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THE LYNDON B. JOHNSON AND SENDAYAN SCHEMES:

A STUDY IN THE COMMUNICATION OF INNOVATIONS

IN TWO SETTLEMENT SCHEMES IN

PENINSULAR MALAYSIA

A thesis presented in partial fulfilment
of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts in Geography at
Massey University.

Amriah Bt. Buang

August 1974

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank all individuals, groups and institutions for having helped, in one way or another, in making this study possible. Special thanks go to the following:

Mr A.C. Walsh who was my Supervisor when this study was still at its embryonic stage, and a vital source of support even when he was overseas. Mr E.C.R. Warr for Co-Superivising the written part of the thesis.

Cik Zaharah Hj. Mahmud, Acting Head, Department of Geography, The University of Malaya, without whose co-operation the fieldwork would not have been possible, and the National University of Malaysia for granting me the sponsorship. Massey University, New Zealand, for enabling me to take up the research.

Incik Abdullah Zawawi Omar, Manager of the Lyndon B. Johnson Scheme and Incik Mohd. Ghazali Sunan A.M.N., Manager of the Sendayan Scheme, for allowing me access to information and statistical material, and for their endless assistance, patience and co-operation throughout my stay in the Schemes. Cik Putih A. Majid and Cik Siti Rahmah Daud, the Settler Development Assistants in the Lyndon B. Johnson Scheme, for allowing me to stay with them during the field research. All Management Staff in both Schemes for their hospitality and friendly co-operation which contributed to the smooth progress of the fieldwork. Block Leaders in both Schemes, for their patience and co-operation during the interviews. The Executive Members of various organisations in the Schemes who answered the questionnaires. The Headmasters of the Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan Primary Schools.

My very special thanks and gratitude go to:

My husband whose sympathy, sacrifice and co-operation were the constant source of encouragement.

The settlers of the Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan Schemes, who, for all their apparently unsophisticated ways, showed keen appreciation of the purpose of the study. It is to them that this thesis is dedicated.

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Illustrations



P R E F A C E

Many developing countries believe in modernising farmers as a strategy to accelerate agricultural development. Most of their national leaders believe this is best accomplished by a body or authority entrusted with the powers necessary to effect rural change with less risk of failure than if modernisation was left largely to the initiative of the farmers themselves.

Frequently, land development has been effected by planned change programmes. Thus, vast areas of virgin jungle have been transformed into orderly agricultural tracts, neatly sown with the crops considered most suited to the needs of the economy. The agency concerned has often tolerated costly expenditure to ensure that land settlement schemes in such areas obtain the necessary inputs; the settlers have been carefully selected, the infrastructure provided, and other facilities and amenities properly cared for. There have been arrangements for the storing, processing and marketing of the produce and reasonable prices have been guaranteed. Reasonably trained personnel, technically capable in various aspects of agricultural and rural development, have been employed in managerial positions, and long range plans set in motion for education and training of the settlers. With these requisites fulfilled it was expected that the settlers would be on the secured road to modernisation and development.

Results, however, have often fallen short of the targets set by planners. Somehow benefits have not met costs, and change has been painfully slow and sporadic. Settlers have not changed their ways of thinking or their practices, and have often appeared unsatisfied with the development scheme.

This has been the experience of the Federal Land Development Authority of Malaysia (FELDA). Yet the terrain, soil and drainage of the areas chosen and the varieties of crops selected appeared excellent. There have been very few cases of delays in supplying fertilisers, insecticides and implements, or in transporting the settlers' produce to the processing centres and markets. Change agents have worked many extra hours to cope with the extra demands of their jobs. Where, then, did things go wrong?

The answer probably lies in one extremely vital element of a planned change programme - communication. (In this study, communication refers to the relationship between the initiator of the programme and the intended receiver.) Land development embodies innovations, the adoption

of which determines the success or failure of the programme. But before innovations can be adopted they must be communicated in the right manner to the receivers. When communication is reasonably efficient, smooth and perfect adoption usually follows suit. In essence and ceteris paribus, it is the mechanism of communication between the innovator or change agent and the receiver that decides the relative success or otherwise of the innovations.

This is the central theme of this thesis. Focusing on two settlement schemes of FELDA in West Malaysia with which country the writer is most familiar, the study seeks to find explanations for the only partial success of these experiments in planned rural development.

The work is a general survey of communication problems. The only point on which it probably differs from other studies of FELDA Schemes¹ is the emphasis it places on socio-psychological factors such as those pertaining to diffusion of message and leadership. The hypothesis is that human factors of communication and leadership play a predominant role vis-a-vis other essentially physical and economic factors, in the implementation of land settlement programmes.

Communication of innovations is a vast subject. To simplify an otherwise unmanageable task, the study borrows heavily from the work of Rogers and Shoemaker². Indeed, the greater part of the questionnaires were based on the generalisations which they list in their Communication of Innovations³ (refer to Appendix A of this thesis).

Three sets of questionnaires were used to obtain data for the empirical part of the analysis. They were for the settlers of the two Schemes (the intended receivers or adopters of the innovations), the management staff (FELDA officers at Scheme level representing the change agents) and the executive members of various settlers' organisations in the Schemes from whom the writer hoped to obtain insight into the settler leadership situation. The writer stayed for five weeks in Scheme

1. See for example Agarwal Singh 1961, Wikkramatelike 1965, Wan Leong Fee, 1969.
2. Rogers E.M. and Shoemaker F.F. 1971 Communication of Innovations.
3. Rogers E.M. and Shoemaker F.F. 1971 Appendix A, 346-385.

settlements, the first week being used to pre-test the settlers' question-schedule.

The settlers interviewed were those who had applied to participate in the Schemes and were heads of the family. For convenience sake, only settlers of Malay ethnic origin were interviewed. The sample populations were basically random, though care was taken to ensure that they were spatially representative of all three phases in each Scheme (see Figs. 3 and 4). Thirty-five settlers were interviewed in the Lyndon B. Johnson Scheme (population 325) and thirty-six in the Sendayan Scheme (population 335). These represented nearly eleven percent of the Malay settlers in the Schemes. Interviews usually had to wait until afternoon when the settlers took a rest after working in their rubber holdings in the morning. The time spent for each interview varied, but normally ranged from between twenty to forty-five minutes. The writer found almost all settlers very co-operative, patient and keen to answer the questions.

Management staff were required to complete their own questionnaires. Thanks to the co-operation of the managers, staff members in each Scheme were assembled in the Schemes' offices for a briefing by the writer on how to answer the questions. Response was satisfactory with 16 out of 22 staff members (72.7%) from the Lyndon B. Johnson Scheme and 14 out of 20 (70%) from the Sendayan Scheme returning completed questionnaires.

The response from executive members, however, was disappointing. This may have been because it did not prove possible to assemble them together for a briefing and the writer only had the opportunity to meet a few of them. The management staff helped by explaining questionnaire procedure to executive members on my behalf and several respondents who were in need of further clarification contacted the writer personally. Response from the two Schemes differed. Twelve answers were received from those who held key positions in the Lyndon B. Johnson Scheme's organisations, but only two were received from similar respondents in Sendayan.

The writer also set a specific question schedule for the village block leaders in the Schemes. (The village area in each Scheme was divided into blocks each consisting of twenty to thirty houses and headed by an appointed leader.) There were 12 block leaders in each Scheme, but only 20, or 83.3%, of them were available for interviews.

Altogether 135 people (71 settlers, 30 management staff members, 14 executive members of settler organisations and 20 block leaders) were formally interviewed and many informal interviews were held with

shopkeepers, school and kindergarten teachers, the clinic midwives and other individuals in the Schemes. During her visits to the primary schools in the Schemes, the writer requested pupils of one of the primary-six classes (average age is 12 years old) to write a short composition on what they thought of the Scheme in general. The purpose was to examine whether there was a discrepancy between the childrens' and the elders' overall view of their Scheme.

This study is only a preliminary survey of leading issues in communication of innovations which characterise, in Malaysia, planned land development programmes. Further research is warranted on the innovation item, the process of innovation diffusion, and the leadership situation.

The thesis is the product of contributions made by many parties and individuals. Nevertheless the opinions and deductions expressed are, of course, the sole responsibility of the writer.

CHAPTER ONEINTRODUCTIONLocation

The Lyndon B. Johnson (the name was given in commemoration of the visit of American President Lyndon B. Johnson to the Scheme on 30 October 1966) and the Sendayan Schemes are situated in the state of Negeri Sembilan on the west coast of Peninsular Malaysia (Fig. 1). Located somewhat southwest of the state, the Schemes are sixteen to eighteen miles away from Seremban, the State Capital, and fifty-eight miles from the Federal Capital, Kuala Lumpur. One can reach the Schemes by following the Seremban-Port Dickson Road, the Kuala Lumpur-Bangi-Sepang Road, or numerous minor internal roads. Thus, location-wise, the Schemes are two of the most accessible FELDA Schemes in West Malaysia.

Physical Characteristics¹

The Schemes are quite fortunate in being situated in the northern half of the gently undulating coastal plain of Negeri Sembilan (Fig. 4) for the soil in this region was mainly derived from igneous rock and sandstone which are superior to the rather lateritic soils of the southern half which derived mainly from shale. The eastern quarters of the Schemes are a part of a narrow piedmont which stands as a boundary zone between the coastal region and the main Malayan Range. This piedmont contains some excellent soil derived from igneous material and is highly suitable for rubber.

The area experiences high and evenly distributed rainfall which, when combined with high, even temperatures characteristic of the region, gives ideal conditions for the year round growth of perennial crops such as rubber. February is the driest month with an average rainfall of slightly over four inches.

The Schemes form part of a "full use region" where the original cover of tropical rainforest has been replaced by rubber. Tropical greenery has been maintained while full accessibility has been achieved.

1. Condensed from Donaldson and Liew .Kam Yew 1969 4 - 9




FIG. 1 WEST MALAYSIA : LOCATION OF THE SENDAYAN AND L.B.J. SCHEMES.

Establishment

Both Schemes were established at about the same time. Jungle clearing began at the end of 1960. This was carried out by contractors engaged by FELDA who also carried out land preparation before the planting of rubber. It was the responsibility of the contractors to maintain the planted area until settlers were brought into the projects. It took about fifteen months for these pre-settlement activities to be completed.

The development of the village and other associated infrastructure was a longer process. Initial access to the sites was usually by roads constructed by loggers and the main access roads were only completed in 1963. With the assistance of 10-foot contour form lines derived from areal photographs, village site and design were selected after felling. On completion of the village design, the construction of the internal (village) roads began, and as these were nearing completion, the construction of the settler houses started. Simultaneously, work commenced on a school, a clinic and the piped water supply. As soon as the construction of settler houses was completed, settlers were called in the Schemes.

Schemes' lay out

The Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan Schemes were divided into three phases (Figs. 2 and 3). The Schemes total area were as follows (Table I):

Table I: Acreages of Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan Schemes

	<u>L.B.J.</u>	<u>SENDAYAN</u>
Phase 1 Rubber	830	890
Phase 2 Rubber	930	1082
Phase 3 Rubber	<u>1503</u>	<u>1387</u>
<u>Total Rubber Area</u>	3263	3359
Village Area	320	284
Reserve	<u>1714</u>	<u>1640</u>
<u>Total Area</u>	<u>5297</u>	<u>5283</u>

Source: Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan Schemes' Offices.




FIG. 2 L.B.J : SCHEME LAY - OUT




FIG. 3 SENDAYAN : SCHEME LAY - OUT.





FIG. 4 NATURAL REGIONS OF NEGRI SEMBILAN:
LOCATION OF THE L.B.J & SENDAYAN
SCHEMES.



The Village Area

All settlers, FELDA personnel and most other government employees (school teachers, police officers and the clinic midwives together with their respective dependents) reside in the village area. The settlers' house lots are divided into three phases according to the approximate year they entered the Schemes (Figs. 5 and 6).

Each Scheme village area has, besides a school, the clinic and piped water supply mentioned previously, a Co-operative provision shop, and FELDA provision shop, police station, bus service to Seremban and other adjacent villages, a mosque, a community hall, a public telephone and a reading room. Recreational facilities in the form of badminton and soccer areas are also provided (Figs. 7 and 8). Unlike the FELDA officers and other government employees in the Schemes, the settlers were not, at the time of the study, supplied with electricity.

The Management

FELDA Headquarters posted 22 staff members to the Lyndon B. Johnson and 20 to the Sendayan Schemes to organise and manage. Staff members comprise a manager, an assistant manager, supervisors, field assistants, settler development assistants, clerks, tapping supervisors, drivers and an office boy.

The personnel came from a varied educational and occupational background. Their basic education was not especially tailored to equip them for their present technically-biased tasks, but the majority of them had acquired the necessary knowledge and experience from attending specialised training courses. Tables II and III give further information on the educational and occupational background of the management staff in the Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan Schemes.

Table II: Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan: Educational Background of the Management Staff.

		<u>L.B.J.</u>	<u>SENDAYAN</u>
Stream:	Malay	11	6
	English	5	8
Highest Qualification:			
	Below primary 6	1	1
	L.C.E. ¹	3	1
	M.C.E. ² /S.P.M. ³	8	8
	Not stated	4	4
Total Respondents:		16	14

1. Lower Certificate of Education
2. Malaysian Certificate of Education
3. Siilil Pelajaran Malaysia - the Malay equivalent of M.C.E.




FIG. 5 L.B.J : DIVISION OF THE VILLAGE AREA






FIG. 6 SENDAYAN : DIVISION OF THE VILLAGE AREA.




FIG. 7 L.B.J: THE VILLAGE AREA.






FIG. 8 SENDAYAN: THE VILLAGE AREA.

Table III: Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan: Occupational Background of Management Staff.

	<u>L.B.J.</u>	<u>SENDAYAN</u>
School teacher	2	
Clerk	4	
<u>Activities related to rubber:</u>		
Tapper	1	
Advisor	1	
Estate photographer	1	
<u>Activities related to military:</u>		
Air traffic controller		1
British soldier		1
Royal Malay Regiment		1
<u>Commercial:</u>		
Salesman	1	
Insurance assistant		1
Domestic instructor	1	
Farmer	1	
No previous occupation	<u>4</u>	<u>10</u>
TOTAL RESPONDENTS	<u>16</u>	<u>14</u>

Table IV: Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan: Courses Followed by Management Staff.

<u>NATURE OF COURSES</u>	<u>L.B.J.</u>	<u>SENDAYAN</u>
Social development	1	2
Rubber processing ^x	4	3
Oil palm processing		2
General agriculture	1	1
Market gardening	1	1
Basic courses for field assistant	1	
Settler development	2	
Book keeping	1	
Youth leadership	2	
Clerical	1	
Home economics ^{xx}	1	
Respondents who did not follow any course	<u>1</u>	<u>5</u>
TOTAL RESPONDENTS	<u>16</u>	<u>14</u>

Duration of courses: ^x 6 months to one year ^{xx} 2 years

Note: All courses were local

Each member of the staff functions according to his profession, although the work of some, such as the manager and the development assistants, could overlap due to the demand of the existing situation.

The tapping supervisors specialise in teaching, advising and demonstrating to the settlers the correct methods of tapping the rubber trees according to FELDA rules.


The scope of the field assistants' work is wider than that of the tapping supervisors. They assist in all matters relating to the maintenance of rubber holdings.

Supervising the work of the tapping supervisors and the field assistants is part of the responsibility of the supervisors of each phase. They have, in addition, to attend to the general upkeep of the dusun area (part of the reserve area which is allocated for the cultivation of fruit crops and vegetables).

Assisting the domestic affairs of the settler families is the job of the settler development assistants. These women S.D.A.s are responsible for advising the senior female members of the settler families on matters relating to home improvement, balanced dieting, family planning, hygiene and child caring. In essence, their role is to "brainwash" the housewives regarding the disadvantages of certain traditional values and practices.

Every Scheme has a rubber collecting centre - a factory-like place where settlers send their rubber latex daily for weighing, storing and marketing purposes. All these activities are in the charge of a field assistant.

The responsibilities of the manager obviously are the heaviest. All aspects pertaining to the Scheme management and development fall on his shoulders. Table V illustrates the structure of administration in the Lyndon B. Johnson Scheme, which is also representative of the one obtained in Sendayan.

Table V: Administrative Structure of the Lyndon B. Johnson SchemeThe Settlers

Almost all settlers in the two Schemes came from various districts of Negeri Sembilan itself, namely, from Rembau, Kuala Pilah, Lengging, Labu, Salak, Rantau, Port Dickson and Nilai. In Lyndon B. Johnson there are 426 settlers of different ethnic origin. In Sendayan there are 433. The ethnic composition of the two Schemes is presented in Table VI.

Table VI: Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan: Settlers' Ethnic Composition

Scheme	Phase	Malay	%	Chinese	%	Indian	%	Total
L.B.J.	1	78	18.3	24	5.6	14	3.3	116
	2	102	23.9	5	1.2	17	4.0	124
	3	145	34.0	8	1.9	33	7.7	186
	Total	325	76.3	37	8.7	64	15.0	426
SENDAYAN	1	85	19.6	19	4.5	17	3.9	121
	2	119	27.5	8	1.8	16	3.7	143
	3	131	30.3	14	3.2	24	5.5	169
	Total	335	77.4	41	9.5	57	13.1	433

Source: Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan Scheme Offices.

(All percentages were separately computed.)

It is clear from the above Table that the predominance of Malays over the other major ethnic groups is characteristic of population composition in both Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan Schemes. The main reason is that rural Malays form the overwhelming majority of the "have-nots", and of the total rural population in West Malaysia.

Selection of Settlers

Settlers' entry into the Schemes was by selection. Suitability and need were the bases for selection of settlers as well as age, skills, family size, education and land ownership which were the criteria of assessment. The settlers' eligibility thus depended on the total points he scored from the Point Selection System shown in Table VII.

Table VII: Settler Point Selection System1. AGE: Total Points = 10

<u>Age</u>	<u>Points</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Points</u>
18	5	27	9
19	6	28	8
20	7	29	7
21	8	30	6
22	9	31	5
23	10	32	4
24	10	33	3
25	10	34	2
26	10	35	1
<u>Applicable only to ex-servicemen:</u>		36	1
		37	1
		38	1
		39	1
		40	1

2. FAMILY SIZE: Total Points = 5

<u>Number of children</u>	<u>Points</u>
5 and above	5
4	4
3	3
2	2
1	1

3. SKILLS: Total Points = 6

<u>Types of skill</u>	<u>Points</u>
Community participation	1
Experience in rubber	3
Other agricultural experience (e.g. rice farming)	1
Special skills (e.g. carpentry)	1

4. LAND OWNERSHIP: Total Points = 5

<u>Acres</u>	<u>Points</u>
0	5
1/2	4
1	3
1.1/2	2
2	1

Table VII: Settler Point Selection System (continued)5. EDUCATIONAL QUALIFICATIONS: Total Points = 4

<u>Qualification</u>	<u>Points</u>
Lower Certificate of Education and above	4
Form I - III	3
Standard I - VI	2
Adult Education Classes	1

Note: Those who own land above 2 acres are disqualified.

Maximum Points = 30

Source: FELDA Headquarters

Settlers' Age

Findings from the field showed that 18 (51.4%) of the 35 settler-respondents in the Lyndon B. Johnson Scheme fell within the 41 to 50 years age group; 7 (20%) were in the 51 - 55 years age group and 5 (14.3%) belonged to the 36 - 40 years age group. The corresponding figures for Sendayan were: 19 (52.8%) of a total 36 respondents, 5 (13.9%) and 7 (19.4%) respectively. The settlers' years of entry in the Lyndon B. Johnson Scheme were: 1962 for phase 1, 1963 for phase 2, and 1967 for phase 3. For the Sendayan Scheme the corresponding years were: early 1963, late 1963 and late 1967. This means that the majority of settlers in both Schemes who presently fell in the 41 - 50 years age group and 39 - 43 years age group were in the 29 - 28 years age group and 39 - 43 years age group about twelve years ago (the Schemes started in 1962). This also means that the majority of the settlers, upon selection, had scored from five to seven points out of the maximum 10. Figure 9 further illustrates the age structure of the settlers.

Settlers' Educational and Skill Background

Education-wise, all respondents from the Lyndon B. Johnson Scheme except one who studied Arabic, were Malay educated. The majority of them (28%) terminated at primary five and six levels. In the Sendayan Scheme two respondents obtained the Lower Certificate of Education while one held a School Certificate which is equivalent to the present Malaysian Certificate of Education. Further details are presented in Table VIII.

FIG. 9 SETTLERS AGE STRUCTURE FOR THE L.B.J. & SENDAYAN SCHEMES




FIG. 10 L.B.J. & SENDAYAN SCHEMES: NO. OF CHILDREN PER SETTLER FAMILY




FIG 11.a SENDAYAN: AGE & SEX STRUCTURE OF SETTLERS CHILDREN




FIG.11 b L.B.J.: AGE & SEX STRUCTURE OF SETTLERS CHILDREN




Table VIII: Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan: Educational Background of Settlers

		<u>L.B.J.</u>		<u>SENDAYAN</u>	
		Number	%	Number	%
<u>Stream:</u>	Malay	34	97.1	33	91.7
	English	-	-	-	-
	Arabic	1	2.9	-	-
	Malay + English	-	-	2	5.5
	Indonesian	-	-	1	2.8
<u>Highest Qualification:</u>					
	School Certificate (= M.C.E.)	-	-	1	2.8
	Lower Certificate of Education	-	-	2	5.5
	Primary 6	15	42.9	8	22.2
	" 5	16	45.7	20	55.6
	" 4	2	5.7	1	2.8
	" 3	2	5.7	3	8.3
	" 2	-	-	1	2.8
Total Respondents		35	100	36	100

In terms of occupational background, data obtained from field research indicates that the majority of Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan settlers had army training and therefore lack agricultural skills. Eleven (31.4%) of the Lyndon B. Johnson respondents and sixteen (44.4%) in Sendayan fell into this army category. Only ten (28.6%) in Lyndon B. Johnson and five (13.9%) in Sendayan had ever been full time rubber tappers. Details of the occupational background of the settlers in both Schemes are presented in Table IX.

Table IX: Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan: Settler Occupational Background

Types of Occupation	L.B.J.		SENDAYAN	
	Number	%	Number	%
<u>Agricultural:</u>				
Rubber tapper	10	28.6	5	13.9
Padi planter	3	8.6	4	11.1
Rubber tapper + padi planter	5	14.3	8	22.2
Fisherman	1	2.8	-	-
<u>Military/Police</u>	11	31.4	16	44.4
<u>Other Non-Agricultural:</u>				
Carpenter	1	2.8	1	2.8
Retailer	1	2.8	1	2.8
Salesman	1	2.8	-	-
Tailor	1	2.8	-	-
School teacher	-	-	1	2.8
<u>No Previous Occupation:</u>	1	2.8	-	-
Total Respondents	35	99.7	36	100.0

Many of the settlers, however, had additional occupational experience or had attended training courses. Sixteen (45.7%) of Lyndon B. Johnson respondents claimed they had additional occupational experience of which eight were agricultural, two carpentry and five military. In Sendayan the figures were twenty-seven (75.0%), nine, eight and four respectively. Seventeen (48.6%) respondents from Lyndon B. Johnson had, at one time or another, attended training or followed specialised courses, six of which were agricultural and five military. Sendayan's respective figures were seventeen (47.2%), five and seven. It is probably worth noting that for many settlers, experience from additional occupations, training and courses on one hand, and the main occupational background on the other, had compensated one another and made them, at least, reasonably eligible candidates for the Schemes.

Settlers' Dependants

The average settler in Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan had one wife and six children usually ranging from 6 to 20 years in age. The ratio of females to males was 1:1.05. Two of the children attended primary or secondary school, one was employed outside the Scheme, one was below five

and two were school dropouts. The settler also provided for one additional person, usually his mother or his wife's mother. Further details on the number of children, their age, sex structure and occupation are presented in Figures 10, 11, 12a and 12b and Table X.

Table X: Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan: Occupational Particulars of Settlers' Children

	<u>L.B.J.</u>		<u>SENDAYAN</u>	
	Number	%	Number	%
<u>Students:</u> Primary	42	19.0	59	25.1
Secondary	51	23.1	49	20.8
Higher	1	0.5	4	1.7
<u>Employed:</u>				
Helping parents tapping in the Scheme	14	6.3	14	6.0
Outside the Scheme	28	12.7	30	12.7
In non-agricultural activities outside Scheme	8	3.6	3	1.3
<u>Unemployed:</u>				
School dropouts (mainly L.C.E. and primary six failures)	31	14.0	34	14.5
<u>Below Six Years Old:</u> (including Kindergarten pupils)	35	15.8	35	14.9
<u>Housewives:</u>	11	5.0	7	3.0
Total number of children	221	100	235	100
Total Respondents	35		36	

The Working System

Each settler, on entering the Scheme, was supposed to be provided with 10 acres of land for rubber cultivation and a house on a 1/4 acre lot. However, according to information obtained during the field work, the settlers' actual rubber lots ranged from 6.5 to 8 acres only.

At the pre-harvest stage the settlers did not know the exact location of their rubber holdings. They maintained the crops on a collective basis with fifteen to twenty settlers allocated to a particular block of land.

They carried out work such as weeding, fertilising and pest and disease control under the supervision of FELDA field staff. At about the fourth year after planting, surveys of individual lots were completed and allocated to each settler by balloting. The settler's name was entered into the Register of Holdings but only in anticipation of a title. For maintenance during this pre-harvest stage each settler was provided with subsistence credits, the maximum amount of which was M\$2.90 per working day with a guaranteed minimum of M\$69.60 per working month. At this stage the settler's work consisted of tapping, collecting and delivering the rubber to the collecting centre in the Scheme, and general maintenance of the rubber holding, secondary crop areas and house lots.

At the harvesting stage the subsistence credits ceased and the settler began to make loan repayments for the credit FELDA had extended to him, which included:

- a. Cost of clearing the land and the planting of rubber, inclusive of maintenance by a contractor until settler entry
- b. Cost of fertilisers, chemicals, tools and implements provided during the immature period of the crop
- c. Cash subsistence credits extended to the settler prior to harvesting
- d. Cost of constructing the settler's house and the development of the site.

On average, for all the items mentioned, each settler had to repay a loan amounting to about M\$16,402.00 (for particulars see Appendix B), together with a compound interest charge of 6.1/4% per annum over a period of 15 years. In addition the settler also had to pay land rent and premium which had been deferred from the crop immaturity period. On completion of the repayment of the loan the land was to be revested to the state government who was to issue the settler with a title for the land.

Processing and Marketing

All produce from the rubber holdings of the settlers were purchased by FELDA who would then either process the raw material on a non-profit basis or sell it to commercial processors with the proceeds accruing

directly to the settlers themselves. Recently, however, the Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan Schemes seem to have differed in policies relating to the processing and marketing of their rubber produce. The former saw no necessity to change from selling to FELDA while the latter preferred to manage things their way. This will be further elucidated in Chapter Five.

Settler Obligations and Responsibilities to FELDA

On entering the Schemes, settlers signed agreement documents which stated that they must abide by FELDA's rules and regulations. This signified that among other things the settlers agreed:

- a. not to sell their rubber produce to unauthorised dealers,
- b. to complete planting of approved crops and to ensure good husbandry of rubber holdings,
- c. to maintain a tapping plane of not more than $3/4$ inches per month,
- d. to reside permanently inside the Scheme,
- e. not to set up private retail shops within the Scheme, and
- f. not to use violence against FELDA staff in the Scheme.

If it was found that the settler was guilty of breaching any of the set rules, he was liable to penalties which could be as serious as to be evicted from the Scheme, and which automatically denied him future entry into any of the FELDA Schemes.

C H A P T E R T W O

PERFORMANCE OF SCHEMES: THE "GOOD" AND THE "NOT SO GOOD"

FELDA Headquarters had more or less defined what they meant by a "good" and a "not so good" Scheme. It seems that in their terminology goodness is synonymous with success. In general the Lyndon B. Johnson Scheme is considered by the Authority, better and more successful than the Sendayan. This deduction is based on a comparison between the two Schemes with respect to:

1. Settlers' production of higher grade rubber (latex)
2. Settlers' production of lower grade rubber (scrap)
3. Settlers' income
4. Settlers' loan repayment
5. Settlers' discipline with regard to the marketing of rubber produce
6. Settlers' general conduct towards the Authority

This chapter attempts to evaluate the justification of the deduction by examining these criteria.

Criterion 1: High Grade Rubber Production

Records from both Schemes showed that, in many instances, rubber production in the Lyndon B. Johnson Scheme exceeded that of the Sendayan. In January 1974, for example, the former produced 61,875 lbs more of higher grade rubber than the latter, which was equivalent to M\$98,056.55 in value. In terms of yield of higher grade rubber per settler, Lyndon B. Johnson exceeded Sendayan by 156.5 lbs which was equivalent to M\$238.55 in value. Further details of higher grade rubber production for the two Schemes are presented in Tables XIa and XIb and Figure 12.

Table XIa: Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan: Production of Higher Grade Rubber for January^{*} 1974 (in lbs)


Phase	<u>LYNDON B. JOHNSON</u>		<u>SENDAYAN</u>		<u>DIFFERENCES (L.B.J.-SENDAYAN)</u>	
	Total	Average	Total	Average	Total	Average
1	127,881.9	1102.4	107,378.7	887.4	20,503.2	215.0
2	121,076.3	976.4	86,733.6	606.5	34,342.7	369.9
3	110,147.0	592.1	103,117.5	610.1	7,029.5	-18.0
Total	359,105.2	834.9	297,229.8	686.0	61,875.4	156.9

Source: Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan Computer Paysheets for January 1974.


* January was chosen because it is typical of production in other months when rubber prices are relatively high.

FIG. 12 L.B.J. & SENDAYAN: TOTAL PRODUCTION OF HIGHER GRADES OF RUBBER PER PHASE FOR JANUARY 1974

a) in lbs.



b) in value (M\$)



Source: L.B.J. & Sendayan Computer Paysheet for January 1974

Table XIb: Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan: Production Value of Higher Grade Rubber for January 1974 (in M\$)

Phase	<u>LYNDON B. JOHNSON</u>		<u>SENDAYAN</u>		<u>DIFFERENCES</u> (L.B.J.-SENDAYAN)	
	Total	Average	Total	Average	Total	Average
1	113,051.80	974.58	74,200.32	613.23	38,851.48	361.35
2	107,692.06	868.48	69,032.36	482.74	38,659.70	385.74
3	98,054.91	527.18	77,509.54	458.64	20,545.31	68.54
Total	318,798.77	748.35	220,742.22	509.80	98,056.49	238.55

Source: Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan Computer Paysheets for January 1974.

Tables XIa and XIb show that Sendayan produced more rubber in Phase 3 than the Lyndon B. Johnson Scheme, but received less income. The explanation probably lies in the fact that the quality of the rubber produced in Sendayan's Phase 3 was very much inferior to its Lyndon B. Johnson counterpart, so that even though the quantity was larger the cumulative monetary value remained unaffected. This lends further support to the proposition that the Lyndon B. Johnson Scheme was "better" than the Sendayan.

Criterion 2: Lower Grade Rubber Production


This also seems to hold true with regard to lower grade rubber production. In fact, the gap between Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan Schemes in this respect was even wider than in the production of higher grade rubber. In the latter, the gap was only 156.9 lbs or 18.6% for the overall average yield, whereas in the former the discrepancy was 28.9%. Details of the production of lower grade rubber for the two Schemes are presented in Tables XIIa and XIIb and Figure 13.

Table XIIa: Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan: Production of Lower Grade Rubber for January 1974 (in lbs)

Phase	<u>LYNDON B. JOHNSON</u>		<u>SENDAYAN</u>		<u>DIFFERENCES</u> (L.B.J.-SENDAYAN)	
	Total	Average	Total	Average	Total	Average
1	38,717	333.7	28,015	132.5	10,702	102.2
2	28,492	229.7	17,580	122.9	10,912	106.8
3	30,193	162.3	24,738	146.3	5,455	16.0
Total	97,402	228.6	70,333	162.4	27,069	66.2


Source: Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan Computer Paysheets for January 1974.

FIG 13 L.B.J. & SENDAYAN: TOTAL PRODUCTION OF LOWER GRADES RUBBER PER PHASE FOR JANUARY 1974



Source: L.B.J. & Sendayan Computer Paysheet for January 1974

FIG. 14 L.B.J. & SENDAYAN: SETTLERS TOTAL INCOME FROM RUBBER PER PHASE FOR JANUARY 1974 (in M\$)



Source: L.B.J. & Sendayan Computer Paysheet for January 1974

Table XIIb: Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan: Production Value of Lower Grade Rubber for January 1974 (in M\$)

Phase	<u>LYNDON B. JOHNSON</u>		<u>SENDAYAN</u>		<u>DIFFERENCES</u> <u>(L.B.J.-SENDAYAN)</u>	
	Total	Average	Total	Average	Total	Average
1	12,133.89	104.60	7,999.21	66.11	4,134.68	38.49
2	9,023.20	72.77	5,584.64	39.05	3,438.56	33.72
3	9,653.76	51.90	7,156.75	42.35	2,497.01	9.55
Total	30,810.85	72.33	20,740.60	47.90	10,070.25	24.43

Source: Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan Computer Paysheets for January 1974.

Criterion 3: Settlers' Income

The settlers in both Schemes were not paid daily for each delivery of rubber. In Lyndon B. Johnson settlers were paid three times a month while in Sendayan the interval was one week. This difference, to some extent, could be taken as reflective of the greater need for immediate cash on the part of the Sendayan settlers. The settlers' main income came from rubber produce (latex and scrap) although some had additional sources of income inside or outside the Scheme.

Again, the performance of the Lyndon B. Johnson Scheme in this respect was comparatively better than that of Sendayan. For January 1974, each settler in Lyndon B. Johnson earned M\$264.89 more than a settler in Sendayan. The Phase 1 and Phase 2 settlers in both Schemes usually earned higher than Phase 3 settlers. This was mainly because the former entered the Scheme and the harvest stage earlier than the latter. Settlers from Phase 3 Lyndon B. Johnson, however, earned a higher income from rubber (M\$57.00 more) than settlers from Phase 2 Sendayan, which is another indication of Lyndon B. Johnson's competence over Sendayan. Details of the settlers' income for January 1974 are shown in Table XIII and Figure 14.

Table XIII: Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan: Settlers' Income
from Rubber for January 1974 (in M\$)

Phase	<u>LYNDON B. JOHNSON</u>		<u>SENDAYAN</u>		<u>DIFFERENCES</u> <u>(L.B.J.-SENDAYAN)</u>	
	Total	Average	Total	Average	Total	Average
1	125,946.97	1085.75	82,199.53	679.33	43,747.44	406.42
2	116,769.96	941.69	74,617.00	521.80	42,152.96	419.89
3	107,704.98	579.06	84,666.29	500.98	23,038.69	78.08
Total	350,421.91	822.59	241,482.82	557.70	108,939.09	264.89

Source: Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan Computer Paysheets for January 1974.

Criterion 4: Settlers' Loan Repayment

Every month a certain amount of reduction is made from each settler's total monthly income for the repayment of loans to FELDA. It had been difficult, however, for FELDA to set a rule whereby a standard rate of loan repayment be deducted from the settler's income regardless of his total income for a certain month because of fluctuating rubber prices. When rubber prices were low an inflexible rate would have left the settler with a net income inadequate for his needs.

In 1969 FELDA introduced a system of loan repayment which may be summarised thus:

- (a) If the settler's income for the month was less than M\$ 70.00, no reduction for loan repayment would be made.
- (b) For a monthly income that was above M\$ 70.00, ranging between M\$ 71.00 to M\$ 144.00, the amount of loan reduction would be 40% of the amount in excess of the first M\$ 70.00.
- (c) If the monthly income was above M\$ 145.00, the amount to be deducted would be 66% or $\frac{2}{3}$ of the amount in excess of the first M\$ 100.00.

This system, however, has been subject to further modification to the extent that only M\$ 150.00 was deducted from a settler whose gross income for one month was more than M\$ 1,000.00.

Table XIV and Figure 15 provide information on settlers' loan repayments for January 1974. On the whole the Schemes equalled each other in the total amount of loan repaid for the month, although Lyndon B. Johnson was slightly higher for Phase 1 and Phase 2. Sendayan's Phase 1, however, did slightly better than Phase 1 in Lyndon B. Johnson. No specific

explanation for this situation was obtained, but it is likely that the better performance of Phase 1 Sendayan was due to the fact that the settlers were under the obligation to pay more for this particular month to compensate for some previous month when incomes were lower.

Table XIV: Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan: Settlers' Loan Repayment for January 1974 (in M\$)

Phase	<u>LYNDON B. JOHNSON</u>		<u>SENDAYAN</u>		<u>DIFFERENCES (L.B.J.-SENDAYAN)</u>	
	Total	Average	Total	Average	Total	Average
1	13,003.34	112.09	14,638.86	120.98	-1,635.52	-8.89
2	13,297.06	107.23	14,394.12	100.66	-1,097.06	6.57
3	16,914.43	90.93	14,699.63	86.98	2,214.80	3.95
Total	43,214.83	101.19	43,732.61	100.99	-622.78	0.20

Source: Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan Computer Paysheets for January 1974.


Criterion 5: Settler Discipline with regard to the Marketing of Rubber Produce

One other significant point on which the Lyndon B. Johnson Scheme had been judged by FELDA officials as better than the Sendayan was the relatively low percentage of settlers selling the lower grade rubber (scrap) illegally. Unfortunately, accurate data for the proportion of illegal selling cases, in the two Schemes was unobtainable. The Authority had not made an effort to conduct a survey on the magnitude of this problem, although they were aware of frequent occurrences of illegal selling. Furthermore, even had the Authority agreed to a survey of the problem, the clandestine manner in which the activities operated would have made it almost impossible to obtain results that would have commensurated the time and costs incurred.

However, the managers in Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan estimated that the proportion of illegal selling of lower grade rubber to be between 10% to 15% in Lyndon B. Johnson and 20% to 25% in Sendayan.

That the percentage of illegal selling of scrap was supposedly lower in the Lyndon B. Johnson Scheme was supported by the statistical evidence concerning lower grade rubber production presented in Table XIIIa. The figures in the Table represented the amounts of lower grade rubber which the settlers delivered to and weighed at the Scheme collecting centre. On the average, for January 1974, each settler in Sendayan delivered

FIG. 15 L.B.J. & SENDAYAN: SETTLERS' LOAN REPAYMENT PER PHASE FOR JANUARY 1974



Source: L.B.J. & Sendayan Computer Paysheet for January 1974

Note: January 1974 is typical for production & earnings when rubber prices are higher

66.2 lbs or 15.3 lbs less scrap to the collecting centre than that delivered by a settler in Lyndon B. Johnson. On the whole, Sendayan's output of lower grade rubber for the month was 27,069 lbs (27.7%) lower than Lyndon B. Johnson's. Differences in size of holdings and age of the rubber trees are unlikely to be responsible for these discrepancies, for the two Schemes were established in the same year, the rubber trees were of the same productive age, and the size of rubber holdings distributed to settlers was similar for both Schemes.

There were strong reasons that might induce a settler to sell his scrap illegally. Firstly, the opportunity to obtain ready cash offered by unauthorised dealers who settled all payments for the scrap they bought from the settler there and then and secondly, by delivering a lesser quantity of scrap to the Scheme collecting centre, the settler's total income registered by the Authority would be lower, thus enabling him to benefit from the FELDA ruling "less income, less reduction for loan repayment".

Illegal rubber sales have always been a problem for FELDA. It results in a drop in FELDA's loan repayment to its financial sources, and unsystematic exploitation and too frequent tapping has a dilatorious effect on the long term productivity of the trees.

Criterion 6: General Conduct of Settlers

The final criterion by which FELDA decided that the Lyndon B. Johnson Scheme was comparatively better than the Sendayan was the settlers' conduct towards the Authority in general, or its management personnel. As in the case of illegal selling of lower grade rubber, there was no official data to support the allegation that incidences of settler hostility towards the Authority or management personnel were fewer in Lyndon B. Johnson than in Sendayan. However, by comparing the number of settlers who appeared in person at the FELDA Headquarters to criticise and make complaints, the frequency of settlers' armed attempts to assault management staff who were only carrying out their duties, and from settlers' indifferent or rebellious responses to reminders and warnings with regard to disobedience of rules, one can understand why FELDA arrived at the conclusion that Sendayan settlers were generally more unco-operative than settlers in Lyndon B. Johnson.

From personnel communication with management staff and FELDA officers at the Headquarters, and also from outsiders who had knowledge of the two

Schemes, the writer learnt that all respondents agreed that Sendayan settlers in general were more aggressive and rebellious than their counterparts in the Lyndon B. Johnson Scheme. The general idea of the "good" Lyndon B. Johnson and the "not so good" Sendayan as they were seen by FELDA is summarised in Table XV and Figure 16. That the Lyndon B. Johnson Scheme performed better than the Sendayan in respect of rubber production, rubber earnings, loan repayment and marketing discipline is confirmed by the evidence discussed earlier.

The evidence also reveals a very significant point that may be worth further research, namely, both Schemes suffered from similar weaknesses and drawbacks regardless of whether the Scheme was "good" or "not so good" in the Authority's eyes. Thus, the problem of illegal selling of rubber existed in both Schemes. The failure of settlers to conform strictly to FELDA's tapping method and procedure was as common in Lyndon B. Johnson as it was in Sendayan. Field observation indicated that 95% of settlers in both Schemes failed at least twice to maintain a 3/4 inch per month tapping panel; once in tidying rubber holdings within time; 30% of Lyndon B. Johnson and 64% of Sendayan settlers were suspected at least once of selling their rubber illegally; 12% of Lyndon B. Johnson and 9% of Sendayan settlers did at least once tap panel B⁵ without FELDA's permission; and 14% of Lyndon B. Johnson and 19% of Sendayan settlers were once guilty of prolonged absence from tapping. These matters will be discussed more fully in later chapters.

In addition to disciplinary faults, certain organisations had stagnated in both Schemes. The Lyndon B. Johnson settlers' Co-operative retail shop, after nearly seven years operation had only 120 members (or 28% of the total 426 settlers) and had accumulated bad debts to the extent of M\$ 3297.60 in 1973. The membership of the Scheme's Youth Association fell from 74 to 55 in 1973. This represented only 12% of the total settler population in the Scheme and hardly 5% of the Scheme's youth population.⁶ For Sendayan's Youth Association, the total number


5. The tapping plane of a rubber tree was sectioned to 2 planes, A and B (see Figure 22). A settler was supposed to tap only one panel at a time, i.e. half-spiral. When it was no more possible for tapping to continue on the A plane, the tapping supervisor would, on behalf of the Authority, permit the settler to start tapping on the other side of the rubber tree, i.e. panel B.

Table XV: Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan: Summary of Rubber Production and Earnings for the Months July - December 1973

Scheme	Month	Higher Grade Rubber		Lower Grade Rubber		Higher Grade and Lower Grade		Net Earnings from Rubber per Settler M\$	No. of Settlers Who Did Not Deliver Rubber Produce to the Collecting Centre	No. of Settlers Who Delivered Rubber Produce to the Collecting Centre	Rubber Seized in the Owner's Act of Illegal Selling
		1000 lbs	1000 M\$	1000 lbs	1000 M\$	1000 lbs	1000 M\$				
L.B.J. S.	July	186	190	77	24	351	214	501.67	1	425	
		201	131	52	15	253	104	238.22	3	430	861b scrap = \$24.35
L.B.J. S.	Aug.	233	170	93	20	360	190	444.07	1	425	12851b scrap = \$314.68
		200	118	54	14	254	131	302.13	3	430	6571b scrap = \$164.10
L.B.J. S.	Sept.	258	149	83	20	341	168	392.50	2	424	
		205	108	60	15	264	123	282.08	4	429	641b scrap = \$14.77 491b latex = \$77.92
L.B.J. S.	Oct.	260	143	77	17	336	160	374.03	1	425	
		197	101	54	12	250	112	257.07	3	430	
L.B.J. S.	Nov.	254	167	77	20	330	186	436.53	1	425	
		198	117	58	15	256	132	210.44	4	429	
L.B.J. S.	Dec.	343	280	99	32	442	311	729.45	1	425	
		331	247	97	29	427	276	635.18	4	429	

Source: Adapted from the Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan Computer Paysheet Summary for the year 1973.

FIG. 16 L.B.J. & SENDAYAN: TOTAL PRODUCTION OF HIGHER AND LOWER GRADES RUBBER IN POUNDS AND IN VALUE (M\$) FOR THE SECOND HALF OF THE YEAR 1973



Source: Computer Paysheet Summary for 1973 of the L.B.J. & Sendayan Schemes

of settlers in 1973 was 77 which amounted to 17% of the Scheme's total youth population⁷.

The sporadic development of the dusun area (reserved area planted with fruit crops and vegetables) offered further evidence of a problem common to both Schemes. In Sendayan, only 250 or 57.7% of the total 433 settler population worked diligently on their dusun lot. In Lyndon B. Johnson the corresponding figure was 252 or 59.1% of 426 settlers.

The failure or unsatisfactory adoption of innovations in a planned change programme is a matter of concern to developing countries. Perhaps even more important is the question as to why innovations fail or are not adopted on the scale expected in the blueprint of the programme. That unsatisfactory progress of innovations also afflicts a relatively more successful settlement scheme seems to imply that there must be reasons other than the settlers' negative attitudes toward change which are more fundamental to (and responsible for) the interplay of elements that give rise to this situation. The task in the subsequent chapters is to seek explanations in other factors, namely, communication pattern and channels, perception, change agents, and leadership.

6. Taking 2.7 to be the average number of youths per family (16 - 35 years old), the total number of youths in the Lyndon B. Johnson Scheme should be around 1,150 (based on the sample of 35 settler respondents whose number of children under youth category was 97).


7. Taking 2.5 to be the average number of youths per family (16 - 35 years old), the total number of youths in the Sendayan Scheme should be around 1,106 (based on the sample of 36 settler respondents whose number of children under youth category was 92).

C H A P T E R T H R E E

T H E C O M M U N I C A T I O N P A T T E R N

Communication is defined as the process by which messages are transferred from a source to a receiver⁸. The communication process in FELDA land schemes involves the Authority as the source, the management as the change agents, the village block leaders and the Scheme Development Council as the direct communication channels, and the settlers as the receiving individuals. The paradigm of this S-M-C-R⁹ communication pattern for the Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan Schemes is illustrated in Figure 17.

Figure 17: Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan: Communication Flow



8. Rogers and Shoemaker 1971 11

9. S-M-C-R model used by Rogers and Shoemaker to refer to Source - Message - Communication Channel - Receiver.

Figure 17 shows that the source of messages or innovations (innovations as they apply throughout this thesis are defined as ideas, practises or objects perceived as new by an individual) was FELDA policy-makers at the Headquarters. The messages were normally in the form of directives relating to what, when and how to innovate. Since the establishment of the Area Controller Office in Seremban, a substantial portion of directives have been sent to the Schemes' management via this office.

The staff members at the Scheme level were both the change agents and the first-level direct communication intermediaries between the source and the settlers. Their functions were to implement the innovations programme as directed. They were also the channels for feed-back from the receivers to the source. Entrusted with the carrying out of the what, when and how of the innovations, their jobs seemed to be the most crucial and hardest.


To lessen the burden of the change agents and facilitate communication, Scheme Development Councils were introduced and offices of block leaders were opened in both villages. Representation in the Scheme Development Council is shown in Figure 18. The functions of the Council as defined by the Authority¹⁰ were:

1. To act as an intermediary body between the settlers and the Authority.
2. To act as a body embodying other settlers' organisations and to co-ordinate the activities of these organisations.
3. To grant opportunities and facilities for the executive members to arrive at certain decisions which relate to the welfare and in the interest of the settler community.
4. To plan and implement projects which are beneficial to settlers through other settler organisations.
5. To integrate settlers' efforts and initiatives in the manner that they can be effectively utilised for communal work.
6. To motivate and encourage settlers to adopt improved health measures and to increase income by means of animal farming.

10. Peneroka 1970. Vol. 2, No. 2, 3 - 4.

7. To promote a sense of belonging and civic-mindedness among settlers with reference to the use of public utilities such as the public telephone, the community hall and recreational fields.
8. To attune farmers to new attitudes and values; to be development-orientated and education-conscious, so that they can form a community which is independent, integral and well-disciplined.

Figure 18: Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan: Representation in the Scheme Development Council



Source: Sendayan Scheme Office.

Closest to the settlers in the communication link were the block leaders. These leaders were democratically elected by the settlers of respective blocks to represent them in the Scheme Development Council. Their roles ranged from formality of attending meetings to informality in listening to settlers' complaints. These roles will be further discussed in the following chapter.

Ending the communication chain were the settlers, who were the receivers of messages from the policy-makers and the intended adopters of the innovations introduced by the source. As they received messages through various levels of intermediaries, they were also expected to convey responses or reactions through these channels. This, however, has not been common for only a small percentage of settlers in Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan Schemes respond directly to the Authority, either in person or by correspondence.

In communicating ideas of innovation to the settlers, FELDA combined three strategies, namely:

1. Individual approach:

This consisted of farm and home visits, office calls and personal letters.

2. Group approach:

This comprised method demonstrations, results demonstrations, settlers' field days and short courses, and exhibits mainly in the form of shows and competitions.

3. Mass approach:

This included mobile extension units, documentary films, circulars, posters, radio, pictures, bulletins, press and television.

Recently, the "dialogue approach" was gaining popularity, whereby senior officials from FELDA or other related fields came to the Scheme by invitation to meet the settlers face to face. This provided settlers with the opportunity of asking questions, expressing feelings, disclosing doubts, making suggestions and even criticising the Authority.

Unfortunately, this approach was usually the least often held. In the Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan Schemes, the number of occasions where "dialogues" occurred between source and receiver had probably not been more than three times in the ten years of the Schemes' establishment.

In general, the communication channels used by the innovators in the two Schemes may be divided into two broad categories:

1. Mass media: the main components being circulars, settler bulletin (Peneroka), local newspapers and radio.
2. Interpersonal: consisting of face-to-face meetings, announcements in the Scheme's mosque after Friday prayers and announcements at special meetings in the community hall.

These channels were used interchangeably in three major functional stages of the diffusion process, namely, knowledge, persuasion and decision functions.

At the knowledge function, messages or ideas about the innovations were made known to the settlers and they were expected to try to adopt them.

At the persuasion function, communication was designed to convince hesitant settlers to adopt innovations. Finally, for the uncommunicable, decisions were sometimes made in the form of warnings or penalties.

Findings from research indicated that the mass communication channels were widely used in the Lyndon B. Johnson Scheme to make the settlers aware of the existence of the particular innovations, whereas in the Sendayan Scheme interpersonal channels appeared to be more dominant. At the persuasion stage, change agents in both Schemes preferred impersonal to interpersonal channels, for this approach constituted 66% of Lyndon B. Johnson and 52% of Sendayan of change agents to settler communication. Impersonal channels were again popular among change agents in both Schemes in their final campaign to motivate settlers to adopt innovations (the decision stage), the proportion being 72% in Lyndon B. Johnson and 62% in Sendayan. Further illustration of the relative importance of impersonal and interpersonal communication channels used by change agents in Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan Schemes is presented in Figure 19.


In disseminating knowledge of the benefits of innovations and in explaining doubts that might arise in relation to the adoption of the innovations, FELDA radio programmes and the settler bulletin were the two most important communication channels. Radio programmes commenced on 1 August 1973 and the bulletin some time before 1967.

Apart from general information interwoven from time to time in various programmes of Radio Malaysia, there were two programmes specially designed for the purpose of communicating messages to FELDA settlers all over the country, namely, "Fajar di-Bumi Permata"¹¹ which features settler characters in one of the FELDA Land Schemes and "Desa Jaya"¹¹ which consists of interviews with successful and exemplary FELDA settlers. To find out how effective these two official channels had been

11. The programmes may be translated to mean "Dawn on the Land of Gem" and "The Village of Success" respectively.

FIG 19 COMMUNICATION CHANNELS USED BY CHANGE-AGENTS IN THE L.B.J. & SENDAYAN SCHEMES


L.B.J.



A






B



C

SENDAYAN



Channels



Impersonal



Interpersonal

Scale of percentages



L.B.J.



Sendayan

A Knowledge level

B Persuasion level

C Decision level

a Circulars

b Settlers Bulletin

c radio

d newspapers

e face-to-face with settlers

f announcement in the mosque
after Friday prayers

g announcement of special message
in the community hall

h warning notices

Source: Based on information from 16 staff respondents from L.B.J. scheme, and 14 staff respondents from Sendayan scheme

in communicating ideas to settlers, respondents were asked their opinions of the FELDA radio programmes and the settler bulletin. The findings are summarised in Tables XVI, XVII and XVIII.

Table XVI: Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan: Settler Response to FELDA Radio Programmes

	<u>LYNDON B. JOHNSON</u>		<u>SENDAYAN</u>	
	Number	%	Number	%
<u>Having radio receiver</u>				
regular listeners	23	65.7	22	61.1
occasional listeners	2	5.7	1	2.8
never listened to	6	17.2	1	2.8
<u>Having no radio receiver</u>				
but listened occasionally	1	2.8	-	-
therefore, never listened	3	8.6	12	33.3
Total number of Respondents	35	100.0	36	100.0

Table XVII: Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan: Settlers' Opinions of the Effect of FELDA Radio Programmes

	<u>LYNDON B. JOHNSON</u>						<u>SENDAYAN</u>					
	1	2	3	4	5	6	1	2	3	4	5	6
Had given settlers valuable information	4	11	7	1	-	-	8	6	4	1	3	-
Had made settlers realise their mistakes	4	12	6	1	1	-	7	7	4	2	2	-
Had answered settlers' doubts	1	4	4	2	11	-	4	2	3	1	7	5
Had inspired settlers to better themselves	3	9	8	1	3	-	6	2	5	2	4	3
Total number of Respondents following the programmes	26						23					
Total number of Respondents interviewed	35						36					

1 = definitely yes 2 = yes 3 = probably yes 4 = probably no
5 = no 6 = definitely no

Table XVIII: Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan: Settlers' Response to the Settler Bulletin

	LYNDON B. JOHNSON		SENDAYAN	
	Number	%	Number	%
Settlers having every issue of Bulletin	35	100.0	35	97.2
Settlers having Bulletins but rarely read them	5	14.3	-	-
Settlers having Bulletins issues but never read them	3	8.6	10	27.8
Total number of Respondents	35		36	

Tables XVI - XVIII suggest that:

1. For settlers in both Schemes, FELDA radio programmes had been more effective in giving information about innovations and in making the settlers realise their mistakes for 62.8% of the respondents in Lyndon B. Johnson and 50.4% in Sendayan gave positive answers to the first opinion and 62.8% and 50% of respondents in Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan respectively had answered positively to the second opinion.
2. For settlers in both Schemes, the FELDA radio programmes, however, had been less effective in clearing settlers' doubts and in inspiring settlers to wholeheartedly adopt FELDA's innovations. This is revealed by the 25.7% of negative answers from Lyndon B. Johnson and 25.0% from Sendayan.
- 3 The proportion of the "uncertain" is not insignificant. This refers to the "probably yes" opinions as they reduce the strength of opinions under the positive categories. In Lyndon B. Johnson, "uncertain" constituted 26.8% of total opinions expressed. The corresponding figure for Sendayan was 18.2%. Twenty percent of Lyndon B. Johnson and 11% of Sendayan respondents were not sure whether they had obtained valuable information from FELDA radio programmes; 17% and 11% were not sure that they had realised their mistakes after listening to the programmes; 11.4% and 8.3% were not sure whether their doubts had been answered by the programmes; and 23% and 14% were uncertain of the inspiring effect of the programmes.

Most settlers read the bulletin issues. However, this observation must be treated cautiously for the value of mass media such as the bulletin lies in the extent to which its contents have been properly read and understood. A settler might read every issue of the bulletin but only the parts that deal most lightly with understanding and adopting innovations. Buying an issue of the bulletin every month is almost compulsory for deductions are made at the pay table. If buying the bulletin was voluntary, a significant number of the settlers - probably the majority - would not buy it. This is not due to the price which is only 15c. but to lack of interest in and understanding of its contents.

A settler bulletin issue published monthly by FELDA Settler Development Division, usually begins with an editorial which is followed by a theme article; a section which deals with aspects relating to FELDA operation; a message or a speech from some prominent FELDA officer or national leader; an attitude-change campaign which has a religion-strategy; reports on current happenings in FELDA Schemes; agricultural columns; a short story; a comic section; a children's corner; a section for the female members of the settler community; and two columns for settlers' opinions. These varied contents of the bulletin clearly illustrate the Authority's effort to communicate with settlers. Presentation is also being constantly improved as evidenced by a more colourful, finer cover quality and picture illustrations of the bulletin's recent issues.

However, it is doubtful that the bulletin is effective in educating and changing settlers' attitudes and thinking. Though highly relevant to development issues, the bulletin tends to be heavy and pedantic, and its style and language are often unsuitable for the majority of not-so-educated settlers. Both the bulletin and the FELDA radio programmes (which some settlers described with sarcasm) are weakened by their tendency to preach. Even the special section allocated for settlers to express their opinions does not result in two-way communication. Thus, the bulletin serves as the source's channel to communicate with the settlers. It informs the receivers what the source thinks they must know, must realise, must follow and must do. The role of the settlers is always to listen and to accept.

Films are another channel of communication but are insufficiently used for educational purposes. A settler in the Sendayan Scheme complained that there had only been two documentary films in the Scheme so far - one was about the life and work of fishermen, and the other, pilgrimage to Mecca. At present, the popular image of the film in the rural minds of the Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan settlers associate it with two attributes: it provides entertainment and it has a deruralising influence. The writer observed that settlers' reactions to the film shown during her stay in the Lyndon B. Johnson Scheme were varied. The youngsters liked the occasion more than the film because it provided the opportunity for them to socialise. The more orthodox elders objected to the excessively sex-orientation of the film and left early. The show was organised in association with the Scheme management. It was not educational and appeared to be shown solely for its entertainment value.

Thus, in summation, we have in the Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan Schemes, on one hand a communication medium which lacks the educational and information emphasis, and on the other, communication channels which are obsessed with education and instruction. In analysing the design, content and approach of the settler bulletin and FELDA radio programmes which represent FELDA's official communication media, one may see that the Authority takes the decision role, while the settlers' role is passive.

The media in general, reflect the following characteristics:

1. The receiver or adopter is not at liberty to voice his opinions regarding the idea, practice or object introduced by the Authority. In other words, he is not free to exercise his choice in adopting or rejecting an innovation.
2. The Authority makes the decisions concerning the what, how and when of innovation, while the settlers have to do the adoption.

These characteristics suggest that the pattern of innovation decision-making predominating in the Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan Schemes (in fact in all FELDA Schemes) is of the authoritative type. This fact is significant because it affects the effectiveness of the communication channels in one fundamental aspect: perception. In authority decision-making, decisions on what, when and how to innovate come from the source (FELDA) which occupies a position of higher authority than the adoption unit. As such, the decisions on innovations tend to be based

significantly on what the Authority perceives as suitable for the Schemes and the settlers. The settlers have little say in the very decisions that affect them. This is perhaps the real reason why the settler bulletin and FELDA radio programmes have been relatively ineffective in communicating innovations to settlers.

CHAPTER FOUR

RECEIVERS' PERCEPTION

The later part of Chapter Three suggests that perception may be a critical factor in an authoritative innovation situation and may have considerable bearing on the effectiveness of communication. Unless prior consideration is directed to this factor communication is likely to be defective and ineffective. This is because a gap exists between the perception of the decision unit or the source and that of the adoption unit or the receiver. There is evidence from the field in support of this hypothesis. The majority of settlers were aware of innovations introduced, some had reasonable knowledge of the purposes or advantages of the innovations, but only a few really knew, understood and perceived them as intended by the Authority.

It is the purpose of this chapter to consider Authority-settler perception as revealed by responses to selected innovations.

Innovation 1: Family Planning

Almost all settlers in the Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan Schemes had heard of family planning and were aware that the pill was available for their wives from the Scheme clinic at a price 50% cheaper than elsewhere. Seventy-four percent of respondents' wives in Lyndon B. Johnson and 80% in Sendayan were taking the pill. The innovation was welcomed because of its benefits, compatibility with settlers' values, and its simplicity of use. When asked the purpose of family planning, however, respondents gave a wide range of answers, which are summarised below.

Purposes of Family Planning as Perceived by the Authority¹²

1. To space births so that a mother's health could be safeguarded.
2. To enable parents to plan the size of their family according to their financial capacity.
3. To ensure that each child receives adequate attention and education.

Purposes of Family Planning as Perceived by Settlers

1. To reduce the number of children one could have.
2. To space childbirths.
3. To safeguard mother's health.
4. To improve material standard of living.
5. To enable mothers to assist with rubber tapping.
6. To reduce the number of Malays in the country.

Purposes 1, 6 (and to a lesser extent 5) as perceived by settlers, may be construed as a misinterpretation of the actual purposes and meaning of family planning as perceived by the Authority. In the Lyndon B. Johnson Scheme a significant proportion (37%) of respondents gave 1, 6 and 5; in Sendayan the corresponding figure was 22%. At least 15% of respondents in Lyndon B. Johnson and 22% in Sendayan were not clear of the purposes and advantages of family planning. Thus, with only 48% of settlers in Lyndon B. Johnson and 56% in Sendayan who had "correct" perception of the innovation, the gap between the perception of the source and the receivers was 37% in Lyndon B. Johnson and 44% in Sendayan. It is of interest that considerable adoption of family planning occurred as a consequence of "incorrect" perception of the innovation. Failing to understand the objectives, the adopter who today may believe in family planning is likely to be susceptible to influences - such as gossip or doubt expressed by a friend - which may lead to his rejection of the innovation. Adoption of innovation for improperly perceived reasons may be only short-term adoption.

Details of the findings regarding settlers' perception of family planning are presented in Tables XIXa and XIXb.

Table XIXa: Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan: Settlers' Perception of the Purposes of Family Planning

	LYNDON B. JOHNSON		SENDAYAN	
	Number	%	Number	%
1. To reduce number of children one could have	10	28.5	4	11.1
2. To space childbirths	5	14.2	9	25.0
3. To safeguard mother's health	4	11.4	1	2.7
4. To improve standard of living	8	22.8	10	27.7
5. To enable mothers to assist with tapping	1	2.8	-	-
6. To reduce the number of Malays in the country	2	5.7	4	11.1
7. Purposes not clear	5	14.2	8	22.2
Total number of respondents	35	99.6	36	99.8

Note that Perceptions one and six may be construed as incorrect and Perception five, inaccurate, vis-a-vis the Authority perceptions.

Table XIXb: Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan: Communication Gap
in Innovation One.

	<u>LYNDON B. JOHNSON</u>	<u>SENDAYAN</u>
% of respondents who were not aware of the innovation	1	1
% of respondents who were aware of the innovation but did not understand the purposes	14	22
% of respondents who knew the purposes but misinterpreted them (Perception gap)	37	44
Total Communication Gap (%)	52	67

Innovation 2: Scheme Development Council

Ninety-seven percent of respondents in Sendayan and 85% in Lyndon B. Johnson reported that they had heard of the Scheme Development Council, but a significant proportion (45% in Lyndon B. Johnson and 29% in Sendayan) were unclear as to the purposes and functions of the Council. Only 28% in Sendayan and 30% in Lyndon B. Johnson gave correct answers when asked of their perception of this innovation. Others gave loose, indefinite answers which were acceptable but weak and contaminated with uncertainties and elements of misconception, as can be seen from the following responses:

Objectives of Scheme Development Council as Perceived by the Authority¹³

1. To encourage settlers' participation, through democratic practices, in administration which affect the interests and welfare of the settler community.
2. To give prior attention to efforts directed to enhancing the socio-economic development of the Scheme.
3. To bridge the communication gap between the settlers and the management.
4. To find, in systematic and organised ways, solutions to settlers' problems through discussions and united decisions.
5. To build a united settler community based on the adoption of advantageous new values.

Objectives of Scheme Development Council as Perceived by the Settlers

1. A source of information to settlers
2. To better settlers.
3. To guide settlers who go astray.
4. For the benefit of people in the Scheme.
5. To receive settlers' complaints.
6. To advise settlers.
7. For settlers to bring up their cases.
8. To build a progressive Scheme.
9. To administer the Scheme's affairs.
10. To plan for the Scheme future.
11. To improve .
12. To organise meetings.
13. To organise settlers for communal work.
14. To act as intermediary between the Authority and the settler.

13. Peneroka, 1970 Vol. 2, No. 2.

Details of settlers' perception are presented in Tables XXa and XXb.

Table XXa: Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan: Settlers' Perception of the Purposes of the Scheme Development Council

	LYNDON B. JOHNSON		SENDAYAN	
	Number	%	Number	%
1. A source of information to settlers	1	2.8	1	2.7
2. To better settlers	2	5.6	2	5.4
3. To guide settlers who go astray	1	2.8	1	2.7
4. For the benefit of people in the Scheme	2	5.6	2	5.4
5. To receive settlers' complaints	-	-	1	2.7
6. To advise settlers	-	-	2	5.4
7. For settlers to bring up their cases	1	2.8	2	5.4
8. To build a progressive Scheme	3	8.4	-	-
9. To administer the Scheme's affairs	4	11.2	3	8.1
10. To plan for the Scheme future	2	5.6	1	2.7
11. To improve	5	14.0	3	8.1
12. To organise meetings	1	2.8	1	2.7
13. To organise settlers for communal work	1	2.8	7	18.9
14. To act as intermediary between the Authority and the settlers	-	-	-	-
Total number of respondents	35		36	

Note that Perceptions one, three, five, six, seven and thirteen may be construed as inaccurate vis-a-vis the Authority Perceptions.

Table XXb: Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan: Communication Gap in Innovation Two

	LYNDON B. JOHNSON	SENDAYAN
% of respondents not aware of the innovation	15.0	3.0
% of respondents who were aware of the innovation but did not understand its purposes	45.0	29.0
% of respondents who knew the purposes of the innovation but misinterpreted them. (Perception gap)	11.2	18.9
Total Communication Gap (%)	71.2	50.9

The situation implies that most settlers who were aware of the establishment of the Council knew that it was a well-meaning innovation.

However, settler reaction to the Council was necessarily affected by their divergent perception of its objectives and functions.

Settlers may appreciate the activities of the Council, but due to the comprehension gap which made them feel inadequate to become active participants, they may detach themselves and leave the operation of the Council to the few who appeared capable. Since the success of this innovation depends on mass participation, such a response from settlers probably explains why the Councils in the Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan Schemes have not been successful in achieving the goals for which they were established. Lack of knowledge and active settler participation has led to the emergence of a few competent leaders and in Lyndon B. Johnson especially, leadership in the Council always comes from the manager himself. In the words of the manager:

"Members of the Council are timid and often fail to defend the decisions that they themselves make against criticisms from other settlers without having to resort to the manager as a source of power and authority."¹⁴

Innovation 3: The Co-operative Society

Ninety-one percent of respondents in Lyndon B. Johnson and 98% in Sendayan knew about the Co-operative Society in their Scheme. Most settlers agreed, in principle, that they should support the Co-operative by becoming members and purchasing their daily needs from the Co-operative store. They were aware that the Co-operative's main function was to serve the interest of its members. This apparent positive impression of the Co-operative in the minds of the settlers is interesting when examined vis-a-vis the unhappy history of the Co-operative Societies in the two Schemes. Why, one would like to know, had there been constant failures when there was such a significant number of Co-operative enthusiasts in the Schemes (the Society membership was 60% of the total settler population in Sendayan and 37% in Lyndon B. Johnson)? The answer probably lies again in perception. The following may provide an insight into how the innovation had been multifariously perceived by the settlers. (Details in Tables XXIa and XXIb).

14. The manager of the Lyndon B. Johnson Scheme, quoted in the questionnaire for the executive members of various organisations in the Scheme.

The Purposes of Settlers' Co-operative Society as Perceived by the Authority.¹⁵

1. To cultivate among the settlers the habit of saving a part of their monthly income.
2. To accumulate funds for business and commercial ventures.
3. To provide storage, processing and marketing facilities for settlers' produce.
4. To cater for settlers' domestic provisions.

The Purposes of Settlers' Co-operative Society as Perceived by the Settlers.

1. To seek for (financial) profits.
2. To provide members with facilities (to buy daily needs).
3. To prevent other bodies from opening provisionary shops.
4. To encourage Malay participation in business and commercial activities.
5. To train settlers how to run businesses.
6. For Malay progress.
7. For the cultivation of settlers' co-operation.
8. To offer better (cheaper) prices of goods to settlers.
9. To distribute profits to members.
10. To help settlers.
11. To uplift standard of living.
12. To give information.
13. To prevent middlemen from operating in the business affairs of the Scheme.
14. To extend loans to settlers.

Table XXIa: Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan: Settlers' Perception of the Purposes of the Co-operative Society.

	<u>LYNDON B. JOHNSON</u>		<u>SENDAYAN</u>	
	Number	%	Number	%
1. To seek for (financial) profits	3	8.4	4	10.8
2. To provide members with facilities (to buy daily needs)	3	8.4	7	18.9
3. To prevent other bodies from opening provisionary shops.	-	-	1	2.7
4. To encourage Malay participation in business and commercial activities	-	-	2	5.4
5. To train settlers how to run business	1	2.8	2	5.4
6. For Malay progress	-	-	2	5.4
7. For the cultivation of settlers' co-operation	-	-	4	10.8
8. To offer better (cheaper) prices of goods to settlers.	-	-	4	10.8
9. To distribute profits to members	1	2.8	2	5.4
10. To help settlers	1	2.8	1	2.7
11. To uplift standard of living	8	22.4	1	2.7
12. To give information	1	2.8	1	2.7
13. To prevent middlemen from operating in the business affairs of the Scheme	2	5.6	-	-
14. To extend loans to settlers	1	2.8	1	2.7
Total number of respondents	35		36	

Note that all except Perceptions two, ten, eleven and thirteen, may be construed as inaccurate vis-a-vis the Authority Perceptions.

Table XXIb: Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan: Communication Gap in Innovation Three

	<u>LYNDON B. JOHNSON</u>	<u>SENDAYAN</u>
% of respondents not aware of the innovation	9.0	2.0
% of respondents aware of the innovation but did not understand its purposes	41.2	13.6
% of respondents who knew the purposes of the innovation but misinterpreted them. (Perception gap)	25.2	62.1
Total Communication Gap (%)	75.4	77.7

Admittedly, the objectives and functions of the Co-operative as perceived by most settlers were not necessarily contrary to those perceived by the Authority. Some were very close to the principles on which a Co-operative Society operates, such as those pertaining to participation in business, commercial ventures and profit making. These, however, were also the defective points of the settlers' perception for they seemed to signify that the settlers perceived the Co-operative solely or essentially as a profit seeking organisation committed to ensure every member a regular profit, other benefits in the form of lower prices for goods bought from the Co-operative store, and the extension of facilities for purchasing on credit. Thus the Co-operative store became a place where the Society had to fulfil the purpose which the settlers thought it was established for. It was obliged to "make things easier" for them and their main concern was to insist on credit purchasing. This was the beginning of the end of the Co-operative, for members were often unable to settle their credit obligations and bad debts accumulated.

In the Lyndon B. Johnson Scheme 41.2% of the respondents who were aware of the existence of the Co-operative reported that they did not understand the purposes and functions of the Society. The corresponding figure for Sendayan was 13.6%. Only 12% of respondents in Lyndon B. Johnson and 13% in Sendayan gave answers that correspond with the purposes of Co-operative as perceived by the Authority. This means that more than 70% of respondents in Lyndon B. Johnson and 85% in Sendayan had misinterpreted the innovation in one way or another.

Thus we see in the Co-operative Societies of the Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan Schemes, another case where perception gap between the source and the receivers has resulted in a discouraging response to innovation.

Innovation 4: The Village Block System:

Sixty-eight percent of respondents in Lyndon B. Johnson and all respondents in Sendayan reported that they were aware of the institutionisation of the village block system whereby settlers' households were divided into blocks, each consisting of 20 to 30 houses and headed by a leader who was elected by the block settlers. What did the block system mean to the settlers and to what extent did their perceptions coincide with those of the Authority?

Purposes of the Village Block System
as Perceived by the Authority¹⁶

To cultivate among the settlers, a sense of commitment to and responsibility for maintaining cleanliness in the village area:

- a. The house lots are to be utilised fully by planting vegetables or fruit.
- b. To encourage the use of water-borne toilets.
- c. To ensure that ditches around the house lot are regularly cleaned.
- d. To ensure that paths are kept clean from wild grasses.
- e. To reduce the soil erosion by building bunds around the houses.

Purposes of the Village Block System
as Perceived by the Settlers

1. For settlers to channel their complaints.
2. To ensure peace in the village.
3. To elect a block leader.
4. To develop the village.
5. To report settlers to the Authority.
6. To function in the same ways as Scheme Development Council.
7. To make it easier for the Authority to control settlers.
8. To delegate administrative responsibilities.
9. To channel information from above to settlers.
10. To find somebody (the block leader) to shoulder the burden of dealing with settler problems.
11. To advise settlers.
12. To unite settlers for communal work.

Details of settler perception of the innovation are presented in Tables XXIIa and XXIIb.

16. Peneroka 1973 Vol. 5, No. 10, 3 - 4.

Table XXIIa: Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan: Settlers' Perception of the Village Block System.

	<u>LYNDON B. JOHNSON</u>		<u>SENDAYAN</u>	
	Number	%	Number	%
1. For settlers to channel complaints	2	5.6	1	2.7
2. To ensure peace in the Scheme	1	2.8	3	8.1
3. To elect a block leader	1	2.8	-	-
4. To develop the Scheme	4	11.2	4	10.8
5. To report settlers to the Authority	-	-	1	2.7
6. To function in the same ways as Scheme Development Council	-	-	2	5.4
7. To make it easier for the Authority to control settlers	1	2.8	6	16.2
8. To delegate administrative responsibilities	-	-	4	10.8
9. To channel information from above to settlers	3	8.4	2	5.4
10. To get somebody (the block leader) to shoulder the burden of dealing with settler problems	-	-	1	2.7
11. To advise settlers	-	-	2	5.4
12. To unite settlers for communal work	-	-	2	5.4
Total number of respondents	35		36	

Note that all except Perceptions four, eleven and twelve may be construed as inaccurate vis-a-vis the Authority Perception.

Table XXIIb: Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan: Communication Gap in Innovation Four

	<u>LYNDON B. JOHNSON</u>	<u>SENDAYAN</u>
% of respondents not aware of the innovation	32.0	-
% of respondents who were aware of the innovation but did not understand its purposes	33.6	18.9
% of respondents who knew the purposes of the innovation but misinterpreted them (Perception gap)	22.4	59.4
Total Communication Gap (%)	88.0	78.3

The situation seems alarming; most settlers did not conceive the innovation in the way it was intended by the Authority. Only 16.2% of respondents in Sendayan and 11.2% in Lyndon B. Johnson had answered "correctly". This situation probably reflects weaknesses inherent in the innovation communication system, for it is unlikely that settler ignorance can be held responsible for such a wide gap in perception. FELDA communication channels had only achieved limited success in transmitting accurate knowledge about innovations to the intended receivers. By the time they reached the receivers, the message was often so fragmented that the gist remained uncommunicated. This is probably the underlying reason why, as will be further elucidated in the latter part of this chapter, block leaders considered their role to be a problem, for what the Authority expected them to do was different from the expectations of the settlers.

Innovation 5: FELDA Radio Programmes

Communicating with settlers through radio was another FELDA innovative experiment. Fifty-seven percent of respondents in Lyndon B. Johnson and 61% of Sendayan stated that they were aware of the programmes, and of these, 75% in Lyndon B. Johnson and 73% in Sendayan had some knowledge of the objectives of the innovation. However respondents differed slightly in their perception of the innovation purposes. (Details in Tables XXIIIa and XXIIIb).

Purposes of FELDA Radio Programmes as Perceived by the Authority¹⁷

1. To operate as an effective medium that transmits information, advice and knowledge to the settlers.
2. To make settlers realise that they are a part of the larger society which receives equal attention from government as far as economic development is concerned.
3. To encourage settlers to improve their quality of living by indicating unsuited and time-worn beliefs and practices, and by providing examples of settlers who have succeeded.
4. As a source of entertainment for the settler community.

Purposes of FELDA Radio Programmes as Perceived by Settlers.

1. For entertainment
2. To give information
3. To make settlers realise their mistakes.
4. To encourage settlers to be honest.
5. To inspire and encourage settlers.
6. To warn settlers of penalties for offences.
7. To teach settlers how to live.
8. Propaganda.
9. A cynical preaching.
10. To advise settlers.

Table XXIIIa: Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan: Settlers' Perception of the Purposes of FELDA Radio Programmes

	<u>LYNDON B. JOHNSON</u>		<u>SENDAYAN</u>	
	Number	%	Number	%
1. For entertainment	2	5.6	1	2.7
2. To give information	3	8.4	5	13.5
3. To make settlers realise their mistakes	1	2.8	3	8.1
4. To encourage settlers to be honest	-	-	1	2.7
5. To inspire and encourage settlers	3	8.4	3	8.1
6. To warn settlers of penalties for offences	-	-	1	2.7
7. To teach settlers how to live	1	2.8	1	2.7
8. Propaganda	-	-	1	2.7
9. A cynical preaching	1	2.8	1	2.7
10. To advise settlers	4	11.2	1	2.7
Total number of respondents	35		36	

Note that Perceptions four, six, seven, eight and nine, may be construed as inaccurate vis-a-vis the Authority perception.

Table XXIIIb: Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan: Communication Gap in Innovation Five

	<u>LYNDON B. JOHNSON</u>	<u>SENDAYAN</u>
% of respondents not aware of the innovation	43.0	39.0
% of respondents who were aware of the innovation but did not understand its purposes	15.0	16.0
% of respondents who knew the purposes of the innovation but misinterpreted them (Perception gap)	9.0	19.0
Total Communication Gap (%)	67.0	74.0

Seventy percent of the total respondents in Lyndon B. Johnson who had some knowledge of the radio programmes and 68% in Sendayan gave "correct" answers regarding the purposes of the innovation. Thus, the perception gap between the source and the receiver was 30% in Lyndon B. Johnson and 32% in Sendayan. However, it must be recalled that respondents only involved 57% of Lyndon B. Johnson settlers and 61% of the Sendayan.

Innovation 6: Second Settler Development Course

Seventy-five percent of respondents in Sendayan and 25% in Lyndon B. Johnson reported having heard of the second settler Development course, but 33% in Sendayan and 22% in Lyndon B. Johnson did not understand the purposes of the innovation. This meant that only 42% of respondents in Sendayan and 3% in Lyndon B. Johnson had some knowledge of the purposes of the courses. Only 13% in Sendayan and 11% in Lyndon B. Johnson really understood the innovation. (Details in Tables XXIVa and XXIVb)

Second Settlers Development Course as Perceived by the Authority¹⁸

1. To extend information and explanation concerning FELDA policies and projects in rural development.
2. To cultivate civic-mindedness and self-improvement among settlers
3. To provide opportunity for exchanging views among participants.

Second Settlers Development Course as Perceived by Settlers.

1. For the participants to gain new experience and knowledge.
2. To discuss matters relating to rubber production, and co-operation.
3. To co-ordinate FELDA's administration.
4. For settler overall progress.
5. For FELDA staff only.
6. To get youth under control.
7. To encourage settlers to espouse causes in the Scheme.

Table XXIVa; Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan: Settlers' Perception of the Purposes of Second Settler Development Courses

	LYNDON B. JOHNSON		SENDAYAN	
	Number	%	Number	%
1. For the participants to gain new experience and knowledge	1	2.8	3	10.8
2. To discuss matters relating to rubber production, and co-operation	-	-	1	2.7
3. To co-ordinate FELDA'S administration	-	-	1	2.7
4. For settlers' overall progress	1	2.8	2	5.4
5. For FELDA staff only	-	-	1	2.7
6. To get youth under control	-	-	1	2.7
7. To encourage settlers to espouse causes in the Scheme	-	-	1	2.7
Total number of respondents	35		36	

Note that Perceptions two, three, five and six may be construed as inaccurate vis-a-vis the Authority Perceptions.

Table XXIVb: Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan: Communication Gap in Innovation Six

	<u>LYNDON B. JOHNSON</u>	<u>SENDAYAN</u>
% of respondents not aware of the innovation	75.0	25.0
% of respondents who were aware of the innovation but did not understand its purposes.	22.0	33.0
% of respondents who knew the purposes of the innovation but misinterpreted them. (Perception gap)	-	11.0
Total Communication Gap (%)	97.0	69.0

Family planning, the Scheme Development Council, the Co-operative Society, village block system, FELDA radio programmes and the settlers Development course provide examples of the importance of receivers' perception, the imperfection of which may explain the limited success of the adoption of innovations.

Block Leaders

In both Schemes receiver misperception was probably increased by misperceptions among the communication intermediaries. These were the village block leaders whose roles were a constant compromise between the expectations of the Authority and those of the settlers. Polarisation of block leaders' roles appears to be typical in almost all FELDA Schemes.¹⁹

Perception of the Roles of the Block Leaders by the Management

1. Every block leader was required to attend the leader meetings conducted by the manager or the field assistants. During the meeting, the block leaders were to note all instructions and decisions from management concerning the organisation of field work and directives from FELDA or the Area Controller Office. It was the responsibility of the block leaders to convey these messages to the settlers.

19. See, for example, illustration on the roles of Block Leaders in Lenga Scheme by Wan Leong Fee 1969 183 - 190. A substantial part of discussion on block leaders in the present chapter is based on Wan Leong Fee's findings.

2. To attend meetings of the Scheme Development Council, of which each block leader was an executive member. During the meeting the block leaders were to participate in discussion concerning major problems in the Scheme and their solutions. The leader was also to inform each member of his block of the resolutions and instructions decided during the meeting.
3. To inspect cleanliness of the settlers' house lots and rubber holdings of the block members, and to organise settlers for collective work (kerja gotong royong).
4. To supervise settlers assigned for the development of minor economic projects, and the development of unused and reserved land for the cultivation of other fruit crops.
5. To attend whenever required, training courses conducted by FELDA Headquarters, and to visit and evaluate the progress of other FELDA Schemes. It was also part of their duties to take note of settlers not residing permanently in the Schemes and to inform the management of unco-operative or irresponsible settlers.

Block Leaders' Self-Perception of Roles vis-a-vis Management

All block leaders in the Lyndon B. Johnson Scheme regarded the monthly meeting of the block leaders, and conveying instructions from the management, FELDA Headquarters and the Scheme Development Council to be the two most important functions expected of them by the management. Other tasks such as visiting sister Schemes and attending courses were regarded as of secondary importance.

Twenty-five percent of block leaders in Sendayan said that their mission in the eyes of the Authority and management was to implement FELDA rules and regulations, and to see that these were being followed by each and every member of their respective blocks.

Perception of the Roles of the Block Leaders by the Settlers

1. The settlers expected their block leaders, either during the monthly leader meetings or in his daily contact with the management, to voice their opinions and grievances with regard to the rate of loan repayment and rubber prices.

2. To agitate for a greater allowance of credit by the Co-operative and FELDA shops.
3. To organise mutual help during deaths and marriages.
4. To inform them of the latest development of FELDA policies or other matters that directly affected them.
5. To help, whenever needed, members of the block in search of jobs.
6. To solve quarrels or misunderstandings among block members.
7. To help with members' financial difficulties.
8. To attend to settlers' requirements with regard to better social facilities such as metalised village roads, bridges and bus services.
9. To forward settlers' complaints pertaining to reductions made from incomes, such as no receipt being given for the deduction for rubber holdings insurance.

Block Leaders Self-Perception of Roles vis-a-vis Settlers

Nearly 50% of block leaders in Lyndon B. Johnson and 70% in Sendayan found the responsibility for the negotiation of reductions in settlers' loan repayment in times of falling rubber prices the most difficult and unavoidable task. The majority of them intensely disliked this duty.

Almost all block leaders interviewed in the two Schemes declared their greatest difficulty was in reconciling the expectations of settlers with those of management. This task demanded diplomatic competence for which they had no formal training. The leaders relied heavily on their discretion. Some preferred to "take it easy"; some took the challenge and pretended to be unaffected by settler reactions; some tried to apply the psychology of religion to settlers; while some adopted an attitude of formal compliance to the minimum requirements of their roles.

The roles and position of the block leaders in relation to the communication of innovations is interesting. Confronted with a dualistic and contrasting task, the block leaders, of necessity, make poor communication material. The possibility of creating an ideal two-way communication between the Authority and the settlers by presenting settlers' opinions, suggestions and criticisms to management is more apparent than real. This is because the fundamental function of the

block leader has been designed not to make a survey of settlers' opinions regarding innovations, but to teach, persuade, organise and urge settlers to adopt innovations. Thus the leader's function is essentially an extension of the change agents (management) task. His job, in the eyes of the decision unit (the Authority), seems to be little more than facilitating the job of the management. His worth to the Authority is his leadership position among settlers which the Authority utilises to achieve its goals. To the settlers, the block leaders provide the usually illusionary hope that their interests, based on their own perception of the situation, will be protected. Block leaders, however, are not vested with powers to influence decisions on innovations based on settler opinion. One may therefore conclude that while block leaders contribute to the adoption of innovations, they do little to break the communication "bottleneck" which exists between the Authority and the settlers.

CHAPTER FIVE

SETTLERS' LEADERSHIP.

Organisational innovation has been another strategy of modernising settlers in the Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan Schemes. Consideration of settlers' organisations, may provide an insight into the leadership situation of the Schemes and how this influences the progress of the Schemes in general.

The Multipurpose Co-operative Societies

Co-operative Societies in the Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan Schemes, have had a long, unhappy history. Poor membership, inefficiency of the Management Committee and deficiency in funds have been the major obstacles. The situation at the time of this study seemed even worse than before in the Lyndon B. Johnson Society. Membership in 1973 was only 120 out of the total 426 settler population, which was 20 below the 1969 membership. Of these, only 49 were regular users of the Society. Debts to major suppliers were M\$12,000 for the first half of 1973.

The situation in Sendayan was a little better. There had been an increase of 11 members from 253 in 1969 to 264 in 1973 and debts to major suppliers dropped from \$19,000 in 1969 to \$6,000 in 1973.

The value of each share of the Society was \$10. Each member held at least ten shares and the maximum shares a member could hold were one fifth of the total share capital of the Society at any particular time²⁰. Thus, assuming that each member held ten shares throughout 1973, the capital of the Co-operative Society for the year would be approximately \$12,000 in Lyndon B. Johnson and \$26,400 in Sendayan. For Lyndon B. Johnson the amount could not even settle the Society's outstanding debts.

Between 30.6.67 and 30.6.69, the Lyndon B. Johnson Society had held only one general meeting, and the Management Committee had changed not less than eight times since its establishment in 1967. This seems to reflect a lack of trust and faith of the members in the Management Committee. Findings from the field, as presented in Table XXV, appear to support this postulation.

20. Mohd. Salleh 1969/70 p. 18.

Table XXV: Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan: Reasons for Settlers' Lack of Faith in the Co-operative Society

	<u>LYNDON B. JOHNSON</u>				<u>SENDAYAN</u>			
	Agreed		Disagreed		Agreed		Disagreed	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Settlers did not adequately understand the Society's principles	13	15.0	15	17.0	7	7.3	25	26.0
Incompetent management - primarily dishonesty (misusing Society's funds)	29	33.0	1	1.1	26	27.1	6	6.3
Lack of capital	7	8.0	22	25.0	3	3.1	29	30.2
Total number of opinions	49	56.0	38	44.0	36	37.5	60	62.5
Total number of respondents	35				36			

The other side of the story, however, saw that the ordinary members themselves were also responsible for the failure of the Society in two respects:

1. Poor participation during meetings.
2. The attitude to indulge in credit purchasing from the Co-operative store.

This is illustrated in Tables XXVI and XXVII.

Table XXVI: Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan: Management Committee Meetings and Member Participation for 1967 to 1969

	<u>LYNDON B. JOHNSON</u>	<u>SENDAYAN</u>
Number of meetings held between 30.6.67 to 30.6.68.	12	14
Average number of members present	9.1	9.4
Number of meetings held between 1.7.68 to 1.7.69	5	13
Average number of members present	7.8	9.0

Source: Adapted from Mohd. Salleh, 1969/70, p. 36, Table 4.3

Table XXVII: Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan: Percentage of Credit Sales to Total Sales of the Co-operative Store between September 1968 and June 1969.

	<u>LYNDON B. JOHNSON</u>	<u>SENDAYAN</u>
September 1968	87.1	82.0
October "	87.1	83.3
November "	89.6	83.5
December "	90.1	83.3
January 1969	92.3	91.9
February "	92.6	93.4
March "	93.9	93.8
April "	93.9	93.0
May "	95.6	96.7
June "	96.3	96.4

Source: Adapted from Mohd. Salleh, 1969/70, p. 39. Table 4.4

Management incompetence and settler ignorance of Co-operative principles reveal interesting implications as far as communication of innovation is concerned. The problem seems to be a lack of information and education, which is to a large extent symptomatic of a faulty communication system between the Authority and the settlers. Settlers were made aware of the advantages of forming a Co-operative Society, but they were not prepared for the actual operation of this innovation. This led to all three groups involved in the affairs of the Society (the members, the office bearers and the settlers who were not members of the Society) being handicapped in one way or another. The settlers had little knowledge of Co-operative principles and their role in making the enterprise a success, and the Management Committee lacked technical skill and business know-how. As such the Society was built on a foundation of conflicting expectations. On one hand the Authority expected the Society to symbolise a step forward to the development and modernisation of the Schemes and the settlers; on the other hand the settlers simply wanted the Society to serve their immediate interests. In this case it enabled them to buy on credit, to provide for their families' daily needs when they could not afford to purchase for cash.

The Youth Association

The latest figure available of Youth Association membership in Lyndon B. Johnson was for 1972. There were then 74 members, of whom only 33 (45%) had paid membership fees to become full members. In Sendayan, membership in the Youth Association at May 1973 stood at 77, of whom 41 (53%) were full members.

In terms of achievement and progress very little can be said of the Associations in the two Schemes. Delays and postponements in carrying out projects and programmes from time to time was the rule rather than the exception. The work of the Sendayan Youth Association in the first quarter of 1974 provides an example. The Association had set out to accomplish the following six projects²¹:

<u>Projects</u>	<u>Realisation</u>
1. Collective work: cleaning the community hall	Completed
2. Conducting extra night classes for the third grades.	Not completed. Reason: the community hall which was supposed to be the classroom was still not supplied with electricity.
3. Agricultural: To work on half an acre of a vacant lot for the planting of sweet potatoes, maize and tapioca.	Not completed.
4. To reorganise the Scheme's reading room.	Not completed.
5. Domestic activities for the female members.	Not completed
6. To run food and drink stalls during the FELDA mobile unit display.	Completed.

The Association had failed to accomplish two-thirds of its main activities within the set time limit. As with the Co-operative Society

21. From the Sendayan Youth Association's File.

in the Lyndon B. Johnson Scheme, weak leadership and irresponsible members were the chief factors. Sluggishness of Youth Associations has been an almost universal phenomenon in FELDA Schemes. The Authority considered this to be the result of the following conditions²²:

1. The executive committee was not efficient in informing members of the development of the Association from time to time. For instance, minutes of meetings and decisions taken during the assembly were not publicised to members.
2. Members felt excluded from the activities of the Association. This was mainly because the projects were not chosen, arranged and conducted in a manner that suited the interests of the members.
3. Members were not sufficiently informed of their responsibilities, rights and privileges, and failed to benefit from the facilities extended by the Association.
4. Members had no sense of commitment to build a reputable image of the Association.
5. Members failed to elect leaders of the right calibre who had initiative, imagination and creative qualities.
6. Most of the projects were heavy on the entertainment side.
7. Members who had been sent to follow certain development courses did not, on return, apply the knowledge to the benefit of members.
8. Some settlers were still inhibited by conservatism and were sceptical about letting their youngsters participate actively in the activities of the Association.

These reasons can only be considered an incomplete explanation. At the core of the problem the inefficiency of the communication mechanism between the Authority and the settlers is seriously implicated. As in many other instances of innovations communication in FELDA Schemes, messages from above were often inadequate and fragmented. As a result, reception by settlers was distorted. Frequently the settlers know that the innovation is well-meaning, but how - and in what ways - the advantages of the innovation can be realised is not usually thoroughly understood. Thus, on many occasions the realisation goes no further than the experimental stage.

22. Peneroka 1973 Vol. 5, No. 7.

The trial and error process is one in which the most irritating experience is that errors tend to repeat themselves.

Basically, settlers are unsophisticated rural people. They can only respond spontaneously and earnestly when they understand and fully agree with the purposes of the innovation. The main defect of FELDA's mode of communicating innovations to settlers is that it fails to translate the message into the settlers' language. High philosophies of "Jayadiri" (self-achievement) and "berdikari" (self-reliance) as implicit in the ideology of the organisations in the Schemes, cannot provide the right motivation for mass spontaneous participation because they are beyond the experience and comprehension of the settlers. This is why, most probably, the settlers fail to cultivate a sense of commitment to the development of the organisations. They do not grasp the essential idea behind the innovations.

In addition to the irresponsiveness of the settler community, poor qualities of leadership among settlers is another factor which retards the Youth Association, the Co-operative Society and other settler organisations in the Schemes. (In Sendayan, however, the crisis in the Co-operative Society may be a thing of the past, for the new management seems to have been successful in restoring the faith of the settlers)²³.

In both Schemes one finds official settler leaders and other opinion leaders who are not appointed to hold office but whose advice and opinions are consulted by settlers. Those who eventually become formal leaders have, at one time or another, been informal opinion leaders. A detailed assessment of leadership strength in the two Schemes is not possible. However, one significant characteristic which has far-reaching implications to the development of the Schemes is the very limited number of leaders who have charisma calibre and technical competency. Such urgently needed leadership cannot occur at satisfactory levels in the Schemes because too few settlers were educated, or conversant or bold enough to assume the challenging role of leading and uniting a mass which was equally ill-informed of its reciprocal role in community development. In Lyndon B. Johnson especially, continuation in office by the same office bearers may be a reflection of the scarcity of capable potential

23. Interview with the Manager, Sendayan Multipurpose Co-operative Store.

leaders and the lack of interest taken by the community as a whole. Fifty percent of the block leaders had been in office for 8 to 11 years, and 25% for 4 to 7 years.

In Sendayan there was more recognition among settlers of the need to change leaders after a certain period in office. Only 25% of the present block leaders had held office for more than 8 years. Fifty percent had held office for 2 years and 25% for a year.

Formal leaders, such as block leaders and representatives in other organisations, were elected on a democratic basis. However, few candidates conducted pre-election campaigns. They appeared anxious to avoid appearing too eager to hold office, claiming that their appointment was due to the pressures people put upon them because there were no other capable substitutes. While such modesty conforms to the norms and sanctions of the settlers' social system, it is also a reflection of irresoluteness which characterises leadership in the Schemes. This has significant repercussions as far as communication of innovations goes, for it explains why leaders have not been effective in improving communication between the Authority and the settlers.

In Lyndon B. Johnson particularly, the only conspicuous trait that distinguishes leaders from followers is the formers' higher degree of compliance, obedience and receptiveness. It may be generalised that leaders in this Scheme belong to the group of active adopters of innovations; their cosmopolitanism and social status only marginally outweigh that of their peers. Neither formal nor other opinion leaders feel the necessity to influence the course of events in the Scheme. It is perhaps ironic that this non-aggressive temperament of Lyndon B. Johnson leaders has been another factor that adds to the good reputation of the Scheme in the eyes of the Authority.

The situation in Sendayan is a little different. The military background of most settlers has probably resulted in a greater number of leaders who regarded leadership as more of a personal commitment. This, however, has led to the development of different spheres of individual influence. Thus, in Sendayan, one may sense the tense atmosphere of keen rivalries among leaders. From personal communication, it was found that settlers were particularly influenced by three leaders.²⁴

24. As viewed by the Manager of the Sendayan Scheme.

Mr A: Capable. Cosmopolitaness similar to peers. Formerly rebellious and very open in criticism of the Authority. Good organisational skills, but lacks formal education and knowledge which hinders the full exploitation of his leadership abilities. Radical. Sphere of influence - the largest, comprising approximately one third of the total Scheme population.

Mr B: Exerts influence through conversance with religious matters. Able to take the lead but too sensitive to criticism; inclines to retreat when openly criticised. Sphere of personal influence is less than Mr A.

Mr C: English educated and had greater formal knowledge than either Mr A or Mr B. Perhaps too ambitious and radical for the people to follow. Lacks tact and diplomacy in dealing with settlers and consequently not popular. Extremely critical-minded. He favours a military type of social system for the Scheme. Though socially less popular, he is an initiator and the community has come to rely on his initiative and higher formal and technical knowledge for leadership.

Mr B does not get along with Mr A or Mr C. Mr A and Mr C, while recognising some personal differences between them, form a powerful team and initiated the taking over of the management of the Scheme rubber collecting centre from FELDA. This was unique and the most far-reaching phenomenon which ever occurred in any FELDA Scheme. The principles of the new Management Committee are:²⁵

1. Harmonious co-operation between settlers and the Scheme management.
2. To act on behalf of settlers on matters or problems involving the Authority and the settler community.
3. To maintain goodwill and mutual co-operation between settlers and the Authority.
4. To work for the improvement of the leadership in the Scheme, so that at the time when FELDA's commitments to the Scheme cease, the settlers are prepared and equipped to take over the administration of the Scheme, and be self-reliant.

The main reasons for the take-over were that the leaders believed the method used by FELDA for weighing and pricing the settlers' higher grade rubber was disadvantageous to the settlers. Under FELDA management, the Metrolac measuring system had been used but as soon as the settlers took over, this system was replaced by the "chee system". With the previous

25. From the Secretary of the Sendayan Rubber Collecting Centre.

method, settlers' latex was weighed and a "metrolac test" was taken to determine the dry rubber content (d.r.c.) of the latex. Normally, the d.r.c. was within the range of 27% to 33% of the weight of the latex. If, for instance, the latex weighed 100 lbs and the d.r.c. 28%, the dry weight of the latex was estimated to be 28 lbs. After weighing, the latex was bulked in storage tanks and preserved under ammonia to prevent it from coagulating.²⁶

In the case of the lower grade rubber (scrap) - cuplump, treelace and pre-coagulum - the wet weight was taken. The d.r.c. was taken as 50% of the cuplump, 50% of treelace and 35% of the cuplump. Dissatisfaction among settlers and their leaders arose when it was found that the metrolac method of determining the dry weight of latex was inaccurate in the sense that the dry weight was likely to be over or under-estimated. This was important because the d.r.c. determines the prices of the rubber, and the settlers' income. One of the conditions set by the buyers of FELDA latex is that the determination of the d.r.c. for the purposes of price settlement would be on the buyers' terms. Thus, the metrolac method provided a convenient way for the buyers to manipulate the d.r.c., and rubber prices, to their advantage.

The new Management Committee of the Sendayan collecting centre prefers a chee system (a chemical determination of the d.r.c.) to the metrolac, because it reduces the risk of unscrupulous manipulation by buyers and provides a means to overcome the problem of "cheating" by irresponsible settlers. It had been a common experience in the Scheme (indeed, in almost all FELDA Schemes) that some settlers added "impurities" as incredible as flour, washing soda, ointment, and drugs to their latex to increase the d.r.c. Thus when the metolac test was taken, a higher reading would be recorded. The difference could range from 5% to 20% of the normal d.r.c. By using the chee system, this could be checked.

Under the chee method, three samples of the bulked latex are taken for each collection of latex by the dealers. One sample is sent to the Rubber Research Institute of Malaysia (RRIM) for d.r.c. determination in the event of there being a major discrepancy between the d.r.c. estimates of the Scheme and the buyers. The Scheme keeps one sample for its d.r.c. determination, and the other sample is retained by the purchasing company for its own d.r.c. determination. The method of the d.r.c. determination adopted by the Scheme and the purchasing company is that specified by the RRIM, e.i. using chemical (chee) determination.

26. Adapted from Mohd. Daham, 1969/70, 22 - 25.

The new Management Committee of the Sendayan rubber collecting centre requires that each settler contribute a small amount of their earnings (2c per lb dry weight) to cover its running expenses. Under the new management, a "sludge trap" was built whereby latex which escapes during bulk storage is caught into a pond-like structure, let to dry and coagulate, and then sold as scrap. Thus, the sludge trap provides another source of income for the collecting centre (about \$300 per month). In Lyndon B. Johnson, on the other hand, the escaping latex is wasted.

The operation of the new Management Committee, however, is not without problems. The biggest so far has been a crisis which involved an apparent loss of 29,000 lbs of the latex dry weight through errors in the determination of the d.r.c. by the purchasing company. The Scheme's latex is purchased by Chin Yam and Company, but it is believed that this Company actually acts as a middleman between the Scheme and the MRDC (Malaysian Rubber Development Corporation), the ultimate buyer. It seems that the MRDC has adopted a new and different method of determining the d.r.c. which gives lower estimates than those registered by the Scheme using the ordinary chemical determination method. This has confused many impetuous settlers because discrepancies have resulted in an income which is lower than should have been the case according to the Scheme's d.r.c. estimates. Meanwhile some opportunists in the Scheme have used this crisis to convince the settlers that the new management is dishonest. However, the evidence seems to indicate that the accusation of dishonesty on the part of the Management Committee is not true. The Scheme's sampling book shows that the apparent loss was caused by the new method of d.r.c. estimates adopted by MRDC and that the estimates taken by the RRIM are even higher than those registered by the Scheme (Table XXVIII).

Table XXVIII: Sendayan: Some Examples of the D.R.C. Estimates of the Settlers' Latex (in%)

Date	Phase	Scheme Method	RRIM Method	MRDC Method
6.3.74	1	28.35	29.38	28.36
	2	31.09	31.97	29.54
	3	29.72	31.99	29.54
14.3.74	1	29.64	29.66	29.62
	2	31.30	32.09	29.70
	3	31.30	32.09	29.70
15.3.74	1	30.65	31.09	31.08
	2	30.65	31.09	31.08
	3	30.65	31.09	31.08
23.3.74	1	31.38	32.11	31.80
	2	31.41	32.05	31.80
	3	31.41	32.05	31.80

Source: Adapted from Sendayan Rubber Sampling Book for 1974.

Throughout this chapter, the discussion has revolved around the leadership situation in the Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan Schemes. In summary, the situation in Lyndon B. Johnson is one of peaceful conformity to, and undivided obedience of, FELDA rules, regulations and expectations. In Sendayan it is quite the opposite. Leadership is characterised by radical attitudes, rivalries and an apparent lack of cohesion among settlers. The Authority is displeased by the settler take-over of the collecting centre management, although this means the shifting of some management responsibilities from FELDA to the settlers, thus providing settlers' leaders with the opportunity of acquiring administrative experience. It appears that the kind of leadership that appeals to the Authority is that of peaceful compliance to the Authority's expectations. "Yes-men" leaders are preferred to radicals. While such leadership may be essential to the uninterrupted implementation of FELDA innovation programmes, one may question the future integrity of the Scheme when it is left to manage on its own. When settlers have settled all loan obligations to the Authority FELDA will withdraw and settler leaders will take over management responsibilities. At this juncture it would seem that Sendayan leaders will be more prepared for the task than their Lyndon B. Johnson counterparts. This was conceded by the Secretary of

the Lyndon B. Johnson Scheme Development Council. He said:²⁷

"It looks like the Lyndon B. Johnson Scheme will still be dependent on FELDA; either in terms of personnel or advice, even when the times comes for FELDA to hand over the administration of the Scheme to the settlers, because we are not prepared yet to manage the Scheme on our own."

27. Personal communication with Inche Zakaria bin Mahat, Secretary of the Lyndon B. Johnson Scheme Development Council.

CHAPTER SIXTHE CHANGE AGENTS

In Chapter One we discussed the educational background and occupational experience of the management personnel in the Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan Schemes, and found that although the formal education of the majority of the management staff was not especially tailored to meet the technical skill requirements of their present task, this had been made up, to a certain extent, by the opportunity that many of them had of attending specialised courses and training.

In terms of dedication to work, the two Schemes seem to differ. In Lyndon B. Johnson, 9 out of 16 members of the management staff (56%) worked from between one to three hours longer than the eight hours per day prescribed by the Authority. In Sendayan, however, only one out of 14 staff members (7%) worked an extra hour daily. This difference is probably due to the fact that in terms of work-load the Sendayan management is relatively better off, for the running of the Scheme's collecting centre had been taken over by settlers. The task of the change agent in developing countries is to be prepared to meet constant demands. For this reason alone it is probably inappropriate to measure a change agent's dedication and effort by the number of hours he labours daily. The change agents in FELDA Schemes live and work with the settlers. They stay in the Schemes and are bound, at all times, to attend to settlers' needs and problems.

One may tend to presume that having to work with rural people whose tastes are varied and who often have a different frame of reference, the change agents' greatest problems should arise from dealing and communicating with the settlers. But, interestingly enough, field research reveals that instead of having to cope with the hazards of managing an under-developed community with all its attendant handicaps, the change agents' greatest problem is in dealing with the Authority itself. As Table XXIX indicates, respondents thought communication with FELDA senior officers at upper levels to be their most urgent problem.

This was the unanimous opinion in Lyndon B. Johnson, and the opinion of nearly two-thirds of the respondents in Sendayan.

Table XXIX: Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan: Change Agents' Main Problems

	<u>LYNDON B. JOHNSON</u>		<u>SENDAYAN</u>	
	Number	%	Number	%
Communication with settlers	10	63.0	6	43.0
Communication with senior FELDA officers at upper levels	16	100.0	9	64.0
Total number of respondents	26	100.0	15	100.00

Notwithstanding the fact that communication with the Authority is the main problem faced by the change agents, the problem of communicating with settlers is by no means a triviality. It is a constant challenge to the change agents because the factors which cause this problem to arise take a long time to eradicate. Inhibition, scepticism and stubbornness are considered to be the main causal factors by the change agents. This is illustrated in Table XXX.

Table XXX: Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan: Change Agents' Opinions Regarding Factors Responsible for the Communication Problems with Settlers

	<u>LYNDON B. JOHNSON</u>		<u>SENDAYAN</u>	
	Number	%	Number	%
Illiteracy	4	8.2	2	5.0
Inhibition	11	22.4	8	21.0
Scepticism	10	20.4	10	26.0
Stubbornness	12	24.5	9	23.0
Descent Pride	7	14.3	4	10.0
Isolation	5	10.2	6	15.0
Total number of opinions	49	100.0	39	100.0
Total number of respondents	16		14	

Perhaps the greatest bottleneck in change agent communication with settlers relates to settlers' empathy with the change agents. In Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan, settlers' responses were contradictory. While the great majority of settlers (91% in both Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan) acknowledged that the job of the change agent demands patience and tolerance, only 31% in Lyndon B. Johnson and 28% in Sendayan admitted to the difficult nature of the change agents' task (Table XXXI).

Table XXXI: Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan: Settlers' Empathy with Change Agents

	<u>LYNDON B. JOHNSON</u>		<u>SENDAYAN</u>	
	Number	%	Number	%
Respondents admitting that change agents' job is difficult	11	31.0	10	28.0
Respondents admitting that change agents' job demands a lot of patience	32	91.0	33	92.0
Total number of respondents	35		36	

This apparently dichotomous attitude undoubtedly adds to the problem of bridging the communication gap between settlers and change agents. By and large, this also explains why, in both Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan, change agents find it necessary to work through opinion leaders in order to halve the distance between them and the settlers. The majority of change agents (94% in Lyndon B. Johnson and 64% in Sendayan) reported that they were more successful when working through the religious leaders, school teachers, block leaders, executive members of the Scheme Development Council and other influential opinion leaders (Table XXXII).

Table XXXII: Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan: Change Agents' Opinions Regarding the Effectiveness of Working Through Intermediaries

	<u>LYNDON B. JOHNSON</u>		<u>SENDAYAN</u>	
	Number	%	Number	%
Religious Leaders	10	24.0	8	28.0
School Teachers	9	21.0	7	24.0
Block Leaders	7	17.0	8	28.0
Executive Members of the Scheme Development Council	11	26.0	6	20.0
Other opinion leaders	5	12.0	-	-
Total number of opinions	42	100.0	29	100.0
Total number of respondents	16		14	

The reliance on intermediaries reflects, to a certain extent, the credibility of change agents in the eyes of the settlers who generally displayed greater tolerance and obedience when they were not approached directly by the change agents. Change agent credibility, particularly in Sendayan, seems to have deteriorated. This is not attributable to the weaknesses on the part of the change agents themselves (e.g. technical incompetency or management inefficiency) but to inconsistency on the part of the Authority in implementing its own rules and regulations. One illuminating example is the case of a Sendayan settler who was found guilty by the management of prolonged absence from the Scheme. Thus the management, with the power bestowed on it, ordered the eviction of the settler concerned. The settler, however, had connections with a local politician who had great influence with FELDA, and used him to put pressure on the Authority so that the order was withdrawn. The effects of this incidence were far-reaching. Firstly, it affected the image of the change agents in the sense that they were seen to be virtually powerless. This may intensify settler disobedience and lead to the ridicule of management staff. Such loss of face can be a serious blow to the morale of the staff and consequently to the Scheme itself.

FELDA's contradictory attitude in not implementing its own regulations is but one of many instances that gives rise to change agent discontent. As has been mentioned earlier, a supportive and sustained rapport between change agents and the source (the Authority) pre-conditions the success of innovations programmes. It is obvious, however, that a decade since the establishment of the two Schemes, this badly needed condition has not yet been fulfilled. Rapport between the change agents and the Authority should be one in which personnel at implementation level (the Scheme level) are given a say in innovation decision making, and in other decisions pertaining to the policies, instructions and rulings affecting the Schemes. It is significant that field evidence showed that 94% of respondents in Lyndon B. Johnson and 98% in Sendayan strongly supported this concept.

Unfavourable conditions of work are another source of dissatisfaction and low morale among change agents. Most feel that they are underpaid compared to other government or semi-government jobs, and that their work

is more demanding in terms of skills and ingenuity in dealing with rural human problems. Chances of advancement are limited. Promotion follows the time-scale instead of merit. Other fringe benefits, for instance, a hardship allowance, are not offered. In the words of one of the officers: "FELDA is exploiting cheap labour".

Discontent in relation to unattractive working conditions seems to be ubiquitous among change agents in FELDA Schemes. This recently exploded in a "work to rule" protest by junior management staff in many FELDA Schemes, including the Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan. This seems to suggest that there is ample justification for the staff demand for better working conditions for, as summarised below, the role and function of the change agents is much more important and indispensable than the Authority admits:

A. Work which came to a virtual standstill

1. Patrolling for the checking of illegal selling of rubber by settlers.
2. Work pertaining to settlers' development.
3. Supervision of work in rubber holdings.
4. Weighing and price determination of settlers' rubber produce.

B. Work which was delayed

1. Weekly payment of settlers' cash advance.
2. Recording of rubber production.
3. Daily progress reports.

C. Further consequences

1. Administrative chaos.
2. Settler-staff relationship affected.
3. Financial loss.
4. Potential settlers' unrest.

Source: Manager of the Lyndon B. Johnson Scheme.

The management in both Schemes apparently were also handicapped due to the shortage of staff. Ninety-four percent of change agents in Lyndon B. Johnson and 78% in Sendayan were of the opinion that more staff are needed for a more efficient management of the Schemes. If the Authority cannot afford to employ more staff members, the possibility of procuring higher efficiency from the present staff by improving their

conditions of work should not be overlooked. The Authority can achieve this by allowing the staff greater freedom in carrying out their duties. It is significant that this need was felt by 75% of the change agents in Lyndon B. Johnson and 78% in Sendayan. In relation to improved communication and adoption of innovations, the first thing that the Authority must do is to attend to change agents' requirements, such as those connected with better working conditions and benefits, and greater freedom.

Secondly, the Authority must recognise the importance of a freer communication flow between itself and the change agents. The "right for a say" from the change agents is essential to the improvement of innovation communication because the change agents are closer to the settlers, and know their opinions with regard to the innovations.

Thirdly, the Authority should refrain from reacting to situations in ways which may jeopardise the credibility of the change agents in the minds of the settlers, for receivers' faith must be sustained if they are to be convinced of the advantages of innovations proposed by change agents.

At present there is little that change agents can do to bring about change. Apart from seeking other employment, they have no alternative but to be content with the situation for the sake of earning a living. In such a disheartening atmosphere, they endeavour to reconcile in their own ways. For many there is a lot of wisdom in the philosophy that when one cannot change the system, one should join it. Fifty percent of the change agents in Sendayan and 62% in Lyndon B. Johnson believe in this resolution. Such an attitude may lead to change agents formally complying only to the minimum requirements of their work. This would reduce effective communication between settlers and the Authority and defeat the whole purpose of the FELDA planned change programme.

The change agents live and work with the settlers in the Schemes. Some of them have worked in the same Scheme since its inception. Despite such long contact with settlers, however, the impact of the change agent is less than anticipated. Table XXXIII shows that in the evaluation of the settlers, FELDA officers at Scheme level only came third in Lyndon B. Johnson and sixth in Sendayan as an element that exerts the most impact on (or has been most useful and helpful to) settlers.

Table XXXIII: Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan: Settlers' Opinions
Regarding Factors of Greatest Impact (Most Helpful and Useful) to Them

	LYNDON B. JOHNSON		SENDAYAN	
	Number	%	Number	%
Newspaper	19	18.1	16	25.0
Settlers' bulletin	14	13.3	5	8.0
Radio/television	21	20.0	10	16.0
FELDA officers	18	17.1	5	8.0
School teachers	16	15.2	3	5.0
Previous occupational experience	1	1.0	9	15.0
Parents	-	-	8	13.0
Friends	1	1.0	6	10.0
Film shows	15	14.3	-	-
Total number of opinions	105	100.0	62	100.0
Total number of respondents	35		36	

Some change agents are concerned about their unimpressive impact upon the settlers, and new ways of approaching settlers are being tried. This trend is relatively more pronounced in the Sendayan Scheme where, undeniably, the comparatively higher degree of aggressiveness and critical-mindedness of the settler population pose a tougher challenge to the change agents. Although still at an embryonic and incoherent stage, one senses a general trend by change agents towards greater liberalism. The old obsession of being "task-orientated" is being replaced by a new "person-centred" approach. Instead of expecting settlers to come to them as pupils come to their teachers, change agents are now willing to make the first move by going to the settlers, not only to teach but also to learn from the settlers, and so understand them better.

Fundamentally, such a change in attitude by change agents signifies their recognition that before any change can occur, they have to learn to accept the people they hope to change, even, probably, to the extent of risking being changed themselves. There is a growing realisation among change agents that the much-valued quality of empathy (if limited to an intellectual understanding of one's environment without acceptance of persons as they are and wish to be understood) does not appear to have

resulted in effective change in the Scheme situation. It seems that there is, among the change agents, a growing belief that when they are more "accepting" in their relationship with settlers, they are likely to be less threatening and more effectively communicative. Settlers are likely to be less defensive and more receptive; and changes that are brought to them are likely to be more lasting than those induced by threat of authority, fear of competition, or imitation of status.

Perhaps these are the underlying reasons why, if one visits the Sendayan's rubber collecting centre, one finds that the settlers and the FELDA officers get along well with each other even though the management has lost control over the running of the centre. In accepting the settlers, the staff understand the genuine aspiration of the settlers to reduce dependence upon them. They have come to appreciate the settlers' purposes in taking over the management of the collecting centre. On their part, settlers' leaders recognise their incompetence in the technical aspects of the operation and readily turn to the service of the staff. None of them sees any threat in the change. Instead, they team together and make the Sendayan rubber collecting centre the most remarkable phenomenon in FELDA history. Only the Authority is not very happy with it.

One may insist that change agents maintain a "safe" distance from the settlers to prevent a situation in which change agents may become so empathic with the settlers that they assume the role of the settlers and do not try to change them. Such fear, however, seems unfounded. Personal communication with change agents confirms that while recognising the inadequacy of previous communication strategies, they also recognise that settlers' welfare is best served by their not relinquishing their role as change agents.

In rural development, it seems that no single formula can possibly account for the vast variety of human factors in different rural settings. The case of the change agents in the Sendayan Scheme represents only one of the formulas. So far as innovation communication goes, it seems that the attitude adopted by Sendayan change agents is a step towards more effective communication, for the most important function of communication in any development programme is to create an environment of easy human relationships so that man can effectively deal with man.

CHAPTER SEVENA SYNTHESIS

FELDA has achieved a substantial success in the context of rural development in Malaysia by establishing the Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan Schemes. Apart from literally transforming 10,580 acres of virgin jungle to a vast area of rubber trees which produce some of Malaysia's highest quality rubber, FELDA has also created secured employment for 859 rural unemployed or under-employed, whose families live at a much higher material standard than they knew in the village. Before, many settlers seldom had enough to make ends meet, let alone to make some savings. Now, a monthly income of \$1,000 for a reasonably industrious settler is no longer an impossible dream.

While FELDA can be proud of such physical and quantitative accomplishments, it will acknowledge that there are still considerable shortcomings in the more qualitative and intangible aspects of the Schemes which cannot be overlooked. For instance, much remains to be done in the refashioning of the manner by which FELDA has been attempting to change, educate and modernise settlers' attitude, outlook and values. This has been recognised by the Authority but there is still a tendency to lay most of the blame for setbacks on the settlers.

One opinion held by the Authority attributes the negative attitudes of settlers towards change to their dependence on FELDA paternalism. Settlers are thus seen to lack the enterprise to provide for themselves, and lean on the Authority for credits which will then be used for uneconomic purposes. There is field evidence to support this allegation. As Table XXXIV indicates, 71% of respondents in Lyndon B. Johnson and 55% in Sendayan agreed that the Authority should extend loans to settlers for the purposes of wedding ceremonies, feasting and renovation, construction and furnishing houses.

Table XXXIV: Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan: Settlers' Opinions
Regarding the Purposes for which FELDA should Extend Loans to Settlers.

	<u>LYNDON B. JOHNSON</u>				<u>SENDAYAN</u>			
	Agree		Disagree		Agree		Disagree	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Wedding ceremonies and feasting	50	36	19	14	39	27	33	23
Renovation/construction of settlers' houses	25	18	10	7	20	13	16	11
Home furnishing	23	17	12	9	17	12	19	14
Total number of opinions	98	71	41	29	76	52	68	48
Total number of respondents	35				36			

Nonetheless it can be argued that while loans given in the events of marriage, feasting and home furnishing do not represent an economic and productive utilisation of capital, the need for FELDA loans to renovate or reconstruct houses indicates their inability to fulfil these desires without relying on FELDA. It means that most settlers cannot save sufficient to provide for future needs.

Furthermore, the allegation that settlers insist on elaborate wedding ceremonies for their children, and that such an attitude is not conducive to development, is debatable. Field evidence revealed that 77% of respondents in Lyndon B. Johnson and 75% in Sendayan thought traditional wedding ceremonies should be simplified and limited only to religious solemnisation.

There is also the view that settlers in FELDA Schemes, or for that matter, rural Malays in general, are still enchained by outdated, disadvantageous traditional values and practices. It seems, however, that such a view is itself outdated. Ninety-four percent of respondents in both Schemes, for instance, emphasised the importance of modern medical practices, strongly recommending that present medical services in the Schemes be expanded. Such views are in marked contrast to the traditional reliance on pawang and bomoh (the traditional magico-religious village doctors). Most settlers also reject the wisdom of

proverb "rezeki sacupak takkan jadi segantang" (man gets no more than what fate has predestined, however industrious he is). Eighty-two percent of respondents in Lyndon B. Johnson and 91% in Sendayan stressed that Malays must discard this time-worn fatalistic outlook if they wish to survive in the modern, competitive world. (Table XXXV.)

Table XXXV: Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan: Settlers Opinions
Regarding a Fatalistic Outlook of Life.

Question: Do you believe that man gets no more than what fate has predestined for him, however hard he works?

Answers	LYNDON B. JOHNSON		SENDAYAN	
	Number	%	Number	%
Definitely Yes	1	2.9	-	-
Yes	1	2.9	2	5.6
Probably Yes	3	8.5	2	5.6
Probably No	1	2.9	-	-
No	12	34.3	10	27.8
Definitely No	17	48.5	22	61.0
Total number of respondents	35	100.0	36	100.0

Attitudes towards education have also changed. The majority of settlers in both Schemes felt the urgency of higher formal education for their children regardless of sex and age. This is a remarkable departure from the traditional discrimination against higher educational pursuit for female children. Ninety-one percent of respondents in Lyndon B. Johnson and 97% in Sendayan agreed that equal opportunities of higher studies for their daughters. (Table XXXVI.).

Table XXXVI: Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan: Settlers' Opinions
Regarding the Necessity of Higher Education for Children

Question: Would you allow your daughter to pursue higher studies locally, or/and abroad?

Answers	<u>LYNDON B. JOHNSON</u>		<u>SENDAYAN</u>	
	Number	%	Number	%
Definitely Yes	32	91.3	35	97.2
Yes	1	2.9	-	-
Probably Yes	-	-	-	-
Probably No	-	-	1	2.8
No	1	2.9	-	-
Definitely No	1	2.9	-	-
Total number of respondents	35	100.0	36	100.0

It is significant, also that education came first in their priorities of utilising savings, and in determining future well-being. Sixty-eight percent of respondents in Lyndon B. Johnson and 80% in Sendayan placed children's higher education at the top of their priority list; 8% in Lyndon B. Johnson and 11% in Sendayan place it second, and 14% in Lyndon B. Johnson and 2% in Sendayan third. Uneconomic items, such as jewellery, were at the bottom of most settlers' priorities. Only 2% of respondents in Lyndon B. Johnson gave it as their second and third priorities. Thus, as seen in Table XXXVII the allegation that settlers pose a barrier to modernisation and progress by maintaining a negative mentality with reference to education-consciousness and spending habits, appears unfounded. This contention is further supported by settlers' low regard of fate and luck as vital determinants of future well-being. Table XXXVIII shows that an overwhelming majority (85% in Lyndon B. Johnson and 91% in Sendayan) considered education to be the most critical determinant. Only 8% of respondents in Lyndon B. Johnson and 6% in Sendayan still believed in the power of legacy, fate and luck.

TABLE XXXVII: Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan: Settlers' Priorities
With Regard to the Utilisation of Savings

Question: If you had enough savings, how would you list your spending priorities with regard to the following?

Answers	<u>LYNDON B. JOHNSON</u>					<u>SENDAYAN</u>				
	(percentages underlined)									
	Order of Importance									
	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5
Pilgrimage to Mecca	3	16	4	-	-	5	15	5	4	3
	<u>9</u>	<u>46</u>	<u>11</u>	-	-	<u>14</u>	<u>42</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>8</u>
A new house	4	2	7	4	2	-	2	5	1	1
	<u>11</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>6</u>	-	<u>6</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>3</u>
Children's higher education	24	3	5	-	-	29	4	1	-	-
	<u>69</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>14</u>	-	-	<u>81</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>3</u>	-	-
Agricultural expansion	1	2	11	7	1	-	5	3	1	-
	<u>3</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>31</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>3</u>	-	<u>14</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>3</u>	-
Business	2	3	2	6	4	1	6	8	6	-
	<u>6</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>22</u>	-	-
Motorcar	-	-	-	4	4	-	-	1	1	-
	-	-	-	<u>11</u>	<u>11</u>	-	-	<u>3</u>	<u>3</u>	-
Home furnishing	-	-	2	2	2	-	-	1	1	-
	-	-	<u>6</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>6</u>	-	-	<u>3</u>	<u>3</u>	-
Shares	1	4	-	5	5	-	-	-	1	-
	<u>3</u>	<u>11</u>	-	<u>14</u>	<u>14</u>	-	-	-	<u>3</u>	-
Jewellery	-	1	1	25	25	1	4	2	2	-
	-	<u>3</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>71</u>	<u>71</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>6</u>	-
Total number or respondents										
			35					36		

Table XXXVIII: Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan: Settlers' Opinions Regarding Factors Determining the Well-Being of a Person's Future.

Question: Which of the following (in order of importance) do you think most important in determining a person's future?

Answers	LYNDON B. JOHNSON				SENDAYAN			
	(percentages underlined)							
	Order of Importance							
	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
Legacy	2	9	7	12	1	16	9	7
	<u>6</u>	<u>26</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>34</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>44</u>	<u>25</u>	<u>19</u>
Fate and luck	1	6	9	15	1	2	12	15
	<u>3</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>26</u>	<u>43</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>34</u>	<u>42</u>
Connection with prominent and influential people	-	13	13	6	-	15	8	8
	-	<u>37</u>	<u>37</u>	<u>17</u>	-	<u>42</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>22</u>
Education	30	4	-	-	33	1	1	-
	<u>86</u>	<u>11</u>	-	-	<u>92</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>3</u>	-
Total number of respondents	35				36			

Malay backwardness has also been attributed to their supposed laziness. It has been often expressed that rural Malays especially are not diligent and industrious. The writer considers that much of this argument revolves around an ambiguous term. It was found from field observation that average settlers worked for five hours daily in his rubber holding, and two to three hours in the other crop lots. This was quite apart from other agricultural (e.g. poultry farming) and non-agricultural chores to which he had to attend. By comparison the average government servant spends the same seven to eight hours per day, but has the advantage of a stable income. Thus, based on hours worked the accusation that settlers are lazy does not seem to be well justified.

The only persons who can speak with authority on settlers' attitudes and values as they relate to modernisation and development, are those who have been working and living with the settlers and thus are closest to them. This, of course, refers to the change agents or the management staff in the Schemes. Table XXXIX illustrates what change agents thought about the average settler. Change agents' opinions were not unanimous, but most did not consider laziness, short-sightedness and fanaticism as characteristics of the settlers in the Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan Schemes.

Table XXXIX: Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan: Change Agents' Opinions of an Average Settler

	LYNDON B. JOHNSON						SENDAYAN					
	(percentages underlined)											
	1	2	3	4	5	6	1	2	3	4	5	6
Fatalistic	-	4	5	-	5	2	-	2	3	4	3	2
	-	<u>25</u>	<u>31</u>	-	<u>31</u>	<u>12</u>	-	<u>14</u>	<u>21</u>	<u>29</u>	<u>21</u>	<u>14</u>
Fanatic	-	1	8	2	5	1	2	-	4	2	4	2
	-	<u>6</u>	<u>50</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>31</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>14</u>	-	<u>29</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>29</u>	<u>14</u>
Critical-minded	3	6	4	2	-	-	1	3	2	5	1	2
	<u>19</u>	<u>37</u>	<u>25</u>	<u>12</u>	-	-	<u>7</u>	<u>21</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>36</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>14</u>
Receptive	-	2	9	1	3	1	1	1	3	4	4	1
	-	<u>12</u>	<u>56</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>21</u>	<u>29</u>	<u>29</u>	<u>7</u>
Lazy	-	3	3	6	3	1	-	1	1	7	4	1
	-	<u>19</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>37</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>6</u>	-	<u>7</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>50</u>	<u>29</u>	<u>7</u>
Short-sighted	-	5	3	4	4	1	-	2	3	3	5	1
	-	<u>31</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>25</u>	<u>25</u>	<u>6</u>	-	<u>14</u>	<u>21</u>	<u>21</u>	<u>36</u>	<u>7</u>
Co-operative	2	7	4	2	-	1	1	-	10	2	1	-
	<u>12</u>	<u>44</u>	<u>25</u>	<u>12</u>	-	<u>6</u>	<u>7</u>	-	<u>71</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>7</u>	-
Perseverant	-	6	3	3	4	-	1	-	5	3	3	2
	-	<u>37</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>25</u>	-	<u>7</u>	-	<u>36</u>	<u>21</u>	<u>21</u>	<u>14</u>
Total number of respondents	16						14					
1	2	3	4	5	6							
Definitely yes	yes	probably yes	probably no	no	no	no	no	no	no	no	no	no

The writer believes that weaknesses on the part of Authority, and not settlers' attitudes, have given rise to multifarious complications and problems which go a long way in affecting the development of the settlers and the Schemes.

Firstly, there is the familiar setback in the communication system of not supplying adequate information on matters that settlers desperately want to know. One of these is the actual situation of settlers' loan accounts with the Authority. It seems that all settlers (except those of phase three in both Schemes) have been informed of their credit obligations

to the Authority which range approximately from M\$12,000 to M\$16,500, and which are to be settled within fifteen years. Every month, a reduction is made from the settlers' income in repayment of the loans. What the settlers are not satisfied with is that, lately, no receipt has been issued when reductions have been made. This makes it difficult for settlers to estimate the actual debt situation. It was gathered from one settler in Sendayan who kept good record, that loan repayment receipts issued by the Authority only covered the following dates:²⁸

<u>Year</u>	<u>Months</u>
1969	June - September, November, December.
1970	January, September - December.
1971	January - April, July, September - December.
1972	January, February, May - October, December
1973	Nil
1974	Nil

We touch on this matter because of its repercussions. Firstly, it casts doubts in the settlers' minds as to the sincerity of the Authority in fulfilling its promise to issue the settlers with titles. The majority entertain the idea that there is something "fishy" behind FELDA's apparent reluctance to inform settlers of their actual loans situation. Some even think that this is part of FELDA's tactics to use settlers as agricultural coolies similar to those found in private rubber estates in the country.

Secondly, it affects the settlers' general attitude to work and life and even more alarming, this can be a promoting factor to the persistency of illegal selling of rubber which FELDA has been combating.

28. It should be remembered that there is a possibility that the particular settler may not have paid his loans for the missing months, and therefore was not given the receipts for those months. However, the fact that not a single receipt has been issued for the entire 1973 and the earlier months of 1974 clearly shows that the Authority has not been consistent in issuing receipts for settlers' loan repayment.

Their faith and trust shaken and their hopes insecure, settlers feel justified in these irresponsible practices. They may no longer see the point of conforming to FELDA's rulings. This, perhaps, is why they close their ears to FELDA's repetitive warnings on potential losses and penalties with regard to the unsystematised exploitation of rubber trees. Their main concern now is to accumulate as much material wealth as they can before the trees become unproductive; and before FELDA calls in new settlers for a new cycle of another estate transplant. FELDA could have prevented these attitudes if it had explained to settlers why receipts had not been issued.

FELDA has also been inconsistent in implementing its own rules and regulations. This has already been illustrated in Chapter 5 with regard to penalising guilty settlers. Inconsistency has caused severe embarrassment to management staff, and the psychological consequences are not conducive to the development of the Scheme or co-operative attitudes among the settlers. Another case concerned the unequal distribution of rubber holdings among settlers. Respondents reported that before entering the Schemes, they were made to understand that each of them would get 8 to 10 acres rubber holding. However, what they actually got was less than had been promised (6 to 8 acres). Moreover distribution was unequal with some settlers obtaining only 6 acres and more fortunate ones more than 8 acres. This has led to unequal incomes among settlers. In Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan Schemes, the number of settlers' productive rubber trees ranged from as few as 400 to as many as 1,000 with 900 being the mean figure for Lyndon B. Johnson and 800 for Sendayan. Most settlers do not understand the reasons for this discrepancy and no explanation has been offered by the Authority. Settlers could have been informed that uneven distribution was unavoidable due to irregular physical features such as swamp and terrain.

Another factor which has contributed to settlers' exasperation is what they see as the Authority's split personality in certain aspects of settlers' development. For instance, the Authority speaks about promoting group work and entrepreneurship among settlers and encouraging them to achieve this by forming Co-operative Societies and opening Co-operative retail stores. However, in doing so, FELDA also set up its own provisionary shops in the Schemes. Because both the settlers'

Co-operative and FELDA's shops are profit-seeking institutions, they tend to compete with each other, and since the FELDA shop has a strong financial and organisational backing, it will flourish at the expense of the settlers' Co-operative shop. The Authority has stressed that the purpose of running a FELDA shop in the Scheme is not to compete with the Co-operative, but to expand facilities and services for the benefit of the settler community. Notwithstanding the assurance, however, the Co-operative shop in Sendayan has lost approximately 50% of its market to the FELDA shop; and in Lyndon B. Johnson, besides a few successful private shops, the FELDA shop almost monopolises the market. Indeed, from the beginning, the FELDA shop in Sendayan has operated in the face of settler resentment.

FELDA also speaks earnestly on the necessity of solidarity and unity among settlers through social organisations, but in Sendayan, the history of women's organisations belies this intent. Before FELDA formed its G.P.W. (Women's organisation), a branch of the State's Women's Institution (W.I.) had already been established. The Authority insisted on the merger of W.I. and G.P.W., despite sustained resistance by W.I. As a consequence the female population in the Scheme has been divided between these two organisations. Both compete for membership and in their activities. There is hostile rivalry, when what is needed is complementary and mutual support. Many settlers have been asking why FELDA insisted on establishing another women's organisation when a stable similar organisation already existed. No satisfactory answer has been given to this question.

The Authority is also partly responsible for the retardation of activities in the dusun area (land reserved for secondary crops) in the two Schemes. Many settlers lost interest in the development of these activities because they could not find regular markets; and the Authority has not yet seriously considered providing disposal facilities for the produce. Thus, apart from producing for their family consumption, the settlers do not see the need to labour on the dusun.

A Scheme's progress or lack of progress can also be determined by external factors. In this connection the impact of official visitors is one that explains, to some extent, the relative "goodness" of the Lyndon B. Johnson and the "not so good" Sendayan. The Lyndon B. Johnson is a privileged Scheme; it is meant to be a model, a show-piece to

important local and foreign visitors. Likewise, it receives a greater number of visitors and attendant publicity and moral boost than its next-door neighbour. The significant point of this factor is that it tends to be self-generating: the privileged settlers feel motivated to live up to their reputation, unprivileged settlers to live down to theirs. (Table XXXX)

Perhaps the most fundamental of FELDA's errors is that it over-campaigned during the early years. In attracting rural people to participate in the Schemes, excessive propaganda resulted in over-expectations on the part of the potential settlers. The promise of land, secure employment, and a higher income and standard of living were stressed to the exclusion of warnings of possible and inevitable complications, and a tough life during the pre-harvesting period.

Table XXXX: Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan: Number of Visits and Visitors.

Year	LYNDON B. JOHNSON						SENDAYAN					
	Visits			Visitors			Visits			Visitors		
	L	F	T	L	F	T	L	F	T	L	F	T
1967	26	26	52	96	96	192	-	-	-	-	-	-
1968	26	42	68	79	104	183	-	-	-	-	-	-
1969	26	42	68	64	98	162	-	-	-	-	-	-
1970	29	24	53	300	77	377	9	1	10	120	14	134
1971	9	12	21	183	92	275	5	7	12	6	44	50
1972	14	6	20	52	28	80	3	1	4	8	13	21
1973	9	9	18	61	37	98	-	-	-	-	-	-

L = Local

F = Foreign

T = Total

Source: Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan visitors' books.

In summary, we discovered that in addition to communication problems the interplay of other factors affected the development of the Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan Schemes. In the context of the communication and innovation, this situation has a significant implication in that, had the communication mechanism not been so faulty, it could have helped reduce the impact of the other factors and prevent the situation from being aggravated. The greater part of the problems

arose from settler incomprehension, confusion and perplexity. This could have been minimised if the settlers had been adequately and correctly informed.

In other matters, such as those relating to FELDA publicity during the early years of its operation, it was communication malfunction rather than the lack of it that has been the root of the problem. Had the settlers been correctly informed of the exact nature of the Scheme, they would not have built fictitious expectations which could only be disappointing. It seems to the writer that the Authority must realise that the importance of good communication is real, and if it has, it should start doing more than just paying a lip service to it.

CHAPTER EIGHT

A CONCLUDING NOTE.

It is perhaps appropriate to enquire, in this concluding chapter, into the settlers' overall views of their life in the Schemes and of the Authority.

Evidence from the field reveals that the majority of settlers in both the Lyndon B. Johnson (77%) and Sendayan (72%) describe their life in the Schemes as moderately satisfactory (Table XXXXI). Most of them are grateful for the opportunity to join Schemes which have given them a level of living relatively higher than they were used to in the village. However, not many recommended similar participation in FELDA Schemes for their children. As indicated in Table XXXXII, most settlers intend to leave the decision of future careers to their children. However, most (68% in Lyndon B. Johnson and 61% in Sendayan) hoped that their children would not follow their footsteps as settlers in FELDA Schemes. As naturally subjective as most personal opinions are, the settler impressions of FELDA Schemes indicate that FELDA cannot as yet, claim absolute success. Some of the reasons for this have been discussed in the previous chapters.

In the light of the above, the study concludes with a few suggestions:

1. In order to rectify the present situation of FELDA-settler relations, it seems appropriate that the initial moves should come from the Authority itself. Perhaps, for a change in strategy, the Authority should give prior consideration to the settlers' points of view. Settlers thought the Authority should place high priority on attending to settlers' major queries and problems.²⁹ Secondly, FELDA officers should endeavour to mix informally with the settlers. Thirdly, settlers felt they should be consulted before the Authority introduces any innovation, directive or policy, for the simple reason that they are the ones who are to be directly affected.
2. There is also an urgent need, especially in Sendayan, for the Authority to adopt a more liberal attitude in allowing for greater

29. Table XXXXIII.

settler participation in organisation movements. The Authority should be more generous in recognising settlers' leadership abilities.

Table XXXXI: Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan: Settlers' Conclusion Regarding their Life in the Schemes.

	<u>LYNDON B. JOHNSON</u>		<u>SENDAYAN</u>	
	Number	%	Number	%
Very Satisfactory	5	14.3	7	19.4
Fairly Satisfactory	27	77.1	26	72.2
Not Satisfactory	3	8.6	3	8.4
Total number of respondents	35	100.0	36	100.0

Table XXXXII: Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan: Settlers' Opinions of the Best Career for their Children

	<u>LYNDON B. JOHNSON</u>		<u>SENDAYAN</u>	
	Number	%	Number	%
Participating as a settler in FELDA Scheme	11	12.0	13	14.3
Participating as a member of management staff in a FELDA Scheme	29	31.5	23	25.2
Migrate for employment in the town	22	23.9	27	29.7
It is up to the children	30	32.6	28	30.8
Total number of opinions	92	100.0	91	100.0
Total number of respondents	35		36	

Table XXXXIII: Lyndon B. Johnson and Sendayan: Settlers' Opinions Regarding what FELDA should do

	<u>LYNDON B. JOHNSON</u>		<u>SENDAYAN</u>	
	Number	%	Number	%
Attend to settlers major queries and problems seriously	32	33.3	35	33.3
Extend time to mix informally with settlers	31	32.3	35	33.3
Consult settlers' opinions before introducing an innovation	33	34.4	35	33.3
Total number of opinions	96	100.0	105	99.9
Total number of respondents	35		36	

We have seen, in Chapter 5, how Sendayan settlers took over the Scheme's rubber collecting centre from the Authority, and how this caused friction between the Authority and the settlers because the former was displeased with such a radical move. To the settlers in Sendayan, there seems to be no turning back, and if the Authority is serious about restoring a congenial climate of interaction with the settlers, it seems only appropriate that it should support the settlers' initiative. The Authority should recognise that there are great potentialities for leadership in the Schemes which, if put to the right use, could be beneficial to the welfare of the settlers and the development of the Scheme.

3. FELDA policy-makers should also reconsider their provisions for change agents at Scheme level. These refer chiefly to the extension of better working conditions, benefits and a special hardship allowance to the management staff. There is perhaps a similar need for the Authority to review its loan policy towards the settlers. Even though field evidence showed that 66% of respondents in Sendayan and 71% in Lyndon B. Johnson feel that the amount of loans charged to them is fair, it is thought that the settlers deserve more than this. For instance, they should be given the benefits of "infant-agriculture status" similar to that enjoyed by infant industries. This would carry the benefit of a "tax-holiday" for a certain critical period. This has been the suggestion that for an equitable treatment of the agricultural sector (of which FELDA land Schemes are certainly one of the largest components) the loan interest charged to settlers should be reduced from 6.1/4% to 5% with an interest-free period of seven years.³⁰

4. In the light of the arguments in the previous chapters, there is an apparent need for a new approach to land development programmes. This new approach is one that is "settler orientated", which incorporates greater settler participation in the overall development of the Schemes, and in which strategy, the special characteristics and diverse talents of the people are utilised to the fullest. The overriding objective of this settler-orientated approach should be to allow for maximum participation by the settlers in the establishment and operation of the Scheme.³¹ Settlers should be informed, right from the beginning, of their responsibilities and obligations as well as those of the Authority, so that the settlers are clear about what, and what not, to expect.

Above all, FELDA must construct a better communication strategy. It should review the past and present communication and discover where and how the loopholes exist, so that these are not repeated in the new strategy of communication. This, of course, will not be easy, for effective communication calls for fine skills in understanding people's wants, perceptions, attitudes and their entire frame of reference. Somehow, however, the task must be done for communication plays a decisive role in a planned-change programme, particularly if the programme is concerned with the restructuring of human elements, and especially if it aims at creating a truly dynamic and progressive human force, and even more so if its overriding mission is to contribute to a better quality of life.

30. Syed Hussain Wafa, 1974, 37 - 38

31. ibid, 26.



Figure 20: Healthy, luxuriant rubber trees welcome visitors to the Lyndon B. Johnson Scheme.



Figure 21: In the event of severe rainstorms, however, the trees could be as hopeless as these.



Figure 22: The tapping plane. A settler must not tap more than $3/4$ inch per month. Each tapping level is marked for inspection.



Figure 23: The dusun in Lyndon B. Johnson Scheme. Market gardening may be an important supplementary source of income.



Figure 24: In the majority of cases, however, the dusun is worked half-heartedly (Lyndon B. Johnson). Those planted with banana, for instance, are in a deteriorating condition.



Figure 25: This is the Lyndon B. Johnson Scheme Co-operative Store. Old, poor and unattractive compared with



Figure 26: the Scheme's FELDA shop



Figure 27: and a private shop just 300 yards away.



Figure 28: Pay day is always the day the settlers look forward to. They queue in front of the management office.



Figure 29: After that, celebration. Socialising in these eating shops



Figure 30: or "shopping". The commercial agents from outside always know the right time to do business in the Schemes.



Figure 31: For many settlers, life in the Scheme is reasonably comfortable (Lyndon B. Johnson). They can afford some luxuries or semi-luxuries



Figure 32: as well as decent education for their children.



Figure 33: Higher grade rubber (latex) is stored in liquid form




Figure 34: in this tank at the rubber collecting centre. However, in this process, some quantities of latex escape.



Figure 35: In Sendayan the escaping latex is properly drained




Figure 36: and caught into the sludge trap



Figure 37: in which it dries and coagulates to be sold as scrap (lower grade rubber).



Figure 38: In the Lyndon B. Johnson Scheme, however, the escaping latex is left to be washed away by rain



Figure 39: or to soak into the ground.

APPENDIX A.SELECTED GENERALISATIONS ABOUT THE DIFFUSION
OF INNOVATIONS

SOURCE: Rogers and Shoemaker, 1971.

1. Later adopters are more likely to discontinue innovations than are earlier adopters.
2. Traditional individuals are more likely to skip functions in the innovation-decision process than are modern individuals.
3. The rate of awareness-knowledge for an innovation is more rapid than its rate of adoption.
4. Earlier adopters have a shorter innovation-decision period than later adopters.
5. The relative advantage of a new idea, as perceived by members of a social system, is positively related to its rate of adoption.
6. The compatibility of a new idea, as perceived by members of a social system, is positively related to its rate of adoption.
7. The complexity of an innovation, as perceived by members of a social system, is not related to its rate of adoption.
8. The triability of an innovation, as perceived by members of a social system, is positively related to its rate of adoption.
9. The observability of an innovation, as perceived by members of a social system, is positively related to its rate of adoption.
10. The degree of communication integration in a social system, is positively related to the rate of adoption of innovations.
11. Earlier adopters are no different from later adopters in age.
12. Earlier adopters have more years of education than do later adopters.
13. Earlier adopters are more likely to be literate than are later adopters.
14. Earlier adopters have a higher social status than later adopters.
15. Earlier adopters have a greater degree of social mobility than do later adopters.

16. Earlier adopters are more likely to have a commercial (rather than subsistence) orientation than are later adopters.
17. Earlier adopters have a more favourable attitude toward credit (borrowing money) than later adopters.
18. Earlier adopters have more specialised operations than later adopters.
19. Earlier adopters have greater empathy than later adopters.
20. Earlier adopters are less dogmatic than later adopters.
21. Earlier adopters have a greater ability to deal with abstractions than do later adopters.
22. Earlier adopters have greater rationality than later adopters.
23. Earlier adopters have a more favourable attitude toward change than later adopters.
24. Earlier adopters have a more favourable attitude toward risk than later adopters.
25. Earlier adopters have a more favourable attitude toward education than later adopters.
26. Earlier adopters have a more favourable attitude toward science than later adopters.
27. Earlier adopters are less fatalistic than later adopters.
28. Earlier adopters have higher levels of achievement motivation than later adopters.
29. Earlier adopters have higher aspirations (for education, occupation and so on) than later adopters.
30. Earlier adopters have more social participation than later adopters.
31. Earlier adopters are more cosmopolite than later adopters.
32. Earlier adopters have more change agent contact than later adopters.
33. Earlier adopters have greater exposure to mass media communication channels than later adopters.

34. Earlier adopters have greater exposure to interpersonal communication channels than later adopters.
35. Earlier adopters seek information about innovations more than later adopters.
36. Earlier adopters have greater knowledge of innovations than later adopters.
37. Earlier adopters have a higher degree of opinion leadership than later adopters.
38. Earlier adopters are more likely to belong to systems with modern rather than traditional norms, than are later adopters.
39. Interpersonal diffusion is mostly homophilous.
40. When interpersonal diffusion is heterophilous, followers seek opinion leaders of higher social status.
41. When interpersonal diffusion is heterophilous, followers seek opinion leaders with more education.
42. When interpersonal diffusion is heterophilous, followers seek opinion leaders with greater mass-media exposure.
43. When interpersonal diffusion is heterophilous, followers seek opinion leaders who are more cosmopolite.
44. When interpersonal diffusion is heterophilous, followers seek opinion leaders with greater change agent contact.
45. When interpersonal diffusion is heterophilous, followers seek opinion leaders who are more innovative.
46. Interpersonal diffusion is characterised by a greater degree of homophily in traditional than in modern systems.
47. In traditional systems followers interact with opinion leaders less (or no more) technically competent than themselves, whereas in modern systems opinion leaders are sought who are more technically competent than the followers.
48. Opinion leaders have greater exposure to mass media than their followers.
49. Opinion leaders are more cosmopolite than their followers.
50. Opinion leaders have greater agent contact than their followers.

51. Opinion leaders have greater social participation than their followers.
52. Opinion leaders have higher social status than their followers.
53. Opinion leaders are more innovative than their followers.
54. When the system norms favour change, opinion leaders are more innovative; but when the norms are traditional, opinion leaders are not especially innovative.
55. When the norms of a system are more modern, opinion leadership is more monomorphic.
56. Change agent success is positively related to the extent of change agent effort.
57. Change agent success is positively related to his client orientation, rather than change agency orientation.
58. Change agent success is positively related to the degree to which his programme is compatible with clients' needs.
59. Change agent success is positively related to his empathy with clients.
60. Change agent contact is positively related to higher social status among clients.
61. Change agent contact is positively related to greater social participation among clients.
62. Change agent contact is positively related to higher education and literacy among clients.
63. Change agent contact is positively related to cosmopolitaness.
64. Change agent success is positively related to his homophily with clients.
65. Change agent success is positively related to the extent that he works through opinion leaders.
66. Change agent success is positively related to his credibility in the eyes of his clients.
67. Change agent success is positively related to his effort in increasing his clients' ability to evaluate innovations.
68. Mass media channels are relatively more important at the persuasion function in the innovation-decision process.

69. Mass media channels are relatively more important than interpersonal channels for earlier adopters than for later adopters.
70. Cosmopolite channels are relatively more important than localite channels for earlier adopters than for later adopters.
71. The effects of mass media channels, especially among peasants in less developed countries, are greater when these media are coupled with interpersonal channels (in media forums).
72. Stimulators of collective innovation-decisions are more cosmopolite than other members of the social system.
73. Rate of adoption of a collective innovation is positively related to the degree to which the social system's legitimisers are involved in the decision-making process.
74. Legitimisers of collective innovation-decisions possess higher social status than other members of the social system.
75. Satisfaction with a collective innovation-decision is positively related to the degree of participation of members of the social system in the decision.
76. Member acceptance of collective innovation-decisions is positively related to the degree of participation in the decision by members of the social system.
77. Member acceptance of collective innovation-decisions is positively related to member cohesion with the social system.
78. A supportive relationship between the adoption unit (a subordinate) and the decision unit leads to more upward communication about the innovation.
79. An individual's acceptance of an authority innovation-decision is positively related to his participation in innovation decision-making.
80. An individual's satisfaction with an authority innovation-decision is positively related to his participation in decision-making.
81. When an individual's attitudes are dissonant with the overt behaviour demanded by the organisation, the individual will attempt to reduce the dissonance by changing either his attitude or his behaviour.
82. The rate of adoption of authority innovation-decisions is faster by the authoritative approach than by the participative approach.

83. Changes brought about by the authoritative approach are more likely to be discontinued than those brought about by the participative approach.
84. Change agents can more easily anticipate the form and function of an innovation for their clients than its meaning.
85. The power elite in a social system screens out potentially restructuring innovations while allowing the introduction of innovations which mainly affect the functioning of the system.
86. The power elite in a social system especially encourage the introduction of innovations whose consequences not only raise average levels of Good but also lead to a less equal distribution of Good.

APPENDIX B.DEVELOPMENT COST OF A TYPICAL FELDA RUBBER
SCHEME UP TO MATURITY.

<u>Acreage</u>	3,200 acres
<u>Village Area</u>	240 "
<u>Reserve</u>	800 "
Number of Settlers' families	424 persons

<u>A. Infrastructure Cost</u>	<u>Total \$</u>	<u>\$ Cost per Settler</u>	
Access Road	240,000	600	
Village Road	200,000	500	
Water Supply	300,000	1,750	
School	315,000	787	
Clinic	15,000	37	
Others	157,000	<u>393</u>	4,067
<u>B. Administration and Management</u>			
Salary, office, plant, equipment and maintenance	866,500		<u>2,166</u>
			6,233
<u>C. Development Cost</u>			
Felling, burning, pruning, planting etc.	1,049,000		9,416
Year 1 - 6 (Rubber)	3,776,400		
<u>D. Village Area Development</u>			
Est. of House Lot	40,000	100	
Settlers' Houses	660,000	<u>1,650</u>	<u>1,750</u>
			<u>17,399</u>
<u>E. Cost per Settler</u>			
A + B Infrastructure Cost and Administration		6,233	
C + D Development and Village Area		<u>11,166</u>	
		<u>\$17,399</u>	

APPENDIX C: LYNDON B. JOHNSON AND SENDAYAN: SUMMARY OF RUBBER

PRODUCTION AND EARNINGS FOR THE SECOND HALF OF THE YEAR 1973.

Scheme	Month	Phase	Higher Grade Rubber (Latex)		Lower Grade Rubber(Scrap)		Latex and Scrap		Net earnings from rubber per settler	No. of settlers who did not deliver rubber produce to the Scheme's collecting centre	No. of settlers who did deliver rubber produce to the Scheme's collecting centre	Rubber Seized in the Owner's Act of Illegal Selling
			lbs	\$M	lbs	\$M	lbs	\$M				
L.B.J.	JULY	1	98245.60	68214.90	31379	9618.61	129624.60	77833.51	280.87	-	116	
		2	86742.80	60406.84	20577	7454.82	107319.80	67861.66	214.23	1	123	
		3	87725.00	61281.73	25605	6737.23	113330.00	68018.96	87.24	-	186	
Sendayan	JULY	1	66809.67	43056.23	16866	4564.46	83675.67	47620.69	122.85	-	121	A total of 86 lbs. of scrap equivalent to \$M24.35 was seized.
		2	65800.33	41912.16	15350	4510.09	81210.33	4642.25	100.35	2	141	
		3	67649.23	45137.55	19777	5748.95	87426.23	50886.50	93.57	1	168	
L.B.J.	AUGUST	1	103633.30	62018.36	31534	8529.05	135167.30	70547.41	469.23	-	116	A total of 1285 lbs of scrap equivalent to \$M314.68 was seized.
		2	89478.90	53988.02	19946	5597.24	109424.90	59585.26	349.79	1	123	
		3	89617.00	53314.98	25723	5727.72	115340.00	59042.70	198.44	-	186	
Sendayan	AUGUST	1	69312.94	39156.26	18096	4203.53	87408.94	43359.79	233.12	-	121	A total of 657 lbs of scrap equivalent to \$M164.10 was seized.
		2	56872.86	35269.15	14372	3756.65	71244.86	39025.80	179.37	2	141	
		3	73110.96	43282.38	21305	5157.63	94415.96	48440.01	185.29	1	168	
L.B.J.	SEPTEMBER	1	91523.00	51334.32	36617	7803.82	128140.00	59138.14	377.82	-	116	
		2	81359.70	47947.71	20248	5589.10	101607.70	53536.81	306.67	1	123	
		3	84929.30	48837.68	25524	5666.36	110453.30	54531.05	186.38	1	185	
Sendayan	SEPTEMBER	1	74169.60	38931.62	22507	5194.20	96676.60	44125.82	169.60	-	121	A total of 64lbs equivalent to \$M14.77 of scrap and 149lbs of latex equivalent to \$M77.92 was seized.
		2	57757.19	31035.24	15425	3481.88	73182.19	34517.12	160.89	3	140	
		3	72671.32	38004.22	21441	5496.87	94112.32	43501.09	240.18	1	109	
L.B.J.	OCTOBER	1	94484.00	51649.09	52169	7244.78	126653.00	58894.40	376.67	-	116	
		2	83534.80	46328.36	20925	4499.19	104459.80	50827.55	288.16	1	123	
		3	81047.50	44662.21	23594	4925.33	104641.50	49617.39	171.35	-	186	
Sendayan	OCTOBER	1	67787.40	34956.58	19034	3629.42	86821.40	38586.00	206.34	-	121	
		2	56809.65	28808.75	13003	3101.87	69812.65	31910.62	149.50	2	141	
		3	71584.21	36485.74	21478	4333.15	93062.21	40818.89	157.41	1	168	
L.B.J.	NOVEMBER	1	90926.40	59662.21	32024	8318.88	122950.40	56981.09	452.74	-	124	
		2	87076.30	57136.82	23310	6045.96	110386.30	63182.78	382.05	-	124	
		3	75119.70	49289.73	21177	5510.40	96296.70	54800.13	190.73	1	185	
Sendayan	NOVEMBER	1	72339.34	42308.43	22091	5484.75	94430.34	47793.18	264.80	-	21	
		2	57473.28	35022.50	14723	3863.46	72196.28	38885.96	178.96	3	140	
		3	67468.68	39274.92	20982	5170.19	88450.68	4445.11	171.89	1	168	
L.B.J.	DECEMBER	1	127073.00	103488.23	39609	12802.04	166682.00	116290.27	863.12	-	116	
		2	111842.50	91081.17	28221	9267.69	140063.50	100348.86	674.09	1	123	
		3	103763.20	84760.03	30541	9349.78	134304.20	94109.87	364.00	-	186	
Sendayan	DECEMBER	1	116296.90	86287.64	34827	10248.56	151123.90	96536.20	650.56	-	121	
		2	92932.95	70795.44	25000	6976.73	117932.95	77772.17	415.26	2	141	
		3	121639.87	89423.53	36220	11305.36	157859.87	100728.89	452.67	2	167	

APPENDIX DSCHEDULES FOR THE SETTLERS IN SCHEMES

- Scheme
1. Name 2. Sex: Male ()
Female ()
3. In what districtand in what State were you born.
4. AddressPrevious address
5. Education: Stream - Malay () English () Chinese ()
Tamil () Religious ()
Highest qualification
6. Previous occupation: Rubber tapper () Fisherman () Padi planter ()
Policeman/Soldier () Others
7. Other training/courses attended: Type
Duration
8. Other occupational experiences:
9. Particulars about children:
- | No. | Sex | Age | Occupation |
|-----|-----|-----|------------|
| 1 | ... | ... | |
| 2 | ... | ... | |
| 3 | ... | ... | |
| 4 | ... | ... | |
| 5 | ... | ... | |
| 6 | ... | ... | |
| 7 | ... | ... | |
| 8 | ... | ... | |
| 9 | ... | ... | |
| 10 | ... | ... | |
10. Other persons responsible for:
11. Why did you decide to participate in the Scheme?
1. FELDA is the best choice ()
2. No other choice ()
3.
12. Acreage in rubber

13. Other crops 1. acres
 2. acres
 3. acres
14. Other agricultural activities: 1. Poultry farming ()
 2. Fish rearing ()
 3. Flock rearing ()
 4.
15. Total monthly income
16. Other sources of income beside rubber and their values:
 1. maize \$
 2. vegetables
 3. sweet potato
 4. tapioca
 5. fish
 6. poultry
 7. flock
 8.
17. Marketing: to which is from here
 by bicycle () lorry () van () taxi () bus ()
 customers/dealers come to the Scheme to buy
18. Expenditure particulars: a. food \$ per month.
 b. clothing
 c. schooling/education
 d. transport
 e. entertainment
 f. water/electricity
 g.
19. Do you have a. bicycle () Since
 b. motorcycle ()
 c. radio receiver()
 d. kerosene stove()
 e. gas stove ()
 f. flush toilet ()
20. You have done some saving since mths./years ago.
 at about \$ per month in

21. Your other activities/effort to improve standard of living:
- a.
 - b.
 - c.
 - d.
22. How do you divide your time for:
- a. tapping hours per day
 - b. other crops
 - c. fish rearing
 - d. poultry farming
 - e.
23. You think that family planning:
- a. benefits you 1 2 3 4 5 6
 - b. compatible with your values 1 2 3 4 5 6
 - c. is simple enough to adopt 1 2 3 4 5 6
 - d. is triable 1 2 3 4 5 6
24. There have been a few participants who are not very convinced of the advantages in having a Co-operative Association. You think this is because:
- a. They do not fully understand 1 2 3 4 5 6
 - b. They feel that the persons running the Co-op. are not very competent 1 2 3 4 5 6
 - c. The Co-op. lacks funds 1 2 3 4 5 6
 - d.
25. You think that FELDA and other organisations in this Scheme should extend their credit service for these purposes as well:
- a. wedding ceremonies 1 2 3 4 5 6
 - b. feasts 1 2 3 4 5 6
 - c. renovating/constructing a new house 1 2 3 4 5 6
 - d. Purchasing/furniture 1 2 3 4 5 6
 - e.
26. You think that working as FELDA officers:
- a. difficult 1 2 3 4 5 6
 - b. needs a lot of patience 1 2 3 4 5 6
27. You think that radio programmes, Fajar di Bumi Permata and Desa Jaya:
- a. have given you valuable information 1 2 3 4 5 6
 - b. have made you realise 1 2 3 4 5 6
 - c. have answered your doubts 1 2 3 4 5 6
 - d. have encouraged and motivated you more 1 2 3 4 5 6

28. You think that the present block system in this Scheme should be continued 1 2 3 4 5 6
29. Opening another provision shop in this Scheme means facing keen competition. Would you venture into this business if you had enough initial capital? 1 2 3 4 5 6
Why
30. Doctors must be increased and the clinic must be expanded in this Scheme 1 2 3 4 5 6
31. The Malays must discard their belief in "bomoh" 1 2 3 4 5 6
32. You believe that "a loaf of bread will never be more" 1 2 3 4 5 6
33. If with traditional methods of tapping you can still earn enough for all the domestic needs, do you think you should follow the new methods of tapping as prescribed by FELDA 1 2 3 4 5 6
34. Would you allow your daughter to study at the university or to go abroad 1 2 3 4 5 6
If not, why
35. Are you a member of a. Scheme Development Committee () ()
b. The Co-operative () ()
c. Women's Association () ()
d.
36. You participate in communal activities: a. often ()
b. rarely ()
c. never ()
37. How often do you go to: a. Serambantimes in
b. Kuala Lumpur
c. Other places
38. How often do you consult FELDA officers:
a. often ()times in
b. rarely ()
c. never ()
39. Reading material at home: a. b.
c. d.
40. You make use of reading material in the library:
a. often ()times in
b. rarely ()
c. never ()

41. Do you know about these things and their purposes/advantages:
- a. Family planning () purposes
 - b. Scheme Development Committee()
 - c. Women's Association ()
 - d. The Co-operatives ()
 - e. FELDA working group ()
 - f. Kindergartens ()
 - g. Settlers' development course()
 - h. Education foundation funds ()
 - i. Village Block System ()
 - j. FELDA's radio programmes ()
42. To whom do you always go for advice and opinion when you are doubtful?
1. 2. 3.
43. Whom do you think are regarded as leaders in the Scheme:
1. 2. 3.
4. 5. 6.
44. You think that ~~Many~~ marriage ceremonies should be simplified to only the religious solemnisation 1 2 3 4 5 6
45. Which do you think of the following - in order - is more important in determining one's future:
- a. property inherited ()
 - b. fate and good luck ()
 - c. having prominent and influential friends ()
 - d. education ()
46. You think that FELDA officers in this Scheme should:
- a. give serious consideration to the settlers' problems 1 2 3 4 5 6
 - b. extend time to mix informally with settlers 1 2 3 4 5 6
 - c. ask your opinion before introducing new ideas 1 2 3 4 5 6
47. Which do you feel has been most helpful to you:
- a. newspaper ()
 - b. Settlers' magazine ()
 - c. radio ()
 - d. film shows by FELDA ()
 - e. teacher ()
 - f. FELDA officers ()
 - g. your trips to town/outside the Scheme ()
 - h.

48. What do you think is best for your children:
- | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| a. Continue participating in the Scheme as you are doing | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| b. Continue participating in the Scheme as one of FELDA's staff members | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| c. Migrate to find employment in town | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| d. It's up to them | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
49. If you had sufficient saving, how would you list your priorities:
- | | |
|---|-----|
| a. pilgrimage to Mecca | () |
| b. build a new home | () |
| c. send children to higher learning | () |
| d. expand your agricultural operation | () |
| e. venture into business | () |
| f. buy motorcycle, scooter, van, lorry, car | () |
| g. buy a new set of furniture | () |
| h. buy jewellery | () |
| i. buy shares | () |
50. Whom do you think have contributed the most to the progress of this Scheme:
51. State 3 reasons for the progress of a Scheme:
52. State 3 reasons for the backwardness of a Scheme:
53. You think that the amount of loans charged to you by FELDA is:
- | | |
|------------------------|-----|
| a. Fair/reasonable | () |
| b. Should be reduced | () |
| c. Should be increased | () |
54. How would you describe your overall life in the Scheme:
- | | |
|----------------------------|-----|
| a. Very satisfactory | () |
| b. Moderately satisfactory | () |
| c. Unsatisfactory | () |

KEY:

1	2	3	4	5	6
(definitely)	Yes	(probably)	(probably)	No	(definitely)
yes		yes	no		no

APPENDIX E.SCHEDULES FOR FELDA OFFICERS IN THE SCHEMES.

1. Name Post
- Sex: Male () Female () Age
2. In what district
were you born In what State
3. Education: Stream Malay () Chinese () English ()
Tamil () Religious ()
Highest qualification
4. Other training and courses attended: Type
Duration
5. Previous experience (occupational)
6. You work for hours per day hours per week
7. FELDA prescribes hours per day hours per week
8. Main problems that you face (in order)
- | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| a. communication with settlers () | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| b. communication with senior FELDA officers () | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| c. | | | | | | |
| d. | | | | | | |
9. How acceptable do you find these statements: the average settlers
in this Scheme is:
- | | | | | | | |
|-------------------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| a. fatalistic | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| b. fanatic | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| c. critical minded | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| d. receptive | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| e. lazy | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| f. short sighted | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| g. co-operative | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| h. not energetic due to poor health | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| i. perseverant | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| j. | | | | | | |

10. You think that the difficulties in communicating with the majority of settlers arise because the settlers are:
- a. illiterate 1 2 3 4 5 6
 - b. inhibited 1 2 3 4 5 6
 - c. sceptical 1 2 3 4 5 6
 - d. stubborn 1 2 3 4 5 6
 - e. proud of descent 1 2 3 4 5 6
 - f. live in isolation 1 2 3 4 5 6
 - g.

11. You think you are more successful when you work through:
- a. the Imam 1 2 3 4 5 6
 - b. teacher 1 2 3 4 5 6
 - c. 1 2 3 4 5 6
 - d. 1 2 3 4 5 6
 - e. 1 2 3 4 5 6

12. What kind of communication channels with the settlers do you use:
- | in order. | Knowledge | Persuasion | Decision |
|---|-----------|------------|----------|
| A. Mass media: (.) | level | level | level |
| a. circulars | () | () | () |
| b. settlers' magazine | () | () | () |
| c. radio | () | () | () |
| d. local newspaper | () | () | () |
| e. | () | () | () |
| B. Interpersonal () | | | |
| a. face to face with settlers | () | () | () |
| b. announced in the mosque after Friday prayers | () | () | () |
| c. announced at a special meeting in the community hall | () | () | () |
| d. | () | () | () |

13. Whom (individuals/groups/organisations) would you regard as stimulators in the Scheme:
- a.
 - b.
 - c.
 - d.

APPENDIX F.SCHEDULES FOR THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEES OF VARIOUS ORGANISATIONS
IN SCHEMES

- Organisation
1. Name Post..... Age
 2. What are the principles of your organisation?
 - a.
 - b.
 - c.
 3. What are your organisation's objectives?
 - a.
 - b.
 - c.
 4. Membership conditions:
 - a.
 - b.
 - c.
 - d.
 - e.
 5. Members total Male Female
 6. Problems that your section is facing
 - A. Members
 - B. Exco
 - C. Financial
 - D. FELDA management in Scheme
 - E. _____:
 7. Your organisation receives/does not receive support from FELDA in this Scheme in the form of morale/material/ morale and material - delete where appropriate.
If receiving support, state:
 - a.
 - b.
 - c.
 8. Achievements so far (from your section):
 - a.
 - b.
 - c.
 - d.
 - e.
 - g.

h.
 i.
 j.

9. You think that the attitudes of the average settler in this Scheme toward the activities of the association are:

a. responsive	1	2	3	4	5	6
b. sympathetic	1	2	3	4	5	6
c. sceptical	1	2	3	4	5	6
d. indifferent	1	2	3	4	5	6

10. You think that the attitudes of the FELDA in this Scheme toward your organisation:

a. co-operative	1	2	3	4	5	6
b. indifferent	1	2	3	4	5	6
c. too interfering	1	2	3	4	5	6
d. encouraging	1	2	3	4	5	6
e. like to find fault	1	2	3	4	5	6

11. You think that for greater success your organisation needs:

a. more money	1	2	3	4	5	6
b. a special building	1	2	3	4	5	6
c. more members	1	2	3	4	5	6
d. more freedom	1	2	3	4	5	6

12. You think that as it is now, the future and prospects of this organisation are:

a. bright	1	2	3	4	5	6
b. moderate	1	2	3	4	5	6
c. dark	1	2	3	4	5	6
d. unpredictable	1	2	3	4	5	6

KEY:

1	2	3	4	5	6
(definitely)	yes	(probably)	(probably)	no	(definitely)
yes		yes	no		no

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