistically to understand how actors arrived at a particular point, and where they might go from there.

History is intersubjective – linking all variables together to provide a linked narrative, dependent on the observer’s positionality. Using history as an intersubjective in the Japan-South Korea case allows the observer to understand more deeply the varied relationship strands, how each interacts with the other strands and therefore this makes the various variables relational-contextual in themselves. For example; while Japanese-South Korean economics may look like liberal institutionalist interdependency on the surface, the history between the two and the way that Japan and South Korea present each other increasingly drive a form of economic autarky in South Korea, and is becoming a source of contention that melds into other facets of domestic and IR policy. This provides differentiation between actors’ various contextual-variables.

History is not determinist. This is shown by the inability of the US hegemon to forge an alliance between Japan and South Korea, despite the structuralist theories to the contrary. At the same time, although South Korea and Japan are separated by history – they have, nominally, come together in facing North Korea – although the latest 2016 Joint Intelligence Sharing Agreement will not likely to be ratified in the South Korean National Assembly.⁷⁶ Hence history can point to alternating future scenarios, including where actors can have contradictory relations with one another.

In a lesson to the positivists – the past can trump the present, just as the present can trump the past. Europe is an example where centuries of warfare and strife have been overcome to reach a sought of union – for now. Conversely, the multiple shared aspects of the Japanese-South Korean relationship have not been enough to overcome the antagonistic history between the two states.

⁷⁶ Since the successful impeachment of Park, BBC News (2017, 12 March) assesses that the South Korean electorate is likely to move to the left and elect a Center-Left President. Traditionally Center-Left Presidents have been more accommodating of North Korea and have been more Japanese-phobic than their Center-Right counterparts in the past. The lead contender for President, Moon Jae-In, has stated that he wants to reinstate the Sunshine Policy with North Korea, which will put him at odds with Japan and the US if that were to occur, especially given the current provocative North Korean situation at present, and the aims and personalities of Trump and Abe.

Lastly; there is no 'End of History'. There will always be a history and there will always be a future. Only the present can change, and history records those changes, while the future posits scenarios in the context of the changes that the present has wrought. Perhaps Japan and South Korea will overcome their historical differences to produce a more harmonious relationship; where Japan accepts its past and seeks the 'appropriate' forgiveness, and South Korea accepts a 'normalized' Japan. Perhaps the current contradictory situation continues to exist to one degree or another. Alternatively, if the US draws down its alliance commitment, and China can restrain North Korea somehow – or Korea becomes united, then Japan and South Korea might come to blows.

So, we must make an overarching statement about the Japanese-South Korean relationship within this case study using history as a contextual-variable. Taking the factors given above, heterarchy would say that history provides the relational-context through which current Japanese-South Korean relations can be understood. If this proves to be the case in the mind of the reader too, then this idea might lead to other stronger understandings within other relational-contexts of IR outside of the structuralist epistemologies. An example of how this might manifest itself through a **catalyst** is demonstrated in Chapter Four using the Abe visit to the Yasukuni Shrine in 2012.

Chapter Four: A study of a catalyst in Japanese-South Korean relations.

In June 2013, South Korean President Park Geun-Hye proposed that a statue to Ahn-Jung-Geun be erected at the Harbin train station in commemoration of his 1909 assassination of the Japanese Prince Ito Harobumi (No Author, 2014, May 29). This prompted Xi Jin Ping, China's President, to offer to build a small museum on the site of the assassination. This proposal and acceptance was a not-so-subtle criticism of the historical stance of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe (No Author, 2014, May 29), especially after his December 2012 visit to the Yasukuni Shrine (Rauhala, 2014, January 2014). This **catalyst** of the Yasukuni visit sparked a quasi-crisis between Japan and South Korea that was to last until 2014.

How the study will proceed

Heterarchy must select and start with a **catalyst** to galvanize a study giving it form and focus. The **catalyst** selected for demonstration purposes here is Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's 2012 visit to Yasukuni. Although this was a domestic matter, it in turn served as the context for the building of the Harbin Ahn memorial and two years of political turmoil between Japan and South Korea.⁷⁷ The case of the Ahn memorial, then, must be juxtaposed against the example of the Japanese Yasukuni Shrine. This serves as a balancing act, where the Ahn memorial is said by the Japanese to glorify a terrorist, but then the Koreans may say "that Yasukuni glorifies a terrorist state" (BBC, 2014, January 20).

The study explores all six heterarchical contextual-variable categories described in Chapter One showing how all are interlinked and can be used to explain this one complex situation. This

⁷⁷ Some might suggest that the 1909 assassination was a **catalyst** in itself – but the heterarchical interpretation of a **catalyst** within IR is its ability to provoke a stimulus or change in relations between actors. In the case of the 1909 assassination this was not the case, as Japan had already made the Korean Peninsula a protectorate – in fact an annexation in all but name. Here the policies of Ito, as Resident-General representing Japan, had already removed the recognized trappings of Korean statehood and its ability to resist, and in fact it could be reasonably argued that the Korean state had ceased to exist in all but name. The assassination did nothing to change the planned Japanese formal annexation of Korea the following year. It was the **catalyst** of Abe's visit to Yasukuni that resurrected the 1909 assassination as a vehicle through which South Korea could express its contextual displeasure on the matter of Abe's visit, and his attitude to Asian historical issues in general. Hence the assassination's insertion into the Japanese-South Korean relationship is an effect rather than a cause.

catalyst and its effects have been selected because it provides a concise empirical case study of the short duration in which to examine heterarchy's conceptual assertions.

This **catalyst** is essentially an event contextual-variable, but it also could match with any of the other contextual-variable categories. Materially, this historical contestation resides in the focus on two physical memorials – the Yasukuni Shrine where Ito's spirit resides to a deity for dying in the service of his Emperor, and in the Ahn memorial, although not the large prominent one erected in Seoul, but rather the small annex established at Harbin Station in the Peoples Republic of China which became the focus of dispute. The study considers key personalities where this event fed into the relational-contextual narrative and individual motivations of Japanese-South Korean relations – Shinzo Abe, Park Geun-Hye and Chinese President Xi Jin Ping, along with Ito and Ahn themselves within their differing contexts to each party. This study will also bring out institutional variables, where the 1909 event, the subsequent memorials and tradition reside institutionally within the national psyche of the concerned states. Lastly, the dispute affected, and was used by the various states to advance or defend interests that had nothing to do directly with the memorials themselves, but that exposed the differing contexts that the concepts of the memorials themselves either supported or challenged. This becomes a locus through which Japanese-South Korean relations became visible. Lastly, the impact of Yasukuni on current relations between South Korea and Japan, one where this memorial continues to exert its influence periodically upon the relationship is evaluated.

Quasi-Crises

Why study these small obscure **catalysts**, and what importance do they have to Japanese-South Korean relations, and to international affairs in general? Kim (2006) refers to such minor ructions as the building of the Ahn memorial, or a Japanese Prime Minister's visit to Yasukuni as a 'quasi-crisis', which occurs over non-security or non-economic matters; but which nonetheless involve national prestige or identity. (p. 161). These are **catalysts**, that while not critical in themselves, if left unresolved and added to other quasi-crisis or **catalysts**, build cumulatively to spill over into the security realm leading to potential conflict. Cases in point include; the 1870 Franco-Prussian War, where France saw Prussia as "an affront to its national honour and prestige" through a number of incidents until an inconsequential issue over the Spanish Throne vacancy brought matters to war (Ascoli, 1987, p. 40), and Austria's 1914 war declaration on Serbia, where the Archduke

Ferdinand's assassination served as pretext for the restoration of national 'honour' 'slighted' by Serbian nationalism during the 19th and early 20th Centuries (Strachen, 2001, p 66).

The Yasukuni Shrine: Multiple symbolic meanings

Yasukuni has “come to embody many symbolic meanings: a site of mourning for dead soldiers, a religious entity encroaching on governmental concerns, an embodiment of jingoistic conservatism, an attempt to justify state-sanctioned violence of the past, and a rejection of the historical view point propagated by the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal” (Suzuki, 2015, p. 6).

The shrine, established in 1869, commemorates those who died in the service of the Emperor (Yasukuni, No Date). No human remains are buried there, but it acts as a repository for the spirits of the dead who are elevated to the status of divinities. Japan has no national war memorial where the living can focus on their grief for the war dead, so Yasukuni is the locus of commemoration (Sakamoto, 2015, p. 23). The war dead, even the executed Class A War criminals whose spirits are said to repose there, become a context for simple political binaries in abstracting the present from the past, defying true reconciliation (Suzuki, 2015, p. 10) between victim and victimizer.

The shrine therefore, becomes a focus for the neo-nationalists and their views of Japanese history (Sakamoto, 2015, p. 27), conflating and intertwining domestic politics, the Shinto religion, national myth and parochial history to produce one-sided distortions of *relational-contexts*. It presents a fixture where politicians need to be seen. This in turn, from a Sino-South Korean perspective, seems to legitimate Japanese historical aggression (Rozman, 2015, p. 264). Regular visits by Japanese politicians in their official capacity while holding office, serve as a persistent irritant between the three states.⁷⁸ The Ahn Museum at Harbin was one response to the context created by Abe's visit.

⁷⁸ The first post-war Japanese Prime Minister, in an official capacity, to visit the shrine was Yoshiro Nakasone in 1983 – where China but not South Korea – which was still under a military dictatorship – protested (Kim, 2006, p. 173; Rozman, 2015, p. 264). South Korea joined China in complaining however, when Ryutaro Hashimoto visited the shrine in 1996 (34), and especially during the Koizumi period when he visited the shrine every year of his Premiership (37) (Kim, 2006, p. 174). Abe did not continue this tradition during his first administration (39) (Glosserman & Snyder, p. 104). His only visit during his second administration so far, was in December 2012 – which was a domestic political imperative – a promise made during the election - that trumped the feelings of Japan's neighbors and the US (42) (Rauhala, 2014, January 2014).

The Ahn Museum at Harbin: Confirming and creating contexts

There is an often-quoted phrase, that ‘one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter’. The cliché is apt in this case, but to understand this contrast in context one must understand how Japan, South Korea and China see and record both Ito and Ahn.

Ito Hirobumi (b. 1841-d. 1909) was a core founder of the modern Japanese state, who established the current governing system (8), becoming Japan’s first Prime Minister – and three times more subsequently (Kazuhiro, 2014, p. 3). To the Japanese he was one of the clique that turned Japan away from Asian traditionalism – seen as backward and benighted, towards Western enlightenment and progress (7) (Hamada, 1936, p. 183). Externally, Ito was a successful statesman and war-time leader who masterminded initial Japanese expansion into Asia (9-14) (Hamada, 1936, p. x). To the Chinese however, under his premiership, Japan initiated the First Sino-Japanese War (12) (Kazuhiro, 2014, p. 136), and hence China had a historical identity stake in a memorial to Ito’s assassin. To the Koreans, Ito as the Japanese Resident-General of the Korean protectorate (15) (1905-1909), demolished the Korean state and laid the ground work for its eventual formal incorporation into the Japanese Empire (17) (Kazuhiro, 2014, p. 214), thus becoming a symbol of Japanese oppression.

Ahn Jung-Guen (b. 1879-d. 1910) fought in the brutal 1905-1906 failed anti-Japanese uprisings in Korea (15), and subsequently went into exile in Manchuria (Denny & Green, 2014, June 6). Ahn’s October 1909 assassination at Mukden (Harbin) station (16) was built into the folklore of both Koreas narratives of anti-Japanese resistance and in their differing versions of national identity, with Ahn in the South being posthumously awarded South Korea’s highest civilian honour. However, to the Japanese he was and remains a terrorist and a ‘criminal’ (No Author, 2013, November 20; Tiezzi, 2013, November 22). Indeed, in their execution of Ahn, the Japanese deliberately buried his ashes in an unmarked grave whose location is lost (16) (Tiezzi, 2013, November 22), an insult to ancestor-worshipping Koreans.

Institutionally, Ahn is portrayed differently in a Memorial Hall dedicated to him in Seoul to that of the Museum in Harbin. In Seoul Ahn is purely a Korean nationalist dedicated to freeing his country from Japanese colonialism. In Harbin Ahn becomes linked to China, not only in the location of the assassination but also in being portrayed as a pan-Asian nationalist who wished to rid Asia of European style colonialism of which the Japanese personified (Denny & Green, 2014,

June 6). Ahn's identity and context is remade, becoming entwined with Chinese nationalism in opposing Japan's narrative of history. This is further reinforced by the languages used at the Harbin memorial to describe Ahn and his life, where the scripts are written only in Chinese and Korean; and where Japanese is absent. Denny and Green (2014, June 6) speak of this aspect of the memorial as being "What is the bigger snub? To repeatedly rub Japanese noses in their historical misdeeds, or to render them non-persons in the course of the retelling?" In this retelling Ito's achievements are either ignored or villainized.

The leaders and their motives

The questions must therefore be asked: 'What were Park and Xi's motives in building the Ahn memorial?'; and secondly, 'Would this joint action knowingly antagonize Japan and its neo-conservative Prime Minister, and to what end?'

Park's reasoning was domestic, bilateral and vengeful.⁷⁹ Firstly, Park felt the need to burnish her nationalist credentials, which were suspect to many South Koreans due to her father's legacy (26) (Rauhala, 2014, January 30; Park, 2015, p. 89).⁸⁰ Secondly, Park herself was well known to the Chinese state – being seen at the time as being the most pro-Beijing of all the South Korean Presidents to date (Park, 2015, p. 89).⁸¹ The Ahn memorial was seen as a way of achieving closer ties with China on a ground where both shared a commonality – hostility to Japan's colonial past. Park also knew that this initiative would rile the Japanese, especially Abe. Abe had in the past year; adversely commented on the Comfort Women issue, made moves to start reforming the constitution and to re-examine the wording of the 1993 Kano apology/declaration, and lastly topped this off with the visit to the Yasukuni Shrine (Tiezzi, 2013, November 22; Morris-Suzuki,

⁷⁹ When I say vengeful, Park had made the favourable resolution of the Comfort Women issue a key policy platform of her Government as a way of burnishing both her nationalist and feminist credentials. Abe, in denying the existence of Comfort Women was seen as a attack not only against the South Korean version of history, but a personal attack on Park herself (Glosserman & Snyder, 2015, p. 108).

⁸⁰ Park Chung-Hee (b. 1917-d. 1979) was seen as pro-Japanese by many Koreans (Kim, 2006, p. 172-173). His family were one of a number of Korean families who benefited from Japanese rule and aided the Japanese in administering the Peninsula. Park served as an officer in the Japanese Army and spoke fluent Japanese. He was more receptive to reconciliation with Japan than his predecessor Syngman Rhee, and violently repressed protests over the 1965 agreement with Japan.

⁸¹ Park is a fluent Chinese speaker and had been used at various times as a special ambassador to Beijing, due to her negotiating ability and the prestige of her father, by various South Korean administrations (Park, 2015, p. 89). As President, she broke the normal protocol by visiting Beijing first rather than Tokyo (Rachman, 2016, p. 94). She was nationalistic and had started her administration by picking a popular fight with Tokyo over the Comfort Women issue – an issue that Abe had originally discounted as being untrue.

2014, November 19), indicating a more nationalistic and militarist thrust to Japanese policy.⁸² The tit-for-tat communiques that flew between Tokyo and Seoul over the Harbin memorial, and her refusal to meet Abe further benefited Park politically domestically.

Xi's motives for proposing the Ahn Museum were both domestic and geopolitical. Domestically, the Chinese dwelt on the historic injustices of their 'Century of Humiliation' (1840-1949) in which the Japanese had played a large part (Rauhala, 2014, January 30). Geopolitically, Xi used this issue to drive a further wedge between the two US allies. The Japanese response of calling Ahn a terrorist, decrying the memorial as being 'not conducive to building peace and stability', and the South Korean counter response (BBC, 20 January 2014), was likely viewed with glee in Beijing, especially at a time when the US were trying to attempt another 'historic' Japanese-South Korean intelligence sharing agreement (Jackson, 2015, April 20; Miller, 2015, p. 56)⁸³. The more that Beijing can keep South Korea and Japan antagonistically, the better its own geo-strategic position within Asia.

The memorial also added to his personal hostility to Park and increased Japanese resentment (Park, 2015, p. 97). In its quest for 'normalcy' Japan does not want its historical issues with its neighbours aired internationally. This had already occurred over the Dokdo/Takishima Islands dispute (Glosserman & Snyder, 2015, p. 102), the Comfort Women issue (Kreiter, 2014, November 29; Kyodo, 2016, September 25) and Japanese use of slave labour (Chun, 2013, p. 174). The extension of historical differences onto foreign soil – even Chinese soil – complicates Japan's drive for normalcy. The bringing to the fore of these historical issues internationally challenges Japan's identity image of itself, bringing on feelings of pain and betrayal (Glosserman & Snyder, 2015, p. 7), and in reminding other states of Japan's contentious past. Lastly, any historical issues complicate Japan's relations with the US, where 'hot' issues can supersede alliance interests domestically, hence Abe could not blithely ignore the Harbin memorial but had to react (Glosserman & Snyder, 2015, p. 3).

⁸² Abe's visit to Yasukuni, while explicitly billed as commemorating the millions of war dead, also occurred at a time when the Japanese were facing an increased military buildup by China in the East China Sea over disputed islands (Rachman, 2016, p. 86). The visit signaled that Japan would protect its interests, show that Japan could pursue policy independent of Washington – which had advised against the visit, and strengthen Abe's position with the nationalistic Japanese right.

⁸³ The 2014 Intelligence Sharing Agreement was not ratified by the South Korean Senate, in part due to the dispute over the Ahn Memorial.

The tit-for-tat spat over the Ahn memorial died out in late 2014 as North Korean nuclear activity concentrated the minds of both the Japanese and South Koreans politicians into seeking some sought of consensus. This could be seen as another **catalyst** bringing possibly a change in relations; however, according to Jackson (2015, April 20), once this perennial problem dissipates the Japanese and South Koreans will likely revert back to their quasi-crises over historical interpretation.

Findings from a heterarchical point of view

So, what can we say about this issue from a heterarchical perspective? Below is a summary of the above case study broken down into contextual-variable categories.

Events: The most obvious contextual-variable is an event: the initial visit to Yasukuni, which then caused the building of the Ahn Memorial. Both sides acknowledge that the visit happened, but it becomes contentious because of the differing contextual interpretations that have been conceived by both sides. Hence the Ahn Memorial and the 1909 assassination itself becomes causal events interlinked *relational-contextually* to the Yasukuni visit from which flow the materiality, institutions, ideations, personalities and interests that result in allowing for holistic study.

Materiality: This represents the physical structures of both the Yasukuni Shrine and Harbin's Ahn memorial – the physical manifestation of what they represent. Yasukuni is the physical manifestation and locus of many different meanings and interpretations as has already been discussed, both domestically and internationally.

The Ahn memorial being built in Chinese Harbin physically links of Chinese and Korean narratives of historical struggles against the Japanese, and their current opposition to Japanese normalcy. The physical presence of the memorial in an area that South Korean tourists visit often – close to the site of the first purported Korean kingdom of Gojoseon (Ancient Origins, 2016, February 17), aids in enhancing Korean nationalism. The Harbin Ahn memorial is tied to Japanese atrocities in China and acts to embed Korean identity further into Asia, rather than following Western orientated Japan.

Institutional: Both structures institutionalize certain policy regimes, about their own memorial and about their concept of the 'other' and its memorial. The Japanese see Yasukuni as a representation of sacrifice, national pride and tradition – 'a sense of identity and surety in an uncertain world'

(Wirth, 2009, p. 478), part of a *policy regime*; while the South Koreans see it as a perpetuation of the Japanese past in which they were victims.

The Ahn memorial continues part of a *policy regime* by South Korea to extract contriteness from Japan for its history. This has both a domestic context – the popularity of ‘Japan bashing’; and an international context, in finding common ground with other states – in this case China, to counterbalance Japan in achieving South Korean interests.

Ideational: Ideationally both Yasukuni and the Ahn memorial are traditions that each state wishes to present domestically – in the case of Japan, and internationally – in the case of South Korea. Both memorials portray the ‘self’ as victim. For the Japanese, the dead embodied as deities are always with and watching over the living (Yasukuni, No Date), and serve as a constant reminder of self-sacrifice for the state – as ‘defenders’ of the state, an essence which the ‘good Japanese citizen’ should emulate thereby perpetuating *Kokkashugi* within Japanese culture.

However, in Korea these same values are understood within the context of Japan’s colonial-militarist past, and Yasukuni comes to embody the subtle nationalist undertones hidden beneath the veneer of Japanese self-professed pacifism (Chun, 2013, p. 166). The Ahn memorial becomes part of the ideational view that the Japanese have never truly repented, and that given another chance they would subjugate Korea once again (Doyle, 2009, p. 62). The Ahn memorial gives a concept to others – in this case China – of Japan as the aggressor and colonizer, in linking a shared suffering of two peoples under the Japanese yoke.

But ideation can also be about individuals – or the concepts of individuals within the national psyche. We have the competing concepts of Japan’s vision of Ito as a self-sacrificing modernizer, politician and diplomat; or the Korean concept of Ito as the oppressor, nation destroyer and its enslaver. And what of Ahn; the ruthless Korean terrorist of Japanese conception, or an equally self-sacrificing freedom-fighter as portrayed by South Korea, where he represents the embodiment of a repressed people lashing out at the oppressor. These different conceptions of historical ideation clash repeatedly in what, on the surface, should be a harmonious relationship.

Personalities: In this thesis, the personalities are not Ito or Ahn, who exist more as existentialist concepts in the context of Japanese-South Korean relations, but in those who make the decisions in light of the contexts of the assassination. Hence, we see the motivations of Park and Xi, and the

counter motivations of Abe. Park's need for domestic legitimacy, a strong linkage with China and a need to rile Abe motivates her to propose a statue of Ahn. Xi, sensing an opportunity in proposing the museum, gained domestically and strengthened bilateral ties with South Korea through a shared history, further damaged the chances of South Korea and Japan achieving their first security related treaty, and thereby continues to pick at the sore of Japanese-South Korean relations – and obliquely at the US containment cordon around China. Park and Xi's decisions then forced a response from Japan – because these decisions attacked a national icon – and hence the LDP's concept of national identity. The Ahn memorial glorified a 'terrorist' and brought up a different conception of history to that which Japan had of itself and that it wished to present to the world if it is to achieve international normalization.

Interests: Lastly, the decision of Abe to visit Yasukuni and the Park/Xi decision to build the museum must be seen in the contexts of their interests – both domestic and international.

The underlying context is that the South Koreans, in remembering their history, seek to ensure that the Japanese state will never threaten the Korean Peninsula again. History thus becomes a tool in pursuing that objective – in reminding the world that Japan is not a 'normal' nation as shown by its history, thus history – or at least the South Korean version of history posits a future 'normal' Japan as aggressive and hegemonic. This however impacts of Japan's 'normalization' process which it sees as imperative in operating in the new post-Cold War Asian environment. Part of that normalization process is the rehabilitation of Japan as a 'normal' nation both domestically and internationally (Rozman, 2015, p. 265) with all the trappings that go with it, hence Japan retaliates against those who challenge that 'normalization' process (p. 266).

Reflection and reflexivity

Lastly in the heterarchical cycle we reflect briefly on the catalyst – the Yasukuni Shrine. We do this because the Ahn Memorial has faded from the news headlines and hence it no longer acts as an **epiphanic** response. So, we ask the question on reflection; 'Has the dynamics of the Yasukuni Shrine also faded from view, or does it still play a part in Japanese-South Korean relations'? The answer is that the Yasukuni Shrine very much continues to periodically play a part in the relations of the two countries where it continues to spark quasi-crises.

In the latest example; on the 27 December 2016, Tomomi Inada, the Japanese Defence Minister visited the shrine one day after returning from a reconciliation visit to Pearl Harbour (McCurry, 2016, December 29). While there was an initial muted response to the visit in Seoul⁸⁴, the **epiphenomena** fell further south in Pusan, where the City Council had been resisting a request to erect a Comfort Woman statue outside the Japanese Consulate. The Council was acting in accordance with the 2015 agreement signed between Japan and South Korea that prohibited such statues (43). However, the visit to Yasukuni by Inada⁸⁵ and the furor this unleashed among the population, if not the elites, forced the Council to agree to the statue's erection. Japan objected to the statue and recalled its ambassador to Seoul home for 'consultations' (46-48)⁸⁶, along with the cancellation of an upcoming trilateral FTA conference. This presented another quasi-crisis, which added to the other crises instituted by differing historical interpretations continue to rile relations between the two states, where Yasukuni continues to act periodically as one of several **catalysts** in stimulating history as a relational-context within Japanese-South Korean relations.

Conclusion

This chapter demonstrates the use of a **catalyst** – that is the 2012 Abe visit to Yasukuni, and how this set events in motion that allowed for a study of the Japanese-South Korean relationship. Although a small crisis within Japanese-South Korean relations, the Ahn/Ito affair does illustrate a pattern, as highlighted in **Appendix C**, of continuing attacks on each other's history that reside outside the mainstream paradigms of IR. The catalyst of the Yasukuni Shrine therefore acts as a periodic intensifier of a dominant trend within Japanese-South Korean relations. Here the catalyst enhances and allows history, as a contextual-variable, to override and intrude upon the security, political, social and economic relationships forged between the two countries over the last seventy years. This enhances the view that all other contextual-variables and relations in this particular

⁸⁴ Not so in Beijing, which refused to send an envoy to Japan to discuss the trilateral FTA in protest. Ironically, this meeting was called by Tokyo in light of the collapse of the TPP with the election of Trump in the US.

⁸⁵ Inada is also identified as a member of Nippon Kaigi (Larsson, 2017, March 9).

⁸⁶ The Japanese Ambassador returned to Seoul on 4 April 2017 (Situation Reports, 2017, April 3). During the interregnum of the ambassador's absence, the South Korean President was impeached, the possible election of a center-left candidate potentially hostile to Japan has become a possibility, while the North Korean situation has gotten worse – all without official Japanese representation and observation in South Korea. The Pusan statue remains in place, but Japan has come to realize that the South Korean situation has become critical to its own security, overriding the furor that the statue had originally caused in Tokyo.

case can be said to be held hostage to history – or various interpretations of history – making it the prime aspect in understanding Japanese-South Korean relations.

Conclusion: Is heterarchy a viable framework for IR?

In conclusion, both the philosophers Kant and Hegel posited that humans thought contextually and in relation to others, as did Ogilvy in his seminal philosophical work 'Multidimensional Man'. McCulloch, from a natural scientific perspective, also posited that the human brain framed its thinking around contexts rather than the positivist notion of hierarchy and objective rationalism. If this is truly the case, then it must stand that actors on the larger scale at a national and international level must also think and act in terms of their own contexts, within what they conceive to be their own realities. However, the mainstream IR epistemologies largely ignore context, thereby limiting their understanding of what is really occurring within the world.

Therefore, the introduction to this thesis posited a framework called heterarchy, going on to frame how it fitted into the academic architecture of the IR discipline. The utility of IR is being questioned, both within policy making circles and within academia itself. If it is to survive and regain its credibility then new concepts that step away from the old doctrines must occur, of which the concept of heterarchy is an offering. In the process of its formation, the concept has borrowed some aspects from many IR paradigms to give an alternative understanding of the IR situation using relational-contexts. Although heavily influenced by anti-foundationalist ontology, heterarchy also contains parts of foundationalism in the way it envisages the existence of the original **catalyst** that sets observation, description and understanding in motion. However, after that the observation becomes influenced by both anti-foundationalist structural and normative constructivists, and the relativists in how the **catalyst** and the events that follow its introduction in to IR study are processed.

Chapter One conceptualized the framework of heterarchy within IR, positing how it might be applied, and suggesting ways that this can be achieved. Firstly, a **catalyst** is identified that sets off a chain-reaction of action and counter-action by actors. Secondly, this allows the observer's focus of observation to become, not on the actor itself, but on the types of relations that the actors have with each other generated by the **catalyst** - and how actors see these relationships through their various contexts. These relations become relational-contextual in being defined by 'self and other', where the observer must also study the 'other' to get their perspective allowing for alternative explanation and understanding of an actor's actions and reaction. To do this heterarchy suggests the use of contextual-variables framed within the use of actor policy regimes, which explain the

actor's contextual structure through which relationships are viewed. The use of policy regimes leads to a deeper discussion of this aspect in **Appendix B**. Lastly, a practical way of applying relational-contexts in empirical study has been suggested in the use of the heterarchical cycle, which in turn allows for observer reflexivity and the ability to posit change within the IR system.

This led on to a discussion in Chapter Two on how heterarchy differs from the established structuralist IR schools. Both heterarchy and the structuralists agree that there is anarchy, but disagree over how to observe, interpret and understand it. The structuralists ironically try to impose order upon anarchy which results in certain interpreted patterns. Therefore, IR becomes hierarchical with analysis conducted at the systemic level and telescoped down into the sub-systemic level forcing actors to conform to structural imperatives. This in turn focuses observation substantively upon dominant actors within the hierarchy, leading to automatic assumptions that lesser actors will conform to the hegemonic order, where actors act in 'rationally objective' ways, where only a limited set of variables can be studied, all of which leads to stability and **presentism**. This allows the structuralists to ignore **catalysts** and differentiation of actors in their theory making, shifting the focus from the relations between actors to the actor itself as a clone of structuralist conceptions. This reinforces particular theories, which are elegant in their detail, but which do not necessarily reflect the real world itself, leading to a continuous **paradigmatic feedback loop** even as reality - context - continues to change.

Alternatively, heterarchy would say that the observer cannot impose order upon anarchy because actors view their reality through their own contexts, and react to **catalysts** that either reinforce or change those perceptions. Hence the focus of study becomes the relationship between actors in reaction to a **catalyst**. This exposes the actor's rationality as subjective and variable according to their own contexts or understandings about what is going on, although this rationality may not be viewed as rational from the perspective of another actor. These contexts include the need to study the domestic – an aspect ignored by the structuralists – because the domestic impacts on and is impacted on by IR, hence its need to be included within IR studies. This in turn allows for the observation of change through analysis of the variables, which further allows the observer to differentiate actors from each other, by placing the variables in the context of each actor (contextual-variables). This invariably turns the structuralist view of anarchy from systemic to sub-

systemic as the locus of study creating frameworks to understand actor actions – some of which may affect and change the IR system.

Chapter Three highlights how the Japanese-South Korean relationship defies structuralist explanations, and suggests how heterarchy might offer an alternative explanation through the application of relational-contexts. Structuralists emphasize the close relations between the two towards a convergence of positions. However, structuralists fail to explain why this so-called convergence contains differences that hamstring the US alliance system by ignoring the contexts within which Japan and South Korea interact with each other outside and even sometimes within their US alliance systems. Heterarchy investigates the empirical evidence of the relationship itself and asserts that it is the use of history that has the largest impact upon the relationship. History became the contextual-variable through which the Japanese-South Korean relationship was analyzed, leading to new understandings that underlie the projected surface cooperation, illuminating deep antagonisms fueled by a contentious interpretation of history. These historical antagonisms affect relations between the two states, ultimately frustrating both the US who is attempting to weld Japan and South Korea into a multilateral-alliance system, and Japanese attempts to become a normal nation in dealing with the aftermath of the post-Cold War era.

In providing the relational-context against which to view the Japanese-South Korean relationship in Chapter Three, Chapter Four launches into a small case-study to demonstrate the use of a **catalyst** on the contextual-variable of history. The **catalyst** selected was Abe's 2012 visit to the Yasukuni Shrine that sets off actions and **epiphenomena** that allows the observer to study sets of contextual-variables that are excluded from the structuralist paradigms. Hence the **catalyst** allows the observer to study several levels from the domestic through to IR, analyze foreign policy through a set of policy regimes of both states (and China as well) to arrive at an understanding of cause and effect. For instance, the reaction of South Korea of the Yasukuni visit was to raise a memorial – with Chinese cooperation - to a one-hundred-year-old assassination, that triggered different national contexts causing a crisis between Tokyo and Seoul, a view that continues to be reinforced in the reflective section posted at the end of this chapter. While this incident had limited ramifications, it added to the series of unresolved quasi-crises that periodically roil Japanese-South Korean relations and build cumulatively to antagonistic relations left out of other IR paradigmatic descriptions.

Having considered the issues presented above, if the reader thinks that heterarchy has some merit in increasing the understanding of IR, then it is suggested that heterarchy be subjected to further empirical testing on other issues of salience, which the structuralist paradigms have ignored, or where there is felt to be incomplete understandings using conventional theoretical explanations. In this way heterarchy can be either rejected, modified or, essentially confirmed as a possible framework within which to understand and interpret IR in order to make it relevant again.

References

- Abraham, William E. (1995). Substance and attribute. In Ted Honderich (Ed.), *The Oxford Companion to Philosophy*, (pp. 858-856). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Akerlof, George A. & Shiller, Robert J. (2009). *Animal Spirits: How human psychology drives the economy, and why it matters to global capitalism*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Alam, Mohammed Badrul (2005, July 12). For a rightful place: UNSC reforms and Japan. *Society for the Study of peace and Conflict*. Retrieved from www.sspconline.org/opinion/ForARightfulPlace-UNSCReformsandJapan...
- Ancient Origins (2016, February 17). The Legendary Founder of Korea, Dangun Waggeon. *Ancient Origins*. Retrieved from www.ancient-origins.net/history-famous-people/legendary-founder...
- Analysis (2016, March 1). What compels South Korea to build up its Defence capabilities? *Stratfor*. Retrieved from <https://www.stratfor.com/sample/analysis/what-compels-South...>
- Analysis (2016, August 18). The double-edged sword of Japanese remilitarization. *Stratfor*. Retrieved from <https://www.stratfor.com/sample/analysis/double-edged-sword...>
- Analysis (2016, September 16). South Korea ups the ante. *Stratfor*. Retrieved from <https://www.stratfor.com/sample/analysis/south-korea-ups...>
- Arteaga, Felix (2012, September 13). From Multipolarity to Multinodality in International Security. *Real Institute Elcano*. Retrieved from <mhtml:file://E:\From Multipolarity to Multinodality in International Security – Elcano....>
- Ascione, Ben (2016, July 24). Can Abe revise Japan's peace constitution? *East Asia Forum*. Retrieved from <http://www.easiaforum.org/2016/07/24/can-abe-revise-japans-peace-constitution/?utm...>
- Ascoli, David (1987). *A day of battle: Mars-la-Tour, 16 August 1870*. London: HARRAP Ltd.

ASAN Report (2015, April 20). Measuring a giant: South Korean perceptions of the United States. *The Asian Forum*. Seoul: The Asian Institute for Foreign Policy Studies.

ASAN Report (2015, August). Eight priorities for Korean foreign and defence policy. *The Asian Forum*. Seoul: The Asian Institute for Foreign Policy Studies.

Bae, Kichan (2007). Korea at the crossroads: The history and future of East Asia (Kim Jin, Trans.). Seoul: Happyreading.

Baker, Rodger (2017, April 4). Asia's dilemma: China's butter, or America's guns? *Stratfor*. Retrieved from <https://www.stratfor.com/sample/weekly/asias-dilemma-chinas-butter...>

BBC (2014, January 20). Japan protest over Korean assassin Ahn Jung-Geun memorial in China. *BBC*. Retrieved from www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-25808437

BBC (2017, January 2017). Japan recalls Korean envoy over 'comfort women' statue. *BBC News*. Retrieved from www.bbc.com/news.

Bennett, A. & Elman, C. (2007). Case study methods in the International Relations Subfield. *Comparative Political Studies* 40(2), 170-195. doi: 10.1177/0010414006296346.

Bell, Markus (2016, June 30). Tragic lessons from Asia for EU-Turkey refugee deal. *East Asia Forum*. Retrieved from <http://www.easiaforum.org/2016/06/30/tragic-lessons-from-asia-for-eu-turkey-refugee-deal/>.

Bogen, James (1995a). Relations. In Ted Honderich (Ed.), *The Oxford Companion to Philosophy*, (pp. 755-756). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bogen, James (1995b). Relations, internal and external. In Ted Honderich (Ed.), *The Oxford Companion to Philosophy*, (p. 756). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bresser-Pereira, Luiz Carlos (2014). The hegemony constraints in the neo-liberal years of Capitalism. In Hideko Magara (Ed.), *Economic Crises and Policy Regimes: The dynamics of policy innovation and pragmatic change*, 56-78. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Brown, Chris & Ainley, Kirsten (2009). *Understanding International Relations* (4th Ed.). New York: Palgrave MacMillan.

Burgess, Chris (2016, October 13). A Japanese multicultural society still far off. *East Asian Forum*. Retrieved from www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/10/13/a-japanese-multicultural-society...

Buzan, Barry (1984). Economic structure and International Security: The limits of the Liberal case. *International Organization* 38(4), 597-624. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org.exproxy.massey.ac.nz/stable/2706625>.

Buzan, Barry & Waever Ole (2003). *Regions and Powers: The structure of International Security*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Buruma, Ian (1994). *The wages of guilt: Memories of war in Germany and Japan*. London: Jonathan Cape.

Buzo, Adrian (2007). *The making of modern Korea* (2nd Ed.). Oxon: Routledge.

Cha, Victor D. (2010). Powerplay: Origins of the US alliance system in Asia. *International Security* 34(3), 158-196. Retrieved from muse.jhu.edu/article/369951/pdf.

Chambliss, Daniel F. (2005). Frame analysis. In George Ritzer (Ed.), *Encyclopedia of Social Theory, Volume One*. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications.

Choe, Sang-Hun (2016, November 22). South Korean leader, amid scandal, approves intelligence pact with Japan. *New York Times*. Retrieved from www.nytimes.com/.../asia/south-korea-intelligence-sharing-japan.html.0710745160.

Choi, Jong Kun & Moon, Chung-In (2010). Understanding Northeast Asian dynamics: Inventory checking and new discourses on power, interest and identity. *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 10(2), 343-372. doi:10.1093/irap/1cq003.

Chun, Chaesung (2013). South Korea's foreign policy and East Asia. In John Swenson-Wright & Rudiger Frank (Eds.), *Korea and East Asia: The stony road to collective security*, (pp. 155-179). Leiden, Netherlands: Koninklijke Brill N.V.

CIA (2016). CIA World Factbook 2016. *Central Intelligence Agency*. Retrieved from <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/...>

Coady, C. A. J. (1995) Relativism, epistemology. In Ted Honderich (Ed.), *The Oxford Companion to Philosophy* (p. 757). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Consonery, Nick, Green, John, Seaman, Scott & West, Sean (2013). Risks in Japan's relations with China, South Korea and Taiwan. *Eurasia Group*. New York: Eurasia Group.

Crane, Tim (1995). Variable Realization. In Ted Honderich (Ed.), *The Oxford Companion to Philosophy*, (p. 896). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Crossley, Nick (2005). *Key concepts in Critical Social Theory*. London: SAGE Publications Ltd.

Crotty, Michael (1998). *The foundation of Social Research: Meaning and perspective in the research process*. Crows Nest, New South Wales: Allen & Unwin.

Crumley, Carole L. (1979). Three locational models: An epistemological assessment for Anthropology and Archaeology. *Advances in Archaeological method and theory* 2, 141-173. Retrieved from archaeology.about.com/od/terms/g/spatialanalysis.htm.

Crumley, Carol L. (1987). A dialectical critique of hierarchy. In Thomas C Patterson & Christine Ward Gailey (Eds.), *In power relations and state formation*, (pp. 155-168). Washington: American Anthropological Association.

Crumley, Carol L. (1994). Historical ecology: A multidimensional ecological orientation. In Carol L. Crumley (Ed.), *Historical Ecology: Cultural knowledge and changing landscapes*, (pp. 1-13). Santa Fe, New Mexico: School of American Research Press.

Crumley, Carole L. (2005). Remember how to organize: Heterarchy across disciplines. In Christopher S. Beekman & William S. Baden (Eds.), *Nonlinear models for Archaeology and Anthropology* (pp. 35-50). Aldershot: Ashgate Press.

Daiki, Shibuichi (2016, May 12). Countering Japan's hate speech groups. *East Asia Forum*. Retrieved from <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/05/12/countering-japans-hate-speech-groups/>.

Denny, Steven & Green, Christopher (2014, June 6). National identity and historical legacy: Ahn Jung-Geun in the grand narrative. *Sino NK*. Retrieved from sinonk.com/2014/06/06/national-identity-and-historical-legacy-ahn...

Denzin, Norman K. (1970). *The research act: A theoretical introduction to sociological methods*. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc.

Depelteau, Francois & Powell, Christopher (2013). Introduction. In Francois Depelteau and Christopher Powell (Eds.), *Applying Relational Sociology: Relations, networks and society*, (pp. xv-xx). New York: Palgrave MacMillan.

Dormandy, Xenia & Kiwane, Rory (2014). *Asia-Pacific security: A changing role for the United States*. London: Chatham House.

Doyle, Randell (2009). *The roots of war in the Twenty-First Century: Geography, hegemony and politics in Asia-Pacific*. Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America Inc.

Dreman, David (1998). *Contrarian investment strategies: The next generation*. New York: Simon and Schuster.

Dudden, Alexis (2017, March 12). Abe caught out in school scandal. *East Asia Forum*. Retrieved from www.eastasiaforum.org/2017/03/12/abe-caught-out-in-school-sca...

Editorial Staff – ASAN (2015, July-August). Washington insights. *The ASAN Forum* 3(4), 173-183. Seoul: The Asian Institute for Foreign Policy Studies.

Editorial Staff – Japan (2015). Country Report: Japan. *The ASAN Forum* 3(4), 232-242. Seoul: ASAN.

Ehrenreich, Robert M., Crumley, Carole L. & Levy, Janet E. (1995). Heterarchy and the analysis of complex societies. *Archaeological Papers of the American Anthropological Association* No 6. Washington: American Archaeological Association.

Fairtlough, Gerard (2005). *The three ways to get things done: Hierarchy, heterarchy and responsible autonomy in organizations*. Birdport, Dorset: Trierarchy Press.

Frank, Rudiger (2013). Introduction: Security issues in Northeast Asia. In John Swenson-Wright & Rudiger Frank (Eds.), *Korea and East Asia: The stony road to collective security*, (pp. 1-24). Leiden, Netherlands: Koninklijke Brill N.V.

French, Howard W. (2002, March 11). Japan rediscovers its Korean past. *New York Times*. Retrieved from www.nytimes.com/2002/03/11/world/japan-rediscovers-its-korean-past...

Funabashi, Yoichi (2001). Japan's moment of truth. *Survival* 42(4), (73-84). Retrieved from www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00396338.2000.10719157?src=recsys.

Funabashi, Yoichi (2016). Asia: Trump's shock doctrine will make China even stronger. *Time Magazine* 188, (pp. 27-28). New York: Time Publishing Inc.

Furlong, Paul & Marsh, David (2010). A skin not a sweater: Ontology and epistemology in Political Science. In David Marsh and Gerry Stoker (Eds.), *Theory and methods in Political Science* (3rd Ed.), (pp. 184-211). London: Palgrave MacMillan.

Gaddis, John Lewis (1997). History, theory and common ground. *International Security* 22(1), (75-85). Retrieved from <file:///L:/200%20Thesis/history%20theory%20and%20common%20IR%20ground.pdf>.

Geertz, Clifford (1989). Anti-Anti-Relativism. In Michael Krausz (Ed.), *Relativism: Interpretation and confrontation*, (pp. 12-34). Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press.

Gelman, Andrew (2011, January 3). All politics is local? The debate and the graphs. *New York Times*. Retrieved from fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/03/all-politi.

Geopolitical Diary (2016, March 1). What compels South Korea to build up its defence capabilities. *Stratfor*. Retrieved from <https://www.stratfor.com/sample/geopolitical-diary/what-compels...>

Geopolitical Diary (2016, August 16). As Northeast Asia changes, Seoul is caught in the middle. *Stratfor*. Retrieved from <https://www.stratfor.com/sample/geopolitical-diary/northeast-asia...>

Geopolitical Diary (2016, October 27). South Korea: Seoul resumes talks with Japan on intelligence sharing. *Stratfor*. Retrieved from <https://www.stratfor.com/sample/snapshots/south-korea-seoul...>

Geopolitical Diary (2016, November 10). The rhetoric and reality of Donald Trump's foreign policy. *Stratfor*. Retrieved from <https://www.stratfor.com/geopolitical-diary/the-rhetoric-and-reality...>

Geopolitical Diary (2017, March 3). The power of consensus in Japan. *Stratfor*. Retrieved from <https://www.stratfor.com/geopolitical-diary/power-consensus-japan>.

Gilmore, Lorna, Hands, Penny, McKeown, Cormac and Robertson, Anne (2007). *Collins Dictionary and Thesaurus* (3rd Ed.). Glasgow: HarperCollins Publishers.

Glencross, Andrew (2015). From 'doing history' to thinking historically: Historical consciousness across history and International Relations. *International Relations* 29(4), 413-433. doi:10.1177/0047117815608233.

Global Edge (2015). Japan statistics 2015. *University of Michigan*. Retrieved from globaledge.msu.edu/a.countries.japan.

Global Edge (2015). South Korea statistics 2015. *University of Michigan*. Retrieved from globaledge.msu.edu/a.countries.south-korea.

Glosserman, Brad & Snyder, Scott A. (2015). *The Japan-South Korea identity clash: East Asia security and the United States*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Glosserman, Brad & Snyder, Scott A. (2015, June 02). The three problems plaguing Japan-South Korea relations. *Quartz Daily Brief*. Retrieved from qz.com/415726/the-three-problems-plaguing-japan-south-korea-relations.

Goh, Evelyn (2008). Hierarchy and the role of the United States in the East Asian Security Order. *International Relations in the Asia-Pacific* 8(3), 353-377. doi:10.1093/irap/1en011.

Goldammer, Eberhard Von, Paul, Joachim & Newbury Joe (2003, August). Heterarchy-Hierarchy: Two complementary categories of description. *Vordenker*. Retrieved from www.vordenker.dej.

Goodard, Stacie E. & Nexon, Daniel H. (2003). Paradigm lost? Reassessing theory of International Politics. *European Journal of International Relations* 11(1), 9-61. Retrieved from doi: 10.1177/135405050136.

Griffiths, Martin (2007). Worldviews and IR theory: Conquest or coexistence? In Martin Griffiths (Ed.), *International Relations Theory for the Twenty-First Century: An introduction*, (pp. 1-10). Oxon, London: Routledge.

Guilhot, Nicolas (2011a). Introduction: One discipline, many histories. In Nicolas Guilhot (Ed.), *The invention of International Relations Theory: Realism, the Rockefeller Foundation and the 1954 Conference on theory*, (pp. 1-32). New York: Columbia University Press.

Guilhot, Nicolas (2011b). The Realist gambit: Post-war American Political Science and the birth of IR Theory. In Nicolas Guilhot (Ed.), *The invention of International Relations Theory: Realism, the Rockefeller Foundation and the 1954 Conference on theory*, (pp. 128-161). New York: Columbia University Press.

Haas, Peter M. & Haas, Ernst B. (2002). Pragmatic Constructivism and the study of International Institutions. *Millennium Journal of International Studies*, 573-601. Retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/237800673_Pragmatic.

Hamada, Kengi (1936, Reprinted 1979). *Prince Ito*. Tokyo, Sanseido Co., Ltd.

Han, Sukhee (2009). The rise of China, power transition and South Korea's soft hedging. In Emile Kok-Kheng Yeos (Ed.), *Towards Pax-Sinica? China's rise and transformation: Impacts and implications*, (pp. 48-67). Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaysia.

Hegel, Georg William Friedrich (1812, Reprinted 1966). *Science of Logic* (4th Ed.) (W.H. Johnston & L.G. Struthers, Trans). London: Unwin Brothers Limited.

Held, David & McGrew, Anthony (1998). The end of the old order? Globalization and the prospects for World Order. *British International Studies Association*. Retrieved from [www.researchgate.net/publication/231841201_The_End_of_the_Old... ..](http://www.researchgate.net/publication/231841201_The_End_of_the_Old...)

Held, David, McGrew, Anthony, Goldblatt, David & Perraton, Jonathan (1999). *Global transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.

Heo, Inhye (2015). Neoliberal developmentalism in South Korea: Evidence from the green growth policy making process. *Asia-Pacific Viewpoint* 56(3), 351-364. doi:10.1111/apv.12093.

Heo, Uk & Woo, Hung-Yeop (2007). Changing national identity and security perceptions in South Korea. In Terrence Roehrig, Jung-Min Seo & Uk Heo (Eds.), *Korean security in a changing East Asia* (pp. 192-205). Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Security International.

Heywood, Andrew (2007). *Politics* (3rd Ed.). Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.

Hill, Christopher (1994). Academic International Relations: the siren song of policy-relevance. In C. Hill and P. Beshoff (Eds.), *Two worlds of International Relations: Academics, practitioners and the trade of ideas*, (pp. 3-28). London: Routledge.

Hindmoor, Andrew (2010). Rational Choice. In David Marsh and Gerry Stoker (Eds.), *Theory and methods in Political Science* (3rd Ed.), (pp. 42-59). London: Palgrave MacMillan.

Hodges, Wilfrid (1995). Logic, Modern. In Ted Honderich (Ed.), *The Oxford Companion to Philosophy*, 500-504. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hollis, Martin & Smith, Steve (2009). *Explaining and understanding International Relations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ivey, Jean (2015). How important is a conceptual framework? *Pediatric Nursing* 41(3), 145-153. Retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/280391894_How_Important...

Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus & Nexon, Daniel H. (1999). Relations before states: Substance, process and the study of World Politics. *European Journal of International Relations* 5(3), 291-332. Retrieved from doi: 10.1177/1354066199005003002.

Jackson, Van (2014). Power, trust and network complexity: Three logics of hedging in Asian security. *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 14, 331-356. Retrieved from doi: 10.1093/irap/lcu005.

Jackson, Van (2015, April 20). How to fix the Japan-South Korea Relationship. *The Diplomat*. Retrieved from thediplomat.com/2015/04/how-to-fix-the-japan-southkorea-relationship.

Jervis, Robert (2011). Morality, Policy and Theory: Reflections on the 1954 Conference. In Nicolas Guilhot (Ed.), *The Invention of International Relations Theory: Realism, the Rockefeller Foundation and the 1954 Conference on theory*, (pp. 33-53). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Jiyoon, Kim, Lee, John J. & Chungku, Kang (2015, August). In troubled waters: Truths and misunderstandings about Korea-Japan relations. *The ASAN Institute for Policy Studies*. Seoul: ASAN

Joo, Seung-Ho (2007). Allies under strain: US-Korean relations under G.W. Bush. In Terence Roehig, Jungmin Seo & Uk Heo (Eds.), *Korean security in a changing East Asia*, (pp. 171-191). Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Security International.

Kai, Jin (2014, December 4). South Korea-Japan relations: America's achilles' heel? *The Diplomat*. Retrieved from <https://www.thediplomat.com/tag/u-s-japan-south-korea-relations>.

Kant, Immanuel (1779, reprinted 2009). *Critique of pure reason*. (J.M.D. Meiklejohn, Trans.). Waiheke Island: The Floating Press.

Katz, Richard (2016, September 19). TPP to tarnish US relations. *East Asia Forum*. Retrieved from <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/09/19/tpp-to-tarnish-us-relations/>?

Kazuhiro, Takii (2014). *Ito Hirobumi – Japan's first Prime Minister and father of the Meiji Constitution* (Takechi Manabu, Trans.). Oxon: Routledge.

Kelly, Robert E. (2014, March 13). Three hypotheses on Korea's intense resentment of Japan. *The Diplomat*. Retrieved from [https://www.thediplomat.com/2014/03/three-hypotheses-on-koreas-intense...](https://www.thediplomat.com/2014/03/three-hypotheses-on-koreas-intense-)

Keohane, Robert O. (1990). International Liberalism reconsidered. In Robert O. Keohane (Ed.), *Power and Governance in a partially globalized world* (2002), (pp. 39-62). London: Routledge.

Keohane, Robert & Nye, Joseph S. (2001). *Power and Interdependence* (3rd Ed.). New York: Longman.

Keohane, Robert O. (2002). Introduction: From interdependence and institutionalism to globalization and governance. In Robert Keohane (Ed.), *Power and Governance in a partially globalized world*, (pp. 1-27). London: Routledge.

Kersten, Rikki (2012). The Koizumi-Abe Revolution in Japanese security policy: Normative transformation and democratic maturity. In William T. Tow & Rikki Kersten (Eds.), *Bilateral perspectives on Regional Security: Australia, Japan and the Asia-Pacific*, (pp. 24-45). London: Palgrave MacMillan.

Kim, Samuel S. (2006). *The two Koreas and the Great Powers*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kirk, Robert (1999). *Relativism and reality: A contemporary introduction*. London: Routledge.

Korea.net (2016, October 16). Korea marks 107th anniversary of An Jung-geun's 'patriotic deed'. *Government of the Republic of Korea*. Retrieved from www.korea.net/main.

Kratochwil, Friedrich (1996). Is the ship of culture at sea or returning? In Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil (Eds.), *The return of culture and identity in International Relations Theory*, (pp. 201-222). Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc.

Kratochwil, Friedrich (2006). Constructing a new orthodoxy? Wendt's Social Theory of International Politics and the constructivist challenge. In Stefano Guzzini and Anna Leander (Eds.), *Constructivism and International Relations: Alexander Wendt and his critics*, (pp. 21-47). Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge.

Kuhn, Thomas S. (1996). *The structure of scientific evolutions* (3rd Ed.). Chicago: The Chicago University Press. Kyodo, (2016, September 25). Fukui mayor cancels trip to South Korean sister city over 'comfort women' issue. *Japan Times*. Retrieved from [www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/09/25/national/politics-diplomacy/...](http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/09/25/national/politics-diplomacy/)

Kyodo, (2016, September 25). Fukui mayor cancels trip to South Korean sister city over 'comfort women' issue. *The Japan Times*. Retrieved from [www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/09/25/national/politics-diplomacy/...](http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/09/25/national/politics-diplomacy/)

Kyodo (2016, September 30). Kishida says Japan will not take extra steps on 'comfort women' issue. *The Japan Times*. Retrieved from [www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/09/30/national/politics-diplomacy/...](http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/09/30/national/politics-diplomacy/)

Lamont, Christopher (2015). *Research methods in International Relations*. London: Sage Publications Limited.

Langlois, Anthony J. (2007). Worldviews and international political theory. In Martin Griffiths (Ed.), *International Relations Theory for the Twenty-First Century: An introduction*, 146-156. Oxon, London: Routledge.

Larsson, Ernils (2017, March 9). Kindergarten scandal shows Japan's nationalist far-right out of touch. *East Asia Forum*. Retrieved from www.eastasiaforum.org/2017/03/09/kindergarten-scandal-shows-japans...

Lowe, E.J (1995). Time. In Ted Honderich (Ed.), *The Oxford Companion to Philosophy* (pp. 875-876). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Lawson, George (2010). The eternal divide? History and International Relations. *European Journal of International Relations* 18(2), 203-226. doi:10.1177/1354066110373561.

Lee, Seungjoo (2015, July 11). The politics of Asian integration. *East Asia Forum*. Retrieved from <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/07/11/the-politics-of-asian-integration/>.

Lepgold, Joseph (1998). Is anyone listening? International Relations Theory and the problem of policy relevance. *Political Science Quarterly* 113(1), 43-62. Retrieved from www.jstor.org/stable/2657650.pdf.

Leonardsen, Dag (2004). *Japan as a low-crime nation*. Houndsmill, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.

Lowe, E.J. (1995). Thought experiments. In Ted Honderich (Ed.), *The Oxford Companion to Philosophy*, (p. 875). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Mahoney, James (2007). Qualitative Methodology and Comparative Politics. *Comparative Political Studies* 40(2), 122-144. Retrieved from doi: 10.1177/0010414006296346.

McCulloch, Warren (1945). A heterarchy of values determined by the typology of nervous nets. *Biophysics* 7, 89-93.

McCurry, Justin (2015, November 2). Japan and South Korea summit signals thaw in relations. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/02/japan-south-korea...>

McGrath, Ben (2012, July 13). South Korea postpones military pact with Japan. *ICFI*. Retrieved from <https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2012/07/kojp-j13.html>.

Meynell, Letitia (2014). Imagination and insight: a new account of the content of thought experiments. *Synthese* 191, 4149-4168. doi: 10.1007/s11229-014-0519-x.

Miller, J. Bershire (2015a). Synopsis of the ASAN Institute Pacific Forum CSIS Conference on US-Japan-ROK Trilateral Relations. In Gilbert Rozman (Ed.), *Asia's alliance triangle: US-Japan-South Korea relations at a tumultuous time*, (pp. 53-58). Houndsmill, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.

Miller, J. Bershire (2015b). Japan's defence reforms and Korean perceptions of Japan's collective self-defence. In Gilbert Rozman (Ed.), *Asia's alliance triangle: US-Japan-South Korea relations at a tumultuous time*, (pp. 75-85). Houndsmill, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.

Milliken, Jennifer (1999). The study of discourse in International Relations: A critique of research and methods. *European Journal of International Relations* 5(2), 225-254. Retrieved from ejt.sagepub.com/content/5/2/225.refs.

Ministry of Defence (2013). Defence of Japan. Japanese Ministry of Defence. Retrieved from www.mod.go.jp/e/pub/w_paper...

Ministry of Defence (2014). Defence of Japan. Japanese Ministry of Defence. Retrieved from www.mod.go.jp/e/pub/w_paper...

Ministry of Defence (2015). Defence of Japan. Japanese Ministry of Defence. Retrieved from www.mod.go.jp/e/pub/w_paper...

Mitrovic, Branko (2015). Historical understanding and historical interpretation as contextualization. *History and Theory* 54, 311-332. Retrieved from doi: 10.1111/hith.10762.

Mitzen, Jennifer (2006). Ontological security in World Politics: State identity and the security dilemma. *European Journal of International Relations* 12(3), 341-370. doi: 10.1177/1354066106067346.

Miura, Satoshi (2014, December 1). Heterarchy. *Encyclopedia Britannica*. Retrieved from <https://www.britannica.com/topic/heterarchy>.

Morgenbesser, Lee (2013). The 2012 TRIP survey of International Relations in Australia: One problem to rule us all. *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 67(2), 218-233. Retrieved from <http://dx.org/10.1080/10357718.2012.750643>.

Morris-Suzuki, Tessa (2014, November 19). Remembrance, reconciliation and the East Asian memory wars. East Asia Forum. Retrieved from www.eastasiaforum.org/2014/11/19/remembrance-reconciliation-and...

Morris-Suzuki, Tessa (2016, December 29). The end of Japan's very long postwar era. *East Asia Forum*. Retrieved from www.eastasiaforum.org/.../29/the-end-of-japans-very-long-postwar-era.

Moravcsik, Andrew (1997). Taking preferences seriously: A liberal theory of International Politics. *International Organization* 51(4), 513-53. Retrieved from www.princeton.edu/~amoravcs/library/preferences.pdf.

Mukoyama, Hidehiko (2012). Japan-South Korea economic relations grow stronger in a globalized environment. *Pacific Business and Industries* 12(43), 2-24. Retrieved from www.jri.co.jp/file/englis/periodical/rim/2012/43.pdf.

Munday, Simon & Song, Jung-A (2015, October 6). South Korea frets as TPP erodes trade advantage over Japan. *Financial Times*. Retrieved from www.ft.com/cms/s/0/1ftblf330-6203-11e5-8608-a0853fb4elfe.html.

Naim, Moises (2013). *The end of power: From boardrooms to battlefields and churches to states, and why being in charge isn't what it used to be*. New York: Basic Books.

Nau, Henry R. (2012). *Perspectives on International Relations* (3rd Ed.). Washington: CQ Press.

No Author (2013, November 20). China, South Korea reject complaint from Japan over statue of assassin. *South China Morning Post*. Retrieved from www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/1360486/china-south-korea-reject...

No Author (2014, May 29). China unveils second monument to South Korean 'freedom fighter' who killed Japanese governor. *Japan Daily Press*. Retrieved from japandailynews.com/china-unveils-2nd-monument-to-south-korean...

No Author (2016) Japan and South Korea. *CIA Factbook 2016*. Retrieved from <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook>.

Noble, Gregory, W. (2008). Japanese and American perspectives of East Asian regionalism. *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 8(2), 247-262. doi:10.1093/irap/1cn003.

Nye, Joseph S. Jnr (2008). International Relations: The relevance of theory to practice. In Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*, (no page number). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

O'Brien, Robert & Williams, Mark (2010). *Global political economy: Evolution and dynamics* (3rd Ed.). New York: PalgraveMacMillan.

Ogilvy, James (1977). *Many dimensional man: Decentralizing self, society and the sacred*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Ogilvy, Jay (2016, February 3). Heterarchy: An idea finally ripe for its time. *Stratfor*. Retrieved from <https://www.stratfor.com>.

Ogilvy, Jay (2016, February 19). Conversation: The intersection of heterarchy and Geopolitics. *Stratfor*. Retrieved from <https://www.stratfor.com/video/conversation.intersection...>

O’Gorman, Kevin & Macintosh, Robert (2015). *Mapping Research Methods*. Oxford: Goodfellows Publishers Limited.

Okinogi, Keigo (2009). Psychoanalysis in Japan. In Salaman Akhtar (Ed.), *Freud and the Far East: Psychoanalysis perspectives on the people and culture of China, Japan and Korea*. (pp. 9-25). Plymouth: Jason Aronson.

O’Leary, Zina (2014). *The essential guide to doing your research project* (2nd Ed.). London: Sage.

Onuf, N. (1989). *World of our own making*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.

Onuf, Nicholas (2005). Late modern civil society. In Ronnie D. Lipschutz (2006) (Ed.) *Civil Societies and Social Movements* (pp. 47-63). Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited.

Ostrom, Vincent, Tiebet, Charles M. & Warren, Robert (1961). The organization of Government in metropolitan areas: A theoretical inquiry. *The American Political Science Review* 55(4), 831-842. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org.exproxy.massey.ac.nz/stable/1952530>.

Park, Cheol Hee (2015). Korea-Japan relations under deep stress. In Gilbert Rozman (Ed.), *Asia’s alliance triangle: US-Japan-South Korea relations at a tumultuous time*, (pp. 87-104). Houndsmill, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.

Park, Ju-min & Kim, Jack (2016, December 16). South Korean President Park Geun-hye impeached. *Reuters*. Retrieved from www.reuters.com/article/us-southkorea-politics-idUSKBN13X2JS

Parker, David A. & Lindfors, Mikael (2014, March 12). Economics and the Japan-Korea relationship: Adding value. *Center for Strategic and International Studies*. Retrieved from cogitasia.com/economics-and-the-japan-korea-relationship-adding-value.

Parsons, Craig (2010). Constructivism and interpretive theory. In David Marsh and Gerry Stoker (Eds.), *Theory and methods in Political Science* (3rd Ed.), (pp. 80-98). London: Palgrave MacMillan.

Pierre, Jon & Peters, B. Guy (2000). *Governance, Politics and the State*. Houndsmill, Basingstoke: MacMillan Press Limited.

Poast, Paul (2016). Dyads are dead, long live Dyads: The limits of Dyadic designs in International research. *International Studies Quarterly* 60, 369-374. Retrieved from <http://isq.oxfordjournals.org>.

Prezowski, Adam (2014). Choices and echoes: Stability and change in policy regimes. In Hideko Magara (Ed.), *Economic Crises and Policy Regimes: The dynamics of policy innovation and pragmatic change*, (pp. 33-55). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Praem, Sara Kier & Steglich-Petersen, Asbjorn (2015). Philosophical thought experiments as heuristics for theory discovery. *Synthese* 192, 2827-2842. doi: 10.1007/s11229-015-0684-6.

Qin, Yaqing (2016). A relational theory of world politics. *International Studies Review* 18, 1-15. Retrieved from irs.oxfordjournals.org/content/18/1/33.

Rachman, Gideon (2016). *Easternisation: War and peace in the Asian Century*. London: The Bodley Head.

Rauhala, Emily (2014, January 30). 104 years later, a Chinese Train Station Platform is still the site of anti-Japanese rancor. *Time*. Retrieved from time.com/2609/104-years-later-a-chinese-train-station-platform-is...

Reus-Smit, Christian (1996). Constructivism. In Burchill, Scott, Devetak, Richard, Linklater, Andrew, Paterson, Matthew, Reus-Smit, Christian & True, Jacqui (Eds.), *Theories of International Relations* (2nd Ed.), (pp. 209-230). Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave.

Reus-Smit, Christian (2001). The strange death of Liberal international theory. *European Journal of International Law* 12(3), 573-593. Retrieved from www.elij.org/article.php?article=1533 [HYPERLINK](#)

["http://www.elij.org/article.php?article=1533&issue=36"](http://www.elij.org/article.php?article=1533&issue=36) & HYPERLINK

["http://www.elij.org/article.php?article=1533&issue=36"](http://www.elij.org/article.php?article=1533&issue=36) issue=36.

Roberts, Peri (2007). *Political Constructivism*. London: Routledge.

Roehrig, Terence, Seo, Jungmin, & Heo, Uk (2007). Introduction. In Terence Roehrig, Jungmin Seo & Uk Heo (Eds.), *Korean security in a changing East Asia*, (pp. 1-9). Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Security International.

Rosenberg, Justin (2016). International Relations in the prison of Political Science. *International Relations* 30(2), 127-153. Retrieved from doi: 10.1177/0047117816644662.

Rosenau, James N. & Durfee, Mary (1995). *Thinking theory thoroughly: Coherent approaches to an incoherent world*. Boulder, Colorado: Westport Press Inc.

Rozman, Gilbert (2015). Review article: 'Ukeikasuru Nihon Seiji' (Japan's politics leaning to the right). *ASAN Forum* 3(4), 262-268. Seoul: ASAN.

Ruggie, John Gerard. (2001). What makes the world hang together? Neo-utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist challenge. In Karen Mingst & Jack Snyder (Eds.), *Essential Readings in World Politics*, (pp. 91-119). New York: W.W. Norton & Company.

Sakamoto, Rumi (2015). Japan, Asia-Pacific War and shifting mindscapes. In Fiona Amundsen (Ed.), *The Imperial Body* (pp. 22-31). Auckland: The University of Auckland.

Salisbury, Harrison E. (1996). *The new emperors: Mao and Deng, a duel biography*. London: HarperCollins Publishers.

Sato, Hiroaki (2015, June 29). Japan's colonial rule of Korea was 'moderate'. *Japan Times*. Retrieved from www.japantimes.co.jp/tag/colonialism.

Schweller, Ronald L. (2001). The concept of alliance. In Yoichi Funabashi (Ed.), *Alliance tomorrow: Security arrangements after the Cold War* (pp. 236-262). Tokyo: The Tokyo Foundation.

Schweller, Ronald L. (2004). Unanswered threats: A neoclassical realist theory of unbalancing. In Colin Elman and Michael A. Jensen (Eds.), *Realism Reader* (pp. 265-271). Oxon: Routledge.

Seok, Hyun-Ho (2009). Globalization of labour and corporate enterprises in South Korea: Labour relations and social adjustment of migrant workers. In Chang Yun-Shik, Hyun-No Seok & Donald L. Baker (Eds.), *Korea confronts Globalization*, (pp. 152-168). Oxon, London: Routledge.

Shapiro, Robert (2014, December 2). Japan and South Korea need to come to economic terms. *Forbes Magazine*. Retrieved from www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2014/12/02/japan-and-south-korea...

Sil, Rudra & Katzenstein, Peter J. (2010). *Beyond paradigms: Analytic eclecticism in the study of world politics*. Houndsmill, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.

Singer, J. David (1961). The level of analysis problem in International Relations. *World Politics* 14(1), 77-92. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2009557>.

Situation Reports (2016, August 19). Japan: Defence Ministry reportedly seeking record budget. *Stratfor*. Retrieved from <https://www.stratfor.com>.

Situation Reports (2017, April 3). Japan: Ambassador to return to South Korea on April 4. *Stratfor*. Retrieved from <https://www.stratfor.com/sample/situation-report/japan-ambassador...>

Skidelsky, Robert (2017, February 23). Economists in denial. *Project Syndicate*. Retrieved from <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/bank-of-england-bad...>

Sneider, Daniel (2014, January 6). Japan-Korea Relations: Time for U.S. Intervention? *The National Bureau of Asian Research*. Retrieved from www.nbr.org/publications/element.aspx?id=716.

Snyder, Robert (2011). Morality, policy and theory: Reflections of the 1954 Conference. In Nicolas Guilhot (Ed.), *The invention of International Relations Theory: Realism, the Rockefeller Foundation and the 1954 Conference on theory*, (pp. 54-78). New York: Columbia University Press.

Soeya, Yoshihida (1998). Japan: Normative constraints verses structural imperatives. In Muthiah Alagappa (Ed.), *Asian security practice: Material and Ideational influences* (pp. 199-233). Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.

Sonda, Claudiu (2014, May 5). Why do we need International Relation? *The World Reporter*. Retrieved from www.theworldreporter.com/author/claudiu-sonda/page/2.

Sorenson, Roy A. (1992). *Thought Experiments*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Strachan, Hew (2001). *The First World War: Volume One, To arms*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Stratfor (2016, October 27). South Korea: Seoul resumes talks with Japan on intelligence sharing. *Stratfor*. Retrieved from <https://www.stratfor.com/sample/snapshots/south-korea-seoul...>

Straub, David (2015). *Anti-Americanism in democratizing South Korea*. Stanford: The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Centre.

Stevenson, Leslie F. (1995). Contextualism. In Ted Honderich (Ed.), *The Oxford Companion to Philosophy*, (p. 160). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Stratfor Geopolitical Diary (2016, September 22). One half of the story on Kashmir. *Stratfor*. Retrieved from <https://www.stratfor.com/geopolitical-diary/one-half-story-kashmir>.

Stratfor Situation Reports (2016, December 31). Japan: Tokyo asks South Korea, China to attend trilateral summit. *Stratfor*. Retrieved from <https://www.stratfor.com/situation-report/japan-tokyo-asks-south...>

Suzuki, Laura (2015). Ghosts that take shape in wet sunlight. In Fiona Amundsen (Ed.), *The Imperial Body* (pp. 5-10). Auckland: The University of Auckland.

Swenson-Wright, John (2013). The role of Japan in the international relations of East Asia. In John Swenson-Wright & Rudiger Frank (Eds.), *Korea and East Asia: The stony road to collective security*, (pp. 105-126). Leiden, Netherlands: Koninklijke Brill N.V.

Takahashi, Toshiya (2016, November 21). Security and the meaning of Japan's constitution. *East Asia Forum*. <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/11/21/security-and-the-meaning-of-japans-constitution/?utm>.

Tara O. (2016). *The collapse of North Korea: Challenges, planning and geopolitics of reunification*. London: Palgrave MacMillan.

Tiezzi, Shannon (2013, November 22). Japan: Uniting China and the Koreas since 1909. *The Diplomat*. Retrieved from thediplomat.com/2013/11/japan-uniting-china-and-the-koreas-since-1909.

Tourism Japan (2016). Statistics of Tourism. *Japan Tourism Board*. Retrieved from www.tourism.jp/en/tourism-database/stats...

Tow, William T. (2007). Contingent trilateralism: Applications for the Trilateral Security Dialogue. In William T. Tow, Mark J. Thomson, Yoshinobu Tamamoto and Satu P. Limaye (Eds.), *Asia-Pacific Security: US, Australia and Japan and the new security triangle*, (pp. 22-38). Oxon, London: Routledge.

Tow, William T. (2012). The broader context: How Australia-Japan relations fit into regional and global security dynamics. In William T. Tow & Rikki Kersten (Eds.), *Bilateral perspectives on Regional Security: Australia, Japan and the Asia-Pacific*, (pp. 147-159). London: Palgrave MacMillan.

US State Department (2015, May). 2015 Investment Climate Statement – South Korea. *US State Department*. Retrieved from www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2015/241618.htm.

Varoufakis, Yanis (2017, April 1). Europe's illiberal establishment. *Project Syndicate*. Retrieved from <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/europe-illiberal...>

Wallander, Celeste A. & Keohane, Robert O. (1999). Risk, threat and security institutions. In Robert O. Keohane (Ed.), *Power and governance in a partially globalized world* (2002), (pp. 88-114). London: Routledge.

Walt, Stephen M. (2005). The relationship between theory and policy in International Relations. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 8, 23-48. doi: 10.1146/annurev.polisci.7.012003.104904.

Waltz, Kenneth N. (1979). *Theory of International Politics*. New York: McGraw-Hill Inc.

Waltz Kenneth N. (2000). Structural Realism after the Cold War. *International Security* 25(1), 5-41. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.massey.ac.nz/stable/2626772>.

Wendt, Alexander (1992). Anarchy is what states make of it: The social constructive of power politics. *International Organization* 46(2), 391-425. Retrieved <https://ic.ucsc.edu/~rlipsch/Pol272/Wendt.Anarch.pdf>.

Wendt, Alexander (1994). Collective identity formation and the international state. *The American Political Science Review* 88(2), 384-396. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2944711>.

Wirth, Christian (2009). China, Japan and East Asian regional cooperation: The views of 'self and 'other' from Beijing and Tokyo. *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 9(3), 469-496. doi:10.1093/irap/1cp007.

Yamada, Toshio (2014). Economic crises and growth regimes. In Hideko Magara (Ed.), *Economic Crises and Policy Regimes: The dynamics of policy innovation and pragmatic change*, 79-100. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Yasukuni (No Date). Yasukuni Official Website. *Yasukuni Shrine*. Retrieved from www.yasukuni.or.jp/english.

Youngshik, Bong (2015). ROK and US views on the foreign policy of the Abe Administration. In Gilbert Rozman (Ed.), *Asia's alliance triangle: US-Japan-South Korea relations at a tumultuous time*, (pp. 61-73). Houndsmill, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.

Zehfuss, Maja (2007). *Constructivism in International Relations: The politics of reality*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Appendix A: Glossary of Terms

Catalyst: In chemistry, a catalyst is a substance that initiates, changes or intensifies a chemical reaction without itself changing; while in social sciences a catalyst can be an event, object or person that causes change (Collins Dictionary and Thesaurus, 2007, p. 122). Heterarchy sees the catalyst as a referent object - an event, person, ideation, materiality, institution or interest – that causes a chain reaction among actors. All actors agree that something has taken place that affects their relations with each other – whether initiated by an actor or not (such as a natural phenomenon) - and where they can agree generally on its properties making it non-reductable at that point in time, leading to action and reaction, which becomes the focus of study. Catalysts are reductable for the purposes of study, in that a catalyst can have a beginning, a past and a future, be broken down into component parts and analyzed how it functions as an entity or in relation to other entities – but only in future analysis at some later point in time.

Heterarchy posits that catalysts can initiate relations – that is in creating new relations between actors. For instance, a new state such as South Sudan is formed (a catalyst) and it initiates relations with other actors whether they be hostile, cooperative or contradictory.

Catalysts might also intensify reactions along an already set trajectory – that is to reinforce and enhance already existing trends in contexts. Ukraine and Russia have a tense and almost hostile relationship. Ukraine removes its pro-Russian President (a catalyst) and moves relations further towards the West, which prompts Russia to retaliate with the annexation of the Crimea and support for separatist Russians in the Donbas. Hence this confirms and intensifies a trend of a hostile relationship.

Alternatively, catalysts may change relations between actors. China and the US were in a hostile relationship, until Nixon went to Beijing in 1972 to seek a balance against Russia (the East-West competition being seen as the catalyst – but in the shorter term also a catalyst might be the US seeking to withdraw in an orderly fashion from Indo-China by trying to separate China from its ally North Vietnam). The US made several key concessions to make this meeting possible and hence a new relationship formed, changing the dynamics of the relationship from antagonism to cautious cooperation on certain matters. Hence the relations between China and the US changed.

Dialectics: The logical debate by question and answer to resolve differences between two divergent views thus reducing manifold understandings into the smallest number of principals to arrive at an answer (Burnham & Young, 2007, p. 139).

Dialectic Change: Exchanges between social formations unlock new possibilities and departures through interaction (Relationalism) (Rosenberg, 2016, p. 139). IR should elaborate the significance of societal multiplicity for the social world and not just in politics (Rosenberg, 2016, p. 139). My thoughts are that heterarchy could go outside the study of politics to changes and interactions between society in non-political or cross-disciplinary areas that can also have impact on politics, or are impacted by politics in some way.

Epiphenomenon: A secondary phenomenon or by-product that results from/or accompanies another phenomenon – a second ordered effect; i.e. interdependence can produce a byproduct of cooperation or it can produce conflict (Goddard & Nexon, 2003, p. 16). An event can produce intended and unintended results that radiate out like ripples in a pond – producing epiphenomena, which can produce secondary-epiphenomena and so on.

Multicentricity: From Governance System Theory. There is no permanently dominant node or actor within an interconnected system, but where the leadership changes depending on the situation – *context* – at a particular time (Miura, 2014, December 1). An IR example might be the EU, where Germany for example is dominant in some contexts – finance - but not in others – for example defence which has traditionally been to preserve of the British or French. My interpretation: The system therefore becomes dynamic, fluid and responsive to differing stimuli - catalysts - creating internal and external understandings for change and action.

Multinodality: From Governance System Theory. Not viewing actors as opposite poles because they are not inherently oppositional or antithetical to one another; but recognized as having greater diversity of what constitutes a node, distinguished along lines of interests and values – and the interaction between them (Jackson, 2014, p. 341). Nodes do not necessarily share the same norms, values or interests – but have links based on pragmatism (Real Politik) and ambitions (interests) matched to resources, that are flexible and changeable based on interests, where frameworks (policy regimes) create their own narratives to maintain cohesion. They may form interest driven coalitions of the willing. This is the antithesis of Multilateral Utility and interdependence, normativism, formalism and legitimacy, where there is a diminishing of

international norms, community of interests and values of international regimes, organizations and treaties (Arteaga, 2012, September 13).

Multiplicity: meaning large number or great variety. The idea of societal multiplicity in human life – political, economic, religious, environmental etc. (Rosenberg, 2016, p. 135). Rosenberg (2016) thinks that there are five components to multiplicity within IR:

Coexistence: Lack of world governance means the co-existence of societies in the same space – leading to the rise of the International from social reality (p. 136).

Difference: Societies differ in a huge variety of ways allowing for comparison (p. 137). My thoughts are that IR could expand into this field where contrasts and comparisons between parts of the political systems, personalities etc. give directions to the way states will likely act.

Interaction: Because of co-existence and difference there is interaction – presenting conflictual and cooperative attitudes that represent danger and opportunity (p. 137).

Combination: No society is truly linear in progression (presentism) nor self-enclosed (Substantivist). Society forms through interaction within and between other societies (Relationalism) (p. 138). Hence societies are multiple, varied and interactive (p. 139).


Dialectic Change: Exchanges between social formations unlock new possibilities and departures through interaction (Relationalism) (p. 139). IR should elaborate the significance of societal multiplicity for the social world and not just in politics (p. 139). My thoughts are that IR could go outside the study of politics to changes and interactions between society where politics touches upon those areas.

Paradigmatic Feedback Loop: A model formed in a particular context will continue to furnish a particular and singular paradigmatic answer no matter what the context. As time goes on, and the model continues to give the same answer by feeding back on itself – the loop – in relation to increasingly distant contexts. It therefore becomes harder for the model to reflect reality, but cannot breakout out of the paradigm loop that it now finds itself in.

For example; say that a theory was formed in one context where the answer given by the model is A.B.C. The context however changes that would give an answer D.E.F. – but the model is

unable to predict nor replicate this new paradigm. Rather than create a new model and acknowledge the new context, or abandon it altogether (possibly because of vested interests), the model continues to function by either contorting reality into the model so that it always comes out as A.B.C – and therefore reality becomes mediated, or reality is ignored altogether and the model’s adherents claim that it continues to hold. Further, context in reality changes again to G.H.I. but for the reasons just discussed the model still posits the result A.B.C., thereby removing it further from reality twice removed. This is demonstrated below in Figure A1.1. This continues until the model is eventually abandoned in the face of reality where it is acknowledged that the model is now totally unworkable.

Figure A1.1



Polycentricity: From Governance System Theory. Many centers of decision making that are formally independent of each other, but causally linked in a non-linear way, where one is strained to reference discrete sectors as separate because of a complex relationship among them (Ostrom, Tiebet & Warren, 1961, p. 831; Jackson, 2014, p. 341). My thoughts on this are that discrete sectors merge depending on context so that one policy or interest can be linked to other policies and interests against a situational background forming a complex of analytical patterns of cause and effect. This allows for a deeper understanding of issues, that may be phrased as speech acts or actions by actors but that have underlying meanings, contexts and causalities.

Presentism: The assumption that the existing conditions of the present will last far into the future. This is the presumption of many IR models and theories, leading to **paradigmatic feedback loops** as reality – context - changes.

Real Politik: A state's interests provide a springboard for interaction with other states where necessities of policies in supporting interests arise (Waltz, 1979, p. 117). This explains a state's policies and rationale for its actions – leading to Balances of Power in realist theory. Realists say that state interests and policies do not change even if leaders do – thereby producing a policy regime. However, heterarchy would say that **real politik** may change when any relational-context changes – including the rise of a new leader (personality changes being outside realist theory) who changes the interests and policy regime of an actor. An example would be Adolf Hitler changing Weimar Germany's policy regime of European cooperation to one of outward expansion.

Relationalism: Governance System Theory. Loosely a combination of **Multinodality** and **Polycentricity** (in Jackson, 2014, p. 341), and **Multiplicity** (Rosenberg, 2016), which is the anthesis of Substantivism. Relationalism holds that referent objects are not identified as stand-alone entities but by the relations/interactions between each actor/entity (Crossley, 2005, p. 266). This describes and compares the relations that lead to setting up institutions and more fluid temporary relations (Crossley, 2005, pp. 266-267), and in relationships in complex networks where interaction becomes irreductable – cannot be reduced back to its component parts (Crossley, 2005, pp. 267-268).

Under Relationalism power is not seen as a 'thing' but as an interaction in varying contexts and dimensions between two or more interdependent agents/entities – including duel power relations where the lesser entity can also have power over the greater entity as well as vice versa (Crossley, 2005, p. 268). In Chinese IR, the world is interpreted as being interrelated and actors are binary with fluid relations to provide for a dynamic system produced by context. Actors can only be 'actors-in-relations' (Qin, 2016, p. 35). Actors identities can only be shaped and constructed by the relations they have with other actors and not as standalone individuals (Qin, 2016, p. 36). Actors are a fixed property, while a process – relationship – is ever changing with unlimited possibilities (Qin, 2016, p. 37). Each actor produces and reproduces their identity time and again through relationships with other actors – but once started the process takes on a life of

its own and become irreducible – leading to modification or unexpected results from the one that was intended (Qin, 2016, p. 37). Actors make decisions depending on the importance of the relationship to other actors which not only affects targets of action but also has unintended effects on other actors. This produces counter actions and acts as a constraint, hence the equation: Logic of Relationality – appropriateness + consequences = the context that must be considered. This precludes the positivist view of individual rationality and self-sustained agency based on decisions of self-interest (Qin, 2016, p. 37-38).

Selection and Socialization: Part of structural realism/constructivist relationism. The selected and normative IR system within which units interact (Goddard & Nexon, 2003, p. 16).

According to structural realism the system will always return to equilibrium of differing power centers in competition with each other through selection and socialization (Waltz, 2000, p. 28). For institutional liberals and normative constructivists, norms become established and deviant actors and habits will disappear or become marginalized while normal behaviors are rewarded and encouraged (Goodard & Nexon, 2003, p. 20). Equilibrium is achieved because deviant behavior is eliminated by selection and socialization of behaviors (Goddard & Nexon, 2003, p. 20) so that all actors conform to the norm. Waltz (2000) termed this modification of the IR structure as the ‘structural imperative to conform (p. 28).

The problem with selection and socialization, from a heterarchical perspective, is that it ignores contexts within which actors exist – including domestic contexts – that go against the ‘structural imperative to conform’, and where the ‘structural norm’ may become mediated by an actor’s internal environment.

Uninodality: Viewing of actors as opposite poles or antithetical to one another. These polar opposites generate hostility towards one another in a constant cycle of competition, where victory is measured in states pulled from one hierarchy to join the other. There are no contradictory or cooperative relations between the poles or actors within a particular pole with actors in the opposite pole.

Value anomalies: A value equates to identifiers – that is the who, what, where, why and how questions - that signal the identity of the catalyst and allows an actor to identify it as either a threat or an enabler towards its interests. These values are assigned by an actor within their contexts (policy regimes) to allow for understanding and interpretation. This in turn generates

differentiation of the actor, their speech acts and actions from other actors, that in turn generates action and counter-action by other actors who have assigned a different valuation, hence creating a value anomaly or value dispute between actors. Value anomalies are derived from McCulloch's (1945) original article on heterarchy (citing Goldammer, Paul & Newbruy, 2003, August; Ogilvy, 2016, February 3).

Appendix B: Policy Regimes as overarching contextual paradigms

I would ask the reader to bear with me in this section, as I discuss policy regimes in some detail. I place this discussion here because: firstly, the stipulated length of the thesis precludes discussion in the main text; and secondly, I feel the need for this discussion because within IR this topic is poorly explained or discussed by those schools that privilege the use of norms within their theory making.⁸⁷ Principally they do not discuss the mechanics of norms and the differing variations that can take place that explain differences even where generally IR actors have the same regimes.

I emphasize to the reader that understanding policy regimes, which has been referred to consistently throughout the text of this thesis, is a tool for understanding how an actor, or even sub-actor, contextualizes their reality to give it realization and to be able to manage issues that would challenge the conception of itself and others. The reason policy regimes are important for heterarchy is that it shows ‘habit’ – the institutionalization or doctrine of how an actor handles contextual-variables in consistent ways. This allows for understanding the ‘rationality’ of the actor - their conception of reality - in initiating or dealing with catalysts. This then leads to an understanding of the actor and hence leads to the observer being able to predict within bounds, the actions of actors to catalysts and towards other actors’ actions.

i Description of a Policy Regime

A policy regime is a structural paradigm (*a predestined set of contexts*) used by an actor as a template to solve issues created by catalysts (Przeworski, 2014, p. 36). It provides an ‘ideology’ – an institutional tradition - from which an actor chooses from a range of policy options that pertain within that paradigm. A paradigm is ideationally formed through understandings – contexts - of the actor in relation to their reality to solve issues that occur within that understanding; where it becomes explained, understood and solved, while being regulated by the paradigmatic parameters that highlight the enablers and inhibitors within which the actor can operate. This leads to observable patterns from which the observer can anticipate and

⁸⁷ Principally institutional liberals, structural realists and normative constructivists.

extrapolate possible future actions, provided the observer is also aware of the policy regimes of other possible actors for comparison.

A policy regime may be identified overtly by the actor stating a particular paradigm which the observer can see in action. For instance; the US sees itself as a defender of human rights in IR as an official policy, hence it calls out ‘recalcitrant’ actors in this area, such as China over Tibet or Iran on domestic policy. However, this paradigm may highlight hidden policy regimes or hidden variations of it, which an actor does not state as official policy within that regime, but that may be seen in its consistent practices. Using again the US human rights example, in those that it does not call out – indicating hidden shades of policy consistency within a policy regime - such as ignoring abuses by Saudi Arabia or while highlighting Israeli settlement violations but in not penalizing it where found culpable.⁸⁸

In IR, this paradigm, with tweaks that are acceptable within that paradigm, persist irrespective of the government ‘of-the-day’ in power – where oppositional actors may promise change but once in power hew to the policy regime line that constrains alternative policies and outcomes (Przeworski, 2014, p. 37). For example; during the economic crisis that hit Greece (from 2010 and which continues), the Greek policy under the New Democracy and technocratic governments was to placate Greece’s creditors at the expense of the Greek population in order to pay back debt and reform the economy, on condition that it be allowed to stay within the Eurozone and continue to receive financial support. The Syriza Party campaigned in 2015 principally on defying the creditors, for which it was elected to form a government. The parameters of the dominant regime however, prevented Syriza, once in power, from adopting a policy independent of the Eurozone where it was forced to conform to the previous policy regime of the old government. It is also noted that advocates for the alternative regime within the party were forced out so that only ‘conformists and pragmatists’ remained.

Policy regimes are reinforced by the constraints placed upon an actor when a given policy coalition achieves hegemony (Bresser-Pereira, 2014, p. 56). In the Greek case, this dominant coalition could be said to be the Northern states of the Eurozone, especially Germany which emphasized fiscal austerity, and the Greek Bureaucracy/elites which preferred the comfortable

⁸⁸ Israel receives the largest allocation of US military aid (\$3 billion annually) of any state, which is not put at jeopardy – due to US domestic pressures and politics, despite Israeli human rights violations.

Eurozone relationship, which forced change upon Syriza’s policy platform to conform to the status quo.⁸⁹ The tools used to enforce compliance were coercive (threats to withdraw the next tranche of loans) rather than sweeteners, showing the amount of hegemonic coalition dominance held within the system. Therefore, this policy hegemony translates into constraints upon the Greeks, providing patterns of analysis for the observer, within policy and action parameters, which highlight constraints and enablers, thereby providing contexts that can be measured, evaluated and disseminated.

ii Hierarchies conceptualized as Policy Regimes

These parameters in turn have implications for how the observer can study policy regimes through the study of hierarchies within heterarchy. Hierarchies, according to Fairtlough (2005), naturally occur to humans in making sense of their world (p. 39). This means that actors usually group their materiality, issues, interests, institutions and other actors into hierarchies of ordered importance within their policy regimes for conceptual purposes. These hierarchies will reflect: actor preferences, that is what the actor wants, as well as; what the actor needs to survive, both domestically and externally. This also allows the observer to see what the current policy regime will exclude in terms of contextual-variables.

So, this brings us to the question of how hierarchies act within heterarchy. Each actor forms relationships with other actors – according to its needs and framed within the contexts of those needs which analytically might be understood as ordered preferences or hierarchies. However, what the observer ‘needs to understand is that hierarchies are not fixed entities but are more of an analytical tool imposed upon the natural face of heterarchical nature’ (Crumley, 1994, p. 13). This produces complexities that the observer can use to their advantage in linking different nodes together to establish domestic/IR patterns and hence understand foreign policy formation and domestic/IR impact.

- Firstly; an actor or contextual-variable within a hierarchy can move up and down the scale in order of importance within the parameters of any given policy regime. This allows the observer to assess the rising or lowering importance of contextual-

⁸⁹ Varoufakis, the Syriza Government Economic Minister at the time quips that this “was a very modern coup undertaken not with tanks but instead with banks” (2017, April 1).

variables to the actor – and of the actor in relation to other actors as catalysts occur. It also makes plain the chief interest or objective of the actor in forming policy at any given time by the positionality of an issue within the actor's preference hierarchy.

- Secondly; actors and contextual-variables of equal importance can occupy the same space within a hierarchy and can be conjoined where aspects of one impact upon the other which produces multiplicity, where actors deal with multiple issues at the same time. This exposes the underlying contextual-variables that the actor may link to policy, but which may not be made explicit in the observed action or speech act promulgated at the international level.
- Thirdly; actors and contextual-variables may be added to hierarchies or drop out completely as they gain or lose salience to the actor, possibly indicating that; an issue has been resolved, new issues have arisen to subsume that issue, different groups have lost or gained power within the context of the actor where there has been a contextual change, and/or that a new policy regime may be being enacted.
- Fourthly; issues or contextual-variables are reductible into their component parts. Some of these component parts may link to other contextual-variables and actors not associated with the rest of the variable. Therefore, there can be sub-hierarchies linked by a particular context brought on by a catalyst outside that variable.
- Lastly; policy regimes can show what has been excluded from the process leading the observer to study why particular exclusions have occurred.

To illustrate this let us take the scenario of Kashmir from an Indian perspective (derived from Stratfor Geopolitical Diary, 2016, September 22), and represented diagrammatically by Figure B1.1. Under the 1947 Agreement of Union, Kashmir was granted autonomy of internal control as enshrined in the Indian Constitution, in exchange for union with India. However, the ruling BJP wishes to overturn this agreement which acts as the catalyst for all that follows. This catalyst raises Kashmir as a domestic issue, and accordingly Autonomy/Constitution would climb the order in the hierarchy of Kashmiri issues. Moreover, Kashmir also has high youth unemployment allowing for clashes between young Kashmiris and the Indian Army, spurred by attempts to

eliminate Kashmiri autonomy, which raises the internal security over the external within the Security sub-policy regime context – thus interlinking two apparently unrelated contexts.


Although not rising in importance within the policy regime – Kashmiri youth unemployment becomes a security issue (securitized) and is considered in conjunction with internal security provisions and not economic policy to form a sub-issue within the security hierarchy.

From a separate Indian hierarchical concern, Pakistan uses the clashes as a context to issue provocative statements that have sovereignty and security implications for India, to which the Indians respond with provocative rhetoric threatening to support the Baluchistani quest for independence in southern Pakistan. To further ramp up tensions Pakistan sends militants across the border, but this does not change India's internal security stance as India does not want to provoke border clashes at this time.

Left outside the Kashmiri policy regime, and not considered, are other policies that the Indian Government has excluded from the process on Kashmir. These are alternative means of solving the Kashmiri issues but that do not fit within the Indian Government's current policy regime, or that would be considered within the prevailing context.

To further complicate this, the Kashmiri issue begins to have wider implications and it links to other seemingly unrelated domestic issues. The BJP is about to enter state elections in Uttar Pradesh, the most populous Indian state within the union, which on the surface have nothing to do with Kashmir. However, the BJP courts two antagonistic voter blocs within the state – the upper-caste and nationalistic Brahmans, and the lower but much larger Dalit caste. The BJP reaches out to the Dalits, but uses the crackdown in Kashmir to assuage the Brahmans and hopefully gain their electoral support, thereby linking an unrelated state election to the troubles in Kashmir.

Fig B1.1



Hence, context drives the relationships between various hierarchies, which on the surface seem unrelated, allowing for a deeper description and evaluation through the study of policy regimes.

Policy regimes continue until there occurs a structural crisis – that is a context created by a catalyst outside the existing policy regime paradigm - that exposes the current policy regime’s inability to deal with it, prompting innovation and a new policy regime to emerge (Prezowski, 2014, p. 36). Alternatively, policy regimes can change when another group captures the policy making process as envisioned by Moravscik (1997, p. 544 – see Chapter 1). Each policy regime produces its own inherent problems and may have structural instabilities that induce further crises. Hence policy regimes often change only in crises where the current regime can no longer

retrieve the situation. But each policy regime choice will necessitate producing new policy weaknesses and attendant adverse consequences, enabling further IR analyzation.

iii External Policy Regimes

Policy regimes can also be adopted by an actor externally where such transference has a perceived benefit in resolving issues. For instance; Poland joins NATO for security against Russia – the catalyst, where it must adopt an already established policy regime to which it was not a party in forming, in order to gain acceptance into NATO. Apple Inc. must pay a US\$14 billion fine to Ireland, and change its taxation policy regime, if it is to continue to do business in Europe. Policy regimes are seen at the international level among international institutions in which states agree to certain norms – the Geneva Conventions, the WTO, the UN Charter and so on – that act as inhibitors and enablers to different actors in differing contexts. These policy regimes become enforced in what Waltz (1979) referred to as ‘Selection and Socialization’ (p. 127). Sometimes, these same policy regimes are often bounded within alliances where states can see issues in similar contexts and can act in unison on agreed upon aspects of a policy regime.

Yamada (2014) suggests that policy regimes can be imposed by the hegemon upon lesser states through its control of international institutions and its power to frame dominant ideations (pp. 84-85). This supports the realist’s Hegemonic Stability Theory where the US, through its hegemonic dominance, has imposed its policy regime upon much of the rest of the world (Pierre & Peters, 2000, pp. 182-183; Nau, 2012, p. 267; Naim, 2012, p. 136). This allows the hegemon entry and influence over the host state’s domestic affairs, by allowing for environment forming where the hegemon’s policy regimes are comfortable in operating at the expense of the host state; regardless of differing material, cultural and ideational factors that differ from the hegemon’s natural environment (Yamada, 2014, p. 89). The creation of this environment then leads to reterritorialization of the hegemon on foreign soil while ‘deterritorializing’ the host state within its own polity. This process can be achieved either through selection and socialization processes proposed by Waltz or through more violent means such as war. This allows the observer to study and conceptualize patterns of contextual influence of dominant actors over subservient states, and can show to what degree this can take place.

iv Policy Regime differences/conflicts

However, this does not consider an actor's own contexts - preferences, expectations or sentiments, history and culture – that play critical roles in producing actions that go against any normative policy regime. Where there are disagreements within alliances, such as over the Iraq War within NATO, it can be said that allies have the same policy regimes, but in which this or that specific issue within the regime is contextualized differently between actors.

This policy regime difference between states that are said to share the same policy regimes, reflects what Trotsky posited in his Combined Development Thesis (Rosenberg, 2016, p. 141), where developing states often tend to mimic successful developed states, including adopting their policy regimes. However, these adopted regimes are mediated and filtered through the adopting state's own culture, society and understandings; so that policy regimes may become differentiated from that of their original source through the context of the adopting state.


Moreover – although Trotsky's thesis was applied to developing states, the same framework can apply to developed states also, where they voluntarily adopt another actor's policy paradigms.

Of course, the other alternative is that an actor will object to the idea of a dominant policy regime as being detrimental to its interests within the context that it understands reality, inviting push-back. If an actor objects to a policy within a regime that they generally agree with then the resistance is likely to be peaceful and partial – for instance a state's resistance to IMF imposed structural reforms in relation to a loan. If, on the other hand, the 'deviant' actor objects to the policy regime in full then it is likely to be confrontational and even violent, because it challenges the existential paradigm of other actors. An example might be Russia in the Ukraine where it challenges Ukrainian survival and concept of 'self', contrary to the West's perceived policy regime of Ukrainian state survival. One could say that in the first instance Russia sees the Ukraine (part of its 'near-abroad') as being within its sphere of influence, and ultimately as a historic part of Russia that someday will be reunited. Hence the Russian policy regime is to take 'extreme measures', within its capabilities, to any move by the EU/NATO to encroach into that sphere or Ukrainian attempts to enhance ties with the West.

Observers should be able to study these policy regime differences – externally and domestically, the reason for rejection, the level of resistance and by whom, how that resistance and objection is expressed, the resulting changes to the relationship between the actors and their constituent parts,

what other actors do to counter the actions of the objecting actor and how effective these measures are. In doing so the observer must see if actions by the initiating actor and epiphenomena created by other actors have changed the contexts and relationships sub-systemically and perhaps systemically. To adequately capture this information, the observer must understand that they too can be affected by context. The observer must be able to reflect upon their observations, and understand how the observation has changed themselves in turn, as new knowledge is gained and comes to light to form new understandings (Figure B1.2).

Fig B1.2




v. *Policy Regime thinking expansion*

Additionally, I propose that policy regimes should not be seen in singular stand-alone terms. An actor often has more than one policy regime at any one time, reflecting the diversity and multiplicity of issues and contexts in which each actor exists and within the realities as perceived by that actor, some of which may not be made explicit to an observer.

For example; India has disputes with China over Kashmir which is handled under what we might call India's Sovereignty policy regime. India also has a domestic water policy regime in which it attempts to ensure water security for its citizens, of which the Ganges River forms a critical part. The Ganges is also sacred to Hindus – the dominant religious/political entity within India – hence the Ganges falls within the religious policy regime of the state. These policy regimes can exist in tandem with each other. However, policy regimes also intersect where issues from one regime can cross over to the another as contexts dictate.

For example, the high ground China occupies in Kashmir also contains many of the Ganges watersheds, which impacts not only on India's sovereignty, but also potentially on its water and religious policy regimes reflecting the underlying aspect of how India understands its Sino-Kashmiri issues. The problem for the observer is that the speech acts or actions by India over sovereignty may not give explicit references to water or religion internationally, as India either assumes both are implied, or where India perceives that one or either of these issues will not be understood contextually by the international community. Indian politicians will however make these issues explicit domestically to audiences which understand the contexts. This thereby gives domestic legitimacy to India's Sovereignty policy regime, and allows politicians the ability to express other related domestic issues which the observer can then link to India's international speech act or action. This can be demonstrated in Figure B1.3 below. Hence, study of the domestic reveals the complexities of the Sino-Kashmiri issue for India and are exposed to the observer, which may have been hidden when using other IR epistemologies. This further allows the observer to connect with other disciplines for collaboration and joint study – in this case for example social and physical geography, hydrology and religious studies to name just a few.

Fig B1.3




Policy regimes may be used to resolve and mediate issues within more dominant policy regimes that are preserved in mediated form rather than being replaced entirely by a new paradigm. These dominant regimes could be referred to as being ‘core’ policy regimes.

Core policy regimes are perceived as existential to the survival of the actor, but where there are acknowledged to be problems generated from catalysts. New policy regimes, which could be referred to as ‘pragmatic’ – can be grafted onto the existing core paradigms to solve identified issues while still maintaining the foundations of the core policy regime intact. China, for example, has an underlying core policy regime of Communism in retaining the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rule in China. However, the CCP recognizes problems within this regime that Communism cannot solve; such as how does China modernize while maintaining CCP rule? The CCP have attempted to mediate these problems through introducing aspects of capitalism. Therefore, some capitalist aspects that go against Communism can exist within the core regime - such as the ability to accumulate capital privately. However, the core policy regime also constrains the pragmatic policy regime, where for example it forbids democracy or anything that challenges the CCP’s legitimacy to rule. This allows for the explanation of contradiction in policy regimes where apparently contradictory aspects of

different policy regimes can be explained as balancing to achieve desired outcomes. This can be demonstrated in Figure B1.4 below.

Fig B1.4



Conclusion to Appendix B

Policy regimes can be used as aids to understanding the relational-contexts of actors from a heterarchical perspective. As Appendix B shows, policy regimes can show how states frame their contexts, which leads to prescribed actions in dealing with catalysts that the policy regimes identify and give value too. This then enables actors to manipulate the contextual-variables in certain ways to achieve outcomes, and to relate to other actors both domestically and internationally. The ability of the observer to divine actor policy regimes allows for an understanding of habits formed within the contexts of the actors' realities, forming their paradigms through which they conduct their actions and speech acts. The understanding of these policy regimes and their nuances therefore allow the observer a tool for analyzation and prediction.

Appendix C: A timeline of Japanese-Korean relations

Serial Number	Date/Era	Event	Details
1	3rd–7th Centuries A.D.	Peoples cross from the Korean Peninsula to Japan	Estimated one million Koreans cross to settle in Japan. Majority of the Japanese elite origins are Korean. Japanese kingdoms provide troops to fight in intra-Korean wars.
2	701 A.D.	The Taiho Code	In imitation of the Chinese – first formal conception of a Japanese centric world, after the first unification of Japan into a single political entity, with Koreans seen as a vassal and inferior people, which in turn colours relations with Korea. Korea merges into the Sino-centric orbit. Divergence into concepts of self and other between Japanese and Koreans.
3	13th Century	Mongol attempted invasions of Japan	Mongol failed attempts launched from the Korean Peninsula in 1274 and 1281.
4	15th Century	Arrival of Europeans in Asia	Japan adopts vestiges of the Europeans – especially weapons and tactics, and gains maritime appreciation of the world. Korea emulates China and retreats into isolation from the world.
5	1575	Reunification of Japan	Toyotomi Hideyoshi reunites Japan using Western tactics and technology. Japan no longer compares itself with China, but with the Europeans – a new identity concept.

6	1592 - 1597	Japanese invasion of Korea – the Seven Years War.	Hideyoshi attempts to conquer Asia via the Korean Peninsula at a time of Chinese weakness, with the cultural destruction and enslavement of Koreans. Chinese intervene in almost the exact replication of 20th Century Korean War and Japan is expelled from the peninsula by 1597. This leads to the beginning of Japanese retreat into isolationism and turning against Western influences because of policy regime failure in attaining its goals in Asia.
7	1853	US Black Fleet	US naval fleet under Commodore Perry reopens Japan to the West, its ideas and technologies.
8	1868	Meiji Revolution	Japan begins to modernize along Western lines. Begins to assume an identification with the West again and turns away from its Asian identity. Ito Hirobumi – a Western educated noble - founds the current Japanese political system, drafts the Meiji Constitution and introduced the concept of <i>Kokutai</i> (Japaneseness) into the Japanese culture.
9	1874-5	Japan forces the opening of Korea to Japanese trade	Japan forces Korea to move from the Chinese sphere of influence to that of Japan.
10	1884	Japanese supported coup attempt against Korean Emperor	Coup attempt crushed by Chinese troops invited in by the Choson Dynasty.

11	1894	Tonghau Peasant Revolt against foreign influences	Chinese troops again invited in to suppress revolt. Chinese involvement seen as threat to Japanese interests sparking the First Sino-Japanese war. Ito was Japanese Prime Minister at the time.
12	1894-5	Sino-Japanese War	Defeat of China. Treaty of Shimonoseki: China is forced to acknowledge an 'independent' Korea within a Japanese sphere of influence. Ito annexes Japan's first overseas colony – Formosa (Taiwan) – from China.
13	1896	Russian occupation of Korean Peninsula	Russia fearful of an expanding Japan in the East. Russia, France and Germany force Japanese military from the Korean Peninsula.
14	1902	Ito negotiates Anglo-Japanese alliance.	Stops France and Germany coming to the aid of Russia in the event of war with Japan. Ito was the Japanese negotiator, having resigned the Premiership in 1901.
15	1904-5	Russo-Japanese War, Korea becomes a protectorate of Japan.	Japanese victory expels Russian forces from Korean Peninsula and Japanese troops garrison it. Ito is its first Resident General as ruler in all but name. Ito's repression of Korean anti-Japanese uprisings and garrisons the Peninsula with Japanese troops. Ito dismantles the Korean state institutionally replacing it with Japanese laws, institutions and personnel, removes structural legitimacy of the Korean state – i.e. disbands the Korean Army, initiates plans for

			Japanese annexation. Ito resigns from the position in early 1909.
16	1909	Ahn Jung-Geun assassinates Ito at Mukden (Harbin) Station, Manchuria.	Ahn executed at Tien, Manchuria by the Japanese in March 1910 and ashes buried in an unmarked grave.
17	1910	Japan formally annexes Korea into the Japanese Empire.	Military rule and repression imposed on Korea and Choson Dynasty disestablished. Japan begins imposing assimilationist policies – ‘ <i>Naisen Ittai</i> ’.
18	1919	Korean ‘March First’ Movement protests.	Death of abdicated Choson Emperor sparks Korean wide protests. Japanese repression – Japanese official figures: 553 Koreans killed (Sato, 2015, June 29), Korean estimates: 7,500 Koreans killed and 47,000 imprisoned (Bae, 2007, p. 317). 1st March becomes the later South Korea’s first Independence Day – start of active political resistance. Birth of modern Korean Nationalism.
19	1920 – 1930	Japanese ‘benevolent’ hand.	Liberalization of Japanese Government brings a lighter hand to Korea allowing a revival of Korean culture. Use of divide and rule policies in favouring cultural nationalists over radicals. Radicals often go into exile in the USSR – such as Kim Il-Sung. Rhee Syngman, a cultural nationalist, seeks exile in China and then the US. Assimilationist policies continue. Collaborationist period for many urban Koreans (twenty percent of

			the population) who benefit from Japanese rule.
20	1931 - 1945	Re-imposition of Military Rule	As the Japanese Government is frightened or taken over by the Military, Korea becomes a military colony and launch ramp for Japanese attacks into Asia. Heavy repression and assimilationist policies aimed at turning South Koreans into model Japanese citizens. Cultural and identity genocide, forced and slave labour, comfort women, militarization of the economy, drafts for the military – by 1945 four million Koreans (16% of population) used by Japan outside Korea.
21	1945	USSR declares War on Japan - 8 August	USSR destroys the Japanese Kwantung Army in Manchuria and occupies the northern half of the Korean Peninsula. Three of the corps employed in the attack are made up of Korean exiles, one corps is led by Kim Il-Sung.
22	1945	15 August Liberation of Korea from Japan	Becomes the second Independence Day for South Korea. The USSR occupies the northern part of Korea and the US the south. Rhee Syngman becomes President of South Korea while Kim Il-Sung becomes President of North Korea. Forced repatriation of almost 2 million Koreans from Japan and repatriation of 800,000 Japanese settlers from Korea

23	1949-1953	Korean War	Japan becomes rear-area for UN Forces and war proves to be a boon for Japan's economy recovering from WW II. 1951: despite US pressure Syngman Rhee refuses normalization of relations with Japan, and continues to refuse until his resignation in 1960. 1952: South Korean forces occupy the Dokdo/Takishima Islands also claimed by Japan.
24	1952	US Occupation of Japan ends	Japanese self-rule under 'Peace Constitution'. LDP begins fifty-year rule, retaining many conservatives and 'rehabilitated' war criminals within it.
25	1959 – 1984	Repatriation of Koreans to North Korea	Forced repatriation of 90,000 Koreans – 'painted as a humanitarian venture'. South Korea refused to participate (Bell, 2016, June 30).
26	1965	Normalization of Relations between Japan and South Korea	Park Chung-Hee assumes power in South Korea in the 1961 Coup d'état. Former Japanese Army officer and collaborator – seen as pro-Japanese. Because of the need for investment in Korea, and with US support, Park agrees to normalization of relations with Japan. Japan assumes that the signing of the Normalization Agreement puts all colonial issues behind them, the South Koreans have other ideas. Park suppresses protests against normalization of relations with Japan.

27	1970	Ahn Memorial hall built in Seoul	
28	1987	Democratization in South Korea	End of military regime allows South Korean nationalism and identity to become visible. Increasing links with China and other countries allow South Korea to diversify economically away from Japan. Links with China also allow for shared-memories of anti-Japanese history and culture.
29	1989 - 1990	End of the Cold War	End of anti-communism as an ideation to unify South Korean society. The state looks towards new forms of identity. Increased interest in pre-division history and emphasis on Japanese colonialism. In Japan, the event wipes away forty-five years of certainty and Japan finds that it needs to engage with Asia. Idea of normalization post- Cold War to safeguard Japanese interests.
30	1991	First public testimony of Comfort Women	Shock in South Korea and issue starts to impact on Japanese relations. Law suits filed against the Japanese Government – upheld in Korean courts but not in Japanese courts who cite the 1965 Normalization Agreement as resolving all disputes. Japanese Government denies the existence of Comfort Women.
31	1992	Visit by Japanese PM	Greeted by Comfort Women protests. Start of the weekly tradition of ‘Wednesday Protests’ outside the

			Japanese Embassy. Japanese Government acknowledges the issue but denies coercion was involved.
32	1993	Japanese Government admits coercion used in Comfort Women issue.	States that coercion was used by private recruiters and was not official policy, hence Japanese Government was not responsible.
33	1994	Asian Women's Fund established by Japanese Government	A private fund relying on private Japanese donations to assist Comfort Women rehabilitation – not seen as state compensation.
34	1996	Japanese PM Hashimoto visits Yasukuni Shrine	South Korea protests for the first time at the shrine visit of a Japanese PM.
35	1997	Kim Dae Jung (1997-2002) elected President in South Korea	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Asian Financial Crisis • Lifts tariffs in 1999 on Japanese imports in hopes of FTA (Mukoyama, 2012, p. 5; Parker & Lindfors, 2014, March 12) – not reciprocated. • Has to deal with rising Korean nationalism mainly expressed by anti-Japanese sentiment (Heo, 2015, p. 357). Increased South Korean awareness of Comfort Women issue, Dokdo/Takeshima dispute, Yasukuni Shrine visits, and Japanese moves towards normalization (Glosserman & Snyder, 2015, p. 101).

37	2001	Prime Minister Koizumi (2001-2006) comes to power in Japan	<p>Revisionist and nationalistic.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Starts Japanese process towards normalization under US pressure • Annual visits to Yasukuni Shrine • Sees South Korean Sunshine Policy towards North Korea and closer ties with China as dangerous to Japan • Exploits strains in US/South Korean alliance and joins War on Terror (Straub, 2015, p. 217). • 2005, starts official Takeshima Day commemorations supported by the LDP – seen as a provocation in South Korea • Starts rewriting text books on early Japanese 20th Century history • Issues favourable comments on Japanese colonial benefits (Glosserman & Snyder, 2015, p. 102) • Start of military buildup and expands Japanese military roles in Line of Communications Security and Peace Keeping/Coalition Support Operations (Heo & Woo, 2007, p. 198)
----	------	--	---

38	2002	Roh Moon-Hyen becomes President of South Korea	<p>Japan and South Korea co-host the 2002 Soccer World Cup – talk of increased ties between the two states (French, 2002, March 11). End of Roh’s term almost see a Cold War develop between the two states (Straub, 2015, p. 217).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Roh seeks balance between the US and China at time when the US is demanding more from allies (Straub, 2015, p. 216) • Sees Japanese military buildup as a threat (Heo & Woo, 2007, p. 198)
39	2007	Shinzo Abe’s (2007-2009) first administration in Japan	<p>Revisionist and nationalistic</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Seeks better relations with South Korea – refrains from visiting Yasukuni Shrine • But failed attempt to amend the Japanese Constitution – especially Article IX • Continues Koizumi’s military programme • More aggressive foreign policy
40	2007	Lee Myung-Bak (2007-2012) becomes South Korean President	<p>Seen as the most pro-Japanese President</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Initiates ‘Future-orientated attitude’ aimed at separating past from pragmatic issues (Doyle, 2009, p. 75) • Repairs South Korean-US relations – able to do this as the US has strained relations with

			<p>Japan under the DPJ Government (2009-2012) (Glosserman & Snyder, 2015, p. 69; Youngshik, 2015, p. 66)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lee less pro-Chinese and becomes hostile to North Korea after the 2010 attacks on the South (Glosserman & Snyder, 2015, p. 72) • Seeks first security agreements with Japan in 2010 – which fail to become ratified in the National Assembly due to public pressure. Second attempt fails in 2012 for the same reason (Glosserman & Snyder, 2015, p. 72) • Japan agrees to currency swap – despite US pressure to the contrary – to stabilize Won during the Great Financial Crisis (Shin, 2014, p. 82) • Lee becomes mired in corruption scandals and makes ‘pilgrimage’ to disputed Dokdo/Takeshima Islands as President to shore up his support – sparks hostility from Japan (Chun, 2013, p. 174; Glosserman & Snyder, 2015, p. 107)
41	2009	DJP break LDP monopoly on power in	Looks to promote a more positive policy with its neighbours

		Japan – Three Prime Ministers over the DJP tenure (2009-2012)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Seeks to balance the US and China, less favourable to the US • Less revisionist and nationalistic • Seeks friendlier relations with South Korea and North Korea <p>However, unable to revive the economy and judged incompetent in handling the 2011 disasters.</p>
42	2012	Shinzo Abe's (2012 plus) second LDP administration	<p>Abe interprets election victory as mandate to continue making Japan a 'normal' nation (Park, 2015, p. 63), rather than as a revolt against the incompetence of the DPJ Glosserman & Snyder, 2015, p. 34)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Against US advice Abe visits the Yasukuni Shrine – an election promise - sparking South Korean/Chinese outrage and prompting retaliation (Rauhala, 2014, January 2014) • Abe offers to meet with Park but refuses to meet Comfort Women resolution conditions (Glosserman & Snyder, 2015, p. 108) • 2014-2017 North Korean nuclear tests and missile provocations (Analysis, 2016, March 1) • 2014 Japan and South Korea attempt to negotiate an intelligence sharing agreement on

			<p>North Korea – it fails ratification in South Korean National Assembly</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2015 Abe issues apology and compensation to Comfort Women (Kyodo, 2016, September 30) • 2016 attempt to revive the intelligence sharing agreement
43	2013	Park Guen-Hye (2013-2016) becomes President of South Korea	<p>Inherits political baggage from her Father (General Park Chung-Hee – ruled 1961-1979) as being pro-Japanese. Starts her Presidency with hostility to Japan (Park, 2015, p. 89)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Park wary of being seen as part of US/Japanese containment of China (Editorial Staff - ASAN, 2015, p. 171) • Park refuses Abe meeting until Comfort Women issue resolved (Glosserman & Snyder, 2015, p. 108) • 2014 – Abe and Park forced to meet trilaterally under US pressure (Glosserman & Snyder, 2015, p. ix) • 2014-2016 North Korean nuclear tests and missile provocations push Japan and South Korea together (Analysis, 2016, March 1)

			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2014: Japan and South Korea attempt to negotiate an intelligence sharing agreement on North Korea – it fails ratification in the South Korean National Assembly • 2015: Park accepts Abe’s reconciliation over the Comfort Women issue (compensation to Comfort Women and official apology in return from removal of Comfort Women statues and end of issue) and agrees to a bilateral meeting. Japan considers the Comfort Women issue closed however, as the source indicates the issue is far from over (Kyodo, 2016, September 30) • 2016: Attempt to revive the intelligence sharing agreement but will likely fail due to Park’s impeachment and resistance in the National Assembly (Choe, 2016, November 22)
44	November 2016	Trump elected to be President of US	Signals new policy of disengagement from the Korean Peninsula (Funabashi, 2016, p. 20).
45	December 2016	Park impeached	Intelligence sharing agreement will likely not now pass given resistance to

			disgraced Park's policies, even within her own party.
46	December 2016	Japanese Minister of Defence visits Yasukuni	Sparks protests from South Korea and China (Stratfor, 2016, December 31)
47	January 2017	Japan requests discussions with South Korea and China on Free Trade Agreement	South Korea agrees but China refuses request in light of serial 46 (Stratfor, 2016, December 31)
48	January 2017	Comfort Woman statue erected in Busan opposite the Japanese Consulate. The Japanese Ambassador recalled to Tokyo for consultations	Statue given approval in response to Japanese Defence Minister's visit to Yasukuni by the Busan City Council (BBC, 2016, January 6). Comments by BBC that FTA discussions are in jeopardy. Note: Comfort Women statue in Seoul is still in place opposite the Japanese Embassy, despite the 2015 agreement.
49	4 April 2017	Japanese Ambassador returns to Seoul despite the continued presence of the statue outside the Busan Consulate.	Pressure of the North Korean situation and internal South Korean issues override Tokyo's concerns over the Comfort Women statues – at least for now.