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OPTIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES
FOR NEW ZEALAND AND
FRANCE 1918-1935 :
Les Liaisons dangereuses?

A THESIS PRESENTED IN PARTIAL
FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
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Abstract

The New Zealand histories typically assert that a new national identity evolved after World War I to substitute for the pre-war British-based model. This assumption has resulted in the creation of a British-centric historiography that understates the important role of other non-British influencers - especially the French - in the evolution of post-war New Zealand. Systematic sampling of newspaper articles in the PapersPast database has revealed that within New Zealand's post-1918 public discourse there was a diverse seam of opinion and news related to France that sat alongside that from Britain. This suggests that events concerning France were more prevalent in shaping the New Zealand story than the earlier histories have indicated. These additional perspectives have been integrated into aspects of the New Zealand post-World War I narrative, supplemented where appropriate with articles from French newspapers and the archive.

When the First World War finally ended, New Zealand attempted to disengage from Europe in order to put the collective national trauma in the past. Resuming the traditional dislike of the French was a reflexive rejection of the war years rather than a considered policy. It was a self-imposed rather than an obligatory restraint which manifested as official resistance to repatriating bodies and haste in preparing the local monuments that replicated the grander memorials being constructed in France. Thus, when France attempted to maintain contact with her New Zealand ally through trade and diplomacy, the clear wish of New Zealand to identify as a British-dependent entity led to rejection. Nevertheless, France remained a significant global power owing to the Versailles Treaty and post-war political and economic realities. As a result New Zealand was reluctantly drawn into further interactions with the French. As the other Dominions chose a more independent path it was New Zealand - having spurned the French overtures - that was left by choice diplomatically isolated, while clinging culturally, economically and diplomatically to the remnants of a British Empire that had no need for the former colony.

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Karen Watts drank many cups of coffee in those archival centres and waited patiently, so my eternal thanks go to her for her gracious tolerance and quiet inspiration.

Author's note:

Permission has **not** been obtained to reproduce the series of postcards from the collection of the Horopapera Karauti on pages 77-79, despite the best efforts of ATL (Alexander Turnbull Library) staff to contact the designated family representative.

These are therefore included but with great regret are only available for the thesis Examiners' use. They can however still be viewed in the ATL collection.

The full database of sampled newspaper articles summarized in the Appendix is available in the MS-EXCEL file that has been submitted with this thesis.

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Introduction

“Is it not the fact that with such friends there is an alluring prospect before us in respect of the future relations between France and New Zealand?”

Report of the ‘French Mission’ requoted in the *Oamaru Mail*, 8 May 1920¹

There is no comprehensive study of the post-World War I relationship between New Zealand and France. New Zealand studies that include the relevant decades tend to be either very general (King and Sinclair), very specialised (such as McKinnon’s study of the depression-era economy) or they are eclectic collections such as the Rachael Bell edited volume covering the years between the wars.² Few of the broad histories or the specialised subject studies do more than touch on the New Zealand-France relationship, while the edited volumes typically include essays that either completely omit France or only mention it as a geographic location with relevance to a specialist topic, such as religion. The detailed biographies of expatriate New Zealand writers and artists, such as Katherine Mansfield and Rita Angus who lived and worked in France, are not concerned with France or the interaction between New Zealand and France, but rather identify France as the coincidental, idealised location where events involving these famous New Zealanders took place.³ The same observation could be made of the many centenary studies of New Zealand’s participation in the war in France; the central role assigned to military action involving New Zealand - such as that at Le Quesnoy - displaces the involvement of the French and France.⁴ I will argue that contrary to the minor position that France occupies in these volumes, there has always been a more prominent France - even if only as an imagined place - within New Zealand’s history from 1918-1935.

¹ “French Mission,” *Oamaru Mail*, 8 May 1920, p.6.

² Michael King, *The Penguin History of New Zealand* (Auckland: Penguin Books, 2012); Keith Sinclair, *A History of New Zealand*, rev. ed. (Auckland: Penguin Books, 2000).; Malcolm McKinnon, *The broken decade: prosperity, depression and recovery in New Zealand, 1928-39* (Dunedin: Otago University Press, 2016); Rachael Bell, ed. *New Zealand between the wars* (Auckland, New Zealand: Massey University Press, 2017).

³ Gilbert Charles, “Courrier des lettres: Une âme transparente,” *Le Figaro*, 9 July 1931, p.5; “Une “fondation Katherine Mansfield,” *Le Figaro*, 28 March 1933, p.5. Katherine Mansfield appears twice in *Le Figaro*’s ‘Lettres, Théâtre, Sciences et Arts’ pages but these talk of Mansfield the writer. Neither article is directly relevant to the New Zealand-France relationship.

⁴ Caroline Lord, “Painting the Road to Le Quesnoy,” in *The Great Adventure Ends : New Zealand and France on the Western Front*, ed. Nathalie Philippe, Christopher Pugsley, John Crawford, Matthias Strohn (Christchurch: John Douglas, 2013). Recognition of the local French population in the Le Quesnoy story is a rare exception.

It was the earliest colonial contacts that set the tone for New Zealand's version of France. Despite neither the French settlement at Akaroa on Banks Peninsula nor the Marist mission in the North (led by Bishop Pompallier) resulting in the establishment of a substantial, identifiably French presence - such as occurred at Quebec in Canada - these early initiatives raised fears of French sovereign ambitions in the Pacific, thus reinforcing the Napoleonic-influenced, anti-French bias of the British settlers and missionaries.⁵ Even after these colonial ventures failed, the French remained strangers to the New Zealanders owing to the minimal direct contact between the two nationalities. Notwithstanding the significant French presence elsewhere in the Pacific, most trade and cultural contacts along with any political exchanges were directed through Paris and London. Maintaining this physical isolation and complicit cultural distance in the years prior to 1914 played an important part in perpetuating an anti-French bias. The extensive, irritating French colonial presence in the Pacific was a reminder - an aide-mémoire - for the New Zealanders of imagined deceits from earlier days.

Once the pre-World War I *entente cordiale* between France and Britain metamorphosed into a full military alliance, the traditional New Zealand dislike of the French had to be reconciled with that of France, the ally. The length, closeness and intensity of the War with the death of some 12,500 New Zealanders on the Western Front suggested that a revitalized and mutually beneficial post-war relationship was possible, perhaps through a trade-based bilateral relationship fostered by a new sense of familiarity based on the shared experience of loss of life.⁶ It did not eventuate, because New Zealand remained a devoted member of the British Empire and her default disposition always reverted to seeing the French as competitors and strangers. Moreover, few identifiably French nationals took up residence in New Zealand, and those that did seem to have rapidly

⁵ Peter Tremewan, *French Akaroa*, 2nd ed. (Canterbury University Press, 2010); Michael O'Meeghan, "The French Marist Maori Mission," in *The French and the Maori*, ed. J. Dunmore (Waikanae: Heritage Press, 1992); Jessie Munro, "Colin and Pompallier and the Founding of the Catholic Church in New Zealand," in *Catholic Beginnings in Oceania: Marist Missionary Perspectives*, ed. A Greiler (ATF Press, 2009).

⁶ *New Zealand Army Expeditionary Force : Roll of Honour, the Great War, 1914-1918* (W.A.G. Skinner, Government Printer, 1924). p.iv.

lost their distinctly French identity.⁷ The population statistics from the immediate post-war years show that arrivals from France were insufficient to warrant a separate line item mention in the migration, naturalization or temporary visitor totals. Despite the absence of an identifiably French population, the continued use of distinctly French names such as *Le Bons Bay Beach*, *French Pass* and *D'Urville Island* made the French presence more audible in a sea of Anglo-Saxon, Scottish and Maori names. The Marist missionaries had even been given the name of the ngati wiwi or the tribe of *oui oui* in the colonial years to distinguish them from the British.

The France that emerged from World War I was still a recognized world power with both a global presence and a significant if indirect local influence (notwithstanding the absence of a bilateral relationship). France was the owner of the international language of diplomacy, possessor of extensive cultural connections and the centre of her own international trading network with extensive colonial interests. She also possessed the assumed moral authority to lead, based on being both victor and a victim of the war. Geography and post-war political and economic circumstances meant France would remain a major influencer of global events, especially as the post-War world attempted to establish a new *modus operandi* based on disarmament and transnationalism. The symbolism inherent in locating the peace conferences in Paris signaled to the world that the French influence based on a self-assigned moral righteousness, would be significant.

Despite this, much of New Zealand's post-War history assigns only a minor role to France. The case that France has a place in New Zealand's national story to a degree greater than has hitherto been suggested rests on determining the nature and importance of any bilateral contacts whether they were direct or indirect. To do so, evidence of the extent of the French presence in specific areas of government policy, New Zealand culture and, day to day life has been investigated and documented.

⁷ "Yearbook collection: 1893–2012," (Statistics New Zealand). New Zealand's 1924 population was still just 1,398,723. In the preceding twelve months only 11,762 immigrants arrived of which 96.15 per cent came from British countries (i.e. British Isles, Australia, Canada, South Africa, and India). The Yearbook notes that most of the remaining 4% 'came from China, (the) United States of America, and Jugo-Slavia'.

1.1 Methodology

Since little has been written about post-War relations between New Zealand and France, New Zealand's digitised newspaper archives (Papers Past) have been used to identify topics with mutual relevance for New Zealand and France. The newspapers reported matters of general interest and these became part of local discussions on the issues of the day. Although the topics identified through the newspaper searches have been supplemented with information from the full range of archival and secondary literature resources resulting in a hybrid methodology, the newspapers are the foundation source used to identify what was in the public mind at the time for, as André Siegfried observed:

The press of a country generally reveals accurately enough the public mind, for, after all, it is representative, and a people has only those newspapers which it needs.⁸

While developing my method, I quickly discovered that a search for the keyword 'France' revealed a large number of newspaper articles mentioning topics such as the Versailles Treaty, to take one example. This suggested that the role of France in shaping the New Zealand public's perceptions of some aspects of the Versailles agreement had a greater emphasis than that given by earlier historians. It is discrepancies such as this that suggested the news can shed new light on previous studies.⁹

New Zealand's news of international affairs was heavily skewed by sources from within the Empire.¹⁰ In addition, many of the articles in New Zealand's Papers Past digital collection refer to France as a historical construct rather than as a contemporary nation, but as Alan Liu has argued, '... the amplest experience of sociality includes the society

⁸ André Siegfried, William Downie Stewart, and D. A. Hamer, *Democracy in New Zealand*, 2nd ed. (London: Bell, 1914). p.232. It is likely that this comment was made with an awareness of the differences and similarities between his observations on New Zealand society's view of France in the pre-1914 period, and the reports in the newspapers about France and French matters such as Dreyfus, Fashoda, Algeria and the New Hebrides.

⁹ Tony Ballantyne, *Webs of empire : locating New Zealand's colonial past* (Wellington: Bridget Williams Books, 2012). p.185. Tony Ballantyne's point that historians need to be more critical of the archives and understand what is absent from them as well as the ideological constructs used to record them and this applies equally to the newspaper archive.

¹⁰ Tony Ballantyne and Australian National University. History Program., *Talking, listening, writing, reading : communication and colonisation*, Allan Martin lecture, 2009. (Canberra: History Program Research School of Social Sciences Australian National University, 2009). pp.21-22. Tony Ballantyne, "Thinking Local: Knowledge, Sociability And Community In Gore's Intellectual Life, 1875-1914," *New Zealand Journal of History* 44(2010).

that is history, and social media will be more fully human if it remembers that'.¹¹ In this case, the culture of the New Zealanders included their collective knowledge of France, even if it was sometimes a re-hashed version of overseas reports alongside a misunderstood version of the past applied to the present. This suggests that investigating whatever sources are available from the French-related public discourse in the selected period will contribute to an understanding of the public's perceptions of France. In this case the newspapers have been used as they are one of the few sources for what survives from the relevant pre-digital discourse.

Before digital archives became readily available newspaper searches by resource constrained historians were limited by their ability to refine their searches.¹² For this reason, searches of hardcopy newspapers tended to find what was sought rather than using broader scans with filters to see what could be found. Referenced newspaper clippings were often used to illustrate a point, but the limitation of *a priori* selection meant they were not necessarily representative. I used this technique for my M.A. research, although in that case the comprehensive search through the electronic *PapersPast* database for a subject such as 'Dreyfus' or 'entente cordiale' was still limited by the topic definition.¹³

At the time of writing there were over half a million articles that included the terms 'France' or 'French', published within the relevant period and available in the *PapersPast* database.¹⁴ While the dataset does not include all newspapers, the coverage is so extensive that it seems unlikely that a major event relevant to both France and New Zealand could have appeared in the public domain but not in some of these newspapers.¹⁵ Therefore, a topic appearing frequently in the newspapers but not in the archives or the secondary literature suggests that the topic has for some reason been

¹¹ Alan Liu, *Friending the past : the sense of history in the digital age*, Chicago scholarship online (The University of Chicago Press, 2019). p.25.

¹² Chandrika Kaul, "Introductory Survey," in *Media and the British Empire* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), pp.2-3. Kaul develops the argument that historians tend to use newspapers in an 'illustrative fashion.' She also argues for a more thorough analysis of newspapers, so that they can be used as a source in their own right and on their own merit.

¹³ Alistair Watts, "Why, when the image of the French in the New Zealand Press 1900-1914 was a divided one, did New Zealand enter World War I allied to France?" (2016).

¹⁴ "Papers Past," (Wellington: National Library of New Zealand, 2016).

¹⁵ "Gallica," Bibliothèque nationale de France, <http://gallica.bnf.fr/accueil/?mode=desktop>. Newspaper sources include the New Zealand *PapersPast* portal, selected United Kingdom newspaper databases and French newspapers accessed via the Gallica web portal.

overlooked or deliberately excluded. Further investigation might reveal that the topic was included in the secondary literature, but the newspaper reporting varied in nuance or scale, as previously mentioned. This effect has been noted by Lansdall-Welfare *et al* who in their large-scale study comparing trends in topics between newspapers and books observed that, ‘... an analysis of newspapers may be more sensitive to certain cultural shifts – notably because of their closer relationship to current events – than books.’¹⁶ In other words, because the newspapers are published frequently, without the benefit of foresight, they provide a more granular source replicating the ebb and flow of events in the context of the period.

Ideally all the relevant newspaper articles would be investigated to identify the significant events that attracted both newspaper editorial and public interest. Reading, analysing and then categorising over half a million newspaper articles was obviously beyond the resources available. One possible solution was to use electronic classification. A major problem with this approach was the absence of any established technique to consistently cluster articles relevant to the same topic.¹⁷ The newspaper terminology is too inconsistent and the background noise is too great to rely on automated electronic searches and cataloguing. A useful contribution to understanding the problem of using automated software to cluster articles comes via the meteorological researchers who investigated *PapersPast* as a supplementary source for studying historical weather patterns.¹⁸ Meteorology has the advantage of access to objective historical data, such as rainfall and temperature, to compare with the newspaper reports. Meteorologists can thereby test the accuracy of newspaper reports against observed results. In the referenced study, the researchers concluded that ‘blind searches’ (for, say, ‘drought’ or ‘cold’) had ‘limited potential’ and were ‘... no substitute for thorough analyses of documentary sources’.¹⁹ The limitation arose from

¹⁶ Thomas Lansdall-Welfare *et al.*, "Content analysis of 150 years of British periodicals," *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America* 114, no. 4 (2017): p.458.

¹⁷ Lev Manovich, "Cultural Data: Possibilities and limitations of the digital data universe," ed. Wendy Coones Oliver Grau, Viola Rühse, *Museum and Archive on the Move: Changing Cultural Institutions in the Digital Era* (Boston: De Gruyter, 2017).

This article has an excellent discussion on the use of digital sources to identify trends and patterns, rather than as collections of curiosities and interesting but atypical events (as Museum collections tend to be).

¹⁸ D. Munro and A. Fowler, "Testing the credibility of historical newspaper reporting of extreme climate and weather events," *New Zealand Geographer* 70, no. 3 (2014).

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p.153.

inconsistencies in the terminology used to describe the same weather conditions between different newspapers and across seasons. The description of a climatic event (rainfall, temperature) depended on the whim of the newspaper, the syntax and the season. Assessed at a statistical level this lack of consistency caused the authors to reject *PapersPast* as a suitable source.

Although the historian might intuitively reach a similar conclusion, the reasons the meteorologists give for this inconsistency are revealing. Firstly, there is 'noise' in the data, because a key-word search inevitably identifies news items that are irrelevant. In my case a search for the term 'French' detected several articles giving the New Zealand market price of French beans. The use of 'France' or 'French' as a given or family name or as a place name (e.g. French Pass) is another example. This was compounded by the automated article clipping tool used by *PapersPast* that can inadvertently group irrelevant information alongside or even within reports of pertinent events. When snippets of overseas news were printed in omnibus columns labelled with names such as "Cable News", this became a significant problem. Inconsistent use of terminology or jargon was another drawback. To take one example, the deceased may have 'passed away', 'left this world', 'gone to a better place', or been 'laid to rest' but less often simply 'died'. As the meteorology researchers concluded:

... there are no shortcuts for thorough analysis; as newspaper data are largely qualitative, newspaper reports require close scrutiny and comparison with other documentary sources.²⁰

Although (as Lara Putnam explains), 'By measuring proximity and comparing frequencies, topic modeling can balance easy hits (using searches for known subjects) with evidence of other topics more prevalent in those sources', using frequency of mention as an indication of importance requires caution.²¹ This issue has been further explored by Tamul and Martinez-Carrillo who questioned whether keyword searches (such as their study had done) produced representative samples of articles.²² They

²⁰ Ibid., p.163.

²¹ L. Putnam, "The transnational and the text-searchable: Digitized sources and the shadows they cast," *American Historical Review* 121, no. 2 (2016): p.399. Even defining a keyword and then agreeing on its meaning in the context of an article raises questions of interpretation.

²² Daniel J. Tamul and Nadia I. Martinez-Carrillo, "Ample Sample? An Examination of the Representativeness of Themes Between Sampling Durations Generated From Keyword Searches for 12 Months of Immigration News From LexisNexis and Newspaper Websites," *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly* 95(2018): pp.97,119.

concluded that ten to fourteen weeks of coverage was required to adequately cover an individual theme (e.g. 'reparations' or the 'League of Nations' to take two cases from this thesis) in the newspaper data base, while in some cases even larger sample sizes would be required. They also accepted that this was 'likely impractical'. In short, not only is a sample of sufficient size required to identify the relevant subject(s), additional sampling is also needed within that subject to investigate the nuances of the topic. Since each article must be read and assimilated into the dataset, the task can quickly become unmanageable.

It was therefore decided to use a random sampling procedure to identify the main topics. There are a number of cautions to be placed on this method. Most importantly, it is impossible to determine how widely any one newspaper article was read. It is quite possible that a sampled article was read by very few, whereas others may have attracted considerable attention – perhaps owing to the topic or the prominence of the headline or its placement.²³ The reasons for this caveat are readily apparent. Firstly, the size of each print run is in many cases unknown, but even where the number of copies was recorded, the number that were circulated and sold remains indeterminate. Claimed circulation data is notoriously unreliable as it is subject to manipulation, not least because circulation metrics were - and still are - used to sell advertising. The dedication of many front pages to advertising provides indirect evidence – page one of the *New Zealand Herald* for 2 January 1935 was still entirely given over to advertising as it was in the previous decades. Secondly, even when circulation data is available, readership measurement remains as problematic then as it does today. One copy may be read multiple times while others may be unread. Readers may have access to more than one publication thus exposing questions as to which they believed.

Just whose opinion the newspapers represented is uncertain although direct editorial comment and letters to the editor are an obvious exception. Many articles in the New Zealand papers were unattributed so it is impossible to determine how authoritative the writer was or to determine where their information came from. (The French newspapers were rather better than their New Zealand counterparts at attributing opinion pieces).

²³ There is surprisingly little comment on this limitation in the literature compared to the volume of scholarly work devoted to measuring and interpreting the content.

Although verbatim repetition in different papers is easily identified, when the same story has been edited or re-written its source and independence cannot be determined. This is a significant problem in New Zealand where provincial papers often re-used Reuters articles licensed to New Zealand Press Association (NZPA) members without NZPA permission.²⁴

The only systematic way to determine which topics were of significance within a manageable timeframe was therefore to draw a statistically valid random sample from the universe of all qualifying articles, reading and classifying them, and then using the most significant topics as the basis for this thesis.²⁵ This method is the least likely to introduce any bias and the technique can be easily replicated, thus allowing verification by other researchers. Moreover, alternative if more sophisticated, stratified sampling designs have severe limitations. Ideally, the print run size and readership would be weighted by the distribution (in relation to the accessed population) to estimate the penetration of any cited issue. The data sources do not permit this degree of precision, so there is little point in examining each newspaper's estimated or claimed circulation and editorial stance since the relevance of either cannot be established at individual article level. Similarly, great caution is needed when using Papers Past search parameters such as relevance (a Papers Past filtering option) as a surrogate for importance. Accommodating the new titles that were constantly appearing while others were either taken over by more enduring mastheads, or simply failed as businesses added another complication. This along with the other mentioned factors means that determining some type of weighting matrix to estimate the readership or even demographic catchment area of any given article is currently impossible. Even making a subjective assessment would be challenging.

Although the random sampling approach draws out much that has been previously understated, it also bypasses some suppressed voices, such as those of women or Māori, that have latterly taken their place in the New Zealand story. This exception is noted

²⁴ Grant Hannis, "The New Zealand Press Association 1880–2006: The Rise And Fall Of A Co-Operative Model For News Gathering," *Australian Economic History Review* 48, no. 1 (2008): p.53.

²⁵ Seán Clarke Paul Lewis, Caelainn Barr, "How we combed leaders' speeches to gauge populist rise: A look at the methodology Team Populism used to chart surge in populism," *The Guardian*, 6 Mar 2019. There appears to be no better alternative. The "Guardian" study still needed to use 'researchers, or "coders" ' (to) read an entire text and compare it with a set of reference or "anchor" texts.

and accepted. This history reconstructs selected topics based on the public voices and their prominence in the news at the time. It does not attempt to recover voices that were marginalised or ignored by the newspapers, because the objective is to investigate the circumstances present in the public discourse in the context of their time.²⁶

Despite these caveats the printed news can provide a verifiable source to supplement the traditional manuscripts. Just as officials may have decided to exclude a particular event (such as a moral scandal) from the archival record, a newspaper might equally have wanted to include it. While requiring considered use - as is the case with any source material - increased access through the profusion of electronic portals makes this source too important to be ignored. The results from identifying and classifying each of approximately 1,000 randomly selected qualifying articles are summarized in the following table.

Figure 1: Count of articles referring to 'France' or 'French':

Column percentages				
	1919 to 1924	1925 to 1935	1936 to 1939	Grand Total
⊕ Politics & Law	28.7%	21.7%	32.5%	27.0%
⊕ Sport, Arts & Recreation	11.4%	23.4%	14.0%	16.2%
⊕ Commerce, Communications, Trade, Transport	13.4%	12.0%	10.5%	12.3%
⊕ Economics	11.6%	7.5%	10.5%	10.0%
⊕ Customs, death customs, etiquette, folklore	11.8%	10.3%	3.5%	9.7%
⊕ Technology	7.0%	8.6%	8.0%	7.8%
⊕ Public administration & military science	6.6%	3.3%	11.0%	6.3%
⊕ History & geography	2.9%	3.9%	4.0%	3.4%
⊕ Social Sciences	2.4%	1.4%	2.5%	2.1%
⊕ Language & education	1.3%	3.1%	1.5%	2.0%
⊕ Books & Literature	1.5%	3.1%	0.5%	1.9%
⊕ Religion	0.2%	0.6%	1.0%	0.5%
⊕ Science	0.2%	0.8%	0.5%	0.5%
⊕ Philosophy & psychology	0.9%	0.3%	0.0%	0.5%
Grand Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Total sample: article count	456	313	246	1015 ²⁷

²⁶ Ballantyne, *Webs of empire : locating New Zealand's colonial past*: pp.178-181. In developing this approach I have drawn on Tony Ballantyne's view that new interpretations of the archives can help clarify the points of blockage and silence i.e. the archived documents are of themselves constructs based on the inequalities that existed at the time.

²⁷ The total sample size exceeds 1,000 due to duplication of one random number, article replication within the main *PapersPast* database and anomalies in grouping arising from the online article clipping tool that meant one sample point could include \geq two topics within one article.

The major topics (such as 'Politics and Law') consist of aggregated sub-topics across three time periods.²⁸ These sub-topics are not shown in the table, but are available to the reader in the Appendix and within the attached electronic version of the database. Within each sub-topic the sampled articles have been classified using their unique URL, historical reference (title, date, volume, issue number, page) main topic group, and year. Details of the sampling procedure, database construction and analysis are appended. The topic sample sizes are sufficiently robust to justify quantitative comparison between the main categories ('Politics and Law' clearly occurs as a topic more frequently than 'Economics') and across time periods. For instance, there are nearly two times as many articles in the five years from 1919 to 1924 as there are in the four years between 1936 and 1939. Despite this, the significance attached to any conclusions when based on minor differences between sub-categories requires careful consideration and these are discussed as they arise.

The New Zealand historiography typically uses the abstract construct of 'between the wars' (1918-1939) as an appropriate period for study. In this case a 1919 start date was selected because the periods of pre-war and wartime engagement have already been subjected to exhaustive, often specialist (especially military) study. This decision has meant that local political events both preceding and during World War I have been treated as background although some New Zealand wartime experiences of - and interactions with - France have been included to give context. The decision to end in 1935 was made after the sample of 1,000 articles published between 1918-1939 had been drawn and their content considered. It was observed that post-1935 New Zealand news mentioning France was less likely to imply direct involvement with, or domestic relevance for, New Zealand. Many of these articles reported international events as if they were mainly European concerns involving other Continental countries especially Spain, Germany, Italy, Russia and so forth. Interactions with France between 1935-1939 have therefore been omitted.

²⁸ The original time periods selected (1919-24, 1924-35, 1936-39) are not of equal duration but were chosen based on changes in topic frequency within the sampled newspapers. These tended to coincide with political changes. Hence the first time period concluded with the end of Massey's premiership while 1935 marked the end of the United-Reform Government following the election of Labour. Although the thesis does not include 1936-39 the period is included in some analyses for comparative purposes.

As a result of this decision, about one quarter (n = 246) of the 1,000 sampled articles fell outside the years investigated in detail. It should however be noted that the order of the topics based on article count is similar across all three time periods, so this decision has not altered the topic selection. Whether an emerging New Zealand nationalism and accompanying political change was the cause of this alteration in tone is undetermined, but the change did coincide with the election of the first Labour Government. The last pre-1935 Reform coalition had been mandated in 1931 with a majority of twenty-one seats in an eighty seat Parliament to make the changes they saw fit. They along with many members of the preceding Governments, often had first-hand experience of France during the Great War (even if not on active service) or were active in political life during the War. These politicians were being incrementally displaced by MPs whose legitimacy was less dependent on wartime experience.


The electorate was also changing. A generation without any first-hand adult experience of 1914-1918 began to question the purpose of the War, what it had achieved and the importance of supporting France and the adjacent constructs of Empire and Home. Less concerned with their parents' experiences, they turned their attention towards making a New Zealand that they saw as fit for their cohort rather than for a generation of returned soldiers. Thus ended a political era dominated by leaders (such as Massey and Ward, Coates and Forbes and their ideological opponent Holland) who tended to view foreign relations as primarily matters for the Empire/Commonwealth to deal with. Without renouncing this link, a gap was opening into which New Zealand independence in foreign affairs tentatively eased. By 1936 the dream of world peace through the League of Nations was also demonstrably floundering while financial recovery suggested new solutions from outside the Empire/Commonwealth had been found for the global economy. France was still present, but appeared to be less relevant - especially once New Zealand embarked on significant domestic reform. Post-war issues such as reparation payments and sequestering gold were subsumed by more recent events.

This research method only identifies and investigates major events which involved both France and New Zealand. Therefore, the reader seeking a comprehensive overview of New Zealand history during the studied period will note omissions, because both France and New Zealand were not always directly involved in each event. Similarly, the analysis within the identified topics is restricted to relevant bilateral interactions. Hence for

example, The Treaty of Versailles only appears as a topic because New Zealand and France were both present, and the analysis concerns topics or discussions that directly involved or had a bearing on these two nations. While this may give the appearance of emphasising lesser points within a broad topic, that is the express intention.

As well as using New Zealand's *PapersPast* database, an analysis of all relevant articles was completed within two French newspapers. *Gallica* has a different structure to that of *PapersPast* so the same sampling procedure could not be applied. Moreover, with a very large number of French titles, many of which have limited geographical distribution combined with what is in many cases a strong political orientation, obtaining a representative statistical sample would require a complex design. Fortunately from a research point of view, only a relatively small number of news articles mentioning 'Nouvelle-Zélande' are present in the *Gallica* source. *Le Figaro* (N = 458 article mentions) and *L'Humanité* (N = 142) were selected to represent the centre-right and left-leaning political views in France respectively.

Figure 2: Article count from Gallica database



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
These metropolitan dailies were published continuously between 1919-1935 and owing to the small number of articles it was possible to read all the items which mentioned

²⁹ "Gallica".

'Nouvelle-Zélande', rather than relying on statistical samples. The same logic – that it was unlikely that a major relevant event would be omitted by both titles – applied. There was no single event reported in only one of the main newspapers whether from New Zealand or France that was not also reported elsewhere, thus validating this approach.

Notwithstanding the post-war memorial and grieving formalities there was a sharp decline in the immediate post-war years in the number of articles mentioning either France or French in the New Zealand news compared with the volume of newspaper articles in general.

Figure 3: Articles mentioning 'France' and/or 'French'



Base = 100 (1918)

Source: Papers Past ³⁰


Since France remained prominent in world affairs and relevant for New Zealand, the pronounced decline is likely due to reduced editorial content. This suggests as a

³⁰ "Papers Past." The lines for 'all articles' and 'France' or 'French' are indexed using 1918 = 100 as the base year. The 'all articles' index has been calculated from a count of items including the English language article word 'the' (as a marker). The word 'the' was used as a tag since it is ubiquitous and is almost certainly included in every newspaper article. Therefore, a count of articles including 'the' once or more can be taken as a surrogate count of all articles in the database.

The decline in the total number of articles is unexplained. Possibilities includes a decrease in the number of newspapers included in the Papers Past database, missing issues, fewer publications owing perhaps to fewer editions of the same title(s), longer articles occupying the same total column inches or vagaries in the algorithms used to automate the clipping and counting process. It seems unlikely that this decline was simply due to a lack of news although in the aftermath of the war small publishers may have been short of newsprint or displaced editorial content in favour of advertising.

working hypothesis that post-war France was rejected as a topic of general interest by the public and was not seen as relevant to their future. To put the counterfactual case, if public interest in France had continued, the editors who were always eager to retain readership would undoubtedly have published additional relevant content. There is indirect, circumstantial evidence to support this conclusion based on the equivalent data using just two metropolitan dailies: *The Evening Post* and *The New Zealand Herald*. The decline in their France/French related article counts are neither as precipitous nor as sustained as is the case for the article count across all papers. In other words, the overall decline in French related articles across the *PapersPast* database must have been more pronounced within provincial and rural titles.

Figure 4: Indexed article count, *Evening Post* and *NZ Herald* 1918-1924



This supports an argument that interest in and knowledge of current affairs related to France varied geographically. This was presumably due to editorial selections that suited the more internationally orientated tastes of North Island metropolitan readers. Conversely it seems probable that qualifying articles were actively rejected by provincial editors, presumably because they were of lesser direct relevance to readers' lives or less impactful or both. This was perhaps the result of an attempt to collectively forget or at least ignore post-war events in Europe involving France in favour of local news.

The following table lists the main topics from the New Zealand newspapers based on article frequency 1919-1939 (extracted from the preceding French and New Zealand newspaper article counts). These have been aligned with their closest equivalent sections in a secondary literature profile based on the Dewey classification system. The main topics, adapted for use as chapters are: Firstly, the history of France and the legacy of the First World War in France as it was explained in New Zealand. Second is the process of remembering and preserving New Zealand's wartime experience while leaving the bodies in France and minimizing political and economic interaction. This leads into the bilateral international trade matters which make up the third topic. Multinationalism, foreign relations and the development of the League of Nations are intertwined with Empire-related governance, colonisation and territorial acquisition - particularly in the Pacific - to make up the fourth topic. Economic, finance and currency matters come fifth. Culture and sport, technology, and communication in an increasingly connected world has been placed sixth.³¹

³¹ The reader's attention is drawn to the full table in the Appendix. This shows all the sub-categories, including those that have been collapsed to form the summary table.

Figure 5: Topic classification (*= includes sub-topics).

Thesis chapter	Main newspaper article classification	Secondary source topics
Chapter one: relics from France	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Politics and law* <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Systems of government and states 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • French history
Chapter two: reparation and reparation - Versailles and beyond	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Customs, death customs and etiquette • Politics and law* <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ International relations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Remembering and memorialising • Political and economic legacies of World War I
Chapter three: trade and engage or disconnect and forget?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Commerce, trade and transport 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • International trade
Chapter four: post war options: empire citizenship, independence, or Membre de la société des nations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Politics and law* <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ international relations, migration and colonization ○ systems of government 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Foreign relations and the League of nations • Colonisation and territorial acquisition
Chapter five: finance and economics: using and misusing the French example	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Commerce • Economics 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Economics
Chapter six: maintaining contact: sport and recreation, communication and technology	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sport, arts, recreation • Politics and law* <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ relation of state(s) to organised groups* ○ systems of government and states* • public administration and military science • communications • technology 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Multiculturalism, sport, communication and technology

1.2 Literature Review

Tony Ballantyne has characterised New Zealand's post-colonial historiography as histories based on a cultural colonisation model that draws on the concepts developed by Edward Said. Ballantyne argued that the relevant texts illustrate the colonisers' use of presumed cultural superiority to occupy and possess. 'Culture' in these texts has become a coded metaphor for race. Such histories thereby characterise the New Zealand colonial project as the result of nation building by cultural takeover and assimilation as a surrogate for racially-based conquest. The former paradigm suits current sensibilities because it places the 'nation as the key unit of analysis' and it draws on a conceptually simple cultural dichotomy within which the winners and losers now seek reconciliation through an emerging bi-cultural nation.³² Other fissures such as race, socio-economic class and - to a lesser extent, gender - have been treated as separate topics or only used to illustrate the predominantly dichotomous narrative. This template is too restrictive. A broader approach that helps us break out of what risks becoming a somewhat closed and oversimplified blame-game in New Zealand's historiography is needed. If the horizon is not expanded, we risk interpreting New Zealand's past as solely the result of local events. Although I have chosen through personal interest to weave the role of France into the New Zealand story within a defined time period, a broader argument stands. New Zealand's history cannot be written through a series of local events while omitting the broader global currents that shaped them. Local actors were significant and responsible, but their actions and the influences that caused them to act in the way they did, were not restricted to historical boundaries, that coincided with New Zealand's geographic borders.

Grouping the secondary sources within these six most frequently mentioned topics defined through the newspaper article random sampling procedure has exposed differences in emphasis that the Tony Ballantyne's comments presage. Some significant issues in the bilateral Franco-New Zealand relationship are scarcely mentioned in the secondary literature whereas they are frequently mentioned in the news and vice versa.³³ This has forced some overlap and re-ordering of the literature categories to locate

³² Ballantyne, *Webs of empire : locating New Zealand's colonial past*: pp.265-267.

³³ This may be a result of limited manuscript sources covering direct interactions. Possibly these topics have attracted less scholarly attention in New Zealand as a consequence.

volumes that draw on a broader empire or even global perspective within the newspaper derived categories. What may appear to be oversights, such as the omission of religion or education (both of which have generated a considerable volume of scholarly literature in relation to France) is due to the low frequency of mentions in the news. Consequently some apparently relevant local literature has been omitted, if it was confined to a more restricted investigation of local events. Katie Pickles warned of the danger of placing undue reliance on intellectual name dropping, cringe referencing and the use of important but irrelevant scholars to prop-up a shaky case.³⁴ In this instance, although the absence of secondary literature is acknowledged as a potential weakness the discrepancies suggest topics worthy of investigation.

The best and most readable overview of the complex Anglo-French relationship is that of Isabelle and Robert Tombs'.³⁵ The widely held post-World War I view that the world could be put to rights by re-establishment of the pre-war order is an underlying theme in the Tombs' analysis. Their description highlights the post-war rejection of the channel tunnel project (symbolically denying a closer link between the United Kingdom and France by maintaining physical separation), the re-establishment of upper-class Anglo-French social contacts (that in sentiment implied exclusion of the masses from cultural exchanges) and, on the French side of the channel a resumption of the popular French disdain for English tourists. Clark's detailed analysis of the causes of the First World War provides an excellent account of the inter-locking treaties, informal agreements and co-dependencies that led to the war.³⁶ Alistair Horne takes a more critical stance of France as his acerbic asides ('In the mother country of liberty, the instinct for authoritarianism also never lies far below the surface') reveal.³⁷ As a Franco-centric foil, *The French Republic* places the French responses firmly in the context of the French experience, a view which the Anglo-centric historiography struggles to incorporate.³⁸ Agulhon uses the Dreyfus affair to assert that notwithstanding the 'facts'

³⁴ Katie Pickles, "Transnational Intentions and Cultural Cringe: History Beyond National Boundaries," in *Contesting Clio's Craft: New Directions and Debates in Canadian History*, ed. Christopher Dummitt and Michael Dawson (London: UTP, 2009).

³⁵ Isabelle Tombs and Robert Tombs, *That Sweet Enemy: the French and the British from the Sun King to the Present* (London: William Heinemann, 2006).

³⁶ Christopher Clark, *The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914* (New York: Harper Perennial, 2014).

³⁷ Alistair Horne, *Friend or foe: an Anglo-Saxon history of France* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2004). p.338.

³⁸ Maurice Agulhon, *The French Republic, 1879-1992*, English ed., *A History of France*. (Oxford: B. Blackwell, 1993).

of Dreyfus' Jewish heritage and presumed treachery, French national unity was in itself sufficient justification for Frenchmen to condemn Dreyfus. In a later chapter, Agulhon discusses the disagreements in both France and the British Isles between those directly involved in World War I and those on the periphery. Both sides included individuals who from within their national perspective still viewed themselves as victims, whether or not they were active participants. As the war ground on, evidence of similar thinking within the political left in New Zealand comes as no surprise, thereby suggesting rather more common ground than the death of soldiers existed between the two nations.³⁹

The post-World War I defence strategies of Britain and France had consequences for New Zealand's relationship with both countries, but much of the writing assumes *a priori* knowledge of later events by the political leadership. Barry Posen provides an alternative view of interwar defence planning, but his work seems to be a rather too convenient example of *post hoc* justification for earlier post-World War I political bumbling.⁴⁰ Posen's claim that the Maginot line was deliberately weakened to invite German attacks through Belgium in order to provoke Britain's entry into the Second World War requires acceptance of a degree of foresight into events, including Munich, which challenges the obvious unpredictability of the preceding diplomatic exchanges.⁴¹ Pratt's alternative view that Britain's strategy was to avoid war by convincing her enemies that she could and would fight a war of attrition, is susceptible to the same criticism although it does contain some useful insights into the lack of co-ordination between the branches of the British armed services.⁴² *Imagining War* links the civilian and military worlds by pointing out the need for a domestic consensus on the role of the military so that war planners are aware of the resource constraints.⁴³ The issue of

³⁹ Kerry Taylor, "The old bolshevik: Alex Gailbraith, the communist party and the New Zealand revolution," in *New Zealand between the wars*, ed. Rachael Bell and Massey University Press (Auckland: Massey University Press, 2017), p.115. Taylor touches on the left's common problem of sharing trans-national views across national boundaries while avoiding accusations of disloyalty.

⁴⁰ Barry Posen, *The sources of military doctrine : France, Britain, and Germany between the world wars*, Cornell studies in security affairs. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986).

⁴¹ T. Bouverie, *Appeasing Hitler: Chamberlain, Churchill and the Road to War* (Random House, 2019). Has a comprehensive review of the events leading to Munich and Chamberlain's political demise.

⁴² Lawrence Pratt, *East of Malta, West of Suez: Britain's Mediterranean Crisis, 1936-1939*, First ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

⁴³ Elizabeth Kier, *Imagining war : French and British military doctrine between the wars*, Princeton studies in international history and politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997).

conscription and its domestic political consequences provides an obvious example as David Littlewood has shown.⁴⁴

There is an unsurprising gap in the between-wars military literature covering direct links between France and New Zealand, although French warships continued to make regular visits to New Zealand ports. Robin Higham's work on the development of aircraft both civilian and military, and their influence on the world between the wars, demonstrates how as one technology becomes redundant another emerges that can have similar influences in two separate countries.⁴⁵ Higham analyses the transformation of the civilian and military worlds which resulted. Unfortunately, his work is marred by errors: Robert Gildea is referred to as 'Gilda' and Higham mixes terminology and confuses his readers by referring to the 'Commonwealth of New Zealand'. Contrary to Higham's assertion, New Zealand was an enthusiastic supporter of Britain during the Chanak Crisis, and not one of the Dominions reluctant to assist.

Overy's writing on the events leading up to World War II is more balanced than the generally pro-Churchill line taken by authors such as Roy Jenkins.⁴⁶ Overy raises some excellent points arising from the policy of autarky which in the case of the United Kingdom gave the appearance of reliance on the Empire (including New Zealand), thus inducing resentment on the part of nations such as Germany who lacked the extensive overseas territories of France and the British. In commenting on Churchill's reliance on the news, it would be remiss to overlook the subject's own canny manipulation of the press.⁴⁷ Britain's purported increasing reliance on her Empire depended on the ability to defend the necessary trade routes. The belief that Britain could or would support her trading interests in the Pacific was apparently only held, as Ann Trotter comments, outside Government circles.⁴⁸ The United States was therefore confused by - and

⁴⁴ David Littlewood, "The tool and instrument of the military? : the operations of the Military Service Tribunals in the East Central Division of the West Riding of Yorkshire and those of the Military Service Boards in New Zealand, 1916-1918" (PhD, Massey University, 2015).

⁴⁵ Robin Higham, *Two roads to war : the French and British air arms from Versailles to Dunkirk* (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2012).

⁴⁶ R J Overy, *The origins of the Second World War*, 3rd ed., Seminar studies in history (New York: Longman, 2008); Roy Jenkins, *Churchill* (London: Macmillan, 2001).

⁴⁷ Ian St John, "Writing to the Defence of Empire: Winston Churchill's Press Campaign against Constitutional Reform in India, 1929-1935," in *Media and the British Empire*, ed. Chandrika Kaul (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).

⁴⁸ Ann Trotter, *Britain and East Asia, 1933-1937*, International studies. (London New York: Cambridge University Press, 1975).

blamed French belligerence for - the British propensity to increase armed naval tonnages when disarmament seemed the obvious solution. France was in turn concerned that Britain's distractions on the other side of the world would limit the necessary defensive attention which France believed the Mediterranean required in the event of war. New Zealand was therefore in direct competition with France for the services of the Royal Navy. McGibbon explains the official thinking on this issue in some detail.⁴⁹ Ronald Hyam presents a compelling account of the construction of the Singapore Naval base and the background political considerations which overrode the strategic defence objectives.⁵⁰ Dawson's writing is also useful, researched as it was in the mid-1960s before the consequences of the United Kingdom's closer relationship with Europe were fully understood by many New Zealanders.⁵¹

New Zealand histories of the First World War in France and its immediate outcome range on a continuum from the early attempts to provide factual, officially sanctioned accounts to the more recent trend of recalling individual experiences.⁵² From the viewpoint of this thesis, the lack of sources relating to France the country as it was seen from New Zealand, when compared to the many volumes written about France the battlefield, has left a significant space in the literature. It was France the country that New Zealand could have developed a closer relationship with, but it was France the battlefield which predominated in New Zealand's national memory. Tourists often visit the scene of an historical event hoping to see or at least gain an insight into the past, but in so doing they implicitly ignore the present and overlook the future. So, it was with New Zealand's collective view of France.

The earliest scholarly works tended to be of the 'letting the facts speak for themselves' genre. Cowan's descriptive narrative is an early example of the eye-of-God, apparently

⁴⁹ I C McGibbon, *Blue-water rationale : the naval defence of New Zealand 1914-1942* (Wellington, N.Z.: Govt. Printer, 1981).

⁵⁰ Ronald Hyam, *Britain's declining empire : the road to decolonisation, 1918-1968* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

⁵¹ Robert MacGregor Dawson, *Development of Dominion Status 1900-1936*, 2006 ed. (Oxon: Routledge, 1965).

⁵² This coincides with the increased popularity of oral histories, a trend enhanced by modern technology that made the equipment so compact and recording so effortless. A parallel can be drawn with the use of databased electronic newspaper articles used in this thesis. Neither is necessarily an easier technique in the execution nor are they always shortcuts, but both allow a broader historical investigation.

factual narrative.⁵³ Glenn Reddiex, Jane Tolerton and Glyn Harper's writing contrasts with Cecil Malthus' well-rounded first-hand accounts, one of which (*Armentières and the Somme; Anzac, a Retrospect*) was rejected in 1966 (as Malthus later recounted) as 'ancient history'.⁵⁴ The soldiers' letters are generally well written, although those included are obviously a selection retained by the original recipients. They can only relate what the soldiers felt permitted to write, and even then have been subjected to further editorial selection. Presumably many letters were unposted, rendered unavailable owing to censorship once they left the writers' hands, were discarded by their ultimate recipients or inheritors, or ultimately rejected by researchers.⁵⁵ Paul Fussell adds a rawness to the reality thus concealed.⁵⁶ The 'fallen' were simply 'dead' although the use of 'fallen' adds a heroic and dramatic aura which 'dead' cannot conjure up. Fussell also notes the stereotypical associations in some descriptions of the trench environment of the different nationalities; from the French trenches came 'delicious cooking' smells, for instance.

Gwen Parson's contribution balances the common narratives of the 'wildly enthusiastic' public who saw the troops off and then neglected them upon their return with a more nuanced view of both.⁵⁷ Clarke's description of the soldiers' homecoming and the aftermath includes similar accounts.⁵⁸ As well as experiencing combat, those who travelled to France as a result of World War I constituted an early example of mass tourism as François Crouzet describes.⁵⁹ The tourism metaphor helps explain the

⁵³ James Cowan and New Zealand Maori Regimental Committee, *The Maoris in the great war : a history of the New Zealand Native Contingent and Pioneer Battalion, Gallipoli, 1915 France and Flanders, 1916-1918* (Uckfield: Naval & Military Press, 2006).

⁵⁴ Glenn Reddiex, *Just to let you know I'm still alive : postcards from New Zealanders during the First World War* (Grantham House, 2015); Jane Tolerton, ed. *An awfully big adventure : New Zealand World War One veterans tell their stories* (Auckland, N.Z.: Penguin Books, 2013); Glyn Harper, *Johnny Enzed : the New Zealand soldier in the First World War 1914-1918*, Online ed., First World War centenary history. (2015); *Letters from the battlefield : New Zealand soldiers write home, 1914-18* (Auckland N.Z.: HarperCollins, 2001); Cecil Malthus, *Armentières and the Somme* (Auckland N.Z.: Reed Publishing (NZ), 2002). p.5.

⁵⁵ My own experience included an unsuccessful attempt to obtain permission to use a postcard collection deposited in the ATL but rendered unusable because the donor's nominee was unresponsive.

⁵⁶ Paul Fussell, *The Great War and modern memory* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975).

⁵⁷ Gwen Parsons, "Challenging Enduring Home Front Myths: Jingoistic Civilians and Neglected Soldiers," in *Endurance and the First World War : experiences and legacies in New Zealand and Australia*, ed. David Monger, Sarah Murray, and Katie Pickles (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars, 2014).

⁵⁸ Stephen Clarke, *After the war : the RSA in New Zealand* (New Zealand Penguin, 2016).

⁵⁹ François Crouzet, *Britain ascendant : comparative studies in Franco-British economic history* (Paris: Editions de la Maison des sciences de l'homme, 1990).

enthusiasm to enlist and raises the possibility of knowledge of both France and the French people arriving home with the returning 'tourists'. With or without wars, the departure of the young for 'overseas' always arouses excitement in those travelling, and trepidation within the parental generation. The subsequent recounting of a unique experience, whether good or bad, quickly palls after the travellers' safe return. Ian Lochhead's contribution usefully draws attention to Samuel Hurst Seager's often overlooked role in the remembering process but Lochhead's argument that differences in weather explain the variation in the perceptions of France and Gallipoli in the New Zealand national psyche - France being 'sodden and undulating' compared to Gallipoli's heat - is unconvincing.⁶⁰ Both geographies have seasonal extremes of weather as the soldiers' letters and this writer's personal experience show. All of France cannot be described as sodden, but for some this was the perception which survived the journey back to New Zealand. Apart from this exception, the war histories generally understate the New Zealand experience of France, as a nation and the French as a people, apart from references to landscape features described in their military context. *The great adventure ends: New Zealand and France on the Western Front* acknowledges the slender intersection between the soldiers and the French as a people within their own land because the narrow strip of contested French territory collectively referred to as the front lines is the predominant topic.⁶¹

Supporting evidence and illustrations in these works often relies on photographs which are presented alongside the soldiers' narratives yet disconnected from them. Typically, the selected images are inserted with minimal captioning. While impactful as an illustration of a moment in time, they add little to an overall understanding of France because they raise so many questions: who was the photographer?, why was he/she there?, is the caption accurate? The minimal descriptions in Harper's *book of photographs* heightens doubts regarding representativeness, context and interpretation.⁶² Fussell's comments provide an excellent counter-point to the apparent

⁶⁰ Ian Lochhead, "Enduring memories: Samuel Hurst Seager and the New Zealand battlefield memorials of the great war," in *Endurance and the First World War: Experiences and Legacies in New Zealand and Australia*, ed. David Monger, Sarah Murray, and Katie Pickles (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars, 2014).

⁶¹ Nathalie Philippe et al., eds., *The great adventure ends: New Zealand and France on the Western Front* (Christchurch: John Douglas, 2013).

⁶² Glyn Harper and National Army Museum (N.Z.), *Images of war: New Zealand and the First World War in photographs* (HarperCollinsPublishers (New Zealand), 2008).

truth of wartime photography as an accurate historical record. (Sir) Peter Jackson's technical enhancements and overdubbing of original war footage from France has produced a superbly viewable product but it raises doubts as to whether his editorial intervention has created a more accurate account.⁶³ Enhancing existing 'memories' sustains rather than advances the discussion by blending with and thereby reinforcing rather than challenging the earlier edited accounts. This treatment is consistent with the New Zealand replication of the memorial monuments first erected in France. Although writing from an Australian perspective Bart Ziino addresses the practical issues which would have also applied to the New Zealand dead buried in France. The neat landmarks, organised in precise military lines conceal the chaos and confusion of the war and the less than orderly interments thereafter.⁶⁴

When problems arose with trade or economics between 1918-1939, increased nationalism was often held to be the solution. Crouzet expands the dialogue with a detailed analysis of reciprocal trade.⁶⁵ The importance of raw wool exports from Australasia, a considerable proportion of which was on-shipped to France from the United Kingdom, receives appropriate attention as does the exceptionalism of New Zealand amongst the Dominions. Being small, and agriculturally dependent, New Zealand's trade was far more reliant on the United Kingdom than that of the other nominally British nations. Tony Ballantyne moves beyond the immediate economic consequences of trade to advance the idea that encounters with strangers through trade are the cause of change.⁶⁶ He draws on Braudel's work to suggest that the level of direct trade (and by extension in the case of New Zealand and France, its absence) explains the degree of interaction. For those questioning the relevance of the economic disciplines to historical studies the work of Clavin and Margairaz provides a useful riposte, not least in their reminder that economic data always requires cultural and societal context.⁶⁷

⁶³ Paul Fussell, *The boy scout handbook and other observations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982). Peter Jackson, "They Shall Not Grow Old," (2018).

⁶⁴ Bart Ziino, *A distant grief: Australians, war graves and the Great War* (Crawley, W.A.: University of Western Australia Press, 2007).

⁶⁵ Crouzet, *Britain ascendant: comparative studies in Franco-British economic history*.

⁶⁶ Tony Ballantyne, "Putting the nation in its place?: world history and C.A. Bayly's *The Birth of the Modern World*," in *Connected Worlds: History in Transnational Perspective*, ed. Marilyn Lake and Ann Curthoys (Australian National University).

⁶⁷ Patricia Clavin and Michel Margairaz, "Is economic history no longer fashionable?," in *Writing contemporary history*, ed. Robert Gildea (London: Hodder Arnold, 2008).

French actions in relation to the reparations issue had profound consequences for New Zealand. These were reported in many newspaper articles and attracted considerable parliamentary comment. When discussing the reparations and related peace settlement issues during the 1923 Imperial Conference, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs suggested that Britain (and by association the Commonwealth/Empire) had tried and failed to find a settlement which met the essential criterion of common consent from all parties. The estimated £6,600,000,000 in collective demands by the claimants for compensation was unpayable. The United Kingdom did not believe Germany could pay, an assertion which the French would not even consider. Moreover, the French refusal to off-set German reparations against cancellation of her own debts to the United Kingdom and the United States suggested that France wanted vengeance by bleeding and thereby permanently weakening Germany.⁶⁸ Some of the writing on the issue that I have used is from first-hand accounts - Keynes' book being an example - and these are therefore treated as primary sources.⁶⁹ The most comprehensive secondary source on New Zealand's involvement is contained in "Caging the Prussian Dragon: New Zealand and the Paris Peace Conference 1919".⁷⁰ Kray's most telling assessment is that the New Zealand Prime Minister Massey was charmed by Clemenceau but failed to understand Wilson's fourteen points perhaps because he (Massey) did not like Wilson personally. The wily French politician enlisted New Zealand's (unwitting) help at Versailles to bolster the French stance of punishing the Germans, notwithstanding the refusal of France to discuss the status of the New Hebrides. Nauru's phosphate deposits proved to be a sufficient consolation prize, as Williams and Macdonald explain.⁷¹

⁶⁸ "Imperial Conference, 1923. Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives, 1924 Session," pp.17-22, 25-31, 34-35.

⁶⁹ John Maynard Keynes, *The economic consequences of peace* (London England: Macmillan, 1920); Louis Loucheur, "The Essentials of a Reparations Settlement," *Foreign Affairs* 2, no. 1 (1923); John Fischer Williams, "Reparations," *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1931-1939)* 11, no. 2 (1932).

⁷⁰ Richard Kray, "Caging the Prussian Dragon: New Zealand and the Paris Peace Conference 1919," in *New Zealand's great war : New Zealand, the Allies and the First World War*, ed. John Crawford and I. C. McGibbon (Auckland, N.Z.: Exisle Pub., 2007).

⁷¹ Maslyn Williams and Barrie Macdonald, *The phosphateers : a history of the British Phosphate Commissioners and the Christmas Island Phosphate Commission* (Carlton, Vic.: Melbourne University Press, 1985).

Schuker maintains that the financial crisis of 1924 and the adoption of the Dawes Plan marked the apogee of French power in Europe - a view reiterated in 2014.⁷² His work attracted considerable critical comment, not least for his tendency to claim knowledge of the participants' inner thoughts. Berg and Schaefer provide a very useful context for the discussion.⁷³ They raise two inter-dependent but extremely important issues that will be familiar to New Zealanders who have followed the Waitangi Treaty settlement process, namely whether inter-generational obligations are justifiable and how, if at all, a counter-factual narrative can be used to assess losses in specific instances of damage.

The economic consequences of the Versailles Treaty are still contested in the literature. Outcomes for trade, colonialism and mandated territories were areas of most direct relevance for New Zealand. Although dated, Kindleberger's work introduces some comparative statistics which show how the counter-cyclical economic fortunes of Britain and France gave rise to ongoing speculation as to why France was apparently lagging behind Britain. While admitting that history cannot prove the various theories offered in explanation, Kindleberger did warn of the dangers when historians 'overgeneralise'.⁷⁴ Published in 1935, Paul Einzig's narrative gives a fascinating insight into how the world's financial issues were understood before the Second World War and Bretton Woods. Even then, Einzig was referring to 'an utter lack in a sense of realities'.⁷⁵

The historiographical theme that Britain was neither completely independent of Europe nor uninfluenced by her own Empire's satellite nations has been investigated particularly well by Antoinette Burton. Stuart Ward provides some useful insights in this area, especially in his explanation of Round Table thinking on the fulcrum between

⁷² Stephen A. Schuker, *The end of French predominance in Europe : the financial crisis of 1924 and the adoption of the Dawes plan* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1976); "What Historians Get Wrong about World War I," *Time Magazine*, 1 August 2014.

⁷³ Shepard B. Clough, "Review: The End of French Predominance in Europe: The Financial Crisis of 1924 and the Adoption of the Dawes Plan, Stephen A. Schuker," review of *The End of French Predominance in Europe: The Financial Crisis of 1924 and the Adoption of the Dawes Plan*, Stephen A. Schuker, *The Business History Review* 51, no. 2 (1977); Manfred Berg and Bernd Schaefer, eds., *Historical justice in international perspective : how societies are trying to right the wrongs of the past*, Publications of the German Historical Institute (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

⁷⁴ Charles Poor Kindleberger, *Economic growth in France and Britain, 1851-1950* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964).

⁷⁵ Paul Einzig, *World finance since 1914*, Routledge library editions. Banking & finance ; v. 12 (London: Routledge, 2012).

full national independence and political integration within the Empire. The 'New Zealand in the World' concept has observable historiographical roots in the amalgam between the two, as Stuart Ward points out. The use of the nation as a unit of study invites further discussion as Ann Curthoys argues in her well written consideration of the various issues which such an approach implicitly raises.⁷⁶ Tony Ballantyne's provocative and comprehensive reassessment of New Zealand's place in the world within the constructs of colonialism and empire are a useful guide for locating New Zealand's past within the broader world context.⁷⁷ I have drawn on Ballantyne's ideas, especially those related to the content of the archive and their role in the construction of post-colonial histories.

The indirect diplomatic and defence relationship between France and New Zealand - conducted through inter-government channels (such as the League of Nations) - was as much a product of the United Kingdom's foreign policy as it was of any New Zealand or French initiatives. Stephen Hoadley notes the controversial nature of the political relationship but his assertion that the events of 1914 - and thereafter - moved New Zealand views of France from 'negative to positive' is unconvincing.⁷⁸ This seems especially so given the few examples of interactions with the French during the war compared to the volume of soldiers' writing from, and about, 'blighty'. I have used Felicity Barnes' work on the role of New Zealand's London as a guide and a contrast for my own discussions on New Zealand's France. As much as London became a part of New Zealand, an imagined France became the antithetical model of an idealised British-New Zealand nation, thus creating dissonance when the goodness in France was exposed.⁷⁹

⁷⁶ Antoinette Burton, ed. *After the imperial turn : thinking with and through the nation* (Durham [N.C.]: Duke University Press 2003); Stuart Ward, "Transcending the Nation: A Global Imperial History?," in *After the imperial turn : thinking with and through the nation*, ed. Antoinette Burton (Durham [N.C.]: Duke University Press 2003); Ann Curthoys, "We've Just Started Making National Histories, and You Want Us to Stop Already? ," in *After the imperial turn : thinking with and through the nation*, ed. Antoinette Burton (Durham [N.C.]: Duke University Press 2003).

⁷⁷ Ballantyne, *Webs of empire : locating New Zealand's colonial past*; M. Belgrave, "Webs of empire: locating New Zealand's colonial past," *Kōtuitui: New Zealand Journal of Social Sciences Online* 9, no. 1 (2014).

⁷⁸ J. Stephen Hoadley and New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, *New Zealand and France : politics, diplomacy and dispute management* (Wellington [N.Z.]: New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, 2005).

⁷⁹ Felicity Barnes, *New Zealand's London : A Colony and its Metropolis* (Auckland, N.Z. : Auckland University Press, 2012).

“After the Nation-State: Citizenship, Empire and Global Coordination in the New Internationalism, 1914-1930” is a multi-lane bridge between the ideas of empire, commonwealth, trade and the League of Nations.⁸⁰ Trentmann describes in detail Zimmern’s advocacy for Lord Acton’s idea of a culturally based world citizenship without nationalities. While theoretically possible it proved, as did so much of the post-World War I idealism, irreconcilable with the more resilient national identities which ultimately prevailed. Perhaps the only example in which anything like this ideal was achieved lies in the human rights endeavours of the League, a topic discussed by Barbara Metzger in the same volume.⁸¹ Even in this apparently non-controversial initiative, Britain expressly excluded selected mandated territories and her African colonies, thereby inadvertently highlighting the elective implementation of many League policies. Recent work (2017) on the Chatham House project provides a much-needed reappraisal of these issues and the camouflage the mandates provided for territorial acquisitions.⁸²

The Chatham House philosophy is consistent with the belief of Harry Holland (the first parliamentary Leader of New Zealand Labour) that an interdependent world, reliant on international co-operation through the League of Nations was possible. He never faltered in this belief but his idealism never confronted the reality of government, as McNeill points out.⁸³ O’Farrell’s workmanlike biography is due for updating, for it does not comment on Harry Holland’s overlooked use and misuse of the French to suit his domestic political purpose. This partly explains some of the later disaffection from the political left with their first world war ally.⁸⁴ In their re-assessment of Labour, Franks

⁸⁰ Frank Trentmann, "After the Nation-State: Citizenship, Empire and Global Coordination in the New Internationalism, 1914-1930" in *Beyond sovereignty: Britain, empire and transnationalism, c. 1880-1950*, ed. Kevin Grant, Philippa Levine, and Frank Trentmann (Basingstoke England New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).

⁸¹ Barbara Metzger, "Towards an International Human Rights Regime during the Interwar Years: The League of Nations' Combat of Traffic in Women and Children" in *Beyond sovereignty: Britain, empire and transnationalism, c. 1880-1950*, ed. Kevin Grant, Philippa Levine, and Frank Trentmann (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).

⁸² James Cotton, "On the Chatham House project: interwar actors, networks, knowledge," *International Politics Online* Ed.(2017).

⁸³ Dougal McNeill, "Labouring Feeling: Harry Holland's Political Emotions," *The Journal of New Zealand Studies* 21(2015).

⁸⁴ Patrick James O’Farrell, *Harry Holland, militant socialist* (Canberra: Australian National University, 1964).

and McAloon acknowledge their use of *PapersPast* and the Parliamentary debates as sources. They also draw attention to the comparative ease with which these can now be searched and read. They point out how both can assist the historian in developing a broader view than that emerging from the archives alone.⁸⁵ Their revised opinion of Holland seems to reflect this ability to systematically examine these additional sources electronically. Not surprisingly, they conclude that Holland was less ideologically rigid and more nuanced than O'Farrell had suggested.

The start of the Second World War saw the suspension of Labour's social engineering initiatives and the end of its originally pacifist sentiment. Savage has cast a long shadow over both. Gustafson's biography of Savage remains the definitive work on his subject although, in common with other New Zealand political biographies, it lacks a broader backdrop of world events.⁸⁶ Both Savage's earlier life experiences and actions in Government suggest, based on Gustafson's account, that Savage and his party had had enough of British Imperialism, aristocracy and economic dependency but the weight of the latter brought such independent thinking back to reality in 1939. Carina Hickey's thesis on William Jordan raises interesting issues about these complex interactions which warrant a deeper investigation than her focus on Jordan alone allows.⁸⁷ Background on New Zealand's involvement with the League of Nations (where Jordan arguably had most of his political impact) and the League itself comes from Susan Pedersen and Gerald Chaudron.⁸⁸

The system of mandated territories, colonies and conquered spaces had considerable impact on the Anglo-French relationship in the Pacific. Jennifer Pitts covers the intellectualism underpinning the imperialist movement from Adam Smith to Tocqueville.⁸⁹ Her work is particularly strong on the evolution of the arguments used to reconcile the contradiction between the nationalistic imperialism of the western

⁸⁵ Peter Franks and Jim McAloon, *Labour : the New Zealand Labour Party, 1916-2016* (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2016).

⁸⁶ Barry Gustafson, *From the cradle to the grave : a biography of Michael Joseph Savage* (Auckland N.Z.: Reed Methuen, 1986).

⁸⁷ Carina Hickey, "Man in his time plays many parts : life stories of William Jordan" (M.A., Massey University, 2003).

⁸⁸ Susan Pedersen, *The guardians the League of Nations and the crisis of empire* (Oxford: OUP, 2015); Gerald Chaudron, *New Zealand in the League of Nations : the beginnings of an independent foreign policy, 1919-1939* (McFarland, North Carolina, 2012); "New Zealand And The League Of Nations" (University of Canterbury, 1989).

⁸⁹ Jennifer Pitts, *A turn to empire : the rise of imperial liberalism in Britain and France* (Princeton, N.J. Woodstock: Princeton University Press, 2006).

powers and the morality of imposing colonial rule. This topic has recently been revisited by James Cotton in an excellent re-examination of internationalists who questioned the motives and methods of this imperialism by stealth.⁹⁰ The rationalisations were exceedingly important as the allied powers - who claimed to have fought the Great War for the freedom (amongst other things) of the smaller nations, such as Belgium - divided mandated territories and colonial acquisitions amongst themselves. Little seemed to have changed since Jules-Alphonse-René Poret (Baron de Blosseville) noted in his report on New Zealand as a potential site for a penal colony that '...nothing in my plan runs counter to morality ... and despotism will seem a humane course of action'.⁹¹ Johnson and Duroselle attribute French domestic unity on the issue to a collective pride in colonisation, but it was a pride bought at the cost of competing with Britain.⁹² The authors assert that pre-eminence in trade and commerce enhanced the national unity of the United Kingdom, but the 'sun never sets' and Royal Navy legends were just as important in the New Zealand public mind.

Within the Pacific, colonisation and territorial acquisition has been well researched and debated. Robert Aldrich remains the doyen of historical research into French colonialism and national aspirations in the Pacific.⁹³ Keith Woodward's contribution includes the popular canard that British interests were to support the locals whereas the French were there only to help their own colonists.⁹⁴ Despite Goulter's suggestive title her work focusses on the missionaries' Catholicism and does not explore how being French made the difference.⁹⁵ Trans-nationalism was seen in practice through the attempts by religious groups to move away from the earlier competitive religious-national-colonial link - exemplified by the French Catholic missions in New Zealand and the Anglo-Protestants in the Pacific - to a new multi-national approach. This theme is explored by John Stuart who argues that World War I caused a re-think of the role of

⁹⁰ Cotton, "On the Chatham House project: interwar actors, networks, knowledge."

⁹¹ Jules de Blosseville, *A proposal for a penal colony in New Zealand*, trans. Martin L Purdy, Bilingual, French/English / ed. ([Canberra]: A.N.U., 1986). pp.10-11.

⁹² Douglas Johnson and Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, "Entente and Mésentente," in *Britain and France: ten centuries*, ed. Douglas W. J. Johnson, Francois Crouzet, and Francois Bédarida (Folkestone, Kent, England: Dawson, 1980).

⁹³ Robert Aldrich, *The French Presence in the South Pacific, 1842-1940* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990).

⁹⁴ Keith Woodward, "Keith Woodward - Historical Note," in *Tufala Gavman: reminiscences from the Anglo-French Condominium of the New Hebrides*, ed. Brian J. Bresnihan and Keith Woodward (Suva, Fiji: Institute of Pacific Studies University of the South Pacific, 2002).

⁹⁵ Mary Catherine Goulter, *Sons of France: a forgotten influence on New Zealand history*, 2nd ed. (Wellington: Whitcombe and Tombs, 1958).

missions, and whether the missions were even sustainable if structured along national lines.

The work of scholars who have scrambled to draw direct links between New Zealand and the French Pacific colonies illustrates the limitations of this genre, and the problem of relying solely on direct associations to prove influence (for a classic example of this self-created problem see Michael Pérez).⁹⁶ Pérez refers to the ‘impossible challenge’ of writing about New Zealand relations with New Caledonia without referring to France or the United Kingdom. Why was it necessary to meet this pre-condition? Having established a non-existent need, Pérez ties himself in knots trying to establish parallels within his self-imposed rule. Such artificial restrictions are not only unnecessary and unduly limiting, but arbitrarily remove the necessary context of colonisation and empire.

Colonisation and territorial acquisition in the Pacific were as much about competition between the great powers, as they were about the motives of their agencies, whether these were military, religious or civil. Miles Kahler explains the domestic political conflicts that arise within an imperial power during the decolonization process.⁹⁷ *The internationalization of colonialism: Britain, France, and Black Africa, 1939-1956* covers a period after the colonial/empirical project reached its apogee and then began to decline under its own political, cultural and economic contradictions. The work highlights the national prestige acquired through colonisation and the consequent emotional sacrifice required when the possessing nation withdraws after so much has been invested.⁹⁸ This can be extrapolated to include the difficulties that arise for the larger powers’ satellites, such as New Zealand, when the parent state renounces their colonial claims even as economic dependency perpetuates the ties. The losses are not simply territorial, but extend to doubts about the legitimacy of the whole colonial project and thus the foundations of the subsequently independent post-colonial nations.

⁹⁶ Michael Pérez, "New Caledonia and New Zealand: Similar Histories, Parallel Destinies, Converging Diplomacies," in *New Zealand-New Caledonia : neighbours, friends and partners (La Nouvelle-Zélande et la Nouvelle-Calédonie : voisins, amis et partenaires)*, ed. Fr. Éd Eric Angleviel, Stephen I. Levine, and Museum of Wellington City & Sea (Wellington, N.Z.: Victoria University Press, 2008).

⁹⁷ Miles Kahler, *Decolonization in Britain and France : the domestic consequences of international relations* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984).

⁹⁸ John Kent, *The internationalization of colonialism : Britain, France, and Black Africa, 1939-1956*, Oxford studies in African affairs (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).

Katie Pickles' thoughtful article reflects the sensitivities surrounding colonialism studies.⁹⁹ Pickles provides a good exposition that can be used by those writing about imperialism and colonialism during the inter-war period to calibrate their own assessments. Tony Ballantyne's reminder that the archives are the 'memory of the state' remains timely if only for its emphasis on the limitations of relying on the state's memory as a holistic view of the past.¹⁰⁰ His challenging views in *Webs of Empire* provides a welcome alternative framework for reassessing the purpose and relevance of the many background documents received by the New Zealand Government via the Governor General.¹⁰¹

Amongst recent publications, Adrian Muckle's is one of the few works that defines the New Zealand-France relationship as bilateral.¹⁰² Muckle's view, that France saw New Zealand as both an ambassador for - and a practitioner of - colonisation by empire, fits with the Seddon-era heritage of a nation that saw itself as an unselfconsciously nascent power in the Pacific. It was not a view that was necessarily competitive with French aspirations. New Zealand's challenges in Samoa aroused some sympathy in 1924 from the then French Consul in New Zealand (M. Jacques Serre) who could see parallels with France's own colonial dilemmas elsewhere.

Beyond the British and French Empires' presence in the Pacific were those of the United States and Japan who gradually assumed the role of the dominant competing Pacific powers between the wars. The moral contradiction between the United States' avowed disdain for European imperialism and her own colonial adventures under other guises had constrained America's approach in relation to the soon to be ignored (by the United States) Versailles settlement. In the New Zealand histories the links and influence of imperial Britain dominate while American cultural colonisation goes largely unremarked. Arguably America was no lesser - and in some respects a greater - acquirer

⁹⁹ Katie Pickles, "The Obvious and the Awkward: Postcolonialism and the British World," *NZ Journal of History* 45, no. 1.

¹⁰⁰ Tony Ballantyne, *Orientalism and race : Aryanism in the British Empire*, Cambridge Imperial and Post-colonial Studies Series. (New York: Palgrave, 2002).

¹⁰¹ *Webs of empire : locating New Zealand's colonial past*.

¹⁰² Adrian Muckle, "Empire in the eyes of the beholder: New Zealand in the Pacific through French eyes," in *New Zealand's empire*, ed. Katie Pickles and Catherine Coleborne (Manchester University Press, 2016).

of Pacific territory and influence than the British or French as Ian Tyrrell's well-argued book explains.¹⁰³

Contact, whether direct or indirect, inevitably raised issues around the 'others' and their race. Race becomes a component of these histories but not one with which contemporary historians readily engage. Hyam works around the issue by separating the belittling racial comment made by establishment and political *grandees* in private from their public statements and actions.¹⁰⁴ However unacceptable this seems in the modern context, it is a plausible explanation for the obvious contradictions. Mention of race usually provokes images of skin colour as the surrogate litmus test associated with difference, but much was also written in the contemporary newspaper reports about the difference between the steady, stoic Anglo-Saxons and the excitable Gallic characters who were viewed as a distinct, white race. These themes are omitted from the secondary literature where race tends to be treated as synonymous with skin colour thereby understating the omnipresence of racial divisions. Writing on transnationalism Katie Pickles hints at, but then appears to shy away from, fully grasping the difficulty posed by the intersection between nationality, culture and race which her title presages.¹⁰⁵ Angela Woollacott also mentions but then sidesteps the topic.¹⁰⁶ In the current age, race receives delicate handling as differences between members of one self-nominated group and another are ascribed to culture rather than genes. By general consent, equality of the races is taken as an accepted genetic fact but difficulties arise when this concept is applied retrospectively. The 'cringe' that Pickles alludes to is not cultural. Rather, it is a response to what are now interpreted as unacceptable historical racial biases from a time when genetic differences were assumed to exist. The contributions of Christophe Charle and Christophe Prochasson add depth to the re-examination of the perceived differences between the French, British (and German) races, their suitability as colonial rulers and their national temperament.¹⁰⁷ The debate was especially relevant as the

¹⁰³ Ian R Tyrrell, *Transnational nation : United States history in global perspective since 1789* (Basingstoke [England] ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).

¹⁰⁴ Hyam, *Britain's declining empire : the road to decolonisation, 1918-1968*: pp.37-49.

¹⁰⁵ Pickles, "*Transnational Intentions and Cultural Cringe: History Beyond National Boundaries.*"

¹⁰⁶ Angela Woollacott, "Postcolonial histories and Catherine Hall's *Civilising Subjects*," in *Connected Worlds : History in Transnational Perspective*, ed. Marilyn Lake and Ann Curthoys (Australian National University.).

¹⁰⁷ Christophe Prochasson, "Fashoda and the Boer War," in *Anglo-French attitudes : comparisons and transfers between English and French intellectuals since the eighteenth century*, ed. Christophe Charle,

Darwinian idea of race-based differences became an acceptable paradigm to rationalise - on an apparently scientific basis - the superiority or inferiority of one race compared to another. Such views had consequences beyond simple assumptions of racially based superiority in day to day life. The commonly accepted narrative that assumes punishing Germany was the sole objective of the World War I victors overlooks the consideration given to developing a broad coalition of white races to rule the non-whites, as Laura Wildenthal points out.¹⁰⁸

The dominant political issue of the late 1920s to mid-1930s was the economy. McKinnon's comprehensive review of the depression years in New Zealand goes some way to re-balancing the historiographical convention which chastises the Reform-United conservative Governments for choosing not to act at a time when 'expert' opinion severely limited the acceptable economic responses, but then praises the succeeding first Labour Government for acting once these artificial constraints had been removed. Both Governments operated within the boundaries of their own political creed, but they faced very different economic conditions. Jim McAloon offers some useful insights on these points.¹⁰⁹ Neither work acknowledges the degree to which options arising from French responses to the depression were aired by both sides of the political divide.

The impact of the various media sources available to the public and therefore the range and breadth of public knowledge of current events relies heavily on anecdotal evidence and speculative assessments, because objectively measured readership and listening statistics are largely unavailable. In other respects, the history of colonial and post-colonial communications is well documented. Chandrika Kaul discusses the importance

Julien Vincent, and J. M. Winter (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007); Christophe Charle, "French Intellectuals and the Impossible English Model (1870-1914)," in *Anglo-French attitudes : comparisons and transfers between English and French intellectuals since the eighteenth century*, ed. Christophe Charle, Julien Vincent, and J. M. Winter (Manchester, UK ; New York: Manchester University Press, 2007).

¹⁰⁸ Laura Wildenthal, "Notes on a History of 'Imperial Turns' in Modern Germany," in *After the imperial turn : thinking with and through the nation*, ed. Antoinette Burton (Durham [N.C.]: Duke University Press 2003).

¹⁰⁹ Jim McAloon, *Judgements of all kinds : economic policy-making in New Zealand, 1945-1984* (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2013); McKinnon, *The broken decade: prosperity, depression and recovery in New Zealand, 1928-39*.

of wireless and cable in reducing perceived time and distance, thus permitting greater central control as information flows improved.¹¹⁰ Technology similarly improved both the scope and the speed of newspaper reporting. New Zealand's progress in this regard was chronicled by A. C. Wilson but unfortunately the inter-war years (when the application of wire and wireless arguably came into their own) warrants a mere twenty-five pages out of one hundred and eighty-five.¹¹¹

Film became increasingly important as a medium for cultural exchange between the wars. The intertwining that resulted from the use of the same medium to transmit both news and fiction inevitably led to overlap. " 'Films as Foreign Offices': Transnationalism at Paramount in the Twenties and Early Thirties" recalls the influence of Walter Wagner who used film to demonstrate 'world acquaintanceship' through 'natural drama.'¹¹² Seeing others going about their everyday tasks could hopefully build a trans-national understanding and hence a predisposition to peace. Based on the peripheral analysis they receive in the work of Simon Sigley, it would seem that French films were perceived by New Zealanders as 'arty', implying that they were not from a culture that locals could relate to, and therefore unlikely to build mutual understanding.¹¹³ Pauline Knuckey's work offers a complementary mini-history of the cinema habits within one provincial city.¹¹⁴

Some points in relation to historical perceptions of the news, and particularly the link with political views, profits and popularity in its dissemination warrant additional attention. Ralph Negrine describes a period later than that used for this thesis, but he does point out that in the three regional United Kingdom dailies examined, the space allocated to parliamentary coverage steadily fell after 1900. Moreover, the content was originally simply descriptive rather than analytic.¹¹⁵ There is no reason to suspect, based

¹¹⁰ Kaul, "Introductory Survey." Kaul also warns of the tendency for historians to use newspaper articles as illustrative, rather than as sources in their own right.

¹¹¹ A. C. Wilson, *Wire and wireless : a history of telecommunications in New Zealand, 1860-1987* (Palmerston North, N.Z.: Dunmore Press, 1994).

¹¹² Desley Deacon, "'Films as foreign offices': Transnationalism at Paramount in the twenties and early thirties," in *Connected Worlds : History in Transnational Perspective*, ed. Marilyn Lake and Ann Curthoys (Australian National University).

¹¹³ Simon Sigley, *Transnational film culture in New Zealand* (Bristol: Intellect Limited, 2013).

¹¹⁴ Pauline Knuckey, "A global province? : the development of a movie culture in a small provincial city 1919-1945" (M.A., Massey University, 2012).

¹¹⁵ Ralph M Negrine, *Parliament and the media : a study of Britain, Germany and the media*, Chatham House papers. (Washington, DC: Pinter, 1998).

on a cursory read of the contemporary New Zealand press, that a similar trend did not occur here. Gaunt makes the point that the concept of the free press was a nineteenth century English invention rather than a judicially given right.¹¹⁶ Similarly, the idea that the press could be a neutral and impartial purveyor of news is debunked. Expectations of the role of the press in France compared to its function in the United States and Britain, provides essential background to understand how it was that the same events received such different coverage within each geography. Tony Ballantyne in his 2009 Allan Martin Lecture emphasised these points from a colonial perspective, especially the importance of local news as a topic of day to day conversation.¹¹⁷ Christopher Hilliard takes a similar view although given his topic it is surprising that the Empire receives so little attention.¹¹⁸ Hilliard does draw notice to the lack of writing on World War I in New Zealand prior to 1939-45, an observation which supports the theory that the objective was to document the 'facts' and then forget and move on, at least until the Second World War gave the first global conflict additional context. One consequence was that many first-hand accounts were lost as New Zealand history writing between the wars moved from well-meaning amateurs to 'proper' historians as archival, Von Rankean methods displaced the (since resurrected) first-hand 'yarns' genre.

With the passing years, the raw wartime histories from France were softened by the symbolic, well-ordered proxy New Zealand memorials which took their place. The results of the war were further blurred by the limited between-wars cultural exchanges. These either ignored or attempted to rise above the events of 1914-18 and the hurly-burly of inter-war European politics. *The colour of distance : New Zealand writers in France, French writers in New Zealand*, although post-dating the period of this study leaves the nagging doubt that a lack of material was the limitation. (It was compiled to celebrate the sixtieth anniversary of Franco-New Zealand relations – but why was this anniversary celebrated by restricting the compilation to the same time frame?).¹¹⁹ Curiously, the Bornholdt compilation appears to ignore recreational travel, sport and fashion as

¹¹⁶ Philip Gaunt, *Choosing the news : the profit factor in news selection*, Contributions to the study of mass media and communications, no. 16. (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990).

¹¹⁷ Ballantyne and Australian National University. History Program., *Talking, listening, writing, reading : communication and colonisation*.

¹¹⁸ Christopher Hilliard, *The bookmen's dominion : cultural life in New Zealand, 1920-1950*, AUP studies in cultural and social history, 3. (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2006).

¹¹⁹ Jenny Bornholdt and Gregory O'Brien, eds., *The colour of distance : New Zealand writers in France, French writers in New Zealand* (Wellington, N.Z.: Victoria University Press, 2005).

possible points of contact, all of which have been written on extensively in other contexts. The cultural exchanges in this work appear to be largely one-way with New Zealanders (such as Mansfield and Hodgkins) travelling to France rather than vice versa. Only one relevant, historically orientated academic work (a thesis written from a French perspective) has been identified.¹²⁰

New Zealand archival sources include the photocopied files of the Dunedin-based French consulate, miscellaneous papers of Sir James Allen and records of the French Mission's visit to the Otago Harbour Board (all within the Hocken Collection). According to the French Embassy, all consulate records were sent to France when the consular offices were replaced with an Embassy. The Dunedin consulate records were copied and retained in New Zealand (contrary to instructions). The Dunedin-based French consulate records provide a fascinating insight into the day to day business of the office. As well as questions of citizenship, these include considerable trade related business documentation. Trade required country of origin certification which, although lacking information on final destination and shipping details, strongly suggests active marketing of lower South Island sourced fine wool consigned to France. Citizenship, especially related to the Middle East territories, mandates and colonies caused considerable administrative problems as apparently permanent residents of New Zealand were required to change their nationality when their former homelands were reclassified as part of a new country. The miscellany of Sir James Allen's papers unexpectedly included a large tabulation within which the assessments of the morale of new recruits was recorded by Trentham Army Camp officers. The issue was obviously of concern as the war continued without an end in sight. The discrepancies between the different assessors' opinions of troop morale says as much about the attitude of the officers making the evaluations as it does about the recruits' enthusiasm.

The Alexander Turnbull Library (ATL) collection supplemented the more familiar official records with personal sources including Arthur (later Sir Arthur) Porritt's letters home, various war-era soldiers' letters and postcards as well as W P Reeves' invaluable, canny and observant civilian-orientated reflections on a visit to wartime France where he was not recognised as an official visitor. Educational material ranging from a

¹²⁰ Geraldine Maria Kimber, "Katherine Mansfield: The View From France" (University of Exeter, 2007).

schoolboy's notebook of French words to University French history lecture notes are also in the ATL collection.

Lord Birdwood's papers and letters in both the British Library and the ATL collection were examined for two reasons. "Birdie" was the nominal ANZAC commander but despite this and the differences between the reliance on volunteers for Australian recruits and conscription for the New Zealanders, there is no mention of General Pau's Australasian visit although it was tasked (according to some sources) with boosting Australasian morale. The United Kingdom Colonial Office files (British Archives, Kew) also has turned up no record of the Pau visit, although there are extensive notes and letters pertaining to the activity of the French Vice-Consul in Auckland. The latter's proactivity attracted the attention of both the British Colonial and Foreign Secretaries and resulted in the British Ambassador in Paris (Lord Bertie) requesting that Leon Hippeau (the offending Auckland Vice-Consul) desist from activities deemed to be outside his remit.

The New Zealand version of this event has its own file within the Archives New Zealand collection. Sir James Allen's letters to Massey in the same location simply note the conclusion of General Pau's visit with little comment. Archives New Zealand holds the nation's copies of the various referenced treaties. Copies of many British documents, including extensive, detailed first-hand accounts of diplomatic contacts, meetings, letters and reports are also archived. These were forwarded through the Governor General, suggesting that the New Zealand Government agencies were probably better informed on international events - assuming they read the material - than their public statements suggested.

Although both are published sources, the New Zealand Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) and the Appendices to the Journals of the House of Representatives (AtoJs) have been electronically searched for any mentions of France and the French. The many relevant references in League of Nations reports, Imperial Conference minutes and Government Department reports have been collated and reassessed in the context of the overall interaction with France. Extracts from these documents - once reassembled into a narrative - provide clues as to why New Zealand's ally France was used so extensively as a point of comparison and criticism in Parliament. It shows how local

politicians used various historical 'lessons' from the revolution and latter-day France, as well as the soldiers' first-hand experiences, and books, film and sporting contacts to their own advantage.

The French sources from Archives Nationales, Pierrefitte-sur-Seine and Centre des Archives diplomatiques de La Courneuve contained instructions to overseas consulates, their reports in reply and communication from General Pau during his time in New Zealand 1918-19. Finally, the New Zealand *PapersPast* database and the French *Gallica* portal have been used extensively for both the primary database construction and as a source for supplementary articles, along with the web archives of other miscellaneous publishers.

The following six chapters - while topic-centric - are broadly chronological. As indicated, the sources in each case are not restricted to the sampled newspaper articles. The full range of primary and secondary sources as well as additional news reports were accessed after the main topics were identified.¹²¹ At the start of each chapter I have included a brief summary of the newspaper categories guiding the discussion.

Chapter one summarises the pre-war attitudes towards France within the political and public sectors. Chapter two covers the Versailles Peace Treaty and the events associated with it. Chapter three includes the immediate post-war phase when opportunities for direct trade appeared, and there was a readjustment of relations with France. Chapter four analyses the consequences for national identity of choosing to reaffirm the Empire links while maintaining only token contact with other nations like France. Chapter five describes the re-awakened interest in France as what appeared to be an apparently successful French economic model. The thesis concludes with an analysis in Chapter six of the impact on the relationship of new developments in communication and

¹²¹ Manovich, "Cultural Data: Possibilities and limitations of the digital data universe," pp.266-267. Manovich discusses in some detail the problem of universe definition since the historical universe is itself a selection whether chosen through the original writers' retention policies, the archivists' selections or the historians' whim. Manovich's metaphor of islands of accessible knowledge in a sea of undefinable scale and unknown boundaries is a useful reality check for users of statistical samples in the Humanities. Moreover, islands of knowledge are selections that have often been mapped in the statistical sea because they cover topics of interest rather than necessarily being representative. The visitor who assumes that items in a museum collection are representative of the civilisation from which they were collected may receive a similarly distorted view.

technology, and looks at how bringing France closer to NZ was dependent on the desire to do so and the (press) messages used, rather than the political process.

1. Relics from France

Just over a quarter (28.7% in 1919-1924) of the sampled newspaper articles fell within the 'Politics and Law' category making this the most significant numerically. The implied homogeneity conceals considerable sub-category granularity. The largest sub-set (about one third of the Politics and Law articles comprising 11.6% in 1919-1924 and 8.9% in 1925-1935 respectively) concerned International Relations with events from pre-war European history often cited. Many of these reports precluded the less informed, casual reader from gaining a clear view of pre-war France. Articles concerned with earlier French history and the geography of France added a further 3% to the total.

* * * *

It is with astonishment that Frenchmen who visit Britain run up against a host of ancient prejudices which they thought were long extinct. Daily one hears of the ambitions of Louis XIV or Napoleon, for the British people are evidently not quite sure that the French have definitely renounced these ideas.

André Siegfried, 1924

Geographer, philosopher and member of the 1918-19 Mission to New Zealand.¹

The British dislike of the French that Siegfried observed was the result of a popular version of Anglo-French history that was rooted in the Revolution and the Napoleonic wars. These views had been brought to New Zealand by the British settlers and then nurtured through repetition. Even in 1924 Harry Atmore (the Independent MP for Nelson) was still positioning France as the natural protagonist of the British:

Suppose (Atmore said), while the Kaiser was butchering Belgium because she barred his way to that dinner he was going to eat in Paris in October, 1914, that France had said, 'England is my hereditary enemy; Henry the Fifth, and the Duke of Wellington, and sundry Plantagenets fought me'; and suppose England had said, 'I do not care much for France; Joan of Arc and Napoleon and sundry other French fought me'. Suppose they had sat nursing their ancient grudges like that? Well, the Kaiser would have dined in Paris according to his plan.²

Both before and after World War I, casual references to France often included similarly dubious comparisons which muddled current events with historical precedent and traditional antagonisms. This folklore was embedded in New Zealand's physical landscape through place names (Wellington, Nelson, Picton *et al*) and supported by historical tropes delivered through media such as books and films which defined France and the French from a British viewpoint. Formal teaching of French history and the frequently unfavourable tone adopted when reporting French current affairs

¹ André Siegfried, *Post-war Britain : a French analysis*, trans. H. H. Hemming (London: Cape, 1924). p.313.

² "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.191: 20th Parliament: 3rd session," (1921), p.589. At issue was the British point of view during the Opium Wars. Atmore was quoting Owen Wister to refute an argument from H.E. (Harry) Holland, the Buller MP and Labour Party Leader.

continually refreshed such interpretations. The inherited Macaulay-like version of Anglo-French relations perpetuated through these *aide-mémoires* reinforced a view of France as a geographically remote place in constant rivalry with the British.

1.1 *Antipodean French history – the popular version*

When post-war New Zealand re-affirmed her status as a loyal Dominion within the Empire, it followed that France would have to revert to her traditional status within the inherited British world view. This foreshadowed a revival of the negative pre-war disposition which the New Zealand public shared with the British masses. It was a reversion that was relatively easily accomplished because post-war direct contact that could have delivered counteracting, favourable views of France was largely restricted to intellectual circles within the local cultural elite and the polity. The post-war re-establishment of this natural order was reinforced through the patriotic sentiment which developed from being a member of a victorious empire and the primacy given to the rural way of life.

An important factor in the reversion to pre-war attitudes towards France came from the characteristics, attitudes and beliefs that the British held about themselves, of which a dislike of the French was an important element. The English (as Billie Melman writes) saw themselves as a more 'harmonious and more stable' people than the 'others'. This opinion was inextricably linked to (and became part of) New Zealand's imagined rural Britain even as the truth of that image was being extensively modified by the industrial development which had begun in Victorian times.³ The pre-industrial rural images were a better fit with New Zealand's Britain than were the landscapes actually experienced by the English masses during the early twentieth century. New Zealand's favourable climate, an adequate supply of 'waste' land and low population density, seemed ready made for the dream of small owner-operated farms which exemplified the ultimate practical form of this fictional rural England. Reinforced by an overwhelming dependence on exports of primary produce, the idealised self-image of a bucolic nation located in the South Pacific grew. If the landscape of post-war New Zealand could be further transformed by collective will into a likeness of rural England, the role of

³ Billie Melman, *The culture of history: English uses of the past 1800-1953* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). pp.6-7; Barnes, *New Zealand's London: A Colony and its Metropolis*: pp.74-75, 76-77.

England as New Zealand's cultural home and England's history as New Zealand's history would be revalidated. The presumed collective aspiration for a rural way of life - hence the offer to returning servicemen of the land settlement scheme, along with a collective geographic and cultural isolation from France - would nurture the links with Home. The disconnect between the image and the realities of wartime Britain - as much a product of industrialisation as they were of the war - became apparent to Bill Massey's tourists when they visited the old country. The idealised, rurally-based economy of small-farm England was inconsistent with the reality of large tenanted-estates owned by the United Kingdom's aristocrats and gentry that existed uneasily alongside an industrial urban sprawl, the whole being controlled within a rigid class structure. It was the French landscape (outside the immediate zone of conflict) that proved to be a better fit, thus creating an awkward dissonance which was not easily resolved.

Melman argues that a popular version of English culture related to class and identity developed after 1800. This culture was based on an English-centric version of history that was characteristically 'urban and metropolitan' with a strong use of violence. It drew on the French Revolution as a foil to English history; the era of upheaval, violence and revolution in urban France was a counter-narrative to the claimed stability of rural England. It was visual and therefore readily accessible. The rapid increase in the availability of the written word either through historical fiction or the newspapers extended the propagation of this source material to the those who could not view it at first hand. The filter of the educated elites (such as Macaulay) with their Whig interpretations of history was thus removed.⁴ Melman argues that the meaning (within the parameters of society, the economy and state) given by the individuals who could now see evidence of this history for themselves requires closer consideration, rather than assuming that history was simply a means for the elite to manipulate and control the masses, as proposed by Foucault.

Was there an equivalent trend in New Zealand to that described by Melman wherein the 'broker(s) of history' and 'cultural entrepreneurs' such as Madame Tussaud took

⁴ Melman, *The culture of history : English uses of the past 1800-1953*: pp.8-15, 249. Melman identifies Lord Acton as '... a chief instigator of professional study of the Revolution ...' as a counterfoil to the popular version of French history.

history away from the elites and brought it into the popular context through visual displays that were readily accessible to the 'plebeian and middle-class' of Britain?⁵ Some of the same films, literature and art were available, but there was no Tower of London, Madame Tussaud's waxworks or original paintings in impressive galleries. Nor were the tombs of Wellington or Nelson nearby to view on demand as they were in London's St Paul's. It could be argued however that Britain's anti-French heritage was just as firmly implanted in the New Zealand landscape. Cartography had been employed to culturally annex the land which the British settlers had physically appropriated. The names of the British heroes who had defeated France reinforced the settlers' right of occupation through military conquest. Hence the City of Nelson with its Trafalgar Square and its Collingwood, Hardy, Nile and St Vincent Streets is itself a monument to the Napoleonic Wars. Wellington's Waterloo Quay commemorates the City namesake's famous victory while Auckland has a Waterloo Quadrant. This colonial rechristening alienated the Māori place names and exiled them to locations far from the city centre while their British substitutes - many with scarcely hidden references to the evils of France - were placed directly in the colonists' day-to-day lives.⁶

Proof of the true nature of France came from historical fiction. New Zealand readership of the relevant novels from this period does not seem to have been studied in the same detail as it has in England, but there are tantalising snippets from newspaper reviews and comment which are consistent with the British experience. One newspaper column ('A Literary Corner: A Year's Reading: Study of History in Fiction') featured an article discussing the use of fictional history, described as a welcome addition for people 'past the age when study is easy'. The extract refers to James's *Agincourt*, a book described as set in the time of Henry V's conquest of France. There was also Scott's *Quentin Durward* retelling the French Crown's battle with the French nobility. The New Zealand novel *Torn Tapestry* (by Mona Gordon) featured a family who settled on land bought from Māori. The English history of the family included an association with Nelson defeating the French at the Battle of the Nile, thereby capturing within a supposedly local story a

⁵ Ibid., p.322.

⁶ Holger Hooch, "Monumental Memories: state commemoration of the Napoleonic wars in early nineteenth-century Britain," in *War memories : the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars in modern European culture*, ed. Alan I. Forrest, Etienne Francois, and Karen Hagemann (Palgrave Macmillan UK.).

role for France in annexing land for the colonists. When reviewing *The Speeches of Anatole France*, the *Press* used the Dreyfus case as an example of Anatole France's passion for justice. This positive tone was an exception since the general tenor of any links with France were neutral to negative. The newspaper mentions are frequent enough to suggest a background presence for France, even when it was not a topic within current affairs.⁷

Over one and a half thousand novels on the French wars were published in the United Kingdom, and according to British library records they were extensively read.⁸ There were, in Melman's words, a '... cascade of popular biographies ... and historical novels ... exploring every imaginable angle of the revolutionary period between 1789 and Napoleon's downfall ...'⁹ Nelson and Trafalgar, Wellington and Waterloo made great material for novels and these were significant subjects in shaping Victorian and Edwardian images of manhood and national identity. Admirals, generals, battles, heroes and victories became part of Britain's national narrative. The genre is narrow in focus and understates both the broader global political implications and the involvement of the rest of Europe. These were "novels of the recent past" somewhere between history and the real experiences of the authors. Marryat's fictional accounts of naval life are an important example of such work.

In *Mr Midshipman Easy* (the novel was titled after Marryat's fictional hero of the same name) the ideology of the French revolution was rejected while the role and glory of the Royal Navy was enhanced. While this book was a commercial success Marryat's first novel, *Frank Mildmay: or the naval officer* was not, probably because it was too realistic

⁷ "Books and Bookmen: A Literary Corner: A Year's Reading: Study of History in Fiction," *Evening Star*, 24 December 1920, p.11.; "Latest Novels," *Evening Post*, 6 July 1929, p.20.; "New Books And Publications," *Press*, 26 October 1929, p.13.. John Keith Moloney, "War diary," (Wellington, New Zealand: Alexander Turnbull Library, 1915-1917), pp.67-68. Moloney records being billeted at Artois. He noted the proximity to Agincourt where 'Henry the Fifth gained a great victory for British Arms over the French in the 15th Century'.

⁸ Lars Peters, "Warrior Sailors and Heroic Boys: Images of masculinity in English nautical novels on the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars," in *War Memories : The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars in Modern European Culture, War, Culture and Society, 1750-1850*, ed. Alan I. Forrest, Etienne Francois, and Karen Hagemann (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2013), pp.139-142.

There is no equivalent study or raw data available for New Zealand apart from published lists of public library purchases. The titles hint at the content but without an in-depth study, the subject(s) cannot always be assumed from the title alone. See for example: "Public Library," *Manawatu Times*, 10 October 1925, p.12..

⁹ Melman, *The culture of history : English uses of the past 1800-1953*: pp.95, 249.

in its account of life at sea in the Royal Navy. Without perhaps realising the consequences, Marryat pointed out in *Frank Mildmay* that once a battle started the Admiral had little control owing to the smoke and confusion. Marryat could have added the difficulties of wind direction, sea conditions and tides as other unwelcome variables during the era of sail. By implication this called into question Nelson's direct influence at Trafalgar, as Peters' analysis of Marryat makes clear. In addition, Marryat used the first person so his characters could express self-doubt and uncertainties. These were inconsistent with the idealized manliness associated with the period, so Marryat thereafter adapted his realistic fiction to create a more acceptable, if less accurate, version of history.¹⁰ Such devices transmuted the harsh reality of the Royal Navy into a '... school for British gentlemen ...' This window dressing was ubiquitous; it appeared in writing such as *Persuasion* (Jane Austen 1817) and works by G. A. Henry and Gordon Stables. The image of the Royal Navy became an inseparable part of a nation 'chosen by God' to defeat the French, to bring victory and prestige, and to build an Empire.¹¹ New Zealand's pleas for post-war defence by a Royal Navy fleet based in Singapore were more than a call to defend New Zealand. They also subconsciously reminded the public that New Zealand's defence relied on a Royal Navy whose default disposition had been predominantly anti-French until the *entente cordiale*, and therefore incompatible with the recent experience of France the ally.¹²

A general review of books in the *Northern Advocate* in 1925 suggests that literature featuring Napoleon and the Revolution was well known to New Zealand readers. The article writer stated that 'goodness only knows' how many books had been written covering Napoleon and the Revolution. For the British and New Zealand reader, *A Tale of Two Cities* (Charles Dickens, 1858) delivered a metaphorical message of redemption, sacrifice and survival involving the traditional French protagonist. The *Advocate* reported that a van was needed to deliver the 'hundreds of volumes' Dickens borrowed in preparation for writing *A Tale of Two Cities*. These came in turn from amongst the 'enormous' number Carlyle had amassed when writing his own history of the

¹⁰ Peters, "Warrior Sailors and Heroic Boys: Images of masculinity in English nautical novels on the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars," pp.145-147. The description "novels of the recent past" is re-quoted by Peters from Fleischman.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p.149.

¹² See p. 59. Trafalgar Day celebrations resumed after the War.

revolution.¹³ The readers' perception that these were factually based, mainstream historical literature topics was reinforced by such reporting.

A Tale of Two Cities received just under two thousand mentions in the New Zealand *PapersPast* database between its publication (in 1858) and 31 December 1935. About three-quarters of these occurred before 31 December 1918. The first New Zealand press review of Dickens' novel is not overtly anti-French although it necessarily refers to the bloodiness of the revolution on which the plot relies.¹⁴ Other editions of Dickens' work were widely advertised both for sale and as additions to public libraries. The influence of popular authors such as Dickens was heightened through public readings. In some cases it appears these events were intended for an intellectual, highbrow audience. Monologue extracts from popular novels were read and then supplemented with expert comment from the lecturer on the authors' work, illustrated with verbatim quotations.¹⁵ Even for those not attending, the newspaper reviews of these events created an impression that the works were based on authoritative and reliable historical sources. These public lectures continued even after the 'movies' became an accessible and regular recreation. The *Scarlet Pimpernel* (the original play by Baroness Emmuska Orczy, reissued as a novel and later a movie) was another work promoting a French-English theme.¹⁶ The *Star* reported (in December 1904):

Early in the new year, Miss Julia Neilson and Mr Fred Terry will produce, at the New Theatre a new play entitled, "The Scarlet Pimpernel." Simultaneously with the production of the play, Messrs Greening and Co. will publish a novel of the same name, founded on the play. The period is the French Revolution ...¹⁷

As was the case for *Two Cities*, the book and the play were widely advertised and distributed.

¹³ "Books and Writers," *Northern Advocate*, 27 June 1925, p.9.

¹⁴ "Literature," *Nelson Examiner and New Zealand Chronicle*, 9 May 1860, p.2.

¹⁵ "The Dickens Entertainment," *Manawatu Standard*, 17 April 1900, p.2. In one example of the intellectual snobbery that could be associated with these events, the anonymous reviewer mentions but excuses the small audience size as being unrelated to the intellect of Palmerston North's citizens while praising the 'expressive rendering' of the lecturer, the Rev. Charles Clark. Clark was a visiting speaker from Britain, who was touring and speaking in several locations. He also lectured on London's St. Paul's, described as the 'heart' of the Empire.

¹⁶ Melman, *The culture of history : English uses of the past 1800-1953*: p.270.

¹⁷ "Notes," *Star*, 30 December 1904, p.1.

Cultural and attitudinal exchanges were a two-way trade between the Anglophone and Francophone worlds. As Crouzet emphasises, the merging of historical fact with fiction can result in a narrative that becomes an influence even more powerful than the formal histories. Early pre-Lord Byron literature available in France had the blended images of perfidy and nobleness while for the lower classes (as Crouzet points out) there were Major O'Grady and Colonel Bramble.¹⁸ In New Zealand, the pre-war France of Revolution and Napoleon became linked to post-war France through homilies and fiction which showed France had not changed.

An example of this (mis)-use of history appeared in the *Manawatu Times* of May 1921 under the by-line 'Napoleon's End'. The target of this homily, credited to 'Matanga' (a Māori noun that can be interpreted as an experienced person, expert, or specialist) appears to be the folly of the French in insisting on post-war punishment of Germany. The lengthy piece, illustrated with direct but unsourced quotations, uses Napoleon's actions in Europe as a metaphor. In a clearly biblical allegory, Napoleon is referred to as 'The Man' and his son as 'the Son of the Man'. The quasi-Christian lesson comes from Napoleon's neglect of the interests of the French nation in pursuit of his own ambitions. The French empire was built on the 'bodies of his countrymen with thousands killed from a population of thirty million'. Personal ambition took over as 'He (i.e. Napoleon) forgot France'. Despite this, France forgave him through (in the unwritten sub-text) his rehabilitation (resurrection). The consequence was the disaster at Waterloo. Napoleon's defeat without a timely, heroic death in action (a serious short-coming for an aspiring hero in the British Victorian narrative since British heroes did not fail; they either succeeded or died in the attempt) emphasised Napoleon's mortality: he was not God. The description of Napoleon's last hours, his death and burial on St Helena and subsequent exhumation nineteen years later for repatriation and reburial in Paris is used as a metaphor for the munificence of the British who facilitated a re-interment originally barred by treaty. Britain had forgiven the old animosity, France was resurrected and the scene set for the *entente cordiale*. The narrative is clear as is the subliminal message. Although England forgave France her Napoleonic sins and allied

¹⁸ François Crouzet, "Problems of communication between Britain and France in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries," in *Britain Ascendant : Comparative Studies in Franco-British Economic History*, Editions de la Maison des sciences de l'homme (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp.468-469.

with her during the war, the French desire to punish Germany through harsh reparations would inevitably have unforeseen but adverse consequences for France, just as Napoleon's actions had done a century before.¹⁹ The nature of France was still the same despite all that the British had done to help in all conceivable ways.

Melman points out that the popular Madame Tussaud's waxwork depictions of guillotine executions served a similar purpose. The 'Terror' became a metaphor for the French national character and by implication the English became a mirror image; of similar form but characteristically opposite. Madame Tussaud's made extensive use of Napoleonic memorabilia (Napoleon Bonaparte's coach was one artefact on display) so that fiction and non-fiction were fused in the public mind through the use of real visual stimuli. It was as if seeing the objects made the story true, although the legitimacy of the subject could be undermined by tilting the balance away from the legend and towards the mortal man, thereby avoiding any suggestion of god-like status.²⁰ The exhibits could not of themselves tell the story. They depended on a narrative to give them meaning rather than, as the public may have assumed, the opposite being true. The illustration or model or representation therefore became evidence which implicitly proved the narrative.²¹ Even *sans* the physical evidence, reports that it existed added credence to the narrative. In a similar manner, the *Ashburton Guardian* felt it newsworthy to report (in June 1919) that one of Napoleon's 'silk stockings' had been sold for £50.²²

Significantly, there was a break in the displays in England between (approximately) 1910-1920 to allow for the *entente*. Unlike pre- or post-war civilian visitors, soldiers on leave could therefore visit England without being exposed to any overtly anti-French propaganda. Business as usual was resumed thereafter with the relevant exhibits restored to prime display spaces. In New Zealand the much-publicised destruction of the bells (reportedly cast from French cannon captured by the Germans in the 1870-71 conflict) in the Christchurch Lutheran church to supposedly assuage French

¹⁹ Matanga, "Napoleon's End," *Manawatu Times*, 18 May 1921, p.7.

²⁰ "Napoleon," *Bay of Plenty Times*, 9 December 1924, p.3. This story suggested that although he was Corsican born, Napoleon was not Italian but Greek. The heresy evidence for this assertion came from an 'old lady' who had conveniently died in 1863.

²¹ Melman, *The culture of history : English uses of the past 1800-1953*: pp.29-32

²² "News and Notes," *Ashburton Guardian*, 3 June 1919, p.5.

sensitivities showed a similar degree of support for the French but by 1925 the *Northern Advocate* was reporting that the Aldershot tatoon (sic) again included a performance re-enacting the Battle of Waterloo. Locally, Trafalgar Day celebrations resumed, signalling that a regression to the old attitudes was acceptable within seven years of the First World War ending.²³ Through such devices the story of the French as a nation of revolution, 'crime and violence' was resuscitated and perpetuated despite the contrary evidence of the successful *entente* and the World War I alliance.²⁴

The French goods available in England and New Zealand commonly consisted of luxuries - cognac and textiles being classic examples - that fuelled an image of '... elegant and easy living'. This raises speculation as to the dissonance thus created. The contradictory images could apparently coexist because they were simultaneously 'selective and generalised'.²⁵ In New Zealand these products presented alongside the printed word provided a substitute for first-hand experience of the artefacts, tombs and memorabilia. Together with the histories both factual and fictional, the cultural influences, the evidence painted on the street signs and the merchandise available in the shops, there was a sufficiency of anecdotal evidence to reinforce the British version of France within New Zealand.

Post war awareness of French-related literary classics and thereby the Anglo-Saxon version of French history was further boosted by the 'movies'. Newspaper mentions of *A Tale of Two Cities* increased when the silent movie of the same name was first advertised in New Zealand in late 1917. *Two Cities* achieved national distribution in 1918 supported by extensive print advertising. Presumably the United States movie-making Fox organization saw little contradiction in their chosen subject matter, even as the United States was being readied politically for joining (on 6 April 1917) the much-derided European War. Whereas the frequent mentions in the newspapers pre- and post-1918 suggest that the original novel gained scholarly attention, it was the movie

²³ "German Bells," *Sun*, 16 July 1918, p.3; "German Bells," *Poverty Bay Herald*, 24 July 1918, p.9; "The German Bells," *Taranaki Herald*, 13 August 1918, p.5; "Timely Topics," *Northern Advocate*, 5 September 1925, p.9.

²⁴ Melman, *The culture of history : English uses of the past 1800-1953*: pp.45-46.

²⁵ Crouzet, "Problems of communication between Britain and France in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries," pp.470-471.

version that won broad audience popularity after 1918 and was therefore influential in highlighting the Revolution in the same year that the war in France ended.

When *Le Figaro* later (in 1925) noted that:

‘The Germans will launch a big (or an immense) propaganda film against our foreign legion. There is no doubt that one picks up all the low slanders that have been going on for a long time on the other side of the Rhine’.²⁶

the need for a response from patriotic French film makers was clearly implied. French-made films had however only limited commercial appeal in New Zealand because those screened frequently relied on themes of war and plots that belittled Germany. Consequently, many were neither escapist enough on the one hand nor sufficiently relevant on the other to attract a broad post-war New Zealand audience. This presented a dilemma when French films were released, as the critics and reviewers sought to provide context and thereby a reason for cinema goers to view them. *Le Figaro*’s announcement in August 1928 that ‘La Grande Épreuve’ would be released and distributed in New Zealand (and other countries) through Paramount can be taken as a case study. The film was set in wartime France, although ten years had passed since the hostilities ended. The *New Zealand Herald* excitedly announced that it was produced with the full co-operation of the French Government, the participation of twenty-thousand troops and the use of the ‘actual battlefields of Verdun, (and) the Marne ...’. Local reviews were mixed and sometimes incoherent. The *Bay of Plenty Times* arranged fiction alongside hyperbole by claiming that:

not one (picture) has shown the French nation’s part in that great conflict

and

no matter what one thinks of war the mental outlook will undergo a change after seeing the “Soul of France”

while saying little.²⁷ The non-committal tone of other reviews suggests that the critic(s) relied on the publicity material, and had not seen the movie as they do not seem to have

²⁶ “On Dit Que ...” *Figaro*, 27 February 1925, p.5.:

“Les Allemands vont lancer un grand film de propagande contre notre légion étrangère. Nul doute que l’on y ramasse toutes les basses calomnies ayant cours depuis très longtemps de l’autre côté du Rhin. “

²⁷ Alexandre Ryder André Dugès (as André Dugès-Delzescouts), “The Soul of France (La grande épreuve, original title),” (1928); Alexandre Ryder and André Dugès, “The Big Test,” (1927); “Figaro-

realised that it was a comedy. By the time the movie was shown in Auckland it was billed as a 'supporting feature'.

Figure 6: *La Grande Épreuve* promotion poster (cinema-francais.fr)

According to *The Bay of Plenty Times*, this comedy was 'a human document, real, vivid and dramatic.'



Another case unrelated to the war was that of the movie 'Miracle of the Wolves'.

Arrangements have just been taken for the distribution of the "Miracle of the Wolves" in England and Ireland by The Allied Artists Corporation Ltd, the English company of "The Artists Associates," United Artists. The same organization will also distribute this great French film in its agencies in Australia, New Zealand, Mexico and Cuba, and in Brazil, Argentina and Chile in South America.²⁸

The plot is described in IMDB as:

King Louis XI tries to unify France by all means fair or foul, which does not please his powerful rival Charles the Bold. It is against this troubled backdrop that the loves of the daughter of a wealthy bourgeois and the king's god-daughter Jeanne Fouquet and knight

Cinema,"*Figaro*, 17 August 1928, p.5; "In Filmland,"*New Zealand Herald Supplement*, 10 November 1928, p.9.; "Amusements.,"*Bay of Plenty Times*, 13 May 1930, p.3; "Amusements,"*Auckland Star*, 7 June 1930, p.13; "Amusements,"*Bay Of Plenty Times*, 14 May 1930, p.3.

²⁸ "On Dit Que ..."p.5.

Robert Cottureau unfurl in spite of all the obstacles in their way. One of these being a pack of hungry wolves trying to stop Jeanne from carrying out an important mission assigned to her by the king himself.²⁹

The first New Zealand mention of this film (which was silent and therefore without any language barrier) was in *The Evening Post* which breathlessly reported, '*Le miracle des loups*' had achieved 'a five weeks' capacity run' to critical acclaim in New York, according to comments sourced from *The New York World*.³⁰ 'France's bid for cinema consideration is brilliant, generously conceived, and shrewdly executed'. Once screening commenced in New Zealand the reviews clearly implied that whatever the film's other merits, its plot was of little interest to New Zealand audiences. Instead of critiquing the picture on its merits, the reviewers made much of the effort expended in capturing and filming real wolves.³¹ The wolves therefore became the stars, a point picked up and repeated by other reviews.³² Many of the evaluations and advertisements (twenty-six out of thirty-six references or about 70%) appeared in the mid-North Island newspapers of Horowhenua, Bay of Plenty, Taranaki and Manawatu, suggesting that the movie had limited appeal and therefore its distribution was curtailed. Isolated reviews from the *Auckland Star* and the *Press* repeated the description of the wolf scene. The *Stratford Evening Post* referred to the quality of the acting but noted that the movie, while 'very romantic', was set in the 'somewhat uncomfortable times of Louis IX' (although the earlier quoted IMDB reference identifies Louis XI as the monarch). Such unenthusiastic endorsements implied was that the plot was not of universal appeal to New Zealand audiences although the Manawatu Public Library did acquire a book of the same name at about the same time.³³

While not all French-related movies were about the war, many that were shown in post-war New Zealand were war-related or used the war as a background theme. 'Hearts of the World' was dramatically described by the *Manawatu Standard* as:

... mostly centreing(sic) around the war on the French front, and bringing home, in however minor a degree, the horrors and struggles of the terrible campaigns waged for so long over some of the finest country in Europe, now laying waste and desolate.

²⁹ Ibid., p.5; Raymond Bernard, "Le miracle des loups," (1924).

³⁰ "Mimes: Music: Records," *Evening Post*, 11 July 1925, p.21.

³¹ "Screen Stars and Films," *Auckland Star*, 18 July 1925, p.28.

³² "Entertainments," *Manawatu Times*, 19 March 1926, p.4.

³³ "Screen Stars and Films." p.28; "Our Ladies' Letter," *Stratford Evening Post*, 20 November 1926, p.2.; "Public Library." p.12.

And further on in the review:

... through the hideous war-scarred regions into which they have been transferred by the bestial brutality of the Hun invaders. It is a picture that will live in the memory for many a long day to come, for the cinematograph has been carried into the fighting line, and faithfully (emphasis added) produces some of the historic combats, with trench fighting, men going over the top, the great retreat of the Allies and their subsequent victorious advance, with tanks, pill boxes and murderous artillery outbursts, shrapnel barrages, the release of poison gas, bayonet charges, the surrender of Hun prisoners and other momentous happenings, including cavalry charges and infantry advances, with the recapture of the French village in which the story opens, the whole being cleverly woven together, and presenting the finest series of war pictures yet presented locally.³⁴

'A Soldier's Oath' used a pre- and post-war French village setting; 'The Firefly of France' featured an American aviator 'who foils the German's plots' while 'The Brass Check', set in a lunatic asylum, included an inmate in a padded cell who 'thinks he is the Kaiser and has dressed himself up grotesquely to aid his illusion'.³⁵ At the other extreme 'The better 'ole', a movie adaption of the stage musical, provided a light-hearted version of the war as seen through the experiences of the 'truthful types which are seen every day in our armies in the field'.³⁶ Although presumably filmed before the war ended and therefore released into a post-war market for which they were not intended, it is difficult to imagine a more inappropriate selection for developing a positive impression of modern France. Even movies using historical themes contributed to an image of France as a place of conflict, as the reviewers' summaries show. The received persona of France remained rooted in the past through the available literature, newspaper articles and movies.

³⁴ "Entertainments," *Manawatu Standard*, 15 March 1919, p.6.

³⁵ "The Picture Houses," *Poverty Bay Herald*, 15 April 1919, p.6.

³⁶ "Photo-Plays," *Evening Star*, 18 August 1919, p.6.; "The Better 'ole," in *Internet Movie Database*.

1.2 Learning French history: formal and self-selected sources

Whereas British and French politicians were commonly drawn from a small, formally educated elite, New Zealand's pre-war and immediate post-war leadership was more broadly-based. It included both locally-born and British immigrants from all social classes. Owing to their educational diversity and the disparity in their personal experiences, they did not share a common version of pre-war French history. Moreover, even when they had some formal curriculum-based knowledge of France, it was often supplemented with informal, self-prescribed adult learning. The result of this eclectic education was a leadership cohort that lacked a common understanding of French history. Their knowledge and interpretation frequently differed from that of their European and British counterparts.³⁷

British and New Zealand youngsters were indoctrinated at primary school level in an Anglo-centric version of French history using a mix of formal education and popular reading. They were taught that the recent history of France was the revolution, the rise of Napoleon and the wrongs committed by France against the British nation.³⁸ Although the school curriculum included formal French language teaching and history lessons, these were treated as independent topics so the context was frequently lost and with it an opportunity to develop a more holistic understanding of France.³⁹ Few pupils progressed through the whole secondary syllabus although the 1921 school rolls show 90% of those who did enrol were taking French as a second language. The *School Journal Part II* for 1922 (to take just one year) had articles on France, Holland and Italy, but these appear to have been published independently rather than being integrated within

³⁷ G. Weisz, *The Emergence of Modern Universities In France, 1863-1914* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014). pp.96-97. James Watson and Lachy Paterson, eds., *A great New Zealand prime minister? : reappraising William Ferguson Massey* (Dunedin, N.Z.: Otago University Press, 2011). The background of William Massey typified the image of the self-made man in New Zealand political life during the late nineteenth and early to mid-twentieth century. This distinctly New Zealand characteristic was in part due to a broader electoral franchise compared to that used at Home prior to 1919.

³⁸ Crouzet, "Problems of communication between Britain and France in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries," p.468.

³⁹ Roger Openshaw, "Contradiction and contestation: Public education in the interwar period," in *New Zealand between the wars*, ed. Rachael Bell and Massey University Press (Auckland: Massey University Press, 2017), pp.91-92; "Report Of The Minister Of Education For The Year Ending 31st December, 1919. [In continuation of E.-1, 1919.] Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives," p.30. The post-war syllabus emphasised the various factors such as race and politics that had contributed to a British victory. Empire ties were similarly incorporated to reiterate the central role of the British race. Such topics were placed early in the syllabus because as the 1919 Department of Education Report noted, only 44% of pupils leaving primary schools in 1919 went on to secondary schools and of these only 25% attended beyond their first year.

the relevant language curriculum. Interest in studying the French language at tertiary level appears disproportionately small compared to that at secondary level, thus suggesting that French language study at school was undertaken as part of a balanced if not obligatory requirement within the syllabus, rather than through any inherent interest in the topic. Schoolboy Reuel Lochore's notebook of French words has 'hippogriffe' as the first word on the first page, but it also includes translations for 'le pâtre', 'le toison', 'laver', 'filer' and 'tisser', suggesting some attempt had been made to give the language colloquial relevance through a connection with the production and processing of wool. The 1929 Education Department Report drew attention to the smaller number of pupils taking French (although 87.7% of boys and 86.2% of girls were still studying the language) and speculated that Latin would 'possibly (be) a little more useful' as it provided the root of many English words.⁴⁰

There was considerable emphasis in the school syllabus on the various factors that had contributed to the Allied victory in the First World War.⁴¹ While the superiority of the white races over all others was an inherent part of the mind-set, it was the racial divide between the British and the 'others' within the white races, demonstrated through the political coherence of the British and the Empire, that had made the difference. Since so few of the pupils progressed beyond primary level these messages were necessarily targeted at a younger, impressionable cohort. During the war a failure to openly accept oaths of loyalty, salute the flag or otherwise publicly demonstrate one's patriotism could lead to ostracism or even prosecution, until Ormond Burton's famous refusal to accept

⁴⁰ "Report Of The Minister Of Education For The Year Ending 31st December, 1921. Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives, 1922 Session," p.31. "Education: Primary And Post-Primary Education. [In continuation of E.-2 of 1937. Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives, 1938 Session." 90% of boys and 93% of girls were reported as taking French. Pupils studying Latin still numbered less than half the total taking French because Latin (by the Department's own admission) offered 'fewer practical advantages.' By 1937 French levels had fallen to 61% for girls and 51% for boys. "Report Of The Minister Of Education For The Year Ending 31st December, 1922. [In continuation of E.-1, 1922.] Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives, 1923 Session," pp.31, 46-47. More than 80% of secondary pupils were still taking French in the following year. At University College level just 384 students out of 3,683 had included French in their course of study. "Education: Secondary Education. [In Continuation Of E.-6, 1929.] Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives, 1930 Session," (1930), pp.2, 6. Reuel Anson Lochore, "French and English word lists," (Wellington, New Zealand: Alexander Turnbull Library, 1928-1986).

⁴¹ Rosemary Bingham Carol Mutch, Lynette Kingsbury, Maria Perreau, "Political indoctrination through myth building: The New Zealand School Journal at the time of World War 1," *Curriculum Matters*, no. 14 (2018). New Zealand's syllabus was strongly biased towards a pro-empire stance with all that this implied for a reflected - if unmentioned - version of France.

the oath led to change.⁴² Remnants of this indoctrination still survive today in the military displays used to open significant sporting events as well as through resistance to changing a national flag which still includes the Union Jack.⁴³ Although no longer recognised for their British origins, such ceremonies and symbols show how embedded the Empire became and how entangled the identity of Britishness was with being a New Zealander to the necessary exclusion of the 'others'. Opinions of France in New Zealand were consequently a product of unstructured reading (from whatever source) and formal education (such as it may have been) supplemented with information from popular fiction and personal experiences before and during the war which reinforced the Empire's default anti-French bias.

A common trope in New Zealand's biographical political historiography is the description of the self-made success – often applied to politicians – who compensated for a lack of formal education through their own extensive reading.⁴⁴ This well-meant praise does not acknowledge the widely differing sources the self-schooled may have been exposed to, especially at a time when secondary education was far from universal. Because this unstructured reading included a multitude of sources from a wide variety of political viewpoints, individual knowledge of France in the pre-war New Zealand polity was a synthesis of historical 'facts' and fiction acquired through the adapted British education system (or directly from it for those who had been schooled in the United Kingdom), from books and from newspapers. For that reason, there was no common understanding of pre-war France. The resulting (predominantly British

⁴² Openshaw, "Contradiction and contestation: Public education in the interwar period," pp.91-93; "The Highest Expression of Devotion: New Zealand Primary- Schools and Patriotic Zeal during the Early 1920s," *History of Education* 9, no. 4 (1980): pp.343-344, 341.

⁴³ The Electoral Commission, "Second Referendum on the New Zealand Flag: Final Result," https://www.electionresults.govt.nz/2016_flag_referendum2/.

⁴⁴ McNeill, "Labouring Feeling: Harry Holland's Political Emotions," footnote 50. "The clippings filed in Holland's papers at the Turnbull— containing Communist papers, Christian articles, independent socialist publications and more from across the world—give some sense of his eclectic range: ATL MS-Papers-1815-11".

Patrick O'Farrell, "Holland, Henry Edmund," in *Dictionary of New Zealand Biography* (1996).; Barry Gustafson, "Massey, William Ferguson," in *Dictionary of New Zealand Biography* (1993 updated 2013).; Michael Bassett, "Ward, Joseph George," in *Dictionary of New Zealand Biography* (1993). All make the same point. Holland showed 'the marks of a self-taught mind: the compilation of a massive amount of knowledge without selective rigour or analytic penetration'. Although Massey attended a 'private secondary school' he possessed 'an impressive library indicative of his wide reading'. Ward was similarly described as 'read widely throughout his life and (in) his retentive memory stored a broad general knowledge'.

sourced) pre-war knowledge was consequently inconsistent and arguably historically inaccurate both in matters of fact and in interpretation when compared with recent academic writing about France.

1.3 *Temporary warriors and war time tourists: New Zealand's soldiers in France and Britain*

World War I was New Zealand's first direct, large-scale exposure to France since the initial competitive colonial period (approximately 1820-1840) and the religious competition that followed. Negative perceptions of the French had been sustained through the extensive reporting of the Dreyfus affair, the Fashoda incident and news of the brutal suppression of the indigenous population of Algeria.⁴⁵ Entering a war in an alliance with the French was a jarring inconsistency with these sentiments. If the proposition had been presented to the New Zealand electorate without the background of the *entente cordiale* and the British link, it is questionable whether many of the public would have seen common cause with France. The 1914-18 wartime alliance was therefore a significant change. The experience that the New Zealanders acquired both first hand and indirectly from the war, suggested there was a considerable irreconcilable dissonance between the France of the past and the present.

There are at least four distinct narratives that describe France of 1914-18 from a New Zealand viewpoint. Initially the apparently independent, unbiased and non-fictional Government-sponsored histories did much to shore up the official version of events. These were often treated as unchallengeable in the inter-war years.⁴⁶ A second version

⁴⁵ Watts, "Why, when the image of the French in the New Zealand Press 1900-1914 was a divided one, did New Zealand enter World War I allied to France?"

⁴⁶ James Allen, "Allen to Massey 14 May 1918," in *Miscellaneous files and papers - Allen and WF Massey correspondence 1st September - 1st August 1919* (Archives New Zealand), pp.3-4. ; "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.185: 19th Parliament 6th session," (1919), p.162. Allen reported to Massey that Cabinet was considering asking families to send letters, diaries and other records for later used by an 'editor.' Allen clearly favoured the fallen hero genre as he suggested that Fitchett who had written 'Deeds that won the Empire' would be a suitable chronicler. Another suggested author was Canterbury academic Professor Stewart as he 'has seen service in Gallipoli and France'. Mr Seddon (Westland) queried Government policy as far as the conservation and exhibition of films and pictures taken in France and elsewhere for patriotic and other purposes was concerned and asked who was to be in charge of their preservation. "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.186: 20th Parliament 1st session," (1920), p.854. There was political pressure to get these official versions into the public domain. Tom Seddon the Westland MP's query to Sir R H Rhodes, the Minister of Defence on 13 September 1920 revealed that Col. Hugh Stewart's *The New Zealanders in France* was already 'with the printers.'

came from the soldiers' own wartime correspondence which gave a more direct description of day-to-day events. In many cases these appeared less than forthright on the realities of the wartime conditions.⁴⁷ Third is the soldiers' edited wartime experiences as re-interpreted by historians such as Harper, Tolerton *et al*, but influenced by the new reality which Paul Fussell brought to the genre. Finally, there is the almost sacred first-hand family account, that of the taciturn, perhaps shell-shocked veteran and his kin who carried the memory-legend in some cases as an infrequently mentioned personal experience. This version was an acceptable part of the New Zealand stereotypical male as seen in Jock Phillips' *A man's country? This Mark I New Zealand man of colonial settler heritage was expected to show stoic acceptance of difficult circumstances, not rebellion. This image in particular was perpetuated through the collective World War I experience as recounted by the returning soldiers.*⁴⁸

1.4 *Official histories*

The first of these genres – the official accounts produced in the immediate post-war years – attempted to give a factual interpretation of events in France while sometimes drawing on the first-hand experiences of their respective authors.⁴⁹ Although now seen

⁴⁷ Fussell, *The Great War and modern memory*: p.7. Showing fear was an ever-present risk, as Paul Fussell highlighted when exploring the truths that are concealed when war stories are retold. (Fussell quotes Sassoon's poem *The Hero* with its reference to "gallant lies" told to cover for a "cold footed, useless swine" of a son to make his point). The binary contrast between hero and coward allowed no middle ground in the public imagination.

Doing battle : the making of a skeptic, 1st ed. (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1996); *The Great War and modern memory*. Jock Phillips, *A man's country? The image of the pakeha male: a history* (Auckland: Penguin, 1987). The soldiers' own letters were understated through censorship and the soldiers' wish to reassure those at home. The importance of censorship, both official (in letters) and self-imposed (continued once home) must be acknowledged, as should the convenient protection this self-imposed taciturnity gave from the fear of describing fear. It was better to say nothing than to admit to having shown fear or acted in anything less than a gallant and heroic manner. Phillips' kiwi-bloke masculinity has come to typify the rugged, taciturn individuality of the inter-war years' male.

⁴⁸ Harper, *Letters from the battlefield : New Zealand soldiers write home, 1914-18*, p.14.; Phillips, *A man's country? The image of the pakeha male: a history*: p.203; Clarke, *After the war : the RSA in New Zealand*: pp.13-16.

⁴⁹ "New Zealand in the First World War," Victoria University, <http://nzetc.victoria.ac.nz/tm/scholarly/tei-corpus-WH1.html>. These notes are applicable to the inter-war period but they omit the more recent (post-2015) centennial publications: 'Unlike after the Second World War, no wide-ranging account of New Zealand's participation in the First World War was prepared at the end of that conflict. Only four official volumes were published (1919-1923), and they were written by senior officers who had fought in the campaigns (Gallipoli, Sinai/Palestine, Western Front) but who generally had no training as historians. Although providing detailed accounts of the fighting on the battlefields itself, they did not describe New Zealand during the war, its economy, politics or society, and the home-defence and patriotic efforts, New Zealanders in the naval or air war, and those serving with other British or Australian forces are not included.

to be of limited scope as secondary sources, these volumes have assumed close to primary source status in their own right as contemporary versions of military reporting. When they were first published they did receive some muted criticism. *The General History* dealing with the three campaigns of 'Gallipoli (including Egypt), France and Sinai-Palestine' was described as "... tolerant and fair, devoid of extravagance and criticism; they are plain, well written and accurate narratives that deserve a high place in the Dominion's literature". Sir Guy Powells' contribution, *The Story of Two Campaigns* dealing with the events in Gallipoli-Egypt received critical approval. The volume on France was however characterised as "not an easy book to read", while *The Auckland Regiment* history caused outright discomfort. It was severely criticised for including Mr Burton's 'unjust criticism'. Descriptions of drunkenness, cowardice and incompetence amongst the troops were not considered appropriate subjects at the time of publication. These were 'harsh and irrelevant statements' according to the reviewer (J. H. Luxford), but the substance was not directly challenged.⁵⁰ Too much reality created the same dilemma as that in Marryat's early fiction. The factual account had to be adjusted to suit audience perceptions and sensitivities.

1.5 *Contemporary accounts: letters, postcards and oral histories*

The personal accounts from the young men of New Zealand who volunteered in 1914 provide an alternative source. The enlistees had what would have seemed to be a one-off chance to tour the old world.⁵¹ They were optimistic, as young people about to travel are, and they had widespread public support when they left. Many were sightseers disguised as soldiers giving an example of military-led mass tourism.⁵² Those who served in France brought with them an assimilated legacy – that set of beliefs and truths used to fill gaps in human knowledge – that while not overtly Francophobic did not extend

Despite this, the four official histories became accepted sources for New Zealand's military effort in the Great War, and have never been updated or superseded'.

The last comment should be read in the context of the qualification implied by 'official' and in the knowledge that there are more recent publications (see bibliography).

⁵⁰ "Regimental Histories," *New Zealand Herald*, 12 October 1922, p.9.

⁵¹ "New Zealand Parliamentary Debates 169: 18th Parliament 4th session July 22 - September 15," (Hansard, 1914), p.553. Their destination was presumed to be Europe but they were sent to the Middle East. There are extensive firsthand accounts still available. The New Zealand National Library website notes that 'We hold enormous heritage collections, and piles of existing research on the war, containing different experiences and perspectives.' These include 'diaries, letters, photographs, (and) archives'.

⁵² Crouzet, "*Problems of communication between Britain and France in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries*," pp.464-502.

to a collective embrace of the French nation.⁵³ It was their collective experience which was to shape their lives and to influence other New Zealanders' views of France in the inter-war years. As is the case with sightseers in general, the soldier-tourists had a firm idea of what they wanted to see when they set off and France was not the main attraction. Although sent to the Middle East, when they did travel on to Europe it was their idealised homeland, 'blighty', they wanted to visit.⁵⁴ Some leave was taken in France, but the men looked forward to visiting the United Kingdom every eighteen months or so.⁵⁵ Moreover, many would still have had intergenerational relatives there, only once or twice removed. Parents and grandparents no doubt urged the young soldiers to visit an imagined and perhaps idealised Home.⁵⁶ France was therefore a lesser, local alternative; Britain was the main event.

The post-war images of France for those who had not served were a fusion of the stories from these soldiers, wartime newspaper reports, propaganda and whatever personal correspondence or official accounts they had read. This was the heroic version which came to be commemorated anecdotally and symbolically. The symbolism manifests in the profusion of monuments, halls, parks and buildings which still dominate many of New Zealand's smaller towns and provincial centres. These have survived long after (in some cases) the local population has shrunk to a fraction of its former size.

The anecdotes were contained in the postcards, letters, memorabilia and selected images of the landscape images sent home from France by New Zealand writers. Understandably much of this material concerned the individual writer's wellbeing and nostalgic memories of home, rather than France. When they went on leave however, these soldiers functioned as tourists. Tourists tend to see and write about the same things because that is what they seek out; hence they view the images they expected to

⁵³ Watts, "Why, when the image of the French in the New Zealand Press 1900-1914 was a divided one, did New Zealand enter World War I allied to France?"

⁵⁴ This is not to understate the importance of the Gallipoli narrative in New Zealand's war histories but most New Zealanders served in France.

⁵⁵ Harper, *Johnny Enzed: the New Zealand soldier in the First World War 1914-1918*: pp.1056-7, 1065; A. Maguire, "Looking for home? New Zealand soldiers visiting London during the first world war," *London Journal* 41, no. 3 (2016).

⁵⁶ Barnes, *New Zealand's London: A Colony and its Metropolis*: pp.54-55.; Siegfried, Stewart, and Hamer, *Democracy in New Zealand*: pp.358-359.

observe.⁵⁷ An initial layer of filtering occurred when the historians selected source material, for the historians predominantly chose material associated with the progress of the war, the location of the sender and the soldiers' day to day experiences. *Just to let you know I'm still alive*, Reddiex's work on the use of the postcard format contains '...examples of the type of postcards that were in circulation and used by New Zealanders during the First World War'.⁵⁸ If these are representative examples (rather than the selections at the author's whim) then it seems virtually all the images were military related – uniforms, trenches and equipment predominate. There are virtually no scenes of France, urban or rural. The landscape, apart from military engineered structures and indistinct topographical features, would have been indiscernible from the postcards. The soldiers' immediate surroundings were apparently mud, trenches, barbed wire, trapped horses and guns. It could have been anywhere in the world. Cowan's written descriptions are similar. France is simply the setting for the war.⁵⁹

The reader of these sources could mistakenly conclude that all of France was a war zone whereas 'the front' was a relatively narrow strip measured in yards, not miles which bisected a geographically-huge country. While there was a heightened awareness that France was the scene of a catastrophic event, questions remain about the communication between returning soldiers and those who remained at home. An exchange with the cruelly-punished pacifist Archibald Baxter exemplifies the lack of communication which probably influenced societal attitudes in the inter-war years:

"And you were in France?

Yes, I was in France

How lovely for you to get a chance to see all those places. I believe France is a very beautiful Country.

Yes, it was lovely for me"⁶⁰

⁵⁷ Crouzet, "Problems of communication between Britain and France in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries," p.472 This has always been the case: the visitor goes to Egypt to see the pyramids, to Venice to see the canals and to Rome to see the forum and the Vatican.

⁵⁸ Reddiex, *Just to let you know I'm still alive : postcards from New Zealanders during the First World War*: p.8. Enthusiasm for collecting and using postcards coincided with the war years. Being unsealed, they were easy for the censors to read. A limited writing space may have been an advantage for the sender who in many cases (one suspects) wanted to say as little as possible about their immediate situation.

⁵⁹ Cowan and New Zealand Maori Regimental Committee, *The Maoris in the great war : a history of the New Zealand Native Contingent and Pioneer Battalion, Gallipoli, 1915 France and Flanders, 1916-1918*.

⁶⁰ Penny Griffith, *Out of the Shadows: The life of Millicent Baxter* (Wellington: PenPublishing, 2015). p.96. Quoted from: *We Will Not Cease*, Archibald Baxter, p.185

There was another version of France which explains this discrepancy. The postcards in Lieutenant Horopapera Karauti's collection - presumably pre-approved and mass produced - include war-damaged, post-combat landscapes.⁶¹ Others postcards show well-fed and clothed soldiers inspecting the destruction. There are no bodies or obvious wounds or fresh graves.⁶² The viewer is drawn to the conclusion that the French civil and religious infrastructure had been badly damaged by enemy activity with minimal human injury. The reproductions are grainy black and white prints which imply reality and gravity.

⁶¹ Horopapera Karauti, "French post cards," (Alexander Turnbull Library, 1917-1918). N.B. I have been unable to obtain permission for reproduction of this series. They are included for the thesis Examiners' use.

⁶² Greg Hynes, "Picturing the empire: Enduring imperial perceptions and depictions in British first world war photographic propaganda," in *Endurance and the First World War : Experiences and Legacies in New Zealand and Australia*, ed. David Monger, Sarah Murray, and Katie Pickles (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars, 2014), pp.231-2. Powerful propaganda came from images of German 'barbarity' through association with the destruction of cathedrals and churches. These contrasted with the 'moral, just masculinity' of the Empire troops who were shown alongside women and children.

Figure 7: “War damage” *Horopapera Karauti Collection*: French post cards (1917-1918) ATL

Another genre in Lieutenant Karauti's collection is labelled 'Boulogne-sur-mer'. These feature seaside scenes, including a gnarled looking fisherman (*Type de Pêcheur, left*) and a young woman in her Sunday best (*Une Boulonnaise Toilette de Ville, right*). There is no obvious evidence of war, nor is there any apparent distress.

Figure 8: "Seaside images" *Horopapera Karauti Collection: French post cards (1917-1918) ATL*

The viewer might easily believe that the sender had visited - perhaps while on leave - the French seaside and seen holiday makers and day-to-day French life much as it had always been. Some of these cards appear to have been photographed in black and white then coloured or tinted during the printing process to give a lighter touch, as was the practice before colour photography became common.


A third set of postcards in this collection straddles the first two. Whimsically labelled 'In the Field, Western Front, Somewhere in France' but with the telling sub-title 'Anniversaire' these are peaceful rural scenes. Typically, there are one or two trees in the foreground with flowers and green fields beyond; in the distance a faint reddish glow which may have represented the sunrise or the sunset or (more probably) a hint of an out of sight battle. No people are visible. The deliberate ambiguity leaves the interpretation to the viewer within the context of a generally peaceful, rural France. The dissonance between the current version of wartime France commonly displayed in

pictorial war histories, and this contemporary version presented without commentary provides a clue to the ambivalence surrounding France and the War and its consequences.

Figure 9: “An alternative view of France at war” *Horopapera Karauti Collection*: French post cards (1917-1918) ATL

There is an important caveat to apply to the soldiers’ contemporary descriptions (when compared with their later recollections). Douglas Wood’s letters to his sister provide a robust illustration. Apparently bland and uninteresting they include few mentions of France - apart from the weather - but they do contain detailed comments and advice on the domestic events that Woods had left behind. Perhaps less articulate than others, Woods would nonetheless have been alert to the strict admonishment on the envelopes to write only of ‘private and family matters,’ and that is what he did.

Figure 10: "Declaration regarding correspondence content" *Letters from Douglas Wood to his sister, Evelyn, ATL*



Given such a stern instruction enforced with the threat of military punishment and discipline as well as the difficulty for the less educated and articulate in describing a wholly new experience, it is unsurprising that many of the soldiers' private memoirs say little about France the country. The vast majority of the private soldiers were not trained observers, historians or scholars and they probably wanted to convey as little as possible of their own privations while continuing an involvement in matters at a home to which they hoped to shortly return. The content of many of the letters are therefore a direct result of these motivations reinforced by orders to discuss only permitted topics.⁶³

When W. P. Reeves gave his account of a visit across the channel during 1914 (the manuscript appears to have been subject to later editing as it includes the comment that this was 'early in the war' thus implying knowledge of later events), he commented upon the apparent emptiness, the silence, the absence of young men and the apparent inactivity. The young and the old were continuing daily life by taking on work which neither had anticipated doing in normal circumstances at this stage of their lives. Whereas many accounts from the serving soldiers mention activity, movement and

⁶³ Patrick Douglas Wood, "Letters from Douglas Wood to his sister, Evelyn," (Alexander Turnbull Library: Wellington, New Zealand, Jan-June 1917).

social interaction, Reeves' writing suggests an empty countryside devoid of people and action.

Soldiers on manoeuvres (like sports teams) typically travel in readily identifiable, socially self-contained groups. They interact with outsiders collectively rather than as individuals. Their observations unconsciously record the manner in which the local populations react to the presence of what to the locals appears to be a large group of self-sufficient strangers. Reeves' observations reflect his intellect and education as well as a less intrusive presence (to the extent he was in one incident suspected of being a spy). The influence from the bustle and disruption of massed troop movements are therefore absent from his observations. His comments give context to the soldiers' observations of French civilians or peasants going about their daily tasks with apparent disregard for the war.⁶⁴ Reading Reeves' account, it becomes apparent that the French civilians he saw were ineligible to serve by reason of age or gender. They were trying to maintain the domestic economy of a largely rural country as best they could. It was the soldiers who were the intruders. The soldiers' observations were those of the impromptu actor who stumbles into a live performance without the self-awareness of the role they were inadvertently playing. In that context the apparent indifference that the soldiers described was the day to day struggle for existence by a very stressed French civilian population who were probably resentful of any military disruption.

1.6 *Later, edited accounts of war*

Revisionist First World War historians such as Harper, Tolerton *et al* have created a new genre by reinterpreting a selection of the soldiers' first-hand accounts. Johnny Enzed, Harper's fictional, composite soldier, was aware of - and recorded - his observations of the French countryside as did Cecil Malthus, his non-fictional contemporary. Of the two, it was Malthus who savoured the French connection, and was to return in a civilian capacity.⁶⁵ Harper's Johnny Enzed enjoyed his leave in France and was '...careful not to abuse it'.⁶⁶ Despite favourable comments on the *estaminets* where soldiers enjoyed convivial company with food, drink and socializing, Johnny Enzed remained a stranger

⁶⁴ William Pember Reeves, "Account of a visit to France during World War One," (Wellington, New Zealand: Alexander Turnbull Library, [ca 1919]).

⁶⁵ "Travelling French Scholarship," *Oamaru Mail*, 28 July 1920, p.4.

⁶⁶ Harper, *Johnny Enzed: the New Zealand soldier in the First World War 1914-1918*: pp.739, 880, 940-2.

in a foreign land. He picked up French phrases (Malthus was already fluent in French), but Enzed had difficulty communicating with the local civilians. When recalling individual acts of kindness and hospitality on the part of French civilians the soldiers' descriptions imply that the warm welcome was unexpected and almost suggestive of an anticipated anti-New Zealand bias - based on their cultural identification with the British.⁶⁷ Predictably, those on leave in Paris visited the traditional tourist sites such as the *la tour Eiffel*, *la Place de la Concorde* and *l'Hôtel National des Invalides*. Apart from visits to Paris, and patronage of local food and drink outlets, interactions with the French seem to have been occasional - and more often than not - accidental rather than deliberate. Often these encounters resulted in misunderstandings or disruption to farming and other civilian activity. As one soldier put it, 'The French people were very good really - unless the troops did something silly'.⁶⁸

There is a surprising paucity of comment on contacts with serving French soldiers. The British and French fought the same war on the same side but, as Jenkins put it: 'The two sectors, due as much to the French taste for closed shutters as to British insularity, remained contiguous but almost hermetically sealed'. Sir Joseph Ward's claim that there was intermingling of the allied troops which did much to bring the allied nations into close association seems fanciful.⁶⁹ Accounts in letters home of interactions with the French are typically confined to civilian encounters on Sundays in town with beer, meals, and girls included; such carefree descriptions were presumably intended to make the front-line experience seem less traumatic. Writing from a war zone meant that these letters could only partially counter what Malthus refers to as the "piffle" of the war correspondents. As both a participant and an observer he recognised that the letters were for domestic reassurance rather than intended as a historical record. The less than frank newspaper accounts further ameliorated the description of trench warfare to an unpleasant but acceptable experience, with the well-intentioned aim of easing concerns

⁶⁷ Tolerton, *An awfully big adventure : New Zealand World War One veterans tell their stories*.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p.176. The tone suggests that this soldier recognised that he and his fellows were the intruders.

⁶⁹ Jenkins, *Churchill*: p.297.; "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.185: 19th Parliament 6th session," p.1393. Although this view has been challenged the case is unconvincing. Undoubtedly there were some close military related exchanges at the individual soldier level. See: Chris Kempshall, "My Heart Softened to the French ... All at Once I Loved Them?: The Entente Cordiale at the Somme," in *British, French and American Relations on the Western Front, 1914-1918* (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018).

at home.⁷⁰ The soldiers' edited descriptions should therefore be treated with circumspection as with any other source material.

1.7 *Legends in retrospect*

The returned taciturn Kiwi bloke, brought a new reality and a minimalist style to the trench warfare experience for family and close acquaintances.⁷¹ One can understand the resentment of Johnny Enzed when told that the real heroes were those buried in France, not the soldiers returning home.⁷² The recipients of this news were in the commonly accepted persona of the returned soldier unlikely to readily retell their own experiences anyway, but whether this was exaggerated by a wish to forget, or a perception that New Zealand people were not interested in hearing about the soldiers' real wartime experience, is unclear. In sporting circles, the New Zealand male commonly shares the adage that 'what goes on tour stays on tour' as an informal bond of confidentiality amongst comrades. This perhaps at least partially explains the reticence of the returning soldiers.

When (former All Black) Chris Laidlaw interviewed one of his successors as the national team captain (Anton Oliver) both men related a common experience, namely that national sports teams performed for their mates, not for the brand or the flag or the anthem.⁷³ Anton Oliver linked his All Black experience to that of his war veteran grandfather who had described wartime sentiments in terms similar to those in the sports team narrative. Like the national game, combat was a shared personal experience of a few comrades fighting for their lives (or in sport, for the game) whatever the hue of the uniform.⁷⁴ Both interviewer and interviewee agreed that the public did not understand this truth in sport and war, because nationalistic propaganda and sports advertising suggested exactly the opposite. The heroic status accorded the amateur-era

⁷⁰ Malthus, *Armentières and the Somme*: p.51, 57.

"New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.236: 24th Parliament 3rd session," (1933), p.188. Much later the war-wounded veteran Labour MP John A. Lee used embellished, anecdotal accounts such as his tale of throwing a bomb simply to stir things up, to add a hint of frivolity to the record.

⁷¹ Clarke, *After the war : the RSA in New Zealand*: p.15. The gap between the 'home and away' experience for the home coming soldiers led to 'awkward silences'.

⁷² Harper, *Johnny Enzed : the New Zealand soldier in the First World War 1914-1918*: p.1661.

⁷³ Anton Oliver, "Anton Oliver," in *Sunday Morning*, ed. Chris Laidlaw (Radio NZ Website2008).

⁷⁴ Malthus, *Armentières and the Somme*: p.7 Pugsley notes in his introduction that the private soldier, such as Malthus, wrote from the perspective of one soldier within a platoon of forty to fifty men. This limited perspective gives additional weight to, and understanding of, the private soldier's experience.

All Blacks in New Zealand culture sits awkwardly with the reality of their professional successors' financial motivation, because the official, commercialised version still draws on the image of a patriotic amateur player-soldier battling against professional opponents.

A similar sentiment - that the soldiers (at least in the early years) travelled to experience the world but then fought a very localised war of survival alongside their mates in France - was omitted from the official, patriotic legend of the returning soldiers. Just how much these sentiments influenced the children and grandchildren of that generation remains open to speculation. Equally questionable is the belief that the men understood the supposedly great cause for which they fought. Once in combat the men almost certainly fought for themselves and their companions' very survival.⁷⁵ The commemoration of the one hundredth anniversary of the war and the veneration accorded the Gallipoli campaign in the national psyche makes this dangerous ground for the historian who - even if not challenging the narrative - does not accept the one-dimensional, nationalistic interpretation. One possible conclusion is that it did not matter in what geography the war was fought, or what the geo-political objective was. The war could have been fought anywhere from New Zealand's point of view with much the same strategic plan, namely winning through attrition, as both the location and the involvement of France are coincidental not fundamental.

The role of New Zealand in supporting Britain and their shared, almost sacred Empire heritage was propagated in the everyday, public narrative as the cardinal reason for fighting battles in France. Accordingly, as described in the various cited works, the soldiers' visits to the British tourist sites in the Empire's heart became virtually obligatory. Britain was held in such regard that any discord with the idealised image attracted attention. At its most base level, the discovery that England had prostitution, poverty and a rigid class structure should not have come as a surprise.⁷⁶ Malthus noted the air pollution and crowding.⁷⁷ But if Britain was an idealised tourist destination and

⁷⁵ Harper, *Johnny Enzed : the New Zealand soldier in the First World War 1914-1918*: pp.1660-80.

⁷⁶ Maguire, "Looking for home? New Zealand soldiers visiting London during the first world war," p.291; Harper, *Johnny Enzed : the New Zealand soldier in the First World War 1914-1918*: p.1518-22; Malthus, *Armentières and the Somme*: p.130.

⁷⁷ *Armentières and the Somme*: p.33.

cultural museum, the French hinterland was the everyday weekend environment. France behind the lines was not a complete escape, but it was where one would expect to find food, drink and sexual adventure well away from England's imagined perfection, and even further from Johnny's memory of the 'frousy old wowsers' at home.⁷⁸ France was someone else's backyard to play in.

The tourists who returned to New Zealand from their regimented, packaged tour had seen - as soldiers do - much that they did not want to see; still less that they wanted to recall and retell. When the returnees re-met those they had left behind, the common ground they returned to was their last mutually shared memory at the time of departing, as is the case for returning holiday-makers or expatriates when repatriated. There was a new reality and thereby a defining disconnect caused by separate experiences and growing apart. The suppression of memories in order to reintegrate into daily life became part of the identity of those who had first-hand knowledge of the conflict. In the absence of their account it was the physical memorials, the political platitudes and wishy-washy ANZAC Day sentiment that filled the gap in the narrative. The questioning of returning servicemen followed a line of enquiry more appropriately directed to a returning holiday-maker: 'How was it?' Possibly because the ex-servicemen had acquired an image as men who drank and had seen 'vice', more detailed questions were not asked - or were only asked privately. Many veterans simply wanted to get on with the rest of their lives. Their responses were consequently taciturn thus leaving an information deficit for those curious to know what had really happened 'overseas'.⁷⁹

In 1917 France had been desperately awaiting American intervention to save her (and her Allies) from potential defeat. The volatility and changeability of the French political circumstances - explained by Maurice Agulhon as the essence of being French even in a time of conflict - had erupted as a major threat to the war effort. The 1917 strikes and

⁷⁸ Harper, *Johnny Enzed: the New Zealand soldier in the First World War 1914-1918*: p.988; John A Lee, *Civilian into soldier* (London England: May Fair Books, 1963). Lee establishes a hierarchy of womanhood from the lowly occupants of the brothels in Egypt, via the "French slattern" (less than ideal) to the purity of the English girl. The over-used 'frousy old wowser' cliché was probably meant to describe a plain but disciplined, morally upright mumsy-like matriarchal figure. In the literal meaning the juxtaposition of 'frousy' - meaning a dirty or unclean female - with 'wowser', implying abstention from alcohol use, appears odd.

⁷⁹ Tolerton, *An awfully big adventure: New Zealand World War One veterans tell their stories*, pp.13-14; Clarke, *After the war: the RSA in New Zealand*: pp.13-16. The real stories were probably shared in the pubs and the RSA bars but these were usually inaccessible to the historians and politicians.

mutinies amongst the French seemed for some to be omens of another French Revolution. Agulhon justifies these rebellions as less than such because they did not take place in the front line. Likewise, the increasing number of desertions were (in his view) simply typically Gallic demonstrativeness.⁸⁰ It is a distinction that no military force could accept in a time of war, and the uprisings were dealt with for what they were - mutiny. New Zealand's battlefield heroism in 1917, so often portrayed as a futile waste, was part of a desperately needed diversion to relieve the pressure until discipline was restored amongst the French. This version of history was a poor fit with the narrative of New Zealand's support for a heroic, besieged ally.

Commenting on these events, W. H. Triggs (a Member of the New Zealand Legislative Council from Canterbury who had visited post-war France) described the terrain where the New Zealanders had fought as a muddy morass, notwithstanding the drought conditions prevailing when he visited. Even though Triggs was apparently letting the facts speak for themselves, he was adjusting his narrative to suit a received historical description which contradicted his personal observations. The muddy terrain explanation suited the World War I image of the battlefield conditions as a mitigating factor in the failure of the 1917 offensives, even as Triggs' own experience (obvious though it was) implied that an attack could have been advantageously delayed until the weather conditions improved. Moreover, the use of a Victorian-Edwardian narrative of futile but brave self-sacrifice helped divert attention from the point of the battle. Triggs lauded the New Zealanders' effort at Passchendaele and commented that although they had failed to achieve their primary objective, their action was 'absolutely essential' at the time because it relieved pressure on the French Front.⁸¹ The significance of these comments does not appear to have been appreciated by the Legislative Council. Triggs' assessment seems to be the only public recognition in the immediate post-war New Zealand parliamentary record of just how close run the war's outcome had been owing

⁸⁰ Agulhon, *The French Republic, 1879-1992*: pp.168-169.; Kempshall, "*Careless Disasters: Allied Relations in 1918*." Kempshall also discusses the clash between political opinion and democratic rights in wartime conditions. The French, he claims, wanted to hold on until the American's arrived, rather than attempt to win and risk defeat.

⁸¹ "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.185: 19th Parliament 6th session," p.1370 ; J.P.T. Bury, *France, 1814-1940* (Methuen, 1969). pp.247-250. Exactly which of the 1917 battles Bury was referring to is unclear but this was a period within which both the French military and political leadership changed as failure to win the war undermined French morale. The British Empire troops carried the load while the French re-grouped.

to the lack of resolve within the army of the key protagonist, France. France owed much to the fortitude of her allies when her own will was ebbing.⁸²

Had such been made explicit at the time, the post-war attitude of France's allies would presumably have assumed a very different tone, but the matter was successfully suppressed and left in abeyance, apart from this brief mention. Thus, New Zealand's France emerged from this version of the war with a largely unscathed reputation. Nevertheless, although France was the victim, she remained an arms-length military ally because there was little or no meaningful direct connection between the New Zealand and the French, whether military or civilian. In that respect the New Zealand soldiers replicated the standard tourist experience. The New Zealanders saw the sights (both the historical edifices and the battles in which they fought) but they did not experience France in the context of the political strain and disruption to local life beyond the weekend hospitality which was in any case probably adjusted to suit their needs. They did not appear to appreciate the significance of their military engagements within the broader context of the war, nor did they interpret the war in its broader context within European affairs. The version of France they brought back to New Zealand was therefore easily assimilated into the existing histories.

1.8 *Outcomes and implications*

What followed was an attempt to place France in the past and enshrine it as a sanitised place of memorial. First however, the memories had to be dealt with. During their visits to England the New Zealanders had acquired some experience of the British class-based traditions and rituals used for post-conflict commemoration. Hoock's discussion of various memorials - especially those in St Paul's - draws attention to the imagery employed and who was commemorated. Burial within the cathedral was reserved for the military leaders, not the common soldiers.⁸³ The example of honouring a common

⁸² Jean-Jacques Becker, *The Great War and the French people*, trans. Arnold Pomerans (Oxford: Berg Publishers, 1985). p.325. France held, according to Becker, because 'the national fabric was too firm'. Even people who may have wanted revolution realized this was not the time and the population would not allow it. A deep sense of nationhood - France had been a nation too long to blow apart - meant that despite the weaknesses of low population growth, war damage and a 'vague sense of resignation' in the last year of the war, France held.

⁸³ Hoock, "Monumental Memories: state commemoration of the Napoleonic wars in early nineteenth-century Britain."

soldier was not unfamiliar in France, however. New Zealand readers of the *Evening Post* of 9 November 1929 would have seen a description of *La Tour D'Auvergue*, the soldier whose name is still called on ceremonial occasions by the Forty-sixth Regiment and whose heart is in the Chapel of St Gregory under the 'Dome of the Invalides' (sic) where Napoleon 'sleeps'.⁸⁴ In contrast, Hooock believes that in pre-World War I Britain - even where death and commemoration was concerned - there was unease regarding possible disturbance to the English class system if lower ranked participants were buried amongst the elite. Moreover, the bodies of those who died mutilated or wounded were depicted in a perfect image, such as that used for Captain Rundell Burgess in St. Paul's who is represented as a near naked, classical figure. The usually male subjects appear with females in support or as angels alongside Britannia as a maternal figure.⁸⁵

After access fees were finally abolished in 1851 (for the Great Exhibition) these images were more widely viewed. How many New Zealand soldiers saw them and the adjacent tombs of Wellington and Nelson in St. Paul's and were thus influenced by the treatment of the elite in comparison with the French treatment of *La Tour D'Auvergue* and the dead from the British lower ranks remains speculative.⁸⁶ Whatever the case, the image of restored perfection after death became embedded in the post-war ideal through the neat rows of crosses prepared for those at home who never saw the battlefield realities. For years to come the ubiquity of service in France was likewise unpretentiously and seamlessly embedded in New Zealand's past.

⁸⁴ "A Heart's New Home," *Evening Post*, 9 November 1929, p.22. Although he regular refused promotion, this Napoleon-favoured hero was an officer rather than a common soldier. His ancestry was probably subject to post hoc adjustment to make him appear to have joined the army as a private soldier and then receive a commission on merit.

⁸⁵ These images are reminiscent of the medieval cadaver tombs or transi tombs but without the representation of the decaying cadaver.

⁸⁶ Hooock, *Monumental Memories: state commemoration of the Napoleonic wars in early nineteenth-century Britain*, pp.202-204.

Figure 11: 1935 Obituary Notice: *Evening Post*

OBITUARY
MR. WILLIAM MACKAY
(By Telegraph.—Press Association.)
CHRISTCHURCH, This Day
The death has occurred of Mr. William Mackay, aged 46, manager of the grain department of the Canterbury Seed Company. He was a prominent member of the Chamber of Commerce and treasurer of St. Paul's Presbyterian Church. He was born in Invercargill and served in France with the artillery.

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This cleansing isolated the war in France as if it had been a tragic and unavoidable event beyond local control, a task relatively easily achieved because the wartime contemporary newspaper reports, the soldiers' later accounts and the official post-war histories did not give a complete and frank account of the battlefield realities. Nor were the military problems France faced in 1917-1918 acknowledged. Downplaying or ignoring the broader challenges that post-war France faced was part of a process which simplified the task of leaving France, but it necessarily restricted any post-war contemplation and reconsideration. New Zealand's world view was therefore blinkered and restricted within a corridor of limited options.

⁸⁷ "Obituary," *Evening Post*, 8 April 1935, p.9..

2. Reparation and repatriation - Versailles and beyond

Articles published immediately after the War ended featured three broad categories. Politics and Law dominated with about one third of the items reflecting the world's difficulty in dealing with the unresolvable legal and reparations issue. The consequences spilled into the Economic field with the first of what proved to be two pulses of interest peaking at about 20% of the articles in 1921. (The 1930s depression is covered in Chapter 5). The poignancy of the human damage was measured in the attention given to Death, etiquette, diplomacy and cultural customs that consistently made up about 10% of the topics.

* * * *

The absence of a consistent policy to guide New Zealand's post-war relationship with France, apart from the tactical imperative of assisting the British, originated with the lack of any clearly stated wartime objectives. Any claims of victory or specific achievement were therefore unverifiable, thus giving credibility to those making the "waste-and-futility" argument. While this shortcoming could be concealed during the war behind a plethora of appeals to patriotic duty and the need to contribute to the Empire's defence, once the war ended the Massey Government was politically exposed. Three interlocking post-war policies were developed in response. These were aspirational rather than practical, they lacked clarity and they were frequently contradictory. This was because the policies depended on the self-imposed condition of aligning with Britain's own changing priorities. Since these New Zealand policies were never coherently and consistently articulated, they can only be deduced from Government actions and statements.

The first objective - typically described in generic phrases such as 'the war to end all wars' or 'never again' - was to symbolically leave Europe with all its apparently insoluble political problems by claiming the war had been won and the issues which led to it were resolved. It followed that France as the main location of the conflict could similarly be consigned to history, while due respect was given to those who had died there. This objective required sensitively curtailing the grieving and homage for the dead who remained in France - a delicate path to tread - for it required re-directing attention towards the future without appearing insensitive to the human losses in France or implying they were pointless.

The second objective was therefore to localise the commemoration and idealisation of the war by quickly erecting local replicas of the memorials located in France. This (it

was hoped) would distance France by placing it in the past rather than in the present as a potential place of pilgrimage, continual retrospection and reassessment.

The third objective was to reinforce New Zealand's role as an essential producer of food for Britain. If the British economy came to rely on Empire-sourced food, as it had during the war – rather than relying on more conveniently obtained French or other European supplies – Britain would have an interest in New Zealand's future prosperity. Moreover the Empire could become a self-contained community. Britain would then have an interest in defending the ocean supply routes used to transport the produce rather than bothering with Europe's problems. Quickly resettling the ex-soldiers on small (usually dairy) farms would also create a cohort of hard working, family orientated, small business-minded Reform voters. The debt owed to the returned servicemen would be re-paid while New Zealand's future as a primary produce-generating nation would be secured. The New Zealand Government's actions are reassessed in this chapter within these broad aims.

2.1 Escaping Europe's problems

The Treaty of Versailles has not become a significant feature of the New Zealand histories between 1918-1935. It has instead been variously viewed as the marker that formally ended the First World War, a document of unfulfilled promises which led to World War II (typically attributed to the failure of the United States to ratify the Treaty), and a redundant peculiarity with little apparent long-term local significance.¹ This last merits a challenge. The scant mention of the Treaty in the Sinclair and King histories, and its absence from more recent multi-topic volumes such as the Rachael Bell edited volume *New Zealand Between the Wars* perpetuates the view that the 1919 Paris Peace Conference had little direct relevance for New Zealand. This is partly due to the apparently subservient posture adopted by New Zealand within the British Empire delegation at the time the Treaty was negotiated, alongside a general desire to re-build a British dependency in the South Pacific, deliberately-isolated from Europe's problems. Such sentiments were wishful thinking. The location of the 1919 Peace Conference in Paris demonstrated the extent of French global influence. A unique opportunity to

¹ United Kingdom Government, "Versailles Peace Treaty - 1919," (Archives New Zealand, 1919). New Zealand's copy, fittingly unmarked and in pristine condition is filed without supplementary notes or explanation in the National Archive, suggesting that it was never viewed as a working document.

shape events was recognised as such by France and therefore seized. Much of the world – not least the New Zealanders – ignored the implications, while metaphorically checking their timetables and glancing at their watches in anticipation of getting back into their home time zones, literally as well as in sentiment. The very fact of seeking independence and remaining free from international entanglements while continuing as an active participant in the British Empire was, however, a paradoxical quest.

The New Zealand histories of the war settlement conference and its immediate outcome typically bypass the broader international consequences of the peace process as if they were of little concern to New Zealand. Richard Kray's work stands as an exception to this generalisation.² From the extensive volume of New Zealand newspaper reporting related to Versailles and the stance of France in particular, it seems that contemporary New Zealand viewed the Versailles agreement as both a symbolic end to further direct involvement in European politics and - when the Anglo-French Guarantee Treaty of 1919 failed - the end of any obligation to support France.³ Massey's New Zealand nevertheless tried to withdraw into the collective fold of the Empire while repatriating the heroic memories from France and leaving the political consequences of the unfortunate war in Europe where they had occurred. These impractical and unachievable aims consequently became the default stance of New Zealand's French policy between 1918-35.

New Zealand's position was in fact more nuanced than the cited histories imply. Wartime objectives, the military outcome and the future of Europe were inseparable from issues surrounding the treatment of the returned soldiers, construction of

² Watson and Paterson, *A great New Zealand prime minister? : reappraising William Ferguson Massey*; James Watson, "'The greatest commercial traveller in the Empire': Massey and Trade," in *A great New Zealand prime minister? : reappraising William Ferguson Massey*, ed. James Watson and Lachy Paterson (Dunedin, N.Z.: Otago University Press, 2011). Kray, *Caging the Prussian Dragon: New Zealand and the Paris Peace Conference 1919.*; Sinclair, *A History of New Zealand*; King, *The Penguin History of New Zealand*; Bell, *New Zealand between the wars*. Neither Sinclair nor King make any substantive comment on the Versailles Treaty. James Watson's biography of William Massey and the various specialist studies covering significant concurrent events such as soldier re-settlement, the influenza epidemic and the prohibition debate have only passing references to Versailles.

³ United Kingdom Government, "Anglo-French Treaty (Defence of France) Act, 1919," (Archives New Zealand, 1919). Antony Lentin, "The Treaty that Never Was: Lloyd George and the French Connection, 1919," in *Lloyd George and the Lost Peace: From Versailles to Hitler, 1919—1940* (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2001); "'Une Aberration Inexplicable?' Clemenceau and the Abortive Anglo-French Guarantee Treaty of 1919," *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 8, no. 2 (1997). New Zealand's copy of this Treaty is archived without comment or explanation.

memorials and graveyards, the future of the Empire and domestic political concerns in New Zealand's post-war years. Moreover, the societal and political differences that had been partially left in abeyance for the duration of the war re-emerged, in part because France sought to achieve her own post-war aims with the backing of New Zealand and the other allies through the Versailles Treaty and attendant security guarantees. These issues dominated New Zealand-French diplomacy in the immediate post-war years. The French position relied on maintaining a belligerent hostility towards Germany, a stance which left the allies divided and in politically difficult positions. Punishment of - and extracting reparation payments from - Germany and her allies became the headline under which these differences were debated. The thousands of publications devoted to the reparations issue will not be re-examined here as the central issue is the New Zealand public's knowledge of events, and how the actions of France affected those perceptions as the topic ebbed and flowed in the local news.⁴ For New Zealand, a seat alongside France on the victors' side of the table presented a unique opportunity. Just what stance would most advantageously benefit New Zealand in the long-term was less obvious. It seems that *carpe diem* was the chosen course.

Claims of victory when the war ended did not justify the hubris that followed, particularly because New Zealand had not 'won' anything. Until America intervened in the later years of the war, France and her allies had been very close to defeat. New Zealand had been part of a coalition that had with American assistance achieved a position sufficiently dominant to temporarily thwart Germany, thus forcing an end to the fighting. Nothing was resolved as far as the traditional Franco-German antagonism was concerned. The evidence for the fragility of the victory claim was exposed when France made a determined effort to retain her wartime alliances, not least because an unallied France was in no condition to enter another conflict with Germany. It was therefore extremely difficult to establish a case for New Zealand to help or even work alongside post-war France without a common understanding of the objectives of the war and what had been achieved. Moreover, any hint that there was some legitimacy in Germany's pre-war stance or in her arguments against the imposed post-war conditions

⁴ A search of the JSTOR article database found 6,586 published articles but only a fraction are recent i.e. published within the last five years.

(it was not a mutual agreement as the word ‘treaty’ implies) exposed the weakness in France’s post-war position and so were fiercely resisted.

The diversity in the New Zealand politicians’ opinions show that the point of the war was unclear. None of the following comments are necessarily contradictory - nor are they particularly controversial in isolation - but collectively they expose the differences of opinion and thus partially explain the lack of coherence in New Zealand’s relationship with France once the war ended. J. P. Luke (Reform, Wellington North) referred on 10 April 1918 to those who had survived Gallipoli and were now in France ‘... fighting for you and for me and for the cause of humanity’, but what the ‘cause of humanity’ meant and what relevance conflict in France had to do with it was not explained. Two days later C. J. Parr (also Reform, Eden) referred to ‘... whether the Empire is to stand or fall is being debated tonight in bitter battle in the fields of France, and with it the issue of whether this little country is to maintain its independence and be a portion of that great Empire’.⁵ In so doing he managed to assert both national independence and Empire membership, as if there was no contradiction between the two. Nor did he explain how winning battles in France could achieve either.

In late 1919 Sir Joseph Ward was still struggling to articulate a trading policy which would on the one hand make it ‘difficult’ for former enemies - Germany being the case in point - to resume trading with New Zealand, but on the other would avoid placing New Zealand in a ‘difficult’ position once the mother country resumed trade with Germany. This was a foretaste of the political bind that the New Zealand Government was entering in the post-war era. As a result of various inconsistent positions adopted during the war - such as New Zealand’s concurrent support for the Empire, for France and for New Zealand’s own commercial interests - a confusing array of contradictory international policies (affirming French security while supporting global disarmament being just two) had emerged. New Zealand having assumed independent, sovereign nation status by default through ratifying the Versailles Treaty had to reconcile these. When Ward spoke in support of a resolution of appreciation and sympathy for the New Zealand servicemen he did say that the New Zealanders ‘fought to maintain the freedom of this portion of the British Empire and other parts of the British Empire’, although

⁵ "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.182: 19th Parliament 4th session," (1918), p.26.; *ibid.*, p.168.

again the relevance of fighting in France against Germany went unexplained.⁶ W. T. Jennings (Liberal, Waitomo) extended this to the ‘right’ of the men to aspire to freehold land, as this (he said) had been their reason for fighting ‘so strenuously against the German hordes’ in Belgium and France.⁷ The Labour MPs, emboldened by their electoral gains, were not afraid to highlight these oddities and their vigorous rebuttals no doubt caused some squirming on the Government benches. These inconsistent rationales undermine the consensus view of New Zealand historians that New Zealand’s war was in support of the British and the Empire, for if this were so why did so few politicians not simply say so without qualification? Presumably such a stance would have opened a political debate on the reasons for assisting the mother country to fight a war in Europe to save the ‘froggies’. The political Centre-Right did not want to debate with the Labour-Left over this political ground, and even less over why Germany – previously a friendly and important trading partner – had been designated without qualification as the enemy.

Further complications with broader, longer-term consequences soon became apparent. Speaking during the debate held in response to yet another invitation for the Prime Minister to attend a forthcoming Imperial Conference, H. E. (Harry) Holland laid down some important ‘markers’, one of which was to push Massey to seek self-determination for the peoples of India and Egypt. This was (as Holland pointed out) the original reason British statesmen had given for the war in France; to preserve the independence of other nations such as Belgium. Holland also reminded the House that the United Kingdom had rejected Ward’s 1911 proposal for an Imperial Parliament because it would remove the power of the Home Government to declare war without the consent of the Dominions.⁸ These positions may have been somewhat consistent with the right of independence for Belgium, France and New Zealand yet the Empire project was an explicit rejection of such rights for other nations. By March 17, 1921 Holland was certain enough of his political support to assert that while the New Zealand men had been told they were fighting for the defence of small nationalities, the big powers were secretly

⁶ "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.185: 19th Parliament 6th session," pp.1281, 1388.

⁷ "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.189: 20th Parliament 1st session," (1920), p.430.

⁸ "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.190: 20th Parliament 2nd session," (1921), pp.192-195.

dividing the world up amongst themselves.⁹ Colonel W. E. Collins speaking in the Legislative Council in 1922 neatly summed up the problems when he stated:

‘It is now nearly four years since the Great War ended, and one cannot help asking what benefit any one has derived from the unparalleled loss of life ...’¹⁰

In the immediate post-war years the Allies had the option of either neutering Germany politically and economically and thereby creating what France assumed would be an impoverished non-threatening neighbour, or they could help Germany establish a functioning state in the image of the other western democratic powers (the United Kingdom, France and the United States) and thereby achieve the same aim: turn Germany into a non-threatening force. The first option was the essence of the French approach as it was explained in New Zealand by the visiting French envoy, General Pau. The alternative was advocated by the United States, Keynes and other progressive economists who foresaw the consequences of humiliating and subjugating Germany. The allies - New Zealand included, with France being the exception - lacked the will to execute the first approach which would have required force; yet they could not face their voters with an alternative which appeared to ignore the great personal losses and their promises to punish German aggression.¹¹

The anti-German spirit aroused amongst the New Zealand public had heightened patriotic support for the war, but it was a contrived sentiment stimulated by propaganda, rather than a re-awakening of any latent cultural bias. Pre-war Germany, with its significant ties to the United Kingdom through royalty, culture and trade had been a supplier of high-end, specialist manufactured goods to New Zealand. Prime Minister Massey therefore had a difficult path through the Versailles process as he needed to adhere to the pro-French British policy of punishing Germany while simultaneously winning compensation for New Zealand’s wartime losses, establishing

⁹ Ibid., p.198. In typical Holland over-reach he went on to claim the financiers had won.

¹⁰ "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.195: 20th Parliament 4th session," (1922), p.88.

¹¹ Isabelle Tombs and Robert Tombs, "Losing the Peace," in *That Sweet Enemy : The French and the British from the Sun King to the Present* (London: William Heinemann, 2006), pp.502-3; "The Economic Situation," *Manawatu Standard*, 19 January 1920 p.5. By January 1920 a group of British notables were alarmed at the deteriorating situation. They signed a memorandum to 'leading Governments' (including France) asking for action on world economic instability. They warned of the consequences of the burden on Germany and the risk of destroying her production by over taxation. Not only would this reduce the chance of payments but it would also incite 'despair and revolt.' Long term credit was recommended for countries requiring it.

New Zealand's trading position with the United Kingdom and dealing with French opposition to New Zealand's aspirations for the New Hebrides.¹²

Post-war diplomatic exchanges with France began with the French Mission's Australasian visit in late-1918/early-1919. The Mission was a direct extension of the Clemenceau Government's single-minded drive for victory which was to be followed by punishment of Germany.¹³ The press reports suggest that the Mission was originally intended to bolster Australian morale and voluntary troop recruitment, so prior to travelling to Australia and New Zealand the Mission members had met with the Australian Prime Minister Billy Hughes in London. Hughes was a strong supporter of conscription, a contentious domestic political question in Australia.¹⁴ It was hoped General Pau 'would kindle to a fiercer heat the fires of patriotism in Australia and bring fresh battalions to the sacred fields of France'.¹⁵ Since the war ended while the mission was in Australia, any conflict related objectives became superfluous during the New Zealand leg, so understandably these were not mentioned in the mission's final report.¹⁶ Pau spoke little English but it became clear through the apparent skill of his 'translator' in remembering large tracts of French prose then repeating them verbatim in English,

¹² Kray, "Caging the Prussian Dragon: New Zealand and the Paris Peace Conference 1919," pp.125-126.

¹³ Agulhon, *The French Republic, 1879-1992*: pp.171-177. The Clemenceau Government was appointed in November 1917 (the secularism-advocating Socialists refused to join). Clemenceau managed to concentrate the French national effort on winning the war without political or other interruptions.

¹⁴ "Billy Hughes," Museum of Australian Democracy, <http://primeministers.moadoph.gov.au/prime-ministers/billy-hughes>. Hughes had been on the losing side in two Australian conscription plebiscites.

¹⁵ "French Mission," *The Sydney Morning Herald*, Mon 29 Jul 1918, p.7.. Barnes (the Australian Minister of Labour who was present) claimed Australia would have supported France even if Belgium were not involved, an opinion that contradicted the British legal justification for entering the war.

¹⁶ William Riddell Birdwood, "Papers of Field-Marshal Lord Birdwood, Indian Army; C-in-C, India 1925-30," ed. British Library (India Office Records and Private Papers, 1883-1949). Curiously, there is also no mention of French morale and conscription boosting initiatives in the papers of Lord Birdwood (the ANZAC and Australian Commander in Chief). Birdwood, ANZAC C-in-C at the time, was later stationed in India, hence the filing of his papers under the latter heading. The file includes correspondence with the Australian Prime Minister Billy Hughes on various military matters but there is no mention of General Pau and his journey to Australasia. There was considerable upheaval within the Australian high command at the time the Métin/ Pau Mission was leaving France. Hughes was in Britain trying to remove Birdwood and divide his role. Because morale was clearly a significant issue for the Australian Army and this was a key motivation for the French mission, its absence from this set of Birdwood's papers is odd. It seems unlikely that Birdwood would have been unaware of the visit but where the relevant papers are filed, if any exist, is unknown.

William Riddell Birdwood Birdwood, "Birdwood, William Biddell Birdwood, Baron 1865-1951 : Letters to Sir Godfrey Williams," (Wellington, New Zealand: Alexander Turnbull Library, 1916-1918). Birdwood knew France and knew his troops but Birdwood's France was the war zone. His correspondence shows an awareness of the importance of communication with subordinates through maintaining a sympathetic dialogue, whether prompted by awards or slights. Apparently comfortable chatting with the troops, in brief letters to his military peers he casually draws attention to have been 'waist deep' in mud to show his awareness of the troops' conditions. He also cautioned against over-optimism for an early end to the war, so his failure to mention the Pau mission seems exceptional.

that Pau's remarks while in New Zealand were not the spontaneous comments of a retired general. They were a series of consistent statements on French post-war policy, as was revealed after the visit. The 'translator's' use of a written script was noted, not to belittle but as an example of the organisational skills involved.¹⁷

The French message for New Zealand and Australia was consequently direct, consistent and unambiguous. General Pau praised the Australasian troops and their leadership while placing the collective hopes of the allies in a future of "fraternity, greater liberties and greater civilization". In so doing he echoed the French revolutionary motto of *liberté, égalité, fraternité*. Such cordiality was not however, to be extended to Germany. In his introductory remarks in Sydney (given before the Armistice was signed) Pau had said that the enemy were beaten and that the German leaders suspected this was so. The German people were simply uninformed as to the gravity of their situation. Pau claimed the German people needed to feel the war personally i.e. Germany should be invaded. As Pau put it, "no punishment for Germany would be complete until she was defeated on German soil ..."¹⁸ He accepted that considerable resources would be needed to do so.

The General repeatedly used quasi-religious idioms to reiterate that France and Britain had had God on their side, thus implying that the proposed punitive action against Germany was legitimate. Germany 'must be quickly and strongly punished'. Germany's crimes included aspiring to acquire material wealth from the rest of the world (i.e. possessing an empire) and her overblown pride. (A cynical observer could claim that neither characteristic was in short supply from the French in the first flush of victory). While stressing the need for fairness, Pau did say that Germany must pay for the war damage and give a warranty against future wars. The point that Germany had not herself experienced the horrors of war was a consistent theme. For that reason (the French believed), notwithstanding the repudiation and disgrace of the former German leaders, German aspirations remained.

German propaganda had always maintained that Germany was winning the war. Pau's statements foresaw the immediate problem which arose from the armistice, namely that

¹⁷ "The English Of The French.," *The Colonist*, 11 March 1919, p.3.

¹⁸ "General Pau Arrival in Sydney: "The Enemy Is Beaten", *The Advertiser*, 11 September 1918, p.11.

the German population did not accept that Germany had been beaten.¹⁹ There is a consensus in the literature that Germany's unwillingness to accept the peace conditions arose because Germany - as far as her public could see - was neither demonstrably broken militarily nor economically damaged when the war ended. Signing the armistice without substantive evidence by way of invasion or conquest to contradict this interpretation meant the 'stabbed-in-the back' narrative gained currency with the German public. Germany remained the most powerful state in Europe while the term 'armistice' suggested a temporary ceasefire rather than a surrender.²⁰

New Zealand was anxious for those serving to return home, a subject of greater concern than invading Germany or hearing praise for the dead from visiting Frenchmen. After all, if the Allies had won why was any further military action needed? Invasion and occupation of Germany was too much to ask of the New Zealand soldiers still in Europe. The newspapers reflected this view with their frequent references to repatriation plans. New Zealand was therefore understandably disinclined to contribute to the considerable resources that General Pau accepted France would need to invade Germany. The few New Zealand soldiers who did cross into Germany were met with sullen disapproval and resentment which contrasted with their understandably more welcoming reception in Northern France. Despite this, once in Germany the New Zealanders fraternised, shared their supplies in return for favours, and patronised the prostitutes, just as invading armies have always done. One soldier (Bert Stokes) recalling his time in Germany said that the New Zealanders had '... much more affinity with them (the German public) than the French. We didn't like the French very much ...' This seemed to have been based on the suspicion and resentment (as discussed in Chapter One) that arose from the soldiers observing French farmers going about their day to day activities close to the lines, within range of the guns where New Zealanders were dying.²¹

¹⁹ Ibid.; Sally Marks, "Mistakes and Myths: The Allies, Germany, and the Versailles Treaty, 1918-1921," *The Journal of Modern History* 85, no. 3 (2013): pp.634-635.; Schuker, *The end of French predominance in Europe : the financial crisis of 1924 and the adoption of the Dawes plan*: p.6. Failing to signal defeat to the local population through a symbolic invasion, as was the case after Waterloo with the occupation of France or by the Germans parading in Paris in 1870-1 would prove to be a significant miscalculation.

²⁰ B.C. Hett, *The Death of Democracy* (Random House, 2018). pp.123-124. Contains one of the more recent opinions that substantiates earlier historians' views on these points.

²¹ Jane Tolerton, *The Armistice and Afterwards. New Zealand soldiers on the Western Front gradually heard that the Armistice had been signed, An Awfully Big Adventure* (Radio New Zealand). Quotations from: Laurent Blyth, Bill Elder, Bert Hughes, Bert Stokes. Many soldiers believed French civilian farming activities were a ruse to conceal spying.

The diversity of views and lack of a common objective amongst the Allies became obvious to the New Zealand public almost as soon as the war ended and the peace negotiations began.²² The punitive French approach held that German participation in the new post-war world order was to be a reward for submitting to the French conditions. A 'leading French authority' argued that German membership of the League of Nations should be conditional on Germany meeting the provisions of the Versailles Treaty. The proposed exclusion of Germany rather missed the point because if, as the quoted expert M. Burgecix (sic, probably Léon-Victor-Auguste *Bourgeois*, an active supporter of the League) claimed the two main functions of the League were to be arms limitation and imposition of penalties for infringements, removing Germany from the League's jurisdiction also removed her from any voluntary reason to comply with the former without removing the latter.²³

Germany's views were extensively reported in the New Zealand press. As early as January 1919, articles based on reports from German correspondents were unequivocally of the view that the peace as proposed would prevent Germany from rebuilding economically, while occupation of the vital mining areas would lead to a 'slow and painful death'. Germany would be better not to sign, as the German state would simply collapse under the imposed terms while German workers became the 'slaves' of the French. Strikes and disruption since the end of the war had already made the indemnity load extremely burdensome. Annexation of the Saar, loss of her colonies and dispossession of Dantzig(sic) made it nearly impossible for Germany to meet the imposed indemnity payments.²⁴

²² To maintain balance the following discussion only uses articles from the original random sample (on the basis of mentioning 'France' or 'French') to illustrate the French connection. None of the articles included direct quotations from New Zealand politicians. This is not to infer that New Zealand politicians did not make comment on the broader issues - they of course did - but it does indicate that most comment pertinent to France came from the newspapers' secondary sources. The New Zealand politicians were not engaging directly with the French point of view in the New Zealand press (although the newspapers were using virtually the same British-led views as the New Zealand Government).

²³ "Russia," *Taranaki Daily News*, 31 January 1919, p.6.; "Dantzig (sic)," *Nelson Evening Mail*, 1 April 1919, p.5.; France was keen on using exclusion as a coercive tool. France objected to Russian participation as a 'triumph for Lenin'.

²⁴ "The Demand For Backbone Against The Entente," *Evening Post*, 31 January 1919, p.7.; "Opinions Of German Delegates," *Nelson Evening Mail*, 10 May 1919, p.5.. United Kingdom/ NZ Government, "Countries - France - External Relations - Saar," (Archives New Zealand, 1921-1924). This file is centimetres thick and includes detailed British Government memos covering first-hand discussions that the British had held with the French at Secretary of State level on these issues. The newspaper

The French response as reported in New Zealand was dogmatic and uncompromising. Anticipating that the German National Assembly would reject the Treaty and Germany would not sign, the French proposed limited mobilisation with a threat to bombard Frankfurt. Hopes that threats of force would succeed, despite the Berlin Press being 'almost unanimous' in rejecting the Treaty, were based on the division in the German Cabinet and the German public being resigned to the inevitable. Unrest in Germany was attributed to Spartacists (i.e. Marxists). *Le Matin* stretched the truth by claiming that the Treaty aligned with Wilson's fourteen points and would still go ahead without an American signature. This cluster of reports reveals the extent to which each of the great powers were promoting their own interests, the level of contradiction in their respective stances, and the paradox of forcing one party to sign a peace treaty under duress rather than trying to achieve a sustainable world order.²⁵ Only the British were portrayed (in the New Zealand newspapers) as maintaining the balance between American idealism and French practicality. The New Zealand public's confusion - as evidenced by the range of views in the newspapers - manifested as a wish to simply leave Europe and resume life as it had been, under Empire protection.

While recognition had to be given to the war dead and French political concerns, it was the survivors and New Zealand's immediate future which concerned Massey rather than longer term consequences. Fixated on his dairy-centric small farming plan, he pushed the international issues aside and then ignored alternatives. His post-war objective of retaining New Zealand's place within the Empire by turning New Zealand into Britain's main supplier of dairy produce was easily explained to the public and appeared simple to execute. All that was needed was the acquisition of land suitable for subdivision, followed by conversion to higher quality dairy pasture using a reliable and cheap source of phosphate-based fertiliser. Additional farmers could be recruited from the ranks of ex-servicemen, supplemented by British immigrants. The sea routes essential for

reports are consistent with these records that the New Zealand Government was receiving via the Governor General at the time.

²⁵ "The Peace Treaty," *Manawatu Standard*, 20 June 1919, p.5.; "League Of Nations," *Grey River Argus*, 10 January 1919, p.3.. (These are two examples of omnibus-type reporting, one including the *Le Matin* views). Senator Lodge was already hinting at a United States' withdrawal.

exporting the resulting produce would be defended by the Royal Navy.²⁶ Matters concerning France and European stability and trade in non-dairy products from the wool and meat industries were distractions and Massey did his best to avoid involvement with them.²⁷ Massey also deliberately overlooked the implications for New Zealand of Britain's evolving role in global affairs, her changing relationship with France and the important domestic changes occurring within the United Kingdom which would affect trade policy. New Zealand could not however seal itself off within the Empire as long as the United Kingdom remained a free-market trader and a globally engaged world power. Despite these contradictions Massey, who showed an astute appreciation of the public mood throughout his political career, probably accurately reflected the sentiment within the New Zealand electorate.

Massey's conduct at Versailles nevertheless tends to be portrayed as that of an unsophisticated and bumpkinesque character (with his small moustache and hat his visage is vaguely suggestive of Charlie Chaplin's screen image) intent only on securing mandates over the Pacific territories of interest to New Zealand.²⁸ Although Kray says that Massey did not understand Wilson's fourteen points, it seems more probable that the pragmatic Massey did not understand **how** the fourteen points could achieve long term peace, regardless of whatever else was agreed. Massey's differences with Wilson were not restricted to the fourteen points as Massey clearly did not like Wilson personally, did not understand his idealism and as a result failed to enlist him as an ally in New Zealand's pursuit of mandated territories. As Kray notes, 'Massey found the

²⁶ "Peace Conference," *New Zealand Herald*, 29 November 1918, p.4.. Massey was clearly in a hurry to return to Europe and attend the Paris Conference - even to the exclusion of other matters. He wanted to both resolve the relevant issues and avoid any backsliding over New Zealand's Pacific territorial claims.

Acquiring the vast quantities of phosphate needed to adapt New Zealand soils for intensive pastoral farming was a significant problem. While the apparent sustainability of a pasture-based production model utilising atmospheric nitrogen fixed by clover plants is commonly identified as the mainstay of New Zealand's farming competitiveness, it was **imported** phosphate that was the missing element. As New Zealand lacked a readily accessible local source, Massey's plan depended upon securing a suitable phosphate supply that was both adjacent and in a form that could be readily processed into superphosphate. Without it, his plan would fail.

²⁷ "Wool Supplies And Consumption: The Requirements Of A British Empire Industry Y1 - 1924/06/01," *Journal of the Textile Institute Proceedings* 15, no. 6 (1924): pp.152-153. This contradicted the concern expressed in a 1916 report prepared for the President of the Board of Trade suggesting that a "serious decrease" in global wool supplies was in part due a decline in sheep numbers as the freezing trade expanded. New Zealand sheep numbers fell in the five post-war years 1919-23.

²⁸ "La Conference de la Paix: Les colonies Allemandes," *Le Figaro*, 25 January, 1919, p.1. France was well aware of New Zealand's interest in the former German colonies.

company of French Premier Clemenceau far more convivial.²⁹ When Massey gave his opinion on the Versailles agreement (in May 1919) his views seemed both realistic and practical in comparison with Wilson's purer but politically unrealistic stance.³⁰ If nothing else proves the point, Massey carried his electorate with him into the next election cycle whereas Wilson lost domestic political support.

Massey did foresee the uncertainty for the French resulting from the untested, experimental nature of so many of the Versailles proposals. He also appreciated that French fears about German intentions were not unreasonable, especially if France did not occupy the left bank of the Rhine. Above all, the complexities of the Treaty and the many difficult issues that were left for later settlement were certain to lead to discontent. Lest there be any uncertainty as to historical antagonisms shaping French views, the last line in a news article reporting Massey's opinions made the spirit of the French stance clear to the New Zealand public:

The German Government is also to restore to the French Government certain papers, and to restore the French flags taken during the war of 1870-71.³¹

Having motivated their citizens through a combination of patriotism and appeals to the righteousness of their cause in response to the injustices of the enemy, the allies could not then ignore the payback implied by the public investment in the war. Lloyd George had contested and won the 1918 election in the United Kingdom by promising to punish German 'war criminals' (revenge for lost lives), gain compensation through reparation payments (material reward for wartime sacrifice) and all the while protect the domestic British market from product dumping (implying a better, economically secure future for the social classes who had provided most of the fighting manpower). These promises restricted Lloyd George's room for compromise during the Versailles negotiations, and by extension also constrained New Zealand's position. As is often the case with apparently easily delivered outcomes there were unexpected consequences. The devastation of the British ship building industry as a result of the acquisition of Germany's merchant fleet was one such example that contradicted the earlier promise

²⁹ Kray, *Caging the Prussian Dragon: New Zealand and the Paris Peace Conference 1919*, pp.137, 139.

³⁰ "Review Of Situation," *New Zealand Times*, 10 May 1919, 7..

³¹ *Ibid.*

of full employment for the returned servicemen. Another was the distortion of global coal markets.³²

The weight of New Zealand public opinion in general - and that of the troops in particular - was strongly anti-German and would have punished a softer line. The New Zealand soldiers were convinced - as Cecil Malthus explained - that the blame rested primarily with Germany which had invaded France. Any subsequent suggestion that the war was wrong was due to the appalling casualties and the conflict's duration, not because the war was seen as unjust.³³ Kray asserts that it was Massey's similarly strong opinion that the Kaiser was a war criminal and Germany should pay. France neither trusted Germany nor saw that France had done anything wrong, views which are difficult to refute. The British did recognise that German nationalism and living space demands had some legitimacy, given the awkward truth that Germany's broader aspirations were not dissimilar to those of Britain and France. Even *L'Humanité* foresaw trouble within an empire-colonial paradigm by noting that 'a large overpopulated country is, without discussion, deprived of all its colonies'.³⁴ Moreover, Britain seemed to tacitly concede that Germany did not and would not accept that she was solely to blame for a war which she did not in any case believe she had lost. Whether Britain eventually accepted that an economically strong Germany would ultimately safeguard European security (as was implied after the premiership of Lloyd George ended) remains uncertain but that position is accepted by some scholars.³⁵

Both sides of the argument were clearly explained and cogently argued in the New Zealand newspapers making the public well aware of these views and the possible consequences. As early as February 1919 the *Dominion* was presenting the German view that payment of reparations in labour or goods in lieu of gold would damage the allied

³² Higham, *Two roads to war : the French and British air arms from Versailles to Dunkirk*: p.7. "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.190: 20th Parliament 2nd session," pp.239, 255, 264, 383. The coal industry was a good example because the West Coast of New Zealand - one of the original Labour strongholds - was the centre of coal extraction. Displaced Welsh coal was allegedly imported into New Zealand owing to northern hemisphere oversupply from cheap German sources.

³³ Malthus, *Armentières and the Somme*: pp.14-20. This contradicted the Labour view. Under Holland's leadership Labour viewed capitalism and class struggle as the underlying cause.

³⁴ "A la Conférence : La Discussion sur les Colonies allemandes - On A Parlé De La Société Des Nations," *L'Humanité*, 29 January 1919, p.1..

³⁵ Kray, *Caging the Prussian Dragon: New Zealand and the Paris Peace Conference 1919*, p.136.; Tombs and Tombs, *That Sweet Enemy : the French and the British from the Sun King to the Present*: p.518.

economies; that forced mining of Germany's mineral resources under duress would be 'humiliating and unprofitable;' and that intergenerational issues would arise.³⁶ Clemenceau was not backward in putting the French case. His language (the war had been won but this was simply a 'lull in the storm') conveys both the ongoing nature of the France-German rivalry and his urgency in pushing for French demands to be met. He raised fears that Germany could still ally with Russia despite the Allies' assurances they would assist France if this eventuated. Clemenceau's claim that Germany had attempted to destroy the French economy - hence the destruction in the northern *Departments* while German factories remained undamaged and usable - was a telling point. Reciprocating with punitive economic damage would neuter a traditional foe, with the side benefit of revenge.³⁷

The practical consequences of these positions soon became evident. The *Dominion* reprinted the remarks of Lloyd George and Sir Eric Geddes (then First Lord of the Admiralty) who pointed out that reparations could be paid in gold, labour, or goods. Germany apparently had no gold but payment through either or both of the alternatives would damage the domestic economies of the Allies. The suggestion that Germany's mineral wealth could be appropriated under a 'Government that could be trusted' had the benefit of simultaneously hobbling Germany economically while not stimulating her industrial base. Occupation under constabulary supervision was possible but the article noted that there was no enthusiasm to invade Germany except from France. The comments specifically recognised the intergenerational consequences of demanding compensation, but *The Times* believed such would make it obvious to the German people that the outcome of aggression would be 'humiliating and unprofitable' for the aggressor.³⁸ Thus there was early, explicit recognition in the New Zealand press that there could be adverse consequences from extracting reparation payments and to do so from an unwilling Germany would be a fraught process.

While Massey has been criticised for his stance at Versailles, a mutually acceptable resolution was beyond the capabilities of the best political leadership the world had to

³⁶ "German Indemnities," *Dominion*, 14 February 1919, p.8.

³⁷ "Lull In The Storm," *Manawatu Standard*, 11 February 1919, p.5.

³⁸ "German Indemnities," *Dominion*, 14 February 1919, p.8. Reprinted from *The Times*.

offer. The German Premier Scheidemann (who was just as subject as the allies to domestic opinion) claimed that Germany was in a struggle for life, not nationalism or prestige, against the peace terms. He declared the Treaty unacceptable to 'cheering' from the House. In the same news item Belgium raised her claim for more African territory, a view which was consistent with the alliance partners' intent to treat large and small nations equally.³⁹ Possible grounds for settling the stalemate were nonetheless becoming clearer by May 1919, even if they were no more acceptable to either side than the earlier proposals. Germany would reluctantly make reparation payments but would not accept the designation of any payments as indemnity (punitive) levies. The urge to accept what was on offer and get home reflected the mood of the New Zealand population who wanted to return to an imagined, better past. Moreover, the distribution of a major prize, the German territories in the Pacific, had already been agreed. As *L'Humanité* put it:

... the great colonial states will keep their overseas possessions, which they will continue to exploit according to the savage methods of capitalist colonialism ... This is the first act of the Peace Law! In the previous day, German colonies of the Pacific (New Guinea, etc.) were occupied by the British Dominions of Australia and New Zealand.⁴⁰

and

We must take advantage of the presence in Paris ... of the British Dominions' representatives to resolve the issue of settlements ... that the Allies share like thieves.⁴¹

New Zealand may have seemed to be better off than the European nations, but this was not the same as being as well as off as the public imagined New Zealand would have been without the war especially given the high casualty rates.⁴²

New Zealand was drawn into the slipstream of French and British enthusiasm for punishing Germany with Prime Minister Massey's opinion more or less in alignment with that of Lloyd George.⁴³ Ignoring Keynes' warnings of the potential consequences Massey and Ward joined the rush to endorse the peace terms demanded by Britain and

³⁹ "Peace Treaty," *Waikato Times*, 22 May 1919, p.5.

⁴⁰ "A la Conférence : La Discussion sur les Colonies allemandes - On A Parlé De La Société Des Nations." p.1.

⁴¹ "Les colonies allemandes," *L'Humanité*, 26 June 1919, p.1.

⁴² "Continued Prosperity," *Waikato Times*, 3 September 1920, p.4.

⁴³ James Watson, *W.F. Massey : New Zealand, Makers of the modern world*. (London: Haus, 2010). p.83. WF Massey, "Massey to Allen 2 January 1917," in *Miscellaneous files and papers - Allen and WF Massey correspondence 1st September - 1st August 1919* (Archives New Zealand). In early 1917 Massey had told Allen that he did not know what to make of Lloyd George. He clearly preferred Asquith but believed Asquith would never regain the Prime Ministership.

France. In a remarkable act of good faith, loyalty, and patriotism, the initial discussion of the Versailles Peace Treaty in the New Zealand Parliament was held without any MPs - apart from Massey and the Leader of the Opposition - having copies to hand. Massey brushed this concern aside by claiming that the indexed version in *The Times* was better.⁴⁴ By way of an introduction to the ratification debate, Massey said 'several telegrams' from the Imperial Government had asked for Parliamentary approval, thus suggesting urgency to meet Imperial demands and complete the formalities.

During his speech Massey made a number of points that were subsequently contradicted - in some cases by Massey himself. By signing the Treaty in their own right, the Dominions (Massey claimed) ceased to be dependencies and became partners within the Empire. Taken at face value this interpretation permitted New Zealand to interact with France or any other country as freely as Great Britain herself, if she so wished. Secondly, Massey repeated that Germany's burden as a result of the Versailles Treaty was not disproportionate to her crimes, a position maintained by France for many years to come. Whether this was so or not, the claim was contrary to expert opinion (Keynes' being the most notable example at the time) and it was not accepted by Germany.⁴⁵ Thirdly, although acknowledging the damage caused by Germany's destruction of French property and industrial capacity in the war occupied *Departments*, Massey nevertheless mentioned the opportunity that German now had to become a 'very successful competitor' in goods formerly produced by France, Britain and America. He went even further when he admitted that in some areas of production Germany was better than Britain. Despite this acknowledgement of the possibilities for New Zealand as a free-trading nation, Massey (frustratingly) did not allow himself to draw the obvious conclusion which his remarks presaged. Fourthly, while noting French representation on the proposed Council of the Great Powers (of the League of Nations) Massey claimed that the only guarantee of peace could come from the United States, the United Kingdom and France acting in unity (i.e. being in sole charge of world

⁴⁴ Government, "Versailles Peace Treaty - 1919." New Zealand's copy in the National Archives seems to be (appropriately) untouched and is in mint condition without annotation or appended comments.

⁴⁵ E. Wiskemann, *The Europe I Saw* (Collins, 1968). p.53. On p.656 of *Mistakes and Myths*, Sally Marks claims that Keynes came to regret writing *The Economic Consequences* by implying he came to believe his interpretation of Versailles was incorrect. Her comment is misleading. Marks' source (Wiskemann) makes it clear that in conversation Keynes expressed regret *because the book became a source that 'the (Nazi) German's never ceased to quote'* not because (as Marks implies) Keynes believed the content was later proven to be incorrect.

affairs). Despite this, Massey conceded that such a structure for maintaining world peace was not possible. He concluded with approbation for the French army and people. These sentiments would prove to be the political high-water mark in New Zealand's support for France.⁴⁶ Thereafter the pro-French tide slowly ebbed as the contradictions in these positions became clear.⁴⁷

In rebuttal, Labour's Harry Holland pointed out the political absurdity of relying on the varying verbal assurances of Ward and Massey rather than a written copy of the Treaty. He highlighted the inherent inconsistency of New Zealand acquiring territory - Massey's obsession with manure from Nauru being Holland's example - through a war that had supposedly been fought in defence of the independence of small countries such as Belgium. There were other flaws that Holland raised; the creation of a body dominated by just five great powers given responsibility for maintaining world peace was one such. Another was the Treaty requirement impelling Germany to trade despite the popular wartime position of Massey, Allen, Ward (as mentioned) and others that there should never be post-war trade with Germany. The Treaty, Holland pointed out, meant that the Allies could not discriminate against Germany in trade matters. The Hutt MP T. M. Wilford seemed to have a better appreciation of the situation than most. Barely a year after the fighting ended, he concurred with Ward that there was 'no possibility' of New Zealand getting any of the repatriation money. While praising Clemenceau, Wilford still believed that a lack of French domestic unity, the need to protect forty million French from eighty million Germans and the unresolved problems of Alsace-Lorraine and the Sarre (sic) coalfields remained as hotspots which made a future war inevitable.⁴⁸

Discussion of the ratification motion in the Legislative Council was more nuanced and less overtly ideological. Stripped of partisan sentiment and raw patriotism, the

⁴⁶ "Dans Les Ambassades," *Le Figaro*, 25 August 1921, p.2. Massey was rewarded for his pro-French stance with the award of *les insignes de grand officier de la Légion d'honneur* conferred by the French Ambassador in London in 1921.

⁴⁷ "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.184: 19th Parliament 6th session," (1919), pp.35-40; "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.200: 21st Parliament: 2nd session," (1923), pp.730-732. In order to support the ideal of a unified Empire speaking with one voice during the subsequent Washington Conference Massey claimed that despite the Dominions signing at Versailles as separate entities they had **not** become independent. This contradicted his earlier position.

⁴⁸ "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.184: 19th Parliament 6th session," pp.60, 62-66, 74-76. Marks, *"Mistakes and Myths: The Allies, Germany, and the Versailles Treaty, 1918-1921,"* p.648. Post-war French policy was driven by fear. Clemenceau knew France and her allies had only achieved a stalemate while waiting for American help. Germany was still stronger, economically undamaged, powerful and ahead of France in the demographic race.

comments reveal a nonplussed reaction. Sir Francis Bell (who is still recognized as one of New Zealand's most distinguished legal practitioners of his era) in moving the motion of support noted the absence of a full text. This must have been an affront to his judicial sensibilities. Bell observed that there was no legal requirement for local parliamentary ratification since His Majesty had sovereign authority to sign Treaties with foreign Governments without the endorsement of the New Zealand Parliament. Despite this (Bell noted) the terms of the Treaty demanded the endorsement of all parties. This gives added weight to Massey's contention that signing altered New Zealand's status since Bell's interpretation implies that New Zealand was now an independent participant. If there was no (legal) need for the New Zealand Parliament to endorse the agreement, why was it done in such haste?⁴⁹ Sir W. Hall-Jones (who seconded the motion) fell back on the patriotic cliché by saying that the 'old German spirit' was still alive and so there was a need for Empire unity (presumably endorsed through New Zealand's ratification and signature). Hall-Jones seemed to represent the views of a large segment of the New Zealand public which wanted to go through the motions of signing, punishing Germany, exiting France and re-building a post-war life. Despite his attempt at ignoring the complexities, Hall-Jones still felt bound to remark that:

the proposals somewhat mystify me, as you have a country like the United States with one representative with voting-power and you have a small country like Panama or Hayti (sic)... which have equal voting power ... Sir I would like to have read, to have heard, or to know more of what we are doing.⁵⁰

From this brief synopsis, it seems that New Zealand signed and ratified the agreement as an independent state notwithstanding the apparent constitutional contradiction in so doing alongside the claimed Empire ('partner') status permitted by Britain. As a result New Zealand had - at Britain's request - formally assumed a legal status under which she could take independent action, sign treaties, and therefore negotiate with France on trade or any other country. Moreover, if the implications were unclear for politicians

⁴⁹ "La Grande-Bretagne Et Le Traite De Paix," *L'Humanité*, 7 October 1919, p.3.. Obtaining agreement from the Empire was clearly important for as *L'Humanité* reported:

Le Temps understands that the British Government will notify the Powers of the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles by the British Empire. The treaty has been ratified by the parliaments of all the Dominions, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Newfoundland, Union-South Africa. The ratification of India is also assured, the treaty not having to be submitted for the approval of a Parliament. In these conditions, it only remains to submit the treaty for signature of the king-emperor ceremony will likely be completed before the of this week'.

⁵⁰ "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.184: 19th Parliament 6th session," pp.29-30.

of the stature of Bell and Hall-Jones, it seems highly unlikely that other Members let alone the public were any better informed, making the failure to recognize that the option now existed understandable.

The most probable explanation for the British enthusiasm to obtain one signature per Dominion lies in the one-country/one-vote principle which Hall-Jones remarked upon. If the Empire was recast as a group of independent sovereign states it achieved increased leverage in any one vote per nation forum such as the new League of Nations.⁵¹ This simple rationale downplayed the constitutional significance of signing the Versailles agreement as a sovereign state for New Zealand's definition of loyalty was now redefined. The test was no longer one of obedience to British/Empire direction(s). The elected government was now obliged to act in the first instance in the interests of its own citizens. Its most pointed implication came in the potential involvement of the Dominions in future wars.⁵² Under Massey's own interpretation of the ratification motion, any Imperial edict ordering participation was voided. Only the Dominions' respective legislatures could grant the necessary authority. The requirement for the Dominions' consent through their respective sovereign parliaments was legislated through the United Kingdom's Anglo-French Treaty (Defence of France) Act, 1919.

Nothing except emotion now prohibited New Zealand from developing a direct relationship with the French. To the contrary, if there was benefit for New Zealand in doing so, it followed that as a sovereign nation there was an implicit obligation to follow that course. It was the able and perceptive William Downie Stewart representing Dunedin West for Reform (speaking during the Peace Conference valedictory debate on a motion wishing Ward and Massey well on their mission to Europe/United Kingdom) who pointed out an obvious if emotive truth which arises from this interpretation:

'Ever since this Dominion was founded we have been under the protecting wing of Great Britain. She has guarded our shores... All that spirit has been removed by the rude shock

⁵¹ "French Territorial Claims," *The Colonist*, 1 February 1919, p.5.; "Peace Conference," *Feilding Star*, 8 February 1919, p.2. *The Colonist* quoted an article from *The Times* mentioning the Dominions' status as self-governing partners under the Treaty. This gave them two voices - their own and one as partners within the Empire (and presumably thereby in other world bodies). Canadian Premier Borden was already describing the British Empire as a 'commonwealth of free nations.'

⁵² "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.190: 20th Parliament 2nd session," p.195; Government, "13 September 1919 Subject: Anglo-French Treaty (Defence of France) Act, 1919."

of this war. We have seen that we cannot dissociate ourselves from world politics, however remote we may be ...'⁵³

Although Massey wanted to move away from involvement with France, the new global political order intervened as France attempted to ensure her allies both honoured their promises and did not forget Germany's culpability or perfidy. From a New Zealand perspective, even with phosphate supplies from Nauru Island secured parts of France were now a New Zealand cemetery and therefore *de facto* consecrated New Zealand soil. There was no possibility that France and the war could simply be forgotten. What then was to be the place of France in New Zealand's future? New Zealand presumptions of a vaguely defined but somehow better post-war world included a politically unified France committed to establishing a peaceful Europe. Arguably none of these conditions had existed since the French Revolution, nor had Versailles created them. Despite this, the reasons for the unsettled French political climate in the post-war years and the French inability to move on from the war seemed beyond the comprehension of the New Zealand politicians as their subsequent actions revealed.

⁵³ "New Zealand Parliamentary Debates v.183 19th Parliament 5th session," (1918), p.1034.

2.2 *Separating Fact and Fiction: Repatriating memories not bodies*

When the unsatisfactory nature of the unratified Versailles settlement threatened the image of heroic sacrifice in pursuit of a better world, the authorities had to reconcile the hagiographic imagery of a noble death with the realities of post-war politics. Any questioning of the war's purpose reflected doubt on the motivation of those who had ordered the troops to fight and by implication on the reason for the heroism and sacrifice shown by those who had died. Moreover, the messy practicalities of disposing of thousands of decaying (in some cases hurriedly interred) corpses had to be aligned with public expectations of appropriate treatment for the heroic dead. An obvious solution for the families was to exhume the soldiers' remains for ceremonial re-burial in New Zealand. Such requests were obviously anticipated. A little publicized agreement proscribing the removal of any bodies, apart from those to be relocated to designated graveyards in France, was signed under French and British authority on November 26, 1918 just fifteen days after the armistice.⁵⁴

Article 3.

Bodies buried in cemeteries or in military graves shall not be exhumed for transport to the United Kingdom or to another part of the British Empire without the approval of the Imperial War Graves Commission; the French Government undertakes to instruct the prefects to refuse all applications for permission for the removal of bodies unless preferred through the Commission.⁵⁵

This decision put aside the problem of mass exhumation, the complex issue of body identification (locating and then embalming the corpses, providing coffins and transport), and the treatment of incomplete body parts. The task would have been immense, requiring labour and financial resources for an indefinite period, as discovery and exhumation of corpses over a century later has shown.⁵⁶ The outcome would have

⁵⁴ "Peace Conference."p.4.. There are numerous similar reports from this period of plans for Massey and Ward, having just returned in August 1918 from a War Conference/Cabinet meeting, to again leave for Europe to attend the Peace Conference. Both were therefore in close communication with the British.

⁵⁵ United Kingdom/ NZ Government, "British War Graves in France," in *Countries - United Kingdom - External Relations - France* (Archives New Zealand, 1922-1930), pp.2-3. This agreement was signed and dated by Pichon (Foreign Minister of France) and Lord Derby the United Kingdom Ambassador to France on 26 November 1918. New Zealand's archived copy is dated as received on 7 June 1919. Both the United Kingdom and the Dominions' Governments obviously anticipated the war's end and the inevitable requests for repatriation of the soldiers' remains.

⁵⁶ I. Bargas and T. Shoebridge, "Mourning, honouring, remembering," in *New Zealand's First World War Heritage* (Exisle Publishing, 2015), p.378.; "Tomb of the Unknown Warrior," ed. Ministry for Culture and Heritage (2004); Penny McLintock, "What do we know about Australia's Unknown Soldier?,"

been a tortuously lengthy grieving period, possibly prolonging a commensurate debate on the war's purpose.

When the Liberal MP W. T. Jennings (who had himself lost two sons) raised the issue of exhumation and repatriation, Prime Minister Massey ducked behind the Imperial Authorities who were against this solution because it would lead to 'chaos.' His answer was not incorrect, but he must have been aware that mass repatriation was never a possibility. Massey did assure the House that the graves were being taken care of.⁵⁷ The following year a petition was presented on behalf of Haami Tutu requesting the exhumation and return of his son's remains at his expense. Again, the Defence Department advised that all such requests were being refused. The most likely reasons for this intransigence - aside from the practicalities and fiscal issues - was the risk of exposing the relatives to the chaotic battlefield archaeology. To paraphrase Fussell, the image of the dead being laid to rest was often far removed from the reality of their mode of demise and burial. Initially the French Government resisted similar requests by parents for reinternments in village cemeteries but a 'right to a free annual visit' was eventually granted and then on 28 September 1920 the French Government 'gave in' and allowed repatriation of bodies at the state's expense.⁵⁸ New Zealand parents may have become aware of this change, but if so there is no evidence of a further push for New Zealand reburials.

<http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-11-11/what-do-we-know-about-australias-unknown-soldier/5081574>. Both Australia and New Zealand later made symbolic repatriations of unidentified remains. To preserve the anonymity of the exhumed the authorities deliberately ignored current technology and relied on a few remnants of uniform and badges to make a country of origin identification – a tenuous link. The Australian authorities noted that: "To our **surprise and satisfaction** (emphasis added), we only had to disturb one grave". This hints at just how complex any large-scale repatriation of what relatives may have assumed to be complete bodies would have been.

⁵⁷ "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.185: 19th Parliament 6th session," p.571; "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.186: 20th Parliament 1st session," p.955. Given that sittings of the House were discontinuous and that it was impossible for MPs to raise in the House every issue brought to their attention it seems likely that the cases that were raised were representative. Once broached the constituent at least knew that the issue had been brought to the Government's attention and the answers could be used to respond to other similar queries.; Hanna Smyth, ""There is absolutely nothing like the carving of names": Imperial War Graves Commission sites and World War I memory," in *Monumental Conflicts: Twentieth-Century Wars and the Evolution of Public Memory*, ed. D.R. Mallett (eBook: Taylor & Francis, 2017), pp.3-4. Online edition, pages unnumbered, confirms the denial of repatriation as consistent with the Imperial War Grave Commission's policy of burial at or near the place of death.

⁵⁸ Jay Winter, *Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning: The Great War in European Cultural History*, vol. I, *Studies in the social and cultural history of modern warfare* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). pp.23-26.

If exhumation and repatriation was denied then perhaps one soldier could be symbolically re-interred in New Zealand. Massey (probably unintentionally) raised that possibility when he read to the House a cablegram detailing arrangements for the re-interment in Westminster Abbey of an unknown warrior 'taken from amongst those buried in France'.⁵⁹ A similar re-interment for a New Zealand soldier did not take place until 2004, possibly because one repatriation may have established a precedent for all, or perhaps because one British soldier buried in New Zealand's metropolis at the heart of the Empire was judged to be representative.⁶⁰ For the New Zealanders who wanted the bodies returned, France became a place where the dead were held in eternal exile. As if to permanently extinguish the possibility of disinterment and reburial in New Zealand, the battle exhumations were declared completed in November 1921, after what was described as six systematic searches.⁶¹

Traditionally sailors and soldiers had been buried where they fell (whether at sea or on land) with exceptions made for the admirals and generals. After the battle of Waterloo the dead were interred in mass graves while after Trafalgar it was Nelson's corpse that was returned to England. A common soldier (or sailor's) identity was thereby incorporated into a collective loss. Mass interments made the burial/battlefield sites worthy of mass visits which assumed the features of pilgrimages. Lloyd identifies three characteristics that transform what otherwise might be considered a site visit into a pilgrimage: firstly, the scale (of the losses); secondly the spiritual nature of the struggle (with a quasi-religious sacrifice of the innocents and the promise of redemption) and thirdly the sanctification of the ground, rather like the Gettysburg battle site of Lincoln

⁵⁹ "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.189: 20th Parliament 1st session," p.734.; "The Unknown Warrior: Body on the way from France, Impressive Ceremony," *Feilding Star*, 11 November 1920, p.2. The repatriation was accompanied by an impressive ceremony and symbolism; '... the coffin ... was draped in a torn and stained Union Jack, beneath which could be just seen the outline of a sword ...'

⁶⁰ "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.192: 20th Parliament: 3rd session," (1921), p.213.; Gareth Phipps, "Bringing our boy home: The Tomb of the Unknown Warrior, its visitors, and contemporary war remembrance in New Zealand" (Victoria University of Wellington, 2009), p.20.; D. Knowles, *HMS Hood: Pride of the Royal Navy* (Fonthill Media Limited, 2019). electronic ed. pages not numbered. Jennings MP (Waitomo) did ask Massey if an unknown warrior from Gallipoli could be brought home as the number of unidentified from Gallipoli was considerably higher than was the case for the dead in France. Knowles refers to the unidentified soldier buried in Westminster Abbey as representative of '... the many thousands of dead from the British Empire'.

⁶¹ "Grave Units Recalled," *New Zealand Herald*, 11 November 1921, p.5; Winter, *Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning: The Great War in European Cultural History*, I: pp.23-26.

fame.⁶² All three conditions could be met through visits to places of mass interment in France.

British sources reported pilgrimages to France for the poor. These included descriptions of prayer and the ‘great comfort’ for those participating. Appropriate though these were for less well-off British residents, similar visits were beyond the resources of many families or the New Zealand exchequer. Visits such as that organized by ‘Bienvenue française’ for two hundred female teachers from Canada and New Zealand and other Empire countries (the visit seemed to be restricted to British Empire participants despite the headline), to see the battlefields and the sites of Paris were more exclusive and were organized with French self-interest clearly in mind (‘these initiatives which can only serve our cause with our friends’). Nonetheless, they were still described as pilgrimages.⁶³

Sir James Allen accepted that journeys such as those described by Rev. Mullineux M.C. during a London lecture (attended by Allen who lost a son at Gallipoli) were all but impossible for many New Zealanders to contemplate, but Allen did note ‘the intention to try and place before relatives some impression of what the completed cemeteries were like’.⁶⁴ Consequently, with no possibility of mass visits nor of repatriation of the New Zealand remains, the care of the graves in France assumed additional significance as did their replication in New Zealand. The need for the goodwill of the French locals was essential, especially in the months before formal war cemetery construction began. In this context, the Westland MP T. E. Y. Seddon (Liberal and son of the famous ‘King’ Dick) asked for the publication in both British and French newspapers of the various resolutions of appreciation and sympathy passed by the House. He had letters from

⁶² "Ōhaeawai NZ Wars memorial cross," Ministry for Culture and Heritage, <https://nzhistory.govt.nz/media/photo/ohaewai-nz-wars-memorial-cross>. A common practice. After the Battle at Ōhaeawai during the Northern Wars the bodies of the officers were interred in the graveyard of St John the Baptist Church at Waimate North while the other ranks were buried in massed graves at the battle site. David Lloyd, *Battlefield tourism : pilgrimage and the commemoration of the Great War in Britain, Australia and Canada, 1919-1939* (London: Bloomsbury, 1998). p.21.

⁶³ "Les pèlerins d'Amérique," *Le Figaro*, 02 August 1922, p.2; "Les Canadiennes à Paris," *Le Figaro*, 04 August 1922, p.2; David Lloyd, *Battlefield tourism : pilgrimage and the commemoration of the Great War in Britain, Australia and Canada, 1919-1939* (London: Bloomsbury, 1998). p.21.

⁶⁴ *Battlefield tourism : pilgrimage and the commemoration of the Great War in Britain, Australia and Canada, 1919-1939*: pp.26-27; Our own correspondent, "War Graves In France And Belgium: Pilgrimages for the poor," *Otago Daily Times*, 19 March 1924, p.10.

people in France who were unofficially caring for graves and he felt it appropriate that New Zealand's appreciation was expressed. J. G. (Gordon) Coates made a similar point.⁶⁵

Following debate in the United Kingdom parliament a policy of individual, uniform headstones for the war graves was adopted, rather than allowing relatives to choose their own designs. The rationale was that individual headstones would not be completed in the foreseeable future whereas standardised versions could be finished and installed within ten years. The War Graves Commission thought these headstones would last a hundred years. Churchill at his eloquent best promised additional memorials inscribed with all the names at each of the battle sites, ready within ten years and built to last three thousand years.⁶⁶ Even this was not without controversy for Churchill had originally proposed leaving the site(s) largely untouched, rather than restoring the landscape and erecting the ordered headstones and grand monuments which are visible today.⁶⁷ On 10 October 1919 Sir James Allen announced to the New Zealand House of Representatives that under the authority given to the Battle Exploits Memorials Committee (a highly suggestive name) in the United Kingdom, sites in Belgium at Messines and Gravenstafel had been approved for purchase with the intent of erecting such memorials and formal cemeteries for the New Zealander soldiers.⁶⁸ This formalized the adoption of these slivers of European soil as New Zealand's own alongside the French burial sites. The following year the Minister of Defence (Sir Robert Heaton Rhodes) informed the House that the graves were now under the care of the Imperial War Graves Commission. The sites included land at Gallipoli which had been granted by treaty. After a visit to France, Rhodes assured the House that the graves were

⁶⁵ "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.185: 19th Parliament 6th session," pp.1395, 1396.

⁶⁶ "War Graves," *Grey River Argus*, 6 May 1920, p.3. There were subtle prompts to 'get on with it'. An anonymous comment pointed out that graves in France with pencil on wood identification would soon be permanently lost without action. A poem attributed to E. Lamont made the point: "Out there in France they did their part, And there in France they lie;" See: "Vagrant Verse," *Southland Times*, 9 June 1920, p.4. James Allen, "Allen to Massey 11 June 1919," in *Miscellaneous files and papers - Allen and WF Massey correspondence 1st September - 1st August 1919* (Archives New Zealand), p.3. Allen had written to Massey in the previous year agreeing that battlefield sites in France and Palestine should be 'secured' for memorial construction.; Bargas and Shoebridge, "Mourning, honouring, remembering," p.386.

⁶⁷ Lloyd, *Battlefield tourism : pilgrimage and the commemoration of the Great War in Britain, Australia and Canada, 1919-1939*: p.121.

⁶⁸ "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.185: 19th Parliament 6th session," p.243. James Allen, "Allen to Massey 7 July 1919," in *Miscellaneous files and papers - Allen and WF Massey correspondence 1st September - 1st August 1919* (Archives New Zealand), pp.6-7. The cost of surveying and transferring the sites from the Belgium Government was a piffling £150, but (as Allen informed Massey in July 1919) the cost of the New Zealand graves was already £28,766 out of 'over a million' to be spent by the War Graves Commission.

being cared for. Although Allied re-interments to date totaled 128, 577 there was still much to be done since New Zealand bodies were scattered throughout France. (Seddon Jnr had previously asked that the task of memorial construction be completed by next ANZAC Day commemoration, clearly an impossible deadline).⁶⁹

Meanwhile, public lectures provided a first-hand, sanitised experience which diverted attention from the graphic reality of clearing the battlefields. Themes of recall and remembrance were also propagated through written war histories. Importantly and unlike the histories of earlier wars, these included stories of the ‘men’ not just those of the generals or admirals. The reverence with which the war losses (and by juxtaposition France as a graveyard) were treated was promoted through the work of Samuel Seager the official war memorial architect, who toured New Zealand in 1927 with his two hundred and fifty lantern-slides showing the places of memorial in France and Gallipoli.⁷⁰ An advertorial column in the *Marlborough Express* advised readers that Chaplain-Captain Burrige would give a talk on his war experience in Gallipoli and France, covering the ‘“stunts” in Flanders’ which would be ‘interspersed with many anecdotes of incidents of active service both humorous and pathetic’.⁷¹ Similar lectures in the United Kingdom were reported in the New Zealand papers. A description of a talk titled ‘Mr Philip Gibbs dispatches(sic)’ at Tottenham was greeted with ‘warm cheers’. Gibbs’ account (he was described as a war correspondent for *The Chronicle*) was a ‘moving story of those thousands of Tommy Atkins who were the men who really won the war’. As with similar raconteurs, Gibbs used a mix of trench warfare ‘realities’ interspersed with ‘humorous’ incidents of day to day life at the front to engage his audience.⁷²

When it came to erecting permanent memorials in France and Belgium, Lochhead says that there was an avoidance of ‘skiting’ and an aversion to ‘historical styles’ while taking

⁶⁹ "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.187: 20th Parliament 1st session," (1920), pp.254, 131.

⁷⁰ "War Memorials," *Evening Post*, 9 December 1927, p.11.; Ian J Lochhead, "Seager, Samuel Hurst," in *Dictionary of New Zealand Biography. Te Ara - the Encyclopedia of New Zealand* (12-Feb-2014). Seager was the ‘... official architect of New Zealand battlefield memorials’. His lantern-slide show included the Gallipoli monuments and does not seem to have discriminated between the two locations.

⁷¹ "Local & General News," *Marlborough Express*, 3 April 1919, p.4.. ‘Stunts’ was synonymous with ‘attacks’ rather than the more frivolous current usage of the term.

⁷² "Tales From France: Philip Gibbs as war lecturer," *Mataura Ensign*, 4 April 1919, p.4.

care to avoid offending the defeated.⁷³ In other words, victory was understated as was the role of the enemy while official recognition of the graves gave validation and status to the loss of life. Thus, E. Newman MP (Reform, Manawatu) referred to Sir James Allen (by then High Commissioner in London) as not wasting time while visiting the continent. He was visiting war graves and attending the League of Nations.⁷⁴ These visits became an obligatory ritual when Government representatives – such as Sir James – visited. The visits were reported in France as were reciprocal visits by official French visitors to the New Zealand memorials.⁷⁵ The visual manifestations and their officially sanctioned, complementary narratives were made accessible through local reproductions in New Zealand. The designs used in New Zealand were British in origin and copied from the originals. Exploring such themes, Katie Pickles has observed:

‘The stories of all historical figures are products of their times. They are then re-told and re-presented by successive generations, being constantly adapted to new conditions. And when the stories are no longer relevant they are forgotten’.⁷⁶

⁷³ Lochhead, "Enduring memories: Samuel Hurst Seager and the New Zealand battlefield memorials of the great war," pp.159,163. Unfortunately, Lochhead polishes his narrative by using the weather as a metaphor: he contrasts the 'sodden and undulating' battlefields of France with steeply contoured, hot and dry Gallipoli. On the days this writer visited the French sites the weather was warm and sunny as it had been for Triggs. There were obviously seasonal variations in the weather patterns in both localities.

⁷⁴ "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.195: 20th Parliament 4th session," p.229.

⁷⁵ "A la mémoire des soldats néo-zélandais," *Le Figaro*, 09 October 1922, p.4. "In memory of the New Zealand soldiers: Under the presidency of Sir James Allen, High Commissioner of New Zealand, a monument was inaugurated yesterday in Longueval, in memory of the 7,000 deaths of the New Zealand division, fallen gloriously in September 1916, on the front of the Somme."

"Petitis Faits," *Le Figaro*, 29 March 1923, p.2." Sir James Allen (as High Commissioner to the UK) in France to sign a protocol annexed to the International Air Convention, (and) yesterday morning laid a crown (wreath) on the tomb of the Unknown Soldier."

"Visit Of Aldebaran," *Akaroa Mail and Banks Peninsula Advertiser*, 15 November 1921, p.2..

Commemoration was not restricted to the war cemeteries in France as was the case when the shared sacrifice theme was reprised during the visit of the French Navy vessel *Aldebaran* in 1921. This article quoted from what was described as a 'literal translation' of the French commander's speech supplied by the French Consul:

E.Dupriez, "La Vie Coloniale: Souvenirs français - dans le Pacifique: Une visite à Akaroa. Enseigne de vaisseau a bord de l'Aldébaran," *Le Figaro: Économique*, Lundi 9 Juin 1924, p.3.. 'Enfin, sur le monument aux morts de fia grande guerre, les noms de Lelièvre, de Mallemanche sont ceux des descendants de colonie; français, dont les corps reposent aujourd'hui dans leur seconde patrie.'

⁷⁶ Katie Pickles, *Transnational outrage : the death and commemoration of Edith Cavell* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). pp.202, 205, 209.

Figure 12: “Nurse Cavell Lane, Paparoa” (Author’s photograph, 2019)



Katie Pickles (using the case of the executed Nurse Edith Cavell) pointed out that while the ‘markers’ are often still present they are no longer commonly recognised as commemorating the individual.⁷⁷ This seems to be so for the ‘No Exit’ side road in Paparoa, named in Edith Cavell’s honour.

A similar fate may await the New Zealand memorials in France and their New Zealand proxies. The War Memorial of the now defunct Newmarket Borough Council hangs in the Auckland City Council Archives – perhaps (ironically) a more appropriate setting than intended when it was first placed there - for it is located in the basement of the Auckland Central City Library building, down three flights of stairs from ground level at 44-46 Lorne Street. It is physically distant from the dead it commemorates (who are presumably in overseas World War I graveyards, although the inscription does not record where they are interred). The memorial is removed from the sight of their descendants and the community who once mourned them.

⁷⁷ A C Watts, *Nurse Cavell Street Sign Paparoa*. Photographed by the author.

Figure 13 : “ ‘Lest we forget’: Newmarket war memorial” : Auckland City Archives, Author’s photograph (2018)



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Fred Waite gave early impetus to the narrative of heroism at Gallipoli, a process which without apparent intent or malice was to displace the primacy of the New Zealanders’ service in France in the public mind.⁷⁹ This theme gained early currency, supported by claims such as Massey’s reference during the Chanak crisis to the Turkish occupation of the Gallipoli Peninsular:

It would not have troubled us so much but for the fact that on Gallipoli lie thousands of the best and bravest men the British Empire ever produce who – including New Zealanders – left their bones there.⁸⁰

Somewhat cynically *Le Figaro* opined that Lloyd George exploited the ‘self-esteem’ the ANZACs derived from their earlier exploits at Gallipoli.⁸¹ If that was Lloyd George’s intent, it was fulfilled. New Zealand’s support for Britain during the Chanak crisis was based on raw emotion rather than any military imperative. Even without formal

⁷⁸ "War Memorial Lest we forget," in *Newmarket Borough Council* (Auckland City Central Library, Post-1918).

⁷⁹ Fred Waite, *The New Zealanders at Gallipoli*, ed. Ian McGibbon, Official history of New Zealand's effort in the Great War ; v.1. (Auckland N.Z.: Whitcombe and Tombs, 1919). "NZDF Support to 2018 Anzac Day Commemorations," (Wellington: New Zealand Defence Force, 2019). An earlier version of this article (since removed) referred to ANZAC Day as a commemoration primarily associated with Gallipoli but this later edition has restored the association with the Western theatre.

⁸⁰ "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.200: 21st Parliament: 2nd session," p.731.

⁸¹ "Smyrne, la Thrace et les Detroits," *Le Figaro*, 20 September 1922, p.1.

"Le gouvernement de l'Australie, celui de la Nouvelle-Zélande, ont déjà accepté d'envoyer des contingents. L'Angleterre a très habilement et dès longtemps exploité le légitime amour-propre que les patries des Anzac tirent des combats de Gallipoli, péninsule sacrée".

graveyards, the Gallipoli battle sites became if not consecrated ground then at least the revered equivalent in the public mind. But in France there was also sacred ground containing New Zealand graveyards, thereby creating a similar, enduring but arms-length tie between New Zealand and France. Thus when Sir T. Mackenzie speaking in the Legislative Council recalled the 17,000 ‘fine young men lying on the fields of France and other countries’ or W. E. (Bill) Parry (Labour, Auckland Central) evoked the events that had ‘moistened the earth with tears of women and children, and fertilized the fields of Flanders with the dead remains of human beings’, they were evoking sentiments similar to those applied at Gallipoli. By implication the status given to Gallipoli should have been extended to France. Moreover, if consistency was applied there was a similar obligation to defend the French sites.

During the same Parliamentary session Massey referred to the £35,387 set aside for war graves ... and battlefield memorials in France.⁸² Preservation of the gravesites and the construction of memorials made little sense however, if they went unseen by the families. Understandably there were requests for financial assistance for relatives to visit once individual body identification had been completed and grave monuments erected. The potential volume of such requests, the support required, and the likely costs raised significant issues for the authorities and in any case, what was the purpose of such visits?⁸³ When Dr H. T. J. Thacker (Liberal, Christchurch East) asked whether assisted visits to graves for the poorest widows and mothers were possible, Massey demurred by saying no decision had been reached. Allen subsequently answered a similar question by confronting the issue of cost head on. He pointed out that large-scale access funded from the public purse was impractical.⁸⁴ G. Witty (Liberal, Riccarton) also asked about the need for ‘permission’ for visits to the graves in the United Kingdom, and was told (perhaps to his surprise) by G. J. Anderson (Minister of Internal Affairs) that no one could enter the United Kingdom without a passport and this needed to be ‘vised’ (sic)

⁸² "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.200: 21st Parliament: 2nd session," pp.163, 377, 598.

⁸³ Lloyd, *Battlefield tourism : pilgrimage and the commemoration of the Great War in Britain, Australia and Canada, 1919-1939*: p.117. At the time of writing (2017) seeking ‘closure’ (whatever that may mean) is a common reason to visit a place of death or interment. In the post-war years there seems to have been an unrealistic expectation that visiting the scene meant sharing the experience of the deceased. In objective terms that was nonsensical. Not only would the terrain have been altered, the graves were now marked and memorials erected. Moreover the weather (if not the season) would likely have been different during individual visits thus creating a confusing dissonance between myth and reality.

⁸⁴ "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.185: 19th Parliament 6th session," pp.571, 393.

by the French Consular Officer for visits to France.⁸⁵ During the same Question Time W. H. Field (Otaki) asked for a reduction in the 'enormous rates' for passages to visit war graves.⁸⁶ Jennings (Liberal, Waitomo) plaintively asked how overseas relatives could see the war graves given these barriers. He pointed out that while there was assisted passage for migrants, fares were still expensive for those wanting to make the reverse journey to visit the battlefields. William Nosworthy (Reform, Minister of Immigration) stalled by saying there was no funding.⁸⁷ The remoteness of France, and the impossibility of financially constrained families ever seeing the graves must have seemed a harsh outcome since so much had been spent on creating appropriate individual burials. The descriptions and photographs of the battlefield left the imagination to create an unedifying vista. By extension it would have been unlikely to present an image of France as an appropriate place for permanent interment of one's relatives.

Rhoda Howden received two stark black and white photographs of her husband's grave. Both appear equally forlorn, and to the untrained eye the background is not the same so they do not appear to be the same grave. The accompanying printed slip notes that 'it is possible that errors may have occurred ...' The condolence letters (he was the 'whitest and best of men') addressed to Mrs Howden include a description which omits any hint of suffering (Howden had died in hospital ten days after a gas attack). Rhoda Howden's image of France was a sanitized version of her husband's demise, a good character reference and two black and white images which could have been photographed anywhere that a selection of wooden crosses were available.⁸⁸



⁸⁵ "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.186: 20th Parliament 1st session," p.415. The Dunedin Consular record from December 1926 to August 1930 includes a note that lists New Zealand as one of the countries whose citizens do not require a passport or visa for visits to France so this may be simply a wartime legacy requirement, perhaps to control anticipated mass pilgrimages.

⁸⁶ *ibid.*, p.653. Shipping to the United Kingdom was at a premium as evidenced by the problems with freight.

⁸⁷ "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.189: 20th Parliament 1st session," p.600.

⁸⁸ Rhoda Howden, "Correspondence re illness and death of her husband," (1917).

Figure 14: “Rhoda Howden: memorial correspondence”, ATL



This photograph was taken by the N.Z.E.F. Photographic Unit and as the name, and other particulars appearing on the Temporary Cross were not checked with Official Records it is possible that errors may have occurred, these however will be rectified when the permanent headstone is erected.

If mass burials were no longer acceptable, more or less the same outcome could be achieved using uniform, individual grave markers. The identical, stylised headstones in France de-personalised the losses and made them of equal value so they were transformed into a site of collective hurt and memory. Memorials similar to those proposed by Churchill were constructed in a more modest form throughout New Zealand, thereby symbolically transplanting the memories. These artificial, local sites possessed neither the graves nor the original location but they had the advantage of being non-specific. Such sites were acceptable memorials for all the battlefields, for all the war dead and therefore an appropriate place for all the locals to grieve. They were also a symbolic repatriation of individual souls. Private commemoration could be undertaken locally, even when conducted in proximity to or concurrent with the public ceremonies.

Figure 15: “Paeroa war memorial” (*Author’s photograph 2019*) and “New Zealand memorial, Longueval, France” (*New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade website*)



Paeroa, New Zealand



Longueval, France

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The process culminated in suggestions for a shared national memorial where the whole nation could grieve. Despite general agreement, the specifications for a national

⁸⁹ New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade, "Longueval: New Zealand Memorial," (2018). Paeroa War Memorial, Primrose Hill photographed by the author 27 May 2018.; Bargas and Shoebridge, "Mourning, honouring, remembering," p.370.

memorial aroused intense debate. Questioned by Dr A. K. Newman MP (Reform, Wellington East) about the item 'National War Memorial £100,000', Allen replied that it was for a war memorial to be sited in Wellington. This was enough to arouse objections. Other towns and cities had raised their own funds so why should Wellington's be financed by central Government? The form of any memorial was also in contention. The Liberal MP representing Eastern Maori, Sir James Ngata, assumed that Allen wanted it to be a New Zealand version of 'Arch of Triumph' (sic) in Paris, or Nelson's Column. He was strongly in favour of a 'proper expression' of New Zealand sentiment, but there was dissent as to whether that meant it should be utilitarian or emblematic or even what was the theme – a celebration of victory or a commemoration of death? A. E. Glover MP (Liberal, Auckland Central) said the memorial was to recognize the 'glorious deeds' of those who had given all in France and Gallipoli to 'save the British Empire'. The somewhat austere P. (Peter) Fraser MP (Labour, Wellington Central) within whose electorate such a memorial would probably be sited did not want a monument because many such structures (he mentioned London's Albert Hall) were 'hideous'. He wanted utility such as an art gallery would provide. J. Craigie MP (Liberal, Timaru) said Wellington could not be compared with London or Paris which was true but immaterial.⁹⁰

Debate between those favouring utilitarian structures such as halls and parks and those who felt more grandiose structures were appropriate (perhaps more in a style of Queen Victoria's monument for Prince Albert) was vigorous. The latter view was championed by Sir James Allen who wanted 'beautiful, statuary, emblematic' structures such as 'monuments like the Champs Elysee, the Nelson Monument in Trafalgar Square and the Statue of Liberty'.⁹¹ All the examples had a French connection although the association seems to have been inadvertent. It would be difficult to think of a more inappropriate archetype than Nelson's column given the recent alliance with France.

⁹⁰ "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.185: 19th Parliament 6th session," pp.1349-51. At about the same time as the issue was debated H. G. Ell (Liberal, Christchurch) asked about the dilapidated state of the Dominion Museum and the risk to the collections therein. The issue was eventually resolved when the National War Memorial Museum was constructed in Wellington. Ell was an early conservationist and lobbied for scenic reserves in the Christchurch and Port Hills environs.

⁹¹ James Allen, "Allen to Massey 19 February 1919," in *Miscellaneous files and papers - Allen and WF Massey correspondence 1st September - 1st August 1919* (Archives New Zealand), p.21.

When the discussion resumed approximately a year and one election later, the House was no more cohesive; ideas ranged from scholarship funding, to the purely functional, or simply an artistic monument. Massey, perhaps still enthralled by empirical glory and New Zealand's own modest Pacific aspirations, favoured a national monument (the *Arc de Triomphe* and the Statue of Liberty were again mentioned) in a style similar to those used by France to commemorate her victories.⁹² Massey was attempting to associate the New Zealand losses with the positive outcome of victory and in so doing he drew on French rather than British icons. Perhaps in his own way he was trying to validate France as an appropriate place of burial for the corpses and the memories.

One result was the structure at the bottom of Bowen Street, Wellington. It rarely attracts a glance from busy commuters hurrying to and from the Railway Station unless for use as a *de facto* windbreak. The blandness reflected in the cenotaph inscription is exaggerated through the absence of punctuation and the mis-phrasing applied to Rupert Brookes' anodyne phrases from *The Red Sweet Wine of Youth*:

These laid the world away
Poured out the red Sweet wine of youth gave up the
years to be of work and joy and that
unhoped serene that men call age and
those who would have been their sons
they gave their immortality⁹³

Another manifestation was the plethora of public amenities including swimming pools, libraries, gardens, park benches, band rotundas, statues, flagpoles and public buildings all displaying the prefix 'War Memorial'.⁹⁴ Their proliferation diluted the impact so that the poignancy of the personal losses they supposedly commemorated was lost, just as the profusion of events in 2018 similarly diluted the war centennial commemorations.

⁹² "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.187: 20th Parliament 1st session," p.316. One MP wanted a national memorial in each of the four main centres.

⁹³ Wellington Cenotaph, *Inscription*, cnr. Bowen St. and Lambton Quay, Wellington. As viewed and noted by the author.

⁹⁴ Clarke, *After the war : the RSA in New Zealand*: p.54. K. S. Inglis and J. Phillips, "War Memorials In Australia And New Zealand:A Comparative Survey," *Australian Historical Studies* 24, no. 96 (1991): p.189.

2.3 *Return and resettlement*

With the bodies sequestered in France, it was important that the survivors were re-settled and given an appropriate future rather than left to brood and grieve. No public figure - regardless of their political disposition - wanted to be seen as insensitive to the needs of the repatriated soldiers. Validation of the war effort required that the Government show that those who served were coming home to a better place and that their interests would be protected. The political opposition (that now included both the United Party and the Labour party following the end of the national wartime coalition government) had to remain sympathetic to these views while arguing that more could or should be done. Less well considered was the form of re-settlement to be used and how to ensure it succeeded.

There was a general presumption that the returning soldiers would want to farm and that small-scale pastoral farming would be appropriate and economically viable. This view probably owed as much to the imagined English ideal as it did to New Zealand conditions. There is no indication that the soldiers' opinions were sought, apart from anecdotal comments gathered by politicians when visiting the troops.⁹⁵ Although there was some provision for alternative vocational employment and university scholarships, the possibility of some ex-soldiers who were otherwise disinclined to farm being induced to do so by the lack of alternatives or by the seemingly generous financial incentives does not seem to have been seriously considered.⁹⁶ Moreover, despite the assumption that the New Zealand 'bloke' and his equally dependable and practical wife were resilient rural dwellers, the inexorable demographic transition towards an urban society was expanding the opportunities for those interested in urban based occupations. On the one hand, there was a financial inducement to adopt farming as a profession and, on the other a lack of practical experience and understanding on the

⁹⁵ Melman, *The culture of history : English uses of the past 1800-1953*: p.7. Melman refers to the British self-deception that idealised a past that was inextricably linked to and part of a rural, non-urban country despite the realities of industrialisation. Michael Roche, "'A Duty of the Country' Soldier Settlement, 1915-1941," in *New Zealand between the wars*, ed. Rachael Bell (Auckland, New Zealand: Massey University Press, 2017), pp.61-62. The lack of consultation contrasts with the liquor prohibition debate when the 'boys' - to use the repeated vernacular - risked being told by those at home what was good for them.

⁹⁶ "New Zealand Parliamentary Debates v.183 19th Parliament 5th session," p.1020. Some alternative separation Allowances and Scholarships covering various disciplines were suggested. These included studying overseas techniques such as sugar-beet growing in France.

part of some participants as to what this might entail. These factors alongside a dearth of alternative rehabilitation programmes, meant rural settlement became a self-fulfilling outcome. Problems soon became apparent. On 8 August 1923 G. McKay (Hawkes Bay) reminded MPs that warnings of the dangers of placing inexperienced returned soldiers on highly priced or overvalued land were not based on hindsight but had been raised at the time the land settlement scheme was mooted. Massey was quoted by McKay as having promised the servicemen land at favourable prices, but Massey's Government had not only raised land prices by competing to buy blocks for settlement, it had also ignored calls for the inexperienced men to be given practical hands-on training.⁹⁷

Later it would be claimed that the success rate of the settlement scheme had been inflated by those whose survival depended on off-farm income sources or who had retained possession while defaulting on rent (or lease) payments. In his analysis refuting this view, Michael Roche correctly pointed out that there is a continuum rather than a dichotomy between complete success and outright failure, and that neither can be objectively diagnosed based solely on the length of time the land was occupied. Using off-farm income to retain the land made economic sense in some cases.⁹⁸ Moreover, land settlement matched the constant refrain for development of the Dominions, a key component of the Empire's ethos. In the broader context, the lesson of population stagnation and the resultant inability of France to defend itself without British assistance made the New Zealand case for intensified land use as part of a broader Empire model appear obvious. It was also a good fit with Massey's ambitious scheme to make New Zealand a significant supplier of agricultural - especially dairy - produce to Britain. The promotion of farming - appropriately described by Roche as '... rooted in a nineteenth-century yeomanry' - incorporated the idea of populating the so-called waste

⁹⁷ "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.201: 21st Parliament: 2nd session," (1923), p.696; "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.228: 23rd Parliament: 5th session," (1931), p.346.; "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.224: 23rd Parliament: 3rd session," (1930), p.928. The 1931 comment repeated Ward's warning from 1919.

⁹⁸ Roche, "*A Duty of the Country' Soldier Settlement, 1915-1941*," p.65. For example, the family home, domestic meat supply and vegetable garden were integral parts of the farm. A residence and sustenance were needed regardless of the equity in the property or its commercial viability.

land and encouraging development through rural population increases.⁹⁹ Politicians (such as Atmore) linked defence capacity to a redistribution of the Empire's population. Atmore claimed there was no moral right to occupation of waste land in New Zealand and Australia unless it was utilized by Britishers (rather than Russell's less targeted description which included 'other' allies) who were 'starving in the centre of the Empire'.¹⁰⁰ Population growth also ameliorated fears of demographic oblivion, particularly the dread of being overtaken in the Pacific by the numerically superior 'others' of Asian heritage.

French agriculture was often used as a reference point when these matters were discussed, but why? There appears to have been an assumption that the New Zealand servicemen would be familiar with small-scale intensive French farming, and this would be an appropriate template for New Zealand. Kaiapoi's Liberal MP David Buddo pointed out that there was 'no comparison' between France and New Zealand agriculture owing to the latter's enormous volume of primary production in relation to population, an argument too general to be sustained across the many different types of agriculture in each country.¹⁰¹ There seemed nevertheless to have been an underlying assumption that French farming methods would be relevant to New Zealand circumstances. Admittedly, both New Zealand and France had important rural sectors – both were predominantly rural countries – and owing to the geographical diversity there were inevitably regions that shared similar climate, soils and topography.

Despite this, the cultural, political and economic differences were so great as to reduce the parallels to exceptions even when there were physical similarities. Hence when the Timaru-based Member of the Legislative Council J. Craigie repeated the perennial Liberal shibboleth in praise of small farms: 'Our boys in France have seen what can be done with small holdings. I have seen many of their letters, which show a realization that it is not necessary to have 1,000 acres, or even 100 acres, to make a living. Those boys have seen prosperous families on small areas', he was relying on the size of the

⁹⁹ "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.185: 19th Parliament 6th session," p.877 . The Avon MP (G. W. Russell) suggested that rural development could involve assisted passages for immigrant ex-soldiers with rural backgrounds from Belgium and France as well as Great Britain. Roche, "*A Duty of the Country' Soldier Settlement, 1915-1941*," p.76.

¹⁰⁰ "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.200: 21st Parliament: 2nd session," p.508.

¹⁰¹ "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.184: 19th Parliament 6th session," p.508.

holdings to validate his comparison. In a later Parliamentary session even W. T. Jennings (Taumarunui) speaking to the Land Laws Amendment Bill raised the use of small areas for intensive cultivation in France and Flanders as an example for settlement of ex-servicemen. The ‘infamous bridge to nowhere’ (spanning the Mangapurua Stream in the Whanganui National Park) that survives within his former electorate’s hilly hinterland demonstrates the fantasy of such aspirations. The difference between Northern France where many New Zealanders served, and the notoriously difficult landscapes and soils of the central North Island defies any meaningful geographic equivalence. Only a few MPs showed some foresight as to the potentially economically disastrous mismatch between aspiration and reality for some of the inexperienced and undercapitalized ex-soldiers. John-Pearce Luke (Reform, Wellington North) cautioned against sending the ‘boys’ onto bushland. Others, such as J. Bitchener (Reform, Waitaki) rejected possible hardship. His rebuttal to those criticizing the purchase of the Hakataramea Estate for re-settlement was to claim that the snowfall there would be little in comparison with how the settlement men had suffered in France.¹⁰² That may have been climatically true, but was irrelevant to their well-being as small farmers.

The instinctive rejection of larger holdings by many MPs led them to argue not only for smaller farms, but also for restrictions on aggregation. Using France as a reference point, Massey claimed that large estates were ‘impossible’ in France because under French law land was divided amongst a man’s family when he died.¹⁰³ J. C. Thomson MP (Wallace) later pointed out that land subdivision in France had led to the creation of plots too small to be economically sustainable.¹⁰⁴ The Wairarapa Liberal MP J. T. M. Hornsby was to assert three years later that France had divided land holdings after the revolution but ‘aggregation went on in spite of anything they could do’. He therefore wanted limits on the amount of land a ‘man’ (sic) could hold, as if the economic environment and political conditions in post-revolutionary France had relevance for the New Zealand farm settlement programme.¹⁰⁵ All of these overlooked the possibility of different forms

¹⁰² "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.182: 19th Parliament 4th session," p.172; "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.185: 19th Parliament 6th session," p.1074; "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.182: 19th Parliament 4th session," p.30; "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.186: 20th Parliament 1st session," p.675.

¹⁰³ "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.189: 20th Parliament 1st session," p.417.

¹⁰⁴ "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.200: 21st Parliament: 2nd session," p.247.

¹⁰⁵ "New Zealand Parliamentary Debates v.183 19th Parliament 5th session," p.111.

of land tenure in rural France. More significantly, France was referred to in these debates rather than the idealized countryside of Home, which still included the large hereditary estates of the aristocracy and the gentry.

Some politicians were aware that a more holistic, integrated approach incorporating re-forestation as was done in ‘highly developed’ countries such as France and Germany offered complementary alternatives to pastoral farming. G. J. Garland (Council) extolled the virtues of plantation farming in France and elsewhere while W. H. Triggs reminded the Legislative Council of a warning he once received (from an unnamed French expert) about the environmental problems that had arisen as a result of deforestation in four important *départements* in France. The suggestion that replanting the dunes which run from the Waitakere Ranges to the then-named Cape Maria van Diemen with a special grass from France (said to be superior to Marram grass), indicates that some politicians were aware that a successful primary industry required more than clover and ryegrass-based ruminant farming.¹⁰⁶

2.4 *The ‘conchies’*

One other legacy issue was still to be resolved. The alliance with France through the *entente cordiale* had led to a fierce debate on the morality of conscripted military service, an argument which assumed great significance in post-war disputes over the justice and morality of the war. Since the war in France was not directly associated with Empire territory, the political Left had greater moral leeway to debate the issue than would have been the case if a fellow Empire member was under attack. The case against conscription was neatly defined by the Left through the ideological divide between the capitalist classes who were using their resources (wealth) to generate profits from the war while the workers were losing their only source of wealth, their lives. Those on the political Left who asserted that a volunteer army was a better reflection of ‘British history and British instincts’ made a powerful point.¹⁰⁷ The counter argument rationalised the war as a collective burden with the necessary sacrifice of life to be

¹⁰⁶“New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.192: 20th Parliament: 3rd session,” pp.494, 500.; “New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.193: 20th Parliament: 3rd session,” (1921), pp.446, 566; “New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.194: 20th Parliament: 3rd session,” (1921), p.524; “New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.203: 21st Parliament: 3rd session 1924,” (1924), p.81.

¹⁰⁷ Franks and McAloon, *Labour : the New Zealand Labour Party, 1916-2016*: p.69.

shared across society by ballot. (One can almost sense the unspoken punch line – an army that had to rely on conscription was so typical of the French even if it was arguably more even-handed and equitable).¹⁰⁸

When *The Grey River Argus* reported the release of P.C. (Paddy) Webb and the other contentious objectors and their welcome home to Greymouth it included a detailed account of the 'conchies' side of the argument. One repeated theme of the Left was that the country was 'denuded of men' to fight in a European war whilst land owners and the wealthy profited. This reasserted the primacy of land ownership and possession as both a source and a symbol of wealth with the implication that land should either be collectively owned through the state or shared by all through individual titles. France is mentioned, but only as the place where the war was fought, rather than as a cause of the war or an entity whose values were worthy of defence in their own right. The use of working-class West Coast miners with their extremely strong left-leaning political heritage to carry out wartime tunnelling work added to the sensitivity. The Left's narrative implied that the miners' effort in France - a country characterised as without common cause with New Zealand - had prolonged the war with Germany to prop up the capitalist system. The same article made it clear that the men in France had told Massey and Ward what they thought of them for holding a referendum on the supply of liquor, but not holding one on conscription, as had been the case in Australia.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁸ Inglis and Phillips, "War Memorials In Australia And New Zealand: A Comparative Survey," p.186. The implementation of conscription in New Zealand contrasted with Australia. There the rejection of compulsion also left a legacy of resentment and political turmoil but for opposite reasons. Evidence of this difference can be seen in the war memorials. In New Zealand the inscribed names are typically those of the dead while in Australia those who served but returned are also named, thus giving them status as volunteers worthy of permanent recognition while shaming by implication those who had not enlisted.

¹⁰⁹ "A Welcome," *Grey River Argus*, 29 September 1919, p.3. The cable service that provided contrary war-time news reports was described as a 'corrupt Northcliffe propaganda agency.'

2.5 *Sequestering the memories: Gallipoli and France*

Perhaps the greatest separation between the France of wartime memories and France the peacetime country, was created though the diversionary Gallipoli memorial project.¹¹⁰ As soon as news of Turkey's surrender was announced, Massey proposed that the Governor General telegraph the Imperial Authorities asking that ANZACs be used to garrison the Dardanelles. The shift of New Zealand's attention away from France can hardly have been incidental. Defending the sacred dead who had died for a noble cause in a hostile land was easy to justify for who would argue against it? The counter case – that they should be left forgotten and unmourned in a foreign culture within enemy territory - would have been impossible to support. Furthermore, the selection of the Gallipoli campaign as an event symbolising national grief was a canny choice because the site was associated with Edwardian heroism and futile sacrifice without any blame being directly attributable to a New Zealand authority. Towards the end of his speech celebrating the Turkish surrender Massey mentioned France, almost as an afterthought: 'Nor can we forget the gallant sons of France, the stand that France has taken right through the war ...' and so on about the role of the citizens of France without defining exactly what the 'stand' that France had taken was.¹¹¹

Although the selection of Gallipoli - the site of a major campaign defeat - as the locus of remembrance for all New Zealand's First World War losses seems incongruous, it had advantages. The people of the Ottoman Empire were in culture, religion and race the 'others' and so local sensitivities were irrelevant. Unlike the losses in France that are nowadays often blamed on incompetent British leaders, the soldiers did not blame Churchill and the British leadership for their defeat in the Dardanelles.¹¹² This view was not unusual in the immediate post-war years. The commanding officer General Ian Hamilton - who admittedly had a point to prove - was quoted in 1922 as regretting the decision of Lloyd George to withdraw. As Hamilton says of Lloyd George, '... he did not let us hold on in 1915 and finish the Turks'. Hamilton, referring to the "Kill the German"

¹¹⁰ Hasan Kayah, "The Ottoman Experience of World War I: Historiographical Problems and Trends," *The Journal of Modern History* 89, no. 4 (2017): p.876. As Hasan notes: "The inherently revisionist propensity of scholarly research may prove to be at cross-purposes with the impulse to reinforce national lore and official narratives tinged with propaganda or tainted by the convenient and willful forgetting typical of official civic commemorations."

¹¹¹ "New Zealand Parliamentary Debates v.183 19th Parliament 5th session," p.170.

¹¹² Malthus, *Armentières and the Somme*: p.15.

theory, pointed out that at Passchendaele (sic) even Ludendorff ('who is considered truthful even by the French historians') agreed that the ratio of deaths was two British for every one German. On that basis the war in France was unwinnable. Hamilton then called attention to the 60,000 Turkish graves at Gallipoli and compared that tally with the 20,000 British soldiers lost there, thus confirming the ANZAC claims that three Turks died for every British soldier. Logically the British would have won a war of attrition in that theatre. The decision to withdraw troops and support from the 'sacred ground' (while forbidding further attacks) made it appear that winning was impossible and so withdrawal was inevitable.¹¹³ The parallels with the post-war German version of the armistice as a stab in the back that thwarted certain victory are striking.

Without re-litigating the campaign, four points have relevance to the prominence Gallipoli has received compared to France in the memorial process. Firstly, those involved had very different points of view of the events, based on both their geographic proximity and position within the hierarchy of the campaign, a point which Malthus, as a member of a small unit (platoon) of just forty to fifty men, acknowledges. Secondly, while the British hierarchy is commonly blamed for the Gallipoli defeat the blame was not universally applied as it tends to be now. Churchill was held by some participants to be the soldiers' champion in a campaign that could have succeeded but for the faint-heartedness of his cabinet colleagues. Thirdly, few New Zealand accounts acknowledge the contribution of the French troops who were fighting at Gallipoli while France itself was partially occupied and under threat.¹¹⁴ It is notable that French losses at Gallipoli appear to be absent from Hamilton's tallies. Finally, French historical opinion is quoted as if it were the most suspect and least reliable, thus giving it extra virtue when it validated the 'truth' of a British officer's (Hamilton's) opinion. The outcome was that memorials in New Zealand while dedicated to all the war dead are used in practice to recall the dawn Gallipoli landings while the much greater losses in France and the subsequent national relationship with France are diminished within the annual commemorations.

¹¹³ "Finishing The Turk," *Auckland Star*, 24 October 1922, p.5.

¹¹⁴ "La Campagne des Dardanelles," *Le Figaro*, 26 December 1926, p.2.. French accounts such as *La Guerre navale aux Dardanelles* reviewed in this reference do refer to the French division under Général d'Amade as well as to the New Zealand and Australian Divisions that made up much of the British contingent.

Memories change with the demands of each generation, from those who lived the events, to the generations who grew up hearing about them, and ultimately to those who only inherited some version of the narrative.¹¹⁵

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With the dead buried, their graves marked, the returned servicemen re-settled and appropriate memorials erected in New Zealand – their primary purpose seemingly to commemorate the Gallipoli landings - the war in France could perhaps be put aside.¹¹⁶ France was destined to become a New Zealand graveyard on uncontested soil. In the immediate post-war decade however, the French connection could not be completely renounced because France still influenced New Zealand's international relationships and was a continuing background presence in day-to-day life. Moreover, many news reports of post-war deaths apparently due to natural causes (tubercular disease was often mixed with wartime gas-related respiratory ailments), the cases of individual hardship (sons and fathers who were ineligible for assistance, widows and children who lacked support or private means) and the casually understated biographical notes which record that the subject had once served in France provided continuous reminders which conflicted with the urge to forget and move on.

Figure 16: "1933 In Memoriam Notice" : *New Zealand Herald*

IN MEMORIAM

ELLIOTT.—In loving memory of our beloved son and brother, Private John Caldwell McNeish Elliott, died of wounds in France, October 6, 1917; late of Waerenga.
Gone from us, but leaving memories
Death can never take away—
Memories that will always linger
While upon this earth we stay.
—Inserted by his parents, sisters and brother, Pokeno Valley.

¹¹⁷ *New Zealand Herald*, 6 October 1933

¹¹⁵ N.C. Hunt, *Memory, War and Trauma* (Cambridge University Press, 2010). pp.197-198. Quoted in D.R. Mallett, "Introduction," in *Monumental Conflicts: Twentieth-Century Wars and the Evolution of Public Memory* (Taylor & Francis, 2017), p.4.

¹¹⁶ "The Great War, 1914-1918. New Zealand Expeditionary Force. Roll of Honour," (Wellington: Government Printer, 1924), xviii.. The French battlefields had in fact the greatest number of New Zealand War casualties (some seventy-five percent according to the official record).

¹¹⁷ "In Memoriam," *New Zealand Herald*, 6 October 1933, p.1.

2.6 *Outcomes and implications*

New Zealand's attempt to disengage culturally and politically from France implied that France was to some degree the cause of New Zealand's losses rather than simply being the venue. In a 1919 letter to British Colonial Secretary Long written at Massey's instigation by the New Zealand High Commissioner (Thomas Mackenzie), attention was drawn to the 1917 notification received by Imperial War Conference under which France's 'generous action' in allotting gravesites in perpetuity was noted with 'deep appreciation'. Despite this, Massey's use of the French example to push during the Paris Peace Conference for Turkey to be forced to cede equivalent rights at Gallipoli implied the Dardanelle graves were in the New Zealand psyche already as important as those in France.¹¹⁸ These attempts - if not downplaying France and all that happened there - were at least deliberately raising Gallipoli to a similar level emotionally. Whether this did lead to the status of Gallipoli rising, or whether the ready acquiescence of France in ceding the necessary land to the War Graves Commission led to the single-minded pursuit of similar cemeteries in the less than friendly Gallipoli territory is unclear. The implied equivalence did however conflict with the more significant part in world affairs that France had (and would continue to have) for New Zealand.

Re-settlement of ex-servicemen came to mean more than repatriation; it was a symbolic expunging of the past through a new beginning. Gwen Parsons has advanced the view that the New Zealand public were neither 'wildly enthusiastic' when the war began nor were they 'united in support' for the duration.¹¹⁹ Nevertheless (she claims) it is a myth to assert that the soldiers were poorly treated upon returning. Of all the claims made, one that cannot be sustained was that the returned servicemen were ignored. The evidence from the political dialogue and the news indicates that at least in the immediate aftermath considerable attention was paid to both their collective good and the many deserving individual cases. About 23,000 ex-servicemen were assisted in some

¹¹⁸ "Colonial Office and Predecessor: New Zealand Original Correspondence - Records of the Colonial Office, Commonwealth and Foreign and Commonwealth Offices, Empire Marketing Board, and related bodies," in *CO 61622*, ed. The National archives (London: British Archives, 1830-1922), pp.95, 96.

¹¹⁹ Parsons, "*Challenging Enduring Home Front Myths: Jingoistic Civilians and Neglected Soldiers*," p.67.

way to purchase their own homes, farms or businesses.¹²⁰ Although the rural resettlement model was based at least in part on a misrepresented, idealised and therefore inappropriate (for New Zealand conditions) French ideal, some very influential parliamentarians believed that the intensive, small-scale farming that the ex-servicemen had seen in France could be appropriated for use in New Zealand.

The issues that arose from Versailles became a theme constantly re-visited, never settled and even with hindsight clearly beyond any workable political resolution which could reconcile economic reality and public expectations. As with the economic problems, there was no obvious way of ameliorating the personal losses from the war, particularly as cultural conventions were so closely linked with the grieving process. For many servicemen the glimpses of French civilian rural life in very close physical proximity to the war zones must have evoked memories of a rural homeland in New Zealand (whether the soldiers were from a rural or urban location mattered less when viewed from such a distance) and appeared as an aspiration which was at the polar opposite both geographically and emotionally from their wartime circumstances.¹²¹ Whether the small-scale French farmers owned the land or rented it and, whether they prospered or struggled at a subsistence level, would not have been immediately obvious to the passing observer. They appeared relatively content while simultaneously symbolising a peaceful home and a break from the wartime experience of France. The urge within the polity to replicate a France-like countryside interspersed with memorials and populated by contented small farmers is therefore understandable.

¹²⁰ Ashley Nevil Gould, "Proof of Gratitude? Soldier Land Settlement in New Zealand After World War I" (Massey University, 1992), p.12. Gould uses J. B. Condliffe's *New Zealand in the Making* to estimate that some 12,000 soldiers were assisted into urban homes and by deduction a similar number were assisted with rural real estate.

¹²¹ Parsons, "*Challenging Enduring Home Front Myths: Jingoistic Civilians and Neglected Soldiers*," p.81. Parsons also claims that these initiatives changed 'attitudes to home ownership in the Dominion.' If that was so, the images from France had an important secondary influence beyond the immediate scope of the rural settlement programme.

3. Trade and engage or disconnect and forget?

Only 12% of all the articles sampled directly concerned trade, communications and transport but the category grew in importance to peak at 20% of all articles in 1928. In many cases these issues were inseparable from economic affairs (about 12%) and international relations (8-9% in 1925-35).

* * * *

Men would always struggle on economic grounds, and when these struggles reached an acute form the only way out was war.

General Pau, Leader of the French Mission to New Zealand 1918-1919.¹

The broad histories rarely question New Zealand's destiny as a post-colonial, British-dependent, agrarian nation. Understandable though this is, given the coincidence of British immigration, de-forestation, the alienation and re-distribution of the land, and the rapid exhaustion of the country's extractive wealth such as kauri and gold, there were alternatives available - even within the limitations of 1918 agricultural technology. Consideration of these options was however curtailed by the decision to designate Britain as New Zealand's major export market, even though the War had demonstrated that apparently stable global trading patterns were susceptible to disruption by international political changes. This policy decision morphed into what was assumed to be a predestined future, as Gordon Coates explained in 1927:

Our natural market is Great Britain, and many of our troubles in New Zealand are due to the fact that Great Britain has been passing through a parlous period. We have no desire to change our principal market ...²

New Zealand's trade plan presumed that any exported produce would be of such importance to Britain that defence of the shipping routes, material investment in the supporting infrastructure, and consumer preference at Home would be obvious and justifiable. The concurrent reliance on Britain as a secondary re-distribution hub for New Zealand's continental exports depended on Britain otherwise maintaining a free-trading policy, while transmitting the end-user market signals back to the producers. It was a fragile foundation on which to build the New Zealand economy.

¹ "French Ideals: The Nation's Place in the World," *Hawera & Normanby Star*, February 3 1919, p.6.

² "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.216: 22nd Parliament: 2nd session," (1927), p.792.

Possibly because it was non-perishable and easily handled and stored in bales, wool was the only New Zealand commodity re-exported from Britain in any significant quantity (about £2,000,000 out of total wool exports of £8,165,408 in 1913). Most of it was consigned to 'the manufacturing centres of Belgium, northern France, and Germany'.³ Unlike the pre-war exports to Germany, merchandise volumes consigned directly to France were too small to warrant a separate line-item in the main statistics. Once the war began, the 1915 New Zealand Year Book factually if somewhat drily recorded that, 'the proportion of exports shipped to the Motherland has become of overwhelming importance ...'.⁴ Direct exports to France did increase fourfold by value between 1914 and 1918 (from a paltry £227,027 to £810,007) but this did not fully compensate for the overall decline in re-exports to Europe.

British intervention through the purchase of New Zealand commodities in support of the war effort was the most obvious constraint on developing alternative products and markets. As meat (March 1915), cheese (November 1916), wool (December 1916) and finally butter (November 1917) were added to the wartime requisition regime, New Zealand became even more dependent on shipping a small range of commodities using one shipping route to one market protected by one navy. The inherent risk in this approach became obvious when a shortage of shipping caused serious delays. Departures fell from ninety-nine sailings in 1914, to seventy-eight in 1916 down to sixty-two in 1917. Shipments of meat decreased from 8.8 million carcasses to 5.6 million between 1914 and 1917.⁵ Although historians have pointed out the benefits (for the seller) of stability through price fixing, and (for the purchaser) of continuity of supply and availability, exclusive supply agreements can produce serious distortions in commodity markets by dampening or totally removing market influences which might otherwise

³ "The New Zealand Official Year-Book, 1915: Destination Of New Zealand Exports," (Statistics New Zealand). The 1923 Edition noted that:

"Included in the exports to the United Kingdom, however, are considerable quantities of produce which are shipped to London merely as a convenient depot, and which are retransferred to the Continent or to America. The total re-exports in normal pre-war years amounted to about £4,000,000 annually, but the amount fell, under war conditions, to £2,408,737 in 1915, £985,891 in 1917, and £565,529 in 1918, rising again to £1,691,168 in 1919, and still further to £3,578,617 in 1920.

The largest item in the re-exports is wool, which, to the value of nearly £2,000,000 annually, was redistributed in pre-war years from London to the manufacturing centres of Belgium, northern France, and Germany. This amounted to a big proportion of the Dominion's wool exports, averaging about 25 per cent".

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ "Feeding Britain," in *New Zealand History* (Ministry for Culture and Heritage, 2016), pp.33, 36.

prevail.⁶ The benefit for New Zealand of Britain buying more or less whatever New Zealand produced, meant that marketing was restricted to supplying raw, unprocessed low cost produce to one customer. Innovation was concentrated on technical improvements to increase the volume of undifferentiated commodities (wool, butter, cheddar cheese) rather than adapting the end product to consumer preference. Despite various marketing suggestions and the later introduction of Producer Boards, the solution to low market prices was usually to lower the cost of production; in economists' terms, producing more using the same capital base and cheaper inputs lowered the marginal cost per unit so that prices could be reduced. As with any market condition, once this pattern was in place it was difficult to consider alternatives since by definition the system worked. It was this economic shell bolstered by wartime patriotism and loyalty to the Empire, that France had to crack in order to establish a direct trade-based relationship with New Zealand.

3.1 Vice-Consul Hippeau's initiatives

When M. Léon Hippeau was appointed French Vice Consul in late 1916, he replaced an Honorary Consul as the highest-ranking French diplomat in New Zealand. As an experienced professional Hippeau would have been aware of diplomatic protocols and unlikely to act outside his brief.⁷ In a very business-like style a proclamation was soon issued that 'asked' all French subjects either invalided-out or otherwise exempted from military service to report to their local consular office for a medical examination, presumably with a view to reassessing their suitability to serve in the French army. The records on the matter of the treatment of the French nationals present in New Zealand (these being the people the French had requested to appear at consular offices) seem uncontroversial as the comments simply relate to how such individuals were to be repatriated to France if they eligible to serve. Public advertising endorsed by the Consulate was apparently acceptable.

⁶ Ibid., p.37.

⁷ "Journaux officiels (Paris): Sont nommés vice-consuls de 1^{re} classe," *Archives Diplomatiques: Journal officiel de la République française. Lois et décrets*, p.146.. Hippeau first appears in the New Zealand Year Book of 1917 as the French Vice Consular representative in Auckland but he is not listed in the 1921-22 edition. ; "Consular Changes," *New Zealand Herald*, 22 December 1916, p.9.; "Local And General News," *New Zealand Herald*, 16 March 1917, p.4.. Hippeau was an experienced career civil servant who had held appointments in Havana and at the French Foreign Office in Geneva. He was clearly a new broom.

During March 1917 at least nine articles were published in various newspapers under the auspices of local French consular offices inviting New Zealand firms that wished to import French goods in lieu of their German equivalents to apply via the consulate to the *Office National du Commerce Extérieur* in Paris for the names of suitable suppliers.⁸ This seemingly unremarkable initiative caused considerable disquiet. Why the issue of trade with France should raise such a concern at this time is not clear, particularly as in one of his regular updates to Prime Minister Massey six months earlier Sir James Allen had noted that the Paris Office of the British Chamber of Commerce had suggested via the Colonial Office that Australia, New Zealand and South Africa appoint Trade Commissioners to visit the main trade centres in France. The significance of that note taken in context is two-fold: the suggestion came from the British Chamber of Commerce and the Colonial Office passed it on to New Zealand. Moreover, despite all that was to come, when a similarly innocuous suggestion was later made in the House of Representatives (9 December 1918) by the Hon. D S McDonald, Minister of Agriculture, Industries and Commerce it did not attract any dissension: 'This country (McDonald said in 1918) may eventually require to establish agents in England, Canada, the Argentine and Australia to look after the interests of our producers'.⁹

The Colonial Office London files from the period include a memo dated 29 January 1918 (i.e. nine months after the enlistment notices were published) directed to the British Ambassador to France (Lord Bertie), asking him to raise with the French Government the activities of the 'French Vice-Consul at Auckland' who had been 'addressing the New Zealand Government direct on questions which are considered outside his legitimate sphere'. Lord Bertie was requested to 'approach the French Government on the subject in such manner as you may think best suited to the circumstances with the view of discontinuance of the practice to which the Governor General calls attention'.¹⁰ Hippeau is not named, but the timing fits with his appointment and his activism.

⁸ "A Third Party," *Auckland Star*, 15 March 1917, p.4. To replicate the search results:

<https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers?phrase=2&query=French+goods+in+lieu>

⁹ James Allen, "Allen to Massey 29 September 1916," in *Miscellaneous files and papers - Allen and WF Massey correspondence 1st September - 1st August 1919* (Archives New Zealand).; "New Zealand Parliamentary Debates v.183 19th Parliament 5th session," p.972.

¹⁰ "Colonial Office and Predecessor: New Zealand Original Correspondence - Records of the Colonial Office, Commonwealth and Foreign and Commonwealth Offices, Empire Marketing Board, and related bodies," p.116.

Lord Bertie's letter to the French Government in the Colonial Office archive lacks the referenced enclosures, but there is sufficient detail to deduce that Hippeau had been in direct contact with the Governor General regarding:

... questions of a general political order, such as the development of commercial relations between France and New Zealand, the sequestration of a number of bells in the belfry of a German church at Christchurch and which were cast from cannon captured by the Germans in the war 1870-71, the establishment of a French Consular Agency at Apia, Samoa, and the question of claims respecting private interests in enemy territory.¹¹

Lord Bertie's diplomatically worded letter to the French Government made it clear that French representations on such matters were to be made through the 'usual diplomatic channels ... (thereby) avoiding duplications and possible confusion'. The French reply is not in the file, but there is a note recording the French view that the Vice Consul at Auckland had not exceeded his powers. Referring to this opinion, a Colonial Office comment ascribed the French attitude to a difference between the two Governments as to the role of a Consul; the British view was that consular activity was limited to matters pertaining to the welfare of individuals from the nation in question. The British opinion relied on a protocol set out by Lord Elgin in a frequently cited circular (dating from 1 June 1906) that clearly took a very limited view of a Consul's powers. In the exchange of views within the Colonial Office (preceded by the familiar complaint that the matter was really one for someone else to resolve, specifically the Foreign Office) the approach by the Consul to the New Zealand Government was attributed to a misapprehension on the part of the French that the Dominions 'enjoy independence in questions of commercial relations'. The Colonial Office note forcefully states that this opinion was 'incorrect, as the Dominions have not complete independence in external affairs and three of the four subjects mentioned in the French note are outside purely internal business ...'¹²

As the matter simmered within the British bureaucracy a rather more abrupt letter dated 1 April 1918 was issued with an instruction from then Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour to Colonial Secretary Long instructing Long to, 'deprecate any continuation of the discussion of this matter with the French Government at the present time

¹¹ Ibid., p.121.; See page 61. Deemed by Sir James Allen and other politicians as "offensive" to the French they were removed, smashed and melted down, apparently with the agreement of the French Consul.

¹² Ibid., pp.123-124. Presumably this is why the recruitment issue went unremarked.

especially'. The letter stated that direct communications from the Consul to the New Zealand Governor General or Government were to be dealt with by acknowledgement and if necessary advice given to pass such communications through the correct channels.¹³ What appears to be a draft instruction to (the New Zealand Governor General) Lord Liverpool is attached detailing a protocol that allowed Liverpool the latitude to unofficially inform the Consul of these decisions.

Although the matter of the French Consul's activities had already been decided in London, Hippeau (in April 1918) forwarded another notice to the New Zealand Minister of Internal Affairs (Hon. C. W. Russell) advising of trade opportunities. Hippeau requested publication of this notice in the New Zealand Gazette, presumably to imply official sanction. The covering letter makes it clear that the request for (albeit passive) Government recognition of M. Hippeau's trade initiatives was seen by France as an extension of the 'bonds of friendship ... started on the common battlefields', and it also makes clear that this was an initiative of the *Office National du Commerce Extérieur*.¹⁴ Unlike the newspaper notice, this version asked for communication with Paris via the local consulate(s). Whether this was an amendment made to avoid London's attention is unclear, but approaching Russell directly rather than via the Governor General, hints at an attempt to position the matter as a purely New Zealand domestic affair. The substantive issue was again the desire on the part of the Vice Consul (presumably with French Government support) to develop a direct commercial relationship with New Zealand with the not unreasonable rationale of replacing New Zealand's pre-war imports of high-end German goods with French products. Despite the earlier advice Joe Heenan, a senior civil servant, wrote to the Under Secretary at the Colonial Office in April 1918 to inform him and the Secretary of State of this fresh initiative and to seek further instruction. Heenan and his Minister saw the latest action as that of the vice-Consul 'acting almost in a diplomatic capacity'. They were especially piqued by the reference to strengthening bonds which could be interpreted as a Dominion giving diplomatic standing to the vice-Consul's actions.¹⁵

¹³ Ibid., p.148.

¹⁴ "Hippeau to Russell," in *Overseas Representation in New Zealand - France- Powers of French Consuls 1918-1942* (Archives New Zealand).

¹⁵ "Heenan to the Under Secretary," in *Overseas Representation in New Zealand - France- Powers of French Consuls 1918-1942* (Archives New Zealand), p.1.; "Liverpool to Long," in *Overseas Representation*

The Colonial Office wanted no such local initiatives. The most likely explanation is tradition, again based on the precedent of Lord Elgin's 1906 edicts on the limited role of Consuls in the Dominions. The excuse that the Dominions were not independent as far as commercial trade arrangements went, meant that New Zealand did not have to be further consulted, France did not have to be confronted, and the Empire could continue to function as it had been doing. The reason for the Foreign Office's direction to abruptly drop the matter in April 1918 is uncertain. There do not appear to be any issues pertaining to the progress of the war that makes this an especially sensitive time in New Zealand-French relations. Whatever the reason, the New Zealand Government was clearly told that it could not participate in making trade arrangements with France. Foreign policy remained the domain of the imperial authorities since even the fact of dealing with such a minor matter through the vice-Consul might have implications for foreign relations beyond the brief of a Dominion government.

3.2 General Pau's mission

Despite this rejection, France was to make a further approach in 1918-19 with the visit of the French trade and diplomatic mission led by the retired General Pau (see Chapter Two). There are no direct references in either the Colonial Office files or the Foreign Office records in the British Archives at Kew relating to this initiative. The Archives New Zealand records only include a passing reference to the Mission amongst James Allen's many exchanges with Massey from 1917-18, but little significance seems to have been attached to the visit. Given the extensive publicity at the time and the sensitivity which the Hippeau's actions had aroused, the lack of reaction seems odd; the explanation is therefore more likely to be misfiling or removal of the British records to another collection.¹⁶ As the New Zealand visit took place after the armistice was signed, the

in New Zealand - France- Powers of French Consuls 1918-1942 (Archives New Zealand). Walter Long had already replied when answering Lord Liverpool's earlier request. He had pointed out that such requests should be politely declined without giving offence. Liverpool had indicated he would do so, with some minor adjustments to allow for local sensitivities.

¹⁶ Mervyn Norrish, "Political Relations between New Zealand and France," in *New Zealand and the French : Two Centuries of Contact*, ed. John Dunmore (Waikanae: Heritage Press, 1997). "The French Mission," *Otago Daily Times*, 10 December 1918, p.4.; "French Mission," *Feilding Star*, 20 December 1918, p.3.; "The French Mission," *Evening Post*, 21 December 1918, p.6.; Muckle, "Empire in the eyes of the beholder: New Zealand in the Pacific through French eyes."; Jacqueline Dwyer, "Ahead of their Time: the French Economic Mission to Australia 1918," *The French Australian Review*, no. 59 Australian

original morale-boosting intent was put aside while promotion of both trade and French post-war policy assumed additional significance, although the Mission's original brief had included 'proper development of the world economy'. Amongst the mix of sightseeing and morale-boosting speeches, the structured public statements on French policy towards Germany and trade during the New Zealand leg of the Mission suggests that while the detail of the New Zealand itinerary was *ad hoc*, the diplomatic substance was not.

The precise objectives of the Mission were lost when the original leader - the scholar Emile Albert Métin - died in San Francisco on 16 August 1918 while *en route* to Australia.¹⁷ The Mission's General Secretary, André Siegfried, assumed *de facto* leadership and took responsibility for that part of Métin's role associated with trade and economic development leaving General Pau as titular head. Three agribusiness representatives from the wool, silk and livestock industries respectively, were accompanied by the General's aide and an assistant secretary. A British representative was present during the Australian leg while a French Consular official from Sydney accompanied the party to New Zealand.¹⁸

The deceased expedition leader Albert Métin had received verbal instructions before the mission departed from France, but he did not share these with his colleagues. This suggests that behind the Mission's official brief there were more sensitive objectives which had been restricted to a one-on-one verbal briefing. The mission's typewritten report notes that:

In addition (to) Mr. Métin's more authoritative handling of the economic and political questions ... he knew better than we (i.e. the other mission members), having prepared for the mission in personal conversations with the Minister.

Summer (2015). The Mission's report is vague and simply states that establishing 'closer relations' and giving thanks for the war effort motivated the visit. The New Zealand newspapers successively reported cancellation and then reinstatement of the visit with the arrival port changed from Wellington to Auckland.

¹⁷ "M. Albert Metin," *Wairarapa Age*, 19 August 1918, p.5.; "The French Mission," *Dominion*, 27 December 1918, p.4.; "Albert Metin dies from war strain," *New York Times*, 17 August 1918; Aldrich, *The French Presence in the South Pacific, 1842-1940*: p.279. Albert Métin wrote *Le Socialisme sans doctrines* (1901) following his earlier New Zealand visit. Robert Aldrich appears to have incorrectly concluded that Métin died after the Mission returned to Europe as he says both Métin and Andre Siegfried wrote 'lengthy reports' on their return to Paris.

¹⁸ Dwyer, "Ahead of their Time: the French Economic Mission to Australia 1918," pp.47-49. Two mission members representing labour interests toured Australia but did not travel to New Zealand.

We judged ourselves to be cautious [...] on a number of issues that were not explicitly addressed in our instructions and on which Mr. Métin had certainly received verbal guidance from interested government departments.¹⁹

His colleagues therefore decided that:

Inspired by our written instructions which, in the absence of Mr. Métin, could serve us as a guide, we set ourselves the task(s):

1. to do work of French propaganda [To speak of France everywhere and to all was the essential thing]
2. to investigate various political, military, economic, social ...(matters)
3. to prepare for, through conversations with the Australian Government, such economic or political negotiations in which the French Government may eventually wish to engage with Australia.²⁰

Aldrich concluded that the Mission aimed to foster the French relationship with Australasia (specifically wartime morale and recruitment), to 'facilitate resolution' of territorial issues in Oceania (including the possession of the New Hebrides, a persistent Australasian irritant), and to promote trade. France, Aldrich surmised, foresaw a post-war need for wool and cereals, and there was the possibility that Oceania would in turn source manufactured goods from France as an alternative to Germany.²¹ The New Zealand leg was added to the Mission's visit late in the planning phase, although well before the Armistice was signed. New Zealand's earlier omission may have been because conscription had already been implemented and so New Zealand was not considered to have the same recruitment and morale challenges as Australia. Alternatively, some prescience of victory and the need to celebrate (as Pau had indicated in Australia) may have been relevant, or perhaps the omission of a numerically small ally was simply an oversight. The least likely explanation is that Germany's imminent capitulation caused trade with New Zealand to become a new French imperative.

An official invitation from the Government of New Zealand was not transmitted to the French Government via the United Kingdom Embassy in France until 20 August 1918, but the French Minister of Foreign Affairs had already unofficially asked the Auckland-based French Consul on 9 August 1918 to "facilitate the (mission) during a stopover in

¹⁹ ""French Mission in Australia", in *Oceania, 2nd new series, New Zealand: 31CPCOM / 10: item: report . Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MAE)*, ed. Center of Diplomatic Archives of La Courneuve (Political and commercial correspondence called "New series" 1896-1918), p.6.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p.7.

²¹ Aldrich, *The French Presence in the South Pacific, 1842-1940*: pp.279-80.

New Zealand and informally advise the local (i.e. New Zealand) authorities of the mission's passage". The Ministère des Affaires Étrangères was able to give formal notice of the invitation's receipt to the Auckland Consular office on 28 August 1918. Lord Derby (who had replaced Lord Bertie as British Ambassador in Paris) did not receive formal French acceptance of the New Zealand invitation until later.²² This convoluted procedure involving the New Zealand Government, the British/Imperial authorities in London, the United Kingdom Ambassador to Paris, the Ministère des Affaires Étrangères and the French Consulate in Auckland illustrates both the unwieldy protocols governing New Zealand's foreign relations, and the time lag so many procedural steps required. The back channel used to communicate the Mission's proposed visit shows that direct communication was both possible and far more efficacious than the official diplomatic channels.

The French sources indicate that extending the Mission's journey to New Zealand was given the same priority as travel to the other Dominions. Owing to the 1918 influenza epidemic and the reluctance of ships' crews to travel to an infected country along with the shortage of post-war shipping, there was a real danger of the visit being cancelled. Even a direct appeal for New Zealand assistance while the Mission was still in Australia failed. Nevertheless, Paris urged the Mission to make every effort to travel to Auckland:

It would be very unfortunate if the Mission did not respond to the invitation of the New Zealand Government. Do not give up on the journey to Auckland unless you have found that it is absolutely impossible to find a means of transport. Get in touch with the French Consul in Auckland, who may be able to help you find a passage, and who in any case can prepare the New Zealand Government to recognize the impossibility of where you are.²³

General Pau was finally able to confirm on 18 December 1918 that shipping had resumed, and the Mission could travel on to Auckland.

Official involvement by the New Zealand Government during the visit appeared strangely restrained.²⁴ By all accounts the Mission was well received and there was no

²² "Hippeau to Pichon Le Vice Consul de France à Auckland à son Excellence Monsieur Stephen Pichon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères," in *Oceania, 2nd new series, New Zealand: 31CPCOM / 11: item: report "French Mission in Australia"*

Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MAE), ed. Center of Diplomatic Archives of La Courneuve (Political and commercial correspondence called "New series" 1896-1918), pp.114, 141, 157, 161.

²³ ""French Mission in Australia", " pp.11, 13, 20, 22.

²⁴ Dwyer, *Ahead of their Time: the French Economic Mission to Australia 1918*, p.44. The Australia leg of the tour was meticulously planned but there is no evidence that this was the case in New Zealand.

shortage of crowds attending the public welcomes, despite the visit coinciding with the aftermath of the influenza epidemic. There were no concerns expressed over the risk of direct infection by those in contact with the visitors nor of cross-infection through large-scale public gatherings. Possibly the Mission's visit was for some communities a first opportunity to gather publicly without an immediate fear of disease transmission.²⁵ Since the visit took place during the traditional Christmas holiday break while Massey and Ward were again in the Northern Hemisphere, it was left to Sir James Allen to represent the National (Reform-United coalition) Government. Allen however remained in the South Island when the mission was welcomed in Auckland. The Government was represented by Hon. W H Herries (Minister of Railways), Hon. A M Myers (Acting Minister of Finance), and Sir Francis Bell. The rest of the greeting party consisted of military officers, local body politicians, community representatives and dignitaries with some interest in matters French. Thereafter the main burden of the tour formalities was carried by the local authorities. Allen did travel to Wellington to formally welcome the delegation when they arrived in the capital, and then travelled south with them to Christchurch where they met with the Governor General, Lord Liverpool.

General Pau's preliminary report (telegraphed from Auckland to Paris by the Vice Consul) succinctly summarised the political circumstances in New Zealand. In the absence of Massey and Ward no one in authority was authorised to implement any initiatives or to make decisions on matters involving the 'simple execution (of) current affairs'. Official matters were therefore restricted to what Pau diplomatically called 'useful conversations'. Discussion of matters related to the peace treaty and imperial conference or any consequential decision-making was impossible. Pau's accurate assessment was that New Zealand would follow British policy, and 'does not appear to me to have any claim to an independent policy'. Pau understood the domestic political

²⁵ "The French Mission," *Auckland Star*, 28 December 1918, p.6.; *Evening Star*, 31 December 1918., p.4. The influenza epidemic and the alleged vector - infection through a failure to quarantine the *Niagara* owing to political pressure from passengers Ward and Massey - was still a live issue although it was eventually debunked. It was an allegation that the Mission would have wished to avoid. This is the most likely explanation for the delay in travelling to New Zealand and the party making much of being inoculated against the disease prior to embarkation.

nuances as he stated that the coalition Ministry would only survive in its current form until the next election.²⁶

Despite the apparent restraint of the central government politicians, regional competition for inclusion in the itinerary caused considerable angst and jealousy. Visits to Dunedin (eventually made possible by the *Niagara's* delayed departure from Auckland), Invercargill (omitted owing to timing) and the Wairarapa (poor weather made road travel inadvisable) all provoked comment.²⁷ In some cases the request was merely a plea for a brief train stop.²⁸ In the interests of showing New Zealand to the visitors and the visitors to New Zealand, the party had to travel from Auckland to Hamilton, thence to Rotorua to view the thermal sites; backtrack to Hamilton to pick up the train to Taumarunui, then travel downriver by launch to Wanganui, on by road to Palmerston North and then to Wellington. Crossing to Lyttleton the French met with Lord Liverpool, visited Akaroa and various Canterbury communities, then were made to journey by train to Dunedin and finally returned by a more direct route to Auckland via Wellington for a formal farewell (although Pau was ill and lagged the rest of the party for some of the return journey by two days). In the public record the Mission appeared to set aside its commercial purpose in favour of public relations appearances alongside local politicians. Even when the delegation was engaged in sightseeing, the public statements placed great weight on vilifying Germany and making French policy clear. There were reports of meetings with Ministry officials in Wellington, but even allowing for the holiday season the Mission seemed light on commercial discussions and heavy on the obligatory sightseeing which is still administered by New Zealanders craving acceptance through a positive association with the aesthetics of the landscape. The French commercial representatives stayed longer in some locations to observe industrial or agricultural activity. The overall impression from the news reports suggests that displaying the mission as if it were a public curiosity took precedence in New

²⁶ Gen. Pau, "Telegram Auckland January 31st, 1919: Auckland, le 31 Janvier 1919 – 1 heure recu le 2 Fevrier a 4 h.4: De la part du General Pau," ed. Center of Diplomatic Archives of La Courneuve. Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MAE) (1919), p.45.

²⁷ "The French Mission," *Taranaki Daily News*, 6 January 1919, p.2. "The French Mission," *Southland Times*, 6 January 1919, p.4.;

²⁸ "The French Mission," *Temuka Leader*, 9 January 1919, p.3. Local politicians were not unaware that Local Body elections were to be held later that year.

Zealand eyes over the commercial priorities, probably because the mission was effectively redirected to this end by local interests.

General Pau's many speeches included heavy use of metaphors and drew on his ardent Catholicism. He openly displayed this religious affiliation through visits to Catholic Church institutions and through his meetings with Dr Cleary, the Catholic Bishop of Auckland. Pau referred to a 'blood bond' linking the two countries, the contrition required of Germany to achieve forgiveness (rather like an absolution) and the praiseworthy service of the French priesthood during hostilities. He directly associated the French clergy and their Christian values with fighting for the 'laws of humanity', while the Germans did the opposite.²⁹ There was an obvious association between the Catholic, freedom loving, French people fighting alongside their predominantly Protestant, British allies against an implied godless Germany. In the official report of the Mission the New Zealand war sacrifice is acknowledged through extravagant descriptions such as 'pulses thrilled for the great principles they (the soldiers) were upholding' and 'many of them now lie sleeping their last sleep on French soil'.³⁰ These positions do not appear to have attracted adverse local comment, despite the activity of the Protestant Political League (PPL).³¹

Pau put little faith in the proposed society of nations (i.e. League of Nations) and he did not in any case consider the Germans were fit to be included.³² The alternative was to continue the Anglo-French-based alliance reinforced through commerce, that had been successful during the war.³³ Another report of what seems to be the same speech put even greater emphasis on the control of German trade. In Pau's view, the fear of German dumping would have to be thwarted by removing German control from both her

²⁹ "Welcome To General Pau," *Auckland Star*, 29 January 1919, p.8.; "French Mission," *Hastings Standard*, Volume IX, Issue 14, 30 December 1918, 30 December 1918, p.6.; "The French Mission," *New Zealand Herald*, 30 December 1918, p.6.; "Tribute To Catholic Clergy," *Evening Post*, 1 January 1919, p.5.

³⁰ "The economic relations between France and New Zealand : report of the French Mission to New Zealand, December 1918-January 1919," (Paris: Mission en Nouvelle Zelande, 1919), pp.20-21.

³¹ "Little Sisters Visited," *New Zealand Herald*, 27 January 1919, p.9.; "Tribute To Catholic Clergy." p.5.; Christopher van der Krogt, "Elliott, Howard Leslie," in *Dictionary of New Zealand Biography. Te Ara - the Encyclopedia of New Zealand*. The PPL was to become an issue for Allen later in 1919 but it was for now ignored - at least in front of the French visitors.

³² "General Pau And The League Of Nations," *Wanganui Chronicle*, 25 January 1919, p.4. Pau advocated excluding countries he considered not qualified to belong.

³³ "General Pau," *Ohinemuri Gazette*, 31 January 1919, p.1.

merchant shipping and her sea ports. On the other hand, Germany would have to pay reparations so she had to be allowed some degree of economic recovery. The self-evident contradiction between these policies was not addressed by Pau. Nevertheless, Pau said the allies needed to act to 'reap the full fruits of victory'. He reminded his audience(s) of Germany breaking her word to Napoleon I (committed to in the 1807 Treaty of Tilsit) when she exceeded an army strength of 43,000 men.³⁴ The General's statements summarised with remarkable foresight the contradictions and mis-steps that were to disrupt the post-war world and the historical biases which influenced the underlying policies. The French policies and warnings were not publicly challenged while he was in New Zealand.

Based on the newspaper reports, Pau's uncompromising advocacy of the French post-war attitude towards Germany was well publicised and succeeded in creating an understanding of - and sympathy for - the French position. Despite this, the Pacific territorial issues went unresolved. Thus, the broader long-term implications for New Zealand's Pacific policy were unclear as was the issue of whether the trade opportunities suggested by the Mission would be converted into action. Meeting with Prime Minister Massey in Paris upon his return, Pau publicly praised New Zealand's treatment of the 'natives' and lauded the shared New Zealand-French battlefield sacrifice. Massey in turn 'hoped' that Britain and France would remain Allies, that Germany would pay for the war, and that those who had caused the war would be punished, all of which were themes the mission had reiterated while in New Zealand.³⁵ M. Hippeau's report (telegraphed to Paris immediately after the mission's departure) stressed the goodwill generated by the visit and specifically referred to the interest shown by both the metropolitan population and the 'indigenes'. Hippeau made the point that the enthusiastic reception and overall positive reaction to the visit was even more of a triumph owing to the mix of sentiment at the time, coinciding as the visit did with the war's end, the influenza epidemic, the summer holiday season, and the uncertainty over rising post-war costs.³⁶

³⁴ "Why We Must "Get Together","*Evening Star*, 25 January 1919, p.2.

³⁵ "The French Mission,"*Otago Daily Times*, 19 April 1919, p.8.

³⁶ "Hippeau to Pichon Le Vice Consul de France à Auckland à son Excellence Monsieur Stephen Pichon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères," pp.52-54. The 'indigenes' may have referred to rural dwellers or, more probably, Maori.

The contemporary newspaper reports suggest that the Mission conditioned the New Zealand public to accept a strongly anti-German, punitive post-war posture in accord with Massey's own views and those of the Lloyd George Government.³⁷ The French visitors were often greeted in the spirit of fellow victors or seen as tourists rather than as potential trade partners.³⁸ The Acting Prime Minister (Allen) apparently assumed that Siegfried was in New Zealand to study and would again be writing about New Zealand's social conditions, rather than recognising his leading role within the trade delegation.³⁹ General Pau's well-received speeches and statements stressed the uncompromising political stance which France intended to take during the forthcoming settlement conference in Paris.

The Mission's report concluded that mutual goodwill would be necessary to develop the commercial opportunities within the sectors identified as having the best prospects. In the cliché, trade would follow the flag. Maintaining direct communications would be of great assistance as would a continued interest from universities and intellectual circles in French language and culture. There was also a passing reference to the desirability of French missionaries continuing to visit New Zealand. The Report was however mainly concerned with the commercial and cultural aspects of the visit, rather than two matters clearly of greater importance to the New Zealanders; sightseeing for the visitors and the relationship with the Empire.

Quaint and idiosyncratic though it may seem, drawing attention to the background scenery of mountains, rivers, lakes and thermal activity was an attempt to assert a

³⁷ Kray, "Caging the Prussian Dragon: New Zealand and the Paris Peace Conference 1919," pp.125-126.

³⁸ "Documents related to the French Mission Luncheon with the Otago Harbour Board," in *French Mission* (Dunedin Hocken Collection). The visit was frequently treated as a celebration, not a trade mission. Hippeau did refer in his summary report to Siegfried's study of New Zealand democracy, his knowledge of New Zealand generally and his information gathering.

³⁹ "After-War Problems," *Evening Post*, 24 April 1925, p.17. "André Siegfried," *Le Figaro*, 8 February 1932, p.5.. Siegfried did write after his visit but this work drew New Zealand's attention to the problems Britain faced in trade and population rather than issues specific to this New Zealand visit. *Le Figaro* when reporting his election in 1932 to the Academy of Moral and Political Sciences (de l'Académie des sciences morales et politiques) noted he had been mission secretary during the 1918-19 Australasian visit and drew attention to *La Démocratie en Nouvelle Zélande*, his account of his pre-war study of New Zealand. He would have noted that the pre-War classless society, largely undivided by rigid ideologies that Siegfried had assumed had been renounced by New Zealand was now showing these same characteristics in the post-War era.

distinct national identity even as large swathes of native forest and bush were being converted into an imagined replication of the British countryside. Similarly, while appearing to be a contradictory and therefore illogical reinforcement of British citizenship, the close association with the Empire was a necessary component of what was seen to be a distinct New Zealand character, distinguished by a loyalty to the Empire which exceeded that shown by the other Dominions. The French visitors largely dismissed or overlooked these signals even when their attention was drawn to them.

The French report suggested that the foundations for a closer relationship were laid when the 'unexpected visitors' (i.e. soldiers) had become acquainted with the French people to a greater depth than had those who had visited as casual civilian (presumably British) 'Cooks' excursionists'. In the French interpretation the New Zealand soldiers had got to know the 'real' people of France, allowing 'mutual knowledge' and friendship to develop.⁴⁰ This was a fanciful interpretation perhaps due to the goodwill experienced by the French Mission members in New Zealand. The local cheering was an aberration which lasted only as long as the visit. Like the soldiers who travelled and existed within their own portable cultural tent while in France, the Mission members mistook the temporary friendship extended to them in New Zealand as evidence of a permanent change in New Zealand's disposition towards France.

Thus, while the mission concluded that New Zealand had the legal right to develop direct trade if she so wished and France possessed the goodwill to do so, the commercial opportunities were not vigorously pursued by New Zealand since the cultural realities conflicted with mercantile interests. The Mission was correct in viewing New Zealand as an independent nation, responsible and self-governing. This status, the mission awkwardly but correctly explained, could be sustained while remaining in a free association within the Empire and therefore it was not a challenge to the Empire's primacy in the New Zealand narrative.⁴¹ The French also noted that New Zealand controlled its own tariffs and had the right to make independent commercial

⁴⁰ "The economic relations between France & New Zealand," ed. French Mission to New Zealand (Paris: The French Mission, 1919), pp.9, 17-19.

⁴¹ "The economic relations between France and New Zealand : report of the French Mission to New Zealand, December 1918-January 1919," p.12. The report highlights the perennial French concern with the perceived low birth rate amongst the white population, thereby limiting the potential of the country.

arrangements - a basic legal requirement for any nation claiming sovereignty. These views are consistent with those expressed in the New Zealand Parliament regarding New Zealand's sovereign status when the Versailles Treaty was ratified.

The Mission's report therefore concentrated on a detailed consideration of possible items for export to France (even eggs, flax and honey were included as possible categories) with manufactured goods travelling in the opposite direction. Meeting with the Auckland Chamber of Commerce, Dr Siegfried, M. Mathieu, and M. Leclerq-Motte noted the complementary product range of each country. New Zealand's strengths in primary produce and French expertise in manufactured goods that could replace German supplies made a reciprocal trade agreement a logical step.⁴² One problem was that direct trade suggested direct shipping. The use of non-British vessels to transport goods direct to foreign destinations would remove an essential component of the Empire's perceived economic strength, and undermine the rationale for New Zealand's place in the Empire and the symbolism inherent in her defence by the Royal Navy. As Lord Tweedmouth had pointed out a decade earlier:

It (the sea) is the outlet and inlet of our exports and our imports, and it is to us in these islands the channel through which we get the food and raw material which are so necessary to our vast population. There is one sea, there is one Empire, and there is one Navy, and I want to claim in the first place your help, and in the second-place authority for the Admiralty to manage this great service without restraint.⁴³

For this reason - and for those of cultural dissonance previously discussed - the offer of trade that the Mission ostensibly promoted was rejected by neglect. This was possibly influenced by the London colonial authorities' earlier quashing of the French Vice-Consul's local initiatives on the grounds that the Dominions could not make their own trade-related decisions, but the final outcome was determined by indifference. As Sir James Allen insipidly noted when updating Massey - who was still in Europe - 'I have nothing particular to say about them'.⁴⁴ Although Allen did give Massey some detail of

⁴² "Yearbook collection: 1893-2012," 1919.; "Commerce With France," *New Zealand Herald*, 25 January 1919, p.10. Imports from Germany in 1914 were four times the value of those from France although both were tiny compared to imports from Britain.

⁴³ "Colonial Conference, 1907 (Minutes of Proceedings of the)," (Wellington: Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives Session I, A-05, 1907), pp.129-131.

⁴⁴ James Allen, "Allen to Massey 17 January 1919 - 18 January 1919," in *Miscellaneous files and papers - Allen and WF Massey correspondence 1st September - 1st August 1919* (Archives New Zealand), pp.8-10.

the visit, it seems the significance of an offer of a direct commercial relationship was dismissed, probably because Massey and his deputy remained fixated along with the rest of the nation on trading with Britain by developing the dairy industry. Therefore, from a New Zealand domestic political perspective the Mission proved to be simply a sustained political propaganda campaign which reinforced Massey's uncomplicated public stance at Versailles.

3.3 New Zealand's response to French trade initiatives

Why did the French entice New Zealand with the promise of a direct trading relationship? There were two interlinked reasons – one commercial and the other defence related. The two went hand in hand for when trade was of mutual benefit both parties would wish to preserve and defend it. If France became a significant trading partner, New Zealand's interests would presumably remain broadly allied with those of France. Wool was identified as the significant commercial opportunity because France was a current customer and was eager to secure additional supplies. Although New Zealand's direct exports of wool to France were miniscule, as much as a quarter of the New Zealand wool consigned to the United Kingdom was re-exported to Europe (as noted earlier). Massey was aware that France and Germany were the main buyers as during debate on the Finance Bill (10 November 1920) he expressed concern about the forthcoming wool sales owing to the destruction of French and Belgium mills.

... some of our best customers for wool before the war - France and Belgium in particular - are not now able to manufacture, and therefore not able to buy. They did not come here to buy much before the war, but they did take a good deal of our wool, buying it in England.⁴⁵

Holland interjected (possibly intending to embarrass Massey) to say that, 'A lot of your (sic) wool went to Germany before the war', Massey replied:

I know that. The Germans are getting to work now, but they are not doing much up to the present. The other countries - France and Belgium - will not get up to full production for years to come, and consequently they are not ready to commence to buy our wool in large quantities.⁴⁶

⁴⁵ "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.189: 20th Parliament 1st session," p.922.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.* Selling wool to France either directly or via the United Kingdom denied supplies to Germany.

Although Massey was correct in his recognition of the short-term constraints on opportunities for exports of raw wool to Europe, he was wrong in his prediction of a lengthy delay before the trade recovered. More importantly, recognition of the potential for an expanded continental wool trade could have encouraged extensive sheep farming, possibly resulting in a reduction in dairying and in refrigerated freight to the United Kingdom. This would have undermined Massey's favoured intensive dairying model.⁴⁷ The shortage of shipping in the post-war period alongside British acquisition of the clip made any immediate prospects of an expanded direct trade in raw wool unlikely. Moreover, the New Zealand sheep industry faced another challenge as a reduction in the high levels of frozen meat imports by France was likely, given France's stated aim of self-sufficiency.⁴⁸ The French offer to buy more wool could have been countered with further sales subject to retention of the meat trade. Instead the Mission was informed that all meat exports were now destined for the British market because New Zealand wished to retain her privileged market position there.⁴⁹

The paralysis in decision making owing to the absence of the all-controlling Massey (shadowed by his coalition deputy Ward) is apparent in General Pau's initial report. Although Pau believed that New Zealand wanted to develop wool exports to France (Pau uses the word 'eager') and that local opinion was favourable to such a course his remarks suggest that some form of state control would continue. The responsible Ministers did inform Pau that with Massey absent they could not even make a **recommendation** (emphasis added) to the Inter-Allied Committee in London on the distribution of New Zealand's wool to France during the post-war transitional period. The situation was ludicrous. A New Zealand Cabinet could do no more than seek instruction from London in response to a request from a visiting French delegation who wanted to buy New Zealand wool for delivery to Britain's closest ally and cross-channel neighbour from stocks already available in England. Allen would do no more than telegraph Massey to request a policy statement, and Massey's reply (as reported by Pau) was that no decision had been made. The 'competent' Minister suggested that France needed to specify her

⁴⁷ "Yearbook collection: 1893-2012," 1920.; "The economic relations between France and New Zealand : report of the French Mission to New Zealand, December 1918-January 1919," p.26, pp.61-63.

⁴⁸ It was this (understandable) desire for interdependence through continental self-sufficiency that was to lead to the European Economic Community after the Second World War with its much-ridiculed Common Agricultural Policy. To European interests the policy made perfect sense, given the continent's long history of conflict and the remoteness of antipodean supplies.

⁴⁹ Pau, "Telegram Auckland January 31st, 1919: Auckland, le 31 Janvier 1919 - 1 heure recu le 2 Fevrier a 4 h.4: De la part du General Pau," pp.47-48.

needs in quantity and quality, but this was an obvious holding tactic as no decision about future supply was imminent. Moreover, the Mission was informed that despite France having been informed from London in September that 60,000 bales were available, the New Zealand Government had received 'instructions' on 21 December 1918 that all the wool previously allocated to France was now to be retained in England. Pau reported that the New Zealand Government claimed they were unaware of the reason for this counter-order.⁵⁰ There were clearly significant opportunities for exports of New Zealand produce to France (direct or via the United Kingdom) but these were not encouraged.

The French share of New Zealand's exports duly fell from 3% by value in 1918 to less than 1% in 1919. France was not to reappear as a reported export destination with more than a one percentage point share until 1923. Virtually all the exports to France over this period consisted of raw wool although, as the 1921-22 Year Book noted, there was much concealed behind the headline statistics:

The forwarding trade of New Zealand has never at any time been of great significance, and, prior to 1914, on only one occasion (in 1907) did the amount exceed a quarter of a million sterling. Since 1913, however, this amount has rapidly increased until in 1920 it reached the comparatively huge figure of £813,072.⁵¹

By June 1919 the British Government had accumulated 'huge Colonial stocks' of wool and it was public knowledge that disposal sales had been 'unsuccessful'.⁵² These distortions in the wool trade were a result of war time market regulation meaning that competition - such as it was - could only exist within the managed trade. When these stocks were offered at auction there was strong demand for certain types, as reports

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ "Yearbook collection: 1893-2012." There are several distortions in the data over the 1919-20 years, probably due to reassignment of volumes between years. Moreover, as the Yearbook notes record: "The high totals for 1918 and 1919 shown for "other countries" are mainly due to temporary heavy exports to France in the former year and Egypt in the latter.' An earlier reference from the Year Books suggests that 25% of the U.K. destined clip was re-exported in 1913. Either way, it was a substantial portion of the total.

⁵² "Fin des restrictions en Angleterre," *Le Figaro*, 28 April 1919, p.1. Restrictions on the sale and distribution of goods covered by the General Security Act had been lifted with exceptions, one being New Zealand and Australian wool. This would have favoured British textile producers over their rapidly recovering French competitors.

suggested that the topmakers (producers of scoured and combed 'tops' or long fibres, suitable for spinning) would be beaten by manufacturers who could pay higher prices.

Supply chain problems had resulted in twenty-one cargoes destined for the following May sales having to be re-shipped or landed *en route* to the United Kingdom, thus restricting supply. As a correspondent noted, "Whenever the State interferes (in shipping in this case) there is usually a muddle". Re-export of semi-manufactured wools such as 'noils' (the shorter fibres), still required a War Trade Department License and this would only be issued if the buyer had a recommendation from the French authorities. All this was still in place five months after the armistice was signed, and the reason for any continental blockade - at least as far as France went - was long gone. Costs of transport by rail from London to Bradford were well above pre-war levels. The only means of easing prices was casually identified as 'raw material dropping (in price)'.⁵³ Clearly this was untrue as direct trading would have reduced double-handling in the United Kingdom, trans-shipping costs, internal freight charges and sales commissions. While James Watson's generally favourable assessment of the trade-off between certainty of market access in return for a lower price is fair, it was a stability bought at the price of gross market distortions which hampered the recovery of the textile trade and stifled other potential non-British sales for New Zealand.⁵⁴ With all supplies directed to one market the reversion to the role of price taker for New Zealand growers was an easy answer when manufacturers' margins tightened.

French activity on the open market in response is apparent in the newspaper record.⁵⁵ A February 1920 article included a report dated 11 December 1919 that described French buyers as 'less active' due to an unfavourable exchange rate. Despite this, the correspondent was 'amazed' at the recovery of the French textile trade. While there was no apparent shortage of wool, the industry still had spare manufacturing capacity. Another item within the same report included news of 'very high prices' for West

⁵³ "Our Yorkshire Letter," *Marlborough Express*, 25 June 1919, p.6.. Thilo Nils Hendrik Albers, "Trade Frictions, Trade Policies, and the Interwar Business Cycle" (London School of Economics and Political Science, 2018), pp.329-330. Costs associated with visible impediments are often blamed for trade distortions whereas tariffs, regulations and policies are usually more significant disruptors of trade.

⁵⁴ "Feeding Britain," p.37.

⁵⁵ The referenced reports used for this section are from the random (n=1,000) sample of articles originally drawn and are thus a representative subsample.

Australian Merino wools – a clear market signal in favour of fine wools rather than the predominantly coarser New Zealand cross-bred product. Meanwhile the British Government was intent on bringing wool ‘home’ and selling it ‘to the relief of the British Exchequer’. The (presumably) British writer described the British Government as the ‘custodian for the colonies’ as far as the wool clip went, thus highlighting the parent-child nature of the Anglo-New Zealand relationship.⁵⁶ By March 1920 the *Press* was reporting that ‘French wool buyers were operating freely’ on the London market while over twelve thousand bales of Australian and New Zealand wool were on sale at Antwerp on 28 February, although it is not clear whether these were shipped direct or via London.⁵⁷ Similarly positive reports of French wool buying occurred up until 1924.

There was considerable ‘churn’ in the post-war United Kingdom wool market making the overall trade patterns opaque. Imported wool was commonly re-exported raw or in semi-processed form e.g. scoured or as yarn. Imported wools also displaced British domestic production so that local wool could be exported. Price and quality interacted to determine the ultimate destination while the ease of storing wool (which of course did not require specialized facilities such as refrigeration) made it an ideal commodity for trading. Unlike many other primary products, knowledgeable wool market participants from farmers (producers) to the end users (retail customers) can assess the quality of the material by inspecting the fineness of the fibre (softness), its lustre and its staple length. Fine wool was therefore easily identified. It could be manufactured into high-end fabric for the trend-setting French fashion industry; women everywhere ‘submit ... to the dictates of the Parisian designer’ as the *Otago Daily Times* reported in reference to French woollen garment designs.⁵⁸ Despite some observable differences, other primary commodities such as dairy or meat products rely on branding and trademarking to convey quality and thereby build consumer discrimination.⁵⁹ Hence wool is an ideal commodity for speculative trading.

⁵⁶ “London Wool Sale,” *Dominion*, 21 February 1920, p.12.


⁵⁷ “Commercial,” *Press*, 4 March 1920, p.7.

⁵⁸ “Who Creates The Fashion?,” *Otago Daily Times*, 12 January 1926, p.14. The creative brains were with the French dyers who cooperated with the manufacturers unlike their English counterparts who had the best quality fabric but lacked the creativity.

⁵⁹ Dai Hayward, *Golden jubilee; the story of the first fifty years of the New Zealand Meat Producers Board, 1922-1972* (Wellington, Universal Printers, 1972). Instances of ‘mis-labelling’ of imported New Zealand meat claiming an alternative country of production was not unheard of as an example of the country of origin issues primary producers can experience.

For these reasons, it is extremely difficult to pinpoint exactly where New Zealand's United Kingdom-bound wool clip was finally landed, but circumstantially it seems unlikely that all of it was processed within the United Kingdom whether acquired under the wartime commandeering or not. From 1918 to 1928 the United Kingdom's own domestic production made up only about 20% of the total raw wool available for either local manufacture or export. Britain's farmers produced just over 1,199,000,000 lbs. of wool but an additional 8,892,900,000 lbs. were imported. About 23% (2,041,800,000 lbs.) of the imported wool came from New Zealand, a significant share in a commodity market.

Figure 17: "Sources of raw wool, United Kingdom market" (Main source: *British historical statistics* B R Mitchell, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988)



From a total 8,892,900,000 pounds of imported wool, about 3,339,600,000 or 38% was directly re-exported so only 62% of the total wool available in the United Kingdom whether grown locally or directly imported was consumed (whether spun or weaved, re-sold as yarn or as finished cloth) locally.⁶⁰ This apparent anomaly was the result of some locally-produced British wools being better suited than others for domestic use, alongside the role of the United Kingdom as a clearing house for the continental wool trade. Moreover, a considerable quantity of raw wool was sent to France for scouring before re-importation into the United Kingdom for manufacture. Therefore, although the United Kingdom justified control of the wool trade by wartime imperatives, in practice this meant much of the extremely lucrative New Zealand wool trade was in the hands of British and French merchants and traders.⁶¹

⁶⁰ B R Mitchell, *British historical statistics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). pp.336, 341.

⁶¹ Harland, "Wool Supplies And Consumption: The Requirements Of A British Empire Industry Y1 - 1924/06/01," pp.161-166. The statistics in this source differ slightly but the overall picture is similar. Only about 20% of the wool available in the U.K. was locally produced, the balance being imported from the Empire and South America. About two thirds of the wool thus available in the U.K. whether locally produced or imported was retained for local use with the balance (re-)exported. The bulk went to the Continent with France, Germany and Belgium the major importers. Australia and South Africa were concurrently exporting considerable quantities of wool direct to the Continent.

While the general pattern within the wool trade is clear, the movement of individual consignments is less so. As early as 1920 there were reports of French agents actively competing for New Zealand wools in the United Kingdom market although there were still regulatory hurdles such as licensing controls as well as an adverse exchange rate to overcome. By 1921 the New Zealand High Commissioner was reporting 'fair competition' from France and Germany as a 'sharp recovery' in the French textile industry resulted in demand for raw wool increasing. French textiles again became available in England while Germany remained a potential market for raw wool given the favourable exchange rate. The British Government's involvement through the commandeered system was however a concern. As United Kingdom post-war wool imports rose, surplus commandeered wool was sold outside the public auction system leaving the Home Government vulnerable to allegation of profiteering through the (mis-)use of the stabilisation regulations.⁶²

This situation had arisen because New Zealand and Australian wools were excluded when wartime restrictions on the sale and distribution of most goods covered by the General Security Act were lifted in April 1919.⁶³ The wool commandeered did not officially end until September 1922 although direct trade appears to have already re-started. In 1921 Sir J P Luke MP referred to 20% of the wool clip being exported already scoured in order to save shipping space. He quoted from 'the latest book on wool' which showed that considerable quantities of Australasian skins were 'secured (i.e. imported) annually' by France. The wool was 'pulled' from the hides for scouring and spinning, leaving the pelts for tanning. Some 56,000 tons of skins were so treated in France. They did not all come from direct shipment to France so Luke was implying that a substantial proportion must have been shipped from Australasia to England and then on to France for wool removal before the hides were shipped back to England. France also re-exported 64% of her washed wool output to England. This was a missed opportunity for New Zealand as far as developing direct trade with France was concerned.⁶⁴ In addition,

⁶² "Our Yorkshire Letter," *Marlborough Express*, 25 June 1919, p.6. Although exports of noils (short wool fibres) were soon to be released from the commandeered the buyer still needed a French recommendation to obtain a War Trade Department license. The issue is obscure but the general point stands – regulations were still in force.; "Commercial," *New Zealand Herald*, 14 December 1921, p.8.; "London Wool Sale," *Dominion*, 21 February 1920, p.12.; "Commercial." p.7.

⁶³ "Fin des restrictions en Angleterre," p.1

⁶⁴ "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.191: 20th Parliament: 3rd session," p.839.

as Dr. Thacker MP pointed out, buyers and profiteers in the old country were getting the returns. William Downie Stewart raised the alternative argument - that New Zealand imports of textiles sourced from France and elsewhere on the continent were 'serious competitors to Britain from time to time' - but this assumed Britain could produce and supply the desired end product in competition with the fashionable French.⁶⁵

On 15 August 1922, the Minister of Agriculture (William Nosworthy) told parliament that in the pre-war years 25% of New Zealand's cross-bred wool had been sold to Germany and that 'a tremendous quantity of wool went on to Germany within the last seven to nine months'. Earlier the then Leader of the Opposition (Wilford) claimed to have been astonished that large quantities of the wool sent Home had been re-exported to Germany and that Germany was already purchasing (presumably cross-bred) wools directly from New Zealand. This it was alleged, resulted in large quantities of wool being trans-shipped to Poland and Russia via Germany. In addition, there was active demand for fine, long wool cross-bred fleeces from continental buyers, including France.⁶⁶ By favouring the British market, New Zealand was forgoing significant opportunities for direct trade.

As a result of shortfalls in post-war European supply the New Zealand wool industry attracted particular attention during General Pau's Trade Mission. While in Otago the Mission visited Port Chalmers and the Roslyn Woollen Mills (accompanied by various local dignitaries). The French industrial specialists were willing to forego sight-seeing opportunities in order to inspect the woollen mills more closely.⁶⁷ The Mission members were well aware that direct French imports of New Zealand wool were minuscule (as noted, less than one percent of New Zealand's wool exports went directly to France) and that British war-time acquisition of the clip was a political and economic decision as much as it was a wartime imperative.⁶⁸ They were also aware that a large

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, pp.656, 795.

⁶⁶ "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.196: 20th Parliament 4th session," (1922), pp.285, 291, 292

⁶⁷ "The French Mission," *Evening Star*, 13 January 1919, p.4.. (Again) a rundown in stock and a significant shortfall in production was the major French concern.

⁶⁸ "Yearbook collection: 1893-2012."; Mitchell, *British historical statistics*. The NZ Yearbook series shows wool sent direct to France in 1919 was just 1% of the total exported (1,482,037 lbs. out of 274,246,613 lbs.) UK Import Statistics show 254,000,000 lbs. were imported from NZ in 1919 so the export-import

portion of the clip was on-sold to France via the United Kingdom. The Mission accepted there was 'no prospect' for change in the near future and that the practice of consignment through the United Kingdom reflected New Zealand links and reliance on the United Kingdom. Still, while on a global scale New Zealand remained a very small market participant, the Mission members showed keen interest in this potential source of supply.⁶⁹

According to Vice Consul Hippeau, the French delegates noticed the New Zealanders' interest in the inclusion of commercial men with 'practical business experience' and specialist knowledge of their respective fields amongst the French mission delegates. Hippeau was of the opinion that New Zealand would adopt the same structure for her own commercially-orientated trade missions since it was apparent that this would be more effective than sending 'official persons' to promote trade.⁷⁰ He assumed that New Zealand commercial interests would seek their own path rather than relying on innovation-stifling, Government-led trade. There were within these comments a lesson and an implied criticism of Government involvement in mercantile activity in general. As Hippeau put it, 'indifference, forgetfulness and routine' were the collective 'enemies' of trade development, a task which Hippeau clearly believed was best managed by private interests. This argument is the corollary of Government support for commercial enterprises' market access. Despite the New Zealand Government's default interventionist stance, it was as Hippeau noted, 'very clear from the New Zealand Mission's visit that New Zealand traders have been all over the place'.⁷¹ They were aware of, and had investigated, the international market.

alignment is close with only some 20,000,000 lbs. or 7% of the exported total not included in the UK figures. This may be due as much to timing and/or calculation error as any diversion of supplies elsewhere.

⁶⁹ "The economic relations between France and New Zealand : report of the French Mission to New Zealand, December 1918-January 1919," pp.26, 37-38.

⁷⁰ "Hippeau to Pichon Le Vice Consul de France à Auckland à son Excellence Monsieur Stephen Pichon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères," p.53.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p.54; Carol May Neill, "Trading our way : developments in New Zealand's trade policy 1930s to 1980s" (Massey University, 2010), p.2. As Dr Neill rightly points out: 'New Zealand's external trade has been mediated by government policies because trade between countries is inevitably political' but investigation is needed into the appropriate degree of government involvement within whatever access rights can be negotiated.

The Dunedin French Consulate records include numerous receipts dated from 1919 onwards for payments received when issuing a 'Certificate d'Origin' for wool destined for France.⁷² The records are in some cases for hundreds of bales, but unfortunately they do not record the specific destination or the type of wool beyond the generic description 'laine'. Given the location (Southern South Island) it seems likely that this was a high value, non-generic trade, almost certainly of speciality fine wool from Merino or Merino-cross sheep (such as Corriedales) whose fleeces were deemed worthy of identification as being from New Zealand (if not from a specific farm). By late 1924 there was such strong demand from French buyers for good quality wool that manufacturers had to rely on the 140,000-bale carryover stock from previous seasons. New Zealand production was increasing (Australia's was lagging at the time owing to drought) but nearly all (90%) of the Australasian clip was now bypassing London and being sold direct to buyers in the purchasing country. By 1926 a Dunedin wool sale was reported as having a full bench of buyers including agents from France, Bradford, America and Germany.⁷³

The vagaries of supply and demand in primary produce markets has always been an issue for New Zealand. Changes in volume and type can take years to implement and by the time they are in place the level of demand has often changed. In the mid 1920s *Le Figaro* was reporting a dramatic increase in global wool production compared to the pre-war years. This was attributed to imports by manufacturing countries exceeding their immediate needs. Wool that had been stockpiled in Britain during the war and immediately thereafter was being relocated to replenish lower stocks elsewhere in anticipation of demand exceeding pre-war levels as consumer confidence recovered. The situation was complicated by complaints from the United Kingdom that exports of woollen textiles from France had risen from 2,300,000 yards in 1920 to 9,500,000 yards in 1922. *Le Figaro* tartly responded that English girls were now well-clothed, thanks to this trend, even though wool production within the United Kingdom had fallen. In fact, the United Kingdom's own exports of woollen products were also expanding, thanks to

⁷² French Consul, "Consular Receipts," (Dunedin: Hocken Library, 1920-24), AG514-03.

⁷³ "Values Of Wool," *New Zealand Herald*, 11 March 1926, p.10.; "Chronique Economique: La situation industrielle," *Le Figaro*, 01 September, 1924, p.5.. "Let us point out the growing trend in New Zealand and Australia of making big sales on the spot without wanting to go through London. Thus 90 per cent of the wool production in these two countries is now (sold in) the local market. This is an evolution which it is prudent to take into account."

wool imported from (mainly) Australia and New Zealand. Counter-intuitively it was England's re-exports of raw wool to the Continent that assisted in driving up the United Kingdom's wool imports.⁷⁴

The French woollen industry was aware of these inefficiencies and attempted to resolve them. In September 1924 French wool trade representatives met with those of the principle producer nations (Australia, New Zealand and South Africa) at Bradford. A key issue was the shortage of appropriate classes of wool. As *Le Figaro* pointed out, (from the French point of view) the Romney rams used in New Zealand were siring progeny that were ideal for meat but not for producing the fine wools which France wanted. South Africa blamed imported Australian breeds for lowering the quality of the South African clip as if this was beyond local control. Other peripheral issues included contamination through the use of tar for branding (possibly treatment of shearing cuts was fouling fleeces in the 'shed' or perhaps tar-marked producer brands on the bales was contaminating the wool), fluctuating exchange rates leading to uncertainty in price and the perennial complaint of wool fibre spinners and weavers regarding the use of jute bales, the fibres of which can contaminate the wool yarn and cause flaws in the woven cloth. The suggestion of an umbrella industry association did not receive a response so again a French overture in the interests of developing a trading relationship was left in abeyance with the New Zealand Government showing little or no interest, despite local agitation over wool pricing and industry structure.⁷⁵

The Meat Industry suffered even more Government interference, prompted by the unsubstantiated threat of the American Meat Trusts. Harry Ell, the Christchurch South Liberal MP complained that the five companies involved in the Trust were a threat to the meat markets in France as well as those of the United States, England, and Italy who

⁷⁴ "La Production et la Consommation de la Laine," *Le Figaro (Illustrated Supplement)*, 20 October 1924, p.2. This report was based on data from the International Institute of Agriculture in Rome.

"L'industrie lainiere anglaise," *Le Figaro (Illustrated Supplement)*, 13 October 1924, p.3. *Le Figaro* pointed out that 85% of wool imports came from the Dominions with Australian and New Zealand supplies being counter-cyclical owing to the seasonal offsets between the hemispheres within the annual cycle. The claim that they would even out since New Zealand wool arrived in February-March is specious given the ease with which wool can be stored.

⁷⁵ "Un important conférence lainiere a Bradford," *Le Figaro (Illustrated supplement)*, 29 September 1924, p.4.

were all potential victims of the 'conspiracy' to 'monopolize' the trade.⁷⁶ The issue resulted in the Massey Government's introduction of the Meat Export Control Bill to establish partial industry regulation through a body to be jointly managed by producers and government.

During the debate on the bill in the Legislative Council Sir William Hall-Jones discussed his experiences when trying to establish a trade in New Zealand meat with France.⁷⁷ Hall-Jones recalled the 1911 Roubaix exhibition where lower priced New Zealand meat was showcased to French housewives. Hall-Jones implied this may have influenced subsequent riotous demands for cheap meat. Although the circumstances therefore seemed to be favourable for imports of cheaper, frozen New Zealand-sourced meat, there was no infrastructure (cold storage, specialist meat railway wagons and so on) available and the carcasses were not allowed into France without the internal organs *in situ*.⁷⁸ Hall-Jones attempted to get a trial shipment of ten thousand carcasses into France. With support from the British Chamber of Commerce in Paris he had arranged the infrastructure (cold store, cartage and a French firm to underwrite the venture) but he could get neither Government support nor the meat companies' agreement to prepare the carcasses in accordance with French law. Hall-Jones explained to the Council that in the meantime Argentina had negotiated a lower duty on meat. Hall-Jones obtained French Government agreement to offer the same conditions for New Zealand but he could go no further as High Commissioner. Follow-up action was required from the (British) Foreign Office and the New Zealand Government but nothing was done. As Hall-Jones explained: 'I believe there is a big field to be opened up in France with regard to frozen meat, they (are) using more mutton and lamb than other countries in Europe ...'⁷⁹ The possibility of French consumers accepting frozen meat was borne out by the *Herald's* special correspondent who at about the same time

⁷⁶ "New Zealand Parliamentary Debates v.183 19th Parliament 5th session," p.972. The new legislation also happened to suit the interests of the mainly British-owned local processors.

⁷⁷ "William Hall-Jones," in *Dictionary of New Zealand Biography, Te Ara - the Encyclopedia of New Zealand* (Encyclopedia of New Zealand, 1993). Hall-Jones had been a liberal cabinet minister, acting prime minister and high commissioner in London prior to serving on the Council. He was a remarkably unassuming and deferential politician even to the point of surrendering leadership of the Liberal Government to Ward without contest after Seddon's death.

⁷⁸ "Anglo-Colonial Notes: France and Frozen Meat," *Auckland Star*, 16 October 1911, p.7. A report from *Nord Illustré* describes shipment of frozen lamb to France for the 'New Zealand exhibit at Roubaix' but despite apparently acceptable quality no commercial venture followed.

⁷⁹ "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.194: 20th Parliament 3rd session," (1922), pp.432-433.

reported that six years of war and rising prices were a powerful influence on the French public's preferences.⁸⁰

In the immediate post-war years France was open to developing a trading relationship with New Zealand, but New Zealand chose not to take the opportunity. The case for this proposition is based on three factors. Firstly, any vestiges of pre-war dislike had been ameliorated at least temporarily by the shared sacrifice of New Zealand lives in defence of French independence against German aggression. Moreover, New Zealand was part of a coalition broadly sympathetic with the French position on the post-war treatment of Germany. Secondly, France had taken the initiative to visit New Zealand and investigate possible sources to help overcome shortfalls in supply. Thirdly, France had acquiesced in New Zealand's participation as a separate nation at the Versailles Conference and accepted her aspirations for territorial acquisitions in the Pacific both for immediate economic gain (in the case of Nauru phosphate) and to meet nascent colonial ambitions (in the case of German Samoa). By the time the final wool shipment left New Zealand under the commandeered arrangement in September 1922 the opportunity was almost gone. As the French Mission had somewhat wistfully noted, genuine free trade was unlikely with protective tariffs still in place (and there was no move from New Zealand to remove these).⁸¹ The first French effort to reward the sacrifice and continue the wartime goodwill had been rebuffed.

In January 1923, the French battle cruiser *Jules Michelet* (named after the famed French historian of renaissance expertise) visited Auckland and Wellington on her journey from Australia to New Caledonia. The Mission Leader (Admiral Gilly) highlighted the goodwill and gratitude of the French people, but the *Auckland Star* in particular was either naïve or feigning innocence in observing that 'behind its military aspect there was the penetrating shrewdness of the commerce of France'. The ship was equipped with a fixed display described as a '*Salon du Goutes Francais*' (sic) supported by four

⁸⁰ "Frozen Meat Trade," *New Zealand Herald*, 18 March 1921, p.5. Similar prejudices amongst housewives and wholesalers had to be overcome in the early days of the British frozen meat trade.

"New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.193: 20th Parliament: 3rd session," p.210. Massey had assumed that since continental soldiers had been fed frozen meat during the war they would have carried the taste for it back into civilian life but this did not seem to be the case in France or elsewhere in Europe. Massey was accordingly dismissive of this possibility.

⁸¹ "The economic relations between France and New Zealand : report of the French Mission to New Zealand, December 1918-January 1919," p.53.

commercial representatives from the Departments of Commerce and Industries, Public Works, Foreign Affairs and Colonies.⁸² The New Zealand hosts again seemed intent on a sightseeing tour for the commercial visitors rather than engaging in trade negotiations. The obvious French objective - to strengthen commercial ties with 'the great Dominions allied to France' - was all but politely ignored by a Government which apparently took little active part, aside from reciprocal set piece visits involving Prime Minister Massey while the vessel was in Wellington. M. Petrequin, one of the commercial representatives, stated that France could potentially buy more butter, frozen meat, and wool from New Zealand.⁸³ He repeated the practical observation that appointing trade agents would avoid delays in dealing through London. Moreover, direct shipping would stimulate trade volumes. During one interview in which he expressed these views the reporter succinctly summed up the New Zealand approach: "And what do you think of the surrounding district of Palmerston North?" was the reporter's first question following Petrequin's statement.⁸⁴

A month after this visit the New Zealand Industrial Corporation met. Within a lengthy report it was comfortingly concluded that none of the French products would compete with New Zealand's own secondary industries. The French exhibits were interpreted as a sign that New Zealand should develop her own manufacturing.⁸⁵ More reasoned opinion was offered by some press commentators. The *Bay of Plenty Times* accepted

⁸² "Our French Visitors," *Auckland Star*, 16 January 1923, p.3. Her consort proceeded direct to New Caledonia. "Through French Eyes," *Evening Post*, 25 January 1923, p.8; "Mission From France," *New Zealand Herald*, 16 January 1923, p.8; "Jules Michelet In Port," *Evening Post*, 25 January 1923, p.8.; "Jules Michelet In Wellington Gift To Dominion," *Hawera & Normanby Star*, 26 January 1923, p.5; "Nos croiseurs en Nouvelle-Zélande," *Le Figaro*, 11 March 1923, p.7.. *Le Figaro* described the visit as "A success which will undoubtedly influence the trade relations between the two countries."

⁸³ "The Meat Trust," *Auckland Star*, 26 April 1919, p.12. The fear of Meat Trusts (monopolies) gaining control over the New Zealand meat trade with Britain could have been eased through such diversification. There were indications of French interest in frozen lamb although New Zealand beef was considered to be of inferior quality. Distance remained a barrier.

⁸⁴ "Trade With France," *Manawatu Standard*, 25 January 1923, p.5.; Hayward, *Golden jubilee; the story of the first fifty years of the New Zealand Meat Producers Board, 1922-1972*: pp.5, 7, 13-14. Stubborn loyalty to exporting via the United Kingdom was raised as a cost issue at the time. Hayward notes that rising costs were in part due to the 'clumsy' shipping arrangements and handling in New Zealand - loading delays and calling at numerous ports on the way around New Zealand also highlighted the need to reduce shipping and handling costs.

⁸⁵ "Industrial Corporation," *Press*, 21 February 1923, p.12.; This issue was not new. Industrialists had been urging Government action to support the development of secondary industries to help solve local economic problems (presumably underemployment) and coincidentally assist their own business interests. There was always the fear of major off-shore manufacturers, of which France was one, penetrating the New Zealand market. See: "A Forecast," *Southland Times*, 25 April 1919, p.2.

that the visit was 'principally' to further commerce and that there were 'bright' prospects for trade. Mission member M. Pétrequin had correctly pointed out the low levels of commerce and the potential for French oils, wines and manufactured goods including machinery. France 'would like to take the place which Germany occupied before the war'.⁸⁶ Pétrequin had yet again pointed out that France bought large quantities of New Zealand wool and he urged direct trade and closer relations in the vein of the Pau mission's earlier advocacy. While accepting that it was 'natural' for New Zealand to look to Great Britain, France would still like to be next in the order of suppliers.⁸⁷

By 1926 *Le Figaro* was reporting that the exchange rate was causing problems for the French wool industry. An unnamed French exporter was quoted as saying there was 'no doubt' that the devaluation of the franc had left the wool industry, 'which is obliged to obtain supplies of commodities in high-exchange countries' in difficulties. France – it was noted – was a relatively small and declining producer of wool with some ten million sheep compared to a national flock of sixteen million in 1913 and thirty million in 1860. Since France only produced five per cent of the volume required for her textile industry, about one hundred million kilos of worsted wool ('worth four billion francs') had to be purchased using 'appreciated' foreign exchange. Direct exports to French mills to alleviate supply problems were still therefore a possibility. The manufacturers' concerns were further heightened by the exchange rate fluctuations. Although textiles were benefitting from increased prices, this was a temporary respite until increases in wool prices as measured in local currency worked through the supply chain once the wool stock on hand was consumed.⁸⁸ The writer assumed that Australia and New Zealand

⁸⁶ "Cost Of Clothing," *Grey River Argus*, 2 June 1920, p.2. Although there were indications by 1920 that both British and American traders had got in early with the German textile trades; moreover, it was alleged, so-called French perfumes and soaps were being manufactured in Germany and re-exported via France which was fraudulently claimed as the country of origin.

⁸⁷ "French Commercial Mission," *Bay of Plenty Times*, 7 February 1923, p.2.; "French Industry," *Bay of Plenty Times*, 2 February 1923, p.4.; "Expansion Urged," *Evening Post*, 30 January 1923, p.10. A suggestion of a reciprocal follow-up mission was apparently not pursued, possible because earlier missions had failed through a lack of specific objectives with their reports eventually ending up in Wellington 'pigeon-holes.' See: "New Zealand Trade," *New Zealand Herald*, 31 January 1919, p.4..

"La Production et la Consommation de la Laine." p.2. One *Le Figaro* report suggested that France was pleading for additional wool: "...that exporting countries were unable to supply quantities equal to the average quantities delivered during the pre-war period explains the current tension in prices, which can only be overcome if, the increase in wool production or the decline in consumption, or these two circumstances together (both caused by the high prices in force) will have helped to restore a better balance between supply and demand."

⁸⁸ "Une situation angoissante pour l'industrie de la laine," *Le Figaro Economic Supplement*, 19 April 1926 p.5; "Textiles," *Le Figaro Economic Supplement*, 19 April 1926 p.6.

still planned to build their own plants and that the volume of raw wool for export would therefore diminish (erroneously as it transpired although local production was attempted on a small scale in New Zealand). France, it was concluded, had to develop colonial livestock farming.

Post-war New Zealand had significant market-led (as opposed to production-driven) export opportunities with continental Europe in general and especially with France. The General Pau-led Mission suggested an alternative trade strategy in both wool and sheep meats in part to recognise the sacrifice and friendship of the war years. There was certainly an element of self-interest on the part of the French, who wished to secure the immediate support of their wartime ally and to extend the arrangement into a longer-term interaction which would bind New Zealand through mutual trade to a French-centred Europe. It was nonetheless a future better suited to post-war commercial realities even if it contradicted the old Empire order. New Zealand greeted the visitors politely, showed them the sights, and took nothing in return. The French offer of a toehold in the French market received the proverbial cold-shoulder. Any inclination to exploit these opportunities was suppressed by an overdeveloped propensity to remain firmly in the British trading bloc, reinforced by the extended wartime commandeering, the shortage of shipping and a wish to develop a British-centric dairy industry. New Zealand greeted the opportunity by retreating into the Empire's failing United Kingdom-centred trading model.

3.4 French exports to New Zealand

Trade implies a two-way exchange with each party supplying goods and services to the other from product categories in which they have a competitive advantage. Manufactured goods and higher end consumer products such as brandy, perfume, clothing and so on could presumably have been sourced from France. This required stimulating consumer demand in the case of high-end retail products while encouraging major commercial purchases by Government or private industry of French machinery, tools and equipment to displace formerly German-supplied products. Stimulating consumer demand required advertising, a point made in the Pau report.⁸⁹ The Papers Past advertising content is the best available data source to see whether this was attempted.

Advertising mentioning 'France' or 'French' was only a minor part of the total promotional market in the immediate post-war years from 1918-1924. Only 4% of national advertising volume between 1919 and 1924 including some reference to France or French.⁹⁰ Clothing was the most frequently advertised category.

Figure 18: Advertisements including 'French' or 'France': 1919-1924

(Products not elsewhere included	19%
Clothing	19%
Wine, liquor, tobacco, food	13%
Education	8%
Public Notices	8%
Cleaning Products and Processes	7%
Pharmaceuticals and beauty treatments	7%
Vehicles, machinery, tyres and accessories	6%
Not Relevant	4%
Entertainment	4%
Cloth or material	4%
Furnishing	1%

91


⁸⁹ "The economic relations between France and New Zealand : report of the French Mission to New Zealand, December 1918-January 1919," p.43.

⁹⁰ The analysis is based on simple, raw, counts of advertisements as measured by Papers Past. This measure is crude but acceptable. While it ignores the size of each advertisement, its prominence (font size, for example), the use of illustrations and the attractiveness of the copy it does give a surrogate estimate of the volume. Between 1919 and 1924 Papers Past content had a count of 2,337,754 advertisements (based on the surrogate inclusion of 'the' as explained earlier) but only 104,561 advertisements included the words 'French' or 'France.'

⁹¹ "Papers Past." n = 150 Data are from within-year simple random samples. Each year 1919-1924 has a sub-sample n = 30. The data are unweighted.

Consumer goods advertising is typically instigated by manufacturers and local retailers. In this case a diverse collection of non-perishable products (ranging from cornets and binoculars to French doors and French windows), as well as higher-end consumables such as brandy and tobacco were included. *Haute couture* items - millinery, gloves and gowns in particular - were prominent. The volume of education-related advertising - such as vacancies for teachers with expertise in French tutoring and language - remained stable suggesting that there was no increased interest in the French language or culture in post-war New Zealand. Any halo effect extending from the time of the Mission's visit quickly faded, since despite a general increase in total advertising volume in the immediate post-war years there was a significant decline in French-related copy after 1920.


Figure 19: Advertisement count 1918-1924



Because French related advertising was so insignificant, this trend is lost when the same vertical scale is used for both the total and the French advertising counts. An indexed comparison has therefore been used to compare French related advertising with the overall advertising market. The following chart confirms that the decline was market related (or due to some vagaries in the source data) rather than specific to French-related content.

Figure 20: Indexed France/French advertising 1918-1924


Source: PapersPast



Advertising in two main metropolitan dailies was further analysed to investigate the year on year trend. This within-publication comparison suggests that overall volumes of relevant metropolitan advertising remained steady in the immediate post-war years - albeit with a slight decline - rather than being subject to an abrupt weakening as the above analysis across all publications suggests.

Figure 21: Indexed selected France/French advertising trend

Source: Papers Past



There is therefore no evidence to suggest that in the aftermath of the French Mission's visit there was an attempt by French manufacturers or their local retailers to stimulate market demand through increased consumer advertising. On the other hand, there is no evidence to suggest there was a deliberate rejection of French goods.

General Pau's report mentioned the issue of tariffs and the possibility of obtaining a preferential rate for France but, as was the case with other policy matters, the New Zealand Ministers had demurred owing to Massey's absence. The thought that France might be considered as a special case did not appear to have been considered. Despite the talk of industrial products and the supply of both machine tools and automobiles the only immediate opportunity identified at the time was the provision of equipment for the major hydro-electric developments which New Zealand was planning. Pau did note that Switzerland was the most recent supplier of such electrical and related equipment.⁹²

Following the 1919 French mission's visit, Hippeau pointedly remarked 'that the information obtained by the mission is about the same as the information collected by the Vice Consulate in recent years'.⁹³ He expressed with some force - just as Hall-Jones had expressed in relation to New Zealand meat exports to France - his frustration with the French traders' failure to seize the moment. The goodwill evident during the Pau visit would not last indefinitely, so it was incumbent on the traders to act before the opportunities were lost to American and Japanese interests. Even if trade did not start immediately, it was essential to maintain the relationships in anticipation of future business. Moreover, despite the official approbation that Hippeau had experienced as a result of his own initiatives, many enquiries from New Zealand traders had not been acknowledged by the French suppliers. The discouraged New Zealand traders had looked elsewhere. In plain language Hippeau made it clear that there was little point in promoting French goods if the exporters were unwilling to engage and it was up to them to act. The reasons given in the official mission report for their tardiness - the small size of the New Zealand market and the not unrelated problem of direct shipping - are the most probable reasons for the failure to tackle the bigger issues of imperial preference, tariffs and non-specific trade barriers. Unsurprisingly, direct exports from France to New Zealand in 1925 were valued at just £918,600 sterling while direct exports from New Zealand to France were a similarly insignificant £600,800.

⁹² Pau, "Telegram Auckland January 31st, 1919: Auckland, le 31 Janvier 1919 - 1 heure recu le 2 Fevrier a 4 h.4: De la part du General Pau," p.47.

⁹³ "Hippeau to Pichon Le Vice Consul de France à Auckland à son Excellence Monsieur Stephen Pichon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères," pp.54-55.

Manipulation of trade using tariffs to either counter the effect of monetary policy (avoiding the consequences of exchange rate changes) or to protect local industries became a significant issue in the late 1920s and 1930s as protectionism through tariffs was advocated by many countries in support of local employment. Despite claims of mutual goodwill and positive intent, France received no preferential treatment within the New Zealand tariff structure. On 20 March 1927 *Le Figaro* noted that a time limit set by New Zealand's Special Commission on Customs Tariff for submissions by foreign goods importers would expire at the end of March. The commission would then prepare a report by June 30th and the Dominion government would thereafter revise tariff levels. *Le Figaro* said 'greater facilities' would be given to British goods, but it was feared that imports from other countries would suffer. *Le Figaro* also noted that '... French products, in the absence of any trade agreement, pay about 40% ad valorem'.⁹⁴ The high value of French goods was therefore of itself a determinant of significant taxes. Such goods remained positioned at the high end of the market and probably outside the consideration set of most New Zealanders. Marketing of French goods in New Zealand was consequently left in abeyance and so French goods did not feature in the forthcoming wave of pre-1930s consumerism.

During the 1920s there had been several allegations of unfair French trade advantages due to cheap labour. J. T. Hogan MP (Independent, Rangitikei) said that when France was being 'swamped with luxuries' she put an 'embargo' on them and stopped the trade within twenty-four hours.⁹⁵ Sir Thomas Mackenzie (Legislative Council) and others said that as Britain was the only free trade country it was difficult for her to compete against France, Italy and Germany who protected their local markets. Mackenzie claimed that British workers were no more productive than workers elsewhere but their pay was greater and hence British manufacturing was uncompetitive. Mackenzie recognised the danger for New Zealand's exports if the British market was damaged, but he concluded that intra-empire exchange could substitute for free trade.⁹⁶ Mackenzie did however

⁹⁴ "Nouvelles de L'étranger: Nouvelle-Zélande," *Le Figaro*, 20 March 1927, p.4.

⁹⁵ "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.221: 23rd Parliament: 2nd session," (1929), p.472. In full cry Hogan said that was what Mussolini would do. After an interjection he pulled back from that position while still calling for more drastic action.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p.130.

specifically mention the danger for the British woollen industry occasioned by cheaper manufacturing in continental locations.

By 1929 H. M. Rushworth MP (Country Party, Bay of Islands) was arguing that New Zealand had one of the highest costs of living in the world while France had one of the lowest. If so, the unfair impact of allegedly low French wages could easily be explained by a lower cost of living. The burden of New Zealand's higher cost base, Rushworth complained, was passed through the economy to the primary producers who had no ability to cut their costs and hence bore the brunt of a high cost economy, a familiar argument from the farming lobby.⁹⁷ The implication was clearly that luxury exports destined for New Zealand could be manufactured at a competitive cost in France but the option of accessing this opportunity by encouraging direct supplies of fine wool to France went unremarked.

George Forbes' statement prior to the 1930 Imperial Conference indicated how disconnected New Zealand had become from changing trade realities. 'We in New Zealand are in a happy position in our geographical isolation from the problems of the Old World and in our very complete economic affiliation to the United Kingdom'. He claimed that New Zealand could concentrate on domestic problems without concern for 'international friction'. Forbes hoped that he could negotiate trade agreements with Canada and France while overseas, an objective which contradicted the previous points regarding New Zealand's isolation and economic security.⁹⁸ Within a year the policy of reliance on the United Kingdom was being questioned, sometimes bluntly. In 1931 W. P. (Bill) Endean MP (Reform, Parnell) described Britain as a third-rate economic power of indeterminate military status. Endean said an unnamed French economist had observed that the United Kingdom had 'changed over' from being the workshop of the world based on coal and iron (i.e. industrially based) to a service and trade-based economy reliant on insurance, banking and shipping. New Zealand was consequently suffering in her main market while the British could not compete with the other European countries owing to higher domestic labour costs. Were there any fault, it was

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, p.195. This reflects the apparently insoluble conundrum when a supplier elects to sell into a single market and then complains of the consequences when they become a price taker not a price maker. The only apparent solution within these boundaries is to lower costs to lower the price.

⁹⁸ "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.225: 23rd Parliament: 3rd session," (1930), pp.91,93.

as usual implied to be beyond local control for Endean stated that if France was 'amenable to reason' with respect to debt, the economic situation could be restored.⁹⁹

When the 1932 Ottawa Conference on which so much hope was placed finally convened, New Zealand was again mentioned in several *Le Figaro* articles. Much of the reporting was narrative but Lord Hailsham's comment that anything less than success would split the Empire was noted, as was his less than ambitious statement that "it may be that we cannot do all that we are asked to do, (but) we will certainly do something". Some three weeks after this announcement a list of the preferential tariffs granted by Canada to goods from Britain and other Empire countries was released and published by *Le Figaro*. The French newspaper noted that counter-measures were to be taken against foreign countries deemed by the Empire to be 'dumping' exports. This was understood by *Le Figaro* to imply that Russia was the guilty country. *Le Figaro* further noted that J. H. Thomas, the 'Minister of the Dominions' (the British Secretary of State for the Dominions) had summarised the Empire-Commonwealth position when he 'announced the certain success of the conference, with agreements to be signed that subordinated individual interests to the common good with the ideal of cementing the British Empire'.¹⁰⁰

3.5 Outcomes and implications

An *Auckland Star* editorial credited the Pau-led Mission with two objectives viz. to firstly give the visitors an appreciation of New Zealand and secondly to explore commercial opportunities. The order of these two objectives told its own tale as far as New Zealand's priorities are concerned. The Mission report on the other hand, said the objectives were to thank New Zealand and to prepare for closer relations in the social, intellectual and commercial spheres consistent with the idea of continuing the alliance rather than relying on the League of Nations. The two sets of objectives overlap but have a marked divergence in their priorities. The end of the war, as the *Star* editorial went on to say, presented an opportunity for greater social and commercial interaction between the allies. The French position proved to be more specific and positive compared to New Zealand's subjective, less assertive view. While tariffs and preferential trade barriers

⁹⁹ "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.228: 23rd Parliament: 5th session," p.447.'

¹⁰⁰ "La Conférence d'Ottawa," *Le Figaro*, 30 July 1932, p.3; "Les conclusions de la Conférence d'Ottawa," *Le Figaro*, 20 August 1932 p.3.

were acknowledged there was no immediate attempt from New Zealand to remove them, at least until an adjustment in 1920 that was slightly more favourable to France.¹⁰¹ The *Star* accepted that the European allies would want to secure their domestic markets for themselves, but they also felt the need to recognise opportunities beyond these immediate priorities. The 'community of material interest' had been shown by history to be a basis for cooperation and friendship and this opportunity now existed between the British Empire on the one hand and France on the other. Personal acquaintance, as demonstrated through the quasi-sacred symbolism of jointly spilled blood, was a precursor to such bonds.¹⁰²

Acting Prime Minister James Allen either completely missed or simply dismissed the trade opportunities on offer when Pau visited. Massey's New Zealand seemed content with continuing the wartime trading arrangements whereby the British purchased New Zealand product on the assumption that this arrangement could continue in perpetuity. When difficulties arose, exporters appeared to simply hope that the British policy of free trade would be replaced by Imperial preference. This proved short-sighted for not only were the wartime trading arrangements terminated by the British, there was also active resistance to them especially within some sectors of the rural industry. With France snubbed and memories of the Pau Mission fading, the public's relationship with official France lapsed into a mix of cultural and sporting contacts, supplemented by arms-length interest in French-related commerce, transport and technology. Even as New Zealand neglected opportunities to engage with France, economic and political developments were changing the world and challenging what New Zealand saw as the Empire's hegemony.

Despite the introduction of Producer Boards and attempts to control and direct trade activity through them, significant flaws remained in New Zealand's trade strategy. These were observed but ignored. In 1932 Robert Masters (then Minister of Industries and Commerce in the United-Reform Coalition Government) told parliament that the Boards had no control or detailed knowledge of the £8,000,000 of New Zealand produce re-exported to Europe by the United Kingdom. Masters was unequivocal in his

¹⁰¹ "Notes Of The Day," *Dominion*, 29 June 1920, p.4. This was described as removing 'an unjustifiable handicap' and as 'something tangible' that resulted from the Pau Mission.

¹⁰² "The French Mission," *Auckland Star*, 27 December 1918, p.4.

declaration that the Boards should be in closer touch with foreign Governments and it was up to New Zealand to develop her own marketing efforts outside the United Kingdom. Well ahead of contemporary ideas, he pointed out that the various producer boards were too focussed on production in New Zealand rather than marketing. He mused:

The thought has occurred to me at times whether the Boards are at the right end of the world - whether they should be in New Zealand or in London. Because after all, we may produce the finest possible article; but unless it is marketed properly, we do not get the true value of our products.¹⁰³

W. H. Field MP (Reform, Otaki) observed that the marketing of New Zealand wool was 'entirely in the hands of Bradford' and that competitive purchasing from Japanese, German and French buyers had been 'our only saving' as far as price went.¹⁰⁴ In 1934 it seemed inconceivable that these three developing markets - of which New Zealand knew so little - would soon to be at war leaving New Zealand even more dependent on the United Kingdom. New Zealand neither led nor followed, but rather chose to follow the trade policy trajectory set by Massey over fifteen years earlier, while blaming any adverse consequences on the policies of others.

¹⁰³ "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.232: 24th Parliament 1st session," (1932), pp.487-8.; "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.233: 24th Parliament 1st session," (1932), p.77. Separately, Alfred Ransom (United Party and cabinet minister 1928 - 1935) quoted the value of primary produce imports by country: France imported £52,000,000 while Germany imported £77,000,000 and Canada and Belgium were also importers. New Zealand's direct exports to these nations was just £2,750,000 whereas Australia alone had sent £10,000,000 of her exports direct to France in 1929-30. 'If we are not careful other Dominions will outstrip us in the race for these markets,' Ransom said. He claimed New Zealand producers were too dependent on the Government.

¹⁰⁴ "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.238: 24th Parliament 4th session," (1934), p.239.

4. Post war options: empire citizenship, independence, or membre de la Société des Nations?

The main "sujets du jour" with implications for development of an independent New Zealand foreign policy included international relations (circa. 10% of the articles within Politics and Law), commerce and trade (12%-13%) and economics (12%, although this declined to under 10% after 1925.) Similarly, events relevant to la Société des Nations straddled international relations (10%), relations of states to organised groups (3% to 4%) and systems of Government (2% or less). Although international migration and colonisation made up only 5% of the article count, these included a significant number of topics that might otherwise have been considered domestic affairs.

* * * *

With regard to the scope of the mission given to Mr. Métin from a political point of view, it will be difficult, given the special situation of the Commonwealth (Communauté) of Australasian colonies in relation to the Metropolitan British Government, to charge the head of the mission (with) anything but studies, observations, and a friendly advocacy role with local government leaders.¹

Instructions to the French Mission, 1918

New Zealand remained a faux-British political space between 1919-35, as shown by the continued close cultural and economic engagement with the British Crown and Empire. Felicity Barnes' work suggests that the positioning of London as a New Zealand metropolis in the post-war years was symptomatic of this self-determined will to retain a British identity, even if it was one which contained elements of a distinctly New Zealand culture not too dissimilar to the position of the Scots or the Welsh within a Greater Britain.² The obvious unwillingness of New Zealand to leave the British orbit contradicts later assertions that a new mood favouring national independence existed in fact or aspiration. If there had been such a mood, some evidence of dissonance or dispute would surely have been apparent.³ An obvious post-war case was the Dominion of Ireland. The sovereign status of that Dominion conflicted with a nationalist movement desiring independence.⁴ Discord, not necessarily evidenced by armed revolt

¹ "The Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Under-Secretary of State attached to the Presidency of the Council," in *31PCOM / 9 piece 42* (Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MAE), Center of Diplomatic Archives of La Courneuve, July 1917).

² Barnes, *New Zealand's London : A Colony and its Metropolis*: pp.4-7. A distinct character such as the London cockney or the Newcastle Geordie can comfortably survive within a broad national identity.

³ Rachael Bell, "Introduction: A nation on the cusp," in *New Zealand between the wars*, ed. Rachael Bell (Massey University Press, 2017), p.11. This common assertion of a new post-war independence is a common feature in the New Zealand historiography. New Zealand's rejection of the 1931 Statute of Westminster provides additional contrary evidence.

⁴ David Reynolds, "The long sacrifice," 144(2015). The political divisions evident within the Irish Nationalist movement are noted as are the divisions within New Zealand society especially those centered on Māori grievances.

would have been similarly evident in New Zealand, if a newly emerged independent character, determined to shape a separate path, had evolved.

It is also questionable whether a War or any other singular event could have resulted in the emergence of a distinctly New Zealand character. As much as the war contributed to defining who the New Zealanders were, the two post-war decades helped define New Zealand's identity by showing who 'we' were not. Confusion about the aims of the war contributed to this process. Leaving France emotionally as well as physically was not only a rejection of the war and its direct consequences but also a rejection of France and the French re-imagined as a more likeable presence and people. If New Zealand's London was a constant (as Felicity Barnes has argued) then so too was New Zealand's version of France as a competitor of the British.⁵ It therefore seems doubtful that there is evidence to support the contention that the war 'undermined ... imperial ties' from New Zealand's point of view.⁶

As Felicity Barnes noted, if London as the centre of the Empire lacked the boulevards and grandeur of Paris, it was still New Zealand's place, perhaps because in part its appearance was spatially less majestic and more compact in keeping with New Zealand's self-image of understated achievement. People in the United Kingdom spoke the same language. There was no 'skiting' in the day-to-day inelegance of London's streets as there appeared to be in Paris, thus making the iconic monuments such as Nelson's Column or St. Paul's even more memorable when they were first glimpsed. Moreover, the war had shown that the British Empire 'worked'. The Dominions rallied to the cause by mustering bodies to fight and delivering essential supplies to sustain life at Home whereas the French Empire had (to British eyes) demonstrably failed, because it needed to be saved by the British. Judged on the tone of the early post-war intra-empire meetings and conferences as well as the international meetings at which the Empire appeared to act *en bloc*, the post-war British Empire was a successful political entity. Inarguably though, cracks appeared within the Empire as well as between the Empire and France once the common enemy had been defeated. Being British was not as simple as it sounded; the French ally appeared to be determined to maintain her traditional

⁵ Barnes, *New Zealand's London : A Colony and its Metropolis*: p.15.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp.68-69, 82-83.


European antagonism towards Germany while on the other offering New Zealand a direct relationship that could bypass the Empire.

Post-war New Zealand had three co-existing, interchangeable identities: it was simultaneously a member of the League of Nations, an Empire adherent, and a nominally independent nation. The motivation for Government inaction over trade with France - or action such as supporting Britain during the Chanak crisis - can therefore be construed as the decisions of an independent country taken in its own interests, or as acts showing obsequious subservience to British Empire policy, or even as the result of implementing a League policy to meet some vaguely defined universal interest. Since national governments are rightly held to account based on their ability to meet the collective interests of their citizens (rather than those of a higher sovereign authority) the motivation matters. The debate over New Zealand's path from British colony to independent state should not therefore be deprecated as solely an intellectual indulgence without purpose. Examination of the motivations underpinning decisions such as the rejection of the French advances, can indicate whether these were taken in the interests of New Zealand as a sovereign state or in the interests of Britain as a governing power. The evidence suggests that the delineation was unclear and that this manifested as uncertainty as to where New Zealand's interests lay and therefore how New Zealand should act in relation to France.

New Zealand historians have debated New Zealand's constitutional status by assuming that as New Zealand is now independent, there must be a time when responsibility switched from political reliance on Britain and the vestiges of Empire to true independence.⁷ The issue has been confounded by a failure to identify a specific event - rhetoric aside - that unequivocally demonstrated independence, notwithstanding the claims of Massey *et al* that independence was one result of the Versailles Treaty. Moreover, membership of the League of Nations suggested there was a third option of interconnected, global citizenship which could accommodate variations in

⁷ W. David McIntyre and Canterbury History Foundation., *When, if ever, did New Zealand become independent?*, The Jim Gardner lecture 2002 (Christchurch, N.Z.: Canterbury History Foundation, 2002).; McIntyre's lecture is a typical example. The debate will remain unresolved because New Zealand has no definitive declaration of independence, day of regicide or treaty signing that ended colonial rule despite the (then ignored) 1931 Statute of Westminster, the earlier Balfour Declaration and so on.

constitutional status. Conceptually, New Zealand's national identity can therefore be



imagined as a relocatable point within a triangular space defined by three reference positions.

Figure 22: Options for independence

The first point is that of a small, nominally-independent, lightly-armed, geographically-isolated but export-dependent nation (a common cliché in the New Zealand historiography and public self-perception of today), the second a point occupied by a blameless, unaligned, disarmed and powerless global citizen reliant on moral right as a defensive stance (a pose typically idealised by League of Nations internationalists in the post-war years) while the third point is defined through membership of a like-minded political bloc such as the British Empire. New Zealand's conundrum lay in locating a stable position within this imaginary triangle which would be in the national interest.

Prime Minister Massey saw the ideal position as anchored to Empire citizenship, whereas Labour Leader Holland imagined - as far as can be judged of a politician who never had to implement his policy - the appropriate space to be closer to the point of the non-aligned, idealised, global League member. New Zealand's imaginary and transient location ebbed and flowed between these two points between 1918-1935. Because the same ebb and flow applied to other nations including Great Britain and France, New Zealand's position was continually re-adjusted by their political shuffling

and economic jostling. This constantly redefined the relative positions so that aspirations of achieving continuity and stability were illusory.

At the beginning of the twentieth century the scholar and intellectual (Sir) Richard Jebb suggested that the British Empire would remain cohesive only as long as the (predominantly) white Dominions were not forced to choose between federation and complete independence.⁸ In other words, the existence of the Empire depended on maintaining flexibility through an equivocal constitutional status. While Balfour's reference during the 1926 Imperial Conference to the 'rapid evolution' of the Dominions was describing a process that appeared natural, undeniably progressive and all embracing, it was not welcomed without qualification by New Zealand Prime Minister Gordon Coates and all his counterparts since progress would disrupt the current equilibrium.⁹ Having staked New Zealand's economic future on Empire membership, Britain's interest in economic gain and diplomatic interactions elsewhere was far from reassuring since this raised the possibility of Britain metaphorically leaving the existing mature Empire and abandoning her 'much petted sons'.¹⁰ Although the need for Britain to change was accepted, British attempts to maintain an ordered structure of the Empire through actions such as securing peace in Europe, defending that vital eastern route to the Pacific through the Suez Canal and the construction of the Singapore naval base would have been a comfort to New Zealand.¹¹

Having elements of an independent sovereign state, League participant, and loyal member of the post-war Empire within the national makeup meant New Zealand could theoretically have chosen any one of those three hats to deal with non-Empire nations. Once the French offer of trade had been rejected, it was unclear to France which position New Zealand would occupy. The decline in French interest in developing a deeper relationship was a reaction to this confusion. Given negligible direct trade, the existence of the League of Nations to resolve inter-country disputes and the

⁸ Ward, *Transcending the Nation: A Global Imperial History?*, pp.45-56.

⁹ As was common at the time, Balfour's explanation implied an influence from an unstoppable Darwinian progression.

¹⁰ "Mr Massey," *Press*, 25 January 1924, p.8.. *The Guardian's* term reportedly stung Massey; it was too close to the truth.

¹¹ "Imperial Conference, 1926. Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives, 1927 Session," pp.9, 18, 22.

continuation of an Empire structure to manage the Anglo-French relationship, there was neither a need for a direct association nor for supplementary diplomatic initiatives from the French viewpoint. Likewise, New Zealand simply bundled France with the 'others' until some matter of consequence arose. The status most appropriate for the situation was then adopted.

4.1 *Empire citizen*

We are too apt to talk of the past as if we saw it embedded in our culture like an ancient monument in a modern city; yet we know this is far from being the case. For a very small number of men, keenly interested in history, it is a complex of riddles asking to be solved, whose progressive elucidation is a series of victories over chaos.¹²

André Malraux

On 24 January 1924, the *Press* reported Massey's return to New Zealand after a five-month absence and noted (as if it were a matter of some pride) that this was his fifth offshore journey in eight years. In the 2,709 days between 24 August 1916 and 24 January 1924 Massey had been offshore for 1,020 days or approximately two years and ten months, the equivalent of one day in three. Based solely on the duration of these visits an outsider might accept the proposition that Massey was a resident of the United Kingdom with responsibility for representing the Empire in New Zealand, thus requiring his presence on station for about two-thirds of his time.¹³ Massey not only voluntarily fulfilled this role as an envoy – the Governor General remained as the sovereign's representative – he exceeded his brief. While Britain was trying to extract itself from Empire obligations as far as the Dominions were concerned (especially once Ramsay Macdonald's Labour Government took office) Massey was attempting to thwart Britain by encouraging and deepening intra-Empire links. His continual shuttling between London and Wellington was symptomatic of the inherent instability in his chosen policy and the consequent need for constant updates and adjustments.

¹² A. Malraux, *The Voices of Silence*, trans. S. Gilbert (Princeton University Press, 1978). p.619.

¹³ Gustafson, "Massey, William Ferguson."; "Mr Massey." p.8. Overseas travel dates from Gustafson (days in brackets): 24 August 1916 to 25 June 1917 (305); 2 May 1918 to 12 October 1918 (163); 12 December 1918 to 5 August 1919 (236); 16 April 1921 to 30 September 1921 (167); 28 August 1923 to 24 January 1924 (149). Between the start of his 1916 visit and his return in 1924 Massey spent 1020 days out of 2709 away from New Zealand. As a former expatriate this writer and his former colleagues would not have found this to be an extraordinary proposition, even in the modern period of air travel.

Richard Jebb's theory of Empire continuity sustained within an equilibrium between independence and federation may have been validated if British political changes had followed a continuum of steady Whig-like progress. They did not however, and neither did New Zealand's development follow a smooth progression, especially when economic reality intervened. Changes in New Zealand or the other Dominions were a disruption to the Empire and vice versa. In his remarks following his return in January 1924 just as the Macdonald Government was assuming office in the United Kingdom, Massey sensed the risk to his Empire-centric vision through the forthcoming changes in Britain. He therefore pointed out that the recent Imperial Conference had considered or acted on five significant points, specifically: the best way to develop the overseas territories and possessions, how to ameliorate the United Kingdom's (industrial) depression, the (naval) means of defending the Empire, fixing the reparations that Germany owed, and assisting in the resolution of European (i.e. French-related) problems.¹⁴ Despite Massey's optimistic interpretation, the consensus amongst the conference participants had in fact faded as differences between the Empire members emerged. Moreover, Massey had to concede that the fate of the decisions from the latest Imperial Conference ultimately depended on the British Parliament as the 'senior' authority. Through this observation, he simultaneously undermined the point of the conferences as he had justified them (consensus decision-making) while concurrently acknowledging that significant decisions were beyond New Zealand's control.

Massey therefore diverted attention to the policy of imperial preference which he said was the bond that could keep the Empire together. Massey rejected any suggestion that there was no return for the United Kingdom in the Imperial Preference model by claiming that New Zealand gave British manufacturers preference on four hundred and twenty-five imported items. Whatever form future conferences of the Empire take, he concluded, "... there will be no question as to the loyalty of New Zealand".¹⁵ This unnecessary blank cheque demonstrated Massey's desperation to hold New Zealand's position, his conservative mindset, and the redundancy of Empire consultation since control of policy and direction was thereby ceded to London. From the French point of

¹⁴ "Mr Massey." p.8.

¹⁵ "Premier Returns," *Auckland Star*, 24 January 1924, p.7.. The conference could not implement imperial preferences for primary produce despite strong sentiments in favour of developing and protecting intra-empire trade. Massey conceded that it was the right of the 'senior parliament to accept or reject recommendations from the Imperial Conference on trade and other matters.

view (as is discussed later) these comments must have indicated that New Zealand was still by choice identifying as a colony under British control.

Tony Ballantyne has argued that new interpretations of the archive help clarify the points of blockage and silence, as well as those on which they speak. He advocates a critical reappraisal to understand what is absent, along with consideration of the ideological constructs used to decide what was preserved.¹⁶ In following his suggestion it is notable that the New Zealand Archive includes extensive records of the interactions between Britain and France from 1918-1935 and beyond. These British-sourced records have been filed using at least ten different record groups, thus indicating the degree of complexity and gravitas of the post-war Anglo-French relationship. 'France' and the 'United Kingdom' serve as the primary descriptors with a third party or topic such as 'Germany', 'Saar' and 'Foreign Policy' used for sub-classification.¹⁷ The documents duplicate memoranda and file notes that were assiduously copied in London for forwarding to the New Zealand Governor General's office. They were then filed by the New Zealand Prime Minister's Department and its successor Government agencies responsible for foreign relationships. Their presence in the New Zealand Archive suggests that the New Zealand Government was as thoroughly briefed as any other part of the greater British state on the relationship with France. The formal delivery channel required the Governor General as the first recipient to forward the communications to 'his' Government, thus perpetuating the traditional colonial power structure and the role of the vice-regal presence within it. The Governor General or his officers had the opportunity to intercede whether it was constitutionally appropriate to do so or not. One handwritten note in the files from (then Governor General) Lord Jellicoe to Massey suggests that Jellicoe - who was known for going well beyond the constitutional boundaries of his office - unabashedly did so.¹⁸ The preservation of this note suggests that Massey and his subordinates believed there was nothing to hide.

¹⁶ Ballantyne, *Webs of empire : locating New Zealand's colonial past*: pp.178-179, 185.

¹⁷ Government, "Countries - France - External Relations - Saar."; United Kingdom Government, "France - Economic Affairs - Currency," (Archives New Zealand, 1925-1940). Scholars may have overlooked these voluminous records because they replicate the London archive or perhaps because they do not appear relevant to direct interactions between New Zealand and France or Anglo-New Zealand relations. Their significance lies in their existence within the local archive.

¹⁸ Ian McGibbon, "Jellicoe, John Henry Rushworth'," in *Dictionary of New Zealand Biography. Te Ara - the Encyclopedia of New Zealand* (2018).

19.1.22

Dear Mr Massey

I enclose a copy of a telegram just received. I know your views as to the necessity of unity between all portions of the Empire in matters affecting Defensive or Offensive Treaties, and you may desire that New Zealand should be amongst the first of the Dominions in her assurances of complete accord with the Imperial Government in this matter. She has usually led. If so it would be desirable to send a telegram quickly and possibly you might wish a copy gets communicated to Australia, Canada and South Africa.

Yours sincerely Jellicoe¹⁹

It seems likely that Massey's successor (Gordon Coates) was referring to this extensive file series and vice-regal interference when he admitted in Parliament in 1926 'that we may not have taken sufficient pains to organise ourselves in a way to rightly and quickly interpret all the communications that came along'. This cryptic comment was followed by Coates' observation that New Zealand needed an expanded foreign policy infrastructure to meet new demands.²⁰

Not only was Coates probably making an oblique reference to the forwarded British records, he was also possibly referring to the Government's reliance on Sir Cecil Day for foreign policy advice. Many of the memoranda and documents have been marked with a rubber stamp informing the reader that these are 'Sir Cecil Day's Notes'. Sir Cecil was the Governor General's Secretary, described by the *New Zealand Herald* (when Day was knighted in 1932) as having '... spent more than 20 years as the right-hand man of successive Governors-General. The honour now conferred upon him fittingly recognises these years of indefatigable and unobtrusive but invaluable service.'²¹ From the contents of Day's notes, his later appointment as a liaison officer with the New Zealand High Commission once he returned to London, and his close contact with successive New Zealand Governments, it appears that Sir Cecil functioned as a *de facto* foreign policy advisor. While there is no apparent artifice in his actions, this unofficial role perpetuated vice-regal participation in foreign affairs. As Ballantyne has pointed out,

¹⁹ United Kingdom/ NZ Government, "Countries - United Kingdom - External Relations - France," (Archives New Zealand, 1922-1930). Jellicoe to Massey 19 January 1922. Filing within this series presumably indicates the topic was viewed as having primary relevance to Anglo-French relations.

²⁰ "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.208: 21st Parliament: 4th session," (1925), p.771.

²¹ "Birthday Honours," *New Zealand Herald*, 3 June 1932, p.8; "Imperial Conference," *Otago Daily Times*, 30 September 1937, p.8. Michael Savage was also effusive in his praise of Day's work.

the archive reflects the inequalities in (post-)colonial relationships.²² Even if Massey had resented Jellicoe and Day's interference, there would have been implicit barriers for an elected Government claiming Empire loyalty as a foundation principle to express dissent with the apparently authoritative, first-hand views of an active British Governor-General and his expert advisor. By the time substantive New Zealand concerns about Britain's reliance on the League of Nations or the cancellation of the Singapore naval base emerged it was too late to start protesting. With the Governor General's connivance, a pattern of obsequious but enthusiastic concurrence was too well established to allow objections from the New Zealand Government to be taken seriously.

Maintaining a British Empire-centric identity with all the implications it had for any possible relationship with France was neither politically easy to sustain nor would it have been economically sensible to discard. As Britain's circumstances changed, William Massey's conservative political successors (Coates, Ward and Forbes) realised that the Empire-centric national character they had encouraged was a diplomatic, economic and cultural cul-de-sac which constrained the development of additional external relationships and trade opportunities with France and other non-Empire countries. In 1924 Sir William Hall-Jones (Legislative Council) had pointed out that despite New Zealand's claim to 'free nation' status, there were still expectations that the United Kingdom public would agree to taxes on food to support a policy of Imperial Preference, and that they would also fund the Singapore naval base. The fall of Baldwin's Government was partly due to the British public's rejection of further Empire support while at the same time both Egypt – the hinterland of the Suez Canal – and Ireland aspired to the political independence allowed to the other Dominions. Although the Empire concept could be stretched to viewing the Dominions as 'free nations,' Canada's appointment of an ambassador to Washington and negotiation of a trade agreement with the United States was further evidence that the Empire was crumbling from within.²³ Hall-Jones apparently felt obliged to soften his observations by making the

²² Ballantyne, *Webs of empire : locating New Zealand's colonial past*: p.181.

²³ Jim S. Nutt, and Michael K. Warren, "Diplomatic and Consular Representations," *Historica Canada*, <https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/diplomatic-and-consular-representations>. Canada had appointed Vincent Massey as the First Minister in Washington in 1926.

appropriate, almost obligatory statements of support for Ramsay Macdonald by comparing the attitude of the new British Prime Minister's Government towards France with that of the 'dictatorial' Baldwin and Lloyd George Ministries. Under Macdonald, the differences with France over reparations and the Ruhr were being resolved (Hall-Jones claimed), while Macdonald was working for peace through the League of Nations. Admiral Field's propaganda visit with the fleet was a welcome sign of support, but Sir William concluded that New Zealand needed to look after its own interests.²⁴

Miles Kahler has proposed a model that appears appropriate for explaining New Zealand's international façade as it may have appeared to France. Kahler identified four modes by which Empires embed themselves within the possessed nation, namely: in the 'political parties and (their) ideology', through 'economic actors' such as industry lobby groups, by creating 'populations of the Empire' whether indigenous or immigrant colonisers and through the presence of the 'state' itself including the colonial administration and staff. Although Kahler was describing later de-colonisation, all four elements were recognisable in the supposedly post-colonial New Zealand of 1918-1935.²⁵ Politically the Empire was championed in New Zealand by the United and Reform Parties, although it was generally treated circumspectly (at best) by Labour and the more radical left, at least until another war threatened. The early economic actors were business enterprises, not dissimilar to franchisees who were either formally or informally licensed to exploit a territory or business sector. These largely British owned consortiums (the meat processing companies being one example) occupied the new territory of New Zealand on behalf of the colonising state and profited by trading more

"New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.216: 22nd Parliament: 2nd session," p.803. Speaking in relation to the rapidly changing governance of the Empire, Downie Stewart made the point that New Zealand would have to move at the 'fastest pace of the fastest horse' since the larger Dominions were already moving towards independence and engaging in international relations on their own account. The prospect of New Zealand having ambassadors and diplomatic staff would however duplicate Britain's own infrastructure. He comforted the House with an ironic analogy; the various constitutions of revolutionary France had looked good on paper but there was no attempt to put them into practice.

²⁴ "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.203: 21st Parliament: 3rd session 1924," p.144. Hall-Jones opposed development of the Singapore base as it was far from New Zealand and the cost was unjustified.

²⁵ Kahler, *Decolonization in Britain and France : the domestic consequences of international relations*: pp.7-9, 131, 348. Although support for (and association with) empires is often linked to parties of the political right, parties of the left could also be supportive although not always within the same paradigm. Hence, despite sharing a recognisably socialist philosophy with Britain's Labour party, the Left in France supported the French presence in Algeria whereas Labour favoured decolonisation.

or less exclusively with the British market.²⁶ Furthermore, New Zealand devoted considerable effort to ensuring that most immigrants were of British racial stock while actively discouraging the 'others', thereby embedding the Empire's presence through racial conformity.²⁷ Finally, the Governor General, even if officially disempowered, retained his hollowed-out role as a constant reminder of the presence of the British state. British disengagement, even if only from the largely symbolic vice-regal control of the Dominion, would have been seen as an existential threat to New Zealand's political Right and its British-centric foreign policy. Collectively these factors made explicit to the French what was implicit for much of New Zealand; New Zealand was a British-dependent state with apparently limited autonomy.

As Hall-Jones had observed, the other Dominions were ignoring or actively discarding the implied necessity of Empire unity as they assumed an independent and active part in shaping their own foreign affairs, without resistance from Britain. The attention and resources of the British Government were in any case being redeployed to other geographies where there were opportunities for direct material exploitation, driven in part by the disinclination of the British-taxpaying public to continue financially backing the Dominions. The infrastructure that remained was neither capable of developing a collective foreign policy for the Dominions, nor was it effective as a body for cultivating their trade relationships.²⁸ Although New Zealand's political association with France had evolved from the status of an Empire ally to Treaty partner at Versailles, and then to that of a Pacific neighbour with adjacent territorial interests, any New Zealand inclination to develop policy appropriate to these changes was hobbled by a self-imposed reliance on this obsolete Empire structure which no longer offered direction. The French could see that this was so, and it ultimately led to satirical derision of New Zealand in the French press. Diplomatically marooned, a supposedly post-colonial New Zealand was left clinging forlornly to the remnants of a disintegrating pre-war Dominion model which was dependent on a restrictive trade policy guided by an unnecessarily Franco-sceptic foreign policy.

²⁶ Neill, "Trading our way : developments in New Zealand's trade policy 1930s to 1980s," p.3.

²⁷ "New Zealand Official Year Books," (1939). Post-war French immigrant totals were minor even within what was a very small sub-set of non-British European settlers.

²⁸ Hyam, *Britain's declining empire : the road to decolonisation, 1918-1968*: p.72. The creation of the Dominions' Office in 1925 as a separate entity from the Colonial Office was just a preliminary step.

During the post-war years the British Empire was still assumed by most New Zealanders - especially those of the political centre and centre-right - to be an unquestionably good institution as well as an essential feature of the national identity.²⁹ Despite this, Massey had to make it clear that in accordance with the unanimous resolution of the New Zealand parliament (adopted before he had again left New Zealand to attend yet another Imperial conference), any decisions would only become binding on the self-governing Dominion(s) if ratified by their respective parliaments. He maintained that there was a separation between those parts of the imperial conference concerned with imperial matters and those concerning the domestic affairs of the Dominion governments and their parliaments. This was not apparently a two-way path as he also said it would be a 'slap in the face' if promises made by the Home government were cancelled. (Massey clearly had in mind foreign policy changes that resulted from the replacement of Baldwin's Conservatives with Macdonald's minority Labour government).³⁰ Post-colonial New Zealand could still be characterised (to borrow Antoinette Burton's words) as an 'imperialised space'.³¹

4.2 *The New Hebrides*

The New Hebridean debate exposed these incompatible positions. The persistence of the Presbyterian missionaries in pressing for full British control of the islands had been an issue since New Zealand was first recognised as a British colony. Successive Governments including those of Seddon and Ward had been vociferous in their public support for British sovereignty in place of the condominium, despite Britain's reluctance to act. According to Aldrich, one of the purposes of the 1918-19 French Mission was to 'facilitate resolution' of issues in Oceania (including the New Hebrides).³² When General Pau and the French Mission departed New Zealand in February 1919, the Vice Consul Lionel Hippeau in summarising Pau's visit noted:

With regard to the New Hebrides - with the exception of the Protestant missionaries whose attitude is known to you, there is little discussion of the New Hebrides, which is considered to be a rather influential zone for Australia. Although appearing to prefer the British Empire, it would probably raise no difficulty in the event of an assignment to the

²⁹ King, *The Penguin History of New Zealand*: p.318.

³⁰ "Mr Massey." p.8. Massey went to some length to explain that the 'Empire in Council' (a decision-making entity) was not the same as speaking of the 'Empire in council' (a consultative forum).

³¹ Burton, *After the imperial turn : thinking with and through the nation*, p.4.

³² Aldrich, *The French Presence in the South Pacific, 1842-1940*: p.280.

French Republic. Mr. Allen, Acting Prime Minister, declares that if England and Australia are in agreement, the Dominion Government would have **no objection to the cession of the New Hebrides to France** ...³³ (emphasis added)

Given that elsewhere in the telegram the paralysis in local decision-making was apparent ('The ministers have always said that because of the absence of the Prime Minister and the circumstances, no orientation can be decided before the peace treaty and the imperial conference') it seems improbable that this offer was made by Allen - assuming it was not a misunderstanding or a misquote - without authority. Allen understood the issues as he had lobbied for the removal of French control during his 1913 visit to London.³⁴ The offer was a remarkably uncharacteristic concession despite the qualification requiring Australian and British agreement.

From New Zealand's point of view the reasons for this stance, its timing and the desired outcome are unclear. The offer (if valid) was not followed up and it understandably received no public airing. The New Zealand record from the Versailles negotiations (that began in January 1919 while the French Mission was still in New Zealand and hence Ward and Massey absent) make it clear that the French did not want the New Hebrides discussed. The British Foreign Secretary (Arthur Balfour) told Massey that the New Hebrides had nothing to do with the peace negotiations.³⁵ During his introductory remarks to the 1921 Imperial Conference Massey was still reiterating the perennial Australasian complaint by raising unprompted the unsatisfactory nature of the New Hebrides arrangement. His suggestion of a territorial exchange to facilitate the removal of the French from the New Hebrides indicates a continued New Zealand (and

³³ Pau, "Telegram Auckland January 31st, 1919: Auckland, le 31 Janvier 1919 - 1 heure reçu le 2 Fevrier a 4 h.4: De la part du General Pau."

'Au sujet des les Nouvelles-Hébrides - opinion à l'exception des missionnaires protestants dont attitude vous est connue, s'intéresse peu question des Nouvelles-Hébrides, qu'elle considère comme appartenant plutôt zone d'influence Australie. Bien que paraissant préférer éventualité rattachement Empire britannique, elle ne soulèverait vraisemblablement nulle difficulté en cas de cession à la République française. M. Allen, Premier Ministre par intérim, déclare que si l'Angleterre et l'Australie sont d'accord, le Gouvernement du Dominion verrait sans objection cession Nouvelles-Hébrides à la France pourvu toutefois que les mesures nécessaires efficaces soient assurées pour la protection race indigène notamment contre l'alcoolisme. Nous avons prié télégraphiquement Thomsen vous tenir directement au courant mission pout Australie.'

³⁴ J Allen, "Ministerial Files - English trip 1913, notes of interviews," (1913).

³⁵ Kray, "Caging the Prussian Dragon: New Zealand and the Paris Peace Conference 1919," p.140.

Australian) desire to obtain sole British governance.³⁶ The matter was reprised in the New Zealand parliament in 1924. Speaking in support of a petition from advocates for British control (who were in turn sponsoring the interests of the Presbyterian Church), J. McC. Dickson MP (Reform, Chalmers) declared that the petition was commended to the Government for 'favourable consideration' (strong parliamentary language from a petitions committee) and immediate transmission to the Imperial authorities for action.

T. K. Sidey MP (Liberal, Dunedin South) came closest to exposing the truth when he pointed out that the immediate post-war period would have been the obvious time to resolve the New Hebrides issue, and he perceptively asked the Prime Minister whether this had been attempted. Sidey laid out the grounds for New Zealand concern, namely the presence of 'foreign powers' in the Pacific and a desire to support the work of the Presbyterian mission.³⁷ Massey's earlier and apparently sensible solution of a complete division of the territory was seen by the Church (Sidey claimed) as a 'counsel of despair.' Massey responded that the petitioners 'did not understand ... that France would never give up any territory'. Massey also said that attempts during the peace negotiations to arrange a compensatory territorial exchange failed because the French 'simply would not look at it'. He did point out that it was Australia and New Zealand that had resisted handing over the islands 'holus bolus'. He also claimed that despite the missionaries' efforts, the New Hebrides were going from 'bad to worse'. He did not state the unthinkable; that in early 1919 New Zealand had apparently been prepared to cede control to France.³⁸

³⁶ "Conference Of Prime Ministers And Representatives Of The United Kingdom, The Dominions, And India (Summary Of Proceedings And Documents Of The), Held In June, July, And August, 1921, At London: Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives, 1921," pp.34-35.

³⁷ John Stuart, "Beyond Sovereignty? Protestant Missions, Empire and Transnationalism, 1890-1950," in *Beyond sovereignty : Britain, empire and transnationalism, c. 1880-1950*, ed. Kevin Grant, Philippa Levine, and Frank Trentmann (Basingstoke England New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), pp.105, 108-109, 307. One consequence of the Great War was the creation of strain across and between Empires and nationalities engaged in religious mission work. The post-war missions therefore tended to reject Empires as they realised that support from them implied they were acting as agents of the originating state. The Boer War and Chinese rebellion exposed the contradictions inherent when a mission promoted its own theology while advocating freedom of religious choice. The missions' collective response was to champion freedom of choice, regardless of who governed. One result was the creation of transnational evangelising initiatives. This trend was less evident in the Pacific probably because the Protestant-Catholic fault-line aligned with the British-French national-Empire divide and so the option did not seem viable. By the early 20th century there were numerous examples of cooperation between Christian Missions.

³⁸ "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.205: 21st Parliament: 3rd session," (1924), pp.939-942.

A suggestion from Rev. L. M. Isitt MP of seeking League of Nations intervention was rejected by Massey who said that France would not allow the League of Nations to interfere because the New Hebrides was not a mandated territory. Wilford's interjection that the matter was 'not a dispute between countries' was affirmed by Massey, thus indicating both the presumed limitations of League influence, the definition of an inter-country dispute and Massey's reluctance to adopt a stronger position. Massey also pointed out that if the situation occurred in reverse, Britain would not compel a (British ruled) island in the Pacific to cede to France as part of a compensatory territorial concession if 'that island objected'. This was the first indication that the traditional owners might have had a legitimate say in their own destiny. Massey disposed of the other option when he asserted that there 'was not the slightest impression to be made at an (Imperial) Conference' based on past experience. A joint visit by Australian and New Zealand representatives to France when they were next in Europe might make 'some little impression'. Isitt's desperate response to such a firm rejection was to claim that some 'decent men' (presumably Protestant) who would be sympathetic must exist in France and that enlisting their help would bring pressure to bear. He implied it was the French who had taken a dogmatic and unreasonable stance.³⁹

The Labour leader Holland (typically) broadened the debate to one of principle by claiming that the Colonial Sugar Company's tolerance of 'compulsory immorality' in Fiji under British rule was no better than the conduct of the French in the New Hebrides. Moreover, territorial exchanges perpetuated the exploitation of 'primitive races' by involving another population who had nothing to do with the original dispute, coincidentally an accurate description of the mandate system.

It might be that the very fact of the petition having been presented to the Dominion Parliament – a Parliament which was part of the machinery of the British Empire ... might have the effect of directing the attention of the French Government to the evil, and might possibly result in remedying it.⁴⁰

Remarkably even Holland accepted that the New Zealand parliament was just a component within the Empire and the problem was caused by the French.

³⁹ Ibid.; Allan K. Davidson, "Isitt, Leonard Monk," in *Dictionary of New Zealand Biography: Te Ara - the Encyclopedia of New Zealand* (Wellington: 1996). Isitt, a strong prohibitionist and Methodist minister was preceded by the radical Tommy Taylor MP in the Christchurch North seat. Issitt's credentials as a moralist and defender of native land rights were unimpeachable.

⁴⁰ "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.205: 21st Parliament: 3rd session," p.942.

On balance, Allen's position as quoted by Hippeau was probably a correct reflection of the Government's private view. New Zealand saw no value in colonial occupation of the New Hebrides, but publicly advocating for removal of the French was a political necessity to placate New Zealand's southern Presbyterian voters. Given the political cover of United Kingdom and Australian agreement, New Zealand could probably have ceded any claim under the cloak of Empire unity which would have trumped local disquiet. Moreover, from New Zealand's viewpoint neutralising the New Hebrides issue would have cleared the way for a direct trade relationship with France by removing the only significant point of dispute. Not doing so perpetuated the irritation which made the thought of closer engagement with France particularly unpalatable for some New Zealand Presbyterian voters.

New Zealand had fought a war to support the British policy of defending France, but would the British reciprocate and help New Zealand in the Pacific? The presumption that an emotional debt existed was now being tested in an unforeseen manner through New Zealand's disagreement with France over the New Hebrides. The question was resolved in the negative as shown in the British version of events documented in the Annual Reports submitted to the British Foreign Secretary by successive British Ambassadors to France. These were copied and forwarded to New Zealand. Two paragraphs in the 1926 Ambassador's Report describe enquiries in Paris instigated as a result of the partition suggestion raised during the 1926 Imperial Conference. The French response was predictably negative. The French were informed that a commission representing Australia, New Zealand and Great Britain would visit the territory to investigate 'any disadvantages' the British settlers were experiencing. Subsequent notes in the Ambassadors' annual reports (copied to New Zealand and now filed in the National Archives) trace a downgrading of the issue until by 1932 in paragraph 115 under 'Miscellaneous' the relevant entry reads 'nil'.⁴¹ There was never any serious post-war attempt by the British to meet New Zealand's demands. Successive New Zealand Governments were made aware of that at Prime Ministerial level according

⁴¹ Marquess of Crewe, "France - 1926 Annual Report," (Archives New Zealand, 1926), pp.49-50; "France - 1932 Annual Report," (Archives New Zealand, 1932), para.115.; Henri Bernay, "Une Situation Paradoxale: La France aux Nouvelles-Hébrides," *Le Figaro*, 12 March 1928, pp.1-2.. The Commission's journey was noted in the French press as was the French Government's intention to retain the New Hebrides.

to the British records supplied at the time, but there was no public statement as a result. None of the available New Zealand postures - limited independence, loyal Empire membership or League of Nations membership - gave New Zealand any leverage in the Quai d'Orsay offices. Despite this, New Zealand still did not embrace the demeanour, political structures or policies of a post-colonial nation, but instead continued in the role of Empire adherent, exhibited through rejection of a closer involvement in global affairs within the League of Nations.

4.3 *New Zealand, France and the League of Nations*

'It was not the borders that had to conform to the population, but the population to the borders.'⁴²

Jörg Fisch, Professor of Modern History, University of Zürich.

Membership of the League of Nations theoretically allowed New Zealand to openly engage as an equal with other non-Empire League members. The League was therefore one of the few venues where there was direct and regular contact between France and New Zealand in the post-war years.⁴³ It was through League meetings that New Zealand comprehended the continued influence of France among the great powers. Yet, even with both New Zealand and France present, the interaction was kept at arm's length, not only because there was disparity in size, language and culture, but also because - in common with the other League members - it was immediate gratification of national self-interest rather than global peace and prosperity which influenced many decisions. This led to the League members adopting postures consistent with their own national interests. These ranged from indifference when the issue or dispute seemed unrelated to the affairs of the relevant nation(s) through to petulant withdrawal if a favourable resolution was not forthcoming on a matter of substance.

By the early to mid-1920s the British Empire was, as far as the Dominions were concerned, a non-prescriptive organisation, not dissimilar to a family supervised by an

⁴² Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, "Empires after 1919: old, new, transformed," *International Affairs* 95, no. 1 (2019): p.90. quoted by Jörg Fisch in *The right of self-determination of peoples: the domestication of an illusion*, trans. Anita Mage (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), p.155.

⁴³ Bain Attwood, "Apostles of peace : the New Zealand League of Nations Union : research essay presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Philosophy in History" (University of Auckland, 1979), p.37. A literal translation of la Société des Nations as the Society of Nations is a more appropriate description as Attwood has pointed out.

indulgent parent seeking domestic unity by accommodating all the members' differing needs. Thus, the Empire's essential character eventually became so broad that it was little more than a series of generalised wishes. Even so, in New Zealand's view adhering more or less consistently to Empire policies (insofar as they could be determined) precluded embracing and developing an independent national identity as a freely associated self-governing member of the League. In part this was due to there being few matters of national policy - whether nominally domestic or international - which the League of Nations as it was first envisaged could not claim as germane to its Covenant. Consequently, a significant portion of the prescriptive membership requirements impinged on what might otherwise have been assumed to be the internal affairs of member states. Although a common opinion holds that the League of Nations failed due to a flawed structure, it was the failure of the League members to place international peace and progress ahead of national interest which was at fault.⁴⁴ Just as various populations were expected to bend to suit newly defined post-war boundaries so too was the League coerced into conforming with nationalistic agendas. As a literal translation of the suggestive name *La Société des Nations* implies, the League was treated as if it were a society or club, but one whose rules the most influential members obeyed or ignored as their circumstances required.

Soon after the fighting ended it became apparent that without American involvement the allies would neither enforce the Paris peace terms nor unconditionally underwrite French territorial security with the threat of force.⁴⁵ By implication New Zealand and the other Dominions shared the blame because they would neither support Austen Chamberlain's policy of guaranteeing French borders nor would they occupy Germany.⁴⁶ The allies did offer France an apparently costless alternative - universal disarmament with disputes to be resolved using League protocols. France had no more

⁴⁴ Gerald Chaudron, "Obsession: New Zealand, Money and the League of Nations, 1920-35," *Journal of Imperial & Commonwealth History* 41, no. 1 (2013). New Zealand was no less complicit. Massey seemed determined to keep New Zealand's involvement to the minimum by underfunding Sir James Allen's unenthusiastic representation. While this posture achieved its designated purpose of positioning the League as powerless it also removed the opportunity for a greater New Zealand presence in international diplomacy.

⁴⁵ Bury, *France, 1814-1940*: p.255.; Antony Lentin, "'Une aberration inexplicable'? Clemenceau and the abortive Anglo-French guarantee treaty of 1919," *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 8, no. 2 (1997): p.57. Lentin has an excellent discussion on the broader issues.

⁴⁶ Johnson and Duroselle, *"Entente and Mésestente,"* p.270 ; Watson, *W.F. Massey : New Zealand*: p.124. Neither Massey's New Zealand nor the United Kingdom had any intention of occupying Germany in the pursuit of either guarantee. See Chapter Two.

faith in the League to deliver national security than she had in the *entente* allies to deliver military support. Given Woodrow Wilson's idealistic enthusiasm for the project, France could not ignore the League's establishment as a pre-condition for reaching an otherwise sympathetic resolution at Versailles.

The leading nations exhibited a common blindness to the resentment and envy their success and dominance in trade, wealth, territory and consequent political power was causing amongst the lesser countries. Many of these points were discussed in 1934 when Prime Minister Forbes made a Statement to the New Zealand Parliament. There was a belief (Forbes said) that the War's losers - those who were militarily defeated - had common cause with the unintended victims who were 'dismembered and disarmed'.⁴⁷ The latter included some of the less influential victors whose aspirations were similar to those of the triumphant great powers, but who lacked the military or political means to acquire what they saw as a legitimate share of the world's resources. Some like India were treated as part of the booty. New Zealand had therefore decided that her security lay within the Empire rather than fully immersed within - and dependent on - League of Nations membership.

In this detailed statement Forbes linked the collective failure to deliver security for France in the two decades after 1914 to disarmament. He questioned whether the ideal of disarmament could be achieved and even if it could, whether it would lead to perpetual peace. France had understandably pushed for security through armed deterrence since she felt insecure in the post-war world. In part this was her own doing. She had coerced her allies to either help create or at the best interpretation, to stand aside while a resentful and financially weakened German state was created on her northern border. Because America would not underwrite the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee (which would have safeguarded France) as an adjunct to the Versailles settlement and since Britain's support was so uncertain, the French sought other alliances.⁴⁸ Hence the need for agreements with Russia and the later attempt to ally with

⁴⁷ "International Situation, Statement By The Right Hon. G. W. Forbes, Prime Minister, Relative To. Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives, 1934 Session," pp.1-2.

⁴⁸ Government, "13 September 1919 Subject: Anglo-French Treaty (Defence of France) Act, 1919." The Act covers New Zealand's obligations in support of the UK in the event of further hostilities between France and Germany. The Act required the express support of the respective Dominion Parliaments

Italy (Forbes explained). Forbes implied that this counter-productive approach was the result of two flaws in the French tactics. The first was the absence at various times of Germany, America or Russia from the League - the former being at the behest of France - as part of the vengeful approach of France in the post-war settlement process. Secondly, without the necessary mechanism to facilitate disarmament France had to rely on agreements such as the Geneva Protocol of 1924 to underwrite her security. When Great Britain declined to join the Protocol because it might be seen as a 'blank cheque' that could oblige military action anywhere in the world, the idea of unlimited mutual guarantees failed, just as had been the case when America had earlier declined to participate on the same grounds.

Forbes then made the extraordinary statement that the British Dominions would in any case support the United Kingdom, and thus would join the United Kingdom in any war.⁴⁹ New Zealand sovereignty was by this admission hopelessly conflicted, as any decision on New Zealand's support for France was in British hands. Moreover, despite avoiding any direct security guarantees to France, New Zealand had failed to disarm and by implication and action decided not to actively engage with the League of Nations. New Zealand had instead chosen to remain a member of the Empire-Commonwealth defensive network while violating the sovereignty of two small nations (the colonial crumbs of Nauru and Western Samoa), albeit under a League mandate. Peaceful global co-existence within the League appeared to be no closer in 1934 than it had been one and a half decades earlier and New Zealand could not claim to be a blameless bystander.

The circumstances leading to this situation had been well-documented, openly-discussed and fully-reported in New Zealand at the time. Germany was only to be admitted to League membership after proving her sincerity by obeying the conditions of the Peace Treaty, a stance making membership conditional on meeting various (French) stipulations while ignoring the intent of the League as a body of freely

before action was taken. US Senate ratification of both this Treaty and the Versailles Treaty was required before the obligations became effective.

⁴⁹ "International Situation, Statement By The Right Hon. G. W. Forbes, Prime Minister, Relative To. Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives, 1934 Session," pp.1-2. Forbes then relied on the well-worn political standby of confidential information to pre-empt any discussion that might have clarified this statement.

associated nations.⁵⁰ How any voluntary body could expect cooperation from countries it had deliberately excluded but continued to claim the right to sanction, was not made clear. Moreover, such stipulations assumed countries would want to join the League and remain within it rather than - as noted earlier - petulantly leaving if their wishes were contradicted. Despite this, Clemenceau declared that the League would 'bind' France and her allies 'by links that nothing can break'. Although the status of the *entente*-based alliance may have been uncertain when the war began England, America, New Zealand and Australia had all participated and 'have given the greatest example in the world - they have fought for the sole nobility of an idea'. Clemenceau intended the League to be a continuation and extension of this unspecified ideal but directed to the interests of France as the injured party.⁵¹

Rewarding, cajoling, pacifying and punishing was expedited through a re-distribution of territory deemed to belong to the losers. The idea that the victorious and the most powerful (the latter not necessarily being a subset of the former) had an inherent right to determine the next steps was rarely challenged, not only because it suited the victors but also because it made management of world affairs simpler within the natural, racially-based order as it was at the time. Unexpected challenges to the natural hierarchy created considerable dissonance. The articulate and coherent objections presented by Emir Feisul (sic) when a French mandate was granted over Syria and Palestine impressed the Council, perhaps by the simple fact that a local representative (the Emir) was making representations as if he were an equal. As a result of the Emir's initiative it was suggested that 'French susceptibilities' would require 'delicate handling'.⁵² Europe's ills could not however be permanently assuaged by granting inhabited territory on another continent to a third party in compensation for failure to

⁵⁰ "League Of Nations," *Grey River Argus*, 10 January 1919, p.3. Germany signed under duress rather than entering into a mutually agreed treaty, as discussed herein, see Chapter Two.

⁵¹ "League Of Nations," *Evening Post*, 20 January 1919, p.7..

"Le Traite de Paix: Discours de M. Clemenceau, M. le president du Conseil," *Le Figaro*, 26 September 1919, pp.1-2. "Eh bien, tous sont venus, et ont donné le plus grand exemple qui soit dans le monde ils se sont battus pour la seule noblesse d'une idée." Marie-Renée Mouton, "La France et La Société des Nations En 1922," *Guerres mondiales et conflits contemporains*, no. 193 (1999).

⁵² "Position Of Palestine," *Ashburton Guardian*, 10 February 1919, p.6; "Autour des traits: Les mandats," *Le Figaro*, 25 December 1919, p.1. *Le Figaro* duly noted the allocation of the greater part of Samoa to New Zealand under a 'C' mandate while Great Britain was to receive Nauru. D. Gorman, "Liberal internationalism, the League of Nations Union, and the mandates system," *Canadian Journal of History* 40, no. 3 (2005): p.453. As Gorman puts it, the Mandates were a device to keep the peace by reducing imperial competition.

resolve territorial disputes or power disparities within their own region. By using such processes to seek mandates in the Pacific without consideration of the local habitants' wishes, New Zealand was as complicit as France.⁵³

Many views on the problems the League faced were reported at the time in terms consistent with current interpretations. The *Star* clearly outlined to its readers the conflict between Wilson's wish to establish the League and the French desire to punish Germany. An editorial from early 1919 (about the time of General Pau's mission) raised the issue of French 'nerves' over the progress in Paris and the inherent conflict between setting up the League of Nations in the interests of long-term stability (Wilson's concern) and the French obsession with the 'crippling of Germany and the exaction of reparation(s)'. As the *Star* fairly described the French concerns, Wilson was 'whittling down' the latter in favour of long-term stability. The *Star* made the dubious claim that the German politicians recognised that French industry was now crippled and uncompetitive. This interpretation seems to be an attempt to highlight French losses as a justification for inflicting punitive damages on Germany. The *Star* also described the complications caused by the haggling over colonial (dis)possession and redistribution and tried to imply that the French had been misled by propaganda suggesting the United Kingdom was putting her own interests first. This sympathetic interpretation contradicted the obvious fact that Britain undoubtedly was acting in her own interests although these coincided (the *Star* hopefully implied) with those of New Zealand.

This editorial concluded that the way to settle matters was to address French concerns, especially those related to the Rhine region and French borders.⁵⁴ This suggestion had at its core the main French apprehension. Legitimate French security concerns were being conflated with the non-American victors' collective need to placate their

⁵³ "Option of nationality of Syrians and Lebanese," in *French Consulate Dunedin Records (1876-1938)* (Dunedin Hocken Collection). The consequences of territorial arrangements went far beyond border adjustments on maps. The Dunedin French Consular files include records of New Zealand resident foreigners whose nationality was reassigned as a result of international agreements in which they had no say.

"New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.197: 20th Parliament 4th session," (1922), p.32. Regulations from the war could affect the national designation of loyal New Zealand residents. Residents of 30-40 year standing (such as Syrian citizens) could by reason of birth be classed as enemy aliens. Further complications resulted when Syria which had been nominally under hostile Turkish rule during the war was re-classified under French suzerainty.

⁵⁴ "French "Nerves."," *Auckland Star*, 14 February 1919, p.4. The damage to French industry was much more limited than this article suggested, as evidenced by the rapid post-war recovery in textile manufacturing. Given the wartime imagery, the readership could easily have assumed that by the end of the hostilities all of France resembled the frontlines.

electorates through the extraction of tribute and territory from Germany, a stance which went far beyond securing the French borders. It was this that was distracting attention from the establishment of the League, and a new start for the world. One sampled compilation of cable news published in early 1919 suggested to New Zealanders that these apparently insoluble problems in a divided Europe were leading to chaos. This reinforced Massey's default position of sheltering within the lee of the Empire rather than entering the storm. It was also apparent that President Wilson would have great difficulty in convincing the American people that the United States had an active role in securing world peace, even without his more immediate but related problem of gaining congressional Republicans' approval for America to become the guardian of the small countries through the League.⁵⁵

The right of a nation to act in its own interests particularly when it perceived the issue in question was one of internal rather than international status remained unresolved throughout the League's existence and beyond. There was no recognition that few of the matters designated as international affairs were without domestic implications, while what were apparently the domestic concerns of large nations could have international implications for smaller countries. This extended to Empire matters - such as the Australian Prime Minister's (Billy Hughes') claim that foreign (i.e. non-British) nations did not understand the Empire, and that Australia was entitled to the same status under the Treaty as the United States. This was consistent with Massey's statement when he introduced the Versailles ratification motion in the New Zealand Parliament. As if that were not enough to validate American domestic opposition to the League by apparently giving the United Kingdom additional compliant votes, Hughes went on to claim that Australia and Canada could still vote in their own interests even when these conflicted with Britain's views. Whatever effect Hughes thought this might have, it must have added to the unease amongst those Americans opposed to Wilson's

⁵⁵ "The League Of Nations," *The Colonist*, 3 January 1919, p.5.; "The New Armistice," *Waihi Daily Telegraph*, 21 February 1919, p.2.; "Peace Conference." p.2.; "Notes Of The Day." p.4.; "The League Of Nations. Reports Of The Representatives Of The Dominion Of New Zealand On The Second, Third, And Fourth Assemblies Of The League Of Nations, Held At Geneva In The Years 1921, 1922, and 1923. Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives, 1924 Session," p.11. America was still technically at war with Germany and still governing the Saar and Danzig regions although - consistent with the US mood to exit Europe - a mandate over Armenia was declined. Armenia was again raised during the Second Assembly when Allen as the New Zealand representative noted the reluctance of the Assembly to act if one of the major powers declined to take to the lead.

policies on the grounds of foreign control and domestic interference. Moreover, other serious rifts were evident. M. Leygues (the French Prime Minister) advised the French delegates to withdraw if Germany was admitted while at the same time M. Bourgeoisie was urging the United States to join.⁵⁶

When the First League Assembly convened the New Zealand delegation acted - as Chaudron has noted - in lockstep with the British. Sir James Allen's narrative-like reports suggest he functioned more as a *rapporteur* than an independent delegate representing a sovereign nation.⁵⁷ Whether this default *modus operandi* of Allen's was the reason for his appointment to the London High Commission and thereby to be New Zealand's representative at the League Assembly meetings is uncertain, but his behaviour was consistent with his time as acting-Prime Minister during Massey and Ward's lengthy journeys to London. In his letters to Massey, he faithfully reported on events but he did not initiate action.⁵⁸ He was clearly not a political innovator nor did he prove to be a pro-active diplomat, but given Massey's loyalty to the Empire and lukewarm, sceptical attitude towards the League, this was probably exactly what Massey wanted. Chaudron does point out that Allen was aware of the need (despite Massey's naysaying) to publicise the League's work and to build public support. Massey did not however expedite the publication of either Allen's reports or the League minutes when they were received, perhaps because he viewed such as an endorsement. By the time

⁵⁶ "League Of Nations," *Timaru Herald*, 15 November 1920, p.7. This issue also contains an Australian and N.Z. Cable Assn. article that is clearly if inexplicably dated 'Received 5.5 p.m., Jan. 14th'. This report detailing the arrival of the New Zealand and other delegations in Geneva was dated 'London, Nov.13.' According to his report in the AtoJs, Allen left London on 12 November 1920 to attend the first Assembly of the League. The meeting began on 15 November 1920.

⁵⁷ "The League Of Nations. Report Of The Representative Of The Dominion Of New Zealand On The First Assembly Of The League Of Nations, Held At Geneva, In The Year 1920. Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives, 1925."; "The League Of Nations. Reports Of The Representatives Of The Dominion Of New Zealand On The Second, Third, And Fourth Assemblies Of The League Of Nations, Held At Geneva In The Years 1921, 1922, and 1923. Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives, 1924 Session," p.13; Chaudron, "New Zealand And The League Of Nations," pp.47-75. Allen in his report from the Second Assembly notes the 'practice' of the Empire Delegations to meet and discuss issues with a view to co-ordinating action although he does stress that there was not always unanimity in committee.

⁵⁸ James Allen, in *Miscellaneous files and papers - Allen and WF Massey correspondence* (Archives New Zealand). Gerald Chaudron, "New Zealand's international initiation : Sir James Allen at the League of Nations 1920-1926," *Political science (Wellington, N.Z.)* (2012): pp.65-66. Allen was, in that respect, the ideal deputy and a model for a succession of steady and reliable Deputy Prime Ministers such as Marshall for Holyoake, Watt for Kirk, Tallboys for Muldoon, Palmer for Lange, Cullen for Clarke, and English for Key. Massey possibly believed that appointing Allen to the London post left him (Massey) with a free hand domestically and a reliable if unimaginative operative in Europe. Chaudron gives Allen rather more credit but even allowing for Massey's controlling style there is little to suggest that Allen was capable of doing more than adhering to League protocol and avoiding controversy, cash-strapped as he was.

these were officially published the events described therein had long been determined and publicised elsewhere. Four years before the official record was published in the 1925 AtoJs, a 1920 *Le Figaro* report had detailed the settlement of the New Zealand mandate ('Samoa assigned to New Zealand') and the protocols for the management of the mandated territories. Nothing of direct consequence for New Zealand in relation to France was noted in Allen's first report.⁵⁹

Allen's second report included considerable discussion on the French objections to the League's involvement in the regulation of trafficking in women and children. Typically, Allen seemed to miss the point, as he could see no reason for these objections apart from French 'jealousy' over another country leading the initiative, or perhaps concerns that the administrative function would not be in France.⁶⁰ The continued insistence by France that issues related to women's rights - apart from international trafficking of women for prostitution - were a domestic policy concern has several possible explanations.⁶¹ One that should have raised concerns for all the colonial powers was the appalling treatment of indigenous workers - including women and children - working in slave-like circumstances, particularly in Africa. Presumably these colonial possessions could have been viewed as 'domestic' territories within an imperial structure. Another concern may have been French fears of a broader debate drawing unwelcome attention to women's suffrage in France. France had the subject of scathing criticism in the British press which seemed to delight in the apparently illogical French

⁵⁹ *New Zealand in the League of Nations : the beginnings of an independent foreign policy, 1919-1939*: p.43.; "A la Societe des Nations: Les mandats coloniaux," *Le Figaro*, 18 December 1920, p.2.; "The League Of Nations. Report Of The Representative Of The Dominion Of New Zealand On The First Assembly Of The League Of Nations, Held At Geneva, In The Year 1920. Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives, 1925."; Charles Noble Gregory, "The First Assembly of the League of Nations," *The American Journal of International Law* 15, no. 2 (1921).

⁶⁰ "The League Of Nations. Reports Of The Representatives Of The Dominion Of New Zealand On The Second, Third, And Fourth Assemblies Of The League Of Nations, Held At Geneva In The Years 1921, 1922, and 1923. Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives, 1924 Session," p.10. This related to the Second Assembly.

⁶¹ Kate Marsh, "'La Nouvelle Activité des Trafiquants de Femmes': France, Le Havre and the Politics of Trafficking, 1919-1939," *Contemporary European History* 26, no. 1 (2017): p.25. 'Nowhere was this debate more marked than in France. The persistence of regulated prostitution within France meant that during negotiations within the TWC French delegates felt the need to stress the distinction between the traffic in women across borders (an international issue) and regulated prostitution (which, they argued, was a national issue).'

intransigence on the issue. Avoiding diplomatic embarrassment may therefore have been the principle French concern.⁶²

The significance for New Zealand is less in the substance of French objections than in Allen's apparent growing irritation and his failure as New Zealand's leading diplomat to determine the basis of the French objections. French views and their associated justifications had been debated with some force in both *Le Figaro* and *L'Humanité* so the discussion points were presumably available to diplomats - such as Allen - as well as the public. Immediately after the war ended the French press had argued that not only was it a 'disgrace' to deny the vote to women who had suffered alongside the menfolk, but the sacrifice of women was of itself an affirmation that they should be treated equally. The French Senate's attitude was contrasted with the views held in Belgium and New Zealand, amongst others. A demographically tenuous but politically astute point was the claimed link between lower infant mortality and universal suffrage, a particularly sensitive issue for France given the continued concern with her low domestic birth rate compared to that of Germany. New Zealand's lower infant mortality was used as an example. It seems incredible that Allen was either unaware of this debate or if he was aware, that he failed to connect the politically contentious domestic suffrage issue with the French stance on women's rights within the League, and moreover that he failed to report the reason for the French attitude.⁶³

New Zealand had three principle delegates at the Third Assembly: Allen, Sir Francis Bell who was coincidentally in London and apparently offered to go along to assist and Sir

⁶² "Brainless Girls," *Auckland Star*, 20 July 1932, p.7.; Joan Wallach Scott, "Part II. Debate. Women: A French Singularity?: "Vive la différence!," in *Beyond French Feminisms: Debates on Women, Culture and Politics in France 1980-2001*, ed. R. Célestin, E. DalMolin, and I. Courtivron (New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2016), p.230. Scott's analysis suggests that the French (male) politicians had resisted change by arguing that women were assiduous supporters of the Church and therefore collectively constituted a reactionary force against French republicanism. Their other justification relied on the contradictory assertion that women were already treated as equals domestically and sexually so they did not need the vote to achieve autonomy or independence.

Gorman, "Liberal internationalism, the League of Nations Union, and the mandates system," p.465. The treatment of women in colonized territories, assuming the other races were recognised as fellow humans, should have raised concerns for New Zealand as well.

⁶³ Georges Goyau, "Le droit de vote des femmes," *Le Figaro*, 11 October 1922, p.1; "Comment votent les mères," *Le Figaro*, 06 November 1922, p.1; "Les femmes dans la Cité politique," *Le Figaro*, 8 February 1931, p.3; "La Séance: Autres arguments," *L'Humanité*, 08 Novembre 1922, p.2. Allen's approach is consistent with his behaviour when he reported to Massey on General Pau's visit. In that case he simply noted the visit but attached no significance to it and displayed no curiosity as to why it may have taken place. Nor did he show any interest in the possible consequences or implications for New Zealand.

Arthur Steel-Maitland. The latter (a British Conservative MP) was enigmatically added to the New Zealand delegation on his own recognisance to assist with his worthy cause of combating slavery. Already (in 1922, barely four years since the war ended) Allen was conceding that post-war hopes for disarmament were 'inconceivable'. As Allen explained, the French had to consider Germany and (possibly) Russia as threats but both were outside the League and therefore outside whatever nominal control or influence the League may have. Allen's report did not include the qualification that Germany's exclusion was a French precondition for the formation of the League though he probably felt he did not need to. The development of aircraft technology and its military application was already a threat to stability and peace while concurrently rendering earlier discussions on conventional weapons redundant.⁶⁴ Allen observed that although France had been opposed to disarmament in 1921, current financial pressures meant that option might now be considered under a Treaty of Mutual Guarantee. Before disarming France wanted very strict and exact security assurances. No doubt with an eye on their own situation the British (Allen reported) were not unfavourable, but were most reluctant to give any firm assurances that could be seen in the United Kingdom as simply underwriting French defence. Fisher (for the United Kingdom) was therefore hesitant to even put the proposal to his Government for further work on the detail. Typically, Allen had no suggestions or recommendations and so New Zealand's position became that of the British by default.

The comfortable stance of acquiescing to British policy positions was replaced with action when New Zealand's interests came directly into question during the Third Assembly's review of the mandated territories. Overriding all was the self-interested display of sovereignty and independence which New Zealand was prepared to assume when it suited. The Nauru mandate was not a matter to be left to Allen, Steel-Maitland or even Bell, although the latter was an eminent legalist in his own right. Captain Mousley, a lawyer experienced in international diplomacy who had assisted Massey at Versailles, provided additional gravitas and expertise to the New Zealand delegation.⁶⁵

⁶⁴ "The League Of Nations. Reports Of The Representatives Of The Dominion Of New Zealand On The Second, Third, And Fourth Assemblies Of The League Of Nations, Held At Geneva In The Years 1921, 1922, and 1923. Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives, 1924 Session," pp.17-18.

⁶⁵ Desmond Hurley, "Edward Opotiki Mousley," *New Zealand Studies* November(1996): pp.10-17; "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.185: 19th Parliament 6th session," p.820. Massey lectured the New

As Captain Mousley's report makes clear, the League's Mandate Committee was showing a rarely-displayed interest in the well-being of the Nauru Islanders. Confronted with a matter of great importance for both the country and the personal prestige of Massey, New Zealand adopted the stance of an independent sovereign state. Without any apparent irony the inconvenient rights of the hapless, smaller Pacific nations were dismissed as internal matters for New Zealand to adjudicate, despite the Mandate Committee's concerns that the Phosphate Commission was not going to look after or otherwise take care of the interests of the inhabitants of Nauru. Mousley adopted a legal rather than a moral approach, and thereby side-stepped the humanitarian issues. He recited the powers given to New Zealand under the Mandate and stressed that responsibility for policy in the territories of Samoa and Nauru lay with New Zealand, not the British Government. Repeating the standard British defence of colonialism, Mousley argued that the mandated territories required 'tutelage' which was best provided by 'advanced nations' and New Zealand would provide this (while of course accessing the phosphate reserves so vital to her dairying aspirations).⁶⁶

Mousley's report noted several matters related to the Mandate(s) that cut across issues within the Empire and for this reason needed clarification at the Imperial Conference level. These were awkward questions related to the reporting lines of League delegate(s) and for whom they were speaking. For example, was it just for the Dominion in question, or was it for the entire Empire? Typically, these issues were left in abeyance once the immediate threat to New Zealand's access to Nauru phosphate was nullified.

Zealand Parliament on the potential gains possible given ready access to phosphatic-rich fertilisers. 'The most nutritious pastures in England and the best dairy pastures in France are those richest in phosphates ...'.

A. J. Glazebrook, "Review: An Empire View of the Empire Tangle. By Edward O. Mousley, with a Preface by the Rt. Hon. W. F. Massey," *The Canadian Historical Review* 2, no. 4 (December 1921): p.396.

Although a copy of Mousley's book has not been located it seems from this review that Mousley was addressing the dilemma of reconciling nationalism with empire. Mousley's credentials and expertise were not universally recognised. Glazebrook's review of Mousley's book was unflattering: "The great value of this unpretentious little book is that it is symptomatic. Written by a New Zealander who has been educated in England, it is evidence that the problem of Empire is gaining ever widening consideration." And "This publication is a collection of press-cuttings. The first chapter consists of a series of cuttings from Dominion newspapers in which the consciousness of nationhood seems to be the main theme, and this is considered against the fact of empire."

⁶⁶ "The League Of Nations. Reports Of The Representatives Of The Dominion Of New Zealand On The Second, Third, And Fourth Assemblies Of The League Of Nations, Held At Geneva In The Years 1921, 1922, and 1923. Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives, 1924 Session," pp.28, 34. S. J. Gale, "Lies and misdemeanours: Nauru, phosphate and global geopolitics," *The Extractive Industries and Society, Department of Archaeology, The University of Sydney, Sydney, New South Wales 2006, Australia* (2019).

New Zealand's self-interested stance was no different from that of France when she had seen her interests in Algeria or the Middle East similarly under threat. Moreover, the issue again exposed constitutional fault lines owing to New Zealand's three concurrent roles of independent nationhood, loyal empire membership and global citizenship within the League.

One of the more significant events of 1922 occurred while the Third Assembly was in session (4 September - 30 September, 1922) but it was not discussed, thereby exposing another of the major flaws in the League's *modus operandi* while opening the three principal League members who were involved in the dispute – Great Britain, France and Italy – to allegations of hypocrisy. The quarrel involved the Dardanelles, New Zealand's symbolic land of wartime sacrifice. Surprisingly given the importance of the location, the New Zealand newspaper reports are mainly incomplete extracts from the cable news and therefore are convoluted and difficult to follow. The *Waihi Daily Telegraph* was however unequivocal when it reported that: 'It is understood that England, France and Italy will oppose for the present the intervention of the League of Nations in the Turkish dispute'.⁶⁷ This exposed the public to the discontinuity between internationalist idealism and national interests. Three of the main post-war powers were unwilling to submit a dispute with a World War I enemy to international arbitration for fear of an adverse finding. A bilateral agreement between France and Britain ('England and France have agreed to the holding of a general Near East peace conference'), although reinforcing the perception of Anglo-French unity, concurrently undercut the League as a potential arbitrator and defender of smaller and militarily weaker nations. There was no suggestion that New Zealand should participate.

New Zealand's representation at the Fourth Assembly held in 1923 reverted to a delegation of Allen, his private secretary and a departmental officer. Attention had turned again to initiating a Treaty of Mutual Assistance to by-pass the apparently irreconcilable differences over disarmament. This suggestion from the Temporary Mixed Commission resurrected one of the earliest post-war security proposals. On the one hand, mutual assistance meant knowing where alliances lay and what immediate assistance an aligned country could expect, while on the other treaties requiring

⁶⁷ "Latest," *Waihi Daily Telegraph*, 21 September 1922, p.3; "The Near East," *Otago Daily Times*, 16 September 1922, p.7; "Kemal's Terms For A Conference," *Auckland Star*, 25 September 1922, p.5; "Chanak Neutrality," *Northern Advocate*, 25 September 1922, p.5.

compulsory action were a return to the old pre-war system of pacts that many blamed for the domino or tipping-point effect which escalated into World War I. Moreover, such proposals took matters outside of the League's auspices. The French response was disarmingly pragmatic and simply proposed the abolition of the Temporary Mixed Commission (eminent persons' group) responsible for generating disarmament proposals. Lord Robert Cecil for Britain was opposed.⁶⁸ The whole point of the Commission was generating ideas for the Disarmament Commission independently from Government control, and it was therefore a potentially useful mechanism for producing options unconstrained by the direct political consequences of its recommendations. It was for exactly these reasons that it had attracted strong French opposition. As a compromise, a temporary reprieve for the Commission was negotiated.

Allen's detachment during these discussions was palpable, both in tone and in fact when he reported that neither he nor his secretary were present. He was clearly becoming exasperated by the naysaying of the French for, as he noted without any apparent irony, they always opposed League involvement in matters of immediate concern to France. The dysfunction of the League was apparent to Allen in other ways, as shown when the worth of a resolution in favour of un-resolved disputes being passed up to the League Council was undermined by the conspicuous absence of the United States, Russia and Germany from League membership. The same problem occurred when the new International Court was proposed. Litigants had to agree to take a case to the court so its function was in fact arbitration rather than delivering 'justice'. Exceptions were to be allowed for existing treaties and conventions. As this exception applied to the Treaty of Versailles, the court's efficacy was questionable. In a case highlighted by the *New Zealand Herald*, Germany had interdicted a British ship carrying French goods consigned to Poland along the supposedly free Kiel Canal. Since Germany was not a member of the League (largely owing to French resistance) she was not bound by the International Court. The basis for the interdiction was therefore moot.⁶⁹ In the New Zealand narrative obstinacy had prevented action against Germany even in circumstances that appeared (to New Zealand) to serve French interests.

⁶⁸ Nobelprize.org, "Robert Cecil - Facts," Nobel Media AB, http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1937/chelwood-facts.html.

⁶⁹ "Notes And Comments," *New Zealand Herald*, 9 July 1923, p.8.

The information provided to the 1923 British Imperial Conference (which met on 1 October) would have confirmed that view. The various solutions proposed for achieving a peaceful, prosperous and even-handed settlement as a result of the war were gone. In his address to the conference Stanley Baldwin back-tracked on Lloyd George's claim, made during the 1921 Imperial Conference, that the reparation and disarmament issues were settled. Solving French budgetary problems by making "the *Boche* pay" was an illusion which could only underpin general political stability in France as long as it was allowed to persist. In the British view, once this fiscal mirage evaporated France would lapse into her default state of domestic political disharmony and dispute. Baldwin in his comments seemed to be aware that the United Kingdom could be accused of prevaricating on this issue, but any failed attempt at mediation (rather than adjudication) can be interpreted as dithering if the mediation fails.⁷⁰

France nevertheless continued to criticise Germany in an attempt to perpetuate Germany's status as the wrong-doing World War I protagonist. In an article dated 10 July 1923, *Le Figaro* reported examples of English opinion favouring the Ruhr occupation. The piece was obviously meant to bolster the impression for the French public that there was general support among the wartime allies for the French view. *Le Figaro* in an attempt to prove that support for the French position was widespread was nonetheless only able to provide one comment from New Zealand, and its authenticity is questionable because it is from an unnamed source(s).

The last that has come down to us is particularly significant, since it comes from the antipodes. An Englishman of distinction, who lives in New Zealand, the city of Dunedin, capital of the rich auriferous province of Otago, protests* in his letter sentiments of the whole English colony in favor of France.⁷¹

(* This could be translated as 'alleges' or 'asserts')

This selected report was not representative of the general tone of the New Zealand press articles which tended to adhere to the British view of frustration with French obstinacy.

⁷⁰ Horne, *Friend or foe : an Anglo-Saxon history of France*: p.534. "Imperial Conference, 1923. Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives, 1924 Session," pp.17-22, 25-31, 34-35. Baldwin praised the role of the Washington Disarmament Conference, probably as much for the potential relief to the defence budget as for the prospect for a disarmed peace. It is remarkable that this disarmament conference had to be held in the capital city of one of the leading non-members of the League despite the core purpose of the League being peaceful dispute resolution and disarmament.

⁷¹ "Echos," *Le Figaro*, 10 July 1923, p.1.. The vague description may have fitted that of the Dunedin-based (honorary) French Consul.

The contortions required for the League to operate alongside - rather than above - the existing European political structures were self-evident. Replacing the pre-war military alliances and implied retaliation with mutual disarmament was beyond the League's political capabilities. Moreover, Empire unity was corroding. The *Cape Times* reported in late 1924 that the prospects of Mr Hertzog of South Africa attending a 'proposed Imperial Conference to consider the Geneva Protocol are insuperable'. Hertzog would therefore not attend. The *Cape Times* considered implementation of the Protocol 'doomed to be abortive' while also opposing Chamberlain's suggestion of offering security to France. The *Cape Times* wanted South Africa to retain Gladstone's policy of avoiding continental alliances and to judge any future intervention in Europe solely on its merits.⁷² The editorial concluded that this was the view of the 'great majority' of the six Dominions' citizens. The *Auckland Star* expressed similar sentiments under the suggestive title of the 'Peace of Europe' but the issues are so complex they would have defied casual readers' comprehension without a more detailed briefing.⁷³

Whatever sentiments New Zealand may have expressed to the contrary regarding the use of the League protocols in the European peace process, exactly the same problems existed when it came to the Pacific because intra-Empire views were diverging. Reporting on the House of Commons debate on funding a naval base in Singapore, *Le Figaro* approvingly re-quoted the New Zealand Prime Minister as saying that:

"You say that your government (i.e. the British Government) is in favour of international cooperation through the enlarged and strengthened League of Nations. I think I have to answer that. One might come to regret the very existence of the League of Nations if the defence of the Empire depends only on that organization; the existence of the Empire depends on the Imperial Navy."⁷⁴

⁷² "Empire Affairs," *Otago Daily Times*, 30 December 1924, p.7.. Includes a re-print of the *Cape Times* editorial. Gladstone's last term as Prime Minister had ended in 1894.

⁷³ "The Peace Of Europe," *Auckland Star*, 23 July 1925, p.7.; Jonathon Riley-Smith, *The Crusades: A History* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005). p.5. The title is suggestive of the medieval 'Peace of God' movement that was intended to protect the poor, women and the clergy by banning violence within specified time periods. Paradoxically, it could only be maintained through military force.

⁷⁴ "Une protestation de la Nouvelle-Zélande," *Le Figaro*, 26 March 1924, p.3.. 'Vous dites que votre gouvernement est en faveur de la coopération internationale par l'intermédiaire de la Société des nations élargie et renforcée. Je crois devoir répondre à cela. On pourrait en venir à regretter l'existence même de la Société des nations si la défense de l'Empire dépend seulement de cet organisme; l'existence de l'Empire dépend de la marine impériale.'

Like their French counterparts, the New Zealand Government had little confidence in the League as a means of protection, whether through disarmament or as a guarantor of mutual security. New Zealand believed that the Royal Navy operating from a safe regional base in Singapore was the best defensive option for New Zealand (and by implication British) interests in the Pacific. The same issue arose when the (Geneva) 'Protocol For The Pacific Settlement Of International Disputes' was proposed. New Zealand's objections to League involvement were more or less the same as those repeatedly expressed by the French. The prospect of disarmament and relying on the League and its associated bodies for protection left both countries feeling very insecure. Under the Pacific Settlement proposal neither Germany nor Russia were to be bound by the protocol (although they might be 'later') but New Zealand would be constrained by and subject to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. Moreover, New Zealand's internal affairs might be regulated by the Court (although New Zealand's main concern in this regard was the possibility of being ordered to accept non-British foreigners as refugees). The protocol did not authorise any state to come to the assistance of another under attack without League intervention, so New Zealand could not assume that Britain or any other ally would automatically come to her aid even if she was herself fully compliant. The convention would (to use a catch-all objection) create an 'immense complication of international relations'.⁷⁵

Alignment between New Zealand and France became exceptional rather than normal as even petty disagreements between France and her past allies increased. In one case, intellectual property sharing became embroiled in national sentiment. When Professor Gilbert Murray (a University academic and prominent supporter of the League of Nations although described by *Le Figaro* as a British Empire delegate) presented his very positive report on the work of the Committee on Intellectual Co-operation, the French delegate (M. Cassin) associated the work of intellectual co-operation with the ideals for which the war had been fought. *Le Figaro* noted however that the Australian delegate

⁷⁵ "Protocol For The Pacific Settlement Of International Disputes: Correspondence Relating To The Position Of The Dominions. Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives, 1925 Session."; Imperial Defence Committee, "Report made by Imperial Defence Committee, recommending to the UK government not to ratify the Geneva Protocol," (UK National Archives, 1925), p.6. As Austen Chamberlain said: 'I do see several reasons why the French should be frightened for the future, and while they remain so frightened they go on cultivating, as it were, reproducing that very feeling of bitterness in Germany which is the cause of their fear. It is moving in an unending vicious circle.'

(a Mr. Charlton) was an 'irreducible opponent, not of the International Institute, but of its seat at Paris'. Sir James Allen disagreed as he thought that the gift from France of intellectual property and a headquarters location should be accepted because the guarantees given for maintaining the international character of the Institute were sufficient.⁷⁶ That the ANZAC countries would dispute such a matter in an international forum would have seemed impossible six years earlier but such was symptomatic of League and Empire dysfunction.

By the time the Sixth Assembly met (7 September – 26 September, 1925), Allen's criticisms extended to the use of the French language because insufficient time was allowed for translation into English. A French proposal to exclude discussion of Allied debts and reparations from a forthcoming international conference seemed incredible to Allen. (France had also proposed regulation of private enterprise to help ameliorate the mid-decade economic slump, a further point of antagonism). Suggestions on security and conflict avoidance remained a touchstone because the League was aware that failure to deliver on these would undercut the whole point of an international body. In Allen's (correct) view, arbitration, security and disarmament needed to be inseparable components of any agreement.⁷⁷ The failure of the delegates' efforts in this regard had already doomed the aforementioned Pacific Regional Treaty proposal.

It would be unreasonable to blame all of New Zealand's disaffection with the League on French actions. It could however be argued that in supporting what later came to be seen as unreasonable French views, New Zealand unintentionally undermined France's post-war position as the wronged party. When the League Council considered the recommendation of the Standing Committee on Warrants in 1926, authors of petitions from mandated territories wanted to appear before the Council to make verbal submissions. Chamberlain and Briand protested on the grounds of interference in the administration of their mandated territories. Briand in particular feared playing into the

⁷⁶ "La Cinquième Assemblée De La S. D. N.: La proposition française touchant l'Institut international est votée à l'unanimité. 1 Genève, 23 septembre. La séance plénière de l'Assemblée est ouverte à 10 h. 10.," *Le Figaro*, 24 September 1924 p.3.. In the event the Australian delegation did not vote against the resolution because it required unanimity and so the resolution was passed and the French offer of a Paris headquarters for the Institute was accepted.

⁷⁷ "The League Of Nations. Report Of The Representative Of The Dominion Of New Zealand On The Sixth Assembly Of The League Of Nations, Held At Geneva In The Year 1925. Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives, 1926 Session," pp.2, 8, 9, 19.

'hands of trouble-makers'. *Le Figaro* related that: 'The representatives of New Zealand and South Africa present at the table of the Council associated themselves with Mr Briand's reservations, and it appeared that the Council would not follow the suggestions of the Commission in that direction'. Countries that ruled others through League-licensed mandates regarded the territories so granted as being within their own fiefdoms to control as they wished, without any direct means of protest or appeal being available to those under their jurisdiction.⁷⁸ Information for the League was to come solely from the occupying powers and in that matter New Zealand aligned with France.

Had she so chosen, post-war France could have used her moral authority and *carte blanche* to move towards a more internationalist position, but from New Zealand's viewpoint France seemed to be attending solely to her own interests. While not an unreasonable rationale in the context of the times, it was unlikely to bolster New Zealand's faith in internationally based solutions, nor in France as an example worth emulating, nor even less in France as a potential partner in the Pacific. From the French viewpoint New Zealand was doing more or less the same. The League was effectively dead as it was neither a useful forum for resolving disputes nor a venue suitable for developing a relationship with France. Unsurprisingly, little else was reported from League meetings after 1925 which directly involved France and New Zealand.

Predictably - given this half-hearted level of engagement - matters relating to the League involving both France and New Zealand were raised on only a handful of occasions in the New Zealand parliament and then only peripherally. When discussing a number of issues relating to the League, T. M. Wilford mentioned the numeric disparity between the French and German populations and the fear that the League would dictate immigration policy to New Zealand. Harry Holland noted the perpetual domination by the five great powers, including France, no matter how many smaller countries joined. Allen (whilst still an MP) had pointed out that although France and Great Britain amongst others had signed the Peace Treaty, New Zealand might still be required to legislate to legitimise Government action in the interests of implementing the

⁷⁸ "Le Conseil s'est occupé de la question des mandats," *Le Figaro*, 4 September 1926, p.3.

Covenant.⁷⁹ The desultory tone accurately reflects the secondary status accorded the League in the New Zealand-France relationship.

Technology provided increased opportunities to share the League with the world and thereby publicly showcase its worth. Filming the proceedings of the League of Nations allowed those with access to the screenings a first-hand impression of the pre-eminent world body in session and thereby to gain an appreciation of its work.⁸⁰ As *Le Figaro* wryly noted:

It did not bring any new sensations. The decoration is that of the other assemblies. It is the austere conference hall, that of the Reformation, which will receive Germany as it has already received Austria, Bulgaria, and Hungary.

Throughout the opening session, formidable headlamps on the galleries on both sides of the hall continued to direct their dazzling light on the presidential platform and on the representatives of forty-eight states out of fifty-five, sent to Geneva.⁸¹

The League had become a stage and it was the performance of the participants as much as the substance of their deliberations that was of interest. Cameras and the dressing of a 'set' modifies behaviours whatever the actors or audience may want to believe. Arguably the politicians and assorted grandees had always been on show when in public, but now the circumstances were explicit and the actors' performances could be recorded and replayed. The physical surroundings that the public saw on screen would not necessarily be what they seemed, because the 'set' created a new reality. No doubt the more astute political actors were canny enough to modify their behaviours in the interests of self-aggrandisement. When considering the admission of Germany to the League of Nations in 1928, *Le Figaro* reported that:

The signing ceremony of the Pact will be "toured" by several film operators. PARIS-MIDI informs us that fourteen emissaries from cinematographic firms have come to Paris to collaborate in their own way in outlawing war.

An interview with one of the film specialists included a detailed description of the technical arrangements. The article concluded with the information that:

⁷⁹ "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.184: 19th Parliament 6th session," pp.62-64, 74-76.; "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.185: 19th Parliament 6th session," p.503.

⁸⁰ "La Société des nations: A Genève," *Le Figaro*, 9 March 1926, pp.1-2. 'Les cinégraphistes ont pu filmer à loisir le premier acte de la pièce historique qui se joue ici. La T. S. F., d'autre part, envoya ses ondes dans toutes les directions'. Presumably TSF refers to the radio or wireless *Transmission Sans Fil* which could broadcast in real time.

⁸¹ *Ibid.* The newspaper descriptions reveal that a movie-like set was used during filming.

Only Germany has reserved its decision. (Definitely, Germany is without enthusiasm!)
[NB. *This last parenthetical comment was quoted in this form within the original article*]

And that's not all, the ceremony will also be recorded on a talking movie. So, the Covenant promises, at least, a great deal for the cinema. We had said the pact was the last and (most) sensational novelty of the season.⁸²

The impact of these 'docu-drama' productions on the participants was the subject of speculation from the journalist Henri Vonoven who guessed that when it came to the American Secretary of State signing what became known as the Kellogg-Briand pact, Kellogg was aware of the pact's limitations and knew that it would be unwise to celebrate it for more than it was. Vonoven concluded that over-playing the celebrations was likely to be misinterpreted as an excess of optimism over reality and that the scene setting required to film the event could contribute to such sentiments.

No doubt he (Kellogg) thinks that this (i.e. the over exuberance of the supporters of the pact) compromises his effort almost as much as the cameras of the eleven cinematographic companies and their projectors take away dignity at the ceremony with the Salon de l'Horloge transformed into a studio.⁸³

A description of the filmed opening of the League of Nations meeting in Geneva as 'the first act of the historical play' seems an appropriate summary of this new genre.⁸⁴

No evidence has been found in the public record indicating that these clips were screened in New Zealand. If they were shown it therefore seems unlikely that they had a significant impact. This omission, along with Massey's deliberate thwarting of attempts to publish New Zealand's official record of the League's proceedings and his public repudiation of the organisation's worth over the Singapore issue, denied the League a primary role in developing New Zealand's international relationships. The 'others' will remain as such if they are deliberately ignored. By the time the League

⁸² Pascal Versini, "La Opinion des autres: Messieurs, on tourne," *Le Figaro*, 26 August 1928 p.3.

⁸³ Henri Vonoven, "La Politique: Un pas vers Tipperary," *Le Figaro*, 26 August 1928 p.1. 'M. Kellogg, qui doit le savoir, ne voit pas dans le pacte qu'il vient signer une panacée contre le fléau de la guerre. C'est une tentative ; il doit aimer qu'on l'accueille avec sympathie, comprendre qu'on apporte à la juger quelque scepticisme ; mais c'est dépasser son sentiment, à coup sur, que de la saluer avec des transports de joie comme une victoire: Sans doute juge-t-il que cela compromet son effort presque autant que les appareils des onze sociétés cinématographiques et leurs projecteurs enlèvent de dignité à la cérémonie du Salon de l'Horloge transformé en studio.'

⁸⁴ "La Société des nations: A Genève." pp.1-2.

proceedings were printed and a less transactional stance was adopted by Massey's successors, the decisive post-war period when the League may have become effective as a link between New Zealand and France had passed. Ignoring the League proved just as successful in making it irrelevant and therefore redundant as direct denigration.

The sampled news articles unsurprisingly included only one direct reference to the League of Nations Union, the grass-roots, non-Government, United Kingdom originating organisation established to promote the League and encourage public support for peaceful dispute resolution and disarmament.⁸⁵ It was a creed that few could disagree with but its worthy aims proved unachievable. The Union did gain widespread support in the United Kingdom, culminating with the Peace Ballot of 1935 but League of Nations Union membership in New Zealand was never more than a modest 2,500 and based on that metric could be considered elitist. Achieving world peace through popular opinion never became a widely accepted New Zealand cause during a period when Government involvement with the League of Nations was half-hearted and minimal. New Zealand deliberately downplaying of the League neutralised another avenue to demonstrate independence by engaging directly with France.

4.4 Could God defend New Zealand?

If New Zealand was not going to engage with the League and/or disarm, what security options remained and what relevance would they have for the relationship with France? As the immediate memory of the war and hopes for global reconciliation faded, the 1924 Defence Review stated what was now obvious. While the League 'may assist' in lessening the instability between the great powers, it was highly unlikely (from a military viewpoint) that an aggrieved party would voluntarily submit to the League or to any other outside judgement when an acute crisis arose. In other words, as far as the League's primary objective of maintaining peace went, it was an empty shell. In such circumstances the report went on, given the interdependence of the nations of the Empire 'all parts' must be prepared to assume their share of the defence burden. The report made the point that neglecting defensive measures would be an 'inducement' to

⁸⁵ "League Of Nations," *Lake Wakatip Mail*, 9 March 1926, p.2.. Attwood, "Apostles of peace : the New Zealand League of Nations Union : research essay presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Philosophy in History," pp.60-61. Attwood concludes that apart from some fervent supporters including Labour, New Zealand was at best indifferent to the League of Nations.

outside aggression. Deterrence was needed, but the former New Zealand Expeditionary Force could no longer be considered effective by reason of age, fitness, training and so on.⁸⁶ Even allowing for the military's predilection for investment in personnel and hardware it is difficult to fault the logic behind the General's statements. If Massey's ambition was to increase New Zealand's dependence on the British market, New Zealand's co-reliance on the already scarcely defensible sea lanes of the Empire would similarly increase.

Defence issues provided the starkest backdrop to New Zealand's post-war national identity debate and whether independent nationhood, co-operative Empire membership or mutual disarmament facilitated through the League of Nations was the most efficacious. As early as June 1921 *Le Figaro* had observed that the British commitment to disarm was qualified by the need to protect her Empire and specifically to defend Australia and New Zealand using the Royal Navy. It followed *ipso facto* that Britain would not disarm although when reporting (in August 1921) on the outcome of the Dominion Premiers' Conference, *Le Figaro* indicated that the defence burden was now to be shared between Britain and her satellites.⁸⁷ *Le Figaro* reminded readers of this decision when reporting a year later that while New Zealand and South Africa were planning to maintain their very small fleets, Australia was proposing a large reduction and Canada wanted to completely disarm.⁸⁸ *Le Figaro* reported that the British were 'alarmed' because they would have to replace these ships with others from the Home fleet and British taxpayers would thereby assume the burden of Empire defence.

There was no choice in William Massey's view between which of the façades (independent country, empire dependent or League of Nations conformist) was appropriate for New Zealand's defence arrangements. This was unequivocally revealed when Sir John Salmond, a prominent legal scholar, was selected as New Zealand's representative at the Washington Naval Disarmament Conference (November 1921 to February 1922). Salmond was firmly of the view that New Zealand was an inalienable

⁸⁶ "Defence Forces Of New Zealand. Report Of The General Officer Commanding The Forces For The Period 1st June, 1923 to 31st May, 1924. Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives, 1924 Session," pp.6-7. The General Officer Commanding the New Zealand Forces (Major-General C. W. Melvill) assessed the global situation in blunt language.

⁸⁷ "Bulletin Militaire: Angleterre," *Le Figaro*, 7 August 1921, p.4.

⁸⁸ "Dans la Marine: La défense navale de l'Empire britannique," *Le Figaro*, 5 June 1922, p.3.

and integral part of the British Empire.⁸⁹ In that respect he was well qualified to be a member of an Empire delegation, but less so to represent New Zealand's national interests. His thorough, competently written and detailed report clearly anticipated further arms limitation and therefore lacks an appreciation of the broader tactical defence issues facing New Zealand which political representation might have provided. Salmond noted that the Washington Treaty limited Britain's capital fleet to equivalence with that of the United States' while France was reduced to sixth in ranking. No new fortifications or bases were to be constructed anywhere in the Pacific, New Zealand included. This however contradicted the Empire defence strategy under which the Dominions were to have their own naval defences including facilities for visiting British capital vessels.⁹⁰ From a New Zealand point of view, continued British defence assistance seemed both obvious and a domestic matter. Therefore, whatever was agreed in Washington was apparently assumed not to impinge on New Zealand's security which was viewed as an internal Empire concern.

Defending the Dominions and retaining British and New Zealand colonial territory in the Pacific at the expense of the British taxpayer carried the inherent assumption that the region had some benefit and presumably would contribute manpower and economic support if there was another European conflict. Debate in the British Parliament concerning Egypt and the Suez Canal substantiates this view. *Le Figaro* noted Lloyd George's observation that over a million soldiers had been transported to France via the canal. It was in French interests to retain ready access to these allies who were apparently prepared to indirectly support French interests by fighting wars in Europe while the British subsidised the cost.⁹¹ There appears to be no public record available in New Zealand suggesting that the cost-benefit of occupying the canal zone

⁸⁹ Alex Frame, "Salmond, John William," in *Dictionary of New Zealand Biography* (Te Ara - the Encyclopedia of New Zealand, 1996). Just as was the case with Capt. Mousley's appointment during the Nauru mandate investigation, New Zealand seemed to have a predilection for selecting representatives with narrow, specialist, legal expertise. Whether through their innate natures or by restrictive instruction, neither Mousley nor Salmond engaged in the broader contextual issues.

⁹⁰ "Conference On The Limitation Of Armaments, Held At Washington From The 12th November, 1921, To The 6th February, 1922. Report Of The Hon. Sir John Salmond, Delegate For The Dominion Of New Zealand: Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives, 1922 Session," pp.6-8. These restrictions were already approaching irrelevance as aircraft and submarines were excluded. Both were far more effective weapons and both were seen as such at the time.

⁹¹ "La politique extérieure de l'Angleterre," *Le Figaro*, 21 June 1921, p.3.; "Bulletin Militaire: Angleterre."p.4.; "Le roi George V a prononcé le discours du Trône, dont voici les principaux passages," *Le Figaro*, 8 February 1922, p.3.; "Dans la Marine: La défense navale de l'Empire britannique."p.3.

and maintaining the canal was debated in either Britain or France. The Dominion Governments - especially New Zealand's - had every reason to support the policy as it facilitated co-dependence through trade between the Pacific and the metropole.

Protecting British interests within the Pacific pre-supposed a naval intervention by a capital fleet whether permanently based in Singapore or on temporary deployment there. New Zealand in particular had placed much faith in Singapore both as a symbol of British commitment in the Pacific and as a practical exhibition of British power. The public debate surrounding the issue was complicated by the uncertainty as to whether the base would contravene the terms of the Washington Treaty. *Le Figaro* opined that uncertainty over the Singapore investment was due to a period of reflection during which many of Britain's Empire dreams had been or were being abandoned. Britain was overly anxious and withdrawn in the application of her foreign policy, or so *Le Figaro* claimed.⁹² Already *The Times* had observed - according to a *Le Figaro* report - that "the world respects few who are not prepared to defend their legitimate interests".⁹³ If the war with Germany resumed, support for France from the Pacific Dominions would be less certain if they were left undefended. *Le Figaro* therefore approvingly reported what it interpreted as counter-acting propaganda when a squadron of British cruisers visited the Pacific in 1923-1924.

The bâtiments (vessels or ships) visited a very large number of ports, above all in the Dominions ... the main goal was to exhibit (shine or burnish) the Navy in all parts of the Empire, thus contributing to strengthening ties between these scattered nations, and (finally) to create a favourable atmosphere for increased subsidies that the Dominions provide for the maintenance of the fleet.⁹⁴

The message from Admiral Field's expedition was clear according to *Le Figaro*; the Dominions needed to support the Royal Navy and contribute towards its upkeep. The fleet's reception was however inconsistent (according to *Le Figaro*), varying as it did from Australian and New Zealand enthusiasm to a less motivated South African reception and open dispute in the Canadian press ('...where it gave rise to a press

⁹² Henry Bidou, "La Question de Singapour," *Le Figaro*, 28 March 1924, p.1. The Washington Treaty prohibited the construction of new naval bases in the Pacific so Singapore was interpreted as an enhancement rather than a new facility. More significantly, Baldwin's Conservatives had been replaced by Macdonald's Liberal-reliant minority Labour Party Government.

⁹³ "Une protestation de la Nouvelle-Zélande." p.3.

⁹⁴ "Dans La Marine," *Le Figaro*, 30 September 1924, p.6.

controversy'). France, with its own interest in the French-Canadian community had its reasons for viewing Canada as an exception amongst the Dominions, but nonetheless the lack of consistency and enthusiasm for collective defence from within the Empire-Commonwealth was obvious and concerning because a unified British Empire would have been of most use to France.

British Cabinet minutes indicate that the diverse views over Singapore and the implications for conciliation, peaceful resolution of disputes and limitation of arms were carefully considered before the British Prime Minister wrote to M. Poincaré (on February 21st 1924) stating that:

Our task meanwhile must be to establish confidence, and this task can only be achieved by allaying the international suspicions and anxieties that exist today.⁹⁵

The Singapore base was postponed. Of all the Dominions, New Zealand had attached the greatest importance and symbolism to Singapore and the attendant naval strategy.⁹⁶ Neither France nor New Zealand wanted construction at Singapore halted since the proposed base would have met the needs of both, largely at British expense. Moreover, cancellation put Britain's less aggressive stance towards any potentially competitive states at odds with New Zealand's policy of Empire loyalty and a *faux* independence, secured by the Royal Navy.

4.5 *New Zealand becomes an 'other' within the Empire*

The 1924 Imperial Exhibition opened shortly after the Commons voted to defer construction in Singapore. It was an opportunity to counteract perceptions that the Empire was weakening but who the exhibition was aimed at and to what end was less clear. The most likely intent was a rekindling of British public support that was so essential for the Empire project, while encouraging intra-Empire trade and impressing if not deterring competitors. The primary wealth of the Empire was on display for the importers and manufacturers of England while the British public could view the

⁹⁵ Cabinet Office, "Draft Telegram to 5 Dominions," in *Cabinet Meetings and Papers* (Kew: The National Archives, 1924), p.305.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp.308-309. Although Australia, Newfoundland and New Zealand wished to proceed with construction and both Australia and New Zealand were prepared to contribute towards the cost, Australia only wanted the new policy to be used as a bargaining chip in exchange for further arms reduction.

produce available and replications of the diverse Empire scenery. Whether the visitors were supposed to provide financial support through taxation, buy Empire produce, migrate or visit as tourists was unclear. *Le Figaro* described the exhibits and praised the replication of the Empire through the scale version exhibited in London.⁹⁷ It was apparent that the British Empire had size, diversity and development to its credit.

The exhibition modelled the Empire's idealised economy within which raw materials were shipped to the United Kingdom for manufacture and then re-exported as finished goods.⁹⁸ If the colonies and Dominions instead developed the industrial characteristics of the mother country rather than taking their rightful place as primary producers and developers of extractive industries, the British Empire's economic plan would be undermined. *Le Figaro* noted the obvious conflict with Dominion ambitions to develop their own manufacturing capabilities. The reluctance of the United Kingdom to grant intra-Empire preferential tariffs was another omnipresent challenge, because the United States was in reserve as a potential alternative market for its Pacific neighbours Australia, New Zealand and Canada. The exchange rate of the British pound was encouraging the colonies and Dominions to import manufactured goods from non-British suppliers in Germany and Italy. The article concluded that there were lessons for France as she prepared for her own exhibition scheduled for 1927.

Le Figaro may have been certain about the primary purpose of the exhibition, but New Zealand apparently was not, for New Zealand's contribution appeared to reflect the vagueness and hesitancy of an uncertain national identity and purpose. New Zealand newspaper reports varied between praise and criticism for both the subjects of the exhibits in the New Zealand pavilion and their design and execution. Descriptions included a 'country stall', a 'dismal failure', and offering little beyond the basics (cheese, wool, meat, butter). One newspaper noted that the exhibition office was receiving some queries '... from people from Continental countries who are primarily interested from

⁹⁷ Thomazi, "En Grande-Bretagne: L'Exposition Impériale. Les productions des Dominions et des colonies," *Le Figaro: Economic Supplement Illustrated* 7 April 1924, p.1.

⁹⁸ Ibid. 'Le but officiel de l'Exposition est de mettre en présence les producteurs de matières premières qui sont dans les colonies et les industriels qui utilisent ces matières dans la métropole.'

the trade viewpoint'. France was mentioned as one such but no detail is given.⁹⁹ The intent was clearly to sell more to Britain rather than to France or other continental customers.¹⁰⁰

Explaining the educational purpose of the exhibition, *Le Figaro* claimed the crowd was attentive and serious rather than entertained and amused. A play (or diorama) showed the Empire's formation with scenes of Cook's discovery of New Zealand, Nelson's victory at Trafalgar and similar significant events used to reinforce the British version of history and the pre-eminence of the resulting Empire.

It is truly a beautiful show that is a fitting addition to the Wembley Imperial Exhibition, a monument to British power, wealth and pride.¹⁰¹

The same correspondent provided a critical analysis of trade patterns within the Empire. Imports by Britain from the Empire posed no particular difficulties but the inconsistency in the British share of individual Empire members' imports exposed a problem. While seventy percent of New Zealand's imports were sourced from Britain, India obtained only forty percent from the same source and Canada sixty percent. *Le Figaro* asked hypothetically whether this could not be increased, given Britain's burden of defending these territories. The answer lay within the relative less populous Dominions. Even if their citizens were loyal purchasers, there were insufficient individuals within the Empire to significantly increase the proportion (quoted as four-tenths) of Britain's exports to Empire countries. Britain needed to expand her markets, but, as noted, the Empire members wished to produce more of their own industrial requirements. The correspondent (Thomazi) concluded that it was impossible to predict how this situation would 'unfold'.¹⁰² Those in favour of the Empire therefore

⁹⁹ "New Zealand At Wembley," *Otago Daily Times*, 12 July 1924, p.7; "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.205: 21st Parliament: 3rd session," pp.160, 517, 522.; "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.203: 21st Parliament: 3rd session 1924," pp.161-2, 171, 268-269, 478-479, 1152.; T. Clarkson, "N.Z. at Wembley: Truth about the exhibition," *Auckland Star*, 1 August 1924, p.8.. 'A little flock of plump, well-woolled lambs grazing' were included as a backdrop to an exhibition of meat cuts and carcasses as was '... the sheep of the taxidermist, awaiting with plaintive expression, its turn to be led to slaughter.'


¹⁰⁰ "Despatches To The Secretary Of State For The Colonies From The Governor-General. Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives, 1925 Session," pp.6, 9. New Zealand had declined an invitation to attend the 1927 Paris Exhibition thus bypassing another opportunity to advance the relationship and possibly trade.

¹⁰¹ Par A. Thomazi (de notre envoyé spécial), "A l'Exposition Impériale britannique," *Le Figaro*, 1 August 1924, p.1.. 'C'est vraiment un beau spectacle qui complète dignement l'Exposition impériale de Wembley, monument de la puissance, de la richesse et de l'orgueil britanniques.'

¹⁰² A. Thomazi, "Quelques considérations sur l'Exposition de Wembley," *Le Figaro: Economic Supplement*, 8 September 1924, p.1.. One organisation described as the 'Economic Development Branch of the Unionist Party' released tables of statistics showing the value of the imports of British

attempted to twist the statistical information to bolster their case. The following graph illustrates the expenditure per head on British goods across selected countries using contemporary published data. These have been multiplied by the omitted 1924 population counts. Although the average spend on British goods per New Zealand citizen was nearly thirteen times that of the average French citizen (£15-1-10 versus £1-3-9) loyalty could not overcome the disproportionate size of the two populations. Measured by value, France as an importer was worth nearly two and a half times as much to the United Kingdom as New Zealand.

Figure 23: Selected countries' purchasing power (£ millions) ¹⁰³



manufactured goods by the Dominions and other imperial territories while omitting any comparative reference to the value of non-Empire British exports. A similar approach was used to demonstrate the loyalty of the citizens of the Empire. The original table did not include the crucial population totals necessary to draw a meaningful comparison.

¹⁰³ "Development Of The Empire," *Press*, 6 October 1924, p.13; Jan Lahmeyer, "Population Statistics: historical demography of all countries, their divisions and towns," (2006).

For New Zealand to have a future as an economy of significance within a British-centric Empire it had to import an even greater volume of manufactured goods from Britain or become a more or less exclusive supplier of a product which offered an otherwise unobtainable benefit. The former would require rapid population growth. In New Zealand's case the potential demographic pool was severely restricted by the self-imposed preference for white, ideally British migrants. As an undifferentiated supplier of bulk commodities with significant shipping costs, the supply-side opportunities were subject to severe competition from Danish and French dairy produce, Argentinian meat, Australian wool and so forth.¹⁰⁴ Sustaining and developing New Zealand within the Empire therefore required British subsidies which in turn depended on indoctrination and education of the next generation of Home voters.¹⁰⁵

Arguably the increasing cultural and political divergence within the Empire was a more immediate problem. Not unexpectedly the French press tended to identify these differences rather than the consistencies, but the former were obvious and foreshadowed serious rifts that Empire Conferences, local politics and the New Zealand press could not conceal indefinitely. Jacques Chastenet, the prominent historian, lawyer, and diplomat pointed out that despite the unwavering loyalty of Australia and New Zealand, South Africa wanted a Boer inspired flag without any Union Jack, Ireland claimed the right to independent representation at the League of Nations and Canada had recently forced the recall of Governor-General Lord Byng of Vimy, with future appointees being subject to Canadian approval. Britain, the article concluded, was now but '*primus inter pares*'. All these developments indicated that there was no longer any certainty about the Empire's fate, with Baldwin's Government in danger of falling over the trade issue and doubts arising as to whether the Dominions would ever again come to the assistance of Britain as they had during the great war. "Has the hour of decadence,

¹⁰⁴ "Will Prices Decline?," *Evening Post*, 27 November 1922, p.7.

¹⁰⁵ "Empire Education," *Evening Post*, 23 August 1924, p.9.. The Wembley exhibition was an ideal opportunity to introduce children to the Empire model and many visited as the Duke of Devonshire (the former Conservative Secretary of State for the Colonies) noted. The Triennial Imperial Educational Conference that was held during the exhibition 'under the auspices of the League of Empire at the University College, London' highlighted the important role of education. Mr J Clark the Director of Education in Glasgow said teachers needed to prevent 'tragedy' for 14-year olds by giving them 'better moral and social equipment' and getting them to think imperially.

which rings sooner or later for nations as for men, sounded for Albion? The immediate future will tell'.¹⁰⁶

The impression that the Kingdom was no longer united was supported by the historian and journalist Jacques Bainville, who claimed that the defeat of the Unionists and the independence of Ireland placed the concept of the United Kingdom in the past tense as, "The Kingdom (that) is no longer "united" ".¹⁰⁷ Despite an apparent role for Ireland as (yet another) supplier of produce for industrialised Britain, doubts were raised by Bainville as to whether Ireland would even remain neutral during a war involving Britain. In Bainville's opinion the 'beautiful (Dominion) unity' of 1914 was no longer a certainty. The Empire was undergoing an as yet incomplete evolution to a 'community of free nations' released from the 'bonds from which the Dominions have sought to free themselves'.¹⁰⁸ In the same issue *Le Figaro* published a brief summary of the recent Imperial Conference. Far from the laudatory accounts received in New Zealand, the piece exposed the contradictions and face-saving required to achieve a common denominator low enough to allow a claim of consensus. Hence peace and security through the League (*Le Figaro* reported) was supported as was a reduction in armaments although this was apparently contradicted by the need to maintain the Royal Navy on at least '... an equal footing with the most powerful foreign navy.'¹⁰⁹

Four days later *Le Figaro* published a scathing article under the authorship of W. Morton Fullerton.¹¹⁰ In flowery prose Fullerton announced that the 1926 Imperial Conference was the 'death knell' of the British Empire. He sarcastically described Balfour's summary as if it were a papal announcement.¹¹¹ In Fullerton's interpretation, if the King was no

¹⁰⁶ L'Académie française, "Jacques Chastenot," in *L'Académie française website* (Paris).; Pierre Villette, "La crise anglaise," *Le Figaro*, 3 October 1926, p.3.

¹⁰⁷ "Le Royaume qui n'est plus « uni », " *Le Figaro*, 24 November 1926, p.3.

¹⁰⁸ L'Académie française, "Jacques Bainville," in *L'Académie française website* (Paris).; Pierre Villette, "L'opinion des Autres: Le Royaume qui n'est plus 'uni'," *Le Figaro*, 24 November 1926, p.3.. Bainville, not without apparent glee, described the United Kingdom's disintegration as, 'C'est là consécration d'un fait accompli'

¹⁰⁹ "La Conférence impériale a terminé hier ses travaux," *Le Figaro*, 24 November 1926, p.3.

¹¹⁰ Marion Mainwaring, "Fullerton, William Morton (1865-1952), journalist and writer," (Oxford University Press, 2018); William Morton Fullerton, *William Morton Fullerton papers*. Fullerton had been the Paris based correspondent for *The Times* and after 1910 was an independent journalist. He was therefore well acquainted with the British-French political relationship.

¹¹¹ W. Morton Fullerton, "Le Figaro aux Etats-Unis. La fin d'un empire. Que va devenir l'Europe? : L'Empire britannique se confesse devant le monde.," *Le Figaro*, 28 November 1926, p.5.

longer King of a United Kingdom there was no longer an Empire. Moreover, the Empire or Commonwealth now existed only as an imprecise concept because - in Balfour's requoted words - it defied definition through being "dissimilar to any political organization presently existing, or ever experienced, (and so) it is impossible to find an analogy or label for it". Fullerton claimed that the concept of an Empire was by this admission a deception rather than a reality. The now independent states made their own policy and so England could no longer count upon their support. Fullerton interpreted this new order as leading to the obvious conclusion that England must now realise she was as 'an integral part of Europe ... in spite of herself ...' While the Empire members endorsed the efforts of Austen Chamberlain to secure peace they were, Fullerton claimed, careful to avoid any commitment to aid the mother country or to give a guarantee to protect France or Belgium against Germany.

Fullerton did warn that this was two-sided. The Dominions might renounce any obligations to Europe but, "if the Dominions wash their hands of any responsibility for the London initiatives, London is relieved of responsibility for a lot of problems, such as those that the future of the Pacific may have on the horizon (for) Australia and New Zealand ... This is true, despite the hitherto carefully concealed agreements on Singapore and the whole problem of defending the Empire!"¹¹² This was New Zealand's worst fear. Despite protestations of loyalty and filial piety to Britain, New Zealand was slowly adapting her domestic policies to align with these truths. The inability of export dependent New Zealand to view the world from a vantage point broader than British-

'It would be useful if the wonderful document which Earl Balfour has just signed on behalf of the Inter-Imperial Relations Committee, which summarizes the work of the British Imperial Conference of 1926, were translated word for word into any language, for consideration by all the statesmen of all the countries. This document is simply one of the more important state papers in the history of England. It records a factual situation that interests the entire universe. It proclaims *urbi et orbi* things known, no doubt, by well-informed people, but sceptically disputed by the mass of observers. It is a confession of ecumenical significance, and its practical significance, which is no less universal, will be endless.'

¹¹² Ibid.

'Fixons pour le moment notre attention sur une seule des vérités que nous venons d'enregistrer. Elle est la plus pratique de toutes. Il s'agit tout simplement de l'émancipation de l'Angleterre, mais émancipation par isolement. Remarquez que si les Dominions se lavent les mains de toute responsabilité pour ce qui concerne les initiatives de Londres, Londres se trouve libéré de responsabilité pour pas mal de problèmes, par exemple ceux que l'avenir du Pacifique pourra susciter à l'horizon de l'Australie et de la Nouvelle-Zélande, ou qui pourront rapprocher dans un jiu-jitsu formidable les populations de l'Afrique du Sud et celles de l'Inde. Cela est vrai, malgré les accords jusqu'ici soigneusement cachés sur Singapour et sur tout le problème de la défense de l'Empire!'

centric self-interest needed to be challenged.

The conservative French historian Bernard Fay described the Geneva Naval Conference of 1927 as a discussion between the two most powerful (English speaking) Empires in the world - Great Britain and the United States - to decide how they would divide the world.¹¹³ Fay claimed that England's justification for a large Navy was based on her mercantile prowess and scattered territories, while the United States counter-argued that her moral obligations, power and size demanded parity. In Fay's view, Canada and Australia followed by New Zealand to a lesser degree were evolving into client states of America. His evidence was the increased trade ties between America and Canada while Australia was already borrowing from United States' financiers. All the British could offer was peace secured by a powerful Navy, but if that was removed so too would be the rationale for the Dominions to align with Britain, and then the Empire would 'probably' end. The situation, the letter concluded, was not without some amusement for the French who had seen the treatment of France during the Washington Conference.

When the much-anticipated renunciation of war treaty (the Kellogg-Briand Pact) was finally signed in Paris in 1928, *Le Figaro* reported that the signatories, including Sir C. J. Parr, the Plenipotentiary of New Zealand, handed a diplomatic note to the representatives of the non-signatory nations informing them that the Treaty had been extended in the course of negotiations to include as signatories all the nations that had signed the Locarno agreement, including the British Empire countries. The inclusion of these nations was at the request of the British whose position was that agreement by the British Empire required participation '... jointly and simultaneously with the governments of the Dominions'.¹¹⁴

¹¹³ Bernard Fay, "Lettre d'Amérique: Une discussion de famille," *Le Figaro*, 7 August 1927, p.1.

¹¹⁴ "Après la signature du Pacte: Un appel aux autres Nations," *Le Figaro*, 29 August 1928 pp.1-2.

Just four years later much had changed to disturb the equilibrium of Empire co-dependence. Although dealt with elsewhere, Lord Hailsham's comment from the Chair at the Ottawa Conference that failure to reach an intra-Empire agreement would split the Empire was noted by *Le Figaro*.¹¹⁵ After the conference M. J. H. Thomas, (described as Minister of the Dominions) was to declare the conference a success but his extremely optimistic interpretation that individual interests had been subordinated to the common good was a wistful reflection from earlier times.¹¹⁶ The eroded value of the British Empire-Commonwealth from the French point of view was made explicit in 1934 with a report that 'Mr. Cobbé, (the New Zealand) Minister of War' had stated that the New Zealand Cabinet's plans for local defence included increased air power and an increase in the civil aviation budget. "If Great Britain," Cobbé was quoted by *Le Figaro* as saying, "was drawn into a conflict, New Zealand and Australia must be able to provide their own defense".¹¹⁷ This was not to claim that Britain would automatically withdraw support for the Dominions but equally it could no longer be assumed that a resource constrained Britain would be willing or financially able to provide New Zealand with assistance.

4.6 *Outcomes and implications*

Although intended as a light-hearted jibe at the expense of King George V and the Empire-Commonwealth, *Le Figaro's* recipe for 1927 Christmas fare included a pointed reference to the produce of the various Dominions and territories. The clichéd reference to the British pudding becomes a 'dig' at the British Empire so popular - the poem says - with the 'old lords' who loved the (colonial) recipe. The poem thereby becomes a critical reflection on British colonisation and the aristocracy. The ditty says (satirically) that every European country has to think and get inspired by this British concoction. The poem includes a word play on the 'Société des Rations' (alluding to the 'Société des Nations') and the post-World War I hope of international cooperation through the League of Nations. The imagined pudding ingredients include contributions from the

¹¹⁵ "La Conference d'Ottawa," *Le Figaro*, 30 July 1932, p.3.

¹¹⁶ "Les conclusions de la Conference d'Ottawa," *Le Figaro*, 20 August 1932, p.3.

¹¹⁷ "Les Dominions entendent collaborer à la défense de l'Empire britannique," *Le Figaro*, 14 September 1934, p.3.

various British territories and colonies. New Zealand's offering contains a barbed reference within an ironic truth:

... And the sheep
Playing his role, he's in command
The fat in New Zealand
(Anyone else feels the ooze [or grease] they say)¹¹⁸

Perhaps New Zealand was led by sheep and the grease or ooze could imply an over-fawning obsequiousness towards the mother country as well as the fattiness of the carcass?

New Zealand had not entered the League of Nations intent on embracing the institution and its high-minded ideal. The aim was to secure mandated territory while participating as an Empire supernumerary with a minimum of effort expended. The League was viewed as a transactional forum with claims of exceptionalism a repeated transgression. The use of part-time representatives who were more akin to *rapporteurs* than diplomats supports this interpretation. When a transaction of importance required it, New Zealand's representation was significantly upgraded before lapsing into indifference once the immediate goal was attained. New Zealand's periods of intense interaction with the League of Nations were a product of self-interest. In any case, when the needs of one nation impinged on the 'rights' of another, a third uncivilized territory usually bore the consequences of the settlement. Labour under Holland - along with leftist opinion in general - did recognise the League's potential as a global forum for collectively assuring the security of all nations. Any pretence that it would become an institution for peace-keeping through arbitration or a forum for progressing

¹¹⁸ Hugues Delorme La Société des Nations, "Au Jour Le Jour: La recette du Pudding Royal. Le roi d'Angleterre a voulu que fût rendue publique la recette du pudding que jusqu'ici on ne dégustait qu'à la Cour.," *Le Figaro*, 4 December 1927, p.1..

“... Et le mouton
Jouant son rôle, il en commande
La graisse en Nouvelle-Zélande
(Toute autre sent le suint, dit-on.)”

"Mr Massey." p.8. The *Press* published an article in 1924 that also used the plum pudding allegory: 'At the reception on the steamer today, his Excellency the Governor-General was represented by Commander Dove, Aide-de-Camp. "Did you bring the plum pudding safely home?" The Prime Minister took the query quite seriously (*suggesting Massey had missed an 'in' joke*. AW). He (Massey) thought the presentation of "the plum pudding was very nice. He had been at the Hotel Cecil on five occasions, and had been nice to the staff, and they felt that they ought to give him a plum pudding. That was the sentiment that prompted the gift. 'Yes, I have got it somewhere in my baggage," added Mr Massey.'

disarmament was destroyed by the absence of Germany and America, the former at French insistence. Re-interpretation of the Washington Conference protocols allowed the Singapore Naval Base to be considered as redevelopment of an existing military establishment, thereby excluding it from whatever limitations were agreed for such establishments in the Pacific. Lest there be any doubt, there was Massey's explicit warning to Ramsay Macdonald's Government that it would be futile to rely on the League to maintain peace. New Zealand and France were equally complicit in this misuse of the League; they were "sisters under their skins".¹¹⁹

¹¹⁹ Rudyard Kipling, "Kipling Society: The Ladies," http://www.kiplingsociety.co.uk/poems_ladies.htm. "For the Colonel's Lady an' Judy O'Grady, Are sisters under their skins!"

5. Finance and economics – using and misusing the French example

Approximately 10% of the newspaper topics referred to financial matters making this the fourth most frequently reported subject. References were found within financial management, international economics, public finance and labour economics. Economic matters understandably featured prominently in various headlines during the depression years but the economy was also referenced within secondary topics such as unemployment and prices.

* * * *

She (France) was much less dependent than the United Kingdom or Germany upon foreign trade and it was not until 1931 that she seriously began to feel the pinch.¹

J.P.T. Bury.

The century between the downfall of Napoleon I in 1815 and the start of World War I had been one of relative global stability but it was neither consistently prosperous nor continually peaceful for either France or New Zealand. Nevertheless, post-war nostalgia stirred a desire to reconstruct what Einzig has called the “Good Old Days”.² This fictional place never existed in the same perfect form as its imagined ideal because pre-war conditions were determined by individual experience and subjective assessment. Moreover, although it is both an explicit rejection of change and an implicit denial that economic modification is irreversible, the broader issue of whether recreating the past is achievable or even a worthy aim, is rarely considered. Returning to the “Good Old Days” presumed that the good elements of the past could be reinstated without the bad, despite the lives lost in the war. This chapter explores how the French example was used as a post-war financial benchmark in an attempt to re-establish an imagined better past, before the dream was finally abandoned in favour of dealing with the present.

The ambition of returning New Zealand to its pre-war past had to be assessed within the context of the post-war world, the place New Zealand would have within it and how a British-dependent economy restored to its pre-war state could interact with post-war Europe. New Zealand’s Empire-centric policies relied on Britain to provide solutions for international economic problems within a regime of arbitrary financial rules or

¹ Bury, *France, 1814-1940*: p.271.

² Einzig, *World finance since 1914*: p.95. During the nineteenth century New Zealand had experienced the Land Wars, the Boer War and repeated economic booms and busts typical of primary production economies. The associated fiscal problems had led *in extremis* to Government moratoriums on both external and internal debt.

conventions based on moral righteousness, imperial pride and tradition. As New Zealand's economic problems worsened during the late 1920s some New Zealand politicians turned to French policies in search of a remedy. Because the economic structure of the two nations was so different, comparison was inappropriate, yet the process did provoke a re-assessment of New Zealand's economic strategy as traditional solutions failed. For all the criticism of the French, it became obvious to the New Zealand politicians that France was guided by French interests and so France was prepared to try alternatives when other solutions failed. New Zealand's continued loyalty to Britain along with her faith in the failing Empire model bemused the French as much as it came to baffle many on the New Zealand political Left who believed there were obvious alternative domestic remedies.

Recreating the past was dependent on the stance of the other nations with which New Zealand had to interact. France clearly did not want to return to a pre-war world in which Germany had been a threat. France was strongly motivated to resist any moves that might restore the pre-war European political and economic environment and with it Germany's financial muscle and military strength. Britain in turn did not want a renewed commitment to assisting France, while New Zealand needed Britain to expand as an export market to preserve its nominally independent status. That in turn depended on Britain and France accepting a recovered Germany as a trading partner within an (expanding) world economy so that Germany could meet its reparation obligations. No realistic attempt was made in New Zealand's economic plans to reconcile the disparities between the imagined Good Old Days and these post-war financial and political realities.

The clear wish of the troops to return to New Zealand from France as quickly as possible was facilitated through Massey's post-war strategy of rural settlement (See Chapter Two). Far from restoring New Zealand to its pre-war state, this strategy implicitly aimed to intensify and expand the British-dependent agricultural economy. The British were expected to import or otherwise dispose of more or less all of the resulting increased dairy production, while a commensurate reduction in wool exports lessened the possibility of trade with either France or Germany. The plan assumed a significant economic expansion was possible rather than a return to the Good Old Days.

These irreconcilable contradictions inherent became obvious during the great depression. A common view of New Zealand's depression years suggests that the United-Reform Governments did little apart from cutting Government expenditure in the interests of lowering costs for farmers and exporters to the detriment of the labouring classes. David Littlewood has argued that it was this policy that eventually narrowed the political Right's electoral base to the extent that skilled workers and tradespeople who might otherwise have been conservative supporters switched allegiance and voted for Labour in 1935.³ Thereafter, with economic activity stimulated through a looser monetary policy, redistributive social programmes, and increased worker purchasing power, the country recovered. Jim McAloon argues that Labour believed New Zealand was implementing stringent budget controls in a land of plenty. The main problem was wealth re-distribution. Once this was recognised and Labour was elected, appropriate policies were implemented and recovery followed.⁴ Neither theory gives sufficient recognition to the economic conventions which the pre-Labour Governments of the early 1930s had to contend with. These constrained the adoption of radically new ideas, because it was assumed that New Zealand had to operate within the conventions of its existing trading partners. When considered from this perspective, the changes introduced by United-Reform of the early 1930s were far-reaching and groundbreaking. The apparently more radical Labour Government that followed extended these macro-economic policies to support their headline social reform programmes and reaped the electoral rewards.

Despite the obvious personal hardships of 1928-1935, the Reform-United policies had broad electoral support albeit in some cases owing to the vagaries of the first-past-the-post (FPTP) system. This was only of indirect consequence for Labour, since if their Leader (Holland) was correct and socialism was inevitable, Labour supporters only had to maintain ideological purity and wait for the existing system to collapse. The Left's support was thereby constrained within a relatively narrow, class-related, demographic (and geographic) voter segment by its own self-imposed, political parameters, while the

³ David Littlewood, "The provision of opportunities: politics and the state," in *New Zealand between the wars*, ed. Rachael Bell and Massey University Press (Auckland: Massey University Press, 2017), pp.32-56.

⁴ McAloon, *Judgements of all kinds : economic policy-making in New Zealand, 1945-1984*: pp.23-24.

political Right received electoral confirmation that their policies were if not popular, at least viewed as practical and the correct remedies for the times. After Holland's death, Labour shifted to a more practical if less pure view - although the basis of the Left's policies remained unchanged - leading to an electoral majority in 1935.⁵ Malcolm McKinnon's analysis supports this argument.⁶ The United-Reform Government was concerned with fiscal adjustments to reduce the deficit and balance the budget. The consequent scale and rapidity of the rise in unemployment - especially amongst skilled workers - was unanticipated. The treatment of those affected - the camps for the unemployed with harsh, unreasonable working conditions - publicly identified and shamed the victims by implying there was a moral dimension to unemployment. It was this outcome and the response to it, that led to the more radical policies of United-Reform, based in part on the French experience. The benefits of these policy changes implemented by the conservative coalition came too late to avoid electoral rejection.

While none of these interpretations of New Zealand's depression years are wholly incorrect, they all rely on a narrow national perspective which understates the situational constraints within which New Zealand as a loyal Empire member reliant on export income had to operate. New Zealand's place within the natural order of the Empire was as a primary produce supplier with minimal secondary and light industry. Britain's control of New Zealand's primary produce exports during World War I had led the Massey Government and its successors to believe that New Zealand had a moral right of unrestricted access to the British markets (justified by wartime contribution) for as long as New Zealand fulfilled its self-assigned role within the Empire's economic model. Increasing primary production became self-fulfilling since both policy and investment favoured this outcome. Far from doing nothing during the recession, United-Reform attempted to restore prosperity within that paradigm by maintaining farmer viability and increasing primary production. The alternative appeared to be allowing the one significant export sector that New Zealand possessed to collapse.

⁵ Ibid., p.32.

⁶ McKinnon, *The broken decade: prosperity, depression and recovery in New Zealand, 1928-39*: pp.150-151, 157, 163.

As Malcolm McKinnon has pointed out, between December 1930 and 1932 the Government ‘scrambled’ for new policies.⁷ This is somewhat distant from the common assertion that the Government simply cut expenditure and hoped for an improvement. The broader problem was finding equivalent national circumstances, whether from within or outside the British-centric world, which might offer policy alternatives. The newspaper reports and Hansard debates suggest that France was a prominent if inappropriate model amongst the available examples. By any objective assessment be it political, geographic, cultural, economic or demographic, France was as dissimilar to New Zealand as could be imagined. Even a cursory investigation would have suggested that France was neither an environment familiar to the general population nor strictly relevant from an economic management perspective, but these were desperate times. Why then was France even considered in the debate?

The initial empathy probably arose from the wartime narrative which had presented France as an innocent victim of German aggression. This scenario was used to encourage charitable fund raising for civilian relief in France and Belgium. As the war progressed, the victim mentality became entangled in the public mind with similar fund-raising initiatives on behalf of those New Zealanders killed or wounded while serving in France. German oppression and destruction were commonly blamed for these deprivations. A theme of shared suffering developed.⁸ This resulted in an awkward dissonance when the post-war French economy recovered surprisingly quickly.⁹ It appeared as if Britain (and by implication her allies) were left with the debts and the dead while France prospered, by receiving reparation payments while concurrently

⁷ Ibid., p.10.

⁸ "Patriotic Funds. Tables Showing Details Of The Various Patriotic Funds In New Zealand From The Outbreak Of War To The 31st March, 1918: Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives," (1918). Poor, suffering France (and Belgium) was a theme used to engender support for the war effort and build national unity.

⁹ Charle, "*French Intellectuals and the Impossible English Model (1870-1914)*," p.235. Kindleberger, *Economic growth in France and Britain, 1851-1950*: pp.8-9. The pre-war Anglo-Saxon world presumed that some malaise caused by an unidentified factor (a miasma-like affliction) was infecting the Gallic race and culture. France had to recover to maintain her place as a world power. Confusingly, an apparently afflicted and war-damaged France appeared to rapidly recover and prosper between 1919-1929. Although this view of post-war French success has since been modified (Kindleberger gave this view in 1964) a rapid recovery and subsequent prosperity was a commonly accepted state of France in New Zealand in the immediate post-war decade and a half.

failing to repay her own debts.¹⁰ On the other hand, if war-ravaged France could recover perhaps undamaged New Zealand could copy her example.

Let us think of the advice the President of France gave to the French people only a few weeks ago, for it seems quite as applicable to this country as it is to France. He pointed out that it was not in the power of the Government of France to remove the difficulties and to restore to the country the conditions which existed previous to 1914. He said to the people, "You must produce more and consume less."¹¹

H. L. Michel (New Zealand Legislative Council) 15 March 1921

The French President's blunt but realistic assessment of Government limitations and his prescription of less consumption and harder work, was advice that few New Zealanders who had experienced the war years would have welcomed. Nevertheless, it was a policy widely adopted in the immediate post-war years.

As with all memories, the wartime images of France persisted only until overwritten by new experiences. Without continued newspaper coverage, the images of France as discussed in earlier chapters became dated, and were only sustained by personal experiences of the war years alongside anecdotes, books, films and versions received from those who apparently had first-hand knowledge of France. These were adapted and requoted as needed within the political process. John A Lee was a leading practitioner of this technique. He interleaved memories based on his first-hand wartime observations from France with political opinion. The most memorable is his reference to seeing 'innumerable cases of women dragging harrows across the fields' in France. Lee's comment was made after the publication (in the Labour Party magazine *The Elector*) of the famous depression-era image of New Zealand men apparently pulling harrows across a field in Petone.¹² French civilian hardship during the war was thereby linked by Lee with the Depression despite the passing of some twelve years.

¹⁰ Tombs and Tombs, "Losing the Peace," p.511.; Higham, *Two roads to war : the French and British air arms from Versailles to Dunkirk*: pp.6-7.

¹¹ "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.190: 20th Parliament 2nd session," p.66.

¹² "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.233: 24th Parliament 1st session," p.695; "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.231: 24th Parliament 1st session," (1932), p.250. "A Challenge To Mr. Nash," *Evening Post*, 30 November 1931, p.10.; King, *The Penguin History of New Zealand*: p.346. Jeremy Veniamin Garvitch, "Relief workers pulling a chain harrow at Petone," ed. National Library New Zealand (1932); akg-images / Alamy Stock Photo, "French women pulling a plough." Holland, Nash and Coates had clashed over Nash's association with this image. Nash did not disclaim an association but made it clear that an attribution referenced by Coates was related to another article in the same

Figure 24: “French women” (Left, *Alamy Stock*) and “New Zealand men” (Right, *National Library Collection*) working as draft horses



When the Coinage Bill was debated it was again Lee who argued - based on his wartime experiences of municipalities in France issuing their own currency - that local coin should have been introduced once New Zealand stopped using (British produced) cash. This system had worked for him and for Gordon Coates (a ‘dig’ at a fellow returned soldier, now Minister of Finance).¹³

In one sense these and more credible wartime recollections were unchallengeable, validated as they were by the memorials, photographs, war histories and family legends. The relevance was however questionable, because the first-hand knowledge of France was more about the past than the future. The disconnect owed much to those MPs who were using a version of France that in many cases relied on redundant memories. Both world and local events had moved on, and a new set of problems had arisen by the mid-1920s into the early 1930s. The servicemen’s generation were in mid-life and in some cases facing considerable financial difficulties. The next generation included New Zealand males under twenty-year olds who had not served in France.¹⁴ This cohort probably recognised a familial obligation towards the truths of the preceding

publication. A letter in the *Evening Post* (signed with a *nom-de-plume*) claimed the original image was of local workers in Petone and implied there was nothing untoward in the men dragging the harrows within a local park. It was therefore, the writer said, not typical of depression era farm cultivation. King simply noted the ‘famous 1931 Labour Party poster.’ I am grateful to Dr. James Watson for drawing my attention to the *Evening Post* article.

¹² "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.236: 24th Parliament 3rd session," p.188.

On another occasion Lee referred to throwing a bomb in France simply to stir things up. As he prepared to launch the missile he noticed, he claimed, that there were two woodlice on the bomb apparently oblivious to their situation, rather like the Government.


¹³ "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.237: 24th Parliament 3rd session," (1933), p.77. Lee was deliberately confusing two issues: whether a local currency was appropriate or not had no bearing on where locally used notes and coins were manufactured.

¹⁴ "Recruiting and conscription," <https://nzhistory.govt.nz/war/recruiting-and-conscription>. Eligibility was lowered to 19 years old in late 1917.

generation, but they had their own problems and challenges to deal with and they did not see the relevance of policies based on events of which they had no direct experience. The population profile was changing and so was France. No coherent case was presented to explain why France was a relevant source of policy options for New Zealand’s circumstances.

The following chart shows the age distribution of MPs elected to serve in the 24th Parliament (1931-1935). This has been compared with the cohort of male voters aged twenty-one years or older at the time of the 1936 census, the nearest available data point.

Figure 25: Age profile of MPs c.f. male population aged 21 years or older



Aside from the obvious male gender characterisation the age profile varies markedly between the two groups, because just under half of the male voters were aged between twenty-one and thirty-nine. Although the oldest amongst this cohort would have been twenty-one years old in 1918 and eligible for military service, many would have been younger and therefore could not have been balloted to serve. By contrast, in 1932 half of the MPs were between fifty and sixty years old. Even the youngest MPs would have experienced the war years as adults aged over twenty-one.¹⁵ In addition, although there is no directly comparable New Zealand study, it seems likely - based on the sampled

¹⁵ "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.232: 24th Parliament 1st session," p.iv. Birthdates for MPs in this parliament have been drawn from *Te Ara*, NZTEC and other records including newspaper obituaries. Statistics New Zealand, "New Zealand Long Term Data Series (LTDS) Title: Consolidated Population by Age and Sex," (2018). This Parliament was probably no less representative than many others but in this case the difference in life-stage experiences was particularly marked.

articles - that the trend in New Zealand was similar to that in the United Kingdom where reporting on parliamentary events as a matter of factual record was in decline.¹⁶ New Zealand newspaper reports from France covered contemporary matters of foreign affairs and inter-government relations, not the war years. Because the parliamentary debates referred to an unfamiliar France of wartime experience, it was impossible for younger voters to validate the politicians' evidence or reasoning, assuming they were even aware of either.

In the broad New Zealand histories the fiscal missteps within the larger economies that contributed to the Great Depression of the 1930s go unremarked or are treated as if they could not have been foreseen.¹⁷ This view implicitly perpetuates the common explanation that New Zealand's post-war economic woes leading into the Great Depression resulted from the Versailles settlement, the unpaid war debts of the great powers, the reintroduction of fixed exchange rates and production imbalances in the world economy. Just as the consequences of the punitive French-led fiscal pathway from Versailles to 1935 can be interpreted as a regrettable but unavoidable consequence of the post-war political attitudes, so too can New Zealand's economic difficulties be viewed as the result of ill-conceived British policies which were related to the world's economic problems. One authoritative albeit non-New Zealand analysis from 1935 neatly summarises the tone of the mainstream New Zealand view: 'The world learns through trial and error, and it would be unfair to condemn statesmen, bankers and economists for not having possessed in 1920 a knowledge of 1935'.¹⁸ Such conclusions completely ignore the alternative views expressed at the time.

Keynes had argued - well before the Great Depression - that the post-war economic policy settings were wrong. He was not alone in expressing this widely-publicised opinion. Keynes' critique suggested that French post-war demands were usurious and unnecessarily punitive. This positioned France within the anglophile world as a

¹⁶ Negrine, *Parliament and the media: a study of Britain, Germany and the media*: p.9.

¹⁷ Tom Brooking, "Economic Transformation," in *The Oxford History of New Zealand*, ed. Geoffrey W Rice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p.232; King, *The Penguin History of New Zealand*: p.342; Sinclair, *A History of New Zealand*: p.256. The earlier cited works from Littlewood, McAloon, and McKinnon are similarly inclined.

¹⁸ Einzig, *World finance since 1914*: p.vii. This analysis has been used because it was accepted as an authoritative, analytically robust and scholarly assessment. At the time it seemed the global economic crisis had abated while the consequences of fascism in Germany, Italy and Japan were not yet obvious.

convenient scapegoat for the later economic problems while ignoring the allies' collective complicity in acceding to the French conditions. As early as 1920 the concerns of various British notables and intellectuals that squeezing Germany too hard would be counter-productive were being reprinted in New Zealand newspapers.¹⁹ With the support of New Zealand (amongst others) France appeared to be insisting on policies that were deleterious to Germany and while arguably beneficial for France in the short term, were of little discernible assistance to New Zealand. The New Zealand Government was briefed by the British on these issues and their consequences at the time.²⁰ Policies such as requisitioning and partially destroying the German merchant fleet removed the means for Germany to export goods and earn foreign exchange to pay reparations. But, this enforced redundancy also removed aged vessels from the German navy, so that when Germany rebuilt it simultaneously stimulated the domestic economy and modernised the maritime technology.²¹

The adoption of broadly British-centric economic policies in post-war New Zealand was motivated by Massey and Ward's desire to remain within Britain's embrace. New Zealand tried to implement conventional monetary and fiscal policies that Massey and his conservatively-inclined successors believed would find favour in London and ingratiate New Zealand sufficiently to win favourable treatment in matters such as borrowing and market access. This was a necessary adjunct to an economic policy which pre-supposed there was consumer preference in Britain for New Zealand's produce. Britain had however already reached her apogee as a free trading, mercantile power by the time World War I began. London was steadily losing financial business to New York, British naval dominance was ending, the American merchant fleet was expanding and Britain's manufacturing advantage was fading as industries in which Britain excelled -

¹⁹ "The Economic Situation," p.5; "Notes And Comments," *New Zealand Herald*, 5 November 1923, p.6.; "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.190: 20th Parliament 2nd session," pp.199-200. Holland was already drawing attention to Keynes view on 17 March 1921.

²⁰ United Kingdom Government, "France - Foreign Policy - General," (Archives New Zealand, 1925-1940); "France - Economic Affairs - Currency." Government, "Countries - United Kingdom - External Relations - France." The latter includes a memo from the Secretary of the Colonies to the New Zealand (Churchill) to the Governor General enclosing minutes from a meeting on 16 January 1922 between Lloyd George and Poincaré during which (p.2) Lloyd George referred to '... economic revival. Conditions of the latter laid down for discussion include recognition by all countries of their public debts, compensation for property confiscated or withheld, and re-establishment of finance and currency conditions offering reasonable security for international commerce and industry.'

²¹ "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.224: 23rd Parliament: 3rd session," p.145. W. H. Triggs mentioned the rebuilt German fleet to the Legislative Council after his world trip.

such as textiles - were displaced by new businesses and competitors.²² This process simultaneously undermined the perception that the Empire was a force for mutual financial benefit between Britain and her satellites and specifically undercut Massey's favoured model for post-war New Zealand as Britain's dairy farm.²³ While free trade was still important to Britain in the post-war decades, the divergence in the interests of the Dominions as discussed earlier precluded the possibility of a unitary intra-empire trading policy.

Even without additional colonies the post-war British Empire was fatally undermined as an economic construct. In part this was because it had never existed as a unified and self-sufficient financial entity. This truth is inadvertently exposed in the actions and statements of Massey and many of his Dominion contemporaries. While professing loyalty to and affection for the Empire, when it came to trade they were talking of Britain as a market for their exports. As mentioned earlier, Massey's solution to limited demand in the United Kingdom was for the 'Empire' – meaning Britain – to develop new markets.²⁴ New Zealand's post-war trade policy assumed that as a quasi-independent nation within the Empire, there was a right of access to United Kingdom markets in perpetuity and to Britain's adjunct trade partners on a selective basis. New Zealand appears not to have considered that the non-Empire markets might not reciprocate, nor that other suppliers might compete for access to the United Kingdom's markets. This left the status of France uncertain. Was France a possible market either directly or via the United Kingdom, or was France a competing supplier?

²² Higham, *Two roads to war : the French and British air arms from Versailles to Dunkirk*: pp.6-7.

²³ "Imperial Economic Conference Of Representatives Of Great Britain, The Dominions, India, And The Colonies And Protectorates, Held In October And November, 1923. Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives, 1924 Session," pp.19-21. Massey's general themes were the value of New Zealand's trade with the United Kingdom and the Empire, his vision of New Zealand as the Empire's dairy farm, the case for Imperial Preference and his misplaced belief in the indivisibility of New Zealand and United Kingdom economic interests. "British Farming," *Evening Star*, 3 April 1919, p.6.. In 1919 a new United Kingdom agricultural policy was proposed. This required intensification of production, as was assumed to be the case in France. This initiative specifically precluded small holdings. Population redistribution within the Empire '... would solve many problems.'

²⁴ "Imperial Economic Conference Of Representatives Of Great Britain, The Dominions, India, And The Colonies And Protectorates, Held In October And November, 1923. Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives, 1924 Session," p.18. By late 1922 reports were indicating that butter in increasing quantities was coming onto the world market from Australia, Argentina and Denmark. With France, Belgium and Holland achieving self-sufficiency it was Argentine competition in the British market that worried New Zealand. Typically, the suggested solution was to cut the price to stimulate demand. See: "Will Prices Decline?," *Evening Post*, 27 November 1922, p.7.

Another indirect link to French policy was via New Zealand's access to credit. In 1930 Bill (W. J.) Jordan MP (Labour, Manukau) wanted the Government to obtain lower interest rates on borrowing by asking the Home Government to guarantee New Zealand's loans, as he claimed the United Kingdom had done for Belgium and France.²⁵ New Zealand required access to credit because the country was perpetually running or creating a deficit (e.g. Ward's 1928 borrowing promises). It was assumed that the London capital markets would offer preferential and favourable terms, but this in turn depended upon Great Britain Incorporated generating a surplus of funds to invest. This was at least partly dependent on the ability of France to repay her wartime borrowing to Britain. France dared not do so without the assurance of continued German reparation payments, for if France could make debt repayments without reparation instalments from Germany it exposed the reparations regime as punitive rather than compensatory. Hence the liquidity of the London capital markets and New Zealand's access to credit was also indirectly influenced by French foreign policy.

Britain's advantage within a free-trading regime had been based on importing competitively priced raw materials such as wool, cotton and flax and using her manufacturing efficiencies to export the finished goods at a profit. Textiles were a traditional speciality but economic growth in the post war-years also occurred through the manufacture of capital goods such as machinery, machine tools, motor vehicles and electrical equipment. Other countries were outperforming the United Kingdom in these industries.²⁶ The new textile mills built in Belgium and France after the war had the 'very latest machinery and labour-saving devices'. British manufacturers were saddled with redundant technology and were thus at a severe cost disadvantage. As Crouzet makes clear, no amount of protectionism or Empire grandstanding could change these facts.²⁷

²⁵ "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.227: 23rd Parliament: 4th session," (1930), p.112.

²⁶ Kindleberger, *Economic growth in France and Britain, 1851-1950*: p.12. Within the considerable literature on the causes of the Great Depression of 1929 there is agreement that the affect was uneven as some newer industries such as 'automobiles, chemicals and electricity' out-performed the traditional sectors.

²⁷ "Aftermath Of War," *New Zealand Herald*, 22 September 1923, p.10; Crouzet, "*Trade and empire: the British experience from the establishment of free trade until the First World War*," pp.385, 406.; Pau, "Telegram Auckland January 31st, 1919: Auckland, le 31 Janvier 1919 – 1 heure recu le 2 Fevrier a 4 h.4: De la part du General Pau." At the time of the 1918-19 trade visit New Zealand had, as General Pau noted, just purchased new hydro-electrical machinery from Switzerland, not from the United Kingdom. The best supplier usually won the sale.

British imports of manufactured goods from Europe and the United States funded those countries' imports of primary products from the Dominions and the British Empire. As a result, the Empire countries could earn foreign currency to purchase manufactured and capital goods from the United Kingdom. Crouzet argues that without free trade the non-Empire countries would have imported primary products from outside the Empire and then exported goods to Empire countries in competition with the United Kingdom. The system depended on two factors: namely that the United Kingdom maintained a surplus on invisibles i.e. non-material trade such as interest payments (from lending), freight (the British merchant fleet) and insurance (Lloyds insurance market being a classic case) while running a trade surplus with India.²⁸ The system was already in jeopardy before World War I, and even from New Zealand's Empire-centric viewpoint, the Empire was unavoidably drawn into the free trade debate. Britain's Empire could not function as a closed system supported by preferences alone, as the 1930s experience openly demonstrated.

Even if the economic nuances are still in contention, New Zealand assumed Britain had a limitless appetite for imported primary produce. When difficult times came the supporters of trade preference argued strenuously in favour of retention and extension of market share in the United Kingdom as they saw the problem as one of restricting competing suppliers' access. Less supply meant higher prices for the remaining sellers. New Zealand's strategy was therefore unsustainable because it ignored two intertwined truths. On the one hand the domestic market of the United Kingdom was not a source of unlimited growth, and secondly, even assuming that British consumers wanted to buy whatever New Zealand produced (or at least whatever the United Kingdom manufacturers could manufacture from New Zealand produce) British consumers of the inter-war period had limited financial means and so wanted the lowest prices. New Zealand's plaintive litany (from many MPs including the United MP C. H. Clinkard who is paraphrased here) was to repeat the flawed argument that New Zealand was Great Britain's best customer per head of population, whereas French imports from Britain

²⁸ Crouzet, *Trade and empire: the British experience from the establishment of free trade until the First World War*, pp.408-409. From an outsider's viewpoint British trade with India could be viewed as exploitative and of no benefit to India's population.

were only 10s per head.²⁹ In his book published in 1924 after he had visited New Zealand, André Siegfried neatly summarised this attitude:

The industries most interested in Imperial preference are those which supply the Imperial market. Not too sure of their footing, they are less concerned with conquering new foreign markets than with preserving by means of special privileges the ground already won in the markets of the Empire.³⁰

The other Dominions realised the problem and acted unilaterally. The Empire's external trade with non-empire countries grew before and even after the Ottawa conference.

In part New Zealand's post-war ambivalence was due to the domestic political configuration. While United and Reform were broadly in agreement with the 'quasi-independent nation within the Empire' view, Labour was addressing the alternatives using the global socialism paradigm. In the immediate post-war period Labour leader Holland had pointed out that surplus Ruhr coal requisitioned from German by France was disadvantaging New Zealand workers because the German miners were working under 'sweated' conditions.³¹ The following year Holland extended this argument to resisting the expansion of trade in general. He attributed rising European militarism to the need to literally capture additional markets in which to dispose of the excess production manufactured by the wealthy owners of capital who exploited their workers. Whatever the merits of this socialist interpretation, it did not suggest an immediate remedy which would have ameliorated New Zealand's problems.

During the 1921 parliamentary session George Mitchell MP (Independent Liberal, Wellington South) argued that New Zealand should look for more conventional solution such as seeking market opportunities in France and other European countries not just in England. Such alternative voices were rarely heard or taken seriously. When the trade pattern is considered in aggregate it is apparent that the Empire was neither self-sufficient nor was it (based on the trends in trade with non-empire nations)

²⁹ "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.233: 24th Parliament 1st session," p.132.

³⁰ Siegfried, *Post-war Britain : a French analysis*: p.119.

³¹ "Untitled," *L'Humanité*, 7 April 1923, p.3; *ibid.*, 7203. The New Zealand Labour Party had informed their British counterparts of their objections to the occupation while separately *L'Humanité* reported that New Zealand miners were on strike.

possessed of a collective desire to be so.³² Given these circumstances, why was France used as a point of comparison by New Zealand and which economic policies were considered relevant? To understand the French influence, the following discussion has been arranged by topic although these are not the discrete independent variables which this treatment implies. There are overlaps in chronology and the historical sources because the categories are contiguous. Nations were attempting to alter one or more variables as if they were independent, had time-limited consequences and could be separated from the often counter-acting influence of other countries. None of these assumptions was true.

5.1 Unemployment

Massey and Reform's interest in the development of small-scale dairying was partly motivated by observing quasi-subsistence scale farms in France during the war years. It was assumed that these enterprises were partly responsible for the low rates of unemployment in France. Similar farms in New Zealand on a modest scale with adjunct rural suppliers could also create employment opportunities, especially since there was to be no large-scale local industrialisation. Frequent repetition of this interpretation of the French war-time economy in the New Zealand parliament prior to 1930 created the impression that the claim was both correct and a valid point of comparison for post-war New Zealand. The claim was not vigorously scrutinised until the Great Depression. When it was considered, attempts to debate the issue were frustrated by both the quality of the data and its use or misuse for political purposes.

Earnshaw's assertion in October 1930 that 'prostrated' France had only 942 unemployed and therefore no need for unemployment relief (i.e. dole payments) was a typical misinterpretation.³³ When Harry Holland repeated the claim in 1931, W.A. Veitch MP

³² François Crouzet, "The core and periphery of the core: Franco-British trade in the belle époque," in *Britain ascendant : comparative studies in Franco-British economic history*, Editions de la Maison des sciences de l'homme (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p.410; "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.191: 20th Parliament: 3rd session," p.707.

³³ "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.193: 20th Parliament: 3rd session," p.5. Hall-Jones "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.212: 22nd Parliament: 2nd session," (1927), p.396. Stewart; "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.221: 23rd Parliament: 2nd session," pp.56-57, 209, 520. Harris, Jenkins, Unidentified interjection; "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.224: 23rd Parliament: 3rd session," pp.95, 322, 508, 674, 934, 945. Buddo, Unidentified interjection, Armstrong, Semple, Macmillan, Stallworthy "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.226: 23rd Parliament: 3rd session," (1930), pp.19, 119-120. Earnshaw, Buddo; "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.227: 23rd Parliament:

(Wanganui) countered that Belgium, France and others had lower reported unemployment rates than New Zealand because none of them had an unemployment scheme(s). Hence, there was no reason for the unemployed to identify as such and register. Veitch validated his case by observing that it was only after an unemployment scheme requiring registration was introduced in New Zealand that the reported total of the unemployed rapidly increased. Holland appeared incredulous when he heard the Veitch claim and challenged the assumption that an absence of an unemployment scheme was the reason for the low reported unemployment rate in France.³⁴ In this one exchange two potential flaws in the use of France as a comparative example were exposed, for not only was it questionable on the grounds of relevance, but the information was suspect.

Although the parliamentary debates suggest that unemployment rates in France were of interest and relevant, the general news coverage had few articles on the topic and most of the mentions were peripheral to the state of France. One report was a comprehensive if self-serving contribution from the President of the Employers Federation (T. Shailer Weston, a Member of the Legislative Council). Shailer Weston forecast deflationary pressure across all sectors of the economy in line with falling prices for primary produce. His remedies consisted of job redundancy and wage cuts in line with the orthodox conservative solutions of the depression years. Cuts and reductions in Belgium and France - where he said there was no unemployment until recently - were due to the French citizens' habit of saving, thus limiting unproductive expenditure. The article is a lengthy and complex justification for the conservative-employer case which held that there was no alternative to austerity.³⁵ It did not suggest that France was a desirable example for the New Zealand electorate to follow.

4th session," p.74. Sinclair; "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.229: 23rd Parliament: 5th session," (1931), pp.84, 90-91. Holland, Veitch; "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.231: 24th Parliament 1st session," p.920. Coates. These citations all refer to unemployment rates in France.

³⁴ "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.229: 23rd Parliament: 5th session," pp.84, 90-91. "Une intéressante statistique : L'ê chômage dans le monde," *Le Figaro*, 11 October 1931, p.4. Statistics published by *Le Figaro* showed French unemployment increasing roughly five-fold from 11,214 in 1930 to 53, 673 in 1931. New Zealand's equivalent was a ten-fold increase from 5,371 to 48, 670. The same dataset showed German unemployment was 4,104,000 in 1931 while Britain's total was 2,142,821. King, *The Penguin History of New Zealand*: p.346. King records that 23,000 registered as unemployed when the New Zealand scheme began in February 1931.

³⁵ "Falling Prices," *Press*, 20 November 1930, p.15.

When Coates returned to Government after the 1931 election he defended New Zealand's performance by saying that local unemployment was less than Germany's. He demurred when questioned on the figures for France by saying he did not have them, thus suggesting he was making selective use of the evidence. He did not however directly challenge the relevance of the comparison. During the April-May 1931 sitting Sir James Allen told the Legislative Council that registered French applicants seeking work had in fact risen from 23,879 to 177,294 between 1930-1931. When Sir William Hall-Jones' questioned the applicability of comparisons with unemployment rates in France and other larger nations owing to New Zealand's small population, he opened the question of why comparisons were being made with France. This line of reasoning was not pursued.³⁶ Bill Schramm (Labour, Auckland East) pointed out that even the United States with both an adequate means of natural production and extensive gold reserves still had an unemployment problem, while the position was worse in Europe especially for France, Italy and Germany. Walter Nash nevertheless still challenged the Reform-United Government to refute the claim that re-inflating the French economy had failed since France had (according to apparently misleading statistics) proportionately lower unemployment than any other country. It was not until 1935 that S. G. Smith, the Minister of Education in the Coalition Ministry, was able to argue that to the contrary New Zealand's unemployment rate was in fact falling while other continental nations including France were still recording increases.³⁷

5.2 Deflationary monetary policies

Massey and his successors wanted New Zealand to grow by selling more and/or increasing prices for New Zealand produce in the United Kingdom. This implicitly assumed increased demand in the United Kingdom, presumably through market growth, or New Zealand producers displacing competitors, or rising prices, or some combination thereof. Whatever the assumptions were, the demand side of Massey's

³⁶ "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.231: 24th Parliament 1st session," p.920. "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.232: 24th Parliament 1st session," pp.62, 69. "Une intéressante statistique : Le chômage dans le monde."p.4. Coates returned as the second ranked minister and held the Works portfolio. *Le Figaro's* published what appears to be a list of selected unemployment statistics on 11 October 1931 showing unemployment in France rising from 11,214 (1930) to 53,673 (1931) with the totals for Nouvelle-Zélande rising from 5,371 (1930) to 48,670 (1931). The apparent five-fold increase for France compares favourably with the ten-fold increase for Nouvelle-Zélande but without any total population data or other context no definitive conclusion can be drawn.

³⁷ "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.233: 24th Parliament 1st session," p.739. Schramm; "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.234: 24th Parliament 2nd session," (1932), p.810. Nash; "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.241: 24th Parliament 4th session," (1935), p.865. Smith gave his source as the *Evening Post*.

equation was clearly not thought through or if it was, it was not publicly articulated. Despite assumptions that there would be economic growth in Britain after the war, the British leadership tried to reduce prices to their pre-war level consistent with a return to the imagined better past. Such an action implied a macro-economic contraction that was directly counter to the expansion Massey was planning for New Zealand's export-led economy.

In mid-1920, Massey attempted to explain the necessity for deflation to Parliament. Issuing paper money to fund a war, Massey explained, was not uncommon. The United States had done so after the Civil War as well as after the war of Independence; Britain had used the same device after the Napoleonic wars while France used paper money to devalue the franc on an unspecified 'previous occasion'. The New Zealand Prime Minister was probably re-stating positions he had heard in England when he claimed that there was therefore a surplus of currency in the world financial system. As Massey correctly predicted, deflation would result if gold coins were removed from circulation as he proposed and smelted down into bullion.³⁸ Despite removing gold from the financial system Massey precluded the issue of additional paper currency as a replacement by decreeing that 'surplus' paper money also had to be redeemed and removed from circulation. The Prime Minister implied that deflation by this method was 'normal' because the process had already started in the United Kingdom, and the surplus currency had to be removed to maintain the gold standard. The overarching concern appeared to be for New Zealand to implement the British economic prescription despite the obvious structural differences between the economies of New Zealand and the United Kingdom.

³⁸ Reserve Bank of New Zealand, "The history of coins in New Zealand," <https://www.rbnz.govt.nz/notes-and-coins/coins/history-of-new-zealand-coinage>. "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.186: 20th Parliament 1st session," p.276. If a currency is composed of the same substance as that in which it is valued it follows that a set amount will purchase the same quantity of goods and services regardless of whether it is in the form of coin or metal. It was nonsense to claim that in the long run gold in coinage form i.e. literally backed by gold could maintain a face value greater than its constituent metal. Massey possibly had in mind the problem with medieval currencies that were sometimes minted with a face value that was **less** than their constituent metal. These were sometimes illegally 'snipped' to harvest the surplus value for smelting, while the face value of the coin was retained. France was quoted alongside the United States and Britain as a reference point but nevertheless it was one that Massey obviously felt added validity to his argument. Gold coins were gradually withdrawn from circulation in New Zealand from 1914 onwards. Silver coin was debased by approximately fifty percent from 1920. Moreover, it seems likely that downgrading gold in this way implied (as far as everyday transactions went) that apart from its use for personal adornment, gold and specie was no more important than any other means of exchange.

Massey appears to have been confusing two issues. One was the problem that arises when gold coins have a face value less than the value of their constituent metal. In such circumstances mining gold for conversion into currency with a face value less than the market value of the bullion inevitably tempts some to illegally smelt the currency back into the base metal to exchange for goods and services or to buy more of the undervalued coin to repeat the cycle. The second problem was the assumption that paper money was valueless unless it could be redeemed for gold. Lowering the gold reserves implied a commensurate reduction in the value of the total paper currency in circulation. Reducing the volume of currency in circulation was deflationary and so both New Zealand and its principal export market were locked into a deflationary cycle. The New Zealand politicians came uncannily close at times to identifying the underlying causes of this financial problem and how it might be resolved, but they were led away from the solution by orthodox interpretations and a desire to act ‘correctly’. Acting ‘correctly’ in this case required mirroring the deflationary monetary policies of the United Kingdom while ignoring the apparent prosperity and growing markets in France.³⁹

These points had been recognised in earlier New Zealand debates. During the 1921 session of the twentieth parliament, A. S. Malcolm (Reform, Clutha) attempted to explain that gold or paper currency were simply convenient means of exchange rather than having an inherent value in the way that consumable commodities and merchandise had. This otherwise obscure, conservative politician had identified the main element in an economic debate that was to vex the world for the next decade.⁴⁰ As Andre Siegfried had explained, restoration of the pound to its pre-war value was a ‘deliberate policy’ which had the acceptance of both industrialists and the public. It was not treated as an economic question, but rather as a matter of national prestige.⁴¹ When the allies tried to restore pre-war parities they made their war debts unpayable.⁴²

³⁹ "Une déclaration de M. Snowden sur la situation financière," *Le Figaro*, 31 July 1931, p.3. As *Le Figaro* noted, the then British Chancellor had observed "... it must not be forgotten that Britain's budgetary position is even more satisfactory than that of any other nation in the world. Do not the United States, Canada and New Zealand have large deficits in their budgets?" In the Anglo-Saxon world a lower deficit was a favourable indicator, even during a depression.

⁴⁰ "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.193: 20th Parliament: 3rd session," p.503.

⁴¹ Siegfried, *Post-war Britain : a French analysis*: p.36.

⁴² Einzig, *World finance since 1914*: p.46. "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.195: 20th Parliament 4th session," p.144. Sir J P Luke (Legislative Council) did point out that Britain had made a generous offer

Einzig's review of the Great Depression – completed before World War II – held that Governments had inflated their currencies during the Great War and then ignored the consequences.

The attitude of statesmen towards the problem of the public debt was characterised by an utter lack in a sense of realities. Great Britain was not the only country to expect to restore the monetary unit to pre-war parity, and thus to increase considerably the real burden of the debt. There was not one single Government which was able to face the fact that in the long run the burden of public debt could not be borne unless it was dramatically reduced by a reduction in the value of the monetary unit in which the debt had been contracted.⁴³

Einzig was wrong: France had done exactly that before Einzig published in 1935.

5.3 Putting gold to work

Using gold and bullion to back local currencies and to facilitate international transfers gave gold an apparently unimpeachable status as a measure of wealth and financial security. It would have been more relevant to question whether gold reserves allowed the state to provide for its citizens' well-being and if not, what point was there in holding bullion? Reliance on gold raised two issues that were ignored or by-passed without resolution. Firstly, as was reported in *The Dominion* in 1919, Germany allegedly had no gold with which to pay reparations to France or any other nation. If true, this obviously hobbled the reparation payment regime almost as soon as it began. Secondly, as the *Northern Advocate* was to note in 1925, world gold production had been declining since 1912. Dependence on gold as a measure of wealth implies an increase in supply to match growth in the rest of the economy.⁴⁴ Any discrepancy or de-coupling of national gold reserves from economic well-being would suggest that gold was not of itself of value or alternatively that it was being misused as a means of wealth measurement and transfers. Massey was aware that a 'very large proportion' of the world's gold was stored in the United States and was therefore unavailable.⁴⁵ In this comment he came close to admitting there was a problem in the accepted financial model. Tying the world's finances to a commodity (gold) that was not only in short supply but was also hoarded

after the war to cancel the vast war debts that France owed the United Kingdom if the United States would do likewise.

⁴³ Einzig, *World finance since 1914*: pp.121-124, 311.

⁴⁴ "German Indemnities." p.8; "Timely Topics: Canada's Gold Production Increasing," *Northern Advocate*, 17 October 1925, p.9.; Ed Conway, *The Summit* (London: Little, Brown, 2014). p.57.; Hett, *The Death of Democracy*: p.206. Hett argues that European inter-war financial arrangements were aimed at constraining Germany rather than achieving financial stability and growth.

⁴⁵ "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.191: 20th Parliament: 3rd session," p.504.

by France, America and other surplus generating countries was deflationary. As long as the volume of currency depended on the volume of gold rather than the volume of tradeable commodities and non-material ('invisibles' in economic jargon) services, the economy was constrained. If the currency volume was fixed, any economic adjustments had to be absorbed through changes in the currency's value (i.e. prices) or production (i.e. output).

Frank Langstone was one MP who perceptively pointed out the obvious discrepancy between gold reserves and prosperity when he stated that huge reserves of gold were apparently no protection against unemployment. Although New Zealand had a reserve of gold the real issue was the flow of goods not of gold.⁴⁶ D. G. (Dan) Sullivan MP (Labour, Avon) adopted a similar theme. Gold sent to America and France to meet reparation obligations, debt repayment and to fund purchases of goods was effectively removed from circulation. This process, referred to in the vernacular as 'sterilisation', meant that the countries sending the gold suffered a contraction of credit. When questioning the relevance of the gold standard David Buddo (a former Liberal MP and later Legislative Council member) asked rhetorically why there should now be a concern with gold? New Zealand had previously managed by using paper currency without any apparent ill-effect. Even if the United States and France were hoarding gold, its value was equivalent to only a small portion of the value of total world trade.⁴⁷ These perceptive observations went unremarked.

Atmore was another who blamed excessive absorption and sterilisation of gold by America and France for the depression. If France, America and Argentina had more gold than they needed, trade would be stifled despite the obvious demand for goods which were in ready supply on the global market. Bill (W. E.) Barnard MP (Napier, Labour) backed this by repeating that the problem was American and French sequestration of gold. Barnard (referring to *Jobson's Investment Digest*) pointed out once again that the world's gold supply was growing more slowly than the world's trade. He pessimistically saw little hope in any proposed international conference of the major powers (France,

⁴⁶ "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.227: 23rd Parliament: 4th session," p.100.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, pp.184, 234-235. Geoffrey W. Rice, "Buddo, David," in *Dictionary of New Zealand Biography* (Te Ara - the Encyclopedia of New Zealand, 1996).

Britain, Germany and America) of resolving the issue.⁴⁸ For countries with low bullion reserves, accumulation of gold and its sequestering had turned from a symbol of prosperity to one of selfish hoarding. Discussing the outcome of the 1933 Monetary and Economic Conference, Forbes reported that the French delegates emphasised the need for constancy. The insistence of some European countries (such as France which had already devalued its currency) on retaining the gold standard in the interests of stability had 'brought the work of the conference to a standstill'.⁴⁹

Significant challenges to the narrative acclaiming the apparent success of post-war France and the worth of holding large gold reserves had now been raised. Prior to the depression there seemed to be a general acceptance that simply holding reserves of gold (as France did) and fixing the exchange rate was enough to ensure prosperity as shown by the minimal focus on this point in the press. Accumulating gold in support of an over-valued currency had not however led to prosperity.⁵⁰

A.J. Stallworthy MP (Eden, United) pointed out that making French gold useful required getting it out of the French Treasury and spreading the bullion throughout the world to kickstart commercial activity. As far as New Zealand's economy went, this was economically sensible, but politically impractical. It did however shift the blame for the prevailing circumstances beyond New Zealand's immediate control – a frequent excuse for inaction from the political right. G. R. Sykes MP (Masterton, Reform) went further and pointed out the uselessness of the enormous gold reserves in France and the United States – the latter had £1, 000, 000, 000 in gold reserves according to Sykes – since there were people starving in both countries. Even were this not the case, as W. D. Lysnar (Gisborne, formerly Reform and now Independent) said, it did not seem plausible that a 'few years ago' creditor nations such as Britain and France would have mismanaged

⁴⁸ "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.227: 23rd Parliament: 4th session," pp.321, 323, 384.

⁴⁹ "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.236: 24th Parliament 3rd session," pp.34-35, 389. There was continual confusion about the importance of gold and the interaction with exchange rates. C. J. Carrington's (Legislative Council) description of the World Monetary and Economic Conference of 1933 alluded to an air of 'scepticism(sic) and self-interest'. Carrington nevertheless still saw all the answers as coming from within the Empire.

⁵⁰ Douglas A Irwin, "The French Gold Sink and the Great Deflation of 1929–32," *Cato Papers on Public Policy* 2(2012): p.1. Irwin says: 'While the tightening of U.S. monetary policy in 1928 is often blamed for having initiated the downturn, **France increased its share of world gold reserves from 7 percent to 27 percent between 1927 and 1932, and failed to monetize most of this accumulation. This created an artificial shortage of gold reserves and put other countries under significant deflationary pressure.**' (emphasis added).

matters to the point of virtually bankrupting so many debtor nations. Both countries had failed to maintain the price stability which might have enabled debtors to meet their obligations. The blame lay with France. Moreover, as the Rev. Carr MP (Timaru, Labour) pointed out it was Sir Otto Niemeyer (who was later a Director of the Bank of England and had in 1931 recommended that New Zealand establish a Reserve Bank) and other experts who had wrongly suggested that a return to the gold standard would have only temporary disadvantages. It was not until 1933 that the French Prime Minister (M. Edouard Daladier) was reported in New Zealand as recognising that allowing free movement of gold was the key to improving the circulation of goods within the global economy. As the Italian representative (S. Guido Jung) noted during the London Economic Conference, by then all nations including the wealthy - presumably he meant those with gold reserves - were suffering.⁵¹

5.4 International exchange rates

France seemed to be prospering in the post-war environment while New Zealand, despite using conservative and apparently obvious solutions, was clearly unable to overcome the effects of the Depression. With France distanced, it was easy to develop a counter-narrative that attributed the global financial problems at least in part, to vigorous exporting by France using an undervalued currency. It was assumed that this was part of the reason for France's success, albeit one which unfairly increased French gold reserves with negative consequences for other nations. The successful recovery of France was not due to France accumulating gold reserves, but rather to commonsense (or underhand depending on the point of view) exchange rate adjustments. Massey had himself noted the devaluation of the German and French currencies (presumably against the pound) but he interpreted the result as the cause of 'trouble and difficulty' because it then became cheaper to buy German or French goods. Wilford agreed.⁵² France therefore did have a lesson for New Zealand, namely to ignore the conventions, but it was not applied. Rather than adopting the implied remedy of lowering the exchange rate i.e. devaluing as France (and Germany) had done, it was inferred that devaluation was unfair. This was a self-imposed moral constraint, not an economic one.

⁵¹ "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.229: 23rd Parliament: 5th session," pp.267, 312, 339, 497; "Work Begins," *Press*, 14 June 1933, p.9. These remarks were included in the respective opening addresses to the London Economic Conference.

⁵² "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.192: 20th Parliament: 3rd session," pp.664, 674.

The economic recovery after the 1923 slump had delayed rather than resolved the gold standard debate and related currency exchange rate problems. As the optimistic economic sentiment of the early 1920s had moved towards renewed pessimism in the 1930s, it became evident to some New Zealand politicians that the management of the French economy was not bound by the same conventions as those used by the British, particularly in regard to the gold standard. France was holding huge quantities of bullion without any moral compunction to maintain a fixed exchange rate for the franc against gold, as was the case for sterling. If the state of France had been considered holistically, rather than through selected and arbitrary examples, the benefits and shortcomings of French policy may have become apparent to New Zealand. The New Zealand political debate instead often reverted to using measures of economic performance - including exchange rates - as proxies for national prestige (as Einzig and Siegfried had explained) rather than as useful assessments of the well-being of the population. This explains the shocked reaction when France devalued while having huge gold reserves. Frank Langstone (Labour, Waimarino) correctly observed that returns for investors in French war loans denominated in francs would be 'wiped out'. British investors in French financial instruments were understandably 'riled' by the devaluation and wanted recompense.⁵³ Meanwhile the United Kingdom and New Zealand had done the opposite (i.e. effectively revalued) so New Zealand's foreign debt increased.

On the night of Thursday, 20 January 1933 the New Zealand exchange rate was re-set at NZ £125 to Stg £100. Imports that previously cost £1 would now cost 25% more while exporters would receive NZ £125 for every Stg £100 of produce sold in Britain. The courage of this policy adjustment gains less praise than it should for the Government paid a significant political price for its boldness. It lost one of its most capable administrators, the widely respected Finance Minister William Downie Stewart who resigned in protest, while alienating substantial parts of the conservative press and

⁵³ "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.227: 23rd Parliament: 4th session," pp.119-120.

traditional Government supporters. The move gave the Opposition - who opposed the resulting increases in domestic prices - additional leverage.⁵⁴

Although New Zealand exports would now be cheaper in the United Kingdom and elsewhere, increasing rather than cutting input costs by devaluing appeared to be against the conventions of the political Right and what was commonly perceived to be the interests of the Government's rural base. New Zealand was however finally acting in her own self-interest by breaking with (British-inspired) conventions, which apparently had implicitly precluded earlier action. In short, New Zealand was making an adjustment that in spirit seemed more akin to the self-interested actions of the French. Furthermore, it was consistent with an independent nation acting in its own interests rather than blindly following British (Empire) policy prescriptions.

5.5 Free trade or tariffs?

In 1930 Bill Endean MP had quoted the credit trade balances that various countries including France and Russia had with the United Kingdom and concluded that New Zealand needed to reduce her costs to the same level as others who were seeking to export to, 'England (or) ... New Zealand will go under'.⁵⁵ Equally importantly, he identified a need for New Zealand to develop more trading relationships. This was an explicit acceptance that New Zealand could not rely indefinitely on the United Kingdom market nor assume that Britain would look after New Zealand's wider trade interests using differential tariffs. This free-trade approach was not accepted by France for, as George Forbes pointed out after the 1933 Monetary and Economic Conference, the French had argued in favour of actively managing the balance between supply and demand as a means to organise production and markets and offset the distortion caused by their rigid gold standard policy. W. A. Bodkin MP (United, Central Otago) quoted the French delegation as saying, "... that the disequilibrium between the production and consumption of agricultural products and raw materials is at the root of the crisis".⁵⁶ Controls such as the sugar quotas used by many countries were one example of

⁵⁴ "A Disastrous Blunder," *Evening Post*, 20 January 1933, p.6; McKinnon, *The broken decade: prosperity, depression and recovery in New Zealand, 1928-39*: pp.220-221. McAloon, *Judgements of all kinds : economic policy-making in New Zealand, 1945-1984*: pp.41-42.

⁵⁵ "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.227: 23rd Parliament: 4th session," pp.100. '... the answer to the leader of the Labour party is this: that if he does not reduce his costs in this country where he is exporting goods to his principal market – namely England ... New Zealand will go under'.

⁵⁶ "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.236: 24th Parliament 3rd session," p.392.

Governments trying to balance supply and demand without using price or exchange rate variations to transmit market signals. Typically, Forbes argued that this was inappropriate for New Zealand because local dairy production was still in a ‘development and growth’ phase.⁵⁷ The latter claim was not a rationale for the former, but it showed New Zealand was as vulnerable as any to criticisms of using exceptionalism by arguing that other countries should manage production levels to support market prices.

When the Trade Agreement Bill was discussed before the 1932 Ottawa Conference convened (well before New Zealand’s devaluation), Sir James Parr MP (Reform, Eden) had pointed out the possibly adverse consequences that might arise from restrictive trade agreements which seemed in the first instance to favour New Zealand. He asked rhetorically where Danish butter might end up if it was displaced from the United Kingdom domestic market in favour of New Zealand produce, given that the French and the Germans were concurrently protecting their domestic markets. The implication was that trade restrictions would affect New Zealand exports elsewhere, except perhaps for wool because there were ‘possibilities in the East’.⁵⁸ E. A. Ransom MP (United, Pahiatua) extended the argument to pointing out how small the volume of New Zealand produce exports were in relation to the total primary production of France and other nations. He went on: ‘If we are not careful other Dominions will outstrip us in the race for these markets’. New Zealand producers were (he said) too reliant on the Government for market diversification. Moreover, in a later debate Ransom quoted butter prices and statistics from France alongside those of other countries to again show how their tariff regimes were bolstering production which led to surpluses destined for the United Kingdom market to New Zealand’s detriment.⁵⁹

While it was obvious that New Zealand had to import from many countries as well as from the United Kingdom, it was left to Alexander Harris MP (Independent, Waitemata) to break with convention and claim that United Kingdom firms that could not exist even with a 10% tariff preference did not deserve to survive. New Zealand’s interests would be better served by reducing the British preference and encouraging as

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, pp.401-402.

⁵⁸ "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.232: 24th Parliament 1st session," p.492.

⁵⁹ "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.233: 24th Parliament 1st session," p.77.

quid pro quo open markets for fresh produce in the likes of South America, France and Holland, all of which had potential.⁶⁰

5.6 Fearing inflation

‘... makes we wonder why we had to struggle in the bog, when there was such an easy way out ...’⁶¹

Former Prime Minister George Forbes

Inflation - the great fear of the political right – was another self-imagined block to change. Walter Nash (Hutt) who as Finance Minister in the first Labour Government was later to be criticised by the more radical left for being too conservative, accepted that both inflation and deflation were harmful. He gave France and others (Germany, Austria and Russia) as examples where currency depreciation i.e. inflation had gone so far as to cause a collapse of the financial system to the detriment of the living standards of workers, thus accepting that moderation was needed.⁶² In the lead up to 1935, the Labour Party nonetheless began to consistently make the case for re-inflating the economy alongside other more moderate policies which countered the somewhat less coherent, radical and contradictory responses they had previously used. Semple quoted Lord D’Abernon who had pointed out the obvious truth that the world was full of goods and the banks full of money, but people were starving. According to Semple, Great Britain had enormous interest bills from her wartime borrowing and was in desperate need of debt relief from the United States. These were simple messages, easy to articulate and undeniably true.

The main objection from the political Right to rectifying the deflationary cycle by increasing credit and the volume of money in circulation as the Left advocated, was the risk of uncontrolled inflation. This risk was dogmatically repeated by the conservative parties until it became a mantra. W. J. Polson MP (Stratford, Independent) was one politician who pointed out the deleterious effect of inflation on savings by claiming that French savers had lost four-fifths of the value of their wealth due to inflation. The Westland Labour MP James O’Brien said that by inflating her currency (i.e. devaluing)

⁶⁰ "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.238: 24th Parliament 4th session," p.478.

⁶¹ Gustafson, *From the cradle to the grave : a biography of Michael Joseph Savage*: p.199. Requote from a letter, George Forbes to Downie Stewart.

⁶² "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.227: 23rd Parliament: 4th session," p.272.

France had transferred eighty percent of her war debt to holders of French bonds. Austria and Germany had done the same, whereas Britain increased the value of her war debts by revaluing. These points were all correct, but given the burden of unpayable debt the world had created as a result of the War and Versailles settlement a day of reckoning had to come, even for Britain.

Other politicians showed that, even as they debated the inflation issue, the possible consequences were not well understood. Reform's Robert Wright MP argued that inflation would disadvantage workers as it had in France and elsewhere since their wages would be worth less. This was, however, only one side of the argument because it assumed wages would be constrained and prices would not. There was obviously confusion for on another occasion France was given as an example where issuing additional currency - thus causing inflation - had resulted in a fall in commodity prices. United's C. H. Clinkard said Stallworthy's claim that the banks were to blame for problems in Germany and France was wrong, as the French Government had issued extra currency to avoid raising taxes. Countries that had maintained the gold standard as France had done had not only experienced inflation but also deflation (which he said always followed inflation). His argument was inconsistent but his opposition to any hint of inflation was vigorous.⁶³

As late as 1932 Rev. Carr MP was still making the point that Governments were deterred from creating credit by exaggerated threats of inflation. This was so, but it was equally true that reports of hyperinflation in Europe had been well publicised and fears raised that the same could happen elsewhere. One opinion quoted by Carr said that if more gold was produced other commodity prices would rise. Carr pointed out that "pieces of paper function just as readily" and so could achieve the same result as long as the public had confidence in the currency.⁶⁴ Decoupling the currency from gold would solve the problem. This was consistent with the opinion of Frank Langstone MP (Waimarino, Labour) who had earlier claimed that the problem was that the quantity of money in

⁶³ "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.232: 24th Parliament 1st session," pp.34, 39; "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.231: 24th Parliament 1st session," p.986; "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.236: 24th Parliament 3rd session," p.808. Hett, *The Death of Democracy*: p.210. Hyperinflation in Germany between 1922-23 had left a persistent aversion to inflationary policies.

⁶⁴ "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.233: 24th Parliament 1st session," p.396.

circulation was at more or less the same level as it had been previously.⁶⁵ Langstone therefore suggested distributing additional money amongst the population through a commodity price smoothing scheme, the use of which could somehow be restricted to the redemption of local goods, rather than imports such as ‘benzine(sic), tires, motor-cars and other luxury items from abroad ...’. Alexander Harris MP (Waitemata, ex-Reform and later Independent) proposed a Trading Coupons scheme to facilitate (non-cash) exchanges of goods. Harris claimed there were already such schemes in France and elsewhere. Downie Stewart was unenthusiastic and pointed out that inducing ‘Inflation by increasing (the) volume of money often fails ... In France, when the note-issue was nearly doubled, prices fell about 20 per cent’.⁶⁶ This last statement appears at odds with economic theory wherein an increase in the money supply should lead to an increase in prices i.e. inflation (or greater supply at the same unit price, if the production capacity was available). The remarks do however confirm the view that once inflation had been suggested, the political Right raised concerns to the level of a plague-like threat as a political positioning point.

McKinnon has argued that urban New Zealand was not opposed to inflation *per se*. In his view the dispute was about the means to do so without damaging the economy, because expert opinion suggested a devaluation would dampen urban economic activity. McKinnon also argues that the establishment of common ground on this issue led to Labour interests aligning with those of the urban elite.⁶⁷ The adverse reaction to the 1933 devaluation was therefore a backlash of urban dwellers against the presumed beneficiaries, the farmers. McKinnon’s case on this point is not compelling. Labour had caused a good deal of confusion in the public mind through their selective use of examples from France and elsewhere, as well as by the imprecise language used to describe their many inconsistent policy suggestions. More importantly, any change in

⁶⁵ "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.230: 23rd Parliament: 5th session," (1931), p.31. "World Production," *New Zealand Herald*, 12 November 1935, p.7. Langstone’s point is unclear as he seems to be arguing the money supply was the same but the volume of business had declined implying inflationary pressures existed. A League of Nations report said that global production had increased by 10% in the previous year although French production had only increased by 7%. It also noted that the world had far to go to get back to "normal" as world trade was still less than 68% as measured in gold, and at only 45% of its sterling value compared to 1929 levels.

⁶⁶ "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.230: 23rd Parliament: 5th session," pp.31, 50, 157. It did not necessarily follow that an increase in the money supply would cause prices to rise: the result might be a greater volume of the same commodities produced at the same price depending on supply.

⁶⁷ McKinnon, *The broken decade: prosperity, depression and recovery in New Zealand, 1928-39*: p.221.

monetary policy such as in interest rates or exchange rates is arbitrary and will therefore result in uneven outcomes depending on the financial circumstances of the individual at that point in time, be they debtors or creditors, employed or out of work. The urban elite included those involved in both importing and exporting, many of whom would have also had some dependence - even if only indirectly - on the rural sector. The case for and against inflating the economy was therefore, at least in the early stages, far from clear cut. Labour exploited this confusion to play on generalised fears that devaluation would negatively impact the economy, despite knowing full well that the outcome would be uneven.

The electoral success of Reform-United in the early 1930s suggests that until the 1933 devaluation the Coalition's arguments against economic expansion by increasing the money supply had held sway with the voting public. H. G. Dickie MP (Reform, Patea) had mocked the idea of inflating the economy by printing money because (he said) the problems in the United Kingdom were due to France, Germany and others inflating their economies in this way and then dumping goods on the British market. The tone was again one of moral disapproval and unfairness, rather than claiming that such policies had not worked to the benefit of France. Frank Langstone later attempted to deflect from this line of criticism by claiming Labour was not talking about printing money (loosening monetary controls) but about using 'internal credits' although this amounted to the same outcome. Simply printing money, Langstone agreed, did lead to inflation. Einzig was to later argue that neither devaluation, nor increased spending on Government projects, nor loosening credit would have reduced Britain, America or France to the same situation as Germany. The state of Germany in 1932 according to Einzig was the product of a unique set of circumstances which were not replicated elsewhere. The other powers' fear of ending up in the same condition as Germany if they adopt less rigid monetary policies was therefore mischievous. Einzig went so far to call it 'childish', but that is a judgement made with hindsight that reflects unfairly on the gravity of the decisions the leaders of whatever political persuasion faced at the time.⁶⁸

⁶⁸ "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.231: 24th Parliament 1st session," p.811, 889; Einzig, *World finance since 1914*: p.68.

A great deal of attention on both sides of the ideological divide was given to identifying the off-shore origins of New Zealand's problems, such as the French gold reserves or French currency manipulation or French obsessions with reparation payments, while insufficient consideration was given to matters New Zealand could control and influence. New Zealand was trying to manage a domestic economy that was dependent on overseas trade using a conservative political prescription within an imagined moral framework derived from being British. With the alternatives restricted by these views, New Zealand was left brooding over global circumstances which were beyond local influence or control. This distracted attention from possible adjustments to domestic settings such as exchange rates, gold reserves, cost cutting and import-export controls. Nevertheless, it is true that many of the macro-economic solutions were beyond the control of a smallish, export-dependent economy.

Rev. Carr pointed out that the large nations (such as America and France) could move off the gold standard and depreciate their currency, but when a New Zealand local body tried to pay interest on loans using New Zealand currency rather than sterling, the London Stock Exchange had delisted the securities. Carr said the New Zealand Government was prepared to 'aid and abet this bullying' of a loyal member of the Commonwealth although there was little the New Zealand Government could do. The broader point stood: the large nations acted in their own interests while New Zealand had very limited scope to take independent action.⁶⁹ Moreover, as uncertainties grew, so too did suspicion as to the true condition and relevance of France as an economic example. When Lysnar suggested stopping expenditure on uneconomic rail links in favour of completing the essential track (his example was the East Coast link that was coincidentally in his Gisborne electorate), W. P. Endean interjected that 'France is scrapping its railways'. Lysnar rejected the comparison, not because the statement was unproven, but because France was a developed country whereas New Zealand was a virgin, undeveloped land.⁷⁰

⁶⁹ "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.236: 24th Parliament 3rd session," p.27. Although he was a fellow Labour MP, Carr's point undercut the Lee faction's assertions that New Zealand could act with impunity on exchange control matters.

⁷⁰ "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.230: 23rd Parliament: 5th session," p.71.

Lest it appear that New Zealand's view of France was an overly simplistic distortion, the reciprocal view - that of New Zealand from France - would have appeared similarly immoderate and unbalanced. *Le Figaro* reported on 11 January 1932 that 'hundreds of unemployed people have been deprived of bread and have attempted to loot one of the largest grocery stores in the city (of Dunedin)'.⁷¹ Reports of riots in Auckland followed. It was claimed that some New Zealand newspapers blamed Communist agitators. Forbes was quoted in *Le Figaro* as saying that 'the government is ready to act in the face of any eventuality, and it will not allow (itself) to be dominated by the forces of disorder'.⁷² None of this was untrue but when reported without context it suggested chronic anarchy in New Zealand, just as C. H. Chapman MP (Wellington North, Labour) reinforced the impression of French unrest by saying that "in France the political cauldron seethes and bubbles with uncertainty".⁷³

When citing France as an example to support their policy positions the New Zealand MPs ignored the chronic domestic political instability of France during the inter-war years. If France in the '20s had appeared to be at the pinnacle of her colonial prowess, the image soon regressed to a nation conflicted by a left-right divide which did not fit the New Zealand narrative of success.⁷⁴ After his re-election in 1928, Poincaré had tried to achieve stability by fixing the value of the franc at 65.5mg of gold and settling on a revised schedule of repayments to the United States. This remained contingent on Germany continuing to pay reparations. Initially it seemed that France had escaped the worst of 'Black Thursday' (14 October 1929) but problems arose with international payments in June 1931. Although adjustments had been made, it became obvious that Germany could not pay further reparations to France. Despite President Hoover's moratorium on all international payments, no French Government could persuade the United States to link repayment of French debt to America with German reparations. Both the French and United States politicians would have faced extremely adverse voter reaction had they tried to renounce these positions or even acknowledged the likelihood

⁷¹ "A Dunedin, les chômeurs suscitent une uné émeute" *Le Figaro*, 11 January 1932, p.3.

⁷² "Les troubles de la Nouvelle Zélande," *Le Figaro*, 17 April 1932, p.4.; "EN NOUVELLE-ZÉLANDE: les sans-travail se battent avec les forces répressives," *L'Humanité*, 16 April 1932, p.3.. *L'Humanité* also reported the unrest which seemed to be a topic of interest for the French press.

⁷³ "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.231: 24th Parliament 1st session," p.301. Chapman's quote came from *Harper's Weekly* published 10th October 1857.

⁷⁴ Agulhon, *The French Republic, 1879-1992*: pp.204-5.

that the debtors might default. The New Zealand politicians lacked direction on the issue, and by appearing economically helpless contributed to an expedient aura of blamelessness.⁷⁵

5.7 A central bank for New Zealand

If the political Right was at fault for failing to recognise alternatives and adapt when the current policy solutions were so obviously failing, so too was the Left by insisting on positioning their solutions within a Marxist-socialist paradigm that appeared to lack relevance and applicability to day to day life in New Zealand's mixed economy. When one of the most progressive policies associated with France - the establishment of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand – was introduced the two sides had a rare moment of policy overlap, even if it went unremarked as such.⁷⁶ Introducing the relevant Bill, Gordon Coates the Minister of Finance quoted the precedent established in England and France of central Government appropriating profits (or losses) on the reserves of gold when these were taken over by the state.

Furthermore, it is a recognized principle that the value of the monetary unit, and, in fact, monetary policy generally, are entirely matters to be determined by the State, which must stand all losses involved and should take all profits accruing therefrom.⁷⁷

This was far from the traditional, right-wing hands-off view of economic policy and could easily have come from a left-leaning politician. When Coates cited France, Belgium, Norway, Sweden and Italy as examples where central banks had helped tide over financial predicaments, Daniel Sullivan MP (Labour, Avon) refuted this with the astonishingly erroneous claim that France had not had to face a post-war financial crisis. William Polson MP (Independent) pointed out that when Britain went off the gold standard the French Government had bailed out the Bank of France even though it was under private shareholder control. His point was that ultimately it was the State that

⁷⁵ Tombs and Tombs, *That Sweet Enemy : the French and the British from the Sun King to the Present*: p.525 ; Agulhon, *The French Republic, 1879-1992*: pp.207-209. The Dawes Plan adjustments in 1929 were superseded by the Young Plan but all to no avail.

⁷⁶ Matthew Wright, "The policy origins of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand," Reserve Bank of New Zealand Bulletin (Reserve Bank of New Zealand); "No 11 Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act," ed. Government of New Zealand (1933).

⁷⁷ "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.236: 24th Parliament 3rd session," p.569. When France had taken similar steps, the state had valued the gold at the new par rate and booked the profits to the Government's account with the Bank of France.

had to deal with any catastrophe so it was appropriate that the state should have control of the Bank.

There was little in that for Labour to criticise although Henry ‘Rex’ Mason somewhat desperately tried. Bankers - so Mason said - wanted to appreciate the value of their main asset, namely money. It was, he claimed, ‘to the bankers we owe the current depression’. He gave as an example the bankers’ insistence on a return to the gold standard after the Franco-Prussian Wars and the earlier Napoleonic Wars, thus restricting credit. Similar circumstances and a similar banker response were evident after the French Revolution. It was bankers who had caused these depressions. Mason had to go back some distance for an example, but the French comparison both resurrected the traditional enemy and avoided criticism of the British.⁷⁸

New Zealand now had the mechanism to impose her own currency controls, a key element of sovereignty and nationhood. Despite this, the Labour MP Robert McKeen (Wellington South) still naysaid by claiming that the reasons the Government gave for setting up the Bank were undermined by the actions of existing Reserve banks, including that of France, because they did not control exchange rates and tried to pursue their own narrow economic interests. The latter was an odd criticism for a Labour MP to make of a central bank, albeit one that still had partial private shareholding. The debate looped back to whether national banks (the French institutions included) were to co-ordinate internationally or were - as Coates said - to pursue their country’s own interests. If the former had been the case there would have been no currency speculation. Britain had been forced to buy gold from France and America to ‘buttress up’ her own exchange mechanisms. Reserve Banks should be the people’s representatives not proxies for financiers or governments. Walter Broadfoot (United) said the Bank of France was ‘caught napping’ because it held huge stocks of gold when Britain abandoned the gold standard. The French Government had to rescue the Bank of France, but this observation confirmed that with a national bank in place the Government was the ultimate backstop of the financial system.⁷⁹ It also reaffirmed the uncertainty of using gold reserves to assess wealth.

⁷⁸ Ibid., pp.653, 669, 680.

⁷⁹ Ibid., pp.875, 884

With the Reform-United Government having accepted devaluation and adopted the concept of a central bank, attention turned to macro-economic policy. Much of the debate remained within conventional parameters although interpretations of the proffered solutions within these boundaries varied and showed some eccentricities. Sir James Parr (Council) was one who seemed to grasp the broader possibilities for New Zealand now the new Reserve Bank was in operation. He pointed out that more than twenty-two countries including France now had a central banking system. New Zealand's new bank could trade in bullion, foreign exchange and general securities including those of France and the other large powers. Clinkard was another MP who was more aware than many of his contemporaries that sovereign nations could change their financial settings rather than adopting the stance of hapless victims. If the financial system of the world could not take the load Clinkard said, new measures could be taken. He again pointed out that France and the other larger nations had depreciated their currency when altered post-war circumstances required it.⁸⁰

Even Sir James Allen seemed to be coming to the view that New Zealand was part of a global economy not just a British subsidiary. When it was suggested that the newly proposed Bank for International Settlements would include France amongst its shareholders (largely comprised of countries using the gold standard), Allen hoped this would expand. He believed there was a case for a world economic organisation. James Hargest also foresaw the need for greater flexibility as he quoted currency depreciations implemented by various countries including France when pointing out that New Zealand had no hope of maintaining her currency at its existing levels.⁸¹ Sir James Parr, when commenting on the 26 September 1936 League of Nations meeting, said that the crumbling of the European gold standard followed by the devaluations of the United Kingdom, United States and French currencies respectively was to be 'welcomed' as a portent of better economic times to come. Sir James contrasted this with the comments at the equivalent meeting in September 1931 when the Second Committee of the

⁸⁰ "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.237: 24th Parliament 3rd session," pp.230-231, 332, 334. Despite this an unreasonable fear of inflation persisted. Clinkard claimed that the 'first inflation that we know much about' was the French inflation of the seventeenth century. Despite massive rises in wages and salaries, Clinkard claimed a Paris judge had died of starvation. He therefore simultaneously illustrated that he was aware of the evils of inflation but that price and wage raises would not solve all problems.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, pp.355, 422.

Assembly had ‘felt sympathy’ with Great Britain which had been ‘obliged’ to abandon the standard.⁸²

The stance in favour of national control of currency and exchange rates still had an awkward boundary with the free market, non-tariff economic model. Clinkard’s suggestion that currency regulation should be under non-political control was well ahead of the then accepted role of a reserve bank. Similarly, the idea of an Empire-wide common currency recalled the Empire dream but such would only be viable within a common market free of trade and production controls. When Teddy (E. J.) Howard MP (Christchurch South, Labour) pointed out that Belgium, France and other countries were providing goods to New Zealand (clothing in this case) that could have been manufactured locally from New Zealand wool he was expressing a common view in support of the development of import-substituting small-scale secondary industry.⁸³ Although an apparently obvious solution to balance trade deficits and reduce unemployment, New Zealand’s customers were unlikely to import raw wool if they could not export the finished product. Nor was Britain in favour. France could still be simultaneously viewed as a manufacturer of competing products or as a valued customer for raw wool or a disrupter of global financial markets.

5.8 Outcomes and implications

If Macaulay’s New Zealander were to come to this part of the earth he could not sketch the ruins of St. Paul’s, but he might describe the wreckage and litter of Europe’s economic stability.⁸⁴

Rt. Hon. W.F. Massey re-quoting W.P. Reeves from *The Times* of 10th July 1923

It was not the case that the New Zealand Governments of 1918-1935 wilfully ignored obvious solutions which had been empirically proven elsewhere. As Sir James Allen had pointed out to the Legislative Council, even the gold committee of the League of Nations could not agree on the cause(s) of the economic crisis. A minority on the committee (Allen said) believed the cause was monetary difficulties. A majority including the French and United States representatives as well as German and Italian delegates, had

⁸² "The League Of Nations. Report Of The Representative Of The Dominion Of New Zealand On The Seventeenth Assembly Of The League Of Nations, Held At Geneva In The Year 1936. Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives, 1937 Session," p.13.

⁸³ "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.231: 24th Parliament 1st session," pp.301-2, 322.

⁸⁴ "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.202: 21st Parliament: 2nd session," (1923), p.335.

not revealed their opinion but they did not agree that monetary difficulties i.e. interest rates and the supply of money was the cause. As if to confirm this point, Reform's Bill (W. D.) Endean MP spoke against untested remedies especially the use of inflation which had in the past caused chaos and led to wars. These were not unrealistic fears. Moreover, huge debts had been created by French demands for German reparation payments. Endean undermined his argument by reverting to emotional appeals. He said there was a need to keep the empire on a "sound basis" as he referred to the thin red line at Waterloo when Britain faced the flower of the French army. British troops saved Europe then and a century later Britain had done the same thing as Britain engaged in an economic war.⁸⁵ This comment, which was made in 1932, was out of context but it reinstated France the wartime ally as Britain's economic enemy.

Einzig's view that little serious consideration was given in the immediate post-war period as to how the war-related debts could be repaid has attracted little academic attention in New Zealand's narrative. Reparations payments were never going to be a significant factor in the New Zealand financial plan, but French demands for payment had repercussions for the New Zealand economy far beyond the immediate fiscal impact.⁸⁶ Understandably, the attitudes amongst the victors' publics meant a less punitive attitude was unacceptable in the immediate post-war period but France made every effort to prolong this phase and New Zealand acquiesced even after Massey's admission that it was unlikely German reparation payments would ever reach New Zealand. That is not to say that the topic was ignored at the time. Keynes' explicit and very public airing of the unreconciled dissonance between economic recovery and punishment of Germany is evidence of that.⁸⁷ Those owed money were, as Einzig said, 'vaguely aware' that the debts could only be paid by the debtors (starting with Germany) running a surplus but this problem was observed rather than addressed. No means of support was offered to help those nations deemed to owe money to repay it.⁸⁸ There was little public criticism of either the United Kingdom or France on this point so New Zealand simply adopted Lloyd George's policy of colluding with France to stifle a

⁸⁵ "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.233: 24th Parliament 1st session," p.731; "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.232: 24th Parliament 1st session," p.740.

⁸⁶ "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.194: 20th Parliament: 3rd session," p.443. In reply to a question in the House in 1921, Massey explained that while France and Belgium had priority he still believed New Zealand would get something although he clearly had doubts as to how much and when. It seems that he was wisely not relying on this source for budgetary relief.

⁸⁷ "A Dark Future," *Evening Post*, 8 April 1920, p.9.

⁸⁸ Einzig, *World finance since 1914*: p.80.

German recovery. As long as Massey remained Prime Minister and Ward was politically active, this largely remained the case, even as the British/ Empire's stance on the issue softened. The indirect implications for New Zealand were not considered.

European economic policies were aimed at achieving easy political 'wins' and re-energising national pride rather than restoring financial well-being. The blame was shared: economists tended to ignore the political implications of their policy prescriptions while the politicians' rhetoric reflected voter sentiment rather than longer-term economic realities. When the MP A.S. Malcolm (Reform, Clutha) attempted to do both by advocating the economically sound and reasonable policy of offering cheap or free commodities to speed the recovery of Germany and the other 'impoverished countries of Europe', his inclusion of the point that 'Britain has proposed it in the case of France' disregarded the political implications of juxtaposing enemy and ally.⁸⁹ Nevertheless, at least some local politicians accepted the importance of aiding European recovery through the supply of cheap or free goods (i.e. credit in another guise), and that the recovery of both France and Germany would be an important factor in Britain's and therefore New Zealand's future prosperity and stability.

As the image of France as a devastated victim of malicious German aggression started to fade it was a financially-recovered France of full employment and enormous gold reserves which replaced it in the political imagination and news reporting. The adoption of radical economic policies by France once her conventional policies failed not only confounded New Zealand's British-inspired belief that doing the right thing would produce the correct outcome, it also perversely reinforced perceptions of French unfairness, volatility and inconsistency. Nevertheless, once despair set in New Zealand's attitudes towards management of the economy underwent a radical transformation under the United-Reform Government(s), inspired in part by the selective use of French policies. Arbitrary changes to the exchange rate and the use of a Reserve Bank while not unprecedented were ground breaking for New Zealand. They opened the path to what was previously considered heretical economic intervention

⁸⁹ "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.193: 20th Parliament: 3rd session," p.503.

The partial displacement of Britain's views and conventional financial orthodoxies was demonstrably initiated even before the first Labour Government took office. The new, radical policy options and interventions introduced by United-Reform became familiar to the public. Most importantly, although still constrained by the national fixation on primary production, the principle of New Zealand Government's acting in the interests of New Zealand – just as the French did - was established. Labour would use these options in 1935-39 to enhance the subsequent economic recovery and build a welfare state. Far-reaching as Labour's changes were, other more fundamental questions about New Zealand's overall direction and the economic conundrum posed by introducing a French-styled small-farm economy went unaddressed.

6. Maintaining contact: sport and recreation, communication and technology

The decline in formal contacts with France meant informal communications - especially those related to sports - assumed greater significance in the newspaper article count. Items related to sports, arts and recreation consequently rose from 11.4% in 1919-1924 to 23.4% in 1925-1935. Film and movie related news and reports were a comparatively small sub-category at 4.2% but there was significant overlap with other topics. Furthermore, single figure percentages suggest intellectual engagement through technology, science and the humanities were in many cases exceptions and oddities published to entertain rather than to inform.

* * * *

The explicit use by the British Government of the press, newsreels and cinema to disseminate propagand received critical impetus from the Great War ...¹

Chandrika Kaul

Although newer technologies (particularly in audio and pictorial transmissions) helped perpetuate a façade of Empire unity, they also made attractive counter-narratives more available.² While these unwanted influences could theoretically have been excluded through deliberate blocking, by omission or by reader rejection, the ready acceptance of alternative, non-Empire ideas meant ignorance by exclusion was unrealistic. This chapter explores some of the post-1918 non-government exchanges and why, given these improvements in technology, enhanced communication did not result in a closer cultural understanding and relationship between the publics of France and New Zealand.³

There is no evidence to suggest that cultural exchanges with France increased after 1918.⁴ Domestic news from or about France (particularly after circa-1925) was reported in an unimaginative and bemused manner which did little to arouse reader interest, thereby suggesting the topics were seen as having little consequence for New Zealand. Reports covering legacy issues or matters of international statecraft were still predominantly drawn from secondary sources - principally via the United Kingdom. The New Zealand and French publics did not therefore engage with each other, notwithstanding their shared interest in innovative or unusual technologies, scientific

¹ Kaul, "Introductory Survey," p.15.

² Ibid., pp.6-8, 10-11, 14.

³ Ballantyne, *Webs of empire : locating New Zealand's colonial past*; Ballantyne and Australian National University. History Program., *Talking, listening, writing, reading : communication and colonisation*; Tony Ballantyne and Antoinette M. Burton, eds., *Bodies in contact : rethinking colonial encounters in world history* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2005). Although the use of diplomatic channels for information exchange has received academic attention particularly through the work of Tony Ballantyne much that was in the public environment appears not to have been investigated.

⁴ See the tables of newspaper article frequency in the thesis 'Introduction'.

developments, and sports - especially tennis and rugby. Even when increasing discomfort with the continued British dominance in the administration of rugby coincided with the controversy over the 1926 Māori rugby team's tour to France, the shadow of Empire won. The possibility of an informal French-New Zealand challenge to the replication of the Empire's structure within the rugby world was rejected. The cinema was potentially a more important influence than sport for extending knowledge of the 'others', but in that respect the French efforts were overshadowed by those of America. As a consequence post-war New Zealand collectively learned little more about contemporary France and its people, leaving New Zealand's France metaphorically in the past.

A significant local French presence - whether through immigrants or leading figures - might have stimulated interest leading to greater interaction, but there is no evidence of either in the sampled newspaper articles. Between 1923-38 immigration from France was too insignificant to warrant even a line item mention in the relevant statistics whereas just seven immigrants from Switzerland were documented.⁵ Moreover, there was a lack of leadership by example that may have helped overcome the 'othering' evident in the relationship. Although the redoubtable missionary Mother Aubert was an exceptionally well-known French identity, she had to fit within the local culture to be effective. Her reputation in New Zealand was therefore a product of her local activity rather than her French nationality.⁶

The absence of local French actors was not due to transport limitations since transfer of goods and people between France and New Zealand via the United States and points in between was routinely available. From mid-1925 onwards at least one company - the American Southern Pacific Lines railway company - regularly advertised a passenger and freight service to the South Pacific via New York and San Francisco.

⁵ "New Zealand Official Year Books."; "Personal Items," *Press*, 10 February 1933, p.10; "Shipping News," *Auckland Star*, 7 August 1935, p.4.. Hotel registrations by significant visitors were still regularly reported. There is one report of a hotel registration by a French visitor (A. G. Boevas). The French warship *Admiral Charner's* 1933 visit to Auckland was simply recorded as a routine ship movement.

⁶ Jessie Munro, "Mother Aubert," in *New Zealand and the French : two centuries of contact*, ed. John Dunmore (Waikanae: Heritage Press, 1997, 2nd., Updated ed). Margaret Tennant, "Aubert, Mary Joseph," in *Dictionary of New Zealand Biography. Te Ara - the Encyclopedia of New Zealand* (1993). Mother Aubert, founder of the Sisters of Compassion, emigrated from her native France to New Zealand in 1860. She was extensively involved in social and charitable work. She became a nationally recognised iconic figure, based on her compassionate, inter-denominational stance.

Figure 26: "Travel advertisement", *Le Figaro*, 7 May 1925



The reverse path for New Zealanders seeking a career in the arts, humanities, sciences and technology still passed through England and often halted there with forays to the continent as interludes. The New Zealander writers and artists domiciled in France attempted to blend into their adopted environment by assuming the demeanour of the locals without perhaps realising - as was the case for the uniformed soldiers before them - that their presence as foreigners influenced the behaviours they observed. They were local in the sense of being semi-permanent residents, but still strangers - isolated within their own 'set'. This is not to deny the merits and consequent prominence of these New Zealand writers and artists, but news from them and of the French writers and distinguished intellectuals who visited New Zealand was occasional and exceptional.⁸ Even while resident in France these New Zealanders recorded little of the local circumstances or environment beyond the climate, their immediate personal situation and their physical surroundings. Few if any offers were apparently extended to French interest groups to undertake visits to New Zealand. Whatever nascent post-war connections there had been were largely expunged, thereby leaving cultural France isolated and remote from the general newspaper reading public.

In the greater Pacific region the French - in common with the British - had shifted their empire and colonial attention to a more exploitative stance. French Indo-China and

⁷ "Billets de Passages," *Le Figaro*, 7 May 1925, p.6.. This was possibly to counter increased use and therefore competition from the Panama Canal route that negated the advantage of an overland rail link from America's east coast through to the Pacific seaports on the west coast. These advertisements appeared more or less weekly.

⁸ Charles, "Courrier des lettres: Une âme transparente." p.5.

China itself assumed greater importance because - as Robert Aldrich noted - the Pacific region had not developed as was originally anticipated.⁹ The Panama Canal could neither negate the awkward realities of a tropical climate nor overcome the uneconomic scale resulting from primary production spread over a few scattered archipelagos. The South Pacific was therefore neither an economically significant producer (apart from some extractive enterprises) nor a sizeable market. Moreover, as more efficient oil-fired ships replaced coal-fueled vessels, the size and number of bunkering facilities and ports was greatly reduced while wireless and improved cable communications lessened the need for land-based relay stations. Without substantive trade, New Zealand declined in significance for France which then became a distant European country with only indirect relevance. European political and economic affairs were treated by the New Zealand newspapers as if they could be confined within Europe, a stance which contradicted the experience of the previous three decades and ran counter to the increasing opportunities as communication and travel developed.¹⁰

6.1 Was La France a feminine presence in New Zealand?

The reports within the 'costume and personal appearance' sections of the newspapers suggest that a perception of France as a female-gendered beauty and fashion orientated space developed during the 1930s. This perception of a feminised post-war France replaced the earlier version of a more pragmatic and combative France of political and economic significance.¹¹ Reports of frilly, exotic and titillating, *risqué* femininity demanded a counter-acting, no nonsense, masculine-heavy disparagement through the development of an imagined traditional New Zealand wife who was a more practical mate in both fashion and work for the rugby playing man 'on the land'.

A detailed description of a beauty school managed by Cleo de Merode (probably Cléopatra Diane de Mérode or an impersonator thereof, 'the most enchanting woman

⁹ Aldrich, *The French Presence in the South Pacific, 1842-1940*: pp.240, 268. "In The Far East," *Evening Post*, 4 October 1937, p.8.. The (British) Labour opposition was critical of China policy which was to co-operate with France and U.S.A. to 'try to keep the peace.' (The U.K. had previously 'rebuffed' U.S. overtures to 'help'). Robert Aldrich refers to a 1932 article (written by Pelleray in *Océanie Française*) in which Rear Admiral Castex was quoted as saying that France did not have a strong interest in the South Pacific and could not defend Indo-China against the Japanese.

¹⁰ "The European Crisis," *Press*, 26 September 1938, p.12.

¹¹ "Le Monument De Costume": The French Woman At The Zenith Of Her Power And Charm. A Sketch Of The Grande Dame Of The The Eighteenth Fury In France," *Ladies' Mirror*, 1 December 1925, p.44.

in France') explained that Mlle Mérode had been 'requested' to train the girls of Parisian society using a régime including milk baths and dancing. For a peaches and cream skin, the girls slept between black silk sheets.¹² Less erotically but no less exotically, ladies in French-themed costumes inevitably featured during local social occasions. French costumed *mademoiselles* attended fancy-dress balls – a popular entertainment in the 1920s and 1930s – to reassert the sophistication and femininity of New Zealand women. French fashion accessories such as flowers, lace, ribbons, shoes, hosiery and gloves were worn at significant social events such as society weddings and were dutifully identified as symbols of upper-class refinement in the society columns.¹³ These suggest that French imagery was associated with a Cinderella-like opportunity to escape the drudgery of everyday life and the farm – at least for one evening. The New Zealand department stores' histories indicate that while French fashion was an influence, this interest did not extend to everyday clothing. The need for practical garments for daily wear and the wish to follow the Home fashions probably restricted the market for more stylish French fabrics and garments, although expressions such as 'Paris models', 'crêpe de chine' and 'georgette' (crêpe Georgette) indicates that French fashion was of interest.¹⁴

Post-war merchandising policies were not dissimilar to the pre-war situation in which eighty percent of the goods sold by the 'Farmers' chain were sourced from Home or the United States. Nevertheless, the war's influence had been considerable with the economic downturn and credit squeeze of the 1920s resulted in a change in Farmers business model. Establishment of buying offices in New York and London during the 1920s was attributed to avoiding any repetition of the difficulty experienced in sourcing European goods during the war, a theme consistent with the wish to stay clear of mainland Europe and any future potential trading problems.¹⁵ Nonetheless, there was a clear desire to promote the image of current overseas styles and trends. The promotions

¹² "Cléo de Mérode," Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cl%C3%A9o_de_M%C3%A9rode.; "A Beauty School," *Sun*, 14 February 1920, p.7..

¹³ "Ramarama Hunt Club Ball," *Pukekohe & Waiuku Times*, 3 October 1919, p.4.; "Women's Corner," *Press*, 24 July 1920, p.2.; "Fashion Notes," *Auckland Star*, 26 June 1920, p.20.; "An Invitation," *Otago Standard and Wallace County Chronicle*, 18 September 1923, p.2.; "Social News," *New Zealand Herald*, 13 November 1925, p.16.; "Women's Corner," *Press*, 2 June 1926, p.2.

¹⁴ Cecile Geary, *Celebrating 125 years, 1880-2005 : Smith + Caughey's* ([Auckland, N.Z.] : Smith & Caughey Limited, 2005). pp.63-64.

¹⁵ Ian Hunter, *Farmers, your store for 100 years* (Auckland, N.Z. : HarperCollins, 2009). pp.71-72, 237. Both of the brothers of 'Farmers' founder Robert Laidlaw were employed in the business and both were killed in the war. Robert was therefore not conscripted.

of higher end fashion items through James Smith's, George Court's and the DIC all mention Parisian designs alongside fashions from Vienna, London and New York. Buyers visited these trend-setting centres and local 'experts' were employed to promote their styles.¹⁶ The dispersion of advertising suggests there was no collaborative effort to promote any particular country's fashion. While effusive in praising French products, the copy suggests exclusivity targeted at the higher-end user.

Les femmes de France were not always associated with high fashion or morality. The use of makeup - described as being as necessary in France as '... bread and meat' - complemented reports of scantily dressed French brides who required the temporary use of a shawl the local priest had purchased for that purpose. The French actress who used fake jewellery also served to bring French women back into a flawed, morally suspect, everyday context. A seer purportedly described King Edward's mistress Lily Langtry as being as beautiful as 'La France roses' thereby neatly co-locating suspect French morality, beauty and royalty within the behavioural standards of upper classes of Britain.¹⁷ Any hint of French cultural superiority or sophistication seemed to demand such belittling counter-narratives in the man's country, rather than the advancement of a superlative case.

In a broader context there is little evidence to suggest that the feminised French culture and themes extended into mainstream New Zealand life, notwithstanding the exposure in broadcasts, news and film. Searching for common French words that might have entered the vernacular such as *vin*, *fromage* or even *haute couture* yields few results. Only one news item between 1925-38 specifically referred to 'vin' and 'French' and this was within a fictional item. *Fromage* appears in the *PapersPast* database just ninety-two times between 1918-35, and then mainly in descriptions of imagined continental menus. The term *fromage* suggests an adventurous French inspired menu rather than the addition of what was probably a simple cheddar. Recipes such as 'oeufs brouillés au fromage', 'bananas gratinées au fromage', and (it seems) nearly any other foodstuff that could be served 'au fromage' were featured. The term 'haute couture' received sixty-four

¹⁶ H. Laurenson, *Going up, going down : the rise and fall of the department store*, AUP studies in cultural and social history: 2 (Auckland, N.Z. : Auckland University Press, 2005). pp.55-58.

¹⁷ "Delay Was Dangerous," *Lake County Press*, 11 November 1920, p.7.; "Women In Print," *Evening Post*, 10 June 1920, p.9.; "Borrowed Plumes," *Auckland Star*, 8 May 1920, p.19.; "A Seer's Confessions," *New Zealand Herald Supplement*, 22 December 1923, p.5..

mentions, mainly within the *Auckland Star's* 'Fashion Notes'. One re-printed article captioned as 'Titles Don't Count' (culinary adventures were obviously treated as an exception) took particular delight in the disparagement of titled, previously well-off and/or older French women attempting to become models as a desperate response to the Great Depression.¹⁸ French femininity was titillating, sexualised and exotic with more than a hint of moral ignominy.

If an overtly femininized France suggested a degree of post-war sophistication, it was the shared interest in rugby and tennis that provided a masculine counterweight. Results mentioning New Zealand were often reported in France even when there was no direct French involvement, although the opposite was again less customary. Themes that reflected broader political attitudes and concerns which might otherwise have been beyond what is usually assumed to be the apolitical world of sport were apparent. Hence *Le Figaro* repeatedly explained to readers why the international tennis rankings had altered after New Zealand was re-classified as an independent nation in the Davis Cup competition. This suggests that the two Australasian national identities that New Zealanders might have supposed to be well known were indistinct to the casual French reader. Matter-of-fact racial stereotypes were frequently used in New Zealand reports to explain sporting outcomes. These usually assumed that the New Zealanders were normal and without fault; thus, if the French Davis Cup team was 'brilliant but erratic' by default 'we' (presumably British-New Zealanders) were not.¹⁹

Rugby aroused particularly strong emotions. The internal politics of the game's administration was of as much interest to French rugby followers as it was to their New Zealand opposites. In rugby circles a distinctly New Zealand identity was clearly delineated from Australia's. Early post-war New Zealand reports described the success of the New Zealand Services' sporting teams ('our boys') winning competitions,

¹⁸ "Night Life In Berlin," *Evening Star*, 23 August 1919, p.10; "Entre House," *Free Lance*, 4 February 1920, p.7; "Cooking Hints: French Recipes," *Auckland Star*, 29 January 1927, p.26; "French Recipes," *Otago Daily Times*, 1 May 1928, p.14; "Passing Notes," *Otago Daily Times*, 8 April 1922, p.4; A Paris Expert, "Fashion Notes: Social Women's Vanity (Mannequins with titles)," *Auckland Star*, 10 December 1932, p.26; "Titles Don't Count (in the mannequin business)," *Waikato Times*, 13 April 1928, p.5; "Germaine", "Paris In the Mirror," *Evening Post*, 21 April 1928, p.15.. These columns were attributed to either 'an expert or 'a Paris expert'. The Evening Post's equivalent - 'Paris in the Looking Glass' (re-titled after 1927 as 'Paris in the Mirror') - was credited to 'Germaine'.

¹⁹ "Notes Of The Day," p.4; "Lawn-Tennis," *Le Figaro*, 15 January 1924, p.6.. New Zealand was previously included as a member of the Australasian Team.

including the inter-allied football championships held in 'England and France'. This link between France, the armed services and the All Blacks is still evident at the time of writing.²⁰ Expectations were always high: a 'crushing' of the English team was anticipated when the New Zealand rugby team toured England in late 1924, but just to be sure the two matches against France were moved until after the England Test match (scheduled for 3 January 1925).²¹

The Māori rugby team's 1926 tour of France was arguably of greater significance in the formation of a distinctly New Zealand national sporting identity for both New Zealand and French enthusiasts. The Māori players had been informed before their French visit that they would not be selected for the South African tour. The decision was excused by the Rugby Union Chair (Stan Dean) as being in the interests of the players:

Native players sent there (i.e. to South Africa) with a football team would only be exposed to the risk of insult and to the contempt of the people, who were, unhappily, not educated to New Zealand's broad views on the colour question. Long before the tour was definitely arranged the New Zealand Rugby Union had discussed the subject with the Māori Advisory Board and had ascertained its feelings; and before the Māori team left last year on its trip to France the players had been specifically informed that they would not be eligible for the South African tour.²²

French newspapers reported that while in France the Māori team acquitted themselves extremely well both on and off the field. Prime Minister Gordon Coates appeared and made a presentation in the best traditions of politicians associating themselves with sporting success but beneath the image of a happy Māori touring team there was a national divide.²³ Ron Palenski's account confirms that there was a 'tacit understanding' that this trip was compensation for the exclusion of Māori players from the South African tour, but nonetheless the tour was a humiliating second-tier option for Māori. George Nepia is quoted as saying that "the whole of New Zealand was highly indignant", but Palenski notes there were alternative views aired in the press. In Palenski's words,

²⁰ "Personal Items," *Mataura Ensign*, 31 July 1919, p.4.; B.J. Clark, "All Blacks taking respect to field with our own poppy," *New Zealand Herald*, 11 November 2017.

²¹ "First Impressions," *Evening Post*, 15 October 1924, p.8.

²² "Maori Rugby Tourists," *Bay of Plenty Times*, 14 September 1926, p.2; "Table Talk," *Auckland Star*, 17 December 1926, p.1.; "The All Blacks," *Otago Daily Times*, 26 October 1927, p.11..

²³ "Rugby: Les Maoris en France," *Le Figaro*, 6 December 1926, p.5; "RUGBY: Courtoisie sportive," *Le Figaro*, 23 December 1926, p.6.

‘the tour of South Africa in 1928 was a Rubicon for New Zealand in terms of supinely acquiescing to the racist dictates of South Africa – however noble the motivation ...’²⁴ Whatever the New Zealand national mindset, it is impossible to ignore the implications for Empire unity. No matter how well the Māori players were treated and respected in France, rugby fans saw that New Zealand had chosen to select a supposedly nationally representative All Black team on a racial basis to avoid offending a fellow Empire member while the “others” (i.e. Māori in this case) were relegated to touring France as compensation.

The New Zealand actions could be interpreted as a necessary sacrifice in the interests of Empire unity or they could be seen as one sporting code acting out of self-interest to the detriment of others, even at the cost of demeaning the national character. Little consideration appears to have been given to the significance of the impression created by New Zealand’s selection of France as the non-Empire nation offering the best alternative for Māori. Greg Buckley pointed out in his thesis that there was ambivalence within South Africa over the Empire project owing to the distinct divisions within the racially divided white population. Even so, he also says that ‘the view of New Zealand political elites in relation to New Zealand and South African rugby tours remained imperialist’.²⁵ If so, this may explain why France was selected as the destination for the tour rather than another Empire country such as Australia or one of the Home nations. Although no direct evidence has been found on this point, there may have been a fear that touring another Empire member could have opened additional intra-Empire divisions over the Empire’s treatment of its non-white races. Empire unity was perhaps bought for the price of acquiescing to racial discrimination within New Zealand’s national sport.

New Zealand’s reluctance to side with France in order to break the British stranglehold on inter-war rugby administration is consistent with a theory of Empire unity taking precedence. It particularly rankled with the French that the Home Unions were collectively described as ‘international’ members of the Board. In 1920 *Le Figaro*

²⁴ Ron Palenski, *Rugby : a New Zealand history*, e-Book ed. (Auckland University Press, 2015). pp.456, 461, 464.

²⁵ Mike Buckley, " "A Colour Line Affair" - Race, Imperialism and Rugby Football contacts between New Zealand and South Africa to 1950." (University of Canterbury, 1996), pp.35-57.

reported that a 'sportsman' was suggesting the formation of a rebel International Rugby organisation involving Romania, the United States, South Africa, Australia, New Zealand and France. England would thereafter be 'obliged' to join. The real reason for not admitting France to full International Rugby Board membership - according to a 1921 *Le Figaro* comment - was the likelihood that this would also open the door for all the southern hemisphere nations to join, thus giving them numerical superiority over the Home Unions. In 1926 *Le Figaro* reported that New Zealand had finally acted by refusing to accept representation on a committee considering changes to the laws of the game without concurrent admission to full Board membership. As *Le Figaro* explained:

The Dominions of New Zealand and South Africa repeatedly demanded, without success, direct representation at the International Board. Now New Zealand is protesting again, refusing to allow its two delegates to sit at a consultative conference to be held in London, with the aim of unifying the rules of rugby, because the agenda does not (include a) proposal to form a rugby committee of the British Empire.²⁶

The New Zealand concept of international representation still existed within the constraints of the Empire, in *Le Figaro's* view.

Other apparently largely unreciprocated New Zealand interest in French sports extended to horse racing and boxing, two other distinctly male-identified activities. The death of Joseph Oller the inventor of the 'Pari-Mutuel' or totalisator betting system was noted by the *Auckland Star*. Elsewhere it was conceded - in typically New Zealand fashion - that French horses were fast but there were no racecourses in England or France to rival the 'beauty or ideal racing' available at Ellerslie.²⁷ The exploits of Tom Heeney the New Zealand heavyweight boxing champion were reported by *Le Figaro* until he became Gene Tunney's 'last victim,' although Heeney aspired to return to New York to avenge the defeat.²⁸ This contrasts with the prominence given in French reports to the New Zealand athletes at the Paris Olympic Games. Although understandable given the location, the detailed coverage of the New Zealand competitors' results during the 1924 Paris Olympics was in part due to the many excellent performances of Arthur

²⁶ "Le Rugby International," *Le Figaro*, 27 September 1920, p.4; Paul Champ, "La France n'est pas admise dans L'International Board," *Le Figaro*, 23 March, 1921, p.5.; "Rugby: La Nouvelle-Zélande manifeste," *Le Figaro*, 14 November 1926, p.5.

²⁷ "Sporting," *Press*, 24 April 1922, p.10.; "Racing World," *Auckland Star*, 31 May 1922, p.7.

²⁸ "Boxe: Tom Henney retourne chez lui," *Le Figaro*, 26 August 1928, p.4.

Porritt, later to become New Zealand's first New Zealand born Governor-General.²⁹ France appeared to have had a more balanced view of New Zealand's place in the sporting world than did New Zealand of France. New Zealand required a direct link to success to give legitimacy to sports reporting and thereby justify the national sense of self-worth. Consequently, some items were reported in New Zealand out of proportion to their wider significance for either country. The French press on the other hand showed interest in international events even when there was no direct French involvement, while concurrently demonstrating a greater awareness of the broader implications for the British Empire when Empire members assessed their self-esteem through sport.

Apart from these sporting exchanges the French version of post-war New Zealand as it appeared in the press regressed through the phases of social laboratory, wartime ally and then potential trading partner into just another (British-possessed) South Seas archipelago. This trend is typified by the treatment of New Zealand objects and collectors' pieces acquired and then traded in France as mementos of an earlier time. Once separated from their original setting and everyday context, their symbolic importance or the utility of their original function was lost. Two examples from the French press – the trade in postage stamps and Māori artifacts - are illustrative.

Collection of and trading in postage stamps became commonplace as international postage evolved. In many cases these items assumed additional value as collectors' pieces far beyond their original face value, but it is not clear what if any impression of New Zealand they conveyed to the traders and collectors. In addition, jade (nephrite, greenstone, pounamu) items apparently of New Zealand Māori origin also featured in traders' catalogues. Descriptions such as 'un "Tiki" en néphrite, verte, Nouvelle-Zélande, 5,000 francs; un casse- tête en nephrite verte, Nouvelle- Zélande, 9.000 francs' are typical of these listings. Portrayals of the items were not always clear, nor was it obvious whether the interest was artistic or simply for titillation and amusement.

(possibly a) doorpost or lintel of woodwork, two coupled figures mounted (possibly meaning sexually joined or an upright figure) (New Zealand), 5,200 francs; a Hei-Tiki pendant in nephrite (New Zealand), 3,600 francs; a nephrite Hei-Tiki of rare translucency (New

²⁹ Arthur Espie (Sir) Porritt, 1900-1994, "Letters to his father," (Wellington, New Zealand: Alexander Turnbull Library, 1924). Porritt barely mentions the Olympic Games in his letters home and has little to say about France. His souvenirs include a copy of the 'Tho. Cook & Sons' map of the battlefields with Porritt's handwritten note: 'Our route thro' the battlefields'.

Zealand), 3,250 francs; a standing female Tiki(sic), in gray stone (Marquesas Islands), 5,300 francs.³⁰

Removed from their original setting and listed in advertisements alongside other exotic artefacts it seems unlikely that such items conveyed any meaning to the French reader or owner beyond their obvious aesthetic or novelty qualities.

6.2 Revisiting the past: movies and films

New Zealand was and still is a minor entertainment market owing to its relatively small population. Little of the received output from any source was therefore tailored to suit local tastes or circumstances. Increased exposure to American culture was one consequence of the war-enforced hiatus in British and European movie-making from which the continental industry appeared slow to recover. The mediocre alternatives that were eventually produced in Europe resulted from a post-war mis-reading of the public mood by British, French, German and other continental film-makers. The lack of competitive films assisted American marketing by default, although New Zealand audiences were also subjected to aggressive promotions.³¹ American movies delivered entertaining, fictional storylines using superior production techniques whereas the old-world films often showed 'foreigners' - including the French - in less escapist stories which were embedded within British cultural parameters.³² The latter seemed less relevant to a younger generation of post-war, post-colonial New Zealanders. Since the cinema was the only opportunity for much of the audience to see the 'others' in their natural setting these impressions mattered, even if it was implicit that a movie was no more than a staged contrivance. Consequently, at the same time as the United States was withdrawing from active participation in various international forums (the decision

³⁰ "L'art et la curiosité: La collection André Breton et Paul Eluard," *Le Figaro*, 4 July 1931, p.9.

'Un montant de boiserie, deux personnages accouplés sur-montés d'un homme debout (Nouvelle-Zélande), 5.200 francs; un pendentif « Hei-Tiki » en néphrite (Nouvelle-Zélande), 3.600 francs; un Hei-Tiki en néphrite d'une translucidité rare (Nouvelle-Zélande), 3.250 francs; un Tiki féminin debout, en pierre grise (îles Marqueses), 5,300 francs.'

"Collections de MM. E. V. et L...", *Le Figaro*, 17 March 1932, p.6.

'une patou-patou en jadéite verte, Nouvelle-Zélande, 4.000 francs; une herminette (adze) de césenionie, pierre en jadéite verte, Nouvelle-Zélande, 7.000 francs; un grand tiki en jadéite verte, Nouvelle-Zélande, 3.200 francs.'

³¹ Simon Sigley, "Film culture : its development in New Zealand, 1929-1972 " (Auckland, 2003), pp.47-48. Sigley notes that films from Europe (i.e. neither British nor American origin) were marketed and (therefore) perceived as 'exotic' while American films promoted a non-British culture that was seen as morally inferior. Nonetheless, American films had more resonance with New Zealand audiences.

³² "Screen Stars and Films," p.28.p.28.

not to join the League of Nations being the most publicised) American cultural indoctrination was increasing.

When the United States entered the war, cinema technology was employed to reinforce the new pro-Allied policy. Any stigma that later American movies might have attracted if the United States' neutrality had persisted was consequently neutralised. The disarmingly flexible approach of the American industry became apparent when the film stars were (re-)presented to their American audience as enthusiastic, patriotic supporters (although many such as Charlie Chaplin were not American natives) of a war that had previously been portrayed as solely a European concern. In part this was necessary for self-preservation because Hollywood as an international community had significant European representation from both sides of the wartime divide.

Contrasting examples show the pivot in attitudes required to move from a neutral isolationist stance to full-blooded support for the American soldiers. In *'The Little American'* Canadian-born Gladys Louise Smith - known professionally as Mary Pickford - played a character who chose a German suitor in preference to a French Count. Two months later Pickford was starring in a fiercely patriotic short film *'One Hundred Percent American'*.³³ English-born Charlie Chaplin announced that he, Pickford and Fairbanks had 'four weeks' hard work ahead on the Third Liberty Loan drive'.³⁴ A gossip columnist described with approval Eleanora de Cisneros' protest 'against any revival of German music in Uncle Sam's Land - at any rate for a good while to come'.³⁵ The tone made a virtue of any French connections and an evil of the German equivalent. In that respect the American movie industry was in sporting parlance, 'on-side'.

At the war's end the American industry was quick to adapt by producing films of an escapist genre that coincidentally promoted American culture as an unobjectionable background. British nationhood within the Empire was thereby confronted with a

³³ "Entertainments," *New Zealand Herald*, 13 March 1918, p.7.; Arthur Rosson, "One Hundred Percent American," (1918). This review is more akin to a promotion of the film than a critical appraisal. Although the movie does not appear to have screened locally, news releases emphasised the patriotism of the American film stars: Pickford was given 'the honorary title of Colonel' and was 'adopted by the entire 143rd Regiment Field Artillery of the 40th or Sunshine Division.'

³⁴ "Footlight Flashes," *Evening Star*, 4 May 1918, p.2..

³⁵ "Dramatic And Musical," *Free Lance*, 11 June 1919, p.10.

threat far greater and less manageable than politicians, intellectuals and the cultural elite could have imagined. The new technologies that the pro-empire theoreticians and political actors had assumed would be used to reinforce the Empire were guilelessly utilised to relentlessly undermine British culture. The ready post-war availability of foreign, mainly American films using escapist themes confounded the British producers who were seemingly fixated on reviving familiar pre-war cultural habits through the portrayal of a socially conservative, hierarchical society. Although consistent with the theme of returning to 'normal' these appeared to be attempting to re-set the social order to pre-war conditions (as was done for instance after the great plague through the sumptuary laws). It also (re-)established old cultural themes such as a renewal of the British elite's affection for the French alongside the lower classes' distain for the same. Many New Zealand servicemen had seen the British class system in action within the British Army in France as well as in its civilian guise while on leave in the United Kingdom. Many had been disconcerted by this cultural reality of Home. They instinctively rejected the class system as they planned their return to an idealised pre-1914 egalitarian New Zealand society. Once home, few therefore presumably desired to see European and British movies - whether depicting the war or using pre-war class themes - that reinforced British societal structures.

The British producers were apparently constrained by the constructs of Empire, cultural legacies, wartime sentiment, and post-war politics, perhaps because these were the winners' culture.³⁶ If so, they badly misread the change in the public mood. As the prominent British film producer Sir Oswald Stoll (requoted in *New Zealand Truth* in 1920) said more in hope than reality:

Public taste is becoming more insistent upon the exhibition of British films of super-excellence, and these films can probably be better produced in Great Britain than in any other country, taking into account the great Variety (sic) of scenery, the opportunities for picturesque and historical background, the proximity of the Continent of Europe for occasional international effects, and the imaginative talent of British authors and actors.³⁷

³⁶ Tombs and Tombs, "*Losing the Peace*," pp.520-521. Sigley, "Film culture : its development in New Zealand, 1929-1972 " p.55. Films from the Continent were promoted on their assumed quality, culture and educational value. The element missing was entertainment.

³⁷ "Great News For Picturelovers," *NZ Truth*, 4 December 1920, p.2.

Stoll's statement missed the point; where and how films were made did not matter because the very purpose of film making is to create an illusion. Portrayals of France did not have to be made on location, they simply needed to depict France - truthfully or otherwise - through representation or by implication.

As interest in wartime induced patriotic themes declined, the entertainment value and quality of the plot rather than the cultural theme became the deciding factor in the selections of the movie-going public. Mr. C. D'Arcy Allen (who was described as the managing director of the British and Continental Feature Film Co. Ltd.) explained that British film-making was to be based on dramatizing 'well-known' books and that as a result English film production was 'steadily forging ahead'. He badly misunderstood the local mood when he predicted that with the 'pick of the Continental output' his company's films would be of interest to the public. One of the Stoll films released by the British and Continental Feature Film Co. Ltd. in New Zealand typifies the disconnect. 'The Four Feathers' was a 1921 filmed adaption of the A. E. W. Mason book of the same name. The complex plot and sub-plots involved an English girl, a Frenchman from Fashoda and a French journalist. The Gallic connection included references to the presence of the competing colonial powers in the Sudan region and the French-constructed Suez Canal.³⁸ It thus integrated virtually all the elements and themes of the uneasy pre-*entente* Anglo-French relationship. The film was an undisguised re-assertion of the British class structure, moral superiority and imperialism located in conquered North Africa using a traditionally negative depiction of the French.³⁹

Such productions were not attractive, even to the British public. A July 1925 column from the *Auckland Star* reported that Stoll Pictures lost £46,639 in 1924 with costs 'greatly in excess' of forecast revenues. The article plaintively noted that the company had sufficient new inventory ready 'when and if' there was a resurgence in 'taste' for the genre of film the British were producing. Films that reinforced stereotypical images of a class-based society within a British nation becalmed in a self-created sea of historical nostalgia were of little interest to New Zealand audiences. Without any

³⁸ René Plaissetty, "The Four Feathers," (1921). This film it has been remade at least seven times, the latest version being released in 2002). None appear to have been an outstanding commercial success.

³⁹ "Advertisements," *NZ Truth*, 14 January 1922, p.2..

acknowledgement of this shortcoming, the lamentations on the state of the British film industry were platitudinous and lacking in substance.

Initially the Dominions attempted to retain the relevance of the Empire by simply excluding the 'others'. During the 1926 Imperial Conference the Canadian Prime Minister (Mackenzie) referred to the importance of films in maintaining the Empire's cultural identity. The Australian Prime Minister Stanley Bruce thus prompted commented that, 'the propaganda value of the film with its universal appeal cannot be over-emphasized'. He went on to decry the lack of films showing British customs and trade without apparently realising the contradiction in his own position, namely that if the content was of interest, audience demand would result in additional productions. The *New Zealand Herald* pointed out that the Conference's own sub-committee report had noted that any official action would be useless unless films were '... of real and competitive exhibition value'.⁴⁰

The possibility of Government intervention to assist British film making and thereby the promotion of the Empire was somewhat quixotically raised in the New Zealand Parliament. French films received only peripheral mentions, but the substantive argument asserted that English films were being squeezed out of the market. A duty (tax) was imposed in 1927 on foreign films at a rate of 1d. per foot, although Downie Stewart said there were doubts that British producers could maintain an 'adequate' supply even if the tariff was effective in restricting non-British films. This revealed the futility of supporting British productions that were not in demand, even within the United Kingdom. While a tariff would be counter-productive to inducing additional output, quota systems such as those in effect in France and Germany were more likely to be effective, or so Downie Stewart said.⁴¹ During the Cinematograph Films Bill debate Gordon Coates claimed that the objective of the controls was to make sure (younger) people gained 'a clearer idea of British history, British countries, and of British customs

⁴⁰ "Imperial Conference, 1926. Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives, 1927 Session," pp.63-64; "Notes And Comments: British Film Industry," *New Zealand Herald*, 6 January 1927, p.8.

⁴¹ "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.214: 22nd Parliament: 2nd session," (1927), p.632. Britain was, according to Downie Stewart, operating a quota system to support their local industry albeit at the ineffectively low rate of 5%. It was pointed out that box-office receipts from foreign films shown in New Zealand resulted in hundreds of thousands of pounds of untaxed revenue being repatriated to the producing country.

and ideals'. He did not, he declaimed, want to detract from the quality work sourced from America, Germany and France. Quotas were being used against foreign films in France, Germany, Great Britain and Australia to foster local productions while the United States had raised significant tariffs against imported foreign films, so New Zealand should do the same.⁴² By 1932 W. E. Barnard was questioning the censorship of a Russian film and whether this would also apply to French and Italian films. Coates pointed out that all films were censored and that Barnard's claimed 'deluge' of American films was mitigated by the not inconsequential number of British originated films (42%) shown locally. This did not necessarily reflect audience share for neither quota nor tariff could coerce an audience to view unappealing content.⁴³

Not all movie-making subjects were as trivial as the advertising and reviews suggest. There were attempts to use the medium to increase understanding between nations and countries beyond crude cultural or racial dramatisation. Desley Deacon credits the producer Walter Wagner with developing the idea that film could be used to overcome the public's uncertainty or fear of foreigners by seeing the 'others' in their (supposedly) home setting through 'natural drama(s)'. While the images were obviously staged and stylised they were nonetheless an opportunity for cross-cultural sharing as the audience saw the others eating, working and carrying out everyday tasks.⁴⁴ The genre was not a commercial success for Paramount Pictures because it overlooked the most important role of the cinema especially in difficult times, namely to indulge the audience by allowing a brief period of escape into a fantasy world. Post-war depression - both economic and emotional - had led the middle American mass market towards entertainment genres that escaped, rather than featured reality. The traditional theatrical themes of fantasy, romance, fortune and conflict predominated and thereby presented to the rest of the world a misleadingly positive America which appeared to be very different from day to day experiences elsewhere.⁴⁵

⁴² "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.219: 22nd Parliament: 3rd session," (1928), pp.324, 327.

⁴³ "New Zealand Parliamentary debates v.234: 24th Parliament 2nd session," p.711.

⁴⁴ Deacon, "*Films as foreign offices': Transnationalism at Paramount in the twenties and early thirties*," pp.139-140. An early equivalent of reality TV shows that are no more representative of real life than these early predecessors.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p.151. Despite this setback for the real-life genre, film makers such as John Grierson were influenced by experimental natural drama. Grierson was subsequently an advisor when New Zealand's National Film Unit (specialising in local documentaries) was established.

Despite a purportedly 'open door' policy, the United States film industry had official assistance via the various restrictions imposed on foreign productions by a heavily-lobbied congress. It was accordingly difficult for French and other European films to penetrate the American mass market even though America was able to export its own culture, apparently confident that it was America's moral right to use its financial clout in order to demonstrate American superiority. This led to the paradox of American political isolationism coexisting with American cultural expansion. In many cases the movie moguls driving this trend were themselves immigrants from Europe who deliberately 'Americanised' their movies using nativist themes. The shift to popular American subjects was evident in New Zealand screenings as Pauline Knuckey and Simon Sigley have described.⁴⁶

Perversely, the French sourced or French-related films screened in New Zealand seem to have exacerbated the otherness of the French rather than creating a common understanding. What was perceived as a somewhat snobbish intellectual culture operated through film societies and the like to associate French and other continental productions with rather highbrow, sophisticated tastes which were better suited to the intellectual classes. These societies unconsciously replicated the British upper-class affection for French culture that contrasted with the lower classes' distain for the 'froggies'. Sigley quotes various Gordon Miriams authored articles published in the *New Zealand Listener* that presumably could have introduced such productions to a broader audience, assuming that Miriams' columns were read by the general public. Miriams developed the theme of French films being distinctive and what now might be termed 'arty' without the simplicity, glamour or celebrity element. Sigley notes that Miriams tried to avoid being snobby or intellectual when 'nudging' his presumably more high-brow readers towards this different genre of films. Nevertheless, the intellectuals were just one segment of the *Listener's* readership and of the movie going community. The commercial reality was that the *Listener* had to be aware of the "common sense" reader

⁴⁶ Knuckey, "A global province? : the development of a movie culture in a small provincial city 1919-1945."; Sigley, "Film culture : its development in New Zealand, 1929-1972 " .

just as the New Zealand film industry had to be conscious of the movie-going equivalent. Such content was therefore limited.⁴⁷

There were insufficient local productions of whatever character to displace the huge volume of imported content necessary to feed the growing demand for movie entertainment. Aside from distance and technology the nascent New Zealand film industry - as with any enterprise dependent on scale - was and still is (as noted) limited by the size of the domestic market. Local films have to balance domestic tastes against possible foreign appeal and sales. Depictions of the New Zealanders' involvement in France through fictional films therefore appear to have been limited to a small number of pioneering local productions.⁴⁸ In his oral history Rudall Hayward, the innovative New Zealand film entrepreneur, described the production of the patriotic war film, *'Just as the sun went down'*, and explained that the war scenes were filmed in New Zealand at Narrow Neck, Devonport during army manoeuvres rather than on location.⁴⁹ This seems to be the one of the few war-period local productions with a specifically French-associated wartime setting and only one advertisement for this feature has been located. Two other mentions of the film in the *Northern Gazette* on the 4th and 5th of February 1915 have been found, but there are no reviews, suggesting that the film had very limited commercial success.

Figure 27: Promotional advertising 'Just as the sun went down'

⁴⁷ *Transnational film culture in New Zealand*: p.122. *The Listener* held monopoly rights to programme schedules and as such had a captive clientele albeit one that was in many cases mainly interested in planning their media consumption. There is no indication from the *Gallica* newspapers that French interests attempted to obtain widespread distribution of French films in New Zealand either before or after the introduction of 'talkies'.

⁴⁸ "Film culture : its development in New Zealand, 1929-1972 " pp.54, 223, 363. Walter Harris (interviewer), *Early Cinema In New Zealand - [Interview With] Rudall Hayward*, (Archives New Zealand: National Film Unit), R24349834. Hayward had a flair for segmenting the market, in modern marketing parlance. His establishment of a theatre exclusively for screening British films assumed that when the 'talkies' were introduced the correctness of the British accents would be an audience attractant. This plan further exposed the main problem - small New Zealand audiences. No amount of well-intentioned effort could overcome this limitation whatever the genre of film. It was consequent difficult for niche productions to succeed.

⁴⁹ *Early Cinema In New Zealand - [Interview With] Rudall Hayward*.; A. H. McLintock, "Feature Films," in *Te Ara - the Encyclopedia of New Zealand* (1966). Hayward recalled that movie shows were regularly screened in Waihi, then a town of ten thousand miners and their families. Waihi's geographic isolation gave exclusive access to a captive audience within the second biggest town (not city) in New Zealand and so it was of sufficient size and thus scale to support a cinema.



Hayward emphasised that there was no deception; *Just as the sun went down* was a fictional film, although Hayward does point out that compromises were always necessary. As an economy measure it was preferable to film outdoors thereby avoiding the need for indoors 'sets'. Such restrictions must have been a morale-sapping reality for local film-makers. Hayward wistfully ascribed the early commercial success of the family business to the screening in Her Majesty's Theatre in Dunedin in April 1905 of *'A trip to the moon'* (Hayward refers to *'A trip to the Sun'* in the interview). Language was not an issue as this Georges Méliès-produced French movie was silent. Hayward describes French women working in long lines, each colouring by hand one portion of the black and white frames. Hayward notes that the French were the pioneers in movie making and implies a high regard for French skills in the industry.⁵¹ It seems reasonable to conclude that the general failure of French films to establish an audience in New Zealand was therefore - as with the English productions - due to irrelevant content that was of little local interest rather than technical shortcomings or distribution restrictions. Conversely, the local industry lacked the scale and financial backing to establish a mass-market industry based on producing identifiably New Zealand-related movies.

⁵⁰ "Advertisements," *Northern Advocate*, 4 February 1915, p.1.

⁵¹ Sigley, "Film culture : its development in New Zealand, 1929-1972 " p.33. The idea of France being intellectually sophisticated or 'arty' in the vernacular frequently emerges in the literature. Sigley describes France as important for both the 'film as art' school of thought and the development of what he calls 'film culture'.

Whether filmed locally or *in situ*, the representations of France available to New Zealand cinema audiences would - in the absence of an alternative narrative - have probably added to the impression that France had become a badly damaged battlefield, consistent with the wartime propaganda.⁵² Without movies that showed a distinct New Zealand presence in France during the conflict, the New Zealand experience became blurred with that of other allied troops. New Zealand's military identity, fused with that of the ANZAC contingent, was subsumed within the Empire's presence in France. Despite the individual diaries, photos and memories, New Zealand's war - as far as its dramatised presence in France was concerned - was not that of an independent country. Not only did the New Zealanders have little direct interaction with the French public, they also apparently served as Empire soldiers in a distant, badly-damaged and very unforgiving climatic and geographical environment.

Since the British monarchy was dependent on public goodwill to survive, cultivating an appropriate public image was - as the Prince of Wales' private secretary put it with a pointed reference to France - 'better than a guillotine in the yard of Buckingham Palace'.⁵³ The oblique reference to the fate of the French monarchy alongside a rise in politically left-leaning philosophies was an explicit acknowledgement of the fears of the British ruling elite that they too could face the wrath of the mob. Staged production techniques were already being used when filming the Prince of Wales' 1920 tour of Australasia. On the one hand, the promotion of a youthful and apparently vigorous heir-apparent was a blatant appeal to the ideal of a progressive Empire, while on the other it was an assertion of the ascendancy of the 'whiteman' and an attempt to pull 'the Dominions firmly back into the imperial fold'.⁵⁴ Journalism and film-making skills were a crucial part of the process. Awareness of camera angles and differing points of view - as seen by the viewer in the edited output - were necessary to project appropriate images likely to stimulate sympathetic reactions towards the Prince amongst the audience. Through film and news reels the media becoming a significant influence on the

⁵² Jackson, "They Shall Not Grow Old." This depiction of France 1914-18 persists, as was shown when Jackson released his digitally restored 'documentary about World War I' in 2018.

⁵³ Frank Mort, "On Tour with the Prince: Monarchy, Imperial Politics and Publicity in the Prince of Wales's Dominion Tours 1919-20," *Twentieth Century British History*, Oxford University Press (2017): pp.19-20. The fate of the Russian imperial family in the Bolshevik's hands would have also heightened concerns.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, pp.16-19, 22-24.

popularity and therefore the survival of the British royals and the Empire. Despite ready access to arguably the best and most patriotic of Empire themes, the contest for British cultural dominance in New Zealand was nonetheless being lost. Film quota legislation and royal propaganda were a desperate attempt to stem the tide of popular choice. The French efforts, misclassified in some cases and too 'arty' in others, failed to gain any significant mainstream influence for French culture in New Zealand.⁵⁵

6.3 *Transport and communication: technical and scientific considerations*

New Zealand and France shared an interest in the technical innovations that were constantly improving indirect communications, the transport of goods and personal travel. The news reports show that advances in transport were usually judged by improvements in speed and range rather than safety or comfort. There was a particular interest in land speed records in 1918-1935 although there was obviously no application for direct travel between New Zealand and France. New Zealand was often the venue for record attempts rather than providing the innovator or a participant.⁵⁶

Progress in aviation assessed by speed and height was keenly reported in the French press with endurance records on new routes in the Pacific often featured. The record of the 'Airman Chichester' who had landed at Lord Howe Island during his attempt to fly from New Zealand to Sydney was located within a 1931 omnibus article that featured five separate but concurrent attempts on aviation records. Earlier (19 September 1927), a Lieutenant Frewen had flown from Australia to New Zealand via stopovers at Lord Howe and Norfolk Islands. Even these reports appear unremarkable when compared with the extensive coverage of the 1928 trans-Tasman exploits of Kingsford-Smith in his aircraft 'Southern Cross' which he had used for his ground-breaking California-Australia flight. Nonetheless, there were other records noted alongside Kingsford-Smith's attempts.

⁵⁵"Notes And Comments: British Film Industry." p.8; "Notes And Comments: British Films," *New Zealand Herald*, 24 September 1928, p.8.

⁵⁶"Automobile: Le retour du major Campbell," 17 February 1931, p.8. "Une tentative pour le record du monde de vitesse," *Le Figaro*, 21 August 1931, p.7; "Nouvelles Du Volant," *Le Figaro*, 16 October 1931, p.4; *ibid.*, Issue 344. The exploits of Malcolm Campbell were noted because a 'Kaye Dou' was planning to exceed his speed record either in New Zealand or at Daytona. New Zealand was proposed as the venue for a similar endeavour by the Australian Norman Smith Wizard(sic) because 'Kaitaia Beach (New Zealand) (had) a superb natural trail of 145 kilometers in length, including 48 kilometers of packed sand'. 'Kaye Dou' may have referred to 'Kaye Don', the British racing driver.

Trans-Tasman aviation was not occurring in isolation as frequent attempts to break air records using new technology developments showed.⁵⁷

Could these developments be exploited to bring France and other northern hemisphere countries closer to New Zealand? Given the topography of the globe, the need for long flat surfaces and the significant oceans between the continents any improvements in the speed of land travel faced significant limitations but these impediments did not apply to aviation. An early suggestion of using airships to improve communication between Britain and the Dominions exposed the lack of common purpose within the Empire owing to the Dominions' geographic dispersion. After discussing the technical difficulties *Le Figaro* realistically assessed the project by observing that, 'Obviously, the practical difficulties are very serious'. Both South Africa and New Zealand declined to participate in an 'airship services (to operate) throughout the British Empire', apparently owing to their respective financial situations. Within six years however, it was announced that the Byrd polar expedition would - after calling at New Zealand - explore the southern polar region using a mass produced, metal-skinned aircraft which could land at various re-supply depots on the ice.

In 1930 *Le Figaro* announced that 'New Zealand's first scheduled air service from New Plymouth to Wellington has just been inaugurated'. Two years later *Le Figaro* explained that the increased number of aircraft used privately and for tourism necessitated a universal system of aircraft identification. New Zealand registered aircraft would henceforth be identified using the letters 'ZK'. Despite setbacks - such as the crash of 'the giant Southern-Sun aircraft' in Malaya while travelling from New Zealand to England - it was reported that Sir Charles Kingsford-Smith and Mr. Johnson Kingsford-Smith were interested in establishing an airline linking New Zealand, Tasmania and other islands. *Le Figaro* noted that 'the company would operate under government subsidies'. The delivery of medical assistance or relief was another possible use for

⁵⁷ "Aviation: Nouvelles Aeriennes," *Le Figaro*, 2 April 1931, p.7; "Aviation," *Le Figaro*, 2 September 1928, p.4; "Derniere Heure Sportive: Les grands raids aeriens," *Le Figaro*, 11 September 1928, p.3; "Le beau raid de la "Croix-du-Sud'," *Le Figaro*, 12 September 1928, p.5.. "Les Raids Aeriens: Australie-Nouvelle-Zelande," *L'Humanité*, 21 septembre 1927, p.2; "Le raid San Francisco Honolulu," *L'Humanité*, 23 novembre 1927, p.3.. The geography was not always clear as shown in a report that claimed 'L'aviateur anglais Giles a decolleissement, hier matin à 7 h. 24, de San-Francisco, pour Honolulu (Nouvelle-Zelande).'

aircraft. Despite a lack of verification (perhaps due to injured pride), it seems that there was an investigation into the possibility of delivering medical supplies to Admiral Byrd's expedition by the aviator Lincoln Ellsworth who was in any case planning to over fly Antarctica from New Zealand.⁵⁸

As *L'Humanité* observed, wireless technology supplemented by improved cable utilisation was making telephony and radio more accessible:

While waiting for the large Soviet post which will be heard throughout Europe with a current receiver, another method is offered for the wide dissemination of programs. Imagine a normal station at the moment, such as that of Moscow (RDW), which would be relayed every thousand kilometers for example by other stations the range (of which) would extend over the whole earth ...

L'Humanité appreciated the political possibilities - presumably since the dream of a worldwide socialist regime was still alive - but as the paper observed it was the British who were introducing such a system so that 'English propaganda will soon cover the whole earth'. *L'Humanité* also noted that, 'In Sydney, Australia, a radio service has just been created to relay the transmissions of the United States and Europe and distribute it to New Zealand, Tasmania, Western Australia, North Queensland and the Islands of Oceania'.⁵⁹

As was often the case, it was the novelty of the new innovations that had first attracted attention. A report that 'A famous artist from New Zealand has just married ...' with guests apparently participating through the airwaves using the services of T.S.F. (probably *télégraphie sans fil*) went on to explain that 'The rites were accomplished one by one, without the distant guests losing anything. They had attended the wedding'.⁶⁰ In 1928 a weekend telegram service - presumably aiming to utilise off-peak capacity - was launched linking France with New Zealand and other southern locations. A similar service had already been instigated between France and America.⁶¹ By 1932 *Le Figaro* was able to published details of the fee structure agreed between the United Kingdom

⁵⁸ "Aeronautique: A propos des lignes de dirigeables.," *Le Figaro*, 31 January 1922, p.6; "L'immatriculation des avions," *Le Figaro*, 5 September 1932 p.6; "Nouvelles Aeriennes," *Le Figaro*, 7 November 1930, p.10; "Aviation," *Le Figaro*, 9 February 1934, p.6; "Un Grand Projet de communications intercontinentales par aéronefs," *Le Figaro*, 09 July 1922, p.4; "Vers Le Pole Sud," *Le Figaro*, 18 August 1928, p.1.

⁵⁹ "Un poste mondial," *L'Humanité*, 24 December 1924, p.4; "Le main noire," *L'Humanité*, 07 Octobre 1928, p.4.

⁶⁰ "Billet du matin," *Le Figaro*, 28 November 1927, p.2.

⁶¹ "Création de Télégrammes de fin de semaine," *Le Figaro*, 15 November 1928, p.6.

and French Governments for international telephone charges. Prices applicable for calls to New Zealand and other Pacific locations were included.⁶²

The 1932 Christmas message from the King was the first to be broadcast simultaneously to the British colonies, Dominions and territories. It was - *Le Figaro* noted - intended that the 'message would unite all the British people in a single thought.' A follow up item confirmed the success of the broadcast, and pointed out to readers the different climate and time zones that the Empire-wide audience would have experienced (it was dawn in New Zealand) at the moment the King was broadcasting from Sandringham (3.00pm local time).⁶³ Hence, by the early 1930s a common British-based identity could be relatively easily shared within the Empire in real time.

These observations are distinguished by their almost exclusively French sources. This suggests that French readers had a broad interest in these topics even when France was not directly involved. Conversely, New Zealand readers heard little of innovations in France or those involving the French in general unless New Zealand or perhaps the Empire was directly involved. This hints at exclusion of such news as a local phenomenon. It also confirms that a less outward-looking, Empire-centric society existed in New Zealand. Maintaining that status relied in part upon excluding - not necessarily with malicious intent - messages that did not reinforce the relevance of Empire or the close links with the United Kingdom rather than exclusion owing to technical limitations. The unofficial diplomatic discourse of 1918-1919 between Paris and Auckland at the time of the Pau visit showed that telegraph and telegram were already being used to transmit messages and facilitate travel arrangements while letters between Paris, London and Wellington were still literally in the post.

6.4 *A laboratory in New Zealand*

The earliest French visitors to New Zealand assessed and recorded potential sites for possible future settlement, evaluated the natural resources and - in the early twentieth

⁶² "Les modifications des taxes téléphoniques dans certaines relations avec les pays d'outre-mer," *Le Figaro*, 7 November 1932, p.6.

⁶³ "Le roi d'Angleterre souhaitera Noël par la radiodiffusion à tout son peuple," *Le Figaro*, 22 December 1932, p.2; "Christmas Aux Antipodes," *Le Figaro*, 27 December 1932 p.4.. The author of the King's message was Rudyard Kipling whose identification with the Empire was as unassailable as any individual's could be.

century - investigated and studied social and democratic innovations.⁶⁴ Despite New Zealand's self-assumed reputation as an innovative nation, there is little evidence that the French still saw New Zealand as such in 1918-1935. The earlier social laboratory legislation phase of the innovative Liberal Government had passed and New Zealand was, if anything, looking to France for new ideas. It may have been only because of this earlier interest in the progressive nature of New Zealand's social reforms that the impact in New Zealand of Pasteur's discoveries was reported by *Le Figaro*.⁶⁵ When there was comment from the 1918-1935 period in the French press it usually related to agriculture or to New Zealand as the site of scientific observation rather than New Zealand as a social innovator. Perhaps because France had such a well-deserved reputation as a nation of science, *L'Humanité* was scathing in its post-war protest at the lack of scientific study and the neglect of the science education as far afield as New Zealand, in favour of military research and spending on memorials.

While the government maintains armies of nearly a million men, pays generals generously, subsidizes activities intended to maintain in the new generation the spirit of war and revenge, our researchers are doomed (voués) to indifference, contempt, and misery.

Lately we have witnessed the scandalous fact of an expedition to study, in New Zealand, one of the most important questions for the development of our knowledge, without a French representative. The pretext, it required 200,000 francs. Ah, if it had been to celebrate a great battle.⁶⁶

The French newspapers' fascination with natural phenomena such as earthquakes and thermal activity was heightened by the science fiction writing of authors such as Jules Verne. The 1931 Napier earthquake was reported as if it were a pre-destined climax to

⁶⁴ Siegfried, Stewart, and Hamer, *Democracy in New Zealand*.

⁶⁵ "L'oeuvre Grancher," *Le Figaro*, 17 December 1922, p.2.. QUOTE Le ministre de l'hygiène et de la prévoyance sociale, assisté du docteur Ei Rousi, directeur de l'Insfituli Pasteurv présidait hier, dans les salons de Mr'àe Grancher, sa vingtième assemblée'- générale, qui fut particulièrement émouvante.' And 'Aussi bien tous les pays d'Europe et l'Amérique, et la Nouvelle-Zélande aussi, se sont emparés de l'idée et multiplient sur leurs territoires des exemplaires de ce mode incomparable de prophylaxie, qui donnera partout et infailliblement les mêmes statistiques admirables! pouryu que les enfants soient choisissant toute contamination et placés. à la campagne, chez des gens bien choisis, sous la direction d'un médecin chef de foyer, intelligent, et vraiment dévoué. UNQUOTE

⁶⁶ "Science sans conscience ...Ce qu'on entend par encouragement des recherches," *L'Humanité*, 31 October 1922, p.2.. The article included a passing reference to Arthur Meyer ('Mr. Arthur Meyer drooled'), a press baron whose organisation won control of *Le Figaro* in 1929. The article does not specify what the expedition to New Zealand was.

earlier reports of geophysical activity.⁶⁷ This fitted with a narrative of colonisation as a project that imposed a familiar landscape on a foreign environment, as if the countryside as well as the people had to be tamed to fit a pre-defined image of a civilized nation.⁶⁸

Agricultural development in the Pacific was seen by New Zealand as a necessity to earn a national income and remain relevant to Britain, whereas for France it was a means of justifying colonisation. Hence the use of agricultural science and technology in cropping systems, the interest in the impact of refrigeration and the need to protect (by patent) inventions and inventors, all of which were noted by *Le Figaro*. New Zealand's use of parasites as a biological control for rampant 'blackberry brambles' was noted as was the possibility of pest control through 'the use of insecticidal powders ... by airplanes flying at height'.⁶⁹ Such innovations became a necessity when attempting to establish an exotic ecosystem in a foreign environment whilst simultaneously (and paradoxically) battling weeds and pests which were imported with the foreign ecosystem.

New Zealand's active participation in agricultural conferences contrasts with an obvious indifference to participation in other world forums because this was one matter in which the Empire and Britain could not represent local interests. Curiously one *Le Figaro* article lamented the poor presentation ('packaging and presentation deplorable')

⁶⁷"Petites Nouvelles," *Le Figaro*, 06 June 1922, p.2. 'On ressent chaque jour, depuis le 9 mai, des secousses de tremblements de terre dans la région de Taupo.'

"La terre tremble en Nouvelle Zélande," *Le Figaro*, 4 February 1931, p.1.

⁶⁸"Échos: Fantaisie," *Le Figaro*, 20 June 1922, p.1. Although scientists agreed that the orbits of the planets made New Zealand the best site to observe Mars the newspapers apparently could not resist the titillating possibility of 'indisputable signs of vibrant life' as seen from New Zealand but these have as yet to be confirmed. Colonisation and/or civilization was not just an earthbound possibility.

⁶⁹"Amérique Latine: Pour l'agriculture brésilienne," *Le Figaro*, 27 March 1921, p.2.. 'Le rapport montre encore le succès de ce système technico-scientifique dans quelques pays, tels que la France, l'Italie, la Grèce, la Suède, la Norvège, le Danemark, l'Australie, l'Indo-Chine, la Nouvelle-Zélande, la Chine, etc.'

"Les colonies et la vie ...chère" *Le Figaro*, 27 June 1921, p.4.. 'L'industrie frigorifique a fait la fortune de l'Australie, de la Nouvelle- Zélande, du Canada. Demain, elle doit faire celle de notre domaine colonial, qui y trouvera l'un des éléments vitaux de sa prospérité.'

"Les inventeurs devant la Nation," *Le Figaro*, 10 July 1921, p.4.. 'C'en était donc fait de l'état de choses contre lequel tout le monde s'était si longtemps insurgé, et il semblait que l'innovation allait être accueillie par une approbation unanime. Il y avait d'autant plus lieu de le croire que des institutions analogues, richement dotées, surgissaient de toutes parts dans les pays alliés, en Angleterre, en Australie, au Canada, en Nouvelle-Zélande, dans l'Afrique Australe, aux Indes, en Italie, en Belgique, au Japon, et que la direction en avait été confiée ici à un homme exceptionnellement qualifié, M. Breton the right man in the right place (quoted in English) dont la largeur d'esprit, le désintéressement et le modernisme étaient de nature à désarmer les zoïles les plus irréductibles.'

"Questions Economiques: La bonne guerre," *Le Figaro*, 12 September 1927, p.3.

of fresh food exports from France. It referred to a talk by 'M. Serre, Consul of France in New Zealand, on the conservation of fruits by the cold.'⁷⁰ Such reports obscured the broader issues. Both France and the United Kingdom were attempting to implant European-based agricultural systems to justify the occupation of their territories on the other side of the world, in many instances within unsuitable physical environments.

Figure 28: Extensive erosion on previously forest covered New Zealand hill country ⁷¹



⁷⁰ "Agriculture et commerce," *Le Figaro*, 27 May 1923, p.7.. Cites 'Gilivrey (New Zealand)' as a representative. M. Meline praised the 'magnificent colonial empire of France' and called for intensification of agriculture production.

⁷¹ Julia Haggerty and Hugh Campbell and Photo: Astrid van Meeuwen-Dijkgraaf, "Farming and the environment - Environmental impacts in the 2000s," in *Te Ara - the Encyclopedia of New Zealand* (2008). King, *The Penguin History of New Zealand*: pp.433-438. King has an excellent review of these issues and the growing awareness of the environmental damage inflicted as European agricultural practices were imposed on New Zealand.

6.5 Outcomes and implications

If New Zealand identified by choice as a British nation located in the South Pacific, the use of European style agriculture provided an economic justification for its existence. This was not dis-similar to the French colonies in the Pacific, for in both cases agriculture became at least part of the reason for retaining territory after (or alongside) the initial extractive enterprises phase (mining, forestry), and penal colonies ended.⁷² The incongruity is apparent in the physical separation between two of the world's largest economies, with their complementary range of primary and secondary industries, by a mere thirty-one miles of English Channel.

Cultural exchanges obviously require a means of transmission, but there must also be a relevant message sent to a receptive audience. Given the earlier rejections and the lack of significant inter-country exchanges, there was little more that France could say or do to penetrate New Zealand's thick crust of Empire-centric, anti-French culture. The misleading narrative of a small, isolated, British-dependent agricultural country became a self-assumed and therefore self-perpetuating characteristic within the New Zealand identity. The more this theme was repeated the more it was assumed to be correct and as a consequence the more it was used. This ingrained self-image assumed that the main conduit to world trade and wisdom ran through London. Return communications had the obligatory veneer of anti-French bias applied before transmission. The technology had not failed, but the received messages were being voluntarily censored and reinterpreted. The infrequent, unanswered and ignored messages from France eventually eased in their frequency and depth of content so that by 1935 it was American culture - employing popular messages and escapist, appealing themes - that forced its way past this barrier, in part through repetition and volume.

It would be unfair to blame this on a lack of direct and relevant messaging from France. France - the place where the New Zealand sacrifice had been most evident - failed to

⁷² Harland, "Wool Supplies And Consumption: The Requirements Of A British Empire Industry Y1 - 1924/06/01," p.158. 'Already efforts are being made by the French Government to introduce sheep breeding on a commercial scale in certain of the French colonies, and the Japanese Government are also keenly alive to the necessity of making the Japanese wool textile industry less dependent upon foreign supplies ...'

gain a local cultural presence because New Zealand chose to be unreceptive. The main reason the messaging failed or went unreceived was the distorted, negative view of France that was accepted as an inseparable part of a colonial British identity.

7. Conclusions: French Lessons for New Zealand?

We are in France. After months of waiting we step on hallowed soil.

John Moloney, War Diary¹

New Zealand's France had three façades. A wartime ally and European peace process affiliate was (briefly) replaced with a potential commercial trading partner, until that option was cast aside in favour of France the resurrected pre-war colonial competitor in the Pacific, albeit one that played rugby tolerably well and now cared for New Zealand graveyards on its home soil. These dissonant identities appeared in succession because they could not co-exist in a cultural space whose default demeanour was unsympathetic towards the French. Unable to resolve the discord, New Zealand tried to minimize or ignore the first two roles. This is reflected in the historiography from the period, for when writing of post-1918 to 1935 New Zealand historians have usually portrayed the New Zealand-France relationship as a series of occasional, exceptional and implicitly unimportant incidents, consistent with the trend towards writing self-contained national histories. This stance perpetuates the theme that a distinctly New Zealand identity gradually emerged after the war when in fact there was a reinforcement of the British-centric identity that implicitly rejected non-Empire influences. This rejection combined the residues of British colonialism with pro-Empire sentiments, local political cheer-leading and domestic cultural attitudes in favour of continuing the British links. Reintroducing the French as an ongoing presence disrupts the uneasy historical equilibrium evident in the post-colonial narratives. It disputes the view that New Zealand's emergence as a nation was simply a reluctant separation of Britain and New Zealand, from which there emerged a bi-cultural entity that (re-)discovered *Te Tiriti o Waitangi* as its founding event.

Identifying as a British nation - as New Zealand inarguably and unashamedly did between 1918-35 - included adopting Britain's tumultuous relationship with France and Britain's ambivalent attitudes towards the French. Therefore, if the role of France in shaping British cultural norms and political events is accepted, it follows that New Zealand's derived attitudes towards (and association with) France cannot be ignored.

¹ Moloney, "War diary," p.40.

The general New Zealand histories of circa. 1918-1935 often overlook this French link, probably because it recalls an inconvenient but continual presence within the cluster of non-Empire nations that metaphorically surrounded New Zealand. Exceptional events involving the French introduced a dissonant contrast against which the dominant British narrative might be re-evaluated. When these episodes did not fit within the preferred (New Zealand) narrative they were extracted from their original context and presented as one-off oddities, just as they were in the newspapers of the day. Restoring the continuity of the French theme has required identifying, exploring, linking and then reinterpreting these occurrences in the context of the bilateral association. This has allowed supplementary interpretations to emerge that enrich the overall narrative.

The scarcity and brevity of relevant diplomatic records in the French archives after the mid-1920s reflects the reality of any direct link from the French point of view. Although New Zealand was a former ally, it was just one of many nations which had engaged in the 1914-18 war alongside France. Due recognition had been given to this debt. Nostalgia alone was insufficient to sustain an active and ongoing bilateral relationship particularly when one party was disinterested in trade. France had significant political issues and opportunities to address elsewhere. After the Pau visit the French delegates published their reports and filed their official appraisals while New Zealand's Acting Prime Minister reported to his leader, 'I have nothing particular to say about them'.² Thus dismissed and without a direct trading or defence partnership New Zealand became of less relevance to France but the influence of France did not diminish within world affairs.

One of the themes emerging in this thesis is 'small' or inconsequential. 'Small' is the essence of New Zealand's defining myth which sits alongside the isolation notion to form the basis of much of the self-assumed national character. New Zealand is not a small country by land area when compared to many other sovereign nations and if it is small in population it is by choice not capacity. Assisted by the cartographers' predilection for using a north-south global orientation, New Zealand is typically drawn in the lower righthand corner of the globe. Despite the realities of comparative land

² Allen, "Allen to Massey 17 January 1919 - 18 January 1919," pp.8-10.

area, close proximity to Australia (Auckland is closer to Sydney than London is to New York) and a Pacific location within easy reach of populous South East Asia, the myths of size and isolation have become embedded, essential interpretations of the national self. It is a theme that has been nurtured and sustained as an indispensable element in constructing both a sense of powerless dependency and the ‘punching above our weight’ myth, a useful fiction whenever an individual New Zealander exceeds the nation’s deliberately understated expectations.³ But this construed, self-conceived isolation only exists if the datum or reference point is assumed to be in Britain. The annual national rituals of ANZAC Day and Waitangi Day reinforce this interpretation by placing New Zealand’s role within a British context while simultaneously downplaying the nation’s exposure to the others. These themes and the adjacent terminology perpetuate the myth of Britain as the centre of the world. This imagined cartography overlooks Europe and France even though both are adjacent to the United Kingdom geographically and politically.

Colonisation proved to be an unstoppable Anglicising process, no matter how much London or Māori tried to temper settler enthusiasm. The isolation myth led to the narrative of a distinctly British national identity which was implanted and nurtured in a new land. As politicians and historians have adapted and repeated this story, it has evolved into the legend of a nation developed and funded through agricultural enterprises utilising the lush, green pasture grown in the rural hinterland of the great metropolis of London to support the Empire. Agricultural output boomed in response to an assumed demand from British consumers without regard for market requirements or environmental consequences.⁴ Technology such as refrigeration and steamships was enlisted to provide more efficient transport, pleas for expanded market access to dispose of the increased supply resulted, requests for capital funding to produce yet more followed, and demands increased for Britain to defend the whole fragile structure from

³ Hagiographic depictions of New Zealand’s heroes who have journeyed to the outside world include: Meads at Twickenham, Hillary on Everest, Rutherford at the Cavendish, Mansfield at Menton and the New Zealand soldiers in France. To paraphrase Janet Frame’s title, they were ‘envoy(s)’ sent to show the others what we (i.e. New Zealanders) could do. Janet Frame, *The envoy from mirror city* (Auckland: Random House, 2000).

⁴ The fact of volumetric increases in primary produce do not necessarily equate with proportionate increases in economic gain, although often the two are commonly assumed to be linked.

unidentified 'others'. This message of continuity and limited options could only be sustained if the alternatives were ignored.

Post-war intra-Empire trade and investment rose for both Britain and France as a proportion of their total economies only because inter-Empire economic activity shrank. At the time however, this observation seemed to prove the point that Empires 'worked'. Overy goes too far when he claims that the worth of Empire went unquestioned, but such an interpretation was understandable as the fact of collective defence and economic development supposedly justified Empires as closed, self-fulfilling and virtuous communities.⁵ This view may have been uncontested in some member states but it was disputed within New Zealand by both the political Left (in relation to international affairs) and by Māori in respect of internal affairs. From an external perspective however, it seemed that the United Kingdom had the best pieces of the globe and wanted to retain them to its own economic advantage. As Tony Ballantyne has pointed out (with acknowledgement to Braudel) trade was of singular importance in the retention calculation. The conflation of loyalty, trade and Empire membership made New Zealand's relationship with the British Empire predictably self-fulfilling but in so doing it limited interactions with the 'others' for both entities, even when the 'others' were geographically or economically more proximate.⁶

Tony Ballantyne has also made the point that relationships and the movement of 'people, ideas and material goods' shaped imperial history. Although he was discussing Aryanism as the common, racially based dominant form within the Empire, his idea of common narratives as a unifying force appeals as a concept to explain Empire unity. In reality the expansion of the British Empire introduced an ever-increasing diversity of races, cultures and ideas which demonstrably were not (and could never be) willingly amalgamated into a single, common national character. Even as themes intended to unify the Empire were promulgated from London they evolved in the telling into new national histories. When Julien Vincent discussed this notion, he argued that the histories of nations can be seen as intellectual transfers of what becomes a shared body

⁵ Overy, *The origins of the Second World War*: p.33.

⁶ Ballantyne, "Putting the nation in its place?: world history and C.A. Bayly's *The Birth of the Modern World*," pp.29-32.

of knowledge. Historians are inherently part of this process because history tends to reflect the way in which both primary and secondary sources are organised.⁷ Moreover, historians' subject choices are influenced by both their own interests and what they perceive to be the interests of their audience. Breaking out of an existing national or empire perspective therefore requires re-consideration of both the movement of ideas beyond the national or empire-based narratives, and the role of the writers of history in their development. The first step is to reconsider the role of non-Empire participants in the New Zealand history of 1918-1935.

The contrived separation of the history of the New Zealand-France relationship into discrete topics is the result of a perceived need to establish evidence of direct contact for validation. Examples such as the military histories of the Great War, General Pau's visit, the French presence in the New Hebrides, the teaching of the French language in schools, colonial France in the Pacific, stories from and about the New Zealand artists and writers who lived in France, the French religious missions, colonisation at Akaroa and so on, abound. Physical contact and direct influence are usually taken as foundation evidence. Once identified these topics have been separated using time periods, geography and so on, as boundaries. By overlaying two or more of these filters (for example a hypothetical study of say New Zealand writers domiciled in France between pre-selected dates written to commemorate an arbitrary anniversary), the topic becomes corralled within the artificial historiographical borders of its definition whether these are appropriate to the broader historical landscape or not. The net result in this case has been an understatement of the collective French influence in New Zealand's history between 1918-1935.

Least this study be similarly criticised, the inherent limitations of a prescriptive random sampling methodology when applied within the restraints of source, time period and subject are acknowledged. There is no attempt here to write an all-inclusive narrative. The content has been deliberately confined to issues that had direct French involvement

⁷ *Orientalism and race : Aryanism in the British Empire*: pp.3, 15-16; Julien Vincent, "Introduction: new directions in the history of intellectuals in Britain and France " in *Anglo-French attitudes : comparisons and transfers between English and French intellectuals since the eighteenth century*, ed. Christophe Charle, Julien Vincent, and J. M. Winter (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007), pp.2, 4, 7.

or influence and were widely reported locally, to make the point. Some well-researched topics in the history of 1918-1935, such as the residual presence of French Catholicism, have therefore been omitted. This is an acknowledged and considered outcome of a thesis intended to supplement the existing record. To go one step further, there is no barrier to the same methodology being applied to other subjects or time periods. Such studies could also yield detail and links that have been hitherto understated. This is especially true for situations when it was obviously inconvenient for the participants such as political leaders to acknowledge foreign influences, just as happened with the post-1918 Government records sent to New Zealand from Britain. Access to information implies a degree of agency. Denying or not recognising the information's existence makes a supine demeanour appear acceptable.

It is no surprise that the most significant theme identified in this study is the persistence of the tripartite link between Great Britain, France and New Zealand. For all the uncertainty and worry expressed by the French, when Britain was forced to choose she decided to support France in the two world wars of the twentieth century. Similarly, the uncertainty evident at times in reconciling New Zealand's loyalty to Britain with a distaste for the French while concurrently claiming a degree of independence melted when a war in support of Britain (as a recruitment agent for France) required it. New Zealand therefore proved to be a loyal and useful adjunct provider of manpower and primary produce during both wars, to the advantage of the French. In the interregnum of 1918-1935 the British - whether by design or coincidence - maintained New Zealand in reserve through the Royal Navy's protection of New Zealand's sea routes, lending money when required, accepting New Zealand's exports in more or less whatever unrefined form New Zealand chose to export them (raw wool of variable quality, fatty sheep and beef carcasses, semi-processed yellow dairy fats) and by managing New Zealand ambitions in the New Hebrides. New Zealand reciprocated with manpower and food in times of adversity.

How did this come about? New Zealand's first version of France was British made. It was brought halfway around the world by the colonists for local propagation and nurturing. The adoption of a simplistic, British-originated, adverse view of France as the site of revolution and regicide conveniently ignored the irony of Britain having once

experienced similar events. The arrival of the French in New Zealand in the nineteenth century at the same time as the British led to competitive religious and territorial interactions as well as contradictions between the inherited version of France and firsthand experience. The image of the British heroes who had defeated Napoleon and saved Europe and the world were nevertheless given a final fictional polish in their adopted New Zealand home and then permanently displayed in local place names to be commemorated annually during Trafalgar and Empire Day, lest we forget. These experiences were selectively interpreted through the biases brought from Home, thereby helping to sustain a negative pre-disposition towards France in spite of the evidence that France was ultimately a benevolent presence.⁸ Moreover, these events tested the utility of using the experience from an inherited historical narrative as a paradigm for defining an independent foreign policy. They also tested the bonds of Empire against a more independent, utilitarian nation-state alternative.

Ignoring or minimizing the pre-war historical heritage in order to adopt a prospective post-war relationship with France meant rejecting Britain's traditional views of the French. On the other hand, completely avoiding or ignoring France was not an option because a relationship with France - whether adversarial or cooperative - was (perversely) part of being British as well as part of the world an emerging independent New Zealand would have to inhabit. When the French made official visits to New Zealand as allies and potential trade partners or when New Zealand and French politicians met during peace negotiations, commemoration events, or during conferences, the dissonance between an inherited pre-war Napoleonic/revolutionary view of France had to be reconciled with France the post-war ally. New Zealand discovered at first hand that Napoleon really was dead and France was a different country from that of 1790-1815. There was a clear dissonance between past and present. The new France could be accepted for what it was - an ally and potential European partner - or the old prejudices could be kept alive and the ancient memories nurtured in the tradition of pre-*détente* Britain.

⁸ There are other examples of an imported bias substituting for first-hand experience in New Zealand's historical narrative but the case of France was unique, owing to the early direct interactions, the wartime alliance and subsequent attempts by France to develop a direct trade and diplomacy-based relationship.

There was an absence of leadership on the issue both from the New Zealand politicians and what might be termed the local highbrows or intelligentsia. Both cliques had been educated, whether informally or formally, in an era when the local culture was a version of British culture, permeated with France the enemy of the public and the favourite of the elite. Pre-war references at Imperial conferences and in selected titbits published in the newspapers provided evidence of quirky French behaviour. Historical fiction, Trafalgar Day celebrations and the names on signposts warned New Zealand to be wary of abandoning the anti-France ethos of the British, even as Britain was embracing the *entente cordiale*. It was easier to generalise and revert to mis-characterising the 'others' as a foreign, irrelevant group when contact was kept to a minimum. From a distance, the post-war reality of modern France - as seen through personal contacts with Frenchmen such as Clemenceau, Siegfried and Pau who were living in the present and dealing with the issues of the day - could be overlooked.

Dividing memories of France the nation of revolution, Napoleonic heritage and political instability from the France of First World War experience appeared to be relatively easy at first glance. It was as if there were two adjacent but self-contained versions of France in New Zealand's post-war memory. One was the wartime ally known for muddy bogs, trenches, rest periods for the troops in the *estaminets*, occasional sightseeing in Paris and infrequent contacts with French locals who saw the soldiers as a collective disruption in their own struggle to survive. This France included idealized small farms in an appealing rural landscape. The other France was the traditional enemy of the British. It seemed in the immediate post-war years that this latter version could be set aside. Whether by design or subconscious urge, France tried to follow this path by attempting to overwrite the pre-war history with the wartime alliance experience and post-war diplomatic engagement.

Distance intervened, however. The last memories of the dead were usually located in New Zealand, geographically remote from their place of burial. The dead were by cultural convention spoken of in the veiled language of a peaceful demise ('now at rest'). This hinted at a departed spirit which was now located where the physical remains were buried: in permanent exile in France. This separation was perpetuated through the New Zealand histories written in the immediate aftermath of the war and in much of the war-

related literature produced since. The many volumes and articles written to describe New Zealand's wartime involvement lack the context of France the country. The terrain, the climate, the politics and culture as well as any descriptions of the people are noticeably absent or are only discussed peripherally within the context of the conflict. France was a foreign place, the site of battles with a topography frequently described in military minutiae but divorced from the broader context of the experiences of the French nation. It seems as if it is less confrontational to treat with the questions surrounding what happened and how the deaths occurred, than it is to confront the broader context for New Zealand: why did these events take place and why there?

The difference between the perceptions of those who visited France as soldiers and then returned, and those who had remained in New Zealand was unbridgeable. Even so, this made little difference because much of the soldiers' experience was irrelevant to building closer relations with the French people, despite the soldiers in many cases having direct access to the original images and symbolism in both France and England. The dissonance was resolved by recasting France as an isolated place of war and widespread loss of life inseparably associated with interment and memorial. The war-related themes were blended into the New Zealand subconscious with the earlier, historical version to create a new post-war French identity. Although more favourable, this revised version was insufficiently robust to overcome all of the old pre-war prejudices. Notwithstanding the wartime upheaval and newly created vistas of France, there was still space in both the political and popular imagination for the France of revolution, Napoleon and civil disorder. This heterogeneous version of France, riven with inconsistencies and contradictions, prevailed in the news and popular culture of 1918-1935. Because it was imprecisely defined this newfangled France could fulfill whatever role was assigned to it. On the one hand, there were aspirational French qualities that could be used as examples of a better way while on the other there was always some objectionable counterpoint to be raised as circumstances required. This was nothing new but it was an innovative approach for New Zealand to adopt a local version rather than accepting the British narrative.

The decision to distance France emotionally and physically was manifested through official resistance to exhuming and repatriating bodies with the surviving troops. The emblematic return to New Zealand of one body had to wait until the twenty-first century, long after Britain had some one hundred years earlier symbolically returned the corpse of one who had served. He or she went to Westminster Abbey for reinterment, not to St. Paul's to lie alongside those recently ennobled aristocrats - Wellington and Nelson - who might have turned in their respective sarcophagi on seeing that alongside their own remains rested evidence of ordinary British lives lost defending France. Better not to expose the masses to the dissonance. So it was in New Zealand. The quasi-religious edifices erected in every town and city were primarily used to commemorate Gallipoli, thereby avoiding potential dissonance by keeping the idealized memories far from where the bodies were actually buried.

The ambiguous terms imposed on Germany at Versailles were a compromise between Wilsonian idealism and Clemenceau's realism. The men who led New Zealand after 1918 saw the challenges that the Versailles Treaty had created when they observed the behaviour of France in the European post-war Councils and through local trade and diplomatic initiatives. French actions towards Germany based on 1870-1 precedents or Congress of Vienna decisions resurrected redundant experiences of France which conflicted with the rapidly fading image of the wartime ally. Any possibility of an honourable peace was lost within this pyrrhic diplomatic win for France. Having built an unprecedented global alliance that was reminiscent of the British-led coalitions assembled to fight Napoleon's France, the French - in New Zealand's view - proceeded to squander the hard-won moral high ground by demanding terms from a German nation which clearly did not believe she had lost. In so doing France confounded her otherwise worthy ambitions to engage with her former coalition partners, including New Zealand, through trade and diplomacy. New Zealand and other former allies of France could see that there was little chance of the reparations ever being paid; still less of France ever being satisfied or Germany pacified. France sacrificed the reservoir of goodwill in favour of pursuing revenge and constraining her traditional foe across the Rhine (Keynes' prediction of 'disastrous' consequences proving uncannily accurate) but it was a policy driven more by fear and a lack of security guarantees than retaliation.

New Zealand's case for retreating into the Empire's clench seemed inarguable, for if the war had been fought (in the British interpretation) to preserve the independence of smaller nations such as Belgium, it was the British Empire rather than the French equivalent that had demonstrably saved them. New Zealand's subsequent self-imposed censorship restricted post-war knowledge of France to an eclectic mix of newspaper articles, formal academic study of language and pre-war history, alongside literature from a genre of what is now termed historical fiction, films, and myths about the French character rooted in the concept that held cultural differences were inherently racial. These were supplemented with experiences - both first-hand and retold - from the war. The evidence suggests that much of this knowledge was wrong or at best misleading, especially in the case of agriculture.

New Zealand never left the Empire but there had been a brief post-war interlude when it seemed that the great powers might consider an alternative to the model of territorial acquisition, empires and nationalism. New Zealand's conservative governments of 1918-1935 saw the League of Nations as useless for any practical purpose, however. The Empire was the best vehicle to attain financial security, military safekeeping and to build a national character. In so doing the possibility of the French becoming a better-known entity was lost. The faults of France 1918-1935 were obvious to many New Zealanders, politicians and newspaper editors and they became even more so as New Zealand attempted to strengthen the Empire bonds. Britain's attempts to develop a more internationalist outlook by shaking herself free from some of these more extravagant Dominion demands were ignored or overlooked.

In the wider context France had no more interest in addressing New Zealand's concerns through the League forum - provided their respective territorial and economic interests were not in conflict - than did New Zealand in directly supporting France. As far as any bilateral contacts between New Zealand and France went the League was a superfluous appendage of the post-war settlement. Any nation could potentially be a victim or an aggressor - or in some circumstances viewed as both - so few trusted the League to protect their interests. There was no single universal formula which would be completely acceptable in all conceivable circumstances. For New Zealand there was little that remained to suggest the League could be an efficacious body through which

to establish additional ties with France. Moreover, the apparently illogical positions taken by France - such as those relating to women's rights and even the use of the French language - were not treated as indicators requiring explanation but rather as inconsequential examples of the vagaries of the French character that reinforced the perception that the French were the 'others'. From the viewpoint of France, still facing a powerful Germany and dealing with the other great powers, New Zealand's supposedly independent views must have seemed an odd, self-selected assortment of semi-independent stances underpinned with an adherence to British policies of questionable relevance for an emerging independent nation in the South Pacific.

Any hope for a fair and impartial multinational organisation was quickly lost as the ambitions of the great powers once again came to dominate global affairs. The only consistent themes guiding New Zealand's foreign policy in Europe came by default through what were clearly becoming inadequate links via Britain. Once New Zealand abandoned an unqualified commitment to supporting Britain's defence policy - despite herself demanding unqualified British support - the link would have seemed hopelessly compromised if not irrelevant from the French point of view. After extracting what territorial concessions they could, both New Zealand and France used the League when it was to their advantage (or when required) to either prevent, thwart or - in the final step - to stop any activities that they perceived were not to their benefit.

Post-war New Zealand became part of the 'others' for the French, just as France regressed to a similar classification from the New Zealand viewpoint. Some of the best evidence for this reversion comes from the shrewd and perceptive observations made of New Zealand in the French press. Because it is impossible to imagine ourselves exactly as the others see us, these newspaper opinions assume extra significance as an external historical source when assessing New Zealand's world status between 1919-35. Moreover, because the imagined self is close to perfection and so does not readily accept fault, any criticism comes as a surprise and reflexively invites denial. Positive national characteristics are taken as obvious whereas the negatives are proscribed thus setting boundaries defined by what we are not. Our strengths are seen in the reflected weaknesses or flaws of the 'others' and are taken as obvious.

The French reporting suggested that the British Empire was faltering and New Zealand was constitutionally adrift. New Zealand's repudiation of a continued role as a French ally and trade partner meant further interactions would be restricted to a southern social laboratory attached to Britain. The lengthy critiques of the British Empire model, doubts about the future of New Zealand within it and the changes in British security arrangements within the French news reports crudely exposed these vulnerabilities in New Zealand's assumed position as an Empire member. Britain aspired to remain apart from the interdependent states of Europe, but the two-way flow of ideas and goods within the Empire and the very fact of the Empire's existence made Britain part of the world, and thereby so too New Zealand. Although nations can be useful political units, they are never completely independent. By clinging to the ambivalent concept of an independent Dominion within the Empire, New Zealand delayed an inevitably critical and awkward examination of its own history of colonial conquest and subjugation of Māori which independence would demand.

Such matters were not of concern to France that was in any case not keen to re-assess its own colonizing adventures. Moreover, despite New Zealand's apparent rejection of French overtures and the Empire's shortcomings, France still had an interest in Britain maintaining her Empire, at least where it was not directly competitive. As long as the British Empire's constituent countries including New Zealand remained as such, they were potential allies and a possible source of military manpower. New Zealand, having believed it had no need of France or at least only a limited need for any non-British military or economic relationship, now saw that the British Empire was facing a conundrum on both dimensions. New Zealand's hopes had largely been hitched to an Empire that was dissolving because it was unsustainable. New Zealand had failed to anticipate a change in the public mood in Britain which now placed less faith in the Empire than did the New Zealand electorate. The highly consequential political and economic changes that resulted were unanticipated.

New Zealand's economic management until circa. 1932 assumed British actions had a benevolent moral motivation. This opinion implicitly interpreted the policies of the others as self-interested. Having placed Britain and British values on a moral plinth at the pinnacle of civilization, it followed that Britain was right and those who did

otherwise were misguided or morally at fault. Views on devaluation, inflation, or on deficits - both in external trade and internal budgets, adherence to the gold standard and the treatment of the unemployed were subjected to a moral examination rather than being read agnostically as economic indicators. It followed that transgressing nations such as France were morally wrong when they ignored the British solutions. The economic prescriptions that resulted, especially those of the conservative-Right, meant evidence of success using alternative policies had to be contradicted or invalidated. There was a naivety in the faithful assuming that acting correctly would deliver a good outcome in the face of mounting evidence that other nations - eventually including the British as well as the French - would ultimately act in what they saw as their own national interests. In a sense New Zealand was left economically bypassed by both Britain and France. Using lessons from France such as the need for a central bank, the adoption of a looser money supply to inflate a depressed economy and the acceptance that sovereign nations could adjust exchange rates regardless of their gold reserves suggested that flexibility and a willingness to adapt were not necessarily faults in the others but might even be strengths.

Improving communication technology allowed greater sharing of knowledge and a possible enhancement of a unified purpose through a shared British identity within the Empire. Countering this affect, the same technologies could help bypass the censoring influence of London. It became easier for alternative ideas and contradictory evidence to be introduced from nations outside the Empire. Attempts to reinforce the concept of a British Empire eventually proved futile - in part because less cerebral images from America offered lighter relief. The latter's ready absorption in comparison with the sober and pessimistic information from Britain and France suggested a change in the national mood. Despite investment in new technologies by both France and New Zealand mutual understanding did not improve. The new methods were instead often employed to expedite the exchange of limited content which regurgitated the past alongside a whimsical selection of the exceptional. Interpretation using the existing paradigms meant any new information was used to confirm old biases regardless of the media deployed to transmit it.

There is no claim in this thesis to new discoveries of fact nor of a new meta-narrative of New Zealand history. Well-known events have been re-ordered and re-connected then reinterpreted from an alternative observation point. The results still fall comfortably within the generally accepted New Zealand historical framework. Thus, Britain's history still provides the base for much of New Zealand's non-Māori colonial and post-colonial history but with additional significance attached to the involvement of France. The historiographical pendulum that had swung to a point where the post-colonial non-British influence was being understated - apart from specific incidents that have been studied in isolation and without broader context - has been gently pushed back. For all the reasons that this may be an unfashionable viewpoint it should at least be aired. Europe and European powers were an obviously important part of New Zealand's past. It would be neglectful to restrict by omission the influence of say Napoleon Bonaparte or the French Revolution to specialised studies of France, just as the same could equally be true for neglecting the global significance of the American War of Independence or the Russian revolution. The importance of France in international affairs, trade and historical background is worthy of acknowledgement as an influence in the formation of New Zealand's national identity, for New Zealand has not been an unfortunate victim of events. The decisions on who New Zealand would engage with, what was to be grown or produced here, where the produce was to be exported and what cultural traditions would prevail were matters of choice rather than circumstance or obligation.

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Appendix: database construction and analysis

The topics for the thesis were identified using a simple random sample of $n = 1,000$ newspaper articles drawn from a universe/population of $N = 472,724$ qualifying items available through the Papers Past database in 2016-17. Qualifying articles had to be published between 1918-1939 and include the term 'France' and or 'French' within the title or text.¹ Topics that occurred more frequently in any particular year therefore appeared in greater numbers within that year's sub-sample. Frequency of mention in has been taken as a surrogate measure of the importance of any one topic. More complex statistical designs were considered - including the use of stratification by year or by topic - but these were rejected since a case could not be made that those variables were the most likely sources of variance in all cases. Additionally, stratification posed considerable difficulties when it came to weighting the data given the lack of universe parameters. It was therefore decided to use a simple random sample because a rational case for a more complex design - such as stratification - could not be justified on the grounds of greater statistical efficiency or precision.²

It is acknowledged that while there is logic in using arithmetic article or advertisement counts to estimate the importance of current events, the method is susceptible to non-sampling error. Unlike estimates of statistical sampling error that can be calculated using the appropriate statistical procedures (within various assumptions made related to the shape of the population distribution), non-sampling error is a matter of subjective assessment and one that all historians are instinctively familiar with from identifying and selecting primary sources. The most significant potential source of non-sampling error in this case is the dearth of readership statistics. This lack precludes estimating the proportion of the population that may have seen any particular article(s). Other potential non-sampling errors in no particular order include the absence from the Papers Past database of any consistent and readily accessible estimates of article size such as word counts or column centimetres, the lack of consistent descriptive 'tags' to

¹ The option of obtaining a database of all the articles and then electronically classifying them was considered but rejected as it proved impossible to establish rules that delivered a consistent result and could be automatically applied to the English syntax used in newspaper reports. The universe of available articles had by January 2019 extended to $N = 676,804$. See:
https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers?phrase=1&snippet=true&query=France+French&start_date=01-01-1919&end_date=31-12-1939&type=ARTICLE

² One of the great truisms of sample design is that it is best done just after the data have been collected and the key statistical features of the population of interest, particularly the variance, are known.

classify prominence (visibility) such as font type or point size within the text and the absence of any classification of articles by the presence of bold headlines or placement within the newspaper. Any or all of these can influence the prominence of an article and thus the likelihood that it attracted the readers' attention. The task of making such measurements manually had to be balanced against the utility of so doing as a means to improve the estimate of the derived parameter, namely the importance measured by frequency of mention for each topic. I concluded that with the major potential problem being the absence of readership data, any improvement would be minor. Even if an article was prominently featured, the readership of the relevant publication may still have been insignificant.

Since non-sampling error is almost certainly a far greater cause of potential error than sampling error, no estimates have been made of statistical variance and significance (sampling errors in the vernacular). Clearly however some topics attracted far more attention than others and this varied over time. The article counts have therefore been treated as indicative rather than determinate. Thus, no statistical significance is implied as to the importance of (for instance) a 24% incidence of articles related to Topic A appearing versus a 29% incidence of articles related to Topic B. The absence of statistical boundaries for estimates of population frequency (e.g. 'a 95% confidence interval of $\pm 3\%$ ' as is often quoted in political polling) is therefore deliberate and these have been omitted to avoid implying that the indicative frequencies used have any accuracy beyond a measure of general importance of any one topic in relation to the others. The broad efficacy of the overall method stands however. To take one example: Previous scholarly writing on New Zealand-French interactions would suggest that religion should feature prominently in the sampled topics but newspaper articles related to religion with a French association accounted for less than 1% of the sampled articles. Clearly this is minor compared to say sports, art and recreation that accounted for 22% of the articles in 1922.

The variance within the data set was unknown when the sample was drawn, so a sample size had to be determined based at one extreme on keeping the risk that a topic of importance could be missed to an acceptably low level and on the other of keeping the overall task to a manageable size. A subjective assessment of these factors led to a

sample size of one thousand articles being chosen.³ Using the filtering tools available through the Papers Past website, all the qualifying articles (i.e. those including the words 'France' or 'French') within the specified date range (all articles from 1918-1939 available online through Papers Past in 2016-17) were identified and chronologically ordered, prior to drawing a representative sample. The 'sort by' function in Papers Past was set to 'Date' as the least likely to introduce bias. Ordering by date reflected the order of the articles as they had originally been published.⁴

Using a random number generator, one thousand ($n = 1,000$) random numbers were drawn within the range $1 \leq 472,724$ (the total qualifying articles identified for the period 1 January 1919 to 31 December 1939). The random numbers were then ordered for ease of use before being matched with the equivalent article number in Papers Past. Therefore, each qualifying article regardless of original source, newspaper, date or specific content had an equal probability of being included in the sample. The sampled articles were entered into a data base and notes made on the topic(s) covered. These were then grouped into sub-samples based on topics – for example the Washington Disarmament Conference - by year of publication. The derived meta-topics were ranked based on frequency of mention.

One thousand and fifteen (1,015) articles have been read and classified. (The excess of fifteen articles is due to various factors including duplication of random numbers, inclusion of multiple topics under one heading e.g. 'cable news' and a small number of articles that Papers Past has 'clipped' that had no apparent mention of 'France' or 'French'.) The 'table' function in MS Excel was used to build a relational database so that the sampled articles could be re-ordered, re-grouped and otherwise interrogated

³ Using a hypothetical binomial distribution (an acceptable approximation for illustrative purposes) in which 50% of the sampled articles were classified to a particular topic and 50% were not, an estimate of the standard deviation could be derived using the formula:

$$\hat{p} \pm z \sqrt{\frac{\hat{p}(1-\hat{p})}{n}}$$


In this case there is a 95% probability that the true population statistic lies somewhere between 46.9% and 53.1% i.e. +/- two standard deviations of the sample estimate of 50%. This is adequate for the purpose of identifying the main topics, especially as non-sampling error is likely to be the main source of any discrepancies.

⁴ The alternatives listed within PapersPast are: 'Best_Match', 'Date', 'Title', 'Publication Title', and 'Content Type'.

as needed. The article database with supplementary charts and notes is available electronically while hardcopy of the topic analysis by year is appended.

The chart below compares the distribution by year of the sampled articles with the distribution by year of all the articles. The close match suggests that the method used has yielded a representative sample.

Figure 27: Article count v's sample count



N.B. The dotted 'all articles' line has less variation owing to the greater number of articles included.

The extract on the page opposite shows an example page from the database.

Beginning on the far left, the first line in the first column shows that the random number 67,653 was generated. The 67,653th article in the chronological sequence described above was headlined 'ENTERTAINMENTS'. The URL for the article is shown followed by the newspaper name, date, issue number and page number. There is a brief precis of the item's content, prepared once the article had been read. These are working notes and are unedited. They were used during the writing phase to identify the articles contributing to the main topics so they could be later read in full. The classification for grouping purposes is within the sub-group 'French Drama' and this has been further aggregated into the main group 'Books and Literature'. The article has been 'tagged' with the year 1919 and included in the sub-group of articles with the period tag 1919-1924. The database can be sorted or filtered on any one of these tags or on a combination of two or more.

If many similarly classified articles were present the main topic group 'Books and Literature' was listed for further research within the appropriate year range. If sample size indicated it was of importance, the sub-topic 'French Drama' was investigated using both the secondary literature and any available primary sources - including additional newspaper articles - as a topic of potential significance. Note that while the next article appears at first glance to be only directly relevant to the headline 'AVIATION', it was sampled because the word 'France' or 'French' was included in the text. To achieve consistency no arbitrary inclusion or exclusion decisions were made during database compilation. Similarly spelling, grammar and format have been left as they were in the original type-setting.

Figure 28: Watts thesis database extract

Random number generator source:

<https://www.random.org/>

using the number generator macro:
<https://www.random.org/integers/?num=1000&min=1&max=472724&col=1&base=10&format=plain&rnd=new>

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I
1	Sample No.	URL	Reference N.B. Spelling as originally published	Topic/ Subject (synopsis of apparently relevant content)	Main Dewey	Dewey	Description	Year	Period
2	67653	https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/news/papers/WT19191202.2	ENTERTAINMENTS Waikato Times, Volume 91, Issue 14229, 2 December 1919, p.5	French Recital including a French play, as well as 'games and songs' in French. 'The Marseillaise' was sung. A Miss Tscheremissnoff seems to have been a key player (Teacher?)	Books & Literature	842	French drama	1919	1919 to 1924
3	15052	https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/news/papers/ESD19190226.2.64	AVIATION Evening Star, Issue 16978, 26 February 1919, p.6	Claim that a French invention enables enhanced air pressure in aviation engines at high altitudes thereby maintaining engine efficiency at the altitudes where the air resistance is least. Sounds like a turbo charger of some sort. Also, first British Air Attaché dispatched to Washington.	Commerce, Communications, Trade, Transport	387	Air transportation	1919	1919 to 1924
4	2672	https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/news/papers/EP19190110.2.38	ENEMY TRADING Evening Post, Volume XCVII, Issue 9, 10 January 1919, p.6	Notes that it is still illegal to trade enemy goods as legislation applies ban for one year after hostilities end. Unlikely to change until after the Peace Conference. No one allowed to communicate with any entity in an enemy country. When trade resumes Govt. has the power to apply a tariff on goods from enemy country, SEE: attached sheet with trade figures.	Commerce, Communications, Trade, Transport	381	Commerce (Trade)	1919	1919 to 1924
5	4827	https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/news/papers/CL19190117.2.16	The Clutha Leader. BALCLUTHA: FRIDAY, JAN. 17. THE FRENCH MISSION. Clutha Leader, Volume XLV, Issue 57, 17 January 1919, p.5	French Mission is to promote trade, led by Gen. Pau. Hoped that previous German trade would now go to France. Notes French restrictions of some primary produce (meat, dairy) but says that NZ and French soldiers 'obtained a fuller knowledge' of each other as a result of being allied. Still refers to previous Anglo-French conflict but at least they were 'fought as gentlemen.' Regrets mission could not stay longer to appreciate the sights and foster trade.	Commerce, Communications, Trade, Transport	381	Commerce (Trade)	1919	1919 to 1924
6	8454	https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/news/papers/NZH19190131.2.16	NEW ZEALAND TRADE. New Zealand Herald, Volume LV, Issue 17073, 31 January 1919, p.4	Suggestion that NZ should dispatch a trade mission in the same way that France had sent General Pau and his delegation.	Commerce, Communications, Trade, Transport	381	Commerce (Trade)	1919	1919 to 1924
7	13207	https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/news/papers/HNS19190219.2.45.2	FRENCH MISSION REACHES CANADA. Hawera & Normanby Star, Volume LXXIV, Issue 0, 19 February 1919, p.7	Report that the 'French Mission' Gen. Pan (sic) and Madame Melba had reached Canada amid praised Australia for her war work.	Commerce, Communications, Trade, Transport	381	Commerce (Trade)	1919	1919 to 1924

Screenshot

Advertising

A similar procedure was used to sample advertising from *PapersPast*. In this instance, a stratified design was used with a sub-sample size of $n = 30$ within each stratum/year. This was the minimum acceptable to sample a (statistically) normal distribution, because estimates of population statistics become valid - albeit with very large confidence level - at the $n \geq 30$ level. The sub-samples have not been weighted so each annual estimate stands on its merits as an observation for that year. In a rapidly changing economic environment it was more important to observe any change between years than it was to derive an apparently statistically more robust result by adding sub-samples, a procedure that would have smoothed the data and thereby possible hidden points of inflexion. Moreover, advertising tends to be volatile and somewhat whimsical in content. Advertising therefore suffers even more than the article counts from the previously discussed issues related to size, prominence and so on. Inferences of greater statistical reliability would again risk implying that the non-sampling error was less than it is. Finally, much of the advertising content although possibly influential, was only indirectly related to the French-New Zealand relationship. Hence for example 'French doors' or 'French styled' no doubt conveyed some sub-conscious impression of France and French goods but they were not directly related to commerce between the two countries.

No identifiable bias has been observed in either data set, nor is there any known bias in this methodology at the time of writing.

Column percentages	1919 to 1924							1919 to 1924 Total							1925 to 1935							1925 to 1935 Total						
	1919	1920	1921	1922	1923	1924	1925	1926	1927	1928	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935											
	1919	1920	1921	1922	1923	1924	1925	1926	1927	1928	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935											
Politics & Law	31.7%	30.8%	24.1%	21.3%	30.2%	24.2%	28.7%	31.4%	26.7%	22.2%	23.3%	23.5%	27.3%	9.5%	22.6%	24.2%	6.7%	17.4%	21.7%									
International Relations	13.4%	11.1%	13.0%	2.1%	15.9%	9.1%	11.6%	8.6%	16.7%	2.8%	13.3%	11.8%	6.1%	4.8%	12.9%	12.1%	3.3%	6.5%	8.9%									
International migration & colonisation	2.1%	6.0%	1.9%	14.9%	4.8%	0.0%	4.6%	14.3%	6.7%	0.0%	0.0%	2.9%	6.1%	0.0%	3.2%	3.0%	0.0%	8.7%	4.5%									
Relation of state to organised groups & their members	4.2%	5.1%	0.0%	0.0%	3.2%	0.0%	3.1%	2.9%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.3%									
Military Law	2.8%	2.6%	0.0%	2.1%	3.2%	3.0%	2.4%	0.0%	0.0%	2.8%	3.3%	0.0%	0.0%	4.8%	3.2%	3.0%	0.0%	2.2%	1.7%									
Criminal Law	0.7%	0.9%	1.9%	0.0%	1.6%	3.0%	1.1%	0.0%	3.3%	8.3%	0.0%	5.9%	6.1%	0.0%	3.2%	3.0%	0.0%	0.0%	2.8%									
Systems of government & states	4.2%	1.7%	1.9%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	2.0%	0.0%	0.0%	5.6%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	3.3%	0.0%	0.8%									
The political process	0.7%	0.0%	1.9%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.4%	5.7%	0.0%	0.0%	3.3%	2.9%	3.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.4%									
Civil & political rights	0.7%	0.9%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.4%	0.0%	0.0%	2.8%	0.0%	0.0%	6.1%	0.0%	0.0%	3.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.1%									
Politics & government	1.4%	1.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.9%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%									
Law of nations	0.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.6%	0.0%	0.4%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.3%									
Political science	0.0%	0.0%	1.9%	0.0%	0.0%	9.1%	0.9%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%									
Constitutional & administrative law	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	2.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%									
Laws, regulations, specific cases	0.0%	0.0%	1.9%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%									
Film & cinematography	0.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%									
Slavery & emancipation	0.0%	0.9%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%									
Sport, Arts & Recreation	6.3%	11.1%	18.5%	21.3%	9.5%	12.1%	11.4%	14.3%	23.3%	44.4%	36.7%	14.7%	21.2%	23.8%	16.1%	18.2%	26.7%	19.6%	23.4%									
Athletic & outdoor sports & games	0.7%	2.6%	9.3%	8.5%	1.6%	6.1%	3.5%	2.9%	16.7%	13.9%	20.0%	0.0%	12.1%	14.3%	12.9%	12.1%	10.0%	6.5%	10.6%									
Film & cinematography	2.8%	0.9%	0.0%	2.1%	3.2%	0.0%	1.8%	0.0%	3.3%	2.8%	13.3%	0.0%	6.1%	4.8%	0.0%	3.0%	10.0%	4.3%	4.2%									
Equestrian sports & animal racing	1.4%	2.6%	1.9%	4.3%	1.6%	3.0%	2.2%	2.9%	0.0%	8.3%	0.0%	2.9%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	3.3%	0.0%	1.7%	1.7%									
Music	0.7%	1.7%	1.9%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.9%	5.7%	0.0%	2.8%	3.3%	0.0%	3.0%	0.0%	0.0%	3.3%	4.3%	2.2%	2.2%									
Indoor games & amusements	0.7%	2.6%	0.0%	6.4%	1.6%	0.0%	1.8%	2.9%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	4.8%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	2.2%	0.8%									
Recreational & performing arts	0.0%	0.9%	3.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.7%	0.0%	0.0%	5.6%	0.0%	8.8%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	3.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.7%									
Aquatic & air sports	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	3.3%	8.3%	0.0%	2.9%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.4%									
Sports, games & entertainment	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	3.0%	0.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	3.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.3%									
Painting (art)	0.0%	0.0%	1.9%	0.0%	1.6%	0.0%	0.4%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%									
Vocal music	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	2.2%	0.0%	0.3%									
Geography & travel	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	2.8%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.3%									
Commerce, Communications, Trade, Transport	12.0%	11.1%	9.3%	19.1%	17.5%	18.2%	13.4%	2.9%	10.0%	8.3%	20.0%	17.6%	15.2%	9.5%	12.9%	9.1%	6.7%	17.4%	12.0%									
Water, air, space transportation	2.1%	4.3%	1.9%	4.3%	4.8%	0.0%	3.1%	2.9%	0.0%	5.6%	0.0%	8.8%	3.0%	4.8%	3.2%	0.0%	3.3%	10.9%	4.2%									
Postal communications	1.4%	0.9%	5.6%	6.4%	3.2%	6.1%	2.9%	0.0%	3.3%	2.8%	6.7%	0.0%	9.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.9%									
Commerce (Trade)	4.2%	4.3%	0.0%	6.4%	1.6%	9.1%	3.9%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	6.7%	0.0%	0.0%	3.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.8%									
International commerce	0.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.2%	0.0%	6.7%	0.0%	3.3%	5.9%	3.0%	4.8%	3.2%	9.1%	0.0%	6.5%	3.9%									
Railroad transportation	0.7%	0.0%	0.0%	2.1%	4.8%	0.0%	1.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	3.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.3%									
Transportation	1.4%	0.0%	1.9%	0.0%	1.6%	0.0%	0.9%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	2.9%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.3%									
Communications	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.6%	0.0%	0.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	3.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	3.3%	0.0%	0.6%									
Air transportation	0.7%	0.9%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.4%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%									
Commerce, communications, & transport	0.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%									
News media, journalism & publishing	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	3.0%	0.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%									
International Communications	0.0%	0.9%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%									

Column percentages	1919 to 1924							1919 to 1924 Total							1925 to 1935							1925 to 1935 Total						
	1919	1920	1921	1922	1923	1924	1919 to 1924 Total	1925	1926	1927	1928	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935	1925 to 1935 Total									
	Economics	11.3%	9.4%	20.4%	8.5%	14.3%	6.1%	11.6%	11.4%	6.7%	5.6%	0.0%	5.9%	9.1%	9.5%	9.7%	3.0%	13.3%	8.7%	7.5%								
International economics	4.2%	3.4%	7.4%	4.3%	6.3%	0.0%	4.4%	11.4%	3.3%	0.0%	0.0%	5.9%	0.0%	4.8%	3.2%	3.0%	3.3%	4.3%	3.6%									
Public finance	0.7%	1.7%	1.9%	2.1%	3.2%	0.0%	1.5%	0.0%	3.3%	5.6%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	3.2%	0.0%	0.0%	2.2%	1.4%									
Labour economics	2.1%	2.6%	3.7%	2.1%	3.2%	0.0%	2.4%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	3.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.3%									
Financial economics	0.0%	0.9%	3.7%	0.0%	1.6%	6.1%	1.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	6.1%	4.8%	0.0%	0.0%	3.3%	2.2%	1.4%									
Production	1.4%	0.9%	1.9%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.9%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	3.2%	0.0%	3.3%	0.0%	0.6%										
Economics	0.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.3%									
Economics of land & energy	1.4%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.4%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%									
Economics production	0.0%	0.0%	1.9%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%									
Socialism & related systems	0.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%									
Macroeconomics	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%									
Customs, death customs, etiquette, folklore	14.8%	17.1%	7.4%	4.3%	4.8%	12.1%	11.8%	14.3%	16.7%	11.1%	3.3%	11.8%	9.1%	9.5%	0.0%	21.2%	6.7%	8.7%	10.3%									
Death customs	3.5%	6.0%	1.9%	2.1%	1.6%	6.1%	3.7%	5.7%	13.3%	0.0%	0.0%	5.9%	6.1%	0.0%	0.0%	15.2%	6.7%	4.3%	5.3%									
Customs, etiquette, folklore	3.5%	2.6%	5.6%	2.1%	0.0%	0.0%	2.6%	0.0%	0.0%	5.6%	0.0%	5.9%	3.0%	9.5%	0.0%	6.1%	0.0%	2.2%	2.8%									
Costume & personal appearance	0.7%	5.1%	0.0%	0.0%	3.2%	0.0%	2.0%	2.9%	3.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	2.2%	0.8%									
Customs of life cycle & domestic life	0.7%	2.6%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	3.0%	1.1%	2.9%	0.0%	5.6%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.8%									
Customs of war & diplomacy	4.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%									
General customs	1.4%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.4%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	3.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.3%									
Etiquette (manners)	0.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	3.0%	0.4%	2.9%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.3%									
UNKNOWN	0.0%	0.9%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%									
Technology	6.3%	3.4%	5.6%	12.8%	7.9%	15.2%	7.0%	11.4%	10.0%	2.8%	0.0%	8.8%	6.1%	14.3%	9.7%	6.1%	16.7%	10.9%	8.6%									
Garden crops	1.4%	0.9%	0.0%	0.0%	3.2%	0.0%	1.1%	2.9%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	4.8%	6.5%	0.0%	6.7%	2.2%	1.9%									
Sewing, clothing, management of personal and family life	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	8.5%	0.0%	3.0%	1.1%	0.0%	3.3%	0.0%	0.0%	2.9%	3.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	3.3%	0.0%	1.1%									
Medicine & health	0.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	6.1%	0.7%	2.9%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	3.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.6%									
Food & drink	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	3.0%	0.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	4.8%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	8.7%	1.4%	1.4%									
Engineering & applied operations	0.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	2.9%	0.0%	4.8%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.6%									
Orchards, fruits, forestry	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	2.1%	1.6%	0.0%	0.4%	0.0%	3.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.3%									
Animal husbandry	0.7%	0.9%	1.9%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%									
Agriculture & related technologies	0.7%	0.9%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.4%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%									
Hunting, fishing, conservation, related technologies	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	2.9%	3.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.6%									
Child rearing	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.6%	0.0%	0.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	3.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.3%									
Hydraulic engineering	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	3.0%	0.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%									
Civil engineering	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	3.0%	3.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.6%									
Surgery	1.4%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.4%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%									
Home & family management	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	2.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%									
Diseases	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.6%	0.0%	0.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	3.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.3%									
Gynecology, obstetrics, pediatrics, geriatrics	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%									
Processing dairy & related products	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	3.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.3%									
Technology of other organic products	0.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%									
Human anatomy, cytology, histology	0.0%	0.0%	1.9%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%									
Field and plantation crops	0.0%	0.0%	1.9%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%									
Mining & related operations	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	2.9%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.3%									
Technology of explosives, fuels, related products	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	2.8%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.3%									
Agriculture Field plantations and crops.	0.0%	0.9%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%									
Pharmacology mad therapeutics	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	2.9%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.3%									
Plant injuries, diseases, pests	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%									
Housekeeping	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%									

Column percentages

	1919 to 1924						1919 to	1925 to 1935						1925 to					
	1919	1920	1921	1922	1923	1924	1924 Total	1925	1926	1927	1928	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935	1935 Total
Public administration & military science	8.5%	8.5%	5.6%	2.1%	6.3%	0.0%	6.6%	0.0%	0.0%	5.6%	3.3%	5.9%	3.0%	4.8%	3.2%	6.1%	0.0%	4.3%	3.3%
Sea forces & warfare	2.1%	0.9%	0.0%	0.0%	4.8%	0.0%	1.5%	0.0%	0.0%	2.8%	3.3%	2.9%	3.0%	4.8%	3.2%	6.1%	0.0%	4.3%	2.8%
Military science	1.4%	3.4%	3.7%	2.1%	0.0%	0.0%	2.0%	0.0%	0.0%	2.8%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.3%
Foot forces & warfare	2.8%	2.6%	0.0%	0.0%	1.6%	0.0%	1.8%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Air & other specialised forces	0.7%	0.9%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.4%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Public administration & military science	1.4%	0.9%	1.9%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.9%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	2.9%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.3%
History & geography	3.5%	0.9%	1.9%	6.4%	3.2%	3.0%	2.9%	5.7%	0.0%	0.0%	3.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	6.5%	6.1%	3.3%	0.0%	3.9%
History of France & Monaco	0.0%	0.0%	1.9%	2.1%	1.6%	3.0%	0.9%	5.7%	0.0%	0.0%	3.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	6.5%	6.1%	3.3%	0.0%	2.2%
Geography & travel	0.0%	0.9%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	6.5%	0.8%
History of Europe	1.4%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.6%	0.0%	0.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Organisations & management of history	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	3.3%	0.0%	0.3%
French history	1.4%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.4%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Russian history	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
History United States	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.3%
History of Russia	0.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
History collective accounts of events	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	2.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
History of British Isles	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
History of Middle East	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	2.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
History Canada	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	3.3%	0.0%	0.3%
History of New Zealand	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Social Sciences	1.4%	3.4%	1.9%	2.1%	3.2%	3.0%	2.4%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	3.0%	9.5%	6.5%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.4%
Groups of people	0.0%	0.9%	1.9%	0.0%	3.2%	0.0%	0.9%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	6.5%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.6%
Culture & institutions	0.0%	1.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.4%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	3.0%	9.5%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.8%
Factors affecting social behaviour	0.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Social problems and services	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	2.1%	0.0%	3.0%	0.4%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Sociology & anthropology	0.0%	0.9%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Social problems of groups of people	0.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Language & education	1.4%	1.7%	1.9%	0.0%	0.0%	3.0%	1.3%	0.0%	3.3%	0.0%	0.0%	2.9%	6.1%	0.0%	6.5%	3.0%	6.7%	4.3%	3.1%
French & related languages	0.0%	0.9%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	2.9%	6.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	3.3%	0.0%	1.1%
Education	0.0%	0.0%	1.9%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.2%	0.0%	3.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	3.2%	3.0%	0.0%	2.2%	0.0%	1.1%
Secondary education	0.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	3.2%	0.0%	0.0%	2.2%	0.0%	0.6%
Linguistics	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	3.0%	0.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	3.3%	0.0%	0.3%
Higher education	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Tertiary education	0.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Adult education	0.0%	0.9%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%

Column percentages	1919 to 1924						1919 to 1924 Total						1925 to 1935						1925 to 1935 Total					
	1919	1920	1921	1922	1923	1924	1925	1926	1927	1928	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935							
	Books & Literature	0.7%	1.7%	3.7%	2.1%	1.6%	0.0%	1.5%	2.9%	0.0%	0.0%	6.7%	8.8%	0.0%	9.5%	6.5%	0.0%	3.3%	0.0%	3.1%				
English fiction	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.6%	0.0%	0.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	3.3%	0.0%	0.0%	9.5%	0.0%	0.0%	3.3%	0.0%	1.1%					
English & old English literatures	0.0%	0.9%	3.7%	2.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.9%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	2.9%	0.0%	0.0%	3.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.6%					
French literature	0.0%	0.9%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.2%	2.9%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	5.9%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.8%					
French miscellaneous writings	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	3.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.3%					
English humour & satire	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	3.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.3%					
French drama	0.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%					
Religion	0.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	3.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	3.3%	0.0%	0.6%					
Missions and religious education	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%					
Christian ethics	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	3.3%	0.0%	0.3%					
Religious experience, life, practice	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%					
Christianity	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	3.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.3%					
Islam	0.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%					
Science	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	3.0%	0.2%	2.9%	3.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	3.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.8%					
Geology, hydrology, meteorology	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	3.0%	0.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	3.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.3%					
Genetics and evolution	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%					
Plants	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	2.9%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.3%					
Mathematical geography	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	3.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.3%					
Philosophy & psychology	1.4%	0.9%	0.0%	0.0%	1.6%	0.0%	0.9%	2.9%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.3%					
Parapsychology & occultism	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.6%	0.0%	0.2%	2.9%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.3%					
Ethics	0.7%	0.9%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.4%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%					
Ethical systems	0.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%					
Grand Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%					

Column percentages	1936 to 1939				1936 to	Grand
	1936	1937	1938	1939	1939 Total	Total
Politics & Law	36.1%	34.1%	25.0%	33.7%	32.5%	27.0%
International Relations	19.4%	12.2%	12.5%	12.0%	13.5%	11.0%
International migration & colonisation	8.3%	9.8%	5.0%	9.6%	8.5%	5.3%
Relation of state to organised groups & their members	5.6%	2.4%	0.0%	6.0%	4.0%	2.3%
Military Law	0.0%	7.3%	0.0%	0.0%	1.5%	2.0%
Criminal Law	2.8%	0.0%	0.0%	1.2%	1.0%	1.7%
Systems of government & states	0.0%	2.4%	0.0%	1.2%	1.0%	1.4%
The political process	0.0%	0.0%	2.5%	2.4%	1.5%	1.0%
Civil & political rights	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.2%	0.5%	0.7%
Politics & government	0.0%	0.0%	2.5%	0.0%	0.5%	0.5%
Law of nations	0.0%	0.0%	2.5%	0.0%	0.5%	0.4%
Political science	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.4%
Constitutional & administrative law	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%
Laws, regulations, specific cases	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%
Film & cinematography	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%
Slavery & emancipation	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%
Sport, Arts & Recreation	11.1%	14.6%	17.5%	13.3%	14.0%	16.2%
Athletic & outdoor sports & games	8.3%	9.8%	5.0%	2.4%	5.5%	6.4%
Film & cinematography	0.0%	2.4%	10.0%	2.4%	3.5%	3.0%
Equestrian sports & animal racing	2.8%	0.0%	2.5%	2.4%	2.0%	2.0%
Music	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	4.8%	2.0%	1.6%
Indoor games & amusements	0.0%	2.4%	0.0%	0.0%	0.5%	1.2%
Recreational & performing arts	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.2%	0.5%	1.0%
Aquatic & air sports	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.5%
Sports, games & entertainment	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.2%
Painting (art)	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.2%
Vocal music	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%
Geography & travel	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%
Commerce, Communications, Trade, Transport	2.8%	17.1%	7.5%	12.0%	10.5%	12.3%
Water, air, space transportation	2.8%	7.3%	0.0%	6.0%	4.5%	3.7%
Postal communications	0.0%	2.4%	2.5%	2.4%	2.0%	2.4%
Commerce (Trade)	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	2.1%
International commerce	0.0%	7.3%	5.0%	1.2%	3.0%	2.1%
Railroad transportation	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.6%
Transportation	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.5%
Communications	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	2.4%	1.0%	0.5%
Air transportation	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.2%
Commerce, communications, & transport	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%
News media, journalism & publishing	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%
International Communications	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%

Column percentages	1936 to 1939				1936 to 1939 Total	Grand Total
	1936	1937	1938	1939		
Economics	8.3%	12.2%	22.5%	4.8%	10.5%	10.0%
International economics	5.6%	9.8%	15.0%	3.6%	7.5%	4.7%
Public finance	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.2%	0.5%	1.3%
Labour economics	2.8%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.5%	1.3%
Financial economics	0.0%	0.0%	2.5%	0.0%	0.5%	1.2%
Production	0.0%	2.4%	0.0%	0.0%	0.5%	0.7%
Economics	0.0%	0.0%	2.5%	0.0%	0.5%	0.3%
Economics of land & energy	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.2%
Economics production	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%
Socialism & related systems	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%
Macroeconomics	0.0%	0.0%	2.5%	0.0%	0.5%	0.1%
Customs, death customs, etiquette, folklore	11.1%	0.0%	0.0%	3.6%	3.5%	9.7%
Death customs	8.3%	0.0%	0.0%	2.4%	2.5%	4.0%
Customs, etiquette, folklore	2.8%	0.0%	0.0%	1.2%	1.0%	2.4%
Costume & personal appearance	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.2%
Customs of life cycle & domestic life	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.8%
Customs of war & diplomacy	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.6%
General customs	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.3%
Etiquette (manners)	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.3%
UNKNOWN	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%
Technology	16.7%	4.9%	5.0%	7.2%	8.0%	7.8%
Garden crops	2.8%	2.4%	2.5%	3.6%	3.0%	1.8%
Sewing, clothing, management of personal and family life	2.8%	0.0%	0.0%	2.4%	1.5%	1.2%
Medicine & health	2.8%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.5%	0.6%
Food & drink	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.6%
Engineering & applied operations	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.3%
Orchards, fruits, forestry	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.3%
Animal husbandry	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.3%
Agriculture & related technologies	0.0%	0.0%	2.5%	0.0%	0.5%	0.3%
Hunting, fishing, conservation, related technologies	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.2%
Child rearing	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.2%
Hydraulic engineering	0.0%	2.4%	0.0%	0.0%	0.5%	0.2%
Civil engineering	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.2%
Surgery	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.2%
Home & family management	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.2%	0.5%	0.2%
Diseases	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.2%
Gynecology, obstetrics, pediatrics, geriatrics	2.8%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.5%	0.1%
Processing dairy & related products	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%
Technology of other organic products	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%
Human anatomy, cytology, histology	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%
Field and plantation crops	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%
Mining & related operations	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%
Technology of explosives, fuels, related products	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%
Agriculture Field plantations and crops.	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%
Pharmacology mad therapeutics	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%
Plant injuries, diseases, pests	2.8%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.5%	0.1%
Housekeeping	2.8%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.5%	0.1%

Column percentages	1936 to 1939				1936 to 1939 Total	Grand Total
	1936	1937	1938	1939		
Public administration & military science	2.8%	4.9%	2.5%	21.7%	11.0%	6.3%
Sea forces & warfare	2.8%	2.4%	2.5%	0.0%	1.5%	2.0%
Military science	0.0%	2.4%	0.0%	6.0%	3.0%	1.6%
Foot forces & warfare	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	4.8%	2.0%	1.2%
Air & other specialised forces	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	9.6%	4.0%	1.0%
Public administration & military science	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.2%	0.5%	0.6%
History & geography	2.8%	4.9%	10.0%	1.2%	4.0%	3.4%
History of France & Monaco	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.2%
Geography & travel	0.0%	2.4%	2.5%	1.2%	1.5%	0.7%
History of Europe	0.0%	2.4%	0.0%	0.0%	0.5%	0.4%
Organisations & management of history	2.8%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.5%	0.2%
French history	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.2%
Russian history	0.0%	0.0%	2.5%	0.0%	0.5%	0.1%
History United States	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%
History of Russia	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%
History collective accounts of events	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%
History of British Isles	0.0%	0.0%	2.5%	0.0%	0.5%	0.1%
History of Middle East	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%
History Canada	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%
History of New Zealand	0.0%	0.0%	2.5%	0.0%	0.5%	0.1%
Social Sciences	2.8%	4.9%	2.5%	1.2%	2.5%	2.1%
Groups of people	2.8%	0.0%	2.5%	1.2%	1.5%	0.9%
Culture & institutions	0.0%	2.4%	0.0%	0.0%	0.5%	0.6%
Factors affecting social behaviour	0.0%	2.4%	0.0%	0.0%	0.5%	0.2%
Social problems and services	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.2%
Sociology & anthropology	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%
Social problems of groups of people	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%
Language & education	2.8%	2.4%	2.5%	0.0%	1.5%	2.0%
French & related languages	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.5%
Education	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.5%
Secondary education	0.0%	2.4%	0.0%	0.0%	0.5%	0.4%
Linguistics	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.2%
Higher education	2.8%	0.0%	2.5%	0.0%	1.0%	0.2%
Tertiary education	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%
Adult education	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%

Column percentages						
	1936 to 1939				1936 to 1939 Total	Grand Total
	1936	1937	1938	1939		
Books & Literature	0.0%	0.0%	2.5%	0.0%	0.5%	1.9%
English fiction	0.0%	0.0%	2.5%	0.0%	0.5%	0.6%
English & old English literatures	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.6%
French literature	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.4%
French miscellaneous writings	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%
English humour & satire	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%
French drama	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%
Religion	0.0%	0.0%	2.5%	1.2%	1.0%	0.5%
Missions and religious education	0.0%	0.0%	2.5%	0.0%	0.5%	0.1%
Christian ethics	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%
Religious experience, life, practice	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.2%	0.5%	0.1%
Christianity	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%
Islam	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%
Science	2.8%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.5%	0.5%
Geology, hydrology, meteorology	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.2%
Genetics and evolution	2.8%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.5%	0.1%
Plants	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%
Mathematical geography	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%
Philosophy & psychology	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.5%
Parapsychology & occultism	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.2%
Ethics	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.2%
Ethical systems	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%
Grand Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%