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Maori at Work:
the Shaping of a Maori Workforce
within the New Zealand State 1935 - 1975

Richard Beresford Nightingale

A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Social and Cultural Studies, Massey
University, 2007
ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the dynamics of the shaping of a Maori workforce within the New Zealand nation 1935 - 1975 as a significant outcome of colonial and postcolonial engagements under the introduced capitalist system. It is argued that this was part of a larger process of acculturation and assimilation of Maori.

That Maori labour formed a second stage in the incorporation of three indigenous components into the New Zealand domain of a global capitalist market system is accepted conditionally with some modification. Essentially, the first stage (from about 1840) was the need for land for the production of farm commodities; the second stage (from about 1935) was the need for industrial labour power for manufacturing production; and the third stage (from about 1975) was the appropriation of socio-cultural values as instruments to be utilized in social and economic administration by the State.

The focus is on the second stage of this process. The central objective is to assess the outcomes of this process on Maori, socially, economically and culturally. Two broad assumptions are interrogated: first, that pools of surplus Maori labour were created as an outcome of the expansion of capitalism on pre-capitalist economies; second, that the incorporation of this surplus labour via migration from about 1935 arose from patterns of capital accumulation that created excess labour demand in urban secondary industries.

Successive government policies of racial amalgamation, assimilation, adaptation and integration from 1840 through to the early 1970s, assumed that civilisation and integration were one-way processes. Government policies were predicated on concepts of assimilation and individualisation in a plethora of government initiatives in health, education, housing and social welfare, most of which were unilaterally justified on the grounds of progress and modernisation. These policies, which came to be called ‘integration’ in the decade of the 1960s, were perceived by government to be for the benefit of Maori and the whole nation, Pakeha and
Maori. Arguably, the Hunn Report of 1960/61 marked the high point of this post-colonial ideology.

The narrative of the key developments in government policies is interwoven with an account of race relations and Maori affairs. It is emphasised that these policies were instituted during a period of enormous change in Maori society and in the configuration of relationships between Maori and Pakeha. The focus is shifted in the last section of the thesis to the response by Maori to government policies. The retreat by Maori from issues of class deprivation to the promotion of issues that centred on loss of land, language and culture is traced. It is noted that the concern with class that marked the rhetoric of many similar global protest movements was remarkably mild in the Maori protest litany. This thesis marks a first attempt to discuss the shaping of a Maori workforce by taking an approach which recognises that the separation between culture and political economy is itself culturally constructed by the dominant actor in the nation-state.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am indebted to a large number of people who in their various ways have been supportive in the shaping of this thesis. Foremost I owe much to my chief supervisor Michael Belgrave. In the discursive process of formulating many of the ideas on which this thesis is predicated I am grateful for Michael’s robust signposting, erudite scholarship and laconic humour. Also, I am grateful for the quiet masterful guidance of my co-supervisor Peter Lineham whose knowledge and experience of the historical and bibliographical domain I was privileged to be able to tap into.

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Finally and most fulsomely to my dear friends – Caril and Brian, Marilyn and Graham, my dear brother Peter and his children and my mate, Dave for their unconditional aroha in this labour of love.
# ABBREVIATIONS

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<td>AFFCO</td>
<td>Auckland Farmers Freezing Company</td>
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<td>AJHR</td>
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<td>a.k.a.</td>
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<td>CARE</td>
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<td>Dictionary of National Biography</td>
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<td>Evening Post</td>
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<td>fol, fols</td>
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<td>ibid.</td>
<td>in the same book, chapter or passage, etc., already cited above</td>
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<td>MOOHR</td>
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<td>MWEO</td>
<td>Maori War Effort Organisation</td>
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<td>Te Punikuokiri (Ministry of Maori Development)</td>
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<td>USA</td>
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<td>Women's History Review</td>
</tr>
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<td>W &amp; T</td>
<td>Whitcombe &amp; Tombs</td>
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<td>WWI</td>
<td>World War I</td>
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Labour and work form an essential integral aspect of Maori lives, yet in New Zealand the historical aspects of it have largely escaped attention as a specific focus of academic interest. This anomalous situation is remarkable when it is considered that the lives of many Maori have been shaped by conditions of labour, especially through the robust processes of colonisation and capitalist expansion in New Zealand. Thus, there is a need to create from an array of archival documentary evidential materials a narrative which analyses the histories of the working lives of Maori in New Zealand. A parallel objective is to demonstrate how European colonialism and capitalism related to the lives of the Maori people of this country.

This dissertation examines the dynamics of the shaping of a Maori workforce within the New Zealand state as a significant outcome of colonial and postcolonial engagements in New Zealand under the globalising ascendancy of the introduced capitalist system. Placing the Maori experience in a universal context enables the observer to discern that Maori were actors in a series of social and economic transformations in which most people in the world participated. In doing so, two extreme viewpoints are possible: first, that what occurred was a totalising process of abstract economic determinism and structural reconfiguration driven by the relentless hidden hand of larger global patterns; second, that Maori reacted to the acculturation process by deploying a number of subversive tactics, co-option strategies and adaptation manoeuvres (sometimes successful, sometimes not) initiated by subjective actors or structural agents. Somewhere along the continuum between these two extreme poles, various Maori responses at different times and in various situations may be plotted. Whatever the final resolution of this interpretive debate, Maori became in a most definitive sense historical products of the universalising process of European modernity.

The central focus is an examination of the political actions of the New Zealand government in relation to Maori affairs, and specifically to policies that affected their working lives: employment, housing, welfare, education, professional and trades training. The perspective will be that of a social historian, integrating broad themes of political and cultural economy with a social history. It will incorporate historically tested evidence crafted from the written record, informed by the visual image archive, leavened by some oral material, but will refrain from any engagement with arcane economics discourse. Discounting any epistemological or
ontological concerns, it will be a ‘realistic’ portrayal if only because historians assert their authority over the real through the ideology of realism.¹

This dissertation is organized into eight chapters: the first introduces the topic and outlines some methodological, organisational and presentation issues; the second reviews the scholarly literature; the third lightly traces two appropriate theoretical perspectives; the fourth examines some of the foundational features of the colonisation process: Maori schooling, early Maori commercial pursuits, Maori rural labour in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and a brief case-study of a Maori family; the fifth focuses on the first 25 years of the incorporation of Maori into the urban work force (from about 1935 to 1960); the sixth centres on aspects of integration in the 1960s and its outcomes; the seventh explores the emergence of cultural nationalism in the 1970s; the eighth draws together some thematic threads, makes some comments, and constructs some patterns in order to give closure to the dissertation.

While admitting that the time-frame of the colonial and post-colonial encounters embraced in this dissertation is wide, the core of this dissertation focuses on four decades (1935 - 1975) during which there was a fundamental transformation of Maori society and a complex reconfiguration of Maori/Pakeha relations. The significance of the commencement date is that it is the beginning of an episode - when the place of Maori in the rapidly modernising social and economic life of the nation-state - urban and not rural - was first seriously addressed, not least, by politicians, both within and outside government. The end date is significant for at least two reasons: it marks the last year of the one-term third Labour Government (1972-75) during which attempts were initiated to assess some of the fundamental issues necessary for active, skilled Maori participation in work, and to address matters other than the role of work in the life of Maori and their place in the social, economic and cultural life of the unitary nation-state.

A salient feature of some recent New Zealand historiography has been a viewpoint, broadly post-colonial, arguably extremist, often neo-Marxist, and certainly provocative, that all policies – social, economic, commercial, trade and industrial - in the history of New Zealand have been driven by a series of agendas for the appropriation of indigenous resources - economic, social and cultural - for the purpose of furthering the unitary State’s economic

development.

These representations, it is argued, frame configurations of social inequality born of the relation of labour, race/ethnicity and gender to power and class. It is only in critiquing these - and other - interpretations that the dynamics of successive policies can be understood in terms of the contradictions within the capitalist economy and in terms of the contradiction between capitalist and Maori principles of social organisation.

Putting to one side these often combative interpretations, it is probably more practical and more insightful to view government policies from the time of formal annexation in May 1840 at least up until about 1972, as driven by agendas of assimilation in their various forms, the most salient of which was officially promoted as ‘integration’ in the period 1960 - 1972. This agenda was in turn over-taken by a programme of bicultural social policies driven by considerations of social equity on the part of the third Labour Government between 1972 and 1975. Similar liberal tenets under-pinned their continuance as part of the Tu Tangata initiatives of the third National Government in the late 1970s and early 1980s. These ideals of social equity were pursued at one level (often rhetorical) with some vigour by the fourth Labour Government between 1984 and 1990, yet, paradoxically, were often effectively negated by its rigorous neo-liberal economic policies that largely stripped away the State’s responsibility for Maori well-being. Thus, the often self-proclaimed altruism and goodwill that accompanied the fourth Labour government’s pursuit of social equity was vigorously critiqued.

For a time in the 1980s, there was a tension between the theories and practice of biculturalism and multi-culturalism arising out of the official recognition of tangata whenua/tangata tiriti and uncertainty over other more recent immigrant groups’ identities and statuses. Moreover, from about this time there was contestation between the declining numbers of so-called ‘traditional, rural Maori’ and the increasing numbers of urban Maori, as to which group had an authoritative political voice nationally. Because the New Zealand nation-state was then

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2 Four acerbic critics have been E.J./Jane Kelsey, E.S. Poata-Smith, G.H. Smith, and L.T. Smith. For a full discussion, refer to Chapter Two: Literature Review (below).


imagined as an essentially historically-based binary one (bicultural or Treaty-based), the identity and place for the expanding urban indigeneity, often ignorant of its whakapapa and specific rural origins, and thus lacking mandated iwi or hapu authority to speak and lobby politically on behalf of those social units, constituted a frequently contested third voice in the national polity.

Central to this neo-Marxist/post-colonialist analysis has been the argument, first articulated cogently in 1989 by Keith Barber, that colonisation might usefully be ‘examined as administrative strategies for the appropriation of Maori resources, both economic and socio-cultural, for the purpose of furthering New Zealand’s economic development’. This argument continued that Maori labour formed a second stage in the appropriation of three resource requirements as integral components of a capitalist market system. His analysis has been developed, extended, and modified by many academics. The first stage, from the time of formal annexation by Britain in May 1840, was the need for land for the production of agricultural and pastoral commodities; the second stage, from the time of the social democratic first Labour government in 1935, was the need for industrial labour power for manufacturing production; and the third stage, from about the time of the third Labour government (1972-1975), was the arrogation of socio-cultural values as instruments to be deployed in the bicultural programmes of public social administration. The argument in this neo-Marxist ideology was that any understanding of the total colonisation process must view the incorporation of Maori workers via labour migration as central and fundamental to any consideration of the marginalised social and economic position of Maori today. This thesis will critique this interpretation.6

Forming part of this interrogation will be an attempt to ascertain the degree and extent that the New Zealand experience of the imperial/subaltern encounter conformed to established universally-conceived theoretical paradigms of rural/urban diaspora and cultural/political economy. The chapter on theoretical perspectives will examine these processes that were integral with the direct territorial appropriation of the geographical entity of New Zealand, the construction of a single geo-political entity, the exploitation of its resources and labour, and the systematic reduction of, and restrictions on the capacity of the appropriated culture - itself not a homogenous entity - to organise its own affairs.

An important consideration in this dissertation is how the social and economic agendas of the 1960s, given a dramatic sense of urgency by that seminal document, the *Hunn Report*, were overwhelmed by cultural and constitutional issues in the late 1970s and onwards into the new century. Simply, why did class disappear from the agenda to be replaced by culture? The business of formulating answers to this conundrum are challenging; some tentative explanations only can be provisionally offered. These are informed by awareness that colonial and post-colonial experiences were complex affairs involving multiple agents, elaborate cultural constructs, and unforeseen outcomes. While immediately inspired by recent developments in social theory associated with cultural, ethnic and feminist studies, as well as with poststructuralism and postcolonialism, this dissertation builds on a long tradition of New Zealand scholarship on colonialism and imperialism stretching from Beaglehole to Belgrave and Belich, from Reeves to Rata.

This dissertation will focus on the second phase of the colonisation process and attempt to ascertain the degree and extent that the Maori experience, conformed to the theoretical typology of a paradigmatic shift of indigenous colonised peoples moving from a rural-based, semi-subsistence, partly-waged society to an urban-based, reserve army of labour, engaged as semi-skilled or unskilled workers in the period of full employment – and conversely, easily jettisoned in the times of economic contraction. A preliminary reading of the evidence demonstrated that the colonial and post-colonial Maori experience would not fit - and, moreover, could not be forced to fit, the proto-typical capitalist formations of early nineteenth

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century England developed by the English Marxist historian, E.P. Thompson in *The Making of the English Working Class*.8

What was missing was any Maori consciousness of their ‘working class-ness’, a fundamental component of the Thompson construct. No working class self-consciousness by Maori, of Maori, for Maori, as part of some larger theoretically-based Marxist-inspired hierarchical class system seems to have developed beyond an incipient, embryonic stage. In the period of fervent Maori oppositional activism from 1975 and through the remaining decades of the twentieth century, Maori protest focussed primarily on land, language and culture. Issues of class effectively were submerged within larger land and cultural issues. All these issues were cobbled together in a passionate re-working of the slippery concept of ethnicity, and along the way issues of class were subsumed (and further obfuscated) in a totality of perceived alienation, marginalisation and subordination. This heady amalgam was dressed up in the emotive language of neo-Marxist rhetoric.9

It became very apparent in the course of formulating, articulating and writing this dissertation that there was a shaping of a Maori workforce but only in terms of actual occupation and ascription, and not in any Thompsonian sense of a development of a positive working class self-consciousness. Was this formation an ideologically acceptable variation to the standard typology? Or was there something different emerging? In short, was the Maori experience unique? Did Maori protest over cultural loss signify something else, something more fundamental? Did this vociferous clamour by Maori about near-absolute total alienation and marginalisation signify a new trend? Was there in fact a retreat from class, as some neo-Marxists have argued?10 These issues will be examined in more detail in the chapter on theoretical perspectives.

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There is a diverse range of materials surviving from the processes of the national government’s legislative, executive and judicial processes. Of these the most significant are the recorded commands, regulations, statutes, memoranda, reviews and statistics generated as part of the government’s business. Much of the evidential material for this dissertation was derived from primary published and unpublished Governmental sources. Because the main focus of the report is on government actions and inactions and on government policies, it is reasonable to assume that these sources gave a reasonably lucid picture both of what ministers and officials intended their policies to be, and of what outcomes they expected to follow from the implementation of their policies.

One of the greatest challenges in shaping this thesis has been the uneven character - in both quality and quantity - of documentary source material. The principal ore has been archival government written records. Specifically, because this thesis examines government policy, it naturally draws on the huge repositories of primary unpublished materials located at Archives New Zealand, the Alexander Turnbull Library and the General Assembly Library, together with primary published government documents in the New Zealand Parliamentary Debates (NZPD) and the Appendices to the Journal of the House of Representatives (AJHR) Conventional history is based upon written documentary evidence. As noted further below in the chapter on theoretical perspectives, information that has been generated by politicians and officials must be closely interrogated. There are always limits to the objectivity that one might find, for example, when government officials were dealing with Maori responses to government policies.

This dissertation however will show that even official sources contain a mine of information about past conditions of labour and like any mine of information, often the questions and approach the researcher decides to take, unconsciously construct the real barriers. In Eric Wolf’s phrase ‘the people without history’ have been rendered so by the policies of the dominant settler society. The very ‘absence of presence’ (to quote Foucault) of ordinary Maori working lives in standard histories is, from a post-colonialist perspective, a ghost-like indication of their subordinate situation. Mindful of these watchwords, it is imperative to alert readers that any historical account will not necessarily inform us about exactly what has

\[\text{Refer below, Chapter 3, ‘Theoretical Perspectives’, pp. 53-4.}\]
happened in the past. History is not a mimesis of life in its multiform variety. History, to paraphrase Hayden White, is a cultural artefact.\textsuperscript{12}

When academic historians compose their work they draw primarily on the written records of participants of the events under consideration. For the purposes of this dissertation, primary sources are those artefacts of the past, generated at the time of (or soon after) the event(s) so recorded or represented. An argument could be pursued for categorising all documents as being similar to conventional secondary sources, because all document production is, of necessity, partial, selective and value-impregnated. The rationale is that the moment an object, text or relic has been identified by latter-day inquirers as material for the making of a history, it is immediately and irretrievably embedded in a specific cultural order. Many historians of nineteenth and twentieth century New Zealand have practised what is essentially a legitimation of selected earlier documents. Leaving this argument aside however, this dissertation will observe the usual conventions about the diachronic separation between primary and secondary documents.

Given the difficulties of accessing and interpreting the varieties of versions of the past which are beyond the conventional/traditional historical paradigm this thesis can only point to the gaps that exist and attempt to suggest vicariously a variety of plausible verisimilitudes.\textsuperscript{13} This is the challenge of the postmodernist and poststructuralist age which can but be alluded to as an ideal construct in this introduction. It is probably an inescapable reality, despite the wishful idealism of literary and historical theorists, that unlike fiction, history can only have one voice, the historian’s. In the final analysis, by privileging a historian’s version of bi-culturalism and poly-vocalism in the text, it is the historian-author who becomes the single mediator between past and present in any given text. The production of professional academic history by committee is an uncomfortable prescription.

The word ‘text’ requires explanation. For some time it has been a central canon of the linguistic turn in the postmodernist (and poststructuralist) litany. As we shall see below, it is


\textsuperscript{13} This challenge has been addressed with some scholarly flair by two University of Auckland academics, Judith Binney and Anne Salmond. Their recent published works are arguably a proof that a Eurocentric prescriptive historiographic paradigm can be broken. Recent examples of this are Judith Binney, \textit{Redemption Songs: a Life of Te Kooti Arikirangi Te Turuki}, Auckland: AUP, 1995; Anne Salmond, \textit{The Trial of the Cannibal Dog: Captain Cook in the South Seas}, Auckland: PB, 2004.
true that all texts do not necessarily assume a written or graphic form. This is arguably a key issue, a fundamental problematic in the inter-face between a traditionally non-literate indigenous culture and a more recently literate European one. It is in a very real sense at the very heart of the whole matter of representation by a privileged group to its acolytes, by author to auditors and audience, and by writer to readers. The dissemination of knowledge is deeply implicated in the power system of any culture, whether Maori or European.

In its widest understanding the forms given to texts belong to a reflexive dimension of all representations by which a material device is proffered as standing for something significant; these shapes and forms can be verbal or non-verbal, print or non-print objects or artefacts. In a well-known essay, ‘Meditations on a Hobbyhorse,’ E. H. Gombrich has pointed out that a representation should not be looked upon as an imitation of something, or a mimesis (by which criterion a broomstick would fail to represent a horse in almost every way) but rather as something capable of substituting for the object represented for a specific purpose.14 The process whereby a decision is articulated on what is capable of substitution for the referent or object is an intrinsic part of the social fabric of the culture. As the focus of this thesis centres on various understandings of peoples’ relations to work, labour and employment there can be texts that assume no use of verbal articulation, that are images, symbols or icons with a representational significance. For example, in the context of this thesis one might incorporate the workers’ tools, the workplace, the fruits of labour itself, the workers’ machines. These symbolically can become non-verbal texts: the signified becomes its own referent; the space where work takes place can become a non-verbal text. We need to be reminded of this against the tyranny of the strictly linguistic approach which reduces the social world to an essentially discursive construction and to pure intellectual academic language games – ‘a ballet of bloodless categories.’15

In the context of this thesis however, these non-verbal (and/or non-written/not printed) forms will be acknowledged where appropriate. The principal focus, however, will be on the culturally encrypted forms of the dominant colonial culture to which the colonised peoples, given the generic ascription ‘Maori’ (rather than specific iwi/hapu identifications) quickly adapted. This is the written mode, the literate form; these are the texts that will be interrogated if only because it is an accessible representational public record of past actions, a literate

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conduit between the recorder and the present inquirer. These records are the ore from which the present-day historian constructs and re-fashions the past and makes a history, a definition of which is now necessary. Cutting beneath all the nonsense that is deployed by proponents and opponents of postmodernism (and its more disciplined relation in the domain of history – poststructuralism) it must be insisted vigorously that history is commanded by an intention and a principle of truth, that the past which history has taken as its object is a reality external to discourse and rhetoric and that knowledge of it can be verified.

The histories that unfold in the successive chapters are necessarily mediated by this presenter but it is hoped that the reader will receive not only some enlightenment of the central issues and questions at stake, but gain some insight into the human dramas that animated the social and economic aspirations of Maori. Above all, it hopes to present a view that, occasionally, Maori agency often gave the lie - or at least a paradoxical twist, to the apparently inexorable might of abstract economic determinism.

The texts which are the focus of this thesis are multi-form, multivalent; they can be roughly grouped into two forms: the graphic or written document and the visual representation or photograph. A full discussion of the meaning of ‘text’ in its many forms and appearances – graphical, literate, non-literate, emblematic and symbolic - is located below. Almost without exception these texts are premised on and generated by an informal colonial and post-colonial administrative imperative, which required that the State record all significant information and data that would impact on the formulation of policy matters. In short, the form and focus of the texts carried a specific prescription with a colonial and post-colonial Eurocentric bias.

In the domain of government, there was (and is) an evidential obsession with the culturally logocentric imperative to record everything for legal and administrative purposes from the perspective of the State. There remain, however, limitations to the candour one might expect to find in such sources. There are also distinct limits to the objectivity one might expect to find, for example, when officials are dealing with Maori responses to government policies. Most of these records survive as a prescriptive template for the critical present-day inquirer. The challenge of shaping an alternative history needs to acknowledge this prescription; then to critically interrogate it. This is the driving force of the deconstructionist paradigm. Critical interrogation is the imperative although we must needs guard against the postmodernist extremes of infinite regress, infinite deferral.
It is the purpose of this thesis to strive to moderate this Eurocentric white gender-biased perspective, acknowledging that the textualised past is highly focussed, subjective, incomplete and ambivalent; and that its meanings, its significances, are multivalent. The ideal postmodernist and poststructuralist goal would be to write a history that incorporated multiple viewpoints to create plural pasts and new approaches to turning history into narrative. Notwithstanding this idealism, the immediate problematic is the paucity of conventional textual evidence to attest to the others’ experiences both of the past and in the past. A second challenge (putting to one side for the moment the gaps in the textual record) in introducing multiple viewpoints into historical discourse is that any critique of the normal history paradigm needs to be balanced by a new vision of historical authority. In the end the paradox is that the individual historian of the new text would act as the single mediator which would privilege that version’s overall viewpoint above others and implicitly authorise it as best by doing so. The alternative: multiple voices that dissipate authority and level privilege.

History is a complex cognitive cultural construct. It is manifest in many forms, four of which are further explicated. It can assume many shapes, which can be encrypted with culturally significant codes, but this huge field needs a sharper focus where a privileged dominant hegemonic culture (and history) is under challenge politically and socially. In its infinite plenitude (which is obviously beyond the scope of this thesis), history is a variously texted past which can be organised into four broad representations: it can be offered in a literate prose sequence in either a scholarly mode (a form preferred by academe) or a populist vein (appealing to a wider readership); it can be rendered in a culturally poetic or artistic mode, such as waiata, ballad, theatre; it can be made manifest as social ritual in the forms enacted in the discourse of hui, assembly, school-room and work-place; it can be signalled by an institutionalized rubric: marae powhiri, court protocol, church liturgy, executive proclamations. The texts of the past have their own presence (or absence of presence.) Importantly, this status is contingent on the political authority of the successor generations.

History is in that sense not all human experience, but that part of the past which is selectively re-called by individual and collective successors and which is transformed into texts – inscribed, spoken, moulded, shaped verbally and non-verbally: a manuscript, a discourse, a korero, an employment contract, a whakapapa or a notice of ‘situations vacant’. These histories differ; they are unique. They are read and heard in varied ways. With one another, tangata whenua and the larger pool of peoples – Pakeha, Maori (or whoever) - interested in the work (and out-of-work) experience, are adept at applying the appropriate mode of re-
A schema might be constructed across different systems of cultural signs - the gossip of the workplace, the dramaturgy of the trade union meeting, the korero of the marae, the imperatives of the Government’s injunctions, the rhetoric of the labour struggle for employment equity. These varied texts in turn can be distilled to shape histories of the Maori labour experience. It is our legacy that we are embedded in the cultural parameters of the post-Enlightenment Eurocentric legacy. This is where some of the more restrained of the postmodernist paradigms can be engaged as practical heuristic devices.

Each text has its appropriate cultural and social context for being read and/or heard. Both Pakeha and Maori are variously and differently socialised and acculturated to varieties of histories. There are expressions about the past that are crafted to suit the time, place and circumstance. This in New Zealand may be a workplace hui or korero, it may be local anecdote or labour notice, it may be a legal submission on the Employment Relations Act in a court of law. Present-day expression about the past in histories is always assiduously molded where it is driven by a subjective agenda: it can be the diary of a unionist, it may be advocacy in the industrial conciliation court, it might be waiata in a Ratana church, it could be the mute testimony of a carved pou at the marae entrance or inscription on a public monument. In the domain of this thesis, it may be a tract from the *Appendices to the Journals of the House of Representatives*, it may be regulations governing conditions of employment, and it might be petition and prayer to Parliament. These are the resources, the primary textualised graphic resources which are the engine driving this thesis.

A liberal open-minded cultural understanding allows us to shift easily between different modes of expression with no sense of contradiction. Most of us are attuned to what is appropriate, what is acceptable for the moment, for the occasion; however, there is always a danger that the individual voice, the alternative version and the contrary interpretation may never be heard in public because a monolithic colonising power or oppressive culture imposes its agenda and binds the many, the diverse in its hegemonic grip. The freedom to read a text as one chooses is always constrained by a shared social common sense of what meanings the expression might bear, what ambivalences it might cover, in what way each reading might distinguish the text from the past of which it is the transformation. In history, past and present are indivisibly fused.

The above explication of the nature of history is of course an idealised representation of its multi-various abundance. More realistically, the goal of this thesis is to critique the work
experience of Maori in order to test the limits of the modernist historical mode. It will examine the variety of histories crafted from the public record in the public domain. The objective is to interrogate the texts in order to distil a more open-ended history that embraces the middle ground; or to put it in the current academic vernacular, to simultaneously deconstruct a selection of the multivalent texts and mold a new synthesis — a process called reflexive contextualisation.

Thus, the raw experiences of the past were and are transformed into texts. These texts (in the *literate* sense) were and are packaged in their turn by the institutions that preserved and maintain them. Historians exploring the past come across the scripted texts in well-thumbed tomes or unopened dossiers. We all, both Pakeha and Maori, have widely different signifiers, registers and poetics for decoding this iconic encrypted past. Every reading can be a new experience, a confirmation, a suspension of the disingenuous. And history in its most fundamental and practical sense is all the ways the past is encoded in symbol form to make a continuously changing present.

History thus informs the agenda of the present. The texts of the past are public. Texts are available to be heard, viewed, read and interpreted. They are not shut away in personal private memory; they are represented/re-presented to elucidate, to inform, to disabuse, to propagandise, to liberate, to empower; they are reproduced to fit the agenda of the presenter, to complement or confront the mind-set of the auditor, viewer and reader. But history is not just personal memory unless it be that very personal memory made into cultural artifact, external, public, social, sometimes accepted, at times contested. The histories of the Maori workers’ experiences are at once highly personal but very public.

This investigative strategy must test the notion that history is too often essentialised to a grand narrative sweep in order to construct heroic (and mundane) patterns from what arguably might be perceived as mere contingency. In this thesis the focus is on the detail, on the minute; the imperial, the global is forsaken. A salutary heuristic strategy has been suggested by Hans Kellner, that ‘the text of history is a text that can only be seen by “getting the story crooked”’. This seeming heresy, this apparent cavalier disregard for the modernist canons of empirical representation requires explication. Kellner is postulating a line of enquiry which is premised on the concept that there are no narratives in the archival relics of the past fretting anthropomorphously for the time when they will be resurrected and told. He explains:

Neither human activity nor the existing records of such activity take the form of a narrative, which is the product of complex cultural forms and deep-seated linguistic conventions deriving from choices that have traditionally been called rhetorical; there is no “straight” way to invent a history, regardless of the honesty and professionalism of the historian.\footnote{Ibid., p. vii.}

In a nutshell, the contention is that history is made; but underlying this contention are the further questions focusing on how it is made, who makes it and for whom it is made. At one extreme some elements of the postmodernist school stressing the linguistic turn would dissolve all history into the area of pure textuality in which it would have little or no identity; at the other extreme, there remains a substantial number of historians who cling optimistically to the ideal of the mimetic representationality of historical writing on its traditional terms of getting the story straight.

One of the strategies of this thesis is to scrutinise the Eurocentric texts on which much conventional history is grounded, at looking honestly at alternative sources of history, located not in documentary archives but in the oral record of discourse and rhetoric; in short, to deconstruct the white, colonial, gender and Euro-centric bias of the written record. While documenting these broader economic and political processes through successive government administrations, emphasis has been given to how Maori perceived and responded to the impact of an introduced alien system on their life-style, their getting and spending, their individual and their whanau’s lives.

In recent years the question of the co-existence of different, even incommensurable or competing historical narratives, each with its own (sometimes mutually exclusive) claims to legitimacy, has become a vitally important issue. The global politics of the post-colonial world increasingly demonstrate that the models of historical reality long taken for granted by the dominant hegemonic groups do not and cannot tell the whole story; may, in fact be part of an attempt (conscious or otherwise) to repress much of the story that they have not wished to contemplate. Indeed, as a number of recent philosophers of history have argued, the very conceptual possibilities of a ‘whole story’ has been thrown into doubt. Furthermore, as Michel Foucault has pointed out:

\[\ldots\text{the more History attempts to transcend its own rootedness in historicity, and the greater the efforts it makes to attain, beyond the historical relativity of its origin and its choices, the more clearly it bears the marks of its historical birth, and the more evidently there appears through it the history of which it is a part.}\footnote{Foucault, 1970, p. 371.} \]
This Foucaultian injunction is a salutary reminder of the constraints that are often imposed authorially in the production of ‘texts’. An interest in the discursive aspects of cultural representation needs to focus not so much on the interpretation or reading of cultural texts but on their relations of production, on the ‘how’ as opposed to the ‘why’. All historiography needs have a specification of discourse and rhetoric in order to pursue an agenda. The problems and constraints which determined these strategies require a finer scrutiny. These, and other issues will be addressed in the examination of the Maori experience in the world of work in this thesis.

The term ‘labour’ as used in this thesis in either of its two broadest senses: either, the effort rendered by a human agent of performing a task or providing any valuable service, or the workers engaged in these activities. Given the nature of Maori incorporation into the capitalist system historically, this latter term usually refers to waged workers. As always, context will determine its specificity.

A closer interrogation of the multiform texts that focus on the Maori experience in the domain of capitalist labour will highlight the multi-faceted nature of that process. In an attempt to grapple with this challenge this dissertation has been informed by the current discourse on the nature of historical representation. Beneath this portrait of a brave new urban world for Maori is an ongoing dialogue with more recent history, with long-term questions of continuity and change, and with theory.

In the following chapter the substantive literature will be reviewed in an attempt to illuminate some of the main lines of this debate and specifically the strategy that has been deployed to re-present (and represent) some of the histories of Maori experience in the world of work and the domain of labour in New Zealand.
2.01. Introduction

This review is organized into two sections: firstly, the historical representations by scholars of the nature of the Maori response to and participation in the local, regional and national economies; secondly, the way that contemporary government policies and legislation were informed and shaped by perceived historical interpretations.

The first section of the review focuses on the representations by academics of the process whereby Maori were incorporated into the New Zealand political economy from about the time of formal annexation in May 1840 through the period of rural-urban migration in the 1940s and 1950s to the economic recession and restructuring of the 1980s and 1990s. The goal is to lay some groundwork for the historicisation of some of the evidence and issues that have at times been misrepresented or skewed in an a-historical fashion. The second section of the review centres on scholastic and critical interpretations of governments' policies. In a sense this review is part of a longer history of social theory in which the participants have all been - unwittingly or otherwise - engaged in a long discourse with the ghost of Marx. That dialogue began in the mid-nineteenth century and continues today.

2.02 Overview

The first sporadic signs of this dialogue were the colonial government's attack on Maori tribal 'communism' as summarized in Henry Sewell's account. Other sign-posts in this discourse were Elsdon Best's ethnological presentation (in the first three decades of the twentieth century) of Maori culture as communist but doomed; the administrative and anthropological development of Maoritanga by Apirana Ngata as an alternative to Maori working class

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20 W. David McIntyre (ed), The Journal of Henry Sewell, 1853-1857, Vol II, Christchurch, N.Z.: Whitcoulls, 1980, p. 258. The full quotation reads: '[3 August 1856] Now for the other side. Responsible Government has been in existence some three months. In that time we have taken the first real steps which has yet been taken to elevate and save the Native by enabling him to obtain an individual title to Land; the first beginning towards planting the family, and raising him out of his present state of debasing socialistic communism. It is so. Here in the heart of Auckland is maintained (in great part at the expense of Government) a so-called Hostelry for the Natives, an organized institution adapted to the Native ideas of communism.' Also, refer NZPD, Vol. 9, 1870, p. 361, which contains the oft-quoted phrase: 'the other great object was...to destroy...the principle of communism which ran through the whole of their institutions.' W. David McIntyre, 'Sewell, Henry 1807-1879', DNZB, updated 7 April 2006. URL: http://www.dnzb.govt.nz/. Viewed 10 September 2006.
restiveness and growing unionism in the rural sector in the 1920s; and Raymond Firth who as a pioneer of economic anthropology, presented Maori culture (in the late 1920s) - in his opposition to Elsdon Best - as capitalist and progressive.

Ernest and Pearl Beaglehole, James and Jane Ritchie and Joan Metge writing in the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s took a perspective of Maori history that reinforced Firth's revisionary researches that hapu structures were defunct and that Maori social structures were adapting along 'an acculturation gradient' (Beaglehole and Ritchie), to the 'culture of the individual' (Ritchie), with more 'mixing with Europeans at work, in education and leisure' (Metge).

In the 1970s this theory, somewhat modified, was continued by Pat Hohepa and Hugh Kawharu; the latter described the remnant tiny community of 'about 250' at Okahu/Orakei, who had been, in every sense, remorselessly reduced to a marginalised fragment, swamped by 'tens of thousands of Pakeha settlers and 30,000 Maori immigrants', working in 'unskilled and semi-skilled manual work' (mainly on 'the roads for the Auckland City Council'), yet miraculously 'preserving .. something of their mana as tangata whenua' of Tamaki Makaurau/Auckland.

In separate editions (1975 and 2003) of contemporary and historical (respectively), student essays, Conflict and Compromise, Hugh Kawharu commented on his own hapu's multivalent responses to acculturation in the largest metropolis, in New Zealand, Auckland. Geographically, his hapu's 689 acres at Orakei was progressively enveloped and engulfed by advancing Pakeha suburban settlement between 1898 and 1950, until only a few acres remained. In his introduction to the 1975 edition, Kawharu noted that a 'higher standard of

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28 Kawharu, 1968, pp. 176-9; also, I.H. Kawharu, Maori Land Tenure, Oxford, UK: OUP, 1977, p. 15: The Native Land Court was a 'veritable engine of destruction for any tribes' tenure of land, anywhere.'
living’ had ‘almost made the tribal community an anachronism, and the individual, a refugee in his own country’. The theme of near-total alienation is re-iterated in the 2003 edition, in terms of the unending struggle of the numerically tiny tangata whenua - an ‘urban, landless proletariat’, in Kawharu’s words, to ‘recreate a sense of community’. There is however a shift in Kawharu’s stance in the later edition. While he acknowledges that the:

Treaty driven initiatives in health, education, social research, small business development ... shape the changing forces of whanau and hapu, ... some Maori, by choice or circumstances of migration, avoid the politics of kinship and tribe, finding instead, support in the ‘compromise’ of urban authorities.

This is undoubtedly an implied critique of some urban Maori authorities, such as the Waipareira Trust and the Manukau Urban Maori Authority, which is an ironic comment indeed, given the re-invention of an urban Ngati Whatua o Orakei in the later twentieth century.

The re-evaluation of the position and relationship of Maori society in the post-colonial, post-Fordist era that emerged in the 1970s prompted a number of interesting political economic theories of Maori society in the last decades of the twentieth century. In some cases these were the product of one author, but in many cases they were co-authored. Amongst the plethora of names these authors were prominent: Peter Brosnan, John Macrae, Robert Miles, James Newall, David Rea, Graham Hingangaroa Smith, Linda Tuhiwai Smith, Paul Spoonley, Christine Teariki and Moira Wilson.
2.03. Elsdon Best and his peers

Elsdon Best’s ethnography of Maori had been predicated on nineteenth century approaches which were fundamentally evolutionist and racialist. His ethnographic style in a large number of publications – encompassing scholarly articles, popular accounts in newspaper columns and more serious major works over some 35 years - illuminated the Maori past while disparaging the contemporary Maori, his informants and hosts. He perceived his role as preserving in the written word the dying world of a people - the traditional Maori – he thought destined to disappear. In his time of writing – the last decade of the nineteenth century and the first three decades of the twentieth – his influence and impact were widespread and enduring; it is perhaps not too much to claim that his perspective on Maori informed many popular conceptions (and misconceptions) lasted well into the mid-twentieth century and lingered even longer in residual form.

Best’s perspective of Maori encapsulated and epitomised a Eurocentric ideology that interpreted Maori culture according to Eurocentric perceptions and thus was limited in unlocking any meaningful comprehension of the significance of Maori culture and its historical representation. Its best expression can be traced in two massive monumental works that profoundly informed several succeeding generations of European perceptions of Maori: *The Maori, as He was: a Brief Account of Maori Life as it was in pre-European days* (1924) and *Tuhoe: the Children of the Mist* (1925.) In these works and many others Best argued generally that Maori were at some mid-way point in the three-stage process of evolution that some ethnographers had developed - from savagery to barbarism to civilization.

Keith Sorrenson’s critique of Pakeha myths about Maori origins has pointed out that:

*Best was anxious to demonstrate that in many ways the neolithic Maori had reached at least the second or barbaric stage; even in a few cases, the level of civilized peoples. Thus he saw in Maori ‘communism’ a survival of the old-world commune; in Maori baptism similarity with the Christian rite; in marriage, at least among the chiefly class, something approaching the Roman confarreato, in the purification of the sick, features of more advanced religions.*

Best’s interpretation of Maori social customs and institutions and their place in the progressive development theory that bore the imprimatur of Darwin, encompassed a range of

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34 His output was prodigious; perhaps the most accessible, popular (and largest) work is *Tuhoe*, Wellington, 2 Vols, various editions and reprints, 1925–96.
37 Sorrenson, 1979, pp. 78-9.
Western epistemological viewpoints that were expressed many decades later by the noted Western historian-philosopher, Hayden White:

One group, taking a positivistic view of explanation, has argued that historians explain past events only insofar as they succeed in identifying the laws of causation governing the processes in which events occur ... another group ... has insisted that historians explain events that make up these narratives by finding the story which lies buried within or behind the events ... 38

Although at first sight these approaches appear radically opposed, both imply an understanding of the past as a continuous process – governed by laws on the one hand, or unfolded as a plot on the other. One of the problems with which Elsdon Best, like other ‘translators’ of Maori history such as George Grey, W.E. Gudgeon and John White, had to grapple was that indigenous narrators (such as Tuhoe) did not (and do not) speak of their past as a continuous process. 39 Rather, Maori narratives were (and are) not unilinear. They are predicated on a whakapapa/genealogy which defines both lineal and lateral relationships between tipuna/ancestors, and thus they articulate different levels, different voices and different perspectives of a complex social and political order. 40

2.04. Firth as Colossus

Firth’s doctoral thesis became his first book, *Primitive Economics of the New Zealand Maori* (1929). A second edition was published in 1959 as *Economics of the New Zealand Maori*, in which Firth critiqued his own original work in a new foreword, modified some chapters, and added references to more recent literature. His research was unusual for an economist; he complemented the substantial literature in English with Maori texts, many from Maori language newspapers. Firth posed his analysis respectfully against his eminent predecessor Best, arguing the importance of the nuclear family, private ownership, individual enterprise, and a strong work ethic in traditional Maori society, contrary to Best’s preoccupation with primitive communism in kin groups and property. Thus while Best had defended the triumph

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of capitalism against primitivity, Firth defended traditional Maori society as inchoate capitalism. The implicit politics of these theories had significantly different social contexts: while Best's analysis had coincided with a history of land acquisition rationalised by the conviction that the Maori were dying out, Firth's analysis coincided in the 1920s with the realisation that the Maori population was increasing and that their landlessness made them a ready workforce for the industrial boom and buyers' labour market of the 1920s.

Firth's work of the 1920s documented major changes in the material changes of the Maori 1770-1880. Curiously, he argued that there were no major changes in traditional 'economic structure' until 1880, after which it ceased to exist altogether. Firth's ideological adherence to functionalist paradigms presented two alternatives in the Maori economic system - traditionalism and assimilation (to capitalism). An examination of Firth's paradox of traditionalism or assimilation will demonstrate how this belief has been so persistent.

Firth outlined four successive phases of culture change among Maori. The first phase of 'initial impact' (1770-1840) was marked by enthusiastic and widespread trade for certain European goods such as potatoes, pigs, tools, muskets, and clothing, and the reorientation of labour for the production of flax, timber, agricultural produce, and fish for commercial exchange. The second phase of 'enthusiastic adoption of cultural forms' (1840 - 1860) was characterised by the rapid expansion of agricultural production, the general use of money in exchange, and substantial investment in farm implements, wheat mills, and sailing vessels. The third phase was a 'mood of reaction' (1860 - 1880) marked by a resistance to further alienation of land, and widespread despondency and resignation following the wars and land confiscations of the 1860s.

The fourth phase of 'acceptance of European standards' (1880 - 1920s) marked by the emergence of 'the principle of individualisation' which had emerged:

 did not have to be laboriously implanted by the white man in the native, but, once given the stimulus of novel economic and social conditions, sprang up and flowered from a soil which had long contained their seed.

Firth's assumption that the land wars were followed by Maori 'despondency' was a popular conviction reflected in the 1920s ethnology of Sutherland (1927) and despite rebuttals by Sorrenson (1956) and Ward (1973) was perpetuated by many mainstream historians as late as

41 Firth, 1929, pp. 448-73.
42 Ibid., p. 426.
the early 1990s, notably Sinclair (1991). This assumption, and a concomitant trivialisation of resistance as religious ‘cults’, continued to obscure the historical facts of Maori social change and struggle in the later nineteenth century. This representation of Maori resistance held for a greater part of the twentieth century. In the last years of the twentieth century the revisionist work of Judith Binney on Te Kooti and Rua Kenana, James Belich on Titokowaru and Buddy Mikaere on Te Maiharoa re-defined the unique and profound impact of these resistance movements. The Pai Mairire ‘cult’, however continues to be viewed through a Victorian lens and needs revisionist attention. Representation of the resistance movement at Parihaka is dealt with below.

A focus on the paradox that was the legacy of Firth’s pioneering anthropological inquiries reveals the persistence of traditional Maori economic structure regardless of any enthusiastic acceptance of colonial ‘material culture’ and participation in commercial enterprise for over a century. Fundamental to Firth’s analysis was his mentor, Malinowski’s conviction that he had discovered bourgeois individualism in the ‘native mind’, a capitalist faith that seemed at odds with Malinowski’s representation of all cultures as rich and unpredictable. Firth’s account of traditional Maori moved from this suppressed spirit of free enterprise in the Maori psyche towards its inevitable goal: assimilation to capitalist culture. Malinowski’s and Firth’s model was the venerable but persistent ideology of necessary evolution from primitive to modern, or from a ‘natural’ economy to a commodity economy.

Within traditional Maori culture, Firth (following Malinowski) projected this oppositional model into an uneasy compromise between community solidarity and native individualism. After European colonisation provided the ‘stimulus’, it was the seeds of native individualism which finally won against traditional economic structure in 1880. The much earlier adoption of European ‘material culture’ and commerce is subordinated to this teleological ‘spirit of capitalism’ as ‘direct material interest’ or individual pragmatism which until 1880 could not yet transform traditional ‘economic structure’. When the latter chains of communalism were finally burst, it was a psychological rather than a material revolution, reflecting the idealist bias in Firth’s theory of culture change.

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The native has shown a revived interest in all forms of commercial enterprise, and has displayed a conscious desire for the adoption of European economic methods. The former Maori material culture has been largely replaced by that of the white man, and the old economic structure has given way in corresponding fashion. Assisted by the deliberate policy of individualizing the shares in tribal land, the former communal system has been gradually abandoned, as no longer suited to the new social environment.  

It is salutary however, to be aware that Firth's focus on work, production, distribution and consumption in the traditional Maori economic structure appealed to both a Marxist as well as a bourgeois interest and was readily adapted to the political economic analyses of the 1970s and beyond - that will be examined below. Firth's oppositional model of traditionalism as antithesis to capitalism suited the political economists' own, although valences were reversed. A more penetrating and less complementary analysis is required if the uneven development of capitalism in New Zealand is to be better understood, and the assumption of persistent Maori traditionalism thwarted.

2.05. Ngata's Practical (and Political) Stance

Perhaps one approach might be to recognise that arcane anthropological theory changes (and changed) nothing and it might be more appropriate to examine the eminently practical anthropology of Apirana Ngata, arguably the shrewdest politician of the first half of the twentieth century. The historical roots of the theory of Maoritanga can be traced back to James Carroll, Ngata's political mentor. Ngata seized on these ideas and popularised them in the 1920s and 1930s, partly in response to the growing ascendancy of Ratana amongst many dispossessed, alienated, rootless Maori - morehu/survivors. Essentially, Ngata held the view that Maoritanga should be grounded in the political economy of specific practices. It is in the perceptions of Ngata as recorded in his letters of the 1920s and 1930s to his colleague and friend Peter Buck/Te Rangihiroa more so than in any of the observations of the 1920s ethnographers - Firth, Pitt-Rivers and Keesing, that there is a vivid sense of the lived contradictions involved in Maoridom. The key ideological juxtaposition between so-called Maori 'culture' and the appropriation of Maori manual labour within the implanted capitalist system is nowhere better expressed than in Ngata's letters to Buck of 2 June and 6 May 1928:

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46 Firth, 1929, pp. 472-3.
47 Refer pp. 39-43 (below).
Dear Peter ... Keesing [an Auckland University education research graduate] has been in the district for nearly a fortnight carrying out investigations into the Native [East Coast] economic conditions, farming, trading etc, for Condliffe [J. B. Condliffe, later to become a prominent economic historian of New Zealand]. I gathered that the latter had formed a very poor idea of the contribution of the Maori people to the economic progress of N.Z. - sum total mythology, literature & arts, the one oasis [i.e. economic contribution] being on this Coast!

When they [Keesing and Condliffe] cracked up the pakeha ‘pioneer’ who carved a home out of the forest primeval they forgot the Maori who packed the pioneer’s goods to his shack, who cut tracks, who felled, burnt, sawed & fenced the forest clearing, docked, shore, dipped & crutched his sheep, drove stock to market, killed the beasts in the works, carted out the wool & so on. The Kauri-gum fields of the north, the timber mills everywhere, the railway & roadworks ... Dairying in Taranaki, at Ruatoki and in the far North, ... fishing including whitebait fishing, & on a small scale carpentry, motor-driving, threshing, grass-seeding, droving, shepherding, domestic service, teaching, clerical & other work in the Public Service, store-keeping, laundry-work &c. The fault has been largely ours - in part that of the Pakeha ... They forget the people who did everything except provide the money, the direction and the driving power. What would Labour with a capital L [the new Labour Party] say about this callous and contemptuous appropriation of the credit.50

This angry statement was born of a fuller awareness of Maori history than most Maori of his day - let alone academics such as Firth, Keesing and Condliffe - would have been able to claim. The key ideological juxtaposition between Maori ‘culture’ and Maori work in Ngata’s statement was perhaps at the core of a developing concept of Maoritanga. It indicates perhaps an awareness by Ngata of the historical separation of theory from practice, between the historical relationship between Maori labour and the received notion of Maori culture. Perhaps Ngata grasped what such political thinkers as Adam Smith, E.G. Wakefield and Karl Marx clearly perceived: that ‘the money, the direction and the driving power’ derived ultimately from labour in such a history of menial work as Ngata enumerated with passion. Much more than ‘the credit’ had been appropriated from generations of Maori workers. With a similar sense of history and grasping clearly the causal link between work and capital accumulation, Marx had called what had been appropriated ‘dead labour’.

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2.06. The Politicisation of Maori: Labour and Ratana

The phenomenon of the rise of the Ratana movement in the 1920s and 1930s, not least of which were its pan-Maori features, that cut across traditional Maori social structures and allegiances as well as its informal alliance with the Labour Party from the mid-1930s (an association that endured the best part of 40 years), has long fascinated and puzzled scholars. Sadly, much of its history has until very recently, remained largely a closed book. A recent addition to the existing thin literature on Ratana as a church and a socio-political movement is a massive 584 page religio-political biography of the man and the movement by the journalist, Keith Newman. It is an authorised publication and appears to be a most comprehensive, well-sourced, very detailed and well-documented account of its 80 year-old history.51 There are some sharp observations of people and events in Newman’s narrative. In a review of the academic opinions of Ratana, Newman commented:

... [that w]hile Henderson and Love view Ratana as a social phenomenon, called into being by the conditions of his time, his presence doesn’t fit neatly into some socio-psychological and anthropological framework.52

His account of the unease that was increasingly pervasive in rural Maoridom in the 1920s is insightful, and provides an accurate and very detailed picture of the appalling social and economic conditions of the time.53 For example, Newman points to the fact that in 1928:

[O]ver half the unemployed [in New Zealand] were Maori, who after leaving their homes in the rural areas to work at freezing works and on forests, farms and other labour-intensive industries found themselves jobless. There was little or no government assistance. The prevailing attitude seemed to be that Maori were well able to live off the land but those who put forward such theories seemed to have forgotten that the best Maori land had been taken.54

One of the frustrations of an earlier unpublished account of the Ratana political movement, Ngatata Love’s 1977 doctoral dissertation, based largely on the archival papers preserved by Ratana’s personal assistant, Eruera Tirikatene, to which Love had privileged access, was the Tirikatene whanau’s injunction on Love, forbidding the citation of specific materials.55

Two publications by J. McLeod Henderson, separated by an interval of nine years and with slightly different titles, (and thus hinting, incorrectly, at a revised second edition), have identical unchanged texts. It was an authorised biography, which, given the injunctions that have often deterred scholars and journalists from writing about Ratana, provides some key

52 Ibid., p. 529.
53 Ibid., pp. 233-342.
54 Ibid., p. 233.
information and insights into the man and the movement. Bronwyn Elsmore's detailed theological study of the man, his vision and his mission was placed in the context of many other Maori prophets. Graeme Butterworth's article on a putative Maori renaissance of the 1920s and 1930s interpreted Ratana as yet another response by Maori to the perceived injustices brought by the Western hegemony in Church and State. A comprehensive account of the details of Ratana's complex political relationship with the Labour Party was explored in some depth by Claudia Orange in her thesis. Of particular note is this comment:

By the late Labour years [1949] political distinctions between Ratana and Labour were fading and the two were in most respects identical. This had come about through a greater involvement of Maori in trade union activities.

She added that the war was largely responsible for bringing this about. Although Ngata had been actively aware of the possibilities offering for Maori advancement through rehabilitation and war activities in general, circumstances had tended to increase the prestige of the Ratana-Labour Maori MPs. By the late 1940s Maori allegiance and loyalty to the Labour Party had brought about significant advances in the wider socio-economic arena. Inclusion of Maori in the country's expanding welfare benefits, together with the special gestures of the war years, were signs of a more serious commitment by Government to Maori development.

The alliance with Labour was an extremely important break with the past. Labour had become to the Ratana people the champion of the rights of Maori. Both Ratana and Labour stood for the interests of working people and both represented a break with tradition. The interests of Maori working people were arguably, to be well served by the Ratana-Labour alliance until the right-wing shift in Labour social and economic policies after 1984. In the 1990s the Maori electoral mandate swung away from Ratana.

2.07. The Politicisation of Academia from the 1940s: Beagleholes, Ritchies and others
The rural-urban migration that had begun at about the time of the early World War II years and continued on a larger scale in the decades after attracted the attention of some contemporary academic writers of the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s, among them, notably, Ernest and Pearl Beaglehole, James and Jane Ritchie and Joan Metge. The first two writers focussed

on the wider Wellington region with a specific study of Ngati Raukawa and the Maori community at Otaki; the last two writers’ scope was nation-wide, leavened with some specific local case-studies: for example, the Ritchies focussed on the Bay of Plenty/north-eastern Volcanic Plateau, and the Waikato, Metge on Northland. The Beagleholes and the Ritchies highlighted the psycho-social outcomes of colonisation and the rural-urban diaspora. They and Joan Metge adopted a perspective of Maori history that followed broadly in the wake of Firth’s revisionary researches, namely that hapu structures were defunct. 60

The theoretical line promoted by the Beagleholes and the Ritchies was accepted and continued by Pat Hohepa and Hugh Kawharu in the 1970s in their respective analyses of the changing form and shape of their respective hapu’s socio-political structures and organisations. 61 Erik Schwimmer in the 1960s and Steven Webster in the 1970s argued against the above scholars that hapu structures persisted. 62 These researches remained side-lined however until they got caught up in the wider intellectual and ideological critiques of the nature of Maori society and its place in the wider New Zealand context associated with the so-called ‘Maori Renaissance’ of the 1970s.

This latter phenomenon drew on a number of closely-linked social and economic factors, among them significantly a deep economic recession that resulted in huge Maori unemployment. Associated with these were many radical social movements (for example, the celebrated 1975 hikoi led by Whina Cooper) accompanied by sharply focussed critiques of New Zealand politics in the 1970s, from many vocal and articulate second-generation urban activists, many of them young, militant women, including Donna Awatere, Ripeka Evans, Moana, Hana and Syd Jackson, Atareta Poananga, and Irihapeti Ramsden. These protest movements were marked by an upsurge in Maoritanga and a concomitant inversion of the earlier assimilationist ideology.63


The dream of a smooth transition from a rural environment to an urban one by Maori was shattered and Pakeha New Zealand’s precious myth of racial harmony was challenged in ways never before imagined. Those most affected by the 1970s economic recession were second-generation dislocated Maori who were minimally educated, mostly unemployed and tribally unschooled. Out of this generation also arose an enlarged and increasingly vocal and politicized Maori elite who brought major political attention to the Treaty of Waitangi and the ways in which it had been allegedly dishonoured by the Crown.

2.08. Assimilation and its aftermath

The economic impacts of rural over-population, urbanisation and proletarianisation were analysed by Graham Butterworth in *The Maori in the New Zealand Economy* (1967) and its revised version published under the patronage of Hugh Kawharu’s Department of Social Anthropology and Maori Studies at Massey University as *The Maori People in the New Zealand Economy* (1974). Both publications have a large amount of empirical and numerical data abstracted from government censuses and surveys. All of this was organized on a regional and national basis and thus would only have a very general application. These works were imbued with an implicit assimilationist ideology; little attempt had been made to make any comment on social and political changes. The second publication stressed the importance of the acquisition of new skills and educational qualifications ‘so that Maori people could play a full part in the economic life of the country.’

The large quantity of empirical data that Butterworth collated pointed to the economic marginalisation of the Maori population prior to World War II. This was exacerbated after that war by a combination of two factors: one, rapid population growth - more than doubling between 1945 and 1966, and the inefficiency of Maori farming in the face of progressive rationalisation and mechanisation in capitalist agriculture - although Butterworth did not

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address this latter situation explicitly. The viability of what remained of the economic base of Maori society thus came under increasing strain.

Unable to obtain sufficient capital and hampered by difficulties in amalgamating or incorporating smaller uneconomic units, Maori farmers could not hope to match these advances. As Maori holdings became less competitive the acreage of productive land declined still further at a time when overpopulation was already straining severely depleted resources.65

In addition, the alienation of ‘uneconomic’ land by the Crown was renewed in the 1950s and 1960s, although on a much smaller scale than in earlier times. Maori were thus forced increasingly to turn to waged labour in order to sustain their livelihood, but as capitalist agriculture became less labour-intensive, the employment opportunities in rural areas declined rapidly.

Although the imbalance between the growing Maori population and their productive resources and employment opportunities had been apparent since at least the early 1930s, the State did not seek to encourage the alternative of urban waged employment until the needs of industry demanded it. This first occurred during World War II when the Maori War Effort Organisation (MWEO) was given the responsibility of recruiting Maori labour to fill shortages in essential industries, often in the cities. Although tribal bodies were given an unprecedented degree of autonomy in organising the Maori war effort, the exercise of their authority in relation to labour was very much oriented towards efficient satisfaction of the short term requirements of industry. An analysis of this and other related matters at the time of the first Labour government (1935-49) is located in Claudia Orange's thesis. A more accessible published summary of the struggle for some form of political control over the Maori social and economic contribution in World War II is found in Orange's article, 'An Exercise in Maori Autonomy: The Rise and Demise of the Maori War Effort Organisation'.66

The war-time situation was dealt with also by Joan Metge from a northern perspective.67 After the war migration continued but, initially at least, was not officially encouraged and was widely perceived as undesirable and something of a social problem.68 When urban labour

65 Ibid., pp. 34-5.
requirements returned to normal after World War II, social policy on Maori affairs reverted temporarily to a focus on land development schemes and the promotion of employment in rural areas.\(^{69}\) As rural unemployment and underemployment became more apparent and urban labour shortages grew, however, there was a marked shift in policy towards an emphasis on matching rural labour reserves with labour demand. The annual reports of the Department of Maori Affairs in the 1950s and 1960s provide an indication of changing policy.\(^{70}\) As always with political documents, an awareness of the language of political rhetoric and presentation bluster is essential armoury. The shifts - both real and illusory - in policy are examined in more detail in the second section (2.20 below).

Michael King’s history of the Maori drew in part on the work of Metge and Butterworth but he teleologically smudges the importance of a large rural Maori proletariat in the 1920s.\(^{71}\) In two of his many publications of the 1970s and 1980s that focussed on the wider strands of Maori history, King is inclined to essentialise an assumed difference between ‘rural’ and ‘urban’ New Zealand, and a parallel difference between Maori and European cultures, as somehow prior to their actual occurrence.\(^{72}\) Although King emphasised the demographic fact of rapid ‘urbanisation’ which ‘began’ during World War II and resulted in a ‘predominantly urban [Maori] people’ by the late 1960s, he down-played the crucial historical problem of a Maori ‘rural proletariat’.\(^{73}\)

2.09. Left-wing Political Economy.

In the related fields of sociology and anthropology there were seminal contributions by John Macrae (1975), David Bedggood (1979, 1980), and Robert Miles and Paul Spoonley (1983, 1984).\(^{74}\) These initiatives swelled to a broad and persistent political economic tradition of analysis. Most notably, these were by Keith Barber (1986), Judith Simon (1990), Linda Tuhiwai Smith (1996), and Graham Hingangaroa Smith (1997).\(^{75}\) These latter writers adopted

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\(^{69}\) Butterworth, 1974, p. 32.

\(^{70}\) Department of Maori Affairs, *Annual Reports 1950-68*, AJHR, usually G.


\(^{73}\) Ibid., p. 285.


\(^{75}\) Barber, 1986; Judith Simon, ‘The Place of Schooling in Maori-Pakeha Relations’, PhD Thesis in Education,
a stance which perhaps could broadly be described as neo-Marxist; certainly they wrote from the perspective of left-wing political economy. Simon and Linda and Graham Smith attempted to show in their many publications how the Native/Maori School system of 1869-1967 was part of the colonial design and that the emergence of kura kaupapa in the 1970s (and beyond) was a striving towards independence and tino rangatiratanga.

Macrae, Bedggood, Miles, and Spoonley developed an historical and political economic outline of Maori society that broke new ground. Nevertheless, like the earlier functionalist theories under-pinning the work of Raymond Firth and his school, the new theory reflected determinist and assimilationist interests of the wider society. Yet despite some of their radical and ground-breaking directions the political economists of the 1970s continued to rely centrally on Firth’s bourgeois history of Maori culture, only revising it in the light of French structural Marxist theories of modes of production and their articulation. And like Firth they assumed an all-or-nothing persistence and then collapse of the Maori ‘lineage of production’ (i.e. hapu) in economic terms by 1880, and complete proletarianisation by the time of the rural diaspora and urbanisation of the 1940s and 1950s.

Miles and Spoonley (1983) separated the economic and political/ideological aspects of the mode of production or hapu. Their argument was that the latter aspect had been perpetuated (albeit in re-invented form) to the present day, and that the former aspect effectively disappeared in the 1880s. After the collapse of the economic basis by the last decades of the nineteenth century, political/ideological aspects of hapu persisted first as a mode of production, and from the beginning of the twentieth century were increasingly co-opted, and from 1985, were actively promoted by the State.

This co-option process, arguably, can be traced from Apirana Ngata and his hapu of Ngati Porou in the 1920s and 1930s to the proliferation of manoeuvres and stratagems under the grievance settlement mode associated with the regime of the Waitangi Tribunal Amendment Act (1985). Recent examples are numerous, but the resurgence of Mahuta’s Tainui, O’Regan’s Ngai Tahu, Dewes’ Ngati Porou, Latimer’s Te Uriohau and Kawharu’s Ngati Whatua o Orakei are high-profile signs of the capacity for cultural re-invention. In short, the emergent Maori elite, nurtured under the assimilationist rubric of a paternalistic State for both


Miles and Spoonley, 1983, pp. 3-26.
material and political reasons adopted a strategy of political co-operation and incorporation within the larger settler-dominated political hegemony.

The conflict at the level of economic relations was not completed until the middle of the twentieth century. Political and ideological relations continued to be reproduced albeit in an increasingly modified form, as Maori agents were incorporated directly into the capitalist mode of production as sellers of labour power. The more salient features of political and ideological incorporation included such examples of social manipulation/engineering (designed by the settler-dominated State) as the suppression of indigenous forms of expression in language and medicine, growing use of the English language, the establishment of the Native Schools system and the adoption of the Christian religion, the suppression of tohunga-ism and introduction of European medical and health systems, often adapted to fit Maori forms.\footnote{The most succinct introduction to this huge topic is Williams, 2001.}

Miles and Spoonley implied a transitional ‘peasant mode of production’ for the Maori 1880-1945 in seasonal work on small capitalist farms, suggesting as a model the incorporation of Irish peasantry into the industrial revolution in Britain. Finally, they also pointed out the central role of the State in the structuring of a labour market for capital accumulation since the 1890s, bearing increasingly upon Maori political allegiances from 1935.\footnote{Miles and Spoonley, 1983, pp. 3-26.}

\section*{2.10. The State’s Role in Structuring the Labour Market}

Peter Brosnan and Moira Wilson in their pioneering theoretical work of the 1980s highlighted the critical role of the predominant role of the State in the structuring of the labour market.\footnote{Peter Brosnan and Moira Wilson, The Historical Structuring of the New Zealand Labour Market, Wellington: IRC, VUW, 1989, pp. 1-4.}

They stated that ‘New Zealand being a settler society, the State played a key role in determining the way in which the indigenous people, the Maori, were structured into the capitalist labour market.’\footnote{Ibid, p. 2.}

They argued that:

\begin{quote}
... the determination of the position of Maori workers within [the labour market] was the outcome of a complex interaction of factors. The actions of the State were critical: in setting the groundwork for rapid growth in the post-war period it brought about chronic labour shortages, and thus established the ‘pull’ for rural to urban migration; the land alienation policies of that State in the Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries which led to impoverishment and over-population relative to land resources provided the ‘push’ for...
\end{quote}
migration; and the policies of the State in the post-war period, in particular the promotion of immigration to fill deficits and the scant and selective attention to training Maori workers, channelled the Maori workforce into low status, low paid employment, and State housing policies, the education system and employer discrimination reinforced that concentration.  

Brosnan and Wilson listed a number of contributory factors that contributed to the low status and low paid employment position of Maori within the labour market:

All Government departments but especially those of Maori Affairs and Labour were reoriented to encourage rural to urban migration and facilitate the incorporation of Maori workers into the urban environment; the Department of Labour spent half its budget in the 1960s on government assisted and subsidised immigration of suitably qualified workers and their families in an effort to ease shortages of skilled labour.

They highlighted some significant facts: the first Maori rural urban migrants tended to be new entrants to the workforce, predominantly young unmarried adults and they rarely had specific qualifications, training or experience because their education had been received in special Native/Maori Schools that specifically emphasized practical and manual skills and eschewed training for the professions.

In the conditions of over-full employment and excess demand for labour in the period 1945-1973/4 internal migrants found it easier to enter unskilled and semi-skilled work, particularly labouring and manufacturing; this concentration became self-perpetuating as new migrants, often unaware of job search procedures or unable to afford a lengthy period of job search, tended to take word of mouth job offers from family and friends and to take employment where Maori workers predominated or were already concentrated.

The only attempts made to encourage Maori entry into skilled occupations were a rehabilitation training scheme for returned Maori servicemen, and the Maori Apprenticeship Scheme run by the Department of Maori Affairs for young male Maori migrants; the Department of Labour at one stage rationalised: ‘it must not be overlooked that the readiness of Maori to do unskilled, semi-skilled, manual and labouring work has made an important contribution to the economy’.

81 Ibid, p. 20.
82 Metge, 1964,
Brosnan and Wilson pointed out that differences in labour supply behaviour that were initially tangible quickly became stereotypically ascribed characteristics: high job mobility led to a belief that Maori were unreliable; concentration in jobs involving the operations of machines, concrete mixers, pneumatic drills, etc, and the driving of trucks, tractors, bulldozers and other heavy wheeled machinery was rationalised as being in keeping with their natural abilities and special aptitudes.\(^8\)

They claimed that immigration policy formed the principal plank of the government’s labour market policy of the 1950s and 1960s: immigration of Commonwealth or Irish citizens of European descent and from some European countries, notably the Netherlands, was promoted to bolster the supply of skilled labour; unskilled and semi-skilled jobs were filled by drawing rural Maoris and previously home-bound women into the labour force.

The issue of Maori worker organization was another unique factor, according to Brosnan and Wilson. Because of their location, Maori contact with the union movement prior to migration was restricted to the shearers’ unions;\(^{85}\) upon migration, contact was restricted and limited by the occupations in which Maori became concentrated.\(^{86}\)

Other aspects that they illuminated were the differences in bargaining power which corresponded with labour scarcity: unions representing Maori workers generally lost power because unskilled Maori migrants constituted a relatively abundant supply of labour, whereas more intense shortages occurred in the skilled occupations that were filled by British immigrants. Trade unions, as the traditional advocates of the working class, were unable (and possibly unwilling), to represent the interests of Maori workers and to prevent their disadvantaged position from emerging.\(^{87}\) This important point is taken up later in the dissertation.\(^{88}\)

It is arguable according to Brosnan and Wilson that housing policy was another important factor contributing to the protracted concentration of Maori in factory employment; they point to the conjunction of the new State housing areas of Cannons Creek/Waitangarua/Porirua East


\(^{87}\) Macrae, 1975.

\(^{88}\) Refer Chapter 5: Section 5.24, pp. 163-5 (below).
with the industrial estate at Porirua, north of Wellington and a similar conjunction of the State housing at Glen Innes and Otara with similar industrial estates at Mt. Wellington and Otahuhu/Wiri/Southdown, in east and south Auckland respectively.

Brosnan and Wilson pointed to the continuing disadvantage of Maori entrants to the labour market and to the ever-widening attainment differentials between Maori and non-Maori at the secondary and tertiary education level; the response of Maori pupils to schooling was a function of barriers in education and in occupational opportunities that are specific to them as a racial group.

2.20. Government Policies: Historical Interpretations: Introduction & Overview

It has been argued by Keith Barber and others that ethnic relations policies throughout the history of New Zealand have been driven by a series of administrative agendas for the appropriation of Maori resources, economic, social and cultural for the purpose of furthering New Zealand's economic development. From this perspective the dynamics of successive race relations policies can be understood first in terms of the contradictions within the capitalist economy and second, in terms of the contradiction between capitalist and Maori principles of social organisation. These dynamics can best be perceived as driven by historically specific resource needs (falling into three broad time-periods): up until the 1930s, the need for land for the production of farm commodities; from about 1939 the need for industrial labour power for manufacturing production; from about 1975 economic recession and restructuring with its concomitant outcome of unemployment have given rise to a greatly increased demand for social services.

Close scrutiny by governments since 1972/73 has determined that many existing government and NGO agencies have been found lacking in their ability to cope with the problem of unemployment, especially as it impacted on Maori. In the last years of the twentieth century this situation had become particularly acute because previous policies had left the bulk of Maori landless, unemployed, and to a large degree de-culturated. Under the policy of multiculturalism set in progress by the fourth Labour government initiatives from the mid-1980s, Maori socio-cultural resources have been called upon to play a part in the delivery of policy measures in order to facilitate greater social harmony and promote economic participation.

89 Keith Barber, 'New Zealand Race Relations Policy', 1970-1988, Sites 18, Winter 1989, Department of Sociology, MU.
90 Ibid., pp. 5-16.
In reviewing some of the government reports and the scholarly literature that have examined the various political strategies, their origins and outcomes, it is vital to recognize the capitalist nature of New Zealand society. In much of the early literature there is only an implicit authorial recognition of this; in contrast, much of the literature of the 1980s and 1990s (especially that emanating from Maori and many academics) has been highly critical of many aspects of the Eurocentric capitalist engine that has driven government policies. Yet it is the capitalist system that has determined the manner in which Maori resources were appropriated: in the case of land and labour power as commodities to be bought and sold in the market place; and in the case of socio-cultural values, as instruments to be utilized in social administration.

2.21. Literature on Land for the Production of Farm Commodities
A considerable literature on the land acquisition and land development phase of New Zealand history has been produced since the advent of the Waitangi Tribunal historical claims inquiry process in 1985. It is of varying breadth, depth and scope. Land is not a central focus of this review but it is as well to be aware of some of the more pertinent and relevant publications dealing with the depletion of land and income resources that impacted on Maori privation.

2.22. Assimilation, Integration and the Hunn Report
The rural diaspora of Maori to urban areas began in the late 1930s where they found employment in food processing and general manufacturing; this movement increased in World War II and reached significant proportions from 1950.

As early as 1950 it was recognized by the Department of Maori Affairs that:

[w]ith the great increase in the number of youths of the Maori race, now estimated at 2000 males per annum, reaching working age it has been found necessary to consider plans for their absorption in the industrial, commercial and professional life of the country.91

No new policies to cope with the rising tide of this rural - urban migration were formulated until a necessity to do so was signalled by the Department of Maori Affairs in 1957:

Some of the obvious questions and problems arising concern race relations, equality, crime and satisfactory employment. It is precisely here that the Maori Affairs Department must function effectively. It must see that the opportunities are there for the young people to attain a desirable niche in town life and that the young people are equipped to use those opportunities.92

In 1958 it was confirmed that Maori Affairs policy must focus on the urbanization of Maori. Three areas were identified as requiring action: education, employment and housing.\(^93\)

A strategic map for Maori policy was developed by public servant Jack Hunn on the initiative of Prime Minister and Minister of Maori Affairs Walter Nash in early 1960. Nash co-opted Hunn to act as Secretary of Maori Affairs and ‘get an accounting of Maori assets and see what we can do for them’.\(^94\) The *Hunn Report* (1961) presented the results of an inquiry backed by statistical evidence prepared by a large team of researchers and writers co-opted from many government departments to support Hunn’s claim that unless Maori were helped to become ‘integrated’ into the urban lifestyle, for which they were unprepared, race relations would become strained.\(^95\) Nine working parties from government departments each prepared statistical data on Maori affairs under a different heading - population, education, employment, health, housing, land titles, land settlement, legal differentiation. It was to be the first of many government commissioned inquiries into Maori affairs in the following four decades.\(^96\)

The main thrust of the *Hunn Report* was that disparities in income, health, housing, employment which negatively impacted on Maori, were a result of their moving from rural areas to towns and cities. In a punning allusion to the nine-fold increase between 1936 and 1959 of Maori employed in transport - reflecting a Maori predilection for operating mechanical equipment - Hunn reported that:

> it seems to be a case of Maori on wheels, heading fast for the towns. The so-called ‘urban drift’ is not so much a drift as an irreversible migration in search of work.\(^97\)

The report was certain in its conviction that the urbanisation process had created problems that could not have been foreseen. Maori were at various stages of ‘detribalisation’, therefore their choices as to the degree to which they integrated into the Pakeha way of life needed to be respected by policy-makers.\(^98\) Maori had not understood, either, the cultural shock to which they were subjected in the cities. Nor, as evidence suggested, were they sufficiently educated as to how to guide their children through the educational and vocational aspects of ‘modern’

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\(^{96}\) Hunn, 1982, pp. 136-58.

\(^{97}\) *Hunn Report*, 1961, p. 29, paragraph 55.

\(^{98}\) Ibid., p. 16, paragraph 10.
life which were necessary to sustain their lives on a level of prosperity that equated to that of Pakeha. Thus Maori education was in a critical state and left much to be desired.\textsuperscript{99}

Hunn's conclusion after thorough investigation was that education for Maori was the crux of the solution to the disparities that placed them at such a disadvantage, relative to Pakeha.\textsuperscript{100} Research by the Department of Maori Affairs had shown that education and employment issues were co-dependent and that the lack of adequate education prevented Maori from accessing jobs. Further complicating this was the fact that the expansion of the Maori population in rural areas had not been matched by a similar expansion of industry in those areas, so that there was no employment available for those Maori resident there.\textsuperscript{101}

Hunn made it clear that, whereas the Department of Maori Affairs shared responsibility with the Department of Labour for solving special Maori employment problems, there was a critical difference between the two departments. The Labour Department held the view that employment was 'an instrument of economic policy'; while the Department of Maori Affairs believed that employment was 'additionally an instrument of racial policy'.\textsuperscript{102} The problem, which was complex, required a comprehensive solution involving the integrated resources of the Departments of Labour, Maori Affairs, and Industries and Commerce in liaison with a newly-created Maori Employment Committee. This group would survey the Maori employment situation regularly, promote employment opportunities, plan migration, placement and induction and tackle the problem of accommodation.\textsuperscript{103}

The \textit{Hunn Report} was arguably, noteworthy for its pioneering vision that involved finding and pursuing a type of bicultural policy consisting of government departments which consulted regularly with Maori (such as the Maori Employment Committee) to find solutions to the disparities which were not only holding back Maori and impeding the progress of integration, but by implication constraining the progress of the nation.

Hunn’s report opened up a new discourse that led to increased Maori involvement in planning for their own future and in maintaining treasured aspects of their culture (taonga). The consultation process between the Department of Maori Affairs and Maori which had developed during the year-long preparation of the report signalled a clear departure from the

\textsuperscript{99} Ibid., p. 22, paragraph 34.
\textsuperscript{100} Ibid., p. 28, paragraph 53.
\textsuperscript{101} Ibid., p. 28, paragraph 53.
\textsuperscript{102} Ibid., p. 28, paragraph 53.
\textsuperscript{103} Ibid., conclusions 16-20, pp. 6, 31.
old ways of doing, thinking and talking about the policies which were best suited for Maori. Thus the report was, in many ways, controversial, but it proved a catalyst in opening up the discourse where Maori could signal their opposition to the suppression of their culture by Pakeha, and where they could define their position as co-authors rather than simply as recipients of government policy.

A shift in government perceptions of the nature of the situation regarding Maori is discernible in the annual reports of the Department of Maori Affairs. Prior to the Hunn Report, the Department of Maori Affairs had ceased building or providing loans for houses in ‘economically retarded areas’ and by 1960 had set up a relocation programme which provided accommodation, employment and ‘guidance’ for new arrivals in the cities, with an initial target of 4000 urban migrants per year.\textsuperscript{104} The relocation programme was driven at one level by a paternalistic welfare concern but doubtless there was a hidden agenda to satisfy the demand of the public and private sector for labour. An indication of this was provided in the 1964 report of the Department of Maori Affairs which suggested the rationale of the programme was that ‘it is obviously in the best national interests to make full use of all available human resources.’\textsuperscript{105} To this end, provision for housing, pre-employment programmes and apprenticeships became substantially focussed on urban areas, not only to relieve rural unemployment but also because, as the Department of Labour noted in 1965, ‘the readiness of Maoris to do unskilled, semi-skilled, manual and labouring work’ made ‘an important contribution to the economy’ which would otherwise have required higher levels of immigration.\textsuperscript{106}

The Hunn Report was the first major signal from the State that Maori participation in the labour market and indeed their place in the wider fabric of the nation’s life was an issue of some urgency. It dramatically pointed to the fact that New Zealand needed to develop policies and institutions that would address the exponentially increasing numbers of Maori in the political economy of internal labour migration in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s (as well as the Pacific Islands immigration of those decades). The expansionist nature of capitalist production in the post-war era up until about 1973/74 required that this demand be met at a State level. However in the boom decades of the 1950s and 1960s and in the immediate wake of the initial urban migration of Maori, there was little academic interest in the economic

\textsuperscript{104} Butterworth, 1974, pp. 35-7.
\textsuperscript{105} AJHR, Annual Report of Department of Maori Affairs, 1964, G-56.
\textsuperscript{106} AJHR, Annual Report of Department of Labour, 1965, I-56.
status of Maori. Research tended to focus on the nature of the migration process, as in the case of Joan Metge, or the impact on the origin communities, in the case of Pat Hohepa.\(^\text{107}\)


From about 1974 New Zealand entered a prolonged economic crisis brought about by the inherent tendency in capitalist systems for the general rate of profit to fall, inhibiting investment and undermining capital accumulation. This chronic tendency by capitalism to produce economic crises reverberated on the State in the form of a legitimation crisis for the whole system.

Thus governments from the 1970s were faced with the challenge of a double-edged crisis of political legitimation and economic management, the outcome of increasingly worsening economic conditions and fiscal instability coupled with a growth in unemployment and the increasing politicisation of ethnic inequalities. These and other signs of social unrest, highlighted by sharply focussed Maori protests, forced governments from the late 1970s to respond to the evidence which showed that the majority of Maori occupied a peripheral place in New Zealand society. Numerous studies from the early 1980s and almost continuously through the following two decades confirmed that Maori disproportionately experienced poor educational outcomes, high levels of unemployment, low income levels, ill-health and lower life expectancy, higher levels of imprisonment, low rates of home ownership and high rates of State dependency.\(^\text{108}\)

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Arguably, attempts to develop some coherent race relations policy that occurred in New Zealand from the 1970s were a response to two situations: the failure of previous policy to bring about the full integration of Maori labour power into the New Zealand economy, as was revealed in the disproportionately high rate of Maori unemployment; and the growing assertiveness and heightened level of protest and violent reaction on the part of Maori people in response to their loss of cultural identity. These two situations combined to demand of government a new response; one that could address both the problem of ‘racial’ integration and that of cultural identity. It was an issue that was to remain highly politicised in the following decades.

Typical of governments’ responses in the 1970s was the comment by the Economic Monitoring Group in 1978:

In the year to April 1978 private sector full-time employment fell by over 22,500 jobs or 3.9%; the highest decline ever recorded. A feature of this level of unemployment is the disproportionately high rate among Maori people.  

Similar comments were reiterated by Treasury and the Department of Labour through the remaining years of the third National Government (1975-84). For example in early 1985 the Department of Labour made these comments on the ethnic aspect of unemployment:

In 1984 the unemployment rate for the Maori population was 14% compared to 3.5% for non-Polynesian. This greater vulnerability of Maori people to unemployment has been explained as resulting from a combination of several factors: their population is younger; it is less qualified academically; it is concentrated in low-skilled occupations with high unemployment rates; and it has little opportunity for creating employment due to a shortage of capital in the community brought about by generally low incomes. However the situation in 1984 is qualitatively different from 1968. A far greater proportion of Maori now live in towns and cities (80% in 1984 compared with 50% in 1968.)

Some academic commentators have attributed the loss of cultural identity by Maori youth during the 1970s as one outcome of the process of social alienation linked to the rural diaspora and urbanisation. This in turn affected Maori youth’s low level of participation and achievement in the educational and occupational structures of New Zealand society. On the one hand, Maori youth were seen as unable to identify with mainstream social institutions because of cultural differences; on the other hand, the accumulated pressure of decades to conform to Pakeha ways had caused Maori to lose attachment to their own institutions.

Unable - or unwilling - to fully accept Pakeha values, and unable to maintain their own, Maori were seen as set adrift without the stability of a firmly established cultural identity. This analysis provided an explanation for continuing poor performance at school, lack of commitment to work, and increasing anti-social behaviour. The solution that this analysis suggested was to put in place a strategy to enhance the status of Maori culture, to restore it and give it a recognised place in society. This it was hoped would stabilise Maori cultural identity, attract the commitment of Maori to the established institutions and satisfy their demand for self-assertion.\(^{12}\)

At a superficial level such a strategy appeared to achieve a desired unity between the goals of social integration and cultural preservation. Yet at a deeper level these attempts to develop a race relations policy paid scant consideration to the issue of accommodating Maori cultural values within the institutional structure of New Zealand society. While these studies took on the language of ‘multiculturalism’ in what might be argued cynically, is a lip-service gesture of tokenism, the institutional structures were never analysed for what they were - bureaucracies with an embedded functional relation to capitalism. A radical critique might well have argued that these new government policies were but an administrative strategy for appropriating Maori socio-cultural resources for the purpose of assisting the government with the issues of social integration.\(^{13}\)

Much of the wider intellectual and ideological critiques of the social policies of the last 30 years have all been premised on their relation to the education and labour processes. Broadly, it has been argued that the object of both historic and current social policy concerning Maori resources has been the incorporation of Maori cultural values into State-owned and -directed institutions with the goal of achieving a more efficient integration of Maori labour power into the capitalist labour process. The general thrust in this latter-day, often post-colonial literature is that any understanding of the incorporation of Maori workers via labour migration is critical to any consideration of the social and economic position of Maori today. This position has been reproduced as an outcome of the combined effects of class, racism, ethnocentrism and relations with the State.\(^{14}\)

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In the early 1980s, three important documents were published at the initiative of the government. These in their separate and different ways dealt with the complex issues of racial justice. They focussed on what was perceived by as an imminent crisis in the wider community (Race against Time), equality of opportunity (Issues in Equity) and warnings of open conflict on racial lines (Public Service in a Multicultural Society). Arguably these documents might not be considered academic literature, in the usual sense of that word, but rather as primary documents; given that opinion, plus the fact of their gravitas they will be dealt with more appropriately in Chapter Seven, ‘The Unravelling of Paternalism’.

From 1984 there emerged a wide array of critiques and analyses of government ethnic policies written from a variety of perspectives for a number of various purposes. Some of these are examined in the section below.


There was a notable shift in government social policy following the election in July 1984 of the fourth Labour government. Broadly, this government attempted to address both the fundamental dislocations that were rending the social fabric, and deal to the rising groundswell of Maori discontent. It tried to do so in a variety of ways including: enhancing the status of Maori culture (for example, the Te Maori exhibition), attracting the commitment of Maori to State institutions and satisfying Maori demands for self-determination in their own affairs. Labour did this in two major ways. First, it extended the jurisdiction of the Waitangi Tribunal giving it the power to examine Maori grievances retrospective to 1840. The partial adoption of ethnic rhetoric by the State and the co-option of elites into State institutions arguably gave the illusion of a partnership as expressed under the Treaty of Waitangi, while marginalising the more radical demands. Second, the official policy of ‘biculturalism’ adopted by the fourth Labour Government after 1984 involved the incorporation of Maori personnel, Maori models of organisation and Maori social practices and cultural symbolism within the institution of the state.

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116 See below, pp. 234-44.
118 Barber, 1989, pp. 5-16.
This was the wide canvas against which the two governments in their various and varied ways attempted to grapple with increasingly serious social dislocations. In the fifteen years from 1984 there were profound changes in economic policy, labour market organization, ethnic policy and the welfare state of a scale and dimension equal to the earlier transformation in the years after 1890 and 1935. The emergence of new forms of ethnic identification and reformulated claims for rights and resources based on such affiliations was evidence of the necessity for cultural re-invention to meet the challenge of post-Fordist capitalism in the 1990s.

There is a wide literature on economic and socio-cultural developments as they impacted on the politics of ethnicity in the 1980s and 1990s. In an attempt to make some sense of the plethora of academic writing in recent times this part of the review is organised into two sections: a comparison of four broadly political/sociological tracts of the late 1980s/early 1990s; and a miscellaneous selection of other literature; all have been selected on account of their succinct analysis, their acerbic critiques and their provocative ideas.

2.25. The Paradigms Proliferate: Colonialism, Post-Colonialism, Race or Class: Some Structural, Situational and Subjective Perspectives.

A large number of scholarly analyses published in the last years of the fourth Labour Government attempted to make some assessment of the impact of that government’s deregulation policies on Maori (and Pacific Islanders). Four of these books have been selected in order to present contrasting interpretations of that government’s policies as they affected Maori: Loomis, Pacific Migrant Labour, Class and Racism in New Zealand (1990); Mulgan, Maori, Pakeha and Democracy (1989); Pearson, A Dream Deferred: the Origins of Ethnic Conflict in New Zealand (1990); Spoonley, Racism and Ethnicity (1988).

These four books are a microcosm, reflecting the wider issues of recent ethnic/race relations academic research in New Zealand. All four books have a wide sociological scope covering many topics including aspects of jobs, work and employment. They share two major broad themes: firstly, the continuing discourse that focuses on the increasingly complex nature of New Zealand society; secondly, the expanding variety of perspectives that distinguish the huge field of social and cultural studies. Today, with some exceptions (mainly in Asia), there are few nation-states that are made up of a single ethnic, racial, cultural or other group; rather, most are multiple group or plural societies; and group power differentials and the inequitable or unequal structural (economic, political, social) incorporation of one group (or some groups)
can trigger frequent internal contestations and/or conflicts, many of which focus on such mercurial issues as justice, inequality, separatism, sovereignty, cultural identities, equal opportunity and political legitimacy. These issues manifest themselves in a variety of ways in these four books, and they all bring to attention the ongoing discourse about the nature and character of New Zealand society and its identity. The analyses in the four books can be bundled into three broadly distinct perspectives that shape recent and current ethnic and race relations research and academic studies.

Pearson sketches the structural, historical, and situational factors that are instrumental in the causes of inequality and ethnic conflict in New Zealand. Spoonley’s often subjective and essentialised analysis sheets the responsibility for Maori’s unequal and subordinate position on Pakeha racism. Loomis deploys an arcane neo-Marxist structure and language to explicate the adaptation of migrant Cook Islanders to New Zealand society. Mulgan, as a political scientist, appropriately explores the wider issues of equality, democracy, and opportunity as they apply specifically to the political and cultural rights of Maori.119

These four studies represent three of the basic stances adopted in recent race/ethnic studies. These perspectives can be grouped in structural, situational and subjective categories. Structuralists, in general, minimize or discount human agency, attributing individual and group behaviour to abstract and external (structural and material, usually economic) forces, thus reducing the role of individuals to pawns of these forces. Exceptionally, there are only a few structuralists who are absolute determinists, whose ideology will not allow situational or subjective forces or influences on behaviour. The more dogmatic Marxists, for example, reduce causality to material or economic forces, individual behaviour but a reflection of these forces. Some Marxists of a more flexible persuasion acknowledge that subjective (e.g. ideological, racial/ethnic, cultural and personal) factors may, as variables, be relatively autonomous (and thereby influence behaviour), but even they, when pressed, revert to the primacy of economic determinants. Another form of determinism manifests itself among commentators who regard culture as a personal subjective factor, a major variable in behaviour but, when pressed, conclude that culture itself is largely shaped, if not determined, by material forces. The fundamental premise of the structuralists is that only through changing the structures and material forces of social and economic systems will there be changes in ethnic/racial and intergroup behaviour.

Each of the Pearson, Spoonley and Loomis studies illustrates the above perspectives (or some combination of them), while Mulgan, along with others, participates more directly in that ongoing discourse concerning New Zealand society. The events of the 1970s and 1980s, marked by increasing ethnic/race conflict and inequality as well as the extraordinary political agenda of the fourth Labour government, stirred all four writers to produce their analyses. Pearson, for example, argues that his analysis is ‘an academic contribution to our understanding of current controversies’, the most basic being ‘a dream deferred’, which he identifies as the inequality of Maori, (as well as other minority groups) within New Zealand. Both situational and historical factors account for these inequalities, he argues, and the motivation for his analysis is the ‘urgent need to re-evaluate the relationship’ between the dominant Pakeha group and the subordinated Maori group. Pearson concludes that their relationship is ‘a highly unequal one’, and ‘a new understanding must be reached’ if some measure of equality is to be achieved. Mulgan is of the opinion that the inequality of Maori and Pakeha ‘threatens to polarise the country’, because Maori struggles ‘to recover their lost power and land’ means that Pakeha will ‘become increasingly intolerant of what they see as unrealistic and impertinent demands’. Loomis focuses on Cook Islanders living in New Zealand, and he claims that their inequality is essentially one example of a more pervasive inequality that includes Maori and Pacific Islanders, as well as working class ‘Pakehas’ who share ‘similar structural positions [of inequality] in the political economy’. He asserts that the fundamental problem, is not one of race/ethnic relations but the exploitation of lower classes under the capitalist system. Race/ethnic conflict, Loomis claims, will continue until the capitalist system is changed. His structuralist position places him in theoretical opposition to Spoonley whose subjective position claims that Pakeha racism is responsible for inequalities within society. For Spoonley, ‘[o]nce again “race relations” are centre stage in the political debates in New Zealand’ and he sees ‘an urgent need to re-evaluate the relationship between Maori and Pakeha’.

All four authors are thus participants in the debate. To varying degrees they accept that inequality and conflict evolved historically. White settlers, primarily of Anglo-Celtic descent (supported, if and where necessary, by British, local settler and kupapa military forces), succeeded in establishing control of New Zealand from Maori, the original inhabitants. Thus, the victorious settlers were in positions of power that gave them control of structures (political, social and economic) that shaped and continued to reshape New Zealand society.

along lines which accorded with their specific Anglo-Celtic cultural beliefs. Later immigrant
groups (mainly Asians, Pacific Islanders and European of non-Anglo descent) were relatively
powerless to change Anglo settler control or cultural hegemony.

In conclusion, these four books focus on three important issues: the historic reasons under-
pinning the social and economic inequalities and the race/ethnic divisions, contestations and
conflicts; the type of society (monocultural, bicultural or pluralist) that New Zealand should
be, and within that, the rights of discrete groups to preserve any unique cultural identity
including language, customs and beliefs; and, arising from that, the extent of a group’s social,
cultural, economic and political rights and the means to achieve equality of treatment and
opportunity.

2.26. Other Academic Viewpoints
A very powerful and comprehensive analysis of the Maori situation in the light of continuing
re-interpretations of the Treaty of Waitangi can be located in one (of many) significant
contributions to the April Report (1988), a product of the fourth Labour government. As an
historical account of some depth and scope, Manuka Henare and Edward Douglas, ‘Te Reo O
Te Tiriti Mai Rano/The Treaty Always Speaks’ is a blend of political rhetoric and polemics
grounded on well-marchalled evidence. As a resource it is an essential primary document;
but, sadly, as a high-powered political statement it (and the bulk of the recommendations in
the April Report) became, arguably, a rather expensive and weighty dead letter.

As a sample of the tone of their paper the following is the cogent comment prefacing a section
of their contribution to the April Report, ‘The Outcomes of Administrative, Political and
Judicial Processes as they Affect Maori individually and collectively’:

The effects of administrative, political and judicial processes on Maori people, can be
best understood in terms of the destruction of Maori identity through assimilation and
the systematic alienation of Maori resources, their land, their labour and their capital
from first contact up to the present time.

One of the most interesting and concise expositions of the nature of the relation of Maori to
the capitalist system is contained in the introduction to Mahi Awatea. The introduction
bears no explicit name, but its tone and expression suggests that it was authored by Paul

121 Manuka Henare and Edward Douglas, ‘Te Reo O Te Tiriti Mai Rano/The Treaty Always Speaks’, in Royal
Commission on Social Policy (Report of the), The April Report, Vol III, Part One, Future Directions, Wellington:
RCSP, 1988, pp. 79-278.
122 Ibid., p. 191.
123 Paul Spoonley, Christine Teariki, James Newall and Taiwhenua o Heretaunga, Mahi Awatea: A Final Report,
Department of Sociology, MU, 1993.
Spoonley, one of the three writers of the final report. Yet if this is the case it is curious that no mention is made of Mahi Awatea in Spoonley’s subsequent publication, Nga Patai (1996). In Mahi Awatea, he alluded frequently to the pioneering work laid down by Brosnan and Wilson (1989) and explicated the nature and application of regulation theory to the New Zealand situation.124

Probably the most accessible literature on the theme of Maori and their place in the wider fabric of the nation of New Zealand can be located in three books - a sort of trilogy - each containing a number of academic papers - co-edited by scholars from four universities including Cluny Macpherson, David Pearson, Charles Sedgwick and Paul Spoonley. The short titles are Tautiwi (1984), Nga Take (1991) and Nga Patai (1996).125 In the first collection of papers those of particular relevance to this thesis were by Jane Kelsey, David Pearson and Robert Miles.126 Kelsey argued from a Gramscian-inspired neo-Marxist viewpoint that the supposed neutrality of the imposed legal system was a façade for the legitimisation of land alienation. Pearson and Miles have a similar thesis that there have been inter-locking links in the political economy of labour migration between economic subordination, political hegemony, cultural integrity and residential patterns of separateness.

In the second book, Nga Take (1991) the key relevant paper was authored by Jane Kelsey. Her essay picked up on the theme articulated in her earlier paper and in a series of devastating critiques asserted that the Waitangi Tribunal was a toothless paper-maché vehicle for tino rangatiratanga.127

The third book, Nga Patai (1996) had a number of appropriate articles on migration, political economy and racialisation; the politics of difference; and institutional policies and options. The contributions by Paul Spoonley, Michael Reilly, Evan S. Te Ahu Poata-Smith and Jane Kelsey are of particular relevance to an understanding of the issues on which this thesis focuses.128 Spoonley has argued that the deregulation of the labour market has sharpened the

124 Refer above: pp. 31-2.
existing racial divisions with Maori and Pacific Islanders on the losing edge. He has made a useful development of the theory first articulated in Manatu Maori’s (1991) *Maori and Work*. In this government agency publication a distinction was made between segmented labour markets (distinctions pre-determined by pre-existing social, economic and cultural differences independent of the labour market) and dual labour markets, in which the labour market itself was divided into primary and secondary sectors. Spoonley argued that there was a need to develop new theoretical explications that would articulate the labour market position of Maori in a post-Fordist work environment where strict regulatory structures governed access to social services.

Michael Reilly in his paper called for a reading of history contrapuntally along the lines first articulated by Edward Said in *Orientalism* (1971) and later in *Culture and Imperialism* (1993). In other words, being aware simultaneously of the history of the metropolis and the ‘other histories’ located at the periphery of empire. Perhaps there is a case here for contrasting the geographically neighbouring, but culturally different Taranaki worlds of Rollo Arnold’s *Settler Kaponga* and the ‘other world’ of Parihaka.

Poata-Smith’s paper provided a sharply delineated analysis, from a neo-Marxist perspective, of the different forms of contemporary Maori nationalist and tangata whenua politics and provided clear explications of the different approaches taken within Maoridom.

Kelsey remarked pointedly in her article that the nature of Maori contestation had become more hard-nosed in the 1990s. She noted that:

> [e]very time expectations were raised and governments failed to respond - on corporatisation and privatisation, resource management and local government reforms, Maori justice, devolution, the Waitangi Tribunal, fisheries and Sealord, the fiscal envelope - the debate focussed more directly on the question of power.

Kelsey argued persuasively that the policies of both Labour and National governments from 1984 was a mish-mash of ‘naïve paternalism’, ‘ad hoc crisis control’ and ‘cynical strategies driven by short-term political goals.”


132 Ibid., p. 179.
Conclusion
In conclusion the sum total secondary literature available and accessible on the specific involvement of Maori in the economic system of New Zealand is very uneven and limited. This has especially the case since the mid-1970s where there has been a striking lapse both in the research and writing of descriptions of the origins and making of the contemporary Maori socio-economic situation and their political and social relations. There are several reasons for this, among them the suspension of the scholarly pursuit of Maori topics by non-Maori in deference to what many accepted as the prerogative of Maori themselves. Alternative directions in the academic arena have taken the shape of active support of those Maori activities later to be called the ‘Maori Renaissance’, increased focus on the alienation of the land resource (and correspondingly minimal focus on the appropriation of the human resource of labour and the nature of economic and political relations and the materiality of culture) and attention to the colonial and post-colonial institutions which make up much of the context of contemporary Maori culture (in my own personal case, Maori land legislation, the Maori Land Court and the Waitangi Tribunal); and most commonly, specialisation in what is claimed (arguably, sometimes on doubtful grounds) as the past or traditional Maori culture.
CHAPTER THREE: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES: DOES POSTCOLONIALISM FIT?

3.01. Introduction
This dissertation is grounded on dependency and postcolonial theory. The rationale underpinning these positionings is that they will provide differing angles of vision which will better illuminate established and presumed historical understandings, thus expediting closer interrogation, review and if necessary, revision. Thus the theoretical focus will shift across the pantheon of race, class, gender, and sexuality - either as individual categories or as intersectional analyses - binding together a historical narrative across lines that might otherwise separate out economic, political, cultural, social, environmental, and legal strands. A shift in the theoretical lens from one partly complementary theory to the other, will hopefully allow a fuller understanding of the multitudinous events touching on the shaping of a Maori workforce covering a span of 150 years of colonisation and post-colonisation.

Dependency theory chooses a structuralist and socio-economic perspective, placing imperialism and colonial development in the unfolding of capitalism, whereas postcolonial theory favours a post-structuralist and cultural perspective, linking imperialism, colonialism and agency to discourse and the subaltern subversion of orientalist modes of representation. An explication of this theoretical position will succeed an overview of the nature of history and an exploration of the debates and discourses that have developed over the representation of the ‘other’ (including Maori) in the domain of history. Modernisation theory, often alluded to in this dissertation, is not deployed as an analytical or heuristic tool. This theory was a creature of the post-World War II United States global ascendancy, a wish-list premised on Western ideals and values.

3.02. The Nature of History
The power of historic representation is rooted in the tension between two conflicting recognitions: that the need to understand the past is a fundamental human imperative, but, alas, is impossible to fulfill; for what we know of the past is always mediated and modified by forms of representation. Remembering and recording the past is fundamental to the human experience. From the chronicles of Herodotus to the origin stories of Polynesia, human beings have long had a need to understand how the past has shaped the present.133 History, in the

European Enlightenment tradition has evolved as an attempt to construct a narrative of past events, an interpretive exercise fashioned from fragments of empirical data, memories, conjectures, ideas, and arguments. For the peoples of Polynesia and specifically of Aotearoa/New Zealand, history in the Enlightenment paradigm is perceived as alien. Their stories are quite literally, non-history. They are fashioned in the crucible of subjective relations; they are narrated in ways which are non-linear where the past and the present are not a continuous process. ¹³⁴ Maori narratives are predicated on a whakapapa/genealogy which defines both lineal and lateral relationships between tipuna/ancestors, and thus they articulate different levels, different voices and different perspectives of a complex social and political order.¹³⁵

Thus the very nature of the past as understood respectively by the heirs of the Enlightenment tradition and the Polynesian birthright defy and define each other. Essentially, there is a collision between people with and without history. This cultural perception resounds most powerfully in the contestations in the legal forum of the Waitangi Tribunal, where, as Michael Belgrave has pointed out:

[At] one level it was necessary to understand just how history could be made and remade before judges and tribunals, but at another level it was an introduction to an applied history, where the issues were often part of a public debate and the consequences meaningful not just for contemporary race relations, but for the material well-being of the claimant groups who were taking their grievances to the tribunal.¹³⁶

As the stories of the past enter a community’s collective memory, they become part of the historical imagination, which creates conflicts between narration and knowledge, and which in turn forges the shared mental images a people possess of their past. Artistic forms as diverse as myths, chronicles and novels may nourish the historical imagination, as it may be

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grounded in scholarly research or family photo albums. When history is written down, the text itself becomes a kind of cultural artifact that can help us excavate not simply the past as it happened, but also the present in which the moments of the past were imagined and reconstructed. Thus historical writings often tell us as much about the world of the author as it does the world depicted in the text.¹³⁷

That history is imagined and not simply a duplicate of past events challenges several centuries of Western historiography, which has proceeded as if the past is wholly concrete and knowable. Nicholas Thomas has written that the ‘orthodox historical imagination’ habitually fails ‘to acknowledge that versions of the past are always recreated for the here and now, are always politically inflected, partial, and interested’.¹³⁸ Such statements have now been amply borne out through countless examinations that have interrogated the intentional and unintentional manipulations of history to serve myriad social and political ends.¹³⁹

Conceiving of history as a manufactured object does not necessarily support an extreme relativist position, but instead speculates that if a ‘real’ past has happened, such an occurrence may be unknowable so long as it depends on subjective human perceptions. Even, however, as scholars are coming to recognize that a historical text is necessarily a product of its broader social context, it remains difficult to recognize when history has been massaged to better fit the zeitgeist of the political present.¹⁴⁰

While conscious of these representational issues this dissertation seeks to interrogate the documentary record, and from that, to reconstruct the shaping of a Maori workforce within the State. Critically, it interrogates the role of government (and this term is purposely used to emphasise the human agency of the State, rather than the more abstract notions of State or Crown), in addressing the multifarious political issues arising from the place of Maori in the

¹³⁷ Ibid., pp. i-xi.
¹⁴⁰ An incisive and topical critique of presentism in the presentation of some Waitangi Tribunal reports is contained in Belgrave, 2005, passim, especially p. vii.
socio-economic system. A further purpose of this endeavour is to reveal how historical texts (and the archival materials from which these histories are fashioned), represent not just a range of possible stories, but a struggle of power and politics to elevate some version of the past while diminishing competing claims. Through this interrogation process the position/situation of Maori in the capitalist workforce might, hopefully, be illuminated. Part of that effort entails better discerning the biases of the historical record. Not only is it important to keep learning from these representations, it is as equally crucial to appreciate that the extant corpus of historical texts does not provide an immutable window to what went before. Realising that Western historical texts may not be the only ‘true’ history opens up novel ways of knowing the past, such as collating oral histories of indigenous peoples, whose own understanding of history has largely been dismissed, often unjustifiably, as unreliable, subjective, and unfixed.141

Yet if western historical texts suffer from the same disorders, then perhaps both ways of knowing the past might be given if not equal skepticism, at least equal consideration. Hayden White has argued that historians do not simply reveal history; they also create it through the processes of transforming a chronicle of events into an intelligible narrative prose. In a given study, the historian selects a particular arrangement of events, choosing what to include and exclude, highlight and attenuate. However, White posits, these decisions are not self-evident and even answering the most elementary historical questions - events, persons, time, place, manner, condition, cause and effect - demands a concentrated effort to compose a cohesive and logical account. This, nevertheless, does not mean that the past is an infinitely plastic resource, as our interpretations of the past are constrained by the actual progression of events as well as socially bound mechanism that dictate how the past may be conjured.142

3.03. Two Paradigms

The over-riding problematic in determining an appropriate theoretical framework has been to find a middle ground which will serve both as a domain for the mass of disparate evidential material and which will hopefully avoid the trap of determinism and the simplicity of reductionism. This has been resolved by deciding to cast two paradigms, namely, dependency and postcolonial theories over the empirical evidence. The rationale undergirding this is that

the central core of the thesis covers the 40 years of the Maori rural–urban diaspora and its consolidation, a crucial event in the shaping of a workforce; while the longer time frame surrounding this central focus, embraces about 150 years of colonisation, decolonisation and post-colonisation. A detailed explication of the appropriate aspects of these two theories will be given further below. This will highlight some of the complementary aspects of dependency and postcolonial theories in an attempt to re-validate some of the insights of the former, while at the same time supporting the latter’s current ascendancy in the field of subaltern politics. A brief overview of the historiography of Maori/Pakeha relations precedes this explication.

Erik Olssen has pointed out that in the past most of the work done on Maori and Maori/Pakeha race relations could be portrayed as a study of the acculturation of the Maori. Historians have mixed opinions on this. It is, however, a perception that is at least very concrete, very materialistic, and a reflection of the power relations operating in New Zealand in colonial and post-colonial times. The outcome of this interpretation has been that the traditional historical literature has often been quite progressive and whiggish in its pursuit of a happy ending for both peoples. Two important examples of this approach can be seen in the general histories of Keith Sinclair and James Belich. In A History of New Zealand Sinclair approached his topic as an omniscient narrator. Maori were portrayed as active, but acting within a European paradigm. For example, Maori leaders were only nominally Maori; their qualities had a Eurocentric moral and cultural core. Some 37 years later, in his book, Making Peoples, Belich adopted many new perspectives on the history of this country, and created a bicultural form of developmental historiography. In commenting on the impact of colonisation on Maori, Belich illustrated creative ways in which Maori confronted these dynamics, while not glossing over the suffering and victimization involved. The important issue, however, is not in the way the two writers portrayed Maori historically, but the general conclusions at which they both arrived: that there were two peoples, Maori and Pakeha, who had different ways of doing things but similar objectives, who ended up in the same country, bound together by the cause of national progress.

Within both these progressive New Zealand national histories, and other, less illuminating general histories, there has been very minimal study of the economic impact of colonisation on Maori as a determinant of their actions, especially in the twentieth century. More

145 Belich, 1996.
pertinently for this chapter on theoretical perspectives, there has been little attempt to theorise
general New Zealand history. Rather, theorisation has focussed on specific topics or discrete
periods such as, for example (to name a few of many), the analysis of the Native/Maori
schools system (Simon, Smith and others, at the University of Auckland), the nature, shape
and form of nineteenth century settler society (Fairburn - at a national level, and Gardner - at
a local level, both at the University of Canterbury, and working class Caversham in suburban
Dunedin - Olssen at the University of Otago). The general literature has instead tended to
concentrate on military, legal and political influences, manifested in the form of a colonising
all-encompassing unifying ‘state’. This approach does not accurately account for changes
within Maori society and promotes highly generalised or unitary causal explanations.

3.04. Dependency Theory

As indicated earlier, a further theoretical perspective has been adopted to fit the exigencies of
the chronologically long range of evidential material. This perspective is dependency theory,
a multi-stranded set of statements or principles, devised to explain the relations between those
with power and wealth, and those without. The system of dependency can be traced to the
industrial revolution of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Some argue that
before this expansion, the exploitation was internal, with the major economic centres
dominating the rest of the country (for example the metropolis of London in southeast
England dominating the British Isles, or the Boston/New York/Philadelphia metropolitan
cluster in the north-eastern United States dominating all the United States). Establishing
global trade patterns in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries allowed this system to
spread to a global level. It is the pattern of internal domination within a nation-state that will
be explored in this thesis.

The place of Maori in the workforce of the nation of New Zealand has global similarities and
differences. In an academic paper, Diane Brydon cited the comparisons made by John Urry:

The relation between nation and diaspora and between nation and cosmopolitanism as
categories of belonging is therefore fraught with ambivalence. John Urry points out that
‘While there are now 200 states, there are thought to be at least 2,000 “nation-peoples”,
all of which may suffer various kinds of displacement and ambiguous location’. Urry
advocates a varied typology, borrowing from Robin Cohen: of victim diasporas (such as
Africans via the slave trade), labour diasporas (such as Italians in the USA), trade

146 Miles Fairburn, The Ideal Society and its Enemies: the Foundations of Modern New Zealand Society 1850-
1900, Auckland: AUP, 1989; W.J. Gardner, The Amuri: A County History, Culverden: Amuri County Council,
1956; Erik Olssen, Building the New World: Work, Politics and Society in Caversham, Auckland: AUP, 1995;
(eds), 2001.
diasporas (such as the Lebanese), imperial diasporas (such as Sikhs), and cultural diasporas. The point of such an expanded definition of the term is to shift attention from thinking in terms of a state or society to addressing mobility itself as the defining feature of globalization.\textsuperscript{148}

It is clear that there are parallels between the Maori rural/urban post-World War II migrations and other global labour diaspora, except that the Maori movements were internal within a nation-state, which echoes the historic nineteenth century Irish diaspora to England, within the historic (1800-1922) Union of England, Scotland, Wales and Ireland.

These labour diaspora were common features of the global phenomena of imperialism and colonisation. Anne McClintock has suggested a typology of colonization:

One might distinguish theoretically between a variety of forms of global domination. Colonization involves direct territorial appropriation of another geo-political entity, combined with forthright exploitation of its resources and labor, and systematic interference in the capacity of the appropriated culture (itself not a homogenous entity) to organise its dispensations of power. Internal colonization occurs where the dominant part of a country treats a group or region as it might a foreign colony. Imperial colonization, by extension, involves large-scale, territorial domination of the kind that gave Victorian Britain and the European ‘lords of humankind’ control over 85% of the earth, and the USSR totalitarian rule over Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia in the twentieth century.\textsuperscript{149}

Colonization, however, might involve only one country. She cited among many examples that of China and Tibet, Indonesia and East Timor, Israel and the Occupied Territories (the geographically distinct Gaza and West Bank), Britain and Northern Ireland, South Africa and Namibia, and Turkey and Cyprus. None of these ‘colonised’ countries can, in any way, be called ‘post-colonial’.

Her argument continued that different forms of colonization have, moreover, given rise to different forms of de-colonisation. Where deep settler colonisation prevailed, as in Algeria, Kenya, Zimbabwe and Vietnam, colonial powers clung on with particular brutality.\textsuperscript{150} Decolonisation itself, however, has been an ad hoc, uneven process. For example, the 1979 Lancaster House agreement ensured that one-third of the arable land in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe remained in white settler hands; 1980 saw formal independence, but has economically undergone only partial decolonisation.

‘Break-away settler colonies’ can, moreover, be distinguished by their formal independence from the founding metropolitan country, along with continued control thus over the appropriated colony (thus displacing colonial control from the metropolis to the colony itself). In New Zealand, formal constitutional independence occurred in 1907. The United States, Australia, Canada and New Zealand remain, in McClinock’s view, ‘break-away settler colonies’, whose so-called ‘first peoples’, a politically-inspired form of self-identity, have not undergone a complete decolonisation, nor are they likely to in the foreseeable future.

McClinock argued that orienting theory around the temporal axis colonial/postcolonial makes it easier not to see, and therefore harder to theorise, the continuities in international imbalances in imperial power. She cited the conspicuous twentieth century phenomenon of the United States imperialism-without-colonies which has taken a number of distinct forms (military, political, economic and cultural), some covert, some barely covert.

A diachronic analysis is needed which enables changes to be seen in terms of a gradual process of pressure from the State for Maori to conform to European-style patterns and systems of living and the responses (which mainly took the form of adaptation) by Maori to these circumstances. This analysis can be referred to in general terms as a theory of dependency. The evidential experience of Maori in colonial and post-colonial times, especially their inculcation into (and later, jettisoning from) the workforce, can be fitted into this theoretical paradigm. There remains however the problematic of the widespread Maori response in the last quarter of the twentieth century against the colonisation process. The leading question is why this totalising response manifested itself in angry, vociferous protests about land, language and cultural issues but not about class and industrial concerns. The critical tool of postcolonialism is deployed to analyse these phenomena.

Dependency and postcolonial theories, though they share some common territory, such as a suspicion of Western liberal modernity and a critical historical analysis, tend to have irreconcilable differences that show up their respective strengths and shortcomings. In one sense, the first is the inverse of the other: the one having a top-down perspective, the other, a view from the nether-world, from below. The form and nature of these two paradigms and the ways in which the evidence can provide proof of these theories are introduced in the following sections.
Dependency theory identified societies as either undeveloped or underdeveloped. Undeveloped societies were those that had not yet been integrated into the modern capitalist system, while those which were underdeveloped were in the process of integration. Dependency theory aimed to map the process of amalgamation in order to identify the nature of the changes involved. It dismissed the idea that 'progress' was a natural order, and in fact argued that once an underdeveloped society (the 'periphery') was tied to a developed one (the 'centre'), the imbalances in the relationship retarded growth, so that true development became the exception, not the rule. It was possible, within this framework, for the 'periphery' and 'core' to exist within the same nation, which then became a site of struggle.

Generally, Maori people, from the time of a least 1844 until well into the mid-twentieth century can be categorised as an undeveloped, peripheral society. Effectively, underdevelopment involved a conjunction of three processes; the operation of the political economy, the ways in which entitlements were lost or gained, and the ways in which levels of empowerment were increased or diminished. The complex way in which these three processes intersected and/or interacted needs meticulous explication. It is too simplistic and too deterministic to attribute Maori social and economic marginalisation directly to the loss of land. Many recent studies in New Zealand have reached the conclusion that loss of land led to poverty among Maori. The causal factors were indeed, much more complex.

Each of the three processes could intersect to produce three parallel concepts: economic capability (the intersection of entitlement and empowerment), property relations (the intersection of entitlement and political economy) and class power (the intersection of political economy and empowerment). For many Maori, economic capability diminished drastically as entitlements to land ownership were lost (for whatever reasons) and control of assets and life generally declined. Property relations changed dramatically from a common property regime, in which access rights (who had access to what land and what resources) and control rights (who had authority over access rights) were known to all, to a private property regime, in which land was a commodity, and even where communal ownership continued under incorporation, individuals owned shares, the original number of which depended on status. As more and more Maori became increasingly dependent on relatively unskilled wage labour (in either the primary or secondary sector of the economy), Maori as a collectivity lost

class power. Nearly all Maori in the long period of colonisation became in effect, poorly paid members of the unskilled or semi-skilled work force. Indirectly, they benefited from general social welfare, and economic legislation, but this was not because they were Maori.

3.05. The Native American Model

The internal national model that has been used in this thesis is that which was formulated by Richard White in his seminal 1983 survey of Navajo, Choctaw and Pawnee relations with the United States. In this work, White addressed the tribes’ descent into dependency upon Eurocentric systems and values. He posited in his introduction and subsequently demonstrated in his text, that one unifying thread uniting all three of these groups was the attempt by the United States administration to bring Indian resources, land and labour into the market. He utilised dependency theory as a tool, believing that ‘[it] exists ... as a general context of historical inquiry’, as a useful means of assessing the process of Indian change. White was by no means a dependency theory fetishist, and conceded that such an approach could be overly materialistic and reductionist.\(^{152}\) His study sought to address the problem of why traditional Indian methods of living collapsed under colonisation, and why they became reliant upon U.S. modes of living. He rejected force as the sole cause, or even the most important factor, noting that the Choctaws and the Pawnees were never actually defeated militarily. Instead, he pointed to a different reason:

A more fundamental cause that emerges from an analysis of the histories of these peoples is the attempt, not always successful or consistent, by whites to bring Indian resources, land and labour into the market. This unifying thread not only stitches together the histories of these nations, but within these histories, it also connects the environmental and social changes of each of the individual societies. To assert this is to subscribe neither to economic determinism nor to a crude materialism. Market relations were the goal of some whites, not all. Such goals sometimes blended with other imperial, religious, or cultural aims; they sometimes clashed with them. Among Indians themselves, market relations were such a threatening and destructive development that all these nations resisted them, with temporary success, for generations. Culture here controlled economics. Understanding change involves not finding the invisible hand of economic interests, but rather the culture, politics, economics and the environment. For Indians, the result of these changes was dependency.\(^{153}\)

White illustrated this concept vividly in a case study of the experience of Navajo living on reservations in the 1920. By this time, Navajo were suffering from over-grazing of their sheep flocks. When the Bureau of Indian Affairs (B.I.A.) intervened, Navajo changed their farming methods to increase efficiency through reservation expansion, stock improvement and stock water development, all of which had previously been delayed by various outside factors.\(^{154}\) As


\(^{153}\) Ibid., p. xv.

\(^{154}\) Ibid., pp. 231-2.
White noted, ‘Navajo economy and land use were deeply embedded in Navajo culture, to abstract them from the culture is to distort them - yet this exact situation was happening under the B.I.A.’\textsuperscript{155} The loss of Navajo sheep herds under the B.I.A. modernization plan led to the creation of a Navajo proletariat and aristocracy which had long been an aim of the B.I.A., couched of course, in the capitalist euphemism of wealth creation.\textsuperscript{156}

This process was just an example of how the dynamic of dependency worked. It may not have been consciously malevolent, but even so, its impact was the degradation of Navajo culture and society. As White stated ‘at its most extreme, the process rendered the Indians utterly superfluous - a population without control over resources, sustained in poverty by payments controlled by the larger society, and subject to increasing pressure to lose their group identity and disappear.’\textsuperscript{157}

This thesis aims to utilise White’s concept of acquired dependence in order to analyze the nature of change in Maori in the period 1867 - 1935. It sets out to analyze the inculcation of Maori in the market economy and to understand the nature of the Maori-State relationship in that changing economic light. As noted however the dependency model, especially as defined by White, is not solely reliant on an economic analysis of an historical situation. He also pointed out the need to take into account culture as a factor in the process of change.

3.06. Other Critical Tools.

The shortage of mainstream historical literature dealing with the concept of culture except in the broadest terms, requires an examination of other disciplines to find parallel paradigms. For many years anthropology has been closely connected to history in terms of the content covered, yet has taken a very different approach to the study of Maori culture and of change over time. In the past the few academic works on Maori community life have been conducted under the guise of anthropological studies. While outstanding as studies of Maori life, Maharaia Winiata, Pat Hohepa, Ranginui Walker and Hugh Kawharu are works of limited usefulness as studies of change due to their synchronic approach.\textsuperscript{158}

\textsuperscript{155} Ibid., p. 236.
\textsuperscript{156} Ibid., pp. 238-9.
\textsuperscript{157} Ibid., p. xix.
Anthropology has long been the leading discipline in analyzing culture as a set of symbols and meanings within a society. Clifford Geertz was one of the main advocates of cultural analysis involving the study of symbols of a group, and analyzing actions in terms of their symbolic context. Influenced by this, Greg Dening also described culture in terms of systems of meanings, ‘in its essence it is consciousness externalized ... To know a culture is to know its system of expressed meanings.’ Dening pointed out that:

all cultural things are signs and symbols of something else. Being cultured means being able to read the signs, not for the univocal single meaning they have but for the meaning upon meaning that is piled up by context and condition.

By the 1980s however a new emphasis had developed in the field of cultural analysis which began to focus on ‘practice’, or a view of culture as ‘a sphere of practical activity shot through by willful action, power relations, struggle, contradiction and change’. This challenge to the semiotic interpretation of culture as propounded by Geertz and others was the result of a shift against the acceptance of established meanings of symbols. This movement was fueled by a growing interest of the concept of the ‘other’, itself an adjunct of postmodernism, which allowed for multiple interpretations within a single community. The abstracted study of symbolic values also lost its appeal for historians because it lacked an insight into how symbols changed their meaning over time.

Nevertheless William Sewell asserted a need to meld these two views of culture, both ‘symbolic’ and ‘practice’ as well as sites of resistance to a unitary model. He believed that the work of cultural analysts was then ‘to discern what the shapes and consistencies of local meanings actually are and to determine how, why, and to what extent they hang together’. Such an analysis has an application within a Maori intellectual framework as it allows for the existence of an accepted ‘landscape of meaning’ and yet is broad enough to deal with physical changes to patterns of existence.

Instead, culture has been utilised as a definition of diversity between Maori and Pakeha, with ‘culture’ distinguishing modes of living. Olssen believed that historians have in the past

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161 Ibid., p. 7.
162 Sewell, 1999, p. 44.
163 Ibid., p. 44.
164 Ibid., p. 56.
165 Ibid., p. 58.
lacked a willingness to engage with ‘the Maori cultural context’ citing the work of Hazel Riseborough, James Belich and Claudia Orange as examples. His proffered reasons for this, either Pakeha academics’ unwillingness to become entangled in ‘the other’s’ culture, or, more commonly, a reluctance to recognise the significance of culture in writing history.\textsuperscript{166} This is not however true of all historians. Judith Binney’s study of Rua Kenana in \textit{Mihaia} described the intertwining of two worlds, with his millenarian teachings combining with his plans for economic development, each a part of the same movement yet separate.\textsuperscript{167}

Greg Dening has argued that anthropology risks establishing a static model of culture treating community life as if it exists in a vacuum, stating that there are no frozen moments in cultures or cultural essence without history.\textsuperscript{168} Dening sees culture as dynamic and moving, continually producing and reproducing as opposed to remaining trapped in an anthropological ‘snapshot’. As he phrases it: ‘the essence of culture is process. One moment is no more hybrid than the last, one response no less creative than that which was made before.’\textsuperscript{169} Anthropology also suffers from a need to impose paradigmatic descriptions on situations of adaptation. Alan Ward asserts that history remains more flexible in its ability to describe change and, in some ways, more open to read cultural symbols precisely because of the absence of pre-determined models within the discipline. He points out that ‘structuralist habits and uncertainty about how to deal with evidence of the contradictoriness of the past - a reluctance even to admit how varied and contradictory it was - tend to dog anthropology’\textsuperscript{170}

Thus, dependency theory will be used to address the major subject area of this thesis: the inculcation of Maori into the market economy and the workforce and, secondarily, cultural analysis (within a postcolonialist framework) will be engaged, in order to shape the economic analysis with an awareness of the fundamental values of Maori society, and to demonstrate how these values increasingly reasserted themselves from, dramatically so from the 1970s, in the context of massive social and economic transformation change.

\textsuperscript{166} Olssen, 1992, p. 64.  
\textsuperscript{167} Binney et al, 1979.  
\textsuperscript{168} Dening, 1980, p.5.  
\textsuperscript{169} Ibid., p. 39.  

There are other issues in the course of writing Maori history which must be addressed. The first of these is the largely theoretical concept of agency, more specifically, the notion of Maori agency, where during the Pakeha ascendancy there was an historic tension between, on the one hand, the traditional collectively determined will, as expressed through rangatira, and on the other autonomous individual activity encouraged by Western values and practices. To clarify this, a broad explanation of the concept of agency will lead into a discussion of the insights that are provided by the perspective of postcolonial studies.

3.08. The Notion of Agency.

First, the concept of agency. In a recent publication, Pauline Marie Rosenau, *Post-Modernism and the Social Sciences: Insights, Inroads, and Intrusions*, has an elusive and slippery definition of ‘agent/agency’ as ‘someone assumed to have authority and power, causal force’.171 Something more substantial and more concrete, however is needed, in order to pin down more closely a term much loved by many sociologists, anthropologists, historians and their ilk. A finer explication of its meaning and significance demonstrates that academics may view the question of the notion of agency in simple, narrow terms or as but one aspect of a broader underlying debate.

The first perspective interrogates whether individuals “make history” at all, or are in fact subsumed by larger collective forces and institutions. The debate posits individual agency against social structures, in a David-and-Goliath contest. It touches some of the core issues of historical causation: does the colossus topple because of the individual striking the blow, or because it was already collapsing from within? Proponents of individual agency in history emphasize the sling-shooter’s accuracy or lucky strike; structuralists examine the fallen monolith for internal failures. The debate itself can never be satisfactorily resolved, but both sides can be incorporated within a multi-causal view of historical change, something that may be in mind when it is said colloquially that the “time was right” for some historical event. It remains a truism that all humans retain some agency but the scope for and boundaries of that agency are what are constrained and limited. Any historical interrogation into any given

outcome often usually uncovers some confluence between structural readiness for change and individuals permitting or actively pursuing that (or another) change.¹⁷²

The second – and broader - viewpoint arises out of a growing critical reconsideration of some of the main theoretical assumptions underlying the historical explanation of individuals’ meaningful actions. By emphasizing the empirical and analytical distinction between language as a means of communication (for example, the structuralists) and language as a pattern of meanings (for example, the postmodernists), conventional notions of society, experience, interests, culture, and identity, might be more productively interrogated and assessed. In this way, it might be possible to circumvent the longstanding and increasingly no-win contest constructed between the binaries of objectivism and subjectivism, materialism and culturalism, social and individual explanation, and social constraints and human agency.¹⁷³

A further twist to the complexities of the role of the individual within a social structure arises from the collective nature of much Maori agency. A fundamental aspect of agency in Maori social organisation was (and is) the key role of the collective will that springs from the structures of whanau, hapu and iwi and the role of rangatira as leaders. This social system was (and remains) at odds with Western concepts of social organisation, as they had emerged by the mid-nineteenth century. Thus, in the establishment of the Pakeha hegemony over Maori, the State’s regulatory and disciplinary power functioned by placing constraints on agency and activism, insisting that they be articulated through the figure of the autonomous individual. In that context it is assumed that agency, the ability of chiefs to participate in government policy or resist its policy, always had a collective component. Rangatira, by definition, were the leaders for, and representatives of groups, even if these were but tiny clusters of whanau.

The emphasis on agency, however, must not be misconstrued to claim that Maori and Pakeha always had equal power to determine, or influence, the course of developments. Such a misconstruction might well lead to interpretations that are inaccurate, in other words, ahistorical. That said, it must be stated quite emphatically, that after 1860, while Maori continued to contribute to the outcomes of their infrequent interaction with Pakeha, they did so as increasingly junior, disempowered players. Their role became that of an increasingly

¹⁷² The U.S. academic journal History & Theory 42 (4), December 2001, focuses exclusively on the concept of agency.
unequal party as the Pakeha hegemony became established in military, political, legal, commercial and economic processes.

The responses of Maori to the many-faceted processes of colonisation has exercised the minds and hearts of many academics. As will be noted in more detail further below Linda Smith has passionately stated that Maori narratives of the past are quite different intellectually, conceptually and culturally from the Western discipline of history, and so ‘our accounts collide, crash into each other’. Unequivocal in her sympathy for Maori as perceived victims of colonisation, Smith claims that in this alien academic tradition: ‘... history is mostly about power.’

While some aspects of the first phase of colonisation was frequently marked by conflict and contestation between coloniser and colonised, following the military, political and commercial victories of the 1860s the process of colonisation was marked by an increasing resort by the colonising authorities to unilateral action. Very generally Maori society was undergoing a transformation and its structures were changing, usually to the point where its capacity to adopt, initiate, and in some measure control economic activity and promote development had been lost. The increasing subordination and marginalisation of Maori in the late nineteenth century was substantially accompanied by economic processes such as, the advent of agricultural and pastoral farming practices in a system that privileged owner-occupier tenure.

Thus in terms of their participation in the capitalist economy, up until the 1860s Maori remained active agents in their own society and frequently negotiated their terms of engagement with the colonisers in terms of trade and commerce. From the 1860s these bilateral opportunities were lost. Maori became increasingly marginalised and subordinated in terms of their participation in the economy.

3.09 Decolonisation: Further Postcolonial Discourse.

One of the essential issues faced by those researching Maori history today is the concept of decolonisation. Linda Smith described the challenge of decolonization of history as telling the

174 Linda Tuhiwai Smith, Decolonizing Methodologies, Dunedin: UOP, 1999, p. 28; refer to pp. 66-7 below.
175 Ibid., p. 33.
historical story from the perspective of the ‘other’ through ‘rewriting and rerighting our position in history’. She asserted that this is not merely a case of narrating the past, but:

... is a very powerful need to give testimony to and restore a spirit, to bring back into existence a world fragmented and dying. The sense of history conveyed by these things is not the same thing as the discipline of history, and so our accounts collide, crash into each other.

Smith argued that ‘reclaiming history is a critical and essential aspect of decolonization’ and launched a broadside at what she viewed as the failings of existing practice within the historical discipline. She also derided theories such as deconstructionism, noting that theories of knowledge contestation and multiple discourses were not new concepts to indigenous communities, even though they were described as oral traditions, not histories. Smith did not see history as inherently important however, as she believed that:

"... history is mostly about power. It is the story of the powerful and how they became powerful and then how they use their power to keep in a position in which they can dominate others."

In this dissertation the potential of a postcolonial perspective has been engaged to contribute to an understanding of the situation of Maori in the workforce. This, as has been noted above, is used conjointly with dependency theory in this dissertation. One of the key insights of postcolonial scholarship is the attention it draws to the homogenization of the ‘other’. From the time of the initial governance contract in February 1840 between the Crown and the indigenous peoples of New Zealand this is clear. The Treaty of Waitangi of 1840 was negotiated between the British crown and a fictional category - a latter-day construct, the Maori. Some of the native peoples of New Zealand were unaware of the Treaty or did not sign it. The colonial power however, insisted on treating the indigene as one. Further, colonial ethnography begins with notions regarding the social organisation of indigenous peoples that were projected onto the tangata whenua. Amongst the most significant preconception was the understanding of the tribe as the primary and constant political organisation and, in particular, seeing the authority of the tribe as the source of hapu authority. Instead, the authority of the iwi arguably derived (and derives) from that of the hapu, which in turn depends on the whanau.

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176 Smith, 1999, p. 28.
177 Ibid., p. 28.
178 Ibid., p. 30.
179 Ibid., p. 33.
As Maori numbers increased in the twentieth century, government social and economic policy became one of assimilation of the Maori as a manual workforce, first in the rural sector, then following World War II in the urban factories. In the 1970s, Maori resistance to continuing land loss and the accelerating speed of acculturation coupled with the emergence of a Maori cultural renaissance challenged the very bases on which the processes of assimilation - which had a distinctive Pakeha coloration - were predicated. These new forces required Pakeha accommodation. In the 1980s, unemployment hit hardest in the Maori workforce. There are a number of similarities between the New Zealand experience and that of other indigenous peoples at this time. 182

Clearly the decision to locate the topic of the incorporation of Maori within a theoretical framework of postcolonialism is problematic, but it will be argued that in so doing there are more insights to be gained than not. The argument for this location proceeds thus:

The emergence of postcolonial studies within the New Zealand academy as a distinct mode of critical analysis can be dated to the early 1980s. It is at times confused with the form of literary and cultural criticism now known as ‘post-colonialism’, and in latter years, efforts to distinguish it from this categorisation, have seen different forms of the word established and recognised by linguists and etymologists: ‘postcolonial’ versus ‘post-colonial’. The work that appeared from the early 1980s built on earlier scholarship and intersected with several other intellectual currents, especially the historiographic process generally described as ‘revisionist history of New Zealand.’ This model broadened the scope of the earlier limited narrow focus on settler society and its politics to include material on Maori and women - to name but two previously over-looked and neglected topics, thus challenging the dominant modes of twentieth-century New Zealand historiography that had tended to maintain an insular amnesia about the ‘other’. This widening of the historical focus has not been without its critics, but by challenging the state-centrism of New Zealand nationalist historiography, and by locating New Zealand within the wider narrative of global decolonisation and the emergence of indigenous voices, it relocated New Zealand historical scholarship in ways that encouraged the voice of the ‘other’ and welcomed new points of view. 183

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Citing one example from the field of study of this thesis: in 1967 employment levels for both Pakeha and Maori fell sharply to their lowest since the 1930s depression. It was in this context that a tiny but significant body of dissident socio-economic studies were published, pioneered by prominent (and radical-thinking) public servant William Ball Sutch, and drawing on various forms of dependency and world-systems theory. These argued that although the history of modern New Zealand economic development appeared superior by Western standards, it shared much with development patterns in other colonised regions of the world. Such a comparison with perceived ‘third world countries’ was not easily accepted by many in the Pakeha community, let alone the mandarins of New Zealand’s officialdom.

The dominant intellectual response to the return of a brief economic crisis in 1967, superficially bearing signs similar to the beginnings of the enormous economic crisis of the 1930s, however, was essentially shaped by variants of modernisation theory and revisionist historiography. Most modernisation theories rested on a crude dichotomy between ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ societies, and were designed to elucidate the means whereby ‘traditional’ societies could acquire the attributes of ‘modernity’. Although modernisation theories are often alluded to in this thesis - as in this current discussion - they are not deployed...
as an analytical or heuristic tool. Modernisation theories were fashionable in the 1950s and 1960s, when they were critiqued by postcolonialists and superseded by dependency theory.

From the now out-of-favour perspective of modernisation theory, the problems besetting New Zealand society since so-called ‘Dominion status’ in 1907 were interpreted as evidence that the country had yet to complete the transition from a ‘traditional’ to a properly ‘modern’ social order. It could be equally well argued that this could sit equally well in the spectrum of dependency theory. For many, one of the appeals of postcolonial studies to supporters of the indigenous cause in Aotearoa/New Zealand as it has emerged since the 1980s has been its attempt to destabilize the dominant culture represented by modernisation discourse. From the perspective of postcolonial studies, modernisation discourse was nothing more than a rearticulation of the nineteenth-century bourgeois ideology of evolutionary progress, the occluded side of which had always been the colonial subordination of the greater part of the world to metropolitan domination.

By focusing overwhelmingly upon variables relating to indigenous aspects of social structure and culture, modernisation theories generally displayed indifference to the whole issue of imperialism and usually ignored or underplayed many important external forces or constraints upon change within given societies. Where modernisation discourses, consistently located modern New Zealand within an apparently self-contained Western context and within a teleologically foreshortened timespan in which the past was understood as calcified ‘tradition’ which simply impeded progress, postcolonial discourse insisted on the need to understand New Zealand historical development in terms both of the longue durée \(^{186}\) and the wider geographical span of Western colonial capitalism. Both modernisation discourse and New Zealand revisionist historiography have stressed the reactionary nature of New Zealand nationalism, whereas postcolonial discourse has suggested that New Zealand nationalism can only be understood contextually, as the complex outcome of local interactions with an aggressively expanding imperialist ‘world’ economy. Where revisionist historiography and modernisation studies have both concentrated on the political elites that shaped local political institutions and state apparatuses, postcolonial studies has sought to develop a more critical understanding of the various forms of subaltern social struggles that have largely been written out of the dominant debates in New Zealand history, whether in their bourgeois nationalist or revisionist versions.

\(^{186}\) A term used initially by historians of the Annalistic School that simply means a long period, usually of at least several decades up to approximately one century, and sometimes, beyond this, in duration.
That said, New Zealand modernisation discourse, revisionist historiography or postcolonial studies ought not to be credited (ex ipso facto) with more internal coherence than they evidence. All have been coloured to some degree by the extended conjuncture of economic restructuring, deregulated markets and a re-writing of the ‘social contract’. A more sober perspective has recently been advanced by Kerry Howe:

... there are the twin waves of postmodernism and postcolonialism. The former, which says that history does not exist, only historians do, is concerned to show not what happened in history, but who writes history and why, and what are the underlying authority structures of such writing. So history is seen to exist only as a ‘discursive practice’, which requires ‘deconstructing’. This approach has led many historians into an intellectual cul de sac and, with its private language, rendered them unable to communicate beyond their tribe. Postcolonialism, for its part, has, at its worst, reduced history to a simplistic morality play where forces of evil (i.e. imperial powers) subdue and victimise weak innocents (i.e. ‘indigenous’ peoples).

The concept of postcolonialism was first cogently articulated in New Zealand terms in 1985 by Simon During in *Landfall*, in which he described New Zealand as coming to ‘know itself in Maori terms’:

New Zealand ... can be characterised by the equilibrium of its postcolonising and postcolonial forces. In no other country are they so equally balanced. This is not a consequence of the way that political or economic power is shared between the Maori and Pakeha. In terms of parliamentary representation, money education, entry into the professions and so on Maori do badly. But as far as what can be called discursive politics the comparative strength of the two communities is, if anything, overturned. New Zealand is inevitably coming know itself in Maori terms; I myself have no doubt that within fifty years the colonial name ‘New Zealand’ will be replaced by the Maori name ‘Aotearoa’.

The asymmetry between socio-economic/ political power and ideological power is a result of the indirection, illegitimacy and emptiness of postcolonising discourses. Postcolonial needs and self-images come to dominate in the absence of postcolonising voices, though no doubt they undergo profound mutations in the process.

In those postcolonial countries which have no effective postcolonised discourse one finds a crisis of emptiness. This is true of Australia in particular. It has never been sufficiently recognised that New Zealand has a different and more complex discursive community than Australia because the postcolonised/postcolonising forces are balanced here as they are not there.

In the two decades following the *Landfall* article New Zealand has negotiated a postcolonial identity that has been played out in cultural policy directions and tourism campaigns, figured in literary texts and films, dramatized through the clamorous assertions of cultural minorities, and reflected in the way the State has managed the intersections of economic and cultural policy. In the 1980s New Zealand, under the astute, if at times, rather flamboyant stewardship

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of Prime Minister David Lange, outwardly embraced biculturalism and publicly acknowledged its cultural situation as a Pacific nation.

The shifting stances towards culture and ethnicity adopted by New Zealand from the 1970s were palpable responses to a crisis characterised by the redundancy of national identities formulated exclusively around settler concerns, the fragility of the single-focus pastoral economy, adjustments to the new imperatives of an expansive global capitalism, and the need for new technology skills. Assertions of indigenous rights, shifts in immigration policy, and the conscripting of international intellectual and economic trends were all caught up in an energetic but confused period of cultural re-evaluation that resulted by the turn of the new millennium in the emergence of a nation whose communities, especially Maori, questioned its identity and role.

Mark Williams has explained at length the important difference between the postcolonized and postcolonizing forces in New Zealand:

> We might characterize the cultural (and even the economic) redirections taken in the 1980s and 1990s as 'settler postcolonialism,' in the loose sense that they aimed to reposition settler societies in a world in which trading patterns, social relations, and national imageries inherited from the colonial period had become negative or unsustainable. Postcolonial here is inherently problematic, given that New Zealand has not been a colony since the early twentieth century and the indigenous rights movements, especially the Maori Renaissance, of the late twentieth century have a more obvious claim to represent the effort to expunge the legacy of empire. Yet the term postcolonial addresses the efforts in [New Zealand] since the 1980s by the non-indigenous as well as indigenous populations to move beyond the forms of national identity derived from and associated with colonialism. 189

There are important differences in emphasis to note. New Zealand's cultural programme under successive governments since the 1980s (especially under the Labour administrations of 1984 - 1990 and 1999 - present) has been postcolonial in terms of the effort directed at reversing the disadvantage to the indigenous population derived from colonial relations and by promoting ‘partnership’ between the two main ethnic groups, Maori and Pakeha. 190

The efforts of New Zealand to distance itself from its colonial past need to be distinguished from those more violent and drastic ones throughout the colonized world in the 1950s and

190 Paul McHugh, The Maori Magna Carta, Auckland: OUP, 1991, p. 6. The concept of ‘partnership’ developed in the Anglican Church in the late twentieth century as it attempted to heal rifts within its communion inherited from the colonial past. In general cultural and political usage the term draws on the notion that the Treaty of Waitangi (1840), the founding document of the nation, embodies an ongoing agreement between the signatory races to share governance. McHugh states: ‘The Treaty of Waitangi ... created a dynamic, ongoing relationship between Crown and tribe. The Chiefs entered into a “partnership” with the Crown.’
1960s. The ‘postcolonial’ movement in New Zealand has been impelled not by popular uprisings against a legacy of oppression but by abandonment by the mother country. Ironically, New Zealand had ceased to be a colony in the strict constitutional sense of the word in the first decade of the 20th century, half a century before the more difficult achievements of independence by African, Caribbean, and Asian countries. New Zealand, which declined to join the Australian federation, was granted Dominion status in 1907, probably in recognition of the success of the settler enterprise in New Zealand and its military contribution to the U.K. in the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902). Yet colonial attitudes had lingered much longer than in countries where a colonized majority of the population had cast off the legacy of humiliation and subjugation, seeking to make a wholly new nation-state. The colonial twilight was especially noticeable in New Zealand, where the ties to Britain have sometimes been more filial and a suspicion of America has been more resilient and more widely distributed throughout the community.\footnote{There are a large number of academic articles and a small number of books that explore the lingering prolonged ‘colonial twilight’. Among the more accessible and challenging are: P.M. Cleveland, ‘U.S.–New Zealand Relations: some parting observations’, Department of State Bulletin, 89, 2147, June 1989, pp. 45-8; Clyde Griffen, ‘Towards an Urban Social History for New Zealand’, in NZJH, 20 (2), November 1986, pp. 11-31; J.O.C. Phillips, ‘Of Verandahs and Fish and Chips’, in NZJH, 24 (2), October 1990, pp. 188-9; J.O.C. Phillips, ‘Our Histories, Our Selves’, in NZJH, 30 (2), October 1996, pp. 107-23; Victor Li, ‘Towards Articulation: Postcolonial theory and demotic resistance’ Ariel, 26 (1), January 1995, pp. 167-89; Colin James. New Territory: The Transformation of New Zealand 1984-1992, Wellington: BWB, 1992.}

Postcolonialism has a number of manifestations on the political landscape of New Zealand as a variety of loosely connected efforts by different communal and economic interests: by political elites keen to distance countries increasingly dependent on Asian markets, capital, and skills from the negative associations of colonial racism; by business interests impatient with colonial trade patterns, seeking unrestricted entry into a global marketplace; by traditionally minded nationalists anxious to protect local constituencies, economic and cultural; by immigrant and indigenous groups determined, with different priorities, to democratize the communal possession of cultural power; and by those embarrassed by the colonial taint, desiring to live in a more just, independent, and mature society.

Settler postcolonialism has included efforts to reposition indigenous peoples within the nation, ranging from presenting them as exotic features of tourism-dependent societies to genuine attempts to arrive at partnership in areas of government, educational, and conservation praxis. As part of the settlement process of Treaty of Waitangi claims there have been not insignificant transfers of assets in the past 18 years as well as legal determinations in favour of indigenous claimants and the conferment by government of a degree of self-management
on mandated tribal authorities. In New Zealand, biculturalism has arguably achieved more than symbolic status. In government departments, especially those involved with welfare, education, and culture, much effort has been directed at rethinking the structures of governance in bicultural terms, and corresponding adjustments in practice have been achieved. Yet, adjustment of the political order has not produced fundamental changes in the disposition of power or wealth. In other words, in bicultural New Zealand, the essential structure of the state inherited from the colonial period has remained intact, while the imagery, the language, and some of the substance of ethnic relations have been refurbished. Moreover, ‘race’ in the nineteenth-century sense of the word has lingered, despite the increasing use of a substitute term, ‘ethnicity’, in the postcolonial reinvention of New Zealand.

Robert Young noted that the concept of racial amalgamation in colonial discourse contained within itself opposing associations: as a feared descent of the superior type into despised otherness, or as an improving blend of higher and lower, redeeming the latter from its state of savagery and allowing it to be brought at least partially within the condition of civilization. In colonial New Zealand the latter view predominated, so long as the issue of ethnic co-mingling was confined to relations between Maori and Pakeha.

The problem for ‘postcolonial’ countries where the dominant national narratives still project the myths and wishes of majorities derived from colonization is linked to the colonial dispute over the effects of racial amalgamation: how to include or expel racial otherness; which forms of otherness are susceptible to assimilation; in what terms - political, mythical, economic - is otherness to be allowed to remain different?

In New Zealand biculturalism became official government policy in the 1980s and was arguably, received with a mixture of responses ranging from enthusiasm to hostility by a few Pakeha, but largely treated with disinterest or disdain by the majority of Pakeha. Yet here too the postcolonial interest in positioning the ‘other’ more prominently in the national imagery for tourism and marketing purposes came at a time when global integration meant that indigeneity has become a marketable sign of local distinctiveness.

Postcoloniality has strengthened New Zealand's sense of exceptionalism, and its detractors have often regarded New Zealand as isolationist and pacifist, its immigration policies providing a backdoor into Australia for the unskilled, a land drifting towards irrelevance in the South Pacific. The reality is that New Zealand has been (and still is) faced with a political and diplomatic conundrum as a tiny Pacific nation where so much of its destiny is determined by human, cultural, and economic capital beyond its borders and beyond its control.

This presentation of the processes and tensions that shaped an emerging cultural identity for the nation-state of New Zealand has back-grounded the period that is central to this thesis: the place of an emergent Maori urbanised work-force in the wider community. In the interim the focus is brought back in the next chapter to the nineteenth century to survey some of the experiences of Maori in work in the nineteenth century.

3.10. Conclusion
The development of postcolonial studies in New Zealand potentially represents a considerable challenge to national studies as currently constituted. Too often reduced on all sides to a contest between Maori sovereignty activists (of whom Jane Kelsey, Evan Poata-Smith and Moana Jackson are, arguably, in the academic vanguard) and Pakeha revisionists (of whom James Belich is one of the leading protagonists), postcolonial studies' real significance may well lie elsewhere. To determine how Maori (and Pakeha) social and cultural development has been mediated by colonial capitalism must be the goal of any materialist postcolonial

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studies. From its inception, the colonial process was never simply a matter of the subjugation of this indigenous people or that ‘other’ territory. It was, rather, an international process through which different parts of the globe were differentially integrated into an emergent world capitalist system. Once this premise is accepted, then it follows that the determination of a specific national configuration must be conceived as a product of the global: to borrow Larsen’s phrase, the part must be thought through the whole and not vice versa. In contrast to a nationalist conception of New Zealand obsessed with the discovery of chimerical “national identities,” and a liberal perception alternative that looks beyond the horizon of the Tasman Sea or Oceania, postcolonial critique impels a reconfiguration in the direction of conjunctural global analysis. From such a perspective, the national arena still remains a crucial site for social struggle, but a true understanding of those struggles can only be grasped contextually within a historically determinate wider global frame.
CHAPTER FOUR: A RURAL PROLETARIAT: THE OPENING OF THE NARRATIVE

4.01. Introduction: Overview and the Introduction of Capitalist Work Systems
The process of the incorporation of Maori as a modified and subordinated replica of the larger principal socio-economic order into the settler-dominated capitalist system in New Zealand was uneven and varied; it can retrospectively be accommodated in two successive long waves. Broadly perceived, the first phase extended over a century from about 1840 to about 1935, and a second phase from about 1935 to about 1975. This chapter will focus on the first phase.

A salient feature of this phase is that in the first sixteen years following annexation in May 1840 up until the collapse of the produce markets and the replacement of sailing ships with steam in 1856 Maori competed vigorously with settlers in the grain and vegetable produce as well as the labour markets. Although the evidence is slight and localised, Maori labour in colonial Wellington in 1844 was paid:

...sixpence a day cheaper than European labour, and this was bitterly protested by Pakeha settlers especially in the public works projects where it undercut wages they demanded.\(^{213}\)

As well as more economic, the colonial government argued that the use of Maori labour was a 'civilising influence' and it remained indifferent to settler criticism.\(^{214}\) This situation suggests that from the earliest times of colonial engagement at a local level there was already an ethnically segmented labour market.

George Grey as Governor (1846-52) pursued native affairs policies that incorporated enlightened capitalist strategies, although he resisted the implication of a rising European middle class and was disdainful of Wakefieldian theory. Government public work gangs prior to Grey’s administration were segregated by hapu and chiefs acted as overseers, but this was soon replaced by ‘mixed tribes working willingly under European supervisors’.\(^{215}\) From 1846 Grey used this model for a colonial policy to instruct Maori in the capitalist mode of labour, trades and wages.\(^{216}\) Under this system, the overseer of public works consciously ignored traditional rank and instituted a work-related social scale, and the workers even constructed a


\(^{214}\) Ibid., p. 534.

\(^{215}\) Ibid., p. 538.

stockade in defiance of orders from their chiefs. Individualisation of wages rather than communal control was apparently the norm, because appropriation by chiefs of the wages of 'slaves' they sent to work in their place became an official problem. This implies both that wages were paid out individually and that the chief did not normally appropriate other workers' wages.\textsuperscript{217}

4.02. The Entrepreneurial Battle

Prior to the Second and Third New Zealand Wars, 1860-66, Maori had been active both in enterprise and in the commitment of labour to Maori and settler commercial engagements. In three recent works: a conference paper, a doctoral thesis and a published book, Hazel Petrie examined the history of Maori commercial enterprise in the period 1840-1860, focussing on those enterprises, flourmills and coastal vessels that required large-scale capital investment.\textsuperscript{218} In her doctoral dissertation, the analysis was driven by a detailed interrogation of the interface between Pakeha and Maori ideologies pertaining to economic and political understandings and practice.\textsuperscript{219} With respect to the factor of labour she noted that the flexibility of the workforce had been reduced by Christian ideologies concerning the roles of women and children, the loss of slave labour, and the availability of individual employment in distant towns. Petrie noted that it had often been considered that communal ownership, a lack of innovation, and an incapacity for deferred gratification which were characteristic of kin-based societies like the New Zealand Maori, constituted a barrier to economic growth and were an impediment to extensive economic changes. However, Petrie produced evidence pertaining to mid-nineteenth century Maori that seriously interrogated those arguments and assumptions. She claimed that Maori proved to be highly entrepreneurial and innovative, husbanding and accumulating communal resources to maximise returns and expand their business interests.\textsuperscript{220}

Petrie produced a wealth of detail evidencing how chiefly entrepreneurs throughout the North Island, such as Paora Tuhaere (Ngati Whatua) at Orakei, Matene Te Whiwhi (Ngati Raukawa/Ngati Toa) at Otaki, Wiremu Tamihana Te Rangitake (Te Atiawa) at Waitara, Kingi Hori Te Waru (Ngati Apakura) at Rangiaowhia harnessed tribal resources and inherent native

\textsuperscript{217} Ibid., pp. 223-4.
\textsuperscript{219} Petrie, 2004, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{220} Petrie, 2002, p. 20.
skills, and ‘adopted commercial forms within their own frameworks’. In this early colonial period before the Second and Third New Zealand wars of the 1860s, it is demonstrated that church missionaries, Pakeha traders and entrepreneurs living and working in Maori communities were instrumental in facilitating these local native endeavours, and often had political lobbying skills to organise government funding. The Rev. John Morgan at Otawhao, the Rev. Alfred Brown at Tauranga and Hans Tapsell at Maketu were but three of many Pakeha living in or close to Maori communities who were active in this respect.

When both flourmilling and coastal shipping industries suffered severe economic downturns in the late 1850s, the *New Zealander* argued from a position of cultural superiority that:

Maori had not accepted the doctrine of ‘small profits and quick returns’ because they had ‘not yet graduated in our School of Political Economy’. It continued that, although ‘their notions of trading are still tinged with the old Protestant fallacies ... they do know that the Pakeha is and must be their best customer, and that it is to their interest to encourage him to settle amongst them.

Interspersion of settlement had previously been the general Maori policy, but by the time of the late 1850s many Maori had recognised that the scale of settlement was making excessive demands on their land, their resources, and on their social structures.

Petrie continued that:

Maori listened to the sermons, both religious and economic, nodding in agreement when it was politic to do so. But their responses were in line with their own need and how they perceived their own interests. Leaving the matter of alliance and Pakeha ideology aside, there were many eminently practical reasons for Maori to engage in wheat growing, flour-milling, and coastal shipping.

Her rationale for the decline and demise of Maori tribal enterprise in the late 1850s was:

... [though] their approaches to business differed little from those of their Pakeha equivalents, ... the greatest difference was in the role played by the chiefs of industry and the relationship between them and their people which enabled them to harness their labour force for greater productive capacity.

Maori defeat in the wars of the 1860s and the ensuing confiscation of huge swathes of productive land in Waikato, Taranaki and the Bay of Plenty underwrote the transfer of commercial and political power to the settler government. With the land had gone not only some of the most productive soil, but the opportunity to relocate within their own domain and to access alternate resources. Petrie concluded her analysis of the demise of Maori

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224 Ibid., p. 118.
225 Ibid., p. 276.
commercial enterprise with the explicit comment that it occurred progressively from the south of the country to the north, ‘Maori in the South Island, Wellington and elsewhere lost their economic pre-eminence earlier than those in the Auckland Province’, with the implication that it was war and confiscation of land that was its death-knell in the Auckland and Taranaki provinces.226

4.03. Amalgamation on a Firmer Footing

The collapse of the Maori commercial trading economy, the confiscation of important potentially productive lands, and the beginnings of the Native Land Court land alienation process within a few years of each other assured the settler ascendancy of a firmer footing. There were two significant trends in the Maori population during this first phase - the appropriation of land for the production of primary farm commodities: the Maori population, mainly North Island in location, declined from something below 80,000 in 1840 to about 57,000 in Fenton’s enumeration of 1857/1858, to a nadir of 42,113 by the 1896 census, when they were popularly perceived as close to the brink of extinction.227 From that low point it recovered steadily to 63,670 in 1926. In contrast, the Pakeha population mushroomed from perhaps a 1,000 or so in each island in 1840, to 34,000 (North Island) and 25,000 (South Island) in 1858, to 112,000 (NI) and 188,000 (SI) in 1874, and to 1,344,469 in 1926.228

The Maori population with few exceptions - for example: Orakei on the eastern edge of expanding urban Auckland, Waiwhetu close to Hutt and Petone, north of Wellington - continued to be essentially rural dwellers during this first phase, eking out a livelihood on a hugely-reduced land base sometimes supplemented by casual waged engagements as farm labourers, road builders and bush workers or primary industry process workers (for example, meat freezing workers) well into the first three decades of the twentieth century. Some aspects of these irregular, casual engagements will be examined in detail in the sections below.

4.04. Labour in the Settlers’ Pastoral Economy

The place of Maori in the wider colonial system following the New Zealand Wars was predicated on values that were driven by the victor colonists’ imperatives. The following sections of this chapter explore some of the configurations of economic engagements between tau iwi and tangata whenua - which Ngata so passionately recalled - in the pastoral economy.

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226 Ibid., p. 276.
It traces the trajectories and the dynamics of global and local power relationships that featured in the earlier-established settler rural industries of the South Island and the later-established frontier farms of the North Island focussing on Tai Tokerau/North Auckland (notably, the Kaipara region) and Tairawhiti/East Coast. These farms were sites where land had been appropriated; these were geographic places where the agents of that appropriation drew tangata whenua into power-laden but covert and distant relations in the far-flung global capitalist nexus from the agricultural and pastoral merchants and financiers of Princes Street, Dunedin, Hereford Street, Christchurch and Fort Street, Auckland, to the overseas agents, be they located in Martin Place, Sydney, Hay’s Wharf, London or the Wool Exchange, Bradford, Yorkshire.

Maori played a key part in the expansion of the settler rural economy in /New Zealand throughout the mid- to late nineteenth century. Wages acquired from seasonal employment in the rural economy increasingly supplemented the proceeds from the traditional economy and petty commodity production. In essence, Maori whanau provided a parallel source of labour to the itinerant Pakeha workforce, and a reserve army of labour employed at times of labour shortages. The flexible nature of seasonal and casual employment allowed Maori families to maintain their traditional links and obligations to iwi and hapu. At this stage the new economic phenomenon of wage labour remained a minor, but certainly growing feature of Maori economic activity. As the pace of land alienation increased, however, so did the Maori reliance on seasonal labour as a means to supplement their declining resource base. Indeed, by the early twentieth century the completely self-sufficient Maori family was rare. The most fundamental and characteristic feature of Maori life was casual employment.229

From the 1850s Pakeha settlement expanded from the initial coastal points of settlement and a rural economy began to develop on a national scale. It was based on extensive pastoralism in the east of both main islands and mixed crop and livestock farming on the smaller farms cleared of bush and fern in the wetter zones of the northern, central and western North Island.231 The expansion of pastoralism in the period from the 1850s was encouraged by long-term trend of rising wool prices as a result of the expansion and mechanisation of textile

industries across Europe. The expansion of dairy farming and the frozen meat industry in the period from the 1880s was promoted by technological breakthroughs in the processing of animal milk and meat products and their efficient non-perishable packaging and transport to the far-distant U.K. market. 233

Profitable pastoralism required huge land-holdings and their acquisition at not too great a cost. Indeed, the colony’s basic economic unit was the efficiently managed sheep-run of 10,000 acres or more. The success of the earliest runs in the Wairarapa from the mid-1840s encouraged the proliferation of runs on the eastern side of the South Island and the Hawke’s Bay by the 1850s. 235

Dense forest, broken terrain and Maori resistance proved a temporary obstacle to the development of the settler rural economy in the North Island and consequently development progressed most rapidly in the South Island where the already grassed and tussocked plains and high country (and what was perceived as an absence of a hostile Maori population), were perfectly conducive to an expanding pastoral industry. A million acres of suitable pastoral land had been appropriated throughout the country by 1852 on which grazed more than a quarter of million sheep. 236 Despite the growing number of sheep runs in the North Island, pastoralism was still very much a South Island industry with around two thirds of New Zealand’s sheep being grazed on South Island runs. 237 By the early 1860s, following a huge scramble for runs, the occupation of the South Island’s suitable pastoral land was complete. Within four years, there were more than 600 runs and 200 stations in Canterbury alone, and, during the decade, there was a massive increase in sheep numbers to nearly ten million nationally. 238


236 In the 1850s, Canterbury became the prime focus for development with virtually all the suitable land between the Waipara and Rakaia Rivers being appropriated by pastoralists and divided into 50 runs. Martin, 1990, p. 7.

237 Ibid., p. 7.

New Zealand’s rural economic development at the time generated an irregular and seasonal employment pattern, which as Martin notes, was reflected in ‘...considerable transience, unemployment and underemployment’. It provided the basis for a large itinerant Pakeha workforce employed in diverse casual or seasonal occupations. Severe labour shortages from the 1850s until 1864 at the height of the economic boom in the South Island prompted a new immigration drive from Britain especially for farm and harvest labourers. Farmers throughout the country complained bitterly of the labour shortages throughout the decade and consequently agricultural labourers and labourers were given preference for immigration to provinces like Canterbury.

The expansion of the rural economy, and pastoralism in particular, had an important impact on employment possibilities for Maori communities. Because of the scarcity of Pakeha labour in some regions, Maori played a key part in the rural economy from the mid nineteenth century. They provided a parallel source of labour to the itinerant Pakeha workforce, and in turn, a reserve army of labour employed at time of labour shortages. The impact of seasonal wage labour on Maori society was extremely uneven. This was because the rural economy was confined to certain regional areas and consequently the degree of Maori exposure to it varied greatly. The nature of the labour undertaken by Maori communities also varied greatly according to the natural resources available in each region and the prospects for employment.

Maori itinerant labourers were to play an increasingly crucial role in shearing, bush-clearing and in general station and farm work. The main areas of Maori shearing in the latter part of the nineteenth century were the Wairarapa, Hawke’s Bay, the East Coast and Poverty Bay. About a third of Wairarapa stations employed Maori shearers, and they were particularly important on the coastal stations where they were also often employed as station hands and as

239 Martin, 1990, p. 16.
240 Martin, 1990 p. 17.
241 Seasonal labour was obviously not as prominent a feature in Maori communities that resided in regions where contact was usually indirect such as the interior of the North Island where the geographical difficulties coupled with Maori resistance to colonisation put a brake on rural economic development.
242 In Kororareka for example, Maori found ‘...employment in the kauri bushes, falling and getting out timber for the saw-mills and squaring for export. Others obtain[d] work in bushes and on roads with their bullock teams.’ AJHR, 1885, G-2, Report No.4, p. 5. In other parts of Northland the Maori economy was increasingly based on large-scale migrations of extended whanau groups to the gumfields. In this way, many Maori communities lived away from their papa-kainga [home] for many months at a time. Martin, 1990, p. 39.
contract labourers.\textsuperscript{243} In Hawke’s Bay and the East Coast overall, close to 90 per cent of the stations employed Maori shearers and for the large East Coast stations the coverage was virtually 100 per cent.\textsuperscript{244} Here, unlike in other parts of the country where both shearers and shedhands were male and hired on an individual basis, Maori extended whanau groups, including female members and children, were often hired for shearing, shedhand work and cooking.\textsuperscript{245}

The seasonal employment pattern that began to develop in these rural industries was characterised by strong summer demand for labour, followed by a falling demand for labour with the onset of winter. This seasonal trend was reflected in the changing organisation of Maori society. Cultivation came to be done ... principally by middle aged and old men’ while the younger families left to find casual employment returning again for planting and the harvest.\textsuperscript{246} In the East Coast and Hawke’s Bay regions for example:

Most of the young men leave their homes during the summer months, and engage themselves to the farmers in the district for sheep-shearing, and more especially cutting grass and threshing, and cleaning grass-seed; they return home for winter months, and their summer months, and with their summer earnings they supplement the supplies which have been obtained by cultivation.\textsuperscript{247}

In his very detailed report for the Te Atainga-a-Mahaki people of the East Coast, Bryan Murton provides a chronological outline of the emergence of a rural proletariat on the East Coast. This sequence is divided thus:

the transition to rural wage labour;
bush-felling and breaking-in the land;
seasonal labour; especially shearing;
permanent rural employment;
subsistence and the Wage Economy;
dependency and the Depression.\textsuperscript{248}

This sequence can very broadly be applied to many other districts throughout the North Island, but it is vital to bear in mind that the chronology and periodisation varied from one district to another in line with the advance of the colonial and settlement frontier and the uneven

\textsuperscript{243} In the 1850s and 1860s at Akito, a coastal north Wairarapa station, many Maori were employed on contract for shepherding, packing to outstations, docking and branding, mustering, sheep washing, fencing, thatching, as shedhands, and for building whare, gathering firewood and cooking for shearers. But from the 1860s onwards in the Wairarapa, most of the available work was snapped up by struggling Pakeha settlers, although at times of labour shortages, Maori were employed in great numbers.’ Martin, 1990, p. 40.

\textsuperscript{244} Ibid. p. 43.

\textsuperscript{245} An official report in 1885 noted that Maori men and women are “...largely employed by the sheep-farmers during the shearing season, the men shearing, and women packing and sorting the wool; indeed in some cases the women also shear”. AJHR, 1885, G-2, Report No. 12, p. 16.

\textsuperscript{246} AJHR, 1885, G-2, Report No. 11, p. 5.

\textsuperscript{247} Ibid., p. 15.

\textsuperscript{248} Murton, 2001, pp. 2-4 and 402.
incorporation of individual Maori (often separated from their whanau) within the capitalist system. With its low number of Maori, the South Island’s history is quite different from that of the North; and within the North Island, the history of Taranaki is different from that of Urewera, Wellington from the Waikato.

Although there had been a great expansion of Maori economic activity throughout New Zealand by the 1880s, from gum digging and whaling in the far north to rabbiting, contract road and rail building in the Waikato and storekeeping and farm labouring on the East Coast, Maori still worked generally in family groups with men, women and children involved in different aspects of the work process. Only labouring involved work outside the local community, but because it was seasonal employment it allowed young Maori families to maintain traditional links with their iwi and hapu. It was a pattern that was to continue well into the twentieth century.

But this economic phenomenon of wage labour had not yet imprinted its form upon the whole of Maori society, nor had it yet, exerted a major influence in molding Maori societal development. Maori wage labour in the early part of the twentieth century remained a minor, although certainly a growing feature of Maori economic activity which was dominated by a hybrid of traditional subsistence cultivation and petty commodity production in which Maori whanau produced goods for market.

Wage labour increasing supplemented the proceeds from both the traditional economy and petty commodity production. The additional resources that could be gained through seasonal labour mitigated against the natural disasters that went with crop failures. With many of the Pakeha settlements becoming self-sufficient in foodstuffs and less reliant on the Maori supply

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249 Martin, 1990, p. 39. Such ‘collective’, family based enterprises were involved in a number of different ventures. Tobacco was grown as a regular crop in many settlements of the Hokianga during the 1880s. It was reported that both Ngati Awa and Ngati Pukeko at Whakatane had procured flocks of sheep realising the opportunities arising from the increasing value of wool. Between them they tended to over 900 sheep. The proceeds from whaling in some coastal settlements increased the cash income of Maori communities with their sale of whale-bone and oil. However, Maori involvement in the whaling industry had declined rapidly since the early nineteenth century and it was no longer a satisfactory source of income on its own.

250 Ibid., p. 39. Money to supplement the traditional subsistence economy was also made from grass seeding with 700 Ngati Porou travelling to the Poverty Bay flats annually for this purpose. Rangatahi also left their kainga to work in road construction returning home for the winter.

251 Ibid., pp. 38-44.

of food and raw materials, Maori had to find some way of earning hard currency to trade for European goods to meet traditional obligations to whanau and hapu.\footnote{253}

The large-scale expropriation of Maori land from the mid-nineteenth century coupled with the increasing self-sufficiency of Pakeha settlements undercut the profitability of petty commodity production within Maori communities and forced Maori to supplement their declining resource base by relying more and more on seasonal labour such as shearing, grass-seed sowing and grass-seed cutting. It was from this point that the wages earned through seasonal labour no longer came to represent a convenient means of complementing the traditional Maori economy, and emerged as an increasingly important feature of Maori society.

4.05. Ngata’s Views

It has been noted above in the literature review that Apirana Ngata was pre-eminently a man of two worlds, whose career did much to ameliorate some of the negative outcomes of the endless fragmentation of native land, to encourage the retention of some of the remaining modified legacy of traditional cultural rituals and practices, while adapting life-styles and daily routines to the \textit{realpolitik} and political economy of the specific practices of the contemporary world. The historical conditions of the generalised Maori identity which emerged between the two World Wars were shaped by a mobile and transient wage labour force, widespread poverty and incipient urbanisation.\footnote{254}

In a sense Ngata was articulating a policy of adaptation by Maori to the Pakeha world that can be traced to the ideas of his mentor Sir James Carroll. Since his rise to parliamentary influence in the early 1890s, Carroll had always asserted what was to become the fundamental assimilationist precept of the Maori graduates of Te Aute College and the leaders of the Young Maori Party (especially Pomare, Buck and Ngata): the Maori must become Pakeha. Late in his career, addressing a hui at Te Kuiti in 1920, Carroll nevertheless exhorted the Maori to \textit{kia mau ki to koutou maoritanga} - ‘hold fast to your Maoritanga’ or Maoriness. When asked to explain the notion, Carroll responded, ‘Who knows what lies ahead? It is for you younger men to \textit{whakaringaringa} (give it hands) and \textit{whakawaewae} (give it legs).’\footnote{255} The apparently contradictory conjunction between Carroll’s lifetime policy of assimilation, and the expectation that some form of Maoritanga could thus nevertheless be materialised, defined

\footnote{253}Ibid., pp. 405-28. 
the ambivalent ideological parameters within which the notion of assimilation would continue to oscillate.

With the exception of the fourth phase of assimilation (outlined in the literature review above) Ngata approved of Firth's four phases of culture contact as a 'fair statement from the angle of the competent European ethnologist' of historical transformation of Maori economy. With respect to the fourth phase Ngata demurred that regardless of a complete outer 'material' transformation, a 'penetration of the psychological strata of Maori life and thought' would reveal that to the contrary 'Native characteristics may persist and racial influences continue their sway over the mind and spirit of the people to a greater extent than European investigators can appreciate'.

It is arguable that Firth, indirectly, and Ngata, more directly, were instrumental in influencing from the 1920s to the 1970s the policies and practices of both the Maori role in the political economy and the received public understanding of Maori culture. By 1940 Ngata had compromised his earlier anger at misappropriated Maori labour so passionately recounted to Buck and taken up Firth's latter-day ideology that Maori practise a symbol and ritual-oriented culture that would not:

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assume a politically aggressive form ... [that] can be dangerous to the life of the wider community, of which the Maori now form an inextricable part.
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Maori 'culture' had become for Ngata an ideological solution in the mind to a contradiction that nevertheless remained unchanged in society. As his mentor Carroll had envisaged there would be a metaphorical distance between a removed realm of Maori 'mind and spirit' separated by the 'hands and feet' of the workaday world of assimilation and domination. The political and economic basis of this maintenance or subversion was a history of compulsion, legislative as well as economic, which had treated 'the Maori' as one 'race' or one category since the earliest colonisation, while integrating Maori land and labour and thus, ultimately, Maori society, ever more closely into the service of capital accumulation. Ngata had seen its effects but chose to find other means, such as adaptation, to mitigate the domination and exploitation of Maori labour.

### 4.06. Ratana versus Kingitanga

Two other forces that were galvanizing significant numbers of the Maori populace in the 1920s and 1930s were the re-emergent Kingitanga – revitalised under the leadership of Te

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256 A. Ngata, 'Native land development', *AJHR*, 1931, G-10.
257 Firth, 1929, pp. 481-2.
Puea Herangi (one of the extended Mahuta whanau) and the newly emergent Ratana religious, social and political movement under Tahupotiki Wiremu Ratana, his whanau and his supporters. Like Ngata, they had significant effect on public and official awareness of Maori and Maori grievances, and thus on the developing perception of Maori as a distinguishable sector of society.258

Some of Ngata’s ideology of Maoritanga has been examined above. His political achievements in the 1920s and 1930s were considerable. In summary, Ngata had direct influence over Maori land policies through Native Minister Gordon Coates between 1921 and 1928. The outcome of a Royal Commission of Inquiry (Sim) into the 1863 confiscations was modest compensation payments to Taranaki and Waikato Maori in 1928; this became the basis of establishment of the various Maori tribal Trust Boards (Arawa, Taranaki, etc.) Ngata’s efforts to reorganise Maori land around Maori communities had begun in 1907 and was coming to fruition in the period of his Native Ministry between 1928 and 1934. His crowning achievement was that during the six years of his ministry he was able to raise over £0.6 million in Government funds, bringing over 1300 farms and about 750,000 acres under his Maori Land Development Schemes throughout the North Island. A significant portion of this land was that which non-Maori small farmers had hoped would become available in the expansion of dairying during the inter-war years. Instead, independent Maori dairying and cooperatives began to develop in Taranaki, the Bay of Plenty, Muriwhenua/Hokianga and the East Coast.259

Te Puea, Ratana and Ngata each became in their separate and very different ways, leaders of their constituencies; and because there was overlap between these constituencies, there was at times intense rivalry between all three. Te Puea had established her leadership of the Waikato and King Movement by successfully leading resistance to Maori conscription at the start of World War I.260 The outcome of this non-cooperative stand by Te Puea was an outburst of animosity between Ngata (who had been promoting the idea of a Maori Battalion) and Te Puea. By the time of Ngata’s appointment as Native Minister in 1928 the rift between the two had healed somewhat.

260 Ibid., p. 164.
The relationship between Ngata and T.W. Ratana was, in contrast to that with Te Puea much less public and more significant. T.W. Ratana began his political career as a Christian faith-healer in 1918. His early policy was simply a rejection of Maori superstitions and tribal affiliations and a call to faith in the Christian trinity. After tentatively offering support to Maui Pomare (who had supported the draconian Tohunga Suppression Act in 1908) and the Kingitanga, T.W. Ratana decided to reject rangitiratanga along with tribalism.

By 1922 Ratana candidates stood in two (of the four) Maori seats and scored impressively against the huge popularity of Pomare and Ngata. By 1926 Ratana had attracted about 18% of the Maori vote. In 1925 he formally constituted his Ratana Church and Anglican authorities were seriously alarmed. Ngata was a supporter of the Anglican Church and he sought to counter the rapid rise of the Ratana movement by lobbying for the establishment of a Maori Bishopric. This was accomplished by 1928 but without the autonomy from the Anglican hierarchy for which Ngata had hoped. Also the selection of Frederick Augustus Bennett (of Arawa affiliation) as first Maori Bishop over Ngata’s candidate, Pineamini Tamahori (of Ngati Porou) was perceived as a dilution of his (and Ngati Porou’s) influence in the Maori Christian community.

From 1928 T.W. Ratana broadened the scope of his mission by advocating for equal rights of working and unemployed Maori with Pakeha under the terms of the Treaty of Waitangi. This culminated in his alliance with the Labour Party in 1931. Thus Ratana’s populist political policy developed in implicit opposition to Ngata’s. Ngata emphasised the hereditary leadership role of tribal high-born and assumed that, while only such a minority could benefit from an academic education, a limited technical or agricultural education would be appropriate for ordinary Maori.

It is to the reproduction of a parallel, but subordinate socio-economic order as perceived by the New Zealand Victorians that we now turn, in order to understand that the foundations for a social hierarchical cultural construct was the education of the Maori.

261 Hector Bolitho, Ratana, Auckland: Geddis & Blomfield, 1921.
263 Butterworth, 1972, p. 165.
Central to the emergence of a Maori workforce endowed with certain closely prescribed vocational - a few professional and a larger number of manual - skills was the role of the specially designated government-run Native School system and curriculum established in 1867. From the outset the goal of government was clear. Schooling was to be used as a mechanism for bringing about the assimilation of Maori. Education policies for Maori were to reflect settler beliefs and perspectives about the instruction of non-European peoples so that they could be better brought into line with European societal norms.266

This was an established practice in many other British colonial administrations elsewhere. The British contact with indigenous populations in Africa, India and Australia had been central in the development of the ideology of the social significance of race.267 This perspective of race constructed links from the real and imagined physiological differences between the indigenous Maori and the Pakeha settlers to social differences constructed on a hierarchical scale, from which the concepts of ‘Christianizing’ and ‘civilizing’ native populations arose and became such a potent and significant feature of colonisation.

These were but two strands of the complex imperial process. Through its agencies the colonial regime shaped identities, prescribed limits and established hierarchies in the wider socio-economic capitalist enterprise that was instituted and perpetuated by the colonial and post-colonial State. Broadly, these agencies were variously utilised as mechanisms in the service of the State machinery of social control and occupational placement in the business of assimilating Maori into a larger Pakeha-dominated community. This wider enterprise managed a complex stream of flows held together by the unifying imperatives of power and a single dominant culture.

In recent years as a direct outcome of the application of Orientalist discourse, famously popularized (but not initiated) by Edward Said, to the received Europeanised ‘knowledge’ of Maori (and Pacific) culture, many aspects of the historical interface between Maori and Pakeha (including education) have undergone most radical and thorough revision.268 Most notably, this re-writing of history has been led by - among others - the International Research Institute for Maori and Indigenous Education (IRI) at the University of Auckland (Judith

Historical narratives of European-style schooling for Maori concede that, for the first one hundred years or so such schooling incorporated an agenda of assimilation, being focussed not only on transmitting school ‘knowledge’ and skills but also with assimilating Maori to the habits, customs and life-style of the European. Many historians have represented this as the overtly guileless programme of the Native/Maori schools’ system and have not seriously critiqued Government policies and practices. Holst for example simply represented such provisions as evidence of the government’s acceptance of the ‘responsibility for the education of Maoris’. Even among those scholars making some probing inquiries into some of the underlying cultural issues, Barrington and Beaglehole fall back on glib clichés such as ‘the peaceful amalgamation of the races’ as the primary intention behind the government’s provisions in the nineteenth century. Certainly ‘racial amalgamation’, a notion conceived within evangelical humanitarian idealism, was a stated objective during the early years of colonization. Harker, on the other hand, examining provisions from 1867 saw them as concerned with not only assimilation but also social control and (in the twentieth century at least) occupational placement. These two interpretations are not necessarily contradictory if, like Stocking, the anthropologist, one recognizes within the nineteenth century humanitarian perspective on ‘native peoples’, a tension between the ‘protective impulse’ and ‘the civilizing impulse’ with its undercurrent of economic self-interest. Evidence of this ambivalence is highlighted in the proselytizing work for the Church Missionary Society of the two Williams brothers (of Waimate, Bay of Islands) in the 1820s and 1830s. This strong evangelical tradition was continued in the second New Zealand generation by Samuel and his three sisters (children of Waimate missionary Henry Williams, noted for his Treaty of Waitangi Maori translation), founders of Te Aute College and Hukarere School respectively.
There is abundant evidence to support the claim by Harker that for the first century at least the schooling of Maori was ‘both instrumental and manipulative’.\textsuperscript{275} In accepting this claim, care needs to be exercised in believing that Maori were passive agents in this process. A closer scrutiny of the dynamics of Maori – Pakeha relations shows that there was a range of responses along which the varied Maori responses can be plotted. The net outcome of these dynamics has been generally one of Pakeha dominance and Maori subordination. The historical record will show however, that the process itself was one of on-going contestation.

Cooperation from local Maori communities in the establishment of Native Schools did not necessarily signal Maori endorsement of the policies on assimilation. The fact that the overall goal of government policy was to assimilate Maori did not persuade all Maori to have nothing to do with the work of Native Schools. In the Urewera a number of Native Schools were established; in Taranaki and Waikato a handful were set up, though the few that were set up in Taranaki in the 1890s (including one at Punihot, which Frederick Augustus Bennett, the new Maori Anglican minister at Bell Block was instrumental in setting up) were closed by the end of the first decade of the 20th century.\textsuperscript{276} All contemporary commentators attributed the difficulties in establishing these schools to the lingering influence of Te Whiti and Tohu of Parihaka.\textsuperscript{277}

According to Mangan, ‘imperial education was very much about establishing the presence and absence of confidence in those controlling and those controlled.’\textsuperscript{278} This goal was established as early as 1844 when government explicitly stated the goal of instruction for Maori. They were to ‘assimilate as speedily as possible the habits and usages of the native to those of the European population’.\textsuperscript{279} At the core of the assimilative process was the requirement that schools were required to instruct in English in order to obtain state subsidies. This however was not enough. Increasingly, settlers believed that Maori should not only learn English but that they should cease learning te reo Maori as well. It was widely held by the Pakeha community that the programme of assimilation would be greatly expedited by actively discouraging Maori language, belief systems and culture and actively promoting Pakeha

\textsuperscript{275} Harker, in Codd et al (eds), 1985., p. 56.
\textsuperscript{276} Ibid., p. 62-75; Simon, 1998, pp. 5-12; Rev. Fred. A. Bennett to J.H. Pope, 13 June 1900, BAAA/1001, 482a, Buildings and Sites, Native Schools Archives, ANZ, Auckland.
\textsuperscript{277} BAAA/1001, 454b and 482a, Buildings and Sites, Native Schools Archives ANZ, Auckland.
\textsuperscript{279} The Native Trust Ordinance, 1844.
belief systems and culture. As Ranginui Walker has claimed, ‘this represented “cultural surrender”, or at the very least, the suppression of Maori identity.280

This agenda was not always solely confined to the school environment but attempts were made (not always totally successful) to extend the Europeanisation project to the Maori communities in which they lived. This was pointed out to Native School teachers in the 1880s:

Besides giving due attention to the school instruction of the children, teachers will be expected to exercise a beneficial influence on the natives, old and young; to show by their own conduct that it is possible to live a useful and blameless life, and in smaller matters, by their dress, in their house, and by their manner and habits at home and abroad, to set Maori an example that they may advantageously imitate.281

The Native School system ran in parallel to the public primary school system and Maori pupils could attend either. Once Maori pupils reached Standard Six, however, there was no state-funded secondary schooling available. Until the establishment of the Maori District High Schools in 1941, the only way that a young Maori could attend a secondary school was to secure an entry to a Maori denominational boarding school through a Department of Education scholarship or to have parents pay the necessary fees.282 The following letter is indicative of the bureaucratic approval processes that aspiring applicants had to undergo. The head teacher at Otamatea Native School in the northern Kaipara wrote to the Secretary of Education in 1883:

I received the memorandum offering a Scholarship at St. Stephen’s Boarding School to William Paul. I was unable to answer it any sooner owing to the boy’s father living a distance from here (Helensville). I spoke to the Rev. William Gittos (Native Missionary) who was on his way to Auckland to see him and let me know. He says he accepts the scholarship provided he is allowed to spend Saturdays and Sundays at the Three Kings Wesleyan College.283

In this way the very few successful entrants to the Native denominational boarding school system became potential candidates in the formation of a Maori élite at the apex of a Maori social formation that echoed similar structures in English colonies. This was an important feature of the Maori socialisation process under the colonial and post-colonial education system which endured for much of the nineteenth century and lasted well into the last quarter of the twentieth century.

283 Robert Haszard to Secretary for Education, 16 December 1883, 1082b, General Correspondence and Inspectors’ Reports, BAAI/1001, ANZ, Auckland.
4.08. Creating an Elite: Denominational Schools for Maori Boys and Girls

A small number of Maori denominational boarding schools had been established prior to 1880. Among them were: the Maori boys’ and girls’ school in St Stephen’s, Parnell, Auckland (1846) - from 1900 the girls separated to another Parnell location as Queen Victoria Maori Girls’ School, while the boys school remained on the Parnell site until relocated to Bombay, south Auckland in the early 1930s; girls schools of St Joseph’s, Greenmeadows, Hawke’s Bay (1867) and Hukarere, Napier (1875); and schools for Maori boys at Te Aute, Hawke’s Bay (1854). Apart from St. Joseph’s, which was Roman Catholic, the others listed above were Anglican. The following comments are relevant to the Church of England schools only. A small number of other denominational schools for Maori pupils included one only Wesleyan school, Wesley College, initially located at Grafton, Auckland (1844), then at Three Kings, Auckland (1876) later relocated at Paerata, near Pukekohe (1924); two Presbyterian schools (Turakina Maori Girls’ College, 1905 at Marton, and Manunui Maori Boys’ Agricultural College, near Taumarunui, in 1913), were set up, but these are not included in the following comments.

The Anglican Church founders in New Zealand, notably some members of the Church Missionary Society,284 and specifically within that proselytizing movement several members of the Williams family, were keen to remove intellectually gifted young Maori from their kainga (homes) and place them in a European environment. The intention of these missionaries was that, on leaving school, this group of elite Maori youth would take their learned behaviours back to their kainga. The intention was that the teaching of new ideas, worshipping a Christian God and practising Pakeha ways, would expedite the transformation of the kainga and thus pave the way for a more rapid assimilation of Maori into Pakeha society. Both Native boys and girls were subject equally to the application of these mission policies. The former, by adhering to a Victorian Christian model of ideal manhood, were seen to be future God-fearing exemplars of moral probity and hard work, not only in their social roles as husbands and fathers but in their economic roles as clerks, interpreters, artisans, teacher aides and skilled and semi-skilled workers; the latter, by conforming to a model of ideal womanhood, were seen to be the guardians of morality through their roles as wives and mothers in the domestic customs of home-making.285

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284 Today known as the Church Mission Society.
In the Native denominational boarding schools for example, boys and girls were to learn that the combination of hard work and Christian principles were essential prerequisites for their future lives as members and spouses of a new native labouring class. For native girls this meant that on arrival at boarding school from their kainga, most of which in the early colonial period were in often isolated distant locations, they were to be educated in a way that closely followed the model of an English middle-class Victorians girls’ school. Dress, speech and behaviour were such as befitted a Victorian middle-class woman, but unlike their English models, native girls assisted in all the domestic duties necessary for every aspect of the diurnal operations of the school. This was seen as a fundamental to the ‘civilizing’ process and the Christian mission.286

Gender-specific functions and roles were in the Victorian curriculum for native boys at these native denominational boarding schools. They were instructed in manual and technical skills necessary to assist in agricultural, horticultural and general farming practices such as sowing, reaping and ploughing, animal husbandry and management, fencing, shearing, herding and mustering.287

This style of mission education is a potent example of the political socialization of young Maori men and women and the strategies engaged in which race and gender were underpinned by a supposed ‘natural relation.’ Anthias and Yuval-Davis have defined this process in this way:

In gender, necessary social effects are posited to sexual difference and biological reproduction. For race, assumptions concerning the natural boundaries of culture are used. These supposedly natural differences in capacities and needs on the basis of gender and race then come to enter into economic relations as legitimizers of inequalities in class position.288

Thus, the curriculum for native girls, specified that ‘valued knowledge’ was defined as ‘useful’ domestic knowledge, while the curriculum for native boys focused on the need for ‘uprightness in body and mind’ that would meet the demands of the ‘service of tilling the soil’ and ‘service to God.’ The subjects of Latin, mathematics, logic, philosophy and morality featured at a very basic level generally in all the Native Boys’ Schools. Curriculum matters at

Te Aute College (and by implication all the denominational native schools) became a national political issue in the early years of the twentieth century and will be highlighted in detail further below. The denominational native schools in Victorian New Zealand would thus teach Maori children that to all intents and purposes they were ‘like Pakeha’, but of a lower subservient order, who would become model Maori citizens: the boys (as men) would work on the land and the girls (as women) would be home-makers and nurturers of the family. This shaping of collective consciousness through the stereotypic image of what was believed to constitute ‘ideal’ Maori citizenship is an example of the use of curriculum to build social constructs and reproduce social formations. It was a form of social engineering that implanted the ‘political authority’ of the Pakeha settler regime and ensured its continuance and permanence.

A shift in both the goals and subjects of the curriculum at the Native Boys’ denominational schools occurred in the first decade of the twentieth century. Soon after his appointment in 1901, the Director General of Education, George Hogben, personally reviewed the native denominational boys’ boarding schools curricula. His report recommended that these schools should strengthen their instruction in English and introduce wider technical education subjects such as carpentry, metalwork, cooking, sewing, hygiene and drill. As well, Hogben urged that the native secondary schools should forgo subjects such as ‘Latin and other purely academic subjects’.

These recommendations for a more comprehensive practical curriculum and an abatement and eventual abandonment of the academic subjects was intended to ensure that Maori remained in their own communities rather than equipping them with professional skills with which they would be able to compete with Pakeha for professional occupations in the growing bureaucratic, commercial and professional sectors of the larger regional towns and cities.

These ideas were resisted by Maori kaumatua elders for some time after they were first mooted. Opposition to these ideas had been fore-shadowed by the distinguished national scholars Apirana Ngata and Te Rangihiroa/Peter Buck, who had advocated an increase in the

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290. ‘Report on Native Schools’, [1901], in AJHR, 1902, Sess. II, Vol VIII, E-1, p. 3: “There are very few Maori boys, and, up to the present, no Maori girls, who have become students at the University Colleges, it seems accordingly a waste of effort to teach Latin and other purely academic subjects to those who should be taught in a practical way the principles that underlie agricultures, domestic work and the other occupations of their future lives.” Emphasis added.
inculcation of professional skills at these schools.\textsuperscript{291} The government chose not to listen to either the parents or the ‘Young Maori Party’ advocates. In 1900 and 1902 it introduced the Manual and Technical Instruction Acts. Schools were offered grants in exchange for the establishment of more practical subjects in their schools.

When defiant native denominational schools did not take up these offers and introduce government policy, they were quickly brought to task and publicly admonished. A Commission of Enquiry into Te Aute College in 1906 was established with the goal of bringing Te Aute College principal John Thornton into line with government policy and refraining from instructing potentially promising Maori scholars for the University of New Zealand entry examination.\textsuperscript{292} Academic studies were to be discouraged and replaced with agriculture and horticulture instead. When Thornton and the Te Aute College Board refused to comply by implementing a technical curriculum, the government retaliated by withdrawing government scholarships.

In effect, Thornton’s attitude and approach to Maori education had been too successful and this had upset the Pakeha political and bureaucratic establishment: the first Maori graduates, such as Ngata, Te Rangihiroa/Buck and Maui Pomare had emerged from New Zealand universities in the 1880s and had played a significant role as Ministers of the Crown, lawyers and doctors. The outcome of the pressure that the Department of Education placed on Te Aute and other similar establishments was a change in the curriculum at those secondary schools to one that emphasized agriculture, carpentry, domestic science and hygiene.\textsuperscript{293} By 1913, the Native Schools inspectors were confident that the government was making more progress:

\textbf{In none of the secondary Maori schools at the present time is there any attempt or desire to give what is usually understood by a ‘college’ education. Generally speaking, the girls’ schools afford further training in English subjects and in various branches of domestic duties--cooking, sewing and dressmaking, housewifery, nursing and hygiene; the boys’ schools in English and manual training--woodwork, elementary practical agriculture and kindred subjects and that is all.}\textsuperscript{294}

The inspector was in fact reflecting the ideal rather than the actual outcome; Maori students excelled in higher school examinations at this time. Many young women went on to take up nursing and teaching studies and while few attended university at this time, a relatively larger

\textsuperscript{291} Apirana Ngata, ‘The Employment of Maoris after leaving school’, First Conference of the Association for the Amelioration of the Maori Race, Wellington: ATL, 1897; Peter Buck, ‘The Decline of the Maori Race’, Third Conference of the Association for the Amelioration of the Maori Race, Wellington: ATL, 1899.

\textsuperscript{292} \textit{AJHR}, 1906, G-5, pp. 1-173.

\textsuperscript{293} \textit{AJHR}, 1913, E-3, pp. 7-10.

number of their boarding school young men were encouraged to seek tertiary education. This trend had more to do with attitudes about women's future role than the intellectual ability of Maori girls. Despite credible school qualifications, Pakeha writers have perpetuated a myth that 'a less academic standard was set at the Maori girls' schools because 'the girls were encouraged to realise the influential part they could play as Christian wives and mothers in their home communities.'

Maori identity was intended to be a subordinated replica of Pakeha lower class identity; and the few Maori (relative to the total Maori population) who chose to attend or were chosen to attend Native Schools were instructed and educated for a prescribed role and function within a predominantly rural colonial New Zealand. Tensions between the structural and the personal were reflected in apparent contradictions between official policies governing the native schools system and the practices within individual native schools. Indeed, programmes aimed at preparing them for professional occupations were actively discouraged by the Department of Education until the late 1940s.

4.09. The Success of the Native/Maori Schools?
To place the data on the Native Schools within a wider socio-historical context we have explored the place of schooling for Maori within the government’s Native policy in general. The Native Schools system was established when a victorious government was extending its controls over Maori after more than a decade of contestation over land and sovereignty which culminated in war. Native policy during this colonial period had been focussed on the missions of ‘civilizing’ Maori and gaining access to their land. An Education Ordinance in 1847 and Native Schools Act in 1858 had provided state subsidies to mission schools for Maori with the view to fulfilling these goals. Evidence of this can be found in school inspectors’ reports of the period published in the AJHRs. For example, a report of 1857 spoke of schooling ‘aiming at a double object, the civilization of the race and the quieting of the country’, while another report a year later argued that ‘schools will give the government an immense moral influence such as is not attained in any other way.’ The Parliamentary debate on the Maori Schools Bill 1867, revealed not dissimilar concerns and the Bill was
passed largely on the grounds of economics and social control. One Member of the House of Representatives (MHR), for instance, is recorded as stating that:

any expenditure in this direction would be true economy, as the more the Natives were educated the less would be the future expenditure on police and gaols.\(^{299}\)

The official reports on the Native/Maori schools published annually in the AJHRs have provided a plethora of information on the schools’ operations. They furnished statistical information on school and roll numbers, attendance of Maori (and a few Pakeha, who were eligible to attend) pupils, scholarships awarded and other distinctions achieved. As well, they gave invaluable insights into the pedagogical instruments that the education system deployed as instruments of social control and the shaping of young natives’ lives to fit the Pakeha colonists’ and settlers’ prescriptions for their working roles and functions in the larger society. Complementary records held by Archives New Zealand (Auckland) provided a wealth of social, economic and cultural information for nearly all of the 318 Native/Maori Schools in New Zealand.\(^{300}\) Some of this data has been utilised in the section below on the social and cultural impacts of kauri gum-digging on Maori communities in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.\(^{301}\)

In 1879, control of the native schools was passed to the newly established Department of Education, and in the following year the Native Schools Code was published. Among a host of ‘ground rules and regulations’ under which the Native Schools were to operate, the work of the Native School teacher was not to be confined to the school alone but extended to the whole Native community. These codes were to be revised several times over subsequent years, specifically to notify curriculum changes and to co-ordinate their policies and practices to be more in line with those of the Department of Education’s board schools.

The policy of assimilation continued to give direction to the Native Schools system until the 1930s when a policy of ‘cultural adaptation’ was officially adopted. This made way for the introduction of elements of Maori culture - music and traditional crafts such as weaving and carving - but not Maori language - to be included within the curriculum. This ‘adaptation’ policy was derived and adapted from a model conceived by the British Colonial Office for its colonies in Africa and set out in a White Paper in 1925.\(^{302}\) The Senior Inspector of Native Schools, in his annual reports during the 1930s, often cited sections of the White Paper in

\(^{299}\) NZPD, 1867, I, part 2, p. 863.


\(^{301}\) See below: Section 4.10.

defence of the new policy. This, however, was not the only reason for the change in policy. Another influence came from within the Maori community itself in the form of a cultural revitalisation movement led by Maori scholars, among them Ngata, as has already been noted in this dissertation. The Senior Inspector acknowledged the gathering momentum of this movement and testified to its impact on the Native School:

So began, in village after village, the revival of Maori arts and crafts, of Maori song and haka, and of the building of Maori meeting houses—all symptomatic of a new courage and a braver outlook. The Native School, as a Maori institution, had, perforce to ally itself with this movement.303

The Native Schools system of New Zealand ran a little more than a century and had a pervasive influence on the lives of nearly every Maori family and those of a large number of Pakeha, especially in the northern and eastern areas of the North Island. In 1947 the Native Schools underwent a name change, being known thenceforth as Maori Schools. This was in accord with a new state policy of replacing official use of the term ‘Native’ with ‘Maori’. By the 1950s the decision was made to transfer all Maori schools to the public schools system, a process which was begun in 1956 and completed in 1969.

4.10. Other Native Labour Engagements: the Kauri Timber and Kauri Gum Industries

Indicative of the demise of Maori enterprise and their progressive incorporation as mainly semi-skilled and unskilled labour in colonial New Zealand is the role of Maori in the kauri timber and kauri gum industries of northern New Zealand. This section traces the trajectory and the dynamics of global and local power relationships that featured in the kauri timber and kauri gum industries. The contact zone (or social field) under scrutiny, North Auckland was a place with known exploitable commodities: timber and gum. It was a site where these and other resources (notably land) had been and continued to be appropriated; it was a geographic place where the agents of that appropriation drew Maori into power-laden but covert and distant relations with the merchants and financiers of Shortland Crescent, Auckland, Flinders Street, Melbourne and Threadneedle Street, London and the politicians of those places.

4.11. Kauri Timber Industry

Demand for kauri timber for both domestic building and for export grew significantly from the 1840s. The conversion of kauri trees into milled timber fell into four stages, all of which required significant labour input. These stages were: felling and cross-cutting, extraction from the bush, transport to the mill, and finally, milling. A systematic examination of the written

records of the timber-milling companies and of contemporary photographs has failed to produce any evidence - explicit, contextual or implicit - that Maori were employed in the last two processing stages.\textsuperscript{304}

That Maori were involved in the first two stages is only a matter of informed conjecture in the absence of substantial archival evidence. Records of the felling and extraction of the timber are scarce and where still extant probably scattered throughout lawyers' archives and local museums. It is possible, even probable that a small number of Maori were involved in timber extraction. This assumption is predicated on two contemporary photographs and one surviving document that relates to the extraction of timber from the 1,750 acre Pukeatua block in Southern Kaipara, some twenty-five miles north-west of Auckland. These are the only independently verifiable records of Maori labour involved in felling, crosscutting and extraction from the bush. All the other evidence relating to these activities is anecdotal, circumstantial and second-guesswork.

The exploitation of the timber resources of Pukeatua commenced sometime around 1883 when a three year kauri logging agreement was made between Edmund Thomas Dufaur, an Auckland barrister and solicitor (and one of the biggest legal agents for Maori land in Auckland as well as later - 1891-1896 - chairman of the New Zealand branch of New Zealand's largest industrial company, the Australian-owned Kauri Timber Co. Ltd.) and a local Ngati Whatua rangatira, Paora Tuhaere for the one part, John Foster, storekeeper, of Waikoukou (near Pukeatua) for the second part, and Hunia Paaka,\textsuperscript{305} bushman, of Pukeatua for the third part.\textsuperscript{306} A related document reveals a contract between Paaka and John Alexander Lamb, logging contractor of Auckland. John Foster was a settler of Waikoukou, a small colonial village settlement carved out of the bush in the upper Kaipara valley immediately south east of the Pukeatua block. The logs were dragged by bullocks to a:

\[\ldots\text{ water station at Waipapa on the Kaipara River or to the two broad creeks on the Pukeatua block running into the Kaipara River.}\textsuperscript{307}\]

Foster was more than just a storekeeper. He had become the owner of the Kahukuri block immediately south east of Pukeatua, on default of a mortgage in 1877.\textsuperscript{308} He also held various

\textsuperscript{304} A.H. Reed, \textit{The Story of the Kauri}. Wellington: Reed, 1953; P.H.H. Taylor, 'The History of the Kauri Timber Industry', MA Thesis in Geography, UNZ (Auckland), 1950.\textsuperscript{305} Hunia Paaka may well have been the same person as John Parker, the founder of the well-known Onehunga timber company, Parker & Lamb established in 1904. It was a household name in Auckland until the 1960s when it was taken over by Fletcher Timber Company. AWMM has the Parker & Lamb archives, which need further interrogation.\textsuperscript{306} Dufaur Mss. Folder 28, Ms. 93/67, AWMM.\textsuperscript{307} Ibid., Folder 28. (N.B. There are three places called Waipapa on the Kaipara River.)
gum-digging licences in the locality. In turn the Kahukuri block had been mortgaged between 1882 and 1884 to L.D. Nathan & Co., of Fort Street in Auckland, a quietly prosperous Jewish trading enterprise as old as the Colony itself, and one of the largest general merchants’ and importing company in Auckland, if not the colony. Foster was in a debtor/creditor relationship with L.D. Nathan & Co., as were many small town traders, general stores and retail grocery and liquor outlets throughout northern New Zealand. This same merchant firm was prominent in the gum industry outlined below.

Thus, Maori were drawn as labour into the global network of capitalism, as a human local component in an international nexus, whose control centre was beyond the seas in Melbourne. It was a process whose pattern was replicated in the pastoral economy (as has been noted above), repeated again in the kauri gum industry and further reproduced in the animal products and meat processing and refrigeration industries (as will be noted below).

4.12. Kauri Gum Industry
All the documentary evidence indicates that kauri gum digging was an important element in the economy of North Auckland in the late nineteenth century and the first two decades of the twentieth century. The invention of synthetic resins in the 1920s brought about the sudden collapse and quick demise of the kauri gum industry. For most tangata whenua gum collecting was a significant element in their dwindling economy. Indeed, gum appeared to be the only viable alternative income source for many of them; it was almost an alternative form of money for Maori.

The table below compiled from various sources provides an approximate guide to the total number of persons engaged historically in the kauri gum industry:

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308 DI 14a, fol. 402, NALTO, LINZ.
309 Hesketh & Richmond Mss., Box 39: Foster File, ACLSC.
310 DI 13A, fol. 289, NALTO, LINZ; Lawrence D. Nathan, As Old as Auckland, 1985, p. 98; and interview with D.R. Nathan, (grandson of the first L.D. Nathan) 10 May 1996.
### Numbers Engaged in Gum Industry 1874 – 1926 (Composite)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Census of New Zealand (excludes Maori)</th>
<th>Other Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1874</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>2,000 European diggers (Vogel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1875</td>
<td>495</td>
<td>1,800-2000 diggers, mostly Maori (Griffin)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1878</td>
<td>1,160</td>
<td>4,000 diggers (Hay)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1881</td>
<td>1,297</td>
<td>over 2,000 diggers British &amp; Maori (Haselden)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1882</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1885</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1886</td>
<td>3,343</td>
<td>10,000 diggers in Northland (Barlow)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1888</td>
<td>3,192</td>
<td>{4,303 fulltime British diggers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>{519 fulltime ‘Austrian’ diggers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>{415 other foreign diggers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>{832 settlers, part time diggers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1893</td>
<td>3,110 Maoris, part time diggers</td>
<td>9,179 Total (Kauri-gum Commission)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1896</td>
<td>3,339</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1898</td>
<td>5,300 Total (Kauri-gum Commission)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>3,192</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1902</td>
<td>3,339</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>2,244</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>1,620</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>1,146</td>
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<tr>
<td>1921</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>1,178</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The precise nature of the labour contract between the gum-buyers and the gum-diggers needs explication in order to fit the latter into the relational nexus of the capitalist system. On private gumfields contracts between diggers and landowners were common. For example:

Mitchelson Brothers: No payment for digging. The digger is only bailee of the gum for the gum until it is delivered to their store. The firm has the right to fix the quality and price of the gum, but it is bound to fix the quality and price of the gum, but it is bound to pay the fair and reasonable value. The digger to leave the land on forty-eight hours’ notice. Number of diggers, 436, exclusive of Maoris.

Molesworth and Saies: No payment for digging. The gum is the property of the firm, and is to be sold to no one else, but the digger is entitled to receive for it the fair market price. Number of diggers, 70, besides 330 Maoris.  

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311 Sources: Censuses of New Zealand, 1874 – 1928; Royal Commission on Kauri-Gum Industry, AJHR 1898, 3 (3), H-12; Cyclopaedia of New Zealand, Vol. 2, 1902.
On Crown land they paid a small nominal fee and in effect worked for no employer. They could and did sell gum to gumbuyers who visited gumfields or at the nearest store. By the end of the nineteenth century there were only two major gumbuyers in the New Zealand market. This duopoly, of Mitchelson Brothers of Dargaville and L.D. Nathan & Co. of Auckland lasted the best part of a decade at the end of the Victorian century; and the latter came to dominate the export market in gum by World War I.\textsuperscript{313} By that time the Nathan merchant empire extended as far as Parengarenga in the Far North, where Samuel Yates, a Nathan uncle-by-marriage, controlled the Muriwhenua gumfields, to the Waitakeres, west of Auckland, where L.D. Nathan & Co. controlled the wholesale grocery, gumbuying and liquor trade.\textsuperscript{314} This company’s role in the financing of trade and land-linked mortgages has been noted above in the section on the kauri timber industry.

The first major academic inquiry into the nature of Maori engagement in the gum industry was conducted by Raymond Firth for his M.A. thesis in Anthropology in 1922.\textsuperscript{315} He pointed out that:

\begin{quote}
for approximately the first twenty years ... between 1845 and 1866 ... the actual collection of the gum was restricted almost solely to the Maoris, and the Europeans regarded it as an employment worthy only of Maori.\textsuperscript{316}
\end{quote}

In the first years of gum collection when it was easily gathered from or near the ground surface:

\begin{quote}
... [V]ery little labour was required [which] was in accordance with the temperament of the Maori, who share with his Polynesian kindred an inclination for a roving life and spasmodic toil.\textsuperscript{317}
\end{quote}

Firth developed these notions of Maori industry in his major study of 1929, \textit{Primitive Economics of the New Zealand Maori}. He argued that the natural surroundings of the Maori forced him to work for his living and that the production especially of food involved considerable strenuous and prolonged effort: ‘[w]ork then had to occupy a basic position in Maori life.’\textsuperscript{318} Firth further developed his argument that:

\begin{quote}
... together with the recognition of the dignity of labour went the reprobation of idleness. Public opinion was very strong in Maori society and was distinctly against the man who neglected his obligations.\textsuperscript{319}
\end{quote}
Firth developed his thesis that the increased demand for kauri-gum meant a lessening reliance on the success of the year's crop, for if they failed there was always the gum to fall back upon. From this emerged the idea that a greater emphasis on gum digging and a lesser emphasis on cropping would enable Maori to buy the food required along with other necessities that were more difficult to acquire with the financial return of a largely subsistence economy.

Maori engagement with the kauri gum industry is exhaustively detailed in two important areas – Muriwhenua and the greater Kaipara region - in the separate claims inquiries held under the Waitangi Tribunal grievance redress inquiry process. The thrust of the arguments is constant in all of the reports and submissions arising from these inquiries. The tenor is set with this comment from the historian of the Kawerau people, Graeme Murdoch:

By the 1850s Te Kawerau a Maki had begun to trade with the town of Auckland. A return of canoes landing in Auckland for September 1853 notes that thirty seven members of Te Kawerau had landed six canoes and twenty tons of kauri gum that year.

The theme is picked up by the writers of the Muriwhenua land report:

The story of Maori gum digging in the north is one of abject poverty. ... Gum extraction, which began before the Treaty of Waitangi, provided the only industry for Maori in the late 1860s. ... The agrarian economy slumped nationally in the late 1850s and, were it not for gum digging, Muriwhenua would have stagnated entirely. ... The gum trade fell to the monopolistic control of a handful of gum traders. They, and the government, were the only ones to benefit substantially.

Bruce Stirling re-iterated these themes in his account of Ngati Whatua's relations with the Crown. He noted that gum digging was 'the only viable alternative income source for many of them'.

He made the interesting comment about the statistical adjustments made to the returns:

By 1893 there were 7,000 gum diggers in Tai Tokerau, 2,800 of whom were Maori, predominantly women and children. Observing the composition of the Maori diggers, and the fact that they did not dig all-year round, officials decided to reduce their numbers by three-fifths for the purposes of preparing 'full-time equivalent' statistics. This reduced the published numbers of Maori numbers to 1,100 but archival papers reveal the true total given above.

321 Ibid., p. 127.
323 Stirling [1998], p. 102.
324 Ibid., pp. 424-5.
The increasing importance of seasonal labour was noted by a number of Native District Officers as early as the 1880s. Maori in the Tauranga district for instance, ... rely less year by year on their plantation, and more on other means of subsistence. A number of younger men work for wages, and it is becoming a custom for large numbers of them to resort to the gumfields lying between here and Thames. One district officer noted the growing transience of the Maori population in search of work in his region:

They do not grow sufficient food for their own use, not even potatoes. They are constantly on the move from one place to another.

This situation was even more noticeable in those regions afflicted by government land confiscations following the New Zealand Wars. The fact that most of the remaining land was unsuitable for cultivation meant that iwi no longer possessed the acreage to feed themselves. Indeed, one of the most noticeable features of the reports of officers in the Native Districts from the mid-1880s is the fact that the traditional cultivation economy of iwi and hapu was declining. Most recorded that there was not nearly as much cultivation in Maori communities as there had formerly been.

Thus Maori became significant collectors of the kauri gum commodity in the northern regions of New Zealand during the latter part of the nineteenth century and the early decades of the twentieth century. The movements of entire families, or large groups of people usually including women and children (up to fifty persons in a group was often recorded) to and from the gumfields was a common socio-economic phenomenon that (among other impacts) would have had a direct effect on attendance at Native Schools, and ultimately on the viability of the school. Thus it was reasonable to expect that there might be some occasional reference to gum digging in the school records.

To ascertain whether this assumption was valid these records were researched. Auckland’s regional office of Archives New Zealand holds all the Native/Maori school records for New Zealand. There are records for approximately 122 schools in the ‘kauri gum’ region of the country, defined as the regions of North Auckland (115 schools), and Hauraki/Coromandel (7

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326 AJHR, 1885, G-2, Report No. 6, p. 8.
327 The Resident Magistrate in Mangonui continually commented: “[t]he small quantity of land cultivated by Natives throughout the district is very noticeable, and when I compare the present state of things with that of previous years, I cannot but regard it as a matter of deep regret”. AJHR, 1885, G-2, Report No. 3, p. 3. J.H. Greenway noted in his report on Maori activities in the district of Russell that “[i]n industrial pursuits the Natives in this district are very backward, they do not grow sufficient for their own wants”. See AJHR, 1885, G-2; Report No. 4, p. 5.
328 BAAA/1001, ANZ, Auckland.
schools). The heaviest concentrations of Native Schools were in the Muriwhenua/Far North, Hokiaonga and Bay of Islands districts. These were also the area of the greatest occurrence of gumfields. Some 55 Native Schools’ records, chosen at random from the 115 listed for Tai Tokerau, were scanned for references to gum digging. Unfortunately the expectation was not matched by tangible results. The yield of material relating to gumfields in the school’s records proved to be disappointing.

Of the 55 schools’ records searched, there was reference to gum digging in only five schools’ records. Of these five schools only one - Whangape – has more than one reference to gum digging. The references were invariably linked to the absence of pupils from school. The full evidence from the five schools is detailed below:

Ahipara (northern Muriwhenua) had one reference (1927):

owing to low price of gum...and partial failure of the kumara crop many of our people are in a very poor way. 329

Whangape, in the northern Hokiaonga, had three references to gum-digging, twice in 1892 and once in 1893:

The bulk of the children have gone to the gumfields...this is very prejudicial to this school... 330

and:

I hope that next year the managers of the State forests will be instructed to exclude women and children from digging gum in State forests; 331

and:

[o]n that morning several Maoris came and said that on account of their sympathy with us in our bereaving a pupil they would not propose to send their children to school for one week more. All the members of the School Committee were away at the time digging gum. 332

Mangamuka, at the head of Hokianga Harbour, had only one reference (1892):

The natives of the district act very foolishly with regard to their large available resources...at the season, kumara, potatoes, taro are sown or planted; then the Natives go off to the gumfields and earn as much as they can; at harvest time the crops are gathered in and large meetings are held to reduce these crops to a minimum; and the Natives and their children spend the rest of the year in a state of semi-starvation. 333

Kaikohe, located in the inland Bay of Islands district, had but one reference (1901):

329 Charles Nepia, Chairman of Ahipara Native School Committee, to Director of Education, Wellington, 3 May 1927. BAAA/1001, 928c, ANZ, Auckland.
330 James Nicholson, teacher, to Secretary, Dept. of Education, Wellington, 16 August 1892, BAAA/1001, 750c, ANZ, Auckland.
331 Ibid., 20 September 1892.
332 Ibid., 17 October 1893.
Attendance has fallen off considerably during the last few weeks...the fact is, the gum, on which they depend for a living, is exhausted within a far radius of Kaikohe...and Maoris are following it to other localities...This is the third failure of the school since 1882...the second was in 1893.334

Oruawharo, located in the eastern Kaipara district, had only one reference (1887):

The attraction of the gumfields is the main cause of loss of interest in the school. The Natives are living on the gumfields, four or five miles at least from the school.335

The Oruawharo Native School was closed in 1888 and did not re-open until 1927.336

The evidence from the records of the Native Schools records reinforces one theme of this dissertation, that Maori generally in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, and certainly in northern New Zealand, were becoming a rural proletariat, living in small settlements, and dependent on casual and seasonal labouring. Sometimes where they were fortunate to have residual land holdings they could practice small scale, usually subsistence farming, In exceptional cases, even where Maori had managed to retain some of their ancestral land under Native Land Court title and develop commercial farming - usually dairy cattle farming in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as in the case study below of the Uruamo whanau of south Kaipara, their livelihood was precarious. It is to this family’s narrative that we now turn.

4.13. A Family’s Story
The Uruamo whanau lived at Te Keti, south Kaipara, some twenty-five miles northwest of the colonial metropole of Auckland. This brief episode in the history of a Maori family is perhaps typical of many Maori caught up in a fast-moving whirl of social, economic and cultural change, of adaptation to European styles of living and the market economy of dairy milk produce.

In 1927, Eriapa Poata Uruamo, with his wife of twenty years, Mereana Pakiorehua Hauraki Paora and his family of five boys and three girls, was the head of a household that lived in a substantial but simple European-style wooden farm homestead on his own rural property. Eriapa was a small dairy farmer on a block of land of some 48 acres 2 roods and 32 perches, known as Te Keti A, in the recently bush-cleared fertile rolling grassland of the lower Kaipara valley, some 25 miles north-west of Auckland. Pakeha settlers and surveyors had bestowed the rustic name Woodhill on the locality that included Te Keti. The district of Woodhill bore

334 BAAA/1001, 263a, T.H. Hawkins, teacher, to George Hogben, Secretary, Dept. of Education, Wellington, 27 November 1901.
335 BAAA/1001, 15c, Inspection Schedule, 28 September 1887.
the fresh signs of the stamp of social and economic colonisation: among them, the railway line - with, at nearby Waimauku, its passenger platforms and stock-marshalling yards and stock-holding pens - connecting Helensville and the Far North with Auckland; the new Maori settlement of Reweti, with its sturdy weatherboard houses and the new church and parsonage that Mereana’s father, the Reverend Hauraki Paora had built; the Woodhill school which Eriapa and his wife and their whanau, cohorts and peers had attended; and the Woodhill creamery, where all the locally-produced milk was collected to be delivered to the Helensville Dairy Company, twenty miles to the north at Helensville. Yet beneath these imprints of colonization, Te Keti A was in 1927 that increasingly rare commodity – Maori-owned land (in European title). All around and about Te Keti A (with the exception of a 10 acre block at Pukeatua, near Reweti, which was owned by Eriapa’s cousins, the Paora / Kawharu whanau) was European-owned land given over to the pastoral farming of cattle, sheep and milch cows. 337

Eriapa was probably more fortunate than many of his whanau, hapu or indeed most of his fellow Maori. Unlike many young Maori males of northern New Zealand, who if they were fortunate, were selected for St. Stephen’s School at Parnell, Auckland, Eriapa had been educated at Te Aute College, several hundred miles away, where he was enrolled as E. Porter, the English name by which he had chosen to be known. 338 He completed three years at Te Aute and on the death of his father in 1903, returned to Te Keti, to farm the 48 acres of Te Keti A. In 1907, he married his cousin, Mereana, daughter of the neighbouring Maori clergyman, the Reverend Hauraki Paora, of Reweti, and began his young adult life as a dairy farmer.

He was the sole mortgaged titleholder to his land, having exchanged his share in another block with his only sibling – his sister - Elizabeth Tatiata Povey. She had been a teacher in the Far North settlement of Peria, near Mangonui, and, had married in 1903 Edward Povey, a small farmer, the Parengarenga-born son of immigrants from Kent, England. 339

337 Interview with Eriapa Maru Uruamo II (grandson of Eriapa Poata), Te Taou o Reweti, 6 November 2000 and 22 August 2001; interview with Ian Hugh Kawharu, Ngati Whatau, Mahurehure, Maori Welfare Officer in 1950s, nephew of Mereana Paora Uruamo, Auckland, 10 January 2000.
338 Friends of Te Aute College, Te Aranga o Te Aute, 2nd ed, Te Aute: 1973, p. 23.
339 Interview with Eriapa Maru Uruamo II (grandson of Eriapa Poata Uruamo), Te Taou o Reweti/Ngati Whatau. Helensville, 6 November 2000 and 22 August 2001; Certified Copy of Entry of Marriage, District of Mangonui, 03/232, Registry of Births, Deaths and Marriages, Auckland.
Eriapa was blessed in some other respects. The land the Uruamos lived on and farmed in the European style – taking his milk and cream to the local Woodhill creamery but a few hundred yards from his gate – was ancestral land. Eriapa’s tipuna had been central actors in the eighteenth century conquest and settlement of the lower Kaipara and Tamaki Makaurau by their hapu, Te Taou. Many of Eriapa’s hapu lived in the lower Kaipara area, principally at the newer settlement of Reweti and secondarily (and more distantly), at the ancient Tamaki Makaurau kainga of Okahu/Orakei, on the fringe of the expanding urban space of the settler metropole of Auckland. Both Eriapa and his wife separately were shareholders (of a total of about 10 titleholders) in the 40-acre hillside Orakei block known as Orakei 4A2. The Uruamos would have drawn a tiny income from the rental monies for the lease of this block to the Biddick family - local Pakeha settlers and farmers on the grassy acres swathing a headland overlooking the Waitemata, which the Maori world had known as Kohimarama and the Pakeha world then called Bastion Point.

Title to the larger parent Te Keti block of some 106 acres had been awarded to his grandfather and great-uncle by the thoroughgoing settler-initiated and implemented regime of the Native Land Court on 31 January 1876. When the two adjoining Te Keti blocks, A and B were appraised by the young Apirana Ngata (with a firm modernisation agenda in mind) in March 1908 as part of the assessment by the Stout/Ngata Commission on the nature, state and extent of Maori land throughout New Zealand, these recommendations were made:

One Native [Eriapa Uruamo] near Helensville is dairying on a large scale, and is anxious to secure more land for his cows and calves [and that Te Keti A and B be] reserved for Maori occupation under Part II of the Native Land Settlement Act, 1907.340

Yet the life of a Western-style Maori farmer was no easy road. We know from anecdotal evidence that the household of ten lived frugally. In fact at times the family scarcely lived much above subsistence level. The acreage of the farm was not large. Eriapa had made several unsuccessful attempts to lease or acquire other farmland adjoining his own Te Keti A block. As a young man before he had succeeded to the title to Te Keti A he had made an unsuccessful bid for the job of caretaker of the Native Hostel at Waipapa, Mechanics Bay, near the shipping port of Auckland. We can also extrapolate from empirical evidence that Eriapa and his older adolescent sons had to supplement their principal income of the cream cheque from the Helensville Dairy Company. In this respect, Eriapa was not dissimilar in his dreams and aspirations, his young family’s needs and requirements than any struggling

Pakeha yeoman farmer settled on a few broad acres of the confiscated lands of the Waikato or a mixed crop arable small-holder in the wheatlands of the Canterbury Plains.

In May 1927, Eriapa Uruamo wrote to Native Minister Gordon Coates to ask if the sand dune reclamation work in the coastal lands immediately to the west and north-west of the Te Keti block that had been started in 1918 and halted in 1924 could be recommenced, ‘as a relief job until the cows come in again.’ In the absence of any work, he and his household of ten could ‘sledge a load of kumara alongside the toheroa bed,’ but, he added,

[i]f we can rely on even a day or two sure work a week over the next month or two it would be a relief indeed and there are many others around here in a worse position than we are. I may add that when the works were previously in operation mostly all the labourers but the overseer were members of our race.  

The allusion to a ‘load of kumara alongside the toheroa bed’ referred to the frequent habit of the Uruamo family of ten during times of poverty, camping in the shelter of taupata shrubbery on carpets of rough marram grass, beside the sands of One Rangitira/Muriwai Beach, some three to four miles from Te Keti and subsisting on kumara for several days while they gathered toheroa.

Eriapa’s situation was at least more fortunate than most other Maori in the new Dominion. He was the successor to the European-devised title of a block of land that was part of a larger area to which his tipuna would have had resource use rights from the time of their arrival in the lower Kaipara and parts of the littoral of the Waitemata many generations ago, and to which he had strong spiritual and emotional connections. The community in which he lived was a strong, kin-based one. Many members of his wider whanau lived either in the nearby tiny settlement of Reweti, or some 25 miles distant by the new-fangled railway system, at Okahu/Orakei, slowly being engulfed by the eastern suburban expansion of the settler metropole of Auckland. At the time (1927) that Eriapa was writing to the Native Minister nearly all of the land in his district was owned or controlled by Europeans. A similar situation prevailed throughout much of the rest of New Zealand. Maori were indeed mostly marginalised as a rural proletariat.

341 E.P. Uruamo, Woodhill, to Native Minister, 3 May 1927, AADS, W3562, Box 264, Bundle 599, LS 22/75, ANZ, Wellington.

342 Interview with Eriapa Maru Uruamo II (grandson of Eriapa Poata Uruamo), Te Taou o Reweti/Ngati Whatua, Helensville, 6 November 2000 and 22 August 2001.
An attempt to determine what Maori were working at (and in which locations) in the second decade of the twentieth century (1910-20) proved to be a rewarding if somewhat haphazard exercise, piecing together some core national data with corroborative evidence from miscellaneous sources.

The only nationally-collated data is contained in *A Register of Maori Males Eligible for Military Service*, published in 1918. In an effort to ascertain the numerical strength of any Maori contribution to the military effort in the First World War, the Army Department collated data, already enumerated, mainly from the 1911 population census and the 1912 electoral rolls. This was published in 1918 and issued by the Police Department. The following analysis is based on that Register. Given that much of this data is historic and that its accuracy and veracity problematic, the following is a brief overview of the contents of the Register.

It claimed to be a record of all Maori males aged between 18 and 40 in the North Island of New Zealand only. The listings were sorted alphabetically by settlement and then by county from Mangonui in the Far North to Palliser in southern Wairarapa. A rough count done indicated that there were approximately 7,600 names. The number of all Maori males of all ages in the official 1911 census was 24,935.

The data in the 1911 census was however not satisfactory with regard to occupation and place of usual residence and was not complete enough to warrant presentation in this dissertation. The 1918 Register however was far more complete. Two strategies were adopted in assessing the significance of this Register.

The first strategy was the analysis of the lists of First World War Maori servicemen published by Christopher Pugsley in *Te Hokowhitu a Tu*. Obviously these lists would have included some of the names listed in the Register, but not all, because the Army Department admitted that the Register was inaccurate and incomplete and needed to be checked by District Police

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343. N.Z. Government. Department of Police, *A Register of Maori Males Eligible for Military Service*, GP, 1918, WA 235: Box 1. ANZ, Wellington. The Register has no listings for the South Island; it is assumed that very low Maori population numbers may have been a rationale for excluding them from the published document.


Commanders when they received a copy of the Register in 1918. There were a total of 1,858 Maori in the First, Third, Fourth & Fifth Contingents and all Maori Reinforcements from the Seventh to 32nd whose occupations were recorded. No occupations were recorded for the 288 Maori men in the Second Contingent.

The second strategy involved comparing, corroborating and verifying the data in the Register for the greater Tamaki Makaurau/Auckland region with all available data for Maori males in all government statistical records for the period 1910 - 1920 for the same region. The data in the Register for the greater Auckland area was organised by the four counties of the Auckland region: Eden, Waitemata, Rodney and Franklin Counties; the places named in the Register for that same region stretched from Haranui in the north-west (on the South Kaipara peninsula), Makarau and Mahurangi in the north, and Huia in the west (Manukau Heads), to Maraetai in the east (Tamaki Estuary), and to Mercer in the south (north Waikato). Of the 210 males aged between 18 and 40 years listed in these four counties, 112 names had no occupation recorded. This is unsurprising, because by Pakeha criteria they would be regarded as still leading an aboriginal lifestyle and would not have easily fitted a European-styled paradigm. Of the balance, 48 were listed as labourers, 23 as farmers, and with the exception of two (detailed below) the remainder had a variety of jobs ranging from driver and stockman to clerk and interpreter. The two unusual occupations were ‘gentleman’ and ‘settler’. These two were both residents of Orakei. Both were substantial titleholders to land in the partitioned Orakei block (and elsewhere) and were probably deemed by those who would determine such matters, in a society that organised occupations hierarchically, to be worthy of classification as ‘gentleman’ and ‘settler’ respectively. The ‘gentleman’ was none other than Wiremu Watene Tautari, the lessor of many acres of partitioned Orakei land to the Coates and Biddick families for cattle grazing. Also, Watene was a substantial local kauri trader between Pitoitoi/Riverhead in the upper Waitemata Harbour and the timber mills on the foreshore of Auckland city. At the mill operated by wealthy Methodist Auckland businessman and Mayor of Auckland (1898-1901), David Goldie, at Commercial Bay, he became well known. Goldie’s aspiring artist son, Charles painted Watene’s portrait, in traditional Maori costume, in 1900. As a descendant of Apihai Te Kawau he had mana in his Maori world; whether he had gained status in the Pakeha world as a ‘gentleman’ must remain problematic.

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346 Foreword by Chief Superintendent of Police, Register, 1918, p. ii.
347 There was no 6th Maori Contingent or Reinforcement.
348 I.B. Madden, Riverhead: Gateway to the Kaipara, Auckland: Riverhead Jubilee Association, 1966; R. Blackley, Goldie, Auckland: Auckland Art Gallery/David Bateman, 1997; OMB 2, p. 355; interview with Ani Pihema (grand-daughter of Wiremu Watene Tautari), Ngati Whatua, Maori Welfare Officer in 1950s, of
To return briefly to the names and occupations listed in the only published record, *Te Hokowhitu a Tu*. The occupations listed for the 485 men of the First Maori Contingent (both A and B Companies) is indicative and typical of the range and spread of occupation throughout the Maori males who served in the Maori Pioneer Battalion.

The geographical range for the names of servicemen of the First World War covers most areas of the North Island. Not surprisingly, there was a paucity of names for Waikato, Taranaki, Bay of Plenty and Urewera, historically areas of rebellion and resistance to Pakeha colonisation. And, again un-surprisingly, there was an abundance of names for the East Coast/Gisborne areas. As it is the only record that is extant it must be accepted for what it is (and for what it is not).

Thus this list of Maori occupations in the second decade of the twentieth century is limited by the archival materials on which it is grounded. An analysis of the *Register* concludes that overwhelming, most Maori were labourers, and well back in second ranking, some Maori were farmers. Precisely what this meant in terms of income remains unknown; but as has been evidenced above, the economic well-being of the Uruamo whanau on their small farm in the south Kaipara was vulnerable. The life of a Maori dairy farmer was scarcely a trouble-free financially secure occupation. The threats of scarcity and poverty were ever present in their lives, as in the lives of many of their fellow Pakeha small farmers. Of the other occupations there was a miscellaneous medley of semi-skilled, unskilled and no occupations. The world of Maori at the beginnings of the third decade of the twentieth century was one of occasional (or rarely – permanent waged) employment, a world of precarious and uncertain existence.

**OCCUPATIONS of the 485 men of the First Maori Contingent, ca.1918.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Labourers</td>
<td>254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerks</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shepherds/shearers</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bush worker</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gumdigger</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seaman</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freezing worker</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commission agent</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stockman</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plumber</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In 1926, 84.4 per cent of the Maori population was located in rural areas and as many as 80 per cent of Maori women and 76 per cent of Maori men in paid employment were engaged in the primary sector.\textsuperscript{351} As late as 1945, 74 per cent of Maori were still classed as rural dwellers although just over half of the Maori men and 39 per cent of Maori women now worked in the primary sector.\textsuperscript{352} By 1973, the economic and social structure of Maori society had undergone a rapid transformation. Secondary and tertiary industries replaced the primary sector as the main avenues of employment for both Maori men and women and as a consequence over 70 per cent of the Maori population now resided in urban areas.\textsuperscript{353} By 1976, only 14 per cent of Maori men and 7 per cent of Maori women were actively engaged in the primary sector.\textsuperscript{354} In the space of 31 years, the occupational, economic, social, cultural and political structures of Maori society had undergone significant transformation.

\begin{table}
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|}
\hline
Occupation & Count \\
\hline
Timber cutter: & 2 \\
Student & 2 \\
Rail employee: & 2 \\
Engine driver: & 2 \\
Carpenter: & 2 \\
Showman: & 2 \\
Compositor: & 1 \\
Interpreter: & 1 \\
Civil Servant: & 1 \\
Professional boxer: & 1 \\
Surveyor: & 1 \\
Butcher: & 1 \\
Gardener: & 1 \\
Driver: & 1 \\
Cook: & 1 \\
Blacksmith & 1 \\
Life insurance agent: & 1 \\
Fruit farmer: & 1 \\
Mill hand: & 1 \\
Engineer: & 1 \\
Contractor: & 1 \\
Horse breaker: & 1 \\
Driver: & 1 \\
Carter: & 1 \\
Mechanic: & 1 \\
Flax mill hand: & 1 \\
Motor driver: & 1 \\
Flax cutter: & 1 \\
Stockman: & 1 \\
No occupation: & 25 \\
\hline
Total: & 485 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{352} Pool, 1991, p. 122.
\textsuperscript{353} Maori Population and Dwellings 1976, p. 10.
\textsuperscript{354} Pool, 1991, p. 181.
4.15. The Modernisation of Maori

The period after World War I became for New Zealand the era of modernisation; it was the time when the antipodean dependency (dependent economically on the U.K., if constitutionally independent since Dominion Day 1907) struggled to consolidate the social and economic initiatives promoted by the State in the so-called Liberal-Labour period of the 1890s and 1900s for the advancement of the implanted settler society; also it was a time when its own small ‘backward’ indigenous periphery was first embraced – albeit rather tentatively en masse by the modern world. The specific brand of modernisation that New Zealand experienced – from the third decade of the new century through to the early 1970s, was of a genre that might be deemed ‘responsible’ colonialism. It is part of that period that Belich has re-named the ‘recolonial’ era.355

Few would argue that despite nominal political independence as a legally constituted ‘Dominion’ from 26 September, 1907, New Zealand was, at least in the economic sense, a dependent client State. As an integral part of this process of modernisation, social engineering by the ‘politically independent’ modern State would create, after World War I, an rural indigenous proletariat and a capitalist agriculture as a mirror-image of the European model; and prior to, during and after World War II, a Keynesian-driven social democracy that belatedly and tokenly admitted a rapidly enlarging and urbanising indigenous proletariat where a pro-active State fomented industrialisation through import substitution, and made a tentative step towards a kind of integration through State-directed education and pepper-pot suburban housing schemes. The watchwords accompanying this modernisation process were ‘national development’ and ‘civilized progress.’

By the 1930s, Maori retained less than one-sixth of the land-mass of Aotearoa/New Zealand.356 This meant that even in the remote areas, Maori were forced to undertake seasonal work such as shearing in order to survive.357 Thus, through the systematic alienation of their traditional lands, many Maori increasingly found themselves as a source of cheap and replaceable labour, primarily in the agricultural sector. The fact that these industries such as shearing were largely seasonal and rural is significant. It would appear that these industries

355 Belich, 2001, pp. 47-86.
356 Over three-quarters of a million acres of the land remaining in Maori hands were leased to Pakeha, with a further three-quarters of a million deemed unsuitable for development (see Pearson, 1990 p. 108.)
357 Indeed, for some years, the shearing done at Waipaoa and several other sheds in the heart of the East Coast of the North Island was undertaken by Maori from the previously remote Urewera who rode from Ruatahuna on bridle tracks cleared from thick bush. It was reported that “the whole crowd of forty or more rode some sixty miles through the bush, and the cavalcade included the men, their women, children of all ages, a string of packhorses – foals and all – and pigs, dogs and hens”. Martin, 1990, p. 44.
served as a transitional point for Maori in the process of integration into the capitalist economy, straddling the boundary between the rural Maori agricultural economy and an expanding capitalist economy well into the twentieth century.

Maori communities were not only becoming more reliant on the proceeds from wage labour derived from the rural economy, they were increasingly subject to the internal contradictions of global capitalism which led to recurrent economic crises as the average rates of profit declined over the long-term undermining investment and therefore adversely affecting the overall levels of employment in capitalist economies. The Great Depression of the 1930s was chiefly responsible for the decline in the proportion of Maori men and women employed in the primary sector. In the context of an economic crisis characterised amongst other things by declining profitability in New Zealand’s main export sector and high levels of unemployment, less work in the primary sector was available. Consequently, from 1926 to 1936, the number of Maori working in forestry, fishing and hunting fell by 42 per cent and in transport by 30 per cent, in personal service by 27 per cent and in manufacturing by 21 per cent as the depression started to impact most severely on rural Maori.358

Initially Maori were denied relief during the depression because it was widely believed that they could support themselves in rural areas.359 Under the first Labour Government, Maori were given equality in sustenance payments, unemployment pay and, standard rates on public works schemes.360 From 1935, the first Labour Government also attempted to diversify New Zealand’s economy in order to avoid the narrow dependence on agricultural exports and the rural economy.361 The introduction of import licensing and exchange controls was designed to

359 It was actually Apirana Ngata who commented that Maori preferred to support themselves in rural life rather than accept relief (Hawke, 1985, p. 201).
360 Sutch, 1942, p. 199. From the mid-1930s onwards there was a steady movement of Maori into public works and the development of Maori land and road works, which was intentionally expanded by the first labour government. This shift into construction increased the share of the industry from 7 per cent of the Maori workforce in 1926 to about 30 per cent in 1936. It impacted most heavily on Maori men for whom the share of construction increased from 9 per cent to 26 per cent in the same period (See B. Thompson, ‘Industrial Structure of the Workforce’, 1985, p. 124). The number of Maori women in domestic service rose by 61 per cent from 1926 to 1936, bringing the proportion of the female Maori workforce actively engaged in this occupation to 16.1 per cent (Ibid., p. 124).
361 It was widely perceived that the depression had impacted so severely on the levels of employment because of the disproportionate numbers of people engaged in the primary sector, so from 1935 there was an emphasis on increasing the local content of manufacturing in an attempt to widen New Zealand’s export base. In fact, there is no evidence to suggest that New Zealand’s experience of the depression was qualitatively more severe than that experienced internationally. Interestingly, those countries with larger shares of manufacturing in their total output appear to have experienced greater declines in per capita real income during the economic depression of the 1930s, than those where agriculture was more prominent. This was because in general, industrial production fell while the prices of industrial goods remained relatively inflexible. Agricultural production, on the other hand,
foster the growth of New Zealand industry such as the motor vehicle industry in which locally assembled bodies were added to imported chasses.

Thus the process of modernisation of Maori that arguably can be traced in some localities to the first decade of the twentieth century quickened and swelled in the years of World War II and reached spate-like proportions in the two decades following that war. A decade of consolidation followed in the 1960s. The mid-1970s marked the approximate closure of this modernisation process. A number of forces – including the removal of a guaranteed market for primary produce when the UK joined the EEC in 1973, and the emergence of radical second urban-generation Maori political activism – seriously questioned the rationale underpinning the modernisation process.

4.16. Conclusion
Over the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, nearly all Maori had becoming semi-dependent or entirely dependent wage earners. Even by the late 1930s 42 percent of the Maori workforce was involved in agricultural and pastoral labour, but by then it was becoming apparent that there was not enough private employment in the countryside to occupy the growing Maori population. In addition, there was insufficient land of suitable quality remaining to support them at a satisfactory standard of living. This affected more than 25–40 percent of the Maori population in 1940. Maori generally had lost their rights of access to, and control over, land and resources. Land was either sold or leased, and even when trusts and incorporations were established, they were normally administered by Pakeha. All that most individual Maori had left to them was their labour power, which they had to sell in order to gain the means of survival. Effectively they owned nothing else, as they now had lost control over the means of production and the mechanisms of exchange. They were reduced to instruments of labour whose value was itself determined in the market place. Thus, one of the most far-reaching outcomes of the creation of a rural proletariat and the lack of rural employment opportunities was the beginnings of an exodus by Maori to the towns and cities.

particulary important for countries like New Zealand whose agricultural exports financed industrial imports. See Hawke, 1985, p. 124.
361 Belshaw, in Sutherland (ed), 1940, pp. 197-9.
362 Ibid., pp. 200-3.
CHAPTER FIVE: THE WELFARE STATE: FULL EMPLOYMENT AND BEYOND

5.01. Introduction

This chapter continues the developing narrative of the place of Maori in the world of work and the larger economic life of New Zealand. The history that unfolds in this chapter is anchored in the process of urbanisation and gradual inculcation of Maori into a wider economic and cultural system that occurred at an ever-accelerating rate from the late 1930s through to its consolidation in the early 1960s. One of the key observers of, and, later, a key actor in, Maori affairs and the business, academic and political world, R. Ngatata Love commented in 1977:

The move to urban areas in the 1930s and 1960s was not an organised exodus, planned and directed by Government or other agencies.363

While it is arguable that government had any direct role, certainly government designed and implemented a raft of policies in many areas - a disinclination to build rural State houses for Maori - to name but one of many policies - to facilitate and expedite the Maori rural/urban diaspora. Certainly, the urbanisation process was driven by both economic ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors (which would be impossible to quantify), but as we shall see later, the ‘push’ of the dwindling land resource base (which had a complex genealogy) on which a rapidly increasing population could be sustained was certainly a major fundamental cause in most internal migration moves by Maori.

The immediate triggers for Maori urbanisation were the dynamics of the Second World War-driven economy. Well before the catalytic events of those global military engagements, the Maori population had risen from a low-point of 42,000 in 1896 to 99,000 in 1945. In 1926, only 16 percent of Maori lived in urban areas; in 1936, just 17 percent of the Maori population were urban dwellers, but this figure grew to 25 percent by 1945 and reached 62 percent in 1966364, and - looking forward - it had risen to 80 percent by 1986.365 Put simply, their much-diminished land resource base could not support an exponentially increasing population.

In this urbanisation (or second) phase Maori were rapidly drawn into waged (but rarely salaried) participation in a capitalist system that involved the systematic incorporation of Maori into a hierarchically organised socio-economic order which had a gender-denominated tiny elite, a small middle class, and a substantial lower class of semi-skilled and unskilled workers. Maori were becoming one of the most highly urbanized indigenous peoples in the world over this period. World War II, ‘manpowering’, and the work of the Maori War Effort Organisation (MWEO) were key contributors to this process. More Maori flocked to towns and cities, and therefore Maori and Maori ‘problems’ became more apparent to central government and Pakeha society. But this is to anticipate the detail that will be presented in subsequent chapters. In this chapter the theme of paternalism underpins the ethno-cultural dynamics between the dominant Pakeha majority and the Maori minority. These are manifest in the formulation and implementation of government policies as they affected Maori, especially in the domains of labour, housing, health and welfare.

5.02. Political Overview 1935 - 49
On entering office in 1935 Labour was credited with creating equality for Maori in the social, cultural and economic spheres. This is arguably a generous opinion, which might have been valid in a legalistic sense. Michael King, for example, has stated that:

Labour introduced the secret ballot for Maori electors, equalised unemployment benefits and opportunities for housing finance, raised expenditure on Maori health and education, provided social security and the first Maori welfare officers, and settled contentious land claims in the South Island and the Waikato.366

While it has been claimed that government initiated most of these, it could be argued - as Claudia Orange has done, that this ‘kind of equality’ was little more than liberal tokenism from a social democratic government; the degree and level of equality have been (and continued to be) open to question.367

In effect, Labour continued well-established government policies of racial amalgamation and assimilation, by which the collectivism of Maori society was being replaced with the individualism of progress and modernisation. Successive government policies of racial amalgamation, assimilation, adaptation and integration from 1840 through to the early 1970s, assumed that civilisation and integration were one-way processes.368 Government policies were predicated on concepts of assimilation and individualisation in a whole raft of government initiatives in health, education, housing and social welfare. There is little doubt

367 Orange, 1977, p. iii, and pp. 1-5.
368 Williams, 2001, p. xi.
that the policies, which came to be called in the post-World War II period ‘integration’, were
deliberate unilateral impositions on Maori for what was perceived by government as for the
benefit of Maori and, importantly, of the whole nation, Pakeha and Maori. Arguably, the
zenith of this post-colonial arrogance was signalled by the Hunn Report of 1960/61: a candid
statement of the imperative to facilitate the modernisation of the Maori people. The degree
and extent of altruism embedded in these policies remains contentious.369

Some perception of the tumultuous changes and challenges that Maori were facing, can be
appreciated in the politically shrewd tactics of the pre-eminent Maori figure of the first half of
the twentieth century, Apirana Ngata, on how best to assist Maori to adapt to Pakeha ways. At
first he supported individualisation of land title until he realised that too many Maori sold. He
then promoted leasehold tenure and consolidation; but many still sold their leases. As the
Maori population increased, Ngata urged, then oversaw, the introduction in 1929 of state
funding for development schemes so they could benefit from what land remained. He devoted
his life to the revival of the Maori race by using the skills he had acquired from his Pakeha
education. He helped his people learn from, and adapt to settler society, while retaining their
Maori customs.370

This ambivalence and equivocation of Ngata, Minister of Native Affairs in two
administrations from 1928 to 1930 and from 1931 to 1934, is captured in his varied responses
to the processes of colonisation; in this example, his changing views on the place of the
English language vis-à-vis te reo Maori. Ngata, like many of his generation of Maori leaders
(especially those who were members of Te Aute College Old Boy’s Association), was a long-
time advocate of the government’s English language-only policy in the education of Maori
children. This education, he thought, would prepare coming generations of Maori for the new
world, dominated by Pakeha ways, that they must now live in. His views shifted in 1945,
however, when he saw the startling statistics of inability to speak te reo Maori among Maori
new entrants to primary schools. He wrote a letter that helped to persuade a Maori Language
Committee to recommend that ways must now be found to teach the Maori language in
primary schools. He concluded:

[I]astly there [is] something in the sentiment of preserving a culture which belonged to
the country. With that goes the assertion that New Zealand would be all the richer for a
bilingual and bicultural people.371

  145.
His concerns were ignored by policy-makers who chose to remember Ngata’s 1930s opinion that English should be the only medium of education, rather than attend to his alarm call for moves to re-kindled the language and culture of Maori. William Watson Bird, a long-serving Senior Inspector of Native Schools, bruskly brushed aside Ngata’s letter with a careless comment:

And finally if the result [of education policies] has been to make Maori lose his language, don’t forget that in its place he has the finest language in the world and that the retention of Maori is after all largely a matter of sentiment.372

A key feature of the early years of the first Labour government was that power within the top hierarchy of the Native Department (from 1947, the Department of Maori Affairs) remained basically in Pakeha hands. Ministers of Native/Maori Affairs were Pakeha, and the Heads of the Native Department were Pakeha until the appointment of the first Maori, Tipi Ropiha as Under-Secretary in September 1948; he held office until 1957.373

The Native Department, re-constituted in 1906, had dealt essentially with land policy up till the change of government in 1935. Orange has stated that with the United Government’s sanctioning of Ngata’s consolidation schemes in 1929; the Department shifted from a legal and accounting role towards a land development organisation.374 Other Government Departments also held partial responsibility for Maori affairs, such as the Health and Education Department, but conflict often ensued if either of these departments attempted to cross the Native Department’s sphere of control. In fact Maori delegates of the Labour Party called for inter-departmental co-operation in 1936, but this was ignored. Control of the Native Department was vested primarily in the hands of Pakeha experts who believed that good organisation of Maori and their resources was the key to a thorough policy.375

Ngata’s direction of the Native Department from 1928 until 1934 gives some insights into the challenges and rewards that beset a Maori Minister of the Crown at that time, over and above the usual political trials and tribulations. The energy and vision that he committed to the land development schemes were nothing short of heroic. Sorrenson commented of him, that the schemes were ‘anthropology in action: not an end in themselves but a catalyst for community

374 Butterworth and Young, 1990, pp. 6-7, 76-83; Orange, 1977, p. 19.
375 Ibid., p. 58.
regeneration.' 376 These qualities have been endorsed by all of his biographers, from Butterworth’s sketch of his early career to Walker’s recent life from a Maori perspective.377

Despite his huge personal mana with his own people and with Maori generally, Ngata was not regarded with any favour or sympathy by the Pakeha community. His methods and style were continually criticised and he became the butt of many culturally supremacist allegations from Pakeha. The outcome of this witch-hunt was that Ngata had to step down as Native Minister in 1934 following a Royal Commission’s findings that the administrative methods, in the delivery of Native Land development funding, had ‘shortcomings’, but they exonerated him of any personal failure.378

5.03. Economic Salvation in Land? Or Work?
The election of a Labour government in 1935 heralded the promise of the delivery of great expectations for Maori who had suffered poverty and deprivation in the depression. The decision by the first Labour government to look for economic salvation on the land was based on the assumption that Maori were, and would continue to be, rural dwellers.379 Land development, therefore became Labour’s major programme for improving the economic situation of Maori, even if it was becoming apparent from all kinds of data and information that the schemes would only take care of a fraction of the people. Furthermore, under Labour the emphasis in the schemes seemed to have shifted away from the development of Maori as a people and toward that of developing the land.380

The Maori land development schemes in the 1930s were based on the dairy industry. The schemes affected many rural parts of the North Island, especially North Auckland, the Bay of Plenty, Rotorua, and the East Coast, all areas with significant Maori populations had important impacts on Maori life. The workings of the dynamics of these schemes brought rural Maori into a web of new relations with the State and the capitalist system that were pervasive and subtle. The altruistic purpose might have been economic deliverance for Maori; it certainly introduced many rural Maori into whole new modes of living on a personal and whanau level as new labour patterns, new technology and new commodities were adopted by


379 Orange, 1977, p. 82.

380 Ibid., p. 75.
Maori farmers. State pressure to conform to changed life-styles, which brought some considerable economic benefit, was also a subtle form of State control over Maori lives, as it was already over Pakeha lives. The gradual inculcation of Maori into a wider economic and cultural system had a more salient signifier in the introduction of that fiscal marker of State omnipotence: income taxation; and its local replica - the land rating system.\textsuperscript{381}

The economic endeavours of Maori dairy farmers succeeded or failed according to the state of the core New Zealand economy. It has already been noted in the case study of the Uruamo family of the lower Kaipara during the 1920s that their dairy farming enterprise on 48 acres at Te Keti barely supported a family of ten. In the 1930s the development schemes gathered some momentum under the direction of Apirana Ngata as Minister of Native Affairs (1928-1934) and State patronage was central to the success of Maori attempts to gain an economic base in dairy farming. The record of their ventures into the dairy farming world in the 1930s was varied, uneven, and ultimately heavily dependent on butter prices in London. Export prices for all primary produce, especially butter were hit severely by the effects of the 1930s depression. In the dire economic circumstances then prevailing all farmers faced hard times. Given the grim situation it was not surprising that many farmers, Maori and Pakeha, walked off their land; however in the long term after 1935 as the economy recovered, some Maori farmers were successful. In the Hokianga, it has been shown that their economic base was precarious; in the East Coast there were some favourable outcomes, some of which could arguably be traced to the patronage of their local MP and erstwhile Minister of Native Affairs, Apirana Ngata.\textsuperscript{382}

Most Maori in 1936 were rural dwellers, but only 40 percent were actually involved in farming, with the remainder engaged in a variety of rural occupations, mainly of a seasonal nature.\textsuperscript{383} Even Ngata, so long an advocate of land development, was beginning to have doubts by 1938, but the government continued to defer the search for a permanent solution to Maori employment until the outbreak of World War II changed the situation dramatically.\textsuperscript{384} Yet, despite the very real fact that census figures showed that there was an appreciable urban

\textsuperscript{382} Belshaw, in Sutherland (ed), 1940, p. 205; Harris, 1996; pp. 25-29; Kaa, pp. 35-43.
\textsuperscript{383} Belshaw in Sutherland, (ed), 1940, pp. 182-9; Butterworth, 1974, pp. 22-3.
\textsuperscript{384} Walker, 2002, passim.
Maori population shift in the 1940s, the Department of Native/Maori Affairs was implicitly denying that this was occurring in all its Annual Reports up until 1951.\textsuperscript{385}

**5.04. The Transition to Urban Labour**

Any strong favourable political opinion of the place of Maori in a modern new world was exceptional. One such was the belief of academic theorist, Horace Belshaw, for a brief period (1934 - 35) an advisor to Minister of Finance Gordon Coates in the Coalition government; but from 1935, as shall be noted in greater detail below, any direct political influence he might have once enjoyed was diminished. By the late 1930s a few researchers, such as Belshaw, realised, that if Maori were to be economically self-supporting, large numbers would have to migrate, because rural areas with large Maori populations were too remote to attract manufacturing to the labour supply.\textsuperscript{386} It is ironic, therefore, that at this time, just as under the Coalition Government before it, the Labour Government increasingly continued to look to land development as an answer to Maori problems.\textsuperscript{387} In 1937 the Prime Minister, Michael Savage, considered that the success in land development and settlement had been ‘encouraging’ and that it was ‘reasonable to assume’ that a continuation of the same policy would be the ‘means of revivifying’ the Maori race.\textsuperscript{388}

Belshaw privately continued his strong interest in the difficulties likely to confront the rapidly growing numbers of Maori unable to find employment in rural areas. In addition to addressing the issues involved in enabling Maori to be self-supporting on their own lands, he advocated a generous approach to educational, health and housing assistance to those forced to move to the cities. With this in mind, and with the support and encouragement of Peter Fraser, acting Prime Minister and acting Minister of Native Affairs, he organised and chaired a successful conference of young Maori leaders, the first of its kind, at Auckland University College in May 1939.\textsuperscript{389} Many speakers at this special conference spoke graphically of the appalling conditions in Auckland, stating that ‘the drift to the cities could be checked only if the Native

\textsuperscript{385} Refer for example to all the Annual Reports of the Department of Native/Maori Affairs in the *AJHRs*, 1936 - 1951, usually under G.

\textsuperscript{386} Belshaw in Sutherland (ed), 1940, p. 197.


\textsuperscript{388} *AJHR*, 1937, G-10, p. 5.


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Department provided more inducement to stay at home ... now that native land had become inadequate.390

Any useful, practical ideas that were aired at the 1939 conference were soon lost in the exigencies of the rapid mobilisation of New Zealand's human, military and economic resources from September 1939 for World War II.391 There was not to be another similar conference until twenty years later.

5.05. Benign Segregation?
Labour's policies in the initial years up till about 1940, of its fourteen-year tenure of ministerial office reflected a continuation of benign segregation. This was probably (and unintentionally) attributable to Ngata’s land development schemes and a vague consciousness that Maori were better suited to rural districts. The prospect of a Maori presence in an urban environment was a disquieting one for some Pakeha, certainly many Pakeha in Auckland and especially those in the developing eastern suburbs, newly connected directly to Auckland by Tamaki Drive. Their feelings were probably well expressed by J.T. Sullivan, legal counsel for Ngati Whatua of Orakei before the Kennedy Commission (1938) who stated: 'the real problem was unease over a Maori island within a European city.'392 Some letter-writers to the Auckland newspaper, the New Zealand Herald in the 1930s, of whom the following comment is indicative, suggested that Orakei Maori be re-located to the Kaipara, 'away from the attractions of a big city and away from the proximity of the Chinese gardens.'393

A further contributing factor to the continuation of a policy of benign segregation was the lack of Government funds to fully implement its pre-election (1935) promises of Maori equality under Labour. Therefore Orange believed there was an unconscious separatist element in Labour's Maori policies.394 These comments from the Registrar of the Native Land Court in Hastings were typical of many at that time:

...[I]n spite of the principle of economic equality proclaimed, the separatist direction of policy in the main areas of land development and education did not change. ... The

394 Orange, 1977, p. 213.
Native Department, now well established in the handling of [land] development work, was loaded also with Maori housing - a further expansion of separate administration.

A Maori employee of the Public Works Department might work alongside a Pakeha work-mate for almost twenty years, for instance, yet be excluded from the usual provision of the P.W.D houses for employees.395

Regarding employment, Maori were directed away from urban areas towards rural work schemes, while in housing, Maori were perceived as not aspiring to the same needs as Pakeha, therefore they received less expenditure. Maori though, did benefit under Labour’s health schemes, much of this due to the work of the Minister of Health, Peter Fraser. They received subsidies for hospital treatment, although in these situations Maori health was linked with housing standards, and tended to reflect a curative rather than preventative measure, the preventative being the improvement in housing. This justifies Orange’s comment that under Labour, policy reflected not the development of Maori but that of Maori land.396

The question of discrimination - whether positive or negative, covert or otherwise as might have been practised by the State in this period is a vexed one. Sorrenson stated that while Maori received welfare relief under the Social Security Act (1938), this rate was usually lower for some Maori on work schemes than for Pakeha up until 1945. This was due to a concern that Maori might become welfare bludgers.397 Orange believed the emphasis on technical education, the development of Maori housing, and Government influence on Maori fields of employment, were examples of a segregationist agenda held by Labour.398

Education was planned for a rural setting that was perceived best for Maori despite Maori appeals that only a minority Maori population could be sustained on the land. This was the ideological criteria behind the initiative to establish Maori District High Schools in the 1940s. In total, only four new schools were set up, all in the Eastern Bay of Plenty/Tairawhiti district.399

5.06. The Impact of Global War

With the coming of World War II, Maori increasingly came into contact with mainstream society through their participation in the war effort and increasing urbanisation. When the war commenced in earnest in 1940 and national enlistment began to gather rapid momentum, the

395 Registrar to President, Hastings, 23 November, 1937, MA 22/1, ANZ, Wellington.
396 Orange, 1977, p. 75.
398 Orange, 1977, pp. 75-77.
Maori response was more whole-hearted than it had been during World War I. A Maori Battalion was formed with over 17,000 volunteers, while 11,500 Maori worked in essential industries. Coinciding with this, the Maori war contribution was coordinated through the setting up of the Maori War Effort Organisation in 1942. This encouraged enlistment, mobilised men and women for essential industries, directed the growing of crops needed for the war effort, raised funds for the Red Cross, and collected comfort items for Maori prisoners of war and troops. Under the direction of Paraire Paikea, MP for Northern Maori and Minister in charge of the Maori War Effort, (and following his premature death in 1943, replaced by Eruera Tirikatene), it appointed recruiting and liaison officers at tribal level, and set up 407 tribal committees and sixty executives, while Paikea and Tirikatene sat in the War Cabinet. But the organisation did not just confine itself to the war effort and became a means of communication between Maori and Government, much to the annoyance of the Native Department.

The Maori War Effort Organisation began encroaching on the duties of the Native Department. While the Native Department focussed essentially on the development of Maori land, the Maori War Effort Organisation developed into a competing department focussing on all aspects of Maori life, also staffed primarily by Maori. The Native Department was criticised for its limited brief and instituted measures to counter these criticisms, such as the introduction of Maori Welfare Officers in 1944 and planned to re-introduce the Maori Councils of 1900. By 1945 the Maori War Effort Organisation had become a powerful organisation with Tirikatene wanting to use the organisation as an autonomous Maori administration promoting Mana Motuhake. But, as Sorrenson has noted, this was circumvented by Fraser, who incorporated the welfare section of the organisation into the Native Department, excluding its leadership, through the passing of the Social and Economic Advancement Act of 1945.

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400 J.V.T. Baker, *The New Zealand People at War*, Wellington: Historical Publications Branch, Dept. of Internal Affairs, 1965, passim. For example, a March 1943 statement in the House of Representatives by P.K. Paikea summarised the activities of the Maori War Effort Organisation (*NZPD*, Vol. 262, p. 359): ‘... Now I wish to deal with Maori manpower. Under the Maori War Effort Organisation we have enlisted 5,178 men for overseas service, 2,088 home service, and 10,229 for the Home Guard, which gives a total of 17,495 enlistments in the armed forces. In addition, there is a total of 11,550 now working in essential industries, making a grand total taking part in the defence Forces and in essential industries of 29,043.’
401 Orange, 1977, p. 142.
5.07. Rehabilitation
Many young Maori men, famously including a disproportionately large number from such iwi as, for example, Ngati Porou and Te Arawa, served in ‘C’ Company in the 28th Maori Battalion during World War II. Overall, of the 5,000 or so young Maori who served in ‘C’ Company, fewer than 1,500 returned home to take advantage of the government’s rehabilitation programmes.403

As early as 1940 the Labour Government had announced that Maori ex-servicemen were to receive equal treatment with Pakeha in rehabilitation, unlike after World War I when Maori had to meet almost impossible conditions to participate under the Discharged Soldiers Settlement Act of 1915.404 In the appointments to the National Rehabilitation Council and Board, Maori interests were not neglected, and at the end of 1943 a joint committee of the Rehabilitation Board and the Board of Native Affairs, called the Maori Rehabilitation Finance Committee, was established to control the rehabilitation of Maori ex-servicemen, using the Native Department as its agent. But Maori were given an option: they could make application for assistance through normal rehabilitation channels, if they so wished. In practice, those who lived in Maori settlements usually used the services of the Native Department, and those in Pakeha communities, the State Advances Corporation and the Rehabilitation Department.405

All farms had mortgages at either three percent (for those who had passed through the training scheme) or at five percent (for those who had not), paid to either the Maori Affairs Department or the Lands and Survey Department. While the rehabilitation programmes only affected a small number of rural Maori dwellers, their importance should not be underestimated as many of the people involved were later to become community leaders and role models. Certainly, they were the first instance of any government directly preparing young Maori for a future other than in rural wage labour.406

5.08. Government Direction in Employment Matters?
The matter of post-World War II Maori employment was only one aspect of the government’s general employment policy. Labour’s objective at the time of its taking office in 1935, was of full employment, but this had not been met by the outbreak of war in 1939. By 1945

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unemployment had been reduced to a record low and there were over 11,000 vacancies in essential industries alone.

Anxious to maintain full employment in peace-time, the government passed the Employment Act in 1945. This provided for the establishment of a National Employment Service that would make the policy effective. There was no distinction made between Maori and Pakeha in the Act. Maori, therefore were caught up in general employment policy, with state agencies other than the Native Department (renamed the Department of Maori Affairs in December 1947) bearing responsibility for Maori employment. In late 1946 the Director of the National Employment Service (and soon to be appointed Secretary of Labour and Director of Employment), H.L. Bockett formed a Maori employment subcommittee within the Department of Labour with a brief ‘to ensure the ultimate full absorption of the Maori race into full employment’. Large numbers of Maori, Bockett observed, were ‘living in a state of semi-subistence, relying on the family benefit, growing vegetables and doing a little casual work.’ The question was whether to settle Maori on the land (the traditional solution during the depression), bring industry to Maori areas, or bring Maori to the centres of industry. The last option, favoured by the Labour Department, raised issues of the provision of accommodation and the existence of racial prejudice among Pakeha.

The need to involve Maori more fully in all sectors of the work force had long been recognized by Labour’s Maori supporters, but as has been noted above, after 1936 the government chose to concentrate on land development, the only exception being the training of youths in carpentry through the Native Department’s housing operations. During World War II the National Service Department had handled Maori employment, giving Maori some 10,000 direction orders under wartime manpower regulations. From March 1946 the overall responsibility for job placement was held by the National Employment Service, under the Employment Act (1945), who in September 1946 produced the first thorough appraisal by government of Maori involvement in the economy. This report, ‘Employment of Maoris’ drew attention to the expanding Maori population, to the high percentage of Maori youth under 15 years of age, and to the greater concentration of Maori population in North Auckland and the East Coast. Taking these factors into account, the report calculated that

within a few years there would be a very serious lack of employment opportunities for most Maori living in remote, backcountry areas.\textsuperscript{408}

The report also included a review of Maori education which showed that the number of Maori children who went beyond Standard Four was very low compared with Pakeha. It agreed with a separately commissioned report by the Ministry of Education from the NZCER on vocational guidance and placement services both generally and for Maori. The latter report, authored by H.C. McQueen had concluded that if Maori were to compete for employment on equal terms with other New Zealanders, they needed the same educational qualifications.\textsuperscript{409} Educational opportunities and government policy relative to Maori education were questioned by the report, which noted that in 1945 it was estimated that only one-half of all Maori school leavers were moving into satisfactory employment. The ‘Employment of Maoris’ report noted further that Maori ‘cannot altogether be blamed for developing habits of idleness and preferring to live on that which Nature and the Social Security Department have to offer’.\textsuperscript{410} Government departments, such as the National Employment Service were finally realising that Maori education needed to be fully addressed; not benignly neglected, if Maori were to receive the education necessary to be fully assimilated into the economic life of the country.\textsuperscript{411}

5.09. Inter-Departmental Liaison

In an ambitious suggestion for postwar reconstruction, the Secretary of Labour and Director of Employment, H.L. Bockett recommended that a Maori Education and Employment Committee (MEEC) be established to liaise between departments and develop appropriate measures to assist Maori employment.\textsuperscript{412} This proposal was approved, and from 1948 the committee, comprising the permanent heads of Labour and Employment, Maori Affairs, Education, Industries and Commerce, the Ministry of Works and the Forest Service met regularly under Bockett’s chairmanship. It considered a variety of issues, such as the

\textsuperscript{408} Ibid., ‘Employment of Maori’, September 19, 1946, MA 17/1s, and Department of Labour L1 30, 1946-47, and L1 30/1/28, 1946-48, ANZ, Wellington.


\textsuperscript{410} ‘Employment of Maoris’, September 19, 1946, MA 17/15, ANZ, Wellington.

\textsuperscript{411} Orange, 1977, p. 174.

\textsuperscript{412} This interpretation is contrary to that of Butterworth and Young, Maori Affairs, pp. 88-93, which suggested that Peter Fraser was behind the formation of the Maori Education and Employment Committee and that government departments other than Maori Affairs dragged their feet on the issue. I have found no evidence of this in the files cited here. Rather it was Maori Affairs that lacked enthusiasm. During the war the Native Department’s Under-Secretary explicitly ruled out placing Maori in urban employment (Orange, 1987, p.164.) Bockett and manpower officers had become concerned about the issue immediately after the war, and had begun to act before Fraser became Minister of Maori Affairs at the end of 1946. See L1, 30/1/28, part 3, 1945-7, ANZ, Wellington; Orange, 1977, pp. 171-7, for Bockett and the work of the National Employment Service.
relocation of Maori to centres of industry, the establishment of local industries in areas where Maori were concentrated, vocational guidance, the training and placement of Maori, the recruitment of Maori by government departments, and ways of 'merging' Maori and non-Maori labour in the community at large. The work of the MEEC is examined in detail below.

At first the committee encountered the strongly held view, among Pakeha, that it was better for Maori to remain in rural areas. Even at this time, Maori crime statistics were used to provide what seemed like a good justification for keeping Maori in the country and out of sight.\(^{413}\) An insight into the paternalism and patronage by Pakeha officialdom and bureaucracy of Maori is given a deep-layered resonance in the minuted records of this inter-departmental committee. Some of this administrative detail is replicated below as a sort of mirror of the power processes of social engineering that were intrinsic in the social democratic policies of the first Labour government. The theme that courses through the agencies' memoranda is the interests of the nation. Maori well-being was only incidental to the greater goal of social and national integrity.

Some, if not all members of the committee would have been aware of the call for employment for Maori in the immediate post-war situation with the unwinding of the wartime manpower regulations. Typical of such a call was that made by the Rotorua District Manpower Officer (J. McGlone) in December 1945, who wrote to the Controller of Manpower, National Services Department, Wellington, that:

\[
\text{[w]ith the return of men from the Forces and the consequent easement in the demand for labour, it has now become apparent that some definite plan will need to be involved to provide full employment for displaced Maori labour.}
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\[\ldots\text{ When the shortage of manpower was most acute, employers had of necessity to make greater use of Maoris. To these people, so used to simply working when it pleased them, consistent endeavour did not come easy, and unfortunately a large number of them have not at any time developed into reliable workers. Furthermore, their general standard of education is so low as to make it impossible ... to place the Maori in other than work of unskilled or semi-skilled type.}\]

\text{Again, his custom of living a community life with his own tribe in close proximity to the traditional meetinghouse makes it a very difficult matter to entice him to take employment any distance from his own particular settlement.}

\text{We have in this district in particular, a great number of small Maori communities, a lot of them isolated, and not in close proximity to any industrial centre. ... The question of finding employment for them is definitely going to be a problem.}\(^{414}\)

\(^{413}\) Ibid., p. 175.

\(^{414}\) J. McGlone, Rotorua District Manpower Officer to the Controller of Manpower, National Services Department, Wellington, 18 December 1945, L1 30/1/28, Part 3, ANZ, Wellington.
The matter of Maori employment was raised again in January 1946, this time by the Controller of Manpower of the National Service Department, Manpower Division in a letter to the Under-Secretary of the Native Department:

The provision of work for displaced Maori labour will become a problem in the near future, and as the government is committed to a policy of full employment some method of overcoming this anticipated difficulty will have to be devised.\(^{415}\)

Gloomy prospects were also held out for employment in the development schemes. In a letter of mid-February 1946 to the Native Department, H. Parsonage (of the National Employment Service) noted that:

...there is little prospect of Maori workers being employed to any great extent on native land development schemes for some considerable time, but if the projected works can be undertaken by the Public Works Department there should be no difficulty in providing employment for any Maoris who may be seeking work.\(^{416}\)

In a paper prepared by the Native Department - bearing no explicit date, but probably from contextual clues, about early 1946 - there was an outline (from the perspective of the Native Department) of the effect of the Native Department’s policy of land development on public works’ programmes. There was a single-minded determination to vigorously pursue further land development, because this was ‘determined by the sociological and economic necessity for urgent integration of the Maori into the national life of New Zealand on a basis of equal opportunity and responsibility with the Pakeha.’ Factors that supported this persistent resolve were estimates of a substantial increase in the Maori population, reaching ‘130,000 by 1955 and 180,000 by 1965’, a ‘disinclination for city employment whether as an industrial or as a skilled worker’, and a preference for ‘the community life of his own rural settlements where, if his efforts as a primary producer are sympathetically led and encouraged, he fits best into the economic structure of the Dominion.’ The Department was, however confronted with the problem that further development of Native land might be at a cost considerably above the value of the lands. As the Department argued, ‘if such lands are not developed on an adequate scale, the Maoris who would have been settled thereon will fail to contribute to the National economy and ... become a charge on the social security funds of the Dominion.’\(^{417}\)

Again, the interests of the nation were invoked.

\(^{415}\) Controller of Manpower, to the Under-Secretary and Native Trustee, Native Department, Wellington, 24 January 1946, L1 30/1/28, Part 3, ANZ, Wellington.

\(^{416}\) H. Parsonage to Native Department, Wellington, 15 February 1946, L1 30, Part 3, ANZ, Wellington.

These concerns were repeated by E.S. Coleman, District Employment Officer, National Employment Service, Whangarei in May 1946 to the Director of Employment in Wellington. He noted that ‘full employment of Maori labour is a problem fraught with many difficulties and unknown factors including lack of training in skilled trades and other occupations, low standard of education, poor appearance, a reputation for unreliability, and a lack of ambition to attain a higher standard of living.’

The importance of close liaison between officers of the Welfare Officers of the Native Department and the Vocational Guidance Service was emphasised by R.W. Chappell, the Gisborne District Employment Officer in April 1947 to the National Employment Service in Wellington regarding ‘31 school leavers ... interviewed by the Vocational Guidance Officer in this district:

It will be noted that the position is quite satisfactory regarding the 14 girls but in the case of the 17 boys there are 5 who would like to get into the building trade and one, Aspinall, who has gone to Wellington in this regard. I would respectfully state that the question regarding the females has been under action and satisfactorily finalised by this Department as instructions were given, after the Vocational Guidance Officer had been in this district, to the Native Female Welfare Officer to follow up these cases.

The long-awaited first meeting of the Maori Education and Employment Committee, was finally held in late January 1948. The meeting was chaired by Bockett, Secretary of Labour and Director of Employment. Some of the direct and forceful style that he had brought to his leadership of New Zealand’s World War II National Service/Employment Service (and was later to display in his role in the 1951 waterfront lockout dispute) was immediately apparent in his command of the strategy and planning of the Committee’s functions. He stated unequivocally that it was the purpose of the Labour government to seek out ‘practical measures for ensuring the ultimate absorption of the Maori Race into full employment.’ He favoured the ‘Government establishing industries in Maori populated areas’ and ‘not bringing large numbers of Maoris to the main cities for employment.’ This would be necessary because ‘non-Government industry was not moving in the direction of establishing units in centres where Maori labour was available.’

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418 E.S. Coleman, District Employment Officer, National Employment Service, Whangarei of 2 May 1946 to the Director of Employment, P.O. Box 165, Te Aro, Wellington, L1 30/1/28, Part 3, ANZ, Wellington.
419 R.W. Chappell, District Employment Officer to Director of Employment, 9 April 1947, L1 30, Part 3, ANZ, Wellington.
At its first meeting, Parsonage, of the Department of Labour reported on the ‘survey carried out by the Department of Labour and Employment of vacancies in the cities and secondary towns of the North Island for which Maori youths would be acceptable’ which showed few vacancies ‘for Maori outside Wellington and Auckland where the work offering was largely manual with a high proportion of labouring vacancies.’ Shepherd, Secretary of Maori Affairs, commented that Maori needed to be trained in order that they could be absorbed, ‘to take his place in the economic and social structure of New Zealand. This would have to be done through the education of Maori children.’ Woods, chief research officer with the Department of Labour and Employment, spoke in favour of taking industry to the Maori as far as possible, a policy plank that he was to consistently argue, often in vain, throughout his long career.\footnote{John E. Martin, \textit{Holding the Balance}, Christchurch: Canterbury UP, 1996, pp. 234-40, 264-67 and 293; Interview with N.S. Woods, Wellington, 27 February 2002.} Pascoe, of Industries and Commerce, supported taking industry to the country. Dolamore said that the State Forest Service was ‘operating a box factory and successfully employing about 50 Maori girls but stated that Maori youths [males] were so unsatisfactory that the Forest Service was avoiding engaging them’. Parsonage, explained to members the arrangements made for the ‘individual follow-up of Maori school leavers, by Maori Welfare Officers.’ Bockett also spoke of the ‘difficulty of placing Maori boys in the trades as apprentices’, which indicated the absolute necessity of setting up ‘trade training schools for Maoris.’ Shepherd ‘outlined the present position in respect of hostels to accommodate Maoris in Wellington and Auckland; the policy of the Maori Affairs Department was to leave the establishment and management of hostels to church organisations.’\footnote{Minutes, Maori Education and Employment Committee, 27 January 1948, L1 30/1/28, Part 4, ANZ, Wellington.}

Following up on the initial MEEC meeting, the Department of Industries and Commerce reported to the Director of Labour and Employment in April 1948 that a ‘number of measures would be necessary to ensure adequate ... employment for the Maoris in the Far North’, which would include the ‘general development of the area based upon any material resources available’ and the ‘development of handicraft industries, wool scouring, yarn spinning, industrial clothing and footwear.’\footnote{J.E. Stokes, Acting.Sec., Department of Industries and Commerce to Director of Employment, 5 April 1948, L1 30/1/28, Part 4, ANZ, Wellington.}

The inter-departmental MEEC committee met six times in the course of its brief two-year existence. The minuted records of all six meetings between 1948 and 1950 give evidence of
on-going chronic ideological differences between the Department of Maori Affairs and the Labour Department. At times there was a palpable tension between the two departments as to the scope and extent of their respective responsibilities for Maori employment matters. Broadly, were these issues exclusively a Labour Department matter or a Maori one? As well there were issues concerning the sources of labour: immigrant white labour from war-ravaged northern and western Europe (the British Isles, Scandinavia and the Netherlands) or rural Maori? In the background, surfacing occasionally, there was the on-going debate as to whether industry should be established in the country or Maori re-located close to existing industry in the cities and towns.425.

Bockett had in 1949 attempted to get Cabinet to agree to commit government departments to consider Maori employment explicitly in their official responsibilities, but this had not been accepted. The Maori Education and Employment Committee, however, had served the useful purpose of alerting others to the issue of Maori employment. By 1951 the MEEC had effectively been disbanded. The Department of Labour considered that its efforts to involve other departments had not been very productive and had merely resulted in a huge amount of paperwork. The efforts of the inter-departmental committee between 1947 and 1951 had been summed up in a memorandum to the Minister of Maori Affairs in 1951:

The committee has done an immense amount of paper work. Reports, surveys, recorded interviews and a great number of proposals have been submitted and examined for the last three years but little concrete achievement can be recorded. The exceptions, of course, are hostels and the follow up actions relating to Maori School Leavers.426

The inter-departmental committee did not meet after 1951. Any outstanding business was completed or continued by the Department of Maori Affairs' Maori Employment Committee.427

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425 The minutes of the six meetings are archived in L1 30/1/28, Part 4, 1948-50, ANZ, Wellington.
427 Margaret Tennant's review of Richard Hill, State Authority, Maori Autonomy comments: "While 'the Crown' is often presented in the book as a disembodied entity, one would sometimes like more sense of the forces operating under this banner. In the social policy arena, research by Melanie Nolan (Breadwinning, Christchurch: Canterbury UP, 2000), Bronwyn Labrum ('Family Needs and Family Desires: Discretionary State Welfare in New Zealand, 1920-1940', PhD Thesis, VUW, 2000) and others have emphasised the 'non-monolithic' nature of the state in New Zealand (as elsewhere), suggesting ambiguity and inconsistency between agencies. Case studies, including those from the Department of Maori Affairs, further complicate the notion of state hegemony, Aroha Harris highlighting a 'merging and blurring' of boundaries between the Department and Maori communities in the post-World War II period ('Maori and “the Maori Affairs”', in Bronwyn Dalley and Margaret Tennant, (eds), Past Judgement, Dunedin: OUP, 2004, p. 202). Hill’s focus is more on the 'lines of official control' from the 'Pakeha-dominated centre (pp. 245-6) during the same period. It is a matter of emphasis, and while Hill's own evidence could equally be read for limitations on the state's coercive powers, he sees any such blurring of boundaries as evidence of the state's successful cooption of Maori energies." Margaret Tennant, 'Review of Richard Hill, State Authority, Indigenous Autonomy: Crown-Maori Relations in New Zealand/Aotearoa, Wellington: VUP, 2004', AHS, 127, 2006.
5.10. Internal or Overseas Immigrants?

Some in the departments, such as Woods, argued that the fostering of Maori employment should be given priority over assisted immigration. Bockett was also conscious of this issue. Woods pointed out that immigrants were being directed into occupations such as forestry work that were eminently suitable for Maori, and that hostel accommodation was also being allocated to migrants. Priority should be given to Maori, he argued, because their opportunities were so much more limited than those for migrants. ‘It is suicidal policy to bring in overseas migrants in those cases where they will fill jobs at the expense of Maoris and overseas immigration should be so channelled that it does not conflict with Maori employment opportunities,’ he said.428

Bockett, Secretary of Labour, pushed for the provision of hostel accommodation for Maori; this was agreed to by the committee, which proposed that carefully selected Maori be sent to hostels (to be run by Maori Affairs) in Auckland and Wellington. It was hoped that this would help to break down prejudice that had been inflamed by the previous migration of ‘less responsible’ Maori. Cabinet approved the provision of hostels early in 1949, but Maori Affairs did little and responsibility for them was handed over to the Department of Labour. In 1951 the Department of Labour purchased hostels in Auckland and Wellington, and in 1955 it established a hostel in Rotorua which was to be run by the Maori section of the National Council of Churches. These hostels provided accomodation for Maori apprentices, most of whom were employed in carpentry and joinery and motor engineering.429

For a few years in the late 1940s the Department of Labour collaborated with Maori welfare officers, vocational guidance officers and the Department of Education to direct Maori school-leavers into jobs which would offer them advancement. For example, in 1949, all

428 Paper of 14 November 1947, L1 30/1/28, Part 4, ANZ, Wellington. In later years, Woods reiterated this theme, for example, at the Industrial Development Conference in 1960. ‘We could be committing a supreme folly if we pursued overseas immigration to the point of creating a racial problem of under-employed Maoris pent up in “Maori areas while immigrant labour filled the vacancies for labour in other areas.” This concern was picked up in the report of Committee III of the Conference. Woods expanded on this theme in comments to the New Zealand Institute of Management on 1 September 1960 when he pointed out that the department had undertaken much research on the subject since 1950: L1, 30/1/28, Part 6, ANZ, Wellington. See also Bockett’s argument that assisted migration should not be expanded at the expense of Maori employment. See paper to Minister, 20 August 1952, L1 22/1/31 Part 3, 1950-52, ANZ, Wellington; interview with N.S. Woods, Wellington, 27 February 2002.

429 Much later, in the following decade, in 1963 the Christchurch immigration hostel was used to accommodate Maori coming into the city, and in 1966 this and the Auckland Maori hostel were transferred from the Department of Labour to Maori Affairs. The Wellington Maori hostel was closed in 1974, leaving the Department with only the Rotorua hostel that was leased to the National Council of Churches.
1,939 Maori school-leavers that year were assessed: 1,478 were assured of employment; of
the balance of 451 in a variety of situations (such as ‘at home’, ‘sick’, ‘married’) some 295
were identified as needing follow-up action. However this scheme soon fell into abeyance, as
the Maori welfare officers who were responsible for it were swamped with welfare cases.430
The Department of Labour assisted Maori in other ways. Many of those living in the workers’
camps in Auckland, Wellington and Lower Hutt were Maori, and there was an exclusively
Maori camp housing more than 100 at Mangere. Each year the Department arranged for
groups from the Rotorua/Bay of Plenty area to work in Taranaki dairy factories for the season.
This scheme, too, like its collaborative effort with the Department of Education noted above,
had attenuated by the early 1950s and was dropped in 1954.431

5.11. Full Employment
As the fear of mass unemployment dissipated in the 1950s and the issue became one of
dealing with endemic labour shortages, so too did concern for finding employment for Maori
abate, in spite of the considerable underemployment which remained.432 Maori were integrated
into the Pakeha urban economy largely through the operation of the labour market rather than
by government intervention. The archival record shows that the Department of Maori Affairs’
human and financial resources were stretched. Much of its activities centred on drawing up
logistical plans for the placement in work and accommodation of hundreds of Maori, principally
in Auckland and Wellington, but there were many more Maori caught up in the urbanisation
process who escaped its monitoring eye. Furthermore, many of the staff of the Department
were increasingly focussed on and burdened with, social welfare work. For example, as
Arapeta Awatere noted in his diaries, in his welfare work in Wanganui, Rotorua and
Auckland in the 1950s and 1960s ‘the pace was set by my boss, Rangi Royal’. Given that
Awatere earned a reputation for hard-driven endeavours in all that he did in both his military
and public service careers, his comments that he and his teams of welfare workers ‘worked
long hours’, sometimes ‘working twenty hours on end’ must be accepted as no
exaggeration.433

430 ‘Report of Maori School-Leavers 1949’, L1 30/1/28, Part 6, ANZ, Wellington; Martin, Holding the Balance,
431 See, for example, ‘Workers to Taranaki’, November 1949, L1 30/1/28, Part 1, and ‘The Dairy Industry
432 AJHR, 1956, H-11, p. 7. The Department maintained a concern for Maori employment. See LEG, 3 (1), 1953;
433 Rangi Royal, Chief Welfare Officer, 1944 - 1956, Tom Jamison & Te Ahukaramu Charles Royal. ‘Royal, Te
Woods, of the Department of Labour research division, for one, however, regarded the little that was done by the government as utterly inadequate, and he and the department maintained a strong interest and his section continued to undertake studies of Maori population and employment.434

5.12. Industry in the Country?

By late 1949, the Department of Labour was reviewing its options how best to deal with the surplus under-employed Maori population, which was most problematic in North Auckland and the East Coast. The MEEC meeting in December of that year had accepted that:

there is little likelihood of any spontaneous development of manufacturing industries on a scale sufficient to contribute seriously to a solution of the problem. On the other hand, for balanced employment opportunities and to build up a familiarity with factory work and its requirements amongst the younger generation in Maori communities, some local manufacturing activity is highly desirable. It appears that this can only be done by State enterprise or suitably guided co-operative Maori enterprise. The [MEEC] Committee takes the view that government should build and equip on or two small factory units in selected Maori communities as an experiment.435

The government did try, with limited success, to convince private industry to locate in rural areas, but by 1949 it was apparent that in isolated areas such as North Auckland and the East Coast, the only solution, other than further land development, was the relocation of Maori to areas where employment was available. Relative to the latter policy direction, the committee observed that there had been an expansion of Maori employment in industrial centres and an increase in the general intermingling of the two races over the whole employment field, so as to prevent a colour bar or a colour line developing.436 Clearly, this recommendation had in mind not only the employment needs of Maori, but the wider implications for relations between Maori and Pakeha. It recognized that by careful planning in the employment field these could possibly be improved. There was an acknowledgement, too, of the Pakeha bias operating against the acceptance of Maori by employers, and to overcome this, it was suggested that the best Maori youth should be placed into higher grades of employment in industrial centres so that the gradual permeation of Maori throughout the economy could be effected. Thus, by contact at all levels of employment in both urban and rural areas, it was hoped that attitudes toward Maori would gradually improve.437

435 Director of Employment to the Minister of Labour and Employment, 'Employment of Maoris’, 9 December 1949, AAMK 869, 17/1/-, ANZ, Wellington.
436 Bockett to the Minister of Labour, 9 December 1949, MA, 17/1/-, ANZ, Wellington; Orange, 1977, pp. 176 - 177.
437 Orange, 1977, p. 177.
By 1949 government had finally accepted that if Maori were to be employed throughout the economy, urbanisation was essential, despite the deprecation of this idea by critics both inside and outside government circles. It had generally been felt that city life was unsavoury for Maori and that rural life offered them a healthy existence.\textsuperscript{438} In reality, by 1949 Maori were being ‘forced’ into urban areas to fulfill employment and other needs (in education, health services etc). Government authorities only reluctantly accepted this. There had been much procrastination among government departments, as well as contentious fundamental disagreements on the place of Maori in the brave new modern social democratic society, but ultimately the Department of Maori Affairs - under the energetic drive of Tipi Ropiha (Under-Secretary 1948 - 1953, Secretary 1953 - 1957) turned the previously moribund, fossilizing Department into ‘an efficiently functioning department’ that competently addressed many of the social and economic issues that were facing urbanising Maori. During Ropiha’s tenure, expenditure on housing, land administration and land development all increased and he was able to fund ancillary ventures such as \textit{Te Ao Hou}.\textsuperscript{439}

5.13. Key Features of Post-War Industrial Development.

During the post-war period a number of ventures for the establishment of light industry in the country, in such centres of high Maori population as North Auckland, the East Coast, Bay of Plenty and Taranaki were made with limited success. Light clothing operations were established in a variety of locations such as Opotoki (Eastern Bay of Plenty), Normanby (South Taranaki) and Gisborne (East Coast). These attempts, albeit successful in a small local way in dealing with a tiny number of the surplus rural Maori labour, made little or no impact on diverting the seemingly inexorable nation-wide rural/urban diaspora. There was no stopping the trend that Maori, especially young Maori, were attracted to the city, not just by the prospects of available work there, but by the perceived rewards of an urban life-style.

The development of industrial production in the post-war period was encouraged by protective tariff barriers, which promoted the growth of some local industries and the establishment of branch plants close to or within the larger metropoles and regional town centre by foreign capital.\textsuperscript{440} Relatively high levels of state spending designed to achieve

\textsuperscript{438} Butterworth and Young, 1990, pp. 86-93. The general feeling of some Pakeha Aucklanders that Orakei Maori should leave their ‘slum’ at Okahu Bay for their ancestral lands in the distant Kaipara (noted earlier, refer 5.03, p. 128 above) was part of this syndrome.


economic diversification and full employment, supplemented these protectionist policies.\textsuperscript{441} Key features of New Zealand’s economic production during this period included the vehicle assembly industry, the production of certain consumer durables, and the processing of primary products which increased the demand for labour in the freezing works, canning factories, in the production of newsprint and the manufacture of carpet. For instance, the processing of horticultural products, particularly vegetable products, developed as a major industry after the Second World War with the proliferation of canning and freezing operations. Many of these food processing operations, notably those in the Gisborne and Hastings areas in the North Island, and the Temuka/Timaru area of South Canterbury, attracted a large number of Maori workers. The same was true of that other standby and stalwart of Maori workers: the meat processing industry.\textsuperscript{442}

The expansion of industry also required new energy sources. During the period from 1945 to 1973, the Waikato River was transformed into a sequence of dams generating hydroelectric power.\textsuperscript{447} Maori workers were prominent in the construction of dams and power stations for much of the 1950s and 1960s.\textsuperscript{448} The demands for labour were even greater with the discovery of the Kapuni and Maui gas fields. Maori workers were drawn into the immediate production process and in the construction of pipelines that fed natural gas to Auckland and Wellington.\textsuperscript{449}

In 1949 Labour was defeated by National in the general elections. Yet, Government policy rather than changing to an urban ideology for Maori, continued on the same course. With the coming to power of National, the Maori Affairs Department embarked on a policy of consolidation of previous Maori land development schemes. This exclusively meant the

\textsuperscript{441} Hawke, 1985, pp. 190-1.
\textsuperscript{442} Ibid., p. 422.
\textsuperscript{447} Ibid., p. 280.
\textsuperscript{448} With the attempt in the 1960s to make power generation more responsive to the daily and seasonal variations by locating power plants near the faster-growing domestic and industrial users, many Maori workers were drawn into smaller centres such as Meremere and Huntly to be involved in the construction of new coal-fired electricity plants. Maori were also employed as far south as Roxburgh in the South Island where the power station was completed on the Clutha River in the early 1950s and in the construction of other dams which were added to the Waitaki River during the same period. (Ibid, p. 280.)
\textsuperscript{449} Ibid. p. 283. Although much of New Zealand’s petroleum was imported and therefore had little impact on local Maori and Pakeha employment patterns in the construction industry, storage tanks, distribution networks and eventually the Marsden Point refinery provided significant work.
development of past rural programmes at the expense of an increasingly urban population. The mediocrity and complacency of this policy was implied by Ranginui Walker in the statistics he used in his contribution to the 1992 Oxford general history: urban Maori in 1926 was nine per cent of the Maori population, by 1951 this figure had risen to 19 per cent, and by 1956 to 24 per cent.\(^450\)

In 1950 the National government announced its new five point plan on Maori affairs. It included continuing existing safeguards against the compulsory acquisition of Maori land for servicemen or general settlement; implementing no changes to the existing system of taxation on profits from block administration of Maori land; further consolidation schemes; taking action to liquidate certain trusts under which Maori lands were withheld from direct management from their owners; and investigating the causes of the lack of progress under the Maori Social and Economic Development Act of 1945. While this was greeted with enthusiasm by Maori such as Ngata, in other sectors praise was more cautious, considering that the majority of Maori voted Labour.\(^451\)

The emphasis on Maori land development can certainly be attributed to the export boom New Zealand was experiencing with agricultural products. This economic upturn was a direct result of the Korean War. The National Government was deeply concerned at the estimated 750,000 acres of unproductive Maori land that was potentially capable of development. In 1949 the Labour Cabinet had directed that 200,000 acres should be grassed over the next decade. Butterworth believed that National wanted to take full advantage of this policy, and set about putting in place a programme to develop every piece of under-developed land in the country. In relation to Maori land, this manifested itself in attempting to bring order to what was perceived as chaotic land title definitions.\(^452\)

Butterworth has described the period of the 1950s as the golden age of the Department of Maori Affairs. Maori society was quiescent, even though the £25 pound and £10 pound inheritance rule of the Maori Affairs Act and the Maori Trustee Act of 1953 were seriously resented by nearly all Maori.\(^453\) Numerically the Department’s staff grew from 596 in 1953 to

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\(^452\) Butterworth and Young, 1990, p. 95.
\(^453\) The ‘less than £25 conversion’ and ‘less than £10’ rules of these Acts were simply explained in contemporary publications of the Maori Affairs official journal/magazine, _Te Ao Hou_. Its detailed expliciation of the “£10 Rule”: ‘The Court may vest the whole of the interest of a deceased person in any one or more beneficiaries to the exclusion of any other beneficiary without the consent of the person(s) so excluded and without payment,
790 in 1958, and its budget in 1956 and 1957 rose as high as one per cent of net government spending, which was a post-war high. The Department also furthered its social tasks by incorporating and giving patronage to the Maori Women’s Welfare League which was set up in 1953. It also, as noted above, established in 1952, the quarterly Maori magazine *Te Ao Hou*, which was to provide Maori with superior reading matter touching Maori life and culture, and foster understanding between Maori and Pakeha, while also outlining and promoting the Department of Maori Affairs’ policies. Yet both organisations were hamstrung in their effectiveness by being beneficiaries of the Department of Maori Affairs. Therefore the degree and level of this golden age, and who it benefited, is problematic.

While Butterworth has noted the economic gains promoted by the Department of Maori Affairs in the 1950s, he has not noted the social consequences of this policy. In 1952 the Department, under the policy of ‘thorough’ initiated under Ropiha’s stewardship, embarked on a cost cutting programme of its staff. Ropiha, sent out a memorandum in February of that year, to all officers of the Department stating that there should be no more requests for more staff.

Under the Social and Economic Advancement Act of 1945, Maori had been given a limited amount of responsibility in the management of their own affairs through Tribal Executives and Committees. These were meant to operate under the jurisdiction of the Maori Welfare Officers and eventually become autonomous over time, freeing the Welfare Officers to concentrate on casework and leave the above organisation to operate on community

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454 Butterworth and Young, 1990, pp. 97-8.
455 An incisive view of *Te Ao Hou* is located in the dissertation by American academic, Chadwick Allen, ‘Blood as Narrative/Narrative as Blood: Constructing Indigenous Identity in Contemporary American Indian and New Zealand Maori Literatures and Politics’, PhD in Comparative Cultural and Literary Studies, UAr, 1997.
457 Memorandum from Maori Affairs (possibly from M. Sullivan, permanent head of the Department) to Public Service Commission, 4/3/52, entitled ‘Departmental Organisation’, SSC 1, Acc w2302, 20/2/29, vol 2, box 182, Maori Affairs till 31/12/57. ANZ, Wellington.
schemes.\textsuperscript{458} There was inevitably, a huge male gender bias; they were dominated by men and focussed on their issues, such as land legislation and rehabilitation. Secondly the organisations were financed only partly by the Department of Maori Affairs. Initially the revenue of the Tribal Executives and Committees was subsidised at the discretion of the Minister of Maori Affairs at a rate not exceeding pound for pound. In 1956 this subsidy was limited to £4000 at the pound for pound rate. As the decade of the 1950s moved on, finance came under more scrutiny.\textsuperscript{459}

It could be concluded that the Department was again operating as a corporate organisation along similar lines that Orange noted during the first ten years of Labour in government. But the consequences of this policy were possibly more severe during the 1950s than the earlier period, due to the pervasive and profound changes in the social and economic environment of Maori. Whina Cooper’s comment at the second annual conference of the MWWWL in the presence of the Minister of Maori Affairs, E.B. Corbett, that ‘all social problems begin with housing’ was a timely reminder that, arising from the League’s 1951 survey, the state of Maori health and housing in the Auckland inner city slums needed urgent Government attention.\textsuperscript{460}

5.15. ‘Hand in hand: a roof and a job’\textsuperscript{461}

The provision and organisation of accommodation for the steady influx of Maori immigrants to the towns and cities - was a feature, generally of governments’ policies and practices after World War II (WWII). This usually was focussed, for single persons, on hostelling in the major cities (often; in Auckland, in the old WWII military camps at Avondale, Cornwall Park and the Auckland Domain), boarding with established families, room-renting at boarding houses, and for some fortunate families, organising the rental of a house either through the agency of the Department of Native/Maori Affairs or the State Advances Corporation.\textsuperscript{462}

The issue of inadequate housing for Maori had long been noted, but - with the exception of the ‘derelict shanties’ at Orakei - too close for Pakeha eyes, most of it was in the country, out

\textsuperscript{459} J.K. Hunn, Department of Maori Affairs, ‘Report of the work and function of the Department of Maori Affairs, the Maori Trustee, and the Maori Land Court, 12 December 1960’, Section E E-1, SSC 1, Acc w2302, 20/2/29, Vol 2, Box 182, Maori Affairs till 31/12/60. ANZ, Wellington.
\textsuperscript{460} President (Whina Cooper), ‘Address to 2\textsuperscript{nd} Annual Meeting, MWWWL’. \textit{Te Ao Hou}, 1, Winter 1952, pp. 55-6.
of sight and thus out of mind. At the 1939 Young Maori Leaders’ Conference at Auckland University College, the Under-Secretary for Native Affairs, O.N. Campbell informed the meeting that it was estimated by his Department that:

at least one half of the 86,000 Maoris [in New Zealand] were inadequately housed. ... Hundreds and hundreds of Maoris all over New Zealand are living under appalling conditions.\(^{463}\)

During World War II the housing problem was particularly acute in Auckland, where its problems were heightened by increasing Maori urbanisation. Since before the war, Maori had been coming in from country areas, drawn by better pay, more varied jobs and the idea of city life, but this movement had accelerated with the war. In 1935 there had been 1,800 Maoris in the metropolitan area; in 1943 about 10,000 lived there, more than one-tenth of the New Zealand Maori population of 97,000, while more than 30,000 lived north of Mercer (in the lower Waikato).\(^{464}\)

More than 2000 Maoris were employed in Auckland’s essential industries, with a concentration of young women in boot and shirt factories, a phenomenon that was directly attributable to the high military demand.\(^{465}\) There was strong reluctance to let houses and rooms to Maoris, who then inevitably crowded into the slum areas, accepting dismal conditions and thereby augmenting the idea that the worst would do for them. No one favoured the idea of setting up a Maori quarter in the city, commented George Graham,\(^{466}\) of the Te Akarana Maori Association, but Public Works Department hutsments near work places would be better than Auckland streets; the suburban Orakei block could be developed to house the whole Maori population of Auckland, and keep them, especially the women, away from the temptations of the city. A residential area there or elsewhere was urgently needed, commented the local evening paper.\(^{467}\)

Although the accommodation for Maori in Auckland was certainly generally very poor, during and immediately after the war, other instances of inferior housing were reported. In 1944, the Mines Department officials were appalled by the overcrowded living conditions of Maori miners in the Waikato. An official report noted that improvised housing consisting of

\(^{463}\) Young Maori Leaders Conference, May 1939, ‘Reports of Morning Sessions’, Box 10, Item 1, MS 873, Papers of Harry Delamere Barter Dansey, AWMMRL.

\(^{464}\) AS, 13 November 1943, p. 4; NZOYB, 1944, p. 30.

\(^{465}\) AS, 8 February 1943, pp. 2, 4.


\(^{467}\) AS, 8 February 1943, p. 4.
‘flattened oil drums for weatherboards, unlined, about 8’ x 10’ with no fireplaces except for a rough stone hearth ... [and these places] in more than one case house three generations and in other cases more than one family.'468 Because most of these improvised homes were open to the weather they were frequently leaking and rotten. Consequently, disease and malnutrition were rampant among miners’ families.469

After World War II there were increasing reports of inferior housing, shanty dwellings and rack-renting in the largest city, Auckland. It was reported by Te Ao Hou that ‘the fiercest and most comprehensive discussions of the 1952 MWWL annual conference were centred on housing. The League had recently completed a survey of Maori housing in Auckland, and the ‘picture was ‘distressing.’ As Whina Cooper said in her presidential address, ‘all social problems begin with housing.’470 Housing, however, for Maori remained a chronic problem throughout the 1950s.

King has noted that during the 1950s Maori were not applying to Maori Affairs for accommodation because the department displayed a lack of interest.471 In 1959, Te Ao Hou reported that ‘the most urgent problem facing the Maori people is that of housing. Better housing is the solution for most of their social evils. Nowhere is the need for adequate housing more apparent than in Auckland, the main centre of the urban Maori population’.472 The link between housing and employment has already been noted. Many contemporaries had observed this simple fact: Arapeta Awatere, Auckland Welfare Officer (1959 - 1968) and Auckland City Councillor (1964 - 1969) stated in his diaries: ‘the two imperatives had to go hand in hand: a roof and a job’; this was repeated time and again (often as political rhetoric and judicial injunction) by many other contemporary observers and commentators from Whina Cooper (of the MWWL) to Judge Shepherd (of the Native Land Court and Secretary of the Native Department).473

5.16. The Impact of Urbanisation in the Provinces
As has been noted above, the Maori Education and Employment Committee first met in January 1948. It recommended urgency in the provision of trade training for Maori youth. The

469 Richardson, 1995,p. 265.
471 King, 1983, p.175.
472 Te Ao Hou, No. 27 (June 1959) pp. 48 - 50. The writer of the ‘Housing’ article was Elsdon Craig, grandson (and biographer) of ethnographer, Elsdon Best.
following bald statistics taken from a Maori Welfare Division report for the Gisborne district gave the impression superficially that all was well. By 1950 there were, for example, in that one regional centre, Gisborne, in an area of high Maori population, the East Coast, 14 Maori apprentices, serving their time in seven different trades (4 plumbers, 5 motor mechanics, 1 carpenter, 1 surgical bootmaker, 1 electrician, 1 cabinetmaker, 1 plasterer). In addition, again in Gisborne, there were a number of others who were being trained as carpenters by the building section of the Department of Maori Affairs. Further, the Welfare Division reported that in 1950, two Maori school-leavers from Gisborne High School had gone to Ardmore Teachers’ Training College to become teachers, and one had gone into a local solicitor’s office. A further school-leaver from Te Karaka District High School had joined the Department of Maori Affairs. These facts by themselves signified nothing - were merely ‘a drop in the bucket’; in the larger context they were not encouraging as a larger government report, detailed below.

By 1950 government had realised that the East Coast north of Gisborne and North Auckland was one of the crisis areas in terms of Maori employment opportunities. The growth of population had outstripped the employment prospects, and a report on Maori employment bluntly stated that ‘the areas are becoming overpopulated’ and that ‘concurrent with overpopulation are under-employment and lower living standards’. The report suggested these remedies to this situation:

1. the transfer of Maori to areas where their services could be fully utilised;
2. the introduction of new primary and secondary industries to the area;
3. the inauguration of measures to encourage closer settlement of the land. It was that measures (2) and (3) had received attention in the past ‘without marked progress’, and that the first, the relocation of population, offered the best prospects.

If the surplus Maori population can be encouraged to go where work is available the problem can be solved. It is too much to expect the older Maoris with families to uproot themselves and shift to more prosperous districts, but something might be done with younger folk.

The report alluded to the ‘existing unorganized drift to the towns’, and to the problems of inadequate housing which were arising. Two of the reports recommendations were aimed at the provision of accommodation hostels for youth in cities, and houses for families. Ironically, a

475 Ibid.
477 Ibid.
478 Ibid. Emphasis added.
decade later the *Hunn Report* noted that ‘the so-called ‘urban drift’ was an irreversible migration in search of work’.

Notwithstanding the serious tone of this report, many of its firm recommendations and stern admonitions were not addressed by the National government. In the early 1950s, government let the labour market act out its laissez-faire dynamics, while the government attempted to deal with some of the social outcomes and symptoms in an ad hoc fashion. In its defence the government would point to encouraging openings in seasonal and casual labouring work in the agricultural and pastoral servicing sector. Most meat freezing works offered seasonal work, as did wool stores, and grain and vegetable produce processing plants. Also, by the early 1950s there were employment opportunities for Maori women in the local hospitals, hotels, and clothing factories.

5.17. Social Issues

The annual reports of the welfare officers however, documented a wide range of serious social issues throughout the 1950s and into the 1960s, when urbanization was proceeding very rapidly. A range of employment reports from the Labour Department provide evidence of continuing employment problems concerning unreliability, laziness, absenteeism, lack of skills, work habits, drunkenness, theft and insubordination. Through these it is now possible to see, with the benefit of hindsight that there was a very real need for serious government efforts to address the fundamental issue of long-term stable Maori employment by implementing a comprehensive programme of thorough-going education reforms, trade and professional training.

As long as the apparent good times that flowed from the primary-products export-based boom continued, government had no real need to seriously intervene in Maori employment issues or plan long-term strategies. The situation during the boom times of the 1950s, was such that the planning of career paths and facilitating the progress of Maori youth into employment largely operated on an ad hoc basis for a short period (1948 - 1950), as we have seen above. This brief period of concerted co-operative team-work between Vocational Guidance Officers, the

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Departments of Education, Labour, Industries and Commerce, Maori Affairs (Welfare Division) and the Forestry Service fell away absolutely, following the collapse of the inter-departmental MEEC in late 1950. From that time, government agencies tended to operate in relative isolation, with little lateral thinking about the policies and practices of other government agencies.

5.18. The East Coast Situation

Some case-histories from the East Coast/Gisborne employment district for Maori will illustrate these points. In that district, Maori were faced with under-employment and over-population in this period. The prospects of school-leavers continued to be a priority. This included organising their placement in apprenticeships, in tertiary institutions, and a variety of other occupations. In 1953, for example, welfare officers in Gisborne dealt with a number of apprenticeship applications, ‘the cream of the East Coast tribes’.\(^482\) In Gisborne, apprenticeship opportunities for Maori in 1955 included a number of trades, motor mechanics and engineering apprenticeships.\(^483\) Significantly, the 1957 annual report commented that two years of secondary education were necessary for trade training, and that it was difficult to recommend all applicants.\(^484\) Only three were recommended - one in forestry, one in special mechanical tractor work, and one in carpentry.

In 1957, formal approval was granted by the Hawke’s Bay Education Board and the Department of Education for welfare officers to visit schools, one purpose of which was reported an increase in career guidance activities among Maori students.\(^485\) In 1958 the annual report commented that these visits were important to identify Maori students who needed encouragement and assistance for tertiary education and to enter apprenticeships. During that year four boys were sent to Auckland to the New Zealand Railway Workshops.\(^486\) The 1959 annual report directly addressed the (by then) very apparent problem of limited employment opportunities in Gisborne. It noted that in ‘Gisborne City placement of apprentices in suitable trades is difficult because the scope here is limited’.\(^487\) Ten boys, however, were sent to Christchurch and Auckland, a trend that was to increase over the next several years. In the

\(^{482}\) Maori Welfare Division, Zone XIV, Annual Report’, April 9, 1953, MA 36/29/5, Part 1, ANZ, Wellington.

\(^{483}\) Department of Labour, Gisborne to Head Office, 15 November 1955, Employment of Maori School Leavers, L1 30/1/28, Parts 1-4, ANZ, Wellington.


\(^{485}\) Ibid.


annual report for 1960 it was stated that some boys had been place in apprenticeships with the Post and Telegraph Department, with New Zealand Railways, and with garages in Gisborne, but that ‘those less fortunate have had to be sent away’ to Auckland, Christchurch, and Wellington.\textsuperscript{488} A comment in another report indicates that at this time, for a Maori boy to become apprentice in Gisborne, he had to have passed School Certificate.\textsuperscript{489} This matter was addressed again in the next annual report as well, where it was noted that young people with the minimum of schooling had been placed in apprenticeships in large centres, but that in smaller regional centres such as New Plymouth, Whangarei and Napier it was difficult to do this unless they had reached School Certificate standard.\textsuperscript{490}

Given all of this effort, how many Maori youth received training to be skilled tradesmen through this period? This is difficult to estimate. For example, it is known with certainty that in Gisborne in 1950 there were 14 Maori apprentices, with 18 in 1956 and 23 in 1961. In the latter year these 23 comprised only 80 percent of the total apprentices in the Gisborne Labour Employment District.\textsuperscript{491} As noted, many more boys had left the area for a variety of apprenticeship opportunities elsewhere. The extent of the effort being made to get boys into apprenticeships outside of Gisborne can be gauged from the figures for 1961: 19 were sent to Christchurch, 6 to Auckland, 3 to Wellington.\textsuperscript{492} These included apprenticeships in private industry, government workshops, the Department of Maori Affairs, the Carpentry Training School in Panmure, Auckland (opened in 1959) and Plumbing and Electrical Training Schools opened in Auckland in 1962. However, overall Maori apprentices only made up three-and-a-half percent of the New Zealand total, even though Maori in the 15-20 age group comprised 9.25 percent of the population.\textsuperscript{493} At the time it was estimated that there should have been 89 Maori apprentices in Gisborne.\textsuperscript{494}

5.19. The Employment Situation Elsewhere

The situation was not dissimilar in other parts of New Zealand. As early as 1952 an officer in the Department of Labour stated, ‘[t]here is nothing for them in the rural areas. They have

\textsuperscript{491} Maori Apprentices, July 1961, L1 30/1/28, Part 6, Maori Employment General, ANZ, Wellington.
\textsuperscript{492} Department of Labour, Gisborne to Head Office, Re: Maori Employment Scheme, 15 February 1961, L1 30/1/28, Part 6, Maori Employment General, pp. 50–52, ANZ, Wellington.
\textsuperscript{493} Employment’, from Hunn Report, 1961, p. 16.
\textsuperscript{494} Ibid., p. 16.
come to Auckland to sell their chief material asset, their labour'. Joan Metge reported in her surveys of Ahipara ('Kotare') in Muriwhenua in 1955 that:

unfavourable circumstances were almost invariably cited first. It was a familiar refrain:

"There are no jobs to be had ... no money ... no land ... no future, back home."

In 1958, a Wanganui District Welfare Officer, commented that '[the] Maori is going through his final stage of development aimed at reaching social, economic and occupational equality with pakeha'. In a similar comment by a Welfare Officer to a class in Adult Education in Wanganui the District Welfare Head Officer stated that ‘each [district] welfare officer is given a target of six placements for a period of 12 months’ because ‘far too many school leavers ... sought employment in jobs which came under the category of “labouring”.

In November 1955, an officer of the New Plymouth district office of the Department of Labour and Employment reported to Wellington Head Office that ‘most of the employers contacted have expressed a willingness to assist the Maoris to attain their rightful place in the community’. Only one employer stated that he would never employ Maori because ‘he will not employ a Maori who is not particularly outstanding.

In a report on young Maori under the age of 21 employed in the City of Wellington by a district officer in the mid-1950s these observations, which are reproduced here in full, were made:

Of the seventy three young people interviewed, only eleven were males. ... possible reasons for the girls being in the majority: ... (1) ... more opportunities ... in the Public Service as shorthand-typists, machine operators and junior clerks. (2) employers in factories say that most of the work they offer is of a mechanical kind and they find women more suited to it. ... Women are paid a lower wage. (3) Young men are more easily absorbed into the labour forces in country districts and have less person to move to the city. (4) Men are seldom employed in domestic work.

... The majority have a record of up to two years of secondary schooling ... only because the law required them to do so. ... Some girls who attended Maori residential colleges and come from what seem to be good homes are working as factory hands, unaffected by the social implications which would worry a European girl .... The main attraction of the jobs preferred is that they offer higher pay and the loss in social standing is not understood.

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496 Metge, 1964, p. 127.
497 K.W. Puohotaua, Wanganui District Welfare Officer, Department of Maori Affairs, Wanganui Herald, 22 May, 1958. AAMK, 869, 17/1, Part 4, ANZ, Wellington.
498 H.W. Northcroft, Wanganui District Welfare Officer, Department of Maori Affairs, Wanganui Herald, 22 May, 1958. AAMK, 869, 17/1, Part 4, ANZ, Wellington.
499 District Officer, Department of Labour and Employment, to Head Office, 16 November 1955. L1 30/1/28. Part 5. ANZ, Wellington.
The problems confronting young Maoris in the City are not different from the problems confronting young Europeans in similar circumstances, except for additional difficulties imposed on them by their own culture and traditions.

The Maori people now form about one twentieth of the New Zealand population, but if we include all those who regard themselves as Maoris, the fraction would be greater. Theoretically, with no obvious bars they should be proportionately represented in all walks of life, but it seems to me that they are not. To me the reasons seem to be just a lack of ambition as understood in New Zealand Society, and then the prejudice which this apparent lack cultivates in European minds.

A report from the Timaru District Office of the Department of Labour and Employment in 1955 stated that 'a number of firms were contacted and the general reaction was not encouraging' with the 'main objection being that Maori boys taken out of their natural environment would soon become a social problem unless they were under strict supervision during their leisure hours.'

The Hastings District Officer of Labour and Employment reported in 1955 that a problem with apprenticing Maori boys in such trades as 'motor mechanics, welding, carpentry and upholstering' was that 'high wages obtainable here during seasonal work lures them away from their apprenticeship contract'.

In the 'deep south' in the mid-1950s, at the freezing works at Ocean Beach, Makarewa and Mataura, both of which received large influxes of seasonal workers from far and wide, many of them Maori, drawing 'high earnings', were alleged by the General Secretary of the New Zealand Freezing Works Industrial Association of Workers to 'spend far too much time drinking in and out of hotels, and as these [accommodation] camps are isolated tends to have bad results also'. The problem was a recurrent annual one. The union urged the Minister of Labour to lobby for the appointment of a welfare officer at Invercargill. The North Island Freezing Companies Association supported the call for a Maori welfare officer. There is no recorded evidence that the union's request was met by the Department of Maori Affairs.

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500 H. McConnell to District Welfare Officer, Department of Maori Affairs, undated, but from context, probably about 1955. AAMK. 869. 17/1. Part 3, 1952 - 1956. ANZ, Wellington.
504 Secretary, N.I. Freezing Cos. Assoc. to the Secretary of Labour, 22 September 1955. L1 30/1/28. Part 5. ANZ, Wellington.
Undoubtedly, seasonal influxes of large numbers of workers - whether Maori or Pakeha - or whether in the 'Deep South' or elsewhere, generally created a number of social problems. Such matters did not seem to have affected the small numbers of local tangata whenua - presumably Ngai Tahu, Ngati Mamoe or Waitaha - in the Invercargill/Bluff area. In a memorandum to Head Office in late 1955, the District Officer of Labour and Employment at Invercargill reported that:

the number of full blooded Maoris in this area is very low being actually under the 50 mark and even allowing for half castes the number is still very low, and this accounts for the small number of secondary pupils. 505

All four Maori students leaving Invercargill schools in 1955 were 'well placed' in 'chemistry apprenticeship, nursing, naval cadetship and school teacher training'. As many commentators have noted both then, and later, Ngai Tahu's process of integration/assimilation was quite different from other iwi, especially those of the northern North Island. 506

A breakthrough in the specific area of employment of Maori as ordinary police officers of the New Zealand Police Force (as opposed to specially designated Native Constables in appropriate areas, or the recently created office of Maori Warden which had limited but specific functions in Maori communities) appears to have been made in late 1952. In September the Acting Minister of Police stated in correspondence with the Principal of Northland College, Kaikohe, that 'it has not been the policy of the Department in the past to entertain applications from the Maori race'. 507 The Minister of Maori Affairs responded to the Acting Minister that:

suitable Maori men ... should not be debarred from joining the Police Force. Applications used not to be entertained in the past by the Armed Services for regular employment, but that has now changed. Not only can Maori constables be of great assistance working among the Maori people in straightening out some of the present social difficulties, but more important, we would be doing away with discrimination, as the policy of your Department in regard to enlistment would indicate. 508

505 District Officer, Invercargill to Head Office, Department of Labour and Employment, 16 November 1955. L1 30/1/28. Part 5. ANZ, Wellington.
508 Minister of Maori Affairs to the Minister in Charge of Police, 9 October, 1952. ADJ2869. Acc. 4644/1. 17/1/23. Part 1. ANZ, Wellington.
There was a happy outcome. In late 1952, the Principal of Kaikohe College was advised by the Minister of Maori Affairs that 'the reason why applications from your two boys were not entertained was because of the past policy of the Department in not providing for Maori recruits. That, I am happy to say, has now been changed'.

**5.20. Longer Academic Perspectives**

More reflective comments from longer perspectives by two contemporary academics and the head of a government department place these minutiae of local detail in a broader context. Joan Metge drew on her own extensive investigations in Ahipara, Auckland City and 'many parts of the North Island' between 1953 and 1965. She wrote in 1967:

> they differ from the non-Maori population in their patterns of employment, income, housing, health, family life, education, crime and delinquency. While they share a large area of common culture with other New Zealanders, they also cherish patterns of behaviour, organization and values that are distinctively Maori.

On work, employment and income and the place of Maori in the rapidly industrialising economy, she made the following observations:

> In 1961, 56 per cent of all Maoris over 15 are 'actively engaged in industry' (as the Census puts it), working in most cases for forty hours or more each week, for a cash return. The Maori labour-force comprises a significantly higher proportion of workers on wages and salaries than the Pakeha one, but lower proportions of employers and persons working on their own account.

On the uneven distribution of Maori in certain, usually unskilled occupations, Metge had some pertinent observations:

> One fifth of ... Maori workers are engaged in primary production, a higher percentage than for Pakeha workers, but by no means as high as might be expected from the size of the Maori rural population. An exceptionally high percentage ... are engaged in secondary industry, as craftsmen, production process workers, and labourers. Maori workers are also over-represented ... in transport and communications, and in service occupations.... [but] they are dramatically under-represented in management and administration, clerical, professional and technical occupations.

She concluded:

> Maori workers are heavily concentrated in certain limited types of occupations, mostly of an unskilled or semi-skilled nature. Over half are employed as labourers, domestic workers, drivers, farmers, forestry workers, and carpenters. Of the relatively small number in 'white collar' occupations, four-fifths are nurses, teachers and clerks. ... Maoris make up an unduly high proportion of New Zealand's workers in certain fields: 9 per cent of the drivers, 12 per cent of the domestic workers, 13 per cent of the operators of stationary engines and similar equipment, 15 per cent of the general labourers, and 30 per cent of the forestry workers.

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Commenting retrospectively on the place of Maori in the national economy, W.B. Sutch, permanent secretary of the Department of Industries and Commerce, 1958 - 1965, wrote in 1964:

The Maori labour contribution to New Zealand’s economy has, at least in the post-war years, been substantial and essential, particularly in development, craft and factory work. The Maori man’s ability to manipulate machines is well known, whether they are tractors, bull-dozers, concrete mixers, pneumatic drills or steel rolling mills. The Maori woman’s patience and manual skills are also very evident.

The census figures [1961] show, however, that the percentage of non-Maori men in professional, technical and related work is 4½ times the percentage of Maori men; in management, administration, clerical and related work the preponderance is 7 times; with sales workers it is 9 times; in the armed forces it is only 1½ times.

These figures mean that in some occupations there must be higher percentages for the total male work force than the percentages for non-Maori. These occupations are farming, forestry, mining and quarrying (and related), transport and the statistical category of skilled craftsmen, production process and labourers.

Maori women, on the other hand, are professional, clerical, selling, catering and other service occupations in markedly greater percentages than are Maori men. Nevertheless, non-Maori women have a higher percentage of their numbers in all these occupations than have the Maori women. In professional and technical occupations the non-Maori is 1½ times that of the Maori, in administration and clerical it is 4 times, in sales it is 4½ times. This means a higher percentage of the Maori women workers are in other fields: these are armed forces, catering and servicing, process workers, farming, and transport and communications.\(^{13}\)

Psychologist James Ritchie and a small team of researchers undertook a long-term participation-observation survey of Maori families in the mid- to late 1950s in the small booming forestry town of Murupara - given the pseudonym ‘Rakau’ - on the north-eastern edge of the Volcanic Plateau.\(^{14}\) Writing in 1968, using the accumulated evidence and a more distanced perspective of his Rakau researches, Ritchie commented on the uniqueness of Maori in their acculturation to Pakeha ways in the workforce. He stated:

A glance at the Maori employment situation might lead to the superficial judgment that Maori are employed in jobs very similar to those we might expect to be filled by any category of persons of similar demographic or sociological characteristics. Where would you expect to find employed people who come from relatively low-income families, or generally low educational attainment, have mainly a rural background, and derive from areas which are reaching their labour limit given present farm production and land utilisation techniques? From this point of view the Maori workers fall predominantly into predictable categories both of occupational classification and of social class. Thus regarded there is no reason to use the term ‘Maori’ at all in order to describe the pattern or kin of work. Nevertheless such data as we have, and which will

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be reviewed in this essay, show that in rhythm and pace, attitude and purpose there are
real differences between Māori and Pākehā on the same job and at the same place.\textsuperscript{515}

In his earlier reports of the Rakau project, Ritchie commented on the complexity of Rakau’s
social schema, where the Māori social schema must mutually deal with the Pākehā schema:

\textit{[Pākehā] farming families ... have little to do with the local community ... a few employ
seasonal Maori labour ... [but] the relationship is limited to working roles. ... There are
three groups of wage-earning [Pākehā] residents in Rakau who do have day-to-day
dealings with Māori people. Forestry workers form two of these groups. ... The higher
status group comprises about a dozen families whose major wage earners work in
administrative jobs in the forestry service.\textsuperscript{516}}

A further group closely associated with the higher status forestry workers were most of the
shopkeepers and tradesmen of Rakau.

Their attitudes \textit{[to Māori]} if a little patronising, are more or less benevolent. ... The lower
status [Pākehā] forestry families chiefly comprise those who are recent arrivals or who
occupy lower-status forestry jobs ... [and] some of [whom have] strong anti-Māori
feeling[s].\textsuperscript{517}

A fourth group of Pākehā residents ‘comprises migratory workers who are a very
heterogenous collection ... single men ... from engineering students ... to alcoholics on the
run.’\textsuperscript{518} Most of these men are casual workers, and except for the students, are mostly of a
‘bitter and shiftless’ kind, usually ‘uncouth and uneducated’, and given to frequent
expressions of ‘anti-Māori sentiments’.\textsuperscript{519}

Ritchie continued his outline of ‘the social map of Rakau’:

\begin{quote}
In general the Pākehā people... think in terms of class, or rather social status, in which
money, job, home standards, education, and personal qualities rank in about that order. ... Three broad groups of Māori families are recognised by Pākehā ... the highest group
comprise Māoris whose chief common factor is their level of education relative to the rest
of the Māori community. ... The majority of Māori families in Rakau are regarded by
Pākehas as of equivalent, or slightly lower, status than the new forestry workers but there
are a few Māoris who rank even lower than the migratory workers.\textsuperscript{520}
\end{quote}

Forty years later, commenting on this last phenomenon, Michael King observed that the
‘social and cultural consequences of this relocation were considerable. They brought a need
for dramatic changes in the management of both Māori and wider national affairs’.\textsuperscript{521}

\section*{5.21. Prosperity for Māori in Forestry Industry?}

Māori were quickly engaged as workers in the new, expanding and flourishing exotic forestry
industries of the Rotorua-Bay of Plenty-Taupo region in the several decades following the end

\textsuperscript{516} Ritchie, 1963, pp. 168-70.
\textsuperscript{517} Ibid., p. 169.
\textsuperscript{518} Ibid., p. 170.
\textsuperscript{519} Ibid., p. 170.
\textsuperscript{520} Ibid., pp. 171-2.
\textsuperscript{521} M. King, \textit{1000 Years of Māori History - Nga Iwi o te Motu}, Auckland: Reed, 1997, p. 90.
of World War II. From the mid-1950s there was an export boom in pulp, newsprint and other paper products from the exotic forests that had been first planted in the central North Island prior to World War II.\(^{522}\) The export boom in forest products allowed companies like Tasman Pulp and Paper and New Zealand Forest Products to grow to be amongst the largest companies in New Zealand.\(^{523}\) The central North Island plateau was the major location for one of the largest timber plantations in the world, the Kaingaroa State Forest, which consisted of a third of a million acres.\(^{524}\) By the late 1950s it employed over a thousand workers in silviculture, logging, milling and in supporting trades and professions.\(^{525}\) The central North Island timberland villages and towns were also located within the traditional territories of major Maori tribal communities such as Te Arawa, Ngati Tuwharetoa, Ngati Manawa and Ngai Tuhoe. These industries were to provide a major source of employment for Maori from the 1950s onwards and by the 1970s had provided employment for more than three generations of some Maori families.\(^{526}\)

By 1961, the South Auckland-Bay of Plenty statistical area had the highest proportion of the total New Zealand Maori population, at 32.3 per cent.\(^ {527}\) The region consisted of a number of smaller centres like Whakatane, Murupara, Taupo, Tokoroa and Mount Maunganui, which all grew rapidly as part of New Zealand's timber, wood-processing, pulp and paper industries and which provided a major source of employment for Maori. At first the migration of Maori workers to these smaller 'frontier' communities of the Volcanic Plateau was a relatively local phenomenon, probably reflecting the convenience of having an important source of employment within the traditional boundaries of several major iwi. It is important to understand, however, that these towns not only provided employment to local Maori but increasingly for Maori from much further a field who were facing pressures to migrate in order to find work. A study of one of these timberland towns in 1960/1, found that local Maori workers from the local tribal communities from Tauranga to Opotoki along the Bay of Plenty coast and in the Urewera hinterland had been greatly outnumbered by Maori workers from more distant parts of the Bay of Plenty and South Auckland and even from as far away

\(^{523}\) Ibid., p. 422.
\(^{525}\) Ibid., p. 187.
\(^{526}\) Ibid., p. 187.
\(^{527}\) New Zealand Census of Population and Dwellings, 1961, p. 5.
as North Auckland. In fact, the study noted that the second largest group of Maori workers had migrated from the Far North, from the area from the Bay of Islands to Te Hapua.  

At the Young Maori Leaders’ (YML) Conference’s Whakatane session in August 1960, reports from delegates and representatives spoke in optimistic and positive terms about their respective socio-economic situations. The following are a selection of comments from the Whakatane session:

A delegate from Tokoroa commented that:

all phases of the forestry side of the work was headed by Maori’ ... it was fortunate that the NZ Forest Products superintendent - who was a Pakeha - had the welfare of the Maori workers at heart. Excellent housing and excellent single accommodation was provided by the Company.

Similar expressions of goodwill emanated from the YML Conference for the situation of Maori in Kawerau, a new company town of the early 1950s. At Kawerau, the large pulp and paper company, Tasman Pulp and Paper Ltd., in which the government had a substantial foundational minority shareholding interest of about 31 per cent, was a company with a social conscience, a relatively rare phenomenon on the corporate landscape in the 1950. The mill had been built with positive government support and encouragement in the early 1950s. It was a rare example of successful joint-venture manufacturing innovations between private enterprise and government; a tangible symbol of the ideology that by fostering manufacturing, governments could aim at providing paid, productive employment, conserve foreign exchange, and support a welfare state.

The 1960 conference recorded that in Kawerau:

Race relations were very good and all groups of peoples seemed to get on very well together. Maoris after a term of three months seemed to get on very well together. Maoris after a term of three months probation were eligible to be placed on the list for a house (numbers of them were already in State Rentals) - for which Tasman Paper Pulp provided £1000 free of interest. Two Maori foremen were doing a good job. With the extensions envisaged for the mill in six months’ time there would be employment for 200 men for the next 18 months and probable absorption into the mill itself after that. The workers themselves came from areas around the Bay of Plenty - some from Northland. There was no bar to anyone wanting to enter business. The Kawerau Drycleaners was a firm owned

528 Ibid., p. 189.
and run by Maoris and now had a monopoly. The main restriction to any extension of Maoris in the business world was finance. The only lending institution so far was Rehabilitation or the Maori Affairs Dept. Several Maoris were invited to attend European functions and to join organisations such as Jaycees, Rotary, etc. It was obvious that Tasman was very keen to take on any young people with a good education.\textsuperscript{531}

The comment of the Round Table session at the 1960 Whakatane conference on difficulties for Maori in setting up business does not appear to have applied to the example of the Delamere whanau. They had set up the dry-cleaning business in 1956, one year after the Tasman mill began production. Monita Delamere established the town's first credit union, later forming several in the Bay of Plenty. He saw the credit union as embracing the philosophy of pooling resources and sharing with others. The union offered low-interest loans and taught budgeting, assisting low-income earners and the ordinary worker. Delamere was opposed by local trading banks and businesses and the Department of Maori Affairs, but his tenacity benefited the less well off. It eventually became an accepted banking facility in Kawerau with strong membership.\textsuperscript{532}

The Bay of Plenty town of Murupara, which was a principal centre of the Kaingaroa timber industry appears not only to have attracted Maori workers from the immediate hinterland surrounding it, but from all over the North Island and grew rapidly between 1961 and 1966 increasing its population by 46 per cent. By 1966, Maori timber workers and their families made up 56 per cent of Murupara's total population of 2,670.

Industrial expansion industry required new energy sources. Adjacent to the flourishing timber processing plants of the Rotorua-Bay of Plenty-Taupo region, during the period from 1945 to 1973, the Waikato River was transformed into a sequence of dams generating hydroelectric power.\textsuperscript{533} Maori workers were prominent in the construction of dams and power stations for much of the 1950s and 1960s.\textsuperscript{534}


\textsuperscript{532} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{534} With the attempt in the 1960s to make power generation more responsive to the daily and seasonal variations by locating power plants near the faster-growing domestic and industrial users, many Maori workers were drawn into smaller centres such as Meremere and Huntly to be involved in the construction of new coal-fired electricity plants. Maori were also employed as far south as Roxburgh in the South Island where the power station was completed on the Clutha River in the early 1950s and in the construction of other dams which were added to the Waitaki River during the same period. (Hawke, 1985, p. 280.)
5.22. Industrial Distribution of the Maori Workforce.

Rural to urban migration was reflected in a radical and rapid reversal of the industrial distribution of the Maori workforce as an outcome of that urbanisation process. Participation in agriculture and traditional rural industries fell and employment in manufacturing came to dominate. Within manufacturing, textiles, weaving, apparel and leather industries absorbed most Maori females, mainly as sewing machinists; and the food, beverage and tobacco sector, which included the meat industry, absorbed most Maori males. There was also a marked increase in the participation of Maori females in the service industry.535

The occupational distribution of the Maori male workforce after WWII was marked by over-representation in low paid, low skill status manual occupation and by under-representation in the professions & in clerical and supervisory occupations. More than two-thirds of Maori males but less than one-third non-Maori males in 1956 were unskilled workers.536

Maori females were also over-represented in low skill status occupations but to a lesser extent than males – they were more likely to be in the lower grades of professional and technical occupations, viz. teachers and teacher assistants, nurses and nurse-aides.537 Maori were ‘at the bottom of the pile’ in the three or more decades after World War II.538

5.23. Maori Distinctiveness: Racial Segmentation of the Labour Market?

Maori rural - urban migrants were distinctive in two respects. They tended to be new entrants to the workforce;539 predominantly young unmarried adults.540 They rarely had specific qualifications; most had received education in Native/Maori Schools, the few remaining ‘mission-founded’ special schools (St. Stephen’s School, Queen Victoria Maori Girls’ School, etc), district high schools, or the technical departments of secondary schools.541 Few had gained School Certificate (at 5th Form) and most had left school at a young age. A case study of Maori workers in Auckland in the 1950s found that the most common skill among young Maori migrants was the ability to drive a motor vehicle.542

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537 Ibid.
539 Thompson, 1978, p. 118.
542 Metge, 1964, pp. 52-3.
In the conditions of over-full employment and excess demand for labour which characterised the early post-war years, migrants found it easier to enter unskilled and semi-skilled work, particularly labouring and manufacturing. This concentration became self-perpetuating as new migrants, often unaware of job search procedures or unable to afford a lengthy period of job search, tended to take word-of-mouth job offers found by friends or kin and to move into the more congenial areas of employment where Maori were already established.  

Differences in labour supply behaviour that were initially tangible, quickly became stereotypically ascribed characteristics. Corresponding to their age and marital status, and to the undesirable and monotonous nature of many of the jobs that were available to them, new arrivals from rural areas often underwent a period of high job mobility and thus Maori workers became stereotyped as unreliable and/or lazy.

These perceptions by Pakeha about the capabilities and suitability of Maori workers for various occupations only served to intensify the self-perpetuating patterns of Maori concentration in low status jobs. For example, the overwhelming preponderance of Maori males in manipulating machines such as truck, bulldozer and tractor driving, steel rolling, and pneumatic drill operating can arguably be traced to their publicity in the Hunn Report. Similar myths were promoted about ‘Maori women’s patience and manual dexterity.’

Beyond the ascriptive characteristics of Maori workers, several other factors contributed to labour market segmentation, namely, immigration, vocational training, workers’ organisation and housing policies.

5.24. Worker Organisation / Trade Unions.

Because of their rural location, Maori contact with the union movement prior to migration was restricted to the shearers’ unions. Most agricultural workers were not unionised and were therefore outside the award system of wage determination that had been operating from 1894.
Upon migration, contact was circumscribed by the occupations in which Maori became concentrated. Differences in bargaining power that corresponded with labour scarcity emerged and the unions representing Maori workers generally lost power because unskilled Maori migrants constituted a relatively abundant supply of labour whereas more intense shortages occurred in the skilled occupations that were filled with British immigrants.

Contrary to popular belief, in the period of urbanisation and incorporation into the manufacturing and service industries, a few Maori were nominal members of most trade unions in the period 1935 - 1975, but most avoided any executive role within the movement. A thorough examination of the lists and minutes of most union organisations in repositories such as, the Herbert Roth collection at the University of Auckland Library, the Alexander Turnbull Library, and the offices of the Food and General Industrial Workers Union in Kingsland, Auckland has yielded only a small number of names that are identifiable Maori.

One speculative explanation of this phenomenon might well be that trade unions, as the traditional advocates of the working class, and whose membership tended to be almost exclusively, Pakeha, were unable (and/or possibly unwilling) to represent the interests of Maori workers and to prevent their disadvantaged position from emerging. According to W. Karaka, a leading local unionist in Auckland, speaking at the Young Maori Leaders’ Conference in 1959:

In the Auckland Labourers union which covers the whole of the Northern Industrial District ... there are 1,000 Maori members, this being slightly under 25 per cent of the whole membership ... but it is rare to see a Maori in trade Union leadership.

There has been much discourse and deliberation as to the reasons underlying this phenomenon. In several short papers Hugh Kawharu has suggested tentatively that Maori workers found the atmosphere of Pakeha-dominated unions alienating and the business of unions - weighty industrial and site regulations not relevant to what they wished to do - work.

547 Spoonley, 1981, p. 46
5.25. The Position of Maori at the End of the 1950s

The relative prosperity of the period encouraged the impression of social tranquility, although
the prosperity generated by the long post-war boom (1945 - 73) did not accrue to all sectors of
society equally. It also concealed the fact that the period was characterized by a high degree
of gender inequality and many instances of minor racial discrimination. The former attitude
manifested itself in terms of the systematic exclusion of women from the paid workforce.552

It was widely believed that New Zealand possessed the best ‘race relations’ in the world
where Maori and Pakeha lived in harmony as ‘one people’. Many political commentators of
the period argued that the relations between Maori and Pakeha were characterised by little
overt conflict and the absence of any strong political expression of dissatisfaction.553 The topic
of race relations, which forms an important milieu for the incorporation of Maori into the
workforce, will be examined in detail in the following chapter.

With the lack of employment prospects in the cities many young Maori found themselves
pushed to the margins of society, left with no other source of income than petty crime. According to the Hunn Report, by 1958, the Maori crime rate had risen 50 per cent in four
years to a level three and a half times the rate of Pakeha offending which had remained nearly
static.554 Maori represented around 6.6 per cent of the population but made up 16.5 per cent of
arrests, 18.4 per cent of convictions and 24.1 per cent of imprisonments.555 The Hunn Report
lamented the ‘inordinately high incidence of law breaking by Maoris’ which was a result of
“juvenile delinquency”.556 It noted that offences against property were the most prevalent
accounting for nearly half of all Maori crime. The report surmised that these property offences
were essentially a result of the:

... survival of the communal way of life followed by Maoris for centuries. Share and share
alike was the custom but property rights in a modern society make it a crime to take other
peoples’ property. Ancient custom dies hard.557

552 A. K. Horsfield and M. Evans, Maori Women in the Economy, Wellington: Ministry of Women’s Affairs,
1988; Poata-Smith, ‘He Pokeke Uenuku I Tu Ai: The Evolution of Contemporary Maori Protest’, in Spoonley et
al (eds), 1996, pp. 97-116; Poata-Smith, ‘The Political Economy of Inequality Between Maori and Pakeha’, in
Rudd & Roper (eds), 1997, pp. 160–79.
553 MA 1, 36/1/21, Box 654, Part 6: ‘Race Relations in New Zealand’: 1961; MA 1, 36/1/21, Box 655, Part 4,
Race Relations Integration & Segregation 1962-63, ANZ, Wellington; D.P. Ausubel, The Fern and the Tiki,
[Sydney]: Angus and Robertson, 1960; D.P. Ausubel, Maori Youth, Wellington: Publication in Psychology
554 Hunn Report, 1961, p. 32.
556 Ibid., p. 32.
557 Ibid., p. 33.
The rapid growth in the Maori population and its redistribution into urban areas with a lack of employment opportunities, poor housing, over-crowding was a matter for discussion even by conservative academics concerned about the threat to New Zealand's social cohesion. The difference in the overall standards of Maori and non-Maori housing is exemplified in the 1956 census figures regarding household amenities as the figure below, 'Percentage of Homes with Household Amenities' demonstrates:

**Percentage of Homes with Household Amenities (Source: 1956 Census.)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage of Homes with Household Amenities (Source: 1956 Census.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bath or Shower: Maori 58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piped Water: Maori 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hot-water Service: Maori 48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flush Toilet: Maori 31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refrigerator: Maori 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washing Machine: Maori 19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The prevalent lack of sanitation and water supply clearly impacted on the health status of Maori whanau. Infant mortality rates for the first year of life were 57.5 per 1,000 births for Maori for the five years 1954-1958 in comparison with 19.8 per 1,000 among non-Maori infants. Officials noted that, 'many Maoris are living in deplorable conditions which affect their health, their morals, and their impact on society in generally.'

**5.26. Conclusion**

From the 1940s, and at a gathering pace through the 1950s, in one of the most extensive internal population shifts recorded globally, Maori had moved to the cities and the towns.

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558 The question of employment opportunity was also highlighted by Frederick Wood. In discussing the high proportion of Maori in North Auckland, he wrote in 1952: “Here the contact between the races has always been closest, and the danger of friction and misunderstanding greatest, especially through the serious local problem of finding work for the young people.” (F.L.W. Wood, *This New Zealand*, (Rev. ed.), Hamilton: Paul’s Book Arcade, 1952, p. 134). I.L.G. Sutherland of the University College of Canterbury expressed concern at the crowded living conditions of Maori families in Auckland City: “[t]he shocking conditions under which many Maori live in Auckland - the 2,000-odd in the Nelson Street area, for example, with, when a survey was made several years ago, 261 persons, comprising 56 families, living in 12-odd houses - this, and the fact that many young Maoris [sic] who have come to Auckland have been very unready for city life, as some of their behaviour shows - this does influence European attitudes ...” (I.L.G. Sutherland, “Maori and European”, *JPS* 61 (1), March 1952, p. 145).

559 *AJHR*, 1951, G-9, p. 6.
Before that migration, most Maori had lived separately and away from much of Pakeha New Zealand in rural settlements, literally out of sight, and metaphorically almost out of sight in public debate and government decision-making; in short, Maori were largely unacknowledged except for their heroic contribution in World War II and for symbolic and sporting purposes.\(^{560}\) The assumption that they would eventually be assimilated into Pakeha institutions and social patterns was maintained across party lines. New Zealand governments continued to experiment with various policies of assimilation, including, prominently, adaptation in the 1930s, which appeared different not least because it was promoted by Ngata. These were all attempts to achieve ongoing interaction within a common unitary framework, thereby maintaining the sovereignty of the Crown. Arguably, these could be perceived (by latter-day post-colonialists) as a covert means of maintaining an on-going Pakeha hegemony. It had become clear to not a few in the new Labour Government of 1957 - 1960 that the Maori situation needed to be addressed by a comprehensive review of their social and economic position. This view was held by all four Ratana Maori MPs, but theirs was a voice crying in the wilderness. The response by government to this deteriorating situation will be the focus of the succeeding chapter.

CHAPTER SIX: FROM INTEGRATION TO BICULTURALISM

6.01. Introduction
The focus of this chapter is the incorporation of the rapidly urbanising Maori population into the workforce and more generally into the wider society under the second National government’s policies of integration 1960 - 1972 and the third Labour government’s policies of bi-culturalism 1972 - 1975. This is placed in the wider context of Maori relations with government. In turn this provides a background against which governments’ employment policies can be contextualized. Specifically it will highlight the style, policy implementation and political environment of successive governments in their dealings with Maori employment issues. It will be demonstrated that government had a key role in the shaping of a Maori workforce. Central to the wide scope of this chapter will be governments’ perceptions of the place of Maori in the workforce and in the wider fabric of New Zealand society. The separate decisions to implement an integration policy programme and then, some twelve years later to fundamentally modify this with the introduction of bicultural policies were made in a context of huge social, economic and demographic changes, and were promoted, rationalised and justified as providing a positive step forward for Maori. Arguably, the overt agenda behind those programmes was clearly to benefit all New Zealanders. In view of the deliberate and effective government policy to encourage Maori people to migrate to urban areas to create a manufacturing and service industry labour force, as implemented by the Department of Maori Affairs, there can be no doubt that the assimilation and integration of Maori people into the larger European-style social, economic and judicial system of the New Zealand nation-state was the main goal behind all government action. Also influential was the growing international debate on issues of racism. There was, arguably, however, one crucial difference between the two policies. The former was essentially a largely Pakeha programme under a National government and into which there was minimal Maori input; the latter was a belated attempt by a Labour government of a socialist tradition and with a liberal conscience to address growing concerns from key Maori and Pakeha interest groups, about serious social, economic, racial and cultural issues facing the two communities.

The shaping of an urban Maori workforce in mid-twentieth century New Zealand was determined by a wide range of factors including education, job training, housing and health. A mix of individual, family/whanau, social and economic dynamics would have acted in a complex manner in this formative process, closely monitored by an increasingly omniscient
government. The broad aim of social policy was to formulate and implement programmes that would have positive outcomes for the social well-being of all peoples ‘through regulatory control of the distribution of and access to goods and resources in that society.’

New Zealand governments had a long tradition of involvement in social control and in the regulation of the terms and conditions of participation in the economy. This role had further intensified with the need to manage the widespread social impacts of the 1930s depression and World War II: the paternalism of the State had become enmeshed with the social democratic tradition at the time of the long Labour Government 1935 - 1949. This was no better exemplified than in the relationship which that Government perceived between Maori work and housing in a modern urban environment. These links were nicely encapsulated in some patronising observations recorded in 1937 by the chief clerk in the Department of Native Affairs’ Head Office, G.P. Shepherd. In a transcribed interview with Dr Lambert from the Western Pacific Health Service, Shepherd stated:

... if we are going to do any good for Maoris we must seek to develop the character of the Maoris themselves. ... Unless we can develop and build up the character of the Maori, we might just as well say we cannot do the job. It is no use giving him the house to live in without furniture, without food, without ‘house consciousness’ without the thoughts of the conception of a house that we Europeans employ. If we are going to give him a house we must give him a means to sustain himself and if we give him a house without those means we are not benefiting him at all. We had much better give him a tent so that he need not incur any liability.

...[I]n the broadest sense we must assimilate the Maori into useful and self-respecting citizenship. That is the general proposition. If we are going to assimilate him into useful and self-respecting citizenship we must give him the same chances from the moment of his birth as we give the Europeans, the same outlook as the European in regard to his advancement in the world. ... Until we can instill that idea into the minds of the Maoris we are going to have an uphill fight because it is no use tackling it when they are adult when the economic shoe begins to pinch – we must get them at an early tender age to think ‘I am going to be a useful man, and I shall be a carpenter, a clerk, a doctor etc.’

In the genealogy of colonialist (and postcolonialist) thinking on the place of Maori in the wider socio-economic order, there is a direct line of ascent from Shepherd in 1937 to Governor Fitzroy’s ‘assimilating as speedily as possible the habits and usages of the Native to those of the European population’ in 1844, and a similar line of descent to Hunn’s magic

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562 Shepherd had a meteoric career path: clerk in Native Affairs in the 1930s, Judge of the Native Land Court (1938), Chief Judge, Native Land Court (1941 - 1945), Under-Secretary for Native Affairs (1944 - 1948). Unusually, he held the last 2 positions simultaneously for 18 months. Refer Butterworth and Young, Maori Affairs, p. 86.
Assimilation of Maori into the dominant society remained the objective of governments at least until the last twenty five years of the twentieth century.

This chapter is structured in five sections: overview, prelude, the ‘long’ decade of the 1960s (1960-72) which ended with a change of government and the short period 1972-5. The rationale for this periodisation is: 1960-1 marked a seminal point in New Zealand political history in respect to Maori - the introduction of a concerted Government-formulated programme to integrate Maori into mainstream society; the shorter period (1972-5) was characterised by the new government’s belief that integration had some serious shortcomings, was no longer acceptable to Maori - and thus attempts were made to undo some of the culturally-insensitive aspects of integration and implement consensual programmes that would lead to more fulsome and willing participation by Maori in the workforce, further satisfy their specific cultural needs and make them proud of their place in the wider community of Pakeha and Maori within the unitary nation-state.

6.02. Race Relations I: Overview
Integration became official policy from 1961 until 1972, although there was much debate (and confusion) as to its alleged (or actual) difference from assimilation. Whatever the reality behind the intellectual debate over semantics, there is no doubt that the on-going government-directed drive of assimilation towards integration in the 1960s showed most acutely in a reluctance to allow Maori to manage their own affairs in a whole range of policy areas including education, family relations, welfare, guardianship and adoption of children, the fostering of children in need of care and protection, managing youthful offenders and land rights. Over-riding all these policy areas was the policy of re-location. This was a thoroughgoing political programme to attempt to integrate Maori socially and economically. It is the...
course of this political agenda that will be plotted in detail in the following sections of this chapter.

Race issues had become prominent globally in the late 1950s and continued in the early 1960s. Together with growing international concern over civil rights and desegregation in the U.S.A, human rights and decolonisation, especially on the African continent, and in light of the increased visibility of the Maori ‘problem’, the image of New Zealand as a racial paradise became tarnished from about 1960. These crystallized following a number of high-profile, widely publicised incidents and events including issues arising from the Springbok tour (1960), the publications of *The Fern and the Tiki* (1960) and the *Hunn Report* (1961) and an alleged case of racial discrimination in 1959 against a prominent Maori psychiatrist and member of a family widely perceived to occupy the highest echelons of assimilated Maori society - Henry Bennett.566

Yet underneath the unprecedented negative publicity from the media and publishers (and a few liberal white academics, such as Bill Pearson) of that time, by the late 1950s it would be fair to generalise that assimilation as official policy and massive government spending had brought about significant socio-economic advancements for Maori compared with their situation of earlier decades. Relative to Pakeha, they were however not as well off, when measured comparatively along the indices of employment, education, housing, health and offending.567

That government was pre-occupied with the imperative of replicating a socio-economic hierarchical order for Maori is evident in a contemporary document compiled by a public servant in the Department of Maori Affairs. The title of the document is ‘Members of Maori Race in the Professions and Trades’. It bears no explicit date, but contextual clues point to a compilation date of about 1959-61. The list has a total of about 142 names, overwhelmingly male by gender, sorted by occupation, but with no identification by hapu or iwi affiliation. The trades, sales and clerical occupations only lists senior managers. Occupations were organised in an approximate hierarchical order, with the first category ‘diplomatic corps’

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566 ‘His identity as a Maori became an issue in 1959 when he was refused a drink at the Papakura Hotel because of his race. At the time he was senior medical officer of health at Kingsseat Hospital. The incident hit the headlines and in the NZH, Dr Bennett said: “If we are going to tell the world that Maori have equality in New Zealand then this sort of thing is untenable. I want to do what I can to put a stop to this situation, not for myself but for the race.”’ Obituary. *Herald on Sunday*, 2 December 2000.

containing two names, ‘C[harles Moihi Te Arawaka] Bennett [and] Peter Gordon’. The list, however, appears to be far from complete and is not comprehensive. For example, with respect to the professions, the document lists 54 persons as ‘professional’, whereas the 1961 census shows that 1.7 per cent of Maori males, that is, a total of 217 individuals were classified as professional; a further indication of a large shortfall in the list are the numbers who were engaged in administrative, managerial and supervisory positions, which are well below the figures in the 1961 census. This showed that about 1,500 Maori males were in those managerial positions and 9,037 Maori males were classified as skilled manual workers. Clearly, only a small fraction of the Maori in senior management positions were included in the Department of Maori Affairs list. Nevertheless, despite its shortcomings as a list of all Maori engaged in the professions and trades, it does provide clear evidence of the official ideologically-driven assimilationist paradigm of mid-twentieth century New Zealand.

At the same time as the Hunn Report team’s investigations (and possibly linked with or associated with Hunn’s research) the District Officer of Maori Affairs in Auckland prepared a ‘private’ survey of ‘complaints’ about urban Maori between June 1960 and May 1961. He listed ‘complaints of rowdiness with overcrowding, liquor and objectionable behaviour’, ‘27’ instances of ‘insanitary overcrowding’, ‘30’ complaints of ‘wife and child beating, ill treatment, generally through liquor’ and ‘27’ complaints of ‘ill treatment of children only’. These recorded instances of perceived problems of urban socialisation (further complicated by Pakeha preconceptions of desirable norms of behaviour and the terms of racial co-existence) took place against the continued erosion of Maori land, language and cultural identity that threatened to further deprive Maori of their distinctiveness as the indigenous inhabitants of New Zealand. Assimilative policies meant that to some extent, the ability for Maori to participate and develop fully their cultural practice was dependent on the tolerance of the dominant culture. The use of the term ‘Maori’ in itself as a marker of identity had an underlying assumption that the dominant Pakeha cultural patterns and lifestyles were normal,

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568 ‘Members of Maori race in the Professions and Trades’, AAMK 869, 17/1, Part 5, Box 637, 1959-61, ANZ, Wellington.
570 There is insufficient documentary evidence to positively link the national inquiry and the personal survey conducted by the Auckland officer from official materials in his own time. Moore, Auckland District Officer, to Secretary of Maori Affairs, Wellington, 20 June 1961, MA 1/654, 36/1/21, Part 3, ANZ, Wellington.
desirable and inevitable. Nowhere was the social irrelevance of Maoridom more evident than in the decline of the language as a tool of daily communication.\footnote{Howe, 1977, pp. 78-9.}

Thus during the term of the second Labour Government (1957 - 1960) it was becoming clear to the four Labour Maori Members of Parliament that the social, economic and welfare needs of Maori needed urgent attention. The Prime Minister, Walter Nash had taken the portfolio of Maori Affairs in the new government, to the disappointment of the Maori Labour caucus.\footnote{Love, 1977, p. 362; Ballara, 2006 ‘Tirikatene’.} Nash as Minister of Maori Affairs was lobbied by the four MPs that ‘an independent report on Maori welfare should be provided, especially with regard to the present activities of the Maori Welfare and the Maori Affairs Department’.\footnote{Love, 1977, pp. 450-1.} Out of this persistent lobbying, was born the preparation of an extensive report on the Department of Maori Affairs - which on public release, 17 January 1961, was quickly dubbed the \textit{Hunn Report}.

The \textit{Hunn Report} was a landmark document. It crystallised many previously vaguely held beliefs of the Pakeha community and sparked some strong responses from Maori. A brief sketch of the nature of race relations at that time follows.

\textbf{6.03. Race Relations II: Prelude - NZ as Utopia - 1960}

In the popular view New Zealand in 1960 was perceived as a racially harmonious society; this applied as to Maori as it did to Pakeha. This rose-tinted perception was given the stamp of academic authority at that time by two young historians, Bill Oliver and Keith Sinclair.\footnote{K. Sinclair, \textit{A History of New Zealand}, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1959; W.H. Oliver, \textit{The Story of New Zealand}, Faber: London, 1960.} As Oliver observed then, the country was ‘proud of her reputation for racial harmony’.\footnote{Ibid., p. 247.} Arguably, no legal or political discrimination existed, but social discrimination served to keep Maori bound within the strictures of prejudice and stereotyping, according to Oliver.\footnote{Ibid., p. 264.} Revisionist historiography of the late twentieth century has argued that widespread if rather minor incidences of social and employment discrimination did occur from the time of accelerated Maori urbanisation during and after World War II.\footnote{See for example, Spoonley, in Spoonley et al (eds), 1994, p. 87; Paul Spoonley, ‘Mahi Awatea? The Racialisation of Work in Aotearoa/New Zealand’, in Spoonley et al (eds), 1996, pp. 55-78; Ranginui J. Walker, ‘The social adjustment of the Maori to urban living in Auckland’, PhD Thesis in Anthropology, UA, 1970; R.J. Walker, ‘The Treaty of Waitangi as the Focus of Maori Protest’, in I.H. Kawharu (ed), \textit{Waitangi: Maori and Pakeha Perspectives of the Treaty of Waitangi}, Auckland: OUP, 1989.}
As with the 'myth' of egalitarianism, however, it was the 'myth', the veneer of harmonious race relations that was important, not least to Pakeha. What the world perceived of New Zealand's race record somehow mattered. Writing in the late 1970s, Pat Hohepa critiqued the one people myth from a Maori perspective. This mythologizing contrasted somewhat with a 1950s reality: broadly there was little blatant, overt racial discrimination, but frequent instances of it were noted by many. For example, in a report on a joint scheme during 1957 of the Auckland Junior Chamber of Commerce ('Jaycees') and the Auckland District Office of the Department of Maori Affairs, the 'Jaycees' commented:

a cross section of commercial employers were approached ... and although there was some evidence of prejudice, most agreed to offer employment to those Maori folk with the necessary qualifications, particularly on the basis that applicants were selected by Welfare Officers of the Maori Affairs Dept. and visited regularly in their place of employment.

106 replies were received and 42 jobs were offered with a further 23 possible. Only 4 declined to employ a Maori while 10 others said there would not be equal opportunities for advancements in their company.

The Auckland office of the 'Jaycees' ended its 1957 report (written in early 1958) that it would be offering a similar co-operative service with Maori Affairs in 1958 but was still awaiting a response from that government department that it wished to continue the placement scheme. In 1958 the welfare officer, John Rangihau, could comment, 'I have been refused accommodation in hotels from Auckland to Invercargill, simply because I am a Maori'.

With supreme irony, Sinclair remarked that, 'the two peoples have succeeded in finding a way of living in harmony. They live apart.' Perhaps Sinclair's broad comments unhistorically smudged the specific reality of the 1950s. What was broadly true of the period prior - that is pre-World War II - to the processes of Maori urbanisation and rapid incorporation as labour into the industrial manufacturing and services sector was not necessarily valid for the period during and after those processes.

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581 Ibid.
583 Sinclair, 1959, p. 289.
Thus, these general observations by Oliver and Sinclair need closer and more finely grained interrogation. There is abundant documentary evidence from a wide range of primary archival materials of a number of government departments about the state of New Zealand’s race relations in the 1950s and early 1960s. Many of these would have been reviewed by the Department of Maori Affairs who conducted the survey for the House of Representatives’ proposed ratification of the I.L. Convention No. 107 on the Protection and Integration of Indigenous People.584 The evidence demonstrates that the process of ‘integration’ was marred by many minor incidents of racial discrimination in the context of more widespread, pervasive but subtle social disjuncture; that for example, the programme of ‘pepper-potting’ of Maori housing in Pakeha neighbourhoods, arguably a laudable intention, faced at least two obstacles: opposition from Maori who often preferred to reside near their own kind, their own extended whanau, in identifiable suburban Maori communities where possible, and many acts of discrimination against Maori from Pakeha in new suburban developments.

Generalisations about Maori housing are notoriously fraught with stereotyping and oversimplification. It is imperative that latter-day perspectives do not cloud or tinge the realities of the historic context. Provision by the government through the agencies of the State Housing Advances Corporation and the Department of Maori Affairs for Maori housing did not begin until the late 1940s. This was because, prior to then, Maori were excluded from mainstream state housing, on the grounds that their presence would allegedly ‘lower the tone’ of state housing communities and because few could afford the rent. Instead, state assistance for Maori housing took the form of loans. For example, in the 1930s, monies allocated for Maori rural land development were also used to replace dilapidated housing. While smaller and simpler than state-sponsored Pakeha housing, these homes were still a vast improvement on what had existed before. Increasing Maori migration to cities after the Second World War eventually convinced the government to admit Maori into mainstream state housing in 1948 through a scheme administered by State Advances and the Department of Maori Affairs.585

At first Maori families were pepper-potted into Pakeha neighbourhoods to encourage their assimilation into Pakeha society. In 1948 one newspaper reported the matter, ‘authorities consider communal settlements should be avoided in order to encourage housekeeping pride,

promote social assimilation and avoid any suggestion of differentiation.' However, as more Maori were accommodated in state housing – partly due to their lower than average income levels – areas of concentration began to develop, such as in Porirua and South Auckland. Although this created 'ghettos' of Maori deprivation, it also facilitated the forging of a new Maori urban culture and identity.\textsuperscript{586}

The wider context of the relationship between the locations of State housing for Maori and concentrated sites of industry providing employment opportunities is again, the subject of endless debate. Stated simply, the cause/effect relation of the two phenomena is complex. In many cases, large scale State housing developments were initiated in the greenfields zones on the fringe of existing urban areas, for example, Porirua (north of Wellington), Glen Innes (east of Auckland) and Otara and Mangere (south-east and south, respectively, of Auckland). In many cases these State housing developments were geographically close to and/or within reasonable commuting distance of existing employers, such as the meat freezing works (for example, Gear Meat at Petone, near Wellington, AFFCO at Otahuhu, south Auckland). There was obviously a cumulative effect with new industries locating close to labour supply. For example, manufacturing industry was developed (Mt. Wellington/Glen Innes/Penrose) in close proximity to these State housing areas (Glen Innes, Otara, Mangere) because they were sources of low waged labour. It has been argued that this further protracted Maori concentration in factory employment.\textsuperscript{587}

In setting up the terms of inquiry for the I.L. Convention No. 7 survey, Acting Secretary of Maori Affairs, J.K. Hunn specifically called for 'quoted verdicts of departments', 'instances ... of discrimination against Maoris', 'cases of discrimination against Pakehas', and 'all fields in which race relations have improved ... [or] deteriorated ... with known examples'. Hunn was of the presumption 'that discrimination exists', but its scope could 'only be answered by reference to certain standards, such as ... race relations overseas [and] the extent of good relations in New Zealand'.\textsuperscript{588} The general findings of the survey were:

that government departments always made distinctions on the grounds of ‘qualifications’ not on ‘race’, but there was some evidence of ‘personal prejudice’ that did not ‘observe faithfully the spirit of official policy’

\textsuperscript{586} NZH, 4 May 1948, in MA 1, Box 615, 30/5/5, Part 2, State Rental houses at Auckland 1948-50, ANZ, Wellington; ‘How family benefits are used to finance Maori housing’, Te Ao Hou, No. 14, December 1959, p. 14; Metge, 1951; Walker, 1970.


\textsuperscript{588} Memorandum to all officers from J.K. Hunn, Secretary of Maori Affairs, 27 April 1961. MA 1/654, 36/1/21. Part 3. ANZ, Wellington.
that in the domain of ‘discrimination against Maoris’, there were frequent instances in accommodation, housing, *employment*, hospitality, and occasional instances in schooling; in addition to these comments on overt discrimination against Maori, government departments reported ‘a great deal of prejudice against Maoris in that they are frequently regarded as inferior to Pakehas’; as well there was evidence that while both ‘economic capacity and social class characteristics are sometimes a basis for discrimination ... race is another and additional factor which exaggerates the effects of the other distinguishing marks’; ‘[w]ell-educated and well-to-do Maoris experience discrimination sometimes while lower class Maoris are discriminated against much more often than would be members of the same class’

that in the domain of ‘discrimination against Pakehas’ there was a short comment that ‘Maoris too discriminate against Pakehas’, which is premised on a ‘stereotyped image of the Pakeha, not a very flattering one’; that ‘not all Maoris were in favour of inter-marriage or integration’ that in the area of ‘improvements/deterioration in race relations’, the ‘observed change in the separate spheres of race relations is for the better’; that the specific cause of this improvement could be attributed almost solely to the ‘“All Black” controversy of 1960’; but there were ‘causes for anxiety’, inasmuch as ‘areas of potential stress are growing rapidly through the increase in, and necessary re-distribution of, the Maori population; because we have a vigorously expanding economy, *making room for thousands of poorly educated and inexperienced country Maoris in the towns and in industry, we have not yet experienced the competition for jobs and other forms of frustration that could lead to a flare-up of racial discord*’. In conclusion, the report said ‘[a] serious economic recession would put race relations to a severe test’. These were tough comments indeed; however in the boom times of full employment of the 1960s, they were largely brushed aside.

The National Government, however, did not proceed with the proposal to ratify the I.L. Convention No. 107. According to Hunn ‘prohibition by law of discrimination against the Maori in such matters as accommodation or employment would leave room both here and overseas for an exaggerated impression of the degree to which discrimination operated, would exacerbate existing feelings, and would be virtually unenforceable in practice.’ Hanan, the Minister of Maori Affairs, had accepted that advice.

Notwithstanding that political decision not to ratify, the record of the research undertaken by the Department of Maori Affairs remains, and this record has abundant documentary evidence of racial prejudice and discrimination especially in the area of employment, one of the many domains on which the *Hunn Report* would focus in 1960. This record also shows that there was a number of other work problems, often to do with attendance, absenteeism, job skills, trade training, site safety and other industrial concerns as well as employer concerns about the social behaviour of young Maori employees beyond the work-place, out of work hours.

The year 1960 marked a change in the nature of the Maori/Pakeha ‘race’ debate, albeit a
change that was barely perceptible at first. It was a significant year in New Zealand’s history
for at least three reasons: the one term Nash Labour Government (1957-60) was replaced by
the Holyoake National Government which was to be in power until 1972; J.K. Hunn, Deputy
Chairman of the Public Service Commission and Acting Secretary for Maori Affairs, reported
to the Government on the work of the Department of Maori Affairs; and the process of Maori
urbanisation and associated incorporation into the urban workforce which had begun during
World War II had reached a critical level. The Hunn Report - a report that was politically
conservative, socially prescient and finally, racially controversial - recommended a raft of
initiatives. While it might be argued that only two of these, namely, the Maori Education
Foundation and the Maori Council, were put in place during the first term (1960-63) of the
second National Government, this ignores the less nationally high-profile processes that were
introduced and/or modified: matters such as Maori accommodation, hostelling, housing, social
and economic welfare and schooling were being monitored and invigilated by a greatly
increased number of Maori welfare officers.591 The Report itself, its recommendations and the
closely linked policy of ‘re-location’ will be examined in detail further below.

In 1968, the Report of the Department of Maori and Island Affairs to Parliament commenting
on Maori/Pakeha comparative statistics, waxed rather literary, and began its observations on
Maori ‘progress’ by citing Lewis Carroll:

> Here, you see, it takes all the running you can do to keep in the same place. If you want to
go somewhere else you must run at least twice as fast as that.592

Taking its cue from Carroll, the Report continued in a similar vein, noting that as Maori were
suffering from ‘the loneliness of the long-distance runner’, endeavours had been intensified to
provide special measures for them.593 Little had changed since the Hunn Report was first
delivered; Maori had continued to lag behind other New Zealanders and special measures
were thus required to assist them to reach a point where these measures were no longer
necessary, that is, when the ‘Maori community attain[ed] its position fully abreast of the
Pakeha’, whatever the real implications of this statement might have been for Maori.594 With

591 Interviews with erstwhile welfare officers, Anituatua Delamere, 20 January 2000, I.H. Kawharu, 10 January
2003.
593 *AJHR* 1968, G-9, p. 7.
594 Ibid., p. 6.
the Holyoake National Government still in power, the 1960s had not seen significant change of any kind for Maori.

The official assimilationist policy of ‘pepper-potting’ - as Walter Nash put it, in reference to ‘the policy in Maori housing ... to disperse Maori among Europeans’ - fell down in the face of the large numbers of Maori flooding to the cities in search of work and other opportunities unavailable in rural areas. Maori came to be concentrated in outlying suburbs of the two major metropoles - Porirua near Wellington, Otara and Mangere on the southern fringes of Auckland - and with this concentration came stark evidence of the deprivation that Maori were suffering. If the Hunn Report in 1960 had adduced this relative deprivation to the wider general public as evidence for the need to assist Maori, the public had been able to turn a ‘blind eye’ to the ‘Maori problem’; it was something discussed by politicians and a few inaudible Maori voices. As long as Maori had remained concentrated in rural areas, their marginalisation could be ignored. The process of urbanisation, then, was also a process of illumination for the Pakeha majority, and the social divisions then revealed were necessarily unsettling to all who saw in them some deeper significance.

The changing nature of race relations in the 1960s provides a background against which the implementation of the government’s labour and employment policies can be presented. Significantly and certainly because it represented the apex of the mono-cultural unilateral ideology of Pakeha New Zealand the Hunn Report demands critical attention. The Report gave (and its ghost still gives) deep insights into the mind-set of Pakeha officialdom (which in turn reflected the wider opinions of an often taciturn Pakeha populace) on the issues of race relations and the place of Maori in New Zealand’s socio-economic web. It has proved to be a mine (and a minefield) for latter-day analysts.

6.05. The Hunn Report: its origins and production
The socio-economic situation of Maori by the close of the 1950s decade was sufficiently serious to warrant two groups to focus on these issues. The national Maori magazine, Te Ao Hou which was the ‘official’ magazine of the Department of Maori Affairs devoted its June

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595 As one newspaper reported the matter, ‘authorities consider communal settlements should be avoided in order to encourage housekeeping pride, promote social assimilation and avoid any suggestion of differentiation’. NZH, 4 May 1948, in MA 1, Box 615, 30/5/5, Part 2, State Rental houses at Auckland 1948-50. ANZ, Wellington.
596 Hon. W. Nash, Minister of Maori Affairs, 5 August 1958, in MA 1, 44/33/2, Box 697, Part 3, ANZ, Wellington.
597 The policy also ran into a further obstacle - the racist attitude of some Pakeha home owners who feared that the presence of Maori in their midst would diminish the value of their homes. See for example, MA 1 Box 696, 44/33/1 Part 1 - Whangarei Housing - Requisition of Land - 1954-61, ANZ, Wellington.
1959 issue to ‘The Maori in Auckland’. A few months later, the Council of Adult Education associated with the Auckland District Council held a Young Maori Leaders’ conference/hui in Auckland from 31 August to 4 September 1959. There is little doubt that both the magazine and the hui regarded the situation of urban Maori with considerable gravitas.

Te Ao Hou had been launched as the official magazine of the Department of Maori Affairs with the Winter Issue of 1952; publication ceased in 1976. It was designed as part of the New Zealand government’s official policy to encourage the ‘progressive adjustment’ of the Maori ‘to our modern world’. According to its first editorial, Te Ao Hou aimed ‘to provide interesting and informative reading for Maori homes ... like a marae on paper, where all questions of interest to the Maori can be discussed’. It became a primary site for a wide range of Maori opinion until its demise. In its early years the magazine, which had a tiny minority of exclusively Maori texts, a slightly larger number of dual texts in both Maori and English, but with most of the articles in English, quickly became popular. One of the magazine’s official purposes was the social assimilation, described as the ‘social progress’ of Maori people. The potential implications of ‘a marae on paper’ as a central metaphor for Maori writing, however, offered a space for resistance to the government’s dominant discourse. It was a space that the first editor (1952 - 1960 and 1961 - 62), Erik Schwimmer, a Pakeha anthropologist and ardent intergrationalist, was to quietly promote and privilege.

The specific issue of Te Ao Hou in which the greater part of the 82 pages was devoted to Auckland issues, included an editorial that - cutting through its heady rhetoric - focussed on two top priorities for Maori in Auckland:

Adjustment to the city depends on two important material factors: employment and housing. Fortunately there has been little difficulty in the past for Maoris to find jobs in Auckland and quite a number are in responsible and worthwhile positions. Our present effort should be to increase the proportion who take up skilled jobs, as these provide the security and stability the Maori migrant needs most of all.

Housing is a constant problem, with some eight hundred new migrants arriving every year. Some wisely stay in a country job until they have financed a home in Auckland, but too many have to accept expensive and inferior housing when they arrive. While the government is making a considerable contribution, it is unable to solve the whole problem single-handed.

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598 Te Ao Hou, No. 29, June 1959.
599 ‘Maori Young Leaders Conference, 31 August - 4 September 1959’, Boxes 10-11, Harry Delamere Barter Dansey Papers, MS 873, AWMML;
600 Form letter from the Editor to potential advertisers in Te Ao Hou, 3 October 1952, cited in Chadwick Allen, ‘Blood as narrative/narrative as blood’, 1997, p. 86.
The opening feature article was a brief ‘historical survey’ over five pages by a young historian of Maori heritage, M.P.K. Sorrenson, with sections entitled ‘Sold for a Mess of Pottage’, ‘Learning the Arts of Capitalism’, and a concluding paragraph that alluded to the necessity for assimilation and adaptation:

It was not until the war years that Maoris began to return to Auckland in significant numbers. Like their predecessors, 100 years earlier, they came in search of employment, European skills and knowledge. Like their predecessors too they have their problems of adjustment to what is in some respects an alien way of life.603

Another article was a well-placed feature on ‘[t]he Problems of Youth’, by a district probation officer.604

Maharaia Winiata605 presented a very full and comprehensive account of ‘Leadership in the Auckland Maori Community’. At the time of writing ‘there were roughly 12,000 Maori people of diverse origins from the major tribal groups in the country in the city of Auckland, among a total population of over 400,000.’

The Maori people are engaged in clothing factories, on the wharves, in the freezing works, in the transport services, the city municipal works and the building trades. They are found in the teaching services and in the Government departments, particularly the Department of Maori Affairs.

They live in the slum areas of Airedale Street, Freeman’s Bay, Hobson Street, etc., as well as in the newer housing areas of Orakei, Onehunga, Owairaka and Mangere. Many Maori people own their houses but the majority utilise the housing programme of the State.

The largest Maori derived denomination in the city is Ratana. Like the Latter Day Saints, the Ratana tend to pervade their influence throughout the community in the form of the social and recreational clubs, though the Roman Catholics and to a lesser extent the Church of England, seem to be doing the same thing.

Leadership in the Auckland Maori community according to Winiata was ‘comprised of a wide range of classes’:

[The educated person is very much in evidence, so are the bureaucratic leader, the professional man, the woman leader, the administrator and the religious leader. It is to be expected that they would feature in an urban community close to European institutions. But then the kaumatua, the kuia and the rangatahi leader are here too. The pattern of leadership is practically the same as that found in the village community, the main difference is in the shift of priority. The educated person has moved to the fore in the urban community, while the kaumatua and kuia are called upon on specific occasions. The bases of authority are not as clear cut as those found in the more homogeneous grouping of the village kinship community. Kinship affiliations in the city are important in developing leadership within particular tribes or subtribes.]

Winiata’s advocacy of assimilation in dealing with the European world while retaining all that was Maori in the Maori world (a phrase resonant with a long tradition to Sir James Carroll and beyond) was evident in these comments:

Ethnic association and the embodiment of Maori ideals however are helping to cut across the restricting boundaries of kinship, though this, as yet is difficult still in Auckland. Maori skills gain recognition in certain situations when Maori deals with Maori. The scarcity of those men and women with Maori ceremonial skills in the city places particular prestige on those who possess such skills. Of importance in this regard is the way the kaumatua status is frequently assumed by younger men and educated persons because of some facility in the required skills. Education and the possession of European skills are the highest qualifications for leadership in Auckland. This is necessary because of the close association of Maori and European. While the educated leader is given prestige by virtue of his education, he maintains his position through concretely expressed interests in the welfare of the Maori community.

An optimistic account of working opportunities in Auckland was given by the district welfare officer:

During the past twenty years ...the Maori population of metropolitan Auckland has jumped from between one thousand and two thousand in 1939 to the astonishing figure of twelve thousand today, just twenty years later. ... Therefore, Auckland has an ever increasing Maori labour force, and so far, because of the country's internal stability and economic progress, this force has largely been absorbed.

This optimism was however tempered with caution: ‘[a] trade recession or slump could occur from a variety of reasons, quite out of the control of our Government, and, of course, the unskilled labour force would be the first to suffer’. Another familiar injunction focussed on the glitter of instant gratification versus setting out on a long career at the bottom of the skilled ladder:

Their choice was either the lower wage, the disciplined effort, the hours of study necessary for an apprenticeship, or on the other hand a free and easy plunge on to the labour market to grab any job that came their way. The same is true for those who entered the professions and are now teachers, doctors, dentists, accountants, administrators, business executives and public servants.

He exhorted young Maori to exercise discipline and aim high in their goals; to forgo the temptations of quick rewards in an over-full labour market:

Auckland offers seasonal employment to thousands of semi-skilled and unskilled workers in freezing works, wool stores, tanneries and chemical plants. Employment is possible on earth moving contracts, in market gardens, on building jobs or in other outdoor enterprises for which the summer months are best suited. The peak months of full employment are from November to February and mid-March. It is easy to see what happens in the winter. For every job offering there are then the many seasonal workers whose summer contracts are over. In 1958, the welfare officers in the Maori Affairs Department in Auckland found jobs for well over 200 people who sought our assistance, and many, many times they had a most difficult task. On one occasion an officer took three young Maoris to a factory in answer to an advertisement and found that 117 others had been there before him. Another time 40 men had applied for a labourer's job before he got there at nine o'clock in the morning. These cases are quoted to illustrate the.

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difficulty of finding employment during the off season, and must surely give us cause for serious thought.  

Finally in this section representing some of the features in the *Te Ao Hou* magazine devoted to Auckland Maori issues, Elsdon Craig gave a rosy portrait of the housing situation:

> It is significant that fewer objections to the presence of Maoris in the city have been heard in recent years. There has been a greater willingness on the part of the community to receive the Maori in its midst. Employers acknowledge that many Maoris have proved that they are capable of undertaking types of work for which they were thought to be unsuited 12 years ago. At the same time many Maoris have shown that they are just as competent as the Pakeha in home management, indicating to the earlier critics that generalisations about Maori behaviour are unjustified, if not dangerous.

> The way the Maori has fitted into the Auckland community has exploded to some extent the argument that the Maori is a communal being. Rather has it emphasised that he is a highly adaptable person.

The Young Maori Leaders conference of late August 1959 in Auckland - the second of its kind, some 20 years after the first that had been called by Ngata in 1939 - voiced criticism of the ‘piecemeal efforts’ by ‘various Government departments’ in ‘their own particular areas, education or land or housing or - to some extent - crime prevention, but when it came to a more general plan, there was never very much progress’. It was noted that in the mainstream Pakeha media ‘there were battles of words in various newspapers as to whether Maori should be ‘assimilated’ or ‘integrated’, whether there should be a ‘separate culture’ or ‘symbiosis’. Whatever the merits of these controversies, they certainly led to no accepted practical programme’. These words of lamentation from key figures in Maoridom about a lack of coordinated policy for Maori were not lost on Nash. As shall be shown in detail further below, Hunn was appointed on 18 January 1960, to review the ‘assets’ of the Department of Maori Affairs and propose ways of improving its efficacy for Maori.

The hui/conference focussed much of its round-table sessions on land matters. A latter-day analysis of the archival papers indicates that land issues took priority and other matters, classified as ‘occupations other than farming’ received considerable attention. Matters detailed in the conference’s round table minutes included, significantly, the priority of education, which the conference expressed as ‘the maximization of young people’s skills’ to

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608 Grandson of anthropologist/ethnologist Elsdon Best.


compete in an ‘environment which emphasises competition, independence and self-sufficiency’. Other areas where the round tables expressed strong opinions was ‘the weakness of the Maori worker in frequent absenteeism, especially the day following pay day’; in education, Maori are generally handicapped by ‘differences in cultural and social background’; in the field of the more personal social relationships between Maori and Pakeha certain unsatisfactory signs are still in evidence’; in the professions ‘teaching is probably the field in which most Maoris are employed while only a few have entered law, medicine, dentistry, accountancy and insurance’.

The Prime Minister and Minister of Maori Affairs, Walter Nash had opened the conference in August 1959. It must have been increasingly clear to government that some co-ordinated initiatives in respect of Maori issues were necessary. According to Ngatata Love, the Maori Policy Committee of the one-vote-majority third Labour Government (1957 - 1960) was able to get the Prime Minister to agree in 1957 to ‘certain matters connected with the present administration of Maori Affairs and the policy in this connection to be pursed by the Government in the future’. A further point in this ‘Maori Affairs Policy’ paper had requested that an ‘independent report on Maori welfare should be provided, especially with regard to the present activities if the Maori Welfare and Maori Affairs Department’. Love has argued that this successful Maori lobbying for an ‘independent report’ was the genesis of the Hunn Report.

Whatever the specific trigger might have been, Jack Hunn was appointed Acting Secretary of Maori Affairs and Maori Trustee on 18 January 1960. Hunn’s appointment was intended to be short-term only, but he was to remain Acting Secretary for over three years. His brief was to review the work of the Department of Maori Affairs and propose ways of improving its efficacy for Maori. The review took some eight months to complete, and the report was submitted to Prime Minister Walter Nash on 24 August 1960. Nash had treated the report as an internal matter for the Department. It promptly disappeared; some speculated that the Prime Minister’s tendency towards procrastination was the cause. In a later interview, however, Nash himself claimed that he had kept the report secret for fear that the impending

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612 ‘Young Maori Leaders Conference, 1959’.
616 Butterworth and Young, 1990, p. 100.
general election would inevitably result in the National Opposition deriding the report’s recommendations, to the unnecessary detriment of Maori.\(^{617}\)

Regardless of the explanation, the election proved to be a resounding defeat for Labour, and the report became the province of the new National Government. The new Minister of Maori Affairs, Ralph Hanan, acted with a haste that contrasted markedly with Nash’s style; without consulting his Cabinet colleagues, Hanan ordered the report to be published immediately and widespread publicity given as to its proposals. It was released to the public on 17 January 1961.\(^{618}\) Thus, the \textit{Hunn Report} was produced at the instigation of Nash and completed shortly before the demise of the second Labour government in 1960. Hanan, Nash’s successor as Minister of Maori Affairs, was a fervent advocate for the integration philosophy and realpolitik recommendations contained in Hunn’s work. He had a reputation as a liberal reformer with the energy, zeal and ability to achieve results.

6.06. The \textit{Hunn Report} as political intervention in Maori socio-economic issues

Arguably, the \textit{Hunn Report} was the most definitive statement of a succession of governments’ views regarding Maori. This unique document advocated special measures for Maori to assist them to ‘integrate’ into the mainstream of New Zealand. Broad in its scope, the \textit{Hunn Report} traversed a host of issues relating to Maori, issues of health, education, employment, housing and - significantly - land utilisation. It collated for the first time a comprehensive range of statistics concerning Maori, statistics that it was claimed, showed the unequal burden being borne by Maori.\(^{619}\) It was not so much that the act of publication of these statistics in 1961 was unprecedented, but that the Government had the imperative of an explicit agenda:

\begin{quote}
that an informed public opinion is necessary to ensure that the reasons behind any subsequent policy measures are understood, regardless of whether the measures meet with popular approval, though, of course, I hope they will meet with such approval particularly from the Maori people.\(^{620}\)
\end{quote}

In other words, Maori, as an identifiable ethnic group, were disproportionately burdened and that this, in turn, could generate racial friction constituted one argument for there being particular policies focussed on them, and the wider Pakeha public had to understand that this was so.

\(^{617}\) Ibid., p. 100.
\(^{618}\) Foreword by Minister of Maori Affairs, J.R. Hanan, to \textit{Hunn Report}, 1961, p. 3.
\(^{620}\) Foreword by Minister of Maori Affairs, J.R. Hanan, to \textit{Hunn Report}, 1961, p. 3.
In his Foreword to the report, Minister Hanan presaged the significance it would later come to have:

Many of the recommendations in the Hunn report are of a far-reaching nature and all have a fundamental bearing on the well-being of the Maori people, the well-being of New Zealanders as whole, and on race relations in New Zealand. This makes it all the more imperative that the public should know the facts of the Maori situation. Putting aside the typical ministerial bluster, the sub-text implicitly contained, probably for the first time, a rhetorical trope that would later be increasingly used as a rationalisation to defend any specific focus by Government on Maori: improving the well-being of Maori would improve the well-being of New Zealand.

The directions given to Hunn were vague: he was to ‘arrive at an “accounting” of Maori assets and find a way of using them for the good of the Maori people as a whole’. This rather vague instruction proved to be finally more useful than not. Hunn took it as meaning he could set the parameters of the inquiry himself, and so he took a very broad approach which contributed to the significance and impact of the report. Hunn certainly did not baulk at asking searching questions: ‘What precisely is New Zealand’s policy for the future of the Maori race?’ he mused. But then Hunn proceeded to hedge his own question with the response that ‘the answer is elusive because nowhere is it defined’. Hunn considered this only sensible:

Official policy can accelerate or retard but not thwart or divert the process of self-determination. Evolution governs policy, not vice versa. This will be the lesson of South Africa’s attempt to force a policy of apartheid on an unwilling people.

Policy could not stand in the way of the juggernaut of evolution and in Hunn’s view evolution was ‘clearly integrating Maori and Pakeha’. On the basis of its inevitability, integration was deemed to be the official policy. As to what Maori thought of this official policy and the fact that the policy for the ‘future of the Maori race’ was to be determined by ‘New Zealand’, Hunn made no comment.

6.07. J.K. Hunn’s Policy Intentions

Five days prior to the official release of the Hunn Report on 17 January 1961, Hunn sent a memorandum to all departments of Government which made some very robust and thorough-going proposals in respect of ‘relocation’ of Maori to places of employment. It was an

621 Ibid, p. 3.
622 Ibid., p. 13.
625 Ibid., p. 15.
extraordinary document. An abridged and re-numbered version of the text is reproduced below to give readers a feel for the stunning impact Hunn’s ideas must have had:

**RE-LOCATION.**
1. Research has revealed that many Maoris are living where employment opportunities, both present and future, are at a minimum. To divert the labour to places where work is offering, the Department is embarking on a programme of planned re-location from rural to urban areas.

2. The programme falls into two broad divisions:
   (a) Relocation of individuals
   (b) Relocation of families

**RELOCATION OF INDIVIDUALS.**
3. Specially selected individual Maoris, mainly single, will be moved from places of known unemployment to urban areas where work is available. Maori Affairs Department will select the workers (who will include apprentices), Labour Department will locate the jobs and arrange placement. Accommodation will be provided at Government hostels or by employers.

**RELOCATION OF FAMILIES.**
4. Specially selected families will be moved from places of known unemployment to urban areas where work is available. Housing will be provided by the Maori Affairs Department, jobs will be obtained through the Labour Department for working members of the family, community interests and helpful associations at the new location will be encouraged by Welfare Officers.

**STEPS ALREADY TAKEN.**
5. These are:
   (a) A Joint Departmental Committee on Maori Employment has been set up.
   (b) The Maori Employment Special Scheme has been introduced.
   (c) Limited provision has been made for housing at Auckland, Wellington, Hamilton and Rotorua.

6. **Joint Departmental Committee on Maori Employment.** This has been set up in Wellington to co-ordinate policy and procedures, to ensure that full use is made of available Government facilities.

7. **Maori Employment Special Scheme.** This is a pilot project in respect of individual Maoris. In the Whangarei, Gisborne and Rotorua districts, adult and junior workers are being recruited for specific jobs in Auckland, Wellington, Christchurch and Dunedin.627

At this early stage of the reconstruction of the evidential materials relating to the policy proposal of ‘relocation’, and the extent to which it was put into effect remains shadowy. There is some documentary evidence that some re-location did occur, but any comment on its scope and extent would be premature and speculative. Suffice it is to say at this early stage that one or two latter-day commentators have surmised that re-location as an official policy practice was limited and minimal. These commentators have further explained that natural migration forces in response to economic ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors, acting especially on single young

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adult Maori, accounted for much of the rural/urban migration of the 1960s. In short, a massive historical research exercise using every scrap of personal and statistical information would be necessary to reconstruct the extent of government relocation of Maori - involuntary, guided or otherwise, versus ‘voluntary’ migration in response to economic forces.

6.08. The Hunn Report: the Text: focussing on Race, Class, Culture, Ethnicity Issues

Arguably, the sub-text of the Hunn Report was to lay down a set of related policy proposals that, if implemented, would provide a government-directed programme for the comprehensive consolidation of issues arising from the involuntary economic and social outcomes of the rapid Maori urbanisation process and their incorporation into the industrial workforce. It is possible that Hunn was moved by the widely publicised dire warnings of Swedish sociologist Gunnar Myrdal of U.S. racial strife published in An American Dilemma (1944). Drawing on the Myrdal paradigm of a ‘beneficial’ and a ‘vicious cycle’ in socialisation processes of minority African-American ethnic communities, Hunn borrowed the idea of a ‘magic circle’ linking ‘education, employment, housing, health, social standing and education’ as his prescription for remedial action.628 The outcome of implementing these recommended policy proposals, the Report implied, would be a broadly similar standard of living and socio-economic for Maori and Pakeha. Essentially, this meant turning Maori into brown-skinned Pakeha. Hunn’s ideas were rigorous, tough and in the final analysis, he claimed, ultimately of benefit to all New Zealanders.

In the Report’s summary - located at the opening of the Report - some four pages were devoted to land issues and three and a half pages for the summary of the rest of the Report findings. This is hardly surprising as land was perceived by Pakeha as the most visible asset. The Report itself attracted a large amount of political and media attention. A short analysis of the Report can be located in a research essay by Chris Molloy.629

An analysis of the full report utilising a methodology from the perspective of de-constructing identities around the three axes or intersections of race, class, and culture reveals that Hunn’s perception of ‘Maori’ was, in a very vague way, not defined by a class paradigm but by a ‘race’ categorisation. This reading of Hunn is constructed by employing historic understandings of the concepts of ‘race’, ‘class’ and ‘culture’, and hopefully avoiding any

presentist constructs. Briefly, this means that the use of the term ‘race’ was appropriate then because, although discredited now as a concept, it was used widely at the time of the *Hunn Report* and had a widely accepted biological meaning.\(^{630}\) Its latter-day substitute ‘ethnicity’ as a term, did not gain currency until the 1970s.\(^{631}\) The term ‘class’, used to mean a socio-economic class, and which has had a long usage historically, would have been current in 1960. The term ‘culture’ was used in a way that Hunn would have understood: ‘a total way of life’, the ‘social legacy the individual acquires from his group’ and ‘a way of thinking, feeling and believing’.\(^{632}\)

The *Hunn Report* stated unequivocally that Maori, as a distinct and particular group within New Zealand, were bearing an inequitable socio-economic burden. The text of the Report was couched in ethnic-relations language. Running through the sub-text was an implicit view that the racial group known as ‘Maori’ was, in some undefined way, different in kind from class groupings. Underlying the *Report* was an implicit assumption regarding the nature of the Maori group at issue: the problems facing Maori could be analysed, at least in part, in terms of race, rather than in terms of social class. For the purposes of social policy, therefore, Maori constituted a distinct group, discrete from ‘the unemployed’, for example, or ‘juvenile delinquents’. There were instead ‘Maori unemployed’\(^{633}\) and ‘Maori juvenile delinquents’,\(^{634}\) a need for a ‘Maori Health Committee liaising between the Departments of Health and Maori Affairs’,\(^{635}\) and a call for greater liaison between specific government departments to address ‘Maori problems’; thus a comprehensive social policy was required to address these particular cases. This was positive discrimination writ large. It argued that government actions were required which focussed exclusively on Maori as a means of rectifying the problems Maori faced. Interestingly, the *Report* was of the opinion that such actions were required for the benefit, not only of the Maori people themselves, but for all of New Zealand by creating a harmonious and tolerant social environment.

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\(^{630}\)A great division of mankind, characterized as a group by the sharing of a certain combination of features, which have been derived from their common descent, and constitute a vague physical background, usually more or less obscured by individual variations, and realized best in a composite picture." Earnest Albert Hooton, *Up from the Ape*, New York: Macmillan, 1949, p. 58.

\(^{631}\) Elliott D. Green, ‘The (Mis)use of Ethnicity in Current Political Economy Literature: Conceptual and Data Issues’, pp. 2 and 3, states inter alia: ‘[S]cholars have neglected to define ethnicity, one of the most notoriously slippery concepts in the social sciences, which has led them into various quagmires. ... First appearing in the *Oxford English Dictionary* in 1972, it has become a source of much debate in such fields as anthropology, history, international relations, political science and sociology, among others’.


\(^{634}\) *Hunn Report*, 1961, p. 32.

6.09. **The Hunn Report: Reactions and Responses**

The initial and immediate responses from the wider public and the mainstream media to the report were favourable. Later and more considered responses from academics, Maori groups and critics ranged from mildly unfavourable to sharply critical and strongly oppositional. The ‘closing the gaps’ aspect of the Hunn Report no doubt drew support from many Maori leaders but its integration philosophy certainly was not warmly embraced by all of them.

One of the first public responses to the *Hunn Report* came from prominent Maori journalist, Harry Dansey. In an address on 14 March 1961 to the New Plymouth Rotary Club entitled ‘Wanted, A Big Brother’, Dansey cited Hunn’s statistical evidence that ‘those engaged in secondary industry and in the process worker, craftsman category have risen from 36.86 per cent to 41.9 per cent’ and ‘the Maori aptitude for operating mechanical equipment has increased their employment in transport from 1.93 pr cent to 9.34 per cent.” On this evidence, Dansey was of the opinion that ‘New Plymouth should have 83 more Maori apprentices’; on this basis, he exhorted the assembled Rotarians to ‘find and encourage and help and place say another 20? or 30? or even 40?’ He concluded his address with a plea to the Rotarians ‘as representative of a younger section ... of our great family here in Aotearoa ... I would say to you, as an older ... part of the same family: “Brothers, give us a hand”.’

Latter-day analyses from the postcolonial school have claimed the *Hunn Report* to be an archetypal product of a dominant colonial culture. Such critiques carried implications of a somewhat sinister cast: for references to ‘evolution’ and ‘integration’, when it was cultures that were being discussed, led quickly in the dubious direction of social Darwinism and all its attendant fallacies.

Deploying some of the language of this school, the *Hunn Report* marked the zenith of a style of cultural politics in New Zealand that concentrated around the binary of Maori (the

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638 H.D.B. Dansey, ‘Wanted, A Big Brother’, [1961], MS 1749, Box 1, Further Papers, Harry Delamere Barter Dansey Papers, AWMM.


640 Pearson, 1974, pp. 100-27.

641 Refer for example to *Hunn Report*, 1961, p. 15, where the term ‘integration’ occurs 6 times, and p.16, once.
colonised) and Pakeha (the coloniser), over-simplified and essentialised. The dichotomous categories of ‘us/them’, ‘either/or’, the employment of this bifurcated structure offered little choice (even perhaps, rather gloomily, no choice) to Maori. The Hunn Report, while it had an illusory liberal ethos (engagingly appearing to offer choices for Maori of multiple aspirations), ignored the ‘diverse realities’ of Maori/Pakeha relations. Little or no acknowledgement was paid in the Report to considerations of gender, generation, class, geographical locale, and political orientation. In short, the Report was a re-articulation of the key projects of agency, subjectivity and the essentialising forces of colonialism.

The language articulated in the Hunn Report was robust. If the government agreed with the report, then it should not permit Maori the freedom to choose the direction or route or even the pace of their own future. The government did agree with the report. Europeans did not wish to coexist with a backward people. Maori must progress - all Maori must progress - according to the norms of the integration philosophy. The only choice left to Maori as individuals was to choose whether they wished to be fully assimilated and detribalised, or whether they desired to retain some vestiges of Maori culture. The monoculturalist assimilationist agenda that had typified New Zealand’s colonial past was in active operation in 1960/61.

Hunn worked with both Hanan and his efficient Secretary of Justice, Robson, to promote a fast-track path towards the elimination of the pieces of legislation found by Hunn’s research team to contain ‘differentiation between Maoris and Europeans’: 58 instances of ‘Maori privilege’; 35 instances of ‘Maori disability’; 69 instances of ‘Maori protection’; and 102 instances of ‘different procedure’. These laws and other policies set Maori apart from the general population and that setting apart should cease forthwith or as soon as was possible.

In theory, Hunn suggested, there were four possible alternative models of development:

- Assimilation: To become absorbed, blended, amalgamated, with complete loss of Maori culture.
- Integration: To combine (not fuse) the Maori and pakeha elements to form one nation wherein Maori culture remains distinct.
- Segregation: To enforce a theoretical concept of 'apartheid'. One school of thought in New Zealand advocates 'parallel development', which in essence is segregation under another name.


Symbiosis: To have two dissimilar peoples living together but as separate entities with the smaller deriving sustenance from the larger (seemingly an attempt to integrate and segregate at the same time). Adopting a neo-Darwinian evolutionary framework, Hunn, thought it was entirely appropriate that '[e]volution is clearly integrating Maori and pakeha.' It was 'the obvious trend.' In Hunn's view, although integration was then the 'official policy', assimilation was possibly 'the destiny of the two races in New Zealand.' It was clear to Hunn that the future for Maori was inevitably either integration or assimilation, and it was only a question of the pace of change that was at issue. That being the case, the object of policy ought, in Hunn's view, to be to assist those Maori 'complacently living a backward life in primitive conditions' to integrate with modern society (not, it should be noted, an ethnocentrically 'Pakeha' society, but simply the 'modern' way of life, according to Hunn), whilst leaving it up to 'the main body of Maoris, pretty much at home in either society' to decide whether or not they would remain integrated or become totally assimilated. In the use of such terms as 'modern', Hunn bluntly fudged the issue of Pakeha dominance.

The fundamental assumptions of the Hunn Report were thus: Maori constituted a particular and identifiable grouping within the broader New Zealand society (despite Hunn's having suggested that the defining of a person as 'Maori' was problematic and came down to arbitrary assignation of ethnic status), a grouping whose relative socio-economic position could be measured against that of New Zealanders generally; the proportionate statistical representation of Maori as compared to New Zealanders generally ought to be the same; for reasons left by Hunn unexplored, some members of this grouping had 'adopted the 1960 pattern of living', whilst others had 'not yet passed the 1860 mark'; those bringing up the rear required special assistance in order that they might be fully integrated in the modern world; thus, the full integration of the Maori and the Pakeha was necessary for the good of New Zealand as a whole.

Measures which amounted to positive discrimination were recommended by Hunn as the most effective means of achieving the desired results. Actions were required which focussed
exclusively on Maori if conditions were to be ameliorated. Crucial, however, was the motivation behind these actions: they were not required to ensure the continued survival of a distinct culture; they were required to assist that culture to become integrated and assimilated with the dominant culture. 652

The Hunn Report and its essential assumptions regarding the future of Maori were to dominate government policy for the next twelve years, that is, for the duration of the Holyoake National Government. In 1964, Hanan candidly commented that ‘the Government is endeavouring to integrate Maori families with the rest of the population’ ,653 while in 1968, Hanan mused again on the murky idea of the integration of Maori with Pakeha:

Looking more generally at Maori affairs one also notes a number of encouraging signs that our ideal of becoming one people within which particular groups can preserve their own cultural values is being furthered. 654

The only response to the Hunn Report on the record from the mainstream institutional churches came from the Maori Synod of the Presbyterian Church of New Zealand. The response was tactfully expressed but nonetheless had a powerful message:

We are people proud of our heritage, and attempts to destroy that, however disguised by expressions of good will, can only result in serious disharmony. 655

Similarly, the Synod commented on the importance of language and culture to Maori. This statement encapsulated the fundamental point of difference between the Hunn Report and the response: where the Hunn Report saw the inescapable integration and assimilation of Maori with Pakeha, the Maori Synod defended the right of Maori to remain distinctly Maori:

We would wish to make it clear, although speaking dispassionately, that one of the irritants, which give rise to tensions between Pakeha and Maori, is the general Pakeha attitude that Maori language and custom are of no importance. They are of great importance to us. 656

The Maori Synod was quite prepared to accept that the Hunn Report had been prepared with good intentions and in good faith and with a view to solving the problems facing Maori at that time; but its conclusions, however, the Synod believed, were antagonistic to Maori and the continued existence of Maori as a distinct people. The Maori Synod unsurprisingly concurred with the Hunn Report that Maori, as a distinct and particular group within New Zealand, were

652 Ibid., p. 16.
653 Minister of Maori Affairs, 4 May 1964, in MA 1, Box 696, 44/33/1, Part 2 - Provision of Housing Sites - Whangarei - 1964 - 1966. ANZ, Wellington.
654 Reports of the Department of Maori and Island Affairs and the Maori Trustee Office and the Board of Maori Affairs for the year ended 31 March 1968, AJHR, G-9, p. 6. AJHR, 1968, G-9, p. 7.
656 Ibid., p. 15.
bearing an inequitable socio-economic burden. The Synod also agreed with the implicit view of the *Hunn Report* that the ethnic group known as ‘Maori’ was, in some undefined way, different in kind from class groupings. The Synod allowed, too, that government actions were required which focussed exclusively on Maori as a means to rectifying the problems Maori faced. Also in line with the views of the *Hunn Report*, the Synod expressed the opinion that such actions were required for the benefit, not only of the Maori people themselves, but for all of New Zealand by creating a harmonious and tolerant social environment. But that was as far as the Synod was prepared to make some gesture of agreement with the *Report*; beyond that it was not willing to absolutely concur or offer support.

Thus it was that two positions, opposed and incapable of being reconciled, had been expressed by the end of the 1960s. The egalitarian notions of equality of outcomes and shared goals, and the belief in the equalising role of the state, required that the machinery of state be used to eliminate the differences. It became official policy that special opportunities and resources for Maori would have to be provided to address these ills.\(^{661}\) Government sought the integration and assimilation of Maori into the mainstream of New Zealand society; Maori themselves sought equity, and their continued existence as a distinct people. The conflicting positions were obvious, and the issues over which the battle was to engage had been articulated.

### 6.10. *Hunn Report* Outcomes

On employment, Hunn was of the belief that it provided Maori with not just a living but a modern way of life. Within this section of the *Hunn Report*, Hunn noted the decline of employment in rural areas, and the employment opportunities in urban areas, especially relating to skilled trades. He noted the occupational status of Maori compared to non-Maori, and the preponderance between 1936 and 1958 for Maori to be over-represented in unskilled and seasonal work than non-Maori. He stated that if all the idle Maori land was developed and settled, it would not provide more than four thousand farms at most, for a population of possibly half a million.\(^{662}\)

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\(^{661}\) See, for example, the need for special employment opportunities in *Hunn Report*, 1961, p. 28.

\(^{662}\) Ibid., p. 29.
On trade training, Hunn proposed the development of a policy promoting Maori skilled apprenticeships similar to that set up in Panmure in 1959, under the auspices of the Departments of Maori Affairs and Labour. Here he officially endorsed urbanisation, quoting the Labour Department’s view that Maori constituted a potential immigration source, and a recent Industrial Conference in Wellington, that drew attention to the availability of Maori for industrial expansion. Hunn therefore proposed planning for migration, and the placement and induction of Maori in employment. He addressed the problem of accommodation that migration involved, also proposing that Industries and Commerce advice would be valuable on the prospects of promoting industries in Maori areas.

Hunn proposed that with employment, inter-departmental committee meetings were needed to help solve the problem of Maori unemployment, and over-representation in unskilled areas. These did eventuate and Hunn was accorded much praise for this idea. But as Orange has stated, this concept had been put forward as early as 1936 by the Maori Policy Committee of the Labour Party and had been instigated under Labour during the years 1947 to 1949. Other criticism developed over the urbanisation policy and employment. Spoonley has argued that Government supported urbanisation to meet the growing demands of developing industrialisation. Colgan has illustrated this point further, stating that in 1965 the Labour Department praised the readiness of Maori to undertake unskilled, semi-skilled, manual and labouring work, believing that without this, emigration would have had to have been pursued to fill this void.

The other features of the Report on population, land settlement, education, health, land titles, legal differentiation and crime do not need any extensive analysis within the scope of this thesis. Of greater relevance to the focus of this thesis is the political decision to implement only two of the Report’s proposals. These were the setting up of a Maori Education Foundation (1961/2), and the New Zealand Maori Council (1962). They became for some years subsequent to the Report’s publication, the two most enduring features of the Hunn Report. Enabling legislation was passed in 1961, and in 1962 the Maori Welfare Act was passed, setting up both these organisations. The Maori Education Foundation campaigned for

663 Ibid., pp. 29-32.
664 Ibid., pp. 31-2.
666 Spoonley, 1993, p. 11.
funds through much of late 1961 and 1962 under the vanguard of Hoani Waititi.\textsuperscript{668} The nationwide campaign brought in £600,000 including a government grant of £125,000. It commenced operation in 1962 under the control of a Trust Board of eight, of whom four members must by law be Maori.\textsuperscript{669} But with the setting up of the Foundation, a warning was issued by Dr. Roger Duff, Director of the Canterbury Museum. He stated to the \textit{Evening Post} in August 1962, that if the Foundation’s policy was simply to provide more scholarships then it was only attacking the symptoms of Maori education, not the problem.\textsuperscript{670}

With the passing of the Maori Welfare Act of 1962, the Maori Social and Economic Advancement Act of 1945 was repealed. The new act created a four-tier system of Maori Committees, Executives, District Councils, and a New Zealand Maori Council. The Departmental Welfare Officers ceased to be part of the structure and the tribal nature of the 1945 legislation was removed. Instead, according to Butterworth, all four organisations were to consider and discuss matters of relevance to the social and economic advancement of the Maori race and other members of the community.\textsuperscript{671} In relation to the setting up of the New Zealand Maori Council, Hunn also believed that at the same time as being an appropriate vehicle of communication between Government and Maori, it could also be used to implement the proposals in the Hunn Report, thus avoiding any suggestions that these changes were being imposed on Maori by the Government.\textsuperscript{672}

The New Zealand Maori Council was perceived by many Maori as a conservative organisation, rurally based and dominated by men. It was initially comprised of seven district councils based on the Maori Land Court boundaries of Tai Tokerau, Waikato, Aotea, Tairawhiti, Ikaroa and Te Waipounamu. The government sent legislation to the organisation for comment. Because of the nature of the Maori Welfare Act of 1962 the members of the Council had a cumbersome job. They were the top tier of a four-tiered structure. To gain an opinion on Maori feeling towards certain issues they had to consult the committees, executives and district councils before decisions could be attained. And like the Tribal


\textsuperscript{669} Metge, 1976, p. 159.


\textsuperscript{671} Butterworth and Young, 1990, p. 103.

\textsuperscript{672} Hunn, in letter to Hanan, 17 April, 1962, MA 1, 35/2/1, Departmental Policy Discussions, Part 1, 1961-1962, ANZ, Wellington.
Executives, Committees and the Maori Women’s Welfare League, their funding was dependent largely on Government grants.673

Ranginui Walker has claimed that the New Zealand Maori Council took up a wide range of issues including prostitution, delinquency, rising Maori crime, and the appointment of Maori representatives to government bodies. But on issues of land the Council dug in, especially relating to its retention and development.674 The proposal to place funds from uneconomic interests of Maori land into the Maori Education Foundation was viewed by the Council as a policy of confiscation and it would not sanction the extension of leases from fifty to one hundred years on Maori land.675 But the Council was not averse to investigating itself what could be done to Maori land. In 1964 the Council set up a special committee to study the whole question of land legislation.676

Booth who had been the Chief Research Officer in the Maori Affairs Department and who was closely involved in the Hunn investigations was much later very critical of Hunn’s methodology. There appears to have been a falling-out sometime in 1962 between Hunn and Booth, who went on to become full-time secretary of the newly-instituted Maori Council in 1963.677 His opinions of Government policies were probably coloured by the nature of his sudden departure from the Department of Maori Affairs. For example, he believed that the Government’s following of some of the recommendations of the Hunn Report, particularly those that had a strong emphasis on the ideology of integration, set back Maori development many years.678 The reasons behind Booth’s sudden change of opinion on the merits of the Hunn Report remain unknown; perhaps he was influenced by his new environment at the Maori Council, but whatever the origin of this unexpected criticism, any interpretation would be speculative.

673 In 1968 the New Zealand Maori Council attempted to have its constitution changed under the 1962 legislation and become an autonomous organisation. This was opposed by the Government who refused to change the legislation fearing radical affiliation groups of the New Zealand Maori Council would gain control. Letter 14/8/1968, D.M. Forrell (Office Solicitor) to M. Herewini (Controller of Maori Welfare), MA 1, 35/2/1, Departmental Policy discussions, Part 2, 1962-1968, ANZ, Wellington.
675 Memo from J. Hunn to J. Hanan on workings of NZ Maori Council, 16 October 1962, MA 1, 35/2/1, Departmental Policy discussions, Part 1, 1961-2; memo from J. McEwan to J. Hanan, 13 July 1964, MA 1, 35/2/1, Departmental Policy discussions, Part 2, 1962-8, ANZ, Wellington.
676 Memo from J. McEwan to J. Hanan, 13 July 1964, ANZ, MA 1, 35/2/1, Departmental Policy discussions, Part 2, 1962-1968.
678 Interview with J. Booth by Molloy, cited in Molloy, 1993, pp. 60-4.
Less visible products of the *Hunn Report* need to be seen within historical context to gain a full understanding of Booth’s comments. To begin, Hunn’s analysis of population through the definition of blood was a faulty analysis. According to Colgan, Government agencies were dealing with Maori in far larger proportions than the numbers in the census figures, which defined Maori as a person of half blood or over, under the 1953 Maori Affairs Act. This acted to eliminate or assimilate Maori into mainstream society. Since 1981 self definition has been incorporated onto the statute books and census figures.

According to Butterworth, land and housing development improved after Hunn. Land development had contracted in the late 1950s and early 1960s, but improved between 1964 and 1969. While in relation to housing, after an initial burst in the early 1960s, the housing programme was gradually contracted out so that between 1968 and 1969 the Department only built 611 houses per year and State Advances was providing only 63 housing loans compared to the peaks of 905 houses built in 1964 and 1965, and 329 loans in 1962 and 1963. These fell far short of Hunn’s proposals. Ultimately, according to Colgan, the levels were relatively low because Maori could not afford to buy a home, therefore they tended to inhabit decadent suburbs or State rental houses.

A Victoria University of Wellington survey of the *Hunn Report*’s conclusions and subsequent action was undertaken in 1969-70. Its findings were published in an academic journal in 1970. All aspects of the Report’s recommendations were surveyed by three graduate students. In the area of employment the following comments were made:

‘a Maori Employment Committee’ - was recommended to liaise ‘between the Departments of Labour and Maori Affairs and also Industry and Commerce’. This was ‘set up’ but ‘disbanded’ after a few years. Its function was continued solely by the Department of Maori Affairs. The recommendation that ‘Industries and Commerce advice’ be sought on ‘the prospects of promoting industries in Maori areas’ was ‘not adopted’. The success of the Panmure Carpentry Training Centre ‘showed the scope for a full-scale trade-training scheme on the rehabilitation model’ as the Report had recommended, ‘gave rise to increased trade training not on the rehabilitation model but rather as part of the normal apprenticeship scheme’. The recommendation that ‘a Maori apprenticeship scheme’ be put in place ‘to raise the number of apprentices from a few hundred to several thousand’ was only part way to achieving the ambitious recommendation, namely ‘twelve courses in eight trades’ in 1968, increasing to ‘fourteen courses in ten trades as from the beginning of 1969’. The final recommendation on employment matters of the Hunn Report that employer organisations ‘could reasonably be approached (by Industries and Commerce) to see if they would provide accommodation

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680 Butterworth and Young, 1990, p. 105.
681 Colgan, 1972,p. 24:
for Maori workers brought in from rural areas’ was attempted but has met with little success.\(^{683}\)

The following case which centred on the provision of housing for Maori on the East Coast exemplified the tensions between local Government agencies, Government head office policy directions and free market forces. On 3 April 1962, Hanan, the Minister of Maori Affairs wrote to the Minister of State Advances on a matter concerning a complaint from E.B. Waddington of Gisborne, a member of the Gisborne State Rental Housing Allocation Committee, about the lack of State-funded houses in rural areas. Hanan’s letter concluded:

... more of the Maori people are coming to realise that, if they and their children are to have a full and satisfying life, they must have good homes; that to justify the investment of public funds in good homes there must be a reasonable assurance of full and regular employment; and that if full and regular employment is not available where they live they must move to areas where it is available. My Department in its general efforts for the advancement of the Maori people must help to make this transition smooth and successful. The movement among the Maori towards wider economic, occupational and social horizons is to be encouraged. It cannot be held back by considerations of employers’ interests or by outdated conceptions of the Maori race as a people of limited needs, limited ambitions and limited capacities; and any suggestion that it be held back by a Government policy of encouraging Maoris to remain in certain localities and accept limited standards of employment and housing is unthinkable.\(^{684}\)

It is with this ministerial panegyric eulogizing the positive payoffs of ‘the movement towards wider economic, occupational and social horizons’ by following the ‘magic’ pathway (an allusion to Gunnar Myrdal and W.W Rostow and other academic advocates of the progressive modernisation project) that we leave this overview of race relations in order to examine in detail the ways in which these policies impacted on Maori employment from the 1960s to the 1970s.

### 6.11. An Employment Transformation?

Generally, New Zealand enjoyed a period of almost uninterrupted prosperity in the 1960 and early 1970s when the Maori urbanisation phase was consolidating. A short, sharp recessionary downturn in the late 1960s impacted severely on Maori, but had minimal effect on most non-Maori. Even discounting its brief but severe effects, it is difficult to assess the extent to which Maori shared in the general prosperity of these halcyon days. During the 1950s and 1960s there were many optimistic assumptions made about urbanisation. As would have been noted in the exhaustive presentation above of the *Hunn Report*, it was assumed that in urban areas Maori would get better housing, education, and social services. Thus they would become

\(^{683}\) Ibid, p. 51.

\(^{684}\) J.R. Hanan, Minister of Maori Affairs to Minister of State Advances, 3 April 1962. MA 1: 655. 36/1/21. ANZ, Wellington.
better integrated into the economy, with a fair proportion in skilled trades, the professions, the bureaucracy, and business. But any gains (if indeed there were gains), including the slow growth of an urban elite, hardly kept pace with the progress of Pakeha. In fact the evidence, certainly after 1967, would indicate that many Maori faced unemployment in exponentially rising numbers. That of course had a cumulative impact on income levels, living standards, health and a widening number of social, economic and other issues. It is difficult to apportion responsibility for this serious social problem. In the final analysis, some of the failures to deliver on some of the recommendations can be attributed to the fact that the policies implemented after the Hunn Report were Pakeha programmes to suit national needs, and were only incidentally for the benefit of Maori.

A shift in government perceptions of the nature of the situation regarding Maori is discernible in the annual reports of the Department of Maori Affairs. Prior to the Hunn Report, the Department of Maori Affairs had ceased building or providing loans for houses in ‘economically retarded areas’ and by 1960 had set up a relocation programme which provided accommodation, employment and ‘guidance’ for new arrivals in the cities, with an initial target of 4000 urban migrants per year. The relocation programme was driven at one level by a paternalistic welfare concern but doubtless there was a hidden agenda to satisfy the demand of the public and private sector for labour. An indication of this was provided in the 1964 report of the Department of Maori Affairs which suggested the rationale of the programme was that ‘it is obviously in the best national interests to make full use of all available human resources.’ To this end, provisions for housing, pre-employment programmes and apprenticeships became substantially focussed on urban areas, not only to relieve rural unemployment but also because, as the Department of Labour noted in 1965, ‘the readiness of Maoris to do unskilled, semi-skilled, manual and labouring work’ made ‘an important contribution to the economy’ which would otherwise have required higher levels of immigration.

The part played by government in directing the flow of the rural diaspora is difficult to assess in retrospect and awaits a more detailed empirical study of all the documentary evidence. In the interim there is an inclination to accept anecdotal and occasional documentary evidence that all through this period of the late 1950s and early 1960s there was a steady flow of Maori

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from regional centres to permanent employment in the major centres, without the assistance of the Maori Affairs Department or the ‘special scheme’.

A very general national view of the process of ‘urban relocation’ was given a favourable interpretation in latter years by a Maori government agency. This was authored by Graham Butterworth, who argued that ‘a co-ordinated approach was employed to achieve relocation’ with the Welfare Division facilitating the practical logistics ‘to families and young Maori.’ Finance for house purchases was made available either through the Department of Maori Affairs or using the innovative notion of capitalisation of family benefit, through the State Advances Corporation. Welfare Officers used their contacts to secure rental accommodation and to ‘successfully find employment for the new immigrant families.’

The targeting of school-leavers was especially successful, according to Butterworth. He commented that ‘pre-employment courses run in the city’ were instrumental in finding ‘jobs for unskilled youngsters’ and that ‘the trade and vocational training courses steadily expanded throughout this period.’ The role of government in providing accommodation and housing for young immigrant Maori was represented in a positive light. For example, during the period from 1961 to 1967 the Department of Maori Affairs was ‘building almost a thousand houses a year and obtaining both loan finance and rental accommodation from the State Advances Corporation to make available a further 500-700 houses.

By the early 1970s some of this impetus was lost. The Department of Maori Affairs suffered a vote squeeze from 1969 to 1973: the net departmental vote dropped a huge amount from $5.4m to $1.2m; and so the department did not have the resources to maintain the programmes at original levels. The formal relocation programme appears to have been abandoned as early as 1967 after it had moved 1220 families and numerous individuals. Maori communities began to doubt the wisdom of completely stripping their areas of all their young people. A downturn in the economy from 1968 to 1971 also made the cities less

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689 Ibid., p. 38.
690 Ibid., p. 38.
691 The last reference to the scheme is in the _Annual Report of the Department of Maori Affairs, 1967_ (AJHR 1967, G9, p. 15). The Welfare Division would still have had some capacity to help families on the basis of need, so the Department informally could still have been doing some relocation. For further discussion see Butterworth and Young, 1990, p. 129.
attractive. Finally, by the late 1960s the first urban generation was coming of age and their views were less favourable to internal immigration.\textsuperscript{692}

This optimistic representation at the national level could be compared with the view at the local level by contemporaries. A very broad account of the process and its benefits has been noted by a District Welfare Officer in Auckland (1965-68), Arapeta Awatere.\textsuperscript{693} The link between housing and employment by Cooper and Awatere has already been remarked upon above; Awatere’s full comments in context were:

So immigrant Māoris from the rural-urban areas who previously lived the Māori formula, were forced by the socio-economic standards of the NZ formula to come to Auckland to earn a living.

To do so, two imperatives had to go hand in hand: a roof and a job. Here, we are touching the most vital area in the integration of Māori and NZ. Māori immigrants of the former, driven by the need to earn to live, enter the latter to obtain that roof and that job.

Sometimes a respectable roof is found. But more often than not, these immigrants accepted second-rate, dilapidated roofs for which they paid exorbitant rents. As the devil drives, needs must.

Awatere’s assessment of his service to his people when he was in the Welfare Division of the Auckland office of the Department of Māori Affairs in the 1960s, broadly accords with Butterworth’s ‘official’ view:

From about 1965 to 1968, my staff and I did some detailed socio-economic surveys of Auckland City, street by street, house by house. ... As a result, we were able, through housing loans and the building organisation of the Department of Māori and Island Affairs, to better the housing conditions of immigrant Māoris.

We found Māoris living in second-rate dilapidated houses and paying exorbitant rents. The lack of building houses was increased so that, literally, we were able to place, on an average, one family of say, mum, dad, and six children in a brand new house of their own every day...365 days of the calendar year. That I think is a meritorious achievement by the Department of Māori and Island Affairs.

How many human beings, saved, uplifted and bettered would that represent? Well, mathematically, I would say 2,500 souls. I am talking about the Auckland Land District, not the whole of New Zealand.\textsuperscript{694}

A contrasting picture is drawn in rural areas from where, of course, Māori were leaving for the towns and cities. This was true of that once heavily-populated Māori district, the East Coast. By the early 1960s the question had begun to be raised by shearing contractors and farmers whether the official relocation policy, as well as the more informal movement, had the potential to damage the pool of labour required for shearing and farm work generally.\textsuperscript{695}

This was however, at a time when much of the remote and rugged pastoral country in the East

\textsuperscript{692} Butterworth, 1991 p. 39.
\textsuperscript{693} Awatere, 2006.
\textsuperscript{694} Awatere (ed), 2003, pp. 225-6.
Coast had deteriorated. So not only were people finding that large wages could be earned more easily in the large urban centres, but there was less rural work available.

Clerical employment also became more important during the 1950s. By 1962 the welfare officer noted in the annual report that ‘a number of our young people who have passed the required examinations are working in our office, the Social Security Department, other government departments and in accountants’ offices’.697

By the late 1950s many young women were entering the Post and Telegraph Department, others were entering nursing, and others the New Zealand Railways. However, many young women were constrained by lack of education to low-level employment in hotels, the hospital laundries, and local health camps, as well as in a variety of domestic service positions. This type of employment, plus seasonal work at vegetable processing plants and work in clothing factories, engaged most women:

The hospitals, hotels and clothing factories and Wattie’s Canneries absorb a number of our women and girls. The work of the girls at the clothing factory is of a very high standard; on visiting these firms there is nothing but praise, and was most pleasing to note absenteeism is almost quelled. More of our girls are being employed as shop assistants. The latter point, that an increasing number of young women had broken into a realm of employment hitherto dominated by Pakeha young women, is significant. But the picture of industrial employment in the clothing factories may be a bit too rosy, as in the same year, 1961, P. Kaua, the Takitimu District Welfare Officer, noted that ‘there is one big clothing firm in Gisborne city who does not employ Maoris and I am quite satisfied in my own mind that they are discriminating between the Pakeha and Maori’.701

By the early 1960s, with the increasing number of school leavers to deal with, and the rapidly growing migration from the hinterland of Gisborne, it was noted that ‘Employment is the bug bear in this area ... Gisborne city, has no improvement in openings for employment’.702

Another report notes that ‘unless other forms of outside industry involving work for the whole year is introduced the position will not improve’. It was at this time, rather belatedly, that the government took more direct action to relieve rural unemployment by inaugurating a ‘Special Scheme’ in which the Maori Affairs Department was to specially select ‘above average’ qualified workers from the Gisborne area to be ‘relocated’ in the main centres.

Initially, five male workers were to be selected for relocation to Dunedin, 10 to Christchurch, and 20 to Wellington. The report of a meeting held in Gisborne on October 1960 between the Department of Labour and Maori Affairs, indicates that the Labour Department was quite willing to ‘pass-the-buck’ on Maori employment to Maori Affairs, and that even by the 1960s the response of ‘regular’ government departments to the special needs of Maori was still ambiguous, and often not well handled.

Maori Affairs officers suggested that the Labour Department should have field officers in rural areas to help Maori register for employment. The Labour Department District Officer suggested that this could be done through enrolment forms available at post offices. It was pointed out to him that many rural Maori could not complete these forms. He then suggested that he would provide Maori welfare officers with forms, and was informed that there would be hundreds of enrolments. He was concerned, because if work was not found for these people they would then be eligible for unemployment benefits through the Social Security Department. After the meeting, on discussing this with his staff, the Labour Department District Officer realised that it was hoped that such a movement would not be inspired by Government Agents such as the Maori Welfare Officers.

Regardless, by early 1961 the ‘Special Scheme’ was in full swing. A report on the scheme from the Labour Department in Gisborne indicated that by February 1961, nine young women and two men had been relocated to Wellington. Another report, prepared in Wellington by the Department of Maori Affairs, indicated, that a publicity programme about the Maori need for employment had borne fruit, as there had been requests from about 40 firms in the four

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704 Head Office, Department of Labour to Christchurch, Dunedin, and Wellington Offices, with attached memorandum to Gisborne/Napier Offices, September 15, 1960, L1 30/1/28, Part 6. Maori Employment, General, ANZ, Wellington.
705 District Officer, Department of Labour, Gisborne to Head Office. Maori Employment-Special Scheme. L1 30/1/28, Part 6. Maori Employment, General, ANZ, Wellington.
706 Ibid.
main centres to fill over 300 vacancies. In Gisborne, the response of males to the scheme was slow because it was implemented at the time when seasonal work, especially shearing and work at the freezing works, was beginning. In other words, around Gisborne, most Maori were employed, if only temporarily.

Yet the number of jobs being offered in the rural sector remained relatively very low. The net Maori population increase in the critical area of 15 - 20 years’ old at the 1961 population census was sharply higher. By the middle of 1961, however, matters had changed dramatically. In April the Secretary of the New Zealand Federated Hotel, Hospital, Restaurant and Related Trades Employees wrote to the Minister of Labour about the ‘terrific exodus of young Maori from the East Coast to the metropolitan areas’. While the complaint was specifically about the loss of qualified workers to the main centres, it did stimulate a ministerial inquiry. This led to a detailed report by the Takitimu District Welfare Officer, P. Kaua concerning the general Maori employment situation in Gisborne. Kaua pointed out that Maori ‘farmers, shop workers, Ministry of Works employees, County Council workers, Truck Drivers, Hotel workers, and Hospital employees and permanent farm workers have reasonable income.’ This enumeration of local Maori employment demonstrates how diversified it was becoming, but Kaua also pointed out that more opportunities were available in the metropolitan centres. He stated that educated Maori youth deserved to find good employment, either locally or wherever it was available:

Gisborne city is our Metropolitan area where we should place all our young men and women. We certainly have the Gisborne Freezing Works, Watties Cannery, and a few other industries but they are not able to supply full and satisfactory employment for everybody, Pakeha and Maori. In most of these industries, there are a lot of Maori and they are working satisfactorily. The Freezing Works and Watties are for the majority only a casual job and in the off season they have to look elsewhere for work.

He went on to state that most families needed permanent work and this could only be found in the main centres. The pattern of movement in the 1960s, typically involving at least two or three steps, from country to a regional town or provincial centre and from there to the major cities, especially Auckland and to a lesser extent, Wellington/Hutt Valley and Christchurch.

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710 F.G. Young, Secretary, New Zealand Federation of Hospital, Restaurant, and Related Trades Employees, Industrial Association of Workers, to T.P. Shand, Minister of Labour, April 17, 1961, L1 30/1/28, Part 6. Maori Employment. General, ANZ, Wellington.
711 P. Kaua, District Welfare Officer to District Officer, Department of Labour, May 15, 1961, L1 30/1/28, Part 6, Maori Employment. General. ANZ, Wellington.
712 Ibid.
has been investigated and corroborated by a range of academic and government researchers.\textsuperscript{713} Not all migratory paths necessarily ended in the larger cities, such as Auckland; often they ended at burgeoning provincial centres of population such as Hamilton, Tauranga, and Rotorua. As Miles noted, ‘[t]here was considerable internal labour migration, one of successive movement from rural area to small town, from small town to large town, and from there to the city.’\textsuperscript{714} By 1976, 76 per cent of Maori lived in either the 24 major urban centres or the smaller urban centres.\textsuperscript{715}

The complex pattern of rural-urban dynamics with its conflicting financial, emotional and spiritual demands and expectations in the early 1970s is conveyed artistically in some of the works of a son of Te Aitanga-a-Mahaki, Witi Ihimaera, most explicitly in the autobiographical novel, \textit{Tangi}, first published in 1973.\textsuperscript{716} In this novel, there is a poignant contrast between the personal emotional heartland or turangawaewae of Waituhi near Gisborne with the economic imperatives of the city of Wellington for the young Maori man.

The failure by government to implement generally many of ‘the closing the gaps’ components of the Hunn recommendations especially in the area of trade training, up-skilling, adult education, Maori Schools education and general education had a considerable impact on the levels of qualification for entry into the workforce in the years after 1960. The wider picture


\textsuperscript{715} With the notable exception of the timber, pulp and paper industries in the South Auckland and Bay of Plenty statistical area, secondary industries were mainly concentrated in the large centres of population, particularly in the Auckland and Wellington-Hutt region. A number of motor-vehicle assembly firms favoured the Hutt Valley region and provided a reasonably constant source of employment for blue-collar workers in the area throughout the long boom.

has been noted by demographer, Jinling Bu. In 1951, 1.3 percent of employed Maori males were in professional, technical, administrative or management positions, compared with a New Zealand total of 7.7 percent. By 1981 the Maori percentage had risen to only 3.1 percent, compared with a New Zealand total of 16.5 percent. The significant contributory fundamental factor in this was the continuing low level of educational qualification for Maori youth.\(^{717}\)

In 1967, Maharaia Winiata commented:

The distribution of Maori workers is skewed towards manual labour, especially farm labour, road construction, bush work, and transport. This is associated with the lower educational attainments of the Maori as compared with the European, and in particular with a wastage at secondary school level. This in turn relates to the economic position of parents, the lack of economic incentives in Maori communities, and the difficulties of disciplined study in an atmosphere of intense communal living.\(^{718}\)

In 1975 Hugh Kawharu prepared a report (with W. Winiata and Jock McEwen) on Maori incorporations for UNESCO in which he claimed there were two aspects to Maori employment. First, Maori labour had been ‘indispensable to the physical development of New Zealand ... and it remains so with respect to the country’s industrial expansion, e.g. meat freezing, forestry and timber processing’; and second, ‘the basic mechanisms for a separation of Maori and non Maori along economic class lines are being shaped in the educational and employment sectors.’\(^{719}\) With respect to the first point, Kawharu was reiterating a comment made eloquently by Ngata some 57 years earlier (1928) in his correspondence with Te Rangihiroa/Buck.\(^{720}\) Interestingly, with respect to the second point, Kawharu was claiming that Maori identity was predicated on ‘economic class’ lines determined by ‘educational and employment’ factors; a claim that had been made by many observers in the past, including Hunn in 1960.

As has been already signalled, the period 1956-66 witnessed the most rapid urbanisation of the Maori population. The broad statistics for this period demonstrate that the average annual growth rates of Maori population in urban areas over the intercensal periods 1956-61 and 1961-66 were four and three times that of the total Maori population. Accordingly, the


\(^{719}\) I.H. Kawharu, J.M. McEwen and W. Winiata, Maori incorporations in New Zealand, [Palmerston North: Massey University, 1979], p. 2. Note, that ‘this collection of papers ... was prepared under a contract entered into between Unesco and the NZ National Commission for Unesco in 1975. There were delays & even in 1979 no sign of publication. Thus, as an interim measure the papers on Maori incorporations have been published by Massey University’, ibid., p. 1.

\(^{720}\) Sorrenson, 1986, pp. 91-2, 95.
proportion living in urban areas rose a huge percentage, from 16.6 percent in 1956 to 41.1 percent in 1966. Jinling Bu continued:

Although the process slowed down since the 1960s, the urban population still increased at an annual rate of much higher than that for the total Maori. The increase in the proportion since 1976 was attributable mainly to natural increase rather than new in-migrants from rural areas, this is because the modal age group 15-24 years of Maori migrants had steadily more urbanised.\(^{721}\)

The table located immediately below is a simplified comparative schedule that highlights some of the differences in proportions in occupational groups between Maori, male and female, and non-Maori both male and female, in the period 1956 - 1981.\(^{722}\)

### MAORI by OCCUPATION GROUP 1956-81.

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Occupational group</strong></td>
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</table>
| MAORI | \begin{tabular}{l|l|l|l|l|l|l|} \hline Professionals & 1.6 & 1.7 & 1.8 & 2.3 & 3.0 & 2.7 \\ Admin. & Mngrs & 0.4 & 0.5 & 0.6 & 1.0 & 1.4 & 1.3 \\ Clerical workers & 1.5 & 1.8 & 2.0 & 2.0 & 2.1 & 2.0 \\ Sales workers & 0.7 & 0.8 & 1.1 & 1.1 & 1.4 & 1.4 \\ Supervisors & 1.1 & 0.5 & 0.7 & 1.5 & 2.2 & 2.2 \\ Skilled manual workers & 24.3 & 24.5 & 25.7 & 20.1 & 21.0 & 19.3 \\ Unskilled manual w'rkrs & 68.9 & 68.8 & 66.9 & 68.4 & 63.4 & 60.9 \\ Not specified & 1.6 & 1.4 & 1.3 & 3.5 & 5.4 & 10.2 \\ NUMBER | \hline 31,406 & 36,885 & 43,099 & 50,105 & 61,573 & 69,852 \\ \hline NON MAORI | \begin{tabular}{l|l|l|l|l|l|l|} \hline Professionals & 7.4 & 7.9 & 8.6 & 11.0 & 12.8 & 12.5 \\ Admin. & Mngrs & 6.4 & 7.5 & 7.5 & 8.0 & 8.6 & 8.8 \\ Clerical workers & 7.5 & 7.9 & 8.3 & 6.8 & 5.9 & 5.4 \\ Sales workers & 6.9 & 6.9 & 7.2 & 7.1 & 6.8 & 6.9 \\ Supervisors & 0.8 & 0.7 & 0.7 & 4.2 & 4.4 & 3.9 \\ Skilled manual workers & 37.7 & 36.7 & 36.7 & 31.3 & 31.3 & 31.2 \\ Unskilled manual w'rkrs & 33.0 & 32.3 & 30.6 & 30.9 & 28.6 & 28.2 \\ Not specified & 0.3 & 0.2 & 0.3 & 0.9 & 1.6 & 3.0 \\ NUMBER | \hline 582,248 & 629,796 & 687,243 & 727,868 & 790,375 & 780,980 \\ \hline

### PROPORTIONS in OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS by RACE - FEMALES 1956-1981.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Occupational group</strong></th>
<th><strong>1956</strong></th>
<th><strong>1961</strong></th>
<th><strong>1966</strong></th>
<th><strong>1971</strong></th>
<th><strong>1976</strong></th>
<th><strong>1981</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| MAORI | \begin{tabular}{l|l|l|l|l|l|l|} \hline Professionals & 10.6 & 9.9 & 8.8 & 7.4 & 8.3 & 7.1 \\ Admin. & Mngrs & 0.5 & 0.4 & 0.5 & 0.5 & 1.0 & 1.0 \\ Clerical workers & 7.3 & 7.4 & 8.0 & 10.7 & 12.9 & 12.2 \\ Sales workers & 2.9 & 3.4 & 3.6 & 3.7 & 4.8 & 4.0 \\ Supervisors & 0.1 & 0.0 & 0.0 & 0.4 & 1.0 & 0.9 \\ Skilled manual workers & 13.5 & 15.5 & 16.0 & 15.9 & 15.4 & 13.0 \\ Unskilled manual w'rkrs & 63.5 & 61.8 & 59.1 & 53.9 & 47.7 & 48.3 \\ Not specified & 1.8 & 1.5 & 3.9 & 7.5 & 9.0 & 13.5 \\ NUMBER | \hline 8,439 & 10,933 & 14,514 & 20,793 & 28,155 & 34,329 \\ \hline NON MAORI | \begin{tabular}{l|l|l|l|l|l|l|} \hline Professionals & 16.4 & 16.7 & 17.0 & 17.9 & 18.9 & 18.6 \\ \hline

\(^{722}\) The table is a composite based on Figure 2 & Table 3, Jinling Bu, 1993 p. 191.
The continuing poor performance of Maori youth in the field of education and the increasing rate of unemployment of Maori, both male and female has been commented on by many. Butterworth made these comments at the time of the third Labour Government (1972-5). Writing in 1974, he stated that:

In certain occupations, where a specific effort has been made to recruit Maoris, very rapid progress has been made. For instance, the number of Maori men who are teachers has grown from 23 in 1936 to 321 in 1961, to 399 in 1966; the number of Maori women teachers has grown from 42 in 1936 to 529 in 1961, but has also grown to 535 in 1966; the number of Maori women teachers has grown from 42 in 1936 to 529 in 1961, but has also grown to 535 in 1966.

He continued that:

The number of Maoris employed as plumbers and drainlayers grew from 36 in 1936 to 1,200 in 1961; the number of electricians and related workers grew from 18 in 1936 to 798 in 1961; and the number of Maori employed as carpenters grew from 92 in 1936 to 3,388 in 1966. While only a proportion of these would be qualified tradesmen, and actually employed in jobs requiring apprenticeship skills, it does indicate the readiness of Maoris to seek jobs calling for higher levels of manual skills. These are all trades where encouragement was given to Maoris either through the post-war rehabilitation schemes or in the Maori trade training centres.

Butterworth was very encouraged by these incremental increases in the skilled trades. To him, 'this has meant that substantial numbers of Maoris are now found in occupations that in the 1920’s and 1930’s seemed beyond the scope of their aspirations.' He did however express disappointment at the figures in both the 1961 and 1966 censuses which showed that well over 50 percent of the Maori male labour force was 'employed in manual work requiring no special qualification'. The table below lists such occupations with the numbers engaged in them in 1961 and 1966.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>1961</th>
<th>1966</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Farm workers (excluding farmers)</td>
<td>5,633</td>
<td>5,344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labourers (not excluding classified)</td>
<td>4,923</td>
<td>5,094</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers engaged in food manufacture</td>
<td>4,077</td>
<td>4,840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road transport workers</td>
<td>2,919</td>
<td>4,215</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Some of the categories are too broad in the 1966 Census to separate out the skilled from the unskilled.


Ibid. p. 63.

Ibid., p. 63.
Excavating and lifting equipment operators  1,390  1,993  
Loggers and other forestry workers  1,319  1,336  
Waterside workers  1,288  1,582  

Total  21,549  24,404  

In the five years following the Hunn Report, the only occupational group of unskilled or semi-skilled workers that had decreased was that of farm workers, which is hardly surprising given the increased mechanisation of agriculture and consolidation of small pastoral farms. The table also reflected a continuing increase in total Maori population numbers in the workforce.

Maori women in 1961 were also found mainly in unskilled or semi-skilled occupations. In that year the largest occupational groups were housekeepers, maids, cooks (2,245), tailors (1,105), workers in telephone and telegraph services (519), hotel workers (478), food processing industries (470) and laundry and dry cleaning (405). Employment in these occupations comprised over half of those engaged in occupations other than in primary production.

The 1966 Census showed substantially the same pattern, though there were some variations. The laundry and drycleaning group (468) and the hotel workers’ group (545) had grown relatively slowly, while the housekeepers, maids, cooks group actually fell (2,229). Workers in food processing industries (819), telephone and telegraph services (664) and tailors (1,419) all increased significantly. The total of all these groups made up 46 per cent of Maori women employed outside primary production. Many of the jobs in the service industries would have been in occupations that had limited or no career progression with low wages.\textsuperscript{727}

Maori unemployment became a serious problem in 1967 because of the nature of Maori distribution in the labour force. As unskilled workers faced with somewhat unfavourable stereotypes, Maori were likely to remain marginalised in the work force, hired when labour was scarce and the first to be dismissed in any slackening of labour demand. In the years from 1936 until 1967 New Zealand governments of both political persuasions, following in the social democratic tradition established by the first Labour government, vigorously pursued policies of full (even, some would argue, over-full) employment. Once this ceased to be the most urgent priority of economic policy, Maori vulnerability to an economic recession, such as occurred in 1967-1969, was fully revealed.

\textsuperscript{727} Ibid., p. 63.
From the 1956 census, which is the first census that has comprehensive, inclusive and reliable comparative figures, an analysis of the unemployment figures in 1961, 1966 and 1971 showed that the Maori rate of unemployment was three or four times higher than that of non-Maori.728

For example, in the 1961 Census, 2.3 per cent of Maori males in the working age group described themselves as unemployed compared with 0.6 per cent of Pakehas. A survey of unemployed workers carried out by the Department of Labour in May 1963 showed that Maori workers (and those of the Pacific Islands) formed a high proportion of the unemployed group. Of the total of 1,053 males and females, 230 or 19 per cent were Maori workers 729

The trend of a higher disproportionate ratio of Maori unemployed workers compared with non-Maori continued through the 1960s to the mid-1970s when it accelerated further. The unemployed figures at the time of the short sharp recession of 1967 - 1969 illustrated how vulnerable Maori were. Though the total number of unemployed never rose above 1 per cent of the labour force when the actual composition of the unemployed was analysed Maoris and Polynesians formed a very high percentage of the unemployed. On 31 July 1967 in response to a question by Whetu Tirikatene-Sullivans, the Labour Department undertook a survey of the unemployed. This revealed that out of 6,294 unemployed 1,737 were Maoris (1,568 men and 169 women) while a further 307 were Pacific Islanders. In bald terms, some 28 percent of the unemployed were Maori.730

Three further surveys of unemployed in the late 1960s confirmed that though the 1967 figure had been sharply lower, a downward overall trend in Maori unemployment (at about 30 per cent) seemed to have set it in. Two surveys taken in June and August 1968 showed that 2,264 Maori were unemployed out of a total 8,020 unemployed (28.2 per cent) in June and August and 1,886 Maoris out of 6,700 (28.1 per cent) in June and August respectively.731 A survey of February 1969 found 1,252 Maori in a total of 3,490 unemployed, 30.6 per cent of the total.732

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730 NZPD, 20 July 1967, XXII, p. 1032; Department of Labour, 'Maori Male and Female Unemployment as at 30 June 1967', AANK, 947, 30/1/28, Part 7; also, 'Unemployment at 30 September 1967: Maori and Pacific Islanders', AANK 947, 30/1/28, Part 8, ANZ, Wellington.
Geographically, too, in this period from 1961 - 1976, Maori showed a different pattern from Pakeha. The largest numbers of unemployed Pakeha were usually found in the four centres, though in February 1969 Whangarei and Hamilton Employment Districts had higher totals than Wellington and Dunedin. Maori unemployment on the other hand was concentrated in the Whangarei, Auckland, Hamilton and Rotorua Employment Districts. These four districts had 60 per cent of Maori unemployed in June 1968, 79 per cent in August 1968 and 61 per cent in February 1969. Even more significant was the proportion of Maori unemployed in the main urban area of each district: Whangarei (65 per cent), Rotorua (64 per cent), Gisborne (68 per cent), Hamilton (48 per cent) and Auckland (26 per cent).

Predictably, the great majority of Maori registered unemployed were persons with work experience confined solely to largely unskilled occupations. In the June 1968 survey, 708 Maori males, 45 per cent of Maori unemployed, described themselves as labourers. While for Pakeha, unemployment affected only a very small minority, well under one per cent, the position was very different for Maori. In June 1968 when there was a total of 8,020 unemployed, apparently less than 1 per cent of the labour force, 3.5 per cent of Maori men were unemployed and just under five per cent of Maori women were seeking work. For Maori, full employment vanished in 1967 and probably over the period between 1969 and 1972 there was never less than one per cent Maori unemployment. During 1971 and 1972 when the yearly average of unemployed reached 3,116 and 5,684, respectively, with 7,264 unemployed at the high point in July 1972, the figure was well over one per cent unemployed.733

The political response from the Minister of Labour to these very negative figures was guarded and on the evidence of the following memorandum, sometimes evasive and covert. In June 1969, the current Minister, Tom Shand responded to an inquiry from the Ratana Labour MP, Whetu Tirikatene-Sullivan, that it was Government strategy not to ‘emphasize the point of high Maori unemployment compared with non-Maori’. He claimed that he had ‘discussed this question [of high Maori unemployment] with a deputation from the Maori Council [and] it would not help to emphasize this point publicly too much.’ In the same memorandum Shand confirmed that:

low levels of education and skill seem undoubtedly to be one of the major reasons for the high level of unemployment among Maoris, particularly in the case of male workers.

Shand concluded by claiming that the difficulty in ‘dealing with the Maori unemployed, particularly those who live in remote areas, is seriously complicated by family and social considerations.’

The response of the Maori Council to the sharp unemployment levels of the late 1960s was to urge the government to set up ‘remedial measures’ such as ‘re-training for new jobs along the lines followed by the Rehabilitation Department after the War’, ‘subsidizing farmers who employed labour on capital improvements’, and increased ‘opportunities for school leavers to take up a trade training course such as those already run for rural Maori boys.’

By the 1960s most Maori did not live on their lands. Most of those who were employed worked in a range of urban jobs, ranging from a few in highly skilled professional, managerial, technical, and educational positions, to a host in semi-skilled and unskilled jobs, with a lack of security and the constant threat of unemployment. Maori had become predominantly part of the urban wage labour force, an urban proletariat.

By 1966 the transformation of the Maori work force from one still dominantly involved in the primary sector to one where 53 percent of the men and 36 percent of the women employed worked in the secondary sector was virtually complete. This workforce was intimately associated with a rural exodus. In 1945, three-quarters of the Maori population was still living in rural areas. This figure was still two-thirds in 1956, yet by 1966, more than three-fifths was urban, with more than two-fifths living in the major centres/metropoles.

In 1945, 34 percent of the male Maori and 11 percent of the female Maori work force were involved in secondary activities in the economy. As Pool has pointed out, during World War II Maori females entered the tertiary or service sector of the economy in a major way. In 1945 50 percent of the female Maori work force was so employed, compared with 14 percent of the male Maori work force. However, much of this latter group were involved in service in the armed forces, which was the first non-primary sector employment for many Maori men. Pool observed that military service frequently created the opportunity for tertiary sector employment after the war, particularly in professional and administrative services, as well as

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735 Booth to Shand, 18 July 1968, AANK 947, 30/1/28, Part 9, ANZ, Wellington.
737 Ibid., p. 122.
for secondary sector employment.\textsuperscript{738} He also commented that while this is often overlooked and unresearched, it was the qualitative impact of returned servicemen turned bureaucrat, teacher, and the like, rather than numbers involved that was significant.\textsuperscript{739}

6.12. Unemployment Emerges

Unemployment became politically contentious: the new Labour leader (and Leader of the Opposition) Norman Kirk, attacked the Minister of Labour in Parliament, and concern for Maori employment resurfaced.\textsuperscript{740} Shand supported the existing departmental policy of treating Maori unemployment as ‘an integral part of the total problem of employment and unemployment’ rather than compartmentalising policy along ethnic lines, and separate figures were not at first released. The department found that Maori comprised between 25 and 30 percent of the unemployed, with particularly high rates among labourers.

Shand instructed the department to survey Maori unemployment in the two employment districts of Whangarei and Gisborne, where the largest numbers of Maori were registered as unemployed.\textsuperscript{741} The survey was followed up by case studies that showed they had very low levels of education and skill, and demonstrated a ‘lack of initiative’ in finding work outside their own experience or geographical area. A combination of personal circumstances often contributed to the situation. The department observed that there did not seem to be a difference in kind between Maori and non-Maori unemployment (a study of the long-term ‘hard-core’ unemployed was done at the same time), but in the case of Maori the relevant factors were more intense.

The economy rebounded rapidly from the recession, but it left behind a core of longer-term unemployed and a warning for the future.\textsuperscript{742} The department began to focus on this group, which comprised ‘mainly those without skills or a sense of responsibility, those with poor work records, limited intelligence or physical or other defects and those residing in rural areas.’\textsuperscript{743}

\textsuperscript{738} Ibid., p. 122.
\textsuperscript{739} Ibid., p. 123.
\textsuperscript{740} Publicity, press statements, AANK, Acc W3574, Box 26, 7/8/5, Part 3, 1958-72, ANZ, Wellington. This file, and Box 47, 30/1/28, 1967-8, has further criticisms of Shand, Minister of Labour and his Department.
\textsuperscript{741} Assistant Secretary of Labour to Minister of Labour, 29 May 1969, ‘Maori Unemployment’, AANK, Acc W3574, Box 47, 30/1/28, Part 10, 1968-9, ANZ, Wellington.
\textsuperscript{743} Perry to Shand, 10 March 1969, AANK, Acc W3574, box 47, 30/1/28, part 10, ANZ, Wellington.
The department had established a Manpower Planning Unit in the Research Section in 1966 as a result of continued labour shortages and regional imbalances. Its job was to attempt to forecast the supply of and demand for labour by occupation, industry and region. This work was overtaken first by the recession and then by the demands of the National Development Conference. Unit staff serviced the Labour Committee of the Conference, whose objective was to estimate the manpower needed to meet growth targets. The Conference recommended strengthening the Unit.

The recession made it apparent that there were disadvantaged groups in the community, and that the department’s employment service should be upgraded to deal with them. Woods admitted: ‘it has come as something of a shock to us to find the handicapped people becoming visible to us – lining up and being counted.’ As the National Development Conference had recommended, a broader and more active employment service was needed than one which simply placed the unemployed in order to reduce the numbers on the register. Women were returning to the workforce, employment should be found for the disabled, workers needed to be trained and retrained for the changing needs of industry, and employers needed advice on the operations of the labour market. Overall, the National Development Conference had argued that New Zealand should, like other countries, adopt an ‘active’ labour market policy in which attention should shift towards improving the quality of employment and by making employment available for all those who wished to work.

6.13. A Semantic Trope: Integration or Assimilation: Which is which?

Much energy and effort were expended by Ministers of the Crown at about the time of, and certainly after, the publication of the Hunn Report in attempting to explain and justify ‘integration’ as distinct from ‘amalgamation’ or ‘assimilation’. What was argued by most contemporary academics (and certainly latter-day commentators) was that ‘integration’ was another name for ‘assimilation’, while on the other hand, proponents of ‘integration’ argued

744 'Manpower planning', LEG, 21 (2), 1971; 'Occupational forecasting activities of the Manpower Planning Unit', LEG, 23, (2), 1973. The formation of this unit represented a resurgence of the planning function, which had been foreseen for the department just after the war, before it was realised that full employment was a long-term phenomenon.


that it was different from, if often confused with, ‘assimilation’. The common feature of most of the justifications was not so much the semantics of their thread-bare rationalizations, as the almost universal occurrence of an arrogant Eurocentric cultural mind-set. This was manifested in a belief by most Pakeha (and indeed, by some acculturated Maori) in the executive arm of government – Maori Affairs – that the unilateral imposition of one set of cultural paradigms would advance the progress of those Maori who were still relatively backward. Indeed this was a point raised some twenty years later by the Secretary for Maori Affairs, I.P. Puketapu and which will be discussed in detail below.

An early instance of this binarism occurred in April 1960 in a departmental statement when Nash was Minister of Maori Affairs. It expounded that there were two broad opposing ideologies on race relations – ‘parallel development’ and ‘integration’. The statement proclaimed that Government policy favoured integration as a ‘dynamic and positive way of encouraging the best for both peoples’. It continued that integration would be progressed by continuing Maori-Pakeha intermarriage and by the sprinkling of Maori homes in a pepper-pot fashion ‘in a predominantly European area on terms of good citizenship and good neighbourliness’.

The names of the ‘present Minister of Maori Affairs, the former Minister (Hon. Mr Corbett) and such Maori leaders as the late Sir Peter Buck and Sir Apirana Ngata’ were cited (incorrectly in the case of Buck and Ngata) as believers in the goal of integration.

In response to the mounting debate in official government and academic circles in the early 1960s Hunn prepared and published in 1962 - with his research assistant John Booth named as co-author - a substantial paper on what was meant by integration, the progress of integration and urbanisation, the rate of integration – noting that the policy ‘must allow for regional and local diversity’ – and general principles to guide integration. The paper began with the boast that ‘for many years New Zealand has been recognized as one of the nations in the vanguard of those that are building multi-racial societies.’ It concluded with the hope that ‘many Pakehas will find time not only to give thought to the important questions involved in this subject of Maori–Pakeha integration but also to extend a friendly greeting to Maori

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749 Ibid.
neighbours and workmates who are coming to take a place alongside them, even participating in Maori activities if this is possible.\(^{750}\)

The debate over ‘integration’ versus ‘assimilation’ was continued by Hanan’s successor, Duncan McIntyre. As Minister of Maori Affairs in the second and the third National Governments, McIntyre gained something of a reputation as a liberal.\(^{751}\) In 1969 he responded to the South African Consul General who had given a surprisingly favourable account of New Zealand’s race relations:

> The official policy of the Government in relation to the Maori people is not one of assimilation as your report seems to imply, but rather one of integration. With both of these words there is, of course, a difficulty in that there are many different interpretations. By ‘integration’, however, I mean a policy of ensuring complete equality between the races legally, politically, socially and economically. I do not believe, however, that the Maori should be called upon to lose his identity. I recognise his wish and his right to retain all those traditional and cultural elements which fit into modern society.\(^{752}\)

McIntyre made similar comments in 1970, in a speech that claimed that some degree of progress had been made in the 1960s to improve the broad Maori socio-economic condition. He refuted the suggestion that the government was pursuing a policy of assimilation. ‘This is not true;’ he said. ‘Assimilation of any of the peoples living in New Zealand has never been policy and Government has always recognised that there are many aspects of life where assimilation is neither necessary or desirable.’\(^{753}\)

As well as responses to internal domestic situations, New Zealand governments were very sensitive to global issues in the 1960s and early 1970s. Among these were the very fast pace of worldwide de-colonisation, on-going sporting contact with South Africa and pressure from the United Nations generally on racial discrimination. Hunn alluded directly in a speech to Maori school pupils in 1962 to a landmark 1960 speech by U.K. Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, on the topic of ‘the winds of change’ that were blowing through Africa and the world. In contrast to the Macmillan speech however, Hunn addressed his concerns to the changes required of indigenous peoples. He urged young Maori to become more modern and more integrated:

> I want all young Maoris to realise that change is inevitable: it is part of life itself. So you are not being unfaithful to the Maori race when you change with the times. You are not being unfaithful to the Maori race when you change with the times. You are

\(^{750}\) ‘The Integration of Maori and Pakeha in New Zealand’, April 1962, MS Papers 5220-127, Miscellaneous Acts, Maps, Reports and Other Papers 1955–1962, ATL, Wellington. This paper was later published in 1962 with a foreword by Hanan, which would indicate that the paper met with Government approval.


\(^{752}\) McIntyre to Philip (Consul-General of the Republic of South Africa), 7 August 1969, MA 1, 36/1/21, Part 10, Race Relations: Policy and Correspondence with Overseas Countries 1969–1971, ANZ, Wellington.

simply becoming a modern Maori instead of an old-fashioned one. And a modern Maori is still a Maori, not a pakeha.

Hunn advised the pupils not to ‘pine for the “good old days” and mourn the loss of Maori culture’, and advised them that:

... so long as you keep your meeting houses up-to-date, your activities modern and your attitudes in tune with the times, then so long will you preserve Maori culture and Maori identity.\(^\text{754}\)

The response of the Maori pupils was not recorded. The feelings of more articulate Maori at the local level to other incidences of unilateral monocultural arrogance from government and public servants were, fortunately recorded. For example, a Raglan newspaper reported in 1962 on a public meeting called to promote the Maori Education Foundation, established in November 1961. The guest speaker at the meeting was Moana Raureti, Maori Welfare Officer for the Waikato. Earlier in his career in the 1950s in the Wairoa district of northern Hawkes’ Bay, Raureti appears to have developed a reputation as an agent avid for the stamping-out of ancient cultural practices, such as tohunga-ism.\(^\text{755}\) At the meeting Raureti was asked whether the Foundation would help preserve the language and culture of the Maori people:

[Mr Raureti] replied that he found that the major cause of crime among the young Maori people was his culture and tradition as his communal way of living in the past taught him to share things, and when he leaves his home he naturally thinks he can share everything his friends have, which is stealing. The sooner the Maori forgets his culture and traditions the better, as he has to learn to integrate fully with the white man, and education is the first step towards this living together as one people.

The local newspaper gave detailed coverage of an incident arising from this belittling Maori culture. A Maori woman in the audience protested vehemently. She explained that she was the mother of nine children, and that she was one of a whanau raised in a ponga hut with a pressed earthen floor. She stated with some passion that:

We are two distinct people in colour and creed. We as a Maori people have learned the language and ways of the white man. How much more do we have to give? There are good and bad but they have not learned anything about us. We have good to give to each other. My culture and traditions should be preserved. I will support the foundation if the funds are used to preserve my culture. Education cannot change a black man into white. There will always be a social barrier between a Pakeha and a Maori.\(^\text{756}\)

Quite plainly, this record of the voice of the marginalised speaks volumes about the feelings of Maori about Pakeha-driven policy that was extinguishing Maori culture as it promoted the benefits of progress. As we shall see, that voice was joined by a host of others in the 1970s as


issues of land and culture gained pre-eminence, sometimes at the expense of other issues such as education, work, training, up-skilling and employment.

It could be said that whereas the 1960s were characterised by an official policy which sought the ‘integration’ of Maori with the European mainstream and which paid little heed to the wishes of Maori themselves, the 1970s were characterised by a wholly different spirit that emerged as a result of several contributory factors. The voice of Maori was heard louder in the 1970s than ever before and Pakeha New Zealanders were made to realise, where earlier they had not, that theirs was not the only culture in the country. After about 1974 there was a marked shift in Government strategies, directions and goals that was arguably a response to many major social and economic changes including, the probable loss of New Zealand’s principal secure market for its primary produce to the U.K. when that State joined the EEC in 1973; and increased oppositional protest strategies initiated by increasingly politically pro-active Maori.
CHAPTER 7: THE UNRAVELLING OF PATERNALISM

7.01. Race Relations IV: The 1970s: The Renaissance of Te Ao Maori: Ka wha whai tonu matou

Throughout the 1970s, awareness by Maori of their deprivation relative to the Pakeha majority rapidly grew, heightened both by the process of urbanisation - which made the differences explicit - and the international transmission of anti-colonialist, pro-indigenous rhetoric. At the same time, this awareness was expressed more and more in activism of various kinds. The mainstream of New Zealand society was slow to respond, and the response when it did come was frequently one of confusion.

Urbanisation had brought young, educated and angry Maori whose awareness of their people’s plight was heightened by a growing international consciousness of the rights of cultures beyond the European one. Protest movements around the world mobilising causes - the war in Vietnam, Soviet repression, South African apartheid - all served to raise people’s appreciation of the injustice of rights denied. This incipient understanding was coupled with a fledgling cultural renaissance that recognised the status of Maori as a distinct and unique cultural group.757

In 1968 young Maori in Wellington printed the first issue of Te Hokioi, a newsletter proclaiming itself as a ‘taiaha of truth’.758 It proclaimed itself as a voice for all those who shared the cause of ‘exposing common problems shared by both races in the struggle for truth against incompetence and deceit in high places’.759 Te Hokioi believed racism to be the inevitable outcome of class inequality, and the exploitation of the workers by the owners of capital. Maori were perceived as being an oppressed section of the working class, whose interests inextricably coincided with all those New Zealanders who were being exploited.760 The issue was not about ethnicity, Te Hokioi claimed, it was about the age-old Marxist concept of class struggle.

The year 1968 marked the time when Maori issues of ethnicity were hitched to issues of class, oppression and marginalisation. This had been a phenomenon of other times of poverty and

758 ‘Te Hokioi Maori Iwi’, Issue 1, No. 1, 12 August 1968, MS-Papers-6373-51. ATL, Nat Lib.
deprivation in many other Western countries such as the 1930s. Parallel issues were perceived by many Maori activists in many international events beginning with the huge general strike of May 1968 that shook France. The dramatic growth in student political activism, the anti-war movement in the West, Black liberation in the United States, and national liberation struggles against United States imperialism were often perceived by Maori activists and Pakeha sympathizers as symptomatic of capitalist oppression.\textsuperscript{761} Occlusion of ethnic, class and cultural issues continued to be the outstanding feature of the passionate rhetoric of Maori activism through the 1970s with the Land March/Te Hikoi (1975), the Bastion Point/Takaparawha 509-day ‘occupation’ (1977-78), and the Haka Party incident (1979).

From 1969, Waitangi Day, the day set aside to commemorate the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi on 6 February, 1840, became the focal point for Maori protest. In its February/March edition in 1969, \textit{Te Hokioi} recorded that the elders of Ngapuhi, the tangata whenua of Waitangi in the Bay of Islands, refused to give a traditional welcome to Members of Parliament and government officials. An official from the Department of Maori Affairs, who had been asked to speak, reportedly departed from the script he had been given, and spoke instead of the injustices perpetrated against Maori.\textsuperscript{762}

Officially sanctioned as New Zealand’s ‘national’ day, Waitangi Day represented for many Maori the day on which the injustices they had suffered were to be remembered and acknowledged; the Treaty of Waitangi and what it represented set Maori apart as the tangata whenua, and as such they had particular rights - rights it believed were not being met, with Maori increasingly relegated to positions of inferiority. For the first time in the country’s history, people made complacent by their dominance were being forced to confront their received and unquestioned assumptions regarding the rights of themselves, and the rights of Maori.

Around the same time as \textit{Te Hokioi} first appeared, the Maori Organisation on Human Rights (MOOHR) was established, opposed ‘to discrimination on account of race or colour which puts at a disadvantage anyone seeking a proper share of the good things of life’.\textsuperscript{763} As with \textit{Te Hokioi}, MOOHR was self-consciously Marxist, observing that in relation to discrimination, the ‘answer to such a widespread and serious situation can be found only in changing the

\textsuperscript{762} \textit{Te Hokioi Maori Iwi}, 1 (4), February/March 1969, MS-Papers-6373-51. ATL, Nat Lib.
basic economic and social system which requires unemployment and discrimination to grease the wheels’. Allegiance was also expressed with other racial groups overseas that were being oppressed, particularly those in South Africa. Relying more on a tone of conciliation and reason than Te Hokioi, MOOHR saw in the Treaty of Waitangi a possible means of establishing a harmonious and bicultural country, a view that was premised, however, on past injustices being put to rights.

Maori voices found further opportunity with the formation of Nga Tamatoa, the young warriors, in the early 1970s. Where previous analyses and interpretations had suggested an integration of class and racial issues, Nga Tamatoa was possessed of the passionately-held belief that racism alone was at the heart of the basic social cleavages that fissured New Zealand. Inspired initially by the liberation rhetoric of the Black Power movement in the U.S.A. Nga Tamatoa directed much of its energies in promoting Maori self-development: a legal aid programme, an employment office in Auckland, and a nation-wide petition for the full recognition of the Maori language in the education system were some of the initiatives. They used demonstrations, petitions and pickets and made submissions to Select Committees. Arguably, from the early 1970s Nga Tamatoa gave voice to much of Maoridom, specifically the young, the urbanised, those Maori who were impatient to seek the justice it ardently believed had been denied since colonisation.

In 1972, the liberal-leaning National Government was decisively beaten in the General Election by the socialist-leaning Labour Party led by Norman Kirk. This change in government - even though it was short-lived - was an important ingredient which contributed to the changing nature of the race debate in New Zealand. The third Labour Government of 1972 - 1975 included within its number both young, university-educated professionals, as well as the more traditional Labour politicians whose roots were more frequently in the trade union movement than the socialist seedbeds of the universities. With its modern liberal values of equality and social justice, Labour was always going to look with greater sympathy upon the Maori cause than its more conservative predecessor. Additionally, Labour had already established a strong link with Maori through the Ratana movement. During the

764 Ibid.
765 Ibid.
767 Poata-Smith, 1996, p. 102.
769 In fact, neither the Prime Minister (Norman Kirk), nor the Deputy Prime Minister (Wallace Rowling), possessed a university degree. See Belich, 2001, p. 395.
Parliamentary debates on the Race Relations Bill in 1971, the Labour Members had manifestly expressed their view of New Zealand’s race relations:

No provision is made in the Bill to safeguard the cultural values of the subordinate people, of the minority groups in our community. That is why we [Labour] do not and cannot view the Bill with favour. It stipulates all sorts of things that we must do on the naïve assumption that some people are opposed to other people because of a difference in skin pigmentation. That is not so. On every occasion when difficulties arise it is because of the different cultural values and codes of behaviour of the two groups.770

The environment in which the Labour Party came to power was not overly favourable towards policies of redistribution and attempts at achieving some form of equality between the races. The New Zealand economy was coming under increasing pressure from a number of global forces, at the same time as the mostly urbanised young Maori population became increasingly visible and audible in its demands for justice. In 1968, MOOHR had hinted at the potential trouble arising from global economic pressures.771 New Zealand’s economy had been sharply weakened by the ‘oil shocks’ of 1973 and the entry of Britain into the EEC in the same year.772 At the same time, New Zealanders were being alerted with ever increasing frequency as to Maori ‘troublemakers’ of various persuasions, and the Government was being lobbied to bolster the faltering economy. Maori, concentrated as they mostly were in unskilled and manual labour, were the hardest hit by the inevitable economic decline.773 The Chairman of the Auckland District Maori Council expressed the concern many Maori were feeling:

For many Polynesians the statements that ‘we are one people’ and ‘we are all equal’ are becoming more and more hollow as the gap between them and the Pakeha widens in the economic, educational, housing and welfare fields and as their numbers in incarceration soar. And as voices of concern are raised, accusations of creating racial disharmony are made.774

By the early 1970s the long boom that had underpinned the social democratic consensus collapsed. A short recession between 1970 and 1971 hit nearly all the major advanced capitalist countries at once for the first time since the Second World War. A very sharp, synchronised world boom followed in the period 1972-1973. But the ‘oil crisis’ of 1973-1974 and an international crash in 1974 brought the golden years to an abrupt end as the mini commodity boom gave way to stagnation and mass unemployment on a scale that had not been seen in 35 years.775

775 Hawke, 1985, pp. 327, 331 and 336.
With Matiu Rata as Minister of Maori Affairs and Whetu Tirikatene-Sullivan as Minister of Tourism, there was a real expectation that a traditional social democratic party with Maori input would improve the social, economic and cultural position of Maori within New Zealand society. The intentions of Labour’s Maori politicians and the widely published bi-cultural agenda of the third Labour Government were, however, quickly offset by the political realities of a capitalist economy in crisis. This was to have dramatic implications for policy-making with respect to Maori.

Kirk’s Labour Government was forced to respond to a profound crisis of economic management which was the product of steadily worsening conditions of economic decline and fiscal instability coupled with a dramatic growth in unemployment (especially Maori unemployment). By mid-1973, the economic crisis deepened following a short-led export boom which saw the trade price index increase by nearly 35 per cent during the world commodity boom between 1972 and 1974. Inflationary pressures had grown to the point where the Government was forced to introduce legislation to freeze all awards and agreements for a period of ten months. By the end of 1973 the first oil crisis exacerbated the crisis of profitable capital accumulation which sent shock waves throughout advanced capitalist countries.

On 28 May, 1975, Te Roopu Ote Matakite was officially convened, taking as it motto the words of the warrior chief, Rewi Maniapoto: ‘Ka whawhai tonu matou: Ake! Ake! Ake!’ In the preamble to its manifesto, Matakite laid down its challenge:

The question the Pakeha must ask for himself is, is he willing to pay that price for the last three million acres of Maori Land, or is he ready to secure it to the Maori in perpetuity for the sake of justice and social harmony?

Led by Whina Cooper, the foundation President of the Maori Women’s Welfare League in the 1950s, Matakite did not, however, see the issues simply in terms of Maori and Pakeha. The real enemy, as it had been for groups such as MOOHR, was perceived as the capitalist state.

Common cause also existed for Matakite with black Americans, reference to which would always create disturbing images of unrest for Pakeha New Zealand:

778 Hawke, 1985, p. 327.
779 “We will fight on for ever and ever”, Preamble, Te Roopu Ote Matakite Manifesto, 28 May 1975, MS-Papers-6373-53, ATL, Nat Lib.
780 Preamble, Te Roopu Ote Matakite Manifesto, 28 May 1975, MS-Papers-6373-53, ATL, Nat Lib.
The alternative [to protecting Maori land] is the creation of a landless brown proletariat with no dignity, no mana and no stake in society. Like the blacks in America, they will stand outside society and aggress against it.\textsuperscript{782}

Matakite set out on a march from Te Hapua (near the northern tip - Cape Reinga, of the North Island - and significantly, the birth-place of Matiu Rata, Minister of Maori Affairs in the fourth Labour Government) in September 1975, arriving at Parliament Buildings in Wellington in October.\textsuperscript{783} The march, involving as it did thousands of people, attracted huge media attention, publicizing more widely than ever the alleged grievances of the Maori people.

The Labour Government, recognising in Matakite a formidable force, sought to ease some of its sense of grievance (and guilt), promised to redress past injustices and to make good its 1972 election promise of enshrining the Treaty of Waitangi in law.\textsuperscript{784} The roopu was not placated and the march went ahead. Even as it did so, the Labour Government carried through the House a piece of legislation which substantially, if slowly, changed the nature and substance of race relations in New Zealand.

The Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 was, in and of itself, of little moment. The Act empowered a Tribunal to investigate alleged claims of prejudice against Maori interests caused by acts or omissions of the government after the Act had come into force. In other words, and crucially, the Act did not address the Maori call for justice, the impact of which continued to be felt, experienced and manifested down to the present day. The Minister of Maori Affairs, Matiu Rata defended this lack of retrospective power by saying that the Labour Government had a fine record of providing redress directly and that issuing a tribunal with such wide-ranging scope and powers was too complex to be undertaken.\textsuperscript{785}

The second National Government of Robert Muldoon that came to power in 1975 was not dissimilar from earlier National administrations in displaying little interest in addressing Maori calls for justice. The Waitangi Tribunal was not convened until 1977, and it was so under-funded that, combined with its limited powers, it was almost totally ineffectual.\textsuperscript{786} Before the decade was out, however, it was made manifestly clear by Maori that Pakeha attempts at ignoring the issue in the hope that it might fade away would be futile. For Maori,

\textsuperscript{785} Minister of Maori Affairs, Hon. M. Rata, \textit{NZPD (Hansard)}, 10 October 1975, pp. 5407-5408.
the desire for ‘social justice’ and the restoration of ‘equality between Maori and Pakeha’ would be tireless and never-ending.

In 1977, the Race Relations Conciliator recorded that there had been ‘frequent inquiries and complaints regarding ... racial discrimination against the majority, that is, New Zealanders of European ancestry’. This discrimination was said to include such institutions as the Department of Maori Affairs, the separate Maori representatives in Parliament, the Maori Education Foundation and the Maori Land Court. As the Conciliator observed, these measures were justifiable under section 9 of the Race Relations Act 1971 which allowed for such discriminations to assist minority groups. Such justifications aside, for many Pakeha, the discrimination was itself an injustice, however well intended. The passing of the Human Rights Commission Act in 1977, enshrining in law the right to discriminate in favour of certain specified groups to achieve ‘an equal place with other members of the community’, only added to Pakeha unease.

One of these demonstrations of the Maori pursuit of justice concerned land. Orakei was the primary marae of the Ngati Whatua people of Auckland. In 1951, the marae, then located at Okahu Bay had been compulsorily acquired by the government and most of its inhabitants relocated to a new sub-division at Kitemoana Street - a short distance up the hill (‘Boot Hill’); in 1977, the government then sought to create a new subdivision on the land. Members of Ngati Whatua occupied the land for 509 days; their actions organised by the Orakei Maori Committee Action. On 25 May 1978, the ‘day the Government took off its mask of democracy’, the protestors were evicted in a ‘brutal police and military operation’ in which 222 people were arrested by a force of over 600 police. Maori resentment at the government’s continued denial of injustice was heightened still further.

The decade closed with a student incident of violence that provided newspapers with sensational headlines, and those opposed to Maori claims with ammunition for their cause. It also illuminated with blinding clarity the division between Maori and Pakeha New Zealand perceptions. On 1 May 1979, a group of about 20 Maori and Pacific Islanders charged into the

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788 It is interesting to note that in its 1979 report, the Department of Maori Affairs justified in its own existence by reference to the ‘common good of all New Zealanders’, which good would benefit from the development of the Maori resource. Report of the Department of Maori Affairs, AJHR, E-13, p. 3.
midst of the common room of the Engineering Faculty at Auckland University. Their aim was to stop the practice by the engineering students of the simulated haka which involved the complete evisceration by mockery of what was for Maori one of the most tapu of cultural expressions.792

The 1970s, then, closed with race relations in New Zealand at a nadir lower than they had been since the wars of the 1860s. This is not to say that each day necessarily brought with it the likelihood of racial conflict, but the scene was certainly set for conflict to break out periodically. The decade had started with a few Maori clamouring for justice and equality and a recognition of their right to determine their known future; it ended the decade with widespread protests by Maori, with many Pakeha expressing little more than bemusement and confusion as to the fuss, but not a few Pakeha profoundly apprehensive about race relations.793

7.02. The Shift to Biculturalism

The ideology underpinning government policies initiated by the Hunn Report remained the cornerstone of Maori policy during the four terms of the second National Government (1960 to 1972). In its last term, however, the policy came under increasing opposition from the four Maori MPs and a number of academics. For example, in April 1970, Koro Wetere, the new MP for Western Maori, strongly attacked in Parliament the policy of ‘pepper-pottin’. He claimed that it was destroying the very basis of Maori society and was promoting the disintegration of Maori communal social organisation. Further, he believed that the pattern of urbanisation was individual in nature, was atomizing Maori society and that Maori could no longer gather together into strong and effective organisations. The ‘malintegration of our people’ had been the outcome of the relocation policies, implementation of the Hunn Report, and the atomization of Maori society.794

J.M. (Jock) McEwen, Secretary of Maori Affairs (October 1963 - February 1975), and arguably, one of that rare breed - a passionate liberal humanist, defender and advocate of all things Maori, warned his minister in 1970 that there was ‘a widespread and deeply seated feeling amongst the Maori people that their culture and language have been downgraded by

the Pakeha decision-makers. A year earlier, and following a sharp but short-term spike in unemployment (1967-68) his deputy secretary, K. Laurence had advised the Secretary of Labour:

that the main causes of unemployment (poor educational qualifications, lack of job opportunities, ill health, unsatisfactory home background etc.) apply to non-Maoris just as much as to Maoris, [however], there are a number of additional factors which I think may explain why the incidence of unemployment among Maoris is so high. ... These special factors are:

(a) Their view of their ancestral lands. Many are reluctant to move away from the traditional area of their people, and the security that living among their own gives. There is also a tendency to return to these areas, where there often are virtually no avenues of employment, if they have been without a job for any length of time in the cities.

(b) Driven by economic fear to the family group, many who have been unemployed for some time adjust their mode of living to unemployment and other Social Security benefits payable and also to the extent that the family group or home community is prepared to support them. Unfortunately, some city workers who have lost their jobs return to their home areas where they lean heavily on the people there - and then show no inclination to resume gainful employment.

(c) Many Maoris are diffident about “pushing” their way into the better jobs that may be offering.

(d) Because they do not like being turned down, the Maori is inclined to give up if he fails in the first or second attempt to obtain employment.

(e) There is a certain employer resistance in some areas where many Maoris have quite an unstable employment history.

A later critic of the Report and its outcomes was the erstwhile Chief Research Officer of the Department of Maori Affairs, John Booth. He had worked directly with Hunn in the preparation of the Report and as we have already noted above, co-authored *The Integration of Maori and Pakeha in New Zealand* in 1962. Following apparent differences of opinion with Hunn, he became Secretary of the recently formed New Zealand Maori Council later that year. When he retired from the Secretaryship in 1970, he published a retrospective article on the Hunn Report in *Te Maori*, the journal of the Maori Council:

[Hunn] says in the Report that integration may only be a stage in the process of assimilation and at several points he indicates his opinion that this process involves the gradual loss of Maori culture, of Maoritanga. Whether he intended it or not, this has come to be seen as the by-product of his policies, if not their main aim, ‘integration’ is not a popular word on the maraes of New Zealand. ...

The Hunn Report advocated a policy of integration but paid no more than lip service to what should have been integration’s main point. Properly applied, a policy of integration would allow a wide range of choices to each individual so that he could shape his life to his own needs and desires. The servicing agencies, such as the Department of Maori Affairs, should ideally put no pressure on its clients to make one choice rather than

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796 Laurence to Secretary of Labour, 11 July 1969, AANK, 947, Acc. W3574, 30/1/28, Part 10, Maori Employment, ANZ, Wellington.
another. However, the Hunn Report and the policy of the Hanan administration tended fairly constantly to restrict ‘Maori’ solutions and to promote instead ‘Pakeha’ answers to the problems of the Maori people.797

It was at about this juncture - the late 1960s and early 1970s - that a rising tide of Maori opposition to the perceived inequitable outcomes of policies that had rarely taken into account Maori aspirations, wishes and values, began to be felt and heard. The increasing vocal protests came from a number of quarters, groups and organisations and broadly they can be characterised as usually tertiary-educated, second-generation urban, youthful, and often with some trade union links and urban. If it is possible to distinguish three groups who arguably were the most consistently critical of government policies, they were the Auckland District Maori Council, Nga Tamatoa and the Waitangi Action Committee. The first group, which included a number of Maori academics, employed conventional tactics and strategies of opposition through rhetoric and articulated reasoned argument, while the latter were younger Maori, often university-educated or with links to trade unions whose opposition was often more radical, expressing its demands both in words – including petitions for official recognition of te reo Maori and Waitangi Day – and in active public political protest and pickets.

Until the National Government lost office in late 1972 Government policy on integration remained firmly in place. There was, however, a change of position in respect of the desirability of legislation on racial discrimination. As has been noted above at the time of the proposed ratification of the I.L.O. Convention, Hanan and Hunn had refused to contemplate such legislation in the early 1960s, although much research into racial discrimination had been conducted by The Department of Maori Affairs. This however did not quell the demands for formal statutory regulations against discrimination. Petitions by Bishop Panapa in 1960 and the Canterbury Maori Executive in 1964 calling for such legislation, for example, were rebuffed.798 Bills prepared by Opposition members, such as the Unfair Discrimination Bill 1963 and the Contracts (Racial Equality) Bill 1964, had been voted down by the Government. According to Hunn, ‘prohibition by law of discrimination against the Maori in such matters as accommodation or employment would leave room both here and overseas for an exaggerated impression of the degree to which discrimination operated, would exacerbate existing


Nevertheless, integration still remained as the cornerstone of government's race relations policy. In a statement issued under the banner 'Progress Report by New Zealand on Government Activities' for the International Year for Action To Combat Racism And Racial Discriminations, the government emphasised its commitment to integration, and only added (almost as an afterthought) that that did not mean 'assimilation':

Full racial equality is fundamental to New Zealand’s way of life. The Government’s policy is one of integration. By this is meant the bringing together of different peoples with complete equality in the eyes of the law and with equality of opportunity in all fields of life, social, economic, political and cultural. The Government’s objective is that no-one should suffer social or economic disadvantage because of his race. Integration does not mean, however, that minority groups are to be assimilated by the majority; the right of all peoples to maintain their own cultural and social heritage is recognised and encouraged.

7.03. Biculturalism

The style, substance and purpose of Government policy substantially altered with the election of the third Labour government in 1972. A strategy was mapped out to set about undoing some of the effects of the policy of integration; race relations policy statements were from then couched in the rhetoric of ‘biculturalism’. The Prime Minister, Norman Kirk, when speaking in 1974 to a bill designed to reverse the direction set by the Maori Affairs Amendment Act 1967, criticised integration as a policy designed to force the minority culture to give up its customs and traditions:

The idea of one people grew out of the days when fashionable folk talked about integration. So far as the majority and minority are concerned, integration is precisely what cats do to mice. They integrate them. The majority swallows up the minority; makes it sacrifice its culture and traditions and often its belongings to conform to the traditions and the culture of the majority. ... We are one nation in which all have equal rights, but we are two peoples and in no circumstances should we by any law or Act demand that any part of the New Zealand community should have to give up its inheritance, its culture, or its identity to play its part in this nation.

That the Labour Government was determined on a thorough-going revision of policies as they affected the place of Maori in the larger social and economic context of the nation-state is no more evident than in its education policy. The Minister of Education, Phil Amos, accepted that the gaps identified by the Hunn Report had not been closed. On the contrary, he said that Maori were facing a crisis as the outcome of a complex combination of factors, including past government policies. He continued that these policies, unless consciously over-turned, were leading to assimilation; that urban relocation which split Maori communities was having a negative impact on te reo Maori, culture, and social organisation in both rural and urban settings; and that the attitude of the previous administration that Maori language and culture were matters to be perpetuated by the people themselves and should not be foundational components of the school syllabus were not appropriate. If these integrationist policies were to continue there was every prospect of the loss of te reo Maori and Maori culture. 802

The Minister of Education revived a dormant Educational Priorities Conference established in late 1972 by the previous government, and under a new name, the Educational Development Conference prepared a number of reports with inputs from a cross section of ethnic communities. Among these was one from the Maori education group that had been chaired by Robert Mahuta. In its introduction the report set out the basic components for laying the foundations of a bicultural nation:

The development of New Zealand as a truly bicultural and bilingual nation (1) depends upon policies based on consultation, co-operation and participation. In view of this, and because social and economic status depends so much upon education, a sympathetic understanding of Maori and Pakeha culture must permeate both the educational system and the attitudes of the wider community. Within this context the indigenous Maori culture has a special and unique contribution to make. 803

The recommendations of the report that were the outcome of this bicultural approach included – that te reo Maori be made available at all levels of the total education system from preschool to tertiary; that steps be taken to recruit and retain more qualified teachers of te reo Maori and that Maoritanga form an important part of the curriculum at all stages. 804 Not all of these recommendations were implemented as Government policy immediately, but they represented the first tentative yet brave steps in connecting the points of the ‘magic circle’ that Hunn had alluded to. There was however, a pronounced difference between Hanan and Amos:


804 Ibid., fol 1.
the shaping of a skilled and educated Maori working force was to be carried out through consultation, co-operation and participation. Maori social and economic status depended upon education, and a sympathetic understanding of Maori and Pakeha culture would facilitate progress to this goal.

The passage of the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 represented yet a further step along the path of the government’s commitment to biculturalism. This Act, promoted by the Minister of Maori Affairs, Matiu Rata, established the Waitangi Tribunal, which was granted a prospective-only jurisdiction to inquire into claims by Maori that they had been prejudiced by legislation and Crown policies. Three of the features of the Act are appropriate to the theme of this thesis. First, the long title of the Act incorporated an allusion to ‘the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi’, which was the first time this phrase had ever appeared in a statute. Secondly, the Waitangi Tribunal was given the exclusive authority to determine the meaning and effect of the Maori and the English text of the Treaty of Waitangi. Thirdly, the Maori text of Te Tiriti o Waitangi was directly incorporated into a statute for the first time, but sadly in a version that indicated a superficial understanding of the finer nuances and ambivalent transliterations of the original text in te reo.805

The Labour Government was ousted from office in 1975 and replaced by the third National Government. Although McIntyre resumed the portfolio of Maori Affairs until 1978, there was, however, no return to the policies of integration that had been vigorously pursued by him and his predecessor Hanan. His successor, Ben Riwai Couch, Minister of Maori Affairs from 1978 to 1984 during the later period of the third National Government, was not in favour of making Maori language a compulsory component in the state schools’ syllabus. He was satisfied with the ‘official recognition’ of ‘the Maori language of New Zealand’ in the preamble to the Maori Affairs Amendment Act 1974, and brushed aside any claim that this was tokenism. Couch refused to countenance policies that might separate Maori out as other than one of many cultures in New Zealand. For him, all minority cultures were entitled to respect and none should claim preferential treatment by the teaching of their language in schools. Any further legislative steps to promote the language were unnecessary he felt.806

806 Couch, 27 July 1981, AAMK 869, 16/2/1, 627a, Maori Language Committee: Promotion and Protection 1979–82, ANZ, Wellington.
In spite of - or indeed perhaps because of - the lack of positive direction from Couch, the National government promoted a number of policies that extended the ethos of biculturalism through a programme known as ‘Tu Tangata’. As a sign that the Government was conscious of its image as well as its integrity, the journal produced by the Department of Maori Affairs was re-named Tu Tangata. The programme was actively promoted and implemented by the energetic Secretary for Maori Affairs, I.P. Puketapu. In his 1983 annual report, Puketapu stated that in his five years as Head of the Department he had encountered a ‘deep-rooted allegiance in the Public Service to a philosophy of “integration of the Maori”, which was propounded strongly in the 1950s and 1960s.’ He continued in his report that:

[w]hile in some respects that philosophy may be sound enough, the results from Government programmes and Maori activities have been quite inadequate to prepare many of our young generation to meet the expectations set them by New Zealand society.

7.04. Race Relations V: The 1980s - the Pakeha Majority Takes Notice: ‘We are all New Zealanders’

At the beginning of the 1980s the relationships between Maori and the government were generally tense following the huge political demonstrations of the 1970s. The ambivalence of the government on race relations and South African apartheid as well as the use of the army in May 1978 to remove protesters against appropriation of Maori land at Bastion Point, extremely assertive policing of demonstrations during the 1981 Springbok Tour, and the threat to override findings against the government regarding pollution of traditional seabeds in Taranaki cast a pall over relations between the government and Maori of all regions and generations.

For the mainstream of New Zealand society - that is, Pakeha New Zealand - the effect of huge demonstration at Bastion Point was to explode the myth of racial harmony which had been carefully nurtured in the collective conscience. The tensions which had been building throughout the 1970s between Maori and Pakeha could no longer be dismissed as the voices of a disreputable few. If racial harmony had existed prior to the 1960s and if this had been made possible because Pakeha and Maori lived apart, this was no longer the case by the 1980s. A new tension emerged in Pakeha society, a tension that would remain unresolved throughout the decade. Its genesis had been hinted at during the brief period of the third Labour Government in the 1970s, but it remained undeveloped during the third National

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807 Department of Maori Affairs, Tu Tangata, Nos. 1–36, 1981–87. This replaced earlier publications entitled Kaea and Maori.
administration 1974 - 1984. This tension existed between a small number of educated Pakeha whose views were expressed by certain groups within officialdom - Pakeha officialdom - on the one hand, and on the other, the ‘average’ Kiwi whose received understanding of New Zealand had been irrevocably shaken. Throughout the 1980s there was a proliferation of official documents which spoke of biculturalism, multiculturalism, the unique status of Maori, the need for equity and social justice, and other vague yet worthy-sounding abstractions. All of this collided violently with that profoundly New Zealand conception of egalitarianism, a differing philosophy of justice which would provide for those individuals who - for reasons beyond their control - were unable to provide for themselves, and that there was only one law, and everyone was equally subject to it. At the end of this decade the official view on the unique status of Maori as tangata whenua, the original indigenous inhabitants who necessarily were possessed of particular and special rights, had been confirmed.

Issues embracing key cultural signifiers of Maori marginalisation and suppression such as land alienation remained paramount in the 1980s in the Maori protest lexicon. While a certain level of protest and empowerment occurred, there was a continuing, if somewhat diminished complacency throughout Pakeha society about the nature of race relations in New Zealand. This permitted a cautious and piecemeal policy change but did not address the widening divisions in society. One example of this ad hoc official approach (and also one which could be seen to address accusations of monoculturalism) was the establishment of Te Kohanga Reo/Language Nests in 1981 by the Department of Maori Affairs in response to Maori concern to ensure the continuing survival of the Māori language.

Besides the sometimes equivocal but nevertheless transparent official admissions about the nature of race relations in New Zealand there were some positive developments during this otherwise difficult period. In 1977, Kara Puketapu had been appointed to head the Department of Maori Affairs, to reorganize and revive an agency seen as old-fashioned, ineffective, marginalised and out of touch with Maori. Radical reorganisation followed, putting greater control of departmental activities at the local level and into the hands of (Maori) district welfare officers. The approach that Puketapu advocated came to be known as ‘Tu Tangata’, to stand tall. The Tu Tangata programme launched in 1977 sought to empower Maori communities to take responsibility for their own actions, and to reduce their dependence on the state.809 The broad objectives of Tu Tangata were to improve educational attainment, to

809 K. Puketapu, Reform from Within, Wellington: Department of Maori Affairs, 1982.

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provide opportunities for self-fulfilment within the community, to raise the socio-economic status of the Maori people and to kokiri, 'to advance'.\(^{810}\)

Three features of the new approach were identified as 'Tu Tangata', to recognise the stance of the people, 'Whaka Whaiti', to harness the resources and strengths of all the people and 'Ko tou rourou', to increase the contribution each of us can make to the advancement of the Maori and to New Zealand as a whole.\(^{811}\)

The opening out of the Department and the involvement of the Maori community (through annual Hui Whakatauira) released a flood of energy and purpose at local level through the Tu Tangata programme, and encouraged Maori to regain their initiative and confidence in handling the adjustment to living in the cities and to rebuild their whanau and social networks to deal with family issues and their young people. The kohanga reo movement, the Maatua Whangai concept to divert juvenile and other offenders from Department of Justice and Department of Social Welfare institutions, and Kokiri Centres all came from that period up to 1983. After that, under the leadership of Tamati Reedy of Ngati Porou as Secretary of Maori Affairs (1983-89), followed the Mana and Maccess training and employment programmes, the expansion of kohanga reo, the start of kura kaupapa and the implementation of the reforms coming out of the 1984 Hui Taumata.\(^{812}\)

Racial oppression in South Africa that had so strongly been opposed in 1981 was, it seemed, occurring much closer to home. In 1983, the Waitangi Tribunal published its first major report, concerning Te Atiawa in Taranaki, detailing some of New Zealand's disquieting past. This, together with the Te Maori exhibition that toured the United States in 1984 to a burgeoning of Maori pride were two important positive developments during this otherwise difficult period. It signified that Maori matters had moved - for better or for worse - from a previously marginal or localised level to one that warranted serious attention. This would lead to an officially promulgated concept of New Zealand as a culturally and ethnically diverse society and onward eventually to a more specific concept of biculturalism: that Maori were the tangata whenua and the centrepiece for nationhood in Maori-Pakeha relations. Racism, particularly institutional racism, and monoculturalism were publicly spoken of. The early 1980s was the period when a switchboard operator in a government department could be

\(^{810}\) Ibid., p. 3.

\(^{811}\) Ibid., p. 10.

\(^{812}\) Butterworth and Young, 1990, passim.
publicly criticized by a Minister of the Crown for greeting telephone callers with ‘Kia Ora.’ It seemed that diversity at a distance was, to a degree, acceptable but that Maori living within the wider population should not enjoy cultural differences. Nevertheless, thinking about equal employment opportunities led eventually to legislation in the late 1980s that enjoined public service managers to provide employment opportunities to Maori, amongst other disadvantaged groups. Later, from the 1990s, Maori activism was once again centred on land issues and the process of litigating and hopefully arriving at some form of settlement of alleged land grievances. 813

Somewhere in this process of what has been perceived popularly as all-engulfing, all-consuming Maori political activism, socio-economic issues of class and occupation were occluded or failed to make a significant mark. Maori protest politics embraced a range of competing political ideologies, which were informed by different assumptions about the causes of Maori inequality in the wider society, and in turn, initiated different sets of strategies for ameliorating and transcending that inequality. Issues concerning land and culture took centre stage; no working class self-consciousness by Maori, of Maori, for Maori, as part of some larger theoretically-based Marxist-inspired hierarchical class system seems to have developed beyond an incipient, embryonic stage. The focus was primarily on land, language and culture, cobbled together by a further re-working of the slippery concept of ethnicity, and along the way issues of class were subsumed in a totality of perceived alienation, marginalisation and subordination. This heady amalgam was dressed up by some writers in the emotive language of neo-Marxist rhetoric. 814

Throughout the 1970s, there was also a growing number of Pakeha, generally located in the educated, liberal-minded academic and literary fraternity, who, through writers such as Dick Scott, were becoming better informed as to the young state’s history, the injustices perpetrated against Maori and the continuing injustices of that time; as they became more aware, they became more uncomfortable. In 1983, the Planning Council published Issues in Equity, a


document which addressed the spectre of ‘social justice’. Also in that year, the State Services Commission published *Public Service in a Multicultural Society*, and warned of the threat of open conflict on racial lines. These two documents, however, were preceded by a publication which perhaps elucidated the nature of the race relations debate in New Zealand at that time more clearly than any other; this report, prepared by the Race Relations Conciliator, was *Race against Time*.

*Race against Time* was produced at a point in New Zealand’s history when the divisions between Pakeha and Maori were being confronted as never before. On 6 February 1981, Waitangi Day, New Zealand heard the resident Head-of-State, Governor-General Sir David Beattie, officially renounce the received myth of racial harmony, perhaps the first official challenge to the idea:

> For years we had ourselves believing we were the most harmonious country in the world - a shining light for all the world to see. What damaging years they were... We are not one people, despite Hobson’s oft-quoted words, nor should we try to be. We do not need to be. What we need to do is to live and work and play together as fellow human beings.

The Race Relations Conciliator then lent his support to this view in *Race against Time*. New Zealand was facing a racial crisis, the root of which was the pressure for mono-cultural conformity, and the decisions and actions to be taken would decide the country’s fate:

> We are at the turning point in regard to harmonious race relations. What we do now as members of a society will determine whether we have racial harmony or racial conflict. The myth of New Zealand as a multi-cultural Utopia is foundering on reality.

The *Race against Time* booklet was a bilingual publication that canvassed a wide range of views on cultural diversity, national identity, equal opportunity and institutionalised discrimination. One of the contentious issues raised in submissions to the Race Relations Office was the relationship between the policy of biculturalism and the concept of multiculturalism ‘often bandied about in political speeches or media articles as a popular cliché.’

The report argued for ‘Unity through Diversity’ and then made this observation:

> The first step towards a multi-cultural society is the deliberate development of a bi-cultural New Zealand. The two cultural foundations of New Zealand society must be recognised. It is no accident that the New Zealand crest is flanked by a Pakeha woman and a Maori man – representing the bi-cultural nature of New Zealand society. These two cultural groups are the foundation of a multi-cultural New Zealand.

The report went on to note that the second largest topic to be discussed in submissions was the retention of the Maori language and the development of a bilingual New Zealand. A

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818 Governor-General Sir David Beattie, quoted in The Dominion, 7 February 1981.
820 Ibid., pp. 50–1.
number of recommendations were made to enhance the status of te reo Maori and the hope was expressed that it would be recognised as an official New Zealand language.821

At the heart of the report - which significantly was printed in both English and Maori - was the view that New Zealand society was dominated by a single culture - that of the Pakeha - which had little tolerance for diversity or difference, and which functioned to obstruct and impede those whose cultural values and conceptions of the worlds were not of the same mould.822 The report suggested that ‘New Zealand’s present society was mono-cultural and ethnocentric, with the dominant Pakeha culture controlling all the major institutions and restricting other cultural expressions’, and that many of the racial problems being experienced stemmed directly from this ‘social control’.823 For this institutionalised discrimination to be eradicated there would need to be social change which would lead to the creation of a ‘true multi-cultural society, based on equality of opportunity in all spheres of human activity’.824 The report called upon the Government to enact policies to eliminate institutionalised discrimination so that all cultures could enjoy an ‘equal opportunity of cultural expression, together with an equal opportunity to share national resources.825 As part of this process of equalization, policies of affirmative action would be required to promote minority groups, including but not limited to Maori.826 The ultimate aim of these policies was the creation of a multi-cultural society, a process which was to be attained firstly by achieving a bicultural society in which, it was optimistically mooted, all peoples would harmoniously share in the two primary cultures of New Zealand - Maori and Pakeha.827 Finally, New Zealand had a choice to make, either to embrace its diversity or to condemn itself to racial strife: ‘We may still have the chance to become that society which some people thought us to be - but we are engaged, whether we like it or not, in a very real Race Against Time’.828

Race against Time encapsulated in a single document at a particular moment the seismic tensions rippling throughout New Zealand. For many, that is for those who were mind-locked in the lore of Pakeha New Zealand, these notions of separate peoples and of special rights threatened the basic concept of what it was to be a New Zealander, a place in which there were no divisions, no classes, a country in which everybody was equal, and in which

821 Ibid., pp. 62-4.
822 Ibid., pp. 4-5.
824 Ibid., p. 5.
825 Ibid., p. 5.
826 Ibid., p. 45.
827 Ibid., p. 51.
828 Ibid., p. 81.
everyone had an equal opportunity to succeed. Justice demanded that everyone be treated alike. This fundamental belief was incapable of reconciliation with the view of those who believed New Zealand to be a monocultural and ethnocentric society whose institutionalised discrimination prevented minority cultures - particularly Maori - from enjoying the same opportunities as Pakeha.

At the core of the discord was the challenge posed to mainstream New Zealand by the claim which said that the Maori polity itself had certain rights over and above individuals, and that these collectively-held rights created obligations on the part of the government. This was, in essence, a clash between differing notions of justice. The egalitarian Pakeha idea of justice was one which demanded that all be equal before the law, that all be treated alike, and that there be no special privileges for people merely on account of their membership of a certain group. Government treatment which amounted to affirmative action because of an apparent disjunction between the Maori ‘group’ and the Pakeha ‘group’; constituted a flagrant act of injustice against individuals. Why should an individual Pakeha, a real person living a real and tangible existence, be denied a place at university, for example, so that equality might be achieved between two abstract, intangible, unknowable groups? Equality of opportunity existed, and people got what they deserved through their own endeavours. To distinguish people on the grounds of race, as it was said, was simply an act of racist division which undermined the basic concept of equality before the law.

This Pakeha egalitarian viewpoint, however, was coming more and more under siege. Those New Zealanders - Pakeha and Maori alike - who believed that such notions of equality consigned one group to the status of a permanent underclass found themselves part of a groundswell of opinion that was gaining ground internationally. As the State Services Commission observed in 1983, New Zealand was required to pay its way ‘in a world which gives increasing emphasis to issues of racial justice’. Justice was not simply a value to be held between individuals; it was one which could be measured between groups - men and women, rich and poor, Pakeha and Maori - and the relative deprivation of Maori made it plain that justice was being denied. Those who asserted that ‘the best thing for all groups to learn is that they are New Zealanders first and foremost’, had to understand that when socio-economic distinctions fell along racial lines, this posed a greater threat to New Zealand’s prosperity than

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829 See, for example, the influence of the 1981 OECD conference on social policy on the language of the 1983 Planning Council paper, *Issues in Equity*.
did notions of multiculturalism and its alleged potential for creating divisiveness and unrest.\(^{831}\) This the State Services Commission put unequivocally:

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\text{It is in the interests of society as a whole to develop a positive approach to cultural diversity and make the changes needed to ensure equitable treatment of all groups in society.}^{832}\]

The battle being fought was over the politics of statistics, and for those who argued for special privileges for Maori, the assumptions were simply this: Maori constituted a particular group within New Zealand which was identifiably different from all others; this group was possessed of certain rights, amongst which was the right to equality of outcome with other groups; the statistics which indicated the relative achievement of groups made plain that this equality of outcome was not being attained; consequently, there was an obligation on society - via the apparatus of the state - to take special action to provide redress to Maori, such that equality of outcome would be achieved.

The issue of race relations was not just a 'Maori' issue - it had become an issue which concerned all New Zealanders, whether or not they wished to be carried along by the rising tide. The year following the publication of *Race Against Time*, the recently established New Zealand Planning Council released *Issues in Equity*, a study concerned with 'social justice' or 'getting a fair go'.\(^{833}\) Equity, so it was said, was not the same as equality, being more justifiable - allowing as it did for essential differences between people - and being a more feasible goal for society. It was concerned with ensuring 'more equal opportunity and more equal access, while still allowing for personal choice and initiative'.\(^{834}\) The Planning Council did concede that setting standards for equity and monitoring progress towards them were challenging and formidable though ultimately achievable tasks. Implicit within this report was the view that for many New Zealanders there was an equality of opportunity and that the cherished belief in a country in which anyone could succeed should they so choose was a convenient fallacy. Those Pakeha who suggested that equality of opportunity in fact existed failed to appreciate the institutionalised discrimination which prevented minority cultures - with Maori at the forefront of these - from succeeding.

At the same time as the mainstream of New Zealand was becoming more aware of these issues, the National Government (prompted undoubtedly by the leadership of the Department of Maori Affairs) had been shifting its official attitude with regard to Maori: rather than

\(^{831}\) Ibid., p. 11.

\(^{832}\) Ibid., p. 11.


\(^{834}\) Ibid., p. 3.
viewing Maori as a group to be assimilated, Maori were instead to be recognised as ‘an integral and legitimate component of society’ whose structures and culture could be seen as solutions, not problems.\footnote{A. Fleras and P. Spoonley, \textit{Recalling Aotearoa}, Auckland: OUP, 1999, pp. 115-16.} The Tu Tangata programme that had been launched in 1977 had sought to empower Maori communities to take responsibility for their own actions, and to reduce their dependence on the state. This trend towards the devolution of responsibility was continued under the fourth Labour Government which came to power in 1984.\footnote{The policy of devolution - giving over responsibility for certain services to Maori themselves, rather than relying on their delivery by government agencies - although superficially supportive of Maori desires for autonomy, was seen by many as neo-liberalism dressed up in liberals’ clothing.} This shift was part of the movement away from what one writer termed the policy of ‘intergrational amelioration’ - whereby the relative disadvantage of Maori was addressed through integration - to a policy of ‘distributive multiculturalism’.\footnote{A. Sharp, 1990, pp. 205-14.} This latter approach assumed as fact the existence of many cultures, each of which had certain rights, including the right to greater self-determination. It also required that the institutions which governed society be reconstructed so as to enhance, not restrict, the opportunities of those whose culture was not Pakeha.

Arguably, the early- to mid-1980s marked a momentous point in the history of New Zealand’s race relations. Prior to that point, the protagonists in the dialogue - Maori and Pakeha - had largely been speaking past each other, the one concerned with its own cultural survival, the other seemingly unaware of any such difficulties and unwilling to consider that New Zealand was not a utopia of racial harmony. By the time the fourth Labour Government was elected, the protagonists - at least those at the official level - were now speaking, if not the same language, then one that bore some common ground. The unique position of Maori within New Zealand had largely been secured, with recognition of this occurring at the legislative level: in 1985, the Labour Government amended the Treaty of Waitangi Act to allow the Tribunal to consider alleged breaches of the Treaty dating back to the time of its signing in 1840; in 1986, the Government included reference to the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi for the first time in legislation when it passed the State Owned Enterprises Act. This official position - couched in politically vague terms - was set out in a letter written in early 1985 by the then Prime Minister David Lange:

\textit{... our country’s history should not be overlooked in considering the relationship between the Maori people and the Government. The Treaty of Waitangi is regarded as a solemn compact between the two which this government is determined to honour. The Treaty

\footnotesize{835} A. Fleras and P. Spoonley, \textit{Recalling Aotearoa}, Auckland: OUP, 1999, pp. 115-16.\footnotesize{836} The policy of devolution - giving over responsibility for certain services to Maori themselves, rather than relying on their delivery by government agencies - although superficially supportive of Maori desires for autonomy, was seen by many as neo-liberalism dressed up in liberals’ clothing.\footnotesize{837} A. Sharp, 1990, pp. 205-14.
placed certain obligations on the Crown to protect certain rights of the Maori people, and these obligations have not always been met in the intervening years. It might have been supposed that this alteration to the relationship would have been reflected in an amelioration of the socio-economic position of Maori within New Zealand society. There is a note of tragic irony, therefore in the fact that, whilst the drive of official rhetoric pushed for the recognition of the unique and special status of Maori, the economic policies of the Labour Government were consigning Maori to further socio-economic deprivation. In other words, it was neither ameliorating through integration, nor multicultural distributivism. It is not surprising, then, that the monocultural face of New Zealand society was once more in the spotlight in 1986.

Puao-te-Ata-Tu (Day Break), a ‘ministerial advisory committee report on a Maori perspective for the Department of Social Welfare’, expressed its considered opinions in powerful, plain language; language that, if a little over-stated, was none the less appropriate to its message:

We need the co-ordinated approach that has been used to deal with civil emergencies because we are under no illusions that New Zealand society is facing a major crisis.

The report canvassed statistics regarding Maori socio-economic deprivation which were overall more widespread and serious than the 1960s. At the time of the writing of the report (1986), Maori were beginning to suffer even more as a result of the massive restructuring initiated by the fourth Labour Government. In its presentation the ministerial advisory committee mounted a case that pointed an accusatory finger at the agents of racism: the State, the institutions and the individual Pakeha. It was a persuasive report that raised many issues of State culpability. Some of the argument of the report is paraphrased in the following sections below.

In its preface, the report stated that the negative socio-economic statistics for Maori were the outcome of ‘cultural imperialism, deprivation and alienation’. It drew on an earlier report of 1975 by the Joint Committee on Young Offenders:

The Maori were over-represented in lower socio-economic groups. Other Government and non-government reports in the last decade have demonstrated that the relative socio-economic status between Maori and non-Maori has remained unchanged for decades.

A catalogue of statistics was presented including:

839 New Zealand Ministerial Advisory Committee on a Maori Perspective for the Department of Social Welfare, Puao-Te-Ata-Tu (Day Break), Wellington: 1986, p. 44.
841 Ibid., p. 15. Emphasis added.
Maori comprise 12 percent of the population; ... 62% of Maori leave secondary school without passing at least one subject of School Certificate compared to 28% of non-Maori. ... 45% of Maori own their own houses ... and 50% are renting whereas for non-Maori the comparable figures are 73% owning and 24% renting. ... Maori unemployment is 14% of the Maori labour force. The non-Maori rate is 3.7% of the non-Maori labour force.842

20% between ages 15 and 19 years are unemployed; 32% of all unemployed between ages 15 and 19 years are Maoris; 25% of the Maori labour force under age 25 are unemployed - almost 10,000 of Maori youth.843

It was the view of the committee that New Zealand had to address these disparities if it wished to survive - the confluence of relative socio-economic deprivation with racial groupings could only lead to massive social conflict:

We think that as a society we cannot survive much longer if we continue to ignore these facts and the situation which gives rise to them.844

The ‘situation’ that was under scrutiny was the monocultural institutionalised discrimination pervading New Zealand society:

The evidence seems overwhelming that the Maori underperformance in social and economic status and law observance is symptomatic of alienation and monoculturalism leading to the disintegration of traditional sanctions.845

As has been noted earlier in this thesis, historian Bill Oliver had observed in 1960 that within New Zealand’s ‘egalitarian’ society, it was Maori who were being enjoined to change, who had been forced to adapt, to compromise. At that time, the issue could be ignored by Pakeha New Zealanders because the problem was largely invisible. By the mid-1980s, this was most certainly not the case. This theme was extended by the ministerial committee when discussing in greater detail the issue of racism: the committee laid the blame for Maori disadvantage firmly at the feet of the monocultural system in which to be Pakeha was (probably) to succeed, but to be Maori was to fail. It questioned, in other words the deeply held belief in equality of opportunity, an equality which alone justified inequality of outcome:

The persistent myth advanced to explain the cause of Maori disadvantage is that the Maori have not “adapted” or have “failed” to grasp the opportunity that society offers. ... The fact is, though, that New Zealand institutions manifest a monocultural bias and the culture which shapes and directs that bias is Pakehatanga. ... Institutional racism is the basic weapon that has driven the Maori into the role of outsiders and strangers in their land.846

The language of the report was as passionate as that expressed two years earlier by Maori activist Donna Awatere, who angrily deplored that ‘Maori people were forced to live by rules’

842 Ibid., p. 15.
843 Ibid., p. 35.
844 Ibid., ‘Preface’.
845 Ibid., p. 36.
846 Ibid., Appendix III, p. 78.
not of their own making which ‘condemned [them] to a defeated life’. Here was officialdom using the language of the activist; the effect on many Pakeha must surely have been gravely unsettling.

The committee did not rest with this serving of rhetoric. It had expressed the alienation of Maori through Pakeha imperialism in language that was magisterial. In its description of Pakeha guilt by acts of omission, it used language that was ominous in its implications:

If a person within an institution that practises institutional racism, that person need not necessarily be racist. However, if those in positions of influence within institutions do not work to reduce and eliminate the monocultural bias that disadvantages Maori and minorities, they can be accused of collaborating with the system, and therefore of being racist themselves.

The committee was absolutely clear and totally convinced where the responsibility for Maori deprivation lay: New Zealand’s society was overwhelmingly monocultural and Eurocentric, working to advantage the Pakeha, and disadvantage Maori and others whose Weltanschauung differed in any way from the mainstream. To demonstrate unequivocally that this was the case - one had only to look at the social statistics, the observable effects, an argument previously made at the State Services Commission’s Waahi Conference in 1982.

On the incorporation of Maori into the labour force, the committee couched its opinion in general wide-reaching terms:

On the one hand, government policy tried to assimilate Maoris fully into the benefits of Pakeha education, health and culture. On the other hand it incorporated Maoris into Pakeha economic, legal and political life, regulating their participation and emphasising that Maori incorporation was on Pakeha terms.

Apirana Ngata, James Carroll and the Young Maori Party co-operated with Pakeha. They were conciliatory towards them and adopted many of their ways because they believed some adaptation was necessary for Maori physical survival as a race. In political and economic spheres, the goal was assimilation.

If it is possible to single out one factor above all others in the monstrous litany of colonial crimes that the committee claimed underlay Maori deprivation then that would be institutionalisation: ‘[t]he government approach to Maori in the 20th century was one of increasing institutionalisation.’

848 Puao-Te-Ata-Tu (Day Break), 1986, Appendix III, p. 78.
850 Ibid., p. 61.
851 Ibid., passim, but especially pp. 61-2.
The report stated unequivocally that institutions had to become more culturally inclusive and allow for cultural difference. Affirmative action was an ‘essential ingredient’ in bringing this alteration to the nature of the leviathan, as was the necessity of acknowledging biculturalism and the place of Maoritanga in New Zealand’s institutional arrangements.\(^{852}\) Put plainly, the edifice of New Zealand was racist (even though individuals themselves might not have been), and the relative disadvantage of Maori proved this. Therefore society had to change or be changed, so that ‘socio-economic parity between Maori and non-Maori might be attained’.\(^{853}\)

For those Pakeha shaken and discomforted by the language of the ministerial committee, the dominance of Maori on the committee might itself have provided them with a rationale - albeit a specious one - for ignoring or refuting its conclusions. Two years later, in 1988, when similar conclusions were drawn by a quite different body - a Royal Commission, such a rationale would have been difficult to sustain.

The Royal Commission on Social Policy which delivered its massive five volume tome in April 1988 (giving it the snappy title of \textit{The April Report}), was chaired by Sir Ivor Richardson, a judge on the Court of Appeal and a man not known for making unsubstantiated or sensational observations. The Commission’s brief from the Labour government was broad in scope and honourable in intent:

\begin{quote}
[to] report on what fundamental or significant reformation or changes are necessary or desirable in existing policies, administration, institutions, or systems o secure a more fair, humanitarian, consistent efficient, and economical social policy which will meet the changed and changing needs of New Zealand and achieve a more just society.\(^{854}\)
\end{quote}

Despite what might have been pre-judged as both utopian and Herculean, the Commission did not shirk from its warrant. \textit{The April Report} traversed every conceivable piece of social policy terrain, it listened attentively to the submissions of thousands of New Zealanders, and it concluded with a raft of recommendations for change. In contemplating the issue of Maori and race relations, the Commission poured over at length the all too familiar and disturbing social statistics relating Maori disadvantage.\(^{855}\) It noted the damage done to Maori society as a result of the pressure applied by Pakeha for Maori to adapt to the Western lifestyle.\(^{856}\) It observed, too, that the relative disadvantage of Maori at that time was ‘one of the consequences of the economic and social development of Pakeha New Zealand’.\(^{857}\) The

\(^{852}\) Ibid., p. 79.
\(^{853}\) Ibid., p. 36.
\(^{855}\) Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 386-99.
\(^{856}\) Ibid., Vol. II, p. 64.
\(^{857}\) Ibid., Vol. II, p. 398.
Commission also concluded that the Treaty of Waitangi was relevant to all aspects of well-being and that, in acknowledging Maori sovereignty, the Treaty recognised the special status of Maori as the indigenous people of New Zealand.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 42, 45.} Indigeneity brought with it certain rights not necessarily available to others, even if these rights were at times difficult to qualify.\footnote{Internationally, the status of indigeneity and the rights said to be immanent in that position, were being increasingly contemplated, and New Zealand was well-positioned both to contribute to and take from this dialogue. See, for example, the UN Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, and the International Labour Organisation Convention No. 169: concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries 1989.} Finally, although the Commission had not used language as passionate and provocative as that contained in \textit{Puao-Te-Ata-Tu}, it nevertheless referred to that document with approval.\footnote{\textit{The April Report}, 1988, Vol. II, p. 58.} As one commentator has observed, the Commission adopted an approach that was as bicultural and cognizant of Maori matters as it was capable of doing.\footnote{\textit{Sharp}, 1990, p. 240.}

Both the authors of \textit{Puao-Te-Ata-Tu} and the authors of \textit{The April Report} had expressed what had come to be a received assumption regarding justice and the distribution of goods which challenged and threatened to undermine the long-standing assumption of equality of opportunity. Pakeha New Zealand had long assumed that everyone had the same life chances, and that people would get those goods which they deserved through their efforts. Inequality of outcome was justified by equality of opportunity. For those who did not succeed, the state would be there to support them. This, however, was not the view of \textit{The April Report} writers. Rather, New Zealand was reproved as a country that had been dominated by a monocultural edifice which had prevented those of other cultures - particularly Maori - from achieving similar levels of success. Trade-offs would be required between individual and group conceptions of justice and, in the official view at least, the right to group equality took precedence.

Officially, at least, this was the note on which the 1980s drew to a close. In the weighty words of the Chief Judge of the Waitangi Tribunal, Maori had become ‘a domestic constitutional entity entitled to special recognition’.\footnote{E. Durie, ‘Justice, Biculturalism, and the Politics of Law’, in M. Wilson and A. Yeatman (eds), \textit{Justice and Identity: Antipodean Practices}, Wellington: BWB, 1995, p. 34.} The rhetoric spoke of Maori as the indigenous peoples of New Zealand who necessarily had a unique status which was confirmed by the Treaty of Waitangi. They were the ‘tangata whenua’ who had been promised an ‘equal status
as citizens of Aotearoa’, a status which was being denied them. The Waitangi Tribunal continued to establish itself as New Zealand’s ‘official’ historian, whose approach was unmistakably favourable to Maori, and which constantly reminded Pakeha of the injustices which their forebears had perpetrated. The contemporary monocultural Pakeha nature of New Zealand society itself served to alienate Maori in their own land, and only by actively addressing this bias could the relative disadvantage of Maori be remedied. Pakeha New Zealand could have been forgiven for feeling itself under siege. The long-held and cherished belief in a society in which those who wished to succeed could do so, a society in which everyone was equal before the law, and in which everyone was equal before the law, and in which the two races lived side-by-side in harmony, this belief had been rudely torn asunder. It was undermined further by the neo-liberal policies of the fourth Labour Government which sought to remove the responsibility of the state for ensuring people’s welfare, a role which was integral to notions of an egalitarian New Zealand. It would be fair to say that by the end of the 1980s, Maori had forged something of an identity for themselves in the crucible of land, language and cultural protest, whereas Pakeha New Zealanders were on the defensive, facing something of an identity crisis, the attempted resolution of which would manifest itself by the reaction in the years to come.

CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION

This thesis concentrated on the development of government policy, on key commissions of inquiry and the formulation and implementation of legislative programmes which occurred in the important period of the shaping of a Maori workforce to meet the requirements of the rapidly expanding manufacturing and servicing sectors of the economy and the equally rapid urbanisation process. The topics addressed focussed on government legislative initiatives in the domains of education, employment, housing, industry and commerce, labour, trade, and race relations, key investigations and commissions of inquiry, the agendas that shaped these policies, the attitudes that informed these agendas, and the outcomes for Maori in terms of occupation, employment, and general well-being. The main period surveyed was that of Maori urbanisation from 1935 to 1975. In order to give context to this central focus, substantial material was presented relating to the period before 1935, while some developments were traced subsequent to 1975. Necessarily, the thesis has been able to interrogate only a limited number of topics within the large field of study. Some topics have been mentioned only in order to highlight the need for further research.

A constant theme of government policies on Maori affairs up until 1974 was assimilation. This was pursued and implemented in varying degrees by successive administrations in all eras from the time of official colonial annexation in May 1840. Nineteenth century settlers were firm in their belief that eventually Maori custom would be wiped out, except for token cultural aspects, and that Maori would become brown-skinned Pakeha. Historian Alan Ward noted this in relation to Governor FitzRoy’s instructions from Lord John Russell in 1844. This policy was continued in the nineteenth century, well into the twentieth century. From 1961 until at least 1974 this policy was accelerated by the Government following the recommendations promoted by Hunn in his 1961 report.865

This belief of cultural extinction overlooked the adaptability and fluidity of Maori culture. Assimilation - as well as assuming a cultural superiority - also presumed a belief in the evolution of a homogenous if somewhat diverse culture where the dominant socio-economic order - Pakeha - ultimately exercised control. From 1840 to 1974, however, Maori were not assimilated. A diverse range and number of strategems were implemented over this long

865 Ward, 1973, pp. 38-9; J.K. Hunn, Department of Maori Affairs, ‘Report of the work and function of the Department of Maori Affairs, the Maori Trustee, and the Maori Land Court’, 12 December 1960, Section E E-1, SSC 1, Acc w2302, 20/2/29, vol 2, box 182, Maori Affairs till 31/12/57, ANZ, Wellington.
period to attempt to bring this about assimilation, but as has been evidenced throughout
dissertation, the urbanisation and proletarianisation processes failed to assimilate Maori. This
was most noticeable with the Department of Maori Affairs’ housing policy of the 1950s and
1960s which failed for a variety of reasons to assimilate Maori.

When Maori have demanded inclusion they have been denied or granted only limited
participation. This has also included their participation in government land development
schemes which have arguably been defined not only in benefits to Maori, but in benefits to the
national economic good – often couched in altruistic terms. Therefore, while governments
have officially supported assimilation, exclusion has also been benignly favoured. The call by
Maori for education in the 1870s was only partially supported and Ngata’s land development
schemes were arguably sanctioned to stop Maori competing for jobs and social security with
Pakeha.866 John Forster has claimed that government support for trade training in the 1960s
was possibly implemented at a time when the demands of industry were changing and when
the skills level of the general work force was being raised. Ironically this had the effect of
probably perpetuating the employment of Maori in lower status occupations.867

One of the most salient features of inclusionary policies was the consistent attempt to co-opt
ethnic leaders within a quasi-separatist bureaucratic structure in the administration of New
Zealand according to David Pearson.868 Certainly there is an abundance of evidence to support
this interpretation. To varying degrees this has occurred in New Zealand political history from
the earliest times of colonisation. The Young Maori Party’s alliance with the Liberals and
Reform at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the Ratana alliance with Labour
from 1934 and the establishment of the New Zealand Maori Council with its initial National
Party-backed membership could be perceived as examples of this tactical manoeuvre. More
covertly, inclusionist politics also included under-funding and hindering the development of
quasi-autonomous organisations, such as occurred during World War II with the tribal
Executives and Committees, or the Maori War Effort Organisation.

The effects of colonisation and subjugation on most Maori were pervasive. Specifically, their
loss of land pushed them into deprivation and poverty. The demographic impact was huge. In

Whanui Series, 1997; also refer to A. Harris, ‘Maori Land Development Schemes, 1945-1974, with Two Case
1896 (at which point Maori population numbers had reached what was to become an all-time low of about 42,000), almost all adult Maori males were subsistence farmers living with their extended whanau in rural dwellings in village communities concentrated in the northern and eastern regions of the North Island. Some workers were able to augment their subsistence living by selling their labour seasonally to Pakeha farmers, timber millers, sheep shearing contractors, meat processing and freezing works and other employers. Generally, however their lives and those of their families were impoverished in a very material sense. The very few urban dwellers were in communities adjacent to or engulfed by the growth of European towns and cities. Fewer still were in the South Island.

In 1926, only 16 percent of Maori lived in urban areas; in 1936, just 17 percent of the Maori population was urban dwellers, but this figure grew to 25 percent by 1945 and reached 62 percent in 1966. 869 Their much-diminished land resource base could not support an exponentially increasing population. It has been pointed out that this was the fundamental driver of the rural-urban diaspora. By the time of the outbreak of global war in 1939 some Maori, most particularly those on the East Coast, had undergone changes in their means of gaining a livelihood as an outcome of the land development schemes; some Maori had limited improvements in their standard of living as a consequence of either a small increase in their income and/or favourable outcomes of the government health programmes.

The immediate triggers for Maori urbanisation were the dynamics of the Second World War-driven economy. In this urbanisation (or second) phase of incorporation into a global capitalist system, Maori were drawn into waged participation in the workplace. During these mid-twentieth century decades a hierarchically organised socio-economic order emerged which had a gender-denominated tiny elite, a small middle class, and a substantial lower class of semi-skilled and unskilled workers. Maori were becoming one of the most highly urbanized indigenous peoples in the world over this period. More Maori flocked to towns and cities, and therefore Maori, and Maori ‘problems’ became more apparent to central government and Pakeha society. The Maori population had risen to 99,000 in 1945.

In 1976, 76.2 per cent of Maori were urban and 23.8 per cent rural. Urbanisation had led to a much wider range of employment opportunities for young Maori workers. However, they were restricted in their employment opportunities by poor educational attainment levels, few job skills and employment prejudice. The outcome was that many Maori were drawn into

unskilled or semi-skilled jobs in expanding secondary industries in towns and cities. By 1976, 37 percent of Maori males and females were working in manufacturing industries, with a further 29 percent of men working in construction or transport and communication. This pattern of employment had rapidly become entrenched, and the legacy was apparent in 1976 in the occupational distribution of Maori, who were three times as likely as non-Maori workers to be in elementary occupation or plant and machinery work and markedly less likely than non-Maori to be in professional or administrative or managerial jobs. As the New Zealand economy diversified from reliance on agricultural exports, and technology replaced manual work, Maori workers appeared to have become trapped in declining industries such as farm labour, meat processing, and in semi-skilled occupations in production and service industries.

Throughout most of the 20th century, average household incomes of Maori were 20 percent or more less than those of other New Zealanders. Furthermore, these lower incomes had to support larger households and families with more dependants. In 1976, over 38 percent of Maori lived in households with incomes in the bottom quartile of household incomes while fewer than 13 percent lived in households in the top quartile. The median income of Maori men was 30 percent lower than that of non-Maori men. Maori women had considerably lower incomes than men; they were 12 percent lower than those of non-Maori women.

Low incomes inevitably had consequences for housing tenure and quality. Maori-occupied dwellings had more occupants than the national average; they were more likely to be overcrowded, and less likely to have a full range of modern facilities. In 1976 only half of Maori, compared with three-quarters of non-Maori, lived in owner-occupied dwellings. These economic and social factors – low incomes and low savings, low educational attainments, low vocational skill levels, poor housing and poor health – formed a cycle of cumulative deprivation, with each factor reinforcing the other, leaving few pathways out of a lifetime of relative poverty.

Matters of Maori self-identification seemed to be of little concern to Maori in the 1950s and 1960s. Maori generally identified themselves as ‘Maori’. Rather, what they were enjoined to aspire to was the assimilationist paradigm of social status achieved by educational and

871 Ibid.
vocational signifiers such as tertiary qualifications and a career path in the occupational field for which they were qualified. The social hierarchy for Maori was to be a replica of the Pakeha order. Apart from a few residual (or revived) aspects of Maori culture (traditional or re-invented) Maori were essentially expected to adopt the life-style, habits and behaviours of Pakeha; in short to adapt to the Pakeha way of living. Their housing, their schooling, their ways of life were largely expected to conform to Pakeha models. That this should be a standard for the new generation of Maori is evident from the literature and documentation initiated and actively promoted by State agencies, especially the Department of Native/Maori Affairs (through its officers and the quarterly magazine, Te Ao Hou) and to a lesser extent the Department of Labour (through its officials and its quarterly journal publication, the Labour and Employment Gazette).

Despite a long history of colonial subjugation, class formation in Maori society, along similar lines to the social hierarchies that evolved in Pakeha New Zealand society, was extremely limited. The Maori elite at the time of the implementation of the Hunn recommendations was very tiny, numbering probably only about 200. Their location at the apogee of Maori society was at the intersection of axes informed by modified concepts of rangatiratanga and Anglo-derived paradigms of social and economic distinction. The number of Maori who could be defined as middle class at that time was very small, whereas the number of Maori who could be classified as lower class was relatively large. The thesis has explored a number of tentative explanations for this. Among them are: first, a lack of consciousness among both rural-dwelling Maori and the urbanising unskilled and semi-skilled Maori of any certain concept of themselves as working class; and second, a vague unvoiced feeling of exclusiveness among Pakeha trade unionists that their struggle for industrial rights was a fight for Pakeha alone.

There is very little evidence of debates among Maori about class in any documentation until the phenomenon of increasing unemployment emerged in the decade of the 1970s. With the exponential explosion of Maori unemployment during the late 1980s and 1990s these debates were re-engaged. Issues of land, language and culture, however, became the abiding concerns of Maori in these later times. Issues of class were subordinated to the all-consuming twin foci of loss of land and loss of culture. Maori feelings of grievance of course were palpable and manifested themselves in massive oppositional campaigns at Bastion Point, Raglan and elsewhere.
Historically, the theme of paternalism underpinned the ethno-cultural dynamics between the dominant Pakeha majority and the Maori minority. These attitudes were the sub-text underlying the formulation and implementation of government policies as they affected Maori, especially in the domains of education, housing, labour, health and welfare.

Generally, these policies re-established, reinforced and reflected settler perceptions that Maori should be subservient to Pakeha values and needs. The colonial regime had put in place policies which had a sub-text that Maori should be kept in a state of benign segregation, preferably, out of sight, and at a distance. The phenomenon of Maori urbanisation shifted these attitudes. Linked to these beliefs was a general feeling that the social and economic lot of Maori should be ameliorated and improved, for both the good of Maori (and Pakeha) and the health and wealth of the nation. Any attitudes of social and cultural superiority that might have lingered long after legislation explicitly outlawed any racial discrimination, were minimal.

Also influential in the mid-twentieth century decades of enormous social, economic and demographic change for Maori was the growing international debate on issues of racism. The Hunn Report of 1961 signalled a clear determination from officialdom of the imperative for government to move decisively to prevent the development of a Maori under-class and a potentially segregated society. Absolutely, there was a widely held public belief that segregation in every sense was abhorrent. The disturbing examples of South African apartheid and southern U.S. segregation against both of which there were intense international oppositional protests certainly influenced the decision to dis-establish the separate Maori school system in the 1960s. The parallel systems of Pakeha and Maori education systems were firmly held by Department of Education officials in the decade of the 1960s to be socially dangerous.

Arguably, the most important aspect in the shaping of a Maori workforce had been the provision of broadly basic education systems available at either the Native/Maori schools or the State education board schools, both with a monocultural, monolingual curricula, basic trade and technical skills training systems and very limited, very restricted professional training courses for Maori. Central to the construction of a State-constructed identity for the Maori workforce was a specially designated government-run Native/Maori school system and curriculum established in 1867. The agenda of the state was explicit. Schooling was a tool in the acculturation of Maori to European ways according to accepted European societal norms.
Until 1969, when the Maori school system was dis-established, Maori pupils could attend either a Maori school or a public primary school. Once Maori pupils reached Standard Six there was, however, no state-funded secondary schooling available. Until the establishment of the Native/Maori District High Schools in 1941, the only avenue open to young Maori wanting to extend their studies was to gain entry to a Maori denominational boarding school via a Department of Education scholarship or by parents paying the school fees.

The continuing existence of the elite denominational schools well into the twentieth century, albeit with fluctuating fortunes, was indicative of the persistence of the State-driven political socialisation of Maori. The selection of Maori boys and girls for the church schools was central in the differentiation of one section of Maori from another. It was a process that was informed by complex notions allied with class, religion, occupation and hapu identity. In this way Maori were classified and stratified along organisational lines similar to the Pakeha hierarchy, except that they were separate from and different from (and implicitly lesser in status) than the Pakeha hierarchy, at least in popular Pakeha perception.

The purpose of separate and practical curricula for boys and girls in their respective schools, was to inculcate skills necessary to promote the dignity of manual labour for the boys and the role of domestic helpmeets, wives and mothers of a Maori labouring class when they returned to their district. In this way, the agenda prescribed that the purportedly natural differences in capacities and needs on the basis of gender and race, underpinned economic relations as legitimizers of inequalities in class position. The colonial tradition of the denominational schools lingered well into the latter part of the twentieth century.

It has been demonstrated that mid-twentieth century education programmes for Maori still retained a large measure of the patronising, paternalistic spirit and style of colonial pedagogical ideology. There was a provision of restricted options from a limited range of prescribed curriculum choices - almost solely in general or technical courses for trade-training in schools education, and a very narrow range of State-funded trade training facilities for a small number of successful Maori applicants. Likewise, entrance to university to obtain professional qualifications was restricted to the very few who had successfully overcome private prejudices, social injunctions, institutional discriminations and educational difficulties to obtain a university place.
The provision of general education for the growing numbers of young Maori was a continual concern for the first Labour Government, and it initiated and conducted a number of investigations and reports. Of these commissions, the most wide-ranging and important were those organised by the National Employment Service and the NZCER in 1945-46. Their conclusions were, in essence, that if Maori were to compete for employment on equal terms with other New Zealanders, they needed the same educational qualifications. Yet many of the recommendations were not put into effect, or were only partly carried out. For example, despite a strong recommendation from the Employment Service for the establishment of the Maori District High Schools, a total of only four were completed, and all in the eastern Bay of Plenty.

A limited vocational guidance service for all students, Pakeha and Maori, both within and outside the secondary school service and the introduction of work placement services were minor policy innovations by the first Labour Government but lack of funding and weak policy implementation meant that there was little achieved. Liaison between the agencies of government in providing guidance to young Maori was almost always the work of dedicated teams of Maori welfare officers in the cities and large towns. Yet, it has been demonstrated that these key figures in the social process of urbanisation were seriously under-funded and over-worked. Annual Reports of the Department of Education in the late 1940s and 1950s repeatedly showed that the number of Maori children who went beyond Standard Four was very low compared with Pakeha. Thus, during the administration of the first Labour Government and its successor, the first National Government, educational opportunities and government policy relative to Maori education were largely left in a state of benign neglect. The Hunn Report revealed (among a wide range of other negative social and economic statistics) that the proportion of Maori apprentices, sixth-formers, and university students was much below that of the European population. In line with Hunn's recommendation the second National government established the Maori Education Foundation in late 1961. This was an innovative and enterprising step, marking out an area of social and educational deficit and setting forth to improve Maori opportunity by a specifically targeted application of positive discrimination. During its first decade of operations the Foundation scored some not inconsiderable successes in promoting and encouraging extended and higher education of Maoris and providing funds for this purpose.

The shaping of a Maori workforce in the period 1935-75 straddled an era of enormous social, economic and demographic changes for Maori and a shift in the ideology of the place of
Maori in New Zealand society. This process was inextricably part of a larger drive to forge a role and identity for Maori that fitted an assimilationist paradigm. It was essentially a one-way process. The long era of assimilation ideology that had driven so many of the government policies of the nineteenth, early and mid-twentieth centuries culminated in a sudden and climactic turn in the early 1960s with the various attempts to address the ‘Maori problem’ with State-initiated policies of ‘integration’. Cultural and racial views had molded the dominant Pakeha/settler group perceptions, attitudes and behaviours towards Maori, leading to their restricted opportunities and limited structural incorporation into society and the economy. Not only did Maori face social controls and restrictions in the types of work, occupation and employment for which they were considered most suitable, but there were similar inequalities in housing, education and political representation. It was this historical Pakeha structural control, combined with an equally powerful Anglo cultural hegemony that was challenged by two confrontational strategies in the 1970s by Maori, both of which were public and increasingly vigorous and widespread. The first was cultural and manifested itself in a growing Maori cultural resurgence, given official recognition in the Tu Tangata programme of the 1970s, one outcome of which was the establishment of kohanga reo programmes in the early 1980s for young Maori children and support for biculturalism; a second outcome involved persistent political lobbying by elected Maori representatives and a host of Maori interest groups for greater structural and more equitable political, economic and social incorporation of Maori.

Viewed from the Maori perspective, New Zealand’s national identity had been based on an Anglo-Celtic ethnic heritage, and Maori were to be assimilated or they would remain outside the nation. Maori increasingly rejected this ideology. They increasingly perceived themselves, as equal to and alongside Pakeha, as one of two charter groups under the Treaty of Waitangi. Their goal therefore, from the mid-1970s was a biculturalism that accepted as co-equal the cultural rights and identities of both groups, and which, Maori later argued, was opposed to any policy of multiculturalism, which would implicitly deprecate Maori ‘rights’ by placing them on an equal plate or footing with those of later immigrant groups.

Equality for Maori was historically an uneven reality. For example, in terms of their place as citizens, their political enfranchisement as voters had been a felicitous contingent act by an otherwise unsympathetic government in the 1860s; and in a further example, only from the time of the first Labour government, Maori had reluctantly and belatedly been given access to State benefits. The attempts by the same government in the late 1940s to implement a
programme of co-ordinated policies in housing, employment, trade training, education and health was ad hoc, half-hearted and partial. Worthy attempts to set up inter-departmental committees to co-ordinate Maori policy had foundered after two years on petty inter-departmental jealousies and on the lack of any genuine vision. Thus, the first Labour Government and the first National Government seem to have accepted that market forces (which at the time of the boom in export receipts in the early and mid-1950s) were positively favourable to Maori employment, even though that employment was largely in the area of unskilled and semi-skilled work. Large-scale government intervention in employment areas was implicitly held to be unnecessary and unwarranted.

The record of the first National government of the 1950s was more satisfactory than its predecessor. Much evidence has been cited of the prodigious efforts made by government departments and by voluntary agencies including the MWWL - in the domains of housing, health, employment and general welfare - to assist Maori in their adaptation to the urban and manufacturing/industrial environment. The net outcome of these Herculean endeavours by Maori public servants and welfare and vocational officers was positive. By any measure most Maori had a distinct upward improvement in their life-chances and their material, physical and financial circumstances as a consequence of re-location and steady employment in the 1950s. Yet there were still some serious social issues in need of attention in the late 1950s. It has been argued that the initiative for the thorough review of the so-called ‘Maori problem’ (subsequently named the Hunn Report), came from the Ratana Labour MPs whose lobbying successfully convinced Labour Prime Minister (and Minister of Maori Affairs) Walter Nash. Many of the strong recommendations of the Report, couched in language that was a reflection of Pakeha attitudes, were partly implemented by the succeeding National Government.

Any assessment of the record of the second National Government’s policies and their implementation must necessarily be guarded; compared to the first National Government, its achievements were limited. Certainly there were successes in a few areas of vocational training, apprenticeship schemes and work placements, but the frequent incidence of racial discrimination under-mined the quiet success of some Maori Affairs programmes. There was in the 1960s frequent reporting of discrimination. Hunn, McEwen and Hanan, all intimately concerned with the implementation of integration, were all deeply committed to social equality, yet the legislators of the 1960s did little or nothing to outlaw the petty discrimination in workplaces and housing that were constantly reported to the media and government agencies. It is a matter of record that the Maori Council, established by Government fiat in
1962, especially the Auckland regional branch under the dedicated direction of such committed social warriors as Ranginui Walker and Pat Hohepa, as well as the active social work of the Maori Women’s Welfare League in many large and small urban centres, did much to ameliorate the symptoms of many problems that urban Maori families were encountering.

Throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s Maori unemployment grew at a relatively faster rate than that of Pakeha. Even a short sharp increase in Maori unemployment, which was quickly reversed, in 1967-8, did not alert Government that some fundamental reform was necessary. By the mid-1970s, the chronic and deteriorating Maori social and economic situation needed urgent attention. It has been demonstrated in the last chapter that Maori feelings about continual marginalisation and privation, loss of land and culture were tense and frequently strident. These feelings were certainly further fueled by constant media attention to negative Maori statistics and protest action.

The occupational position of Maori workers within the labour market and the inculcation of them and their whanau into the wider social, economic and cultural system was the outcome of a complex interaction of factors. It is challenging to apportion any weight to any one single factor, but it is necessary to acknowledge that the over-riding forces - albeit abstract ones - in the dynamics were global finance and capital, world trade and commerce, which kept the small, dependent economy enmeshed in the capitalist system. The processes of the shaping of a Maori work force were integrally part of a wider global process over which they as individual subjective actors had absolutely no control, and even the principal agent of change, the government, had minimal influence and even less control.

The policies of the State were however critical in a series of acts of commission (or omission) that impacted on national economic management and social control which ultimately had profound and pervasive consequences for Maori. These policies can be grouped into five: the legacy of Native/Maori land alienation policies which led to Maori over-population relative to land resources in rural areas, thus giving the ‘push’ for migration; the continuing refusal of government - at least till the late 1940s - to freely accept that there was a limited future for Maori on development schemes in the country; fiscal, trade and tariff policies, coupled with business and commercial incentives to enhance and expand the infra-structure for secondary and tertiary industries in the major metropolitan areas, thus expediting rapid economic growth in the post-World War II period, and bringing about chronic labour shortages, which
established the 'pull' for Maori rural to urban migration; the policies of the State in the post-World War II period, in particular the promotion of immigration from the U.K. and northwest Europe to fill skill deficits and the meagre and over-selective attention to training only limited numbers of Maori workers, channelled Maori into low status, low paid employment in labouring, manual and semi-skilled jobs. These were reinforced by State housing policies, the education system (where from the late 1960s, government focus was not on the benefits of an integrated system, but on the dangers of an increasingly segregated one) and covert employer discrimination.

During the 1970s the low level of participation and achievement by Maori youth in the educational and occupational structures of New Zealand society had come to be interpreted as the result of social alienation caused by the loss of cultural identity. On the one hand, Maori youth were seen as unable to identify with mainstream social institutions because of cultural differences. On the other hand, the accumulated pressure of decades to conform to Pakeha ways had caused Maori to lose attachment to their own institutions. Unable - or more probably, unwilling - to fully accept Pakeha values, and unable to maintain their own, Maori were seen as adrift without the stability of a firmly established cultural identity.

This analysis provided an explanation for continuing poor performance at school, lack of commitment to work, and increasing anti-social behaviour. The solution that this analysis suggested was to put in place a strategy to enhance the status of Maori culture, to restore it and give it a recognised place in society. This it was hoped would stabilise Maori cultural identity, attract the commitment of Maori to the established institutions and satisfy their demand for self-assertion.

At a superficial level such a strategy appeared to achieve a desired unity between the goals of social integration and cultural preservation. Yet at a deeper level these attempts to develop a race relations policy paid scant consideration to the issue of accommodating Maori cultural values within the institutional structure of New Zealand society. Again as argued in the final chapter, institutionalised racism and structural discriminations were obstacles to any meaningful compromises. While some of the government-initiated reports of the 1980s studies took on the language of 'biculturalism' and 'multiculturalism' in what might be argued cynically, is a lip-service gesture of tokenism, the institutional structures were never analysed for what they were - bureaucracies with an embedded functional relation to capitalism. A radical critique might well have argued that these new government policies
were but an administrative strategy for appropriating Maori socio-cultural resources for the purpose of assisting the government with the issues of social integration.

It has been argued that utilising culture as a concept might well give insights into the nature and effect of historical change. Manuka Henare has asserted that ‘the response of Maori communities to change has been to address it while referring to fundamentals of the culture (of Maoridom)’.

The historical literature regarding Maori has rarely engaged with culture as described above. To some extent the concept of acculturation, which privileges a materialist explanation, has led Pakeha to ignore the Maori-ness of the Maori and the nature of cultural change. Another contributing factor to the neglect of Maori culture has been the history profession’s preference for socio-economic explanations, indubitably a legacy of the extensive, critical inquiries into the nature of class formations accompanying the industrial revolution developed by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels in the mid-nineteenth century.

A further reason has been the suspension of the scholarly pursuit of Maori topics by non-Maori in deference to what many accepted as the prerogative of Maori themselves.

New Zealand’s system of government and its institutions of State through its colonial and post-colonial history had been managed primarily to benefit Pakeha. Maori were required to fit into Pakeha culture and systems. All basic public institutions functioned on the assumption that being Pakeha was ‘normal’, which is an ironic inversion of the original meaning of ‘Maori’. Policies were implemented that made a token nod to Maori aspirations, and they delivered work, justice, health and education programmes for the benefit of all within the unitary state. Even under the guise of biculturalism, mainstream programmes were predicated on the assumption that Maori tikanga was irrelevant if Maori were to succeed: everything had to be done the ‘white way’. The result was that the infrastructure of New Zealand society was structured to deliver white privilege. Only the exotic features of Maori culture were encouraged, where they benefited the country in areas such as tourism and sport. Sorrenson, writing in 1992 about Maori and Pakeha at the turn of the nineteenth century commented that Maori co-existed with, but were not rigidly segregated from Europeans:

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874 A cogent opinion from a personal perspective is located in the introduction of Michael King, Being Pakeha Now: Reflections and Recollections of a White Native, Auckland: PB, 1999.
Sometimes Maori and Pakeha lay in the same bed; more often they were in separate beds within the same house. But the Pakeha had got hold of the house.\textsuperscript{875}

To continue the metaphor: by the late 1970s most Maori still worked in the kitchen, prepared the food, delivered the goods, made the beds and swept the floors; only a few Maori worked as house managers or chefs.

Maori had become urbanised in a short period and their standard of living and health had positively improved. These changes in well-being could be measured in any terms as a significant advance relative to their own past or to other colonised peoples globally. The shaping of a Maori workforce within the unitary nation-state had been a complex process: at base there had been a Pakeha prescription, but there were some modifications to this as an outcome of Maori opposition. Implicitly Maori had rejected inclusivist Pakeha agendas of identity, which had been informed by notions of cultural superiority, affirmations or denials of socio-economic class distinctions, and paternalistic and patronising humanitarian impulses.

In the process of contesting that Euro-centric agenda, Maori began to successfully regenerate their collective mana through significant cultural revitalisation programmes. Further, their choice of a protest in the form of a richly symbolic and visually stunning, hikoi/land march to parliament in 1975 led by the charismatic (and respected in both worlds) Whina Cooper was a huge, palpable jolt to the Pakeha conscience, an emblematic reaffirmation that Maori had an unsentimental, spiritual connection to Maori land which could not (and would not) be replaced by a surrogate attachment to a suburban ‘quarter-acre’, as Hunn had idealistically assumed. Maori in the workforce in 1975 might have subscribed nominally to the processes and patterns of the capitalist system, but in their hearts was the reassurance that their identity was not solely determined by the practical daily realities of the workplace, nor the abstract materialism of economic forces. In the words of Pamera Te Ruihi Warner, of Te Taou, a woman of considerable mana in the world of Maori and respect in the Pakeha world, given in evidence to the Royal Commission on the Maori Land Courts in 1980:

\begin{quote}
The Court's big-brother/guardian attitude amounts to interference with my rights as a citizen. The Maori Courts impound the Maori in the kindergarten of our national life; they prevent us from becoming fully fledged citizens; and they condemn us to a life sentence of second class citizenship in the land of our birth.\textsuperscript{876}
\end{quote}

The shaping of a Maori workforce within the parameters of the formation of a larger Maori identity was a complex process, as is any personal, group and social identity formation. Maori

\textsuperscript{875} M.P.K. Sorrenson, 'Maori and Pakeha', in Rice (ed), 1992, p. 166.
would have taken heart, however, from the words of Matiu Rata, Minister of Maori Affairs in the third Labour Government, in a parliamentary debate in 1973, that:

I see it as my task within the collective responsibility of the Government to pursue a policy not of negative integration but of full participation.\textsuperscript{877}

Rata’s words summed up the negative aspects not only of the years of assimilation, but those of the accelerated programme of integration. It is a fair and insightful comment. His rhetoric was, as we now know with the benefit of hindsight, not empty. Pakeha notions of the place of Maori in the workforce and the wider integrated community had failed to take account of Maori feelings or aspirations. It was a political error but luckily one that was overtaken by later official recognition of Maori cultural values and setting up of a legal process to redress Maori grievances. Rata’s words signalled that it was a lesson that government learnt the hard way. Government policy had faltered - but not foundered - on the shoals of indifference by Pakeha to Maori feeling about their own culture. A political economy that accommodated Maori on unilateral Pakeha prescriptions was found to be seriously wanting. New strategies incorporating genuine concessions by the Pakeha hegemony, and accommodations of Maori demands in broader compromises would be needed to genuinely incorporate Maori in the spirit of equal partnership and ‘full participation.’

\textsuperscript{877} NZPD, 382 (1973), p. 593.
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