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**Sentence-final expressions**

— *rasii* and *yoo*

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## Abstract

### Sentence-final expressions — *rasii* and *yoo*

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In the Japanese language there is a group of sentence-final expressions, which indicate the speaker's attitude toward the proposition they are maintaining. Included in this group are expressions such as *kamosirenai*, *tigainai*, *hazu*, *yoo*, *mitai*, *rasii*, *soo* (hearsay) and *(si) soo*. This thesis is an examination of the functions of the two expressions *yoo* and *rasii*. In many cases *rasii* and *yoo* are interchangeable in the respect that they work as evidential markers that the speaker makes a judgment based on evidence. However there is a subtle difference between them. The distinction between them is made by the degree of the speaker's perception. Even though the same types of evidence may be used, *rasii* indicates that a lesser degree of the speaker's perception is involved, whereas *yoo* indicates that a higher degree of the speaker's perception is involved. A closer investigation of the uses of *rasii* and *yoo*, based on Brown and Levinson's politeness theory, is carried out and it is concluded that both *rasii* and *yoo* work as politeness strategies. That is, the speaker utilises the function of either *rasii* or *yoo* to satisfy the other's feeling and to establish a good rapport between the speaker and the addressee in human interactions, as well as to maintain the speaker's own desire.

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## Abbreviations

The following abbreviations have been used when giving translations of the examples provided in the thesis.

<b>ACC</b>	ACCusative case marker ( <i>o</i> )
<b>CAUS</b>	CAUSative affix ( <i>~sase</i> )
<b>COMP</b>	sentence COMPLEMENTizer ( <i>no, koto, to, tokoro</i> )
<b>COP</b>	COPula ( <i>da, desu</i> )
<b>DAT</b>	DATIVE case marker ( <i>ni</i> )
<b>GEN</b>	GENitive case marker ( <i>no</i> )
<b>HON</b>	HONorific form ( <i>~rare, o-V ni naru</i> )
<b>LOC</b>	LOCative case marker ( <i>ni, de, e</i> )
<b>NEG</b>	NEGative morpheme ( <i>~nai</i> )
<b>NOM</b>	NOMinative case marker ( <i>ga</i> )
<b>PASS</b>	PASSive affix ( <i>~rare</i> )
<b>POL</b>	POLite affix ( <i>~masu, ~desu</i> )
<b>Q</b>	Question particle ( <i>ka</i> )
<b>TOP</b>	TOPic marker ( <i>wa</i> )

\* ungrammatical / unacceptable

? awkward

In translating the examples, the markers RASII, YOO and SOO are used respectively to indicate *rasii*, *yoo* and *soo*. Johnson (1994) interprets these terms as “AUX (AUXiliary verbs)”. Other researchers, such as Teramura (1984) also interpret these terms as auxiliary verbs. In this thesis however we do not specify these terms as auxiliary verbs. The aim of this paper is not to investigate whether or not these expressions represent auxiliary verbs, but to investigate their functions from the viewpoint of semantics and pragmatics.

## Notes on Romanisation

The Kunrei romanisation is adopted for Japanese examples with the long vowels shown by the double *o* system.

e.g. syoogakkoo ‘primary school’, tyuugakkoo ‘junior high school’,  
Tookyoo ‘Tokyo’

The Hepburn system is used in translations of the examples and bibliographical information, where the long vowels are not indicated following the widely practised translation.

e.g. Taishukan, Shogakukan, Chikuma

When a different system is adopted in citations, it is changed to the above system for unification.

## Sources of Japanese Examples

Many of the Japanese examples are taken from the following:

Abe, Kobo. *Suna no onna*. Tokyo; Shincho sha, 1981.

Endo, Shusaku. *Seisho no naka no onna tachi*. Tokyo; Kodan sha, 1972.

Inoue, Hisashi. *Monkipotto shi no ato shimatsu*. Tokyo; Kodan sha, 1974.

Kaneko, Shiro. *Atorantisu tairiku no nazo*. Tokyo; Kodan sha, 1974.

Kaji, Motojiro. *Remon*. Tokyo; Shincho sha, 1967.

Kida, Gen. *Gendai no tetsugaku*. Tokyo; Kodan sha, 1991.

Kitamura, Kaoru. *Mizu ni nemuru*. Tokyo; Bungei bunshu, 1997.

Mayumira, Taku. *Nazo no tenkosei*. Tokyo; Kadokawa shoten, 1975.

Miyabe, Miyuki. *Henzi wa iranai*. Tokyo; Shincho sha, 1994.

Shibata, Takeshi. *Nihongo wa omoshiroi*. Tokyo; Shincho sha, 1973.

Suzuki, Takao. *Nihongo to gaikokugo*. Tokyo; Iwanami shoten, 1990.

Yamada, Masahiro. *Kazoku no risutorukusharingu*. Tokyo; Shincho sha, 1999.

Some examples are taken from "CD-COM *Shincho sha bunko no 100 satsu* " (1995).  
Examples are used from the following works contained on the CD-ROM.

Akagawa, Jiro. *Onna shacho ni kanpai!*

Inoue, Yasushi. *Asunaro monogatari*.

Miura, Ayako. *Shiokari toge*.

## *Chapter 1*

### Introduction

#### 1.1 Introduction

This thesis is an examination and analysis of the sentence-final expressions *rasii* and *yoo*<sup>1</sup>. These expressions indicate the nature of the speaker's relationship to the proposition that he/she is stating. This thesis attempts to examine the use of these expressions and seeks to clarify both the nature of their common denominator and the distinctions between them. The use of *rasii* and *yoo* have a common denominator in the respect that the speaker makes a judgment based on evidence, and both *rasii* and *yoo* work as evidential markers. Although these two expressions have this common denominator, there is a subtle difference between them. The distinction does not depend on the types of evidence, the nature of the speaker's attitude towards the proposition, or the fundamental characteristics of *rasii* and *yoo*. We will examine the function that is involved in this distinction between *rasii* and *yoo*. Close investigation indicates that *rasii* and *yoo* can imply the speaker's intention to satisfy the addressee's desire or his/her own desire. The use of *rasii* and *yoo* indicates not only that they are evidential markers, but also that they are markers that show the speaker's consideration for the addressee. That is, the speaker chooses *rasii* and *yoo* in order to show his/her concern for the addressee's feelings. *Rasii* and *yoo* promote good communication between the speaker and the addressee. It can be explained in terms of the concept of the 'politeness'.

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<sup>1</sup> Normally *yoo* does not occur in the sentence-final position on its own. In many cases *yoo* occurs with the copula *da/desu* such as '*yoo da/ yoo desu*'. Modality represents the speaker's psychological attitude at the time of his/her utterance. Therefore, the modal expression itself does not form past tense or negative forms. In this thesis we will discuss the term '*yoo*' without attaching the copula '*da/desu*' for the modal expression.

Following this introductory chapter, Chapter Two reviews a number of studies on the distinction between *rasii* and *yoo*. The aim of Chapter Two is to examine how the usages of *rasii* and *yoo* overlap and how their usages can be distinguished. Chapter Three examines more closely the use of *rasii* and *yoo* in dialogues from a pragmatics viewpoint, specifically with in the context of Brown and Levinson's politeness theory (1978, 1987). This chapter will provide further examples and discussion in support of the hypothesis that *rasii* and *yoo* work to maintain the "public face" of dialogue participants.

Finally, conclusion summarises the evidence examined in this thesis. It can be considered that the distinction between *rasii* and *yoo* is due to the degree of the speaker's perception. Even though the same types of evidence may be used, *rasii* indicates that a lesser degree of the speaker's perception is involved, whereas *yoo* indicates that a higher degree of the speaker's perception is involved. The important point to note is that this function of the two expressions can work as the politeness strategy, specifically by applying the theory of politeness developed by Brown and Levinson (1978, 1987). That is, the speaker utilises the function of either *rasii* or *yoo* to satisfy the other's feeling or desire and to establish a good rapport between the speaker and the addressee in human interactions, as well as to maintain the speaker's own desire or pride.

## 1.2 Literature review

This introductory chapter summarises the main findings of previous analyses of the uses of *rasii* and *yoo*. In Japanese there is a group of sentence-final expressions, which are classified as modality<sup>2</sup> that expresses the speaker's attitude toward a proposition that he/she is making. Included in this group are expressions such as *kamosirenai*, *tigainai*, *hazu*, *yoo*, *mitai*, *rasii*, *soo* (hearsay) and *(si) soo*. Teramura (1984) categorises these expressions as "*gaijen* (general statement)" which enable the speaker to avoid making

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<sup>2</sup> Some grammarians such as Suzuki (1972) use the term *muudo* (mood) with the same meaning as modality (Moriyama et al. 2000:4).

an assertion<sup>3</sup>. Among these expressions, *rasii* and *yoo*, which may be translated as ‘seem’, ‘look like’, and ‘appear’<sup>4</sup>, have a common denominator in the respect that the preceding sentence is a judgment by the speaker based on evidence that he/she has obtained. Both *rasii* and *yoo* are marked as evidentiality. In other words, the use of these expressions implies that there is some kind of evidence available to the speaker. Consider the following:

- (1) Ame ga hutte iru yoo da/ rasii.  
 rain GEN falling in the state of YOO COP/ RASII  
 (It seems that it is raining.)

In the above sentence the speaker has perceived some piece of evidence, which allowed him or her to draw the conclusion in the predicate, i.e. that ‘it is raining’. This evidence may have been, for example, the sound of rain falling or wet ground. *Rasii* and *yoo*<sup>5</sup> are interchangeable in the above example; however there is a subtle difference between the meanings they convey. Traditionally, the following three types of distinction between *rasii* and *yoo* have been proposed in past studies such as those by Shibata (1982), Teramura (1984), Hayatsu (1988), and Nakahata (1990)<sup>6</sup>.

- a) The type of evidence available
- b) The speaker’s attitude toward the state of affairs
- c) The fundamental characteristics between *rasii* and *yoo*

The first type of distinction indicates the type of evidence used to make a judgment. Teramura (1984), Kasuoka (1980), and Hayatsu (1988) state that *rasii* is used in cases when the speaker makes a judgment based on second-hand evidence that he/she has heard, read, or seen. On the other hand, *yoo* is used in cases when the speaker makes a judgment based on evidence that he/she has gained directly.

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<sup>3</sup> According to Teramura, *gaigen no muudo* (mood of the general statement) is contrasted with *kakugen* (affirmation / assertion). The *kakugen kee* follows the plain and past forms. The *kakugen kee* is categorised as primary mood, and represents the affirmative statement. Secondary mood is subdivided into two categories *gaigen* and *setumei* (explanatory mood). Explanatory mood includes *wake*, *tokoro*, *koto*, *mono* and *no (da)*.

<sup>4</sup> Johnson (1994: 112), Makino et al. (1986: 373, 547)

<sup>5</sup> *Mitai* has a similar meaning to *yoo*, and can be used in informal statements (Teramura 1984: 242).

<sup>6</sup> This classification is derived from Nakahata (1990), Kamiya (1995) and Nobayashi (1999).

The second type of distinction represents the speaker's psychological attitude toward the state of affairs. Shibata (1982) and Hayatsu (1988) claim that *rasii* is used in cases when the speaker's psychological distance from the state of affairs is further, whereas *yoo* is used when the speaker's psychological distance from the state of affairs is closer.

The third type of distinction is based on the different essential characteristics of *rasii* and *yoo*. Nakahata (1990) and Tanomura (1991) claim that *rasii* represents the speaker's inference based on evidence, whereas *yoo* represents the appearance or impression of the state of affairs.

However, *rasii* and *yoo* cannot be clearly distinguished by the above three methods. In fact there are the cases when both *rasii* and *yoo* can occur based on the same type of evidence. Moreover, *rasii* can also be used in cases when the evidence is derived directly; and *yoo* can also be used in cases when the evidence is second-hand.

It is reasonable to suppose that the distinction between *rasii* and *yoo* is determined by the degree of the speaker's perception. That is, *rasii* is used for marking a lesser degree of the speaker's perception, whereas *yoo* is used for marking a higher degree of the speaker's perception. This can be proved by an examination of the compatibility between *rasii* and *yoo* and four expressions that convey the degree of the speaker's perception. In Chapter Two we will investigate how the use of *rasii* and *yoo* can be distinguished.

*Rasii* and *yoo* are also markers for euphemism which indicates that the speaker avoids making an assertive statement in order to maintain a satisfactory dialogue with the addressee (Kasuoka 1980). This kind of expression is considered as more polite than direct sentence expressions. Brown and Levinson (1978, 1987) have proposed a "politeness theory". "Politeness theory" relates to a set of universal strategies for verbal interaction. Brown and Levinson maintain that all speakers and addressees have a "face", which is "the public self-image that every member wants to claim for himself" (Brown and Levinson 1987: 66). It will, in general, be to the mutual interest of both the speaker and the addressee to maintain the other's "face" (Brown and Levinson 1978: 65). Ide (1989, 1992), Usami (1993b, 1998, 1994, 1999) and Matsumoto (1988)

investigate the relationship between Japanese language and the politeness theory. As *rasii* and *yoo* are makers for euphemism, it is more likely to apply the politeness theory to our examination of their usages. Let us consider the following example (Kasuoka 1980: 171).

- (2) Anata no kotae wa matigatte iru yoo da/ rasii.  
 you 's answer TOP mistaking in the state of YOO COP/ RASII  
 (It seems that your answer is wrong.)

In example (2) *rasii* and *yoo* are used as markers for euphemism. *Rasii* and *yoo* are often used in cases when the speaker makes an unfavourable statement in relation to some aspect of the addressee. It can be considered that the speaker uses the nature of *rasii* and *yoo* as markers for avoiding making an assertive statement to maintain the addressee's face. It can be considered that the euphemistic aspect of *rasii* and *yoo* has its roots in the politeness theory.

In Chapter Three we will examine the deeper investigation about the relationship between *rasii* and *yoo* and the notion of the politeness.

### 1.3 Syntactic analysis of *rasii* and *yoo*

In this section we will investigate the syntactic functions of *rasii* and *yoo*. *Rasii*<sup>7</sup> follows the plain form of a verb and an *i*-adjective. The nouns and the *na*-adjective stem are directly attached to *rasii*. *Rasii* conjugates like an adjective, and it conjugates into past form, however it does not conjugate into interrogative and negative forms (Teramura 1984: 243). A negative expression is expressed by a negative predicate followed by *rasii* as in (4a). Johnson (1994: 8) provides the following examples.

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<sup>7</sup> *Rasii* has another usage. *Rasii* following a noun means 'likeness' or 'ideal'. Consider the following example.

Kare wa otoko rasii.  
 he TOP man like (He is manly.)

- (3) a. Kare wa sensyuu kuni e kaetta rasii.  
 he TOP last week home to went back RASII  
 (It seems that he went home last week.)
- b.\* Kare wa sensyuu kuni e kaetta rasii desu ka.  
 he TOP last week home to went back RASII COP-POL Q  
 (Does it seem that he went home last week?)
- (4) a. Ano eiga wa omosirokunai rasii.  
 that movie TOP interesting-NEG RASII  
 (It seems that that movie is not interesting.)
- b.\* Ano eiga wa omosiroi rasikunai.  
 that movie TOP interesting RASII-NEG  
 (It doesn't seem that that movie is interesting.)

*Yoo* also follows the plain form of a verb and an *i*-adjective, and conjugates like *na*-adjectives. *Da* following *na*-adjectives is changed to *na*, and *da* following nouns is changed to *no*. *Yoo* does not conjugate into negative forms as in (5a). (Teramura 1984: 243). Instead, the negative expression is conveyed by a negative predicate and *yoo* as in (5b).

- (5) a. \* Dare ka (dare mo) kuru yoo de wa nai.  
 somebody nobody come YOO COP TOP NEG  
 (It doesn't seem that somebody (nobody) is coming.)
- b. Dare mo konai yoo da.  
 nobody come-NEG YOO COP  
 (It seems that nobody is coming.)

*Yoo* can conjugate into interrogative forms, but these generally produce unnatural expression (Teramura 1984: 247).

(6) a. ? Dare ka kuru yoo ka?

somebody come YOO Q

(Does it seem to me that anybody is coming?)

b. ? Maguro wa aa site kuu yoo ka?

tuna TOP such doing eat YOO Q

(Does it seem to me that we eat the tuna like that?)

The point here is that *rasii* and *yoo* have a common denominator from a syntactic viewpoint. Neither *rasii* nor *yoo* can occur with the conjunction *ba* (if), which indicates that the preceding clause expresses a condition (Moriyama et al. 2000: 140).

(7) \* Teasi ni surikizu ga are ba, kaidan kara otita  
 arms and legs in scratch NOM have if stair from fell down  
 yoo da/ rasii.  
 YOO COP/ RASII

(If there are scratches on your arms and legs, it seems that you fell down the stairs.)

The above characteristic suggests that *rasii* and *yoo* express a judgment that is based on evidence. In other words, the speaker must have some verification, or proof, in support of their judgment. A conditional clause such as the one in (7) gives no such evidence. In addition, *rasii* and *yoo* cannot occur with the conjunction *zya* (then) which indicates that the speaker makes a statement on the assumption that the preceding statement is true (Moriyama et al. 2000: 140).

(8) “Kare, kanozyo ni kuru tte yakusoku siteta wa  
 he she DAT come COMP promise make-PAST COP  
 yo.”  
 you know

(He promised her that he was coming.)

- \* “Zya, kuru yoo da/ rasii.”  
 then come YOO COP/ RASII  
 (Then, it seems that he is coming.)

Moriyama et al. (2000: 141) state that the above characteristic derives from the fact that *rasii* and *yoo* are used when the speaker perceived evidence on which his/her judgment is based.

#### 1.4 Evidentiality

This section reviews the contributions of a number of Japanese linguists to academic discussions on the usages of *rasii* and *yoo*. In recent research *rasii* and *yoo* are often discussed in the context of ‘evidentiality’, which indicates that the speaker makes a judgment based on identifiable evidence. The following is a review of the traditional theories of evidentiality to convey cross-linguistic expressions.

The notion of evidentiality has been used broadly to convey cross-linguistic expressions of the speaker’s attitude toward the state of affairs about which they speak. Willett (1986: 52) states that “evidential distinctions are part of the marking of epistemic modality, even though evidentials as such are seldom explicitly mentioned in theoretical treatments of modality”. Willett (1988) discusses evidentiality in the narrower sense of “information source” and examines its use in languages that have grammaticised this meaning. Willett cites Bybee (1985)’s work. Bybee (1985: 184) gives a definition of evidentials as “markers that indicate something about the source of the information in the proposition”, and classifies evidentiality as part of epistemic modality. Jacobsen (1986) states that evidentials mark the relative truth of an assertion as to reliability of the evidence on which they are based. Chafe (1986: 234) labels evidentiality in terms of the notion of “knowledge”. “Knowledge” is defined as “the basic information whose status is qualified in one way or another by markers of evidentiality”. Chafe (1986:262) regards evidentials in a “broad sense” as marking epistemology, coding the speaker’s attitude toward the speaker’s knowledge of a situation, and in a “narrow sense” as marking the source of such knowledge. Anderson (1986) discusses evidentials that

“express the kind of evidence a person has for making factual claims”. Chung and Timberlake (1985: 242-246) distinguish epistemic modality into two categories: “epistemic mode”<sup>8</sup> and “epistemological mode”. Epistemological mode is used by the speaker to evaluate the actuality of an event with respect to a source. Willett notes that although Chung and Timberlake’s category of “epistemological mode” is not labelled as evidential, “only evidential-like parameters” (ibid, 53) are included in the following subcategories of epistemological mode: “experiential, in which the event is characterized as experienced by the source”; “inferential or evidential, in which the event is characterized as inferred from evidence”; “quotative, in which the event is reported from another source”, and “construct”, in which the event, such as thought, belief, or fantasy is construed by the speaker (Chung and Timberlake 1985: 244).

Palmer (2001) places evidentials within the category of propositional modality. Propositional modality is concerned with the speaker’s attitude toward the proposition and is subdivided into two main types of modalities, “epistemic modality” and “evidential modality”. “Epistemic modality and evidential modality are concerned with the speaker’s attitude to the truth-value or factual status of the proposition” (Palmer 2001: 8). Palmer maintains that “with epistemic modality speakers express their judgments about the factual status of the proposition, whereas with evidential modality they indicate the evidence they have for its factual status” (ibid, 8). Evidential modality is simply classified as being either “sensory” or “reported”, the former is subdivided into “visual”, “non-visual” and “auditory”, and the latter into three types of report<sup>9</sup> (ibid, 9). The problem here is that inference could be categorised as epistemic modality. In fact Miyake and other Japanese linguists regard inferential markers in Japanese as epistemic modality. Palmer (ibid, 6) cites the evidential system of Central Pomo

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<sup>8</sup> Chung and Timberlake (1985) state that “epistemic mode”, which is a subcategory of epistemic modality, characterises the actuality of an event in terms of both the actual world and other possible worlds. “Epistemic mode” is subdivided into “necessity” (the event belongs to all alternative worlds) and “possibility” (the event belongs to at least one alternative world) (ibid, 242). These subtypes are illustrated by the English modal auxiliaries as in the following examples.

- a. John must be in Phoenix by now.  
(=in all alternative worlds that one could imagine at this time, John is in Phoenix.)
- b. John can / may be in Phoenix now.  
(=there is at least one world one could imagine in which John is in Phoenix.)

That is, (a) is a ‘necessity’, whereas (b) is a ‘possibility’.

<sup>9</sup> ‘Reported (2)’, ‘Reported (3)’, and ‘Reported (Gen)’ are included.

(Mitihum 1999: 191) which has forms with markers for “general knowledge”, “first-hand personal experience (usually visual)”, “auditory evidence”, “hearsay” and “inference”. These first four categories take the place of Palmer's evidential categories of “reported (general)”<sup>10</sup>, “visual”, “auditory” and “reported (2)”, while the last “inference” simplifies the epistemic modality of “deductive” (ibid, 8). Palmer treats inference in Central Pomo as evidential modality whereas he treats deductive in English as epistemic modality. He illustrates this using the example of English “must” (ibid, 8). “Must” suggests that the judgment was based on evidence. He maintains that “Inference and Deductive are very close and can both be treated as Deductive”. He considers that, because both a deduction and a piece of evidence are involved, it is reasonable to treat the English form as a judgment system and the Central Pomo form as an evidential system. Chafe (1986: 267) asserts that the “knowledge” has been acquired through induction to indicate the specific kind of evidence on which the induction was based, and that such evidence is typically sensory or perceptual.

The concept of evidentiality, which indicates that the speaker makes a judgment based on some kind of evidence, is common to the studies cited above. According to these studies, from the viewpoint of cross-linguistics the concept of evidentiality is common to all languages. Therefore, it can plausibly be argued that this concept is appropriate to the Japanese language system. In fact, various studies on evidentiality in Japanese have been undertaken.

In Japanese there are many sentence-final expressions relating to the speaker's judgment toward the truth-value of a statement. Teramura (1984) groups *daroo*, *mai*, *kamosirenai*, *tigainai*, *rasii*, and *yoo* into one category as the speaker's judgment concerning the truth-value of the proposition. Traditionally, the sentence-final expressions in (9) are classified as “judgment modality”<sup>11</sup>. Judgment modality is further subdivided into two major types: the type which expresses the probability of the speaker's judgment being correct and the type which expresses the speaker's judgment based on evidence (Miyazaki et al. 2002:143).

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<sup>10</sup> ‘Reported (Gen)’ indicates reported evidence from general knowledge.

<sup>11</sup> Miyazaki et al (2002: 143) use the term ‘*handan no modarityi*’. *Rasii*, *yoo*, *mitai*, *soo*, and *to iu* are categorised as ‘*zissyooteki handan* (demonstrative modality)’.

- (9) Ame ga hidoi no de, siai wa tyuusi ni naru kamosirenai/  
 rain NOM terrible because game TOP stop become may/  
 ni tigainai/ hazu da/ yoo da/ mitai da/ rasii/ soo da/  
 must expected YOO COP seem RASII SOO COP  
 yoo da.  
 YOO COP

Miyake (1994), Masuoka (1991) and Moriyama et al. (2000) place such sentence-final expressions within epistemic modality. Miyake (1994, 1995) categorises these expressions as epistemic modality, which represents the semantic elements concerning the speaker's perception toward the truth-value of the proposition. According to Miyake, *rasii* and *yoo* are further subdivided into "positive judgment"<sup>12</sup>, which is a marker suggesting that the speaker perceives evidence which indicates that the proposition is true. *Rasii* and *yoo* are evidential markers showing that the speaker and the state of affairs have an indirect relationship. Miyake states that in this sense "positive judgment" denotes the notion of evidentiality. Miyake (1998: 184) illustrates the following example.

- (10) Asa no densya no naka de amedama o syaburu otokotati ga  
 mornig in train 's inside candies ACC lick men NOM  
 hueteru noda.  
 increase as it is  
 Demo, aruiwa yoru no takusii no naka de mo, ame o  
 but or night at taxi of inside in also candies ACC  
 nameteiru hito ga iru.  
 licking people NOM exist  
 Dooyara ame ga oohayari no yononaka rasii.  
 presumably candies NOM big fusion of world RASII

<sup>12</sup> Miyake (1994, 1995) divides epistemic modality in Japanese into five judgments, *dantee*, *suiryoo*, *zissyooteki handan*, *kanoosee handan*, and *kakusinteki handan*. *Daroo*, *mai*, and inferential and volitional form (*u / yoo*) are categorised as '*suiryoo* (inference)'. *Kamosirenai* is categorised as '*kanoosee handan* (possible judgment)', whereas *tigainai*, and *hazu* are categorised as '*kakusinteki handan* (conviction judgment)'.

(The number of men who eat candy on morning trains is increasing. There are also people who eat candies in taxis late at night. Presumably it seems that eating candy is very fashionable.)

(Miyake 1998: 184)

In the above sentence, the evidence is given first and a proposition is drawn from that evidence. Miyake states that analysis in the form of inference of “positive judgment” is possible for *yoo* as for *rasii*. *Yoo* also expresses the existence of evidence for a proposition. *Yoo* and *rasii* both express “positive judgment” and only these two sentence-final expressions indicate this type of judgment. Other sentence-final such as *daroo*, *mai*, *kamosirenai*, *tigainai*, and *hazu* do not fulfil this function.

The point we must clarify here is that *rasii* and *yoo* are distinguished from above five sentence-final expressions in the respect that *rasii* and *yoo* cannot be used if a proposition relates to a future action or event. Miyake discusses the following sentences (1995: 186).

(11) a. Asita wa ame ga huru {daroo/ kamosirenai/ ni tigainai/  
tomorrow TOP rain NOM fall maybe may must  
hazu da}.  
expected

b. Asita wa ame ga huru yoo da/ rasii  
tomorrow TOP rain NOM fall YOO COP/ RASII  
(It seems that it will rain tomorrow.)

Sentence (11a) expresses the possibility of a future occurrence “it will rain tomorrow”, whereas (11b) expresses the possibility of a future event based on what we know today. In (11b) the evidence for the proposition “it will rain tomorrow” is the present situation, that is, today’s weather (e.g. the presence of rain clouds in the sky).

Masuoka discusses the “truth judgment sentence” and categorises *rasii* and *yoo* as giving a “suspended judgment” in a “fixed truth judgment” (Masuoka 1991: 109-10). To fall into this category an expression needs to show clearly that it is a judgment with a

limitation, and therefore the predicate is marked accordingly. This is represented in Figure 1 below.

Truth judgment sentence	{Fixed truth judgment	{Decision
	{	{
	{	{
	{	{Suspended judgment
	{	{ex) <i>daroo/ tigainai/hazu/yoo/</i>
	{	{ <i>rasii/kamosirenai</i>
	{	
	{Unfixed truth judgment	

Figure 1: Truth judgement

“Suspended judgment” is divided into two types; the primary modality and the secondary modality. *Daroo* belongs to the first modality. The other sentence-final expressions belong to the secondary modality. The secondary modality indicates that the sentence-final expressions contain a judgment. Masuoka states that *rasii* and *yoo* express the evidence that brings about a judgment. The evidence is found in the external world through the speaker’s observation and is not subject to the speaker’s imagination or opinion. Because *rasii* and *yoo*, unlike *hazu*, do not express logical inference, it is difficult for them to exist together with *kara* (because) such as in adverbial clauses, and with *toozen* (properly) which expresses the necessity of a result. However, it is possible for *rasii* and *yoo* to specify the context of the evidence. Therefore it is possible to use *rasii* and *yoo* together with expressions such as *—tokoro kara miruto* (from the view point of -). In addition *rasii* and *yoo* can exist together with adjectives such as *dooyara* and *doomo* (presumably). In this case these adjectives are used with the meaning of “according to some certain observation and information”.

Moriyama et al. (2000) categorise *rasii*, *yoo* and *mitai* as “signal judgment”<sup>13</sup>, which is a subcategory of epistemic modality. “Signal judgment” indicates that the proposition is

<sup>13</sup> Moriyama et al. use the term *tyookoossee handan*.

derived from evidence or a sign. The speaker does not obtain the proposition by his/her direct experience, but perceives the proposition in his/her imagination, thought or inference on the basis of evidence (ibid, 95). Let us consider the following example.

(12) (looking at the plane moving to the landing strip)

Dooyara    ano hikooki, tobitatu    yoo    da/    rasii/    mitai da.  
 presumably that plane    fly away    YOO COP/ RASII/ seem  
 (It seems that that plane is about to take off.)

The sentence-final expressions above imply the evidence on which the proposition is based (ibid.). Moriyama et al. (ibid, 96) systematise “epistemic modality” in Figure 2 below.




Figure 2: Types of Epistemic modality

“Inference”<sup>14</sup> indicates that the speaker regards the state of affairs as uncertain and perceives it in his/her own imagination, thought or inference. “Probable judgment”<sup>15</sup>

<sup>14</sup> “Inference” is translated from the term *suiryoo* (Moriyama et al. 2000: 94).

expresses the degree of the speaker's certainty toward the state of affairs. According to Moriyama et al, "inference" is marked by *daroo* and *mai*, whereas "probable judgment" is marked by *kamosirenai*, *tigainai*, and *rasii*, *yoo* and *mitai* mark "signal judgment".

Miyazaki et al (2002: 143) dispute the notion of the speaker's 'judgment'. They maintain that these sentence-final expressions cannot be regarded entirely in terms of the notion of judgment. For example, in the case of "hearsay" the speaker's own judgment is not involved, and, moreover, there is a usage that marks the speaker's own observation rather than his/her judgment. In (13) below *yoo* is used as a marker for the speaker's direct observation.

- (13) Sukosi yaseta yoo desu ne.  
 a little lost weight YOO COP-POL you know  
 (It seems that you have lost weight, haven't you?)

In (13), the speaker observes the addressee's appearance. It seems to us that in the above sentence *yoo* fulfils the role of a marker for the speaker's observation rather than his/her judgment. Miyazaki et al (2002: 143) consider that the following sentence-final expressions are marked as evidentiality. Let us consider the following example.

- (14) Ame ga hidoi no de, siai wa tyuusi ni naru kamosirenai/  
 rain NOM terrible because game TOP stop become may/  
 ni tigainai/ hazu da/ yoo da/ mitai da/ rasii/ soo da/  
 must/ expected YOO COP seem RASII SOO COP  
 yoo da.  
 YOO COP  
 (I suppose/No doubt the game will be cancelled because of the heavy rain.)

They argue that the common factor in the above types of expression that the speaker perceives the state of affairs on the basis of evidence, such as the speaker's own perception or a second-hand source. These expressions are divided into two main types: "possibility and necessity" and "evidentiality". "Possibility and necessity" is marked by

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<sup>15</sup> "Probable judgment" is translated from the term *gaizensee handan* (Moriyama et al. 2000: 94).

*kamosirenai*, *tigainai*, and *hazu*, whereas “evidentiality” is marked by *yoo*, *mitai*, *rasii*, (*si*) *soo* (appears to be), and *soo* (hearsay). Semantic meaning such as inference or hearsay is labelled as “evidentiality”. They state that “possibility and necessity” indicates that the speaker perceives that the possibility or necessity of the proposition does exist. The speaker marks possibility with *kamosirenai*, whereas necessity is marked by *tigainai* (Miyazaki et al. 2002: 143-52).

Aoki (1986) has carried out an investigation into evidentiality in Japanese. He discusses three areas of meaning associated with Japanese evidentials (Aoki 1986: 225). According to Aoki, evidentials in Japanese can be considered to convey three types of meaning as follows:

- a) the speaker communicates that he has, of necessity, only indirect evidence, as in *gar*.<sup>16</sup>
- b) the speaker communicates that he has generally valid evidence as in the case of *no* or *n*.<sup>17</sup>
- c) the speaker communicates that he cannot say that he is in complete possession of information because of the nature of the evidence, as in the case of hearsay, and inferential forms.

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<sup>16</sup> The first area as in (a) “involves expressions which deal with sensation and make a syntactic distinction between the description of a sensation experienced by the speaker and a sensation experienced by a nonspeaker” (Aoki 1985: 223). The latter type of description is marked by *gar*. *Gar* is contained as in the following example.

Kare wa atu gatte iru.  
 he TOP hot  
 (He is hot.)

According to Aoki, in the above example, the insertion of *gar* turns *atu* (hot), which represents state, into non-state. *Teiru* (in the state of) is added to turn it back into a state.

*Gar* has a function of expressing inference rather than direct experience, from which a further inference can be made about a person, which is often unexpressed in Japanese (Aoki 1985: 223-225).

<sup>17</sup> *No*, or *mo*, as evidential, may be used to express the fact that the speaker is convinced that for some reason what is ordinarily directly unknowable is nevertheless true (Aoki 1985: 228). Consider the following example.

Kare wa atui no da.  
 he TOP hot as it is  
 (I know he is hot.)

The above sentence can be interpreted that it is a fact that he is hot (ibid, 228).

According to Aoki's classification, *soo*, *yoo* and *rasii*, which mark hearsay or inferential statements, are placed within the third area of Japanese evidentials. *Yoo* is used in cases "when the speaker has some visible, tangible, or audible evidence collected through his own sense to make an inference", whereas *rasii* is used in cases "when the evidence is circumstantial or gathered through sources other than one's own sense" (ibid, 231).

### 1.5 Comparison of *rasii* and *yoo*

Miyazaki et al (2002: 152) give the following four forms of evidentiality.

- (15) Konohon wa kekkoo {urete iru yoo da/  
 this book TOP well selling in the state of YOO COP/  
 urete iru mitai da/ urete iru rasii/  
 selling in the state of seem/ selling in the state of RASII/  
 urete soo da/ urete iru soo da}.  
 selling Soo COP/ selling in the state of SOO COP

The above sentence-final expressions have a common denominator in that the speaker perceives the state of affairs on the basis of evidence, such as his/her own observation or second-hand evidence. Among these expressions *rasii* and *yoo* are interchangeable in many cases. This interchange has been researched by many linguists. Teramura (1984) states that *rasii* has a lot in common with *yoo*. *Rasii* is a marker for the speaker's judgment based on objective observation or knowledge. *Rasii* and *yoo* are used when the speaker's statement is the truth as far as he/she knows, based on the objective and unambiguous information at hand. *Rasii* and *yoo* are both used when the speaker's perception is based on either evidence he/she already possesses or is based on evidence acquired from some secondary source. There are various kinds of studies in which *rasii* and *yoo* are classified into one category<sup>18</sup>.

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<sup>18</sup> Suzuki (1972: 481) classifies *rasii* and *yoo* as secondary *musubi(daini no musubi)*. *Musubi* represents a modal meaning and indicates that the speaker makes an inference based on subjective evidence. Kamio (1985) categories *rasii* and *yoo* into one category as the *kansetu kee* (indirect form). The *kansetu kee* represents an unassertive statement such as hearsay and inference. In this case the state of affairs does not belong to the speaker's territory.

However, although *rasii* and *yoo* are interchangeable in many cases, there is a subtle difference between them. Recent research concerning the difference between *rasii* and *yoo* can be divided into three main types: (1) the type of evidence on which the statement is based; (2) the degree of the speaker's attitude toward the state of affairs. This type is further subdivided into two: the degree of the speaker's psychological attitude toward the state of affairs and the degree of the speaker's consciousness of taking responsibility for his/her own judgment; (3) the essential characteristics of *rasii* and *yoo*.

### 1.5.1 The types of evidence

Teramura (1984), Kasuoka (1980) and Hayatsu (1988)<sup>19</sup> investigate the difference between *rasii* and *yoo* in terms of the evidence that the speaker obtained. They focus on the types of evidence used to make a judgment. They claim that *rasii* is used in cases when the speaker makes a judgment based on second-hand evidence, whereas *yoo* is used in cases when the speaker makes a judgment based on evidence that he/she obtained directly. However Kamiya (1995) and Masuoka (2000) criticize that there are instances when both *rasii* and *yoo* are acceptable in an utterance based on the same type of evidence. Let us consider the following example (Kamiya 1995: 550).

(16) Kono eki o riyoosuru hito no kazu wa izen no hoo  
 this station ACC use people's number TOP before 's than  
 ga ookatta yoo da/ rasii.  
 NOM many-PAST YOO COP/ RASII

(It seems that more people used to use this station than they do now.)

Example (16) is an utterance based on evidence gained directly by the speaker, and in this case both *rasii* and *yoo* can be used. On the other hand, the following example also indicates that both *rasii* and *yoo* can occur in an utterance based on evidence from a secondary source.

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Okamura (1969), Morita (1983), and the *Nihongo kyoiku jiten* (1982) contain similar research on distinguishing between *rasii* and *yoo* (Hayatsu 1988: 47-8).

- (17) Tenkiyohoo ni yoru to, asita wa ooame ni naru yoo  
 weather focus according to tomorrow TOP heavy rain become YOO  
 da/ rasii.  
 COP/ RASII

(According to the weather forecast, it seems that it will rain tomorrow.)

(Kamiya 1995: 550)

Examples (16) and (17) demonstrate that the distinction between *rasii* and *yoo* does not depend on the type of evidence. Moreover, Nobayashi (1999: 55) argues that this type of investigation merely deals with inferential usage, and does not cover “appearance” or “hearsay” usages.

### 1.5.2 The degree of the speaker’s attitude

The second point we must clarify here is the difference between *rasii* and *yoo* in the context of the speaker’s psychological attitude toward the state of affairs. Shibata (1982) states that *yoo* is used in case when the speaker’s psychological distance from the state of affairs is nearer, whereas *rasii* is used in case when the speaker’s psychological distance from the state of affairs is further. Hayatsu (1988) divides the speaker’s psychological attitude toward the state of affairs into the “bringing near-attitude” (“*hikiyose*” *no taido*) and “pulling apart-attitude” (“*hikihanasi*” *no taido*). According to Hayatsu, *yoo* normally marks evidence that the speaker obtained directly. However *yoo* can be used in case when the speaker regards the state of affairs as his/her own territory even though the evidence on which the judgment is based on second-hand. *Rasii* normally marks evidence from any second source; however *rasii* can be used in the case when the speaker regards the state of affairs as outside his/her territory even though the evidence is obtained directly by the speaker.

Teramura (1984), Kasuoka (1980), and Kin (1991) investigate the difference between *rasii* and *yoo* in respect of the degree to which the speaker takes responsibility for his/her own judgment. They maintain that *rasii* involves a lesser reliance by the speaker on his/her own perception and more confidence in the evidence obtained from outside the speaker, whereas *yoo* involves a higher degree of the speaker’s own perception

supporting the utterance. Kasuoka (1980) also discusses the difference between *rasii* and *yoo*. Kasuoka (ibid, 175) discusses the following sentences.

- (18) a. Kare wa sigoto o yametai yoo da  
           he TOP job ACC want to quit YOO COP  
       b. Kare wa sigoto o yametai rasii.  
           he TOP job ACC want to quit RASII  
           (It seems that he wants to quit his job.)

As Kasuoka points out, (18a) conveys an impression that the speaker makes an intuitive judgment that ‘the addressee wants to quit his job’, whereas (18b) gives an impression that the speaker’s judgment is based on objective evidence, or that the speaker does not take any responsibility for the judgment. Kasuoka states that when *rasii* is used, time, space, or psychological distance between the speaker and the state of affairs is involved. Moreover, statements with *rasii* express the speaker’s judgment based on a third party’s judgment or his/her objective observation of the state of affairs. Therefore (18b) contains the characteristic that the speaker does not have the responsibility for the judgment made by a third party. On the other hand, statements with *yoo* represent the speaker’s intuitive judgment based on his/her own observation through his/her own senses. Therefore (18a) contains the characteristic that the speaker takes responsibility for the judgment. Kasuoka’s solution is similar to Kin’s (1992) in that he labels *rasii* and *yoo* as “objective inference” and “subjective inference”<sup>20</sup> respectively. “Objective inference” indicates that the speaker takes an objective attitude toward his/her own inferential judgment, as if he/she is a third party toward the judgment. “Subjective inference” indicates that the speaker takes a subjective attitude toward his/her own inferential judgment, and takes a strong attitude as an owner of the judgment. According to Kin, *rasii* is a marker for objective inference, whereas *yoo* is a marker for subjective inference. Kin maintains that the primary factor for distinguishing between *rasii* and *yoo* is whether the speaker takes an objective attitude or a subjective attitude toward his/her own final judgment (Kin 1992: 23). Masuoka’s research on the difference between *rasii* and *yoo* supports this theory. He maintains that if the speaker considers the information to be “inside the speaker’s territory”, *yoo* will be used, whereas *rasii* is

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<sup>20</sup> Kin uses the terms ‘*syutai suiryoo* (subjective inference)’ and ‘*kyakutai suiryoo* (objective inference)’.

used for information “outside the speaker’s territory“(Masuoka 1991: 121). Masuoka states that *yoo* is used if the speaker considers that the expression of a given observation and the evidence are inside his/her territory, whereas *rasii* is used if the speaker considers that the observation are evidence outside of his/her territory. Because the speaker usually regards his/her direct experience as inside his/her territory, it is highly likely that *yoo* will be used. The information gained from a secondary source has a high possibility of being considered to lie outside of the speaker’s territory; therefore, it is highly likely that *rasii* will be used. Masuoka (1991: 121) introduces the following example.

- (19) Honbu            kara no hookoku de wa, zendaitooryoo ga  
       the head office from ’s report in TOP ex-president NOM  
       tukamatta yoo desu/        rasii desu.  
       be caught YOO COP-POL/ RASII COP-POL

(According to the report from the head office, the ex-president has been arrested.)

He explains that in this case, although the clue itself is evidence from a secondary source, the use of *rasii* and *yoo* is dependent on whether the head office is regarded as inside the speaker’s territory or outside. He states that *yoo* is used when the speaker considers that he/she is a member of the head office, whereas *rasii* is used when the speaker thinks he/she is separated from them. The speaker’s choice of *rasii* or *yoo* depends on his/her attitude towards the source of evidence, in this case, a report from the head office. If the evidence is considered to be within the speaker’s domain, his/her posture towards the judgment will become positive and in this case *yoo* is used. If the evidence is considered to be outside of the speaker’s territory, his/her posture towards the judgment will become relatively passive, and in this case *rasii* is used. In addition, *yoo* is used when the speaker feels more responsibility for the judgment made.

This distinction has been criticised on the basis that the notion of psychological attitude is impossible to disprove (Miyake 1994: 29). Nobayashi (1999: 56) comments that it is not possible to determine ‘the distance between the speaker and the state of affairs’ or ‘the degree of the speaker’s responsibility’.

### 1.5.3 The fundamental characteristics of *rasii* and *yoo*

The third point that requires clarification is that *rasii* and *yoo* have different essential characteristics. Nakahata, who argues that past researches have merely focused on inference of the truth of the state of affairs, examines the usages of *rasii* and *yoo* in a broader sense. He states that *rasii* is used when the speaker infers the truth-value of the state of affairs, whereas *yoo* is used when the speaker describes the real world rather than the truth of the state of affairs. The usage of *rasii* is further subdivided into two usages, ‘hearsay’ and ‘inference’. ‘Hearsay’ with *rasii* indicates that the evidence is second-hand, whereas ‘inference’ with *rasii* indicates that evidence is obtained by the speaker him/herself. The usage of *yoo* is subdivided into three: ‘inference’, ‘euphemism’, and ‘likeness’<sup>21</sup>. ‘Inference’ with *yoo* indicates that the speaker regards the state of affairs as uncertain. ‘Euphemism’ with *yoo* indicates that the speaker avoids an assertive statement of the state of affairs. ‘Likeness’ with *yoo* indicates that the speaker expresses the likeness of the state of affairs (Nakahata 1990: 29-32). Tanomura (1991) also claims that *rasii* and *yoo* have different essential characteristics. He asserts that *rasii* expresses the speaker’s inference based on evidence, whereas *yoo* expresses the looks, appearance, and impression of the state of affairs. Nobayashi, however, argues that this kind of classification merely focuses on the distinction between *rasii* and *yoo* and cannot explain their complex connection (1999: 56). Moreover this classification ignores the fact that *rasii* and *yoo* have similar functions.

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<sup>21</sup> He uses the term *hikyoo*.

#### 1.5.4 Nobayashi's framework for analysing *rasii* and *yoo*

Nobayashi makes manifold investigation of the usages of *rasii* and *yoo*. The methodology used in his study is also useful to us in conducting our research. It has been proposed that the difference between *rasii* and *yoo* can be classified in three ways: the circumstances in which each expression is used; the characteristics of *rasii* and *yoo*; and their practical usages. Nobayashi maintains that this method of classification can account for the whole range of usages of *rasii* and *yoo*, such as hearsay and appearance as well as inference. Nobayashi (1997) categorises *rasii* and *yoo* into three types as follows:

- a) *Yoo* (appearance)
- b) *Rasii*, *yoo* (presumptive/ hearsay-like)
- c) *Rasii* (hearsay)

In subsequent research Nobayashi (1999) further classifies *rasii*, *yoo* and *soo* (hearsay) into five types as follows:

- a) *Yoo* (appearance)
- b) *Yoo* and *rasii* (presumptive usage)
- c) *Yoo*, *rasii* and *soo* (situation where the speaker states his/her indirect perception based on second hand evidence)
- d) *Rasii* and *soo* (third party's perception)
- e) *Soo* (message and transmit usage)

This classification is based on the circumstances in which these sentence-final expressions co-occur. Nobayashi states that the above classification can explain the overlapping usages of *rasii* and *yoo* (1999: 57). In this study, he classifies *rasii* and *soo* into one category. This kind of *rasii* and *soo* are used when the speaker makes a statement based on second-hand evidence, and in this case the speaker's statement cannot be regarded as his/her own opinion. That is, the speaker merely states the third party's perception without confirming if it is true or not (Nobayashi 1999: 61). Certainly, *rasii* has a similar function to hearsay *soo*, especially when evidence is

derived from second-hand source<sup>22</sup>. Nobayashi's classification seems to be effective in investigating the overlapping usages of *rasii* and *yoo* together with hearsay *soo*. However it seems that *rasii* can be a marker involving the speaker's own perception even though his/her statement is based on second-hand evidence. Let us consider the following example.

- (20) Hazime watasi wa huransugo de ippanni midori to  
 firstly I TOP French in generally green COMP  
 kangaerarete iru izyoo sikisai ni kansite *comme une pomme*  
 thinking-PASS in the state of since colour concerning  
 to ie ba, sore wa tadatini nanika ga midoriiro  
 COMP saying if this TOP immediately something NOM green  
 de aru to iu imi ni naru ni tigainai to tanzyunni  
 it is that COMP meaning become must COMP simply  
 soozoosita.  
 imagined  
 Tokoroga, huransuzin ni iroiro tazunete miru to, doomo  
 however French people DAT variously asking see and presumably  
 soo de wa nai rasii/ \*soo da.  
 so COP TOP NEG RASII/ SOO COP

(At first I imagined that the French term “*comme une pomme*” meant “green”, however, as a result of asking many French speakers about this, it seems that it is wrong.)

(Takao Suzuki: *Nihongo to gaikokugo*: 35: 14)

Example (20) refers to the speaker's statement based on second-hand evidence. What is shown here is that in the above sentence the use of *soo* is unnatural, whereas the use of *rasii* is natural. Moreover it is possible to replace *rasii* with *yoo*. The compatibility of *rasii* and *yoo* with *dooyara* (presumably) is a key to this distinction<sup>23</sup>. This fact leads to the hypothesis of this thesis that *rasii* and *yoo* are markers involving the speaker's perception, however the degree of this perception differs from *rasii* and *yoo*. Related to

<sup>22</sup> Hayatsu (1988: 53), Miyake (1995: 187), Kamiya (1995: 556-7) and Kikuchi (2000: 48) mention that *rasii* has a similar characteristic to *soo* in hearsay usage.

<sup>23</sup> Miyazaki et al (2002: 156-7)

this, Masuoka (2000: 145) defines the notion of “the degree of the speaker’s certainty toward his/her judgment”<sup>24</sup> in inferential *rasii* and *yoo* (2000: 145). According to Masuoka, *yoo* indicates a higher degree of the speaker’s certainty, whereas *rasii* indicates a lower degree of the speaker’s certainty toward his/her final inferential judgment.

In the next chapter we will examine both the overlapping functions of the usages of *rasii* and *yoo* and the distinctions between them in detail.

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<sup>24</sup> Masuoka (2000: 145) uses the term “*suiryoo no kekka erareta kakusindo no tigai*”.

## *Chapter 2*

### **Semantic analysis of *rasii* and *yoo***

In this chapter we will investigate the usages of *rasii* and *yoo* from the viewpoint of semantics. We will firstly examine the circumstance in which only *yoo* can occur<sup>1</sup>, and then examine the circumstance in which both *rasii* and *yoo* can occur, and finally investigate the circumstance in which only *rasii* can occur. Throughout this investigation we will pursue the fundamental usages of *rasii* and *yoo*.

#### 2.1 The semantic difference between *rasii* and *yoo*

There is a common denominator between *rasii* and *yoo* in the respect that the speaker makes a judgment of the state of affairs based on evidence such as, for example, the speaker's perception of the event, or secondary information. However there are subtle differences between these terms, and these differences have been extensively researched. Traditionally the distinction between *rasii* and *yoo* has been divided into three types: the type of the evidence to make judgments (Teramura 1984, Kasuoka 1980, and Hayatsu 1988); the nature of the speaker's attitude toward the evidence he/she has acquired

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<sup>1</sup> *Yoo* can express a counter-factual situation (*hikyoo*), and this type of *yoo* is not comparable with *rasii*. Consider the following example.

Kimura san      wa    marude sake    o    nonda yoo    da.  
 Mr./Ms. TOP just like alcohol ACC drunk YOO COP  
 (Kimura looks as if he/she had just drunken alcohol.)

In the above case, the adverb *marude* (just) can be used for emphasis (Makino et al. 1986: 549). In this paper we will exclude this kind of *yoo*.

(Teramura 1984, Shibata 1982, Hayatsu 1988, Kasuoka 1980, and Kin 1991); and the fundamental characteristics of *rasii* and *yoo* (Nakahata 1990, and Tanomura 1991).

Nobayashi (1999:55) argues that the first and the second types of research have considered merely inferential usages, and ignored the other usages, for example, hearsay and appearance usages. In addition the third type of research (Nakahata 1990, Tanomura 1991) merely focuses on the distinction between *rasii* and *yoo*, and does not explain the complex common denominator between them.

Nobayashi (1999: 57) examines the relation between these three types of research which have been used to examine *rasii* and *yoo*. The fundamental characteristics of *rasii* and *yoo* are related to the circumstances of their usages, and vice versa. Nobayashi analyses the usages of *rasii* and *yoo* in terms of three aspects, the circumstances in which they are used, their essential characteristics, and their functions. Nobayashi (1997, 1999)<sup>2</sup> classifies *rasii* and *yoo* into four categories according to the circumstances of their usages. The first category is the condition in which only *yoo* can occur, which he labels it ‘appearance usage’<sup>3</sup>. Nobayashi (1997: 35, 1999:58) states that *yoo* in this case is used when the speaker observes the perceptible state of affairs and expresses its looks or appearance through his/her own senses. The second category is the condition in which both *rasii* and *yoo* can occur, which he labels ‘presumptive usage’<sup>4</sup>. This condition indicates that the speaker infers the state of affairs based on some evidence. The third category is the condition in which *yoo*, *rasii* and *soo* can occur, and the speaker states his/her indirect perception based on hearsay. The fourth category is the condition in which *rasii* and *soo* can be used, and indicates the third party’s perception based on hearsay.

In this chapter we will establish the hypothesis that the choice of either *rasii* or *yoo* does not always depend on the types of evidence for which either *rasii* or *yoo* is marked. This might be proved by the fact that both *rasii* and *yoo* can mark both the evidences based on the first-hand and second-hand as mentioned in the previous chapter. Moreover we will

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<sup>2</sup> Nobayashi’s framework is discussed in the previous chapter.


<sup>3</sup> Nobayashi (1999:85) uses the term *yootai*.

<sup>4</sup> Nobayashi uses the term *suitee yoohoo*.

hypothesis that the distinction between *rasii* and *yoo* is concerned with the degree of the perception by the speaker. Even in the case when the same evidence is used for *rasii* and *yoo*, the nature of *yoo* indicates a higher degree of the speaker's perception, whereas the nature of *rasii* indicates a lesser degree of the speaker's perception.

## 2.2 The types of evidence

Willett (1988: 57) examines the evidence on which a judgment can be made from the viewpoint of evidentiality. The following figure shows the way in which he categorises the types of evidence on which the speaker's perception is based.




(Willett 1988: 57)

*Figure 3: types of evidence*

He firstly divides the source of the speaker's primary information into two types, direct evidence versus indirect evidence. He then subdivides indirect evidence into two main types: "Reported", which indicates "evidence via verbal report" versus "Inferring", which indicates "evidence upon which an inference is based (Willett 1988: 57)". The above two types of evidence are contrasted with direct evidence, in which he labels it "Attested". He further subdivides these three main types of evidence into more specific categories.

Reported evidence is marked as “second-hand”, “third-hand” (hearsay), and “folklore”. Inferring evidence is specifically marked as involving “observable evidence (results)” or “a mental construct only (reasoning)” (ibid)<sup>5</sup>.

Furthermore Palmer (2001: 22) summarises the basic category of Propositional modality as follows:



*Figure 4: Categories of Propositional modality*

Palmer categorises “Deductive” as Epistemic modality. As mentioned previously, “Inference and Deductive are very close and can both be treated as Deductive”, and “both a deduction and an evidence are involved” (Palmer 2001: 9). Willett (1988) in fact regards inferring evidence as evidentiality.

In this chapter we will divide the cases in which either *rasii* or *yoo* occur into three types: the case in which only *yoo* can occur, the case in which both *rasii* and *yoo* can occur, and the case in which only *rasii* can occur. We will then examine what kind of evidence is

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<sup>5</sup> ‘Folklore’ indicates that “the speaker claims that the situation described is part of established oral history” (Willett 1988: 96). Palmer argues that the use of Willett’s terms “quotative”, “hearsay” and “folklore” is very inconsistent in the literature, and this might lead to confusion. He divides “reported evidence” into three categories instead, “Reported (2)” (reported evidence based on second-hand), “Reported (3)” (reported evidence based on third-hand) and “Reported (Gen)” (reported evidence as general knowledge) (Palmer 2001: 40-41).

marked for each of these conditions. In this chapter we will use Willett's terms (1988) for the classification of *rasii* and *yoo*<sup>6</sup>.

### 2.3 The circumstance in which only *yoo* can occur

First, we shall investigate the case in which *yoo* is not interchangeable with *rasii*. Let us consider the following example.

- (21) “Sukosi yaseta yoo/ \*rasii zyanai ka.”  
 a little lost weight YOO/ RASII COP-NEG Q  
 (“You look like you have lost weight, haven't you?”)

“Anata wa ohutorini natta yoo desu/ \*rasii desu  
 you TOP HON-put on weight YOO COP-POL/ RASII COP-POL  
 ne.”  
 you know  
 (“You look you have put on.”)

(Masuoka 2000: 137)

- (22) Sono Nobuo o furikaete Sadayuki ga itta.  
 that ACC looking back NOM said  
 “Zyukubenkyoo wa zyuntyoo ka ne.  
 examination study TOP smooth Q you know

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<sup>6</sup> It is reasonable to treat the inferential usage of *rasii* and *yoo* using an evidential system because the speaker makes his/her perception on the basis of evidence indicated in the usages of *rasii* and *yoo*, as mentioned in the previous chapter.

Sukosi tukareta kao o site iru yoo/ \*rasii da ga,  
 a little tired face ACC do in the state of YOO/ RASII COP but  
 karada o kowasite wa ikenai yo.  
 body ACC ruining TOP bad you know

(Sadayuki looked at Nobuko and said, “How’s your study of the exam going?

You look a little tired, but don’t wreck your health.”)

(Ayako Miura: *Shiokari Toge*)

Example (21) would be used in the case where the speaker sees his/her partner’s appearance, and uses this as evidence. *Yoo* in this case is used when the speaker perceives the visual evidence for the event. Namely, this kind of *yoo* is marked as the speaker’s observation based on visual evidence. Previous research such as Nobayashi (1997:35, 1999: 58) and Masuoka (2000: 136) categorise this type of *yoo* as appearance<sup>7</sup>. This type of *yoo* cannot be replaced by *rasii*. According to Nobayashi and Masuoka, this type of *yoo* indicates that the speaker observes the perceptible event and perceives through his/her own senses. Examples (21) and (22) refer to events visually perceived by the speaker. In (22), the speaker observes Nobuo’s condition mainly through her visual sense, and perceives the actual state of affairs. As mentioned above ‘visual evidence’ is a subdivision of ‘Direct evidence’. ‘Visual evidence’ is explained in the following way: “the speaker claims to have seen the situation described” (Willett 1988: 96). Therefore it is reasonable to think that visual evidence is marked not by *rasii*, but *yoo*.

On the other hand, the fact that *rasii* does not occur in this case indicates that *rasii* cannot function as a marker as involving the perception of visual evidence. This might arise from the function of *rasii* as a marker involving the speaker’s perception on the basis of evidence as the observed state of affairs.

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<sup>7</sup> Kamiya does not use a specific term such as ‘appearance’ (*yootai*) in this type of *yoo*. He states that this type of *yoo* is used when the speaker expresses the state of affairs before his/her eyes (1994: 158). Kikuchi (2000: 47) mentions that only *yoo* can occur in cases when the speaker states the state of affairs that he/she obtains and observes directly and that this type of *yoo* does not contain the speaker’s inferential judgment.

In addition, the fact that *yoo* is compatible with a set of phrases or verbs such as *mieru* (visible), *miukeru* (it can be seen), *omoo* (I think), *omoeru* (it can be thought) and *kanziru* (I feel), *ki ga suru* (I feel like) shows that the speaker's sensory perception is involved in the use of *yoo*<sup>8</sup>. Let us consider the following examples.

(21) Hutotta        yoo    ni    mieru  
       put on weight YOO COP look  
       (It looks like you have put on weight.)

(22) Tukareta kao o        site iru                yoo    ni    kanziru.  
       tired        face ACC do    in the state of YOO COP feel  
       (I feel that you are tired.)

In the above examples, the compatibility between *yoo* and sensory expressions derives from the fact that this type of *yoo* functions as a marker of sensory evidence perceived.

Chafe (1986: 267) maintains that in English “the knowledge” derived from sensory evidence may be treated as less than fully reliable. In English phrases such as *look like*, *sounds like*, and *feel like* express lesser reliability compared with the explicit verbs *see*, *hear*, and *feel*, which are equivalent to the direct assertions. Chafe (1986: 267) illustrates the following three kinds of sentences.

(23) I see her coming down the hall.

(24) She's coming down the hall.

(25) She looks like she's sleep.

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<sup>8</sup> Nakahata (1990: 31), Kamiya (1994: 160-1), Nobayashi (1999: 59), and Kikuchi (2000: 47). Hujishiro (1996: 47) states that appearance *yoo* with sensory expressions indicates the speaker's simple impression, and in this case *yoo* works like *soo* in appearance usage.

In (23) and (24)<sup>9</sup>, a higher degree of the knowledge is contained. In contrast, in (25) the phrase ‘looks like’ expresses a lesser reliability on the knowledge.

It can be thought that *yoo* as a marker for sensory evidence is equivalent to example (25) type of sentences in the respect that the speaker’s statement with *yoo* shows a lesser degree of reliability compared with direct assertions. Consider the following examples.

- (26) a. Hutotta            ne.  
           put on weight you know  
           (You have put on weight, haven’t you?)
- b. Hutotta            yoo    ni mieru ne.  
           put on weight YOO look        you know  
           (You look like you have put on weight, haven’t you?)

Example (26b) with *yoo* shows a lesser degree of reliability to the statement compared with (26a).

The fact that a lesser degree of reliability to the statement based on direct sensory evidence can occur with only *yoo* indicates that this restriction can relate to the degree of the speaker’s perception.

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<sup>9</sup> The bald assertion (24) is equivalent to (23), except for the lack of evidential specification (Chafe 1986: 267).

## 2.4 The circumstance in which both *rasii* and *yoo* can occur

Now we shall investigate the case in which *rasii* and *yoo* are interchangeable.

There is a common denominator between *rasii* and *yoo* in the respect that the speaker perceives the state of affairs based on evidence, that is, the speaker's perception of the event, or secondary information. Consider the following example.

- (27) *Itu no ma ni ka amadare no oto ga yande ita.*  
 at some time or other patter of raindrops' sound NOM stopping was  
*Ame ga yanda rasii/ yoo da.*  
 rain NOM stopped RASII/ YOO COP  
 (The patter of raindrops has stopped without our noticing.  
 It seems that the rain has stopped.)

In above example *rasii* and *yoo* are interchangeable. In (27) the speaker infers the state of affairs on the basis of evidence 'the patter of raindrops has stopped'. In this case *rasii* and *yoo* are marked as involving evidence that indicates the source of the speaker's perception.

Now consider the following examples.

- (28) *Haha wa iru hazu da ga, kotaenai tokoro o miru*  
 mother TOP exist must COP but answer-NEG COMP ACC see  
 to gaisyutu site iru rasii/ yoo da.  
 COMP go out in the state of RASII/ YOO COP  
 (Mother ought to be there, but it seems that she must be out, because she didn't answer.)

- (29) *Kono sokaisita kurasu kara yuusyuna suugakusya ga*  
 this evaluated class from complement mathematicians NOM  
*haisyutusita koto kara mite mo, seekatukankyoo to*  
 turned out COMP from see also living environment and

gakumon to wa amari sookansee ga nai yoo  
 learning COMP TOP very relation NOM NEG YOO  
 de aru/ rasii.  
 it is that/ RASII

(If we also look at it from the point of view that this evacuated class turned out competent mathematicians, it seems that the living environment does not have much effect on learning.)

In (28) and (29), the speaker's inferences are included. In (28), the speaker firstly observes the result of the event 'her mother didn't reply to her call', and then infers that 'she is not home', which she has inferred from her observation of the state of affairs. In (29), when the speaker sees the result of the event that 'this place of refuge has turned out many competent mathematicians', he/she makes use of it as evidence to infer leading to that 'the circumstances do not reflect the learning'.

Willett (1988: 61) states that "inferentials arise from the need to assign causes to observed situations". The process of inference in the above examples in the uses of *rasii* and *yoo* can be illustrated in Figure 5.




Figure 5: The process of inference

The above figure shows that the speaker infers the previous action or events on the basis of the end results as indirect evidence. This type of evidence applies to Willett's subdivision of Inferring, that is 'observable evidence (Results)'. He defines 'Results' as "the speaker

infers the situation described from the observable evidence (i.e. from perception of the results of the causing event or action) (1988: 96)". It can be said that *rasii* and *yoo* have a common denominator in marking 'the observable evidence (results)' as the basis for inferring.

*Rasii* and *yoo* as inferential markers are associated with two types of evidence: observable evidence and second-hand evidence. As mentioned above, (28) and (29) refer to the speaker's inferential perception based on observable evidence. On the other hand, the following examples refer to the speaker's inferential perception based on second-hand evidence (Nobayashi 1999: 60).

(30) Tada ituka Taeko ga itta tokoro ni yoruto, kentikugisitati wa,  
 but sometime NOM said according to architects TOP  
 kyuuryoo igai no, arubaito ryoo ga ooi yoo de aru/  
 salary except 's part-time job rate NOM many YOO it is that/  
 rasii/ ?soo de aru.  
 RASII/ SOO it is that

(But it seems that, according to what Takeo said some time, there are many architects who earn income from part-time jobs as well as their salary.)

(31) Kiiteta ra, itizoku no naka ni, saibankan toka bengosi toka  
 hearing when relative 's among judge or lawyer or  
 sonnna no ga gorogoro site iru rasii/ yoo nan da/  
 such people NOM common in the state of RASII/ YOO it is that/  
 ? soo nan da.  
 SOO it is that

(According to what I've been hearing, it seems that it is common for these to be several lawyers and judges in one family.)

According to Willett's categorisation of the kinds of evidence, second-hand evidence is subdivision from indirect reported evidence. However the fact that the speaker can use either *rasii* or *yoo* shows that he/she infers the occurrence of an event or action on the basis

of second-hand evidence. The above two sentences contain the phrases that *-ni yoru to* (according to -) and *kiite ita ra* (I was hearing that), which indicate that the source of evidence from which the inference is made is second-hand. It seems to us that this type of *rasii* and *yoo* are marked as hearsay because the speaker's judgment is based on second-hand evidence. The fact that hearsay *soo*<sup>10</sup> can also be used in these examples suggests this. Nobayashi (1999: 60) in fact places this kind of *rasii* and *yoo* into one category together with *soo*. It is clear that *rasii* especially fulfils the function of hearsay because the interchange between *rasii* and *soo* is natural, while the interchange between *yoo* and *soo* is unnatural.

#### 2.4.1 The relation to hearsay *soo*

The expression of hearsay evidence is most commonly marked by *soo* (Aoki 1986:230). Hearsay *soo* (I heard that-, I understand that-, or it is said that-)<sup>11</sup> indicates that the speaker is reporting or conveying information which he/she has obtained by hearing or reading something. *Soo* follows the plain form of verbs and *i*-adjectives with the copula *da/desu* added after *na*-adjectives and nouns (Teramura 1984: 255, Okano et al. 1994: 186-7).

Let us consider the following:

- (32) *Kawasima sensei no zyugyoo wa kyuukoo da soo desu.*  
 Prof. 's class TOP cancel COP SOO COP-POL  
 (I heard that Prof. Kawashima's class was cancelled.)

(Okano et al. 1994: 186)

The source of information, which can be expressed – *no hanasi dewa* (what someone said) or – *ni yoruto* (according to-) appears with *soo*. The form *-no hanasi dewa* is used when the source of evidence is a person, and – *ni yoruto* is often used when the source of evidence is

<sup>10</sup> *Soo* in appearance usage is not included in the investigation in this paper.

<sup>11</sup> Makino et al. (1994: 186)

some other medium. Hearsay *soo* involves evidence obtained from an outside source. *Soo* does not express the speaker's inference at all, and the speaker is simply a conduit conveying evidence from an outside source to another party (Nitta 1992: 11, Johnson 1994: 105)<sup>12</sup>. The hearsay *soo* is equivalent to statements such as *-to iu koto da*, or *-to no koto da* (I heard that - / someone told me that -), which do not involve a modal expression<sup>13</sup>. As Johnson points out a sentence with *soo* does not involve a speaker's inferential judgment, but it is a declarative statement. The speaker is simply conveying outside evidence, and he/she does not have to take responsibility for what is said since statements ending in *soo* are not based on any of his/her own inference. *Soo* is not used to express either the possibility of a proposition's truth or the speaker's supposition of the truth of a proposition, but rather only that the proposition was obtained from an unspecified outside source.

The use of *soo* indicates that the speaker informs the addressee of the state of affairs that was brought about from someone who was a direct witness. That is, *soo* is a marker of second-hand evidence, in which is a subdivision of 'Reported evidence' according to Willett's categorisation. However, in a strict sense, in the above case *rasii* and *yoo* are not marked as second-hand evidence, but as inferring evidence. Palmer (2001: 29) states that in most of number of languages, 'Deductive' (inference) and 'Assumptive' occur together in systems that include evidential markers of 'reported' (Reported) and 'sensation'.

This is proved by the fact that while *rasii* and *yoo* are compatible with the adverbs *dooyara* or *doomo* (presumably), *soo* is not (Miyazaki et al. 2002: 157). Aoki (1986:234) states that this kind of adverb indicates a lesser degree of certainty than *matigainaku* (unmistakably) or *utagainaku* (undoubtedly), and requires that the verb stem indicates a corresponding degree of certainty. Let us consider the following examples.

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<sup>12</sup> Nitta (1992: 11) states that the characteristic of *soo* that it is used in cases when the speaker reports or conveys the information which he/she obtained from a third-party can be proved by the fact that this type of *soo* is not compatible with the phrase *-to omoo* (I thinks that-) as the following example.

\* Kare ga kekkonsuru soo da to omoo.  
 he NOM marry SOO COP COMP think

<sup>13</sup> Teramura (1984: 255) states that the following are hearsay usage expressions: *soo*, *-to iu koto da*, *-to no koto da*, *- to iu* (someone says that-), *yosi da*(I hear), and these expressions have different characteristics respectively. Moriyama et al. (2002: 161-164) categorise hearsay into two types, *inyoo kee* (quotative hearsay) and *ninsikikee* (recognitive hearsay). The phrases *-tte*, *- to iu koto da*, *-to no koto da* are categorised as *inyoo kee*, whereas (*-suru*) *soo da* is categorised as *ninsiki kee*.

(30)' -- dooyara kentikugisitati wa, kyuuryoo igai no, arubaito ryoo  
 presumably architects TOP salary except part-time job rate  
 ga ooi yoo de aru/ rasii/ \*soo de aru.  
 NOM many YOO COP/ RASII/ SOO as it is

(31)' -- dooyara sonnna no ga gorogoro site iru  
 presumably such people NOM common in the state of  
 rasii/ yoo nan da/ \*soo nan da  
 RASII/ YOO it is that/ SOO it is that

Sentences (30)' and (31)' with *soo* are ungrammatical because *soo* indicates that the speaker's perception is not contained at all and merely marks indirect reported evidence from someone who is a direct witness. Therefore inferring second-hand evidence and reported second-hand evidence should be specifically distinguished. As mentioned above, while *rasii* is likely to be replaced with *soo*, the interchange between *yoo* and *soo* is unnatural. It should be noted that this derives from the fact that *rasii* is marked as a higher degree of the reliability of reported second-hand evidence than *yoo*. Given this perspective, we can find subtle distinctions between *rasii* and *yoo* in the usage of inference. We can clarify two obvious differences of these. One is that the speaker's sensory perception based on visual evidence is marked by only *yoo*. The other is that when either *rasii* or *yoo* marks the speaker's inference based on second-hand evidence, *rasii* is more likely to be replaced by *soo* as a marker for reported second-hand evidence than *yoo* is. These two facts suggest that the choice of them is connected with the degree to which the speaker's own perception is involved.

## 2.4.2 The examination of compatibility

We will hypothesise that *yoo* is used for marking a higher degree of the speaker's perception, whereas *rasii* is used for marking a lesser degree of the speaker's perception, and that this is evident in the whole range of usages of *rasii* and *yoo*<sup>14</sup>. To prove the preceding hypothesis, we will examine the compatibility between the four types and the two expressions, *omooni* (I think that-), *tasikani* (surely), *matigainaku* (unmistakably), and the denial clause *-ga, watasi wa soo wa omowanai* (but, I don't think so).

### 2.4.2.1 Compatibility with *omooni*

Now we will examine the compatibility between *rasi*, *yoo* and *omooni* (I think that -)<sup>15</sup> which illuminates the speaker's own perception. Let us consider the following examples.

(21) *Omooni*, yaseta yoo desu ne.

I think lost your weight YOO COP-POL you know

(I think that you look like you have lost weight, haven't you?)

(22) *Omooni*, sukosi tukareta kao o site iru yoo da/

I think a little tired face ACC do in the state of YOO COP/

\**rasii* ga, karada o kowasite wa ikenai yo.

RASII but body ACC ruining TOP bad you know

(I think that you look a little tired, but don't wreck your health.)

<sup>14</sup> In this study we exclude *rasii* which expresses likeness and *yoo* which expresses likelihood. We will focus on *rasii* and *yoo* in inferential usage and *yoo* in appearance usage.

<sup>15</sup> The compatibility with *omooni* (I think that-) is derived from the work of Moriyama (1989) and Kin (1992). Moriyama uses *omooni* to distinguish between 'suitable perception (traditional inference)' and 'informational perception (traditional hearsay)'. Kin uses *omooni* to distinguish between 'subjective inference' and 'objective inference'. In this study we will use *omooni* to investigate the difference in the degree of the speaker's perception.

(28)' Haha wa iru hazu da ga, kotaenai tokoro o miru  
 mother TOP exist must COP but answer-NEG COMP ACC see  
 to omooni gaisyutu site iru \*rasii/ yoo da.  
 COMP I think go out in the state of RASII/ YOO COP

(Mother ought to be there, but I think that it seems that she must be out, because she didn't answer.)

(29)' Kono sokaisita kurasu kara yuusyuna suugakusya ga  
 this evaluated class from complement mathematicians NOM  
 haisyutusita koto kara mite mo, omooni seekatukankyoo  
 turned out COMP from seeing also I think living environment  
 to gakumon to wa amari sookansei ga nai  
 and learning COMP TOP very much relation NOM NEG  
 yoo de aru/ \*rasii  
 YOO it is that/ RASII

(If we also look at it from the point of view that this evacuated class turned out competent mathematicians, I think that it seems that the living environment does not have much effect on learning.)

(30)' Tada ituka Taeko ga itta tokoro ni yoruto, kentikugisitati wa,  
 but sometime NOM said according to architects TOP  
omooni, kyuuryoo igai no, arubaito ryoo ga ooi yoo de aru/  
 I think salary except part-time job rate NOM many YOO as it is  
 \*rasii.  
 RASII

(But I think it seems that, according to what Taeko said sometime, there are many architects who earn income from part-time jobs as well as their salary.)

(31)' Kitteta ra, omooni itizoku no naka ni, saibankan toka bengosi toka  
 hearing when I think relative 's among judge or lawyer or  
 sonnna no ga gorogoro site iru \*rasii/ yoo nan da.  
 such people NOM common in the state of RASII/ YOO it is that

(According to what I've been hearing, I think that it seems that it is common for these to be several lawyers and judges in one family.)

(21)' and (22)' refer to the speaker's direct observation based on visual evidence marked by *yoo*. (28)' and (29)' refer to the speaker's inference based on observable evidence. (30)' and (31)' refer to the speaker's inference based on second-hand evidence. In all the above sentences *yoo* is compatible with *omooni*, whereas *rasii* is not. This reveals that, even in inference, *yoo* is marked as involving a higher degree of the speaker's perception than that marked by *rasii*.

#### 2.4.2.2 Compatibility with *matigainaku*

Secondly we will examine the coexistence between *yoo* and *rasii* and *matigainaku* (unmistakably) which emphasises the speaker's perception. Masuoka (2000: 145) uses *matigainaku* to investigate the degree of the speaker's certainty of the judgment as a result of his/her inference as the following example.

(33) a. Matigainaku tonari no heya ni dareka iru yoo da.  
 unmistakably next 's room DAT somebody exist YOO COP

b.? Matigainaku tonarai no heya ni dareka iru rasii.  
 unmistakably next 's room DAT somebody exist RASII  
 (Unmistakably it seems that someone is in the next room.)

Example (33) would be used when the speaker hears the sound from the next room.

*Matigainaku* (unmistakably) emphasizes on the speaker's perception. Aoki (1986: 234) states that *matigainaku* (unmistakably), *utagainaku* (undoubtedly), *tasika(ni)* (surely) etc. express the speaker's certainty about the statement that is being made, and that this kind of adverb always corresponds to overt evidential elements.

A more credible hypothesis is that the evidential marker as involving the higher degree of the speaker's perception corresponds with the use of this kind of adverb. Let us consider the following examples<sup>16</sup>.

(21)' Matigainaku, yaseta yoo desu ne.  
 unmistakably lost your weight YOO COP-POL you know  
 (You look like you have unmistakably lost weight, haven't you?)

(22)' Matigainaku, sukosi tukareta kao o site iru yoo da  
 unmistakably a little tired face ACC do in the state of YOO COP  
 ga, karada o kowasite wa ikenai yo.  
 but body ACC ruining TOP bad you know  
 (You look a little tired unmistakably, but don't wreck your health.)

(28)' Haha wa iru hazu da ga, kotaenai tokoro o miru to  
 mother TOP exist must COP but answer-NEG COMP ACC see COMP  
matigainaku gaisyutu site iru \*rasii/ yoo da.  
 unmistakably go out in the state of RASII/ YOO COP  
 (Mother ought to be there, but it seems that she must be out unmistakably, because she didn't answer.)

<sup>16</sup> We admit that these examples with *matigainaku* do not sound very natural to the native Japanese speaker, however, we consider that it is still valid to investigate the acceptability of the degree of the compatibility of *matigainaku* with *rasii* and *yoo*.

(29)' Kono sokaisita kurasu kara yuusyuna suugakusya ga haisyutusita  
 this evaluated class from competent mathematicians NOM turned out  
 koto kara mite mo, matigainaku seekatukankyoo to gakumon  
 COMP from seeing also unmistakably living environment and learning  
 to wa amari sookansee ga nai yoo de aru/ rasii.  
 COMP TOP very much relation NOM NEG YOO it is that/ \*RASII

(If we also look at it from the point of view that this evacuated class turned out competent mathematicians, it seems that the living environment does not have much effect on learning unmistakably.)

(30)' Tada ituka Taeko ga itta tokoro ni yoruto, kentikugisitati wa,  
 but sometime NOM said according to architects TOP  
matigainaku kyuuryoo igai no, arubaito ryoo ga ooi  
 unmistakably salary except part-time job rate NOM many  
 yoo de aru / \*rasii.  
 YOO as it is/ RASII

(But it seems that, according to what Taeko said sometime, there are many architects who earn income from part-time jobs as well as their salary unmistakably.)

(31)' Kitteta ra, matigainaku itizoku no naka ni, saibankan toka  
 hearing when unmistakably relative 's among judge or  
 bengosi toka sonna no ga gorogoro site iru  
 lawyer or such people NOM common in the state of  
 \*rasii/ yoo nan da.  
 RASII/ YOO it is that

(According to what I've been hearing, it seems that it is common for these to be several lawyers and judges in one family unmistakably.)

As a result of the preceding examples, we find the degree of acceptance of adverbs, which indicate the speaker's certainty about the statement, differs between *rasii* and *yoo*. That is,

*yoo* is compatible with *matigainaku*, whereas *rasii* is not likely to be compatible. This result suggests that the speaker's own higher perception is marked by *yoo*.

#### 2.4.2.3 Compatibility with *tasikani*

We will examine the coexistence between *rasii* and *yoo* and *tasikani* (surely, indeed) which emphasises the speaker's perception. *Tasikani* emphasises the speaker's positive statement that the state of affairs is certain or true based on the evidence, such as the speaker's own experience or second-hand source. *Tasikani* indicates that the speaker takes high confidence in his/her judgment because his/her judgment is not based on his/her own imagination or guess, but based on certain evidence (Morita 1989: 638-9).

Masuoka (2000: 146) illustrates the degree of the coexistence with *tasikani*.

- (34) a. Otoki no hoo mo, watasi ga “koyuki” ni itte zyotyuuatati ni  
           's side also I       NOM                DAT going waitresses DAT  
 kiitari, kanozyo no sundeita apaato ni itte sirabeta no  
 asked and she       's living-PAST flat    DAT going researched COMP  
 desu ga, kore mo tasikani otoko ga atta yoo  
 COP-POL but this also indeed boyfriend NOM existed YOO  
 desu.  
 COP-POL

- b. ? ..... kore mo tasikani otoko ga atta rasii desu.  
           this also indeed boyfriend NOM existed RASII COP-POL

(I went to ‘*kokuki*’ and asked the waitresses about her. I also went to her flat.

As the result of my research, it seems that she surely had a boyfriend.)

(35) a. Tanaka wa madogarasu ni uturu zibun no kao ni me  
 TOP windowpane DAT reflect oneself 's face DAT eye  
 o yatta.

ACC turned

Tasikani huransu ni kite yaseta yoo da.

indeed France DAT coming lost weight YOO COP

b. ?..... tasikani huransu ni kite yaseta rasii.

indeed France DAT coming lost weight RASII

(Tanaka saw his own face reflecting the windowpane.

Indeed, it seems that he has lost his weight since he came to France.)

(Masuoka 2000: 146)

In (34), the speaker makes an inference based on both his/her direct observed evidence and second-hand source from the waitresses. In (35), the speaker makes an inference based on his/her direct observed evidence. In both sentences, *yoo* is more likely to be compatible with *tasikani* than *rasii*. As in (34) and (35), the kinds of evidence are irrespective of the choice of *rasii* and *yoo*. As mentioned above, *tasikani* indicates that the speaker makes a judgment with his/her high certainty that the state of affairs is certain or true because his/her judgment is based on evidence. That is, the speaker's statement with *tasikani* contains high degree of the speaker's perception.

Let us consider the following examples with compatibility with *tasikani*<sup>17</sup>.

(21)' Tasikani, yaseta yoo desu ne/ \*rasii desu  
 surely lost your weight YOO COP-POL you know/ RASII COP-POL  
 ne.

you know

(You look like you have surely lost weight, haven't you?)

<sup>17</sup>We admit these expressions with *tasikani* do not sound very natural to the native Japanese speaker, however, we consider that it is still valid to investigate the acceptability of the degree of the compatibility to *tasikani* with *rasii* and *yoo*.

(22) Tasikani, sukosi tukareta kao o site iru yoo da  
 surely a little tired face ACC do in the state of YOO COP  
 ga,/ \*rasii ga,.....  
 but/ RASII but

(You look a little tired surely, but don't wreck your health.)

(28) Haha wa iru hazu da ga, kotaenai tokoro o miru  
 mother TOP exist must COP but answer-NEG COMP ACC see  
 to tasikani gaisyutu site iru \*rasii/ yoo da.  
 COMP surely go out in the state of RASII/ YOO COP

(Mother ought to be there, but it seems that she must be out surely, because she didn't answer.)

(29) Kono sokaisita kurasu kara yuusyuuu suugakusya ga  
 this evaluated class from competent mathematicians NOM  
 haisyutusita koto kara mite mo, tasikani seekatukankyoo to  
 turned out COMP from see also surely living environment and  
 gakumon to wa amari sookansee ga nai  
 learning COMP TOP very much relation NOM NEG  
 yoo de aru/ \*rasii.  
 YOO it is that/ RASII

(If we also look at it from the point of view that this evacuated class turned out competent mathematicians, it seems that the living environment does not have much effect on learning surely.)

(30)' Tada ituka Taeko ga itta tokoro ni yoruto, kentikugisitati wa,  
 but sometime NOM said according to architects TOP  
tasikani kyuuryoo igai no, arubaito ryoo ga ooi  
 surely salary except part-time job rate NOM many  
 ?yoo de aru/ \*rasii.  
 YOO as it is/ RASII

(But it seems that, according to what Taeko said sometime, there are many architects who earn income from part-time jobs as well as their salary surely.)

(31)' Kitteta ra, matigainaku itizoku no naka ni, saibankan toka  
 hearing when unmistakably relative 's among judge or  
 bengosi toka sonna no ga gorogoro site iru \*rasii/  
 lawyer or such people NOM common in the state of RASII/  
 yoo nan da.  
 YOO it is that

(According to what I've been hearing, it seems that it is common for these to be several lawyers and judges in one family surely.)

As a result of the preceding examples, we find the degree of acceptance of adverbs, which indicate the speaker's certainty about the statement, differs between *rasii* and *yoo*. That is, *yoo* is compatible with *tasikani*, whereas *rasii* is not likely to be compatible. This result suggests that the speaker's own higher perception is likely to be marked by *yoo*.

## 2.4.2.4 Compatibility with denial expression

Thirdly we will examine the compatibility between *rasii* and *yoo* and the denial expression<sup>18</sup>. In the following examples the speaker denies the preceding statement him/herself.

(21)' Yaseta            \*yoo desu        ga, watasi wa soo wa omowanai.  
 lost your weight YOO COP-POL but I        TOP so TOP think-NEG  
 (You look like you have lost weight, but I don't think so.)

(22)' Sukosi tukareta kao o site iru            \*yoo da ga,  
 a little tired face ACC do in the state of YOO COP but  
watasi wa soo wa omowanai.  
 I        TOP so TOP think-NEG  
 (You look a little tired, but I don't think so.)

(28)' Haha wa iru hazu da ga, kotaenai tokoro o miru  
 mother TOP exist must COP but answer-NEG COMP ACC see  
 to gaisyutu site iru        rasii/ \*yoo da  
 COMP go out in the state of RASII/ YOO COP  
ga, watasi wa soo wa omowanai.  
 but I        TOP so TOP think-NEG

(Mother ought to be there, but it seems that she must be out, because she didn't answer, but I don't think so.)

---

<sup>18</sup> The compatibility with the denial clause *-ga, watasi wa soo wa omowanai* (but, I don't think so) is derived from the work of Nitta (1992: 5). Nitta uses this compatibility between hearsay *soo* and inferential *yoo*. In this study we will use *-ga, watasi wa soo wa omowanai* to investigate the difference in the degree of the speaker's perception.

(29)' Kono sokaisita kurasu kara yuusuuna suugakusya ga  
 this evaluated class from complement mathematicians NOM  
 haisyutusita koto kara mite mo, seekatukankyoo to  
 turned out COMP from see also living environment and  
 gakumon to wa amari sookansee ga nai  
 learning COMP TOP very much relation NOM NEG  
 \*yoo de aru/ rasii ga, watasi wa soo wa omowanai.  
 YOO it is that/ RASII but I TOP so TOP think-NEG

(If we also look at it from the point of view that this evacuated class turned out competent mathematicians, it seems that the living environment does not have much effect on learning, but I don't think so.)

(30)' Tada ituka Taeko ga itta tokoro ni yoruto, kentikugisitati wa,  
 but sometime NOM said according to architects TOP  
 kyuuryoo igai no, arubaito ryoo ga ooi yoo de aru/  
 salary except part-time job rate NOM many YOO it is that/  
 \*rasii ga, watasi wa soo wa omowanai.  
 RASII but I TOP so TOP think-NEG

(But it seems that, according to what Taeko said sometime, there are many architects who earn income from part-time jobs as well as their salary, but I don't think so.)

(31)' Kitteta ra, itizoku no naka ni, saibankan toka bengosi toka sonnna no  
 hearing when relative 's among judge or lawyer or such people  
 ga gorogoro site iru rasii/ \*yoo nan da  
 NOM common in the state of RASII/ YOO it is that  
ga, watasi wa soo wa omowanai.  
 but I TOP so TOP think-NEG

(According to what I've been hearing, it seems that it is common for these to be several lawyers and judges in one family, but I don't think so.)

As in (21)' and (22)', it is unnatural for the speaker to deny the state of affairs based on direct visual evidence. Moreover in (28)' and (29)', the speaker's denial of the state of affairs marked by *yoo* is unnatural, whereas *rasii* is natural.

Nitta (1992: 5) states that in the inferential usage that concerns the speaker's judgment, the denial of his/her own previous statement causes self-contradiction. On the other hand in the hearsay usage that does not involve the speaker's own perception, the denial statement of his/her own previous words does not lead to contradiction. The result of our examination clearly shows that in the preceding sentences, the use of *yoo* is ungrammatical, whereas the use of *rasii* sounds more natural. Moreover *rasii* as a marker for second-hand evidence in (30)' and (31)' is used more naturally rather than *rasii* as a marker for observable evidence. This fact indicates that the inferential *rasii* involving second-hand evidence fulfils a similar function to that of hearsay usage involving reported second-hand evidence.

The compatibility between *rasii* and the denial statement indicates that *rasii* is used as a marker for the lesser degree of the speaker's perception. On the other hand the non-compatibility between *yoo* and the denial statement indicates that *yoo* is used as a marker for the higher degree of the speaker's perception.

#### 2.4.2.5 The distinction between *rasii* and *yoo*

The compatibility of *yoo* with the expression that emphasises or illuminates the idea that the actor is making the judgment produced by the speaker, and the compatibility of *rasii* with the expression which represents the speaker's denial of his/her own previous statement, reveal the validity of the preceding hypothesis. That is, the fact that *yoo* is likely to occur with both *omooni* (I think that-), *matigainaku* (unmistakably) and *tasikani* (surely) shows that *yoo* is used as a marker for involving the higher degree of the speaker's perception. On the other hand the fact that only *rasii* can occur with *-ga*, *watasi wa soo wa omowanai* (but I don't think so) shows that *rasii* is used as a marker for involving the lesser degree of the speaker's perception.

### 2.4.3 The syntactic distinction between appearance *yoo* and inferential *yoo*

Masuoka (2000) proposes the following three points concerned with *yoo* as a marker of visual evidence in appearance usage:

- a) The speaker is able to add the interrogatory, questioning whether the proposition is true.
- b) The speaker is able to express dual appearance and impression in one sentence.
- c) Whereas appearance *yoo* can take the negative form and the interrogative form, inferential *yoo* can not.

It is clear that above three points are helpful to distinguish between appearance *yoo* and inferential *yoo* from the syntactic viewpoint. Now let us examine the following examples illustrated by Hayatsu (1988:57).

(36) Kinoo kare to iti zikan hodo hanasimasita ga, kare no hanasi kata  
 yesterday he with one hour about talked-POL but he 's talking way  
 ni wa tokidoki kansai ben ga maziru yoo desu ne.  
 in TOP sometimes Kansai dialect NOM mix YOO COP-POL you know  
 (I talked to him for about one hour. It appears to me that sometimes I can hear the Kansai  
 dialect in his speech.)

(37) Tennai o hitotoori mite kita ga, kono mise no sinamono  
 inside the shop ACC over looking came but this shop 's goods  
 wa doremo tikaku no mise yori iti wari gurai yasui yoo  
 TOP anything neighbour 's shop than ten percent about cheaper YOO  
 da.  
 COP

(I looked around inside this shop, and it appears to me that any goods in this shop is ten percent cheaper than in the neighbouring shop.)

Hayatsu (1986: 57) regards above two sentences as the speaker's inferential perception on the basis of direct evidence. According to Hayatsu (1988: 57), *yoo* is unlikely to be interchanged with *rasii*<sup>19</sup> in this case because the speaker's statement includes the presupposition that the speaker obtains direct evidence. It seems to us that (36) shows that the speaker received an impression that he speaks Kansai dialect based on his way of talking. Similarly in (37), the speaker makes his/her observational statement that any goods in this shop are cheaper than ones in the neighbouring shop. It is likely that in both of above sentences, the speaker observes the events or action through his/her direct visual or auditory evidence. We find it useful to utilise the above three points in order to examine whether *yoo* in (36) and (37) is a marker for appearance. The results are shown as follows:

- (36)' a. Kansai ben ga maziru yoo da ga, ki no sei ka  
           dialect NOM mix YOO COP but feeling 's fault Q  
           mo sirenai.  
           too know-NEG

(It appears to me that sometimes I can hear the Kansai dialect in his speech, but it might be thought that I'm imagining things.)

- b. Kansai ben ga maziru yoo de mo ari,  
           dialect NOM mix YOO COP too as it is  
       Tokyo ben ga maziru yoo de mo aru.  
           dialect NOM mix YOO COP too as it is

(It appears to me that sometimes I can hear the Kansai dialect in his speech, or it appears to me that I can hear the Tokyo dialect in his speech.)

- c. Kansai ben ga mazitta yoo de wa nakatta yo.  
           dialect NOM mixing YOO COP TOP NEG-PAST you know

(It appears to me that I cannot hear the Kansai dialect in his speech, you know.)

<sup>19</sup> Hayatsu uses the mark '?' to indicate that the use of *rasii* is unnatural.

- (37) a. Tikaku no mise yori itiwari gurai yasui yoo da ga,  
 near 's shop than ten percent about cheap YOO COP but  
 tonari mati nohoo ga yasui ka mo sirenai.  
 next town than NOM cheap Q too know-NEG

(It appears to me that any goods in this shop is ten percent cheaper than in the neighbouring shop, but the goods in another shop is cheaper than in this shop.)

- b. Titaku no mise yori itiwari gurai yasui yoo de mo ari,  
 near 's shop than ten percent about cheap YOO COP too as it is  
 tonari mati no mise yori yasui yoo de mo aru  
 next town 's shop than cheap YOO COP too as it is

(It appears to me that any goods in this shop is cheaper than in the neighbouring shop, or is cheaper in the next shop.)

- c. Tikaku no mise yori itiwari gurai yasui yoo de wa  
 near 's shop than ten percent about cheap YOO COP TOP  
 nakatta yo.  
 NEG-PAST you know.

(It appears to me that any goods in this shop is not cheaper than in the neighbouring shop, you know.)

This result derives from the fact that both (36) and (37) satisfy all of the conditions that *yoo* is marked as involving direct Attested evidence, that is this type of *yoo* expresses appearance usage<sup>20</sup>.

Willett (1988: 61) points out the confusion of the overlapping between a sensory perception and inferential meaning in the above case. Concerning this problem, he defines attested and inferring in the following way: “an assertion based on perception of the actual occurrence of an event is an instance of the use of Attested, but an assertion about the supposed

<sup>20</sup> In fact Kikuchi (2000: 47) regards *yoo* in (37) as appearance usage.

occurrence of that same event based on perception of its end result is an instance of Inferring evidence (1988:61)".

Palmer (2001: 51) simplifies the hierarchy of evidentials attempted by Oswald (1986:43) as follows:

Visual > Non-visual > Deductive > Reported > Assumptive

In the above figure, "Visual" is the preferred evidence. Palmer (2001: 51) states that visual evidence is used "whenever the speaker has seen, or is looking at, a state of event", and "even if he has or has had another type of evidence, he will still use the Visual evidential rather than that appropriate to the other types".

That is, attested evidence indicates that the speaker is faced with the actual occurrence of an event, and refers to his/her perception. On the other hand inferring evidence indicates that the speaker is faced with the end result and infers the occurrence of a previous event which is causing the perceived state of affairs. It seems to us that (36) and (37) refer to the speaker's sensory perception of an actual occurrence of event. However what the speaker is actually faced with is the end results of the occurrence of the event, and he/she infers based on the indirectness of the evidence for the event that is causing the perceived state of affairs.

## 2.5 The circumstance in which only *rasii* can occur

Thirdly we will investigate the case where *rasii* is more likely to occur. In the following type of examples, the use of *rasii* is more plausible than the use of *yoo*.

- (38) Kondo osiete moratta Sugawara Sinzaburoo san (Miyazawa Kenzi  
 this time teaching reserved Mr.  
 kinenkan no syakaikyooiku sidookan) ni yoru to, Hanamaki  
 memorial museum 's social education instructor according to  
 hoogen de wa dakuon de hazimaru "birarito" to iu no ga  
 dialect in TOP voiced consonant with start COPM NOM  
 hutuu rasii/ de aru soo da/ ?de aru yoo da.  
 common RASII/ it is that SOO COP/ it is that YOO COP

(According to what Mr. Shinzaburo Shinozawa (the social education instructor of the Miyazawa Kenji memorial museum) told me, it seems that in the Hanamaki dialect it is usual to start "*birarito*" with a voiced consonant.)

In (38), the speaker perceives the particular pronunciation of the Hanamaki region on the basis of secondary evidence<sup>21</sup>. It seems to us that *rasii* in this case is marked as hearsay, because *rasii* can replace *soo* as hearsay usage. However it is not impossible to suppose that it can also be interchanged with inferential *yoo*. This fact might indicate that *rasii* is not solely marked as hearsay, but marked for the speaker's inference on the basis of secondary evidence.

Kamiya (1995:566) gives some cases in the usage of inference that can be expressed only by *rasii*. The first case is when the speaker cannot understand or agree to the result of his/her inference on the basis of the observed state of affairs. Consider the following:

- (39) Oyuki ni wa yoku wakaranakatta ga, dooyara hanasi no  
 for TOP very much knew-NEG but presumably conversation 's

<sup>21</sup> As mentioned above, the insertion of the adverb *dooyara* helps to distinguish between hearsay *soo* and *rasii*.

yoosu de wa sonnooha to yara ni naru rasikatta/  
 look according to TOP COMP or something become RASII-PAST/  
 yoo datta.  
 YOO COP-PAST

(Oyuki wasn't sure about that, but it seemed that they would become something like 'sonnooha' from their way of talking.)

In (39) the speaker infers the state of affairs on the basis of second-hand evidence, and at the head of this sentence the subordinate clause, which indicates that the speaker cannot understand what she inferred herself, is marked.

Moreover when the inferential evidence brings about unexpected results for the speaker, the use of *rasii* is more acceptable than *yoo* (Kamiya 1995: 566). Let us consider the following sentence.

(40) Korera no hitotati wa Zeami no densyo o hukaku  
 these people TOP 's Quintessence of Noh Plays ACC deeply  
 yomu koto ni yotte meezin no kurai ni tassita no de wa mattaku  
 read by master 's grade DAT reached COMP TOP at all  
 nakatta rasii.  
 NEG-PAST RASII

(It seems that these people didn't reach the grade of master by reading Quintessence of Noh Plays.)

Example (40) refers to unexpected nature of the perceived evidence for the speaker. In this case the state of affairs that the Noh masters from the Meiji to Showa period did not learn the Quintessence of Noh Plays at all is unexpected for the speaker. *Rasii* can be marked for such kind of evidence, whereas *yoo* cannot be. This is connected with *rasii*'s nature as a marker for involving lesser degree of the speaker's perception.

In addition *rasii* can be marked for the events or actions which the speaker does not participate in, or is not allowed to participate in him/herself (Kamiya 1995: 567). Consider the following:

(41) Kagakusya no kenkai de wa, tooi ten ga mokusee no kidoo  
 scientist 's view in TOP distant spots NOM Jupiter 's orbit  
 tikaku ni aru rasii.

near to exist RASII

(According to the scientist's view, it seems the spots exist near to the orbit of Jupiter.)

(Kamiya 1995: 567)

Example (41) refers to the speaker's inferential perception based on second-hand evidence. In this case the speaker's judgment is based on the scientists' view. The evidence for making the judgment is specialised, and not familiar to ordinary people. Therefore this kind of evidence does not involve his/her perception. It can be considered that the nature of *rasii* as a marker for a lesser degree of the speaker's perception is made use of in this case.

## 2.6 Psychological attitude toward evidence

Some grammarians focus on the degree of the speaker's psychological attitude toward the state of affairs when choosing either *rasii* or *yoo*.

Teramura (1984) states that the difference between *rasii* and *yoo* depends on whether the judgment made is found to a higher degree on evidence from outside or on one's own perception. Teramura maintains that *rasii* involves the lesser degree of the speaker's inference and a heavier reliance on evidence obtained from the outside, whereas *yoo* gives the impression that there is more of the speaker's own inference supporting the utterance. Moreover there is a further difference in that *yoo* can be used in the case where the speaker's conclusion is his/her own idea even though the inference is carried out based on objective facts or evidence (Teramura 1984: 251-252).

Hayatsu (1988) divides the conventional research into *yoo* and *rasii* into two types: the subjectivity/objectivity theory and the explanation that the utterance (*hatuwa syutai*) and situation (*zитай*) are used. In the former concept, Hayatsu cites Okamura (1969), Morita (1983) and Teramura (1984), and in the later concept, she cites Shibata (1982). Hayatsu (1988) points out that the two types are connected with the difference between *rasii* and *yoo*. Hayatsu (1988:51) then divides the basis of judgment into two types of information, indirect information and direct information. Indirect information is the evidence that is acquired through some external medium such as books and what other people say. Direct information means the evidence which the speaker acquires him/herself. She also divides mental attitude based on the utterance in relation to the situation into the bringing near-attitude (“*hikiyos*” *no taido*) and pulling apart-attitude (“*hikihanasi*” *no taido*). “*Hikiyose*” *no taido* means that the speaker considers the situation about which the speaker will make a judgment and the context of that judgment to be near him/herself. “*Hikihanasi*” *no taido* reflects the speaker’s view that the situation about which the speaker will make a judgment and the context of judgment is fixed distance from him/herself.




Figure 6: The system of inference

Hayatsu suggests that *rasii* can be used to make a judgment based on indirect information. Even if the basis of evidence is direct, the speaker perceives that he/she is distancing him/herself from the utterance. Hayatsu then suggests that *yoo* can be used to make a judgment based on direct evidence, and even if based on indirect evidence, the speaker recognizes that he/she aligns him/herself more closely with the utterance. Hayatsu (1988:

57) states that *yoo* is also used to draw inference from the situation based on evidence obtained through the five senses. Hayatsu (1988: 59) points out that on the occasion of language expression, distinction between the speaker's own mental domain and another's domain is naturally made around the speaker. Therefore, when a judgment is made in or about a certain situation, there may be a choice made as to whether to consider the utterance to be inside of the speaker or to regard it as outside. Judgments such as these govern the proper use of *rasii* and *yoo* in inferential expression. Hayatsu (1988: 60) concludes that *rasii* is used when the speaker regards the situation as outside of the speaker's own domain, whereas *yoo* is used when the speaker regards the situation as inside of his/her own domain.

Masuoka (1991) also discusses the speaker's psychological difference between *rasii* and *yoo*. He maintains that if the speaker considers the evidence to be inside the speaker's territory, *yoo* will be used, while *rasii* is used for evidence outside the speaker's territory. Masuoka states that *yoo* is used if the speaker considers that the expression of a given observation and the evidence are inside his/her territory, whereas *rasii* is used if he/she considers these are the outside of his/her territory. Because the speaker usually regards his/her direct experience as inside his/her territory, it is highly likely that *yoo* is used. The evidence gained by another has a high possibility of being considered to be outside of the speaker's territory, therefore, it is highly likely that *rasii* is used. Masuoka (1991: 121) introduces the following example.

(42) Honbu            kara no    hookoku de wa,    zendaitooryoo ga  
       the head office from GEN report    in TOP ex- president NOM  
       tukamatta        yoo desu/        rasii desu.  
       had been arrest YOO COP-POL/ RASII COP-POL

(According to the report from the head office, the ex-president has been arrested.)

He explains that in this case, although the evidence itself is the information from others, it is dependent on the situation as to whether it is regarded as inside the speaker's territory or outside. He says that *yoo* is used when the speaker considers that he/she is a member of the

head office, whereas *rasii* is used when the speaker thinks he/she is separate from the head office. Whether the speaker will use *rasii* or *yoo*, depends on their attitude toward the evidence source, in this case, a report from a head office. If the speaker detects that the inferential evidence is in his/her domain, his/her posture over the judgment will become relatively positive and in this case *yoo* is used. If the inferential evidence is in the domain outside of his/her territory, his/her posture over the judgment will become relatively passive, and in this case *rasii* is used. In addition, *yoo* is used when the speaker feels more responsibility for the judgment made.

It follows from this that the choice of either *rasii* or *yoo*, which is concerned with the degree of the speaker's psychological attitude toward the state of affairs, is related to the degree of the speaker's perception. The choice of *rasii* and *yoo* is concerned with these fundamental usages and is based on whether the speaker's perception is contained or not. If the judgment is based on the speaker's own perception, his/her psychological attitude toward the inferential evidence is more familiar, whereas if it is not, his/her psychological attitude is more distant. As Hayatsu (1988), Kamiya (1995) and Masuoka (1991) mentioned, *rasii* is likely to be used when the evidence is not familiar to him/her or is outside his/her territory even though he/she obtained it directly.

## 2.7 Conclusion

A diagram showing the usages of *rasii* and *yoo* is presented in Figure 7. Willett's (1988) terms are used for the classification of *rasii* and *yoo*. *Yoo* marks appearance and inferential usages, whereas *rasii* marks inferential usage. The use of direct visual evidence for appearance usage is marked by *yoo*. In inferential usage, both *rasii* and *yoo* mark indirect inferring results evidence and indirect reported second-hand evidence. However, in the usage of hearsay, *soo* also marks indirect reported second-hand evidence. *Rasii* and *yoo* are frequently used as markers indicating that the speaker makes a judgment based on evidence. The common denominator between *rasii* and *yoo* is especially evident in inferential usage. In this kind of usage the speaker perceives evidence of some kind and uses it to make an inference. However, there is a subtle difference between the uses of the two expressions. This distinction does not depend on the types of evidence, but on the degree to which the speaker's perception of evidence is involved. The fact that direct visual evidence is marked by *yoo* suggests that *yoo* is a marker indicating a higher degree of evidential perception by the speaker. On the other hand, the fact that the state of affairs that is outside of the speaker's territory is likely to be marked by *rasii* suggests that *rasii* is a marker indicating a lower degree of evidential perception by the speaker.

{Direct	{Visual evidence	}Appearance ( <i>yoo</i> )
{		
{Indirect	{Inferring evidence	}Inference ( <i>rasii/yoo</i> )
{	{Reported second-hand evidence	}

Figure 7: The classification of *rasii* and *yoo*




Figure 8: The degree of the speaker's perception of evidence

Nobayashi (1997: 38) mentions that *rasii* and *yoo* involve different kinds of reliability due to the lack of the speaker's confidence in the result of the judgment. *Yoo* is a marker that indicates that the speaker merely relies on his/her perception to make a judgment. That is, in the speaker's statement '*Hutotta yoo desu ne* (You look like you have put on weight)', it would be no great surprise to find that he/she has not put on weight. On the other hand, *rasii* indicates lesser reliability due to the lack of the speaker's confidence because *rasii* is a marker that indicates that the speaker has not directly observed the actual state of affairs. This is related to the degree of perception by the speaker. The nature of *yoo* as involving a higher degree of the speaker's perception brings about lesser reliability, whereas the nature of *rasii* as involving a lesser degree of the speaker's perception brings about lesser reliability.

It can be considered that this distinction between the two expressions by a speaker is related to verbal communication strategies. It is clear that the speaker chooses either *rasii* or *yoo* in order to express different intentions. That is, the speaker's subtle difference in intention expressed in the choice between *rasii* and *yoo* is likely to promote harmonious communication with the addressee. In the next chapter we will examine how the choice between *rasii* and *yoo* functions in verbal interaction.

### Chapter 3

#### Pragmatic analysis of *rasii* and *yoo*

In this chapter we will examine the use of *rasii* and *yoo* in verbal interactions. What is significant in this argument is that the usages of *rasii* and *yoo*, which we examined in Chapter Two, are related to linguistic politeness in the respect that the speaker utilises these terms based on concern for the addressee. A number of studies have been carried out on this topic, such as Grice (1975, 1989), Brown and Levinson (1978, 1987), Lakoff (1972) and Leech (1983). Brown and Levinson classify and formulate their theories from the viewpoint of strategies, which the speaker uses specifically to be linguistically polite. They provide a framework of five main strategies for the satisfaction of “face” the basic “wants”<sup>1</sup> of every member of a society. We suggest that the use of *rasii* and *yoo* is marked as maintenance for the “face” of both participants. The use of *rasii* and *yoo* might be partly a result of the speaker’s intention to care about the addressee’s feeling or desire. The use of *rasii* and *yoo* as evidential markers indicates that there is no guarantee of the validity of the speaker’s utterance in the respect that the speaker merely makes an equivocal judgment based on evidence. That is, the speaker’s statement with *rasii* and *yoo* is equivocal indicated that the degree of the speaker’s responsibility for his/her utterance is low; consequently, the fear of directly denying the addressee’s feelings and wounding his/her pride is removed. In contrast, a statement without either *rasii* or *yoo* may wound the addressee’s feelings. Therefore, it can be considered that the uncertainty contained in both *rasii* and *yoo* protects the addressee’s feelings or desires. This chapter will discuss how *rasii* and *yoo* work in verbal interactions, especially focusing on Brown and Levinson’s work.

### 3.1 Linguistic politeness

Firstly let us consider the following example (Kasuoka 1980: 171).

- (43) a. Ananata no kotae wa matigatte iru yoo da/  
 you 's answer TOP wrong in the state of YOO COP  
 rasii.  
 RASII  
 (It seems that your answer is wrong.)

Example (43) refers to the speaker's disagreement with the addressee's answer. Example (43) can be interpreted as a euphemistic expression as well as the speaker's inferential judgment<sup>2</sup> (Kasuoka 1990: 171). The point here is that the speaker could make an assertive statement without using either *rasii* or *yoo*, as in the following:

- (43) b. Anata no kotae wa matigatte iru.  
 you 's answer TOP wrong in the state of  
 (Your answer is wrong.)

It is obvious that example (43b) causes offence to the addressee. On the other hand, in (43a), either *rasii* or *yoo* is used to indicate that the speaker avoids an impolite attitude toward the addressee. The use of *rasii* and *yoo* as euphemisms is an example of using an indirect expression to avoid a more direct utterance, and conveys a more polite impression than an assertive statement. What we are concerned with is the suggestion that the usage of *rasii* and *yoo* represents a strategy for smooth verbal interaction.


Before we describe the pragmatic usages of *rasii* and *yoo* in detail, we must review the recent theories of politeness discussed by Brown and Levinson (1978, 1987). They propose the universality of the politeness theory surrounding verbal and non-verbal

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<sup>1</sup> The term 'want' indicates the every participant's desire for the satisfaction of his/her 'face' (Brown and Levinson 1978: 67).

<sup>2</sup> Kasuoka (1980: 171) states that (43) can be interpreted as both the speaker expresses his/her judgment euphemistically, and the speaker does not have confidence whether his/her judgment is true.

communication. They present “face”<sup>3</sup> as a core element of their work. “Face” indicates “the public self-image that every member wants to claim for himself” (Brown and Levinson 1978: 66), and every model person<sup>4</sup> is endowed with two particular face wants, “negative face” and “positive face”. Negative face indicates “the want of every ‘competent adult member’ that his actions be unimpeded by others”, whereas positive face indicates “the want of every member that his wants be desirable to at least some others” (Brown and Levinson 1978: 67). They further discuss five strategies for the maintenance of every member’s face, such as “bald on record”<sup>5</sup>, “positive politeness”, “negative politeness”, “off-record”<sup>6</sup> and “don’t do the face-threatening act (FTA)” as shown in the following figure (Brown and Levinson 1978: 65).



*Figure 9: Circumstances determining choice of strategy*

<sup>3</sup> Brown and Levinson’s notion of face is derived from that of Goffman (1967), and “from the English folk term, which ties face up with notions of being embarrassed or humiliated, or ‘losing face’” (Brown and Levinson 1978: 66).

<sup>4</sup> Model person (MP) indicates the speaker and the addressee (Brown and Levinson 1978: 63-4).

<sup>5</sup> “Bald-on-record” indicates an action without giving ‘face’ to the addressee, and this action is carried out in the most direct, clear, unambiguous and concise way possible. For example, the speaker asks for a request, by saying “Do X!”. When the speaker wants to do the FTA with maximum efficiency more than he/she wants to satisfy the addressee’s face, the speaker will choose the bald-on-record strategy (Brown and Levinson 1978: 74, 100).

<sup>6</sup> Brown and Levinson explain “off record” in the following way: “if an actor goes off record in doing A, then there is more than one unambiguously attributable intention so that the actor cannot be held to have committed himself to one particular intent (Brown and Levinson 1978: 74). That is, if the speaker wants

Brown and Levinson (1978: 65) state that in these five sets of strategies, the more an act threatens the speaker's or the addressee's face, the more the speaker will want to choose a higher-numbered strategy. Among these strategies, "face-threatening action (FTA)" represents certain kinds of acts which intrinsically threaten face. In addition, "positive politeness" is regarded as "redress directed to the addressee's positive face, his perennial desire that his wants (or the actions / acquisitions / values resulting from them) should be thought of as desirable", whereas "negative politeness" is regarded as "redressive action addressed to the addressee's negative face", that is, "his want to have his freedom of action unhindered and his attention unimpeded" (Brown and Levinson 1978: 159).

According to Brown and Levinson, "the numerical value that measures the weightiness of FTA<sub>x</sub>"(W) is determined by three values, the social distance (D) of the speaker and addressee, the relative power (P) of the speaker and addressee, and "the absolute ranking (R) of impositions in the particular culture"<sup>7</sup>. The weightiness of an FTA is calculated in the following way<sup>8</sup> (Brown and Levinson 1978: 81).

$$W_x = D(S, H) + P(H, S) + R_x$$

Grice postulates the use of Brown and Levinson's theory of politeness in conversational communications from four maxims (1978: 60). Grice discusses the "Cooperative Principle" to formulate what the participants will be expected to observe from the expressed utterance. Grice states that the "Cooperative Principle" requires that a particular in a conversation "make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged" (Grice 1989: 26). The Cooperative principle is further divided into four main maxims, "Quantity", "Quality", "Relation", and "Manner"<sup>9</sup>. The

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to do an FTA, but wants to avoid the responsibility for doing it, the speaker can do 'off record' and leave it up to the addressee to decide how to interpret it (Brown and Levinson 1978: 74).

<sup>7</sup> Hill et al. (1986: 350) point out that the degree of politeness is determined by the factors of Social Distance, Authority, Cost-benefit, and Optionality according to Leech (1983), as well as P, D and R according to Brown and Levinson.

<sup>8</sup> 'S' stands for the speaker, and 'H' stands for the addressee (Brown and Levinson 1978: 64)

<sup>9</sup> Grice (1989: 26) quotes these four maxims from Kant.

first maxim of Quantity relates to the amount of information conveyed, and is divided into the following sub-maxims (ibid, 26).

- (a) Make your contribution as informative as is required  
(for the current purposes of the exchange).
- (b) Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.

The second maxim of Quality is categorised as a supermaxim, by which a participant will “try to make your contribution one that is true” (Grice 1987: 27). Quality is subdivided into the following two specific maxims (ibid, 27).

- (a) Do not say what you believe to be false.
- (b) Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.

The third maxim of Relation requires that a contribution “be relevant” (Grice 1989: 27). The fourth maxim of Manner indicates how what is said is to be said. This maxim represents the supermaxim, “be perspicuous” (ibid, 27), and is further categorised into the following four maxims (ibid, 27).

- (a) Avoid obscurity of expression.
- (b) Avoid ambiguity.
- (c) Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity).
- (d) Be orderly.

The above principles are connected with the particular purpose of the conversation exchange, and propose a maximally effective exchange of information. However, Grice (1989: 28) states that we should also consider other sorts of maxims, which are not for the purpose of exchange of information such as “be polite”, which has an aesthetic, social or moral characteristic. Moreover, Grice (ibid, 30) discusses the following cases in which the Cooperative Principle and maxims are infringed upon:

- a) He may quietly and unostentatiously violate a maxim; if so, in some cases he will be liable to mislead.

- b) He may opt out from the operation both of the maxim and of the cooperative principle; he may say, indicate, or allow it to become plain that he is unwilling to cooperate in the way the maxim requires. He may say, for example, I cannot say more; my lips are sealed.
- c) He may be faced a clash; He may be unable, for example, to fulfil the first maxim of quantity (be as is required) without violating the second maxim of quality (have adequate evidence what you say).
- d) He may flout a maxim; that is, he may blatantly fail to fulfil it.

In cases in which a participant fails to maintain the Cooperative Principle, Grice proposes the “Conversational Implicature” according to which we assume that a participant maintains the Cooperative Principle and the maxims in his/her real intention. In other words, a participant fails to fulfil the principle on purpose, and tries to imply cooperation with what he/she says. Brown and Levinson (1978: 63) cite Grice’s Conversational Implicature using the following example: “if A says ‘what time is it?’, and B replies ‘(Well) the postman’s been already’, then A assumes that what B said was rationally oriented to what A said, and hence A derives from B’s utterance the inference that it is, say past 11 a.m.”. It follows from the above example that B fails to fulfil the Cooperative Principle on purpose and implies the fact that it is past 11 a.m. However, their conversational exchange is coherent based on the assumption that “B intended to cooperate, and rationally chose a means that would achieve his cooperative end” (Brown and Levinson 1978: 63).

Hashimoto (2001) points out that, in many cases which involve the Conversational Implicature, the failure to fulfil the Cooperative Principle and the maxims is motivated by the participant’s ‘concern’<sup>10</sup> for the other. Utterances which fail to fulfil the Cooperative Principle include the participant’s intention to do an FTA as the Conversational Implicature, and in fact the conversational exchange is made on the assumption that the addressee infers what the speaker implied. This type of conversation including the Conversational Implicature is similar to Brown and Levinson’s concept of negative politeness (Hashimoto 2001: 46). Moreover, Hashimoto pursues a fundamental distinction between Grice’s Cooperative Principle and Brown and Levinson’s politeness

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<sup>10</sup> ‘Concern’ is translated from *hairyo* (Hashimoto 2001: 46).

theory. He states that the politeness theory focuses on why the participant tried to mislead, whereas the Cooperative Principle does not. The Cooperative Principle and the maxims merely indicate the general principle for the purpose of the effective exchange of information in conversation, and the infringement of this principle brings out the implied meaning which is not limited to the simple exchange of information (Hashimoto 2001: 47-48). Let us consider the following example (ibid, 48).

- (44) a. Suupu o nomu toki wa oto o tateruna.  
 soup ACC eat when TOP noise ACC make-NEG  
 (Don't make noise when you eat soup.)
- b. Hutuu suupu o nomu toki wa oto o  
 generally soup ACC eat when TOP noise ACC  
 tatemasen yo ne.  
 make-NEG-POL you know  
 (Generally we don't make noise when we eat soup, do we?)

Example (44) refers to the speaker's request to the addressee that he/she should not make a noise while eating soup. From the viewpoint of the politeness theory, (44b) indicates that the speaker makes a request to the addressee by making use of a general rule, which can be regarded as an example of negative politeness strategy "state the FTA as a general rule" (Brown and Levinson 1978: 211-212). Hashimoto (2001: 48) claims that almost all politeness expressions, especially negative politeness, violate Grice's maxim of quantity. In the above examples (44b) is a prolix expression in the respect that the addressee has to infer what the speaker is trying to imply from what he/she said in contrast to (44a) where the meaning is clear. That is, in (44b), the speaker's concern for the addressee is expressed in the violation of the informational efficiency<sup>11</sup>. The politeness theory focuses on particular divergences from the highly rational maximally efficient mode of communication outlined by Grice (Brown and Levinson 1978: 60). The use of *rasii* and *yoo* can be considered to adhere to the

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<sup>11</sup> Hashimoto (2001: 48) maintains that this kind of violation leads to 'irony' as well as 'concern'.

politeness theory; they form prolix expressions rather than direct expressions due to the operation of the Cooperative Principle.

Now let us re-examine (43).

(43) a. Ananata no kotae wa matigatte iru yoo da/ rasii.  
 you 's answer TOP wrong in the state of YOO COP RASII  
 (It seems that your answer is wrong.)

b. Anata no kotae wa matigatte iru.  
 you 's answer TOP wrong in the state of  
 (Your answer is wrong.)

As mentioned above, (43) refers to the speaker's disagreement with the addressee's answer. According to Hashimoto's hypothesis, example (43a) violates Grice's maxim of quantity in the respect that the addition of either *rasii* or *yoo* leads to a prolix expression rather than an assertive statement such as (43b). However, it seems appropriate to suppose rather that the use of *rasii* and *yoo* violates Grice's Manner maxim. The Manner maxim is related not to what is said, but rather to how what is said is to be said. According to this maxim, the speaker's utterance must be "perspicuous" (Grice 1989: 27). This means that the Manner maxim is concerned with the manner of expression, or the way of saying something. It can be said that the insertion of *rasii* and *yoo*, specifically the euphemistic usages, indicates ambiguity and non-straightforwardness from the point of view of Grice's Manner maxim, in the respect that the speaker uses either *rasii* or *yoo* even though he/she is certain that the state of affairs is true. The violation of the Manner maxim indicates that the speaker expects the addressee to comprehend why the speaker chooses an ambiguous utterance. What we would like to emphasize here is that the speaker expects the addressee to recognise that the speaker is expressing concern for the addressee by the insertion of either *rasii* or *yoo*. That is, the use of either *rasii* or *yoo* works to maintain the addressee's face wants.

We will review the positive politeness strategy and negative politeness strategy that might be related to the usages of *rasii* and *yoo*. Brown and Levinson refer to the four highest-level strategies, bald on record, positive politeness, negative politeness and off

record, which “utilize the FTA-minimizing strategies according to a rational assessment of the face risk to participants” (ibid, 96). Positive politeness strategies work to redress offence directed to the addressee’s positive face, and to satisfy his/her perennial desire that his/her wants (or the actions/acquisitions/values resulting from them) should be thought of as desirable (ibid, 106). Brown and Levinson (1978: 107) list the following fifteen strategies to redress the addressee’s positive face.

- (a) Notice, attend to H (his interest, wants, needs, goods)
- (b) Exaggerate (interest, approval, sympathy with H)
- (c) Use in-group identity markers
- (d) Seek agreement
- (e) Avoid disagreement
- (f) Presuppose/raise /assert/ common ground
- (g) Joke
- (h) Assert or presuppose S’s knowledge of and concern for H’s wants
- (i) Be optimistic
- (j) Include both S and H in the activity
- (k) Include both S and H’s activity
- (l) Give (and ask for) reasons
- (m) Assume or assert reciprocity
- (n) Give gift to H (goods, sympathy, understanding, cooperation)

On the other hand, negative politeness strategies work to redress the addressee’s negative face. Brown and Levinson (1978: 136) note the following ten strategies.

- (a) Be conventionally indirect
- (b) Question, hedge
- (c) Be pessimistic
- (d) Minimize the imposition, Rx
- (e) Give difference
- (f) Apologize
- (g) Impersonalize S and H: Avoid the pronouns ‘I’ and ‘you’
- (h) State the FTA as a general rule
- (i) Nominalize

(j) Go on record as incurring a debt, or as not indebting H

We can posit the hypothesis that the functions of *rashii* and *yoo* in our verbal interactions are related to the above strategies which are universally linguistically polite. However we remain faced with the problem of whether or not the Japanese language system actually corresponds to Brown and Levinson's framework. In the next section we will examine the applicability to Japanese language.

### 3.2 The universality of Brown and Levinson's framework

The problem here is whether or not Brown and Levinson's politeness theory can be applied to the Japanese language system. Recent studies have argued against the validity of universality of Brown and Levinson's work (Matsumoto 1988, Ide 1989, Gu 1990, Mao 1994). They point out two main problems: one is the notion of 'face', and the other is the applicability of the theory to the Japanese honorific system<sup>12</sup>. Matsumoto (1988) and Ide (1989) argue that Brown and Levinson's notion of face, relating to individual members of a society, is not applicable to Japanese culture. Matsumoto (1988: 405) states that "a Japanese generally must understand where s/he stands in relation to other members of the group or society, and must acknowledge his/her dependence on the other". According to Ide (1989: 241), in a Western society, where individualism is regarded as the basis of interaction, 'face' is likely to be a key factor of interaction. On the other hand, in a society where group membership is regarded as the basis of interaction, such as Japanese, "the role or status defined in a particular situation" is the key factor of interaction. That is, Brown and Levinson's 'face' governs the maintenance of an individual's territory, therefore Japanese culture, based on group membership, cannot be interpreted in terms of face. Moreover, Mao (1994: 459-462) states that Brown and Levinson's notion of face differs from the Chinese notion of face in the respect that the Chinese 'face' has two specific meanings, "*mianzi*" and "*lian*"<sup>13</sup>. In

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<sup>12</sup> These two main arguments related to the validity of the universality of Brown and Levinson's work are discussed by Usami (1998: 149).

<sup>13</sup> Gu (1990: 457) cites Hu (1994)'s definition of these two Chinese words. *Mianzi* stands for prestige or reputation, which is achieved through getting on in life, whereas *lian* indicates "the respect of the group for a man with a good moral reputation" (Hu 1994: 45, cited from Gu 1990: 45). According to Gu (1990: 457), *lian* especially does not incorporate Brown and Levinson's notion of face in its meaning.

addition, Gu doubts the validity of the notion of politeness. The notion of politeness in the Chinese context “exercises its normative function in containing individual speech acts as well as the sequence of talk exchange” (Gu 1990:242).

Ide and Matsumoto put forward arguments concerned with the applicability of the politeness theory to Japanese honorific system. Ide states that a Japanese speaker uses honorifics to express the notion that the speaker realises his/her own proper place in terms of “group membership (in-group or out-group), role structures (relative status, power relationship, specific role relationship such as selling and buying), and situational constraints (formal and non-formal settings)” (Ide 1989: 241). Ide maintains that the use of honorifics in Japanese does not have anything to do with ‘face’. That is, honorifics in Japanese can occur even with a non-FTA utterance. Matsumoto (1988: 209) illustrates the following three types of examples which vary depending on the relationship of the speaker to the addressee.

- (45) a. Kyoo wa doyoobi da.  
           today TOP Saturday COP
- b. Kyoo wa doyoobi desu.  
           today TOP Saturday COP-POL
- c. Kyoo wa doyoobi degozaimasu.  
           today TOP Saturday COP-SUPER-POL  
           (Today is Saturday.)

In (45), the speaker has to choose copula with the appropriate honorifics (plain, polite, or superpolite). The maintenance of each other’s face in Japanese culture is to recognise each other’s relative position and to maintain the social ranking order (Matsumoto 1988: 409-423).

In contrast, Usami (2001) claims that Brown and Levinson’s framework is adaptable to the principle of ‘politeness’ in Japanese. Usami maintains that politeness in Japanese needs to be focused not only on honorifics, but also on verbal interaction. Usami argues that the past studies that doubt the validity of the universality of the notion of face and politeness misunderstand the interpretation of Brown and Levinson’s terms. Usami states that it is not valid to discuss the connotative meanings of ‘face’ and ‘politeness’ in

each culture, because Brown and Levinson account for the observed cross-cultural similarities and define these notions as universal strategies of verbal interaction. While the content of face is different in different cultures “(what the exact limits are to personal territories, and what the publicly relevant content of personality consists in)”, Brown and Levinson assume that “the mutual knowledge of members’ public self-image or face, and the social necessity to orient to it in interaction, are universal” (Brown and Levinson 1978: 66-7). Usami argues against the argument that the honorific system in Japanese is not applicable to Brown and Levinson’s politeness strategies. The difference of the forms (plain, polite or superpolite form) can be explained by the weightiness of an FTA. For example, in the case when the “power (P)” is greater because the speaker talks to his/her senior, or in the case when “the social distance (D)” is greater because the speaker talks to someone whom they are meeting for the first time, the degree of an FTA is greater. Therefore the more polite form needs to be chosen. Usami focuses on the following points concerning Japanese politeness: it is irrelevant to examine politeness only through the use of honorifics. When we compare the different types of languages, such as Japanese which has complex honorific systems and English which does not have honorifics, the notion of ‘politeness’ approaches ‘the practical effect of utterance’, in other words, whether the speaker’s utterance makes the addressee comfortable<sup>14</sup>. That is, the degree of politeness is not always equivalent to the use of honorifics (Usami 2001). It can be said that Brown and Levinson’s work should be examined within a broader sense of politeness. That is, Brown and Levinson’s framework indicates that we can view an utterance through the care conveyed by the participants toward each other, not through typical techniques of polite utterance, such as honorifics.

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<sup>14</sup>Usami (1998: 151 – 154) introduces the notion of ‘discourse politeness’. Discourse politeness indicates integral function of pragmatic politeness on the level of the discourse, and on the level of the sentences. Usami (1998, 2001) gives the following examples of strategies of discourse politeness; “the down shift” in which the speaker changes from the polite form to plain form in a formal conversation to show the speaker’s friendliness to the addressee (1995); the way and frequency of the introduction of a new topic (1993); the frequency of nodding and using the sentence final- particle *ne* (1997).

In a close study on Brown and Levinson's framework, Hirata (2001) examines how the usage of *kamosirenai*<sup>15</sup> (might) works as a politeness strategy in our conversation exchange. Hirata (2001: 64) discusses the following example.

(46) A: Ore ga tentyoo ni mikomarete, zibun ga nuite  
 I NOM master DAT expecting-PASS yourself NOM leaving  
 ikareru no ga kowai n zya nai desu ka?  
 behind-PASS COMP NOM scary COMP COP NEG COP-POL Q  
 (Aren't you scared that I am chosen by the master and you are left behind?)

B: Omae nanka kowai hazu nai daro.  
 you scary must NEG you know  
 (You do not scare me at all, you know.)

A: Soo ka na.  
 so Q you know  
 (It that so?)

Maa kankee nai kamosiremasen ne.  
 well relation NEG might you know  
 (Well, maybe you are nothing to me.)

Shuji san, koko dete iku n da si.  
 Mr. here going out COP  
 (You are leaving, Shuji.)

In the above example, *kamosirenai* is used as a politeness strategy to maintain the addressee's (A's) negative face want. In (46), the speaker makes an utterance which "strokes the addressee's fur the wrong way" even though the addressee is his senior. The speaker's utterance to the addressee is an FTA that threatens the addressee's negative face. According to Hirata (2001: 64), the speaker uses *kamosirenai* to avoid

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<sup>15</sup> *Kamosirenai* can be translated as 'might', 'cannot tell if' or 'it is possible that - '. *Kamosirenai* is categorised as modality which indicates that the speaker cannot decide that the state of affairs is true, and the degree of the speaker's certainty of the state of affairs is low (Masuoka and Takubo 1991, Nitta 1991).

threatening the addressee's negative face. That is, *kamosirenai* functions as a politeness strategy for redressing an FTA with threatens the addressee's negative face. Hirata concludes that such a function is derived from the characteristic of *kamosirenai* which conveys the speaker's attitude as more subjective.

Above investigation makes it possible to interpret that there are motivations for the speaker's intention of using indirect expressions such as *kamosirenai*. Similarly, on the assumption that the speaker's choice of either *rasii* or *yoo* contains the speaker's motivation, we can conclude that these two indirect expressions work for the maintenance of the face wants. In the following section we will examine how both *rasii* and *yoo* function to maintain the face wants.

### 3.3 The uses of *rasii* and *yoo* as politeness strategies

In our examination of the uses of *rasii* and *yoo* as politeness strategies, we will divide their uses into two cases; the case in which the speaker's act threatens the addressee's face; the case in which the speaker's act threatens the addressee's face<sup>16</sup>. We will then examine how the speaker makes use of either *rasii* or *yoo* as a positive strategy.

#### 3.3.1 Maintaining the addressee's negative face

We will firstly examine the case in which the use of *rasii* or *yoo* can function as a politeness strategy for maintaining the addressee's negative face want. The following is an example of the euphemistic usage of *yoo* (Morita 1989: 183-4).

- (47) A: "Doo da ne.                    Watasi ni niau ka ne."  
           how COP you know I        for suit Q you know  
           (How is it? Does it suit me?)

B: “Sukosi iro ga zimina yoo desu.”  
 a little colour NOM quiet YOO COP-POL  
 (The colour seems a little quiet.)

In (47), the following assumption would be made; the first speaker (A) asks (B) whether the clothing suits him/her or not. The second speaker (B) indicates that it does not suit the addressee (A). In this case, the act whereby the speaker expresses his/her thought using the direct form such as ‘*Sukosi iro ga zimi desu* (The colour is a little quiet).’ would make the addressee feel uncomfortable, and threaten the addressee’s negative face want.

Let us suppose that *yoo* is used as a negative politeness strategy, specifically as a strategy 2 “hedge”<sup>17</sup>. Brown and Levinson (1978: 150) assert that a “hedge” indicates a usage that modifies the degree of membership of a predicate or noun phrase in a set.

G. Lakoff introduces R. Lakoff’s observation that certain usages convey hedged performatives as in the following example (G. Lakoff 1972: 213, Brown and Levinson 1978: 150).

- (48) a. I suppose (guess / think) that Harry is coming.  
 b. Won’t you open the door?

(G. Lakoff 1972: 213)

According to G. Lakoff, (48a) is a hedged assertion, whereas (48b) represents a softened request. Brown and Levinson (1978: 150) translate (48b) as “I hedgedly request that you open the door”. Brown and Levinson focus on two types of hedges: hedges on illocutionary force<sup>18</sup>, and hedges addressed to Grice’s Maxims. Hedges in illocutionary force are performative hedges that avoid the speaker’s assumption that the addressee is

<sup>16</sup> As a space is limited, we have concentrated on the addressee’s negative face and the speaker’s positive face.

<sup>17</sup> Brown and Levinson (1978: 151) note that some kinds of hedges can be explained under positive politeness strategies.

able or willing to do something. Such hedges are a “primary and fundamental method of disarming routine interactional threats” (Brown and Levinson 1978: 151). Hedges on Grice’s Maxims indicate that “conversational principles are the source of strong background assumptions about cooperation, informativeness, truthfulness, relevance, clarity, which on many occasions need to be softened for reasons of face” (Brown and Levinson 1978: 151). The speaker’s desire to avoid presuming may be partially satisfied by not assuming that the addressee wants to cooperate, and such communication may be made by a set of hedges addressed to Grice’s cooperative dimensions: Quality, Quantity, Relevance, and Manner. These four types of hedge are used with great frequency in ordinary talk, as shown in the following examples: Quality hedges that weaken the speaker’s commitment may redress advice or criticism; Quantity hedges may be used to redress complaints or requests; Relative hedges may be used to redress offers or suggestions; Manner hedges are useful to redress insults (Brown and Levinson 1978: 176). Quality hedges indicate that “the speaker is not taking full responsibility for the truth of his utterance” (Brown and Levinson 1978: 169). The term Quality hedge may be applicable to the usages of *rasii* and *yoo*. Brown and Levinson provide the following examples of Quality hedge<sup>19</sup>.

- (49) a. There is some evidence to the effect that....  
 b. To the best of my recollection...  
 c. I think (believe / assume)....

(Brown and Levinson 1989: 169)

The following examples are Quality hedge in the Tamil language (Brown and Levinson 1978: 170).

- (50) Nixioin keTTikaarantaan-*nnu vacci kuvoom*.

(Nixon is a clever guy, *let's suppose*.)

- (51) *avaan vantaan pool(e) irukku*.

(*It seems that he came*.)

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<sup>18</sup> Brown and Levinson cite Ueno (1972)’s work that the Japanese particle *ne* is a marker of hedging illocutionary force.

<sup>19</sup> Quality hedges have another aspect that stresses the speaker’s commitment to the truth of his/her utterance (Brown and Levinson 1978: 169-170), e.g. “With complete honesty I can say...” or “I absolutely deny (promise / believe) that...”.

(52) maRe peyum nnu too/*Natu*.

(*It appears that it'll rain.*)

(53) nii etoo conna *maatiri* iruntatu.

(*It seemed that you said something.*)

(54) avaar naa Lekki varrar-*amm*.\*

(*They say that he'll come tomorrow.*)

As shown in the above expressions, from the viewpoint of cross-linguistics the concept of Quality hedge is common to all languages. Therefore, it is possible to suppose that this concept is appropriate to the Japanese language system. Moreover the use of indirect expressions such as “assume” “it seems that”, work as the Quality hedged expressions in the respect that the speaker avoids his/her direct statement. Quality hedges that soften the speaker’s commitment can be seen in the use of *rasii* and *yoo* as in (47). In (47), the speaker (B) softens an FTA by disagreeing with the addressee’s opinion using *rasii* as a Quality hedged expression that indicates that the speaker does not take full responsibility for his/her own utterance rather than using an assertive statement.

Now let us return to example (43a).

(43) a. Anata no kotae wa matigatte iru yoo da/ rasii.  
 you ’s answer TOP wrong in the state of YOO COP RASII  
 (It seems that your answer is wrong.)

(Kasuoka 1980: 171)

It can be thought that in (43a), the use of *rasii* or *yoo* can work as a negative politeness strategy “hedge”. In (43a), the speaker is doing an FTA that criticises the addressee’s answer, and might threaten the addressee’s negative face want. The use of *rasii* or *yoo* that makes the speaker’s utterance uncertain softens the speaker’s commitment, and the addressee’s face want can be maintained. Hayatsu uses the following example to investigate how inferential *rasii* works to avoid the speaker’s own responsibility. Consider:

(55) Mother in-law:

“Sonna ni usugi de wa samukute kawai soo zya nai  
Such light clothing in TOP cold and poor COP NEG  
ka.

you know

Motto kisete yari nasai.”

More wear giving please

(“Your child might get cold in such light clothing. Dress him/her in more clothing.”)

Daughter-in-law:

“Demo, amari atugi o saseru to ase o kaitari  
but too much clothing ACC CAUS when sweat ACC in the state of  
ugokinikukattari de kaette yokunai rasii desu  
hard to move by on the contrary good-NEG RASII COP-POL  
yo.”

you know

(“But, on the contrary, it seems that wearing much clothing is not good  
because he/she might get sweaty or find it hard to move.”)

(Hayatsu 1988: 55)

In the above sentence, the daughter-in-law has an opinion that her children should be brought up with wearing light clothing, however, her opinion differs from that of her mother-in-law, and in this case, conflict between them might occur. The use of *rasii* mitigates the impression that the opinion is the speaker's own, and therefore conflict with the mother-in-law (addressee) can be avoided. On the other hand, the use of *yoo* gives an impression that the speaker has a high confidence in her own judgment, and therefore the situation might worsen (Hayatsu 1988: 55). What needs to be emphasized here is that that the speaker's (daughter-in-law's) utterance causes the addressee displeasure and is an FTA that impinges on the addressee's negative face, because the speaker expresses disapproval of the addressee's statement and gives a contrary opinion to that of the addressee. As mentioned in the previous chapter, *rasii* represents a lesser degree of the speaker's perception involved than the use of *yoo*. It can be considered

that in the above case the use of *rasii* works as negative politeness, specifically strategy 8, “state the FTA as a general rule” (Brown and Levinson 1978: 211-212). Strategy 8 indicates that “a way of communicating that the speaker doesn’t want to impinge but is merely forced to by circumstances, is to state the FTA as an instance of some general social rule, regulation, or obligation” (Brown and Levinson 1978: 211). The reason why this strategy can be applied is that the use of *rasii* gives the addressee an impression that the speaker’s utterance is not derived from his/her perception, but merely conveyed from a second hand general statement. The speaker redresses the addressee’s face want by conveying the sense that the utterance contains a lesser degree of the speaker’s perception. A further important point is that in (55), *rasii* works not only as the strategy of “state the FTA as a general rule”, but also as a “Quality hedge”. In (55), the speaker succeeds in showing his/her softened disagreement by using *rasii*, which indicates that the speaker’s utterance involves a lesser degree of the speaker’s perception, even though her statement is based on direct evidence. Next, let us consider the following example.

(56)A. “Ano, Tsujiguchi desu ga, tanondeatta huku wa  
excuse me COP-POL but asked clothes TOP  
dekitemasu ka.”  
ready-POL Q  
(“Excuse me, I’m Tsujiguchi, are the clothes I ordered ready?”)

B. “Tsujiguchi san ? Tyotto omati kudasai ne.  
Mr a moment waiting-HON please you know  
(“Mr. Tsujiguchi? Just a moment please.”)

Tujiguchi san wa, osyoogatu kara gotyuumon o itadaiteinai  
Mr. TOP new year from order-HON ACC receive-HON-NEG  
yoo desu kedo, syoosyoo omati kudasai ne.  
YOO COP-POL but a moment wait-HON please you know  
(“It seems that we haven’t got an order from New Year, but just a moment please.”)

Ima syuzin ni kiite mairimasu kara.”  
now husband DAT asking come-HON then  
(“I’ll ask my husband now then.”)



Ohata ga niyaniya site, “Daibu tigau yoo da  
 NOM smirk in the state of pretty different YOO COP  
 ne.” to itta.  
 you know COMP said

(Ohata said smirking, “It seems it is pretty different from what you thought,  
 you know.”)

(Jiro Akagawa: *Onna shacho ni kanpai!*)

In the above sentence, the speaker (Ohata) mentions to the addressee (Ojima) that Ojima’s thought is a mis-understanding and he is in the wrong place. If the speaker uses the assertive form ‘*daibu tigau ne* (it is pretty different what you thought)’, the speaker’s utterance indicates an FTA that may threaten the addressee’s (Ojima’s) negative face want. Therefore, the speaker makes use of *yoo*, which indicates that he is merely making an inference based on a high degree of his perception, and implies the doubt of the truth-value. This strategy succeeds in maintaining the addressee’s face want. In this sense, *yoo* works as a negative politeness strategy, specifically as a Quality hedge.

The above investigation demonstrates that the uses of *rasii* and *yoo* include an aspect of redressing the addressee’s negative face want.

### 3.3.2 Maintaining the speaker’s positive face

There are acts that threaten the speaker’s own face as well as acts that threaten the addressee’s face. According to Brown and Levinson (1978: 73), the speaker’s act of apology directly threatens the speaker’s positive face<sup>20</sup>. The act of apology indicates that the speaker indicates that he/she regrets doing a prior FTA, and by that means, the speaker damages his/her own face to some degree. The following example conveys the speaker’s apology to the addressee.

(58) “Doomo sainan desita ne.  
 absolutely misfortune COP-POL-PAST you know  
 (“It was very unfortunate, you know.”)

Kotira mo kibinsa o kaita tokoro ga atta yoo  
 we also celerity ACC lack-PAST part NOM have-PAST YOO  
 de, moosiwake arimasen desita.”  
 COP excuse have-POL-NEG COP-POL-PAST  
 (“I apologise that it seems that we didn’t deal with it quickly.”)

(Jiro Akagawa : *Onna shacho ni kanpai!*)

The above sentence shows the speaker’s apology for his junior partners’ inefficient transaction. The act of apology might put the speaker in a difficult situation, and therefore threatens the speaker’s own positive face. It should be noted that the speaker makes use of the characteristic of *yoo* that makes the speaker’s utterance uncertain because a high degree of the speaker’s perception is involved. Kin (1991: 30) uses the following example to illustrate the distinction between *rasii* and *yoo* concerning the degree of the speaker’s responsibility for his/her judgment.

(59) Soosa o ayamatte kikai ga kowaresimatta  
 operation ACC mistaking machine NOM break -PAST  
 yoo desu/ rasii desu.  
 YOO COP-POL RASII COP-POL  
 (It seems that the machine has broken because of mis-operation.)

In the above sentence, the speaker apologises to the addressee for breaking the machine due to his/her mistake in his/her operation. According to Kin (1991:30), the use of *yoo* or the direct form indicates that the speaker expresses a great regret for what he/she has done. On the other hand, the use of *rasii* gives the addressee an impression that the speaker avoids the responsibility for his/her action even though his/her utterance is an apology to the addressee. Admitting the speaker’s mistake conveys an FTA that

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<sup>20</sup> Brown and Levinson (1978: 73) demonstrate that acts such as apologies, acceptance of a compliment,

threatens the speaker's own positive face directly. The speaker inserts either *rasii* or *yoo* to hedge the fact that the speaker is taking full responsibility for his/her utterance. Although we acknowledge that both *rasii* and *yoo* are used to redress that FTA that threatens the speaker's positive face, it seems to us that the degree of the redress to the speaker's own face differs between *rasii* and *yoo*. As mentioned in the previous chapter, *rasii* and *yoo* differ in respect of degree of the speaker's perception. This means that *yoo* expresses a higher degree of the speaker's perception, whereas *rasii* expresses a lesser degree of the speaker's perception. Therefore the use of *rasii* is more effective in enabling the speaker to maintain the speaker's own face than the use of *yoo*, in the respect that the speaker can escape more easily from his/her responsibility because *rasii* indicates that a lesser degree of the speaker's perception is involved. In addition, the use of *yoo* is more effective than the use of a direct statement in maintaining the speaker's own face want in the respect that the speaker hedges his/her own statement.

### 3.4 Euphemistic usage of *rasii* and *yoo*

Kasuoka (1990), Nitta (1992), and Nobayashi (1999) allow the euphemistic usage in *rasii* and *yoo*<sup>21</sup>. The euphemistic usage represents an indirect expression that people use in order not to be blunt (Nijima et al. 1997: 298). Nobayashi (1999) states that the euphemistic usage in *rasii* and *yoo* is a rhetorical expression that makes use of the uncertainty inherent in both *rasii* and *yoo*. Nitta (1992: 7-9) states that the euphemism is basically concerned with the speaker's way of uttering, such as expressing politeness. The euphemistic expression contains two elements: the first is that the speaker

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admissions of guilt or responsibility, directly damage the speaker's positive face.

<sup>21</sup> Nakahata (1990) and Tanomura (1991) point out that only *yoo* has a euphemistic usage. On the other hand Kasuoka (1980) states that both *rasii* and *yoo* have euphemistic usages. Masuoka (2000: 148-9) accepts the euphemism in *yoo*. This type of *yoo* is close to the appearance usage. Kikuchi (2000: 48) also accepts the euphemistic usage but only in *yoo*. The euphemistic *yoo* is used even though the speaker thinks the state of affairs is true. He illustrates this with the following example.

Sukosi tiisai yoo desu kara, yamete okimasu.  
 a little small YOO COP-POL because giving up decide-COP-POL  
 (I'll give up buying this clothing because it seems it's a little bit small for me.)

In the above sentence, the speaker uses *yoo* even though the clothing which he/she tried is an apparently small, and in this case *rasii* cannot be used (Kikuchi 2000: 48). In this study we accept the usage of euphemism in *rasii* in the respect that the euphemism is linked to another usage such as inference.

recognises that the state of affairs is true, and the second is that the speaker has not confirmed the state of affairs. Nitta allows that both *rasii* and *yoo* have euphemistic usages, but notes there is a difference between them. In euphemistic *yoo*, the speaker uses *yoo* as an avoidance marker even though he/she knows that the state of affairs is true. In the use of *yoo*, there is overlap between inferential and euphemistic usages. On the other hand, in the euphemistic usage of *rasii*, there is overlap with hearsay usage. The difference between euphemistic *rasii* and hearsay *rasii* is that in the euphemism the speaker perceives that the state of affairs is true, whereas in hearsay usage he/she does not decide whether the state of affairs is true or not.

However, Nitta's analysis of the overlap with euphemism can be seen in another usage as well. In the use of *yoo*, the overlap between appearance usage and euphemistic usage can be seen in (47). In (47), the speaker sees the addressee's appearance, that is the colour of his/her clothing, and uses it as visual evidence. Moreover, as Nitta mentioned, in the use of *rasii*, euphemism and hearsay overlap. However, Nitta's above analysis of euphemistic and hearsay *rasii* classifies as inferential usage, because this kind of *rasii* is comparable with *yoo*, in the respect that both *rasii* and *yoo* are based on second hand evidence in this case.

That is, in the use of *rasii*, the inferential usage based on indirect second-hand evidence and the euphemism usage overlap. However, in (59), *rasii* marks as euphemism in the respect that he/she uses *rasii* even if the speaker perceives the state of affairs directly. Namely, the euphemism in *rasii* can be expanded or derived from the meaning of either inferential or appearance usage, and the euphemism in *yoo* can be expanded or derived from the meaning of either inferential usage or appearance usage. What is significant in this argument is that the derivation from another meaning implies the speaker's motive to maintain either the speaker's or the addressee's face wants.

### 3.5 Conclusion

In this chapter we examined how *rasii* and *yoo* work to express linguistic politeness, specifically by using Brown and Levinson's framework. The insertion of *rasii* or *yoo* provides an ambiguous expression from the viewpoint of Grice's Manner maxim,

specifically euphemistic usage. Such a deliberative violation of the Manner maxim by the speaker implies his/her motivation as to why he/she inserted either *rasii* or *yoo*. The speaker's intention may be viewed as a politeness strategy, as defined by the speaker. As mentioned above, such politeness strategies can be seen in the use of inferential *rasii* and *yoo*, and appearance *yoo*, and in such cases these usages are linked to the euphemistic usage of these expressions. This derives from the fact that the euphemistic usage is a key factor of politeness in the use of *rasii* and *yoo*. As a result of this examination of the uses of *rasii* and *yoo*, we find that *rasii* and *yoo* mainly work to redress either the addressee's negative face want or the speaker's positive face want. That is, the uses of *rasii* and *yoo* as politeness strategies satisfy the other's feeling or desire and to establish a good rapport between the speaker and the addressee in human interactions, as well as to maintain the speaker's own desire<sup>22</sup>.

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<sup>22</sup> We admit that we did not cover all examples of *rasii* and *yoo* in the examination of this paper. However, the main aim of this chapter is to investigate whether *rasii* and *yoo* work as linguistic politeness, and to illustrate some of the examples to prove their function.

## *Chapter 4*

### **Conclusion**

This thesis is an examination and analysis of the sentence-final expressions *rasii* and *yoo*. In Chapter One we reviewed the past studies concerning the use of *rasii* and *yoo*. In Chapter Two we examined a semantic function of *rasii* and *yoo* and the common denominator and distinctions between *rasii* and *yoo*. In Chapter Three we examined these expressions from the viewpoint of pragmatics, specifically by using Brown and Levinson's framework.

*Rasii* and *yoo* have a common denominator in the respect that they can be marked by the notion of evidentiality, which indicates that the speaker makes a judgment, based on evidence. In other words, the use of these expressions implies that some evidence is available to the speaker. Although *rasii* and *yoo* are interchangeable in many cases, there is a subtle difference between them. We examined the circumstances in which only *yoo* can occur, and then examined the circumstances in which both *rasii* and *yoo* can occur, and finally investigated the circumstances in which only *rasii* can occur. As a result of these investigations, we find that *yoo* marks appearance and inferential usages, whereas *rasii* marks inferential usage. *Rasii* and *yoo* are frequently used as markers indicating that the speaker makes a judgment based on evidence. The common denominator between *rasii* and *yoo* is especially evident in inferential usage. In this kind of usage the speaker perceives evidence of some kind and uses it to make an inference. However, there is a subtle difference between the uses of the two expressions. This distinction does not depend on the types of evidence, but on the extent to which the speaker's perception is involved. The fact that direct visual evidence is marked by *yoo* suggests that *yoo* is a marker indicating a higher degree of perception by the speaker. On the other hand, the fact that the state of affairs that is outside of the speaker's

territory is likely to be marked by *rasii* suggests that *rasii* is a marker which indicates a lesser degree of perception by the speaker.

In Chapter Three we examined how *rasii* and *yoo* work to express linguistic politeness, specifically by using Brown and Levinson's framework. The speaker's intention to insert either *rasii* or *yoo* may be viewed as a politeness strategy, as defined by the speaker. Such politeness strategies can be seen in the use of inferential *rasii* and *yoo*, and appearance *yoo*, and in such cases these usages are linked to the euphemistic usage of these expressions. That is, the euphemistic usage is a key factor of politeness in the use of *rasii* and *yoo*. *Rasii* and *yoo* mainly work to redress either the addressee's 'negative face want' or the speaker's 'positive face want'.

The uses of *rasii* and *yoo* as politeness strategies satisfy the other's feelings or desires and help to establish a good rapport between the speaker and the addressee in human interactions, as well as maintaining the speaker's own desire or 'want'.

As Nobayashi (1997: 38) mentioned, both *rasii* and *yoo* indicate the speaker's uncertainty of his/her own judgment. That is, *yoo* marks a lesser reliability that a direct assertion due to the lack of the speaker's confidence because *yoo* indicates that the speaker merely relies on his/her perception to make a judgment. On the other hand, *rasii* marks a lesser reliability due to the lack of the speaker's confidence because *rasii* is a marker that indicates that the speaker has not directly observed the actual state of affairs. This 'uncertainty' can be utilised for avoiding a statement which is offensive to the addressee, or for escaping the speaker's responsibility for what he/she said in verbal conversation. The fact that the speaker's statement with *rasii* and *yoo* is equivocal indicates that the degree of the speaker's responsibility for his/her utterance is low. The statement with either *rasii* or *yoo* can wound the addressee's feelings; therefore, the equivocation contained in both *rasii* and *yoo* protects the addressee's feelings or desires.

This thesis has contributed towards the investigation of the difficult problem of how a speaker makes a choice between *rasii* and *yoo*. However we have not investigated the details of the relationship between *rasii*, *yoo*, and the other sentence-final expressions, such as *doroo*, *kamosirenai*, *tigainai*, and *hazu*. It seems that the common denominator between *rasii* and *yoo* will become clearer through a comparison with the other

sentence-final expressions. Nakahata (1990) states that *daroo* occurs in opposition to *rasii* and *yoo* in inferential usage. Nakahata (1990: 25) maintains that the common denominator between *rasii* and *yoo*, which indicates that the speaker makes a judgment based on the actual evidence, is distinguished from *daroo*, which can be used when the speaker infers an imaginary state of affairs. Let us consider the following examples.

(60) a. Ano hito wa naite iru daroo.  
 that person TOP crying in the state of maybe  
 (Maybe that man is crying.)

b. Ano hito wa naite iru rasii.  
 that person TOP crying in the state of RASII  
 (It seems that that person is crying.)

c. Ano hito wa naite iru yoo da.  
 that person TOP crying in the state of YOO COP  
 (It seems that that person is crying.)

(Nakahata 1990: 25)

According to Nakahata, (60a) with *daroo* indicates that ‘*ano hito* (that person)’ does not exist in physical proximity to the speaker on the occasion of the speaker’s utterance. On the other hand, (60b) with *rasii* and (60c) with *yoo* indicate that ‘*ano hito* (that person)’ exists in physical proximity to the speaker on the occasion of the speaker’s utterance. Therefore, future research involving a the comparison between *rasii*, *yoo* and the other sentence-final expressions will aid in developing the full understanding of the usages of *rasii* and *yoo*, which in turn will aid in developing our understanding of the modalities in Japanese.

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