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An Affective Politics of National Life

Doctor of Philosophy in Public Health

At Massey University, SHORE & Whariki Research Centre,
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Abstract

This thesis examines the affective politics of national life at the intersection of emotion, colonisation and privilege. Within this frame, I focus on Pākehā experiences of two national days in Aotearoa New Zealand, Waitangi Day and Anzac Day. As occasions of ‘hot’ nationalism, national days provide numerous opportunities for affective meaning-making. From citizen talk, to mass media newsmaking and commemorative events, Pākehā affective-discursive practices often bring very narrow, highly selected aspects of the past into the present, promoting and protecting particular cultural interests and identities whilst simultaneously ignoring and excluding others. As such, national commemoration is a key site through which not only the ongoing nationalisation and cultural production of memory are organised, but where the affective politics of nationhood are put to work. Drawing on recent theorising in critical social psychology, I explore some of the ways these patterns unfold at sites of commemorative practice, observing Pākehā affective privilege (or what ordinary feelings accomplish) as and when it is (re)produced and resisted.

Three key findings are established. First, I demonstrate how newsmaking practices select received means of emoting around national commemoration in ways that both model and reinforce dominant cultural practices of Pākehā society. Waitangi Day is used to strengthen colonial power through hailing social agents into affective-discursive positons that vilify Māori, dismiss Treaty breaches, and marginalise protest action. In sharp contrast, Anzac Day protects and promotes colonial worldviews through mythologising ‘the birth of the nation’ and associated affective identities in Gallipoli. Representations of Anzac Day overlook the role of the Treaty of Waitangi in nation building, silence any acknowledgement of the New Zealand Wars and recurrently frame dissent as despicable and deviant.

Second, I draw on focus group data to demonstrate how participant talk is a key site in which emotional common sense is put to work. Participants repeatedly draw on contradictory yet entrenched forms of affective meaning-making to make sense of Waitangi Day and Anzac Day. For Waitangi Day, agents draw on the rhetorical pairings of being ‘pissed off’ and ‘confused’, allowing both for the expression of anger directed towards Māori alongside doing a kind of (often) wilful uncertainty around the day and its

1 New Zealander of European ancestry
purpose. For Anzac Day, agents recurrently report feeling ‘grateful’ and ‘moved’. However, numerous emotional resources are simultaneously available that excuse agents from the hard work of attending dawn ceremonies and commemorative events. I argue that, put together, feelings around both national days are put to work in ways that reproduce colonial power, whilst allowing agents to get on with the business of ‘having a day off’ with little hassle or complication.

Third, drawing on video records of participants filmed on Anzac Day, I argue that the assumed racialised harmony and normative national identity work is possibly more fragmented, complicated and troubled than one may initially assume. I critically explore the role of emotion in what could be described as ‘quiet resistance’ to hegemonic national narratives. Indeed, Anzac Day in Aotearoa New Zealand is positioned as a day of unity, marking a proud national identity, and embracing an active, engaged citizenry. It is a moment when ‘thousands rise early to remember the sacrifice for peace’, and a day to honour ‘those that risked their lives for our freedom’. My data suggests, however, that far beyond popular repertoires and sound-bite headlines, dwells a diverse range of emotions, positions, identities and practices.

Throughout the thesis, I highlight numerous forms of affective-discursive common sense routinely put to work by media and citizens. In exploring these in greater detail through interviews and data analysis, one is continually reminded of the degree to which resources for challenging ordinary feelings are often limited. Participants typically lacked conceptual, discursive and affective vocabularies or repertoires that could tell another, more just and sustainable story. Furthermore, given the ubiquity of normative common sense, embodied resistance is always in dialogue and negotiation with it; a dialogical back and forth. As such, resistance becomes part of a longer process of unlearning unproductive old habits, and engaging in new forms of being in the world, both of which most certainly involve practice. For Pākehā, it is this kind of grounded, everyday practice that will be a vital contribution in terms of working towards a mutually beneficial Treaty partnership with Māori.
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<td>Aotearoa</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
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<tr>
<td>Haerenga Kitea</td>
<td>Go Along</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>He whakaputanga</td>
<td>Declaration of Independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hikoi</td>
<td>March, journey, protest</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iwi</td>
<td>Tribe</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kaiwhakahaere</td>
<td>Director</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kaupapa</td>
<td>Principle, concept</td>
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<td>Kāwanatanga</td>
<td>Governorship</td>
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<td>Māori</td>
<td>Indigenous peoples of Aotearoa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Marae</td>
<td>Meeting grounds</td>
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<td>Pākehā</td>
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<td>Rangatira</td>
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<td>Taonga</td>
<td>Treasure, anything prized</td>
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<td>Te Ika-a-Maui</td>
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<td>Te Reo Māori</td>
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<td>Wairua</td>
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Introduction

**Waitangi Day marked with dawn service, marred by PM absence and media ban at Te Tii Marae**

Waitangi National Trust Board Chair Pita Paraone has criticised Te Tii Marae trustees’ dealings with the Prime Minister and the media, calling it a shambles.

Haunui-Thompson and Patterson, Radio New Zealand, 6 February 2017

**Opinion: PM should choose where to celebrate Waitangi Day**

Over the years not too much has changed at Waitangi. I have never found the celebration anything to write home about. I wonder why the prime minister, members of parliament and other dignitaries can be bothered attending?

Merepeka, Rotorua Daily Post, 27 January, 2017

**Anzac Day dawn service draws thousands to Ohinemutu**

We give up one morning of our lives to honour those who gave up every morning for the rest of their lives.

Martin, New Zealand Herald, 25 April, 2017

**Opinion: Anzac Day a time to come together**

As the sun rises over Lake Rotorua this morning hundreds of people will stand together… as they pay their respects to our fallen soldiers.

Holland, NZ Herald 25 April, 2017
Focus Group Extract 1:

Todd: That’s the difference between Anzac Day and Waitangi Day. With Anzac Day it doesn’t matter what race you are, whether you were Māori or Pākehā doesn’t even come in to it, but Waitangi Day it does, it’s separated. To me Anzac Day is basically New Zealand Day. That’s when every Kiwi is most proud of us.

Rob: One thing about Anzac Day is everybody is together.

Todd: And Waitangi Day is a fuckin’ waste of time as far as I’m concerned, we should just scrap that.

Focus Group Extract 2:

Olivia: Um, you know, to me Anzac Day is a far more important than Waitangi Day.

Anna: Yes.

Emma: Yes.

Olivia: To me Waitangi Day doesn’t steer any national pride so to speak. And to me it’s just a day off, very nice to have but it doesn’t mean anything.

Anna: But, if you were a Māori, would it?

Olivia: Well, I was just going to say, I think it’s really a stage for probably the more um – what’s the word I am looking for, well not belligerent, but ah, those that hold really strong feelings about you know place of Māori in – in New Zealand today (Emma: Yes, you’re right) and I don’t think that’s actually beneficial, I think it’s causing more of a split than actually making a (Alice: Yes, I agree with you) unified New Zealand. I think rather than Waitangi Day, I would rather it were called
New Zealand Day and we did away with the [inaudible] of Māori gathering at Waitangi

Focus Group Extract 3:

Chloe: I don’t feel any sense of patriotism or, that’s not the word, nationalistic belonging on Waitangi Day like I do on Anzac Day

Ella: No me neither

Chloe: I have no feelings of it being a special New Zealand day

AM: Where do you think that comes from? What do you think?

Chloe: Um, well as I said before it’s been high-jacked for political games, you can do that any day of the week, you don’t have to make a day of it? And I think you know, its, its stopped bringing awareness to people. It’s just a day of ‘Oh my God it’s going to be another, you know, insulting day for visiting at Waitangi’ and people should just forget about it [laughs]. You know its ceased to become something meaningful it’s just become a farce really, so it’s just a holiday

Days of national commemoration are rich in meaning and emotion. From newsmaking practices, to political discourse, and into the sites of everyday societal life, these annual episodes on the national calendar build and divide, recognise and refute, remember and forget, and include and ignore. They comprise a range of experiences from determined indifference, to proud patriotism, to overt displays of anger and irritation. Commemorative events powerfully put the affective politics of nationhood to work. They represent key moments in a nation’s life and their celebration performs the everyday ‘banal nationalism’ (Billig, 1995) central to the formation and maintenance of national identities (Liu, McCreanor, McIntosh, & Teaiwa, 2005). Indeed, to explore the affective and emotional experiences of commemoration becomes akin to placing a magnifying glass over the feelings and emotions of ordinary everyday national life, observing all the heated, heightened, and amplified detail unfurl.
In Aotearoa New Zealand there are two major days of national commemoration – Waitangi Day and Anzac Day. Waitangi Day commemorates the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi on 6 February 1840 by representatives of the British Crown and some Māori Rangatira. While the Treaty was, in part, intended to establish bicultural equity around the building of a nation state (Orange, 2011), Māori were swiftly set aside by the rapid growth of settler society and the particular cultural politics, laws, education systems and economic imperatives they brought with them (Ballara, 1986; Belgrave, Kawharu, & Williams, 2004). As such, the privileging of Pākehā ways of life, and marginalising of Māori, has led Waitangi Day to be one that is marked by a long history of debate, protest, activism and resistance. It marks an annual moment where historic injustices and Treaty breaches surface into wider view (Yensen, Hague, & McCreanor, 1989); often in ways that work to reproduce Pākehā power (Abel, 1997; McConville, Wetherell, McCreanor, & Moewaka Barnes, 2014). Protests have long been centred around Waitangi itself, which is located in the Bay of Islands on Te Ika-a-Maui of New Zealand, around 3 hours’ drive from Auckland, New Zealand’s largest city. Across the nation, a range of events are scheduled for the day, often in the form of ‘family fun days’, featuring food stalls, music and varying forms of entertainment. These typically choreograph a festive, atmosphere appropriate to public holiday but with little specific national commemorative content.

Anzac Day, held on 25 April each year, commemorates the Gallipoli landings of New Zealand and Australian soldiers in the First World War, and has since been extended to commemorate those that have lost their lives in all wars (Davis, 2009; Sharpe, 1981). While the day has traversed periods of unease, such as in the 1960s and 70s era of resistance to the New Zealand government’s involvement in the Vietnam War, today it enjoys widespread support as a day which birthed a unique New Zealand identity and associated sense of nationhood as distinct from Britain (Davis, 2009). Across the nation, commemorative events take place typically in the form of the dawn service, a highly routinised and scripted occasion reminiscent of a military funeral. Alongside dawn services, a range of commemorative events are held across the country in the mid-morning, and usually take a more informal line yet still comprise many of the formalities of the dawn service such as the playing of ‘The Last Post’, and laying of the wreaths at the cenotaph.

The broad objective of the research reported in this thesis is to explore the affective politics evoked as people relate, engage and grapple with these cultural observances and acts of remembrance in Aotearoa New Zealand. My focus is on the responses of
Pākehā New Zealanders and I am particularly interested in tracking, first, the meaning-making found in the media which sets the scene and, then, in affect and emotion in live social contexts as participants get involved in the commemorative process. Throughout, my focus is on what I define as Pākehā affective privilege (which can be simultaneously read as affective-discursive privilege) and its role in national commemoration. Pākehā affective privilege, as I conceive it, relates to what feeling ordinary accomplishes. Within this frame, I primarily observe the emotive possibilities deployed by agents in ways that reproduce ethnic advantage.

This thesis is a thesis by publication. In other words it consists of four journal articles either published, in press or under review and a number of sections and chapters setting the context for these articles and explaining the empirical research which informed them. My research was a key part of a wider research project on Affect, Wairua and National Days supported by the Marsden Fund, administered by the Royal Society of New Zealand (contract MAU019). The research team consists of Tim McCreanor (Pākehā), Margaret Wetherell (Pākehā), Angela Moewaka Barnes (Māori), Alex McConville (Pākehā), Te Raina Gunn (Māori), Jade Le Grice (Māori), Emerald Muriwai (Māori), and led by Helen Moewaka Barnes (Māori) as Principal Investigator. The project included two PhD students, one Pākehā (myself), one Māori (Te Raina Gunn), both exploring affect and emotion from our respective cultural backgrounds. Te Raina employs Kaupapa Māori methods to explore affect and emotion from the perspective of Wairua, and I draw on recent Western theorising on affect and emotion in social psychology (Wetherell, 2012) and critical qualitative modes of analysis. Keeping in mind the spirit of the Treaty of Waitangi, the bicultural team engaged in an ongoing conversation as to how we might approach national life in Aotearoa with respect to the varied affective standpoints espoused through Māori and Non-Māori understandings and practices around days of commemoration and celebration.

Research Aims

As noted, the primary purpose of this thesis is to examine some of the ways in which normative national feelings are (re)produced and resisted in Aotearoa New Zealand. In order to achieve this, I explore the role of affect and emotion in the social practices of national life as observed through days of national commemoration and celebration. The study is set within the historical context of colonisation, which continues to play a central role in the ongoing preservation of the cultural order, where despite the
promise of partnership and bicultural equity extended by te Tiriti o Waitangi, numerous advantages remain with Pākehā, including better health outcomes, a higher social status, and greater economic opportunities. Within this setting, I attempt to demonstrate some of the ways in which Pākehā feelings are put to work.

While days of national commemoration provide numerous opportunities for affective meaning-making, I note the often very narrow and quite limited range of feelings deployed across sites of commemoration, in the affective-discursive practices people share, and in media coverage of the events. I argue that the reproduction of particular emotions often serves to promote and protect Pākehā interests and identities, whilst simultaneously devaluing indigenous struggle. In this way, national commemoration functions as a key site where ethnic advantage continuously unfolds.

In order to investigate these dynamics, I draw on recent theorising on affect and emotion in critical social psychology (Wetherell, 2012) in conjunction with insights from sociology (Burkitt, 2013) cultural studies (Ahmed, 2004b), feminism (Hochschild, 1983) and social constructionism (Harré, 1988). Put together, I take an approach to understanding forms of affect, feeling and emotion as and when they sustain, maintain, and resist colonial power.

The empirical work this thesis reports employs a range of qualitative research methods distributed across a number of key sites in which expressions of commemoration, nationalism, and national identity play out. First, in order to frame some of the dominant affective-discursive practices of national commemoration, I examine coverage from national and regional newspapers around both Waitangi Day and Anzac Day. Second, analyses of focus group discussions are carried out in order to explore some of the dominant forms of affective meaning-making and identity reproduced through interaction. Lastly, I draw on our haerenga kitea visual records in order to gain a greater sense of how aspects of affect and emotion are negotiated in situ as participants experience live events and engage in activities significant to them on these national days.

The thesis asks three central questions

- What are the common sense affective-discursive resources available to Pākehā New Zealanders for Waitangi Day and Anzac Day?
- What are the implications of these resources in terms of what they accomplish for Pākehā agents?
What might be learnt for a critical politics of resistance at the interface of hegemonic affective common sense?

Three key findings are established. First, I demonstrate how newsmaking practices select received means of emoting around national commemoration in ways that both model and reinforce dominant cultural practices of Pākehā society. Waitangi Day is used to strengthen colonial power through hailing social agents into affective-discursive positons that vilify Māori, dismiss Treaty breaches, and marginalise protest action. In sharp contrast, Anzac Day protects and promotes colonial worldviews through mythologising 'the birth of the nation' and associated affective identities in WW1 and subsequent conflicts. Representations of Anzac Day overlook the role of the Treaty of Waitangi in nation building, silence any acknowledgement of the New Zealand Wars (O'Malley, 2016) and recurrently frame dissent as despicable and deviant. As a result, feeling, affect and emotion around Anzac Day is reduced to constructing it as a 'sacred day of respectful remembrance' where ‘True Kiwis’ engage in the ‘proper’ rites, rituals and cultural performances that Pākehā hegemonic tradition demands.

Second, the focus group data demonstrate how people’s talk is a key site in which emotional common sense is put to work. Participants repeatedly draw on contradictory yet entrenched forms of affective meaning-making to make sense of Waitangi Day and Anzac Day. For Waitangi Day, agents draw on the rhetorical pairings of being ‘pissed off’ and ‘confused’, allowing both for the expression of anger directed towards Māori alongside doing a kind of (often) wilful uncertainty around the day and its purpose. For Anzac Day, agents recurrently report feeling ‘grateful’ and ‘moved’. However, numerous emotional resources are simultaneously available that excuse agents from the hard work of attending dawn ceremonies and commemorative events. I argue that, put together, feelings around both national days are put to work in ways that reproduce colonial power, whilst allowing agents to get on with the business of ‘having a day off’ with little hassle or complication.

Third, I argue that the assumed racialised harmony and normative national identity work is possibly more fragmented, complicated and troubled than one may initially assume. Here I draw on the concept of affective practice to critically explore the role of emotion in everyday activism and in quiet resistance to hegemonic national narratives. As noted, Anzac Day in Aotearoa New Zealand is positioned as a day of unity, marking a proud national identity, and embracing an active, engaged citizenry. It is a moment when ‘thousands rise early to remember the sacrifice for peace’, and
a day to honour ‘those that risked their lives for our freedom’. My data suggests, however, that far beyond popular repertoires and sound-bite headlines, dwells a diverse range of emotions, positions, identities, and practices.

**A Reflexive Note: Situating Myself**

From a racialised point of view, like most Pākehā I have grown up socialised by cultural practices that legitimate Pākehā privilege and Māori disadvantage (Wetherell & Potter, 1992). Within this paradigm, the notion of racism was a somewhat foreign concept located somewhere in the annals of North American history. I do not recall it being raised formally within the education system nor was it something I noticed on a day-to-day basis. Looking back, however, it becomes clear how racism and privilege has long been built into New Zealand’s banal nationalist background as an everyday ordinary thing. From this perspective, I do recall drawing on a narrow range of repertoires to deal with questions of race if and when the occasion arose. For instance, I generally carried some of the long standing Pākehā ways of viewing cultural relations that included interpretive repertoires such as the notion that our bicultural situation is not perfect, but Māori/Pākehā relations are some of the best in the world (Nairn & McCreanor, 1991). Likewise, my cultural (in)competence was informed by normative understandings of Māori as anything from lazy (Elers, 2014; Petrie, 1998) to criminal (McCreanor et al., 2014). In short, I generally did not think too much about Māori Pākehā relations, and when I did, it usually took the direction of feeling uncertain about Māori, seeing ‘them’ as somewhat mysterious and generally Other in a pejorative sense. Based on this it is unsurprising that a weekly Te Reo Māori class we took in year 9 (aged 13) was seen as little more than ‘free time’.

At university undergraduate level I focused primarily on psychology, political studies, philosophy and statistics. Throughout this period of around 4 years, there was little engagement around Māori/Pākehā cultural relations or the Treaty of Waitangi. Perhaps the only time mention was made was during a few clinical psychology lectures where the focus tended to be on numbers of Māori in prison or involved in varying forms of anti-social activity. While there was a ‘cultural competence’ lecture or perhaps two, it generally felt like something we ‘had to do’; a formality rather than something important or necessary. Similarly, at an interview for a position in a clinical psychology programme, I was met with many anxious Pākehā candidates wondering how they might deal with the ‘Māori questions’ and furiously attempting to rote
practice ‘the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi’ in the form of “the three Ps: partnership, participation and..? What was the other one!”.

It was not until I began graduate studies in psychology with my supervisor Shiloh Groot that I was really challenged to think through Māori and Pākehā relations. Alongside this, I started to recognise the role in which systems and institutions played in the structuring of everyday life (McConville & Groot, 2013). This shift from the notion of the atomised individual deeply entrenched in undergraduate psychology education to a broader and deeper critical approach, was highly generative and academically liberating for me, offering new possibilities to ‘connect the dots’ in ways otherwise unseen (Giddens, 1984; Giddens & Pierson, 1998; Martín-Baró, Aron, & Corne, 1994). Through community psychology (e.g., Campbell & Murray, 2004), I began to recognise that I had found a psychology which not only made sense, but felt immediately relevant to everyday life, and which unapologetically challenged the status quo. As someone who has long felt uncomfortable with the established social order in many regards, the idea that scholarship could be used as a kind of destabilising force greatly appealed.

Moving into a PhD project based at the Whariki Research Group then, was a welcome progression into an academic space of resistance in line with the kinds of politics I was beginning to take seriously. Certainly, joining a bicultural team comprising Māori and non-Māori scholars of whom I have felt equally challenged and supported was definitely inspiring. Indeed, Helen Moewaka Barnes and Tim McCreanor facilitated this transition brilliantly. In the initial stages, however, based primarily on my socialisation into the invisibility of whiteness (Sue, 2006), I could feel the filters and lenses in which I had come to know and see the world very much stifling my view. Indeed, I was still entering this research in many ways somewhat out of touch with what it may mean to be Pākehā and how we might be meaningfully situated biculturally. Academically, I also arrived predominantly carrying a typical understanding of cultural scholarship that focuses on the object of the Pākehā gaze (Māori), and at times the negative effects of colonisation, its impact on Māori, and the defects they experience as a result (e.g., Bécares, Cormack, & Harris, 2013; R. Harris et al., 2006) rather than focusing on Pākehā as the beneficiaries of colonisation (H Moewaka Barnes, Borell, & McCreanor, 2014).

After noting some of these concerns to Belinda Borell, she suggested I take a Te Reo Māori (Māori language) immersion course. I ended up finding a suitable year-long part time offering at Te Herenga Waka o Orewa Marae, where for 5 hours a week and
intermittent weekends, I was fortunate enough to learn a great deal about myself as Pākehā, and begin to gain an understanding of Māori culture, protocols, practices, and how I might be situated in relation to them. I was very fortunate to come into contact with Kaiwhakahaere Kereama Nathan, Whaea Marara Schreurs, and the other excellent facilitators that made this experience truly enriching. This provided me with a reasonable degree of confidence as to where I am culturally positioned and how I might continue to develop bonds with allies.

The experience at the marae was simultaneously enriched by being based at Whariki – a Māori-led research group where practices such as openness and inclusion sustain a cultural climate where people are valued and appreciated. Furthermore, it has been especially freeing to move far beyond mainstream psychological takes on emotion, engaging instead with critical approaches advanced by Helen Moewaka Barnes and Margie Wetherell and developed within the team. The data collection phase carried out in various ways with a range of agents was particularly illuminating. From interviewing key informants, to filming individuals at commemorative events and conducting focus groups, I was recurrently intrigued by the reciprocity between theory and practice. For instance, as focus groups progressed, saturation was swiftly reached (Morse, 1995). I found myself becoming increasingly frustrated by the various forms of discourse and rhetoric exchanged in the focus groups. For the most part, it was dismissive and indifferent to Māori struggle.

From here, it was primarily thorough conversations with Belinda Borell that I came to recognise white privilege as a key problematic within the various bicultural formations within which we find ourselves. I also learned a great deal about privilege and racism from colleagues Teah Carlson, Victoria Lesatele, Tuiloma Lina Samu, and Emerald Muriwai. Alongside this, monthly meetings with Pākehā scholars were immensely helpful. Here, Mitzi Nairn, Ray Nairn, Ingrid Huygens, Jenny Rankine, Biddy Livesey and Susan Nemic offered excellent advice and support. When I went on to conduct focus groups, much of where Pākehā spoke from, I could also see within my own cultural history – an invisible whiteness of being (Sue, 2006). This refers to the default cultural standard and normative background from which all other groups are made visible, judged, evaluated and often deemed inferior or deviant. Indeed, these were precisely the affective-discursive practices put to work in the focus groups and much of the wider corpus, ultimately assisting in the reproduction of colonisation, the Pākehā project and its respective benefits and advantages.
More broadly, I acknowledge examiners Michael Billig, Antonia Lyons and Dave Williams for their excellent feedback and comments. Appreciation also extends to Lisa Morice for her librarianship and Jan Sheeran for her support in the final stages of thesis assembly. I am grateful to my parents, family and friends for their support. The Marsden Fund is similarly much appreciated for their assistance. Lastly, I want to acknowledge the participants for their time and contribution. Thank you all.

I owe a particular debt of gratitude to Margie Wetherell and Tim McCreanor, both of whom supervised this thesis to completion. Their detailed critiques and discussion played a key role in the development of the argument. Their patience and wisdom was exemplary. Thank you both kindly.

**The Thesis Ahead**

**Chapter One: Nations and Nationalism**

This chapter offers a brief overview of some of the relevant literature on nations, nationalism, national identity, and national days of commemoration and celebration. It is divided into six sections that, alongside work in Chapter Two, outline central elements of the approach underlying the thesis. First, I explore the question ‘what is a nation?’ going on to broaden and deepen a textbook definition. Second, I look at nationalism, focusing primarily on Michael Billig’s (1995) notion of banal nationalism. Next I explore national identity and the way in which it relies on inclusion and exclusion as an organising force. I then turn to national days of commemoration as active, constructive processes, foregrounding the banal as a reminder of ‘the way things are’, whilst simultaneously forgetting, or ignoring alternative possibilities. Following this, I explore these perspectives within the local context of Aotearoa New Zealand.

**Chapter Two: Affect and Emotion**

This chapter focuses on affect and emotion. I begin with a critical assessment of two highly influential and very different bodies of work from two contrasting relevant disciplines – the first being basic emotions in positivist social psychology, and the second being affect theory in cultural studies. Following this, I use my critique to identify approaches that offer a useful grounding for the thesis. First, I review perspectives that offer clues as to how I might proceed where I focus on social constructionism, feeling rules, emotionology and structures of feeling. I then go on to
outline A Way Forward grounded in social practice theory and then affective practice from which I outline what I describe as Pākehā affective privilege.

Chapter Three: ‘Hostility Won’t Deter Me Says PM’: The Print Media, the Production of Affect and Waitangi Day

This chapter explores affect, discourse and emotion in national life. I focus on the print media’s use of Waitangi Day as an affective-discursive distribution channel maintaining and reinforcing the hegemony of settler culture. Applying new thinking around affect, I consider how the cultural production of emotion in print media privileges settler identity, whilst simultaneously devaluing indigenous struggle. One hegemonic interpretive repertoire is discussed; that ‘Waitangi Day is a day of conflict’. Two subordinate repertoires are juxtaposed against this: that it should be ‘a day of celebration’ and that it should be ‘a day of conversation.’ I argue that these repertoires and their associated affective-discursive positions encourage readers to move into episodes of pejorative affect directed towards Māori ‘ruining the day.’ Productive engagement with biculturalism requires a broader and deeper range of affective-discursive resources. Popular journalism fails its readers and limits debate through its narrow modelling of the emotional experiences Waitangi Day might evoke.

Chapter Four: Imagining an Emotional Nation: The Print Media and Anzac Day Commemorations in Aotearoa New Zealand

This chapter explores affect, discourse and emotion in national life. Drawing on recent thinking in discourse and affect, alongside previous work on nation and communities of practice, I focus on the print media’s use of Anzac Day in Aotearoa New Zealand, as a site through which settler identity and cultural hegemony are reproduced. One hegemonic interpretive repertoire is observed throughout, that Anzac Day is a sacred day of respectful remembrance. Within this frame, a series of associated affective-discursive positions are deployed covering issues that range from inclusion and exclusion, to conformity and dissent. I argue that this repertoire and its associated positions constitute citizens engaging with the day as a homogenous group of national subjects, bound together as a particular kind of affected community. This imagined community and the affective practice attributed to it, however, largely ignore the bicultural makeup of Aotearoa New Zealand, narrowing down the diverse range of potential emotional positions to just a few. Popular journalism fails readers and limits debate through its thin portrayals of community, legitimate affect and engaged
citizenship. National life is impoverished when print media lack the cultural competence necessary to effectively engage in broader debates and political discourse.

Chapter Five: ‘Pissed off and Confused’ / ‘Grateful and (Re)moved’: Affect, Privilege, and National Commemoration in Aotearoa New Zealand

This chapter explores affect, colonial privilege, and the cultural politics of national commemoration in Aotearoa New Zealand. Based on focus group interviews around two major national days, I examine means through which feelings and emotions are deployed in ways that enable the reproduction of ethnic advantage. Situating affect within patterns of relationship, four interrelated affective-discursive practices are explored. In relation to Waitangi Day, agents tend to work under the rubric of anger and confusion. For Anzac Day, being grateful and moved shapes the interaction, though an ideological dilemma is often encountered in which participants simultaneously negotiate preferences towards quite simply ‘having a day off’. Taking into consideration a national context characterised by colonial hegemony, analysis observes the associated freedom and ease through which affective privilege is (re)produced. Often incongruent and rarely challenged, privilege allows associated actors to do what they want, when they want, however they want. This climate authorises the ongoing reproduction of, and justification for, membership to a higher status ethnic group of which unearned opportunities and entitlements remain its everyday, expected currency.

Chapter Six: Defrosting the Deep Freeze and Other Untold Anzac Day Stories: Everyday Activism, Affective Dilemmas, and Quiet Resistance

Anzac Day in Aotearoa New Zealand is typically positioned as a day of unity, marking a proud national identity, and embracing an active, engaged citizenry. It is a moment whereby ‘thousands rise early to remember the sacrifice for peace’ (The New Zealand Herald, 2017); a day to honour ‘those that risked their lives for our freedom’ (Holland, 2017). However, far beyond popular repertories and soundbite headlines, dwell a diverse range of positions, identities, emotions and practices. Drawing on a corpus of data gathered from go-along interviews with people doing whatever it is they decide do on Anzac Day, this paper draws out three different forms of quiet resistance. The first case study follows one immigrant’s maiden Anzac experience. For this half decade resident of New Zealand, the dawn ceremony is seen as a shocking
experience in the performance of what she describes as ‘pure ideology’ and ‘complete bullshit’. The second case study follows a Pākehā family to a mid-morning service and their mixed emotions and discourses, grappled with over afternoon tea. The final case study follows a couple who take advantage of the day to unload and defrost the deep freeze. Alongside the thawing and careful reorganising, they explore the affective dilemmas the day evokes. Put together, the assumed racialised harmony and normative national identity work of commemoration become fragmented, complicated, troubled.
Chapter One: Nations and Nationalism

This chapter offers an overview of relevant literatures on nations, nationalism, national identity, and national days of commemoration and celebration. It is divided into six sections that, alongside work in Chapter Two, outline central elements of the general approach underlying the thesis. First, I explore the question ‘What is a nation?’ going on to broaden and deepen a textbook definition. Second, I look at nationalism, focusing primarily on Michael Billig’s (1995) notion of banal nationalism. Next I look at national identity and the way in which it relies on inclusion and exclusion as an organising force. I then turn to national days of commemoration as active, constructive processes, foregrounding the banal as a reminder of ‘the way things are’, while simultaneously forgetting, or ignoring alternative possibilities. Following this, I examine these perspectives within the local context of Aotearoa New Zealand. I end the chapter by noting a range of questions this work sets up, alongside some key areas that ought to be addressed.

Nation

Having a nation is not an inherent attribute of humanity, but it has now come to appear as such.

(Gellner, 2008, p.6)

When imagining a nation such as New Zealand, it may be easy for some to picture a somewhat fixed, concrete and unchanging phenomenon, something akin to a Platonic Form. Indeed, the idea of the nation has come to feel inevitable, as if “a man (sic) must have a nationality as he must have a nose and two ears” (Gellner, 2008, p.6). Nationalist ideology “[among other things] holds that the world is divided into nations, each having its own distinct character, history and destiny” (A. D. Smith, 1995, p.7). Nations require a widespread belief in a semblance of continuity and relative stability, with the natural consequence being that individuals and collectives may acquire and maintain a sense of loyalty and belonging.

But what, exactly, is a nation? First, it is important to distinguish between nation and state. A state typically refers to the physical, quantitative subdivision of a particular geographical territory into a sovereign political unit (Connor, 1978). The concept of
nation, a more intangible phenomenon, requires a little more unpacking. Dictionary.com, a popular online source of English definitions, for instance, posits “a large body of people, associated with a particular territory, that is sufficiently conscious of its unity to seek or possess a government peculiarly its own”. According to this definition, the nation emerges via collective awareness of a unique set of common characteristics woven throughout a group that occupy a bounded geographical space. While a useful start, this definition can be expanded in three ways.

First, we must include the possibility of more than one nation occupying a single state or territory. Take, for instance, the First Nations peoples of Canada who currently comprise 634 communities across the state or territory of Canada, with over 50 distinct nations and language groups (Assembly of First Nations, n.d). Indeed, while many states are nations to some degree, many nations do not hold state sovereignty. The Tūhoe iwi in Aotearoa, for example, openly and publicly constitute themselves as a nation, yet are not a state given they do not currently carry the necessary political authority to manage and govern their own affairs. Furthermore, while some nations clearly form without states, some states may also be nationless (Baldacchino, 2002; Fitzgerald, 1995). Though while each do not necessarily require the other, they are often intended for, and gravitate towards, each other (Gellner, 1983).

Second, while governing collectives with an assortment of characteristics have existed over a long period of time (Calhoun, 2007) the very notion of nation and its prominence as a basic unit of political organisation is arguably a fairly recent phenomenon (Eley & Suny, 1996). Classical antiquity, whilst familiar with republics, confederations and empires, for instance, seems to have had no term that quite captured the idea as we typically understand it today (Renan, 1990, cited in Bhabha, 1990). As such, in discussions around the idea of nation one must be mindful in that we are always dealing with a nation rather than the nation (A. D. Smith, 1991). Nations are never fixed in time, but rather come into formation, persist for a while (albeit in degrees of flux), then sooner or later pass away, potentially changing into other configurations. Nation formation is always a process (Connor, 1990), or perhaps more specifically an ongoing process in which particular ideas are broadly reproduced in a range of ways and through various means.

Third, a nation tends to emerge when a range of social conditions are met. Gellner (1983, p.55), for example, specifies ‘standardized, homogeneous, centrally sustained high cultures, pervading entire populations and not just elite minorities’ and ‘well-
defined educationally sanctioned and unified cultures… with which men (sic) willingly and often ardently identify from a foundation of cultural homogeny’. A nation may also require being able to lay claim to particular shared collective memories about its history, how it came to be the way it is in the present, and relates to the way its people come to understand themselves and their place within it (Grosby, 2005). However, factual accuracy is not a necessary condition as stories and myths often run alongside more accurate portrayals of events and occurrences. Instead, a nation tends to ‘carry around’ a particular set of memories about the past that come to be reproduced in certain contextual presents. The emphasis on particular memories, reinforces the degree to which power plays a key role in the way a certain nation moves through processes of formation, and why some ideals come to fruition whilst others are left behind (L. T. Smith, 1999).

One of the key means through which nations are reproduced is kinship which refers to “recognized traceable lines or relations of biological descent” (Grosby, 2005, p.13). One is born into a nation in a similar way to that in which one is born into an ethnic group – the latter from a common ancestor, and the former from a common territory. What is important here is that both are forms of relationship through which one can feel connected to others in a wider sphere of communal inclusion. A nation may similarly refer to nostalgia for a commensurate ethnic past. Smith (1986) suggests this to be even more relevant in the contemporary period where a constant collective search for meaning runs alongside a decline in religious practices and ongoing erosion of various societal traditions as the result of a range of factors from scientific advancement to the rise of acquisitive materialism. Here, the idea of nation offers opportunities for identification and community sedimented by mythologies, motifs and symbolisms passed on throughout generations as collective memories, recirculating the fears, needs and desires of dominant social groups.

The ongoing reproduction of a nation-state is, of course, linked to a range of legally sanctioned benefits including citizenship, rights to belong, and the provision of borders which come with freedoms and restrictions on movement. The passport, for instance, provides a formal sense of identification, clearly distinguishing citizen and non-citizen, alongside ascribing rights, duties, penalties, taxes and access to welfare (Torpey, 2000). Similarly, citizenship affords particular privileges and responsibilities such as enabling a legal basis for political participation, affording the right, for example, to cast a vote during election periods.
Despite the supposed neutrality and equity citizenship discourse assumes, citizenship in a nation invariably comes with a range of unspoken opportunities and restrictions. These are dependent upon normative forms of inclusion and exclusion, belonging, and questions of not simply who belongs, but who really belongs (Humpage, 2006). In New Zealand, for example, the notion of citizenship reflects the country’s origins as a British settler colony in preference to its Māori history, so that indigenous political structures and ideas of sovereignty are subsumed under newly imported, yet long established post-feudal capitalist conventions (Pearson, 2005). Within this frame, colonial dominance in parliamentary representation related to significant settler arrogation of Māori political power, land and socio-economic marginalisation (Sullivan, 2003 cited in Liu et al., 2005, p.25).

Nationalism

The metonymic image of banal nationalism is not a flag which is being consciously waved with fervent passion: it is the flag hanging unnoticed on the public building

(Billig, 1995, p.8)

The traditional primordial school of thinking on nationalism posits ethnic identity as so deeply entwined with the human condition that it may as well be formulated as a ‘natural’ or ‘given’ marker of group identity (Özkirimli, 2017). From this perspective, nations can be causally explained as wider extensions of the human inclination to nurture bonds and shared roots, and thus nationalist impulses are seen to be present throughout history (Geertz, 1973). From a different perspective, modernisation theories argue that nationalism emerges alongside the transition from premodern to modern society, materialising through processes such as capitalism, industrialisation and the formation of politically bureaucratic, territorial, sovereign and centralised states. Benedict Anderson (1991) cites a further range of factors, including the rise of the printing press which enabled the imagining of communities to take precedence over religious certainty. Ethnosymbolism, in contrast, emerges through a critique of modernism, and emphasises the role that myths, memories, values, symbols and traditions play in the formation, maintenance, and changes in nationalism and ethnicity (A. D. Smith, 1986). This school of thought seeks to understand the modern emergence of nations through taking into consideration the ways in which they are shaped over time by ethnicity (Hutchinson, 1994). Among other aims, it seeks to
explain ways in which nationalism primarily pursues symbolic goals including educating the public in a certain language or deeming certain sites as sacred and protecting them in accordance with the preservation of particular collective memories.

The approach to nationalism observed in the current thesis extends beyond primordialism, modernism and ethno-symbolist schools and into postmodernist understandings. This broad collective of perspectives rejects reductionist and causality centred analyses of nationalism, and instead tends to focus on the study of social and discursive dimensions of nationalist discourse. Here, no one theory can adequately explain the full range of applications of nationalism, nor can its study be reduced to an essentialised understanding. Postmodernist approaches instead recognise that various forms of nationalism work through discourses that constitute a) the values and interests of nationalist positions as primary b) nationalist truths as essential truths and c) forms of inclusion based around the exclusion of those defined as ‘other’ (Özkirimli, 2017).

In the contemporary life of nations, nationalism in both popular and academic writing is typically framed in terms of struggles to build new states or, as with the right wing UK Independence Party (UKIP), attempts to reclaim the nation. As Michael Billig (1995, p.5) points out, writings around nationalism typically discuss “dangerous and powerful passions, outlining a psychology of extraordinary emotions”, and as a result, nationalism is often seen “as the property of others, not of ‘us’”. In other words, nationalism as an ideology tends to be positioned as a phenomenon located solely on and around the margins. Similarly, nationalists are often characterised as being those situated on the societal periphery, inhabiting a violent and highly charged affective and emotional psychology, and whom draw on illogical means to irrational, often destructive ends.

But, as Billig argues, nationalism carries an incredibly powerful general ideological aura. Its rhetoric, for example, is often drawn on by leaders to call a country into war without being required to justify the importance of nationhood or why dying for its protection is reasonable. Billig argues that these times of national emergency or crisis effortlessly pull together nationalist rhetoric due to the daily reproduction of nations and nationals, which are then situated in a larger configuration of nations. As such, nationalism requires that:

\[ a \text{ whole complex of beliefs, assumptions, habits, representations and practices must also be reproduced. Moreover, this complex must be } \]

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reproduced in a banally mundane way, for the world of nations is the
everyday world, the familiar terrain of contemporary times. (p.6).

For Billig, everyday life is the site through which nations and nationalism are routinely accomplished in familiar, yet entirely ‘forgettable’ ways, continually reminding citizens of their nationhood, national identity, and the ways in which they may, or may not, belong. The continual ‘flagging’ of nationhood is so familiar, that it constitutes the very background from which the foreground of everyday life emerges. It marks particular ways of being in the world as obvious and natural, as normative common sense. The use of small words, ‘our’ and ‘here’, for instance, in the mass communication of media and political discourses do much to position and situate ‘us’ within the context of nationhood – a context and concept which is assumed ‘we’ all understand. “Even ‘the weather’, so familiar and so concrete a concept, is routinely nationalised in this way” (Billig, 1995, p.175). Or think, for example, of the many identifiers of a nation’s existence: bank notes, flags, monuments, and as noted linguistic deployments of small reminders such as evoking the national ‘we’ and ‘here’ in news reports and political discourse. Here, nationalism is rhetorically reframed as patriotism and moves from being an irrational and problematic force, to a reasonable and meaningful practice. With the repeated instances in the marking of ‘us’, we see not just ‘ourselves’, but in many cases we see ‘them’, the ‘others’ which are not included in our idea of nation and nationalism. In short, whatever else is forgotten, one’s nation and national identity will always be remembered. And as we will see, commonplace ways of reproducing everyday national life and the ways in which they are associated with familiar discourses, identity positions, and emotions, alongside conceptions of ‘us’ and ‘them’ can set up precarious conditions for cultural relations.

National Identity

The history of each nation is marked by the presence of significant others that have influenced the development of its identity by means of their ‘threatening’ presence.

(Triandafyllidou, 1998, p.600)

As Billig (1995) argues, the discourses of postmodernism, globalisation, and decentralisation have for quite some time become a popular way to view the world. Featherstone (2007) for instance argued that nationalism’s tendency towards
centralisation and the elimination of difference has been supplanted by decentralisation and new acknowledgment of multifaceted differences in the West. However, while interchangeable and numerous identity possibilities are now regularly upheld as a shining feature of postmodernism, national identity “cannot be exchanged like last year’s clothes” (Billig, 1995, p.139). National identity has a kind of permanence, a non-transferability.

“[National] Identity is to be found in the embodied habits of social life. Such habits include those of thinking and using language. To have a national identity is to possess ways of talking about nationhood. Having a national identity also involves being situated physically, legally, socially, as well as emotionally.”

(Billig, 1995, p.8)

As noted in previous sections, in order for a nation to come into formation, it will typically be dependent on shared institutional, structural and economic systems, geographical territory, cultural ties and psychological and embodied processes that assemble in various ways that can produce a feeling of belonging (A. D. Smith, 1991). Similarly, as Connor (1978) argues, national identity is primarily held together through the belief in common descent; a psychological bond derived from a conviction that a particular group of people are ethnically related. Identity, even in its etymology, suggests sameness, and is “seemingly incompatible with the diversity of identities, interests and values contained within a nation” (Skilling, 2010, p.176). As such, it becomes unsurprising that “at the most general level, the rhetorical force of invoking ‘national identity’ is to assert a degree of unity. It presents society as meaningfully united, and united in quite a specific way” (Skilling, 2010, p.178).

What constitutes a nation also has functional capacity. Deutsch (1953), for instance, suggests membership to a national community requires the ability to communicate with fellow nationals more effectively than with those considered outsiders. However, as Triandafyllidou (1998) argues, “elements like culture, religion, or language are important not only to the degree that they reinforce the nation’s identity but because they differentiate the ingroup from the outgroup and thus justify and make real this divided view of the world” (Triandafyllidou, 1998, p.597). From this perspective, identity is not simply a question of relative similarity, but, as noted earlier, employs the recognition of overt otherness. Indeed, markers of identity such as codes of dress, ways of talking and patterns of emoting reinforce both sameness and difference as...
categorically distinct rather than on a benign continuum. As such, a national identity is fundamentally both inclusive and exclusive; relational rather than autonomous – the concept of ‘other’, inextricably tied to the concept of ‘us’ and ‘our’ national identity (Connor, 1993). While those that are othered as inferior reside as sometime members and other time non-members of ‘our’ nation, there are often clear boundaries as to who can make uncontested claims to privilege that come with inclusion (Guibernau, 2013). Furthermore, ingroup boundaries become policed by ‘symbolic border guards such as language, religion and culture which help to perpetuate the community internally’ (McCrone, 1998, p.29). Here, partitions between racialised identities are strengthened, with ethnic national identity defined through the ways in which these divisions are setup and how people view themselves in relation to others.

Billig (1995) argues than an important question is not ‘What is national identity?’ but ‘what does it mean to claim to have a national identity?’ In a bicultural setting where opportunity is unequally distributed, however, the question perhaps becomes ‘what does it mean for an advantaged ethnic group to claim to have a national identity, and what do these claims achieve?’ Indeed, for Billig, national identity can only function when people a) know what their identity is b) what assumptions they have about the nation and c) what patriotism is (Özkirimli, 2010, p.172). In order to fuel such narratives, among other things a conception of a particular national history is important, and how it relates to ‘us’ and ‘our’ ways of being in the world. This is often accomplished through what Billig et al. (1988) terms lived ideology. This refers to the interpretive resources and normative common sense made available via a range of systemic processes which people draw upon to interpret events and phenomena. From this perspective, claims and ties to a dominant national identity will come with privileged access to meaning-making tools that regularly work to maintain and defend the status quo.

### National Days

*Recollection of the past is an active, constructive process, not a simple matter of retrieving information. To remember is to place a part of the past in the service of conceptions and needs of the present.*

(Schwartz, 1982, p.374)
National days are key moments in the life of a nation. In Aotearoa, Waitangi Day and Anzac Day are the two big commemorative events on our country’s calendar (McCreanor, McPhee, Wetherell, Moewaka Barnes, & Moewaka Barnes, 2017). As ‘hot’ moments in a nation’s life, these events are deeply connected to the ordinary and everyday patterning of banal nationalism (Billig, 1995). National days play a significant role in the formation of national identity (Liu et al., 2005) and are potent cultural performances that in numerous ways emphasise inequitable distributions of power, capital, and value that run through all levels of society, from ordinary everyday speech to formal institutional practices and processes (Said, 1978). Indeed, as ideological sites, and in the context of our entrenched colonial society (H Moewaka Barnes et al., 2014), national days can illuminate a diverse range of patterns of inclusion and exclusion, the nature of the relationships between Treaty partners, imaginings of community (Benedict Anderson, 2006) and contemporary formations of identity and wellbeing (McConville et al., 2014; McConville, McCreanor, Wetherell, & Moewaka Barnes, 2017; Helen Moewaka Barnes et al., 2017; Wetherell, 2013b, 2015; Wetherell, McCreanor, McConville, Moewaka Barnes, & le Grice, 2015).

National days of commemoration and celebration offer a means through which nations can be reproduced in ways that allow for ideas such as what it means to be a ‘New Zealander’ to acquire normativity (McCrone & McPherson, 2009). They offer possibilities for the past and present to be remade through public commemorative activities that formulate narratives around a nation’s history (Gillis, 1994). Furthermore, they offer opportunities to highlight and reinforce particular kinds of collective experiences, recalling significant historical moments that contributed to ‘our’ progress, and how ‘we’ might then look forward to a particular version of the future (Zerubavel, 1995). As such, commemorative occasions will express highly affective forms of inclusion and exclusion, identity struggles, patterns of relationship, and imaginings of community (McCreanor et al., 2017).

National days typically combine multiple possibilities for citizens to engage at a range of sites including parades, ceremonies (Bekerman, 2002), exhibitions, contributions of film and popular culture (Biesecker, 2002), speeches, poems, the displaying, saluting to, and waving of flags (Hayes, 1960, p.167), holding private parties, monuments (Mitchell, 2003), wreath-laying ceremonies, sermons, along absorbing the gamut of news (Castelló & Castelló, 2009; Rodell, 2009). In different, but connected ways, these performative, affective, and discursive practices mobilise members of a nation to participate in the ongoing building of the nation (Tileagă,
Each of these sites can weave together multiple maps of meaning, including memories, narratives, affects, and identities, and offer a sense of community comradery. Take, for instance, the 2010 independence jubilees held throughout Africa. In Mali, for example, the significance given to precolonial history offered a means to boost national pride. One way this was represented was through a choreographed civic parade comprising more than two thousand dancers that depicted Mali’s precolonial history (Lentz, 2013).

National days are towards the ‘hot’ end of Billig’s banal nationalism, and offer a unique set of circumstances that make them quite distinct. Geisler (2009) points out at least two ways in which national days are unique. First, they are not ubiquitous. Second, they do not go unnoticed. While banal nationalism focuses on the easily forgotten, yet deeply entrenched non conscious nature of everyday nationalism, national days, being once a calendar year, tend to be thrust into the foreground in numerous ways that make them possible to ignore, but difficult to forget. Geisler (2009, p.17), however, argues that “national days cannot ‘flag’ nationalism in the way described by Michael Billig because they are not sufficiently ‘over-determined”. Geisler explains:

> One day a year is simply not enough to retain our loyalty to this marker of the national narrative for the remaining 364 days. On those other 364 days, we encounter the flag and the currency, a reference to the capital on a daily or almost daily basis, and even the emblem and certain national monuments are likely to pop up on advertisements and as parts of the media discourse. But national days occur but once a year, staying outside the perimeter of our awareness for the remainder of the time.

I disagree with Geisler’s suggestion of a kind of dichotomy, or mutual exclusivity between national days and their relationship to the banal. While national days are foregrounded moments of a nation’s life, they are simultaneously always inextricably tied to its ordinary and everyday activities, practices, discourses and identities. Indeed, national days work in concert with the banal flagging of the nation, mutually inscribing ontological consistency to a nation’s identity. National days, in many ways, enhance and accentuate what already is. They make the banal highly salient. In this way, they are determinedly overdetermined. In almost a complete flip side to the above quote, A. Moewaka Barnes et al. (2012) argue

> National days… are condensed and over-determined moments in the life of a nation. They are ‘cultural performances’ that bring together, in
One key point made here, is quite simply that national days do not exist in an acultural vacuum. While the days themselves typically occur only once annually, they make evident the ways in which everyday cultural and identity formations are patterned. Certainly, national commemorations serve a range of functions that directly relate to ordinary everyday national life. Firstly, they promote and protect particular cultural interests whilst simultaneously eschewing others (Qasmi, 2017). If one of the key features of national identity is its ‘us’ and ‘them’ binary nature, commemorative or celebratory events of and for a nation similarly emphasise particular aspects of ‘our’ past whilst bracketing, ignoring or forgetting other, often problematic memories and histories that involve ‘them’ (Neufeld, 2002). Indeed, national commemorations determine what identities are held in view, and which are obscured or excluded from sight, and as such emphatically perform distributions of power and powerlessness in their respective societies (Said, 1978, p.332). Put in another way, while national commemorations are often said to be sites through which a sense of national belonging is constructed (McCrone & McPherson, 2009; L. T. Smith, 2013; Tsang & Woods), just like nations, nationalism and national identities, they must also be recognised as sites that exclude and deny (Helen Moewaka Barnes et al., 2017).

The ontological security that a consistent national identity provides is put to work by state actors using these days as a way to refresh and reassert the sanctioning of official national memories of a nation (Lebow, 2016). This occurs in numerous ways such as the designation of public holidays, in the particular formulations of official texts and reports, and fitting additions to the school curricula. National days invigorate collective cultural memory making practices through the leveraging of newsmaking and media work, word of mouth, the engaging of social and religious institutions, alongside hailing the public into rites, rituals and performances representations of the past (Lebow, 2016).

Lastly, while national days are often held as days in which much about a nation is to be remembered, Connerton (2008) distinguishes seven types of forgetting; five of
which will be useful to consider in this context. Repressive erasure refers to the spectrum of means through which memory is removed. This includes acts such as renaming politically problematic names of provinces, destroying statues and abolishing various forms of address, to subtler forms such as the deployment of historical master narratives by state and institutional actors which over time become the official and sanctioned public records. Prescriptive forgetting, like erasure is carried out by the state, but is carried out in the belief that it is for the benefit of all parties involved. Forgetting which is constitutive in the formation of a new identity, emphasises the benefits that can come about when certain memories are discarded in favour of newly shared, more favourable and beneficial memories for the ongoing maintenance of identities: “Not to forget might... provoke too much cognitive dissonance: better to consign some things to a shadow world” (Connerton, 2008, p.63). Structural amnesia refers to the tendency to remember the more socially important aspects of their genealogy. Lastly, forgetting as humiliated silence, refers to “covert, unmarked and unacknowledged” (Connerton, 2008, p.67) events of such historical significance and ongoing repercussions that to speak of them would likely engender humiliation and shame. Put together, these offer some useful points of reflection in regards to the New Zealand context.

The New Zealand Context

We cannot, of course, infer the fact of forgetting from the fact of silence. Nevertheless, some acts of silence may be an attempt to bury things beyond expression and the reach of memory

(Connerton, 2008, p.68)

Aotearoa New Zealand has a population of almost four and half million, of which around 71% self-identify as New Zealand European, 14% as Māori (IndexMundi, 2017). Māori are the indigenous peoples of Aotearoa, and first experienced European contact from the late 1700s, though Dutch explorer Abel Tasman made a brief visit in 1642 (Belich, 1996). As the numbers of European visitors and traders increased, so too did associated disorder and tension which resulted in firstly a declaration of independence He Whakaputanga in 1835 and then a treaty with Britain, Te Tiriti of Waitangi in 1840 (Network Waitangi Whangarei & Te Kawariki, 2012).

Te Tiriti was signed in 1840 by some Māori and by representatives of the British Crown ostensibly to protect Māori interests, control the behaviour of Europeans and
dissuade other foreign powers from incursion (Orange, 1987). Te Tiriti, written in Te Reo, and which most Māori signed, stated that Māori would retain sovereignty and authority over their lands, resources and taonga. The English version, on the other hand, held that sovereignty would be ceded to the British Crown (Kawharu, 1989) while Māori retained control of estates and other possessions that they did not wish to sell. Initially at least, it has been this interpretation that has carried the most influence. Commercial and political pressure, along with a thoroughgoing sense of white English superiority, set the scene for colonisation and immigration on a massive scale, exacerbated tensions and from 1843, led to bitter warfare between settlers and Māori that continued at multiple sites over several decades. The existence of contradictory versions of the document in Te Reo and English was exploited by colonial leaders to seize control, appropriate vast territories and grow the British colony despite staunch Māori resistance.

Contemporary New Zealand as a highly racialised and discriminatory society, emerged through the process of colonisation where settlers quickly became the main beneficiaries. The rapid influx of British nationals and other Europeans after 1840 led to a population majority a decade later. With this, new sets of laws, beliefs, and practices, including settler self-government based on the English Acts Act (M. Durie, 2005, p.2), were laid down. The national culture came to be dominated by the normative power of settler culture (Bell, 2009). Despite the expression of partnership and bi-cultural equity underpinned by Te Tiriti o Waitangi, power and privilege remain with the coloniser and continue to extend into interpersonal relations, societal norms, and institutional practices reproducing a society developed by and for settlers (H Moewaka Barnes et al., 2014).

*British commanders, military officers and local militia were at the forefront of acquiring the wealth dispossessed from the natives, some of them later holding extraordinary powers in the new social order as governors, land court judges, local government officials, businessmen and traders of property. Indeed, these acts of reward in wealth, power and opportunity were offered as the key motivational factor in securing their services to start with. For some who had come from an environment where upward mobility of any sort was severely limited by class and social position, the power of these enticements cannot be overstated.*

(Borell, Moewaka Barnes, & McCreanor, 2017, p.2)
Despite the promises of partnership proffered in Te Tiriti, colonisers have enacted a racist ideology that failed to protect the interests of Māori people with land ownership being a critical flashpoint among the many legitimate grievances. The alienations of the 1860s, in which over 3,000,000 acres of land were confiscated as a punishment for refusing to sell and challenging the colonial government (R. J. Walker, 1984). Today, while some tribes have had small proportions of their losses returned, there are still many outstanding claims. Indeed, less than 1% of the total land area of the country remains in Māori hands (New Zealand Waitangi Tribunal, 1996). In February 1840, the position was the complete opposite. This is unsurprising given the way the Treaty has been observed throughout its history. Mason Durie elaborates

*The Treaty was soon to become a marker of the past rather than a signpost to the future. Not only was the parchment itself allowed to fall into tatters, but the promise of a joint Māori-Crown approach to transformation gave way to a one-sided declaration of colonial rule. The establishment of a Māori electorate and four Māori seats in Parliament in 1867 was overshadowed a decade later by Justice Prendergast in a Supreme Court decision that declared the Treaty to be ‘a simple nullity;’ it could be virtually disregarded. By the mid-1950s the Treaty of Waitangi was being recognised as a significant but essentially historic document largely irrelevant to modern times.*

(M. Durie, 2009, p.4)

Latterly, as a result of long and determined Māori struggle, the Treaty is generally acknowledged as a living document where the interests of Māori should be protected through a bicultural partnership (M. Durie, 1998). However, the existence and reproduction of inequity between Māori and Pākehā, through the hegemony of settler cultural and social practices continues. Pākehā citizens are afforded a range of benefits such as greater economic power (Spoonley, Pearson, & Macpherson, 1991), better health prospects including greater life expectancy (Ajwani, Blakely, Robson, Tobias, & Bonne, 2003; Bell, 2006; Robson & Harris, 2007) and higher social status. Māori citizens find themselves continuing to negotiate ideological worldviews of white superiority that support colonial domination (Borell, Gregory, McCreanor, Jensen, & Moewaka Barnes, 2009). As Smith (1999) argues, these allow Pākehā the privilege to bypass the racist and destructive origins of their settler society and ignore the resultant comprehensive contemporary disparities between Treaty partners (H Moewaka Barnes et al., 2014).
Critical commentators note that belonging and exclusion have long been defined by "characteristics which were seen as quintessentially British" (Spoonley, Bedford, & Macpherson, 2003, p.30). Inclusion was dependent upon who had connections with Britain and this orientation continues its powerful influence on Pākehā identity and assumptions of belonging (Bell, 2006). As outlined in the section on national identity, a nation's history is marked by significant others whose presence is seen as a threat. In New Zealand Māori have almost from the outset been cast as that threat to Pākehā identity, interests and wellbeing (Bell, 2006).

New Zealand has long been privy to nationalistic discourses of 'openness, diversity and tolerance' (Skilling, 2010, p.175). Despite the bitter historical record, the standard story of racial relations in New Zealand, for instance, claims the relationship between Māori and Pākehā to be the ‘best in the world’ – fair, egalitarian, harmonious (Nairn & McCreanor, 1991). Such ‘master narratives’, or “stories of the powerful that infuse the common sense of whole societies and underpin the everyday logic of institutions” (Came & Humphries, 2014, p.99) in many ways continue to lay the foundations for Pākehā cultural practices, discourses and identities in New Zealand. Indeed, given “Pākehā political, economic, ideological hegemony was systemically established by force, by parliament, by democracy and the everyday workings of Kāwanatanga” (Came & Humphries, 2014, p.97), it should be of little surprise that Pākehā hegemony is ongoing and largely uninterrupted.

Despite the rhetoric of diversity and inclusion, monocultural processes and systems involved with British colonisation of Aotearoa continue to guide social practices in New Zealand, denying Māori autonomy and ways of life (Network Waitangi Whangarei & Te Kawariki, 2012; R. Walker, 1990; Yensen et al., 1989). Pākehā have used assimilationist frameworks where rhetoric of ‘one people’ or ‘we’re all New Zealanders’ has often been accompanied by stigmatisation of Māori in a range of ways. As an example the mass media a key site in the maintenance of national identity routinely marks Māori as associated with patterns of threat and extreme behaviour (A. Gregory et al., 2011). Mainstream television news programmes, for instance, radically under-represent Māori and when Māori stories are aired they typically depict protagonists as violent, criminal, and irresponsible (Nairn et al., 2012). Similarly, print media habitually position Māori as threatening and ‘Māori criminal behaviour’ is to be expected (McCreanor et al., 2014). ‘National’ agendas (in reality those of social elites) are pitted in opposition to ‘Māori interests’ (Phelan, 2009).
Furthermore, where – in those rare instances – there is an overt focus on ‘Māori issues’, the discourse is predominantly carried by Pākehā speakers (Rankine et al., 2014).

These advantages in numerous sites exemplify the degree to which Pākehā privilege allows white culture to position itself as normal, neutral, and ordinary; the baseline representation of the human experience. From this vantage point, Pākehā people are quite simply people, whereas Māori people are most certainly Māori people. As such, [Pākehā] people struggle to recognise their own group as having a particular culture, but rather that ‘culture’ is a phenomenon that other ethnic groups hold (DiAngelo, 2016). Here, Māori culture, institutions and practices are regularly observed as inferior and different, whilst Pākehā culture remains out of sight in a space where comfort, belonging, entitlement, confidence, and status remain secure and intact (H Moewaka Barnes et al., 2014).

The approach this thesis takes relates to forms of social practice that put to work cultural beliefs around superiority and inferiority. Despite being implicated in the reproduction of racism and privilege, this is not to focus or place blame on individual people, naming and shaming them as good or bad, racist or not. Rather, it is to reinforce the notion that there are broader cultural forces implicated in the reproduction of social inequalities that position Māori as inferior and on the periphery (Ballara, 1986; McCreanor, 2008; Wetherell & Potter, 1992). Such forces assist in the reproduction and maintenance of power and privilege in everyday national life for Pākehā, be it in the form of access to social opportunities and public goods based on ethnic identity, or the epistemologies, representations and narratives on offer that formulate Pākehā privilege and power, situating it as natural and obvious (Borell et al., 2009).

**Waitangi Day and Anzac Day**

As nationally designated days of remembrance and ritual, commemorative occasions in Aotearoa will be useful sites to explore the various ways in which processes of privilege play out. National days of commemoration and celebration have a central role in building secular religions and reminding ‘us’ of ‘who where are’ and ‘where we come from’ (Elgenius, 2005). Bringing both Waitangi and Anzac Day into the analysis within the context of Pākehā national identity will be intrinsic to its understanding as each day unfolds in unique and contrasting ways and evokes comparatively very
different responses for Pākehā citizens. Indeed, given each day, in their own way represents ‘the birth of the nation’, the affective politics tend to be fraught. Here, Anzac Day, tends to be positioned as a successful and uncomplicated day, whilst Waitangi Day tends to be positioned as unsuccessful and problematic. Keeping in mind the ‘us’ and ‘them’ dialectic that makes particular national identities uniquely placed, both days highlight ways in which a coherent sense of settler identity is maintained.

Waitangi Day, which was first officially commemorated in 1934, is observed annually on the 6th of February and commemorates the signing of Te Tiriti o Waitangi / the Treaty of Waitangi. It marked the commencement of British settlement, and was the antecedent event that opened the floodgates of colonisation (Ballara, 1986; Belgrave et al., 2004). Given the now entrenched and ongoing nature of colonisation and its associated inequities, Waitangi Day becomes a deeply contested space (Abel, 1997). Officially, Waitangi Day tends to be described as a day of commemoration (McAllister, 2012; New Zealand History, 2017), a day of celebration (McAllister, 2007), or a mixture of both. Most routinely, however, it is positioned as a day of conflict and controversy (Abel, 1997; McConville et al., 2014), or quite simply a day off work (Wetherell et al., 2015).

The central focus for the day are commemorations at Waitangi, the location where the Treaty was initially signed. Events begin on the 5th of February at Te Tii Marae, where political dignitaries are traditionally welcomed and speeches and debate occurs around political issues of the day. Waitangi Day itself begins the following day with a dawn ceremony at the Treaty Grounds. A range of national actors, including the Royal New Zealand Navy, Army, and government dignitaries, are involved at varying levels throughout the day. Flags are raised, multicultural performances are held, marching bands parade, guns salute, waka (canoe) arrive, and navy ships are docked in the bay. Outside of Waitangi a range of events take place across the country, often carnivalesque or celebratory in nature, with foods, crafts, sports and music.

One of the key features of Waitangi Day relates to the political debate around the place of the Treaty in the contemporary setting. Modern Māori protest, in the form of hikoi, pickets, petitions, occupations, and demonstrations, has a robust and well-established history in New Zealand with roots extending back even prior to 1840, a long list of petitions for justice carried to English monarchs, land occupations, boycotts and armed resistance (A. Harris, 2004). Waitangi Day itself, has seen a resurgence
in protest since the 1970s, derived from the progressive social movements of the 1960s. Here, Māori struggles against racism and inequality were put to work in conjunction with the anti-racist movement and the women’s liberation movement among others (Poata-Smith & International Socialist Organisation of Aotearoa/New Zealand, 2013). In 1960, Māori developed a close working relationship with Pākehā anti-racist groups in challenging the New Zealand Rugby Football Union’s exclusion of Māori players in the tour to South Africa (Keane, 2012). Over the next decade, the Pākehā anti-racist movement played a collaborative role in advocating for Māori equity in New Zealand society (Huygens, 2016). Some Pākehā have long engaged in protest alongside Māori, which reflects inherent discontent with a range of issues from the levels of inequality experienced via economic disparities to racial discrimination. Waitangi Day is a central site in which protest reflects ongoing social and cultural injustice.

Anzac Day, held annually on the 25th of April commemorates the Gallipoli landings of New Zealand and Australian troops during the first world war (Crawford & McGibbon, 2007; Scates, Wheatley, & James, 2016). Rhetorically, it has since been extended to remember the causalities of all wars, playing a significant role in building national mythology (e.g., Seal, 2004), though local wars in Aotearoa are curiously left out (O’Malley, 2016; O’Malley & Kidman, 2017). Anzac Day variously unfolds in similar ways at commemorative events across the country. The dawn service is described as a ‘rite of passage for many kiwis’ (The Royal New Zealand Returned and Services’ Association, n.d). A typical dawn service will involve a military personal march to a memorial where community members are located and will incorporate prayers, hymns and ‘The Last Post’, a piece of music used to commemorate those killed in war. Commemorative duties are often followed by coffee and rum. A second ceremony takes places later in the morning, which involves similar rites and rituals but is more geared towards being a public commemoration rather than the overt militarism of the dawn service, and ‘less intimate and less emotional’ (New Zealand History, 2017). ‘Nationhood and remembrance’ frame the occasion.

As a day of mostly uncontested commemoration, Anzac Day in New Zealand reflects the belief that nations are made through war; that sacrifice and death fused with heroism and bravery are core qualities that carry a nation to maturity (Reynolds, 2010). Contemporary Anzac Day events also fuse discourse that routinely condemns war yet simultaneously valorises the role of nobility, sacrifice and the figure of the soldier in the formation of a nation; New Zealand national identity linked to military
endeavour for the British Empire. The day aims to achieve a sense of pride and purpose to the nation and offers a way through which identity can be put to work.

The recent resurgence of Anzac Day in Australia and New Zealand is typically understood as part of a recent wider international surge in war commemoration (Twomey, 2013). The ubiquity of the global war industry is the result of the efforts of a range of actors including private corporations and states, alongside being supported by media organisations and the tourism industry (McKenna & Ward, 2007). Alongside this McKenna (2014) suggests a range of other factors for the growing popularity of the occasion that include: an opportunity to build a sense of community in a secular age; significant media increases in coverage and prime ministerial speeches; and is the result of many years of government funded programmes focusing on the Anzac legend. This is in conjunction with a widespread lack of critique and reflexivity around the events that actually occurred and how they might connect to national identity (J. Brown, 2014; Holbrook, 2014; Kilmister, Bennett, Ford, & Debenham, 2017; Lake, Reynolds, McKenna, & Damousi, 2010; MacLeod, 2007; Morris, 2012; Scates, 2015; Seal, 2004).

The current project recognises and problematises the challenging nature of contemporary configurations of ‘nation’ and ‘nationalism’ in Aotearoa New Zealand. In particular, it seeks to understand with greater breadth and depth, the conditions within which these particular formations are maintained (Balibar, 1990) and how some forms of resistance look within that. Throughout the thesis, I keep in mind questions around what banal nationalism accomplishes for a settler colonial society such as New Zealand, but as the following chapter will develop, I ask this within the context of affect and emotion.
Chapter Two: Affect and Emotion

This chapter focuses on affect and emotion. I begin with a critical assessment of two highly influential and very different bodies of work from two contrasting relevant disciplines. The first being basic emotions in positivist social psychology, and the second being affect theory in cultural studies. Following this, I use my critique to identify approaches that seem to offer a useful grounding for the thesis. First, I review perspectives that offer clues as to how I might proceed. I focus on social constructionism, feeling rules, emotionology and structures of feeling. I then go on to outline A Way Forward grounded in social practice theory and then affective practice from which I outline what I describe as Pākehā affective privilege.

Basic Emotions in Psychology

In social psychology, emotion has long been portrayed as being fundamentally produced and located within the corporeal self—‘irrational’, ‘private’ and largely ‘hidden’ from the wider social context (Katz, 1999, p.9). Here, its proponents attest that emotion, ‘in the individual organism’ has ‘adapted’ over time through ‘automatic appraisals’ to certain ‘antecedent events’ working to produce ‘coherent responses’ (Ekman, 1992). This system of thought predominately construes emotion as universally shared, primarily biological in nature, and distributed in ‘packets’ of ‘basic’ processes; emotions being discrete, biophysically distinct elements, intrinsic and evolutionary in origin (Ekman & Davidson, 1994). Within this frame, the primary purpose of emotion is to rally the subject together in ways that swiftly deal with key interpersonal encounters, achieved in part by what has occurred prior; that which has been historically adaptive for both the species and one’s own life history (Ekman, 1992).

The thesis is based on research stressing that distinct facial muscle movements express relationships with particular emotions such as anger, fear, surprise and happiness (Ekman & Friesen, 1975, 2003). Paul Ekman (1992), a student of Silvan Tomkins, suggests there are two key observations which can be framed as basic. First, there are a number of emotional states such as sadness and enjoyment that, as noted above, are distinct, separate and discrete to each other, and which can be observed through their expression and in other ways such as their probable
behavioural response and physiology. Second, emotions are hypothesised to have evolved as a means to deal with fundamental life-tasks, or universal human predicaments including important life moments such as achievements, losses, and wins. Surprise, for instance, includes raised brows allowing for more to be seen, and more light to enter the visual field (Ekman, 1979). Here, the kinds of emotion that surface prompt the subject into a particular interpretive landscape modelled through an evolutionary past.

Alongside articulating differences between each emotion, Ekman groups basic emotions into families of related states where each basic emotion exhibits common characteristics. Ekman claims that anger, for example, has over 60 families of anger expressions. One family, for instance, might pull together an array of related muscular patterns such as lowered eye brows, raised eye lids and tightened muscles in the lips. Other families may be elicited in slightly different ways dependent upon how the emotion is being controlled and managed, or whether it is spontaneous or provoked. Each emotion family comprises themes and variations. Themes relate to certain characteristics unique to a particular emotion family, and are suggested to be primarily genetic and evolutionary in origin. Variations on themes are the result of an assortment of influences from biological differences of each individual, to the nature of the occasion in which an emotion is experienced. Whilst variations are theorised to reflect learning, they are also both primarily constrained by Darwinian evolution.

The dominance of a basic emotions approach is still felt today. Antonio Damasio’s psychobiology of affect (Damasio, 1994, 1999, 2003), for instance, exemplifies how basic emotions feed into the structuring background of more recent theories. Damasio typically identifies six primary emotions that, akin to Ekman and colleagues’ findings, points to what he describes as innate, universal, and hardwired predetermined profiles (see also, Panskepp, 1998). Damasio posits that ‘the state of emotion’ situates the immediate and physical unfolding of biological mechanisms via external situations or internal cognitions setting off pre-set body and brain mechanisms. Damasio does suggest these flows are open to adjustment through cultural learning and factors related to personal history, but despite this, the primary states of emotion form the basis from which action is carried forth, oftentimes beyond awareness and control, and always preceding thought and feeling.

Psychobiological research, however, has increasingly questioned the degree to which emotions might legitimately qualify as natural kinds with quantitative boundaries and essences which distinguish one from another (Russell, Bachorowski, & Fernandez-
Dols, 2003; Turner & Ortony, 1992). Even if not natural kinds per se, many researches still assume emotions to be something given by Nature (Griffiths, 1997, 2004; Russell & Barrett, 1999). Barrett (2006, p.28) categorically denies these assumptions as simply “not warranted by the available empirical evidence”, and as such present “a major obstacle to understanding what emotions are and how they work” (Barrett, 2006, p.29). In reviewing evidence for strong correlations among measurable emotional responses, for instance, Barrett notes 30 years of inconsistent findings that range from modest relationships to no relationships to negative correlations (e.g., Gross, John, & Richards, 2000; Mauss, Wilhelm, & Groos, 2004; Reisenzein, 2000). Whilst some studies have reported moderate to strong relationships between facial movements and subjective experience (Bonanno & Keltner, 2004), put together the evidence strongly suggests that “lack of response coherence within each category of emotion is empirically the rule rather than the exception” (Barrett, 2006, p.33).

Cultural research has also played a key role in the destabilising of psychobiological approaches. A classic example can found in that of Schachter and Singer’s (1962) research on emotion. In contrast to the psychobiological approach in which a stimulus evokes a particular emotional response, their research argued that cognition plays a key role in determining what label the state of physiological arousal or an emotion inducing situation provokes, be it fear, anger and so on. They go on to question the degree to which the state of physiological arousal is sufficient to produce an emotion. Drawing on earlier studies in which subjects were injected with adrenalin and then asked to introspect, nearly one third reported experiencing physical symptoms with no emotional overtones. Furthermore, most described their experiences in terms of ‘as if’ emotions – that is, they reported feeling ‘as if’ they were in certain emotional states, but not quite inhabiting them fully. Indeed, only a few reported having genuine emotional experiences. Schachter and Singer reason that given subjects likely knew they were receiving an injection in order to feel certain effects, the underlying physiological changes they reported related to what they considered an appropriate cognition as to why they were feeling a particular way. They argue that when placed in a situation where no immediate or appropriate cognitions are available yet a particular form of physiological arousal is in play, the subject would label their feelings dependent on what they know about the immediate situation. For example, if the subject were placed in front of another person, perhaps they would decide they were in love. Were they at a party, perhaps they would decide they were experiencing euphoria. In other words, in states of physiological arousal and without obvious
explanation, subjects will determine what state they are in and describe feelings in relation to the cognitions available.

Drawing on a wide body of literature from social psychology to anthropology research in the 1980s and 1990s, Wetherell (2012) agrees that ambiguous psychological arousal often leads people to look to the situation and experience of others in order to decide what it might be that they are feeling. This moves beyond approaches that locate the individual in a vacuum, such as Damasio’s ‘state of knowing the feeling’, where one feels something, then registers it and ‘knows’ it a-contextually. Furthermore, not only context is imperative in the meaning-making involved in emotion, but cultural context. Drawing on Shweder (1994), Wetherell notes the culturally relative ways in which lay theories of emotional experience are put to work. In the West, for instance, people posit emotional arousal as discrete, purely subjective experiences tied to broader narratives of individual responsibility and frameworks that privilege reason and rationality. In other cultures, emotion might be tied to very different conceptual frameworks. Even language terms to describe emotional experience can be very different from culture to culture (Wierzbicka, 1999) and in varying historical-cultural epochs (Paster, 2010), alongside operating in different ways in bi and multilingual contexts (Pavlenko, 2005). Furthermore, theorists from different schools of thought, often begin from very different positional gazes; carrying diverse psychological assumptions and inevitably carrying unique ideas about nature and the psyche, that unsurprisingly guide their research practice in quite distinct ways.

Many of the problems with the basic emotions approach come clearly into view if we think about how it might be applied to national commemoration. Firstly, my focus in this thesis would likely be quite limited. For example, how would I understand basic emotions around text based news reports of events, when I cannot see a face? And, when I do witness a facial expression at, say, a Waitangi Day event, how would I make sense of it? If a researcher had no idea as to the event’s context, history, and the current situation regarding local cultural practices and ethnic relations, what kind of meaning might be made? What could be said about the emotion outside of its predominantly mechanistic, reductionist substrate, in terms of the facial muscles being stretched and contorted in various ways, or around the degree of apparent physiological arousal if one had to hand a meter for measuring the galvanic skin response? Could we really differentiate between indifference and boredom? And if so, what would the particular emotion mean for the broader politics of national commemoration? Given a basic emotions approach largely excludes the role for
socio-cultural processes other than as a trigger for preprogrammed flows, it does seem as if much of the story will be missed.

Although much of the traditional psychology of emotion is not fit for purpose for social research, it is important nonetheless to review this work as it draws on and has sustained many of the cultural resources and assumptions found in lay and media discourse about emotion. As some of my following chapters will show, such discourses show contrasts between cognition and emotion, notions of universality and emotion as located in the individual.

**Affect Theory in Cultural Studies**

I now turn to a very different body of work on affect and emotion but which turns out to share some of the problems evident in basic emotions. The past few decades has seen the ‘turn to affect’ in cultural studies play a central role in the way in which affect is theorised. Born in part out of a dissatisfaction with the way social construction of emotions had reduced lived experience to discourse and representation (e.g., Howson & Inglis, 2001), affect theory sought to move ‘beyond’ meaning, ideology, representation, culture, conscious knowing, talk and text, and into an ontology of the prepersonal; the precognitive and visceral realm ‘beneath’ (Clough & Halley, 2007). Here, the focus turned from meaning and narrative, to embodiment, sensuality, and immediacy and brought in Deleuzian approaches that conceive affect as force, movement, and intensity (Gregg & Seigworth, 2010).

As a result, much of the recent work on affect and emotion in the social sciences has been underpinned by a focus on the non-verbal, pre-personal, post-human, and what are often described as ‘non-representational’ dimensions of affect (Thrift, 2004). These dimensions are said to engage a move ‘beyond representation’ in an attempt to ‘take the body seriously’. As such, the activities of everyday life (including everything from political speeches and advertising to the newsmaking practices of the mass media), are reconceptualised as working on the body at the levels of energies, intensities and chemicals, acting on individuals in ways that transcend arguing and thinking.

‘Affect’, in affect theory, is not to be confused with ‘feelings’ and ‘emotions’. They are seen as following different logics. Feelings are *personal*, emotions are *social*, and affect refers to *prepersonal intensity* – what happens from one body state to the next (Massumi, 2002). Affect, then, beyond language, below conscious awareness and
recognition, is seen as preceding thought and will. Affect prepares the body for action conceived as pure potential, mostly outside one’s control. Shouse (2005) uses an example of an infant. The infant lacks language skills through which sensations are cognitively processed, and a history from which to draw on in determining how to categorise what is felt. As such, within this model, an infant does not have the ability to experience feeling, given that feeling requires previous experience and the capacity to label. The infant is saturated in innate intensities. They enter into an assemblage of correlated responses involving facial muscular changes, postural modifications, autonomic nervous system (ANS) shifts and vocalisations that express the particular intensities of the moment.

Unlike personal feelings and domesticated or socialised emotions, affect, as an ‘unstructured’ phenomenon is thought to have has the capacity to transmit between bodies, making the distinction between individual and environment somewhat blurred. In terms of national commemoration, then, it might be argued that participants are bound together primarily through affective energies, in most part experiencing non-conscious affective resonances. Here, affect is understood as more about the way in which one is moved, rather than the meaning ascribed in the particular context within which one is situated.

To claim affect to be an unstructured and nonsignifying intensity certainly seems in stark contradistinction to basic emotions approaches in which affect comes in prepackaged structures. As Leys (2011, p.443) points out, however, both theories are strikingly similar.

Thrift states that he wants to avoid the emotion categories of the empirical psychologists and social scientists. But then he proceeds to draw on four “translations” of affect that include references to the ideas of Tomkins, Ekman, and Damasio—the last of whom, in spite of a declared Spinozism and antidualism that makes his work especially attractive to many cultural critics, follows the Tomkins-Ekman paradigm in his approach to the study of the basic emotions.

In other words, akin to the proponents of basic emotions, affect theorists similarly attest that affect is a distinct, independent system operating outside of meaning and signification. Furthermore, both propose a gap between affect and cognition significant enough to entail that the ability for appraisal, intention, belief and reasoning arrive too late for the mind to intervene in processes already well under way. In this
sense, affect is an excess; it exceeds the knowing mind. Leys goes on to closely critique some key experimental studies that proponents of affect theory draw on, and she finds numerous complications.

Moving her critique across three studies, Leys finds contradictions between Massumi’s conclusions which are quite different to the conclusions of the studies he draws from, imposing on the author’s findings “an interpretation motivated by a set of assumptions about the asignifying nature of affect” (Leys, 2011, p.450). Take, for example, Massumi (1995) influential essay *The Autonomy of Affect*. As already noted, Massumi posits that the hit of affect precedes awareness, and in general that the brain swings into motion half a second before one decides to perform the associated action. In the experiment Massumi draws from, subjects were asked to perform an action and then report on when they decided to perform said action. Results seemed to indicate a half-second delay between the corporal event and registering when the intention to act occurred (Libet, 1985). Leys focuses on Massumi’s claim, alongside other scholars such as Damasio, LeDoux and Thrift, that the experiment provides evidence of the behind-hand nature of subjective awareness. She suggests that this interpretation of Libet’s findings comprises numerous complications.

First, she notes a number of researchers who argue that a lack of awareness of one’s movement does not necessarily mean that said movements are unintentional. The classic example of the pianist, for instance, points out the non-conscious awareness of the manifold movements made when performing, yet these movements still emerge through an *intention* for the performance. In a similar way, Libet’s experiment required participants’ intention to carry out the task and follow researcher requests, of which were already known by participants in terms of what they intended to do going into the experiment. As such, the context for the experiment was already framed.

*In short, it is a confusion on both Libet’s and Massumi’s part to think that because such actions usually go on automatically, below the threshold of consciousness, it is necessary to break with the whole idea of intentionality and to assume that it can only be explained in corporeal terms.*

(Leys, 2011, p.456)

Put another way, despite an ontological commitment to Spinozian non-dualism expressed by affect theory, classical mind body dualism clearly informs the experimental interpretation. Indeed, whilst many actions take place automatically, and
non-consciously, it does not necessary follow that will does not play an intentional role, or that the body-brain is the only intentional domain. Massumi assumes that in order to qualify as intentional, something must be sufficiently conscious. In this way, one can make a neat separation between body and brain response and consciousness itself. As Leys points out, however, contextual framing plays a key role in the formation of bodily response: “the brain appears to be constantly engaged in beginning to prepare likely motor sequences relevant to the emerging context” (Wetherell, 2012, p.63).

Contemporary psychobiology is also in conflict with other basic premises of affect theory. Wetherell Wetherell (2012) notes Massumi’s distinction between quality and intensity and the centrality of this distinction to his theory of affect. Akin to affect theory’s segregation of affect, feelings, and emotion, quality refers to social meaning or signification (Clay, 2010, p.67); naming and conscious awareness; “conventional discursive and linguistic framing” (Wetherell, 2012, p.57) whereas intensity refers to the hit of events on bodies, to force, psychological arousal, and to the strength, intervals, and duration of the physiological goings on. For Massumi, if intensity indicates affect, then quality is a characteristic of emotion – an organising moment in which affect becomes categorised, labelled, narrativised, and thus disseminated into the social. However, Wetherell (2012) points out that the psychology used to inform these kinds of demarcations is a) merely one psychological story that can be drawn upon and b) is not the dominant story, despite being presented as such. Wetherell (2012, p.62) points to the current frame favoured in psychology and neuroscience:

The picture that psychology and neuroscience typically now paints of affect is of a highly dynamic, interacting composite or assemblage of autonomic bodily responses (e.g. sweating, trembling, blushing), other body actions (approaching or avoiding), subjective feelings and other qualia, cognitive processing (e.g. perception, attention, memory, decision-making), the firing and projecting of neural circuits (e.g. from the thalamus to the cortex and the amygdala), verbal reports (from exclamations to narratives) and communicative signals such as facial expressions. An emotional episode, such as a burst of affect like rage or grief, integrates and brings together all of these things in the same general moment.
Whilst affect theory offers more promise for social research when compared to basic emotions theory in psychology, some of the problems with it become clear as we try to apply this thinking to the example of national commemoration. Can affect really work on bodies in ways that transcend talk text and meaning? Sumartojo (2015, p.267), for instance, broadly draws on affect theory to account for the role darkness plays in the shaping of atmosphere around Anzac Day, marking “darkness as generative of atmosphere” where it “recasts the built environment as mysterious and shadowy” and “conjures the crowd of participants as unknowable and therefore imagined to each other”. One might question, however, the degree to which darkness itself “signalled stillness” (Sumartojo, 2015, p.278). Of course, there is little doubt that darkness plays a role in resultant practical problems such as finding one’s position to watch proceedings, or lacking the ability to realise the scale of the crowd.

However, does darkness itself encourage quietness as the author suggests? Or is being surrounded by others who are steeped in silence conditioned by past practice and skilled expertise of how to behave during a dawn ceremony encourage it? Many cultural practices around funerals, for example, occur in daylight yet encourage quietness. Similarly, darkness in other contexts – all night beach parties for example – can encourage a range of other ways of being and doing dependent on the situation. It is points such as these that put aspects of affect theory into question. That is, if we leave out fundamental human capacities that include talking and meaning-making, we are likely to miss key aspects in the unfolding of affect and emotion. Beyond these considerations, Leys (2011) and Wetherell’s (2012) critiques of the underlying psychology employed to build affect theory comprehensively attest that its current formation is unsustainable.

**Clues to a Way Forward**

This section outlines some approaches to emotion that offer clues to A Way Forward for research on affect and national commemoration, but I will suggest that these still miss some important aspects. I briefly explore social constructionist approaches to emotions, followed by Hochschild’s (1983) notion of feeling rules. I go on to discuss emotionology (Stearns & Stearns, 1985), followed by Raymond Williams’ (1977) work on structures of feeling.

A social constructionist approach relates emotions to sociocultural meanings and phenomena within which they are expressed, whereby words, language,
vocabularies, idioms, rules governing expression, and cultural patterns and processes of interaction become some its primary domains of focus (Averill, 1982; Harré, 1988; Lutz & Abu-Lughod, 1990; Parkinson, 1995; Rosaldo, 1984). Within this frame, emotions emerge in ways that include communication, verbal signalling, discourses both written and verbal, and are constrained through socialisation, rules and norms. In this sense, emotions are thoroughly social and cultural phenomena.

Emotions from a social constructionist perspective are generated via appraisals based on cultural beliefs and values (Lynch, 1990). They are thus learned and culturally relative rather than natural, innate or universal phenomena. Moreover, emotions are based on agent appraisal. That is, instead of being universally triggered by a stimulus and resulting in a cascade of emotional programmes unfolding, they can be experienced in different ways depending on the situation and the agent’s understanding and evaluation of the situation. For example, Jessica swears at Jane. Jane may experience anger as a result. Jane could, on the other hand, experience empathy based on her knowledge that Jessica has recently lost her job. As such, emotions involve moral evaluations and other systems of judgement about the situations within which they are expressed.

Within the constructionist paradigm, the physiological sensation experienced is not the emotion as said sensation could accompany responses as diverse as empathy or anger. Rather, emotions are cognitive appraisals of situations. As Lynch (1990, p.10) explains

*If I am hurt at not being invited to Mary's wedding, I can reasonably be expected to change my feelings (that is my appraisal) when someone points out that only close relatives were invited because Mary's father had recently died and his long illness had exhausted the family's funds and put the family into debt.*

Lynch argues that emotions are rational, distinct from uncontrollable passions exploding and pouring forth. Furthermore, emotions cannot be identified merely by behaviour. The sound of screaming, for instance could be read as anything from escaping an attack to chasing a celebrity. Indeed, more information around the sociocultural context is required in order to appraise it.

While there is much more to a constructionist approach, this brief overview indicates some of the ways in which social constructionism disrupted Western common sense approaches to emotions as purely private, introspective, and wholly natural
experiences and instead positioned them as public and culturally mediated. However, there are a number of aspects to a purely social constructionist perspective that are questionable. Within the context of this thesis, a main concern relates to social constructionism’s disembodied approach, where a text and talk become the focus, and the visceral, lived, and felt body are left behind. Take for example, (Hochschild, 1983) exploration into emotional labour in the work place, with particular reference to flight attendants and their work in the airline industry. Again, moving beyond biological, irrational or purely individual approaches to emotion, Hochschild argued that emotions are subject to rules or cultural norms around how they ought to be expressed or experienced appropriate to the situation in which the person is located. Here, people purposefully manage their emotions, their expression and response based on the particular context at hand.

Feeling rules, and, by extension – display rules, define the normative expectations around the duration and intensity that an emotion ought to take (Gordon, 1981). I remember, for example, seeing a counsellor upon my friend’s passing. They noted quite clearly the stages of grief I should be going through and a set period within which this would take place. Each week when I attended, I was reminded as to where I was situated on the timeline and how much longer it would take to pass through each stage. Upon the supposed completion of grief, the counsellor seemed somewhat bewildered that my experience was not corresponding to the timeline. My mourning was now ‘taking too long’ and the assumed rules prescribed no longer fit. I had entered the ‘get over it’ zone. In short, the kinds of emotions I should have been feeling failed to neatly align within a particular cultural configuration, replete with the recommended length and intensity (Francis, 1997).

A situation such as this exemplifies the way in which the experience described did not neatly correspond with the theory prescribed. As such, it points at some critical issues around the notion of feeling rules. Indeed, while I increasingly noticed the extent that many began to tell me that it was ‘time to move on’, or that ‘perhaps I needed to consider medication’, or to ‘begin a new hobby’, I always felt that this was a ‘journey’ in which my experience would unfold in its own particular way, with its own time frame – narratives and practices rather than rules and stages. That said, upon reflection, it could certainly be conceded that from time to time when there was a greater felt sense of urgency, or pressure to ‘get back to normal’ increasingly experienced by me, one which at times led to episodes of surface acting when talking to certain people and deep acting in terms of attempting to somehow manipulate my
experience in a way that corresponded to the norm of a time line. However, this experience still related more akin to a timeline as such, rather than a culturally prescribed time line. Indeed, imposing a timeline on healing from depression can be useful in a neoliberal paradigm where economic productivity and individual responsibility are deeply valued, but it fails to account for the lived experience itself (Cvetkovich, 2012). If we primarily adhere to rules, then we are liable to forget the body and its particular rhythms that most certainly do not always coincide with normativity.

In a similar way, Stearns and Stearns (1985) emotionology delineates the way a society of a certain historical epoch carries its own normative standards or values pertaining to the way in which emotions ought to be expressed and restrained. These standards, according to Stearns and Stearns, help explain how and why various societal bodies actively promote and reproduce certain emotions and limit, or exclude others. An emotionology points to the various socio-cultural shifts in the normative organisation of emotional value that surface through changing ideological, economic, and class conditions. For instance, the authors point out the way the swell in individualism following rising market relationships in eighteenth-century America weakened traditional emotional relations among men. This lead to the family being utilised as a greater ‘emotional safe haven’ away from the competition that increasingly characterised their new market-based relations.

Emotionology speaks primarily to the values of a society, rather than explicitly to embodied experiences. Yet, of course, broader societal conventions influence localised experiences and theories pertaining to the character, context, and significance emotions hold over lifeworlds’ in various ways (Harré, 1988). The meanings and practices of climate change, for instance, oscillate as organisations seek to manage shifting emotionologies that may threaten profit margins and shareholder confidence via reconfiguring stifling narratives of ‘threat’ and ‘conflict’ to potentially enabling narratives of ‘challenge’ and ‘opportunity’ (Wright & Nyberg, 2012). Returning to my previous example, however, the detail again becomes challenging. Certainly, from social constructionism in general and these perspectives in particular, it must be recognised that there will be more at play than the mere subjection and synchronisation to norms and rules akin to other forms of behaviour.

Raymond Williams (1977) Marxist approach to the study of experience begins to tie in some of the concerns outlined here around the gap between norms and lived experience. Williams used the term structures of feeling as a central concept that
pointed towards the ways in which affective social formations emerge through a dialectical process of hegemony and resistance, where a range of identity markers such as race, class, power, and gender intersect (Zembylas, 2002). At its most simplistic, a structure of feeling has been conceived as the commonly shared experience of a certain period. More specifically it refers to the embodied experience that emerge as a result of a particular social formation.

Williams makes explicit the distinction between fixed social norms or ‘thought experience’ and the actual lived experience of a person. Feeling, according to Williams, is still held within a set of inter-subjective relations, which are at once cultural, political, and discursive, alongside recognising these to be embodied experiential aspects of being, forever unfinished and not always articulated (Zembylas, 2002). From this perspective, Williams (1977) seeks to explore the affective formations that comprise ordinary everyday experience, keeping in mind the degree in which they are often developed in inequitable ways via the distribution of power through various markers of identity. While this approach comes closest to a generative way to explore national commemoration, exploring the tensions and tendencies, the hegemonic and resistant, the term structure itself fails to capture perhaps the looser and dynamic aspects of affect, which the following section seeks to address.

**A Way Forward**

In this section, I will traverse some of the ways forward offered by a number of theorists. I will begin by positioning the central approach – social practice, and follow it with numerous supplementations posited by other theorists before arriving at the positional gaze for the thesis – Pākehā affective privilege.

Social practice theory forms the ground from which the approaches in this thesis are developed. Social practice theory, like banal nationalism, takes a sustained focus on the seemingly unimportant, seemingly inconsequential activities of everyday life. To emphasise practice is to centre *routinisation*, *habit*, *know-how*, and the degrees of *expertise* imbued in these. It is to take a keen interest in the conventionalised, and culturally shared ways of behaving, knowing, and desiring; to examine the ways “in which bodies are moved, objects are handled, subjects are treated, things are described and the world is understood” (Reckwitz, 2002, p.250). Put in another way,
practice theory situates significance primarily within the frame of *embodied human activities* (Schatzki, 2001, p.10). That is, practices always imply bodily knowledge.

Despite the shared nature of social practice, practice theories are neither norm orientated theories of action, focused on collective norms and values, nor are they purpose-orientated theories of action, focused on individual intentions and interests (Reckwitz, 2002). Margolis (1999) for instance, suggests that Bourdieu evades both structuralism and existentialism through three related themes. First, humans are positioned as *agents* rather than subjects. That is, they do not automatically follow rules, nor do they have full autonomy. Second, human action is not to be understood in terms of obeying rules, but instead in terms of making use of *available* possibilities and strategies. Third, people are both agentic and constituted through social processes. In other words, they are not purely objectified and subject to the impositions and determination of structures as insisted by structuralists, nor do they engage in entirely free and autonomous actions, choices, and decisions located in a Sartrean vacuum.

Within the frame of social practice, and taken together, affect and emotion can similarly be recognised as a kind of practice. Agents become *carriers* of particular practices. Routine habits of activity, thoughts, feelings, and doings, become entrained in varying degrees for different agents in terms of skilful performance, building visible forms of order to social and cultural life. Particular practices gain momentum and become more desirable, more beneficial, more *available* for agents to take up, and some practices become more legitimate than others. From this perspective ‘the way things are’ reflects both the constraining and enabling dimensions of practice. We tend to do what we have done before, but this could certainly be otherwise.

Bodily and mental activities and the felt ways in which they are situated in the world become sites of the social, not wholly owned by individuals, but rather dimensions of the social practice; routinised relations rather than individual actions. In this sense, emotions include aspects of mind and body, both of which are ontologically intertwined. As acts of body and cognition, emotion also becomes subject to the conditioning of a social context; a trained, plastic, and historically situated phenomenon.

*Depending on where and when we live, we learn to keep our thoughts and feelings to ourselves (or not), to listen to our hearts (or our heads), to be “true to ourselves” and to know what we want. These are not*
universal features of subjectivity. The history of the self in the West has shown that the concepts on which such practices are based—interiority, self-reflexivity, distinct faculties of feeling and thinking—have been intensely cultivated at certain times in specific social and cultural constellations. And since attending to “inner” experience is a practice, it is also always embodied, dependent on brain cells, bodily postures, and the disciplining or habituating of these

(Scheer, 2012, p.200)

Scheer (2012) draws on Bourdieu’s theory of practice as a means for navigating body and social structure, which put together assemble emotion. Bourdieu formulates what he calls the *habitus*, dispositions internalised as second nature based on cultural habits to think feel and act in certain ways (Bourdieu, 2005) in conjunction with the agent’s own history of habit and, among other things, (re)production based on the particular practices enacted (Bourdieu, 1990). In contrast to the notion of feeling *rules* or *structures* of feeling, habitus incorporates practical sense where people tend to behave in accordance with the requirements of their community, though not purely through learning the rules and then following them, but rather through gaining a sense of what is ‘the right way’ of being in a particular situation. In this way, practices relate to degrees of skill, which after numerous episodes of repetition become automatic. The martial artist, for instance, practices forms of combat over many years where it progressively becomes ingrained and ready to deploy as habitus. Scheer continues

> People move about in their social environments... in most cases supremely practiced at the subtleties of movement, posture, gesture, and expression that connect them with others as well as communicate to themselves who they are. These practices are neither “natural” nor random; they adhere to a learned repertoire that positions a person in a social field and constitutes participation in that field’s “game”. They are not executed as a mere reproduction of norms, but rather according to what Bourdieu refers to as “strategy” and the practical sense that emerges from the habitus.

(Scheer, 2012, p.202)

Much of my approach to emotion and practice within this thesis is indebted to Margie Wetherell’s (2012) notion of *affective practice*: “An affective practice is a figuration where body possibilities and routines become recruited or entangled together with
meaning-making and with other social and material figurations” (Wetherell, 2012, p.19). Affect as a practice surfaces the rhythms, patterns, and unfolding orders of social life. Here we find affect distributed among constantly changing patchworks of body and cognitive action, neural firing, verbal reports, and intersubjective communication. These assemblages are always situated within contextual settings, constrained and enabled by various iterations of one’s cultural formation, historical positioning, group identity and other social locations. They can vary in scale, from one to one interaction, to group rituals, to the various ways in which communities are imagined by cultural institutions such as the mainstream media. They will be subject to power differentials determining the distribution of privilege and disadvantage, and what ways these tend to be made available for varying agents.

One of the key contributions of the thesis will involve exploring the relationship between affect and discourse developed in previously unexplored scenes of investigation. Wetherell (2013a) proposes that the notion of social practice, which has been of importance in discursive research, can be usefully recruited into the study of entangled dimensions of affect and discourse in human interactions. affective-discursive practice (Wetherell et al., 2015) explores the deployment of entanglements of semiotics and embodiment. Here, utterance, gesture, body movement, and facial expression run in tandem; intertwined, and of a shared relational, historical, and ideological context (Billig, 1991; Billig et al., 1988; Wetherell, 1998). Affect and discourse become located “within emergent patterns of situated activity, and makes these patterns, as they need to be, the main research focus”, not least due to the observation that discourse does not merely describe emotion states, but can actually create them (Lutz & Abu-Lughod, 1990). Indeed, in terms of developing a practical application in the study of an affective scene, to separate affect and discourse becomes highly problematic at worst and paradoxical at best, especially when one considers that the visceral is in many ways accessed through the representational realm of the discursive, there being no moment when affect and discourse are separable in the interactive, interpretive, meaning-making practices of social life (Wetherell, 2013a).

An example of this can be found in a popular video on YouTube (LifeHunters, 2014). Two people buy a range of food from McDonalds – burgers and chicken nuggets among other things. They remove the items from their original packaging, take the top of the bun from the burgers, and cut both the nuggets and burgers into four equal sections. Everything is laid out on tasting plates, and each item is skewered. They
take these reassembled items to an artesian food fair, and present them as new organic alternatives to fast food. As people taste them, they describe them in ways that participate in the new context’s game, far removed from the drive through and brown bags. The affective-discursive practices usually associated with McDonalds are replaced with context and class derived utterances such as ‘moist’, ‘nice and firm, has a good bite’, ‘rolls around the tongue nicely, if it were wine I’d say it’s fine’, ‘I feel some warmth releasing in my mouth’. When asked if they were to compare it to McDonalds, one said “It definitely tastes a lot better, and the fact that it’s organic is definitely a good thing – it’s just better for you “, another said it was much tastier, and that “you can just tell this is a lot more pure”. This exemplifies the deeply contextual nature of affect, the way it interweaves and is changed through discourse, alongside subject and situation transformed, mutually creating new possibilities for action.

Cromby (2007), reading Merleau-Ponty through Vygotsky arrives at a similar conclusion. That is, inner speech gives form to the flux of feeling, allowing for the representation and transformation of experience. It allows us to articulate with greater clarity what we are feeling and why: Am I hungry, or angry? How can I change this? It offers possibilities for us to invoke particular feelings based on certain thoughts, memories, and perceptions. Cromby extends this by suggesting that the linguistic component of inner speech can be dropped, leaving feeling-as-such still imbued with meaning, conceptual, and analytical potential - structures of feeling. Cromby (2007, p109) exemplifies

> What were previously logical sequences become feelings of ‘and’; what were discursive objections become feelings of ‘but’; what were previously expressions of puzzlement become feelings of ‘why’; and so on. Inner speech, then, is already feelingful, just as embodied feelings are already social.

Affective-discursive practices are also recurrently put to work in the virtual world of texts found online and in print where facial and body expression and movement cannot be directly read. Such spaces tend to draw on a greater emphasis of what Ahmed (2004b) determines as figures – the bogus asylum seeker, the terrorist, and the illegal immigrant, for example. Ahmed suggests that emotions operate in ways that stick figures together through histories of association. Figures of hate, such as the asylum seeker and the terrorist get stuck together building an economy of fear accruing affects that become read as the cause of our anger, and in ways that constitute them as a common threat we face. Put together, these cultural and
affective-discursive politics of fear have material implications in ways that enable the behaviour of some whilst restricting the movement of others.

While the virtual plays an increasingly common role in social life, (Stearns & Reddy, 2009, p.8) reminds us that “practice theory insists on drawing our eyes back down to earth, where human individuals are located and where, by taking action, they put structures as risk”. This point is particularly relevant to mediated spaces that are primarily based around text – for instance, various forms of print and online media. Indeed, despite taking the appearance of disembodied words-on-a-page, such sites always involve techniques that invite bodies to feel and act in particular ways at the expense of others, always carrying embodied meanings (Cromby, 2007). In this sense, words, language, discourse are thoroughly human, profoundly embodied.

**Pākehā Affective Privilege**

Recently, I was sat in the waiting room at the physiotherapist. Someone next to me was filling out a form. Half way through she offered a bemused reflection to the receptionist “I never know what to say when they ask me my ethnicity! Such an annoying, confusing question. I guess I’ll put down New Zealand European”. This small, seemingly inconsequential affective-discursive scene is revealing of the banal forms of Pākehā privilege affords in daily life. There is a particular kind of relationality established in this affective episode. The relationship between the person and their information form, the affective meaning made around the question based on past practices and racialised know-how, alongside the verbal utterance announcing to the room that she did not, in fact, know what to do with the question. The receptionist smiled. But no one replied. No one needed to. For while the on paper this may be read as genuine confusion and thus in need of a response or clarification, her intonation clearly suggested that it was faux confusion. Here, it was more a statement around the point and purpose of the question itself, putting to work common rhetoric deployed by Pākehā that ethnicity is irrelevant, or that ethnicity was not important, or that ‘we’ are exempt from ethnicity; that it was not for ‘us’ but for ‘others’ (DiAngelo, 2016). In the New Zealand context, this affective scene is ordinary. Indeed, as mentioned, no one replied. Her utterance did not call for a response. It was merely a lived part of the daily racialised affective climate, and of normalised privilege. It is a small reminder of one of the ways in which Pākehā hold entitlement to space, where one can boldly make claims about ‘how it is’ without second thought, and without challenge.
Some time ago a Pākehā friend was making a somewhat precarious U-turn on a road close to a corner. As he was half way through the series of moves, a Māori family came around the corner and crashed into him. A number of Pākehā people saw the incident, and swiftly attended to him, testifying that they saw the whole incident, and that they would be prepared to give a statement if he needed it. However, it was he who was clearly in the wrong, and he knew it. That said, the direction of sympathy and blame was automatically displaced. This could be read as an example of how economies of fear around Māori people, who are often figured as ‘dependent’, ‘lazy’, ‘violent’, and ‘criminal’ ‘drug abusers’ can be transformed into material advantages and opportunities for Pākehā such as avoiding higher insurance premiums or panel beater bills.

These two casually plucked examples note privilege’s entrenched, practiced, and everyday/ordinary nature. Here, ontologically secure feelings of comfort and homeliness form the ground from which the world is recurrently patterned into existence to favour Pākehā in various ways. In this thesis, the primary aim is to explore some of the affective dimensions of ethnic privilege in Aotearoa as evidenced in and around experiences of national commemoration. In this sense, I will be exploring what ordinary feelings accomplish as Pākehā engage with national days. I expect to find relatively consistent patterns in which Pākehā agents and institutions (re)produce, and at times disrupt received cultural requisites around issues of race and ethnicity. Pākehā affective privilege, as an ongoing, historically and culturally entrenched set of processes and practices (Borell et al., 2017) will reflect the more “stubbornly lodged and painfully unmovable” (Wetherell, 2012, p.23) dimensions of social practice. Affective privilege will often (but not always) be reminiscent of what William Reddy (2001) describes as rigid emotional regimes. Emotional regimes include broad sets of normative emotions, rituals, ideals, and practices people engage. An emotional regime is considered ‘rigid’ if the norms contained within it are clearly cut and quickly enforced by its society, and ‘loose’ if norms allow for emotional deviance. Indeed, here we will see both.

The inequitable distribution of outcomes for Pākehā and Māori, of which ethnic privilege plays a key role, means that the study of its affective dimensions requires moving beyond the simple explication of processes of felt privilege, and into a critical narration of the ways in which these are held in place, the histories of power distributions, and their implications (Wetherell, 2012). At this point, I want to remind the reader of the three central questions this thesis attempts to address. First, I ask
what are the common sense affective-discursive resources available to Pākehā New Zealanders for Waitangi Day and Anzac Day? Second, I ask what are the implications of these common sense resources in terms of what they accomplish for Pākehā agents? And lastly, I question what might be learnt for a critical politics of resistance at the interface of hegemonic common sense?

Methodology and Methods

As noted in the Introduction, this thesis formed part of a wider research project on *Affect, Wairua and National Days* supported by the Marsden Fund, administered by the Royal Society of New Zealand (contract MAU019). The research team consisted of Tim McCreanor, Margaret Wetherell, Angela Moewaka Barnes, Alex McConville, Te Raina Gunn and Jade Le Grice, led by Helen Moewaka Barnes as Principal Investigator. There were two PhD students, one Pākehā (myself), one Māori (Te Raina), both exploring affect and emotion from our respective cultural backgrounds. Te Raina used kaupapa Māori methods to explore affect and emotion from the perspective of Wairua (broadly meaning spirit), and I drew on recent western theorising on affect and emotion in critical social psychology (Wetherell, 2012) using qualitative modes of analysis. Keeping in mind the spirit of the Treaty of Waitangi, the team engaged in an ongoing conversation as to how we might approach national life in Aotearoa with respect to the varied affective standpoints espoused through Māori and Non-Māori understandings and practices around such days of commemoration and celebration.

The broad objective of the wider research project was to explore the affective politics evoked as people relate, engage and grapple with cultural observances and acts of remembrance in Aotearoa New Zealand. Overall, this project aimed to make two major contributions. Firstly, it sought to offer new analyses of ‘the state of the nation(s)’ in Aotearoa New Zealand from diverse Māori and non-Māori standpoints. We explored the meanings made and the practices engaged with around Waitangi Day and Anzac Day, investigating contemporary formations of national belonging, identity struggles, cultural relationships, and imaginings of community. Secondly, our project was one of the first pieces of social research to investigate affect, emotion and wairua in live social contexts. My particular contribution, as noted in the Introduction, was to recruit and collect the data from Pākehā participants and key informants and to develop empirical analyses in line with the project’s broader goals, focusing specifically on Pākehā affective privilege and its role in national commemoration.
In this chapter I discuss the methods we developed to conduct the research and which formed the basis for the analyses and arguments reported in this thesis. I first describe the methodological positioning employed. I follow this with a discussion on the range of analytical tools used. Next, I go into chapter-by-chapter detail in terms of the methods by which each piece of research was carried out. Lastly, I make some notes on ethics.

**Methodological Positioning**

This thesis is underpinned by a constructionist epistemology. While there is no single account as to how this may be defined, Gergen (1985) offers a number of key assumptions that form its basis. Positioned in opposition to positivism and empiricism, social constructionism takes a critical stance on conventional forms of knowledge that favour, for instance, so called ‘objective’ and ‘detached’ ways of investigating processes and phenomena and instead interrogates rather than accepts the way things appear to be. Social constructionism, in contrast to traditional psychological approaches, rejects essentialism and common sense ways of understanding human behaviour, and therefore rejects the positivist aspiration to define and discover a particular nature, or essence in a person or people. It similarly rejects realism as a primary form of knowing, and instead tends to view knowledge as something formed through social understanding and the ways in which it will serve particular interests over others.

It similarly takes into consideration the historically and culturally relative ways in which knowledge and meaning are produced and sustained by everyday social processes rather than neutral descriptions as to what reality ‘actually’ is (Foucault, 1972, 1977, 1980). As such, those of us who create and reproduce psychological knowledges in various ways are also bound by particular cultures and histories. Truth claims also become a product of reproduced cultural and historical relations, and the kinds of knowledges that are constituted as Truth are explored in terms of the ways in which they sustain and maintain certain forms of social action often to the exclusion of possible alternatives. From this perspective, psychological study then moves from the search for Truth, to developing theories and explanations as to why the current order is as it is, given the particular context within which it is reproduced.

Social constructionism avoids traditional psychological approaches that locate social qualities in and of the individual in terms of attitudes, behaviours and cognitions, yet is also wary of sociological positions that focus primarily on social structures and the
ways psychological phenomena emerge through them. Instead, social constructionism tends to focus on social practices that agents carry, negotiate, and perform, alongside the forms of interaction people engage in with each other (Reckwitz, 2002). Furthermore, the emphasis is not on what kinds of knowledge or truths people have, but what they do with them and how these actions are accomplished. Social constructionism also tends to avoid static concepts such as traits and structures, and instead focuses on processes, group dynamics and power.

Within these frames, language has long been a common way for researchers to explore the various ways in which culture, social order and everyday understandings are reproduced. Language reveals much about the normative ways in which people think, argue and make meaning by providing a framework for understanding and relating. As such, language moves beyond mere description of ‘reality’ or personal expression and into active construction and co-creation of a world, actively producing and reproducing forms of knowledge and systems of meaning rather than passively relaying information about ‘the way things are’. Language is thus seen as a form of doing; performative and action-orientated in ways that accomplish things in the world (Billig, 1996; D. Edwards & Potter, 1992; Potter & Wetherell, 1987).

Within a constructionist framework, I primarily draw on discourse analytical techniques and critical discursive psychology to inform my analytical understanding around the data gathered. A discourse refers to “a set of meanings, metaphors, representations, images, stories, statements and so on that in some way together produce a particular version of events” (Burr, 1995, p.32). Discourse analysis, while broad and varied in its scope (see Wetherell, Taylor, & Yates, 2001) examines what people do with their talk and the kinds of ends they are attempting to accomplish. Moving beyond attitudes and opinions typical of traditional psychology, discourse analysis recognises a discursive culture as the key site from which people draw on discourses to make meaning of events and phenomena. Informed through speech act theory, ethnomethodology and conversation analysis, discourse analysis concentrates on how accounts are put together and examines the particular interests they serve, as well as how rhetorical devices people draw upon are put to work (e.g., Billig, 1991, 1996). A particular innovation of this thesis, in accord with the scope of the wider project, is to draw affect and emotion into these frames in ways that foreground the simultaneous interplay of multiple modalities including the psychological and the social, the affective and the discursive, and private and public life as they are assembled in practice and examined within the context of broader
patterns and power struggles (Taylor, 2015; Wetherell, 2012). To engage with the affective-discursive, then, is to conceive of affect as a socially specific, embedded, situated, emergent and synchronous phenomenon (Taylor, 2015) rather than individualistic, universalistic, and determined (Wetherell et al., 2015). As an epistemic tool, the movement of affect becomes determinant of the meaning made and is often similarly dependent on relational ontologies (S. D. Brown & Stenner, 2009) which assist in the weaving of particular historical and immediate social and material contexts together alongside the biographical, generational and communal practices assembled in the episodic moment (Wetherell et al., 2015).

This thesis foregrounds the joint figuring of affect and discourse. I explore the intertwining of talk, action and emotion in the same general moment. To achieve this, I focus on what is culturally available, and the embodied meaning-making that emerges through the logic of social practice (e.g., Reckwitz, 2002; Schatzki, 2001). I go on to trace some of the implications for Māori and Pākehā relations. Here, embodied experience and coordinated, relational activity will always be bound up with an examination of the broader patterns of social relationship, value, and the moral order (Wetherell, 2013b).

The methodological focus for this thesis is primarily concerned with what we have termed the emotion canon. That is, the canonical, orthodox, taken-for-granted, clichéd, conventional, immediately familiar and mundane forms of normative common sense available which agents orient to in order to emote and draw meaning from their actions and positions (McCreanor et al., 2017; Wetherell et al., 2015). This relates primarily to the Pākehā experience and to hegemonic cultural projects that maintain and reproduce forms of colonial affective privilege. These forms of privilege can show up in numerous ways, such as involving feelings of entitlement to particular cultural and material resources, and having the discursive tools to justify access. Such privileges will always be tied to a broader context of colonisation and cultural power struggles to emote in certain ways, and will often comprise assumptions that particular ways of feeling are authoritative, obvious, and unquestionable – they simply are the way things are.

Analytical Tools

A number of analytical tools are employed at various places throughout the study. The first two analysis chapters primarily draw on the logic of interpretative repertoires and subject positions. Interpretative repertoires (Potter & Wetherell,
1987; Wetherell & Potter, 1988) are repeated characterisations and formulations of events and phenomena. As ‘repositories of meaning’, they refer to familiar, accessible and naturalised ways of discussing objects and occurrences using tropes, rhetoric, and metaphors that commit speakers to particular ways of making meaning and therefore aligning with and reproducing dominant ideologies (Edley, 2001, p.202).

Subject positions (Davies & Harré, 1990) denote the available identity possibilities on offer, and speaking positions constructed through text. Put together, interpretive repertoires offer particular ways of making meaning of the world alongside proposing and supporting positions and identities from which to speak. With reference to the current study, my core focus is on the kinds of emotional identities and forms of affect made available.

A third tool employed is the notion of ideological dilemmas. Developed by Billig et al. (1988), ideological dilemmas refer to “aspects of socially shared beliefs which give rise to the dilemmatic thinking of individuals” (Billig et al., 1988, p.8). They denote the ways in which common sense, “which, quite literally, is the sense commonly shared by a community” (Billig et al., 1988, p.13) offers contrary ‘either or’ conflicting themes which provide people with choices, and often generating confusion as each theme will contain some elements of truth and limitation. Opposition, through dilemma and disagreement, allows for the possibility of social thought. It allows for arguments to emerge within a particular form of common sense such that people can engage in debate around their shared common sense preference. Indeed, “if all elements of social belief were in complete harmony, and there were no possibility of ever confusing recklessness with courage, then there would be no possibility of arguing about such matters” (Billig et al., 1988, p.17). The dilemmatic nature of common sense allows for argument and deliberation, tying close together the nature of thinking and arguing. In Chapter Six I work with the affective and emotional dimensions of ideological dilemmas, with particular reference to agents who arrive in ideological fields with distinctly resistant positions. In this instance, affective dilemmas become counter hegemonic, yet play out within a field of negotiation, constantly moving between resistance and compliance.

At times I also draw on thematic analysis, a qualitative analytic data approach in which thematic patterns are located (Braun & Clarke, 2006). This involves selecting an epistemological position (mine, as noted above is constructionist), and is followed by becoming familiar with data over a number of readings and then coding it into groups that share similar features. In analysing each print media corpus, for instance,
data was inductively coded according to particular repetitions that came through in
the dataset – ‘flags’ for instance, was one piece of subject matter that came to
constitute a theme for Waitangi Day, and ‘honour’ become one of a number of themes
for Anzac Day. Video data were coded in similar ways, particularly moments in which
participants would engage in discussion with the interviewer, or based on numerous
affective repetitions put to work throughout the day. In other moments where
participants were engaged in activities specific to either national day, for the purposes
of this project, I focused on points where clear ideological dilemmas arose. Given the
nature of the data, I also coded for forms of embodiment and facial gesture, and took
into consideration power struggles agents were immersed in.

At times I also draw on a range of other tools to highlight some of the other affective
aspects of the data. Sara Ahmed’s (2004b) concepts of **figure** and **stickiness** will
both be of use here. Figure, may best be thought of as akin to figurines – statuesque,
captured in particular poses in easily distinguishable, culturally recognisable
representations of particular groups of people formed in ways that work to align social
actors with or in opposition to them. Ahmed uses examples of the figure of the terrorist
or asylum seeker. She argues that over time, as the proliferation of particular figures
progress, affect and emotion continues to circulate and accumulate greater degrees
to ‘stickiness’ of signs to bodies. Similarly, different figures get stuck together, such
as the asylum seeker as terrorist, based on past histories of association and accrue
particular affective resonances in these forms.

Benedict Anderson’s (1991) notion of **imagined communities** will also be helpful in
mapping and locating the terrain I’m interested in. Imagined communities, broadly
speaking, reference groups of people whom exist beyond those we meet in everyday
interaction in and around sites such as our neighbourhood or workplace and into often
vastly wider, human defined physical territories. Traditionally conceived of as nations,
these forms of community become known not through everyday sites and in person
contact as such, but rather due to the nature of the size of the group, and are instead
connected primarily by imagination, through the print media for instance, outside the
traditional bounds of space and time.

Lave and Wenger’s (1991) concept of **community of practice** is another tool that will
be of assistance. They suggest that learning moves beyond being quite simply a
cognitive skill where knowledge is acquired, and extend the concept into taking place
in terms of peoples’ practical engagements in accessible communities of practice
such as boy scouts, support groups, or language classes. Over time a community of
practice is reproduced through gradated induction and socialisation. Here, people involved in the ongoing learning and practice of activities related to their particular community interest develop greater levels of expertise and degrees of skilful coordination, where particular identities, subjectivities and emotionalities are constituted.

Ian Burkitt’s (2013) notion of patterns of relationship argues that emotions ought to be studied as complexes where they are at once corporeal, embodied and socio-culturally assembled. Emotions become multi-dimensional in their constitution and constitutive of a social habitus (Burkitt, 1997). Burkitt argues that emotions are meaningful only in relations to others – I become angry, for instance, because of a particular object - human or otherwise - behaving in a way I do not like (see also, Ahmed (2004b) on the ‘aboutness’ of emotions). Emotions become expressed in expected ways depending on the particular relational context. As such, opportunities for descent or subversion in an interactional climate of affective privilege will be limited. Even for those who carry oppositional forms of embodied know-how, dissent will always be negotiated alongside hegemony, in multiple ways.

**Methods**

In order to achieve the objectives of the project and thesis, a range of qualitative methods were deployed with a wide range of samples. They included media analyses, semi-structured interviews with both Waitangi Day and Anzac Day key informants, semi-structured focus group interviews, and haerenga kitea or ‘go along’ interviewing that involved accompanying participants as they experience commemorative occasions, using audio-visual recording techniques. What follows are brief descriptions including some of the key details in each phase.

The broad approach I take to analysis of data uses what could be described as an affective-discursive method. As the term suggests, an affective-discursive analysis seeks to study when, how and why particular forms of language are put to work, forms of which are often primarily spoken or written but can also include active physical expression, whilst simultaneously observing embodiment and the affective meaning-making made by, or intended for, people. Language and embodiment are both conceived as historically accrued, constructed, and situated, yet are an always open, unfixed, and flexible set of cultural resources agents draw upon in ways that often, but not always, remake cultural common sense and shared knowledges of social life (Edley, 1995).
The approach taken to discourse and affect within this thesis view both as semiotic, relational practice, wherein affect is accessed through familiar forms of analysis available in the social psychological study of discourse (McAvoy, 2015). To include affective and emotional life into an analysis is not to assume we have or are trying to access the ‘true’ feelings or experiences a participant or agent experiences. Rather, whatever is reported or observed around one’s feelings, experiences and beliefs is, like traditional discursive practices, read as constructions of particular version of events formulated within the particular context where certain values, practices, and processes flourish, drawing on received wisdom and ongoing debates and positioned within relations of power (Taylor, 2015).

In Chapter Three, ‘Hostility won’t deter me, says PM’ The Print Media, the Production of Affect, and Waitangi Day’, I draw on a corpus of 69 print media articles published over the three days in the lead up to the 6th of February 2013, alongside those published on Waitangi Day itself. Using thematic analysis to inductively group data, 16 articles discussed local events and commemorations around the country, two discussed flags, six focused on a pub crawl in London, and five focused on predictions about what would happen on Waitangi Day. On Waitangi Day itself, 11 articles discussed the politics of the day, five discussed ‘granny gate’ which referred to an incident with key Māori activist Titewhai Harawira, four discussed then Prime Minister John Key promising to return to Waitangi (despite the hostility), ten focused on particular commemorative events, and four focused on then Labour leader David Shearer’s vision for Waitangi Day.

In Chapter Four, ‘Imagining an Emotional Nation: The Print Media and Anzac Day Commemorations in Aotearoa New Zealand’, I draw on a corpus of 77 articles published four days in the lead up to the 25th of April, as well as on the day itself and one day subsequent. Articles were included that discussed Anzac Day and its related issues. Again, a thematic analysis was used to code the main themes covered. Here, six focused on the poppy, seven focused on preparations at Gallipoli, 6 dealt with the management of dissenting views, seven focused on Anzac Day sports matches, 11 focused on community preparation around the day, 12 discussed Anzac Day in general, 14 primarily looked at the day’s patriotism, 12 made a point of the services being successful occasions, and two were critical of the day.

In Chapter Five, ‘Pissed Off and Confused, Grateful and Removed: Affect, Privilege, and National Commemoration in Aotearoa New Zealand’ I draw on qualitative data obtained from eight semi structured focus group interviews. Each focus group was
filmed to capture verbal and non-verbal affective performances. I asked a range of questions focusing on how participants are positioned emotionally around national days in Aotearoa New Zealand, where focus was primarily placed on Waitangi Day and Anzac Day respectively. The semi-structured focus allowed for probing into further items of interest as and when they presented themselves, and often went on to cover topics such as identity, nation, culture and community with particular reference to affect and emotion. I asked a range of questions once for Waitangi Day and again for Anzac Day. The order in which each day was discussed changed from group to group. Focus group data was transcribed in part by myself and in part by independent contractors, paying attention to participants’ responses to each other’s contributions and the questions presented. With reference to the chapter noted here, and akin to the media corpus process, I coded the data into themes that captured some of the means in which participants drew on aspects of the emotion canon in ways that put privilege to work. In selecting themes for Waitangi Day and Anzac Day, and taking space limitations into consideration, I focused on the most prominent themes that came through on each day. From here I put together an argument which attempted to exemplify how the four major themes work together to reproduce ethnic advantage.

A total of 34 participants spread across eight focus groups were recruited based on snowballing methods. Some groups shared friendship and neighbourly networks, and some were occupational. Of these, 25 identified as female (73.5%) and 9 male (26.5%). Ages ranged from 21 to 76. Ethnically, 73.5% of the participants identified as Pākehā/New Zealand European/Kiwi, 8.9% Samoan 5.8 %, Korean, 8.9% Māori and 2.9% European. Geographic regions in Aotearoa New Zealand represented included the greater Auckland (61.7%), and Waikato regions (38.3%). Participants each received a $30 supermarket voucher upon completion. Aside from the participants in one focus group comprised of pro-Treaty academics, who opted to use their given names, participants all used pseudonyms. Alongside audio recording, focus group sessions were also filmed.

In Chapter Six, ‘Defrosting the Deep Freeze and Other Untold Anzac Day Stories: Feeling Politics, Affective Dilemmas, and Quiet Activism’ I draw on Haerenga Kitea interviewing (Carpiano, 2009) and Photovoice (V. Jensen, Kaiwai, McCreanor, & Moewaka Barnes, 2006). This method involves filming participants as they join in Anzac Day events, or follow them doing whatever it is they decide to do on the day. Filming participation allows for the exploration of verbal and non-verbal affective
performances and communications, and their varying levels of response and engagement. It also allows the person conducting the record to stand back and film at appropriate times, observing the participant immersed in events and activities. Participants were free to request that particular moments were recorded or ask for others not to be, to capture material themselves, or simply request to stop videoing as and when they preferred. This allowed participants to actively participate in and experience the event with little intrusion and provided data that reflected both participant and researcher perceptions. Participants were free to engage in conversations with the researcher and offer commentaries as and when they wished. The data in this particular chapter draws on three Haerenga Kitea records derived from a corpus of 15 gathered on Anzac Day conducted with Māori and non-Māori populations. The three chosen involved Pākehā participants each carrying a collection of critical takes and embodied experiences of and towards the day.

Data has also been collected that has not been used directly in this project, but has played a role in informing directions and perspectives for the thesis in general. Members of the research team also collectively gathered 16 haerenga kitea for Waitangi Day with Māori and non-Māori populations recruiting from broad personal networks, and advertisements in local newspapers. These were collected by myself and members of the wider team (Helen Moewaka Barnes, Margaret Wetherell, Tim McCreanor, Belinda Borell, Angela Moewaka Barnes, Te Raina Gunn and Jade le Grice) and three contracted researchers (Danjel Hall, Jennifer Liu and Tuiloma Lina Samu).

Furthermore, I travelled to Waitangi to collect key informant interview data with the Waitangi Day Governance Group. This group consisted of a range of actors that come together to organise the celebrations at the Waitangi grounds in Waitangi. Together, they manage everything from parking, to recycling, to food and entertainment. These governance meetings included representatives from: Navy, Police, Security, Government, Fire Services, District Council, Iwi liaisons, Māori Wardens, Ngati Hine Health, Te Puni Kōkiri, Mai Pewhairangi Waka, Rotary, Entertainment, Stalls, and Ground Organisation. I conducted interviews with six key informants, including the Waitangi Trust CEO, entertainment coordinator, two stall organisers, recycling manager, and Navy representative. For Anzac Day, I interviewed two key informants in Wellington, one manager for heritage projects at the Ministry for Culture and Heritage and a project manager from the WW1 Commemoration Programme. Like the focus groups, interviews were semi-structured, and based on a range of guiding
questions, with associated probes and follow up questions deployed as and when necessary for clarification, further reflection, and greater insight.

In total, across contributions from the team, there are 67 records for this project collected around various locations on Te Ika-a-Maui. These include 15 Anzac Haerenga, 16 Waitangi Haerenga, 17 Key Informant Interviews (including interviews conducted by Te Raina), 14 Focus Group Interviews (which includes interviews conducted by Te Raina) and 7 Autoethnographic Observations.

Figure 1: distribution of data collection

Ethics

Ethical approval was granted from the Massey University Ethics Committee. All Participants were informed of their right to decline to answer any question, to withdraw from the study at any time within 1 month from the interview, to ask any questions about the study at any time, to ask for the audio recorder to be turned off at any time during the interview, and to be provided with an opportunity to view images and make any amendments they saw fit within a timeframe provided by the researcher. Participants were also offered the right to opt out of having sound recorded, images recorded, and having data placed in an official archive. All participants were assured their data would be kept confidential. As such, participants’ names were replaced with suitable pseudonyms on transcripts. Records were kept in a secure location on university premises and on password protected hard drives if they were ever
transported. Focus group and key informant participants were each provided with a $30 koha in the form of the voucher upon competition. Haerenga Kitea participants were given a $50 koha in the form of a voucher upon completion.
Prior to this project, I never paid too much attention to Waitangi Day – I never really had to. Being Pākehā, and rarely associating with Māori meant I could quite easily get by without needing to do, think through, or be challenged around critical issues in ways that necessarily involved Māori. Similarly, never being one to enjoy or appreciate commemorative events, it was easy to overlook Waitangi Day. Furthermore, I have no recollection of learning about it in school, nor discussing it with anyone known to me. At best, it would culminate in a conversation that may have gone something like this:

Person: Ok, Alex, well I’ll see you on Tuesday
Me: Not Monday?
Person: Public holiday on Monday
Me: Oh!
Person: Yeah, Waitangi Day
Me: Ah, Okay. See you Tuesday

If I were asked to describe the day, the first things to come to mind might have been typical mainstream media narratives and discourse. Drawing on that, I would probably mention something around how each year there are protests at Waitangi around various Treaty issues that the government were ignoring, and how typically it would unravel into some kind of brawl. Māori would be angry that no one listened, Pākehā would be disappointed that the day was marred, and everyone would go home dissatisfied.

However, from the little I did know, Waitangi Day was a clearly charged and emotional day. As such, it was precisely why when entering into a project on affect, emotion and national days, Waitangi Day became an obvious choice to begin an investigation, to enter a conversation. Like most other Pākehā, if there were anything I knew about Waitangi Day, it was probably with thanks to the mainstream media (Rankine et al., 2008). The print media, in particular, would also be a useful site from which text could be accessed for analysis with relative ease. It would similarly allow for the development of an affective-discursive approach, where discourse and emotion are
theorised to work in synchrony and treated equally beyond binaries (Wetherell, 2013a).

Materials from this chapter were presented at The Sociological Association of Aotearoa New Zealand (SAANZ) conference in late 2013, in Auckland, New Zealand as well as the inaugural Social Movements, Resistance and Social Change in New Zealand workshop held in Palmerston North, New Zealand in August 2014. I gave a similar presentation to the Psychology and Social Issues Group at Auckland University and I thank those in attendance at each meeting for their encouraging feedback and critique. This chapter was submitted as a paper to Sites: A Journal of Social Anthropology and Cultural Studies. It was published in December, 2014.

McConville, A., Wetherell, M., McCreanor, T., & Barnes, H. M. (2014). ‘Hostility won’t deter me, says PM’: the print media, the production of affect and Waitangi Day. Sites: a journal of social anthropology and cultural studies, 11(2), 132-149.
Chapter Three: ‘Hostility Won’t Deter Me Says PM’: The Print Media, the Production of Affect and Waitangi Day.

Abstract

This paper explores affect, discourse and emotion in national life. We focus on the print media's use of Waitangi Day as an affective-discursive distribution channel maintaining and reinforcing the hegemony of settler culture. Applying new thinking around affect, we consider how the cultural production of emotion in print media privileges settler identity, whilst simultaneously devaluing indigenous struggle. One hegemonic interpretive repertoire is discussed; that 'Waitangi Day is a day of conflict.' Two subordinate repertoires are juxtaposed against this: that it should be 'a day of celebration' and that it should be 'a day of conversation.' We argue that these repertoires and their associated affective-discursive positions encourage readers to move into episodes of pejorative affect directed towards Māori 'ruining the day.' Productive engagement with biculturalism requires a broader and deeper range of affective-discursive resources. Popular journalism fails its readers and limits debate through its narrow modelling of the emotional experiences Waitangi Day might evoke.

Keywords: Waitangi Day; media representations; affect and emotion; positions and repertoires; emotional capital

Waitangi Day is a key moment in the national life of Aotearoa New Zealand and a crucial focal point in (re)presenting ourselves to ourselves. Its commemoration performs the everyday ‘banal nationalism’ (Billig, 1995) central to the formation and maintenance of national identity (Liu et al., 2005). In the context of New Zealand’s colonial history, Waitangi Day illuminates patterns of inclusion and exclusion, the nature of the relationships between Treaty partners, imaginings of community (Benedict Anderson, 1991), and contemporary formations of identity and wellbeing. To date, researchers have investigated the politics and history of Waitangi (Kawharu, 1989; Orange, 1987), modes of commemoration and their functions and effects (McAllister, 2007, 2012; P. Richards & Ryan, 2004), and media representations of Waitangi events and histories (Abel, 1997). This article builds on
and extends this body of work focusing particularly on the emotion and affect of Waitangi Day. We explore the print media’s narration of the emotional possibilities for citizens and the characteristic affective-discursive practices found in newspaper accounts of this particularly intensified moment in national life.

The mainstream media aim to inform the public of both local matters and cultural issues (Hodgetts, Masters, & Robertson, 2004). In doing so, they play a central role in the construction of intergroup relations (Livingstone, 1999). As Abel and her colleagues have demonstrated (Abel, 1997; Abel, McCreanor, & Moewaka Barnes, 2012), the media have been especially important in the shaping of the agenda for Waitangi Day and people’s understandings of the Treaty. Media practice has long been criticised as a site where settler ideology is privileged and Māori perspectives are marginalised (Borell et al., 2009; McCreanor, 1993; A. Moewaka Barnes et al., 2012; Nairn et al., 2012). As we will demonstrate, these processes play out also in the affective orderings around Waitangi Day. We argue that Waitangi Day becomes an affective-discursive distribution channel shaped by the media in a way that maintains and reinforces the hegemony of settler culture. Our argument is based on the analysis of a corpus of newspaper articles collected around Waitangi Day in 2013. In discussing our findings we consider the limitations of the affective-discursive resources newspapers present to readers and in particular how these restrict the emotional capital required for citizens to engage in biculturalism.

Waitangi and National Life

Te Tiriti o Waitangi commemorated on Waitangi Day recognises the agreement signed in 1840 providing British subjects with the right to settle in Aotearoa, as well as granting Māori the right to become British subjects (Orange, 1987). The process of treaty making was complicated in this case by the relative importance of oral explanations of the text and the existence of contradictory versions of the document in Te Reo and English. Te Tiriti, written in Te Reo, which most Māori signed, stated that they would retain sovereignty over their rights to resources and land, while in the English version sovereignty was to be ceded to the British Crown (Kawharu, 1989).

Contemporary New Zealand emerged through the process of colonisation opened up by Te Tiriti o Waitangi where settlers quickly became the main beneficiaries of possible interpretations of this agreement. The rapid influx of British nationals and other Europeans after 1840 led to a population majority a decade later. With this, new sets of
laws, beliefs, and practices, including settler self-government based on the English Acts Act (M. Durie, 2005, p.2), were laid down. The national culture came to be dominated by the normative power of settler culture (Bell, 2009). Despite the expression of partnership and bicultural equity underpinned by Te Tiriti o Waitangi, power and privilege remain with the coloniser and extend into interpersonal relations, societal norms, and institutional practices reproducing a society developed by and for settlers (H Moewaka Barnes et al., 2014). The hegemony of settler cultural and social practices continues to afford non-indigenous citizens a range of benefits such as greater economic advantages, better health prospects, and a higher social status (Bell, 2006). And, citizens today find themselves continuing to negotiate ideological worldviews that have supported colonial domination and the notion that settlers are culturally superior. As Tuhiai Smith (1999) argues, these work to afford Pākehā the privilege to pass over the racist and destructive origins of their settler society, and ignore the resultant comprehensive contemporary disparities between Treaty partners (H Moewaka Barnes et al., 2014).

The ongoing tension between Māori and Pākehā over the meaning and status of Te Tiriti is often reflected in the nature of Waitangi Day itself. Observed on 6 February each year, it is formally described as the day in which New Zealand commemorates the signing of Te Tiriti o Waitangi by Māori chiefs and representatives of the British Crown (Orange, 1987). However, like Te Tiriti itself, the meaning of the day is contested. While for some it has become a time for commemorating loss, others characterise it as a day of conflict and thus offering nothing to celebrate. Still others remain indifferent and see it quite simply as a day off work.

The positions people currently take up reflect the range of reactions foregrounded at different periods in the last 174 years. The middle part of the 20th century, beginning in 1938, for instance, saw large annual commemorations, with the day portrayed as steadily increasing in popularity after the Queen of England’s visit in 1953 (O'Malley, Stirling, & Penetito, 2010). These events were celebratory in nature guided by a politics of cultural assimilation evident in the concept that ‘we are one harmonious nation.’ In contrast, the late 1970s and early 1980s saw Waitangi Day highlighted as a key site for protest and dissent. This helped to establish the day as a platform for critical discussions around Māori and Pākehā relations (Orange, 1987). Certainly, woven through this history, and in people’s hearts and minds, is the demand that Waitangi Day be felt as something. There are many embodied possibilities: quiet reminiscence, patriotism, empathy, release, guilt, indifference, apathy, pride, anger,
resentment, anguish, joy, pain, etc. Our questions are: which responses do the print media privilege and what emotions do they routinely attribute to which social actors?

The Mainstream Media as an Affective-discursive Distribution Channel

For information around Tiriti issues, the media is cited as a main source (UMR Research Limited., 2004). This emphasises the pivotal role media plays and the ethical and political responsibilities involved. Previous research in New Zealand suggests that said responsibilities are often ignored. Māori, for instance, are regularly characterised in a wide range of disparaging ways such as being intrinsically violent and primitive, to being the cause of their own predicament (McCreanor, 1993; A. Moewaka Barnes et al., 2012; Nairn et al., 2012). A commonly media constructed figure (Ahmed, 2010), for instance, is of the unreasonable Māori stirrer, understood as immoderate, irrationally motivated by anger rather than legitimate grievance, and extremist for the sake of it. This figure is often contrasted with a normative standard set by an imagined ordinary ‘Kiwi New Zealander’ – a convenient masking label from which settler norms, practices, and perspectives are privileged and enacted (A. Moewaka Barnes et al., 2012). (See also Dominy (1995) and Pearson and Sissons (1997) for discussions of settler identity, the range of nomenclature and its significations).

We begin to see the relevance of what Heaney (2011, p.272) calls the ‘hidden history of emotions’ to understanding both the play of power in New Zealand society and the media’s broad ideological role. As Heaney argues, given the centrality of the distinction between emotion and reason, or passion and objectivity in Western thought, less attention has been given to the connections between emotion and power. Heaney urges scholars to place increased emphasis on ‘how emotions are implicated in the manufacture of consent in societies, and on the emotional bases of social order’ (Heaney, 2011, p.271).

Political scientist David Ost draws attention to the degree in which frustration and discontent are stitched into the fabric of social life as a consequence of economic inequality, the lack of perceived distributive justice and prejudiced meritocracy. As a result ‘anger is built into politics through the everyday activities of political parties, which continually both stoke and mobilize anger in order to gain and maintain support’ (Ost, 2004, p.230). Similarly, Pantti and Wahl-Jorgensen (2011) suggest that over time journalists have moved from being primarily neutral observers of events such as
disasters to becoming more actively engaged in social and political processes through the increasingly apparent manufacture of morally charged stories evoking strong emotion. Journalists now more readily offer personalised views, and increasingly speak for the public.

B. Richards and Rees (2011) invite us to imagine news gathering as a pump, distributing a flow of affect that begins with agents of the media and ends with consumers of their product. They note the many sites through which the emotions related to selected news items travel. As the process unfolds, emotions are felt, shared, worked through and distributed in various ways. Journalists deal with their direct experience of events, their own feelings towards the contexts and the histories of these events, and how audiences might respond to their views. They work within an economic paradigm in which competition for consumer attention is of utmost importance, and thus ‘the most profitable stream is found in material with the strongest emotional content, especially if it points to danger or loss’ (B. Richards & Rees, 2011, p.854).

Affective-discursive Practice

It is clear that media deliver to their audiences not just a cognitive or intellectual experience but also an emotional one, and that the kinds of emotions on offer for national events such as Waitangi Day will be bound up with broader power relations, the politics of biculturalism, and the wider cultural projects of Pākehā settler society. But to study affect and emotion in the print media, some account is needed of affect itself and how it might be accessed and studied. This is no easy matter given that much recent scholarship in the social sciences follows Thrift’s (2004) non-representational theory which conceives affect as a non-verbal, pre-personal, extra-discursive force.

Here, we follow Wetherell’s (2012, 2013a) argument that embodied responses to events and meaning-making occur in synchrony. Drawing on contemporary psychobiology and neuroscience, she suggests that there is no non-representational moment in affect. Rather, being affected by events and registering these affects as specific kinds of emotional experiences is a multi-layered process in which body/brain processes intertwine with personal histories, discourses and culturally available ways of making sense, and intertwine also with larger-scale social histories and the material organisation of spaces and contexts.
Wetherell argues that this entangled flow produces relatively ordered patterns and social practices, and she suggests that these can be studied directly in episodes of social action (For similar arguments, see Burkitt, 2013; Reckwitz, 2012; Reddy, 2001). The implication is that examining the print media might disclose some regular ways of emoting and of narrating the process of being affected. It might disclose the emotion canon, or feeling norms print media present to the nation and the types of emoting actors who are privileged. The study of text and discourse can thus expand to include emotion registers and affective-discursive practices. This is not to say, of course, that the transmission of an ideologically inflected emotion canon is always successful and that all readers of a newspaper article will feel the same emotions. Readers and citizens are not emotionally unsophisticated and a variety of affective responses and practices will be relevant on any particular occasion. But, the sustained and repeated development of particular emotion canons and affective-discursive positions in newspapers will have an impact on what comes to be seen as the usual and expected emotions for national events like Waitangi Day, and is likely to influence the kinds of emotional reactions which become seen as accountable, in need of justification, and as deviant. These dimensions of national emotional life, which have been neglected in existing research, are our focus.

To delve into the emotion canon around Waitangi, we apply a range of analytic concepts derived from discourse studies in social psychology (Edley, 2001; Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Wetherell & Potter, 1992). We aim, for instance, to identify the main interpretative repertoires in a sample of the print media and their affective dimensions. Interpretative repertoires (Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Wetherell & Potter, 1988) are repeated characterisations and formulations of events and phenomena. Like steps in a dance they are made up of familiar argumentative sequences, metaphors, tropes and rhetoric. We also seek to identify the main subject positions on offer in media texts and their affective valence and character. Subject positions (Davies & Harré, 1990) refer to the identity possibilities, voices and speaking positions a text constructs. An interpretative repertoire very frequently formulates, for instance, not just a way of understanding the world but also a position from which to speak which affords the speaker a particular kind of character. In this case we are interested in the emotional identities and forms of affect on offer.

The corpus developed for this analysis focuses on one year – 2013 – and includes 69 articles from a survey of national and regional newspapers. All articles were included that discussed issues around Waitangi Day, published over the three days in
the lead up to 6 February 2013, along with those published on Waitangi Day itself. An analysis of the main topics covered in these articles found that, prior to Waitangi Day, six discussed the then Leader of the Labour Party David Shearer’s vision for Waitangi Day, 16 discussed local events and commemorations around the country, two discussed flags, six revolved around a pub crawl in London, and five articles made predictions about what would happen on Waitangi Day. On 6 February itself, 11 articles discussed the politics of the day, five discussed ‘granny gate’—an incident with prominent Māori activist Titewhai Harawira—four discussed Prime Minister John Key promising to return to Waitangi, ten discussed particular commemorative events, and four discussed Labour leader David Shearer’s vision for Waitangi Day.

To illustrate the repertoires and positions found in our analysis of this corpus and their affective-discursive patterning, we will focus on sequences in two specimen articles chosen because they are representative of the recurring regularities we found across the corpus. These are an article titled ‘Hostility won’t deter me, says PM’, published in the *Taranaki Daily News* on 6 February 2013 (Ewing, 2013), and an article titled ‘Day marred by rancour and ill feeling’, published on the same day in *The Timaru Herald* (Burrows, 2013). These will be supplemented with extracts from a range of other articles. Our presentation of this material is organised around a central contrast deployed in the majority of news items that focus on Waitangi Day at the national level. Here, Waitangi Day is primarily presented as a day of conflict (91 percent). Of the stories revolving around conflict, 39 percent of articles suggest the day should be one of celebration, 10 percent of articles suggest it should be a day of conversation, and 35 percent discuss aspects of both. What affective-discursive trajectories does this motif set in motion?

**Waitangi Day is ‘a Day of Conflict’**

The kind of conflict media focus on is protest action and dissent enacted by Māori people. Conflict, as mentioned earlier, is a staple in Western news reporting, and even more so in the contexts of contestation found in settler societies (Abel et al., 2012). We begin with the headline from the article in the *Taranaki Daily News* and its affective-discursive affordances.

*Hostility won’t deter me, says PM* (Ewing, Taranaki Daily News, 2013)

This headline establishes an affective-discursive position of courage (self)-assigned to Prime Minister John Key. The overarching repertoire, ‘day of conflict’, is evoked
through the use of the single word ‘hostility’ and sets the back-drop for the ensuing article. This categorisation effortlessly calls into focus the repeatedly reproduced, news gathering notion that Māori are particularly disruptive and menacing subjects on Waitangi Day (Abel, 1997; Rankine et al., 2008). Readers who can identify with (feel into) the affective-discursive position constructed for and by Key are rewarded with an affective platform of stability, strength, and safety offered by the state through the media. From here, the reader is welcome to feel into other affects such as righteous indignation directed at the figure of hostile and menacing Māori.

Of course, the particular regime of truth (Foucault, 1980) and the associated emotional thrust with which the article begins do not necessarily have to be picked up by the reader. Headlines are, however, powerful shortcuts summarising what is about to follow (Andrew, 2007) and as such, the cascade of affect that is set in motion will be in relation to what is read, be it resistance, acceptance, or otherwise. Other headlines in our corpus evoke similar themes.

‘I’ll keep turning up’, vows PM (Day, The Dominion Post, 2013)

‘I will be back’ PM tells elders (New Zealand Herald, 2013)

Waitangi Day tension (Tirikatene, Southland Times, 2013)

Rivals in scrap to escort Key (Laird, Northern Advocate, 2013)

Throughout the corpus it is evident that whatever paper of the day the reader comes into contact with they are likely to be swept into images of Māori attacking government officials, ‘quarrelling’ amongst themselves, and generally stirring up ‘rancour’ and ‘ill feeling’ (Burrows, 2013). Given that much of this material is actually published in advance of Waitangi Day itself and in advance of any actual events on the day, the ‘prepared’ and routine nature of this affective-discursive script can be seen. In years that depart from this script, the story often becomes that: ‘This year there is no story.’

Our focal Taranaki Daily News (Ewing, 2013) article continues after its headline as follows:

1. Despite Titewhai Harawira’s attempt to steal the show at Waitangi, Prime Minister John Key has vowed he will continue to attend celebrations there regardless of the reception he receives.
2. Threats of yet another disturbance, this time over whether Mrs Harawira would be allowed to escort him on to Te Tii Marae, descended into farce yesterday.

3. But Mr Key said no matter how hostile the reception was, he would always be there as long as he was prime minister.

4. “I'll keep turning up, you decide how you use it,” he told iwi leaders in his speech at Waitangi's lower marae.

The article begins by drawing on and reminding readers of the media focus that played out in the days leading up to Waitangi Day, 2013, a dispute between Ngapuhi elders and prominent Māori activist Titewhai Harawira, around who would lead distinguished guests on to the marae at Waitangi. In the excerpt above, Harawira is positioned as ‘stealing the show’. The use of this theatrical idiom suggests a lack of authenticity and sincerity in her actions. It takes its place within the collage of coverage around the time in which she is variously described as a ‘bully’ whose ‘culture is based around media coverage and radicalism’ (Northern Advocate, 2013) and as a ‘threat to the undisturbed celebration of Waitangi Day’ (The Press, 2013). In contrast to the characterisation of Key as a courageous politician, Harawira is positioned as a menacing Māori – a carnivalesque figure. She has become what Ahmed (2004b) would describe as a ‘sticky’ subject: a site for intensifying negative affect and emotion around issues that involve Māori and Pākehā relations. Particularly in 2013, these kinds of pejorative affects stuck to Harawira but are part of a larger media strategy built up over time – put quite simply, that news about Māori is bad news (Nairn et al., 2012). In contrast to Harawira’s link with ‘farce’, Key is positioned as not just courageous but also as steady, willing and consistent (‘I'll keep turning up’). The article continues.

1. Mr Key questioned the legacy that violent protests left for Waitangi Day and local iwi, Ngapuhi.

2. ‘If they want to do what they did to me last year, shout me down and not give me a chance to speak, fair enough. But that just doesn't take us anywhere’ he said.
3. ‘If you want to let a bunch of thugs jump around with bull horns we are not going to go anywhere,’ he said referring to his assault by the Popata brothers in 2009.

4. ‘How will history judge me? I think as courageous, because I will keep coming back’ he said.

The positioning of Harawira as menacing is extended to wider Māori dissent in general (in extracts 5 and 6) which works to further justify hegemonic readings that Māori are the sole source of conflict. Across the corpus and in media representations of Waitangi more generally (see Abel, 1997), formulations of Māori protest are overtly ahistorical and decontextualised. Again, the affective-discursive positions assigned to Māori protesters as violent, hostile, irrational, and lacking control and consideration contrast with Key’s self-positioning as courageous. Interestingly, these affective-discursive formulations tend to individualise Key as a particular kind of person rather than positioning him as an agent for a collective, or through his role as head of the government. Across the corpus, Key, in contrast to iwi leaders, is given the space to articulate feeling and define appropriate emotion through extensive quotation, deployed without question or critical reflection. This affective patterning legitimises, privileges, and reinforces a particular view, whilst denying the affective validity of both Māori and those dissatisfied with an unjust Tiriti relationship.
Waitangi Day Should be ‘a Day of Celebration’ / Should be ‘a Day of Conversation’

The overarching interpretive repertoires throughout the corpus juxtapose the notion that Waitangi Day is a day of conflict against the claim that Waitangi Day should be a day of celebration, and that it should be a day of conversation.

1. *It's Waitangi day, New Zealand's national day, a day where Kiwis get together to amicably celebrate our nationhood. Yeah right* (Burrows, *The Timaru Herald*, 2013)

The excerpt above, this time from our second focal article in *The Timaru Herald* also published on 6 February 2013, draws on the ironical trope, ‘Yeah right’, the advertising slogan of brewery *Tui*. The distance between Waitangi Day and amicable national celebration is emphasised. Again, little context is given in the rest of the article as to why this might be the case. The use of the category ‘Kiwis’ here does subtle work to deny the heterogeneity of beliefs and values held by different cultural groups, while privileging settler perspectives. The sarcasm of ‘Yeah right,’ along with the term ‘Kiwi’ constructs a frustrated but stoical national collective. Kiwis are realists but they are missing out on what should occur – an ideal national day in which celebratory rituals, theatrical ceremonies, and widespread festivities carry on uninterrupted. It is this kind of affecting tension between what should be the case and what is the case that in part gives the media coverage its ideological clout. We, ‘Kiwis', are forever wishing to celebrate ‘our' national day yet we are continually ‘denied' such satisfaction. *The Timaru Herald* continues:

2. *Overseas visitors must be shocked to see the way Kiwis appear to 'celebrate' their national day. It's certainly in sharp contrast to other countries’ national celebrations.*

This dissatisfaction that our national day is not a day of celebration is further reinforced. The journalist stresses the hit of ‘shock’ that foreign visitors may experience when they realise that Waitangi Day is not an example of unity, celebration, and enjoyment—characteristics attributed to the national days of other countries. Subsequent thought might question this, including reflection on Australia’s national day which similarly features indigenous dissent alongside media dismissal of
that dissent (Banerjee, 2000), but in the affective moment conjured by the newspaper article it is the sense of ‘missing out’ compared to others which becomes most dominant.

In the newspaper corpus, conflict and its notional opposite, celebration, are triangulated with a third possibility: conversation. Our focal Taranaki Daily News article reports Key applying these three affective-discursive states making short rhetorical work of bicultural relations in Aotearoa New Zealand.

3. ‘If we want this to be a day of celebration we have to demonstrate that we are big enough to talk about the issues, even if we can’t agree on them’.

Key engages with the notion that Waitangi Day should be a celebration, suggesting that to reach this goal Waitangi Day needs to become a day of conversation. Dialogue here is set up as an obvious good thing and as emotionally demanding. Those who do engage in conversation are admirable because they are ‘big enough’. Key, by implication, is ‘big enough’. Māori might retort that their requests for cordial dialogue around important matters over the last 174 years have frequently gone unanswered by Pākehā.

What is also clear is the normative framing. Activism formulated as ‘violent protest’ is not a legitimate expression of dissatisfaction (see also Abel, 1997). In describing both parties as needing to ‘demonstrate’ that they are ‘big enough,’ Key can be read as infantilising Māori. The forms of affective privilege we have tried to illustrate here are generally reinforced throughout the corpus. In our focal Taranaki Daily News article, Māori are continually spoken for (‘If we want this to be a day of celebration’). Māori are continually spoken at (‘if you want to let a bunch of thugs jump around with bullhorns’). Māori are continually told what they are doing wrong (‘Shout me down and not give me a chance to speak, fair enough. But that just doesn’t take us anywhere’). And, Māori are continually told how to behave (‘we have to demonstrate that we are big enough to talk about the issues, even if we can’t agree on them’).

In contrast to PM John Key who suggests it is conversation that will move us from conflict to celebration, David Shearer (then Labour Party leader) suggests that the tension can be resolved by dropping politics, and thus conflict, from the agenda altogether.
4. Too often discord has defined the day. I’m tired of it, and I think most New Zealanders are, too. While there are legitimate issues to debate for Māori and Pākehā alike, Waitangi Day should be the day when we focus on what we have to celebrate as a country (Shearer, The Dominion Post, 2013).

In suggesting that the removal of politics from the agenda on Waitangi Day will make way for more straightforward celebration, Shearer takes on an affective-discursive position of the happy, uncomplicated, patriotic celebrator. He applies the conflict repertoire and noting its hegemonic status suggests that he himself and the majority of New Zealanders have had enough of ‘it’. Here Shearer takes the affective formations of the media—their practice of finding discord—as if it were Truth. This kind of affective-discursive labour works to further marginalise the emotional possibilities Waitangi Day holds. Indeed, Waitangi Day is a mixed, heterogeneous affective-discursive experience with a range of affective practices running concurrently. We have tried to show, however, that the print media continually strip the depth and breadth of these practices out of the national account and ‘feel’ the day primarily through a limited set of affective-discursive positions which privilege particular standpoints.

**Building Emotional Capital**

The concept of ‘emotional capital’ has a complex history (Reay, 2004). Originally developed to refer to the added value associated with particular consumer brands such as Coca-Cola, it can also be read, as Reay points out, as an extension of Bourdieu’s analyses of social and cultural capital. These forms of capital posit that the resources people can mobilise, and which maintain and determine their social position and social class, include not just accumulated financial wealth but other kinds of ‘goods’ such as social networks, the ‘distinction’ afforded to particular leisure pursuits and habits, and familiarity with highly valued cultural practices. In contrast to social and cultural capital, however, the notion of ‘emotional capital’ is not so straightforward. It is often debatable what counts as emotional privilege or as ‘emotion goods’, for instance. Might it simply be capacities for emotional resilience? The seeming universality of emotional reactions complicates matters. Social and cultural capitals work through differential exclusion and inclusion. If all of us, however, have equivalent universal emotion potentials then how do these come to be unequally socially distributed?
Finally, as Reay (2004) also notes, the emotional capital and surpluses generated by some groups (such as women and mothers) might be appropriated by other social actors (such as workplaces, male partners, and children) on a routine basis, without any benefit to the originator of the capital. Despite these complexities, it is insightful to think about the distribution of emotional capital in Aotearoa New Zealand in light of the affective practices we have identified in this sample of the print media. The classic ‘who benefits?’ question, characteristic of ideological critique, is relevant to both the affect constructed by newspapers and the cognitive content of the representations.

We have tried to show what we interpret as systematic biases in the emotional ranges allowed different social actors and in the narration of the affect attributed to ‘Kwis’ and Māori around Waitangi. The affective-discursive resources found in our sample of print media, and the forms of emotional work and labour evident in the articles, maintain the hegemony of settler society. They are a classic form of accumulated capital in this sense. The media’s reliance on particular interpretive repertoires and associated affective-discursive positions dilutes complex histories of Pākehā and Māori relations, and positions Māori in harmful affective terrain whilst Pākehā remain explicitly unmarked and largely invisible. This allows Pākehā the freedom to feel certain ways about Māori without needing to engage in any particular reflexivity around their emotional experiences given the ‘evidence’ for such feelings are clearly laid down in print.

But, it is also possible to think of national emotional capital in a more inclusive and critical sense. What kinds of emotional labour and new affective-discursive practices might foster biculturalism? And, while segments of settler society might in some sense benefit from the repetition of these affective-discursive positions, are there not major losses also as a consequence of this limited palette and the relentless attempts to demonise some and make others aggrieved? Arguably, this affective-discursive patterning might feel good in the moment but is deeply problematic for citizens who use the media as a primary source of information on issues relevant to Treaty-based relations. From a social justice standpoint and in terms of the democratic wellbeing of Aotearoa New Zealand, the lack of reflexive emotional labour in Pākehā media practice is challenging. We recommend ‘affective combat’ as a form of resistance. It may seem as though emotions simply are an authentic and natural expression of how the world affects us, but, as we have tried to demonstrate, affect is a matter of practice. In this case combat should be directed to developing critical thought around the nature of these practices and to identifying and debating the collateral damage, developing further the possibilities for change.
Introduction to Chapter Four

As mentioned earlier, I entered this project somewhat uninterested in national days. This cannot be emphasised enough for Anzac Day. Akin to Waitangi Day, Anzac Day was another day of commemoration that I rarely paid much heed to, yet whilst Waitangi Day felt as if there was a significant degree of charged affect bubbling away, and very often boiling over, Anzac Day felt very subdued, dreary, and situated firmly in the past.

I once attended an Anzac Day dawn service. I was around nine years of age, and I remember little much else other than it being dark, quiet, and feeling somewhat dull. I am not sure why I went, perhaps my parents thought it was something that ought to be done once in one’s life. Beyond that I was only really forced to think about Anzac Day later on when my then partner, a migrant from Indonesia, attempted to convince me as to why waking up at 5am and heading up to the local Anzac Day dawn service was a good idea. Living in the city meant we were relatively close to the large annual gathering held at the Auckland Museum. Needless to say, when the day arrived, and the alarm sounded, we both agreed that it was too cold and we were too tired, and as such, headed back to sleep.

After completing the Waitangi Day media paper, I became energised in the idea that the thesis would involve an in-depth exploration around the affect and emotion of Waitangi Day. Indeed, the media paper had evoked a number of questions about the nature of the day for Pākehā people, particularly in terms of how affective-discursive practices such as those evoked might be countered or resisted, and how activism at Waitangi may unfold in practice. Upon further thinking through possibilities moving forward, however, it became apparent that leaving Anzac Day out of the analysis may indeed be a missed opportunity. This became particularly obvious when I read through media representations of the day and being struck by the stark contrast in affective and emotional possibilities on offer in comparison to Waitangi. When thinking in terms of Pākehā privilege, to not include Anzac Day would leave out a large chuck of the affective labour that goes into reproducing the Pākehā emotion canon. Indeed, the day’s concurrent rise in popularity alongside its particular kinds of politics and huge financial backing compared to Waitangi Day (Muriwai, 2017) meant that it made good sense to carry out a similar study as to what was undertaken for Waitangi Day in Chapter Three.
Elements from this chapter were presented at The Affect Conference: Memory, Aesthetics, and Ethics held in Winnipeg, Canada in September 2015, and the 45th Annual Meeting of the Society for Cross-Cultural Research in Portland, Oregon in February 2016. Material was further complied and submitted as a paper to Media, Culture & Society in October 2015, and published in January 2017. I wish to acknowledge John Corner and Katy Parry for their sound advice and suggestions for revision.

Chapter Four: Imagining an Emotional Nation: The Print Media and Anzac Day Commemorations in Aotearoa New Zealand

Abstract

This article explores affect, discourse and emotion in national life. Drawing on recent thinking on discourse and affect, alongside previous work on nation and communities of practice, we focus on the print media’s use of Anzac Day in Aotearoa New Zealand, as a site through which settler identity and cultural hegemony are reproduced. One hegemonic interpretive repertoire is observed throughout, that Anzac Day is a sacred day of respectful remembrance. Within this frame, a series of associated affective-discursive positions are deployed covering issues that range from inclusion and exclusion, to conformity and dissent. We argue that this repertoire and its associated positions constitute citizens engaging with the day as a homogeneous group of national subjects, bound together as a particular kind of affected community. This imagined community and the affective practices attributed to it, however, largely ignore the bicultural makeup of Aotearoa New Zealand, narrowing down the diverse range of potential emotional positions to a just a few. Popular journalism fails readers and limits debate though its thin portrayals of community, legitimate affect and engaged citizenship. National life is impoverished when print media lack the cultural competence necessary to effectively engage in broader debates and political discourse.

Keywords: affect and emotion, Anzac Day, colonisation, media representations, positions and repertoires, privilege
Introduction

Held on 25 April each year, Anzac (Australian and New Zealand Army Corps) Day initially commemorated the Gallipoli landings of the First World War. It has since been extended to remember all those who served and died in subsequent military operations and is seen as signifying New Zealand’s emergence as a distinct nation. The year 2015 marked 100 years since New Zealand soldiers landed at Anzac cove and as such offers a timely opportunity to explore – via a corpus of newsprint articles – ways in which the affective-discursive offerings available support a hegemonic account of military and national history as print media construct the nation in the present. Such an account, we suggest, involves media practices that imagine the affect and emotion of Anzac Day in ways that are congruent with and reinforcing of settler (here, used interchangeably with Pākehā – both of which refer to New Zealanders of European descent) supremacy and the fantasy of a homogeneous national identity via a narrowly defined community of practice.

This article examines a range of interpretive repertoires and affective-discursive positions around Anzac Day and discusses these within the frame of imagined communities (Benedict Anderson, 1991), communities of practice (Lave & Wenger, 1991) and recent work on discourse and affective practice in social psychology (Wetherell, 2012, 2013a). Affective-discursive positions refer to distinct pieces of emotional text constructing potential identity slots primarily derived from a cultural canon of feelings and emotions (Wetherell et al., 2015). Ideologically charged, these positions assist in recreating a ‘background of felt dispositions’ (Blackman, 2011) which construct identities within constricted forms of culturally competent citizenship in New Zealand.

The current analysis suggests that Anzac Day is predominantly framed as a ‘successful’ (Hawke's Bay Today, 2015b) day, one in which the promise of something powerful, stirring and memorable is affirmed by the widely reported numbers of people taking part in services across the country alongside a range of deeply emotive accounts repeatedly laid down in print. Throughout the country, affective-discursive practices are put to work; the 25th of April becomes ‘a legend of sacrifice’ (Martin, 2015) in which ‘the spirit of the Anzacs’ (Hawke's Bay Today, 2015a) is powerfully interpellated through news narrative. Here, Gallipoli becomes ‘a name that has been seared into New Zealand and Australian consciences’ (Moore, 2015), ritualistically marking the (re)'birth of our [particular kinds of] nations' (Moore, 2015).
These positions and repertoires hail citizens into particular kinds of affective practices and identity formations: the True Kiwi, observing Anzac Day in the way it ought to be observed; the galvanised community citizen at the dawn service; the pilgrim on a spiritual journey travelling to Gallipoli; the disrespectful menace, ignoring expected rites and rituals; and the despicable deviant protesting against war despite public opprobrium. Uniform across all positions and practices is the way in which they overwhelmingly speak to and uphold the power of settler cultural identity. We explore these affective-discursive framings within the context of the Treaty of Waitangi – the agreement signed in 1840 by Māori and the Crown. Despite the guarantee of Māori sovereignty, the subsequent process of colonisation saw settlers quickly become the beneficiaries of the agreement, laying down new sets of laws, beliefs and practices which led to a national culture that has come to be dominated by the normative power of settler culture. Here, settlers typically enjoy a range of ongoing benefits that include, for instance, economic advantages and better health prospects (Bell, 2006), societal norms that reflect settler preferences and systemic processes that privilege settler identities (McConville et al., 2014).

**Anzac Day and the Print Media**

Described by a government website as ‘a signature date in New Zealand history’ (Gow, 2014), Anzac Day traditionally marks the anniversary of the invasion of the Gallipoli peninsula in Turkey by Australian and New Zealand soldiers during the First World War, the purpose being to eliminate Turkey’s military power and enable France and Britain to more effectively descend upon Constantinople. The campaign, however, was poorly executed and ultimately saw nearly 3000 New Zealanders killed and over 5000 wounded, nearly 9000 Australians killed and over 18,000 wounded, alongside an estimated 87,000 Turkish deaths (Slade, 2003). In New Zealand, 25 April has gone on to be held as a major national day commemorating these landings and has, over time, been extended to remember all New Zealand fatalities of war.

Anzac Day, in both New Zealand and Australia, has in recent decades experienced resurgence in public support. In contemporary cultural discourse, the meaning of Anzac Day is typically unified and uncontested and is habitually referred to as a ‘sacred’ day across media, political and commemorative services (Henry, 2006; Seal, 2007). However, this has not always been the case, and at one period the print media suggested it was condemned to be a day that would eventually dissolve due to lack of public support (Twomey, 2013). In exploring print media portrayals of Anzac Day...
in Australia in 1965, ambivalence, meaninglessness and malaise were common emotional repertoires which emerged around the period of the Vietnam War. Pilgrimages to Gallipoli were few and unorganised, and media coverage in general was sparse. However, 1990 saw ‘carefully choreographed’ ceremonies ‘attended by high ranking dignitaries’ (Macleod, 2002, p.154) alongside a tour to Gallipoli comprising politicians, veterans, media and others. Similarly, criticism and critics of the day were beginning to be affectively marked in exclusionary ways.

Macleod (2002) accounts for the change in a number of ways. First, the day’s association with the Returned Services League (RSL) had, by 1990, evolved through a range of actors that became involved in different ways – government and feminists, for instance. The latter of which, Twomey (2013) attributes as playing a major role in the rise of the day’s prominence – an unintentional outcome of using the day for protest action around war’s traumatising effects and the subsequent media coverage it received. Second, newspaper coverage had significantly differed. The 1965 coverage expected a degree of familiarity with the story of Gallipoli and as such lacked much explanation around the day in favour of a broader rhetoric ‘emptied of meaning’ (Macleod, 2002) – ‘lest we forget’ became ‘what are we remembering?’ (Macleod, 2002, p.157). In comparison, 1990 coverage included a wide range of interviews with living veterans, diary and letter extracts, and a broader burgeoning ‘Anzac education industry’, which included efforts to teach children about Gallipoli, greater museum participation and reinvigorated interest likely developed over a number of years based on influential books written on Gallipoli such as Bill Gammage’s (1974) *The Broken Years*, and the popularly of the film *Gallipoli* (Weir, 1981).

Twomey (2013) argues that, from the early 1980s, media repositioned Anzac Day reporting in line with neoliberal ideology. Emotion and affect, expressed through personalised, individualised stories, were placed at the centre of reporting in tandem with recasting war as ‘traumatic and horrible’. Here, ‘the “damaged and dependent veteran,” symbolically and rhetorically, was one of the forces that helped to revivify interest in an institution that had been in the doldrums since the late 1960s’ (Twomey, 2013, p.89). Similarly, older repertoires that linked war to glory and manhood were recast, linking it to horror and the shattering personal effects suffered. Alongside this, Anzac Day has come to be explained as ‘a story of mateship among individuals who exemplify what it is like to be Australian’ (Macleod, 2002, p.168). These ideas also resonate in New Zealand; for example, the New Zealand Symphony orchestra
recently put together an event ‘influenced by the acts of human violence throughout history’ entitled ‘music, mateship and memories’ (WW100: New Zealand's World War Centenary, 2014).

**Anzac Day and National Life in Aotearoa**

Our analysis examines the print media’s approach to Anzac Day within the context of the Treaty of Waitangi and subsequent and ongoing colonisation of Aotearoa. The Treaty of Waitangi was signed in 1840–1841 by Māori and representatives of the British Crown allowing for the former to become British citizens and granting British subjects the right to settle in Aotearoa (Orange, 1987). Complications arose over the interpretation and implementation of the Treaty due to Crown determination to use the English form which read as a cession of sovereignty, rather than the Māori language form, which the majority of Māori signed, that stated they would retain sovereignty and Tino Rangatiratanga with the Crown overseeing governance (Humpage, 2008).

The Crown stance was used to legitimise subsequent colonisation that saw an exponential rise in the arrival of British nationals and other Europeans. Land was typically alienated from Māori using quasi-legal processes of Crown pre-emptive purchase and sold to immigrants at higher but still cheap rates. This allowed the Crown to both fund the process of colonisation and entice settlers to leave their homeland and relocate to New Zealand (Novitz & Willmott, 1989). Within a decade, both settler population and culture had come to dominate. Colonial laws, values and social practices quickly became entrenched, with the power and privileges that come with such hegemony benefiting settler society while simultaneously marginalising Māori power, commerce, organisation and social practice. Settler domination persists in the contemporary cultural climate affording a greater sense of inclusion, well-being and higher social status than Māori, so that they experience greater financial wealth, higher levels of education and employment, better housing, health and life expectancy, alongside a host of other advantages (Borell et al., 2009).

The manifest and un-reconstituted colonisation of the country underlies a form of identity that is unexpectedly fragile and precarious, one which Bell (2006) argues reflects a profound ‘ontological unease’. While Pākehā are the majority national group, they are not native to the land they inhabit yet claim a kind of national identity that would assume this to be so. Throughout the initial phases of the settler cultural project, this fact went relatively unchallenged, but latterly historical accounting (Belich,
1986, 1996; Salmond, 1991) has given rise to critiques ‘questioning of the morality of [Pākehā] claims to place and peoplehood’ (Bell, 2006, p.256). Indeed, a once secure claim to national identity has increasingly come under question and is arguably reflected in the distinct ways Pākehā observe both Anzac Day, as outlined in this article, and Waitangi Day (McConville et al., 2014) – the other major national day in Aotearoa, the character of which we will briefly outline below in order to contextualise the current argument.

Waitangi Day commemorates the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi which is often regarded as the founding document of the nation. Compared to Anzac Day, however, Waitangi Day is routinely presented in common talk, political speech and media coverage as a conflict ridden and hostile day. It is an occasion where activism and protest around issues that highlight Treaty injustices are regularly recast as Māori being irrationally angry and repeatedly ‘hijacking’ celebrations and ‘disrupting’ the day (Abel, 1997; McConville et al., 2014; Wetherell et al., 2015). While the day ‘could’ be a day for ‘celebration’ and ‘cordial conversation’, it instead becomes a day that ‘we’ would rather forget. In short, mainstream media in particular use the day as a reminder as to why Māori activism is little more than an unfounded commotion. This further entrenches the idea that Māori regularly threaten ‘New Zealanders’ enjoyment of social spaces (see also Nairn, McCreanor, Rankine, & Moewaka Barnes, 2009), in brazen attempts to draw upon what is widely represented as their ‘privileged’ status – a common trope in social discourse (McCreanor, 2008; Nairn & McCreanor, 1991) despite the glaring evidence of marginalisation, exclusion and disparities.

Both Anzac and Waitangi Days are used as sites in which the maintenance and reinforcement of settler hegemony is performed, reproduced and maintained through varying means to the same end. Anzac Day is viewed as ‘our’ day, and thus celebrated as ‘we’ (Pākehā) see fit, while Waitangi Day is seen as ‘their’ day – and accordingly devalued and disregarded. This observation is supported by the discrepancy in funding each day receives. Tens of millions of dollars have been set aside for projects related to the First World War centenary programme since 2012. Lottery Grants Board Funding has allocated over 25 million dollars to support community involvement; Creative New Zealand has provided 1.5 million dollars for organisations both national and international to support ‘large-scale, collaborative work with New Zealand artists as part of the wider government programme to mark the First World War centenary’ (WW100: New Zealand's World War Centerary, n.d-b). Alongside this, a range of funders have provided monetary assistance around
the day, from further lottery grants, Veterans’ Affairs New Zealand assisting old soldiers to attend overseas commemorations, and a range of arts and culture organisations to broadcasting assistance from New Zealand On Air (WW100: New Zealand's World War Centerary, n.d-a).

These figures are particularly illuminating when considered alongside Waitangi Day funding. The ‘Commemorating Waitangi Day Fund’ administered by the Ministry of Culture and Heritage (MCH), for instance, offers local government and community organisations the opportunity to apply for grants which range from NZ$200 to NZ$10,000 and on average are delivered at NZ$3000 (Ministry for Culture and Heritage, 2017a) to a total of around half a million dollars. Recently, MCH declared that ‘more than $17 million has been allocated to help communities commemorate the centenary (of World War One)’ (Ministry for Culture and Heritage, 2017b). This comparative lack can be again explored in terms of the way in which Anzac Day is marked as a day primarily to reproduce a particular settler-centric perspective and in turn reinforce an associated hegemonic identity, with a greater focus on internal wars between Māori and Pākehā in the years after the Treaty was signed, potentially raising complications for the fantasy of an untroubled and uniform sense of national identity.

Imaging an Emotional Nation

This article draws upon three positions around the print media that taken together, imagine an emotional nation. First, following Benedict Anderson (1991), we assume nations to be partly imagined in nature. Anderson notes the degree to which the large groups of people that form a nation will never meet all of those marked as belonging, but nonetheless manage to maintain a coherent imaginative sense of connectedness and ongoing felt sense of national identity. A key way through which an imagined community constructs a sense of continuity and connection is through print capitalism’s capacity to circulate ideas to a large number of people and, as a result, reproduce particular cultural formations.

The emotional possibilities the print media offer on Anzac Day are often quite similar to those of other mainstream media outlets; for example, Radio New Zealand, which has a reputation for fair and accurate journalism, tends to frame Anzac agendas through conventional discursive practices. As one long time journalist employed by the station attests,
Every year, Anzac Day, like the budget, has a formula to its reporting. Firstly, there are the dawn services that occur across the nation and reporters are assigned to those where the Governor-General, Prime Minister and other high profile people attend.

(Pamatatau, 2012)

Within this formulaic and predictable approach to national identity building, there is little willingness to engage in coverage that includes perspectives outside settler colonial narratives (Pamatatau, 2012). Visual media such as television has played a significant role in the revival of interest in and around Anzac Day, with the advent of coverage transmitted from Gallipoli in the 1980s now commonplace alongside regular documentaries and televised pilgrimages by ‘elderly men and their supporters, accompanied by a raft of state officials’ (Davis, 2009, p.80).

Beyond the mainstream, since 2004 Māori television has presented indigenous histories and stories in ways that complement, support, maintain and challenge conventional constructions of New Zealand national identity, and from 2006 its day long Anzac Day coverage includes indigenous histories that can assist in rethinking the greater national imaginary (Abel, 2013; J. Smith, 2011). New and social media offer possibilities for citizens to directly engage with the day in a range of ways; for example, Social Networking Service Twitter saw a range of expressions of dissent around Anzac Day in 2015 (B. Edwards, 2015). The blogosphere in general offers similar opportunities for a wider range of voices to engage around the day, some exemplifying dissent and reflexivity and others reproducing normative and expected affective practices (e.g., Upton, 2015).

Our second assumption follows Wetherell (2012, 2013a) in assuming affect and emotion to be entangled with discourse, meaning-making, and practice. In contrast to highly influential theories of affect that posit it as non-verbal, pre-personal and post-human in nature – as an ‘excess’ or ‘operating outside discourse’ (e.g., Thrift, 2004; Ticineto Clough, 2010), ‘affective-discursive patterns evident in social life that operate rather like other social practices (such as cooking, sport, personal care, mothering and so on)’ (Wetherell, 2013a, p.351). The study of Affective-discursive practice observes culturally available forms of emoting and making meaning and, in this case, the canonical means through which some forms of being affected and some emoting actors are privileged and included (while others are simultaneously excluded) through familiar and recognisable tropes and rhetoric. The patterning produced coalesces with
wider social and national histories and ties into ways through which space and place are both organised and managed. Affect and emotion are often understood as private, hidden and located in an inaccessible psychological domain. In contrast, the study of Affective-discursive practice turns attention to the public, performative, patterned and social nature of affect. In this sense, affect can be revealed, interrogated and observed through an exploration of how social power and force accrues from successfully constructing a particular kind of affected community and making it stick (Ahmed, 2004b) as canonical and consensual.

Third, while a lay conceptualisation of print media coverage around Anzac Day might be that the media attempt to anticipate and describe actual social practices performed by members of the nation, we assume that media representations around the day more specifically act as a tool to both map and leverage normative reproduction of a particular kind of community of practice. Lave and Wenger (1991) define a community of practice as a group involved in related learning and activity and who, over time, reproduce the community through gradated induction and socialisation. The media, in this sense, operate as a platform through which the coordination and facilitation of particular social processes are articulated working to (re)induct members of this community into particular kinds of identities and affective practices.

Taken together, we suggest that the print media, through its imaginings of the affected nation, play a key role in the reproduction of a particular community of affective practices in Aotearoa New Zealand. More specifically, we argue news choreography is organised in such a way so as to facilitate the fantasy of a homogeneous community through which congenial similars sharing an untroubled colonial identity are free to reproduce hegemonic rituals, routines and affective practices. Of course, these canonical, espoused practices will differ somewhat to actual lived practices, and the ideological map of how social actors ought to feel and be in relation to aspects of the day will not always successfully show up in embodied states.

The current focus recognises that repetition and foregrounding of various interpretive repertoires and affective-discursive positions available on the day will impress upon the public sphere in ways that allow for certain emotional positions to become obvious and expected, while other possibilities recede into the background. Interpretive repertoires (Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Wetherell & Potter, 1988) refer to socially available patterns and familiar formulations of events and phenomena which emerge through culturally recognisable discourse configurations, metaphors, rhetoric and tropes. Interpretive repertoires offer both a perspective from which to understand the
world and usually occur alongside possibilities for particular characters of speech and forms of feeling to emerge. Here, subject positions (Davies & Harré, 1990) refer to the range of identity possibilities, voices and speaking positions a text constructs. In this study, we are interested in the emotional identities and forms of affect on offer.

The corpus developed for our analysis focuses on 1 year – 2015 – and includes 77 articles from a survey of national and regional newspapers. All articles were included that discussed issues around Anzac Day, published over the 4 days in the lead up to 25 April 2015, along with those published on and after the day itself. An analysis of the main topics covered in these articles found that 6 focused on the poppy, seven focused on preparations at Gallipoli, six focused on managing dissent, seven focused on sports matches, 11 focused on community preparation for the day, 12 discussed Anzac Day in general, 14 focused on patriotism around the day, 12 discussed successful Anzac services and two were critical of the day.

**Anzac Day is a ‘Sacred Day of Respectful Remembrance’**

The print media’s approach to Anzac Day is overwhelmingly unified around the interpretive repertoire of Anzac day being a *sacred day of respectful remembrance*. This repertoire is typically uncontested, facing no ideological dilemmas or serious challenges to its legitimacy. We begin by exploring ways in which such an imagined community of practice might be reproduced via the print media:

*Gallipoli is a name that has been seared into New Zealand and Australian consciences and holds a sacred spot in both countries as this is regarded as being the birth of our nations.*

*Perhaps it’s fitting then that it was so bloody and so painful for those who fought and died there, as well as their mourning loved ones left behind.*

*To mark their sacrifice – and of all the other Anzac servicemen and women – we wear red poppies in the lead up to April 25 (Anzac Day) and November 11 (Remembrance Day).*

*The small flower is appropriate as it grew in both Flanders fields and the hills of Gallipoli.*

*Last Friday, I went into town to finalise details of an imminent trip that will pass close to Flanders fields.*
I was pleased – and not a little surprised – at the huge number of people wearing poppies. There were so many that those without could be counted on one hand (Moore, 2015).

Published on 21 of April in the days leading up to Anzac Day, this extract exemplifies ways in which a social field is organised so that opportunities for collective learning are presented around how the occasion ought to be normatively engaged with and adhered to. The opening sentences present Gallipoli as a site through which national identities were birthed via collective turmoil and affective practices of pain. As a ‘sacred spot’ in ‘our’ country’s history, the day is presented as one that connects people through a shared domain of interest – nationhood. Assuming this interest, the article extract seeks to build a relationship to and understanding around the day via preparing symbolic (‘The small flower’) and affective (‘I was pleased …’) resources members of this community will require in order to acquire a degree of practical expertise around the day.

Poppy wearing is modelled as an essential requirement for membership in this community of practice and offers a material and performative connection to both past and present. In short, this extract assists in forming the conditions necessary to ensure that the repertoire is operationalised on the day in a way that cultivates adherence to normative affective practices. It is in effect an affective-discursive strategy of assimilation to a community of practice concerned with the reproduction of a particular identity. The following excerpt speaks more directly to those this community of practice might more specifically include:

I think that we are only really now beginning to realise how important Gallipoli was. It was a time that we actually began to think that we weren’t British, that we weren’t Australian – that we were actually New Zealanders.

We were a nation in our own right. It was a real turning point for us – we really saw that we were different.

Gallipoli is a key part in our history and our sense of ourselves as being Kiwis. Those servicemen and women at Gallipoli really embodied the best of us. They were courageous, selfless and incredibly human.
Gallipoli is such an emotional place. You can't help but be emotional when you look at those graves there – and that is just a fraction of those who died there.

(Bailey, 2015)

Taken from a piece entitled ‘Gallipoli such an emotional place’, celebrated local media personality Judy Bailey recounts her trip to Gallipoli for Anzac Day commemorations. In the above vignette, Bailey employs the personal pronouns ‘we’ and ‘our’ along-side adverbal qualifications such as ‘New Zealanders’ and ‘nation’ intending to speak for ‘Kiwis’ as such. This presupposes a singular, unified collective of people, of which the ‘best’, akin to the Anzacs, come replete with emotional and psychological characteristics of courageousness, selflessness and incredible humanness. This could be described as the True Kiwi affective-discursive position – a broad brush appeal to the supposed emotive nature of the figure of the ‘Kiwi New Zealander’. The collective singular ‘New Zealanders’ is contrasted to British and Australian national identities of which separation, distinction and difference from what was inferred as a more unified tripartite supposedly emerged through the country's role in Gallipoli. In this light, a very specific kind of national identity is being constructed; one that finds its roots as a settler colonial society augmented by the British Crown. From this perspective, the ‘we’ Bailey speaks of and to is the Pākehā ‘we’ – those of us who identify with Britain through ancestry or descent and align with those Australians who share a common heritage.

Another affective-discursive position this formulation gives rise to is that of the pilgrim on a spiritual journey – a position that affectively marks those travelling to Gallipoli as dedicated, diligent subjects who will, by default, also occupy the True Kiwi position. The spiritual pilgrim position was liberally spread through the corpus and likely reflects broader social practices of national commemoration around Anzac Day. Indeed, secular pilgrimages have become popular ways to express and enact nationalistic, travel, spiritual and semiotic motives within a broader frame work of self-discovery (Hyde & Harman, 2011). In terms of a cultural identity for Pākehā, then, Anzac Day offers not only imagined possibilities but also concrete places and spaces where one can venture and practise forms of national pride and honour as modelled through Bailey’s account of her trip.

Bailey asserts an inherent emotionality to Gallipoli; one ‘can’t help but be emotional when you look at those graves there’. This is assumed to be what many from New
Zealand experience as they find themselves immersed in the experience of being at the battlefields of the Gallipoli peninsula observing the gravestones: “They believe that their emotional response is immediate, elicited by the sight of … gravestones … as if all prior knowledge of Gallipoli counted for nothing when weighed against the experience of “being there” (McKenna & Ward, 2007, p.141). It is precisely this kind of affective and emotional work that charges communities of practice, and the places and spaces within which they function, with particular forms of meaning, affect and intention (McKenna & Ward, 2007). For those unable to make the trip to Gallipoli, the many commemorations held throughout the country provide ample opportunity to participate and media offer much coverage and commentary. The following excerpt exemplifies the form local news and community commentary take:

*Every nook and cranny was packed at today’s Gallipoli centenary Anzac Day dawn service at Tauranga RSA’s cenotaph.*

*At least 3000 people crammed the carpark and surrounding areas, grabbing whatever space they could find to get a view across a sea of heads.*

*It was clear from the volume of traffic streaming down Cameron Rd that the service was going to be unlike anything the RSA had seen before.*

*And that’s how it turned out, with the poignant atmosphere given a special resonance by the sheer numbers who flooded into the grounds.*

*The emotionally laden atmosphere of the minute’s silence after the bugler played the Last Post was so quiet that the air could have been cut with a knife.*

(Cousins, 2015)

Print media coverage was significant in this domain, and overwhelmingly framed the day as a ‘successful’ day, one in which the promise of something powerful, stirring and memorable was affirmed by the widely reported numbers of people taking part in services across the country, alongside a range of deeply emotive accounts repeatedly laid down in print. Taken from an article titled ‘Record numbers commemorate at Tauranga dawn service’, the central affective push of the piece focuses on documenting the grandiose and eminent nature of the occasion. Drawing on water metaphors (‘sea of heads’, ‘traffic streaming’, ‘flooded into the grounds’), the article emphasises crowd sizes of a nature, which in any other situation might perhaps
be reported as reaching dangerous, potentially unmanageable levels (e.g. ‘3000 people crammed the carpark and surrounding areas, grabbing whatever space they could find’). This nature of excess in terms of crammed bodies and limited space within which to contain them is juxtaposed against their ability to stand together in silence despite the emotional intensity they carry. The affective-discursive position which this, and other pieces like it, evokes a strong sense of the figure of the *galvanised community citizen*; one who shows up and eagerly participates in dawn services in ways that strictly adhere to silence at the correct times, poised restraint and polite spectatorship.

This kind of national nostalgia is in effect a tool to protect a positive sense of national in-group identity (Smeekes, 2015) and maintain a perimeter around the community of imagined affective practices contained and insulated with very specific emotional, material and psychological characteristics. People who attend these events are by default positioned as *True Kiwis*, but they are also *galvanised community citizens* who might one day go on to also be *pilgrims on a spiritual journey*. Affective-discursive positions are multiple, overlapping and dialectically reinforcing one another and the hegemonic repertoire that *Anzac Day is a sacred day of respectful remembrance*. As such, it becomes difficult for discourses of dissent and non-normative affective-discursive practices to penetrate or seriously challenge its force. The following illustrates ways in which one example of non-normativity was dealt within the mediascape:

> ‘The din was horrendous’ – Motorcycle gang drowns out Last Post

The Rebels Motorcycle Club has apologised for disrupting today’s dawn service in Waiau.

A written statement emailed late this afternoon said the club had the ‘utmost respect for our fallen heroes whom have given their lives for our freedom’.

‘We were passing through at the time of service; we stopped to pay our respects. Assuming the service was completed, we then continued on our journey. Unfortunately, we misunderstood, causing disruption, this was not our intention. There are no excuses for the events that occurred; we can ensure you this will not happen again in the future’.

‘We deeply apologise for this, all hope that this apology is accepted.’
A grandmother who was at the service said members of the gang turned up to the service in the central North Island and revved their motorbikes while a bugler played the Last Post.

Merna Brotherston, who was at the service with her daughter and two grandsons, said the disruption was ‘despicable’ and shocked hundreds of people paying their respects.

‘It was really disgusting because there were lots of families there, people turned out with babies in prams and everything. The din was horrendous, then they drove off and it was just despicable – what a lack of respect’.

(Ryan, 2015)

Positioned as a ‘gang’, and thus immediately excluded, the headline sets up an affective-discursive position for The Rebels Motorcycle Club that, in ‘disrupting’ the playing of ‘The Last Post’, become disrespectful menaces. In the opening sentences, however, the power of the day of respectful remembrance repertoire is put to work in two significant ways. First, via an immediate apology from the club for the disruption, the sincerity of which is emphasised through ‘a written statement’ in which a quote taken from the letter draws upon familiar tropes of Anzac Day being a day to respect those who ‘have given their lives for our freedom’. Second, the nature of the collective doing the apology, a gang that supposedly operates outside socially acceptable communities of practice, so clearly, humbly and ‘deeply’ apologise for the disruption. This is exemplary of the ways in which the respectful remembrance repertoire’s force seemingly extends to categorically distinct communities of affective practice outside of its normative scope and as such reinforces the ubiquity of its hegemony.

The affective-discursive reach of the non-normative disrespectful menace here extends into an interesting juxtaposition with ‘a grandmother’, one who – outside of Anzac Day is often excluded through a narrative of dependency and burden (e.g., A. Walker & Maltby, 2012). However, here she is given a speaking position as a True Kiwi and used to reinforce the kinds of social practices one ought to engage in on such an occasion through affective-discursive practices of difference (‘what a lack of respect’) and taste (‘It was really disgusting’). Her account includes other kinds of actors (‘babies in prams and everything’), which exemplifies the possibility of inclusion across a diverse range of groups contingent upon adhering to certain discursive, affective and performative tropes. These conditions for inclusion follow a similar pattern for Māori.
Indeed, what little aspects of indigeneity are included in the corpus tend to be those that are seen as least problematic to settler hegemony. The sporadic mention of ‘Māori cultural groups’, for instance, is occasionally evoked in ways that enrich the emotion and affect of an occasion and assimilate within a hegemonic narrative: ‘Then, after a period of silence, the New Zealand Defence Force Māori culture group will perform a stirring karanga (call to gathering) and the dawn service will begin with an introduction by Master of Ceremonies Major General Mark Kelly’.

The following exemplifies how engaging in overt dissent, in this case in Australia, is dealt with through the affective-discursive practices of the New Zealand print media:

SBS says a sports presenter who made highly inappropriate comments about diggers was fired because audiences could no longer respect or trust him.

The multicultural broadcaster on Sunday sacked football journalist Scott McIntyre for a series of tweets on Anzac Day that Communications Minister Malcolm Turnbull described as ‘despicable’.

McIntyre began his tweets on the centenary of the Gallipoli landings by criticising what he said was the ‘cultification [sic] of an imperialist invasion’.

‘Remembering the summary execution, widespread rape and theft committed by these brave Anzacs in Egypt, Palestine and Japan’, he said.

SBS managing director Michael Ebeid on Sunday labelled the remarks inappropriate and disrespectful, saying they breached the broadcaster’s code of conduct and social media policy.

‘It’s not tenable to remain on air if your audience doesn’t respect or trust you’, he said.

Besides causing outrage on social media, the tweets also caught the eye of the minister, who said it was difficult to think of anything more offensive or inappropriate.

‘Despicable remarks which deserve to be condemned’, Mr Turnbull tweeted.
Against a particular affective climate established through the *day of respectful remembrance* repertoire and associated affective-discursive positions of inclusion and exclusion, the above article exemplifies how overt dissent is managed. The article opens by positioning a resistor as a *despicable deviant*. Through engaging with affective-discursive practices that oppose hegemonic repertoires around the day where, for instance, ‘heroes fought and died for our freedom’, a sports presenter is positioned as engaging in ‘highly inappropriate’ and ‘despicable’ behaviour. Consequences of these actions are exemplified through the reporter being ‘fired’ from his position in the organisation.

Throughout the article, the resistor is continually excluded through affective-discursive practices which condemn dissent, deny debate and avoid critical reflection and broader discussions of meaning-making around the day. While some of the resistor's positions are quoted, none of them are brought into dialogue or conversation, effectively working to discount any validity his claims may hold. Multiple actors in positions of power are drawn on to police dissident condemnation through emotive expressions of disapproval.

These kinds of media practices echo the observation of Murray, Parry, Robinson, and Goddard (2008) ‘of what Daniel Hallin has termed the “sphere of legitimate controversy” with the anti-war movement relegated to a “sphere of deviance”’ (Murray et al., 2008, p.7). While Murray et al. observe this repositioning from favourable to unfavourable coverage of activism occurring as a result of media coverage during wartime, it appears to have some crossover as a similar media practice during contemporary war commemoration, at least in New Zealand. Taking into consideration Billig’s (1995) argument that national identity is reproduced in banal and mundane ways alongside more overt nationalist acts such as going to war, it follows that a militarised day such as Anzac would be of benefit to the maintenance of a nation state, and more specifically the survival of a national identity currently traversing a period of ontological unease.

**Conclusion**

This article has attempted to demonstrate ways in which the print media both appeal to and model a dominant cultural identity in order to imagine a particular kind of
emotional nation. Drawing upon familiar tropes and rhetoric, a range of geographically specific affective-discursive practices are recurrently put to work.

In compiling a distinct set of interconnected affective-discursive positions together under a singular, uncontested interpretive repertoire that Anzac Day is a sacred day of respectful remembrance, hegemony is assumed, national unity is performed and settler identity is effectively reproduced. Boundaries demarcating acceptable and transgressive affective practices are clearly set in place, with opportunity for inclusion open if social actors adhere to a specific set of rites and rituals around the day and accept the dominant historical narrative.

The observed print media affective-discursive practices critiqued in the analysis reinforce and build on prior literature in a number of ways. Anzac Day is again presented as a sacred occasion with public support at an all-time high. The day is portrayed as being infused with emotion, meaning and purpose, through a range of sites and practices set up, both at Gallipoli and across the country, embodying and exemplifying the power that this kind of affective meaning-making has for national identity. However, particularly in light of the near invisibility of Māori in media representations of these commemorations over the survey period, this article questions, whose national identity is being performed. Although on initial inspection it appears as if the day is presented as one that speaks to New Zealanders as such, closer examination reveals a clear appeal to Pākehā identities and cultural history.

When providing coverage around Anzac Day, our sample of print media often fail to take into account the contributions of Māori to the armed services, the position of the Treaty of Waitangi in nation building and the subsequent role that Pākehā and Māori ought to have in the way identities and emotional positions are represented. From this perspective, the way in which dissent is managed also needs to be reassessed, with a broader, deeper pool of affective-discursive resources deployed to deal with a range of possibilities for how we might collectively come to terms with our conflicting histories, emotions, discourses and identities. Indeed, national life is impoverished when media lack the cultural competence necessary to effectively engage in broader debates and political discourse.
Having explored the affective-discursive practices of the print media in relation to each day, I became intrigued, and decided to compare and contrast the ways in which Pākehā people in focus group situations might make use of the affect and emotion around these days. Would they follow paths similar to media trajectories or might they deploy strategies unseen in media making practices? Would we see new, emerging affective possibilities? Would we see an interesting negotiation of both? Or might we see something entirely different altogether?

As I carried out the focus groups, it quickly came to my attention the degree to which the Pākehā emotion canon evident in mainstream media newsmaking, carried a remarkably similar tone in the affective and emotional work of the participants. Indeed, by the end of the first focus group, which stretched over two hours, in terms of affective-discursive practices put to work, I already felt as if I had reached saturation! The interpretive repertoires, subject positions, and ideological dilemmas deployed by the media were routinely put to work in very similar, yet this time very embodied ways, by the participants. In many ways I was quite struck to be actually witnessing these packets of affect and discourse unfolding and circulating in lived practice. Of course, I should not have been surprised, as I am surrounded by similar such banal offerings on a day to day basis. Though after immersing myself in its study, and gaining new perspectives around its logic, the focus groups revealed quite clearly the degree to which these affective-discursive practices are most certainly entrenched.

What struck me was the intensity and conviction with which people spoke. Indeed, for both Waitangi Day and Anzac Day, people often engaged quite passionately, conveying a strong belief as to the legitimacy of their respective views. While most of the perspectives deployed for each day represented business as usual (e.g., Wetherell & Potter, 1992), one key difference between the mediated versions of events and personalised accounts became very clear. This was noticeable particularly around the ways in which people actively reproduce pro-Anzac affective-discursive practice, yet would hesitate and recoil somewhat when discussing the possibility of doing the harder work of actually attending commemorative events. This chapter goes onto explore the affective politics of this curious pattern whilst keeping ethnic privilege in mind.

This chapter was submitted as a paper to Political Psychology in August, 2017. It has since been through the review process and is currently in the final stages of revision.
Chapter Five: ‘Pissed off and Confused’ / ‘Grateful and (Re)moved’: Affect, Privilege and National Commemoration in Aotearoa New Zealand

Abstract

This article explores affect, colonial privilege and the cultural politics of national commemoration in Aotearoa New Zealand. Based on focus group interviews around two major national days, we examine means through which feelings and emotions are deployed in ways that enable the reproduction of ethnic advantage. Situating affect within patterns of relationship, four interrelated affective-discursive practices are explored. In relation to Waitangi Day, agents tend to work under the rubric of anger and confusion. For Anzac Day, being grateful and moved shapes the interaction, though an ideological dilemma is often encountered in which participants simultaneously negotiate preferences towards quite simply ‘having a day off’. Taking into consideration a national context characterised by colonial hegemony, analysis observes the associated freedom and ease through which affective privilege is (re)produced. Often incongruent and rarely challenged, privilege allows associated actors to do what they want, when they want, however they want. This affective climate authorises the ongoing reproduction of, and justification for, membership to a higher status ethnic group of which unearned opportunities and entitlements remain its everyday, expected currency.

Keywords: Affect and emotion, white privilege, national commemoration, national identity, colonisation, normative common sense

I actually reckon 90% of New Zealanders couldn’t give a shit. And, I’m sick of talking about it because I hate it that much. (Jake, Waitangi Day, Pissed off)

How is it supposed to be a national day? I just, it really confuses me. I just don’t understand Waitangi Day – I’m confused by it. (Luke, Waitangi Day, Confused)

I feel a great deal of gratitude. Servicemen and women allowed us to live in such a plentiful, peaceful environment. So I really enjoy reading
about the stories and experiences. It’s a great opportunity to merge past, present, and get a sense of continuity. I do like Anzac Day. (Leah, Anzac Day, Grateful)

I did actually ask Rick if he wanted to go to service on Sunday purely because it was the hundred year anniversary, otherwise I probably wouldn’t have bothered. (Anne, Anzac Day, Removed)

In this article, we explore the political psychology of national commemoration in Aotearoa New Zealand from the positional gaze of affective privilege. Anchoring emotion in affective-discursive practice (Wetherell, 2013a), we locate interconnected episodes of anger, confusion, gratitude and incongruence as and when they emerge through group talk. We explore who benefits from particular ways of doing nationalism, what groups are excluded in narratives of national life, who is celebrated and who is marginalised as ‘unsuitably national’ (Edensor, 2002, p.4). National commemoration highlights certain community values, promotes and protects particular interests and identities whilst simultaneously shadowing others (Neufeld, 2002). They perform particular versions of the past, reworked and reimagined to service the purposes of the present, and as such, relate to inequitable distributions of power as evidenced in the racialisation of societal life (Cinar, 2001; Said, 1978).

Whilst populist perspectives hold that colonisation is an antiquated concept of the past, this paper asserts that in Aotearoa New Zealand, contemporary hegemonic nationalism is synonymous with Pākehā (descendants of British nationals) identity. As an ongoing process, colonisation continues to shape social relationships, cultural norms and systemic practices which put together reproduce a nation by and for the coloniser (H Moewaka Barnes et al., 2014). As such, being Pākehā in present day New Zealand is advantageous. Pākehā, have, through an aggressive arrogation of power via the dispossession of land, marginalisation and attempted destruction of Māori economic, spiritual and cultural society, come to experience a cultural hegemony that allows for an ongoing reproduction of a range of intergenerational, heritable advantages across numerous areas of national life (Borell, 2014; Borell et al., 2009; J. Durie, 1999; R. J. Gregory, 2002; Mulvey et al., 2000). Such privileges are at once ubiquitous yet simultaneously rendered invisible through Pākehā cultural practices which both proliferate and protect their power (Leonardo, 2004). Indeed, having greater access to land, jobs, housing, education and other resources and having their interests promoted and protected are clearly advantages yet are rarely used when explaining Pākehā health and wellbeing statistics (Borell et al., 2009).
This paper primarily draws on research located within the emerging field of affective-discursive psychology (Wetherell, 2012, 2013a, 2015). We recognise the ongoing need for political psychology to examine the rhetorical nature of talk (Weltman & Billig, 2001), and similarly seek to extend its discursive framing into a sustained analysis of the more embodied and visceral affective-discursive politics of national commemoration. First, we provide an overview of the politics of commemoration in New Zealand. Second, we explore privilege and common sense within this context. Third, we note some of the affective dimensions of privilege. Following this we examine some key affective-discursive practices around commemoration and national days in New Zealand. We conclude by reiterating the emotional power of normative common sense and its implications for national life in Aotearoa New Zealand.

**The Politics of Commemoration in New Zealand**

Aotearoa New Zealand comprises two major national days of commemoration – Waitangi Day and Anzac Day. Waitangi Day commemorates the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi on 6 February 1840 by representatives of the British Crown and some Māori chiefs. While the Treaty was, in part, intended to establish bicultural equity around the building of a nation state (Orange, 2011), Māori were swiftly set aside by the rapid growth of settler society and the particular cultural politics, laws, education systems and economic imperatives they brought with them (Ballara, 1986; Belgrave et al., 2004). As such, the privileging of Pākehā ways of life, and marginalising of Māori, has led the day to be one that is marked by a long history of debate, protest, activism and resistance, where historic injustices and Treaty breaches are highlighted (Yensen et al., 1989), often in ways that reproduce Pākehā power (Abel, 1997; McConville et al., 2014).

Anzac Day, held on 25 April each year, commemorates the Gallipoli landings of New Zealand and Australian soldiers in the first world war, and has since been extended to commemorate those who have lost their lives in all wars (Davis, 2009; Sharpe, 1981). While the day has traversed periods of ontological unease, such as in the 1960s and 70s era of resistance to war, today it enjoys widespread support as being the day which birthed a unique New Zealand identity and associated sense of nationhood as distinct from Britain (Davis, 2009).
Us-and-them binaries are recurrently reproduced through highly racialised representations that take place around Aotearoa New Zealand’s two major national days, where Waitangi Day is designated ‘their’ day, and Anzac becomes ‘ours’. Within this normative (Pākehā) frame, Waitangi Day and Anzac Day are often placed in opposition as competing national days (McCrone & McPherson, 2009), predicated upon assumed similarities and differences between in-group and out-group membership (Huddy, 2001; Monroe, Hankin, & Vechten, 2000). Regularly pitted against each other in media discourse and associated research polls (e.g., Holmes, 2012), the discourse around each day imagines the nation in quite distinct ways and involves complex processes of forgetting and remembering. Both days, for instance, mark moments and places, different moments and places, where a particular kind of nation was born. For Pākehā, it is certainly advantageous to draw attention to Anzac Day being ‘the birth of the nation’ as opposed to Waitangi, where the affective politics of biculturalism are foregrounded. Indeed, nationalism becomes particularly intensified when an ethnicity or nation’s interests are perceived as being placed under threats both real and imagined (Hastings, 1997). If Waitangi Day is the day that puts Pākehā hegemony into question, then the characteristic positioning of Anzac Day as ‘an untroubled day of national unity’ will likely form one key reason as to why the day exhibits such a strong degree of support in contemporary national life.

Privilege and Common Sense

Nations, at least in the global north, are increasingly adopting postracial, colourblind discourses, politics and practices (Bhattacharyya, Gabriel, & Small, 2001; Foldy & Project Muse, 2014; Goldberg, 2009; Squires, 2014; Wise, 2010). In Aotearoa New Zealand, racism is regularly argued to be all but eradicated. The former Prime Minister Bill English, for example, was recently quoted as stating that protest on Waitangi Day is ‘no longer nationally relevant’, that its time ‘has past’ given ‘so much progress’ on relations with Māori has been made (Jones, 2017). Political discourse such as this is routine and unsurprising: New Zealand has a long history of priding itself as having ‘the best race relations in the world’ – the normative account of racial relations or what Nairn & McCreanor (1990, 1991) term ‘standard story’. Despite the discursive framing, however, New Zealand is now a world leader in entrenched inequalities (Rashbrooke, 2013).

One way in which Pākehā privilege remains unchallenged and unquestioned is through deep-rooted ways of apprehending the world to the exclusion and rejection
of legitimate alternatives. Neoliberalism provides forms of economic (Harvey, 2007b), cultural (Hall & O'Shea, 2013) and affective ‘common sense’ (Ben Anderson, 2016) that arguably assist in the reproduction of poverty, inequality and – by definition – privilege (Clegg, 2013; T. Jensen, 2013). Deployed in a range of contexts from talkback radio, to media representations and everyday talk, a common sense orientation shapes psychosocial practices in ways that marginalise and foreclose possibilities for dissent through drawing on hegemonic repertoires such as the so-called ‘individual’ located in a vacuum, and ignoring broader contexts (Harvey, 2007a).

Racialised common sense is primarily marked by the dismissal of race as a legitimate topic of concern in contemporary postracial life. From a position of racelessness, discourses of equal opportunity and meritocracy inform and legitimate actors’ psychological orientations to social and cultural issues such as inequality. It becomes difficult for citizens who take these orientations for granted to comprehend how programmes initiated to ameliorate the effects of structural racism such as affirmative action and race based social services are required as it is assumed that all structural impediments to an equitable society have been addressed. This is primarily where distinctions between antiracism and antiracialism become important to make. While antiracialism involves ‘moving on’, ‘getting over’ and ‘forgetting’ the past, antiracist politics requires historical memory to inform the contemporary situation (Goldberg, 2009, p.21).

One of the key accomplishments of racial hegemony relates to the entrenched idea that success is associated with superior attitudes, talents, and a strong work ethic, not a historical context of racism and theft that has dispossessed and debased indigenous peoples. Hegemonic common sense relegates colonisation to a past; a single act of relative insignificance. As such, in a society built upon foundations of racism and exclusion (Kearns, Moewaka-Barnes, & McCreanor, 2009), the resultant advantages gained for the respective ethnic group tend to be set up in a ways that render invisibility. From invasion to hegemony, colonising discourse eschews links between Pākehā cultural status, comfort, profit and power with the suffering and dispossession of the colonised (Memmi, 2003). In Aotearoa the intergenerational effects of colonisation continue to unfold: Pākehā are more likely to be employed, their families more likely to economically prosper, and their children more likely to live free from poverty. Pākehā simultaneously experience greater outcomes in education and health, alongside higher incomes than Māori (H Moewaka Barnes et al., 2014).
As beneficiaries of colonisation, Pākehā have gained not only material wealth through large scale land confiscations and theft of property, but also symbolic and cultural power through the Crown’s institution of legal, economic, and other systems. Borell et al. (2017) draw on literature around historical trauma to explore its flip side – historical privilege. Akin to the ways in which historical trauma affects descendants long after acts have taken place, historical privilege surfaces ways in which benefits are shared across generations and the accumulation of effects they generate such as intergenerational transfer of wealth and social position. Borell identifies upward mobility and inheritance as two particularly relevant areas of note through which historical privilege amasses. It provides opportunities and greater possibilities for building the ‘right’ social networks within which culturally valuable forms of affective, social and symbolic capitals circulate. Inheritance, moves beyond being viewed as the transfer of wealth from parents to children within families, and into broader, intergenerational transfers of wealth in its various forms that trace back to the arrival of the original British colonials.

**Affective Privilege and the Present Study**

Diane Reay’s (2000, 2004) concept of emotional capital is useful to inform questions of affective privilege. Drawing on Burkitt’s (1997) approach to emotion as constituted through ongoing relational practices, Reay uses emotional capital to explore mothers affect laden interactions with their children. Emotional capital refers to “the emotional resources passed on from mother to child through processes of parental involvement” (Reay, 2000, p.569). In a race based context, colonial affective capital can be conceptualised through a similar logic, referring to the affective and emotional resources that Pākehā inherit through familial, societal and cultural transfer and ongoing interactions between actors in privileged social settings.

If Pākehā carry culturally sanctioned emotional capital that can be drawn upon to make meaning of events in ways that they see fit and that allow for the ongoing reproduction of ethnic advantage, then such capital similarly offers the ability to define the terms and conditions as to what is deemed worthy of being good and proper alongside constituting that which becomes abject (Bourdieu, 1986). This unequal distribution of affective capital, puts Pākehā actors at an advantage, reinforced by an amenable educational system, mediascape, and laws.
Affective privilege as a social practice incorporates feelings of entitlement, comfort, and belonging (Gaztambide-Fernández, Cairns, & Desai, 2013). Spaces and places *ought* to feel as if they are *ours* to enjoy as we see fit. ‘We’ should feel accepted and welcome, and as if we can come and go as we please. Here, ‘Nation’, becomes akin to the ontologically secure, normative feeling of home; “the place where the door will always be open for you, where a fire will be lit upon arrival and where you will receive the warmth of your mother’s care” (Kinnvall, 2004, p.761). Similarly, in terms of national commemoration, a national day ought to be a day where ‘we’ feel most comfortable, one in which we can celebrate if we wish, commemorate if we so desire, or for those in regular employment - simply ‘enjoy a day off’.

The current study is situated within the emerging field of affective-discursive psychology (Wetherell, 2012, 2013a, 2015). As Wetherell (2012) argues, affect is in part *situated activity*. Action is organised temporally, spatially, episodically and sequentially. Affect tends to follow familiar rhythmic patterns, and when situated in interaction is negotiated in particular ways dependent upon culturally established practices of making meaning. In the context of the current study, for instance, when a topic of discussion is provided such as ‘why do you celebrate this specific national day?’ *normative sequences* of affect surge into action, drawing in with it recognisable mannerisms, gestures, body routines and discursive habits. Wetherell argues that these sequences become layered through ‘words, movements, turn-taking, intonation patterns and so on’ (Wetherell, 2012, p.83) in ways that mark difference and exclusion whilst concurrently signalling and justifying in-group status. In a context of colonisation and associated affective privilege, Pākehā affective actors are likely to engage in joint inter-subjective normative sequences that reiterate and reproduce a familiar Māori/Pākehā relational history and, of course, in a way that reiterates the Pākehā standard story.

Similarly, Burkitt (1997, 2002, 2013) argues for the central object of emotion to be studied as *patterns of relationship*. While dominant approaches to affect and emotion position it as particular qualities or substances privately contained, hidden within the so called individual, Burkitt argues for emotions as *complexes* where they are at once corporeal, embodied and socio-culturally assembled – multi-dimensional in their constitution and learned through a social habitus (Burkitt, 1997). Burkitt argues that emotions are meaningful only in relation to others – one may become angry, for instance, because a particular object - human or otherwise - behaves in a way they do not like (see also, on the ‘aboutness’ of emotions). Likewise, as Fanon (1968)
illustrates – black men become ‘black’ only in relation to white men. Emotions become expressed in expected ways depending on the particular relational context. As such, opportunities for descent or subversion in an interactional climate of affective privilege will be limited.

As in any relational practice, and particularly pronounced from a standpoint of ethnic advantage, power will play a central role. Burkitt (2002) draws on Foucault (1977, 1982) in his articulation of an account of power in relation to affect. Here, power is a force through which social relations are affected in ways that ‘incite, induce, or seduce’ (Burkitt, 2002, p.165) possibilities for particular actions. It energises privilege akin to “a warm tailwind that propels the advantaged through life” (Kimmell and Ferber, 2003 as cited in H Moewaka Barnes et al., 2014, p.4). As such, privileged affective practices enacted as situated performances and embodied displays will carry a wide range of possibilities for action in numerous ways yet tend to be incited towards a key goal – to reproduce, enable, and carry forth that privilege into the next moment and beyond.

Method

Design

This paper examines qualitative data obtained through focus group interviews on the topic of national days in Aotearoa New Zealand. The focus group interview guide consists of a range of questions about how participants are positioned emotionally around national days in Aotearoa New Zealand, with a primary focus on Waitangi Day and Anzac Day. Alongside this, the interviewer (AM) took a semi-structured approach where ways in which we days link to identity, nation, culture and community were investigated further at various stages of the interview. The survey contained 15 questions, which were asked once for Waitangi Day and once for Anzac Day. The order in which each day was discussed changed from group to group.

Participants

A total of 34 participants spread across eight focus groups were recruited based on personal networks of the first author and snowballing methods. Of these, 25 identified as female (73.5%) and nine male (26.5%). Ages ranged from 21 to 76. Ethnically, 73.5% of the participants identified as Pākehā/New Zealand European/Kiwi, 8.9% Samoan 5.8 %, Korean, 8.9% Māori and 2.9% European. Geographic regions in
Aotearoa New Zealand represented included the greater Auckland (61.7%), and Waikato regions (38.3%). Participants each received a $30 supermarket voucher upon completion. The following analysis draws upon a subset of this data, focusing on Pākehā engagement specifically. Pseudonyms are used.

Data Analysis

The interpretative phase of analysis initially involved organising data into dominant themes (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Beyond this, data were inductively analysed in ways broadly informed by critical discursive psychology (Wetherell & Potter, 1988) whereby conversation analysis’ action orientation of talk is blended with wider poststructuralist approaches to discourse analysis. Affect and emotion were brought into observation through the recognition of affect and discourse as a mutually entangled and co-created process (Wetherell, 2012, 2013a) that can be explored through patterns of relationship (Burkitt, 2013). Here, participant talk is recognised as drawing on rhetorical and affective strategies provided by a particular culture at a particular time and place and organised in ways to do or achieve particular things. Data extracts are employed to both illustrate participant affective-discursive practices and to analyse some of the more regularly deployed dimensions of emotion in interaction.

Findings

Waitangi Day: Pissed off and Confused

Rob: I think people are pissed off with it [Waitangi Day/the Treaty of Waitangi], they’re probably pissed off, and probably confused - that’s a New Zealander’s attitude I think.

AM: Pissed off and confused

(laughter)

Rob. Absolutely

For Waitangi Day, Pākehā participants frequently expressed feelings of anger, irritation, frustration or quite simply engaged in practices of doing anger alongside being muddled, conflicted, lost, or quite simply confused. On this day, participants tend to position themselves at a distance, viewing it as a spectacle to be observed
from afar. As one participant Linda reflected, ‘I think it’s really a stage for probably the more um – what’s the word I am looking for, well not belligerent’. The mere mention of Waitangi Day sends affective-discursive practice into an ‘us’ and ‘them’ Pākehā/Māori feeling dichotomy where pejorative affective value swiftly accrues. From the positional gaze of the colonial spectator, anger and confusion regularly intertwine. The following analytical sections are divided into two. First we deal with doing anger as an affective-discursive practice, and the second follows the practical application of confusion.

**Pissed off**

All participants were asked the range of feelings they went through on Waitangi Day. The following excerpt is exemplary of ways in which canonical forms of affect and emotion are rehearsed, and patterns of relationship established. Within these, formulations of Pākehā affective privilege are surfaced:

- **Susan:** I think they go again
- **Olive:** and what kind of trouble are they going (Susan: Yes) (Jane: Yes) to stir up this year
- **Linda:** Yes that right, yeah. Is it going to be quiet or is it going to be a political platform again or something
- **Jane:** I think I always remember how our current Prime Minister at the time, I think must have been Helen Clark was spat at
- **Susan:** Yeah but she also wanted to speak, didn’t she? But they didn’t let her and she cried
- **Jane:** Oh somebody spat at one the ah (Linda: Somebody spat somewhere) at one of the Prime Ministers. Um I think, I think of the trouble that often happens up there on the day
- **Olive:** Yes
- **Susan:** Why?
- **Jane:** Because
In the above vignette, dimensions of privilege are being ‘normatively organised as part of socially recognised routines or affective practices’ (Wetherell, 2012, p.81). Drawing on familiar scripts and tropes prescribed for Waitangi Day, participants collaboratively (re)assemble the routine affective and emotional forms that circulate widely in this context. The freedom and ease through which participants both draw on and exchange variants of dominant affective-discursive resources swiftly sets the scene. Māori and Pākehā are positioned in their respective affective spaces and in a way that is accomplished and affirmed between people of a particular cultural and historical setting (Burkitt, 1997).

Affective-discursive practices are arranged such that Māori are foregrounded as disruptive and hostile (throwing mud/spitting/causing trouble) and Pākehā rendered helpless victims (crying/being tackled/not being allowed to speak). This formulation (e.g., ‘I think there they go again’) enacts the repeated deployment of disgruntlement in ways that come to ‘land’ solely on Māori figures (‘and what kind of trouble are they going to stir up this year’) (Ahmed, 2004b). Drawing on the classic stirrers repertoire (Nairn & McCreanor, 1991), these practices work to form the effect of surfaces or boundaries, ‘sticking’ pejorative affects to figures and marking Māori as mischief-makers (‘Yeah but she also wanted to speak, didn’t she? But they didn’t let her and she cried’) and Waitangi Day as a site of trouble (‘is it going to be a political platform again or something’).

With regards to the affective positioning of Pākehā, we should reiterate that ‘trouble’ does not exist in a vacuum. Indeed, trouble is troubling precisely because it troubles ‘us’. One way in which the vignette can be read then, is exemplifying patterns of affect that in illuminating ‘them’ as troublemakers, it simultaneously brings ‘us’ closer together (Ahmed, 2004b). The figure of ‘The Māori’ is positioned akin to actors on a stage engaging in mere fiasco - one that is clearly performed, not authentic. Māori
become affect aliens, they convert ‘our’ good feelings into bad; kill ‘our’ joy (Ahmed, 2008, p.12). ‘We’ then become affectively positioned as bemused spectators, innocent bystanders - taking in a spectacle which makes little sense.

Susan opens the dialogue by noting ‘I think, here they go again’. At the end of the excerpt, however, as she seeks to go beyond the usual repertoires and into some detail, the affective thrust is lost: “Because they don’t agree – is it because they don’t like the way the country’s, see it makes me realise how ignorant I am”. And while she does, however, note and how she “will now pay more attention to Waitangi Day” she swiftly moves back to the certainty that “there is always trouble” before returning to the safety of familiar affective repertoires. Indeed, when participants attempt to venture beyond the familiar tropes that facilitate anger, they often end retreating to confusion.

Confused

In the following excerpt, participants collectively negotiate and rehearse proper feeling in response to the question what are you supposed to feel on Waitangi Day?

Rick: That’s a good question
Anne: The proper day, probably like you think of national pride for your country
Rick: You reckon?
Luke: Nah
Anne: I don’t know
Rick: What are we, what are we supposed to feel?
Luke: Guilt? Is it supposed to be a celebration or are we supposed to feel guilty?
Anne: About what?
Luke: Guilty about..
Jake: It’s fuckin’..[All start talking over each other]
Rick: They’re nah, nah it’s supposed to be a celebration
Patterns of confusion are often triggered in settings where white privilege is challenged (DiAngelo, 2011). Even here, where no overt challenge is made, the mere mention of ‘Waitangi Day’ is enough to evoke such affective dilemmas. The circulation of affect observed in the above vignette is, however, unsurprising given it is situated in a bicultural context where to not be confused, would require among other things, a critical understanding of the Treaty of Waitangi, colonisation, and the role of media and institutional practices within it. To acquire an appreciation of these areas is challenging, however, in an educational climate that lacks critical engagement with New Zealand history and often involves public opposition around the possibility of including such engagement in the curriculum (e.g., O’Malley & Kidman, 2017).

Viewed from an alternative position, however, perhaps to be confused is far from an innocent or harmless manoeuvre. One could quite reasonably make an argument as to why it is not in the interest of an advantaged ethnic group to demystify or critique their own advantage. Indeed, no one suggested that they were supposed to feel anger on Waitangi Day; such a move would be problematic. It is much more beneficial to view the associated anger as a natural, perhaps unintended, spontaneous, or maybe even critical or subversive take on the day. Whatever the case may be, doing anger as an affective-discursive practice in the context of commemoration gives leverage to affective-discursive practices of confusion. Often times, participants would employ this logic to go on to suggest that a different national day all together was required.

Emma: Well I don’t think it’s a celebratory day, do you? It’s just a holiday

Lizzy: I don’t think I know anybody who sees it as a celebratory day because what are we actually celebrating?

Emma: You know, all the speeches that are made about nationhood, no one that I know of, thinks that day is any description of nationhood at all. So I reckon that we should have a separate New Zealand Day, where we can celebrate, actually celebrate being New Zealanders because we’re pretty unique in the world,
we’ve got so many unique things here that we should be very, very proud of and we’re a small country and our intellectual contribution to the world has been huge. You know, we’ve got New Zealanders working all over the world in really high ranking science jobs, medicine, we’ve got some of the best inventors, those are the things we should be celebrating… not…

Lizzy: Yeah see, to me, Waitangi Day is more of a protest day than anything

Maria: Which has its own place but should be, should not be used instead of yeah… a day of, of…

In the above vignette, participants begin by producing confusion based on the idea that national days ought to be days of celebration, and given Waitangi Day ‘is not that’, it becomes merely a holiday, a day off. Emma builds on affective-discursive practices of anger and confusion by suggesting such emotional dilemmas around a failed nationhood calls for an alternative national day of celebration. As such, the day could be a useful way of celebrating the ‘unique’ nature of New Zealand. The Treaty of Waitangi, which exemplifies a unique relationship between Māori and the Crown is not considered here. Rather, Waitangi Day is positioned as a ‘protest day’ and as such, has no place as a national day. This was echoed by numerous participants who were often irritated by the affective politics of Waitangi, typically suggesting they ought to be discarded and replaced with unrestrained celebration.

**Anzac Day: Grateful and (Re)moved**

**AM:** How do you feel about Anzac Day?

**Jake:** Oh I’ve got no personal feelings towards it. You see it on the news you sort of get that um, that, um, you know, in your ticker, where you’re proud and you think fuck you know that makes me want to cry you know

**Anne:** So you are feeling an emotion?

**Jake:** Oh very emotional, I mean, it’s only yourself, but all of a sudden you think fuck I got to go feed my cows and
The above sample vignette exemplifies some of the more recurrent dimensions of feeling for Pākehā participants around Anzac Day were one is ‘obviously’ moved, yet often simultaneously materially absent from the formal commemorative aspects of the day. For Anzac Day, participants tend to position themselves in the foreground, embodying the day as a highly relatable experience. The mere mention of Anzac Day also offers very accessible ways to become emotional, however this time in a positive sense. As Jake exemplified, to be emotional, moved, grateful and proud of New Zealand is typical of the day, even if one does not initially realise it. And yet, such feelings are effortlessly replaced with the return to the realities of day to day life; business as usual. First we deal with doing and using gratitude as a way into Anzac Day. Next, we explore how avoiding the hard work of attending a commemorative event is navigated within this frame.

**Grateful**

In contrast to Waitangi Day where anger and confusion are readily deployed, when questioning participants around broad feelings towards Anzac Day, a very different emotional horizon surfaces. The most dominant feeling put to work is that of gratitude, with the majority of participants in each group bringing this up as both the emotion they feel, and the emotion they are expected to feel. Take, for instance, the excerpt below. While for Waitangi Day, the emotions they were ‘supposed’ to feel involved confusion, for Anzac Day, the flow of affects were pieced together with significantly greater cohesion and detail. Indeed, for these Pākehā participants, Anzac Day holds an aura of relatability.

AM: So in terms of feeling and emotion, how do you think you’re supposed to feel on Anzac Day? How should you feel?

Emma: Reflective I guess

Maria: Definitely grateful

Emma: Yeah
Lizzy: What you said was really good, between being sentimental and being philosophical, um yeah

Emma: You have to go through the sentimental bit first

Maria: Yeah

Lizzy: Yeah, that’s what I’m like too, as soon as they play the Last Post it’s like

Emma: ‘oh the Last Post!’ [laughs]

Lizzy: it just sends hairs up your, you know, shivers up your spine and um just that

Maria: Well that’s important too because you’re almost feeling, feeling a part of it yourself…

Lizzy: Yeah, yeah and then afterwards you, the philosophical part of you is saying ‘oh what, what a waste of life…

Maria: [overlapping] and then you’ve got to look ahead as well…

Lizzy: What a stupid waste, a stupid war

Patterns of affect interweave and overlap each other, relationally piecing together cultural, emotional and practical motifs for the day. Affect is ordered in sequential stages, as if one must pass through one feeling prior to moving to the next (‘you have to go through the sentimental bit first’). The playing of ‘The Last Post’ is affirmed to have quite specific somatic affects, with shivers up the spine and hair standing on end. Maria notes its importance ‘because you’re almost feeling, feeling a part of it yourself’, which may indicate that the emotional intensity of the episode blurs lines between subjective experience and objective event, integrating spectatorship and performance through a particular kind of embodied subjectivity; one that is temporally located and historically embedded, drawing in considerations of past present and future. Anzac Day is a day in which one is deeply immersed in the event – grateful, reflective and affected bodies experiencing the day without complication in line with hegemonic narratives.
The distribution of affective value allows participants from the dominant group to feel very much at home on Anzac Day; comfortable, relaxed, at ease. Embodied affect is coordinated and attuned relationally and positioned within wider commemorative, social and affective practices and narratives of war, history and past present and future. Through the affective-discursive practices of participants, Anzac Day becomes a culturally valuable occasion of which said value is expressed through a kind of unconditional positive regard; one where even the reflection that war is “stupid” does not unsettle this regard but in fact strengthens it. Anzac Day is one that ‘we’ can both enter into and reflect on, look to the past, position ourselves in the present, and orient ourselves to the future. Such positions were reflected throughout the corpus.

Luke: We’re supposed to be Kiwi and celebrate, celebrate what they did
Rick: Have pride in your country
Anne: Think, think of the past. That we have our freedom because of the past
Rick: Yeah

Akin to what was observed on Waitangi Day, the affective-discursive practices put to work around Anzac Day echo the normative flow of emotion modelled by newsmaking practices of the mainstream media (e.g., McConville et al., 2017). Here, Anzac Day is regularly positioned as a sacred day of respectful remembrance, one in which a tightly bound affective community is purported to experience emotion quite uniformly, and with little tolerance for conflicting or subversive affect.

(Re)Moved

The experience of feeling ‘moved’ was, alongside the other major themes, a typical affective-discursive resource participants drew upon to articulate the emotional valence of the day. What becomes curious, however, is the way in which affect again becomes contradictory and incongruent. This arises around feeling grateful, being moved about the day, yet recurrently expressing reluctance around overt participation. Take the excerpt below, for example. Despite expressing a deep attachment to the day, when questioned on her participation, Linda expresses some hesitancy.
Linda: Yeah, I could go up the road really and go to the dawn service at six in the morning, just take the car I suppose, it would be quite moving, absolutely

Linda asserts the day would be moving, and that she could go up the road. Discursive formations such as ‘I suppose’ and ‘six in the morning’ suggests that there is, however, a sense of hesitancy around following through. Patterns like this were recurrent throughout the dataset. While the affective-discursive resources to describe the day were abundant, so too were resources around not actually explicitly being involved in events. As mentioned earlier, privilege generally allows Pākehā to do as they want, when they want, however they want. One common affective-discursive practice involved tongue-in-cheek responses such as ‘6am, are you kidding me?’ followed by group laughter. The level of respect and reverence held for Anzac day, however, often saw participants go to great lengths to accomplish a range of justifications as to why they chose not to attend events.

AM: You attend these events on the day or in the past?

Rick: I didn’t this time around, it’s just, it was so huge I just didn’t, yeah. We had a chat about it we said oh yeah, should we go? And I said, ‘oh nah’, we certainly weren’t not going to go for any oppositional type reason it’s just that ah, we felt that ah, you know, probably weeding the garden was a better idea

To not attend a dawn ceremony on Anzac Day within the emotional context of feeling pride, gratitude, and being emotionally moved - sometimes to tears - is potentially conflicting and would likely be read as incongruent. In the above excerpt, Rick uses two justifications as to why he chooses not to attend. Firstly, because the event ‘was so huge’. As a justification in and of itself, this likely infers a range of practical difficulties such as finding parking, missing out on seeing particular aspects of the event, and so on. Secondly, and perhaps more interestingly, he makes it clear that not attending has nothing to do with any form of resistance, ideological or otherwise but rather that tending to the weeds made more sense.

There is a curious incongruence and peculiar juxtaposition between generally experiencing the event as emotional and meaningful yet prioritising the mundane activity of weeding the garden. To be clear, this was not said in jest, or held any sense of irony around it. Nor did other participants question it. These kinds of affective
patterns exemplify the freedom with which privilege moves in ways that reproduce it, free of policing or surveillance. Moves such as these, of which all participants are implicated, serve to accrue affective resources, insulate and bank affective capital for future use. The dialogue continues:

Anne: I probably went, last went to a service probably when I was a teenager and you’re in service things like Girls’ Brigade and that but you always did those things at that time, but yeah… being an adult, we haven’t at all. I’ve been preoccupied, my son was born on the 24th of April so Anzac’s always been the day after a family, birthdays and stuff…

Rick: In saying that, I think it was great, the turn outs for the parades and stuff

Luke: A bit more eh

Jake: Fucking huge

Rick: It was the young people that were going to it

Anne notes that the last time she attended a ceremony was as a teenager, but has since been preoccupied. As someone in her 50s, Anne has been preoccupied now for most of her life. These discrepancies are bypassed however through the group accrual of affective resources reinforcing the power of the myth. Group dialogue affirms the strength of the Anzac tradition with plentiful supplies of citizens in full attendance. Furthermore, to note that it was predominantly young people present suggests the day is in good stead for growth and sustainability.

Other participants, when questioned around what they do on Anzac Day, had elaborate explanations as to why they do not attend commemorations. What is perhaps most important to note here, is not to suggest that participants ought to be attending events in order to properly embody ‘The Anzac Spirit’. As Rick emphatically observed “You don’t have to go to a parade, you feel it, people fucking died for our freedom!”. Indeed, to attend a service is unnecessary in the performance of national belonging. Pākehā already embody normative markers of identity, and a service is not required in order to further legitimate their power and place in the ethnic order. As such, tending the weeds becomes a perfectly viable, acceptable option.
National Days in Aotearoa: Competing or Complementary?

These unseen, value laden, and incongruent – indeed, common sense dimensions of Pākehā affective privilege are closely related to the ways in which emotions are routinely surfaced. As Hall and O'Shea (2013) note, while neoliberal common sense feels intuitive and congruent, it is often incoherent, inconsistent and ‘fundamentally contradictory’ (Hall & O’Shea, 2013, p.2). After Gramsci they note a mish-mash of conflicting stories, prejudices, abridged and truncated scientific principles thrown together in a metaphorical echo chamber. Akin to affect, its persuasiveness may be because we imagine what is said as akin to the stuff of Nature rather than situated historically, and relationally practised.

The forms of settler affective privilege put to work here reflect the culturally shared affective, emotional, embodied and discursive resources that are publically available for dealing with bicultural issues in Aotearoa New Zealand. Each section reflects the positions held by Billig et al. (1988) that common sense is dilemmatic in nature and established through contrary themes: Pissed off / Confused; Grateful / Removed. Put together, these four areas reflect Billig et al’s approach to common sense. As Wetherell and Potter note:

> Common sense, Billig et al suggest, is a composite of egalitarian and authoritarian strands, of individualism and collectivism, and emphasizes both special expertise and shared knowledge, both prejudice and tolerance

(Wetherell & Potter, 1992, p.176)

What is perhaps most striking about the affective-discursive practices and patterns of relationship around Anzac Day is that they remember the past to inform the present where a more inclusive, collectivist series of affects are worked up. This, of course, is in stark contrast to the ways in which meaning is made around Waitangi Day where affect is assembled in a neoliberal vacuum, free from the constraints of history and context. As mentioned earlier, former Prime Minister Bill English discussed moving on from the past around Waitangi Day. A similar logic for Anzac Day would, in the contemporary affective climate, be severely scrutinised. Indeed, two months later, English praised ‘young people today’ and their ‘superior education’ around the history of Anzac Day as compared to his generation (The New Zealand Herald, 2017). Put together, this reflects the broad ways incongruence works as a useful tool to reproduce and legitimate privileged forms of feeling. Its rhetorical, and indeed
affective, flexibility allows for differential dimensions of social practice to emerge as and when they are useful for particular actors to navigate each respective cultural terrain in ways that maximise ethnic advantage.

The differential accrual of affective value for Pākehā and Māori becomes especially pronounced when group inequities remain positioned as natural and obvious expressions of ‘the way things are’: There can only be one reason for ‘our’ bad feelings: Māori. The power to decide how ‘we’ feel is enabled in two predominant ways. Firstly, through drawing on normative forms of affective capital, such as those leveraged by mainstream newsmaking practices, participants enact readily available emotional resources in ways that reinforce and justify superiority (Abel, 1997). Indeed, the affective-discursive practices put to work across the dataset show an uncanny resemblance to the recognised routines and mediated flows of mainstream news reports. The mainstream media, for instance, typically position Māori as “bitter, grumpy, ill-mannered and divisive” (Wetherell et al., 2015, p.61) on Waitangi Day. Similarly, reporting regularly plays out under a master narrative of the day being one of conflict; one in which protest is decontextualised and ahistorical and activists are portrayed as “violent, hostile, irrational, and lacking control and consideration” (McConville et al., 2014, p.9). Here, ‘we’ would prefer it to be a day of unbridled celebration, free from an inherent, and inconvenient politcality.

Anzac Day, on the other hand, pulls together collectivist patterns of feeling and an appreciation for the role of history in the formation of particular identities. As noted at the outset, Pākehā affective privilege is set up in ways that allow for actors to reproduce certain affective-discursive practices and interactive sequences so that they may do whatever they wish, whenever they wish, however they wish. Ultimately, in the case for Waitangi Day, this allows actors to avoid confronting colonisation and Treaty responsibilities, and for Anzac Day, reinforces the hegemony of untroubled, normative Pākehā identities. Earlier, we noted that national days in New Zealand could be read as competing. In each case, however, both Days make available a series of emotional resources that allow actors to simply get on with the business of ‘having a day off’ with little hassle or complication, albeit in varying ways that keep power and privilege firmly intact. In this sense, for Pākehā, national days in New Zealand could also be read as conveniently complementary.
Introduction to Chapter Six

With a general affective and emotional background sketched out, it became clear the degree to which hegemonic affective practices have a trenchant grip upon numerous scales of cultural life, from the embodied, personal affective repertoires of agents, to the newsmaking practices of the mainstream media. Across the dataset, from print media articles, to key informant interviews, to focus groups and haerenga kitea visual records, the majority of the emotional work was patterned in ways that (re)produce Pākehā privilege and maintain common sense and the status quo.

There were, however, a number of instances where participants followed trajectories that countered dominant understandings of nation, identity, and common sense forms of affective meaning-making. Though in terms of Anzac Day, what I found most interesting were the ways in which some of these episodes of resistance played out in conjunction with some of the more hegemonic affective practices. That is, the more I observed, the more I observed complex forms of situated negotiation that took place, and the often simultaneous unfolding of embodied forms of oppositional practices such as uttering words of dissent alongside adherence to normative requirements such as expected feeling and display rules of quiet and respectful behaviour in these live commemorative contexts. Indeed, these resistors were never entirely engaged in overt acts of counter hegemony, nor were they always entirely compliant with the normative frames.

It is my hope that this chapter offers another contextual shade to some of the ways in which hegemony infiltrates the affective politics of the national landscape. Indeed, often times scholars take a binary approach to the study of the normative and the counter-normative, whilst frequently missing the points in-between, where agents find themselves in situations where pathways to action are not clearly defined, or where the body finds itself caught between multiple, conflicting discourses, banal or otherwise. This chapter explores some of these instances, reflecting on the role of counter-normative affect as it is negotiated in everyday life.

Some of the ground work that informed the formation of this chapter was presented at the 25th Annual Meeting of the Society for Cross-Cultural Research in Portland, Oregon in February 2016. A revised version of this chapter is currently in press as an article for the journal Qualitative Research in Psychology for a special issue entitled Feelings, Affect and Emotions in Qualitative Psychology.
Chapter Six: Defrosting the Deep Freeze and Other Untold Anzac Day Stories: Everyday Activism, Affective Dilemmas and Quiet Resistance.

Abstract

Anzac Day in Aotearoa New Zealand is typically positioned as a day of unity, marking a proud national identity, and embracing an active, engaged citizenry. It is a moment whereby ‘thousands rise early to remember the sacrifice for peace’ (The New Zealand Herald, 2017), a day to honour ‘those that risked their lives for our freedom’ (Holland, 2017). However, far beyond popular repertoires and soundbite headlines, dwell a diverse range of positions, identities, emotions and practices. Drawing on a corpus of data gathered from go-along interviews with people doing whatever it is they decide do on Anzac Day, this paper draws out three different forms of quiet resistance. We explore the critical role of emotion in everyday activism and discuss how best to theorise this affect. The first case study follows one immigrant’s maiden Anzac experience. For this half decade resident of New Zealand, the dawn ceremony is seen as a shocking experience in the performance of what she describes as ‘pure ideology’ and ‘complete bullshit’. The second case study follows a Pākehā family to a mid-morning service and their mixed emotions and discourses, grappled with over afternoon tea. The final case study follows a couple who take advantage of the day to unload and defrost the deep freeze. Alongside the thawing and careful reorganising, they explore the affective dilemmas the Day evokes. Put together, the assumed racialised harmony and normative national identity work of commemoration become fragmented, complicated, troubled.

Keywords: Affect and emotion, Anzac Day, national identity, decolonisation, banal nationalism, social practice
The purpose of this paper is to examine affective dimensions of Anzac Day experiences in Aotearoa New Zealand where many citizens grapple with the nature of well established, highly routinised, and naturalised conservative public rituals, whilst simultaneously carrying progressive, change-oriented or emancipatory aspirations. It attempts to understand what happens when personal affective styles and embodied repertoires associated with challenging or resisting institutionalised practices, intersect with generational, communal and cultural actions that seek to replicate or preserve them. Within this frame, we uncover some of the emotions, tensions, and complexities evoked. We begin by briefly outlining the commemoration of Anzac Day in Aotearoa New Zealand and some of its contentions. This is followed by explicating the theoretical argument of the paper, followed by an account of method, and analysis of three case studies. Based on the findings we conclude by arguing for a broader and deeper series of affective and emotional possibilities for national commemoration.

**Anzac Day and Hegemonic Nation Building in Aotearoa New Zealand**

Anzac Day commemorates the failed invasion of the Gallipoli peninsula in Turkey during the First World War by the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (Anzac). Latterly it has been extended to cover the remembrance of all New Zealand armed service contributions and particularly causalities, in war overseas. It is a key day on New Zealand’s national calendar, foregrounding qualities such as sacrifice and mateship (Fenton, 2015), courage and loyalty (Key, 2015), and bravery and endurance (Clark, 2005) in its reproduction of national identity.

Anzac Day commemorations typically play out across the nation in small towns at local war memorials, as well as in larger scale regional and national events in the bigger cities. They tend to take two prevailing forms, a dawn service and a mid-morning service. The dawn service usually includes a march by military personnel, prayer, hymns and the playing of ‘The Last Post’, followed with a minute’s silence, a prayer and the national anthem. The mid-morning service includes a parade where veterans and other community groups march together to the local war memorial where a service takes place, and members of the community and other organisations lay wreaths (New Zealand History, 2017).

In terms of affect and emotion, the canonical forms of feeling put to work on Anzac Day orient primarily to the needs, desires and sentiments of the dominant Pākehā
culture. The mainstream media, for example, recurrently position Anzac Day as a *sacred day of respectful remembrance*, where New Zealanders' unite as a homogenous group of national subjects, bound together as an affected community of *true Kiwis* and *galvanised citizens* (McConville et al., 2017). It is a day where Pākehā are positioned as uniformly *grateful and moved*, and where citizens engage in the performance of proud and reverential feelings and emotions (see Chapter Five). Furthermore, it is a day where even those who hold political standpoints generally mismatched with Anzac nationalism still find themselves, at times, inhabiting the canonical feelings and embodied experiences – the swell of pride as bagpipes skirl or the lump in the throat as the bugle plays ‘The Last Post’ (Wetherell, 2013a).

This hegemony, although startlingly dominant, is increasingly coming under challenge in various ways. Firstly, there is a growing critique concerning the absence of commemoration for the victims of the New Zealand Wars (1845 – 1872) where indigenous Māori fought Crown incursions on their territories (Ballara, 1986; Belich, 1986). In 1863, for example, the largest war fought within New Zealand, the invasion of the Waikato region, saw high levels of casualties on both sides, the destruction of Māori villages and crops, alongside the looting of livestock and government seizures of valuable land to transfer to colonists (O'Malley, 2016). For Māori, death, injuries, deprivation and disease followed in the years beyond the military aggression. Upon visiting sites of local conflict, and registering the lack of recognition they play in contemporary national life, one group of secondary school students successfully petitioned parliament for a separate national day of commemoration for the victims of these wars, which have for the most part been forgotten by Pākehā (O'Malley & Kidman, 2017). The first commemoration of National Land Wars Day was held at Ruapekapeka on October 28, 2017.

Similarly, in conjunction with the rapid growth of new media, there are now more accessible spaces for dissenting voices around Anzac. Interactive public message service, *Twitter*, for instance, provides a platform for a range of soundbite sized affective-discursive reflections free from many of the constraints and filters of the mass media. Anzac Day has recently surfaced numerous affect-laden, oppositional forms of discourse such as “I acknowledge soldiers who gave their lives. I also acknowledge those, like my great grandfather, who were tortured for refusing to kill” (B. Edwards, 2015) and “Let’s not romanticise WW1. Most died young in trenches filled with each other’s blood, shit & vomit, the overwhelming stench of death in the air” (B. Edwards, 2015). Even some mainstream media commentators, albeit outside
of the usual headlines, have started to question the reverence and reputation of Anzac, reminding readers that “soldiers fought for nothing” and that the great number of deaths, New Zealand, Australian, and from the Ottoman Empire “made barely any difference to the war’s outcome” (Paulin, 2015). Examples such as these suggest that oppositional forms of affect and emotion are beginning to re-emerge around Anzac Day, and are, to some extent, gaining traction. For instance, 2017, saw a peaceful anti-war demonstration held at an Anzac event draw mixed mainstream commentary, some of which was supportive of it (e.g., Mau, 2017).

**Affect and Everyday Activism**

Our interest is this nascent questioning of Anzac commemoration and, more broadly, what it might tell us about the role affect plays in everyday activism and in quiet acts of resistance. How does emotion feature in commemoration which subverts rather than reinforces banal nationalism? Activism itself is often conceived as a grandiose, explicit performance, “dramatic, physical, ‘macho’” (Maxey, 1999, p.200). When we take other affective possibilities into consideration, however, we begin to also see some of the more complex forms of resistance, that may not necessarily directly challenge the status quo, but can most certainly facilitate affective bonds, and enact flows of feeling that resemble those often expressed in more recognisable social formations such as community cohesion and camaraderie (e.g., Horton & Kraftl, 2009; Wilkinson, 2009). The activism we will highlight engages with and deconstructs banal nationalism, in the moment, during acts of commemoration, and unpicks the canonical stories, puzzling over the emotional sensibilities on offer, arriving at different feelings, and critical perspectives. As the data will demonstrate, quiet resistance is itself embodied and infused with emotion and involves dilemmas. But how should this affect be theorised?

Typical approaches in critical social research on emotion are characteristically concerned with the formulation of orthodox and conventional everyday forms of life and how related affects sustain the status quo. Sara Ahmed’s (2004a) work on affective economies, for instance, highlights ways in which value and capital become attached to some figures as opposed to others with an emphasis on particular ways of doing emotion. It highlights the unequal distribution of emotional possibilities for agents to take up, noting ways in which particular figures become marked as deviant whilst others have their interests advanced and supported (Nairn, Pega, McCreanor, Rankine, & Barnes, 2006). In another formulation, Hochschild (1983) suggests that
how we ought to feel and ought not to feel in relation to people and situational happenings, are akin to a Bible-like set of prescriptions situated in received cultural wisdom (Hochschild, 1998). Feeling rules, and, by extension display rules, also define the normative expectations around the intensity, duration, and intensity that an emotion ought to take (Gordon, 1981). However, the gaps in these theories mean that neither help us to understand a phenomenon such as quiet resistance to canonical emotion story lines, agency and practical autonomous activity.

The current study deploys conceptual tools based on social practice theory, where personal activities, their routines, repetitions, and resistances constitute bodily knowledge (Schatzki, 2001). To take a social practice approach in a study of affect is to recognise that human agents and their affective capacities are neither entirely norm defined nor rule following, but also that they are neither fully autonomous or entirely free of social forces in determining their intentions, interests and actions (Reckwitz, 2002). Rather, social practice involves actors drawing upon available positions and strategies in ways that recognise people as both agentic and constituted through social processes (Margolis, 1999). Social practice “focuses on the specificities of constraint and creative flexibility, normativeness and difference, the constituted and the constituting, demonstrating how both play out in relation, and in situ” (Wetherell, 2013b, p.223).

Drawing on Wetherell (2012), affect as a social practice posits that affect is neither wholly owned, innate, pre-programmed, or located solely within the subject as explicited in the early social psychology of basic emotions (e.g., Ekman, 1992; Ekman & Davidson, 1994), nor is it devoid of discourse and representation, beyond meaning, ideology or culture as presented in affect theory in cultural studies (Clough & Halley, 2007). Instead, affect becomes situated within routinised relations rather than individual actions. The print media, for instance, are somewhat constrained by a lack of visual modes of affective communication such as facial movement, and tend to rely on social practices based on a culturally shared affective-discursive canon (McConville et al., 2017; McConville et al., 2014; Wetherell et al., 2015).

From this perspective, affective outcomes are produced via an assemblage of dynamics that include but are not limited to cultural contexts that constrain and enable various forms of action, body states both registered and non-conscious, and the particular relational subtleties of the moment. Within this frame, the always ongoing flux of assembling and reconfiguring affective predicaments leads to wide ranging formations and possibilities for new and creative becoming alongside the
reproduction of dominant practices. Affect, in this sense is plastic – open to reformulation in ways that stimulate broader social and cultural shifts. In this way, affective scenes are never entirely settled: despite how regular and routinised they may appear, agents are always participating in something unfinished (Berlant, 2011).

We suggest that quiet resistance will be an active negotiation with banal nationalism and a dialogic customising – not the wholesale replacement of one practice with a new practice necessarily but a melding, attentive to the canonical; a phenomenon that is in some ways “enabling of compulsive repetition” and in others expresses “creative becoming” (Pedwell, 2017, p.1). In this sense, emotion and its registers can become counter-normative tools, affective barometers constantly attuning embodied patterns towards, away from, and in spite of narrative and norms of the moment. As such, quiet resistance will incorporate practical sense, where people often behave in accordance with the requirements of their community, gaining a sense of what is the ‘right’ way to act in particular situations (Bourdieu, 1990). But it also recruits body possibilities within alternative figurations which together disrupt dominant trajectories through the particular forms of entanglement, and often conflicted and contradictory enmeshments of meanings made (Wetherell, 2012, p.19). Quiet activism, then, refers to particularly mobile and fluid, flexible and nuanced emotional practices that are concurrently personal, political, public, private, and distributed as part of an everyday activism across the life course (Nolas, Varvantakis, & Aruldoss, 2017).

Given its negotiated nature, we expect such practices will be full of dilemmas. Indeed, the profoundly dilemmatic nature of quiet resistance and its duality of affect will subsequently show up in the body in the form of affective dilemmas. Reminiscent of Billig et al’s (1988) ideological dilemmas, affective dilemmas recognise the dilemmatic aspects of feeling akin to “those aspects of socially shared beliefs which give rise to the dilemmatic thinking of individuals” (Billig et al., 1988, p.8). However, while Billig’s observations are focused on common sense and its contrary themes, quiet resistance within the frame of everyday activism concerns, through reflexive embodiment (Crossley, 2006), the inherently dilemmatic nature of negotiating the demands of common sense whilst concurrently carrying practices of resistance to the hegemonic.

Furthermore, while ideological dilemmas lead to agents facing a choice of positions to take, affective dilemmas of the nature outlined above are potentially more restrictive. What we aim to show is that the investment in counter-hegemonic positions within the context of everyday, ordinary hegemony, makes it obvious which ideological choices will be made when facing difficult situations. However,
embodiment in practice will typically be a case-by-case negotiation of the ways in which counter-normative positions are ultimately put to work. Certainly, the challenge of occupying positions of resistance at the interface of banal nationalism and everyday existence is likely to be practically complex, involving greater negotiation and strategy in comparison to non-reflexive engagement.

**Method**

The data in this study derives from a large mixed methods investigation of national commemoration in Aotearoa New Zealand focusing on Waitangi Day (another commemoration) and Anzac Day using focus groups, haerenga kitea / go-along interviewing, media analysis, and key informant interviews. The analysis in this paper works with the small number of participants who were critical of Anzac Day. All three haerenga kitea were collected by the first author. Ethical approval was granted from the Massey University Ethics Committee. All participants were informed of their right to withdraw from the study at any time within one month from the interview, to ask any questions about the study at any time, to ask for the video recorder to be turned off at any time during the interview, and to be provided with an opportunity to view images and make any amendments they saw fit within a timeframe provided by the researcher. Records were kept in a secure location on university premises. Participants received a $50 koha (gift) upon completion. Data were transcribed by the first author with careful attention to discursive moves and varying forms of affective performance, including intonation and gesture.

Case studies were utilised not as a means to generalise a population response, but to explore and describe a phenomenon witnessed within its context, and as a method to develop and refine theory (Stake, 1995; Yin, 2002). Moreover, they allow for the researcher to deal with ‘how’ and ‘why’ kinds of questions (Baxter & Jack, 2008). The aim in each case was to offer an ethnographic report based on the first author’s observations, the video, and transcribed interviews. These were primarily analysed through the critical Pākehā lens occupied by the first author.

Haerenga Kitea draws on ‘go along’ interviewing (Carpiano, 2009) and Photovoice (V. Jensen et al., 2006). It involves filming participants as they join in events, or follow them doing whatever it may be that they decide to do on the day. Filming participation allows for the exploration of verbal and non-verbal affective performances and communications, and their varying levels of response and engagement. It also allows
the person conducting the record to step back and merely observe at times, and question, interview and gather reflections at other times. The data derives from three Haerenga Kitea records from a corpus of 14. They were chosen based on similarities of experiences and involved participants with critical takes on the day. I also draw on data from a focus group in which two of the three participants were involved. Lastly, it should be remembered that throughout these haerenga kitea, particularly in regard to Case One, participants are often communicating their position to AM as a particular kind of audience. AM was already known to each participant, and similarly critical, open to, and inviting of their non-normative responses. As such, it is important to note as a reminder that affective practices here are co-created.

Case One: Dawn Ceremony Failure

Juliet, a half decade migrant to New Zealand from Germany and a PhD candidate in Sociology was my first haerenga kitea participant. While not entirely enthusiastic about having to wake up at 4am to make the hour long drive to the city, she agreed to attend the dawn ceremony based on her appreciation of the trials and tribulations related to recruiting participants, but also showed some interest as to how the event may unfold given a close friend’s strong association with the day. Upon finding a place to park, we walked among the many others towards the museum, which was red-draped by floodlights, “to symbolise the bloodshed” noted Juliet. Thousands of people had gathered to witness the proceedings. We found a place with no view as such, bar a few bright white floodlights directed towards what was assumedly the cenotaph, lectern, or perhaps military personnel. Across the city the ‘Skytower’, an Auckland landmark, was similarly floodlit red. Like others alongside us, we waited quietly in anticipation for the ceremony to begin.

After the scattered calls of military personnel, and a military aircraft flying overhead, a voice via loud speakers broke the silence: “please join in singing in the hymn, Abide with me”. Juliet sharply turns around, looking at me both surprised and shocked, both confused and unenthused, whispered “It’s like church!”, indicating shock for many milliseconds before unhurriedly turning around again to witness the proceedings. After the hymn concluded, the same voice nowhere seen, everywhere heard, continued to direct the service: “prayers will now be offered by Royal New Zealand Navy Chaplain, Colin Mason. “Let us pray…” the Chaplain begins. As he speaks, Juliet begins weaving around people, attempting to get a view of the event, but failing
and ultimately finding a new place to stand, continuing to listen to the speaker for some time before the following scene unfolded.

*Colin Mason:* God, war is a horror. It devastates the lives of so many yet we recognise that peace is often only gained and sustained by the bearing of arms...

*Unimpressed, Juliet turns to me, and whispers something. I fail to hear what she says, lean in and gesture for her to repeat, to which she quietly yet clearly utters “complete bullshit” before turning back to listen.*

This affective episode illuminates one instance of quiet resistance at work. Though a small sequence, it exemplifies the way in which social practices of dissent are often coupled in simultaneous yet contra-directional ways within the consensual coordination of the dominant action (Baerveldt & Verheggen, 1999), and assembled in ways that both adhere to and resist the particular scenes and contexts of the moment. Here, the whispering and softness of tone follows the local, situated, normative, cultural and historical display rules and surface acting around dawn ceremony expectations of respectful silence marking the formal, solemn nature of the occasion. Yet the affective-discursive thrust of the utterance clearly transforms the experience; the nature of the quietness now demanding a very particular way of seeing, feeling, and being both alongside and outside of the event.

Throughout the dawn service, Juliet increasingly appears uncomfortable. Indeed, it is clearly performed. She is often restlessly shuffling about, gazing at the sky, at the museum, the ground, and from time to time looking at me and rolling her eyes, and sometimes yawning in ways that are obviously exaggerated. Children from schools recite speeches, the mayor lays a wreath on the cenotaph in memory of the fallen and all who have served. The speaker returns intermittently to manage proceedings, and then ‘The Last Post’ plays followed by a minute’s silence. The *Ode for the Fallen* is recited by two veterans. The Salvation Army Congress band and Auckland Youth Choir perform a memorial anthem as a tribute to veterans and families; “please join in in singing the choruses” prompts the speaker. The sound equipment becomes distorted with feedback at times and Juliet screws up her face in disapproval. The speaker then announces “his worship the mayor of Auckland will now address us” Juliet yawns again. “…And we will always remember the [inaudible] New Zealanders who made the ultimate sacrifice for freedom in that troubled far off land”. Juliet is
becoming increasingly unimpressed now as she turns towards me, eyebrows raised, mouth pulled into a frown, whispering again, repeating what was said in a sarcastic tone “the ultimate sacrifice for freedom” as if to reiterate the utterance “complete bullshit”.

Australian and New Zealand national anthems are rehearsed, and Juliet rolls her eyes. Again, the sound equipment begins to peak at points, where upon conclusion, a baby pierces the silence bursting into tears, Juliet quipping “I would cry with those speakers”. The speaker returns: “To conclude our Anzac Dawn Ceremony…" Juliet nods, smiles “Good”, and we both quietly laugh. The military march off, the crowd politely clap. A marching band begins and the crowd again extends its appreciation. Juliet blankly gazes into space. Upon completion of the formals aspects of the ceremony, and with the wider crowd now freely engaging in chat, I asked for her reflections.

I just think the ceremony in itself, it’s really uninspiring. The type of things they talk about, and it’s kind of like trying to [inaudible] of honour and dignity – just empty words, man. If you were really against war, if you really wanted to change it, you would tell us other things than ‘it’s necessary for our freedom, so keep on [inaudible]’. It’s bullshit man, it’s bullshit. Pure ideology. I didn’t like it. I don’t like how they throw around these big words. Since when are we so just, since when are we so free. Try and go to a fucking protest and walk on the street [inaudible] and let you know where your freedom ends – on the pavement. That’s where it ends. Bullshit. Yeah, so that was interesting. Don’t have to go again [laughs]. So the message of the day for me was ‘it was sad what happened, but we will continue doing what we are doing, because essentially it is still the right thing to do’. Nah, it’s not. You don’t really care. You don’t really want to prevent these things if you are doing the same thing you were doing before. And that’s why I find it disappointing. No you don’t want to change things. Use the same ideas that lead to this this? Nationalism? Our freedom, fuck the rest? We are a whole world. If you don’t start caring about each other beyond national borders, which is what we should be doing then yeah, people will keep on dying. So narrow minded.
Case Two: Ceremony and Cake

Sally’s parents were born in the flu epidemic after the First World War, lived through the Second World War, and migrated from Holland thereafter.

*I experience a lot of detachment from Anzac Day because Anzac Day was for New Zealand soldiers, it was very male, very focused on soldiers giving sacrifice in the war, so it seemed small and contained. I feel a kind of despair now that it is growing into somehow trying to pull in these other tendrils around a growing national Pākehā identity through the day. I feel a kind of despair about that. The one thing that I think could come out really well is the Māori determination that it’s a day to honour your tupuna [ancestors] in a much more generic kind of way and I like that young people seem to get that and that might yet save Anzac Day.*

In the 1990s, Sally became engaged as part of the anti-racism and Treaty movement in Aotearoa “so I have spent a lot of time up at Waitangi itself getting involved in the kind of protests and activism on the day from a Pākehā point of view”. Here, Sally refers to the other major national day on the nation’s calendar – Waitangi Day. Sally positions Anzac Day in contrast to Waitangi Day, where “they [the government] kind of hedge their bets because on the one hand it could be dangerous for people to feel too good on Waitangi Day, because then we get a constitutional focus, on the relationship with Māori as the birth of our nation and I think hence hedging our bets with Anzac Day”. Here, Anzac Day is framed as a safer option for the consolidation of national identity. In contrast to Waitangi Day, where feeling too good about it may lead to government loss of land, assets and relative power, feeling good on Anzac Day retains the status quo. I drove from Auckland to Hamilton to follow her, her partner, son and friend as they attended the morning ceremony in central Hamilton.

It was a warm and sunny mid-morning as we arrived at the service which was held in a picturesque park filled with a flourishing array of flowers and trees neatly situated alongside a river. A sizable crowd was gathering by the cenotaph guarded by military personal on each corner holding New Zealand Flags. We found a spot with a relatively good view of the podium, where a choir stood to one side and other dignitaries stood to the other. A large screen to our left depicted the event clearly should anyone have an obscured view.
Initially what struck me as interesting was the way the participants’ morning unfolded ‘as per normal’. That is, we walked down to the grounds where the service was to be held, and alongside many hundreds of people also assembling we found a place. Once the ceremony begun, things unfolded as expected. Military horses marched by. There were speeches, musical interludes, wreaths placed at the cenotaph, and the morning was concluded with tea and Anzac biscuits. My participants, like other attendees, quietly stood and watched, politely clapped when obliged, and participated as required. After a serving of Anzac biscuits and tea, we strolled along the path, past the cenotaph and manifold handmade poppies perched in the ground. There were pleasantries shared with other attendees, and we eventually walked home. So far, so ordinary.

However, when we sat down to some afternoon tea and cake, what arose in dialogue was quite contrary to the picture of normativity portrayed at the ceremony. There was a lot of talk initially about the day and why participants were not particularly enthused by it. For example, when I asked why Rose decided to attend given her general anti-war stance, she replied quite simply that she “wanted to see the horses”. Similarly, Rob, questioned if it should even be a national day in the first instance: “It doesn’t make sense to me. I think it should be Waitangi Day. Anzac Day as ‘the birth of a nation’ doesn’t really make sense to me”. Indeed, while Anzac Day ceremonies may appear in many regards to be business as usual, and while the social practices of citizens in attendance is routinely mined by the media to reproduce dominant narratives of its success and unity, beyond popular repertories and soundbite headlines dwells a diverse range of emotions, positions, identities, and practices; many of which are quiet, and go unnoticed. These can be exemplified in the way Sally talks about the day.

_The New Zealand celebration is in such a bubble. For me my feelings on Anzac Day are of absolute real respect, but mostly sadness at how rigidly limited what gets talked about. I almost want to weep when the prefect gets up and speaks, because I hear them saying these clichés. So today the first part of speech was full of clichés, but then when she talked about her own generation, it felt better. But then she went back to speaking about the collective spirit of that time – sometimes the young speak in such clichés; ‘the futility of war’, ‘the sacrifice for our freedom’ – actually New Zealand wasn’t under threat. The reason New Zealand went to war was because we were being loyal to the mother country. The Second World War was because Europe was under threat from Hitler. It’s sad when the young people say those things, I just want to cry._
Like Juliet, Sally raises concerns around clichés deployed by speakers. Whereas Juliet expressed forms of anger and obvious irritation, Sally communicates mainly sadness despite, or perhaps because of, the respect she has for aspects of the day. She focuses on the repertoires of students, the limitations that come with that, and the resultant affective dilemma she finds herself in. In like manner, she speaks to the general lack of acknowledge of the Māori experience of Anzac at the service.

_I felt angry. Now that we know more about the Māori experience, that they were acting that Māori were not part of New Zealand’s fighting force. You know, Māori are a higher portion of our army for lots of reasons, like those battalions. And I just think it would be great to hear the Māori experience. In proportion more Māori went to war than Pākehā. Yeah, for me I just feel annoyed that we are not hearing more about the unique Māori experience. Would be great to have a speaker from them wouldn’t it._

Sally connects anger and annoyance to the lack of acknowledgment of Māori at the service. As a long time Treaty educator, Sally has been closely involved in critical consciousness raising among Pākehā and decolonisation and the divesting of colonial power. Indeed, earlier in the focus group she noted that she felt ‘hopeful’ in terms of the Māori critique and burgeoning acknowledgement of the civil wars that happened in New Zealand and the increase in public and political discussion. Sally’s experience of the event, however, exemplifies quite clearly the still significant chasm between hope and the present experience.

**Case Three: Defrosting the Deep Freeze**

Upon arrival to Chris and Jen’s house, I sat down to a cup of tea and a generous helping of Anzac biscuits, from which I proceed to ‘go-along’. Jen and Chris often use Anzac Day as an opportunity to catch up on household chores, and defrosting the deep freeze is one of those activities which “puts the day to good use”. Here, Chris diligently unpacks the freezer whilst Jen carefully keeps track of each item in a little red book. Over the course of a few hours, the freezer moves from being
indiscriminately dressed in layers of ice, to an empty, defrosting, watery mess, and on to a fully replenished, neatly organised space fit for display at a boutique. This timeframe makes room for the interweaving of stories, emotions, and a significant amount of reflection around Anzac Day and some of the affective positions and dilemmas that arise.

While Jen was born in London, she has lived in New Zealand since she was four years old: “I don’t really belong anywhere else.” She became “drawn into” Anzac Day during the Peace movement in the 1960s. Chris, is “a Pākehā New Zealander of Scots and English decent”. He remembers being “the guard of honour at the [location removed] cenotaph for the ceremonies – “one of the few times I actually managed to get the military manoeuvres right.” For Chris, Waitangi Day rather than Anzac Day has long been “part of my horizon”. He recalls quite vividly memories from primary school of viewing the Treaty as “something very special in New Zealand”, and though his engagement with Waitangi Day was initially fairly uncritical, it has since grown from there. In regards to Anzac Day, however, as mentioned above, they tend to use the day to defrost the deep freeze.

Chris: When I was at Auckland and going to the dawn ceremony, I found it certainly always triggered my strong nationalistic emotions because there is this part in the Auckland service where you’re standing out on the hill looking to North Head and Rangitoto, and as you come to the close of the service before the Last Post is played, you’re just beginning to get light over the Coromandel Peninsula, and the words are to the effect of ‘as the dawn comes up we remember that dawn, and the forging of our nation with that bravery on the beach at Gallipoli’, and I guess much of the time it annoys me furiously that that still has the power to get my juices going, at the same time as I know they didn’t go in on dawn because the sodding general wanted to have his breakfast before the troops went in. I guess that’s part of the fictionalising.

Jen: Well dawn is an emotionally stimulating event in its own right, actually. You know, the darkness and the seeping light and so on. That can make your fur stand on end without any… and the Last Post in that semi
darkness is a very eerie, emotionally jerking sound. I mean you’d have to be quite stubborn to withstand it in a way if you were there. And it’s sort of like that setting that emotionalises what you’re taking about and reading about and hearing about and so on. And I’m not sure why we are indoctrinating another generation, except maybe we don’t want anyone to be too critical going to Afghanistan and Syria. I mean, you can’t tell me that they are making their own cannons. You know, there’s the whole armaments and weapons industry that you can’t leave out of the equation, even if they are not funding the RSA [laughs]. There’s too many big players behind the scenes that worries me.

Chris: So, there’s a sort of renewal involved in doing the deep freeze and doing the stock take seems suitable for Anzac as an activity. Because you sort of hope that someone gave us a Crayfish that we forgot about and its sitting there down the bottom

Jen: It’s not true. The bits down there we probably forgot about were frozen choko, which was a blimmin’ mistake trying to freeze the blimmin’ things [laughs].

Early on Chris locates himself at the dawn ceremony at Auckland Museum, the same space we encountered Juliet in the first case. His first memory is of having his ‘nationalistic emotions triggered’. He positions himself on a hill observing the mountain and volcano in the distance beyond the sea in conjunction with the breaking of light of dawn, and the colourful, deeply emotive rhetoric flooding the space. Despite the obvious trenchant embodied grip the scene holds, he simultaneously notes the concurrent flow of feeling and appraisal that this ambience has to annoy him furiously through the embodied power it wields.

For Chris, this experience becomes a counter-hegemonic affective dilemma. While initially he enters hegemonic affective practice, feeling the ‘correct’ emotions in conjunction with the particular discourse and atmosphere of the occasion, his subsequent appraisal of his experience sits at odds with the experience, and embodiment is simultaneously pulled in an opposed direction,
markedly impacting his expression. The affective episode emotionally dislocates the body, leaving little room for choice as he is now bound between opposites. Chris’s embodied dilemma is likely related to past practice and familial socialisation which he noted earlier in a focus group I conducted.

Chris: Well I don’t know but I guess one of the things that I currently feel is that I’m kind of letting somebody down. I suspect the somebody is Dad, that I don’t respond to the day as I think he might have. He certainly would have said back in my college days – this is what it’s about and this is how you’re meant to, you’re meant to feel gratitude, you’re meant to feel a sense of being given a gift, and you’ve got to do something with it that honours the givers, and that is why I don’t go to Anzac services in the same way that I don’t go to fundamentalist Christian Church services because I know that they will ‘ping’ my triggers in a way that pisses me off [Laughter].

As noted by Wetherell (2012, p105), Bourdieu argues that “past practice becomes embodied in social actors so they acquire a kind of sediment of dispositions, preferences, tastes, natural attitudes, skills and standpoints”. Chris points out this background of socialised dispositions and feeling rules that were carried forward into subsequent Anzac Day experiences. But habit is transformed when placed in a context where the freedom to act differently based on new information and established contrary routines are concurrently enfolded into past practices through the making of new meanings around changing interpretations of circumstances (Burkitt, 2013, p.116). Indeed, during our haerenga kitea, Chris and Jen spoke at great length and depth around the nature and history of Anzac Day, covering the way the First World War was primarily in the interests of upper-class Englishmen, their suspiciousness around the romanticisation of its history, and their involvement in the 1960s peace protests.

Jen in her reply articulates the way affect assembles through the various contextual components of the dawn ceremony that stimulate emotion. The relationship between darkness and light itself is positioned as “emotionally stimulating” (see also Sumartojo, 2015). Similarly, the nature of ‘The Last Post'
- a bugle call commemorating the war dead - reflects the often expressed perception that music is inherently moving and affective, facilitative of deep feeling (Higgins, 2012). Jen notes the way in which the dawn ceremony in and of itself and the act of being there, immersed in affective repertoire, gives a fuller sense of what one has heard and read on the subject. It breathes life into the myth, makes it ‘real’. Yet in almost the same breath, she seamlessly moves into generational indoctrination, war, and weapons manufacture. Here, quiet resistance is again put to work as ordinary activity. Indeed, despite the dynamic emotional overtones, a broader awareness of the multiple and contradictory affective resonances involved manage to side-line the dominant call-to-feel at the interface of contradictory information and know-how.

**Conclusion**

As Foucault (1977) points out, *where there is power, there is resistance*. Here, resistance is never in a position of exteriority to power. Rather, one is always inside power, there is no escaping it. Resistance, for Foucault, “is something of a multiplicity; with points of resistance present everywhere in the power network”. In other words, resistance is not located in one particular place and operationalised, or put to work in one particular way. Rather, resistance works as a plurality of resistances.

*Resistances that are possible, necessary, improbable; others that are spontaneous, savage, solitary, concerted, rampant, or violent; still others that are quick to compromise, interested, or sacrificial; by definition, they can only exist in the strategic field of power relations. But this does not mean that they are only a reaction or rebound, forming with respect to the basic domination an underside that is in the end always passive, doomed to perpetual defeat.*

(Foucault, 1977, p.96)

Certainly, when many think of ‘activism’ they may contemplate practices of ‘big affect’, cliché, swirling, heated and highly charged clashes of ideology pushed to the forefront of national news cycles depicting images of angry mobs carrying placards, pickets, and an appetite for disorder and disobedience. Less likely, and perhaps less romantic is it to imagine activism, the activist, resistance and indeed protest being carried out through more ‘subdued’ means: calm dialogue, family gatherings, and alongside mundane household chores. Indeed, these forms of everyday
activism and quiet resistance may regularly be forgotten or under-estimated in the formation of the notion of activism, but if – as with banal nationalism – such sites facilitate “the ideological habits which enable the established nations of the West to be reproduced” (Billig, 1995, p6), then a reorientation of focus to the way activist practices play out in a range of scenes will be useful.

This paper has attempted to exemplify some of the ways in which participants read events and reflexively deconstruct them. It points to their varying forms of puzzling over the sensibility of the occasion, and numerous ways in which they make new sense of them. In these instances, affect, discourse, practice, agency and activity become necessarily interwoven phenomena. Within this frame, we see a variety of emotions such as anger, frustration and sadness unfold as agents negotiate mundane framings in multiple ways. As such, quiet resistance is not distinguished by the type of affect experienced, but rather how that affect is put to work in situ and combined with other practices and storylines. The dilemmatic nature of these affective practices when deployed in the context of banal nationalism offer a vivid sense of Raymond Williams’ (1977) emergent structures of feeling – change is generated as new modes of being gradually emerge in dialogue with older modes rather than necessarily wholesale shifts from one form of hegemonic practical consciousness to another.
Discussion

The primary purpose of this thesis was to examine some of the ways in which normative national feelings are (re)produced and resisted in Aotearoa, New Zealand. In order to achieve this, I explored the role of affect in the social practices of national life as observed through national days of commemoration and celebration. The study was set within the historical context of colonisation, which continues to play a central role in the ongoing preservation of the cultural order where, despite the promise of partnership and bicultural equity extended by Te Tiriti o Waitangi, numerous advantages remain with Pākehā, including better health outcomes, a higher social status, and greater economic opportunities. Within this frame, I attempted to demonstrate some of the ways in which affect and emotion are put to work around commemoration, national identity, and decolonisation.

While national days provide numerous opportunities for affective meaning-making, I noted the often very narrow and quite limited range of feelings deployed across sites of commemorations per se, to the affective-discursive practices people share, and media coverage of the events. I argued that the reproduction of particular emotions often works to promote and protect Pākehā interests and identities, whilst simultaneously devaluing indigenous struggle. In this way, national commemoration serves as a key site where the reproduction of ethnic advantage is always at play.

In order to investigate these dynamics, I drew on recent theorising on affect and emotion in critical social psychology (Wetherell, 2012) in conjunction with insights from sociology (Burkitt, 2013) cultural studies (Ahmed, 2004b), feminism (Hochschild, 1983) and social constructionism (Harré, 1988). Put together, I took an approach to understanding forms of affect, feeling and emotion as and when they sustain, maintain, and resist colonial power.

The empirical work this thesis reports employed a range of qualitative research methods distributed across a number of key sites in which expressions of commemoration, nationalism, and national identity play out. Firstly, in order to frame some of the dominant affective-discursive practices of national commemoration, a corpus of coverage from national and regional newspapers around both Waitangi Day and Anzac Day were examined. Second, analyses of focus group discussions were carried out in order to explore some of the dominant forms of meaning, affect, and
identity put to work in interaction. Lastly, I drew on a selection of data from the haerenga kitea corpus in order to gain a greater sense of how aspects of affect and emotion are negotiated as participants experience live events and engage in activities significant to them on these days.

Three central findings were established. First, I demonstrated how newsmaking practices deploy received means of emoting around national commemoration in ways that both model and reinforce dominant cultural practices of Pākehā society. Waitangi Day is used to strengthen colonial power through hailing social actors into affective-discursive positons that vilify Māori, dismiss Treaty breaches, and marginalise protest action. In sharp contrast, Anzac Day protects and promotes colonial worldviews through mythologising 'the birth of the nation' and associated affective identities in Gallipoli. Representations of the day overlook the role of the Treaty of Waitangi in nation building, silence any acknowledgement of the New Zealand Wars (O'Malley, 2016) and recurrently frames dissent as despicable and deviant. As a result, feeling, affect and emotion around Anzac Day is reduced to constructing it as a ‘sacred day of respectful remembrance’ where ‘True Kiwis’ engage in the ‘proper’ rites, rituals and cultural performances that hegemonic tradition demands.

Second, the focus group data demonstrated how people’s talk is a key site in which emotional common sense is put to work. Participants repeatedly draw on contradictory yet entrenched forms of affective meaning-making around Waitangi Day and Anzac Day. For Waitangi Day, agents draw on the rhetorical pairings of being ‘pissed off’ and ‘confused’, allowing both for the expression of anger directed towards Māori alongside doing a kind of (often) wilful uncertainty around the day and its purpose. For Anzac Day, agents deploy the dilemmatic of being ‘grateful’ and ‘moved’ as regular rhetorical fare. However, numerous emotional resources are simultaneously available that excuse actors from the hard work of attending dawn ceremonies and commemorative events. I argue that, put together, feelings around both days deployed in ways that reproduce colonial power, whilst allowing actors to get on with the business of ‘having a day off’ with little hassle or complication.

Third, haerenga kitea visual records of three participants observed some of the ways in which dissent is negotiated in conjunction with dominant framings of Anzac Day that position it as successful and uncontested. Put in another way, the chapter demonstrates ways in which power and resistance are often affectively entangled in situ and the various means by which agents navigate these dilemmas. It points towards the important role quiet resistance plays in the spectrum of dissent and within
the broader context of everyday activism as a lifelong task. Within this frame, it acts as a reminder that significant changes are often the result of gradual shifts in dialogue with older modes of practice rather than wholesale changes from one hegemonic practical consciousness to another.

**Pākehā Affective Privileges of Scale**

One of the key patterns of this thesis, relates to the way in which it has traversed varying scales. National commemoration mobilises affect across multiple scales from the most macro institutional engagements to the micro embodied forms of quiet resistance, recognising that across this spectrum, affect can be simultaneously read as subjective, social, personal, historical and somatic (Wetherell, 2012). At a macro level, I began with media and news making practices exploring the dominant ways in which they distribute emotion. These affective-discursive practices are put to work in ways that “align some subjects with some others and against other others” (Ahmed, 2004a, p.117), reproducing affective economies where value and capital are allocated to particular figures whilst excluding alternatives.

At another scale, we might think of media articles themselves as very specific injunctions to particular kinds of people and citizens in ways to read. Given the uneven distribution of affect noted above, it raises questions of who exactly is recruited by the particular affective-discursive positions these articles espouse, and what this means in terms of the ongoing inequitable cultural power relations. Indeed, when exploring focus group affective-discursive practices, many tropes and repertoires I noted were very similar to those found in the media. As such, we can infer that from the macro processes of the media, to the more micro level individual processes of engagement, there are entrenched and quite limited routes for emoting around national commemoration.

At the micro level, when I explored the embodied engagements of ‘ordinary’ citizens and activists, what often emerged was that the body and its flux of feeling was always in conversation and negotiation with the dominant affective pulses of Anzac Day. In this sense, the logic of affective privilege is always speaking to scale in various ways and in a range of forms. At the macro level, Pākehā affective privilege dictates ways in which emotion and discourse frame events, and which ethnicities are acknowledged and celebrated. Though agents may be free to do otherwise, they often take up variations of mediated positons and reproduce them in interaction with others.
in a shared affective-discursive dance around the politics of inclusion and exclusion, patriotism and nostalgia. The common-sense feelings agents embody deliver particular forms of value, and in interaction with other Pākehā, often lead to expressions of mutual identification, subsequent bonding and connection. Put together, Pākehā affective privilege works at multiple levels such that it is sustained, maintained, and reproduced.

Turning one’s attention to Pākehā affective privilege offers a number of political insights, and certainly in my own experience it opens up a greater field of awareness around how it operates in different spaces, and the ways in which it can become deeply lodged in the practical memory of the body. For example, the other day I was walking up the road and noticed a billboard advertising a university located outside of Auckland. On it depicted a person of colour located within an academic space smiling in a way that signalled comfort and confidence. My very first reaction to the advertisement related to a feeling around the particular university not being a quality academic institution. However, this experience near simultaneously arose alongside a recognition that such a judgement stems from the belief that people of colour are not as intelligent, or high achieving as Pākehā and thus the institution must be second rate. I then read the advertisement as quite obviously a political decision to appeal to a more diverse range of identities, destabilising an iron clad white norm. Despite this awareness, I could still feel a sense of discomfort within me, that what I saw ‘wasn’t right’ and that ‘we’ should remain at the foreground of representation. Perhaps there was a fear of loss lodged somewhere among the vicissitudes of the body. Indeed, despite recognising the detrimental nature of carrying such practices, my body certainly tried to indicate otherwise.

The predicament above is reminiscent of the affective dilemmas explored in Chapter Six. Indeed, as already mentioned, while finding myself located in positions of resistance to privileged discourse, I concurrently occupy a body socialised to do otherwise. As outlined above, this can at times be somewhat confusing. That said, most often I come across advertisements depicting Pākehā people doing Pākehā things, and in a similar way, I feel unease and discomfort around such representations of ordinary everyday life and the very specific kinds of social practices they legitimate.

Pākehā affective privilege is primarily about what it feels like to be ordinary, and what that achieves. It is to see an advertisement for a university, feel one is reflected through that advertisement, believe that university is a possibility for them, suitable for them, and to then move on. It involves comfort and ease. Likewise, it is to read
the news and to not have our lifeworlds challenged. Put in another way, it is related to the social and cultural reproduction of feeling that our affective-discursive practices are seen, heard, felt and protected, and that any resistance to the status quo is considered marginal and therefore irrelevant. As such, Pākehā affective privilege incorporates a significant degree of ontological security. Similarly, it involves a deep sense of entitlement to particular ways of feeling that are recurrently associated with the maintenance of power, order, and getting what one wants. Its power is further reflected in the ways that even agents of resistance are often caught up in affective dilemmas when situated in spaces of normativity.

Where to Next?

This thesis has observed some of the ways in which Pākehā affective privilege is accomplished and negotiated in a number of sites. Certainly, it has become quite clear that institutions including the media for both Waitangi Day and Anzac Day alongside the typical choreography of Anzac Day commemorative events function knowingly or unknowingly in ways that reinforce and reproduce Pākehā privilege. Alongside this, when engaging in discussion with Pākehā around the commemorative days, many of the emotional threads and themes evident in both the media and in the choreographed events are again reproduced in interaction. Furthermore, as observed in some of the haerenga kitea conducted with long term activists, it is not simply a matter of engaging in a ‘pure’ form of resistance, but will often be a process of dialogic back and forth to some degree or another. This section explores several avenues that could be followed in order to develop the current findings.

The first relates to building on the insights gained and approaches deployed in the print media analysis. Here, I am particularly interested in following ways in which privilege, racism, national identity and cultural relations at the interface of affect and emotion might be reproduced across a broader range of media platforms. Indeed, one of the potential gaps in the current project relates to the limited selection of platforms investigated. In primarily focusing on the print media, other platforms such as radio, television and new medias were neglected and may express important deviations and different patterns. That said, New Zealand research evidences similar tropes extend across a range of mainstream platforms (e.g., Abel, 1997). And while some new and alternative media platforms may offer positions that challenge dominant narratives (e.g., McCulloch, 2014), many similar sequences of rhetoric and tropes deployed still turn up, as I observed first hand in some of the affective-
discursive responses in a comment section to an interview I gave to a popular alternative media source around the media and Waitangi Day.

One thing I am particularly interested in is developing the concept of affective-discursive practice in relation to varying forms of discourse particularly within online spaces. The exponential rise of social media and new media in general has me curious around the fertile ground of new media and the phenomenal shifts observed around the way people engage with new forms of information, much of which often seems to take on discursively condensed, and highly emotive forms (Hillis, Paasonen, & Petit, 2015). Take, for instance, the popularity of the ‘meme’. The meme, as it is commonly conceived, typically refers to an image (though video can also take the form in different ways) with a few words or pieces of text superimposed that intend a humorous response. It seems to me that the forms of intensive rhetoric, and broad political values that memes can engender in often rapid and unexpected ways, not only assist in the production of new forms of human affective experience and political engagement but also offer emergent and open ended possibilities that (for better or worse) may offer fresh perspectives for social and political change.

In regard to building on the work with participants in focus groups, one gap relates to the lack of youth (5-16) and their perspectives and positions. I would like to extend the research into youth orientated focus groups in order to gain a greater sense of where the affective-discursive practices among such populations are orientated, and how they work to enable the reproduction and disruption of the ordinary. Quantitative research carried out with youth on their core beliefs and assumptions around Anzac Day suggests they see the day as significant but can lack the ability to draw on historical evidence to justify why their premises are valid (Sheehan & Davison, 2017). Conducting in-depth qualitative research with a modified methodological approach to focus groups (e.g., Kennedy, Kools, & Krueger, 2001) would allow for a broader and deeper exploration of children’s affective meaning-making. In a similar way, there is no research on children’s affective and emotional positions and practices in relation to Waitangi Day. Both ought to be addressed.

Beyond suggesting ongoing development of what some aspects of Pākehā affective privilege could look like across various commemorative sites and spaces, I think perhaps that the general direction of future research should involve a greater turn toward a more sustained study of affect and activism. Three ways in which emotion might be tied to activism come to mind.
Firstly, the notion of *affective activism* (Allison, 2009) offers potentially generative ways of moving forward. Drawing on Hardt and Negri’s (2006) concept of immaterial labor, Allison illustrates some ways in which activism blends into pop culture and capitalism, engaging stories of loneliness, isolation, personal and social survival. Allison points towards the “flexible sociality, instantaneous communication, information juggling – that are so routinely condemned in public discourse” (Allison, 2009, p.89) as a means from which novel ways of social connection and engagement might be assembled. For instance, social media and its role as an activist tool has in recent years become a serious topic for discussion (Gerbaudo, 2012; Lim, 2013; Tayebi, 2013), and while its affective implications and possibilities mark a burgeoning field of diverse research (e.g., Castells, 2012; McCosker, 2015; Papacharissi, 2015), there is a dearth of local examples and applicable methods.

Next, I would like to explore the emotional dimensions of activism as and when they are put to work in the field of live protest within the context of national days in Aotearoa. In our haerenga kitea visual records, we followed a number of activists as they participated in Waitangi Day protest action at Waitangi. Beyond headlines that portray dissent around Waitangi Day as the actions of ’a few disgruntled Māori’ engaged in irrational means to unjustified ends, our data exemplify a wide range of agents participating in protest in numerous ways and for a diverse range of reasons. One participant I followed, for instance, was Sue - a migrant who grew up in apartheid South Africa and who arrived in Aotearoa over two decades ago with a deep intention to become an ally with Māori. While participating in many protests and forms of pro Māori activism over the years, 2014 was her first Waitangi Day at Waitangi. In contrast to the typical depiction of Waitangi Day activism, for Sue, this was a time of education – to meet like-minded activists, long term activist leaders, and to support the kaupapa of the day. The particular unfolding of embodied affect here becomes more considered and reflexive despite it being situated amidst chants, banners and myriad protesters.

Lastly, I believe it would be worthwhile to continue to explore what I examined in Chapter Six where everyday activism and quiet resistance are put to work in live contexts. In particular, I am interested in further developing accounts around how agents negotiate embodied forms of resistance within highly routinised rituals and hegemonic spaces. From challenging normative assumptions without necessarily being seen or witnessed doing so, to overtly and very publicly resisting the status quo, there are multiple and indeed overlapping ways in which embodied resistance might
take shape within frames of normativity (Bobel & Kwan, 2011). While I would primarily explore how activists and those who embody orientations quite distinct from the status quo negotiate these spaces, I would also want to explore what I conceive as banal counter-hegemony and how that might play out within similar scenes.

Banal counter-hegemony as I observe it, relates to the ways in which traditional ideological dilemmas play out, where affective and discursive possibilities for both reinforcing and resisting the status quo are made available (Billig et al., 1988). However, banal counter-hegemony focuses on the ways in which the counter-hegemonic affective-discursive practices assist in establishing hegemony even more firmly. In the case of Anzac Day, for instance, many participants in our study would engage in ‘either or’ ideological dilemmas. Here, Anzac Day could at once be ‘a day in which they died for our freedom’, and yet war could then be positioned as ‘futile and hopeless’ without any recognisable conflict or ‘genuine’ embodied affective difficulties such as those explored in Chapter Six. Indeed, while participants were at times willing to go to some length in order to outline an anti-war stance, these always managed to be positioned quite neatly within hegemonic narratives of war being necessary. To explore the affective dimensions of this dilemmatic in live social contexts may advance the understanding of the roles affect and emotion play in the maintenance of power, and possibilities for its undoing.

I introduced this thesis by highlighting numerous common sense forms of affective privilege routinely put to work by media and citizens. In exploring these in greater detail through interviews and data analysis, I have been continually reminded of the degree to which resources for challenging common sense are often limited. Many of my participants seemed to lack conceptual, discursive or affective vocabularies or repertoires that could tell another, more just and sustainable story. Furthermore, as noted in Chapter Six, embodied resistance is always in dialogue and negotiation with the hegemonic, and as such is not often quite so straight forward. Put together, I understand these embodied resistances as part of a longer process of unlearning unproductive old habits, and engaging in new forms of being in the world, both of which most certainly involve practice. For Pākehā, it is this kind of grounded, everyday practice that will be a vital contribution in terms of working towards a mutually beneficial Treaty partnership with Māori.
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Appendices:

Appendix One: Statement of contributions

Appendix Two: Papers as published
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(To appear at the end of each thesis chapter/section/appendix submitted as an article/paper or collected as an appendix at the end of the thesis)

We, the candidate and the candidate’s Principal Supervisor, certify that all co-authors have consented to their work being included in the thesis and they have accepted the candidate’s contribution as indicated below in the Statement of Originality.

Name of Candidate: Alex McConville

Name/Title of Principal Supervisor: Tim McCreanor

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Name of Candidate: Alex McConville

Name/Title of Principal Supervisor: Tim McCreanor

Name of Published Research Output and full reference:

In which Chapter is the Published Work: Chapter Six

Please indicate either:

• The percentage of the Published Work that was contributed by the candidate: 80%
  and / or

• Describe the contribution that the candidate has made to the Published Work:

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Alex McConville
Candidate’s Signature
20/11/2017
Date

Tim McCreanor
Principal Supervisor’s signature
20/11/2017
Date