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What factors may influence defence future relations between
New Zealand and the European Union?

A thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Philosophy
In
Defence Studies

at Massey University, Palmerston North,
New Zealand

Peter Cain

2008
Abstract

New Zealand and the European Union (EU) have a long standing and broad spectrum relationship which appears likely to continue to strengthen. However, there is little academic literature regarding the existing defence aspects of this relationship and even less on the possible future form of the relationship. Consequently, this thesis aims to identify the factors that may influence defence future relations between New Zealand and the EU. In order to determine these key factors the thesis examines the following key areas:

- Background to the relationship between New Zealand and the EU.

- The overall relationship between New Zealand and the EU - present status and future influences.

- Present status of defence links between New Zealand and the EU.

- Key elements of the 2007 Joint Declaration on Relations and Co-operation that may influence future defence relations between New Zealand and the EU.

- Key interests of the EU that may influence it’s future defence relations with New Zealand.

- Key interests of New Zealand that may influence it’s future defence relations with the EU.
Acknowledgements

I would like to acknowledge the assistance of my thesis supervisor, Dr Lance Beath. I should also like to acknowledge the assistance provided by the staff of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade including Peter Kennedy, Bronwyn Evans-Kent and Mary Thurston.
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<tr>
<td>ACP</td>
<td>African, Caribbean, Pacific.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADF</td>
<td>Australian Defence Force.</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMM</td>
<td>Aceh Monitoring Mission.</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANP</td>
<td>Afghan National Police.</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANZAC</td>
<td>Australia New Zealand Army Corp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANZUS</td>
<td>Australia, New Zealand, United States.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APEC</td>
<td>Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARF</td>
<td>Association of South East Asian Nation’s Regional Forum.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of South East Asian Nations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDR</td>
<td>Closer Defence Relations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CER</td>
<td>Closer Economic Relations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSE</td>
<td>Communications and Signals Establishment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTC</td>
<td>Counter Terrorism Committee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTED</td>
<td>Counter Terrorism Executive Directorate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPMC</td>
<td>Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSACEUR</td>
<td>Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDF</td>
<td>European Development Fund.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEZ</td>
<td>Exclusive Economic Zone.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defence Policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESS</td>
<td>European Security Strategy.</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUPOL</td>
<td>European Union Police.</td>
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<tr>
<td>EXIM</td>
<td>Export Import Bank.</td>
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<tr>
<td>FCO</td>
<td>Foreign and Commonwealth Office.</td>
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<tr>
<td>FPDA</td>
<td>Five Power Defence Arrangement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRENZ</td>
<td>Facilitating Research Co-operation between the European Union and New Zealand.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>FRANZ</td>
<td>France, Australia, New Zealand.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSM</td>
<td>Federated States of Micronesia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GATT</td>
<td>General Agreement on Trades and Tariffs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCHQ</td>
<td>Government Communications Headquarters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCSB</td>
<td>Government Communications Security Bureau.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERFET</td>
<td>International Force East Timor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCLEC</td>
<td>Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Co-operation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDLIC</td>
<td>Least Developed Landlocked and Island Countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LoI</td>
<td>Letter of Intent.</td>
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<tr>
<td>LOT</td>
<td>Liaison and Observation Team.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAP</td>
<td>Military Assistance Programme.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFAT</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFO</td>
<td>Multinational Force Observers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLO</td>
<td>Military Liaison Officer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCRE</td>
<td>National Centre for Research on Europe.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NHI</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization Helicopter Industries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSA</td>
<td>National Security Agency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZ</td>
<td>New Zealand.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZDF</td>
<td>New Zealand Defence Force.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCCAR</td>
<td>Organisation Conjointe de Cooperation en Matiere d’Armement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Overseas Development Aid.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCT</td>
<td>Overseas Countries and Territories.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIF</td>
<td>Pacific Islands’ Forum.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAAF</td>
<td>Royal Australian Air Force.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAF</td>
<td>Royal Air Force.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAMSI</td>
<td>Regional Assistance Mission Solomon Islands.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRT</td>
<td>Provincial Reconstruction Team.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSI</td>
<td>Proliferation Security Initiative.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QEII</td>
<td>Queen Elizabeth the Second.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RNZAF</td>
<td>Royal New Zealand Air Force.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RNZN</td>
<td>Royal New Zealand Navy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RTC</td>
<td>Regional Training Centre.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UKANATT</td>
<td>United Kingdom Afghan National Army Training Team.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIK</td>
<td>United Nations’ Mission in Kosovo.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTSO</td>
<td>United Nations’ Truce Supervision Organization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>United Soviet Socialist Republic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organisation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WW1</td>
<td>World War One.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WW2</td>
<td>World War Two.</td>
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</table>
INTRODUCTION

The literature review outlines the sources of information used in researching the subject of this thesis. To present the reader with the findings of the analysis of the sources of information in a logical manner the body of the thesis is divided into seven chapters.

The first two chapters describe the broader relationship between the two parties. *Background to the relationship between New Zealand and the European Union* outlines key internal issues within the EU of significant relevance to future defence relations and briefly describes the historical development of the general relationship between the two parties. *The overall relationship between New Zealand and the European Union - present status and future influences* outlines political, economic and common geo-strategic interests of the two parties, as well as describing likely key challenges and influences upon the future general relationship.

The third and fourth chapters concentrate on defence and security relations between the two parties. *Present status of defence links between New Zealand and the European Union* examines the extent of the historical and current defence and security links between the two entities. *Key elements of the 2007 Joint Declaration on Relations and Co-operation that may influence future defence relations between New Zealand and the European Union* examines key extracts of this guiding political document that appear relevant to future defence relations.

The fifth and sixth chapters identify each party’s interests that may directly or indirectly influence defence relations. The seventh chapter summarises the findings of the first six chapters and suggests a list of factors that appear likely to influence defence future relations between New Zealand and the EU.
LITERATURE REVIEW

Review of official sources of information

A review of official policy documents provides a starting point for attempting to identify the factors that may influence defence future relations between New Zealand and the EU. The *2007 Joint Declaration on Relations and Co-operation between the European Union and New Zealand* is the most recent official document that outlines the political intentions of the two parties for the development of their overall relationship. A review of this document identified the following extracts of possible relevance to defence future relations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Review of 2007 Joint Declaration on Relations and Co-operation between the European Union and New Zealand</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviated extracts of possible relevance to defence future relations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Common Goals that may have relevance to future defence co-operation:**
  - Support democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, within their own societies and internationally.
  - Support the maintenance of international peace and security, including through peace support operations.
  - Support the role of the UN and promote its effectiveness.
  - Support international efforts in non-proliferation, disarmament and arms control, and counter terrorism.
  - Foster mutual knowledge and understanding between their peoples and of their cultures.

- **Continue the practice of close, practical co-operation, demonstrated in Bosnia and Afghanistan, in similar crisis management and post-conflict stabilisation activities.**

- **Strengthen their relationship in global and regional security, counter-terrorism and human rights and identify opportunities for closer dialogue and co-operation between the participants on counter-terrorism.**

- **Ratification and implementation of all UN counter-terrorism conventions.**

- **Readiness to assist third countries in meeting their counter-terrorism obligations.**

- **The stability and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region is a priority and a significant focus of political and security dialogues.**

- **New Zealand and the EU value their good co-operation as like-minded partners in the ARF and will continue their efforts to strengthen the ARF as a vehicle for co-operation.**

- **New Zealand and the EU share the concern that some countries in the Pacific face political and security challenges and will work together to address this.**

Review of the *2007 Joint Declaration on Relations and Co-operation between the European Union and New Zealand* suggested that additional strategic relations policy documents concerning the two entities’ relations in the Asia-Pacific region should be considered. Six key documents appear to contain elements that may have significant relevance to defence future relations - these are outlined in the following table.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Document</th>
<th>Abbreviated extracts of possible relevance to defence future relations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade Our Future with Asia¹. | - New Zealand has vital political, security, trade and economic interests in Asia.  
- New Zealand must work with Asian countries and regional groupings to develop and maintain regional security and stability and to address trans-national issues of concern.  
- New Zealand is a participant in regional security dialogue through the ARF and FPDA.  
- New Zealand will develop its relationship with ASEAN. |
| Nuremburg Declaration on an EU-ASEAN Enhanced Partnership 2007². | - Promote closer co-operation in addressing and combating terrorism, trafficking in human beings, drug trafficking, sea piracy, arms smuggling, money laundering, cyber-crime and related trans-national crime.  
- Co-operate in the areas of disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery.  
- Encourage participation of ASEAN member countries in ESDP operations. |
| 2008 European Union - Australia Partnership Framework³. | Key items of defence and security interest identified for ongoing collaboration:  
- Identify shared security interests within the ESDP.  
- Enhance co-operation to counter illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons.  
- Support ISAF’s Comprehensive Strategic Political Military Plan for Afghanistan.  
- Encourage the ARF to enhance regional security including counter-terrorism.  
- Maintain high level bilateral consultation on the global terrorist threat.  
- Continue support for the JCLEC.  
- Enhance co-operation to combat terrorism and trans-national crime. |
| European Commission’s Communication 2003 / 399 “A New Partnership with South East Asia”⁴. | - Strategic objective of supporting regional stability and the fight against terrorism.  
- EU commitment to supporting regional co-operation to fight terrorism and to share its experience in the fight against terrorism.  
- Support for any willing South East Asian country to implement UNSCR 1373 and other relevant UN conventions.  
- Encourage South East Asia to combat terrorism with a comprehensive strategy, with respect for human rights and peaceful political opposition.  
- Strategic objective of human rights, democratic principles and good governance.  
- A strong ASEAN is most likely guarantee of South East Asian peace and stability. |
| EU Relations with the Pacific Islands⁵. | - Building a stronger political relationship on matters of common interest: global political security; trade, economic and social development; and the environment.  
- Enhancing the focus of development action and enhance regional governance.  
- Increased efficiency in aid delivery, co-ordination with Australia and New Zealand. |

Document | Abbreviated extracts of possible relevance to defence future relations
---|---
“Cotonou Agreement” between the European Union and African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries⁶ | - Article 11. Peace building, conflict prevention and resolution shall include:
  -- Support for mediation, negotiation and reconciliation efforts.
  -- Effective regional management of shared, scarce natural resources.
  -- Countering the illegal trafficking of small arms and light weapons.
- Article 30. Encourages regional co-operation to:
  -- Address arms control;
  -- Develop action against drugs, organised crime and money laundering.
  -- Implement dialogue on conflict prevention and resolution.
- Article 72. Humanitarian and emergency assistance may include:
  -- Safeguarding human lives in crises and immediate post-crisis situations brought about by natural disasters, conflict or war;
  -- Contribute to the financing and delivery of humanitarian aid by all logistical means available.
- The 2005 revision includes the following policies:
  -- Countering the proliferation of WMD.
  -- International co-operation in the fight against terrorism.
  -- Prevention of mercenary activities.
  -- Management of financial assets and the use of resources to promote peace and to manage and settle conflicts.

Review of the 2007 Joint Declaration on Relations and Co-operation between the European and New Zealand also suggests that the following three defence and security related documents also have relevance to defence future relations.

Document | Abbreviated extracts of possible relevance to defence future relations
---|---
- To assist in the maintenance of security in the South Pacific and to provide assistance to our Pacific neighbours.
- To play an appropriate role in the maintenance of security in the Asia - Pacific region, including meeting our obligations as a member of the FPDA.
- To contribute to global security and peacekeeping through participation in the full range of UN and other appropriate multilateral peace support and humanitarian relief operations.

---
Abbreviated extracts of possible relevance to defence future relations

European Security Strategy. - Key global threats are: terrorism; proliferation of WMD; regional conflicts; state failure; and organised crime.
- Emphasises the importance of international law and the primacy of the UN for the maintenance of international peace and security.
- ASEAN makes an important contribution to regional security.
- The EU’s historical, geographical and cultural ties, throughout the world, are an important asset for the development and enhancement of the EU’s external relations.

- UN Member States to implement measures to prevent and suppress terrorist acts.
- Imposes specific obligations and called for additional measures including:
  -- Criminalization of terrorism-related activities including provision of assistance to carry out those acts.
  -- Denial of funding and safe haven to terrorists.
  -- Exchange of information on terrorist groups.
- The implementation of the measures requires political commitment and the allocation of significant resources by member states.

Numerous other official policy documents, lectures, addresses, press releases and web pages - originating from Australia, France, the EU, New Zealand, the United Kingdom (UK), the United Nations (UN) and the United States of America (USA) - provide further background to the main policy documents that have been outlined in the preceding tables.

Initial Conclusions drawn from analysis of official sources of information

Analysis of the collective sources of official information tends to suggest the following conclusions regarding future potential defence relations between New Zealand and the EU.

Conclusions drawn from initial review of official sources of information

| The extent of present defence relations between New Zealand and the EU. | - Low profile.
| | - Directly consisting of small-scale co-operation on a temporary basis.
| | - Indirectly of considerable substance based upon deep and longstanding links between EU member nations and New Zealand. |

### Conclusions drawn from initial review of official sources of information

| Factors that may influence defence future relations between New Zealand and the EU. | - New Zealand's need to co-operate with reliable partners sharing similar political values and strategic goals for security co-operation in the Asia-Pacific.  
- New Zealand's desire to obtain financial support to contribute to its defence, security and development objectives in the South Pacific.  
- The EU's desire to co-operate with reliable partners sharing similar political values to demonstrate practical commitment to the ARF and to addressing the security challenges of the Asia-Pacific region.  
- Both parties desire to demonstrate practical commitment to implementing the 2007 Joint Declaration on Relations and Co-operation: European Union and New Zealand.  
- Both parties desire to play a role in global security with partners who share their commitment to the UN, multilateralism and international law.  
- The EU's capacity for leadership of global peace and security tasks could be inadequate for the most demanding peace support operations and may require support from, or leadership by NATO. |

However, whilst the above conclusions may appear to be acceptable on a ‘prima facie’ basis, they do not perhaps give sufficient recognition to the potential hidden influences that may prove to be strong determinants in shaping future potential defence relations between New Zealand and the EU. Consequently, it is necessary to review academic literature in order to develop a more robust appreciation of the factors that may influence future defence relations between the two parties.

### Review of academic sources of information

Perhaps not surprisingly, there would appear to be a dearth of published academic literature focusing exclusively on defence relations between New Zealand and the EU. In contrast, there is a plethora of information on the EU. This is complemented by the availability of a significant quantity of literature on the Asia-Pacific region and New Zealand that has indirect relevance to future potential defence relations between New Zealand and the EU. The following articles of academic literature provide significant insights to some of the issues - which are identified within official sources of information - regarding future EU domestic, political, foreign policy, security and defence issues.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Literature Article</th>
<th>Extracts of significance to analysis of official sources of information</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>‘Armed Forces and Society in Europe’ by A Forster&lt;sup&gt;10&lt;/sup&gt;.</td>
<td>- The status of military capabilities within EU member states.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Democracy and Military Force’ by P Everts&lt;sup&gt;11&lt;/sup&gt;.</td>
<td>- Popular support within EU member states for military action during international security emergencies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘EU Operational Capabilities’ by L Pnevmaticou&lt;sup&gt;12&lt;/sup&gt;.</td>
<td>- Prediction of the development of the ESDP and the longer-term military relationship between the EU and NATO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Europe and the new balance of global order’ by H Maull&lt;sup&gt;13&lt;/sup&gt;.</td>
<td>- The context of the ESS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- The effectiveness of the EU as a global power.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Euro-clash’ by N Fligstein&lt;sup&gt;14&lt;/sup&gt;.</td>
<td>EU domestic issues including:</td>
</tr>
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<td>- The functioning of political processes.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Likely internal influences on future political integration.</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>- The perception of a European identity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Popular resistance to continued integration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- The development of foreign policy, defence industry and military capabilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘European Foreign Policy’ by S Nuttal&lt;sup&gt;15&lt;/sup&gt;.</td>
<td>EU foreign policy challenges during times of international security emergencies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘European Security and Trans-Atlantic relations after 9/11 and the Iraq war’ by H</td>
<td>- The relative influence of individual nation states within European defence and security organisations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gärtnert and I Cuthbertson&lt;sup&gt;16&lt;/sup&gt;.</td>
<td>- The suitability of the EU’s military capabilities for security tasks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Headline Goal 2010 and the Concept of the EU Battle Groups’ by J Lindley-French&lt;</td>
<td>- The development of the EU’s military capabilities.</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Public Opinion and European Defense’ by P Manigart&lt;sup&gt;18&lt;/sup&gt;.</td>
<td>- Attitudes towards EU military integration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘The attitudes of European Officers towards European Defense’ by F Merand&lt;sup&gt;19&lt;/sup&gt;.</td>
<td>- Attitudes of EU member state military personnel on defence and security issues.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following academic articles provide insights into some of the Asia-Pacific issues that should be considered when analysing official sources of information regarding future potential defence relations between New Zealand and the EU.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Literature Article</th>
<th>Extracts of significance to analysis of official sources of information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>‘The EU’s Relations with Developing States’ by M Lister20.</td>
<td>- Issues surrounding the effectiveness of the EU’s international development aid.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘The European Union and the Asia Pacific: Media, Public and Elite perceptions of the EU’ edited by N Chaban and M Holland21.</td>
<td>- Perceived issues in the EU’s democratic functioning.</td>
</tr>
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<th>Literature Article</th>
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The following articles contain information which has relevance in analysing sources of official information regarding New Zealand issues that may influence future potential defence relations between New Zealand and the EU.

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<td>‘The European Union and the Asia Pacific: Media, Public and Elite perceptions of the EU’ edited by N Chaban and M Holland32.</td>
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<td>‘The Role of France in Pacific Island’s Security’ by K Von Strokirch33.</td>
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32 Chaban and Holland.
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Collectively, the extracts of academic literature outlined in the preceding tables provide a useful tool for the analysis of sources of official information. The method for conducting this analysis is outlined in the following section.

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MATERIALS AND METHODS

As outlined in the literature review, analysis of official sources of information suggests a theoretical outline for defence future relations between New Zealand and the EU. During 2006 - 2007 a review of official documents, a limited quantity of academic literature on specific EU issues, and interviews with personnel from the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) and the Ministry of Defence (MOD) International Relations Branch were conducted. These interviews indicated that there were many significant issues in addition to those identified during the initial analysis of official sources of information.

To examine the extent of these additional issues, it was necessary to review further academic literature during 2008. In searching for academic material with which to contrast, compare and critique the official sources of information a significant degree of reliance was placed upon extracting relevant observations from academic articles that have a peripheral relevance to future potential defence relations between New Zealand and the EU. Rarely has the main substance of an academic article been of direct relevance to the topic of this thesis. Following this review of academic sources of literature a limited number of interviews were conducted with MFAT personnel who suggested additional areas of research necessary to refine the analysis of the official sources of information.

In writing this Thesis the intention has been to provide the reader with the wider background to relations between New Zealand and the EU. Consequently, the first two chapters and some elements of subsequent chapters cover topics which may not appear to be immediately relevant to defence relations. However, these references to the wider relationship between the two parties are necessary in order to appreciate the wider political and economic influences that may affect defence future relations between New Zealand and the EU.
CHAPTER ONE
BACKGROUND TO THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
NEW ZEALAND AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

Before examining the present status of the overall relationship between New Zealand and the EU, it is necessary to describe the present form of the EU and outline the development of its relationship with New Zealand.

Outline of the European Union

*Europe in 12 Lessons* states that the EU has evolved over more than 50 years into its present form comprising 27 member countries. It has a combined population of 450 million people and produces the world’s largest gross domestic product (GDP). The EU does not fit any traditional legal category of statehood and in this sense the EU is unique - it is more than a confederation of states, but it is not a federal state. It can be described as a family of democratic European countries that have ceded part of their sovereignty to common institutions, so that decisions on specific matters of joint interest can be made democratically at a European level. Officially, the twenty seven member countries of the EU work together in order to achieve the following for the people of Europe:

- Peace, prosperity and stability.
- Overcome the divisions on the continent that have historically resulted in terrible conflict.
- Ensure that people can live in safety.
- Promote balanced economic and social development.
- Meet globalisation challenges whilst preserving the diversity of the peoples of Europe.
- Uphold the values that Europeans share: sustainable development; a sound environment; respect for human rights; and a social market economy.

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38 *Europe in 12 Lessons*, in http://europa.eu/abc/12lessons/lesson_1/index_en.htm
Organisation of the European Union

*Euro-clash* states that, for the outsider, the EU can appear to be an administrative nightmare. The proliferation of organisations in Brussels and the complexity of their relationships make the operation of the EU seem impenetrable\(^{39}\). There are nine major institutions within the EU: The European Parliament; The Council of the EU; The European Commission; The Court of Justice; The Court of Auditors; The Economic and Social Committee; The Committee of Regions; The European Central Bank; and the European Investment Bank. The first four of these institutions arguably have the most relevance to New Zealand’s relations with the EU and are described in the following paragraphs.

The European Parliament shares responsibility, with the Council of the EU, for approving or rejecting proposed new laws and the annual budget. Additionally, the European Parliament has the power to dismiss the European Commission. The European Parliament has a total of 785 members who are elected every five years in democratic elections by the people of the EU’s 27 member states.

The Council of the EU represents the interests of the member states and consists of ministers from the 27 national governments. Up to four times each year the presidents, or prime ministers, of the member states conduct summit meetings, known as the European Council, to set overall EU policy. Most of the decisions are passed on a majority vote, although a unanimous decision is required on critical issues including taxation, asylum, immigration, and foreign and security policy\(^{40}\). Presently, the Presidency of the European Council is rotated every six months between the member states\(^{41}\).

\(^{39}\) Fligstein, p. 38.

\(^{40}\) *Panorama of the European Union, how are we Organized?*, in [http://www.europa.eu/abc/panorama/howorganised/index_en.htm](http://www.europa.eu/abc/panorama/howorganised/index_en.htm)

The European Commission promotes the common interests of the EU and is independent of the member states’ national governments. The European Commission drafts proposals for new European laws and presents them to the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union. The European Commission also manages the daily business of implementing European Union policy and the expenditure of EU funds. The President of the European Commission is chosen by the EU’s 27 member states’ national governments, subject to the approval of the European Parliament. Additionally, the European Commission monitors breaches of EU treaties and laws and can refer rule-breakers to the European Court of Justice. The Court of Justice ensures that EU law is interpreted and applied consistently in all of the 27 member countries.\textsuperscript{42}

\textit{Euro-clash} identifies that the EU member states, through their control of the Council and their ultimate vote on directives, would seem to have the upper hand in political processes otherwise managed by the Commission. When scholars have asked participants in policymaking in Brussels who is most influential, the answer is typically the member state governments, followed by lobbying groups, and the European Commission.\textsuperscript{43}

\textbf{Evolution of the European Union}

A number of European leaders in the late 1940s became convinced that the only way to establish a lasting peace in Europe was to politically and economically unite France and Germany. The first step of this process was the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952 by Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. In 1957 the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community were created amongst the six countries, thereby forming a common market. In 1967 the institutions of all three communities were formally merged into the European Community. In 1973 the first enlargement of the European Community took place with the addition of Denmark, Ireland and the UK. The 1980s saw further membership expansion with Greece joining in 1981 and Spain and Portugal joining in 1986. The 1992 Treaty of Maastricht laid the basis for further forms of co-

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Panorama of the European Union, how are we Organized?
\item Fligstein, p. 41-2.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
operation in defence and foreign policy, in judicial and internal affairs, and in the creation of an economic and monetary union. This further integration created the EU. In 1995, Austria, Finland and Sweden joined the EU. This was followed in 2004 by the addition of Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. Bulgaria and Romania joined in 2007, raising the total membership of the EU to 27 nations. Candidate countries for future membership of the EU include Croatia, Turkey and the Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia\(^{44}\). The present 27 EU member states and the candidate countries are shown on the following map\(^{45}\).

In 1999 a new currency, the euro, was launched on world money markets. In 2002 the euro was introduced to widespread retail circulation and by 2008 was the sole currency of 15 member states. The President of the European Council has described the

European single market as an undisputed success. *Europe: the way forward* states that the EU has the largest economy in the world, with a GDP in 2006 of approximately New Zealand $22 trillion. The EU is also the world's largest trader, accounting for approximately 20 percent of global trade in goods and services\(^{46}\).

**Popular support for the European Union integration process**

Whilst the EU can be described as a highly successful model of regional economic integration, it does not enjoy widespread popularity amongst its own citizens. An indicator of the lack of popular support for the EU integration process was the rejection in 2005, by French and Dutch voters through national referendums, of an EU Draft Treaty for a Constitution. As a consequence of this rejection, the proposed EU Constitution was revised and a Draft Reform Treaty was proposed in 2007 - popularly known as the ‘Lisbon Treaty’. To implement the Lisbon Treaty would have required it to be ratified by all of the 27 EU member states for real progress on the adoption and implementation of an EU Constitution to be achieved\(^{47}\).

The idea behind the Lisbon Treaty was to omit the unpopular trappings of statehood (motto, flag, etc.) but to retain the key practical features of the constitutional treaty - a new full-time post of EU president; reworked voting weightings to reflect a greatly expanded membership; reduced national vetoes in a number of policy areas; expanded powers for the European Parliament; and a single foreign service\(^{48}\). However, the Draft Reform Lisbon Treaty was rejected by Irish voters during a national referendum during 2008.

*Euro-clash* identifies that the majority of European citizens associate more strongly with a national rather than a European identity. One method of gauging the attitudes towards a European identity amongst the populace of the EU is through a series of surveys called ‘Eurobarometers’. These are financed through the European Commission and carried out simultaneously in EU member countries and study social


\(^{46}\) Julien.

\(^{47}\) ibid.
and political opinions. One survey question during 2004 asked whether respondents associated with a European or National Identity. Whilst results differed markedly between 15 countries, the clear result was that most Europeans associate with a National identity rather than a European identity. The results of this survey are displayed in the following graph.

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The European Union and the Asia-Pacific: Media, Public and Elite perceptions of the EU notes that the rejections of EU national referendums in the Netherlands, France and Ireland have been compounded by other crises including: record low voter participation in the June 2004 elections for the European Parliament; the emergence of anti-EU parties; the cautious reaction by the general public to further expansion to the east; and the ongoing debate within European publics and elites concerning the membership prospects of Turkey. Collectively, these crises point to three fundamental shortfalls in the EU's effective democratic functioning: democracy; legitimacy and communication. Intense academic debate surrounds these three shortfalls but there is increased

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49 Fligstein, table 5.2, p. 143.
acknowledgement by policy makers that they are the primary impediment to the EU’s integration process\textsuperscript{50}.

**Development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the European Security Strategy**

*European Foreign Policy* states that the Cold War dominated European defence and security interests for approximately 40 years until the removal of the Berlin Wall in 1989. The end of the Cold War marked a shift from an immediate, clear and powerful external threat to European states, to a period of increasing global instability and uncertainty. Prior to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 little attention had been paid to the security dimension of European Commission foreign policy making. The European Communities’ response of economic sanctions against Iraq proved to be inadequate and the European Community was unable to make a collective military contribution to the military campaign\textsuperscript{51}. There was a significant difference of popular opinion between individual nations concerning the use of violence to liberate Kuwait and a substantial difference in public support for the commitment of military ground forces to evict Iraqi Forces from Kuwait. These differences are outlined in the following graph\textsuperscript{52}.

\begin{figure}[h!]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{graph.png}
\caption{Graph showing differences in national support for military action.}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{50} Chaban and Holland, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{51} Nuttal, p. 9.
\textsuperscript{52} Everts, table 6.2, p. 103.
As a consequence of a failure to reach agreement amongst EU member states, countries made individual decisions about participation. This convinced many influential parties that the European Community would not achieve global influence unless it developed the means to project military power\textsuperscript{53}.

In 1992 the ‘Maastricht Treaty’ on EU expressed an intention to develop a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)\textsuperscript{54}. In the same year a five-nation military force, known as Euro Corp, was created by France, Germany, Belgium, Spain and Luxembourg. Euro Corp subsequently conducted peacekeeping missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, the Democratic Republic of Congo\textsuperscript{55}, and Kosovo.

In 1999 the ‘Amsterdam Treaty’ established the office of ‘High Representative for the CFSP’. The purpose of this Office was to co-ordinate CFSP and act as the public face of EU foreign policy. Also in 1999, the European Council placed crisis management tasks - known as “The Petersburg Tasks” - at the core of the process of strengthening the CFSP. The crisis management tasks include: humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping; and peace making. Additionally, the European Council decided that the EU required the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, to respond to international crises without prejudice to the actions of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)\textsuperscript{56}.

In 2003 the EU adopted a European Security Strategy (ESS). The strategy advocated that Europe should share responsibility for global security and building a better world. The Strategy identified key global threats with consequences for the EU as follows: terrorism; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD); regional conflicts; state failure; and organised crime. The Strategy emphasised the importance of international law and the primacy of the UN for the maintenance of international peace and security. The ESS also identified that regional organisations, including the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), make an important contribution to security. Additionally, the ESS identified that the EU’s historical, geographical and cultural ties,

\textsuperscript{53} Nuttal, p. 9.
\textsuperscript{55} The World Factbook, European Union.
\textsuperscript{56} European Security and Defence Policy, in http://ue.eu.int/cms3_fo/showPage.asp
throughout the world, were an important asset for the development and enhancement of
the EU’s external relations. However, in *Europe and the New Balance of Global
Order* it has been suggested that although the ESS is a succinct, well-written description
of the EU’s ‘role concept’ as a civilian force and its aims and purpose in international
relations, it cannot be described as a true strategy. The document fails to spell out the
policy implications of its analysis and therefore does little to relate tangible means to
specific ends in given problem areas.

Potentially undermining the credibility of the CFSP and the ESS is the perception that
the EU’s development of independent military capability falls short of the requirements
of its policy objectives. *Headline Goal 2010 and the concept of the EU Battle Groups*
observes that in 1999 the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) set a target
known as the ‘Helsinki Headline Goal’. It was envisaged that by 2003, the EU member
states would be able to deploy within 60 days a military force up to Corps level (15
brigades or 50 – 60,000 personnel) that would be capable of conducting the most
demanding crisis management operations. The Helsinki Headline Goal objective was
not achieved and in 2004 the European Council recognised the shortfall and embraced
what amounted to a much more modest target known as “Headline Goal 2010”. This
concept envisaged having a force comprised of battle groups, each with a strength of
2,500 personnel, able to deploy within 15 days, to conduct a full spectrum of crisis
management operations. A target was set of achieving 13 EU battle groups by 2009.
Overall, Headline Goal 2010 is a retreat from the Helsinki Headline Goal and reflects
“the art of the possible, as opposed to the science of the required”.

In 2004 the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe offered possibilities for
increased defence and security co-operation by EU member nations. Had the Treaty
been approved, the ESDP would have been implemented. However, the rejection of the
Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe by French and Dutch voters in 2005 - and
the Draft Reform Treaty by Irish voters in 2008 - halted these plans.

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58 *Maull*, p. 792 - 4.
The European Union’s Global Influence

Whilst the EU advocates that it is developing and strengthening its foreign policy and external relations, there is considerable doubt as to the EU’s power in these areas. *Treaty Gamesmanship* outlines that the Russian invasion of South Ossetia in August 2008 provided an interesting insight into the strength of the EU’s foreign policy and ability to wield diplomatic power. The French President, who held the rotating EU presidency at the time of the invasion, claimed that the EU had risen to the occasion. He also argued that it could have been done better if the Lisbon Treaty had been ratified, as a consequence of a permanent President of the European Council and a strengthened representative for foreign policy. However, the tendency for divisions to arise in the EU during international diplomatic challenges - that had been exposed during crises in Yugoslavia and Iraq - re-emerged during the South Ossetia incident. Against this evidence of division it would appear that the mere ratification of the Lisbon Treaty would be insufficient to create a forceful common foreign policy.

In *Public Perceptions of the EU in Thailand and South Korea* it is argued that despite the EU’s aspirations to promote democracy, civil society development, human rights, free trade and good international governance, the EU can only be considered a ‘soft’ force in international relations because it does not have at its disposal traditional means of statecraft. A key point is that the CFSP depends on the inner consensus of the member states. Additionally, swift and decisive actions have been rare because of the procedural and logistical complexities of intergovernmental co-ordination. Furthermore, it has been suggested that the EU is mostly a regional rather than a global force. The EU has been quite successful in promoting, through dialogue, co-operation, assistance and simply by the prospects of accession into the Union, transformation in the former communist countries in post-Cold War Europe. Outside Europe however, the EU has relied mainly on soft security tools to exert its influence and maintain its visibility.

Notwithstanding the limitations on the EU’s ability to influence international events, it does display potential to be as effective as other global powers in mechanisms of global

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61 Ka-Lok Chan, p. 129 - 30.
governance, such as the General Agreement on Trades and Tariffs (GATT) regime and the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Additionally, there are two key situations in which the EU may actually be more effective than other global powers. Firstly, in situations where the EU’s ability to transcend traditional conceptions and inhibitions of sovereignty can give it a competitive advantage. Secondly, in situations where the EU attracts attention and support as a civilisation model, such as in the ideological and cultural dimensions of international relations – including relations with the Islamic world62.

**The development of the relationship between New Zealand and the European Union**

New Zealand and the European Economic Community - the predecessor of the EU - first established a permanent diplomatic relationship in 1961 when New Zealand accredited an Ambassador to Brussels and the European Commission. The accession of the UK to the European Community in 1973 had a substantial negative effect on New Zealand's exports and highlighted the need for enhanced communication with the European Community.

Since 1975 regular meetings have been conducted between New Zealand and European Community representatives. These meetings now take place during each EU Presidency and are attended by: the foreign minister of the member state which holds the six month rotating EU Presidency; the New Zealand Foreign Minister; and the European Commissioner responsible for external relations. Complementing these meetings are periodic visits to New Zealand by EU Commissioners and visits to Brussels by New Zealand Government Ministers. The European Parliament maintains a specific committee for relations with Australia and New Zealand and a similar committee of New Zealand parliamentarians interested in the EU has also been established.

In 1984 the European Commission’s Delegation to Australia was accredited to New Zealand. The delegation keeps the European Commission informed of political and economic developments in New Zealand and aids bilateral co-operation. The EU

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62 Maull, p. 793.
opened a delegation office in New Zealand in 2004\textsuperscript{63}. The Head of the Delegation travels regularly to New Zealand and conducts meetings with government and foreign officials, interest and media groups, and diplomats from the EU member states with permanent missions in New Zealand\textsuperscript{64}. These include Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain and the UK\textsuperscript{65}.

The EU and New Zealand share longstanding co-operation in science and technology, education, development co-operation and human rights. In 1991 representatives of the European Commission and New Zealand signed a Science and Technology Co-operation Arrangement. In 1996 an agreement was concluded on the sanitary measures applicable to the trade in live animals and animal products. Additionally, in 1998 an agreement was reached on mutual recognition in relation to conformity assessment. In 1999 a \textit{Joint Declaration on Relations between the European Union and New Zealand} was signed which provided the foundation for enhanced political and security co-operation in the Asia-Pacific region. Also in 1999 progress was achieved in resolving the controversial butter dispute between New Zealand and the EU.

The shared commitment to see progress on international policy issues has been one of the strongest bonds between the EU and New Zealand. The two parties co-operate on a broad range of issues that include climate change, development assistance, trade and investment liberalisation, scientific research and shared humanitarian aid\textsuperscript{66}. This co-operation was reaffirmed in 2004 through the issue of a joint statement titled \textit{New Zealand and the European Union: priorities for future co-operation}. The most recent major development in relations between the EU and New Zealand occurred in September 2007 with the signing of the \textit{Joint Declaration on Relations and Co-operation between the European Union and New Zealand}.

\textsuperscript{63} European Union Information Paper, p. 6 – 7.
\textsuperscript{64} The European Commission’s Delegation to New Zealand, EU/New Zealand Political Relations, in http://www.delaus.ec.europa.eu/newzealand/EU_NZ_relations/politicalrelations.htm
Chapter Summary

The EU represents a unique achievement of regional political co-operation, integration and economic success over more than 50 years. However, to outsiders the organisation of the EU can appear bureaucratic, overly complex and highly confusing. Internally, there is significant opposition to the EU’s expansion and what is perceived to be an erosion of member states’ national sovereignty. Additionally, considerable debate surrounds the effectiveness and efficiency of the EU’s democratic processes. The EU has made significant political efforts to develop its foreign and security policy capabilities. However, these have been slowed by: popular opposition to further integration and the erosion of member state sovereignty; a lack of robust foreign policy mechanisms; and a substantial gap between the EU’s foreign and security policy objectives and its military capabilities to achieve those objectives. Consequently, the EU is not a global power in the same sense as the USA, nor is it likely to become one in the foreseeable future. Notwithstanding this, the EU has considerable “soft power” and is likely to continue to exert significant and increasing influence on a broad range of global issues through the exercise of diplomatic and economic instruments.

New Zealand and the EU have progressively developed a relationship over more than 40 years. The UK’s accession to the then European Community in 1973 had a major impact on New Zealand’s exports and served as a catalyst for New Zealand to enhance its diplomatic relations with the European Community. Since that time the political and economic relationship has grown substantially and resulted in the adoption of a series of Joint Declarations on Relations in 1999, 2004 and 2007.

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66 The European Commission’s Delegation to New Zealand, EU/New Zealand Political Relations.
CHAPTER TWO
THE OVERALL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NEW ZEALAND AND THE EUROPEAN UNION - PRESENT STATUS AND FUTURE INFLUENCES

Before examining the extent of the present defence links between New Zealand and the EU, it is necessary to outline the key elements of the existing general relationship between the two parties and the influences that are likely to shape that relationship in the future.

Political and Economic Links

The Joint Declaration on Relations and Co-operation

In September 2007, the Joint Declaration on Relations and Co-operation between the European Union and New Zealand was formally adopted. The New Zealand Foreign Minister stated that the Declaration would serve as an anchor for the relationship between the EU and New Zealand for at least the next five years\(^{67}\). The Declaration expresses a high-level political intention to strengthen New Zealand and the EU’s partnership and work to achieve the following common goals:
- Support democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, within their own societies and internationally.
- Support the maintenance of international peace and security, including through peace support operations.
- Support the role of the UN and promote its effectiveness.
- Support international efforts in non-proliferation, disarmament and arms control, and counter-terrorism.
- Co-operate on development and governance issues, in particular in relation to countries in the South Pacific.
- Promote free market principles for trade in goods and services and for investment, reject protectionism and work to expand and further strengthen the multilateral trading system within the WTO framework.

\(^{67}\) NZ, EU adopt declaration on co-operation, 21 September 2007, in http://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/nz+eu+adopt+declaration+cooperation
- Promote sustainable development and the protection of the global environment including in particular the need to address the issue of climate change.
- Encourage innovation, increased productivity and competitiveness.
- Foster mutual knowledge and understanding between their peoples and of their cultures.

**Political Aspirations**

In March 2007, the New Zealand Minister of Finance stated that New Zealand could find a common link with, and be inspired by, the following aspects of Europe's democracies: the vibrancy of its multilateral institutions; the value and potential of trade agreements that both created a common market and added higher social, environmental and labour standards; and the vitality of industrial development that underpinned some of the highest living standards in the world. Important political ties between New Zealand and the EU included the two parties’ trade and substantial historical links, shared cultural roots and status as developed countries. However, far more important than all of these factors, was the shared commitment of the EU and New Zealand to the concepts of democracy, human rights, international law and robust international institutions.

**Economic Links**

MFAT describes the EU as a critically important economic partner for New Zealand. After Australia, the EU is New Zealand’s second largest export market. Approximately 15% of New Zealand’s total exports are to the EU. It should be noted however, that if the whole of the North-Asia region were counted as one trading bloc, then New Zealand’s combined trade with North-Asia would be greater than its total exports.

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68 Joint Declaration on Relations and Co-operation between the European Union and New Zealand September 2007, p. 2.
69 Michael Cullen, Building on our links with Europe, Speech by the New Zealand Minister of Finance on 21 March 2007, in http://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/building+our+links+eu
trade with the EU. Notwithstanding this, the EU is New Zealand’s largest, highest value and in many instances fastest growing market for key products that include butter, sheep meat, apples, and kiwifruit. Imports to New Zealand from the EU cover a wide range of products that includes vehicles, aircraft and medicines. An outline of New Zealand’s top export markets in 2006 is shown in the following graph (the data for the EU is restricted to 25 member countries):

The EU is the second largest source of visitors to New Zealand - 462,000 in 2004. Other services trade includes communications, insurance and business services. Additionally, the EU is the second largest investor in New Zealand, with approximately NZ$10.8 billion of investment stock deposited in New Zealand.

**Perception of the importance of the European Union to New Zealand**

Whilst the EU’s high level political and economic links with New Zealand are deep and robust, there appears to be a weak popular understanding within New Zealand of the

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72 Cullen.
74 Overview of the European Union.
importance of the relationship. A survey designed by Canterbury University’s National Centre for Research on Europe (NCRE) identified that of a representative sample of New Zealanders, only 12% rated the EU as an important partner for New Zealand. The findings are represented in the following graph:

![Graph of New Zealand's bilateral relations](image)

**Perception of the importance of New Zealand's bilateral relations**

*How Australians and New Zealanders perceive Europe and the European Union* suggests that given the strength of the economic relationship between the EU and New Zealand it is surprising that the EU has such a low rating. It would appear that many New Zealand citizens’ view of Europe is more tied to the UK than to the EU. This is an important public perception that New Zealand Government representatives should take into account in future dealings with the EU.

### Asia-Pacific Interests

MFAT’s *New Zealand and the European Union: priorities for future co-operation* identifies the Asia-Pacific region is the main focus of political and security co-

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75 Julien.  
76 Jones, fig 3.1, p. 107.  
77 ibid, p. 107-8.
operation between New Zealand and the EU\textsuperscript{78}. A major element of the EU and New Zealand’s commitment to the Asia-Pacific region is South East Asia. This political commitment to South East Asia is articulated in key documents, which are covered in the following paragraphs.

\textit{New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade Asia White Paper}

MFAT’s \textit{Our Future with Asia} states that New Zealand has vital political, security, trade and economic interests in Asia and that occurrences in Asia have a direct effect upon New Zealand. MFAT’s \textit{Asia White Paper} states that New Zealand must work with Asian countries and regional groupings to develop a stronger shared interest to maintain regional security and stability and to address trans-national issues of concern to the region. New Zealand is a participant in regional security dialogue through ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and a participant in the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA). ASEAN continues to play a key role in: Asia’s integration; the East Asia Summit process; and in the future of the Asian community. For these reasons New Zealand will deepen its relationship with ASEAN and with its key members, both through regional processes and bilateral connections\textsuperscript{79}.

\textit{The 2007 Joint Declaration on Relations and Co-operation}

\textit{The 2007 Joint Declaration on Relations and Co-operation} states that the EU values New Zealand’s good co-operation as a like-minded partner in the ARF. The EU and New Zealand will strive to further strengthen the Forum as a vehicle for dialogue and co-operation in the Asia-Pacific, including through the development of the Forum’s role in preventive diplomacy\textsuperscript{80}.

\textsuperscript{78} \textit{New Zealand and the European Union: priorities for future co-operation}, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade: Europe Division, March 2004, in http://www.mfat.govt.nz (now removed)

\textsuperscript{79} \textit{Our Future with Asia}, pp. 5-6, 12, 63.

\textsuperscript{80} \textit{Joint Declaration on Relations and Co-operation between the European Union and New Zealand September 2007}, p. 4.
European Security Strategy

The ESS states that the EU should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world. The EU advocates that regional organisations, such as ASEAN, make an important contribution to a more orderly world\(^\text{81}\).

European Commission’s Communication 2003/4 (399)

The European Commission’s Communication 2003/4 (399): A New Partnership with South East Asia describes the EU’s commitment to South East Asia and its intention to build a more comprehensive relationship with states and regional organisations. The Communication identified the following six strategic priorities for the EU’s relationship with ASEAN:

- Supporting regional stability and the fight against terrorism.
- Human Rights, democratic principles and good governance.
- Mainstreaming Justice and Home Affairs issues.
- Injecting a new dynamism into regional trade and investment relations.
- Continuing to support the development of less prosperous countries.
- Intensifying dialogue and co-operation in specific policy areas.

The communication specifically identified that a strong ASEAN is probably the best guarantee of peace and stability in South-East Asia\(^\text{82}\).

Perceptions of the European Union in the Asia-Pacific

As the EU has made comprehensive statements with regard to its commitment to the Asia-Pacific Region, it is worthwhile investigating the perception of the EU in the Asia-Pacific Region. A partial insight into this subject has been achieved by the NCRE through a trans-national comparative research project known as Asia-Pacific Perceptions\(^\text{83}\). Part of the project was called Public, Elite and Media Perceptions of the EU in the Asia-Pacific Region. The project questioned members of the business, political and media ‘elite’ in Australia, New Zealand, Korea and Thailand on their

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\(^{82}\) A New Partnership with South East Asia, pp. 5-6, 14.  
\(^{83}\) Chaban and Holland, p. 2.
perceptions of the EU. The EU was seldom seen by any of the elite groups in any of the four countries to be an international leader as such, however, it was generally regarded to be a key source of global influence, and a source which is likely to increase in importance and effectiveness in the future. Whilst the EU’s economic prowess was widely acknowledged by Asia-Pacific elites, so too were its bureaucratic convolutions, which were perceived to be limiting its efficacy as an international actor. The continued preference of the Asia-Pacific countries to trade and negotiate with the member states of the EU, and to portray the EU in a fragmented manner, combined with the frequent perception of disunity within the EU, contribute to an ambiguous perception of the EU amongst Asia-Pacific elites.

**Perceptions of ASEAN’s Contribution to Regional Security**

Whilst New Zealand and EU political documents advocate that ASEAN makes an important contribution to regional security, it should be recognised that there would appear to be questions over the robustness of ASEAN’s ability to resolve regional conflict. *Public perceptions of the EU in Thailand and South Korea* made the following observation. Since its foundation in 1967, ASEAN has adhered to the doctrine of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of member states. The *Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation in South East Asia* of 1976 introduced elements of arbitration that remain largely on paper. The “ASEAN Way” has been limited to quiet diplomacy and attempts to ‘mediate’ between members. ASEAN has never imposed sanctions for the poor conduct of its members. However, this reflects one viewpoint and there are more factors to be considered in assessing the effectiveness of ASEAN, or in particular, the ARF. These issues are examined in greater depth later in this paper.

**European Union policies towards Pacific Island Countries.**

The EU has assumed a substantial degree of responsibility for the provision of wide ranging development assistance to countries in the Pacific region which were formerly colonies, or dependencies, of the present EU member nations. An example of this transfer of financial responsibility was highlighted following the New Zealand Foreign

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84 Bain and others, p. 204-5.
85 Ka-Lok Chan, p. 138 - 9.
Minister’s statement of February 2006, reported in *Peters causes diplomatic flurry, will take message to the US*, which included a reference to the UK’s engagement in the Pacific. He stated “You once had dominion over these people. You can’t exit it and leave for somebody else to pay for and help build. We’re taking these responsibilities on board”. In response, the UK High Commissioner stated that “Britain remained engaged in the Pacific through its contribution to the large EU aid programme in the region”86. The EU’s engagement in the Pacific is outlined in the following paragraphs.

**Overseas Countries and Territories**

The treaty establishing the European Community included the creation of an association known as the Overseas Countries and Territories (OCT). The purpose of the association is to promote the economic and social development of the countries and territories that are dependent on EU member states, but are geographically separated from Europe. There are 21 OCTs around the world and four of these are in the Pacific: three are French - French Polynesia, New Caledonia and Wallis and Futuna; and one is British - Pitcairn87.

**The Lome and Cotonou Agreements**

From 1975 the EU’s provision of development aid to the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states was steadily expanded and enhanced under the *Lome Agreements*. In 2000 the EU and members of the ACP States signed a comprehensive development agreement which is referred to as the *Cotonou Agreement*. The Pacific States covered by the *Cotonou Agreement* includes the following: Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, Pacific Islands (Palau), Papua New Guinea (PNG), Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and Samoa. The Pacific ACP countries are identified on the following map by a dot within a circle - PNG and Timor Leste (not shown on map) are also ACP countries88.

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87 *EU-Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs) relationships*, in http://ec.europa.eu/development/geographical/regionscountries/regionscountriesocts_en.cfm
Of these Pacific nations, the following are specifically identified as being amongst the least developed landlocked and island countries (LDLIC): Kiribati; Samoa; Solomon Islands; Tuvalu and Vanuatu. There are some favourable accommodations within the Cotonou Agreement to allow for the under-development in these countries. Article 84 states that independently of the specific measures and provisions for LDLIC in the different chapters of the agreement, special attention shall be paid in respect of these groups as well as countries in post-conflict situations to the strengthening of regional co-operation.

The arrangements in the Cotonou Agreement were developed further under the EU Development Policy Statement of 2005. The Cotonou Agreement insists on human rights and good governance as part of the conditions for development aid to be

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89 Partnership Agreement Between The Members Of The African, Caribbean And Pacific Group Of States Of The One Part, And The European Community And Its Member States, Of The Other Part, Annex VI, Article one, p. 1. and Article 84, p. 109.
provided. It also aims to promote stability. Regional co-operation is identified as a key
to stability and has a broad meaning. It includes dealing with natural disasters (the
FRANZ agreements already provide for co-ordination between France, Australia and
New Zealand in this area), managing longer-term threats such as global warming and
helping the countries of the region to achieve sustainable development\textsuperscript{90}.

\textit{The European Union’s Pacific Strategy}

\textit{EU Relations With The Pacific Islands - A Strategy for a Strengthened Partnership}
applies to the following Pacific states: the Cook Islands, FSM, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall
Islands, Nauru, Niue, Palau, PNG, Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Tuvalu,
Vanuatu and Samoa. The Pacific Strategy consists of the following three components:
- Building a stronger political relationship on matters of common interest, such as
global political security, trade, economic and social development and the environment.
- Enhancing the focus of development action, with greater emphasis placed upon
regional co-operation in order to build up a critical mass, enhance regional governance
and facilitate mutual enrichment.
- Increased efficiency in aid delivery, including the greater use of direct budget support
and closer co-ordination with other partners, in particular with Australia and New
Zealand\textsuperscript{91}.

In his 2003 Europa Address, the European Commissioner for External Relations stated
that both the EU and New Zealand have important convergent interests in promoting
stability and sustainable development in the developing countries of the South Pacific.
An example is the shared effort to promote stability in Bougainville - the EU and New
Zealand jointly supported the policing system\textsuperscript{92}.

The EU, if the individual contribution of its member states is counted, is the largest aid
donor in the world and the second largest provider of aid in the Pacific region\textsuperscript{93}. Since

\textsuperscript{90} HE Jean-Michel Marlaud, \textit{New Zealand, the EU and France in the Pacific}, Speech on 7 April 2006, p. 4 - 5, in \url{http://www.europe.canterbury.ac.nz/seminars/2006_presentations/marlaud_apr2006_ncre.pdf}
\textsuperscript{91} \textit{EU Relations With The Pacific Islands - A Strategy for a Strengthened Partnership}.
\textsuperscript{92} Chris Patten, \textit{EU- New Zealand Relations after Enlargement}, Lecture to the National Centre for
Research on Europe, by the EU Commissioner for External Relations, Wellington, 23 April 2003, in
\url{http://www.europe.canterbury.ac.nz/europa/pdf/2003_patten_address.pdf}.
\textsuperscript{93} Julien.
1975 the EU Overseas Development Aid (ODA) contribution to the South Pacific has amounted to approximately NZ$8 billion. In 2006 annual bilateral aid between the EU and Pacific nations was NZ$115 million, with a further NZ$15 million provided for regional aid.

Perceptions of the European Union's engagement with Pacific Island Nations

Whilst the EU advocates that it has a highly developed political strategy for engaging with Pacific Island countries, Governance, Capacity and Legitimacy questions the appropriateness of the EU’s desire to interact with partners on a region-to-region multilateral basis rather than encourage country-to-country bilateral relations. The EU argues that not only would this make sense organisationally but that such an arrangement would benefit countries more than were they to interact bilaterally with the EU. The general assumption on the part of the EU seems to be that the EU integration model can be replicated outside Europe regardless of local conditions. This is in spite of the fact that such notions are not easily entertained, even in Europe. Some concerns include issues such as the depth and extent of political integration in the Pacific, the necessity for greater political integration in terms of development, and the likelihood of successful economic integration.

European Union member states bilateral ties with South East Asian and Pacific States.

In addition to the EU's formal commitment to South East Asia and the Pacific, some EU member states have extensive bilateral links with countries in the region. In most instances this is a historical legacy of ties established during a former period of European colonial administration. Whilst the constitutional link no longer remains, or has substantially altered, the trade and diplomatic relationships have, in some cases, evolved into a modern form. The EU member states of France, Portugal and the UK collectively have substantial bilateral links, interests and involvement with many nations in South East Asia and the Pacific.

94 Marlaud, p. 3.
95 Holland and Koloamatangi, p. 113.
It is important to note the extent of some of these bi-lateral relationships as it has been suggested that the continued insistence of Asia-Pacific countries on dealing primarily with EU member states may prove detrimental to those Asia-Pacific countries in the future. As the EU integration process continues, it is likely that the importance of the Community structures of the EU will augment in importance in order to manage and contain the growing breadth and diversity of its membership. If its partners abroad are unable or unwilling to accept these changes to traditional forms of international interaction, then they risk being left behind and dropping off the radar of the ever-shifting EU as it looks more and more towards inter-regional rather than international engagement with global partners. An outline of some of the main bi-lateral relations between South East Asian and Pacific States with EU member countries is contained in the following paragraphs.

**France**

Although the relationship between France and its former colonial possessions has altered dramatically over the past century, France still retains a strong link with South East Asia and the Pacific. In 2006 ASEAN agreed to allow France to sign the Association’s *Treaty of Amity and Co-operation*. Also in 2006, the second "France - Oceania Summit" was conducted in Paris and officiated by the French President. The meeting was attended by delegates of countries and regional organisations of Oceania as well as representatives from New Zealand, Australia, the French Overseas Territories of the Pacific and the EU Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid. The Final Declaration issued by the Summit expressed the participants shared belief that Oceania should be a region of peace, harmony, security and economic prosperity and that the region should be based on the values of democracy and respect for, and promotion of, human rights and good governance. Additionally, the Final Declaration also expressed France’s determination to support the objectives of the *Pacific Plan* that was adopted by the Pacific Island Forum (PIF) Leaders in 2005. In 2007 the French Minister Delegate of European Affairs stated that France and its European partners have

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96 Bain and others, p. 204-5.

a substantial interest in the future of South East Asia. France’s key bi-lateral links in the South Pacific are covered in the following table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Constitutional, Political and Legal</th>
<th>Economic</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>French Polynesia</td>
<td>Overseas Land of France. Benefits substantially from development agreements with France.</td>
<td>46% of French Polynesia’s exports are to France. 5% of French Polynesia’s imports from France.</td>
<td>Applied for associate membership of the PIF.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matthew and Hunter Islands</td>
<td>Claimed by France.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Caledonia</td>
<td>Overseas Land of France. Receives NZ$45 million annually in aid from France.</td>
<td>Export significant quantities of Nickel and Nickel products to France, Spain, Belgium and Italy.</td>
<td>Applied for associate membership of the PIF.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vanuatu</td>
<td>Close political relationship. France is only EU member state to maintain a diplomatic mission in Vanuatu.</td>
<td>French development aid programme.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wallis and Fortuna</td>
<td>French Overseas Territory.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Applied to become observer in the PIF.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Role of France in Pacific Island’s Security notes that until 1988 French colonial policies in New Caledonia were perceived as contributing to insecurity in the form of protracted conflict between nationalists and loyalists backed by the French state and military. Similarly, until 1996 the French Nuclear Test program in Polynesia was a threat to security on health and environmental grounds, whilst it was also an affront to indigenous rights. Since abandoning its intransigence on colonialism and nuclear testing, France’s policies have shifted more into line with Pacific Island security perspectives.

In the last decade France has reinvented its role in the French Pacific. The state now presents itself as a partner in development, by providing financial assistance and advice but leaving economic planning to local governments. Moreover, France portrays itself...
as a mediator in conflicts between nationalists and loyalists and between local
governments and civil society. As a result of the accords in New Caledonia, and the
closure of French nuclear testing in French Polynesia, France can play a more altruistic
role in its provision of an independent judiciary and a disciplined security force. By
exercising these powers responsibly France can also uphold its liberal values of
democracy and human rights. France defines itself as a partner in ‘emancipation’, the
pace and nature of which is to be determined in consultation with the inhabitants of
French Polynesia and New Caledonia. These trends serve to legitimise France’s
regional presence for French pacific citizens and the international community. France
has acknowledged, to some extent, the negative impact of its policies on the culture,
society and economies of the indigenous people in the French Pacific. Ultimately
France’s contribution to security will be measured by its long-term commitment to the
welfare of these people, whether they choose to remain French or not 101.

Portugal

Portugal has a strong historical link with Timor-Leste. Portugal is the second largest
individual nation aid donor to Timor-Leste and to date has contributed approximately
120 million euros. Portugal pledged approximately NZ$100 million in development aid
over the period 2004 - 2006, to be spent on projects deemed a priority by both
governments, especially Portuguese language teaching and economic and political co-
operation. Timor-Leste is the main beneficiary of Portugal’s overseas aid programmes,
receiving approximately 40% of Portugal’s total co-operation budget 102.

The United Kingdom

In addition to its links to New Zealand, the UK has extensive ties with many nations in
South East Asia and the South Pacific Region. A summary of some of the UK’s
bilateral links is represented in the following table 103.

101 Von Strokirch, p. 69.
102 Lisbon Pledges Euros 50 Million Aid To Dili Over Next 3 Years, January 5, 2004, in
http://www.mfac.gov.tp/
103 Country Profiles, Policy, Asia and Oceania, in
### The United Kingdom’s bilateral links in South East Asia and the South Pacific.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Constitutional, Political and Legal</th>
<th>Economic</th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Head of State QEII.</td>
<td>Extensive political co-operation.</td>
<td>Member of FPDA. Intelligence and Communications sharing agreements.</td>
<td>Member of FPDA. Intelligence and Communications sharing agreements.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brunei</td>
<td>Member of Commonwealth. Treaty of</td>
<td>UK Shell Oil holds 50% stake in Brunei Shell</td>
<td>Permanent Garrison of UK Ghurkha Battalion.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Friendship and Co-operation.</td>
<td>Petroleum.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>Member of Commonwealth.</td>
<td>13% of Fijian exports to UK.</td>
<td>2,500 Fijians serve in UK Armed Forces, with further 250 recruited</td>
<td>Fijian students study in UK under Chevening Scholarship scheme.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kiribati</td>
<td>Receives most of its aid from the</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Nauru</td>
<td>Member of Commonwealth.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Relations are limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>Member of Commonwealth.</td>
<td>UK is Malaysia’s largest market in Europe.</td>
<td>Member of FPDA.</td>
<td>11,500 Malaysian Students in UK. 30,000 Malaysian students study for</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>UK invested over NZ$50 billion in last 30 years.</td>
<td></td>
<td>UK qualifications.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niue</td>
<td>Head of State QEII.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Norfolk Island</td>
<td>Head of State QEII.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
<td>Head of State QEII.</td>
<td>UK investment in PNG NZ $1.3 billion.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Significant political co-operation.</td>
<td>Major UK commercial investments in Philippines</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>infrastructure and financial services.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Pitcairn Islands</td>
<td>Head of State QEII.</td>
<td>UK funding for administrative purposes.</td>
<td>Last remaining British Overseas Territory in Pacific.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Administration conducted from Pitcairn Island Office New Zealand.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Samoa</td>
<td>Member of Commonwealth.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Relations are limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>Member of Commonwealth. Significant</td>
<td>UK commercial investment in Singapore exceeds</td>
<td>Member of FPDA.</td>
<td>20,000 UK nationals living in Singapore. 5,000 Singaporeans studying</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>political co-operation.</td>
<td>NZS$45 billion. 700 UK companies in Singapore.</td>
<td></td>
<td>UK.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solomon Islands</td>
<td>Member of Commonwealth.</td>
<td>UK investment in Solomons hampered by political</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Close bilateral relations.</td>
<td>Two way trade exceeds NZS$6 billion.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Timor-Leste</td>
<td>UK provided more than NZS100 million in development aid.</td>
<td>Major contributor to INTERFET.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tonga</td>
<td>Member of Commonwealth. UK funds</td>
<td>4.6% of Tonga’s imports from UK.</td>
<td>2000 UK / Tonga exercise.</td>
<td>Royal family connections.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuvalu</td>
<td>Head of State QEII.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vanuatu</td>
<td>Member of Commonwealth.</td>
<td>Minor trade and investment.</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
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The UK also maintains a Strategic Programme Fund which aims to promote action on global issues of strategic importance to the UK. Funding for 2007 – 2008 is approximately New Zealand $200 million spread across 11 programmes. Beneficiaries in the South East Asia-Pacific region for funded programmes include Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, PNG, the Philippines and Vietnam.

Outline of General Issues in the future of New Zealand and European Union relations

There are key issues that are likely to shape the future general relationship between New Zealand and the EU and may consequently have an effect upon future defence relations between the two parties. Some of the key issues are examined in the following paragraphs.

The 2007 Joint Declaration on Relations and Co-operation

The Declaration will provide a political framework for New Zealand and the EU’s joint work programme over the next five years. In Europe: the way forward the EU Ambassador to Australia and New Zealand outlined specific issues within the Declaration that will be addressed by New Zealand and the EU. These issues are outlined in the following paragraphs.

New Zealand and the EU intend to work together to address the challenges of global and regional security, counter-terrorism, and human rights abuses. Development co-operation in the Pacific region will be the focus of New Zealand and the EU’s joint effort on development assistance. Trade and economic matters will be an important focus for co-operation - New Zealand stands to benefit from a strong and competitive EU economy.

Annual trade and agriculture talks will continue to be conducted and the possibility of negotiating a broader framework for trade and economic relations will be explored.

106 Strategic Programme Fund, Funding Programmes, in http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1059131211423
Both parties support the intention to update veterinary agreements and investigate the possibilities for both customs co-operation and wine agreements. The status of the agreement *Facilitating Research Co-operation between Europe and New Zealand* (FRENZ) may be upgraded and a science and technology co-operation agreement may be adopted. There is an intention to promote the alignment of educational qualifications between New Zealand and the EU. Environmental issues and climate change are of mutual concern to New Zealand and the EU.

The Ambassador also stated that as New Zealand’s relationship with Asia grows, its relationship with the EU will not wither, but it will change. New Zealand can expect to deepen its connections with Europe in both political and economic fields.\(^{107}\)

### Opportunities and challenges for New Zealand

In 2007 the New Zealand Prime Minister stated that the EU will become an increasingly influential participant in global affairs and that New Zealand would need to ensure that its views on a range of issues were communicated effectively.\(^{108}\) However, the enlargements of the EU in 2004 and 2007 have significant implications for the degree of diplomatic effort that New Zealand has to invest in the EU.

Prior to the enlargement of the EU by 10 additional members in 2004, *Enlarging the European Union* highlighted some of the challenges that New Zealand would potentially face following the expansion. Notwithstanding that the relationship between New Zealand and the EU appears to have continued to strengthen following the 2004 and 2007 enlargements, many of the issues identified in the article remain relevant and summarised extracts are outlined in the following paragraphs.

From political and security perspectives, it is in New Zealand’s interests to see the development of a peaceful Europe and to see the EU play a major role in world affairs and in the UN. New Zealand shares many policies, values and human rights perspectives with the EU and faces similar social issues. Additionally, New Zealand should benefit from the regulatory effects of the EU’s increasing global trade. The

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\(^{107}\) Julien.  
\(^{108}\) NZ, EU adopt declaration on co-operation.
requirement for countries exporting to the EU to conform to the EU’s legal and financial practices is likely to contribute to making investment and trading practises much safer.

One of the risks for New Zealand is that because of its small size, it will be harder for New Zealand to influence the enlarged EU. Thousands of people from the acceding EU countries will take up positions within the EU institutions, and ministers from countries that have had very little association with New Zealand will participate in EU affairs. Some of these representatives will participate in decision-making that stands a chance of affecting New Zealand. To counter the risk of New Zealand’s reduced influence in an enlarged EU, New Zealand representatives will need to take an active stance and take positive steps to ensure that New Zealand’s interests are brought to the attention of the EU\textsuperscript{109}.

Achieving a satisfactory level of influence may pose a significant challenge for New Zealand diplomatic representatives to the EU and its member countries\textsuperscript{110}. As at October 2008, New Zealand has nine permanent diplomatic missions located in EU member states. New Zealand’s diplomatic representation to the 18 other EU member countries is accredited through New Zealand’s permanent diplomatic missions in Europe\textsuperscript{111}.

Non-EU countries that aspire to influence EU policy have to be prepared to do so on several fronts. Not only do New Zealand’s representatives need to be aware of the content of the draft policies and legislation prepared by the European Commission and if possible influence them, they also need to ensure that the brief for ministers of EU member states, that is written in national capitals, accommodates New Zealand’s concerns. By the time a national minister of a member nation arrives at the Council of the EU, the policy of their national government has already been established and cannot be influenced in New Zealand's favour. This is compounded by the fact that ministers have time-intensive schedules when attending meetings of the Council of the EU. Once

\textsuperscript{109} Enlarging the European Union, in New Zealand International Review, May - June 2003.
\textsuperscript{111} New Zealand Embassies, High Commissions and Representative Offices Overseas, New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, in http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Embassies/1-NZ-Embassies/index.php
the meetings of the European Council of Ministers have concluded, it is very difficult to get decisions taken by the Council to be reconsidered.\textsuperscript{112}

**Chapter Summary**

The *2007 Joint Declaration on Relations and Co-operation between the EU and New Zealand* expresses a clear political intention to further develop relations. Political statements suggest that considerable foreign policy similarities - including a commitment to democracy, human rights, international law and robust international institutions - are the key motivations behind the intention to further develop relations. However, the critical importance of the EU as an economic partner for New Zealand should also be recognised as an important motivation for the desire to further develop relations. Despite these strong political and economic drivers, the importance of the EU as an international partner lacks popular recognition within New Zealand. It may be that many New Zealander’s opinion on the EU is overshadowed by their perception of links with the UK.

Both New Zealand and the EU have expressed a high level political interest in the stability, security and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region, with a significant convergence of interests in South East Asia. New Zealand and the EU’s policies advocate that ASEAN makes an important contribution to regional security. However, despite the publicly expressed high-level political intentions, and the flagship 2005 AMM by the EU, academic literature identifies two significant issues that may impede the effectiveness of the EU’s influence over South East Asian security and stability. Firstly, it may be that within South East Asian political circles, the EU is viewed as having significant weaknesses - it is not regarded as a global power, but rather as a bureaucratic entity that possesses substantial economic and diplomatic influence. Secondly, there are indicators that ASEAN could be viewed as having limited effectiveness as a regional security institution. As a consequence of these combined factors, it would appear that whilst New Zealand and the EU’s 2007 Joint Declaration extol shared security objectives in South East Asia, the EU has limited power to achieve those objectives, and the venue through which the EU will exercise that power is in

\textsuperscript{112} *Enlarging the European Union.*
itself perhaps of limited effectiveness. Therefore, from the perspective of New Zealand’s security interests in South East Asia, whilst the EU may be viewed as a close political ally with significant influence, it should not be regarded as a dominant or decisive force in the region.

Whilst the EU has assumed many of the historical legacy responsibilities of its member nations in the Asia-Pacific region, the EU member states of France, Portugal and the UK collectively have substantial bilateral links, interests and involvement with many nations in South East Asia and the Pacific. The UK has extensive economic interests in South East Asia and maintains a significant diplomatic and economic profile in the region. However, in the South Pacific, the UK continues to pursue a policy of devolving colonial legacy responsibilities, particularly for aid and development, to the EU. Whilst Frances’ relationship with the South Pacific has not historically been without difficulties, it now appears to maintain a reasonably constant level of direct engagement with PIF countries on a range of regional issues. France has the most high profile military presence in the South Pacific of any European nation. If the EU relationship with South East Asian and South Pacific regional representatives continues to develop and strengthen, this may influence individual states to reassess their bilateral relations with EU member states, as the EU has a preference for engaging with regional, rather than national representatives. If this occurs, the EU and the individual PIF countries will face a substantial challenge in attempting to establish a robust and truly comprehensive region to region relationship that reflects Pacific states’ requirements.

High level political intentions are for the EU and New Zealand’s relationship to develop in the following areas: promoting global and Asia-Pacific regional security, counter-terrorism, and human rights; development in the Pacific region; trade and economic matters; agriculture, science and technology co-operation; educational qualifications and exchanges; and the environment and climate change. However, influencing the EU to accommodate New Zealand’s interests will continue to pose a significant challenge due to the requirement for extensive diplomatic resources to influence EU member states’ national governments. Ways will need to be found to bring New Zealand to the EU’s attention.
Whilst it is arguable that it is in New Zealand's interests for the EU to play a major role in world affairs and in the UN, it needs to be recognised that the EU is not a global power in the same sense as the USA - or even an Asia-Pacific regional power such as China. Furthermore, the EU is unlikely to become a global or Asia-Pacific regional power in the foreseeable future unless it achieves a paradigm shift in all of the following: the progress of its internal integration; its foreign policy mechanisms, especially its security-emergency decision making processes; and its integral military capabilities.
CHAPTER THREE
PRESENT STATUS OF DEFENCE LINKS BETWEEN NEW ZEALAND AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

The present status of defence and security links between the EU and New Zealand would appear to be a likely foundation for any future defence relations between the two parties. Consequently, the existing links are examined in detail in this chapter.

Direct co-operation between New Zealand and the European Union

The Chief of the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) visited Europe in 2006 and met senior EU and NATO Military Officers and the Chief of Defence Staff of the UK. Positive feedback was received on the work of NZDF personnel in many parts of the world. The Joint Declaration on Relations and Co-operation states that “New Zealand and the EU have taken concrete action and co-operated closely on the ground.” This co-operation is examined in the following paragraphs.

New Zealand Defence Force and European Union co-operation in Bosnia.

The NZDF had a significant direct working relationship with the EU in Bosnia from December 2004 to June 2007. In December 2004, responsibility for the UN mandated mission in Bosnia was transferred from the NATO lead stabilisation force to a EU force. Six New Zealand staff officers continued to serve with the UK led Multi-National Task Force North West at the EU Force Headquarters in Banja Luka. In May 2005 the New Zealand Government approved the deployment of up to ten personnel in the role of a Liaison and Observation Team (LOT) on six-monthly rotations for 18 months, effective from the 1 November 2005. The purpose of the LOT was to be accessible to citizens and local authorities, to collect information, to liaise with the local population, and to encourage trust and co-operation. In August 2005 the number of NZDF staff officers in the EU Force Headquarters was reduced to three. Following a major reduction in EU

114 Joint Declaration on Relations and Co-operation between the European Union and New Zealand September 2007, p. 4.
personnel numbers in Bosnia, the New Zealand LOT was withdrawn from Bosnia in April 2007. The three Staff Officers continued to serve in the EU Force Headquarters until June 2007, when they were withdrawn to coincide with a major reduction in EU and UK forces in the region. This occurred as a consequence of a change in the focus of the peace support operation from the military deterrence of armed force to political and civilian institution building.

**New Zealand Police and European Union Co-operation in Afghanistan**

The New Zealand Police contingent in Afghanistan works under the operational control of the European Union Police (EUPOL) Head of Mission. However, it should be noted that the New Zealand Police element has very close links to the NZDF contingent due to: both entities remaining under full command of the New Zealand authorities; both elements co-location in ‘Kiwi Base’ Bamyan Province; and practical co-operation to facilitate training and liaison. Consequently, the New Zealand Police co-operation with EUPOL has considerable significance to New Zealand’s defence relations with the EU.

In October 2007 the New Zealand Prime Minister signed an agreement for New Zealand to join the EUPOL Mission in Afghanistan. In joining the EUPOL Mission, the New Zealand Police work in conjunction with the EU, the USA, and other national policing missions to improve harmonisation and standardisation amongst the Afghanistan National Police (ANP). The New Zealand Police deployment provides one New Zealand Police officer in a mentoring role for the provincial police chief and other senior ANP personnel, and two New Zealand Police Officers to oversee training in the Bamyan Regional Training Centre (RTC). The New Zealand Police worked in conjunction with both the EUPOL predecessor mission - led by Germany - and with the USA’s police programme.

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EUPOL Afghanistan - An Opportunity for Whom? expresses an interesting view on the formation of EUPOL Afghanistan by the EU. UNSCR 1746 of March 2007 welcomed the decision by the EU to “establish a mission in the field of policing with linkages to the wider rule of law and counter-narcotics, to assist and enhance current efforts in the area of police reform at central and provincial levels, and looks forward to the early launch of the mission”\(^{119}\). However, the mission planning process, which commenced in 2006, has been criticised for its failure to adequately consult with the European Parliament\(^ {120}\). It is unclear whether this lack of consultation was essential for reasons of operational security. If it wasn’t, then it could perhaps add to the perception of a “democratic deficit” in the EU’s political functioning that was identified in chapter one\(^ {121}\).

It has been suggested that the influences on EU efforts appear to stem from political opportunity more than anything else. EU resources in 2007 were concentrated on the Balkans. The EU’s plan was for EUPOL to contribute between 160 and 190 personnel - from member states and third party countries potentially including Canada, Norway and New Zealand - that would be imbedded within International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) PRTs throughout Afghanistan. However, this assessment appeared incongruent with the request of the USA for the EU to provide 3,000 personnel for Afghan policing duties. The EU defended this decision on the grounds that a larger contingent would be counter-productive, by impeding development of the ANP. However, this appears to lack logic, as there are between 35,000 - 60,000 ANP, most of which are poorly trained. A more likely reason for the low numbers of personnel could be the lack of EU will and capacity - particularly as the EU Civilian Headline Goal capabilities noted a shortfall in personnel for the police category. It has also been suggested that the EUPOL mission could be perceived as a means for Germany to substitute its commitment to Afghanistan from a military one to a civilian mission. This would ease political pressure in Germany, where 77% of the population is opposed to Germany’s military role in Afghanistan. The UK also views the EUPOL mission as politically important for two


\(^{121}\) Chaban and Holland, p. 2.
reasons: maintaining national influence; and preserving the UK’s strategic partnership with the USA\textsuperscript{122}.

Overall, the EUPOL mission in Afghanistan faces a substantial challenge and appears to be under resourced. Key challenges include a combination of an excessively militarised theatre, a ‘top down’ approach to local ownership, and political opportunism by certain actors involved\textsuperscript{123}. However, it is not possible to assess whether these higher level challenges for EUPOL Afghanistan, that were perceived to exist in 2007, will be proven to be correct and have a negative long term effect on the overall mission.

**New Zealand and European Union co-operation with NATO**

Operations in Afghanistan provide a tangible example of New Zealand and the EU’s practical co-operation with NATO. The NZPRT, as part of ISAF, operates under NATO leadership. The New Zealand Police Contingent, which is collocated with the NZPRT, operates under the operational control of EUPOL. The EUPOL Head of Mission is responsible for ensuring that EUPOL works closely and co-ordinates with NATO / ISAF and PRT lead nations\textsuperscript{124}.

New Zealand first conducted operations with NATO in Bosnia-Herzegovinia in the 1990s\textsuperscript{125}. In 2006, the New Zealand Government stated that it supported more formal ties with NATO. In 2008 it was observed that New Zealand has moved appreciably closer to NATO and the following were cited as examples: the New Zealand Prime Minister has participated in a NATO Leader’s Summit; other ministerial contacts are frequent; a commitment has been made to training in Germany; and New Zealand appears to accept a seemingly open-ended military involvement in Afghanistan\textsuperscript{126}.

\textsuperscript{122} Gya, p. 4 - 5.
\textsuperscript{123} ibid, p. 8.
\textsuperscript{125} New Zealand and NATO sign information sharing agreement, New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, foreign relations, New Zealand’s Relations with Europe, News and Events, in http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Foreign-Relations/Europe/index.php
New Zealand’s bilateral defence links with European Union member states.

Whilst New Zealand’s direct defence and security co-operation with the EU is modest, the cumulative total of New Zealand’s bilateral defence links with individual EU member nations is substantial and is an indirect defence link between New Zealand and the EU. An outline of New Zealand’s defence links with EU member states is contained in the table below and described in the following paragraphs.

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| New Zealand’s bilateral defence arrangements with European Union member states |
|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|
|                                | Constitutional Links or memorandum of understanding | Intelligence or data sharing agreements | FPDA |
|                                | Quadrilateral Forum | Major Equipment Procurement | Personal attachments or exchanges | Remembrance Activities / War graves | Exercises | UN mandated or compliant peacekeeping missions |
|                                | Afghanistan (EUPOL, UNAMA, ANATT, or PRT) | Iraq (UNAMI) | Israel / Lebanon / Syria (UNTSO) | Korea (UNCMAC) | Kosovo (UNMIK) | Timor Leste (INTERFET, UNAMET) | Sinai (MFO) | Sudan (UNMIS) |
| Austria                         | x                                           | x                                           | x                                           |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |
| Belgium                         | x                                           | x                                           | x                                           |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |
| Bulgaria                        | x                                           | x                                           | x                                           |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |
| Cyprus                          | x                                           | x                                           | x                                           |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |
| Czech Rep                      | x                                           | x                                           | x                                           |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |
| Denmark                         | x                                           | x                                           | x                                           |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |
| Estonia                         | x                                           | x                                           | x                                           |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |
| Finland                         | x                                           | x                                           | x                                           |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |
| France                          | x                                           | x                                           | x                                           |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |
| Germany                         | x                                           | x                                           | x                                           |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |
| Greece                          | x                                           | x                                           | x                                           |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |
| Hungary                         | x                                           | x                                           | x                                           |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |
| Ireland                         | x                                           | x                                           | x                                           |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |
| Italy                           | x                                           | x                                           | x                                           |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |
| Latvia                          | x                                           | x                                           | x                                           |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |
| Lithuania                       | x                                           | x                                           | x                                           |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |
| Luxembourg                      | x                                           | x                                           | x                                           |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |
| Malta                            |                                            |                                            |                                            |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |
| Netherlands                     | x                                           | x                                           | x                                           |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |
| Poland                          | x                                           | x                                           | x                                           |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |
| Portugal                        | x                                           | x                                           | x                                           |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |
| Romania                         | x                                           | x                                           | x                                           |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |
| Slovakia                        | x                                           | x                                           | x                                           |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |
| Slovenia                        | x                                           | x                                           | x                                           |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |
| Spain                           | x                                           | x                                           | x                                           |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |
| Sweden                          | x                                           | x                                           | x                                           |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |
| UK                              | x                                           | x                                           | x                                           |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |
France

New Zealand’s relations with France reached a low point in the 1980s. Since then, substantive defence co-operation has been developed progressively with the French forces in the Pacific, based mainly in New Caledonia. In 1992, New Zealand and France signed two agreements: the *Joint Statement on Disaster Relief Co-operation* (including Australia, called FRANZ): and a *Technical Arrangement on the Exchange of Data* between the Chief of Staff of the French Armed Forces and the Chief of the NZDF\(^{127}\).

In *The Role of France in Pacific Islands’ Security* it is suggested that France believes that military forces stationed overseas fulfil a significant function by impressing the populations of French territories and regional states with might and influence. Periodic port calls to Pacific states were justified by a former French Prime Minister, Michel Rocard, because they: “contribute to a better perception of our defence policy and attest to France’s desire to be a part of the South Pacific Ocean”. Moreover, joint military exercises are believed to strengthen France’s influence by enabling the display of French capabilities and the demonstration of the performance of French equipment\(^{128}\).

In 1998, at New Zealand’s instigation, France obtained observer status at the Quadrilateral Forum on Military Co-operation in the Pacific (New Zealand, Australia, the USA and France) and has been a full member since 2002\(^{129}\). In 2000, New Zealand and France held an inaugural round of bilateral political-military talks at senior officials' level. These talks are scheduled on a biennial basis and the last round took place in Paris in April 2007\(^{130}\). Defence co-operation is presently at its highest level in many years, primarily centred on the South Pacific, but has also occurred in other theatres over the past 15 years, such as during peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Somalia. More recently, the French military worked closely with New Zealand troops to provide

\(^{127}\) Hoadley, ‘New Zealand’s Pacific Island Security Policies’ p. 130.

\(^{128}\) Von Strokirch, p. 73.


\(^{130}\) *France, Bilateral Relationship*, New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Countries, Europe, in http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Countries/Europe/France.php#bilateral
humanitarian assistance during the UN sponsored intervention in Timor-Leste. Co-operation between the NZDF and the New Caledonian Armed Forces (FANC) is the backbone of the defence relationship between the two countries. A bilateral Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was adopted in 1997. This was followed by the signing of a Co-operation Agreement during a visit to New Zealand by the Chief of FANC in 1999. These instruments have facilitated a series of joint defence exercises in the Pacific, both single service and combined, between the two forces.\(^{131}\)

NZDF personnel from all three services participated in the French led Exercise Croix du Sud (Southern Cross), in New Caledonia in 2004 and 2006.\(^{132}\) There are numerous visits and exchanges between the French and New Zealand Defence Forces. During 2006 the Chief of the Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN) visited France. The Royal New Zealand Air Force (RNZAF) has utilised flight simulator facilities in France to conduct training for aircrew on the King Air aircraft. In November 2007 the French Naval Ship Le Moaqueuse visited New Zealand.\(^{133}\) During September 2008 French Naval and Air elements participated in Exercise Maru, a multi-national, multi-agency exercise that is part of the Proliferation Security Initiative.\(^{134}\)

**Germany**

New Zealand and Germany signed a status of forces agreement in 2008 outlining conditions for temporary stays by NZDF personnel in Germany for training, exercises and exchanges. This will be followed by the posting of RNZAF personnel to Germany from early 2009 to train with the German Army on the NH90 helicopter.\(^{135}\)

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135 *Airforce crew to be trained in Germany*, in Nelson Mail, 15 November 2008, p. 4.
**Hungary**

There is no formal defence co-operation between New Zealand and Hungary. However, the MFAT website country profile for Hungary states that there is scope for closer co-operation on international issues, including Afghanistan, where New Zealand and Hungary both provide PRTs\(^\text{136}\). The two PRTs share a common border between Bamyan and Baghlan Provinces\(^\text{137}\).

**Italy**

Defence co-operation between New Zealand and Italy is minor compared to the links with France and the UK. Nonetheless, the New Zealand Embassy in Italy states on its website that defence co-operation is an important element of the bilateral relationship between Italy and New Zealand. Co-operation has occurred in such areas as peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and humanitarian assistance during the UN sponsored intervention in Timor-Leste\(^\text{138}\).

**The United Kingdom**

New Zealand has substantial defence links with the UK. The 2005 NZDF briefing document to the incoming Government stated that the long standing defence relationship with the UK provides significant political and professional benefits\(^\text{139}\). The defence links between New Zealand and the UK cover many areas, some of which are outlined in the following paragraphs.

Commissions for Officers in the NZDF are signed by the Governor General on behalf of Her Majesty the Queen. Many members of the Royal Family hold honorary


\(^{137}\) ISAF Regional Commands, 5 December 2007, in [http://www.nato.int/ISAF/docu/epub/pdf/isaf_placemat.pdf](http://www.nato.int/ISAF/docu/epub/pdf/isaf_placemat.pdf) (article has now been altered)


appointments within the NZDF - for example, His Royal Highness Prince Andrew is the Colonel in Chief of the Royal New Zealand Army Logistic Regiment\textsuperscript{140}. Some instruments of military law are shared between the two countries, including such documents as the Visiting Forces Act\textsuperscript{141}.

Some elements of the tactical and doctrinal expertise of the UK Armed Services are used by the NZDF. This is typified by the NZDF Publication \textit{Foundations of New Zealand Military Doctrine}. The document uses \textit{British Defence Doctrine Joint Warfare Publication 0-01}\textsuperscript{142} as one of its intellectual foundations, along with several Australian doctrinal publications\textsuperscript{143}.

During operational deployments NZDF personnel have worked closely with UK military units. Following the passing of UNSCR 1483 on 22 May 2003, New Zealand contributed 61 NZDF engineers and support staff for twelve months to work alongside British Forces in Southern Iraq until September 2004. The three NZDF officers stationed in Bosnia as part of the EU Force served as staff officers at the resident British Divisional Headquarters\textsuperscript{144}. The NZDF holds two positions in Afghanistan within the UK element of the Afghan National Army Training Team (ANATT)\textsuperscript{145}.

New Zealand and the UK are both members of the FPDA, the longest standing defence agreement in South East Asia. The Chief of the NZDF attends scheduled Defence Chiefs’ Conferences where security matters of mutual interest to the five partners are discussed\textsuperscript{146}.

Exercises are conducted involving New Zealand and the UK. No 5 Squadron RNZAF competes for the Fincastle Trophy with Maritime Squadron crews from the Royal

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{140} Duke of York to visit Army Logistic Regiment, 23 Sep 2005, in \url{http://www.nzdf.mil.nz/news/media-releases/20050923-doytvalr.htm}


\textsuperscript{144} Defence Portfolio briefing to the incoming government 2005.

\textsuperscript{145} UKANATT-UK Afghan National Army Training Team, in \url{http://www.nzdf.mil.nz/operations/deployments/afghanistan/ukanatt.htm}

\end{footnotesize}
Australian Air Force (RAAF) and the UK’s Royal Air Force (RAF)\textsuperscript{147}. New Zealand and the UK participate in Exercise Bersama Padu\textsuperscript{148} and Bersama Lima as part of the FPDA. In November 2007 two teams from the New Zealand Army participated in the British Army’s Cambrian Patrol exercise in Wales\textsuperscript{149}.

Numerous attachments and exchanges of personnel are conducted between New Zealand and the UK, examples include the annual Exercise Longlook tri-service bilateral exchange of personnel and RNZAF helicopter aircrew attachments. Substantial two way recruiting has been conducted between air forces of the two countries between 2001 – 2007.

New Zealand and the UK are members of the international partnership for the exchange of foreign intelligence and the sharing of communications security technology. New Zealand gains considerable benefit from this arrangement, as it would be impossible for New Zealand to generate the effectiveness of the five-nation partnership on its own\textsuperscript{150}.

\textit{Defence procurement.}

The New Zealand Ministry of Defence (MOD) has procured substantial quantities of equipment for the NZDF from companies within EU member nations. These procurements are outlined in the following paragraphs.

The French Company of Thales has provided identification friend or foe equipment for the Mistral surface to air missile system\textsuperscript{151}. A contract was signed in 2004 with the Spanish company of Indra Sistemas SA to supply identification, cueing and alerting

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{147} Exercise Fincastle - International Competition with a Difference, 10 Feb 2005, in \url{http://www.nzdf.mil.nz/news/media-releases/20050210.htm}
\item \textsuperscript{148} Bersama Padu Confirms New Zealand up to the Mark, 21 September 2006, in \url{http://www.nzdf.mil.nz/news/media-releases/210906-bpcnzutm.htm}
\item \textsuperscript{149} NZ Patrols win medals in tough British event, 14 Nov 200, in \url{http://www.nzdf.mil.nz/news/media-releases/200711014-nzpwmitbe.htm}
\item \textsuperscript{150} The job of the GCSB, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Securing Our Nation’s Safety, How New Zealand manages its security and intelligence agencies, The Government Communications Security Bureau, December 2000, paras 7 and 8, in \url{http://www.dpmc.govt.nz/dpmc/publications/securingoursafety/gcsb.html}
\item \textsuperscript{151} Very Low Level Air Defence, Current Acquisition Projects, in \url{http://www.defence.govt.nz/acquisitions-tenders/current-acquisition-projects/vllad.html}
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
systems for the Mistral surface to air missile system\textsuperscript{152}. The combined cost of the two purchases from France and Spain was approximately New Zealand $10 million.

The Italian company of Finmeccanica owns the helicopter manufacturer Agusta Westland\textsuperscript{153}. The New Zealand government has signed a contract to purchase five Agusta Westland A-109 helicopters at a cost of $139 million\textsuperscript{154}. This project is separate to the contract signed by the New Zealand Government in 2006 with NATO Helicopter Industries (NHI) to purchase eight NH90 helicopters for the RNZAF at a total cost of approximately $772 million\textsuperscript{155}. NHI is a consortium of companies from the following four EU member nations: Eurocopter (France and Germany); Augusta (Italy); and Stork Fokker Aerospace BV (the Netherlands)\textsuperscript{156}.

The UK firm of Automotive Technik Ltd provided 321 Pinzgauer Light Operational Vehicles for the NZDF. The total project cost was approximately $93 million and delivery commenced in 2004\textsuperscript{157}.

\textbf{Concurrent involvement in United Nations’ Mandated Missions}

During 1999, New Zealand France, Germany, Ireland, Italy and the UK made a military contribution to International Force East Timor (INTERFET) - the force authorised under UNSCR 1264 to restore peace and security in Timor Leste\textsuperscript{158}.

As at 2008, New Zealand provides military and police personnel to participate in eight international peace-keeping missions, in which personnel from a combined total of 25 EU member nations participate. Cyprus and Malta are the only two EU member states that are not involved in international peacekeeping missions in which New Zealand

\textsuperscript{153} Agusta Westland Profile, in http://www.agustawestland.com/company03.php
\textsuperscript{154} First RNZAF Helicopter Crew On Way To Germany Early Next Year, in NZPA Newswire, NZ National, 14 November 2008.
\textsuperscript{156} NH Industries company profile, in http://www.nhindustries.com/site/FO/scripts/siteFO_contenu.php?arbo=1&noeu_id=31&lang=EN
\textsuperscript{158} Crawford and Harper, pp. 49, 50, 63, 79, 111.
participates. The missions in which New Zealand and EU member states contribute are outlined in the following paragraphs.

In Afghanistan New Zealand provides one officer for the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA)\(^{159}\). EU countries providing personnel include: Denmark, Germany, Lithuania, Romania, Sweden and the UK\(^{160}\). New Zealand provides two personnel for the ANATT, which includes personnel from France and the UK. As part of ISAF, New Zealand provides a PRT as do Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, the UK, Spain and Sweden\(^ {161}\). The NZPRT shares its Bamyan Provincial Boundary with: the Lithuanians in Chaghcharan Province; and the Hungarians in Baghlan Province\(^ {162}\). EU member nations committing military personnel to other ISAF tasks include Latvia\(^ {163}\) and Luxembourg\(^ {164}\).

In Iraq, New Zealand provides one officer for the United Nations Assistance Mission Iraq (UNAMI), which also includes personnel from the EU countries of Denmark and the UK\(^ {165}\).

In Kosovo one officer was employed in Pristina on the headquarters staff of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) as a Military Liaison Officer (MLO) until Oct 2008. The following EU member states also contribute personnel to the mission: Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain and the UK\(^ {166}\).

\(^{159}\) UKANAT and UNAMA, in http://www.nzdf.mil.nz/operations/deployments/afghanistan/ukanatt.htm
\(^{161}\) Provincial Reconstruction Teams, International Security Assistance Force, Reconstruction and Development, in http://www.nato.int/isaf/topics/recon_dev/prts.html (article has now been altered)
\(^{162}\) ISAF Regional Commands, 5 December 2007, in http://www.nato.int/ISAF/docu/epub/pdf/isaf_placemat.pdf. (article has now been updated)
\(^{164}\) ISAF Regional Commands.
\(^{166}\) UN Mission's Contributions by Country.
In the Middle East New Zealand has eight military observers deployed with United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) in Israel, Lebanon and Syria. EU member nations contributing personnel to UNTSO include Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Slovakia, Slovenia and Sweden\textsuperscript{167}.

In Korea four NZDF personnel are attached to the UN Command Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC). This is a multinational mission led by the USA. The UK also contributes personnel to the mission\textsuperscript{168}.

In Sinai, New Zealand provides personnel to the Multi National Force Observers (MFO) team. Although the MFO is an independent international organisation and not a UN Mission, the organisation undertakes the functions and responsibilities stipulated in the treaty for UN Forces and Observers\textsuperscript{169}. The following EU member nations also provide personnel: France, Hungary and Italy\textsuperscript{170}.

In Sudan three NZDF personnel are attached to the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) along with personnel from the following EU member countries: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Sweden and the UK\textsuperscript{171}.

In Timor-Leste, one NZDF representative and 25 New Zealand Police are attached to the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) along with police and military personnel from the following EU member states: Portugal, Romania, Spain and Sweden\textsuperscript{172}.

\textsuperscript{168} NZ extends commitment to UN Korea mission, 3 August 2007, in http://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/nz+extends+commitment+un+korea+mission
\textsuperscript{169} Protocol, Multinational Force and Observers, in http://www.mfo.org/files/Protocollo.pdf
\textsuperscript{170} Organization, Multinational Force and Observers, in http://www.mfo.org/1/4/10/base.asp
\textsuperscript{172} UN Mission's Contributions by Country.
Remembrance activities

In *Europe: the way forward* the EU Ambassador to New Zealand stated that the EU had brought peace and stability to Europe. He acknowledged that peace in Europe had a high significance for New Zealand for the following reasons: so many New Zealanders lost their lives during the First World War; New Zealand and Europe shared a history of involvement in war; and through the ancestral ties with EU countries that so many New Zealanders have. New Zealand conducts many Remembrance activities within EU member nations, including: Belgium; France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands; and the UK. Some of the Remembrance activities are outlined in the following paragraphs.

Many memorials throughout Belgium commemorate New Zealanders who died in the First World War. Every year on ANZAC Day, the New Zealand Ambassador to Belgium participates in commemorations held at the New Zealand Memorial in Mesen and at the Menin Gate in Ieper. The names of 86 New Zealanders, with no known graves, who served with other allied forces in the First World War are inscribed on the Menin Gate. The names of New Zealanders also appear on memorials at Tyne Cot Cemetery, Buttes New British Cemetery, Polygon Wood, Zonnebeke and Messines Ridge British Cemetery. In July 2007 the Governor General and NZDF representatives attended a ceremony to commemorate the 90th anniversary of the beginning of the Battle of Passchendaele. The New Zealand Prime Minister and NZDF representatives attended a further ceremony in October 2007. New Zealand signed a shared memories arrangement with the Flemish regional government in October 2007 and a similar arrangement with the Belgium federal government was being finalised during 2008.

173 Julien.


177 Belgium, Bilateral Relations, New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Countries, Europe, in http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Countries/Europe/Belgium.php#bilateral
A number of New Zealand soldiers who fell in World War Two are buried in Commonwealth War Graves in the Czech Republic. In France, evidence of the value placed on New Zealand’s contribution during the First World War was demonstrated by the award of the Légion d’honneur in 1998 by the French Government to all surviving New Zealand Veterans of the First World War. In February 1999, the town of Le Quesnoy launched a resource centre aimed at promoting links between France and New Zealand. Memorials which record New Zealand casualties of the First World are located at Longueval and Le Quesnoy. NZDF personnel conducted the ceremonial return of the New Zealand Unknown Warrior from France to New Zealand in November 2004. In September 2006, NZDF personnel participated in the ceremony to mark the 90th anniversary of New Zealand’s involvement in the Battle of the Somme. In April 2007, the New Zealand Ambassador to France unveiled a memorial in Arras to commemorate the New Zealand Tunnelling Company of the First World War.

Greece claims a special relationship with New Zealand stemming from World War Two when New Zealand forces fought alongside the Greeks in continental Greece and Crete. In 2001, the New Zealand Prime Minister and NZDF personnel and veterans attended the Battle of Crete commemorations. The Minister of Foreign Affairs attended anniversary celebrations in May 2003 and the Minister of Police in May 2006.

178 New Zealand’s Relationship with the Czech Republic, New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Countries, Europe, Czech Republic, in http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Countries/Europe/Czech.php#bilateral
183 Greece, Bilateral Relationship, New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Countries, Europe, in http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Countries/Europe/Greece.php#bilateral
185 Greece, Bilateral Relationship.
The development of New Zealand’s current relationship with Italy dates from the period of the Second World War, during which New Zealand soldiers participated in the liberation of Italy. This involvement has not been forgotten in either country and New Zealand’s role is remembered in many Italian towns and villages. In Italy, ANZAC Day ceremonies are held every year in Rome on 25 April. In 2004 the New Zealand Prime Minister, NZDF personnel and veterans of the 1944 battle attended the Battle of Cassino commemorations.

In the Netherlands there are graves in 85 different cemeteries for 256 New Zealand airmen who served in the RAF during the Second World War and died in, or over, the Netherlands. In August 2006 the New Zealand Ambassador to the Netherlands attended the military funeral service for New Zealand aircrew of an RAF Stirling Bomber that was shot down in 1942.

In the UK, NZDF representatives attend the Remembrance Day annual commemorations in London on 11 November. NZDF representatives also attend the Commonwealth Aircrew annual commemoration in May at Runneymede. In September 2005 NZDF representatives attended the unveiling of the Battle of Britain Monument in London. The New Zealand Prime Minister and NZDF representatives attended the unveiling of the New Zealand Memorial in London in 2006. The New Zealand Prime Minister and NZDF personnel also attended a special ceremony in September 2007 to honour Lord Bernard Freyberg VC, GCMG, KCB, KBE, DSO and three Bars.

Chapter Summary

The EU and New Zealand have conducted small-scale, integrated, practical co-operation during the past four years – initially on military operations in Bosnia Herzegovina and more recently on police operations in Afghanistan. These operations have been highlighted in the 2007 Joint Declaration on Relations and Co-operation as an example of the successful co-operation between the two parties. Whilst co-operation between New Zealand and the EU may have been successful, there are indications that the EU’s underlying motivation behind EUPOL Afghanistan may owe more to political expediency rather than a credible and robust commitment on the part of the EU to achieve a paradigm shift in the efficiency and effectiveness of the ANP. However, it is unclear whether these academic perceptions will be proven to be correct and if so, whether they will have practical consequences for the success of the EUPOL mission.

Whilst direct defence and security co-operation between New Zealand and the EU is modest, the co-operation appears to be underpinned by significant foundations. NATO has a close and long standing relationship with the EU and a significant and growing relationship with New Zealand - New Zealand’s participation in EUPOL and ISAF are a practical example of this association. New Zealand and 25 individual EU member states participated concurrently in UN mandated, or UN compliant, international peace support missions during 2008. New Zealand has substantial defence ties to the UK and a significant link with France. Other bilateral defence links between New Zealand and EU member states include defence procurement and remembrance activities. These links are visually represented in the following diagram.
NZ - EU operations in Bosnia and Afghanistan. NZ and EU co-operation with NATO.

NZ and EU member state participation in UN authorised or compliant peacekeeping operations.

NZ and UK FPDA co-operation. NZ and France FANC co-operation.

Joint Declaration on Co-operation. Commitment to UN and International law. NZ and EU member states Remembrance activities. NZ defence equipment procurement from EU member states. Interests in Global, South East Asian and Pacific Island’s security.
CHAPTER FOUR
KEY ELEMENTS OF THE 2007 JOINT DECLARATION ON RELATIONS AND CO-OPERATION THAT MAY INFLUENCE DEFENCE FUTURE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NEW ZEALAND

The 2007 Joint Declaration on Relations and Co-operation between the European Union and New Zealand sets official policy intentions for the overall relationship between the two parties for a five-year period. Consequently, it is useful to identify and examine the key elements of the Declaration that appear to have relevance to future defence relations.

Common Goals and Intentions of relevance to further defence co-operation

The goals in the Declaration that may have some relevance to defence and security co-operation between the EU and New Zealand are as follows:
- Support democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, within their own societies and internationally;
- Support the maintenance of international peace and security, including through peace support operations;
- Support the role of the UN and promote its effectiveness;
- Support international efforts in non-proliferation, disarmament and arms control, and counter-terrorism;
- Foster mutual knowledge and understanding between their peoples and of their cultures.

The Declaration states that both participants will look to continue the practice of close, practical co-operation - demonstrated in Bosnia and Afghanistan - in similar crisis management and post-conflict stabilisation activities.

Resolve to strengthen the relationship in Global and Regional security and counter-terrorism

The Declaration states that the EU and New Zealand have resolved to strengthen their relationship in global and regional security, counter-terrorism and human rights and will
identify opportunities for closer dialogue and co-operation between the participants on counter-terrorism. Both parties expressed their commitment to the ratification and implementation of all UN counter-terrorism conventions and protocols, as well as to the implementation of all relevant UNSCRs including UNSCR 1373 of 2001 and the UN Counter-Terrorism Strategy of 2006. The Declaration also states that the EU and New Zealand are ready to assist third countries in meeting their international counter-terrorism obligations.

**United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373**

UNSCR 1373 of 2001 calls on member states of the UN to implement measures to prevent and suppress terrorist acts. UNSCR 1373 imposed specific obligations on member states and called for additional measures in the area of counter-terrorism. These measures include the criminalization of terrorism-related activities including provision of assistance to carry out those acts, denial of funding and safe haven to terrorists and exchange of information on terrorist groups.

**United Nations’ Global Counter Terrorism Strategy**

The UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy was adopted in September 2006. The plan of action obliged member states to carry out the following key actions:

- Resolve to consistently, unequivocally and strongly condemn terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, committed by whomever, wherever and for whatever purposes, as it constitutes one of the most serious threats to international peace and security.
- To take urgent action to prevent and combat terrorism in all its forms.
- Recognise that international co-operation and any measures that are undertaken to prevent and combat terrorism must comply with the obligations of international law, including the Charter of the UN and relevant international conventions and protocols, in particular human rights, refugee and international humanitarian law.

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192 Joint Declaration on Relations and Co-operation between the European Union and New Zealand September 2007, p. 3 - 4.
**New Zealand’s Interest in Counter-Terrorism**

In the conclusion of the 2005 National Counter-Terrorism Capability Seminar, it was stated that it is in New Zealand’s interests to take an active role in supporting global and regional security and counter-terrorism efforts. New Zealand fundamentally rejects that there is any justification for terrorist attacks. The terrorist attacks in London in 2005 demonstrated the threat to New Zealanders and New Zealand interests from global terrorism - the Bali attacks in 2002 demonstrated that the Asia Pacific region is not immune to terrorist violence\(^\text{194}\).

**The European Union’s Interest in Counter-Terrorism**

The ESS states that it is in the EU’s interest to take an active role in supporting global and regional counter-terrorism as Europe is both a target and a base for terrorism. European countries are targets and have been attacked – notably Spain in 2004 and the UK in 2005. Logistical bases for Al Qaeda cells have been uncovered in the UK, Italy, Germany, Spain and Belgium\(^\text{195}\).

**The stability and prosperity of the Asia – Pacific Region is a priority**

The Declaration states that the stability and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region is a priority for both the EU and New Zealand. Therefore it is a significant focus of political and security dialogues. Both participants value their good co-operation as like-minded partners in the ARF and will continue their joint efforts to further strengthen the Forum as a vehicle for dialogue and co-operation in the Asia-Pacific, including through developing its preventive diplomacy role\(^\text{196}\). To appreciate the policy foundations of the commitment to the ARF expressed in the Declaration, an outline of associated policies and statements are covered in the following paragraphs.


\(^{195}\) *A Secure Europe in a Better World - European Security Strategy*, p. 3.

\(^{196}\) *Joint Declaration on Relations and Co-operation between the European Union and New Zealand September 2007*, p. 4.
Potential Challenges in South East Asia to Global Stability

In 2007 the French Minister Delegate of European Affairs commented that member states of ASEAN face major challenges that could lead to global destabilisation. The challenges noted included poverty, terrorism, acts of piracy, pandemics and emerging infectious diseases. Specific mention was made of the fact that one third of world trade transits via the Malacca strait - practically three times as much oil transits through this region as through the Suez Canal\textsuperscript{197}.

New Zealand Defence Policy Framework

The commitment of New Zealand to the Asia-Pacific Region is reinforced by the New Zealand Government’s Defence Policy Framework of 2000, which lists among New Zealand’s security interests an expanding role in South East and North East Asia and, where appropriate, a role in regional security consistent with New Zealand’s interests and capabilities. The Defence Policy Framework also states that New Zealand’s security policy includes active participation in important regional fora such as Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) and the ARF. New Zealand will take a constructive approach to regional human rights initiatives and, where necessary and feasible, participate in mediation and peace support operations\textsuperscript{198}.

European Union and ASEAN’s 2007 Enhanced Partnership Declaration

The EU's official commitment to South East Asia is supported by the \textit{Nuremberg Declaration on an Enhanced Partnership between the European Union and the Association of South East Asian Nations 2007}. Both parties agreed to enhance political dialogue between the EU and the ARF for advancing the common interests of both parties in promoting peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. Both parties also agreed to promote closer co-operation in addressing and combating terrorism, trafficking in human beings, drug trafficking, sea piracy, arms smuggling, money laundering, cyber-crime and related trans-national crime. They will also co-operate in the areas of disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation of WMD and their means

\textsuperscript{197} Colonna.
of delivery. The EU will encourage participation of ASEAN member countries in ESDP operations - as appropriate in view of the mandate of the respective organisation.

**European Union and ASEAN’s 2005 Aceh Peace Support Mission**

The EU led the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) in Indonesia during 2005. The EU officially articulated its attachment to a united, democratic, stable and prosperous Indonesia. It also emphasised its respect for the territorial integrity of the Republic of Indonesia and recognition of its importance as a major partner. Participants in the AMM included the EU, Norway, Switzerland and five members of ASEAN - Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. The Head of the EU Mission stated that the AMM had broken new ground for ESDP missions. The EU Presidency Report of 2005 noted that the successful planning and implementation of the AMM had enhanced co-operation with ASEAN.

**European Union’s Communication 2003 / 399 “New Partnership with South East Asia”**

As outlined in chapter two, the European Commission’s Communication 2003 399: A New Partnership with South East Asia has set six strategic priorities for its relationship with South East Asia. One of these priorities is “supporting regional stability and the fight against terrorism”. This strategic priority is explained in more detail as follows:

- The EU is committed to supporting regional co-operation to fight terrorism and to share its experience in the fight against terrorism.
- The EU is prepared to consider support to any willing country in the region to implement UNSCR 1373 and other relevant UN conventions.

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199 Nuremberg Declaration on an EU-ASEAN Enhanced Partnership 2007, in

200 Plan of Action to Implement the Nuremberg Declaration on an EUASEAN Enhanced Partnership, in

201 European Security and Defence Policy Newsletter, issue 2, June 2006, p. 18 - 23, in

202 Presidency Report on ESDP 12 December 2005, 1567805, COSDP916, p. 18, in
http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/05/st15/st15678.en05.pdf
- The EU encourages its partners in South East Asia to combat terrorism with a comprehensive strategy, taking care to respect basic human rights principles and peaceful political opposition.

Perceptions of the European Union's involvement in ASEAN Regional Security

Having outlined some of the background policies that are potentially of relevance to the 2007 Joint Declaration it is worthwhile examining perceptions of the EU’s involvement in ASEAN regional security. In ASEAN’s Relations with the European Union: Obstacles and Opportunities, several observations are made on the EU’s involvement in ASEAN regional security, some of which are outlined in the following paragraphs.

Historically, the EU has lacked a credible security role in South East Asia. This is evident in the ongoing debate on how to reduce piracy and sea robbery in the Straits of Malacca and secure Southeast Asia's shipping lanes. The USA, Japan, India and even China all offered to help the littoral states with capacity building efforts. However, the EU, and major European powers, have done very little except express concern at the situation.

The 2003 adoption of a Joint Declaration on Terrorism by the European Union and ASEAN marked a substantial step forward in relations between the two parties and signified that the EU was finally acknowledging the importance of Southeast Asia in the context of global security. However, the complete declaration could convey the impression of a piecemeal approach, or an attempt to do everything without prioritising, neither of which conveys an impression that the EU knows what it wants to achieve.

The EU’s insistence on a human rights clause in its agreements appears to be mutually incompatible with ASEAN’s policy of non-interference in the domestic affairs of its member states. Despite this, both parties have endeavoured to maintain co-operation, and overcome challenges such as those posed by human rights abuses in Myanmar.

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203 A New Partnership with South East Asia, p. 14.
204 Oerstrom Moeller, p. 473 - 5.
**Perceptions of the ARF’s effectiveness**

The high-level political commitment to South East Asian stability and security - that has been expressed by New Zealand, the EU and some of its member states - places significant importance on the role of the ARF. Consequently, it is worthwhile identifying some of the perceptions of the ARF with regards to the organisation’s effectiveness and significance. In *Advancing East Asian Regionalism*, it has been suggested that as the ARF is a relatively young organisation, with objectives designed to be realised over the longer term, it is difficult to fairly assess the effectiveness and significance of the ARF. However, some preliminary assessment of the organisation’s effectiveness can be made on the basis of a number of issue-based indicators, both positive and negative.

A commonly cited positive indicator of the ARF’s effectiveness is the fact that since the creation of the ARF in 1994, there have been no major conflicts fought in East Asia. To a limited extent this is true. On the one hand, there has been no significant outbreak of interstate hostilities since the ARF was founded and, indeed, several former enemies (such as China and Vietnam) are now partners in developing Confidence Building Measures. On the other hand, a technical state of war still exists on the Korean Peninsular and Japan and Russia are yet to reach a peace treaty from World War Two, while other unresolved issues such as the sovereign control over the South China Sea and the China-Taiwan dispute still hold the potential to cause widespread regional insecurity. So the success of the ARF in preventing conflicts must be considered relative.

A negative indicator regarding the ARF is whether the pace of institutional reform will allow the ARF to develop as a regional security body, or if the relatively slow and un-institutionalised nature of the ARF’s evolution renders it less meaningful in a region where many new security challenges now threaten regional peace and prosperity. Issues such as the unresolved threat to regional stability generated by the repeated outbreaks of haze in Southeast Asia, the lack of a timely response to the crisis in Timor-Leste, or the absence of effective regional mechanisms to prevent narcotics trafficking and small-
arms smuggling, could suggest a diminishing relevance. However, it is necessary to consider that ARF members have addressed these issues via other international bodies as well as sub regionally. In this latter area, the umbrella of the ARF acts as a venue to initiate, continue, or conclude negotiations becomes important.

To a certain extent both sets of indicators are dependent on assumptions relating to the appropriate role of the ARF in regional security affairs as well as the necessary speed of institutional change required for the ARF to remain relevant. The problem with either side of the debate is that there are no comparative models by which to compare the developments to date. At the end of the day it is up to the members to validate the organisation by remaining actively involved. Given this, it is also possible to consider the success of the ARF in terms of its relevance to members’ security needs. In other words, to what extent regional states are choosing to commit their resources to the ARF instead of other regional or international bodies.

**Intention to address political and security challenges in the Pacific**

The Joint Declaration states that New Zealand and the EU share the concern that some countries in the Pacific face political and security challenges and that New Zealand and the EU will work together to address this. Addressing security challenges in the Pacific is a fundamental defence interest for New Zealand and consequently of primary relevance to future defence relations between the EU and New Zealand. Some of the political and security challenges facing PIF Countries - and the EU and New Zealand's role in addressing these problems - are outlined in the following paragraphs.

**The European Union’s intention to increase co-operation with New Zealand.**

In June 2007 the European Commissioner for External Relations delivered the annual Europa lecture in New Zealand. The Commissioner emphasised that one of the three key areas that were highlighted for enhanced co-operation between the EU and New Zealand...

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205 Curley and Thomas, p. 13 - 14.
206 Joint Declaration on Relations and Co-operation between the European Union and New Zealand September 2007, p. 4.
Zealand was improving security in the Pacific. The European Commissioner stated that in many respects the latest security developments in the Pacific region had not been encouraging. The Commissioner stated that the EU was appreciative of the following: New Zealand's participation in the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI); its role in dealing with the latest military coup in Fiji; and its active engagement with Indonesia. The Commissioner outlined that the EU has launched a special procedure on Fiji specifically targeted on the question of human rights and the rule of law. The EU and its regional partners agreed that the aim must be for Fiji to hold elections no later than the first quarter of 2009. The EU continues to be actively involved in Timor-Leste and also has a substantial involvement in Indonesia through work in Aceh. The EU intends to co-operate with New Zealand in working to ensure Indonesia’s stable political and economic development as the economic powerhouse of the region and also the largest Muslim nation in the world208.

**Link between terrorism and trans-national crime in the Pacific Islands**

The PIF countries regard trans-national organised crime as a major issue in their region. The linkages between trans-national crime and terrorism, including of a financial nature, are internationally well established. Trans-national criminals create systems and arrangements which are exploited by terrorists. Equally, measures put in place to counter terrorism serve as well to deter trans-national crime. Many PIF countries have identified problems common to international crime and to terrorism. Border security is a major vulnerability. Other concerns are traffic in small arms, people and drugs. Responses required include the need for more training of border officials, better control of passports, and better access to immigration data. The PIF Member Nations' problems include port and airport security, and the difficulties of tracking vessels and people among remote islands in huge areas of sea. In addition to the threats of trans-national crime and terrorism, the PIF Nations also identify significant internal threats to

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individual member countries. These include problems of governance, communal relations, land use, environmental degradation and slow economic growth. These problems may cause internal destabilisation, which can increase the threat of terrorism, not least because disaffected and disadvantaged communities are more open to infiltration and external exploitation. The Pacific Island states have made counter-terrorism part of their security agenda. However, the requirements and obligations of the UN counter-terrorism agenda are unusually onerous for them. To carry them out requires sustained political will and bureaucratic commitment from the Island states. It can only be done with the assistance of the region and of the international community - whose security a safer Pacific will in turn reward209.

*United Nations’ Security Council Resolution 1373 - Pacific Islands’ Requirements*

UNSCR 1373 established the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC), consisting of the 15 UN Security Council delegations. The CTC monitors UN member states’ implementation of UNSCR 1373 and, where necessary, facilitates the provision of relevant technical assistance to member states210. The UN Counter Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED) maintains a technical assistance matrix to identify individual state’s requirement for technical assistance to enable them to meet the requirements of the Resolution. As at October 2007, the technical assistance matrix identified the following requirements for PIF Countries211:

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### United Nations Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate Technical Assistance Matrix

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<tr>
<th>PIF Country</th>
<th>Civil Aviation</th>
<th>Counter-Terrorism Law and Practice</th>
<th>Customs and Border Controls</th>
<th>Extradition Law and Practice</th>
<th>Financial Law and Practice</th>
<th>Immigration Law and Practice</th>
<th>Maritime Security</th>
<th>Police Law Enforcement</th>
<th>Training and Capacity Building</th>
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The technical assistance matrix should not be considered a comprehensive summary of all of the security issues confronting PIF Countries. However, it does provide a useful insight into some of the security problems that potentially confront New Zealand and the EU in addressing security challenges in the Pacific.

**Chapter Summary**

The Joint Declaration expresses a political intention for New Zealand and the EU to address future global and regional defence and security issues through dialogue and cooperation - similar to that which has been conducted in Bosnia and Afghanistan. Also specifically identified in the Declaration is a commitment to countering terrorism.

South East Asia is identified as a significant focus for New Zealand and EU political cooperation to address security issues. Security problems in South East Asia include: poverty; terrorism; trafficking of human beings; pandemics and emerging infectious diseases; acts of piracy and the vulnerability of shipping in the Malacca Strait; drug trafficking, arms smuggling, money laundering, cyber-crime and related trans-national
crime. If political co-operation by New Zealand and the EU to address security issues were to extend to practical defence co-operation, the intent of the Joint Declaration implies that the co-operation would probably be conducted under the remit of the ARF.

Whilst New Zealand and the EU have described the ARF as the most suitable regional entity to address South East Asia’s security challenges, the effective influence of the ARF potentially raises cause for concern. The ARF was unable to effectively address the crisis in Timor Leste and doubts have been expressed over the ARF’s ability to implement the institutional reform required to transform itself into a truly effective regional security organisation. Therefore, whilst the Joint Declaration indicates a political intention to address security issues in South East Asia through the ARF, it needs to be considered that resolving some security challenges may exceed the ARF’s capability.

There would appear to be an element of uncertainty regarding the effectiveness of the EU’s engagement with South East Asia on security issues. Despite extensive economic engagement by the EU with South East Asia, the EU has historically lacked a security role in the region. However, its increasing willingness to take effective steps to co-operate in addressing terrorist threats in South East Asia may indicate a strengthened resolve to address South East Asian security challenges. Notwithstanding this, the EU’s advocacy for human rights issues is likely to present challenges for its political engagement with ASEAN, due to ASEAN’s resistance to what it potentially perceives as interference in the domestic issues of member states.

The Joint Declaration expresses an intention to address security issues in PIF countries. The security issues include: trans-national crime and its potential links to terrorism; border security; port and airport security; traffic in small arms, people and drugs; and the difficulties of tracking vessels and people among remote islands in huge areas of sea. Other issues that can affect security, directly or indirectly, include problems of governance, communal relations, land use, environmental degradation and slow economic growth. The PIF countries have requested external assistance to address the considerable security challenges that confront them.
CHAPTER FIVE
KEY INTERESTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION THAT COULD INFLUENCE ITS FUTURE DEFENCE RELATIONS WITH NEW ZEALAND

There are a range of international and domestic general issues that will effect the broader development of the EU over the longer term. These issues will be outlined in the earlier paragraphs of this chapter, as it is necessary to appreciate their potential to influence the EU’s future foreign policy and its general relationship with New Zealand. On the assumption that the EU develops in accordance with the mainstream predictions of the EU’s governing institutions, then there will be important security and external relations issues that may influence the EU’s future defence relations with New Zealand. These security and external relations issues are outlined in the latter paragraphs of this chapter.

General issues

Some of the broader issues that may affect the EU in the longer term, and consequently have a direct or indirect effect on the EU’s foreign policy and overall relationship with New Zealand, are examined in the following paragraphs.

Prediction of the general issues and developments over the next 10 years.

The UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s 2006 white paper titled Active Diplomacy for a Changing World describes some of the key pressures that the EU may face during the next decade. Many European citizens have questioned the EU’s role in making a positive difference in their daily lives. The success of the EU and public support for European co-operation will depend above all on achieving economic dynamism through reform. It will also require more effective co-operation on judicial, immigration and asylum issues and coherent action to tackle other key issues for the security and prosperity of Europe, in particular terrorism, climate change and energy security\(^{212}\).

The theme of resistance to continued integration is addressed in *Euro-clash*. It identifies that the main source of tension and conflict over what might happen next in Europe is the gap between those who participate and benefit from Europe directly and those who do not. There is an immense amount of political co-operation, a more or less well integrated market for goods and services, and a nascent European politics. There is a great deal of social communication whereby people travel for business and holidays, speak second languages, and share some media and popular culture. But, for most people, this co-operation is not directly experienced. Given the fact that the beneficiaries of much interaction have been people who are richer and more educated, ‘Europe’ makes a big potential target for politicians and much of the population who do not think of themselves as Europeans. These citizens can easily view European integration as either a business plot that benefits those who are already better off or an assault on their national identity, state sovereignty, and welfare state. Whilst this is a caricatured view of some of the arguments of the EU’s opponents, it is, at some level, a not unreasonable representation that is in sync with what is happening for those who are not involved with the European economic project. Much of the conflict and occasional stalling of the European process in the past 25 years can be understood in this way; if citizens see themselves as Europeans, they are likely to favour Europe-wide political solutions to problems. If not, then they will not support Europe-wide policies213.

Active Diplomacy in a Changing World forecasts that the EU’s role in the European neighbourhood will be critical, its role in foreign and security policy is likely to grow. So too will its role in international development - by 2010 the EU will account for two-thirds of global development assistance214. However, the *EU’s relations with Developing States* identifies that the EU’s record is marred by a number of failings including: slow disbursement and excessively bureaucratic procedures; poor co-ordination between the EU, on the one hand, and the member states on the other; the tying of much aid to EU purchases; the failure to prioritise and thereby have a significant effect in any sector; the failure to integrate development policy with commercial or agricultural policy; poor evaluation and dissemination of information; and the lack of a coherent overall strategy215.

213 Fligstein, p. 4.
214 *Active Diplomacy in a Changing World - The UK’s International Priorities*, p. 23 - 5.
215 Lister, p. 358.
Identifying the issues for the next 20 years

The December 2007 Presidency Report of the European Council stated that an independent ‘Reflection Group’, referred to as ‘Horizon 2020’ that will examine key issues which the EU is likely to face from 2020 to 2030. The issues may include the following:
- Strengthening and modernising the European model of economic success and social responsibility.
- Enhancing the competitiveness of the EU.
- The rule of law.
- Sustainable development as a fundamental objective of the EU.
- Global stability.
- Migration.
- Energy and climate protection.
- The fight against global insecurity, international crime and terrorism216.

The influence of the new member states on the European Union

In *New Zealand and the EU, 12 months after enlargement*, the New Zealand Minister of Foreign Affairs outlined some of the perceived effects of the new member states upon the EU. Popular support for membership of the EU is strong amongst the new member states. However, few leaders of these countries actively promote the benefits of ever increasing integration. This may be due to a reluctance on the part of these nations, who have relatively recently escaped from the control of the former United Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR), to surrender an excessive degree of their regained independent national power and freedom to Brussels. These countries do not want to see EU membership having a weakening effect upon their sovereignty. The enlargement process has also changed the veteran members of the EU. There are many in these member states that see a risk that they will end up paying for development in the new member nations, and are unwilling to do so. This is part of the reason why there is resistance in some member states towards the admission of Turkey and the Ukraine into

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the EU. Perhaps the key feature of enlargement is that the EU is now so large and
diverse that the central driving force of France and Germany has been dissipated.
France and Germany, and the member states who share very closely their political
ambitions, are no longer able to command a clear majority. Many of the new member
states identify instead with the more liberal economic approaches preferred by the UK,
and also with the UK’s reluctance to cede too much sovereignty to Brussels²¹⁷.

**Key Bilateral External Relations**

Bilateral external relations will be a major influence upon the EU. The most important
bilateral relationships that may affect the EU’s CFSP are likely to be with the USA,
Russia, China and Japan. Some of the key issues in these bilateral relationships are
outlined in the following paragraphs.

The USA will remain the most influential global actor. The partnership between the EU
and the USA will need to be based on a common agenda. The EU will need to play a
greater role in the pursuit of security interests and the USA will need to work with the
EU and others in the pursuit of the wider economic, development and environmental
priorities that are now so clearly linked to those shared security concerns. The
relationship between the two parties will play an increasing role as the EU’s
international influence and responsibilities increase.

Russia will be of major importance to the EU as its largest neighbour, a major energy
supplier, a nuclear power and a key player on proliferation issues²¹⁸. *Europe must take
the lead against the Russian Bully* identified that Russia’s invasion of South Ossetia in
August 2008 marked the worst deterioration in relations with ‘the west’ since the end of
the USSR. Calls for tough action by the west may have exposed significant differences
between the EU’s and the USA’s diplomatic power. It has been suggested that the EU’s
response potentially exposed: it’s military weakness; deep divisions over security of
energy supplies from Russia; and showed that the EU’s ambivalence towards Russia
and preference for ‘soft diplomacy’ is ineffectual in the face of Russian ‘power politics’.

²¹⁷ Phil Goff, *NZ and the EU, 12 months after enlargement*, Europa Lecture by the New Zealand Minister
of Foreign Affairs, delivered in Christchurch, New Zealand, 9 May 2005, p. 2 - 3, in
This contrasts with the USA, which arguably has few illusions as to the diplomatic instruments that are respected by Russia and has the ability to employ them effectively\(^\text{219}\).

China’s focus over the next 10 years is likely to be on increasing its own prosperity and security. However, whether China achieves its domestic goals will depend on the success of its further integration into the global community. The success of this further integration will depend on continuing progress in domestic political reform and on upholding human rights. A joint approach by the USA and the EU will be essential to ensure that China’s growing influence strengthens the global community.

Japan will be an important partner for the EU on a range of global issues. Japan’s relationship with China will be complex, including elements of co-operation and tension. Additionally, Japan will be a critical factor in the security of East Asia\(^\text{220}\).

**Energy Requirements**

Energy dependence is a special concern for the EU, as Europe is the world’s largest importer of oil and gas. Imports accounted for approximately 50 percent of energy consumption in 2003 and this is predicted to rise to 70 percent by 2030\(^\text{221}\). Most of the EU’s energy imports come from three key areas: the Middle East (45% of oil), Russia (40% of natural gas) and North Africa\(^\text{222}\).

The International Energy Agency predicts that much of the EU’s increasing gas imports will come from Russia. Whilst Iran and Iraq both have gas to spare, the EU is reluctant to do business with the former, because of its nuclear ambitions, and unable to do business with the latter because of its instability. *Dependent Territory* identifies that gas supplies from Russia are potentially fraught with problems as Russia has demonstrated its willingness to use oil and gas for political purposes on several

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\(^{218}\) *Active Diplomacy in a Changing World - The UK’s International Priorities*, p. 23 - 5.  
\(^{220}\) *Active Diplomacy in a Changing World - The UK’s International Priorities*, p. 23 - 5.  
\(^{221}\) *A Secure Europe in a Better World - European Security Strategy*, p. 3.  
occasions. In *Putin fires energy warning over talk of EU sanctions* the UK Prime Minister is reported to have warned that if the EU does not review energy links with Russia it risked “sleep walking into an energy dependence.” The historical precedent for Russia’s use of energy as a political bargaining chip is unclear. In *Russia seeks to ease fears over western oil supplies* it is identified that Russia claims it never cut off oil supplies for political purposes - even during the height of the Cold War. However, some analysts have suggested it has often done so in the past, although under different guises.

European Commission policy recognises that a strategy for the security of energy supply must be implemented to reduce the risks linked to the external dependence. The main objective of a EU energy strategy would be to ensure: the well-being of its citizens; proper functioning of the economy; and uninterrupted availability of energy products on the market at an affordable price for all consumers. Additionally, the strategy would need to satisfy environmental and sustainable development concerns.

**Defence and Security Issues**

*Euro-clash* suggests that most academic analysis tends to indicate that in the collective fields of CFSP; an EU Military Force to implement the CFSP; and a common weapons production and procurement system, “the glass is less than half full.” Some of the associated issues are outlined in the following paragraphs.

**European Security Strategy**

The ESS states that for the EU to be able make a contribution to global security that fulfils it's potential, it needs to be more active, more capable, more coherent and needs to work with others. It needs to be more active in pursuing its strategic objectives. The EU’s military forces need to be transformed into more flexible, mobile forces. More

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226 *Towards a European strategy for the security of energy supply.*
resources will be required and these will have to be used more effectively including the following: European assistance programmes; the European Development Fund; and military and civilian capabilities from member states and other instruments. The EU needs to work with partners to achieve objectives through multilateral co-operation in international organisations and through partnerships with key actors. Notwithstanding these issues, Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council 14 December 2007 reported that the ESS had been very useful and provided the EU with the relevant framework for its external policy. In light of developments, including mission experience, the policy was to be examined with a purpose of improving and complementing the strategy.

Military Capabilities

*Euro-clash* identifies that European member state governments have different foreign policy goals as a consequence of their historical experiences, the size of the country, their views of threats to national sovereignty, and their current views on the appropriateness of intervention in the political affairs of other states. These policy differences have resulted in differing views on the role of their national militaries, the adequate sizing of those militaries, and their national defence industries. For example, the UK and France have the largest militaries and in the post-WW2 era have used them to intervene in places where they believe they have national interest at stake. On the other hand, Germany has armed forces that are restricted to fighting only for self defence. This, of course, is a result of WW2 and subsequent restrictions on Germany’s rearmament. Germany and many of the smaller countries such as Denmark, Sweden and Finland, prefer to view their role in international affairs as involved more with diplomacy and less with military intervention.

The consequence of these historically influenced dissimilar foreign policies is that the EU consists of 27 member nations with vastly differing military capabilities. *Armed Forces and Society in Europe* identifies that there is a substantial difference in the structure, equipment, organisation and ethos of EU member nations’ armed forces. A

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227 Fligstein, p. 95.
generic description of the principal missions of armed forces of some of the EU member states is depicted in the following table.\(^{231}\)

<table>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Countries.</td>
<td>France.</td>
<td>Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain.</td>
<td>Czech Republic, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Sweden.</td>
<td>Austria, Ireland.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In *European Security and Trans-Atlantic Relations after 9/11 and the Iraq War* it is suggested that European military capabilities are better suited to projecting low-intensity power rather than for rapid deployment of combat forces over long distances. It notes that EU military capabilities have most utility and value in peacekeeping, humanitarian action, disaster relief and post-conflict reconstruction rather than in war fighting.\(^{232}\)

**Military Attitudes**

*Public Opinion and European Defense* identifies that in 2000, a ‘Eurobarometer Survey on European Defence’ established that whilst the majority of Europeans were in favour of institutionalising European defence in one form or another - namely, through the creation of a common policy and an organisation that would no longer be strictly national - they were still far from disposed toward a really integrated defence policy. Only 7% were of the opinion that the decision to send troops within the framework of a crisis management operation outside the EU should be taken by majority vote. Nearly

\(^{230}\) Fligstein, p. 93.  
\(^{231}\) Forster, p. 45.  
\(^{232}\) Heinz Gärtner,‘NATO and EU’, in “European Security and Trans-Atlantic relations after 9/11 and the Iraq War”, p. 12.
one in two Europeans believed that it should be up to those governments prepared to send troops to decide whether to conduct a EU-led crisis management operation. Similarly, only 12% wanted a single European Army to replace national armies. The solution preferred by Europeans was that of a permanent European Rapid Reaction Force in addition to the national armed forces (37%)\(^\text{233}\). In the following graph *Democracy and Military Force* summarises the attitudes of European citizens towards the tasks to be conducted by a possible European Army\(^\text{234}\).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proposed tasks of a European Army</th>
<th>Percentage of citizens of individual EU Member States (15) who support the proposed tasks</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To defend the territory of the EU, including own country.</td>
<td>A 56  B 78  D 63  Dk 76  E 70  F 60  Fn 63  Gr 70  Ir 65  I 70  L 77  Ni 79  P 65  S 61  UK 61  EU 71</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To maintain peace in the EU.</td>
<td>A 55  B 69  D 62  Dk 68  E 60  F 78  Gr 72  Ir 72  I 50  L 58  Ni 64  P 70  S 62  UK 67  EU 47</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To assist in natural disasters in Europe</td>
<td>A 54  B 68  D 61  Dk 67  E 47  F 70  Gr 62  Ir 49  I 41  L 53  Ni 64  P 76  S 41  UK 65  EU 43</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To defend human rights</td>
<td>A 38  B 57  D 48  Dk 57  E 62  F 50  Gr 57  Ir 52  I 44  L 43  Ni 54  P 53  S 74  UK 49  EU 51</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To execute humanitarian operations</td>
<td>A 41  B 53  D 48  Dk 45  E 57  F 36  Gr 41  Ir 38  I 43  L 53  Ni 54  P 37  S 42  UK 40  EU 48</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To intervene in conflicts on the borders of the EU</td>
<td>A 41  B 60  D 54  Dk 46  E 37  F 63  Gr 45  Ir 38  I 33  L 31  Ni 59  P 64  S 55  UK 36  EU 44</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To repatriate Europeans in conflict zones</td>
<td>A 35  B 55  D 52  Dk 53  E 27  F 61  Gr 31  Ir 25  I 27  L 28  Ni 49  P 47  S 43  UK 22  EU 41</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To assist in natural disasters outside Europe</td>
<td>A 34  B 46  D 39  Dk 43  E 29  F 45  Gr 37  Ir 30  I 24  L 31  Ni 49  P 53  S 25  UK 48  EU 30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To take part in peacekeeping missions decided by the UN</td>
<td>A 24  B 44  D 47  Dk 42  E 19  F 36  Gr 43  Ir 24  I 29  L 27  Ni 45  P 53  S 26  UK 50  EU 34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To defend the EU’s economic interests</td>
<td>A 16  B 33  D 12  Dk 22  E 21  F 35  Gr 19  Ir 29  I 19  L 18  Ni 27  P 18  S 19  UK 19  EU 23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To symbolise a European identity</td>
<td>A 14  B 29  D 12  Dk 19  E 13  F 28  Gr 11  Ir 31  I 13  L 13  Ni 36  P 13  S 18  UK 17  EU 19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To intervene in conflicts in other parts of the world</td>
<td>A 10  B 28  D 21  Dk 17  E 15  F 22  Gr 8  Ir 10  I 16  L 13  Ni 26  P 33  S 21  UK 19  EU 18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To take part in peacekeeping missions without UN mandate</td>
<td>A 12  B 27  D 14  Dk 13  E 11  F 24  Gr 8  Ir 12  I 14  L 13  Ni 27  P 22  S 12  UK 11  EU 15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There should not be a European Army</td>
<td>A 3  B 8  D 3  Dk 2  E 3  F 2  Gr 4  Ir 3  I 5  L 3  Ni 6  P 3  S 5  UK 4  EU 4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know / no answer</td>
<td>A 4  B 3  D 5  Dk 4  E 5  F 3  Gr 10  Ir 3  I 6  L 5  Ni 5  P 5  S 6  UK 7  EU 13  EU 5</td>
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</table>

\(^{233}\) Manigart, p. 330 - 1.

\(^{234}\) Everts, table 5.5, p. 85.
The graph shows that, as far as the roles of a future ‘European Army’ were concerned, more than 70% considered that it should be used to defend the EU’s territory, including their own countries. The so-called Petersberg tasks did not receive enthusiastic support from European citizens, with the exception of three of them: humanitarian missions; intervening in conflicts on the EU’s borders; and the repatriation of Europeans from conflict zones. Respondents also made rather a clear distinction between taking part in peacekeeping missions outside the EU without the agreement of the UN (15%), and those mandated by the UN (34%). On a comparative level, the analysis showed that public opinion in the six founding members of the EU (and even more particularly, in Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg and France) was systematically most favourable to a common security and defence policy and to the idea of a European Army. Generally, the UK was at the other end of the spectrum. Overall, whilst the Eurobarometer survey did not really find a convergence of European public opinion regarding a common security and defence policy, it showed that public opinion often, though not always, corresponded closely with the opinions of the respective governments.

For military personnel, the possibility of a truly integrated EU defence capability raises much deeper questions of identity and political legitimacy than is the case with NATO. In contrast to the Atlantic Alliance, military actors frequently involved in EU operations might need to rethink their primary political allegiance. This raises the question of whether European military personnel are willing to think of themselves not only as citizens of a nation-state, but also of the EU. *The attitudes of European Officers toward European Defence* outlines some interesting research, extracts of which are covered in the following paragraphs.

It has been suggested that the institutional evolution of ESDP is a product of the influence of chiefs of staff and their delegates who, given the near-absence of close political control, define its contours in a piecemeal manner. The process of Europeanization also shapes the thinking of defence planners, including military officers. In France and Germany, high ranking officers adapt their behaviour and rhetoric to an increasingly European context. However, it is generally taken for granted that UK Officers support only NATO and prefer co-operating with the USA.

235 Manigart, p. 330 - 1.
Analysis of a study conducted in 1992 by The European Research Group on Military and Society identified that a substantial minority of French and UK Officers, but a clear majority of German, Swedish and Italian Officers supported the idea of common European Armed Forces. Because of important cross-national variations and a lack of consensus within countries, it was concluded that there was not yet a single European culture of security. Subsequent analysis of the same data in 2002 identified that the significant predictors of support for European Armed Forces were: speaking foreign languages; having only a few soldiers in one's family; belonging to a 'support unit'; being highly ranked; and believing in virtues of international missions.

Comparison of numerous studies conducted between 1998 - 2000, which focused on the organisational structures and value systems of European militaries, identified that, by and large, there is a common military culture in Europe based on professionalism and the acceptance of peace-making operations, however, vexing problems of ‘cultural interoperability’ between European Officers remain.

**Defence Industry**

*Euro-Clash* identifies that at the end of the Cold War European governments sought ways to rationalise defence procurement in order to use research and development funding more effectively and to spread the costs of new weapons systems over different member states. One outcome has been the formation of the Organisation Conjointe de Cooperation en Matière d’Armement (OCCAR) to facilitate the joint production of defence equipment. OCCAR became a legal entity in 2001 involving Germany, France, the UK, Italy, Belgium and Spain and currently manages 80% of Europe’s military expenditures.

Another arrangement between France, Germany, the UK, Italy, Sweden and Spain has been the signing of a ‘Letter of Intent’ (LoI). The purpose of the LoI committed parties to: allow for the rationalisation of the European defence industry; agree to accept cross-border mergers if the states where firms were located would agree to sell armaments across Europe; and agree to share technical information, jointly fund research and

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236 Merand, p. 339 - 41.
development and where possible share the costs of common weapons systems. In practice the LoI has proven to be difficult to implement because, as mergers have been proposed, governments have had second thoughts about how far they intend to allow national weapons capacity to be under foreign ownership. In 2004 the EU agreed to create a European Defence Agency with a broad mandate. This organisation provides a EU venue to continue discussions about defence consolidation and interfaces with OCCAR, the LoI, and other European organisations dedicated to the same ends.

By 2004, three consortiums had emerged from the mergers of European defence firms - EADS, BAe and Thales. These three consortiums do not function strictly as competitors, but continue to operate joint ventures and subsidiaries. The end form of the firms will certainly depend on how far the member-state governments of the EU go in centralising their weapons investments and expanding defence production because of commitments to a European Defence Force. While both these ideas are on the table and there is movement in the direction of centralising production, the end state of these firms is not certain. However, the remarkable feature of this process is that the European defence industry, which many may have expected would have remained centred on national champions, has been reorganised on a European basis. What exists is a nascent military industrial complex, in spite of governments moving slowly and cautiously in their desire to maintain control over defence systems.

**Defence and Security Organisations and Alliances**

*Armed Forces and Society in Europe* identifies that the EU's military capabilities and organisation are substantially different to NATO. The EU’s Global Crisis Management Strategy identifies with an international order based on effective multilateralism as one of its three key priorities. In particular, a key mission is ‘strengthening the UN, equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities and to act effectively’

From the outset, the centrality of UNSC approval has therefore been built into the rules governing EU military action.

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237 Fligstein, pp. 93 - 5, 100 - 2.
In European regional security organisations some nation states have more influence than others, for example: the USA within NATO; Russia in the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE); and France, Germany and the UK in the EU\textsuperscript{239}.

*Active Diplomacy in a Changing World* predicts that NATO will remain the primary security institution binding the EU and North America together. It will also be the main provider for the most demanding military operations - for example, those similar to the operations presently conducted by the NATO led ISAF in Afghanistan\textsuperscript{240}.

In the long run, the ESDP will most likely either duplicate NATO structures or borrow from its organisational assets\textsuperscript{241}. *EU Operational Capabilities* states that the need for the EU to have the capacity for autonomous action and to take decisions and approve military action, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, has been recognised by the North Atlantic Council in its Washington Declaration of April 1999. In that same declaration, certain principles have been established to govern the relationship between NATO and the EU in questions of security and defence policy; these principles include the need for mutual consultation, co-operation and transparency while avoiding unnecessary duplication; the need to ensure the fullest possible involvement of non-EU European Allies in EU-led operations; the determination to use separable but not separate assets and capabilities; and the need to further develop the role of the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR)\textsuperscript{242}.

**The Cotonou Agreement**

The Cotonou agreement has been outlined in chapter two. However, it is worthy of further examination as the Cotonou agreement contains much detail which describes the European Union's political commitment to the Pacific Region. The Cotonou Agreement potentially has relevance to future defence and security relations between the EU and New Zealand as the Agreement has a significant emphasis on peace-building, conflict prevention and resolution. The key elements of the Cotonou Agreement that may have relevance to future defence relations are covered in the following paragraphs.

\textsuperscript{239} ibid, p. 213.
\textsuperscript{240} *Active Diplomacy in a Changing World - The UK’s International Priorities*, p. 23 – 5.
\textsuperscript{241} Merand, p. 339.
Overall objectives of the Cotonou Agreement

The Cotonou Agreement is intended to cover the period 2000 - 2020 and is reviewed every five years. The partnership aims to assist ACP states to achieve the following objectives:
- The eradication of poverty.
- Sustainable long-term development in conjunction with good governance.
- The gradual integration of the ACP countries into the world economy.
- The economic, social and cultural development and greater well being of the ACP member states’ populations.
- Peace, security and stability in conjunction with respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law.\(^{243}\)

Article 11 – Peace Building Policies, Conflict Prevention and Resolution

Article 11 of the Cotonou Agreement covers the EU's specific commitments to peace building, conflict prevention and conflict resolution. It would appear that some objectives might have been included to address specific challenges within African or Caribbean states. Nonetheless, many of the generic objectives do have considerable relevance to security in the Pacific area. The specific objectives that are addressed in Article 11 are outlined in the following paragraphs.

The efforts to be included in peace building, conflict prevention and resolution shall include the following: support for mediation, negotiation and reconciliation efforts; effective regional management of shared, scarce natural resources; demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants into society; addressing the problem of child soldiers; suitable action to set responsible limits to military expenditure and the arms trade, including through support for the promotion and application of agreed standards and codes of conduct. Particular emphasis is placed upon the fight against anti-personnel landmines as well as to countering the illegal trafficking and accumulation of small arms and light weapons.

\(^{242}\) Pnevmaticou, p. 334.
\(^{243}\) Partnership Agreement Between The Members Of The African, Caribbean And Pacific Group Of States Of The One Part, And The European Community And Its Member States, Of The Other Part.
In situations of violent conflict the EU and ACP states shall take all suitable action to prevent intensification of violence, to limit its territorial spread, and to facilitate a peaceful settlement of the existing disputes. Particular attention shall be paid to ensuring that financial resources for co-operation are used in accordance with the principles and objectives of the Partnership, and to preventing a diversion of funds for belligerent purposes.

In post-conflict situations, the EU and ACP states shall take all suitable action to facilitate the return to a non-violent, stable and self-sustainable situation. The Parties shall ensure the creation of the necessary links between emergency measures, rehabilitation and development co-operation.

*Article 30 – Regional Co-operation*

Article 30 of the agreement encourages regional co-operation to address a wide variety of issues. Specific areas with implications for defence and security are arms control and action against drugs, organised crime and money laundering. One of the intended consequences of regional co-operation is to encourage a regional dialogue on conflict prevention and resolution.

*Article 72 – Humanitarian and Emergency Assistance*

The Cotonou Agreement also gives the EU a specific interest in humanitarian and emergency assistance. The following abbreviated extracts of Article 72 of the Agreement may have relevance to the EU’s interaction with Pacific States.

Humanitarian and emergency assistance shall be accorded to the population in states faced with serious economic and social difficulties of an exceptional nature resulting from natural disasters, man-made crises such as wars and other conflicts or extraordinary circumstances having comparable effects. Humanitarian and emergency assistance shall be granted exclusively according to the needs and interests of victims of disasters and in line with the principles of international

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244 ibid, article 11, p. 19.
245 ibid, article 30, p. 45.
humanitarian law. In particular, there shall be no discrimination between victims on grounds of race, ethnic origin, religion, gender, age, nationality or political affiliation.

The aims of humanitarian and emergency assistance, which may have some indirect applicability for defence co-operation, includes the following elements:
- Safeguard human lives in crises and immediate post-crisis situations brought about by natural disasters, conflict or war;
- Contribute to the financing and delivery of humanitarian aid and to the direct access to it of its intended beneficiaries by all logistical means available\textsuperscript{246}.

\textit{The 2005 revision}

The 2005 revisions to the Cotonou Agreement include the following elements which may be of significance to defence and security co-operation:
- The partners agreed to include a reference to co-operation in countering the proliferation of WMD. Additional financial and technical assistance will be granted for co-operation on non-proliferation of WMD. The EU considers this agreement constitutes a real break-through in the area of international relations and reflects the common commitment of 78 ACP countries and the 27 EU member states to combating the proliferation of WMD.
- The revised agreement provides for inclusion of a clause that confirms the Cotonou Agreement partners’ international co-operation in the fight against terrorism.
- A provision is also included relating to the prevention of mercenary activities.
- Arrangements for the management of financial assets is specified. The provision covers financial management in crisis or conflict situations and the use of resources to promote peace and to manage and settle conflicts\textsuperscript{247}.

\textbf{The European Union’s Pacific Strategy}

In addition to the Cotonou Agreement, the EU has a specific strategy for the Pacific: \textit{EU Relations With The Pacific Islands - A Strategy For A Strengthened Partnership}. The EU advocates that it aims to help stabilisation in post-conflict situations and establish

\textsuperscript{246} ibid, article 72, p. 95.
good governance by strengthening credible institutions. It will also encourage greater compliance with international standards in the fight against corruption, money laundering and terrorist financing. The EU aims to strengthen its political dialogue through increased contact with the PIF, which is the main regional institution for political issues. The EU also recognises the importance of conducting bilateral dialogue with key Pacific countries, in accordance with the Cotonou Agreement. The EU considers that regional integration is crucial for an effective development aid strategy.

Ten percent of the exports from the Pacific ACP States go to the EU. The EU’s Pacific Strategy recognises the challenges that will be placed on the Pacific Region as a consequence of a growing demand for their substantial natural resources (fish, timber, minerals, oil and gas). The new generations of Fisheries Partnership Agreements will provide regulated access to fishing opportunities for European vessels. Close co-operation between the EU and the Pacific states is envisaged to promote responsible fishing and ensure conservation and sustainable use of the fishery resources.

**Perceived challenges for European Union and Pacific Island Co-operation**

*Governance, Capacity and Legitimacy* suggests that the EU’s attempt at engagement with PIF nations seems to be based on a desire to assist the nations, if not into integration with the international economy, then in the very least to begin to fend for themselves. Underlying motivations propelling these exchanges are, understandably perhaps, not as simplistic or as one-dimensional as that. But the EU’s sentiments would have to be stoical given the inconsistency of political circumstances and developments in the region. It is clear that governance, legitimacy and capacity issues range from adequate in some nations to wholly in need of reform in others. In some ways, rather than be seen to be joining with other outside actors in the region in pushing for the reform of governance structures, the EU may be seen as contributing to the ‘problem’ since some Pacific nations do not take kindly to ‘interference’ and these issues, for

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instance democratic governance, are hardly new but have been confronted by Islands for some time.\textsuperscript{249}

In \textit{Regionalism: EU and Pacific Perspectives} it is stated that in the European experience, regionalization has been a drawn-out, incremental, evolutionary process. It makes it difficult to try to implement wholesale in the Pacific the strategies developed by the EU, because the cultural make-up of the Pacific is so different. However, there are lessons that the Pacific Islands can learn from the EU. There is a near consensus that some of the problems in the region would be better approached on a regional basis. EU region-to-region assistance will be invaluable as the Pacific leaders start making the unavoidable, though difficult, decisions for their people about deeper co-operation and integration.\textsuperscript{250}

\textbf{Chapter Summary}

There will be continued substantial popular resistance within the EU to further integration by those who perceive the EU as either a ‘business plot’ by a privileged few or a threat to national identity, state sovereignty and the welfare state. The new member states in particular are unlikely to favour any significant transfer of national authority to the EU. Additionally, veteran member states may resist the perceived financial burden of providing economic development assistance to the new member states. Essentially, citizens who do not regard themselves as Europeans are likely to oppose any measures that are not perceived to benefit their national interests. To maintain a critical mass of popular support, the EU’s political leaders may seek further internal reform to achieve greater economic dynamism. They will need to co-operate to address judicial, immigration, and asylum issues and take action to address issues of terrorism, climate change and energy security.

Whilst it is forecast the EU will provide the majority of global development aid by 2010, the EU’s record on the delivery of aid has historically had numerous weaknesses including excessively bureaucratic processes and a lack of a coherent overall strategy. EU policy for global development advocates engagement on a region to region basis. In

\textsuperscript{249} Holland and Koloamatangi, p. 117.
\textsuperscript{250} Koloamatangi, p. 190.
seeking to apply this policy to relations with the PIF the EU will have to address governance, legitimacy; capacity and cultural challenges. Collectively, these challenges will make the implementation of the Cotonou Agreement and Pacific Strategy objectives a demanding and protracted task for both parties.

The EU’s bilateral relationship with the USA will be critical to global security and prosperity. Relations with Russia will be uniquely important, and probably troublesome, due to the EU’s external dependence on energy resources. The EU’s engagement with China and Japan may have particular significance to New Zealand’s Asia-Pacific interests. Despite the EU’s global economic influence, it will be severely challenged by diplomatic crises that rely on the actual or threatened use of ‘hard power’. This weakness will not be corrected unless the EU is able to resolve the substantial deficits in its CFSP, military capability, and weapons production and procurement system.

EU member states have vastly differing national foreign policies and military capabilities. Of all 27 EU member nations, only France and the UK possess military forces that are primarily structured and equipped to enable the conduct of expeditionary war fighting operations. The remainder of EU member nations' expeditionary capability falls somewhere between the ability to contribute to international security missions and an ability to participate in limited peacekeeping tasks. There is perhaps here a corresponding link with the ethos of military personnel - within the UK and French armed services there appears to be a far greater sense of national, rather than European, loyalty. NATO will remain the entity of choice for EU member nations to collectively participate in high intensity military operations in the most challenging environments. Due to the limitations of EU military capabilities, ESDP missions for the foreseeable future will probably be confined to less challenging peacekeeping tasks.
CHAPTER SIX
KEY INTERESTS OF NEW ZEALAND THAT COULD INFLUENCE ITS
DEFENCE FUTURE RELATIONS WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION

Just as there a broad range of issues that will effect the future development of the EU, so too are there a range of international issues that will affect New Zealand’s foreign policy. It is necessary to outline these influences, as they will determine the future of the overall relationship between New Zealand and the EU.

Overview of New Zealand’s Strategic Environment

While New Zealand does not face any direct military threat, recent events in Fiji, Tonga, the Solomon Islands and Timor-Leste have highlighted the growing insecurity and fragility in the South Pacific. When combined with a growing number of transnational security challenges that have implications for New Zealand, these events depict an increasingly difficult and uncertain strategic environment.

International terrorism remains a significant and serious threat to New Zealand and the region and the government has determined that combating international terrorism is a policy priority for a number of agencies. The lesson of Afghanistan is that failed states are more than a humanitarian tragedy - they can also threaten international peace and security.

The Pacific will continue to be a key focus for the NZDF. New Zealand has formal constitutional obligations for the defence of the Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau and under The Treaty of Friendship with Samoa a responsibility to consider sympathetically any requests for defence assistance. In the wider Pacific region New Zealand has international obligations, including assistance with the surveillance of Pacific Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ), disaster relief, maritime search and rescue, and peace-keeping. The impact of globalisation on the Pacific has transformed the regional security environment. The challenge for New Zealand will be to maintain ready and capable agencies, including the NZDF, to help Pacific neighbours address these issues, block
threats, and continue to assist in established ways such as emergency help and disaster relief. To do this, New Zealand requires partners\textsuperscript{251}.

**New Zealand’s key bilateral relationships**

New Zealand’s key bilateral relationships are with Australia, the USA, the EU, Japan, the Pacific Island countries and China. Beyond this, New Zealand is broadening the base of its relationships by strengthening linkages with existing partners including: Southeast and South Asia; and the Russian Federation. New Zealand is also building links with newer partners, for example in the Middle East and in Latin America\textsuperscript{252}. A description of New Zealand’s relations with the EU and some key member nations has been covered in previous chapters. A brief description of New Zealand’s key bilateral relations - that may have some relevance to defence and security future relations with the EU - are covered in the following paragraphs.

**Australia**

Australia is New Zealand’s largest trading partner and closest defence ally. New Zealand annual exports to Australia were in excess of $7.2 billion, and imports from Australia were in excess of $8.5 billion\textsuperscript{253}. There are three fundamental pillars to the trans-Tasman relationship: extensive people-to-people links; deepening economic and trading ties under the Australia New Zealand Closer Economic Relations (CER) Trade Agreement; and close defence and security co-operation under the Closer Defence Relations agreement (CDR)\textsuperscript{254}.


\textsuperscript{252} Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade - post-election brief September 2005, Asia, Regional Security, Background, (now removed)

\textsuperscript{253} New Zealand External Trade and Statistics June 2007, Table 5.01, Top 50 bilateral trading partners, p. 97, in http://www.stats.govt.nz/NR/rdonlyres/1C559AFD-693B-4932-B847-2CB9408AF681/0/NewZealandExternalTradeStatisticsJune2007.pdf

\textsuperscript{254} Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade - post-election brief September 2005.
In 2008 a European Union - Australia Partnership Framework was adopted to shape the future direction of bilateral co-operation. An abbreviated outline of key defence and security issues identified for ongoing co-operation are as follows:

- Identify shared security interests within the ESDP.
- Enhance co-operation to counter illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons.
- Support ISAF’s Comprehensive Strategic Political Military Plan for Afghanistan.
- Encourage the ARF to enhance regional security including counter-terrorism.
- Maintain high level bilateral consultation on the global terrorist threat.
- Continue support for the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Co-operation (JCLEC).
- Enhance co-operation to combat terrorism and trans-national crime.

Australia’s Relations with the EU Brief states that both parties co-operate increasingly closely in the Asia-Pacific region, including to enhance security, stability and good governance, and to improve the co-ordination of development co-operation assistance among donors to the region. Australia is the leading donor of aid to the independent countries of the Pacific and conducts a program of defence co-operation. Australia also has significant trade and commercial interests in the region.

The Australian Government will release a new Defence White Paper that will announce a focus on three key priorities. First priority will remain the defence of the Australian continent without relying on the assistance of others. The second priority will be to maintain a capability to take a lead role in stabilisation efforts in its own immediate region. The third priority will be to maintain the capacity to join in coalition efforts in the broader Asia-Pacific region and beyond. This will require a balanced force and some difficult capability and force structure decisions as a consequence of budget limitations.
Regional and International Co-operation in Tackling Trans-national Crime, Terrorism and the Problems of Disrupted States notes academic observations that Australia’s political and security initiatives in the region have frequently been criticised by regional spokesmen and the media as intrusive, arrogant and insensitive. Australia’s role in Timor-Leste, its so-called ‘Pacific Solution’ to the illegal immigration problem, and statements on a ‘pre-emptive strike’ strategy against terrorist strongholds have caused genuine concern in a number of regional countries. Its close strategic affiliation with the USA, including military commitments to Afghanistan and Iraq, have given greater credibility to Australia’s reputation as a regional ‘deputy sheriff’ of the USA, and its interventions in the Solomon Islands and PNG have raised some concerns about what directions Australia is taking in the region\(^{259}\).

The United States of America

Official policy documents outline that the USA is a key partner for New Zealand and the two countries enjoy a longstanding friendship. The USA is New Zealand’s second-largest individual export market and New Zealand exports were in excess of $4.5 billion\(^{260}\). Additionally, the economic flow is balanced, with imports from the USA to New Zealand being slightly under $4.5 billion. Both countries work particularly closely in the WTO negotiations and through APEC in pursuit of their shared interest in opening global markets\(^{261}\). USA policy states that its interests in the East Asia-Pacific region include promoting regional stability, fostering democracy and human rights, encouraging economic prosperity, furthering co-operation on fighting trans-national issues and international crime, and preventing the proliferation of WMD\(^{262}\). New Zealand policy states that security issues dominate USA foreign policy and the contribution of New Zealand to international security and efforts to counter-terrorism, particularly in Afghanistan and the Pacific region, are appreciated by the USA. However, bilateral defence co-operation continues to be constrained as a consequence

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\(^{259}\) McFarlane, p. 69 - 70.
\(^{260}\) New Zealand External Trade and Statistics June 2007, Table 5.01, Top 50 bilateral trading partners, page 97.
\(^{261}\) Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade - post-election brief September 2005, New Zealand Foreign and Trade Policy Interests and Issues, United States of America, Background and Interests.
\(^{262}\) Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, US Department of State, Under-Secretary for Political Affairs, Regional Topics, in http://www.state.gov/p/eap/regional
of the effective demise of the Australia - New Zealand - United States of America (ANZUS) Treaty in 1986\textsuperscript{263}.

*The International Setting* states that for much of the next decade, the USA, still the world’s sole superpower, will remain pre-occupied with the Middle East and European regions, waging war on terror. While the extensive USA seaboard ensures the Pacific will never be overlooked, when the USA refers to the Pacific they usually mean the North Pacific, more particularly developments in China, the Koreas and Japan. This is unlikely to change. The Micronesian sub-region will remain important to the USA. In contrast to Micronesia, the USA’s strategic interests in the South Pacific are likely to continue to decline, although the territory of American Samoa means that it will never completely disappear. Furthermore, the USA’s Pacific interests are defended by two loyal ‘deputy sheriffs’: Australia in the south and Japan to the north. In time, China’s expanding influence in the Pacific is bound to clash with the USA\textsuperscript{264}.

Notwithstanding that the USA’s major regional interests are in the North Pacific, the USA does have substantial involvement south of the equator. *A New Way to Wage Peace; US support to Operation Stabilise* identifies that the USA demonstrated its willingness to offer substantial military support, under regional leadership, in South East Asia through its commitment to INTERFET in 1999\textsuperscript{265}.

**Japan**

Japan is a major bilateral and regional partner of New Zealand and one of New Zealand’s anchor trading relationships. Strong political ties are underpinned by a commonality of views, shared interest in the stability, growth and development of the Asia-Pacific community, and substantial (for New Zealand) economic, trade, tourism and people-to-people links. New Zealand's exports to Japan were in excess of $3.4 billion and imports from Japan were in excess of $3.6 billion\textsuperscript{266}.

\textsuperscript{263} Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade - post-election brief September 2005.


\textsuperscript{265} Collier, C, A New Way to Wage Peace; US support to Operation Stabilise, in *Military Review*, vol 81, issue 1, Jan / Feb 2001.

\textsuperscript{266} New Zealand External Trade and Statistics June 2007, Table 5.01, p. 97.
New Zealand’s defence and security relationship with Japan has grown steadily in recent years, reflecting common security concerns and interests. The two countries’ engagement includes defence talks, high-level military visits, ship visits, NZDF participation in multilateral seminars hosted by Japan, and sharing of expertise in areas of mutual interest such as peacekeeping. New Zealand and Japan also work closely in multilateral defence settings such as the defence track of the ARF and the PSI\textsuperscript{267}.

**The Pacific Island Countries**

The Pacific occupies a central place in New Zealand foreign policy for reasons of geography, history and people to people links. New Zealand’s export to the Pacific Islands were in excess of $1.2 billion as at June 2007\textsuperscript{268}. As well as having broad political, security, economic, diplomatic, environmental and human rights interests in the region, New Zealand has constitutional relationships with the Cook Islands, Niue, and Tokelau and a Treaty of Friendship with Samoa\textsuperscript{269}. Supporting good governance and increased regional co-operation are the new themes of New Zealand’s modern Pacific diplomacy\textsuperscript{270}.

**The International Setting** outlines some of the issues confronting Pacific Island States and a possible solution. A number of global trends have considerable impacts on the Pacific, among them globalisation itself. The social effects of globalisation can be argued to be a new security threat as it weakens the ‘cultural glue’ that has held Pacific societies together. Fragile economies are also a major source of concern, as their fragility can be compounded by international pressures for free trade. Both forces create tensions that are unlikely to abate in the short term. On a less pessimistic note, it must be observed that the countries of Oceania are increasingly coming together to discuss ways to deal with their various concerns. Sharing skills and resources by increasing levels of co-operation and integration through regional organisations is now becoming the norm rather than the exception for preventing conflict and dealing with

\textsuperscript{267} *Overview and Defence, Countries, Asia-North, Japan, Relations with New Zealand*, in http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Countries/Asia-North/Japan.php
\textsuperscript{268} *New Zealand External Trade and Statistics June 2007*, Table 5.01, p. 97.
\textsuperscript{269} *Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade* - *post-election brief September 2005*, New Zealand Foreign and Trade Policy Interests and Issues, Pacific, New Zealand’s Interests.
\textsuperscript{270} *Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade* - *post-election brief September 2005*, New Zealand Foreign and Trade Policy Interests and Issues, Pacific, Background.
security issues in the Pacific. If the region continues to nurture its close internal relationships and deep networks, based on trust and mutual respect, some of the forces and tensions that currently make many people nervous may be made to work for the region, rather than against it\textsuperscript{271}.

Of specific interest to New Zealand’s defence and security interests in the Pacific is the Final Declaration of the France - Oceania Summit of June 2006. The Declaration made specific mention of co-operating with nations of the Pacific to achieve the following:
- Developing disaster risk management measures, including through the France, Australia and New Zealand (FRANZ) agreement.
- Enhancing air and maritime security measures in the Pacific.
- Strengthening the fight against terrorism through initiatives that include the PIF’s Working Group on Counter-Terrorism and Exercise Ready Pasifika.
- Implement the Australia-France-New Zealand Declaration of Co-operation on Maritime Surveillance and combating illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing in the Pacific Islands’ region.
- Reinforce and complement the existing surveillance capabilities of the EEZs in the Pacific, including through satellite means\textsuperscript{272}.

Also of significance to New Zealand and the EU’s interests in the South Pacific, was the New Zealand Government’s advocacy for EU financial support relating to RAMSI in 2004. New Zealand, the EU and the Solomon Islands subsequently signed an MOU to provide up to NZ$33 million of funding over three years for basic education for children\textsuperscript{273}. Obtaining this funding required the New Zealand Government to persuade the European Council Working Group responsible for Asia and Oceania that the EU and RAMSI shared the same aims\textsuperscript{274}. New Zealand, the EU and the Solomon Islands subsequently signed an MOU to provide up to NZ$33 million of funding over three

\textsuperscript{271} Henderson, ‘The International Setting’, p. 505-6.
\textsuperscript{273} Goff signs education MOU with EU, Solomon Islands, in Beehive, 8 June 2004, in http://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/goff+signs+education+mou+eu+solomon+islands
\textsuperscript{274} Phil Goff, Europa Lecture 2005, Minister of Foreign Affairs, p. 6, in http://www.europe.canterbury.ac.nz/europa/pdf/2005_goff_address.pdf
years for basic education for children. The New Zealand Government is likely to make requests for EU funding for similar activities in the future.\footnote{275}{Goff signs education MOU with EU, Solomon Islands.}

**China**

The bilateral relationship with China has grown to become one of New Zealand’s most important. As a global and regional power, New Zealand’s 5th largest export market\footnote{276}{New Zealand External Trade and Statistics June 2007, table 5.01, p. 97.}, and a major source of migrants, students and tourists, China is important to New Zealand as a bilateral, regional and multilateral partner. The relationship between China and New Zealand is characterised by regular high-level contacts, an expanding range of official dialogues and strengthening people to people contacts\footnote{277}{China, Relations with New Zealand, Overview, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Foreign Relations, Countries, Asia-North, in http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Countries/Asia-North/China.php}. New Zealand’s exports to China are in excess of $1.8 billion. However, there is a substantial imbalance in the flow of trade in China’s favour - imports from China to New Zealand are in excess of $5.2 billion\footnote{278}{New Zealand External Trade and Statistics June 2007, table 5.01. p. 97.}.

The history of New Zealand’s formal relations with China since 1972 has not been without discord. The Chinese Government crackdown on the Tianamen Square demonstrations in June 1989 was strongly condemned in New Zealand and ministerial and senior official contact suspended for more than a year. Another issue of direct significance to New Zealand is China’s relations with Taiwan\footnote{279}{China, Relations with New Zealand, Bilateral Linkages, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Foreign Relations, Countries, Asia-North, in http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Countries/Asia-North/China.php}. In the 1972 *Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the People’s republic of China and New Zealand*, New Zealand agreed not to recognise the independent nation status of Taiwan\footnote{280}{Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the People’s Republic of China and New Zealand, New York, New York, 21 January 1972, in http://www.chinaembassy.org.nz/eng/xxl/lstp/t48564.htm}. This position is consistent with most countries and the UN’s non-recognition of Taiwan as a separate state. However, of the 23
countries that do recognise Taiwan as an independent state, six are located in the Pacific: Kiribati, Marshal Islands, Nauru, Palau, Solomon Islands and Tuvalu.\(^\text{281}\)

*The International Setting* outlines that China’s geo-strategic interests in the Pacific are threefold and will be pursued with great vigour. First, China continues to work to fulfil its longstanding aspiration of gaining recognition as an emerging major player in Asia-Pacific affairs. China’s second objective is to halt Taiwan’s efforts to gain diplomatic recognition from Pacific Island states. The third objective is to expand China’s economic and trade interests in the Pacific. China will continue to work hard to expand its political influence in the Pacific Islands’ region. It has been estimated that it maintains more diplomats in the region than any other state. Furthermore, China, (like other aid donors) will continue to use foreign aid to reinforce its political agenda. China’s market will grow in importance for Pacific Island states. The flow of Chinese tourists will also increase as more Pacific states gain ‘approved destination’ status and China becomes more affluent. China’s strategic economic interests, which currently take second place to political concerns, will continue to relate mainly to access to natural resources - fishing, minerals, forestry and energy. If internal unrest in China were to become significant it would have serious repercussions for the Pacific Islands’ region - it could spark hard-to-control waves of illegal Chinese immigration and organized crime.\(^\text{282}\)

The potentially divisive effect on the Pacific Island States of China and Taiwan’s opposing political agendas and their competition for diplomatic recognition in the region is of direct interest to both New Zealand and the EU. The Australian Foreign Minister stated in 2008 that the high level of Chinese activity in the Pacific Islands was not helpful – referring to “the building of infrastructure without too much reference at all to local needs using only Chinese construction workers”\(^\text{283}\).

Academic Literature suggests there may be other wider and unintended consequences of the China-Taiwan rivalry. *The International Setting* states that one of the factors


\(^{283}\) Fitzgibbon.
preventing UN involvement in helping to resolve the Solomon Islands’ conflict may have been that country’s recognition of Taiwan - to which China, a permanent member of the UNSC, objected\textsuperscript{284}. \textit{Australia-Oceania and the Pacific} states that the Solomon’s experience shows that the bidding war between China and Taiwan can produce quite dramatic unintended consequences in a weak state. Taiwan’s actions, in fact, helped unintentionally to fuel the crisis in the Solomon Islands after the 2000 coup. The loan of US$25 million from Taiwan’s Export Import Bank (EXIM) was a big bribe to retain diplomatic recognition from the Solomon Islands. The presumed purpose of the loan was to buy peace, by distributing compensation to the victims of ethnic war. But instead of helping stability by reinforcing traditional customs, the Taiwan money sparked a greedy grab for cash in 2002 that descended from rent-seeking to banditry. Australia’s High Commissioner in Honiara stated that the EXIM money ran out at the end of 2002 after being “used for a number of very problematic compensation claim payments. And at that stage criminal gangs in Honiara turned directly on the government and extorted money under weapons from the consolidated revenue”\textsuperscript{285}.

\textbf{Asia Pacific Policy}

The intention for New Zealand and the EU to focus on co-operating in the Asia-Pacific region has been detailed in previous chapters, notably through the specific references in the 2007 Joint Declaration on Relations and Co-operation. However, specific interests and policies of New Zealand in the Asia-Pacific need to be described in greater depth and are outlined in the following paragraphs.

\textbf{Developing issues in the Asia-Pacific Region}

\textit{Shaping Peace and Security in the Asia-Pacific Region} offers a prediction of key developments in the Asia-Pacific Region. The region is home to two of the most important powers over the next 50 years, China and India. In the coming decades, their economic growth and military capability will shape both the region and the globe. Managing this shift in the centre of gravity to the Asia Pacific will be a great challenge in the first half of the 21st century. Regional dialogue which nurtures confidence and

\textsuperscript{284} Henderson, ‘The International Setting’, p. 508.
\textsuperscript{285} Dobell, p. 81.
trust will be crucial to managing changes in the power balance both within and outside our region. Miscalculation in the Taiwan Straits or on the Korean Peninsula is not the only potential threat. As the region continues to grow energy resource challenges could arise as nation-states seek to meet the needs and expectations of their people. Water may become more precious as population growth and pollution puts pressure on freshwater supplies. Climate change could force large migrations of people.286.

**New Zealand’s Asia Strategy**

*Our Future with Asia* describes two key elements that underpin New Zealand’s Asia strategy. Firstly, New Zealand must invest more time and effort into strengthening its ties with Asia. Building strong relationships is vital in all areas, including business, politics, education and culture. Secondly, New Zealand needs to look at ways in which it can build a greater shared future in the region, making a bigger contribution to Asia as well as focusing on what can be gained for New Zealand. Because ASEAN continues to play a key role in Asia’s integration, the East Asia Summit process and in the future of an Asian community, New Zealand will deepen its relationship with the organisation and with its key members. New Zealand’s defence and security commitments are fundamental to partnerships in Asia and will be maintained whilst developing new links. New Zealand will strengthen efforts, in concert with the region, to combat terrorism and trans-national crime. Additionally, New Zealand will extend capacity-building and other assistance, particularly in times of crisis, to Asia’s law enforcement agencies.287.

**New Zealand Defence Force activity in the Asia-Pacific Region**

*Our Future with Asia* outlines New Zealand’s commitment to security in East Asia. The following extracts provide a useful summary of New Zealand’s contribution. The NZDF (and in some cases the New Zealand Police) make a unique contribution to New Zealand’s work for peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region. The involvement of New Zealand military personnel in Asia stretches back to WW2, and has included operations in Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, the Korean Peninsula and Vietnam. More recently the NZDF had a role, under UN Command, in rebuilding Cambodia and Timor-
Leste. Today, New Zealand is an active participant in the FPDA alongside Malaysia, Singapore, Australia and the UK. In Korea, New Zealand contributes to UNCMAC. In a new and significant move, the NZPRT in Afghanistan includes a Singaporean element. In addition to its operational activities in the Asia-Pacific, the NZDF is building a capacity for dialogue with defence counterparts in Japan, China, Korea and Vietnam. Deepening New Zealand’s defence and security understanding of East Asia and strengthening its engagement with individual countries is a component of broader diplomacy and confidence-building efforts288.

**New Zealand’s Security Engagement in the Asia-Pacific**

Efforts towards closer security engagement have been built on the FPDA, the ARF, bilateral military ties and defence diplomacy. This has extended in recent years to new defence relationships. Bilateral police relationships with the region are complemented by contributions to regional counter-terrorism (such as through regional counter-terrorist centres in Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur) and closer co-operation in combating trans-national crime289.

It is important to define the difference between military and police roles in security engagement, particularly in the context of tasks conducted in the past 10 years in the South Pacific. *The Role of the Police* states in part that when Police are deployed as part of overseas assistance missions, their role will usually be to restore law and order, mentor and train local police and provide an environment in which economic and social reform can occur. The military role is to neutralise armed conflict, provide a secure environment and provide logistical support to the wider operation290.

**Perceptions of Australia and New Zealand’s approach to Pacific Islands’ security**

*The New Zealand Centre for Strategic Studies Working Paper No 20/05* raises the question of whether New Zealand and Australia need to rethink the traditional doctrine of non-intervention in Pacific Island states given the experiences of the Bougainville,

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288 *Our Future with Asia*, p. 23.
289 ibid, p. 59.
290 McLeod, p. 219.
Solomon Islands and Timor-Leste interventions and in light of security challenges from other island countries. The Government of Australia appears to have done so in mid-2003. Some leaders and analysts in New Zealand are doubtless following these developments and reconsidering policies but are likely to be less outspoken than their trans-Tasman counterparts. Neither government will abandon the Westphalian presumption of respect for all sovereign governments, but each may find pragmatic reasons for qualifying that presumption on a case-by-case basis when urgent threats arise.\footnote{Hoadley, ‘Pacific Island Security Management by New Zealand and Australia: Towards a New Paradigm’ p. 12 - 14.}

**Potential benefits of European Union involvement in the South Pacific**

The Asia-Pacific region is the focus of political and security co-operation between the EU and New Zealand with the objective of achieving and maintaining stability and prosperity for the region. There may well be experience in other parts of the world on the part of EU members that could be of benefit in formulating approaches or solutions to some of the political and security problems now occurring in the Pacific region.\footnote{New Zealand and the European Union: priorities for future co-operation, global and regional security, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade-Europe Division (article now removed).}

**New Zealand’s relationships with key Security and Defence Alliances**

In considering the possibilities for future defence relations between New Zealand and the EU it is necessary to examine New Zealand’s existing connections with key security and defence alliances. These are outlined in the following paragraphs.

**Australia - New Zealand - United States**

USA policy states that the conflict between the New Zealand Government’s anti-nuclear policy, and the USA Government’s policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence or absence of nuclear weapons onboard its naval vessels, has resulted in an impasse since 1986. In effect, this has resulted in the cessation of practical alliance co-

\footnote{Hoadley, ‘Pacific Island Security Management by New Zealand and Australia: Towards a New Paradigm’ p. 12 - 14.}

\footnote{New Zealand and the European Union: priorities for future co-operation, global and regional security, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade-Europe Division (article now removed).}
operation under the ANZUS agreement. This situation will not change without a
significant policy concession by one or both parties293.

**The Association of South East Asian Nation’s Regional Forum**

The ARF was established in 1994 and comprises the ten members of ASEAN plus
Australia, Bangladesh, Canada, China, the EU, India, Japan, Mongolia, New Zealand,
North Korea, Pakistan, PNG, Russia, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Timor-Leste and the
USA. MFAT describes the ARF as providing a useful framework in which ministers,
senior officials, defence officers and operational practitioners meet to discuss issues of
importance to regional security and hold activities aimed at building confidence
between its members. The ARF also allows New Zealand to engage with countries that
it ordinarily only has contact with through the UN294.

**Closer Defence Relations**

New Zealand’s closest strategic partnership is with Australia. The NZDF will continue
to work and operate closely with the Australian Defence Force (ADF) in order to
respond in a timely and co-ordinated manner to a range of contingencies, including
regional peacekeeping operations and disaster relief efforts295.

**The Five Power Defence Arrangement**

The NZDF remains very strongly committed to the FPDA with Australia, Malaysia,
Singapore and the UK, and maintains bilateral relationships with several other South
East Asian nations296.

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294 *Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade - post-election brief September 2005*, Asia, Regional Security, New Zealand’s Interests. (article now removed)
296 ibid, p. 8 – 9.
**The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation**

Outside of NATO’s formal partnerships, it maintains links with countries who share similar strategic concerns and key alliance values including democracy. NATO refers to these as ‘Contact Countries’ and they include New Zealand, Australia, Japan and South Korea\(^{297}\).

NZDF personnel first worked with NATO in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the 1990s\(^{298}\). In 2006 the NZPRT in Afghanistan moved from under the control of Operation Enduring Freedom to the UN mandated ISAF, run by NATO\(^{299}\). In October 2007 the New Zealand Prime Minister and the NATO Secretary-General signed an agreement on allowing the exchange of classified information between the two parties\(^{300}\).

In *New Zealand must take care before it takes sides on Georgia* interesting issues are raised with regards to New Zealand’s involvement with NATO. It is noted that New Zealand has recently moved appreciably closer to NATO - one example is New Zealand’s involvement in Afghanistan. It is argued that Afghanistan is on the very periphery of New Zealand’s interests, which are profoundly shaped by the successful advance of East Asia and the re-emergence of China. It is suggested that as New Zealand diminishes its commitment to UN peacekeeping, dedicated training with the forces of India, Malaysia and Korea should rank at least as equivalent objective to any new connections with the ‘Atlantic World’. It is suggested that a future New Zealand Defence White Paper will need to address directly these broader issues of international political and economic security\(^{301}\).

**Intelligence and Communication’s sharing**

New Zealand is a member of a long-standing collaborative international partnership for the exchange of foreign intelligence and the sharing of communications security

\(^{297}\) [NATO – New Zealand co-operation](http://www.nato.int/issues/nato_new-zealand/index.html)

\(^{298}\) [New Zealand and NATO sign information sharing agreement](http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Foreign-Relations/Europe/index.php), New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, foreign relations, New Zealand’s Relations with Europe, News and Events,

\(^{299}\) Dominion Post, 28 Jan 2006, p A 2.

\(^{300}\) [New Zealand and NATO sign information sharing agreement.](http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Foreign-Relations/Europe/index.php)

\(^{301}\) O’Brien.
New Zealand participates in this arrangement through the Government Communications and Security Bureau (GCSB). Other members of the partnership are the USA’s National Security Agency (NSA), the UK’s Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), Australia’s Defence Signals Directorate (DSD), and Canada’s Communications Security Establishment (CSE)\textsuperscript{302}.

However, it is interesting to note a possible conflict with New Zealand’s relations with the EU. In \textit{EU’s Quantum Leap} it is stated that France and Germany reportedly harbour suspicions that the echelon system is used for industrial espionage. Consequently, the EU announced plans in 2004 to develop a secure communication system based on quantum cryptography\textsuperscript{303}.

**New Zealand Defence Force Activities provide an expression of New Zealand’s Foreign Policy**

In a speech in 2003 by the Secretary of MFAT, the importance of the NZDF contribution to expressing New Zealand’s Foreign policy was outlined. Key elements of the speech are covered in the following paragraphs.

As an enduring outcome, MFAT seeks to reduce risks to New Zealand from global and regional insecurity. In working to achieve this outcome, the NZDF is an indispensable partner to MFAT at both the policy and operational level. The relationship between New Zealand’s foreign and defence policies is close and complex. The NZDF is a tool of central importance for the New Zealand Government, not just to protect New Zealand from danger, but also to give expression to its commitment to regional and global peace and security. In the places where New Zealand diplomats seek influence for New Zealand, the competence, availability and reputation of the NZDF can be a vital factor in overall relationships.

\textsuperscript{302} The job of the GCSB, paras 7 and 8.
\textsuperscript{303} Soyoun, H, EU’s Quantum Leap, in Foreign Policy, Sep/Oct2004 issue 144, p. 92, in http://web.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.massey.ac.nz/ehost/pdf?vid=14&hid=116&sid=b91fbc2e-0054-4b01-ab49-ea330d69583c%40sessionmgr102 (article no longer available)
In 2003 the Centre for Global Development created the first annual commitment to development index, which grades 21 rich nations on whether their aid, trade, migration, investment, peacekeeping, and environmental policies help or hurt poor nations. Although New Zealand was not noted in this index for its particularly generous aid giving, it finished fourth overall thanks to a strong showing in migration and peacekeeping policies. This index serves to prove the point that the NZDF contributes in large measure to New Zealand’s image as a good international citizen, and thus to the essential work of MFAT304.

**New Zealand Defence Policy**

To appreciate how New Zealand foreign policy - in any future potential defence relations with the EU - could theoretically be translated into practical tasks for the NZDF, it is necessary to examine the following: New Zealand’s Defence Policy Objectives; Roles and Tasks of the NZDF; and the NZDF Employment Contexts.

**New Zealand’s Defence Policy Objectives**

Three of New Zealand’s Defence Policy Objectives align closely with the 2007 Joint Declaration on Relations and Co-operation between the European Union and New Zealand and the existing defence bilateral links between New Zealand and EU member states. These three objectives are as follows:

- To assist in the maintenance of security in the South Pacific and to provide assistance to our Pacific neighbours.
- To play an appropriate role in the maintenance of security in the Asia–Pacific region, including meeting our obligations as a member of the FPDA.
- To contribute to global security and peacekeeping through participation in the full range of UN and other appropriate multilateral peace support and humanitarian relief operations305.

304 Murdoch, Simon, *CEO Address to the New Zealand Defence Force*, Speech by the Secretary of the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade in Trentham on 11 June 2003, in http://www.mfat.govt.nz (article now removed)
Roles and Tasks of the New Zealand Defence Force

The roles and tasks of the NZDF are directly subordinate to the New Zealand Defence Policy objectives. Within the three Defence Policy Objectives outlined in the previous paragraph, the three roles, and selected tasks within those roles, which appear to have direct relevance to future potential defence relations between New Zealand and the EU are summarised in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Roles and Tasks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Pacific</td>
<td>- Contribute to the maintenance of peace and stability in the South Pacific.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Strengthen our relationships in the Pacific through our Mutual Assistance Programme (MAP), including providing defence assistance and ODA delivery.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Assist with the surveillance of the Pacific Islands Countries’ EEZs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Provide assistance after natural and humanitarian disasters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia-Pacific</td>
<td>- Continue to participate in FPDA activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Build upon existing co-operative bilateral defence relations with Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Develop a broader-based defence dialogue with other nations in East Asia, which will include participation in important regional fora such as APEC and the ARF and, where necessary and feasible, mediation and peace support operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Globally</td>
<td>- New Zealand will meet its UN Charter commitments to the maintenance of international peace and security.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- The NZDF will contribute to UN and other appropriate multilateral peace support and humanitarian relief operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Due regard will be given to the increasing complexity and danger of these operations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

New Zealand Defence Force Employment Contexts

A representative and illustrative range of circumstances – referred to as Employment Contexts – are indicative of possible defence activity in accordance with the Defence Policy Objectives and NZDF Roles and Tasks. The employment contexts that would appear most likely to have relevance to defence future relations between New Zealand and the EU are as follows:

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306 ibid, p. 5 - 6.
**Chapter Summary**

International terrorism is perceived as a serious threat by the New Zealand government and combating this threat is a policy priority for many agencies. Closer to home, the South Pacific depicts an increasingly difficult and uncertain strategic environment. New Zealand needs to work with partners in order to help Pacific countries to counter the threats of organised crime, terrorism, money laundering, illegal fishing, and illegal trafficking of people, drugs and small arms weapons. Implementing solutions to counter these threats will require a broad spectrum, multi agency, regionally agreed approach.

In addressing security issues in South East Asia and the South Pacific, New Zealand’s key bilateral relations will be with Australia, the USA, the EU, Japan, the Pacific Island Countries and China. Australia’s interests in South East Asia, the Pacific Island Countries and with the EU have many similarities with New Zealand. Consequently,
Australia will be New Zealand’s closest partner in co-operating to address regional security issues. Of the EU member states, the following have the most significant links to Australia and New Zealand’s regional defence and security interests; France in the South Pacific through FANC co-operation; and the UK in South East Asia through the FPDA. However, it needs to be recognised that France and the UK’s co-operation with Australia and New Zealand exist as a legacy of colonial ties to the region and are not officially a EU arrangement - although their may be a significant overlap with EU interests. The USA will be the dominant power in the Asia Pacific. It is likely to have a benign and possibly declining presence in the South Pacific, unless it perceives a need to counter China’s growing influence in the region - if it does so the political, diplomatic and economic consequences could be extreme. Japan and China will be major economic, political and security influences in South East Asia. However, whilst Japan shares New Zealand, Australia, the USA and the EU’s fundamental commitment to freedom, democracy and human rights, China does not. Consequently, this has the potential to generate political and diplomatic conflict. Furthermore, China’s adversarial relations with Taiwan and competition for diplomatic recognition are likely to continue to cause significant political and diplomatic problems in the South Pacific. If, in extremis, China internally destabilizes or fragments, the security repercussions for South East Asia and the South Pacific will be substantial.

A range of issues will challenge the stability of the Asia-Pacific region including: managing the growing influence of India and China; energy resource challenges; fresh water shortages; and climate change. A major focus of New Zealand’s foreign policy will be to advance New Zealand’s interests in the Asia-Pacific region. Defence and security commitments are a fundamental part of this process and the NZDF will have a key role to play, in conjunction with other agencies including MFAT and the MOD. The likely continued requirement for military intervention in South Pacific states will pose significant challenges for policy makers in developing suitable responses. EU member states may have experience from other parts of the world that could be of benefit in formulating approaches or solutions to some of the political and security problems now occurring in the Pacific region. The New Zealand Government has expressed intent to obtain EU funding for activities similar to those in the Solomon Islands in 2004 which received EU financial assistance.
New Zealand's security engagement in the Asia-Pacific is built upon the FPDA, ARF and bilateral defence relations. Outside of the Asia-Pacific, New Zealand has recently developed a closer relationship with NATO. The NZDF is a significant contributor to New Zealand’s diplomatic relations. The three New Zealand Defence Policy Objectives that align most closely with the intent of the 2007 Joint Declaration on Relations and Co-operation between New Zealand and the European Union are as follows:

- To assist in the maintenance of security in the South Pacific and to provide assistance to our Pacific neighbours.
- To play an appropriate role in the maintenance of security in the Asia-Pacific region, including meeting our obligations as a member of the FPDA.
- To contribute to global security and peacekeeping through participation in the full range of UN and other appropriate multilateral peace support and humanitarian relief operations.
CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION – WHAT FACTORS MAY INFLUENCE DEFENCE FUTURE RELATIONS BETWEEN NEW ZEALAND AND THE EUROPEAN UNION?

The analysis conducted in the preceding chapters of this thesis leads to the conclusion that the following factors may influence defence future relations between New Zealand and the EU:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors that may influence defence future relations between New Zealand and the EU</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand factors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Political and economic influences.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Diplomatic influence on EU member states’ governments.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- NZDF as an instrument of diplomatic influence.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Popular perception of the EU.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Asia-Pacific policy.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Existing foundations for defence relations with the EU.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- EUPOL leadership in Afghanistan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- NATO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- ARF.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Australia.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- UK.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- France.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- USA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- China.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The factors that are outlined above are described in more detail in the following paragraphs.

**European Union factors that may influence defence future relations**

**Internal popular support for the integration process**

Internal popular support for the EU is a fundamental issue that will shape the integration process. It is almost certain that widespread popular resistance to the EU will continue and may focus on generic perceptions that the EU is a business plot to suit the rich, or an unwarranted erosion of the nation state. This lack of popular support will pose a
major challenge to political leaders seeking to implement a robust EU Constitution, a stronger foreign policy mechanism and enhanced military capabilities.

**Ability to achieve foreign policy objectives**

Without a strengthened foreign policy mechanism and enhanced military capabilities the EU is unlikely to be able to exert a level of influence - particularly during foreign security emergencies - that corresponds with its status as a global economic power. The EU’s key weakness in its foreign policy decision making process for foreign security emergencies is its requirement to reach a consensus amongst twenty seven member states - many of which have widely differing and entrenched views on foreign policy issues. Without a strong, robust and agile military capability that is able to credibly support its foreign policy objectives the EU may be regarded only as a “soft power”. During security emergencies the EU risks being perceived as ineffectual whenever its diplomatic, economic and limited military instruments are unable to achieve the foreign policy outcomes it seeks. However, when dealing with security issues that are not time-critical emergencies and that require only limited projection of military power, the EU may be highly successful in achieving its foreign policy objectives, particularly those involving substantial diplomatic and cultural complexity.

This suggests that the EU may be of limited value to New Zealand for the conduct of practical co-operative defence missions in response to security emergencies requiring rapid and decisive political decision making, or security issues of a large scale at the higher end of the threat spectrum. It would appear that this situation will only change if the EU can achieve a paradigm shift in its foreign policy decision making process for time critical security emergencies, and its military capabilities. However, the EU could have significant value to New Zealand for practical co-operative defence missions to address less time-critical security issues of high diplomatic and cultural complexity but towards the lower end of the threat spectrum.

**Military Capabilities**

The EU has not been able to develop military capabilities to a level - or at a rate - predicted by its political leaders to match foreign policy objectives. It appears that the
EU still has substantial progress to make in developing a military force to implement its proposed CFSP; and a common weapons production and procurement system. The collective military capabilities of the EU are based upon the widely differing military capabilities of its 27 member states. The consequence is that for the foreseeable future EU member nations are more likely to conduct the most challenging high intensity military operations using NATO - rather than ESDP - leadership, organization and resources. This does not imply a limitation on the theoretical participation of NZDF elements in ESDP missions, but it does suggest that operations under EU leadership - in which New Zealand participates - will probably be limited to missions of lower threat and intensity than missions led by NATO.

**Political influence of member states’ governments on foreign and security policy**

Historically, France, Germany and the UK have been the most influential states within the EU on foreign security issues. This could potentially appear to work in New Zealand’s favour as shared political interests with these countries are substantial and bilateral relations are robust - particularly in the case of France and the UK who have significant security interests in the South Pacific and South East Asia respectively. However, the enlargement of the EU could theoretically reduce the overall influence of these three states. Consequently, this could alter the EU’s collective perspective of its foreign security interests - potentially South East Asia and the South Pacific could be perceived differently than they are at present.

**Security of Global Trade and Energy Supplies**

The EU has a critical interest in the security and stability of trade and energy supplies. It’s immediate interest in energy supply security is likely to focus on Russia, North Africa and the Middle East. However, if the EU intends to be regarded as a credible contributor to the global security of trade and energy supplies, it may need to make a more credible contribution to addressing security issues in the Straits of Malacca as this is a critically important transit route for global trade and energy supplies. This may potentially overlap with NZDF Employment Contexts under security challenges to New Zealand’s interests in the Asia Pacific. Employment Context 4B refers to acts of piracy and 4C refers to impeded rights of passage through contested sea lanes.
Security Issues in South East Asia

In addition to security concerns in the Straits of Malacca, security issues in South East Asia include: poverty; terrorism; trafficking of human beings; pandemics and emerging infectious diseases; drug trafficking; arms smuggling; money laundering; cyber-crime and related trans-national crime. South East Asia’s continued long-term economic growth is dependant upon lasting stability and security. The EU and New Zealand have a substantial economic and political long term interest in a prosperous, stable and secure South East Asia. Therefore, it is in the long term interests of the EU and New Zealand for the region’s security issues to be addressed.

Effective influence in South East Asia

The EU’s ability to effectively contribute to addressing security issues in South East Asia is likely to be dependant on its credibility with ASEAN, the ARF and individual South East Asian nations. It is possible that the EU - despite its economic strength - is perceived by some of its South East Asian partners to be an excessively bureaucratic organization that lacks substantial political commitment and military power. Some of the EU’s South East Asian partners may prefer to continue to pursue bilateral relations with individual EU member states. Therefore, any potential defence co-operation between New Zealand and the EU in South East Asia would need to be carefully analysed to determine whether New Zealand would gain tangible long term political and security benefits beyond those it already receives through existing co-operation with its FPDA and bilateral partners in the region.

Political sensitivities in South East Asia

Whilst the EU and New Zealand share significant security interests with many ASEAN member states, the EU and New Zealand’s views on human rights are not shared by a significant number of countries within ASEAN. One of the founding tenets of ASEAN was the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of sovereign states. Significant dialogue on human rights has been conducted between the EU and ASEAN over the past decade, particularly in regards to events in Myanmar. However, there is a possibility that some ASEAN member states may hold a viewpoint that the insistence of
the EU - and perhaps by association, New Zealand - on formally linking human-rights principles to the resolution of regional security issues is an unwarranted interference in sovereign states’ domestic affairs. This will pose a substantial diplomatic challenge for all parties involved and add to the complexity of addressing defence and security issues in South East Asia.

Security and development issues in Pacific Island Countries

Security issues identified in some PIF countries include: trans-national crime and its potential links to terrorism; border security; port and airport security; trafficking in small arms, people and drugs; and the difficulties of tracking vessels and people among remote islands in huge areas of sea. Other issues that can affect security, directly or indirectly, include problems of governance, communal relations, land use, environmental degradation and slow economic growth. For its political credibility, the EU needs to demonstrate that it has improved the efficiency and effectiveness of its aid delivery. Consequently, it is critical that it successfully implements the objectives of the Cotonou Agreement and its Pacific Strategy. To do so will require a reasonably stable and secure environment within South Pacific states. Consequently, it is in the EU’s interests for Pacific Island security issues to be addressed. Therefore, the EU has a vested interest in the success of defence and security missions undertaken in the South Pacific by New Zealand, Australia and their regional partners. Conversely, defence and security activity conducted by the NZDF in the South Pacific is often closely linked to New Zealand’s development objectives and New Zealand may seek to obtain EU funding for these objectives. Therefore, in the South Pacific, New Zealand defence and security activity and EU development activity may on occasions be mutually dependent.

Effective engagement with Pacific Island Countries

EU policy for global development advocates engagement on a regional basis. In seeking to apply this policy to relations with the PIF the EU will have to address governance, legitimacy; capacity and cultural challenges. Establishing and maintaining an effective region-to region relationship will prove to be a demanding and protracted task for both parties.
New Zealand factors that may influence defence future relations

Political and economic influences

It is likely that the general relationship between New Zealand and the EU will continue to develop and strengthen. However, the form of the relationship may change, especially as a consequence of New Zealand’s increasing interaction with Asia. The EU’s importance as a trade and economic partner to New Zealand and the two parties shared political commitment to the concepts of democracy, human rights, international law and robust international institutions would appear to be the likely high level political motivation for New Zealand to engage in any future defence and security cooperation with the EU.

Diplomatic influence on European Union member states’ governments

The EU appears to be a highly complex and extremely bureaucratic organization and the most influential entities within the EU appear to be the member states’ national governments. New Zealand’s diplomatic representation in EU member states is probably the key to influencing the EU to act in a manner that favours New Zealand’s political, economic and security interests. As New Zealand has nine resident diplomatic missions in the EU, influencing 27 member state governments will continue to pose a substantial diplomatic challenge.

New Zealand Defence Force as an instrument of diplomatic influence

NZDF activity can have a significant influence on New Zealand’s diplomatic relations, especially in locations where New Zealand lacks formal diplomatic representation. Consequently, NZDF activity could potentially be used as one form of influence for New Zealand in its relations with the EU. Direct defence and security co-operation, even of a modest nature, may contribute to raising the profile of the relationship between the two parties and serve as a public indicator of the political will to achieve shared security objectives.
**Popular perception of the European Union**

The apparent popular perception that the EU is a substantially less important partner for New Zealand than either Australia, the USA, Asia, the UK or China may be a significant consideration for future potential defence co-operation. Factored into any calculation may need to be an appreciation that many New Zealanders’ view of Europe is tied more to the UK than to the EU.

This lack of popular recognition of the importance of the EU to New Zealand would suggest that there are three key considerations regarding the public acceptability of enhancing defence co-operation. Firstly, whether the political justification for defence co-operation would be understood and accepted by the New Zealand population. Secondly, if the political justification was not initially widely understood, whether defence co-operation in itself would raise the profile of the relationship within New Zealand. Thirdly, whether the utilisation of existing defence links, probably with France and the UK, as a foundation for developing co-operation with the EU, would influence the public acceptance of the enhanced defence co-operation.

**Asia-Pacific policy**

In addition to the immediate threats to security a range of developing issues will challenge the stability of the Asia-Pacific region including: managing the growing influence of India and China; energy resource challenges; fresh water shortages; and climate change. The Asia-Pacific will be a major focus of New Zealand’s foreign policy and defence and security partnerships in Asia have a fundamentally important role to play. In the South Pacific the likely continuing requirement for military intervention will pose substantial challenges for New Zealand’s policy makers and the EU may have experience gained from other parts of the world which may be of use in developing suitable responses to security issues.

**Existing foundations for defence relations with the European Union**

The indirect link to the EU provided by New Zealand’s bilateral defence co-operation with EU member states may provide a significant foundation for the development of
future practical defence co-operation with the EU. Within the South Pacific, existing local relations between FANC and the NZDF serve as a useful foundation. However, for operations outside the South Pacific region, the utility of existing defence links with France may reduce due to a lack of linguistic and doctrinal similarity. Whilst defence links between New Zealand and the UK are limited in the South Pacific, they potentially offer greater usefulness outside of the region than any other EU member state due to linguistic, cultural, legal and doctrinal commonalities.

EUPOL leadership in Afghanistan

The long-term strategic success of EU leadership of the EUPOL Mission in Afghanistan may influence the New Zealand Government’s willingness to conduct future defence and security co-operation with the EU. The performance of the EU could potentially be compared with NATO in assessing both entities’ value as future security partners for New Zealand.

NATO

New Zealand’s relations with NATO have a significant overlap with New Zealand’s security co-operation with the EU. The risks and benefits to New Zealand of future defence co-operation with NATO will require careful analysis - and possible comparison with the risks and benefits of defence co-operation with the EU.

ARF

Both the EU and New Zealand have expressed political commitment to addressing South East Asian regional security issues through the ARF. However, the effectiveness and significance of the ARF cannot be quantified with any certainty - there are conflicting indicators on this subject. Consequently, the successful outcome of political and diplomatic activity to address regional security issues through the ARF is unclear.
**Australia**

Australia’s relationship with the EU, the UK, France, ASEAN and the PIF countries share substantial similarities with New Zealand’s interests. The stated political intention for Australia and the EU to investigate possible shared interests in ESDP operations - and one of the key focuses of Australia’s forthcoming Defence White Paper being Australian capability to take a lead role in stabilisation efforts in its own immediate region - offers theoretical possibilities for Australian direct or indirect defence and security co-operation with the EU.

**United Kingdom**

The UK is likely to continue its policy of devolving responsibility for development aid in the Pacific to the EU as a logical consequence of post-colonial disengagement. However, the UK’s limited but credible military presence in South East Asia may enhance its political standing in the region and thereby deliver trade and economic benefits. This may logically incline the UK to remain engaged in FPDA for the foreseeable future. As the UK shares many similar political reflexes with New Zealand it is likely to continue to be New Zealand’s most valuable EU member state partner in South East Asian Affairs.

**France**

France appears likely to remain New Zealand’s closest EU member state partner for direct co-operation on defence and security issues involving Pacific Island Forum Nations. Provided that French and New Zealand political objectives in the region continue their general trend of increasing alignment, the bilateral relationship may offer an avenue for enhancing co-operation between New Zealand, the EU and PIF states to address defence, security and development challenges.

**USA**

The USA will be the dominant power in the Asia-Pacific. It is likely to have a benign and possibly declining presence in the South Pacific, unless it perceives a need to
counter China’s growing influence in the region - if it does so the political, diplomatic and economic consequences could be extreme. The EU’s co-operation with the USA in continuing engagement with China will have a critical influence on the successful integration of China into the global and Asia-Pacific communities.

**China**

China’s increasing regional influence may introduce increased complexity to New Zealand and the EU’s co-operation in South East Asia and the Pacific. China’s conflict with Taiwan over diplomatic recognition by Pacific countries could introduce substantial political risks and greatly complicate any potential defence and security co-operation between New Zealand and the EU.

**Diagrammatic Summary**

A visual summary of the factors that may influence defence future relations between New Zealand and the EU is represented in the following diagram.
The willingness and ability of the EU and New Zealand to engage in defence future relations will depend on the following internal influences.

**Influences within the European Union**
- Popular support for the integration process.
- Military capabilities.
- Political influence of member states’ governments on foreign and security policy.
- Ability to achieve foreign policy objectives.
- Security of global trade and energy supplies.
- European Security Strategy.

**Influences within New Zealand**
- Popular perception of the EU.
- Political and economic influences.
- New Zealand’s diplomatic influence on European Union member states’ governments.
- Use of NZDF as an instrument of diplomatic influence.
- EUPOL leadership in Afghanistan.
- New Zealand Defence Policy Objectives.

If both parties are willing to engage in defence future relations, the *2007 Joint Declaration on Relations and Cooperation: The European Union and New Zealand* is likely to be a guiding document for defence relations, both in the Asia-Pacific region and Globally.

Defence co-operation in the Asia Pacific region may be influenced by the following factors:
- NZ MFAT Our Future with Asia.
- UNSCR1373.
- Australia: CDR and the 2008 EU / Australia Partnership Framework.
- USA.
- China.

Defence co-operation in South East Asia may be influenced by the following factors:
- FPDA (United Kingdom).
- 2007 EU / ASEAN Declaration.
- EU Communication 2003 / 399.
- Regional security issues.
- ARF effectiveness.
- EU effective influence.
- ASEAN political sensitivities.

Defence co-operation in the South Pacific may be influenced by the following factors
- EU Pacific Strategy.
- France: FANC and Cotonou.
- PIF security and development issues.
- EU’s effective engagement with PIF countries.

Defence co-operation globally may be influenced by the following factors:
- UNSCR approval.
- UN peacekeeping.
- NATO.
- Continuation of ISAF and EUPOL operations in Afghanistan.

The factors outlined above are likely to influence the form of the defence future relationship between New Zealand and the European Union.
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