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MODES OF THOUGHT AND SOCIAL CONTROL

Theories of Knowledge in the Context of Social Action

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To my mother and father

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In studying man Rousseau was concerned with two complementary tasks.¹ On the one hand, he was engaged in a journey to the centre of the species in order to understand the "natural" pre-civilized man as a human possibility. He situated that possibility in pre-history and viewed certain realities in modern civilization as a threat to its own perpetuation. On the other hand, he was engaged in a journey to the centre of his own civilized being. The first task was historical, the second personal.

In The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology Gouldner argues that future sociological studies should in part focus on field-workers-cum-theorists, in order to be more aware of themselves as a part of society instead of pretending to objectivity. The social world is to be known not only by looking outward, but also by opening oneself inwardly.² Anthropological activity is not just scientific: it is also expressive or symptomatic of a pre-supposed world view of which it is itself an integral part. The anthropologist in field work is involved in "double translation".³ While his impulse to understand the largely unexperienced, but imagined, possibilities of himself as a civilized person proceeds, he is caught, so to speak, in the web of an alien understanding;

¹Lévi-Strauss, Claude (1963) 'Rousseau, Father of Anthropology'. A major contributor to the discipline. UNESCO Courier 16, No.3: 10-14.

²Gouldner, Alvin Ward (1970) The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology. Criticism of objectivism in social science. N.Y.: Basic Books.

³Kaplan, Abraham (1963) 'The Conduct of Inquiry'. Recommended methodologies for field work. Methodology for Behavioural Science, Chandler: California, p.386.

and their resulting attitude towards him shapes the object of his experience. In short, the anthropologist embodies an attitude that changes and conditions human beings, and this in turn generates a response modifying his own behaviour. Not only are they objects who become subjects to the field-worker's view but these subjects view him as an object, to which they either give positive assent, or avoid supporting his endeavour. Responses are recorded according to personal circumstances and are incorporated in the construction of models.⁴ He can assume a logical and historical complementarity between himself, as a prototypical modern man, and the subjects with whom he is concerned.

We have all become engineers with concepts, working from plans and anxious to get the structure right. The primitive is not an engineer but a bricoleur. He puts together his structures from whatever comes in handy, without special concern for the congruity of their elements. Bricolage is the sort of thing made out of oddments. The bricoleur is the handyman, the tinkerer, who gets surprisingly practical and often aesthetic results from the most unlikely material. One of the fundamental theses of The Savage Mind⁵ is that the structure is all-important rather than material content. According to structuralist theory, the same structure may recur in different manifestations, the contents being subsumed under a formalized design.⁶ Structuralism is an attempt to avoid enclosing the

⁴Cicourel, Aaron Victor (1964) Problems in research method. Method of Measurement in Sociology. N.Y.: Free Press.

⁵Lévi-Strauss, Claude (1966) The Savage Mind. The structure of human thought. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, pp.352-363.

⁶Caws, Peter (1970) 'What is Structuralism?' Readings on structuralist orientation, Ch.15, cited in The Anthropologist As Hero, Hayes & Hayes (ed.). MIT Press, pp.213-214.

human mind in any particular reality (loc.cit.). This attempted synthesis, which embraces data, the construction of a model, introspection in the service of self-knowledge, which in turn clarifies further what one is observing, is the first lucid expression, and among the last, of what anthropologists do or should do.⁷ Edmund Leach described Lévi-Strauss's Structures Élémentaires de la Parenté (1949) as a splendid failure.⁸ But as he himself (Leach) admitted, the common principle Lévi-Strauss distilled from Mauss, Freud and Jakobson is important to our understanding of the mental categories Lévi-Strauss believed as generic to the human mind (ibid.). He states that social behaviour is always conducted with reference to a conceptual scheme, a model in the actor's mind of how things are or how they ought to be. The essential characteristic of this model is that it is logically ordered. Lévi-Strauss has been less concerned with the empirical and substantive materials concocted by the brain and rather more concerned with what lies behind the empirical facts. Importantly, principles regulate the legitimate limits to which materials conforming to rules, may be combined and transformed from one level to another. Lévi-Strauss believes in an underlying logic producing a specifiable and limited number of rules linking customs in marriage with kinship systems, totemism, puberty rites, the relation between

⁷Diamond, Stanley (1969) 'Anthropology in Question' in Hymes Dell (ed.) Reinventing Anthropology. Argument for a new critical Anthropology. N.Y.: Pantheon, p.412.

⁸Leach, Edmund (1965) 'Claude Lévi-Strauss - Anthropologist and Philosopher' in Manners & Kaplan (eds.) (1968) Theory in Anthropology. An examination of major theoretical issues in Anthropology. Routledge & Kegan Paul: London, pp.545-546.

myth and ritual exchange and so forth.⁹

By conscious and reflective practice on his world, man can know himself only by way of history.¹⁰ Man's conception of himself is relative, and subject to change.¹¹ We can articulate the rational attributes only by addressing man's situation as an historical problematic. Through "being", being constituted and reconstituted in continual process it is accordingly meaningless to set limits to what man is capable of achieving. To man there exists at least in an imaginable sense infinite possibilities when referring to alternative styles of thought and action. The main constraining force shaping man's response to life itself is the past. Man becomes what he is by what has controlled and shaped that destiny, namely his own particular history. Nature is to things, as history is to man. We even find in the wisdom of St. Augustine, "Man, likewise, finds that he has no nature other than what he has himself done."¹²

The notion that the intellectual fulfils a very specific and distinctive function has been important to those particularly concerned with the history of ideas and the philosophy of science. It is emphasized in many studies dealing with the sociology of knowledge, notably in Karl Mannheim's Ideology and Utopia.¹³

⁹Sontag, Susan (1970) 'The Anthropologist as Hero'. Readings in structuralist orientation, in Hayes & Hayes (eds.) Claude Lévi-Strauss: The Anthropologist as Hero. MIT Press, p.193.

¹⁰Lewis, I. M. (1968) History of Social Anthropology. Readings in the Relationship between history and anthropology (ed.). N.Y.: Tavistock. Introduction xxii.

¹¹Tennekes, J. (1971) Anthropology Relativism. An inquiry into the methodological principles of a science of culture. The Netherlands: Assen Van Gorcum, pp.36-39.

¹²Ibid.

¹³Mannheim, Karl (1936) Ideology and Utopia. An introduction to the sociology of knowledge. Routledge & Kegan Paul: London, pp.61-103, 132.

One of the main concerns of Mannheim's book is to find the answer to the disturbing problem arising from inquiries into the relationship between mind and society. If our thoughts and even our modes of thinking are shaped by our specific social position, if each one of the segments of society - workers, industrialists, financiers, farmers, rural aristocracy and tenant farmers - looks at the same reality in different and often conflicting ways, how then can we still believe in a universal truth binding for all the strata of society? Mannheim sought to unify the partial and limited views held by the various classes. He believed such a synthesis could be achieved by persons who were not linked to particular groups and not drawn into their struggles (ibid.: 167). He had in mind the intelligentsia, the socially unattached intellectuals whose aloofness would enable them to meet the challenge of integrating the one-sided and often conflicting insights of the different components of society (ibid.: 135). He hoped that through the contribution of the intellectual, society would attain a more comprehensive grasp of reality, a more objective understanding of the truth.

We are well aware of the contribution which Mannheim has made to the work of sociology. However, we cannot overlook the illusion which his optimistic faith in the role of the intellectual reflects and which the events of the quarter century following the publication of Ideology and Utopia have so relentlessly destroyed. We have only to remember the role of scientists and researchers in schemes ranging from Nazi concentration camps, the status quo orientation of theorists capitulating before the dictates of commercialism, militarism, communism and fascism.

The same kinds of works engaged in by anthropologists were designed to assist the Americans in Thailand, Vietnam and Chile, and it was doubtless unethical. Therefore we realize the fancifulness of Mannheim's thesis that it is the intelligentsia as a class to whom our age owes its understanding of objective truth. How can we explain that a scholar of Mannheim's stature, who has done so much to dispel the illusions dominating the thinking of individuals and social groups, could maintain such an unrealistic view of the role of intellectuals? The answer in part lies in Marx's pronouncement that intellectualism, like most things in society, had become a commodity fetish. One way to circumvent this debasement is to accept a relativistic social science and thus avoid the generalized mediocrity we are perforced to fashion in all research wherever this uncritical dimension is applied. Anthropology needs emancipation from the absolute acceptance of a methodology.¹⁴ Implicit in this performance is the unreflexive subscription to categories employed by the anthropologist's own culture. The value attached to such categories is a commitment and an interest and therefore signifies a value to both the cultural interests of the theorist and as such the perpetuation of dominant existing conceptions (op.cit.: 297). Mannheim critiques this approach thus:

It is only by means of this liberating - if at times painful and as yet uncritical - perspectivism that we can hope to come to the point where the false ideal of a detached, impersonal point of view [can] be replaced by the ideal of an essentially human point of view which is within the limits of human perspective, constantly striving to enlarge itself.

(Mannheim, 1936, p.297)

¹⁴Wolf, E. R. (1964) Anthropology. Prentice Hall. A discussion about issues in post-war anthropology in U.S.A., pp.20-25.

Wittgenstein views such perspectivism in terms of activities with their appropriate languages,¹⁵ and a modified verification principle is now used to ask what sort of things would count against it. If we know that we can say in which "language game" a concept belongs the assertion is "at home". It is now recognized that different kinds of language are appropriate in different situations. The language of love is not that of biology, nor is the language of politics that of physics. The word "cause", for example, has different functions in the disciplines of physics, economics and history. We should not try to mix the language of love with other language games.

Radcliffe-Brown first elaborated the notion of structure in social anthropology,¹⁶ defining it as the complex network of actually existing social relations in any society. Other anthropologists, while accepting the concept of structure, have found this formulation too wide. Thus Evans-Pritchard¹⁷ has preferred to restrict the term to those relatively enduring relationships which unite persisting social groups into a total social system.

These definitions have sometimes tended to suggest that there is in every society something which may be called "the structure", and thus rather obscure the fact that a society may reveal many

¹⁵Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1945, 1949) Philosophical Investigations. An inquiry into the nature of understanding. G. E. M. Anscombe & R. Rhees (eds.). Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp.23, 7. On the variety of language games, cf. p.65 ff.

¹⁶Radcliffe-Brown (1952) Structure and Function in Primitive Society. A positivist thesis on social structure. London: Cohen & West. Also Radcliffe-Brown (1953) 'Letter to Lévi-Strauss' in Tax Sol (ed.) An Appraisal of Anthropology Today, p.109.

¹⁷Evans-Pritchard, E. (1962) 'Social anthropology: Past and present' in Manners & Kaplan (eds.) A Reader in Theory and Method. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, pp.46-57.

different social structures, depending on the interest of the observer. The view that structure is something that is "there" in the society, something that the social anthropologist may, if he uses the right techniques, hope to discover and put on record, has been criticized by Claude Lévi-Strauss.¹⁸ He emphasizes that any kind of structure, in the sense in which anthropologists use the term, is a construct or model, based on but not composed of the empirical data. The validity of a scientific model, unlike that of an empirical fact, is to be judged not by its truth but by its usefulness or "strategic value" in facilitating comparison and leading to new knowledge.¹⁹

Cognitive configurations

There are, this writer points out, two distinct models.²⁰ These are what I would term relative constructs. A model by which members of a society represent to themselves their concept of their own society. This is an exigetical description. The anthropologist abstracts from the observational and empirical level the contents in order to order them logically in a formalized fashion to produce an arbitrary interpretation. The operational model, then, represents to the theorist an explanatory device whereby each level is explained by the level that immediately

¹⁸Lévi-Strauss, Claude (1967) The Scope of Anthropology. A summary of the discipline. Cape Editions.

¹⁹Leeden, A. C. van der (1971) 'Empiricism and Logical Order in Anthropological Structuralism', Journal of Royal Netherlands Anthropological Society. Bijdragen 127 (1): 15-38.

²⁰Rossi, I. (1974) 'Structuralism as Scientific Method'. Discussions on structuralism, in I. Rossi (ed.) The Unconscious in Culture. Dutton paperback, pp.60-107.

precedes it. In this way, believes Lévi-Strauss, what lies hidden below the level of consciousness is revealed to us through the various determinations articulated between the various levels. One famous example Lévi-Strauss used was in reference to the Bororo.²¹ Here, the classic Bororo system of exogamous moeties divided into clans, lost its functional importance as a result of being underlain by a more fundamental tripartite endogamous structure. A screen type model presents a barrier to understanding. Wittgenstein poses a difficult problem when he asks, How can one claim one understands when understanding is itself the problem? Can something that is hidden to our understanding be understood when "comprehension" poses a problem in inferring the meaning behind social events? We rationalize others' cognition in constructing an overarching conceptual scheme, embodied in an operational model. The structure, for instance, of a system of kinship relationships as it is expounded by an anthropologist in a journal is very different from the "same" structure as it is understood by a participant in the system. Furthermore, understanding functions in relation to the specific contextual controls operating through rules expressed in an ideology, which expresses, describes or commends a particular way of seeing the world, other men, and oneself, and the way of life appropriate to such a perspective.²² The logical structure ordering such a grammar is typified according to what characterizes

²¹Lévi-Strauss, Claude (1969) The Elementary Structures of Kinship. A formal analysis of kinship organizations, Ch.I, III, IV, XXIX. London: Eyre & Spottiswoode.

²²Helmer & Hirschberg (1958) 'On the Epistemology of the Inexact Sciences', Rand Corporation Reprint. Science and non-science contain elements of qualitation.

a way of life.²³

The question of "hermeneutics" refers to the various stylizations of meaning. Linguistic analysts have also considered this question. In fact, it has been central to their method, for an answer to the question of meaning is implied in a modified form of the verification principle. According to linguistic analysts, if we wish to know the meaning of a word or statement, we must look at the way it functions in actual use.²⁴ Statements of sense-content cannot be verified by commonsense or empirical means. That is to say, they cannot be verified by a shared sense experience, since they do not say what "all of us" can see but only what "I saw". Nor can they be checked against empirical data open to any competent investigator who cares to examine them, for again, a sense content statement is about what "I saw", not about what is "there for everyone to see". Only "I" can record what was "on the mirror of my mind". But this is only to say that sense content statements are not commonsense or empirical assertions and more cannot be said against them.²⁵ The way to verify a statement of sense content is to see if the words and actions of the person who makes the statement conform to it. The test is one of consistency. If Hamlet claims to have seen his father's ghost "and" to have learned from the ghost that his father was murdered, his claim is verified by his setting out to avenge his father's death.

²³An issue appreciated by John E. Smith commenting on Wittgenstein in 'The Impact of Wittgenstein', An Analysis of Language. Penguin Books, 1960, p.239 ff.

²⁴'The meaning of a word is its use in the language' Wittgenstein (1967) op.cit., p.43.

²⁵For the logic of the following analysis of "sense content" statements, cf. Wisdom, John (1957) Philosophy and Psychoanalysis. Oxford: Blackwell, p.240 ff.

His actions tend to support his claim of what he had seen and heard.

In like manner, a person's statement of sense content, which identified the one he saw with a man who had lived a certain kind of life, is verified by the events of that person's subsequent life.

The context of situation

To Wittgenstein each context signals its own way through which to communicate and initiate action. Each context must therefore be necessarily bounded and contain its own intrinsic usages. Cultural filters shape communication processes. Different contexts generate their own *raison d'être* emphases for action. Each context limits the nature of discourse in relation to specifically contextually inter-relatable concerns.

Wittgenstein's thesis that ideas are social productions fabricated relative to context is analogous to Mannheim's conjecture on the importance of how position²⁶ within a structure circumscribes a domain of experience. Therefore the situational placement an actor takes must strategically shape and colour perception and so on. What is perceived in these different situations is always different. This applies to all people.²⁷

My point here is, that the nature of association and class necessarily promulgates a closure on the contents of consciousness, particularly

²⁶Mannheim acknowledges his indebtedness to Husserl's hypothesis that spatial objects can only be viewed from definite local positions from where their properties present themselves to the observer only in one-sided "profiles", in partial perspective. By analogy with Husserl's approach to everyday physical nature Mannheim argues that historical, cultural and psychic objects present partial mental-psychic profiles to the observer who is himself inevitably rooted to a limiting mental-psychic perspective.

²⁷See Merleau Ponty (1963) The Structure of Behaviour . Boston: Beacon Press, p.118 ff. A phenomenological understanding explaining situational constraints on behaviour.

in the earlier infantile critical periods. In taking this approach it is inadmissible to assert that the way past this problem is to move through space and time, and socially across boundaries in order to divest oneself of the specifically domestic and indigenous concepts which clothe a person's outlook. In their studies on colour perception Berlin and Kay²⁸ are really pointing to the fact that overall there are different colour aggregates between bounded contexts. The fact that these theorists arrived at "the term 'focal colours' seemed to indicate a common appreciation involving eleven colours being offset by an array of colours all named for their distinctive referents". In short, a theorist, be he an analyst or experimentalist, cannot slough off the cultural edifice which selectively sifts expressive possibilities open to such an actor. Further, Piaget saw the crucial operations of "conservation", "constancy" and "reversal" as occurring throughout early childhood before closure sets in. This treatment derives from Piaget's theoretical framework, in which he views cognitive development as the construction of successively more complex systems of different types.²⁹ The skeletal structure provides the basis for "pulling together" certain specified ideas resulting in intrinsic complexes of relations with their own internal rules for consistency. Core values arise by the canalization of messages into a coherent whole where each element represented in a series contributes to the whole and defines its placement by its essential relationship to that whole. The tendency to stabilize and conserve intact the essential

²⁸Berlin, B. & Kay, P. (1969) Basic Colour Terms. Research on Cross Cultural Perception. Berkeley: University of California Press.

²⁹Piaget, Jean (1970) J. Piaget's theory in P. H. Mussen (ed.) Carmichael's Manual of Child Psychology, Vol.2. N.Y.: Wiley, pp.703-732.

closure results in a degree of continuity through time and space. On the other hand, closure can become an inordinate hindrance to selecting innovative ideas and solutions. To be too fixed means that the unadaptive feature becomes uppermost. A small measure of flexibility in any carapace lets a little "air" in to replenish, and refurbish and, if necessary, change the existing formal arrangement, so that the acquisition of favourable characteristics and the ability to reproduce renewable materials abundantly ensures an adaptive advantage to the most successful (Lorenz, 1972, p.65). The human brain operates on the principles of openness and closure.³⁰ What is accessible to the brain at any time becomes effectively translated into psychic material, but the definitive closures localized in the solidification of brain mechanisms occur early in the life cycle.³¹ The logical conclusion then, is that mobility does not preclude fixity in belief and attitude. In fact, mobility may do just the opposite in reassuring the intending aspirant that his prejudices, latently suffused into his way of life, are basically insuperable. All adaptive modification is essentially identical with induction. That is, certain sensitive periods facilitate imprintation through selective mechanisms establishing group identification.³²

My intention is not so much to ask where cultural idioms develop in the individual or in society, but more - how do ideas come to be

³⁰Lorenz, Konrad (1972) 'The Enmity Between Generations and its probable ethological causes'. A study in intergenerational conflict, in Play and Development, W. M. Piers (ed.). N.Y.: Norton.

³¹Piaget, Jean (1972) 'Intellectual evolution from adolescence to adulthood', Human Development, 15: 1-12.

³²Lorenz, Konrad (1969) 'Innate Bases of Learning'. An ethological inquiry setting out stages of growth and development, in On the Biology of Learning, K. Pribram (ed.). N.Y.: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, p.35.

used as if to circumscribe the possible limits to consciousness? Language structure exists and operates generally below the awareness of the speaker-hearer. The strong constraints operating in the choice of words regulate word usage. The appearance of Noam Chomsky's syntactic structures marked the beginning of a new trend in linguistics that has come to be called "transformational generative grammar".³³ The contribution linguistics made to anthropology here was to emphasize the need for the theorist to go beyond the "facts" of the given to search for an underlying highly organized and very restrictive schema that permitted the child to make a leap from scattered and disparate data to highly organized knowledge. Chomsky calls this an innate language that the child brings to language learning.³⁴

Chomsky began by defining a language as a set of sentences and a grammar as a device capable of generating and specifying the only acceptable sentences of a language. The set of sentences that constituted a language was examined, and various possible mathematical models for explicitly defining such a total set were explored. Transformational generative grammarians seek true universals of language, both formal and substantive. Instead of proceeding from sounds through syntax to meaning with the unnecessary constraints adhered to by structuralists, Chomsky began his approach to language from a point between sound and meaning, namely the structure of sentences.³⁵ The philosophy underlying this approach to linguistics thus accepts

³³Chomsky, Noam (1964) Current Issues in Linguistic Theory. An outline of current linguistic theories. The Hague: Mouton, p.18.

³⁴Cited in Elders, F. (1974) Reflexive Water (ed.). A recorded discussion between Chomsky and Foucault, p.137. Subtitle - The basic concerns of mankind, Condor.

³⁵Chomsky, N. (1965) Aspects of a Theory of Syntax. Examines sounds and meanings and their repetitive patterns. Cambridge, 1015 pp.

the need to postulate abstract constructs when attempting to describe natural language.

The idea of performance relates to nuances of meaning shaped by reference to a particular style of cognition. Performance contains errors, false starts, pauses, memory limitations, non sequiturs,³⁶ etc. Chomsky has therefore distinguished sharply between performance and what he calls competence, that is, the speaker-hearer's knowledge of his own language and an ability to articulate and reconstruct information in line with an available framework. The locus of the creation of meaning is taken to be those standards that socially reproduce the collectivity. Combinations of ideas embody a social construct, and the means constituting those ideas are given social recognition. Competence therefore refers to the level of acceptance of a framework. The field-worker is not a free floating agent existing in vacuo, detached absolutely from a particular framework. He learns rules which he takes with himself to the field.

This means that everything is comprehended from the self referent vantage point; the world exists for someone only as he is conscious of it. Rollo May expressed it this way:

We cannot ... stand outside our own skin and perch on some Archimedes point, and have a way of surveying experience that does not itself depend upon the assumptions that one makes about the nature of man or the nature of whatever one is studying.

(1961, p.290)

Things are significant or insignificant, important or unimportant, attractive or unattractive, valuable or worthless in terms of their relationship to oneself. We evaluate the world and its meanings

³⁶Chomsky, N. & Halle, M. 'The Sound Pattern of English', in Chomsky, N. (ed.) (1968) Language of Mind. Observation into differential language styles. N.Y.: Harcourt, pp.4-5.

(including other people's world for them) according to how we see ourselves.³⁷ Translations between distinct and bounded contexts indicate meaning to be newly formulated, rather than accurately retained. The Italian words 'Traditto Traditare' mean that the translator betrays the original intended meanings. The observer is bound by predominant commitments that signify a point of view. As Rieff put it: "Character is the restrictive shaping of possibility."³⁸⁻³⁹ Let us now reformulate the problem we have set ourselves by recasting it in the context of an African ethnographic example.

"Mukanda": rite of circumcision

In Ndembu social structure⁴⁰ cleavages occur between fissive segments so that the competition for the highest ritual role brings together the widest possible number of localities at the highest, general and most inclusive level. Similarly at each corresponding level in descending order of abstraction role positions are taken up by ritualists with correspondingly less range of responsibility and obligation tied to role performance. Therefore at the highest and most inclusive level of influence the ritualist enjoins the greatest power, taking in and cross-cutting many localized lineage segments. The lowest ritual positions cover a relatively narrow context - probably an exclusive context to which a lineage segment is located. Higher ritual positions

³⁷May, Rollo (1961) 'The context of psychotherapy' in Contemporary Psychotherapies: M. I. Stein (ed.). N.Y.: The Free Press. See also May, R. (1953) Man's Search for Himself. Man's existential dilemma. N.Y.: Norton.

³⁸Rieff, cited in Becker, Ernest (1974) The Denial of Death. The fear of death. N.Y.: The Free Press, p.266.

³⁹Ibid. In addition, Becker writes "Abstractions will never do. God terms have to be exemplified ... Men crave their principles incarnate in enactable characters, actual selective mediators between themselves and the polytheism of experience." p.266.

⁴⁰Turner, Victor (1967) The Forest of Symbols. Aspects of Ndembu Ritual. London: Cornell, p.155.

are competitively sought after - Nyaluhana is a case in point (loc.cit.).

There are two major contenders for the right to sponsor Mukanda and to perform its leading roles. One is Headman Machamba, the other, Headman Nyaluhana. Each had his factional following in the vicinage during the Mukanda situation (ibid.: 159). Generally speaking, factions are multiples of village memberships, where internal quarrels in villages sometimes result in dissident groups and individuals supporting, sometimes openly but more often clandestinely, the faction opposing the headman's. On the face of it, Nyaluhana is supported by Wukengi, whose head is Nyaluhana's classificatory sister's son, by Wadyang'amafu, by Kafumbu, by Nyampasa, and by Mukoma. Machamba, on the other hand, is supported by Sampasa, and by Sawiyembi. Turner thought that Nyaluhana's claim was the more strongly backed up, but it must be mentioned that much of Nyaluhana's following had closer links with Wukengi than with himself, and that Nyaluhana and Wukengi were by no means on the best of terms. The outcome of their rivalry was by no means a foregone conclusion when it was first suggested that Mukanda should be performed.

Nevertheless, Nyaluhana's claims to sponsor Mukanda and allocate its key roles were formidable. His village was "a village of the chieftainship (mukala wawanta), and men belonging to its matrilineal nucleus may become candidates for the Kanongesha senior chieftainship, or rather for the Chibwika chieftainship, whose incumbent was Konongesha's heir apparent. Indeed, the current Kanongesha, Ndembi, belonged to the Nyaluhana matrilineage; but for this very reason, it was unlikely that the next Chibwika would be nominated from Nyaluhana Village, for it is the Ndembu convention for each new Chibwika to be appointed from a different village belonging to the chiefly maternal descent group. Nyaluhana claimed that his lineage was descended from Nkeng'i, the uterine sister of the founder of the Kanongesha chieftainship. Turner's genealogies of Ndembu villages recorded several female

village heads in the nineteenth century, and indeed there was a woman village head, Nyampasa, in the vicinage when Turner made his study of Mukanda. The present Kanongesha's mother's mother was an older sister of the first Nyaluhana. Kanongesha Ndembi had married Wukengi's sister's daughter when this woman, Mulosu, had been a member of Nyaluhana's village, that is, before Wukengi had split from Nyaluhana Village. Kanongesha had a son by her, whom he had sent to be circumcized at this Mukanda. Nyaluhana Village, like the other villages in the vicinage, lay within Kanongesha's own area. Kanongesha thus held a two-fold authority over the vicinage. He was Senior Chief and Native Authority of all Ndembu and was also the local territorial chief. Since he was a matrilineal kinsman of Nyaluhana, and had clearly indicated that he favoured Nyaluhana's claims by sending his son to the latter's village, it seemed long odds at the time that Mukanda would be performed in the vicinage, that Nyaluhana would control the most important ritual roles.

Nyaluhana himself had been Senior Circumciser (Mbimbi wamukulumpi or Mbimbi weneni) at no less than three previous performances of Mukanda. The first occasion had been in 1928, shortly after Nyaluhana had succeeded to the headmanship of his village. The novices' seclusion lodge had been erected near his village (which was then situated beside the Kanjimu River, a mile or two from its location in 1953). Nyaluhana had again been Senior Circumciser in 1941, when a Mukanda was held at Katong'i Farm, an offshoot of Nyaluhana Village. The third time was in 1943, at Nyaluhana Village itself, when the village was not far from its present site, near the Kachibamba River. Thus, there were abundant precedents for Nyaluhana's continuing to fill the senior role (ibid.: 160). In conclusion then, each faction or fission in Ndembu social structure constitutes a perspective and position within which and from which to view a social structure.

Historical and cultural relativism maintains that whatever is "truth" in history is relative to the process under which it arose and without reference to which it cannot be understood.⁴¹ Central to this position is the notion that the student of human affairs constructs his account under the dominance of his particular values (op.cit.: 31). Moreover, these evaluations are not simply personal, but reflect societal conditions and hence change from age to age (op.cit.: 34). A presuppositionless nirvana is unattainable because as both Marx and Mannheim asserted, class interests form the basic substructure of knowledge systems. It is unnecessary to assume any specific world view is false. Each has access to a part of the truth though "the truth in its entirety escapes all theorists because each limits itself to a specific line of vision".

At whatever developmental stage a culture finds itself, preconditions valued for their adaptive and aesthetic power pull people together into a similar belief system. Without this conserving force serving to yield a common heritage, the problems of order, survival and unity would not begin to be solved. Human psychic stability is balanced in a precarious fashion. There is always the danger of slipping into biological centredness - a neurosis, or slipping outside the limits to experience flights of ideas - a psychosis. Culture, as E. Becker (1973, p.45) so rightly assumed, is the life and death struggle to impose boundaries, and limits, categories and classifications, whose erasement at any step means death. Culture is simply the struggle of life over death and

⁴¹Mandelbaum, Maurice H. (1967) The Problem of Historical Knowledge. An answer to relativism, N.Y.: Harper & Row, p.19.

good over evil. Social relations may be metaphors for exchange but when the "relation" evaporates men die with it. For, as de Saussure wrote, the viewpoint creates the object, the object does not create the viewpoint.⁴² It is necessary for man to divide his universe into specifiable relevancies so as to erase any fiction. Man continually reconstructs categories in perspective form by definitions, insulating him from madness and death.

"Commonsense", a composite of elements

Robin Horton holds that there are striking similarities between primitive and scientific forms of thinking.⁴³ He believes that in the case of traditional African cultures one should distinguish between commonsense and theoretical thinking, and this distinction is essentially of the same kind as that between commonsense and science in western culture. He says:

Commonsense is the handier and more economical tool for coping with a wide range of circumstances in everyday life. Nevertheless, there are certain circumstances that can only be coped with in terms of a wider causal vision than commonsense provides. And in these circumstances there is a jump to theoretical thinking.
(loc.cit.)

According to Horton, the search for theoretical explanation is the search for unity behind apparent diversity, simplicity behind seeming complexity, order behind chaos, regularity behind arbitrariness. He explains as follows:

Indeed, some modern writers deny that traditional religious thinking is in any serious sense theoretical thinking.

⁴²Rossi, I. (ed.) (1974) The Unconscious and Culture. Paris: Mouton.

⁴³Horton, Robin (1967) 'African traditional thought and Western science'. Comparison of different modes of thought. Africa, 37: 60-61.

In support of their denial they contrast the simplicity, regularity and elegance of the theoretical schemas of the sciences with the unruly complexity and caprice of the world of gods and spirits ... From the point of view of sheer number, the spirits of some cosmologies are virtually countless. But in the superficial sense we can point to the same tendency in Western cosmology, which for every commonsense unitary object gives us a myriad of molecules.

If, however, we recognize that the aim of theory is the demonstration of a limited number of kinds of entities or processes underlying the diversity of experience, then the picture Horton believes becomes very different.

Indeed, one of the lessons ... is precisely that the gods of a given culture do form a scheme which presents the vast diversity of everyday experience in terms of the action of a relatively few kinds of forces ... Like atoms, molecules, and waves, then, the gods serve to introduce unity into diversity, simplicity into complexity, order into disorder, regularity into anomaly.

(Ibid.: 51-52)

A second characteristic of theoretical thinking, both in science and African religious thought, is that the theory places things in a wider causal context than that used by commonsense:

Through the length and breadth of the African continent, sick or afflicted people go to consult diviners as to the causes of their troubles. Usually, the answer they receive involves a god or other spiritual agency, and the remedy prescribed involves the propitiation or calling off of this being. But this is very seldom the whole story. For the diviner who diagnoses the intervention of a spiritual agency is also expected to give some acceptable account of what moved the agency in question to intervene. And this account very commonly involves reference to some event in the world of visible tangible happenings. Thus, if a diviner diagnoses the action of witchcraft influence or lethal medicine spirits, it is usual for him to add something about the human hatreds, jealousies, and misdeeds that have brought such agencies into play. Or, if he diagnoses the wrath of an ancestor, it is usual for him to point to the human breach of kinship morality which has called down his wrath.

(Ibid.: 53)

Thus, the "diviner" as Horton would have us believe, does what the scientist does also:

Reference to theoretical entities is used to link events in the visible, tangible world (natural effects) to their ancestors in the same world (natural causes).

Horton believes that both the diviner and the scientist make the same use of theory and transcend the limited vision of natural causes provided by commonsense. (ibid.: 54).

I believe Horton's thesis is indefensible. An example demonstrating the fictive nature of our perceptions, and how they vary according to context, is given by Trobriand ethnography. Malinowski was interested in the perceptual resemblances between parents and child. He found a complicated but culturally uniform pattern of such perceptions. Among the Trobriand Islanders, children were perceived to look like their father but not like their mother. Furthermore, siblings, children of the same father, did not look like each other.⁴⁴ This posed a perceptual paradox to Malinowski because he saw the Trobriand society as a matrilineal society that regarded the mother and child as "blood" relatives, but not the father and the child. To Malinowski the similarity between father, and son and sister seemed obvious. By breaking the rule Malinowski discovered it was very bad manners, embarrassing to the brothers in particular, to mention that two brothers looked alike. A still worse offence was to say a brother looked like his sister. A normal observer imagines the world exactly as he sees it. He accepts the evidence of perception uncritically. He does not realize that his visual perception is mediated by indirect reference

⁴⁴Segall, M. H., Campbell, D. T. & Herskovitz, M. J. (1966) The Influence of Culture on Visual Perception. Case studies in cross-cultural thinking. Chicago: Bobbs-Merill, pp.25-26.

systems. Implicitly, he assumes that the evidence of vision is directly and immediately unmediately given. This attitude is phenomenal absolutism. Learned organizations are phenomenally absolute operating mostly below consciousness. Common principles that possibly could serve to unite the underlying events, however, cannot be applied when these events are significantly grounded in a unique context. The Trobrianders saw no causal link between the father's image being impressed on the foetus and the assertion of similarities that they did not see. Malinowski (op.cit.: 3 and 6) believed that over and above these restraints on verbal expression, the actual perceptions followed the cultural pattern. Malinowski makes a plausible case for perceptual differences (op.cit.: 28). The ideas of Hallowell and Wittgenstein converge, that is the world looks the way a people have learned to talk about it.⁴⁵ Where an individual is a member of a cohesive work group he "speaks the language of his group; he thinks in the manner in which his group thinks. He finds at his disposal only certain words and their meanings. These ... determine to a large extent the avenues of approach to the surrounding world ... Thus it is not men in general who think, or even isolated individuals ... but men in certain groups who have developed a particular style of thought in an endless series of responses to certain typical situations characterizing their common position." (Mannheim, 1960, pp.2, 3)

⁴⁵I refer to the early Wittgenstein who emphasized logical positivism (Vienna school) that saw language as the main tool shaping reality. This position differs from the later Wittgenstein, who saw language as masking the intricacies through which meanings were conveyed. The form of the logic coloured discourse itself. It is this later position that I shall emphasize. Above, I refer to the "picture theory" but as I go on, I show that this "picture theory" is akin to "commonsense" and therefore positivist, in treating observable events as "real".

Abstract

Wittgenstein in his 'Notebooks' (op.cit.: 79): "the subject is not a part of the world but a presupposition of its existence" and furthermore, "The I is not an object".

Speech shows its difference from that which provides for its intelligibility, its way of being in language. This difference provides for the difference between positivist theorizing, which conventional versions of sociology display, and which in seeking to speak of some object, called class or society, covers over the possibility of seeking for the social in speech's ways of being in language. Reflexive and dialectical theorizing, on the other hand, lives precisely as this seeking. Positivist sociology is not ground in its explicit notion of the social, for that is something which it seeks to stand apart from and not together with, in order to describe it accurately and explain it. Therefore we may hazard that we find its grounds, its implicit notion of 'logos'.

Political rule vacillates between two contradictory modes of unintelligibility. That is, it formulates its groundless, unquestionable character in terms of what we may call, borrowing from Weber,¹ either traditional or charismatic authority, respectively, the authority of "It is written ... therefore ...", or "It is written ... but I say unto you" (Weber, M., 1964: 361). Extra-ordinary speech attempts to differentiate itself or to sound (neutral) in the space of its evident difference from ordinary speech. The moral call for superiority as excellence is too easily translatable into the political call for superiority as a rule.

¹Weber, M. The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation(1964).
N.Y.: Free Press.

Reflexive and dialectical analysis seeks for its difference from conventional sociology, and its versions of the social embedded in its versions of the 'logos', by affirming at least the presence of these versions as suppressed within sociological discourse, and by reaffirming them as ways of being in language which are neither new, nor adequately understood, nor the only possible ways of being in language.

The depths of meaning constituted in language open up the possibility for an interpretive hearing of movement and possibilities and provides for and indeed requires that the extraordinary be heard in the reformulation of what is ordinary speech. Reflexive theorizing enables us to recover the performative character of apparently descriptive speech and to make visible what lies at the heart of class.

Language and symbolic play

When a child early in life is undergoing rapid growth in which the development of mental and sensori-motor characteristics occur, he manipulates objects and assimilates environmental input into his cognitive structure. If the input is new and adds a new dimension to his thinking, the child's thinking patterns are modified or changed by accommodation. Assimilation and accommodation are, according to Piaget, the basic processes by which individuals learn. Piaget's work suggests that language in its functional use appears to be limited to a level of sophistication which has already been achieved in cognitive development. For example, language enables children to detach thought from action at the start of the pre-operational stage. Thus, thought becomes symbolic and, because language too is inherently symbolic,

it becomes the natural medium for representing absent objects and past events. This ability to represent is a hallmark of the beginning of the pre-operational stage, and language acquisition sets the pattern for subsequent acquisitions of social materials. Piaget believes "language does not constitute the source of logic, but is on the contrary, structured by it".²

Those interested in child language and cognition frequently point out that children use words without mature meanings or with missing attributes. When a youngster uses "because" and "although" without full conceptual understanding, Piaget would say they are largely meaningless terms. In addition, he would contend that until the child acquires the complex significance of these terms, no amount of use in speech will help him to learn their meanings. Contrast this point with Vygotsky who would contend that the individual child's understanding increases gradually as he uses³ the terms in his everyday speech. In Vygotsky's theory, the role of adult language is critical for all language and thought development. This position is Marxian in orientation. To Vygotsky, adult dialogue and monologue provide external speech forms consistent with the predominant contextual meanings codifying the requisite functions inner speech and real thinking may logically assume for membership - in a school, paradigm, instruction or society.

²Piaget, J. (1955) 'Studies in Child Language Acquisition'. The Language and Thought of the Child. N.Y.: Meridian Books, p.90. See also Piaget, J. (1952) 'Assimilation and Accommodation'. The Origins of Intelligence in Children. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, p.7. "Thus, sensori motor intelligence gives rise to operations of assimilation and construction, in which it is not hard to see the functional equivalent of the logic of classes and of relations."

³Vygotsky, L. S. (1962) Thought and Language. A Marxian interpretation of learning, edited and translated by E. Haufman and G. Vakar. Cambridge: MIT Press, p.225 ff.

At an early stage communication between a child and his community is partial. The child expresses his own idiosyncratic formulations rather than subscribing to conventionalized articulation, incorporated and framed by the dominant ideology. For this reason individualized verbal forms of representation begin with the words to designate "global rather than undifferentiated" referents.⁴ Linguistic genesis is dependent upon the development of mental operations that permit the child to "differentiate among, and to specify events in his environment, so the referents of his vocalisations progressively approximate the referents of adult names". Consequently, he begins to use different words for different referents. As an example, Werner and Kaplan cite the development of the use of the word "mamman" by a little girl. At twelve months of age, the child used "mamman" as a name for her sister, for bread, and for cooked dishes. At seventeen months she began to use it also to designate milk. Only between nineteen and twenty-one months did she stop using "mamman" for all these things and begin to use separate names for each. At the same time she began to use the word "mama" as a specific form of reference to her mother.

Even when the child begins to use specific words to represent discrete things, actions and properties, the symbols still refer to ideas that stand midway between the particularity of referents constructed by sensori-motor activity and the generality of referents constructed by later mental operations. Piaget (1952) hypothesizes that these symbols are "fluctuating incessantly between the two extremes"⁵

⁴Werner and Kaplan (1956) 'The Developmental Approach to Cognition: its relevance to the psychological interpretation of anthropological and ethnolinguistic data', American Anthropologist, 58: 866-880.

⁵Piaget, J. (1952) The Child's Conception of Number. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, pp.90-124.

and that they thereby exhibit a lack of understanding and confounding "of individual identity and ... general class". This conceptual fluctuation is indicative of the child's attempt to classify and thereby comprehend his world. Early on, the struggle for the child is presented by a cognitive problematic, wherein he intentionally seeks to interpret particular events, fitting these into general classes. Prior to acquiring classificatory skills the child uses words interchangeably. This is because he does not clearly select appropriate elements from a continuum whose discrete units are socially and culturally pre-determined for the child.

My theoretical position comes close to Piaget's, and indeed, further extends his notion relating to perceptual egocentricity. Developing from the material basis distinguished by s-m manipulation and cue selection, is the trend toward reflective symbolic activity, located in cultural meanings through which symbolic complexes mediate experience and regulate the materials in consciousness.⁶ This egocentricity results in mediated symbolic meanings that posit a short psychological distance between subject and the object of his experience, something indelibly fixed and framed for life. On the other hand, even if the child extended the scope of his mental operations, including the construction of conceptual knowledge, this would not be sufficient to overcome the contextual basis on which the child, and later the adult, predicates his conceptual categories. Then, theoretical possibilities

⁶Piaget, J. (1950) The Origin of Intelligence in the Child. Routledge & Kegan Paul, pp.380-425. Norms impress a given structure and rules of equilibrium upon the material. Logic is not co-extensive with intelligence, but consists in the sum total of rules of control which intelligence makes use of for its own direction. What directs behaviour is the sum total of functional relations, implying the distinction between the existing states of disequilibrium and an ideal equilibrium yet to be realized. See The Moral Judgement of the Child by Jean Piaget, pp.401-411: Glencoe Free Press (1951).

become an imaginative extension of the person before entry into research tasks. The amount of intelligence required in cognitive flexibility between multiple perspectives is relative and certainly not absolute. And it depends upon the energies in the child and the tasks society sets within a context, and whether outcomes are suitable to the child's desire and will to be motivated and succeed. Subject-to-subject orthogenesis (~~id~~ifferentiation and hierarchic integration) and developing perspectivism⁷ lead to mental mediation, internal or personal motivation, and intentional planning.⁸ That a child gradually learns both to differentiate progressively between subject and object, and to transcend the spatio-temporal bounds of immediate experience, nonetheless limits the perceptive faculty open to interpretive schemata, built with respect to a particular cultural style. This style is not only consistent within itself, but also each element fits into an overall pattern.

This approach may be extended to the learning of cultural phenomena. Language, for example, learned and spoken by individuals, is a social phenomenon produced through the interactive process. The regular discriminations which constitute linguistic structure are the spontaneous outcome of continual control, exercised on an individual attempting to communicate with others. Expressions which are ambiguous or which deviate from the norm may effectively enhance communication, through speakers experiencing a direct feedback encouraging conformity. Language has more loosely and more strictly patterned domains in which

⁷"Perspectivism" here refers to language training, among other types of training, operating to direct the child's interactions with the environment and thus to "focus" on relevant dimensions of task situations. This point is borne out in conservation tasks suggesting that language does aid in the storage and retrieval of relevant information. Cited in B. Inhelder, M. Bovet, H. Sinclair, C. D. Smock, 'On Cognitive Development', American Psychologist, 21 (1966): 160-164.

⁸Werner, H. (1948) Comparative Psychology of Mental Development. Cross-cultural comparison on child development, 1948 reprint. N.Y.: Science Editio 1961.

ambiguity has either more or less serious repercussions on effective communication. Thus there are certain domains in which ambiguity can be better tolerated than in others.⁹ A cultural system is analogous with language in that it organizes thought, categorizes content and establishes rules regulating the boundaries within which legitimate procedures take place. Pollution rules operate in such a fashion, to tidy up experience, allocate matter to appropriate classes and abolish marginal and ambivalent substances. Mary Douglas believes pollution rules can thus be seen as an extension of the perceptual process insofar as they impose order on experience, marginal substances are handled in a special way and thus reduce dissonance.¹⁰ Durkheim held that the dangerous powers imputed to the gods are, in actual fact, powers vested in the social structure for defending itself, as a structure, against the deviant behaviour of its members (loc.cit.). Indeed pollution behaviour varies enormously between contexts and is similar to differential perceptual focusing. Using this awareness, we can agree with Van Gennep's statement that marginal states relevant to transitory phases are dangerous for their liminality, that is the suspension of conventions such as time before the neophyte's eventual reinstatement. In combination with this momentous act, society redefines and re-establishes itself as a singular entity, signalling the neophyte's reincorporation into a new status. Thus, for example, a society or social group - say, a caste - that is deeply concerned about its integrity, its boundaries, is likely to symbolize that concern in beliefs about the margins of the

⁹Osgood, C. and Sebeok, T. (1954) Psycholinguistics: A Survey of Theory and Research Problems. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, p.129.

¹⁰Douglas, Mary (1968) 'Pollution' in International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, Vol.XII, pp.336-341. The ritualized avoidance of ambiguity: Macmillan.

human body; hair, nail clippings, faeces and so on, are likely to be treated with special ritual procedures (Douglas, M., 1966).

It is clear to us that through all this, those who engage, say, in religious studies, have no clear objective reference point¹¹ against which to judge the application of paradigms. We must recognize that there is often no clearly existing extra-linguistic world in terms of which it is possible to judge our linguistic-cum-cultural creations. As Winch instructs us, "our idea of what belongs to the realm of reality is given for us in the language we use. The concepts we have, settle for us in the form of the experience we have of the world."¹² A case in point is reflected in what Hymes calls code variability between settings. To use the Javanese language in a particular situation a speaker must choose one of three levels or styles of speech. Firstly, the lowest level indicates an informal and rough dialect. The highest level indicates an elegant and formal approach to speaking. There is also a middle dialect combining elements contained in both the lower level and higher level. The level of discourse chosen depends on who so happens to be the Javanese speaker and the situation, the latter instance, is an index of social class. A speaker's repertoire depends on choice to the extent of it reflecting the speaker's relative position within his social structure. Language style is conditional on the individual's status and his relationship with other participants which serve as a constraint on communication.¹³

¹¹Hinshaw, V. (1973) 'The Epistemological relevance of Mannheim's sociology of knowledge' in Remmling, G. (ed.) Towards the Sociology of Knowledge, Origin and Development of a Sociological Thought Style. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, p.232.

¹²Winch, P. (1963) The Idea of a Social Science. Argument for a relativist social science. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, p.15.

¹³Hymes, D. (1972a) Cited in Bateson, G. Steps to an Ecology of Mind. N.Y.: Ballantine, pp.165-166.

They imply differences not in thought but in ways of expressing the same thoughts.¹⁴ Ironically, Mannheim's critics proceeding as they do from observable world view presuppositions reinforce his central assumption, that the existentially determined standpoint of thinking extends via an individual's shared perspective context into the content of a judgement, leaving its imprint on the entire body of knowledge.¹⁵

In his brilliant exposition of the caste system Dumont (1966) describes the characteristic way in which hierarchy, separation, and specialization are interrelated to form the caste system. Hierarchy results from the evaluation of social facts in terms of a hierarchy of values. In the Hindu system values predicate the distinction and contrast between purity and impurity, and the superiority of the pure to the impure. The contrast and subordination that knit the several elements together make hierarchy under the hegemony of the Brahmin (set off in polar opposition to the untouchable) the touchstone of the system. Separation is a consequence of the contrast between purity and impurity and entails endogamy and the denial of commensality. Specialization consists primarily of a liturgical division of labour that draws into its purity-ranking system purely secular crafts as well. The caste system, then, is an ordering of social relations in terms of the classifications, contrasts and complementarities of Brahmanic ideology.

Dumont argues that in the ideology of caste, power is completely

¹⁴Whorf, B. L. (1956) Language Thought and Reality. Hypothesis on linguistic relativity. Boston: MIT Press; N.Y.: Wiley, pp.212-214.

¹⁵Remmling, W. (1973) 'Existence and Thought' in Towards the Sociology of Knowledge. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, p.25.

¹⁶Dumont, L. (1966) Homo Hierarchicus. The caste system and its implications. Paladin, pp.147-155.

secularized and opposed to religion. Thus dharma (doctrine) and brahman (god/priest) are contrasted respectively with artha (politico-economic affairs) and ksatra (dominium). Furthermore, power is subordinated to religion, artha to dharma, ksatra to brahman. The hierarchy of ritual values encapsulates and subsumes the whole universe, including power and its exercise. Dumont concedes that ideology never fits empirical reality perfectly, that the Brahmin is in fact dependent on the king or dominant caste who may sometimes flout caste prescriptions but yet not lose status (Dumont, 1966: 93-103, 106-8, 194-6). The ritual hierarchy accommodates these contradictions by being indifferent to and aloof from the distribution of power, by regarding its exercise as outside the orbit of its concern.¹⁷ To examine the correlation of the caste hierarchy with politico-economic stratification is, therefore, to interpret the whole in terms of the part, to account for the ritual hierarchy in terms of what is ideally subordinated to it and, in practice, a matter of indifference. Dumont rejects this approach as an ethnocentric attempt to reduce religious hierarchy to relations of power and the religious aspect to an epiphenomenon (1966: 49). He argues that it is necessary to analyse the caste system in terms of the conceptions on which it is based. To regard ritual status as in any way dependent on politico-economic power is to distort it by forcing it into an alien conceptual framework. The result is the characterization of the essence of the system (for example, the superiority of the Brahmin) as exceptional, deviant and inexplicable (loc.cit.).

Dumont goes on to define caste with two features, one being the interdependence between exclusively bounded groups produced through mutual task allocation, the other being that a section be classed as outcastes ¹⁸

¹⁷Dumont (1966) refers to power, its distribution and exercise as being "left outside" the hierarchy (p.108) and states that "the political sphere is severed from the realm of values" (p.366; see also Dumont, 1962: 66).

¹⁸See p.34.

(cf. Dumont, 1967: 271-2).

This then poses the question of the extent of the social system. In South America the Indians make up the majority of the population throughout the region. We can safely say that the Indians are not simply an appendage to Hispanic society and therefore implicated as outcasts. On the contrary the Indians are a social system existing apart. In Latin America, then, there are but two societies combined and economically interdependent within a single physical society. Pitt-Rivers puts it in this manner, that there is no underlying principle existing in common between systems that arose out of different historical necessities. That this phenomenon has been observed in various places and at various times in the history of the world and has seduced philosophers of history, as Freyer puts it:

... to construct a kind of model which, while not explaining the miracle of high culture, at least reduced it to an intelligible formula. But the further modern historiography penetrates into the distant past, calling on techniques of archaeology and comparative linguistics, the more questionable these models become, and the more clearly it emerges that the beginnings of culture are as individualised as its subsequent development.¹⁹

Cultures do not emerge in linear succession or follow a uniform pattern of laws, as postulated by the unitary philosophy of history. Cultures, then, develop independently of each other, just as do the different species of animal and plant - a polyphyletic development as a phylogeneticist would call it (ibid.). There is then no super-ordinate framework

¹⁸'Caste: a phenomenon of social structure or an aspect of Indian culture?' in A. V. S. De Renck and Julie Knight (eds.) Ciba Foundation Symposium on Caste and Race: Comparative Approaches. London: Churchill, 1967.

¹⁹Freyer, M. (1974) quoted in Lorenz, K. (1977) Behind the Mirror. A search for a natural history of human knowledge. [Trans.] London: Methuen, p.178.

into which all elements can fit.²⁰ In the final analysis a sterile classificatory system would have to give way to a particular description combining intrinsic usages.

Let us move on, and examine in detail the diverse and variegated elements composing various terminologies of caste. A definition for caste cannot be applied indiscriminately without first examining what it refers to. Instead, the theorist's task is to illuminate the various properties peculiar to caste. Cross-cultural comparison dissolves when ideas and events assume an intrinsically meaningful expression. It is a mistake to treat all empirical elements in similar fashion as if these elements were alike and inter-translatable.

Rather than engaging in false generalizing, the task of the theorist is to describe facts at the ethnographical level where contradiction is to be avoided, by eschewing comparison. Citing a concrete example, the castes in India express formations different from the clans of Gurayira, or the lineages of the Andes. Any historical explanation must also draw a distinction between Indian examples and Andean Indians of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that were recognized as social classes or the Yucatan Indian tribes in the nineteenth century. Each is unique. We agree therefore with Pitt-Rivers's assumption that common terms of reference have historically been used to confuse distinctive traits. Examples show that an indiscriminate usage of words such as "mana" and "tabu" are irrelevant if removed from their original context. Pitt-Rivers points to this as "the empiricist fallacy".²¹

²⁰We have traditionally emphasized a linear and continuous succession of sequences concerning diachrony. Just as a harmonious gestalt mistakenly presupposes an ordered configuration, in regard to a theorist's thinking, so, likewise, does the idealized appearance of a rationally ordered peaceful history. Events occur randomly in as much as control over them is not assured. History is zigzag.

²¹Pitt-Rivers, J. (1971) 'On the Word "Caste"' in Beidelman, T. O. (ed.) The Translation of Culture. Essays in honour of E. E. Evans-Pritchard.

The dominant persuasion constitutes the bounds within which normality operates. Usually, authoritative figures circumscribe and provide the working definitions for a collectivity. Needless to say, such beliefs are fictional to the extent that they emanate from a partiality, embodied in the synthesized image, the human sensory and brain system captures from its surroundings. This picture is relative.

Agreement must be elicited, for knowing to be seen as an appropriate treatment. This, then, refers to the functioning of elements intelligibly, through someone being in a position to know something. To be located somewhere means being present to what one speaks about. Position contributes to structuring what one speaks about, which is present in a particular way to the one who does the speaking. This notion will be seen to generate the idea of favouritism because if one has privileged access to what he speaks about and if the claim to know contains as a parameter the claim of such privileged access, a problem for research is generated. For example this occurs in the sense that the discourse that is made must be segregated from its concrete author and treated as the discourse of anyman. Discourse must be divested of its privilege, but only under the assumption that privilege makes reference to the special access which the concrete speaker has to what he speaks.²²

The methods proposed by social scientists show through their procedures the belief in the necessity of agreement for the proper conduct of science. As men in the game of science, they must decide when to evoke the rule of bias. It can be stated that natural science seeks to locate within nature properties that would be described as invariant.

²²Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1950-51) 'On Certainty', G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. Von Wright (eds.). Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1969, p.73.

Indeed the thrust of Wittgenstein's point is that one should read invariance as equivalent to agreement or "general consent". Regarding this necessity of science Harré notes that:²³

Invariances are not all obvious in nature, and cannot be demonstrated in any obvious way by experiment. It is not clear how one would demonstrate experimentally that momentum is conserved in a certain sort of interaction. This cannot be done by separating off the momentum and measuring it independently of the bodies which "possess" it; for momentum is the product of mass and velocity and these are quite different sorts of bodily property. Clearly the origin of the invariances is not to be found in the experimental side of science. It is to be found in the general conceptual system.

If this is the undergirding of science, what light is then shed on the nature of bias as one rule of science? In the scientific community bias is a way of seeing the intrusion of irrelevant interest into an inquiry where the notion of irrelevance is defined, ironically enough, as that which is most relevant to the speaker, i.e. as that which he has an interest in preserving and aggrandizing. What he has an interest in preserving is the illusion that his privileged access to his speech is irrelevant. Bias points to the scientist's version of the problem of suspicion, because to charge bias is to indicate that one is suspicious of the speaker's claim that his authorship (authority) is irrelevant.

But there are many interests which science deems irrelevant so our next question concerns which sorts of interest are those which represent bias? We shall propose that bias is the intrusion of unnecessary personal interests which fall outside of what are conceived to be the inevitable consequences of history and character. To see bias is to see the purported inquiry as more intelligible by making reference to the contingent personal position of the inquirer than to the nature of the objects he claims to describe. Bias rests on the notion that these subjective meanings of

²³Harré, R. (1964) Matter and Method. Naturalist explanation versus a cultural description. London: Macmillan & Co., p.32.

the inquirer make it impossible for him to locate invariances and thus no comparison of "findings" is possible. "Comparison of findings" is, of course, a metaphor for fellowship and for the social relationship, and in this sense the charge of bias is grounded in a conception of adequate speech which stipulates rational speech to be the speech which demonstrates its interchangeability for anyman. Consequently, the idea of favouritism affirms the recognition that the speech demonstrates the need for fellowship which masks self-interest. To recognize that the speech is grounded in self-interest rather than the ideal of fellowship is itself a display of fellowship.

Simply to assert that personal character enters a description is not enough, however. Not everything that displays character is of itself vulnerable to the charge of bias. Think of art, dreams, aptitudes, attitudes, preferences, food, as displays of character. It is thus probably not just showing character, or the accusation of showing it, which displays bias, since it is not applied to these forms of character display. Notice that we typically perceive these things to be possibilities in a different way from bias. Bias is only a possibility, established by making a certain kind of claim. Bias is a contingency. It is not necessary, not inevitable, in the way having dreams or preferences is inevitable. Bias is conventional in the technical sense of the term, i.e. we think it need not occur. This means it cannot be applied to (distortions caused by) basic character or history. When by perspective we mean historical perspective, we do not charge bias. We talk instead about controlling bias, since it cannot be eliminated. One confusion of the literature is thus clarified by distinguishing between "unnecessary" and "necessary" observer effects.

Therefore, the norm model, which operates on the level of the "given", studying phenomena that are directly observable, is as far as the human

faculty for understanding and description may lawfully proceed. The hidden nature and inaccessible properties inherent in the articulations apparent in each culture are inexplicable. This glossing over the differences between distinctive contexts is really an attempt to impose one set of values on another zone. Word usages are ignored in favour of manipulated bias and language debasement.

Man can perceive an "imaginary" situation. The animal does not have the power of perceiving symbols; it cannot imagine what would happen if ..., it cannot put itself in an imaginary situation. That is why an ape cannot read the simplest map. When reading a map, we imagine that we are here or there and decide what would be our next movement in this fictitious situation. Then, why is the point of view from which we view an object crucial to our way of coming to know anything?

Merleau-Ponty explains how objects are always perceived by us from a certain point of view in a certain perspective. We can never at the same time see the same mountain from every viewpoint. Even when we see it from an aeroplane we miss it from below. What we perceive in these different situations is always different. Husserl called these various aspects "Abschattungen" (perspective shadings).²⁴

If we look at segmentary social organization, one of the essential features is the relativity of component sections. It is the nature of a descent group to be at the same time inclusive of and included in other descent groups. Thus the particular group in which an individual's membership is relevant in a given social context depends on the genealogical distance which separates him from the person or group with whom he sees himself as related in the particular situation.

²⁴Merleau-Ponty, M. (1963) op.cit., p.125. See also Merleau-Ponty (1964) Signs, translated with an introduction by R. C. McCleary. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press.

In a system of this kind new lineages constantly form as old ones segment. At the same time, in certain situations, different but related descent groups unite and act as one. This process of fissure and fusion is typical of and indeed part of what is meant by a segmentary lineage system, the essence of which is the maintenance of political equilibrium. Typical, also, of such a system is the assimilation of all social links to a kinship pattern, even where there is no genealogical connection. The creation of fictitious kinship links is thus a feature of lineage-based societies of this kind.²⁵ Each grouping appears with its own peculiar characteristics - its own point of view - and its position is relative to one another.

The political system

A point to note about Nuer law is that it has not everywhere the same force within a tribe, but is relative to the position of persons in social structure, to the distance between them in the kinship, lineage, age-set, and, above all, in the political systems. In theory one can obtain redress from any member of one's tribe, but, in fact, there is little chance of doing so when he is not a member of one's district and a kinsman. The wider the area which contains the parties to a dispute the weaker the feeling of obligation to settle it and the more difficult the task of enforcing settlement, and, consequently, the less the likelihood of it being settled. Within a village differences between persons are discussed by the elders of the village and agreement is generally and easily reached and compensation paid, or promised, for all are related by kinship and common interests. Disputes between members of nearby villages, between which there are many social contacts and ties, can also be settled by agreement, but less easily and with more likelihood of resort to force. The nearer we get to the tribe the less the chances of settlement. Law operates weakly outside a very limited radius and nowhere very effectively. The lack of social control to which we have often referred is thus shown in the weakness of law, and the structural interrelations of tribal segments are seen in the relativity of law, for Nuer law is relative like the structure itself.

(op.cit.: 169)

²⁵Evans-Pritchard, E. (1940) 'The Nuer', An African Ethnography of a segmentary society. London: Oxford University Press, p.137.

A commonly shared assumption subscribed to on the highest and most inclusive level is Kwoth. In its otiose form it provides the ground rules applying in all particular circumstances through which Kwoth is made manifest. In other words as we move from its highest and most inclusive form of generality capable of articulating all Nuer customary usages it is transformed from one level to another as the occasion may suit. The different categories of spirit in a tribal pantheon have usually distinct segmentary status. At the same time, each type of supernatural has particular attributes, powers, functions, a rank or valuation in the divine order involving implicit or express relationships to other types, a station²⁶ in the cosmos, and a corresponding cult of its devotees.

To the Nuer religious practices are closely articulated with the kinship system; shrines to the deceased lineage heads may form the foci of ancestor cults which unite the members of the descent group in the common discharge of ritual obligations. The Nuer social structure is a segmentary system with various appropriate refractions of the divine principle Kwoth (ibid.: 102). Refraction here is defined in line with the differential aggregates the source Kwoth embodies for its scattered adherents. The Nuer divide the spirits into spirits of the "above" and spirits of the "below". With their distinction between spirits of the above and spirits of the below and the final vertical gradations within each class, corresponding generally to successive levels of the social hierarchy, the Nuer also provide a first-class illustration of a relation between cosmic height and segmentary level, a neater example, perhaps, than is ordinarily encountered. The supernatural representations of

²⁶Fortes, M. and Evans-Pritchard, E. (1940) 'Investigations into tribal political systems' in African Political Systems (ed.) International African Institute, London: Oxford University Press, p.101.

higher-order social groups are literally "on high", the others ranged accordingly on a scale of heaven and earth. Kwoth is symbolized by the sky and associated with major celestial bodies. Spirits of the air are of the atmosphere, clouds and breezes, the greater of them close to God, and the lesser nearer to earth; whereas at the "lower" extreme, some fetishes speak from below the ground.

To the Nuer, Kwoth symbolizes²⁷ their overall unity as a people and so, at its most general level, Kwoth represents oneness. Here also the segmentary principle applies, because the variegated forms Kwoth assumes serve to divide Nuer from one another. Oneness segments itself revealing how Nuer social groups hive off. Nuer genealogical history constructs a fictive record which results in cleavages after about the third generation. The support for the divisions arising in kinship loyalties on each level is given by Kwoth whose unique manifestation particularly affirms the exclusive nature each group enjoys. While in certain situations Kwoth and the blood ties associated therein transcend group boundaries, in other situations the same version of Kwoth is not commonly shared, signalling a cleavage or even possible conflict. Therefore Nuer interpret each fissive break by legitimizing secession in terms of a newly divided conception. Kwoth, situationally and therefore constitutionally, defines the boundaries of a particular locality.

It is possible for a person to appeal to the more fickle and capricious local deities or it is possible also to appeal directly to more comprehensive spirits that extend to include larger numbers of segments.²⁸ All these

²⁷A general account of Nuer religion may be found in E. E. Evans-Pritchard, Nuer Religion. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956.

²⁸A summary of sociological aspects of Nuer religion appears in E. Evans-Pritchard (1953) 'The Nuer Conception of Spirit and its Relation to the Social Order', American Anthropologist, IV: 201-214.

manifestations merely represent to these different segments the one overall unifying element. Depending on the circumstances involved, such as a perceived external threat, Nuer combine into groups. Therefore the common recognition of Kwoth forms a constitutional matrix organizing Nuer into larger segments, should the need arise. Greater and lesser segments of the tribe have their own patron versions of Kwoth - in several categorical forms as are appropriate.²⁹

Nuer have many conceptions for Kwoth for it is differentiated in both its genealogical and spatial representations. Nuer sacrifice to one or another conception according to the nature of the circumstances. Kwoth propounds multivalent meanings that only Nuer themselves are fully aware of, when Kwoth becomes transformed through various contextual customary usages. It may be that this conception of one spirit in several representations is singularly appropriate to a segmentary lineage system, itself harmonious in principle from top to bottom, and materializing at various levels by reference to the principle of complementary opposition (Evans-Pritchard, E. E. and Fortes, M., 1940: 100). A Nuer knows the form Kwoth expresses and what it means to any participants enmeshed in a nexus at "their" appropriate level for performance. This level of performance calls forth a set of expectations that only Nuer themselves can engender and understand, given "that" context and the particular spirit referred to. In short, Kwoth is transcendent and also immanent, assuming various local forms. Horton tries to encapsulate the transcendental African schema in an explanatory scheme:

... the essential point in the difference between personal and non-personalised idioms which affect the nature of the explanatory quest itself. A barrier to understanding tradition is the

²⁹Fortes, M. and Evans-Pritchard, E. (1940) op.cit., p.59.

impersonal entities posited by western thought.³⁰

Quite apart from other considerations Horton's attempt sought to avoid intrinsically meaningful personal metaphors expressing social commitment. The point is that irrespective of the translatability of common-sense propositions, which in Horton's case can only be hopelessly one-sided, we are bound by the very postulates in which and through which we seek to pursue our understanding. For example to the Moslem experience there are two halves to the perception of God, that were never meant to be separated because God is both above and within His creation, the latter supremely so in man. Transcendence allows us to reflect on the internal and the infinite, whose perception in the core of the Koran is unequalled in power and majesty. Immanence, the divine within us, gives us a certain autonomy and scope to use our intellect to discriminate, judge for ourselves, to fulfil our talents given by God in a progressive creative synthesis. Eventually the tie with the divine has been broken, and material existence became an end in itself with man striving on his own to be superman.³¹

In conclusion then the metaphors characterizing African subjective usage serve as a source for recruiting, training, and continuing group alignments. The only effective comparison is to perceive the value members attach to their commitment to a form of life. The crucial ground for understanding in part remains subjective.

³⁰Horton, R. (1967) 'African Traditional Thought and Western Science' Part I, From Tradition to Science, Part II. The "closed" and "open" predicaments. Africa, 37: 229.

³¹Cited in The Economist, Vol.270, No.7069, February 24, 1979. Afka Muljhik, Edited correspondence.

Language and cognition

Language expression is fluid. Waisman,³² following on from Wittgenstein and Wisdom, described the pervasive quality of language as "open textured". Put in a somewhat generalized form, the view is that the meanings of most words and expressions in common use are not precisely and exhaustively fixed, and more than this, it would be very inconvenient if they were. They are given by their users just the degree of determinate meaning which fits them to do what they are needed to do. Experience is all the time bringing us minor surprises, and what we need to get from language is something that can be related to experience. A terminology is useful precisely because it is fluid at the edges, no less than because its centre is clear and definite. When the Azande think, Evans-Pritchard³³ informs us, it is not something external. Rather, Zande reasoning has a texture all its own where every strand is interwoven to form a web which encloses the thinker. We have to be clear, then, that we must examine the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language (ibid.: 109).

Any Zande who has cultivated his garden to the best of his ability, let us say, following all locally prescribed procedures, has a bad yield because of some pest, then the Zande does realize the natural cause is attributable to a disease-carrying insect. But what a Zande person wants to know is why his correct methods have been undermined, when others have not suffered the same fate.³⁴ Zande believe that such misfortune is

³²Waismann, F. (1965) The Principles of Linguistic Philosophy. An examination in language construction. London: Macmillan, p.104.

³³Evans-Pritchard, E. E. (1937) Witchcraft Oracles and Magic among the Azande. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp.194-195.

³⁴Evans-Pritchard, E. E. (1973) 'For example, Witchcraft' in Douglas, Mary (ed.) Rules and Meaning, The Anthropology of Everyday Knowledge. Penguin Educ.

the result of witchcraft. Any maliciousness subscribed to by his enemies is flushed out by consultation with oracles.

The most authoritative Zande oracle is benge wherein a poison is administered to chickens. Questions that are put to the poison oracle may be interpreted according to positive or negative results indicated by the chickens' reactions. The wing of a fowl that has died from benge in an oracular consultation may be sent to the witch identified by it, who blows upon it to "cool" his witchcraft.³⁵ Should Zande encounter the problem whereby oracles precipitate contradictory answers then the answers from the prince's oracles are regarded as final. The prince's oracles maintain and bolster a system of rule providing a means of settling disputes that would otherwise remain unsolved.

When an oracle contradicts itself, answering "yes" and "no" to exactly the same question, Zande would not doubt the value of the oracles in general. They would merely argue that there had been some fault in procedure. Although the Zande system of belief cannot be tested in any definitive fashion, it tends to be circumlocutory, something like the addition of ad hoc premises to assumptions in order to qualify the existing basis for belief. In this manner there always arises a residual category accounting for any exception to the normal course of events. This point gives rise to what Polyani sees as the convincing nature of the system:

So long as each doubt is defeated in its turn, its effect is to strengthen the fundamental convictions against which it is raised.

(Polyani, M., Personal Knowledge, p.123)

The stability of belief, then, is shown "by the way it denies to any rival conception the ground in which it might take root". For instance,

³⁵Lienhardt, G. (1964) Social Anthropology. Broad overview of the field. London: Oxford, p.125.

any new addition to the system is apprehended on indigenous terms and reinforces in effect the entire Zande system.

... a new conception, e.g. that of natural causation, which would take the place of Zande superstition, could be established only by a whole series of relevant instances, and such evidence cannot accumulate in the minds of people if each of them is disregarded in its turn for lack of the concept that would lend significance to it.

The point that Polyani³⁶ makes is very similar to Durkheim's "conscience collective", where categories of thought presuppose the existing inbuilt logic which cultural perception assumes for its adherents. In Polyani's words, "by holding the same set of presuppositions they mutually confirm each other's interpretation of experience" (ibid.). To this idea I would add that the institutional basis for a paradigm proceeds according to the same communal need to mutually reinforce conventionalized social categories. Indeed, the gregarious nature implied in social behaviour occurs prior to theory building and permeates the theorist's attitudes and conduct to his work.³⁷

Beliefs do not arise in a vacuum. "Expectations" arise in response to the logic of the situation and represent an intrinsic state of consciousness. Therefore understanding is predicated on internally consistent, specifiable orders of meaning, linked to existential postulates about the world. In my references to witchcraft as a cultural reality of Zande, the underlying character is basically religious in that the diagnosis attributable to illness and misfortune is inseparable from a moral world view. In short, it is a "cultural system" which serves as both a "model of" and a "model for" reality.

³⁶Polyani, M. (1957) Personal Knowledge. An inquiry into the subjective element in knowledge construction. Chicago: University of Chicago Press (2nd edn. N.Y.: Harper Torchbooks).

³⁷Polyani, in this work, demonstrates the imprint of subjective and creative dimensions on experimental science.

The argument put forward by Normal Cohn³⁸ states that there is a latent need to transcend conditions where pain and suffering are the norm. He writes, "there is in many, perhaps in all human psyches a latent yearning for total salvation from suffering". Cohn³⁹ believes frustration runs so deep that a collective displacement ensues. This point has some validity. But, further I would argue that witchcraft accusations may also be seen as a form of victimization. "All people are equal, but some are more equal than others" really means that inequity and inequality result in strategies to lock out unfortunate and miserable people from sharing in the overall benefits available in a system. Such misfortunes that befall marginal groups are not simply acts of God. In former times natural catastrophes which played havoc with the productive system (crop failures, epidemics) or cut a wide swathe through human populations (plagues etc.) may have been the cause of witchcraft manifestations. Different crises were confronted in particular local frameworks with moderate success.

Functionalist theories on human cognition

Let us see how Malinowski and Firth have approached the problem of primitive thought. To Malinowski science, magic and religion were areas of interest and focal points in his studies. His theoretical work was guided by the concept of dual reality: the natural world studied in observation and a supernatural sphere grounded in emotional needs which gave rise to faith. While differentiating between magic and religion,

³⁸'Medieval Millenarianism: Its bearing on the comparative study of millennial movements' in S. L. Thrupp (ed.) Millennial Dreams in Action N.Y.: Schocken, 1970, p.32.

³⁹Cohn, N. (1970) The Pursuit of the Millennium. Revolutionary millenarians of mystical anarchists of the Middle Ages. (3rd edn. London: Temple Smith).

Malinowski treated the former as an essentially pragmatic response to fear. Malinowski certainly influenced Raymond Firth, who saw the acts of magic and rituals as compensating for deficient techniques, removing the fear of failure from production and fertility ventures and making both work itself a part of a prescribed procedure and co-ordinating the workers so as to produce the maximum co-operative efforts. As Firth⁴⁰ states, "labour in Tikopia is on the whole socially controlled". Each day a choice of activities is open to the Tikopian. His decision between them is determined in part by the comparative yield which they offer, but in part also by the wants of the household of which he is a member, by the traditional dictates of seasonal occupations, by special claims of ritual or by other social obligations (ibid.:145). Firth claims social forces catch up and enmesh the economic factors in a wider net (loc.cit.). Production units in Tikopia are constituted primarily on the social regard for effective communal activity. The principle ethic in regard to work in Tikopia is not based on profit and productivity criteria. Therefore, work and production do not indicate that there is inefficiency, or a need for compensatory ritual techniques to bolster that confidence. Work should be seen as a schedule of preferences for social advantages - the system is oriented that way. For instance, a Tikopian would say, "the brother-in-law goes to seek his brother-in-law" (ibid.: 147). Put in another way, another man said, "anything done in the house of a brother-in-law I rise and go and look after it" (loc.cit.).

Supporting this social arrangement is a theory of magic. Malinowski believed that appeals to supernatural agencies supplement technical knowledge, filling in the gaps, so to speak. Firth thinks that this system is

⁴⁰Firth, R. (1965) Primitive Polynesian Economy. A study in economic practices and activities. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, p.165.

economically inefficient - it drags the process of production along but in the short run provides a stimulus for achieving community. The function of the Tikopian chief in all this is to act as titular owner and perform the principal ritual. Some statements by Pa Porima will illustrate the point. In discussing fishing and canoe ritual, he said of his vessels, "My canoe, but the chief comes to perform Kava for it; my own canoe which I have had built." He said again in general form:

... the canoe for a man is hewn, hewn, and then he goes to speak to the chief about them both as to what may be his wish - as to who may be set up as tutelary spirits of the canoe. The sacred canoes are given, as big spirits, only the chiefs, the Kau firifiri (that is the line of dead chiefs). The chief may speak of their father or he may speak of their ancestor of old, who ever he may mention.

By this he meant that it is the privilege of the chief to choose one of his own forebears as principal spirit guardian of the vessel. An example (ibid.: 218) was given to Firth of the canoe built by Pa Faiaki who went to the Ariki Taumako and asked him whom he would like to be the tutelary spirit of the vessel. The Ariki answered that he would like to have his father, the late chief as the guardian spirit of the vessel and so the appointment was made.

The concept⁴¹ of manu relates to the quality of operation of Tikopia "magic". The agency of operation involves a two-fold conception: that natural objects are sentient and capable of response to human urging; and that spiritual beings can be induced to intervene in the process. But their relative importance varies greatly according to the situation. At one end of the scale, as in planting a banana sucker or in the simplest forms of fishing, the formula implies direct action; a spirit being

⁴¹Firth, R. (1967) Tikopia Ritual and Belief. A native belief system. London: Allen & Unwin, p.200.

is concerned little or not at all. As the individual object becomes more valuable, or can be thought to be capable to contrary will, the entry of the spirit being is posited more clearly. At the highest, general and most inclusive level of Tikopian magic the spirit being is more distant, but it is not an unknown quantity. Its possession is guaranteed by the chief. For instance, in all forms of sea "magic" he is commonly addressed as Ariki Tautai "Sea-Expert-Chief", a term concealing the identity of a named ancestor who acts as tutelary deity of family canoes. In other situations this same entity is refracted into specific forms. In other forms of magic he may be addressed as Ancestor, or, (particularly) if he is a non-human deity, given his name or title. There are then various arrangements or forms through which spirit beings are made immanent and certain magical acts are associated with them. These situational circumstances vary according to the nature of the request for pig-welfare, canoe-welfare or sago-welfare. At the lowest level, for the ordinary "magic" of production, especially where the entry of a spiritual being is at a minimum, any member of the Tikopian community is eligible as a user of magic, since he always has some ancestor to call on. But the most important the magic the greater the power needed to implement it, the more weighty the spirit being required for intervention, and consequently the higher the rank of the possessor and user, and the broader the coverage of area relative to the whole of Tikopia. It is for this reason, Firth believes, that the magic of personal destruction is in the hands of chiefs and lineage heads who are ritual elders.

The thesis of manu is that success above a certain point, the

"normal", is spirit given. Its most local form occurs in terms of concrete results, phenomena such as crop growth, fish and recovery from disease. Not only is its presence judged by material tokens, but at times it is represented as being in itself a material object - as when a dead chief hands it over to his successor or keeps it clenched in his fist. At its highest level manu comes from the sky:

... we look at the rain which is about to fall, that is, the manu which will come. The manu of the rain, the manu is given after the fashion of the gods; no man sees it; one observes only the food has become good.

(op.cit.: 191)

The manu concept is rendered in several instances differentiated between contexts as a manifestation of categorical Tikopian concerns both unified at the highest level of inclusiveness covering the whole Tikopian chiefdom and yet distinctive in many localized appearances.

The fieldworker's dilemma

The anthropologist who intends studying a culture apart from his own is, I believe, culturally preconditioned, and therefore deconditioning, in response to his own learned reflexes is well nigh impossible. In a certain sense the ethnologist finds himself in the position of a child with regard to the culture he undertakes to study. He has everything to learn in order to understand better, from the inside, how this culture functions; he attempts in a hasty fashion to go rapidly through all the stages of socialization. The anthropologist goes through in his own mind by tracing the steps by which his own homologue, the child, assimilates the instructions or teachings imposed on him, in order to gain his place in society. The difference

for the anthropologist lies in the fact that he cannot retrace all the child's emotions and reactions from the moment the mother puts him on her back for the first time to the moment when, by initiation, he becomes an adolescent united with the male community. In this way, the need to accelerate the course of events taking the anthropologist into the orbit cognized by his informant means that the anthropologist uses tools from his own imagination to fill the gaps lacking in his experience. It appears that difficulties of communication and integration into his community confront the child, likewise the anthropologist is faced with a variant of the same problem. The actual stages through which movement into that society occurs naturally affect to a large extent the data-content elicited there. Therefore the semantic differentiation of an alien universe is coloured by the principles of the anthropologist's own culture and community. The elements of the native universe may logically be inferred but it cannot be fully appreciated as it omits their principles and existential struggles in the search for an intelligible semantic construction. Such a language is translated into an anthropological set of categories, another language which is an attempt to strain native meanings to fit our intellectual taste patterns. Linguistic usage is an attempt to penetrate into the deep structure to find explanation, but explanation here means another cultural invention, another language. It does not explain anything.

The anthropologist really ignores the primitive nature of thought inasmuch as it is affected by a community logos which fails resemblance. The cosmos is turned in, as it were, on man.⁴²

⁴²An excerpt in Douglas, M. 'Primitive Thought Worlds' from Robertson, Roland (1969) Sociology of Religion. Selected readings. Harmondsworth: Penguin,

Its transforming energy is threaded on to the lives of individuals so that nothing happens in the way of storms, sickness, blights or droughts except in virtue of these personal links. So the universe is man-centred in the sense that it must be interpreted by reference to humans. Anyone who has moved understandingly in the Australian bush with Aborigine associates becomes aware of the fact (op.cit.: 93). He moves, not in a landscape but in a humanized realm saturated with significations.

It is important to point out that the connections between persons and events which characterize primitive culture do not derive from failure to differentiate. They do not even necessarily express the thoughts of individuals. It is quite possible that individual members of such cultures hold very divergent views on cosmology. Vansina gives three accounts of very independent thinkers he met among the Bushong. One old man had come to the conclusion that there was no reality, that all experience is a shifting illusion. The second had developed a numerological type of metaphysics, and the last had evolved a cosmological scheme of great complexity that no-one understood but himself.⁴³ It is misleading to think of ideas such as destiny, witchcraft, mana, magic as part of philosophies, or as systematically thought out at all. They are not just linked to institutions, as Evans-Pritchard put it, but they are institutions. They are all compounded as part of belief and part of practice. Similarly, the feats of endurance entailed in the relative deprivation a fieldworker would encounter, affects not only his knowledge of the total social situation, but the unique exotic elements infect any anthropologist with totally new reactions and experiences. This is part of the institution anthropology has

⁴³Vansina, J. (1955) 'Initiation rituals of the Bushong', Africa, 25: 138-52. Vansina, J. (1964) 'Le royaume Luba', Annales Sciences Humaines, No.49, Musec Royale de l'Afrique Centrale.

defined for itself.

Just as the primitive ritualist possesses a need to formulate order through repetitive time-honoured norms, the anthropologist too finds that he must do the same according to the ordinances laid down by his discipline in order to make clear what he wants to say. In this sense to build models simply reflects a specialized form of communicating the dominant values in the discipline.

According to the views of theorists Robertson, Smith, Durkheim and Gluckman⁴⁴ the nineteenth century view of rituals as "the fruits of mental processes and ideas" contrasts with the modern view that sees them "in terms of social relations". He goes on to assert that modern minds are bored by the nineteenth century approach. What this seems to mean is that Van Gennep, Tylor, Frazer, and other nineteenth century writers treated religious beliefs as serious attempts to account for the world and its workings. Their modern successors who take their cue from Gluckman are unable to see such beliefs as having any serious intellectual content, and so tend to treat them as nothing more than a sort of all-purpose social glue (ibid.: 349). Again, while the nineteenth century writers felt that the invisibility, personality, and other equally curious properties attributed to mystical beings posed fascinating problems that demanded answers, their modern successors find little of interest in any aspect of religion other than its postulated capacity to keep society running smoothly. Horton thinks that Gluckman leaves many unsolved problems which he puts aside rather than any authentic progress having been made. In part, whereas the nineteenth century theorists lived in a predominantly religious society, the

⁴⁴Horton, R. (1964) 'Ritual man in Africa'. Is ritual reducible to social relations? In Lessa and Voygt (1965) Reader in Comparative Religion. An anthropological approach. Harper & Row.

modern agnostic is often the product of a milieu in which religiosity is treated as marginal. Consequently, respect and acquaintance with the contents of belief fall into disrepute today because most anthropologists prefer scepticism which irrefutably shapes their conduct and research projects. Worsley interprets this difficulty arising from ethnocentrism and prejudice correctly. He argues that primitive people accept that the world around them exists, and that it has its regularities, its appropriate rules and operations. But these norms are not solely technical ones, any more than we operate in a totally technical manner. We, too, are influenced by jealousy, lust, magical notions, status seeking, generosity etc. even in our most scientific moments. For primitive cultures, the area of the extratechnical is wider and often more supernatural simply because the volume of scientific knowledge is smaller.⁴⁵ As an example, what we would call empirical, say, the planting of potatoes, defecating or drinking beer to the Melanesian have to be achieved by "ritual" actions and "empirical" ones. But it is common for the same word, often in Melanesian tongues the term for "work", to be used to describe both kinds of action (op.cit.: 227). In other words, the distinctions we draw, they do not.

One must guard against looking upon these conceptions as the result of a collective aberration, a mentality hampered by the irrational.⁴⁶ In the Sudanese Kingdom of Mali, during the fourteenth century, ritual practices domesticated gold, by regulating the supply. Ritual safe-guarded

⁴⁵Worsley, P. (1957) The Trumpet Shall Sound: A study of "cargo" cults in Melanesia. London: MacGibbon & McKee, p.225.

⁴⁶A point in his theory on primitive mentality that Levi Bruhl considers. See his (1923) Primitive Mentality .

the gold washer against the greed of feudal powers and made transaction necessary. Never did Mansa Moussa, the supreme sovereign, dream of taking possession of the gold mines.⁴⁷ A common service peculiar to ritual is that it also introduces strict regulation, a kind of planned economy which is indispensable in the case of an activity capable of upsetting primitive and vulnerable economies. The agreements established by tradition which reveal indigenous sociological sophistication and which operate towards an equilibrium situation, have not as such been able to resist the upheavals created by the European presence. Today, commercial companies have upset the traditional equilibrium negotiated through the dioula currency and introduced a speculative system. In short, western money has contributed indirectly to the desanctification of production and trade. External vicissitudes increase to the extent that gold washing diminishes in its importance.

From the aforementioned examples we must agree with Worsley⁴⁸ when he states that the understanding of the universe that is supplied by religion is often of a very different order from that supplied by vulgar "materialist" empiricism or by science. He argues that the kind of morality that is part of a theological system of belief is of a different order from that of the agnostic. In accord with Wittgenstein's emphasis on language games, a spiritual and moral discourse derives its "logic", its legitimization, its charter, its validation from quite different sources. Worsley sees a social order buttressed by a dominant or established religion enabling an overlapping of institutional orders, an extra dimension of

⁴⁷Balandier, G. (1966) Ambiguous Africa. An investigation into "alternatives" in post independence Africa. (trans.) London: Chatto & Windus, p.72.

⁴⁸Worsley, P. (1968) 'Religion as a category' in The Trumpet Shall Sound. London: MacGibbon & McKee, pp.21-35.

congruence that the secular polity lacks.⁴⁹ To him, religious 'Weltbilden', religious ethics, religiously validated polities differ in kind quite simply, from those in which this dimension is lacking.

The production and intelligibility of a text ultimately rests on something other than grammar, i.e. usage. To put it more realistically, our grammar rests on our lives together and thus on the nature of ourselves and of our world (form of life).⁵⁰ So the author's text is non-conventional in the sense that to change its intelligibility we would have to change what we do and how we live. Ways of seeing are thus not conventional (and hence arbitrary); they are features of how we act together.⁵¹ "Our concepts rest not on a kind of seeing on our part, it is our acting which lies at the bottom of the language-game" (Wittgenstein, On Certainty, para.204). So the author's differentiation of himself through his text, his claim to "see beyond" what appears, is possible only from within a way of being-in-the-world upon which rests his authorial claim to know, his Authority. His very claim to difference reflects his deference to some mode of production! Dr. Jackson⁵² draws a distinction between man's passivity versus man as an active agent. He believes passivity is overcome in symbolic activity so that Kuranko actively transform events whilst remaining outside their

⁴⁹Cited in Robertson, R. (1969) op.cit., p.233.

⁵⁰Wittgenstein, L. (1958) Philosophical Investigations. Understanding thought through language analysis. Oxford: Blackwell, pp.7, 23, 43.
_____ (1969) On Certainty (ed.). Oxford: Blackwell, para.204.

⁵¹Silverman, David (1975) 'Problems of Reflexivity and Dialectics in Sociological Inquiry, Language theorising difference' in Davis & Moore Market Speech and Community. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

⁵²Jackson, M. (1977) The Kuranko - Dimensions of social reality in a West African tribe. London: Hurst, pp.201-2.

technical understanding. He judges events to be arbitrary unless anticipated. An understanding of their grounds for activity is not just an intellectual reproduction. My discussion is situated in terms of a reflexive and dialectical problematic. This requires an appreciation of an immediate difference between the ways of understanding the nature of speech, language and meaning, which, almost in order to be put at all, should really be asserted in multi-dimensional forms. As against this consideration, positivism, the theorizing of science (in particular "scientism" in the social and human sciences) and also (in some of its modes), of commonsense, speaks, shows and affirms a one-dimensional paradigm of language.⁵³

Rather than the tendency to reduce all picture theories of meaning to sets of atomic propositions which picture the world of facts (logical positivist and empiricist), it simply means these facts are unanalysable for they fail to be analysed as a picture.⁵⁴ Such empirical formulations resting on the one foundation form of meaning were held to be empirically verifiable (ibid.: 111). However, the reflexive problem still remained, how to verify the verification principle.⁵⁵

Wittgenstein's later thought was, as he himself acknowledged,⁵⁶ dialectically related to his earlier thought. It proposed a multi-variant reality of language and meaning, seeing it now as tool-box

⁵³Marcuse, H. (1968) One Dimensional Man. Studies in the ideology of advanced industrial society. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

⁵⁴Roche, M. (1975) Class and Difference, see section on Language and Difference: Reflexivity and Dialectic, pp.109 ff.

⁵⁵This point is a criticism of the logical positivist school of Vienna. The point also supersedes Karl Popper's notion that a good theory is a falsifiable theory, in that the meaning of the test criteria is in question. Wittgenstein, L. (1958) op.cit., pp.2-30.

⁵⁶In effect, the Philosophical Investigations supercedes the Tractatus.

containing words, concepts, grammatical forms, and so on which performed many functions in the life of natural language use, but which performed no overall unitary function. Truth was to be defined in terms of the consistency inherent within a framework and the manner in which strategical functions coincided with the intended and expectational requirements. In this manner anthropology's aspiration should be directed to producing knowledge that should predominantly clarify activity. There arises an analogy here between the symbolic depersonalization of a neophyte in, say, Kuranko society versus a neophyte anthropologist. Both performers are temporarily stripped as a prelude to enculturation whilst at the same time impersonating and complying with ideal rules set by omnipotent others. This is also "playing the game", which is also a kind of enculturation. By transcending the purely idiosyncratic through playing extraordinary roles, performers evoke traits consistent with social principles and categories. These social elements transfix the individual as each one passes through learning phases culturally pre-established and constituted even after the individual has moved on (Jackson, M., 1977, p.203).

The scientist never carries on a dialogue "pure and simple" with nature.

He is no more able than the 'bricoleur' to do whatever he wishes when he is presented with a given task. He too has to begin by making a catalogue of a previously determined set consisting of theoretical and practical knowledge, of technical means, which restrict the possible solutions.⁵⁷

⁵⁷Lévi-Strauss, C. (1966) The Savage Mind. The structure of the human mind - both primitive and civilized. Ch.9.

A structural understanding

Meanwhile, let us consider what I call the "expectational" or what Collingwood calls the "presuppositional" grounding from which theory gains its relative identity. In his dealings during daily life someone from Azande assumes that strange and unaccountable forces will impinge on him and upset the smooth running of his routine. He is not terrified, only annoyed. Someone, out of spite, has ruined his ground-nuts, or spoilt his hunting, or given his wife a chill and surely this is a cause for anger! He has done no one harm, so what right has anyone to interfere in his affairs. It is an impertinence, an insult, a dirty offensive trick.⁵⁸ It is the aggressiveness and not the eeriness of these actions which Azande emphasize when speaking of them, and it is anger not awe which we observe in their response to them.

Evans-Pritchard writes:

... witchcraft is not less anticipated than adultery. It is so intertwined with everyday happenings that it is part of Azande's ordinary world. There is nothing remarkable about a witch - you may be one yourself, and certainly many of your closest neighbours are witches. Nor is there anything awe-inspiring about witchcraft. We do not become psychologically transformed when we hear that someone is ill - we expect people to be ill - and it is the same with Azande. They expect people to be ill, i.e. to be bewitched, and it is not a matter for surprise or wonderment.

A culture selects the "rules" in order that actors correctly play the cultural game. These "rules" must by definition equip each incumbent actor to grasp priorities in regard to himself as ego,

⁵⁸Evans-Pritchard, E. E. (1937) 'Azande belief system outlined' in Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic among the Azande. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp.64-67.

but also, more importantly grasp the "rules" held by other players and the consequences of their likely intended moves. However, these intended moves are not isolated events in time. In other words, what makes these "rules" a social phenomenon? Are these rules analysable? An example would be the European witchcraze phenomenon that is in many significant respects irrational. As Trevor-Roper has argued,⁵⁹ the belief in "witches" was not necessarily irrational in the intellectual context of the time, but the belief in witches did not cause the witchcraze. What was distinctive about the witchcraze and what requires explanation going beyond the self-understandings of the actors involved are such factors as the ferocity of the persecutions, the sudden and dramatic increase in the number of putative witches who were discovered and condemned, the geographical and social patterns of persecution and the widespread use of torture. By focusing only on the concepts available to the actors involved, we could not explain these phenomena adequately: it would certainly not do to say that the cause of the witchcraft craze was the fact that the number of witches had dramatically increased! Moreover, in doing so we would fail to see how it involved a process of scapegoating that served to deflect social discontent. By focusing on witchcraft in terms of the system of belief and values of which it was a part, we would miss what is also essential to the reality of the witchcraze.

Thus the Azande attribute many misfortunes to witchcraft (Evans-Pritchard, E. E., 1937, p.40). The

⁵⁹Trevor-Roper, H. R. (1969) 'An historical account of witchcraft crazes' in The European Witch-craze. N.Y.: Harmondsworth, Ch.3.

victim realizes that the witch is likely to be someone who knows and who has a grudge against him, for people bewitch those they hate. The culprit is revealed by consulting an oracle or a diviner and, if his activities have not yet resulted in death, he is approached and politely asked to withdraw his witchcraft. If the victim were to die, formerly vengeance could be exacted provided that the oracle's decision as to the witch's identity was confirmed by the king's or chief's oracle. Nowadays magic is made against the witch, though nobody knows who he is; and when after a lapse of time somebody in the community dies, this person is believed, after post hoc oracular confirmation, to be the witch, and the incident is closed. A similar cycle of events then begins in connection with the last death. Thus Azande beliefs about witchcraft form a closed system.⁶⁰ They tie up some of the loose ends in experience and provide a socially acceptable way of thinking about death (a most disruptive experience in any community). They canalize emotions of envy and hatred into expectational criteria by providing a formal way of dealing with them. Since the system of oracles constitutes a hierarchy,⁶¹ like the political system with which it is associated, the body of Azande belief supports and is consistent with the political organization. In these and other ways these beliefs are shown to form a coherent system of thought, closely integrated with social life. Often, also, witchcraft beliefs form an important sanction for good behaviour;

⁶⁰We must inquire about the status of Zande belief within the context of Zande commonsense. There is no question of its truth ... it is operatively true. See for discussion on this argument: Barden, G. (1972) 'Method and Meaning', Ch.VI in Zande Themes. Essays presented to E. Evans-Pritchard (ed.), Singer, A. and Street, B. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp.120-128.

⁶¹Ibid., p.123. The caveat that one should approach it as if it were false because it is false according to our standards of verification is not ultimately useful; one might just as well approach it as if it were true because it is according to Zande standards.

for unneighbourly conduct may not only incite the enmity of others and perhaps provoke them to bewitch a man or his family, but it may also bring on him accusations of witchcraft, with consequent reprisals.

Conflict is inextricably interwoven into social relations. There is no doubt in my mind that the popularity Gluckman enjoyed is attributable to a great extent to the static conception of society that functionalism with its harmoniously ordered systems portrayed. By introducing conflict into social relations, which derives from an interest in Marxism, Gluckman⁶² opted for discontinuity and mobility between what would otherwise be fixed and entrenched positions. Different sectional interests pull against one another in an endeavour to maximize their relative opportunity costs and put their rivals at a disadvantage. Whereas on one level a district is involved in fighting all those related to it, these groups may combine when faced with a common enemy. On another level if one of them is involved in fighting with a more distant section all those districts may join up with one another. The spatial and genealogical differences between sections are crucial variants when determining likely friendships or hostilities.⁶³ Ultimately all Nuer tribes are united against foreigners.

As we follow Evans-Pritchard's analysis working out from the individual Nuer into the larger society, we see that at every point each man is pulled into relations with different men as allies or

⁶²Gluckman, M. (1963a) Custom and Conflict in Africa. Achieving cohesion by violence. London: Basil Blackwell, pp.4-8.

⁶³Firth, R. (1957) (ed.) Man and Culture. An evaluation of the work of Bronislaw Malinowski. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, pp.102-3. ... the context of situation provides a valid configuration of elements comprising persons, objects, non-verbal events as well as language between which significant relations obtained thus constituting a set of functions as a whole.

enemies according to the context of situations. If a man is to herd his cattle successfully he must be friends with neighbours even though widespread disagreement is evident. The herding of cattle demands that certain separated groups at some seasons be friendly. Similarly a man cannot marry his close female relatives. This means that he must be friendly enough with other people for them to give him a wife. Indeed this requirement is vital to group life. For, as Lévi-Strauss (1963a) has pointed out, groups by nature are opposed to one another and both the incest taboo and the rules of exogamy demand that women be pumped from a friendly group to a hostile enemy group; and that payment shall proceed to compensate the group which has given up a woman. This mode of formally arranged marriage transactions through alliances occurs in the South American Nambikwara, and is designed particularly as in the case of the Yanomamö to increase the status of the wife-receiving group. This group selects its women from previously well-established and highly reputed groups in order that the group that receives increases its relative political strength. Women are bargained for because their procreative powers represent a loss to their domestic group and a benefit to the marrying-in group. Child-bearing endows the woman and the group she belongs to with the means to carry on and reproduce itself naturally and socially. The conflict between groups is analogous to that which maintains in a consanguineous relationship arising out of parenthood and its fulfilment in marriage, the union being consummated between spouses who by definition are not kin. Fortes supports this point when he instances the relationships perpetuated throughout a society by kinship rules having their basis in a bond, the very

essence of which is the absence of kinship.⁶⁴ Hence comes the ambivalence and the arousal of anxieties and tensions inherent in intra-familial cognatic relations. There arises also another category of social relations, both in the family and between members of different families and clans, relations of affinity. The principle of complementary opposition exemplified in the dual "giving" and "receiving" between groups, from a structural viewpoint is embodied in the Tallensi and Nuer segmentary lineage systems.

The bridge to a structural insight

To what degree has the historical and interpretive content been dissolved by anthropology? Lévi-Strauss, who was influenced by Marxism as well as psychoanalysis, elaborated a theory that came to be called structuralism. This has some resemblance with Marxism in that it aims at a grasp of totality, but unlike the Marxists, Lévi-Strauss draws a line between primitive societies which are supposed to be timeless and static, and advanced cultures which elude anthropological analysis because they are "in history". Then there is the difficulty that Lévi-Strauss - like Edward Tylor, James Frazer and other nineteenth century evolutionists - tries to establish conclusions about the workings of the human mind, but his time-sense is very different from theirs, being geological rather than historical. He has said:

Unlike the history of the historians, history as the geologist and the psychoanalyst sees it, is intended to body forth in time ... certain fundamental properties of the physical and psychical universe.⁶⁵

⁶⁴Fortes, M. (1949) The Web of Kinship among the Tallensi. Principles relevant to social organization including "segmentary lineage" systems. London: Oxford University Press, p.15.

⁶⁵Lévi-Strauss, C. (1964b) 'Mythologiques I: le cru et le cuit' in Understanding Myth. Paris: Plon, pp.101-102.

This makes it difficult to classify him as a Marxist, while his tendency to see primitive peoples as models of what is basic in all mankind suggests a certain affinity with Rousseau. It has been remarked that he takes his cue from Rousseau in arguing that it is language which constitutes the essence of humanity as distinct from animality, a transition that accompanies the shift from nature to culture.⁶⁶ This leads us to the notion that verbal categories provide the means whereby universal characteristics of the human brain are transformed into patterns of behaviour, and this is where structuralism makes contact with the historical or geological part of the argument. For if such universals exist, they must in the course of human evolution have become elements of the human psyche, along with the development of those parts of the brain that are directly linked with speech formation.⁶⁷

The theory owed something to the Prague school of structural linguistics developed by Roman Jakobson. It differs from Malinowski's functionalism, which was much closer to empirical evidence, and must be regarded as a self-contained body of thought peculiar to Lévi-Strauss and his disciples. This is not to say that structuralism and functionalism are necessarily incompatible. The term "social structure" draws attention to the interdependence within a social system of all the different classes of relations found within a given society. So defined, structuralism makes no claim to the possession of special insights denied to anthropologists or sociologists working with empirical material. The rather abstract model favoured by Lévi-

⁶⁶Lévi-Strauss, C. (1955) Triste Tropique. Lévi-Strauss's autobiographical ethnography. Paris: Plon, Ch.38.

⁶⁷_____ (1969) 'Structuralist dynamics explaining a kinship logic' in The Elementary Structures of Kinship. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, p.27 ff.

Strauss⁶⁸ is not for this reason radically divorced from the sort of explanation by origin or function favoured by historians and sociologists. Where it differs from the historical approach is in its attempt to decipher a code instead of tracing a pedigree. The basic assumption of structuralism resembles Noam Chomsky's theory of language, according to which all human languages derive from a finite set of universals common to all men and anterior to cultural variants. Similarly, Lévi-Strauss believes that the structures of kinship, social organization and economic exchange in primitive society are the manifest expressions of structural laws embedded in the unconscious. To take the best-known example, the binary organization which men give to their perceptions, the universal habit of classifying experiences in pairs of opposites such as in the Nuer case, are expressed in spirits of the air at the highest and most general level versus the particular "spirits of the below" on the local level. Hence the various levels of spirit phenomena represent a (supernatural) structuring of ideas as mirrored in the segmentary principle denoting oppositions at all levels, particularly more numerous on the lowest levels of abstraction. Lévi-Strauss visualizes an analogical process occurring between nature and the human mind in that it involves the use of Nature for social classification. The brain is a source of metaphors for social thinking and for Lévi-Strauss appears to be homologous with Nature.⁶⁹ Does this point correlate with social organizations structures entirely differently, as in the Ashanti kingdom where the notion of confederacy exists?

⁶⁸Robey, D. (ed.) (1973) Structuralism: an introduction. Oxford: Clarendon Press, Ch.1, 2, 3, 4, 6.

⁶⁹A thesis that Lévi-Strauss mentions in Totemism (1962). Penguin (1969), pp.150-155.

Human beings, Lévi-Strauss argues, are able to communicate because all languages and all codes of behaviour are rooted in cerebral universals. Like Chomsky's "generative grammar", Lévi-Strauss's structural anthropology wears a Cartesian look, but it can also be described as materialist in that it postulates a physico-chemical foundation underlying the patterned structure of social behaviour. In that it resembles the Freudian model, which presupposed a physiological basis of mental behaviour, even though Freud emphasized that that layer of the mind was not accessible to the science of his day. It is doubtful that psychoanalysis, generative linguistics and structural anthropology in the form given by Lévi-Strauss share a common belief in the existence of an as yet unexamined biological foundation, similar to the genetic code whose decipherment ranks among the major intellectual advances of the present age. In this sense, Lévi-Strauss, like Freud, is a materialist, the chief difference being that Freud was concerned with the interpretation of dreams, Lévi-Strauss with the analysis of the collective dreams known as mythologies.

In fact, theory building is a social conception. All cultures are in some way victims of this illusion, they are trapped in their perception by the very historical methods structuring their experience.

The meaning contained in every custom was seen by Malinowski⁷⁰ to be pragmatic and related to meeting basic biological needs. The drawback in this approach is that it assumes that a natural explanation is a sufficient facilitating closure, on human biology. This meant that nomothetically inspired laws would in time apply to culture itself because culture was really a physiological product. This

⁷⁰Malinowski, B. (1936) Excerpts taken from Anthropology, Encyclopaedia Britannica, first supplementary volume, pp.132-139. Examination given functional point of view.

prompted Radcliffe Brown to insist on the organic analogy which biologized culture. Just, as if the interdependence between efficiently working organic units ensue the working together of the parts throughout the whole organism may be assumed. Likewise culture would give rise to units called institutions whose respective instrumentalities would result in an organic unity, a collectively shared orientation that expressed an ideal equilibrium. However, these "facts" seem to be self-defeating tautologies. Functionalism possesses a pragmatic and utilitarian attitude which simply asks, How do things work? How do the parts of a system "pull together" to create the desired effect? How do we solve the problems of integration, survival, order and unity? Can we simplify the diversity of events by reducing their complexity to a limited number of causally adequate mechanisms? This last question still poses the same answer that is implied somewhere in the question. Explanation, therefore, amounts to saying what has already been suggested in the answer.

Functional critique

For Carl Hempel, the fatal flaw of functionalism is, "The information predictably provided by a functional analysis affords neither deductively nor inductively adequate grounds for expecting 'i' rather than one of its alternatives." The occurrence of a cultural element in question is not really explained, because there is no accounting for why that element occurred rather than one of its functional equivalents.⁷¹ The crux of the problem then becomes apparent when functionalist analysis cannot account for cultural

⁷¹Hanson, A. (1975) Meaning in Culture. Examination of theories about human culture. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, p.92.

differences, the instances pointing to diversity and the diverging evolution cultures take. Likewise the unitive answers sought in trying to explain cultural events with material gleaned from physiological and materialist principles does not mean that culture falls within a totally naturalistic system. Similarly, the treatment of illness is not reducible to a purely technical affair. I particularly have in mind Gluckman's theory about 'The Rituals of Rebellion' (1938, 1962, 1963, 1965). He sees the central theme of the Zulu first fruit ceremony (umkhosi wokweshwama) as concerned with expressing "integrative" rebellion,⁷² for, though hatred of the King is expressed by his rival brothers in the "hate" songs, these songs of hate and pronouncement of rejection are directed at the incumbent of that kingship, and not at the institution of kingship itself. The rituals, Gluckman argues, thus provide an outlet to express discontent without necessarily removing the incumbent or revolting against the institution of kingship. In this sense the rituals provide a catharsis and have the effect of reinforcing the society.

Although this theory has provoked a great deal of critical response, notably from Beidelman (1966)⁷³ and Raum (1967), I believe not enough attention has been given to the central theme of the Zulu ceremony - namely ridding the whole kingdom (i.e. the land, people and King) of the evil influences that had accumulated during the previous year, and casting the evil in scapegoat fashion on the black bull, which is then burnt to cinders. The good things for

⁷²Gluckman, M. (ed.) (1962) Essays in the Ritual of Social Relations Conflict resolution and emotional catharsis. Manchester University Press.

⁷³See Beidelman, T. O. (1966) 'Utani: Some Kaguru notions of death, sexuality and affinity', Southwestern Journal of Anthropology, 20: 354-380.

the new year are achieved by sacrificial animals and white symbols, including medicinal symbols. The song of "hate", which Gluckman has used as an operative point in his analysis is related to a deep-seated mystical condition, namely a form of pollution termed by the Zulu umnyama which is understood to weaken their victim and make him more accident prone, as well as socially obnoxious.⁷⁴ The "hate" song therefore expresses vividly the socially undesirable qualities termed isidina in the person of the King, who as the embodiment of the nation is polluted by umnyama while going through the ritual phases calculated to expiate himself from evil and thereby forestall evil becoming apparent in social relations throughout the kingdom. Seen in its proper context, illness is not singularly an emotive phenomenon. Nor is the role itself pertaining to kingly obligations placed in jeopardy. The King's person in the form of his whole being is mystically treated. Should any somatic symptoms appear then empirical means are applied as in curing any malaise.

Ngubane indicates in her analysis that the causation of disease demands three criteria of treatment (Ngubane, 1977, p.131). In particular, people sometimes are considered sick not because of any organic disorder, but because they undergo certain life crises and are regarded as stricken with pollution. Ngubane points out that pollution is a mystical concept that cannot be demonstrated according to laws of cause and effect (ibid.). The correction of the condition involves mystical means expressed in symbolic medicines.

By contrast, there is illness that always presents itself in somatic symptoms and is recognized as a natural process. Illness of

⁷⁴Ngubane, H. (1977) Body and Mind in Zulu Medicine. An ethnography of health and disease in Nyuswa - Zulu thought and practice. Academic Press, p.152.

this class is collectively known as umkhuhlane, and is termed a natural illness. Its occurrence is beyond the control of the patient, and he is therefore not held responsible.⁷⁵

To the Zulu there is finally a dimension of morality more particularly associated with social situations. When people are properly "balanced" or in good order, or balungusiwe, sorcery bounces off them. Hence social behaviour implies duty and responsibility towards oneself as well as towards dependants. By complying with social rules, a proper balance is ensured in personality and therefore it would counteract any sorcery or accidental misfortune. Morality also implies that maintenance of good relations with the ancestors, who would otherwise withdraw their protection. Umnyama, in contrast to balungusiwe, must be seen as an inescapable, determinable condition generic to human birth and life crises. By objective cleansing rites impurity is reduced but never abolished. However with balungusiwe, which is an act of sorcery committed against offenders of moral and social rules, there exists the possibility of conscience, and the deliberate breaking of conventions that could have been otherwise avoided.

An interest of functionalism is to show how the rationality of institutions with respect to their environments interlock. The concept of function is borrowed from physiology.⁷⁶ In addition, as the meaning is implied here, we assume some metaphysical notion of purpose. However, the "usage" implied in the teleological meaning of "function" simply refers to an adaptive strategy. The function of any object tends to be assumed

⁷⁵This idea points to a radical disjunction between Horton's attempt to reduce primitive states of consciousness, to emphasis on a narrow verification criteria and those entirely different cognitive arrangements.

⁷⁶Murphy, R. (1972) The Dialectics of Social Life. Alarms and Excursions in Anthropological Theory. London: George Allen & Unwin, p.164.

and therefore implicitly contains in its descriptions an evaluation that might not refer intelligibly to the people who were studied. The function of any symbolic act may be interpreted according to a different contextual awareness.

An example showing the different demands placed on an African youth is given by Richards. She has said, "it is difficult in fact to imagine the extent to which the young boy or man is bound to rely on his father or the family group for support".⁷⁷ Dependence on the part of a youth is stressed through rituals associated with food, protection and instruction. This particularly applies when a youth depends on his father's goodwill for the cattle of the bridewealth which allows him to move from the domestic domain where his upbringing occurred and move to create a new household of his own.

In our society there is a trend away from the willingness of young adults to establish a family. In Africa the nucleus of society is the family and elaborate patterns designed to express submission in patrilineal societies are maintained through an admission of parental responsibility and filial piety (loc.cit.). To the African conception power comes partly from a simple extension to them of the awe and dependence that the younger generation feel towards the seniors among the living. Communal bonds combine in both a social-empirical and a mystical element through the operation of moral constraints. These relationships tie human beings together in close networks with concomitant personalized and socially accepted normative patterns prescribing the outcome. Meyer Fortes suggests:

It is as if fathers are exorbitantly compensated by society with spiritual powers for being deprived of material powers for the sake of continuity of the society.

⁷⁷Cited in Richards, A. I. (1932) Hunger and Work in a Savage Tribe. A tribal ethnography, Routledge & Kegan Paul, p.77.

It reconciles them and exonerates the latter of guilt, as can be discerned in the funeral ceremonies.⁷⁸

The shades are supposed to inhabit a vague underworld. Often they are localized below the ground of the family homestead, or in the food garden where their bodies lie buried. The little shrines that are built for them or the grave on which the offerings are made, are not their actual abode so much as the focus for the devotion of the living. The primary concern, to which their concentrated power force is directed is always the preservation of the human family to which they still belong, for it is as true of them as the living that they are mystically present because they participate. Hence, their continual anxiety lest the living allow them to slip into oblivion or spoil the solidarity and health of the human group by breach of custom or bad relations. Then, any contravention of social relationships among the living overflows into the domain occupied by the ancestors invoking and requiring their intervention in the affairs of the living in order to heal socially disruptive tensions.

Here we are confronted by the manner according to which any society conceives its orders and the pattern generated by and expressed in the order, is contained in contextual significant. To Radcliffe Brown⁷⁹ there were two poles of analysis which he claimed were complementary, for as he explained:

Actual observation of the way persons do behave will enable us to discover the extent to which they conform to the rules delimiting the scope of choice-making and the amounts of deviation therefrom ...

⁷⁸Fortes, M. (1959) Oedipus and Job in West African Religion. Intricacies in family and communal life. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

⁷⁹Glucksman, M. (1974) Structuralist Analysis in Contemporary Social Thought. A comparison of the theories of Claude Lévi-Strauss and Louis Althusser. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, pp.37-38.

Deviations from the norm have their importance. For one thing they provide a rough measure of the relative condition of equilibrium or disequilibrium in the system. Where there is a marked divergence between ideal or expected behaviour and the actual conduct of many individuals there is an indication of disequilibrium

The functional understanding of primitive society narrowed its focus to a crystalline conception within its framework. In addition, the use of this approach implied some kind of consistency between "parts", at any rate up to the point of open contradiction and conflict being avoided. Structure was defined to exclude contradictions. History was thus expelled a priori and the justification offered was that the only alternative to inductive functional studies was an evolutionist historicism. Modern British social anthropology was conservative in its approach and certainly not adventuresome.

Later the contradictory, conflictual and antagonistic relations on which Bohannan, Leach and Gluckman focused were integrated into a self-stabilizing system. The internal dynamics of the Burmese and African formations they studied were absorbed into a circular, repetitive and unimaginative stereotyped history. In other words, presuppositions severely restricted the handling of data to a non-history. Subsequently Victor Turner has transposed the circular diachrony Gluckman practised on to the ritual plane, conceptualizing social life as an endless "dialectical" interplay of structure and anti-structure embodied in rites de passage. The Ritual Process enunciated the now classic functionalist thesis that even the most apparently subversive rituals merely reinforce the social order. "The structure of the whole equation depends upon its negative as well as its positive signs." A brief quote should suffice:

... structural superiors, through their dissensions over particularistic or segmental interests, have brought disaster on the local community. It is for structural inferiors, then - (in the Zulu case, young women, who are normally

under the patria potestas of fathers or the manus of the husbands), representing communitas, or global community transcending all internal divisions - to set things right again. They do this by symbolically usurping for a short while the weapons, dress, accoutrements and behavioural style of structural superiors - i.e. men. But an old form now has a new content. Authority is now wielded by communitas itself masquerading as structure.⁸⁰

Also Gluckman in his analysis of the Swazi illustrates the eventual process of conflict leading to an harmonious resolution:

Among the Swazi, an annual, national ceremony, the incwala, links the ritual of inversion to the collective action required during the first harvests. It involves two phases. The first submits the capital to a symbolic sacking and the King to expressions of hatred - sacred songs affirm that his "enemy" the people have rejected him. However, the King emerges strengthened by these trials; he becomes once more the Bull, the Lion, the Indomitable⁸¹

The social order is thus exposed and is renewed at the very moment when the ties with nature and the cosmos are tightened. When, after a show of humility, the King returns to his "rightful" place at the head of the royal clan, order is reimposed. The incwala rite ritually transforms the contestants through various disjunctive phases and restores unity, securing security and prosperity.

Victor Turner, drawing on Van Gennep's concept "rite de passage", expresses the conflictual processes involved in rites of transition. Turner uses the expression "permeating symbolism of birth and death" to show how these two vital concerns to Ndembu in their life cycle are communicated sociologically. Nkanga may be defined as a life

⁸⁰Turner, V. (1969) 'The constitutive properties embodying structure' in The Ritual Process. Structure and anti-structure. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, p.184.

⁸¹Balandier, G. (1970) Political Anthropology. Theories and methods in political anthropology. Penguin Books (1972).

crisis rite where the uninitiated become initiated through undergoing various trials which assume for the individual a significance. The girl "dies" as an active member of her own family group and is born into the membership of her husband's and of the adult tribe. Turner says the structure of Nkanga is concerned with the conflicts arising from change of social relations. The norms governing the girl's behaviour in her former status as a dependent on mother, father and mother's brothers no longer apply during her seclusion, and new norms appropriate to her future status are taught to her by precept, example, mime and symbol. Using Gluckman's conceptualization, enunciating Nkanga as a "ritual of rebellion", Turner claims this rite expresses woman's ultimate structural dominance. Turner writes:

The Mudyi tree is not merely an emblem of womanhood; it also represents the value set on matriliney as the hub around which the whole society revolves. Between various categories of female relationship Nkanga demonstrates keen conflict: between the mother and the daughter, between senior and junior women, between mother and adult female society, between mother and instructress. But the Mudyi stands for their widest common interest and their ultimate solidarity as the seed-bearers of Ndembu society. It opposes them to men as a sex before it reunites them with men as joint producers of children, in the concluding phase of separation.

(Turner, V., 1966, pp.21-3)

We have seen the different stylized methods utilized by specific cultural modes in relation to particular contexts. We have dealt with the holistic and static approaches that Radcliffe Brown used in his "organic analogy". The functionalist model sought to express ideological conception in "purposive" and utilitarian considerations when describing essential elements contributing to the maintenance of the social order. In conclusion then, the orders of meaning presupposed by the theorist depend upon ultimate values subscribed to by the discipline without reference to a faithful

interpretation of the native's qualitative expressions. This means observation is grounded in bad faith in that theory necessitates the presence of preconception within the bearer's own imagination.

Finally, values do not drop from the air; they are painfully worked on to produce a workable structure because man, as Nietzsche⁸² correctly assumed, "is stung out of the limits of his body" - he is an heroic and questing creature, who feeds on symbols for his sustenance. Man constantly reinterprets the world through re-ordering it and creating in it, what man himself must express in order to articulate self-understanding. This effectively raises the question time and time again, whether we can imagine the concepts of knowing without taking account of the whole complex of traits by which man is characterized, and how without these presuppositions, we can even think of the concept of knowing, to say nothing of actually engaging in the act of knowing. To name a thing is to put it in a system of articulation, which, by differentiating it from what surrounds it in a chain, gives it meaning. Much of the analysis of labelling events and their relative categorization mentioned in The Savage Mind (1966b) locates events within structure without giving primacy to any particular level.⁸²

⁸²In Becker, Ernest (1973) The Denial of Death. Death as heroics. N.Y.: Free Press; Macmillan, p.158. Becker's terminology is "... distortion occurs due to the feat of life and death and distortion due to the heroic attempt to assure self expansion ...".

CHAPTER 2 DO LOGICAL MODELS EMBODY VARIOUS POLITICAL SITUATIONS?

Abstract

In general, interest groups exhibit the characteristics of organization and shared interests (interest is here used in the sense of a conscious desire to have policy move in a particular general or specific direction). To more fully understand their role in the policy process however, their aims (objectives) need examination. By and large, the function of an interest group is to act on and alter the political process; to bring the manifest desires of the organized group to bear on the authoritative allocation of values (the outcome of a social norm).

'Pressure' politics is by no means the only effective (or most salient) means employed by such groups in achieving their aims. For the purpose of this exercise I suggest two alternative ways by which interest groups are intimately involved in the policy process. Firstly, the clientele method, which is a master-servant relationship between an interest group and the relevant administrative agency. The group thus becomes the natural expression and representative of a given social sector - a natural reference point for all policy matters concerning that particular sector. Herein, my reference to hierarchy, in turn, raises the question of mutual obligation. The other method is a plural relationship, based on group interaction involving political kinship amongst close and integral political units and between associational interest groups and external agencies. Essentially, the clientele relationship is based on a position orientation - its strength lies in the creation and maintenance of fixed channels of access to the superior agency - whereas the plural

relationship is based on an issue orientation - pressure must be generated afresh with each new issue and each time must be perceived to be salient by the policymakers (it is intense but often sporadic).

In conclusion then, I draw together a link between the inter-organizational (and interpersonal) dimension and the realm of the wider social structure via a focus on resources, bearing in mind that these are differently distributed between groups in society. Organization members are seen as engaged in processes of resource acquisition, resources being of two types: wealth and authority.

My argument, then, rests on the fact that belief styles contribute to characterizing unequal and disjunctive structures even to the extent that those made worse off react with deference. The question confronting us then is how does the diffusion of ideas, for example, encourage a cultural acknowledgement of inferiority and dependence in time resulting in obligations to superiors?

Cognition: an intersubjectivity

Berger and Luckmann¹ emphasize that throughout the process of socialization the child attempts to make sense of its world largely, though not exclusively, by means of language, which categorizes practically all phenomena and brings the individual into relationship with them. It learns patterns of behaviour and sets of values which allow it to engage in intelligible relations with others. Values tend to be long lasting and accepted without question.

¹Berger, P. and Luckmann, T. (1966) The Social Construction of Reality. A treatise in the sociology of knowledge. N.Y.: Doubleday.

Integral to phenomenological understanding is the realization that most people accept their world as "real" and their life-style as "given". To the phenomenological method the notion of "epoche", meaning the suspension of doubt and the adoption of a non-critical acceptance of reality, is an effort to avoid judgement of alien thought patterns.

Phenomenology focuses attention upon intersubjectivity, hence the importance of language and non-verbal communication. The process of socialization, phenomenologically understood, is one in which individuals enter into worlds of meaning and significance shared with others. Basically, man desires to make sense of his environment. Durkheim, whom I quoted earlier, stated that the process of making sense of the world is not to be regarded as a solely intellectual task, for while cognitive activity is of basic significance, so is the realm of affectivity, of the emotional context or frame within which thinking occurs; the two must be seen to be inter-related. Behind the conception of events, cognitive activity is itself articulated by cultural rules that the structuralist believes he can uncover. His purpose is to make thought intelligible.

The question we intend to raise is the difficulty with the belief in a universal principle that would serve as an explanation for discrete social elements expressed in Indian society in all their bewildering variety. In studying an ideological system such as caste rules with all their bewildering diversity and complexity, theorists such as Dumont (1966) have attempted to discover some general unifying principles which can be applied to the whole of Indian society. The first and most dominant is, of course, the hierarchical ordering of hereditary, endogamous groups of people. The one thing we know for sure, anywhere in India, is that the Brahman caste will

be at the top of the hierarchy and the untouchables or Harijans will be at the bottom. We also know that every other caste whether Hindu or non-Hindu, e.g. Buddhist, Jain or Sikh, will be jostling and manipulating the system in order to increase the status position of their own caste, within the hierarchy. Each region or locality has its own ranking system between the two set categories of highest and lowest, i.e. in the middle range.

But the important universal factor is that of hierarchical ordering. The structure of the caste system is constant even though the elements within it, i.e. the individual castes, are continually demonstrating the hierarchy's flexibility by their mobility within it. The concept of pollution is fundamental² to the caste system as it is through the purity-impurity opposition that the relationships between castes are expressed. Diversity is found here too as some areas or localities, e.g. south India, are more strict in their pollution observances than others, and also, some castes, usually low castes (in relation to other low castes), are more rigorous in upholding pollution rituals than others. It is more characteristically the south Indian Brahmans who are the most rigorous in separating themselves from impurity. Purity-impurity is a way of defining the relationships between castes in their day-to-day interaction. There is a structural element here too, although the elements are constantly changing, in that the ritual state, the degree of purity of the caste as a whole, is relative to the positions and relative distance between incumbents, e.g. the Brahman caste - pure, and the untouchable castes such as the leatherworker - impure, even though the relative level of purity-impurity

²Dumont and Pocock (1959) 'Pure and impure'. Pure versus impure dichotomy. Contributions to Indian Sociology, III, pp.9-39.

of the individual in any given caste changes with time, e.g. at the death of a close kinsman.

On this skeleton, let us try and attach the meat and gristle of Indian anthropologists' hypotheses.

With the social structure of Indian society there is the problem of trying to analyse the interaction between Indian civilization, the macrosystem, and Indian villages, the microsystem. Micro-studies tend to be limited, considering India's great regional diversity, but macro-studies miss the nuances,³ refinements and subtleties that can only be reached by detailed micro-studies. "Micro-studies provide insights while macro-studies yield perspectives, and movement from one to the other is essential" (Srinivas, 1966, p.2).

Redfield has drawn a distinction between the universal cultural elements which attach themselves to a Brahmanic conception and more localized occurrences he calls the Tradition-Little Tradition.⁴ His starting point in the study of civilizations was microscopic, synchronic and socio-cultural, but he later came to develop a macroscopic, historical approach. We will only be concerned with his work that is applicable to India. A civilization, he postulates, has both "societal structure" and "cultural structure". The former consists of the total network of social relations that connect the communities of different kinds to one another over long periods of time and is formed by networks of marriage and kin, trade and work, religious pilgrimage, political administration and organization which join together different villages with one another and with urban centres.

³Srinivas, M. N. (1966) Social Change in Modern India. Change and Sanskritization. California University Press, pp.2-10.

⁴Redfield, R. (1960) Peasant Society and Culture. A cultural typology. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

The cultural structure of a civilization is the structure of its ideas and the products of ideas, i.e. cultural traditions which are compound and complex. In every civilization there is the "high" cultural tradition of the reflective few (the Great Tradition) and "low" folk traditions of the unreflective many (the Little Tradition). These dimensions constantly interact. The Great Tradition tends to be cultivated and transmitted by intellectual specialists teaching in schools and temples located in special kinds of centres, whereas the Little Tradition is perpetuated without the benefits of such institutions. But there are transmission channels between the two. He believes that the world view of the Little Tradition, in India, is on the whole polytheistic, magical and unphilosophical, while the strands of the Great Vedic Tradition choose different intellectual and ethical emphases, tending to be theistic and ethical. He proceeds to demonstrate the Great Tradition's being transmitted over time to the Little Tradition with the example of the Ramayana which is the literary source of a commonly recited text told at village festivals and now believed to be a local story. Apparently a civilization in the "primary" phase of development means that the Great Tradition has developed indigenously from precivilized local cultures and, although carried to a reflective level and systematized, remains essentially homogeneous with the Little Tradition. In this phase Great and Little Traditions are dimensions of each other, and there tends to be consensus about the order of "highness" and "lowness" among the different communities in the civilization. The "secondary" phase occurs where a civilization tried to incorporate cultural elements from other cultures and civilizations which tends to weaken consensus about the order of levels in tradition and to weaken the cultural integration between city and country. But this factor is

dependent on how well the civilization can absorb foreign elements over a long period of time without losing its essential character.

This theory is still very much at the mental construct stage as the analytical studies required to prove or disprove it have yet to be done. As we shall see, the need to emphasize the diffusion of elements from the Great Tradition appears congruent with expressing through the purity and impurity continuum preference for a Brahmanized view of the Indian universe. The general theorist approaches local elements primarily to subject local contents to a professedly broader view - the universal, the sine qua non!

Marriot, as does Singer, appears to agree with Redfield's civilization scheme or hypothesis. Marriot proposes a two-way interaction between the big and little traditions in the concepts of universalization and parochialization. The former process occurs when the little traditions of the common people exercise their influence on the texts of the great traditions which take up some element of belief or practice, and by incorporating it in their reflective statement of Hindu orthodoxy, universalize that element, for all who come under the influence of their teaching in following generations. The examples he uses come from the area of religious practice and festivals. Parochialization occurs when some Sanskrit element is learned about and then reformed by a local people to become part of their local cult.⁵

This is all nicely categorized and labelled, but it has been criticized as a descriptive rather than analytic process.

⁵Marriot, M. (1966) Village India. Hindu tradition and village life. Chicago University Press.

The role of ideology in belief

Another approach, involving this difference between the ideology of the civilization and the actual occurrences on the ground level, postulated by Srinivas, is called Sanskritization (1966, op.cit.: 6). It is the "process by which 'low' Hindu castes, or tribal or other groups, change their customs, ritual, ideology and way of life in the direction of a high frequently, 'twice-born' caste" (Srinivas, 1966, p.6). Generally such changes are followed by a claim to a higher position in the caste hierarchy than that traditionally conceded to the claimant caste by the local community. The claim is usually made over a period of time (a generation or two) before "arrival" is conceded. These practices and values associated with Sanskrit scriptures include such things as vegetarianism, teetotalism, wearing of the sacred thread, performance of life-cycle rites by Brahman priests, non-blood sacrifice or offering, prohibition of widow remarriage, belief in the doctrines of karma, dharma, rebirth and release.

Sanskritization is an ongoing process and has been for thousands of years but it has accelerated with the increased economic mobility brought about by westernization or modernization.⁶ Generally castes occupying the top positions of the hierarchy are more sanskritized than those of the middle or low. Lower castes have always, it seems, tried to imitate the life-styles and customs of higher castes especially those which are in close proximity, hierarchically speaking. This was met with a hostile attitude on the part of the locally dominant caste who often used physical force to try and keep them

⁶Srinivas, M. (1970) Caste in Modern India. Modernization and sanskritization. Asian Publishing House.

in check, but over time it was usually accepted. Gradually a chain reaction would occur when each group imitated the one higher and in turn gave it to the group below, so that over a long period of time it was possible for sanskritization to occur. The Brahman caste is not the sole source of sanskritization - often it is the locally dominant landowning caste which is high up in the hierarchy that was imitated, even sometimes by Brahmans.

As lower castes become more sanskritized, higher castes, in order to keep their exclusivity and distance often adopt western modes of behaviour which are often the direct opposite of their traditional practices.

According to Dumont and Pocock,⁷ sanskritization answers the need arising from the micro-macro opposition.

In order to fit the local atom into a larger perspective we call the universal, broader studies ensued. One of the biggest setbacks in micro-studies was the discovery that the village no longer fitted the image of "primitive isolate" and probably never was isolated and self-sufficient. The village as a demographic fact is secondary to its social considerations as a link in the network of regional inter-relations based on social ties such as kinship, economics and religion. Here then we believe a problem arises in that the elevation of local discrete elements into a broader framework for the purpose of explanation cannot be assumed, a priori, to be accurate statements of some underlying reality.

Caste hierarchy indicates a gradation according to which groups struggled to achieve a better status. Thus a group, such

⁷Dumont, L. and Pocock, D. (1957) 'Village Studies', Contributions to Indian Sociology, 1: 23-41.

as a tribe, would indicate its entry into the Hindu fold by becoming a caste. The adoption by a lower caste of the customs and habits of a high caste is motivated by the group's desire to raise its status in the caste hierarchy. Srinivas calls the process of the spread of Sanskritic Hinduism "sanskritization" since he thinks it occurred in two ways.⁸ Firstly "by the extension of Sanskritic deities and ritual forms to an outlying group, and secondly by the greater sanskritization of the ritual and beliefs of groups inside Hinduism" (Srinivas, 1952, p.214).

A result of sanskritization meant Brahmins⁹ adopted an ideology to buttress an exclusive social position. To achieve dominance they developed the dual ideas of pollution and power, which led to fear to loss of power if anyone had contact with the food or body wastes of another group. This accounts in part for the origin of the system. It is in reference to this larger system of ideas that generalist theorists turn to for their over-riding scheme. The Brahmanical view of power confirms their possession of ritual supremacy and their ideological omnipotence.

The conception of "all-India spread" offers one idea pertaining to the unity problem that is constantly featured in Sanskritic Hinduism. Srinivas uses the concepts "horizontal" and "vertical" spread. The first refers to the ritual forms shared by the same or similar castes in different parts of India such as the adoption of similar forms of Sanskritic ritual. The vertical dimension refers to

⁸Srinivas, M. N. (1952) Religion and Society among the Coorgs of South India. London: Oxford University Press, p.214.

⁹Cohn, B. S. (1971) 'India: The social anthropology of a civilization'. A structural-functional analysis. Anthropology of Modern Societies Series. Prentice-Hall, p.62.

the cultural and ritual forms shared by different castes in a single homogenous linguistic and cultural region. The point Srinivas develops when writing about the diffusion of, among other beliefs, the peculiarly Sanskritic beliefs and rituals, is that a common heritage seemed to envelop "all India". However, this point bears more consideration because it implies a uniform standard without really accounting for the changing prestige of different groups.

There is in the Sanskritic scriptures a theory of four classes or varnas - Brahmins, Kshatriyas, Vaishyas and Shudras - which seeks to rationalize the caste structure into a single functional hierarchy.¹⁰ Srinivas has discussed this theory as contributing to the spread of an "all-India Hinduism" by encouraging the assimilation of local and regional caste differentiation to the simpler varna scheme.¹¹ Underlying the great diversity of practice is the idea of duty (dharma). This is translated as law or religion depending on the context. One must act in social as well as ethical ways. It is one's duty to follow the right action within the system of values to which one is committed.¹²

One problem confronting the anthropologist then is to trace in concrete studies the flow between traditions.¹³ Singer became convinced that the continuity in tradition does not reside in an exemplary set

¹⁰Brown, W. (1961) 'The content of cultural continuity in India', Journal of Asian Studies, 20, 4: 431.

¹¹Srinivas, M. cited in Singer (1972) op.cit., p.45.

¹²The conception I try to draw is a multi-layered state with varying kinds of authority and power vested at various levels: a local, a sub regional, and a regional flow of beliefs and ordinances between various levels. For instance, Cohn cites the frequency with which the state worked an internal alliance system contingent on whether local chiefs or corporate bodies were partially incorporated through granting of legitimacy by a ruling family or group who centred their rule in their capital. See Cohn, B. S. (1971) p.65.

¹³Marriott, McKim (1955) 'Little communities in an indigenous civilization' in McKim Marriott (ed.) Village India. Studies in the little community. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp.191-192.

of texts and rites such as those defined by Sanskritic Hinduism or in an alternative "lower level" local variety. Any unity, if it is to be found, resides in the concrete media of song, dance, play, sculpture, painting, religious story, and rite that connect the rituals and beliefs of the villager with those of the townsman. A vital clue is given to the answer we are seeking when Singer writes, "... sects lose some of their exclusiveness when one looks at the media that they use to communicate their particular version of Hinduism."¹⁴ The question, do local beliefs arise from the diffusion and universalization of the varna scheme or is the varna scheme an accretion of outside elements grafted onto the local variegated culture, is difficult to answer.

The general and pervasive qualities located in the detailed Sanskritic tradition consist in the main in mythology and legend. The same stories from texts such as the Ramayana, the Bhagavata Purana and the Mahabharata are recited, sung and played in both village and city. Singer gives two examples indicating the spread of sanskritization. On one occasion he observed a teacher among untouchables who were otherwise culturally impoverished instructing children how to act out Sanskritic folk-tales (op.cit.: 75). One Hari Katha artist we talked to said that she had performed all over India, as well as in Burma and Sri Lanka. Outside the Tamil-speaking areas, her audiences rarely understood her Tamil narration but never failed to respond to her songs and pantomime because they were familiar with the puranic and epic stories she recited (op.cit.: 79). Commenting on the various messages, Singer noted that a rich variety of ways occurred in which stories are told and retold. He tells us that practically every

¹⁴Singer, M. (1972) When a Great Tradition Modernises. Changing face of Hinduism. Vikas, p.47.

cultural performance contains a puranic theme (op.cit.: 76). These motifs became variegated in song, dance and drama, in what was popularly regarded as "culture". Also these formal differentiations became articulated horizontally and vertically.

In a locally based empirical study Singer shifted his emphasis from the common stock of epic and puranic stories concomitant with their cultural specialists to elements of cultural content. Rather than finding a homogenous spread of textual beliefs, Singer pointed to the rich variety of ways in which stories were told and retold. He found traces of Sanskritic elements throughout cultural performances including song, dance, play, recitation and exposition. To Singer the cultural media were more important than just the books when studying Indian culture. It was the conscious behaviour, Singer argued, that carried the content of belief and practice expressing the ideas people had about themselves. Essential to Singer's appreciation is his deliberate focusing on song, dance and drama because each constitutes an idea derived from concrete and specific examples.

In conclusion then, these formal differentiations are in turn well articulated with other aspects of culture and society. As we shall later see, this approach contradicts the structural emphasis on texts.

Berreman accused Dumont (1971) of conceiving the principle of hierarchy from the top to be mainly a Brahmanical construction supported by Vedic and Sanskritic ideology. By listening in the main to the Brahmins, Dumont has, in fact, distorted the complex manifestations that constitute the hierarchical principle .¹⁵

¹⁵See Berreman, G. (1971) 'The Brahmanical view of caste', Contributions to Indian Sociology, n.s., 5: 16-23.

A civilization is not to be imagined as passing in linear form from top to bottom or from one stage to another or on one line through space. In other words, elements connect at various points and speeds.

In my view, the social structure consists of all the networks of marriage and kin, trade and work, religious pilgrimage, and political administration and possibly even war either joining or separating segments in a process of transformation. The Indian social structure is a structure of networks and centres of many different kinds in which communities containing elements from both 'Great' and 'Little' traditions combine or fragment. Similarly the cultural structure is the structure of its ideas that arise from cultural traditions. Here "high" cultural traditions of the reflective few and the "low" folk traditions of the unreflective many interact constantly between levels at different intensities. The Great Tradition tends to be cultivated and transmitted by intellectual specialists teaching in schools, temples and literary centres. The unlettered transmitted ideas among themselves without specialized teachers and institutions. To Redfield¹⁶ the concept of civilization in this sense means a complex assemblage of communities and cultures of different levels and kinds co-existing in mutual dependencies of different kinds and degrees over vast stretches of time and space.

On a more regional level, anthropologists have found in their studies that the village may have been an organized unity with which a villager identified, but the numerous "extensions" of a village embedded it inextricably in a wider society and culture.¹⁷ In his study of social organization and religion among the Pramalai Kallar of south India, Dumont found the

¹⁶Redfield, R. (1962) Human Nature and the Study of Society (ed.) by M. Redfield. Chicago: Chicago University Press, p.257.

¹⁷Marriott, M. (ed.) (1966) Village India. p.51.

smallest independent social unit among these Kallar¹⁸ was not the village but the province (nadu in Tamil), which comprises a collection of patri-lineal, patri-local lineages with a common religious cult. In this case the chief of the province is also the chief of the lower lineage chiefs as well as of the lineage cults. The issue Dumont raises is that the smallest local unit through the occurrence of interlocking kinship links form clusters which do not represent any particular level.

We should not lose sight of the fact that cultural mobility was tied to relations of dominance and so therefore served to obscure our view of the caste system. F. G. Bailey has shown how Harijans are prevented from improving their position. Further, Bailey points out that it is assumed due to a harmonious view of the system that conflict has been minimal and that no units have withdrawn from the system.¹⁹ In addition, some low castes have improved their position by taking it upon themselves to engage in Sanskritic practices, or through aggressive shows of strength they have relegated any opposition to subordinate positions.

There are many signs that Sanskritic Hinduism has undergone many transformations over the ages. Built into the system is an inherent flexibility which permits a variety of changes to go unchecked. The order or precedence among rules may, on occasions, be altered. The resolution of conflicts between alternatives, and an adaptation to local and exceptional conditions avoids the undercurrents of localized movements. An example demonstrating how rules are bent occurred in a sacred thread

¹⁸Une Sous-Caste de l'Inde du Sud, Organisation des Pramalai Kallar. Paris, The Hague: Mouton, 1957.

¹⁹Bailey, F. G. (1959) 'Politics in Orissa', Economic Weekly, Vol.XI, No.35: 37-42.

ceremony. A conflict situation arose because a woman in pollution cannot take part in any religious ceremony, but the mother's participation is required for the completion of the sacred thread ceremony. In this case, the Brahman priest compromised by postponing the ceremony for three days due to menstrual pollution, with the proviso of a purificatory bath on the third day. Rather than making the mother wait the customary four days before the bath, the priest felt he could waive scriptural rules (Singer, M., 1972, p.95). In each rite then, different ceremonies are composed of different proportions of Sanskritic and non-Sanskritic elements such as elements of belief incorporated into rites from regional folklore. Singer believes that what looks to be somewhat less Sanskritic, sectarian various are not necessarily closer to the Little Tradition because they include vernacular scriptures, non-Brahmans, and devotional worship. Smarta orthodoxy not only includes Sanskritic traditions but also has incorporated many local customs and "lower" practices and beliefs,²⁰ and along with them much of what heterodox sects have stressed from Buddhist and Jain times to the present (Singer, M., 1972, p.138). Hence Singer holds a valid position, rejecting any single definition of the structure of Sanskritic Hinduism. Moreover, there is no commensurability between this structure and the Great Tradition.

Basically, the conception of sanskritization cannot be seen as

²⁰Among the lower forms of belief and action are spirit possession, exorcism, charms, spells and some prescriptions referring to sexual intercourse. These examples are directly related to more localized manifestations. Ironically the Atharvaveda, which is one of the four great Hindu holy books belonging to the Vedic tradition, predominantly is composed from elements contained in regional folklore. This conception became infused into inter-regional and supra-religious ideology and adopted by Brahmanic ritualists. For acceptance as a Hindu there exists the necessity for the believer's faith in the Atharvaveda. The Epics and the Puranas stem largely from the Little Tradition, but in fact their acceptance is not necessary in order to be accepted as a Hindu. Both the Puranas and Epics have become integral to the Great Tradition.

simply some definitive Brahmanic imitation nor an emulation of Brahmanic ways. The life-styles of the warrior, even of the merchant and peasant and the saints, are also regularly adopted as models for cultural mobility. In the second place the process incorporates into the system not only Hindus, but also Jains, Buddhists, Parsis, Muslims, Christians, and other groups that do not consider themselves Hindu. In view of these considerations, it would be more appropriate to think of "Sanskritic Hinduism" not as a single set of beliefs and practices defining one life-style (that of the Brahmins), but rather as a complex pattern of beliefs and practices associated with different life-styles.

This poses the problem on the conception of caste. To Dumont it is a state of mind which is expressed by the emergence, in various situations, of groups of various orders generally called castes (op.cit.: 71).

Dumont believes that hierarchy is a system into which fluid and fluctuating elements fit given that operational definitions are variable according to circumstances. Rather than focusing on the definition of an element and constituting all other elements by reference to a definite scheme, Dumont prefers to analyse the caste system as a system of ideas and values. He rejects an empirical approach which singularly focuses on castes. Instead he insists that specialization and interdependence between castes, known as the jajmani system infuses the caste system itself. The system therefore extends its distinctive status differentiation.

In initially raising the question, whether it is useful to compare the caste system with other systems of social stratification, Bouglé asked, "Is the caste system a universal phenomenon common to all civilisations, or is it a unique phenomenon peculiar to India?"²¹ Dumont takes this

²¹Bouglé, C. 'Essays on the Caste System', Contributions to Indian Sociology, II, 1958, p.7.

question and repeats it in Homo Hierarchicus.²² The crux of the debate centres around how broad or how narrow a definition of caste is to be allowed; and is this definition to be based on universal structural principles or is it to be confined to a specific cultural context? Can caste be seen as existing alongside other forms of social stratification (classes, estates), or must it be seen as a specific and unique form of social stratification? A complementary question raised is, how adequate are the theories of social stratification, as developed by Western sociologists, in analysing a non-Western phenomenon, i.e. if caste is totally unique to India? Berreman considers the caste system in India to be comparable and structurally non-unique; Dumont takes the opposite point of view.

Is caste ideology a universal phenomenon?

How do these writers define "caste"? Firstly Bouglé: a society is "a caste system ... divided into a large number of mutually opposed groups which are hereditarily specialised and hierarchically arranged - if on principle it tolerates neither the merging, nor miscegenation, nor a change of profession". Dumont takes Bouglé's definition and adds that the common basis for these features (hierarchy, specialization and repulsion) is the opposition of pure and impure - an opposition of its nature hierarchical, which implies separation, and on the professional level, specialization of the occupations relevant to the opposition. Dumont defines caste in terms of this opposition (Dumont, L., 1966, p.82).

²²Dumont, L. (1966) The opposition between pure and impure pervades the system. However, the level of observation, which we are accustomed to, alters our perception of caste segmentation.

We shall say that there is caste only where this characteristic disjunction between status and power (Brahman and Ksatra) is present, and we shall request that any society lacking this characteristic, even if it is made up of closed status groups be classified under a different label.²³

Berremen's definition of caste gives a broader base for comparison.²⁴

A caste system occurs where a society is made of birth-ascribed groups which are hierarchically ordered and culturally distinct. The hierarchy entails differential evaluation, rewards and associations.

From these definitions we can see where the points of controversy arise. Dumont has been criticized for his disjunction between status and power. Singer said this was "oversharp", while Berremen, Kantowsky and Bêteille question whether this disjunction actually exists. Berremen has been attacked for regarding caste groups as culturally distinct - a justifiable criticism, but one that does not completely destroy his argument when it is seen in its broader context. An examination of the main points of these opposing groups will commence (as did Dumont's argument) with Bouglé's reasoning.

Bouglé's definition of caste is expressed in the inter-relation of three organizing principles - hierarchy, specialization and repulsion (or separation). Hierarchy is unequally divided rights; with hereditary specialization, professions become the obligatory monopolies of families; and in repulsion, different groups in society are rigidly separated. Each group isolates itself and makes every effort to prevent its members from contracting marriage alliances with other groups. This is illustrated by endogamy, food taboos and restrictions, and the impure and pure dogma.

²³Cited in Madan, T. 'Review of Homo Hierarchicus', Contributions to Indian Sociology, New Series, V, p.214.

²⁴Berremen, G. and Dumont, L. (1962)(Discussion of) 'Caste, racism and stratification', Contributions to Indian Sociology, IV, 1962, pp.122-124.

Dumont's position departs from here. The basic opposition of pure and impure can segment itself without limit. The conceptual reality (1966: 85) of the system lies in this opposition, not in the groups which it opposes. Hierarchy in India is essentially the scale of statuses, which are religious on basis. Power, economic and political, is distinct from and subordinate to the hierarchy. The Brahman and the Untouchable constitute the two opposite (1966: 84) poles of this hierarchy which culminate in the Brahman. Dumont sees the Brahman and Kshatriya as having a definite fixed relationship. The Brahman consecrates the king's power which otherwise would depend entirely on force. The Brahman is spiritually supreme but materially dependent, whereas the king is materially the master but spiritually subordinate. Dumont maintains that this disjunction between power and status is what makes caste unique to India. Hierarchy as caste in India is status in religious terms; elsewhere hierarchy as class is economic and political in essence. Caste hierarchy, thus, never attaches itself to power as such but always to religious functions, because religion is the form that the universally true assumes in these societies. The essential function of hierarchy is in expressing the unity of society while connecting it to what appears to it to be universal, namely a conception of cosmic order. Hierarchy integrates the society by reference to its values. The link of caste to Hindu beliefs about pure and impure is not accidental but an essential feature of the system. The caste system cannot be removed from this context, and remain a caste system.

Berremen accepts that caste in India has several unique features - its religious aspects, its complexity, and the degree to which the caste is a cohesive group that regulates the behaviour of its members - but he also maintains that caste can be accurately defined in broader

terms. His basic argument being that "similar social facts can be usefully categorized together despite differences which, while not denied, are not crucial to the purposes at hand".²⁵ A cross-cultural comparison of caste is essential in the study of social processes dealing with hierarchical organization. His broader definition of caste is "a hierarchy of endogamous divisions in which membership is hereditary and permanent". Correlates of this are: inequality in status and in access to goods and services; interdependence of the subdivisions, restricted contacts among them, occupational specialization, and/or a degree of cultural distinctiveness. Berreman maintains that these are correlates rather than defining characteristics. While Dumont does include some of these aspects in his definition of caste, Berreman has also been guilty of them in some of his definitions of caste (i.e. stratification, pluralism and interaction).

Aside from such minor points - how does Berreman regard caste, as conducive to comparison? Which features does he take as comparable? A large part of Berreman's thesis rests upon his view of social systems as regulating and modifying social interactions.

My contention is that caste systems are rigid systems of social stratification, but that they are also systems of socio-cultural pluralism, and that both these facts are to be understood largely in terms of distinctive patterns of social interaction. (Stratification, pluralism etc.)

Caste hierarchy is to a large extent an interactional hierarchy.

Berreman views India and the caste system as having plural features. He bases this upon what he calls the "cultural distinctiveness of castes, and lack of consensus among castes on many key values and attitudes".

²⁵Berreman, G. 'Caste in India and the USA' in Structural Social Inequality by Heller.

'Stratification, pluralism and interaction' in Caste and Race. Ciba Foundation, p.74.

He maintains that this is an important difference between the caste system and other systems of social stratification. Stratification is seen by Berreman as presupposing a wide consensus on the criteria and expressions of rank in a society. To accept this premise, one must accept that castes are culturally distinct. Berreman cites differences in social and religious custom, the gods worshipped, as indications of caste distinction, while recognizing that there will be common elements due to the possession of a common cultural tradition. Perhaps Berreman is going too far in his cultural pluralism scheme as an indicator of caste oppositions. Differences between castes on "cultural features" are relatively minor, when compared with the large similarities present. It is this very "cultural distinctiveness" criterion that enables him to compare the southern U.S.A. negro-white hierarchy with the Indian caste system (1962: 125).

Similarities Berreman sees

The ideal intercaste behaviour and attitudes in India are much like those in America, while the actual interaction and attitudes are similar. Berreman cites dwelling area, occupation, place of worship and cultural behaviour as important symbols associated with caste status in both these countries. In both, status is determined by birth, membership is ascribed and unalterable. The high castes are seen as maintaining their superior position by exercising powerful sanctions, in the main economic and physical. Economic interdependence of the high and low castes is also cited, and the resulting differences in power and privilege that result from unequal distribution of wealth.

Berreman considers the fact that the difference in ideological justification of the inequalities is a cultural detail. He looks, in the main, to the attitudes and feelings expressed by those high

in both hierarchies and those low in both hierarchies. He maintains these are the same, and he is probably justified in his contention. But are psychological factors enough to justify his claim of complete comparability? He may be dealing more with "psychological" universals that occur in situations of inequality, rather than a universal of the system of caste.

Berreman's argument that the power-status opposition cited by Dumont is a false dichotomy is based on his claim that power and status are two sides of the same coin. The basis of caste as lying in differential power, which is expressed in ritual status terms, gives a simpler explanation, more in accord with the facts of social life in India, i.e. according to Berreman.

He is supported in this by B eteille, who strongly disagrees with Dumont that there is in principle a separation between status and power. According to B eteille, political and economic power were generally combined, and there is abundant evidence to support this. Brahmans have wielded material power at every level and during every period of Indian history. Hence the argument of separation in principle can be refuted on empirical grounds. Conceptually one can argue that the office of king should not be compared with the social category of Brahman. B eteille accuses Dumont of interchanging king and Kshatriya randomly without respect to the fact that king is an office, Kshatriya a social group albeit of high status.²⁶

As stated previously, Dumont insists that "caste" can only be applied where there is a disjunction between status and power. If, in fact, B eteille and Berreman are correct in this aspect of their

²⁶B eteille, A. (1964) 'A note on the referents of caste', European Journal of Sociology: 130-134.

criticism, Dumont's argument will be weakened to a certain extent. It still remains to account for the complete pervading of the Indian society and caste system with the impure-pure dichotomy. This is Dumont's strongest point. When such a criterion enters into every aspect of life, it cannot be discounted as accidental or as merely a cultural detail. There is a difference between ideology as preached, and ideology as practised. Cosmological schema cannot be easily discovered as rationalizations or sanctions reinforcing the system.

In reply to Dumont's opinion that social inequality is a recognized value in India, whereas its opposite is the recognized value in Western culture, Bêteille cites the British educational system, and the clubs found in America and Britain. These social institutions perpetuate status distinctions, and show that inequality is as much a part of social reality and social consciousness in the Anglo-Saxon world as it is in India. The social evaluation of schools, colleges and universities reflects inequalities and social distinctions. Clubs are exclusive in character and graded in terms of status and exclusiveness. Conditions of membership are very stringent; family background, education and professional association largely determine the kind of club one belongs to.

Bêteille takes this as evidence to show that hierarchy or social inequality - as both behaviour and value - is not a mystic quality of the Hindus, but can be studied systematically on a comparative basis. Castes are seen as status groups, ranked on an elaborate scale of honour, but as status groups exist in all complex societies, alongside classes, there is no need to exclude Indian castes from

a comparative study of status groups.²⁷

The core of these arguments centres around how one defines caste - the definition being a reflection of to how great an extent the term can be used. A second argument to Dumont is more general and deals with the necessity of cross-cultural comparison, the weakest part of Homo Hierarchicus. The uniqueness of caste in India (accepted by Berreman) is hardly a convincing argument against comparison, for everything in the world is ultimately unique. One can extract aspects, elements, principles of relationships which are common for purposes of comparison. The purpose is to determine what is specific to one culture or society, and what is common to types or categories of social organization, or is it common due to recurrent processes and historical circumstances.

This approach is used if one is searching for universals, but it also has inherent difficulties. We can remove an element from the "whole" for the purposes of specific study and evaluation, but then the element must be looked at in its relation to other elements in the "cultural network". Thus it becomes difficult merely to pick out bits and pieces for universal study. The meaning of a common element may differ greatly from one context to the next. This is not to say that such an approach is invalid, rather it is fraught with "traps" that must be recognized for the approach to have any measure of success.

Bottomore sees the Indian caste system as unique among systems of

²⁷Béteille, A. (1965) 'The future of the backward classes'. The competing demands for status of power. Perspectives Supplement to the Indian Journal of Public Administration, XI, No.1: 1-39.

social stratification, but believes that it is not wholly incomparable with other types of stratification. The most striking common characteristic is connected with economic differentiation. Bottomore sees the jati as the effective caste group: and describes it as endogamous, the principle referent group of the individual; it embodies a distinctive way of life and maintains it by the exercise of customary sanctions. Economically, it is for the most part occupational groups and in tradition village economy largely provides the machinery for exchange of goods and services.

Bottomore will only classify the non-Hindu groups of India and the Hindu settlements outside India as having true caste systems.²⁸ But he does maintain that elements of caste can be observed in other societies, where more or less strict segregation of particular groups occurs.

Madan supports Dumont - "he preserves the system by typifying it and does not dissolve or neglect it by classifying it". Berreman's criticism is said to be based on too narrow a definition of the aims of the comparative method. Dumont arrives at the specificity of the Hindu caste system through comparison which stresses differences as well as similarities between societies in terms of their underlying structural principles.

Dumont's main criticism of Berreman's comparison of the southern U.S.A. and India is that he chooses certain features of the Indian caste system for comparison, but ignores completely other features that are not found in the U.S.A. To do this is to lose perspective of the

²⁸Bottomore, T. B. (1955) Classes in Modern Society. Inquiries in stratification. London: Penguin.

relationship of features to one another - "A particular feature if taken not in itself, but in its concrete position within a system, can have a totally different meaning according to the position it occupies" (Dumont, 1966, p.70). Dumont stresses the importance of ideological features, and says that these must be given the same status as the behavioural features so stressed by Berreman. By studying societies which approve and emphasize inequality, we can understand better concepts of social class and social stratification as features of a society that stresses egalitarianism. For Dumont this is the value of the comparative approach. For Berreman, this is too limited in scope.

Inequality, class and exploitation

One hypothesis often used to explain the dominance of religion is its role in the structure of exploitation (cf. Marx, 1961, Ch.1, and the analysis by Godelier, 1972: the tribute claimed by the King is an objectivation of the surplus, and of the exploitation, which is impossible to cover, like the surplus value in the capitalist mode of production which is invisible and hidden). Exploitation cannot be denied, so it must be declared rightful.²⁹ Hence, the importance of the members of the priestly estate, who are full-time ideologists working on presenting the surplus as instituted by God. Often the religious mystification of the tribute and of the Kingdom go together with the deification of the King. Egypt and the Inca are obvious examples. But the plausibility of a God-King requires

²⁹Godelier, M. (1972) 'Structure and contradiction' in Capital by Blackburn (ed.). (Originally published in 1966 as 'Système, structure et contradiction dans le Capital', Les Temps Modernes.)

a centralized and united civilization and a continuous dynasty at the throne. India does not fulfil these requirements. She was only periodically united under authority of great dynasties, such as the Maurya. But in between these periods political "mobility" was high: local dynasties rose and fell; new groups ascended to power. Under such circumstances the King cannot be deified, only the Kingdom can be! (Djurfeldt and Lindberg, 75: 44-45.) For this task the "deifiers" are needed, and their influence must be more than local.³⁰ Hence, the super-imposition of Brahmanical standards upon local territorial segments. The Brahman regarded as the ritualist is hired to make offerings on behalf of lower caste members. Included in these sacrifices were the giving of alms, services and product to the Brahman at certain designated points throughout the sacrificial ritual or during the major festivals.

Djurfeldt and Lindberg agree the ideology meets with difficulties in reconciling the fact that Brahmans cannot receive food or water from lower jati groups with the fact that they receive a tribute³¹ from them. This gives rise to a contradiction which ideology attempts to dissolve by distinguishing between raw and cooked food or between food and non-food (gifts to a Brahman such as land, cattle, clothes, gold etc.). The former is immune to pollution, while the latter is much more sensitive in this respect. The Brahman is allowed to receive raw, but not cooked, food: a rule which expresses the tribute

³⁰Djurfeldt, G. and Lindberg, S. (1975) 'Behind poverty: The social formation of a Tamil Village', Asian Monograph Series, Scandinavian Institute.

³¹Here tribute may be oversimplified. Presentations take on wider significance when combined with relations exemplifying differential rank. Gift giving in the cast of hypergamy establishes a relationship over a period. Daksina, the offering of gifts to the Brahman sacrificer, is built into the act of ritual itself so that the actual giving of the gift completes the rite. It is quite likely that Marxists would see this as a customary gesture signifying an exploitative consummation of the whole series of ritual expressions.

relation, but which cannot suppress the basic contradiction, that the pure who want to define themselves as separate from the impure are, in fact, united to them through the structure of exploitation.

The contradiction is also reflected in the ideological account of the division of labour. Ideology ascribes impurity to the lower jati on account of their relation to ritual objects (e.g. the cow), but their relation to the means of production is suppressed. The untouchables are impure not because they are serfs or slaves working the land, but because of secondary criteria, such as their beef eating.

Obviously, ideology does not encompass the division of labour, but reflects it in a perverted and distorted form where the fundamental class relations are extenuated. The Brahmanical world view amounts to false consciousness and according to definition (op.cit.: 211), ritual practice is rooted in the relations of production. Though the Brahmins believed in the ideological justification for their exclusive control over the membership criteria for "twice born" procedures, the suppressed did not always respond in a compliant manner. In conclusion, then, the Brahmanical conceptual scheme was not a theory, but an ideology in which the Brahmins were charged with legitimizing a social order conferred by them and compatible to their own interests. Apart from this consideration, it is the Kshatriya (warrior) caste that enacts and enforces discretionary powers handed down by Brahman ideology.

The Brahmanical conception is not accepted wholeheartedly. It is subscribed to mainly by the upper and middle jati, while the lower ranks, and especially the untouchables (op.cit.: 46), tend to laugh at it. Caste discrimination survives in the South Indian village of Thaiyur. Despite the transformation of the relations of production, a correlation between caste and class remains (op.cit.: 221). Even if caste does not automatically ascribe his class position to the individual, the ownership

of the means of production still largely rests in the hands of the dominant castes. There is the case that because the Harijans are dependent upon the Velichai Naicker for their livelihood they must periodically ask forgiveness from the Brahmans of the village for their ritual impudence (op.cit: 222). This case clearly exemplifies what these authors term the restrictive determination of inter-caste relations by their basis: their class position allows the Naicker to command the ideological apparatus of the caste system. Thus, it is in accordance with this reality that many Harijans continue to regard themselves as a subordinated group who according to Brahmanic ideology presumably lie outside the varna schema. Djurfeldt and Lindberg support the thesis that the Harijans tend to see their subordination not as a result of their class position, but as deriving from their caste identity, i.e. from the ritual status accorded to them by the ideological apparatus of the caste system (op.cit.: 218). Jati identity is defined and objectified in inter-caste rituals. The jati identities, thus defined, must obviously be reflected in stereotypes held by the castes towards each other.

Caste and racial definitions

Race relations in the Americas involve relations of super- and subordination,³² but that is where the common characteristics end. Principles specifying how these groups are to be constituted in each case have nothing in common. How is it that elements came to be associated with one another where boundaries are drawn to mark off members from non-membership? A method that attempts to draw a comparison of social

³²From Pitt-Rivers, J. (1971) 'On the word "caste"' in Beidelmann, T. O. (ed.) The Translation of Culture. Tavistock, p.250.

structures is concerned with the elements of social structure: hierarchy, authority, power, sanctity, the division of labour, the definition and solidarity of groups, the transmission of property, the rules of descent and so on (ibid.: 251).

Is it then possible to provide the word caste with an analytical definition? Dumont does so (op.cit.: 269): "... caste exists only where the disjunction between status and power is present and we would like to classify .. all societies, even those constituted of permanent and closed status groups, which do not possess it" (Dumont, L., 1966, p.269). However, Dumont finds the criteria he sets for himself missing outside the Indian context. Swat (op.cit.: 273) and even Sri Lanka are excluded for caste proved non-generalizable. Dumont is forced to recognize the relativity of his concept which he calls a class. The cross-cultural comparison of caste is not possible. Pitt-Rivers enunciated this theme (op.cit.: 251-252):

The distinction between colour and class hinges on the notion of social mobility, for, whereas class can be changed, colour cannot. This is the essential analytical distinction as well as the basis of the moral objections to the colour-bar of those who called it caste: the status attached to it is 'hereditary and permanent' because it is genetically transmitted. Equality of opportunity is denied. But heredity and permanence, though they appear to be the same in India and the United States and therefore justifiably assimilable, do not in fact carry the same significance within each system and it is the characteristic of the systems that we are concerned to establish before we can assimilate them. In the Indian case it is the principle of social descent which determines the system (hence the recognized rule of endogamy, qualified or not by a rule of hypergamy or hypogamy); in the American case the determinant principle is genetic transmission, since colour is what counts and those who are physically able to 'pass' can do so - at the sacrifice of their familial ties. As Dumont (1967) has pointed out, hierarchy and stratification are not the same phenomenon.

In Hindu society the individual's place is determined by the kin-group into which he is born; this is part of a subcaste and caste in whose collective status he participates. In the United States his place is determined by his appearance, which is due to his physical, not his social heritage; his status is not within a hierarchically ordered structure of communities of known persons, but as an individual within a class (in the logical sense of the word) of persons identified by their

physique. For this reason, while it is possible for the same caste to have a different status from one place to another, colour is everywhere the same throughout the country. Where there happens to be a statistical correlation between physical feature and caste status in India, even if it should be perfect, this is contingent to the definition of caste, just as where there happen to be communities composed of groups of kin among whom a man lives, it is not this that makes him a negro. In fact, this is frequently the case, but negroes are negroes in the United States 'because' they are coloured, not 'because' they were born and bred as such and their culture reflects the fact.

Furthermore the type of values underpinning conceptions in one culture are based on the group and community whereas in the other individuality and the repudiation of solidarity in part accounts for a different mental attitude. Equality of opportunity is pitted against the sanctity of status.

The determining criterion is social allegiance in one case, physical appearance in the other, and this implies that the first is a collective status, the second an individual status. This difference reflects two quite different types of society: one structures in corporate groups, the other the open society; the one organized throughout by the principle of caste, the other inspired by the concern with individual worth. This is the basis of the distinction, fundamental in the thought of Dumont (1966: 300-1), between Homo Hierarchicus and Homo Aequalis, Western man, whose yearning for equality derives from an individualistic conception of mankind. The existence of a phenotypical distinction, determining membership of one or other of the two so-called 'castes', partially parallel systems of social stratification which are prevented from fusing into one by this distinction, poses a problem for the operation of the mechanism of social mobility upon which the social system of the United States is founded and a challenge to their ideological charter.

Above all a dilemma presents itself for white society. Caste-structured Indian society does to the modern age; but colour discrimination, the physiological residue of a dismantled structure, that of a servile society, persists in modern America, defining the condition under which the system of social mobility can operate. Servile traits of descent should not be displayed by the socially successful. An absence of social mobility is therefore the

most significant factor in these definitions of caste.

In conclusion, then, the conflict between Dumont and Meillassoux points to a crisis of perception between two Western-oriented theorists. Meillassoux, as we shall further see, focuses on the individual, presumably with the express intention of demystifying the wholistic or communal conception which Dumont would view as ethnocentric. Dumont perceives the trap in his understanding, namely individualism, materialist philosophy, and the post-revolutionary consideration of equality. Herein lie the cultural perceptions of two theorists whose mutual understandings end up opposed and yet complementary to one another in the problems that they address. Dumont is a fieldworker who seeks to slough off his own cultural categories and repudiate the narrow constraints of empiricism. To achieve this Dumont claims for himself a Brahmanic sanctity in that his approach uncritically views the system. Dumont comments on other critical approaches pursued by empiricists without their due attention to mental categories. Many analysts miss the fact that distortion subconsciously affects mental phenomena which shape their cultural filters. My argument is simply to question the integrity of Dumont's universalist aspiration given the diversity and complexity of those underlying cognitive structures.

A problem therefore arises between particular ideologies which result in conflicting conceptual apparatuses. For instance, Dumont would insist on a more generalized opposition between the pure and the impure, between Brahman and Untouchable. Meillassoux argues that this is nonsense, in that any apparent hierarchical fixity in the caste system was offset by such factors as conflict and mobility affecting caste membership throughout India. What Meillassoux considers is the nature of social practice, which

Dumont attempts to construct based on a theoretical praxis, itself raises questions.

Anthropologists have been trained specifically to study the small scale unit either in the form of a society or subset of the larger entity. Many social anthropologists then study the different kinds of institutionalized social relationships which they abstract from the observed behaviour of the peoples they study, and they are also concerned with the beliefs and values which are intrinsic to these relationships.³³ Even more importantly, social anthropologists are interested in "meanings" as constituting systems in their own right (ibid.). An anthropologist studies both systems of social relations and systems of beliefs and values (op.cit.: 123). We must ask how meanings (relationships) are constituted and articulated according to particular functions or usages.

A paradoxical development arising from an interest in small scale social units relates to their isolation, in contradistinction to a growing theoretical realization that such aggregates are not isolatable units. Rather, a tribe or society may not only possess internally interlocking institutions but be additionally drawn within the ambit ascribed to them by somewhat larger wholes, such as an industrial complex. In Africa, fieldworkers have found that the effect of groups and institutions not physically present in the tribal area influences the behaviour of people in it. The unit of interacting relationships, in other words, is larger

³³Beattie, J. (1959) 'Understanding and explanation in social anthropology' in Manners, R. and Kaplan, D. (1968) Theory in Anthropology. A sourcebook. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, p.117.

than the tribe.³⁴ Moreover, the convergence of various contextual domains sets anthropologists the complicated task of experiencing and recording newly emerging tensions and anxieties at points located on the interfaces between various positions in social structure. Each domain studied possesses properties that may only be assessed when the direction - up, down, sideways - which the study intends to display is revealed and analysed for its credibility.³⁵

The disappearance of closed corporate peasant societies where they have existed in the past and assumed an importance to anthropology, now poses the discipline with a new challenge. No defensive pattern usually lasts indefinitely, even in the most integrated and cohesive communities. In these types of set-up such as existed in Java, labour-intensive techniques limited the amount of permissible technological change and capitalization.³⁶ However, in central Java the Dutch instituted a sugar industry, renting land from villages and drawing on the total supply of labour in the village. The aim was to rotate sugar with rice production so that the requirements of subsistence could be met in addition to supplying cheap labour to the management of a sugar factory (ibid.). Undermining the interlocking characteristics of tradition, band, tribal and peasant economies with their self-contained social security systems turned inward are cash earning, literacy, education and technology. Naturally, Dalton argues that

³⁴Mitchell, J. C. (1966) 'Theoretical orientations in African urban studies' in the *Social Anthropology of Complex Societies*, Banton, M. (ed.), Associations of Social Anthropologists Monograph, No.4. London: Tavistock Publications, p.56.

³⁵Nader, Laura (1964) 'Perspectives gained from field-work' in Sol Tax (ed.) Horizons of Anthropology. Chicago: Alpine Press, p.292.

³⁶Wolf, E. R. (1957) 'Closed corporate peasant communities in Meso America and Central Java' in Manners, R. and Kaplan, D. (eds.) (1968) Theory in Anthropology. A sourcebook. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, p.298.

these latter properties belong to modernizing trends.³⁷ Dalton fails to account for unintended consequences, when he specifically mentions that modern activities create new income alternatives and that modern technology enables physical control of the environment. Any value and benefit gained by any section of the populace either falls into the hands of the colonial elite who seek to culturally and commercially emulate their European masters, or it is the latter category who pay themselves for risk attached to capital investment. Where I think Dalton is wrong is that he displays an ethnocentric bias in asserting that the structure of traditional village society becomes undermined because its traditional functions of mutual aid, security, and protection become displaced, once superior economic and technological alternatives become available (op.cit.: 298).

Dalton's approach is predicated on formalist assumptions that emphasize least cost combinations, and maximization of marginal revenue in association with managerial expertise. There arises the obvious fact that many of those same people are pauperized by modernization. Temporary retrenchment in the form of conservative strategies, I believe, is a response by indigenous peoples to cope with change through tactics obstructing the onset of inevitable oppression and exploitation. In another context where the problematic carried religious connotations, Huizer (1970) states that the passivity and conservatism of the Tzintzuntzenas had not prevented their struggling against oppression.³⁸

³⁷Dalton, G. (1971) Economic Anthropology and Development. Essays on tribal and peasant economies. London: Basic Books, p.288.

³⁸Huizer, G. (1970) Resistance to Change, and Radical Peasant Mobilisation, Foster and Erasmus Reconsidered Human Organisation, 29, (4): 303-313.

Rather, he would suggest that peasant resistance has been broken under pressure by the church and the wealthy landowners. "The communities where the image of the limited good prevails suffered severe physical and spiritual repression from a combination of the landed elite and the religious authorities" (Huizer, 1970, p.304).

In a very interesting discourse on the disruptive effects laissez-faire capitalism brings with it in a traditional setting, Balandier (1966) writes of the need for indigenous African women who sell their bodies for sexual pleasure to make a living.³⁹ "The young girls do no violence to their feelings when they become these courtesans concerned solely with coquetry and amusement, but they resent the speculative pressure of which they are the object" (op.cit.: 193). Balandier compassionately expresses the plight befalling these young girls. He writes that the surrender to commercial love is not devoid of bitterness. The young women make the most out of their misery by dressing in costly fabrics and compete to buy the best jewellery. In their dancing and their singing, the erotic choreography is skilfully acknowledged by the author as only one manifestation of social upheaval that is beginning to predominate (op.cit.: 194). In this manner, two simultaneous features, dependence for livelihood on outside sources and the personal cleavages resulting from modernization, accentuate the linkages between village and urban environments. Migration is institutionalized as a sign of adulthood for Nyakyusa (Gulliver, 1955b and 1957). Migration is expected by being incorporated in the normative system and presumably permeates Nyakyusa society. Foster has suggested that a relatively static

³⁹Balandier, G. (1966) Ambiguous Africa. Cultures in Collision. N.Y.: Pantheon.

economic system and the fatalistic outlook on life associated with the "image of the limited good" make an achievement orientation inappropriate in a peasant society.⁴⁰ He says:

... I believe most strongly that the primary task for development is not to attempt to create an achievement at the mother's knees, but to try to change the peasant's view of his social and economic universe away from an Image of Limited Good toward that of expanding opportunity to an open system, so that he can feel safe in displaying initiative.

(1965: 309-310)

Micro systems link with society

One hidden agenda in this assumption is that the native is a member of a pluralistic set of associations. Even in the Indian situation where castes are distinct, the castes seem part of a single religious system. Common participation in ritual is an essential way of holding the society together. Should there arise a common value system expressing a unitary function in spite of temporary cleavages, such as in the Ndembu case, nonetheless there exists a cohesiveness contained within local common boundaries. In "unitary" as opposed to "plural" societies, internal differences may periodically be submerged in the performance of common rituals. In this way, for example, the Earth cult unites the clans which compose Tallensi society (Fortes, 1945).

From our conception that single, small scale, and unitary societies were primarily the focus of anthropology, this is no longer a realistic assumption. "The conception of an integrated social system gives way to the conception of a cluster of related

⁴⁰Foster, G. M. (1965) 'Peasant society and the Image of the Limited Good', American Anthropologist, 67: 293-315.

but partly independent fields of activity."⁴¹ To Mitchell, changing societies embody complex reticulations of social relationships cross-linked by numerous ties and bonds, some operating now to hold people together this way, and some operating now to hold the same people together in a different way. Societies conceived thus have no cultural boundaries unless there is a marked attempt to socially redefine a particular stylized mode of thought and action. This attempt to clarify and mark off cultural boundaries through prohibiting encroachments on the part of dominant powerful institutions on smaller traditional communities is only possible in relation to the ability to enforce such choices. Fundamentally, this position implies the actual capacity to mobilize forces and put on a show of strength. An assumption drawn by Mitchell states that if consensus exists, it leads to a rich cluster of bonds as opposed to a conflict situation where sparse bonds imply that there are relatively few situations in which members of all the component clusters feel themselves obliged to act in concert.

One important reason for the closed society and close interaction maintained between members, according to Dalton, was low average productivity.⁴² He also gives other reasons why co-operation and personal affective ties were paramount. Plant diseases, insect infestations, soil deficiencies, adverse weather could mean hunger. There was no access to markets. Added to this were the constant risks involved in travelling and tribal enmity. Dalton asserts that

⁴¹Mitchell, J. C. (1960a) Tribalism and the Plural Society. Inaugural lecture. London: Oxford University Press, p.267.

⁴²Dalton, G. (1970) 'Economic anthropology and development', Essays on Tribal and Peasant Economies. London: Basic Books, p.287.

the combined effects of poor technology, physical isolation, absence of markets, and the absence of real alternatives to secure material livelihood (op.cit: 288) promoted the likelihood of famine and insecurity. My argument is simply based on the premise that such deficiencies still remain even though certain transformations have occurred in the material way of life. One such example is the introduction of alien technology of sophisticated proportions over which indigenous cultures have no operating control. The boundaries between domains remain although their distinctiveness is attenuated. It is implicit rather than explicit in different cultural views. It is the relative disregard for the less scientific view that inevitably leads to its being down-graded and resulting in implicit inferiority and ultimate rejection.

Eric Wolf⁴³ has described this process in terms of a "crisis in the exercise of power" brought about by the advent of the capitalist market principle:

Tribal chief, mandarin, landed nobleman - the beneficiaries and agents of an older social order - yield to the entrepreneur, the credit merchant, the political broker, the intellectual, the professional ... The managers of fixed social resources yield to the managers of 'free floating' resources. Groups oriented toward subsistence production diminish and groups committed to commodity production or to the sale of labour power grow in size and density.

(1969: 282)

Interestingly, Caulfield also makes the distinction between imperialist and non-imperialist settings because she believes a crisis of power exists in both categories.⁴⁴ In a colonial setting, the

⁴³Wolf, E. (1969) 'American anthropologists and American society' in Concepts and Assumptions in Contemporary Anthropology (ed.).

⁴⁴Caulfield, M. D. (1969) 'Culture and imperialism'. Proposing a new dialectic. In Hymes Dell Reinventing Anthropology. Pantheon, pp.182-183.

imperialist power is an organized technological and bureaucratically organized force. It is placed in a dominant position over a subject people. It is not only a dual economy, but a dual social system. Thus, Caulfield rightly argues that the traditional social structure is transformed by the advent of the market principle, and the entire set of roles and statuses held by the natives, whether transformed or not, is subordinated to the entire set held by the colonialists (op.cit.: 195). The aim of the imperialist section is to deny access to the exercise of real power by members belonging to the sub-culture or other races.

Micro and macro systems

In plantation colonies, where peasant economies exist side by side with large estates, labour patterns of seasonal migration have developed, and longer term migrant labour is a common pattern in African mining. Furthermore, as Wolf (1969) notes, imperialism has everywhere engendered an "ecological crisis":

Where in the past the peasant had worked out a stable combination of resources to underwrite a minimal livelihood, the separate and differential mobilization of these resources as objects to be bought and sold endangered that minimal nexus ... Paradoxically, these processes of containment, subversion, and forced withdrawal of the peasantry from their land coincided with a rapid acceleration of population growth ... The peasant thus confronted a growing imbalance between population and resources.

(op.cit.: 202)

Wolf goes on to suggest that this imbalance forced men to "seek new social forms which would grant them shelter" and that the peasant revolutions in the countries he is considering were the "outcome of such defensive reactions, coupled with a search for a new and more human social order" (op.cit.: 282).

A case study showing the limitation on opportunity afforded by

the peasant in traditional Baganda is given by Fallers (1970). The Kabaka who embodied the person of the King held total control in Baganda over power, wealth and honour. Members of the King's descent line form aristocratic segmentary lineages. Children of a Kabaka are known as "princes of the mujaguzo", the great drums which are among the great symbols of kinship. Only princes of the drums are eligible to succeed to the Kingship.⁴⁵ A traditional saying about the Kabaka is a pointed comparison with the namunswa, the queen termite (op.cit.: 279):

Namunswa alya Ku nswa ze.
("The queen of the termite hill feeds upon her subjects.")

Another saying extols the glory which comes as the reward of absolute obedience:

Omuddu awulira, y'atabqaza engule ya Mukama we.
("The obedient servant is the one who carries into battle the crown of his master.")

A good chief was one who engaged in extending the boundaries of the Kingdom against its enemies by falling upon adversaries and turning their misfortune to building the surplus enjoyed by the Kabaka. The idea was to resume the seat of office lost to the enemy and to distribute the bounty to Buganda as a whole. War was pursued in order to create a national sense of purpose and cultural aggrandisement at the expense of neighbours. The struggle for existence, the will to power, and the survival of the most adaptively advantaged through a vision of competition, ruthless rivalry and arbitrary cruelty, link with theories derived from Nietzsche. At the turn of the nineteenth century the

⁴⁵Fallers, L. A. (1959) 'Despotism, status, culture and social mobility in an African kingdom' in Middleton, J. (1970) Black Africa - Its peoples and cultures today, (ed.). London: Macmillan.

Kabaka further increased its overall power because the ancestor cult which formerly checked the Kabaka's excesses was being discredited by Christian, Muslim and syncretic belief systems. The King encouraged members to dream of personal conquest and individual assertion, but the majority of people in respect of the Kabaka and in deference to him accepted a subordinate role to his plans. Thus, there existed an absence of institutional and legal restraint upon mobility but parents accepted their menial position which they in turn transmitted to their children. Children of highly placed parents were given a greater opportunity to learn the skills appropriate to high office, and to inherit property (op.cit.: 280).

Furthermore, the idea of status and class did not apply to Buganda. There are words for "honour" (kitiibwa), "wealth" (bugagga), "rulership" (bufuzi) and "importance" (bukulu). There is the word kika, which means both "clan" and "kind". The closest approach to "class", however, is apparently a clumsy circumlocution employing the word for "ladder" (madaala). The Buganda simply do not think of people as being arranged in social layers; they think instead of dyadic relations of inferiority versus superiority (op.cit.: 281).

Usually, the assumptions posited in some sense predetermine the structured cognitive structure and provide a preconceived legitimate conclusion. Depending on the premise drawn we would expect a Marxian approach to analyse material with "class" as its *raison d'être* and struggle and conflict over property ownership and control of the means of production as fundamental. By contrast many studies conducted on India are steeped in an Idealist, conservative ideology, and anxious to discover in the Indian system the expression of universal social harmony.

Hierarchy and class, what conception? Whose view?

Meillassoux⁴⁶ argues that the repressive effect of the "caste system" is coherently related to the ideological and religious notions associated with the representation of society. Certain sections of the upper varna had, in fact, become declassed, on account of their contact with and eventual dependence on lower levels of society. It is this author's belief that the purity and impurity rule applying social distance in inter-caste relations disguised the institutionalized persecution and violence designed to keep the lower orders in their impurity. To conclude then, the pollution roles were administered by codifying and reinforcing the pre-existing relations of subordination and alienation, since according to his argument one must be alienated if one accepts being impure. In this system "dominance is wealth, power and the landed interests as well as political power".⁴⁷

The Brahmans' of Karimpur were, according to him, the caste that held most of the rights over the land (ibid.). This class went under different names in different regions; mirasdar (Hutton, 1946, p.179) or zamindar (ibid.: 189) is, for Hutton, unequivocally "that of the great landed proprietors". The dominant caste seemed to apply a number of formal functions. Among these were rights over land, power to grant access to land, employ labour either as specialists or agriculturalists, build up a large clientele, or even an armed force, power of justice, monopoly of authority (op.cit.: 101).

According to Meillassoux, Dumont's thesis is untenable. He says Dumont rejects the hereditary characteristic so far as the varna

⁴⁶Meillassoux, C. (1973) 'Are there castes in India?', Economy and Society, 2: 89-111.

⁴⁷Here Dumont is cited in Meillassoux, C. (1973) op.cit.: 100.

are concerned and yet confuses this concept repeatedly with that of "caste" in spite of the finer distinctions he tries to introduce. Meillassoux continues that contrary to Dumont's belief, endogamy varies between contexts. In fact, hypergamy applies among the "twice born" varna. The avoidance of contact is subject to so many rules and exceptions that there is no typical characteristic. Adoption rituals make it possible to pass from one "caste" to another. Finally on this point, the concept termed the "division of labour" is derived from formalist economics and is used by these theorists to refer to the relative specialization of certain groups, referring not only to "profession" but also the function (op.cit.: 91).

The crux of Meillassoux's argument is basically a negation of the over-rated status conglomeration at the top which is called the varna. He believes the varna has divided and fragmented. Ordinarily, any aristocracy was replaced by conquering newcomers. Continual struggle for advantageous positions instigated from below led to no fixed Brahmanical commonality in India. Those who were situated at or near the top were either lowered or absorbed by larger and more powerful groups. Kshatriyas entered various menial trades. Brahmins became cooks and relied on untouchables for virtual survival. Significantly, what these usurped groups practised and achieved insofar as a distinctive status, was to refuse all contact and marriage with those groups they despised, and depended on. One could speak of a convectional current applying to the status principle as upper varna were replaced, only to ideologically retain belief in superiority without any substance being attributable to the claim. The vanquished simply reverted to what many persecuted sections do. On the one hand, groups withdraw and re-organize and develop a strategy to

cope with defeat and oppression. Included in this exercise is the retention of severe discipline and asceticism or there is assertion and revolt, or possibly further splintering and absorption into relevant specialist groups. Consequently, Meillassoux states that the religious ideology applicable to the varna served as a framework for an open and flexible hierarchy which preserved the status principle whose underlying expression lay in the transformations occurring in Indian society (op.cit.: 106).

Theoretical hegemony

In what way does scientific thought contribute to our understanding social systems? Horton states that the important factor in scientific thought is its drive towards a unified and often transcendent conception of the domain to be explained that must inevitably cross-cut specified boundaries.⁴⁸ If the Azande are "enmeshed" in their "web of belief" simply by reason of the structure of the web itself, then so is the scientist enmeshed within his. Horton uses the term theory to denote explanation in referring to the world (op.cit.: 219). For example, "anomalous characteristics of the spirits in African thought are best explained by treating them as theoretical entities whose characteristics can then be explained in terms of features of the 'model building' process familiar from Western scientific theory" (ibid.).

For Horton, research strategy starts with commonsense and the way actions are integrated into a coherent system. Horton⁴⁹ sees

⁴⁸Skorupski, J. (1976) Symbol and Theory. A philosophical study of theories of religion in social anthropology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.182.

⁴⁹Horton cited in Mair, L. (1974) African Societies. Introductory summaries to ethnographies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.216.

Kalabari religion as a mode of explanation as well as classification, and although he does not regard it as a proto-science, he argues that what the Kalabari are doing in their cosmology, though different in many respects from what we call science, is closer to it than most anthropologists suppose. He thinks it is important to recognize what these two ways of thinking have in common before beginning to look at the differences. Both the Kalabari and the nuclear physicist are working out "a scheme of entities or forces operating 'behind' appearances or 'within' the world of commonsense observations". Basically, phenomenal transactions with the world are conducted by reference to a conceptual scheme, a model in the actor's mind of how things are or how they ought to be. The essential characteristic of this model is that it is logically ordered. Lévi-Strauss believes that the inner structure of myth systems are everywhere much the same.⁵⁰

Totemism was Claude Lévi-Strauss's (1962) contribution to this theme. The major characteristic of totemic systems is that the actors use the same verbal classifications to impose order upon the human society as they impose order on the natural environment. When literate people store information they do so by means of structured codes. Thus communication is facilitated by the mutual interchange and feedback associated with codes repeating in the message the same form. In pre-literate society, all objects in the external world fit into verbal categories, and the way information is itself stored is dependent on a shared structuring of contents.

⁵⁰Leach, E. (1965) 'Claude Lévi-Strauss - Anthropologist and Philosopher' in Manners, R. and Kaplan, D. (1968) Theory and Method in Anthropology. A sourcebook. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, p.546.

Using examples borrowed from Evans-Pritchard, Lévi-Strauss postulates a relation which he calls metaphorical between human groups and animal species (op.cit.: 153). The Nuer speak about natural species by analogy with their own social segments such as lineages, and the relation between a lineage and a totemic species conceptualized on the model of what they call buth, the relationship between collateral lineages descended from a common ancestor. The animal world is thus thought of in terms of the social world. There is the community (cieng) of carnivorous animals - lion, leopard, hyena, jackal, wild dog and domestic dog - which includes as one of its lineages (thwok dwiel) and so on. These theoretical classifications are the basis of the totemic ideas:

An interpretation of the totemic relationship is here, then, not to be sought in the nature of the totem itself but in an association it brings to the mind.

Evans-Pritchard has formulated this view more rigorously:

On to the creatures are posited conceptions and sentiments derived from elsewhere than from them.
(op.cit.: 154)

Fundamental to the totemic thesis is how objects fit together into a scheme utilizing binary discriminations. Lévi-Strauss would argue that this performance is generic to underlying structures localized in the brain, and representing reality in analogical fashion.

"Primitive thought fashions mental constructions which render the world intelligible to the degree that they contrive to resemble it."⁵¹ Savages build models of reality, of the natural world,

⁵¹Geertz, C. (1967) 'The cerebral savage'. Comments on Lévi-Strauss and structuralism. In Manners, R. and Kaplan, D. (1968) Theory in Anthropology. A sourcebook. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, p.554.

of the self, of society. Instead of integrating ideas into an explanatory framework, ordered on the basis of abstraction and generality involved, the primitive organizes objects into intelligible wholes. The science of the concrete arranges directly sensed realities into oppositional discriminations, thinks Lévi-Strauss. To Nuer, twins embody manifestations of spiritual power. Firstly, there is the higher embodiment representing gat Kwoth translated as "children of God". Commensurate with this level is the sky which is treated as the divine abode and may also be called "persons of the above" (ran nhial). In this context they are opposed to ordinary humans who are "persons of below" (ran piny) (Lévi-Strauss, C., 1962, p.152). Classification in this sense serves the dual purpose of imposing order on, and storing up information about, the external world and in addition imposes order on the speaker's own human society.

It can be seen using this approach that the spirits form into a hierarchy both in Nuer and Kalabari. Just as scientists use a hierarchy of models that are purported to increase in explanatory power the higher the degree of abstraction, so too do some primitives. Kalabari see the world of men and spirits as forming a hierarchy of more and more inclusive levels, "the world of men", the various spirits, aspects of tamuno and so considered as unities. However, I think these arguments are superficial and indicate a general unawareness for the moral and communal aspects that undergird primitive thinking which cannot be subsumed under an intellectualist position without their overtones being considered.

Symbolism and ideas

The symbolist is concerned with the way actions are integrated into a coherent system. In line with this approach one theorist argues

on insisting "that the limits of empiricism are not assumptions⁵² unguaranteed, intuitively known to be correct, they are ways in which we make comparisons and in which we act" (Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 1967, pt.V, Sect.18). The symbolist, Beattie, would argue that totemism is a magico-religious institution. Crucial in understanding this approach is our awareness that an object is not (or not only) regarded as valuable in its own right, because it stands as a symbol for something else. To Beattie, the totem symbolizes more than the unity of the clan. In the case of the Australian aborigines, a particular kind of interdependency between man and the natural products occurred. For Tallensi the crucial relationship ensued between man and ancestral ghosts. To my way of thinking, Beattie is a particularist:

Institutions which have been labelled totemism are so various that no single hypothesis is likely to be adequate to explain them all. As with all symbols, we have to ask what it is that is symbolised and what the social consequences of symbolising it are. There is no reason why all cultures should give identical answers to these questions.⁵³

Thus, Winch would subscribe to this point because different modalities develop their own view, and their own criteria of rationality. Western science is not entitled to sit in judgement.

The symbolists stress that theory is to be understood as a system of beliefs elaborated to characterize and explain experience, but whose domain of reference goes beyond what is given in experience.⁵⁴

⁵²Wittgenstein, L. (1945, 1949) 'Philosophical Investigations'. Anscombe, G. and Rhees, R. (eds.) (1967). Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

⁵³Beattie, J. (1964) Other Cultures. Aims, methods and achievements in social anthropology. London: Cohen & West, p.224.

⁵⁴Firth, R. (1970) Rank and Religion in Tikopia. A study in Polynesian paganism and conversion to Christianity. London: George Allen & Unwin, p.14.

The symbolic functionalist therefore assumes that religious beliefs must be about something other than what they overtly say they are. Firth (1967) gives an example in the fire ceremonies in Tikopia. The child is a passive element. The symbolic content though ostensibly directed for his benefit is, in fact, an appeal to other, mainly adult, interest. Such rituals are expressive of the social order. To Firth (1967) the true referents of ritual and belief are found in the social order.⁵⁵ What is achieved in this rite is to set before the kin, verbally, the schemata embodied in a form that the child must learn if it is to be successful. Firth writes that when viewed from this angle, what would ordinarily be interpreted as a technical or "magical" rite for the child may, in reality, be a ceremony of moral injunction for the kin. Again, important social obligations may be more readily discharged if the importance of their performance is magically stressed. Firth expresses it thus, "... the performance of magic ... reinforce technical means ... so in social contexts it may be part of moral education" (op.cit.: 74). Magical and ritual beliefs tend to cluster round places, people and periods of special social importance, so as to enhance and emphasize this importance. Firth views this ceremony in allowing structural elements of the kinship system to be expressed thereby going beyond affirmations of the text of the formula to the social context (ibid.). This point gives rise to the intended emphasis, and a conflict in approaching systems.

My reference to Horton in presenting reason as a transcendent category appears to coincide with the task Dumont sets himself.

⁵⁵Firth, R. (1967) Tikopia Ritual and Belief. Study in Tikopia religion. London: George Allen & Unwin, p.74.

Dumont finds a single or transcendent basis for caste ranking. For Dumont, there is no sharp break between the mind of the participant observer and the ethnographic facts which he observes ignoring the fact which he readily assumes in Homo Hierarchicus (p.75) that the construction entailed in ethnography is institutionalized. Hence Dumont's insistence that the structure of jati organization which is "out there", external to the observer, is integral with the structure of varna theory on hierarchy. Dumont prefers to ignore history and focus on an ideological construct operating within, analogically, the minds of men. To him the varna system provides the key to hierarchy making sense of the facts, and making them intelligible in terms of a coherent system. According to Leach, Dumont's view of the past is an ambiguous category which creates a difficulty for the more empirically oriented theorists.⁵⁶

In referring to totemism, I noted that Lévi-Strauss concentrated on pointing to the generic operation of the human mind and its tendency to utilize binary distinctions. Fundamental to these thought processes is separation and opposition between elements dividing up the universe of discourse. By focusing on the interdependence (relational) between castes, Dumont argues that there exists one fundamental conception that is not to be characterized by atomization into simple elements which is not a principle of the caste system itself. Instead, he argues for a single principle that divides points in the hierarchical scheme into opposing conglomerates whose basis is the opposition between pure and impure:

This opposition underlies hierarchy, which is the superiority of the pure to the impure, underlies separation because the pure and impure must be kept separate, and underlies the division of labour because pure and impure occupations must likewise be kept separate. The whole is founded

⁵⁶Leach, E. R. (1971) 'Espirit' in Homo Hierarchicus, Ch.2, Contributions to Indian Sociology, New Series, No.V, Dec.1971, Vikas.

on the necessary and hierarchical co-existence of the two opposites.

(Dumont, L., 1966, p.81)

To Evans-Pritchard, the notion of structure when applied to the Nuer refers to the relativity of the various orders of groupings or distinctions with respect to situations in which they are seen in action. It was Evans-Pritchard who showed us a basic principle of structuralism in "opposition" which is a way of conceptualizing this system. However, Dumont sees this approach as too empiricized (ibid.: 79). Structure here is tied to empirical circumstances, but it does provide an important concept in segmentation. Structurally, the caste appears in certain situations and disappears in others in favour of larger or smaller entities (loc.cit.).

For Dumont's model the purity and impurity continuum operates independently of the distribution of power. Crucial then is "the principle by which the elements of a whole are ranked in relation to the whole" (ibid.: 72). It is religion which provides the view of the whole, and the ranking is thus religious in nature. In other words, hierarchy is the relationship between that which encompasses and that which is encompassed (op.cit.: 111).

In referring to Firth, I gave an example characterizing activity as something other than its actual appearance would indicate to us. If Indian culture was conceived from our angle, Dumont would claim, we in the West would focus on the element and reify it as an "isolate", because the primacy of the individual seems assured. In other words, the element is distinct from reference to the whole. Conversely, Dumont assumes the primacy of ideology which often submerges itself, particularly in the middle region of caste hierarchy. The reason given is that castes in the upper and lower portions of the varna system accept the legitimate

claims of other groups in respect of status. It is in the middle of the hierarchical set-up that groups become particularly sensitive to the ambitions and mobility of other groups. The key here is the relative status accorded a group in opposition to that status denied to another group. This point is given ideological validity by the Brahmanical conception. To Dumont the individual element is not a directly observable phenomenon existing as a concrete entity, but rather is a function of his relationship with the whole, which Dumont terms ideology. What would thus be readily comprehended by us as a duality between "status" and "power" - an opposition, is, in fact, transcended by reference to the whole.

Status then is always religious as far as Dumont is concerned. The problem lies in the disjunction between status and power, because these entities do not occur in direct relation to one another (1965b: 89). Ideology, to him, predominates and carries a universal importance (1966a: 20). The indirect quality implied in hierarchy is located, argues Dumont, in ultimate values. Here the priesthood and purity of the Brahman encompasses power and its concomitant impurity. There seems no dichotomy or contradiction between the religious and the secular, but both are united as the encompassing and the encompassed.⁵⁷ The facts of power are not ignored or denied, they are devalued, relegated to the secondary level of the encompassed. Dumont states that the Brahman is dependent on the King. However, this takes second place as it is situated on the lower level.⁵⁸ On the primary level,

⁵⁷Heesterman, J. C. (1971) 'Priesthood and the Brahman', Contributions to Indian Sociology, New Series, No.V, Dec.1971, Vikas, p.44.

⁵⁸Kolenda, P. (1976) 'Seven kinds of hierarchy' in Homo Hierarchicus 581-596, Contributions to Indian Sociology, Vikas, p.593.

Dumont asserts in fact that the explicit values shown by the ruler's dependence is "encompassed" by his spiritual superiority. Indeed, the Brahman's position is ambiguous. As an ascetic and a renouncer, he portrays the only element of recognizable individuality we in the West could point to, as an isolated element. Therefore the Brahman is opposed to the man within caste who cannot be an individual in a truly hierarchical society.

The individualism of the renouncer or "holy man" is the counterbalance to the holism of the caste system.⁵⁹ On one level renunciation negates caste by denying its viability. But the renouncer who is placed outside the caste system is not outside of society, for he teaches or conveys his ideas to ordinary caste regulated people. It is Dumont's view that it is the renouncers rather than the Brahmans who have been the creative agents in Hinduism, their ideas percolating into the caste system itself. As prime examples of the influence of the renouncers upon caste, Dumont (1966) cites the imitation by Brahmans of the vegetarianism and non-violence of Buddhist and Jain renouncers (op.cit.: 194). Given such a creative role, Dumont concludes that "hierarchy in actual fact culminates in its contrary the renouncer" (ibid.).

From this position, it is clear that the central idea to Homo Hierarchicus is the encompassment of power. Here too, in the traditional sense the upper realm of dharma (right action) dominates the lower realm of artha (power), and that the locus of stability is the domain of religion, and ritual status. So a part of the function of low castes is to remove contaminant and polluting tasks from the Brahman and this in part constitutes

⁵⁹Masson, J. M. (1976) The Psychology of the Ascetic, pp.611-626.

functional specialization.⁶⁰ Here Hindu reciprocity served to reinforce hierarchy, according to Dumont, although he is not too clear on this point (ibid.). Reciprocity obtained whereby ritual offerings were dispensed downwards, concomitantly with a complementary removal of defilement. If mutual reciprocity were not to take place this would prevent the occasion for Brahmanic opportunities to approach and address the divine. Thus, from the higher levels of the caste system pollution was drained away to the low castes of impure ritual specialists. We can therefore conclude that exchange should embody from Dumont's viewpoint a cleansing function that over-rides mere economic considerations and, in fact, facilitates through the jajmani system the opposition between the pure and the impure. This is consistent with the principle of hierarchy and separation whose underlying expression is the interdependence of superior and inferior, whose basis is complementarity anchored on the pure and impure dichotomy, permeating the caste system. To emphasize the religious nature implied in economic affairs, we need only look at the concept of daksina,⁶¹ meaning endowments which were maintained by Brahmans through receiving special fees for work. Brahmans selectively exchanged with villages their subsistence or they retained a source of livelihood such as cows upon which they could live without contaminating themselves with manual labour.

This point correlates with Firth's point on the symbolic ostensibility of action and the ease with which behaviour and ideology can be inadvertently mixed. Brahmans did this because they sought independence from tainted sources of resources and wealth, and

⁶⁰Uberoi, J. S. (1971) 'The elementary structure of caste', Contributions to Indian Sociology, New Series, No.V, Dec.1971, Vikas, p.39.

⁶¹Derrett, J. D. (1976) Rājadharmā, 597-610, p.604.

even from the King himself.⁶²

On the division of labour then, the jajmani system is constituted on the primary level in relation to the whole as opposed to the orientation to an individual's profit and thus represents a religious expression. On a second level, specialized functions are markedly religious. Even in the case of middle-range castes rank has often been most disputed. Occupation appears difficult to rank because, as Meillassoux mentions, ideology is an obstacle to understanding a mode of production. Perhaps Meillassoux has incompletely alluded to the ideological form masking the relations of production.⁶³ Ideology, thinks Dumont, hinges on the pure and impure dichotomy giving rise to positional claims. But here purity takes on a new conception commensurate with putative life-style, origin myth, and recent history - and not occupation (op.cit.: 644). What Dumont regards as an ideology, Meillassoux defines as a screen allowing for unilateral domination. Dumont would criticize Meillassoux for mechanically applying external ideas of class and exploitation as if these exist apart from praxis, as if action can occur outside ideology. Is Meillassoux guilty of erecting a scientism and imposing both monism and divisiveness, when it is not there? Does Meillassoux understand the process of "mediation" Dumont mentions, and the externality theorists impose from Western culture? To Dumont, the comprehension of historical form must be presupposed by an examination of ideology. However, both Dumont and Meillassoux ruefully neglect the function of symbolic domination.

⁶²Cf. Manu III, 64, 153; IV, 85-86.

⁶³Meillassoux, C. is cited in Barnett, L., Fruzzetti, L. and Ostor, A. Hierarchy Purified. Notes on Dumont and his critics, p.642.

In conclusion, idealists emphasize that actual behaviour of individuals may be full of irregularity and improvisation. Nevertheless, they argue that these practices are an expression of the actor's orderly ideal scheme just as the ideal scheme is itself a programme for action produced by the praxis of the whole society.

CHAPTER 3 BY WHOM ARE RATIONAL AND WEALTH-MAKING CHOICES DETERMINED?

Abstract

Substantive problems aside, ideologies opposed to innovation are closely tied with vested interests in society and the general bias of human beings and social units against any change. Basically, three arguments are put forward to justify such a stance. They are firstly deterministic beliefs, that is, every effort to change reality is in vain; secondly, the present order expresses some higher will and it would be sacrilegious to alter it; and lastly social institutions embody the accumulated wisdom of many generations and should not be endangered by rash action. The arguments put forward by preservers of the status quo are almost always rationalized in terms of some conservative ideology (although this may not necessarily be created by them). Here I would agree that because improvements are not a technical matter and are never neutral in terms of social power or the allocation of benefits and costs, any argument towards retaining things as they are cannot be sustained. By far the more important factor is the general inertia of individuals and social units. Although society is in an epoch of radical social change, I would maintain that this has not yet affected the policy-making process. Most people tend to cling to the few social institutions that seem to be stable. This tendency is strengthened by the increasingly widespread feeling of being lost in the 'lonely crowd', a feeling of helplessness in the face of possible catastrophe, as well as uncertainty induced by rapid changes in the material environment (that is, technological innovation).

To the hearer an espousal of any political philosophy manifests the excoriation of dichotomy and difference. For someone to hear

of a commitment means concrete difference and dichotomy speak; it is to hear a call for extraordinary speech to differentiate itself, or to sound in the space of its evident difference from ordinary speech. The moral call for superiority as excellence is too easily translatable into the political call for superiority as a rule which destroys the 'polis' as discourse.

True communication is not possible for the truth is never revealed completely. Life is lived in order for us to learn that understanding is a problem in that our categories hide in their intricate detail our real feeling and our actual thinking and even mask the communication process itself. Communication fails to be direct to experience, cannot be captured by commonsense propositions, and does not in the main refer to semantic categories. Messages embody qualities and reflect an expression grounded in a way of life.

Hierarchy, a theoretical problem

Overall, Dumont seeks to make an all-inclusive study of the caste system. Quite properly he would be regarded as a grand theorist. Grand theory offers a finite number of formulae to which all experience can be assimilated and in terms of which it must be explained.¹ The logic of such systems is essentially metaphysical (loc.cit.). It is self-justifying and is empirically irrefutable and unverifiable. It is a logic which provides a set of instructions about how to stick together one's observations of the different bits of the social world so that they add up to a plausible story. However,

¹See Dumont, L. (1965) 'The functional equivalents of the individual in caste society', Contributions to Indian Sociology, No.VIII: 85. Mouton.

it can do no more than assert that its particular plausibility is greater than any other logic. Cohen argues that distortion occurs through analysis not so much from explanatory flimsiness but from the member's own social pathology.²

The sensitive ethnographer must regard such logic as wanting in that it provides only incomplete accounts of the social world in describing social behaviour. In describing social behaviour, the theorist cannot simply reduce it to a simple analogue of mathematics, to deductive or cybernetic logics. It is precisely because of the "illogicality" in behaviour that one turns to culture for an explanation. Furthermore, the participant observer must recognize that social reality is what is perceived by social members. It is not what they would have seen had they operated with the same theoretical logic as those who would explain them. In this regard, to explain a particular native perception merely as evidence of false consciousness or of malintegration is somewhat futile. People see what they see, and what they see affects how they will behave. Behaviour does not have a truth value. It happens, it is there, to be described. That is what ethnography is about. Gellner writes, "the awareness of alternatives" seems credited to individuals. He goes on:

... systems of thought, unlike individuals or groups, are abstractions. They can be observed only as incarnated in the verbal and other behaviour of the individuals or groups, and their isolation from the continuum of behaviour may well be question begging. The observer may isolate one or more such 'systems' which illustrate his point whilst a rival observer may choose to isolate quite other units.³

²Cohen, A. (1978) Cited in 'Ethnographic method in the real community', Sociologia Ruralis, XVIII, 1: 7.

³Gellner, E. (1973) 'The savage and the modern mind' in Horton, R. and Finnegan, R. (eds.) (1973) Modes of Thought. Essays on thinking in Western and non-Western societies. London: Faber & Faber, p.168.

What a participant within a system says is a means to communicate knowledge. Since a knowledge that enables one to behave appropriately is acquired from other people it must be communicated in some symbolic medium. Frake argues that he finds it difficult to conceive of any act, object or event which can be described as a cultural artefact, a manifestation of a code, without some reference to the way people talk about it.⁴ He believes that the informant's interpretation of a socially meaningful act (a message) is the key to the discovery of the code rules. An informant makes an interpretation by applying code rules to the observable message. The anthropologist seeks to infer the relevant code rules. Frake makes it clear that "meaning" is articulated according to extra-grammatical rules of usage rather than to the extent to which the conditions for the use of an utterance are verbally constrained or verbally specifiable. Ideally, thinks Leach, "we hope to describe what the significant social categories are; not ... what they ought to be".⁵ Furthermore, Conklin sees that the mapping of domains is facilitated by discovering locally important frames of reference and by testing for lexically contrasted categories within such frames.⁶

The task of the ethnographer is to reveal the structure contained in the articulatory mechanisms that place objects from a cultural field into designated categories. Frake uses some good examples.

⁴Frake, C. O. (1964) 'Notes on queries in ethnography', American Anthropologist, 66, 3 (2); and also in Tyler, S. (ed.) (1969) Cognitive Anthropology. Readings in ethnographical method. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, p.124.

⁵Leach, E. R. (1961c) 'Rethinking anthropology'. Studying anthropological method, London School of Economics Monograph on Social Anthropology, 22: 27.

⁶Conklin, H. C. (1962) 'Lexicographic treatment of folk taxonomies' in Householder, F. W. and Saporta, S. (eds.) Problems in Lexicography. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

He asks the question, when you hand a Navajo a plant specimen or an American a sandwich, what is the available range of culturally defined arrays into which this object can be categorized? In answering the question, Frake cites the case where a methodology using principles of contrast and inclusion enables the observer to construct a schema indicating treatment of objects pertaining to the range of choices open to the cultural actor. The problem is basically, how does an observer decide which out of a set of alternative categorizations is the correct one in a given instance?

Basic to componential analysis is that it is a system of contrasts. The important question is always, what makes a difference? In the context of different cultures the task is to state what one must know in order to categorize objects correctly. A definition of a Navajo plant category is not given by a list of botanical species it contains but by a rule for distinguishing newly encountered specimens of that category from contrasting alternatives.⁷ In addition, Frake argues that any method for determining the distinctive and probabilistic attributes of a segregate must depend, firstly, on knowing the contrast set within which the segregate is participating and second, on careful observations of verbal and non-verbal features of the cultural situations to which this contrast set provides an appropriate response (loc.cit.). Lévi-Strauss seeks to show that primitive peoples use either-or logical categories just as we do. Next, he infers that social organization and behaviour result from a limited number of mental categories. Just as there is a ground plan for language, he argues for similar ground plans undergirding collective behaviour.

⁷Frake, C. O. (1969) 'The ethnographic study of cognitive systems' in Tyler, S. (ed.) (1969) Cognitive Anthropology. N.Y.: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, p.36.

Semantics and componential analysis

In an investigation into the kinship patterns that divide the cultural world into a classificatory system, Schneider makes some interesting points about the application of this method.⁸ Quite rightly Schneider insists that any theoretical approach starts with an idea in order to demarcate a domain. Secondly, he cites kinship terminology as somehow related to the indigenous conceptualization in regard to reproductive activity, and the distribution of caring functions. The point is that the theorist expresses what he thinks, using a system of references which he considers fits the situation (ibid.: 306). The theorist does this by framing what Schneider terms the control question which in turn defines a semantic domain.

As Schneider argues, componential analysis in referring to Yankee kinship terminology is really defined according to the control question and what the author calls the frame within which the domain is contained, and by which it is defined (loc.cit.). In utilizing this approach, Schneider insists that it is not an analysis of kinship terms but of the indigenous mind working as an analogue to what it presupposes or classes in kinship terms. It should be realized that each culture specifies the rules according to which orders of meaning build on one another and articulate experience. For instance, "father" can be used for genitor or priest; the first is a kinsman, the second is not. "Uncle" and "aunt" can be used for a parent's sibling and for a parent's friend; the first a kinsman, the second not. However, as Schneider reveals, not all these terms are to be regarded as kinship terms. Thus componential analysis realistically defines a domain by treating all the terminological categories as defined

⁸Schneider, D. (1969) 'American kin terms and terms for kinsmen'. A critique of Goodenough's componential analysis of Yankee kinship terminology, in Tyler, S. A. (1969).

by the relative products they differentiate. These categories are mental constructs that are shared between members within a culture. The theorist attempts to interpret and classify the relative products according to a specified category.

Schneider defines the particular domain that is defined in a culture as the semantic domain because it accurately describes how a kinship system is structured. Naturally, this descriptive level differs from the more abstract and general level termed by Schneider the analytic domain. The analytic domain is a way of setting up a standardized frame into which he believes any culture might be fitted for comparative purposes (ibid.: 307). What Schneider seems to be saying is that the "idea" occurring on the broader level related to the analytic domain carries with it a logic that is sought elsewhere. Yet, this higher order model is similar to the grand-theoretical premise pertaining to rules strictly dividing kinship and non-kinship terms from each other according to an arbitrarily imposed category set. It also implies that analysis is primarily a pre-determining affair because the control question bases itself on certain presuppositions. It draws out of informants the fact that the uncle's wife need not necessarily be an affine or kinsman at all (op.cit.: 309). Where componential analysis seems to be effective is in showing how kin terms are distributed across a particular universe of kin types. Important descriptive material is probably ignored in favour of the theorist's maintaining a logically coherent model.

In one way or another, all of those stressing meaning emphasize the importance of placing acting within a context of social rules. For phenomenologists, social activities are rule ridden. To them, the task of sociology is to grasp the meaning of an individual's action within one or another context of rules, so as to understand the meaning of his

actions for him and for others, this is viewed as incompatible with a causal explanation of the same actions.⁹

Anthropologists seek to construct the social reality binding peoples into a social conglomerate. Whyte¹⁰ notes, "We need data on social processes, and questionnaires do not provide such data. Who is to provide such data? Somebody who is out in the field observing what is going on, perhaps even a participant observer."

The reason why questionnaires (and interviews) do not get at social processes and interaction is self-evident. These techniques typically obtain verbal reports from one individual then from another, and another, and so on, until everyone in the sample has completed the research task. Following this "scientific" data gathering process, individuals are then grouped together on the basis of one or more variables of interest to the investigator and are then discussed as if interaction had actually been studied. Among the shortcomings of such techniques is the researcher's assumption that he knows the meaning of his measures (questions, indices, whatever) for those whom he is investigating; that is, he understands the meanings which they attach to his enquiries. One reason for this is that the interview process itself constitutes a source of influence on the respondent's replies and reports. This is not to say, of course, that various observational techniques are not also subject to the influence of interaction between the investigator and the subjects of his or her enquiry. Cicourel (1964) captures the problem in a nutshell: "researchers in the social sciences are faced with a unique methodological problem: the very conditions of their research constitute an important complex variable for what passes as the findings of the investigation".¹¹

⁹Brenner, M., Marsh, P. and Brenner, M. (eds.) (1978) The Social Contexts of Method. How to study social behaviour. London: Croom Helm, p.213.

¹⁰Whyte, W. (1969) 'Reflection on my work' in Horowitz (ed.) Social Self Images. Observational methods. Sage Pub., p.47.

¹¹See p. 146

Paradoxically, attempts to control for biasing affects, over rapport, "going native" and the like, presume a knowledge and understanding of the very social processes which much sociological research has as its central concern.

The source of difficulties facing the participant observer attempting to make a scientific analysis of social reality is the underlying nature of the "so-called concrete facts of commonsense perception" as highly complex abstractions constructed within the "commonsense attitude of daily life". The social scientist seeks to develop "constructs of the second degree" based upon the primary constructs of people, whose behaviour the scientist explains in accordance with the rules of his discipline. Whereas the natural scientist deals with phenomena which are "just facts", the "thought objects" of social science, Schutz (1962) argues, refer to and are founded upon the commonsense constructs of people living their everyday life in society.¹² Schutz emphasizes the personalized character of the individual's biographically determined situation, being "the sedimentation of all his previous subjective experiences" and experienced as a unique temporal and spatial reality (op.cit.: 76). Rather than give weight to a private idiosyncratic expression, biography and social typification are developed within an "inter-subjective world of culture", where the individual lives among others within a shared "texture of meanings" (op.cit.: 10). An important idea developed by Schutz is that the objects of the world may assume different meanings for different actors with varied biographical situations and histories. For instance, as already mentioned, the refractions of Kwoth express different meanings according to the Nuer's

¹¹Cicourel, A. V. (1964) I refer the reader to the introduction for summarization. To Cicourel the theorist's background and the choice of skills and tools are variables that should be taken into account when data collecting, in Method and Measurement in Sociology. N.Y.: Free Press.

¹²Schutz, A. (1962) Collected Papers, Vol.1. The Hague: Nijhoff, pp.5-6.

arrangement in space, respective zone of operation, and the structures of biographical articulation and extent and number of Nuer constituting any association in time. Kwoth is immanent and manifest in all its complex forms, but appears to the individual revealing only an aspect of itself. Interestingly, Schutz mentions the "interchangeability of standpoints" and the "congruence of relevance systems", which together form the "general thesis of the reciprocity of perspectives".¹³

Schutz speaks about two forms of social mediation. Firstly, the face-to-face "encounter" is characterized by spatial and temporal immediacy. The mutual orientation between two expectational consciousnesses Schutz terms the "thou orientation", where one person experiences the other-in-person. Therefore a social relation built up on a plurality of experiences is a "we orientation", involving the mutual apprehension of specific personal characteristics through which is realized "the joint flow of our experiences".

Beside the personalized nature of certain experiences there exists external and public knowledge in the concrete situations involving encounters with others. Included in this dimension are the social typifications of people, their motivations, patterns of action and hierarchies of plans as well as knowledge of the prevailing social sign systems, including language. The "they relation" is based then on typified knowledge of the social world. The "they relation" is based on the premise that everyday life is rule governed and has to do with the usage of rules whatsoever theorizing power one theorizes the world with. In everyday discourse theorizers allow forgetfulness to rule their speech.¹⁴

¹³Schutz, A. (1945) 'On multiple realities', Philosophical and Phenomenological Research, 5: 533-576.

¹⁴Foucault, M. (1972) The Archaeology of Knowledge. Toward understanding epistemology. London: Travistock, p.25.

We must renounce all those themes whose functions is to ensure the infinite continuity of discourse and its secret presence to itself in the interplay of a constantly recurring absence. We must be ready to receive every moment of discourse in its sudden eruption; in that punctuality in which it appears, and in that temporal dispersion that enables it to be repeated, known, forgotten, transformed, utterly erased, and hidden, far from all view, in the dust of books. Discourse must not be referred to the distant presence of the origin, but treated as and when it occurs.

In this treatment one can interrogate the discourse for its rule of functioning, its mode of rationality inscribed in whatever form of life reflexively theorised as its origin, rather than locate this origin in the traces of some once determinate presence in either 'reality' or 'discourse'.¹⁵

Investigations into the theorists whose main interest is to study how knowledge is accumulated reveals the same rule-governing functions that articulate knowledge gathering. In the case of men of knowledge, it is emphasized that they orient themselves to particular audiences, receiving their problems, theories, methods, rewards and recognition from these audiences (op.cit.: 217). To varying extents, these latter writers emphasize that it is the scientific community itself which creates scientific knowledge. Consider Kuhn's (1963: 395) assertion that:

It is not, after all, the individual who decides whether his discoveries or theoretical inventions shall become part of the body of established science. Rather it is his professional community, a community which has and sometimes exercises the privilege of declaring him a deviant.¹⁶

Similarly Polyani¹⁷ writes (1958), "Scientific truth is defined ...

¹⁵Brenner, Marsh and Brenner (1978) op.cit.: 82.

¹⁶Khun, T. S. (1963) 'Response to critics' in Crombie, A. C. (ed.) Scientific Change. London: Heinemann.

¹⁷Polyani, M. (1958) Personal Knowledge. The personal element in knowledge construction. N.Y.: Harper & Row, p.217.

as that which scientists affirm and believe to be true." As far as the individual scientist is concerned, it is the scientific community which makes the final judgement as to the truth or falsity (correctness or incorrectness) of his knowledge claims. The decisions and consensus of the community warrant scientific truth and knowledge.

If we regard the scientific viewpoints held by various scientists as possible ways of viewing things, we must ask why some of these 'possibilities' have greater survival power than others. Obviously, there is a hierarchy within every scientific discipline which follows their own processes of submission and domination among various individuals and groups.¹⁸

The problem of meaning in symbolic action derives as much from intent in the executions of the actions and processes as from any underlying cognitive structure. There is an infinite number of possible worlds. There must be rules for combination of elements so that the number of possible instances will be limited. Messages are circumscribed by the belief structures that predicate them. The parameters impose themselves mainly in the course of juridicial, divinatory and ritual action, for it is primarily in these settings that the moral order of [any] society is constituted.¹⁹

Orders of meaning

How, therefore, are "orders of meaning" arranged to form the basis for sequences and phases of action?

To the Kalabari,²⁰ succession disputes are resolved by an interplay

¹⁸See Phillips, D. (1978) in Brenner et al (1978) op.cit.: 220.

¹⁹Turner, V. W. (1975) Revelation and Divination in Ndembu Ritual. Belief and ritual in Ndembu. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, p.31.

²⁰Kuper, A. (1970) Kalabari Village Politics. An African democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

of factional manoeuvres occurring within a framework of values devolving on a concept called molas. Molas is a multi-referential term with many of the connotations of the English word 'law'. It covers social and natural regularities, bodies of rules, customs, and instructions from seniors to juniors and, in its broadest political sense, "the constitution". The acts prescribed by molas define the legitimate boundaries within which chiefly action may occur. When a headman acts in a manner proper to his role he "is" in the law. If he is held to be acting wrongly, people say he is spoiling sinya, which is the law. The law rules are expressed in the indigenous term molas ke pusho, and the headman is identified with the law only so long as he rules constitutionally.

Among the Fang, the competitive struggle for wealth and status results in two structural tendencies. Firstly, any Fang²¹ possesses a number of wives. Their ability to procreate represents a status increment to Fang husbands. The transition of a girl into a concubine involves a movement from freedom to responsibility. The splitting off of lineages results from the failure of a Fang to fulfil particular obligations, the main one being the loss of territory through the loss of wives and successors. Secondly, the object is to marry into the most alien group in order to widen the lineage's circle of relationships involving co-operation. Therefore, ties cross-cut. The influence over women and land, and the options to marry into all levels, is to create obligations in other groups, thus establishing an intellectual and moral superiority.

Amongst the Tonga of Northern Rhodesia, as described by Elizabeth Colson, unlike the Kalabari case, no headman holds his leadership over an organized body of kinsmen. Even strangers may

²¹Balandier, G. (1970) The Sociology of Black Africa. Social dynamics in Central Africa. (Trans.) London: Deutsch.

come to settle in the village. Membership is defined by residence. The competition between rival loyalties occurs over the scarce supply of labour to herd cattle. Nowadays men are putting their cattle into the care of small girls. To the Tonga the supreme value is indicated by a cattle complex involving ownership and exchange of cattle. The matrilineal arrangement precludes a man's settling with his own children so there is competition between men for the services of boys. An unstable workforce leads to conflict over rights in cattle between factions operating at all levels of the structure. In this context, the different situational constraints expressed in balanced reciprocities over cattle preclude the institutionalization of repeated acts of vengeance. Each phase of the action is transient, for each act of vengeance like each original incident mobilizes different groups whose interests are concerned in the particular case and that alone. In order to mobilize support, a particular faction will even falsify claims so as to create a fictitious tie involving matriliney.²² It is interesting to note that Mary Douglas, in considering matrilineal systems, thinks that they are low yield economies. There may be certain social advantages but the problems apparent in both the Ndembu and Tonga cases indicate that competition causes men to draw in their horns and concentrate their responsibilities on their nearest kin. The fundamental problem is how to create new blood and maintain manpower at the necessary level of skills and energy.²³

²²Colson, E. (1962) The Plateau Tonga of Northern Rhodesia. Social and religious studies. Manchester University Press.

²³Douglas, M. and Kaberry, P. (eds.) (1969) Man in Africa. Readings in African ethnography. Tavistock, p.129.

In the case of the Kalabari, there are two overlapping principles controlling social relations and cognitive functioning. Firstly, there is the native wari, a descent group where a member traces his links through both male and female. However, the wari has very little claim on the ties of its members. In other words, many other ties compete with and diminish the force of these claims. The second operational principle manifest is the result of a thick web of ties binding villagers in every conceivable direction. The salient features of Kalabari life involve elements of choice, enterprise and achievement in all spheres of life, and relatively little emphasis is given to descent groups. An open criterion of culture operated and so members of a wari or any other group are not bound by obligations to one another. In the Kalabari context, competition between canoe houses for prestige and rights replaced the focus on the wari. Kalabari sought to include alien people and invent fictional kinship ties. Why were the canoe houses so constituted? One house or group of houses tried to gain a dominant position over other chiefly descent groups. Therein lay the village scene where shifting personal followings amongst one set of descent rules emphasized various recruitment styles.

In Ndembu society groups have an inherent tendency to segment and then to become bound together by cross-cutting alliances. There exists a tendency to attenuate conflict through ritual performances smoothing over tensions. The way this principle operates is, in the Ndembu view, through an interdependence between hunting associated with masculinity, virility, potency and strength versus principles of female fertility and reproductive processes. To Ndembu hunting brings men together.²⁴

²⁴Turner, V. W. (1957) Schism and Continuity in an African Society. A study of Ndembu village life. Manchester University Press, p.27.

In another ritual, Nkanga, the girls' puberty ritual, white beads often represent female fertility or many children. These beads are draped around a miniature bow (kawatu) and placed at the apex of the novice's seclusion hut. The bow, too, stands for procreative ability. Whiteness appears as a ritual expression, standing for strength or good health. "When white things are grouped together, the spirits can see them and make a patient free from diseases," says Muchona (op.cit.: 56). Whiteness possesses an intrinsic efficacy. It is a reminder to an adept of Chihamba that it is both the embodiment of a wish directed towards the spirits but most importantly affirms the need for cohesion and continuity.

For Ndembu the principle of matriliney is the principle on which society expresses that continuity. Mudyi represents the place of all mothers. It is the ancestress of women and men. Kutembwisha means "to cause to be initiated", and to dance around and around the mudyi tree where the novice lies. Ndembu say "the mudyi is where our ancestress slept, to be initiated there means to become pure or white (kutooka)" (op.cit.: 139). Men, too, are initiated in a circumcision under a mudyi tree. Ndembu say, "when we are thinking of a particular novice kankang'a we say that mudyi is their lineage", that is, it represents the novice's own matrilineage. Women interviewed during the girls' puberty ritual said that the mudyi tree represented a mother and her child. Others described the leaves of the mudyi taken at one stage of the ritual and thrust into the thatch of the mother's hut as the novice's "children". Mudyi is an elastic concept that arises according to the level of dominance assigned to it in each situation.

Turner's informant, Muchona, said that the mudyi's white gum represents the breasts exuding milk, a reminder of womanhood and of that matriliney articulating Ndembu social structure. Ndembu say that a novice in Nkanga will bear children and some of them will be hunters. In undergoing ritual sleep, a woman's auspicious sign is her passivity and forbearance at the foot of the mudyi tree. This is simply a euphemism for the ordeal undergone by a girl novice who has to lie motionless throughout the hot and noisy day. In doing this, Ndembu believe, a woman will bear many hunters and men of sexual desire. Mudyi is also regarded in the Nkanga ritual as a symbol of learning. Just as a child drinks milk from its mother and grows strong, so does the novice learn tribal customs. Community health and welfare are symbolized by the arrangement of objects into typified complexes creating patterned responses within a force field. The multi-referential meanings relevant to mudyi embody variations cast by its extended symbolic shape and form manifest according to situational imperatives.

Outside Nkanga (Turner, V., 1975, p.142), mudyi has many uses and interpretations. For example, it is used in medicine for inducing a flow of milk in women's breasts. If a baby's mother dies, or if a mother has refused to nurse her child, it is said that a grandmother's teats may be washed with mudyi latex and water. After that she is believed to be able to feed the baby. If a mother of twins has insufficient milk she is said to be similarly treated. If a baby dies or abortion inadvertently occurs, the baby is buried under a mudyi tree. The connection repeatedly asserted between mudyi and terms like chifwilu and ihung'u which are expressions of death and rebirth inextricably

linked to suffering, are themselves knots in associative networks, affirming the values attached to motherhood, nurturance and fertility. The pains, as well as the pleasures and rewards of womanhood are represented by this symbol. A simple symbol standing alone, like the mudyi tree, around which women dance at a girl's puberty rite is thus given a multitude of senses by the Ndembu. The Kapong'a shrine is basically a mnemonic or memorial of Kavula. It is an assemblage of simple symbols each with a fan of referents, when the mudyi tree becomes a component of Kapong'a the connotations point to female fertility and concomitant vicissitudes. Briefly, then "a symbol possessing a spread of connotations becomes, under the influence of a culturally standardized leading purpose or emotion, a member of a configuration of symbols, a selection is made among its connotations for the one or those few compatible with the telos of the situation" (op.cit.: 164).

Teleology and explanation

The studies of Iatmul "naven" ceremonies are an attempt to avoid a teleological explanation. Bateson²⁵ tries to explain the ceremonies by showing the logical network into which they fitted, and their inter-relation with other aspects of Iatmul life on the structural, cultural, "ethological" (affective), and "eidological" (cognitive) planes, in addition to examining them developmentally (cybernetics and metaperception). The explanation was structural in that it showed how and why the ceremonies operated, the significance of their different aspects and features for different levels of social organization. Bateson separated the cultural sphere from

²⁵Bateson, G. (1936) Naven. Ceremonial ritual. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

the social structure and utilized the principle of over-determination. This was an attempt to avoid a study of causation from one point of view, as Bateson regarded this as insufficient. Teleological suspensionism therefore does not succeed. It merely separates a system of natural explanation and quantification from a cultural description embodying the qualitative aspects relevant to Iatmul ceremonies. Bateson is really ignoring the fact that delimitation represents a value orientation exemplified vis-à-vis interests, aims, purposes and focal control giving a type and character to the analysis. The analyst predetermines the theoretical mode by complying with set categories which are subject to requirements of culture and profession.

The taking for granted of the very reality of the everyday world within which things and events are noted is itself a cultural product.

Suspension means a shift in modes of attention and differential focusing so as to remove the constrictive nature of a mental blockage.²⁶ However, that elements are arranged in sequential focusing and unfocusing implies some direction and purpose in the enterprise and therefore remains problematically a valued emphasis. Conventional sociology is definable as an implicit value orientation according to sociological theorists. This point raises the question of value freedom. In fact, natural explanations conceal the intentions of those who claim objectivity. Communal values represent a qualitative and meaningful expression. Illustrative examples from Turner's accounts of Ndembu symbolism dramatize the powerful sentiments that objects evoke in events surrounding the mudyi tree.

²⁶An idea derived from Husserl in the notion of "epoche".

For both the Tonga and the Kalabari respectively, expressions evoked by cattle complexes control ownership, production and shifting demographic allegiances. The power of symbolic display regulates communal life-styles and represents a way of life, a cultural language circumscribing particular events.

Gluckman writes that in small-scale face-to-face societies where "there are few specialized relationships" and these are not linked together in large-scale institutional arrangements, "close personal relationships serve most of men's interests", and thus "all events tend to be explained by what occurs in those relationships".²⁷ Further, Turner makes a distinction between models based on impersonal and linear causal characteristics which are mainly Western in orientation versus the personal multi-causal, communal, metaphysical properties of African-oriented models. The demigod Kavula is sacrificed by the neophytes of his cultus, who are in turn, sacrificed to him by his adepts. It is as though all social structural statuses, roles and rules cancel one another leaving a liminal space that is what Turner calls a "pure act".²⁸ Kavula is an artefact of his culture and his efficacy is symbolically transferred to the personal shrine set up for each candidate. The shrines consist mainly of seeds and cuttings as though Kavula were being "planted" in the personal symbolic space of each of his worshippers, whom he has slain and who have slain him, in the fecund emptiness of their mutual death. When the cultural icons, the significant, the symbolic vehicles of Kavula, have been exposed and dismantled, his invisible and potent

²⁷Gluckman, M. (1963) Order and Rebellion in Tribal Africa. Conflict and resolution in Africa. London: Cohen & West, pp.93-95.

²⁸Turner, V. W. (1967) The Forest of Symbols. Ndembu symbolism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, p.93.

meaning (signifie) is planted in the natural shape of seeds, there to personify the cosmos and society, with which the new adept is now one. This point in time becomes the focal point in which health and fertility as principles are affirmed through submission to ordeals as signs that Ndembu members rise to a higher plane (op.cit.: 101). Complete obedience characterizes the relationship of neophyte to elder. The unfolding interaction leads to a continuing programming of members by members. The mukanda rite of circumcision is a process whereby neophytes undergo a sacred symbolic death and represent in their transitional phase "naked and unaccommodated men". These liminal personae are regarded as structurally dead and epitomize the metaphor of dissolution (op.cit.: 93). The male elders symbolizing ultimate authority and Ndembu's concept of purity cut away infantile characteristics simultaneously removing femininity and impurity (loc.cit.). 'Rites de passage' express an unlearning of earlier attitudes and the acceptance of an adult way of life.

The incisions made symbolically indicate the cutting away of the infantile accretions. Impurity therefore symbolizes in a simultaneous sense the entry into a higher status through loss of biological matter and also instruction on the proper treatment of bodily substances. The marginal phase is an intervening step abolishing previous cognitive categories to be replaced by an adult conception of cognition and responsibility. Transitions, and purity represent social means for handling the passage of persons according to culturally established categories. In short, the body is a microcosm of the universe and may be used as a model for social, religious and cosmic ideas. As such, it participates in a wide variety of initiation themes. The combination of ideas underlie or even constitute what Ndembu conceive to be reality. Growing up in Ndembu involves sacrificial steps

undertaken throughout the life-cycle. Just as Kavula the Otiose High God is a sacrificial victim so too is the Ndembu neophyte. In both, sacrifices are considered necessary in order to remove the ritual impurities associated with infantilism, femininity and being undomesticated. The symbolic messages in the Ndembu context portray a way of life designed to anticipate disorder within the liminal phase. Conversely Ndembu reimpose established categories so as to reinforce both the necessity and authenticity of that order. An anthropologist begins his analysis with the need to express order. The concept of understanding is an equivocal category we call "commonsense" providing this frame of reference.²⁹ In short, we rely on the meanings of our own time in order to recreate the meanings behind the events occurring in a particular context. This is the point of Jack Douglas's criticism of historians who presume too much when extrapolating materials from one configuration located elsewhere to another configuration, because we build up our understandings from the presumed nature of everyday life that we share (loc.cit.). It is an extraordinarily difficult task to dissolve everyday commonsense entities because the human mind rationalizes and categorizes that world in which it is embedded. It is a prevarication on this issue when Douglas asserts it is something "human" that makes comparison at all possible (loc.cit.). It is impossible to realize the comparativist's dream and therefore we must suspect intellectual hegemony. I believe Douglas contradicts himself when he writes, "any scientific understanding of human action, at whatever level of ordering or generality, must begin with and be built upon an understanding of the everyday life of the members performing those actions". Douglas is saying that meanings are socio-historical manifestations, but history is inadequate because it has no control in explaining events and establishing a predictive value. He says we have to establish the context of

²⁹Douglas, J. (1971) Understanding in Everyday Life. Towards the reconstruction of sociological knowledge. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul,

meaning, but this is impossible in the manner in which he puts it. So to paraphrase Wittgenstein, the anthropologist should "pack up and go on holiday" because when extrapolating ideas from one context to another he participates in false abstractionism.

From Mauss we learnt that culture simply means "communication".³⁰ We must ask what is to be communicated. How is communication facilitated so as to represent a "value" to its adherents?

Hymes's contributions to the ethnography of speaking focus on what is being said and heard by members. He believes that specific linguistic properties associated with situational meanings are indeed sanctioned and encouraged through the medium of specifiable message forms. Hymes suggests members select their vocalizations from a set of alternative viewpoints structuring ideas according to situational constraints. Each cultural universe divides itself up by differentiating component elements into relevant semantic properties.³¹ In Natural Symbols Mary Douglas³² shows how the symbolic layering in various contexts operates to reinforce diverse authority structures which in turn regulate and constrain social relations. Hymes implicitly rejects the closed mechanistic approach developed by Lévi-Strauss and derived from Neumann, "that there exists a finite and limited number of formal rules underpinning the extent to which content and material operate, from one level to another".³³ According to the critical periods hypothesis

³⁰See Leach, E. (1976) Culture and Communication. The logic by which symbols are connected. Themes in the social sciences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

³¹See Hymes, D. (1962) in The Ethnography of Speaking. Also cited (1964) in Language Culture and Society. N.Y.: Harper & Row, pp.127-139.

³²Douglas, M. (1970) Natural Symbols. Exploration in cosmology. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

³³See Neumann, J. von and Morgenstern, O. (1944) Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour. N.J.: Princeton University Press, pp.186-219, 49.

of human development mental processes conform with stages of growth and the acquisition of cultural skills. Learning is carefully shaped depending on exposure to certain specifiable categories. We have already discussed the Ndembu life-crisis rites as symbolic or learning transformations for the neophyte which establishes some limits to discourse, which specify allowable mental operations. As Hymes (1962) points out, we must be careful to draw a distinction between semantic discourse and speech. It is not possible in assigning speech to a few specifiable rules which select a message in a given situation. Culture is more open and variable, and indeed the reflexivity implied in each act and the thought that goes with it makes each act both unique and particular, even though on the surface it may seem essentially repeatable and reversible. Ironically the ahistorical synchrony of structuralism expresses historicism. The historicist's urge is to demystify the contingent which we agree is acknowledged in multiform complexity, by surrendering its contents to one over-riding principle. Timeless dialectic indicates that desire to attain mastery and rigour, thereby obliterating the finely nuanced fields of experience. In the light of this criticism of such people as Lévi-Strauss and Jackson (1977), it becomes disturbing to see such theorists adopt categories which cover over the idiosyncratic, the intuitive and multiform characteristics of mental events. Models are strategic views of phenomena according to these theorists.³⁴ Context is reduced to

³³(contd.)

"The game is simply the totality of rules which describe it."
Lévi-Strauss extrapolates from statistical regularities to marriage rules, each being the reverse of the other.

³⁴Social structure here is a "system", a model built up after empirical reality. Theorists aim at isolating strategic levels, and this can only be achieved by "carving out" a certain family of phenomena. [Does Lévi-Strauss mean the same as Wittgenstein does by family resemblances?] Anyway, see Lévi-Strauss, C. (1953) 'Social Structure' in Anthropology Today by A. L. Kroeber. An encyclopedic inventory. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. pp.524-525. 529.

textual analysis and to an a priori manipulation of elements into various prefigured forms, according to asserted rules. Further, the material gleaned from informants presupposes that the people used as informants are all competent members of the society and hence have (like the fieldworker) gained "normal" interpretative procedures for deciding appropriateness and assigning degrees of relevance. In fact, values play a large part in deciding the terms of reference both for fieldworker and the cultural member. Both participant and observer pre-select their materials from the range of information [privately] available to them which excludes experiences which do not imply "commonsense". Commonsense is a regularized norm, or perhaps a segment of life, but it is not the whole of life. A way of life contains core values and the marginal and ambiguous values mean that ideas are continually manifold. It becomes hard to accept Jack Douglas's assertion that the fieldworker should "retain the integrity of the phenomenon"(op.cit.: 16). As I have demonstrated throughout this thesis, meanings when translated between radically disjunctive bounded contexts are strained and squeezed into forms, to fit that theorist's commitment, which always remains a preconceived interpretation located somewhere in his predilections, motivations, intentions and stresses. These elements coalesce in the experience of the observer as a mutually interacting subjectivity responding to other provisionally situated subjectivities. To what extent does classifying beliefs shift according to different situational circumstances? An ethnographic example, denoting the vivifying force which animates Dinka social structure, is atyep, which when translated means "ghosts", but to the Dinka means "shadow" and "reflection". It is not to be conceived of as a class of beings as we might think. Lienhardt³⁵ describes the

³⁵Lienhardt, G. (1961) Divinity and Experience. The religion of the Dinka. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp.101-102.

trend in Western thought towards materializing "ghosts" by representing them in the categories of external physical space. Lienhardt shows how the Dinka have never heard of an encounter with a ghost as occurring in the "external" objective, physical world, as is sometimes imagined by us when we use "ghost" and "spectre" interchangeably.

Metaphor and control

To Dinka atyep is both ubiquitous and immanent in its particularized manifestations. Lienhardt writes, "the atyep, therefore, may disturb its living kin wherever they may be, though its activity is more readily regarded as purposive and reasonable if it appears to a man in his home where he can act to satisfy it". The Dinka world is not an object of study but an active subject. Furthermore, the Dinka conception of divinity is both single and manifold. Divinity is manifold as human experience is manifold and of a manifold world (op.cit.: 16). The super-ordinate transcendence of divinity is stressed in Dinka invocations and hymns:

... and you, Divinity, I call you in my invocation
because you help everyone and you are great towards
[in relation to] all people, and all people are
your children.

and

Divinity, no other man is hated,
Divinity, my father, creator, no other man is hated.

(op.cit.: 157)

To Dinka, the "image" helps maintain the widest community where values such as honesty, sincerity, truth, justice and uprightness reinforce solidarity. Conversely, the same force is represented in sterility, barrenness or pointless or apparently pointless death. Creativity, fertility and prosperity come from the same ground.

The configuration of Dinka experience is realized in a similar vein to Gluckman's notion of socially multiplex relationships whereby the socially constituted patterns with their moral underpinnings spill over into the invisible and sacred domains (Gluckman, M., 1963, p.95). So, whereas the visible and secular might seem an autonomous domain, it in fact becomes intimately related to the invisible and "premonitory will" attached to spiritual phenomena. In other words a "total prestation" occurs between the spiritual and social in that uncharitable acts, occurring, poison and evoke capricious responses from the ancestors. Both the moral and physical domains according to Dinka remain inseparable and therefore incongruous to our fieldworker's structuralist disposition. To Dinka rain-coolness-pastures-cattle-milk-procreation-abundance-life-light and its contrasting features rain-clouds-thunder-lightning-sudden death are all represented by Deng. Dinka associate Deng with lush pastures which they want for their cattle, and the rich harvests from which their women will prepare porridge and beer. Deng can emerge in any one context taking on variable meanings. Deng is richly associated with cattle in complex metaphors but always in relation to men, for Deng is a male divinity and also may stand for a husband or son.

According to Dinka Deng recreates the whole syndrome of experience in which certain symbolic significations are played up, and other attributes are submerged, depending upon the context. In other words, Deng represents a symbolic fan, and each point on the fan becomes operationally manifest according to the context. For instance, rain with its penumbra of associated meanings represents an idea to Dinka in which they acknowledge that their economy makes them dependent upon the grass and crops. The sensuous pole is mirrored in the ideological pole, in which these qualities mean life and abundance, just as their absence,

or their presence at the wrong time or place, can mean death and misery.

Lugbara in their own accounts speak about God as one but many.³⁶ In His most transcendental aspect He is named Adroa. God from the sky is more remote, both spatially and in intensity of contact, than God on the earth. Offerings are made to Him in His immanent aspect and not to Him in His transcendent aspect. Adro is defined by Middleton as a personified force, outside the control and beyond the understanding of the living men who are His creatures. It is in His immanent aspect that God may become present in all kinds of natural phenomena.

God the Creator is outside and above any particular field of social relations and any lineage or section. He features in no genealogy and is outside the system of authority. However, God becomes inverted in His immanent aspects with which diviners, spirits and other agents and beings are also associated in Lugbara thought. God in His immanent aspect is associated with death, with witches and sorcerers. In short, God is known as "bad God" (Andro Onzi). It is in this aspect that He comes into more direct contact with His creatures (op.cit.: 257). In conclusion then, powers imputed to the gods, to use a Durkheimian understanding,³⁷ are in fact powers vested in the social structure for defending itself as a structure, against the deviant behaviour of its members.

How do pollution rules undergird and reinforce the Lugbara theory of ideas? Both Mary Douglas³⁸ and Durkheim believe perception is an

³⁶Middleton, J. (1971) Lugbara Religion. Ritual and authority among an East African people. London: Oxford University Press, p.254.

³⁷See Durkheim, E. (1915) in (1954) The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life. A theory of knowledge. (Trans.) N.Y.: Free Press, Chapter 3.

³⁸See Douglas, M. (1968) 'Pollution' in Lessa and Voygt Reader in Comparative Religion. Harper & Row, p.200.

extension from a moral understanding reinforced and affirmed by pollution behaviour, which is an intrinsic attempt to develop a social theory of knowledge. Pollution rules vary enormously cross-culturally. In essence they prohibit physical contact. They tend to be applied to products or functions of human physiology. Thus they tend to be applied to products or functions of human physiology. Thus they regulate contact with blood, excreta, vomit, hair clippings, nail clippings, cooked food and so on. Although I do not intend developing this theme, different techniques are used to remove impurity by specified acts of cleansing according to distinctive rules, so the "divine" may be approached. This entails a separation from the secular domain denoting secular impurity and contamination as a prelude to addressing the deity. Conversely a candidate who has undergone a period of mourning may require purification to re-enter normal social life. Communication is facilitated only when prescribed rites purify the celebrant prior to the entry of sacred power and fertility into the human condition made ripe for it. A communication occurs when the barrier dividing human limitation from divine omnipotence is dissolved and both enter and live (and have life) in the other. In the Lugbara context God is often segmented and associated with clans. When God is not in direct contact with men He remains a mystery, "in the wind and in the sky". Inversion, as a concept, represents both being outside human society but also entering it from outside (heroes, early Europeans) or leaving it to go outside (witches, the recently dead); and it is thus also used for the agents of the power of God.

Using Van Gennep's concept "rites of transition", sacrifice in the Lugbara case may better be understood as a mode of communication where the sinner repairs his sinful nature before acceptance into the larger community. The sinner is changed into a sinless person who

is reaccepted as a lineage member. He is identified with the sacrificial animal by consecration. The animal becomes a completely sacred object by its slaughter, by which the patient is put into contact with the sphere of the dead and God. Middleton remarks, "he is reaccepted into the lineage by the blessing and anointing by lineage representatives, whose spitting marks his re-identification with them as fellow lineage members" (Middleton, J., 1971, p.108). Ritual addresses are made, accompanied by the use of sacred leaves, and occur at changes of ritual status. Also the non-washing of the actors' faces sets them apart from the everyday world. Lugbara say of them:

A man sacrifices; he does not wash his face
in the morning and he can then insert his
hand (into the shrines). He does not fear the
ghosts.

(op.cit.: 44)

A man who does not fear (or respect ru) the ghosts is set apart from ordinary lineage obligations. The spittle auspiciously represents tali, a manifestation of divine power in such a person. He is thus "outside" the sphere of the living and dead of the lineage. It is only God who can effect such marked changes in the patient's status, and it is for this reason that he enters into the rite of sacrifice at various points and in various ways.

Once again, the marginal substance spittle comes to embody different values according to the context in which it is seen and used. Lugbara say that a sorcerer may use a person's spittle, nail pairings, excreta, semen and other body products in order to harm him. Spittle has an intimate connection with the breath (op.cit.: 109). In Lugbara, air is expelled in its ritual usage with a loud and breathy pa in quite different manner to that in which it is expelled in other contexts. To spit in an ordinary manner is considered ill-mannered, even to imply a threat of witchcraft, if one has been eating or drinking as a guest;

but in this case it is merely a sign of dissatisfaction and has no mystical content. When spat breathily in a ritual situation it is an anointing. It contains breath, in which is something of soul and life the transfer of which may relieve a state of impurity. By spitting the places of a curse may neutralize it, even when he spits on his own chest. The ritual anointing with spittle may be done only in the morning after the spitter has washed and cleaned his teeth and mouth. Spittle in this context has tali, a word which Middleton translates as "personality". Tali refers essentially to some manifestation of the power of God, and it is divine power which effects the anointing (ibid.). Further, the rules relating to handling special substances in one context differ when applied to that same substance should it be seen outside the same context. Spittle stands as a power for evil or for good depending upon the appropriateness assigned to it by context.

Structuralism has, with Lévi-Strauss's inspiration, paid little attention to context. He does attempt to refer all the episodes in the myth of Asidwal to their ethnographic context and show how the events of real life are transformed in the course of mythologization. But he always upholds the relative autonomy of myth and cultural products in general, and establishes this methodologically by reconstructing for each its internal structure. To Lévi-Strauss, mental constraints limit the freedom of cultural production and orient it in a specific direction.³⁹ Lévi-Strauss confuses the "human spirit" and the same mental constraints which he claims appear in the human mind. In other words, there appears a Durkheimian "collective conscience" somehow irreducible with its own distinctive laws governing action.

³⁹Glucksman, M. (1974) Structuralist Analysis in Contemporary Social Thought. A comparison of the theories of Claude Lévi-Strauss and Louis Althusser. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Ricoeur⁴⁰ describes Lévi-Strauss's position as a "Kantianism without a transcendental subject", a formula which Lévi-Strauss accepts. Since myths are collective representations any particular mind fails to account for them, and the categories in the myth do not correspond to those in any human mind.

This particular theoretical approach disguises its ideological message, never questioning the grounds for its existence. It fails since it does not theoretically interpret content, the form, the perspective and the conceptual structure of thought styles as functions of the social conditions determining intellectual production. Ideologies should no longer mask themselves and instead reflect the economic infrastructure (The German Ideology, pp.196-199). Total ideological analysis penetrates into the cognitive sphere, discredits the entire structure of the opponent's consciousness, and subverts the validity of his theories by revealing them as mere functions of his inescapable social situation. Mannheim⁴¹ also regarded the socio-existential partiality of all intellectual positions as constraining the construction of knowledge according to the research arrangement and situational perspective (cited in Remmling, G., 1975, p.60).

Conversely, Mannheim's discussion of historical changes in thought styles has the purpose of supporting his basic assumption that social reconstruction presupposes the reconstruction of human thought and human action (op.cit.: 94). In his view, each stage of social development corresponds to a specific type of intellectual activity and each context

⁴⁰Ricoeur, P. (1963) Structure and Hermeneutique. Espirit, p.11.

⁴¹Remmling, G. (1975) The Sociology of Karl Mannheim. With a bibliographical guide to the sociology of knowledge, ideological analysis and social planning. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

reveals its own set of internal resemblances and connections, subject to some statutory delimitations. This position is similar to Godelier's idea of the position of an element in a series serving to articulate a particular historical level according to its functional significance. Godelier rebukes Lévi-Strauss for neglecting a proper historical explanatory mechanism which accounts for Godelier's insistence on the articulation of elements functioning within levels in his interpretation of structure.

To the structuralist history is supposedly narrowed down to sedimentation in a material substratum. The logic of temporality is allegedly apprehended as transformable cut off from the knowing subject's view of the processes involved. Lévi-Strauss seeks laws of causation without really satisfactorily pointing out interaction between conscious behaviour and the structure of the human unconscious. He believes that a conscious model serves as a screen to mask and mystify the observer's obligation to apprehend an unconscious structure behind the apparent one.⁴²

The human mind and cognition

Lévi-Strauss ambiguously refers to the higher level of the human mind, which is turned towards the Transcendent. Kant used the word Reason (Critique of Pure Reason) in this sense. There are two aspects to be distinguished in the Intellect: an active and a passive, or receptive, aspect. The active aspect is called the agent intellect, the receptive aspect is the possible intellect. These terms should not be misunderstood. The agent intellect is very much in relation with the senses, since it "animates" them. And the possible intellect is not merely passive, since it utters the word and refers it to reality and to the transcendent category. To my way of thinking, Lévi-Strauss asserts the superior function of intellect is the latter category Vernunft (reason)

⁴²See Hayes and Hayes (eds.) (1970) Claude Lévi-Strauss. The anthropologist and hero. Various interpretations on structuralism. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, pp.72-73, 80-87.

as opposed to Verstand (understanding).

There is a difference between knowing and understanding. Kant and Hegel had meant that the problem solving function, involving insight and understanding (verstand), is secondary to reason. Before discovering the solution of a problem we must be aware, however faintly, that there is a problem, that there is "something" which demands an explanation. We are interested in the first contact with reality, which is prior to all understanding and insight and which we obtain through the act of knowing or of affirming. We are led to believe that verstand, the lower category of the mind, structures the phenomenal world according to (Jack Douglas's definition of) commonsense. Lévi-Strauss sees vernunft within the same category and yet linguistic properties peculiar to man have their origin in vernunft (reason). I can only assume Totemism and The Savage Mind fall within verstand, which Lévi-Strauss asserts is a meeting point achieved by an attempt at understanding by me, putting myself in their place and by them being put in my place. The code, which he claims, allows translation functions within the verstand category and yet its logic ironically is the condition emanating from vernunft.

To the understanding, the world consisted of finite entities identical only with themselves, and totally opposed to all other things. It thus failed to penetrate immediacy to grasp the dialectical relations beneath the surface. Vernunft, on the other hand, signified a faculty that transformation, it was claimed, went beyond mere appearances to this deeper reality. Although Kant differed from Hegel in rejecting the possibility of reconciling the world of phenomena with the transcendent, noumenal sphere of "things-in-themselves" he shared Hegel's belief in the superiority of vernunft over verstand. What Robin Horton has done is to reject the complete identification of reason and logic with the limited power of verstand. With the breakdown of the Hegelian synthesis in the second

half of the nineteenth century, a new stress on empirically derived social science had developed alongside the increasing domination of natural science over men's lives. Positivism denied the validity of the traditional idea of reason as vernunft which it dismissed as empty metaphysics.⁴³ Unfortunately, positivism just would not do. Why? Positivism led to the fetishism of facts. The logical positivists' tendency to see logic as an analogue of mathematics, Horkheimer held, was to reduce it to a series of tautologies with no real meaning in the historical world (op.cit.: 62). To believe that all true knowledge aspired to the condition of scientific, mathematical conceptualization was a surrender to a metaphysics as bad as the one the positivists had set out to refute. The positivists, arguing in the Weberian manner, thought that they could separate facts from values. Humanistic theory, whose goal was the understanding of intentional phenomena by grasping the coherence which exists among "their" meanings, was a sell-out to the status quo. There was no way to criticize these phenomena, and lay bare the ways in which the ideas people have of themselves mask the social reality to which their behaviour relates. The humanist cannot appreciate the role of critique in social science; Lévi-Strauss confines himself to interpreting the meanings which various aspects of social life are constituted in respect to duality and opposition which he thinks provides the immediate data of mental and social reality (Murphy, 1971, p.203). For instance, Rousseau showed that people may desire wealth, but that what they really want is social distinction.⁴⁴ This thesis is supported by Thorstein Veblen.

⁴³Jay, M. (1973) The Dialectical Imagination. A history of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research, 1923-1950. Boston: Little Brown, p.61.

⁴⁴Rousseau (1964) Discourse on the Origins of Inequality in Masters (ed.). N.Y.: pp.265-266.

Another example was Becker, who argued that people pursue sexual romance and contact because sex is a cipher for everlasting life, and what they really want is to overcome the fear of their own death.⁴⁵ I believe Lévi-Strauss has driven rationality away from the world into contemplative inwardness. It has led to a separation between essence and appearance which fosters a non-critical acceptance of the status quo.

For Lévi-Strauss, culture is really a natural product and which he insists points towards universal categories generic to the human mind. Lévi-Strauss believes that there is a complex algebra operating at a deeper level of a synchronic nature and similar to a transformational grammar giving rise to variable surface structures and accounting for cultural diversity. My contention is then in line with Diamond's critique of Lévi-Strauss that because of his personal history and disposition, he strives to attain the goal of pure knowledge, general principles and objectivity.⁴⁶ We agree that Lévi-Strauss's writings are governed by philosophical idealism and his personal biography. The idealist principles of his structuralism are based on what Marxists would regard as "the last redoubt of bourgeois intellectualism". The principal thrust

⁴⁵Becker, E. (1973) The Denial of Death. Discourse on fear as a complex associated with death. N.Y.: Free Press, pp.160-170.

⁴⁶The rationalism of the Jews is a passion for the universal (Diamond, S., 1974, p.326). Diamond uses the word "discrimination" (p.327) to describe him (the Jew) as a disembodied philosopher who is a pure lover of the abstract. Intellectually, the Jew conceives the individual "as only an ensemble of universal traits" (p.324). The defence of the Jew against the irrational powers arrayed against him; tradition, race, national destiny, instinct, is to deny them: "magic, unreason, everything that cannot be explained on the basis of universal principles, everything that betrays a tendency to the singular and the exceptional" is challenged by the Jew. Note Lévi-Strauss's universalistic pessimism. Consult Diamond, S. (1974) 'The inauthenticity of anthropology'. The myth of structuralism. In Diamond et al In Search of the Primitive. Dutton, p.292.

in critical theory states that there must always be a dynamic moment in verification because it implies the possibility of a different set of possibilities - that simply means there are "negative" elements latent in current reality.

We believe structuralism must disguise the negative moment and its outcome, prejudicing the possibility of a fair and reliable test simply because its "interest" is linked to the present order and not in its negation. The dialectic apparent in structuralism is similar to the Hegelian one, where the moment of negation of the negation implied in the antithesis of the thesis turns in on itself in search of its lost and tormented centre. It has become abstract and disembodied only because the bourgeois dialectic is struggling to find its truer identity. The inadequacy of the structuralist attitude to history is that the formal ordering of events cannot be assumed in the context of "objective" historical forces. Further, to Lévi-Strauss a dialectical play occurs between the human mind and cognition of natural products. Just as there exist natural categories in the external world, so too there are categories in the mind. It may be a mistake in predicating cultural artefacts on biological processes, even of an epiphenomenal nature.

As the Ojibwa show, their way of life excludes the possibility of observing natural products as merely reducible to physical categories. To the Ojibwa, the concept of the "supernatural" does not presuppose a concept of the "natural", a distinction we would be accustomed to make. Hallowell writes, "it is unfortunate that the natural-supernatural dichotomy has been so persistently invoked by many anthropologists, in describing the outlook of peoples in cultures other than our own."⁴

⁴Hallowell, A. (1960) Primitive Views of the World. Essays from culture in history. N.Y.: Columbia University Press, p.58.

Linguists learned long ago that it was impossible to write grammars of the languages of non-literate peoples by using Indo-European grammars as a framework (loc.cit.). "The sacred word 'nature' is probably the most equivocal in the vocabulary of European peoples" according to Lovejoy (ibid.: 59).

To the Ojibwa, for example, gizis (day luminary, the sun) is not a natural object in our sense at all. Not only does their conception differ; the sun is a "person" of the other-than-human class. More important still is the absence of the notion of the ordered regularity in movement that is inherent in our scientific outlook. To the Ojibwa any regularity in the movements of the sun is of the same order as the habitual activities of human beings. There are certain expectations, of course, but on occasion there may be temporary deviations in behaviour "caused" by other persons. Above all, any concept of "natural" forces is totally foreign to Ojibwa thought (loc.cit.). Since their cognitive orientation is culturally constituted and instilled in psychological categories, we cannot assume that objects, like the sun, are perceived as natural objects in our sense.

In conclusion then, Hallowell wrote (op.cit.: 60), "it would be an error to say that the Ojibwa 'personify' natural objects". This would imply that at some point the sun was first perceived as an inanimate, material thing. There is no evidence for this. Hallowell believes this assumption holds in all areas of Ojibwa society. In short, Ojibwa are engaged in a radical departure from the framework of our own thinking. The manner by which Ojibwa allocate stones and thunder to animate grammatical categories as parts or elements combined into larger cultural sets is crucial to our appreciation of their thought processes. It does not mean that stones fall into a consciously formulated category, the property of a naturalistic model. The Ojibwa recognize a priori

potentialities for animation in certain classes of objects under certain circumstances. Accordingly, both Wittgenstein and the Gestalt psychologists would agree that not only are shapes or figures similar or different depending on their ground or context, but people and their ideas are also similar or different in relationship to a background. In addition, Wittgenstein showed that the degree of precision required in communication about events is relative to a context.⁴⁸

It was Mannheim who claimed that all knowledge was rooted in its social context⁴⁹ (Seinsgebunden). Critical theory is interested in the truth content of philosophical concepts and problems. Mannheim has undermined the distinction between true and false consciousness to which critical theory adhered, because depending on context and objective

⁴⁸In Wittgenstein (1967) Philosophical Investigations, pp.97-99. A sentence must have a definite sense. An indefinite sense would not make sense at all. This is like an indefinite boundary and this is not really a boundary at all. Thus a blurred concept is no concept at all. Wittgenstein remarks on Frege who "compares a concept to an area and says that an area with vague boundaries cannot be called an area at all. This presumably means that we cannot do anything with it. But it is senseless to say: 'stand roughly there'?", para.71.

⁴⁹Jay, M. (1973) op.cit.: 63. A related problem, in the evolution of communication, concerns the origin of what Korzhbytski (in Bateson, G., 1972, pp.180-183) has called the map-territory relation: the fact that a message, of whatever kind, does not consist of those objects which it denotes ("the word cat cannot scratch us"). This is a similar distinction and signified. The relationship between both is arbitrary and thus events are metaphorically construed. The mind works by analogical inference on the object world. Language, then, operates rather like a map signifying territory. Denotative communication as it occurs at the human level is only possible after the evolution of a complex set of metalinguistic (but not verbalized) rules which govern how words and sentences shall be related to objects and events. How then, we may ask, does science verify or falsify hypotheses when its basis is distinguished by a mechanistic outlook? The boundaries science erects are mechanistically employed. Gellner in Horton, 1975, p.172 argues that science delimits the bureaucratization of nature. Elements flow, and are not apprehended categorically a priori.

priority what was first there? Spirit or matter, consciousness or being, is already meaningless as posed. Marxism by necessity must abandon its traditional belief that the ideological superstructure was a reflection of the economic infrastructure. Yet, correspondingly, the structuralist assertion that the structures of society are categories isomorphic with the structures of the mind and are basically reducible in a deductive manner to thought processes of an oppositional kind is an attempt to divide elements simply by inventing and applying dichotomous rules. To Lévi-Strauss, the basic organization of the thought processes is analogous to the workings of a digital computer in posing conceptual opposites, but he claims it goes beyond this to find resolutions of those contradictions. Conversely, the structure of society is similarly conceived as sets of oppositions and these are congruent with, if not emergent from, those of thought.⁵⁰ Robert Murphy describes it as a "timeless dialectic, frozen and crystalline, an underlying level of reality that can occasionally be glimpsed within the chaos of events".⁵¹

⁵⁰Lévi-Strauss often refers to social interaction as embodying a language, or to myth as a language. But the terms language, syntax, vocabulary are usually used metaphorically as in the following passage (1967e: 3):

"Mythology constitutes a 'language'. Ritual, social institutions, technical-economic procedures, and art are also discrete 'languages'. Thus, if for one of these we have correctly isolated the syntax which forms its latent structure, this syntax [he believes] should be transformable into the syntax of the other languages."

To Lévi-Strauss, society is decomposable into several distinct levels, each of which possesses an internal organization or principles of operation. The internal articulation between the various levels is supposedly homologous. For all this, refer to Structural Anthropology, op.cit., p.34, and Interview, A contre courant, Le Nouvel Observateur.

⁵¹Murphy, R. (1970) 'Connaissez-vous Lévi-Strauss?' in Hayes and Hayes (eds.) The Anthropologist as Hero: Lévi-Strauss's theories. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

In short, the transformational geology stratified within the mind imposes its own determinations, and the agent is its unfree consequence.

Herein, we have discussed two critical weaknesses within the structuralist approach. Primacy is accorded to the rational domain which at any rate sought to demonstrate with mathematical precision that there operates somewhere deep within the human mind a natural syntax. It is assumed that we can intuitively penetrate to the heart of the unconscious but Lévi-Strauss is wrong. Natural being is different from historical being. Abstract mathematical rules like physics are valid in their own sphere. A dialectical phenomenology cannot try to investigate nature as does history. "Nature," Marcuse wrote, "has history, but is not history." Being there "Dasein" is history.² Marcuse's argument is consistent with my position in that he considers language, any language, to be inwardly concealed within its own inner workings.

The deep structure of the human mind should not be confused with an ordered and logical grammar. Any attempt to make intelligible what would otherwise resist some semblance of orderliness can be understood as an aesthetic or artistic invention. It is my belief that the Jungian theory of Archetypes should not be confused with an ordered, logical and predictable symbolic record, for this is not what the interior mind precipitates. Deep structure is chaotic and the contents may well be organized irrationally. The problem facing Ndembu elders or Polynesian leaders is then to show the young how to conform to a recognizable normative pattern. Furthermore the

²Marcuse, H. (1955) Reason and Revolution: Radical critique of western society. Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ch.1.

the emphasis on the logic of language and the ordered sequence of time narrows down the actual powers, imagination, deep-seated anxieties and guilt the human mind generates. Emotions channelled throughout the mukanda rite or references by Dinka to the multivarious qualities embodied in Deng or Ndembu alluding to the divine Kavula portray ontological categories. Speech discovers and embodies these values; speech is subject to the ontological because it is embedded in a form of life. Marcuse, in an article on dialectics, wrote, "the boundary between historicity and non-historicity ... is an ontological boundary" (op.cit.: 40). Distinctions between cognitive categories may be studies of cultural classifications but these categories presumably are constituted by reference to the need for reinforcing external structures. The categories assumed to be constituted by reference to a syntax are not consistent with the booming, bubbling, buzzing confusion of the human mind. As we shall see, subjective elements cover over any possibility for a clearly delineated category set, referring particularly to any universal claim. Contrary to Lévi-Strauss's assertion, the human mind, we believe, is not a mechanical machine with various compartments with thoughts congruent with designs projected on it. In conclusion, then, thought and feeling are subtle expressions often ingeniously and intricately weaved into delicate and deceptive patterns. Metaphors may prefigure in them patterns or cultural rules but this assumption is far less unreasonable than the illogical belief based on intuition that because humans can be rational then we may assume existence for a similarly structured unconscious. This type of analogy is illusory. The unconscious in all its subjective profusion is composed of its own intrinsic quirks, lies, tricks, deceptions, ambiguities and conspiracies. After all this, where is the logic or rationale for such claims as "rational" and "logic" but in the

head of the theorist whose need to invent abstractions takes him away from the real world into an ordered one.

This leads on to my second criticism in which I refer to the negative moment in transformation of abstracted structure. For Lévi-Strauss, the conflict must be purely abstract and unrelated to social praxis, it is a tormented dialectic in a search but nowhere to go. Dialectical transformation for Lévi-Strauss is simply unreflective, disembodied, inapplicable and impractical. The author is involved with symbolic play for its own sake. Lévi-Strauss plays with elements detaching himself from social commitment. Lévi-Strauss cannot relate to the outside world which represents a hostile and alien experience to a sensitive and persecuted nature. If his commitment to life, to the various styles of struggle, had been greater, Lévi-Strauss would not, indeed could not afford to, sit back and reduce the human condition to an idealized intellectualism. Quite apart from this consideration it is then necessary to avoid being mesmerized by the rigour because the complexities of culture and politics are not reducible to a natural explanation but must be treated in their "multiple intersubjective dimensions".⁵³

Since the nineteenth century it was hoped that rationality would sufficiently improve in precision so as to narrate the future, and to understand the nature of history. A criticism of this point however is that men are unaware in an objective sense of the manner in which they make history in their own period. There is no positive and absolute detachment in order to read the situation correctly.⁵⁴

⁵³This concept refers to Schutz's phenomenological work, namely, see my own Chapter 3, footnote 13.

⁵⁴Critical theory is action oriented. In one sense, we have a social praxis, which, as societal synthesis, makes insight possible; in the other case a political praxis which consciously aims at overthrowing

C. W. Mills stated that there is no "law" stated by any social scientist that is trans-historical, that must not be understood as having to do with the specific structure of some period.⁵⁵

We subscribe to Mills's point, "what a man calls moral judgement is merely his desire to generalize and to make available for others those values he has come to choose" (op.cit.: 117). Mills not only sought to unmask all trends in current sociological theory as ideologies, but made quite explicit that for his own part he felt that social science can have no other function than to render value judgements. "To say that 'the real and final aim of ... social science' is to predict is to substitute a technocratic slogan for what ought to be a reasoned moral choice" (op.cit.: 150). Moreover, he conceives social science generalization as the passing of moral judgements. In short, a paradigm functions in an analogous way to primitive belief in that both express respectively an ontological concern.

Language games may be defined as the inter-relationship between ideas which represent a way of life to the adherents concerned.⁵⁶

⁵⁴(contd.)

the existing system of institutions. Because of its reflection on its own origins (which structuralism neglects), it is to be distinguished from philosophy and science. Refer to Habermas, J. (1974) Theory and Practice. Heinemann.

⁵⁵Mills, C. W. (1959) The Sociological Imagination. A critique of the sociological profession, and modern society. N.Y.: Oxford University Press, p.14.

⁵⁶See Steiner, G. (1975) in After Babel, Oxford University Press, where he uses examples of counter factuality in the lie as a creative metaphor and a mechanism designed to overcome contradiction in discourse itself. Taking Nietzsche's quotation cited, he focuses on the lie as a strategy primarily enabling survival. Beyond this biological ploy there exists cultural mechanisms of deception and play, masking certain specified rules by foreground disclosures. Both are artistically and aesthetically pleasing to the senses.

Wittgenstein's "language games" present simultaneously a powerful critique of universal theories and a powerful methodological tool for an awareness that the cultural barriers we erect prevent correct inter-translatability between distinctive contexts.

Kulpe, an Austrian who was trained in experimental psychology, founded an experiment to do with coloured boxes in order to combat the claim that mental processes could be reduced to sensations (Wittgenstein, 1967, p.48). Presenting his subjects with cards containing nonsense syllables of various colours and arrangements, Kulpe asked some of his subjects to report on colour, others on the pattern, others on the numbers of the items seen. In every case the subject abstracted those features that he had been instructed to report and made no mention of - and in many cases could not remember - other features of the card that could easily have been taken as simples. Two results arose. Firstly, the answers depended on the question asked, on the context. Secondly, for Kulpe, Buhler and other Gestaltists - and for Wittgenstein in his later work - association depends upon organization or theory. Instead of producing something essential, Wittgenstein sought to show that no single entity exists as a common property which makes one use the same word for all. Rather words (meaning) are related to one another in a variety of different ways. The multifarious relationships form complicated networks of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail. The point Wittgenstein makes is that the human mind contrives familial resemblance which forms into wholes and preselect and predetermine ideas for communication.

Language consists of a multitude of different, often interacting, language games each with its own "grammar" or rules of use. The first, surface grammar, concerns the way in which a word is used in the construction of a particular utterance. The second, depth grammar, relies more on the point of the language game or form of life in which that word plays some part. Wittgenstein's depth grammar does not, contrary to what is occasionally suggested, correspond to Chomsky's deep grammar, as expounded in his linguistic theory.⁵⁷ Like the Gestaltists, Buhler, Piaget, Koffka, Lewin et al sought to show that theory making organization was a basic function of the human mind independent of associations of sense impressions or other "atoms of thought". To these theorists the organizing and theorizing activity of the mind enjoyed a kind of priority which determined the kinds of wholes with which one would deal as "elements" in thinking.

Each culture forms a rich interweaving of life, like a tapestry. Wittgenstein uses the imagery of a mosaic pattern. Thus philosophical critique becomes the activity of showing how language may stray from its proper place and then bringing it back to its correct context. The cultural map is like a wire-netting spread over the globe. Each language game has its own internal rule set. (Wittgenstein, L., 1967, op.cit.: 271). To experience any effects of this process one must contract to enter wholeheartedly into each "operum magnum" thereby agreeing to achieve a resolution in the terms its forms and meanings establish.

Within each language game contradictions (lies) displace a formal structure and express a creative store of information.

⁵⁷Bartley, W. (1974) Theory of Language and Philosophy of Science as Instruments of Educational Reform. Wittgenstein and Popper as Austrian school teachers, in Method and Metaphysical, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol.XIV (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1974).

When order is ruptured, ideas are released at a higher integration and synthesis thereby expanding a culture's store of signification. The joke may be said to reinforce this form. The essence of cultural humour is where something formal is attacked by something informal, and something organized and controlled by something energetic and vital. "The joke," writes Mary Douglas, "is an attack on control." Humour is indicative of a release from control and an attack on the balance of power.⁵⁸ Momentarily there is a release in favour of subconscious wishes and desires before cultural mores are reasserted and encrustation sets in. Men must see, feel and experience the terror "nihilism" embodies before they decide that regulation and constraint is infinitely preferable and therefore the price that they have to pay for self-perpetuation. My point is that jokes are expressive of situations in which they occur whereby the dominant pattern of relations is temporarily challenged by the forces of disruption without losing absolutely the necessary control to reimpose order.

Differentiation of the grounds of thought

Reality is qualitatively a variegated and multi-coloured expression. This affects our enquiry into our epistemological roots. 'The Investigations' programme instructed the verificationist that

⁵⁸Douglas, M. (1975) Implicit Meanings. Essays in anthropology. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, pp.94-95. At this point we can take up Steiner, G., 1975, on the general history of word usage. Ambiguity enriches and complicates the general standard of definition, which gives coherence to a system. The inverse consideration is untidiness that makes human speech innovative and expressively creative in personal (latent) intent. I think that Steiner's rejection of Chomsky's innate, universal grammar reflects the vital constancy of that creative motion indicating the epistemological and psychological failure of the project of a "universal character"; p.203.

it is senseless to talk of a one-to-one correspondence between the simples of language and those of reality (even assuming that either sort of simple existed). Wittgenstein reasoned rightly that simplicity is not a matter of absolutes, but is context dependent. One might, he notes, break down the visual image of a flower into all the different colours of which it is composed - although even that, as he failed to remark, would presuppose a highly sophisticated theory of colour absolutes. Even were this possible, the question of which properties are more simple, he reasons, makes little sense. Multi-colouredness is one kind of complexity; being composed of straight lines is another. Since, in Wittgenstein's view, we use the words "composite" and "simple" in a great many different ways that are also differently related, questions that presuppose absolute complexity and simplicity apart from context are not answerable and ought not to be asked. Ideas about colour gain their meaning from the use to which they are put within some established area of discourse. In learning this proper use, one learns the rules of the game in which the expressions occur. The 'Tractatus', which would be a philosophical analogue to Robin Horton's epistemological objectivist position, is just one grand category mistake - in this case that of supposing the ubiquity of commonsense shared between different levels, and promulgated under the auspices of one supremely authoritative language game - namely science.⁵⁹

In the present society then, it would be a mistake to see intellectuals as freischwebende (free floating), to use the term

⁵⁹The underlying problem here is, of course, that while it is indeed wrong to apply inappropriate criteria to a particular subject matter, we often cannot say in advance which criteria or which categories will be appropriate or inappropriate. It is, therefore, probably wrong to ask first of some criticism whether it is appropriate to its subject matter in that it, say, satisfies some such conditions as "scientific character".

Mannheim had taken from Alfred Weber and popularized. The ideal of a "free floating" intellectual above the fray was a formalistic illusion which should be discarded.⁶⁰ The intellectual is rooted (verwurzelt) in his culture and class context.⁶¹ In short, to maintain the formal dualism of facts and values, which traditional theories of the Weberian kind so strongly emphasize, is to act in service of the status quo.

An approach to understanding man (see Jackson, 1977) understands there is no longer any prideful place for science. Scientific propositions connect with many other language games, no one which enjoys the power of judging or criticizing any other and each of which gains its meaning from the use to which it is put within some established area of discourse. Our tendency to impose on our mental concepts, tasks and rules appropriate at best to our physical concepts (and often not even to them), becomes largely a fallacious set of categories. One can argue all day about monism versus dualism. These old disagreements, Wittgenstein suggests, are not disagreements about matters of fact, as they appeared to be to most of those who engaged in them, but are rather rooted in such mistakes as misapplying the grammar of mental concepts to the grammar of physical concepts and vice versa, and taking words out of their proper grammatical context.

⁶⁰See Remmling, G. W. (1975) The Sociology of Karl Mannheim. A guide to the sociology of knowledge. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, p.71.

⁶¹Marxists tend to use the concept of socio-existential determination to correlate specific theories with concrete social classes, separated by property relations. Mannheim sees socio-economic contradictions as struggles between contradictory world views, thought styles and ideas. For this point see Remmling, 1975, op.cit.: 59.

Do we picture reality? Wittgenstein was led by this route to devote a large part of the Investigations to mental concepts, to the study of words such as "thinking", "feeling", "meaning", "understanding", "intending" and so on. He develops an idea of "imageless thought" closely resembling that of Kulpe and Buhler. "There is a lack of clarity," he writes,

about the role of imaginability in our investigation. Namely, about the extent to which it insures that a proposition makes sense. It is no more essential to the understanding of a proposition that one should imagine anything in connection with it, that one should make a sketch from it. Instead of 'imaginability' one can also say here: representability by a particular method of representation. And such a representation may indeed safely point a way to further use of a sentence. On the other hand a picture may obtrude itself upon us and be of no use at all.

(Wittgenstein, L., 1967, pp.395-397)

When repudiating the representational portrayal of reality expressed in the Tractatus, Wittgenstein in his Lectures and Conversations⁶² denies that when a Frenchman says "il pleut" and an Englishman says "it is raining" something happens in both minds which is the real sense of "it is raining". Wittgenstein explains,

We imagine something like imagery, which is the international language. Whereas in fact: (1) thinking (or imagery) is not an accompaniment of the words as they are spoken or heard. (2) The sense in the thought 'It's raining' is not even the words with the accompaniment of some sort of imagery.

⁶²Wittgenstein, L. (1938) Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief. Edited by Cyril Barrett. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1966, p.30. Roughly stated, the epistemological obstacle is this: there could only be a real and "universal character" if the relation between words and the world was one of complete inclusion and unambiguous correspondence. To construct a formal universal syntax we would need an agreed inventory of all fundamental particulars, and we would have to establish the essential, uniquely defining connection between the symbol and the thing symbolized. In other words a universal character demands not only a correct classification of "all primary units in the world" but requires proof that all such "simples" have indeed been identified and listed. Any language forms an unstable summary and approximate representation of reality and the same applies to the rules of grammar itself.

Against the picture theory of the Tractatus, Wittgenstein notes that even if we were to assume that we did have mental images, these would still have to be interpreted, and thus would be incapable, even if present, of providing an immediate and infallible point of contact between thought and reality. Thus not only is the language of the physical not reducible to the language of the mental; the latter could not in any case give us access to the ultimate constituents of reality, any more than logic gives us access to the ultimate structure of reality.

Language and ideology

How, then, must language be seen and dealt with in everyday discourse and in its more specialized methodological aspect? Words have different, often iridescent and fluid meanings. If I define their meaning, my definitions too have again different meanings and the variable factor in these meanings is often impossible to pin down. Even if I try to remove all points of equivocation, misunderstanding is bound to occur even through what is left unsaid. Language falls short of reality.

The high "C" can be played on any musical instrument, but sounds differently on the violin and the cello; the sounding board is different. In language it is more than merely "le ton qui fait la musique". For some words there seems to be no translation. They are taken over into other languages untranslated. A play on words can rarely be preserved in translation, and many words can be translated only non-literally and paraphrase has to take the place of translation.

Sentences are in a state of perpetual motion. My language is not mine alone. Language exists in dialogue, communication. Words are not handed on like bricks, for the simple reason that they are not matter, but mind. Language is not a static structure, but a dynamic event, embedded in the flux of the whole history of man and the world. In

a living language, words and sentences continually get and give new impulses. In a new situation words and sentences can completely change their meaning and, vice versa, can themselves completely change a situation, for where there are words there is found a distinct history. Language, then, is always on the way to reality, a basic phenomenon of man's historicity.

Sentences are susceptible to ideology. Words and sentences are at our service. They seem to be often used, abused and exploited, for advertising and propaganda and also for pious purposes. They are then subjected to a yoke that it is almost impossible for them to shake off, for they are wholly and exclusively taken over by a particular idea, a particular ideology, a particular system, with the result that they may end up by saying the exact opposite of what their authors originally meant. When words get sufficiently distorted or become unusable, they turn into empty shells. Language can degenerate and decay. Ambiguity in effect can become a political mechanism used singularly to exploit and for someone's advantage.

In a now famous essay, Malinowski stressed the "binding power of the word" in preliterate societies.⁶³ He also emphasized the pragmatic function of language in such societies (a mode of action rather than "a counter sign of thought") and went to considerable lengths to show that speech was meaningless when isolated from its context of action.⁶⁴

⁶³Malinowski, B. (1923) 'The problem of meaning in primitive languages' Supplement 1, in Ogden, C. K. and Richards, I. The Meaning of Meaning. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, p.451.

⁶⁴Malinowski, B. (1923) *ibid.* However, we must also realize that language in addition to being local, is mobile and pluralistic even to the simplest acts of reference. Without this "multivalence" there would be no history of feeling, no individuation of perception and response. To quote Steiner, G. (1975) pp.204-205,

... it is because the correspondence between words and 'things' is, in the logician's sense of the term, 'weak' that language is strong.

Since language contains and articulates thought, Malinowski concluded that preliterate man was thereby limited in his freedom to speculate and to think independently of his culture. Preliterate man was, moreover, unable to dissociate words from effects. The power of the spoken word in traditional Maori society can be demonstrated in several ways (op.cit.: 481): the belief in the instrumental efficacy of incantations (karakia), the significance of sacred formulas in tapu-imposing and tapu-lifting procedures, the values placed upon skills in oratory, the magical use of words in love spells, and the shattering impact of ngeri chants, all these and more point to the relative merits contained in the promotive and efficacious usage these terms engendered for their members.

The point is that no matter how well-designed a cultural system may be, no matter how clearly and thoroughly its members understand what behaviour is appropriate at what time, outcomes are affected in some degree by choices and decisions. There is a certain amount of ambiguity, indeterminacy and uncertainty built into any system.⁶⁵ All that is needed is to acknowledge that human beings receive messages from a variety of sources. As a consequence, epistemological considerations become all important. There is a difference in order of preference between access to material resources through a determinate relationship and rights and obligations pertaining to the distribution and utilization

⁶⁴(contd.)

Steiner, rather powerfully draws out the duality between private and public categories as providing in dialectical fashion the tension which is essential in all discourse allowing scope for the indeterminate usages of normal speech. Vital acts of speech are those which seek to make a fresh and "private" content publicly available.

⁶⁵See Biels, A. and Siegel, M. (1966) Divisiveness and Social Conflict. Calif.: Stanford University Press, p.89.

of those same resources.⁶⁶ In the later case it becomes presumptive to consider it normative if social conflict has not occurred over the common perception of scarce means.⁶⁷

Problems which are related to scarcity and particularly those vital to survival are solved at varying technological, social and ideological levels when perceived by social movements.⁶⁸ Due to an undermining of the dominant group's established position, racial intolerance tends to be greater in periods of economic decline. Whites who are usually accustomed to security resist changes when unable to advance themselves, they are forced by economic strains to compete more heavily with minority groups.⁶⁹ In New Zealand the expulsion of Polynesians corroborates this point.

For Althusser, political conceptualizations are based on exchange and production relations and as such represent theoretical ideologies. Together these articulations in theoretical form of the practical ideologies of the different social classes embody the totality. In each case various positions within social structure are constituting the "form of social consciousness" peculiar to each class.⁷⁰ Each theoretical ideology, then, is based on a corresponding practical ideology, embodied in the practices, experiences, struggles etc. of the corresponding class and its individual members. For the worker an experience of the antagonistic character of the capitalist form of production works thus:

⁶⁶Despres, L. (1975) Ethnicity and Resource Competition in Plural Societies (ed.) particularly the essay 'Toward a theory of ethnic phenomena'. The Hague: Mouton, pp.194-195.

⁶⁷This point links up with the normative aspect contained in a theory of development. Cf. my later reference to Stanley, M.

⁶⁸Beals and Siegel (1966) op.cit.: 90.

⁶⁹Wilson, J. W. (1973) Power, Racism and Privilege. Race relations in theoretical and socio-historical perspectives. N.Y.: Macmillan, p.150.

⁷⁰Benton, T. (1977) Philosophical Foundations of the Three Sociologies. Approaches to sociology. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, p.179.

the worker enters the market to purchase his means of consumption from the sale of labour power. Being involved in production the worker experiences the antagonistic character of this form of production that constitutes his experience. Marx describing social relations says of them, "this phenomenal form ... forms the basis of all the juridicial notions of both labourer and capitalist, of all the mystifications of the capitalist mode of production".⁷¹ But involvement in productive practices, and the struggles which develop from its antagonistic forms, constitute the elements of an alternative practical ideology which may, in turn, form the basis of an alternative theoretical understanding of the social formation. In failing to understand difficulties of others the dominant conception, we must contend, distorts information from lower positions within the social structure in order to resist the need for change. Those most affected by the intransigence of those superiorly positioned respond according to how they cognize their desperate plight.

Juridicial norm and policy formulation

It is here that I want to introduce a case study of a New Zealand social movement that reflects a countervailing tendency to dissent from the dominant ideology in an attempt to win popular support. For practical purposes I intend naming the movement 'Te Matakite'. Te Matakite was a land march that arose in part in association with the Bastion Point and Raglan Golf Course issues over Crown acquisition of Maori land. Te Matakite was a localized and spontaneous uprising on the part of younger Maoris in response to the rebuttal from the Crown that led to the formation of long distance marches of those alienated, to the seat of power - namely Parliament in Wellington.

⁷¹Marx, K. Capital , Vol.1. (N.Y.: International Publishers, 1967) p.540.

However, we see Te Matakite is really a reflection of a more broadly based cross-cutting set of alliances taking in all of those alienated through the Crown's cutting back the freedom (ownership of land and other rights associated thereof) that many Maoris previously enjoyed. To put this idea more convincingly Kawharu (1975) has argued that prior to the foundation in the early 1890s of Maori land courts, the Maori had been able to retain their own networks of obligations which enabled the Maori for a short time (1870-1890) not only to produce an adequate food supply for an increasing native population, but also sell scarce primary resources to the Pakeha facilitating the latter's survival. The land courts introduced a Europeanized version of the individual title and ownership of land, and law providing for individual rights of ownership, plus a reinforcing mechanism in money. Money destroyed Maori social organization because some younger Maoris were encouraged often by devious transactions to sell their own titles. This practice set a precedent for vested interests to misrepresent falsely a legal right on behalf of the Crown to step in and assume it had all the rights. What Kawharu neglects and what we must see as important is the spate of injustices created and not a radicalized and emotional mob. The status quo then represents those groups of interests that have become co-ordinated in a programme to erode the traditional Maori concepts of justice and rights inextricably tied up with land ownership patterns.

In view of this, it is not uncharitable to regard the sets of interests that competitively seek to expand the mercantile philosophy to be balanced and in accord when acting in concert to acquire cheap Maori land. For instance, an individual may spuriously claim to represent his hapu, in order to gain a few material goods in the

belief he may get rich quickly. But what the capitalist merchantilists want besides their own individual profit is the abolition of a native ideology which opposes an exploitative utilization of land for mere profit. This constitutes a threat to the Pakeha standard of what we indeed mean whenever we broach the subject of what it is that we mean by whose concept of justice. Is justice, then, to be defined to coincide with those who dictate and operate through their articulation of ideas, the only possible criterion, facilitating the fair distribution of rights and duties?

Te Matakite's basic expression is proletarian and charismatic. The charismatic element recognizes spontaneity, feeling and emotion as a persuasive element rather than working within a rigid organizational command structure. Members co-ordinate their thinking and action due to the congruence of overlapping interests which precipitates a common attitude.⁷² From the standpoint of class-conscious and alienated proletarians who feel excluded from redress of wrongs, their response is intense. It encourages a site adequate consciousness (Grunwald, 1934, p.219). The critical point to remember is that knowledge is a form of social production and as such relates to practice. This is the lesson to be learnt from introducing Te Matakite as a splinter group. Te Matakite together represents people who believe their aspirations, their way of life, have been crushed under materialism.

⁷²Grunwald, E. (1934) Systematic Analyses. Translated in Petras, J. W. and Curtis, J. E. (eds.) The Sociology of Knowledge. A reader. N.Y.: Praeger.

Class consciousness in New Zealand

Those who are on the bottom of the hierarchy may only look forward to restrictions insofar as opportunity is concerned. The deteriorating circumstances faced by lower class people with a large segment of Maori and Polynesians means that racial and class solidarity embodied in such precepts as Te Matakite set out to challenge and arrest the oppressive practices as they see them practised through unjustly constituted statutory provisions enacted by the dominant class. The boundaries between the two will often be confusing, being variable, shifting back and forth from periods of accommodation (or peace in feud) to periods of overt conflict. Te Matakite represents and indeed embodies a response to new and challenging socio-historical conditions. The existing system offers the poorer person few rights in return for persistent demands for allegiance to co-ordinated sets with partisan interests.⁷³ The capacity to gain concessions by actual leverage inter alia, the various bargaining positions influencing policy, to redistribute effective power is minimal, and may lead to even worse outbreaks of resentment and violence, even among competing lowly ranked members.

Such protest movements centre upon a myth of a social order more just and egalitarian than the hierarchical present. Such myths may look backwards to the recreation of a golden age of justice and equality in the past, or forward to the establishment of a new order on earth, a complete and revolutionary change from existing conditions. Uprisings of this kind show themselves

⁷³Although it is not my primary purpose here, this point should be seen in relation to the concept of scarcity of monies that helps raise rates of interest.

to be cognisant of a need to re-order society radically through mobilizing support. The sudden release of frustration may lead, for a time, to a jacquerie, a bloody uprising. E. J. Hobsbawm has pointed out that such activities for all their violence may not aim at a realistic reconstruction of the social order.⁷⁴ It may not be that members are poor that they protest but that the system engages actively in exploiting a situation of inequality. Anyway, the emergence of a common myth of transcendental justice can move people to act in common as other forms of organization cannot. But it provides only a common vision, not an organization framework, for action. Should economic conditions be severe enough, lower class white people may have a tendency to adopt proletarian class positions. This depends on the strength of the working class in relation to the bourgeoisie. For the working class to succeed it needs to establish alliances with other popular classes and class factions, and thus weld the people together against the bourgeoisie.⁷⁵ The polarization of the petty bourgeoisie towards proletarian class positions depends on the petty bourgeoisie being represented by the class struggle organizations of the working class. Naturally the strategy of the stage (op.cit.: 215) in this situation becomes divisive. State economic interventions subject all incumbents to wage earning. The state achieves surplus value and transfers the surplus value among the fractions of capital. This involves the extortion

⁷⁴See Wolf, E. (1966) Peasants. For textual usage in referring to Hobsbawm's term "jacquerie", p.106.

⁷⁵Poulantzas, N. (1974) Classes in Contemporary Capitalism. Contradictions inherent in capitalist mode of production. Translated from the French by David Fernbach. New Left Books, p.334.

of surplus labour, the unequal terms of exchange in service to capital.

The lower class people seem to want to reassert a control over their own sense of destiny without over-relying on the alien presence of political monopolization and expropriation of the workers' productive efforts. What these people want is recognition given them, as rightful imperatives pertaining to dignity and respect for their structural displacement (Wilson, J., 1973, p.151). The land issues and the legal fictions associated with such claims deny to the lowly positioned groups redress of a perceived imbalance between a status quo containing co-ordinated interests devoted to efficiency with its economies of scale, and the Polynesians' attempt to find a place and a "home" for unacknowledged prestige. The usage made by legal authorities of anthropological data to confirm a viewpoint is what Wittgenstein would term a category mistake and therefore is both highly illegal and unethical in principle. No theoretical treatise, no matter how brilliantly conceived can fit the full definition of the situation for it is interpreted in line with the tenents and categories that belong to the discipline. It is simply a case of pitching one set of moral categories against an opposing set.

In response to a threat perceived by young radicalized Maoris who now present themselves as the new spokesmen, a different set of moral categories arises in the face of dispute. Traditionally in the past anthropologists have observed how kinship helped provide a moral basis for the way things have been in the past, are now, and ought to be in the future.⁷⁶ Professor Kawharu

⁷⁶Kawharu, I. H. (1975) Orakei. A Ngati Whatua community. Wellington: NZ Council for Educational Research, Whitcoulls, p.71.

reveals descent among the Maori as a basis for co-operation among kin, irrespective of domicile. The Orakei household represents a combination of these descent criteria to the extent that it is bilateral in character like the family, and yet may remain a "local group" for a number of generations (op.cit.: 59). In Orakei, however, other kinds of kin group are dependent upon particular individuals who need not link themselves to an ancestral genealogical charter. The members of each group are thrown up, and so do not necessarily depend for their support on an ancestor (op.cit.: 65). An important consideration, Kawharu believes, is that it is useful to know which kinsfolk one can legitimately call upon as key support personnel.

Upon what basis are kindred based groups formed? Kawharu cites these groups as previously formed for the purpose of warfare (op.cit.: 66). This kind of response to pressing exigencies in the politico-judicial domain cannot rule out the plausible maintenance of this arrangement in the face of acute social crises where they may be an intervention on the part of proletarians with mutually aligned self-interests, seeking to establish a "new deal" for their own members in lieu of the "avoidance procedures" pursued by the status quo. As an adjunct to these circumstances, the government seems intent on antagonizing these groups by refusing to recognize their claims. We disagree with Kawharu's comment that "the kindred based group forms only to pursue an objective lasting a few hours or at most a few days and then disbands" (loc.cit.). These groups increasingly form by recognition in common for the necessity of self-protection and an essentially negative position in their relationship. The status quo ideologically must confute its critics in justifying its practices, meanwhile

numbing feelings of adherents. Subject to racist and oppressive laws, Maori offenders appearing in court suffer unduly because they are inarticulate and because magistrates interpret this as indifference or arrogance or an admission of guilt.⁷⁷ Such injustices are perpetuated when the Maori in a stressful time is singled out and stereotyped as maladjusted, by a system stressing values oriented to meeting abhorrent production schedules. Ernest Beaglehole made a valid point in referring to a "brown-skinned proletariat" (op.cit.: 81). Only by experiencing this antagonism, that is by becoming aware of it, and by acting it out, does the group or class establish its identity. Finally, a common idea exists in the minds of these adherents to a particular cause, in their collective need to assuage the harsh relationships which are only internally reproduced in direct proportion to the form of illegitimate social control and exploitation externally imposed.

A racist heritage

A system that no longer is in touch with a common membership fails to provide the basis for its lower class members to excel and demonstrate some form of heroic contribution. We are not dealing with people who fail to take opportunities offered to them, but people whose opportunities have been taken away, and thereby denied them. An outcome, resulting from the lowly ranked's partaking in this unfavourable position is that the lower class member is forced into association, and therefore stereotyped by the visible nature incurred by his predicament. Skin colour

⁷⁷In Kawharu, I. H. and Brookes, R. (eds.) (1968) Administration in New Zealand's Multi-Racial Society. London: Oxford University Press, p.95.

comes to be seen as even more of a disadvantage and the rate of conversion in the transaction moves so as to put further premium upon whiteness.⁷⁶ The psychological effects upon dark-skinned and obese people puts a premium on white-skinned and better proportioned stereotypes, with its concomitant unsavoury social spin-offs (loc.cit.).

Other theorists have already developed this theme in relation to object relations and socially mediated reaction formations and displacement.⁷⁹ Freudian thought suggests that unconsciously members of one stratum (the kindred group) use their social superiors (the projected image of whiteness) to keep one another under control. This point of view we contend is built into Kawharu's appraisal of the kindred group which, we believe, for him represents a cultural "cul-de-sac", but for us, it pertains to needs arising from its asymmetrical and disjunctive relationship with the establishment. There must arise attempts by the establishment to quell the outbursts of this quasi cross-cutting ethnic-cum-worker alliance. It is in the interests of the establishment to divide such protest groups into factions that would rather compete against one another for power; rather than combine all their strengths and direct their energy to overcoming indifference by the state. Scape-goating does not become a liability for a parasitic status quo, but indeed is essential for its survival. Societies that

⁷⁸Banton, M. (1977) The Idea of Race. Racial stereotyping. London: Tavistock, pp.85-92.

⁷⁹For details, refer to Becker, E. (1969) Angel in Armour. Free Press.

regulate strictly the lives of their members need scapegoats (Banton, op.cit.: 295). The Freudian postulate that culture is simply a millstone tied around a person's neck and designed to weigh down the person sufficiently lest his "id" bursts out in unrestrained expression, is not so ridiculous and irrational after all.

Poverty as a legal instrument

Any assistance to the poorer displaced and free-floating labour proletariat takes place voluntarily or is imposed by law so that the poor will not become active and dangerous enemies of society,⁸⁰ so as to make their reduced energies more productive and to prevent the degeneration of succeeding generations. The person is demoralized by the establishment's structuring itself as an autonomous and distinct entity existing as an organized and alienating alterity.⁸¹ The negative self-image is firmly inculcated and bred inter-generationally.⁸²

A depressed way of life we call the culture of poverty flourishes in, and is generic to, the early free-enterprise stage of capitalism and that it is also endemic in the colonial form. In conclusion, then, it is much more difficult to eliminate

⁸⁰Simmel, G. (1968) 'The poor' in Simmel, G. (ed.) Poverty, Power and Politics. Universal Library, p.7.

⁸¹Satre, J. P. (1960) Critique of Dialectical Reasoning. Paris: Gallimard.

⁸²Lewis, Oscar (1970) Le Vide. Anthropological essays on studies on poverty. N.Y.: Random House, p.270 et al. "As an anthropologist, I (Lewis) have tried to understand poverty and its associated traits as a culture, or more accurately as a sub-culture, with its own structure and rationale, as a way of life which is passed down one generation to the next."

the culture of poverty than to eliminate poverty per se.

The unacceptable outputs from the poorer sections do not meet the market requirements sustained and supported by an institutionalized cash nexus. Effective participation by young Polynesians and Maoris in society is, in effect, repudiated and discounted as more likely amounting to an aberration. Locked out from realizing life potential, members must draw together and collectively announce their plight. Fanon makes this evaluation of the role of the lumpen proletariat based upon his experience in the Algerian struggle for independence.

It is within this mass of humanity, the people of the shanty towns, at the core of the lumpen proletariat, that the rebellion will find its urban spearhead. For the lumpen proletariat, that horde of starving men, uprooted from the tribe, and from their clan, constitutes one of the most spontaneous and most radically revolutionary forces of a colonized people.⁸³

George Simmel enunciates the inequality problem. The principle whereby the state has the obligation to assist the poor is simply offset by the fact that there is no corresponding right to assistance on the part of the poor. The poor participate in society through their condition as an endpoint in altruism, and on the other hand they present an inert object without rights (Simmel, G., op.cit.: 9). Removal of rights for the Maori came in 1890 with the co-operation of the land court representing the Crown's interests with those of the settlers who relied on Maori vices and weaknesses and who used Pakeha law to claim rights in Maori land. When debts failed to be accounted for, then Maori land could be acquired. Maoris were left with no rights apart from conforming to Europeanized models of motivation and achievement.

⁸³Fanon, F. (1965) The Wretched of the Earth. A study in poverty and revolution. N.Y.: Grove Press, p.103.

The obligation to give to the poor is not oriented to the poor but towards society whose preservation per se means that society must legislate to protect its interests by extracting from its organs some means to recompense in substitute form its already displaced recipient's loss in traditional prestige. The acceptance by the recipient marks him out by effectively signalling him as a dependant, announcing simultaneously the status differential where otherwise it would remain submerged; the poor person is formally "déclassé" (op.cit.: 12). We have argued that the proletariat is perceived as those who have nothing to contribute and this has necessitated by selecting the unilateral exchange of benefits as the most evident criterion of the poor role (op.cit.: 32).

In response to experiencing "lock out" strategies there arises in response to these changed circumstances tensions within the kindred based group which, in fact, prepare this group for a new task by realigning its sectional tasks. We have since discovered that the kindred based group must be extended to become more broadly based. The traditional emphasis on the Kaumatua, the ceremonial leader, is being replaced in its traditional manifestation representing age, command of oratory and seniority of descent (Kawharu, I. H., 1975, p.68). No longer is it the case that the Kaumatua is always a respected elder because in today's world superior powers of oratory and a sophisticated outlook do not automatically prescribe him as the "first among equals". The alienating alterity displayed in inept officials, who engage in economic warfare costly to the losers, is a prelude to the necessity for re-organization implying a transformation of past traditional fiats and mores. Whereas previously the hapu concept created a sort of racial "sectarianism", it must now change its conservative stance to cope with a broader social

and economic problem.⁸⁴ It has been suggested that a more effective distribution of wealth and income would be one of the corollary aims of Te Matakite. This quasi-religious zeal embodies and expresses the "sharing ideal" as a function integral to its community and its attempt to extend this moral concept to a wider society. The hapu, as Kawharu portrays it, becomes anachronistic simply because constitutionally it contains ascribed and genealogical factors, providing for unadaptive consequences. Burridge, when operationally defining religious activity, shows how the rules which govern the use and control of power change.⁸⁵

Despite the conservatism implied by Kawharu's approach in understanding Maori related issues - religious activities, in this case - the reclaiming of lost power, prestige and wealth combined with a new social sense of worth becomes a vital imperative. This fact applies not only to young Polynesians but to all young - proletarians unsettled by a malevolent system. Assumptions about the nature of power and hence the rules which govern its use and control, can no longer guarantee the truth of things as they presently stand. Ethically, the anthropologist must make a stand because a passionate neutrality is both absurd and pernicious. To remain theoretically attuned and deft in traditional methodological practices becomes an abstract, cold and isolated exercise, indicating a refusal to commit oneself to the fray. In other words, theory becomes an excuse to procrastinate thereby avoiding the consequences implied in concrete and constructive social action. Proper theory is generated from the consequences of social activity, otherwise our discipline turns in on itself into fruitless abstract pontification.

⁸⁴De Bres, P. H. (1971) Religion in Atene. Religious associations and the urban Maori. Wellington: Polynesian Society, p.72.

⁸⁵Burridge, K. (1969) New Heaven, New Earth. A study of millenarian activities. Oxford: Blackwell, p.7.

The prophetic Pai-Marire movement was designed to reassert Maori control over some of its own affairs. It should be seen against the inevitable abuse of human dignities. A principle evoked by these people was invulnerability to bullets. This seemed silly to Europeans. However, when seen from a different point of view it also symbolized, and was a protest against, the fact that a man of quality and courage had no alternative but to die or bow the head before any kind of man with access to a gun (op.cit.: 39). Postures pursued for deferential reasons denote inferiority in some way or another. The New Guinea system of stratification emphasized various patterns of social intercourse and communication. The system operated between two groups based on subtle separation, defined by a code of intergroup etiquette.⁸⁶ Their interaction defined the relative positioning enjoyed by members with respect to one another. The stress was on super-ordination versus subordination. Behaviour required overtly submissive and self-effacing behaviour by Melanesians positioned lower in the overall ranking structure (ibid.: 376-377). Melanesians had to generally address Europeans by appropriate honorific titles, such as pidgin equivalents of "master" and "missus", while natives were customarily addressed as "boy" or "mary". Also a Melanesian could not motion himself into the attention of the European lest he was shunned. Rather, he had to stand and wait his turn before he was beckoned. In the Melanesian case the people had no centralized political institutions. They had no way to respond in a unified fashion to European influence. Cults functioned to reduce

⁸⁶Valentine, C. A. (1968) Culture and Poverty: Critique and counter proposals, an excerpt from which is cited in Harding, T. (1970) 'Cultures of the Pacific' in Harding, T. and Wallace, J. Selected Readings. N.Y.: Free Press p.375.

this disadvantage which produced new unifying structures. This served to produce new leaders based on a wider appeal of competence in manipulating the white man's world in a plural society (op.cit.: 378). Interestingly, Worsley's analysis of the same problem pointed to the importance of allegiance to a broadly conceived extra-segmental, supra-local form of organization.⁸⁷

Those made to experience cultural and economic deprivation and forced to demonstrate their inferiority especially expressed in predictable shameful responses may be perceived by outsiders to be characterized by a pathology. An interpretation which attaches maladjustment to those coerced by circumstances into living an alien life-style may well reflect on the one hand the dominant class's will to resist change and that class's mistrust. It cannot be unilaterally held that groups such as these growing ever more prevalent are maladjusted products of cultural ambivalence who are lazy and emotionally disturbed. It is my contention that many Polynesian youths, Pakeha juveniles and those reflecting similar feelings - all who are lowly placed in the scale of rewards - are adjusted within their context as members enjoying prestige in a marginal culture.⁸⁸ What certain people might detect as pathological for the marginal culture is constituted by reference to collectively shared and enforced marginal experiences (ibid.: 166).

Any error seems to become a special problem only in regard to those propositions an observer chooses to exclude a priori and in principle. Self-evidence is not the prerogative of the analyst. R. S. Peters's

⁸⁷Harding, T. (1970) op.cit.: 381. We must bear in mind that institutions of the dominant group condition how the institutions of other groups adapt. Moreover, the dominant group has a more effective boundary maintaining-and-conserving mechanism to protect its group's interest than the weaker or more exploited groups. Often the dominant groups rely on subtleties implicit in the potential to exercise force, as a control mechanism. See Smith, 1971a, p.33.

⁸⁸Rose, P. I. (1974) They and We. Racial and ethnic relations in the U.S.A., 2nd ed. N.Y.: Random House, p.165.

"transcendental principle" points out that no principled declaration is unimpeachable.⁸⁹ Rather, we can only agree and surmise on the point at which some values are preferable (and perhaps sufficient and necessary conditions in certain circumstances) in opposition to less valuable values in relation to any context. This does not mean we are entitled to sit in judgement. The desire to emphasize traditional techniques attributable to ethnographic data collection may become dogmatized. The functionalism isolated both from context and its surrounding circumstances may come to be overlooked. The idea of dogma may be strained and exaggerated. When dogmas are undialectically and uncritically isolated and absolutized, the outcome is dogmatism, consisting in exaggeration, isolation and absolutization of dogma, which in this case is status quo oriented. The binding nature of ethnographic methodological doctrinalism degenerates into juridicism when applied to correcting a perceived imbalance in line with conventional standards. Every definition is a hazardous undertaking. It is necessary in extreme emergencies, but it must never be embarked on without risk. The delimitation of a frontier can only too easily bring one close to that frontier oneself - not a bad thing so long as one does not stop still in the process. In short, let me suggest that the professional anthropologist conceives in himself the need to become the partial observer, the particularist, the authoritative, the authoritarian, and the intellectual and the rationalist. The trend to formulation and objectification finally leads to formalism, objectivism and positivism that crush the truth with truths. Frantz Fanon espouses this principle:

In any case I needed not to know. This struggle, this new decline had to take on an aspect of completeness. Nothing is more unwelcome than the commonplace: 'You'll change, my boy;' I was like that too when I was young ... you'll see it will all pass.⁹⁰

⁸⁹From Peters, R. S. (1966) Social Principles and the Democratic State. Problems in values and legitimation. London: Allen & Unwin.

⁹⁰Fanon, F. (1952) Black Skin, White Masks. White racism. Trans. London: MacGibbon. p.135.

The vibrant energy and enthusiasm of youth, this sparkle it is said has not been tamed by the mistakes that come with a lifetime's experience.

To Fanon this is nonsense:

The dialectic that brings necessity into the foundation of my freedom drives me out of myself. It shatters my unreflected position. Still in terms of consciousness, black consciousness is immanent in its own eyes. I am not a potentiality of something, I am wholly what I am. I do not have to look for the universal. No probability has any place inside me. My Negro consciousness does not hold itself out as lack. It is. It is its own follower.

(loc.cit.)

The consequence of the replacement of the repressed African spirit in the consciousness of the slave by an authority symbol representing the Master, a symbol implanted in the subsoil of the collective group and charged with maintaining order in it as a garrison controls a conquered city.

(ibid.: 103)

The Negro has been given two frames of reference within which he has to place himself. His metaphysics, or, less pretentiously, his customs and the sources on which they were based were wiped out because they were in conflict with the civilization that he did not know and that imposed itself on him.

(ibid.: 110)

Ernest Becker writes that each person is bent on his own security, his own future. Meanwhile there is no social future for men in common. In a word, Western man has no social ego.⁹¹ Ironically Western man is unprincipled in relation to his own conduct, and principled when referring to what others ought to do.

Handsome Lake had a very weak control over his destiny. For example his behaviour was an abreaction to cope with the white man's undermining of traditional Indian categories.⁹² Established categories

⁹¹Becker, E. (1968) The Structure of Evil. An essay on the unification of the science of man. N.Y.: Macmillan; Free Press, p.281.

⁹²Wallace, A. F. C. (1970) Culture and Personality. Psychology and culture, 2nd ed. N.Y.: Random House,

made conventional wisdom redundant. The loss of conventional categories led to mental blockages resulting in a narrow control over concrete situations. Consequently, whoever witnesses such a containment and restriction over previously successful strategies may, in fact, be unfocused and unrelated in cognitive orientation to change. A person or group whose categories are strained to their limits may be undergoing such intense pain as to be unable to handle a new reality concept. Lapses in cognitive stability may end in confused, bizarre and seemingly irrational pathologies.⁹³ There are latent forms of psychosis that become overt as the result of traumatic experience (loc.cit.).

LaBarre regards the religious movement, the Ghost Dance, as a pathological acting out of oedipal fears and desires. He claims it is irrational in its origins; religion is also maladaptive in its consequences, for it generates false or untestable hypotheses about reality. LaBarre asserts: "the soul hypothesis has never generated a single demonstrable truth; the matter hypothesis however has made man the most magnificently adapted mammal in the history of evolution".⁹⁴

This view diametrically opposes Weber's. To begin first with fact, the full weight of Weber's comparative studies and Religions-soziologie document the argument that without the soul hypothesis the magnificent matter hypothesis never would have come about at all. Only through

⁹³See Arendt, H. (1958) The Human Condition. A socio-philosophical treatise. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

⁹⁴LaBarre, W. (1972) The Ghost Dance. The origins of religion. London: George Allen & Unwin, p.89.

formulating a spiritual order differentiated from the visible order was man able to regard the visible order as objective and secular, hence exploitable by capitalism and manipulable by science.

Civilizations such as China which were extremely worldly failed to de-sacralize the world sufficiently to rationalize it. Calvinism with its transcendental metaphysic achieved this momentous step in evolution,⁹⁵ and the Calvinist metaphysic derived from the prophetic tradition and the reform movement, in a word, from the Ghost Dance. In light of the massive historical argument of Weber, LaBarre's is myopic.

LaBarre does succeed brilliantly in suggesting the infantile and irrational origins of at least some religious themes and movements, but elementary logic forbids the argument from origins to consequences (op.cit.: 109-112). As Weber's studies remind us, irrational reasoning could have adaptive results. (Calvinists reasoning logically from the premise of predestination would have become fatalistic ritualists rather than active innovators.) We can doubtless salvage hypotheses from the oedipal argument, for example, that the greater the oedipal and the less the rational content of the prophet's vision, the more likely his movement will be maladaptive. But proof of maladaptive consequences requires an analysis entirely separate from that of oedipal origins. Such an analysis is the Weberian, to which the brilliant but biased synthesis of LaBarre adds a fundamental dimension.

⁹⁵Weber's main contention in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism was a cautious attempt to correct some of the one-sided social deterministic explanations of social change. For a detailed account on Calvinism and its influence on desacrilization, I refer the reader to pp.170-183, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Trans. N.Y.: Scribner, 1958.

In regard to the question of the adaptiveness of religious movements, then, Weber is at one extreme, LaBarre at the other. Wallace⁹⁶ is closer to the position of Weber, but for different reasons. He takes account of the oedipal origins of the vision, but he nevertheless stresses its rational content and adaptive consequences. And he explicitly denies that the prophet is psychotic (op.cit.: 179). Indeed, Wallace fears that with the loss of psychotherapeutic benefits from religious movements the world incidence of neurosis may increase (op.cit.: 195). If not that, the populace seeking therapy for stress may create a substitute for religious faith by deifying the state, resulting in tyranny and a new threat to reason (op.cit.: 190). Some might consider Wallace's view of religion too rosy, in that it does not take account of the numerous movements which have, indeed, had noxious consequences. Bizarre figures like Bokelson, highly respected reformers such as Zwingli and Savanorola, and scores of Asian, Amerindian, Melanesian, and other non-Western visionaries have met bad ends while their movements dwindled into passivity or violence. On the other hand, others might consider Wallace's theory to be too mechanical. Burridge provides more of an inner view when he analyses the movement's potential for achieving more than the "steady state" of Wallace. By resurrecting cultural values through identification with charismatic prophet the revitalization movement can provide what Burridge terms "redemption".

Whatever the adaptive consequences of the movement, it offers a unique opportunity for a single personality to impose its qualities on history. The charismatic leader's uniquely personal vision,

⁹⁶Wallace, A. F. C. (1970) Culture and Personality. A psychological appraisal of theories in anthropology. N.Y.: Random House, pp.148-151.

whether autistic or rational, can powerfully influence the course of history for millennia. Great world religions such as Christianity and Islam originated as revitalization movements in marginal areas. Spreading widely, they have endured long, incalculably influencing history to the present, and still capable of affecting its future. The convergence of personality and history that is accomplished by the movement calls for psychological analysis in order to illuminate this aspect of the evolution of consciousness.

Formalism reveals historicism

In his Kuranko study, Dr. Jackson states that the "future" means uncertainty for this tribal people (1977, p.20). He cites Eliade for what is termed the primitive fear of history. History, then, is abolished conveniently through ritual whose convenient focus is past origin and a timeless dialectic. Kuranko are similar to all thinking and reflective people; they are powerless to control and predict what will happen, so they give vent to what should happen through the power of imagination. The Kuranko's conscious attempt to recreate structures interpretable in line with an idea collectively adduced from the past is one way of handling the terror of an indeterminate fate. It is my view that social science is faced with the same problematic. As Lévi-Strauss observes,

One can speak of explanations only when the past of the species constantly recurs in the indefinitely multiplied drama of each individual thought, because it is itself the retrospective projection of a transition which has occurred, because it recurs continually.

(loc.cit.)

Once again Becker rightly suggests that desperate reactions amongst people become a normal response because the principal problem of adaptation cannot be handled owing to a failure to harness the

future for favourable purposes. Society too can face exactly the same problem through restrictive and out of date ideas, and thus fetishization sets in. The status quo attempts to retain control over areas where it has shown an incompetency and ineptitude in response to a large section of its members' needs. These members have every right to take their redemptive task into their own hands, to create new meanings and cut through old forms. Fetishization, defined by over-rigid parameters, permeates Western society and social science. The fragmentation of life, the splintering of the anthropological discipline, has become an unseemly obsession.⁹⁷ One point is the prefabricated lie that the anthropologist can account for all the transformations and articulatory mechanisms prevalent in any culture and the position of that culture as just one transformation. Why then do anthropologists mention their inability to investigate all cases and all sources of information, refer to every point of view, use every available technique to elicit data and yet agree not to reveal information because it contravenes agreed, undisclosed, inaccessible, exclusive and private contracts? It is simply preposterous that fetishization on the one hand allows us to extend our theoretical coverage to make meaningless and probably politically inspired pronouncements on the other. A point made by Phillips was that social scientists are engaged in vulgar imitations of what they mistakenly think physical scientists do.⁹⁸

⁹⁷Becker, E. (1961) The Lost Science of Man. A critical look at sociological and anthropological disciplines. N.Y.: Brazillier. I refer to end portions of Parts 1 and 2.

⁹⁸Phillips, D. L. (1973) Abandoning Method. Sociological studies in methodology. San Francisco: Jossey Bass, pp.121-122.

Why has this fetishization led to the rejection and disappearance of reality? How has theory building resulted in sublimation through fabrication? Anthropology has benefited from Lévi-Strauss's inspirations. Structuralism has an intellectual and rational purpose. The rational is separated from the passionate, romantic and actual social practice.

This philosophy neither believes in nor understands constituent realities. Reality recedes simply because whatever is formally clear and perfect is forever defeated by the actual course of events, where nothing happens more frequently than the totally unexpected. To act in the form of making, to reason in the form of "reckoning with consequences", means to leave out the unexpected, the event itself, since it would be unreasonable or irrational to expect what is no more than an "infinite improbability" (Arendt, H., 1958, p.300). Since, however, the event constitutes the very texture of reality within the realm of human affairs, where the "wholly improbable happens regularly", it is highly unrealistic not to reckon with it, that is, not to reckon with something with which nobody can safely reckon (loc.cit.). Thomas Hobbes was the founder of a political philosophy whose modern exponent is Claude Lévi-Strauss. The political nature beholding structuralism obfuscates the real, and truncates our view of the multi-dimensionality of reality. Rational structuralism founders on the perplexity that modern rationalism is unreal and modern realism is irrational which is only another way of saying that reality and human reason have parted company.⁹⁹

⁹⁹Dewey held that "the sense of reality is the sense of effectiveness" - a beautifully transactional statement of the problem of experience (1958, p.167). In this kind of segmented life (contd.)

How has the rationalist predication led to the distortion of various human preferences? The Hobbesian grammar links all elements including man into an endless array of cause and effects. How earlier experiences affect an actor, it is argued, should affect later behaviour albeit stemming from perceived threats. Similarly, what occurs on future occasions is only a determination of present causal acts.

Both behaviourism and structuralism stem from the same rationalist predication. They assume that conduct is chiefly the product of inherited bio-psychological equipment: wars, for example, may be caused ultimately by the fact that men have an instinct to be brutish, solitary, nasty, and life itself to be a short experience. The environmentalists deny the existence of such instincts. Men may be conditioned to be peace-loving as well as to be war-like.¹⁰⁰ The important inference leading from both positions is that men have little, if any, free choice in the matter. What they are culturally, is determined by the patterns of response that they have had indelibly stamped upon them by the equipment of their heredity or the stimuli of their environment (op.cit.: 231). When

⁹⁹(contd.)

situation, organismic striving must be an aesthetics, it must be a process wherein the organism tries to put more and more of the external world together, so it can have a greater "real". "The essence of power is the drive towards aesthetic worth for its own sake" (p.163). An organism "composes" the real or actual out of the powers it exercises over sense-data. Dewey would say that the organism keeps action moving by converting a problematic situation into an organized whole or an aesthetic unity. The ultimate grandeur of the world, then, arises out of the slow process of unification. This idea formed by reference to a system is indeterminate inasmuch as it arises and then surpasses itself in motion. See Dewey, J. (1891) (reissued 1958) Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics. Ann Arbor: Inland Press.

¹⁰⁰Morris, C. W. (1955) Signs, Language and Behaviour. Philosophers of education in cultural perspective. Hold-Dryden, p.209.

the behaviourist seeks to imprint on a subject the highest form rationality attainable, by an individual achieving autonomous action according to some successive approximations principle, the behaviourist is really a totalitarian controller disguising certain interests. Behaviourism focuses on the effect of human motivation and it is in reference to a schedule of preferences against which it measures itself. It is a co-ercive ideology // - a modus operandi. Structuralism is similar, for it admits that we are victims of biologically innate gene complexes. A strategical model is an attempt at abstraction and a reconstructing of all the deeper layers of the mind, according to the variable perception of some observer through combining selected elements into some plausibly consistent organization. Somehow this model is imagined as characterizing an ordering of a determinate sequence of component elements, coalescing into a homology of the brain's physical structure. These types of theoretical construction are really a fetishization of time according to an ahistorical fear of the unknown and unexpected. Rather falsely, science projects an over-confidence through overstepping the boundary into "ought" statements about the world. Science contains an impure metaphysical dimension that theorists secretly and avowedly hope will go away; like death, they seek its banishment should a mandatory explanation not arise.

Another way in which this fetishization results in over-determination leading to a historic closure on possibilities for free action is an attempt to seize superiority and power by demonstrating psychological mastery. Psychoanalytical theory has a strict analogue in structuralism whereby the pattern of the causal-deterministic model has found its acceptance after a borrowing from physics. The erroneousness of this transfer has been amply documented in recent years.¹⁰¹ I wish to draw attention

¹⁰¹See, for example, Gregory, R. L. 'On physical model explanations in psychology', British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 4: 192, 1953.

here to the particular application of the principle of physical determinism, and its misapplication to human affairs. This is called "historicism".¹⁰² Historicism is a doctrine according to which historical events are as fully determined by their antecedents as are physical events by theirs. Hence, historical prediction is not essentially different from physical prediction. Much that alludes to the mechanistic and deterministic approaches infused into dialectics results in the downgrading and even the negation of free choice and responsibility; no matter how "open" the degree of freedom and the willingness of actors to existentially justify and authenticate their own being-in-the-world. "Every version of historicism," writes Popper, "expresses the feeling of being swept into the future by irresistible forces" (op.cit.: 160). No more perfect description of the Freudian imagery of human conduct, and structuralist dogma - "swept into the future" by the Unconscious - could be wished for.

Whereas in psychoanalysis, adult behaviour is considered the result of instinctual drives and early life experiences, in structuralism, there is additionally the factor of unconscious forces generating various behaviours in a causal manner. Herein lie the crucial similarities between Marxism and Freudianism. Each is an historicist doctrine attributing all-pervasive causal influences on conduct to a single type of "cause" or human circumstance. Marx singled out an economic infrastructure giving rise to various determinations at each level, each dialectically related to the other. Freud

¹⁰²Popper, K. (1960) The Poverty of Historicism. Determinism demolished, 2nd ed. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

assigned the same powers to so-called genetic-psychological circumstances. These doctrines remain unsupported, and as Popper shows unsupported and false, doctrines that have nevertheless become widely accepted in our day.

In view of the glaring inadequacies of historicist theories, the question arises as to why people subscribe to them. The answer seems to be that historicist doctrines function as religions masquerading as science. Popper puts it this way,

It really looks as if historicists were trying to compensate themselves for the loss of an unchanging world by clinging to the belief that change can be foreseen because it is ruled by an unchanging law.

(ibid.)

Lévi-Strauss conceives of geological strata as sedimentary layers wherein the contents mean history. He extends this metaphor by incorporating contents into a logical form. It refers to syntax at the deeper level. Curiously, Freud and Lévi-Strauss - both devout determinists and historicists - have a Talamudic fascination mediating categories in order to control the boundaries of experience. Freud attributed religious belief to man's inability to tolerate the loss of the familiar world of childhood, symbolized by the protective father.¹⁰³ Man thus creates a heavenly father and an imaginary replica of the protective childhood situation to replace the real or longed-for father and family. The differences between traditional religious doctrine, modern political historicism, and psychoanalytic orthodoxy thus lie mainly in the character of "the protectors".

¹⁰³Freud, S. (1927) The Future of an Illusion. In The Standard Edition, Vol.XXI, pp.1-58.

They are respectively God and the priests, the totalitarian leader and his structuralist and behaviourist apologists, and Freud, the founding father of psychoanalysis.

While Freud criticized revealed religion for the patent infantilism that it is, he ignored the social characteristics of closed societies and the psychological characteristics of their loyal supporters.¹⁰⁴ He thus failed to see the religious character of the movement he himself was creating. It is in this way that the paradox that is psychoanalysis and its concomitant theory in structuralism - both systems comprising historicist fallacies, and in the psychoanalytical case composing anti-historicist therapy - come into being. Historicism fulfils the same need for Freud, Marx and Lévi-Strauss, making them feel that they may be in control: otherwise the individual is a dependent and helpless creature at the mercy of forces beyond its control. Really historicism is, to use the Freudian term, a form of "intellectual masturbation" against the uncertainty and insecurity that unforeseen and unpredictable change brings to a psychically uncomfortable theoretician.

Geological structures and their sedimentary contents, according to Lévi-Strauss, reveal the atemporal consolidation of those layers. This comparison on the one hand refers to an actual sequence of events and on the other expresses illogical and irrational events given a contingent expression and mediated according to foreclosure on unconscious determinations.

In conclusion, then, the historicist seeks to make panic and fear look like reason for what amounts to an abstract explanatory paradigm expressed in the need to rationalize events, in making claims which cannot be substantiated in fact. In any event, to the historicist

¹⁰⁴See Popper, K. R. (1966) The Open Society and its Enemies. Discourse on critical rationality, 5th ed. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

social context and changing historical forces cannot remain inexplicable. He evokes a conviction, and a passion to superimpose order and structure on cultural phenomena. In the Jew, Jean-Paul Satre says, "(There is) a sort of impassioned imperialism of reason: for he wishes not only to convince others that he is right, his goal is to persuade them that there is an absolute and unconditioned value to rationalism."¹⁰⁵

The author adds that the basic category of their philosophy, their intuition

... has no resemblance to the Pascalian subtlety of spirit - and it is this latter - based on a thousand imperceptible perceptions - which to the Jew seems his worst enemy.

(ibid.: 115)

¹⁰⁵Satre, J. P. (1960) Anti-Semite and Jew. N.Y.: Grove Press, pp.112-113.

Abstract

As I have already indicated, the Nuer, Ndembu and Kalabari examples demonstrate that a political culture clearly involves a degree of pluralism. Further, pluralism (involving as it does the existence of multiple centres of power, each of which is attempting to be wholly sovereign) draws its strength from the very existence of this autonomy. Competition over power, and opposing it, the need for consent, makes autonomy of groups an essential pre-requisite for the successful operation of the pluralist system. Autonomy of groups, then, provides the distinction between pluralism (which has it) and mass society (which does not). In mass society, the elites and non-elites lack an insulation or buffer between each other, thus providing an avenue for elite manipulation. This, it is suggested, results in the dominance of elites at one end of the stick, and the atomization of the individual at the other.

Thus, if we are interested in the structure of New Zealand's political culture, the question of this autonomy of groups is a vital one. Autonomy (or the lack of it) has important bearings on notions other than the viability of pluralism, however. It brings into play crucial constitutional issues, for example, the question of responsibility for groups closely connected to and affected by the policy process. What then are the implications of this if it can be shown that private groups, at least those in this particular study, are lacking in autonomy? Autonomous intermediate groups in pluralist democracies are differentiated from the means for real participation. Does the lack of autonomy

mean an end to participation? Groups may fall within two functional categories, the "protective" and the "affirmative". The former objective of an organization consists of those activities concerned with securing its existence, and minimizing the danger of external interference in its decisions. The latter includes those activities concerned with the growth of an organization (and, we might add, its interests).

Information flows across webs of relationships. Ideas differentiate themselves and we should provide an examination of the impact of a particular flow of information. Inter-organizational relationships are often about bargaining and negotiating and result in "partisan mutual adjustment" which expresses a potentially enforceable claim. This suggests that the structure of the network, the pattern of links and the locations of "nodes" are related to interests and what is being exchanged.

A network is structured partly by who is involved in the network, which would appear to be those with functional responsibilities to participate in a particular policy system, and partly by the reticulist skills of network members. My argument sets out to show how the command over resources which determines who is a member of the decision network, and it is the manipulation of those with command over resources which affects the style of the reticulist's achievement.

My approach is neither pluralist nor systems-focused, but stresses the forces which structure the distribution of resources between interests in society as a whole. Inter-organizational research and theory have been insufficiently concerned with the issues of macro-structure.

Alliance and political theory

In Chapter 5 of Les Structures Élémentaires de la Parente, titled 'Le Principe de Réciprocité', Lévi-Strauss tells us that even marriage through capture does not contradict the law of reciprocity. It is merely one of the possible institutionalized ways of putting it into practice. In Tikopia, Lévi-Strauss argues, the abduction of the betrothed woman expresses in a dramatic fashion the obligation of the detaining group to give up the girls. The fact that they are "available" is thus made evident. Women, then, ought to be seen against the background of a total exchange wherein two groups juxtaposed in opposition to each other establish a relationship with the other vis-à-vis "the gift". The gift is a "total social fact" that surpasses purely economic values and assumes an importance, setting the context for a range of dynamic forces in interaction. It should not be surprising then to see women are included among a number of other reciprocal prestations (op.cit.: 65).

Lévi-Strauss, thus, goes on to indicate that the small nomadic bands of the Nambikwara Indians of Western Brazil are in constant fear of each other and avoid each other; but at the same time desire contact because it is the only way in which they are able to exchange, and thereby obtain articles which they are lacking. There is a bond, a continuity, between the hostile relations and the provision of reciprocal prestations. Exchanges are peacefully resolved wars: wars are the outcome of unsuccessful transactions. This characteristic is evidenced by the fact that the passing of war into peace or at least of hostility into cordiality operates through the intermediary of ritual gestures. The adversaries feel each other out, and with gestures which still retain something

of the attitudes of combat, inspect the necklaces, earrings, bracelets, and feathered ornaments of one another with admiring comments.

From battle, the contestants pass immediately to the gifts; gifts are received, gifts are given, but silently, without bargaining, without complaint, and apparently without linking that which is given to that which is obtained. These are, indeed, reciprocal gifts, not commercial operations. But the relationship may be given yet an additional meaning. Two tribes who have thus come to establish lasting cordial relations can decide in a deliberate manner to join by setting up an artificial kinship relation between the male members of the two tribes, representing the relationship of brothers-in-law. According to the matrimonial system of the Nambikwara, the immediate consequence of this innovation is that all the children of one group become the potential spouses of the children of the other group and vice versa. A continuous transition exists from war to exchange and from exchange to intermarriage (op.cit.: 67). Thus, the exchange of betrothed women is merely the termination of an uninterrupted process of reciprocal gifts, which brings about the transition from hostility to alliance, from anxiety to confidence and from fear to friendship.

Similarly, to Chagnon, it appears that the Yanomamö see themselves situated in terms of an oppositional demographic pattern in which they perceive their apparent mutual hostility and enmity and hence as such display threats¹. The problem of aggression is expressed in two ways, by Chagnon. Yanomamö warfare does not arise "automatically" because of excessive population density and problems pertaining to scarcity (ibid.). Rather Chagnon sees the issue

¹Chagnon, N. A. (1974) 'Studying the Yanomamö' in Spindler, G. and L. (eds.) Studies in Anthropology. Stanford University Press.

in terms of primitive warfare which is strictly not a characteristic of ecocentric or biocentric assumptions about the nature of tribesmen and tribal culture.

Like Chagnon, we have to admit to our view the fact that warfare is everywhere a means to political ends and cannot be seen entirely within the context of scarce resources. That is to say, warfare has socio-political attributes (ibid.).

In all tribal groups (see Sahlins, 1968, for a definition of tribal culture) local communities are "sovereign" in that the political behaviour of their members is not dictated from above by supralocal institutions. This preservation of localized political sovereignty refers to the sine qua non of context with its own internal dynamic. From Hobbes via Sahlins (ibid.), there is a phrase called "warre" meaning political stance. Chagnon describes this as

... the chronic disposition to do battle, to oppose and dispose of one's sovereign neighbours ... In tribal cultures the world over there is a general tendency for tribesmen to hold an attitude that their neighbours being remote spatially and genealogically are therefore less moral and less human than themselves. One suspects his neighbours of sorcery, witchcraft and chicanery, and treats them accordingly.

(ibid.: 77)

In a similar vein to Lévi-Strauss's account earlier in this chapter, Chagnon sees a similar process at work,

... the range is from trade to raid, but even in the former, trade is hedged in and dominated by ritual and ceremonial, a reflection perhaps of the awesome danger accompanying association with potential enemies.

(ibid.)

Among the Yanomamö, Chagnon points out, we are dealing with a situation where warre has for reasons other than the distribution or availability of resources taken on the quality of warfare. Yanomamö perceive themselves that they are bound into a social

complex expressing opposition in terms of social distance and this colours the type of threat evident.

Security and distance denote sovereignty.
(ibid.: 78)

Chagnon (1974) then shows by way of observation of Yanomamö ethnographical data how the village of Mishimishimaböwei-teri shows some striking differences when compared with other Shamatari villages, which in turn differ from the Namowei-teri (ibid.: 78). In particular, we are told the Shamatari are growing at a faster rate and have expanded over a much larger area than the Namowei-teri in the same period of time. This occurrence has led Chagnon to conclude that the Shamatari have the potential to realize their socio-cultural advantage in the realm of intergroup competition, and by extension group selection, or group survivability (ibid.).

With a higher birthrate and the subsequent dispersal of newly-generated villages, Chagnon implies that the Shamatari would have a tremendous advantage should, for example, territoriality arise as a problem in this area. In short, we are led to believe that Shamatari's greater adaptability would eventually result in their biological and cultural domination of the Yanomamö tribe as a whole.

Oppositional thinking here is not empirically presented but it envisages that contrasting relations create the relative distinctions to which power and ideology refer. These distinctions expressed symbolically represent to the people concerned transformational relationships both of an expressive and instrumental nature. Expressive symbols simply divide up the universe into logical and relevant categories. Instrumental distinctions embodied in symbolic complexes refer to the actual divisions on which questions relating to power and technology are conveyed in ritual. In turn, both the expressive and instrumental symbolic forms form

the cornerstone of political organization in primitive societies. Symbols articulate the domain of discourse on which a group reproduces itself according to the dominant cues expressed in social activity. In short, the relevant objects appropriated are used in a way which is expressive of a way of life. On objects there are superimposed unique symbolic functions and symbolic usages through manipulation of the available materials.

According to Abner Cohen there are many cases where a kinship ideology is made to articulate the political organization of large populations in both uncentralized and centralized societies.² The Bedouin of Cyrenaica³ and the Tallensi,⁴ for example, express their political organization in the idiom of kinship. The same can be said of the organization of kingdoms. The whole political structure of the Swazi is expressed in a lineage pattern that pervades the whole kingdom from the highest to the lowest levels. Gluckman points out that in most tribal societies, inter-personal relationships are highly ritualized.⁵ Kinship symbols and ritual symbols are highly interdependent and Cohen believes neither category can operate without the other (op.cit.: 218). "Social anthropology," argues Cohen, "has as its central theoretical interest the study of symbols and their involvement in the relationships of power ..." (ibid.). Cohen believes that the same symbolic function can be

²Cohen, A. (1974) Two Dimensional Man. An essay on the anthropology of power and symbolism. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

³Peters, E. L. (1960) 'The proliferation of segments in the lineage of the Bedouin of Cyrenaica', Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, 90: 29-53.

⁴Fortes, M. (1936) 'Ritual festivals and social cohesion in the hinterland of the Gold Coast', American Anthropologist, 38: 590-604.

⁵Gluckman, M. (1962) 'Les rites de passage' in Gluckman, M. et al Essays on the Ritual of Social Relations. Manchester University Press.

achieved by a variety of symbolic forms. Thus distinctive symbolings might serve to reinforce the same overall total effect. For instance, instrumental examples may indicate to us the situation of context in messages of emblems, facial markings, myths of origin, customs of endogamy or exogamy, beliefs and practices associated with the ancestors, genealogies, specific ceremonials, special styles of life, shrines, exchange modalities, notions of purity and pollution and so on (Cohen, 1969, pp.201-214). Ritual symbols differ in their formal expression but their function signifies an objective common to all of them. Thus, the notion of function used here is analogous to the Althusserian problematic. This simply means that the specific characteristics associated together in the human mind reinforce the structure and define a conceptual framework which determines the forms of the posing of all problems and what is seen as relevant to the problem (Althusser and Balibar, 1970, p.25). The problematic constitutes within itself the absolute and definite condition of possibility, and hence the absolute form determining which problems must be posed at any one moment.⁶ Objects and phenomena which do not have necessary links with the circumscribed field defined by the problematic are excluded so that internal limits are placed on discourse. Althusser elaborates the point that it is the fundamental questions, the outlook, that determine the results and the conclusions of any study.⁷ The discovery of the outline of a problematic amounts to a production of knowledge, rather than a surface reading, and to

⁶Althusser, L. and Balibar, E. (1970) Reading Capital. Trans. Ben Brewster. London: New Left Books.

⁷Althusser, L. (1969a) For Marx. Trans. Brewster. London: Penguin, Allen Lane, p.67.

distinguish it Althusser calls it a "symptomatic reading" (Althusser and Balibar, 1970, p.28). It attempts to discover the undiscovered, or what is latent in the texts. Thus when studying Marx (Althusser, 1969a, p.66):

We must go further than the unmentioned presence of the thought of a living author to the presence of his potential thoughts, to his problematic, that is, to the constitutive unity of effective thoughts that make up the domain of the existing ideological field within which a particular author must settle accounts in his own thought.

Similarly kinship and ritual, though distinct in form, have a great deal in common, and the separation between them is often arbitrary and sometimes misleading. They are both normative, depending on categorical imperatives that are rooted in the psychic structure of men in society through continual socialization. Both consist of symbols and of symbolic complexes. These symbols are cognitive, in that they direct the attention of men selectively to certain meanings. They are effective in that they are never emotionally neutral; they always agitate feelings and sentiments. They are connative, in that they impel men to action. These characteristics determine the potency of symbols which can be ranged on a continuum from the less potent, a mere "sign", to the most potent, "a dominant symbol" (Turner, 1964 and 1968). Symbolically expressive themes are systematized together, in the same manner as Wittgenstein⁸ associated discrete cultural elements such as a stick and a brush which symbolize to our way of thinking the qualities of "broom-ness". Thus specific entities are culturally labelled by combining their simples into a composite frame that signifies a culturally meaningful usage.

⁸Wittgenstein, L. (1945/49) Philosophical Investigations. P.60.

Symbols are integrated according to the consistent qualities denoting a cultural pledge to the same underlying expressive patterns. To us a stick is not a broom, nor is a bunch of bristles sewn together. The quality of broom-ness is verifiable only by reference to the culturally expressive symbols underlying thought processes, and in reference to a specified context. Thus the problematic poses an inner logic that is expressively articulated according to a contextual frame posing the requisite variables relevant to a particular thought structure.

An hypothesis can thus be put forward concerning Godelier's (1972: 310) ideas relating to the variability of variables within a system. There is a functional relation between these variables, such as between a handle which is only a stick, a bottom piece that completes the T shape of a broom; without which hair-like projections called bristles, our terminological definition, would be incomplete and inapplicable to the instrument we call a broom. We must remember in our postulate that the outlines of categories are indefinite and blurred on their edges. Our language classifications and their contrived designata must then evolve towards new structures. In this connection Godelier would observe a relation between structure and event, wherein dialectical transformations involving the Hegelian notions of thesis, antithesis and synthesis occur in what he analytically defines as a process. A structure has the property of "tolerating" and "digesting" certain types of event up to a certain point of time when it is the event that digests the structure. The broom is only an idea or a complex of ideas interwoven into a functional whole at some point - the structure. But if the broom were to lose its vital characteristics through the stick's disengaging from the other segment, then a contingent variable, involving the functioning of the remaining segment in what might be termed a makeshift brush commensurate with that event takes

shape. Any social structure (how we combine ideas into selective wholes) can thus dominate an evolution and contradictions (both internal and external) up to a certain point which is not known in advance in a determinate fashion. In this sense Godelier rejects the norms or conscious model devised by Leach (in Nutini, 1965) which postulates a structure. A social structure then is a property of the social relations and the dialectical interplay between consciousness and what Godelier would interpret as the unconscious inner logic of the human mind (op.cit.: 311).

From the point of view of the group, the person is socially reproduced as the common individual by qualifying through his function to be a reciprocal relation to everyone.⁹ Birth is reproduced artificially (in an initiation the group takes responsibility for). What is certain is that birth is a pledge to precisely the extent that the pledge is a birth (Satre, 1960, p.486). The person rises to the common level where his bodily inception is over-ridden by his pledge recorded in and through his social birth giving him certain powers - his pledge. In other words, like the processing of elements into a schema within a language, the individual undergoes expected ordeals to achieve the stature of a common individual. His correct relation to everyone else makes it incumbent upon him to exercise practical powers. Initiation helps the individual manifest his endurance, acquiring merit, which is an indication of the degree of commitment, solidifying the value placed on consistent action sought and won in the pledge. On the basis of this commitment the group preserves the right to punish someone born into it who decides to leave it. The group message refers to

⁹Satre, J. P. (1960) 'Critique de la raison dialectique', Bibliothèque des Idées Paris.

the neophyte's impatience for initiation, his courage during the ceremony that symbolizes a commitment for him and a responsibility undertaken on behalf of him by his immediate predecessors. In this sense, the parents wish to place him at the higher level so that he can, with all his power and complete knowledge, decide whether to remain in the group, to change his function in it, or to withdraw. Should he decide to share in the higher potential bestowed upon him as a common individual, he interiorizes common freedom as the true power of his individual freedom.

Symbolism as power differentiation

Satre (op.cit.: 487) uses the example of counter prestation in which he recites the community's commitment to the individual, being the same as the individual's freely committing himself to the community. Thus rites of passage such as marriage are bilateral symmetrical ceremonies. They actualize a reciprocity. It is therefore impossible for the child not to interiorize this future anterior which has been constituted for him a priori and not to interiorize it through positive acts (initiation procedures, choice of a wife, military prowess, or, where appropriate, the struggle for power). Thus, ultimately the organic individual grasps his contingency in every movement of his life. This means that he is not his own product; but as a common individual, his birth is indistinguishable from the arrival of his freedom. To be born is to produce oneself as a specification of the group and as a complex of functions such as burdens and powers, debt and credit, right and duty. The common individual produces himself as a new pledge within the group (ibid.). In this sense, in effect, truth is normative because fidelity to logical "principles" is only a form of fidelity to the pledge (op.cit.: 502).

Only the organizer (elder) has an immediate, practical comprehension of the structures in all their complexity and this is the basis of an

abstract analysis, which he then performs on these structures as skeletons. In fact, the natives of Ambrym from French West Africa use diagrams. Satre points out how Ambrym draw lines on the ground and these, according to their length and position, represent one or other of the spouses, their sons, their daughters etc. seen of course from the view of a complex matrimonial system (Satre, 1960, p.502). In this case, it is important to realize that in producing these relations in the domain of the absolute inert (earth or sand) and of perfect exteriority they were not copying some model which they were carrying in their heads; and it would be equally incorrect only to say that they directly project their synthetic practical consciousness of themselves and of everyone into the analytical milieu of the inanimate. Rather, practical knowledge unfolds simultaneously on two planes and according to two types of rationality. The laws of inertia are transformed into practical laws of organization by a set of guiding schemata. Both represent distinctive levels dialectically transforming each other. What is inscribed on the ground (on inert matter) dialectically transforms mental events from their moment of inception and thus constitutes a falsification of the mental plane. Presumably the diagram treats the forms as if they were real structures when they should represent fidelity to the pledge - which is normative.

In fact, the decision to make the kinship system into a fabricated, inorganic object (lines made on the ground) corresponds for the native to a practical attempt to win the support of inorganic materiality in order to produce the structures in the form of inert abstract schemata. The reason for this is that he is explaining them to a stranger who is situated in the exterior, and who therefore thinks in terms of exteriority. Satre (1960) therefore shows how an Ambrym expresses pledged inertia not as interiorized exteriority, but as a pure determination of universal exteriority. But in establishing this minimum schema, that is to say

reducing the structure to bare bones, he is guided by a synthetic understanding (a language game defined by membership criteria) which defines his membership of the group (ibid.: 503).

A gift symbolizes a relationship of non-hostility. Gift-giving is simply not an economic act but it is always "limited and qualified by other aspects of the institution of exchange".¹⁰ Following Mauss, Lévi-Strauss has shown that the potlatch is supra-economic in character.

The best proof ... is that ... greater prestige results from the destruction of wealth than from its distribution, because, however liberal it may be, distribution always requires a similar return.¹¹

It cannot be denied that the gift has a basic quality of reciprocity, as anthropologists acknowledge. The gift serves a moral purpose, encouraging the receiver to recognize his obligation to both a giver and the larger community. In its destructive form the gift is not so much an elementary form of exchange as a mortgage of the one for the other. The period of time which separates the two ceremonies, even if reduced to a minimum, masks their reversibility; in effect the first donor issues a challenge to the second. Mauss has emphasized the ambiguous character of potlatch being an act both of friendship and aggression (in Satre, op.cit: 107). In effect, what may happen is that the act of giving may mask actual hostility because it places the absolute Other in an untenable position regarding his obligation.

Symbolic meaning and personal redundancy

Indeed, it is not hard to grasp what Satre terms the double transition under production itself from scarcity as the dispensability of each individual

¹⁰Malinowski, B. (1961) Crime and Custom in Savage Society. Trobriand legal system. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, pp.39-45.

¹¹Lévi-Strauss, C. (1949) The Elementary Structures of Kinship. London: p.55.

in relation to all, to scarcity as the designation by society of groups of under-consuming producers (op.cit.: 153). At this point the relation between groups becomes violence - not necessarily because it was established by violence but because it is itself a relation of violence between violent men. Engels was right to say that very often, when two groups engage in a series of contractual exchanges, one of them will end up expropriated, proletarianized and, often, exploited,¹² while the other concentrates the wealth in its own hands. This takes place in violence, but not by violence: and experiencing exchange as a duel in this way is characteristic of the man of scarcity.¹³

The simplest case is that of the co-existence of foreign companies producing export commodities with a wide range of subsistence activities. To Furtado¹⁴ this co-existence may continue in a state of static equilibrium for long periods. Furtado postulates three sectors in the Brazilian economy: a subsistence structure, a structure oriented mainly towards export, and an industrial nucleus connected with the domestic market and sufficiently diversified to produce a part of the capital goods it needs for its own growth. The industrial nucleus is under permanent competitive

¹²See Barratt Brown, M. (1974) The Economics of Imperialism. A history of political economy. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

¹³Plantations in the new world may have begun as capitalist institutions and become feudalized. The colonial powers relied increasingly on a landlord class, in India a princely class as indirect rulers on their behalf. In India the zamindars had been transposed from Moghul tax collectors into landowners and rentiers (see Barratt Brown, 1970a, pp.54, 177). If the indigenous institutions were firmly established then co-existence facilitated through indirect rule enabled capitalism to inter-penetrate the indigenous society. Otherwise the local institutions would be wiped out.

¹⁴Furtado, C. (1964) Development and Underdevelopment. California University Press.

conditions with external producers (Furtado, op.cit.: 42).

The local producer tries to compete on the same basis with external economies of scale (imports). Price structures in the local market are on a par with those in the foreign industrial economies exporting manufactured goods. Thus, the technological innovators which appear most advantageous are those making it possible to approach the cost and price structure of industrialized countries, and not those permitting the faster transformation of the economic structure through the absorption of the subsistence sector.

Consequently, the part of the population affected by development, Furtado states, remains proportionally small, and similarly to Frank (1969a) he argues that there is a relative decline in productivity within the subsistence sector.¹⁵ Business and trade union leaders want low food prices. They can "buy" at lower prices from landlords in return for loopholes in land reforms and in laws limiting interest rates, for low agricultural taxes, and for subsidized inputs for the big farmers.¹⁶ Such a deal is politically stable, because urban business and labour can easily be organized into monopolies and cartels when the powerful rural groups are included. Smallholders and landless labourers are often deprived of a viable leadership by emigration or the pre-occupation with holding down a tenancy. Naturally, peasants are sufficiently concerned about risk to behave as simple profit maximizers (Lipton, op.cit.: 144). The small farmer's reluctant economic response, argues Lipton, is not born

¹⁵Frank, A. G. (1969a) Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America revised edition, Monthly Review Press: Penguin.

¹⁶See Lipton, M. (1968) 'Strategy for agriculture: Urban bias and rural planning in India' in Streeten, P. and Lipton, M. (eds.) The Crisis in Indian Planning. Oxford University Press, pp.130-147.

of stupidity. Farmers seek to insure themselves against disaster, not to rely on techniques for merely an uncertain return. Furthermore, peasants seek to maintain their family status by means of expensive weddings, ensuring that each son inherits land, which forestalls simple profit maximization (op.cit.: 134).

Developing underdevelopment

Underdevelopment is a process due to the penetration of modern capitalist enterprises into archaic structures (Furtado, 1964, p.139). Furtado argues that there exists a vicious interaction between an industrial economy linked both in interests and behaviour to its external patrons, and an untransformed internal structure whose existence enabled both local and foreign capitalists to maintain high profit levels by relying on a "reserve army of the unemployed", so that their interests became inimical to internal dynamism. The capitalist sector is not moved to resolve its own internal contradictions, and the state sustains this situation, protecting capitalists supported by the internal market from competition, holding the position of the landowners intact, and providing infrastructure and a suitable "climate" to aid the group allied to external interests. He sums up (p.68),

In short, the social structure ... can be outlined as follows: at the top is a ruling class composed of various groups of interests, in many respects antagonistic to each other, therefore unable to form a plan for national developments, and holding the monopoly of power unchallenged; lower down we have a great mass of salaried urban workers employed in services, which forms a social stratum rather than a class; beneath this is a class of industrial workers which hardly represents one-tenth of the active population of the country but constitutes its most homogenous sector; and finally the peasant masses.

Furtado¹⁷ goes on to show the manner in which events in North-east Brazil operated in the reverse to what was intended. In the sugar region, an improved market led landowners to drive workers off their plots. The workers organized peasant leagues to resist removal and in the main were successful. However, peasant gains led to an increase in the cost structure of the industry, without correspondingly improving its efficiency, and increased its reliance on the protected internal market. In the interior, where the basic problem is rising population on drought-stricken land, improvements have all gone to the benefit of the ranchers rather than the sharecroppers, and have consolidated the position of the oligarchy whose production is of low intensity.

The Mexican revolution of 1910 was just such a response by people who felt repressed by the existing regime. At first this was an elitist movement concerned only with political democracy, but it had need of peasant support and found this among the oppressed peasants of the pastoral North. At first the new leaders did not even slow down the process of land engrossment by the hacenderos (Wilkie, J. W., 1960, pp.41-49) and they quickly alienated the peasants who resumed the revolution with a new determination.¹⁸ Especially in Morelos, a sugar region just South of Mexico City, a truly revolutionary movement organized and held together by Emiliano Zapata adopted land restitution as its main plank (Womack, J., 1968 and Huizer, G., 1970) and through the bourgeois constitutionalists ultimately gained complete control.¹⁹ The new constitution

¹⁷Furtado, C. (1965) Diagnosis of the Brazilian Crisis. California University Press.

¹⁸Wilkie, J. (1970) The Mexican Revolution: Federal Expenditure and Social Change since 1910. Berkeley and Los Angeles.

¹⁹See Womack, J. (1968) Zapata and the Mexican Revolution. A study in peasant movements. N.Y.

incorporated land reform, as well as improved conditions for the working class. But there was no guiding ideology. Though the power of the hacendados was greatly reduced, and wholly eliminated from certain areas, and the advance of foreign ownership and control was decisively checked, the urban bourgeoisie were the real victors. Many of the benefits gained by the peasantry were on the way to being lost by 1930. Further on, Zapata's contribution is treated in more detail.

Thus the benefits of a money economy (with increased monetary income and buying power) are not equally distributed among the members of a community²⁰ (Stavenhagen, 1964, p.321). What has occurred in Latin America is that wage labour and cash crops displaced colonial domination with clear-cut class relationships. The result of Spanish colonial policy on Indian communities has given way to a non-Indian domination increasing the economic subordination of these rural groups (Stavenhagen, op.cit.: 322). Stavenhagen argues then that the most striking feature in change when considered in relation to third world countries is the emergence of new class relations which are closely linked to the class and power structures at the national level (op.cit.: 331). Reinforcing this state

²⁰Stavenhagen, R. (1964) 'Changing functions of the community in underdeveloped countries', *Sociologica Ruralis*, 4: 315-331. Furtado (1973) sees this problem as modernization rather than development based on the adoption of new patterns of consumption by a minority. Consumption patterns are critical. The mass of low income earners support industries with weak linkages and small scale organization. The main raw materials are drawn from agriculture. The high income minority has a far more diversified consumption pattern based either on foreign imports or a complex domestic industrial sector. The latter cannot emerge with only a limited market. The industrial sector is limited by internal savings schedules, and the risk in investment plus it being capital intensive. For the mass of the population the price inflation produced by its expansion against limited capacity to import may lead to a reduction in real income. See Furtado, C. (1973) 'The Brazilian "model"', *Social and Economic Studies*, 22: 122-131.

of affairs is the scarcity of money, which raises the cost of money. Therefore moneylenders, middlemen and merchants increase their relative wealth through borrowing as a mortgage on the other. Thus these people manipulate the flow of money wealth, artificially create shortages in resources, encourage wild speculation, channel capital to selfish ends rather than national priorities, produce bottlenecks in production through financial constrictions, and cause inflation through artificially created money income, relative to national income. Such institutions purposefully alter the economic structure to the cost and detriment of any developing nation.

Given certain definite material conditions pointing not so much to absolute scarcity as to relative scarcity, we could then postulate as follows; the impossibility that a society in certain circumstances should grow beyond a certain limit without any change in the mode or the relations of production. That is to say, scarcity happens in the form of the discrete liquidation²¹ of non-producers in a given society (Satre, 1960, op.cit.: 149) according to certain rules, and also through the selection of under-nourished producers. This relative scarcity, which itself has an historical dialectic (an intelligible history), acquires, in class societies, the status of an institution. Satre argues that, in the context of scarcity, the differentiation of functions necessarily implies the constitution of a dispensable group and the formation, by this group, of a group of under-nourished producers. He states that there is a converse danger apparent to non-producers who fear their possible liquidation. They represent the absolute

²¹"Discrete liquidation" is a term I have adopted which is the concept Satre (1960) uses. I think Kampuchea and post-revolutionary China applied the term in its literal sense. Stalin's purges within Russia involved discrete liquidation of an imagined opposition consistent with the historical czarist tradition. All opposition to centralism posed a threat to overall stability and unity.

Other (living off the labour of Others) and interiorize the ambivalent condition due to their position that prompts them to behave towards individuals as if they were "Other" than man, or as if they alone were men in the midst of a different sub-human species (ibid.: 150). The sacrificial group's relation with Others is only describable as struggle. Let me quote from Satre (1960),

For even if violence is not used, such a group will be negated by everyone, that is by scarcity in everyone and it will reply by negating this negation - not, however at the level of praxis, but simply through that negation of negation which is need.

(loc.cit.)

Engels is partially correct when he believes that societies always have enough of what is necessary, given the instruments at their disposal and the needs which have become stratified in their organisms. It is rather the mode of production which, through the institutions that it conditions, produces the social scarcity of its product, that is to say, class inequality.²² In Marx, we see the direct co-operation of individuals around a mode of production which determines its conditions. But why must these direct transformations inevitably become antagonisms? Why should the social division of labour which is a positive differentiation be transformed into class struggle, that is, into a negative differentiation? Firstly, Marx postulates a negative reason in the inadequacy of knowledge and, therefore, of the productive forces which he makes vanish (Satre, op.cit.: 147). Secondly, he gives an entirely positive cause in the increase of the productive forces for an entirely negative event, namely the liquidation of surplus population by famine or emigration (in Satre, ibid.: 147-418). This is just

²²In Engels, F. and Marx, K. (1933) 'Communist manifesto' in Karl Marx, Selected Works, Vol.1.

the conclusion he wanted to reach, because the capitalist period possesses a mode of production that produces scarcity. An example would be the presence of a surplus population in a given society leading to an overall decrease of purchasing power, because it comes into contradiction with the relations of production. Marx and Engels thought that the proletariat would soon be in a position to re-absorb this social scarcity into a new society. Satre thinks that later on contradictions will arise in a socialist society owing to the gigantic struggle against scarcity (loc.cit.). It is this positive certainty which prevented Marx and Engels from emphasizing scarcity as a negative unity through matter in labour and man's struggles. And it was this same certainty which gave such uncertainty to Engels's reflections on violence.

The errors of the classical economists and of Dühring^{2 3} are exact opposites. The former, basically, believe in human nature. Man is placed in situations of scarcity - this is what defines the economy - and classical economics is an attempt to study his behaviour and the resulting relations between the objects of the economy. But it is assumed that man is what he is at the outset and that scarcity conditions him externally. Dühring, on the other hand, immediately attributed to man a capacity for violence and a will to use it which could only come from his enslaved will. We must criticize this point for violence is not necessarily an action. Engels, argued Satre, succeeded in showing that as an action it is absent from a great many processes.

^{2 3}Engels, F. (1934) Herr Eugen Dühring's Revolution in Science. Anti-Dühring. Moscow: Co-operative Publishing Society, USSR.

Interiorized scarcity, Satre (1966) believes, is the constant non-humanity of human conduct (op.cit.: 149). It is what makes people see each other as the Other and as the principle of Evil (ibid.). Thus the idea that the economy of scarcity is violence does not mean that there must be massacres, imprisonment or any visible use of force, or even any present project opposing it. It merely means that the relations of production are established and pursued in a climate of fear and mutual mistrust by individuals who are all ready to believe that the Other is an anti-human member of alien species. In other words, that the Other, whoever he may be, can always be seen as "the one who started it".

Encoding differentiation

As a general rule, we can assume that differentiation occurs in a society whose members always produce a little less than everyone needs. I would insist this is always so whatever the level of technique and demand generated. A choice in distribution is made by the dominant class concerning the constitution of an unproductive group. The subordinate group is either forced into accepting malnutrition or being selected as a surplus population to be eliminated. History has developed, through the differentiation of functions and sub-groups, within a humanity in which even today men literally die of hunger. So it is immediately obvious that administrative, managing and ruling groups are both the same as those they administer (insofar as the latter accept them) and other than them. For not only are they responsible for determining the Others in the group, that is, for choosing the victims of the new system of distribution;

but also, they are themselves the Others in the sense that they are completely dispensable, consuming without producing and constituting a pure threat for everybody.

On another level the colonial contacts we have established with other civilizations are due both to our real power and to the process of trickery and victimization. For example, the establishment by white colonial rulers of a language denoting metaphors of subjugation and inferiority was a deliberate attempt to eliminate any Melanesian dignity. We could call this colonial language game used by the whites a language of declamation.²⁴ This consists of apprehending another by trying to negate them whereas they apprehend us by assuming all along that we are affirming them. They seek to affirm us in the same way they think we are affirming them. When it confronts these other civilizations, all the power and force in our civilization lies in this principle of the negation of the Other. Because our system is based on the principle of integrating the Other with ourselves - an integration that may take the form of genocide or so-called policies of integration - we must necessarily and continually seek another to negate. By construction then - in a geometric sense - our being as individuals and as a civilization is in its essence a form of extension. In discussion here, we are considering the concept of "marginalization" of dependent groups, a process by which they are deprived of the opportunity to envisage higher goals or to participate effectively in decision making.²⁵ This argument is similar to the "centre-periphery"

²⁴Worsley, P. (1957) The Trumpet Shall Sound. A study of cargo cults in Melanesia. London: MacGibbon, pp.89-90.

²⁵Barraclough, S. L. and Domike, A. L. 'Agrarian structures in seven Latin American countries' in Stavenhagen, R. (ed.) (1970), 41-94; Land Economics 42 (1966): 391-424.

model that Furtado supports through his subscription to "dual economies". An alternative approach is to focus on unequal distributive mechanisms which in turn affect unequal spatial patterns arising from a single historical process.

Stavenhagen prefers to call this situation internal colonialism, or the sway held over the rest of society by "poles of growth".²⁵ He goes on to attack the "trickle down" or "modernization" thesis that progress will come about by the spread of industrial products into the backward, archaic and traditional areas, maintaining that progress has taken place at the expense of these areas. This leads him to dispute the view that national capitalism is interested in reform and development in the periphery, and that backwardness is an obstacle. We shall argue, the national bourgeoisie is concerned with its own development and has no interest in breaking the power of the landed oligarchy, for this oligarchy aids in the policy of internal colonialism which is designed to contribute to the status and wealth of the national western-style bureaucratic elites.

In two Indian examples, namely the South Indian villages of Dalena and Sripuram, there is a growing rift between sections of the populations giving rise to factionalism. In both, the small farmer is experiencing further marginalization as an inescapable accompaniment of "dependent development". In the case of the mirasdars or traditional owners there is growing an unproductive group whose modern displacement is encountered in the mapillai. The mapillai (in-laws) have chosen education over traditional customary obligations both to the land and to maintaining a protective clientele for workers. The mapillai then represent a class of intellectuals and commercial opportunists whose new allegiance is the city and yet who attempt to retain the privilege that goes with their former

²⁵Stavenhagen, R. (1966) Seven Erroneous Theses about Latin America in New University Thought. Detroit, 4, 4: 25-37.

traditional status.²⁶

In comparing the life-styles of three Indian villages, Wangala and Dalena (see Epstein, T., 1962), and Sripuram (Béteille, A., 1965), it is my intention to demonstrate how attitudes among Wangala's community result in an altogether different cognitive orientation from the communities of Dalena and Sripuram. Wangala accommodated itself to change without unsettling its own social structure, oriented to agriculture. In Dalena and Sripuram, agriculture declined in importance resulting in a mobile, consumerist population with shifting and dissolving social networks. Therefore, we must see in Dalena and Sripuram that there exists a mutual interest between city and rural district. In Wangala the peasant system²⁷ is based on symmetrical reciprocity in spite of the introduction of irrigation and some modern techniques. However, we see growing in Dalena and Sripuram an emerging class which commands respect because of education, bureaucratic experience, or factory or plantation work in a cash economy. Those who remain tied to the land experience negative reciprocity through traditional ties breaking down and exposing their asymmetrical position, which is itself based on exploitation, pursued in violence. Thus, a mobile, Western-educated elite, far from being progressive, enterprising and expanding, is tied to foreign consumption patterns whose internal productive efficiency is far superior to that of the under-developed country's own industries. There occurs no diffusion of development. Productive efficiency really only benefits a few. But this success is achieved at the

²⁶Béteille, A. (1965) Caste, Class and Power. Changing patterns of stratification in a Tanjore village. Berkeley: California University Press.

²⁷Epstein, S. T. (1962) Economic Development and Social Change in South India. A study in the economies of two villages. Manchester University Press.

the cost of eliminating a growing number of small farmers from the market, leading to further marginalization, proletarianization and exodus to the cities. These émigrés are a part of the system, but they prefigure in themselves the socially normative decision of administrators to arrange for these under-nourished people the least rewarding and most dependent niche. We are informed by Stavenhagen (1964, p.92) that governments in under-developed countries have failed in establishing a workable system of medium-sized family farms devoted to a rational diversified agriculture supplying the internal market. The impact of a cash economy has led to massive social upheaval and displacement from the land resulting in a rural exodus and urban hypertrophy (ibid.). What lies beneath this exodus is a relation of negation by "capital" of the traditional way of life in favour of producing a massively dependent consumer class.

A dual micro-economic study comparing the impact on village life of economic forces was undertaken by Epstein. According to Epstein, Wangala's traditional social system survives basically intact after changes in the regional economy. The main reasons for Epstein's terming Wangala's growth as unilineal are firstly the retention of traditional values (op.cit.: 188-189). She cited such factors as peasants preferring to remain agriculturalists due to a traditional system of patronage involving customary relationships. Most farmers regard the ownership of a plot of land with sufficient income combined with stability of family life to be their main priority. Secondly, the alternative economic opportunities open to Wangala are restricted. The acceptance by Wangala's untouchables that the high castes had priority in securing employment in Mandya's sugar factory or on the factory plantations curtailed any interest in external economies (op.cit.: 182). Indeed, according to Epstein, economic changes since irrigation have strengthened the ties between peasant farmers and their Untouchable clients. Peasant farmers have now a greater need for the services of their Untouchable

clients. Thirdly, the political representation of lower castes in the village panchayat was attempted by imposing external legislative reforms so as to undermine a dominant caste influence (op.cit.: 183). It appears to have failed. (See an important passage written by Durkheim.)²⁸

The economy of Dalena is more diverse than that of Wangala and this is shown in a greater range of income and expenditure. This allows the development of a divided and multi-levelled social structure, according to allowable opportunity and possible access to the distribution of wealth. Economic differentiation is facilitated through Dalena's being interlocked with the regional economy. With the continued expansion of external economies the specialization of functions is likely to become formalized. All those who can earn cash through contact with the wider economy tend to become more closely associated with the economic class appropriate to their occupation. For instance, factory workers show signs of forming one group distinct from contractors or traders. On the other hand, Wangala economic differentiation is based on landholding. Internal handing out of land parcelled to meet hereditary requirements means periodic re-organization of family holdings. In Wangala, sons are expected to stay as farmers, but expectations differ in Dalena. There, education and all that it implies refers, in the main, to change in the social fabric. Many young Dalena men used to become farmers. Today this does not eventuate because their interests have turned to a wider economy, and irrigation has entailed a change from customary subsistence

²⁸Durkheim, E. (1964) The Division of Labour in Society. Trans. by G. Simpson. N.Y.: Free Press, pp.396.

If the institution of classes or castes sometimes gives rise to unfortunate frictions instead of producing solidarity, this is because the distribution of social functions on which it rests does not correspond, or rather no longer corresponds, to the distribution of natural talents.

relationships into the cultivation of more productively diverse crops. In addition, people from Dalena hoard money for future investment. Kempegowda is the owner of a flour mill. Through judicious investment he expects to extend his outlay into a local sugar factory (op.cit.: 274). In Wangala struggle for prestige has led to heavy expenditure on weddings (ibid.: 273). As much as five percent of village cash income is utilized to purchase food, clothes and ornaments for weddings. In Dalena prestige rating by wedding expenditure is less important and consequently only two percent of village cash income is devoted to this item.

In Dalena what has emerged is an achievement motivated orientation that characterizes such an emphasis on entrepreneurial skills. Lingegowda, who is Kempegowda's eldest brother and the son of the village headman, shows remarkable ability. Being the oldest son, Lingegowda undertook a greater share in family responsibility. This fact opened up more contacts outside the village. Being the son of a headman he was in a privileged position with sufficient spare time away from cultivation activities. Lingegowda's ambition yielded a high return on ventures in which he invested.

In Dalena, if men wanted to diversify they had to take up opportunities on newly irrigated land in neighbouring villages or branch out into non-agricultural specialties. By contrast, Wangala men could increase their income by concentrating on the cultivation of their newly irrigated, more productive, wet lands (op.cit.: 247). Nowhere was as much initiative shown by Wangala's inhabitants as by Dalena's strongest faction. Also this competitiveness began to undermine customary life in Dalena. The difference between the two villages rests basically on the rejection of customary obligations binding Dalena's people together in favour of self-interest. A "laissez faire" and conflict oriented conception arose.²⁹

²⁹The three functional requisites of societies sociologists talk about are (contd)

Whereas irrigation brought a number of changes in Wangala, the dominant form of customary behaviour ensured that most people remained tied to the land. The headman's sons, Nanjgowda and Kempegowda, were members of the same lineage in Dalena. Eventually all gained control over production and ownership through moneylending. Whereas debt relationships in Wangala were hereditary, in the case of Nanjgowda loans are purely business transactions and they have no personal aspect (op.cit.: 249). Consequently, there exist few occasions which jointly serve to unite members. Sectional interests now outweigh joint interests. Epstein puts it thus,

Through their regular contact with the Administration in Mangya, they have learnt to manipulate the wider political system by calling on caste loyalty or by bribery. Thus the innovators are in a much better position to get things done when it comes to getting support from the Administration in Mangya (op.cit.: 288-289).

The headman and his sons in Dalena had influence with officials in the state and national governments. Through comparison of these three villages we are shown the extent of politico-economic interpenetration of village life. There is the acquisition of outside attitudes but there is also on the part of those strongly motivated the desire to participate through networks and adopt customary behaviours of those in higher positions. In a Northern Indian village of Govindapur, networks are developed by placing allies in local government. By this means the headman of Govindapur area

²⁹(contd.)

a system of communication, a system of production and lastly a system of distribution. In regard to resource distribution, I think the quotation of Parsons is apt because there must be sufficient numbers who accept a distributive norm for it to be viable, if it is to survive as an organization. As pointed out by Parsons (1951, 1967) in The Social System,

From the point of view of the functioning of the social system, it is not the needs of all the participant actors which must be met, nor all the needs of any one, but only a sufficient proportion for a sufficient fraction of the population.

Parsons, T. (1967) The Social System. A functional theory. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, pp.26-36.

controlled the agency distributing food and money to the destitute.³⁰ By manipulating the channels through which contacts distributed scarce goods the headman of Govindapur was able to gain considerable power and many followers.

A traditional view of change

The traditional relation between landlord and tenant tended to be permanent due to its customary character. Here the social relations were organized on the basis of a mutually affirmed notion of harmonious connections between allies or partners. Ties between two interdependent families which have been based on more than a purely economic component brings together people who define themselves as simply different from each other.

There have been three phases in the career of the old landowning class in Sripuram (Béteille, 1971, p.116). The first phase was one in which it was tied more or less firmly to the village and relations between landlords and tenants were of a fairly close and durable character. In the second phase, which commenced towards the beginning of this century, the old landowners began to look beyond the frontiers of rural society and many of them moved out, becoming absentee landlords. A third phase seems to have set in recently, in which the old landowning families, already much depleted, have become keenly aware of their insecure position and are gradually beginning to dispose of their land.

Having moved from the village the big absentee landlords, termed mirasdar, broadened their range of interests and therefore the hereditary ties and binding nature of customary obligations dissolved. Whereas in former times many of the mirasdar inherited land, today they have moved out in search of better education elsewhere. In order to retain ownership

³⁰Swartz, M. J. and Jordan, D. K. (1976) Anthropology. A perspective on humanity. Wiley, p.540.

in Sripuram and to have a say in local village affairs through the council or agraharam, as it is locally called, sons-in-law, termed mappillai, may (and do) represent the power and presence (by proxy) of the mirasdar (Béteille, 1971, p.115). However, the position of the mappillai in relation to the agraharam and to the peasants is weaker than that of a person who has been born and bred in the village and has his ancestral home there. The position of the mappillai is always a delicate one (op.cit.: 169).

The agraharam portrays a microcosm of the village. Today it lacks a well-organized and cohesive strategy. This has occurred through old families emigrating to cities, particularly Brahmin families who formed a homogeneous group wielding the different alliances into a unified purpose. Those who have supplanted the old families have neither the position nor the interest to supply Sripuram with the leadership which formerly existed. Furthermore, the mappillai signifies an ambiguous position due to his ambivalent attitude to the village. After all, the mappillai having attained a Western education, experienced urban life and worked in a bureaucratic set-up, carries important qualifications for leadership. Thus, when the mappillai first came to settle in the village, leaving his job at Madras, he was able to organize many things which would have been difficult for the traditional leaders of the agraharam to achieve (op.cit.: 171). With initiative and flair the mappillai introduced electricity and an improved access to Sripuram in a metalled road (ibid.). Indeed, the mappillai is sought after for advice relating to higher education, formal business transactions and a wide range of contacts.

In the agraharam the population has a rather shifting character, with many of the old notabilities leaving. They have been replaced by new persons who do not have proper roots in the village. In spite of being a relative outsider, the person most likely to establish some influence in the agraharam and in the village as a whole is often referred to as

mappillai, but he does not enjoy the same unequivocal support that the leaders of a generation ago did. When the mappillai first came to settle in Sripuram, his actions were delicately measured against the yardstick of tradition by the orthodox elders of the village. He dressed and carried himself in the manner of the city-bred man rather than the villager. People tried to draw him out in various ways and to make him declare his position in regard to rituals, tradition and Hinduism. Being an intelligent and tactful person, he provided answers which enabled him, at least to some extent, to make himself acceptable (op.cit.: 172). Conflicts in values which assume new criteria for competence and arise from situations outside the immediate Sripuram boundaries result in a certain amount of division. The conflict most prevalent which is indicative of changing styles is that between the separate attitudes implied by elder versus younger points of reference. Although the absence of a strong leadership within the agraharam does not lead to open or violent conflict, still there is a lack of strong and effective social control and organized collective action (op.cit.: 172-174).

Under the traditional system, Bêteille argues, the class system was largely subsumed under the caste system. This meant, in effect, that ownership and non-ownership of land, and relations within the system of production, were to a much greater extent associated with caste than is the case today (op.cit.: 191). The caste system has changed with the advent of westernization and secularization. The class system has undergone modification due to the extension of a cash economy and the private ownership of land. Some of the older families have left the village altogether, but the genealogical data Bêteille studied pointed to the fact that land is more widely available. Towards the beginning of this century, by contrast, mirasdar and Brahmin were almost synonymous, forming a homogenous entity at the top. This meant that the Brahmins

who were appointed by the ruling prince provided a couple of priests for the temple and domestic duties and the rest administered the land. Thus the agraharam was dominated by this caste.

Power bases emerge

Today, political power whether in the village or outside it is not as closely tied to land titles as it was in the past. New bases of power have emerged which have altered the relationship between class and caste. In former times power was attributable to the function of caste. Today, however, power is no longer a monopoly of any single caste in the village. It has to some extent detached itself from caste and seems to be connected to factional manipulation.

Indian village panchayats may be defined as councils which have in the past reached their decisions of seeking unanimity, sometimes prolonging their discussions to extreme lengths in order to find it.³¹ This liking for consensus is not confined to the traditional village councils of India. Some Indians, who work in councils which have constitutional provision for a majority vote, yet feel that this method is inferior to that of consensus (ibid.). Rather than the emphasis on the atomist individual of society, we in the West affirm, communities in India are organisms the parts of which are naturally adjusted to work in harmony with one another. We are led to believe everyone participates in decision-making and decisions are reached through consensus (op.cit.: 4). We are told that according to Bailey we have no means of knowing how consensus was reached in those days or on how many occasions it was not reached (loc.cit.). However

³¹Bailey, F. G. (1965) 'Decisions by consensus in councils and committees: with special reference to village and local government in India' in Banton, M. (ed.) Political Systems and the Distribution of Power. A.S.A. Monographs, Tavistock.

we do know from accounts of past writers that where traditional panchayats have been reported effective power has been said to be, or to have been until recently, in the hands of a dominant caste (op.cit.: 15). It has also often been reported that the energies of traditional panchayat members have gone largely into factional disputes, especially in villages where the dominant caste is numerically large in relation to other castes. These factional disputes have often caused total paralysis, and such panchayats have appeared as arenas where there is an endless disputation about decisions which are seldom taken and, if taken, rarely implemented (loc.cit.). Anyway, factions in the dominant caste have traditionally commanded an army of retainers and subordinate allies in inferior castes that constitute a weapon at the disposal of the faction leaders (ibid.: 16).

A typical case comes from the Bengal village of Govindapur where separate factions continue to be distinct from one another even when they are in alliance. The fundamental reason for this is that two faction leaders can never have identical interests because resources are scarce.³² Men powerful enough to be faction leaders, according to Nicholas, are always potentially in conflict (loc.cit.). Factions appear as groups (or perhaps better, as quasi-groups) only during conflict (ibid.: 44). But, curiously, there are instances of factions co-operating with one another of factional 'coalitions' or 'alliances'. Within Govindapur, competition

³²Nicholas, R. W. (1965) 'Factions: A comparative analysis' in Banton, M. (ed.) Political Systems and the Distribution of Power. A.S.A. Monographs, Tavistock.

within the dominant caste is expected and expressed in a way of life. Govindapur political leaders tend to convert their 'private power' such as control over share-croppers, debtors, kinsmen, neighbours and so on into public, political power in the form of votes (ibid.: 45). In conclusion, then, factions may be seen moving from alliance to opposition and factions are not subject to losing their separate identities in an alliance.

That underprivileged factions in Govindapur have seen benefits going to the wealthy means consensus is now less readily achieved in the village panchayat. Consensus no longer hides the inequalities and injustice of the system.

For Sripuram the popular leaders of the village today are not necessarily big landowners (Béteille, op.cit.: 200). The panchayat president who is a key figure in village politics owns some land, but this is not his principal source of power. We have previously had conveyed to us how his power depends upon a plurality of factors, among which his contacts with politicians and party bosses outside the village and his position in an elaborate system of patronage are important (ibid.).

Villagers are now taking part in the affairs of local government, and political parties. Political networks link the individual villager to people occupying a variety of social positions both within and outside the village. They inter-connect village leaders, district leaders, party bosses, members of the Legislative Assembly, financiers and government officials.³³

³³It is interesting to see Worsley and Furnivall note that it is the word "rule" say, in Africa, which is operative. They argue that the formal power of the state was thin on the ground and ill-financed. In this setting, the liberal doctrine of minimal government could take root and also flower into "indirect rule". Worsley (1964) argues that

As a result of modernization, the agricultural labourer feels that there is no security. Changing ownership patterns and the break-up of family holdings and fragmentation of units combined with the mirasdar's failure to meet his traditional obligations to tenants, artisans and servicing groups, particularly during the festivals Deepavali and Pongal, results in his failure to distribute necessary goods (op.cit.: 201). The breakdown in the normal distributive and communicative channels has been so complete that there is no recognizable procedure to maintain fair and equitable practices. Tenant demands are changing, beginning with a repudiation of the Brahminic domination, and this is reflected in the changing and fluid nature of the agraharam. Factions are changing their composition more rapidly and so they are flexible in membership because of their ability to work for different goals as these become available. Caste groups, also corporate entities, join factions in order to be effective and they remain together in more or less permanent fashion to gain a common goal, usually aimed at raising their standing in the social hierarchy. A tenant often has a plurality of roles and his attitude is shaped by a delicate perceptual balance between specific personal interests (Béteille, op.cit.: 207).

The agricultural labourer has been tied for generations to a particular way of life, and he does not normally fix his aspirations beyond a certain level. A secure and stable source of livelihood for himself and his family is his immediate objective. As he

³³(contd.)

this tradition of government never became entirely dehumanized. However, Worsley fails to see the insidious and pernicious doctrines in laissez-faire capitalism which necessitated a solid political framework within which peasant surpluses could be acquired as a bulwark that would serve to maintain a class administrative structure. See Worsley, P. (1964) The Third World. London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, pp.41-42.

generally sees it, the best and most obvious way of achieving this is by acquiring a lease through the favour of some mirasdar. The idea of patronage, as an exchange of favour for service, is an important legacy of the traditional system. The thought of organizing political action does not come easily to the landless labourer, particularly if he happens to be of the older generation (ibid.). Essentially then, given the total amount of resources, more dominant corporate groups want to hold onto their superior position, and they do so in conflict with other competing factions.

Due to the changing circumstances surrounding decision-making within Indian society, the village panchayat has become the focus for ascertaining the various strengths of factions. The panchayati raj in Rajasthan has led to a disproportionate representation of the high castes and the richest landlords.³⁴ The function of the mappillai role can, in fact, lead to the over-representation of an absentee class whose urban interests take priority. We must conclude that projected changes carry an urbanized agenda which neglects the essential factors behind the peasant villager's intention and cognitive orientation.³⁵ The villager tied to the land, therefore, repudiates any proposed urban incursion, either in the form of planning or development schemes, because there is no agreed concept of sharing the benefits. The peasant mistrusts an acquisitive urban sector.

³⁴Potter, D. C. (1964) Government in Rural India. Bell, pp.53-54.

³⁵See Bailey, F. G. (1966) 'The peasant view of the bad life', Advancement of Science, December. Bailey states that effective agricultural planning must recognize and bridge the gap between the peasants' varying mixture of goals (status, income, security), and the planning maximand (value added in agriculture).

The small farmer has no reason to regard the programmes administered from outside the village as worthwhile. Poor farmers are too concerned with risk to behave as simple profit maximizers. For the Indian peasant caste has provided social order, and cohesion in the sense that such order is accepted. In the case of single caste factions an element of social security has been provided. The peasants' attachment to outmoded agricultural practices also merely reflects a disguised insurance policy. Such ideas as hoarding, bartering and other traditional practices such as the persistence with customary techniques of animal husbandry is consistent with a cautious but workable pattern. If peasants were to repudiate their recognition of each other based on mutual interdependence, it would be the case that such a change in cognitive orientation reflected their avowed belief in gaining some advantageous position.

Thus continued allegiance to a Brahmanical concept is understandable because the who-whom of power, custom and respect continues to survive due to the system's guaranteeing certainty insofar as the provision of perceived wants occurs. At every level there arose in the need to contribute to the overall system a pervasive understanding of specialization and its accompanying characteristic of hierarchy. On two accounts, the system of inequality continues because the powerful have resources that bind the poor and because Hinduism comforts the poor and weak with an optimistic future. Attitudes of rural people then do affect the allocation of resources, and the eventual type of usage (or non-usage).

In conclusion then, it may be more sensible to rethink development strategies. The idea pertaining to the optimal allocation of scarce resources between competing factions glosses over the fact that peasants set their own cognitive standard. If the actual technologies and

economies of scale do not fit the peasant cognitive orientation then continued enforcement through education of the capitalist "high roader" ethic emanates purely from extrinsic prejudice and unawareness of the peasant viewpoint. In fact, more micro-level village studies would point out the discrepancy between village belief-structures and the acquisitive philosophy of those who seek to change (and exploit) the Other. Any technology then must take account of peasant requirements and work within a differently conceived framework. Peasants seek control in that they desire to successfully reconstitute a more authentic way of living for their community, somehow recognizable by them as their own. Any pattern of life must contain belief in an efficaciously just order.

CHAPTER 5 COERCION, BY WHOM?

Abstract

Policy can be considered as 'a set of actions that lead to the adoption of particular aims and to state the means by which these aims can be achieved, including the provision of resources to do so'. Public can be expressed as 'that which needs to be known for effective policy to achieve the public interest'. In other words, policy provides guidelines to action; it is a narrowing of the range of choice of actions that may be taken in a given circumstance. But of more importance is the requirement that policy must satisfy the needs of society. This basic requirement that some criteria be developed by which one can judge whether or not these needs are satisfied. The public interest (and the institutions involved in satisfying it) provides the only real criterion on which public policy can be evaluated.

While no scholarly consensus exists as to what the public interest is, the concept undoubtedly plays a central and pervasive role in discussions of public policy. It is used to express evaluation of policies. In a general sense public interest simply means that which is of interest to the public or that which is a public area of concern - policy decisions taken by government.

Public policy involves the deliberate choice of collective goals and the implementation of public decisions. When enacted, such decisions are considered authoritatively binding upon all members of society. The political system is the vehicle for enacting these decisions. But while policies are made in the hope and expectation that the human condition can be altered in some predictable and desirable direction, they always exist within the context of the countervailing forces (be they political, economic, legal etc.) in society. In

most modern states the demand for reform is a never-ending process, policies reflect the interests of a section of citizens in some way, and more importantly, it is very difficult to confine the area of policy concern. An endless stream of demands may be made and it is the endless responsibility of the government to respond to those demands. Because anything may be brought to bear on a particular situation, bargaining for advantage becomes the salient aspect of the policy-making process. What people want most from public policies are conditions that improve their security, and their contentment at achieving this end-state which is the object of the struggle.

Macro-system and the State

Governments, employers and other organizations make decisions that regulate the lives of people. No organization acts in a vacuum. Each regulatory function circumscribes sectors of authority and responsibility. However, each sector is developing at a different rate. An effect on social relations is found in structural unemployment, particularly within developing countries. Inevitably disputes arise because there is a marked difference in growth rates which upsets any reasonable relativity. Furthermore, any share in overall wealth is circumscribed by dominant classes. Indeed, the conservative reaction on the part of South American landed elites is one where they have sought to institutionalize sacrosanct relativities. However, a revolution has occurred with accelerating technological and social change and the balance between sectors such as the State, peasants, financiers, development agencies and so forth has given rise to cleavages between various levels resulting in added conflict.

Moreover, political factors have determined the economic priorities given by the State, in this case defined as the macro-system. An

intelligible description requires more than an analysis of the internal dynamics comprising a situation. The nature of the macro-system provides the parameters for the situation. Any analysis, then, must account for the relationship between a micro-system and the macro-system.¹

It seems that the availability of charismatic, or at least solidarity-inspiring, leadership among peasants is highly important in getting an organization to the point where it may confront the elites who, in principle, embody that macro-system. However, Huizer (1976) argues that the predominant view among theorists and development experts is that the peasants' "resistance to change" portrays apathy and fatalism.

Peasant cognition

Foster, after much fieldwork in the Municipality of Tzintzuntzan in the State of Michoacán, Mexico, explains that peasant behaviour (especially resistance to change) can be best understood as being in accordance with a cognitive orientation based on the peasant's own perceived scarcity. Anyone who tries to take more than his appropriate share of this "limited good" is scorned and criticized.² Hence, an apparent relative improvement in someone's position in respect of any "good" is viewed as a threat to the entire community. The predominant cognitive orientation subscribed to by peasants forbids any improvement, perceived to be a threat to all individuals and families (op.cit.: 297).

¹Salisbury, R. F. (1976) 'The anthropologist as societal ombudsman' in Pitt, D. (ed.) Development from Below. Anthropologists of development situations. The Hague: Mouton.

²Foster, G. (1965) 'Peasant society and the image of the limited good', American Anthropologist, 67 (2): 293-315.

To the peasant perception the total amount of wealth available is finite (ibid.). Foster stresses (op.cit.: 296) that the peasant sees his existence as determined and limited by the natural and social resources of his micro-system.

A different view is held by Wolf³ where he views the peasant household as conscious of the precarious circumstances surrounding the accumulation of wealth. "The successful household realises in looking at its less successful neighbour that often no more than change - 'the grace of God' - has made for any success" (op.cit.: 80). Peasant households tend to increase their security by widening their resources in goods and people. They must also retain autonomy to guard their own survival. To maintain a livelihood, peasants enter alliances in the form of coalitions so as to defend themselves. Hence, such coalitions will strongly resist forces which strive to unravel the social ties which bind people together (op.cit.: 81). In the Chinese village we discover a range of domestic groups ranging from nuclear to extended families. Wolf supports this view by demonstrating that wealth was a prerequisite for the maintenance of the extended family. Using the Chinese as an example, Wolf shows that as families become wealthy in resources and extended in social composition, they also form a coalition called a tsu or clan. This coalition was activated by invoking the principle of common descent through a set of male ancestors (op.cit.: 88). In short, the idea of an extended family meant that the production of wealth required careful regulation.

The concept of the image of the limited good is presented as a reason for the reluctance of peasants to get ahead individually or

³Wolf, E. (1966) Peasants. Prentice-Hall.

to show more initiative and entrepreneurial spirit than their neighbours.

The peasants also exhibited a variety of other behaviours which

... have been suggested as adversely influencing economic growth ... the 'luck' syndrome, a 'fatalistic' outlook, inter- and intrafamilial quarrels, difficulties in co-operation, extraordinary ritual expenses by poor people and the problems these pose for capital accumulation, and the apparent lack of what the psychologist McClelland has called 'Need for Achievement'.

(Foster, op.cit.: 67)

In his reports, Foster gives little attention to the fact that the State of Michoacán has been strongly touched by the Mexican Revolution, and particularly by the agrarian struggle and its aftermath. This struggle went on for years at the cost of many lives, but Foster refers only to the efforts of the clergy to intimidate and discourage peasant participation in the agrarian reform. He does not describe this struggle or analyse its effects on the peasants' attitudes.

Some of the facts are available in studies carried out by others in the Tzintzuntzan area. Calderon Caballero, for example, in a study of the village of Cucuchucho in the Municipality of Tzintzuntzan, presents some data on the agrarian movement that failed in that locality because of strong opposition from the traditional hacienda interests.⁴ In 1935, Nemesio de la Cruz and twenty-four other villagers started proceedings to obtain land according to the land reform law and denounced the existence of unused lands on the hacienda Santiaguito. Since the cristeros (anti-reform bands often led by priests and armed by the landlords) were strong in the area, the community asked for military protection. The peasants themselves

⁴Cited by Huizer, G. (1970) 'The image of the limited good; theories on peasant resistance to change', Human Organization, 29: 313-314.

soon received arms, although they had not yet received land. De la Cruz was attacked when the agrarian petition was officially taken under consideration and an engineer had come to measure the land. He defended himself; but, through legal intrigues and paid witnesses, he was accused of assault and sentenced to five years in prison in an attempt to intimidate the "agrarianists". He was imprisoned in Morelia, far away from his followers, rather than in the local gaol of Pátzcuaro. Threats of excommunication added to other threats resulted in the ultimate dissolution of the petitioning group which signed a declaration to renounce its agrarian activities. After Nemesio left prison, life was made impossible for him in Cucuchucho. He worked for a while in Pátzcuaro and later went as a migrant worker, or bracero, to the United States. Cucuchucho is still known for its conservative and distrustful attitudes, and the fascist-inspired sinarquista movement which started in rural Mexico in the late 1930s has had a strong impact in the village.

What image of the limited good?

The communities where the image of the limited good prevailed, Huizer argues, "suffered severe physical and spiritual repression from a combination of the landed elite and the religious authorities" (Huizer, op.cit.: 304). In fact, Wolf (op.cit.: 93) argues that the success of the Mexican Revolution appeared to lie less in its efforts at land reform than in its attempts to break open the Indian corporate communities. In effect, this diminished the autonomy of the micro-system and effected a hook-up between the political

organizers in the village. To support this point, Wolf argues⁵ that the Spanish colonists in Mexico increasingly wrested control of the crucial economic and political relationships from the hands of the royal bureaucracy. Most significantly, they developed their own labour force, in contravention of royal command and independently of the Indian communities. They bought Indian and Negro slaves. Also they attracted to their embryonic enterprises poor whites who had come off second-best in the distribution of conquered riches. These landed elites furnished asylum to Indians who were willing to pay the price of acculturation and personal obligation to a Spanish entrepreneur for freedom from the increasingly narrow life of the encysting Indian communities. By the end of the eighteenth century the colonist enterprises had achieved substantial independence from the Crown in most economic, political, legal and even military matters (op.cit.: 55). Power thus passed from the hands of the Crown into the hands of the local rulers who interposed themselves effectively between nation and community. Effective power to enforce political and economic decisions contrary to the interest of these power holders was not returned to the national level until the advent of the Mexican Revolution of 1910.

Alongside the Indian villages and the entrepreneurial communities located near haciendas, commercial plantations, mines or mills, there developed loosely structured settlements of casual workers, farmers, middlemen and "lumpenproletarians" who had no legal place in the colonial order. Colonial records tended to ignore them unless they came into overt conflict with the law. The very marginality

⁵Wolf, E. (1971) 'Aspects of group relations in a complex society: Mexico' in Shanin, T. (ed.) Peasants and Peasant Societies: Modern Sociology Readings. P.54.

of their origins and social position forced them to develop patterns of behaviour adapted to a life unstructured by the law. The hacienda proved admirably suited to the purposes of the colonists, who strove for greater autonomy, and a greater conservatism towards peasants, vis-à-vis the State. In short, the operation of the hacienda permitted control over a resident labour force. From the beginning it served commercial ends (op.cit.: 56). Its principal function was to convert community-oriented peasants into a disciplined labour force able to produce cash crops for a supra-community market. What the workers accomplished was security through abdicating personal autonomy, and communal solidarity.

The Mexican Revolution of 1910 was the result of a political contradiction between the State and the self-limiting economic system promoted by the hacienda with its conservative orientation preventing geographic and economic expansion. The end of debt bondage, for example, permitted or forced large numbers of people to leave their local communities. On this point, Wolf finally argues that hacienda blocked the channels of social and cultural mobility and communication from nation to community (op.cit.: 59).

Restriction on peasant upward mobility revealed structures to them indicative of exploitative relations. An oppressive ideology was culturally enforced by external agencies who imposed a violent programme. Huizer coins the term "culture of repression" (Huizer, G., 1970, p.308). Repression is a dynamic factor, something imposed upon the peasantry. "Resistance to change" is conditioned by those who have power over the peasants (op.cit.: 309). The mutual distrust existing among peasants is induced by their vertical relationship, expressed in violence imposed by the status quo (op.cit.: 311).

In short, the culture of repression may also be labelled "the violence of landlords" (op.cit.: 314). Landlord violence masks peasant rebelliousness causing the peasants to turn inward, resulting in frustration. The rich and the landed elites jealously guard their own prerogatives which they have promulgated to enforce peasant subservience. The "limited good" image among landlords accounts for their resistance to change because they fear making concessions in respect of conceding their privileges and prerogatives (op.cit.: 309). Seen from a different angle the limited good view, if it applies at all, applies to a culture of repression (op.cit.: 313).

Peasant self-reliance, a motivation

Peasants may opt to lessen their dependence on the larger society. Related to this common purpose to maintain a steady state by decreasing expenditures is the effort to institutionalize poverty.⁶ Wolf calls this "tightening up" a "cult of poverty". With a decline in outlays on goods, members from the peasant household increase their own productivity. The family thus acquires special importance. Such a productive unit does not equate its labour value with outside monetary values. Labour is not converted to a commodity value. No money changes hands within the family. It acts as a unit of consumption and it can cut its consumption as a unit. The family, according to Wolf, is the ideal unit for restricting consumption. Lack of money resources required that sales and purchases in the market would be small. Wolf gives us an example from the people in Manicaboa who were acquainted with the notion that cash crop

⁶From Wolf, E. (1955) 'Types of Latin American peasantry: A preliminary discussion', American Anthropologist, 57: 452-471.

commodities could be exchanged for goods they needed.⁷ From this it was but a short step to the acceptance of a system of credit in which they pledged their cash crop production in the future for commodities received now. We are told that the peasants did not understand how interest payments worked. Most peasants believed in the binding quality of the spoken word and the force of customary law. The creditor merchants who dominated the coffee industry in the second half of the nineteenth century, however, belonged to a new and different culture. Most of them were Spaniards who had learned the notion of interest in their home country.

Many peasants lost their holdings in Manicabo. To the peasants who realized what credit meant to them and grasped its consequences in terms of capitalist economics it meant one of two things. If they became coffee producers, they could only compete with the growing hacienda system as long as they performed the operations of production and processing by hand. This meant an intensification of labour and a closer marshalling of the available resources of family labour. It also meant a curtailing of their standards of consumption. On the other hand, the opportunity of balancing their ownership of land with wage labour on the hacienda meant that extra goods could be obtained through contributing labour-value elsewhere (op.cit.: 177). The credit system meant restricted consumption for many and wage labour for others. Foster even points to this fact when he mentions that the highland village markets in Mexico are similar

⁷Wolf, E. (1969) 'The hacienda system and agricultural classes in San Jose, Puerto Rico' in Béteille, A. Social Inequality. Penguin Modern Sociology Readings, p.176.

to groups with low incomes which can only buy a little at a time.⁸ Resistance to outside forces or submergence by them resulted in the development of underdevelopment. Furthermore, peasants have traditionally perceived a threat from outside, consequently turning inward in order to rely on their own meagre resources - an encogido syndrome. Peasant vulnerability has led to a feeling of powerlessness and to withdrawal (Huizer, op.cit.: 319). Indeed, the peasant feeling of resentment tends to be masked by landlord measures harshly enforced from outside, in respect to concealing any rebelliousness. Notwithstanding this fact, the innate predisposition of peasants to organize in the face of attrition should be noted.

Peasant mobility

We can expect various factors of production and the activities carried on within the peasant household, when stripped of any customary behaviours, to have been a response to external forces. Wolf (1966, p.82) points to three conditions. Firstly, it could happen when the old order weakens, and individual families' control of goods declines and thus they fulfil their obligations. Peasants may enter into new ties with outside. Second, it could happen where autonomous households were set up leading to new relationships with middlemen or employers. Third, it could happen when network markets penetrate into a peasant community and transform social relations into commodity relations. Under such circumstances, we could find many-stranded ties with economic or political middlemen and overlords.

⁸Foster, G. (1948) Empire's Children: The People of Tzintzuntzan. Mexico City: Smithsonian Institute of Social Anthropology, Publ.6, p.154.

We agree with Wolf's⁹ argument that sustained peasant mobilization is not achievable in a situation of complete impotence. Peasants need some form of leverage which does not lie in depending for their livelihood on the landlords. Thus, poor peasants and landless labourers are unlikely to pursue a course of rebellion, unless they are able to rely on some external power to challenge the power which constrains them. Such external power is represented in the Mexican case by the action of the Constitutionalist Army in Yucatan which liberated the peons from debt bondage "from above"; by the collapse of the Russian Army in 1917 and the reflux of the peasant soldiery, arms in hand, into the villages; and by the creation of the Chinese Red Army as an instrument designed to break up landlord power in the villages. In conclusion then, where such external power is present the poor peasant and the landless labourers have latitude of movement; where it is absent, they are under near complete restraint. It is the rich peasant whose role becomes vital in securing rebellion.

Peasant discontent

For Wolf there are two components of the peasantry which possess sufficient internal leverage to enter into sustained rebellion. These are the landowning "middle peasantry" or a peasantry located in a peripheral area outside the domains of landlord control. Should peasant land and resources be under minimal control of landlords then the degree to which this is operable leaves room for political manoeuvre. The same, however, holds for a peasantry poor of "middle",

⁹Wolf, E. (1969) 'On peasant rebellions', International Social Science Journal, 21.

whose settlements are only marginally controlled from outside. Here landholdings may be insufficient for the support of the peasant household. Subsidiary activities such as casual labour, smuggling, livestock raising - not under the direct control of an external power domain - supplement land in sufficient quantity to grant the peasantry some latitude of movement. Wolf (1969) cites examples of a tactically mobile peasantry in the communes of the central agricultural regions of Russia; in the villages of Morelos in Mexico; in the northern bastion created by the Chinese Communists after the Long March; among the Fellahin of Algeria and so forth.

Yet this recruitment of a "tactically mobile peasantry" among the middle peasants and the "free" peasants of peripheral areas poses a curious paradox. We are informed that it is this conservative stratum which is the most instrumental in dynamiting peasant unrest. This paradox dissolves, however, when we consider that it is also the middle peasant who is relatively the most vulnerable to economic changes wrought by commercialism, while his social relations remain encased within the traditional design. Peasants in this context face a precarious existence. They may be threatened by landlord rivalry, changing market trends, growing population, falling prices, and uncertain environmental forces. It is this stratum which is most conservatively oriented as a defensive measure. Middle peasants suffer the most when their normative patterns are upset. Naturally, these incumbents react in distrust to any predatory incursion, by such agencies as tax collectors, landlords and development experts.

The essential relationship is 'dependence'

We must then recognize that the issue of dependence on the macro-system can be recast to express the fundamental appendage to the State apparatus that middle peasants represent. If the poor peasant goes to the city, then the shifting nature of such relationships precludes any of the previous absolute ties to a rigidly circumscribed traditional community. The middle peasant is caught in a situation in which one part of his family retains a footing in agriculture while the other undergoes an urban training. This makes the middle peasant a transmitter also of urban unrest and political ideas. In conclusion then, the aggressive and ambitious entry of peasants into the macro-system is due to forces undermining the peasant community's internal fabric which in turn create social conditions for upheaval. Peasant displays of entron express such an entrepreneurial drive, culminating in notable rebellious outbursts, and a cathartic displacement of tensions building up over time. Such vigorous explosions by organized labour serve to burst asunder social forces that have historically constrained and burdened the peasantry with inequitable fiats. Peasant anarchism and an apocalyptic vision repudiating the constrictive impositions from outside make for a collective peasant aspiration to join in alliances. The cognitive orientation of the radical broker provides the ideological fuel that drives the rebellious peasantry.¹⁰ Contrary to Erasmus's position, which entails our viewing peasant entron displays - and their inducement -

¹⁰"Drive" may be alternatively defined as entron, cf. footnote 11.

as invitations to investment in, and submission to, a wage economy, we know otherwise.¹¹ Most peasants reject overtures, both explicit and implicit, that mean capitalist exploitation! The spread of the market has torn men up by their roots, and shaken them loose from the social relationships into which they were born! Industrialization has given rise to new social clusters, as yet unsure of their own social positions.

Peasant rebellion

In the Mexican Revolution which started in 1910, the peasantry played a crucial role. This should be seen as a reaction to the usurpations of communal lands by large haciendas.¹² This took place in the second half of the nineteenth century. Many indigenous communities tried in vain to retain or recover the communal lands from which they had been displaced under new legislation favourable to private property. The haciendas had expanded considerably at the expense of the communities. As a result, in 1910 the peasantry was ready to answer the call to armed revolution.

One of the most outstanding peasant leaders was Emiliano Zapata, the son of a small farmer who had lost his land because of despoliation by the local hacienda. Zapata was elected president of the committee of his village, Anenequilco, in the State of Morelos, which was attempting recovery of the lost lands. This took place shortly after Zapata

¹¹See Erasmus, C. (1970) A Reply in Human Organisation, 29, op.cit.: 315.

¹²In Huizer, G. (1976) 'The strategy of peasant mobilisation: Some cases from Latin America and South East Asia' in Pitt, D. (ed.) Development from Below. Anthropologists and development situations. The Hague: Mouton.

had returned from a period of forced military service and work with a hacendado in Mexico, work imposed on him as a kind of punishment for his rebellious attitude. During this period, Zapata gained experience and insight that served him later as a peasant leader.

Three villages in the district combined under Zapata and hired a lawyer to defend their rights against the claims of the large haciendas. After legal means proved ineffective, the peasants took the law into their own hands combining their energies into a revolutionary movement in 1910.

Insurrection was inevitable because the President of Mexico paid lip service to their demands. Zapata formulated his own plan in November 1911. The plan demanded radical land reform measures. In accordance with this programme, Zapata distributed land to the peasants in the areas that fell under the control of his troops. A minor concession to Zapata's position was made by Mexico's President Carranza to peasant rights. However, nothing substantively materialized. Meanwhile, Zapata spread his influence by instituting land distribution programmes.

Organizing and bargaining

By organizing and bringing pressures to bear on central government, Zapata's principles were incorporated into the Mexican Constitution in 1917. In spite of this official acceptance, however, effective distribution of lands took place in those areas where peasants were well organized and heavily armed. Arms were needed because the opposition of the landlords to agrarian reform took violent forms. In 1919, Zapata was assassinated by a man who was in league with the government and the landlords.

From the foregoing discussion, it seems that those peasants who were relatively better off were most apt to participate as leaders or a vanguard in the initiation of a movement. They were a little less dependent on the landlords or rich farmers, and could thus afford to take more risks. For this reason, the peasant leagues in Brazil purposely focused on relatively independent small landholders. Only after the initial groundwork had been laid did the organizers attempt to attract the mass of landless peasants after a start had been made and some strength gained. Alavi¹³ noted a similar trend in China from the twenties onwards and in some of the peasant movements in India. Similarly, Wolf (1969) pointed out that leadership came from a group of peasants who were somewhat better off.

The emergent "middle" peasantry

In conclusion, then, it is not so much the "middle class" peasant as such who was in the vanguard of peasant protest movements, but rather those among the "middle class" who, for some reason, felt their relative security threatened. These mobile peasantries in their frustration perceived constraints placed on them by elites who precipitated provisional and capricious social structures. Protests against unjust fiats meant that some peasants wanted to decide for themselves, rather than undergo repression. My approach has focused on the dynamic forces at work. Destabilizing tendencies located in various conflicts between groups have given rise to a changing and fluid composition from different levels. New exigencies have arisen according to the unique and specific characteristics underlying the

¹³Alavi, H. (1965) 'Peasants and revolution', The Socialist Register: 241-277.

articulation between cross-currents of ideas, which express centrifugal forces operating across a variegated contextual pattern.

We should mention two important points at this stage. The legislative means enforced on behalf of elites mainly avoids the initial causes of peasant resentment. Laws framed which aim to contain mobilization trends result in greater pressure applied against existing structures and merely serve to obstruct and mask peasant resentment. Such laws deal with the effect rather than the cause of peasant rebelliousness. By delaying reform, those in power merely submerge the initial cause and complicate the issues. In all this, I have tried to demonstrate the truth that law is a technique for the regulation of social power. The principal purpose of laws is to precipitate an obstruction in blocking people's aspiration to improve their circumstances. It enables regulation and restraint to set in, and to routinize heavy restrictions already imposed.

Foster's value orientation focuses on the peasants' resistance to change superimposing the characteristics of a cognitive style which is alien. An argument of Pitt (1976) points out that, for the achievement oriented development expert, the loss of indigenous identity is an important prelude to their becoming wealthier and more developed.¹⁴ While on this issue, the quality of that change is disconcerting to those whose cognitive orientation does not emphasize a similar achievement orientation. Foster disguises his affiliations and produces a distorted orientation by alleging that peasants' cognitive resistance to capital intensive schemes is unsound when

¹⁴Pitt, D. (1976) Development from Below. The Hague: Mouton, p.16.

we know that that basis is mistrust. The question put, then, suggests that peasants may be achievement motivated according to a different social set than Foster has put forward. Whose "interests", then, do theorists and developers predominantly serve?

A Marxian critique

According to Marxian theory, capital is the wealth produced by the workers but expropriated from them by politico-legal devices. To put it differently, the worker produces "value" but he is paid not the full amount he has produced, only a part - the minimum necessary to guarantee his return to the same work on the next day. The value he produced but did not receive, that value which was appropriated (stolen, would be the better word) is the source of all capital. "Capital," said Marx, "is but yesterday's frozen or dead labour."¹⁵ This is true whether the capital is represented by money, machinery, factories or anything else. Accumulated capital, arising from the exploitation of workers yesterday, perpetuates the enslavement of the living workers today.

But there is one question on which we must be clear if we are to understand the workings of capitalism. At what stage is wealth created? The capitalist convinces himself that it is he who has created wealth, capital, when he sells an article for more than it cost him to produce. But in actual fact, wealth is not created at the time a commodity is sold but when it is produced. It is true that it is only when he sells an article and gets paid for it that the capitalist can lay his hands on the excess

¹⁵Cited in Greene, F. (1970) The Enemy. What every American should know about imperialism. N.Y.: Vintage, p.56.

value - that portion that was not paid to the worker. But this value was already contained in the product itself before it was marketed. The real issue is not whether the accumulation of capital is "wrong", for capital is an essential element of progress. Vital then is who owns it, who controls it, and for whose benefit it is to be used (op.cit.: 57). Erasmus¹⁶ ignores this point in his conjectures on the relationship between capital and its role in generating through the multiplier effect a collectivized form of development. Erasmus writes,

As the middle sector expands, it absorbs the depressed, under privileged masses and diminishes the power of hereditary wealth.

He goes on, "... an expanding number of durable goods and emulative behaviour accompanies their acquisition" (op.cit.: 315).

As we can see, this model is ethnocentric and employs the concept of rational "economic man", manifestly expressive in its cognitive orientation. An example illustrating the obvious bias ignored in Erasmus's assumptions is given by Greene (1970), where he gives an account of post-civil war America dominated by the northern industrialists. Here, Greene argues that the industrialists wanted slaves to be free not because they were against slavery as such, but because they were dependent on an ever-expanding pool of propertyless and unorganized labour. Cheap labour tied to the plantations in the south was no help to them. They wanted the slaves released to expand the "free" exploitable labour market (op.cit.: 70). Moreover, we are told that American

¹⁶Cited in Human Organisation, 29 (4), Winter 1970: 315.

industry benefited enormously from the huge pool of unpropertied and unorganized labour that became available (op.cit.: 73).

We have discussed the Morelos province of Mexico where every effort was made to prevent the workers from mobilizing their collective power. Unions were illegal. Strikes were forbidden and when they occurred were often forcibly ended by military action. Those attempting to organize the workers were arrested and imprisoned. In Bolivia, the area surrounding the Santa Clara Monastery proved to be a similar case in point. The monastery had leased some of its land to large local landholders, and the lease included the right to the labour of the resident peasants.¹⁷ The peasants, in turn, decided to organize a union to rent the land themselves from the Santa Clara Monastery, and thus avoid the onerous obligation of working for the landholders. Their efforts met with strong opposition from various local landowners who saw in them a direct threat to their traditional rule. Ultimately the landholders bought the land from the monastery and evicted the peasant families who had been living and working there for years, destroying their homes and forcing them to leave the area or revert to serfdom (ibid.). Another example happened in La Convención valley of Peru (op.cit.: 227). The arrendires (peasants of the valley) had to render services and a certain number of days of unpaid agricultural work for the landlord in return for a plot of virgin land. When the virgin land was cleared and began to produce a yield, the landlords increased their demands. Their intransigence made it easy for radical leadership

¹⁷Cited in Huizer, G. (1976) 'The strategy of peasant mobilisation: Some cases from Latin America and South East Asia' in Pitt, D. (ed.) Development from Below. The Hague: Mouton, p.226.

to develop. Huizer (1970) argues that the culture of repression can become the starting point for a peasant impetus to organize and develop a cohesive struggle and a charismatic-style leadership. In Morelos province the peasants' response to commonly perceived existing laws used by the rich exemplified an unwillingness by the rich to restructure ownership patterns which demonstrated a conservative reaction. Wherever possible, the very rich may circumvent and violate present statutes. As Mills (1957) argues, "they have had laws created and enforced for their direct benefit".¹⁸

The advent of organized labour has brought advances - but these must be seen for what they really are. It is one of the ironies of capitalism that gains achieved by one section of the working class are paid for by another section. Capitalists found that the higher wages they were forced to give workers resulted in increased costs. To avoid cutting into their profit margins, capitalist entrepreneurs went abroad. There, in the satellite communities, the total ruthlessness became apparent. Land was stolen and the self-sufficiency of the subject peoples was destroyed. Peasant communities were driven (much like the enclosure movement in England) into the arms of the "free labour" market. From there, as we have already mentioned, these helpless and dependent victims were recruited for work in the mines and plantations at wages that barely kept them alive. In other words, the amelioration of the sufferings of the workers in the imperialists' cities led to the increase of sufferings of the workers in the colonies. Penetration into the satellite dependencies served merely to further the interests of imperialism. If one takes not a regional view but considers both

¹⁸Mills, C. Wright (1957) The Power Elite. Oxford University Press, pp.95, 99.

the proletariat as a whole and its relationship to a series of urban complexes, we then can envisage surplus value syphoned off through a worldwide apparatus of imperialism. In conclusion, then, "bourgeois democracy" has brought no improvement, no amelioration of conditions, but rather an increase in repression.

Backward countries, if they are to become less poor, need to adopt two strategies. Firstly, there is a necessity to remove urban elites who are maintained in serving the interests of capital. These urban elites within the dependent State exist to appropriate wealth without creating it for internal advancement of all sectors. Secondly, the accumulation of capital for their own advancement would be a negative incentive to peasants to change their outlook because profits are accruing to foreign investors. The dual role traditional and industrial lifestyles played was extended by Furtado to include South America as a whole. He emphasized the principle of development based on the assimilation of technological progress rather than its generation, giving rise in the context of existing institutional structures to (1969: 251),

a new type of dualism between highly capitalised productive units employing modern technical processes and productive sectors employing traditional techniques and having a low level of capital investment, a dualism superimposed on the former polarisation between market-economy sector and subsistence economy sector.¹⁹

The idea, then, that peasants resist change and development for no apparent reason is obsolete. It is a position that does not approximate the facts. The economist Gunder Frank perhaps expressed the situation most clearly,

¹⁹Furtado, C. (1969) Obstacles of Development in Latin America. Trans. by C. Ekker. N.Y.: Cassel

The metropolis expropriates economic surplus from its satellites and appropriates it for its own economic development. The satellites remain underdeveloped for lack of access to their own surplus ... One and the same historical process of expansion and development throughout the world generated - and continues to generate - both economic development and structural underdevelopment.²⁰

Economic development is scarcely ever spread evenly, but rather concentrated at certain points, producing a mosaic of regions at different levels of prosperity.²¹ Once recognized, this kind of spatial variation has proved difficult to explain in terms of traditional models of inter-regional economic relationships, particularly trade models.²² Such models, based on the concept of static equilibrium, assume that given a relatively free mobility of the factors of production²³ (p.369), "factor movements tend to bring about an equalization of income among regions". Any differences in income levels between regions must therefore be viewed as only temporary, due to some slight lag in adjustment. Unfortunately, however, as other authorities have pointed out,²⁴ equalization models are of little use in illuminating the development of spatial variation (op.cit.: 13).

Spatial organization

The inadequacy of equalization theories has prompted economists to put forward new conceptual models of the development of spatial variation

²⁰Frank, G. (1963) Cited in O'Connor, H. 'Venezuela, A study of imperialism' in 'Whither Latin America', Monthly Review Press, N.Y., p.93. Also Frank, G. (1971) Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America. Harmondsworth: Penguin, p.5.

²¹Hirschman, A. O. (1958) The Strategy of Economic Development. Connecticut: Yale University Press, p.183.

²²Harris, S. E. (1954) 'Interregional competition: With particular reference to North-South competition', American Economic Review, 44 (2): 367-380.

²³Harris, S. E. (1957) International and Interregional Economics. N.Y.: New Press, p.191.

²⁴Myrdal, G. M. (1957b) Economic Theory and Underdeveloped Regions. London: see also Myrdal, G. M. (1956, 1957a).

in economic prosperity (1957b). Framed in terms of countries with poorer relative terms of trade and underdevelopment, Myrdal applies the concept of "cumulative causation" to the problem of economic development with underdeveloped countries. He states that "in a free economy, particular changes do not, as equalisation models contend, call forth countervailing changes but instead, supporting changes which move the system in the same direction as the first change but much further" (op.cit.: 13). New increments in economic activity and growth will tend to be concentrated in the already-expanding regions because of their "derived advantages", rather than in the remaining areas of the country.

The concept of cumulative concentration is not, however, the only important feature of Myrdal's model. Closely involved with it in his explanation of differential regional growth is that of spatial interaction between the growing and stagnating regions. Once growth has begun in the former, Myrdal claims, spatial flows of labour, capital and commodities develop spontaneously to support it. Such flows operate, however, as "backwash effects" upon the remaining regions of the country, since, faced with the higher returns obtainable in the growth regions, these other regions tend to lose not only their more skilled and enterprising workers, but also much of their locally-generated capital. At the same time, goods and services originating in the expanding regions flood the markets of the remaining regions, putting out of business what little local secondary and tertiary industry may already have developed there. A further type of backwash effect operates through non-economic factors, such as the provision of poorer health and education services in the stagnating as compared with the expanding regions. In all these ways, backwash effects, particularly those working through spatial interaction, come into operation to frustrate growth in the former and sustain

it in the latter.

However, these backwash effects are not the only inter-regional relationships which the model postulates as developing within a growing economy. Also of significance are "certain centrifugal 'spread effects' of expansionary momentum from the centres of economic expansion to other regions" (Myrdal, op.cit.: 31). Myrdal argues that by stimulating demand (e.g. for agricultural and mineral products) in other, particularly neighbouring, regions, expansion in the growing areas may initiate economic growth elsewhere. Contrary to the "satellite dependency" theory put forward by Frank (1967), Myrdal would have us believe that the local satellite economy would be strong enough to resist and overcome local backwash effects enabling cumulative causation to begin, and leading to the development of new centres of growth. Interestingly, however, Myrdal modifies this point by insisting that such spread effects are only sustained within the strongest economies where there are high income levels relative to material productivity. Development according to this manner proceeds because this "is accompanied by improved transportation and communications, higher levels of education and a more dynamic communication of ideas and values" (op.cit.: 34). Myrdal unconvincingly leaps to the conclusion that stronger spread effects will boost the economic growth of the country as a whole. He believes that all resources should properly be utilized to strengthen stagnant regions. The critical facts expressed by the concept of "internal colonialism" portrayed in the poor filtering down of wealth from retrenched elites, indicates that the reverse is empirically true.²⁵ The resources of the stagnant regions are acquired unjustly by those whose business it was (and still is) to direct these resources elsewhere rather than into

²⁵See Stavenhagen, R. (1975) Social Classes in Agrarian Societies. Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Book, Doubleday.

the depressed economic sectors.

In his thesis, Frank argues that the capitalist withdraws either when the resource base has dried up, or when the market demand for the goods has declined (op.cit.: 7). The argument for cumulative causation only works for those whose policies are aimed at fostering consumer-oriented rather than socially productive units. Implicit in this assumption is the polarizing capacity inherent in capital that evokes an urge to rebelliousness in those who miss out on the benefits from external economies located in the macro-system (Huizer, G., op.cit.: 317).

Another theorist with a somewhat similar emphasis to Myrdal is Hirschman, who focuses on differential growth between growing "Northern" and lagging "Southern" regions in the form of polarization and "trickling down" effects (op.cit.: 187). Backwash effects involve movements of capital, labour and commodities. However, these elements do not exist or operate in unison. As a result, Hirschman neglects this point when arguing about imbalance between regions resulting from the dominance of polarization effects. In fact, Hirschman postulates a moving equilibrium model in that he believes counterbalancing forces would come into play to restore the position of an equilibrium position throughout a developing country. However, the movement of capital outward from the dependent sectors to the metropolitan economies definitely provides for disincentives to peasants. It is understandable, then, for peasants' attitudes to reflect a subtle form of victimization. This does not mean peasant perceptions are distorted by preconceptions.²⁶ Ecological constraints may be apparent, but these problems remain tied to the productive and ownership patterns

²⁶Ortiz, S. (1971) Reflections on the concept of 'Peasant culture' and 'Peasant cognitive systems' in Shanin, T. p.331.

which generate social contradictions between the interests of labour and capital. In sum, the basis for fair and equitable socio-economic practice is offset by outside forces distorting micro-systemic patterns. Alien concepts are introduced and imposed. Management arbitrariness, associated with risk on capital investment belongs to an uncontrollable and inaccessible jurisdiction. Peasants are bereft of any viable litigation to redress a perceived political imbalance. They experience, most profoundly, a dilemma in that the broker operates vis-à-vis the capital-industrial complex, but his main interest is to represent and forge exploitative relationships. What, to the peasants' perception, must seem a very capricious commitment to the wage economy, from our secure vantage point fails to give an account of the consequences for the predatory and exploitative nature characterizing that macro-system.

In conclusion then, this ideology produces within satellite micro-systems depressed and undernourished consumers made dependent for their life means on unconditional surrender to an exploitative predatory incursion. There is only one option left for the "middle" peasants who decide to act in order to secure their future for themselves. Herein, any belief in "choice" does not occur to the peasant. There is no choice.

CHAPTER 6 : MULTIVARIOUS MOVEMENTS CONSOLIDATE UNDER CULTURES OF REPRESSION!

Abstract

No-one would dispute that systematic policy analysis is essential for deciding particular issues. However, it must be remembered that policy-making is always carried out within a context (rarely made explicit) of what are essentially political definitions of relevant interests, and of a simplified treatment of relevant values. One also cannot neglect the fact that the relationship between policy and governmental institutions is very close. A policy does not become a public policy until it is adopted, implemented, and enforced by some governmental institution. These institutions essentially give public policy three distinctive characteristics: lend legitimacy to policies, involve universality, and monopolize coercion in society. Essentially, dominant interests evolve a theory of ideas in good currency.

In general, government accepts as mysteriously given the issues around which a policy and a programme must be shaped. They are only mysteriously given because of the bias in the policy process in favour of the rational, the well-formed and the retrospective, and a basic failure to see the less visible process through which issues actually come to awareness and ideas about them become powerful. In other words, much of explicit policy-making focuses attention on the visible conflicts over policy. But by the time such conflict is crystallized, most issues have long since been identified, ideas for their solution have long since been available, and sides defined and subsequently taken.

An argument we consider is that of the centre-periphery dichotomy: government at the centre and the rest of society at the periphery.

The centre has the responsibility for the formation of new policy and for its imposition on localities at the periphery. It must induce the localities to behave in conformity with central policy - a system which, by and large, seems to work effectively in respect of some strategically positioned segments within society.

A very real problem also exists with the emergence of new cultural symbols and the inevitability of continual change. Faced with this situation, the government can no longer play the role of 'experimenter of the nation', seeking first to identify the correct solution and then train society at large in its subsequent adaptation. The centre's role must thus become that of detecting significant shifts at the periphery (and not in the nexus of official policies at the centre), to play explicit attention to the emergence of ideas in good currency, and to derive themes of policy by induction. The centre must therefore be the facilitator of society's learning rather than its trainer. The question of "radical disjunction" may arise the further we proceed from the centre in respect of policy enactment to the outlying sectors where movements co-ordinate attempts to undermine that order.

Some organizations are more powerful than others because they directly command more resources and/or because of their connection to dominant interest groups in the wider social structure. An agency may be able to mobilize forces external to the network as a means of controlling resource flow within it. Those agencies with most command over resources are the most strategically located within a network, and have an enhanced bargaining power vis-à-vis peripheral organizations. Can an innovative exercise of 'reticulist' skills deflect power from existing positions and hence create new patterns of resource flow?

This raises questions in reference to the validity of equilibrium analysis. Equilibrium analysis contrives a system to be made up of relations and conditions. These relations and conditions may be theoretical, conjectural, normative or observational. The particular mix will determine the general applicability of the system and the degree of realism and precision that it can attain. The relations provide the system with its forces, while the conditions interpret the special contexts and determine the scope of the system (Myrdal, 1958: 198-205).

Moreover our intention is directed towards showing up inadequacies in the ubiquitous subsumption intuited to primary concepts, which in idealism and materialism provide the dimensions of the system - that is the kinds of change to which the elementary units are prone, such as variations of mass, position, velocity, and time. Finally, the rules of composition or aggregation describe the limits beyond which the elementary concepts do not apply.

Synchronous idealism

According to the idealist emphasis the "spirit of caste" isolates fragments into a multitude of opposing segments. Levels are superimposed on one another separated only by their mutual repulsion. To Bouglé, the spirit of caste unites three tendencies in repulsion, hierarchy and hereditary specialization, and all three are integral to any definition of the caste system. Bouglé's definition then, is that,

a society is subject to this system if it is divided into a large number of mutually opposed groups which are hereditarily specialised and hierarchically arranged - if, on principle it tolerates neither the parvenu, nor miscegenation, nor a change of profession.¹

Bouglé stated that the Brahmin's place was on top of a caste

¹Bouglé, C. 'The essence and reality of the caste system' in Contributions to Indian Sociology, No.II (April 1958) Mouton.

hierarchy based on purity and impurity. He saw the superiority afforded to the Brahmin by the ruler who recognized the former's sacrificial and ritual roles. The sacrificial emphasis in Indian civilization, Bouglé thought, was displaced by the emphasis upon dharma.² This assumption seeks to establish that the caste system can only be understood when we realize that it is permeated by essentially religious conceptions.

Power and sanctity conflict

Perhaps the key to understanding based on the holistic position is seeing that in Hindu thought dharma takes precedence over artha. Dharma is the dominant religious conception and may be defined as spirituality and caste duty. As we shall see, this term is bound up with status considerations. Artha, judging by many of the texts, denotes the activities making for the wealth upon which kingly power rests - is subordinate to dharma but legitimate at its own level.³ The question is, is it inferior as well as necessary to the maintenance of dharma? What is confusing is that Dumont says very little about dharma in Homo Hierarchicus. Kolenda believes the principle of dharma (right action) to be implied in the caste system and equal in importance to the principle of purity-impurity (op.cit.: 594). For Dumont, essentially, that expression specifying a hierarchical relationship is, if dharma encompasses artha that

²Kolenda, P. (1976) Seven Kinds of Hierarchy in Homo Hierarchicus, pp.581-596

³Dumont (op.cit.: 101) sets up a contrast here with Karve when she suggests that castes result from the aggregation of subcastes from the subdivision of castes. Dumont insists Karve's approach would be limited, and interested exclusively in the origins, particular customs and racial composition which constitute the material of which the system is made up at the empirical level, but which Dumont does not agree as constituting the system itself. The reader is referred to: Karve, I. (1961) Hindu Society: an interpretation. Poona, Deccan College, pp.28-29.

does not mean the denial (negation) of artha (force). Dumont focuses on a dilemma,

Either power must be accommodated within the theory of caste, as here, or else the theory of caste must be brought under the notion of power and 'politico-economic relations ... It is a matter of approach ... The fact remains that the empirical approach [which highlights politics and economics] is a misconstruction of Indian civilisation: it amounts to assimilating dharma to artha ...

(Homo Hierarchicus, p.308)

Let us explore this distinction between religion and power. An argument put forward by Derrett⁴ states that the Hindu considers there is merit in the subordination of political power to whatever power is wielded by the Brahmin community, for they see this as symbolic of the overlordship of dharma (righteousness) to which the Brahmins are nominally wedded (op.cit.: 598). Concomitant to the kingly function is the administration of political-juridical fiats. As opposed to the realm of values and norms it is the realm of force. Sovereignty opposes dharma or universal order because it is the realm of ambition, interest and advantage (op.cit.: 599). It seems to me that this is where empirical studies pick up the threads because they demonstrate that people are wilful, factionalized, competitive and geared to interest. Berreman is blunt when he criticizes Dumont for constructing an intellectual edifice that takes the vitality out of the real. To Berreman⁵ caste is synonymous with oppression and cannot be regarded as an epiphenomenon. He argues, from an empirical level, that institutionalized inequality goes unrecognized by the structuralist,

⁴Derrett, J. (1976) 'Rājadharmā' Journal of Asian Studies, 35 (4): 597-610.

⁵Berreman, G. (1971) 'The Brahmanical view of caste' in Ch.3 Contributions to Indian Sociology New Series, No.V, Dec.1971, Vikas, p.20.

even to the extent that the reciprocity between Brahmin and client goes on, unchecked, in violence. Dumont seeks to counter this by asserting "that the system assures subsistence to each proportionately to his status" (op.cit.: 153). However, Berreman states that proportionality means that the Brahmin enjoys primacy over access to resources relative to his dominant position leaving a relatively smaller amount, relative to status, for the untouchable to consume. The system thus guarantees security, comfort, health and prestige to those people holding positions relative to their status.⁶

Whereas the principle of relative purity fascinates Dumont to the point that it perpetuates hierarchy, Kantowsky argues⁷ that the joint family and the jajmani system have maintained inequality and created the mental image of caste. If Dumont insists on the proportionality argument as evidence that distribution is indefinitely acceptable in line with the unequal rules pertaining to the caste system, then present observations indicate the reverse. In this realm, artha means implicitly (even as an unintended consequence) power and administration, and its manifestation through the system is unequally distributed.

We should express the problem more fully, remembering that a theoretical orientation opens up particular perspectives and ignores specific alternatives.⁸ Kolenda (p.596) criticizes

⁶Let me add that the greater the extent to which power can be used indirectly to shape perceptions and preferences, the less the need for it to be used directly in ways which make it visible.

⁷Kantowsky, D. (1971) 'The problem of sponsored change' Contributions to Indian Sociology New Series, No.v, Dec.1971.

⁸For discussion of the problem, see Milton Singer, 'Text and context in the study of religion and social change in India' The Adyar Library Bulletin XXV, Parts 1-4: 274-303.

Dumont for his not giving us "access to the conscious aspect" of the Hindu's action. We know Dumont believes ideology to be central to analysing the system. He assumes "man acts consciously and we have direct access to the conscious aspect of his action" (op.cit.: 263-264). Otherwise "there is complementarity between the two, a relationship which is variable" (op.cit.: 264).

In nearly all sources the first duty of the King is said to be protection (pālana).⁹ The term covers a wide range of activity, including the protection of life and property by the enforcement of law and the protection of the Kingdom from invasion, but first and foremost the King's protective function had to be exercised in respect of the divine social order, the varnāśrama-dharma, thereby giving the optimum chance of spiritual progress.

From sources ascribed to Kautilya, the ideal King accepts the interpretation of the dharma given by the pandits attached to his court, and enforces it ruthlessly and impartially by means of coercion (danda). It is this principle which some sources regard as critical (loc.cit.).

In supporting the alternative view, Meillassoux posits a redistributive system set up between the leader and subjects as between elder and his dependants.¹⁰ In other words the sovereign fulfils at the level of the Kingdom the functions - sometimes symbolic - of the elder within the community. Such relations are often supported by an ideology which relates people to a mythical single ancestor and into a common sib. Hence, once we have a social structure where one

⁹Basham, A. L. 'Some fundamental political ideas of ancient India' in Philips, C. (ed.) Politics and Society in India. London: George Allen & Unwin, p.16.

¹⁰Meillassoux, C. 'The social organisation of the peasantry: the economic basis of kinship' Journal of Peasant Studies, 1, 1973-4: 88.

corporate group dominates and exploits other corporate groups we are dealing with a class system in which rules of social relationships will change again with the change of the productive relations (ibid.). Meillassoux, then, views kinship here to be transformed into an ideology whose raison d'être is not so much to express relationships generated from the growth and organisation of the society as to justify and even support a domination imposed from outside (loc.cit.). For instance Basham writes,

... implicit in the doctrine of the King's duty of protection is the right of the Aryan to enjoy his legally acquired property without hindrance, and to live according to the traditional ways of his forefathers.

(Ibid.: 17)

When kinship reaches a religious dimension, it may gain enough strength to be considered as the basic justification for domination and exploitation (Meillassoux, op.cit.: 88). The situation tends to be inverted when in telling us about the ideal King Basham states that,

He should not look on as good whatever pleases himself, but whatever pleases his subjects, says the Arthaśāstra.

(Ibid.: 18)

The benevolent aspect of monarchy is clear, we are told, by reference to what Basham sees as a false etymology, given in several sources. The word rāja, is wrongly derived from the verb rañjayati 'he pleases' (loc.cit.).

Dumont's predisposition is to address an ideal-type schema. We believe Dumont disregards to some extent that the conscious (willed) attributes of artha seem manifest at all levels in the system and therefore articulates how distributive justice or injustice is perpetrated. Dumont omits the negative reciprocities that must necessarily be implied in our notion of unequal positional strength. For Dumont the two

categories or principles of Brahman and Kshatriya may be fused in opposition to others in spite of their hierarchical opposition. In other words the Kshatriya participates of the Brahmin in relation to others.

Derrett argued that the Brahmins discussed and refined dharma by promulgating the duties to be performed by each caste. These duties were laid down for the benefit of the ruler who could usurp that function (op.cit.: 607). The concept of rājadharmā meant that the king should rule his subjects, including Brahmins, to ensure a balance of interests and secure control over a region.¹¹ Derrett inverts Dumont's presupposition by assuming the supremacy of Kshatriya's function to rule, assisted by the Brahmins who fictively portrayed him as a deity. Thus superiority as defined by Dumont in terms of purity seems overtly restrictive because a great deal of latitude was allowed to the kings. The superiority of dharma was accepted by people in terms of righteousness. This may be described on the one hand as the preservation of peace by everyone (masking alienation), and on the other, a righteous king's assigning a position within that hierarchy for everyone (exploitative). This belief coincides with a collective belief in the eternal values of the dharma (science of righteousness), even if earlier rules are discarded as outworn or inadequate under modern conditions.¹²

In Homo Hierarchicus Dumont, I think, realizes this point without following it to its logical conclusion. A Kshatriya pursues an inferior end, artha, according to him, only after reference and action has submitted

¹¹Dumont, L. (1971) 'On putative hierarchy and some allergies to it' Contributions to Indian Sociology New Series, No.V, Dec.1971, Vikas, p.72.

¹²See Derrett, J. (1976) op.cit.: 598. The Dharmashastra refers to code books of law that constrain behaviour according to proscribed rules-customs.

itself to the requirements of the higher end, dharma.¹³ Thus, following the logic of the principle of disjunction, "the Brahman encompasses the Kshatriya by means of dharma's encompassing artha. This means in effect that the religious encompasses the politico-economic in Hindu ideology to the extent that the highest and therefore most encompassing end is superior to the more particular and the highest group is logically in control of the universal end of the whole society" (op.cit.: 78).

Which is subordinate in principle?

How then are we to interpret Dumont? Is dharma mediated by Brahmins to the ruler to uphold the position of either ruler or Brahmin or both? That is the crux. Which function is to be reified? What function is to be subordinate? Is Dumont's point on proportionality imposed by a religious ideology tenable, and consistent, with fair distributive conceptions? This answer implies a value explicit bias, and depends on interests to which the observer subscribes. As Derrett has pointed out, it was the king's duty, dharma, to protect people in exchange for grain payments, to see to it that inter-varna marriages did not occur, and to administer justice (op.cit.: 607). The ruler allowed a fair amount of latitude through the application of principles (dharma). As we have seen, the ascetic function combined with the sacred (dharma) reinforced the disjunction between priest and ruler. Dumont concedes that the king is a "link between Brahmanic wisdom (asceticism) ... and the empirical world of men". The crucial word is "link" for is the ruler merely that, or is his function embodying something more, down played in Dumont's scheme?

¹³This idea is consistent with the act of sacrificial love.

In conclusion, then, are we to perceive exchanges between castes possessing different rankings as linked to and therefore justified (just) by reference to a sacred dharma? To Marriott, exchanges within the realm of artha are predominant. Exchange expresses an asymmetrical relationship. Again, a value is merely invoked. Economic and political power seem to divide the constituent groups from one another. Superior castes are separate, legislating for, and determining the relations among lesser powered castes. Thus, in addition to caste, economic principles organize Indian society. Finally on this point, Barnett et al (op.cit.: 637) wish to have the problem solved by criticizing Mencher's one track penchant for obscuring class struggle, and thus dissolving the extreme positions, "... purity and impurity are related to each other in a segmentary hierarchy that is neither mere stratification nor frustrated and obscured class struggle."¹⁴

By acknowledging any approach, the theorist circumscribes the problematic determining the value he places on weighing principles located in dharma or artha. On this point there arises an Archimedian dilemma. Utilizing an ahistorical approach, texts are used not as historical evidence but as offering certain systems of ideas with which the present may be compared. Two simple solutions are offered. Firstly the idealist; for him the varna classes are the reality which have been corrupted by later divisions and the imposition of later ideas. The second might be characterized as positivist. With a plausible show of empiricism the positivist discounts the varna scheme as a figment of priestly arrogance or as an earlier social form and lays his emphasis upon the existing social groups, the jati. It seems one stands in relation to a system, either externally or internally. Any position in relation to that system

¹⁴Barnett, S., Fruzzetti, L. and Ostor, A. 'Hierarchy purified: notes on Dumont and his critics' Journal of Asian Studies, 35 (4) (1976): 635.

deforms and ruptures its apprehension and therefore encounters an incomplete representation. Anthropological knowledge is a specific kind of knowledge that occurs at the interface of two cultures and generates a particular kind of externality from our own position when looking across the double boundary (of translation) that divides us.

We can further reduce the distinction between sacred dharma and artha to the way in which these entities become mental events - states of mind. This point enables Dumont to assert that principles operate independently of the distribution of authority (op.cit.: 15). In this regard, Dumont rejects an empirical and functional interpretation for he says it is not enough to observe that actual men behave. Rather, he believes, men act with an idea in their heads in conforming to custom (op.cit.: 40). Where I differ with Dumont is in his personal capacity to transcend the particular situation absolutely, because his personality is tied to his language and customs. Dumont conceives the particular man as a common element composed in relation to society, and therefore a collective agent and therefore subject to rules (op.cit.: 44). Thus Dumont rejects analysts who abstract ideas directly from observed behaviour. The reason for this is merely that it reflects a pointless game without explaining it. It remains on the level of expectation and motive, and swells on personal communication (op.cit.: 46).

When referring to equality as an idea embracing communities, Dumont makes a distinction between its moral opposite and natural opposite (op.cit.: 47). Moral inequality, he argues, results from the exploitation of natural inequality for social ends. Drawing on Plato, he explicitly states that inequality is inevitable and that true equality exists in proportion (ibid.). Proportional distribution in the caste system relates to the whole with the sacred dharma giving rise to distinctions based on relative purity. This point may be unintelligible to the empiricist,

but Dumont does make the interesting point that equality works under despotism and therefore its combination with liberty is best exemplified in proportionality (op.cit.: 47). We are faced with a chicken-and-egg argument. Does Dumont evade the issue of injustice simply by ignoring it? Whilst focusing on symbolic constituents, Dumont pays lip service to the security afforded to the lowly ranked members in the caste system. So the problem for him does not exist. He simply assumes it away by asserting that proportionality as a concept reinforces inequality in logically expressing hierarchy. In conclusion then, according to Dumont, equality may well be good when combined with liberty and when it consists in proportionality, that is, when it is applied reasonably. In neither case is it sufficiently clear that a latent function of the system may well constitute injustice. It is fallacious to reify power and thereby focus singularly on production relations and proceed to ideological obfuscation. And in converse form, symbolic domination may produce ideological constructs that act to reproduce a social formation whose concealed nature is asymmetrically designed. This does not mean that the idealist emphasis is sufficient in unveiling the logic of artha (power).

The point at which the two theoretical positions merge is on the level of ideology. Both structuralists and the marxists seek the "inner logic" that demonstrates the workings of the system. To succeed therefore both approaches ought to consider more fully the "screen" covering over the surface, masking various underlying forces. Through examining the ideological form, then, praxis is ideological praxis and it is necessary to demonstrate the historical formations thrown up. The structuralist necessarily subscribes to over-rigid social formations which he believes are grounded in an "objective" ahistorical reality. It is at this deeper level that power has been relatively neglected. In conclusion then, the dialectical relationship between relations of production and their

various determinations (superstructural) existing in the Indian context requires further investigation.

Hindu Weltanschauung and the Hindu social system

Since in all societies there is a differential distribution of the goods of this world - power, wealth, prestige and so on - it may be expected that, in the long run, the persistence of the social order does not depend so much on the equality or inequality of distribution so much as on the degree to which the distribution is perceived to be equitable or inequitable. It is a matter of degree whether people subscribing to a form of life believe that they (and others) are, or are not, receiving their fair share of these goods. This is another way of saying that in the long run the persistence of the social order depends on whether or not the system is seen as invested with legitimacy, and authority. It may further be expected that those who enjoy less than what they assume to be their fair share of those goods will constitute a potential source of either structural or positional change. If they believe the distributional system has no moral authority, they may constitute a potential source of change in the system itself (structural change). If, however, they accept the moral authority of the system but view the actual distribution of power, wealth, and so on as unfair, they may aspire to change the distribution so as to obtain a greater share of these goods for themselves (positional change).

We have seen, particularly from Dumont's analysis (1966) that Hindu dharma prescribes compliance with one's own caste norms, and from this viewpoint militates against positional change and thus presents conservative upper strata who resist change. Positional change with respect to power implies usurpation of the dominant tradition. We have seen how dharma converts the socio-economic order into a moral one. Differences in

rank are based on an hereditary principle which in turn regulates a distributional system. In short, the socio-economic order within the traditional conception is mediated by reference to dharma which is truly a conservative force lending powerful support to the status quo. It not only provides a moral justification for unequal distribution of wealth, but confers moral as well as social prestige on the rich. They enjoy prestige both because of their wealth and because their relative level of purity lies at the bottom of the system.

To summarize, it would be difficult to invent a more convincing moral justification for, and therefore a more stabilizing influence on, the economic status quo. By reference to a fundamental view underlying caste inequality and denoted by the purity and impurity continuum, Dumont would insist that it seems pointless to criticize him. Indeed, we would point out that relative purity denotes the position one is entitled to as opposed to other degrees of relative impurity. For the poor (relatively impure) then, there appears a relative subordination in line with the customary norms propagated from above. According to our view the neat picture of the system expressed in "hierarchy" which separates and divides segments obscures the relative deprivation handed out to the lower segments. What better ideology and attitude could one have to assure the stability of the socio-economic order? The principle of inclusion must be taken to mean the principle of exclusion (or using Sartrean terminology) pure exteriority which is an alienating condition (negates itself in a negative dualism). We would point out, then, that dharma appears as a weapon of class exploitation, only to be transformed and inverted by capitalist interpenetration of dependent satellites (cf. the Fuerbachian thesis inverting the "idea" or notion of "spirit"). As we shall see, dharma and its inversion concomitant with the politico-economic strain (artha) point to manoeuvre and manipulation in the form of continual power struggle.

Both dharma and capitalism¹⁵ sought according to the hegemonous principle of "inclusion" to dominate and extract wealth and in so doing support an intellectual framework, to codify and enchrine their respective practices.

Recent research has questioned the characteristic approaches to traditional systems. Most of this research is in the field of political anthropology and is based on a refusal to identify tradition with "fixism" and an attempt to uncover the 'dynamic aspects' of traditional society.

The notion of the traditional remains imprecise. It is seen as continuity, whereas modernity involves break. It is usually defined as conformity to timeless norms,¹⁶ those affirmed or justified by myth or dominant ideology and those handed down in an informational package. Symbolic meanings may be reconstituted as message carriers. Heretofore, such elements correspond to a fundamental traditionalism, an attempt to safeguard the values and the social and cultural arrangements superimposed from the past. In Indian society the perennality of the caste system and of the ideology that expresses it reveals that, despite the ambiguous and varied relations that link it to modernity, it remains predominantly a conservative force. In fact, although changes do occur within the system, the system does not appear to change from the outside, when viewed as a whole.

Simplicity and passivity are not intrinsic properties of less modern societies, but the result of modernizing influences upon them from its very beginnings; a situation we are told

... created by brutality, pillage and violence, without which the historical conditions of this very development would not have been brought together.

(Lévi-Strauss, op.cit.: 316)

¹⁵Herein, the analogy we propose is drawn in line with Wittgenstein's argument that relates to the degrees of relevance suggested in family resemblances conforming as a general rule to the notion of the "game". Capitalism and dharma have this in common to the extent that they extend domination. Each in its respective way seeks to incorporate opposed entities by subordination or elimination.

¹⁶Lévi-Strauss, C. (1973) Structural Anthropology. Trans. London: Allen Lane, pp.137-138.

There is not a zero point of change. Western civilization's growth resulted from the Other's negation commensurate with their destruction. The mechanized civilization finds in its distant satellites its own creation (ibid.: 315). Formal traditionalism usually has been made to co-exist with the preceding type.

A system in process

Here we see clearly the fallacy of using an ideal-type model as our primary concept. The point is simply this: if we are to treat individuals as ends, we cannot subjugate them to other kinds of values. For our purpose, the individual strives to open the possibility for choices. We certainly do not want to subordinate him to some larger, self transcendent identificatic Health values are all of a piece again with our philosophy of adjustment.¹⁷ It is not a question of sacrificing individual health in all circumstances to higher symbolic values.

For us to ascertain reliably how an open possibility is achieved under an individual's own power and not strictly according to an acquiescent character, we must view those as agents of their own energies. We may fruitfully ask how co-ercive are the restrictions placed on choice making. The individual may not have control over maintaining self esteem, and may be denied the character of his own power.

Hence during the period of colonial domination, the traditionalism of resistance served as a protective screen or camouflage to conceal the reactions of refusal.¹⁸ For this reason, Balandier suggests that there exists an essentially different character of the dominated culture.

... in the eyes of the colonizers, a strange, incomprehensible quality; traditions, either modified or revived served as a defence for expressions of opposition and for attempts to break the ties of dependence.

¹⁷Becker, E. The Structure of Evil. N.Y.: Free Press Glencoe, p.298.

¹⁸Balandier, G. (1970) Political Anthropology. Harmondsworth: Penguin, p.173.

And then Balandier alludes to the purpose of symbolic expressions which essentially mask actual events on the political plane.

... a new phenomenon appears that might be called pseudo-traditionalism.

(loc.cit.)

Factionalism: divergence as power

Competition for leadership and control within the Congress Party in Rajasthan, as in other Indian states, was interpreted by Sisson as characterized by intra-party groupings or factions which have competed for positions of leadership and control within the party organization as well as in the formal institutions of government.¹⁹ The nature of factions has tended to vary from level to level in the political system, those at the lowest levels of political organization, such as Municipal Boards and the Tehsil Congress Committees, being based largely on a caste (jati), while at successively higher levels those units have tended to coalesce around a dominant political figure and to form a new political group which involves a number of smaller units. These larger factional coalitions have always been socially heterogeneous and include in their fold political groups drawn from numerous castes.

Conflict then permeates at all levels. Divisiveness occurs through conflict over positions of power within the macro-system. Sisson tells us that the Congress organization has been a primary vehicle for the mobilization of new political resources (ibid.: 218). It stems, first, from the support given it from a jati base. Second, existing leaders and elites have vied for the support of groups which are already a part of the Congress system and in a few cases have attracted the support of political groups from outside the party. Third, it is important for us to realize that

¹⁹Sisson, R. 'Caste and political factions in Rajasthan' cited in Ch.6 of Caste in Indian Politics, edited by Kothari, R. Poona: Sangam Press.

in terms of the 'system' political groups have attempted to expand their base of support through the mobilization of 'new' castes into the Congress, by co-opting existing caste leaders or by 'creating' new leaders in those castes by the act of co-opting and granting political access. The process has arisen not only out of conflict between two dominant elites at the district level, but also from conflict between local groups in municipal and tehsil level public institutions and party organizations (loc.cit.). Competition, in the face of a perceived threat from the Rajputs whom the Jats saw as adversaries, continued on from the traditional order into a modern political stance (ibid.: 220).

Rigidity and stability are manifest in the top segment of the Jats, who as an elite, whilst experiencing differences, have managed not to become split politically (ibid.: 221). All other castes have been divided by elites which compete for relatively scarce political positions. Cohesion is readily achieved by what Sisson has termed the 'political pay-off' that results from organized activity, the desired returns on one's political investment. This, he argues, is a major factor distinguishing the Jats from other castes and the Jat coalition from other coalitions (ibid.: 222). He notes such features as employment and patronage, favours accorded from the administration and government agencies and loans. Command over the allocation of these political goods has not only been important in the maintenance of cohesion within the Jat caste and Jat coalition, but has been instrumental in the ability of the Jats to attract the support of new political groups. Politics for the Jat elite has become a commitment and remains critical in the command over resources and strategic positions in the Congress Party and the government of Rajasthan.

In many villages, the statutory panchayat exists merely as a 'front' organization, and the real locus of power remains in the hands of influential villagers who function as go-betweens or patrons in village negotiations,

bargaining and disputes. A series of studies on power and leadership in different parts of rural India is prefaced by this observation,

While in all these villages the traditional caste panchayats continue to meet and to carry weight, in none of them does the government or judicial panchayat have prestige. The long identification of government officials with an alien or unsympathetic government has apparently not been disturbed by the events of independence ... In some villages, the village leaders of recognized stature have consented to assume offices in the government panchayat. But such membership is not the source of their leadership.

We are informed by Tinker that the political scene in India during the 1950s was clouded by dissatisfaction.²⁰ In the sphere of parliamentary government there was discontent with increasing centralization of administration, and with the functioning of a Western-style democracy (ibid.).

The cleavage in outlook between the government and their people is also perhaps a normal and inevitable feature in politics. We are informed by Bailey that a greater part of a party worker's energy and time in Orissa is spent not in propagating party policy among the electorate, except for a very short period before the election, but in internal rivalries and contests for power.²¹ An enormous cleavage between the middle classes and the common people necessitates an emergent and mobile stratum. Bailey terms this "the brokerage network" (ibid.). The network enables humbler members "to act as ordinary election workers, alongside or in place of volunteers, carrying messages, sticking up posters, starting whispering campaigns and so forth" (ibid.: 111). This reality signifies, too, the fact that castes like villages are commonly split into factions and to gain one faction is to lose another. There is little evidence, as in more developed states, of widespread caste organizations (ibid.: 105). The point of getting hold of a caste or any other kind of association we are

²⁰Tinker, H. (1963) 'Tradition and experiment in forms of government' in C. Philips (ed.) Politics and Society in India. London: George Allen & Unwin, p.168.

²¹Bailey, F. G. (1963) 'Politics and society in contemporary Orissa' in C. Philips (ed.) Politics and Society in India. London: George Allen & Unwin, p.109.

told is,

by capturing the support of leaders, one draws automatically on the non-political loyalties of their followers.

(Ibid.)

But in a different way caste is essential to an understanding of the relation between the politician and the voter. Orissa has its dominant castes, the Karan and the Brahman (ibid.: 106). Together they constitute not more than eight percent of the population, but they hold a very high proportion of responsible positions both in politics and in the services. The two castes are rivals, and some of the old manoeuvres of the pre-Independence Congress are to be attributed to this rivalry. But this is not the case today in politics. Members of both castes take a leading part in all political parties except the Jharkhand, and lines of cleavage both between parties and within parties, are not illuminated by looking at caste membership. The position is that the members of these two castes, together with an increasing number of castes nowadays, and with the few members of the princely families constitute Orissa's very small middle-class elite, and it might be more correct to regard their dominance in politics and the administration as a class phenomenon, rather than a caste phenomenon (loc.cit.).

Let us concentrate on a few examples of stratification. Class we define as arising out of differences in economic role, and status as we have already seen divides inferiors from superiors in terms of different claims to prestige. Thus there are cross-cutting interests which divide classes internally as well as ties which link segments of one class with another. In addition, status distinctions within a class also operate, often with very fine distinctions which appear as invisible to the outsider. Thus groups severely discriminated against, such as urban Africans in South Africa, who are both a class (unskilled workers predominantly) and in part almost a caste (because virtually no social intercourse with whites

is allowed by law outside the work situation), develop subtle distinctions of status within their own ranks. A similar function is performed by voluntary associations (like football teams) which have lots of officers and elaborate displays of status symbols and thus provide a source of dignity and self esteem to the deprived.²² If there were not these cross-cutting ties between classes and divisions within them, all classes would evince 'instant solidarity', and overt class warfare would be a constant phenomenon.

The phenomenon of factionalism can give rise to two contradictory tendencies in political recruitment, as in Bihar.²³ Lower castes discover that they have to find new avenues of social mobility. The traditionally sanctioned avenues of social mobility are virtually closed for them and employment and business opportunities are scarce and highly competitive. Moreover, to succeed in business they need capital, and in order to gain employment in public or private services they need higher educational degrees. In order to win support and have greater support vis-à-vis the Congress Party, there arises the necessity for contending groups to widen their political interests, if a winning coalition is to eventuate (ibid.: 253). This necessity drives the competing groups to seek and win support from different caste groups. This is usually done through the device of co-optation. The dominant group would usually sponsor a promising person from a politically ineffective caste and push him up to junior positions of leadership, thereby securing the support of the caste the person belonged to. However, inasmuch

²²Kuper, L. (1965) An African Bourgeoisie. Yale University Press, Ch.22.

²³Roy, R. (1970) 'Caste and political recruitment in Bihar' in Kothari, R. (ed.), pp.251-254.

as all the contending groups could take recourse to such a device, this tended to induct different politically dormant caste groups into the political process and thus widen the circle of participation. This also tended to intensify political competition inasmuch as the 'junior' leaders, when they built their own support structure, began clamouring for more power (loc.cit.). Thus far we have discussed the nature of the inequality of the social system in Bihar and its impact on the recruitment styles for the Congress party. We have also noticed that the Congress Party in Bihar is still dominated by the upper castes, although a trend is in operation which signifies the growing importance of the underprivileged caste groups in political calculus. Factionalism has thus enabled a challenge to emerge to the Kayasthas, the dominant caste group in Bihar. The Kayasthas, conscious of their weak numerical strength, have, since the advent of independence, had to seek an alliance with a larger caste group in order to survive politically. In conclusion then, if factions sought to elevate their position in respect to the Congress Party, then in their bid to capture power and strengthen their power base, they resorted to co-optation of leaders from different caste groups (ibid.: 252).

Naturally there has arisen from groups located in more powerful positions a propensity for resistance to outsiders. A coalition involving more powerful segments introduces pressure which they believe gives them incontrovertible and indisputable rights to impose their will on inferior and parochial segments. In south India the struggle against the predominance of Brahmans has largely been won, and the discrimination against this hereditary intellectual elite has led to a lowering of standards in education and the professions. Opportunities are not distributed evenly throughout

the non-Brahman population, but the chief beneficiaries of the new order are those high non-Brahman castes which, thanks to their large land-holdings and economic power, have become the new dominant castes. These castes are everywhere rather conservative, and it is in their interest to impede as far as possible the rise to economic and political power of the numerically strong, but economically still largely underprivileged, Harijan castes.²⁴ This tendency runs counter to the official policy of assisting such underprivileged groups as the untouchables to overcome their disabilities, but paradoxically it is precisely these constitutional provisions guaranteeing to the Harijans a fair share of government posts, admittance to colleges and other benefits, which have accentuated caste consciousness and even produced the previously unheard of competition for classification as 'backward' (ibid.). Thus it is now being realized that the measures designed to bring about equality of opportunities and give the underprivileged a chance in raising their socio-economic status tend to perpetuate the caste system, the ill effects of which they try to combat! There are thus many ties which more positively unite members of different classes via personal or local level links, or even via national institutions which cut across class divisions. Dutch sociologists have called the latter phenomenon 'pillarization' or verzuiling in contrast to 'stratification', the former being the division of society into vertical 'pillars' as against division into horizontal 'strata'.²⁵ Clearly, verzuiling is a very important phenomenon,

²⁴Von Flüer Haimendorf, C. (1963) 'Caste and politics in south Asia' in Philips, C. (ed.), p.57.

²⁵From Worsley, P. Introducing Sociology. Harmondsworth: Penguin, p.320.

for ethnic and religious divisions in particular may well cross-cut horizontal class divisions.

Dual polities

Ethnic, religious or other status groups may thus constitute a stratum or a 'pillar'. It is quite possible for divisions to be vertical, and divide society into separate compartments. The council of the sub-Himalayan village of Sirkanda met once during 1957-1958 in a meeting called by the village level worker, a government employee stationed in the village.²⁶ The meeting was announced well in advance and was scheduled to coincide with the annual visit of the government tax collector and the even rarer presence of the village accountant, with both of whom all landholders had to deal. The village level workers was motivated to call the meeting primarily because it was time for him to turn in certain reports, but it was announced as a meeting to discuss village improvements. No agenda was circulated in advance. The meeting was held in the open near the two village shops and beside the trail to the village water supply, which we are told is a pleasant, convenient, and conspicuous location, with the shops serving as comfortable retreats for bored participants and observers. Berreman informs us that attendance was poor. Most council members did their business with the government officials and left and those who did attend did so out of idle curiosity, drifting in as they felt inclined and away again as they tired of joining their colleagues in peering through the village accountant's spectacles, reading

²⁶Berreman, G. (1972) Hindus of the Himalayas: Ethnography and Change. University of California, p.287.

the tax collector's book of blank receipts, stamping one another with the official panchayat seal, gossiping with their neighbours, or making sarcastic remarks about the business of the meeting. From the proceedings, Berreman points out peasant indifference to the suggestions or decisions for positive action (ibid.: 291). The lack of success of this meeting, as of village self-government and government programmes in general in this area, lies in part in the fact that it did not contain much of real interest to the villagers. Six items were proposed, of which only two concerning the water supply were acted upon, and the only other subject mentioned that was of interest to the villagers concerned the community centre (ibid.). What the villagers desire is minimum interference from outside. Many villagers avoid these meetings, believing them to be a waste of time, and their beliefs are thereby reinforced. Herein, we have mentioned some typical examples of reactions to government sponsored local self-government and other programmes in this area. In fact, there are villages in Bhatbair, the region in which Sirkanda is found, which are considerably more hostile to such programmes than is Sirkanda, "Villages," Berreman informs us, "in which the meeting would, in all probability, have been boycotted entirely" (ibid.: 292). The combination between two opposed belief structures sees the peasant interlocked between inside and outside forces. The peasant tries to turn off, to withdraw, to sever ties with the state and thereby promote an atmosphere of non-cooperation or incivisme. This condition is a product represented by a clash between separate life-styles and not the adoption of one attitude. Two alternative sectors face the peasant, the one regulated by tradition, the other by modernity. It makes it possible to grasp, through lived experience, the dialectic that

operates between a traditional (declining) system and a modern system (imposed from outside); from this dialectic emerges a third, unstable type of socio-cultural system whose origin is to be found in the confrontation of the first two (Balandier, 1970: 179). Because of its very size, the village community is the unit where this complex dynamic is best seen at work. New structures can be seen in their emergent state and where modern political action is expressed in the most immediate way (ibid.: 180).

Pakistan's present search for forms of government suitable for a people who (according to former President Ayub) are 'not yet ready' for democracy has given the quietus to the agitation for an Islamic state. When Ayub was President, he appeared to regard Islam as at best a private matter of conscience and morality and at worst a reactionary influence: 'the cobwebs of superstition and stagnation' (Tinker, op.cit.: 177). The mazhab of al-Shafi'i, ijmā' is regarded as the consensus of the 'ulamā', that is of those who, in any given generation, are capable by reason of their character and scholarship of exercising ijtihād²⁷ or personal effort at interpreting the Qur'ān and Sunna to meet contingencies not already provided for by existing determinations of the Holy Law.²⁸ It is the 'ulamā' who are not appeased with the incursion of a secular polity and their present discontent with secular regimes remains undisguised (Tinker, ibid.). In sum, the effect of the secular,

²⁷We shall endeavour to explain some important concepts here. Mazhab al-Shafi'i usually means 'religion'; ijmā' (another word for this); 'ulamā' is the nearest transliteration of the Arabic word - from 'ilm 'knowledge' - which means literally 'the learned, the teachers of religion' (the pandits or the śāstrīs).

²⁸Hardy, P. (1963) 'Traditional Muslim views of the nature of politics' in Philips, C. (ed.), p.34.

military polity based on revolutionary aspirations has been to revert to the politics of Curzon's India. Herein interests from outside have superimposed this necessity for efficiency, rationalization and development culminating in a social cleavage between the central administration and the multifarious local micro-systems or village communities located in pockets throughout Pakistan. Thus, both localized conglomerates and the 'ulamā yielded and continue to manifest their discontent with the continuous streams of military regimes (loc.cit.). The present regime still has to tread the path from autocracy to democracy. It still has to evolve a polity that will reconcile modern political aspirations and traditional attitudes.

The general opinion held in Sirkanda over the influx of cosmopolitan influences into the Pahari domain appears contradictory. To the Paharis [pahār meaning hill, thus 'hill people'] from Sirkanda, life in the macro-system is regarded as more suited to the plains people but it is not thought as favourable by the poorer Paharis (Berreman, op.cit.: 305). One Rajput, in reference to the emigration to the plains, commented: "Anyone who leaves the village is a fool because here he is king but there he is slave" (ibid.). Another, referring to short-term visits, objected to this view, saying, "A person can learn and improve himself only by going away and having other experiences. In the village he can learn nothing" (ibid.). The one Sirkanda man who had gone out and made a success of life on the outside was pointed to with pride by some villagers, although he had apparently not been well thought of at the time of his departure and he left as a result of a family dispute. Disputes were involved in many cases of temporary emigration from the village (ibid.). Niehoff²⁹ comments that among factory workers of

²⁹ Niehoff, A. (1959) 'Caste and industrial organisation in Northern India' Administrative Science Quarterly, 3: 501.

Kanpur, "... the push from the village was stronger than the pull from the city and the factory." By contrast and in the opinion of most Paharis, cultural distances are too great to permit their successful adjustment to town life. Despite their efforts to practise the proverb, "When in Nepal, eat buffalo" (do as the Nepalese do), they find it difficult to adjust to the unfamiliar way of life of the city (op.cit.: 307). The city is an exciting, but in many ways mysterious and dangerous, place for most Paharis (ibid.: 308).

The important feature of village-urban contacts, Berreman argues, is that of victimization of the naïve Pahari villager by urban shopkeepers and others. A foreigner in India is likely to get the impression that shopkeepers, service personnel and officials are 'out to get' him (op.cit.: 309). However, this is just exploitation of the unwary, in short, the vulnerable. It hits the villager, and particularly the Pahari villager, hard, for he is just as vulnerable as the foreigner and much less able to afford the results of his vulnerability than are most foreigners. Such exploitation affects villagers in most contacts with outsiders, but especially the urban areas (ibid.).

The average villager is at the mercy of shopkeepers when he goes to town, and his vulnerability is advertized by his dress, speech and manners. He is an easy mark. He is the hillbilly come to town and everyone known he has money with him, as otherwise he would not have made the trip. The Pahari buys inferior goods at inflated prices and is none the wiser. He pays Rs.2 for a flashlight bulb that costs anyone else Rs.0.25, and feels fortunate to have found a store which sells such an intricate mechanism. He is victim of the cheat and thief and the dishonest official as well. The only Sirkanda villager who ever tried to buy a radio had his pocket picked of Rs.350 in a cinema before he had a chance to spend it. Money is extorted from the Paharis regularly

by corrupt inspectors, toll tax collectors, and police who threaten a false report if no bribe is paid. It is a simple matter to produce a bottle of illicit liquor and accuse a Pahari of having sold it - better to pay a bribe than risk a heavy fine or imprisonment. The Wisers have described well the position of residents of the plains village in which they worked. Paraphrasing villagers' statements they say:

In the cities they devise ways of exploiting us ... We are at home in the wholesale market. But when we get our money and want to take home some cloth, the shopkeepers get out the pieces which they have been unable to dispose of, and persuade us to buy them at exorbitant prices. We know that they are laughing at us. But we want cloth, and the next shopkeeper will cheat us as badly as the last. Wherever we go in the town, sharp eyes are watching to tempt our precious rupees from us. And there is no one to advise us honestly or to help us escape from fraudulent men. When we go to town to attend the courts, there are men everywhere waiting to take advantage of our ignorance and fear. Our lawyers charge fees which they know are beyond our means to pay. And then if we win a case they think that they deserve an extra large gift. And then if we win a case they think that they deserve an extra large gift. Sometimes there is a sincere helper among them, but we are never sure who is what.³⁰

Social pressure on the internal system

As has been mentioned previously, social pressure is one factor which keeps people from bringing urban or other alien traits into the village. The man who had returned to the village after being in the army in World War II, and who had enjoyed his outside experience very much, replied to an inquiry:

"When I got back to the village I didn't like it at first. I was used to the comforts of army life. But I gradually became accustomed to the village again. I would have liked to bring some things home with me, especially utensils and other conveniences for the house. However, I brought only some cloth for the family, and what I brought is similar to what other people here use. I didn't bring any really nice clothes or other things because people would have laughed at me."

(Berreman, op.cit.: 310)

³⁰Wiser, C. V. and W. H. (1951) Behind Mud Walls 3rd edn. N.Y.: Agricultural Missions, p.163.

Modernist ideologies (Balandier, 1970) are characterized by their instability, by their own movement, in relation to the transformations achieved and the degree of change in political consciousness. Apter has tried to show how ideology is diffused and linked with multiple and, to a large extent, contradictory images.³¹ Under pressure from necessity and events, it is built up and new elements are added to it, as soon as its recipients become receptive to the themes and symbols that have no part in tradition. Also, it is equally our belief that the internal system combines both traditional and modern elements, demonstrating an almost contradictory symbolization; and changing according to the participants' desire to either accede to a system of mobilization, or resist contact, and thus hive off from the predominant macro-system ideology. Hence the antagonism toward anything threatening orderliness is conceived as apparently real in the inner micro-system, promoting cleavages between internal and external systems. This fact may be recognized by the Pahari's obsession with "intermediary forms" expressed in modern aims, that appear as ambivalent because the strange currents from outside, to his way of thinking, embody marginality.

This attitude has not prevented the Pahari, in spite of threats to his system of classification, from acquiring material possessions but it has been one challenge to his way of life expressed in the adoption of new things (Berreman, op.cit.: 311).

Clothing styles, especially those of men, who are in contact with outsiders more frequently than are women, have changed considerably in recent years. Costume jewelry and other ornaments have been acquired by women. Household possessions have come to include more utensils procured from town bazaars. For the most part these have been relatively minor changes - better artifacts rather than new ones. A few people have gotten new items, spurred by urban example. One villager had a functioning

³¹Apter, D. (1965) The Politics of Modernisation. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp.314-327.

phonograph and a few worn records, and someone else was alleged to have a similar machine, long inoperative. The only radio in Bhatbair history, brought by the man employed near Delhi, had failed to operate ... A few young men in the village had mechanical pencils or pens, and at least one owned a cheap watch. One purchased a Japanese cigarette lighter adorned with photographs of nude girls. Many boys owned pocket knives. The village tailor had a hand-operated sewing machine and a charcoal-heated iron for use in his craft.

Tools and materials for agriculture have changed little. Corrugated iron is now often used in roofing, and one new house has a little cement in its construction. Household furnishings now include string cots and cotton quilts or rugs in addition to the traditional wood blanket used for sleeping on the floor. A few kerosene storm lanterns and one or two flashlights are in the village.

There is an accelerating demand for all these things as they become increasingly accessible and as villagers become increasingly aware of them. However, material items in the village, like behavior and beliefs, are predominantly traditional.

(Ibid.: 311)

Government in Sirkanda

Mass politics means new political invasions of traditional society. To these new encounters, caste brings as part of its way of life certain attitudes of special relevance to politics. Of these the central one concerns the nature of political authority. Sirkanda has been designated as the seat of a regional council, originally for much of Bhatbair and now for a less populous area on the western edge of Bhatbair.

It is the village which serves as headquarters for the village level worker and the economic cooperative supervisor. It contains the largest of three schools in Bhatbair. On the rare occasions when tax collectors or other officials come to Bhatbair, they usually do their work in Sirkanda.

In order to understand the relationship of villagers to specific programs in the village, it is necessary first to understand attitudes toward the government in general.

The current state and national governments (not distinguished from one another by villagers) are thought by Sirkanda people

to be made up of corrupt troublemakers. Anything advocated by the government or its representatives is automatically suspect and is usually opposed out of hand. Villagers' attitudes were perfectly exemplified in their response to Republic Day ceremonies planned for the village by the teacher, and supported by the other two governmental employees stationed in Sirkanda. This celebration was announced well in advance. A full day of activities was scheduled, beginning with a flag-raising ceremony at the school, followed by a procession of school children, led through the village by the teacher and his fellow sponsors, singing patriotic and religious songs. In the afternoon a village assembly meeting was to be held at which patriotic speeches would be made and some village business would be conducted. At the conclusion of this, tea and sweets were to be distributed.

Villagers completely ignored the whole program. When the singing group went through the village not a soul joined, acknowledged, or even watched, the procession. Even the usual number of people who would be expected to be in view were out of sight, consciously avoiding the display. No one came to the scheduled meeting, and only the school children were on hand to receive sweets. This was enough to discourage even the conscientious teacher and to convince the other workers that their job in Sirkanda was hopeless.

(Ibid.: 312)

Government controls on land reform

Once we have defined the concrete historical framework within which cultural discontinuity manifests itself, we can attempt, with fewer risks, to bring out the deep causes of the resistance to development (Lévi-Strauss, 1972, Vol.2, p.318).

... we must first of all give a special place to those cases, however exceptional, where the native culture succeeds in taking a partial refuge in a sort of cultural "niche" provided for it by the industrial civilization.

(Ibid.)

As a consequence of traumatic contact, Paharis have galvanized themselves into a non-cooperative frame of mind and with it a mixture of passivity and explicit refusal. Whereas we think the idea of taking a majority

vote is sufficiently democratic, to the Pahari and other like-minded people social cohesion, the emphasis on consensus decision-making and the goodwill within the group are held preferable to any change. Consequently, behaviour is modified in the context of council decision-making - a contingently varying factor - by a movement towards unanimity (Lévi-Strauss, p.320). The conception of many Paharis about their relationship between nature and culture may go some way in explaining their resistance to development in the context of controls placed on land; as an economic mode of production. Development implies the unconditional priority of culture over nature, which is almost never admitted outside the area of industrial civilization (ibid.).

Berreman (1972: 312) shows to us the Pahari resentment as a consequence of nationalization of forest lands. The result was governmental restrictions upon cultivation of new lands and upon access to the products of uncultivated lands; the latter category it was said would prevent flooding, erosion and depletion of forest resources. This hit at the basis of Pahari livelihood. Paharis feel this interference by government is unwarranted and they refuse to ask permission to use that which they believe to be rightly theirs.

Nationalization of the forest lands (cf. Ch.2) has made it illegal to cultivate new lands without special permission. Villagers cite nationalization as an example of governmental stupidity.

"The government asked us to increase crop production for the national welfare. We were happy to comply. However at the same time they made illegal the only means to accomplish this." The ruling

means that, as fields become depleted or inadequate for increasing family size, new ones cannot be legally prepared without special permission. An understanding village accountant (probably he understood bribes) looked the other way when villagers disobeyed the law, but a later accountant, either out of respect for the law or pique at the lack of bribes or of

sufficient bribes, reported the matter. Considerable rancor was aroused before a reasonably happy solution was reached in the land records office, where the offenders were assessed back taxes and allowed to keep the land. This is not a solution for the future, however. As in the use of forest products, notably trees, there is not a rigid prohibition against use of new land, but there is a procedure of application, payment of fees, and so on, which must be followed. Villagers refuse to abide by these rules just as they do the forest laws. Their attitude is not softened by the extreme difficulty they encounter, the necessity for repeated trips to distant headquarters, the arrogant and often greedy officials with whom they must deal in making such applications. It is a task to frustrate anyone, most of all a semi-literate villager. This point will be briefly elaborated below as one element in a pattern which villagers face in dealing with the government.

Another aspect of land legislation is that of taxation. Unfortunately, when landlordism was abolished in the state in 1953, taxes were raised slightly for Sirkanda landowners. Although the increase was slight and lower taxes resulted for the majority of agriculturists in the state, it was resented in Sirkanda, where all agriculturists had long owned the land they tilled. The village comment is, "Congress promised to lower taxes and instead they raised them" (loc.cit.). Villagers are totally unaware of the larger picture on this matter.

The indiscriminate application of general programs of land reform that are inappropriate to the Pahari context has thus been an important factor in alienating these villagers from the government. In itself it would probably have been sufficient to achieve this result. However, it was not the only factor.

(Ibid.: 115)

Agents of authority

For villagers, one of the most frustrating aspects of their relationship to the government is their contact with its official representatives, and especially those who hold power over them. The Wisers have discussed the problem in a plains village at some length (C. V. and W. H. Wiser, 1951, pp.130 ff.; cf. Beals, 1954; Newell, 1954). The brutality and dishonesty of the police are proverbial in Sirkanda. The maxim, "Never trust a policeman," is often quoted and religiously practiced. Specific instances of police brutality and dishonesty are legion, ranging from simple demands for bribes upon threat of a false accusation of illegal distilling to unreasonable violence in trying to extract confessions or information (or, alternatively, heavy bribes) from people who obviously had no connection with a case.

(Ibid.: 316)

The courts are held in utter contempt by most villagers. Examples are given of how even the most serious and flagrant crimes or civil cases are decided on the basis of bribery.

No crime is now so serious that the money cannot win acquittal; no man is so innocent that an enemy cannot put him in prison or win a judgement against him if he has sufficient money for bribes.

(Ibid.: 317)

Peasants like the Paharis are not blind to advantages but they adhere to the hypothesis put forward by Banfield that the villagers act according to the following implicit rule: "Maximise the material, short run advantage of the nuclear family; assume that all others will do likewise."³² And elsewhere, "... indeed [acting] for any end transcending the immediate, material interest of the nuclear family" (ibid.: 10) seems commonly to be eschewed. Unless peasants know where any novelty will lead, they would much rather let it pass them by.

In Sirkanda the unfamiliar, be it a person or a program of change, is regarded with suspicion. The reasons are readily apparent. Contacts with outsiders have been limited largely to contacts with policemen and tax collectors - two of the most unpopular forms of life in the Pahari taxonomy. Such officials are despised and feared, not only because they make trouble for villagers in the line of duty but also because they extort bribes on the threat of causing further trouble and often seem to take advantage of their official position to vent their aggressions on these vulnerable people. Since India's independence, governmental responsibilities have increased and extended to matters previously ignored, such as closer supervision of enlarged government forest lands and rationing of certain goods. The grounds for interfering in village affairs have multiplied as the variety of officials has proliferated. Any stranger, therefore may be a government agent and as such he is potentially troublesome and even dangerous.

(Berreman, ibid.: 322)

Villagers' fears on this score are not groundless. Aside from the unjust exploitation which such agents are reputed to employ, the villagers themselves carry on many illegal or semilegal activities which could be grounds for punishment and are easily used as an excuse for extortion. In Sirkanda, government forest lands and products have been illegally appropriated by villagers, taxable land has been

³²Banfield, E. (1958) The Moral Basis of a Backward Society. Glencoe, Ill.:

under-reported, liquor is brewed and sold illicitly, women have been illegally sold, guns have gone unlicensed, adulterated milk is sold to outside merchants, marriages of children under legal age are performed, men have fled the army or escaped from jail, and property has been illegally acquired from fleeing Muslims at the time of partition. Any of these and similar real and imagined infractions may be objects of a stranger's curiosity and therefore are reasons for discouraging his presence in the village.

Paharis are thought by people of the plains to be ritually, spiritually, and morally inferior. They are suspected of witchcraft and evil magic. In addition, they are considered naïve bumpkins; the hillbilly stereotype of other cultures is shared by Indians. Paharis try to avoid interaction with those who hold these stereotypes. Alien Brahmins may seek to discredit their Pahari counterparts by finding evidence of their unorthodoxy; alien traders may seek to relieve Paharis of their hard-earned cash or produce by sharp business practices; scoundrels may seek to waylay or abduct village women; thieves may come to steal their worldly possessions; lawyers or their cohorts may seek evidence for trumped-up legal proceedings which a poor Pahari could not hope to counteract in court. Christians may hope to infringe on their religious beliefs and practices. Strangers are therefore suspected of having ulterior motives even if they are not associated with the government.

The only way to feel sure that such dangers do not inhere in a person is to know who he is, and to know this he must fit somewhere into the known social system. Only then is he subject to effective local controls so that if he transgresses, or betrays a trust, he can be brought to account. The person who is beyond control is beyond trust and is best hurried on his way.

(Ibid.: 323)

To take a stranger's advice and change accepted practices would be foolhardy. In view of past experience with the government, government sanction of the advocate and his program merely serves to increase the distrust of villagers.

"Ordo rerum"

This political process seems to have a dual effect on caste. To the extent that the loyalties of caste or subcaste are consistently exploited, the traditional structure tends to become frozen. There is a conscious effort on the part of

Tanjore Brahmans in south India to foster a sense of oneness.³³ The Brahmans today define their identity in terms of their distinctions from the non-Brahmans and not on the basis of subcastes. In this regard they differ somewhat from the non-Brahmans. In the Tanjore villages there are no agraharams and at best only a few families of priestly Brahmans. In converse fashion political parties and associations have played a leading part in organizing support against the Brahman mirasdars.

At the beginning of the present century the Tanjore village of Sripuram was well known throughout Tanjore district for its large and prosperous community of Brahmans. The agraharam at Sripuram contains Brahmans belonging to a number of different castes and subcastes. Fifty years ago the Brahmans of Sripuram enjoyed a decisive dominance. However the internal cleavages between the Smarthas and the Shri Vaishnavas, and among the latter between the Thenalai and Vadagalai sections, were reflected in the competition for power relating to control of the village temple and other institutions. Today the power of the Brahmans has declined considerably, the old disputes between the Smarthas and the Shri Vaishnavas have been largely (though not entirely) forgotten and the Brahmans try to face the challenge of the emerging non-Brahman leadership with a measure of unity. Using Dahl's terminology Bêteille states that Sripuram is being transformed from a 'system of cumulative inequalities' to one of dispersed inequalities (ibid.: 274). In the past the Brahmans enjoyed the highest positions in the hierarchies of status, class and power.

³³Bêteille, A. (1970) 'Caste and political group formation in Tamilnad' in Kothari, R. (ed.), p.273.

Today they continue to enjoy ritual and economic dominance but political power has shifted to the non-Brahmans. The shift in political power has been hastened by the introduction of Panchayati Raj (ibid.: 274).

Till the mid-forties the Brahmans dominated the village panchayat. The panchayat head was always a Brahman and the panchayat room was situated in the agraharam. Since independence the status and positions have been inverted as non-Brahmans acceded to power. Symbolic of the transfer of power from the Brahmans to the non-Brahmans has been the shift in the location of the panchayat-hall from the agraharam to the non-Brahman streets. Furthermore, we are led to believe that in an agraharam village Brahmans and non-Brahmans live in "segregated compartments" in their separate residential areas. Brahmans usually avoid contact with the non-Brahman residential surroundings.

These changes in Sripuram reflect changes in the bases of power in the wider system. In the traditional system power was derived largely from landownership and high ritual status. The introduction of new political structures and specialized political organs have helped non-Brahman leaders of Sripuram (who command the support of numerically preponderant groups and have access to leaders and party bosses outside the village) to edge out of the panchayat the Brahman landowners (ibid.).

By utilizing effectively the communication media beyond Sripuram, external pressures were brought to bear on the internal fabric. Through external shifts in power produced by events in the wider structure, the distribution of power within inverted the then existing structure (ibid.: 275). The movement then is characterized by the 'system of mobilization' that organizes

modification of society (Apter, 1965, Ch.6). The internal and external articulations put forward by Balandier (op.cit.: 183) are presented in two versions. Firstly, a literature compiled for a sophisticated audience is intended for the political and intellectual elites for diffusion abroad. The second concerns a more simplified version, couched in a traditional vocabulary, aimed at the peasantry and those strata less affected by literacy. Hence, ideas for external functions included conferences held in 1916, 1917 and the sending of a powerful delegation to England in 1919 to present the non-Brahman case before a Joint Parliamentary Committee (Béteille, op.cit.: 275). Ideas designed for internal consumption and reconstructed to fit a "leading symbol" or a "dominant persuasion" were multi-language newspapers in English, Tamil and Telugu which served as mouthpieces for the movement (loc.cit.).

The political party is the primary means of modernization by virtue of its origin in the initiative of the modernist elites, its organization, which gives it closer contact with the community than that possessed by the administration. This aspect is accentuated in the case of unitary parties or movements that result from a desire to change the community, to restructure social relations and to engender a new form of consciousness and ethics (Balandier, op.cit.: 181).

There are various ways in which participation in organized politics tends to alter the structure of caste (Béteille, 1970, p.292). Rudolph and Rudolph have drawn attention to an important change which accompanies the emergence of caste associations. A caste association is no longer a birth status group in which membership is automatically ascribed at birth: membership in a caste association has to be acquired, although the base of recruitment may be restricted to a single caste or group

of castes.³⁴ Party programmes also may (and increasingly do) lead to splits within a caste and to alliances across castes.

Political alliances between castes and between castes and political parties tend to be rather unstable. Traditional groups which are in the same camp today may find themselves in opposite camps tomorrow. It is perhaps becoming less and less common for the same caste or subcaste to identify itself persistently with a particular political party or movement over any significant length of time. And to the extent that a caste does not identify itself persistently with any particular party but tends to divide and subdivide and to enter into multifarious alliances across its boundaries, its very contours ultimately become blurred.

(Béteille, *ibid.*: 292)

Politicians in Tamilnad have learned to manipulate caste in the furtherance of their interests. But politics is a dynamic phenomenon and the politician whose only skill is caste politics is likely to become obsolete. In this context what Dahl says of ethnic politics in the United States of America is particularly relevant.³⁵ "In order to retain their positions, politicians are forced to search for new issues, new strategies, new coalitions."

Forms of political mobilization differ. They are shaped in particular by the perception of the actors, in a given situation, of the problems and values confronting them and the range and variance of the larger social reality.³⁶ In India, we are faced by the fact that on the level of the region each political party is associated with certain caste interests, whereas on the all-India level a party stands for a specific ideology (Von Fürer-Haimendorf, C., 1963, p.64). Reformers,

³⁴Rudolph, L. and Rudolph, S. The Modernity of Tradition; Political Development in India. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, Ch.1.

³⁵Dahl, R. (1967) Pluralist Democracy in the United States; Conflict and Consent. Chicago: Band McNally, Ch.1.

³⁶Bhatt, A. 'Caste and political mobilisation in a Gujurat district' in Ch.9 in Kothari, R. (1970) (ed.), p.299.

as well as reactionaries, hoping to preserve existing divisions of power and wealth, have long dreamed of actually creating institutional 'pillars' which would create cross-cutting ties not between individuals but between the groups and organizations of the different classes, so as to counter-act and reduce class conflict. They have usually pinned their hopes on mystical, religious and dogmatic presuppositions, becoming fixated in the process (Worsley, 1969, p.321).

Opler has described perhaps the most crucial obstacle to community development programmes as "the social organizational difficulty of expecting a social structure which was essentially fluid, diffuse and conservative to implement programmes which demand decision, dispatch, and an experimental frame of mind".³⁷

The controlling group in Sirkanda has always been the high-caste landowners, and they remain so today. Although they are not a co-ordinated body on many matters, they are co-ordinated in their relationship to the low castes, whom they control in almost every sphere. This leads to one of the most perplexing problems in community development in Sirkanda, the conflicting interests of high and low castes.

Sirkanda has a sharply segmented society with important privileges granted to high castes and withheld from low castes. High castes naturally have a heavy stake in maintaining the status quo.

(Berreman, p.325)

The Congress party and the government of India have proclaimed an equalitarian, anticaste ideal. To Sirkanda villagers this is one important characteristic of "government" and of "Congress". This alienates high-caste people from the government and its representatives, who are assumed to be dangerous radicals who threaten the traditional system. They feel that ultimately the government will force them to associate with their caste inferiors and will help low castes to independence, prosperity, and arrogance, possibly at high-caste expense and certainly to their detriment. This is an important and explicit reason why high castes refuse to co-operate with government people and programs in Sirkanda.

³⁷Opler, M. 'The extensions of an Indian village' Journal of Asian Studies, 6: 5-10 (1956)

Low-caste people have been hopeful of improved status and livelihood on exactly these grounds. They hope to benefit from the government's attitudes and programmes. The Community Development Programme, as it has functioned thus far, has been designed primarily to benefit agriculturists - the high-caste, well-off landowners. This is to be expected because, as Lewis³⁸ has pointed out, the main aim of the programme has been "increases in production rather than social justice". This has become apparent to low-caste Sirkanda villagers, who note that the VLW does not talk to them or consider their problems and obviously has no interest in aiding them.

High-caste people are antagonistic to the government, partly because of its alleged interest in the equalitarian ideal, which they feel will ultimately result in active championing of low-caste grievances. This is a dilemma that has not received explicit recognition but which is very real in Sirkanda and has no readily apparent solution without a choice between production and social justice.

Modernization via political intrigue

There are several reasons why foreign investment and aid are regarded by poorer groups with suspicion rather than with joy. During the colonial period much foreign investment, particularly in plantation agriculture and in mining, did not yield significant development effects (see Singer, 1950; Lewis, 1954; Geertz, 1963). The mines and plantations were owned by the foreigners, typically, nationals of the European power exercising colonial control, who employed the Africans or Asians at low wages to do unskilled jobs. Taxes were not ploughed back into development

³⁸Lewis, W. A. (1969) Some Aspects of Economic Development. London: Allen & Unwin, p.536.

outlays. Higher paid managerial, professional and skilled jobs were occupied by Europeans or brokerage networks (cf. Bailey, 1963). There were few spread effects (in Myrdal's sense) created by the European commercial presence. Dalton³⁹ describes peasant resistance;

... this expresses old-fashioned xenophobia, a general mistrust of foreigners ...

Accordingly Dalton's castigation of underdeveloped countries and their apparent level of expectation is thus briefly stated:

... [peasants] have utterly unrealistic expectations about what can be achieved in short periods of time. There is widespread misunderstanding about the long term structural changes necessary to generate growth.

(Ibid.: 216)

Dalton here is incorrect in making a blanket statement whose source is a unitary theory, based on various formalist theories predetermining the systems that they attempt to become familiar with.

In India it cannot be emphasized enough that regional feeling has not been in relation to the centre, except perhaps to a small degree in the State of Madras, but in a sense of rivalry to other regions.⁴⁰ All are claimants for the patronage and bounty of the centre. It is a kind of rivalry between the Tamils and the Andhras, the Gujaratis and the Marathas, the Bengalis and the Biharis, each desiring to go forward more rapidly than the other, and each in a measure jealous of the other, that passes for regionalism in India. One then can visualize a system of factional bargains.

The khap is a council wielding together a number of Jat villages.

³⁹Dalton, G. (1974) Economic Systems and Society: Capitalism, Communism and the Third World. Harmondsworth: Penguin, p.215.

⁴⁰Panikkar, K. The Foundations of New India. London: George Allen & Unwin, p.242.

A sarv-khap refers to a collection of councils permitting matters to be raised and dealt with over a broader area such as a region. Adjudication of authority systems with which the political set-up is concerned are held mainly to ensure 'the resolution of conflict between separate members or groups as they arise within a society'.⁴¹ Commercial considerations are modified in a system where for instance a number of villages might combine their strengths to safeguard their interests.

Centripetal tendencies generally prevail over centrifugal tendencies not only at the level of corporate kinship and local groupings (thok, village, ganwand, clan and khap) but also at the inter-khap level. The reasons for this are the same as at the minor level: namely, physical proximity of the khaps, ties of kinship affinity, and the necessity for mutual co-operation.⁴² Conflicts cannot be allowed to go on indefinitely if these ties are to be maintained. Moreover, certain common values, such as a belief in the sarv-khap council as an institutionalized means of redress, a sense of 'brotherhood' among the khaps and the ideal of sarv-khap solidarity, help a great deal in the resolving of conflicts between khaps and restoring amity between them over a period of time.

The meeting of the sarv-khap council in the Shoron village of Baliyan during March 1963 was concerned with a wider reference to economic and social problems (op.cit.: 207). The sarv-khap council although having no administrative powers represents a voluntary association. Its executive functions are limited, and it can only be put into effect with the mutual consent of the khaps which participate in a meeting and decide to implement the decisions within the respective khap areas.

⁴¹Goldschmidt, W. (1967) Understanding Human Society. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, p.92.

⁴²Pradhan, M. C. (1966) The Political System of the Jats of Northern India. Oxford University Press, p.115.

The actual task of implementation is left to the respective khap leaders. The decisions taken are not binding on those absent from the meeting or those who disagree with actual procedures - situational logic. Thus its functions are judicial and legislative only (op.cit.: 131). In the Baliyan area the different sectional leaders were encouraged to think that they could widen the influence of the council among the masses even beyond the sarv-khap area (which covers the souther-eastern districts of Punjab) and extend it to other parts of the country. It remains to be seen whether and to what extent this optimism is justified. Success depends very much upon the leaders of other areas who attended the meeting being able to implement its resolutions in their own spheres of political influence (ibid.: 208).

The resolutions on national defence clearly indicate that the sarv-khap panchayat and its leaders still consider it their duty to help against foreign invasion, which was one of the council's functions in earlier times. It can no longer raise armies and fight the invader direct, but it can still support a national defence movement (ibid.).

Politically the council leaders are averse to joining hands with any one party or adopting its manifesto. Rather they want the local leaders of the Congress, the Socialists, Swatantrists, Jan Sangh and so forth, to propagate the ideology of the sarv-khap council in the areas under their influence, and to help in implementing its resolutions. That this is so is evidenced by the fact that leaders of all the major political parties, except the communists, were invited to the meeting and were given the panchayat platform. This attempt to make the sarv-khap council a supra-party organization should, in the long run, enhance its prestige and political effectiveness as an organ of social and economic development - just as in earlier

times, only under changed social and political conditions.

It can be seen from the resolutions that by and large the leadership of the sarv-khap panchayat still functions within the traditional thought patterns. Rather than adopt the 'rightist' or 'leftist' views of political parties, it is grappling with the tasks of social and economic development in the traditional manner - with a 'peasant outlook' as it were. This is evident from its views on co-education, cow protection, physical fitness and the need to increase production of milk and ghee. Although progressive ideas can also be discerned in some of the resolutions, these ideas seem to be actuated by changing social conditions rather than by the ideologies of the political parties which stand for them (ibid.: 209).

Therefore on the one hand the sarv-khap council stands for social change and some welfare schemes, but on the other hand it acts as a check on developments such as urbanization and westernization and the ideas which go with them. There is a direct influence from the past history of the council on the matter in which it deals with the problems of modern times.

The participation of delegates from many castes is consistent with the idea that the sarv-khap represents the views of many groups located on the various levels throughout a collection of villages. Political continuity is provided for in the suggestion Pradhan puts forward, of kinship proximity and local continuity serving as principles binding together various interests (loc.cit.).

The politicization of caste and community groups in secular terms is clearly leading to destabilizing tendencies against which the traditional virtues reflected in morality and conservatism find it difficult to hold their own. Traditional concepts have

tended to serve as a brake on social change. Factions may serve to coalesce as mutually rigid associations at the top, preventing the articulation of the demands of the lower castes. In many parts of India inter-caste associations perform this function. With the advent of complex and myriad forms of conflict, multiple movements obstruct a unitary or centralist frame of reference from becoming our principle integrative rule. Disaffected low-caste groups may find that they are excluded from effectively expressing their demands in the established political forums such as the Congress party or the sarv-khap, and must go into opposition to articulate their demands and express their discontent.⁴³ To Hobsbawm (1963) and in line with this point, challenge to the old order takes the form of new and disruptive social forces, when it is suggested by him that:

legitimism may cover a mass revolt against the injustices of the new order.⁴⁴

From this point of view of the genuinely conservative institution the ideal is obedience, not enthusiasm, whatever the nature of the enthusiasm. Not for nothing was 'Ruhe ist die erste Buergerpflicht' (Tranquility is the first duty of the citizen) raised to the forefront of ideas within the early German society (loc.cit.). Obedience to a status quo then affords a total commitment whereas enthusiasm can change direction just as it can wax and wane.

In reference to local pre-independence movements, one such particular case concerned the role played by the Patidar Mandal, an association of the Patidar caste, in an important phase of the national movement that took place in the Gurat district of Gujarat

⁴³Brass, P. Factional Politics in an Indian State: The Congress Party in Uttar Pradesh (1970) Los Angeles: University of California Press, p.243.

⁴⁴Hobsbawm, E. J. (1963) Primitive Rebels. Manchester: Manchester University Press, p.118.

(Bhat, 1970, p.299). In the early years of the twentieth century, when the Mandal started its work, the distance between the national elite and the rural masses was very great. The distance implied a gap between ways of life as well as between the 'idioms' of politics. In short, there arose some discontinuity between the national elite and the rural dweller, reflected in an anti-urban attitude and the low regard held for agricultural workers in an industrializing society. Consequently communication between rural niches and urban conglomerates was based on mutual avoidance and mistrust. Participation of the more traditionally oriented masses was made more difficult by the lack of mass media, illiteracy, deep-rooted ways of the masses and the radical methods of the elite (op.cit.: 336).

In this situation, the leaders of the Mandal provided a crucial communication link between the 'centre' and the 'periphery'. Working as 'link men' between the traditional masses and the modernized political elite, they acted as integrators of traditional and modern values. We can see those of lesser wealth and status were tied in by such bonds to others higher in the class system; in the rural proletarian community, class equals predominantly seek each other out to establish a fictive kinship relationship. The system, abstractly conceived, is part of the 'traditional culture' and is expressed in behaviour associated with a 'small-community way of life' (Wolf, 1959, p.142). It is important to draw out a distinction between the cultural and social domains, because the view of a homogenous group carrying a homogenous body of conventional understandings conceals the fluid, dynamic reality of daily life. In so doing, the dialectic between tradition and modernity, the essential dualism we propose, could well disguise the causes for keeping things as they are, and for making them change.

The Patidars, while consolidating themselves for the nationalist

movement, changed some of their traditions and customs and also developed new patterns of social interaction (Bhat, *ibid.*). Leaders of the Patidar Mandal found quite early in their movement the need for taking along various groups with them in their effort to mobilize mass opinion, instilling awareness of the utility of political means for serving divergent needs, and developing wider categories of social organization for effective political action. As this realization grew, the perceptions of the leaders directing the activity took on a complex character and this shaped the Mandal's organization and ideology (*ibid.*: 301).

In their task of organizing public support for the national movement at the local level, the leaders confronted several problems. First of all they had to prepare the traditional leaders to relate their roles to the political movement, by supporting their caste reforms while at the same time driving home to them the utility of political means in achieving their goals. Secondly, they had to seek the approval of higher level leaders whose style and idiom were dominated by universalistic and secular symbols. They had also to gain recognition from the urbanized, high-caste sections of society. Since political activity in this period was confined to a small section of the English educated urban elite, the efforts of these rural leaders towards a mass movement were often looked down upon or even ridiculed, by the former. It was therefore important, in the beginning, to win their recognition, and by a slow process to incorporate some of them into the new leadership and to make them see the utility of traditional society and loyalties for a broad based political movement.

Working through their caste association, these rural-based leaders played the role of mediators between the universalistic values of the national leadership and the parochial orientations of the masses with

whom they had to work, always addressing themselves to the task of solving concrete problems. In doing so, they developed a political style that was applicable to the existing structure of society, thereby making the structure responsive and adaptable to the demands of the national movement.

Anti-domination alliances

Kunvarji, a local based Patidar from Gujarat, came from a group known as 'Kunbis' and 'Bhabhas', names indicating the rural and backward character of the caste (op.cit.: 318). Kunvarji had come under Gandhian influence in 1910. He continuously kept himself informed about Gandhi's activities in South Africa and wrote letters to Gandhi informing him to the activities of the Mandal (loc.cit.). He had also requested him to visit the place of his operations which is called an ashram. The Mandal collected funds for Gandhi's satyagraha campaign (passive resistance) in South Africa and the students of the ashram observed fasts and donated their savings to the fund (ibid.: 320). Gandhi subsequently moved back to India to begin his passive resistance programme. Kunvarji tried to associate as many caste leaders as possible in the reception for Gandhi. He thought that once they were involved in nationalist activities, there would be no turning back. He therefore asked one caste leader of Bardoli taluka to garland Gandhi when he came. Gandhi was very much impressed by the ashram and the activities of the Mandal. He said:

I had respect for Patidar Yuvak Mandal while I was in Africa. Many people told me there that when I would come to India the Mandal would surely give me support in my work even if others did not. In South Africa Patidars helped me much. I shall see how they help me here when time comes.

(Ibid.)

From 1917 onwards the activities of the Mandal took a distinct

political turn. Caste reform was thrown into the background for a while and politics came to the fore. In 1917, a satyagraha in Kaira district against the government's refusal to postpone the collection of land revenue took place. Kalyanji Mehta was asked to be a member of the Inquiry Committee appointed by Gandhi to examine the case of the farmers before starting the satyagraha; later he joined the satyagraha. Now the Mandal openly took an anti-British and nationalist stand. Patel Bandhu also became openly nationalist, giving unreserved support to the Kaira satyagraha. In the ashram too propagation of nationalist ideas and training in public service were given more importance now. Political leaders were invited to address and meet students whenever they came to Surat. Local Home Rule Leaguers were also invited to the ashram.

Kunvarji, although he belonged to the Leva subcaste of the Patidars, came from a middle-class, educated and socially mobile family. His position seems to us to be analogous in position to the Yeomen of sixteenth century England, the rich peasants of China, or the Kulaki of pre-revolutionary Russia (Wolf, 1966). Kunvarji's father had moved from a primarily agricultural role and had extended his interests into business. In time he ascended to the position of being a recognized leader of his caste and his modernizing role was enhanced by the fact that he was a teacher (Bhatt, op.cit.: 302). Kunvarji learnt from this dual role adopted by his father, and in turn gradually endorsed social reforms, for abolishing harmful customs and traditions in the caste. In addition, he possessed a talent for mobilizing and cultivating public opinion and protecting the interests of the farmers (ibid.). He was police representative from 1913 to 1920 and resigned from this position in response to the call of Gandhi during the 1921 movement.

The Mandal workers were mainly Patidars who had little previous contact with non-Patidars. From 1919 onwards, as they were drawn more and more into politics, their contact with non-Patidar political and social workers increased and they realized the necessity of expanding their field of activity. Although they retained their identity as Patidars, they had to function in a universe enlarged by the induction of workers from various social categories. Kunvarji's work through the Mandal for two decades was directed towards not antagonizing the caste leaders. He proceeded slowly and by stages in his attempts to avoid estrangement from the traditional society. He, in fact, represented networks that cut across strictly class antagonisms and integrated traditional caste values with a reformist anti-urbanized, anti-materialist, and anti-colonial philosophy vis-à-vis Gandhi's satyagraha movement. Poems depicted the cruelty and cunning of the British. People were encouraged to attend Congress sessions and also they were implored to use Indian goods (op.cit.: 309). As Wolf (1952) points out, our dynamic analysis reveals to us the different uses to which the form is put by different individuals, or of the ways in which people explore the possibilities of a form, or the ways in which they circumvent it.

On January 31, 1922, the Congress Working Committee met in the Patidar Vidyarthi Ashram and approved the selection of Bardoli for launching a satyagraha in the form of non-payment of land revenue (Bhatt, op.cit.: 326). An 'ultimatum' to the government was sent. Everybody appeared ready and organized themselves for the historic event. Then came the setback. In Chauri-Chaura a crowd burnt several policemen to death. Gandhi, much against the wishes of everybody, withdrew the satyagraha. He called a meeting of the people of Bardoli and asked them to pay the land revenue. Only

one day was left for the payment and many of the people did not have the money as they had earlier decided not to pay the revenue. But the leaders persuaded them to pay up their dues and arranged for financial help for the impecunious farmers. This self-imposed discipline not only reveals the quality of the leadership provided by the main actors of the drama but also the feeling of trust and devotion vested in them by the people.

Kunvarji also called a meeting of two sections of Charotaria Patidars, the Choryasi and the Baleshwari Panchas, and requested Sardar Patel to persuade them to remove restrictions and differences between the two. Since then these segments have remained integrated (op.cit.: 331). Inter-caste co-operation achieved during the satyagraha movement still continues. Harmony between the Muslims and the Hindus was also achieved. In the words of an important observer:

An excellent outcome of the Bardoli movement is the remarkable unity among the people of the taluka. Today Hindus, Mohammedans and Parsis have forgotten all their differences and have accepted the leadership of the Sardar of Bardoli. When I see Hindu, Muslim and Parsi leaders working together, in the same Swarajya Ashram my heart rejoices.

(Navjivan Mudranalaya, 1928)

Thus if caste were useful in the mobilization of support for the satyagraha, the satyagraha in turn integrated and secularized caste.

Kunvarji's painstaking tact in developing contacts indicates that where politics becomes the major force working for modernization, involvement in politics secularizes caste, because caste then becomes too narrow a group for all practical purposes and is forced to find a wider identity. In order to strengthen support and integrate various levels, a forging of coalitions and a federation of structures becomes necessary. Such support and integration forms a 'pillar' effect in that class and caste boundaries are cross-cut. It gives strategical effect to relative placement vis-à-vis the policy determining processes

ostensibly linking the periphery to a central power base. As Bhatt puts it:

... the Bardoli satyagraha showed that, given proper leadership, caste symbols and sanctions can sometimes become complementary to secular appeals for many.

(Op.cit.: 337)

It is possible to bring about a meaningful reconciliation between traditional and modern elements and lead in the direction of collectively mobilizing displaced elements. It requires the outsider to appreciate the constituent framings which influence peasants' perception of their way of life and how the urban person should be prepared to re-evaluate the dignity (and not just the pecuniary potential) that the peasant seeks, and the intrinsic value attached to family and communal life.

In both India and Pakistan apprehension that the power of the executive has increased rather than declined since independence has led many to look back to the Gandhian ideal (Tinker, op.cit.: 179). One of the most coherent expressions of this spirit is the Sarvodaya movement, whose aims are presented in a penetrating work of social and political analysis by Jayaprakash Narayan, A Plea for Reconstruction of Indian Polity (ibid.).

Some political implications must be noted here. He sees the problem of devising the right kind of polity as part of the larger problem of social reconstruction. Narayan sees the need for social integration according to some collectivist notion. This social reconstruction should go back to a rural base and be founded in a co-operative society. The community should remain the basic social unit for India. His goal was a commitment to localized or a village level dharma. To him the function of dharma is to hold together harmoniously the social order (cf. Tinker, ibid.: 180). We are told it is a law rooted in social custom, and cannot be revived by means of legislation. Rather it must arise from life itself. Jayaprakash contrasts his

'communitarian' society with the present 'centralism', which he believes is an inherent feature in parliamentary democracy. He argues that parties create the cleavages within the system that culminate in an adversarial system. It is a natural outcome of bureaucratic centralism and the struggle for influence.

The solution propounded by Jayaprakash drawn heavily upon Gandhian teaching; a federation of village republics: but the village is not regarded as self-sufficient, and the sense of community is expected to broaden out to include neighbouring villages (ibid.: 180). He expects these associated villages (which he calls the 'regional community') to provide the main focus for the communitarian society. As we proceed from the inner to the outer circles of communal life and organization, there is, he thinks, less and less to do for the outer communities. When we reach the circle of the National Community it has only a few matters to attend to, such as: defence, foreign relations, currency, interprovincial co-ordination and legislation. The present vast responsibilities of the Centre in the economic and social field would be dissolved. Planning would begin from the primary community and therefrom fan outwards. In his scheme of things the regional plan, i.e. the plan of the regional community, would be the pivotal plan. This would mean that the regional plan - and not the village plan which would be too small for the purpose - would be the unit out of which the whole national plan would have to be constructed (ibid.).

Many of the details of the political philosophy of Jayaprakash echo traditional Hindu values; the spirit of community is expressed in the search for unanimity; when members of panchayats are selected, the method of choice should be 'by general agreement or by drawing lots'. One such general view of this system could be the one put forward by Geertz who uses the Indonesian word aliran (stream) to denote factions. He

defines the term, however, as "an ideologically defined political faction ... a political party surrounded by networks through which factional conflict is manifested at certain levels".⁴⁵ He adds:

An aliran is more than a mere political party, and yet more than a mere ideology: it is a set of interconnected social forms which act to group large masses of people into a generalized category.

(Ibid.: 128)

Geertz's perception of the phenomenon of factions which embrace ideology and political party affiliation is, it should be pointed out, derived from observation of factional politics at a variety of levels of political competition and is not confined to the village level. We could even go further and imagine that aliran is a transformation of the patron-client relationship we noted sometime earlier, in bringing about vertical structuring of alignments embodied in our principle of subjugation through manipulation. Alavi, in supporting Wertheim's position, writes,

We find that, in the wake of the 'Green Revolution' in countries of Asia, such challenges have indeed been manifested in new forms of peasant militancy. The profound economic changes which are currently taking place have had the effect of disrupting patron-client relationships and the vertical alignments dominated by wealthy landowners.⁴⁶

In supporting this point, we have propounded an idea endorsed by Meillassoux⁴⁷, who argued that a system practising "to each according to his status" creates inherently unstable networks of social relations, responsible for producing a volatile and changing system (op.cit.: 170).

⁴⁵Geertz, C. (1965) The Social History of an Indonesian Town. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, p.127.

⁴⁶Alavi Hamza (1973-74) 'Peasant classes and primordial loyalties' Journal of Peasant Studies, 1: 47

⁴⁷Meillassoux sees relations of production as "built on the basis of genealogical kinship relations, which are themselves subject to constant modification and renewal". The kinship relations revealed to us are the result of these changes. Cited in Meillassoux (1964) Anthropologie économique des Gouro de Côte d'Ivoire: de l'économie d'autosubsistance à l'agriculture commerciale. Paris: Mouton, p.168.

The peasant dilemma

One important strategy is to resolve the basic peasant dilemma (Wolf, op.cit.: 16) by curtailing consumption. The peasant may reduce overall consumption due to the level of violence he perceives exists on an implicit level which in turn precipitates his reliance on domestically produced products. Using this means peasants adopt successful strategies in underconsumption. This ensures that they rely on internal means of nourishment. This attitude is reinforced by inducing fear in reaction to novelty. By maintaining internal mechanisms that re-allocate scarce resources and scarce qualities, peasants are able to operate autonomously in resisting acceptance of outside pressures. In conclusion, then, peasants who operate discontinuously with a larger social system and who devise their own redemptive style, do so in order to stay outside an order they perceive to be threatening. We may agree, then, that peasant systems seem historically to oscillate between opposite tendencies exemplified in retrenchment and increased assertiveness. It seems therefore that Foster's definition restricts itself to the passive subordinated phase and therefore his position appears one-sided.

According to Huizer⁴⁸ resistance to change by peasants is mainly a reaction of self-defence against the 'resistance to change' of the traditional elites which fear losing their domination over the peasants. Huizer believes peasants can be mobilized quite well if the purpose of the mobilization is to change the existing status quo for a system under which the peasants can reasonably expect effective improvements (loc.cit.). In Latin America the combination of hacienda system, landlord and bureaucratic agencies makes life exceedingly difficult for peasants. The peasant does not reproduce fully his own life

⁴⁸Huizer, G. (1973) Peasant Rebellion in Latin America. Harmondsworth: Penguin, p.2.

conditions. "The object that labour produces, its product, confronts it as an alien being, as a power independent of the producer."⁴⁹

The violent reaction on the part of peasants is not so much an inherent characteristic of their movements but results from the fact that the landed elite makes the orderly development of representative peasant-interest groups impossible, either by provoking struggles between groups or through repression (Huizer, op.cit.: 66). Constructive change is often hindered by paternalistic social structures blocking initiatives on behalf of would-be peasant leaders.

Predominantly, the main factors causing a crisis in distribution are, on the one hand, the penetration of a market economy and Christianity outside their immediate domain, and on the other a radical shift in values between domains because of a new normative interpretation of existing values. It becomes obvious then that peasant resistance to change is a refusal to comply when there exists no reason for the peasants to expect that they would benefit from any change advocated by the authorities. In Latin America intransigent interests opposed to the peasants are the causal factor behind peasant frustration, radicalization and repression (Huizer, op.cit.: 154). There is a tendency to defend the present stability at all costs (ibid.: 157). Consequently, distrust is a logical reaction of the peasant to the 'resistance to change' of the landed elite (ibid.: 158).

So described, the conceptions of 'traditional culture' and of the 'small-community way of life' change character radically!⁵⁰ The

⁴⁹This citation is from Marx, K. (1954) Capital, Vol.1. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, p.348.

⁵⁰From Mintz, S. (1973-74) 'A note on the definition of peasantries' Journal of Peasant Studies, 1: 91-106, 97.

social-relational (manoeuvring) aspect of behaviour makes of 'the traditional' no longer something 'surviving' or 'conserved' from the past, but rather a pattern of and for behaviour that remains viable, though its symbolic meanings and its actual utility may have become quite different. And since different members of the peasantry, or of different sub-groups of the peasantry, may be expected to engage in highly variable employment of cultural content to achieve desired goals, the ways such materials are employed is a function of the sociology of those who 'carry' the culture. In peasant societies, 'blind custom' is neither blind nor customary, and the differential distribution of power, wealth and status will affect the uses of patterned behaviour, as well as its meanings for those who engage in it. From this we can avoid the point of view that permits us to see peasants constituting the underside and passive sources of consciousness. According to another perspective they may well include both exploiters and exploited, and cannot be fully understood, if we take for granted that they are economically and culturally homogenous (ibid.: 96).

Under-employment and peasant resentment

By reviewing pressures on the land tenure system, Roy indicates how irregular is peasants' income. Under the existing system in the Terai region in the west of Bengal, a jotedar employs adhiars (share-croppers) to cultivate his land on a contractual basis every season.⁵¹ All the transactions are made orally and there are, therefore, no legal documents to establish any rights for the tillers. The jotedars have been legally free to exploit the peasants as they like. Roy

⁵¹Roy, A. K. (1975) The Spring Thunder and After: A Survey of the Maoist and Ultra Leftist Movements in India: 1962-75. Columbia: South Asia Books, p.55.

tells us that no land records were maintained, and the jotedars took advantage of this and started a large number of malafide transfers of holdings in excess of the ceiling. This was followed by large-scale evictions of the peasants and share-croppers, who did not get any protection from the law (loc.cit.).

As we shall attempt to show, the land reforms of the 1950s and 1960s did not bring about any structural change in agrarian relations but merely abolished semi-feudal 'intermediary' tenures (ibid.: 57). Whilst these laws regulated and protected tenancy rights of land-owning cultivators, they did almost nothing to protect the rights of share-croppers. On the contrary, they permitted the owners to resume land from share-croppers (loc.cit.).

Roy argues that, to understand the mobilization process in Bengal, we must address in an operational manner the sector-wide distribution of employed persons (loc.cit.). There existed three categories where the local tribal people were gainfully employed. These, then, were tea plantations where wages received amounted to more than what the mass of the peasantry earned. Forest labourers constitute the second sector of employment. Third, the major segment of the population is engaged in cultivation (ibid.: 58).

Although cultivators comprise a relatively large proportion of the population it would be a mistake to view them as a homogenous group. There are discernible distributions which mark them out into several groups, one such being their relative degree of poverty or affluence (ibid.: 59). Roy chooses to emphasize relative wealth in terms of the size of the holdings owned by the cultivators. Those holding five acres or less he regards as the poorest among the cultivators. In the police districts of Naxalbari, Phansidewa, and Kharibari there appears to be on average in excess of fifty per cent of small cultivators.

But we are told, however, of another element whereby a large segment comprises cultivators who possess no rights in the land they till. Significantly, a high proportion of them cultivate on an agency basis (bhagehash). In excess of fifty per cent of the holdings in Naxalbari and Phansidewa are held on an agency basis. If reform were to ensue successfully, then protective devices against the eviction of bhagchashis (share-croppers) would be seen as necessary (loc.cit.). According to Roy the militant base of the peasant movement rested heavily on the plight of the bhagchashis in the area (ibid.: 60).

Moreover, Roy informs us that the peasant most susceptible to radical movements lives under irregular tenancy law. Where the old rural elite has been weakened combined with political education, literacy, entry into the market, closeness to towns, accessibility to communications etc., is a share-cropper, agricultural labourer, or dwarf (i.e. holding under one acre) found in crop areas where the emphasis devolves on one crop susceptible to market fluctuations (ibid.: 62). Furthermore insofar as Naxalbari was concerned, the serious grievances of the peasants presumably were latent tensions that when carefully articulated vis-à-vis the local communist party enabled them to wrest control from other factions in order to dominate the Kishan Sabha and mobilize eruptions (loc.cit.).

Shanin supports Wolf's view in making the oppressed peasantry one of the critical diagnostic features of peasant status.

The political economy of peasant society has been generally speaking based on expropriation of its 'surpluses' by powerful outsiders, through corvée, tax, rent, interest and terms of trade.⁵²

Again, in his discussion of 'peasantry as a process', he notes that

⁵²Shanin (1971a) 'Peasantry: delineation of a concept and a field of study' European Journal of Sociology, XII.

... [structural] changes in peasantry have been determined (or at least triggered off) by the impact of non-peasant sections of society, a situation which can be explained both by the character of the peasant social structure ... and by the very fact of peasant domination by powerful outsiders.

(Shanin, 1971a, 298)

This emphasis is well taken, and represents a step forward from earlier descriptions of the content of peasant society that dealt too little with structural relationships of peasants to non-peasants. In Wolf's treatment, the central defining characteristic is taken to be the exactions of agricultural productivity by outside forces:

The peasant ... does not operate an enterprise in the economic sense; he runs a household, not a business concern.

(Wolf, 1966, p.2)

... In primitive society, surpluses are exchanged directly among groups; peasants, however, are rural cultivators whose surpluses are transferred to a dominant group of rulers.

(1966, pp.3-4)

... A peasantry always exists within a larger system.

(1966, p.8)

... there exist in more complex societies social relations which are not symmetrical, but are based, in some form, upon the exercise of power ... Where someone exercises an effective superior power ... over a cultivator, the cultivator must produce a fund of rent. It is this production of a fund of rent which critically distinguishes the peasant from the primitive cultivator ... So far, then, the term 'peasant' denotes no more than an asymmetrical relationship between producers of surplus and controllers.

(1966, pp.9-10)

In recent years in south Asia, the so-called 'green revolution', based on an elite farmer strategy (for the native bourgeoisie) of increasing the agricultural surplus sought to sustain industrialization and urbanization as well as to expand the domestic market for manufactured goods.⁵³

⁵³Alavi, H. 'The state in postcolonial societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh' in Gough, K. and Sharma, H. (eds.) Imperialism and Revolution in South Asia. London: Monthly Review Press, p.147.

Contradictions remain, however, for the elite farmer strategy is having a disruptive effect on the fabric of rural society, and this may have consequences which reach beyond its confines. The discontent stemming from rural areas occasions concern on the part of the bourgeoisie, which seeks through controlled and limited 'trickling down the pillar' to consolidate the conservative alliance with the 'feudal' landowning classes to preserve the existing social order (ibid.: 164). Alavi informs us that the native bourgeoisie played an anti-imperialist role and contributed to the national independence movement against the colonial power, but only up to the point of independence. In the postcolonial phase there is a double re-orientation of alignments, both of the indigenous bourgeoisie and of the erstwhile 'comprador' class of merchants, building contractors and the like. The latter, unable to compete on equal terms with overseas oligopolies and monopolies, demand an internal policy of protectionism, and acquire an 'anti-imperialist' posture. Just, when the 'national' bourgeoisie grows in size and aspires to extend its interests, its external economies remain inefficient compared to overseas concerns and thus it puts pressure on the need for efficient competitive requirements within the internal system. Alavi describes it thus:

Their small resources and scale of operation keep the possibility of independently developing their own technology out of their reach.

(Ibid.).

For access to the requisite advanced industrial technology, they have to turn for collaboration to the bourgeoisies of the developed metropolitan countries (cf. New Zealand) or to socialist states. As it grows in size and extends its interests, the so-called 'national' bourgeoisie becomes increasingly dependent on the neocolonialist metropolitan bourgeoisies:

... agreements with the native bourgeoisie establish captive markets for their products as well as for their technologies.

(Op.cit.: 165)

Although a merging occurs, involving many mutual 'interests' between the indigenous 'national' bourgeoisie and the metropolitan bourgeoisies into what could be imagined as a unitary phenomenon, this in fact is not the full picture. For such an apparent unity belies the fact of segmentation and hierarchical opposition in that conflict implies their relative separateness and the tension that underlies their relationship (ibid.).

In India regional and ethnic disparities in employment and wealth create competitive struggles particularly among the educated classes in different linguistic areas, castes and religions. Gough argues that it is easy to mistake segmentation as an outward manifestation of 'traditional' birth status groups when in fact competitive struggles reflect inequalities, through superordinate capitalism and its corollary expression of materialism.⁵⁴

Unless the economics of land tenure and use of labour systems are articulated, then in any case we would not be able to understand the internal dynamic and indeed oppose the reasons for the landlord's appropriation of peasant surpluses. We should see how an outline of the form of domination has generally failed to break peasant attachment to agriculture and the land (Shanin, 1971, p.241). And yet peasant perception of their inferiority and their resulting persecution devolves on seeing their lesser relative value in terms of effective contribution, which is put forward in the relatively higher value placed on industrial technology and the acquisition of related skills. Distribution of added capital value is represented in relation to the impact of industrialization, commercialization, urbanization and centralization, and is directly

⁵⁴Gough, K. (1973) 'Imperialism and revolutionary potential in south Asia' in Gough, K. and Sharma, H. (eds.), p.9.

attributable to the power from the dominant impact of expanding and structurally different economies. Both traditional regional diversities and structural change are reflected in the heterogeneity of peasant societies.

Colonial and neo-colonial interpenetration

In Pakistan, the ruling elite's lack of responsiveness to the needs and aspirations of its own people contrasts sharply with its eagerness to serve the international neo-colonial hierarchy with its own special brand of industrial, financial and monetary institutions. This international system is recommended to the local elite through elaborate mechanisms of powerful salesmanship, individual enticement, brainwashing and militarist infiltration and pressure. The case of Pakistan is a classic example, argues Gardezi, of how these mechanisms have been used, ostensibly to modernize the country, but in effect to acquire total control of its political economy and social policy.⁵⁵ Colonial and neo-colonial interests turned the hinterland into a dependent enclave controlled by capitalist interests abroad (ibid.: 140). We are informed:

Pakistan's heavy dependence on aid now makes it possible for the lending countries to regulate its basic policies governing taxation, prices, distribution of income, and national and international political commitments.

(Ibid.)

There are many variants of the distribution or sharing of power between political leadership and bureaucratic-military oligarchies in post-colonial societies.⁵⁶ Political parties at the vanguard of

⁵⁵Gardezi, H. N. (1973) 'Neocolonial alliances and the crisis of Pakistan' in Gough, K. and Sharma, P. (eds.), p.138.

⁵⁶Alavi, H. (1973) 'The state in postcolonial societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh' in Gough, K. and Sharma, H. (eds.), p.149.

the movement for national independence inherit the mantle of legitimacy and the trappings of political power. Nevertheless, in a large number of post-colonial countries there has been in evidence a progressive attenuation of their power and, correspondingly, an expansion in the power of bureaucratically and militarily controlled oligarchies, which has often culminated in an overt 'seizure' of power by the latter (loc.cit.). In general, however, we are informed by Alavi of the existence of tension between the political leadership and bureaucratic-military oligarchies. The political leadership supported by the latter serves a useful purpose by conferring the mantle of political legitimacy on regimes and, through the charade of democratic process, absorbs public discontent and channels their greivances (loc.cit.).

The essential issue put forward in Alavi's argument is that of the relative autonomy of the state apparatus as a whole and its mediatory role as between the competing interests of the three propertied classes - the domestic bourgeoisie, the metropolitan bourgeoisies, and the land-owning classes. Insofar as a political leadership participates in the performance of the mediatory role and in the preservation of the relative autonomy of the state apparatus, it becomes a valuable partner for the purposes of the bureaucratic-military oligarchy. It forms the third component of the oligarchy. It is only where political parties seriously challenge their relative autonomy and the mediatory role of the bureaucratic-military oligarchy that conflicts arise in which, until now, the latter have prevailed (ibid.: 150).

In the case of India there has been a tendency towards control of state power by a political party. The ruling Congress party is by no means a party of a single class. It participates with the bureaucracy in mediating the demands of competing propertied classes, whilst at the same time participating with it in using state power to

uphold the social order that permits the continued existence of those classes, despite the socialist rhetoric of the Congress party. Alavi maintains that even with regard to foreign capital, the actual performance of the government of India is very different from the rhetoric of the Congress politicians (ibid.). What is crucial for us to realize is that behind the apparent power of Congress politicians the Indian bureaucracy does enjoy a very wide margin of autonomy (ibid.).

On transfer of power in 1949, the Congress party implemented Agrarian Reforms. It seemed quite a radical departure from the bourgeois point of view.⁵⁷ It recommended abolishing intermediary tenants, giving land to the actual tiller, protecting the tenant from rent-rackets, and the commuting of rent in kind into cash. The reforms envisaged small and medium sized farms following the allotment of land to tenants (ibid.: 105). In reality, however, the Congress governments in different states adopted a wait-and-see attitude, and by the time 'implementation' of the land reform legislation ensued, the original programme was greatly diluted in favour of maintaining the interests of the entrenched rural oligarchies intact. Intermediate tenants appropriated huge tracts of land and evicted millions of tenant cultivators (ibid.). Land reforms were proposed to alleviate rural poverty and eliminate exploitation, but it feared to go too far in this lest it antagonize the powerful vested interests in the rural areas who, in turn, according to vertical alignments, supported the autonomous centralized bureaucracy.

But the more permanent effect of this change led in the direction of extensive underemployment among labourers and monopsonistic control of labour by rural landlords and moneylenders who subjugated the peasantry to an experience to do with 'low classness' (Shanin, 1972). In two

⁵⁷Chattopadhyay, P. (1973) 'Some trends in India's economic development' in Gough, K. and Sharma, H. (eds.), p.104.

ways, then, land, at least from an instrumental view, when cultivated serves as a means for reduced, or even elimination of, unemployment provided that the attachment therein continues. Otherwise, presumably the 'low classness' we proposed could only be overcome by influential 'brokers' from outside assisting internal re-organization and mobilization. The absence of real pure competition in rural labour markets has escaped economists. Hence production functions are ill-fitted and momentous policy conclusions drawn on the assumption that labourers are indeed free in India.⁵⁸ Bagchi maintains that an absence of competition helps keep a 'slack' in the system, and capitalists can live like rentiers off the fat of the land. In converse fashion, since production methods do not change, except very slowly, it remains profitable to retain systems like crop-sharing and the employment of labourers as virtual serfs (ibid.). Many European planters in Bihar found it profitable to turn into zamindars (big landlords who leased their lands to share-cropping tenants) when natural indigo failed in competition with artificial dyes (ibid.). Again, Parry's of Madras, managing agents of the largest sugar mills in south India, found it more profitable to rent out land to peasants than to cultivate it themselves, using modern methods and large doses of fertilizer (loc.cit.). In fact, political structures, producing both internally and externally a commitment to policies of underemployment, contribute to cheapening the relative value of labour. If we acknowledge during the phase of colonial rule the existence of formally free labour, then the irresistible trend towards imperfect monopsonistic control precedes political destabilization and segmentation in the macro-system and increasing fragmentation within variegated micro-systems.

⁵⁸Bagchi, A. 'Foreign capital and economic development in India: a schematic view in imperialism and revolution in south Asia' in Gough, K. and Sharma, H. (eds.) (1973) p.55.

An assessment with respect to the Green Revolution shows that although an increased food supply resulted, this was accompanied by an unanticipated intensity towards political polarization.⁵⁹ An objective of the scheme was the transplantation of high yielding grain varieties coupled with an entirely new technology and new strategy (ibid.). Frequently, though, a one-sided emphasis on production increases with a neglect of institutional issues has exacerbated existing inequalities.

We would maintain that a structural-synchronic view is accompanied by an ahistorical frame of reference. It seems to us a one-sided passive account, would less accurately render a truthful description in reference to peasant resistance to change. In a few short years, peasants of India have transcended this description and made a major breakthrough in productivity (op.cit.: 79). We would point to the devaluation placed on and inculcated through the instrumental and expressive symbolic complexes filtering ideas from a point outside the micro-system, which generates a third mediating principle based on a 'bricolage' formed and structured on a combination of customary and modernist elements. This combination of elements understandably has led to ambivalent and hostile attitudes among peasants as it threatens the stability of their social classification.

Sharma does not attribute this breakthrough to a sudden technological shift (ibid.). Rather, the Green Revolution occurred because for a while there seemed a ready relaxation in peasant thinking which was conducive to an introduction of new technology, and it appeared as appropriate as the farmers were in agreement to these advantages. Ironically, as production grew, social relations grew more tense (ibid.: 80).

⁵⁹Sharma, H. 'The Green Revolution in India: prelude to a red one?' in Gough, K. and Sharma, H. (eds.) (1973) p.77.

Unlike the traditional village-based conflicts between factions within the dominant landowning groups, which involved localized symbols of power and prestige, the new conflicts emerged along class lines (loc.cit.). Weaker exploited sections in rural India have risen against their oppressors, but these peasant uprisings have lacked cohesive leadership and class ideology (loc.cit.).

A nationally cohesive political leadership is perhaps still lacking, yet the present rural unrest in areas such as Naxalbari and Phansidewa is unmistakably distinguished by their massive scale and militant overtones. The peasant uprising in Naxalbari (1967) was a symptomatic outburst which set the character and tone of things to come. Trouble occurred regularly in many forms including Gandhian satyagrahas, massive land grab marches, forceful seizures of harvested crops, unionized demands for higher wages and, increasingly, the physical annihilation of landlords. The form varied, the content was the same and in the process the line of demarcation became clearer (ibid.: 81).

Entrenched elites - landlords, rich peasants, rentiers, paymaster - depending upon their respective strengths, responded differently. Sometimes they fled to the cities, to return only when their allies in the state apparatus (the police, the army) made it safe for them to do so. At other times they retaliated with force (loc.cit.). Sharma puts to us the question concerning ubiquitous instability and ramifications of violence; based on Home Minister Chavan's statement:

Unless the Green Revolution is based on social justice, I am afraid the Green Revolution may not remain green.

(Ibid.: 82)

Is it co-incidence that the two developments - an increase in agricultural productivity and an increase in class oriented tensions - have occurred simultaneously? The fact that more wealth is there is not the only reason for accentuation in the circumstances that led to politicization

of the peasantry.

In the first instance, Sharma refers to the preceding historical conditions, which he described as modified by British imperialism but mostly conserving the feudal exploitation of the peasantry. Whether or not an area came under British rule or was administered by native princely states, and regardless of the type of tenure system such as zamindari, ryotwari, or mahalwari, the net result amounted to social injustice. At the time of independence a highly skewed landownership pattern, a substantial proportion of landless or near landless peasants, and an extremely oppressive landlordism of a semi-feudal kind were among the features which characterized the Indian agrarian system as a whole (ibid.: 83).

Whilst the caste system and the respective various micro-systems presented a less segmented view prior to the mid-nineteenth century, the essential compositions of these traditional social units changed. By drawing the Indian village into the orbit of international capitalism and subjecting it to such monstrous calamities as the outside pressures built up until the preceding social aggregates lost all sense of orderliness. Castes until this time functioned as occupational guilds, panchayats (village councils) fulfilled the function of real or fictive kinship ties, and the inter-caste functional inter-dependencies provided a degree of internal cohesiveness. Moreover, and this is where we support Sharma, the aggregation of elements into social units, operating prior to neo-colonialist incursions, varied inversely with the degree of involvement in the market system. This involvement was encouraged under British rule (ibid.: 85).

Moreover, the Congress party's postponement, during the independence struggle, of attending to peasant grievances was according to Alavi a matter of political expediency because of the primacy, as they understood

it, which should be accorded to an anti-imperialist struggle. After independence the ideologues of Indian socialism abandoned the struggle for the poor peasant altogether.⁶⁰ Thus Ashoka Mehta, who was Chairman of the Praja Socialist party and its most influential ideologue, wrote:

Should the Socialists, as the Communists are wont to do wherever they are in power, foment class conflict in villages even after landlordism is removed and use the wide array of tactics developed from Lenin to Mao Tse-Tung to use one section against the other? ... If that is the line chosen, democratic rights and socialist values cannot survive. Then must come the whole complex of communist paraphernalia: the people's courts, liquidation of kulaks, forced levies and the attendant violence. The other alternative is to help the village to recover its community solidarity and foster autonomy of the village community ... The organic needs of village community cannot be met by sharpening class conflicts or party rivalries.

Alavi comments:

Such an outlook acquiesces in and perpetuates the exploitation of the poor peasant by the rich peasant.

(Ibid.: 319)

Due to the historical repression of peasants, communists like others had to face the fact that poor peasants, desperately exploited and literally starving, were nevertheless too strongly dominated by their masters to be able to emerge, in the political context of the time, as an independent force (ibid.: 319).

The main communist thrust in the meantime was similar to that of the socialists. They concentrated on agitation for broad peasant demands, especially for security of tenure, debt relief, and cheaper credit facilities, and sought to influence government policy rather than to bring about direct peasant action. This policy still continues today (ibid.). Communists have intermittently led many local struggles some of which assumed major proportions.

⁶⁰Cited in Alavi, H. 'Peasants and revolution' in Gough, K. and Sharma, H. (eds.) (1973) p.318.

An important movement was the Tebhaga Movement, which arose in north Bengal, including the districts of Dinajpur and Rangpur (ibid.: 320). The slogan of the movement was the demand for reduction of the proprietor's share of the crop from one half to one third. The 'proprietors' of the land, the jotedars, were 'occupancy tenants' who possessed transferable and heritable rights to the land, and paid a fixed money rent to the zamindars, the great landlords. Over the years, the fixed money rent had become a relatively small part of the value of the crop so that, in course of time, the jotedars appropriated the largest share of the crop which they extracted from the cultivators of the land, the share-croppers. As an aside, four-fifths of the rural population in Bengal had been said to be unemployed and landless. In addition, the bulk of the share-croppers were under a heavy burden of debt, the lenders generally being the rich jotedars. Alavi supports the view that any analysis of class conflict in the Bengal countryside must especially take into account the effects of usury on the situation of the middle peasants (ibid.: 320). As Bhowani Sen, a communist theoretician and leader of the Tebhaga Movement expressed it:

The middle peasant of today is the share-cropper of tomorrow. The peasant is painfully aware of this prospect. The situation of the middle peasant in Bengal is far more precarious than in many other regions and could well be compared to the Yeoman farmer, who found he was ousted by changes in productivity and tenure patterns (ibid.: 321).

For the Tebhaga Movement the role of the middle peasants appeared as crucial. According to an account given by Bhowani Sen, the movement began in Thakurgon subdivision of Dinajpur district as a middle peasant movement against the oppression of the jotedars. Middle peasants had become politicized and the communist party had recruited many of them. By throwing the middle peasants out the jotedars produced more by using

capital and labour in a rationalized form and by hiring the most subservient who, if they rebelled, could in turn be exchanged for someone more subservient. Thus, they could undersell and thereby dis-establish middle peasants. Unable to compete, the middle peasants, like the Yeoman farmers were turned into proletariat for the tenant farmer. Middle peasants formed themselves into a politically effective cadre. The sons of middle peasants had little difficulty in persuading their people that their fight against the jotedars could succeed only if they rallied the entire rural poor. They espoused the cause of share-croppers which was their own cause, for many of them supplemented their incomes by share-cropping (ibid.: 333). According to Bhowani Sen, most leading members of the Tebhaga committees were middle peasants and not poor peasants, but all participated in the movement (loc.cit.).

The crucial battles of the Tebhaga Movement were fought at harvest time, when the crop was shared out. But the fight did not end there because the share-croppers had to resist attempts by jotedars, with the support of the police, to deprive them of their gains. This continuing struggle was led by peasant committees which became a power in the villages. Peasants set up their own autonomous councils so that they could proclaim the authority of the Kisan Sabha (Peasant Congress) in their village. Peasant committees began to administer the affairs of the village and to administer justice (op.cit.: 324).

It might well be suggested that outside pressure generates a common body of custom and belief that draws, through a common experience or groundswell, various oppressed factions together. In reference to two villages of the Thanjavur district of Madras State, Gough points out that the communist movement might have failed if large numbers of Harijans had earlier become owner cultivators, craftsmen, industrial workers or white collar employees. This was, in theory, the aim of

the Congress government.⁶¹ The idea was to permit Harijans to lose their identity of oppression by dispersing them into more varied and lucrative occupations. This aim was frustrated by landlord resistance to change in that they feared the ascendancy of the lower castes, and above all by the fact that the economy was not expanding rapidly enough to provide avenues for upward mobility for more than a very few. It remains to be seen whether the Congress government can improve this situation, or whether the slow pace of economic development and the devotion of the communists will gain them still more supporters among the non-Brahmans and lower statuses, as is already happening in some villages. Thus we can see government policy as oriented towards preserving the interests of various powerful conservative factions which quid pro quo resist demands for reform.

The Green Revolution in Sharma's view (1973) resulted in the instalment of a capitalist growth pattern for agriculture (op.cit.: 86). When the Congress party came to power in 1947, representing, by and large, landlord interests, conditions in India were so grim that it had no choice but to institute reforms. Furthermore, in order to facilitate much needed industrial growth, agricultural productivity had to be boosted (ibid.).

Pressure was emanating from rural areas in the form of popular movements organized by peasants in order to afford themselves some relief. A Kisan Sabha (Peasants Committee) was formed (1936) and demanded "the introduction of a system of peasant proprietorship under which the tiller of the soil is himself the owner of it, and pays revenue direct to the government". The Congress party was faced with massive insurrections from the Tebhaga Movement in Bengal, the Telangana Movement, and numerous movements in Madras and Kerala (ibid.: 87).

⁶¹Gough, K. 'Harijans in Thanjavur' in Sharma, H. & Gough, K. (eds.) (1973) p.242.

A structural definition for peasantries

It becomes necessary to deal with the problem presented by the complex notion of what is meant by a peasantry especially in the light of capitalist incursions. Ahmad tells us in an example from Sahiwal, a village in Sargodha district in Pakistan that the settlers' primary obligation was to produce.⁶² Those who failed to fulfil the landlords' demands were subject to eviction. The landlords provided the agricultural land and paid the land revenue. In return, the tenants paid half of all they produced and contributed begaar (unpaid labour) when this was demanded. All the expenses and energy involved in agricultural production were the responsibility of the tenants. The settlers constituted a category which included kammis, those who manufactured and serviced the farmers' tools or performed other services. The duties and obligations of kammis were traditionally defined, as were the amounts of their payments in the form of annual shares of the produce (ibid.). To Ahmad, a local status group is termed the qaum and may equally be defined in the Punjabi society as caste, clan, and occupation group as it cross-cuts all these. Qaums divide and segment, but overall form part of a hierarchical continuum over which old-fashioned landlords dominate. Arranged below the apex, the two major component groups or qaum segments divide into zamindars (traditional cultivators) and kammis (traditional artisans). Ahmad states that membership in these groups does not today specify one's actual occupation, for many kammis are cultivators and a few zamindars have become artisans (loc.cit.).

A further shift towards capitalist agrarian relations that impoverish the tenants and artisans has been caused by the enactment of land reform measures and the threat of more radical land reforms (op.cit.: 208).

⁶²Ahmad, S. 'Peasant classes in Pakistan' in Gough, K. and Sharma, H. (eds.) (1973) p.205.

This has led many landlords to put a certain portion of their land into 'self-cultivating' farms, on which the land is in fact now cultivated by hired labourers rather than by tenants, as in the past. By 1965, Ahmad mentions that two village landlords had put more than 200 acres each into such farms in order to avoid having their land confiscated. This meant not only eviction of tenants but also loss of work for kammis. At the same time, the growing industrialization of the country in general, including the establishment of textile mills and shoe factories, has meant a loss of markets for such artisans as weavers and cobblers.

The relationship between the more old-fashioned landlords on the one hand and tenants and villagers on the other is feudalistic in nature. Although the share-cropper is exploited, his exploitation is nevertheless sweetened by customary norms. The traditional landlord who lives according to traditionally conceived structures periodically comes from outside the village as a purveyor of hereditary exchange patterns based on old precepts (ibid.: 213).

In contrast to other classes, the middle peasants spend more money for the ceremonial fund. They also conform more closely to the ideal Punjabi norm of hospitality and generosity (ibid.: 215). While others often receive harsh treatment, the middle peasants are always politely treated.

One of the largest groups of rural Punjabis are the poor peasants. They include tenant farmers (share-croppers) and artisans. The farmers depend exclusively upon rented land as their only means of subsistence. Some among this class may have better equipment or more and better animals, and may be richer than those who do not have these advantages. But poor or less poor, their livelihood depends upon rented land from which they can be evicted any time the owner finds it profitable (ibid.: 216).

The artisans depend upon the customary seip relation, whereby they receive a share of all that their patrons produce in return for their work. Their subsistence, like that of share-croppers, depends upon the fate and whim of their patrons - whether they are rich, middle, or poor peasant farmers (loc.cit.).

While the cultivators and the artisans occupy the same position in the organization of production and objectively have similar class interests, one often finds social divisions between the two groups. The tenants who belong to one of the zamindar qaum conceive of themselves as socially superior to the kammis. This social division is often exploited by the landlords to exacerbate conflict among the poor peasants. However, this contradiction appears to be an example of what Mao Tse-tung calls a non-antagonistic contradiction, i.e. in the opposition to the exploiting class, status differences are replaced by a unity around class interest (loc.cit.). For example, when one of the landlords proposed the idea of buying harvesters, which would have enabled both the landlords and the tenants to make extra money by supplying wheat in the market ahead of others, the idea was rejected by the poor peasants. While the tenants knew they would make some extra money, they realized that this would mean an end to the customary share of the mehnati-mussali (winnowing), and that if mechanization was approved it might also mean an end of tenancy over a period of time.

Mechanization and capitalization of farming hurt the artisans as well as the tenants; both are forced to become peasant proletarians. In this period of increasing emphasis on mechanization, artisans are worse hit; but since mechanization is only the first step in the emergent capitalist farming, the tenants will soon follow

in the footsteps of the artisans.

The most important category with which we are concerned in Ahmad's analysis concerns what he calls the peasant proletariat (ibid.: 217). The members of this class are neither craftsmen nor tenants. They have neither a share of produce nor a fixed income. They are labourers, and they sell their labour power. They also contribute most to the semi-employed and unemployed. Historically, they are drawn from the ranks of middle and poor peasants. With the increasing mechanization and capitalization of agriculture, their number has been growing. The Planning Commission of Pakistan reports that mechanization of farms reduces the need for labour by 50 per cent, and that with the arrival of the Green Revolution - i.e. tractors, tube wells, new seeds, fertilizers, pesticides etc. - thousands of tenants have been evicted from land. It is needless to add that mechanization of farms affects not only the tenant farmers but, even more, the artisans.

Thus, as we saw earlier, more of the tradition-bound landlords who live outside the village confines have engaged in an enclosure policy or what Ahmad terms "self cultivating farms". Insofar as this policy was pursued, it could only have been achieved by evicting the tenants or decreasing their holdings which in turn correlates with the point we have raised in reference to controls brought to bear on ceilings on holdings wherein farmers could legitimately carry on cultivation. Through arbitrary management more by capricious design than anything else, landlords could manipulate and regulate the labour supply, tenure patterns and indeed the sum total of work and social organization and through it, either alleviate or in this case mainly aggravate the desperate plight of the poor. This capitalization of the productive infrastructure led to its subsumption both in the form of land and the predominant social

unit we described earlier as the gaum commensurate with its modification under an over-rigidified archaic structure. Imposed on, and overlaying this archaic structure, new economic exigencies forced tenants to relinquish their holdings hence forcing them to work at least partly as labourers. Deprived of the means to earn a living either by farming or craftsmanship, they roam from village to village and from village to cities in search of jobs. They form the majority of the unskilled workers in the building and construction projects (Ahmad, p.217).

One problem in delineating classes among peasants involves the very definition of a peasant. Who is a peasant? Generally it is agreed that 'peasant' refers to a cultivator and not, for instance, to a fisherman. Yet those who thus define peasants also refer to Indian and Pakistani villages as peasant villages. In Sahiwal, which is typical of many Punjabi villages, more than 50 per cent of the population are not cultivators (ibid.: 209). They are artisans, shopkeepers, village functionaries etc. Are they peasants? If so, what is their class position? Are they rural proletariat? If so, how do the kammis, who are paid a customary share of the produce, differ from the landless labourers who earn a daily wage? In seeking an answer to these questions, we must briefly review some of the pertinent literature.

In his pioneering works⁶³ Mao Tse-tung analyzed the rural society of China as consisting of five classes: (1) landlords; (2) rich peasants; (3) middle peasants; (4) poor peasants; and (5) workers. As a rule the poor peasant had to rent land for cultivation and sell a part of his labour power. A worker had to make his living wholly by selling his

⁶³Mao Tse-tung (1967) Vol.1 'Analysis of classes in Chinese society' in Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung. Peking: Foreign Language Press, pp.13-21, 23.

labour power. In Mao's analysis, the middle and the poor peasants constituted the largest mass of the rural people. The 'peasant problem' was essentially their problem.

Hamza Alavi, while recognizing the distinction between rich, middle, and poor peasants, argues that the "different strata arranged one over the other, in a single order ... is misleading. The middle peasants, for instance, do not stand between the rich peasants and the poor peasants; they belong to a different sector of rural economy". Accordingly, he distinguishes between three sectors. The first sector is composed of the landlords and the share-croppers or poor peasants. The second sector consists of independent small landholders or middle peasants, who do not exploit the labour of others. The third sector is that of capitalist farmers or rich peasants. Their farming is based primarily on the exploitation of the wage labour of the farm labourers. Thus there are "capitalist farmers, independent smallholders, share-croppers, and farm labourers".⁶⁴

Kathleen Gough finds that the rural population of Kerala and Tanjore in south India is divided into five classes in a manner similar to Mao's description of China.⁶⁵ The classes tend to be arranged one over the other in terms of production relations as well as wealth and social status, since middle peasants usually rent some land from landlords and employ some workers at peak seasons. In this sense, among others, she disagrees with Hamza Alavi.

Among the most recent analyses - and the one most pertinent to our case - is that of Tariq Ali.⁶⁶ Tariq Ali distinguishes five classes

⁶⁴Alavi, H. (1965) Peasants and Revolution. N.Y.: Monthly Review Press, p.244

⁶⁵Gough, K. 'Peasant resistance and revolt in south India' Pacific Affairs, Winter 1968-9: 527-544.

⁶⁶Ali, T. (1970) Pakistan: Military Rule or People's Power? N.Y.: William Morrow & Co.

in rural West Pakistan: (1) big landlords, who own more than 100 acres of land; (2) rich peasants or kulaks, who own between 25 and 100 acres; (3) middle peasants, who own between 5 and 25 acres; (4) poor peasants, who own less than 5 acres; and (5) tenant share-croppers, who own no land of their own, and rural proletariat (farm labourers who work for daily payments in cash or kind).

We shall deal briefly with the points of view of the several writers.

Alavi's analysis does not appear to deal adequately with the problems of rural social stratification. Speaking of "certain common assumptions in all different theories of social class", S. Ossowski notes that

classes are components of a system of two or several groups of the same kind ... It means that any definition of any social class must imply relation of this class to other groups of the same system; ... the notion of middle class implies again the notion of upper and lower classes.⁶⁷

In this sense we disagree with Alavi and follow a rather conventional definition. Alavi's formulation also tends to simplify the changing class structure: he separates landlords and capitalist farmers into two different classes, equating the latter with the rich peasants. This creates both theoretical and methodological problems. The two property owners of Sahiwal, like many others in West Pakistan today, rent part of their land to share-croppers, while another part is cultivated by wage labourers. Are they both landlords and rich peasants? It appears to us a difficult proposition to treat the same group of people as members of two distinct classes.

Tariq Ali, similar to Roy (1975), reduces the whole problem of class differences to differences in the amount of land owned. He does not

⁶⁷Ossowski, S. (1969) 'Old notions and new problems: interpretations of social structure in modern society' in Béteille, A. (ed.) Social Inequality. London: Penguin Books, p.80.

incorporate the notion of relation to the means of production. More importantly, all three - Alavi, Gough and Ali - even while dealing with rural India or Pakistan, have neglected to incorporate the artisans into their analysis. But for those concerned with rural India and Pakistan, the neglect of artisans and other servants, who in some areas constitute nearly 50 per cent of the population, is a serious oversight. Perhaps this problem can be resolved if we follow the Marxist definition of class and emphasize structural and relational rather than occupational criteria.

Classes exist in relation to the means of production. This relation defines the positions people occupy in the organization of production, which in turn refers to a hierarchy of a composite of social, economic, and political differences. "The classical Marxist three or four class scheme," Ossowski says, "is formed by the cross-cutting of three dichotomic divisions based on different criteria: (a) those who possess and those who do not possess means of production, (b) those who work and those who do not work, (c) those who employ hired labour and those who do not" (ibid.: 82).

Wolf (1966) then defines peasants in a manner that I find useful:

We agree that peasants are primarily agriculturists, but we believe that the criteria of definition must be structural and relational rather than occupational. For in most peasant societies, significant numbers of people earn their living by non-agricultural occupations. It is not what peasants produce that is significant; it is how and to whom they dispose of what they produce that counts.

Historically, artisans and other village servants have been essential components of rural India and Pakistan. Their specialized skills have helped in the development and survival of the village communities as more or less self-sufficient social and economic units. The work of cultivators has depended upon certain artisans, generally referred to as agricultural kammis or agricultural artisans. By our definition,

all those who own land, and who do not themselves work to produce and live exclusively by the exploitation of others, should be treated as belonging to the class of landlords (Ahmad, p.212). Furthermore, the distinction between landlords and capitalist farmers is transitional rather than structural. In this period of transformation from a feudal-type economy to a capitalist economy, many landlords have adopted new modes of production and new methods of capital accumulation.

We have seen put forward the argument based on capitalist inter-penetration at every level of south Asian life together with its tendency to accentuate segmentation at all levels. Infused into the general politico-economic structures are new variants undertaken in expediency and provisionality as expressed in such ill features as corruption, badly planned development schemes, and increasing mistrust. It appears that, with the encouragement to transform existing structures, cleavages both between the peasant micro-system and its regional network and also between regional administration and central government precipitate divisions and generate reticence on all levels.

According to the principle we mentioned earlier, Gough sees the resistance to landlords and government officials as at least partly guided by political parties, especially by communists, or else by nationalist and separatist movements of formerly primitive tribes.⁶⁸ She would maintain that the limitations of revolts have sprung more from broad political forces at the level of the province and the colonial and post-colonial state than from the caste system. We have already alluded to the fragmentation of caste in the post contact era in supporting Gough's claim.

⁶⁸Gough, K. (1974) 'Indian peasant uprisings' Economic and Political Weekly, 9 (32-34 special number): 1391-1412.

Capital introduces discontinuity

Whatever the earlier record, we are told that revolts broke out in many areas during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as the Moghul bureaucracy became more oppressive and exacted harsher taxes as commercial relations penetrated the countryside (ibid.: 1392). Oppression tended to contain a reverse effect in that some, but not all, of the revolts against the Moghul power involved the local land managers under the leadership of local princes or local land managers (zamindars) who rebelled because the imperial land revenue pressed so heavily on the peasants that there was little left for these local dignitaries. This is consistent with Wolf's argument that we mentioned earlier; the exploiters may indeed turn out, under the capitalist's incursion, to be exploited. Especially during the post contact phase of British rule, structures of underdevelopment in the Indian countryside became endemic, which Gough argues has been modified but never eradicated since independence.

Firstly, the early decades of rule by the East India Company saw outright plunder of the country's wealth coupled with ruinous taxation of the peasantry, in some areas up to twice that imposed by the Moghuls. These no doubt contributed to the Bengal famine of 1770 in which a third of the people died (ibid.).

Secondly, in later decades, land revenue declined to a much smaller proportion of the crop than was exacted by the Moghuls, but by that time surplus was being removed from the peasants by other kinds of agents such as money lenders, non-cultivating intermediary tenants, landlords, merchants, the new professional classes such as lawyers, and particular, though less directly, by British firms engaged in export crop farming, banking, shipping, exports and imports and internal trade (ibid.).

Thirdly, the British land settlements for the first time made

land private property of a capitalist kind. For instance the new landlords included zamindars who had previously been revenue collectors under the Moghuls (ibid.).

Gough believes that all of the revolts seem to have occurred under conditions of relative deprivation (ibid.: 1396), that is of deprivation considered outrageous by comparison with the past or with the condition of others in the present. All of them, she argues, embodied ideas of freedom from undue economic exploitation or deprivation; of some form of collective independence from a domination conceived of as foreign and unjustified; and of a just social order sanctioned by some religious faith, or an all-embracing modern ideology especially that of Marxism (loc.cit.). When translated into the language and concepts of peasants, Marxism has similarities to religious movements, in that it purports to offer a complete explanation of society and especially of social evils, and in that parts of the explanation are accepted on faith (loc.cit.).

In her analysis Gough highlights the harsh oppression meted out by the British when she points out the relative stability of the population under the Moghuls. She says that between 1765 and 1857 a large proportion of revolts were led by Hindu or Muslim petty rulers (ibid.). These were former revenue agents under the Moghuls, tribal chiefs in hill regions and local landed military officers (poligars) in south India. They were supported by masses of peasants and sometimes by former soldiers. The revolts were either against the conquest itself and the imposition of heavy revenues on existing nobles, or retaliatory attempts to drive out the British after they had dispossessed a zamindar or a raja for failing to pay the revenues and had replaced him with some other claimant to the estate, with a company officer, or with a merchant, money lender or adventurer who had bought the estate at an auction.

The goals of these revolts were complete annihilation or expulsion of the British and reversion to the previous government and agrarian relations. The peasants were not blind loyalists (ibid.). All the movements we are told involved several thousand armed rebels and huge supporting populations. We are informed that the largest rebellions produced alliances of nobles in several districts. Peasant insurrections occurred over wide areas, the capture of towns and the temporary expulsion of the British from some areas (loc.cit.):

The prime enemies were of course the British government, military and planters, the big 'loyal' princes who allied with them, the revenue officers, the wealthier merchants and the money lenders ... Revolts raged fiercely in areas which had been conquered after 1800.

(Loc.cit.)

Among the causes for such resentment, Gough notes, since British rule there had occurred, were increasing encroachment on tribal hill territories; reduction in the size of some Indian handloom and handicraft industries especially through discriminatory tariffs; exports of capital; in many areas various means were devised to compel cultivators to grow industrial crops, and even food crops for export; growth of absentee landlordism; speculation and investment by new classes of merchants, bureaucrats, landlords and successful cash crop farmers; a breakdown in traditional customary relationships; population increase and a radical increase in famines (ibid.).

Mass insurrections aimed at the redress of particular grievances were thus initially reformative. The Deccan Revolt of 1875 was joined by water carriers, barbers and even the house servants of money lenders in addition to cultivators. It covered Poona and Ahmednagar districts. Basically, excessive revenue exactions, low prices of grain and cotton crops and evictions and land mortgages to money lenders drove the peasants to a three-week insurrection (ibid.: 1402).

The Moplah Rebellion of 1921 is described by Gough as bridging

the period of pre-political party, peasant uprisings and that of peasant actions sponsored by political parties. In its first large all-India struggle towards Independence, the Indian National Congress joined with Muslims of the Khalifat Movement, to boycott British instituted councils, law courts, titles, educational institutions and the purchase of foreign goods. The boycott allied Hindu and Muslim middle class leaders, a few landlords, high ranking non-cultivating tenants and a large mass of poverty stricken cultivating tenants and landless labourers, especially Moplahs, who formed a majority of the population in the Ernad and Walluvanad taluks and who followed the Khalifat leaders. Both the Congress and the Khalifat parties had begun to organize a movement for tenancy reforms, which was strongly opposed by Malabar's big landlords with their memories of the nineteenth century Moplah revolts. For six months British rule became inoperative throughout the region. A leader emerged to govern it who was known as Raja by the Hindus, Amir by the Muslims, and Colonel of the Khalifat army. He administered the territory, supervised the execution of police, both Hindu and Muslim, who had committed atrocities, and of traitors who helped the British forces, put an end to the looting, and announced the suspension of land revenue and rents for one year. He commanded poor peasants to harvest their landlords' crops and used the surplus to feed his army.

According to Gough (1973) landlords, rich peasants, poor peasants and landless labourers have existed in both pre-capitalist and capitalist south Asia, but their proportions and relations of production have undergone a series of complex changes in the colonial and neo-colonial periods (op.cit.: 15). In general, she argues, pre-capitalist relations were characterized by a relatively self-sufficient village economy, hereditary tenancies of varying kinds and hereditary rights in land or its produce for the different classes of peasants, legal bondage in serfdom for poor

peasants, and (where they existed) slavery for landless labourers. In these pre-capitalist relations, economic surplus was extracted from the producer by institutional (i.e. legal and political) means. Colonial and neo-colonial (or 'underdeveloped') capitalist relations have involved varying degrees of absorption into the commodity economy of world capitalism. Along with this has come loss of self-sufficiency of the village or other local region and with it orientation to agricultural production for markets, the disappearance of legally hereditary tenancies and of tenants' and labourers' hereditary rights in land or its produce, the private ownership of land; acute competition for and intensive marketing of land; a kind of marketing of labour through contractual, competitive, and often short term, tenancies; and polarization of class structure; involving a reduction in the proportion of middle peasants and an increase in those of poor peasants and of 'free' but impoverished and insecurely employed landless labourers (ibid.).

Using examples drawn from Sharma (1973) we proposed seeing how the capitalist intrusion during the Green Revolution rather than dissipating and alleviating peasant hardship in fact radically altered the relationships between economic sectors.

From Sharma's account we learn that a whole series of measures were instituted in the form of land reforms, bureaucratic and administrative innovations, and the establishment of new institutions to provide credit, storage, marketing and technical facilities to peasants. While it is impossible to detail all these measures here, it is necessary to identify their salient features and to assess their effects on the formation of new class forces (op.cit.: 87).

The benefits derived from the Green Revolution appear highly selective and its spread effect in terms of income is inconsiderable in many areas. The Green Revolution affects the few rather than the many and goes beyond

mere environmental conditions to a consideration of the many farmers who were institutionally precluded from taking advantage of new agricultural trends. With the promise of higher output, prospects for profit from farming have increased (as a consequence of increased yield potentials and favourable prices), many landlords have taken over their formerly rented lands for operation on their own account with hired labour. As a result of introducing new technology there has arisen a squeeze whereby tenants are reduced to share-croppers and eventually to landless workers. Sharma points out that the 1950s were characterized by double normative standards - deceit, false promises, political manoeuvrings, and bureaucratic manipulations - all of which concealed a massive power-play. At the very least tenancies were put on an oral, informal basis in order to prevent the tenants from claiming ownership when the laws were passed. Landlords invoked traditional norms to put pressure on tenant farmers, made deceitful statements in order to force tenants to deny to the authorities that they were tenants (ibid.: 88).

It is a mistake, therefore, to see the Green Revolution as a substitute for land reform. Indeed, reform becomes increasingly imperative as the rate of adoption of new technologies accelerates. Despite the anomalies and in deference to pressures, peasants found themselves coerced into expulsion from their plots or they would face the prospect of awesome, expensive, and lengthy bureaucratic and legal battles (loc.cit.). Legislative provisions contained loopholes and inconsistencies that could be administered. Clauses existed for the resumption of tenancy land for the landlords' 'self-cultivation', and this was provided for in most state land reform laws. Such provisions ensured dislodgement of tenants. 'Self-cultivation' could, moreover, mean anything from disguised tenancy to cultivation through hired labour to mechanized farming (loc.cit.). Social dislocation therefore was not due to technological innovation

per se but was attributable, in the main, to those forces in control who sought to increase their grasp over the institutional support structures that channelled wealth due to modernization.

During modernization, attitudes towards land and labour change, and land per se becomes valuable (Dorner, 1972, p.73). Those in superior positions may claim exclusive rights to land. A conception different from the one enjoined by the traditional view emerges whereby conception of land as a commodity emerges over which exclusive ownership must be secured. The idea gradually emerges that an 'owner' can cultivate the land with tenants or hired workers and establish the social order on his land by his choice of terms of labour and tenure arrangements. The upper classes are in a position to take advantage of new technological inputs by virtue of their superior status, their power position being thus enhanced.

This brief resumé shows that with the added promise new wealth ought to bring, ironically it culminates in cleavages, the result of accentuated conflicts at every level throughout Indian society. A record of dismal failure of land reforms as far as the alleviation of the conditions of the masses of rural people in response to a development and modernization programme set the basis for conflicts between factions, and precipitate new conflicts which emerge along class dimensions. We are told that the fifteen years of the implementation of various lang legislation led to an emergence and consolidation of rich peasants. Sharma (ibid.: 90) terms them kulaks, and they seemed set by the mid-sixties to embark upon a capitalist growth path in agriculture.

Where the upper class assumes the initiative in exploiting the gains inherent in the new technology, it develops an interest in freeing itself of obligations to the peasants and gaining full control over the land. The shift to a capitalist orientation focuses mainly on

recognizing the benefits from technological and economic opportunities which can be realized only as the power of the state is used to protect private property and the enforcement of contracts. For this and other reasons, modernization strengthens the authority of central state power. Whenever the upper rural classes become actively engaged in management, they will seek to shed social obligations, gain a free hand in controlling land use, and obtain the services of a 'law-and-order' state in protecting their property.

From Wolf (1966) we have learnt that peasants may, if they emerge as a land-owning peasantry, seek to eliminate the land rights of both the upper classes and the peasant community. Attempts to remove the rights of the upper classes stem from peasant desires for security, from loss of traditional functions of the upper classes, or from shifts in political power of the landed upper classes vis-à-vis the peasantry. The freedom from community controls finds its rationale in the possibility of individual adoption of technology (e.g. Nanjgowda from Dalena), the prospect of using credit on the security of their landownership, and the need to free individual innovators from group claims to their gains.

Little wonder, then, that Sharma (1973) and Gough (1974) draw the same conclusion on the reasons compounding peasant animosity and agree on the objective historical conditions for revolt. From our viewpoint peasant reactions merely represent a 'priority adjustment' insofar as their position within a structure requires them, according to their precepts, to assist in changing dominant patterns. This assertion could well locate such activists in a position of tactical independence such as their oppressors would now enjoy. Such activism is interpretable in terms of shifting locations and the capacity to deploy resources and usurp the extant dominant classes in order to

offset (to tactically outmanoeuvre an opponent with pure strategy) any external threat. In India the incursions of the British constituted a real and a counter cultural force to the one prevailing. The threat they posed to the apparent stability of the internal system engendered distress through imperial extraction of wealth from India via the localized networks inducing poverty, famine, agricultural sluggishness and agrarian unrest (Gough, 1974, p.1406). Many revolts that have arisen range from social banditry and terrorist vengeance through the massive insurrections, which last Gough sees as having been more successful.

Some examples are given by Gough in which she mentions certain areas having an especially strong tradition of rebellion. We refer to only a few.

Bengal has been a hotbed of revolt, both rural and urban, from the earliest days of British rule. Some districts in particular such as Mymensingh, Dinajpur, Rangpur and Pabna in Bangladesh, and the Santhal regions of Bihar and West Bengal, figured repeatedly in peasant struggles and continue to do so. The tribal areas of Andhra Pradesh, and the state of Kerala, also have long traditions of revolt. Hill regions where tribal or other minorities retain a certain independence, ethnic unity, and tactical manoeuvreability, and where the terrain is suited to guerilla warfare, are of course especially favourable for peasant struggles, but these have also occurred in densely populated plains regions such as Thanjavur, where rack-renting, land hunger, landless labour and unemployment cause great suffering.

(Ibid.)

We are told by Hamza Alavi⁶⁹ that the consequent disturbance unleashed by stagnation and indicative of the capitalist mode and not that of the capitalist final crisis

brings out the importance played by the conscious struggle of the people in the establishment of socialism. The contradictions of capitalism will not necessarily do it for us.

⁶⁹Alavi, H. (1964) Imperialism: Old and New in Socialist Register. London: Merlin.

To Alavi, then, capitalist contradiction and 'conscious' class struggle become a dialectical unity insofar as the latter process works on and widens the apparent process of cleavage throughout a social structure on every level. Hence, being 'frustrated' is something built into the ongoing resistance of the peasant. But the inherent contradictions in the system produced from outside and manifest from above accentuate difference, break down customary clientele relationships, and precipitate the emergence of a class for themselves.

Related to this question of capitalist crisis is the critical position adopted by the peti-bourgeois or 'broker' towards the working class movement. Neo-marxists may argue, as we have done with respect to the centre-periphery position, that the working masses at the periphery are 'exploited' by the workers at the centre among them peti-bourgeois. Conversely, the defensive strategies amounting to a conservative stance endorsed by those positioned at the centre seems predicated on a theory of super-profits and higher wages which permits their political apathy and apparent defence of imperialism. Perceiving their predicament, sectors of unemployed and victimized could see their way through to a rebellion to enhance their position and dominate either those who were defeated, or those who did not engage in a strategical usurpation by diligently applying the requisite priority adjustments. Thus, they may have remained submerged. The working class at the centre, then, may defend themselves against the exploited peoples in the colonies and semi-colonies. Hence, it is an oversimplification to dwell on a 'class solidarity' between the workers in the centre and those in the periphery:

... the western working class appropriates to its own benefit part of the profits of exchange with the underdeveloped countries.⁷⁰

⁷⁰Emmanuel, A. (1972) Unequal Exchange. London: New Left Books, p.183.

Samir Amin puts the same position in a slightly more sophisticated way. At one end of the scale he seems to suggest that because of the declining rate of profit in the centres a higher rate of surplus value is called for, and since this is available at the periphery "in relative terms, the proletariat of the periphery suffers an increasing degree of exploitation as compared with the petit-bourgeois and proletariat at the centre".⁷¹ Yet at the other end of the scale it is suggested that the exploitation takes place because "the objective mechanism which is the basis for the unity that links the bourgeoisie with its proletariat serves as a mechanism which limits exploitation at its centre, does not function in the extraverted periphery".⁷² An example we referred to earlier was the abortive legislative enactments adopted in the 1950s in India that proposed ceilings for individual landholdings. Typically these measures were counteracted by the more highly educated mobile strata, which quite clearly precluded peasants gaining right of redress for wrongful perpetrations (Sharma, 1973). By complicity in the removal of surplus-value, those more mobile and oriented to vertical mobility assist, through their upward movement, the inflow of super-profits from underdeveloped regions to more developed sectors. Thus support for the structure permitting oppression is part and parcel of "supporting the basis controlling productivity, and of ensuring for the workers of the metropolitan countries standards of living higher than those in the colonies".⁷³

⁷¹Amin, S. Accumulation on a World Scale. N.Y.: Monthly Review, p.25.

⁷²Amin, S. Op.cit. Vol.II, p.600.

⁷³Mandel, E. (1973) Marxist Economic Theory. London: Merlin, p.479.

In our account, thus far, we need to draw a distinction between the petit-bourgeois whose commitments preclude them from identifying with the class interests occupied by subordinate groups, and those totally committed to revolutionary struggle. History demonstrates, and Lenin emphasized the point, that political leadership of the working class must come from outside the working class itself, for the proletariat left on its own sinks into economism. A small body of professional revolutionaries would emerge to take up the politics of the working class, providing the leadership before the proletariat can seize power. As Lenin instructs us:

It is the task of the party to bring to the working class a true consciousness of its own interests, and to organize and lead the struggle for state power. In order to do this, the party must set itself the highest theoretical standards; it must wage a constant fight to defend the principles of Marxism and to develop an adequate understanding of the real conditions of society. Without this it will have no compass to guide its activities, but must of necessity respond pragmatically to every new development in the workers' movement and inevitably fall prey to bourgeois ideology.⁷⁴

And in their analysis of the role monopoly capital plays, Baran and Sweezy see the apparent force, and counter-thrusts, as emanating from the local micro-level or peasant domains we have dealt with, when they believe that the class struggle has been 'internationalized' to the periphery:

The revolutionary initiative against capitalism, which in Marx's day belonged to the proletariat in the advanced countries, has passed into the hands of the impoverished masses in the underdeveloped countries who are struggling to free themselves from imperialist domination and exploitation.⁷⁵

⁷⁴Lenin, V. I. (1971) 'What is to be done?' in Selected Works, Vol.I. Moscow: Progress.

⁷⁵Baran, P. and Sweezy, P. (1966) Monopoly Capital. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

The sociology of knowledge and theories on development

Social development, then, cannot avoid bias insofar as its application to a community proceeds. Both positivist and normative policies necessarily imply a normative dimension, the validity of which cannot be objectively determined.⁷⁶ And as Stanley himself admits, this derives from the fact that social scientists, like anyone else, possess socio-cultural locations within history which include implicit or explicit impressions about where history is going (ibid.). Furthermore, these metascientific conceptions of history assent to selecting complex variables over-riding a hidden agenda grounded in normative criteria. This point reinforces my principal aim and that is to assert that position within a social structure colours everyone's mentality and perception and implicitly defines the available range of choices open to consciousness. Stanley has demonstrated the normative impact on a social development policy. He warns that the 'ends' or target should be made explicit (Stanley, op.cit.: 315). Stanley's emphasis attempts to develop a value orientation which may suffice as a basis for distributive justice. Moreover, symbolic features imposed as the dominant configuration may require to be exposed and confined as and when necessary to remove ideological domination. Any normative commitment is relative to any other value orientation, and as such provides a contentious issue. The facts are that change and development proceed according to the logic of materialism, production, investment and the bureaucratic machinery that overall opts for stabilizing those forces in society maintaining dominant ideological control and regulation.

In another article (1972a: 290), Stanley argues that liberalism has produced a profound shift in values from objective laws of nature

⁷⁶Stanley, M. (1967) 'Social development as a normative concept'. Values implicit in developmental theories. Journal of Developing Areas, 1: 301-316, 303.

to a criterion involving utility, with a rationalist basis. Quite rightly, he perceives a value nihilism in modern culture with a positivist emphasis in which new elites of expertise will only be able to agree on material and mathematical problematics. Stanley states that these criteria prove so impressive and baffling in their complexity to the average citizen (democracy demolished) that elites will devise persuasive new technocratic ideologies in order to manipulate public consciousness (Stanley, op.cit.: 296). This state of affairs arises due to a desperate need for a collectivized stereotypical comprehension. Stanley (p.294) writes that "modernism both culturally and sociologically also is associated with a new sense of personal freedom and initiative". That Stanley believes liberalism is the seedbed for equality (philosophical flattening out effects), is contradicted by the simple assertion that laissez-faire capitalism combined with the intellectual support of the nineteenth century economist Marshall was instrumental in providing the means for false consciousness by creating inordinate self-interest. Inequality was not only maintained by humanism and liberalism, it also found its ideological premise in the puritan ethic which enhanced social distances. The historical result meant that what was posited was in turn negated for a return to its contrary, namely authoritarianism and totalitarianism. This is an acceptance of political muscle over reason, and logic is not free from such an incorporation (op.cit.: 290-294). What Stanley under-emphasizes is that the dominant controllers create scarcity and even foster the myth through establishing the need for unnecessary consumption. Meanwhile, the climate of distrust in an increasingly competitive and materialist society provides the seedbed for cultures of silence and of revolutionary movements.⁷⁷ Such movements, once formed, may attack

⁷⁷Stanley, M. (1968) 'Nature, culture and scarcity' American Sociological Review 33 (6): 855-870.

the constitutional foundations of the social order as a distributive system or may be directed at particular reforms (op.cit.: 859). Thus, the roots of latent scarcity we have raised may be strongly culturally induced, and are translatable into what Stanley describes as scarcity consciousness, with associated corrective movements (ibid.).

Scarcity has become politicized (Stanley, op.cit.: 855). Social scientists may also be thought of as agents of political change. To Stanley, issues relating to modernization and development are basically reducible to the problems generated by massive changes in scarcity definitions and scarcity consciousness (op.cit.: 866). He draws a distinction between scientific-observer defined scarcity which he distinguishes from the subjective, existentially defined conception of scarcity. This is something akin to Victor Turner's distinction between an observer's operational model and the subject's exigetical model of themselves. We should be aware that the fieldworker invents his own understanding.⁷⁸ The analogies he creates are extensions of his own notions and those of his culture. This author cites that the subject is an objectified element to the fieldworker serving as a control for his invention (ibid.). Scarcity then is apprehended by the fieldworker, according to Stanley's definition, as functionally relevant to the translation of valued ends into a concrete situational expression through norm designs and other means (Stanley, 1968, p.859). In conclusion, then, scarcity is a relative concept. It is normative and exists relative to its historically and culturally perceived concretization. Therefore, scarcity depends for its cultural definition on the observer's position (his reflexivity) in a social structure and involves cutting through symbolic obfuscation to analyse its content. The fieldworker is a cultural carrier

⁷⁸Wagner, R. (1975) The Invention of Culture: Society as an Arbitrary Construct N.J.: Prentice-Hall, p.12.

who without foreknowledge is a purveyor of categories that constrain his mode of behaviour and limit the tools and skills his discipline makes available to him. Anthropology has matured in an age of colonialism and domination. Its professional practitioners represent elitist interests whose relative position within an alien structure makes their motives and intentions a subject for investigation because their position likely circumscribes their perception. Furthermore, in the context of India, any consideration of the relation between differentially ranked personnel and their inter-relationships within the caste system relates to outlining and specifying distributive formations. To ascertain the extent of proportional fairness, distribution takes rests in examination of attitudes or orientations on the one hand and certain kinds of relation or objects in the world on the other. These aims of life are artha, kāma and dharma and are most frequently exemplified in ordinary life and therefore partially identifiable by reference to it.⁷⁹

Movement, power, and control

Those peasants that seem likely to rise successfully are not the poorest and landless:⁸⁰ rather they are the middle peasants who have sufficient control or leverage over their own resources to rise in challenge to their overlords (Wolf, 1969a). Wolf gives one definition for strategical success as the participation of a tactically mobile peasantry (op.cit.: 294).

⁷⁹The point I make is similar to Dr. K. Potter (1965) Ch.1, particularly pp.8-9, in Presuppositions of India's Philosophies. Examining Indian philosophical schools. Prentice-Hall.

⁸⁰Wolf, E. R. (1969b) 'On peasant rebellions' International Social Science Journal, 21 (2): 286-294.

Positional redress

The revolt in Telangana and the adjoining districts of the Andhra delta was one of the postwar insurrectionary struggles of peasants in India. It was launched by the Communist Party of India (C.P.I.) as a sequel to the shift in its earlier policy of collaboration with the Congress, giving way to a strategy of encouraging or initiating insurrectionary partisan struggles. Movements such as this one arose against the background of increasing deprivation and class polarization (Gough, 1973, p.17).

In the post-independence period, large monopolist corporations, and the governments that represent them, are more and more penetrating south Asian economies. This penetration gives rise to internal stresses and strains, to struggle and dispute, of contrary aspirations and the affirmation of contradictory legitimacies (Balandier, 1970, p.188). These dependent economies are being overlain by a complex and unstable form of financial domination to the extent that it is fast reducing the internal system composed in the main of industrial, merchant, and financial bourgeoisie, its landlords, its bureaucracy, and its military to the status of segments of a single and yet multiple and complex neo-colonized bourgeoisie. In spite of the complex rivalries between these segments and between the various imperial powers to whom they appeal for support, there occurs a divisiveness between these institutions, which becomes more marked by cleavages the further we proceed down the vertical pillar or in terms of one stratum superimposing itself over another. In turn, with the change in historical conditions it has meant the banding together of the conservatively entrenched strata enjoying power

under the protective umbrella of the bourgeoisie against the revolutionary forces of peasants of their own countries (Gough, op.cit.: 16). On the local level, the introduction of a commodity economy with its attendant contradictions manifests the struggle for economic independence as pockets of resistance abound, the grabbing of land (purchasable and rentable), the concentration of production into the hands of the minority and the forcing of the majority into the ranks of the proletariat.⁸¹

In his study of the Telangana Revolt (1946-51) Dhanagare noted some improvement resulting from land reform legislation that produced some perceptible changes in the agrarian social structure of the region.⁸² Dhanagare viewed the revolt as reflecting these internal and external forms of contradiction superimposed on an agrarian structure concomitantly with the inordinate dividing between segments, inherent on all levels. Thus conflicting interests require that a Marxian view be used to approach this system. Dhanagare has borrowed the model of agrarian classes consisting of the 'rich', 'middle', and 'poor' peasants and the concept of landless labourer from the works of Lenin and Mao Tse-tung. The model is regionally specific and reflects a host of social cleavages other than class, such as caste, kinship or ethnic ties which cut across economic class situations (op.cit.: 110).

Firstly, a political structure from medieval Muslim rule had been preserved intact till the state merged into the Indian Federation in 1948 (ibid.). It appears that a loose structure associating

⁸¹From Bundy, C. (1979) The Rise and Fall of the South African Peasantry. London: Heinemann, p.126.

⁸²Dhanagare, D. (1974) 'Social origins of the peasant insurrection in Telangana, 1946-51' Contributions to Indian Sociology (n.s.), 8.

various segments on the different levels held the system together and more or less intact prior to independence. We are told the landholders were not owners per se but were treated as pattadars (registered occupants) (ibid.: 111). We can see operating here a hierarchical structure which we believe modifies ownership and land utilization patterns. The actual occupants within each patta were called shikmidars, who had full rights of occupancy but were not registered. As the pressure on land grew, the shikmidars, previously the cultivators, began to lease land out to sub-tenants (asami-shikmis) for actual cultivation. The latter were tenants-at-will having neither legal rights in land nor any protection against eviction. We are thus informed that the process of subinfeudation had steadily penetrated deep into the system of raiayatwari tenures, that was the proprietary system, from 1920 to 1950.

After the advent of the British in India, the Nizams in Hyderabad secured sovereignty which they exercised with the tacit consent of the representatives of the British Crown. There were several jagirs defined as tenures spread over a wide area. These jagirs were feudal tenures with their own mix of lords and noblemen (ibid.). By bestowing a ranking order to administer each jagir the Nizam in return was guaranteed support of a number of standing armies.

Dhanagare draws a distinction between lands he calls sarf-e-khas which were assigned to the Nizam himself and the special tenures called jagirs which were run by lower ranked middle-men like typical feudal tenures.

Jagirs, then, may be conceived as a sub-set within the overall scheme, the responsibility for them being delegated to a far harsher and oppressive intermediary cluster:

The civil courts had no jurisdiction over jagirs and therefore

the jagirdars and their agents were free to extort from the actual cultivators a variety of illegal taxes ... (Loc.cit.)

In another proprietary system known as the khalsa, deshmukhs and deshpandes, who were hereditary revenue collectors, introduced direct debt collection in the last part of the nineteenth century. These intermediaries propped up their position in the agrarian hierarchy when they were granted vatans (annuities). When debts remained unpaid the deshmukh could gain access to land records and his influence enabled him to grab lands by fraud. In so doing, his action reduced the actual cultivator to the status of a tenant at will or a landless labourer (ibid.: 112).

Feudal exploitation of the peasantry seemed most intense in the Telangana districts (ibid.). The traditional client relationships had become perverted and now the jajmani system was at the mercy of exploitative forces immediately beyond Telangana, and was based on the economic power wielded by those jajmans who owned land.

Whereas the Brahmans were once predominant, changes appeared within Telangana. Most notable, Marwadi sahukars gradually penetrated rural Telangana and established their ascendancy as money lenders. In this set-up the cultivators had to depend almost entirely on urban money lenders, traders, merchants and businessmen who controlled the commercial outlets and which came under a strictly centralized institutional pattern. As a result of growing land alienation brought about through the usual pressures, land began to pass into the hands of non-cultivating urban interests, mostly Brahmans, Marwadis, Komtis and Muslims.⁸³ Consequently, through growing

⁸³Furer Haimendorf, C. Von (1945) Tribal Hyderabad. Hyderabad: Government of H.E.M. Nizam, pp.41-43.

land alienation many actual occupants or cultivators were being reduced to the status of tenants-at-will, share-croppers or landless labourers.

The communists arrived on the Telangana scene during the latter half of the war. The party drew its strength from the famous caste of Kammas - well-to-do peasant proprietors. Between 1928 and 1933, Professor Ranga, who came from the urban intelligentsia and had shown some generosity towards the poorer sections, laid down a framework of regional level peasant organizations which in 1936 were affiliated to the All India Kisan Sabha, the C.P.I.'s front organization. This, for the C.P.I., was the period of the 'United Front' strategy which made strange political alliances possible and helped it to infiltrate the Congress and the Congress Socialist Party and to capture a host of peasant organizations all over India, including those in Andhra delta (ibid.: 116). Consequently the Indian Peasant Institute, started by Ranga at Nidubrolu, imperceptibly turned into a training centre for C.P.I. cadres (ibid.: 117). By 1940 the communists were firmly entrenched in the Andhra delta politics. During the ban (1940-42) they operated through 'front' organizations like the Kisan Sabha, Andhra Mahasabha, and so on. Rich Kammas (kulaks) formed the class base of the Andhra C.P. and provided the party with funds and workers (ibid.).

Through the Andhra Conference young communist cadres were able to act as a voice for the Telangana peasantry. The peasants groaned under the tyranny of landlords, deshmukhs and sahukars, an unsympathetic police force, an unfair revenue, judicial, administrative machinery that further added misery to their poverty. The communist cadres were able to draw attention to the agrarian problems in Telangana by focusing their concern mainly on the oppressive tax

system. By 1942 the communists were able to oust the right wing elements from the Andhra conference and the Mahasabha (ibid.: 117).

Without going into the actual details of the revolt some features that occurred seemed relevant to our argument. The revolt was not staged by peasants from a single agrarian stratum. Its adherents cross-cut traditional sub-caste and caste groups (op.cit.: 126). The leading communists of the Andhra delta and Telangana were predominantly well-to-do peasants who came from the Kamma or the Reddy caste of peasant proprietors. Thus these memberships or 'interest' associations were not located within the lowest position of the hierarchy but were in a position on behalf of the alienated and subjugated masses to assist them in their grievances by enunciating the peasant cause. No doubt the revolt was meant to assume a vertical thrust towards the seat of power. The rich peasants dominated the party, and commensurate with it, all the sub-sets positioned in the subordinate agrarian classes. Among them were the smallholders (middle peasants) and the tenants and share-croppers (poor peasants), quite as much as the landless labourers, all of whose interests for a while coalesced and thus coincided in an alliance. These interwoven interests formed into a voluntary and provisional spearhead in order to usurp the handful of big absentee landlords, whose power and dominance was so immense it could not be otherwise threatened (ibid.: 127). As Dhanagare put it:

The multiple grievances of all the sections of the peasantry during the postwar economic crisis had opened up the possibility of such an alliance.

(Loc.cit.)

In the abstract, it seems reasonable to argue that changes in the distribution of income and distribution and power affects the possibility for cleavages and whether or not there is the likelihood of them happening. A highly skewed pattern of income distribution

may result in a lower level of effective demand and national income seems likely to be concentrated in the hands of a few powerful factions. Particularly under conditions of mass unemployment and underutilization of resources and with unequal distribution, the multiplier effect will widen the gulf between dominant and oppressed groups and sectors of the economy. A poor distribution of power must likewise contribute to inordinate segmentation.

It is understandable, then, to view the communist support for the Telangana peasantry as an attempt at an attenuation of the oppressive institutional forces arrayed against the poorest segments. The communists emphasized three ideas. Firstly, a condemnation of high taxation, and demanded higher wage increases. Second, they condemned the large scale eviction of tenants and demanded both abolition of landlordism and a moratorium on all debts. And thirdly, they deplored the landlords and deshmukh's evasion of levy regulations (ibid.: 128). Peasants had experienced the fact that there was no automatic mechanism linking increases in production to equivalent increases in employment. The serious prospect of underemployment due to a pervasive bias towards a capital intensive pattern of investment is the most likely factor causing insurrection. Poor peasants, particularly the tenants and share-croppers and the landless labourers began to seize lands from the landlords and deshmukhs (loc.cit.). The agricultural sector of underdeveloped regions comprise a large proportion of poorer, mobile and dependent labour whose biggest problem is devaluation of their agricultural contribution, and with it a decrease in their effective opportunities and a constriction on their means of livelihood.

The concept of agrarian reform itself, however, can lead to certain misunderstandings. It is no longer a question of reforming an anachronistic and outdated agrarian structure of yesteryear, but rather of carrying forward

an agrarian policy which is adequate to the country's current needs for economic and social development, and appropriate for solving the problems produced by the new land tenure structure (Stavenhagen, 1966). Thus, it seems apparent to us for the need to reform land reform or the institutional structures administering such projects. This refers not only to the problems of land tenure but also to formulation of an adequate agricultural development policy. Heretofore, peasant frustration in Telangana made possible an alliance of the different agrarian strata by collective sharing of grievances and demands and it did not arise as a consequence of any grand theory precipitating reform. The cleavage between reform agency and peasant aspiration appears in the present situation to be insurmountable. Alliances between the various oppressed factions worked in the Telangana case so long as fundamental issues such as land seizures, ceilings, and distribution did not threaten its solidarity. Cracks within the alliance began to appear over the question of what to do with the land once it had been seized (Dhanagare, p.129). It demonstrates the impossibility for reform when the reformers are corrupt and the peasants' suspicion of any plan means simply another ill-conceived venture inviting their mistrust. Hereunto, any proposed developmental programme (due often to false and one-sided assumptions) seems to be imbued with inertia as the accepted norm resulting in a quid pro quo among the various entities concerned.

The lessons for us from this movement assume a two-fold nature. The revolt signified a build-up in resentment by various dispersed entities that threw in their lot together and combined into an ad hoc body to demonstrate their mutually overlapping interests. Deprived and peripheral groups from all walks of life suffered under the landlords and deshmukhs. Lack of alternative avenues had rendered them weak in bargaining with respect to the central policy networks. They were doubly exploited,

culturally as well as economically. By joining the communist organizations and councils constituted, it seems, throughout the various strata, in response to degradation, and through them revolting against the oppressive system, they had nothing to lose and everything to gain (Dhanagare, *ibid.*: 129).

The other significant point to note is that although we have gone to some length to espouse Wolf's (1966) version of explicating the crucial role played by the middle peasant, we note that the interests of middle and rich peasants are customarily harbingers and portenders of mistrust. The traditional peasant has no agenda against which he may check that trust even amongst the assertive and ambitiously inclined who emanate from a similar background. For this apparent reason, movements might well dissipate their intrinsic efficacy as discord, dissension and rift lead from conjunction to disjunction, and from the symmetrical to the asymmetrical juxtaposition of opposed entities. As Dhanagare points out, the role of the rich peasants was anything but revolutionary. In the first two years of the insurrection, they gained a great deal from the alliance. They were able to ward off the grain levy. But despite the gains, many of them were reluctant to increase the wages of their own labourers in pursuance of C.P.I. directives. After the army takeover, the grain-levy issue was no longer focal anyway (*ibid.*: 129). Moreover, as the grip of the military administration tightened, troops began to suppress the peasants ruthlessly, with some rich peasants adopting double standards. Whilst on the surface paying lip service to party precept, in providing the requisite food and shelter to the squad leaders and guerillas, they were also simultaneously acting as informers to the army and the police (Sundarayya, 1972a, pp.125, 259). It appears to us, then, that various ties cut across class divisions but often they reinforce them. The co-called 'race war' overlaps inter-

nationally with political and economic conflicts. Though at one level the major conflicts may be regarded as political and economic in the end, at the level of both individual motivation and institutionalized ideology the race factor and racial and ethnic superiority may manifestly express itself. In the case of the rich peasant, he may by judicious manipulation put on an appearance of his affiliation with different groups in rivalry with one another even though his interests appear undivided. Through careful choices he may adopt one 'persona' from a range of multifaceted displays available to him and depending on the different ways of life he wishes to portray. This ploy invariably represents an instrumental means for preservation and subtle exploitation in the one approach. As we mentioned earlier, the poorer peasant is denied any option and when hemmed in reacts in consequence to the constriction he perceives as threatening him.

Social classes in the full Marxist sense, characterized by a sense of solidarity amongst their members and by class organizations, are only one view then which expresses and articulates conflict against other classes over the radically unequal division of property. Other factors shape the likely occurrence in which cleavage and complex and unstable revelations result. For instance vertical divisions of ethnicity, tribal and regional differences may often divide classes and unite people as 'pillars' despite economic differences of position and wealth.

Frantz Fanon has argued, however, that the national bourgeoisies are too weak to challenge foreign enterprise and that in most small independent states, as we have seen, they are not a beneficial contributor to growth, since they have developed as an appendage of colonial society and now act primarily as direct or indirect agents of foreign investment capital (Fanon, 1965). Since they are a highly privileged and minute fraction of the population, mainly confined to the towns, often educated

in foreign countries and usually wielding great political power, they tend to defend their own interests strongly and close their ranks against threatening competitors;- hence the occurrence of fundamental cleavages between urban and non-urban locations.

On two counts, then, governmental power is usually decisively in the hands of those in the capital who control the party or the army, but their capacity to decide is always qualified because the 'commanding heights' of the economy are in foreign hands.

Added to this problem, and based on the principle of the Law of Comparative Advantage, these dependent nations ought to produce their wealth via agriculture. This objective is limited owing to the structure of international prices, the gap between the price paid for manufactured goods and that for primary products and raw materials. This economic non-development further depresses the rural and therefore dependent economy, and the peripheral peasant suffers most, raising the likelihood and legitimacy for revolutionary and nationalist protest movements.

Social distance, command and control

An important consideration is purpose and means. If the avowed aim is to achieve political power, then the greater or lesser distance from central political purpose must determine the success or otherwise of a movement's strategic capability. Often movements located far from the strategic sources articulating power are more likely to be unstable. Drift and change may set in. Devolutionary elements, lacking even a modicum of control, act in an emotional, impulsive way rather than in terms of cold logic and are thus swept away centrifugally from an inner politically attentive zone to more bizarre outer regions. Hence, there is some substance in Wolf's description of a positionally out-of-touch peasantry, with concrete realities.

Where the peasantry has successfully rebelled against the established order - under its own banner and with its own leaders - it was sometimes able to reshape the social structures of the countryside ... but it did not lay hold of the state, of the cities which house the centers of control of the strategic non-agricultural resources of the society ... Thus a peasant rebellion which takes place in a complex society already caught up in commercialisation and industrialisation tends to be self limiting and hence anachronistic.

(Wolf, 1969b, pp.371-372)

A second reason why the purpose to achieve an envisioned target fails is because a movement's divorce from strategic long term planning means that it is too narrowly focused. A non-institutional religious movement does nothing to exert its influence against basically unsympathetic entrenched reactionary forces. Nietzsche has shown that ideas, whether good or bad, only become effective by organization.⁸⁴ Any movement is bound to succumb to the purposeful ideas of a stronger opponent since it, like the inferior player of a chess game, considers moves too often in terms of immediate tactical advantage.⁸⁵ Such 'movers' remain blind to variations offered by less attractive options later. Position and strategy and the effective mobilization of pressure affect the chances open to aspiring movements. The dangerous trap here is that the 'means utilized to influence power-holders may suffer setbacks, and an impatient lapse into military rather than politically aligned policy positions may occur.'⁸⁶

⁸⁴Cited in Joad, C. (1938) Guide to the Philosophy of Morals and Politics in the chapter on 'Nietzscheanism and Christianity'. Gollancz, p.640.

⁸⁵The competitive maximization of advantage pursued by what we in the west term rational decisions on the part of 'economic man' become absurd when by this is meant the deliverance of technological military penetration. Is this what the formal economist would term rational when the historical consequence had been the outright annihilation of those who failed to comply with the technicist norm? The concept of economic rationality is not only illogical, it is absurd. It pretends to be neutral by enveloping itself in a vacuum.

⁸⁶See J. J. Leurdiyik (1975) In International Terrorism and World Security. London: Faber & Faber, p.10.

Anthropologists have devoted little consideration to post-war decolonization movements whose avowed aims are nationalist and liberationist. Many liberation movements were competing among themselves for experience, armaments and prestige. Also, partisan groups simulated low level 'guerilla' movements aimed originally against oppressive domestic governments. Arguably, now, both patterns of terrorism have failed in the last decade to achieve their goals, and this has created a synthesis of method which exploits current technology to place causes before a world audience. Seen thus, it is possible to grade applied terror in a scale from rational, organized political method, down through looser, more dramatic situations such as hostage-hijacking, to a shape of violence which is vast, variable, indiscriminate and not aimed at government decision circles. As Aron points out, strategic thought draws its inspiration each century, or at each moment in history, from the problems which events themselves pose. So too, therefore, contemporary terrorism, while a subject for strategic theorizing, may not be analysed in isolation from its broader political and cultural background.⁸⁷

When Engels in 1895 wrote a new preface to Marx's Class Struggles in France, he too said that the time of surprise coups, of barricades and street fighting by small elites leading amorphous masses devoid of class consciousness, was over once and for all. The nineteenth century development of modern arms had made such fragmentary applications of terrorism obsolete.⁸⁸ Engels then can be seen as positioning himself for political/strategical violence. Force would be needed, to his

⁸⁷Cited in Aron, R. (1969) 'The evolution of modern strategic thought in problems of modern strategy', I Adelphi Paper, 54. London, p.7.

⁸⁸See Lacquer, W. (1971) 'Diversities of violence and current world system' in Adelphi Paper, 82, Part 1: 'The scope of civil violence'. London.

mind, but only at a very special time and place. "Fighting," Engels wrote to Marx in September 1857, "is to war what cash payment is to trade, for however rarely it may be necessary for it actually to occur, everything is directed towards it, and eventually it must take place all the same and must be decisive."⁸⁹ Terror, judiciously channelled for a political purpose was valid. However, the direction of the attack was to focus on the central political machinery. Lenin believed "we have never rejected terror on principle, nor can we do so. Terror is a form of military operation that may usefully be applied, or may even be essential in some movements".⁹⁰

In all these movements emphasizing change, the need for political activism often becomes obscured. Perhaps by their very adherence to terror as an idea to facilitate change, the defeat of Guevara and Debray in South America was a logical outcome. Furthermore, such movements may tend to emphasize idiosyncratic factors such as will and dedication as against relating to the social context where a constructive programme for change might be envisioned.⁹¹

Moreover, it becomes easy to degenerate from any political strategic focus into purely military considerations, violence for the sake of violence. There may arise a contempt for locality and established institutions with no creative or constructive purpose, the means taken amounting to the enjoyment of violence as a culture

⁸⁹Aron, R. (Feb.1969) 'The evolution of modern strategic thought' in 'Problems of modern strategy' I, Adelphi Paper, 54. London, p.7.

⁹⁰Cited by Putsay, J. S. (-965) in Counter Insurgency Warfare. London: Collier-Macmillan, p.26.

⁹¹In Earle, E. M. (1943) Makers of Modern Strategy. Princeton University Press p.158.

or lifestyle. For instance, Fanon believed that, collectively and individually acts of violence could be cathartic. Politicized emotions were to be given direction and force as purposeful terror and thus become purifying experiences for those made wretched and deprived under colonialism.

Fanon's thirst for violence seems poorly directed and therefore irrational and mindless when this violence is subjected to his own psychiatric findings. This contradiction is exposed in his writings. While helping individual terrorists prepare themselves for their tasks Fanon also collected case histories in his psychiatric work which proved to him that "the events giving rise to the disorder are chiefly the bloodthirsty and pitiless atmosphere, the generalization of inhuman practices and the firm impression that people have of being caught up in a veritable apocalypse."⁹²

If then it is no longer possible to pretend that violence is a purely creative and 'cleansing' force, then the onus is placed squarely on ideologies of terror to show that they have succeeded propitiously in revolution.⁹³ Have they brought about a tangibly better life unattainable in any other way?

⁹²Fanon, F. (1967) The Wretched of the Earth. Trans. Constance Farrington. Harmondsworth: Penguin, p.202.

⁹³For detail of some psychopathological side effects I would refer to Devereux's work on Hungarian freedom fighters: Devereux, G. (1961) 'Two types of modal personality models' in Kaplan, B. (ed.) Studying Personality Cross-Culturally. New York: Harper & Row, pp.227-241.

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