Repolitcising Development: The Diaspora Knowledge Network (DKN) *ChileGlobal* and its contribution to development in Chile

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Abstract

Throughout the last fifteen years, developing countries have increasingly devised diaspora strategies to tap into their overseas migrant populations for the purpose of achieving national development objectives. Endorsed by multilateral donor organisations, the private sector, NGOs and supported by bilateral donor agencies, diaspora strategies tend to represent diasporic communities as development actors whose entrepreneurial expertise, business knowledge and access to resources can be usefully captured via social and monetary remittances.

However, critical scholarship cautions against simplistic assumptions that underpin the often elite-based attempts of governments to leverage their diasporic collectives via selective policies. Moreover, the so-called ‘rise of the diaspora’ as a development actor, has also generated concerns suggesting that the state-integration of diasporic groups for development rationalities signifies a process of de-politicisation and control. Building on multi-sited research, this thesis engages with the practices, shifting coalitions and their outcomes of the Chilean diaspora knowledge network ChileGlobal.

The ChileGlobal knowledge network initially emanated from the World Bank’s Diaspora for Development programme in 2005 with the particular goal to foster innovation and economic development in Chile and, as such, was positioned as a distinct economic actor. Through the use of post-structurally informed concepts, and attending to the multiple sites of interaction within ChileGlobal, this thesis maps out how attempts to expand the scale and scope of ChileGlobal reconfigured and mobilised this knowledge network in unintended and far-reaching ways generating diasporic spaces of contestation and ambivalence.

By tracing the different sites and trajectory of ChileGlobal, as well as its politics of expansion that resulted in subsequent change of the constituency of ChileGlobal network, this thesis demonstrates how the partial transformation of this diaspora network from an economic to a political actor signifies a narrative that runs counter to broad claims about the depoliticising effects of contemporary development projects. Instead, the diaspora community assembled around ChileGlobal is indicative of the malleability and ambiguity of diaspora networks as development actors as well as their potential to challenge existing
public policy orthodoxy and dominant discourses of economic and calculative practices in contemporary Chile. Moreover, this thesis also highlights how simplistic outward focused diaspora strategies often fail to take into account how local, mundane, place based norms and cultures often shape and mediate the transfer of diasporic contributions.
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This thesis is dedicated to the memory of both my parents who instilled a sense of curiosity, and appreciation of autonomy and opportunity in me that was not available to them for the vast majority of their lives and that I do not take for granted.
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<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AIP-UChile</td>
<td>Asamblea (Coordinadora) de Estudiantes/Investigadores/as en Postgrado de la Universidad de Chile</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANT</td>
<td>Actor network theory</td>
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<tr>
<td>AoIR</td>
<td>Association of Internet Researchers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPS</td>
<td>British Psychological Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APEC</td>
<td>Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBPC</td>
<td>Centro Nacional de la Productividad y la Calidad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEPAL</td>
<td>Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CESEC</td>
<td>Centro de Estudios Socio-Económicos</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEO</td>
<td>Chief Executive Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNIC</td>
<td>Consejo Nacional de Innovación para la competitividad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONICYT</td>
<td>Comisión Nacional de Investigación Científica y Tecnológica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CORFO</td>
<td>Corporación de Fomento de la Producción</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DICOEX</td>
<td>Dirección para la Comunidad de Chilenos en el Exterior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DKN</td>
<td>Diaspora Knowledge Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEES</td>
<td>El Fondo de Estabilización Económica y Social</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIC</td>
<td>Fondo de Innovación para la Competitividad</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIZ</td>
<td>Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HTAP</td>
<td>High Technology Investment Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDB</td>
<td>Inter-American Development Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGU</td>
<td>International Geographical Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organisation for Migration</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPD</td>
<td>Initiative for Policy Dialogue</td>
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<tr>
<td>ITT</td>
<td>International Telephone and Telegraph</td>
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<tr>
<td>K4D</td>
<td>Knowledge for Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KEA</td>
<td>Kiwi Expat Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDGs</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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MERCOSUR  Mercado Común del Sur
MIT  Massachusetts Institute of Technology
MNC  Multi-National Corporation
MPI  Migration Policy Institute
NDB  New Development Bank
NGO  Non-Governmental Organisation
ODS  Official Development Assistance
OECD  Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PBCT  Programa Bicentenario de Ciencia y Tecnológica
R&D  Research and Development
RedTicotal  La Red de Talento Costarricense en el Extranjero
SDGs  Sustainable Development Goals
SENCE  Servicio Nacional de Capacitación y Empleo de Chile
SOFOFA  Sociedad de Fomento Fabril
TOKTEN  Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals
UN  United Nations
WTO  World Trade Organisation
1.1. Introduction

In 1999, the World Bank published its World Development Report that included an often, and famously cited statement, which subsequently informed the decision of various countries to implement diaspora strategies for the purpose of generating the transfer of knowledge and expertise from their overseas populations.

“Knowledge is like light. Weightless and intangible, it can easily travel the world, enlightening the lives of people everywhere. Yet billions still live in the darkness of poverty- unnecessarily.” (World Bank, 1999, p. 1)

That report marked a high point in the efforts of the World Bank to reposition and rebrand itself from a lending institution to a source of knowledge creation and dissemination. The report echoed calls, which proclaimed the Knowledge Society within which information and knowledge, rather than capital were the primary resources for achieving national development objectives. The creation and transfer of knowledge took centre stage and was presented as an important process for developing countries to overcome poverty. Against the backdrop of recognising the wider significance of knowledge in its various forms such as high technology expertise, contacts and market knowledge, the role of diasporic communities rapidly gained attention. In particular, the group of skilled diasporas were identified as a resource to aid economic transformation via technology transfer, institutional reform and the development of human capital.

Following its jubilant rhetoric and through its programme Knowledge for Development (K4D), the World Bank established the Diaspora for Development programme that provided funding and support for a number of diaspora initiatives since 2005. This thesis engages with one of these projects and examines the work and activities of the Chilean diaspora knowledge network ChileGlobal. The ChileGlobal network was part of a pilot project series within which the World Bank promoted diaspora strategies by initiating
diaspora networks in a number of Latin American countries such as Mexico, Argentina and Chile.

The World Bank’s turn towards mobilising diasporic communities for national development purposes was part of a wider trend that gained traction in the late 1990s when governments of low and middle income countries increased their efforts to form and institutionalise relations with their diasporic communities. Those efforts were primarily guided by economic rationalities to tap into diasporas in order to help to achieve national development objectives of countries in the global South. While attempts to harness members of the diaspora through institutionalised practices are not a novelty of the recent two decades, but go back at least to the 1960s, the more recent wave occurred across a wide range of countries that created institutions and policies to leverage their respective diasporas.

The first generation of policies to re-integrate diaspora members was largely informed by concerns about brain drain and the associated loss of skilled human capital for developing countries. As an institutional response to these concerns, the UN launched its Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN) programme in 1977 (Rao, 2006). The programme sought to enable skilled migrants living and working in European or North American countries to return to their countries of origin for up to six months in order to help in capacity-building efforts through devoting their time and knowledge. Those early institutionalised attempts to engage diasporic communities were largely premised on eventual repatriation and offering incentives to return. More recently, the focus of diaspora-related integration initiatives has shifted. Instead of offering incentives to return to the country of origin, contemporary diaspora strategies are characterised by creating ties that connect individual members of the diaspora with selected sectors of the homeland for the purpose of channelling resources such as expertise, contacts and technology. There is no generally agreed conceptualisation about what constitutes a diaspora strategy, but the most commonly used definition defines a diaspora strategy as “an explicit and systematic policy initiative or series of policy initiatives aimed at developing and managing relationships with a diaspora” (Ancien, Boyle, & Kitchin, 2009, p. 3).
The design and creation of diaspora networks can be understood against the backdrop of economic and political globalisation, market liberalisation, as well as discourses about the so-called knowledge economy. Furthermore, the recent rise in diaspora strategies, not only throughout the so-called developing world, but also economically advanced OECD countries is indicative of a view that casts specific groups within diaspora communities as vital actors in the process of home country development. Overall, the significance of diasporic involvement in home country development and associated considerations about mitigating brain drain has been recognised as one of the primary themes around migration and development (Skeldon, 2010).

At the outset of this introduction it is important to note that there are often three overarching reasons for the contemporary surge in diaspora strategies (Boyle & Kitchin, 2011, p. 15). Firstly, the Post-Fordist age has seen a reinterpretation that views emigration not as a failure of development initiatives in the so-called developing world, but instead recasts diasporic and emigrant communities as agents with an inherent potentiality to enhance the international competitiveness of their home countries through intangibles such as contacts and access to business networks. Additionally, the currently dominating migration-development orthodoxy interprets emigrants as bearers of knowledge, who can infuse their expertise and specialised knowledge in their countries of origin to facilitate positive change and to mitigate the effects of brain drain, that is the loss of skilled labour.

The second reason for the growing interest in diasporic communities relates to an evolving understanding of the nation-state as a networked entity of dispersed institutions and populations. In addition to the traditional interpretation of the nation-state as a territorially bounded community, an understanding emerged through which the nation-state can also be conceptualised as a globally connected or networked community. This globally connected community does not only comprise the territorial nation-state, but also includes overseas emigrant groups which may shape social, political, economic and cultural processes in their countries of origin. Following this reading of nation-states implies to assign diasporas an extraterritorial, yet state-constituent role.

Thirdly, and related to the second reason, the rising prominence of diaspora strategies is underpinned by a perceived increase in international migration and rise in labour mobility, which has led to a revision of citizenship models in the sense that countries have designed
and reformulated policies regarding the rights and obligations of their overseas’ emigrant population. Just as there has been a compelling increase in state-diaspora institutions and transnational state practices in the last decade, there has also been a corresponding rise in policies seeking to extend citizenship, as well as voting rights to emigrant communities. While the extension of rights and obligations across borders is the institutional and political response to transnational practices of migrants, this process occurs unevenly across countries. For critics, however, the rise and popularisation of diaspora strategies is intimately linked to an expansion of a particular set of neoliberal rationalities that seek to circulate and stabilise a form of self-responsibilised conduct in countries of the global South (Kalm, 2013; Kunz, 2008).

In particular, the World Bank’s K4D programme has been highlighted as a form of biopolitics that embodies and operationalises forms of development that are grounded in Western “prescriptions of order” (Boyle & Ho, 2016, p. 15). Interrogating diaspora strategies through the lens of rule, control and governance has generated important insights about how and why countries enact policies that target overseas citizens. However, framing diaspora strategies around globalising forms of governmentality, neglects that the concept of governmentality has its limitations when deployed to state forms that do not fit the category of classical liberal states (Joseph, 2010). More importantly in the context of development, only scant attention has been paid to whether diasporic communities might resist or circumvent strategies that are designed to govern and discipline. Indeed, calls to investigate how diasporas resist, object particular subjectivities, or appropriate regimes of governance (Ragazzi, 2009) have largely been left unanswered. The focus on governing diasporas tends to, not only overshadow how new alliances may be created that invoke counter subjectivities, but also how the transfer of resources undergoes a process of mediation and translation.

1.2. Framing the problem

This thesis examines the diaspora knowledge network ChileGlobal to broaden the field of critical approaches to diaspora studies and how diaspora groups shape development processes. Contemporary research on diasporic contribution to development reiterates the need to get policies and institutions right, so as to ensure an effective diaspora-centred development. While contributions other than monetary transfers are clearly recognised,
literature on diaspora strategies tends to often focus on financial transfers and more recently, how diaspora policies are diffused across countries (Délano, 2014). Important as research on remittances and policy diffusion is, most studies seem to provide generalising inferences that tend to oversee how local particularities affect and shape the outcome of diaspora engagement practices in the context of development. Instead, a careful untangling of the diverse interests of state and non-state institutional actors in relation to migrants, development and diaspora intermediaries calls for case specific examinations (Ho, Hickey, & Yeoh, 2015; Larner, 2015).

It is also important to note that “the limited conceptualisation of the relationship between networks and development may reflect a more general lack of theoretical rigour in development studies” (Henry, Mohan, & Yanacopulos, 2004, p. 842). The investigation of diasporic networks and their contribution to development based on a novel conceptual framework sketched out in chapter three, can make a valuable contribution to development practice and theory. Therefore, this thesis engages with the contemporary understanding of diaspora initiatives by investigating the Chilean diaspora network *ChileGlobal* and how this transnational diaspora network contributes to wider development effects in Chile. The two main research questions that guided this thesis are:

1. *How are donor induced non-state diasporic actors, such as ChileGlobal positioned to contribute to economic development in Chile?*
2. *What are the factors and barriers that mediate knowledge transfers to Chile?*

The first research question responds to calls for investigating how non-state actors are co-constituents of globalising diaspora strategies (Larner, 2015, p. 198). As such, the focus of this thesis rests explicitly on investigating the protean trajectory of a World Bank derived network, which, in its early incarnation, existed outside Chilean state institutions. Directly related, this thesis seeks to reveal the effects and wider consequences that emerge in the wake of initiatives such as *ChileGlobal* and rising resistance against development models that are underpinned by particular forms of governmentalising practice. In order to answer this question, this thesis draws on insights deriving from post-structural work that informed critical work about the side effects that are generated as a result of development projects. Additionally, the conceptual framework that guides this thesis takes cues from ‘anti-politics machine’ derived lessons to broaden the field of analysis in
the context of development in general. In particular, the approach outlined in more detail in chapter three provides insights that go beyond utilitarian descriptions of diasporic contributions by pointing towards “reciprocity and social solidarity within the webs of connections making up diaspora relationships” (Ho, Hickey, et al., 2015, p. 156). In sum, the first research question pays attention to the situated practices and encounters that often go unnoticed, but continue to shape the extent to which diaspora knowledge networks contribute to development.

The second question seeks to identify how local barriers may impede the flow and transfer of diasporic knowledge and expertise. In essence, this thesis highlights how place-specific barriers are at least of equal importance to consider in the context of diaspora and development. As outlined above, policymakers, think tanks and multilateral institutions stress the need to have robust and stable public policies and institutions to ensure the frictionless flow of diasporic resources (Kuznetsov, 2013). However, prioritising policies, institutions, as well as the highly mobile diasporic elite, somehow neglects the mundane activities, encounters and social context that shape knowledge translation processes. Bringing attention to place-specific social norms in Chile provides productive insights into how and why knowledge networks act and are less successful in generating change as envisaged by proponents of diaspora strategies.

The regional focus of this thesis on Chile is deliberate, and underscores the wider significance, because studies on political transnationalism, institutionalised diaspora relations and how they relate to development aspirations of countries in the global South tend to focus on Asian and African countries. Thus, existing research tends to be characterised by a bias against South American countries (Margheritis, 2011). This thesis is a timely response to the identified spatial dearth through an examination of a diaspora initiative that emerged in a country, that not only has often been hailed as the role-model for other developing countries, but has been at the forefront of deep tectonic socio-economic transformations in South America (D. G. Richards, 1997). Indeed, and as shown in chapter five, the ChileGlobal network acts as a role-model and is being replicated throughout Latin American countries such as Uruguay, Honduras and lately Costa Rica.
The choice of Chile as a research site is informed by Chile’s unique history as a country that has often been at the forefront of profound shifts in relation to the implementation of national development models that were subsequently applied across countries in the global South. For instance, Chile was one of the first Latin American countries that implemented structural economic policy prescriptions in the early 1960s (Bethell, 1996, p. 241). Ideas in the domain of Latin American structuralism largely emerged from the Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL), the United Nations’ regional economic commission that was based in Santiago de Chile. Latin American structuralism was effectively a regional expression of the then dominant Modernisation Theory and was concerned with enabling macro-economic growth and stabilising inflation rates. More than just another economic approach, Latin American structuralism was an “indigenous doctrine elaborated by Chilean and other Latin American economists in reaction to imported doctrines judged to be inapplicable to Chile” (Hirschman, 1965, p. 282). Key to achieving economic growth via industrialisation was the establishment of protective measures, such as high tariffs, and fiscal incentives to enhance the industrial base, which became known as Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI).

In the 1970s Chile once again spearheaded economic reforms and became a laboratory for neoliberal economic orthodoxy (Barder, 2013, p. 104; Kay, 1989, p. 12). The Chilean example of experimenting with neoliberal policies served as a benchmark and was replicated in other parts of Latin America. Emulation of radical deregulation and market liberalisation occurred either through repressive military regimes such as in Argentina (Undurraga, 2015), or through the imposition of policy conditionalities by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank prior to granting loans in the wake of the Latin American debt crisis throughout the 1980s (Brown, 2009; van Dijck, 1998). Similarly, Chile’s so-called growth with equity strategy of the 1990s, that combined increased social spending with export led growth was heralded and adopted by international finance institutions as a role model for generating economic development in Latin America and the developing world (M. Taylor, 2006, p. 116).

Moreover, prior to the 1970s Chile has been characterised by immigration rather than emigration because of its economic prosperity and stability. However, the brutal military coup of 11th September 1973 signalled not only the reversal of that historic trend by creating a Chilean political diaspora, but is also seen as a key event that catalysed mass
flight from South American countries (Wright & Oñate, 2005, p. 57). With a distinctive history of pioneering development initiatives that were replicated elsewhere, and a dictatorship induced diaspora, Chile seemed a unique and logical choice for conducting research on diaspora knowledge networks that are promoted as a development tool by donor countries, multilateral donor- and development institutions alike.

1.3. Thesis organisation

This thesis is structured in two parts. The first part maps out the conceptual and analytical rationale that guides this research. Chapter two sketches out a literature review that provides a critique of the relevant literature on diaspora, migration and development and chapter two also highlights the need to go beyond the existing focus on state–diaspora policies and remittance-related research. There is a need to understand in more detail how the effects of diaspora integration mechanism in the context of development play out. Chapter three lines out the usefulness of a network approach, and provides the conceptual framework to analyse diaspora knowledge networks. This chapter applies concepts that are largely derived from post-structural ideas in order to explain politicisation processes that occur as a result of the formation of social groups.

Chapter four comprises two parts. Part one provides a brief contextual narrative about the political, historical and social particularities in which the ChileGlobal network emerged. The second part introduces ChileGlobal, its main programmes, objectives and some of the key actors. The chapter delineates how and why the ChileGlobal network surfaced when it did. Chapter five describes the methodological approach that informed the research process. Chapter five also outlines some of the methodological limitations that were encountered in multi-sited research and concludes the framing part for this thesis.

Part two of this thesis comprises chapters six to ten. The chapters examine the profound shifts that occurred and significantly altered the trajectory of the network in more depth. Chapter six describes the institutional changes that occurred when the focus of national development in Chile shifted towards an emphasis on marketisation that competed with considerations about capitalising on Chile’s overseas population for the purpose of generating knowledge transfers. Chapter seven suggests that the recent genealogy of the
*ChileGlobal* network indicates a transformation from being a largely economic actor to a political actor with a decisive political agenda. Framing this transformation around a repoliticisation of diasporic sites, constitutes analytical as well as heuristic utility to make a case for the repoliticisation of diasporic collectives in the context of development.

Chapter eight returns to one of the key themes surrounding the debate on diasporic contributions to development, and outlines how a particular set of cultural relationships, social norms and institutional contingency mediates the transfer of skills and knowledge in Chile. By carving out the institutionalising effect of deeply embedded place-specific norms and practices, this chapter demonstrates the importance to go beyond policy-specific questions to analyse how diaspora networks can contribute to development. Chapter nine expands the discussion of the key findings and argues that, while *ChileGlobal* may not have been able to contribute to economic development as envisioned by its creators, the network has nonetheless produced a number of important and unintended side effects. The concluding chapter draws together the key findings that have been presented and discussed in the preceding chapters and also highlights the limitations of this thesis, its policy implications and possible future research directions deriving from this research.
Chapter Two: Multiple and contested meanings of diaspora and development

2.1. Introduction

There is extant literature that underscores contemporary discourses on the role diasporas can play in the development of their homelands. The purpose of this chapter is to situate the thesis within current debates of development and diaspora groups. To do this, the first three sections outline the relationship between the concepts diasporas and transnationalism, review the literature on migration and development, and sketch out Mohan’s (2002) analytical framework to express how development occurs in, through and by the diaspora. The remainder of this chapter pays particular attention to literature that casts diasporic groups as actors in the development apparatus constituting a convenient resource into which countries can tap. By drawing out themes, such as governmentality and social remittances, this chapter positions the thesis at the intersection of emerging work that calls for assessing non-state diasporic actors (Larner, 2015), and attending to the processes and practices that occur between different diasporic collectives in the context of national development aspirations (Dickinson, 2017).

2.2. Diaspora and transnationalism – defining and clarifying key concepts

The trope diaspora has experienced a remarkable degree of proliferation after it was almost non-existent as a concept in the social sciences before the 1960s when it primarily existed in cultural studies (Dufoix, 2008). In its religious meaning diaspora often referred to the Old Testament and the historic dispersion of the Jewish people, as well as the New Testament denoting the scattering of the Christian church (Dufoix, 2008). In the 1970s, diaspora became more frequently used to broadly characterise communities and people who lived away from ancestral lands, or their country of origin (Armstrong, 1976; Baumann, 2000). The extended use was accompanied by a conceptual broadening and secularisation of the term by incorporating the multiple experiences of, for instance, the
African diaspora in the 1960s (Harris, 1993) and the Irish diaspora in the 1970s (McCaffrey, 1976). The semantic and conceptual genealogy of diaspora experienced another transformation in the 1980s when across academic disciplines, the term diaspora was applied in reference to expatriate groups and cultural communities (Baumann, 2000). The rapid increase in the use of diaspora is best illustrated by Brubaker’s (2005) article, which points out that the term diaspora appeared as keywords only once or twice in dissertations written in the 1970s. Brubaker (2005) maintains that the popular use of the word diaspora is not limited to the academic world, but also increasingly used in public discourses, which he highlights by claiming that diaspora yielded about a million hits on Google by the time he wrote the article. Approximately seven years later in 2012, I repeated this simple exercise with the result that diaspora generated almost 60 million hits on Google. While the exponential increase in usage and appearance of the word diaspora in academia as well as in public discourses may be partly explained by a rise in digitally and digitalised publications, and increased sophistication of the search engines, it is nonetheless fair to state that research, policies, and debates on diasporic matters has vastly expanded in the previous decade.

As indicated above, the notion of diaspora traditionally characterised the global dispersion of a group of people that share the same territorial origin (Dufoix, 2008). This interpretation of diaspora was informed by the traditional and archetypical Jewish diaspora that was forced to leave their home territory and has been at the centre of any diaspora conceptualisation ever since (Cohen, 1997). Other classical diaspora experiences include those of the Armenian people, the Greek diaspora or the Black African diaspora (Cohen, 1997). Often these early understandings of diaspora are referred to as victim diasporas with connotations that highlight the often catastrophic and violent circumstances that led to dispersal. Building on Safran’s (1991) work that extends the diaspora concept to expatriate minorities, Cohen (1997) developed a framework for diasporas that differentiates between victim diasporas such as African or Armenian diasporas, labour diasporas such as the Indian diaspora experience, trade diasporas as for instance the Chinese, imperial diasporas as found in the expansion of the British empire and cultural diasporas such as the Caribbean diasporas. Other classification include Esman’s (2009, p. 14) taxonomy that divides diaspora into three classes such as settler, labour and entrepreneurial diaspora whose common denominator is that they are migrant
communities that maintain a range of affective and material ties with their home countries.

Another concept that is intimately related to diaspora is transnationalism. Often referred to as the transnational turn in migration studies that emerged in the early 1990s, transnational perspectives sought to shift nation-state centric views (Faist, 2010, p. 11). Initially spearheaded by anthropologists, transnational perspectives highlighted the multiple patterns of activities and ties that connect migrants, institutions and space across and beyond the confines of nation-state boundaries (Vertovec, 1999). Increased and broadened opportunities of technology mediated forms of mobility and communication allowed for maintaining dense long distance transnational connections. As such, transnationalism opened new avenues of inquiries for the often fluid experiences and relationships that previously signified geographical space and social identity in migration studies (Basch, Schiller, & Szanton Blanc, 1993, p. 7). Research on transnationalism highlights the agency of migrants and their active construction of identity and organisational forms of exchanges as they are engaged in host and home countries (Glick Schiller, Basch, & Szanton-Blanc, 1995, 1992; Guarnizo, Portes, & Haller, 2003; Levitt, 1997). Scholars in this vein of thinking stress the fluid nature of processes that occur when “groups migrate, regroup in new locations, reconstruct their histories and are no longer tightly … spatially bounded” (Appadurai, 1996, p. 48). Hence the view is sharpened for new forms of collectives and communities that emerge and that are characterised by notions of shared belonging, and manufactured through “the work of imagination, and new, hybrid institutions” (Mazzucato, 2004, p. 157).

This underscores the similarities between both concepts, diaspora and transnationalism, as they tend to refer to various cross border mobilities of people, ideas, and materialities. Furthermore, both concepts also implicate social formations that transgress the boundaries of nation-states (Bauböck & Faist, 2010; Blunt, 2007). However, transnational communities is a concept that is often used in a more inclusive way, in the sense that this concept not only includes diasporic communities that are dispersed across several countries, but also groups of people that “are contiguous … and may straddle just one border” (Van Hear, 1998, p. 6).
It is in this sense that contemporary conceptualisations of diasporic communities are often inclusive of migrant and transmigrant communities and vice versa. Castles and Miller (2009, p. 31), for instance, assert that diaspora is simply an older trope for transnational communities. This claim, however, ignores that not every transnational migrant activity or relation is necessarily diasporic (Dahlman, 2004b, p. 486). Similarly, diaspora is far too often equated with migrants, which may create analytical problems, because not every member of a given diaspora is a migrant and “some migrants may not choose to identify with any diaspora and, therefore, should not be considered as part of one” (Bakewell, 2009, p. 793). And yet, the 1990s was a key period for the convergence of concepts such as migrant communities and diasporic communities as this was a time where due to political transformation processes in South Asia, Africa, Eastern Europe and the Middle East so-called new diasporas emerged (Van Hear, 2009, 2010). In relation to transformations of understandings of diaspora, migration scholarship often discusses the densely knit transnational linkages between migrant communities in host countries to their home countries through applying a diasporic lens. In this context, it is not uncommon to see the formation and consolidation of diasporas as consequential of transnational migration (Esman, 2009, p. 3).

In the context of migration and development, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) has been one of the main drivers of broadening the concept of diaspora, to the extent that diaspora is inclusive of almost all migrants that contribute to the development of their home countries (Weinar, 2010, p. 78). Other institutional actors involved in devising and implementing policies pertaining to Migration and Development, such as the European Commission (EC) and the United Nations (UN) share a similar understanding that eliminates distinctions between transnational communities and diaspora (Weinar, 2010). Instead, diaspora became the generic umbrella trope that includes ethnic minorities and migrant communities. Their transnational practices and ties to the homeland were the focal point of interest for economic potentialities, which led to the marginalisation of questions of identity expression and cultural practices (Weinar, 2010, p. 86).

While mindful of the conceptual distinction that exists between core concepts such as diaspora and transnationalisation, and related ideas such as transnational communities, diasporic spaces, transnational structures and the like, this thesis treats both concepts
interchangeably. In doing so, this thesis follows the generally accepted, however contested, contemporary use of diasporic and transnational communities when referring to diasporic communities as ‘social forms’ that maintain links and ties with their countries of origin (Vertovec, 1997). This interpretation of diaspora is wide-ranging enough to include stereotypical, as well as modern incarnations of diasporic groups while it is still specific enough to retain the term’s analytical purchase (Gamlen, 2009, p. 31).

2.3. Migration and development

This section maps out how the concepts of development and migration are both intimately intertwined. Both processes are inherently contested and invoke conflicting views. The significance of this relation was highlighted in the 2010 World Migration Report that contains an explicit elaboration about the need to mainstream migration in national development agendas (IOM, 2010). However, the inherently political nature of migration governance made it virtually impossible to achieve international consensus on targets and indicators in relation to international migration and making it a distinctive Millennium Development Goal (MDG)\(^1\) at the time (Skeldon, 2008b). Succeeding the MDGs, the international community agreed to adopt the current framework of international development the so-called Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in 2015, that will guide aid and development policies between 2016 and 2030 (Kindornay & Twigg, 2015). In comparison to the MDGs, the SDGs are not only more complex in scope and ambition, but also link migration and development far more explicitly, effectively integrating migration for the first time ever into a global development framework (UN, 2015). International migration implicates the SDGs in a number of ways. For instance, emigration of skilled health professionals and the resulting absence of health practitioners can have an impact on public health in developing countries (Usher & IOM, 2005). Moreover, for some countries, migration has become a constituent part of their national

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\(^1\) The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) reflected an international effort to improve human well-being primarily in ‘developing’ countries (Vandemoortele, 2009). Based on an agreement between 192 countries, the MDGs consisted of eight goals that were to be achieved by 2015 such as eradication of extreme poverty and hunger, achieving universal primary education etc. Each of these goals had a number of specific measurable targets and indicators (United-Nations, 2014). Unlike the MDGs, the SDGs comprise 17 goals, are far more comprehensive and universal in scope in that they recognise fundamental issues such as growing inequality and environmental degradation as global problems that implicate wealthy industrialised aid donor countries as much as aid recipient countries (Sachs, 2012).
development framework (Mughal, 2013; O'Neil, 2004; N. Phillips, 2009). The current trend and increasing interest of countries to build durable relationships with their diaspora, is underpinned by renewed and often overly positive views as to how migration relates to development. While discussions of this relationship have traditionally swung back and forth between optimism and pessimism, the currently dominating perspective assumes that migration is beneficial for all stakeholders, migrants, developing countries and destination countries (de Haas, 2010; de Haas & Rodríguez, 2010; Gamlen, 2010; Newland, 2010; Skeldon, 2008a; UNDP, 2009).

Brushing the migration-development relations in bright and optimistic colours, often underscores the hope that emigration of the highly skilled population does not necessarily constitute a one and for all loss for developing countries. Instead, traditional concerns of brain drain, the dominant view throughout the 1970s and 1980s came to be reframed around brain circulation that assumes a multi-directional mobility of skilled migrants and knowledge workers (Beine, Docquier, & Rapoport, 2008; Blachford & Zhang, 2014; Boeri, 2012; Gibson & McKenzie, 2014; Portes, 2008; Saxenian, 2005; Solimano, 2008). These proponents of brain circulation suggest that emigration may not be equated with the eternal loss of human capital and skills. The overarching theme of brain circulation suggests that due to improved internet and telecommunication opportunities, as well as up-scaled corporeal mobilities, migrants remain in touch and connected with their country of origin. As such, they can contribute via knowledge and expertise exchange to capacity building in their respective home countries.

The UN’s *Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals* programme (TOKTEN) was a first institutional response that addressed increased concerns that brain drain has negative ramifications for the development aspirations of less developed countries. The TOKTEN programme was created in 1976/1977 and was geared towards supporting the temporary return of skilled migrants (Logan, 1990; Rao, 2006). TOKTEN’s objective was to offer a framework for mitigating the effects of brain drain by supporting the temporary and voluntary return of skilled migrants to their country of origin for a brief period of time, usually ranging between two weeks and six months. During their temporary stay, highly skilled expatriates are placed in research institutions or universities, to provide their technical expertise, policy advice and research to the public sector, governments and the private sector (Muneer, 2011, p. 91). Those early attempts to utilise expatriates’
expertise were largely framed along developmentalist ideas through which wider political issues of social well-being in developing countries could be addressed. However, more recently emerged initiatives to institutionalise state-diaspora relations, gained largely traction throughout the late 1990s and 2000s and often invoked notions of individualism that tends to accompany human capital discourses (Larner, 2007, p. 336).

Views that advocated for the beneficial impact migration has on development, also often point to the professional and scientific networks that emerged in the 1990s (Meyer & Brown, 1999; Meyer et al., 1997). At the heart of these networks were often scientists that formed loose groups in order to collaborate in research projects. To a large extent, those early research and science networks were only retrospectively ‘discovered’ by governments and incorporated in national development strategies (Larner, 2007, p. 336). A well-documented case study of a scientific network is the Colombian network Red Caldas that was established in Columbia after policies designed to incentivise the return of Columbian researchers largely failed in the 1980s (Chaparro, Jaramillo, & Quintero, 2006; Granés, Morales, & Meyer, 1996; Meyer, Kaplan, & Charum, 2001). The Red Caldas network was created in 1991 to establish linkages between Columbian researchers residing overseas and in Columbia for the purpose of strengthening the Columbian domestic science and research capacities. After some successes in advancing research partnerships between Columbia and other countries the network was downscaled due to restraints in the national budget and concomitant lack of political support (Chaparro et al., 2006; Meyer et al., 2001). As for embracing diaspora knowledge networks, the enthusiasm that was to surround the effectiveness of these actors, was not initially given. For instance, the authors of a report for the World Bank voiced considerable doubt about the viability of diaspora knowledge networks and cautioned against the celebration and expectations of the people involved in those networks (Lowell & Gerova, 2004, p. 24). However, as discussed in more detail below these concerns did not last, nor did they seem to have had an impact on the World Bank’s decision to launch its Diaspora for Development programme in 2005.

The growing importance of none-state actors in the context of development is testament to the rapidly changing geographies of aid in particular, and development in general (IFAD et al., 2013; Richey & Ponte, 2015). The rise of non-traditional partnerships, networks and alliances in development processes does not necessarily signify the
emergence of new actors *per se*, but may rather be seen as a process that opens up new spaces of inquiry and interrogations (Richey & Ponte, 2014). This insight holds true for migrant networks that have been shaping the trajectories of regions and countries well before the introduction of the modern nation-state (Castles, Haas, & Miller, 2014). While traditionally, the main actors in development are state, market and civil society (IDS, 2016), a more inclusive and historical reading of development actors allows for framing networks such as migrant, or diaspora networks as classical actors in development\(^2\).

Similarly, development is equally diverse and characterised by elements of ideological argument and a multitude of approaches and dimensions hence, “the concept of development itself is a contested concept” (Naerssen van, Spaan, & Zoomers, 2008, p. 3). Development, or lack thereof, such as deprived livelihood options has been described as causative for migratory movement; push factors such as low income, lack of economic opportunity or politically suppressive environments were seen as the primary reasons for emigration. In addition, the exodus of productive human capital in less developed countries, commonly known as ‘brain drain’ framed much of the debate on migration and development. As the amounts of transferred remittances increased, attention was drawn to their direct influence on national income in source countries and the indirect impact that may occur through investment.

### 2.4. Development in, through, and by the diaspora

The general developmental impact of diaspora groups was typically framed along unidirectional and reductionist lines that highlights how migrant groups may generate change in developing countries (Kapur & McHale, 2005). Mohan’s (2002) categorisation, on the other hand, is premised on a three dimensional understanding of the relationship between development and diasporic groups that accounts for the multiple and multi-directional flows.

\(^2\) State, market and civil society are often somewhat schematically represented as the classical main actors in development policy, practice and theory. Insight from critical theory and post-structuralism, however, suggests that these classifications are somewhat arbitrary and constructed. Critical studies suggest that the state, for instance can be conceptualised as a network of different groups, people, institutions etc. (Jessop, 2001; Passoth & Rowland, 2010).
Following this threefold typology, diaspora-derived development occurs:

- *in* the diaspora
- *through* the diaspora
- *by* the diaspora

Development *in* the diaspora occurs within diasporic communities when diasporans utilise their networks to generate socio-economic well-being. Independent of essentialised attributions of what constitutes the home country, this kind of development occurs *in situ*, the place where diasporic communities reside. This may be exemplified by drawing attention to so-called Chinatowns where layered socio-economic relations exist between co-ethnic members of the Chinese diaspora. These densely knit Chinese co-ethnic networks often provide almost exclusive sources of labour, suppliers and customers to Chinese emigrant business owners (Meares, Cain, & Spoonley, 2011). The formation of diasporic networks within the host country is primarily grounded in the mobilisation of social capital and often serves to offer protection and support to diaspora members in the host nation. Related to this, development *in* the diaspora encompasses activities that lead to the creation of political, social and civil groups, yet the main unit of analysis remains to be economic activities (Mohan, 2002).

Development *through* the diaspora is a somewhat geographically extended version of the previous category. This kind of development occurs when benefits of diasporic activities accrue in the place of residence. However, unlike development *in* the diaspora that signifies activities in the host country, development *through* the diaspora takes a broader approach and looks at how diaspora groups use “their diffuse global connections beyond the locality to facilitate economic and social well-being” (Mohan, 2002, p. 113). Orozco (2011), for instance, applies this category and demonstrates how the Mexican *tres por uno* program in which each dollar contributed by a diasporic home town association will be matched by one dollar from local governments, one dollar from state governments and one dollar from federal governments. Funds that were raised through this Mexico specific programme were utilised to improve health centres, community development projects and education among other initiatives (Orozco, 2011, p. 115).
Development *by* the diaspora refers to a variety of flows such as monetary resources and political support, generated by diasporic communities (Mohan, 2002, p. 123). This final element of diasporic development signifies the kind of activities that forms the rationale for much of the contemporary interest and policy responses to diaspora potentialities. Just like the previous two categories, development *by* the diaspora is enabled through cultural ties that can generate diverse initiatives in the home country enacted through political, economic, social and cultural means. The role of diasporas is diverse and often contradictory to achieving an improvement of living conditions in home countries. Interpretations of what constitutes development may differ between diasporic perspectives and those of home country communities. Bakewell (2009, p. 799) cautions that understandings of national development of members of the diaspora, may often be informed by their particularistic interests, biases and experiences of transnational, elite-like privileges. Therefore, diasporic engagement should be guided by principles of accountability and broad-based consultation with stakeholders and communities in home-countries.

The notion of diasporic communities as development actors challenges ideas according to which states, international finance institutions and Northern or Western-based NGOs are the driving forces of development initiatives (Mohan, 2002, p. 138). It may well be true that a significant degree of “intrinsic motivation” (Kuznetsov, 2008, p. 268) differentiates diasporic communities from the more conventional development agents. Indeed, their growing influence, coupled with advantages such as understanding the often complex socio-cultural and ethnic particularities in their countries of origin, which enables them to create and utilise important relationship opportunities, made some diasporic communities a much sought after partner of traditional development actors (Brinkerhoff, 2006, p. 9).

### 2.5. Re-discovering diasporic contributions

The ‘re-discovery’ of migrants and their framing around notions of national development actors is often expressed in public addresses from either presidents, prime ministers or other senior members of the government. For instance, the Mexican president Vicente Fox addressed the Mexican overseas population by calling them “heroic countrymen”
Likewise, India’s former Minister of External Affairs gave a compelling address during which he likened the impact of the Indian diaspora to the influence of Mahatma Gandhi, by asserting that “Just as the Mahatma changed the course of Indian history after his return, I am certain, overseas Indians will play a major role in building a glorious future for India and for the world” (Sinha, 2003, p. 15). Assigning diaspora groups national importance and their celebration as national heroes, often obscures the self-interest governments may have and that this particular representation of migrant communities is often equivalent to assigning them responsibility and risk to develop their home countries (Åkesson, 2011). The next section sketches out the rationale and assumptions that underpin the recent celebration of diasporic collectives as agents of development.

2.5.1. Financial remittances

The transfer of financial remittances constitutes a central research and policy area in the context of diasporas’ contributions to economic development (i.e. Bracking, 2003; de Haas, 2005; UNDP, 2009). These remittances are primarily goods and money that are transferred to households and communities by migrants working outside their home countries (Adams Jr, 2011). Remittances outstrip official development assistance (ODA) by far, and are only topped by foreign direct investment, the third major external source of funding (Driffield & Jones, 2013). According to the World Bank’s (2016b) most recent remittances fact book, financial remittances in 2015 were expected to be in excess of 600 billion US dollars. The perceived positive impacts associated to remittances in receiving countries are multifaceted such as regional poverty elimination (Acosta, Calderón, Fajnzylber, & Lopez, 2008) or increased school enrolment rates (Amuedo-Dorantes & Pozo, 2010; Calero, Bedi, & Sparrow, 2009; Nakamuro, 2010).

However, the discussion on remittances and their impact on, for instance, schooling, is far from being a clear-cut case and remains divided. Results vary between regions and countries, in fact, employing different methodologies even leads to different outcomes for the very same country. While Acosta (2011) concludes that remittances do not have a positive effect on school enrolment rates in El Salvador, the results of Edwards and Ureta (2003) suggest that the transfer of remittances does increase school enrolment rates.
Adding another dimension, de la Garza (2010) found that children whose parents migrated are more likely to abstain from school, rendering the beneficial effect of remittances at least questionable. While education and schooling are just one example of the inconclusive and mixed results research on remittances can generate, it does seem to be suggestive enough to caution against the celebration of remittances as a development mantra (Kapur, 2004).

Furthermore, there is evidence that suggests that remittances can lead to a decrease in poverty (Acosta et al., 2008), yet other studies assert that remittances can contribute to an increase in inequality (Viet, 2008). Rising inequality between remittance-receiving families and families without remittance-related financial support, can undermine social cohesion and increase marginalisation (Marchand, 2008). Adding another layer of abstraction, research has also revealed that the transfer of remittances does not necessarily create inequality, but may further inequality that already existed in the first place (Takenaka & Pren, 2010). Hence, a differentiated analysis of migration and its contribution to development must take into consideration that migration is often a selective process (i.e. de Haas, 2005; R. C. Jones, 1998). Often it is not the most socio-economically deprived people that migrate but those who already have the material or social resources (Castles & Miller, 2009).

Inconclusive results also appear after examining the spatial reach of remittances. Proponents of financial remittances claim that remittances are more probable to reach regions that are either overseen or hard to reach through ODA (Farrant, MacDonald, & Sriskandarajah, 2006, p. 14). These claims that are often advanced by authors that are affiliated with institutional actors such as the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and the World Bank are contested. Indeed, Skeldon (2008a) argues that remittances should not be seen as a substitute for ODA. Unlike official aid that can be channelled through the national budget to target particularly vulnerable groups and the eradication of poverty, remittances often flow to areas that “involve neither the poorest area nor the poorest people within those areas” (Skeldon, 2008a, p. 8). Indeed, these often contradictory findings highlight the intrinsic complexity of the remittance debate that remains to be characterised by a divide in remittances optimists and remittances sceptics (de Haas, 2012; Gamlen, 2014b).
Without a doubt, there are considerable benefits on household and partly community level that can be attributed to the transfer of monetary resources. Nonetheless, there are also significant costs involved that cast doubt over a potential triple-win situation where migrants, the country of origin and the country of residence benefit equally (Hermele, 2015). Moreover, research has also highlighted several components that give further reason to caution an undifferentiated view on financial remittances. A decline in commitment to sending money to home countries seems to be one of the most significant factors that distinguishes first generation migrants from second generation migrants (H. Lee, 2007). This insight poses the question of remittance dependency. Remittance dependency is of particular concern for countries where the monetised transfer of remittances is a significant share of the gross domestic product (GDP). Countries such as Honduras where the inflow of remittances is 17.4% of the country’s GDP, Moldova, where financial remittances account for 26.2% of its GDP, or Tajikistan where migrants’ financial contributions account for 41.4% of the country’s GDP (World Bank, 2016b, p. 13) are clearly vulnerable to potential disruption of remittance flows as witnessed in the aftermath of the economic recession between 2008-2012.

Critical scholarship on remittances also cautions against the uncritical representation of financial remittances and challenges the fundamental nature of financial transfer by asserting that “remittance sums serve neo-liberal governments that, not bothering to come up with actual development alternatives, use them as a currency source that sustains a fragile macro-economic stability” (Wise & Covarrubias, 2009, p. 96). These concerns resonate with calls for awareness for a more nuanced perspective of remittance transfer, which implies to critically look at the role of governments that utilise migration as a development strategy (N. Phillips, 2009). To employ migration as a development tool implies that governments of low and middle-income countries actively promote labour movement of its population. Case studies on Morocco and the Philippines, which pursue such a strategy, show that reliance on remittances indirectly enables governments to procrastinate or even avoid social reforms (Dudwick, 2011; Kireyev, 2006). It is missing reforms that would potentially allow the most marginalised and vulnerable people to experience sustained improvement of their socio-economic situation as these are the people that typically do not migrate, hence, do not benefit from remittance transfers.
2.5.2. Social remittances

Another set of developmental implications that arises out of diasporic transmissions is the transfer of social remittances that may contribute to social, cultural and political transformation in the home country (Kleist, 2008b; Levitt, 1998; Levitt & Nyberg-Sørensen, 2004). The circulation of social remittances such as identities, norms, practices and social capital is often acknowledged, yet receives far less attention in research and practice (Horst & Gaas, 2008; Page & Mercer, 2012). Social remittances are also inclusive of political remittances such as the transfer and diffusion of ideas, behaviour and the value of democratising structures (Kapur, 2010; Piper, 2009). Studies on the transfer of social remittances such as civic engagement³ suggest that international migrants can contribute to fostering democratic structures through channelling political values, principles, information and practices (Pérez-Armendáriz & Crow, 2010). Other authors highlight how diaspora groups can be sites of mobilisation for or against particular political issues (Sökefeld, 2006; Vélez-Torres & Agergaard, 2014). Political diaspora groups may instigate violent ethnic conflicts in the sense that long-term migration and diaspora networks may facilitate the export and diffusion of contention and dissent from home countries to host countries (Lyon & Uçarer, 2005; Stares & Smith, 2007). Thus, research on political implications of the transfer of ideas requires attention and sensitivity to the local context. Faist (2008, p. 31), for instance, cautions that while the Chinese government encourages its overseas population to continue to invest in mainland China, the central government is less enthusiastic about the transfer of political remittances such as ideas around alternative forms of government. On the other hand, a report published via the Peace and Research Institute Oslo suggests that diaspora groups can play a positive role in reconciliation processes following ethnic and religiously motivated conflicts (Horst & Gaas, 2008).

The circulation and mobilisation of ideas, concepts and practices via people, is not a new outcome that flows from recent transnational literature. Instead, a historically more

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³ The notion of civic disengagement is often used to describe the decline of participation of the general public in political processes such as elections, but also processes that are outside of formal political processes such as community involvement. While there is no commonly agreed on definition of civic engagement, Adler and Goggin (Adler & Goggin, 2005, p. 241) suggest to define civic engagement as the process of “how an active citizen participates in the life of a community in order to improve conditions for others or to help shape the community’s future”.
nuanced reading of the multiple mobilities of ideas and people allows for an interpretation of the rise of neoliberalism in South America. Dezalay and Garth (2002) for instance, show how the introduction of neoliberal policy prescription in South America occurred through the interaction within a network of particular universities in North America, universities in South America, status-conscientious elite groups of lawyers, economists and technocrats in South America and historical political struggles. This melange of a diverse set of institutions and mobilisation of people and ideas enables a reading of the socio-economic transformation of South American states as a result of continuous and multiple interaction, rather than being the result of foreign policy imperialism (Prince, 2009, p. 47). Migration-related research along these lines has demonstrated how social remittances “circulate continuously and iteratively” and in the process change organisational practices at local, regional and national scale (Levitt & Lamba-Nieves, 2011, p. 19). In a similar vein, Tabar (2014) has argued that political remittances are at risk of being co-opted into utilitarian approaches. Following this line of reasoning posits that diaspora groups are embraced merely as a tool for electoral purposes in homeland political affairs. For example, Lebanon’s interactions with its diaspora occurred at the pretence of genuine engagement and seeking diasporic advice on policy matters. However, the Lebanese government’s engagement obscured the strategic nature of outreaching to the Lebanese diaspora in an attempt to secure the diaspora’s electoral preference which, in effect served to stabilise the “dominant political structure in Lebanon” (Tabar, 2014, p. 457).

Lastly, and contrary to measuring the impact of financial remittances, tracing the flow and pinpointing the effect of social remittances has proven rather problematic in times where material and symbolic resources as well as information, travel between societies through multiple ways (Boccagni & Decimo, 2013, p. 2). Distinguishing between diaspora-induced change of political views, norms or behaviour and change that was mediated via non-migrant related circulation of information, such as media and communication technologies, remains a fundamental challenge and requires in-depth ethnographic work (Boccagni & Decimo, 2013). Other existing studies highlight the need to consider the context in which social remittances such as democratic values may or may not gain traction. For example, Itzigsohn and Villacréz (2008) show how transnational political participation and increased civic activities does not necessarily strengthen the democratic practices in the context of El Salvador and the Dominican Republic. Instead,
the authors conclude that transnational migrants tend to be part of local elite groups and, as such, they are hardly the group that is likely to contest the current system that is wired to reproduce exclusion (Itzigsohn & Villacrés, 2008, p. 683). However, this view is also problematic because it not only homogenises and essentialises transnational communities, but it ignores how “a critical analysis of elites becomes more important than ever to a critical sociology of resistance” (Dello Buono, 2012, p. 374). For that reason, a more engaged investigation of the activities of diasporic collectives that is conceptually framed around an understanding of their political potency is needed.

2.6. Donors and diasporas

The promises and assumed potentials alluded to above contributed to diasporas being subjected to utilitarian interpretation not only from home country governments and multilateral organisations, but also latterly from the international donor community. Donor agencies began to invest in diaspora-related research and increasingly sought to identify and work in collaboration with diasporic communities of aid-receiving countries to form strategic partnerships (Brinkerhoff, 2011; Groot & Gibbons, 2007; Newland & Plaza, 2013). Traditional donor countries such as the UK, France and The Netherlands are partnering up with diasporic groups in order to work collaboratively to maximise cultural, social as well as economic development outcomes (Brinkerhoff, 2011). Similarly, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) provides financial support for development projects that are implemented and executed by members of the Haitian diaspora (GFMD, 2009). Once again, the guiding rationality is that diasporas can act as cultural bridges and better inform donor decisions around project implementation in developing countries.

Critical scholarship cautions that diaspora–donor relationships are inherently unequal and are likely to follow traditional donor–recipient country relationship patterns (D. A. Phillips, 2013). Phillips (2013, p. 139) notes discrepancies between donor agencies and diaspora groups echoing the contention that donors’ history of paternalism in relation to aid recipients is likely to inform donor countries’ interaction with diaspora groups. Rather than engaging in genuine partnerships, critical analysis might reveal how consultation and collaborating with the diaspora may be tokenistic as well as constituting a risk.
mitigation tool to prevent the failure of development projects. Research along this line of inquiry is often critical of the utilitarian and instrumentalising view of diaspora on one end of the spectrum, and cautions that migrant and diaspora groups can be “unaccountable power groups” on the other end of the spectrum (Itzigsohn & Villacrèes, 2008, p. 683). From this sceptical perspective, potentially fruitful and effective partnerships are impeded by a lack of trust and the perception that diasporas are merely another instrument to further donor countries’ interests rather than viewing the diaspora as a genuine partner (Groot & Gibbons, 2007; Sives, 2012). To some extent then, concerns around co-optation and loss of autonomy characterise the relationship of diasporas with donor agencies as well as the relationship between diasporas and their home country governments.

2.7. Interpreting the contemporary rise and spread of ‘diaspora strategies’

The ascent of diaspora-related policies is often interpreted through the analytical framework of neoliberal governmentality seeking to interrogate the political-economic implications of diaspora strategies (Kalm, 2013; Kunz, 2008; Larner, 2007; McConnell, 2012; Mullings, 2012; Ragazzi, 2009). Advancing this view, authors draw on Foucauldian insights as to how governmental practices of the post-welfare state are shaped by employment of policies, devices and technologies that seek to frame the individual as existing in enterprise agreements (Dean, 1996; Hamann, 2009; Lemke, 2001; Rose, 1996a, 1996b; Rose, O'Malley, & Valverde, 2006). The political rationality that guides these state practices promotes an image of the individual as “an active and responsible agent in the securing of security for themselves and those to whom they are or should be affiliated” (Rose, 1996b, p. 335). Neoliberal governmentality typically refers to the deliberate process of engineering and normalising social conditions in which individuals instil and embrace market-based principles and ideals such as “personal responsibility” and “self-care” (Lemke, 2001, p. 203).

Scholarship that analyses diaspora strategies through the lens of neoliberal governmentality, asserts that population re-management is at the heart of neoliberal re-imaginations seeking to produce “self-enterprising subjects” (Ong, 2007, p. 5). Indeed, by rendering the diaspora’s socio-economic domain visible and championing self-entrepreneurialism, mobile diasporic individuals become “mobile governable subjects”
Diaspora strategies, governmentality authors suggest, are a tool to promote a “specific form of life” (Dean, 1991, p. 13). The specific form of life revolves around choice, personal responsibility, control over one’s own fate, self-promotion and self-government (Rose, 1996b, p. 335). The elite diaspora of not only developing, but also developed countries is represented as conduits and bridges to foreign markets (Brinkerhoff, 2008b; Kuznetsov, 2006c). Reaching out to diasporic individuals and collectives is often underpinned by racial, gendered as well as spatial division that prioritises areas that are often seen to be masculine such as investment, finance and ICT in locations such as Europe and North America (Larner, 2007, p. 341). In a similar vein Bailey and Dickinson (2007, p. 764) note “classed invisibilities” in India’s diaspora integration policies that celebrate the professionally successful and global Indian as representative of the ‘new India’ while silencing low-skilled Indian emigrants as reflective of the past.

Varadarajan’s (2010) insightful account of the production of the Indian diaspora, for instance, asserts that extending the imagined boundaries of the Indian nation is co-constitutive of restructuring the Indian state along neoliberal lines. Drawing on Gramsci’s notion of hegemony Varadarajan (2010), argues that India’s diaspora policies were driven by the vested interests of domestic elites in India. Research in this domain interprets diaspora strategies as moments during which nation-states enact transnationalised and globalised rationalities to govern and manage their population, as well as to invoke the notion of self-disciplining citizens with internalised norms (Adamson & Demetriou, 2007; Ho, 2011; Kunz, 2008, 2012; Larner, 2007; Larner, Heron, & Lewis, 2008; Ong, 2007; Ragazzi, 2009).

These central tenets of neoliberal rationalities are of particular importance in the context of development thinking and associated practices in the global South where post-Washington consensus deliberations advocate the increasing significance of the role the private sector may play in development (Pellerin & Mullings, 2013). Pellerin and Mullings (2013) argue that the rise of diaspora-related policies in the global South, represents the discursive power with which the World Bank attempts to promote its broad objective of private sector-led economic development. By implication, the World Bank as the self-proclaimed expert deliverer of best practice advice reinforces its own institutional, historic governmental force in the context of development (Pellerin &
Mullings, 2013, p. 112). These observations resonate with claims that posit how framing diaspora strategies around elite groups may reproduce uneven socio-economic transformation (Bakewell, 2009; Ho, 2011).

Scholars of political geography on the other hand tend to focus on how policies spread across regions and analyse the proliferation of diaspora-related policies and consular activities through the lens of policy diffusion (Délano, 2014). Drawing on existing research of policy transfer processes as advanced by Peck and Theodore (2010), Délano argues that the recent surge in diaspora-focused institutions and policies throughout Latin American countries, can be explained through notions of regional unity and socio-cultural similarities across the countries of the region (Délano, 2014). However, further research is needed to untangle country-specific approaches to better understand which actors and policy sites are privileged over others and, by implication, which policies are mobilised and legitimised. Unpacking these questions would generate insights into whether the recent wave of diaspora policy diffusion, is indeed, only the result of socio-cultural similarities or also the result of rational decision-making in attempts to compete for scarce resources such as foreign capital in the context of Latin America (Dobbin, Simmons, & Garrett, 2007, p. 463).

While further research may yield insights into how, and under what conditions particular diaspora-related policies are mobilised, the effect of those policies would still remain unexplored. For instance, and as chapter three carves out in more detail, questions as to which local factors affect the translation or diffusion of diasporic knowledge into the home country are strikingly absent. This dearth in knowledge is where a thesis that focuses on diaspora and development can add not only texture to existing research, but also provide new insights into the formation of critical collectives. Recently emerged scholarship on the globalisation of diaspora strategies, postulates the need to unpack and interrogate globalising diasporic spaces and to be sensitive towards emerging social actors (Ho, Boyle, & Yeoh, 2015, 2015; Zhang, 2009). Reaching out towards diasporic collectives is not just limited to state actors, but is often driven by non-state actors such as NGOs, think tanks, multilateral institutions, policy research centres, frequently in conjunction with actors from within the state.
2.8. Summary

This chapter has mapped out how diaspora groups came to be associated with being important agents in development thinking and practice. However, diaspora-induced development is often reduced to the transfer and distribution of financial remittances. Related to this, a vast array of knowledge is being generated that puts forward ideas as to how to interpret the rise and increase of diaspora strategies, for instance through the lens of governmentality or policy diffusion. Thus, on the whole, diaspora-related literature is characterised by a focus on high-level policy implication and attempts to generate comparative meta-level theories of state practices in relation to diaspora groups (Délano, 2014; Gamlen, 2008a, 2014a). While these avenues of inquiries are important because they produce new fields of knowledge in their respective academic and policy areas, they do not address local layers of diasporic interaction, nor do they assess locally grounded patterns and relationships that may influence the transfer of knowledge, ideas and technology.

Moreover, the current fixation about diaspora and development has been partly triggered by the impact the large-scale Asian diaspora populations had on economic development of the information technology sector in Asian countries such as India and China (Kapur, 2001; Pandey, Aggrawal, Devane, & Kuznetsov, 2006; Saxenian, 1990, 2005; Saxenian & Li, 2003; Smart & Hsu, 2004). Thus, much of the diaspora literature is inspired by, and continues to interrogate the developmental impacts that occurred in Asian countries. Research tends to focus on how financial contributions of the diaspora such as remittances, can be channelled towards generating more effective use and transfers. Likewise, research investigating the role of the African diaspora has gained traction and generated a substantial body of literature and institutional responses such as the establishment of the African Europe Development Platform in 2009, which is financed by the European Union as well as individual member countries such as Netherland, Germany and Switzerland. The political entanglements of African diasporas has become subject to critical inquiries, appears well-documented, and has been disseminated via various special editions (i.e. Iheduru, 2011; Mohan, 2008; Page, Mercer, & Evans, 2009; Whitaker, 2011). With regard to Latin America, research tends to focus on remittance-related contributions of countries in Central America, such as Haiti, Puerto Rico, Dominican Republic, El Salvador or Mexico, with the notable exception of Mullings
(2012) research on Jamaica. However, research on how diasporas of South American countries may contribute to development of their home countries remains surprisingly marginal (Margheritis, 2011).

In spite of the fact that development-related diaspora initiatives have become part and parcel of multi-lateral donor agencies’ policy prescriptions, there are important questions that have not yet been answered. The research community and donor agencies engaged in diaspora projects are just beginning to develop an interest in actual and potential barriers to knowledge translation and diasporic engagement beyond institutional and policy level (Kuschminder, Sturge, & Ragab, 2014). Furthermore, Larner (2015) asserts that in relation to advancing the analysis of diaspora strategies questions about the actual experiences of those involved need to be asked. This is compatible with an investigation of the experiences of diasporic members in transferring their knowledge into the home country context. Moreover, diaspora knowledge networks are development actors that “require new tools, methodology and concepts” in order to be explored theoretically, as well as empirically (Meyer & Wattiaux, 2006, p. 4). Thus, the following chapter outlines the conceptual framework and is informed by demands for a more refined engagement with diasporic collectives in the context of development.

Overall, this thesis responds to calls for a more situated engagement through an investigation of the Chilean diaspora network ChileGlobal, a network that was initially established through the World Bank’s diaspora for development programme. An examination of this network and its trajectory since 2005, provides productive insights into how diasporic initiatives play out on the ground and in the complex and messy home country reality that these initiatives are designed to transform. Moreover, this thesis provides insights into the complex network inherent dynamics and how the various, yet continuous institutional, political and personal changes influence the scope, activities and ultimately the understanding of the purpose of diasporic collectives in the context of development. With this in mind, the next chapter outlines the conceptual and analytical framework that guides this thesis.
Chapter Three: Analysing and conceptualising diaspora knowledge networks

3.1. Introduction

The previous chapter explained how international migration and diaspora groups have become developmentalised over the last two decades. Throughout this process diaspora networks were increasingly framed as agents in development processes in the context of capital investment, the transfer of financial remittances and knowledge transfers (de Haas, 2010; Nyberg-Sørensen, van Hear, & Engberg-Pedersen, 2002; Spaan, van Naerssen, & Hillmann, 2005; Van Naerssen, Spaan, & Zoomers, 2011). The purpose of this chapter is to map out the conceptual framework that guides this thesis. As mentioned in chapter two, the current scholarship on diaspora-related development initiatives predominantly takes the state as the primary unit of analysis. Recent scholarship however, highlights the need to go beyond functional state and policy centric approaches to explore the role of non-state diasporic actors as both subjects and objects (Kunz, 2012; Larner, 2015). Related to this are questions about the conditions and frames as to how globalising diaspora networks emerge as a result of “intricate interweavings of situated people, artifacts, codes and living things and the maintenance of particular tapestries of connection across the world” (Whatmore & Thorne, 2008, p. 236).

This chapter provides the conceptual rationale for making those connections traceable and explains the conceptual rationalities that guides this thesis. The first part of this chapter introduces the concept translation, which is often associated with authors working in the realm of actor network theory (ANT) (Callon, 1986a, 1999; Latour, 1987, 2005; Law, 1991a, 2009). Translation is discussed in light of its analytical utility for assessing how diaspora networks are subject to multiple interpretations that shape the outcome of network-related activities. The second part of this chapter introduces the concept of ‘anti-politics machine’ (Ferguson, 1990). Narratives of ‘anti-politics machine’ are often invoked in the context of development interventions to demonstrate the depoliticising effect that development projects may generate. However, through a careful
reconceptualisation of James Ferguson’s (1990) ‘anti-politics machine’ this chapter expresses the conceptual logic for assessing how diaspora networks may produce sites of repoliticisation. The two concepts, translation, and ‘anti-politics machine’ are linked. Whereas the former provides the analytical lens to conceptualise change, the latter provides the interpretative lens to evaluate the occurred changes.

3.2. Analytical purchase of actor network theory for development research

Actor network theory does not necessarily constitute a stringent theoretical frame, but rather a set of sensibilities that rejects “catch-all” approaches (Baiocchi, Graizbord, & Rodríguez-Muñiz, 2013, p. 324). As such, ANT sits particularly well with the ethos of research conducted within Development Studies. Since its inception, Development Studies has taken intellectual insights from disciplines such as Sociology, Geography, Anthropology, Economics and cognate academic disciplines. However, while ANT has become a reasonably well established tool and methodology in those disciplines, only a few development-related studies have employed elements that derived from ANT derived (e.g. Campregher, 2010; Le Meur, 2006; Lewis & Mosse, 2006; Mosse, 2005; Rottenburg, 1998). Indeed, despite the fact that analytical insights of ANT have long informed a diverse range of research projects across academic disciplines, ANT’s conceptual usefulness for Development Studies “has not been adequately recognised” (Heeks, 2013, p. 15).

The utility of concepts that emerged from ANT for development and diaspora-related research arises out of its uncompromising attention to processes and practices of network formation, making it an ontology of connections (Latour, 2005). Moreover, the theoretical canon of Development Studies theory is characterised by a schism between reductionist ideas of rational choice, objective truth and economic growth on end of the spectrum, and purist post-development thought with a relentless focus on deconstruction, reducing everything to discourse on the other end (Scott-Smith, 2013, p. 7). Recent post-development thought (i.e. Gibson-Graham, 2005; McGregor, 2009) has attempted to offer theoretical approaches that go beyond discourse analysis. However, much of that work still remains either dichotomised contrasting development with local resistance, or essentialised, in that it takes westernisation and global capitalism versus local
communities as a frame of reference (Donovan, 2014, pp. 869-877). In different words then, much of post-development thinking still revolves around binaries such as global and local or structure and agency.

Taking inspiration from ANT is useful for questioning claims about seemingly inherent properties, such as structure and agency because ANT proposes to view agency as an effect of relations between people, texts, materials and things (Callon, Law, & Rip, 1986; Pickering, 1995). ANT’s intellectual tradition is informed by post-structurally derived misgivings towards prevailing claims of universal truth and knowledge that produces and represents truth as objective. Instead, post-structuralist ideas assert that knowledge is produced within particular systems and arrangements and forms of knowledge that are claimed to be objective, are mediated and given meaning through discourse. For instance, rather than describing reality, scientific methods, models and theories produce it (Müller, 2015, p. 71). Contesting the objectiveness of knowledge, actor network theorists share post-structuralists’ concerns as to how knowledge is being produced and how certain forms of knowledge, such as scientific knowledge are prioritised over other forms of knowledge.

ANT has gained currency in the wake of the crisis of representation instigating a wider turn in the Social Sciences that saw the rise of other critically reflexive and actor-focused approaches, which interrogate the production and negotiation of development meanings for different stakeholders in the context of development, for instance, the Manchester School-derived actor-oriented approach (Lewis & Mosse, 2006; Long, 1990; Long & Long, 1992). Yet by resting on the convenient separation of different lifeworlds the actor-oriented approach relies on problematic and predisposed assumptions that ascribe “permanence and fixity to worlds of knowledge across epistemological interfaces” (Rossi, 2006, p. 47). However, explained below, the assumption of stable interfaces within which the different knowledge worlds of, for instance, donor representatives and local community representatives meet and negotiate meaning is problematic, because the very existence of interfaces that neatly separates different epistemic worlds is inherently contested. Indeed, the notion of agency that provides room for manoeuvre and that allows individuals to negotiate and claim meaning, does “not fall from heaven” (Hebinck, den Ouden, & Verschoor, 2001, p. 11). Instead, critical approaches, such as ANT direct
attention to how the ability to generate action is the product of complex arrangements and ordering, rather than an innate property.

The central argument of ANT’s initial key proponents Bruno Latour (i.e. 1987, 1999, 2005), Michel Callon (i.e. 1987; 1999) and John Law (i.e. 1987, 2008, 1991b) is that any action results from associations of humans, materials, devices and technologies. For example, Latour (1986) argues that treating power as a cause of actions or behaviour relies on a set of a priori assumptions such as the fact that someone or something simply has power. This essentialisation, Latour (1986, p. 266) laments, is often conveniently used to “explain (away) hierarchy, obedience or hegemony” because treating power as a cause obscures the factors that contributed to an entity or actor possessing power in the first place. Instead, treating power as a consequence, rather than the cause of collective action, requires directing attention to the range of associations that precede the act of exercising power.

Returning to questions of structure and agency, rather than arguing against the existence of these contested concepts, proponents of ANT propose to investigate these categories as performative effects that result from particular socio-material arrangements (Law, 2009; Pickering, 1995). Accepting this reading opens up avenues for studying power relations in the context of Development Studies, because as a non-representational approach ANT shifts the focus to practices or actions rather than structures (Dicken, Kelly, Olds, & Yeung, 2001). Rather than black-boxing objects and categories such as agency, power and society, describing these as contingent effects of joint action and abandoning distinctions, such as macro and micro, provides a meaningful extension of the theoretical repertoire available for research in the context of development. Conceptualising networks beyond a topological understanding and interpreting individuals, corporations and the like as a set of precarious relations also implies that “particular forms of domination are clearly reversible” (Callon et al., 1986, p. 229).

Noting how network approaches have been usefully applied to the study of migration as well as technological innovation, Meyer (2001, 2007) found that network approaches have not been applied in the context of the mobility of diasporic knowledge workers. Drawing on the analytical purchase of translation as discussed in the following section, points the way towards an analytical framework that allows to “investigate how actors
come to be enrolled into networks and the extent to which these enrolments disfigure, disrupt and deform other (valued) affiliations and identities” (Murdoch, 1997a, p. 750). Moreover, as Barry (2013b, p. 418) notes, insights from ANT may help to expose unexpected or unanticipated outcomes, which sits particularly well with the emerging nature of qualitative research as well as the ambivalences of diaspora networks.

3.2.1. Key insight translation and its significance for knowledge networks

The concept of translation, understood as the relentless circulation of ideas, practices and objects, can help to understand how diaspora networks operate and change over time. The notion of translation has been used and conceptualised in a variety of ways. Initially invoked by Michel Serres (1982), translation encompasses three different dimensions, and can be seen as a way to describe a form of exercise of power, the movement in and transformation of geographical space and lastly, the process of concurrent replication and differentiation (Barry, 2013b, pp. 414-415). In its most general sense, translation refers to the processes of establishing and sustaining links across space and over time, and may be viewed as a concept used to describe “displacement, drift, invention, mediation, the creation of a link that did not exist before and that to some extent modifies two elements or agents” (Latour, 1994, p. 32). What is important to note in the context of this thesis, is the notion of translation directs attention to the performances and activities that precede the formation of organisations, networks, companies and heterogeneous entities in general. In order for action to occur, and for an actor to emerge, diverse interests need to be aligned.

In the seminal illustration of translation, Callon (1986b) elaborated how translation is underpinned by the four distinct and overlapping moments, problematisation, interessement, enrolment and mobilisation that may occur sequentially or co-evolve simultaneously. Callon (1986b) showed how scientists attempted to translate a method for breeding scallops in France. The scientists discovered that scallops were successfully cultivated in Japan, and sought to introduce the particular Japanese technique of breeding scallops to the St Brieuc area in France where stocks of scallops were continuously declining, thereby threatening the livelihood options of fishermen. During the first moment, problematisation, the scientists defined the problem as well as all the actors that
were deemed relevant to successfully translate the Japanese breeding method. The second moment, *interessement*, refers to the activities of the translator, in this case the group of scientists who represented themselves as those that possess the necessary knowledge to stop the decline of scallops in St Brieuc, and to get other actors to accept and enact the roles to which they have been assigned.

The third moment, *enrolment*, involves building alliances and relationships to achieve alignment of all actors’ interests and may require “multilateral negotiations, trials of strength and tricks” (Callon, 1986b, p. 211). Finally, *mobilisation* typically signifies the successful completion of the network and involves that all enrolled actants are mobilised. In Callon’s (1986b) case successful mobilisation implied that the group of scientists assumed the role of overall representatives and effectively “become the head of several populations” (Callon, 1986b, p. 216). The end of a successful translation process is characterised by consensus between all enrolled entities where the scientists translated fishermen whose livelihood was threatened, scallops that needed to be cultivated in a particular way as seen in Japan, and the scientific community that would accept the achieved results as scientifically rigorous enough. However, this consensus is fragile, because it means that “the margins of manoeuvre of each entity will then be tightly delimited” (Callon, 1986b, p. 218).

This is where Callon’s (1986b) study is instructive as to how heterogeneous networks may dissolve, for in the case of St. Brieuc, the successful translation of a particular scallop cultivation technique failed, because eventually, several groups of actors refused to act in compliance with the role they were assigned to by the actual translators. The idea of failure and fragility is an important one, for it allows us to understand failure of network formation as a lack of alignment of interests. It also highlights the role of intermediaries such as manuals, standards and technological devices that transport ideas, concepts and conventions across time and places. Often however, and this is crucial for understanding network dissipation, intermediaries or immutable mobiles “distort, and modify the meaning or the elements they are supposed to carry” (Latour, 2005, p. 39). Immutable mobiles that circulate between the different components of a network for the purpose of stabilising the network may actually reconfigure the network and produce extensions in far-reaching ways. For example, recent work on the global proliferation of standardisation and certification practices explored how the implementation of forms of standardisation
through using the same standards continues to produce disparate, rather than similar results across countries and regions (Higgins & Larner, 2010).

Recent work has expanded the scope of translation by looking at the concrete, yet unforeseen effects of policies. Bliss (2013) illuminated how a single directive issued from the federal government of the USA constantly produced and reproduced the genomics of health and race disparities as a distinctive and powerful actor. Attending to the mediating effect of a particular directive that sought to govern racially and ethnically inclusive practices in the context of post-civil rights movement in the USA, Bliss (2013) showed how a machinery of institutions and alliances was set in motion that led to the use of racial classification systems and affirmative action policies. However, when the directive that was issued in the 1970s made its way into the field of genomic research, it problematised race in the context of public health such as racial health disparities, and genomics, in such a way that the directive effectively remade genomics into racial health disparities genomics (Bliss, 2013, p. 430).

As a result of this reconstruction, the meaning of both, the particular policy, as well as the social field the policy pertained to, genomic science, have been altered, repositioned and continue to be in flux. Indeed, the federal government’s directive acted as an obligatory passage point just as the scientists did in Callon’s (1986b) case study, in that the government directive problematised race and racial health disparities. Moreover, the creation of the new and distinctive research field of racial genomics, has not only led to the production of new alliances, but also, and more importantly, to the creation of new obligatory passage points. Indeed, the subsequent institutionalisation of racial health disparity genomics meant that genomics evolved into a powerful actor that engendered various institutions for public health genomics, federal research centres, funding preferences, and acted upon those. The compelling result is a curious twist where a policy-led genomics transformed into genomics-led policies where racial genomics has become the main actor and centre of power. This process remade the initial object, such as race-based disparities, and crucially, the various actors, coalitions, practices and politics that seek to produce accounts of race (Bliss, 2013, p. 439). The point to note is that translation is performative in the sense that practising translation may actually produce models of a particular situation, field or social world that were sought to be described (Müller, 2015).
Likewise, through a careful expansion of translation, Horowitz (2012) demonstrated how an indigenous protest group formed strategic alliances with a number of different actors, among them powerful multinational corporations (MNCs) from the extractive sector, and also a local government to advocate for environmental concerns in the context of Nickel mining in New Caledonia. Focusing on the different power dynamics that shape distinctive sets of relationships between NGOs, provincial governments, indigenous rights groups and law professionals, Horowitz (2012) showed how diverse interests of these actors were aligned and realigned to achieve seemingly common goals. The desire to generate change on the part of the indigenous group met the desire to continue to generate revenue on the part of the MNC and required both these seemingly disparate actors to collaborate and engage in concessions and compromises. However, while both actors pursued different, at times, even conflicting objectives they aligned their interests just enough to enable a fragile alliance. Pointing towards translation alignment, Horowitz (2012) concludes that seemingly powerless groups can generate power by rationalising and strategising the alliances they engage in with supposedly intrinsically powerful MNCs, and the alliances the indigenous groups chose to terminate, such as the alliance with an environmental NGO. Likewise, the coalition between the indigenous group and the MNC, as well as the power that derives from this particular coalition, is fragile, contingent and subject to ongoing contestation.

Both these studies draw on particular readings of translation as advanced by Callon (i.e.1986a, 1986b; 1999) and speak to the potential ability of translation processes to change, not only the networks within which translation occurs, but also the sites and spaces that are linked due to translation processes. This is of particular significance for conceptualising diaspora networks and their performative dimension in relation to development. Diaspora networks are primarily created for the purpose of generating economic development. Yet, analysing the trajectory of these networks through the lens of translation may yield insights about how the ongoing production of connections and the mediating effect of interconnections can lead to unintentional, and perhaps undesired effects, such as the coproduction of solidarities and place-specific struggles (Featherstone, 2007; Routledge, 2008). This is of relevance in the context of diaspora networks that were set up with the help of institutions that pursued a distinctive economic rationality.
Moreover, diaspora networks can manoeuvre themselves as ‘spokespersons’ and representatives for a range of institutional actors, discourses and diasporic groups, just as the scientists positioned themselves as overall spokespersons for multiple collectives in Callon’s (1986b) case study. As a result of these twists and turns, diaspora knowledge networks not only change the purpose for which they were designed in the first place, but also transform themselves through new practices, new actors and new discourses that link into them. Again, Bliss’ (2013) insights explained earlier in this chapter, provide cues that help to frame diaspora networks as actors that grew out of certain policy considerations, particularly in the context of commercial, as well as innovation based calculations, and evolved into a translational force with implications for policy-making sites. Similarly, following Horowitz’ (2012) inquiry is instructive for understanding that strategic alignment is often followed by disputes and bargains of actors internal to a heterogeneous network where mobilised discourses have agential power to reshape existing networks and instigate controversies. In the context of knowledge networks, this insight suggests that groups of actors strategically and temporarily align their interests compatible enough with the overall purpose that initially underpinned the creation of a heterogeneous network. The strategic alignment consequentially alters not only the appearance, but also the purpose and scope of knowledge networks through recursive effects that may lead to unintended effects, such as resistance and the repoliticisation of development as explained below.

3.2.2. Translating and aligning diaspora networks

The lesson to note from work inspired by Callon’s (1986b) seminal case study employing translation as a heuristic device for conceptualising diaspora knowledge networks, is that alliances may shift and become fragmented due to “weakly aligned networks” (Callon, 1991, p. 146). The coalitions that make up the network, organisation or diaspora group for that matter, are subject to contestation at any given moment. The fact that identities of actors are not only negotiated and inscribed, but also rejected, means that the role of network members may change throughout translation processes, which means that the network itself changes as new sets of relationships are established that change the shape and constituency of the diaspora network. The constant negotiations speak for the inherently contingent nature of translation processes in the context of diaspora networks.
and its institutional actors where new alliances are forged, existing partnerships with economic actors disintegrate, and translations are modified to render them strategically compatible with the narrative and objectives of other institutional allies and groups (Horowitz, 2012, p. 810). Translation helps to draw attention to how the initial purpose diaspora knowledge networks existed for, may change as their constituent groups engage in processes of dissidence and betrayal.

Using the analytical purchase from translation provides the necessary grip to understand how associations and collectives need to be made and remade, while “each actor is relatively unpredictable, because any translation is constantly being undone” (Callon, 1991, p. 152). Conceiving of translation as the process by which diasporic collectives are patched together involves attending to the compromises and contentions, which inevitably shape the network, its activities and ultimately the outcomes it produces. In the context of diaspora networks and their contribution to development in Chile, the notion of translation is particularly helpful for two reasons. First of all, in its formulaic meaning, translation as “an attempt to define and control others” is essentially a power struggle and the coalitions that it forges are inherently unstable (Horowitz, 2012, p. 809). The alignment of interests between different actors within diaspora networks is often just temporary, and the partnerships that exist between diasporic groups, individuals, discourses and institutions may dissolve at any point in time.

Conceptually speaking, the fragility of diaspora coalitions means that these networks are often provisional and divergent, “where norms are hard to establish and standards are frequently compromised” (Murdoch, 1998, p. 362). Hence, the economic imperatives that guided the efforts of multilateral organisations to create knowledge networks in the first place become contested and are subject to different interpretations. As such, these diaspora networks become sites of permanent struggle and negotiations between powerful actors such as World Bank officials, country-specific historic events, ingrained memories thereof and contemporary discourses as to what constitutes development. Empirically speaking, the provisional connections that exist, at least temporarily between different actors of a diaspora knowledge network such as distinct regional groups, high profile individuals, national agencies, multilateral institutions and the like, implies that the networks are spaces of on-going re-negotiation within which variable and more importantly revisable alliances are formed (Murdoch, 1998, p. 362). This is the result of
assertions that by linking into different sites and with different groups and actors, translation not only changes what is translated, but also who translates it (Czarniawska & Sevón, 2005, p. 10).

Secondly, and related to the point just mentioned, translation does not occur without resistance (Callon, 1986a, p. 26). Instead, the multiple actors that make up diaspora knowledge networks in general, and Chilean networks in particular, are often embroiled in competing political narratives and practices. Focusing on the unstable nature of diaspora networks and how the different actors’ particular interests align with that of the translating actor, demonstrates the ambivalence that signifies diaspora knowledge networks where “a social group enrolled and reduced to a few interests and/or a few needs, can define itself differently” (Callon, 1986a, p. 34).

By way of linking the insights of translation with the overriding focus of this thesis, it is important to understand that processes of translation change the constitution of diaspora networks in profound ways. To what extent the interest of particular actors within diaspora networks are aligned with one another’s, does not only determine how coalitions are formed, but also, and more importantly, how they dissolve and change. Focusing on processes of translation in the context of a Chilean diaspora knowledge network, provides the conceptual rationale to assess how the shape, constitution and as a result of that, the objectives of a distinct economic actor has been altered. While translation provides the conceptual frame to describe the shifts and changes diaspora networks can be subjected to, the next section provides the reasoning to interpret those shifts by outlining how a lack of translation alignment can lead to a reversal of what was considered a depoliticised space.

3.3. Depoliticised diasporas

Critical scholarship on development discourse has often demonstrated how development rhetoric and practice tend to depoliticise the inherently political nature of development (Büscher, 2010; Ferguson, 1990; Harriss, 2002; Hout & Robison, 2009). The purpose of this section is to map out how development initiatives in a highly dynamic and ambiguous field such as diaspora networks may not only be characterised by depoliticisation, but
also produce sites of resistance and contestation. By building on more nuanced readings of anti-politics, this section proposes a framework within which the politically performative role of diaspora networks can be imagined. Recent work on diaspora strategies claims that attempts to reel diasporic communities back into the realm of the state constitutes an act of containing and asserting control over groups residing outside the territorial bounds of the state (Turner & Kleist, 2013, p. 200). According to Turner and Kleist (2013), the effect of containing, controlling and perhaps silencing diasporas deprives them of their ability to challenge the socio-political order of things.

Likewise, following Ferguson’s (1990) assertions that development projects initiated by multi-lateral donor organisations inevitably and unequivocally lead to depoliticisation, the recent surge in diaspora programmes initiated by the World Bank and other donor institutions, seems to constitute a wave of pushing depoliticisation further into the realm of migration and development. This is compounded by accounts grounded in structural thinking, which argue that contemporary neoliberal hegemonic policy preferences gradually ooze out the intrinsically political questions of distribution of resources in the context of development (Büscher, 2010). Moreover, the current arrangement in the international development sector is characterised by an increasing focus on standardisation, institutionalism and managerialism. These practices of public management are driven by distinctive occupational groups with a particular set of technical skills and organisational expertise exercising power, and managing change via technocratic measurability matrices and performance targets (J. Clarke, Gewirtz, & McLaughlin, 2000, p. 8; Mowles, 2010, p. 152). Attempts to standardise, professionalise and manage the public sector, such as the development sector, implies that the production of compromises, managerial and technical arrangements, as well as the production of consensus removes the “properly political” from the public sphere (Swyngedouw, 2015, p. 138).

In the context of diasporas and their depoliticisation, research has shown how diaspora groups that are actively implicated in processes of national development, often consciously and strategically downplay their political leverage (Marabello, 2013, p. 217). Instead, diaspora strategies are often characterised by their entrepreneurial scope and implicit representation of development as economic growth and often fail to recognise and address more deeply layered social struggles. Indeed, given that most diaspora
initiatives are distinct elite-based programmes, they often tend to fall short of challenging the socio-political order (Mohan, 2008, p. 476). Rather, diaspora networks are often presented as acting in line with the political status quo of their home countries, eschewing explicit references to structural transformational change. However, and as discussed previously in the context of translation, diaspora networks are characterised by variation and flux, in that they become sites that are “fluid, interactional and unstable” (Murdoch, 1998, p. 362). This section proceeds by introducing Ferguson’s (1990) understanding of ‘anti-politics machine’. The second part proposes a reconceptualization of ‘anti-politics machine’ that builds on an accentuation of political, rather than politics, to offer a framework for assessing diaspora knowledge networks as political actors.

3.3.1 The (Anti)-politics of side effects

The notion of ‘anti-politics machine’ goes back to Ferguson’s (1990) landmark contribution that examined the results of a rural development project in Lesotho in southern Africa. The point of departure for probing the Lesotho project was not an evaluation of whether or not the project objectives as stipulated by donor agencies were achieved, but rather what unintentional side effects were generated. Drawing on Foucauldian insights of governmentality and particularly problematisation, Ferguson (1990) suggests that the development industry acts as a hegemonic apparatus that produces its very own discourse. The discursive practices produce concurrently a particular kind of knowledge of a certain situation or social object, and render it intelligible by generating a structure of knowledge around them. As Dean (2010, p. 38) suggests, these problematisations often rest on assumptions and “are made on particular regimes of practices of government, with particular techniques, language, grids of analysis and evaluation, forms of knowledge and expertise” that is typically associated with the role of foreign experts and consultants. Subsequent development projects are then planned and executed around this knowledge and its proposed technical solutions, echoing claims that discursive practices of international development, position themselves as fields of intelligence and expertise that exist entirely outside the country and people they describe (Mitchell, 2002, pp. 210-211). Yet, and as pointed out in the previous section, models, projects and theories to generate change often create the reality they purport to describe and are effectively performative. In the end, while development
interventions may often fail to achieve their objectives, they can produce a number of significant and instrumental, yet, unintended side effects.

Ferguson (1990) exemplified this point by highlighting how the development intervention in Lesotho failed to generate increased production of crops and a transformation of commercial livestock farming. However, becoming a development site meant that physical and logistical infrastructure, such as roads, a prison, a police station, an immigration office and other state service related infrastructure were built which consequently led to an expansion of state control and political policing over formerly isolated areas and people. The fact that this rural development project was co-constituent for the creation of an entirely new district administration in Lesotho is evident of the productive dimension of unintentional effects of development projects and the rolling out of bureaucratic state power.

For Ferguson (1990) himself, this is not to suggest that development interventions always have a deliberately hidden agenda that actively seeks to oppress a particular group of people. Unlike critical development writers such as Escobar (1995) who asserts that development rhetoric, planning and intervention are parts of an active and deliberate attempt to exercise hegemonic power and control over developing countries, Ferguson (1990, pp. 255-256) suggests that the vast majority of side effects are produced unintentionally. Rather, the development apparatus is locked in a colonising machine-like process of systematic suspension of “politics” from even the most sensitive political operations at the flick of a switch” (Ferguson & Lohmann, 1994, p. 180). The key idea that Ferguson (1990) sought to convey is that discursive and rationalising practices of the donor community and development industry fail to recognise the complex, inherently political and structural reasons that underpin the multiple dimensions of poverty. Yet, failure to recognise deeply ingrained political reasons for poverty leads to a technical framing of such problems, which ultimately lends itself to offering technical and “politically neutral” expert-led solutions (Ferguson, 1990, p. 66).

Similarly, Li (2007b) contends that The will to improve that guides development interventions is situated in the arena of forms of governing that seek to steer social interaction through disciplinary technologies. Development interventions rest on certain construction, stabilisation and representation of a situation as a problem in technical
terms. The process of representing an object as a problem and rendering it technical, proceeds by moments of identification, delimitation, dissection and correction of the problem, which allows the development industry to offer its technical solutions for innately political or distributional questions (Li, 2007b, pp. 123-155). As discussed in chapter two, analysing diaspora strategies through the lens of governmentality, allows for an interpretation of diaspora groups as actors in neoliberalising forms of development and indeed, the developmentalisation and responsibilisation of mobility more broadly. However, and as the remainder of this chapter outlines, the failure of a donor-induced project may indeed produce a number of intended as well as unintended processes, but unlike Ferguson’s (1990) case study, these unintentional effects can be highly political and constitutive for the emergence of sites of resistance.

Ferguson’s (1990) claims that effects such as the unintentional expansion of state control and controlling forms of bureaucracy has since been critiqued, developed further and deployed in different areas (e.g. Büscher, 2010; Chhotray, 2011; Huber & Joshi, 2015). For instance, rather than seeing depoliticisation as an unplanned side effect, Büscher (2010, p. 33) argues for understanding the framing of development planning and intervention in non-political ways, as part of a systematic strategy that works actively towards reconstituting the neoliberal political economy within which contemporary development is embedded. Likewise, Li (2007a) suggests that practices of anti-politics are not necessarily one-dimensional exercises of power in which donor agencies, or state institutions exercise forms of governance and communities are passive recipients. Instead, local communities are often complicit and co-constituents of diverse forms of anti-politics as they engage in compromises that may close down some avenues of resistance while, at the same time, open up others (Li, 2007a, p. 279). The more nuanced reading of anti-politics and governance suggests that development practices and related discursive imaginaries are not only imposed, but are actively co-produced by those that purportedly benefit from development projects (Doolittle, 2006).

3.3.2. Revisiting the ‘anti-politics machine’

The reading of diaspora-induced development as a form of ‘anti-politics’ can generate productive insights as to how discursive practices and the construction of a particular kind
of knowledge continues to shape development thinking and practice. As discussed in the previous chapter, diaspora-related policies have been analysed in the context of neoliberal governmentality and conceptualised as a form of rule and governance. Extending the notion of anti-politics in the context of neoliberalising processes and development, recent research has argued for assessing ‘anti-politics machine’ as a systematic and ideologically grounded political strategy (Büscher, 2010). However, Büscher’s (2010) interpretation rests on a particular reading of neoliberalism as a global hegemonic orthodoxy that proceeds across the globe attempting to “establish a world where all social and political dynamics are subjected to market dynamics” interpreting neoliberalism as “an ideology that favours particular modes of political conduct, such as anti-politics” (Büscher, 2010, p. 34).

Despite the insights those generalised and schematic interpretations of neoliberalism may have for discussions about the international political economy of development, critical and longstanding research has advanced conceptualisations that question the monolithic character of neoliberalism and resulting totalising accounts of the effects it produces (Brenner, Peck, & Theodore, 2010; Larner, 2003; Ong, 2007; Peck, 2004; Springer, 2010). Instead of interpreting neoliberalism as the hegemonic order of today that produces the same socio-political transformations everywhere it goes, critical scholarship asserts how neoliberal practices and outcomes are “highly variable and particularized” (Peck, 2001, p. 451). This critical line of thinking cautions against singular representations of neoliberalism as an overwhelming, inevitable and inexorable process or a unified set of policies (England & Ward, 2007, p. 256; Larner, 2003, p. 511; Ong, 2007, p. 7).

Instead, critical research about the contingent and contested enactment of neoliberal policies highlights neoliberalism’s ability to “constrain, condition, and constitute political change and institutional reform in far-reaching multifaceted ways” (Peck & Tickell, 2002, pp. 400-401). Emphasis here is on the multifaceted and poly-directional ways with which variegated and contradictory forms of neoliberalism constitute subjects, create various spaces and deploy multiple techniques (Larner, 2003, p. 509). Following this reading of neoliberal processes in the context of development, guides the framework within which to situate moments of repoliticisation. By building on established work that conceptualises neoliberal transformation as a process of complex linkages between diverse realms of practice, enables a representation of neoliberalism as continuously
contested, composite, multiple in form, and producing results that are not predestined (Larner, 2000, p. 20). This understanding paves the way for recognising how contemporary neoliberal processes and practices may give rise to contingent and unexpected outcomes (Larner, 2000, p. 511; Ong, 2007, p. 5).

Applying this interpretation to moments of ‘anti-politics machine’ that depoliticises “everything it touches” (Ferguson, 1990, p. xv) in the context of contemporary diaspora-development assertions, enables a framework for interrogation into how development projects such as diaspora networks can be rearticulated as sites of multiple struggles that produce resistance and contestation. This entails avoiding to foreground essentialising notions of structure and instead looking at how interactions between situated circumstances and elements defy claims of determination by grand global structures (Ong, 2007, p. 5). By implication, “dichotomies” such as “global neoliberalism vs. local resistance” (Baiocchi et al., 2013, p. 324) can be overcome allowing for a relational understanding through which place-based struggles are not bound but spatially stretched, thereby reshaping connections and configuring new political identities, imaginaries and strategies (Featherstone, 2005). Prioritising neither technocratic, nor predetermined, interpretations of ‘anti-politics machine’ and its effects, an open reading that is situationally sensitive to the particular configurations of diaspora groups and attentive to their specific temporality is needed. Such a view is generative of insights that can highlight how diasporic collectives engage in articulations of dissent, which may ultimately reclaim grounds of contestation and consequentially repoliticise sites of development.

3.3.3. Carving out a space for the ‘political’

To understand how diaspora networks may be assessed in light of their political role that deviates from established ‘anti-politics machine’ work requires a definition as to what politics refers to. Two separately evolving bodies of literatures have generated important insights through interrogating how elements such as populism, science and technological rationalities have replaced proper politics (N. Clarke, 2011, p. 35). Work in the domain of post-politics is often post-foundational in character and focuses on the importance of dissensus that should signify the territory of the political (Mouffe, 2005; Rancière, 2004;
Žižek, 2006). Work associated with anti-politics is in its broadest sense concerned with the institutional and discursive arrangement that facilitates and frames political questions and engagements (Barry, 2002; Ferguson, 1990; Hindess, 1997). Both strands are neither internally coherent bodies of literature nor do they converge in defining what politics entails. Yet, despite some important differences, post-politics and anti-politics not only overlap enough to combine them for analytical purposes, but they also share the important commonality of asserting that “politics is not found everywhere” (N. Clarke, 2011, p. 37). In spite of the merits of the often evoked dictum that politics is everywhere, it is important to define and to delimit the concept of politics to ensure its analytical purchase.

A more differentiated reading suggests that politics, in its conventional understanding, refers to a repertoire of practices, particular sets of institutions and forms of knowledge that not only frame, but also contain contestation (Barry, 2002, p. 270). These sets of practices, institutions and knowledge typically form the foundation upon which certain forms of contestation that revolve around partisan, state and government-related activities are exercised (Barry, 2001, p. 194). The common understanding of politics attends to the “juridical, administrative, or regulative tasks of stabilizing moral and political subject, building consensus, maintaining agreements” (Honig, 1993, p. 2). As such, what is conventionally understood as politics is tied to institutional arrangements that seek to contain and moderate disputes.

Politics is in this sense, almost always and inevitably a form of anti-politics that seeks to narrow and restrict the propagation of political spaces and sites of controversies. For example, for parliamentary party politics to be successful, it is important for parties to employ anti-political strategies to maintain party discipline in order to avoid either party or governmental instability (Barry, 2001, pp. 195-207; Kam, 2009, pp. 7-10). Indeed, the notion of legislation, for instance, implicates the ability to contest political ideas to the extent that legislation regularises social interaction and, as such, removes actions from the realm of public contestation (Barry, 2002, p. 271). Taken as a whole, the intrinsic properties of politics are about moderating the space of dissensus and steer, as well as confine, expressions of contestations. What is conventionally referred to as politics then, always, and necessarily has followed the logic of anti-politics in that politics serves to limit the political, and produces fundamentally anti-political effects.
In contrast, what constitutes the political, is less defined by notions of codification and consolidation of certain forms of partisan contest within the machinery of government and state institutions, but rather an index of the site in which disagreement and contestation occur (Barry, 2002, p. 271). Unlike sites of partisan politics, the political sites in which expressions of dissent emerge are neither managed nor clearly defined, nor are they associated or linked to particular ideologies. Loosely following Agamben (1993), Barry (2001, pp. 175-196) notes that for effects to qualify as political, they must not be reducible to partisan politics. Instead, what constitutes the political is characterised by the absence of a particular political-ideological programme, and the absence of any identifiable political association within the organised and established framework of politics. For example, the Tianmen Square protests in China in 1989 constituted an instance of political action that could not be reduced to politics because the demonstrations at Tianmen Square were not characterised by a particular identity, but by fashioning a coalition signified by difference “without any representable conditions of belonging” (Agamben, 1993, p. 85). This means, the lack of a distinct political identity allowed for framing the Tianmen events as existing outside the accepted parameters of politics and as such, made it difficult for the Chinese government to denounce and belittle the protests as politics. Instead, the events were political because of their ability to defy and to undermine the logic of what is considered politics (Barry, 2001, p. 195). Both Barry’s and Agamben’s work largely resonates with interpretations of Hannah Arendt’s (1958) ideas about political action being “fundamentally non-routine because it involves attempting to bring into being new relations between people” (Whittle & Spicer, 2008, p. 620). The political then, exists outside and independent of what constitutes partisan deliberations as will be demonstrated throughout chapters seven, nine and ten.

This interpretation demands that political effects must not be reducible to questions of ideology, or forms of organised decision-making and codified forms of contestation occurring within the space of politics (Barry, 2001, p. 207). The notion of the political is rather characterised by situations of multiplicity and contestability and, as such, exceeds narratives of structure and determinism that are often invoked in the context of anti-politics accounts, such as Büscher’s (2010). Instead, attention to the situatedness of the political requires acknowledgement that political situations have “to be stitched together from fragments that are distributed across time and space” (Barry, 2012, p. 331). This reading of the political is not only useful for moving discussions about anti-politics
beyond accounts built on hegemonic assumptions grounded in political-economic thinking, but it is also a utility to understand how political situations do not simply exist everywhere, but “have to be made and remade” (Barry, 2012, p. 331). The analytical distinction between politics as a site of antagonistic and routine partisan deliberation, often designed to manage and contain dissensus, and political as an action that unlocks new terrains of contestation is an important one to understand the emergence of new political collectives, such as diaspora knowledge networks in the often depoliticised territory of development initiatives.

In the context of development and ‘anti-politics machine’, Huber and Joshi (2015) recently proposed a distinction between politics and political to capture more adequately how contemporary development politics is often a form of anti-politics driven by practices that prioritise consensus over contest and antagonism. Drawing on Swyngedouw (2011) and Mouffe (2005), the authors argue that the practice of anti-politics serves the interests of multiple stakeholders, and that governments are often actively pursuing anti-political strategies that are “politically disabling, and fundamentally undemocratic” (Huber & Joshi, 2015, p. 22). Huber and Joshi’s (2015) account provides new insight into the multiple effects the ‘anti-politics machine’ may generate, including the creation of new political spaces. However, their conceptualisation of political remains within the realm of democratic decision-making and is still situated in what Barry (2001) would define as a space within which deliberation over politics occurs along identifiable ideological and political lines. Yet, as suggested earlier, politics is necessarily a form of anti-politics, and by moving beyond the demarcation of politics, and beyond narratives of hegemonic practices, it is possible to explore the new sites of struggle that are produced and within which forms of political resistance emerge that sit outside the terrain of politics.

Moreover, Huber and Joshi’s (2015, p. 15) understanding of the political is problematic because it relies on an essentialising framing of political as being a “constituent dimension of human society”. Yet, as argued before, taking note of scholarship that is informed by a relational ontology of connections, cautions against preconceived ontological assumptions. Instead, it is important to recognise how the dimension of human society, the social, defies static inscriptions, because what constitutes the social is in itself composed of heterogeneous associations within which “the roles and functions of objects
and subjects, actors and intermediaries, humans and non-humans are attributed” (Murdoch, 1997b, p. 331). Following this interpretation makes it problematic to speak of the political as an innate and constitutive part of human society, but rather as an outcome that has to be continuously produced to exist.

While it is important to interrogate development interventions in relation to their anti-politics effects, the conceptual distinction between politics seen as the struggle between ideologies, partisan interests and institutions, and political as the site of dissent and contestation, opens up spaces to reconceptualise what anti-politics entails in the context of development and diaspora. This conceptualisation furthermore disrupts totalising narratives of the contemporary political economy that tends to represent neoliberal practices as a process that shuts down plurality and multiplicity (Büschler, 2010). Instead, the complex new associations that emerge as a result of diaspora-related development ventures may not be recalcitrant per se, but these diasporic collectives that are drawn together around a certain point of contention constitute sites of resistance and politicisation. The distinction between politics and the political is useful, for it allows the framing of activities that occur in the depoliticised realm of development as a political situation that is performed and practiced through various ways such as policy statements, news media bulletins, public demonstrations and the like (Barry, 2012, p. 331). The essence of these conceptual considerations is that diaspora groups that emerge as a result of a certain government strategy, or as an expression of a particular rationality, can generate political effects. Rather than assuming away their political potentialities by reference to the depoliticising effect of the dominant political-economic orthodoxy, attention to the form diasporic collectives are engendered as well as the sites “within which they circulate” (Barry, 2001, p. 208) and within which political action is enacted, renders their political activities visible.

By way of pulling the strings together between the conceptual insights of what constitutes the ‘political’ and diaspora knowledge networks to represent these actors as political actors, requires an analysis based on empirical work which is something the remainder of this thesis will deliver. What needs to be noted at this point is that diaspora knowledge networks are potent and dynamic actors and they are “political actors to be reckoned with” (Kleist, 2008a, p. 1137). As outlined earlier, the notion of project failure served as a starting point for Ferguson’s (1990) assessment of the side effects that occurred as
unplanned results of development interventions. In a similar vein, investigating the side effects that were generated as a result of a donor-induced diaspora network seeking to contribute to development will expose a range of political effects that will substantiate claims of repoliticisation in the context of a Chilean diaspora network.

Lastly, and importantly, political disputes are never singular isolated events and subsequent repoliticisations must not be treated as occurring in an atomistic fashion, but as elements of multiple political situations of which they form a part (Barry, 2013a, p. 6). This is particularly so in the context of a distinctive region such as the Southern Cone countries where the political, social and economic restructuring of the last 30 years has had profound effects on the social fabric of the region (López-Alves & Johnson, 2007, p. 16). The transformation that occurred as a result of radical state restructuring provoked a number of unexpected outcomes such as collective social action and mobilisation. Associated with this, South American countries have experienced a wider shift during which development as a whole became repoliticised (Roberts, 2009, pp. 1-2). It is merely consequential then, to provide a more systematic interrogation of how Chilean diaspora groups are entangled in diverse struggles and competing discourses. Particularly relevant in the context of this thesis, it is also important to note that the frequent demise or ongoing adaptation of established social and political actors is better understood than the rise of new actors (Roberts, 2009, p. 4). By framing the political as “enunciating dissent and rupture” (Swyngedouw, 2009, p. 605) the framework outlined in this chapter responds to the lack of understanding of the emergence of social actors in the context of diaspora networks and South America. As argued above, an account that is attentive to the situative, contingent and accidental arrangements that emerge out of translation processes can help to describe the rise of social and political actors.

Stringing together the insights from translation and a reconceptualization of ‘anti-politics machine’, it can be noted that diaspora groups and networks have been assessed from a number of perspectives that often take for granted either their existence or their potential to contribute to development. However, diaspora groups are not monolithic actors that continue to exist in purity, unchanged, and in line with a single rationality that underpinned its initial often economic configuration. Rather, they are sites within which competing groups, institutions and ideas circulate, that enable new formations to emerge. Indeed, the analytic lens of translation derived from post-structural approaches can help
to understand how network formations such as diasporic collectives emerge at particular points in time, remain malleable and continue to be shaped by, and respond to specific events and particular political moments in their home countries. Therefore, the continuous and ongoing production of diaspora networks that seek to establish global connections needs to be conceived of as a “labored, uncertain, and above all, contested process” (Whatmore & Thorne, 2008, p. 237).

A different frame of reference for assessing the political, invites for contesting the inevitability of depoliticisation in the context of diasporic initiatives and development. Extending insights from a particular interpretation of what constitutes political into the realm of diasporic activities and development, points towards a way for reconceptualising the depoliticising nature of development programmes. Moreover, framing activities such as diasporic mobilisation that emerge against the backdrop of a critical reading and extension of ‘anti-politics’, does not resolve ‘anti-political’ tendencies of the development industry, but does allow for a differentiated reading that highlights the repoliticising effects that are produced and negotiated in the new localities that emerge as a result of translation.

3.4. Summary

Translation and ‘anti politics machine’ are useful concepts for exploring the activities and changing associations of a diaspora knowledge network that was initiated through a World Bank programme. Partnering the analytical insights from translation with a reconceptualization of ‘anti-politics machine’, is instrumental for describing how diaspora knowledge networks host different alliances that continuously change. Whereas translation allows us to understand how heterogeneous entities such as networks evolve, perhaps dissolve and give way to new forms, a revised reading of ‘anti-politics machine’ permits insights into how, as the result of translation processes, new interstices are produced in which forms of resistance may be exercised.

This framing of diaspora networks, not only juxtaposes dominating structural ontologies in development that represent diaspora networks as emblematic manifestations of contemporary neoliberalising processes, but highlights the ability of diaspora formations
to generate spaces of controversy, resistance and contestation. Taken together, extending conceptual insights from ‘anti-politics machine’ through a careful consideration of the distinction between politics *versus* political and bringing them into dialogue with translation, constitutes a conceptual framework that allows to capture the highly dynamic, yet intrinsically ambivalent life of diaspora networks and the way they act in the context of development. Empirically deploying categories such as translation and anti-politics is a question of research design and strategy, which is discussed in chapter five that maps out the methodological, thematic and ethical choices that were made in order to follow and prioritise particular flows, interactions and activities over others.
Chapter Four: Mapping the historical context around the emergence of ChileGlobal

4.1. Introduction

The previous chapter has explained the conceptual framework that guides this thesis. Chapter three has furthermore made reference to shifts in the development trajectory of South American countries during which development has become repoliticised after decades of restructuring the state and implementing market reforms. This chapter maps out Chile’s development history with emphasis on how political events in Chile inevitably shaped the country’s trajectory. Work on Chile’s development path often rests on assessments of the role of the state as a development actor. Literature in this domain either highlights the strong and regulative developmental state that existed prior to the military coup 1973 (Caldentey, 2008; Sideri, 1979), or, enforced by the highly authoritarian Pinochet regime, an excessively trimmed down state in order to enable market rule as the main actor in Chile’s development aspirations. Yet, a narrow focus on abstract formations of either state, or market tends to obscure the role that relationships between groups of people and institutions in and around the state play in the context of Chile. Moreover, descriptive declarations such as strong state obfuscate the importance of policy-oriented networks and shifting alliances in the wider realm of the state and its institutions and their impact on restructuring national economies (Dezalay & Garth, 2002, p. 44). Hence, it is important to pay attention to the informal networks and coalitions that operate within the wider territory of policy-making sites.

This chapter introduces the ChileGlobal network by situating its emergence in the wider context of Chile’s political economy, and by pointing out the particular historical circumstances that enabled the network to emerge with the purpose of influencing public policy in Chile. The chapter proceeds in three parts. Part one introduces the ChileGlobal diaspora knowledge network that, in formal terms, grew out of the World Bank’s Knowledge for Development (K4D) programme. More importantly, however, the particular configuration of the network is the result of longstanding and evolving
relationships based on trust and friendship. As such, the highly integrated nature of the network and its orientation towards innovation policy, is intimately linked to ingrained practices of influencing public policy in Chile and, in principle, resembles what Teichman (2001, pp. 15-22) referred to as “international policy networks”. Part two demonstrates how ChileGlobal may be seen as a contemporary expression of Chile’s development strategy but, at the same time, the network is part of a chain of highly integrated international networks that were often linked to, but existed outside of state institutions. Part three of this chapter describes how the decisively depolitical nature of ChileGlobal contrasts with the politicised space of Chile’s historical diaspora by highlighting how depoliticisation and technocratisation processes were initiated under the dictatorship, and entrenched and consolidated throughout redemocratisation processes.

The initial configuration of the network has also been the result of shared values, views and evolving friendships between well-connected Chileans and representatives of multilateral institutions. This has important implications for understanding the creation of diaspora knowledge formations, not only as tightly intertwined with the broader social, economic and political changes in contemporary Chile, but also as expressions of historically grounded and ongoing relationships between certain groups of people, as well as between people and particular institutions. The inception of the ChileGlobal network is part of a continuum, tied to historical and country specific struggles and circumstances rather than merely a contemporary expression of a country’s development aspirations as the wider diaspora-development literature suggests.

4.2. Transitioning into the knowledge economy

For the past forty years, Chile’s national development strategy remained mostly focused on foreign investment and the expansion of export-oriented commodity markets such as copper and nitrate (Barton, 1998; Ffrench-Davis, 2010). Essentially imposed throughout the military dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet between 1973 and 1989, the Chilean economy was restructured from the state-led economic nationalism that dominated national development prior to the 1970s, to a radical form of economic liberalism informed by monetarism. The well-researched effects of the introduction of a puristic understanding of neoliberal policies under Pinochet led to rapid deindustrialisation,
decline of domestic manufacturing and the influx of international capital. As a result of restructuring, Chile experienced the rise of domestic conglomerates and the private sector in general, whose share in the domestic economy, rose from 11 percent in 1970 to 73 percent in 1980 (Foxley, 1986, p. 31).

After the return to democracy in 1990, Chile experienced a continuation of the development policies espoused by Pinochet when subsequently elected governments maintained the neoliberal principles of capital accumulation through export-led industries (Schatan, 2001; M. Taylor, 2010). Throughout the 1990s, the country attempted to diversify its trade partners through free trade agreements and participation in trade associations such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and becoming an associated member of Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR) (Bull, 2008). Additionally, Chile sought to diversify its export base away from relying on copper to increasing the export capacities of other non-mineral goods such as fruit, wine, forestry and fish. At the same time, however, free market policies and commodity price booms bolstered natural resource extraction as the back bone of Chile’s economy which, not only generated high environmental costs, but also effectively limited the diversification of the economy and the development of non-traditional goods and production capacities (Ffrench-Davis, 2014; Meller, 2008). Areas such as the development of human capital, innovation, research and development were secondary to trade and investment-related development and only recently gained traction as explained below.

The relevance of strengthening Chile’s innovation and knowledge-related sectors was recognised throughout the 1990s after the Canadian International Development Centre’s review of science, technology and innovation in Chile suggested that Chile was in need of a coherent policy framework to support science, research, technology and innovation related initiatives (Mullin, Adam, Halliwell, & Milligan, 2000). In addition, when asked to assess Chile’s development in the aftermath of the 1997 Asian crisis, Chile’s former Finance Minister Alejandro Foxley scathingly stated that “innovation is simply not there” (2005, p. 147). In short, a growing sense of urgency about moving from an export-oriented economy to a knowledge-based economy began to gradually gain momentum.
The Asian crisis of 1997 highlighted the harmful effects of Chile’s dependence on copper and the need to urgently strengthen non-traditional areas of economic growth. Moreover, in 1996 the US-American semi-conductor giant Intel was searching for a location to build an assembly plant and considered Chile to be an option for its US$ 300 million venture, but then decided to build the plant in the smaller Central American country Costa Rica, leaving high level officials in Chile feeling rebuffed and consternated about a high-tech company selecting Costa Rica over Chile (Nelson, 2007; Spar, 1998). These two events were magnified by discourses of the knowledge economy that dominated development considerations at the time. Taken together, these reasons led to the creation of the High Technology Investment Promotion Programme (HTAP) under Chile’s development agency CORFO in late 2000 (Nelson, 2007). CORFO’s investment programme was essentially another means to attract additional and non-traditional FDI in high technology industries, services and manufacturing areas to generate spill-over effects that would enhance domestic innovation.

4.2.1. Institutionalisation of innovation and knowledge-based development

Chile’s approach to innovation and so-called knowledge-based development changed significantly when a new institutional framework was created and the public-private entity Consejo Nacional de Innovación para la Competitividad (CNIC)\(^4\) was established in 2005 (E. Arnold, Malkin, Good, Clark, & Ruiz-Yaniz, 2009). The CNIC’s role was to advise the government on devising a policy and institutional framework to avoid duplication of innovation-related initiatives and to ensure policy coordination. Following the launch of the CNIC in 2005, the National Council for Innovation and Competitiveness initiated Chile’s first National Innovation Strategy in 2007 to explicitly foster innovation in areas such as science, human capital formation and the development, transfer and diffusion of technologies through the implementation of pro-innovation policies and the allocation of respective budgets. The institutional measures were complemented by public finance instruments such as a mining levy implemented in 2006 to generate revenues that were used to establish the Fondo de Innovación para la Competitividad (FIC) (IDB, 2010). The Innovation for Competitiveness Fund was supplemented by a

\(^4\) Consejo Nacional de Innovación para la Competitividad stands for National Council of Innovation for Competitiveness
fiscal measure that sought to incentivise the private sector in Chile to increase investment in Research and Development (R&D) by offering tax credits (Ruiz-Dana, 2007).

Chile’s state-led National Innovation System is structured around the Ministry of Education’s Comisión Nacional de Investigación Científica y Tecnológica (CONICYT) and the Ministry of the Economy’s development agency Corporación de Fomento de la Producción (CORFO) and its outlet Innova Chile. While CONICYT focuses on supporting knowledge production thus providing financial support to universities and other public and private research institutions, CORFO/Innova Chile specialises on subsidies and seed capital that aim to support innovation and competitiveness in small, as well as micro enterprises (Agosin, Larraín, & Grau, 2010, p. 11). The drive towards innovation was further accelerated by the economic crisis between 2008 and 2009 when global commodity prices slumped and once again highlighted Chile’s vulnerability to the volatility of primary commodity prices.5 Taken together, the establishment of the National Council of Innovation, increased funding due to the Innovation for Competitiveness Fund and tax credit for private sector investment in Research & Development (R&D) constitute the government’s approach away from resource and trade-driven development to knowledge-based development since 2005. Chile was making strides to enter the global knowledge economy.

4.2.2. Inception of ChileGlobal

In formal terms, the ChileGlobal network grew out of the World Bank’s Latin America focused Diaspora for Development programme that supported three diaspora pilot projects in Argentina, Mexico and Chile. The Diaspora for Development programme itself was part of the World Bank’s Knowledge for Development (K4D) initiative that promotes investment in innovation, education, knowledge and skills as drivers for economic growth. The World Bank’s K4D (1999) approach took shape in 1996 under

5 As part of enacting the Fiscal Responsibility Law in 2006, the Chilean government established the El Fondo de Estabilización Económica y Social (FEES) in 2007 to accumulate excess copper revenue in times of commodity price booms and uses the fund as a countercyclical instrument to ensure public expenditure (education, health and housing) and fiscal deficits can be financed when commodity prices plummet (Zahler, 2011). The fund and its predecessor the Copper Stabilisation Fund became important tools in avoiding the economic recession during the Asian crisis (1998/1999) and the recent economic crisis (2008/2009) when commodity prices fell and related revenue decreased.
then President James Wolfensohn and culminated with the release of the 1998/1999 World Development Report titled Knowledge for Development. The release of the report signified the World Bank’s ambition to move away from a pure lending institution to becoming “a central node in capturing and disseminating development knowledge” (Kramarz & Momani, 2013, p. 413). Knowledge, so the mantra went, was an important driver of economic growth and in order to effectively participate in the global knowledge economy and to achieve economic development, developing countries were encouraged to invest in information infrastructure, education, innovation systems and to provide institutional stability.

The inception of the ChileGlobal knowledge network is as much the product of previously existing, personalised networks as it is based on previous innovation related projects in Chile that received funding from the World Bank. Officially launched in 2005, the network’s impetus can be traced back to 2004 when the World Bank’s senior economist Yevgeny Kuznetsov commissioned the Chilean economist Molly Pollack to conduct a survey with overseas Chileans. The purpose of the survey was to generate insights into the conditions that highly skilled Chilean emigrants considered essential to either return to Chile, or to engage in collaborative work with institutional partners in Chile (Pollack, 2004). The small scale and informal survey was sent out to about 35 Chileans who were personally known to Molly Pollack, either because they were part of her professional economist networks, or they were part of a long-lasting personal network based on friendship ties.

Concurrently, Yevgeny Kuznetsov travelled across Latin America to advocate for a new set of industrial and innovation policies based on public-private partnerships. Yevgeny Kuznetsov was co-author of the World Bank’s K4D report (World Bank, 1999) and is affiliated with the Migration Policy Institute (MPI) based in Washington D.C., as well as he was research fellow and scholar at the Brookings Institute⁶. In November 2004, for instance, Kuznetsov and his colleague, the lead author of the 1998/1999 K4D report, Carl

⁶ Based in Washington D.C. the Brookings Institute is an influential think tank that is concerned with public policy in areas like foreign policy, governance, economics and development and ranks as the ‘top think tank in the world’ (McGann, 2016). The Migration Policy Institute (MPI) on the other hand is an offspring of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. The Carnegie Endowment for Peace is yet another influential Washington based think tank that is described as the first transnational think tank with satellite offices in other continents such as Europe and Asia, and ranks third on the list of top think tanks in the world (McGann, 2016, pp. 19-49).
J. Dahlman, gave a presentation to the Chilean Ministry of Finance in which both argued how private entrepreneurship and public-private partnerships are key to achieving sustained economic growth (Kuznetsov & Dahlman, 2004). That presentation made particular reference to designing industrial policies with a focus on diaspora groups and the assumed business networks and innovation clusters into which these groups are linked. Kuznetsov, was also a task force member of the Industrial Policies unit of the Initiative for Policy Dialogue (IPD), which was founded by economist Joseph Stiglitz in 2000. The IPD describes itself as:

a global network of leading economists, political scientists, and premier academic and policy centers … that helps countries analyze the complex policy trade-offs they face and provides them with access to a broader range of economic solutions that promote democratic, equitable and sustainable development (IPD, 2016, n.p.).

Connected to influential think tanks in Washington D.C., and primarily working on private sector development in the context of transition countries in Latin America and post-socialist countries in East Europe, Kuznetsov’s focus rested on promoting industrial and innovation related policies in transition economies.

As indicated earlier, the second person that was instrumental in the creation of ChileGlobal and steering the network in its infant years was Molly Pollack who, like Kuznetsov is a trained economist. The well-connected Molly Pollack began her economist career at the University of Chile in the 1960s, where she has worked as a research assistant for Ricardo Lagos who would eventually become Chile’s third post-authoritarian president in 2001. Continuing her post-graduate studies in the USA at the University of California, Pollack earned a PhD in economics from the private Georgetown University in Washington D.C. in 1974.

Molly Pollack has subsequently worked as a consultant for multi-lateral organisations such as the United Nation’s Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL), the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the World Bank, and has also been the director of Chile’s Centro Nacional de la Productividad y la Calidad (CBPC). She has researched, consulted and published on themes such as gender and poverty (Pollack, 1993, 1997), microenterprises
and poverty (Orlando & Pollack, 2000). Through her work at several international organisations Molly Pollack was not only domestically, but also internationally well-connected with close ties to business and company owners, financiers and economists, and an in-depth understanding of Chile’s institutional landscape.

In sum, the genesis of ChileGlobal was grounded in Yevgeny Kuznetsov’s proximity to Washington-based think tanks such as the MPI and Brookings Institute, and even more so, his professional affiliation to the World Bank as the funding and dissemination body for diaspora and innovation projects. Complementary to Kuznetsov’s vision around promoting industrial policy changes was Molly Pollack with a vast and long-standing network, relational capital, and institutional knowledge accumulated over the course of her own career trajectory across organisations such as CEPAL, ILO and the World Bank. More importantly, however, the relationship between the two key individuals Pollack and Kuznetsov was characterised by a degree of trust and understanding. Indeed, in one of the first interviews conducted for this thesis, Pollack referred to Kuznetsov as alma (soul) to express the close professional relationship, respect and trust between the two protagonists. Kuznetsov, on the other hand eventually entrusted Pollack to head the ChileGlobal network as director in 2005 knowing he could trust and rely on her due to their shared professional background and a well-developed sense of collegiality.

4.2.3. Institutional entanglement

When the ChileGlobal network was launched in January 2005, it was initially placed under the institutional parenthood of Fundación Chile. The organisation Fundación Chile was established in 1976 with the aim of conducting work centred on innovation, research and technology transfers (Meissner, 1988). Jointly created by the Chilean government and the USA-based telecommunication corporation International Telephone and Telegraph (ITT), the purpose of Fundación Chile was to help diversifying the Chilean economy by identifying and diffusing foreign technologies into the context of Chile. In its most simple form, the organisation can be described as a technology development agency that transfers, adapts and modifies foreign technology to the particular local conditions in Chile (Bell Jr & Juma, 2007, p. 303).
Early projects of transfers revolved primarily around food-processing industries and horticultural production technologies that saw Fundación Chile developing companies in novel markets and selling those companies to investors from the private sector. More recently the organisation’s focus shifted towards developing human capital in Chile through education programmes and is in line with the country’s overall national development strategy as explained earlier. Because of its instrumental role in technology transfers and business incubation, Fundación Chile was frequently lauded as a prime example for how knowledge intensive technology can be meaningfully translated into the context of developing countries’ needs (Aubert, 2005, p. 20; UN-Millennium-Project, 2005, p. 126).

What is important to note at this stage is that Fundación Chile was a key driver in Chile’s ambition to transition from a country that relies on copper extraction, to a country that adapts and initiates high technology, as well as entrepreneurial projects, to build up new production activities in Chile. Therefore, locating the ChileGlobal network under the umbrella of Fundación Chile seemed a logical and straightforward choice. The institutional capability of Fundación Chile, its dense network of domestic and international contacts to consultants and technology suppliers, as well as the institution’s increased focus on innovation and developing knowledge intensive sectors sat well with the objectives of ChileGlobal. Moreover, as a private institution Fundación Chile was not explicitly part of Chile’s national innovation strategy, and Yevgeny Kuznetsov repeatedly highlighted the institution as a role model and ideal formation to steer innovation in Chile (Kuznetsov, 2006b).

Funding for ChileGlobal was initially provided by Chile’s National Commission for Scientific and Technological Research CONICYT (Pollack, 2011, p. 217). CONICYT was able to fund ChileGlobal due to a World Bank loan agreement worth $US 25.3 Million (World Bank, 2007b). The so-called Science for the Knowledge Economy Project loan, led to the establishment of the Programa Bicentenario de Ciencia y Tecnológica (PBCT), the Bicentennial Programme for Science and Technology7, which was designed

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7 The trope Bicentennial is in reference to the processes that led to Chile’s factual independence 1818 after declaring independence from Spain in 1810 (Soto & Zurita, 2011). The commemoration of 200 years of independence involved a number of projects and activities, such as the symbolic naming of scholarships or funding programs such as the Bicentennial Programme for Science and Technology referred to above.
to improve Chile’s innovation system as well as to increase human capital in the science and technology sector. As expressed in Table 1 below, the Science for the Knowledge Economy was part of a series of loans and a direct follow-up on the Building Human Capital for the Global Knowledge Economy loan the World Bank committed to within the Millennium Science Initiative Project that was launched in 1999 (World Bank, 2004).

Table 1: World Bank funded innovation/knowledge related projects in Chile

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Funding</th>
<th>Amount</th>
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<tr>
<td>Chile Millennium Science Initiative</td>
<td>23.09.1999 – 30.09.2002</td>
<td>US$5.0 Million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science for the Knowledge Economy</td>
<td>03.11.2003 – 31.03.2007</td>
<td>US$25.3 Million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promoting Innovation and Competitiveness</td>
<td>15.08.2008 – 15.08.2010 (cancelled by the Piñera government)</td>
<td>US$30 Million</td>
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Source: Generated from World Bank (2016a)

The Promoting Innovation and Competitiveness loan that was agreed to under the Bachelet government, was cancelled by the incoming Piñera administration. The World Bank’s cancellation note states that the Piñera government “considers that the public sector should not play an active role in addressing market failures (or that there are substantial market failures) related to innovation and proceeded to request project cancellation” (World Bank, 2010, p. 8). In addition to cancelling World Bank funded projects the Piñera government also cancelled nine projects with a value of around $US 339 million that were funded by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB, 2014, pp. 1-4).

As Table 2 maps out more clearly, in 2007 after two years of funding from the World Bank and six-monthly evaluations, the Chilean government recognised ChileGlobal as a

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8 In terms of multilateral funding the IDB portfolio in Chile generally exceeds that of the World Bank. However, as the focus of this thesis is on an organisation that emerged out of a World Bank programme that is intimately linked with previous projects that received funding from the World Bank and to highlight the quasi-genealogical character of these projects, I have focused on projects that received funding from the World Bank, rather than the IDB.
project of public interest and provided government funding through Chile’s national development agency CORFO and its programme *Innova Chile* for the next three years. For example, according to the annual financial audit for 2011, the *ChileGlobal* network received about 39 Million Chilean Pesos, which equates to roughly $US 60 thousand, for project work, and exclusive of remuneration for *ChileGlobal* staff (KPMG, 2012).

Table 2: *ChileGlobal* funding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Funding source</th>
<th>Parent organisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005 – 2006</td>
<td>World Bank – channelled through CONICYT; Fundación Chile</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007 – 2009</td>
<td>CORFO – channelled through CORFO’s ‘Innova Chile’</td>
<td>Fundación Chile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010 – present</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Relations</td>
<td>Fundación Imagen de Chile</td>
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</table>

*Source: Adapted from Pollack (2011)*

As indicated earlier, both state entities, CONICYT, as well as CORFO/Innova Chile are part of the government’s strategy to foster innovation in Chile and to create the next Chilecon Valley (Economist, 2012). Essentially, *ChileGlobal* transitioned from the privately run institution Fundación Chile to the publicly funded state agency Fundación Imagen de Chile in 2009. As can be seen more clearly in Figure 1, there are three layers of connections. The personal level connects the network via its long-standing director to the World Bank’s Knowledge for Diaspora programme based on mutually compatible interest, trust and a degree of loyalty between Molly Pollack and Yevgeny Kuznetsov. The institutional layer describes the changing institutional arrangements within which *ChileGlobal* was embedded. The funding layer refers to the different funding mechanisms that supported *ChileGlobal*. As of 2010, five years after its inception, the network is directly and publicly funded through Fundación Imagen de Chile.
Figure 1: Three layers of connections

Source: compiled by author

Fundación Imagen de Chile was established in 2009 as Chile’s nation branding agency and signifies Chile’s first comprehensive attempt to launch an international country image campaign as part of a broader country positioning strategy (Labarca, 2008). The decision of the Chilean government to create an image strategy coincided with the period when Chile was increasingly negotiating and ratifying free trade agreements with European and Asian countries. Launching an encompassing campaign that promoted Chile’s country image, was primarily guided by the aim to take full advantage of the free trade agreements Chile had in place at the time (Labarca, 2008). Fundación Imagen de Chile has the mandate to coordinate the multi-sectoral activities of various state, non-state organisations and export-oriented stakeholders whose activities are considered relevant for Chile’s image abroad (Fundacion-Chile, 2012; OECD, 2015).
4.2.4. (In)formal meetings and institutional links

After launching the ChileGlobal network in 2005, the pilot stage years between 2005 and 2007 served to build trust and nurture commitment from selected network members through informal, yet important meetings in New York and California. Initially, meetings between the ChileGlobal director Molly Pollack and a small group of network members were also attended by representatives from national organisations such as Chile’s national development organisation CORFO, Chile’s National Commission for Scientific and Technological Research CONICYT and PRO Chile, Chile’s export promotion agency (World Bank, 2006). As first meetings under World Bank funding between 2005 and 2007 were invitation only events, ChileGlobal’s core constituency comprised a small and select group of mostly high profile executives and managers working in finance, information and communication industries in Canada and the USA.

A summary report (World Bank, 2006) of the second ChileGlobal meeting states that the telecommunication sector was represented by Samir Talhami, president and CEO of TKC Telecom, a globally active Canadian telecommunication service provider, and Salomon Suwalski, who served as president of Chile’s national telecom provider Entel under Allende, before escaping to Canada in 1973. The international investment banking sector was represented by Nicolás G. Schmidt, a global investment specialist and vice-president of J.P. Morgan; business consultancy expertise was represented by Alberto Harambour, a trained lawyer and president of ChileConsult, a Texas-based consultancy firm with a focus on oil and gas industry. The format of those meetings varied, but usually included workshops and presentations from representatives of institutions such as CONICYT, ProChile and ChileGlobal to present their institutions’ approach to transform Chile into a regional knowledge hub.

The meeting that was held at the four star Metropolitan Hotel in Central Manhattan at the end of June 2006, featured a presentation of CORFO’s vice president Carlos Álvarez who outlined Chile’s Innovation for Competitiveness agenda and the role CORFO aimed to play in funding enterprises (World Bank, 2006). During the same meeting, then president of CONICYT Vivian Heyl introduced CONICYT’s approach to innovation by highlighting plans to invest in the education sector and to increase public-private research ventures. Oscar Guillermo Garretón, at the time president of the private organisation
Fundación Chile, mapped out the goals of his institute in the pursuit of competiveness, such as improving innovation in service and production sectors as well as increasing general productivity in Chile. The commercial director of ProChile, Juan Somavia, on the other hand, gave an address during which he highlighted the importance of maintaining a positive country image and the role members of the diaspora can play in creating a good reputation for Chile. In different words, the institutional *Who’s Who* of Chile’s trade, export and marketing institutions, represented by either presidents, directors or vice presidents, lined up to demonstrate commitment and ambition towards steering Chile into the global knowledge economy and international competitiveness.

The overall agenda of the early *ChileGlobal* years was to draw on individual diaspora members, not only to generate the transfer of entrepreneurial knowledge and expertise to enter the knowledge economy, but to also foster institutional and policy dialogue to advance institutional and policy change in Chile. At the inaugural *ChileGlobal* meeting in June 2005, Kuznetsov (2005) clarified his vision that promoting particular members of the Chilean diaspora served the goal of opening up and reforming national innovation systems. In this sense, Chilean diasporans were seen as a source for “policy, technological and market intelligence” that could help to foster new technological alliances between Chile and the USA (Kuznetsov, 2005, p. 11). The new technological alliances between Chile and the USA are not without antecedents. Rather, they form part of a continuing ideational transfer between North America and Chile that exists in its various manifestations since at least the 1950s, as subsequent sections demonstrate.

In a follow up meeting one year later in Santiago de Chile in September 2007, Chilean executives from the US and Canada gathered to discuss and present their ideas about creating joint ventures and collaborative projects (*ChileGlobal*, 2007). The Santiago meeting was also attended by the network’s mastermind Yevgeny Kuznetsov who gave two presentations, one of which introduced the World Bank’s report *Building Knowledge Economies* (World Bank, 2007a), which provides a synthesis of the work, lessons and

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9 In 2005, Chile launched a country image campaign called ‘Chile, Sorprende Siempre’ which subsequently was translated into ‘Chile, All Ways Surprising’. This first stage of nation branding was still considered fragmented since it was executed by the international branding agency Interbrand, but largely coordinated collaboratively between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade through its export promotion agency ProChile, and the Ministry of Economy, Development and Tourism. Subsequently, more systematic nation branding strategies were executed by the 2009 established nation branding agency *Fundación Imagen de Chile* (Larrain, 2011).
research that emerged since the World Bank’s K4D initiative was launched with the publication of the World Bank’s Knowledge for Development report (1999). Kuznetsov’s (2007) second presentation was somewhat different and explicitly addressed the institutional conditions within which a knowledge network such as ChileGlobal can operate. In this particular presentation, Kuznetsov (2007) articulated concerns about the network’s lack of autonomy within Fundación Chile as the parent organisation was perceived as too restrictive and interfering.

Instead, Kuznetsov (2007, p. 22) suggested a more hands off and flexible approach that would allow the network to operate more independently within the institutional realm of Fundación Chile. Similar concerns were also stated by ChileGlobal’s director who asserted that in order to ensure ownership of the network by its members, the parent organisation is best advised to avoid interfering with network activities (Pollack, 2011, p. 220). Those early concerns draw attention to the tensions and the uneasy relationship that existed between the founders of the network, and the institutional setting within which ChileGlobal was positioned. Advocating for an institutional hands-off approach for a group that was assembled to open up Chile’s innovation-policy sector, also speaks to insights about how the spread of ideas about policy-making in the context of development, is increasingly mediated by lose formations of non-traditional policy actors. These non-traditional actors include networks of think tanks and people, which constitute a wider shift from government to governance. As a result of that shift, national policy venues, such as ministries and institutions, are not necessarily bypassed or disabled, but rather linked in complex new ways (Stone, 2013, p. 107).

The point to note is that the wider purpose of ChileGlobal was structured around an understanding of generating policy impulses that is grounded in informal groupings that often bridge the public-private divide as the second meeting with representatives from state institutions suggests. Diaspora networks were conceptualised as tools to shape policies, and as “a device to institutionalize exceptions: a way to sustain change” (Kuznetsov, 2006a, p. 17). The particular way to sustain change by way of influencing public policy through personalised networks is not novel in Chile, but a deeply ingrained pattern of practice as the next section shows. Promoting the rise of diaspora network communities occurred through workshops and conferences with economically successful Chileans in North America, World Bank economists with ties to policy research institutes,
and consultants such as Molly Pollack. Similar to policy communities, the personalistic networks are held together and supported by an emergent infrastructure of conferences, research institutes, think tanks and websites (Prince, 2009, p. 190). The second part of this thesis will trace the links and connections that held the ChileGlobal organisation in place.

4.3. Antecedents of policy networks and the rise of economic-technocratic consensus

Internationally, Chile initially attracted bilateral and multilateral funding in the post-World War II period from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the Alliance of Progress and was the first ever developing country to receive loans from the World Bank in 1948 (M. Taylor, 2006, p. 16). Concurrently, US-American agencies and private philanthropies such as the Ford Foundation and the Rockefeller Foundation began investing in reforming Chile’s education sector through scholarly and ideational investment (Valdés, 1995, pp. 83-85). The ensuing north-south transfer of knowledge and ‘modernity’ embedded in aid transfers was designed to produce a new technocracy of development to counter the growing momentum of communist ideas, Marxist tendencies and socialist movements in the region after the Cuban revolution under Castro (Dezalay & Garth, 2002, p. 65; Valdés, 1995, pp. 85-92). Thus, academic investment in Chile occurred against the backdrop of the Cold War and was supposed to rationalise and de-ideologise development economics in Latin America as a whole.

4.3.1. Domestic policy networks

Foreign ideational investment in the education sector occurred across the Social Sciences, but was particularly visible in the field of economics where investments of USA-based foundations and agencies for training economists at the University of Chile and the Catholic University throughout the 1960s exceeded two million US Dollars (Puryear, 1994, pp. 16-17; Valdés, 1995, pp. 185-189). Again, growing concerns of the US government and corporates about a shift towards the political left meant that aid became highly politicised and Chile received disproportionate economic, military and political
assistance in the 1960s making Chile the largest recipient of public and private US aid in Latin America (Kornbluh, 2013, p. 5; Petras & Morley, 1974, p. 23).

Of particular importance, is the well-documented exchange between the economics department of the University of Chicago and the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, the (Pontifical Catholic University of Chile in Santiago) that saw a group of about 30 Chilean students receive graduate training under the aegis of Arnold Harberger. The exchange programme between the two universities provided an opportunity for neoclassical theorists such as Arnold Harberger, Milton Friedman and Friedrich Hayek to internationalise the then rather marginalised ideas about neoliberal economic orthodoxy. By circulating key propositions of neoclassical economic policy preferences, the Chicago School of Economics challenged the primacy of Keynesianism in much of the industrialised world and that of Chicago’s disciplinary rivals at Ivy League universities Harvard and Yale. More importantly, the transfer of neoliberal orthodoxy also countered the dominance of policy advice that emerged from CEPAL, which provided credibility to the protectionist interventionism of the developmental state in Latin America at the time (Dezalay & Garth, 2002, p. 45; Valdés, 1995, pp. 93-95).

Imbued with core tenets of neoclassical orthodoxy, the group of Chilean Chicago graduates, touted as the Chicago Boys, returned to Chile to ‘liberate’ the country from what they perceived as the paralysis of national developmentalism. In the eyes of the Chicago Boys the concept of state intervention was equated with irrational and value-based decisions, inefficiency, corruption and ideology that had to be replaced with a neutral and ideology-free economic order to ensure personal, economic and political freedom. Thus, the Chicago-trained economists returned to Chile with a, sense of mission, the mission of the economist who, as the new philosopher, transmits science and modernism to society, teaches the layman to defend his freedom and multiply his options, and offers the politician the privilege of being guided by science in the adoption of his decisions on economic matters and of being able to rationalise his general vision of society (Valdés, 1995, p. 129).

Upon returning to Chile, the Chicago Boys were still largely excluded from policy circles in Chile under the Frei government of the late 1960s and, instead, built close relationships
with partners from the business sector such as the highly influential Edwards group. The Edwards group, led by patriarch Augustín Edwards, is a Chilean conglomerate with close ties to US-American economic groups, and publishes the politically right of centre newspaper *El Mercurio*\(^\text{10}\) (Fisher, 2009; Kornbluh, 2013). Other than cultivating relationships with private businesses such as the Edwards group, the Chicago Boys formed close ties with high level military generals and members of the corporatist, conservative Catholic Right, the *Gremialistas*. The alliance between Chicago Boys and business groups succeeded in creating private research centres such as the *Centro de Estudios Socio-Económicos* (CESEC) and utilised these in conjunction with the conservative newspaper *El Mercurio* as well as the trade association SOFOFA\(^\text{11}\) (*Sociedad de Fomento Fabril*) to disseminate insights and values from neoclassical economics to influence public opinion, and particularly Chile’s business and entrepreneurial community (Constable & Valenzuela, 1991, pp. 166-188; Valdés, 1995, pp. 225-228).

The time of Chicago-derived neoclassical economics came after the military coup at September 11\(^{th}\) 1973 when the military junta under Pinochet, itself lacking in economic training, drew on the expertise of the Chicago Boys to restructure the Chilean economy. The common denominator between conservative economic technocrats and the military was their contempt for parliamentary politics, the Chilean establishment and profound antipathies for socialist ideas (Dezalay & Garth, 2002, p. 50; Teichman, 2001, pp. 70-71). The proposition of the Chicago Boys to revive the economy by replacing politics with depoliticised, rationalised and technocratic decision-making patterns based on scientifically objective economic facts, sat well with “Pinochet’s missionary discourse of order against politics” (Montecinos, 1998a, p. 129). The ensuing cultivation of

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\(^{10}\) Recently declassified files from the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) archive suggest that Austin Edwards personally lobbied the US government under president Nixon to take action against the Allende administration, which resulted in the *El Mercurio Project* (Kornbluh, 2013, pp. 6-7, 91-94, 215-216). The *El Mercurio Project* refers to a clandestine sponsoring programme during which the US government funded the Edwards owned *El Mercurio* newspaper to publish anti-Allende editorials and articles effectively turning *El Mercurio* into the CIA’s “key outlet for a massive propaganda campaign” in Chile (Kornbluh, 2013, p. 91)

\(^{11}\) Incidentally, Carl J. Dahlman (2004a), the lead author of the 1998/1999 World Bank led a seminar at SOFOFA in March 2004 titled Challenge of the Knowledge Economy: Towards a Pragmatic Innovation Agenda. The content of this presentation stressed the government’s role in eliminating regulation to ensure private sector-led development can occur.
relationships within domestic policy networks based on personal trust, shared values and loyalty between Pinochet and a handful of Chicago trained economists that represented domestic conservative conglomerates, was the basis for implementing harsh market reform policies in Chile.

Returning to the notion of policy networks, the radical economic restructuring programme that took effect in 1975, was an already formulated plan that the Chicago Boys drafted throughout the turbulent pre-coup years while working in and with the private sector. In essence then, a “highly personalistic network leading policy change arose outside of the state, entered the state and carried policy reform forward” (Teichman, 2001, p. 94). While the planning and implementation of economic policies in the 1970s was largely a process driven by a domestic policy network, the debt crisis of the 1980s saw the rise of international policy networks as the next section explains.

4.3.2. International policy networks

The particular way the ChileGlobal network was created, and the purpose it appeared to serve, is not without its antecedents and, in principle, resembles what Teichman (2001, pp. 56-64) referred to as international policy networks. International policy networks are often characterised by the transnational links they maintain to individuals and representatives in private as well as public institutions and agencies abroad (Bull, 2008, p. 198). In the context of Chile, these networks are also characterised by their links to think tanks, a high degree of coherence based on occupational and personal relationships, and a commitment to influence public policy.

Similar to the domestic policy networks described earlier, the 1980s signify a period during which Chile’s development trajectory had been shaped by international policy networks, which became particularly visible during the debt crisis in the early 1980s. Unlike staff from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), representatives from the World Bank developed close relationships with high level officials at Chile’s main ministries and state institutions throughout debt negotiations during the Latin American debt crisis of the early 1980s (Teichman, 2001, pp. 56-64). This was partly because the second generation of foreign-trained Chilean economists heading Chile’s key institutions were
primarily graduates from economic faculties of Harvard, Yale and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), as were their debt interlocutors from the World Bank. Attending the same universities, faculties and even classes, meant that Chile’s state-elite often shared important common ground with official debt negotiators from the World Bank, which enabled both groups to form collaborative relationships not only based on shared values, academic experience and alumni connections, but also sympathies for distinctive policy reforms (Dezalay & Garth, 2002, pp. 45-47; Teichman, 2001, pp. 56-61).

The shared occupational background and technocratic ethos between economic debt negotiators working at the World Bank’s Latin America unit and state economists expedited the emergence of international policy networks that arose out of informal gatherings and official receptions throughout prolonged debt negotiations and solidified the domestic standing of USA-trained economists in Chile (Dezalay & Garth, 2002, pp. 46-47; Teichman, 2001, pp. 59-60). Even in instances where formal deliberation between debtor countries such as Chile and creditors were suspended, informal discussions continued within highly integrated personal networks (Teichman, 2001, p. 79). On-going dialogue, and interaction in areas where there were no loan intentions whatsoever, and consistent policy-dialogue fostered a culture during which close relationship between emissaries from the World Bank and domestic technocratic elites evolved and tightened.

Networks based on trust and friendship continued, even as Chile gained access to international capital markets and the World Bank subsequently lost its clout over Chile (Teichman, 2007, p. 565). The implications of policy networks in the context of Chile and diaspora networks revolve around understanding how highly integrated, often, informal personal networks in and around the state have become important actors in Chile’s development trajectories. The notion of international policy networks is furthermore important, as they highlight that diaspora relations to the home country do not emerge ad hoc as some research suggests (Gamlen, 2008b, p. 5). Instead, diaspora networks are part of long-standing and country-specific interaction and exchanges. Specifically, these exchanges of ideas in relation to policy preferences occur, not only between multilateral institutions and domestic organisations in Chile, but also between integrated networks of people such as officials from the World Bank and economists in Chile.
4.4. The distinct geographies of Chile and ChileGlobal

By outlining the context within which the ChileGlobal network emerged, this chapter has so far mapped out how domestic and international policy networks have continuously shaped Chile’s development policies. This chapter also teased out how the ChileGlobal network was ambitiously positioned as an actor to open up and reform Chile’s national innovation system. This section highlights how the Chilean diaspora not only differs from the ChileGlobal diaspora, but also that unlike the ChileGlobal diaspora, Chile’s traditional diaspora has been necessarily a site of partisan politics in opposition to the military regime of Augusto Pinochet. The distinction between Chile's traditional diaspora as a site of partisan politics, and the ChileGlobal diaspora as a site of economic activities is important for understanding the transformation of parts of the ChileGlobal community into a site of political mobilisation, rather than a site for partisan politics.

The coup d’état that was staged in Chile in 1973 and the ensuing violence against union members, members of the previous government, but also sympathisers and members of political grassroots organisations that were linked, or assumed to have links with the political Left triggered a mass exodus (Bolzman, 2011, p. 149). A large part of the Chilean diaspora initially sought exile in neighbouring countries in South America. This particular choice of exile was shaped by the belief that the military’s rule over the country was only temporary and Chile would soon return to civilian rule. Often however, the first place of exile transformed into a transitory space (Wright & Oñate, 2005, p. 59). For instance, a large contingent of Chileans left for countries such as Argentina and Peru, yet the changing political environment in Argentina where a right-wing military dictatorship seized power in 1976 meant that Argentinian exile was no longer a safe option for political exiles (Wright & Oñate, 1998, p. 43). Likewise, exile in Peru or other neighbouring countries, proved difficult as a general trend towards reactionary governments in the region, and the relatively moderate level of economic development in those countries, did not provide the political climate nor the economic capacity to take in larger groups of Chileans (Wright & Oñate, 1998, p. 92). For these reasons, Chilean exiles migrated to more than 200 countries around the globe (Pozo Artigas, 2006).

Although the estimated number of emigrants ranges between 200,000 (Wright & Zúñiga, 2007) and 1.8 million (Arrate, 1987) the number of at least 200,000 political exiles is the
more commonly cited, yet arguably conservative estimate (Stern, 2004; Wright & Oñate, 1998). Preferences for destinations were based on cultural affinities such as neighbouring countries, as explained above, and Spain after the death of Franco, political affinities such as the former Soviet Union and its allies, as well as personal affinities (Wright & Oñate, 1998; Wright & Zúñiga, 2007). Unlike transnational interactions that occur between two distinctive countries such as Cuba and the main destination of Cuban migrants Miami, USA, the dispersal of the Chilean diaspora was truly global, as there was no primary destination (Wright & Oñate, 1998, p. 91).

The majority of emigrants that constitute the Chilean diaspora left for political reasons. However, two major economic crises in Chile in the mid-1970s and the early 1980s sparked waves of emigration during which thousands of Chileans left their country for reasons of economic decline (Wright & Zúñiga, 2007). Moreover, the distinction between economically and politically motivated emigration is somewhat artificial because often Chileans considered to be regime critical were denied employment and had to leave the country for lack of employment options (Wright & Oñate, 2005). Far from being passive, the Chilean diaspora played an important role in lobbying host governments to impose sanctions such as trade bans on Chile to raise awareness regarding the violation of human rights under Pinochet (Simalchik, 2006; Sznajder & Roniger, 2007; Wright & Zúñiga, 2007).

The formation of solidarity committees was instrumental in establishing a resistance movement against the military junta, as formal domestic opposition in Chile did not emerge until 1982 due to repressive measures of the military. Essentially, Chilean diasporic spaces were often characterised by notions of resistance as “exiles reconstituted themselves as the political expression of those silenced in Chile” (Simalchik, 2006, p. 96). While, as of the late 1950s forced exile, diaspora formation and transnational communities became common denominators of Latin American countries, the Chilean diaspora was seen as distinct, in that Chilean exiles appeared to be much more politically active, hence more visible in their host countries, and the duration of their exile was longer in comparison to the exile of their Latin American neighbours (Wright, 1995, p. 360). The solidarity work and oppositional politics of the Chilean diaspora largely aligns with the framework of what constitutes politics as sketched out in chapter three of this thesis because the activities of the politically active part of Chile’s diaspora followed the logic
within which political and ideological antagonisms are organised. The brutal and overt attempts of the military regime to eradicate Chile’s political Left necessarily created a largely partisan diaspora that initially self-organised around a politics of alternative that was ideologically reflective of Chile’s socialist and communist parties (Hoopes, 2017). However, as will be shown in chapters seven and nine, the ChileGlobal diaspora does not identify with a particular partisan actor or ideological narrative. Instead, network members participated for reasons of professional gain, exchange of ideas or to obtain funding rather than to become embroiled in the struggles of partisan politics.

4.4.1. Mapping the ChileGlobal diaspora

The geography of the early ChileGlobal affiliated diaspora differed significantly from the geography of the dictatorship-induced diaspora as the vast majority of network members were based in North America. As Table 3 shows below, the initial focus of the network was explicitly on Canada and the USA, even though the USA accounted for only 1.3 percent of the Chilean diaspora in 1984 (Llambias-Wolff, 1993, p. 581). In general, and as the personal invitations and sponsorship of meetings underscores, membership to the network in its early days was based on considerably tight eligibility criteria as potential members “must be influential people, recognized by their sector, active and resident abroad” (Pollack, 2011, p. 219).

Table 3: Distribution of the Chilean diaspora and the ChileGlobal diaspora

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Distribution of Chilean diaspora in 1984</th>
<th>Distribution of ChileGlobal diaspora in 2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Llambias-Wolff (1993, p. 581)\textsuperscript{12} and Pollack (2011, p. 219)

\textsuperscript{12} Numbers for exiled Chileans and their destinations vary greatly. Pozo Artigas (2006, pp. 196-197) for instance uses statistics that suggest 76% of Chilean exiles lived in Latin America in 1980, whereas
The difference in size and distribution is partly owed to the pilot character that guided the early years and, to some degree, explains the contrasts between the globe wide distribution of the Chilean diaspora in comparison to the more regional distribution of the ChileGlobal diaspora as seen in Table 3. For instance, around 75% of ChileGlobal members resided in North America in 2011. On the other hand, and as suggested before, ChileGlobal was purposively positioned to create dynamic alliances between North America and Chile, rather than between Chile and its neighbouring countries.

Moreover, unlike Chile’s original diaspora, the ChileGlobal diaspora did not exhibit, or express a political identity of any kind. Indeed, as will become clear throughout chapter eight, motivation to join the network was often premised on the condition that the ChileGlobal organisation remained outside state structures, a preference that was not only shared by company owners, but also the two key individuals Molly Pollack and Yevgeny Kuznetsov, as mentioned earlier in this chapter. As such, the early ChileGlobal diaspora was not only a primarily non-partisan and non-state actor, but was deliberately positioned outside the structures of what constitutes partisan politics.

4.4.2. Tracing depoliticisation and technocratisation

Following a plebiscite in 1988, a broad alliance of centre-left parties, the co-called Concertación under presidential candidate Patricio Aylwin, won Chile’s first post-authoritarian presidential election in 1989. Strong electoral support for the Concertación alliance and an electoral system in preference to broad party coalitions ensured that this alliance won four subsequent elections effectively allowing for twenty years of uninterrupted centre-left rule between March 1990 and March 2010. The Concertación years saw a continuation of the development policies espoused by Pinochet, as subsequently elected post-dictatorial governments maintained the neoliberal principles of capital accumulation through export-led industries (Schatan, 2001; M. Taylor, 2010).

The first two Concertación administrations under Christian Democratic presidents Aylwin (1990 – 1994) and Frei (1994 – 2000) were characterised by consolidating

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according to Orellana-Vargas (2008, p. 205) around 63% of Chilean exiles found refuge in Latin America in 1980. The overall trend, however, in spite of the divergent numbers tends to be similar in relation to Chilean exiles in Latin America and North America.
democracy through a focus on maintaining political consensus, careful avoidance of open conflict and balancing notions of mistrust from the military and the business sectors. An important outcome of negotiating the transition era is that processes of redemocratisation have solidified the deactivation of Chile’s civil society, and the depoliticisation of Chile’s political society (Carlin, 2006; Joignant, 2003; Silva, 2004a, 2004b, 2006). While the cornerstone of the first Concertación governments firmly rested on managing and maintaining economic and political stability, there are four reasons that are typically cited as factors contributing to political demobilisation. First of all, the vivid memory of extreme political polarisation of the Allende years, combined with the concerted anti-politics outlawing political activity and creating a culture of fear, repression and persecution under Pinochet, generated a degree of lasting ‘political fatigue’ and apathy among those who lived through the violent events of pre- and post-coup Chile (Silva, 2006, p. 47).

Secondly, transitioning to democracy was a negotiated and pacted bargaining process that required concessions from both parties, the military-conservative and business elite complex on one side, and the broad centre-left parties coalition on the other side of the negotiations (Cavarozzi, 1992; Fuentes, 2013; Uggla, 2005). On the Concertación’s side, the terms of the transition were largely negotiated by party elites of the Socialist and Christian Democratic parties with a distinctive interest in limiting social mobilisation to avoid the hyper-politicisation of the early 1970s. To this end, demobilisation of popular sectors such as labour movement, and discouraging active protest was a conscious and calculated practice to ensure governability on the one hand, but also further eroded the ties between the base and party leaders on the other hand and contributed to political disillusion in Chile (Jocelyn-Holt Letelier, 1998; Posner, 1999, 2008).

Thirdly, while in exile and exposed to ideas of social democracy in Western Europe, leaders of the political Left, particularly of the Socialist party, underwent a process of renovation and political learning that fostered a politically pragmatic socialist culture bereft of revolutionary ideas and ideological conviction (Angell, 2007, pp. 11-13; Wright & Zúñiga, 2007, pp. 38-43). While the process of political renewal was important, as it eventually paved the way for a coalition with Christian Democrats and other centrist parties to form the Concertación alliance, it has also contributed to a party politics that is lacking in programmatic content (Huneeus, 2003). For instance, unlike elections of the
Allende period and the first democratic elections in 1989, elections in 1993 were “almost totally devoid of ideological debates” (Angell & Pollack, 1995, p. 106). Fourthly, similar to industrialised countries’ recent experiences, Chile experienced notions of civic disengagement, the personalisation of politics and a general decline in interest in parties or politics within the electorate (Tironi & Aguero, 1999, pp. 164-166). Indeed, the public interest in politics is often the lowest in countries that experience relative stable rates of economic growth such as Chile and Peru, with Chile being the country scoring the lowest level of interest in politics in Latin America (Latinobarómetro, 2013, pp. 37-38).

Paired with a focus on governability and high rates of economic growth that largely validated the Concertación’s economic policies, the four factors mentioned above were compounded by processes of professionalisation and modernisation of politics throughout the Concertación years. Professionalisation and rationalisation of politics entailed that policy proposals were increasingly sourced from research institutes and think tanks that were staffed with economists. In turn, that consolidated the role of economists in state bureaucracy, legislature and the executive as well as it opened another important channel of influence as economists gradually succeeded in occupying leadership roles in political parties of the left as well as the right (Montecinos, 1993, 1998b). Thus, the technocratisation, and rationalisation process of governance instituted by Pinochet, advanced into the party and bureaucracy apparatus of the leading parties under centre-left governments and permeates not only political parties, but “the entire administration ... and even social movements” (Montecinos, 2009, pp. 160-161). In light of the confrontational events of Chile’s past, economic expertise and associated values such as calculative practices, were viewed as measures to protect the country from specific forms of populism and practices of clientelism that led to polarisation and the breakdown of democracy (Montecinos, 1998b, p. 121). Consequently, redemocratisation processes in post-Pinochet Chile not only legitimised and entrenched technocratic solutions for questions of socio-economic development, but also solidified depoliticisation of politics and the civil society.

It would be erroneous and simplistic to conclude that Chile under Pinochet and after the return to democracy was a place free of resistance, contestation and dissent reigned by passivity. Furthermore, the intention of this section is not to idealise the radical political polarisation of the early 1970s or to suggest that the rich, complex and multifaceted
history of Chile can be conveniently compartmentalised into phases of depolitical and over-political absolutism. Even despite the brutal and systematic attempts of the military junta to eradicate electoral competition to coerce Chile into a market society, there were pockets of resistance with often creative forms of civil disobedience (Winn, 2004, pp. 11-12). Likewise, historically marginalised groups such as indigenous groups, women’s rights, and environmental groups, contest policies of the *Concertación* government and seek active participation and political representation (Carruthers & Rodríguez, 2009; P. Richards, 2006). Moreover, beginning in 2006 and coinciding with the centre-right government of President Piñera, Chile has experienced waves of student protests that culminated in the largest expression of protest and dissent over education policies since the return to democracy (Donoso, 2013; Villalobos-Ruminott, 2012). By 2011, the protests turned into a veritable grassroots, democracy-based social movement that demanded structural reforms in the education sector and challenged the then centre-right government of President Piñera in particular and Chile’s almost cult-like style of consensus-based politics in general (Muñoz-Lamartine, 2012; Sehnbruch & Donoso, 2011).

However, the point is to convey an understanding of the interrelated reasons that contributed to continuous and systematic depoliticisation of large parts of the civil and political society of what was considered to be one of the most politicised Latin American countries in the 1960s and early 1970s (Silva, 2006, p. 45). This is even more peculiar as the introduction of neoliberal state and market reforms has often led to populist backlashes in other parts of Latin America. The first generation of foreign-trained economists under Pinochet certainly technocratised, de-ideologised and depoliticised Chile’s society and large parts of the political fabric. Yet the post-authoritarian *Concertación* government continued, entrenched as well as legitimised these processes, and the role of technocratic experts at the risk of democratic accountability mechanism (van Dijk, 1998). Indeed, in line with the neoliberal ethos of the Chicago Boys the first post-dictatorial centre-left government under President Aylwin stressed that technical, rather than political skills, determine selection processes for governmental posts (Silva, 1991, p. 405).
What is important to remember is that Chile’s diaspora was inherently partisan, whereas the ChileGlobal diaspora was not only positioned outside the formal realm of what constitutes politics, but also had decisively

Overall, a political and policy culture within which technocratic and economic expertise was valued over others, dominated development-related planning in Chile at the time the ChileGlobal network was established. Moreover, the gradual depoliticisation of Chile’s political sphere and the systematic deactivation of civic life in Chile resonates comfortably with attempts of multilateral development institutions such as the World Bank to manage depoliticisation of the public sector (World Bank, 2000, p. 85), and the United Nations, which is complicit in organising workshops that explore the depoliticisation of civil service reform in the context of developing countries (UN, 2003). However, chapter three of this thesis has taken issue with Ferguson’s (1990) notion of the ‘anti-politics machine’ and provided a framework that allows for an interpretation of how donor-funded development initiatives do not inevitably and necessarily constitute instances of depoliticisation of development, but may lead to complex and ambivalent outcomes. These are claims that are empirically substantiated in chapter six.

4.5. Summary

This chapter is thematically structured around three different, yet interrelated sections that emphasise distinctive facets of Chile’s development trajectory and how they relate to the creation of ChileGlobal. Stringing together the different sections the chapter’s intention is to draw out how the diaspora knowledge network ChileGlobal reflects long and country-specific forms of interaction between distinct groups of people and institutions. While the creation of the ChileGlobal network may be seen as a particular contemporary expression of a Chile’s development strategy, it is also characterised by a continuation of Chile-specific and historically grown practices of often successful attempts to enact policy change through informal and integrated international networks.

The creation of ChileGlobal occurred furthermore within a narrative signified by the discursive and alluring forces that surrounded the so-called knowledge economy and a growing awareness of Chile’s high export concentration and vulnerability to volatilities
of commodity prices. World Bank officials with intimate knowledge of Chilean institutions and key individuals facilitated the placing of the network under institutional parenthood of Fundación Chile, an organisation that focused on the transfer of technology and had a history of incubating small enterprises in Chile. Moreover, in its early incarnation ChileGlobal’s objectives were not only articulated towards enhancing Chile’s innovation-related sectors, but the network was positioned with the intention to influence industrial policy. In this sense, the ChileGlobal network is representative of a country-specific tradition of initiating change through highly personalised networks based on trust, shared values and friendship.

For the purpose of this thesis it is important to understand that the Chilean diaspora has been a politicised space within which political agency was exercised to contest the dictatorial rule in Chile. In contrast, back in Chile a powerful coalition of business elites, conservative forces and the military pursued a project of radical economic liberalisation and depoliticisation of the political, as well as the civic sector. Perhaps counter-intuitively the structural weakening and deactivation of populist sectors and sources of protest such as the labour movement, was solidified after Chile’s return to democracy with an entrenched technocratic and consensus-based understanding of politics and national development grounded in the country’s traumatic experience dominating policy and political practices.

However, the institutional narrative of the ChileGlobal network changed in 2010 when the network was integrated into Chile’s newly created nation branding agency. Five years into its existence the institutional transition implied that the network was now publicly funded, as it was considered a project of national significance. This transition from a private organisation with a focus on innovation and competitiveness to a public organisation that aims to marketise Chile by managing the country’s image, created a number of effects. The multiple effects that were generated and what they mean in relation to the ChileGlobal’s contribution to development in Chile constitute the empirical and remaining part of this thesis. The next chapter therefore sketches out the methodological approach and considerations that inform this thesis.
Chapter Five: Research Methodology

5.1. Introduction

This chapter describes the methodological framework within which this thesis is anchored. Research on diasporic groups often grapples with the poly-sited, multigenerational and fluid character of diasporas and methodological questions as to how to investigate these in a time when the formation of social groupings is increasingly influenced by the internet (Alonso & Oiarzabal, 2010; Brinkerhoff, 2009). As a result, methodological considerations regarding the investigations of diaspora groups need to consider and reflect the implicit new ways of computer-mediated connectivity between dispersed groups. The sections that follow describe the methodological choices and methods that were employed throughout planning, enacting and writing this thesis.

5.2. Case study methodology

The methodological framework has followed a case study research design. Case study research can be either quantitative and positivist in nature following the ontological assumption that there is an absolute truth based on a set of generally applicable laws and regularities that can be objectively captured and quantified through observation (Gray, 2004, p. 18). This line of thinking assumes that knowledge exists independent of the researcher or observer and reality is knowable. In contrast to quantitative case study approaches, case study research that follows a qualitative logic is typically embedded in an interpretative framework that values the epistemology of the particular rather than the general (Stake, 2003, p. 145). This thesis follows the latter approach by employing a qualitative methodology and recognises that the complexity and messiness of the so-called real world can hardly be measured and grasped with an approach based on quantitative analysis. Instead, qualitative research practice stresses the need to understand the world composed of multiple realities and the social construction of these (Flick, Kardoff, Steinke, & Jenner, 2004).
5.2.1. Five guiding principles

As a methodological approach, rather than a method case study research, is a strategy that “involves an empirical investigation of a particular contemporary phenomenon within its real life context” (Robson, 2002, p. 179). Case study methodology consists of a number of distinctive tenets. Firstly, in keeping with the real life context and a qualitative research design, the strength of case studies derives from their ability to represent a phenomenon, activity or event from the perspective of participating individuals (Stark & Torrance, 2005). In the context of this thesis, the phenomenon of investigation is a particular expression of a Chilean diaspora knowledge network that operates transnationally with the objective to foster innovation and development in Chile. Drawing on the perspectives of a wide range of participating individuals, such as the founders of the network, current network participants and members that left the organisation, this thesis bundles the different, at times conflicting, perspectives to better understand the scope, opportunities and fallibilities of diaspora organisations and their contribution to development.

Secondly, research based on case study methodology entails a careful contextualisation and needs to recognise the socio-historical particularities in which case-derived activities, initiatives and actions occur (Ragin & Becker, 1992). Indeed, it is crucial to take note of the historical, political, social or economic context in which a case occurs because almost every case is “a complex entity located in a milieu or situation embedded in a number of contexts or backgrounds” (Stake, 2005, p. 449). Chapter four has responded to this criterion as it mapped out not only the broader socio-historical conditions and circumstances in Chile, but also the specific and particular relationships between key individuals and key institutions that enabled the network to emerge. Furthermore, chapter four highlights how the ChileGlobal network is not an atomistic entity, but follows a country-specific and deeply rooted tradition of enacting change through highly personalised networks and associations.

Thirdly, proponents of case study research often point out that case study research can be grouped according to whether priority is assigned to a single case or to multiple cases. Both research design options have in common that they can be conducted through the use of embedded units of analysis. For instance, a single case study may focus on a particular school to investigate how students achieve the given learning objectives. To accomplish
the research task, the investigator might choose to focus on two or three specific class rooms as units of analysis that are contextually and analytically embedded, and help to increase the overall rigour (Yin, 2014). The strategy of embedded units of analysis is particularly well-suited to be employed for diaspora-related research (Gamlen, 2012b). In the context of this study, embedded units of analysis are the diverse localised networks that are grouped under *ChileGlobal* as explained in more detail throughout the remainder of the thesis. Understanding and describing the rise of different regional and localised Chilean networks that have become constitutive of the actual case *ChileGlobal*, is important in order to understand the transformation of the network from an economic actor to a political actor.

Fourthly, single case studies are well suited to utilise where the research objective is of revelatory nature and the phenomenon of interest is difficult to access (Yin, 2012, p. 49). The focus of this thesis rests on a Chilean diaspora organisation of which little was known when this study commenced in late 2010. As explained in chapter four, the scarce information that was available comprised a few paragraphs that were reiterated throughout book chapters and a journal article and were essentially authored by the network’s master mind, senior economist Yevgeny Kuznetsov (e.g. 2008, 2006c). The work that was available typically advanced the generic narrative about how diaspora networks act as bridges to foreign markets to spur economic and technological development. An online search for *ChileGlobal* at the start of 2011 yielded only meagre insights, as the network’s web presence was limited to a sparse blog that was updated every fortnight or so with little information about the people involved, the scope of the organisation and its programmes.

If the goal of this thesis was to conduct an exploration of how *ChileGlobal* contributes to development in Chile, a single case study based on a concentrated inquiry and ethnographic methods appeared to be a sound methodological fit. Concentrated inquiries are strategies that dig into the particular nature of the entity of interest, its historical background, its physical setting, its economic, political and legal context and sources informants through which the entity of interest can be known (Stake, 2003, pp. 136-141). As stated before, the context within which the network emerged has been elucidated in chapter four. As for the revelatory nature of case study methodology, chapter six demonstrates how diaspora networks may counter claims of depoliticisation in the context
of development by revealing how *ChileGlobal* transformed into a site of repoliticisation. Revealing this insight was not only aided by the conceptual framework outlined in chapter three that prioritises a temporal and situationally informed frame of reference over structural and universalising accounts, but also through the deliberate methodological choice for embedded units of analysis.

Fifthly, selecting a good case study is often guided by negotiating questions about the opportunity to learn something new vis-à-vis a certain typicality of which the case is representative (Stake, 2003, p. 152). The decision to investigate *ChileGlobal* was as much about learning how diaspora knowledge networks operate in the context of South America, as it was about scrutinising and re-examining generalised claims about the depoliticising effects of development interventions. Moreover, case studies are generally in harmony with the three primary components that underlie any qualitative method, describing, understanding and explaining (Hamel, Dufour, & Fortin, 1993, p. 39). Jointly, the descriptive part aids in following the trajectory of *ChileGlobal*, while the interpretative part draws on the conceptual framework outlined in chapter three to understand how the network transformed into a site of repoliticisation. Finally, the explanatory part will outline the factors that impede and mediate knowledge flows from the diaspora to Chile.

### 5.2.2. Addressing generalisability

In spite of the overall usefulness of single case study methodology, there are some important limitations. It is often contended that qualitative case study research is constrained because, unlike its quantitative equivalent, qualitative research does not lend itself naturally to broad generalisations (Hedström, 2005, p. 101). However, case study research can be used to make inferences about other cases through transferability (Lincoln & Guba, 2000). Moreover, interpretative case studies tend to be generalisable in relation to theoretical propositions rather than populations at large, as the researcher aims for analytical generalisation instead of statistical generalisation. Analytical generalisation based on case study research and derived from empirical findings does not aim to represent a sample, but generates results that are generalisable to a theory about the phenomenon that is being investigated (Becker, 1990, p. 240). Results from case study
research are furthermore suitable to make contingent generalisations rooted in specific configurations of conditions such as situations, regions and times (George & Bennett, 2005, pp. 119-120). This means, for inferences to be generalised, the different cases need to share a set of conditions and qualifications. Thus, in order to generalise from a single case study, the careful and strategic choice of the case determines to what extent it may be possible to generalise from research findings (Flyvbjerg, 2006, pp. 224-228).

The choice to investigate the ChileGlobal network was deliberate and fits the notion of strategic choice as condition for contingent generalisability for the following reasons. The institutional model of ChileGlobal became subject of regional replication in 2010 when staff members from ChileGlobal and Fundación Chile were invited to consult on the reproduction of the legal-institutional model of the ChileGlobal network in the context of Honduras. As a result of this cooperation, the Honduras Global network was created with financial support from Germany’s national development agency Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) (Seddig & Cerrato Sabillón, 2014, p. 12). Likewise, the Costa Rican network, La Red de Talento Costarricense en el Extranjero (Red TICOTAL), was modelled after ChileGlobal, and an attempt from the governments of Uruguay and the Dominican Republic to connect with its highly skilled diaspora was influenced by insights from the ChileGlobal experience. The case of ChileGlobal set in motion a process of institutional and policy translations within the context of Latin America. Combining the specific observations about ChileGlobal advanced in this paragraph with general reflections about Chile’s historic role in the context of development policies as explained in chapter one, is suggestive enough to make causal inferences for diaspora knowledge networks that are similar in scope and strategic orientation.

Returning to the idea of contingent generalisability, findings from researching the ChileGlobal network are useful to make valid, albeit contingent generalisations about diaspora knowledge networks in the context of contemporary Latin America. Contingent generalisations rather than probabilistic broad-scale generalisations are particularly useful for development-related policies, because knowledge derived from well-specified conditional generalisations that are deliberately narrower in scope, are better suited for policy-making (George & Bennett, 2005, pp. 265-266). In the end, this sits well with claims that the purpose of generalisations from case study research is not rooted in making
universal proclamations, but to extend concepts, generate theory, and more importantly to draw specific implications (Walsham, 1995, p. 79).

The deliberations over contingent generalisability speak to the inherent value of qualitative research as an approach that prioritises rigor over replicable generalisability, and to explore a phenomenon in depth, rather than breath (Carlsen & Glenton, 2011). Overall, a case study methodology proved the right methodological fit because it allowed for understanding a ‘case’, such as the ChileGlobal network in its totality because of the flexible and open-ended technique of data collection and analysis from multiple sources (Grinnel, 1981; Yin, 2014). Data for this thesis has been sourced from libraries in Chile, World Bank repositories, Chilean emigrants, organisation reports, newsletters, previously published interviews with network members, census data, and participation in network events. Given the geographical dispersion of network members, this study also involves an element of multi-sited research in which data has been generated from different geographical locations as explained in section 5.4. below, which allowed for the production of rigorous results.

5.3. Ethical implications

As with most studies that involve human participants, the research proposal underwent an evaluation process to gain ethical approval from Massey University prior to leaving for the field and was judged low risk by the Massey University Human Ethics Committee (MUHEC). This approval was preceded by an internal review during which thesis supervisors and other researchers from Massey University’s Development Studies programme discussed potential ethical issues that may arise during fieldwork. Both the internal review and thinking through the application to MUHEC were important measures, because they sensibilised me for fieldwork-related considerations such as handling data, informed consent, privacy and confidentiality, which, in turn helped in my preparation to conduct and appreciate ethically sound fieldwork.

One of the main concerns in the context of research with human participants revolves around balancing competing principles, such as protecting the identities of research participants versus ensuring the integrity of data (Kaiser, 2009; Saunders, Kitzinger, &
Kitzinger, 2014). This thesis follows standard practices where through the use of pseudonyms, names of interview participants remain anonymous. Although some interview participants consented to having their real name used, I decided to choose pseudonyms as seen in Table 4 below to protect research participants from possible ramifications that may arise as a result of this thesis. In particular, the group of students and young professionals who were often at the beginning of their employment trajectory either in public institutions or private research centres appeared to be vulnerable to possible acts of retribution. Likewise, although most executives were financially independent and otherwise resourceful, which would make them perhaps less susceptible to possible repercussions, I opted for using pseudonyms.

The decision to use pseudonyms was furthermore based on the fact that this thesis has multiple audiences. For instance, one company owner based in the US explicitly consented to having his real name used if this thesis will be used for academic purposes only. The problem with that particular consent was that this thesis does not exclusively address an academic audience. Other than writing this thesis for academic purposes and hoping to disseminate findings through publications to an academic audience, other research participants constitute another audience. Indeed, the wider ChileGlobal community constitutes an audience and, in light of the often close relationship between the different members who often held different views, I considered the use of pseudonyms, as shown in Table 4 below, an important responsibility.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participant Group</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Key informants</strong></td>
<td>Blas Tomic, FldC</td>
<td>Molly Pollack, <em>ChileGlobal</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Students</strong></td>
<td>Adrián, Alfonso, Cristóbal, Emilio, Ernesto, Fernando, Jorge, Miguel, Santino, Vicente</td>
<td>Abril, Alexa, Jimena, Julia, Laura, Lola, Manuela, Sara, Silvana, Victoria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total: 20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Entrepreneurs, Consultants and Executives</strong></td>
<td>Carlos, company owner, David, CEO, Gabriel, retired senior executive, Juan, consultant, Lorenzo, senior manager, Manuel, senior executive, Pedro, senior executive, Rafael, CEO, Raúl, company owner</td>
<td>Adriana, consultant, Agnés (i), entrepreneur, Carla (i), entrepreneur, Natalia, business owner, Rafaela, consultant/entrepreneur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total: 14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Academics, Researchers and Scientists</strong></td>
<td>Alejandro (i), academic, Andrés, academic, Ignacio, researcher, Javier, researcher, Mateo, researcher, Pablo, scientist, Rodrigo, scientist, Silvio, senior researcher, Sergio, scientist</td>
<td>Antonia (i), researcher, Camila, researcher, Clarisa, researcher, Estefanía (i), researcher, Gabriela, post-doctoral researcher, Luciana, scientist, Sofía, post-doctoral researcher, Theresa, researcher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total: 17</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Administration, (public &amp; private institutions), Journalists</strong></td>
<td>Antonio (i), civil servant, Eduardo (i), civil servant, Francisco, DICOEX, Luis DICOEX, Paulo, FldC, Roberto (i), industrial engineer, Vicente, FldC, Yevgeny Kuznetsov, World Bank</td>
<td>Anna, FldC, Carolina, journalist, Catalina, FldC, Mariana, FldC, Paulina, IOM, Verónica, FldC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total: 14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Abbreviations**

DICOEX = Dirección para la Comunidad de Chilenos en el Exterior
FldC = Fundación Imagen de Chile
IOM = International Organisation for Migration
i = former intern

*Source: Author*
The protection of research participants’ identities has become the orthodox and normative directive in the sense that anonymity is often equated with ethically correct research. However, there is no universally accepted research ethic in relation to respondent anonymity and confidentiality (Grinyer, 2002; Marzano, 2007; Tilley & Woodthorpe, 2011). Anonymity and confidentiality are two related, yet distinct concepts. This thesis followed the understanding that anonymity is the way in which confidentiality is operationalised, for instance through anonymising data by assigning pseudonyms (Wiles et al., 2008, pp. 417-418). However, confidentiality often goes beyond anonymising data and extends to ensuring that no information from one study participant is discussed with, or disclosed to other research respondents and is thus, prone to be breached unintentionally in conversations with study participants (Wiles et al., 2008, p. 418). Pseudonyms were randomly chosen and applied to almost all research participants with the exception of three, as explained below. Rather than using technical codes, such as S1 for ‘student 1’, I chose to allocate random first names to all participants to retain the human element and to ensure equivalence between the different categories of research participants and key informants.

On some selected occasions I have decided to use the real names of participants. While the protection of research participants through the use of pseudonyms is one of the core imperatives in qualitative research, the decision to use real names is often grounded in the belief that research participants should retain ownership over their voice (Giordano, O'Reilly, Taylor, & Dogra, 2007; Kaiser, 2009), and is also considered a tool to ensure accountability (Duneier, 1999). In the context of this thesis, the use of real names was exercised with three participants when information was largely congruent with the institutional position particular research respondents represented, such as interviews with Blas Tomic, Molly Pollack and Yevgeny Kuznetsov.

5.4. Fieldwork

Fieldwork for this thesis occurred in two field sites, the physical field site Chile and the internet, which signifies a field site that offers an additional lens for understanding interaction and social practices (R. M. Lee, Fielding, & Blank, 2008). This section explains the rationale for recruiting study participants and briefly describes the locations
where interviews were conducted. The focus is primarily on explaining how participants were recruited, and how selection bias was dealt with and rectified.

5.4.1. Participant recruitment

In November 2011, I travelled to Chile to participate in the regional conference of the International Geographical Union (IGU) that was held at the Escuela Militar del General Bernardo O’Higgins in Santiago de Chile\textsuperscript{13}. The timing of this conference meant an opportunity to combine the presentation of tentative thesis-related considerations in front of an academic audience, with conducting a first set of interviews after the conference. As explained in chapter four, Molly Pollack’s central role as director of ChileGlobal and the fact that the early constituency of the network essentially consisted of Pollack’s long-time friends, colleagues and associates signalled her role as key informant. In addition to conceiving of her as a key informant with critical, in-depth knowledge, I considered her approval of conducting research on ChileGlobal vital, and a gate-opener that would lend legitimacy to further interview requests and ultimately lead to more interview referrals.

In our first meeting, Molly Pollack expressed support and agreement to the idea of writing a thesis about ChileGlobal, and offered support and assistance in contacting other network members. Conversations and interviews with Molly Pollack were typically held at her office in downtown Santiago and commonly lasted an hour, with one particular meeting stretching to three and a half hours of intense, personal and work-related discussions. Outside fieldwork-related encounters we maintained contact through email exchanges during which I have sent her chapter drafts and conference papers, and Molly in return has informed me of major changes such as her departure from ChileGlobal in 2015. Circulating conference papers and chapter drafts never elicited any response in the sense that Molly Pollack ever condoned, dismissed, challenged, or approved the content of the documents that were sent to her.

\textsuperscript{13} The regional conference in Santiago de Chile generated considerable and important criticism for the conference’s host was the Instituto Geográfico Militar and more importantly, the venue was the Escuela Militar del General Bernardo O’Higgins (Hirt & Palomino-Schalscha, 2011). The Military Academy gained notoriety for its implication in torture, violent interrogation and murder throughout the dictatorship.
As mentioned above, I considered Molly Pollack a gatekeeper that would help, not only legitimise interview queries in a highly personalised network, but also led to more interview referrals. The notion of gatekeeper is complex and multi-layered because, on the one hand, gatekeepers may generate greater acceptance within the wider population of interest. On the other hand, gatekeepers may just as well lead to selection bias based on the gatekeeper’s conscious or unconscious decision to exclude certain members of the population of interest, and interviewees might answer interview questions based on how they view the gatekeeper (Borovnik, Leslie, & Storey, 2014; Willis, 2006). Attempting to recruit study participants, I initially contacted network members by indicating, albeit not overplaying meetings with Molly Pollack so as to suggest a degree of familiarity. Again, this was due to insights that the original group of network members were essentially close friends and associates of Molly Pollack and the strategy of name dropping can be a tool conducive to enrolling participants such as company owners that otherwise would have been unlikely to respond to interview queries (Scheyvens, Scheyvens, & Murray, 2014, pp. 203-204). As one participant from West Virginia, USA who I contacted via email relayed to me during an interview, he contacted Molly Pollack prior to agreeing to be interviewed to inform her of my interview request and to verify my claims of past meetings with her.

By way of addressing the potential gatekeeper-inherent selection bias noted earlier, this thesis was aided by serendipity in the sense that about one year after the first field visit, Molly informed me that ChileGlobal was about to launch a password-protected, private digital platform in 2012 to decentralise the network. Approximately one month after this email exchange the digital platform, which in structure and application loosely resembles a social networking site, was launched at a ChileGlobal meeting in California. With the launch of this platform, I had access to the email addresses and profiles of around 500 network members that were registered at that time. To be included and to be granted access to the individuals that constitute the network was invaluable, as it essentially enabled a participant recruitment strategy independent of, and complementary to suggestions for participants from Molly Pollack. To this end, the digital platform allowed for snowballing research participants via multiple entry points ensuring a further reduction of selection bias and countering some of the limitations of snowball sampling.
Snowball sampling can be particularly helpful when little is known about the organisation or a group of people a study is based on (Kumar, 2011, p. 208). The advantage of snowball sampling furthermore derives from the fact that research respondents might know individuals that share certain characteristics relevant to the study, quite similar to interview referrals via gatekeepers. In the present study, Molly Pollack facilitated contact with other members she considered important as outlined before. Subsequent interviews based on Pollack’s referrals led to the recruitment of other interview participants, which again snowballed to generate a further set of interviews based on suggestions by study participants.

There are also risks involved in snowballing. Ultimately, and similar to potential selectivity bias when relying on gatekeepers, the respondents are in control of unintentionally, or arbitrarily including or excluding potential research participants which can lead to skewed study results (Overton & van Diermen, 2014, p. 45). There are also times that snowballing has its limits. In one instance, a research participant knew of another person who would be able to provide valuable information related to the interview questions. The research participant proposed to establish contact between the other potential interview respondent and myself. This contact, however, never materialised. It remains unknown as to whether my research respondent had actually contacted the potential participant or whether the potential participant was indeed contacted but chose not to participate.

Returning to the digital platform that allowed for a reduction of selectivity bias in the sense that I had unmediated access to network members, the accessibility of professional profiles from more than 500 different network members created a set of delicate ethical questions. Was it ethically sound to canvas research participants from inside a closed community of which it was safe to assume that network members did not subscribe to in order to be contacted for research-related interview requests? Amounting to a judgement call based on the nature of the individual research project, rather than a question that lends itself naturally to a generalising answer, I opted to apply a strategy of ethical “stretching or elasticity” (Rice, 2010, pp. 73-74). The notion of ethical stretching, or the elasticity of one’s positionality refers to how positionalities may be altered throughout the research process when the researcher’s status as outsider may be changed by a third party.
For instance, Rice (2010) notes how interviewing notoriously suspicious corporate elites was made realisable for him because he was introduced to corporate elites not necessarily as an academic, but as a researcher who is part of a broader project within which commercial activities of corporate actors were surveyed. This allowed for a representation of the researcher as partly insider, thereby stretching ethical elasticity without breaching ethical imperatives of research conduct by narrowing the distance between corporate elites and researcher. As such, Rice (2010) argues, elastic positionalities are seen as a component of a wider, and ethically sound field strategy (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). In the context of this study, Molly’s decision to ask me to become a part of the network signalled that I was positioned as a network member, ‘a friend of Chile’ and, by way of accepting the problematic binaries of insider versus outsider, technically an insider. Of course, that did not alter my positionality into a cultural insider, yet it stretched my field positionality and rendered my outsider status enough to the extent that I was considered a group insider, which allowed for approaching and accessing research participants in a transparent and ethical manner as a member of ChileGlobal.

The relationship between researcher and gatekeeper has often been simplistically presented as unidirectional, as a practical consideration and as static in character, rather than dynamic and evolving (Campbell, Gray, Meletis, Abbott, & Silver, 2006). For instance, conceptualisations of gatekeepers typically focus on the entry stage in which researchers seek access to hidden and hard to reach populations as it was the case in this thesis. The initial configuration of a foreign student seeking access to resources such as information, contacts and approval vis-à-vis the director and founding member of a reasonably closed diaspora organisation, resembles the entry stage of a field visit as expressed below in Figure 2 (Campbell et al., 2006).
Effectively relying on establishing good rapport with Molly Pollack to enact this research, the rather one-sided relationship soon evolved into a multi-layered relationship similar to Figure 2. For instance, during the second field visit in 2013, I was introduced to the newly appointed ChileGlobal web director Paulo who was employed to manage the digital platform that is explained in more detail in subsequent chapters. During the meeting Molly Pollack, Paulo and I discussed how the ChileGlobal community has increased in diversity and might require a different approach to manage the different interests and expectations of job-seeking Chilean PhD graduates returning to Chile, Chilean CEOs with distinctive business interests and a diverse group of researchers with their own particular interests.

While I was under no illusion that my contribution to that discussion would influence subsequent strategic decisions made by the team around Molly Pollack, I realised how
my initial role somewhat changed as I became more immersed in the network and familiar with the different currents, even to the extent that I was asked my opinion about how to navigate the different interests of network members. Moreover, being embedded in the network and conducting interviews with diverse member groups, thereby acquiring insights and access to different conduits of information and opinions, can enable a power shift in the sense that the researcher gains knowledge vis-à-vis the gatekeeper. As a result of this immersion, the power relationship somewhat changed as my position became similar to that of a key master as seen in Figure 2 unsettling static conceptualisations of an entry-seeking research student versus door-opening gatekeeper (Campbell et al., 2006).

Instead, the relationship between researcher and gatekeeper may be fluid and in a process of constant renegotiation reflecting that relationships between researcher and researched are as important as those that occur between researchers “and the network of actants, of which gatekeepers are a part” (Campbell et al., 2006, p. 118). Indeed, after conducting in-depth interviews with different stakeholders that often shared important details about the past of the network and the people that were steering its direction, I felt I had acquired intimate knowledge about the institution ChileGlobal and the multiple contours of its institutional embedding and the people that steered the direction.

Research participants were recruited from three broad groups that were largely representative of the professional profile of network members between 2011 and 2015 as they were company owners, senior level managers and entrepreneurs for group one, researchers and scientists for group two, and the third group consisted of students. Notwithstanding the often vast socio-economic differences between individual network members, for instance, between a business executive owning a private jet, holding two or three citizenships and a research student struggling to make ends meet, participants were largely a socially homophilic group, in the sense that they shared similar phenotypical attributes with a high level of formal and often foreign tertiary education. Hence they were typically at least bi-lingual and often spoke more than two languages.

As such, they were largely reflective of the majority of ChileGlobal members, which Camila, a public health researcher working in London described to me as a group of
people that shared a particular set of characteristics that made them identifiable as belonging to a certain social class in Chile:

Well if you look at the names, if you look at the people; the people that are in touch with this network, well, they usually have a rather similar background, which is quite different to other groups if you understand what I mean. To be part of ChileGlobal you have to have a good education, which means you are from a certain class level. Unlike other countries where you just have to work hard enough to achieve something, in Chile you have to have a good education or a good surname or very good connections and that’s a reality. So the people that belong to ChileGlobal are quite similar in that sense.

Camila, researcher, 2013

This quote is insofar important as it speaks to how ChileGlobal members self-identify and recognise their distinctive social status based on, for example family lineage, which is a well-documented marker for belonging to upper-class Chileans as opposed to having Amerindian lineage (Barandiarán, 2012).

In addition to members from the three occupational main groups that constitute the key group of research participants, interviews were also carried out with journalists and staff from ChileGlobal and Fundación Imagen de Chile. Other than formal interviews, informal conversations and email exchanges that would add texture and context were conducted with representatives from, Chile’s Ministry of Foreign Relations directorate for Chileans overseas, DICOEX (Dirección para las Comunidades Chilenas en el Exterior), staff at the Santiago office of IOM (International Organisation for Migration), World Bank personnel and Chilean researchers with thesis-related expertise based in universities and research institutes in Chile.

To ensure that data is representative, and selected interviewees constitute a representative sample, I have used a combination of purposive and snowball sampling as well as methodological and data triangulation. Methodological triangulation refers to generating data through different methods to enhance confirmation validity in qualitative case studies (Hyett, Kenny, & Dickson-Swift, 2014, p. 8). Unlike methodological triangulation, triangulation of data refers to combining data generated from multiple sources, at various times, from a variety of places and from different people (Jupp, 2006,
pp. 305-306). For example, in the context of this thesis I have sourced data and interview participants from different spatially dispersed networks in the UK, USA, Germany, Israel as mentioned in section 5.4.2. Other than generating data through interviews, I have drawn on data from meeting minutes, newsletters, bulletins, documents and previously published interviews. While triangulation has helped to generate a ‘representative’ sample, it is also important to acknowledge that “there are more than three sides to the world” (Hemming, 2008, p. 155). Rather than aiming for positivist derived ideas of validity and representativeness, the aim of triangulating sources and sample selection is to reveal the depth and complexity of the particular case that is under investigation (Gentles, Charles, Ploeg, & Ann McKibbon, 2015, p. 1782; Hemming, 2008, p. 155). Lastly, purposive sampling and snowball sampling are useful sampling strategies to achieve representativeness in qualitative research (Palinkas et al., 2015). The use of purposive sampling involves interviewing research participants with rich knowledge of, and experience with, the particular object of inquiry (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2010). In the context of this thesis I have applied purposive sampling strategies to get insights from the director of ChileGlobal, executives and company owners with a long standing affiliation with ChileGlobal all of which had intimate knowledge of the early years of the ChileGlobal organisation. In addition, I have purposefully selected research participants who were instrumental in setting up the diverse locally focused groups and networks to ensure representativeness, in so far as representativeness can be achieved in the context of qualitative research.

5.4.2. Interviews

About 63 formal, semi-structured interviews were carried out with research participants in Chile, UK, USA, Germany, Israel, Panama, Denmark, Australia, New Zealand through face-to-face interviews and the use of the conference software Skype. In addition to formal interviews, I conducted numerous informal conversations, chats, email correspondence with most of the 67 participants that helped to shape the research outcome. Fieldwork for this thesis occurred throughout two stints in Chile, a first three months visit between October 2011 and January 2012 and a second three months field visit between May and July 2013. Interviews with ChileGlobal members residing in the UK and Germany were carried out in May 2012 and July 2014 in combination with
attending conferences in London and Oxford and a family visit to Germany. The duration of interviews varied from 30 minutes to 3.5 hours. Interviews in Chile were carried out at various locations ranging from noisy cafés with trendy background music in downtown Santiago, to the formal, elevated and air-conditioned office space of Fundación Imagen de Chile overlooking Santiago, and the guarded privacy of a gated apartment complex in Viña del Mar near Valparaíso.

During my first field visit, Molly Pollack extended an invitation for a formal reception that was part of a design competition organised by ChileGlobal in conjunction with the Chilean president of an office supply company based in the US, as depicted in Figure 3 below.

Figure 3: Function at Fundación Imagen de Chile

*Source: Author (in the picture: Molly Pollack, Salomon Suwalsky, Blas Tomic)*

Attending this function provided an opportunity to informally liaise with network members, and exchange contact details that I followed up by emails to coordinate further interviews. Other than making contact, observing the different interactions such as press interviews, the particular mannerism and the accentuated respect with which Chilean
executives were courted, provided not only additional and contextual insights, but also a degree of humility.

In spite of using multiple entry points to rectify early selection bias because of snowballing, the very nature of researching a globally dispersed group of people constitutes a methodological challenge in the context of time and resource-restricted doctoral research, as it was simply unrealistic to do face-to-face interviews with Chileans in the US, Canada, different countries of Europe or Latin America. Given that the ChileGlobal network appeared to be biased in favour of Chileans living in North America, the distribution of research participants is loosely congruent with the distribution of network members and the overall distribution of Chileans overseas. For instance, according to the latest census there were about 10,280 Chileans living in Germany (DICOEX & INE, 2005). This constitutes roughly 1.20% of the overall Chilean diaspora. About six of the forty registered ChileGlobal members living in Germany were interviewed, which constitutes about 3.45% of the ChileGlobal population in Germany.

However, the dynamic shift in membership that began in 2008 after the network became part of Fundación Imagen de Chile, meant that membership outside of North America increased rapidly. This is elaborated on in more detail in the next chapter. While I have tried to accommodate the shift in membership by interviewing network members from European countries and also from Australia, there is still a noticeable lack of study participants that reside in Asian countries such as China and Japan. This may constitute a methodological weakness as it skews the representativeness of the interview data.

5.4.3. Language in the field

Growing up in Germany means that neither the English nor Spanish language is native to me. Hence, writing a thesis in a foreign language (English) is as much a challenge as conducting interviews in another foreign language (Spanish). As for the language barrier, I was confident to converse and to conduct interviews in Spanish and ascertained I was able to conduct fieldwork without the aid of a research assistant or interpreter. In 2005, I took an intensive Spanish course as part of my studies at the Latin America Institute (LAI) of the Freie Universität Berlin and I lived in Costa Rica for about a year. With the
exception of one interview, all interview participants voiced a preference for conducting the interview in English. However, often the first conversations and small talk occurred in Spanish, but when given the choice all research participants opted for interviews in English. The participant, Anna, who opted for conducting the interview in Spanish, was a trained journalist who was well versed in conducting interviews and who was working as a project manager for Fundación Imagen de Chile.

Anna’s English proficiency clearly exceeded the proficiency of other study participants, yet her demeanour during the interview was somewhat guarded and her responses seemed mostly careful and measured. The interview was carried out in the formal environment of Fundación Imagen de Chile’s boardroom. Choosing a more neutral setting outside the restraining office environment might have generated a more casual interview space in which Anna may not have felt like an employee and representative of Fundación Imagen de Chile which might have elicited less measured responses.

Speaking the language of respective research participants may allow a researcher to acquire insights into the native mentality of the group and communities that are at the centre of a research project (Davies, 2008; Malinowski, 1922). However, conversing in a foreign language is not free of pitfalls, because speaking the same language can lead to the illusion of understanding the context of what is said, when we actually do not understand (Agar, 1980, p. 102). I, nonetheless felt that my command of the Spanish language helped me to ‘break the ice’ in first conversations with respondents and contributed to building relationships with research participants. This rapport may have aided the depth of this study in the sense that it created an interactive mutuality through which learning and using another language can help “building up a set of shared cultural memories” (Davies, 2008, p. 88).

5.5. Invoking and navigating multiple positionalities

Qualitative research is often an “interactive process shaped by one’s personal history, biography, gender, social class, race and ethnicity and those of the people in the setting” (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011, p. 5). This implicates the conduct of empirical research in a number of ways as demographic markers of the researcher, events, histories and moments
Of biographical disruption are co-constitutive of the research process, not only throughout fieldwork, but also throughout the writing process. Drawing on the notion of cultural insider/outsider required critical reflections about my own multiple positionalities, such as European, white, male, affiliated with a New Zealand-based university, and the inscriptions these markers might have evoked.

As suggested earlier, those basic biographical facts failed to offer any immediate points of connection with the research topic or the people I was hoping to make contact with prior to conducting fieldwork. Therefore, interacting in the field and conducting interviews, I needed to ensure that my self-representation rendered me knowable to research participants beyond immediately accessible biological and social markers, or information that could be found elsewhere. For instance, one interview participant from Israel candidly relayed he googled my name and found my LinkedIn profile prior to agreeing to be interviewed. Reversing conventional conceptions of researcher versus researched, I became the temporary subject of someone else’s research. On these grounds, I chose to highlight different subject positions and foreground certain biographical aspects that added different layers and texture to the knowable subject of what might have been perceived as a ‘Western’ research student. Effectively, I attempted to invoke a range of shared positionalities (Mullings, 1999) depending on study participants and distinctive research moments as described below.

For example, representing myself as a research student, was generally met with a great degree of collegiality from participants who were either students themselves, or working in academia and knew about the occasional difficulties to enrol study participants. Some students voiced excitement about being able to help, while others commented on how difficult it must be to find Chileans wanting to be part of this study, an assessment that was far from being congruent with my experience throughout this study. At other times, however, negotiating the different invisible positionalities such as biographical ruptures, I chose to foreground particular biographical facets to create a degree of commonality without attempting to suggest sameness. For instance, highlighting a childhood spent under the dictatorial East German regime and the ensuing transition to a life within a liberal democracy sought to signal a sense of credibility, rather than ingratiation for interviewing Chileans that have experienced Chile’s authoritarian period.
The strategy of constructing a shared space was grounded in the belief that invoking a sense of shared positional space may assist, not only in gaining the trust of a population with whom I otherwise shared only a few commonalities with, but also in representing the views of research participants more faithfully (Mullings, 1999, p. 340). In reflecting on the application of constructing shared positionalities, study participants reacted with a mix ranging from insouciance to acknowledging similar experiences such as a comment from a Canada-based senior manager who commented on experiencing dispossession under the Allende government and repression under the Pinochet regime by saying, “Well, you know how it is” (Lorenzo, manager, 2013). Other study participants appeared indifferent towards my status as a student with a dual biography of authoritarianism and political liberalism, and were more interested in my personal motivation to study a topic that is related to Chile. For example, with the question “Tell me, why are you interested in Chile?” I was more often than anticipated quizzed about how someone with no immediate connection to the country would be interested in Chile. Occasionally, this question was phrased somewhat conditionally, almost like a test in the sense that participants waited to have the question answered satisfactorily before engaging in a deeper conversation.

The notion of constructing shared positionality in the context of self-representation, however, is also a treacherous and complex one that may raise a number of misconceptions and ethical dilemmas (Mullings, 1999, p. 347). For instance, throughout the first stage of fieldwork, I was particularly aiming to conduct interviews with a group of CEOs and senior executives and typically highlighted previous meetings with the network director Molly Pollack so as to invoke a sense of legitimacy and trustworthiness. While this strategy proved to have worked with associates and friends of Molly Pollack that were part of the initial core group, the strategy reached its limits when contacting research participants with different occupational and social backgrounds. For example, during one interview with a UK-based interviewee who was working in the public health system, I was asked whether I could use my affiliation with the directorate of ChileGlobal to secure employment for the interviewee. Taken by surprise, this unusual query prompted a reassessment of my self-representation in the written interview requests to determine what may have given the impression I was in the position to assist in employment and career-related prospects of interviewees.
Retrospectively, invoking a more neutral and impartial self-representation, which prioritises an interest in the organisation rather than a strategy that consist, of name dropping and mentioning meetings with staff at the directorate in Santiago de Chile, might have been a more sensible approach in this instance. Similarly, in hindsight knowledge that ChileGlobal’s transformation generated a mix of incandescent grievances among the first generation of network members and reflecting on interview requests that were left unanswered, it seems reasonable to assume that rather than aiming to construct a shared positionality, maintaining an identity as an impartial foreign outsider may have occasionally helped to enrol other study participants. Either way, the lesson for subsequently occurring interviews was to exercise more reticence about my meetings with the directors of ChileGlobal and Fundación Imagen de Chile to avoid any misunderstandings, and fallibilities on my part.

Research in a cross-cultural setting needs to acknowledge the existence of power relations that shape the conduct of research relationships. However, assuming innate and stable power differentials along neat and categorical inscriptions such as ‘powerful’, ‘western’, ‘researcher’ versus ‘powerless’, ‘southern’, ‘researched’ are problematic, because these dualisms fail to recognise the complex and dynamic processes during which identities and power relations are renegotiated in the field (Thapar-Ǧ Björkert & Henry, 2004). Likewise, the relationship between researcher and study participants was often not clearly cut along the classical binaries such as an inherently powerful, white, male research student versus powerless Chilean study participants. Often, it was quite to the contrary.

Engaging with study participants who were materially and relationally resourceful because they were the offspring of well-known politician families and close friends with billionaire then president Piñera positioned me not only as a cultural outsider, but also as someone with a vastly different social status. Indeed, in one interview prior to the presidential election that would determine the next Chilean president following president Piñera, a senior executive based in California made a remark that encapsulated both, the relational proximity of some network members with the two frontrunners for Chile’s presidency in 2013, and by implication the social distance that divided a good part of other study participants and myself by saying:
Michelle Bachelet studied medicine with my sister, she’s a friend of my sister and Evelyn Matthei, who is the other candidate, is a school mate of mine. We both attended the Deutsche Schule in Santiago so I know her very well. So whoever wins the election is kind of like family to me. It’s a small world.

Rafael, CEO, 2013

There was no doubt that some of the study participants occupied social positions, moved and socialised inside distinct elite type social, political and corporate networks that were clearly not accessible to me even if I had been a cultural insider. Indeed, a critical awareness about the limits of positionality and reflexivity is important to recognise that researchers can never completely reflect on their own position or the position of their interview partners (Rice, 2010, p. 73; Smith, 2006, p. 651).

Conducting fieldwork in the context of development is increasingly defined by its multi-positional and multi-sited nature where research “is designed around chains, paths, threads, conjunctions, or juxtapositions of locations” (Marcus, 1998, p. 90). This enmeshment that influences fieldwork holds true for researching the ChileGlobal collective where the absence of any natural association with Chile surely positioned me as a cultural outsider. Yet, invoking shared positionalities such as being a student, living overseas, and having experienced authoritarianism all of which the different categories of research participants could identify with, undermined neat insider/outsider categorisations and enabled the process of engaging diverse research participants in mostly genuine conversations. Not only was I navigating and negotiating, but I was also learning from the flaws of constructing nuanced positional spaces that are important to create research relationships based on mutual trust.

5.6. Online data

Against the backdrop of diaspora-inherent characteristics such as dispersal and fragmentation a significant amount of data for this study had to be generated through internet-based or online means. The internet signifies a field site that offers an additional lens for understanding interaction and social practices (R. M. Lee et al., 2008). Research on diaspora groups benefits from the emergence of social media and the internet, as they
enabled researchers on their quest for new sets of methodologies to recruit research participants through a variety of continuously emerging media such as Facebook or LinkedIn (Crush et al., 2012).

Before leaving for Santiago in November 2011, I had followed ChileGlobal and its virtual traces for almost two years to get a broad, albeit limited understanding of what constitutes the organisation in terms of its scope, and some of the activities to the extent they featured on the initial blog. Following and observing the online activities of an organisation, social network or online community is also referred to as lurking. More specifically, the ‘lurker’, unlike the ‘poster’ who actively interacts with the online community, is typically a non-actively participating observer of an online discussion community (Kozinets, 1999; Preece, Nonnecke, & Andrews, 2004; Schneider, Von Krogh, & Jäger, 2013). The motivation to lurk is often related to an epistemic curiosity of the individual lurker, the wish to acquire new knowledge by eliminating knowledge and information gaps as well as solving intellectual challenges (Schneider et al., 2013, p. 294).

In the context of this study, I took the position of an electronic eavesdropper (Clegg Smith, 2005) to get a contextual understanding of ChileGlobal, its activities and some of the members that featured on the blog of the organisation’s early years. However, while lurking helps to build trust and is essential for the researcher to get familiar with the online community, lurking as a method to collect data is highly problematic (Chen, Hall, & Johns, 2004). This points to a wider dilemma in internet-based research and questions as to where the boundary between public and private space is, and how researchers position themselves, as explained below. While the infrequent entries and updates on the ChileGlobal blog did not suffice for providing a comprehensive understanding of the various layers of relationships within the network, they nonetheless responded to an initial epistemic curiosity and contributed to a tentative understanding of the network. Lurking helped to identify key protagonists in Santiago, such as Molly Pollack and pointed to partner institutions such as the World Bank and Chilean agencies. To this end, the practice of lurking had explicit methodological implications as identifying institutional partners was an important step in delimiting the case study.

The blog www.chileglobal.org was abandoned around 2012 when, in addition to the closed digital platform a new and more elaborate ChileGlobal website was launched at
that offered more comprehensive information and regional contact
details. Similarly, communication and sharing information between ChileGlobal and the
‘outside world’ occurs through various modes and social media platforms such as a
Twitter account that was opened in March 2011, a Facebook account since July 2011, and
a LinkedIn networking group that was created in January 2012. The communication
between different participants that occurs on these public outlets provided a convenient
and tempting wealth of potential sources for information and data. However, the choice
to use communication from these outlets for a contextual understanding, rather than
sourcing data is grounded in three distinct reasons.

Firstly, ChileGlobal’s Twitter, Facebook, and LinkedIn accounts are managed by an
externally contracted and private service provider that works independent of the network.
Moreover, frequent checks on the Facebook account suggested that users came from a
wide spectrum, were often non-members and constituted a population group that was not
of primary interest for this thesis. Secondly, because of my upbringing under a regime
that employed mass surveillance through the collection of personal phone and written
communication, including an extensive archived file of information about my family, I
felt at unease and a moral, albeit not necessarily ethical obligation to abstain from utilising
personal communication that was ‘publicly’ available for instrumental reasons.

Thirdly, blog entries and updates on the ChileGlobal Facebook account may be seen as
occurring in the public domain that can be accessed by practically anyone with an internet
connection. Hence, a researcher could legally and ethically treat those postings as public
as if they occurred on television or radio (Kitchin, 2007). This position is also supported
by the Association of Internet Researchers (AoIR) who argues for a case-by-case
approach during which the researcher assesses whether “access to an online context is
publicly available, do members/participants/authors perceive the context to be public?
What considerations might be necessary to accommodate ‘perceived privacy’?” (AoIR,
Markham, & Buchanan, 2012, pp. 8-9). Similarly, the British Psychological Society
(BPS) cautions that some internet users “may consider their publicly accessible internet
activity to be private” (BPS, 2013, p. 7). Yet, there is long-standing concern that urges
researchers to be aware of the distinction between accessing and disseminating
interaction that occurs on those platforms (Fox & Roberts, 1999, p. 651).
Even if I assumed that network members were aware of the public nature of their postings on publicly accessible social media outlets, there would have still been the lingering question to determine which individual might have objections to having its contribution anonymised or “preferring to remain known and public in any published results” (AoIR et al., 2012, p. 10). More importantly were concerns about disseminating anonymised or non-anonymised postings through this PhD thesis. Depending on the context and occasion, it is ethically sound to treat postings that occur in non-membership websites such as Facebook sites of public institutions as occurring in the public domain (McLennan & Prinsen, 2014, pp. 84-85). However, ‘Western’ binaries of public and private are not coherent and clear cut, but often vary depending on culture, context and even nationality, and the divide should rather be seen as fluid and part of a continuum (Gal, 2002).

Following that line of reasoning, I interpreted that the notion of public sphere, in which *ChileGlobal* related online communication occurred, is neither a universally accepted concept, nor has it a utilitarian or monolithic meaning (McKee & Porter, 2009, p. 84). Quintessentially, whether or not to use publicly available information from social media outlets is also a question of context. Therefore, I reasoned that content from public online outlets such as blogs and Facebook accounts is not automatically public discourse and as such available for dissemination. As a result of this interpretation and the three reasons given above, I refrained from citing and quoting material from online communication that occurred on *ChileGlobal* blogs, Facebook or other related online means.

5.6.1. Trust and rapport online

An important challenge in computer-mediated interviews is to establish rapport and trust with the interviewee. In the conventional face to face scenario, researcher and research participant often have the chance to get to know each other in the field, and building rapport often relies on, and is aided by, visual cues (O'Connor, Madge, Shaw, & Wellens, 2008, p. 280). In the virtual field, however, the necessary trust and rapport between researcher and research participant often needs to be established through text-based communication in the form of emails that may include comprehensive information about the researcher such as hobbies, age and work to provide an introduction (Kivits, 2005). Similarly, self-disclosure and repeated interaction are often bread and butter of
establishing trust and rapport in an online environment that may lead to reciprocal disclosure of personal information (Illingworth, 2001; Joinson, McKenna, Postmes, & Reips, 2007; Mann & Stewart, 2000). On the other hand, highlighting perceived similarities should be nuanced, as they may not necessarily lead to establishing rapport, but may work detrimentally, thus alienating interviewer and interviewee (Abel, Locke, Condor, Gibson, & Stevenson, 2006).

In the context of this study, I found that applying a strategy of nuanced self-disclosure was key to building rapport and trust in the virtual world. Occasionally, and perhaps inevitably, conversations diverted to sharing personal experiences from the past in relation to how political transformation affected the lives of some of my research participants as well as my own. Moreover, the widely popular ex-president Michelle Bachelet\(^\text{14}\) whose father was assassinated under Pinochet, lived and studied in East-Berlin, Germany, which some of the respondents cheerfully noted during interviews. Similar to my experience in the physical field, I found that these imagined and existing commonalities were conducive to establishing a fruitful research relationship in an online environment before and during the interview process.

5.6.2. The interview process

There are distinct drawbacks of computer-mediated conversations, for instance, the inability to identify socio-economic markers such as ethnicity, gender and other elements that are accessed through visual cues (Hewson, 2007; Markham, 2008). Furthermore, the absence of body language or other non-verbal communication parameters are virtually impossible to capture if computer mediated conversations are exclusively auditory or asynchronous in nature. Applied to this study, the imperative to avoid inflicting any harm over research participants left me with the dilemma as to how to decide when any of my comments or questions would be perceived as offensive, intrusive or harmful in any other way, because the ability to notice visual or aural signs of distress and discomfort are radically reduced in online interviews (Evans, Elford, & Wiggins, 2008, p. 24).

\(^{14}\) Most of the interviews were conducted between 2011 and 2014, after Bachelet’s first presidency (2006-2010). Bachelet was elected again in March 2014.
For example, I conducted one Skype interview where the respondent chose to make himself not visible, while I was visible to him. This conversation lasted one and a half hours during which we discussed his contribution to *ChileGlobal* as well as biographical topics around his decisions to live and work overseas. While I felt that the nature of this interview was not particularly sensitive and could not possibly cause distress for my respondent, it would have been impossible for me to notice any visual cues of discomfort that the research participant displayed if he had felt uncomfortable. However, I hoped that the perceived disadvantage regarding the inability to read visual cues of distress, would be compensated by the advantage that interviewees can withdraw from online interviews comparatively easier and with less social cost as opposed to face-to-face interviews (Kraut et al., 2004; O’Connor et al., 2008).

Overall, the disembodied nature of conducting computer mediated interviews allowed for including the voices of *ChileGlobal* members that were living outside of Chile. In keeping with the ethical imperative to not inflict harm, computer-mediated interviews provide research participants a degree of control over the interview process as they may choose an interview location where they feel comfortable in a setting that is neutral and yet personal (Hanna, 2012). Using computer-mediated interviews is by no means a substitute for face-to-face interviews, but can usefully complement conventional interview approaches. Instead, computer and internet-mediated interviews enabled the provision of a multi-local and multi-vocal perspective that otherwise may not have been achievable in the context of this thesis.

### 5.7. Data analysis

Formal interviews were recorded and successively transcribed into word documents. As interviews were conducted over a period of three years, data analysis occurred concurrently, rather than consecutively. This particular approach to analysing primary data emanated from the context of Grounded Theory where data generation and analysis occurs simultaneously and in a process of constant comparative analysis (Birks & Mills, 2011; Glaser, 1978). Yet, the practice of concurrent data collection and analysis is not limited to the methodological approach of Grounded Theory, but is theoretically flexible enough to be employed as a credible method within case study research (Halaweh, 2012).
For instance, following the first field trip in late 2011, a first set of interviews underwent an initial coding process that revealed some tensions and ambiguities between and within the different membership groups, which gained in magnitude over the next couple of years, and ultimately changed the purpose of ChileGlobal as chapter six explains. Once again, the qualitative nature of this inquiry, and the particular coding technique proved useful for its potential to examine, not only the outcomes, but also the preceding processes that lead towards particular outcomes (O'Leary, 2004, p. 116), such as the transformation of the ChileGlobal network.

Subsequent interviews, either through skype or during the second stint of fieldwork followed a similar pattern of simultaneously generating and analysing data. The iterative and recursive approach of ongoing generation and analysing data, while going back and reviewing previously assigned codes led not only to more data intimacy, but also helped to uncover first patterns of associations and relationships between different passages of raw data. Ultimately, the process of generating and analysing data concurrently influenced the way the initial research question to this thesis changed shape and became narrower in focus over time. The coding of transcript and field notes data occurred largely emergent rather than \textit{a priori} and followed a descriptive rather than evaluative rationale in the sense that text segments were marked with words and phrases that were often used by interview participants, which helped to “break open the data” (Bazeley, 2013, p. 161). Descriptive coding soon evolved into a low order categorisation of codes to ease data management, which was followed by a higher order categorisation and analysis to identify major themes such as socio-cultural norms, institutional change and politicisation.

5.8. Summary

This chapter has outlined some of the primary methodological considerations and methods that guided this study. Research in the context of migration requires a holistic approach that connects migration trajectories with the broader contemporary social transformation that occur and how these are linked to global trends (Castles, 2012, p. 21). The choice for a single revelatory case study design was deliberate, a response to the qualitative nature of the research questions and informed by the little available knowledge.
about diaspora knowledge networks in the context of Latin America at the time. Moreover, drawing on embedded units of analysis, such as country-specific networks that are related to *ChileGlobal*, provided the necessary grip and insights into “different salient aspects” (Scholz & Tietje, 2002, p. 10) of the chosen case, *ChileGlobal*. Taken together, this methodological approach is suited to better understand the production of sites of resistance as will become clearer throughout the remaining chapters of the thesis.

Clearly, the use of online methods and the internet as a research tool is increasing across and throughout disciplines. Focusing on geographically dispersed research populations and involved costs to reach these, internet-mediated studies have proven to be valuable and complementary tools to conventional methods of fieldwork. Within the context of this thesis components such as online lurking were applied as a means to obtain information for purposes of contextualisation, while skype-mediated interviews were conducted because they often were the only feasible and affordable means to generate primary data in a study that is characterised by its poly-sited nature. In line with the conceptual framework that guided this study, this chapter has highlighted how a researcher’s multiple, often overlapping positionalities need to be considered.

This chapter pointed out how biographical events tend to shape the way research is being conducted and thus requires a critical and self-reflexive understanding of a researcher’s inhibitions and dispositions (England, 1994). In the case of this thesis, it meant that I refrained from using personal communications that occurred in publicly accessible online media for not only methodological, but also personal reasons. This does not necessarily constitute a methodological weakness, but rather a choice made based on the specific context of this thesis, Chile’s particular political trajectory and my own biography. Pointing out the methodological considerations means that this chapter concludes part one of this thesis that sought to sketch out how this thesis is conceptually and methodologically framed. The second part and the remaining chapters constitute the empirical component that present and discuss the findings of *ChileGlobal’s* contribution to development in Chile.
Chapter Six: A new institutional framework

6.1. Introduction

This chapter describes the institutional transformation of *ChileGlobal* and suggests that the transformation of *ChileGlobal* has been the result of overlapping and competing interpretations of how diaspora communities can contribute to national development in Chile. Tracing the institutional trajectory of the network, and providing an institutional layer of description, is important to understand why and how the network has been repositioned. As a consequence of the institutional changes and interpreting Chile’s diaspora as ambassadors and vehicles of promotion, the new framework within which *ChileGlobal* operated put effectively an end to the aspirations of the network’s founders and initial institutional supporters such as the World Bank’s Knowledge for Development (K4D) programme.

The key actor around introducing and promoting the idea of Diaspora for Development to Chile was the World Bank’s K4D programme, which advocated for a flexible and member focused arrangement of the network. The transformation of *ChileGlobal* can be attributed to the arrival of a new and powerful concept driven by private consultancy firms and supported by the government. The introduction and subsequent institutionalisation of nation branding and competitive identity problematised Chile’s national image and successfully linked the notion of a positive country image with national development. By extension then, ideas of economic development through nation branding also connected with diaspora communities, as they were interpreted as country ambassadors that supposedly represent a modern Chile based on success and progress. The first two sections of this chapter draw primarily on secondary sources while the remainder of this chapter presents results and analysis from primary sources to better understand how *ChileGlobal* was incorporated in Chile’s nation branding institution.
6.2. A new institutional framework and two policy initiatives

As pointed out in chapter four, the ChileGlobal network became part of Fundación Imagen de Chile in 2009 while prior to that the network operated under the auspices of Fundación Chile, an organisation dedicated to the transfer of technology. The creation of Fundación Imagen de Chile was part of a new institutional framework the Chilean government initiated in late 2007 under the first presidency of Michelle Bachelet. The new framework broadly revolved around the idea of nation branding as a tool for economic development and sought to create, promote and circulate a national country image to capitalise more effectively on Chile’s rapidly expanding free trade agreements (Labarca, 2008). As shown below, by becoming a part of Fundación Imagen de Chile, the ChileGlobal network entered a terrain within which the network connected with two distinctive policy initiatives that would shape the network in unexpected ways.

6.2.1. The effect of branding the country

The creation of Fundación Imagen de Chile in 2009 was the result of a long-standing attempt to shape international public opinion about Chile and to promote its exports by positioning Chile as a modern and progressive country. Attempts to forge a unique national image distinctive from its regional neighbours, have periodically surfaced since the Sevilla exposition in Spain in 1992 where the Chilean government sought to reposition post-authoritarian Chile by representing the country as politically, culturally and economically modern and advanced (Jiménez-Martínez, 2013; Korowin, 2010). In 2005, Chile’s export promotion agency ProChile launched the international branding campaign Chile: All Ways Surprising and two years later President Bachelet commissioned the Proyecto Chile-Imagen País the Chile Project- Country Image. The project began in 2007 and was mandated to coordinate the different activities of government institutions pertaining to international trade, commerce, tourism and exchange (MINREL, 2011). The idea was to ensure a more coherent approach in marketing Chile on the international stage and outside its traditional markets for products and services. In addition, the project’s objective revolved around generating a narrative that would foster and promote a national identity and a positive country image.
Around 2008, the Chilean government invited one of the leading international branding experts, British consultant Simon Anholt, to Chile to get more momentum behind the project and to advise the project’s directors on best practice and how to devise a more effective branding strategy for Chile (Larrain, 2011, p. 193). Following the invitation, Anholt travelled across the country to participate in a range of activities such as public seminars, surveys, workshops and focus groups that sought to stabilise the idea that Chile needed a new, progressive and forward-looking image. Moreover, the road trip around the country also served to convince the Chilean public of the need and benefit of a modern and progressive national identity and served to stabilise the legitimacy, not only of Anholt as a key driver and knowledgeable expert of sorts, but also of the problem around the international perception of Chile (Aronczyk, 2013, p. 137). The problematisation and framing of a particular situation as a deficit is still largely in line with ideas underpinning governmentality literature as the public recognition of a given problem and its solution, often generating public legitimacy, if not demand, is crucial for ensuring that the target population accepts and condones non-imposed interventions (Li, 2007a, p. 277). Furthermore, and this is crucial for understanding the following transition of ChileGlobal, through enlisting Simon Anholt the Chilean government accepted Anholt’s notion of competitive identity that underpins country image and reputation management which, as nation branding strategists claim, is critical for the economic, social, political and cultural progress of a country (Anholt, 2007, p. 9).

Effectively, Anholt succeeded in problematising Chile’s national image by not only enrolling, but also aligning the powerful actor of economic development with the notion of a competitive country identity. Linking the need for fostering a modern and new Chileanness (Larraín, 2011, p. 200) through creating a competitive national identity, served as a prerequisite for achieving Chile’s national development objectives of increased foreign investment. The new Chile was defined by progress and modernity rather than the violation of human rights and authoritarianism of its recent past. Through concerted public activities such as the seminars noted above, the idea of creating and circulating a national image of Chile was stabilised, gained currency, achieved public, as well as political legitimacy and eventually led to the institutionalisation of the image project by creating the publicly funded, yet privately held agency Fundación Imagen de Chile in May 2009.
Meanwhile, the institutional arrangement that saw ChileGlobal operating as a semi-independent programme under Fundación Chile came to an end as the purpose of Fundación Chile typically rests on technology transfer through incubation processes. As explained in chapter four, Fundación Chile’s main aim revolves around identifying, acquiring and adapting technologies, and the subsequent incorporation of private partners to create a new company around the acquired technology. Focusing on incubation processes meant that after nearly five years at Fundación Chile, the ChileGlobal network crossed the time threshold where it was no longer viable to operate under the institutional frame of Fundación Chile. The end of the institutional affiliation with Fundación Chile was also beckoning the end of ChileGlobal in the eyes of its ideational father. Noting that the management of Fundación Chile was increasingly focusing on incubation processes, Yevgeny Kuznetsov commented in an email to me on ChileGlobal’s relocation with a sense of resignation by stating that Fundación Chile have streamlined their operations to focus on revenue-generating activities and ChileGlobal does not pursue such activity (Yevgeny Kuznetsov, economist, 2012).

Shortly after its launch in mid-2009, Fundación Imagen de Chile, then headed by Juan Gabriel Valdés, considered the ChileGlobal network an asset for the purpose of raising Chile’s international profile as highly skilled and successful diaspora members were seen as devices that could provide international visibility. Linking nation branding with diaspora groups was supposed to support the notion of competitive identity as envisaged by branding consultants such as Anholt, and the Chilean government alike. Conceding that the incorporation of network members in Chile’s nation branding strategy was novel at the time, Verónica, a senior official at Fundación Imagen de Chile with intimate knowledge of the history, people and inner working of the ChileGlobal network recalled how the integration of diaspora member seemed a logical choice at the time:

All these members could be the ambassadors of the Chilean image. For me it was something new. But now that I’ve been at Fundación Imagen de Chile for two years I’m completely convinced that these Chileans are the best we can have to work with us here, more than any campaign on TV or print.

Verónica, senior official, 2011
Verónica’s quote highlights how network members were interpreted as vital image resources. Verónica’s quote is significant as it demonstrates a shift in how the ChileGlobal community was seen. The interpretation of Chilean expatriates as country ambassadors was a distinct deviation from the original idea that underpinned the formation of the network where members of the diaspora were sourced for their expertise in key technology areas. Indeed, the mere representational purpose of diaspora members was rather anathema to the more active and transformational potential diasporas groups were assumed to disposition, as envisioned by key proponents such as World Bank economist Yevgeny Kuznetsov as seen in chapter four.

What is important to understand is that two distinctive ideas to achieve national development were introduced to Chile around the same time, and independent from one another. As explained in chapter four, the notion of Diaspora for Development was introduced to Chile and promoted by the World Bank via a highly personalised network of economists, and Chilean business executives along the line of traditional policy-making networks in Chile. Through informal meetings in Chile and the USA that occurred largely outside the public gaze, the concept of diaspora knowledge networks became formalised, albeit not institutionalised, through the creation of the ChileGlobal network. Yet unlike formal diaspora strategies, the case of ChileGlobal was deliberately held outside state institutions and was supposed to be driven by the interests of network members and instituted under a flexible and reliable public-private organization.

In stark contrast, the concept of nation branding through developing a competitive identity was primarily advanced by a private consultancy firm in combination with, and supported by, the national government of Chile. Unlike Diaspora for Development, the idea of nation branding arrived in Chile with the private sector, travelled across the country through meetings and seminars where it gained acceptance and materialised into the public private institute Fundación Imagen de Chile mandated to coordinate Chile’s public diplomacy. Seeking to increase Chile’s international visibility in the contest for accessing global markets and the competition for foreign investment, the newly created institution Fundación Imagen de Chile recognised the high profile Chilean diaspora around the ChileGlobal network as a device for magnifying and circulating a positive Chilean image.
The transition of *ChileGlobal* to Fundación Imagen de Chile was the result of a complex mix of two overlapping problematisations, namely the supposed lack of a positive country image, at one end of the spectrum. At the other end of the spectrum was the Diaspora for Development complex that problematised the lack of innovation in Chile and claimed that the notion of diaspora knowledge networks and an institutional hands-off approach would be the solution to opening up the national innovation framework. Moreover, the Chilean government interpreted the diasporic community that made up *ChileGlobal* at the time as an entity of national importance and decided to provide public funding. Yet, unlike the initial reasons that underpinned the formation of the *ChileGlobal* network, the role of diasporic communities was to increase Chile’s international prestige because, by successfully promoting and marketing a competitive national identity, Chile could increase its development and well-being. Conceptually then, the notion of Diaspora for Development has been translated in two completely different ways.

### 6.2.2. The effect of an educational policy

Around the same time as the two ideas of nation branding and Diaspora for Development converged around the *ChileGlobal* network, another policy proposal linked into the *ChileGlobal* network when the Chilean government proclaimed the creation of the *Sistema Bicentenario Becas Chile* in May 2008. *Sistema Bicentenario Becas Chile*, often simply referred to as Becas Chile, is a bold and highly ambitious scholarship scheme based on a fund worth more than US$6.000 million that aimed to bankroll the post-graduate studies of Chilean students at overseas universities (OECD & World Bank, 2010a). Other than post-graduate studies, the initiative was designed for the purpose of specialised professional training such as teacher and technician training. Proposed in 2008, the scheme was rolled out swiftly in 2009 when a first cohort of scholarship awardees went overseas. Administering the scholarships was entrusted to the Ministry of Education’s National commission for Research, Science and Technology, CONICYT (Comisión Nacional de Investigación Científica y Tecnológica), which is at the centre of Chile’s innovation strategy as explained in chapter four.

As the numbers of scholarship awardees increased, the scholarship administering body sought to create a platform for overseas students to interact within, and to circulate
information about employment opportunities in Chile. It was in 2012 that the Becas Chile administration approached the ChileGlobal administration and, during a meeting with the network’s director Molly Pollack, and ChileGlobal’s project manager Paulina Hidalgo, decided to work in cooperation with the network to share and utilise the platform that was already in place. Both groups agreed to use the existing digital platform, not only for ChileGlobal members such as entrepreneurs, but also students and researchers that are based overseas. Paulo, who was employed to manage the digital platform and to facilitate student engagement with ChileGlobal, described the collaboration between CONICYT’s Becas Chile programme and ChileGlobal as a deal between the two entities:

Becas Chile, wanted to create a platform for the students and that’s when they heard about ChileGlobal and came for a meeting with Molly and Paulina in which they told the Becas Chile people about the platform. So, when they understood how the platform worked they decided not to create another platform which wouldn’t be good for anyone but they wanted to use ChileGlobal’s platform. For that reason we have a deal with Becas Chile. The idea is that once Becas Chile students are inside our platform they start creating groups and involve the ChileGlobal community.

Paulo, platform manager 2013

This deal, born out of the need to avoid duplicating the communication structures that were already in place began to take place in October 2012 when the digital platform was formally launched at a ChileGlobal meeting in San Francisco at the University of California, Davis USA. Talking at the event, the executive director of Fundación Imagen de Chile, Blas Tomic, was cited in El Mercurio as presenting the platform as a means that connects all “prominent and important overseas Chileans that wish to contribute to Chile”15 (Leighton, 2012). As a result, the digital platform was launched in October 2012 and what used to be a highly personalised network with restricted access, transformed into a more inclusive and somewhat more heterogeneous group. Two months after launching the platform ChileGlobal membership increased to about 500 with members from non-traditional host countries of Chilean emigrants such as Egypt, India and more recently, China, as seen in Figure 4 below announcing seminars in China in 2016.

15 My own translation
The platform links the various *ChileGlobal* groups that exist, not only through their subscription to the network, but also through regular activities such as newsletters sent from Santiago, or posting videos of interviews with network members. The two posters announcing *ChileGlobal* meetings in China that are seen in Figure 4 for instance, were widely circulated through social media sites such as LinkedIn. Moreover, the platform serves as a medium to organise and coordinate conferences, meetings and discussions as explored in more detail in chapter seven. Taking *ChileGlobal* into the digital platform in order to decentralise the network was an idea primarily pushed by Blas Tomic whose goal was to create a *self-sustainable platform*, independent of the head office in Santiago that is open to, and used by Chilean expats without them being prompted or mediated by the directorate in Santiago (Blas Tomic, director, 2013). The idea of a decentralised platform effectively depersonalised long existing relationships between early *ChileGlobal* members and *ChileGlobal* personnel.

Launching the digital platform accelerated the change of the *ChileGlobal* network. The subsequent increase in number and diversity of network members gained further traction when the network started to actively encourage and fund the formation of overseas communities of Chileans. The decision towards supporting individual groups was once again primarily initiated by then director of Fundación Imagen de Chile Blas Tomic. The
director’s idea of ChileGlobal was in many ways opposed to that of the two founding persons, Kuznetsov and Pollack. In line with the objectives of Chile’s nation branding institution Fundación Imagen de Chile, its director advocated an approach that interpreted diaspora members along more instrumental lines. In his view overseas Chileans have *two functions: They are ambassadors of Chile and they are bearers of knowledge* (Blas Tomic, director, 2013). While the latter resonates with conventional ideas around the incorporation of diaspora communities for economic development, the former clearly deviates from mainstream ideas as advocated in the context of diaspora and development. Yet the notion of country ambassadors gained priority over their function of bearers of knowledge.

Taken together, the changes of the new institutional framework, within which ChileGlobal operates, suggest two things. First of all, unlike the initially articulated purpose and objective with which the network sought to bind just a few selected entrepreneurs and senior executives to the network, the two policy initiatives that interacted with ChileGlobal opened and repositioned the network and its members. Working under an institution whose key mandate is to create and promote a competitive national identity, outweighed Diaspora for Development translations as promoted by the World Bank’s knowledge for development programme. Working under the umbrella of Fundación Imagen de Chile meant that the purpose of the Chilean diaspora, insofar as it was tied to the ChileGlobal network, shifted as their representational purpose gained priority over their entrepreneurial expertise. Secondly, after implementing the vast and ambitious Becas Chile scholarship program, the Ministry of Education’s scholarship administering body CONICYT partnered up with ChileGlobal in an attempt to manage the communication with and between scholarship holders more efficiently. The move constituted a shift in that the governmental organisation CONICYT leveraged the public private arrangement within which ChileGlobal was embedded. The rise in numbers led to the formation of different nationally focused and localised networks whose interests and agendas were often in conflict with the notion of representation, as the next section demonstrates.
6.3. The new collectives

As described above, two distinctive initiatives gradually broke open the *ChileGlobal* network. In particular, the evolving relationship with CONICYT led to a process of ongoing production and inclusion of diverse groups of Chileans into the *ChileGlobal* network. Table 5 shows a list of networks and localised groups that are formally connected to *ChileGlobal*. While each of these networks is distinct in either thematic or regional focus, they share a similar preoccupation with the formation of public policy in Chile as will become clear throughout this chapter.

Table 5: A selection of *ChileGlobal* affiliated networks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Network</th>
<th>Members</th>
<th>Founded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nexos Chile-USA (USA)</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red INVECA (Germany)</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>echFrancia (France)</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Redicec – Red de Investigadores Chilenos en Canadá (Canada)</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riech – Red de Investigadores en Educación Chilena</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red Ice - Investigadores Chilenos en Educación (thematically grouped around Education)</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICES: Investigadores Chilenos en Suiza (Switzerland)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red de Investigadores y estudiantes chilenos en UK (UK)</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>2014</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: ChileGlobal platform, compiled by author*

As illustrated in Table 5, since about 2010 various formalised network emerged across European countries and North America. The remainder of this chapter introduces and describes two of those, such as Nexos Chile-USA and the network of Chilean students and researchers in the UK. These groups are insofar important as they demonstrate how the politics of network expansion brought together new actors and concerns that eventually contributed to the further transformation of the diaspora knowledge network.
More importantly, the two networks are representative of the particular way Chileans were engaged, targeted and encouraged to create formalised, visible groups.

### 6.3.1. Nexos Chile-USA: The revival of North bound transborder relations

Of all the groups and micro-networks that partnered up with ChileGlobal, the case of Nexos Chile-USA is particularly interesting as it exemplifies the active and public role that organised diaspora-collectives play and how state-agencies pay increased attention to particular groups outside the occupational realm of senior executives. Secondly, the case of Nexos Chile-USA is instructive for understanding the consistency of north-south relationship and ideational transfers between public institutes in Chile and groups of Chileans in the USA. In this instance, Nexos Chile-USA started as a loose formation of researchers in 2006, was formally founded in 2010 and has evolved into what is best described as an interest group that positions itself as an outlet for the advancement of science and technology capacity in Chile (NexosChile-USA, 2016, para 3). The organising committee of this group consists of post-doctorate researchers in and around renowned universities and research centres such as the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Harvard University, John Hopkins University, Columbia University or Pennsylvania State University in the Eastern part of the USA.

It was around 2011, about one year after Nexos was formally founded, when the group’s organisers were approached by Blas Tomic of Fundación Imagen de Chile in a systematic attempt to enlist existing networks of Chile’s scientific diaspora and to present the institution’s branding objectives to the group. There was a sense of suspicion among the Nexos members about being approached by an institution that has no innate links with scientists or researchers, and that merely seemed to revolve around marketing purposes. Sofia, a former Nexos representative who then was employed at post-doctorate level at Harvard University, recalled how Blas Tomic contacted Nexos:

Blas Tomic approached the director of Nexos and he wanted to be part of our science group. He actually wanted to give a presentation about country marketing; and he was like – ‘Yes, I can do it. I can show how we see and sell the country from our point of view’. And for us [group of researchers] it was like; I still remember, we were like sitting and talking about this and it was
kind of strange, but then we found it natural and we started to communicate with the people of ChileGlobal.

Sofia, researcher, 2013

Overcoming initial suspicions that were grounded in what Sofia described as an habitual separation of the different, relatively closed professional groups of Chileans in the US, where scientists move within social and professional networks of scientists, business executives typically socialise within their own distinctive groups, Nexos started to collaborate more formally with ChileGlobal around 2011. For Nexos members, enlisting the support of ChileGlobal offered an additional institutional outlet that Nexos could leverage for its own advocacy purposes. For ChileGlobal on the other hand, identifying and approaching Nexos was partly informed by the objective to expand its membership base through accessing Nexos’ contact list. Andrés, a long-standing member of Nexos based at a University in the Midwest of the US, recalled how there was an interest from the ChileGlobal group to have access to Nexos’ contact list:

The other thing they [ChileGlobal] wanted from us was our [Nexos] contact list. At that point we had a much larger contact list than them [ChileGlobal] probably because they were focusing on entrepreneurs too much. I think the generation they addressed at the time wasn’t the correct one because in general, entrepreneurs outside of Chile are older in average than, in this case, researchers. So, maybe that was the cause why they [entrepreneurs] were not interested in participating in this kind of network compared to people that are much younger, and have a lot more questions and are more motivated to participate and to be involved in different aspects of public policies, or collaborations, or co-operations.

Andrés, academic, 2013

This quote is suggestive of two important points. First of all, the ChileGlobal network was rapidly expanding its reach through contacting and integrating already existing networks such as Nexos Chile-USA, comprising researchers, scientists and academics. Subsequently, the relationship between ChileGlobal and Nexos Chile-USA became primarily a funding based connection where ChileGlobal, as an entity of Fundación Imagen de Chile, supported and sponsored annual meetings and conferences of Nexos Chile-USA. The second point to note is that the funding-based relationship between ChileGlobal and Nexos Chile-USA facilitated an increased exposure of Nexos to Chilean
newspapers and online media that reported about the Nexos Chile-USA network and its meetings as exemplified in Figure 5 and explained in more detail below.

Former Nexos member Clarisa, a biomedicine researcher in Scandinavia, described the purpose of Nexos to me as revolving around four main objectives. Firstly, the aim is to provide opportunities for research collaborations between Chilean universities and research institutions in the USA. Secondly, Nexos is trying to raise the profile of Chilean researchers in general by showcasing their work to peers in the US. Thirdly, the aim is to provide assistance, mentoring and support to Chilean students entering universities in the US. Fourthly, Nexos aims to participate and influence processes of public policy creation in Chile pertaining to areas such as Science, Technology and Innovation, all of which are considered important and related to Nexos’ members. To this end, Nexos is holding annual meetings in which governmental stakeholders from Chile increasingly show interest in to participate.

Nexos’ growing profile in Chile is reflected in the trend that Chilean stakeholders and institutions such as Chile’s Agency for Economic Development CORFO (Corporación de Fomento de la Producción) actively seek participation in Nexos’ meetings. As Ignacio, a molecular biologist who signed responsible for Nexos’ international communication and liaison has poignantly put it:

Each year more people are interested in participating. Before we had to run after them and trying to convince them. Now each year there are more people contacting us, first private universities, now there are state or public universities and even state institutions. CONICYT\textsuperscript{16} in some way assumes that we are inviting them every year and they are waiting for our invitations. CORFO, well they have also contacted us and last year they contacted us one week before the meeting and they wanted to participate but we didn’t have any space left. Before we had to pay money to get them here and now it’s like, well if you can pay for your ticket we gladly have you here and we can give you some space to participate. I think that we appear now more often in the news as an organisation that is in the US and that is generating operations over distance.

\textsuperscript{16} CONYCIT the Comisión Nacional de Investigación Científica y Tecnológica, or National Commission for Scientific and Technological Research in Chile is part of the Ministry for Education and administers the BECAS Chile scholarships. CONICYT also acts as a funding agency for science and technology projects. In line with Chile’s overriding development strategy to enhance human capital in Chile, CONICYT is increasingly liaising and collaborating with overseas education providers and research institutions.
Ignacio’s observation suggests two important changes. First of all, while the Nexos Chile-USA group had held annual meetings since 2010, it was through funding from, and cooperating with ChileGlobal that the Nexos Chile-USA network appeared to have gained visibility in Chile. Nexos’ increased visibility and recognition in Chile provided a useful clout to leverage the interest governmental agencies took in liaising with Nexos. Ignacio’s comment about the increasing interest and recognition of Nexos by state agencies, research centres and universities alike is echoed by occasional media reports about Nexos in Chile. For instance, Chile’s leading conservative newspaper, El Mercurio, publishes regular news features of Nexos Chile-USA such as the one pictured in Figure 5 below.

The article displayed in Figure 5 is titled *Young researchers debate how to improve science in Chile* and provides a brief and general introduction into the emergence of different national networks that supposedly mark the end of the brain drain to Chile. More importantly, and irrespective of its content, the article symbolises how influential Chilean print outlets such as El Mercurio, a political actor in its own right (Cabalin, 2014), facilitated domestic recognition of overseas groups that were previously not recognised by the Chilean public, or only to a limited specialised audience, such as science-related faculties.

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17 The influential newspaper El Mercurio is considered an outlet for promoting politically conservative values and political views that are decidedly right wing (Moulián, 1997; Navia & Osorio, 2015). Championing conservative core principles such as private property, free market, and the subsidiary role of the state El Mercurio gained notoriety when it actively supported the overthrow of Salvador Allende and continuously supported the military dictatorship through supportive campaigns and editorials (Alvear & Lugo-Ocando, 2016; Lagos-Lira, 2009).
Figure 5: Article “Jóvenes investigadores debaten cómo mejorar la ciencia en Chile

Source: El Mercurio, 14.10.2013 (Urbina, 2013)

Likewise, other print outlets such as the business and finance-focused newspaper El Diario Financiero, and online sources such as the online outlet of the Asamblea (Coordinadora) de Estudiantes/Investigadores/as en Postgrado de la Universidad de Chile (AIP-Uchile) report about Nexos meetings. The AIP-Uchile, in particular, reports in relation to the controversial announcement of changes to the sciences and research...
sector in Chile (AIP-UChile, 2012) that is explained in more detail in chapter seven. Evidently, through joining *ChileGlobal*, the Nexos Chile-USA group became a device of Fundación Imagen de Chile’s attempts to portray Chile in a certain way to audiences inside and outside of Chile, which, in turn increased Nexos’ profile and visibility in Chile.

The second point to note is that groups such as Nexos were not passive links in a chain that was tied to Fundación Imagen de Chile’s strategy of circulating a particular image of Chile, but also used their increasing profile for their own distinctive interests such as acting as advocates for change in Chile’s research and science sector. As mentioned before, one of Nexos’ key aims was to participate in the formation of public policies in Chile. Participation occurred in the form of lobbying, and consultation with leading representatives of agencies such as CORFO or CONICYT that recognised Nexos as a group of interests as seen earlier. In 2012 for instance, Nexos’ annual meeting was attended by CONICYT’s director of *Programa de Atracción e Inserción de Capital Humano Avanzado*, Carmen Luz Latorre, and the executive director of CORFO’s Innova de Chile, Conrad von Igel, who both participated in Nexos-led discussions about Chile’s policy framework for the reintegration of Chilean scientists in either industry or academia in Chile (NexosChile-USA, 2012).

In the case of Conrad von Igel, the Nexos group benefitted from the fact that Igel himself had been part of the Nexos Chile-USA group before, when he was living and studying in the US. As such, he had not only been in contact with Nexos, but also provided a useful bridge upon returning to Chile where von Igel presided over CORFO’s Innova Chile programme between 2011 and 2014, as Nexos member Mateo recalled in 2013:

> The funny thing was that he [Conrad von Igel] was part of our contact list before because he was here in the US, in Arizona, I think. And he always was very active about proposing things and now he is in CORFO-INNOVA and he was really interested. He saw everything from inside in some way, so he knew how our organisation works and was really interested in being involved and to participate more with CORFO-INNOVA. Those kind of things are really rewarding in terms of being recognised by those institutions.

Mateo, researcher, 2013
The point to note is that Chilean state agencies, and research institutions began to recognise groups such as Nexos Chile-USA as important stakeholders and sounding boards for devising domestic policies, at least in so far as policies pertain to the development of advanced human capital, one of the key pillars of Chile’s national development strategy as highlighted in chapter four. At this stage, the Nexos network may not be involved in direct policy consultation processes in Chile, yet through the attention the network generated among state agencies and universities alike, and subsequent meetings with their representatives, the group became part of a wider informal policy network.

Overall, through the support of ChileGlobal, Nexos Chile-USA developed from a loose group of Chilean students and researchers to a distant actor that creates and facilitates relations between the public policy sector in Chile and Chilean communities in North America. One of the outcomes is that not only Chilean institutions such as universities, but also state agencies such as CORFO or CONICYT are increasingly courting groups such as Nexos Chile-USA and view them as resources. At the same time, groups such as Nexos Chile-USA become complicit in strategies of public-private institutions such as Fundación Imagen de Chile that facilitate and leverage the visibility of Nexos Chile-USA for its own strategic mission of positioning Chile.

6.3.2. Red de Investigadores y Estudiantes Chilenos en UK

Unlike NEXOS Chile-USA, formalised networks of Chileans in European countries mostly emerged after the implementation of the Becas Chile scholarship\textsuperscript{18}. The British network of Chilean researchers and students in the UK, Red de Investigadores y Estudiantes Chilenos en UK, for instance, formed around a common idea to share what is being researched by Chileans in the UK. Unlike NEXOS Chile-USA, the British network is representative of how Chileans were actively encouraged by the directorate of Fundación Imagen de Chile to form groups, hold meetings and to organise through using

\textsuperscript{18} Associations and networks of Chileans, for instance in the form of politically active solidarity groups, existed historically at least since the 1970s and largely as a result of the military dictatorship as explained in chapter four. Yet, as this chapter explores the role of networks and formations that emerged and gained relevance in the context of the diaspora knowledge network ChileGlobal, the focus remains on localised networks that primarily came to the fore in the wake of the implementation of the Becas Chile scholarship scheme.
the digital platform that was advertised as a means to connect more effectively. The impetus for the genesis of the British network is directly related to meetings of the CEOs from Fundación Imagen de Chile and ChileGlobal with Chileans based in the UK who had an interest in organising meetings and support networks. For instance, Julia, a doctoral student in neuroscience, who eventually became instrumental in organising meetings in the UK, stated that Chilean students in particular were addressed to form groups whilst studying overseas:

They [ChileGlobal] were telling us it was a good networking tool for those looking forward to going back to Chile and for those looking forward to start new smaller networks around a specific topic, a specific field or area around a specific country etc. That’s how it started.

Julia, student, 2013

Julia’s quote highlights how encouraging Chilean students to form groups was linked to their professional aspirations. Other than encouragement, student engagement with ChileGlobal was not left to chance, but was actively facilitated. Indeed, just like the initial core group of company owners and executives were enlisted through technologies of “solicitation and seduction” (Weisser, Bollig, Doevenspeck, & Müller-Mahn, 2014, p. 115), so too were the groups of students. For instance, Paulo the former manager of the digital platform candidly admitted how facilitating student engagement was premised on a specific set of student-related engagement criteria to which he knew students would respond:

I know what is important. What is important is really money in all sorts of ways. The people with a BecasChile scholarship need a job because everyone has to return to Chile after they finish their studies overseas. So when I put in the platform something like scholarship, then I see the analytics go up. Jobs, scholarships and funding, these three elements are like putting a carrot in front of a horse.

Paulo, platform manager, 2013

This quote conveys the particular way student engagement was solicited through leveraging their specific needs, desire and aspirations. The rapid rise in the number of students wanting to join the network occurred against the backdrop of the realisation that
Chile’s academic labour market did not have sufficient employment opportunities for graduates returning to Chile. Becoming a member of the network seemed to promise access to additional opportunities and contacts in a highly competitive labour market situation, at least that was how the network was presented to the different groups and networks as evidenced by Julia’s quote at the beginning of this section. Capitalising on students’ and researchers’ immediate concerns such as jobs and employment truly resonated. This can be seen in Fernando’s response who was the co-director of Red de Investigadores y Estudiantes Chilenos en UK and a doctoral student at London’s King College. Fernando stated that exposure to corporations in Chile and establishing connections to Chilean universities was the main draw that attracted students to sign up with ChileGlobal:

They [ChileGlobal] have contacts with very interesting people, they have contacts with people in the government in big corporations and also in important universities. And this is one of the contributions you can get as a user of ChileGlobal; that’s something good.

Fernando, student, 2013

Fernando’s quote is reflective of a wider trend in the ChileGlobal landscape because the vast majority of newly founded networks in Europe was initiated by Becas Chile scholarship holders, rather than young career researchers as seen earlier in the case of Nexos Chile-USA. As a result of the institutional change described before, ChileGlobal provided a space for student-related and labour market associated concerns. The role of ChileGlobal, which by then was represented as Fundación Imagen de Chile’s overseas network of talents (MINREL, 2010), in supporting the creation of localised networks, was, in part, material, through sponsorship of meetings and travel expenses. Other than material support, the ChileGlobal network provided non-material support through advertising. Victoria, a design student based in London who acted as treasurer for the UK network stated that ChileGlobal provided selective funding in the form of travel grants for the representatives of other European networks to participate in joint meetings of the different Chilean networks:

When we organised some of these meetings here they [ChileGlobal] paid for the trips of the representatives of the networks. They’re also constantly
announcing our activities through their website and even now they are offering funding for these annual meetings.

Victoria, student, 2012

Similar to the revealing remarks of ChileGlobal’s web manager earlier in this section, Victoria’s quote confirms the direct and co-constitutive role ChileGlobal had in helping to create and support localised networks of Chileans. The promotion and rise of various nationally focused networks changed the landscape of the ChileGlobal network in profound ways. For instance, the explicitly public way in which ChileGlobal was represented as a network of students, professionals and entrepreneurs, was a significant deviation from the rather tacit and discrete mode in which it operated prior to becoming a part of Fundación Imagen de Chile.

Moreover, the creation of nodes across different countries, as well as the representation of ChileGlobal as Fundación Imagen de Chile’s network of talents signalled, not only a departure from the early focus on North American countries, but also manifested the shift from a fairly independent network to a programme that was instituted and regulated by the goals and objectives of Chile’s national branding agency Fundación Imagen de Chile that sought to project and control a particular image of Chileans. Yet the rapid creation and incorporation of nationally focused networks that repositioned the ChileGlobal network, obfuscated from the grievances of the various groups and members that questioned the purpose and intention of network expansion, as explained in the next section.

6.4. Emerging dissent

As seen above, the constant incorporation of students and researchers led to a change in the network’s constituency that became increasingly diverse and heterogeneous. Moreover, as stated in chapter one, this thesis is interested in the sets of relationships between diaspora networks and institutional non-state actors of the home country in order to understand more clearly how, rather than why, expatriates are positioned to contribute to development of their home country. As will become more evident throughout this section, the relationship between ChileGlobal and Becas Chile scholarship awardees is
highly ambivalent. The *ChileGlobal* network morphed into a funding agency that provided monetary support for localised networks and activities such as conferences and meetings for overseas groups. Yet, while the prospect of generating funding for meetings, and accessing information about employment opportunities led to an increase in network members, there were clear sets of expectations and conditions about conducting overseas meetings. The attached funding conditions often ran counter to the intentions of localised networks and conference organisers and gradually led to tensions between the different networks and *ChileGlobal* as demonstrated below.

### 6.4.1. Conditional support

Encouraging Chileans in Europe and the USA to organise regular meetings was incentivised through funding opportunities as described earlier. Yet, while sponsorship for meetings, conferences and workshops constitutes a device through which networks in Europe were encouraged to meet and as such remain attached to the *ChileGlobal* community, there were also conditions attached that led to irritations. In 2012, for instance, the Chilean student society of the University College London (UCL) was planning to host and organise a number of seminars and small scale conferences in London with the aim of hosting Chile-themed seminars and conferences UK-wide. In its funding proposal to *ChileGlobal* the group of research students suggested to advertise a series of workshops and conference publicly through the use of Facebook sites.

The idea was to create a forum for Chilean and non-Chilean students and researchers, whose research relates to Chile to present and discuss their work. The organising committee sought funding from varies entities and funding bodies, among which were *ChileGlobal*. While funding from *ChileGlobal* was eventually secured, there were certain conditions and modalities attached to the conference funding. Laura, one of the coordinators of a series of London conferences and seminars commented that the way the organisers envisaged to coordinate the seminars was not in line with what the directorate of *ChileGlobal* had planned. For instance, the seminar organisers planned to organise a series of conferences in London in an open and accessible way through a designated Facebook account:
The problem was that ChileGlobal didn’t want us to have an extra Facebook because ChileGlobal already has a Facebook site. If we had another Facebook on top of the ChileGlobal Facebook and the Chilean student society Facebook to disseminate information, then the ChileGlobal platform would be useless. They preferred us to not use another Facebook cause no one would be using the platform if they already get the information through facebook. So that’s why we’re not using facebook so we can encourage people to use ChileGlobal. That was badly seen for most people here in the organisation [British network]. But obviously, when they say ‘Don’t use Facebook!’ then we won’t use Facebook because they’re giving us the money you know.

Laura, student, 2013

Laura’s quote encapsulates an important point. By advising the British network to plan and organise its London conferences through ChileGlobal’s outlets, the ChileGlobal network sought to steer the British network, at least as its activities pertained to organising public and information disseminating events such as conferences. Attempts to influence the planning process through containment in the confines of the private platform, was in stark contrast to the ideas of the organisers who planned to announce the conference in a more transparent form to a broad and international audience in a more public way by using open and accessible social media outlets.

Yet if the conferences were announced through the digital platform of ChileGlobal, then only those who had subscribed, and were entitled to, would have access to information about the series of meetings and conferences. While the autonomy and governance of localised networks was never truly questioned or endangered, the notion of conditional funding and resulting concession created and fuelled sentiments of apprehension among members of the network. However, a pragmatic approach informed by conciliation and the need for funding led to accepting the suggested conditions as demonstrated by Sergio, a junior scientist in London:

If they’re giving us money then there’s obviously something you have to give as well. We wanted those seminars as open as possible but we couldn’t because if we wanted to have support from ChileGlobal, we must run these seminars online within the platform of ChileGlobal. And their platform is not open.

Sergio, scientist, 2013
The strategic partnership with *ChileGlobal* has been, and continues to be useful for localised networks such as Red Inveca, the British network, Nexos and others. However, for reasons that are grounded in mistrust over funding decisions as the quote above suggests there are also moments of apprehension and caution. These notions are not singular occurrences, but were voiced across the board of the representatives of regional networks. For example, Miguel who was one of the founding members and co-directors of British network noted the increased efforts of *ChileGlobal* to enlist overseas groups and cautioned against possible repercussions as a result of funding and sponsorship related dependencies:

In the last ten months or so, ChileGlobal has been more systematically supporting all those networks. So, my concern is about what will happen when *ChileGlobal*, is extending its arms everywhere in all kinds of networks that it supports and I guess that this will have an impact on our independence for saying what we think about science, or if we want to criticise the government, even ChileGlobal. I mean ChileGlobal is part of Fundación Imagen de Chile and if we want to criticise the Fundación or even ChileGlobal then this could have an impact on the funding. So, having this kind of relationship with ChileGlobal is creating this kind of dependency.

*Miguel, student, 2013*

Miguel’s quote represents the growing unease about *ChileGlobal* exercising control over the activities of localised networks and echoes wider concerns about transparency in the context of decision-making processes. Pablo, at the time, one of the directors of the German network of Chileans Red Inveca cautioned that the rapid increase in networks and groups associated with *ChileGlobal* was somehow curious. In relation to funding practises and sponsorship questions, Pablo noted:

What is practically happening is that we are using public money for these meetings and I think a problem could be that not all the decisions taken are as transparent as they should be. We are not too sure about how decisions are made at ChileGlobal about how they finance or how they decide to finance one project and not other ones.

*Pablo, scientist, 2013*

Pablo’s comment clearly reflects unease about the motivation for approving funding and lack of transparency around decision-making processes in relation to funding. Yet another
area of concern revolved around the extent to which nationally focused networks may lose their independence by engaging with *ChileGlobal* in relationships that are characterised by conditionalities and concession. There were shared concerns across European networks about becoming *absorbed* into *ChileGlobal*, thereby losing a sense of purpose, identity and also the ability to work in direct collaboration with institutions in Chile the way Nexos Chile-USA did as seen before. It emerged that within the individual networks there was a sense of apprehension about becoming too immersed in an obstreperously expanding organisation that was initiated for a different group of people. Statements like *I won’t become a member of ChileGlobal because this is a platform that first of all was created for entrepreneurs* (quoted by Jorge, student, 2013) are reflective of an overall sense of caution about why the *ChileGlobal* network actively encouraged the formation and institutionalisation of local networks outside the initial core category of entrepreneurs and company owners.

Similarly, the network’s status as a government-funded, yet privately owned entity seemed somewhat opaque and raised suspicion to the extent that *people have decided not to participate because this has to do with the government* (Jorge, student, 2013). Mistrust about becoming part of a government project was expressed throughout the different occupational groups but was strongest among company executives and students. Silvana, a graphic design doctoral student and network coordinator of a small group of Chileans in Cambridge, UK described her frustration as she tried to build a bigger group of Chileans, but faced rejection because of *ChileGlobal’s* perceived proximity to the government:

> People don’t want to participate because it [ChileGlobal] is part of the government even though I have said the opposite, and some people think that this is part of the government’s strategy to disseminate their ideas, which is not true. Some people are not participating because of that perception because of the funding, which is public some people believe the institution is part of the government.

Silvana, student, 2013

Silvana’s observation highlights a key issue in the traditionally complicated relationship between non-profit organisations and the government in Latin American countries, in general, and Chile, in particular. As can be seen in Figure 6 below, the *ChileGlobal*
network is sitting at the intersection of a number of governmental agencies and non-state entities. For instance, operating under the institutional umbrella of the public-private Fundación Imagen de Chile implied that ChileGlobal’s objectives of technology and knowledge transfers were rendered subordinate to that of Chile’s nation branding agency as explained before.

Interestingly, Fundación Imagen de Chile itself is institutionally operated outside Chile’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as illustrated in Figure 6. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ sub-ministerial committee DICOEX is the government’s formal outlet for overseas Chileans in relation to legal and other consular-related matters. The implementation of the Becas Chile scholarship under the Ministry of Education’s commission CONICYT led to the subsequent collaboration of CONICYT and ChileGlobal as seen before. As the result of this collaboration a number of locally focused networks emerged primarily in European countries, but also in Canada, such as RedICEC, the Network of Chilean Researchers in Canada as highlighted in Table 5 earlier.

Other networks, such as Nexos Chile-USA or RedInveca were formed independent of the Becas Chile scholarship programme but were open to, and gradually populated by, Becas Chile students as indicated by using dashes, rather than lines, as illustrated in Figure 6. These localised networks linked into the ChileGlobal network and became the new core constituency. The point to note is that the ChileGlobal network operates as a part of a complex ensemble of state institutions in Chile. Likewise, although the ChileGlobal network was adamant in representing itself as sitting outside government structures, especially after collaborating with Becas Chile, receiving funding from the government blurred the private-public lines significantly and fuelled not only distrust, but ultimately led to hesitation in joining the network.
The growing distrust added to overall concerns about the network exercising control over nationally focused groups. These concerns resonated deeply across the different groups.
as evidenced by statements from representatives of three different networks. Rodrigo, who works as a Science Group Leader in Germany and acted as one of the three coordinators of the German network Red Inveca, cautioned against the almost beguiling appeal a large network such as *ChileGlobal* produced:

> I am always the person who likes to say ‘Let’s not get absorbed’, because it’s very easy. They have all the platforms, they have a lot of people working there, they have a very nice webpage and so on. It would be really easy if all of us joined ChileGlobal and work in a forum there or as a subgroup of ChileGlobal where we could use all the infrastructure. But we want to keep RedInveca a separate entity just in case we need our independence from ChileGlobal. Sometimes we don’t know the people who are influencing other networks.

Rodrigo, scientist, 2013

Referring to *ChileGlobal’s* comparatively scintillating website with its inbuilt features that make communication presumably easier for smaller networks, Rodrigo’s statement highlights the ambivalent feelings and concerns that members of local networks had towards engaging in a more formalised relationship with the *ChileGlobal* network. The reference to maintaining independence signalled a sense of caution against the trade-offs and compromises that came as a consequence of working closer together with a state-sponsored institution that was far more resourceful than Red Inveca. Likewise, Rodrigo’s statement about not knowing who influences other networks highlights a degree of mistrust and conveys a lack of transparency that not only resonated with concerns of members from other local networks as shown below, but also with a more general sense of apprehension in relation to the conditional nature of funding decisions as seen earlier in this section.

In a similar vein, Jimena who was a doctoral student at the University College London, and one of the co-organisers of the seminar series in London mentioned earlier in this chapter, was adamant to position the British network as distinct from *ChileGlobal*:

> We want to keep our network more local at the moment, focusing on our interest and to be able to organise ourselves, to be able to collaborate directly with organisations and institutions in Chile to be able to present ourselves not to go all the time through ChileGlobal to do something. So, from that point of view we try to keep that separate because we also want to have our own
name and not always be related to ChileGlobal in case we want to do something without their support.

Jimena, student, 2013

Similar to the case of the German network before, this quote clearly conveys a sense of unease about being usurped by the more resourceful ChileGlobal. More importantly, however, Jimena’s quote highlights that the British network of researchers and students sought to position their group as independent from ChileGlobal so as to allow for more direct and unmediated interactions with agencies, organisations and institutions in Chile. This is compelling, as facilitating access to institutions in Chile was one of the main currencies ChileGlobal administration was using to draw Chileans into the network.

So far, ChileGlobal’s story of formation and reshaping has been one that primarily revolved around expansion and consolidation through the incorporation of relatively diverse groups of Chileans. Enrolling larger cohorts of students, researchers and academics led to the production of new sites of activity, forms of encounters and, crucially, a re-imagination of the network’s purpose. Simultaneously, however, the integration of Chileans outside the business and commerce realm into the network involved negotiations, concessions, and at the time, bargaining. Acts of negotiations led to increasing appropriation and reframing of the diasporic space around the ChileGlobal network on one end of the spectrum. On the other end, funding related concessions produced concerns among the newly formed groups about co-optation and the underlying motivation that drove the rapid expansion of the network.

6.5. Summary

This chapter demonstrates that the rise of the new institution Fundación Imagen de Chile, which emerged as a result of translating the concept of nation branding and competitive identity into Chile, led to the partial remaking of the knowledge network ChileGlobal. The inception of Fundación Imagen de Chile has changed what the diaspora knowledge network ChileGlobal existed for as the notion of country ambassadors gained privilege over the previously dominant interpretation of diaspora networks as agents of development. In Chile, the initial concern around improving innovation through members
of the diaspora became secondary with the arrival and institutionalisation of nation branding as advocated by branding experts who linked national development objectives with the circulation of a particular national identity. Consequently, diaspora groups are increasingly enlisted as intermediating devices to help promulgating a positive country message to foreign and domestic audiences.

The key observation of this chapter suggests that the original formation of the highly elite type ChileGlobal network was gradually made undone by concurrent and competing interpretations of the role of diaspora in the context Chile’s national development objectives. Under the institutional umbrella of Fundación Imagen de Chile and objectives of nation branding, the ChileGlobal network used technologies of seduction and coercion to tie students and researchers to the network. Rather than a network of entrepreneurs, the new occupational groups and members became the core constituency and gradually reshaped the ChileGlobal network. The act of translating concepts across space constantly produces new sets of challenges and responses that continually remake actors such as ChileGlobal, alliances and the diverse accounts and practices that are produced around the initial concern about what was problematised.

The second important theme that has emerged from this chapter is that the local networks that were created as the result of the interplay between the Becas Chile scholarship and Fundación Imagen de Chile’s nation branding objectives soon produced criticism and tensions among network members. Distrust and concerns revolved around the particular ways of engaging and positioning Chilean expatriates as newly forged relationships were based on conditional funding. Conditional funding, lack of transparency and more general concerns about being marginalised, produced alienation and mistrust among members of local networks that were often still in their incipient stage. If diaspora strategies constitute a technology of governing overseas populations (e.g. Kalm, 2013; Larner, 2007), then the Chilean example provides a more nuanced account as to how attempts of non-state actors to enrol members of the diaspora may play out in post-authoritarian countries with historical struggles and tensions between the state and its populace.
Chapter Seven: Diasporic sites of repoliticisation and contestation

7.1. Introduction

The previous chapter has described how the ChileGlobal network became populated with multiple groups and localised, nationally focused organisations that partly existed prior to the implementation of the Becas Chile scholarship and partly emerged because of the increased numbers of Chilean scientists and students living overseas. This chapter builds on the previously established insights that the ChileGlobal community has been increasingly translated as a device for representing the new Chile as a forward-looking, progressive and modern country as narrated by Chile’s public diplomacy institution Fundación Imagen de Chile. However, as this chapter shows, ChileGlobal’s support for recently formed groups and networks in the context of positioning these groups as country ambassadors led to complex interaction between, and encounters of, groups and events that generated sites of dissent, contestation and, ultimately repoliticisation. The key message of this chapter claims that diasporic expressions of politicisation and contestation gained currency and shaped the ChileGlobal network following the systematic integration and incorporation of a wider breadth of groups and people between 2011 and 2012. Moreover, this chapter argues that the result of multiple interpretations of the purpose of ChileGlobal allowed network members to appropriate and reshape certain diasporic sites.

Inextricably linked to notions of repoliticisation are questions of malleability and ambiguity of economic, versus political interests that are brought together here and discussed more critically in chapter nine. The wider purpose of this chapter is grounded in the need to explore in more detail how the reconfiguration of diasporic network sites produces spaces of mobilisation and subsequent enrolment of a diverse set of actors with often conflicting agendas. This is important to understand how the new modes of engagement with diaspora groups may be resisted and create new forms of political activities. The new forms of political activities are at odds with disciplining rationalities.
that underpin globalising diaspora strategies in order to advance forms of governance at a distance (Rose & Miller, 2010). At the same time, it is important to understand that the production of politicisation does not occur in splendid isolation of other critical events, but needs to be seen in the context of wider shifts, historical struggles and interacting events as described in this chapter.

7.2. The announcement of a proposal

In September 2012 the Chilean newspaper *El Diario Financiero* published an interview with the then Minister of the Economy, Development and Tourism Pablo Longueira19 (El Diario Financiero, 2012). During the interview Longueira announced his plans to draft a law that would lead to the relocation of CONICYT, Chile’s main funding entity for science and research away from the Ministry of Education to the Ministry of the Economy. Drafting the law came at the request of Chile’s then President Sebastián Piñera. According to Longueira, the new law was supposed to increase the transfer of science and technology, an area that was identified as key to national development in Chile, as outlined in chapter four. Relocating CONICYT was part of a wider restructuring agenda that extended to the *Servicio Nacional de Capacitación y Empleo de Chile* (SENCE). SENCE, Chile’s National Training and Employment Service is an entity within the *Ministerio del Trabajo y Previsión Social de Chile* (Ministry of Labour and Social Provision) that coordinates and supports various programmes such as social projects and employment-related programmes such as apprentice and vocational training for young people.

The public announcement of the restructuring plan was met with rejection from both the Ministry of Education that acted as host to CONICYT since 1967, and the academic science and research community within Chile. For instance, two days after Longueira’s plans were publicised, the then minister of education which oversaw CONICYT, Harald Beyer, denounced the plans and called for more and broad-based consultation before enacting any institutional changes (La Segunda, 2012). Likewise, Chile’s research

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19 The full name for the Ministry of the Economy is *Ministerio de Economía, Fomento y Turismo*, or Ministry for the Economy, Development, and Tourism. Yet, talking or writing about the Ministry, it has become common practice to give emphasis to the ‘Economy’ i.e. Ministry of the Economy, rather than writing the full name and giving equal emphasis to Development and Tourism.
community feared that placing CONICYT under the umbrella of the Ministry of the Economy would lead to the economisation of science and research as the evaluation of research grants and proposals would be guided by economic and calculative imperatives that evaluate research around its potential to be commercialised. In a swift reaction the Chilean science foundation Más Ciencia Para Chile, condemned Longueira’s plans as guided by ideology rather than evidence and international best practice (Más-Ciencia-Para-Chile, 2012).

Even before the publicising of Longueira’s proposal, Más Ciencia Para Chile advocated strongly for a renovation of the governance that regulates national research and science, including funding in Chile. A few months prior to Longueira’s interview Más Ciencia Para Chile published a commentary in the prestigious Science magazine, in which it urged the government to create a more progressive national framework, increase funding and create a Ministry for Science, Research and Technology as have most OECD countries (Astudillo, Blondel, Norambuena, & Soto, 2012). Although the government responded by rebutting claims of insufficient funding and institutional inadequacy of its current approach towards research (Aguilera, 2012), the notion of an independent Ministry mirrored ongoing discussions that were held across the scientific community outside of Chile and independent networks such as the previously introduced group Nexos Chile-USA. Yet Longueira’s proposal, backed and initiated by the president Piñera, lingered over Chile’s research community generating not only grave fears, but also mobilisation inside and outside of Chile.

7.3. The journey of a proposal

The announcement of restructuring the governance of science and research, not only generated reactions and opposition within Chile, but also travelled overseas where it was subsequently discussed in the various nationally focused groups and networks that have just recently emerged. Local networks such as NEXOS Chile-USA and the British network of Chileans in the UK along with other groups such as networks in Spain, France, Germany and Canada met to discuss the proposal independently and separately from one another. The common denominator of initially separate discussions within localised networks were the grave concerns about the consequences that such relocation would have for science and research in Chile, a concern that echoed the strong reservations of
Chilean researchers within Chile. As Alfonso, one of the co-director of the British network stated:

We are very concerned about that and we always recall the case of Spain under Aznar where the Science body they had went to the Ministry of Economics and since that had taken place most of the indicators have shown that Science in Spain has decreased in quality and quantity. Of course this has also to do with the crisis there and many other things but for us it’s kind of like an alarm, it’s a red light.

Alfonso, student, 2013

Indeed, in a bid to reduce public spending by reducing the number of state ministries, Spain’s right of centre government disassembled Spain’s Ministry of Science and placed its remainder under the Ministry of Economy and Competition in 2011 (Catanzaro, 2011). The concern of Chilean researchers then, was informed not only by a precedent, but more importantly by an “emerging reality” (Barry, 1999, p. 81). The emerging reality for Chile’s science and research sector was a reality that the different networks perceived as increasingly determined by output-focused, rational and calculative indicators.

For example, members of Nexos Chile-USA shared concerns about evaluation rubrics for science and research in Chile, and lamented a high degree of bias in the sense that national evaluation committees who assess the growth and performance of science, research and future research funding allocation in Chile, primarily consist of economists. Addressing an inherently technocratic approach to measuring the performance of academia and research, Javier, a long-standing member of Nexos’ core group stated:

Last time there had been a commission to evaluate how science is growing in Chile and what to do, you see that there were 15 people there and there are ten that are economists and you got one from Humanities, one from Social Sciences one Biological sciences and two that are from Politics. So, from that point of view it’s really disappointing to think that the people that are making decisions about science, technology and innovation in Chile are completely biased.

Javier, researcher, 2013

Javier’s claim is representative of the common concern of Chilean researchers and students across disciplinary boundaries. Members of the different networks expressed concerns that if the funding agency CONICYT was governed by the Ministry of
Economics, research proposals would be assessed based on metrics of profitability such as possible financial and commercial returns. Researchers with a background in neuroscience, for instance, were concerned that applied research would gain priority over basic research, whereas the humanities were concerned about funding cuts for non-profitable research. Beyond being unified in their concerns about the planned relocation of CONICYT, the different groups self-identified as immediate stakeholders in processes of public policy deliberations and were adamant to participate in these to shape institutional and political governance of research in Chile.

Taking issue with the proposed changes to the Chilean science, technology and research sector was not a selfless project, but occurred in relation to intrinsic personal motivation. As elaborated in chapter four, the Becas Chile scholarship scheme is an ambitious and comparatively expensive scheme that continuously sends hundreds of Chilean students to overseas universities for the purpose of completing their Masters and Doctorates. There are estimates that the Becas Chile scholarship will produce on average of 800 new researchers with a PhD per year between 2014 and 2018 (Gonzalez & Jiménez, 2014, p. 133). In particular, the group of PhD students self-identified as key stakeholders of the proposed changes and felt that any deliberation over the institutional set-up of science and research in Chile should be inclusive of them. Ernesto, a Doctoral student in Urban Planning at a London-based university pointed out how students are directly implicated in policy decisions about a reorganisation of Chile’s education and research framework:

We want to participate in the policy-making process in Chile about science. I think what will make a difference is when we come back to Chile we are going to be part of the science sector and not being, you know, aliens landing in Chile. We are going to be part of those research centres, maybe directors of these research centres or faculties.

Ernesto, student, 2013

Once again, Ernesto’s quote highlights the aspiration of localised networks to participate in deliberations over public policy in relation to science, research and education. Additionally, Ernesto’s quote is indicative of how the group of students and researchers

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20 The number of approximately 800 completed PhDs refers to awarded doctorates at overseas institutions only. A review team of the OECD and World Bank (2010b, p. 52) estimates that domestic production of PhDs will increase too and the combined increase of domestic and overseas awarded PhDs will lead to an annual production of around 3900 PhDs per year by 2024, which constitutes an output per million population that is within the average of OECD countries.
that comprise overseas networks self-identified as stakeholders whose future in Chile’s research centres and universities is implicated by any pending changes to the Chile’s science sector. Beyond becoming a dominant theme in discussions of the individual networks, Longueira’s proposal to relocate CONICYT to the Ministry of Economy, soon became a matter of collective concern of the various overseas groups as they are engaged not only in online meetings.

For instance, Manuela a former journalist and current Becas Chile Doctoral student in London described the role of local networks as a hub for transmitting to Chile the idea of creating an independent Ministry of Science that was circulating within circles of researchers in and outside of Chile:

> So the idea is to mobilise this idea or take it and communicate it to government officials in the coming months and years – entering discussions because one of the biggest problems of Chilean science is that the administrative organisation is really a mess. And this has been discussed for the last two years and now recently there had been some decisions taken in this direction because what everybody wants is a Ministry of Science.

Manuela, student, 2012

Manuela’s assertions speak, not only to how discontent about the proposed changes to the regulatory framework of science and research in Chile was growing within overseas groups of Chileans, but also that overseas groups were actively engaged in circulating and adding weight to institutional alternatives in the context of science and research in Chile. What stands out so far is that Longueira’s proposal to relocate CONICYT produced irritation, reservation and eventually contestation as explained below in the groups that emerged largely as a result of Chile’s increased investment in the formation of advanced human capital. However, it should also be clear that dissent with Chile’s institutional research infrastructure existed earlier among the groups of overseas-based students and researchers. Yet the deliberations that were building up, within and across the different networks about the institutional governance of science and research that was considered an institutional mess as Manuela called it, were still confined discussions between individuals and individual groups. However, the rise of a conferences series that gained financial and other immaterial support from ChileGlobal provided an outlet for not only gathering wider support, but also for circulating dissent more openly and widely as demonstrated in the next sections.
7.4. The rise of Encuentros

The Encuentros conference series began in 2006 as a small scale meeting between eight Chilean science students based in Dresden, Germany. Initially, the two main purposes of these meetings revolved around socialising and discussing each other’s work. However, as Figure 7 highlights, over time the conference grew in size and numbers of participants, the latter peaking when the conference was held on home turf in Santiago reaching 770 in 2014. Other than expanding in size, Encuentros meetings became more formalised and most importantly, the discussed topics evolved from mere science-related exchanges to non-science themes such as employment opportunities, reintegration policies and funding opportunities.

Figure 7: Encuentros conferences series

Source: Adapted from RedEncuentros website (RedEncuentros, 2016)

Likewise, as opposed to earlier meetings, with increasing numbers of participants and topics that were discussed, the occupational background of participants also changed. Rather than just a platform for the exchange of specialised knowledge between scientists and science students, the Encuentros gatherings were also a place for critical discussions that extended to meetings during which national policy formation was discussed. For
instance, one of the key themes of the 2009 conference was the continued brain drain effect of Chilean scientists leaving Chile (Encuentros, 2009). Santino, one of the organisers of the 2009 Encuentros conference described the ethos of the conference as a meeting point for different people with interests in Chile, rather than a pure science-related conference:

We can discuss the scientific policies in Chile on occasions or more generally in the global context where you have people that really can make a difference with their opinions. Now we’re trying to merge all this together to make bigger conferences where people can really present their work and also for people thinking about possibilities of generating progress in Chile that is not strictly scientific.

Santino, student, 2013

The 2011 edition of Encuentros was the first time that Fundación Imagen de Chile via ChileGlobal acted as a funding entity for the conference that by then claimed to be the largest conference of Chilean students, professionals, and entrepreneurs (Encuentros, 2011, p. 3). One year later, six years after the first meeting, Encuentros had become a truly professionally organised and visible event with keynote speeches from invited internationally renowned speakers such as sociologist Saskia Sassen, the release of a 50 minute post-conference film and the publishing of an edited book (Devilat-Loustalot, Lanuza-Rilling, & Sandoval-Henríquez, 2013).

By 2012, the Encuentros conference had become a relatively strong actor that was originally positioned as a site for exchanging primarily academic knowledge. Moreover, since 2011 the ChileGlobal network acted as a sponsor for Encuentros and channelled funds into organising not only national conferences and workshops as explained in the previous chapter, but also became one of the prime funders for subsequent annual Encuentros conferences. Yet rather than being limited to a site devoted to academic knowledge exchange, Encuentros developed into a space where the institutional framework, the politics and governance of Chilean science and research was discussed, and ultimately contested as the next section shows. Furthermore, it is important to understand that the main purpose for ChileGlobal’s sponsoring of the Encuentros conferences was not necessarily about encouraging critical discussions about domestic
politics and reintegration policies, but quite simply to showcase and stage Chile’s budding international research community.

As mentioned before, the primary purpose of these conferences and meetings was initially the production of academic encounters, yet there were also more deeply layered outcomes that surrounded conference venues as *sites of knowledge exchange* (Ward, 2008). The conference acted as a site for more intangible, opaque and amorphous means that underlie the formation of critical collectives to the extent that attending the conference energised participants and instilled a sense of critical mass. In other words, the conference acted as an amplifier to assert, if not change, at least a collective voice from overseas-based groups. Lola, who was part of the first cohort of students to receive a Becas Chile scholarship for study in the UK and who was on the advisory committee organising the Rotterdam Encuentros conference in 2015, likened the group gatherings to *something powerful* as seen below:

There are loads of Chileans working and studying in the UK and because of the number you can create something that is powerful, and you can create something that seems powerful because there are so many people interested in these meetings and so many people coming to that.

Lola, student, 2013

Lola’s quote highlights the important role of Encuentros as an actor that instilled a sense of a powerful overseas community drawn together at a particular political moment and in the context of a conference. The role of conferences as vehicles for disseminating academic, commercial and political knowledge is well documented, yet conferences also constitute spaces within which protest and dissensus are negotiated and performed (Craggs & Mahony, 2014, pp. 425-426). Quite literally, conferences may not only be seen as the terrain for the negotiating the boundaries between science and politics as was the case for Encuentros as described in the next section, but also as a means that inculcates a sense of exuberance as Lola’s statement above highlights. Moreover, building on the notion of *critical mass* needed to steer change, Emilio, a leading member of the British network one of the conference organisers, was confident in achieving the necessary size and network population to make Encuentros a sizable actor:
The amount of people going abroad to study has significantly increased in the last four years and it has changed from, I don’t know, maybe thirty people each year to like 1000 each year. So you can imagine that we have a huge amount of people that comes together at Encuentros and we have a critical mass now to start this kind of networks and to drive change.

Emilio, student, 2013

With the rise and steady growth of Encuentros, the conference became a site that brought together Chileans with specialised academic knowledge and a site within which non-material exchanges took place. Overall, ChileGlobal funded and supported not only localised groups that increasingly self-organised as seen in chapter six, but also supported the annual conference Encuentros that, in itself, became an important actor not only for showcasing and discussing research, but also for gathering support and providing an enabling structure, which eventually acted as an outlet for voicing opposition and sketching political alternatives as the next section shows.

7.5. Becoming a space of contestation

As seen above, since around 2011 a number of different networks formed and were actively encouraged by Fundación Imagen de Chile and ChileGlobal to organise meetings and to subscribe to the ChileGlobal platform. The formation of groups and networks was facilitated by providing funding and by tapping into the aspirations of researchers and students. Incidentally, at the same time as different diasporic groups emerged, Chile’s Minister of the Economy proposed a contentious restructuring of the institutionalisation of science and research. The institutional framework of science and research in Chile was already a topic that received a significant amount of criticism from different groups such as Nexos Chile-USA and had been a topic of discussion soon after the first Encuentros meetings were held. The proposal sparked opposition within Chile and increasingly outside of Chile where the suggested changes were discussed in the recently formed national networks such as networks in Spain, France, the UK, Germany and the USA.

Through online and face-to-face meetings members of the different nationally focused networks met and discussed not only more effective ways of collaboration between the networks and to capitalise on increasing numbers of students, but also how to position
themselves in response to Pablo Longueira’s proposal. Adrián, a research student in Chemistry who was based in Germany and instrumental in rallying the different nationally focused groups, recalled how the support of ChileGlobal helped to generate ongoing discussions within the localised networks and between representatives of the different networks:

Especially during the last year I committed myself to contribute greatly to this idea that the international networks of Chilean researchers should get in contact. I spent quite some time trying to push a bit that we should meet and organise activities together – and that was the reason why I went to France, Spain and the US because I forced myself to push for this idea … of trying to bring all those networks in contact; because there is a lot of potential there to do things and we got a lot of support from ChileGlobal there.

Adrián, student, 2013

Following the Encuentros Paris conference the deliberations between the different network members culminated with the publicising of the Encuentros Paris 2012 declaration that was part of the post-conference publication. The declaration demands structural changes in Chile to ensure inclusive development and was expressed around six key points:

1. Public education should be a State priority for social inclusion
2. Create an equitable and non-discriminating public health system
3. Reinforce the industrial and redistributive capacity of the State
4. Environmental protection should be a constitutional duty
5. Citizen empowerment, participation and inclusiveness
6. Creation of a Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation

(Devilat-Loustalot et al., 2013, pp. 4-6)

The organising committee stated the ambitious, albeit vague goal to have critical cross-societal discussions about Chile’s current economic development model and the critical role of the state. The declaration’s first five key points are also a reflection of the general concerns within the nationally localised network and are therefore necessarily broad in scope and scale. Key point six, however, is specific enough in that it postulates concrete
demands pertinent to most students and researchers, such as the creation of a single and independent Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation:

As organizers of what has so far been the largest conference of Chilean researchers abroad, Encuentros Paris 2012, we believe that the creation of a Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation is a key instrument to consolidate a knowledge-based development.

In conclusion, the realization of the above proposals has as a common ground the reformulation of the role of the State in our society, which should evolve from a regulatory and subsidiary agency towards an institution dedicated to the active and effective promotion of equitable and inclusive development in Chile. This requires a legitimate structure of redistribution, considering cognitive, symbolic and material resources, with the capacity to close the existing divide in terms of quality of living, social security and real access to opportunities.

(Devilat-Loustalot et al., 2013, p. 6)

Hidden behind somewhat convoluted articulations were not just demands that opposed the relocation of CONICYT, but also a proposal for an alternative institutional arrangement, such as a designated ministry. With the publishing of this declaration the organising committee of Encuentros was entering public discussions about Chile’s overall development model in general, and its policy framework and policy direction in the context of science and research in particular. By implication then, the declaration which is effectively a materialised form of the collective concerns of the different geographically dispersed networks, positioned the ChileGlobal network somewhat unwittingly as an enabling structure for the production and dissemination of dissent.

The Encuentros Paris conference in 2012 was a pivotal moment in that it acted as a mobilising structure for discussing and mobilising concerns, hosting workshops and for eventually publicising a declaration that disputed the government’s proposal and postulated concrete demands. The critical collective that was drawn together at Encuentros is testament to how diasporic imaginations of contestability and the development projects emerged in response to specific issues and events that require to be framed in particular ways, globally communicated and reproduced to continue (Sökefeld, 2006). As a result of converging historical and ongoing struggles, as explained in the next section, and energised by meetings and conferences, parts of the ChileGlobal community became a key site for challenging and contesting policy proposals made by the central
government. More importantly, however, is to remember that the various sites within which localised groups of the network enacted protest that came to enter the conference Encuentros, were an effect of the overall transformation of the diaspora knowledge network *ChileGlobal*.

### 7.5.1. Contextualising disputes

The *Encuentros* declaration that was published in the aftermath of 2012 Paris conference, including the demand to refrain from relocating CONICYT, was a collective and public reaction against the announced proposal made by Longueira. However, what is important to recall is, the declaration was not explicitly positioned as a political statement of sort against the then governing right of center administration of President Sebastian Piñera’s *Coalición por el Cambio*. Indeed, the organisers of *Encuentros* who signed responsible for the declaration clearly positioned themselves as sitting outside the terrain of ‘politics’. Careful not to be drawn into the programmatic and rhetoric of politics safeguarded that raising alternative institutional solutions could not be denounced as ‘politics’. As Santino, one of the co-coordinators of the London-based network of Chilean researchers and students in the UK remarked, discussions around education and research-related topics are highly politicised in Chile (Santino, 2013). Instead, by presenting themselves as sitting outside of politics, and acting from outside of Chile, was supposed to aggregate and support distinctive solutions and alternatives, such as creating a new Ministry for Science and Research, as most OECD countries have in place, was paramount to ensuring an institutional proposition that is devoid of partisan politics.

Likewise, by providing funding to Encuentros conferences, *ChileGlobal* clearly entered the realm of the political, albeit not necessarily the terrain of partisan politics, in the sense that the funds certainly aided in the production of sites of contention, often the kind of contention that diasporic policies are designed to tame. Through subsequent funding, *ChileGlobal* partially enabled, if not supported the production of spaces and structures outside the realm of the state where critical counter narratives to political decisions and decisions-making processes were voiced. To what extent these opposing narratives will translate into tangible results remains to be seen, but local coordinators of national networks were adamant in mobilising and achieving a critical mass of Chileans to influence public policy in Chile. In fact, the case of Nexos Chile-USA has shown how
overseas networks are increasingly linking into domestic policy-making sites. Moreover, the trend of the previous four years suggests that similar regionally focused networks continue to be created that will partially give weight to reaching a critical mass of stakeholders outside Chile.

Achieving a critical mass of students and researchers via conferences and localised groups to dispute the government’s proposal denotes how the re-incorporation of Chileans into the realm of the Chilean state has enabled some diasporic groups to assert civic claims. Taking its collective message about rejecting the government’s plan into the public realm was partly achieved through the supportive role of ChileGlobal that funded meetings and conferences through monetary means but also, and more importantly, the provision of infrastructural and logistic support such as data bases, contacts and an institutional bridge back home to Chile. Clearly, articulations of dissent may have been voiced independently and separately from existing links and the support of ChileGlobal. However, circulating political demands through ChileGlobal has certainly amplified the overall palpability of these demands.

Likewise, the network’s sponsoring of collective meetings such as the Encuentros conference series helped in shaping the identity, and energised the emergence, of groups, which, in turn, was vital for the rise and formation of a critical response to the announcement of restructuring the governance of Chile’s science and research sector. The financial support for conferences such as Encuentros, has made the exchange of opinions, discussions, knowledge and the connection to other contentious debates realisable as it helped to create a critical interstice in which the different groups could meet. The financial and logistic support of local networks in Spain, the UK, Canada and other countries, as well as supporting annual conferences and monthly gatherings of organisations such as Encuentros, instilled a crucial nonmaterial sense of audacious ownership, agency and confidence to engage and challenge deliberations about public policy formulation in Chile.

However, the sponsoring role of Fundación Imagen de Chile through ChileGlobal is somewhat delicate too because as a private, albeit publicly funded organisation, the institute was implicated in encouraging the production of overseas networks and collectives that ultimately engaged in domestic politics. As seen in chapter six, the means
by which groups were enticed into the network is not unproblematic and speaks to how technologies of citizenship are employed to discipline diasporic communities (Kalm, 2013). Yet whereas Chilean groups were complicit in that they formed and institutionalised networks, the groups also acted in non-compliant ways that challenged attempts to control and govern Chile’s overseas groups.

The events that contributed to the production of spaces of contestation were not limited to the proposed changes in the science and research sector, but occurred against the backdrop of multiple struggles. In the case of Chile, there are at least three distinct, yet overlapping and contentious narratives that coalesced around the ChileGlobal network which help to understand how the network became a site of contestation. First of all, chapter four has outlined how the Chilean diaspora has traditionally been a site of dispute and resistance within which opposition to the dictatorial Pinochet regime was exercised (Mira & Santoni, 2013; Wright & Zúñiga, 2007). As such, the Chilean diaspora is an important, longstanding site of historic struggle and contestation, albeit along clear ‘political’ and identifiable ideological lines. Second, at the time of proposing the institutional change about relocating CONICYT to the Ministry of the Economy, the right of centre government under President Piñera government did not only experience a general and fundamental decline in approval rates in Chile fluctuating between 26 and 32 per cent in 2012 (Adimark, 2014), but also faced ongoing and intensifying conflicts with Chilean protesters. However, the demonstrations soon evolved into a large scale social movement with support from unions and other parts of Chile’s civil society that came to dispute the broader Chilean development model rather than just education-related inadequacies.

Those moments of political struggle in Chile were clearly noted within the ChileGlobal community. However, neither of the individual and nationally focused networks took a visible stance by positioning itself as either condoning the protests or in support of the government. Despite the reluctance to openly take position, the declaration’s first point explicitly connects with the student protests that occurred in Chile in the sense that it calls

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21 The organisers of the German network Red Inveca, for instance, decided to apply for registering their network as an incorporated association with legal implications in the sense that the network may legally function as a corporate body. The idea that underpinned the ‘incorporation’ of the network was to have a lasting structure that is independent from individual persons to ensure the network does not demise when the current organising team leaves Germany.
for abandoning Chile’s excessively market-driven education model in favour of a more inclusive and egalitarian approach (Devilat-Loustalot et al., 2013, p. 4). Mobilising against the proposal was not an act of innate and pugnacious opposition, or to precipitate further political tension in Chile, but informed by the clear ambition to participate in policy-making processes as a collective as the following quote from Sara, a business law student in the UK, highlights:

At the long term we’d like to be more involved in consultation processes and if they can have it in a more formal way then that would be better. And that is why we are now trying to cooperate between the different networks of researchers outside of Chile that are growing. Now there are people in Germany, Canada, Spain, France and now in Australia something is starting too. That’s pretty good because if in the end we all unite our interests and efforts which are basically the same we can push a lot more about really having a voice in this group of people that decide about policies. What we want is to take part in that process and for that we need to be a group and cannot act as a person.

Sara, student, 2013

The third point of discontent that is important to understand the increasing moments of contestation in parts of the ChileGlobal community, revolved around concrete concerns of scholarship holders and some parts of Chile’s overseas’ science community about the structural weakness and limited employment capacities in Chile’s domestic academic labour market (Gonzalez & Jiménez, 2014; Nunez-Parra & Ramos, 2014). Again, the concern around employment deficiencies for researchers and scientists is longstanding, having its roots in the 1970s when Chilean universities, traditionally the place for conducting research, were mostly stripped off their research portfolios by a dictatorship committed to transforming universities to mere learning, rather than research institutions. Science and research were relegated to private research institutions and foreign foundations, and gained only partial entrance in the universities, after Chile’s return to democracy. Not only students, but also the science and research community within ChileGlobal and associated networks such as Nexos Chile-USA advocated vehemently for addressing the shortage in employment opportunities for highly skilled returnees via employment creating policies (Nunez-Parra & Ramos, 2014).
More importantly still, the concern around the lack of opportunity structures has gained dramatic magnitude with the implementation of the Becas Chile programme because while Becas Chile can be credited for a rapid increase in highly trained specialists in excess of 6,000 Masters and Doctoral graduates in its first years, the Chilean labour market is clearly lacking employment capacities and strategies for integrating the returning upskilled cohorts of Masters and Doctoral graduates. Alerted by a looming brain waste, Chile’s diasporic science community pointed towards the lack of a coherent and integrated insertion policy framework that could help to facilitate the reinsertion of highly skilled human capital into Chile’s labour market.

Effectively then, these distinct conflicts came together, connected broadly with the ChileGlobal community, and more specifically linked into the different national subgroups such as RedInveca and NEXOS. Combined, the conflicts and networks eventually entered events, such as the conference series Encuentros precisely around the time the government announced its plan to relocate CONICYT to the Ministry of Economics. As sites of exchange (Ward, 2008), within which networking, the exchange and diffusion of different knowledge can occur, conferences are important events that have performative and mobilising characters where alliances and their inner politics are produced through engineering connections that are rooted in “face-to-face-based moments” (Routledge, 2008, p. 214). The Government’s plan to relocate CONICYT to the Ministry of Economics was the impetus of a wave of discontent that was initially articulated within localised networks and fed into post-Encuentros conference deliberation to eventually materialise in form of publicised demands as seen in the previous section.

In short, the Longueira interview in 2012, and the looming changes to the governance of science and research in Chile, connected with several long-standing disputes and the fact that groups of Chileans were increasingly forming networks to lobby for their interests. The re-articulation of dissent in the context of ChileGlobal generates insights into how the expression of discontent is made palpable through the new diasporic collectives in spaces that are maintained by an institutionalised and publicly funded organisation. This, however, is not to suggest that there is unanimous agreement within the Chilean diaspora to actually work with ChileGlobal. Factions, disputes and conflicts exist, even among ChileGlobal members in relation to using this platform as a forum for protest as shown
in chapter six. At the same time, however, and as mentioned before, the emergence of diasporic dissent is inevitably linked to, and contingent of political processes in Chile. The ‘new’ collectives of students are clearly stakeholders in policy processes with respect to the wider areas of science, technology and academia.

7.6. Contesting voting rights

The increasing incorporation of diverse groups of Chileans generated encounters that speak for the increasingly complex relationships that evolved between institutions in Chile and Chilean expats. The particular way Fundación Imagen de Chile supported the rise of Chilean networks outside of Chile, raises questions about the role of non-state actors such as privately owned organisations, and their efforts to position expats in certain ways vis-à-vis their country of origin. What emerges as evident from the previous section, is that there is a strong tendency to avoid claims and asserting demands that would place the networks along clear political identities, or ideological projects. Instead, there were ostensible attempts to evade any commitment to political actors, and the notable absence of references to any political doctrine or political actor. Once again, what seems like a curious silence in taking a political stand when Chile was swept by the largest wave of post-dictatorial, anti-government protests and a genuine social movement rolled over the country was, interestingly, owed to the high degree of politicisation within Chile.

Noting the high degree of mass mobilisation in Chile at the time, network members sought to deliberately position themselves outside the realm of partisan antagonism that often defines party and ideologically grounded politics. The mass mobilisation in Chile, which was partly presented as the rise of the new Left (Webber, 2011) constituted an instant of protest that most network members did not wish to be caught up in because they felt it narrowed the debate about changes. On the other hand, however, there was clear acknowledgement of the particular political moment that defined Chile at the time of the Piñera government. As Theresa, who works at the University College London Hospital pointed out:

You know, Chile is very politicised. We might say so many things that people might not like. I have worked at the University of Chile for five years and I volunteered a lot so I was in touch with different stakeholders at different
levels, at the academic level, professional level, population and society level. These political tensions have been there forever, but it happens now that because of the election it is more visible, and also, it happens because Piñera is in power, so there is more friction which might not have been seen before, but it was there.

Theresa, researcher, 2013

Theresa’s claim about the historical presence of societal politicisation that gained more traction prior to the presidential election and under the centre-right administration of President Piñera is important for understanding the framing of civic activities in non-political ways. Referring to increasing tensions throughout the presidential election in 2013, Theresa’s quote mirrors observations that were generally felt among network members who often stated *This is the time of elections and everything is politicised* (Luciana, 2013). It is against the backdrop of the high degree of politicisation that members of the network frequently stressed that their activities and the often implicit political focus does not represent a partisan agenda or partisan commitment whatsoever.

An example of introducing political activism without partisanism can be found when the *ChileGlobal* platform was utilised for supporting the *Haz tu voto volar* campaign, which roughly translates into *Make your vote fly* as seen in Figure 8 below. The campaign aims to push for legislative change that would extend voting rights to Chileans living outside of Chile (Cádiz, 2013). Owing to electoral reforms of the Pinochet government that were enshrined in the constitution in 1980, Chile remains one of the few democratic countries, and the only OECD country, where citizens outside the nation-state territory are unable to participate in national elections. The campaign gained largely traction throughout social media accounts when overseas Chileans performed an alternative election and took to the ballots to symbolically cast their vote in their countries of residence.
Taking the *Haz tu voto volar* campaign into the *ChileGlobal* platform, as seen in Figure 8, was a particular expression of a politically dismantled attempt to promote a basic civic right such as the ability to vote in a highly politicised country like Chile where the denial to vote is inextricably linked to the dictatorship. Carolina, a journalist living in Berlin at the time, was the driving force behind the campaign and acknowledged the complicated nature of advancing objectives that have historically been associated with Chile’s political Left:
We want to take away the stigma that the ‘vote abroad’ campaign is from the Left. Chileans abroad are as diverse as the Chileans within Chile. A lot of people, even within the campaign, think that we would be more towards the left but to be honest, I don’t know. I don’t know what the voting intention of all these students is.

Carolina, journalist, 2013

Carolina’s statement touches on the concerns of campaigners to be seen as motivated by partisan interests. The underlining concern to be associated with a particular political agenda that would undermine the campaign, resonates deeply with the goal not to become embroiled with, and instrumentalised by, any political party or any given government as voiced by the initial group of senior executives back in 2005. Yet while the group of executives was characterised by a shared sense of contempt for politics and rejected attempts to work in collaboration with governmental agencies for reasons ranging from ineffective bureaucracy to incarceration during the dictatorship, both groups were clearly divided in their political activism. For example, as Carolina’s above quote highlights, campaigners for the vote from abroad interpreted the private platform of the ChileGlobal community as both an outlet and an opportunity to extend the reach of a campaign for civic rights and to lobby for voting rights. Executives on the other hand seemed primarily interested in ChileGlobal for commercial activities rather than political objectives22.

Carolina’s statement furthermore implies awareness for assumptions that could compromise the prospect of achieving wider resonance and could be indicative of wider concerns about co-optation and instrumentalisation in a highly politicised country such as Chile. It also reverberates with more general concerns that address the often complicated and vibrant relationship between home country-led diaspora institutions and their respective diaspora population (Sives, 2012, p. 117). The resonance to the Haz tu

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22 The issue of voting rights was not an explicit focus of this thesis. Yet, against the backdrop of the heightened tension prior to the presidential election, the notion of voting rights inevitably entered conversations with study participants. During conversations with executives I have occasionally asked about their stance towards the inability to vote from abroad. Perhaps in light of the fact that most executives held citizenship rights in two or more countries, the vast majority seemed indifferent to changes of the voting legislation. While most indicated that they would be happy to vote, provided there is legal provision to vote from overseas, none seemed overly concerned with the lack of voting rights or interested in joining petition initiatives. As one participant remarked: Well, I mean I never cared very much really. I left Chile in 1987 for the first time and so there were no elections at that time, so there were no votes under Pinochet. Since then I’ve been out of Chile and I was more interested in getting my son a Chilean passport. (Carlos, 2013).
campaign on the ChileGlobal platform was limited and, in comparison to the overall number of network members, attracted only a few supporters. Based on records from the digital platform that lists all the participants of any given initiative, the campaign had about 37 participants who supported Haz to voto volar. One of the reasons for the relatively low participation may be that the presidential election in 2013 was the first election that was held under an electoral reform that was implemented in 2012, the so-called voluntary voting system. Under this new system Chileans are no longer obliged to vote as in previous years, which led to a dramatic decline in interest as well as in voter turn-out, to the extent that only about 56 percent of eligible voters casted their vote (McHugh, 2013).

However, the point to note is the ChileGlobal network became a site that was translated as a space for advancing contentious agendas such as voting rights. Quite literally, activists behind the Haz tu voto volar campaign interpreted the network as an ally for their cause to enact constitutional change that would instate overseas Chileans’ right to vote. Once again, utilising the network as an outlet for an intrinsically political campaign is indicative of the evolving character of what used to be a knowledge network for the transmission of innovative practices and expertise.

7.7. Summary

Through opening the network up to students, researchers and academics outside the commerce and business realm the constituency of the network changed significantly. As noted in this chapter, the process of opening up the network to a range of communities and nationally focused networks of Chileans, produced new sites and circuits through which ideas, opinions and projections for Chile were circulated as well as articulated and, so it was hoped, rendered more visible. In addition, and importantly, in light of often totalising claims around depoliticisation of development through donor-funded projects, through the convergence of a number of events that coincided with the publicising of a contentious proposal, the ChileGlobal network contributed to the production of spaces of politicisation and contestation. As a result of the pluralisation, the network experienced a shift away from economic concerns to a preoccupation with public policy in relation to science, technology and research. The changes in network constituency highlight that
diaspora entities such as *ChileGlobal* are best characterised by notions of emergence and plurality that are held together through constant negotiation, performance, struggles, and events such as conferences.

The key point to remember is that mobilisation for rallyng was not instigated by a single event, but occurred against the backdrop of a number of conflicts of which proposing the restructuring of the national governance of science, technology and research sector was the one that most directly resonated with the concerns and aspirations of a particular group of network members. Resistance against the government’s proposal to relocate CONICYT to the Ministry of Economy was not guided by a particular ideological conviction or partisan considerations. In fact, Encuentros’ declaration that disputed the relocation of CONICYT and demanded a reformulation of the state, may be read as speaking out against 25 years of market conformist policies by the centre-left administrations, as it could be read against the centre-right government of the Piñera administration that came forward with the actual proposal that triggered expressions of discontent. Likewise, taking the campaign about extending voting rights to overseas Chileans to the digital platform in 2012 to amplify pressures for constitutional changes, constituted an act of civil engagement to assert basic civic rights, rather than a partisan statement at a particular political moment in time. The circulation of demands for extending voting rights to Chileans abroad was explicitly positioned as a project that was not associated with any political actor or ideological programme to ensure the campaign could not be discredited as ‘politics’.

Enabled by material support from Chile’s public diplomacy institute, whose mandate actually revolved around coordinating and circulating a national image, held together and energised by non-material events such as the annual Encuentros conference, local conferences and meetings, produced a site within which diasporic groups became politically active outside the realm of politics. In other words, the new groups of network members appropriated and reconfigured this diasporic site from one that was concerned with economic particularism, to a site of politicisation and contestation. While the discussions, dissent and some of the controversies that accompany newly formed relationships between localised networks in European countries or the USA and Chilean domestic policy areas are contingent of broader political and institutional processes in
Chile, it should also be clear that the mobilisation of resistance to a policy proposal was mediated by the *ChileGlobal* network.

The story of the rise of different localised networks is also a story of a quiet demise. The clear tensions that shaped the politics of expansion that were largely driven by the CEO of Fundación Imagen de Chile would ultimately lead to the demise of a network of executives and entrepreneurs as the next chapter illustrates. The process of opening up the network to a range of diasporic communities of Chileans has produced new, energised sites and circuits in and through which ideas, opinions and projections for Chile were circulated. Nonmaterial means of support, such as facilitating access to other Chilean diaspora groups, the creation of linkages between locally operating networks and *ChileGlobal*, but also tangible assistance such as financial support enabled the partial transformation of *ChileGlobal* to a political broker from a hitherto economic actor. However, the appropriation and reconfiguration of particular diasporic sites such as *ChileGlobal*, is also contingent of wider political and institutional processes within Chile as well as outside of Chile, and the repoliticisation must be seen as but one element of a larger chain of effects, disputes and narratives of contention, as suggested throughout this chapter. Indeed, the dispute about the governance of science, research and technology is not a discrete event, but connects with diverse historic and ongoing conflicts in Chile, and needs to be understood as new and complex forms that feed into conflicts.
Chapter Eight: Contributions, barriers and the complexities of generating change

8.1. Introduction

The previous two chapters present findings that were the direct result of the institutional changes that occurred to ChileGlobal. This chapter moves from an institutional to a thematic level to describe the experiences of network members. The wider purpose of this chapter is to explore the experiences and perceptions of network members to understand how the new institutional calibration affected the flow of resources such as knowledge in the context of diaspora knowledge networks. Thematically, this part of the thesis also grapples with some of the overriding problematiques of knowledge networks and the often complicated assessment of tangible results because, thus far, the quantification of knowledge transfer remains an unresolved task (Friesen & Collins, 2016).

This chapter introduces programmes and initiatives that the ChileGlobal network has been running, such as an internship scheme, as well as reintegration efforts that seek to reinsert members of the Chilean diaspora into the Chilean labour market. The notion of providing information for reintegration was introduced in the wake of the cooperation with CONICYT to provide Becas Chile scholarship holders information about vacancies in industry and academia in Chile. The internship scheme, however, is a relatively long-standing programme that the ChileGlobal website praises as a successful programme initiated by Chilean company owners and directors in the USA. As this chapter demonstrates, there are discrepancies between the representation of the internship scheme as a story of success and an a posteriori account of the interns’ experiences. This chapter furthermore highlights some of the experience of the entrepreneurs, academics and other professionals and difficulties that came to the fore after the institutional changes occurred in order to point out existing tensions around the lack of institutional support that is the result of the particular way the network is integrated in Fundación Imagen de Chile.
The key theme of this chapter revolves around presenting a description of the developmental potential of knowledge networks and outlining existing barriers that impede knowledge transfer. As the remainder of this chapter shows, these barriers are a combination of what may be referred to as labour culture derived disparities, a particular set of social practices and lack of adequate institutional support. Taken together, these three factors help to better understand the factors and processes that influence effective diaspora strategies that are more cognizant of place and context-specific particularities. Through highlighting distinct, yet less conspicuous, cultural, social and institutional features that shape diasporic knowledge transfers, this chapter points out the necessity to go beyond schematic home country development – diaspora inscriptions that often inform diaspora strategies.

8.2. Tensions between the implementation of change and local working cultures

As demonstrated in chapter two, literature on diaspora strategies and return migration often stresses the benefits that may arise through tapping into the knowledge- and professional networks of diasporic communities (Kuznetsov, 2006c; Sharma, Kashyap, Montes, & Ladd, 2011). One of the ChileGlobal programmes dedicated to fostering innovative practices in Chile is an internship programme that was originally initiated by network member Raúl in 1992. Raúl’s life trajectory, motivation and elevated socio-economic status as the owner of a prosperous midsize company on the Eastern coast of the USA, is in many ways, representative of the first cohort of relatively wealthy and influential Chileans that were drawn into the network between 2005 and 2007. Forced into exile in 1973 because he was the appointed president of the government-owned national telecommunication provider, Raúl returned to post-authoritarian Chile in 1990. Invited by his former Alma mater, Universidad de Chile, to give public guest lectures Raúl sought to convey his idea around reimagining Chile’s economy along the lines of entrepreneurialism and innovation because there hasn’t been an entrepreneurial culture in Chile (Raúl, company owner, 2012) and Raúl was adamant to change that through his participation in workshops, discussions and lectures.

Looking back, Raúl described the reaction to the discussions that followed his public lectures as a combination of disbelief and rejection. Frustrated about sustained rejection
he experienced from Chileans in Chile, but still committed to his cause of implanting an entrepreneurial culture in Chile, Raúl set up an internship scheme that aimed to allow young professionals and students to spend up to six months working in his company, a supplier for office products. Interns would typically work in the product design or marketing department and assist with the day to day activities within their respective departments. They were also given small-scale projects to run, such as developing local marketing campaigns. The internship scheme was furthermore underpinned by the idea to create a *mind-set of development* (Raúl, company owner, 2012), which, according to Raúl meant that Chileans needed to get a better understanding of the limits and shortcomings of business-related practices in Chile and how to do them better:

> So I thought, if I had these students coming to my company and they have the opportunity to experience how we do things over here, then … once they go back to Chile maybe some things will change because these guys are young and very energetic and it’s an experience I wanted them to have.

Raúl, company owner, 2012

Encapsulated in this quote are two ideas that were shared across the board of entrepreneurs and senior executives interviewed for this research. First of all, there was a shared sense around cultivating a juxtaposition of experienced Chilean businessmen who often represented themselves as resourceful, knowledgeable and metropolitan bearers of entrepreneurial know-how along an us versus them rhetoric. Statements such as self-referential representation of executives as *people that have a little more experience, that have lived a little longer, that can tell them that there’s something to be done here and explain to them some of the realities of common society* (Rafaela, consultant, 2013) were often followed by pointing out the deficits in Chile, as perceived by company owners and senior managers. Secondly, the quote is representative of the often uncritical belief in the unequivocal benefits of change in Chile where the notion of change is at least partly informed and defined by experiences made in North American companies, albeit companies that are either owned or operated by Chileans.

As for the example of the internship scheme as an attempt to imbue a sense of entrepreneurialism into young Chileans, the rationale that underpinned it, as well as the reason leading up to the scheme, is paradigmatic for recent diaspora initiatives, and so are the complications that revolve around those as explored later. In particular, the clear
discrepancies between expatriates’ vision of a modern and developed Chile modelled after high technology countries in North America on the one hand, and what Raúl perceived as largely indignant reactions towards his proposals on the other hand. Notions of rejection and sentiments of opposition in relation to demands of change, particularly when voiced from Chileans who were living outside of Chile, were frequently mentioned by several interviewees, and constitute a common denominator of not only senior managers, but also academics, and to some extent, students.

Indeed, country-specific and historical reasons help to understand feelings of rejection and suspicion that are often grounded in the concerted politics of disinformation and propaganda orchestrated by the military regime between 1973 and 1989, which still echo on in contemporary Chile. The aim of systematic propaganda was geared towards representing exiled Chileans as living a life in ‘golden exile’ thereby enjoying a privileged lifestyle (Wright & Zúñiga, 2007). The result of the military propaganda was a lasting division between Chileans who endured the Pinochet years in Chile, and exiles who after they returned to Chile were often confronted and ostracised by the legacy of systematic disinformation and propaganda. Remarks towards returned exiles such as, “You come from abroad - where you have lived well, and you arrive here to run things” (Celedón & Opazo, 1987, pp. 57-58) or “We've had it up to here with your talk of how everything is done in Sweden!” (Hite, 1991, p. 6) were not unusual in the immediate aftermath of the dictatorship, nor are its legacies an exception in contemporary Chilean society as the next section demonstrates.

8.3. Mobilising knowledge

The ChileGlobal website lists the internship scheme as a particular success story, caso de éxito and quotes a former intern by stating how the “internship at a multinational company offered distinct opportunities for professional and personal development” (ChileGlobal, 2013, n.p.). However, the findings that emerge from conversations with former interns suggest a more nuanced and measured experience. For sure, the vast majority of interviewed internship participants feel they have indeed benefitted at the individual level and commented on the importance of the internship for their personal development and some of the more obvious advantages such as improving English skills. Roberto, an
industrial engineer from Santiago, for instance, commented on intangibles such as increased confidence, rather than particular skills that he gained from the internship:

I got a lot of confidence in pursuing stuff. I didn’t learn any new skills there, in the sense of technical skills. No. All the graphic design stuff I had to do I already knew how to do it. The technical skills I executed there were skills I already had. But, the internship helped me to understand how a lower middle class guy from Chile could be in the US and acting just like everyone else. The very moment I stepped on the JFK airport, I was like, okay I’m here and people are just like me. After that I knew that everything was of course more developed over there [USA] but not that different. So, that was a personal achievement.

Roberto, industrial engineer, 2011

Roberto’s comments about increased confidence were shared among the group of internship participants and illustrate how the internship did not necessarily aim to equip participants with a specific set of measurable and definable hard skills. Rather, the internship programme was a mechanism to instil a sense of confidence that was not only important in terms of personal development, but also needed to advance entrepreneurialism, as seen earlier. Despite those personal gains there were common concerns and collectively felt barriers in translating some of the experiences that were seen as beneficial back into the Chilean context. The case of the former intern Alejandro, who subsequently found employment as an academic in the Media Design department of a Chilean university is illustrative of some of the ambivalences:

Everything here in Chile is a lot more hierarchical in every sense. You have an organisation and their structure is very vertical. Coming back to Chile is hard, it’s really hard. I did it because I wanted to because I love my country because I love my institution and I love a lot of things (here) but it’s hard because I spent some time in the US in a very creative and open city in a very creative and open institution. But normally in Chile stuff is very hierarchical and roles are very defined.

Alejandro, academic, 2011

Alejandro’s reference to perceived hierarchies is representative of commonly expressed sentiments that recurred in conversations with participants of the internship scheme. Internship participants noted the pronounced hierarchies in professional environments in Chile. Quips about rigid hierarchies were occasionally shrugged off by adding That’s how
things are here or That’s Chile but there were also suggestions about how hierarchies are gradually challenged and beginning to change. Eduardo, an industrial engineer claimed that fluid hierarchies at workplaces are beginning to take hold in Chile, and linked the introduction of flat hierarchies to the idea of generational change, in the sense that senior management roles are being filled by younger people who may have spent some time overseas:

That kind of stuff [flat hierarchies] is starting to happen here in Chile, slowly and in very few places and probably because the boss of that area is kind of a young person and with a different mentality and probably he lived outside of Chile too.

Eduardo, civil servant, 2011

At the same time, interns cautioned against broad generalisations in relation to the perceived lack of hierarchies the interns experienced in the US. Instead, Antonia a civil engineer and former intern, pointed to the fact that any preferential treatment the interns received and the generally good experience they had made in the US, may be explained by the particular nature of the relationship they had with the Chilean company owner:

Here in Chile you can find both types of companies [rigid hierarchy and fluid hierarchy] and I think you can find these two types of companies in the US too. For us it was very much like a flat hierarchy experience because we had very good contact with Raúl [company owner]. He’s a Chilean and he was the one that brought us there to the US but I don’t know how it is with the people who work there every day but for us it was very much being on the same level.

Antonia, researcher, 2011

Antonia’s perspective clearly offers a counter narrative to generalising claims in relation to the absence of hierarchies or power structures, and instead points towards certain patterns of social relationships that exist and how these sets of relationships based on kinship rather than employment status, determined hierarchical orders and the interactions within these.

Tangentially related to notions of hierarchies, were tensions that interns commented on which relate to difficulties around implementing things, such as project management skills, they have learned overseas. Often these different ways of doing things revolved
around seemingly mundane practices and norms that exist in organisational and working cultures that are distinct from those in Chile. For instance, a commonly voiced distinctive cultura laboral that regulates and enforces workplace norms, behaviour and expectations was noted and often identified as being a barrier for a partial integration of experiences gained overseas. In the context of Chile, interview participants described cultura laboral as a sort of workplace culture that revolves around an agreed set of informal practices and habits. Agnés, a business studies graduate and former intern, exemplified cultura laboral by pointing towards habitual practices in Chile such as work arrival time and usage of work time in particular ways that she found difficult to reconcile with after returning from her internship:

Here in Chile work starts at 9am, but most people arrive at 10am. That’s what I mean by cultura laboral and that was the easiest example but there are other examples. We used to have this expression sacar la vuelta for spending too many hours in the office, for instance going to the office and taking a coffee break with someone or talking with your mother on the telephone and all those things that are not related to the work that you have to do. So I think that the things that Molly and Raúl have in mind for us is to see that in the United States they arrive at 9 they have lunch at 12 for 30 minutes and they arrive in time, whereas here in Chile they don’t arrive on time because they go shopping, they go to the doctor etc.

Agnés, entrepreneur, 2011

Agnés’ observations echo the experience of other interns who commented on the conflicting understandings between returned members of the ChileGlobal programmes and their local work force peers around work attitudes, norms and interpretations of punctuality. These conflicting understandings are not limited to Chile, but resonate with members of the diaspora of countries as diverse as Mongolia, Georgia and Ghana where members of the diaspora felt that aspects of socialisation may take precedence over work-related activities during work hours (Kuschminder et al., 2014). Addressing these discrepancies and acting against established social norms, however, implies the risk of alienation from other co-workers which meant that returned diasporans often decide to either keep a low profile or scale back their commitment to their workplace.

23 Many interns and ChileGlobal members referred to Molly Pollack referring to Molly Pollack the former and long-standing director of ChileGlobal.
The described experiences resonate with the institutionalising effect of social norms where institutions are broadly seen as “habitualized social practices” (Etzold et al., 2012, p. 186). Such habitualised practices govern behaviour in that they are underpinned by a normative structure that regulates the realm of the social and renders aspects of social life prescriptive, evaluative, and more importantly, obligatory (Scott, 2008, p. 54). In the context of the ChileGlobal internship programme, the result of existing normative and regulative effects of social norms meant that Chileans who returned to Chile as part of the internship programme, felt that acting against the established cultura laboral isolates them from their colleagues and co-workers. In relation to perceived issues of rigid hierarchies, the majority of interns were at the beginning of their professional careers and, felt they had little leverage to implement and push for changes.

Their junior position simply did not allow them to alter generally accepted work norms as the following transcript of the 25 years old Estefania who, at the time of the interview, worked in a private research institute, suggests. Despite noting a sense of guilt, and also noting disapproval from her co-workers, she continued to act and behave in ways she felt constitutes professional, albeit foreign, conduct:

Estefania: Also, I think that I can accommodate some things I have learned. I think I can make some sort of mixture with the Chilean way because if I piss off a person every time that person is late I won’t have a happy life because here in Chile people are used to being very late. It is very difficult. If you think you’re an example or if you think you’re doing things well, like being a role-model, then sometimes the people around you will think ‘Oh, she’s leaving quite early’ or something like that, but I think doing that you can make a difference.

Axel: How did the people around you react after you returned from the US and were always on time and went home after you finished your work after say 8 hours?

Estefania: It wasn’t well received because if in the US I left early after I did all my work I did not feel guilty because I did all my work but here, it was like hmmm ‘You are leaving early’ and they tried to make me feel bad about it but I don’t ‘hear’ them.

Estefania, researcher, 2012
Estefanía’s experience is representative for how the reintegration of interns and the introduction of minor changes that deviate from conventionally accepted cultural norms at workplaces in Chile were often met with reluctance and partial rejection. The internship programme exemplifies how the transfer of practice is mediated by cross-cultural communication and socio-professional identities, as well as professional status and thus by positionality (Williams, 2006, p. 604).

The Chilean case of diaspora-led implementation and integration of minor changes at the individual level, unguided by a supporting mechanism such as an integrated programme, is often restricted by hierarchical rigidities. The Chilean example suggests how particular work patterns and norms as well as a traditional culture of rigid hierarchy and authority determine to what extent seemingly mundane changes can be implemented. To what degree the hierarchical social structure is still a vestige of Chile’s totalitarian past, is beyond the scope and purpose of this thesis. However, studies suggest that existing hierarchical structures are a combination of traditional respect for hierarchies and authorities, as well as the result of the dictatorial, military discourse and an associated culture of obedience that is influencing employment relations in contemporary Chile (Rodriguez & Gomez, 2009).

Overall, it was not unusual for former interns to comment on the limited scope for introducing change and implementing new ways of doing because of persisting patterns of particular working and institutional cultures. However, existing tensions and resistance around introducing different practices has not discouraged participants of the internship scheme to carefully negotiate some of these barriers and seeking ways forward. The findings, so far, highlight how, despite exercising a degree of cultural and geographical mobility that theoretically allows diasporans to traverse between the different cultures the embodied skills and different practices remain underutilised, socially situated and mediated by ingrained social practice. By conceptualising social practices as institutions that are constituents of normative systems, allows for discerning how the diffusion of diasporic knowledge is mediated by socio-cultural particularities in the context of Chile, as shown in this and the following section. The next section highlights in more detail how distinctive social practices and their omitting effects need to be considered and understood to understand the opportunities, but also more importantly the limits of knowledge transfers in the context of diaspora knowledge networks.
8.4. (De)valorisation of diasporic experience

This section draws attention to particular sets of social practices that interviewees identified as partially causal for the depreciation of professional experience gained overseas. Research on mobility, migration and transferability of knowledge through migrants and migrant networks, often posits that returning migrants are actors that may infuse their acquired knowledge into their country of origin upon return (Potter, Conway, & Phillips, 2005). Studies have demonstrated that exposure to a different professional working environment for as little as three months, can be seen as a beneficial learning experience in which specialised tacit knowledge may be acquired and subsequently disseminated after return to the home country (Williams & Baláz, 2008).

However, the complexities surrounding the potential transferability of tacit knowledge, revolve around the fact that knowledge is often “place specific, being forms of socially situated knowledge and institutionally specific. They are grounded in relationships between individuals, in particular settings and in socialisation processes.” (Williams & Baláz, 2008, p. 1925) and thus, are necessarily difficult to transmit without devalourising the acquired knowledge. It is in this light that former interns often commented on the negative consequences of their overseas stints. For instance, as seen before, it was not unusual for interns who returned to Chile to experience notions of rejection. Contrary to a large body of literature that suggests that overseas experience may enhance employability, the actual experience of interns seems to suggest a more nuanced outcome. The following interview excerpt from a conversation with Carla, who at the time of the interview was working in Panama and subsequently found employment as a business intelligence consultant in France, is suggestive of the struggles that were encountered after returning to Chile to find employment. The general perception was that difficulties to find employment, and then experience rejection occurred as a direct result of overseas work experience:

I spent like five months after the internship to get a job and I couldn’t get a job in Chile and it seems like they don’t really appreciate the experiences abroad. Yes, it’s very strange. When I applied for jobs in other countries they are very impressed and they want to speak with me and I get a lot of interviews. And the people are very excited. But if I apply in Chile it seems
as if they don’t really care. Yeah, I think I was more appreciated abroad than in Chile.

Carla, entrepreneur, 2012

Carla’s quote resonates with the experiences of other Chileans that returned to Chile. The common theme that was noted and commented on was that the overseas working experience has not necessarily increased the employability, at least not in the short term. These experiences cannot necessarily be explained away by pointing to the various economic crises that rattled labour markets around the world since 2008 and led to high rates of unemployment in most of the OECD countries. Unlike the vast majority of the OECD countries, Chile was one of three OECD member states that defied the general trend and actually experienced a decline in unemployment rates among the tertiary-educated work force between the peak years of the global economic recession between 2008 and 2011, while other member states experienced an increase of unemployment among their tertiary-educated work force (OECD, 2013, p. 78).

8.5. Webs of relations and reciprocity networks

Study participants hinted at the notion of *pituto* to offer possible explanations for the difficulties around finding employment following overseas stints. The *pituto* is a particular Chilean expression for describing the ties and connections that exist between members of Chile’s middle class (Barozet, 2006)²⁴. Often framed around the strategic use of social capital, these ties determine and shape accessibility of employment opportunities to the extent that the *pituto* is seen as an organising principle that regulates and mediates social relations in Chile. As such, *pituto* bears some similarity to relationships that emphasise reciprocity, but also border on nepotism and clientelism. Adler-Lomnitz (1994, p. 23) has defined these mechanisms as “a system of reciprocity that consists of the continuous exchange of favours that are given, received and motivated within the

²⁴ As a distinct concept *pituto* has received only marginal reception in academia and has been discussed only by Adler-Lomnitz (1977, 1988) and Barozet (2006). Throughout ongoing email conversations with Emmanuelle Barozet to clarify *pituto* it emerged that while the concept of *pituto* is part and parcel of practices in Chile and its various forms are scrutinised in blogs, newspapers etc., actual academic exploration remain in its infancy. Instead, consequences and ramification of the purposeful use of social and cultural capital are often at the centre of investigations.
framework of friendship. Sets of informal exchanges that are practised in formal settings and environments such as employment relations, often occur to the detriment of rights and priorities of third parties (ibid.). Consequently, deeply entrenched reciprocity networks through which services, goods and information are exchanged, co-determine the extent to which employment can be secured and information about vacancies is distributed (Adler-Lomnitz, 1977, 1988; Barozet, 2006).

The notion of reciprocity networks is best exemplified by highlighting the perception of academics. In relation to the mediating role of the norms highlighted above, members of the ChileGlobal diaspora wanting to return to Chile after years of working, for instance, in research and academia outside of Chile, felt that leaving the country alienated them from these practices as they vacated the regulating system of reciprocity networks. Chileans noted the necessity to strategically maintain close ties to the country and their particular field of expertise by going back at least twice annually. Inability to travel to Chile seemed to equate to a decline in relational capital that is not compensated for by processes of upskilling or overseas work experience that so often tends to be represented as desirable for professional upward mobility. In the context of academics for instance, reciprocity networks require constant maintenance, and the physical absence was often felt to negatively influence the prospect of finding employment in Chile as stated by Silvio, a senior researcher at a public university in Germany:

I have to be there in Chile, travel at least two times a year, do presentations, introduce myself and so on and then you may find some open doors. But sending emails and calling doesn’t really work because no-one knows you or no-one remembers you or people that remember you will ask you ‘Yes, but where were you these last two years’ and so on.

Silvio, researcher, 2013

As encapsulated in this quote, gaining professional experience overseas often implies to leave behind existing reciprocity networks and the support associated with them. A similar note of caution relates to researchers and scientists, as well as journalists that joined ChileGlobal motivated by the desire to return to Chile. This group of network members shared the belief that the existence of dense local relationships formed around

reciprocity clearly impinges on the ability of Chilean expatriates to find employment in Chile and outweighs criteria based on professional merit. Local norms, or what Chileans often refer to as *pituto* constitute a specific form of relational capital. Bordering the notion of nepotism, the *pituto* orders social practices, not only within Chile, but also the translation of embodied knowledge from socio-culturally distinctive contexts such as Europe or North America to Chile.

The so-called international resume that is often said to be a career advancing essential in academia seems, by itself, an insufficient criterion. As Gabriela, who was working as a post-doctoral researcher in Germany and experienced moments of rejection found when she attempted to find employment in Chile, noted:

> You know that in Chile we like to ask a lot from our own people. In Chile you won’t impress anyone unless you went to Harvard or something like that. In order to impress or to be recognised by your own people you have to do so much more than people who come from the outside. You could say ‘I’m German’ and they’re already impressed but I would say this is this South American thing, we have this thing that everyone from outside is better than anyone from inside.

Gabriela, researcher, 2013

Academics and researchers that are affiliated with the network were often aware of those invisible barriers. Mechanisms of informal social governance and regulation were identified as barriers that impede the effective reintegration of Chileans into the labour market. The *pituto* and associated practices can lead to a form of inverted brain waste, whereby particular sets of skills and expertise remain underutilised, a phenomenon that is often found when ‘overeducated’ migrants cannot find employment adequate to their degree of education (Beckhusen, Florax, Poot, & Waldorf, 2013). The *pituto* then can be seen as a distinct socio-cultural institution that inhibits the integration into the Chilean labour market, and by extension, constrains the transfer of diasporic knowledge and expertise. This particular barrier is also at odds with the often heralded cross cultural mobility that diasporans are assumed to exhibit and needs to be considered in discussions around the (im)mobilities and flows of translocal knowledge in the context of development.
8.6. Institutional bias towards images, words and representation

The above sections highlight how socio-cultural particularities in Chile have often complicated what was envisioned to be a free flow of ideas and knowledge into Chile. Likewise, the reintegration of Chilean diasporans into Chile’s labour market is often accompanied by arduous negotiations with dense and tightly knit reciprocity networks that contest simple claims about diaspora knowledge networks as instigators of change and agents of development. By drawing out some tensions that emerged as a result of the institutional changes this section links back to the network changes that were elucidated in chapters five and six. As explained earlier, the ChileGlobal network operated under the umbrella of Chile’s nation branding agency Fundación Imagen de Chile. As seen in chapter six, one of Fundación Imagen de Chile’s previous CEOs described the role of individual network members in an interview as vehicles of promotion and ambassadors of Chile (Blas Tomic, director, 2013). In other words, the main focus for engaging with company owners, entrepreneurs and executives shifted as the key motivation was to generate and circulate a particular country image of Chile and to use members of the ChileGlobal diaspora as devices and points of reference.

However, being assigned the role of ambassador or vehicle of promotion whose function revolved around representing Chile constituted a shift that did not sit well with the ambitions and aspirations of long-standing members of the network. As described in chapter four, during the early years, the overall focus of the network rested on drawing in Chileans with expertise in key technologies, as well as Chileans with experience in developing scalable companies. Yet as Canada-based senior executive manager Manuel, who was approached by the Chilean consulate in Toronto to join ChileGlobal recounts, the purpose of contacting executive level managers and entrepreneurs was not exclusively informed by capturing entrepreneurial expertise, but also served more mundane representative reasons. Attending meetings with the intent to not only advance his portfolio, but also to modernise recycling techniques in Chile with the prospect of offering support in setting up a venture in Chile, senior executive Manuel recalled with visible dismay his frustration and disappointment about feeling used as a tool for domestic politics:
While the president in Chile was Mr. Lagos\textsuperscript{26} we [ChileGlobal members] were encouraged to fly to Santiago de Chile to have tea one evening with Mr. Lagos. And yes, everybody understood that was a big honour to sit down and have a cup of coffee or have a cup of tea with the president of the country. I mean, that was of no interest to me at all. Just travelling down from here to Chile to just sit there for an hour or two maybe and get my picture taken with the president of Chile for whatever political purposes he had in mind was just not attractive to me. And that shows that this was public propaganda in a way of indicating acceptance or in a way of indicating a glorious future to come because this guy in North America wants to help us but I wasn’t interested in the pictures, I was interested in doing something.

Manuel, senior executive, 2013

Manuel’s frustration highlights the clear discrepancy that exists in a diaspora integration model that seeks to combine objectives of country representation through public diplomacy, and leveraging the expertise, skills and knowledge of overseas Chileans. Manuel’s quote is clearly indicative of how changes in the rules of engagement may jeopardise the initial, albeit partially economic, commitment of diasporans to their country of origin in a post-dictatorial context. Indeed, the notion of nation branding revolves, not only around creating and promoting positive country representation to external markets, but also to generate national cohesion and is a domestic politics tool to create a sense of citizenry, national pride and nationhood in the home country (Barr, 2012; Huang, 2011; Jansen, 2008). The rift between the commercial interests of executives on the one hand and the institutional interests of an agency wanting to communicate a particular message to the Chilean electorate on the other hand, revealed the compatibility issues between ChileGlobal’s objectives that exist as a result of operating under the institutional umbrella of Chile’s nation branding agency.

High-level CEOs and members of the business community felt that an approach that privileges the production of images for political purposes is anathema to the initial conception of ChileGlobal. The level of discontent about the direction ChileGlobal took under Fundación Imagen de Chile rose steadily. Gabriel, a retired US based senior manager, recalled the moment of realising the shift in focus by wrapping up the misconception through stating:

\textsuperscript{26}Ricardo Lagos served as president of Chile between 2000 and 2006.
I had understood that the way we had developed companies in North America ... I had developed whole companies in North America, and the way I had developed businesses in Latin America, at least in three countries in Latin America could be of interest to them, but it was not.

Gabriel, senior manager, 2013

Gabriel’s statement highlights the level of frustration, anger and disappointment that was felt across the board of entrepreneurs who felt they were specifically invited and approached under the pretence of expanding their business ventures to Chile but then realised that their expectation was undermined by the institutional parent which steered the ChileGlobal network towards representational purposes. The sense of disillusion was shared by senior economist Yevgeny Kuznetsov, who was instrumental in orchestrating the emergence of ChileGlobal. After I initiated an email conversation with Kuznetsov to get his view on ChileGlobal’s trajectory, his reply about how the network as it is currently ensconced was brief and resounding. He stated that the transition from Fundación Chile to Fundación Imagen de Chile constitutes the demise of the network in my view as it is no longer capable to turn discussions of possible contributions of the network's members into projects (Yevgeny Kuznetsov, economist, 2012).

The statement of the demise of the network needs to be interpreted against Kuznetsov’s original idea to create new technological alliances between Chile and high-profile Chileans such as senior managers and executives in North America as explained in chapter four. However, the institutional outfit of Fundación Imagen de Chile is not primarily tailored towards engaging members of the Chilean diaspora for reasons of technology and expertise transfer. Rather, Fundación Imagen de Chile’s objective seemed to be geared towards social engineering in the sense that economically, or otherwise, successful Chileans were valued for their representational utility and, were strategically positioned in, for instance, television events as highlighted by Manuel earlier in this section. Kuznetsov’s sentiments also resonate with concerns that were voiced by members of the network back in 2005 who stated that while they were interested and committed to participate in ChileGlobal, the condition was that they did not wish to become embroiled in any political and partisan agenda of any kind. Veronica, a senior executive with intimate knowledge about the early years of ChileGlobal remembered in an interview how during the very first ChileGlobal meeting in California, USA in 2005,
the invited group of Chilean executives, managers and company owners were adamant in 
keeping the network non-political and outside government institutions:

Veronica: ChileGlobal should be apolitical, you see. In Chile that is very 
important. It’s really important, okay! Because in the first meeting, that was 
so important the Chileans there said, if ChileGlobal was going to be 
something depending on the government, they were not going to be in the 
network.

Axel: Was that depending on the government at that particular time of the 
meeting in 2005?

Veronica: Any government. They [Chileans abroad] didn’t want to be with 
CORFO, they didn’t want to be with any minister because there is a lot of 
bureaucracy and also they didn’t have any good experience with any 
government.

Veronica, senior executive, 2012

Veronica’s quote draws attention to how the first group of network members felt clearly 
averse to becoming a part of Chile’s government apparatus. Indeed, a growing awareness 
for the overtly and ostentatiously representative nature of some of ChileGlobal related 
activities has fuelled resentment particularly among the groups of entrepreneurs and 
CEOs who perceived the new direction ChileGlobal was heading towards as largely 
driven and enforced by the branding objectives of Fundación Imagen de Chile.

Ultimately, this particular Chilean example of integrating the diaspora network into a 
country marketing entity, has led to ramifications in the form of a steady decline of 
engagement among exponents of the business sector. The often heralded potential of a 
country’s diaspora to contribute to innovation or human capital development in Chile 
seems to be clearly undermined by the integration of the network into an organisation 
whose purpose is to produce images and words in an attempt to marketise the country. As 
Pedro, a senior manager based in Canada succinctly pointed out, If ChileGlobal is what 
it intended to be in the beginning, then it shouldn’t be about selling Chile to anybody 
(Pedro, senior executive, 2014).

Scepticism about the role and suitability of ChileGlobal to participate and instigate 
meaningful initiatives was not limited to executives. Questioning the overall approach of
ChileGlobal to facilitate exchanges that lead to ventures and economic initiatives, Alexa, a UK-based PhD student of Development Economics cautioned:

I don’t see that ChileGlobal has a major focus or a direct focus in relation to economic initiatives, whether those economic initiatives are from the private sector in Chile or to connect researchers abroad with local companies abroad. I don’t see that happening. And the government, they don’t have a policy about that, they don’t really have something.

Alexa, student, 2013

Indeed, the network’s increasing focus on students, researchers and scientists seemed incompatible with the way diaspora knowledge networks operate. DKNs are often engaged in diverse, cross-sectoral activities that range from “scientific or technological diplomacy” to more informal and “ad hoc consultations in the context of research and development projects” (Meyer, 2011, p. 160). Some of these activities were also part of ChileGlobal activities. However, the lack of a systematic and dedicated approach to facilitate technological, scientific or ideational transfers limits the overall viability of knowledge networks that are a part of a marketisation agency.

8.7. Personal relationships

Related to the institutional barriers mentioned above, are leadership-related challenges that resulted from the relatively high degree of turn-over at executive level at Fundación Imagen de Chile. As stated in chapter six the Chile Project – Country Image began in 2007 and was institutionalised in 2009 with the creation of Fundación Imagen de Chile. Appointed by then President Michelle Bachelet, the project was led by political scientist and former Minister of Foreign Affairs Juan Gabriel Valdés27 who continued to be the director after the project institutionally materialised into Fundación Imagen de Chile in 2009. Valdés was succeeded in his role of executive director by former Vinos de Chile executive René Merino in November 2010 who acted as interim executive director for about six months. After winning the presidential election and taking office in March 2011, right of centre President Sebastian Piñera appointed his personal friend economist Blas

27 Juan Gabriel Valdés is the author of Pinochet’s economists: The Chicago school in Chile (1995). Following her successful campaign for a second presidential tenure Michelle Bachelet appointed Valdés as ambassador to the USA in May 2014.
Tomic to lead Chile’s public diplomacy institution Fundación Imagen de Chile in May 2011.

As expressed in Table 6 below, following yet another presidential election in 2014, the fourth executive director Myriam Gómez was appointed in 2014 thereby replacing Tomic. The appointment of Myriam Gómez as the new CEO of Fundación Imagen de Chile in 2014 also marked the departure of Molly Pollack from her role as director of ChileGlobal, as she was asked to resign in 2015 after heading the network for about 10 years since its inception in early 2005. Reflecting on what she perceived as an eroding process that not only undermined the trust of the executive group of network members, but also her own endurance in advocating for, and explaining the existence and initial cause of ChileGlobal, Pollack stated that in the wake of successive administrative changes at Fundación Imagen de Chile following several presidential elections, she was happy to resign:

The new Executive Director [Myriam Gómez], appointed by the current Chancellor [Michelle Bachelet], asked for my resignation and I was happy because I can no longer continue to deal with each change of authority. There is nothing political in this decision, since I am very much a Bacheletista28 but I am tired of trying to convince each new incoming authority of ChileGlobal’s value for the country.29

Molly, director, 2014

The quote echoes previous conversations in which Pollack commented on the frequent, politically instigated changes at executive level following presidential elections with each new CEO quizzing the purpose and legitimacy of ChileGlobal. Effectively, Fundación Imagen de Chile experienced rapid changes at executive leadership level throughout its infant years with four different executive directors between 2009 and 2014. Once again, going back to the initial idea that underpinned the creation of the network as an independent entity that sits outside the dynamics of partisan affiliations, the quote above

28 Bacheletista = an expression used to indicate an inclination to be in favour of Michelle Bachelet. Likewise, Pinochetista and Pinochetismo are Chilean expressions to refer to persons with a political affinity to Pinochet, or persons with a tendency to endorse the political project and/or ideological programmes Augusto Pinochet represented.

29 This is my own translation of an email Molly Pollack sent to a network member in Canada and copied to me explaining her resignation.
suggests a sustained level of frustration that came as a result of institutional, as well as personnel-related changes that affected the leadership of the *ChileGlobal* network.

Table 6: Fundación Imagen de Chile

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Years served as CEO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Juan Gabriel Valdés</td>
<td>2009 – 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>René Merino</td>
<td>2011 – 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blas Tomic</td>
<td>2011 – 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myriam Gómez</td>
<td>2014 – present</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source*: generated from Fundación Chile and interviews

Indeed, the different CEOs of Fundación Imagen de Chile had an often different interpretation of the nature and purpose of the network. For example, the first director of Fundación Imagen de Chile, Juan Gabriel Valdés, took a more hands-off approach and regarded the *ChileGlobal* network after its transition from Fundación Chile as a semi-independent unit. In contrast, the incoming director Blas Tomic heading Fundación Imagen de Chile took a more micro-management approach and sought to be involved, not only in strategic decisions, but also in more mundane and administration-related tasks such as the design and distribution of *ChileGlobal* leaflets (Mariana, administrator, 2013). As mentioned earlier, the head of Fundación Imagen de Chile was rather critical of the way the network was originally positioned, envisioning a more depersonalised and decentralised network. Musing over the well-known close relationship between Chile’s President at the time Sebastian Piñera and the director of Fundación Imagen de Chile, one of the early network members, Juan, a Texas based consultant speculated that a more hands-on approach may have been motivated by interests that sit outside the immediate group of people around *ChileGlobal* and Fundación Imagen de Chile ‘*I think Piñera is not very excited about the network*’ (Juan, consultant, 2012).

It was around 2012, when the working relationship between the director of Fundación Imagen de Chile, Blas Tomic and the managing director of *ChileGlobal*, Molly Pollack was increasingly characterised by tensions about the strategic orientation and purpose of *ChileGlobal*. Fundación Imagen de Chile’s director was highly critical of the way the
network was positioned by repeatedly stating that *ChileGlobal is merely a network of Molly’s friends ... that doesn’t really exist* (Blas Tomic, 2013). Unlike the previous director Juan Gabriel Valdés who granted Pollack more autonomy in decision making processes, the existing director Blas Tomic took a more micro-managing approach. The tensions were not only felt across staff at Fundación Imagen de Chile and *ChileGlobal*, but were also felt across network members, in particular, among the group of executives as David, a network member and CEO of an Israel-based Biotechnology company confirmed. He recalled how the pressure to digitalise was asserted through Fundación Imagen de Chile’s director Blas Tomic and was largely seen as creating *personal issues that interfered with the original ethos of the network* (David, CEO, 2012). David’s remarks about the *original ethos* referred to the personalised nature of the network that a digital decentralisation was very likely to undermine.

The relationship between the director of *ChileGlobal* and the director of Fundación Imagen de Chile became increasingly tense. Over the course of nearly four years, both directors had conflicting ideas about the purpose of the diaspora knowledge network *ChileGlobal*. As director of Fundación Imagen de Chile, Blas Tomic was clearly committed to objectives of nation branding, whereas the director of *ChileGlobal*, Molly Pollack, felt loyal towards the objectives of the core group of network members that met in 2005. Some of these complications between the two directors are related to changes that were the result of aligning the *ChileGlobal* network with the objectives of Chile’s nation branding agency. As the following email excerpt from an executive with in-depth knowledge about the network and decision-making processes states, the director of Fundación Imagen de Chile was steering the network into a direction that neither World Bank officials, nor the group of company owners and executives endorsed:

> He [director of Fundación Imagen de Chile] made arbitrary changes that have now led to a network of Chilean students abroad, which is excellent, but it has nothing to do with the principles that guided us in the beginning and in the years following. The result: today we have 1000 members of which the majority are students. It [ChileGlobal] has a very useful digital platform for students, but has had no impact on entrepreneurs and professionals, and less about Chile. Rather, the number of entrepreneurs has declined and they are not active.

Catalina, executive director, 2013
Again, the discrepancies mentioned in this quote arose out of the particular institutional arrangement within which ChileGlobal was a discrete programme within Chile’s nation branding agency, but not independent of it. Related to tensions that arose out of the discrepancy between the objectives of nation branding, and the interests of senior executives, was the increasingly complicated relationship between the director of Fundación Imagen de Chile, and the director of the ChileGlobal network. Exercising leadership over the network was formally in the remit of Molly Pollack, yet integrating and aligning the network with the strategic role of Fundación Imagen de Chile, was a task that was clearly filled and interpreted in expansive ways by the director of Fundación Imagen de Chile. As suggested earlier, Fundación Imagen de Chile’s director was highly critical of the way the network was positioned in the first place and actively worked towards broadening the scope and membership of the ChileGlobal community.

8.8. Summary

The results presented in this chapter indicate that the longevity of the presented activities and contributions from ChileGlobal members are contingent upon forms of institutional support and socio-cultural particularities in Chile. In summary, these results suggest that claims about the transformative role of diaspora knowledge networks in development processes need to be taken with care. Presenting these networks as agents of development that generate knowledge flows, often obscures that highly mobile diasporans are just one element of a larger chain of actors, institutions and processes that mediate the circulation of knowledge (Friesen & Collins, 2016; Hughes, 2007). Equally important, albeit often neglected, are home country-specific considerations such as socio-cultural practices that call for an assessment that takes into account how the spaces of knowledge transfer are not only shaped by elite members of the diaspora and formal institutions. Rather, recognition is needed to understand how knowledge transfers are shaped by home country communities, co-workers and, more generally relatively immobile populations (Greiner & Sakdapolrak, 2013, p. 376).

The attempts to reimagine Chile’s diaspora in the words of Fundación Imagen’s former director as vehicles of promotion and to render diasporic communities more visible for the purpose of nation branding processes clearly conflicted with the vested interests and
agendas of those remaining executives wanting to engage for reasons of either business expansion, collaboration or consultancy work. The ChileGlobal network became an outlet for promotional narratives rather than a resource pool of expertise for organisations and agencies working in knowledge intensive areas in Chile. The notion of disseminated assets that are integrated in marketing strategies, has truly given new meaning to diasporic contributions to development in the context of Chile. At the same time, however, the experience of some ChileGlobal members suggests that the role of brand ambassadors has created feelings of alienation, grievances and frustration in that members felt deceived and lured into the network under the pretence of enacting collaborative business ventures. In particular, the group of high-level executives felt resentment as the core focus of the network has shifted from welcoming distinctive contributions, proposals and the development of human capital, to the mere function of representation, including the involvement in partisan politics.

The second theme this chapter teases out, highlights the convoluted nature of integrating diasporans into the Chilean labour market and concomitant complications in the transfer of knowledge. Unlike idealistic assumptions that envisage the spread of knowledge at the speed of light, “knowledge transfer usually travels at the speed of a donkey” (Denning, 2002, p. 240). Knowledge transfers are mediated through deeply embedded sets of socio-cultural norms and practices in Chile, even more so considering the post-dictatorial trajectory and concomitant tensions that still exist and permeate social relations in Chile. This insight is of particular importance for a more nuanced understanding of the potential of diasporic contributions to development. Both of these reasons, Chile specific sentiments that are grounded in particular historical and political events since 1970 as well as elite type notions of distrust in relation to the possible reproduction of the social inequalities in combination with ingrained patterns of social norms that will be presented in the next section and a lack of systematic integration with supporting policies and institutions challenge and hinder the implementation of ideas that derived from members of the ChileGlobal community.
Chapter Nine: A discussion of the ambiguities and elusiveness of diasporic contributions to development

9.1. Introduction

The previous three chapters have provided distinctive, yet interrelated narratives about how the ChileGlobal community has changed over the course of nearly ten years. This chapter discusses these findings along the lines of three major themes that have been identified. The first theme that emerged as critical was the institutional change that saw the ChileGlobal network become part of Chile’s nation branding agency. The result of the institutional relocation was a change in network constituency, evolving practices of resistance and new forms of relationships between different networks, institutions and domestic policy proposals in Chile as described in chapter six. The second important theme coalesces around emerging forms of repoliticisation that occurred as a result of appropriation during which localised networks utilised the ChileGlobal space for contesting domestic policies. As suggested in chapter seven, the institutional change described earlier, produced spaces of contestation and dissent that transformed the network from an economic to a political actor. The third theme that was teased out in chapter eight brings together a mix of formal and informal institutions to outline existing barriers in the transfer of knowledge as practised in the context of ChileGlobal.

The three themes have conceptual, theoretical and practical implications. The first part of this chapter contextualises the institutional change by arguing that the impetus for the changes that preceded moments of repoliticisation, is rooted in competing and overlapping interpretations of the network. The translation of concepts, such as nation branding to Chile, overlapped with, linked into, and transformed the ChileGlobal community in far-reaching ways. In this context, translation is inspired by Callon’s (e.g. 1986a; 1986b, 1999) understanding of how concepts travel and how heterogeneous alliances are crafted through means such as coercion, seduction or solicitation. Yet, at the
same time, attempts of creating alliances may fail, and existing networks may just as well dissipate and lead to the emergence of new groups and forms of often temporary coalitions (Horowitz, 2012). The rise and incorporation of new collectives with different interests, such as localised networks of students, researchers and other occupational groups, transformed the purpose of *ChileGlobal* significantly. The transformation is not only important to understand the ways non-state actors engage with diasporic communities, but also to recognise how different side effects are continuously produced in the context of development and diaspora.

The second part builds on the insights of part one by explicating the consequences of multiple and overlapping problematisations that triggered a number of profound changes in how *ChileGlobal* operates. By discussing the transformations within the *ChileGlobal* diaspora against a reconceptualised understanding of the ‘anti-politics machine’ (Büscher, 2010; Chhotray, 2007; Ferguson, 1990), the main message of this part asserts that development projects may become sites of repoliticisation, rather than depoliticisation. This re-articulation is important for understanding how contemporary development initiatives do not necessarily have to follow the logic of an ‘anti-politics machine’ that inevitably depoliticises everything it touches, everywhere it goes. Instead, the trajectory of *ChileGlobal* suggests that diaspora strategies are not only producing responsibilised overseas citizens as posited by strands of the governmentality literature that emphasises the “mobile governable subject of migration-development” (Raghuram, 2009, pp. 109-110). Rather, a nuanced extension of ‘anti politics machine’ highlights how attempts to govern and control overseas collectives may generate ambivalent consequences such as complicity, appropriation and resistance.

Finally, part three discusses the barriers that were identified in the transmission of diasporic knowledge and expertise to Chile. Part three makes specific reference to both, formal institutions and informal institutions such as place-specific norms that mediate the translation of knowledge and skills into Chile. Taken together, these three components allow for a critical understanding of the largely malleable nature of diaspora knowledge networks and, are thus suited to better understanding the limits and opportunities behind bold representations of diaspora networks as agents of development.
9.2. Institutional changes

Chapter six has explained how ChileGlobal’s relocation away from Fundación Chile to Fundación Imagen de Chile, constituted an institutional change that largely instigated the transformation of the network and its constituency. The concept of translation in its broadest sense allows for understanding how ideas, objects and concepts travel, and emphasises the very real probability that ideas may get changed and edited as they move from one place to another (Powell, Gammal, & Simard, 2005, p. 233). More specifically, the notion of translation alignment draws attention to the compromises that underlie the formation of new groups as a result of translating and instituting development ideas (Horowitz, 2012). Diaspora networks, such as ChileGlobal, are spaces within which various alliances are continuously negotiated, formed and reversed, and often occur against the backdrop of multiple struggles, such as defining national development objectives and the role diasporic actors play within those. The attempt to form relationships between concepts such as nation branding, competitive identity and national development, led to the creation of Fundación Imagen de Chile that subsequently linked into the ChileGlobal network leading to new encounters that changed the network in far-reaching ways (Malecki, 2014).

Assessing the trajectory of the ChileGlobal network through the lens of competing and overlapping translations of distinct concepts, allows for a more nuanced understanding for how some ideas fail to materialise into institutions, while others, such as nation branding, become institutionalised (Czarniawska-Joerges & Sevón, 2005). Tracing the translation of Knowledge for Development via Chilean diaspora communities has revealed how the meaning and significance of development strategies and their constituent components can be repurposed, “altered, and indeed splintered” (Olds, 2005, p. 170). For example, ChileGlobal’s relocation to Fundación Imagen de Chile and subsequent re-interpretation as a network of talents acting as a vehicle of country promotion, reconfigured the meaning of diaspora as country ambassadors for Chile. As a consequence of re-interpreting and prioritising the role of diaspora groups as country ambassadors rather than agents of knowledge transfer, the network increasingly enrolled new members and organisations to stabilise the ChileGlobal network as a conduit for channelling and disseminating a particular country image.
More importantly, drawing on the notion of translation constitutes an original insight that adds depth and perspective into understanding the reasons that underlie often cited problems in the context of diaspora for development, such as the lack of institutional coherence and policy continuity (ADPC, 2011; Agunias, 2009; IOM, Naik, Koehler, & Laczko, 2008). The institutional change was key to the (trans)formation of the diaspora collective ChileGlobal and a pivotal point for moments of resistance to occur as new groups with particularistic interests entered the network. The point to note is that the government’s interpretation of diaspora groups privileged the representational value of Chile’s diaspora over their role of knowledge-bearers. The ostensible instrumentalisation of the Chilean diaspora demonstrates how strategic interests that guide governments’ interaction with their respective diaspora constitute undermining factors for more successful collaboration between diaspora groups and their country of origin (Brinkerhoff, 2011).

Understanding the institutional change as a product of simultaneously occurring problematisations, allows for seeing how the implementation of particular concepts change, not only the meaning of the concept, but also the social actor that is translating it (Czarniawska & Sevón, 2005, p. 10). Specifically, attending to the institutionalisation of the ChileGlobal network under Chile’s nation branding institution, revealed the processes through which an economic actor may become a political actor. The historic structure of ChileGlobal was changed and re-arranged quite simply because every act of translation generates a new set of challenges, encounters and responses (Bliss, 2013, p. 439). Essentially, the introduction of nation branding into Chile led to the incorporation of diasporic communities that were tied to ChileGlobal into a new institutional public-private framework. As a result, the knowledge-brokering role of ChileGlobal demised, and newly created groups utilised the network’s resources for forging new relationships and eventually contesting public policy in Chile.

9.2.1. Understanding network changes

This section argues that the ChileGlobal network, as a mechanism for transferring entrepreneurial knowledge, largely unravelled through the simultaneous enactment of two distinctive policy initiatives. The institutionalisation of nation branding in Chile through
the creation of Fundación Imagen de Chile (Aronczyk, 2008; Niesing, 2013), and the introduction of the Becas Chile scholarship scheme (OECD & World Bank, 2010a) influenced the ChileGlobal network in profound ways, and largely rendered the role of diaspora members as knowledge agents, irrelevant. The creation of Chile’s nation branding agency was, in itself, an attempt to translate country marketisation ideas promoted by foreign consultancy firms. In broad terms, the goal was to reimagine Chile’s society and identity along the ideas of a new Chileanness that was to be circulated as part of a wider strategy grounded in the construction of a competitive country identity (Anholt, 2007). Through concerted activities such as seminars, surveys, public consultation, and campaigns throughout the country, the message about the need to promulgate a competitive national identity for national development purposes was spread and gained currency. Eventually, the valence of the concept nation branding was commonly accepted and acted upon by making and circulating a new Chileanness (Larraín, 2011).

The institutionalisation of the concept nation branding, primarily driven by foreign consultancy experts in conjunction with the government, not only overlapped, but more importantly, competed with a particular translation of the concept of diaspora integration as advocated by proponents of diaspora knowledge networks (IOM & MPI, 2012; Kuznetsov, 2006c, 2013; Meyer, 2011; Meyer & Wattiaux, 2006; Plaza & Ratha, 2011). Instead of following the path, as envisaged by best practice accounts of integrating diaspora communities in national development policies, ChileGlobal became a conduit for multiple flows of information, narratives, images and additional translations as new inscriptions and occupational groups were enrolled to position Chile within globalising “image circuits” (Stillerman, 2010, p. 209). The incorporation of the ChileGlobal diaspora into an institutional framework designed to create and transmit a country narrative and identity, occurred at the expense of the ability to leverage diaspora communities for their expertise, knowledge and professional networks.

As illustrated in Figure 9 below, promoted by the World Bank, the ChileGlobal network was the result of problematising brain drain and the lack of innovation in Chile and responded to the longstanding and overarching concern of the Chilean Government to enter the so-called knowledge economy (Araneda & Marín, 2002; IDB, 2010; Mullin et al., 2000).
Figure 9: Sketching competing translations

The establishment of a DKN was presented as a solution to the lack of innovation and garnered initial, yet temporary, institutional support from Fundación Chile. By the same token, the idea of nation branding arrived in Chile and culminated in the creation of Fundación Imagen de Chile which subsequently integrated and usurped the *ChileGlobal* network, widened its membership base to enact somewhat extractive relationships with network members in order to promote a particular Chilean identity. Broadening the
The institutional framework in which the *ChileGlobal* network was embedded, was clearly at odds with Kuznetsov’s (2005) original idea of revitalising technological alliances between Chile and the USA, and envisioning diaspora groups as actors that could unlock and transform national innovation systems by the sheer force of their professional and entrepreneurial expertise. Instead of acting as bridges to foreign markets (Bargava, Sharma, & Salehi, 2008; IOM & MPI, 2012) and opening up domestic innovation systems, diaspora members were rendered country representatives whose life narratives and professional biographies added the necessary grip to country marketing campaigns. The instrumental reasons diaspora members were supposed to fulfil were modified and gained a more extractive sense, as the representative role of Chileans in the diaspora was given more importance over their now side-lined role as instigators of change, as often advanced by diaspora-development literature (Brinkerhoff, 2008a; IOM, 2013; Kuznetsov, 2006c; Newland, 2010; Sharma et al., 2011). However, as outlined in chapter seven, the co-optation of senior managers for country branding campaigns, including the participation in television events showcasing their economic success abroad to a domestic audience, was equally doomed to fail, as the vast majority of entrepreneurs refused to be enlisted for promotional activities.

The insight that multiple translations between different institutions and people produced a number of side effects and conflicts has important implications. The problematisation of Chile’s country image generated tensions that put a wedge between the original component parts of the network, such as the group of executives and diasporic knowledge for development at one end of the spectrum, and an increasing number of students, researchers and other professionals at the other end. The initial, and temporarily successful alliance following the translation of Diaspora for Development discourses in Chile, was gradually undone, as a number of company owners and entrepreneurs resisted fulfilling the role they were imputed to, under attempts to translate *ChileGlobal* as a tool.
for country marketing purposes. The durability of initially powerful coalitions comprising resourceful actors such as CEOs with extensive relational, political and economic capital, is not only a precarious and contingent achievement, but is also often challenged in unexpected ways (Horowitz, 2012; Latour, 1986). In this context, Diaspora for Development was rendered incompatible under the institutional umbrella that was put in place after the adaption of nation branding. This altered the network in the sense that CEOs, tied to the network via “technologies of seduction” (Weisser et al., 2014, p. 115), such as the prospect of business ventures withdrew from ChileGlobal as the initially expressed mutual interests have been made incompatible under the new institutional framework. The retreat of many CEOs that were enrolled and represented as main allies to achieve knowledge transfers, rendered the pursuit of objectives, as enunciated under the World Bank’s Diaspora for Development programme, unrealisable.

However, the practice of translating new ideas, concepts and practices across space, is not a one-dimensional affair, because “some things are gained while others are lost” (Horowitz, 2012, p. 821). The practices of network expansion through sine qua non conditional funding, led to new impulses and new chains of actors stirring change, because each new actor’s specific intentions and endeavours transform the set of ideas that guided the original translation of a concept, or practice (Hansen & Salskov-Iversen, 2005, p. 232). The adoption of new ideas, such as diaspora knowledge networks, carries the risk that recipient communities may attribute different meaning to them (Powell et al., 2005). As seen in earlier chapters, the new groups of Chileans, ideas and interpretations that populated the ChileGlobal landscape were effectively attributed the capacity to appropriate the hybrid public-private space of ChileGlobal through a series of new sets of relations, connections and, indeed, disputes. The institutional transformation of ChileGlobal is, on the one hand, indicative of the creative destruction of institutional frameworks pertinent to the relationship between states and their diasporic populations (Gamlen, 2012a). On the other hand, the institutional transformation eventually enabled resistant forms of citizenship, as discussed in the next section. As such, the institutional transformation provided an outlet for the growing discontent of network members, which is in part reflective of the continuous divarication between regimes of governance and diasporic groups over emerging configurations, meaning and content of membership and identity (Brand, 2014, p. 62). The consequences of the institutional changes were far-ranging as the concept of Knowledge for Development (K4D) as advocated by the World
Bank (1999) was altered and became of secondary importance. Not only was the Chilean rendition of Diaspora Knowledge for Development side-lined, but eventually faltered under a new powerful coalition of public and private interests dedicated to country branding that garnered enough support to become formally institutionalised. The diaspora knowledge network *ChileGlobal* was effectively undone and is testament to howevery act of emulating concepts across space produces challenges, encounters and resistance (Bliss, 2013, p. 439; Callon, 1991, p. 152; Horowitz, 2012, p. 821).

The implications of the institutional change outlined above, are a more layered and locally grounded understanding of how diaspora-related engagement practices in the context of national development aspirations are not only diffused by ideas of some collective Latin American identity as recent research suggests (Délano, 2014). Instead, the Chilean example is rather indicative of how the diffusion of diaspora institutionalisations is inextricably linked to evolving processes of state marketisation. More importantly, the institutional trajectory of *ChileGlobal* provides insight into the complex entanglements that emerge when governments enact policies apposite to national development objectives. For example, diaspora networks are typically seen as actors that reside outside the very systemic structures they are affecting (Varadarajan, 2010, p. 31). Yet, the complex institutional interplay of state agencies, multilateral development institutions and private institutions, of which *ChileGlobal* is a part, gives reason for cautioning against neat, clear-cut categorisations. Portraying diaspora networks as sitting outside of the relevant structures they are affecting, neglects how these networks are part of a melange of governmental institutions, indeterminate organisational forms and private interests.

The emergence of Fundación Imagen de Chile was, in itself, a process of replicating international best practice in the context of nation branding in order to complement Chile’s foreign policy objectives of internationalising the country’s economy and solidifying Chile’s status as a member of the international community (Jiménez-Martínez, 2013). Countering Chile’s dictatorial past, the notion of competitive identity problematised Chile’s international image and offered an alternative modern narrative aided by successful overseas Chileans. What is novel, then is that the institutionalisation of diaspora relations occurred under a framework mandated to managing Chile’s image, and which positioned diasporic communities, not only as knowledgeable subjects, but also, and primarily as country representatives.
Thus, the *ChileGlobal* community became, at least temporarily, complicit in framing and transmitting a particular kind of knowledge about a new and progressive Chile. The insight of shifting a diaspora project that emanated from a World Bank initiative, speaks to how hybrid transnational organisational forms such as diaspora networks are part of globalising structures that may perform an important role in support of a state’s developmental interest (Hansen & Salskov-Iversen, 2005, p. 229). The *ChileGlobal* network was positioned in a unique institutional form to perform a role within a public-private organisation tasked with a service that is often considered to be in the remit of the government (White, 2015). However, as seen in chapter seven, and as discussed in the next section, the initial complicity of *ChileGlobal* members, as well as the absence of political determinations was only temporary. The important point to note is that the *ChileGlobal* network as a mechanism to transfer diaspora knowledge, ceased to exist.

### 9.3. Making sense of, and building a case for repoliticisation

Building on the previous section, this section argues that the institutional change discussed above, led to moments of political appropriation and ultimately the repoliticisation of development. Chapter seven concludes by stating that senior World Bank economist Yevgeny Kuznetsov, who was instrumental in setting up the network, and *ChileGlobal’s* long-standing director Molly Pollack, considered the way *ChileGlobal* is currently run, a failure of the overall project of establishing a Chilean diaspora knowledge network. Both protagonists shared the view that *ChileGlobal* has failed its original objectives. The view that the *ChileGlobal* network in its current institutional setting, and its *modus operandi*, constitutes yet another failed development project, can only be understood if measured against original intentions as spelled out by Kuznetsov (2005, 2006a) and Pollack (2011) who intended to create a network of highly influential Chileans for innovation and knowledge transfers.

However, the very notion of *success* versus *failure* is problematic, and attention should be given to the interpretation of outcomes because “projects may have positive effects while being declared, or declaring themselves, as failures” (Mosse, 2005, pp. 18-19). Indeed, chapter three has argued that contrasting the notion of *failure* with representations of unintended effects and activities seen through the lens of a revised reading of ‘anti-
politics machine’ suggests the ChileGlobal diaspora knowledge network can be seen as a site that opened up ‘new’ spaces of contestation. The findings presented in chapter seven clearly indicate that ChileGlobal’s expansion and change of constituency, something that the two network creators considered a failure, has actually produced resistance and instances of politicisation.

To better understand the evolving repoliticisation, it is critical to remember how the early incarnation of the network is congruent with various accounts of anti-politics scholars (e.g. Huber & Joshi, 2015). As explained in depth before, the network was set up and funded by the World Bank with a distinctive focus on elite-driven transfer of expertise and as a tool for opening up Chile’s national innovation system. Framing the solution to the problem of a lack of innovation, was to occur through new technological alliances between the USA and Chile outside state institutions. Simultaneously to the problematisation of Chile’s lack of innovation, a powerful problematisation of Chile’s country image entered the country and, endorsed by the Chilean government and Chile’s export sector institutionalised through the formation of Chile’s nation branding institute Fundación Imagen de Chile (Niesing, 2013, pp. 100-110).

However, the materialisation of the concept K4D remained at best ephemeral and rather incomplete, at least in comparison to other examples of reference, such as often cited diaspora initiatives of Asian countries where diaspora groups were lauded as agents of development (Agarwala, 2016; Pande, 2014; Saxenian, 2002, 2006; Yong & Rahman, 2013). Instead, a competing, and in the context of Chile, more powerful concept materialised and morphed into the public diplomacy agency Fundación Imagen de Chile. Public diplomacy is “the process by which direct relations are pursued with a country’s people to advance the interests and extend the values of those being represented” (Sharp, 2005, p. 106). In hindsight, it appears that Chile’s government’s prioritisation of public diplomacy through branding strategies, and the subsequent integration of ChileGlobal into Chile’s nation branding institution, were key decisions that ultimately led to the provision of resources for diasporic groups.

The need to brand Chile for reasons of national development was presented as a truism to which there is no alternative, which created a curious consensus of various private and state institutions alike (Larrain, 2011). The incorporation of groups and actors with
different agendas and motives can lead to bifurcations within the network, which may consequently lead to new topics, discussions, themes and translations (Latour, 2005, p. 128). That is precisely what happened in the context of the different networks associated with ChileGlobal. A contentious proposal entered the network and stirred up dissonance with the result that recently enrolled groups, utilised material and non-material infrastructure provided by ChileGlobal to mobilise against what they interpreted as yet another step towards the economisation of the public sector. Taking a closer look at the different groups that populated the network since 2009, the encounters that were generated and the ensuing activities, suggest that the evolving ChileGlobal network was no longer defined by a non-political logic, as often favoured and engineered by donor institutions. Rather, the network seen through a lens that acknowledges the “multiplicity and contestability of situations” (Barry, 2012, p. 331) draws attention to the different sites and interests that are tied to various groups, individuals and institutions with often conflicting agendas as the next two sections demonstrate.

9.3.1. Reappraising side effects of ‘failure’ through unravelling the ‘political’

Conceptualisations of the interrelation between space, place, mobilisation and resistance in the context of diasporic communities, highlight the need to go beyond essentialist notions underpinning the formation of critical diaspora groups and, instead, consider specific processes of mobilisation as foundational (Koinova, 2016; Sökefeld, 2006). As seen in chapter seven, the specific processes and moments of diasporic mobilisation in around ChileGlobal posit that the formation of a critical transnational community is not a natural outcome of displacement, circular or temporary migration. Instead, the emergence of a critical identity and ensuing resistance occurred in response to a particular political moment in Chile after leaving the country and demonstrates that diasporic mobilisation is often the direct outcome of a specific set of political struggles and circumstances (Chaudhari & Moss, 2016, pp. 16-17; Sökefeld, 2006, p. 280). As a result, this thesis asserts that one of the side effects of what was considered ‘failure’, generated political mobilisation which led to forms of diasporic resistance.

Resistance in the context of this thesis is loosely informed by an understanding of resistance as appropriation, subversion and re-envisaging, rather than outright refusal.
(Pfeffer, 2014, pp. 10-15). As seen in chapters six and seven, localised groups were co-created through material and non-material resources of ChileGlobal, but eventually co-opted a space that was designed for the transfer of resources such as knowledge and expertise before it morphed into a site of representation. The rise of resistance within groups that were supported and partly funded by ChileGlobal suggests an antagonism in the sense that political mobilisation may be directed against, and is critical of, institutions in the political realm, but does not exist in splendid isolation of those. As seen in chapters six and seven, the different means of infrastructural and monetary support for nationally focused networks were important to tie the different localised groups to the ChileGlobal landscape. More importantly, however, the diverse forms of support provided the necessary structural base needed for mobilisation. Therefore, the ChileGlobal network was highly implicated in the formation of critical transnational collectives, because mobilisation requires structural and contextual conditions that act as enabling components for the communication and dissemination of issues, as well as for the formation of organisations (Baser, 2016; Sökefeld, 2006; Tarrow, 2011).

Yet moments of contestation and disputes hardly ever revolve around one specific problem such as the announcement of cross-ministerial relocation of a certain commission, such as CONICYT. Rather, contestations are part of a chain of conflicts that arise at particular points in time, at distinctive locations and evolve for the most part, separate from each other (Barry, 2012, p. 332). Being attentive to the temporal specificity and the situated circumstances of ChileGlobal’s transformation from an economic actor to a political broker is important for understanding the evolving repoliticisation as embedded in, and imbricating multiple, often ongoing struggles. The case of ChileGlobal goes some way to confirm existing work about how states position their overseas populations following a particular rationality of creating, representing and normalising diasporic subjectivities as responsibilised actors conforming to norms of state marketisation as highlighted in chapter two (Gamlen & Marsh, 2011; Larner, 2007; Pellerin & Mullings, 2013; Ragazzi, 2009). In particular, the transition to Fundación Imagen de Chile, as described in chapters five and six, signified a move that is suggestive of how non-state actors are increasingly complicit in constituting diasporic subjects as partners in globalising the national development strategies of their home countries. Encouraged to meet and institutionalise their activities through localised networks,
Chileans affiliated to *ChileGlobal* were presented as entrepreneurial and knowledgeable talents to an international and domestic audience alike.

The decision to incorporate *ChileGlobal* into Chile’s nation branding institution was owed to the calculative rationality of capitalising on the ostentatious representation of *talented Chileans* both nationally and internationally. As such, the idea of appropriating Chileans may be seen as a technology that seeks to organise activities and organisations around the central concept of entrepreneurial subjects (Weidner, 2011). However, this thesis demonstrates how attempts to govern and control off-shore communities do not only lead to particular forms of governance, but also generate unexpected forms of resistance in the context of domestic policy deliberations. Research has demonstrated how practices of resistance and non-compliance may occur when states seek to constitute governable subjects, either in the context of diasporic communities (Kunz, 2008, pp. 17-18), or community forest management (Li, 2007a, p. 269). Indeed, the very idea of governing at a distance relies on antagonisms and requires practices and forms of politicisation to normalise entrepreneurial and responsibilised subjectivities (Foster, Kerr, & Byrne, 2015, p. 134). For example, contemporary forms of depoliticisation rely on shifting responsibility for certain policy fields to the individual, or an organisation outside the realm of the state. Devolving responsibility for particular policy fields from the state to private organisations, may render these non-state organisations political in the sense that they constitute sites within which politics and a form of governance play out and converge (Foster et al., 2015, p. 131). As such, politicisation is intimately linked with, and often occurs within the framework of contemporary forms of depoliticisation.

However, and this is an important contribution to understand, building on the distinction between ‘politics’ and the ‘political’ as sketched out in chapter three, the key insight is that resistance forms of politicisation are constitutive of *political action* as exercised by localised groups within the *ChileGlobal* community. As a result, the forms of resistance and contestation speak to repoliticising a space that was decidedly devoid of political practices and narratives. Crucially, repoliticisation was not informed by a particular political doctrine, nor was the *ChileGlobal* group associated with any political party or actor of sorts, or defined by a distinctive political collectivity, which are important prerequisites that signify *the political* (Agamben, 1993). Rather, mobilisation across the different national networks occurred in the specific contemporary post-political context.
of state politics where the governance and management of the public sector is characterised by a depoliticising “consensualism in policing public affairs” (Swyngedouw, 2011, p. 371). The insight of political mobilisation is, insofar, important as most diaspora-related research remains narrowly focused on how political mobilisation is tied to electoral politics rather than other forms of mobilisation such as non-institutional and organisational forms of action (Chaudhari & Moss, 2016, p. 4).

A consensus-driven approach to politics was a distinctive feature of Chile’s post-authoritarian politics where the governability of the country was privileged over deeply ingrained ideological divisions (Carlin, 2006; Silva, 2004b). The ChileGlobal diaspora differs significantly from Chile’s early diaspora of the 1970s and 1980s that was the product of Pinochet’s violent attempts to eradicate the political Left (Sznajder & Roniger, 2007; Wright & Zúñiga, 2007). As noted in chapter four, Chile’s diaspora primarily comprised members of the political Left that formed solidarity committees and engaged in politics of opposition to contest the military dictatorship. Despite significant factions and conflicts for instance between Communist and Socialist groups, the politically active part of Chile’s diaspora was clearly defined by a distinctive political identity and collectivity that existed independent of, and prior to, engaging in activities of opposition (Harmer, 2016; Isern-Munné, 2004; Joly, 1996; Roberts, 1998). Clearly, the actions of Chile’s traditional diaspora need to be understood as necessarily occurring in the realm of what constitutes politics as the activities and objectives were distinctly positioned along a commonly accepted and definable sense of politics, a sense of politics that is understood as partisan with often conflicting political and evolving interests.

In contrast, through applying a frame of reference that enables an understanding of political action as activities of collectives whose politics “cannot be located and fixed” (Barry, 2001, p. 196), the activities of the ChileGlobal diaspora can be described as inherently political, and thus are representative of repoliticisation. Repoliticisation in this context refers to the mobilisation practices and activities that occurred against the backdrop of, and in response to, mutually reinforcing processes of depoliticisation and practices of governance where “neo-liberal governmentality is made operational through depoliticisation techniques” (Foster et al., 2015, p. 135). However, repudiating any sense of a common and shared political identity, and defying any association with a particular social or political actor, the activities of the group of students, journalists and researchers
behind the ¡Haz tu Voto Volar! campaign and contesting the relocation of CONICYT are truly political, as they opened up a space of contestation through appropriation.

The ChileGlobal network has produced a space of political action because, unlike most social movements, the politics of ChileGlobal’s collective could not be articulated by reference to ‘politics’ and, as such, the activities could not be explained away and discounted by labelling them ‘politics’. The political potency of diasporas has long been recognised, for example in the context of supporting opposition parties in electoral contests (Abbink, 2006), or as a mediator in negotiating political crises between opposition parties and the government of countries depending on the remittances of their diasporas (Hammond, 2012). There are also cases where diasporas are traditionally divided along religious and ideological lines but rally together in support of a particular political party of their home country (Satzbrunn, 2009). What these cases have in common, is that diasporic political activism occurred firmly and decisively within the terrain of politics seen as the machinery of governance as explained in chapter three. Yet, what is conventionally understood as politics, is not inherently political as politics is a set of institutions, technologies and practices designed to intermediate conflicts, and the advancement of partisan interests (Barry, 2002, p. 270; Swyngedouw, 2011, p. 373).

The case of ChileGlobal, however, is distinct as it highlights how diasporic action and demands are political, in that its politics is not locatable and occurs outside the established canon of politics, and through actively evading generally accepted markers as to what constitutes politics. As shown in chapter six, most network members were conscious about the high and increasing degree of politicisation within Chile throughout the Piñera years, and particularly during the first genuine post-authoritarian mass protests that swept the country between 2011 and 2013 (Muñoz-Lamartine, 2012, p. 25). Nevertheless, in the absence of a shared ideological narrative, and unlike traditional political diasporas, the ChileGlobal community was devoid of a common political identity. The focus of the vocal ChileGlobal community rested on pointing out how relocating CONICYT to the Ministry of Economy could increase the risk of commodifying research and science along commercial imperatives. Most students and researchers feared that Chile’s already highly privatised education sector was to become even more organised, governed and evaluated along the logic of economic rationalities if CONICYT was placed under ministerial stewardship of the Ministry of Economy. Returning to the depoliticising nature of ‘anti-
politics machine’ then, more nuanced readings need to account for, how in the process of enacting development initiatives, different relations are constantly reworked and reassessed as the development spaces “become a politically charged arena” (Li, 1999, p. 297). Therefore, the effects of the ‘anti-politics machine’ are far more variegated and necessarily contain elements of resistance (Huber & Joshi, 2015; Li, 1999, 2007b).

The findings, so far, support work that stresses the highly historicised and contingent nature of political mobilisation in the context of diasporic formation and mobilisation as the response to particular critical events in the home country (Koinova, 2013; Sökefeld, 2006). Beyond that, however, the case of ChileGlobal is instructive of how interstices, within which a particular kind of political action emerges, are actively co-produced through the complex interactions that occur between critical events that unfold in the home country and globally dispersed groups. Parts of the ChileGlobal community transformed from being a representational device for branding purposes into an actor that became political and engaged in transnational diasporic political action.

9.3.2. ‘Anti-politics machine’ revisited

The implication of the rise of forms of resistance and contestation as discussed in the previous section, suggests that a side effect of the World Bank’s K4D programme ChileGlobal is the production of political mobilisation. Without doubt, diasporic spaces are far too often sites that reconstitute and reproduce the given mode of political and economic organisation and often represent a site of stasis (Mullings, 2012, p. 407). Notions of stasis are clearly evident and resonate with this thesis’ findings, for instance when the membership of ChileGlobal is primarily defined by a distinct professional status such as CEOs, or the privilege of receiving overseas education. Beyond that, however, the case of ChileGlobal provides a counter example and an indication about the ambivalences for how diasporic collectives can reconfigure depoliticised spaces and carve out sites of contestation. As seen in chapter seven, the multiple nationally focused networks were actively encouraged to meet and self-organise partly for representational purposes and, as such, were created in an attempt that largely constitutes an act of staging the diaspora (Turner, 2013; Turner & Kleist, 2013). Yet in response to a set of domestic events, local networks not only met for the purpose of generating instances of academic
exchange, but actively engaged in political debates by opposing policy proposals and circulating alternative ideas concerning the governance of research, science and education. Effectively, the attempt to stage the Chilean diaspora led to the appropriation of a site that was designed for a selected group of primarily male, elite-type entrepreneurs and business executives.

To suggest that the *ChileGlobal* network has been translated into a site of political contestation leads to a critical extension of Ferguson’s (1990) ‘anti-politics machine’. True, the particular configuration the network was set up in the first place, clearly signifies an approach that is in line with what is often referred to as the depoliticisation of development, and remains largely congruent with cognate critiques advanced by recent accounts of ‘anti-politics machine’ (Büscher, 2010; Chhotray, 2007, 2011; Huber & Joshi, 2015; Li, 2007a). State and donor-led engagement of diaspora groups for development-related purposes, can surely lead to depoliticisation when newly evolved, diasporic collectives enact new and exclusive sets of relations with national agencies and institutions to frame questions of national development around the lack of entrepreneurship (Marabello, 2013, pp. 216-219). Mindful of the early *ChileGlobal* years, which saw a network that was tailored towards entrepreneurial ends, the subsequent change in the network’s constituency resulted in transforming *ChileGlobal* into a means that helped to organise and channel dissent. As demonstrated in chapter seven, the network was complicit in facilitating activities and practices of resistance against proposed changes to the governance of science and research in Chile.

By analysing the collective practices of resistance against a particular reading of the political, as outlined in chapter three, this thesis claims that what the network’s protagonists considered a project failure, denotes an event that became a key moment for political action. Political, in this context refers to how modes of repoliticisation may alter and transgress the accepted orders of the existing status quo (Swyngedouw, 2011, p. 377). The different networks utilised an outlet that was supposed to brand and marketise Chile for challenging domestic policy proposals and advocating for the extension of voting rights for Chileans abroad. More importantly, however, resistance seen as a form of appropriation, emerged largely outside established institutional frameworks and independent of conventional existing structures that enable activism and provide political opportunity structures, such as unions, NGOs or interest groups. The mobilisation that
occurred around *ChileGlobal* is emblematic for the internal complexities that signify contemporary cross-border activities of networked communities asserting political force (Chesters & Welsh, 2005, 2006).

Bringing together two separately developed bodies of work, such as ‘anti politics machine’ (Büscher, 2010; Ferguson, 1990; Huber & Joshi, 2015), and critical insights about what constitutes the political, and anti-politics as advanced by Barry (e.g. 1999, 2001, 2002, 2012) and Swyngedouw (e.g. 2009, 2010, 2011, 2015) respectively, allows for framing the recent trajectory of *ChileGlobal* as an act of repoliticisation. Resorting to an overgeneralising politics is everywhere has its merits, yet also risks turning politics into an empty category with little analytical purchase. Instead, it is important to carefully trace the relationships that emerge out of encounters between dispersed diasporic groups and specific events in their home country. Tracing iterative processes, such a series of conferences and meetings, as described in chapters six and seven is important to understand how contemporary moments of contestation and perturbation evolve within nested networks and “through the practice of encounter” (Chesters & Welsh, 2005, p. 203). Revealing how the rise and unfolding of contestation is tied to multiple sources of dissent and dispute, means that the importance of contestation is not necessarily defined “by its specific focus, then, but needs to be conceived in terms of its relations to a moving field of other controversies, conflicts and events, including those that have occurred in the past and that might occur in the future” (Barry, 2012, p. 330). Translated into the context of this thesis, the ascent of repoliticisation within the *ChileGlobal* network is not an isolated event that was triggered by the government’s announcement to relocate CONICYT. Rather, the formation of a critical diasporic collective is connected to multiple historical and ongoing struggles in Chile.

Highlighting how the rise of diasporic disputes such as contesting policy proposals and advocating for the extension of voting rights is linked to multiple historical and ongoing controversies, signifies an extension of diaspora-related scholarship in the context of development. Drawing on how the *ChileGlobal* network was complicit in generating resistance among recently emerged diasporic groups to the formation of public policy under the Piñera administration, is a clear indication that “diasporas are becoming [emphasis added] political actors with local and transnational agendas” (Koinova, 2010, p. 149). As a World Bank initiated project, *ChileGlobal*’s transformation from a largely
economic actor to a network that mediated political action challenges the very notion of a one-dimensional ‘anti-politics machine’. Instead, axiomatic claims about an ‘anti-politics machine’ that implacably depoliticises “everything it touches” (Ferguson, 1990, p. xv) require a more nuanced understanding because a key development within the ChileGlobal network revolved, rather unwittingly, around opening up the possibility for disagreement and repoliticisation. The ‘failure’ of ChileGlobal did not only produce truly political effects, but also revealed the largely malleable nature of unintentional side effects in the wake of contemporary development projects. Solely focusing on the presumably hegemonic neoliberal order of things and its complement depoliticisation obscures the often ambivalent, processual and situated consequences and thus, fails to recognise the imbrication of (neoliberal) rule and resistance (Larner, 2000, p. 14).

Claiming that ChileGlobal became a site of political contestation, cautions against assigning inherent properties to any development intervention, project, or programme by labelling them political, technical, depoliticising and the like. As the findings show, the ‘political’ defined as the modes in which “activities or practices become objects of contestation” (Barry, 2001, pp. 5-6) describe that becoming a political actor happened by chance rather than on purpose, or as a result of strategic, calculated planning. The transformation was as much a product of the discord caused by two competing problematisations pertaining to Chile’s national development objectives, as it was the product of being entangled in domestic and cross-national struggles such as pending changes to the governance of research, the lack of a national reinsertion framework, and a traditionally critical and potent diaspora.

Therefore, the repoliticisation of the diasporic space around ChileGlobal is an institutionally, as well as a regionally situated and rather fortuitous event that highlights how the very notion of diasporic and transnational space needs to be seen as a “historically contingent process” (Collyer & King, 2014, p. 15). By extending this insight into the context of development interventions, this thesis argues that notions of depoliticisation and repoliticisation of development do not describe an inherently and necessarily given and stable state of affairs that is the result of any hegemonic order of sort, as conventionally suggested by ‘anti-politics machine’ scholars (Büscher, 2010), but a precarious outcome that needs to be continuously remade to hold. Lastly, giving priority to how political activities are produced, cautions against innate forms of practices of
depolicisation that occur as effects of the complex relationship between governmentality and consolidated neoliberal regimes.

9.4. Socio-cultural norms, institutional bias and the flow of knowledge

The previous sections have discussed two distinctive, yet inter-related themes that speak to the highly complex ways of sustaining diaspora knowledge networks. The last section returns to practical implications of ChileGlobal related programmes to instigate knowledge transfers from the Chilean diaspora to Chile and discusses two barriers that mediate the transfer of expertise and knowledge. As outlined in chapter two, diaspora strategies are often premised on the transfer of knowledge, technology and skills through diasporic collectives. While not disputing the potential for the flow of resources to occur, this section addresses two important barriers that mediate these flows such as socio-cultural norms and institutional bias towards marketing and promotional activities.

9.4.1. Institutional bias

This section links back to implications from institutional changes discussed in the first section of this chapter and presented in chapters six and eight. As stated before, the number of business executives rapidly declined after ChileGlobal’s transition to Fundación Imagen de Chile. Yet a number of around 50 senior executives remained as participating members committed to collaborate with Chilean institutions and agencies. As explained in chapters four and six, the institutional arrangement that saw ChileGlobal becoming a part of Chile’s nation branding institution has not only had altered the constitution of the network, but also reinvented the purpose of diasporic CEOs and senior executives. Rather than engaging with company owners for purposes of knowledge transfers, the new rules of engagement were informed by viewing this particular contingent of overseas Chileans as disseminated assets (Dinnie, 2008).

The notion of disseminated assets refers to re-imagining certain elite type diaspora communities as reputation-enhancing agents that can provide legitimacy to political processes and decisions that occur in the home country. In the language of branding experts, diasporic communities “may be viewed as a pre-existing network of potential
nation-brand ambassadors awaiting activation” (Dinnie, 2008, p. 72). However, in the context of ChileGlobal, the remaining entrepreneurs that were awaiting activation for nation branding purposes were far and few. Instead, most of them resented the idea of becoming embroiled in processes of country representation and even less so when that implied to be involved in national television events with the Chilean president as described in chapter eight. This speaks to the problematic nature of diaspora initiatives that are primarily and unilaterally steered by institutional and state interests (Brinkerhoff, 2011; Kleist, 2014; Sives, 2012).

The rather unique institutional configuration, within which the diaspora network is part of Chile’s nation branding agency seems illustrative for often cited policy incoherencies that exist in the context of diaspora organisations in the sense that institutionalising national development and diasporic contributions to development objectives remain separate terrains of national policy considerations (Kleist, 2014, p. 65). In the case of Chile, the lack of coherence between different policy priorities became particularly evident when the ChileGlobal network was institutionally usurped by Fundación Imagen de Chile rather than being aligned with institutions that were more explicitly situated within Chile’s national innovation strategy such as CORFO. As such, the case of ChileGlobal adds a development and diaspora perspective to the friction that exists between domestic policy sub-systems (Carbone, 2008).

The decision for integrating diasporic communities in an institutional framework that is dedicated to country marketing is characteristic for governments of post-authoritarian societies, to build national unity. Creating a sense of patriotic unity occurs through depoliticising policies and social conflicts pertaining to the relationship between a state and its diaspora to prioritise questions of unity rather than politically charged controversies (W. Jones, 2015, p. 200). However, attempts to generate images of unity about 25 years after Chile’s return to democracy, generated sentiments of reluctance towards being co-opted into the public realm of domestic politics, and resonate deeply with concerns that were voiced by members of the network back in 2005. Informed by experiences of dispossession, political arbitrage and violence of the past, those members stated that while they were interested and committed to participating in ChileGlobal, the condition was that they did not wish to become embroiled in any partisan agenda of any kind. Indeed, as demonstrated in chapters seven and eight, seeking merely strategic
partnerships with, and the concomitant instrumentalisation of, diasporic members have often been an undermining factor for more successful collaboration between diaspora groups and their country of origin (Brinkerhoff, 2011; J. Taylor et al., 2014). A growing awareness for the overtly representative nature of some of ChileGlobal related activities fuelled resentments, particularly among the groups of entrepreneurs and CEOs.

The objective to draw on Chilean expatriates’ experiences, ideas and skills is an ambitious and contentious endeavour in its own right. In the context of Chile, the relationship between parts of the diaspora and government institutions was already strained by experiences of loss, trauma and mistrust of the past. Supposed to be owned by, and responsive to the interests of network members, as envisaged by Kuznetsov (2005) and Pollack (2011), the incorporation of the network into an institution that was driven by branding objectives seemed incompatible with the interests of executive managers. What has enabled the repoliticisation in the first place, has also enigmatically served to confirm the mistrust in political institutions and the government of the group of members that fled Chile throughout the dictatorship years. Chile is often lauded for its institutional stability (Larroulet, 2013). However, there are clear and definable institutional barriers in engaging the group of executives and company managers for the purpose of the knowledge and expertise transfer more effectively.

9.4.2. Invisible ‘actors’ and institutions

In addition to institutional barriers, chapter seven has outlined how less visible actors and informal institutions, such as a particular set of norms embedded in local cultures, influences the reception of both, Chileans returning to their country of birth trying to enter the domestic labour market, and the transfer of skills. More specifically, the findings presented in chapter seven highlight how Chileans feel that distinctive relationships and reciprocity networks mediate the dissemination and integration of diasporic knowledge. This insight points to the shortcomings of most diaspora-related strategies in the context of development that far too often tend to focus on creating incentives for diaspora communities and single out formal institutional factors, such as the main impediment for transfers (Agunias, 2009; IOM & MPI, 2012; Kuznetsov, Nemirovsky, & Yoguel, 2006). Diaspora policies and programmes that narrowly focus on institutional stability and
courting skilled members of the diaspora tend to overlook the importance of local, place-based norms that mediate and shape the integration of, not only embodied knowledge and skills, but also the reintegration of members of the diaspora.

For instance, interns returning to Chile from a stint at USA-based companies commented on how attempts of introducing alternative practices in their work environment in Chile were often met with rejection. Accounts of rejection lend support to claims that the introduction of new ideas or practices through mobile diasporic knowledge workers are clearly mediated by different sets of relationships, not only with co-workers at work places in, for instance the USA, but more importantly also with colleagues at work places back in the home country (Kuschminder et al., 2014, pp. 21-23; Tejada, 2016, p. 198; Wang, 2015, p. 167). As described in chapter seven, the interns’ rather privileged positions at USA-based companies was the result of being embedded in social networks based on kinship ties such as shared language, ethnicity and culture with the Chilean company owners, which rendered hierarchical orders less pronounced. Back in Chile, however, those very same features that positioned interns in socially privileged ways within organisations and companies overseas, were rendered irrelevant. Instead, interns felt their overseas experience often disadvantaged them in a number of ways in the sense that their attempts to alter work practice were met with rejection, often grounded in their junior professional status or alienation from colleagues and co-workers. The experience of Chileans mirrors research that cautions how hierarchies and workplace relations constrain the infusion of alternative practices, new skills and innovations (Connell, 2009, pp. 156-157; Siar, 2014, pp. 212-217).

The encountered limitations in transferring skills to Chile, has important implications for the different ChileGlobal programmes such as the internship scheme at companies in the USA. The very selection criteria that qualifies Chileans to participate in the internship, that is, being early career professionals and having junior status, often also conditions their employability and how alternative practices can be integrated in work-places after returning to Chile to their detriment. The professional experience gained overseas often positioned returning interns at the margins in Chile’s labour market. Experiencing marginality, rather than enhanced employability is, in so far, an extension of existing diaspora scholarship in that overseas work experience is often represented as an advantage for the integration into the labour market (de Souza, 2005). However, in their
recent study, King, Lulle and Buzinska (2016, p. 192) found that “time spent abroad and the possession of “foreign” credentials are often obstacles rather than assets for getting a decent job”. The findings of this thesis clearly add to the growing scepticism, because exposure to alternative work practices and different ways of learning seemed to firstly, correlate negatively with employability prospects, and secondly, with reported distrust and depreciation towards Chileans once they are hired. These narratives challenge some existing claims that construct diasporic returnees as knowledge-brokers that can access, modify and translate tacit knowledge in a culturally reflexive and sensitive way (Faller & Freinkman, 2013; Newland & Plaza, 2013; Williams & Baláž, 2008).

Recognising a diverse set of challenges that mediate the extent to which diasporas engage with their country of origin, a landmark joint publication of the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and the Migration Policy Institute (MPI) (2012, pp. 95-108) outlined, what the two organisations considered to be the main barriers for more effective collaboration with diaspora groups. Identifying issues such as flexible citizenship, political rights, special property rights, tax incentives, portable benefits, and general laws that recognise the diaspora are important barriers in their own right. Granting political rights such as voting rights, resonate to some extent with the Chilean example as seen in chapter seven. Important as they are, these barriers are primarily legalistic in nature and thus fail to address barriers that are grounded in cultural patterns such as work culture, as seen in chapter eight, or other non-legalistic reasons that require a deeper historical, socio-cultural appreciation to understand and address country-specific barriers (Mullings, 2011; Trotz & Mullings, 2013). While returned Chileans often made reference to individual gains such as language acquisition, increased cross-cultural competence, valuing horizontal hierarchies, utilising work time more productively, they found that translating these back into the Chilean context was considerably more difficult and associated with social costs and stigma.

The encountered difficulties highlight that knowledge transfers via returning members of the diaspora is relational and mediated by positionality and social identities (Williams, 2006). Permeating different layers of society, the group of academics, researchers and scientists interviewed noted how a culture of distrust and depreciation towards them ultimately shaped the valorisation of expertise, skills and finding employment more generally in ways that are only scantly covered by existing scholarship on diaspora and
development. On the other hand, the findings of chapter eight clearly signal that the degree of individual embeddedness in the home country determines the extent to which returning members of the diaspora can share and transfer knowledge, skills and resources (Wang, 2015).

Evidently, diaspora knowledge networks operate within a complex array of deeply layered relationships. Diasporic knowledge and expertise does not travel along clear and straight contours as knowledge is socially situated and embedded in, as well as shaped by country-specific histories and norms (McCann, 2010; McFarlane, 2011). Histories and norms implicate the transfer of diasporic knowledge in the context of Chile in profound ways. The histories need to be understood in the particular Chilean context where the notion of rejection is partly grounded in historical distrust towards Chileans returning to Chile in the post-dictatorial era, as seen in chapters four and eight. The mistrust is the residue of the concerted propaganda throughout the dictatorship that portrayed the political diaspora as living a life in ‘golden exile’ (Flores-Bórquez, 2000, p. 220; Wright & Zúñiga, 2007, p. 63). Feelings of rejection and suspicion are rooted in the concerted politics of disinformation and propaganda orchestrated by the military regime between 1973 and 1989 that still echo on in contemporary Chile as felt collectively by the different occupational groups of the ChileGlobal community. While the notion of distrust has been recognised as a constituent part of Chile’s society (Valenzuela & Cousiño, 2000), the experience of members of the Chilean diaspora suggests that distrust is particularly pronounced and expressed towards Chileans from overseas returning to their home country. The Chilean experience of rejection is compounded by the lack of effective intermediating factors that would help to facilitate transfers through specific, perhaps government-led insertion programmes, and a more comprehensive reintegration policy that could champion a culture of acceptance, which is often recognised as a barrier to meaningful transfers of scientific, cultural or entrepreneurial knowledge (Siar, 2014).

The norms, herein *pituto* (Barozet, 2006) that shape the flow of diasporic knowledge, refer to the set of culturally embedded practices as described in chapter eight that take the form of institutions, which regulate social orders such as employment and hiring practices. Seen against the backdrop of regulating conduct, institutions are the rules that are constantly, socially reproduced, thereby enabling, constraining and giving meaning to social practices. These norms effectively constitute “normative and cultural cognitive
elements … that regulate the relations between different places and the flows across different spatial levels” (Etzold et al., 2012, pp. 186-192). The rule and norms are embedded in reciprocity networks that first emerged in Chile in the 1920s and continued to exist through the deep structural transformation of Chile’s society under Pinochet (Adler-Lomnitz & Sheinbaum, 2011; Barozet, 2002). The notion of reciprocity networks is particularly pronounced in the context of Chile’s middle class that evolved within Chile’s public sector and cultivated the formation of clientelistic networks with party representatives and institutional elites to regulate social practices such as securing employment (Barozet, 2006; Salazar & Pinto, 1999).

By extension, diaspora networks that only focus on formal institutions and disregard the social contexts within which transfers occur, are bound to ‘fail’ because they neglect to recognise that social realities are often “peppered with contradictions and complexities” (England, 1994, p. 81). These contradictions and complexities, such as reciprocity networks that mediate the extent to which employment is secured, and employment information is being disseminated outside particular networks, and skills transferred in Chile, ask for re-considering the design of diaspora integration mechanism along lines that account for the complex and locally ingrained relationships that govern social practices. This thesis adds important insights to scholarship on diaspora and development that tends to focus either on corporate elite diasporans on one end of the spectrum, or money remitting low-skilled diasporans on the other end but neglects the relatively large group of members of the middle class (Hickey, 2015).

There is some growing recognition about the need to develop a more supportive policy infrastructure for both, the temporary transfer and permanent reintegration of Chileans from overseas to improve human capital and to enable more effective transfers of skills (Nunez-Parra & Ramos, 2014). As suggested earlier, ChileGlobal was originally positioned outside government organisations, because the initial group of high-profile members were against becoming implicated with any institution that was linked to the government and to avoid state bureaucracies. Deeply rooted mistrust against government entities further complicated the exploration of possible synergies between diasporic communities and state organisations. The lack of addressing historical mistrust more effectively, is compounded by the absence of an encompassing policy, and institutional
infrastructure, which suggests that Chile is lacking a coherent and comprehensive diaspora approach (Doña Reveco & Mullan, 2014, p. 2).

The viability of diaspora networks as development tools has been questioned on grounds of problematic norms and traditions based on class, race and gender differences that impede the translation of diasporic knowledge (Mullings, 2011). Moreover, diaspora initiatives often seem to neglect cultural barriers in their knowledge transfer projects (Conway, Potter, & Bernard, 2012; Kuschminder et al., 2014). Findings that derive from ChileGlobal related programmes are, in some ways complementary of those issues, yet also go beyond social markers such as race and gender by pointing towards scantily understood, and less visible, mediators such as informal social institutions that regulate and order social practices in the context of knowledge transfer and integration of returning members of the diaspora in Chile’s labour market. More importantly, research that links diaspora studies with labour market studies is just emerging as this thesis draws to a close (McGrath, Madziva, & Thondhlana, 2017). Taking a more integrative approach that links disparate fields such as labour market studies and diaspora integration more systematically, is clearly outside the scope of this thesis but is likely to elicit more insights about local barriers to the flow of diasporic knowledge.

Overall, claims around diaspora knowledge networks as tools for development need to be more carefully assessed in relation to their institutional and socio-cultural situatedness. The notion of reciprocity networks is an important one to consider beyond Chile-specific particularities as it speaks to how deeply ingrained place-specific practices mediate the integration of members of the diaspora, and how the translation of knowledge and alternative practices often conflicts and overlaps with historically rooted sentiments, underscoring reasons for rejection. In spite of technological advances, increased selective mobility and the celebration of knowledge transfer as an unproblematic and value-free vehicle to development in the context of diaspora strategies, the notion of locality interpreted as the places in which concepts, expertise and ideas are translated into continuous to be “more rather than less important” (Harvey, 1993, p. 7).

In summary, schematic interpretations of diasporic knowledge transfers that fail to take into account the specific social and cultural peculiarities of the home country seem bound to invoke exaggerated hopes and expectations regarding the role of diaspora knowledge
networks as transformative actors in development processes. Informal and entrenched practices such as the *pituto* are “un flagelo permanente contra el progreso de Chile” – a scourge against Chile’s progress (Cleary, 2009; para. 1) require recognition in the context of transborder flow of resources. Interestingly, as it stands, informal networks of reciprocity cannot be sustained across space via virtual networks or social media, which points to avenues of further research in the context of not only Chile, but other parts of South- and Mesoamerica, where the intersection of development, diaspora networks and reciprocity networks should be studied together to elude a more in-depth understanding. These and other implications are drawn out more systematically in the concluding chapter.

9.5. Summary

The *ChileGlobal* diaspora network that was created in 2005 by the World Bank is not the same as its 2016 version. Multiple, and often competing translations have produced effects that influenced not only the network, but also its growing community in unexpected ways. Throughout its eleven years of existence the *ChileGlobal* network transformed from a highly personalised and integrated network to a reasonably broad organisation, similar to a meta-network that generates encounters and connects a wide variety of groups of people, institutions, regions and topics. Extending the reach to members of the Chilean diaspora that were outside the initial core category generated a number of ambivalent outcomes. Triggered by working in collaboration with CONICYT, *ChileGlobal*’s constituency increased in heterogeneity, as not only students, but also researchers, journalists and other professions joined the network. The increase in heterogeneity led to different interpretations of *ChileGlobal*’s purpose as different members saw the network as a means to advance their particular interests.

The first part of this chapter analysed the institutional trajectory of *ChileGlobal* out of which two insights emerged. The first insight is essentially conceptual as it highlights how through competing and overlapping translations the *ChileGlobal* network was being reimagined and eventually integrated in Chile’s newly established nation branding agency. Directly related to this is the notion that the *ChileGlobal* network in its infancy that comprised individuals and institutions was a relatively powerful actor. Yet power,
and agency for that matter, has to be continuously remade, stabilised and thus remains a precarious achievement, rather than an intrinsic property. For instance, the integrated group of senior executives, company owners, influential World Bank representatives, domestically well-connected Chileans and the very potent discourse of knowledge economy that initially comprised ChileGlobal consist of a potentially powerful and strategic arrangement drawn together by shared interests. However, the overall wealth of a diaspora is by no means a sufficient indicator for its influence on domestic politics (Bekoe & Burchard, 2016). As can be witnessed, this alliance was shattered by the combined force of competing interconnecting translations and their representation as to what the role of the Chilean diaspora entails.

The second part of this chapter builds on the first part through a discussion of the effects and practical implications of competing translations by suggesting the ChileGlobal network has become a site of contestation and resistance. This is an important outcome for two reasons. Firstly, accounts of donor-induced development projects often point out the inherently depoliticising nature these projects are framed around; and rightly so! However, as chapter three argues, those accounts are often guided by dualistic narratives built on notions such as local versus global, agency versus structure, and hegemony versus subordination, which reproduce narrowing binaries at the expense of ambivalence, multiplicity and variegated outcomes of what are essentially complex interactions. Development projects such as diaspora networks do not always follow the script of World Bank economists, nor do they inevitably lead to depoliticisation. Instead they may open up a space of ambivalence within which new, albeit necessarily temporary alliances are forged that through acting in unexpected and unpredictable ways, create new sites of struggle.

Secondly, by applying a reconceptualised understanding of Ferguson’s (1990) ‘anti politics machine’ and by defining the boundaries of what constitutes the political, the more specific implication of multiple, competing and overlapping translation suggests that diaspora knowledge networks may produce sites of repoliticisation. The unintended and often ambiguous side effects that are produced in the wake of development initiatives are neither characterised by their technical properties, induced by some natural law of inevitability, nor are they a co-constitutive part of depoliticisation processes in the context of development. Rather, the new sites that are being produced through a politics of
network expansion are signified by dissent and political action. Political action is understood as those moments of dispute that emerge outside the commonly accepted sense of politics. The particular politics underscoring this dissent cannot be clearly and indubitably positioned, so that disputing public policy proposals and circulating demands for constitutional changes to instigate legislative change in favour of voting rights, go beyond the typical markers of political action such as clashes of “economic interests, state powers or social movements” (Barry, 2001, p. 196).

The third part of this chapter discusses the importance of formal institutions, as well as hidden ‘actors’ and institutions such as norms and networks of reciprocity that mediate the flow of resources such as expertise and knowledge to Chile. Outside the focus on monetary remittances, proponents of diaspora strategies in the context of development tend to overplay the role that expatriates can play in the transfer of skills and knowledge, while underplaying the significance of place-specific regulations such as norms and habits. With particular reference to country-specific forms of reciprocity networks that mediate and order social practices, the findings suggest that in the absence of a more integrated and collaborative approach, the cross border transfers of knowledge, and the reintegration of highly skilled Chileans as promoted by ChileGlobal, are highly elusive.
Chapter Ten: Conclusion

10.1. Introduction

Diaspora knowledge networks are actors that straddle the boundaries of state institutions and powerful policy actors alike sitting at the intersection of multiple and often conflicting, particularistic interests. Researching the diaspora knowledge network ChileGlobal revealed the often fragile nature of supposedly powerful actors in the context of the complex interplay of state objectives, multinational donor agencies, new public-private partnerships and foreign consultants within the terrain of diaspora and development. What started as a highly personalised network operating in the discreet realm of meetings across the USA and Chile, with virtually a hand-picked group of high profile Chileans, was propelled into the open by a powerful ensemble of new institutional actors and processes that generated unexpected and unintentional outcomes.

Contrary to what was envisaged to be an organisation dedicated to opening up Chile’s innovation framework, new institutional forms of engagement not only led to new forms of coercion, governance and control, but also produced forms of complicity, as well as non-compliance and contestation. What seemed like an erratic trajectory of the ChileGlobal network that was the subject of the different interpretations is in many ways representative of the messy reality of development initiatives. The results of this thesis suggest three distinctive contributions that will help to better understand the opportunities and limitations of diaspora groups and yields productive insights for extending conceptual understandings of side effects in development more generally.

Conceptually, this thesis was deliberately framed around an ontology of connections and contiguity that prioritises emergence rather than innate stability of existing structures that often informs research in the context of development. The conceptual framework is situated at the intersection of a more nuanced understanding of ‘anti politics machine’ and the rapidly growing body of literature on politics versus political to reveal new insights about unexpected forms of resistance. Methodologically, this thesis was informed by an epistemological approach that privileges a plurality of meaning and voices, and that
understands social life as signified by degrees of disorder, rather than linearity to retain a sense of evocation in the context of diaspora and migration (Findlay & Li, 1999; Legg, 2005).

Taken together, the conceptual and methodological choices proved critical for investigating the activities, trajectory and effects of the Diaspora Knowledge Network *ChileGlobal*. Both the conceptual and methodological framework were also sound deliberate choices to respond to the aim of this thesis, which revolved around an interrogation of the *ChileGlobal* network to better understand the malleable nature of non-state actors, such as diaspora groups in the context of globalising diaspora strategies. Unpacking *ChileGlobal*, by tracking the encounters and processes the network engendered, was key to uncovering how different actors and collectives “allow themselves to be drawn into ruling assemblages but render these assemblages inoperative by performing alternative registers” (Boyle & Ho, 2016). The remainder of this conclusion proceeds in three parts. The next section teases out the three thesis contributions that emanate from the discussion in chapter nine followed by a section that draws attention to the wider implications of the main contribution by asking and answering the critical *So What?* question that underpins any academic inquiry. The final section returns to the key findings and encourages the search for finding and reclaiming the *political* in the different territories of development.

10.2. Contextualising three distinctive thesis contributions

As stated in chapter one, this thesis responds to calls for investigating how non-state actors are positioned as co-constituents of globalising diaspora strategies (Larner, 2015). The first research question asked how the World Bank initiated diaspora knowledge network *ChileGlobal* contributes to development in Chile and was informed by commonly held assumptions that diaspora knowledge networks do contribute to social and economic development through transfers of knowledge and expertise. The first research question yielded two insights.

Firstly, following the institutional trajectory of *ChileGlobal*, this thesis indicates that governments increasingly mandate hybrid, or non-state actors to position diaspora groups more systematically as representational devices. The purpose of *ChileGlobal* was
increasingly defined along rationalities that are employed to mobilise and manage populations for instilling and conveying a particular sense of *Chileanness*, often accompanied by narratives of economic and academic success, progress and modernity.

In so far, the Chilean example of a diaspora network appears to be congruent with literature that interprets diaspora strategies as a form of neoliberal governmentality that seeks to govern and discipline expatriate groups from a distance (Kalm, 2013; Kunz, 2008; Larner, 2007; Ragazzi, 2009). Instituting a diaspora network under the umbrella of an institute that is dedicated to public diplomacy to circulate particular messages to foreign and domestic public audiences, speaks to the ways of how states create and contract hybrid entities to govern the conduct of complex organisational forms in particular ways through self-management and self-responsibility (Hansen & Salskov-Iversen, 2005, p. 232). However, while the focus on neoliberal forms of globalising governmentality offers a critical framework for analysing the emergence of diaspora strategies, the concept of governmentality is also characterised by limitation to elicit insights in the context of globalising forms of constructing subjectivities (Joseph, 2010). For instance, the focus of most governmentality theorists rests on advanced liberal democracies and tends to ignore how governmental practices informed by principles of liberalism play out outside the territory of mature liberal Euro-American democratic state forms.

Moreover, investigating the emerging relationships between different actors and projects in the context of neoliberal governmentality, may actually illuminate possible forms of resistance and counter-hegemonic practices (Joseph, 2010, pp. 239-243). The case of *ChileGlobal* denotes that the result of positioning diaspora groups along public and visible lines of engagement to enhance a country’s narrative of an internationally competitive and progressive country generated a series of ambiguous and unintentional side effects. The new modalities with which *ChileGlobal* sought to engage a certain part of the Chilean diaspora side-lined not only commercial interests and the circulation of a particular subjectivity, but were instrumental for the rise of collective expressions of discontent. Instead of formalising the institutionalisation of knowledge transfers pertaining to areas of high technology and investment banking, diaspora groups carved out critical spaces of resistance. This thesis then, contributes to a more differentiated understanding of diaspora collectives because it is the first account that responds to
Raggazi’s (2009, p. 392) call for exploring the possible “appropriation [emphasis added] … of the governmental practices” to which diasporas are subjected. Rather than merely black-boxing diaspora initiatives as a particular form of governance, a new understanding of diaspora and development emerges when research seeks to uncover the effects of governmentalising strategies and the ambiguous forms of resistance that are created as attempts to create particular sets of subjectivities unfold.

Secondly, the findings that emerged from the first research question suggest that development discourse and resulting programmes do not always, necessarily and inevitably produce the same outcome. Consequently, their side effects do not have to have depoliticising effects per se. Therefore, this thesis argues that by highlighting the disjunctures and the complex, situated entanglements of events, policy proposals and dispersed communities allows for seeing how spaces of dispute and contention are actively co-produced through the interaction of disparate, yet related elements such as discourses of knowledge economy, political moments, and institutional objectives. The often contingent outcome of development initiatives is a well-documented fact in the context of the messy local realities. Local contexts alter well-intended ideas and projects about generating knowledge transfers, which may have succeeded in foreign localities, but failed to replicate success in different regional and institutional contexts. By the same token, the side effects that are produced by development projects, do not lead to a uniform set of results, such as depoliticisation, but may generate episodes of repoliticisation.

Accepting the notion of contingency in the context of contemporary development practice, implies a differentiation of generalising claims about the totalising effects of neoliberalisation that are often invoked to explain depoliticisation as deliberate and strategic, as claimed by ‘anti-politics machine’ writers (Büscher, 2010; Huber & Joshi, 2015). Instead, attending to the specific sites that were strategically crafted by donor agencies and within which local diaspora networks operate, renders acts of co-optation visible. The production of sites of contestation, within which resistance was exercised, is precisely the outcome of a strategy that is often applied to actually do the opposite, to contain extra-territorial communities such as diaspora groups. The insight of variegated outcomes of development projects does not undermine Ferguson’s (1990) landmark work, but adds a critical dimension through highlighting the negotiated nature of social order (Gherardi & Nicolini, 2005).
By drawing on concepts, such as *translation* this thesis is hopeful to have made a case for more development related research to employ relational concepts. Contemporary development policies, practice and outcomes are marked by increasing complexity and mutability. For instance, the rise of new donor countries such as India, China, Turkey, and new donor institutions such as the New Development Bank (NDB) speak to the highly dynamic changes in the wider development landscape. However, focusing on those structures that shape and often dominate encounters and policy directions tends to be locked in either deterministic accounts focusing on macro level analysis, or deeply engaged interrogation of how those structural forces impact on a micro level. While both perspectives are useful in their own right they tend to re-produce existing binaries, whereas non-linear ANT related concepts, such as translation are more useful for they account for the often fluid nature of the relationship that characterises the interconnection between local, micro-level analysis and structural, macro-level approaches (Bosco, 2006; Law & Urry, 2004). Therefore, a conceptual framework that draws on ANT related concepts, which revolve around an explicit recognition of malleability are particularly useful, yet under-recognised in the field of Development Studies to render new ecologies of contestation visible. This thesis constitutes an extension of the theoretical canon of Development Studies because rather than focusing on structural formations, the thesis prioritises how different groups emerge as a result of the various relations between funding institutions, overseas collectives, national development objectives and state interests. The different relations between disparate actors produce ongoing transformation and new constellations that ultimately challenge conceptions of *stasis* (Mullings, 2012) in the context of diaspora and development.

Likewise, an approach to political mobilisation that is not grounded in the ubiquitous, yet analytically aleatory understanding of a politics that can be found everywhere, is useful to uncover and understand new topologies of contestation within which political performances are exercised (Staeheli, 2013, p. 447). The merit of an approach that treats political action as a “rather rare and … specialised activity” (Barry, 2001, p. 194) has distinctive theoretical implications. For instance, future work in Development Studies should be encouraged to systematically combine relational concepts with a revised understanding of political mobilisation to better understand how development projects that reflect a particular hegemonic order of things lead to struggle, contestation and “counter hegemonic struggles” (D. Arnold & Hess, 2017, p. 2190). Moreover, future
research would be well advised to employ this refined understanding of political mobilisation with action research methodologies to produce a more applied understanding about how power is a tenuous and volatile effect of social and institutional interaction, discourses and materialities (Allen, 2016). As seen in the context of diasporic spaces that emerged out of a World Bank project, the at times coercive and at other times seductive power of development initiatives remains contested and challenged, transforming initiatives into sites of action and mobilisation (Barry, 2001, p. 194). The performativity of these productive side effects clearly have theoretical implications and utility beyond the field of diaspora studies.

The second research question drew attention to the barriers that mediate diasporic transfers. The third thesis contribution asserts that the transfer of diasporic knowledge through either embodied forms, such as returning members of the diaspora or internship programmes is clearly mediated by formal and informal institutions. In particular, the role of informal institutions such as country-specific norms and existing reciprocity networks, casts doubt over the rhetoric that tends to present diaspora knowledge networks as agents of development that can contribute to achieving national development objectives through the transfer of knowledge, ideas and expertise. The very notion of knowledge as a driver of national development and enhancer of international competitiveness, continues to capture the imagination of policy-makers, donor organisations and the development community alike, and remains a “critical force” (Friesen & Collins, 2016, p. 16). However, in its current institutional modus operandi, the ChileGlobal network is neither likely to generate sustained knowledge transfers, nor seems to be actively encouraging the transfer of highly specialised knowledge any longer.

The case of ChileGlobal is instructive for how well-intended assumptions around leveraging a country’s diaspora may lead to practices that are best described as multiple forms of co-optation. The network itself was co-opted by alluring discourses and promises of country marketisation, which consequently led to the appropriation and population of the network by students, researchers and other groups of Chilean professionals who utilised the network for their own interests. In this sense, the trajectory of the ChileGlobal network is as much suggestive of how diaspora knowledge networks are part of wider brain chains that are being reproduced through policies, processes, specific discourses and the institutions they engender (Friesen & Collins, 2016, p. 2), as
it is indicative of the failure of the Chilean government to recognise the multiple interests of its diaspora and to enact an adequate policy (Doña Reveco & Mullan, 2014, p. 8). Facile narratives of diasporic contributions tend to overplay the developmental potential of the diaspora and underplay the complexity of translating diasporic knowledge, whether framed around entrepreneurial expertise or seemingly mundane practices into local contexts.

As it stands, there is reason for the Chilean government to evaluate and reconsider its current approach of integrating diasporic groups into Chile’s nation branding institution. This thesis claims that in response to the institutionalisation of nation branding in Chile and the subsequent integration of ChileGlobal into Fundación Imagen de Chile, the role of diaspora members as agents of knowledge transfer has been undermined and rendered irrelevant. If the Chilean government’s goal is to draw on the expertise of senior executives for reasons of transferring expertise and specialised knowledge, an institutional outfit dedicated to public diplomacy and marketing Chile, is unlikely to generate instances of sustained transfers. The lack of trust in politicians and politics remains a constant feature in contemporary Chile, and contrary to what marketing strategists maintain, the currently existing institutional model that is tasked to manage and control Chile’s country image, seems to be largely unequipped for questions of diaspora and development. A more integrated approach where the ChileGlobal network is associated with, for instance, Chile’s development agency, CORFO, and supported with cognate policies, for example, in the context of providing assistance to returning members of the Chilean diaspora is warranted in order to leverage Chile’s diaspora more effectively and productively.

10.3. So what?

Development initiatives clearly constitute forms of exercising power through networks of institutions, policies, projects and people to shape the conduct of the people in the global South in general (Rojas, 2004). As such, critics view diaspora-centred development as an extension of economic rationalities that seek to disseminate political and economic subjectivities to the global South through decentralised governmentalising projects such as the World Bank’s Knowledge for Development initiative that instituted
the ChileGlobal network (Boyle & Ho, 2016). Yet, while generally sympathetic to insights deriving from governmentality literature, this thesis has demonstrated that development programmes that are framed around a celebration, representation and heroisation of diaspora members as entrepreneurial, knowledgeable talents deployed to regulate social conduct can be slippery slopes that generate unintended side effects. Donor-induced development programmes are always subject to contestation and, as seen throughout this thesis, the “processes of composition, instability, heterogeneity and multiplicity in governing [development] assemblages can frustrate the intended outcomes … and complicate the ambition of hegemons” (Boyle & Ho, 2016, p. 17). Therefore, research in the context of development, diaspora and Latin America is well-advised to note and follow the situated practices and encounters, which unfold in the wake of development initiatives emanating from donor entities and national governments alike. Carving out the complex, layered and conflicting relationships that emerge, questions meta-narratives of an all-encompassing machine-like development apparatus that relentlessly steam-rolls across the globe leaving behind depoliticised landscapes.

Claims of the repoliticisation of development through diasporic collectives come at a time when extant research grapples with the post-political condition of technocratisation and depoliticisation (Badiou, 2005; Marchart, 2010; Mouffe, 2005; Rancière, 1999; Rancière, Panagia, & Bowlby, 2001; Swyngedouw, 2010; Žižek, 1999, 2006). United by concerns about the removal of political contention, most of the accounts that explore post-political forms of governance fall short of offering pragmatic visions for rectifying depoliticisation by hoping for the rise of the masses (Tsouvalis, 2016, p. 38). Yet following the traces of diasporic collectives that were created as devices for forging a tale of success, prosperity and unity in Chile, exposed how political mobilisation occurs within already existing fissures and crevasses of national development narratives. Exercising citizenship occurred in the terrain of the Chilean society that was subjected to relentless and historical forms of depoliticisation driven by social and political actors across the political divide. This thesis’ key insight highlights the need to recognise the multiple, often creative dimension of the contradictions that unfold when development ideas unravel in countries such as Chile. Recognising the dynamic contradictions of development projects points to ways of framing the repoliticisation of development along concrete, already existing struggles, sites and collectives rather than waiting for “the ‘phantom mass’ to rise” (Tsouvalis, 2016, p. 38).
Attending to the effects of contradictions and competing interests of national and multilateral institutions, governments and diasporic communities, renders critical interstitial sites visible. Recognising the political potency of diaspora groups in the context of development, is important for opening up an analytical space that is often closed down by totalising narratives of development as a self-perpetuating machine-like force that produces a uniform set of depoliticising results across countries and places. The key point to remember is that spaces within which resistance and contestation occur, are often the result of multiple struggles that unfold in complex and unexpected ways. Research in the domain of diaspora studies and development focusing on Latin America should be well positioned to uncover the strings and contiguity that connects complex webs of action, which may generate resistance and repoliticisation, rather than reiterating monothematic narratives of the depoliticising nature of development effects.

The notion of failure, which is a familiar trope and verdict in the development industry, has long been questioned for its problematic, unidirectional use because “‘success’ and ‘failure’ are policy-oriented judgements that obscure project effects” (Mosse, 2005, p. 19). Thinking about unintentional side effects as being largely synonymous for an extension of control, power and the depoliticisation of development (knowledge) through the framing of solutions to development problems around technical fixes as ‘anti-politics machine’ scholars suggest, is also problematic for it advances a similarly totalising and essentialising narrative in which side effects have an innately depoliticising quality. This thesis has argued that such a view is problematic because of its predilection for neat and stable categories that neglect the ambiguous, layered and complex ecologies of action (Chesters & Welsh, 2006, p. 90) within which forms of resistance may occur that unsettle the narratives of colonising and hegemonic effects of liberalising effects of development initiatives.

By privileging disjuncture, ambiguity and incoherencies, this thesis claims that the interstices that emerge at a particular political moment and out of encounters between diaspora groups, new institutions and long-standing conflicts constitute sites within which resistance can be palpably articulated. Work on the evolving nature of contestation has highlighted that whether or not an actor is considered political depends on the frame of reference and has also revealed incongruences between an actor’s self-representation and its often more or less concealed, or overt political performativity (McLennan, 2012). By
drawing on the explicit distinction between politics and the political, this thesis has highlighted how diasporic groups can appropriate spaces that were produced as sites of governance, which constitute an instance where subjects transformed into actors (Chesters & Welsh, 2006, p. 2). This insight will enhance a more nuanced understanding of the political subjectivity of diaspora groups and a more differentiated reading of interpreting effects of development initiatives in general.

In examining the barriers and challenges for the transfer of resources and the reintegration of Chileans, this thesis has deliberately and explicitly prioritised the perceptions of Chileans that have either returned, or intended to return, to Chile. Explorative in nature, rather than representative, assessing the perception of network members was primarily informed by the ongoing change in direction following the relocation of ChileGlobal from Fundación Chile to Fundación Imagen de Chile. Therefore, the focus of future research should centre on existing work relationships and investigate the perception, not only of diasporic returnees, but their co-workers and employers in more comparative ways. The topic of reintegration in the context of contemporary diaspora strategies is still rather inchoate, and would benefit from further, in-depth and comparative research. Lastly, recent scholarship on conflict-generated diasporas suggests that episodic mobilisation of the diaspora does not necessarily translate into sustained forms for political resistance (Koinova, 2016). Yet only little is known about how ‘new’ diaspora groups, whose genesis is not characterised by experience of conflict, sustain resistance in the context of development.

10.4. Final reflections

Research on diasporic initiatives in the context of development has generated a wealth of information that has contributed to a better understanding of the motivations, limitations and opportunities in the terrain of state – diaspora relationships. Indeed, the potential of diasporic groups continues to attract the imagination of state and non-state actors, policymakers, think tanks and donor agencies alike as they engage with, and position diaspora formations in ways that are more or less consistent with the national development framework of countries. Reflecting on the often problematic ways in which foreign aid continues to undermine public ownership of development paths in the global south,
former World Bank consultant David Phillips (2013), goes as far as to suggest that in light of *The decline of aid, the rise of the diaspora* constitutes a viable and more meaningful alternative in the context of wider development strategies of former aid recipient countries. This thesis has highlighted how the often complex and evolving nature of institutional structures, based on the calculus of commercial returns, does not allow for simplistic generalisations and representations of diaspora groups. This thesis clearly indicates that diaspora groups should not be seen as an alternative to conventional drivers of national development strategies. Instead, they have been, and are likely to continue to remain complementary.

The way the *ChileGlobal* network was repositioned within Chile’s public diplomacy agency speaks not only to the ways in which diasporic communities are shaped by globalising development strategies, but also how diasporas manoeuvre in distinctive and unexpected ways within these strategies. Again, the point is not to exclusively view these processes through a single explanatory framework such as neoliberalism, or governmentality, but rather to point out the more productive, unpredictable dimensions and heterogeneity of how power plays out and shapes the outcome of development initiatives. Work on the political role of diasporas continues to attract research that produces accounts where politics is synonymous with partisan antagonism and the cognate conceptualisation of politics as the contest of ideas within which diasporas take a side, or are leveraged for (Bekoe & Burchard, 2016). Yet the political potency of collectives such as diaspora networks is neither inherently given, nor limited to the struggle of partisan politics. Quite to the contrary, the emergent forms of political diasporic spaces as the result of competing interests around the subject of diaspora knowledge networks continues to be highly relevant and proves to be a fertile research ground for investigating the complex interaction between, within and across these actors. As such, the production of repoliticisation as an unintentional side effect impinges on other areas in the context of development too.

Lastly, the essence of this thesis is not a celebration of a particular group of Chileans, nor is this thesis a story of resistance. It is rather an interpretation of the multiple unintentional effects based on material that was collected “at specific points in time, at concrete locations, and on the basis of real events” (Rottenburg, 2009, p. xvii). By pointing out how an initiative that was instigated by the World Bank not only failed to achieve its
anticipated objectives, but was effectively dismantled and constitutive of moments of resistance, this thesis is neither downplaying, dismissing nor relativising the often and truly depoliticising effects of donor induced project rationalities. Rather, engaging with diaspora knowledge networks through a lens that is attentive to the particular political moments and historical struggles allows for making the fissures and contestations that underpin contemporary development initiatives visible. Rendering these situational contentions visible recognises that the outcome of failure should never be equated with failure nor does the failure of development projects necessarily have to produce the same results always and everywhere. Exploring the folds of the contemporary development landscape is important to understand how agency and repoliticisation is being produced and enacted more often than what conventional ‘anti-politics machine’ scholarship suggests.
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Appendix 1: Information Sheet (Spanish & English)

Redes de Conocimiento de la Diáspora (Diaspora Knowledge Networks, DKN, por sus siglas en inglés) y su contribución al desarrollo económico en Chile

Hoja Informativa

Mi nombre es Axel Malecki y estoy en Chile para realizar el trabajo de campo para mi tesis a fin de optar por un título doctoral en Estudios de Desarrollo. Me encuentro asociado con Massey University en Palmerston North, Nueva Zelanda.

El objetivo principal de este estudio es entender cómo la emigración, a pesar de la pérdida asociada de capital humano, puede ser utilizada para generar desarrollo regional en un contexto chileno a través del apalancamiento de las capacidades y destrezas de la población chileno en el exterior.

Si usted está interesado en participar, y tiene preguntas acerca de su participación en el proceso investigativo, éstas serán bienvenidas. Si desea formar parte de este estudio, se le pedirá firmar un formulario de consentimiento. Usted será entrevistado en dos ocasiones durante aproximadamente una hora, dependiendo del tiempo que usted tenga disponible.

Si participa de este estudio, tendrá derecho a retirarse en el momento que lo desee y además tendrá derecho a rehusar responder cualquier pregunta en particular. Se le solicitará permiso para grabar la entrevista en cinta de audio. No obstante, usted tendrá derecho a pedir que se detenga la grabación en cualquier momento, o pedir que sea borrado lo que ha sido grabado en cualquier momento. Asimismo, usted puede hacer preguntas acerca del estudio en cualquier momento durante su participación.

Para proteger la privacidad y confidencialidad me aseguraré que los nombres o datos personales que permitan la identificación de los participantes, sean removidos y sustituidos por pseudónimos. Adicionalmente, a cualquier persona involucrada en el proceso de entrevista se le solicitará la firma de un formulario de confidencialidad para
garantizar la privacidad. Toda la información será almacenada de forma segura, y todas las entrevistas grabadas serán eliminadas luego del análisis de datos. No serán utilizados datos de identificación o nombres en ningún tipo de publicaciones o reportes.

Alrededor de Octubre/Noviembre 2012, estará disponible un resumen con algunos hallazgos preliminares, el cual puede ser descargado en www.devnet.org.nz. Alternativamente, y si lo prefiere, enviaré la versión impresa de los hallazgos preliminares por correo ‘convencional’.

Al finalizar esta investigación, aproximadamente en primavera del 2014, produciré un resumen de la tesis, el cual le será enviado si así lo desea.

Muchas gracias por considerar esta invitación para formar parte de este estudio.

Axel Malecki

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Si usted tiene preguntas o inquietudes siéntase en libertad de contactarme a mí y/o a mis supervisores.

Este proyecto ha sido evaluado por pares y se considera de bajo riesgo. Consecuentemente, no ha sido revisado por uno de los Comités de Ética Humana de la Universidad. El investigador que se cita arriba es responsable por la conducta ética de esta investigación.

Si usted tiene inquietudes acerca de la conducta de esta investigación que desea plantearle a otra persona distinta al investigador, por favor contacte al Profesor John O’Neill, Director, Research Ethics, teléfono 06 350 5249, correo electrónico humanethics@massey.ac.nz
Appendix 2: Consent Form (Spanish & English)

Redes de Conocimiento de la Diáspora (Diaspora Knowledge Networks, DKN, por sus siglas en inglés) y su contribución al desarrollo económico en Chile

FORMULARIO DE CONSENTIMIENTO - INDIVIDUAL

He leído la Hoja Informativa y me han sido explicados los detalles del estudio. Mis preguntas han sido contestadas satisfactoriamente y entiendo que puedo hacer preguntas en cualquier momento. Comprendo que tengo el derecho de retirarme del estudio en cualquier momento.

Entiendo que puedo rehusarme a contestar cualquier pregunta durante la entrevista, y solicitar que cualquier comentario sea eliminado de la grabación. Además, entiendo que tengo el derecho de solicitar que se detenga la grabación de audio en cualquier momento durante la entrevista.

Estoy de acuerdo en participar de este estudio bajo las condiciones establecidas en la hoja informativa.

Estoy de acuerdo / no estoy de acuerdo en realizar la entrevista con grabación de audio.

Firma: __________________________   Fecha: ___________

Nombre completo impreso: ________________
Diaspora Knowledge Networks (DKNs) and their contribution to economic development in Chile

PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM – INDIVIDUAL

I have read the Information Sheet and have had the details of the study explained to me. My questions have been answered to my satisfaction, and I understand that I may ask further questions at any time. I understand that I have the right to withdraw from participating in this study at any time.

I understand that I may decline to answer any questions during the interview, and that I may request that any comments be taken ‘off the record’. I understand that I can answer the questions and not be recorded or have notes taken at the time. I also understand that I have the right for the audio-tape to be turned off at any time during the interview.

I agree to participate in the study under the conditions set out on the information sheet.

I agree / do not agree to the interview being audio-taped.

Signature: __________________________ Date: ____________

Full name printed: __________________________