TERMS OF ENGAGEMENT: WHEN ACADEME MEETS MILITARY

In this paper we outline what we understand modern universities and militaries to be and what their functions are before delving into the issues arising for academics seeking to undertake research into military matters. As we do this, our primary audience is academe. However, we also believe this paper assists military personnel in understanding the background and some key considerations of the academics they may encounter in their barracks or in the field. The value of an understanding of the other side’s perspective and institutional culture is a strategic advantage that military personnel will appreciate when academe and military meet. In fact, we would look forward to a team of soldiers writing the counter piece to this paper: ‘When military meets academe’. This paper seeks to discuss broader issues that affect the engagement between academics and soldiers, such as the levels of militarisation and militarism in societies at large as well as more practical matters (such as operating in danger zones) in ascertaining how, if at all, academics and military personnel might best interact. These broader issues also include some reflections on matters that directly and typically influence or shape the relationships between these two sides: secrecy and the risk of seduction, as well as competing organisational cultures (such as the Universities’ role as ‘critic and conscience’ and militaries’ roles in defending the state) and different levels of acceptable risk. Note that for the purposes of this brief paper we capture such key issues in only broad strokes, thus we warn the reader that we must necessarily work in somewhat blunt terms.
The Military

Military forces are not monolithic in nature. Indeed, we must first of all expressly recognise that we are going to focus our discussion on professionalised military forces within modern liberal democracies (see Verweijen 2015 for an account of seeking to do research with military forces in other contexts). In investigating further, we must also note that not only are these particular militaries easily divided into components such as air, sea and land power elements along the traditional concepts of air force, navy and army, but each of these are themselves divided into many different specialist functions. From cooks to special forces, ‘the military’, including the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF), houses a vast range of personnel and skill sets. Some of these skillsets, such as cyber, also necessarily cross different domains. To a certain degree, however, for the purposes of this paper we must lump these differing people and their roles under the term ‘the military’ or ‘military personnel’.

This is in part because, despite differences between services, there are some central tenets that we seek to discuss which help provide traction on some of the issues academics face when seeking to engage with ‘the military’.

The first of these tenets is that the concept of the military is tied up with the development of standing armies and the concomitant development of the modern interstate system. In brief, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the feudal mode of military organisation, in which military service was a matter of personal contract between liege-lords and their vassals (Strayer 1965: 13), slowly gave way to larger, more centralised professional standing armies (Howard 1976: 54). This was due to fundamental political change. In 1648, the signing of the Peace of Westphalia signalled the end of the Holy Roman Empire as an effective political institution. Following the loosening of the church’s authority post-Westphalia, absolutist European monarchs (Mann 1993: 476) could become, for the first time, at least in theory, truly sovereign – having supreme legitimate authority over their territory (Philpott 1995: 360).

Buttressed by the principles of non-intervention and mutual recognition (Hirst 2002: 16), inter-state recognition also enabled intra-state hegemony. Once control over the state’s internal population had been achieved, the state could then organise and systematise its military capacity and direct it outwards (Giddens 1987: 181-92). In this way:

The emergence of the modern nation-state and the incorporation of all civilizations within the interstate system … created a world organized and divided into domestic and foreign realms – the ‘inner world’ of territorially bounded national politics and the ‘outer world’ of diplomatic, military and security affairs (Held et al. 1999: 32).

The signing of the Peace of Westphalia, therefore, set in motion developments “that were of great significance to the history of political communities, including … the introduction of standing armies” (Held et al. 1999: 36). Thus military institutions, as varied as they are, have often been associated with states and state-making, hence Tilly’s much cited notion that “war made the state and the state made war” (1983). (This has implications for thinking about the relationship between the military, society and the state – included in that array are academic commentators – so we will return to this issue later in the piece).

In addition to the above views that present standing armies as a state’s instrument for international engagement or conflict, standing armies have also been used by ruling political elites to quell domestic
dissent. Once police forces are no longer able to enforce the laws of the status quo, the standing armies can become an instrument of last resort for challenged political elites. For example, in the 19th century, France’s standing army violently repressed domestic uprisings of the urban poor in 1830, 1848 and 1871, thus keeping nearly toppled governments in power. Popular uprisings throughout German states in 1848 and 1849 were crushed by standing armies. In the 1890s, Italy’s army was deployed to quell separatist movements in Sardinia and Sicily. Standing armies can also become domestic political actors in their own right, often in collaboration with conservative elites who have lost political power after democratic elections. Europe’s 20th century witnessed several instances where left-leaning democratically elected governments were displaced by military coups: Portugal (1932-1974), Spain (1939-1975) and Greece (1967-1974). In these, and other, instances the militarisation of all of society’s institutions becomes an almost inevitable dynamic that can take decades to unravel, re-establishing the carefully calibrated separation of institutional powers. We will take a closer look at seductive or coercive forms of militarisation – and its implications – of societal institutions in this paper’s last few sections.

By the end of the eighteenth century, these standing armies looked much like the militaries we are familiar with in modern liberal democracies today. Military administration had become centralised (Strachan 1983: 4), quartering in barracks, rather than billeting, had become the norm, as had the wearing of uniform, and developments in military technology (such as the invention of the bayonet in 1690) had increased the need for soldiers to dedicate time to drill (Hirst 2002: 19). These features led to military forces developing particular characteristics which are still present today. For instance, the core war-fighting role of the military has resulted in personnel typically being utilised as (individually relatively insignificant) components in a greater machine – as parts of units ranging from platoons to armies. To function in this way, a strong emphasis is placed on leadership, highly-structured decision-making processes and hierarchy (Seiler 2009). Importantly, in part due to increased specialisation, rising costs, geostrategic shifts after the Cold War, societal change and so on, such modern militaries tend to be staffed by professional volunteers rather than by conscripts. New Zealand last used conscripted troops in World War Two and ended conscription entirely in the 1970s (Aimer nd). Even compulsory military training has become less prevalent worldwide, with typically only 25 or so countries maintaining this tradition (although 2017 did see a small resurgence in Scandinavia (Porter 2017)).

As noted at the start of this section, the military also makes great use of functional specialisation. This type of functional specialisation is multi-layered. At the highest level, the majority of modern militaries are comprised of distinct services, thus within the New Zealand Defence Force there are: the Army, the Navy and the Air Force. Within these services there are additional specialisations. Within Army, for example, there are functionally distinct units such as headquarters, artillery, cavalry, infantry, engineers, and signals. These units are made up of different components, each performing different roles that contribute to the overall ‘Army’ performing its function. Thus platoons perform roles that contribute to battalions performing their functions, and so on, until the overarching function of securing the state against external threat or domestic rebellions is being played (Greener and Fish 2015). Each of these different component parts of ‘the military’ has its own traditions and cultures.

It stands to reason, then, that some military units within and across these three services are more focused on directly participating in lethal violence than others. That is, in the Army, infantry units will have greater capabilities and training to deliver on the core task of killing the enemy with weapons
than will logistic or catering units, although the latter are vitally important to the former achieving success in this aim too. Air Forces have more or less offensive capabilities – fighter jets armed with missiles versus strategic lift capabilities, for example. Needless to say there can be a difference in this vein both within and between the three services – for example, in terms of the levels of familiarity different personnel will have in terms of bearing arms.

In seeking to understand the role and purpose of military forces in modern liberal democracies, it thus may remain “a truism” that the main purpose of an army is to defend the state (Jeffrey 1985: 51) or the status quo. However, not only does military culture differ from state to state and within different branches of the military itself, but numerous additional roles have been added to create a veritable suite of tasks – a feature of contemporary military life that we will discuss in more detail below. In New Zealand, for example, the Defence Act 1990 states that New Zealand’s Armed Forces are raised and maintained for:

- the defence of New Zealand, and of any area for the defence of which New Zealand is responsible under any Act;
- the protection of the interests of New Zealand, whether in New Zealand or elsewhere;
- the contribution of forces under collective security treaties, agreements, or arrangements;
- the contribution of forces to, or for any of the purposes of, the United Nations, or in association with other organisations or States and in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations;
- the provision of assistance to the civil power either in New Zealand or elsewhere in time of emergency;
- the provision of any public service (Defence Act 1990: 10).

These themes are echoed in strategic policy documents such as the 2016 Defence White Paper which asserts that key tasks for the NZDF include defence of the state, support to allies, support to international and regional institutions, peace and stability operations, humanitarian aid and disaster relief (HADR) and search and rescue (SAR) roles at home and abroad and so on. In terms of what this means for the day-to-day work of the NZDF, moreover, in the 2015-16 financial year, the NZDF was deployed to:

- train Iraqi forces in its Building Partner Capacity programme;
- surveillance roles in the Combined Maritime Force;
- UN missions in Korea, Sinai, Sudan and to UNTSO;
- air support to an Australian-led freight/personnel programme in the Middle East;
- train Afghan National Army personnel in Afghanistan in a British-led programme;
- to roles in coalition headquarters in Bahrain and Kuwait;
- in HADR roles in Fiji and at home in New Zealand;
- engage in multinational exercises such as Tropic Twilight and Southern Katipo;
- Mutual Assistance Programme initiatives (85 in the Pacific and 29 in Southeast Asia)
- maritime and air surveillance roles in the Pacific;
- help the Cook Islands Police Service deliver a Youth Development Programme;
- support New Zealand’s interests in Antarctica;
- provide sixteen Defence Attaches / Military Advisors;
- provide bomb squad, surveillance, search and rescue, Youth Development, Cadets, support to Fire Service, ANZAC commemoration and other events (NZDF Annual Report 2015-6: 14-20).

NZDF policy documents note that these taskings fell under three main ‘outcomes’ determined by the New Zealand government. These are: ‘International Order is Supported’, ‘New Zealand’s National Interests are Secured’, and ‘Veterans’ Service is Honoured’ (NZDF Annual Report 2015-6: 10).

Such objectives are both vast and vague. What it potentially allows is for the use of the military in a range of non-military tasks – bringing both risk and opportunity. Indeed, concern about overstretch and overreliance on the military instrument is a key contemporary issue (see Downes 2010; Adams and Murray eds 2014; Brooks 2016; Fish, Greener, Harding, Sigley 2017) that is prime fodder for academics whose very purpose is to ask questions of contemporary and historical problems and – if need be – to ‘speak truth to power’.

The University

Contemporary universities in modern liberal democracies have a number of key objectives. The New Zealand Education Act (1989) states that a ‘university’ is identifiable as an institution which provides a “wide diversity of teaching and research” and which “maintains, advances, disseminates and assists” in the application of knowledge whilst also having an “intellectual independence” (NZE Act 1989 Section 162). Most relevant to this discussion is the much touted notion that universities are meant to support academics and to produce research and graduates to help further the central goal of acting as ‘critics and conscience’ of society (see also the NZE Act 1989 which defines universities as needing to ‘accept’ this role).

Just like ‘the military’, however, ‘the university’ as a societal institution also has its own specialisations, including academic specialisations known as disciplines. It is interesting to note, therefore, that although bound together by the more generalised objectives noted above, different academic disciplines within ‘the University’ can have slightly different relationships with military institutions by virtue of the types of methodologies, codes of ethics and epistemologies, amongst other things, which dominate within that academic discipline.

Anthropology, for example, like most other disciplines, has its own Association and history of debates about the purpose of anthropology writ large. And the discipline as a whole has long held reservations about engagement with individuals or institutions who hold power. Thus academic Mats Utas (2009: np) reflected on his appointment to Head of the Africa programme at the Swedish National Defence College saying that: “If I would have been a political scientist no one would probably have objected to my choice but being a social anthropologist I have received numerous comments”. Many of these comments he mentions would have been from fellow anthropologists concerned about what his appointment meant for the reputation and future of the discipline as a whole. This explicit concern about working with military establishments is in part due to the research methods dominant in anthropology. Ethnography and participant-observation are research methods based on living amongst specific communities and forming close relationships with specific individuals, which leads this academic discipline in particular to pay so much attention to potential pitfalls in engaging with the military: “controversy comes less from the study of abstract social processes than from the study of concrete social contexts” (Calhoun 2010: 1102). This variation of disciplinary approaches to
militaries and militarism that exist within the broad rubric of ‘the university’ is demonstrated in the
difference of approach of, say, peace studies and gender studies versus strategic studies and war
studies. A striking example of this is explored later in the piece when we look at a feminist take on the
potentially seductive qualities of militaries and militarism.

Moreover, some universities, as the institutional setting within which these different disciplines are
located, will be more risk averse than others. In New Zealand, Massey University has taken a very
public stance on its attitude towards the role of the University within society – particularly through
the recent establishment of the new Bachelor of Arts. Massey’s new BA now requires students to
complete compulsory courses in an effort to demonstrate how the University directly seeks to meet
the requirement to be society’s independent critic and conscience. Thus the new BA structure requires
students to take core papers including, at 100-level, an academic writing paper, a paper on what it is
to be a citizen of New Zealand (Turangawaewae) and a critical thinking paper, as well as, at 200-level,
a paper on being a global citizen (Turangaranga). A practicum paper at 300 level (Tu Tira Mai) then
requires students to engage in activities or projects as members of a particular community round out
this ‘core’ to the new BA. Key to the argument for introducing these compulsory papers to the BA
schedule was the idea that simply stating that graduates will necessarily emerge from a BA as ‘critical
thinkers’ who can contribute to the society within which they live was not enough. The University
needed to ensure that students are equipped with the necessary skills and information in order to be
able to carry out these roles (Shaw 2016). Other New Zealand universities are currently considering
adopting a similar approach.

Despite the disciplinary and institutional differences involved across ‘Universities’, – again like in the
case of ‘the military’ – there remains a central raison d’être which marks out and defines academics
as constituting ‘the university’; that of ‘critic and conscience’ as well as ‘independent researcher’. What
this means, then, is that understanding, explaining and, essentially, critiquing the nature of
strategy and policy, the role of military forces, types of organisational cultures, taskings, objectives,
doctrine, training, education and relationships to other institutions is arguably the responsibility of a
range of individuals within academe. The relationship between military institutions and academe can
therefore be a precarious one – in large part because of the tension between their core objectives. One
exists to protect state, society and – not infrequently – the status quo through organised armed
violence; the other exists to be critic and conscience of that same state, society and status quo. We
now consider a range of issues arising from these sites of tension.

Status, Secrets and Seduction

The intimate relationship between the military and the state is perhaps most fundamental to
understanding some of the issues academe might face in seeking to explore the military or issues
arising from undertaking research with the military:

The claim that a state is not a genuine state in the eyes of the “international community”
unless it has its own instrument of organised coercion – an army – carries a lot of weight, even
in a society not usually considered highly militaristic (Enloe 2000: 46).

New political entities such as Kosovo have immediately clamoured for their own military forces both
to gain status and potentially to increase internal controls, whilst states aiming to attain increased
status and power have typically pursued major military modernisation programmes with an emphasis
on power projection capabilities, exemplified in contemporary times by countries such as China and India. The existence of military forces is thus seen by most governments as central to statehood. However, there is no foundation in international law for a connection between statehood and a standing army. The UN Charter’s five criteria for membership – i.e. applicants declare themselves to be a state, be peace-loving, accept the UN Charter, be willing to carry out the obligations contained in the charter, and demonstrate their ability to implement these obligations (UN, 1945: Article 4.1) – predicates statehood on peace-making and relation-building capabilities rather than war-making capabilities. And while there is no UN-endorsed definition of statehood, “the most widely accepted source as to a definition of statehood is the Montevideo Convention of 1933” (Grant 1998: 403). Article 1 in this convention declares that a state is simply constituted by a permanent population; a defined territory; a government; and a capacity to enter into relations with other states. Again, military forces are not at all suggested as essential for statehood and some do not – with nine Pacific Island states, for example, choosing this route. Nonetheless, realpolitik has led to about 90% of the governments of UN member states to believe that having a military is central to their existence. And these military institutions tend to be allocated a certain status and power both due to their capacity to use lethal force and due to the fact that they are often intertwined with myths of nation and statehood.

Subsequently, this means that “military policy is among the most centralized policy areas in any country; furthermore, military policy usually is shrouded in a secrecy that is legitimated by notions of ‘national security’” (Enloe 2000: 20). Gaining research access to such organisations can be challenging. This may require academics to either make do with public information where information may also have to be gleaned by ‘reading between the lines’ through discourse or textual analysis. Some of the strongest academic research in the international security field has, however, been completed in this manner.

Post-modern works, for example, have indicated how dominant narratives about national security can be usefully deconstructed to better comprehend just what assumptions are inherent in national security discourse, about what issues are prioritised, about which values are held dear, and about what courses of action are considered (Campbell 1992; Klein 1994). However, a danger for academics working in this area is one of seduction – both of academics working with military and academics working with military research in general. Carol Cohn’s work highlights this salient concern.

Cohn, a feminist academic by trade, elected for a 12-month period to work alongside defence intellectuals in a University centre dedicated to analysing nuclear strategy. Despite this being part of ‘the university’ which we have already discussed, this particular Centre tended to produce research and commentary that generated or supported existing defence establishment thinking. That is, it reinforced rather than questioned the status quo. In working in this environment for a year, Cohn found herself seduced by the language she was surrounded by. Calling this language ‘technostrategic’, Cohn believed that this language both reflected and shaped “the nature of the American nuclear strategic project, [and] that it plays a central role in allowing defence intellectuals” to function (Cohn 1987: 690). She noted that “as I learned their language, as I became more and more engaged with their information and their arguments, I found that my own thinking was changing to think and act as they do” (1987: 688). That is, her thinking was changing in such a way as to be able to dispassionately discuss and seriously entertain the possibilities of nuclear war with all of its terrible impacts. Immersion in another cultural context, in this case the potential immersion of academics into more
militarised settings within the university as well as in ‘actual’ military settings, can bring both constraints and opportunities to bear. Thus, by then critically questioning her own experience of seduction, Cohn was then also able to expose this reinforcement of the status quo, as well as to challenge ‘technostrategic’ language’s dominance of the nuclear discourse (Cohn 1987: 717) by demonstrating that this language was fun, sexualised and hence seductive, not the objective and rational technical discourse its makers claimed it to be. Cultural immersion can provide opportunities to more effectively act as critic and conscience, but only if critical thinking is also turned back on the academic’s experience of engagement itself.

Australasian Examples

The concerns outlined about seduction are not new, and local examples abound. The Australian National University, for example, was for many years a bastion of critical engagement with the security community, employing strongly dissenting views through the agency of individuals such as Desmond Ball and Jim George. However, a series of decisions within the University to bring the institution closer to government, such as the opening of the National Security College in 2009, has raised concerns about potential diminishment to its capacity to critique policy. Touted as a ‘joint initiative’ between the government and the university, the National Security College not only has a significant proportion of practitioner staff, thereby potentially asking questions as to the raison d’etre of academic staff, but also houses a Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF) which perhaps challenges principles of openness and independence. Similarly, the ANU’s State Society and Governance in Melanesia programme has, after winning a $24million contract with the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and partnering with the Lowy Institute, been transformed into the Department of Pacific Affairs. Despite reassurances from the Foreign Minister Julie Bishop who officially opened the initial program that “as a Government we value independent, objective – ferociously independent and objective – research and opinions”, she also immediately reminded the research team that “we are looking forward to the benefit of our investment” and that this consortium of researchers “will be driving greater focus on policy” (Bishop 2017). Such a trend towards close government partnerships has also continued with the February 2018 announcement of a new UNSW Defence Research Institute that “draws on the expertise of researchers from the University of New South Wales in Sydney and Canberra, to provide Defence with solutions to real life issues” (UNSW Canberra Website 2018).

In the New Zealand context too there remain similar possibilities for seduction or constraint. Concerns have been expressed that not only might ‘outreach’ efforts by defence institutions – such as the 2016 Defence White Paper consultations – simply be rubber stamping exercises (Rogers 2017: 320). There is also an awareness about the possibility that, in engaging too closely with policy makers, academic researchers may seek to produce research “with official security policy objectives in mind, rather than as a contribution to the pool of scholarly knowledge in its own right” risking a move from ‘critic’ to ‘courtesan’ (Rogers 2017: 319). This is likely to be particularly pressing for those working in National Defence Universities, or in situations where Universities are contracted to teach to military academies, or in situations where academic units, such as the Centre for Defence and Security Studies (CDSS) at Massey or the Centre for Strategic Studies at Victoria University, have strongly institutionalised relationships with government. Indeed, CSS, then jointly supported by the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, faced controversy over employment dealings with its Founding Director and, later, his replacement.
Yet we also cannot assume that there are pressures on academic agency in these cases – in either research or teaching. For example, the University of New South Wales, which provides degree courses for Australian Defence Force Academy (ADFA) officers, for many years housed academics that were highly critical of Australian foreign and security policy. In another example, Massey University held the contract for teaching into the New Zealand Defence Force Command and Staff College at Senior Level (Major / Lt Colonel rank equivalent) for over a decade, and, over this period, academics had autonomy over content delivery.

Moreover, the tension between the need to provide independent research and the need for continued public funding of universities in more general terms lays yet another level of fractiousness to the relationship between academe and any government agency. After all, governments fund universities, and research funding in particular is often geared towards encouraging ‘real-world’ research with policy relevance which can collapse the distance between both institutions. Truly independent sources of funding for research is rare. ‘Research for research’s sake’, highly theoretical, or highly critical work can be vulnerable. New Zealand academics have thus suggested that the possibilities “for development of individual voice tend to be constrained in the context of the survivalist, neoliberal university, where scholars flock toward the deepest pools of money, regardless of whether they have a particular interest in the funded subject area or not” (Moses 2017: 9). Researchers often:

have an interest in challenging the way in which we understand real world phenomena – in many respects making issues more complex and open-ended – [whilst] policymakers have a more instrumental objective, finding solutions and ‘resolving’ problems by narrowing debate parameters (Barbara 2017: 26).

Funding increasingly encourages research for policy rather than of policy, a phenomenon that has been increasingly common in the Pacific (Barbara 2017). From here the more finely grained concern, the notion that academe might be a lapdog rather than watchdog, is to be found in the specific issue of academics working out in the field and the instrumental use of their research.

**Force Multipliers in the Field or Damsels in Distress in Danger Zones?**

At the most extreme end of the spectrum academic work can potentially enable military dominance both at a strategic and policy level or even at an operational or tactical level (to use military speak!). Militaries can seek to make instrumental use of academics and their work, just as they can seek to utilise non-governmental organisations or aid-provision as ‘force multipliers’. The most famous assertion was made by General Colin Powell in late 2001 in discussions about the role of NGOs as being said force multipliers for the US military in accomplishing intervention goals (Rieff 2010). Powell asserted that:

I am serious about making sure we have the best relationship with the NGOs who are a force multiplier for us; such an important part of our combat team. We are all committed to the same, singular purpose to help every man and woman in need. (Powell, cited in Banta, 2017: 8)

In particular, the use of anthropological knowledge in the mid to late 1990s, and the Human Terrain System in Iraq and Afghanistan has resulted in heated debates about the ways in which academic work and personnel can become complicit (or worse) in military campaigns. In this section we discuss some
of these concerns, but first of all we would also like to note the changing roles of militaries which has, in part, helped to exacerbate this situation.

Militaries are for warfighting. But they are also, as intimated earlier on in the discussion about the breadth of taskings the NZDF carries out, utilised for peace operations, disaster relief, training, intelligence gathering, youth programme provision and so on. This broadening out into a range of non-conventional roles is predominantly a post-Cold War phenomenon; sparked by the end of the bipolar superpower standoff, furthered by developments such as the rise of peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention in the 1990s, and by a more recent focus on counterinsurgency rather than inter-state conflict. Captured by phrases such as the ‘Three Block War’ (Krulak 1999), militaries have, in recent times, increasingly worked within, amongst and alongside different populations. And, although the emphasis remains on kinetic options, with a potentially increased possibility of interstate war and an emphasis on large scale Air Sea Battles (Etzioni 2014) in very recent times, the need to work with populations remains. It is in this broad remit of working with populations where the military has most keenly engaged with academe.

The most obvious site of contention in recent years when discussing the notion that social science or humanities based academics (here we note the concern of scientists and mathematicians amongst others that their work might be used for military purposes but this is not our main focus) might be instrumentally used for military purposes is thus that of the United States Army Human Terrain System (HTS). The HTS officially ran from 2007 to 2014 (note that despite a formal disbanding of the HTS the aims of this programme continue to be pursued in other parts of Army). Run by the US Army Training and Doctrine Command, the HTS was said to offer a “unique sociocultural capability” whereby teams would “conduct granular social science research among the civilian population and report directly to the brigade staff” (Sims 2015: 3). This direct use of academic research in the pursuit of military objectives resulted in an explosion of debate.

Despite not actually having employed many anthropologists within Human Terrain Teams (Price, 2011, pp.4 &amp; 160; Selmeski, 2007, p.11) much of the critique of HTS came from the discipline of anthropology. This was because the notion of Human Terrain was a clear violation of anthropological codes of ethics, codes which in the case of the American Anthropological Association (AAA) had in fact historically been shaped by issues raised by anthropologists’ engagement with the military in Vietnam, Cambodia and Latin America (Price, 2011, pp.21-27). The Executive Board of the AAA in fact concluded in a 2009 report:

(i) that the HTS program creates conditions which are likely to place anthropologists in positions in which their work will be in violation of the AAA Code of Ethics and (ii) that its use of anthropologists poses a danger to both other anthropologists and persons other anthropologists study (AAA Commission on the Engagement of Anthropology with the US Security and Intelligence Communities 2009).

The “instrumentalization of cultural knowledge for war-fighting” was “of concern to practitioners of a profession inclined to engage, seek to understand and empathize with others” with many scholars arguing it was “unlikely” that the type of ethnographic research being asked for was “compatible with wearing fatigues, carrying arms and being transported, protected and supported by combat troops” (Zehfuss 2012: 177-8).
From a different perspective, some academics across the social sciences, including some anthropologists, saw the HTS as important in aiding commanders to make better decisions in the field, minimising casualties on all sides. Indeed, some engaged directly by being employed in the system themselves (see McFate and Laurence eds 2015 for autobiographical accounts by HTS academics who elected to engage in these teams). The film *Human Terrain* (Udris D, Der Derian and Udris M’s 2010), for example, follows the experiences of social scientist Michael Bhatia who joined the HTS and was killed by an IED in 2009 in Afghanistan. What the film demonstrates is the degree to which Bhatia took time to think about the implications of joining the programme, demonstrating the complexity of the situation as he strove to understand whether or not he could make something ‘better’. This complexity is what is recognised by most academic opinions on the matter.

In a case in point, in an interview about his book “Soft” Counterinsurgency: Human Terrain Teams and U.S. Strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan, American Sociology Professor Paul Joseph suggested that:

> I think any sort of complex human activity is better when informed by social science perspective. The more the military tried to incorporate social science perspective, the better. But if the agenda includes violence, that has its own logic and can collide with social science. And if it also includes control or manipulation or trying to determine outcomes favorable to your side, then social science is contaminated by that agenda. So yes, there is a role for social science, but we can’t exclude these other dynamics that actually interfere with an appreciation of social science understanding (Howard interview with Joseph 2014).

The HTS issue may have “led to disproportionate scrutiny” of a particular piece of the “historically brittle relationship between academia and the military” (Sims 2015: 6). It has also been called a ‘whipping boy’ for more general concerns about the wars waged in Iraq and Afghanistan (Griffin 2010: 229). Yet it usefully illuminates some of the concerns academics may have about any form of engagement with things military.

One of those concerns is risk to the physical safety of civilian researchers operating in conflict zones. This safety can be potentially provided for in two ways – in distancing oneself from the military effort in the hope that claims to neutrality will provide security, or in embedding oneself closely with that military effort in an effort to attain security that way. In terms of the first of these options, some believe that the risk of ‘going it alone’ is necessary. That is, that any full or partial association of academics with the military not only skews what is able to be accessed by the academic (as well as impacting the attitudes of local populations who could associate those academics with military aims), but also that connections with militaries may actually undermine the possibility of doing research that is independent from the interests of the warring parties. This risks bringing academic researchers to a world where investigative journalists have already arrived: the world of ‘fake news’ expands to include ‘fake research’. In this world, findings are not challenged or subject to falsification but believed or disbelieved depending on the embeddedness of the source. For example, as a matter of principle, *Médecins Sans Frontières* (MSF) does not seek protection in the field from military forces of any party. MSF argues that “whereas one of the declared aims of these military operations is the ‘creation of conditions for the provision of humanitarian assistance’, they may provoke precisely the opposite effect, and endanger the continuation of humanitarian action” (Marin, 2017: 5). Paraphrased for academics, this may mean that military protection for the creation of conditions to undertake research
may provoke the opposite effect and endanger the furtherance of academic research. However, strict neutrality may in practice be very difficult to maintain.

Researchers must at times operate in areas considered by military personnel to be their battlespace or area of operations. The personal safety of such non-military individuals working in a military area of operation has at times required a level of embeddedness or at least a form of communication between the two. Like non-governmental organisations, different academic researchers might take different approaches in terms of just how much association is appropriate. One consideration in making this judgement is the fact that, alternatively, a lack of willingness to work with / around / among / alongside military personnel can also pose risks to researchers who can face consequences in country and at home should they not cooperate.

Finally, in considering questions of risk to research and risk to safety, we would also recognise that there are potential risks for militaries seeking to utilise academic research. Questions were raised during the height of the use of the HTS, for example, about the impact that utilising such research would have on soldiering too. That is, whether or not the increased empathy that cultural competence and awareness might engender could “significantly interfere in a soldier’s ability to be first of all a decisive killer” (Denselow 2010). This is a highly focused issue, however, and we would instead draw attention to a more general trend within Western militaries to encourage personnel to undertake social science training themselves. In the New Zealand context, for example, “Command and Staff College graduates are now expected to personally understand the utility and possibility of social science data and methodology for comprehending environments, trends, and populations” (Lieber and Hoverd 2017: 142). This social science training, a form of reverse embedding perhaps, can potentially carry other risks. Lieber and Hoverd (2017: 145) therefore ask “when (if ever) is it wise to introduce a questioning, critical, evidentiary, methodological skill set into a hierarchical (often political at senior levels), military organization?”.

This section has sought to demonstrate that there are a number of issues arising in the relationship between academe and the military. In particular, the issue of the costs of embeddedness versus isolation is one that we would suggest can also occur within society as a whole. That is, when a society becomes highly militarised or values military efforts and approaches above all other avenues for action, any independent critique becomes very difficult to achieve – particularly if challenging the military is seen as traitorous or as a threat to national identity. This brings us to the question of militarism.

**Militarism and Society**

New Zealand is, perhaps, a relatively demilitarised society. But just what is a ‘militarised society’? Historical sociologist Michael Mann (1987: 35) suggested that militarism is “a set of attitudes and social practices which regards war and the preparation for war as a normal and desirable social activity”. Other authors define militarism to be a “disposition to use force” and militarisation to be “the acquisition of the potential to use force or the relative weight and importance of the states military in relation to its society” (Mabee and Vucetic 2018: 98). Key feminist author Cynthia Enloe expands upon this notion of militarisation as constituting:

[A] step-by-step process by which a person or a thing gradually comes to be controlled by the military or comes to depend for its well-being on militarized ideas. The more militarization
transforms an individual or a society, the more that individual or society comes to imagine military needs and militaristic presumptions to be not only valuable but also normal (Enloe 2000: 3).

Importantly, then, she suggests that “A gun can be militarised or unmilitarised” depending upon the value assigned to it. She also notes that civilian voters can be ‘militarised’. Here Enloe notes that Britons have identified certain elections as “khaki elections” where candidates seek to gain votes by presenting themselves as ‘war victors’ (Enloe 2000: 6). And, finally, she also points out that those who seek to alter military policy are at risk of the seduction noted above. That is, “any popular movement is prone to militarisation if its activists believe that altering military policy can be achieved only if the movement’s leaders are willing to engage in elitist state politics” (Enloe 2000: 20). These are useful discussions to have about the influence of ‘the military’ in both material and ideational terms. Thus, it seems key that militarist ideologies, as belief systems that place great value on military activities, are vitally important in understanding the place of the military within a given society.

Yet there is a key site of tension in modern society. The very professionalization and specialisation of military forces (not all citizens are able to operate weapons systems or to effectively handle arms) has two potentially contradictory consequences. First, this can potentially bestow on those military personnel significant power and status as these institutions and people are able to be placed on pedestals and/or can assume superior technical knowledge, thereby increasing civilian politicians’ dependency on military personnel for advice. Second, this distancing of the need to undertake military tasks from the majority of the population at the same time potentially enables a demilitarisation of those citizens themselves, and the potential of irrelevance or of being objects of disdain due to difference (see Shaw 1991: 13 for a discussion of some of these ideas). This question as to the role of military service as an integral part of society goes back centuries. Philosophers as diverse as Aristotle and Rousseau found conscription an essential foundation under a civic society, arguing that all civilians should serve the state so that all know the costs of war and so that military personnel are not overly separated from the society they serve. This point of view, and its opposite notion – that is, that military personnel should be professional and all volunteer forces separated from society – constitute one of the main debates in military sociology. Respectively represented by the work of Morris Janowitz (1960) and Samuel Huntington (1957), it is the latter professional and all-volunteer approach that has come to dominate in most modern liberal democracies since the end of the Cold War in the 1990s, with a range of consequences for society and government (see Caforio 2003).

A growing cultural gap between the lived experiences of military personnel and of that of same-generation civilians living in liberal societies has been one of the subjects of concern. The possibility of militaries reverting “to a kind of garrison status, largely self-contained and increasingly distinct as a society and subculture” (Ricks 1997) as different employment trajectories splintered a post-Cold War generation has been raised. More alarmingly, however, in the case of the US, were suggestions emanating from professional army personnel that a military esprit de corps is not only what the American society needed, but what American society at heart actually is:

It is one matter to acknowledge that much in American society today is deserving of contempt. It is another matter to propose that the role of the U.S. military—especially an all-volunteer professional military oriented toward conservative Republicanism—is to fix those problems. Yet that is what some are doing. “It is no longer enough for Marines to ‘reflect’ the society
they defend,” Michael Wyly, a retired colonel, advised in the March, 1995, issue of the Marine Corps Gazette. "They must lead it, not politically but culturally. For it is the culture we are defending.” (Ricks 1997).

What has happened since the mid-1990s in the US could be said to, in some ways, bear out these concerns. That is, the military has become an even more foundational part of American society (Cohen 1985). Although the US is not our key area of focus, a brief discussion as to what has developed in terms of the place of the US military within society is useful to bring to demonstrate some of the issues academe might seek to be aware of in engaging with the military.

One of the key contemporary concerns of academe is thus the notion that the US military has become a “one-stop-shop” for policy makers (Brooks 2016). The Department of Defense, the US military and militarised responses have become so dominating that they are seen the only option for action. In an interview on her book *How Everything Became War and the Military Became Everything*, Brooks argued that the US is ‘trapped in a vicious cycle’, since 9/11 viewing all threats ‘through the lens of war’ such that non-military agencies wither and:

> "If your functioning government institution is the military, everything starts to look like a war. And if everything looks like a war, then everything looks like a job for the military. And when everything looks like a war, then it looks like war rules, the legal framework for war applies to more and more things. And everything looks like a military mission [which] displaces the civil institutions, and undermines their credibility even while it overloads the military itself (Neier interview with Brooks 2016: 4)."

Thus in her text she points out that American military personnel have recently engaged in agricultural reform projects, led small business development initiatives, trained parliamentarians, vaccinated cows and designed programmes to tackle human trafficking (2016: 8). This has led to an ‘unintentional militarism’ (Downes 2015) whereby, instead of this militarism constituting a challenge to domestic civilian control over policy, the US military has increasingly become the primary actor and face of US policy abroad (see also Adams and Murray 2015) as well as saturating public consciousness as a force for good. Pointing out that 23,000 plus people work in the Pentagon alone, Brooks noted (rather tongue in cheek) that at the Pentagon:

> "You can buy a new pair of running shoes – or you can order up a marine expeditionary unit to patrol in the Philippines. You can buy some Tylenol at CVS if you have a headache, or you can order a team of Special Forces medics to go fight malaria in Chad (Neier interview with Brooks 2016: 3)."

Not only does this bring the mundane into contact with the extraordinary on a regular basis, thereby potentially rendering that extraordinary type of activity somewhat less exotic and therefore perhaps more permissible, but it also hints at the vast number of people engaged in either the military, security or intelligence communities – as well as the ‘military industrial complex’ more broadly defined.

Perhaps the most telling indicator of levels of militarism in modern liberal democracies, then, could be found by combining an understanding of both the stature and status given to personnel and the perceived utility and necessity of the institution and its personnel as options for action. Public acceptance of the legitimate existence and also the centrality of the military to domestic and foreign
affairs is key. The way in which service personnel are treated in public is perhaps a useful way to consider the place of the military within society. In the contemporary USA where these trends outlined above have occurred, for example, it is common for service people to receive free or discounted goods and to hear members of the public call out in support of those who are in uniform. And in New Zealand service personnel, mostly, are viewed in a positive light with a 2016 survey of 1,000 people resulting in 77% either very or somewhat favourable opinion on the Defence Force (Keating 2016). So this immediately brings us back to reflecting on the assumptions that New Zealand must be relatively demilitarised society especially as, in New Zealand like in the USA, the military is often central to foreign policy efforts, varying from peace-keeping operations to assistance in regional disaster response (Defence White Paper 2016). Yet, at the same time, we might also suggest that New Zealanders are supportive of the NZDF in fact because they are viewed as a relatively ‘demilitarised’ military, one which has a strong track record of peacekeeping and other humanitarian assistance roles.

There is more work to be done in increasing knowledge and understanding of the role of militaries. Indeed in 2018 scholars have begun calling for research on “military affairs to be brought back in” (Mabee and Vucetic 2018: 98). An important part of this research into ‘things military’ will be work that specifically reflects on the very role and nature of academic research on such military matters.

Conclusion

There are a range of risks involved in academe engaging with the military. There are risks to independence and a ‘view from nowhere’ approach for academe, and there are risks to military institutions in engagement with academe in terms of potential critical views being aired. But there are also risks to the military from non-engagement – academe can provide a useful external view on a somewhat closed institution and set of practices – whilst non-engagement with institutions that hold power also brings risk of irrelevance and irresponsibility for academe. Most fundamental here is the idea that an openness to critique is especially vital for healthy liberal democracies which carefully balance the demands of liberty and security on behalf of citizens.

The work of Brooks referred to in the later stages of this paper brings this last issue to the fore, including concerns about the military being a one-stop-shop, the old adage about when you ‘only have a hammer everything looks like a nail,’ and a deep and broad embedding of the military throughout American society. Her work, and that of a number of others, focuses on the US which is quite a particular case – one where previous US presidents have themselves expressed concerns about the role of the military and the military-industrial-complex more broadly defined. Yet these issues are relevant for other countries, including New Zealand. One of the reasons for this relevance is that, as Brooks (2016: 6) points out, we face a situation where we no longer know what weapons are, we can’t define the enemy and we struggle to distinguish between combatant and civilian. This is perhaps not new, with authors since the end of the Cold War and later the events of 9/11 emphasising a blurring of categories both in terms of internal and external (Andreas and Price 2001) and private and public (Bachman, Bell and Holmqvist eds 2015) security provision. In this situation of practical and conceptual confusion, it is perhaps surprising that the military has become the instrument of choice. That is, a relatively hierarchical, strongly ‘whipped’ institution (by organisational culture and specific legal systems) has somehow become the ‘jack of all trades’.
It is against this backdrop of military utility that academics must pursue their mandated roles as critic and conscience of society. In this paper we have explored some of the issues arising for academics seeking to engage with militaries. Risks and traps abound as do opportunities in this space and relationship. What we advocate is an openness and honesty by academe about what approach is being taken in any given research project, as well as a willingness on behalf of military institutions and personnel to be open to discussion and critique. We call for a range of views, a multiplicity of voices on the subject of ‘things military’, and will seek to protect and project those views through our work at the Security Politics and Development Network. Some of these views will be of instrumental value to organisations, some will be more polemical, but the aim of such research should always be to understand and challenge existing ideas, processes and practice.

In particular, we would hope that a range of disciplinary views will be forthcoming. An anthropological study informed by Bourdieu’s theorising about habitus, for example, will illuminate different issues than a feminist view on the performance of masculinities than will a military sociological view on the agency of the military. Academic debate can provide a rich feast. Researchers can, depending upon their training and interests, potentially undertake: historical investigations into the development of core military myths; discourse analysis about dominant narratives; aesthetic analyses about the use of imagery in military operations; development studies research into militaries and humanitarian or development practice; international relations investigations into the nature of security dilemmas; critical security studies of securitisation; historical sociological analyses of the changing role of state actors in security provision. In particular, we would suggest that a project which looked into the researcher-military-government relationship over the course of two Pacific deployments (RAMSI and Timor Leste) as juxtaposed against the experiences in Afghanistan, noted here, could be a useful first step in furthering of the core intent of this working paper.

To echo the words of Paul Joseph cited above, ‘any sort of complex human activity is better when informed by social science perspective’. That includes research into the military. And it includes self-reflection by those social scientists about their roles in studying and researching in the area of ‘things military’. This paper is intended as a starting point for initiating discussion about this kind of research in New Zealand. We welcome your feedback.
REFERENCES


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1 Email addresses for correspondence: b.greener@massey.ac.nz; n.j.harding@massey.ac.nz; a.r.powles@massey.ac.nz; g.prinsen@massey.ac.nz

2 The use of mathematical algorithms for developing missile guidance systems, the use of biological weapons and so on have long been concerns of academic researchers who do not wish to engage in research that could be used in military contexts. For a recent example of this in our region see [http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2017/01/japanese-military-entices-academics-break-taboo](http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2017/01/japanese-military-entices-academics-break-taboo) which notes the recent granting of monies by the Japanese government to researchers working on dual-use technologies.
Terms of Engagement: When Academe meets Military

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