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NEW ZEALAND AID AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF CLASS IN TONGA:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE BANANA REHABILITATION SCHEME

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS

BY
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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the bilateral aid relationship between New Zealand and Tonga. Its central purpose is to examine the impact aid is having in transforming Tongan society. This involves a critique of both development theory and of New Zealand government aid principles.

The understanding of development and the application of aid by the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs remains greatly influenced by the modernisation school of thought, which essentially blames certain supposed attributes of Third World peoples for their lack of development. Dependency theorists challenged this view, claiming that Third World poverty was a direct result of First World exploitation through the unequal exchange of commodities. This has had some influence on the use of aid as a developmental tool, but has failed to supercede modernisation theory as the dominant ideology.

The theory of articulation of modes of production transcends the problems of both modernisation and dependency schools. Its main thrust is that the capitalist (First World) mode of production does not immediately dominate the non-capitalist (Third World) mode but rather interacts with it. Such a conception takes cognisance of the influence of indigenous modes in creating new social formations. This is demonstrated through an analysis of the New Zealand financed Banana Rehabilitation Scheme of Tonga.

In order to understand the effect of New Zealand funded aid projects in Tonga, the Banana Rehabilitation Scheme, the largest project funded at present, was used as a case study. The research method demanded a fieldwork component which entailed three months in Tonga in order to collect both historical and archival data only available there. The main fieldwork component was a series of interviews with a cross section of scheme members and other significant actors related to the scheme.

This study of the Banana Rehabilitation Scheme shows that the redistributive aims of New Zealand aid have been undermined by a greater concern with productivity. Emphasis upon the latter has meant that the project has been reoriented in favour of giving greater assistance to those who can produce bananas most easily, those who already had access to land, capital and labour. This category of growers is as much a product of the indigenous social structure of Tonga as of forces impinging from outside.

Although through the banana scheme large amounts of money are being pumped into the Tongan economy, its redistributive effects are minimal. The structure of the scheme is such that many of the major benefits accrue to the already advantaged.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I am first and foremost indebted to my thesis supervisors Ms Kay Saville-Smith and Dr Brian Ponter. Kay, particularly during Brian’s absence on sabbatical in 1987, has been a source of inspiration, drive and friendship. Brian’s guidance through his depth of knowledge of development issues has been invaluable over the last three years. I am also particularly grateful to Professor Graeme Fraser, whose encouragement and financial support was greatly appreciated.

I thank His Majesty’s Government in Tonga, for permission to carry out my research, and all of the government departments in Nuku‘aloa that provided me with data. I am also grateful to Baron Vaea and his wife Tuputupu, who lent me assistance during those first difficult days in Tonga.

The New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs staff, both in Wellington and Nuku‘aloa, were helpful and interested; I am appreciative of their support. I would also like to extend my sincere thanks to Malcolm Cessford and Keith Leonard, who, in their capacities as Project Manager and Banana Production Advisor, gave time and resources. I would also like to acknowledge the assistance of my Tongan tutor, Lesieli MacIntyre and my interpreter Sione Taufa.

My appreciation is also extended to: Donna Cook, Pat Barnett, Barbara Roberts and Anneke Visser, who all had a hand in the typing of the thesis; Wiebe Zwaga, Allanah Ryan and Hugh Oliver, my fellow graduates, who did the proof reading, and the staff of the Turnbull Library, who enthusiastically assisted in finding plates to illustrate this thesis. I also acknowledge the assistance in typing and general support of Bronwyn Klenner.

Without the co-operation of the subjects of this study, the people of Western Tongatapu, my research would not have been possible. To all those with whom I spoke, in various contexts, I offer my sincere thanks.

Lastly, but by no means least, I extend my thanks to Siua, Suli, Fi‘e Ilo, their friends and relatives, who opened their homes to me and made my stay in Tonga so happy and successful.

Malo Aupito.
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CHAPTER ONE

AID: THE NEW ZEALAND - TONGA CONNECTION

Introduction

Since 1970 New Zealand has committed over NZ$42 million in aid to Tonga under the bilateral assistance programme. Repeatedly this figure is cited by the New Zealand Government as indicative of its commitment to development in the Pacific. What is the impact of this expenditure on Tonga? Why is it made? Who benefits? This thesis tackles these problems by examining the largest agricultural aid project financed by the New Zealand government in Tonga, the Banana Rehabilitation Scheme.

Expenditure on aid is frequently presented by some critics as benefitting only the recipient country, but aid is rarely the only form of exchange between those societies engaged in giving and receiving it. Despite the absolute increase in aid allocation between 1975-76 (Table 1.1), New Zealand’s aid transfer has been more than counterbalanced by an inequitable trade relationship which has developed since World War II between Tonga and New Zealand in the latter’s favour.
Table 1.1: Trends in New Zealand bilateral aid to Tonga
1971-1987 (selected years)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>NZD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1971-72</td>
<td>250 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-75</td>
<td>1 600 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977-78</td>
<td>1 900 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-81</td>
<td>2 707 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983-84</td>
<td>4 300 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986-87</td>
<td>5 000 000 +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-87</td>
<td>42 000 000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Wellington

Aid consists of direct grants and/or other inputs which contain, at least partially, concessionary components to the recipient country. For most major aid givers direct grants only make up a small proportion of aid. New Zealand’s aid tends to consist of budgetary or project assistance. It is also predominantly bilateral rather than multilateral. Over two thirds of New Zealand’s bilateral aid goes to Third World countries in the Pacific. Of these Tonga is a major recipient.

Tonga, a state of less than 100 000 people, does not fit the common image of a Third World nation (Bertram and Watters, 1984:373). Its national income, however, clearly shows it to be a poor country. Tonga’s GDP per capita in 1980 was T$395. Despite its freedom from formal colonisation, Tonga is very much a part of the global system of capitalism. Tonga’s relationship with New Zealand, itself a former colony, is clearly one between First World and Third World nations.
New Zealand's History of Colonial Aspirations

New Zealand's colonial aspirations in the Pacific date back to the late nineteenth century (Gordon, 1960:9-15). However, New Zealand could not fulfill its own annexationist interests without Britain's support and the latter had only limited interests in the Pacific. It was the threat of German annexations which enabled New Zealand to persuade Britain to support its imperialist ambitions (Fieldhouse, 1973:441).

The Cook Islands became a New Zealand colony in 1900. Samoa, a former German colony, was occupied by New Zealand troops in 1914 at the outbreak of the Great War (Ross, 1964:288-304) and was later administered by New Zealand, first under a League of Nations mandate and then in 1946 as a United Nations trusteeship (Thompson, 1967:25). In contrast Tonga was never officially annexed by any power. It was used instead as a bargaining point in the demarcation of spheres of influence between imperialist powers. At the turn of the century the Germans and Americans obtained ascendancy in Samoa in exchange for accepting Britain's influence in Tonga and Nuie (Fieldhouse, 1973:437-456). Thus Tonga and New Zealand were, in the first instance, linked through British imperialism.

A direct relationship between Tonga and New Zealand has been a predominantly twentieth century phenomenon. The nature of that relationship reflects post-World War II trends towards decolonisation and First World attempts to draw former colonies into a global economic, rather than a political, system. Integral to this was the construction of development assistance programmes, which quickly became referred to simply as 'aid'.

Map of Tonga

THE KINGDOM OF TONGA

NIUAFO'OU
NIUATOPUTAPU
TAFAHI

VAVAU GROUP

HA'APAI GROUP

TONGATAPU GROUP

Source: Tongan Statistics Department
Aid in the Post-Imperialist World

Aid was developed by the United States as an effective form of leverage during the Cold War\(^2\). In Western Europe it was seen as mitigating the effects of post-World War II decolonisation and the economic hegemony of the United States.

Aid was connected to the Marshall Plan, which was credited with the rebuilding of a shattered European economy and ensuring the political support of the European nations for United States policy. The 'Nourse Report' later reinforced this by stating that the American export surplus was largely dependent on the aid programme to Europe. Finally the 'Harriman Report' concluded that:

The interest of the USA in Europe, however, cannot be measured simply in economic terms. It is also strategic and political ... If these countries by democratic means do not attain an improvement in their affairs, they may be driven to turn to the opposite direction (Keesings,1946-48:8989a-8990, reported 20/12/47).

These together established aid as a major implement in foreign policy.

The apparent success of the Marshall Plan in Europe encouraged the adoption of similar principles in the newly independent nations of the Third World. It was believed that injections of capital and technology would allow undeveloped societies to experience an overall increase in their standard of living, interest in western consumer goods and commitment to the democratic systems of the so-called 'free' world. These notions, first embraced by the United States, quickly underpinned the West's international aid policy. They also received intellectual and theoretical validation from theorists aligned with the modernisation school.
Aid and Modernisation Theory

The problem for modernisation theorists and policy-makers was to identify structural and cultural properties which would encourage such development. This involved an analysis of the 'lack of progress' as well as an analysis of 'progress' itself. Economically 'backward' areas in Asia, Africa and South America in the post-World War II era were seen as similar to war-damaged Europe and demanded similar treatment.

Rostow, the best known modernisation theorist, argued that all societies take the same road to development but some progress faster than others. The problem was to ensure that the level of progress became uniform and, according to Rostow, this required instilling entrepreneurial ambition; encouraging sustained capital accumulation and ensuring capital investment (Rostow, 1953). This capital accumulation could be encouraged by direct overseas inputs in 'pre-modern' societies both in the form of aid and private capital investment (Rostow, 1978). New Zealand's continued close alliance with Britain, and a growing affinity with the USA, served to draw New Zealand into using this First World strategy.

New Zealand's Aid History

The Canberra Pact (1944) was the earliest significant expression of New Zealand's concern for the Pacific as a region (Gordon, 1960:201-212). In it Australia and New Zealand stated an intention to encourage the native peoples of the South Pacific to assimilate the benefits of the culture of a 'more advanced people' (Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, 1972:48-65). Three years later this was subsumed within a wider international initiative. In 1947 the six countries with the highest colonial profiles in the Pacific, Australia, France, Holland, New Zealand, Great Britain and the United States, set up the South Pacific Commission (SPC) (Brown, 1970:15; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1972:128-137; Smith, 1970:74-76) expressly to;

encourage and strengthen international co-operation by promoting the economic and social welfare of peoples in the non-self-governing territories of the South Pacific (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1974:3).

Initially New Zealand almost exclusively concentrated its efforts on its Pacific territories, the Cook Islands, Nuie, Tokelau and Western Samoa. In 1950, when New Zealand became a founding member of the Colombo Plan, these were extended to South and South-East Asia. New Zealand's involvement in the Colombo Plan was a particularly explicit commitment to modernisation theory and the strategies for development which derived from it:

Colombo Plan aid and similar assistance given on a larger scale by the United States is integrated into the development programmes formulated by the recipient governments and financed in the greater part, from their own resources. These programmes aim to bring about a permanent increase in standards of living in the area, by ensuring that economic development outpaces the growth of population. On such economic development the social and political stability of the area depends as does the part which the area plays in international trade (JHR, 1953:8).

By June 1969 government targetted one per cent of gross national product (GNP) to go towards Overseas Development Assistance (ODA). This placed New Zealand policy in line with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) although New Zealand did not actually become a member of the OECD until 1973. The early 1970s also saw the introduction of the South Pacific Aid
Programme which was increasingly emphasised as New Zealand's aid contributions expanded (Debreceny, 1984:207-220). Increasingly, then, New Zealand's bilateral aid role was defined within institutional frameworks; the South Pacific Aid Programme, the Colombo Plan, the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and budgetary finance to states with constitutional links to New Zealand.

Aid and its Ideological Framework

Until the early 1970s aid was shaped by principles laid out in the Marshall Plan. However, neither this, nor the more abstract theoretical underpinnings of the plan, were acknowledged. Indeed, aid agencies dismissed theory as ideological. This made any sustained critique of aid strategies and philosophy difficult. The London-based Overseas Development Institute (ODI) refused to publish Theresa Hayter's work on the grounds that it contained an ideological argument. She commented on this when publishing her research independently as 'Aid As Imperialism':

You're falling into the World Bank's error: saying that O.D.I books are not 'ideological' when in fact they are (you know they are), but their ideology is not usually made explicit—although I could give a lot of quotations from O.D.I publications, including mine whose ideological content is pretty clear... (shall I?) . What's mainly wrong with my latest effort is not that it has an ideological framework, but that it's the wrong one - and perhaps also that it's made more explicit than usual (1971:208).

The ODI and the New Zealand government might maintain the facade of a depoliticised aid institution by refusing to acknowledge that modernisation theory informed aid policy, but there is little doubt that its aid policy took
on board some of the illusions and ideas of development mythology - the myths of progress and "modernisation". Policy has been infected by modernisation theory that sees island states developing progressively, economically, socially and especially politically, towards greater political maturity and responsibility (Bertram and Watters, 1984:383).

Of course modernisation theory itself facilitated the pretence. In many ways it simply embodies people's 'common sense' and this not only serves to make the approach pervasive but also apparently atheoretical and non-ideological.

The Reality of Aid

While the ODI and the New Zealand government have largely avoided critiquing their own aid strategies, the bulwark of those strategies, modernisation theory, has become the focus of international scholarly and practitioner criticism. High concentrations of foreign investment in some Third World countries have led to pockets of industrialisation and agricultural expansion. Even in those countries the notion that the benefits of investment would filter through to benefit all members of society has become discredited. The experience of societies receiving aid and capital investment from the First World, far from modernisation has been marked by increasing impoverishment and depletion of social and economic resources. The gulf between the First and Third Worlds appears to have increased rather than decreased.

Szymanski's extensive empirical data illustrates that an inequitable flow of resources has been the reality of First World intervention in the economies of the Third World. Not only is Third World labour and raw materials exploited directly but also their trade dependency (Table 1.2).
Table 1.2: Structure of exports and imports of the Third World

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage of Third World exports going to First World countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Third World</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East and Sth Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage of Third World imports that are from First World countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Third World</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East and Sth Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Heavy reliance on First World societies is exacerbated by the tendency for Third World countries to be dependent on a single export commodity (Table 1.3). This leaves them particularly vulnerable to the changing interests of trans-national corporations and fluctuations in world commodity prices.
### Table 1.3: Concentration of exports of selected Third World countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1965</th>
<th>1977</th>
<th>Commodity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>78.6</td>
<td>54.2</td>
<td>copper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Columbia</td>
<td>63.8</td>
<td>62.7</td>
<td>coffee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>59.3</td>
<td>58.5</td>
<td>coffee, bananas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>62.1</td>
<td>55.2</td>
<td>cotton, coffee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>coffee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>phosphates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burma</td>
<td>62.2</td>
<td>56.9</td>
<td>rice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>jute, black tea</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Szymanski, 1981:237, Table 7.8.

The indebtedness of the Third World (Table 1.4) is partly a result of this reliance upon single export commodities. Not all debt, however, has been accumulated through inequitable trade relations. Much of the Third World's debt represents the expense of pursuing a development strategy based on modernisation theory which required heavy capital investment. This was financed either through direct grant aid, which has no explicit cost, soft loans, or more often through fully commercial loans.
Table 1.4: External public debt/G.N.P: selected Third World countries
(millions of U.S. dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1970 Total</th>
<th>% of G.N.P.</th>
<th>1976 Total</th>
<th>% of G.N.P.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>7935</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>12392</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>688</td>
<td>22.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>713</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>2131</td>
<td>24.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>642</td>
<td>37.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>2066</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>3527</td>
<td>39.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Szymanski, 1981:253, table 7.11

A variety of empirical evidence documents the vast disparities between the First and Third Worlds which have been greatly exacerbated during modernisation programmes (George, 1976; Hayter, 1971, 1985; Lappe, 1980; Linear, 1985; Payer, 1974). Below it will be shown that the relationship between New Zealand and Tonga displays many of the above characteristics.

Aid and Trade Between Tonga and New Zealand

Prior to World War I Tongan trade dependency on New Zealand was being established. Almost 45% by value, of the goods imported into Tonga in 1908 came from New Zealand, compared to 35% from Australia. During the 1930s depression Tonga's imports dropped some 300%, but New Zealand held its share of the market albeit at a reduced absolute level (Colonial Reports Annual 1910 and 1934). During the
inter-war period there was a relatively equitable flow of imports and exports to and from Tonga and in most years Tonga actually displayed a visible trade surplus.

This equilibrium was increasingly disturbed in the post-World War II period. In particular New Zealand's exports to Tonga showed a dramatic increase relative to its imports from Tonga (Table 1.5).

**Table 1.5: New Zealand - Tongan trade**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N.Z. exports to Tonga ($T)</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>27.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of total Tongan imports</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tongan exports to NZ ($T)</td>
<td>.919</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of total Tongan exports</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Government statistics departments: Wellington and Nuku'alofa
* Figures unavailable.

During the 1970s New Zealand's exports to Tonga steadily increased. The rising absolute value of imports from New Zealand and the relatively stable percentage of total imports indicated that Tonga became a burgeoning market for First World produce, precisely what was envisaged in the Marshall Plan. The total value of Tonga's exports has increased further over recent years, but the volume of produce exported has
remained static and in some cases fallen and an enormous imbalance within New Zealand and Tongan trade has developed. This has been duplicated in Tonga's trade relations with other partners. It is an imbalance which Tongan's pay for through remittances from kin overseas, other invisible earnings, some budgetary aid and, finally, through calling on foreign reserves.

New Zealand imports predominantly primary produce such as fruit and vegetables from Tonga. Tonga historically relies upon copra which has a volatile world price and is facing continued downward pressure. Tongan imports from New Zealand consist mainly of manufactures, of which tinned meat and other processed foods make up a large proportion. They are increasingly more difficult to pay for. Using the prevailing exchange rate the New Zealand - Tonga trade relationship is presently in New Zealand's favour at a rate of at least 4:1. The net aid transfer serves only as a partial amelioration of the overall resource transfer of over NZ$6.5 million in 1980 from Tonga to New Zealand (Hau'ofa, 1987:9). This situation is not unique (Hoadley, 1977:150). Trade figures for two of Tonga's neighbours show a similar pattern (see Table 1.6).
Table 1.6: Trade and partners (US$ million)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Exports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tonga (1979)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$29</td>
<td>$7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZ 34.3%</td>
<td>$9.947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUS 27.3%</td>
<td>$7.917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK 8.7%</td>
<td>$2.523</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUS 40.9%</td>
<td>$2.863</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZ 26.4%</td>
<td>$1.848</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK 14.3%</td>
<td>$1.001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Samoa (1976)** | | |
| $60 | $14 |
| NZ 24.7% | $14.82 |
| FRG 20.0% | $12.00 |
| AUS 16.6% | $9.96 |
| FRG 27.4% | $3.830 |
| NZ 23.7% | $3.310 |
| AUS 35.3% | $3.050 |

| **Fiji (1976)** | | |
| $470 | $249 |
| AUS 35.3% | $165.9 |
| NZ 15.0% | $70.5 |
| JAP 14.3% | $67.2 |
| UK 37.0% | $92.10 |
| US 15.1% | $37.50 |
| NZ 9.6% | $23.90 |


It is more difficult to trace other cash flows between New Zealand and Tonga. Nevertheless Tonga appears to be becoming increasingly dependent upon remittance earnings from labour migrants to New Zealand and Australia (Bertram and Watters, 1984a; 1985b; 1986). The apparent remittance flow into Tonga from Tongans labouring in New Zealand may not in fact provide a source for capital accumulation in Tonga. Much of the money remitted finds its way back to New Zealand or goes to other First World countries. Certainly time spent by Tongans in New Zealand stimulates demand for western food and commodities which must be imported into Tonga. The relationship between New Zealand and Tonga displays precisely the inequitable
relationships which Szymanski illustrates. It is likely that these will deepen.

It was, in part, the recognition of this unbalanced economic relationship between First and Third World countries which during the 1960s and 1970s inspired an understanding of development processes other than that expressed by modernisation theorists.

**Opposition to Modernisation and Orthodox Development Strategies: The Dependency School**

Unlike modernisation theory, dependency theory locates the cause of the Third World's apparent backwardness in the growth of a world capitalist system. Instead of underdevelopment being an original state, dependency theorists portray it as the result of a historical process by which the capitalist countries 'developed' through actively 'underdeveloping' what has become the Third World. According to dependency theorists, capital investment from the First World has not lead to 'take-off' but to a progressive appropriation of the Third World's capital and resources by First World investors. Halting this, consequently, is regarded as the key to an accumulation of indigenous surplus and ultimately indigenous development (Frank, 1967).

This explanation of Third World underdevelopment, while an improvement on modernisation theory, has also proved inadequate. Its monocausal explanation of social underdevelopment fails to recognise the way in which certain groups in recipient societies do benefit from capital investment and aid. There is little doubt that some
Balance of trade, New Zealand - South Pacific.

NZ-South Pacific Trade Deficit Compared to Official NZ Bilateral Aid, 1978.

The trade - aid relationship?
Source: Bellam, 1980:12.
indigenous groups accommodate themselves to penetrating capitalist forces and profit from them. Some indigenous groups have economic interests which are closely aligned to the First World (Leigh, 1975:11-22).

Moreover, by the early 1970s it was clear that the experience of under-development around the globe was extremely diverse. Some countries experienced high levels of economic development while others became relatively more underdeveloped. Such diversity cannot be explained with sole reference to some mechanism of surplus extraction by which all First World countries are seen as exploiting all Third World societies.

Changing Strategies for Development

Whatever the theoretical problems of dependency theory it has been evident to most in New Zealand that development strategies based upon the modernisation approach have not lead to 'take off' and improved living standards for all in the Third World.

In 1973 the New Zealand labour government directed not only that bilateral aid be concentrated in the South Pacific but also that the poorest groups within the South Pacific be targetted. The Minister of Foreign Affairs stated that;

emphasis will be placed on development at the "grass roots" level, to help raise the living standards of the ordinary people and provide jobs for them (JHR, 1974:41).
The National Conference on International Aid and Development (March 1974), also called for a greater recognition of the need for social justice, equality and liberation of poor peoples. This reinforced growing government sentiment at the time but the advisory committee set up as a result of the conference in liaison with Foreign Affairs could not agree on any broad prescription for development. There was a significant conflict between those who wished to emphasise overall growth and ignore the internal distribution of benefits within recipient societies and those committed to the notion of egalitarian distribution.

Despite this impasse and the refusal of aid contributing nations to acknowledge that aid benefits were not generally 'trickling down' to the common people, aid goals did become significantly reoriented in the 1970s. Instead of pursuing the goal of industrialisation, the New Zealand government has focussed on reducing the number of Third World inhabitants facing absolute poverty. This 'basic needs' strategy has been espoused throughout the 1980s and represents a tacit recognition of the failure of previous aid strategies informed by modernisation theory. It also represents a response to dependency theorists demands for more equitable aid arrangements. Nevertheless, as the 1981 'Aid Principles' defined in the New Zealand government's guidelines for project assistance requests show, the contradictions between growth goals inspired by modernisation theory and distribution goals remained.

The 1981 new Aid Principles were designed to ensure that any Third World projects eligible for New Zealand aid would be:

increasing the productive capacity of the recipient country;

expanding employment opportunities there;
improving the living conditions and welfare especially of people on lower incomes and in rural areas;

safeguarding the interests of vulnerable groups such as women and increasing their capacity to contribute to development;

and also the extent of popular participation in and support for the project (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1984:1).

The contradictions embedded here are clear. Increasing the productive capacity of a country does not necessarily mean that there will be greater employment opportunities, more equitable distribution of income, or that groups such as women will achieve any increase in economic independence. Surges in overall productivity have in other contexts very often marginalised already disadvantaged groups (Lappe, 1980; Mosley, 1987). Nevertheless, the Banana Rehabilitation Scheme in Tonga is one of the projects which has been funded according to these principles. The purpose of this study is in part to assess these principles and the degree to which they do in fact provide a practical and achievable guide to aid goals which benefit all Tongans.

Despite the seeming emphasis in these principles on the benefits to recipient countries, the New Zealand government has been concerned to demonstrate to the taxpayer at home that aid is associated with benefits for the giver as well as the receiver (Corner, 1980:216):

New Zealand’s bilateral aid is not formally tied to the use of New Zealand goods and services, although to the extent practicable and appropriate projects are normally expected to incorporate an identifiable and significant New Zealand element (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1984:5).

On the other hand there is little recognition of the relationship between the wealth of the First World and the poverty of the Third. Despite the acceptance by some of the
analysts of dependency theory expressed elsewhere, for instance, in the Brandt Commission Report (1980), New Zealand aid policy has remained primarily informed by modernisation theory. Factors internal to the Third World are consistently identified as significant barriers to development and the role of aid is conditional upon changes in these internal factors. According to a former senior Foreign Affairs official:

aid is only a small part of the development process and steady progress depends essentially on the efforts of the people in the developing countries themselves and the quality of the leadership their governments provide (Miller, 1984:29-30)⁵.

Moreover, there is a continued failure to differentiate adequately between effects and the benefits of aid. The New Zealand government, while tacitly recognising in its policy shifts in 1973 and 1974, that aid may exacerbate inequalities within recipient societies which may indeed be determined by elite groups within those societies, has not attempted systematically to address such problems. Instead in a fruitless attempt to appear atheoretical and apolitical Foreign Affairs adopted a ragbag of ideas derived predominantly from the modernisation school. New Zealand policy still mirrors philosophies first developed in the Marshall Plan. Aid, while presented as a moral imperative, is determined according to broad Western strategic interests and more immediate political or economic returns to New Zealand⁶.

In considering the effects of bilateral assistance programmes these contextual features are important but one must consider the nature of particular projects and the societies into which they are introduced. In Tonga the Banana Rehabilitation Scheme is the largest single project presently funded by New Zealand. An investigation into its history and effects serves to demonstrate both the nature of the relationship between the First and Third Worlds and the meaning aid has for recipient societies.
The Banana Rehabilitation Scheme: A Brief Review.

In attempting to meet the objectives for aid contributions laid down in 1981, the External Aid Division (EAD) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has oriented its programme around project aid. This is regarded as the best means by which widespread change may be effected at the grass roots. The 'Renewed Banana Revitalisation Scheme' (RBRS) is one of those projects and is not the first to attempt to revitalize the banana industry. The EAD, in conjunction with the Tongan Government, had been involved in relatively small scale attempts to increase banana production throughout the 1970s. They have had only limited success.

Banana production in Tonga experienced a boom in the mid-1960s. Because of the rapid increase in disease, however, it could only be maintained with the heavy use of pesticides and fertilizers. The greater expense made production less attractive to farmers and production never regained the peaks experienced in the 1960s. The Tongan Ministry of Agriculture continued in its efforts to revive the banana boom, particularly since the depression of copra prices. Consequently a Banana Working Committee was set up in 1977 to consider reorganisation. This culminated in a proposal that the New Zealand Government be asked to fund the recommended project which was published in A Review of the Banana Export Industry in the Kingdom of Tonga (Banana Working Committee, 1979). A formal request was forwarded in October 1979.

The scheme was assessed under the New Zealand EAD's terms of reference. A confidential report, The Likely Impact of Some Critical Factors (Brook and
Sorrenson, 1981), estimated that the project would cost NZ$5 million over five years. The particular goals of the scheme were:

- Self help and self sufficiency through encouraging foreign exchange earnings;
- creation of job opportunities;
- improved living standards at village level;
- improved productivity;
- more rapid uptake of technology;
- greater awareness of market requirements (Brook and Sorrenson, 1981:9).

The intention was that an exporting banana industry be self-supporting within five years. Bananas purchased from plantations registered under the scheme were to be exported. Those not attaining minimum export quality would be rejected the producer being denied incentive payments. Capital equipment, expatriate expertise, extension programmes and input subsidies of chemicals and fertilizers would all be supplied under the scheme. The subsidized supply of chemicals and fertilizers would, however, be phased out over the life of the scheme.

Participation in the scheme was restricted. All growers had to have at least two acres of bananas within the first eighteen months of the scheme's operation and new plantations had to be planted with approved planting material. Growers unable to meet the minimum average export yield or who ignored instructions from the Banana
Services Section of the Tongan Ministry of Agriculture Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) were all likely to be deregistered (Memorandum of Understanding, 1983).

The scheme got under way officially in early 1983 and at regular intervals the EAD sent consultants (usually economists) to analyse its progress. Despite claims of a commitment to generalised social improvement it was not until the Fifth Review Mission in April 1985 that any comment was made on the scheme's social impact:

It was possible in the time available to obtain only a superficial impression of the social impact of the project at the family and village level. This task needs to be undertaken as a separate formal exercise (Fifth Review Mission, April 1985:32).

By late 1987 this exercise had still not been initiated. Furthermore, perceptions of what such a study would entail appear to have been extremely limited. A Fifth Review Mission member stated in relation to my proposed analysis that it was better to measure numbers of new trucks, bikes, houses, videos etc going into the rural areas (Personal correspondence, July 1986).

The delay and the suggested limitation of assessment to the possession of Western capital and consumer goods confirm Hoadley’s claim that there is a reluctance among New Zealand aid administrators to give prominence to the redistributinal aspects of development, or even to evaluate systematically the effects of such aid projects on the development of recipient countries (1977:153).

The concern with the the impact of the scheme on the attributional characteristics of scheme members reflects a retreat into the raw empiricism characteristic of aid assessment informed by modernisation theory (Food and Agriculture Organisation, 1955:paper no 52). Knowing how many vans have been purchased by
Chemical and fertilizer application are an integral part of the banana scheme. 

The Banana Production Advisor on an inspection visit during a picking and packing day. 
scheme members does not provide an understanding of the scheme's effect, unless such data are within a relational framework of analysis in which people's social position, degree of economic security, life history and probable life trajectory are mapped.

Attributional approaches ignore the fact that the effects of any scheme are mediated by structure and processes in place prior to the scheme's inception. Without an understanding of productive relations, political structures and kinship relations there is little chance that a scheme's impact can be determined.

Conclusion

The inequitable relationship between the First and the Third World has deepened since the adoption of aid strategies in the late 1940s. Given that aid is a significant proportion of Third World income it is increasingly necessary to ensure that aid offers a route out of this impoverishment. This demands a more critical analysis of the impact of aid upon the Third World involving a detailed analysis of the social processes at work in both the donor and recipient society. Such an approach must be informed by theory rather than the raw empiricism that has pervaded the field of aid assessment until now.

The Banana Rehabilitation Scheme is, by virtue of its sheer size of investment, a candidate for an analysis of the social relations impinging upon and the effects of aid. After five years of operation it will have cost the New Zealand government about NZ$5 million. This is a relatively large slice of the almost NZ$50 million that New Zealand will
have contributed in aid to Tonga between the early 1970s and 1987. Superficially, such a large monetary outlay would seem to imply a strong commitment on the part of the New Zealand government to development in Tonga. The meaning of that commitment can only be assessed by its outcomes.

NOTES

1. The Kingdom of Tonga is an archipelago of approximately 150 islands spread over 700 000 square kilometres of the Pacific Ocean (36 of which are inhabited). The total land area of the archipelago is is about 700 square kilometres. It is situated in the South West Pacific, between 18 and 22 degrees longitude and 174 to 175 degrees latitude, 700 kilometres east-south-east of Fiji and nearly 2 000 kilometres north-north-east of Auckland, New Zealand.

The main island Tongatapu, is 257 square kilometres and contains over sixty per cent of the Kingdom's population of 94 534 (preliminary census figures, January 1987). The capital, Nuku'alofa, which is the centre of commerce, the main seaport and the seat of government is on Tongatapu. The population of Nuku'alofa is over 25 000 and growing rapidly due to high natural increase and internal migration.

2. Some nineteenth century governments transferred money at concessionary rates to their colonial governments, known as grant in aid. Such grants were not equated with any moral imperative, often being used to fund the maintenance of colonial control. 'Pump priming' capital investment into Latin American countries during the 1930s was an attempt to invigorate the stagnant world economy. Aid as we know it today is a post-World War II phenomenon (Mosley,1987:11-21).


4. The Principles Guiding New Zealand's Bilateral Development Assistance Programme

   i. New Zealand's Development assistance is directed primarily to the Island states of the South Pacific and is designed to help meet their specific requirements: the second area of concentration is South East Asia and in particular the countries belonging to A.S.E.A.N.
ii. Bilateral Assistance is provided by the Government in accordance with New Zealand's capacity and in response to specific requests made by recipient Governments on the basis of their own plans and priorities either directly or through regional institutions.

iii. The principle purpose of New Zealand's development assistance is to help promote the economic and social development of the recipient countries, by expanding their capabilities to raise the living standards of their peoples.

iv. New Zealand development assistance is normally provided from New Zealand itself; New Zealand goods and services are used wherever this is compatible with the principle purpose.

v. A project to be assisted under the New Zealand programme should have specific development objectives that are to be achieved within a specified time and with specified resources: after that time it should be possible for the project to be carried on by the recipient country from its own resources.

vi. Considerations taken into account by the Government in deciding what requests to respond to include the contribution to be made by a project to: [These are given in the body of text.]

5. This paper was presented to a Rotary meeting and internally circulated to a number of Foreign Affairs staff as a position paper.

6. Bertram and Watters (1984) incorporate these global considerations when mapping out the objectives of New Zealand foreign policy in the South Pacific.

   i. Political stability of the island states.
   ii. Maintenance of an international system of security and defence.
   iii. Economic growth and development of the island states
   iv. Maintenance and improvement of reasonable conditions of social welfare.
   v. Availability of a relatively cheap source of labour.
   vi. Provision of fruit and vegetables to New Zealand.
   vii. New Zealand's defence role in ANZUS, its responsibility for the defence of the South-West Pacific.
   viii. A third world debt crisis is a threat to the western and world economy.
CHAPTER TWO

WAYS TO STUDY AID TO TONGA

This thesis focuses on the nature and implications for Tonga of its bilateral aid relationship with New Zealand. For modernisation theorists assessing aid, and indeed aid as a phenomenon, is relatively unproblematic. Aid is characterised as an investment of capital necessary for development. If aid fails to engender development such a failure is defined as largely due to cultural barriers within the recipient society. For modernisation theorists then, the ‘object’ of research into the impact of aid becomes the ideologies, attitudes and propensities of the people of the Third World. In the conscience collective, modernisation theorists find their explanations of aid’s success or failure.

For dependency theorists the analysis of aid demands a different approach. Aid is seen as part of an exchange between two societies. The donor society is portrayed as making an investment in aid not purely to develop the Third World, but primarily to obtain some profitable return. Aid, according to dependency theorists, allows contributory societies to exploit the labour and resources of recipient societies. The inequitable trade relationships outlined previously are just one manifestation of this.

Dependency theorists are, then, not concerned with the conscience collective of recipient societies. Their focus rests on the nature and direction of resource flows between societies locked into aid relations. But this approach does not provide an adequate analysis of aid and/or its impact. Nor does the inequitable trade relationship
between Tonga and New Zealand tell us much about the impact of aid on Tongan society? Some Tongans benefit greatly from aid to Tonga while others hardly benefit at all. Similarly, while all New Zealanders could be seen to benefit from the cheap labour and resources of the Third World it is unlikely that all New Zealanders benefit equally or consistently over time from the exploitation of those resources 1.

Through the world market economic surplus may be transferred from satellite to metropolitan societies but this transfer cannot be assumed to represent the major form of inter-societal exploitation or the most significant manifestation of that exploitation. Nor can the continued impoverishment of many people in societies such as Tonga be explained in such crude terms. Dependency analysis constitutes a real theoretical advance on modernisation theory and makes a strong critique of the aid strategies informed by it, but it has severe limitations.

Critique of Dependency Theory

According to dependency theory metropolitan penetration into satellite states is based upon an underconsumptionist tendency in the metropolitan centre. Penetration of another mode of production is seen as stimulating demand, alleviating stagnation and thereby facilitating capitalist expansion. The crude functionalist suggestion that such penetration was directed to such an end must be rejected. It is possible to accept, however, that the development of capitalism in Europe was encouraged by the colonial expansion of Spain, Holland, Portugal and England in the sixteenth century (Bradby, 1975).
The most severe inadequacies of dependency theory derive not from this aspect of its functionalism, but its conception of economic surplus which Baran (1966:17-26) defines as

the difference between what a society produces and the cost of producing it.

This problem fails to acknowledge, however, that whatever a society produces and the costs of that production, varies according to the mode of production. That is, the structures in which production takes place (Taylor,1979:72). Consequently 'surplus' can only be determined with reference to a specific mode of production. This makes estimating the surplus flow between two societies with different modes of production almost impossible. Such estimates, which are central to dependency theory, can only be achieved if it is assumed that 'surplus' is an absolute with an equal meaning within all modes of production. This is of course fallacious and rests on the misguided notion that capitalism is primarily a set of commodity exchanges rather than productive relations.

The emphasis on commodity exchanges has led to a resurgence of 'vulgar economics'. This term, used initially by Marx in his critique of post-Ricardian and neoclassical economics, is apposite to dependency theory which concentrates on the analysis of surface phenomena, such as circulation of goods and capital and neglects structural relations and the productive relations which underlie commodity transactions (Bottomore,1983:515-516). For dependency theorists the essential difference between societies is the size of the market rather than the relations of production and the form of surplus extraction embedded in these relations. Dependency theorists do not, then, define capitalism as a mode of production (Worsley,1984:32).
The emphasis on the market allows the differing effects of various penetrating forces on non-capitalist societies, and the actual constitution of those societies, to remain largely unanalysed. Non-capitalist modes, according to dependency theorists, immediately become capitalist at the time of penetration;

once a country or a people is converted into the satellite of an external capitalist metropolis, the exploitative metropolis - satellite structure quickly comes to organise and dominate the domestic economic, political and social life of that people (Frank, 1967:10).

Under these circumstances the social structures prior to penetration have no influence on future social formations. In reality, however, surplus exploitation by a metropolitan country with a trading advantage over a satellite country is not unique to capitalist relations. Such exchanges could be equally evident between many societies and consequently this analysis of social change is essentially unsound (Laclau, 1971).²

To summarize, it is clear that dependency theory is shackled by three major problems. First, a functionalist explanation of causes which suggests that underconsumption within the metropolitan centres caused their penetration into the satellite states purposely to stimulate demand and facilitate subsequent capitalist expansion. Second, the theory's inadequate conception of economic surplus does not take account of the structures within which production takes place either at the centre or the periphery. Moreover, surplus value is virtually impossible to operationalise adequately and consequently charting surplus flows between societies must be treated with caution. Finally, dependency theory relies on an analysis which distinguishes between societies according to the size of the market rather than their productive relations which serves to mystify rather than clarify the structures and processes of
development and underdevelopment. These shortcomings together lead dependency theorists to concentrate too heavily upon underdevelopment as defined by exchange and transfer of surplus from satellite to metropolitan states.

The problem which confronted theorists concerned with these limitations was to develop an approach that recognised exploitation through the transfer of surplus value and took account of the different structures of production between the centre and the periphery. Articulation of modes of production theory attempts precisely that.

**Articulation of Modes of Production**

The theory of articulation of modes of production asserts that different developmental trajectories among Third World societies result from the interaction of the exact nature of the capitalist penetration and the structure of the non-capitalist society. Changes resulting from penetration are determined partly by the features of the indigenous mode and consequently vary from one Third World society to another.

Articulation theory, however, does not, like modernisation theory, see the indigenous mode as the barrier to capitalist penetration. Apparent remnants of indigenous production, such as petty commodity or subsistence production do not constitute barriers to capitalism but may be bulwarks of it. Capitalist penetration is presented as transforming indigenous modes from;

modes of production subject to their own 'laws of motion' to modes of production whose motion is primarily determined by the laws operating in the capitalist mode of production, and hence also progressively transforms the content, and eventually the form, of their relations of production (Leys, 1977:104).
The organisation of the indigenous mode are at all times vulnerable to the dictates of the dominant mode. For instance, when capitalist enterprises enter areas of production previously dominated by non-capitalist production they quickly dominate, destroying non-capitalist competition. Where non-capitalist production survives it does so because it does not compete with capitalism and maintains vital but, for capitalism, unprofitable spheres of production. This usually includes subsidising labour to capitalism through the maintenance of subsistence production.

Contrary to Frank, then, articulation theorists maintain that the incorporation of the periphery into a capitalist world system does not automatically imply capitalist transformation within peripheral societies (Laclau, 1971). Rather, social structures survive in various forms and are even propped up or reconstituted by the penetration of capitalist relations. In short, there is an engagement between societies rather than a total obliteration of one by another. This allows articulation theorists to recognise the agency of indigenous peoples, something which is sorely lacking from dependency theorists.

Certain indigenous groups can, because of the original structure of the penetrated mode, accommodate themselves to and take advantage of the interplay of the two modes. Meillasoux (1981) demonstrates, for example, the manner in which elders in certain African tribes insert themselves between capitalist and non-capitalist modes of production in order to facilitate the appropriation of the earnings of younger tribal members in the capitalist mode. They manage this through the manipulation of one of their continuing spheres of control in the non-capitalist mode, the distribution of
brides. This is a quite different process of transformation from that implied by dependency theorists in their conceptualisation of a comprador (provider) elite which they argue acts purely as an intermediary between metropolitan societies and satellite societies.

Articulation theory does not reject entirely the dependency theorists' claim that there is transfer of value from the Third to the First World. Instead it is argued that the process by which such a transfer is facilitated is not through the mechanism of exchange but through the appropriation of value at the point of production. The inequality manifest at the level of international exchange is merely symptomatic of differential control over the organisation of production. It is this very distinction between an emphasis on relations of production as opposed to exchange that embeds articulation of modes of production theory in marxist analysis and, like marxism it sees through and goes beyond appearances to reach real social relations. It does not stop at analysing the market relations where the appearances show but analyses the relations of production. In contradistinction, "vulgar economics" cannot go beyond appearances and its analysis is locked up in the sphere of circulation. It cannot see that the relations between things are in fact relations between men in their productive process (Gulalp, 1983:132).

Unfortunately some articulation of modes of production theory reflect the worst tendencies in marxist analysis and fall into 'vulgar economics'.

There are, however, real tendencies towards economic reductionism and functionalism in articulation of modes of production theory. While in the 1970s it was hailed by development theorists as a means by which the structure emphasised by dependency theorists and the agency emphasised by modernisation theorists could be
understood. By the late 1970s it was increasingly rejected as mechanical and deterministic. The concern over these tendencies towards economic reductionism was in part valid.

In the 1960s classical marxist thought was overtaken by structuralism and it was structuralist marxism which profoundly influenced development theory. The major exponent of this position in the area of development theory and the theorist who most avidly attempted to dispel the economism in articulation of modes of production theory was John Taylor. Taylor maintains the basic principles of articulation of modes of production theory. He argues that the Third World experience has been one in which capitalist and non-capitalist modes of production juggle; that the capitalist mode eventually dominates (Taylor, 1979:101-104) and that the combination of modes of production inform class structures and political representations unique to each social formation (Taylor, 1979:ix).

He is profoundly structuralist, however, in that he asserts that each social formation is defined as having a structure which contains four relatively autonomous practices: economic, ideological, political and theoretical. These combine to designate the nature of a particular mode of production. He attempts to avoid economism by using a notion of the 'dominant instance'. The 'dominant instance' refers to the most influential practice in determining the production and extraction of surplus value in each society. For instance, in feudalism, Taylor argues, surplus was extracted through political control, while in capitalism the 'dominant instance' is the economic (Taylor, 1979:120-121). In the process of capitalist expansion the dominant instance within a non-capitalist mode becomes displaced and is restructured according to the
'logic' of the penetrating capitalist mode. This results in what Taylor calls a form of development which is restricted and uneven (1979:103).

According to Taylor there is no linear movement from dominance by a non-capitalist mode to a capitalist mode of production. The forces of imperial penetration attempt to adapt the dislocated levels of the non-capitalist mode to the political, ideological and economic requirements of the capitalist mode. Ultimately, however, Taylor is reductionist in the sense that he is committed to the notion that the economic will be determinant in all articulated social formations.

On the other hand he does have two great strengths. Firstly, he recognises, though with occasional lapses like so many marxists, that 'production' is at a different level of abstraction from 'economics'. Secondly, he demands the integration of theory and empirical research. The dynamic nature of the interaction between indigenous and penetrating modes requires not only an analysis of the social structure of the non-capitalist mode of production (its productive and reproductive organisation) but also the precise process of capitalist penetration. Both these points are crucial and need to be considered carefully.

The confusion between the abstract levels of the concepts of production and economics has been particularly marked in marxist and articulation theory among both proponents and critics of those positions. It is this confusion which has led to allegations of economic reductionism. Such allegations may be true but they are not, as some critics of marxism and articulation theory state, an inevitable or integral part of those theories. This can be seen by returning to Marx's own work.
Although Marx was ultimately concerned with capitalist relations and the possibilities for change within capitalism, his analysis does not start either with capitalism or with the classes he identifies as major actors but with production in general, socially determined individual production (Marx, 1973:83). All societies needed to produce in order to reproduce themselves (Topolski, 1980:468-469). Production is a highly abstract concept, it represents a universal around which all societies orient themselves. Marx defined the ‘mode of production’ in ‘Capital’ as the specific economic form, in which unpaid surplus labour is pumped out of direct producers [and also that this] determines the relationship of rulers and ruled, as it grows directly out of production itself and in turn, reacts upon it as a determining element. Upon this, however, is founded the entire formation of the economic community which grows up out of the production relations themselves, thereby simultaneously its specific political form. It is always the direct relationship of the owners of the conditions of production to the direct producers ... which reveals the innermost secret, the hidden basis of the entire social structure (Marx, 1961:ch 47, sect II, cited in Bottomore, 1983:336-37).

Production is also concrete, it is

always production at a definite stage of social development - production by social individuals ... all epochs of production have certain common traits, common characteristics. Production in general is an abstraction, but a rational abstraction in so far as it really brings out and fixes the common element and thus saves us repetition. Still, this general category, this common element sifted out by comparison, is itself segmented many times over and splits into different determinations. Some determinations belong to all epochs, others only to a few (Marx, 1973:85).

In capitalist societies Marx regarded economic relations as central to the productive process. In non-capitalist societies such as Tonga, production was organised around non-economic relations such as kinship, politics or ideology. Thus production and economic are quite different. While economics is always part of production, production involves much more than economics.
The reasons for the conflation between the two concepts are found in Marx's preoccupation with capitalist modes and reflects the degree to which the economic has become virtually a fetish in capitalism (Bottomore, 1983:165-166). As Marx demonstrates in 'Capital' (1961), in capitalism all relations become reduced to the economic. This economic fetishism in which social interactions, structures and processes are determined by economic and instrumental interests, informs our sociological understanding of not only capitalist societies but all societies and in doing so is frequently distorting (Geras, 1971:69-85). It is this fetishism which underlies not merely the economism of articulation theory but also the less critiqued but equally economistic tendencies of modernisation theory and dependency theory.

The continuing and unresolved debate over economic reductionism and the twists and turns marxist anthropologists and structuralists have taken to get out of it, is based on this unfortunate conflation between 'production' and 'economics' which ensures that the debate is virtually unresolvable. For if one makes production and economics synonymous then the alternatives to economism are limited and not attractive. They consist of rejecting materialism and falling into idealism; attempting to distance oneself from notions of the determining affect of the economic (the structuralist position); or creating new determining modes or infrastructures. Examples of such strategies are found throughout the literature.

Structuralist marxists have been particularly wary of economic reductionism and have argued for the 'relative autonomy' of 'superstructural' institutions, notably the family, ideology and politics. These are seen as both influencing production, while being ultimately determined by the economic in the 'final instant'.
Godelier (1977) in his study of the Baruya of New Guinea took the alternative of defining other phenomena as infrastructural. Because he uses production and economics synonymously he was forced to seek a coherent economic system in his study of Baruyan society. His discovery that kinship rather than a separate economic system dominated production inspired him to add to the economic infrastructure another component, kinship (Godelier, 1977; Kahn, 1978a).

Worsley is one of the latest theorists, who, while not working within the framework of the articulation theory has recognised some of its problems, particularly the problem of conflating production and the economic. In his work, in which he emphasises the role of indigenous societies in the process of capitalist penetration, Worsley notes that economism derives from not only the conflation of production and economic but the assumption that the material is inherently economic. Material objects, he argues, are not used in a socio-cultural vacuum, rather social relations such as socialisation, internalisation of work ethics, acceptance of authority and so forth are essential to production (Worsley, 1984:28-30). To treat these as mere economic relations, even in capitalist societies let alone other cultures with different conceptions of work, production, exchange, and property reflects a mentality connected to a capitalist fetishisation of the economic rather than to the reality of productive imperatives.

In European society, particularly under capitalism, there has been an explicit cognitive distinction between the ideal and material, the instrumental and the affective, the economic and the social, but these distinctions do not exist a priori. Where they do not, it does not imply that production, as a material process, is of less significance. Part
of the problem is that researchers from capitalist societies tend to sort the information gathered in other societies by arbitrary categories taken from their own.

In their study of Mundurucu culture, the Murphy’s make a distinction between economy and kinship, whereas in Mundurucu society there is no such concrete division. Kin groups are the primary units of production and consumption of food and artifacts (Murphy and Murphy, 1985:75), but the researcher must always be aware that certain conceptual divisions are heuristic devices to aid description, not reality.

In pre- and early contact Tonga, as in Polynesia generally, there was likewise no distinction between kinship and economy. The distinction has developed over the last two hundred years. Indeed it is the penetration of capitalism into Tonga and this concomitant division of economic and non-economic relations within production which constitutes a major theme in this thesis. As capitalism has become more entrenched in Tonga, production has increasingly been defined by a new set of economic forces. Production simultaneously includes, then,

the changing relations of humankind to nature, the social relations into which humans enter in the course of transforming nature, and the consequent transformations of symbolic capability (Wolf, 1982:21).

Production is economic, ecological, social, political and socio psychological.
Problems of Empirical Application

Compared to the theories of modernisation and dependency, articulation of modes of production theory comes closer to defining a methodology which allows empirical application. Indeed John Taylor, in *From Modernisation to Modes of Production* (1979) sets out how his theoretical position can be converted into empirical research in order to examine societies in concrete, as opposed to abstract terms. Thus while Taylor did not resolve the problem of economic reductionism, he did move well beyond both the modernisation and dependency schools in grounding his theory in an empirical context. Such an approach facilitates an understanding of the manner in which social relations in a penetrated society are redrawn as a result of articulation with the incoming capitalist mode.

Relations of production in Tonga have changed, particularly since World War II, partly as a result of various forms of capitalist penetration. New Zealand aid is an example of this. The purpose here is to follow through the effect of this aid on broader class relations in Tonga. Through this it is possible to develop an empirical understanding of the impact of aid itself. Its effects are analysed within the context of indigenous economic, political and cultural conditions. In order to achieve this a picture of the productive relations of pre-, early and post-contact Tonga must be constructed. It is here that the methodological principles embedded within theory serve to inform the nature of the research method.
Because this thesis utilises the theory of articulation of modes of production, its focus was inevitably directed towards the productive relations within Tonga as well as on aid as a particular form of capitalist penetration.

Articulation theory also offered an approach to understanding aid not merely as a means of extraction of economic surplus from Tonga by New Zealand, but as a factor in the construction of capitalist relations and, by extension, class formation in Tonga. If aid encourages class formations and inequalities, the problem is to define the nature of those inequalities. This is not merely an academic problem, but has very practical implications for it confronts the issue as to whether New Zealand aid is indeed contributing beneficially to all Tongans.

The Banana Rehabilitation Scheme, as part of the New Zealand bilateral aid programme in Tonga is an obvious candidate for such a study. Its impact cannot be understood from a mere study of inputs and outputs. First and foremost it must be examined as part of a totality of productive relations in a particular historical space. The sheer variety of data that such an approach demands necessitated several data collection methods. These are described in the next chapter.
1. Davis and Huttenback (1982:119-132) examine the capital flows involved in British imperialism in the period 1860-1914. They suggest that the returns to empire were high, but sustained by the British taxpayer who financed military campaigns. Empire, therefore, served to redistribute income in the United Kingdom rather than strictly transferring income from the empire to the United Kingdom.

2. For example, they fail to see that the central distinction between capitalism and feudalism is not the transferal of surplus but the conditions under which it is produced and appropriated.

3. A further example is the way in which squatter settlements on the outskirts of cities, provide accommodation for workers and reduce the cost to capital of labour force reproduction. The shape of the city then represents the way in which capitalist enclaves maintain profitability through the payment of low wages.

4. Taylor's intention was to follow up his 1979 work, which illustrated theoretical abstractions with available empirical data, with his own empirical research (Taylor, 1979:xii). The work is, as yet, not forthcoming.
CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHOD

The fieldwork component of my research entailed three months in Tonga. It was devoted mainly to interviews with actors in the Banana Rehabilitation Scheme on which I concentrated my analysis. The questions asked (see Appendix A) were designed to gauge the present structure of social relations, the degree to which they were undergoing change and how these changes had been influenced by factors internal and, to a degree, external to Tongan society.

The analysis then (chapters 4-8) drew upon a combination of historical materials, original interview data, and data available through government departments in Nuku'alofa, particularly the Statistics Department and the Ministry of Agriculture Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF). The case studies presented in Chapter 8 were a cross section of respondents and were designed to highlight the relationships between particular social positions of individuals as well as demonstrate the way in which broad social processes were actually played out in their everyday lives.

This methodological pluralism is consistent with the 'reflexive' approach advocated by Hammersly and Atkinson (1983:25). The process of triangulation, the method whereby multi-data sources are used to avoid reliance on one data source, was pursued.
Setting up the Fieldwork

Preliminary information on the scheme, obtained from New Zealand Foreign Affairs in Wellington, indicated that apart from production data, there was little information available in relation to scheme members. In order to analyse the effects of the scheme and the broader implications of capitalist penetration, it was necessary to construct a broad-based questionnaire which tapped both attributional and relational aspects of the lives of people involved with the scheme.

(a) The sample

Four villages were the target population for the fieldwork. Scheme members were spread across Tongatapu, and although the island was small (no one village was more than an hour by road from the furthest village) a random sample would have posed major access problems with regard to resources and time available. Moreover, the context of social relations in a particular area would have been lost if isolated individual respondents had been the object of study.

Most research in Tonga undertaken by sociologists, anthropologists and human geographers has adopted the village sample technique, including the work of Maude (1965), and Nayacakolou (1959). Previously this had been partly due to the unavailability of a suitable frame in which to construct a random survey of Tonga. This is no longer the case but other methodological considerations remain pertinent. It is easier to gain an insight into social relations when a number of respondents are drawn from one village rather than widely scattered households. A random sample may have
produced a degree of statistical validity when generalising results to Tongatapu as a whole, but would have been at the cost of a poorer understanding of complex interrelations at the village level (Maude, 1973:165-166).

A snowball sample was equally inappropriate as it would have brought about a self selection of respondents, particularly of the urban elite, which spoke English, were aware of my research, and were more accessible. Many of the initial contacts I made in Nuku'alofa were with significant gatekeepers, all of whom had a tendency to try to direct me to their neighbours and friends who grew bananas for export. Although this group was important to the analysis of the scheme they would not reflect the reality of the scheme for many of those involved.

In order to build up a comprehensive picture of social relations surrounding the scheme and to see who in fact was benefitting from it, representatives of the three main groups of participants had to be interviewed. These groups were: growers presently in the scheme, growers who at one time had been in the scheme but no longer were and people who work for scheme members as plantation labour.

The scheme administrators provided a 'present grower' readout giving each grower's village and acreage in bananas. It was from this that my initial sample was derived. The noble estate of Tu'i Vakano, which contained ten villages, was selected as the broad sample area. Within these villages there was a total of 46 growers (as at October 86). Four villages were selected, containing 20 growers, all of whom would be interviewed.
Growers still involved in the scheme were the least problematic of the three groups to contact, they were almost invariably in or near their plantations. They were then, always somewhere in the general area. The questions for growers were designed to obtain an understanding of how they came to be in a position to take advantage of opportunities presented by the scheme; to what degree the respondent relied upon banana production and other cash cropping to maintain a livelihood and, as a scheme member, what their likely future trajectory would be. In addition to this, an 'outlier' sample was taken of a numerically small group of elite growers who were predominantly urban-based.

From the scheme administrator's data and from information from villagers, it was possible to locate and interview those in the four villages who had at some stage been in the scheme. Sixteen people in the four villages were past members of the scheme. Ex-growers were much harder to find. Once they were no longer registered scheme members the scheme administrators lost touch with them. The questions designed for the ex-growers were along similar lines to those for the present growers, but emphasised reasons as to why they were no longer scheme members. In both cases, the questions given to the growers and ex-growers concentrated upon the centrality of land and labour to production, the respondents access to these and the increasing importance of capital.

Those involved in the scheme as labourers are central to any analysis. Specific questions were developed, for example, to tap whether it was through choice that the labourer worked for someone else in growing bananas, or due to particular constraints such as lack of land. Deciding how to choose labourers to interview was problematic as
they were not a clearly definable group in the way that growers and ex-growers were. Some were full time labourers while others were part time. Some worked occasionally for wages and some for food. The numerically largest part of the labour force was unpaid women's and children's labour. My central concern was to interview labourers who considered their labouring tasks to be a major part of their livelihood. Unpaid domestic labourers were not a specific part of the sample, although when possible their involvement was discussed. There were specific questions to growers relating to their use of unpaid domestic labour. Not all labourers employed by sampled growers were interviewed, but all growers were questioned in relation to their employee's wage status, age, land access and a series of questions referring to the nature of the employer-employee relationship.

In addition to the interviews conducted with those involved in the scheme, the town officer (ofisa kolo) for each village, the district officer (pule fakavahe) and district extension officer were also interviewed. Total interview figures are set out below. This does not include the series of interviews with various government officials.
Table 3.1 Record of Interview sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Four village sample</th>
<th>Outliers</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Growers</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ex-growers</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labourers</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non scheme grower</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village officials</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Town officer</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District officer</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District extension officer</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) The interviews

The interview sessions were guided by thematically grouped questions which respondents were encouraged to 'talk around'. This often threw up contextual information not elicited by very direct questioning. Some respondents volunteered information which provided incisive commentary on their lives, but had not been asked about because it had been decided that such was too personal. The extent of data was circumscribed to a degree, however, by the fact that most interviews went through an interpreter. Sometimes the content of lengthy monologues from respondents were not fully brought out in the translation.

Interview times ranged from 35 minutes to four and a half hours, the longer ones usually being over more than one period. Most interviews fell in the one hour to one
hour fifteen minutes range. In most cases respondents were recontacted up to six weeks later when extra questions were asked.

The actual interview situation can often be a powerful factor in determining the information gathered:

Interviews and questionnaires intrude as a foreign element into the social setting they would describe, they create as well as measure attitudes, they elicit atypical roles and responses, they are limited to those who are accessible and will cooperate (Webb, 1966: 1).

This problem cannot be sidestepped but can be alleviated by reducing the alienating effect of the interview situation. The use of a tape recorder was consequently rejected possibly to the detriment of actual recording of data. But interviewees were generally not inhibited and those interviews conducted in the bush, possibly sharing lunch, or over a kava bowl in the respondent's home, were particularly rewarding.

Taping was also rejected because of the need to use an interpreter which meant that most of the interviews were three way. Any transcribing would have required constant attendance of the interpreter which was impossible. In any case the large social distance between the three participants combined with the common bush interview meant that most recordings, unless labouriously set up with individual microphones would have been inaudible.

Those interviewed in English were predominantly part of the educated and/or business elite and showed in some cases a reticence even in relation to note taking. A tape recorder, although increasing recall would, I felt, have decreased the depth of
response. In one particular situation the interview was progressing poorly, until I put away my note pad and the respondent immediately became more animated. The problem then was to record the data immediately after the interview as fully as possible.

Sometimes, however, seemingly 'natural' situations appeared to create problem interviews. Many interviews were conducted in the presence of friends and family and almost always of inquisitive children. Some respondents clearly felt under pressure in relation to some questions. One respondent naturally felt uncomfortable when answering questions in relation to access to land because his older brother, who had received the family plot, was present during the interview.

During the five to six weeks when the bulk of the interviewing was being carried out almost all of my time was devoted to collecting and writing up interviews. A fairly typical period would involve leaving home at eight, picking up my interpreter and arriving at a village by nine. We would either work through until about one, then return home to write up, or break for lunch then work until late in the afternoon. In the latter case the evening and the following morning would be used for writing up, with a shortened day in the field the next day. Memory loss during sleeping hours is limited providing no new experiences are added before writing up is carried out (Lofland, 1971).

(c) Representativeness

When comparing the data on growers and ex-growers in the four villages provided by the scheme's management, it was clear that the villages chosen were not atypical regarding easily definable parameters such as land use and population. As
stated, I moved outside the four villages to collect a number of interviews with elite growers who, although numerically small, had a disproportionate influence on the scheme. In this area, the selection of critical cases proved more useful than random sampling ever could. A major factor affecting the ability to generalise was that most land use for banana growing (and indeed most land use overall) is either on noble estates or government estates. The difference can markedly influence security of tenure and cost of usufruct. Within noble estates, the noble-villager relationship varied from noble to noble and between individual nobles and villagers. As my interviews were concentrated on a noble estate some of the implications of the study for landholders on government estates may differ in some respects. The land quality in the Western and Central districts is far superior to that of the Eastern district. The four villages chosen were in the border region, between the West and Central an area of moderate to good growing capacity for bananas.

Due to the qualitative nature of a large part of the research and the subsequent need to visit Tonga for both interview purposes and to collect secondary data available only in Tonga a series of practical research problems arose.
Access problems can be discussed at four levels: official permission, negotiating gatekeepers, finding respondents and arranging interviews, getting to and from the research area.

Gaining official permission from the Tongan Government to conduct the fieldwork was a time consuming and lengthy procedure. The initial application to conduct research was made in December 1985 but official permission had not been granted when I departed for Tonga on 10 October 1986. My application was actually given Cabinet approval (see Appendix B) on 8 October but this did not reach me until I had been in Tonga for ten days. A telegram from the Tongan education department one week prior to my proposed departure for Tonga suggested that gaining research permission might be contingent on the payment of a T$1 000 bond returnable once two copies of my completed thesis were lodged with the Tongan government. This requirement was later dropped (see Appendix C).

Getting to respondents involved negotiating a series of gatekeepers beginning with the noble of the estate on which the villages chosen, and subsequent respondents, were situated. The hierarchy led from the noble to the district officer and to the town officer, a person elected by villagers and charged with co-ordinating many village activities and reporting to the district officer who was directly accountable to central government. The town officer was always the first village resident approached, first as
a matter of courtesy, but also because he would usually know the whereabouts or movements of a proposed respondent. The *faikava* (*kava drinking session*), held regularly in all villages, served as a medium by which the town officer publicised my presence. The town officer was also interviewed as a major participant in village affairs, and in one case as a present scheme member.

Most respondents were interviewed in or near their homes, or in the bush (*api uta*). The relaxed approach to work by most respondents, particularly those working for themselves as cash-subsistence growers, meant that it was easier to locate the person and request an immediate interview. The usual response was "*Sai pe*" ("That's fine") followed by a crossing of the legs and sitting down. Less than one quarter of the respondents preferred to make a later time for the interview. The main problem was actually finding the respondents, not convincing them to be interviewed.

Finding respondents could often take half of the time put aside for interviewing, which slowed down the work considerably. Consequently, two interviews a day were the norm. It was very difficult to determine what was the best time to try and find respondents as work patterns varied depending upon personal whim, if self-employed, or on the demands of employers.

Wild goose chases were not uncommon and served as a source of amusement to villagers. On one occasion my interpreter and I spent half an hour wandering around the village looking for the home of a respondent to later find that he had watched us in our search from his seat under a tree on the equivalent of the village common. He knew we were looking for him, but was enjoying the game. Pursuing respondents
whom we had already interviewed but under a different name was also an occasional problem. On one occasion all the men of one village were attending a funeral across the other side of the island every day for four days, forcing a change of plans for the week.

Transport was a problem as a result of the limited budget for the research. Tentative offers from the government’s Agriculture Department were not pursued due to the need to avoid being seen to be linked to government. A motorcycle was used for the first six weeks, thereafter we relied on bicycles.

(b) Culture shock

... when someone is thrown into a new and alien cultural milieu, a setting in which familiar meanings and symbols within which one has lived, and to which she or he was socialised, are totally absent (Murphy and Murphy, 1985:61).

My first experience of culture shock was in 1984 during a visit to a friend on a mission station in Samburu territory in the northern desert of Kenya. I had all of the classic symptoms, almost total incomprehension within social situations, including no language facility, and an inability to interpret gestures or facial expressions (Murphy and Murphy, 1985:61). My response was depression and withdrawal.

My entry into Tongan society held none of these nightmares. I was learning Tongan, I knew Tongans in New Zealand, the family with whom I was to stay lived in a European house and although English was not the language of conversation, one household member was fluent in it. Furthermore, although some of my cultural
practices were seen by my hosts as a little odd, this was seen as consistent with the strange way that most *palangis* (Europeans) were seen to conduct themselves. All members of the household had spent some time in New Zealand and were conversant with some of our cultural norms, including the miserly way in which *palangis* feed their guests.

Unlike in New Zealand, where food is usually served on separate plates for individuals, this Tongan family had a more smorgasbord approach to eating whereby all food was laid out for one to help oneself. A guest's empty plate was perceived as a lack of hospitality by the hosts and consequently my empty plate was constantly refilled well after the time that I was fully satisfied. I quickly learnt the art of chewing my food for incredibly long periods in order to ensure that my preferred quantity of food intake coincided with the finishing time of my hosts, who consistently ate twice as much as I.

(c) Negotiating a role with hosts

Conducting fieldwork in another country with an alien language and culture leaves one feeling that fieldwork is a constant activity. The 8 to 10 hours each day not used in formal social surveying were spent developing a broad ethnography, most of it based on my experiences with my host family.

It is, therefore, important to describe my position within the Tongan family with which I stayed for three months. Without this sustained interaction my success in the field would have been reduced. Apart from some family ties to one of the villages in my survey, the family had no explicit connection with the research.
The basis of my entry into the family as a guest was through a Tongan university friend who was the half sister of the mother of the household. The family lived in Nuku’alofa. They enjoyed an above average standard of living, a result of the husband’s mid-level government job and the fact that for a couple rearing children in the 1950s and 1960s they had defied the Tongan norm and had only three children.

I had been introduced to and had stayed with the family for a period during my three week visit in May 1986. My university friend had accompanied me and had negotiated most of the situations for me during that visit. It was clear that on my return in October, alone, for an extended stay, I had to negotiate my own position.

Reciprocity was a constant problem particularly regarding household costs. I was keen to avoid being a financial burden while not undermining the hospitality of my hosts. Toward the end of my stay it became clear that my fears in relation to contributing to household livelihood were unfounded as the bounds of reciprocity in these situations reach far beyond the immediate relationship or time frame. Evidence of this long term indirect reciprocity has manifested itself on my return to New Zealand, which has included provision of substantial interest free loans to Tongan friends and occasional cash gifts.

A board and lodging type arrangement was clearly an unsavoury approach. A resolution came about part by default and part as a result of my increasing understanding of hospitality and reciprocity in Tonga. This meant that I felt increasingly at ease with the decisions I made in relation to such problems. The best way, it seemed, to make a financial contribution was to make it on a haphazard or seemingly
spontaneous basis. I therefore, for example, purchased varying types and amounts of food throughout my stay. This posed a problem in itself in that whatever I purchased was deemed to be my favourite food. Tinned beef is one of the most frequently consumed meats. I dislike it intensely, but it seemed to be popular, particularly on Sundays in *lu pulu* (beef and coconut milk wrapped in banana leaves and cooked in an *umu* - an earth oven). I usually purchased several tins on each shopping expedition and subsequently found most of my meals contained an element of this New Zealand manufactured emetic.

I was also initially confronted with the stereotypical British breakfast of fried eggs and bacon, toast and baked beans, triple rations at that, and purchased at great expense. It took several weeks to convince my disbelieving Tongan ‘mother’ that I never consumed such breakfasts in New Zealand. Apart from initial problems of that ilk I was able to eat well without seeming to disrupt the family’s usual eating patterns, although I am sure I was favoured in being plied with chicken over *sipi* (mutton flap), imported from New Zealand.

As a male, housework, which included cleaning, washing dishes or clothes, was taboo to me. I was allowed the concession of making my own bed, based on the assumption of my hosts, I suspect, that I did not want anyone in my room. I was allowed to assist in male chores such as putting down an *umu*, carrying crops or feeding animals. Nevertheless I still had to make it clear that I was keen to participate in these activities. I also had the dubious honour of learning how to castrate a bull which, considering my city lifestyle, I thought I handled with reasonable aplomb.
A major problem I had feared early on was that I would be perceived as being rude or unsociable due to my post-tea disappearance into my room to write up field notes. My fears were unfounded, part I think, due to the emphasis most Tongans place on the utility of education. My age in this respect was a definite advantage as I was perceived as a student and in some situations was even chastised for not getting on with my work.

Language was a problem in that the person with whom I had the most contact in the household, the mother, had a level of English proficiency about equal to my Tongan. Our lack of more efficient communication did not inhibit the growth of a friendship, but a potentially huge source of knowledge went begging.

(d) The language barrier and the need for an interpreter

During the early months of 1986, I began weekly Tongan language lessons under the tutelage of a Tongan graduate student, herself preparing for fieldwork in Tonga. My initial intention was to gain a level of proficiency enabling me to conduct my interviews in Tongan. My tutor assured me that all but a few of my respondents would have a high level of proficiency in English. This transpired to be not the case. A three week reconnaissance of Tonga in May 1986, which included informal meetings with Tongan farmers, made it clear that at least four months full time language learning would be necessary in order to grasp an acceptable conversational level. It was also clear that in the rural areas, where most of my respondents resided, the knowledge of English was extremely limited. The employment of an interpreter became imperative (Murphy and Murphy, 1985:63).
There were various minimum pre-requisites of an interpreter. The two most important were that the interpreter have a good grasp of both English and Tongan, and be male. The cultural constraints of having to have a male interpreter, in a highly patriarchal society like Tonga, meant that finding an interpreter was difficult. Most males with a good knowledge of English and a sixth form education would by October, after having left school the previous December, have found employment. This was often in government departments in the booming Tongan bureaucracy.

A school leaver was my first choice as he would be less likely to have decided opinions in relation to some of the questions we would ask. But at the same time he needed to be able to grasp quickly what was expected of him in each situation. An understanding of Tongan custom so as to save me from any major breaches of etiquette was also important. Preferably he would not have any connections to local government departments, which might have an interest in my research; should not have noble rank or be closely related to those of noble rank. This would be likely to lead to the respondents becoming tight lipped, particularly in relation to possible criticism of the nobility or bureaucratic elite, and especially in relation to land access. It was preferable that he not be from any of the four villages in which I was concentrating my research. As a bonus I hoped he would be five stone lighter than the average Tongan male, as he would have to squeeze onto the back of a trail bike with limited seating capacity.

I enlisted the assistance of the headmaster of the prestige high school in the capital, and after five days was introduced to Sione Taufa, a young man of nineteen with a good sixth form record, good English and awaiting entrance to business college.
in America. He was not related to any elite families, and proved to be disarming amongst respondents when we entered the field. He was happy to enter into the relationship of researcher - interpreter on the basis of five pa'anga (about seven New Zealand dollars) for each day he worked, which would not be every day. This payment was only marginally more than wages received by many day labourers in the scheme but Sione rarely worked more than six hours in any one day which was considerably less than most plantation workers. Sione, with the exception of his father, was the smallest Tongan adult male I saw in Tonga in three months.

We spent the first two days translating the questionnaires into Tongan. This served to familiarise Sione with the content and allowed me to explain the general significance of the data being collected. I wanted to emphasise the importance of translating as accurately as possible what the respondent had said, not what Sione thought was appropriate. It also served to help Sione think in two languages, as he had not used English regularly since leaving school nine months previously. Through this exercise I also gained a working knowledge of the questionnaire in Tongan. This allowed Sione and I to work better as a team, and for me to build up rapport with respondents.

The relatively small number of respondents who had limited or partial knowledge of English was problematic. Some insisted they could not speak English, then intercepted questions between my interpreter and myself. This often led to misunderstandings. Others insisted on answering the questions in English, but also asked that the interpreter not be present, to avoid the embarrassment of struggling with English in front of a Tongan fluent in English.
My understanding was mediated by the immediate problem of translation. Those fluent in English were invariably in a higher socio-economic group and were more lucidly able to express their understanding of the situation, to which a monolingual researcher could develop an immediate empathy. The tendency was for non-English speaking respondents to adhere more closely to the format of the schedule while English speakers, once they thought they had grasped the essence of the research were more inclined to be expansive.

Sione and I quickly developed a good working relationship, with Sione always ready to explain anecdotal situations or answer general questions. When not in his strict role as interpreter he served as a guide. As we spent several hours each working day either travelling to or between villages or walking around looking for respondents, my general knowledge of such things as flora and fauna, child care and play practices, work routine, bus timetables, pre-marital courtship, religious rivalry and family genealogies were all extended. This ethnographic data was not formalised. I hardly had time to concentrate on writing up survey data let alone record all the events of the day. Nevertheless much of this contextual information was recorded in one of my journals.

(e) Keeping a journal

In addition to the writing up of specific fieldwork responses I kept four journals, each serving a particular purpose. A chronological journal mapped everyday events and observations, basically, where I was, why I was there, who I was with, how I got to be there and what happened.
Observations were also written straight into what I called my theoretical/abstract/offbeat-ideas journal. Here I recorded possible links or assertions about what I was recording in the field and trying, where possible, to link them back to theoretically guided presuppositions. Writing down these sometimes seemingly absurd ideas down obliged me to work on further lines of enquiry.

A third journal was concerned with the practicalities of my fieldwork method. It contained ideas on how to improve the interview situation and reflections on the methodological problems of the day.

My fourth journal was a personal one which contained my feelings as to how the research was progressing, and how relationships with those whom I came in contact developed. This performed a cathartic role in the same way that a close friend lends support. I would like to think that I did not write this section in any way similar to Malinowski (1967;1978), although, on reflection there are some passages about which I feel some shame:

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You can guarantee that when you are trying to track down a Government official, either to get general information or talk to them specifically they will be one of four possible places: sick, on leave, at a conference overseas, at lunch.

At the time this reflected my increasing exasperation with Tongan officialdom, though it should not be seen as a particularly accurate statement or useful in any social commentary.
Keeping a journal provided me with a sounding board, one usually provided by colleagues in the university setting. In their absence a journal becomes an intellectual companion.

(1) Legitimacy in the field

A deepening debate in the social sciences as to who should be studying what, has meant researchers increasingly have to justify their existence in the field and not just their theoretical and methodological stance.

It is appropriate that an increasing amount of research should be done by indigenous researchers. Nevertheless, outside researchers have something to contribute to knowledge creation. The position of the 'culturally at sea' researcher has one advantage over the indigenous researcher. While the indigene can more specifically concentrate on the research task at hand, rather than, for example, learning the language, he or she may fail to consider factors impinging on the research area which have been internalised to the degree that they are considered irrelevant or remain completely unrecognised. The foreign researcher can more easily attain the aloofness which Hammersly and Atkinson (1983:102) claim is important:

There must always remain some part held back some social and intellectual 'distance'. For it is in the 'space' created by this distance that the analytic work of the ethnographer gets done.

However, the foreign researcher is faced with the danger of seeing everything as relevant and thereby being enveloped by new, interesting but only partially relevant facts.
Two areas of particular interest threatened to sidetrack me. One was the changing patterns of social relations surrounding the movement away from kava consumption in all but ceremonial areas, to the consumption of beer. This had relevance to the study as beer drinking is a much greater drain on household resources than kava consumption, but the peripheral nature of the material meant that the area went predominantly unstudied. The money lending business run by my host also evoked my interest, and its relevance to the increasing cash nature of the society was clear, as well as its link to the increasing tendency for young men to drink beer, requiring relatively large cash sums. This particular area was not systematically followed up either.

There are several aspects of being an outsider that affect one's legitimacy. Most foreign researchers and aid officials are viewed with some skepticism, although my main concern was that I would not look sufficiently important enough to be worth talking to. Using a motorcycle did not seem to reduce my legitimacy as a researcher although I am unsure about the effect of turning up on pushbikes, as we did during the latter half of the research. Using a bicycle in the middle of a tropical summer, cycling long distances even at midday, singled me out as something of an eccentric. The fact that questions related to their source of livelihood meant that my reception was usually positive, possibly due to their initial perception that I was some kind of aid official. Their perception of the scheme as being rather tenuous meant that I sometimes became a focus for pleas to maintain New Zealand's involvement in banana production.

Hammersly and Atkinson (1983:87) see a tendency for ethnographic-type fieldwork to be, if not the domain, then dominated by younger persons, very often
Sharing a lunch of sipi (mutton flaps) and hopa (similar to bananas) with a respondent and one of his sons.
moving towards a higher degree. They posit that the youth of the researcher is often advantageous in adopting the ‘incompetent’ position. Age does influence the data collected and the relationships developed in the collection phase. My rapport with children and young adults, usually in general social interaction, was, I feel, enhanced as a result of my youth. My access to, and researcher - respondent relationship with most of my formal respondents, who were predominantly men 15 to 35 years older than me, did not seem adversely affected by my age, although there is no way to determine what may have been held back from me.

(g) Photography as a legitimate fieldwork activity

Photography in the field can serve varying purposes but can also easily become an end in itself. My use of a high quality miniature 35 mm auto focus served three distinct purposes over the three month period. My initial purpose was to record field situations to aid later analysis and the possible inclusion of plates within the thesis. But the photographing of interview situations or respondents at work often turned into semi-formal portrait sessions for individuals or family groups. Double prints allowed me to return a set to the respondents which served as a quid pro quo as well as providing further access to ask questions, which usually arose out of the initial interview session.

I also quickly assumed the role with my hosts of informal family photographer, once it became clear that I was keen to take photographs and was happy to provide extra prints for anyone who wanted them. I was increasingly called upon by family and neighbours to photograph a wide range of events: someone admiring their breadfruit tree; someone showing off a tapa; children playing in the rain; a group dressed for a
funeral. Photography also served as an entry to some seemingly otherwise closed areas. For example, I was asked to accompany a group of women presenting tapa to the parents of the suitor of a family member and as a result gained an insight into courtship procedures. In this particular case I think it was my sex rather than my outsider status that would have preempted my entry into this social sphere without a camera. However, as an outsider I could be more easily considered asexual.

Conclusion

The manner in which the research has been carried out, with its incorporation of both qualitative and quantitative methods, is a result of the theoretical requirements of the approach discussed in chapter two. The fieldwork experiences are a corollary of the dialectic between theory and method when working within the parameters of the articulation of modes of production.

NOTES

1. Chapter four provides a picture of pre-contact Tongan society and the changes resulting from capitalist penetration. The section draws largely on archival material and historical works both of academics writing contemporary commentaries on history; and on non-academic works, predominantly original narratives of early contact Tonga.

2. Reflexivity calls for an acceptance that the researcher is a part of his or her field of study;

   there is no escape from reliance on common sense knowledge and a common sense methods of investigation. All social research is founded on the human capacity for participant observation (Hammersly and Atkinson, 1983:25).
Reflexivity is an attempt to escape from the opposing twin pillars of positivism and naturalism:

Reflexivity does not rule out the usefulness of quantification, though it does count against the idea, which sometimes seems to underly the practices of quantitative researchers, that only quantitative data constitutes valid knowledge (Hammersly and Atkinson, 1983:235).

3. A major problem in conducting research which takes in both ethnography and social survey is the formal presentation, as Newby (1977:127) states;

Survey and participant observation require two very different styles of authorship: the former is impersonal, formal and hence usually written in the third person, the latter is more informal and impressionistic and thus written in the first person. Academic convention frowns upon a mixing of the two styles, and even literary consistency makes it difficult to switch suddenly into a first person anecdotal style in the middle of the measured presentation of hard data ... As a result of this, the actual selection of data to go into the written up fieldwork may be dictated by such considerations of style or academic etiquette.

4. Rogers (1975:31) contends that the administration by town and district officers is weak, probably due to the administrative districts being arbitrary and not reflecting social groups.
CHAPTER FOUR

TONGAN SOCIAL STRUCTURE: PRE-CONTACT TO PRESENT DAY

The land has always been important in Tonga and increasingly access to land has become the pivot around which social relations revolve. To understand contemporary social relations and the impact of the Banana Rehabilitation Scheme on them, one must understand the historical struggles over land and the changing place and meaning of land for Tongans in their search for a viable livelihood. Unfortunately data regarding the nature of pre-contact Tongan society is largely confined to observations collected by James Cook on his three visits during the 1770s. By definition these are observations of post-contact Tonga, but they offer by far the most comprehensive documentation of a lifestyle which is likely to resemble most closely pre-European Tonga.

Subsistence Production and Distribution

In the mid-seventeenth century Tasman was impressed by the extent and organised nature of cultivation in Tonga and both Cook (1777) and Mariner (Martin,1827) observed dispersed settlement patterns with people residing near to the land under cultivation. The population of Tonga at the time of Cook's visits is unclear. Maude (1965:27) estimates a total population at the end of the eighteenth century of about 30,000 and while there were few villages, there were 'centres' where the chief of
the district and his family and attendants resided. The most important of these was Mu’a on Tongatapu, the home of the king of Tonga, the Tu’i Tonga. Cook reported:

The Island of Tonga-tabu and the skirts of Ea-o-o-we are ... wholly laid out in plantations in which are some of the richest productions of nature. Here are no Towns or Villages, most of the houses are built in the plantations with no other order than conveniency requires, paths leading from one to another and publick lanes which open a free communication to every part of the Island (cited in Bott,1982:15).

According to Cook, although yams and bananas were the most highly cultivated crops^3^, coconuts, breadfruit, taro, sugar cane and sweet potato were also abundant. The main tool for horticultural production was a stick, flattened and sharpened at one end in order to facilitate digging (Maude,1965:34). Seed storage and selection were fostered so as to maintain harvests. The only example of food storage was the occasional storing of breadfruit and yams in pits and special shelters respectively (Rutherford,1977:79). These observations were made in the west of Tongatapu where my own fieldwork was undertaken. Even at that time it was densely populated and by far the most intensively farmed part of Tonga (Bott,1982:15).

Despite the lack of evidence of food storage there was an horticultural surplus produced, much of which was appropriated as tribute by chiefs and the Tu’i Tonga^4^. The Tu’i Tonga was the line of kings which established its authority about 1 000 P.E. and represented the people’s earthly link with divinity. It was to them that Tongans owed allegiance and around the king production and distribution were organised. Early accounts of the monarch-commoner and chiefly-commoner relationship characterise the appropriation of foodstuffs and koloa (valuables or durables) as grossly exploitative. However, as much as ninety per cent of these commodities (particularly of the food
which would not keep) was redistributed. This redistribution was determined by cycles of ceremonies, when huge feasts were held, with food shortages often ensuing in between.

The chiefly hierarchy could then be seen as effective clearing houses for food (Bott, 1982:102). Like all 'middle-men', they took a 'cut', and dictated when, where and to whom the food would be redistributed (Cummins, 1977:76-78). Chiefs could place taboos on certain food items either to conserve produce when crops failed or to accumulate surpluses for ceremonial functions. Gardens were inspected to ensure the adherence of commoners to such directives and taboos (Gifford, 1929:102-107; Maude, 1965:35).

There was an explicit exchange between the upper hierarchy and the commoners (Cummins, 1977:73). The inasi (first fruits) ceremony, was a presentation to the gods, through the Tu'i Tonga. This ensured the gods' favour, particularly in relation to production. The gods could also be appealed to at other times if, for example, recent weather had not been conducive to good crop growth (Gifford, 1929:103-4). The chiefs, then, were brokers between the spiritual power of the Tu'i Tonga and the commoners.

Chiefs also mediated the relationship between craftsmen and commoners, indeed the chief came to be identified more with the product of the craftsmen than the craftsmen themselves. The matapule or mu'a were specialist craftsmen, in canoe building and net making, two crafts central to fishing which, along with horticultural
production, dominated Tongan life. Commoners (tu'a) filled the lower ranked occupations such as cooks and barbers (Cummins, 1977:80).

Struggle For Power: The Tripartite Kingship

The three centuries prior to European contact was characterised by a drawn-out power struggle. This had a major impact on the political structure into which outsiders first penetrated in the late eighteenth century, and the type of social formation that followed. The future influence of missionaries and quasi-colonial institutions upon the political structure, as well as social and productive relations, partially reflected events in this period.

Present social relations in Tonga are a product of the conflation of pre-contact Tongan society and a particular form of imperialist penetration. A central theme here, and throughout this study, is the changing nature of commodity production and the formal social hierarchy. Two factors central to production - land and labour, are pivotal to these changes.

In the late fifteenth century, the twenty fourth Tu'i Tonga passed secular and governmental authority to his brother who became the Tu'i Ha'atakalaua. The Tu'i Tonga remained the nominal king and retained spiritual paramountcy, but he was the last of his line to maintain direct and absolute rule over the land. The central power of the Tu'i Tonga was further weakened in the early seventeenth century when the sixth
Tu'i Ha'atakalaua shared his powers with his son, who became the Tu'i Kanokupolu. The Tu'i Kanokupolu rapidly usurped the power of the Tu'i Ha'atakalaua.

The struggles within this tripartite kingship were in essence a struggle over symbolic and productive power. The main role of the Tu'i Kanokupolu, beyond his power base in Western Tongatapu where his power was nearly absolute, was the supervision of the production and accumulation of first fruits in tribute for presentation to the Tu'i Tonga (Maude 1965:31). The latter probably assumed that, by subdividing his power base into the two spheres of symbolic and productive power, his symbolic power would remain supreme. This did not eventuate.

The Tu'i Kanokupolu came to dominate the organisation of production which became central to the preservation of the power of the Tu'i Tonga. Much of the Tu'i Tonga's power became mediated by the Tu'i Kanokupolu (Bott, 1982). By the 1770s, when Cook was in Tonga, the Tu'i Kanokupolu posed a direct threat to the Tu'i Tonga. During this period the power of the Tu'i Tonga became further undermined with the development of commodity production. This entrenched the power of the Tu'i Kanokupolu and inroads by Christianity broke the Tu'i Tonga's previous monopoly over the supernatural.
Tonga was divided into several districts within which chiefs had wide autocratic powers over land and subjects. The land was traditionally bestowed by the Tu'i Tonga upon the chiefs, and from this the chiefs allotted tracts to the matapule (Maude, 1971:108; Morton 1972:50), who were usually heads of lineages (fa'ahinga). A group of fa'ahinga came under the authority of a chief, whose own fa'ahinga was the highest ranking of the group. Chiefs considering themselves to be descended from a common ancestor formed a ha'a (Maude, 1965:95-121, 1971:106-125).

In eighteenth century Tonga the hierarchy of power flowed from the king to chiefs who held authority in particular geographical areas. Chiefs usually did no horticultural work. Their extensive gardens were tended by other household members and, when needed, non-familial labour. This was labour supplied by commoners who predominated in horticultural production.

The mu'a and the matapule were assistants to the chiefs. The mu'a played a central role in ceremony and also acted as the chief's spokesman. The matapule performed similar roles but were of lower status as their parents were not both of chiefly and matapule rank. The majority of the population wereuntitled and known as tu'a (commoner). Slaves were of two types: hopoate were those taken as prisoners in war and popula were those being punished by the chief through enslavement (Cummins, 1977:68). They were limited in number and were often treated little differently from the tu'a (Bott, 1982:101-102).
The life of the commoner was oriented around food production and was reflected in the basic household unit, the *api*, within which most production and consumption was oriented. The *api* commonly consisted of a married couple, their children (unmarried), married sons and their families and a few other relatives. Descent was patrilineal. It was normal for sons to inherit the use of lands used by their fathers although chiefs had the power to disposess any one at any time (Gifford,1929:174-175). Women's rights to land were not clearly defined, usually only widows held any land.

Usage rights to subsistence necessities such as land and labour were allocated according to rank determined largely by kinship. Chiefly women could direct the labour of non-chiefly women in the same manner as chiefs could direct that of non-chiefly men. The degree to which chiefly men could direct non-chiefly female labour is unclear, except in the case of demands for sexual services (Gailey,1980:301).

The sexual division of labour was complex. Men's work was considered *ngaue* (work) while women's produce was considered *koloa* (durables or valuables). This division was to be significantly affected by later capitalist penetration and increasing commodification. Men performed most agricultural activities. Women usually produced mats, coconut oil (used as a lotion and for lighting), baskets, and *tapa* (cloth). The two types of work operated in separate spheres of exchange. Men carried out the low status role of cooking (West,1865:267) while house construction and child care were shared roles.

The complex system of deference and authority ensured that prior to contact there was no clear gender hierarchy. Furthermore the status of females vis-a-vis certain
male relatives ensured that no woman was totally reliant upon her husband (Gailey, 1980:304). Tongan women had widespread social authority over men as sisters, being able to make special demands upon her brothers (Gailey, 1980:299). Women could also activate the fahu (unlimited authority) relationship, in which mothers’ brothers paid obeisance to sisters’ children (Gifford, 1929:22-26; Kaeppler, 1971:188; Latukefu, 1974:3; Marcus, 1974:89; Rogers, 1977:157-182)6.

Fatonga refers to the exactions in the form of labour and produce which were the right of the chiefs and Tu‘i Tonga over the common people. This was both evidence and a reaffirmation of that power base on which they relied to control labour directly and appropriate surplus produce (Cummins, 1977:78-79).

It may have been that the Tu‘i Tonga was the nominal land holder and the chiefs the owners, although the use of the term ownership is misleading as it implies an absolute control, when Tongan philosophy towards land was based more upon control through use (Maude, 1965:32). Gifford (1929:174-75) contends that once the land is granted to a chief, matapule or commoner it resides permanently with the family of that holder. This is consistent with popular feeling in contemporary Tonga that any new allotments created by subdividing old holdings should be allocated to relatives of the previous landholder.

The power of individual chiefs was considerably greater than in most Polynesian societies:

Tongan chiefs had a very considerable degree of power over their subjects. Provided they fulfilled their obligations to their king, they were
supreme in their own territory. They did not have to account to any higher authority for the way they ruled their subjects ... The lives of subjects were at the chief's disposal. All the produce of the land belonged to the chief. Although the chief's power over his kainga was extensive, he depended on them to provide food so that he could fulfil his obligations to the king and to his relatives, and he was bound by custom as well as by prudence to be generous to his kainga in sharing out any provisions he received from outsiders. Hoarding was not practicable with food as a major form of wealth that soon went rotten if not shared (Bott, 1982:160).

Despite Cook's contention that chiefs were indifferent to their subjects' welfare, they clearly had social obligations and responsibilities. Tongans themselves saw money as destructive of the communality of Tongan society. As a Tongan in the early nineteenth century commented:

certainly money is much handier, and more convenient, but then, as it will not spoil by being kept, people will store it up, instead of sharing it out, as a chief ought to do and thus become selfish, whereas, if provisions were the principal property of a man, and it ought to be, as being the most useful and most necessary, he could not store it up, for it would spoil, and he would be obliged either to exchange it away for something else useful, or share it out to his neighbours, and inferior chiefs and dependents for nothing ... I understand now very well what it is that makes the Papalangis so selfish - it is this money (Bott, 1982:102).

There does not appear to have been rigid boundaries defining the forces of production. Strategic resource access was 'preferential' rather than 'exclusive' (Sahlins, 1972:92-99), and while ranking was defined by heredity, ranking only entailed differential privileges, a greater call on resources, rather than ownership. Tongan society, then, was not egalitarian, even before European contact, but the relations of production were still kinship dominated (Gailey, 1980:298).

The nature of this kin-oriented system whereby the western distinction between the economic and social is not discernable was clearly in a state of transition prior to and during early contact. As a result of European penetration, social and economic
relations became increasingly dominated by Tongans who could most immediately accommodate themselves to powerful new influences. The present dynasty was created by Taufa'ahau Tupou I in the mid-nineteenth century through a manipulation of the penetrating European system and the incumbent traditional one. Economic and social relations in Tonga, illustrated in this thesis through reference to the Banana Rehabilitation Scheme, are partly a legacy of Tupou I’s internal power struggle. On achieving victory he consolidated his power through a conflation of tradition and new structures.

Increasing Penetration, Centralisation and Commodification

At the end of the eighteenth century Tonga was in a state of civil war (Wood, 1945:29-54). The tripartite kingship had collapsed under pressure from the increasing power of the Tu'ii Kanokupolu in relation to the Tu'ii Tonga. Fighting continued sporadically for two generations. Taufa'ahau, who eventually founded the modern state of Tonga and called himself George I, began to gain ascendancy in the 1820s. He took over as ruler of Ha'apai from his father, became ruler of the northern island group of Vava'u in 1833 and became Tu'ii Kanokupolu in 1845. This title was contested by chiefs on Tongatapu until Taufa'ahau’s major military victory in 1852 (Maude, 1965:36). It was this victory which allowed the centralisation of Tonga into a nation state modelled along European lines. The resources which the king relied upon to extend his power derived from an increasingly entrenched system of commodity production and exchange.
(a) Early trade and missionary influence

Increasing trade with visiting ships, an embryonic commercial centre on Tongatapu, and the growing influence of missionaries were major catalysts in the political centralisation of Tonga (Gailey, 1987:68). The earliest recorded European residents were beachcombers, convicts from New South Wales, who held a privileged position in Tongan society until the arrival in 1797 of members of the London Missionary Society and eventual entrenchment by 1826 of the first Methodist missionaries. Intense rivalry between the two groups ensued. Ironically it was a beachcomber, Samuel Blackmore, who was the first to teach Tongans about Christianity (Gunson, 1977:106). It was some time after the first attempted inroads of the missionaries that Taufa'ahau became the first chiefly leader to accept the new religion in 1828 (Gailey, 1980:312). The alliance between Taufa'ahau and the Wesleyan Methodists served to further alienate the increasingly marginalised *Tui Tonga*.

(b) Expanding trade networks

Rivalry between chiefs for spheres of influence also intensified. All chiefs had access to firearms through both trade and plunder but, with the support of the Wesleyans, Taufa'ahau began to receive regular supplies of firearms through reliable trade networks. Roman Catholic missionaries arrived in 1842, and many of the alienated chiefs became Catholics, signifying the coalescence of denominational and factional rivalry (Gailey, 1980:312; Rutherford, 1971:10).
To facilitate access to firearms Tongans were increasingly oriented toward commodity production. The early trade of provisions in return for iron goods and curios between Europeans and Tongans became regularised in the early nineteenth century. It gave Tongans access to horticultural tools and their demand for these further facilitated and encouraged commodity production. The impact of new technology was not confined to productivity increases, but extended the changing nature of social relationships that are embodied within production (Murphy and Murphy, 1985:41-42).

Trade was not a phenomenon confined to western contacts. Barter trade within Tonga and with neighbouring islands had been important for many years. Tonga acquired ocean-going canoes, pottery and adornments from Fiji, the main partner (Cummins, 1977:80; Sharp, 1964:27-29). Tonga was also an entrepot. Its considerable trade with Samoa included retraded articles previously bartered from Fiji. Nor was trade confined to commodities, Tongan warriors served as mercenaries in other island groups (Martin, 1827).

The combined influence of the missions and the expanding trade network meant that Christian chiefs, who had become increasingly involved in the production of commodities, were supplied with firearms, with which to wage a Christian war against still pagan chiefs. By 1865 Tonga had been united by warfare into a centralised state under the leadership of the Methodist Taufa'ahau, who, with the help of his chiefly supporters, began to re-orient the basis of land rights to land and labour.
In 1839 Taufa'ahau had developed a code of law for Vava'u (see Latukefu, 1974:221-225), a regional attempt to reinforce his own power base and limit the power of the chiefs. He clearly defined the limits of chiefly power and directed them to provide land to commoners for their own use.

In 1850 the king prohibited the sale of land to foreigners and in 1872 extended this prohibition to the sale of land per se. This reinforced the powerful position of Taufa'ahau not only relative to chiefs but to missionaries and traders. The Emancipation Act of 1862 set out legally to dismantle some of the traditional exchanges between the chiefs and commoners. The chiefs were no longer permitted to demand goods and labour arbitrarily. They required then, another source of livelihood.

The chief's income then was to be derived from a poll tax of three dollars on all men over sixteen years. These men in turn were able to claim land provided they paid an annual rental of two shillings to the chief (Marcus, 1978a:509; Rutherford, 1971:19). This action served a number of purposes. It increased the chiefly hierarchy's reliance upon the central state, and drew commoners in to a system of commodity production which provided the state with revenue.

Latukefu's (1974:162) contention that the dismantling of traditional exchange and the establishment of commoners' rights to land was partially inspired by the king's visit to Sydney where he was impressed with the leasehold system but appalled by the poverty through landlessness, is dubious. Particularly given that subsistence needs of
all Tongans had, in general, always been met in the past. It is more probable that the king’s main reason for these changes was first to finance the consolidation of his central state through taxation, and second to provide a source of revenue to pension off his newly created nobility (Rutherford, 1971:20).

The 1875 constitution granted tofi’a (estates) to a certain number of chiefs (Maude, 1965:98). These included not only those who had backed Taufa‘ahau’s rise to power but also his most powerful and high ranking opponents. The latter, thus, were given a vested interest in maintaining the power of central government. Otherwise the constitution added very little to the legal structure introduced in the Emancipation Act of 1862. Moreover it was not until 1882 that estates granted to former chiefs, now entitled nobles, were universally recognised as hereditary and executive positions in government were widely conferred upon them.

Initially thirty chiefs and six matapules were appointed as hereditary landlords (nobles) of estates. All men over the age of sixteen were eligible for a garden allotment of eight and a quarter acres and a town allotment of approximately two fifths of an acre, these were to be granted to them by the noble of the estate on which they lived (Marcus, 1978b:12-13).

The system of central government was set by 1875. The ‘Parliamentary Monarchy’ (Marcus, 1978a), had cabinet ministers, selected by an executive, with a Privy Council made up of the personal appointees of the monarch. The King’s Council, traditionally the king’s advisory board, was converted into a legislative assembly made
up of both elected nobility and elected representatives of the people. Power, however, effectively remained concentrated in the monarchy rather than parliament.

The king had effectively reduced the power of the chiefs, and set out to assure his control through the control of the labour of commoners in order to boost state coffers. This was the period after the initial drive for centralisation. The king had used commodification effectively to gain power, it could now be used to consolidate his dynasty.

The king demanded by law in the mid 1860s that every household should plant twenty coffee bushes and two hundred cotton plants, in an attempt to extend commodity production and expand potential sources of state revenue. This achieved, Tongans had to be forced to pick the produce, which was done so carelessly that the crop was rarely of export quality. Further repressive legislation in the 1880s, inspired by Baker, the king's missionary advisor, failed to entrench coffee and cotton production.

This failure to direct labour into commodity production contributed, along with the laws that circumscribed land leases and outlawed sales, to the limited expansion of European plantations in Tonga. About 1 000 acres was under European production by the mid 1880s. Obtaining land for leasing was difficult and although overwhelmingly horticulturalists, Tongans showed little enthusiasm for horticultural work other than for their own subsistence and cash needs (Maude, 1965:34-40). Through methods described above and below the need for cash expanded and soon domination of Tongan society by cash exchange is clear.
The land tenure system evolved over a period of about twenty years, during a period of struggle between the king, who endeavoured to set up a central state with himself as the head, and the chiefs who jealously guarded their power. This was then a transitional stage with traditional forms of authority being challenged by new constitutional authority.

Commodification and Changing Labour Relations

The subsistence orientation of the eighteenth century was being undermined by the early nineteenth century and the demands on commoner labour both increased and changed in nature. Coconut oil had become the first regularly exported commodity in the mid-1840s, with approximately 700 tons of oil valued at nearly 15 000 pounds exported in 1866. In about 1869 the major trading firm of Godeffroy and Son began purchasing copra in preference to oil. This was the result of a recently perfected technique for oil extraction from dried coconut kernels (copra) which meant that the actual extraction of the oil was carried out in Hamburg (Gailey, 1987:71-72; Rutherford, 1971:35). Tongans' opportunity to add value to the primary product was therefore curtailed, and their labour devalued. By the mid 1870s coconut oil was almost totally replaced by copra production. This and other coconut products have dominated Tongan exports ever since.

The king's advisor, the Wesleyan missionary Shirley Baker, collaborated with Godeffroy and Sons in order to convert church tithes, then in coconut oil and copra, into cash to finance Tongan and overseas mission work (Rutherford, 1971:28-35). The
The success of church demands for donations was a result of the close alliance between church and state (Rutherford, 1971:39). Less than wholehearted support for the church could be seen as a lack of faith (Rutherford, 1971:34) and potentially subversive in relation to the state (Gailey, 1987:72). Those who were frugal in tithing were, then as today, publicly humiliated.

Commodification and the construction of a strong central state were mutually dependent:

In Tonga, the state claimed the land; use-rights to land, labour and products became determined by one's relationship to the state, the nobility, foreign and indigenous merchants, missionary advisors and other administrators. For direct producers, use-rights became mediated through demand for tribute in the form of tax-rents and church donations (Gailey, 1987:75).

Increased commodity production was encouraged through political repression, church tithes, which had a clear state connection, taxation, and the mission-inspired redefining of customary behaviour which made certain practices such as breaking the sabbath, wearing traditional clothes, swimming, or making tapa, illegal. Transgressors were punished through fines in cash or demands for labour directed towards commodity production (Gailey, 1987:75). The imposition of import tariffs were a further attempt to augment state income (Bollard, 1974:32). All of these actions served at the same time to reinforce the administrative and fiscal power of the state, and to entrench the autocratic leadership of Tupou I.

As commodity trade expanded the demand on non-chiefly people's labour increased. Chiefs directed commoners into a new division of labour which had a
profound effect on the exclusive nature of men's and women's production and exchange. The value of women's work, for example, *tapa* was particularly damaged by European produce. On the other hand, the demand for coconut oil, which had been traditionally considered *koloa* and therefore women's work, meant that chiefly demands on non-chiefly women's labour increased (Ledyard, 1956:202). The change in demand from oil to copra, a men's product, in the 1870s, eased the demands on non-chiefly women's labour. This was associated with a decline in women's economic power. Their position further deteriorated with the introduction of cotton products and the outlawing of *tapa* production in 1875 (Scarr, 1967:86-87).

The outlawing of *tapa* production was inspired by the desire to facilitate further trade and impose western standards of dress. It also served to give men power over women's access to cloth. The cash needed for purchasing cloth derived from copra production which was controlled by men. Women were relegated to an auxiliary role in copra production, which allowed their labour to be used, but alienated them from the control of both the product and the income derived from it. A distinct parallel can be seen between this and women's roles in banana production today. Missionary zeal extended to the outlawing of the *fahu*, which effectively eliminated a woman's autonomy in relation to her husband, changing social deference behaviour into structural and economic dependence (Gailey, 1980:315-318; Home, 1929).

In order to pay tax and rent to maintain land rights, commoners increasingly engaged in labour for commodity production. Copra was most important and increasing demands were placed upon households for men's labour. This altered the sexual division of labour and women progressively took over domestic and cooking
roles reinforced by missionary insistence that such tasks were God-given women's roles (Gailey, 1987:72). This did not mean that women were exempted from horticultural work (Thomson, 1968:373), simply their control over its end product was curtailed.

Tongan society's contemporary social structure continues to be oriented around noble land control and a cash-subsistence orientation. This is a legacy of the mid to late nineteenth century increase in commodity production brought about by penetration, and used by Taufa'ahau to create and reinforce his dynasty. Within this dynasty social relations have become increasingly influenced by commodity production.

The final decade of Tupou I's rule was highlighted by problems emanating from the premiership of Shirley Baker, including allegations of unconstitutional and despotic leadership, as well as financial misdealings. Baker was deported in 1890, leaving Tonga in some disarray. In 1891 the British sent Basil Thomson, a civil servant resident in Fiji, to codify laws and to reorder finances.

Tupou I died in 1893, with the financial and constitutional autonomy of Tonga seemingly secure. Under Tupou II Tonga became increasingly integrated into the world political and economic system (Marcus, 1981:51). The British imposed a 'Treaty of Friendship' in 1900 in order to give them some power to influence internal policy and to ensure that no other imperial nation annexed Tonga. British influence was further increased in 1905 when the British agent and consul was given power to vet public service appointments and expenditure. Consular control diminished steadily after 1905, punctuated, as Lavaka (1981:142-163) points out, with bouts of intervention. A new
Women beating tapa. By the twentieth century cotton was entrenched as a commodity. Since then tapa has been used for ceremonials (n.d. circa., early twentieth century).
Source: U.S.S co-donation, Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington, N.Z.

Group outside house. Note the predominance of cotton clothing (n.d. circa., early twentieth century).
Source: Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington, N.Z.
View of the Friendly Islands.
Engraving by T. Baschke of a native village and surrounds, Tongatapu 1793.
Source: Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington, N.Z.

George Thabou on his way to open Parliament, Nukualofa, Tonga.

Symbols of a centralised state displayed for N.Z. Prime Minister Richard J. Seddon (1900).
Photograph by F. Sears.
Source: Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington, N.Z.
'Treaty of Friendship' was signed in 1958 giving Tonga increased independence, followed by full independence in 1970.

Social and economic institutions, introduced under Tupou I, became entrenched with the land laws engendering increased individualisation which meant a growing emphasis on the household rather than the extended unit (kainga). For most Tongans the cash sphere and concomitant commodity production were not central to their lifestyle. Indeed Bollard (1974) sees Tongans during this period as receding from the cash sphere. Furthermore the role of the church and the state diminished. In the post-Baker era the church did not have the same monetising influence (Bollard, 1974:43). Under Tupou II there was major discontent about high taxation and widespread evasion followed. Fluctuating export prices for copra also encouraged many Tongans to return to a more subsistence oriented lifestyle.

Demands for labour, as a result of fluctuations in the level of cash cropping have varied since contact. Under Tupou I, chiefly demands on non-chiefly labour increased, while under Tupou II and Salote, household demand for labour decreased. Since the post World War II leadership of Tupou IV a resurgence of labour input into cash crop production has been evident. The copra boom of the 1950s (Maude, 1965:42-45) was central to this increased production because it constituted the first period in which commoners achieved widespread access to luxury consumer items such as bicycles and sewing machines. The increased availability of consumer goods reinvigorated monetisation and initiated rapid rural-urban migration, particularly to the primate city of Nuku'alofa, which now contains about one third of Tonga's total population.
The Present System of Land Allocation

Legal changes in 1891 were meant to introduce central government responsibility for land allocation. It did not have this effect. In 1915 nobles were once again given consultancy rights before the lands minister granted land, the noble then had an effective veto on land allocation (Tongilava, 1984:7). The nobles' main instrument of power over his villagers was then, and continues to be, his prerogative in distributing the parcels of land which have become increasingly scarce.

The present system is grounded in the 1927 Lands Act (Thaman, 1975:113-114; Maude, 1965:96). This served to systematise the organisation of land tenure generated half a century earlier by clarifying categories of tenure. These were established as hereditary estates of the nobles and matapules, hereditary estates of the king, hereditary estates held jointly by the royal family, government or crown land.

Land for subdivision into agricultural allotments were in the first and last categories. Most commoners resided upon noble estates and therefore sought assistance from them in relation to land dealings, those on government land could deal directly with the state.

Although inalienable rights to land were presented as ensuring that commoners had the means to produce a subsistence living there has been a growing group of landless commoners. However, access to subsistence prior to the Second World War was rarely a contested issue as the pressures on land were not great and informal
access was easy and widespread. Commoners did not actively seek land in large numbers, as their subsistence and minor cash requirements could be met under the customary system of land holding.

Since 1945 land has become increasingly sought after, particularly in its registered form, as Tongans search for ways in which to meet their subsistence and cash requirements. Those who have either maintained or achieved access to land over this period have been able to entrench their position. Those without land are reduced to wage labour or unemployment. The period of commodification initiated in the early nineteenth century and reinvigorated in the post World War II era, has ensured that the lives of Tongans today are cash oriented. Land is no longer used by Tongans mainly as a source of subsistence livelihood. The land has to provide income for purchase of manufactures and major annual expenditures such as school fees. Whereas land distribution used to be partly on the basis of subsistence needs, the increasing cash demands of Tongans mean that those without structural access to land have very little chance of acquiring any. The contemporary position of land holding and its role in social relations is addressed in chapter five.

NOTES

1. Recorded oral traditions history are concerned mainly with the non-material aspects of Tongan culture (Rutherford, 1977:8).

2. Only three visits by other explorers were documented in relation to Tonga in the two centuries preceding Cook's visits, all of them being short term. The recollections of William Mariner, who spent four years in Tonga in the early nineteenth century, after the ship he was on was captured and the crew murdered, supplements Cook's data, as does the narrative based on the recollections of the renegade missionary George Vason.
3. This is unlikely. As a food bananas have never been rated highly by Tongans.

4. At various times the Tu'i Tonga also had the power to compel payment of tribute from Samoa, Niue, Rotuma and Futuna (Maude, 1965:24).

5. Cook was unsure as to their relative positions to the extent that he did not know to whom he should pay the most respect (Bott, 1982:18). The separation of sacred and secular leadership was not alien to Cook, as England had its king or queen and its Archbishop. His visit was however during a major power struggle.

6. The relationship is also manifested between brother's children and father's sisters. In most cases this was restricted to the chiefly classes.

7. This explanation partly resorts to a technologism. It was not purely the tendency of food to rot which made chiefs redistribute it. There was no necessity to harvest any surplus, or it could have been destroyed in a potlatch-type ceremony. Redistribution effectively bartered food for status and influence.

8. Pre-contact Polynesia, including Tonga, has been variously labelled as a feudal, a lineage, and even a Pacific mode of production (Thaman, 1975:112). Such a proliferation of conceptions denigrates the utility of the concept of mode of production itself by giving every society a unique and specific label (Worsley, 1984:30-31). Some have rejected attempts to differentiate between non-capitalist societies and have simply employed 'non-capitalism' as a generic term. Such a term tells us little but at least is not as ethnocentrically predictive as the label 'pre-capitalist'. Too often specific labels have been attached to societies about which there is not enough empirical data to make their use appropriate. Non-capitalist at least avoids this by its generalised nature.

Defining societies as 'kinship based' grew out of an attempt to describe what societies were, not what they were not, that is, 'classless' or 'stateless'. The extent of kin ties varies from society to society, with some anthropologists arguing that place of residence, a concrete reality, rather than lineage or kinship, abstract realities, should be the starting point for analysis (Leach, 1961:104). Wolf attempts to combine the diversity of kinship definitions into an operational view, allowing it to be seen in the context of political economy;

through kinship social labour is "locked up", or "embedded", in particular relations between people. This labour can be mobilized only through access to people, such access being defined symbolically. What is done unlocks social labour, how it is done involves symbolic definitions of kinsmen and affines (1982:91).
9. The movement from merchant capital to capitalism was delayed in Tonga. Tropical plantations, which were the vanguard of capitalism in so many colonies could not gain a foothold.

10. These tariffs remain one of the main income sources for central government coffers today, and help explain why government is more concerned to follow a policy which encourages cash crop exports to finance imports, rather than import substitution through greater reliance on products grown or made in Tonga.
CHAPTER FIVE

THE CONTEMPORARY CENTRALITY OF LAND.

Most Tongans rely on horticulture for their survival. Almost 50% of household heads derive their main income from farming, under 24% from the tertiary sector (professional, technical, administration, managerial, clerical, sales, service). Only 15% gain their main income from manufacturing, transport or labouring (New Zealand and Tongan Statistics Departments, 1984:table 9). Tongan export earnings are almost entirely derived from the sale of horticultural products, in particular coconut products such as copra and desiccated coconut. Land, then, is of central importance to Tongans as individuals and for Tonga as a nation.

About half of the total land area of the kingdom is planted with coconuts and about 85% of all other crops are grown under them (Baker, 1977:237). Coconut products have consistently accounted for more than three quarters of the value of total exports since the mid-nineteenth century. From early this century bananas have been the second major export crop. In the late 1960s vegetables, such as tomatoes, popular in more temperate climes, were established to meet off-season demands in New Zealand. Vanilla, presently experiencing a boom, looks set to become Tonga's second export crop after coconuts.

Almost total reliance upon the export of primary produce, in the form of one or two tropical commodities, places Tonga in the same position as many other Third World producers. Tonga is a price-taker on an unstable world commodity market and has little
opportunity of moving into more lucrative export alternatives. This is the legacy of colonialism. Although Tonga was never actually formally colonised it became enmeshed in the interests of the two leading colonial powers in the Pacific, Germany and Britain and, as we have seen, was drawn into a world economic system through the activities of the missionaries and traders.

Because of the variety of income sources upon which Tongan households draw it is difficult to calculate the exact degree to which individual households rely on horticultural production. The primacy of horticultural production in people’s existence is clear, however. Tongan households continue to be strongly oriented towards a cash-subsistence system in which horticultural production is relied upon for essential food and to meet immediate cash needs. Many households are involved in the local sale of surplus production such as *ufi* (yam), *kumala* (sweet potato), and *manioke* (cassava). These crops are also sent to friends and relatives overseas in exchange for cash remittances. Bananas and vanilla, two major exports, have not been historically important as subsistence crops. Coconuts were widely used as a subsistence crop before they became a major export crop, but they were not a staple (Farrel, 1972:51; Oliver, 1975:198; Ralston, 1977:18).

The livelihood of most Tongans is then intimately tied to the land. It is the basis of not merely their immediate subsistence but their cash transactions. Consequently land distribution is fundamental to the organisation of social relations in Tonga.
Contemporary Land Distribution

According to the constitution all Tongan males have access to just over eight acres of land. It is upon these constitutional rights of access that the Banana Rehabilitation Scheme is predicated. These rights made it appear that aid investment into a horticultural scheme would benefit a large number of Tongans. Unfortunately the scheme's administrators failed to recognise the reality of the distribution of land in Tonga. Much of the population is excluded from land access in Tonga.

About one third of eligible Tongan males have been able to lay claim to their legally defined quota of land. The 1976 census shows that 23,986 males over the age of sixteen were eligible to apply for tax allotments. Of that number only 8,430 (35%) had any land, of this 35%, however, a large number had considerably less than eight acres (Tongan Statistics Department:269). The prospects for land acquisition for many of the contemporary landless, particularly when the household to which they belong is also landless, is bleak.

The principle of universal male landholding still stands, however, and continues to create misconceived expectations within aid agencies. The New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs still appear to believe that universal male landholding is a reality, or at least a realistic expectation. The full extent of landless households is unknown, but taking into consideration the limited availability of allotments and the fact that some individuals and households have multiple holdings, landlessness must be widespread. Maude (1973:163-185) collated a number of village studies carried out in the 1950s and
The api uta (bush allotment) remains a major source of cash and subsistence livelihood for many Tongans.

60s to give some idea as to the extent of landlessness, both for individual taxpayers and for each household (Table 5.1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Village</th>
<th>Persons/ km²</th>
<th>0.</th>
<th>0.5-</th>
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<td>Ha'akame</td>
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<td>Nukunuku</td>
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<td>1960</td>
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<td>Ha'ateiho</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nioutoua</td>
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<td>31</td>
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<td>82</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

H = percentage of households
T = percentage of taxpayers

Source: Maude, 1973:173

It is not only population density which determines the extent of landlessness. In the villages of Nukunuku (also part of my fieldwork), Ha'akame and Ha'ateiho where the population density is below 150 per square kilometre, the extent of landlessness is higher than in villages with a higher population density and where landlessness is lower. A more equitable distribution of smaller holdings facilitates greater access to subsistence production, while larger holdings undermine this. Of course it benefits those with large tracts of land because they can pursue greater cash crop production.
In Nukunuku 30% of households and 51% of taxpayers (legally entitled to land) were landless in 1960. Population growth means this figure will now be higher. It may have been, as Maude (1973) suggested, that although landlessness amongst both individual taxpayers and households was high, borrowing land was relatively easy. This is now less likely to be the case.

The critical nature of landlessness and the evident inability of the Tongan social system to balance out landholding inequalities was illustrated by Maude (1973:173-174). In his four village survey it was shown that the per capita income of households without land was half that of households with full sized allotments.

There is a struggle going on for available land particularly on Tongatapu. At the centre of this struggle is the nobility, the most important gatekeeper in mediating a person's access to land. Immigrants from outer islands almost invariably have problems getting land, except in rare circumstances where they have large cash sums available, simply because they do not have the associations with Tongatapu-based nobles to facilitate access to land.

This growing landless population has few official connections, limited capital and very often few kin ties on Tongatapu. Many, but not all of the landless are migrants from other islands. One grower who had moved from the northern islands of Vava'u had acquired land for his plantation by borrowing it from his wife's father's sister. He was, however, concerned about how hard it was for those from islands other than Tongatapu to get land on Tongatapu:
I never got land on Vava'u and it is hard for people from Vava'u to get land on Tongatapu (Viliami, Petit Bourgeois - Grower, 1986)[Names are pseudonyms].

Nepotistic ties, however, do not guarantee a person's success in applying for land. One banana grower, who had noble kin had endeavoured to get that noble to agree to provide him with some land, but

he didn't listen, he wants lots of money. I went two years ago and he said there was not enough land, but I know he wants the money (Peni, Petty Commodity Producer - Grower, 1986).

Another grower, using borrowed land on the Tu'i Vakano estate had unsuccessfully tried to get a registered allotment from the noble Tu'i Vakano. He was, however, not unduly concerned, as he was related to a neighbouring noble from whom he was sure he could obtain land as soon as the noble returned from a long visit to Australia;

when he comes back I will take a carton of beer to his place and drink with him until he promises to give me some land... You can do this when you are a relative and you don't pay a thing (Fallisi, Petit Bourgeois - Grower, 1986).

There is also a residual category of people who are able to use a number of strategies to obtain access to land, temporarily or permanently. For example, the oldest son from a landholding family may inherit his father's plot. Frequently, however, the land is subdivided amongst siblings. This is usually the only way that a younger son can acquire land without large cash payments to the nobility. Often heirs temporarily forgo their rights to land in order to pursue other opportunities, particularly the option of emigration. One cash-subsistence grower meeting with major success in his banana export endeavours was the youngest boy from a large family;
none of my brothers want to live in Tonga and grow crops like bananas, so I can keep it ... My father will let me keep the land as my older brothers don't want it (Taniela, Petty Commodity Producer - Grower, 1986).

Cash subsistence growers often want to expand into wider production of cash crops, but are restricted due to lack of capital. This category usually has subsistence security but very often cannot find routes to meet their expanding material aspirations.

A third, smaller category has capital, both material and cultural, thereby commanding both important connections and financial resources to gain access to land. Very often such people have major access to land through an elite network. If land, however, cannot be obtained gratis, capital is usually available to facilitate leasing. One elite grower with major sources of local income as well as overseas investments had no trouble obtaining land in order to experiment with banana production. An uncle with large tracts of land in fallow was quite happy to lend, without cash payment, a good plantation-sized area, for an indefinite period:

Nobody was using it and nobody wanted it so I suppose we can have it for as long as we like (Atu, Bourgeois - Grower, 1986).

In contrast, the cost of obtaining land has cut out most of the landless poor from access to it as they require the land predominantly for subsistence rather than commercial production. One grower with a small allotment recognised the plight of many landless Tongans but was at a loss as to what could be done;

some people have 60 acres and it is all in weeds, and someone who really wants to grow crops has no land. But the law says you cannot take that land, you must ask the owner (Peni, Petty Commodity Producer - Grower, 1986).
Despite constitutional rights, land tenure within contemporary Tonga is characterised by the inequitable distribution of arable land. The advantaged position of the nobility has been preserved through entrenched traditional controls over land while the emergence of a new economic elite has been partially facilitated by their ability to access land.

Before 1957 only government estates were divided into plots for allocation. This had a limited affect because 60% of the population actually resided on noble estates (Maude, 1971:114). By 1962 most of Tonga, both government and noble estates, had been surveyed and subdivided for the purpose of allocating and registering predominantly eight acre plots. By 1966 the majority of the allotments had been allocated. With pre-existing customary holdings usually being retained, most allotments went to the sons of the old customary landholders.

Those who had traditionally relied upon kin for access to land made up the legally landless. That is, under the new land laws, individual access became more clearly defined, therefore those who did not have customary tenure found themselves disadvantaged under the individual system of land registration. Even prior to contact the system of distribution based on kin ranking meant that lower ranked individuals were often reliant on more senior kin to provide access to land for their subsistence needs.

With increasing commodification and the increasingly individualised nature of land tenure, the willingness of landholders to provide land for subsistence production by their own kin has decreased. Where land is provided tenure is often insecure. The possibility of high cash returns on holdings through commercial production has meant
that the traditionally landless, previously assisted by kin when land was plentiful were now clearly landless.

The limited monetisation of the pre-World War II Tongan economy impeded the individualisation of land tenure. This probably reinforced the lack of dissent among the landless who existed even at that time because they could maintain a livelihood through appeal to landed kin. Only as informal access to land became harder and the need for cash increased did the landless, or those who failed to take advantage of opportunities to register customary holdings before nobles started to charge higher prices, begin to express discontent.

Since the 1960s much of the land has been subdivided and allotted on secure tenure. However, as the level of tribute related to this land declined, the nobles’ power over remaining unregistered land allowed them to become virtual land ‘brokers’. They have been able to demand high informal prices from those wanting to register land even though they might already be working it. The pattern which has emerged then, is very different from Tupou I’s ideal of all tax paying males having their own plot of land for horticultural production.

Comprehensive reports on land ownership did not become regularly available until the early 1970s. At the end of 1971 almost 41% of the total land area had been granted as tax and town allotments. It was not clear how much of this land was securely registered or how evenly the land was distributed between different households. At this stage the Crown and the nobility retained either absolute or very strong control over almost 50% of the total land area (Table 5.2).
HEREDITARY ESTATES & CROWN LANDS of TONGATAPU

Source: Thaman, 1975:122
Table 5.2: Land ownership statistics 31 December 1971

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nature of Tenure</th>
<th>Area (acres)</th>
<th>% of total area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Land granted as tax and town allotment to native Tongans</td>
<td>70,573</td>
<td>40.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land leased by native Tongans</td>
<td>2,771</td>
<td>1.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land under Crown</td>
<td>34,084</td>
<td>19.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hereditary noble estates</td>
<td>51,448</td>
<td>29.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign leases</td>
<td>2,222</td>
<td>1.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charity lease</td>
<td>4,104</td>
<td>2.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lakes</td>
<td>7,323</td>
<td>4.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
<td><strong>172,525</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.00</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Minister of Land, Survey and Natural Resources, 1972, Appendix II.

A large proportion of the 41% of land granted as tax and town allotments has been granted from government estates, on which residents in villages had little difficulty registering customarily held land:

People on Government land are a lot more fortunate, once they have land allocated to them they get it registered only for the cost of administration (Kuli, Tongan Lands and Survey Official, 1987).

Nearly 30% of all land in 1971 was designated as hereditary noble estates, although much of this was customarily held by villagers. Villagers using this land might consider it family land but they had no secure, individual tenure, and no right to register. For instance, the noble estate on which I concentrated my interviews in the Nukunuku district had never been properly divided and allocated so a system developed whereby the noble allowed people to farm land without them moving towards registration ... If the cost of registration was T$200 every one of those people in Nukunuku would register. But they know they have to get
T$1,000 to T$2,000 even up to T$10,000 depending on who they are, most people prefer to take their chances and produce on the land for as long as they can (Kuli, Tongan Lands and Survey Official, 1987).

Between 1973 and 1974 the criteria for defining noble estates was altered. Land under customary tenure previously categorised as 'hereditary noble estates' was recategorised as total allotments not yet registered but already allocated'. Noble estates were thus technically reduced from just over 27% of total land area in 1973 to just under 7% in 1974. Noble estates had stayed around this level for the past fourteen years. Such a recategorisation did not, however, change the fact that the 'allocated but unregistered' land was still a major source of noble control and revenue.

A noble retained two main kinds of control over land. First, 'hereditary noble estates' were where nobles had almost absolute control, because this land was private inheritance. Most nobles had not used this holding to undertake large-scale horticultural production, preferring to lease the land to commercial interests. This provided a guaranteed return which far exceeded the level of input. Secondly, and usually the largest area of control, was land within the nobles' estates which was allocated to commoners but unregistered.

Role of Exchange in Land Acquisition

Reforms during the era of Tupou I legally had decreased the power of chiefs to demand tribute from villagers and replaced it with a tax-funded pension system for the nobility. This inhibited the establishment of the nobility as a fully fledged rentier class.
Because of the relatively minor role commercial horticulture played till post-World War II they did not become large scale farmers on their personal estates.

While the subsistence economy continued reasonably intact, the nobles could continue to appropriate tribute in goods and services. They maintained their tribute and their prestige as large landholders and became de facto rentiers (Marcus, 1978a). The tribute they received reflected their control of land and their power to distribute land.

The nobility retained a veto on the decision of the Minister of Lands to grant registration of allotments, providing the nobility with arbitrary powers:

I had to give a lot of yams to the noble [now dead] to get my api kolo [town allotment] in Matahau in 1971. Before I got it, every time I went to the noble to ask him I took T$100 or T$200 to make the noble love me (Misini, Petty Commodity Producer - Ex-grower, 1986).

I ask my chief for eight and a quarter acres, and he accepted my request according to the following terms. I went with a large pig and a cartful of yams to make him willing to grant my request. The chief called the village officer and told him to locate an area for me. After two years planting coconuts, yams, bananas and taking the first fruits to the chief, I went again with T$150 asking him to register the piece of land. He said "yes" and told me to see him again one month later. I took one tapa (5 feet wide by 100 feet long) and he told me to fill in the application form to request the land from the Ministry of Lands, then give him the form to sign. I did what I was told. Then I went to the Ministry of Lands to register the land. I paid T$18.00 for the survey, T$12.00 for draughting the map. Then I gave T$150, one large pig worth about T$200, and a role of tapa worth about T$250 to the chief. The advantage of registration is that it gives us rights which our sons can inherit. To improve the registration system the government should standardize the procedures in order to avoid nobles forcing bribes from people (Crocombe, 1984:30).

The experiences of these two men illustrate the process of land acquisition, including the probationary period when the prospective landholder continued to pay tribute in order to gain final registration. It is a matter of semantics to discuss whether the price for land access be called rent, tribute or purchase price, although most respondents
perceived themselves as 'buying' the land. Once a villager registers the land, the noble loses his major lever of control over him. For most landless, however, the issue did not arise, as they could not afford the land anyway.

One respondent without land of his own contended he would need to find T$10 000 in cash as well as a cow and a pig to give to his noble in order to get 8 acres allotted and registered. There was very little chance that he could ever afford this on his income of about T$1 000 per year. This cost, however, was not the same for everyone:

It depends on the noble, he doesn't make his relatives or some of his friends pay (laughing). I should forget about land as it is too expensive to get from the noble (Samiu, Petty Commodity Producer - Ex-grower, 1986).

An ex-banana grower with tenuous land use through borrowing land from someone who was overseas effectively admitted that land acquisition was not a possibility for him:

If I really needed land I would go to the noble and get my own api uta. But it is too expensive. If I had a lot of money I could do it. I would need T$6 000 in cash, and all at once (Felipe, Petit Bourgeois - Ex-grower, 1986).

Recent legislation has liberalised the laws pertaining to leasing. Large tracts of land controlled predominantly by the nobility have consequently become available either to the highest bidder or to those with personal ties with the nobility. Increasingly, it was the ability to pay commercial rentals that was the arbiter of land access; as two wealthy commercial growers, within the banana scheme and with other interests explained:

There is no shortage for commercial farming, that is, if you have the money you can have all the land you want, but if you want a tax allotment to grow your own food that is when you can't get it, money is the criteria (Paulo, Bourgeois - Grower. 1986).
An ex-grower with a cash-subsistence plot of his own understood quite well that cash rather than need or tradition was the main arbiter in land access:

It doesn't matter about the 8 acre limit, if you have the money you can get another api uta, or you can lease some (Siope, Petty Commodity Producer - Ex-grower, 1986).

There had also been land available for lease which had been held since early this century as European leases. These have facilitated land consolidation in the hands of an already wealthy elite who had the capital to invest in commercial horticultural production. Both types of land had been leased in large parcels. This further constrained access of the landless to land for small commercial or subsistence production. In doing this the nobility had exacerbated the land shortage and reinforced the powerful position of the nobility in relation to land access and the benefits which accrued from commercial horticultural opportunities.

The expense and difficulty of legal routes to land for production meant that many landless and small commercial farmers used other means to acquire land. Temporary tenure from kin or friends was the most common, particularly amongst the landless. Many, however, were willing to lend land to landless only on the proviso that no long term crops, like bananas, were grown.

The combination of increasing land pressure and noble rights to land created a new dimension in noble power and villagers were well aware of this;

it is expensive. So many people live with him, friends and relatives, and the noble must provide for them first, then for the people that want to lease land and last for the others (Felala, Petty Commodity Producer - Grower, 1986).
the noble wants too much money, and a pig, ten years ago it was very cheap, now if I have T$3 000 I can get some land (Falisi, Petit Bourgeois - Grower, 1986).

The noble has spare land but he can't afford to divide it for the others, just for his relatives (Samiiu, Petty Commodity Producer - Ex-grower, 1986).

The inflation of land prices reflected the shortage and the increased power of the noble to extract resources from those wanting land. The nobility had transformed themselves into rentiers through the power they had over land:

It is hard to get land, you have to give money to the noble, maybe T$2 000 for four acres. Most of the property here is owned by generations of families and everyone is holding on to it for their children. The noble has no spare land unless you have T$2 000 (Viliami, Petit Bourgeois - Grower, 1986)

Between 1974 and 1985 the land that was moved from the allocated (or customarily held) to the registered categories represented only 7.3 % of the total land area. Therefore by 1985 nearly 20% of total land was still not registered and still under strong noble control (Table 5.3). Thirty-nine nobles had direct control over 12,824 acres, an average of 328 acres per noble. They had indirect control over another 35,535 acres, an average of 911 acres per noble.

The Department of Lands and Survey's commitment to full registration of allocatable land, rested on the assumption that secure tenure would encourage increased investment in horticultural production. The nobility were seen as slowing this process. However, increasing investment in horticulture, particularly export production, was contrary to equitable and wide registration of land. Those with limited capital, not
Table 5.3: Land ownership statistics for 1985

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nature of Tenure</th>
<th>Approx. area (acres)</th>
<th>% of total area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Registered Tax and town allotments</td>
<td>80 418</td>
<td>43.550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total allotments not yet registered but allocated</td>
<td>35 535</td>
<td>19.240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government leases</td>
<td>1 954</td>
<td>1.060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land leased by Tongan nationals</td>
<td>2 731</td>
<td>1.480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land leased by Commodities Board</td>
<td>507</td>
<td>0.027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Usable</td>
<td>40 431</td>
<td>21.900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hereditary noble estates</td>
<td>12 824</td>
<td>6.940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign leases</td>
<td>4 962</td>
<td>2.690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charitable leases</td>
<td>5 309</td>
<td>2.870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
<td><strong>184 673</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Minister of Lands, Survey and Natural Resources, 1985:2.

...enough to 'buy' land from the noble, were unlikely to have capital available for investment in intensive export production. The non-elite with insecure routes to land want land security for cash-subsistence, not expansionist commercial production.

The beneficiaries of such action by the nobility were the non-noble bourgeoisie, who had access to capital for productive investment and were most likely to engender an export oriented system of horticultural production. The consequences of this for the majority of Tongans still dependent upon a cash-subsistence livelihood was that as land consolidation by the elite increased there would be a shift in the use of labour from cash-subsistence production, that is, petty commodity producers working land...
themselves for their own livelihood, to an increasingly landless population, drawn into wage labour for large commercial producers.

If commercial production were encouraged, further self-sufficiency would be undermined. However, if subsistence production and import substitution were encouraged, an important source of taxation revenue would diminish. The state's policy was effectively maintaining the appearance of a policy of equity, while facilitating the entrenchment of capitalist production and the consolidation of land among a minority.

Changing Social Relations

Although the old nobility has been preserved, a commoner elite had emerged. Members of non-noble families within the church hierarchy who performed with distinction in the education system received bureaucratic positions within government. Such positions were either shunned by the nobility or closed to them due to their lack of involvement in the education system. This was a result of the nobility's concern not to become involved in new institutions, where they could be in positions subordinate to commoners. The nobility had also been careful, in general, to maintain the purity of their descent through selective marriage. Conversely, Tongan families of commoner status intermarried with palangi early this century and late last century and now form the nucleus of the commoner elite.

Rutherford (1971:29 and 52) referred specifically to two prominent palangi traders operating in Tonga during the latter half of the nineteenth century. Their half-caste
relatives are prominent in business today. At least two families directly descended from the traders had large interests in the present banana scheme (and were interviewed in the outlier samples). This sector of the commoner elite had utilised governmental bureaucratic structures to its advantage, but it was initially economic rather than symbolic or cultural capital that facilitated its elite position.

Many of this new elite utilised their economic and social security derived from legal land registration as a basis for upward mobility (Marcus, 1977:226). Any new elite without land had tended to legitimate their economic position socially by acquiring land, thereby adopting each other's symbols of cultural capital.

Apart from this commoner elite, recent capital accumulation through cash cropping, and often through access to cash earned overseas, has meant the development of an embryonic petit bourgeoisie. Extra-horticultural interests included taxi and bus services and a growing number of small retail outlets. This group, still in its infancy, formed a hard to define 'transitional category' lodged between the large landless and petty commodity producing groups, and the smaller bourgeoisie which contained both the nobility and the commoner elite.

This chapter has outlined the context in which the Banana Rehabilitation Scheme was developed. Given the importance of land in Tongan society it has been a seemingly logical step to introduce aid funded programmes within horticulture. The assumption is that reliance on horticulture is so widespread that any aid input would reach the widest spectrum of Tongans. However, inequality in land access directly
mediates the direction and impact of aid in Tongan society. The overall impact of the present scheme is to exacerbate present inequalities.

NOTES

1. Tonga has no known commercially viable mineral deposits, although over the last decade the Tongan Government has encouraged overseas companies to explore for oil within Tonga's economic zone. Future technology, combined with the search for new energy sources, such as manganese nodules or phosphate deposits on the ocean floor, may mean that the ocean within Tonga's vast territorial waters will take on a new significance. At present however, the livelihood of Tonga rests largely upon terra firma.

2. In most cases the designated household head was the principle income earner, although on average there are just under two income earners per household. The nature of the household structure meant that the income of unmarried adult sons and daughters became part of the overall household income. There was a major problem in defining other household members contributions to horticultural productivity, which was all credited to the household head.

3. It was often the case that those within the tertiary sector also had a substantial secondary income from horticultural production, the reverse was unlikely for those whose main income is dependent upon horticulture.

4. The residual 12% were either unspecified or cited as 'not actively engaged'

5. Tongan exports over the past two decades had consistently fallen short of imports, the trade deficit being made good by tourist receipts, remittances and foreign aid.

6. The irony was that the scarcity of land, particularly over the last 15 to 20 years had prompted moves to tie actual patterns of land holding with the land laws promulgated a century ago.

7. Technically the land still belonged to the King.

8. There was provision within the law for the nobles, on their own discretion to subdivide part of this land into commoner allotments, but this has rarely been done.
9. The Lands Amendment Act of 1976 extended the legal provision for the leasing of tax and town allotments for up to ten years, (Central Planning Department, 1981: 20) extended to twenty years in 1983 and allowing one person the control of up to ten allotments (80 acres).

10. Nearly 22% of land was unusable, in the form of uninhabited islands, volcanoes, lakes etc (categories 6, 10, 11). Therefore the percentages shown, as a fraction of usable land, need inflating.

11. In relation to the role the nobles played in the process of land access the concept 'allocation' appeared to be problematic. The reason for this I perceived as being a result of 'allocation' having two meanings. In the more official context it meant that a piece of land has been allocated to a person and there was intent by both the noble and the potential landholder to have the land fully registered. There was also 'allocation' where although land users felt secure, the land was not registered and there was no intent by either party to move towards registration and secure tenure. The variation in costs between these two types of allocation was understandably considerable.
CHAPTER SIX

THE BANANA REHABILITATION SCHEME

The Banana Rehabilitation Scheme is the largest and arguably the most ambitious project financed by the External Aid Division of New Zealand Foreign Affairs in Tonga. The scheme was, as shown previously, set up as part of New Zealand's aid programme and was formulated within the broader philosophy of New Zealand aid. The following discussion focuses on the structure of the scheme and how this was expected to benefit Tongans. It is important to understand the broader socio-historical context which lead, in the early 1980s, to the Tongan government approaching New Zealand Foreign Affairs to provide such large funding in order to re-establish a banana industry.

The banana in Tonga has a long history both as a subsistence crop and a commodity. James Cook observed on one of his three visits to Tonga late in the eighteenth century that yams and bananas were the most cultivated crops (Maude, 1965:34). In spite of this early observation bananas were never a prestige crop although they figured in early contact history. Cook referred to his receiving roasted bananas as part of a gift from a Tongan ruler (Bott, 1982:17), while Mariner commented that the chief he had stayed with on Vava'u brought a quantity of ripe bananas to the ship that took Mariner away from Tonga (Martin, 1827:262).

In Basil Thomson's attack on the administration of Shirley Baker he commented on one of Baker's schemes to initiate large scale banana plantations. This involved the importation of labour from the Cook Islands. Thomson, who had been sent by the
British government to restructure the Tongan economy commented on his task of dismantling Baker's creation:

We now had to pay off these labourers and send them home. They had done little work, and even if they had, the proceeds of their labour would have gone into the pockets of the New Zealand firm who had contracted to buy the bananas (Thomson, 1968:42).

It was not until the latter half of World War II, with the stationing of American troops in Tonga, that Tongans were greatly exposed to Western consumption patterns. Up until that time bananas were predominantly a product that was either sent overseas or consumed when other food was scarce:

The Tongan does not use the ordinary banana, to any degree, as a foodstuff and fruit production over market requirements would be used as feeding stuff for pigs (Colonial Reports Annual, 1932:10-11).

One old timer in recollecting the situation prior to World War II said that bananas were not even sold in the market in the 1930s, but at that time there was little selling of produce anyway, everyone could grow what they needed, and what they didn't grow they would trade with others who did. ... The marketing of produce locally as we know it today in Tonga is really a post-World War II phenomena. Prior to this, the few Indians in Tonga set up street stalls and bought crops from the Tongans in exchange for the goods they had to sell. This was all done on the streets, so the government set up the market place (Joey, Bourgeois - Grower, 1987).

Consumption by American troops (Weeks, 1987:399-426) who came to represent western wealth (a period known by many Tongans as the 'silver time') influenced the Tongans' perception of the 'poor man's food'. Previously only consumed unripe and cooked, like most root vegetables, bananas increasingly came to be consumed ripe and uncooked. One interviewee recalled entering an American camp and seeing a bunch of bananas hanging outside every tent, ripening in the sun.
The Vava'u Islands: Bananas were involved in early European - Tongan exchange. (n.d. circa., early nineteenth century).
Source: Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington, N.Z.
Increased commodification coincided with, but also directly influenced, the increased domestic consumption of bananas. The American influence resulted in an increase in overall commodity production;

they brought things like cigarettes and other things that Tongans wanted, and needed to get money. Before this food was plentiful and there was not much that needed buying, and at that stage there was no clamour for western food and there was plenty of fish so we did not need to buy tinned food like now (Joey, Bourgeois-Grower, 1987).

The first officially recorded export shipment of bananas were in 1953 (Englberger, 1982), 3,000 tonnes being exported. Maude, however, refers to a well developed export trade in bananas and oranges as early as 1887, a result of the first regular shipping service linking Tonga with New Zealand. What proportion of exports was in bananas is unclear but by 1891 the value of fruit exports had risen to 8,533 pounds sterling although this fell to around 3,000 pounds sterling by the turn of the century. By that period export dependence upon bananas and copra was established, albeit bananas being secondary to copra, and still based mainly upon subsistence surplus (Maude, 1965:41-42).

Banana exports reached a high in 1904 and 1905 but a combination of disease and the disruption of shipping caused by World War I, effectively annihilated the trade until the 1930s. During the 1920s the government had attempted to regain a direct shipping link with New Zealand (Colonial Reports Annual, 1923:4) and in 1923 a link was reopened. It collapsed very soon after, a result of the government's inability to induce growers to produce the required quota. The trade was more successful when reopened in 1931, with a revised New Zealand government quota system. Nevertheless, the attendant problem of irregular shipping, failure to meet quotas and poor quality,
persisted. Exports expanded during the Second World War and the resulting increased prosperity in New Zealand which followed it (Maude, 1965:42-45). Exports continued to expand in the post-war era and reached a high of 20,000 tonnes in 1967. Following the arrival of the black leaf streak disease, exports dropped to 7,000 tonnes by 1969. Exports have never since achieved such high levels.

From the early 1970s the New Zealand government began its increasing involvement in actual banana production in Tonga. Until this period the New Zealand government's involvement had been restricted to the quota system giving preferential access to the New Zealand market for Tongan bananas. By the 1970s, with Tonga's exports of bananas to New Zealand well down on the levels of the 1960s, a guaranteed export market went begging. As a result of falling production and exports from Tonga and other Pacific Island producers, New Zealand importers began making up the shortfall with increased imports from Ecuador and the Philippines. Delivery and quality of the produce was guaranteed. As a result of this improved quality it was clear that the bruised and sap stained Tongan bananas would not attract the increasingly discerning New Zealand public.

It was clear to those concerned to increase banana exports from Tonga that there could not be a return to the haphazard production methods of the 1960s. Clearly marked out plots with well defined plant spacing, consistent labour input and major capital expenditure on chemicals and fertilizer had to become standard.

In 1971 the Tongan government in conjunction with the Produce Board had funded the first Banana Rehabilitation Scheme, in an attempt to arrest falling
production. New Zealand’s assistance had been sought in 1974, and a series of aid grants followed. These earlier attempts to introduce a structure to banana production were predominantly unsuccessful. It was not until the institution of the present scheme that clearly defined attempts were made to ensure quality export production.

Although the scheme administrators continued to emphasise the viability of the ‘small grower’, the smallest permissible acreage for one grower was two acres and the common expectation was that four acres was really the minimum size for long term viability. It was clear that the smaller growers were being squeezed out of production in order to engender larger scale production. The industry was not being rehabilitated, as the title of the scheme suggests, but totally reconstituted under increasingly capital intensive production and capitalist relations of production.

Many of the large growers who had exported in the 1960s took the opportunity to re-enter production. Many of the smaller growers, however, now excluded as a result of the new stringent production requirements.

Pre-requisites for Scheme Membership

Participation in the scheme was immediately restricted because land access was a minimum requirement for membership. Each prospective member had to have at least two acres planted in bananas within eighteen months, although the administrators were flexible in allowing farmers with slightly smaller acreages into the scheme. Moreover, despite the long-time nature of banana production requiring sustained land
use, the security of tenure and access to land of prospective scheme members was never closely scrutinised. No record of growers' security of tenure was ever maintained.

In addition to the land requirement, prospective scheme members also needed access to capital for the purchase of planting material, chemicals and fertilisers. This, and the year between the initial investment and the first return, meant that growers with no other established source of income would at best struggle to meet their cash requirements over that period.

The scheme encouraged the participation of prosperous farmers and growers with already established access to land and capital and with sources of income other than horticulture. Small growers who entered the scheme were forced to obtain needed capital through borrowing. Loans, in turn, were more likely to be forthcoming if security of tenure could be demonstrated. In short, as was admitted in the Banana Bulletin, the scheme was exclusive. It would only be viable if the farmer has decided that he has enough land, that he is prepared to work hard in the plantation and he can afford to wait eleven months before receiving his first income, then this banana bulletin can help. It can assist the grower by providing the fourth main factor of production, which is knowledge... (Englberger, 1982:2)

Consequently, although one of the aims of the scheme was to draw Tongans then marginal to the monetary economy into it, the structure of the scheme served to exclude most of them by more rigidly establishing the division between the monetary and the cash subsistence economy. Large scale farmers, businessmen and bureaucrats understandably endorsed the scheme, some having input into its construction. Most of them could easily meet the structural requirements for membership.
The frontpiece of a circular, explaining the banana scheme.
Source: Tongan Ministry of Agriculture Forestry and Fisheries.
Ko e pa'anga tokoni 'e ngāne'aki ta ki huna tosiong —

Tokoni Fakafotuo'tu

Calixin

Ki he malo'ā
'o e kauāonā

Furadon

Ki he ponu 'o e eka no e mongomoanga viva'en

Me'alele mo e ngaahi
me'angaue

Fakalele'itu e ngaahi fa'asakl slainē.

Kau matauaro 'i he slainē
fa'a mo e faka'amākeri —
- tangata keone pule' homo
  fakalele 'o e ngāne;
- tangata fa'ale'i.'

Kau ngaahi fate fa 'o aki
siaini .

Fakalele'itu e tosiong;
- ke to e faka'alaha 'a e tosiong
  ki he kau ngaahi 'i he enau 'ata
  atu 'a e fa'a 'oku lele'i.' Ki hono
  ma'u 'o e tosiong ko'eni. Kuopau
  ke toe tokanga ange 'a e tangaŋ
  ngaahi ki he lahi mo e lele'i 'o e
  siainē 'oku ne 'a 'i atē.

'I he tu' a' e S 'o e pido'kalamē, ko e tokoni ki he kau ngahei, kau
ki he pa'anga, ngahei pua mo e tosiong, 'e holoki. Pea 'a he 'ene
a'u ki he 1988 ho'okai leva ke toe 'i ai ha tokoni. Kuia ai 'oku
mānui ke toe fakalele'iti ange 'a e ngahei 'a e tangata ngahei, ke
ma'u e oka 'oku lele'i ko'rehi ke tu' mo' a' pe 'ene tu'anga faka-
'skonomi. Kapau e toe faka'alaha ange 'a e tu'anga lele'i 'o e
siainē pea 'e toe hiki hake leva 'a e tosiong 'i Na'usila.
The Banana Scheme in Action

On 1 January 1987 there were 244 growers registered with the scheme, 227 on Tongatapu Island and seventeen on nearby Eua. Total acreage was estimated by agricultural extension workers to be about 1,140 acres, just over 4.5 acres per grower. Typically, however, the majority of growers owned less than this.1

Some twenty growers account for about 362 acres of the 1,140 total. In short, just over 8% of the growers account for almost 32% of the land registered within the banana scheme. Consequently the vast majority of the scheme's growers have banana plantations of less than four acres. Indeed 70% of the growers in the scheme had an average of two and a half acres, accounting for 35.6% of the land incorporated into the rehabilitation scheme.

On 1 January 1987 in the Nukunuku district, the area where the four village survey was carried out, there was a total of forty nine registered growers with an average of six acres per person. The single largest plantation on Tongatapu was in the Nukunuku region which, if excluded, would reduce the average banana plantation size to a little over five acres (5.09).

The four villages in which my research was carried out exhibited less diversity in acreage characteristics than the scheme overall. In January 1987 the average banana plantation size was just under five and a half acres (5.3), of an average api uta (bush allotment) size of almost fifteen acres (14.85)². The ex-grower plantation average at the time of leaving the scheme was just under four and a half acres (4.4) with an
average "api uta" size of just under eleven and a half acres (11.4)\(^3\). The remaining growers then had larger plantations and larger over all "api uta" sizes.

Between August 1984 and January 1986, forty eight growers were deregistered in the Nukunuku area. At the time of their deregistration their average acreage in bananas was just over three (3.33) acres per person\(^4\). This considerable difference in acreage size suggests that acreage size and the concomitant reasons mediating access to land are central factors in deregistration.

Security of Tenure

Growers compared to ex-growers in the village survey showed that the type of land access was not particularly diverse. But there is a major difficulty in measuring security of tenure, the respondents' perceptions of this and their influence on decision making. Table 6.1 shows land available to growers and ex-growers in the survey. The few differences between growers and ex-growers in relation to the categories of land tenure does not give an adequate indication of the extent to which security of tenure is problematic. Several of the respondents who claimed to have security of tenure proved not to have when official records were checked. In practice, however, there were few evictions. This suggests that the respondents belief about security of tenure is in effect real under present conditions.
Table 6.1: Grower - Ex-grower comparisons for land access type

Note: Respondents can obtain land by more than one means

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Access Type</th>
<th>Grower</th>
<th>Ex-Grower</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Borrowed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non-exchange - kin</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non-exchange - non-kin</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>exchange - kin</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>exchange - non-kin</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Informal Lease</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kin</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non-kin</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Formal Lease</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Customary/Family/Allocated/Registered</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL** 24 21 45

Number of Respondents: Growers = 20 Ex-Growers = 16


Any emphasis on differences between growers and ex-growers conceals important differences within the grower and ex-grower categories. In both grower and ex-grower categories the *api uta* holdings are above the standard size of eight and a quarter acres, compared to the fact that only 35% of eligible men actually have any land holdings. The structural demands of the scheme ensure that preliminary access is dependent upon some form of land access, increasingly a privilege rather than a right in Tonga.

In relation to borrowed land, respondents were more concerned over the security of their land tenure. One ex-grower respondent related how a Tongan living overseas
phoned him and asked him to lease out his eight acres because he would be overseas for a long time. On the holder's behalf the respondent leased to a third party, informally, for five years for T$500 and the leasee planted bananas. The holder returned early and evicted the leasee, who had no legal defence (Misini, Petty Commodity Producer - Grower, 1986).

Land Holdings of Growers

Among the growers it became apparent that a relatively small group of growers controlled a disproportionately large amount of land in banana production (Table 6.2)

Table 6.2: Banana acreage and total landholding by grower

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grower</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Average banana acreage</th>
<th>Average total land holding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Petty Commodity Producers</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petit Bourgeois</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bourgeoisie</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>48.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


and could be considered a bourgeoisie. They were almost invariably involved in income-generating activities other than banana exporting. These activities included other major crop production and non-horticultural commercial interests. They also tended to employ wage labour and this tendency appeared to be increasing.
Within the scheme the bourgeoisie not only enjoyed greater access to large land holdings, those land holdings were generally more secure. Respondents among this bourgeoisie had a number of ways in which they gained access to land (Table 6.3). Most held land in one of the 'traditional' tenures. They also held extra land, often as private estates under other arrangements with nobles. These arrangements involved large tracts of land and major financial transactions. This elite had also been able to appropriate large tracts of land previously leased to Europeans.

Table 6.3: Grower by socio-economic position and land tenure type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Borrowed</th>
<th>Petty commodity</th>
<th>Petit bourgeois</th>
<th>Bourgeoisie</th>
<th>Total access by type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>non-exchange kin</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non-exchange non-kin</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>exchange kin</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>exchange non-kin</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal Lease</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kin</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non-kin</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal Lease</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Customer/Tenure/</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allocated/Registered</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Types of Tenure For Each Category</td>
<td>29/27</td>
<td>14/9</td>
<td>20/10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Four Village and Outlier Survey, Tongatapu, 1986-87

It is clear from Table 6.3 that the bourgeoisie had the most ready access to land and were more likely to have inherited or acquired land through allocation and
registration and through leasing. In most cases this leased land had been acquired for a specific purpose, such as entering into banana export production (Table 6.4).

Table 6.4 : Growers and ex-growers by socio-economic position and land use prior to banana production

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Growers</th>
<th>Petty commodity producers</th>
<th>Petit bourgeois</th>
<th>Bourgeoisie</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cropping (grew crops prior to bananas)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Prior Use (acquired land for bananas)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Information</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Ex-Growers                    |                          |                |             |
| Cropping                      | 4                         | 1              | -           |
| No Prior Use                  | 4                         | 1              | -           |
| No Information                | 3                         | 3              | -           |
| TOTAL                         | 11                        | 5              | -           |

Source: Four Village and Outlier Survey, Tongatapu, 1986-87

An emerging petit bourgeoisie with other income sources and interests such as small retail outlets, tend, like the bourgeoisie, to use banana export production as one source of income among others. They are, however, more likely to depend predominantly upon banana production for their main livelihood, and rely upon their own labour and that of their family. The petit bourgeoisie are most easily differentiated from the bourgeoisie in that they do not rely upon wage labour for banana production. Furthermore, if their banana export income was reduced considerably, they would suffer a clear but not necessarily critical decrease in their living standard.
The petty commodity producing group, which relied upon banana production for its major, if not only, source of regular cash income was disadvantaged in their access to the benefits of the scheme relative to the bourgeoisie. They were, however, in a position of advantage over a burgeoning landless category (Table 6.2).

The petty commodity producers differed from the petit bourgeoisie mainly because banana production was their greatest form of capital investment, while the petit bourgeoisie had other interests. Petty commodity producers were overwhelmingly reliant upon cash crop production for their cash livelihood.

Petty commodity producers tended to have only one type of access to land (Table 6.3). Of the ten checked in the official land records six claimed to have secure and hereditary tenure over the land they had under bananas but none, according to the records, had registered land. Their land access was entirely informal. The noble might allow usage but this itself did not indicate security of tenure or any intent on the noble's part to allow registration.

For petty commodity producers participation in the Banana Rehabilitation Scheme meant a major change in the way in which they allocated their resources. They had to stop growing something else in order to grow bananas. Banana production was not an extra income source, rather it constituted what they hoped would be a more profitable alternative. Nevertheless, in most cases, petty commodity producers were able to go into banana production without jeopardising their subsistence livelihood, because they continued to grow root crops and other staples.
Petty commodity producers who were no longer in the scheme (Table 6.4) were spread between ‘acquiring land for bananas’ and ‘having grown crops prior’, very different from those in the grower category. Those ex-growers who acquired land specifically for banana production within the scheme did so under less secure tenure than any other growers or ex-growers. Eight of the eleven petty commodity producing ex-growers (all those who responded) obtained their land through kin networks. These respondents perceived themselves as having little security of tenure. This probably undermined their willingness to invest time and capital in land that they could lose. This made it more likely that they would drop out of the scheme at an early stage. As the commercial value of land increases, the security offered by informal land borrowing was likely to decrease further driving more growers from the scheme.

Many of the growers who left the scheme have been termed by the scheme’s controllers ‘quick buck merchants’. Some growers were accused of entering the scheme to exploit high initial returns over the period of high subsidy without any intention of moving into permanent production. As one of the fifth review mission members explained:

[Tongans] have been promised so much so often only to find, for one reason or another, the programme collapses after a year or so. Over the years growers have adopted a rather cynical approach to large aid funded schemes. This in turn has generated a high degree of ‘opportunism’ amongst growers and the banana project is no exception ... The Tongan grower (or any island grower) will never surrender completely his staple subsistence farming for a “cash economy” system - it is simply too risky for
A scheme member trimming excess foliage in his plantation. 

His wife and children resting after packing their latest shipment of bananas ready for export. 
them. That also influences the attitudes to aid supported schemes. Their attitudes are in fact quite understandable. (Personal communication, Fullerton to Needs, 1986).

The notion that not all growers will pursue production along fully commercial lines because they cannot afford to jeopardise their access to primary subsistence only applied to the small grower. There were an increasing number of growers who were not reliant upon horticulture for the basis of their livelihood and perceived only a minor opportunity cost between cash crop and subsistence production.

Fullerton may characterise these growers to be ‘cynical’ and ‘opportunistic’, but they might equally be described as far-sighted and sensitive to the free market. If indeed aid is still inspired by modernisation theories and the idealisation of capitalism, then the project has been a success. Not only has it developed capitalism in Tonga but some Tongans have learnt to direct their capital where the returns are greatest. Any lack of long term commitment to the scheme after the reduction of aid is a wholly rational reaction.

Financial Returns to Growers

It is hard to quantify how advantaged in relation to economic returns from the scheme the bourgeoisie were compared with the majority of growers, particularly as the Tongan economy still had a large non-cash sector. Nevertheless estimates of their gross income from banana production for export over 1986 can be devised (Table 6.5). The table highlights that average incomes per grower can be particularly misleading, as
there were, in fact, very large disparities in income generated from banana production. This was exacerbated by the fact that those with the highest export incomes also had other major revenue sources, thereby serving to undermine the redistributive orientation of the scheme.

Table 6.5: Gross income from banana exports for present growers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Main income</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Secondary income</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Petty commodity producers</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>$3,990</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>$1,677</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petit bourgeois</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>$5,166</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>$2,192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bourgeoisie</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>$11,722</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Export figures for three respondents unavailable

Source: Banana Export Figures for 1986

Of the thirteen petty commodity producers, eleven relied on banana production for their main income, the average gross earnings being just under T$4,000. With high input costs for banana production the net return is considerably less. Determining the net return is difficult without knowing labour and land and other costs, most petty commodity producers, who rely on family labour, would net about T$2,000. This can be compared with the gross income figures for the bourgeoisie, who have an average gross income of nearly T$12,000. Significantly, in all ten cases, the income derived from banana exports was secondary to a more substantial income generated elsewhere. The difference between gross and net income from the scheme was likely to be larger for these growers. Their costs associated with reliance on wage labour was
readily apparent while smaller growers utilised family labour the cost of which was hidden.

Until these incomes are related to other incomes and the cost of living, it is not clear what the economic position of the growers is. In 1984 27.5% of the households in Tongatapu had a cash income of less than T$1,000 (New Zealand and Tongan Statistics Departments, 1984). The survey did not say whether these households predominated in urban or rural areas, but they clearly constituted the lower socio-economic households. Even taking into account inflation, none of the growers interviewed were in this category.

Conclusion

During the early attempts by the state to organise initiatives to re-establish the banana industry there were some large growers who stood to gain most from production. The Tongan government's actions, however, were probably oriented around the large number of Tongans who had received a cash income from banana exports in the 1960s with the hope that this group would again have access to a reliable and steady source of cash. It would also provide a source of state revenue through taxation, which could not be collected on subsistence production.

Although it seems clear that the scheme's advocates did not consciously set out to provide a scheme which benefitted already advantaged groups, it must have become
rapidly apparent that structural features of the scheme inherently excluded some people while drawing others into the scheme.

Within the scheme there were major differences among members. The bourgeoisie secures most advantage from the scheme by virtue of their privileged access to land and capital. This does not imply that those relatively disadvantaged within the scheme represent the rural poor of Tongatapu. To be able to gain access to the scheme in the first instance, structural requirements were such that only those with land access and at least a subsistence livelihood from another source could become involved. Those without resources, who borrowed land and/or capital in order to join the scheme, were most likely to fail as growers. There were a large number of Tongans not mentioned in this chapter who were prevented from joining the scheme due to their total lack of land. They are described in chapter seven as landless labourers.

NOTES

1. A survey conducted in mid-1986 by the Banana Production Advisor confirms much of this data, a discussion of which is in appendix D.

2. The total allotment size held by each grower was never ascertained by the scheme's administrators. The only figures available are then from the four village survey.

3. Acreage estimates for the village survey were taken from the respondents and, where possible, checked against the scheme's official figures. Where banana acreage figures showed a discrepancy it was usually the result of different methods of calculation used. Scheme administrators estimated acreages on a set number of plants per acre, while respondents usually calculated on actual acreage.

4. These figures come from the use of grower registration details. Prior to August 1984 the details were incomplete and unreliable.
5. Although the more urbanised island of Tongatapu where the scheme was based, had by far the highest involvement in the cash economy at just over 64% with non cash spending at just over 22% (New Zealand and Tongan Statistics Departments, 1984). The non cash sector for the other island groups was around 50%.
CHAPTER SEVEN

LABOUR

Like most Third World societies, Tonga has a primarily horticultural economy and more than half of the labour force is engaged in farming (Ward, 1979:357). The combination of land and labour, then, is a central mediator of social relations.

Like contemporary Tonga, pre-contact Tongan social structure was initially bound up with norms concerning access to land. The landless were able to rely upon kin to assure them of a subsistence livelihood. In return they provided status to the landholder and, when required, labour. The subsistence nature of production, however, circumscribed the degree to which peoples' labour could be called upon. With increasing commodification and commercialisation of horticulture, those with land, and increasingly with capital, began to pursue commercial horticulture and had an increasing need for labour. Just as land became commercialised so too did labour.

Past struggles over labour obligations were described in chapter four. These revolved around the power of the Tu'i Tonga and the chiefs to demand labour as well as material tribute. The coercion previously used by the powerful to obtain labour had become partially replaced by greater individual control over capital and the central means of production, land.
Labour and the Problem of Production

Obtaining horticultural labour was a continual problem for farmers with large operations, particularly for those involved in commercial growing. The small group of European planters who earlier this century established themselves despite sanctions against land sales were unable to obtain sufficient labour and this severely hampered their viability (Colonial Reports Annual, 1931:9).

The reasons are clear. Most Tongans had adequate access to land for subsistence production and subsistence production involved almost all Tongans; a wage earning class may be said not to exist, as the people are peasant proprietors ... (Colonial Reports Annual, 1931:9).

Tonga remained a 'peasant' economy with an almost totally indigenous population. As commodification increased and minor cash cropping competed with full scale commercial horticulture, the struggle for land and labour intensified\(^1\).

Still evident in Tonga is a system of labour relations based on kinship or other affective ties. However, there is also a growing sector of capitalist enterprise using wage labour. Frequently both are evident within the same productive process. Indeed horticultural labour was so difficult to get that it was the landholder who managed to utilise both systems of kinship and wage labour who most successfully maintained both economic and cultural power. For instance, while many people tend to avoid highly labour intensive yam production, one bourgeois grower contended that he made a lot of money from yam production, his second biggest crop after bananas, precisely because...
he could invoke personal ties to attract labour when needed. In his industrially-based business in Nuku'alofa, which has no trouble attracting labour, he employed on a contract basis however. Yams, he stated,

are very hard to grow, you have to be very organised to grow yams, it is important to have good personal relationships with many people so you can get workers, it is hard to get people to work on your land. Some people have a lot of money, but with no friends they cannot get anyone to tend their plot (Semisi, Bourgeois - Grower, 1986).

This particular respondent had extended his own allotment through informally leasing land from his brother-in-law, who worked for the respondent, receiving wages, free crops and a rental payment on the land. The respondent's brother-in-law was happy to enter this relationship precisely because he knew he would have trouble finding labour:

He won't want it back, maybe his son. He prefers to have free food rather than cultivate, then he doesn't have to worry about getting labourers (Semisi, Bourgeois - Grower, 1986).

The Use of labour in the Banana Rehabilitation Scheme

The scheme's administrators were aware of the significance of labour to the success of the scheme but appeared to have little information about its actual availability or the conditions under which labourers worked. Again it was assumed that all Tongans with land would, through the exploitation of family labour, be able to succeed in the scheme:
Does the grower have enough labour? In most cases in Tonga, this is not a problem. An average family should be able to maintain two acres of export quality bananas without additional outside labour inputs. Plantations with additional acreages and families with fewer working members are other factors that need to be taken into account (Englberger, 1982:2).

In fact, the most successful growers were those who had enough free capital to employ labour. Nevertheless, it was the case that most scheme members relied predominantly on household labour for banana production.

Tongan households increasingly resemble nuclear families. It was, however, still common for relatives (often a younger sibling of the husband or wife) to co-reside with the family. ‘Household labour’ here refers only to these relatives in such cases, but in general it refers to husband, wife and their children. ‘Kin labourers’ refers to relatives who, if they reside in the household at all, only do so because of their obligations to provide labour.

The ability to obtain labour for banana production varied according to family structures, obligations and status among kinsmen and villagers, and the availability of capital. The ability to pay competitive wages was not the only determinant of the extent to which a grower could obtain labour but it was an important one.

Although growers mix their labour options the type of labour used followed a clear pattern. Petty commodity producers relied predominantly upon their own labour or that of the immediate household (Table 7.1). The petit bourgeoisie tended to mix their options, although most continued to rely upon personal and household labour and only employed labour on a casual basis (Table 7.2). The bourgeoisie rarely work on the
plantation themselves, nor do they use the labour of their immediate family. Most commonly they employ full-time workers. Sometimes these workers were kin of the employer, however, and their conditions of work and the exchanges involved with the employers were shaped, but not determined entirely, by that kinship relationship (Table 7.3).

(a) Petty commodity producers

All twenty-seven petty commodity producers interviewed relied predominantly upon their own personal labour. While only ten considered that they also made major use of the labour of their immediate households, all referred to the use of their wives' and childrens' labour particularly during busy periods².

Seven occasionally hired a work group for a short period, mainly for tasks such as weeding, and belonged to personal work groups. They laboured, usually with fellow villagers, on each other's plantations in turn, with no monetary exchanges taking place. The member whose plantation was being tended that day usually supplied food³. None of those who used household labour extensively had occasion to call on paid work groups and consequently their cash requirements to stay in the scheme were less. For those hiring labour, crops sometimes were used in part payment but cash was the usual form. The burden this placed on this group meant that most petty commodity producers were involved in labour systems which did not involve monetary exchange.
Table 7.1: Type of labour used by petty commodity producer growers and ex-growers for the four villages and outliers

Note: Some growers may use more than one type of labour

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Personal Work Group</th>
<th>Occasional Hiring</th>
<th>Regular Employment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FAMILY LABOUR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own Labour,</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household labour,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and/or non-household family labour</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own Labour Only</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Personal Manual Labour Input</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Communal work groups did not increase labour input, because a group of men work consecutively on each other’s plantations. Respondents claimed, however, that working with a group of friends made one work harder. The real saving was in the use of family labour which was hard to quantify. Women and children were an essential part of the petty commodity producers’ production strategy, but were rarely acknowledged as part of the labour force either by male household heads or by scheme administrators in Tonga or New Zealand. 
Few petty commodity producers, then, were preoccupied with calculating their returns on labour input because labour was not an explicit cost. Petty commodity producers within the scheme were largely self-contained production units. This made calculations of the benefits or costs to this group within the scheme almost impossible at least within the framework set down by its administrators. The production of bananas by most petty commodity producers was not rationalised on the basis of maximisation of returns in the western sense. Banana production was an effective method of getting reliable access to cash and a way of avoiding lengthy trips to town to sell produce on an unsure market. At the same time it served to meet a series of non-economic obligations.

(b) Petit bourgeoisie

The petit bourgeoisie, whose non-horticultural interests often included small retail outlets or transport services, also used their own and household labour. In addition, they were likely to use paid labour on a casual basis. The petit bourgeoisie's personal involvement in other commercial activities often more profitable than banana production made it a worthwhile option to employ labour. Both the petit bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie have been more comprehensively drawn into capitalist relations of production, and were more likely to perceive their actions in economic terms and 'opportunity' costs.
Table 7.2: Type of labour used by petit bourgeoisie growers and ex-growers for the four villages and outliers

Note: Some growers may use more than one type of labour

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Personal Work Group</th>
<th>Occasional Hiring</th>
<th>Regular Employment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FAMILY LABOUR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own Labour,</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household labour,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and/or non-household family labour</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own Labour Only</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Personal Manual Labour Input</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


(c) Bourgeoisie

The bourgeoisie, which is becoming increasingly significant as a result of its large holdings, was the major employer of paid labour (Table 7.3). Of the ten bourgeois growers interviewed, all ten regularly employed labour. Moreover, this labour tended not only to be full-time but also on a relatively large scale. Some employed up to eight full-time workers. Employers themselves were rarely engaged in physical work on their plantations. The time they spend in their plantations was usually in a supervisory
capacity. Frequently even supervision was left largely to a manager. Family labour was seldom used although one of the growers in this category used his wife’s and children’s labour in addition to a full-time workforce.

Table 7.3: Type of labour used by bourgeois growers and ex-growers for the four villages and outliers

Note: Some growers may use more than one type of labour

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NON-FAMILY LABOUR</th>
<th>Personal Work Group</th>
<th>Occasional Hiring</th>
<th>Regular Employment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FAMILY LABOUR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own Labour,</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household Labour,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own Labour Only</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Personal Manual Labour Input</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


This group’s ability to obtain land, and its possession of capital, not only contributed to its ability to attract the labour it required to produce bananas and to benefit from the scheme, but its domination of land itself ensured a large pool of landless males available for employment. However, there were contradictions here.
Despite the large pool of landless who were not actively employed, many commercial growers frequently had problems retaining their workforce.

By refusing to work for wages which were very low, many landless were in fact resisting encroaching capitalist relations. Having no independent source of income they often preferred to rely upon relatives in Tonga or overseas, to accepting low wages. Whether some wage labourers would choose this mode of employment in preference to working their own land is unclear. The extent of landlessness ensured this issue rarely arose.

The extent to which landlessness was a problem for individuals clearly related to their position in the life cycle. Several of the younger labourers made it clear that while they were young and single they did not want the responsibility of their own land. Moreover, they were complacent about their opportunities to get land when they were ready. Few acknowledged that they were likely to remain landless in the future, believing instead that the nobles have a lot of land, and many people have none, it is up to the people to buy land from the nobles. There is no shortage as you can see many weeds (Sikifi, Labourer, 1986).

The sight of weeds to commoners signify the availability of land and opportunity. In reality, it signals the monopolisation of land and the exclusion of those wanting land from subsistence production.
Who Labours and Why?

Those who labour for banana growers did so mainly because they had no sizeable land of their own. They were unable to meet their cash requirements through other means. The status of paid horticultural labourers being so low it was unlikely that many labourers would choose this option if they had adequate access to land for their own cash-subsistence production.

Seventeen employees of scheme growers were interviewed. Four of the seventeen were petty commodity producers. They had fairly secure access to land on which they practiced cash-subsistence production. None, however, had land of their own, and none belonged to the scheme. Their labouring activities provided the main cash component of their livelihood. Horticultural production was enough to cover subsistence needs with only a small surplus available for cash sale.

The thirteen remaining labourers were effectively landless. Three had access to land on other islands north, but their options for growing cash crops on these were limited by poor freight facilities. The main reason for the move to the main island was not only lack of income options in the northern groups but the desire for such opportunities as education.

(a) Kin labourers

Four of the 'landless labourers' interviewed could be referred to as 'kin labourers'. This group conformed closely to a previously mentioned traditional
relationship whereby someone without land entered a patron-client relationship with a landholder to whom he was related. Previously, the relationship resulted in the landholder providing some land and deriving some status from the fact (Marcus, 1978a:520-527). Now the relationship might increasingly involve providing a job in return for cheap, reliable labour. None of the four had any other source of income, and were almost totally reliant upon their employer for their needs. One of the labourers was not in fact related by blood to his employer but had developed close ties which effectively drew him into the circle of kin.

All four were paid T$25.00 per week, low for full-time adult labour. All provisions came from their wages apart from the crops that were available in the plantation and they were not provided with land for personal cultivation. Accommodation, a one room shed without facilities of any kind, was provided gratis.

Another grower employed three relatives full-time. All three were aged between twenty and thirty and unmarried, provided with food and accommodation and paid T$4.00 per day. This grower had also previously employed non-relatives at higher wages but without any other provisions. As his need for labour contracted he dismissed the non-relatives. The flexibility of non-relative labour was the major advantage of proletarian labour which was increasingly on a purely contractual basis.

The use of kin labourers was favoured by some employers because of the obligations the labourer had to the employer. As one employer said:

I used to have non-relatives working for me, but they left because the pay was too low, so it was the relatives that carried on... But relatives do get
other supplements. I help out with their kavenga\(^5\) like funerals and misinale\(^9\). I also help out with school fees, which I suppose makes them feel obligated to keep working for such low wages... Occasionally they take a pig or something and that doesn't bother me, where else can I get reliable workers for that price... There are pros and cons of having relatives work for you, they feel obligated to you, but you have to look after them in times of need (Paulo, Bourgeois - Grower, 1986).

Not all the three growers who employed kin labour saw the relationship in such instrumental terms. One claimed to be following well established traditional relations:

We use the extended family system here, there are three men working here all of the time, not just on the bananas, they look after the pigs and collect nuts as well. All three of them are relatives, two of them are sons of my adopted brother, one of them is a kind of foreman, and there is one other relative (Sioussi, Bourgeois - Grower, 1986).

These particular kin labourers were young and unmarried, with limited personal obligations in the way of direct dependents\(^10\). Their lack of responsibilities was used to present their employment as useful in helping them ‘fill in time’ between the single state of boyhood and the married state of manhood. But many kin labourers were in fact older single men who continued to rely on landowners not only for work but for most daily requirements. No explicit wages were paid, the grower provided food and clothing when necessary and ‘pocket money’ for beer and cigarettes\(^11\). In these circumstances the use of kin labour becomes less obviously a means by which older men supported younger men until they take on adult responsibilities, but a direct exploitation of cheap labour.

Many of the younger labourers, after giving their marital status, pointed out that it was very important to acquire land before getting married in order to grow one’s own crops\(^12\). Landless males who took on wage employment were less likely to get land as
a result of their marginal economic as well as social status. This reinforced the likelihood of being a low wage earner on a long term basis. If independence through landholding continues to be a criteria for marriage, with a continued growth of the landless there will be a recreation of gender relations whereby marriageability is no longer defined by the present level of economic independence of the individual.

Extended kin networks were also used by employers when the labour intensive job of picking and packing bananas was carried out, usually every three weeks. As payment, kin workers were provided with rejected export bananas. Like the full-time kinship labourers, these kin workers were probably able to make claims upon the plantation owner at other times for payment of such expenses as school fees and court fines.

(b) Proletarian labour

The increasing number of landless people and an increasing unwillingness of landholders to lend out land for cash-subsistence production, has meant that those with farming skills but with no land become part of the rural or urban proletariat. Bourgeois farmers gain certain advantages from employing the landless because the relationship is purely contractual. Five of the eleven growers who employed regular labour maintained this impersonal form of relationship.13

Growers employing relatives as labourers did so partly because of the low wages that could be paid. They also did so because of the relative ease with which such labourers could be called upon. This was in a labour market where, although
unemployment was high\textsuperscript{14}, there was a shortage of farm labour at the wage levels offered\textsuperscript{15}. Conversely, the growers who employed 'proletarian labour' employ on the basis that non-relatives were easier to discipline and to dismiss. This has offset the higher cash wages which needed to be paid. As one commercial grower with other business interests and a permanent payroll of over a hundred, said:

It makes it easier to fire people, it is hard to fire a relative (Robert, Bourgeois - Grower, 1986).\textsuperscript{16}

Such an attitude was not restricted to business magnates. Relatively small-time commercial growers, employing only one or two labourers, showed a preference for non-relatives for similar reasons. One small employer pointed out that:

Non-relatives are better as relatives are always resting and there is nothing you can do, if they want to climb a tree and sleep, they do it (Misini, Petty Commodity Producer - Grower, 1986).

Even those who employed relatives attempted at times to depersonalise the relationship. This was particularly so among those employing large numbers of labourers. The largest grower of bananas at the time of interviewing employed eight full-time workers, two of whom were relatives. All were paid on the same basis, and the respondent claimed that there was no preference given to relatives in any way. The size of the enterprise facilitated this contractual relationship because the level of interaction was low and mediated by a manager.

Conflicts arose between traditional obligations and the desire to have contractual labour relations. Some employers used kin networks to obtain land, and in doing so
collected social debts the payment of which included employing kin. Such reciprocity restricted the extent to which capitalist relations of production were expressed within the scheme.

Payment to plantation workers varied greatly. Rates were especially dependent upon the particular labour relations evident. Those employed part-time usually received between T$1.00 and T$1.50 per hour. Labourers who were kin were paid cash, between T$8.00 and T$25.00 per week, with the cash payment usually varying inversely with the amount of 'extras' provided, such as food, clothing and accommodation.

'Proletarian labourers' in the employ of interviewed growers were paid an average weekly wage of about T$35.00. There was a marked variation according to the age of the labourer. The youngest earned as little as T$20.00 per week but a senior labourer in a supervisory role earned T$50.00 per week.

Eight of the twenty-one proletarian labourers had no access to subsistence at all. Three of these labourers were under twenty years of age and continued to live with their parents. Their incomes were a part contribution to the total household income. None of these three had prospects of receiving land. Labouring for low wages may be adequate at present but their position in the future may become more dependent and exploited.

For the other five, who were proletarian labourers with no land access, the cost of living was such that T$35.00 per week would not maintain the household unless there were access to subsistence or some extra source of cash income. These five
A plantation packing site. The workers are contractual wage labourers. Source: Fieldwork 1986-87.

Two wage labourers cutting banana hands during a packing day. Source: Fieldwork 1986-87.
maintained their livelihood through access to additional wage work offered by their employer in his other businesses. They worked up to seventy hours per week, boosting their income to between $50.00 and $75.00 per week.

Of the twenty-one proletarian labourers, thirteen had access to land. However, this was particularly tenuous and restricted to subsistence production. The plots, often borrowed from relatives, were very small, frequently less than one acre. Certainly they were not enough to provide crops over and above what would be consumed for subsistence for an average Tongan household. Nor was it likely to allow them to build up any supply of livestock which could be used to help off-set the cost of kavenga such as church feasts, funerals and weddings. Despite this, labourers with very limited land access still argued that without it they could not maintain their livelihood on their wages. It was the combination of low wages and limited land access for subsistence production which enabled this group to survive.

Factors Affecting the Supply of Labour

Employers of labour on banana plantations often confront labour shortages, despite the marginality of those without secure land access and their increasing need for cash. The low wages and poor conditions offered by growers make such work unattractive particularly if cash needs can be fulfilled through remittances from relatives working overseas:
It is hard for large banana growers to get labourers as many potential workers prefer to rely on someone else's income, like a brother working overseas (Joey, Bourgeois - Grower, 1987).

Furthermore, status accorded to those working within the horticultural sector was low compared with popular white collar employment. Scope for white collar employment was, however, limited, especially for those with minimal educational qualifications. Their best prospects lie in finding employment outside Tonga.

Remittance money probably had the most influence upon the social and economic mobility of most Tongans. It was potentially accessible to all, unlike many of the benefits associated with aid projects for which access was contingent upon pre-existing privileges. Both aid and remittances were, however, dependent on international goodwill. This was highlighted during the turbulent 'overstayer crisis' in New Zealand in the mid-1970s, when money remitted from New Zealand to Tonga dropped from nearly NZ$2.5m to under NZ$1m between 1974 and 1976 (Campbell and De Bres, 1976:7-9).

The internationalisation of the Tongan labour force directly affected the internal economy and labour market within Tonga. Access to money from overseas provided an indirect subsidy to employers of labour in Tonga as the wages paid to Tongans constituted less than a living wage. Migration for one or more members of a family and possible steady remittance flows was a major hope for a large number of Tongans. It also acted as a safety valve for potential unrest through landlessness (Central Planning Department, 1986:88-98). The long term landless increasingly aspired to find work overseas in order to meet their cash needs, very often splitting up families for long periods (Campbell and De Bres, 1975; 1976).
Landless labourers aspiring to land ownership perceived remittance money as the most likely way of saving enough to purchase land and without remittances many landless face immediate impoverishment. Those with little recourse to subsistence horticulture relied on overseas incomes even for basic foodstuffs. In some cases a family member was virtually forced to remain offshore semi-permanently in order to maintain the family back home.

Remittances are not the preserve of the landless although, due to their plight they were probably more significant to them, than to others. Remittances also play a role in elite formation:

The existence of instrumental family networks spanning locales - especially those created and nurtured by elites - sustains the range of options through which individuals view their life possibilities (Marcus, 1981:50).

Remittances constituted a viable route to mobility for both the landless and those with land.

Many households have access to remittances, therefore, even if a wage labourer had no recourse to subsistence to subsidise his low wages the household would not be totally reliant upon his own wage labour. Labour in Tonga was, therefore, cheap to employers through the subsidising effect of Tongan labour overseas. At the same time low wages offer little incentive for Tongans without paid employment to look for it if they can rely on remittances. This did not only apply to the landless.

For instance, an ex-grower with control of sixteen acres of land, eight of which were legally his, grew nothing but coconuts. He spent little time making copra however.
This was partly due to the low world price but mainly because his sons in New Zealand regularly sent him remittances totalling about T$3 000 per year. This was more than enough for him and his household to live on without working their land. This ex-grower kept control of his land in the belief that one of his sons might return to Tonga and take up farming. In the meantime it went unused.

Conclusion

The use of labour in the productive process is becoming increasingly defined by capitalist relations. This is evident within the scheme. A number of labourers were employed by growers on a contractual basis. The fact that in a society like that of Tonga, with high unemployment, it is difficult for horticultural employers to hire labour is indicative of the articulation of two systems of production and their associated conceptions of work. In the capitalist mode the opportunity cost of not working is foregone income. In the non-capitalist mode, where work is more expansively defined, the opportunity cost of not working for wages may be minimal. This wider conception of work is becoming increasingly dismantled as more people are forced to survive through the sale of their labour. Other alternatives to cash income, however, have been created by Tongans which are consistent with the dominant social relations.

This is not to suggest that Tongans have not adjusted or are backward or pre-modern. When a man turns down T$30.00 a week for plantation work modernisation theorists tend to see him as acting in a pre-modern way. In reality, given the important factors in a Tongan’s life, the social obligations to kin and community, it may not be
worth pursuing that particular job. This oscillation between two systems will become less possible as capitalism becomes more entrenched and the landless in particular are forced to orient their productive relations increasingly around capitalism.

When systems of production cross cut each other, social relations also become changed as the various actors try to maximise their positions, for example, the employer who perceives the problems in employing relatives but does so in order to maintain certain social obligations. The cost of not employing relatives may be greater than the concern that they may not work as hard as contractual labour, even though he can pay them less. Labourers also seek to enhance their situation by moving between two systems, but from a position of relative disadvantage.

The picture which emerges of labour relations in the scheme is of small growers who continue to rely on non-capitalist relations, while the larger growers combine elements of capitalist and non-capitalist relations to their own best advantage. The largest growers rely almost exclusively upon capitalist relations. For the landless, the opportunities to move between two systems are becoming more circumscribed, with an increasing reliance on wage labour, which at present is not enough to maintain a subsistence livelihood.
NOTES

1. For imperialist powers to attain the horticultural production required by the metropolitan centres, the securing of adequate and cheap indigenous labour was contingent upon the alienation of those people from their land, the source of their subsistence livelihood. The Maori of New Zealand were alienated from their land and pushed in to back blocks until their labour was required with the rise of the New Zealand manufacturing industries. Government welfare legislation served to draw the Maori into the cities when their labour was needed (Bedgegood, 1979; Spoonley, 1982:269-271). The indigenes of Fiji maintained strong control over their land, facilitated by the early era of British administration, ensuring their continued access to subsistence. To solve the problem of access to labour the British imported indentured labour from India. The combination of Tonga's independence, land laws and limited economic importance meant that such options were never taken up, and wage labour of any type was kept to a minimum:

   The number of labourers employed in Tonga is negligible. There are a few Solomon Islanders, Fijians and Indians working on plantations or in the stores (Colonial Reports Annual, 1927:11).

2. A Commodities Board official asserted that the use of family labour was increasing as a result of the increasing number of vehicles owned by farmers, thereby facilitating transportation of family labour to the plantation, sometimes several miles from the home (Personal correspondence, May 86).

3. One work group member, rather than having the other members work on his plantation, contracted them out to others for the day. He pocketed the cash and had to carry out his own garden tending. Thaman (1975:175-180) discusses the variety of work groups evident.

4. I have reason to believe that the petty commodity producers' use of family labour is higher than Table 7.1 indicates. In two documented cases, where growers claimed that their wife and children did not work in the plantation, on re-visiting on packing day, both wife and children were engaged in central tasks. I do not believe that I was intentionally misled. Rather, that packing day labour is considered 'one off' and not major use of labour. As mentioned in chapter four, the women are drawn into production but have no control of the end product or the value created. This parallels the economic control lost by women when copra rather than coconut oil, which was women's work, became the basis for commodity production.

5. Banana production and packaging involved a multitude of tasks which have become hierarchised, particularly in the busy packing stage. Observations over the three month period enabled me to note the following division of labour:
Adult men - picking, packing and stacking boxes.
Women - placing crown pads on bunches.
Older boys - cutting off hands from bunches.
Younger boys - placing ‘Blue Palm’ stickers on bunches.
Girls - caring for infants, therefore freeing women.

6. The consistency of statements by growers and labourers on the subject of labour suggests that the information given by growers about labourers in cases where labourers were not interviewed was also reliable.

7. The growth of the vanilla industry, particularly in the Vava’u group, has ameliorated this problem as vanilla is a low weight, high value crop unlike, for example, copra.

8. Obligations.

9. Church tithes.

10. Obligations of unmarried adults often extend to the children of close relatives. These may involve heavy expenditure on school fees and other recurrent expenses.

11. Beer, particularly amongst younger men, is increasingly favoured over kava, partly, as a sign of affluence, as beer is much more expensive than kava, also due to the status it derives from its Western origin.

12. This is particularly relevant in light of interview results that showed them to have low educational attainment, thereby circumscribing their entry into the popular ‘white collar’ jobs in business and the government bureaucracy, another route to marriageability.

13. Out of this group of five growers, twenty-one labourers were employed full-time in banana production. Two of the growers, with other business interests, for example, a construction industry, used wage workers, predominantly employed elsewhere, when the plantations required labour over and above the regular full-time staff. These labourers were not included in any estimate of average wages.

14. There are no official unemployment statistics for Tonga and there is no form of unemployment benefit.

15. The question of remittances and the low status attached to horticulture is addressed in a later section.

16. As all labour in Tonga is non-unionised it is only social pressure that can influence an employer’s decision to ‘fire’ labour.
17. Most growers who employed by the hour did so on the assumption that a labourer could only work at full capacity for three to four hours in any one day, and were therefore reluctant to employ them for a whole day.

18. Extensive data is available in the results of the 1984 Income and Expenditure Survey.
CHAPTER EIGHT

CASE STUDIES OF SCHEME PARTICIPANTS

The case study is the most incisive method to illustrate the reality of people's lives. Nine selected case studies follow, including three from each of the bourgeois, petty commodity producing, and labouring categories. The aggregated data, presented in previous chapters, provides a general picture of the characteristics of various groups influenced by the scheme. Case studies make a study more contextually complete.

In making the cases succinct I have not necessarily related all the information I have on that particular respondent. I have, for example, within the three case studies on petty commodity producers, tended to highlight different areas to build up a picture of particular aspects of respondents' lives. Where appropriate the respondent has been directly quoted, this however proved to be difficult, particularly with labourers.

What follows are attempts to present an understanding of everyday life, in order to indicate the general patterns of social and economic relations, and to place individual experiences within the context of a social totality. These case studies bring together the processes analysed in the last three chapters. The degree to which case studies can be used to generalise depends upon the adequacy of the theory which underpins them, and not the particular case study itself (Mitchell, 1984:206).

No single case study can be archetypical of the position of a particular group, this is evident in the case studies provided here as there are major differences among
actors in similar structural positions. There are, however, discernible patterns in the case studies which support the theoretical and empirical work discussed in the earlier chapters.

**Bourgeois Scheme Members**

**Ofa**  
Nukunuku village  
Professional

*Ofa reclined in his padded chair in his spacious office on the second floor of one of the modern aid-financed buildings in downtown Nuku’alofa. After six years at university in New Zealand on a Tongan scholarship he returned to Tongatapu in 1980 to take up a senior civil service position. His wife was also a senior civil servant, their combined salary in 1986, not including private enterprise and investments, was T$16,000, approximately four times the average cash income per Tongatapu household (New Zealand and Tongan Statistics Departments, 1984). He shared a government house, provided with his job, with his wife and three children and his brother and his wife. The house had modern facilities including a stove, refrigerator and television. If Ofa ever left the government service he would build his own home on a 2/5 of an acre town allotment (api kolo) he held in Nuku’alofa.*

*A radio advertisement first drew Ofa’s attention to the banana scheme in 1983 but he did not join until 1985. According to Ofa his membership represented a small experiment in farming and a diversion from his main job.*
Originally from the middle island group of Ha'apai, Ofa not only had an allotment on Tongatapu but also one he had inherited from his father on his home island. This he allowed his brother to use. The latter did not cultivate the land, rather he used it to collect coconuts for copra.

Ofa's sixteen acres on Tongatapu were leased. Two eight acre plots were leased from allotment holders, who were willing to relinquish legal control over it for twenty years. Ofa used part of one of these allotments for banana production. The costs were high; some T$5 000, which he borrowed from the Tongan Development Bank.

Ofa's commercial cultivation was not restricted to his two acres of bananas. He also grew other crops for sale and subsistence. These included five acres of talo which was very profitable, earning him more than T$4 000 per year.

Working in the plantation in the early morning or evenings before and after work was a pleasant diversion from his office work. Most of the everyday work was carried out by his brother who lived with him and who worked for beer and cigarettes. According to Ofa his brother was quite happy with the arrangement.

Ofa's wife also worked in the plantation before and after work. This Ofa saw as a liberation for women: "It is a kind of women's lib, a good kind that suits Tonga".

His wife worked in the gardens, at a paid job, and carried out most domestic chores along with her sister-in-law. When large amounts of labour were needed, Sione hired a tou ngaue at $1.00 per hour per person.
Olau's gross income from banana exports over the 1986 year was only T$1 464. This was below the average for the scheme, but he explained that he made much more than this as he had been diverting bananas, intended for export, on to the local market where the price was sometimes higher and there was no quality control.

The cash return on his banana production and other crops was not critical. Even if he had lost all of his land he would not be unduly concerned as he could easily have afforded to purchase all of his requirements from his and his wife's combined salary. Money from the gardens was extra, which usually meant increased demands on his income through, for example, misinale (church contributions). He perceived his agricultural enterprise not so much as a means of making money but as a way of conserving his other resources. Funerals, weddings and church feasts came around with amazing regularity, all of which required major contributions of food. If it were not grown it had to be bought, and with crops such as ufi costing T$30.00 a basket and a large pig T$500 it could be a major drain.

Semisi
Kolomotua district
Businessman

As we sat in Semisi's suburban Nuku'alofa home we had to raise our voices above the chatter of his four children who were engrossed in the computer games their father had brought back from his recent business trip to New Zealand. At thirty-five Semisi has built up a successful contracting business based in Nuku'alofa, employing sixteen full-time workers.
After finishing his sixth form education, Semisi went to New Zealand on a training award provided by the Tongan government. He returned to work for the government for nine years before setting up on his own.

Semisi's contracting business was by far his most important source of income. Banana production and other horticultural activities were, he asserted, a supplementary income source, and also a hobby. He said he would not continue in horticulture, however, unless he continued to make a considerable return on his investment. His gross income from banana exports during 1986 was T$11 670, approximately three times the average gross income for a banana exporter.

Semisi was part Tongan, part English and part Solomon Islander and the fifth boy in his family. Together these would appear to make land ownership impossible. However, with a Tongan father and his older brothers residing permanently in the USA and the Solomons where his mother owned a large tract of land, Semisi has been left with secure access to a four acre allotment. He had obtained a further four acres of adjacent land from a neighbour. This entailed an initial payment of T$250 and a verbal agreement to provide the lesor with part of the harvest.

Another eight acres were leased from Semisi's brother-in-law, who was overseas until recently and now preferred to work on the land that he himself leased to Semisi. Semisi paid his brother-in-law the same cash wage that he paid his other full-time plantation labourer (T$5.50 per day). On top of this, however, he paid a rental on the land and provided for all the subsistence crop needs of his brother-in-law and his family.
Semisi started growing bananas in 1978 for both export and local markets. It was not until Semisi started his contracting business in 1984, however, that he made a more serious commitment to banana production. By this time the Banana Rehabilitation Scheme was established and its advantages for members increasingly clear.

Semisi was sure that much of the reason for the success of his banana venture had been due to his ease of access to the expatriate staff who ran the scheme. He could contact them at their office in town or phone them either from his home or office. Urban-based and English speaking growers had huge advantages over the small rural grower in obtaining expert advice. Semisi never attended the scheme meetings held periodically in the villages:

What they do in the meeting is for people who can’t contact Keith (the expatriate banana production advisor), I can run up to Keith or phone. In a meeting it gets translated and starts to lose its effect, I can talk straight to Keith.

Semisi’s ease of access to expert advice probably went part way to explaining his high yield, in fact one year he won the award for the most impressive plantation:

When the plants were young I got Keith out to check the plants to tell me what he thinks is wrong. He came about every two months, then I know if I am improving... I say just come and have a look and he says what is right and what is wrong.

On busy picking and packing days Semisi transferred his main labour force from his contracting business into the plantation. This meant that he had few problems
finding the mass of short term labour needed. The pay for packing at the plantation was up to 40% below his labourers normal pay but few chose to forego wages completely:

I cannot have them working elsewhere on packing days, as I am in the plantation and if I am not there they sleep. But they all come and like it, I give them a big feed and they get to buy the reject bananas at T$3.00 a basket rather than T$5.00 like in the market.

Some time after the first interview Semisi took me on a tour of his allotments, proudly showing off his thriving banana plantation. He also had a lucrative yam crop which he expected to net him in excess of T$10,000. For successful yam production regular weeding was essential and Semisi hired a tou ngaue twice a month which would weed the whole yam patch for T$200. Even with twenty workers such a task meant a very long day. Most of the members of this tou ngaue took on this contract work as a major source of cash to supplement their other cash-subsistence activities.

Semisi was then setting up a vanilla plantation. Vanilla was a lucrative export crop, and Semisi saw the chance to increase the profitability of his horticultural enterprise by growing this long term crop. There would be no return for three years, but once production started the income promised to be very high.

Semisi kept two cows and two dozen pigs on his allotment. He did not intend them to realise an economic return, rather they helped to defray the costs of obligations. To buy a cow to kill for a wedding or funeral would cost about T$1,000. Semisi saw his cows as walking banks, banks he hoped he would not have to open: "You cannot afford to have relatives die in Tonga - ask them - please stay alive".
Robert ran a series of businesses in Tonga. These involved large amounts of capital and employed over 100 full-time workers. Banana production was just one, though a relatively profitable income generating option. Robert's gross income from banana exports for 1986 was just over T$16 000. This constituted a relatively minor source of income for Robert, but with returns on overall investment exceeding 30% it was a worthwhile involvement.

After finishing the fifth form at Tonga's most prestigious high school, Robert left Tonga for fourteen years. He returned to live at Nuku'alofa in 1976. Through investment of capital into growth areas he quickly became a leading businessman. His three main businesses were quarrying, stevedoring, and a heavy vehicle service. These had all thrived largely because of the growth of aid funded infrastructural projects such as roads, wharf extensions and an airport.

Robert had been growing bananas for export since 1980 and joined the scheme specifically to receive its benefits. In January 1987 he had over 40 acres in bananas on a series of leased plots. These plots were leased for long terms, some up to ninety-nine years from nobles or land originally leased to Europeans. Some of this land was originally leased by his grandfather, a prominent English trader, earlier this century. Robert was at present negotiating the lease of another sixteen acres from a noble, which he expected would cost about T$1 000 per year.
His largest plantation was run by a manager and it was with him that Robert had most contact. He had very little contact, if any, with the labourers: "I visit my foreman most days to check that everything is OK and that he is supervising OK".

Robert generally left the everyday running of the plantation to his foreman. This was in spite of the fact that he had a regular opportunity to take advantage of the expertise of the expatriate scheme managers: "Keith and Malcolm are good friends, I see them at the club most Fridays, but not to talk business, I leave that to my foreman".

A core of workers laboured full-time on the main plantation. As plantation labour required little skill he could rely on a pool of workers from his other businesses when labour demands were high on the plantations. Because he employed such a large number of workers he had no idea as to possible other income sources they might have had or whether they had access to land. He paid them on a strictly cash basis, which has been his policy since he started employing labour some ten years ago.

Ofa was a particularly good example of the educated elite who had used their educational opportunities to entrench themselves both socially and economically. Initial opportunities to take advantage of higher education were usually based upon pre-existing privilege, however. Once educational status was attained the status position and economic rewards reinforced each other.

Like Ofa, Semisi had based his position upon family background which facilitated educational attainment, and which had further facilitated entry into business. Access to
the banana scheme was predicated upon an already successful entry into capitalist relations of production.

Robert was the grower whose production was most embedded in capitalist relations. He had used to good advantage a long history of family entrenchment in both business and bureaucracy in order to gain access to large tracts of land and capital.

All three had in common relatively easy access to land and education, albeit in different forms. Their main differences lay in the degree to which each had become reliant upon capitalist labour relations in order to produce bananas for export. Ofa still relied upon non-capitalist relations to acquire his brother's labour. He also entered into capitalist labour relations with various work groups. Semisi oscillated between two sorts of labour relations in order to meet predominant economic aims. Robert was totally reliant upon capitalist relations in order to meet the productive requirements of his economic venture. All three recognised that the banana scheme was only one component in a lifestyle that could be maintained without it.
When we first spoke to Tomasi he was in his banana plantation which lay next to his home. He was packing bananas ready for delivery to the waiting containers in Nuku’alofa. While Tomasi harvested and separated the bananas into hands, his wife wiped off the sap, put on the crown pads and Blue Palm logos and placed the produce in the cardboard cartons ready for weighing. Tomasi and his wife share most of the work on the plantation. He used to make the trip into Nuku’alofa to collect the harvest payments by himself and then spent them as he saw fit. More recently, according to Tomasi, both he and his wife have gone together to collect the money. It was still he, however, who decided how it was spent.

Tomasi was twenty-eight years of age and had lived in Matahau all of his life. He was the oldest boy in his family and would inherit the eight acre plot which he was using at the time. After leaving school at fifteen he began working on his father’s land. As Tomasi’s younger brother had little hope of finding land of his own Tomasi will divide his land into two four acre plots.

Tomasi’s house was a two-room cement construction with no modern facilities. In it he lived with his wife, their one young child and Tomasi’s elderly father.

Tomasi had been growing bananas since he left school, but did not begin exporting them until 1981. When he heard about the present scheme on the radio he
thought it would be a good idea to join so he could get cheap fertiliser and sprays. If the
scheme finished in 1988 he would not be able to afford the full cost of the inputs and
would probably grow something else, possibly ufi.

Ufi was his second crop. It provided food for the family and some cash from
sales at the local market. His major source of income, however, was from bananas.

Having only one child at present, Tomasi's expenses were relatively limited.
Consequently he intended to accumulate his banana export payments and have them
paid out three or four times a year. His gross income in 1986 was T$4 716 a reflection
of the small amount of land he could give over to banana growing. He was unlikely to
be able to expand his involvement without more capital and without going to work
overseas access to capital was very limited. Even when he joined the present scheme
he had to borrow T$200 from the Tongan Development Bank in order to buy three bags
of fertiliser.

Knowing that he would lose land to his brother eventually made him wary of
further investment, particularly as Tomasi did not think the noble would be forthcoming
with more. He would have preferred to lease land from people who were overseas, the
cost of which, he said varied between T$200 and T$1 000 for eight acres per year.
Leasing extra land would have provided the chance for Tomasi to make more money,
but if he ran out of money he could have gone back to just working his personal
allotment.
Siua
Matahau village
Petty commodity producer

After finding Siua near to his home, we sat in the shade of a giant breadfruit tree in order to escape the midday heat. We could not, however, so easily escape the inquisitiveness of about thirty local children who had heard us arrive on a rather noisy motorbike.

Siua had lived in Matahau, his wife's village, for seventeen years having moved there on marriage. This matrilocal arrangement gave Siua, who came from the isolated northern groups, access to land on Tongatapu. They had nine children with whom they shared a small one room fale papalangi (European house). Siua would very much, "like the chance to go to Fiji or New Zealand to get extra money for the family to build a better house, and spend more money on growing crops".

Siua left school when he was twelve years old and worked on his family's land on the northern island group of Vava'u until he came to Tongatapu. His sister also lived in Matahau, and her in-laws had lent Siua twelve acres on which to grow crops. In return Siua provided them with all their staple food requirements. This land appeared secure because of such an exchange. Siua's sons, however, had little prospect of owning land.

Siua had been growing bananas for export since 1980. When he heard about the present scheme through radio advertisements and MAFF officers talking to kava circles (lai kava) he was attracted by the subsidies on the chemicals and fertilisers. The future discontinuance of the subsidies was of great concern because at existing
banana prices he would not have been able to afford unsubsidised inputs and would have been forced to leave the scheme. This would have taken away his only regular flow of cash, which he especially needed to pay his children's school fees. Siua and his family led a very hand to mouth existence: "I need the money (payment for bananas delivered to the wharf) as soon as it is available, so I must get the cash every shipment".

Working the land for subsistence and cash sale is the only life Siua knew. Apart from the little money which came in from his wife's handicrafts, which she sold to tourists, they had no other income. He was not sure whether his banana plantation or the local sale of root crops brought in the most money. He did not differentiate between the two sources and kept no account of sales. Nevertheless according to export data, Siua's gross income from banana exports for 1986 was T$2 310.

Siua's plantation was within ten minutes walk from his house which meant he could visit the plantation daily. He was the only full-time worker in the plantation both on his bananas and other crops. His teenage sons helped him regularly. His wife and younger children helped on the busy picking and packing days and on tasks such as deleafing. Siua, however, was in total control of the revenue received from banana production. There was rarely, however, money available for luxury expenditure after processed foods, clothes and school fees had been paid for. Siua also belonged to a tou ngaue with three other men. They worked on each other's gardens in turn so they had company while working. The other three men lived in Matahau but were not related to Siua, and none of them grew bananas for export.
We found Tevita resting outside his home after a trip to Nuku’alofa, some twelve kilometres by bus. We joined him and a number of his family under a rough shelter built to allow exposure to the breeze but protection from the sun.

Tevita was fifty years old and had lived in Matahau all of his life. He left school before the end of his primary education and had worked on the land ever since. According to his wife he had ten children, Tevita himself was not sure. He also had many grandchildren who lived with their parents in nearby houses. Four of his children still lived in his household, which was a rudimentary fale papalangi divided into two rooms.

Being the third oldest boy in his family Tevita had inherited no land but he used eight acres belonging to his oldest brother who lived in New Zealand. Although he felt reasonably secure on his brother’s land he was aware that future circumstances could see him dispossessed. More secure forms of tenure were beyond his means however. It would have cost between T$7,000 and T$10,000 to get the noble to allot him a piece of his own land. The alternative of leasing was not attractive and his access to capital was limited:

I don’t want to lease land because I am not allowed to keep it. I would like to get some more land then I could grow more bananas... The only way I could afford some land would be to go overseas to work. I have never done this before. I would like to go to New Zealand; the money is not as good as Australia or America but it is easier to get in, and I know other Tongans who are there [paraphrased].
Banana growing and exporting had been Tevita's main income source since 1962. He had been in several schemes and had trouble differentiating among them. The main point was that they all provided subsidies of some sort. When he joined the present scheme he borrowed T$400 from the Tongan Development Bank in order to prepare the plantation site by ploughing and fertilising. His gross income for exports in 1986 was $4 644. Of his eight acre plot, Tevita had 3.5 acres in bananas with the rest mainly in ufi, talo and manioko which were mainly for household consumption, with any small surplus being sold. When time permitted Tevita went fishing, using his small homemade canoe. There was rarely fish left to sell after feeding the family.

In general Tevita was happy to export bananas but he was equally prepared to sell on local markets and did so when local prices were higher than export. Bananas were his only reliable source of cash income and this was critical for day to day existence.

Tevita worked in his gardens daily except on Sunday. This was facilitated by the proximity of his land to his house. This also allowed him to call upon children and wife for help in weeding, picking and packing. Like Tomasi and Siua, Tevita belonged to a tou ngaue primarily for the company.

The similarity amongst petty commodity producers was an indication that the scheme was reaching a large number of predominantly rural dwellers, who relied on horticultural production for their livelihood. They were, however, clearly not part of the relatively impoverished rural dwellers to whom aid is supposed to be targetted. Tomasi
was a good example of a rural horticulturalist whose cash subsistence lifestyle on securely held land had been invigorated by access to a scheme which provided him with a reliable and consistent income. No matter what happened to the scheme, Tomasi's subsistence livelihood was assured. Siua and Tevita did not own their allotments, they were, however, strongly assimilated into a broader network of kin who assured them that their cash and subsistence livelihood was secure. The problem for such petty commodity producers was providing for the future livelihood of their sons. All three were reliant upon the use of household labour to maintain production.
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Paid Labourers in the Scheme

Ifoni
Vaotu’u village
Petty commodity producer - labourer

As I sat outside Vaotu’u Primary School with my interpreter, we watched the whole school practicing a spear dance. The man directing the activity was Ifoni Fonua. He was not a teacher but a member of a tou ngaue or work group. He worked for one of the largest banana growers in the village. After interviewing his employer we had been refused permission to interview Ifoni in his employer's 'time' so we had arranged to meet Ifoni at the school.

Ifoni was born just up the road in the relatively large town of Houma and had shifted to his wife’s village of Vaotu’u five years ago. They had four children and they lived together with Ifoni’s wife’s sister and her family in a three room wooden fale papalangi. The village, like many now on Tongatapu had electricity but Ifoni, like most residents, had not been able to afford connection.

There was no possibility of Ifoni inheriting any land from his family. He shared his father-in-law’s allotment. The four acres he cultivated usually only produced enough for household consumption. When there was a surplus he might take it to the market in Nuku’alofa to sell. The main source of cash from his allotment was copra but this was rarely worth more than T$200 in any one year. The family’s diet included fish when Ifoni had time to go fishing.
The limited opportunities to develop cash-cropping on the allotment and the increasing expense of school fees and clothes led Iloni to form a tou ngaue with three other men. They worked for one of the larger farmers in the village as horticultural labourers. Their employer had eight acres of his own land and legally leased another twenty-four. Just under three acres of this was entirely under bananas.

The tou ngaue worked two days per week for this farmer and received, as a group, T$16.00 to T$17.00 per day. The farmer had wanted to pay them in crops, but for Iloni about T$8.00 per week in cash was extremely important. It was his main and most regular source of income. Very occasionally he received money from relatives overseas, but he never knew when he would get it or how much it would be. If the opportunity to go overseas to work had arisen he would have taken it:

I would like to work anywhere overseas to get extra money to send home for my family to use for school fees, food, building a better house and for kavenga (obligations).

In the longer term Iloni recognised the need to get his own allotment. Farming was the only job in which he had ever been involved and his primary school education and lack of English meant that most other job options were closed to him. Like so many others he would have liked a fully registered allotment but he did not have the money to ask the noble for land. Leasing was not an attractive option as it offered limited security for him and his children.

Iloni stressed the need for a steady cash income. He would have liked to grow bananas and be a member of the scheme. He had thought about converting some of
his land then under root crops to bananas. The need for chemicals and sprays, about which he felt he had no knowledge, and could not afford without a loan, had dissuaded him however. Moreover, he would have had to use the income from banana production to purchase staples presently grown in his allotment.

Mosese
Nukunuku village
Kin Labourer

Mosese was twenty four years old, unmarried and in a similar situation to that of a large number of Tongan men who had grown up in an era when land access was a privilege rather than a right. With only a primary school education and no English his employment opportunities were limited to horticulture or unskilled labouring in the small enclave industries in Nuku'alofa, some ten kilometres away from his home.

His father had an allotment on which Mosese worked occasionally, but as a younger son he would not inherit any land. After leaving school he just 'hung around', with nothing much to do except help his father.

Mosese started working on his cousin’s plantation after his uncle, who also worked on the plantation, arranged with the owner to give Mosese a job. Although his parents live close by, Mosese shared a hut with the other three workers on the plantation. They all got paid T$5.00 per day and could eat what crops were available from the plantation. Their cash needs for buying such foodstuffs as sugar and salt were limited. The total land area they worked was thirty-two acres, twelve of which were
under bananas. Their employer ran a professional service in Nuku'alofa and usually checked on their daily work on the way home from his office in the evenings.

This wage was Mosese's only source of income and much of it was given to his family, although when he in turn had expenses he went to his family for help. Likewise, if he lost his job he would return to his family and help them grow root crops for sale in the market:

I would work on my fathers land and grow talo which I would sell in Nuku'alofa and make more money than I do here. But I prefer to work for my cousin as the work is not so hard.

For Mosese returning to his parent's land would not have been a long term option. He wanted land of his own and was hopeful of getting an hereditary allotment from the noble so that he did not have to pay the high yearly rental of leasing land. He did not, however, have any connections with the noble that might have facilitated land access nor did he have the necessary tribute to get his request considered.

Any land he did manage to get would have been too small for banana production and he said he would most likely have had to grow root crops on it. Land for Mosese was a route to self-sufficiency, not to cash. This was not to suggest that the cash value of land was unrecognised by Mosese. On the contrary, he would have accepted the opportunity to join the Banana Rehabilitation Scheme with alacrity. But such an opportunity was not seen as likely.
Mosese was quite happy to be working for his relative. All of his needs were met either by his wages or through the provisions of his employer and the work was not too demanding. He was, however, quick to point out that his present situation would be inadequate if he ever got married.

Isi
Nuku'alofa city
Proletarian Labourer

As we each sat perched precariously on a coconut, madly swatting mosquitos and wishing that we had remembered to spray ourselves before leaving for the day's fieldwork, Isi wandered out from among the banana plants where he had been desuckering and sat down.

Isi was twenty-six years old and unmarried. He moved to Tongatapu with his parents when he was thirteen. His home island was eastern Niuatoputapu which was one of the northern most groups and extremely isolated. Isi held an allotment in Niuatoputapu but he had no intention of returning to use it. If he moved back to the northern group to make use of his land the only cash crop he could realistically have grown would have been coconuts for copra. This would have entailed a lot of hard work for little return, particularly given the low world market prices for copra and the transport difficulties in the northern group.

His immediate family moved to Tongatapu and settled in Nuku'alofa in order to take advantage of the opportunities on the main island. None of the family members however, had been able to acquire land so the family of six which shared a fale Tonga
(Tongan house) relied on the wages that Isi and his sister earned. These have to cater for all of their needs, including buying all basic foodstuffs, which were very expensive in the market.

Being the main income earner Isi would very quickly have had to find another job if he had lost his present one. It was unlikely that he would have found one which paid the same wages. He was allowed plenty of overtime which raised his take home pay to T$50.00 per week. He received T$6.00 per day working in the plantation and worked three or four nights a week at the quarry at 70 seniti (cents) per hour.

Apart from unskilled manual labouring and agricultural work Isi had no other options. He finished his education while still at primary school. He was hopeful of obtaining some land from the local noble in order to grow crops for family consumption but he had no basis for making a strong claim not having been born in the area:

I really need some land for my own use to grow crops for my family. Maybe I will go to my noble and try to buy some land. Many people try and buy land from my noble but it is difficult. The land of any noble is the same, it is hard to get and expensive.

Isi was, then, well aware that many people were attempting to secure land from his noble and some of these people could afford to give more than Isi. He was not sure how much he would have to pay to get eight acres but he knew a town allotment (api kolo) on which to build a house would be T$1 000, and that a bush allotment (api uta) would have been much more and he would probably also have had to give pigs as well. Such capital would have been beyond him unless he were able to work overseas. But
even this option was fraught with difficulty as more immediately pressing cash needs would have had to be met before land purchase considerations could be made:

I would like to go to New Zealand to stay with my brother, to work to get money to send home to my family for them to buy food and to build a new home (European house).

Each of the three men represented here rely to a large degree for their livelihood upon providing labour to large banana exporters. Each one faced distinct disadvantages over land access. Poorly educated, they were reliant upon horticultural work either as cash-subsistence growers, or, as in this case, as labourers for large growers. Their modes of employment varied. The common link was that their earnings from plantation labour were not enough to support them and their families. In Ifoni’s case it served as a cash top-up, while for Mose he income was only sufficient due to his single status. Isi was also single but was the main breadwinner in his parent’s household, to earn enough to support his family he had two jobs. All three indirectly provide a subsidy to their banana growing employers by effectively working far below the cost of the reproduction of their labour.

Conclusion

The cases are not meant to be ideal types and it is obvious that even within the selected cases there are discernible differences between, for example, two petty commodity producing scheme members. What does come through, however, are
general characteristics which demonstrate the degree to which class and the concomitant capitalist relations are becoming entrenched in some instances, while non-capitalist relations which serve a purpose within a changing Tonga are preserved.

NOTES

1. Pahl (1984:146-147) summarizes the variety of purposes for which case studies can be used:
   
i. A simple descriptive device, in this case the uniqueness of the circumstances or event will be highlighted.
   
ii. Although the case studies are seemingly ideographic, the interpretation of these cases are in terms of general patterns. It is the general within the case study, in spite of the exceptions that are emphasized.
   
iii. Case studies can be used to develop theory. The heuristic value of such studies is facilitated through the sorting of generalistic relations.
   
iv. Case studies can be used as 'plausibility probes' similar to a pilot study prior to further empirical investigation.
   
v. Crucial case studies may facilitate support for an argument when circumstances mitigate against that position, or disconfirm a seemingly self evident hypothesis.

2. A methodological problem faced by most field researchers is that one person's or one group's story is told more fully. This was manifested in my research through the ease of access to the elite within the scheme as a result of their fluency in English, residence predominantly in Nuku'alofa and ease of contact through phone calls. In contrast, the landless labourers invariably could not speak English, and were not particularly articulate in their own language. They were also often quite hard to re-contact, although in most cases a second meeting was possible.

3. There is no typical case. All case studies are context specific and the context must be clear if the validity of the case is to be judged. The author must guide the reader through the case study highlighting the general principles which may be obscured.
CHAPTER NINE

CLASS RELATIONS AND INEQUALITY

The social relations embedded within the Banana Rehabilitation Scheme constitute, in many ways, a microcosm of Tonga. The impact of the scheme, like the impact of Western capitalist penetration in a broader sense, had been particularly mediated by social forces already in place. The form of the scheme itself reflected vested interests in Tonga. The structural difficulties of access to the scheme were to the advantage of Tongans with land, capital and position within the higher echelons of the bureaucracy, precisely the group which already had power and influence in Tongan society. The support of the New Zealand public for aid was largely inspired by the belief it provided for the poor (Hoadley, 1977:148)\(^1\). It was incumbent on the External Aid Division of the Foreign Affairs Department to ensure some spread of aid benefits and it has been quick to focus on examples of those benefits reaching the disadvantaged in Tongan society. At the same time, however, aid was undoubtedly tending to increase rather than decrease inequalities.

The Banana Rehabilitation Scheme had contributed to the development of a class system of increasingly visible exploitative relations between different groups in Tonga. The New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs had largely ignored this, and failed to carry out the long proposed social impact report. In any case it was doubtful, given the manner in which the Ministry had approached social impact assessments in the past, that the very real processes of inequality encouraged by the scheme would be revealed by such a report even had one been undertaken\(^2\). To understand the nature
of this widening inequality, it was necessary to analyse the way in which the banana scheme had transformed previous relations.

Well before the banana scheme was set up, before New Zealand began providing bilateral aid to Tonga and even prior to penetration, there were major inequalities in Tongan society. They were not capitalist inequalities but they have had a major bearing on the development of capitalist inequality in Tonga today. Productive relations had changed since penetration and the importance of capital had become pronounced. Nevertheless, land remained central in the nexus of social relations in Tonga and it was this which had structured the nature of the impact of the scheme on Tongan society.

The Problem of Land Distribution

Landlessness was commonly claimed by the privileged to be the result of increased population. One bourgeois grower with large holdings and a net income (from all sources) for 1986 in excess of half a million dollars argued:

The population explosion is the biggest problem, we can grow enough food to feed half a million people, but ownership of land is the problem, there is nothing to own anymore. The younger generation has to accept that they can't have 8 1/4 acres of their own land, but they can farm by leasing (Joey, 1987).

Yet he later admitted that:

It is very hard for the people in the villages to lease land as they do not have the contacts.
Thus privileged social relations, not overpopulation, undermined the constitutional provision for universal male access to land.

The nobility, still the largest individual controllers of land, were becoming increasingly divorced from the needs of commoners and felt less obligated to redistribute land. Not even commoners with customary land tenure (allocated and farmed long-term but unregistered) may be secure in the future:

Much of the land in Nukunuku has been farmed by families and passed down to sons, but they may never have had secure tenure through registration to start with. Therefore if, in the future, the noble gets a better offer for the land or wants to use it for himself, the people with present use have no legal position, this is morally but not legally wrong (Kuli, Tongan Lands and Survey Official, 1987).

Although such evictions were extremely rare, rising land values may cause them to become more frequent.

Three important factors had exacerbated landlessness; governmental tardiness in pursuing adequate land reform, the nobility's obstruction of land registration, and demands for tribute by the nobility. These together consigned many people to dependence on remittances, low wage labour, and limited access to other people's land holdings.

Finally, the increasingly capitalist nature of productive relations had encouraged a progressive monopolisation of 'available' land by a small commoner group which had no traditional obligation to ensure the survival of landless commoners. Under these circumstances the principle of every man having access to land, and therefore a
livelihood, was still nominally adhered to in Tongan law. The reality, however, was that large holdings by elite commoners and nobility ensured the inability of many to achieve at least minimum subsistence rights through horticulture.

The Possibilities of More Equitable Land Distribution

Many of the privileged landed, frequently influenced by notions of agribusiness, argue that a more equitable distribution of land would have made land parcels too small to be viable for subsistence cash crop production. However, many parcels of land were already small, and subsistence cash-cropping, under present conditions at least, could be undertaken with less than the 8 acres constitutionally designated to each Tongan man.

As discussed previously, in 1976 around 65% of the men eligible for land were in fact landless. At that time nearly eight and a half thousand men shared a total of 74,379 acres of officially registered land, an average of 8.8 acres each. If, however, all arable land had been allocated equally among all eligible males, the average allotment size would have only dropped to 5.6 acres each. These calculations are based on the 1976 census figures, now over a decade old.

Through the use of data available over the last two years, a more recent picture may be calculated. If all land were available (which includes registered, allocated but unregistered, and noble estates, as well as government leases, charitable leases, and land leased by the commodities board, Tongan nationals, and foreigners) there would be a total arable area of 144,242 acres. If this were distributed equally among those
constitutionally eligible for land, they would receive 4.8 acres each. Because there was often more than one male over sixteen years of age per household, the land available per household would then have been greater than 4.8 acres. Indeed if land were divided by household, greater equity could be achieved.

The total population of Tonga, according to the provisional census figures for 1986 was 94 535, with a total of 17 506 households, therefore 5.4 members per household. Under these circumstances each household could have 8.2 acres. (By coincidence, this was the size of the original entitlement ceded to all eligible males by Taufa’ahau Tupou I in the mid-nineteenth century). ⁵

The desire for land reform was widespread even among successful growers. As one who was also a senior government official argued:

The system needs overhauling and I hope the King can move to change things before a crisis arises. The system as it is was good for 100 years ago but not now... if change is implemented now it may work for a long time, because I think the results from the 1986 census will show that the population has not increased and may have declined, and will not increase, therefore the system created now can cater to a static population (Siouisi, Bourgeois - Grower, 1986)⁶.

**Landlessness and Wage Labour**

Landlessness had previously caused little overt discontent. The landless had been primarily oriented to kin above them rather than towards other landless persons (Marcus, 1978a:529). Relations among those in the banana scheme illustrated this, particularly in the relationship between kin labourers and growers. At the same moment
proletarian labour was bringing together in the workplace Tongans of similar position, a group for whom landlessness was a common characteristic.

The labour needs of large growers were increasingly met by this pool of landless labourers. Their employment opportunities in a predominantly cash-subsistence economy were limited and their lack of formal educational skills restricted white collar employment in the tertiary sector. Consequently they had either to gain access to subsistence production through informal arrangements over land, usually with kin, or became progressively dependent on wages.

The former option was being increasingly undermined by the monetisation of land. Landless people were consequently forced to sell their labour at concessionary rates, topping up their wage with tenuous subsistence production and equally tenuous, if ubiquitous, remittance payments.

The use of cheap wage labour was not only limited to banana production and other horticultural ventures. The success of the small, but growing, industrial sector based in Nuku'alofa, and in particular in the government-established Small Industries Centre, was based on the government's ability to attract overseas capital investment into semi-labour intensive industries employing non-unionised, low paid workers. White collar employment was also characterised by low wages. Indeed, despite being highly sought after, such jobs are often paid no better than plantation labour and occasionally lower. As one major employer of horticultural wage labour, specialising in a variety of export crops, complained:
Two men left me at T$7.00 per day to work for the government at T$5.00 per day as the job was higher prestige ... Farming in Tonga has the lowest prestige* (Joey, Bourgeois - Grower, 1987)

Whether earned in clerical work or in farming such wages would not come close to sustaining the daily requirements of a Tongan household unless they had recourse to other income sources. There were, however, pragmatic reasons for pursuing white collar employment. The possibilities of moving into a higher paid position within the tertiary sector were greater. One was also more likely to get access to work overseas if one had marketable tertiary skills and a good command of English. The rewards for white collar government employment included: housing, pensions, job security and paid holidays.

The influence of external economies on the Tongan domestic economy, predominantly through remittances and the corporate nature of extended family units (Marcus, 1981:48-64), made it impossible to judge the actions of Tongans on purely internal or individual economic grounds. The prestige afforded to white collar work was much higher than horticultural work. People see nothing wrong with taking a low paid job as long as they can get it supplemented by remittances.

The tendency for economic and cultural capital to combine was clearly demonstrated in Tonga. Households containing white collar workers, predominantly as a result of educational attainment, were more likely to be households with the traditional accoutrement of status and privilege. These included access to land and nepotistic ties with the hereditary and, increasingly, commoner elite. Landless labourers were disadvantaged in almost all these spheres. Their lack of land was exacerbated by
limited kin ties to nobility or commoner bourgeoisie. They lacked formal education and proficiency in English. Access to remittance money was for many the only way to meet their expanding material needs and status aspirations.

Relatives of those without land were increasingly unwilling to loan land without remuneration. The ability of landless labourers to subsidise their low wages was, therefore, increasingly circumscribed. The landless perceived education as a route to mobility and their hopes became pinned on the temporary, semi-permanent or permanent migration of a family member to work overseas. Contradictorily these very strategies served in part to increase further the value of land.

The commodification and monetisation of Tongan society meant that land itself was not only transformed into a commodity but an increasingly valuable commodity. The nobility and major leaseholders controlled what land was left for distribution. Inflated prices meant that those relying on cash-subsistence farming were virtually excluded from increasing or making secure their land holdings unless they could find a lump sum via remittance payments. For large growers the cost of land access, over and above what they may already have had, was taken into account when considering extended production. Those controlling available land estimated value on the potential returns to a commercial grower, not a cash-subsistence grower. Meanwhile petty commodity producers without secure tenure had to obtain large cash sums, not in order to advance their position, but simply to maintain customary land access through formal registration.
Ironically, although land prices continued to increase, there was a clear underutilisation of land. The continuation of the traditional fallow system, particularly by cash-subsistence growers, ensured there would always be some uncultivated land. However, there was much unused land controlled by people with other major economic interests in Tonga or absentee landholders, usually semi-permanently or permanently residing overseas. The Tongan government had refused to dispossess these absentee landholders. Part of this reluctance resided in the importance of absentee landholders’ remittance payments. These were a significant part of the funding of the high balance of payments deficit.

Tongans working overseas remitted large cash sums to friends and relatives back in Tonga. The longer they were away from Tonga the less frequent and smaller the remittances became as kin ties became weaker. When Tongan citizens resident overseas maintained links with Tonga through landholding, they needed to service consistently the ties with kin still in Tonga who acted as custodians of the absentee landholder’s land. If government had cut such ties it would have severely reduced Tonga’s remittance earnings.

The Emergence of Class

The banana scheme had exacerbated many of these problems by favouring the already privileged within Tonga. Within the scheme itself, there was clearly a small group who gained access to a disproportionately large amount of the aid funds. This resulted from the criteria for access to the scheme. A large proportion of the male
population, technically eligible for, but unable to gain access to, land were effectively excluded from the benefits of aid. Those with access to land, who were able to join the scheme immediately, constituted an advantaged group vis-a-vis the landless.

The scheme, then, was failing in its aim to reduce inequality. Moreover, those who got the most immediate benefits from the scheme were not reliant on it, and those who got the least benefit were. For the latter, the removal of the subsidies will bring crisis. Their access to cash will have decreased while their need for it, due to the advancing monetization of Tonga will be increasing. The scheme, then, was rigidifying those class structures associated with capitalist penetration. Some of these classes were new formations. Others were capitalist reformulations of old social collectivities. All were products of interaction between penetrating capitalist and indigenous non-capitalist modes. This transformation was not sudden or complete.

Relations of production and social collectivities sometimes change in contradictory ways. Relations of production do not immediately produce social collectivities, nor can non-capitalist social collectivities be assumed to reflect economic positions directly. They cannot, therefore, be easily transformed into classes. Changing relations of production give rise to a changing pattern of social collectivities. These collectivities may not necessarily change completely or develop into classes (Figure 9.1).
Figure 9.1: The transformation of non-capitalist social collectivities to class relations

Pre Capitalist Relations of Production

Give rise to social collectivities

Increasing Capitalist Relations of Production

Give rise to classes

Penetration is partly defined by these interests

The struggles within and among these social collectivities influences the outcome of the struggle to establish class positions

Capitalist Penetration
eg: Banana Scheme
Class Structure

(a) Petty commodity producers

The largest category numerically was the small grower, the petty commodity producer. Those in it relied for land access on small inherited family plots or land usually borrowed from close kin. Banana production and scheme membership was perceived as a viable option in family maintenance. It was a reasonably reliable way of obtaining their increasing cash requirements and some were able to expand into small commercial enterprises. Higher cash incomes could have been achieved through the cultivation of other crops, but the regular income from bananas (payment was made after each shipment and, therefore, about every three weeks) was preferred to annual or seasonal lump sum payments for other produce. This 'drip feeding' of funds was taken a step further by some growers who worked overseas in order to invest remittances in banana production which would provide a long term return, even if that return was no greater than the total input\(^{10}\).

The petty commodity producer, as well as exploiting his own labour, for which he did not receive a wage, also exploited the unwaged labour of his immediate family. Consequently, petty commodity producers maintained very direct and immediate control over the various components of production. Nevertheless their opportunities were constrained by their limited access to capital. Their production and reproduction was determined by commodity relations, by production for sale in the market (Goodman, 1981:84).
Their survival was dependent upon intensified commodity production in which they incorporated surplus labour time into the product through the use of unpaid labour. The petty commodity producer, therefore, incorporated wage labour in production, although it was hidden within household production;

the 'price' which the producers receive is no longer a pure category of exchange but ... a relation of production, a concealed wage. Behind the superficial 'surface' sale of products, peasants under this form of domination sell their labour power (Banaji, 1977:34).

This was not new to Tonga. During early contact, merchant capital served to intensify commodity relations. This was not full-blown capitalism, but it helped to bring about the subjugation of direct producers and allowed both traders and the state to gain some control over their production process.

(b) Petit bourgeoisie

There was an embryonic petit bourgeois group which relied significantly upon the foothold it had gained in the Tongan economy as a result of increasing commodification of goods and services, and access to cash earned overseas. Most common among the petit bourgeoisie were the small retailers and private operators within the thriving transport industry. Banana exports constituted a major element in their livelihood.

(c) Bourgeoisie

The developing bourgeoisie included not only the nobility, who may not have directly employed labour but accrued surplus value through the manipulative control
they had over land, but also a business and bureaucratic elite. These were major employers of labour and controllers of capital.

The nobility (formerly chiefs) continued, in an albeit modified form, to mediate commoners' access to land. They were transformed from a 'traditional' elite to a rentier fraction of capital which has forced those without capital into a structurally more disadvantaged position. The nobility, instead of maintaining a social obligation to provide commoners with the means of survival, have commodified these exchanges. The gatekeeping role of the nobility was discussed in chapters five and six. The degree to which individual nobles had reoriented their social and economic relations to maintain their power varied (Marcus, 1978b:82-118).

The nobility did not figure prominently as growers in the present scheme. In many cases nobles had used their privileged position to move directly into capitalist enterprises although the amount of capital per se among individual nobility varied greatly.

Within the scheme there was a relatively small number of growers, usually with large plantations, who had wider business interests or senior civil service positions. These growers had access to landholding both through family estates and through formal leasehold provisions facilitated by their bureaucratic and/or noble connections and access to capital. The business sector of this category tended to run their ventures in a conventionally capitalist manner and employed labour on a predominantly contractual basis.
Members of the bureaucracy who were growers tended to have smaller plantations. Their labour needs tended to be fulfilled by the use of kin networks. Increasingly, however, they were making use of paid labour. Production was less profit-oriented than the business grower. Part of the rationale for engaging in production was to provide a means by which they, as prominent figures within extended family networks, could fulfill their widespread social obligations. Such ventures offset the costs of maintaining these obligations to kin while at the same time, making use of the labour of those kin who made, or were likely to make, calls upon their resources. This concern with maintenance of social obligations did not, however, undermine the ultimate concern for an economically viable form of production. Indeed the former encouraged the latter.

Bourgeois growers relied to varying degrees, on being able to use labour at concessionary rates. The low wages of the wage employees of these growers were subsidised through their engagement in such activities as subsistence production, the use of remittance payments and overseas wage labour.

Use of Kin or Capital

In spite of the various production orientations of the different classes, all relied on labour supplied at concessionary rates. Figure 9.2 depicts the degree of orientation to kin or capital among different classes.
Figure 9.2: Production orientation - kin or capital

- Petty Commodity Producers
- Petit Bourgeoisie
- Bureaucratic Bourgeoisie
- Business Bourgeoisie

Kin Orientation (Labour Use) "Relations of Production"

High

Low

Non-Capitalist

Capitalist

Production Orientation (Use of Capital) "Forces of Production"
Social Relations Within the Scheme

The changing nature of wealth in Tonga was a result of the increasing penetration of capitalism and its articulation with the non-capitalist mode. This study has begun to draw a picture of the extent of capitalist horticulture in Tonga and to speculate about the development of more visible class relations in the future. Social differentiation is no longer based purely on kinship relations, yet at this stage, the interactive process between capitalist and non-capitalist modes makes class analysis tentative. The petty commodity producers remained central to the social structure of Tongan horticulture. They were, however, being overtaken on both sides by a growing landless proletariat and a relatively small but powerful bourgeoisie increasingly engaged in capitalist relations of production.

The banana scheme, and capitalist penetration on a broader level, had influenced changing social relations among Tongans. At the same time existing social relations informed the nature of capitalism's impact on Tonga. The model below (Figure 9.3) outlines a view of Tongan social structure as perceived through the operation and effects of the Banana Rehabilitation Scheme. Horticultural production is so central that these relations are widespread throughout Tonga in a variety of different contexts.
Figure 9.3: Tongan social relations as identified within the banana scheme.

KEY

Generalised Class Relations

1. Landless become clients of petty commodity producing kin to obtain land.

2. Landless deference to nobility who mediate land access.

3. Bourgeois commoners' capital access secures land from nobles.

4. Petty commodity producers' provide part time plantation labour for large growers.

5. Deference by petty commodity producers to nobility influenced by level of land security.

6. Landless provide labour to large growers on contract or through kin networks.
As Tonga became increasingly entrenched within the world economic system and dominated by the capitalist mode of production, the social collectivities identified in pre- and early contact Tonga became progressively class-based. The petty commodity producer, a category which earlier this century had accounted for the vast majority of Tongans, was now less pervasive, as the landless category became increasingly evident and began to form a rural and urban proletariat. Out of the petty commodity producers had emerged a predominantly urban petit bourgeoisie which had acquired enough capital to enter other ventures as well as, or in place of, petty commodity production.

The contemporary landless were increasingly less integrated into kin networks, partly as a result of increasing individualism and partly due to greater geographic mobility, both nationally and internationally. The landless were becoming progressively more visible particularly as they became embedded in capitalist relations of production and wage labour became their major source of livelihood.

The commoner bourgeoisie was not part of an identifiable social collectivity in pre- or early contact Tonga. Rather it consisted of those most able to take advantage of the struggle over new resources and sites of mobility offered by the construction of western-oriented institutions. The most significant of these were the formal church hierarchy, educational institutions and the bureaucratic apparatus of the state. In none of these spheres had the nobility taken immediate control.

The nobility, contrary to much local opinion, had also changed markedly. Indeed it had undergone a double transformation from being part of the chiefly hierarchy prior to
the nineteenth century reforms; to a pensioned-off nobility, created to strengthen Tupou I's position as absolute monarch, and finally to a rentier fraction dealing in land. As land had increasingly become a commercial resource and a major source of wealth, the nobility had used their control over it to extend both their economic power and consolidate their social status.

While all of these class formations are partial manifestations of the workings of capitalist penetration, it was the bourgeois commoner and the landless who had had their positions created rather than reconstituted, as in the case of the petty commodity producer and the nobility.

The effect of the banana scheme in encouraging capitalist horticulture does not mean that the petty commodity producers will disappear. Capitalist horticulture has lived side by side with peasant small holdings in many countries even where land rights have not been entrenched (Williams, 1984). Petty commodity producers will, however, be a less significant proportion of the population as classes more oriented to capitalism expand.

Petty commodity producers in Tonga have been providing labour to capitalist horticulturalists as a supplementary source of cash income. It will, however, increasingly be the landless who serve as the labour force for expanding horticultural capitalism. The petty commodity producers and the landless will therefore become less able to change their class positions. Few Tongans are likely to move into the petty commodity producing class unless they inherit land. Nor are they likely to compete with capitalist horticulturalists in the land market.
Whether petty commodity producers in general maintain a livelihood through cash subsistence production or become part of an allotment-holding proletariat is unclear (Lenin, 1972: 172-187). What is clear in Tonga is that the petty commodity producing household will increasingly have to reproduce itself through a greater interaction with the wider capitalist economy. Because this group retains some control over its means of production, as opposed to the landless, there is likely to be a growing gulf between the interests of these two.

What Does the Future Hold?

A greater number of people will be increasingly forced to oscillate between at least two modes of production in order to survive. The growing strength of capitalism that creates wealth for the bourgeoisie is undermining one of the present bases for its success, that is, the ability of their workers to gain access to alternative forms of subsistence. Remittance earnings, now entrenched in Tongan culture, are not internally controlled to any degree. The extent of international migration, particularly to Australia and New Zealand, is controlled by the immigration policy of those countries. This makes the advantages accruing to some, and the basis for livelihood of the landless, increasingly tenuous.

Consultant economists such as Barry Brook (personal communication, April 1986) have widely advocated the freeing up of land distribution to facilitate further coalescence into the hands of commercial farmers. This would have three effects. First, it would increase the food importation bill for Tonga. This is already higher than
Payday for banana growers. Many growers with limited capital and income collect payment as soon as possible. Frequently wives queue while husbands wait outside. Source: Fieldwork 1986-87.

Entrenched into the cash nexus. This grower immediately uses his export payment to pay off some of his expenses incurred within the scheme. Source: Fieldwork 1986-87.
Variation in housing standards among those involved in the scheme. Above left, a petty commodity producer's new two room home. Above right, the home of a landless labourer provided by his employer. Bottom left, a petty commodity producer's one room home. Bottom right, the home of a bourgeois commoner.
total exports. Second, it would lead Tonga into a situation of extended reliance upon world prices and a less stable value of exports and likelihood of maintaining its standard of living. Third, it would exacerbate inequalities within Tonga.

An increasing number of wage workers are already isolated from access to subsistence production, and are reliant upon waged work for a living. At present, however, low export commodity prices encourage the bourgeoisie to lower labour costs and limit the demand for labour. Under these circumstances the landless are cast adrift lacking land for subsistence production while at the same time not having access to a living wage.

As an example of aid input and the increasing entrenchment of capitalism the scheme is bringing about increasing social polarisation. Measured by indicators such as gross domestic or gross national product the scheme is indeed increasing wealth in Tonga. It is, however, a dependent development with limited distributive effects.

NOTES

1. Public attitudes in New Zealand towards aid are largely an unknown quantity. The Aid Advisory Committee recently commissioned a major study of understanding and attitudes to development and aid. One of the more major concerns of the public was that aid should be targetted to the poorest groups in the Third World (Advisory Committee on External Aid and Development, 1986-87).

2. Gordon Campbell in 'The Marshall Plan' (1987:28-32) highlights the role aid projects play in developing overseas markets for New Zealand interests. A geothermal aid programme in the Philippines was funded to the tune of NZ$23.38 million between 1973 and 1988, 85-95% of that went to an Auckland consultancy firm. Cheap electricity was produced for the island of Leyte, however;
those poor and rural dwellers we aim to help could not afford light bulbs, let alone the cost of installing electricity. The main beneficiary of Leyte power turned out to be an environmentally destructive copper smelter in which three Japanese multinationals had a large stake (Campbell, 1987:31).

3. As there is often more than one eligible male per household, the inequitable distribution of land among households could be marked.

4. The land acreage figures are available in the 1977 Report of Land, Survey and Natural Resources, Appendix II.

5. The major problem with a redistributive exercise, is that although the calculations include arable land on inhabited islands, it does not take account of the population density on Tongatapu. Any redistribution of land would, therefore, have to be paralleled with policy to reverse the internal migration which is increasing. The viability of cash crop production on islands other than Tongatapu can be encouraged, as is clear with the success of vanilla production on Vava‘u. But the will power of the privileged to institute initial changes to land distribution would have to be combined with a political will to institute policies redistributing, for example, aid funds for horticultural projects to areas beyond Tongatapu. Which will in turn ease the migratory flow to the south.

6. The provisional figures for the 1986 census show a population decline of some 3,000 to under 92,000.

7. Tax concessions and other financial inducements also influence overseas capitalists’ decisions to invest in Tonga.

8. Horticultural work is accorded low prestige, but is further subdivided. Those working for others are accorded the lowest status, while farmers, who are perceived as being quite wealthy due to farming, have much higher prestige, particularly if they do not work themselves.

9. Cash expenditure by Tongan households is widely variable, depending not only upon the degree to which subsistence food beyond basic manufactures, such as sugar, salt, etc., must be purchased, but also the expenditure on what are now becoming perceived as normal in Tonga. Most Tongans now expect to live in a European style house (Fale Papalangi). Electricity, particularly in Nuku‘alofa and the larger villages, is becoming more and more the norm. Electricity bills, electrical appliances, etc., increase the cash requirements of the household tremendously. No indicators for relative poverty within Tonga have been laid down, but at this stage of economic development those living in a fale Tonga (traditional house) must be considered as being in relative poverty. In the near future, electricity may be added to this as a criteria.

10. This rationale was also used in relation to remittance money spent to purchase goods for a shop (fale koloa). Although the likelihood of any
economic return on investment was limited, due to family use of stock, kin use, and extended credit to villagers, the shop provided an input of funds over a sustained period. This contrasted with someone returning from, for example, New Zealand with $4,000 in cash, whereby systems of obligation mean the sum is quickly used up. The setting up of a shop, or community transport service, makes these growers part of a petit bourgeoisie.

Evidence of increasing wealth in Tonga as well as money being the main arbiter of land access is highlighted in the latest venture by Tonga Land Development Enterprises. Headed by a top civil servant, the venture has acquired 16.5 acres from a noble on a long term lease, 16 kilometres from Nuku'alofa, and is developing a T$4.7 million complex designed as a village retreat for the Tongan elite. The minimum package available costs T$67,000. This must be placed in the context of Tonga's GDP per capita of less than T$1,000.
Articulation of modes of production theory highlights the role that capitalist penetration plays in the changing nature of Tongan social relations and the formation and increasing rigidity of classes. This thesis has demonstrated that, in this instance, New Zealand bilateral aid has encouraged capitalist penetration which, rather than benefitting all Tongans, has exacerbated existing inequalities. More particularly the scheme has assisted in the transformation of the nobility from a pensioned off elite to a rentier class. A rising commoner elite rests its position on control over the means of production.

Social Change, Unrest and Aid: Tonga's Future

Since last century, when the present dynasty took control in Tonga, there has been very little political unrest. Tongan people were generally bound by allegiance to their king, kin and religion. Political agitation in 1986, however, reached a relative fever pitch as result of unpopular moves by the government, particularly the introduction of a value-added tax. Possibly more important were the events leading up to the January 1987 elections. For the first time several candidates ran as commoner representatives standing on a ticket openly critical of the nobilities control of government. A number of these candidates were subsequently elected. Although the structure of the political system makes commoner representatives effectively powerless in the face of a noble
block vote, it was clear that urban-based intellectuals were beginning to agitate for political change. They have been careful not to transgress the boundaries of Tongan public sentiment regarding the monarchy and their religion\(^2\).  

The watchdog status of the new breed of commoner representatives is politically sensitising the wider Tongan public. The issue most likely to cause unrest is the increasingly evident inequalities of wealth, privilege and power and the awareness that such inequalities are not immutable.

Class relations in Tonga, at present embryonic, are likely to become established and increasingly to set political agendas. It should not be ignored that it was a disgruntled, dispossessed working class, of both Fijian and Indian ethnicity, that helped put a labour coalition into power in the 1987 Fijian general election. Likewise, a growing proletariat in Tonga will be a force for future change. Indeed class consciousness among this group may be more pervasive in Tonga than in Fiji given that ethnicity is not a basis of divisive interests. About 96% of the population is ethnic Tongan and apart from the growing strength of the Mormon church, Tonga is also relatively homogenous denominationally.

In Tonga social unrest, politicised or not, is most likely to be expressed by proletarianised and increasingly urban youth. Over the next two decades, an increasing number of young men and women without access to independent means of survival are likely to constitute a growing challenge to social order. The urban youth of Nuku'alofa are already seen as a problem and a threat to stability\(^3\). Religion and kin-ties, two factors which have been long term mediators in maintaining stability in the face of
increasing capitalist penetration, are no longer integrating forces after legitimate and traditional means of survival are undermined⁴.

Under these circumstances, the 'success' of aid in Tonga is questionable. This has been virtually acknowledged by senior officials in the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Freeman-Greene, 1987:64). This is not to say, however, that aid or even the Banana Rehabilitation Scheme, has had no beneficial effects. A large number of scheme members regularly export bananas and have used the scheme as an economic base from which to improve their material lifestyle. The most needy people however, remain excluded from the scheme. This exclusion is a result of internal political structures in Tonga and inadequacies in the planning of aid schemes by New Zealand. Those in power in Tonga lack the political will to address issues of inequality, and the New Zealand government is guided by more than one agenda in its aid programme⁵.

The changes being wrought by capitalist penetration in general and the Banana Rehabilitation Scheme in particular cannot be typified as changes from traditionalism to modernity, as modernisation theorists would have us believe. Nor, contrary to the claims of dependency theorists, has capitalism completely dominated Tongan society. If Tonga can now be seen as a predominantly capitalist society, and this is still debatable, it has a capitalist social formation of its own. The articulation between the culture and social relations of non-capitalist Tonga and capitalist penetrations gives rise to a unique society which retains and incorporates particular elements of its non-capitalist past.
Dependent Development

Bertram and Watters (1985a:501) identify four important factors in shaping the present and future of South Pacific microstates; migration, remittances, aid, and bureaucracy. MIRAB (an acronym of the four factors) economies are portrayed as sustainable systems because islanders can use migration and remittances. These, according to Bertram and Watters (1985a:511), allow islanders to be proletarianised without, in the process, becoming a proletariat. Because they retain control over means of production they enjoy considerable managerial autonomy and are not dependent upon wage labour for their survival.

This is debatable. MIRAB economies such as Tonga may well be sustained by migration and remittances but these choices are hardly made by autonomously acting Tongans. The options are dependent upon significant First World partners. The degree to which such transnational survival strategies will equalise opportunity is also dubious. Bertram and Watters’ conclusions reflect an implicit articulation analysis in which it is assumed that economies such as Tonga’s will contain two modes of production between which Tongans can choose to move. This thesis challenges this assumption. Wage exchanges and commodification appear to be dominating and transforming relations of production in Tonga.

The uneven flow of resources demonstrated in relation to the banana scheme undermines much of what Bertram and Watters see as positive in the MIRAB process. If aid administrators continue to ignore the internal social structures which mediate its influence, the unequitable distribution of Tonga’s wealth will be compounded.
Aid projects such as the banana scheme may indeed be boosting per capita income in Tonga, but they are also having an adverse redistributive effect which may make a large part of the population relatively and absolutely worse off. In the South Pacific Agricultural Survey (Ward, 1979:57) this is recognised but not adequately dealt with:

In Tonga, an increasing number of high ranking civil servants as well as people in the commercialised service sector are entering horticulture on a relatively large scale, fully commercial, mechanised basis. This opens possibilities for earning acceptable levels of cash income and so acquiring material goods, status and power. Trends such as this may well do more to raise the status of horticulture in general, than any programmes in schools. This trend does, however, have implications for the distribution of wealth in society as a whole, and raises the issue of whether sufficient land is available, and under what terms of tenure, for more than a small proportion of the population to be able to participate in this type of agriculture, except as labourers.

The beneficiaries of the world economic system, and in this case the Pacific regional system, are clearly not confined to New Zealand and Australia. There are elites in all countries in the region. The situation has developed whereby many of the elite in Tonga have much more in common with the elite in New Zealand than with other Tongans. These ties include governmental, business, professional, and educational links as well as through marriage and migration (Hau'ofa, 1987; Marcus, 1981).

The lack of homogeneity within Tonga in the case of the banana scheme was discussed in chapters five to seven. The elite within the scheme have become increasingly homogeneous with the elite of the First World Pacific nations, sharing the same language, ideology and material lifestyle. Meanwhile, those marginal to the benefits of the scheme and capitalism in general, adopted strategies of survival evident
among much of the proletariat and lumpenproletariat in the First World (Pahl, 1984)\textsuperscript{8}. There is however still a

strong reluctance on the part of the regional privileged, including academics, to recognise the emergence of modern classes in the island world. There is a tendency for island analysts, businessmen, state officials and politicians, influenced by their Western mentors to blame the poor for their own conditions (Hau'ofa, 1987:11).

This position is both a result of the pervasiveness of modernisation ideology, which has most influenced Third World leaders, and a stance which reinforces their own privileged access to aid resources. The poor of Tonga, according to the elite, lack the resourcefulness or motivation to take advantage of opportunities offered. This is highlighted by the poor's tenacity in clinging to 'traditional' or 'pre-modern' social relations. In reality, the action by the poor of Tonga reflects their structural disadvantage in access to resources. To survive they strive to maintain rights in 'traditional' society while trying to maximise their advantage from the encroachment of capitalism.

New Zealand: A Commitment to Aid or Unequal Benefit?

The aims expressed in the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs documents conflict. The banana scheme was conceived as a response to all of the five aid principles first espoused in 1981, productive capacity, employment opportunities, welfare of the rural poor, welfare of women, and the need for popular participation. But as the scheme has aged not only have these not been accomplished but New Zealand aid administrators have actually limited the goals of the scheme. This is a general
The sole criteria for success frequently becomes increased productive capacity, or a viable overall return on investment (Cassen, 1986:12):

In practice New Zealand's aid policies run the same risk of urban, centrist and class bias ... it is very difficult to meet the particular goals stated in the set of principles, especially section six ... The poor are indeed invisible to observers who rarely travel further than to the main island ... (Bertram and Watters, 1984:395).

Certainly it does appear that the problems of aid in Tonga reflect those which Bertram and Watters described in their review of New Zealand government aid in the South Pacific, and which hamper all horticultural aid projects as they are presently constituted;

larger, more affluent, more literate, or more entrepreneurial farmers capitalise heavily on the new opportunities while the poorer, more isolated and less well aware villagers "beyond the tarmac road" receive little or no benefit. Thus while the new innovations may benefit some favoured regions or classes of people, it also serves to widen the economic disparities between classes and regions (Bertram and Watters, 1984:394-395).

The lack of reflexivity on the part of New Zealand aid administrators relates directly to their over structural position. But it also reflects their commitment to modernisation theory, which, while largely discredited amongst academics, remains powerful as an ideology among those who control the purse strings of the world economy. Out of this commitment emerges a tendency to explain failures in aid schemes as the fault of the receiving country. This makes criticism of aid difficult, particularly because Third World societies so desperately need the investment aid provides and given that societies such as Tonga are enmeshed in world capitalist relations in any case. The problem is how can aid be made more effective, and
equitable. This depends on the construction of sophisticated and precisely targetted aid schemes, more efficient monitoring, as well as increased aid inputs.

New Zealand's Future Role

The New Zealand Labour government has, since its election in 1984, maintained a commitment to reaching the United Nation's target of 0.7% of gross national product (GNP) to go towards aid\(^0\). New Zealand's aid vote at about 0.3% of GNP, remains one of the lowest in the world and has been effectively cut for the 1988 financial year. The figure only retained some credibility on paper because of some creative accounting whereby the overseas students' education fund was transferred from the education to the aid vote.

Representatives of the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs argue that although their aid vote is low, the value of their contribution to development is beyond its absolute size. This allegedly derives from the sensitivity to the problems of their aid partners which they bring to aid administration (Freeman-Greene, 1987:5). New Zealand, like all donor countries, wishes to be associated with demonstrably successful projects. It is partly this which leads to the administrative neglect of the poor. It is hardest to show in any quantitative manner the success of a project aimed specifically at the poor because the benefits are often not readily reducible to monetary units, for example, improved health, school attendance and decreased dependence upon others, compared to increased export income or GNP per capita which can more easily be measured and presented as proof of success (Cassen, 1986:16).
The abolition of aid is not advocated here despite the inequality which has been shown to result from it. In the context of First World - Third World relations aid is important. Tongans need aid but not necessarily in its present form. There needs to be greater flexibility and more direct targeting to those identified as poor. The New Zealand government has to recognize that for the poor to take the opportunities offered by aid, the programmes must be set up to take account of the structures already in place. Inequalities in Tonga prior to the scheme continue to prevent the scheme from undermining present inequalities. The Tongan government must also have the political will to tackle major problems, for example, inequitable land distribution and the ensuing disparity between the wealthy elite and the poor. If the New Zealand government is committed to contributing to the lives of all Tongans, then it must confront its own interests in the maintenance of inequalities not only between New Zealand and Tonga but among Tongans.

NOTES

1. They also published a broadsheet which had a series of issues during 1986. It retailed in local shops, with over 1,000 copies of each issue being sold. Various government ministers tried to gag the publications and made personal attacks on the former high school teacher who spearheaded the dissent.

2. Marcus (1978b:159-163) contends that the king could effectively weaken the power of the nobility without undermining his own power base. This may have major consequences for the future of the nobility if agitation by commoners about the increasing inequality becomes more overt.

3. A representative of the New Zealand government in Tonga claimed that the banana scheme was directly designed to address this problem. Part of the scheme's aim was to create jobs for these urban youth and to stem
the flow of rural-urban migration by creating wage labour out of the capital.

4. Although the household unit remains central to Tongan life, it is changing from an extended basis to a predominantly nuclear pattern. Most extra household members are unmarried relatives (Maude, 1965:50). Whereas previously it was likely that the household head directed the labour of other members of the extended family, the increasingly individualised nature of holdings today means that sons, who manage to acquire land through inheritance or on application to a noble, are independent entities, and kin increasingly work independently. The cash crop orientation of the economy and increasing availability of consumer items, encouraging individual spending have undermined the social welfare function of the family which serves to subsidise capitalist production as well as the power of the household head. However, larger kinship orientation is still evident. The *matakali* (also called the *familii*) is the commonly recognised descent group, relations within it are relatively loose and are activated mainly during ceremonial functions.

5. These not only include the aims publicised by the External Aid Division of Foreign Affairs but the domestic and international aims, which include supporting aid programmes which are advantageous to New Zealand businesses, an indication of the present government's policy of increasingly using the External Aid Division as a more explicitly pragmatic tool of foreign policy (Campbell, 1987).

6. The material they use is illustrative of their approach. In 1976, Tongan exports were equivalent to 36% of imports, 52% of earnings were accounted for by remittances, donations, and gifts. By 1980, exports were 23% of imports. An increased level of aid covered most of the deficit, as remittances, donations, and gifts dropped to 34% of earnings (Bertram and Watters, 1985a:506-507). Self-reliance and autonomous development by countries like Tonga are not, according to Bertram and Watters, a realistic goal.

7. Bertram and Watters contend that the recognition of the MIRAB process is a sign of the maturation of attitudes towards development in the South Pacific, a development dependent upon former colonial powers, maintaining a strategic interest in the region. They deny the possibility of autonomous economic development, which, if accepted by the MIRAB economy, could facilitate a lowering of the emphasis upon bureaucratic structures, constantly enlarged to pursue the elusive development goal. This is the most useful part of their analysis. They recognise the posturing of island elites in maintaining advantages accruing as a result of the 'developing' status of their countries.

The MIRAB model continues to be refuted by the states at which the analysis is aimed. The Tongan government and administration cling to the rhetoric of autonomous development, a position facilitating continued advantage to the elite, which profits most from the present relationship;
national leaders are persuaded that development planning can solve problems which are essentially questions of power and politics (Bertram and Watters, 1984:392).

8. Pahl (1984) demonstrated in his study of the working class on the Isle of Sheppey in Kent the extent of the informal economy, often with wide use of the labour of all household members.

9. A key objective of the Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee (a Parliamentary select committee able to make recommendations to government), set up in late 1987, was to ensure that by 1990/91 New Zealand's aid spending would be 0.51% of GNP (Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee, 1987).
Appendix A

QUESTIONNAIRES

NB. This schedule was only sighted by the researcher and his interpreter. Its main role was to provide an aide memoire to ensure that no important issues were omitted.

PART ONE

General Questionnaire

Questions for growers, ex-growers and labourers.

General

1 Name?
Ko hai ho hingoa’?

2 Male or female?
Tangata pe fefine?

3 Age? (estimate or ask?)
Ta’u fiha? or Ko e ha ho ta’u motu’a?

4 Island of birth? (If not Tongatapu when did respondent move?)
Ko e te fonua na’e fa’ele’i ai koe? Hiki mai ki Tongatapu ‘anefe?

5 Village of birth?
ie: Where did you live when you were a child?
(If different from present village, when did respondent shift and why?)
Koiteitu’u na’e faele’i ai koe?

5a Position in family?
ie: Were you the oldest boy in the family?
Ko koe oku lahi taha he famili?

6 Length of residence in present village?
Koe tau eni ‘e fiha ho’o nofo ‘iheni?

7 Name of Mother’s lineage?
Koe ha ae fakaiku ‘oe famili ho’o ta’e?
8 Name of Father's lineage?
Koe ha ae fakaiku 'oe famili ho'o tamai?

9 Marital status?
Ku o ke 'osi mali?

10 Number of children?
Oku toko fiha ho'o fanau?

11 English spoken? (what level)
'Oku ke poto he lea fakapalangi?

Education

1 What class were you in when you left school?
Na'a ke nofo mei he ako 'i ho'o kalasi fiha?

2 Have you ever been to school or studied overseas?
eg: High school, Technical institute, University.
Ku o ke osi ako i muli?

3 If yes: For how long?
Koe ha hono loloa ho'o ako ai?

4 What did you study?
Koe ha ae me'a na'a ke ako ki ai?

5 Who paid for this?
eg: self, parents, relatives, Tonga scholarship, other country scholarship, other?
Ko hai na'ane totongi ho'o ako?

Sources of Income

1 Apart from growing bananas for export / labouring in the banana plantation what other ways do you make a living - what other work do you do?
eg wage work/other wage work, cash cropping/other cash cropping, remittances, wife working, land rental, business interests eg taxi, boats, shop(s), motels.
Tuku kehe ho'o ngaue he siaine, oku 'i ai ha fa'athinga ngaue kehe 'oku 'ke fai ke ma'u ai ha pa'anga?
eg remittances - pa'anga mei muli, wife working - ngaue ae mali, fishing - toutai, shop - fale koloa, taxi - tekisi.
2 Of these different types of work and income sources which one(s) are the most important.
Ko e ha ho’o fa’ahinga ngaue oku ma’u lahi taha mai ai ho’o pa’anga?

3 Have you ever worked overseas?
Kuo ke ‘osi ngaue i muli?

4 If yes: For how long?
Koe ha hono loloa?

5 What did you do with the money?
Koe ha ho’o me’a na’e fai ki ho’o pa’anga?

Dwelling

1 Do you live in a fale Palangi or a fale Tonga?
Oku ke nofo fale papa/fale piliki pe fale Tonga?

2 How many rooms are there?
Ko e loki e fiha ‘i faleni?

3 How many people (children and adults) usually live there?
Koe toko fiha oku nofo i heni (kakai lalahi moe fanau).

4 Do you have electricity?
Oku iai ha’a mou ‘uhila?

5 Do you have a refrigerator?
Oku iai ha’o mou aisi?

6 Do you have an electric stove?
Oku iai ha’a mou sitou uhila/ Pe sitou kasa?

7 Do you have a telephone?
Oku iai ha’a mou telefoni?

Religion

1 What Church do you go to?
Oku ke siasi ha?

Positions of Status and Power

1 Do you hold any positions in organisations like the church, region, government?
Oku iai hao fa’aahinga lakanga ihe lotu, fonua, pule anga?
2 Do you have any relatives who are nobles or Members of Parliament?
Oku i'ai hao kainga oku konga hou'eiki pe Memipa he Falealea?

3 If yes: What is his name?
Ko hai ho nau hingoa

Work History

1 What other types of work (as opposed to plantation runner or labourer) have you done since 1977 (there was an earthquake in 1977)?
Koe ha ae fa'ahinga ngaue na'a ke fai talu mei he taha hiva fitu fitu (na'e hoko ae mofuike 'ihe taha hiva fitu fitu)?

PART TWO

Questionnaire for labourers

Knowledge of scheme/plantation (q.lab kno sch)

1 How long have you been working on this plantation?
Ko e ha e fuoloa ho'o ngaue he ngaue'anga ko eni?

2 Are you a relative of the plantation owner?
'Oku ke kainga mo e tangata ha'ana e ngaue'anga?

3 Question mapping awareness of scheme involvement.

4 Do you know how large this plantation is?
'Oku 'ke ilo ko e ha e lahi e ngaue'anga ko eni?

5 Do you have any idea what the income of this plantation is?
Oku 'tai ha'o 'ilo, ko e ha e lahi e pa'anga oku ma'u mei he ngaue'anga ni?

Payment

1 How do you get paid? eg cash, food, accomodation, school fees of children paid, transport from outer islands, combination.
'Oku totongi fete ho'o ngaue? - pa'anga, pe me'akai pe ha toe founaga kehe?

2 Would you prefer to be paid in cash or in some other form?
Tke sa'ia ange ke totongi pa'anga, pe ha fa'ahinga founaga kehe?
3 Is this job the only work you do or do you have work in other places as well?
Ko ho'ō ngaue pe eni, pe oku ke ngaue i ha fietu'u kehe?
eg: hotel work in town, sale of crafts, fishing etc.
eg: ngaue hotelie i kolo (Nuku'alofa), fakatau atu ngaue fakame'a, toutai etc.

4 Which is your most important source of income?
Ko e ha ho'ō pa'anga humai lelei taha?

Land

1 Do you have any land of your own?
Oku 'i ai hao kelekele tonu pe 'o'ou?

2 If yes: How much land do you have?
Ko e ha e a lahi ho kelekele koia?

3 What are the names of these pieces of land?
Ko e ha e hingoa ho'o kelekele (api uta)?

4 How did you acquire each of these?
Na'ė anga fefe ho'o ma'u e kelekele ko'enī?

5 If no: Do you think you will be getting any land of your own soon? If yes: How will you get this land?
If no: 'Oku ke fakakaukau teke lava pe 'o ma'u ha'o konga kelekele he vave mai? If yes: 'E anga fefe ho'o ma'u ia?

6 Do you have any land which you use but you do not actually own it, land you may be borrowing or leasing?
Oku iai pe ha konga kelekele 'oku ke ngaueaki ka 'oku 'ikai ko ho kelekele? Ko ho'o kole pe lii ia?
If yes: Where is this land, who owns it, how much do you use, how much do you pay for the use of it, how long will you be able to use it for?
If yes: 'Oku tu'u 'i fe konga kelekele ko'eni, ko hai 'oku ha'ana, koe ha e lahi 'oku ke ngaue aki, ko e ha e mahu'inga 'oku ke totongi ki he konga kelekele, ko e ha e fuoloa teke ngaue'aki e konga konga kelekele?

7 What do you do with the crops that you grow on the land that you are using? eg: consume, sell locally, give away, export.
'Oku fefe'i e-fua ho'o ngoue?

8 Do you grow any bananas yourself?
'Oku 'ke to pe 'e koe ha siaine ma'au?

9 If yes: How many?
If yes: Fu'u siaine 'e fiha?
10 If you wanted to start growing bananas on a more fulltime basis (assumption that at present growing is limited) would you be able to get the land you needed?
Kapau 'Oku 'ke fiema'u ke ke to siaine taimi kakato teke lava pe 'o ma'u e kelekele 'oku 'ke fiema'u?

11 How would you get this land eg: application to noble, legal leasing, informal leasing, borrowing from friends and relatives?
'E anga tefe ho'o ma'u e kelekele ko ia eg kole ki he nopele, lisi, kole ki ho kaume'a pe ko ho kianga?

12 Do you think that there is a land shortage on Tongatapu?
'Oku 'ke fakakaukau 'oku 'i'ai ha nounou/sisii 'o e kelekele 'i Tongatapu?

13 If yes: How do you think this problem could be solved?
If yes: Ko e ho'o fakakaukau ke solova 'aki e palopa'ema ko 'eni?

Livelihood

1 If you included all the things that you would pay for in a year like: food, electricity bills and other bills, presents, air fares, petrol for a car or van, fixing up the fale, tools for working in the gardens - everything in fact that you need in a year, what place or job would provide you with the most money to pay for these things?
Kapau 'oku kau e ngaahi me'a teke totongi fakata'u hange: me'akai, mo'ua 'uhila moe ngaahi mo'ua kehe, me'a faka'aho, lolo ki he ka pe veeni, fakalelei'i ho fale, me'angaue ki he ngoue anga - me'a kotoa 'oku ke fiema'u fakata'u, koe ha e fefu'u pe koe ngaue tene 'oatu ai ha pa'anga lahi ke ke totongi e ngaahi me'a ko eni?

1a How important are your earnings from working in the plantation in providing the things you need?
'Oku fe'unga e lahi e pa'anga mei ho'o ngoue'anga ke fakalate ho'o ngaahi fiema'u?

2 How many of the things below have you used to help pay for the things you need in a year: remittances (money from relatives or friends overseas), working in town, fishing, making copra, selling crops in the local market, running a bus or taxi?
Ko e fe he ngaahi me'a 'i lalo, 'oku tokoni kiate koe ke totongi ho'o ngaahi fiema'u fakata'u: pa'anga mei ho famili 'i muli, ngaue 'i ko lo, fangota, ngaahi niu, fakatau ho'o ngoue fakalotofonua, fakalelei ha bus pe ko ha tekisi?

3 If you stopped working in the plantation would you still be able to pay for the things that you need in the year?
Kapau na'e'ikai teke toe ngaue he ngoueanga teke lava pe 'o totongi ho'o ngaahi fiema'u fakata'u?
4 How much of the food that you and your family eat do you get out of family gardens? Does the family rely more upon the family garden, the local market, or the supermarket in town?

(need to quantify, see 1984 household expenditure survey)

Ko e ha e lahi e me'akai 'oku ke kai mo ho'o famili mei ho'o ngoue'anga. 'Oku fakafalaia e famili' i he ngoue'anga maketi fakaloto fonua, pe mei he falekoloa?

PART THREE

Questionnaire for Growers

Scheme members

NB. A slightly modified questionnaire was used for ex-growers.

1 Have you ever been in other banana schemes?
Kuo ke 'oshi kau ki ha polokalama to siaine kehe?

2 If yes: When was this?
Kapau ne ke 'oshi kau ki ha polokalama, na'a ke kau ki ai 'anefe?

3 What year did you join the scheme that you are in at the moment?
Ko e ta'u fe na'a ke kau ai ki he polokalama to siaine 'oku ke lolotonga kau ki ai?

4 Have you ever been in schemes for other crops eg coconuts?
Kuo ke 'osi kau ki ha polokolama pehe ni 'i he ngaahi fo'ikau kehe hange ko e niu?

5 If yes: When was this?
Kapau 'oku 'io, 'anefe?

6 How did you get to know about the banana scheme you are in at the moment?
Na'e anga fefe ho'o 'ilo e polokolama to siaine 'oku ke lolotonga kau ki ai?

7 How often do you see: extension officer, expatriate staff ie Keith or Malcolm, or their counterpart ie Afu Tu'ivai?
'Oku tu'o fiha ho'o felloaki mo e kau 'ofisa ngaue, kau fai polokolama hange ko Keith pe ko Malcolm pe ko honau kau fakafolanga hange ko 'Afu Tu'ivai?

8 When you see one of them who got in contact with whom, eg :did you phone him and ask him to call round did one of them just turn up, did you go into town to see one of them?
'I he taimi 'oku mau fe'iloaki ai' ko hai 'oku ne fai e fetu'tutaki; eg: Oku ke telefoni ki ai 'o kole ke ha'u, pe 'oku 'alu atu pe ha taha 'o 'a'ahi atu, 'oku ke 'alu ki kolo 'o fe'iloaki mo ha taha 'iate kinautolu?

9 What is the main thing you talk to the person about?
Koeha e tefito'i me'a 'oku ke fie talanoa ki ai mo e 'ofisa?
10 Have you ever attended any courses, lectures, videos etc in relation to banana production?
Kuo ke 'osi kau ki ha polokolama falei, ako pe sio vitéo felavei mo e siaine?

11 If yes: Where, when, what about?
Kapau 'oku 'io, na'e fai 'anafe pea 'ife' pea ko e ha e me'a na'a mou ako ki ai?

12 Are you glad you joined the scheme?
'Oku ke fiefia i ho'o kau ki he polokolama?

13 If no: Why?
Kapau 'oku 'ikai, koe ha e 'uhinga?

14 Do you want it to continue after 1988?
'Oke ke fiema'u ke hoko atu 'a e polokolama hili 'a e tau 1988?

15 If it does would you like to see any changes?
Kapau 'e hoko atu, teke sai'ia ke fai ha ngaahi liliu?

16 If so: What?
Kapau koia, koe ha a e ngaahi liliu koia?

17 You are paid for your exports after every shipment, do you like this system or would you prefer to be paid say every six months or each year?
'Oku ke ma'u ho'o totongi 'i he 'osi a e uta kotoa pe, 'oku ke sai'ia he founga ko 'eni' pe ko hano toki totongi 'atu 'i he osi nai ha mahina e 6 pe ta'u e taha?

18 Do you listen to any of the radio programmes on bananas?
If yes: What day and time of day do you listen to the programme?
'Oku ke fanongo ki ha polokolama 'i he setio fekau'aki moe siaine? Kapau koia koe ha'a e taimi moe 'aho 'oku ke fanongo ai ki he polokolama?

18a Do you find it useful? What for?
If respondent does not listen to any of the programmes on bananas, especially the one run by MAFF extension what are the reasons and would they listen to it if it was on at a different time?
'Oku 'aonga ia kiate koe? Ko e ha e mea 'oku 'aonga ki ai? Kapau 'oku ikai fanongo a e toko taha ngoue ki he ngaahi polokolama fekau'aki moe siaine, pea tautauteftio ki he polokolama 'oku fai e he MAFF, koe ha nai e 'uhinga? 'E lava nai ki nau fanongo ki ai i ha taimi kehe?

19 Are the roads into your plantation good enough to allow you to get to your bananas and to get the boxes of bananas out of the plantation?
'Oku sai (feiunga) 'a e hala ki ho'o ngoue anga ki hono fetuku mai ho'o puha siaine?

20 Do you have a van?
'Oku i ai ha'o veeni?
20a Do you deliver the boxed bananas yourself or get MAFF to pick them up?

'Oku ke 'ave ho'o saine ki hono uta' pe 'oku fetuku ia 'e he MAFF?

Capital expenditure

1 Since you have been in this scheme have you applied for any loan money in order to improve your plantations output/efficiency/quality?
Kuo ke 'osi no pa'anga ke fakalelei'i 'aki a e fua moe ola ho'o ngoue talu ho'o kau ki he polokolama ko 'eni?

2 If yes:
Have you received any loan money?
If yes:
Where/who did you get it from?
How much was it?
What did you spend it on?
Kapau na'a ke no.
Kuo ke 'osi mau ha pa'anga no?
Kapau kuo ke mau?
Na'a ke mau ia mei fe pea ko hai na'a ke 'omai mei ai?
Nae anga fefe ho'o fakamoleki ia?

3 (re-presents 1&2 in a different form, use only if needed)
Do you own any special machinery or equipment eg tractor with weeding discs, spraying machines etc which you use to increase your production?
'Oku i ha'o me'angaue fakamisin i hange ko ha palau, misini fana mo e ngaahi ala me'a pehe 'a ia 'oku ke ngaue'ake ki toe leleiange e ola 'o ho'o ngoue?

4 If yes: What equipment do you have?
Kapau 'oku i ai, koeha e me'angaue oku ke ma'u?

5 How did you get the money to pay for this equipment?
Na'a 'ke ma'u tefe e pa'anga na'a ke fakatau'aki e me'angaue ko 'eni?

Work practices

1 How far away from your plantation do you live?
Koeha e mana'o 'o ho api nofo'anga' mai ho'o ngoue'anga?

2 How often do you visit your plantation?
eg: everyday, once a week, during important phases of production like picking, spraying etc, never?
Ha hono lahi 'o ho'o toutou 'aaki ki ho'o ngoue'anga? 'Aho kotoa pe, tu'o taha 'i he ulike, 'i he ngaahi taimi mahu'inga pe hange ko e taimi fana' pe ko e taimi ke fakaonga'i ai e fua 'o ho'o ngoue' pe oku 'ikai pe te ke' a'ahi koe ki ai 'i ha taimi?
3 Do you work in the plantation yourself?
Which of these chores do you participate in: picking, packing, spraying, de-suckering, weeding, bagging ...?
"Oku ke kau ki he ngaue 'i ho'o ngaue'anga? Ko e fe 'i he ngaahi ngaue' ni 'oku ke fa'a kau hono fai: ta, fa'o, fana, to'o huil, huoi, kofu ...

4 Would you say that you spend more time supervising other workers?
"Oku ke pehe 'oku lahiange e ta 'oku ke fakamoleki ki hono pule'i o e kau ngaue' 'i he taimi 'oku ke fakamoleki 'ki ha'o ngaue 'i ho'o ngaue?

Land use and access

1 How much land do you have?
Ko e ha e lahi 'o e kelekele 'oku ke mau?

2 What is your land used for?
"Oku ke ngaue'aki ki he ha ho kelekele?

3 What are the names of your pieces of land?
Koeha e hingoa 'o ho ngaahi 'api?

4 How did you get each of these pieces of land?
e g heredity, application to noble, borrowed, leased, other.
Na'a ke ma'u fefe e ngaahi konga kelekele ('api) koia? eg tukufakaholo pe 'api fakafamili, kole ki he nopele, ngaue'aki fakataimi, lisi, toe founga kehe?

5 Is everything that grows on this land your own or are some of the crops someone else's?
Ko e ngaue kotoa 'i ho kelekele 'oku 'a'au pe'oku 'i ai ha konga ia 'oku 'a ha taha kehe?

6 If land is borrowed: How long do you have use of the land for?
Ko e ha e fuoloa ho'o lava ngaue aki a e api?

7 How much of your land do you use for growing bananas?
When did you start growing bananas on the land you are using now?
Koeha e lahi 'o e kelekele 'oku ke to siaine'i ? Na'a ke kamata fakaku hono to siaine'i e kelekele 'oku ke ngaue'i 'i he taimi' ni?

8 Did you use this land for growing other crops before you grew bananas on it?
Na'a ke ngaue 'aki e kelekele ko eni' ki ha fa'ahinga ngaue kehe 'i he te'eki te'ke to siaine'i?
9. Would your plantation be more efficient with more land?  
If yes: How would you go about getting this land?  
'Ooku ke pehe 'e leleiange, ho'o ngoue 'o ka lahiange ha kelekele keke ngoue'i'i?  
Kapau 'oku ke pehe e leleiange, 'e anga tefe ha'a to e ma'u mai ha kelekele ke ke ngoue'i'i?  

10. Do you think there is a land shortage on Tongatapu?  
'Ooku ke pehe 'oku si'isi'i e kelekele' i Tonga Tapu' ni ki he fiema'u 'a e kau ngoue?  

11. If yes: How do you think this could be solved?  
Kapau 'oku ke pehe 'oku si'isi'i e kelekele', koeha ha founa 'oku ke fakakaukau 'e lava ke solova'aki 'a e palopalema' ni?  

11a. Who are your neighbours, what are the names of the people who have api utas next to you?  
Kohai ho kaunga api, pea ko hai fua 'oku hoko atu honau 'api 'uta' ki ho'o ngoue?  

Grower - labourer relations  

1. Who works for you in your plantation? eg friends, family, relatives, villagers.  
Ko hai 'oku ngaue i ho'o ngoue'anga eg kaungame'a, kainga, famili pe ko ha kakai i ho kolo.  

2. How many people other than your immediate family do you have working on your plantation at the moment?  
What are their names?  
Are you related to any of these people? If so: How?  
Tukukehe ho kii famili totonu, ko hai fua 'oku ke fakangaeu' i ho'o ngoue'anga, ko hai honau hingoa? 'Oku ke famili mo nautolu? "oku ke ha 'aki nautolu?  

3. How many people who work for you rely on this work for their main source of income?  
What are their names?  
Ko e tokofihia nai 'oku fakafalala 'enau ma'u'anga pa'anga i he 'enau ngaue kiate koe?  
Ko hai ho nau hingoa?  

4. How do you pay your workers?  
eg: cash, food, accommodation, access to subsistence gardens or land for cash cropping, paying of childrens school fees, fares to and from other islands or a combination.  
If in cash: is this a regular payment eg monthly?  
Ko e ha 'oku ke totongi 'aki ho'o kau ngaue? eg pa'anga, me'atokoni, nofo'anga, mai me'atokoni mei ho'o ngoue pe ngoue fakapaanga, totongi e 'ako 'a e fanau pe ko e te'alu 'aki he vaha'a motu?  
Kapau 'oku totongi pa'anga, ko e ha e vaha'a taimi 'oku totongi ai kinautolu eg fakamahina?
5 Do you pay your relatives differently to how you pay workers who are not your relatives?
'Oku kehekehe 'a e totongi ngaue 'oku ke ngaue'aki he taha ko ha kainga, mo e tokotaha 'a ia 'oku 'ikai ko ho kainga?

6 Do you prefer to have relatives or non-relatives working for you? Why?
'Oku ke sai'ia ange ke ma'u ha kau ngaue 'i ho kainga', pe ko e kakai 'oku 'ikai ko ho kainga?

7 Do the people that work for you do so on a regular full-time basis or just when you need them?
'Oku ngaue taimi kakato ho'o kau ngaue', pe 'oku nau toki ngaue pe 'o ka fiema'u ha ngaue ke fai?

8 Do you prefer to pay your workers in cash or in some other form?
'Oku ke sai'ia ange ke totongi pa'anga ho'o kau ngaue pe ko ha to e fa'ahinga founga kehe?

9 Do you think that your workers prefer to be paid in cash or some other form?
'Oku ke pehe 'oku sai'ia ange ho'o kau ngaue' ke totongi'i pa'anga kinautolu pe ko ha toe fa'ahinga founga kehe?
Appendix B

MEMORANDUM

8 October 1986

To: Hon. Minister of Education
   Hon. Minister of Police
   Hon. Minister of Finance
   Secretary for Finance
   Director of Education
   Chief Superintendent of Police
   Accountant General
   Auditor General
   Private Secretary to His Majesty

With reference to Request to conduct research in Tonga -
Mr Andrew Needs Massey University.

I have the honour to inform you that His Majesty Cabinet's decision on
8th October 1986 was as follows:-

Recommendations 1, 2 and 3 are approved but recommendation 4 is not approved i.e.:

1. That Mr Andrew Needs, a Master of Arts student of Massey University, New Zealand be granted permission to conduct Research on the "Social Aspects to Tonga's Banna Rehabilitation Scheme" for 3 months, commencing 10 October 1986 until 10 January 1987.

2. That Mr Needs be granted the required Research Visa by the Immigration Department for the duration of the project.

3. That Mr Andrew Needs submit two copies of his completed Research to the Tonga Government through the Ministry of Education.
ANDREW NEEDS
SOCIOLGY DEPARTMENT
MASSEY UNIVERSITY
PALMERSTON NORTH

RESEARCH APPLICATION PENDING CABINET DECISION STOP NEW CONDITION REQUIRES DEPOSIT TDLRS1000.00 WITH TONGA TREASURY REIMBURSE WHEN TWO COPIES COMPLETED RESEARCH RECEIVED STOP ADVISE DO NOT ARRIVE TONG UNTIL WE INFORM DECISION SOONEST TONGAED

COL TDLRS1000.00 REPT-TDLRS1000.00*
3801 PM GX2

ANDREW NEEDS
SOCIOLGY DEPARTMENT
PALMERSTON NORH
NEW ZEALAND

RESEARCH APPLICATION APPROVED CONTACT MINISTRY FOR DETAILS UPON ARRIVAL STOP CONDITION REGARDING TDLRS1000. DEPOSIT CANCELLED. TONGAED
Appendix D.

**SCHEME ADMINISTRATORS' DATA**

This survey carried out by Keith Leonard, the banana production advisor, involved questioning agricultural staff likely to know the personal situations of the growers. The figures provided are the only ones available for the scheme as a whole in relation to general land access and income sources. The figures are important because they provide a more generalised view of scheme participants' characteristics. My own more in-depth research with a smaller number of participants, fleshes out in detail the social characteristics and concomitant social relations within the scheme.

Leonard (1986) uses seven different categories using other criteria in addition to acreage:

1. Full time farmer with only one tax allotment and no other income
2. Full time farmer with only one tax allotment and some other (small) income.
3. Full time commercial farmer with more than one tax allotment and no other income.
4. Full time commercial farmer with more than one tax allotment and other income.
5. Government or quango employee with farming venture.
6. Other salaried staff or self-employed person with a farming venture.
7. Institution or group.
Leonard labels categories one and two as small farmers, categories three and four as commercial farmers and five and six as business/professional. Category seven was not considered for the purpose of this study.

A major criticism of these categories is that they are based on an assumption that land allocation is a systematic and consistent factor in Tongan society. They embody the official position on land allocation rather than the reality which is characterised by a proliferation of informal land dealings. Typically less than half of the land used by a person is actually registered in that person's name (Central Planning Department, 1981:20). Leonard conflates various groups of people thereby obscuring the differences among them which serve to highlight the reality of production relations in Tonga. Leonard's data requires refinement into a form more closely reflecting the productive reality.

Growers within categories one and two are predominantly petty commodity producers, they rely upon horticultural production for cash and subsistence horticulture for their non-cash consumption. Categories five and six include a bourgeoisie group, made up of government bureaucrats and growers with substantial business interests. For them banana production is one of several income sources. These categories are not made up entirely of the bourgeoisie, a small business group which retains reliance upon banana production represents a growing petit bourgeois group.

It is categories three and four, Leonard's 'commercial growers', which are problematic. Those in category three, although having more than one tax allotment, have no other income, and are most likely to be petty commodity producers. There may
be a small number which has large commercial holdings as individuals but most large commercial growers tend to have other incomes as well, which would place them in category four. Many instances of large landholdings in category three may be a result of the corporate nature of the household or kinship production unit. That is, although only one grower is named, the productive capacity of that plantation may be spread over more than one household. Conversely, category four, with more than one tax allotment together with other income, is more aligned with the bourgeoisie. Here land access is activated through both long standing methods and introduced methods such as legal leasing. This route is predominantly closed to the petty commodity producers as the returns on production serve to meet daily requirements and cannot run to the high costs of land rental evident now.

It is possible, then, to reduce six of Leonard's divisions to two. One, two and three are predominantly petty commodity producers. Four, five and six contain the bourgeoisie, but within the latter there is an embryonic petit bourgeoisie.

Leonard reduces six of his categories useful here to three (small farmers, commercial farmers and business professionals) and presents his data on the basis of these. Data for each of the six categories is only available for number of farmers by district (Table D.1).
Table D.1: Number of farmers by category and district

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fo-ui</td>
<td></td>
<td>42</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nukunuku</td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Town</td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vaini</td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kolonga</td>
<td></td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tatakamotonga</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>113</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>263</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Leonard's regroupings make it impossible to relate his data to the two regroupings which are most significant in this study. Categories one and two make up 48% of growers and have only 31% of the land. Within groups one and two at least, the petty commodity producers control a disproportionately small amount of land in banana production.

Divisions four, five and six make up about 23% of growers. This figure is not representative of the overall percentage of a bourgeoisie in Tonga as scheme members make up a self-selected sample through their privileged land access.
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