New Zealand's Military Aircraft Purchases

1957 - 1981

From the Canberra to the Boeing 727

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Abbreviations

AJHR  Appendices to the Journals of the House of Representatives  
ASW  Anti-submarine warfare  
CAS  Chief of Air Staff  
CDC  Cabinet Defence Committee  
CDS  Chief of Defence Staff  
CGS  Chief of General Staff  
CNS  Chief of Naval Staff  
FEAF  Far East Air Force  
MRT  Medium-Range Transport  
NZPD  New Zealand Parliamentary Debates  
RAF  Royal Air Force (Britain)  
RAAF  Royal Australian Air Force  
RNZAF  Royal New Zealand Air Force  
SRT  Short-Range Transport  
VTOL  Vertical Take-Off/Landing  

Note: The term 'combat aircraft' was used in the 1960s to describe aircraft whose primary function was the delivery of offensive weapons. The expression is used in preference to the term 'strike' to differentiate between the combat role in general and the long-range strike/bomber role in particular.
Introduction

This thesis will examine the factors that influenced New Zealand's military aircraft purchasing decisions between 1957 and 1981. This larger question gives rise to two lines of enquiry. Firstly, why did the New Zealand Government choose to equip particular roles? Secondly, why were the various aircraft types then chosen to fulfill these roles? This period encompasses the purchase of the Canberra, which was a significant episode in the history of the RNZAF's combat wing. It also includes the crucial re-equipment programme of the 1960s. The period ends with the purchase of the 727s, which was part of the adaptation to new defence commitments.

While a number of authors have commented on individual purchasing decisions, some have considered broader issues involved in military aircraft purchases. Foremost amongst these was David Filer, whose work dealt with the RNZAF during the period from 1946 to 1972. He stated that the most significant development in the RNZAF during the 1946-72 period was the selection the United States as a source of new aircraft. This was in contrast to the early post-war period when New Zealand had chosen to purchase from Britain. He suggested that the change towards American purchases was part of the Air Force's response to the general defence trend in the period away from ties with the United Kingdom and towards ties with the United States and Australia. However, he acknowledged American dominance in military aircraft production and their willingness to provide credit facilities. Filer concluded that the RNZAF was altered more by this move from defence ties with Britain towards ties with the United States and Australia than by the switch from commitments in the Middle East to South-East Asia.

Filer emphasises the importance of budgetary constraints, claiming that finance has often been the overriding factor in procurement decisions and has led to many deferrals of...
equipment purchases.\textsuperscript{4} This concern has meant that although the RNZAF has acknowledged the benefits of common equipment, Australian-produced planes have cost too much in comparison to their competitors and have not been chosen.\textsuperscript{5} To reduce expenditure and financial risk, two factors have dominated in the type of military aircraft New Zealand has chosen: they have been relatively cheap and they have had a proven service record.\textsuperscript{6}

Rolfe identified a desire to standardise equipment with Australian, noting that “For at least 40 years, there have been tentative moves to co-operate with Australia in defence supply... Little was achieved.”\textsuperscript{7} Rolfe, like Filer, mentions the Services’ preference for proven types\textsuperscript{8}, and points out that New Zealand acquisition projects often involve the purchase of second-hand equipment which becomes available at short notice.\textsuperscript{9}

Three main sources were used to answer the questions posed and to test the arguments advanced by previous authors. Firstly, there were files from the National Archives, including Cabinet, Treasury and RNZAF documents. Some material relating to the replacement of the Canberra was obtained from HQNZDF. The Alexander Turnbull Library provided files relating to the sale of New Zealand-built aircraft. Secondly, the reports of the Service boards, Ministry of Defence and Ministry of External Affairs were researched. Lastly, Newspapers, particularly the Christchurch Press, and Hansard were consulted.

This thesis agrees with Filer that the choice of roles for the RNZAF was affected by financial limitations. These concerns were particularly important in determining the RNZAF’s specific combat role. However, while the Government was keen to restrict defence spending, it was willing to purchase the best aircraft available to fulfill the roles it had chosen for the RNZAF. Trade concerns and the desire to standardise with allies, particularly Australia were evident, but not over-riding. This thesis will argue against the
view that the purchase of American-built aircraft was part of a move away from defence ties with the United Kingdom. New Zealand still had close defence links with Great Britain in the 1960s, which was the most important period in terms of aircraft purchases. However, the decline of the British aviation industry meant that suitable British-built alternatives were not available for consideration. On the other hand, the United States was producing the best aircraft in the West. The result was that the United Kingdom joined New Zealand, Australia and numerous other countries in purchasing American aircraft. Australia’s aircraft were not only expensive, but did not meet New Zealand requirements or match the performance of contending types.

The most significant change in the RNZAF was not the shift to the United States as a source of aircraft; it was the switch in emphasis from the combat roles it favoured to providing support for the Army. While in the 1960s the Government was not willing to equip the RNZAF to participate in its preferred combat roles, it did purchase aircraft suitable to support the Army in South East Asia. This was significant, because as Filer pointed out, the prestige of combat aircraft was important to the RNZAF’s identity, morale and ability to attract recruits. The emphasis on the RNZAF’s support functions continued after the end of forward defence. In fact the requirement for air transport grew as New Zealand’s defence commitments shifted closer to home.
Notes

2 ibid.
3 ibid., p.112.
4 ibid., p.111.
5 ibid., p.110.
6 ibid., p.111.
7 Rolfe, p.
8 ibid., p.137.
9 ibid., p.141.
Chapter One

The Canberra and the Light Bomber Role.

The Canberra bomber was New Zealand's last major military aircraft acquisition of the 1950s. It was also the last British-made aircraft purchased before the RNZAF began to buy from the United States. A number of commentators have sought to explain the decision to purchase the Canberras. They have generally seen it as the result of a deliberate change of roles in the 1950s. Wright noted that in 1947 planning for the RNZAF included a long-range bombing capability, but he claimed that the selection of the Canberra bomber to replace the Vampire fighter/bomber was influenced by Britain’s 1957 Defence White Paper. That review had ruled out new fighters for the RAF, and Australia and New Zealand followed this general lead. The RNZAF’s combat role changed from day fighter/ground attack to light bomber/interdiction and the Canberras were obtained accordingly.

Ewing and Macpherson mentioned that by 1948 planning for the post-war RNZAF provided for two bomber/reconnaissance squadrons and one fighter squadron. The RNZAF was finally able to purchase bomber aircraft when spending cuts elsewhere in the service made funding available.

Lockstone stated that the Canberra was obtained to meet the RNZAF’s requirement for a tactical bombing and interdiction capability. He noted that while Australia was also producing the Canberra, British-made aircraft were favoured for their lower cost. The decision was also influenced by the fact that No 75 Squadron in Malaya was equipped with Canberras hired from the RAF.

Filer suggested some rather different motives for the purchase. He maintained that the delay in ordering a replacement for the Vampire was caused in part by the switch from Middle Eastern to South East Asian commitments. This led the Government to re-evaluate
the RNZAF’s requirements before selecting a new aircraft. Filer believed that the RNZAF had chosen the Canberra to replace the Vampire and then adapted the combat role to suit. He claimed that the RNZAF favoured strike aircraft for reasons of prestige, even though the bomber role would be less important in South East Asia than close air support. The Canberra was also preferred as it was a proven and relatively cheap aircraft that was in service with New Zealand’s allies. However, the Government’s wish to restrict expenditure delayed a decision to order aircraft until 1957.

This chapter will argue the RNZAF had actually planned to operate Canberras alongside its Vampires in the early 1950s. Financial constraints delayed the purchase to such an extent that the Canberra’s introduction to service coincided with the obsolescence of the RNZAF’s fighters. By that time the Air Force had recommended a change from the day fighter/ground attack role to a light bomber force. It will also argue that the choice of the Canberra was not affected by the shift to commitments in South East Asia as the Canberra was favoured before that move took place. However, it concurs that there is some evidence to suggest that the change in the RNZAF’s combat role was influenced by changes in British policy in regard to fighters.

In 1948 the Government approved a plan providing for two regular RNZAF bomber squadrons and one fighter/bomber squadron. In December 1950 the Cabinet Defence Committee endorsed another plan for the RNZAF that had been prepared in consultation with the British Chief of Air Staff, Lord Tedder. The intention was to field both Vampire fighters and Canberra bombers for service in the Middle East. Some aircraft, including Vampires, had already been ordered, but no decision had been made on the Canberra.

Lord Tedder had recommended that the Air Force preserve its knowledge of bombing methods by buying Canberras, even though this would increase its number of types in service. The Canberra was favoured because it was ‘by far the best of its type in the
world and would be taken into service in the Royal Air Force in 1951'. The Prime
Minister, Sidney Holland, expressed concern at the variety of roles included in the plan, and
stated that 'It appeared that effort might be unduly dispersed at this time with a resultant
loss of overall efficiency.' He invited the CAS to consider whether it would be better to
limit the range of RNZAF activities. While some changes were made to the plan, the
recommendation to purchase Canberras remained.

In June 1951 the Chief of Air Staff informed the Defence Council that the Mosquito
fighter/bombers operated by the RNZAF were obsolete and could not be deployed
operationally. Maintaining these aircraft was costly and replacement was necessary. 
Therefore the RNZAF wished to re-equip with Canberras in 1952. The CAS pointed out
that the Canberra would be the standard medium bomber in RAF service. Heavy demand
for the aircraft meant that a delay of up to two years was expected, making it necessary to
place an order as soon as possible. The CAS said that Australia was also preparing to
manufacture Canberras and recommended that consideration be given to supporting the
Australian aircraft industry, despite the fact that Australian Canberras were expected to cost
more than those of British origin.

The Secretary to the Treasury acknowledged that new aircraft would be more capable
and more economical to operate, and recommended placing orders as soon as possible.
However, Cabinet did not approve the purchase: it was anticipated that the cost of the new
bombers would drop as mass production got underway, while demand meant that none
would be available before 1954. The RAF suggested that additional fighter/bombers
would suffice as an interim measure. It would seem that the early enthusiasm for the
Canberra was dampened by financial considerations.

In February 1954, the Minister of Defence, T. L. Macdonald, said 'It cannot be denied
that a more modern fighter aircraft must eventually replace the Vampire if New Zealand is
to maintain itself in a reasonable state of preparedness. In August he explained that the evaluation of aircraft to re-equip No. 75 Squadron would have to consider the plans of other Commonwealth air forces with which New Zealand might have to integrate. However, progress on making such a decision seems to have stalled for almost two years.

In February 1956 the CAS pointed out that the RNZAF did not have an aircraft capable of combating surface raiders, and recommended re-equipping one of the transport squadrons with light bombers for this purpose. He explained that a medium-range transport squadron could be formed with civilian aircraft if war broke out, and argued that allies should provide long-range transports. This demonstrated the RNZAF’s willingness to forgo other roles to acquire strike aircraft and particularly the prestigious Canberra. It also suggests that the role of the Canberra was not settled. On the other hand, perhaps the RNZAF believed that an argument based on maritime security and trade protection would be more likely to persuade Cabinet than plans for raids on distant enemy targets.

In May 1956 Cabinet considered a proposal to convert No 41 Squadron from transport aircraft to Canberra bombers. This recommendation was one of a number of urgent equipment requirements put forward by the three Services. The plan also provided for the purchase of new fighter aircraft to re-equip No 75 Squadron. No contending types were named, but planned expenditure was based on the cost of the Hawker Hunter. The Air Force was also considering re-equipping No 14 Squadron with Canberras, although this was not included in the proposal before Cabinet. Even after the switch to an emphasis on South East Asia in 1955, the RNZAF was clearly hoping to obtain both fighters and bombers to replace the existing day fighter/ground attack aircraft. In December 1956 it was reported that Air Commodore Eveleigh, the Assistant Chief of the Air Staff, had referred to the possibility of New Zealand receiving Canberras as an ‘open secret’. He pointed out that ‘how many, when, and even where’ were still to be decided by the Cabinet Defence
Committee. Eveleigh also said that Canberras would 'put some more kick into SEATO, a thing we will have to do if we want to keep war away from New Zealand'. The CNS was said to support the acquisition of Canberras.23

During the 1957 Review of Defence it was proposed that the fighter/ground attack role be switched to light bomber/interdiction.24 It was argued that the new role would provide a more balanced Commonwealth force in South East Asia and give the RNZAF greater flexibility. The proposed change was seen as conforming with the allied strategy in South East Asia, where plans called for air strikes on the Chinese mainland followed by interdiction missions against the Chinese army.25 The Far Eastern Air Force (FEAF) was re-equipping half of its day fighter/ground attack squadrons with Canberras to undertake such raids. The remaining units were to operate night fighters to protect the bomber bases, and the Chiefs of Staff claimed that New Zealand had to choose between these two roles. The Canberra was preferred because it could perform high-altitude bombing and low-level support, and it had a long range.26 The Canberra could also mount strikes from bases in Australia should allied forward defensive efforts fail.

The RAF was withdrawing its Venoms from the region, and these were the same aircraft that the RNZAF was operating in Malaya. A squadron of eight Canberras would cost approximately the same as a squadron of sixteen Venoms. Moreover, the RAF was willing to provide Canberras for use in Malaya for little more than the cost of hiring the Venoms.27

Wright argued that the change in the combat role was influenced by Britain's 1957 defence white paper, which had signaled the demise of the manned fighter.28 Indeed, that year the British Minister of Defence told the New Zealand Cabinet that fighters were not considered a high priority because it was impossible to defend cities from nuclear attack.29 Therefore reducing the number of fighter aircraft would not greatly affect security. However, fighters were being maintained to protect bomber bases until more effective
surface to air missiles became available. The RNZAF had previously considered aircraft like the Hunter to replace the Vampire/Venom in the day fighter/ground attack role.

However, the RAF was now re-equipping its day fighter/ground attack aircraft in the Far East with interdictors and night/all-weather fighters. New Zealand faced no air threat, so night/all-weather fighters were not required on national grounds. These fighters also lacked the versatility of the Canberra, which offered the RNZAF a much more flexible combat force.

Filer argued that the RNZAF preferred the Canberra for reasons of prestige, despite the fact that fighters would be more useful in South East Asia. However, fighters were considered less important in allied plans for operations in South East Asia at that time. Fighters operating in the close support role might have been adequate in counter-insurgency efforts, but defence planners were focused on the potential for larger conflicts. The Chiefs of Staff rated limited war with China a distinct possibility in 1957, and New Zealand’s allies believed that nuclear strikes and interdiction missions would be essential to slow the advance of the enormous Chinese army. Thus the Canberras were intended to assist operations on the ground even though they were to fly interdiction missions rather than close support. The RNZAF’s emphasis on a light bomber/interdictor was also consistent with SEATO strategy.

The decision not to acquire new fighters also fitted with the Government’s unwillingness to expand the RNZAF’s combat force. The Air Force had planned to equip two squadrons with Canberras and one with day fighter/ground attack aircraft. However, Cabinet did not approve the proposal to convert No 41 Squadron, leaving the RNZAF with only two combat squadrons. At the same time, the day fighter/ground attack role seemed to have vanished from the FEAF, so it made sense to press ahead with plans to equip with Canberras only. If Cabinet objected to the re-equipment of No 41 Squadron because of the
cost involved, it is likely that financial constraints influenced the decision not to acquire new fighters.

The RNZAF thus wanted to hire Canberras to equip No 14 and purchase Canberras for No 75 Squadron.\textsuperscript{32} Fourteen aircraft would be required for service in New Zealand, and they were expected to remain in front-line use until 1965. With the arrival of the Canberra, the Vampires would be used for training. The RNZAF believed that re-equipment in other roles could be deferred to accommodate this purchase, a further indication of the high priority that the Air Force accorded combat aircraft.

The 1957 Defence Review, tabled in June, announced the change in the combat role and stated that the Vampires and Venoms would eventually be replaced with Canberras.\textsuperscript{33} A Cabinet Minister, Tom Shand, told the House that ‘The Canberra bomber is undoubtedly the best close support aircraft in existence today, and especially valuable because it can fly from New Zealand to the theatre of operations, something which is not possible with fighter type aircraft.’\textsuperscript{34} Philip Holloway, a Labour MP, supported the change in the combat role, saying that ‘it seems commonsense to use a striking force rather than an interceptor force’.\textsuperscript{35}

The Cabinet Defence Committee had noted that the recommendation to order Canberras was a matter of urgency.\textsuperscript{36} In June Cabinet discussed the proposed purchase and agreed that Britain should be approached to secure the best financial terms.\textsuperscript{37} In July the Minister of Defence sought Cabinet approval for the purchase of fourteen Canberras to equip No 75 Squadron.\textsuperscript{38} The Canberra was recommended because it could operate in both the bomber/interdictor and close support roles. It possessed high performance, long range, ease of maintenance and acceptable runway requirements. The aircraft was operated by a number of air forces and was expected to have a considerable service life. It was rated as the most cost-effective option to re-equip the RNZAF, and gave New Zealand the means to deploy nuclear weapons.
The Air Board had selected the B(I) 8 Canberra produced in Britain, rather than the B 20 manufactured in Australia. The Australian aircraft did not meet the operational requirements of the RNZAF, and cost approximately twice as much as the more advanced B(I) 8. Furthermore, the short production run in Australia would necessitate a costly arrangement for life-of-type spares and attrition aircraft. Although the RNZAF had previously been willing to consider paying a higher price to support Australia’s defence industry, it is doubtful that they ever envisaged paying twice as much. The British variant was to remain in production for some time, which would allow costs to be spread. The choice would also allow the RNZAF to benefit from an integrated provisioning scheme in place with the RAF that provided further economies and a proven source of supply.

Treasury did not contest the choice of the Canberra or the need for re-equipment. They did suggest that if crews were trained by the RAF fewer training aircraft would be required in New Zealand. The RNZAF, no doubt anxious to secure an order as soon as possible, agreed to reduce the number requested to eleven.

In July, the Minister of Defence recommended to Cabinet the purchase of eleven Canberras. The British Air Ministry had stated that delivery could commence in September 1958 provided that an order was placed that month. The Minister noted that delay could lead to greater operating costs for the Venoms once the RAF had re-equipped. Postponement could also result in a higher purchase price.

Doubts about the acquisition of Canberras were expressed privately by members of the External Affairs Department. In March 1956, Frank Corner questioned how the Canberras would fit into the concept of a single, unified defence force. He told Alister McIntosh that ‘I slightly mistrust the U.K. pushing us into Canberras but know almost nothing about it.’ McIntosh wrote that he was ‘very doubtful about the Canberras but cannot clarify my doubts or produce worthwhile objections to experts’. 
These doubts are significant, especially in the case of McIntosh as he frequently attended meetings of the Cabinet Defence Committee. Some of their concerns related to the correct balance of forces. Corner in particular favoured a more unified defence force and suggested that the RNZAF should focus on supporting the Army. Conversely, the bomber/interdictor role would allow the Air Force a greater degree of independence from the other Services. There were also questions about the likelihood of the kind of war in Asia that would require such air strikes.

It is also clear from this correspondence that there was strong resistance within the Government to spending on the military. McIntosh told Foss Shanahan that the Deputy Prime Minister, Keith Holyoake ‘doesn’t like defence, and he has been even more determined than the Prime Minister to ensure that the Defence Fund is used up for other purposes, as, in fact, it has been largely used up’. He also stated that ‘Relations between the P.M. and Mr Macdonald have been very bad for some time, and, on this defence issue, we could do nothing with him at all. As I told you last week, the decision on Canberras was only brought about as a result of a question asked by Mathison, [an Opposition MP] obviously drafted by the press.’

Mathison’s question had been prompted by comments attributed to the Australian Minister of Supply and Defence Production, Howard Beale. He had visited New Zealand for discussions on defence production and procurement and was subsequently interviewed by the Melbourne Herald. Beale was quoted as saying that ‘It is expected that an arrangement will be made for the Australian aircraft industry to service and modify the Canberra jet bombers which the New Zealand Government has purchased from the United Kingdom Government.’ This was before Cabinet had approved the purchase. The Australian correspondent reported that Beale had not visited Wellington with the intention
of selling Australian-manufactured Sabre fighters as he already knew that New Zealand had decided to purchase Canberras on special terms from the United Kingdom.

Mathison asked the Prime Minister to confirm that the RNZAF would be re-equipped with Canberras. On 9 August, the Minister of Defence answered that in the New Zealand White Paper it was stated that the RNZAF would be re-equipped with Canberra aircraft. Those for the squadron in New Zealand are being purchased in the United Kingdom. The terms are not yet finalised. He also explained that the squadron in Malaya would operate hired Canberras. It would seem that the embarrassing question from Mathison forced the Government to make a decision. On 14 August 1957 Cabinet approved the purchase of 11 Canberras.

The RNZAF’s desire to obtain the Canberra preceded any questions over the replacement of the Vampire. While the purchase of bombers marked a change in the combat role of the Air Force, this occurred because of the decision not to acquire new fighters which was in turn due to a belief that the age of the manned fighter was drawing to a close. Nor does it seem that the wish to purchase Canberras was affected by the change in commitments from the Middle East to South East Asia. The willingness to forgo other roles for the sake of the Canberra demonstrated the importance of strike aircraft to Air Force planners. Filer argued that the RNZAF wanted the Canberra for reasons of prestige, and to some extent that is true. Combat aircraft were considered essential to the RNZAF’s identity as a fighting Service. Modern aircraft were also necessary to maintain morale and attract recruits. The prestige of the Canberra was important for these reasons, but it would be unfair to say that the Air Force wanted Canberras solely for reasons of prestige. RNZAF planners, like their SEATO allies, believed that Canberras would be required to fight a limited war in South East Asia.
The Canberra purchase also highlighted the increasing importance of financial considerations, over and above military concerns. These restrictions delayed for several years a purchase that the RNZAF considered urgent. The Government was reluctant to approve the purchase of Canberras even after an undertaking to do so had been published in the 1957 White Paper. This was despite the absence of any serious challenge to the proposal from Treasury. The desire to limit defence spending that was beginning to emerge would have more serious repercussions in the years that followed.
Notes

2 *ibid.*, p.142.
4 *ibid.*, p.165.
7 *ibid.*, p.84.
8 'The Size and Shape of New Zealand's Armed Forces', National Archives, 'Part 1-Defence-1955-57', AAFD, 811, 224/8/2, box 149g.
9 Revision of the R.N.Z.A.F. Plan', CAB 228/1/1 dated 20 December 1950, National Archives, 'Part 1-General 1950-57' (Air Force), AAFD, 811, 228/1/1, box 74j.
10 Minutes of Cabinet Defence Committee meeting held on 15 June 1950, DC (50) 1, National Archives, 'Discussions with Sir Hugh Saunders - 1950', AAFD, 811, 228/1/2, box 74k.
11 Extract from DC (50) M 1, 23 June 1950, National Archives, 'Part 1-General 1950-57' (Air Force), AAFD, 811, 228/1/1, box 74j.
12 Extract from Minutes of first meeting of the Defence Council, dated 28 February 1951, National Archives, 'Part 1-General 1950-57' (Air Force), AAFD, 811, 228/1/1, box 74j.
13 'RNZAF Plan', DC (51) 9, dated 31 May 1951, National Archives, 'Part 1-General 1950-57' (Air Force), AAFD, 811, 228/1/1, box 74j.
14 Extract from Minutes of the 6th meeting of Defence Council 1 June 1951: Item 3, RNZAF plan DC (51) 9, National Archives, 'Part 1-General 1950-57' (Air Force), AAFD, 811, 228/1/1, box 74j.
15 'RNZAF Plan', DC (51) 9, 31 May 1951.
16 'Notification to United Kingdom of Aircraft Requirements for Royal New Zealand Air force', dated 2 October 1952, National Archives, 'Aircraft - General - 1950 - 1957', AAFD, 811, 228/3/1, box 106j.
19 Cabinet Defence Committee minutes, D (56) M1 for meeting held 2 February 1956, National Archives, 'Part 1-Defence-1955-57', AAFD, 811, 224/8/2, box 149g.
21 'Notes for discussion at Cabinet sub-committee meeting', D (56) M 6, 9 April 1956, National Archives, 'Part 1-Defence-1955-57', AAFD, 811, 224/8/2, box 149g.
22 The *Marlborough Express*, 8 December 1956, (clipping) National Archives, 'Post-war policy RNZAF 6/48-7/63', Air 1, 1/1/35.
23 *ibid.*
24 Cabinet Defence Committee minutes, D (57) M6 for meeting held 18 April 1957, National Archives, 'Part 1-Defence-1955-57', AAFD, 811, 224/8/2, box 149g.
26 Cabinet Defence Committee minutes, D (57) M6 for meeting held 18 April 1957.
27 *ibid.*
28 Wright, p.142.
29 Minutes of Cabinet Meeting held 3 September 1957, CM (57) 35, National Archives, 'Part 1-Defence-1955-57', AAFD, 811, 224/8/2, box 149g.
30 Filer, p.83.
32 *ibid.*
34 NZPD, 311(1957), p.32.
35 NZPD, 312(1957), p.1131.
36 'Cabinet Defence Committee minutes, D (57) M3 for meeting held 11 April 1957, National Archives, 'Part 1-Defence-1955-57', AAFD, 811, 224/8/2, box 149g.


41 Alister McIntosh to Frank Corner, May 1957, Unofficial Channels, p.228.

42 Alister McIntosh to Foss Shanahan, 12 August 1957, Unofficial Channels, p.231.

43 Ibid.

44 The Press, 8 August 1957, p.11.

45 NZPD, 312(1957), p.1579.


47 Filer, p.84.