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**Unravelling the Taiwan Question:  
A Discussion on the Historical Background,  
Theoretical Issues, Policy Approaches,  
The Present and the Future**

**A thesis presented in partial fulfilment  
of the requirements of the degree**

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## **Abstract**

The Taiwan question is a multi fold story with complexity and outsiders of China may not grasp a full picture of the question. Taiwan is a part of China and the idea is taken for granted for Chinese, but not debate-free in the world. This thesis aims to resolve some misunderstandings in the debate. The thesis is composed of four chapters. The first chapter will discuss Chinese people's altitude on national unity and delineates the historical background of the Taiwan question with a focus on its bond with the Chinese Mainland. Some theoretical issues, relevant to the Taiwan question, such as sovereignty, self-determination right and so on, will be discussed in the second chapter. Chapter three will brief policy approaches across the Taiwan Strait. The updated situation and the Taiwan question's possible future will be presented in the fourth chapter.

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## **Abbreviations**

ARATS	the Association for Relations across the Taiwan Strait
CPC	the Communist Party of China
DPP	the Democratic Progressive Party
GMT	the Guo Min Tang (the Nationalist Party)
PRC	the People's Republic of China
ROC	the Republic of China
SEF	the Strait Exchange Foundation

## Introduction

2008 is an unusual year for China. It is the 30<sup>th</sup> anniversary celebration since China triggered its reform and opening-up policy. China intends to showcase its achievements and promote Chinese culture. The Olympic Games was held in China for the first time, and the Chinese people are trying to present a more open and prosperous China to the outside world. A famous Chinese saying may remind Chinese people they are too optimistic.

The saying goes as follows: ‘the tree many crave calm, but the wind will not drop’--- indicating that things take their own course regardless of one’s good will. Ezio Bonsignore, the editor in chief of the *Military Technology*, even said:

from multiple points of view, the coming 29<sup>th</sup> Olympics are clearly intended to be very much a contemporary equivalent of the 1936 event in Berlin-a proud demonstration of the self-confidence and capabilities of a nation a political system, a monumental show of efficiency and discipline, and a palpable confirmation of the status of an assertive emerging Great Power.<sup>1</sup>

He argued that for the sake of a successful Olympic Games, China will make great compromise on the Taiwan question. Ezio Bonsignore said:

the countdown to the Olympics would seem to offer the Taiwanese an absolute unique, “use it or lost it forever” window of opportunity to achieve formal independence (or something like it) while minimising the inherent risk. ... (China) would rush to mollify their stance and willing accept whatever compromise solution that would allow them to save both the Olympics and face.<sup>2</sup>

Interestingly enough, this scenario is adopted not by Taiwan but by Tibet.

Before the global tour of the Beijing Olympic Games flame, in middle of March, a massive riot took place in Tibet and consecutively in Si-chuan and Gan-su provinces

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<sup>1</sup> *Military Technology*, Vol. XXXII Issue 2 2008, p4

<sup>2</sup> *ibid*, p4

of China. During the flame's global tour, some disruptions have taken place to support the independence of Tibet. The media coverage on the Tibet issue, from the Chinese perspective and the Western perspective is totally different. China's history has been ignored when discussing issues in reality by the non-Chinese community.

To understand China is not to accept all about China, such is an impossible mission; but it is at least important to acknowledge its core values and the efforts already made by the Chinese people. Thirty years passed since China implemented the open up policy, but misunderstanding has not decreased towards China, but to a certain extent, intensified. 'Many Western commentators have portrayed China in harshly negative ways that often revealed more about their own normative biases and intellectual assumptions than about China'.<sup>3</sup> For example, the CNN's coverage about the Tibet riot was regarded a huge distortion or bias by the common Chinese people. CNN even extended its coverage of Olympic Games flame relay to humiliate the whole China.

On April 9, 2008, Jack Cafferty, CNN's programme presenter, said:

they're holding hundreds of billions of dollars worth of our paper. We also are running hundred of billions of dollars worth of trade deficits with them, as we continue to import their junk with the lead paint on them and the poisoned pet food and export, you know, jobs to places where you can pay workers a dollar a month to turn out the stuff that we're buying from Wal-Mart. So I think our relationship with China has certainly changed. I think they're basically the same bunch of goons and thugs they've been for the last 50 years.<sup>4</sup>

Hyperbole, maybe, but hardly objective reporting from a leading Western media outlet.

Under the background of the two conflicting mindsets, it is not difficult to find: some protests to the Olympic Games torch relay are not accepted by the most Chinese but

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<sup>3</sup> Peerenboom Randall, *China Modernizes: Threat to the West or Model for the Rest?* Oxford University Press, New York, 2007, p282

<sup>4</sup> <http://news.wenxuecity.com/messages/200804/news-gb2312-571655.html>, viewed on April 15, 2008

regarded as troublemakers to tarnish China's image in the world. If the country's main efforts as well as contributions to the world have been ignored, it is a wilful misunderstanding expression of extreme dislike. This thesis will not discuss the controversy of Tibet. The point the thesis intends to highlight here is that, indeed, China is willing to run a great Olympic Games, but not at the cost of national unity.

The flame-disrupting actions and "Nazification" of Beijing Olympic Games by Western media has only achieved the opposite effect and arouse protests from all Chinese. An online signature protest against the distorted coverage on the Tibet issue, as well the Tibet independence, was launched by Sina.com, one of popular websites in China. Up to April 16, 2008, more than 5.5 million netizens have registered their names online to show their anger.<sup>5</sup> This is a reminder to the West that China will not make any concessions on the affair of national unity. If the West remains totally regardless the national-unity-cherishing mindset of the Chinese people, or if the politicians of the West make wrong judgements on these situations, it will not increase the understanding between China and the West.

Theoretically, Ezio Bonsignore's Taiwan scenario is an option, but most risky as well as less visionary. The declaration of Taiwan's independence will only increase the rift between the Taiwan Strait. The Taiwan question should not be resolved in such a simplified scenario, regardless of Chinese national character and its history. History is the past. The past is the cause. According Buddha's canon, the universal is interwoven with cause and effect. Human beings' history is made of cause and effect.

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<sup>5</sup> <http://hi.news.sina.com.cn/news/xizang08/index.php>, viewed on April 16,2008

Any effects definitely should have causes, although the cause and effect in different paradigms, sometimes is entangled or preconditioning to each other.

In this regard, any complex issues will not be as clear as water for people to look through just by a glance. Common people usually focus their interests on the reality ahead of their eyes or around themselves. Their conclusions normally are drawn according shallow facts or what they have been taught to believe. 'Ideology provides a lens through which one sees the world, a set of beliefs that are held so firmly that one hardly needs empirical confirmation'.<sup>6</sup> To get an objective stance is not easy, sometimes is very difficult. Common people's life will most deal with something at sight reach, such as routine work, entertaining with sports, camping and so on. Something abstract is beyond their interests. But to historical issues, such as the Taiwan question, focusing-at-sight-reach is not enough. Sometimes, historical legacy behind scenes may be the cause of questions. The flickering present will soon become another past which triggers another effect. People with vision will penetrate the actual reality in terms of the past, the presence and the future. This thesis will discuss the Taiwan question in terms of its past, the present and the possible future, as well as other affairs intermingled with it.

The thesis will firstly delineate what is the Taiwan question and clarify several definitions adopted in this thesis. The Taiwan question revolves the following sub-questions: Is Taiwan a part of China and why? If not, how will the Chinese people react? Generally speaking, the Taiwan question can integrate a huge number of issues, relevant to Chinese history, Taiwan's national identification, the Chinese people's

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<sup>6</sup> Stiglitz Joseph, *Globalization and Its Discontents*, 2003, extract from *the Collapse of Globalism* written by Saul Ralston John

national affection and sovereignty issues. The Taiwan question also forms the most sensitive and important part of the Sino-U.S. relations. Before the election held on Taiwan Island to choose the next leader, both China and the United States were not at ease. In this context, China's positions on the Taiwan question really need to be clarified better to outsiders, not on the diplomatic rhetoric, but through convincing by history and hopefully accepted in theory and in reality.

Second, the definition of terms used in the thesis. Beijing (the capital city of the People's Republic of China) will be used as the reference to the People's Republic of China; Taipei (a city in Taiwan) will be used as the reference to the Taiwan authorities (in Beijing's stance) or the Republic of China (in Taipei's stance). There are four major players in this evolution: the Communist Party of China (hereinafter referred to as the CPC) on Chinese Mainland, the Guo Min Tang (or the Nationalist Party, hereinafter referred to as the GMT) and the Democratic Progressive Party (hereinafter referred to as the DPP) on Taiwan Island, and the United States of America (hereinafter referred to as Washington). Although Beijing regards the Taiwan question is an internal affair, Washington is inevitably involved by history.

The Taiwan question is always a large issue in the three Joint Communiques signed between Beijing and Washington. On March 27, 2008, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang said:

the Taiwan issue is always the most sensitive and important core issue in China-U.S. relations, and China hopes the United States will scrupulously abide by its commitments that the United States adheres to the one-China policy and the three Sino-U.S. Joint Communiques and opposes "Taiwan independence" and Taiwan's bid to join any international organization which only sovereign countries can join.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-03/27/content\\_7870724.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-03/27/content_7870724.htm), viewed on March 27, 2008

Beijing and Taipei will be used in the context of history; the CPC Beijing, the GMD Taipei and the DPP Taipei will be applied in the context of specific policies. The abovementioned phraseology will not be applied to quotations from literature.

The term “China”, in this thesis, will be the most complex as well important concept to be addressed. There is an argument---‘If China only exists when the mainland and Taiwan are united, it suggests that in the absence of that unity, there is no place that may properly be considered China’.<sup>8</sup> Because one of themes of this thesis is trying to clarify the different understandings on the definition of “China”, between both sides across the Taiwan Strait, in such case, the connotation of “China” can not be clearly defined at the very beginning of the thesis. But as a “must” word, “China” will definitely be used very often.

People will have no doubt that there is “a China” in the world. When “China” is mentioned, people will normally categorize it to the eastern world and relate it to Confucius represented by the “a China”. The “a China” always connect with abstract Oriental to ordinary Westerners. But if being asked, where the “one China” specifically is, or “China” is a short name for one regime or “China” has another official title and what it is, people may find it is not easy to answer such question.

There is a confusing enough phenomenon: both official name Beijing (the People’s Republic of China) and Taipei (the Republic of China) claim themselves share the same word “China”. According to the Constitution of Beijing, the Chinese Mainland and Taiwan Island are under its sovereignty, but the Constitution of Taipei also

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<sup>8</sup> Rubinstein A. Murray, *The Other Taiwan: 1945 to the Present*, An East Gate Book, New York, 1994, p33

acclaims jurisdiction over the same territory. If Beijing and Taipei represent two different countries, how can their territory are overlapped? If both sides across the Taiwan Strait belong to the same country, why the intense confrontation occurred after 1949? The above-mentioned questions may be enhanced by the author's random survey of maps in Wellington main book stores, relating to China and Taiwan.

Most of the publishers categorize China and Taiwan as two states. For example, Philip's "Atlas of the World" (2002-year version), on its national flag page<sup>9</sup>, the red-five-star flag (representing Beijing) and the blue-sky-and-white-sun flag (representing Taipei) are both included. The Hutchinson Atlas of the World (2001-year version), on its column of "Nations of the World"<sup>10</sup>, it groups PRC and ROC as different nations.

The large circulation of maps can greatly influence the ordinary person's view regarding the geo-political situation of the world. The result will never be accepted by Beijing and countries which have established diplomatic relations with it. In their eyes, Taiwan Island is a part of China but not a country. The conflict in maps at least reveals there is no absolute consensus relating to the question: whether China and Taiwan are different states?

If the information in one map contradicts to common sense or reality, for example, displacing the United States of American in the South American Continent, in the context of market economy, the sale numbers of the less accurate map will be very low. Since most of maps are still on shelves, this indicates that the concept of "Taiwan as a country" is not challenged by consumers' common sense. Of course, to

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<sup>9</sup> Philip's, *Atlas of the World*, Philip's, London, 2002, inside front cover and inside back cover

<sup>10</sup> Helicon, *the Hutchinson Atlas of the World*, Helicon, Oxford, 2001, p151, p172

most people, the Taiwan issue is unimportant on a map; to Chinese, however, the issue may be serious. A survey may supplement this argument.

On 12 February, 2008, a questionnaire for academic research was conducted by the author in the Junior Staff Course for the NZDF Air Force. 25 questionnaires were returned. 52% of the questioned agreed “there is only one China in the world”; 60% disagreed “both the Chinese mainland and Taiwan belong to one China”; 68% believe that “the People’s Republic of China and China is the same entity”. In short, the questionnaire can be paraphrased into such stance: more than half of these questioned actually believed “there is only one China represented by the People’s Republic of China, but Taiwan is not part of China”. This counters the Chinese overall perspective which includes Taiwan within the “one China”. Putting Taiwan and China on the equal footing is regarded by the Chinese as ridiculous as treating China and Hainan Province (one of Chinese islands, near the Bei-bu Gulf or the Gulf of Tonkin to westerners) equally, or in other word, as nonsense as discuss the relation between Wellington and New Zealand on equal footing.

In this questionnaire, 44% believe “the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of China is the same entity”, obviously this is an evidence of the less adequacy about the Chinese history; interestingly enough, the opinion regarding “the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of China are two different entities” also account for 44%. The questionnaire indicates that people are confused about the relations between two sides across the Taiwan Strait. Not many people can offer a clear answer. It is not easy as well for Chinese-speaking people to identify the two entities, even “being a Chinese” has different implications.

Logically, due to the self-acclaimed official title, it is a common sense to call the people living under Beijing and Taipei authorities-- Chinese. But the indication of “being a Chinese” is varied, because the Chinese character of “being Chinese” can be written in different forms. In Beijing’s perspective, “being a Chinese” (zhong guo ren 中國人) means he or she is a citizen of the Chinese political entity as well as the Chinese culture and kinship origin; in Taiwan’s perspective, “being a Chinese” can be either “zhong guo ren (中國人)” or “hua ren”( 華人) . “Hua ren” means the distinct image of cultural as well as kinship origin, but not the identification to certain political entity.

In such case, the connotation of “China” is relevant to whether either its political aspect or its cultural aspect will be emphasized respectively. ‘Under the present (Taipei) Constitution, Taiwan is referred to as the “freedom area of China” while the mainland is described as “Republic of China territories other than Taiwan’.<sup>11</sup> According the Guideline of National Unification issued by Taipei’s Mainland Committee, ‘the (Chinese) mainland and Taiwan are both the territory of China. To develop the national unification is the same responsibility of the Chinese’.<sup>12</sup> (大陸與台灣均是中國的領土，促成國家的統一，應是中國人共同的責任) The guideline was ceased to function by Taipei on March 1, 2006. Up to now, Taipei has not issued another official definition to “China”.

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11 Ching Cheong, *Will Taiwan Break Away? The Rise of Taiwanese Nationalism*, World Scientific, Singapore, 2001, p167

12 <http://www.mac.gov.tw/big5/mlpolicy/gnu.htm>, viewed on April 15, 2008

On the Beijing side, there are two laws regarding to the political connotation of “China”. According to the Beijing’s Constitution,

China is a country with one of the longest histories in the world. The people of all of China's nationalities have jointly created a culture of grandeur and have a glorious revolutionary tradition. ... Taiwan is part of the sacred territory of the People's Republic of China. It is the inviolable duty of all Chinese people, including our compatriots in Taiwan, to accomplish the great task of reunifying the motherland.<sup>13</sup>

According to Beijing’s Anti-Secession Law, Adopted at the Third Session of the Tenth National People's Congress on March 14, 2005,

there is only one China in the world. Both the Mainland and Taiwan belong to one China. China's sovereignty and territorial integrity brook no division. Safeguarding China's sovereignty and territorial integrity is the common obligation of all Chinese people, the Taiwan compatriots included. Taiwan is part of China. The state shall never allow the "Taiwan independence" secessionist forces to make Taiwan secede from China under any name or by any means. The Taiwan question is one that is left over from China's civil war of the late 1940s. Solving the Taiwan question and achieving national reunification is China's internal affair, which subjects to no interference by any outside forces.<sup>14</sup>

Actually, both sides across the Taiwan Strait do not present a clear-cut definition to “China” itself, which can only be regard as self-evident or self-explained term. There is only one point shared by the two sides: the “92 Consensus”, which will be discussed by this thesis in the following up parts. Since there is no mutual-acknowledged term for “China” between Beijing and Taipei, this thesis itself defines “China” as follows: China is geographically composed with the Chinese Mainland (including its affiliated islands), and Taiwan Island is one of these affiliated islands. The people who live on this geography have formed a multi-national country whose sovereignty is consecutively represented by different political entity for more 5000 years with record.

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<sup>13</sup> [http://www.zftrans.com/favorite/template/2006-2/24/1239062241239583740456\\_2.html](http://www.zftrans.com/favorite/template/2006-2/24/1239062241239583740456_2.html), viewed on April 16, 2008

<sup>14</sup> [http://english.pladaily.com.cn/site2/special-reports/2005-03/14/content\\_158070.htm](http://english.pladaily.com.cn/site2/special-reports/2005-03/14/content_158070.htm), viewed on December 28, 2007

The first chapter of this thesis will start by addressing China's aspiration for national unity is historically formed. This chapter will firstly pinpoint some China's national icons, delineate the evolution of China's national integration as well as its major legacy and highlight their significances to the Chinese people. Secondly, this chapter will discuss the historical bond, with twists and turns, between Taiwan Island and the Chinese Mainland. The self-identification of people on Taiwan as well as its alienation will also be highlighted in this chapter. At the end of chapter one, two modules, exemplified by the author, will be presented for an easy-and-quick grasp of the complex of the Taiwan question.

The second chapter will discuss theoretical issues relating to the Taiwan question. They include: what sovereignty is, how it develops and what sovereignty means to China as well as the current world, what China's perspective on sovereignty is and why it develops so, main theoretical arguments on China's sovereignty over Taiwan, whether the sovereignty of one country can be intervened by other countries, whether human rights is superior to sovereignty, and whether people on Taiwan Island have the self-determination right to separate from China.

The third chapter will elaborate policy approaches held by the two sides across the Taiwan Strait. Because the Taiwan question has been lasting for nearly six decades, policies, relevant to it, sometimes may be consistent, sometimes with reverses, and confrontation as well as compromise is not a rare phenomenon.

The fourth chapter will search on possible ways to disentangle the Taiwan question.

Supported by the updated reality, this chapter will discuss the methodology suitable for the Taiwan question. Basing on analysis of the different political mechanism running on both sides across the Taiwan Strait, this chapter will probe the possibility of gluing the two in frameworks already available. Lastly, chapter four will highlight the relationship between the way of disentangling the Taiwan question and reunification as well as democratization.

## Chapter One: Historical Background

Fu Yin, the Chinese ambassador to Great Britain, issued her article in *the Sunday Telegraph* on 13 April 2008. She said: ‘China cannot be integrated herself with the world just relying upon her one-way sincerity. The wall lying between China and the world is too thick and weighty’.<sup>15</sup> [the author’s English translation] The wall, referred by ambassador Fu, is the misunderstanding between the West and China. For example, most Chinese people regard Taiwan a part of as well as one province of China.

Although only twenty-two countries have ties with Taiwan in diplomatic terms, some outsiders still interpret that Taiwan is an independent state. Regarding to China’s rise in recent years and based on a realist approach, the countries which have established diplomatic ties with China recognize the “one China” principle, but this is only an official stance held by governments. On an idealist approach, numbers of foreign people as well as their governments underneath still regard Taiwan as a liberal, democratic and independent country under the threat of the non-democratic and dictatorship China. They ignore the Chinese people’s desire for national reunification, which is historically formed.

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<sup>15</sup> <http://news.wenxuecity.com/messages/200804/news-gb2312-568170.html>, viewed on April 16,2008

China officially claims itself a recorded history of five thousand years. The current territory of China originates from the Huang He River (黄河 , literally translated as the Yellow River), the Chang Jiang River (长江 , literally translated as the Long River and also well-known as the Yangtze River) and their branches, which are adjacent to the geographic centre of what is heartland China. The “Middle Kingdom” is the literal translation of the Chinese characters “中国” referring to China. As to the word middle, it does not simply mean that China is sandwiched between one kingdom and another. ‘It meant then, and still means to some degree in the Chinese mind, that China is the centre of the world and the highest civilization of all’.<sup>16</sup> Chinese people are likely to show pride in their long history and the glorious cultural contribution to the world. Chinese civilization was once one of the pinnacles of civilization.

The original source of Chinese civilization is reasonably explained by the “hydraulic theory”. Karl Wittfogel (1957), in his “ hydraulic theory” of state development, proposed that ‘noelithic farmers in the area where states developed were dependent on flooding rivers, such as the Tigris, the Nile, and the Yellow rivers, to water their fields and deposit new soil’.<sup>17</sup> The Yellow River and the Long River, as the symbol of Chinese origin, gradually evolved as the Chinese emblem, which is the enhancement of the Chinese national identification as the rugby and kiwi bird to New Zealanders. Although national identification, to certain extent, is an abstract affection of individuals, it is not totally intangible.

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<sup>16</sup> Daniel Burstein and Arne de Keijzer, *Big Drangon China’s Future: What It Means For Business, the Economy, and The Global Order*, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1998, p213

<sup>17</sup> Robbins H. Richard, *Global Problems and the Culture of Capitalism*, PEARSON, Boston, 2008,p111

National identification is normally delineated and reinforced by shared symbolic images as aforementioned, which are products of the accumulation of people's history. On April 15, 2008, in *the Dominion Post* of New Zealand, an article regarded the Maori painted Matroshka dolls are ugly and insulting. From a cultural perspective, the doll is not as simple as just a doll. The Maori image conveys the feeling or affection of one group of people. It is fair to pinpoint that the long history of China also produces some shared affections, such as national unity. In the contemporary period, the Taiwan question is a vehicle of such affection, which is signified by the Chinese people who hope their values to be respected by other countries. In Beijing's perspective, unfortunately, some foreign countries take advantage of the Taiwan question as a means to intervene China's internal affairs. This is not merely a misunderstanding but an insult to the Chinese. It is hard to locate the exact time of the formation for such affections, but the year 221 B.C. can be regarded as an important benchmark.

In 221 B.C., Emperor Qin Shi-huang of Qin kingdom unified other kingdoms into one political entity, well known in China as the Qin Dynasty (221B.C.-206 B.C.). 'He conquered territory ranged from the Gobi desert, in what is now Inner Mongolia in the west, to the Gulf of Tonkin in the east. (It was, however, only about one half of today's China.)'.<sup>18</sup> This is regarded as the starting point of the establishment of a unified China. From the Qin Dynasty on, the Chinese icon has been lasting without interruptions although the ruling regime was consecutively differently and not always unified as Qin Dynasty model.

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<sup>18</sup> Heath John, *Tibet and China in the Twenty-first Century: Non-violence Versus State Power*, Saqi, London, 2005, p45

The most prosperous period in Chinese history was when China was unified as one political entity. For example, during the Tang Dynasty (618-907), the Chang'an City (today's Xi'an City in northwest of China), the then Chinese capital city, was with more one million residents. At the time with underdeveloped technology, the more people, the more powerful of a country was a generally recognized understanding. In such perspective, Tang Dynasty could be regarded as one of most prosperous times in China's history. During the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644), from 1405-1433, seven ocean-going missions were commanded and arrived as far as the outer reach of African continent. In the long history of China, dynasties' disintegration normally would yield wars as well as chaos. Generally speaking, the belief of "unity brings prosperity, disintegration brings chaos" becomes a common mindset of the Chinese people.

The Chinese have used the term 内乱外患 (literally, civil chaos and foreign aggression) to refer to the severity of the crisis that China as a nation-state encounters. Civil chaos and foreign aggression are interconnected. A weak centralized State and divided nation often invites foreign aggression. Hence, a strong centralized State is a precondition for China to be strong and independent in the nation-state system.<sup>19</sup>

Although disintegration of one political entity normally would lead to chaos, on the other hand, it also functioned as a double edged sword: the interaction of diversity as well as the preparation of the next emergence of an integrated entity. Such cycle was repeated in the long history of China. A unified political entity enforced the national identification, and its disintegration would normally serve as another cycle of nation-state-building process.

There is general agreement that, from its beginnings, the civilization that became known as Chinese was the product of a complex ethnic and cultural synthesis, and also that imperial China absorbed some essential formative influences from outside...Chinese' civilization fought to assert itself as an organized entity, eventually emerging in its distinctive form.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> Zheng Yongnian, *Discovering Chinese Nationalism in China: Modernization, Identity, and International Relations*, Cambridge University Press, U.K. 1999, p15

<sup>20</sup> Wiethoff Bood, *Introduction to Chinese History: From Ancient Times to 1912*, Westview, U.S.A., 1975, p135

The PRC government defines China in the prelude of its Constitution as ‘a unitary multinational state created jointly by the people of all its nationalities’.<sup>21</sup>The Chinese national identification is enriched rather than lost by integration of different peoples during its long history.

Tracing back to history, as a methodology, is not always appreciated. In John Heath’s works, he argued: ‘we must be aware of history, but not be ruled by it. History means so much to the Chinese, understandably so. But, actually, what happened in the thirteenth or eighteenth centuries is completely irrelevant to today’s situation...China uses history to set the agenda’.<sup>22</sup> John Heath’s argument pinpoints the different mindset between the Chinese and the West, but his logic is not strong enough to justify itself. The non-consideration of Chinese national trait, which has been formed in a long history with far-reaching impact, is a neglect of today’s situation. Nowadays, most Chinese people carry on their national legacy and have a strong sense of history, such is a unique trait distinguishes Chinese people. To some people, lacking a long history of their countries may be a pity as well as a fortune for them; because, for a people with long history, on one hand, it means a rich civilization which can be self proud of, but on the other hand, means certain complex situations to confront from one generation to next generation. The ignorance to such complexion left by the Chinese long history is a big trigger of misunderstanding between China and the West. For example, Heath John argued: ‘it is difficult for Westerners to see why China does not accept that Taiwan is de facto independent and warmly embrace it as a friend’.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> [http://www.zftrans.com/favorite/template/2006-2/24/1239062241239583740456\\_2.html](http://www.zftrans.com/favorite/template/2006-2/24/1239062241239583740456_2.html), viewed on February 3, 2008

<sup>22</sup> Heath John, *Tibet and China in the Twenty-first Century: Non-violence Versus State Power*, Saqi, London, 2005, p270

<sup>23</sup> *ibid*, p207

As a matter of fact, the Taiwan question was left by history. “Left by history” is not an eschewing rhetoric to avoid answering the question, but because the question itself inter-tangled by too many factors.

One main factor is how the people living on Taiwan Island identify themselves. National self-identification is closely linked to historical settings. Different environments could yield different identifications. ‘National identity will change over time. At one time, it may become more acute, exclusive and focused, while at other times it may be more relaxed and inclusive’.<sup>24</sup> People may not find answers by tracing tack to the history. But people may, under the help of understanding history, further understand the different perspective of other people. In this regard, to understand the historical evolution of the Taiwan question as well as the self-identification of people living on Taiwan Island, is vitally important, not only to the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, but also to the outsiders who may intend to “intervene”.

Human beings may be lost in the fog of history if tracing back as far as the legend reaches. Probably no one knows for certain where Taiwan’s indigenous people came from and when they arrived on the island. But there is an assumption: ‘aboriginal people began living in Taiwan perhaps six thousands years ago’.<sup>25</sup> Archaeological discovery may point to another assumption: ‘some of the indigenous people, particularly those in northern and western Taiwan, came from the mainland of China before the Christian era, while those in the southern and eastern parts of the island

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<sup>24</sup> Gould Bryan, *the Democracy Sham: How Globalisation Devalues Your Vote*, Craig Potton Publishing, New Zealand, 2006, p145

<sup>25</sup> Lai Tse-Han, Myers H. Ramon and Wei Wou, *A Tragic Beginning: The Taiwan Uprising of February 28, 1947*, Stanford University Press, California, 1991, p13

were migrants from the South Sea Islands'.<sup>26</sup> John Robert Shepherd argued: 'archaeological sites document the presence of aboriginal societies in Taiwan's high mountains hundreds of years before the onset of Chinese migrations'.<sup>27</sup> Some academicians argued that the aboriginal of the Taiwan Island was the Austronesian. 'It is estimated that the current Austronesian population in Taiwan is a little more than 400,000, the highest it has been in formal historical record'.<sup>28</sup> The recorded history between the Chinese Mainland and Taiwan Island started from the third century. 'The earliest date of China's influence spreading into Taiwan was the times of Wu, one of the three kingdoms of the post-Han period. In 230 A.D., Sun Quan, first emperor of Wu, was recorded as having sent a commander as head of an expeditionary force to Taiwan. Nothing came of the expedition, but the record shows that the knowledge or information about the island was quite accurate'.<sup>29</sup> Some academicians even doubt the significance of China's arrival on the Taiwan Island. For example, Zhao Sui-sheng argued: 'ROC historians suggest these historical contacts were intermittent, of short duration, and do not reflect any effort to colonize, occupy, or lay legal claim to Taiwan'.<sup>30</sup> Lai Tse-Han argued: 'serious immigration from the Mainland began only about four centuries ago, around 1600. ...why Taiwan remained a generally undesirable piece of land for a millennium is not clear'.<sup>31</sup> One point may be clear: for a long time, there were least non-aborigines on Taiwan Island.

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<sup>26</sup> Hung Chien-Chao, *A History of Taiwan*, Il Cerchio Iniziative Editorial, Gambalunga, 2000,p6

<sup>27</sup> Shepherd Robert John, *Statecraft and Political Economy on the Taiwan Frontier 1600-1800*, Stanford University Press, California, 1993, p2

<sup>28</sup> Hsieh Jolan, *Collective Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Identity-Based Movement of Plain Indigenous in Taiwan*, Routledge, New York, 2006, p3

<sup>29</sup> Hung Chien-Chao, *A History of Taiwan*, Il Cerchio Iniziative Editorial, Gambalunga, ISBN 88-86583-80-X, 2000,p11

<sup>30</sup> Zhao Suisheng, *Across the Taiwan Strait: Mainland China, Taiwan, and the 1995-1996 Crisis*, Routledge, New York, 1999, p46

<sup>31</sup> Lai Tse-Han, Myers H. Ramon and Wei Wou, *A Tragic Beginning: The Taiwan Uprising of February 28, 1947*, Stanford University Press, California, 1991, p13

Only some passengers visited this island. ‘For centuries Taiwan remained unattractive to profit-seeking seafarers, and its inhabitants were left largely uncontacted by all but occasional adventures or fishermen engaging in barter’.<sup>32</sup> Taiwan Island, visited by outsiders at that time, was regarded more likely as a foothold point to rest temporarily. At that time, the Chinese people had a strong sense of family-belonging and islands normally would act as the venue for exile of prisoners. If not castaway like landless adventurers and pirates, people seldom would like leave their homes to dwell on isolated islands. In such context, the aboriginal people, dwelling on Taiwan Island, probably would feel that, more or less, their life being “touched” rather than their national identity being threatened, just as a family will not change its nature if only approached by visitors. Up to then, Taiwan Island, with various aboriginal tribes, was neither formed into a kingdom nor under an effective jurisdiction of any regimes. ‘As early as the fourteenth century, the Chinese and the Japanese arrived in the island as merchants, fishermen, and deer hunters....The first Chinese settlers on Taiwan were landless adventurers and semi-retired pirates’.<sup>33</sup> The situation was changed during the Chinese Yuan Dynasty (1271-1368).

The Yuan Dynasty established administrative institution near Taiwan Island in the late 14<sup>th</sup> century.

Around 1350 the Mongols installed a local administrative official, the sub-district magistrate [巡檢司] on Penghu [Penghu, also known as Pescadores, is a group of islands in the middle between the Chinese Mainland and Taiwan Island, and geographically is regarded as affiliated part of Taiwan Island]. ‘This was the beginning of the presence of Chinese political authority in the Taiwan-Penghu area.’<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> Shepherd Robert John, *Statecraft and Political Economy on the Taiwan Frontier 1600-1800*, Stanford University Press, California, 1993, p7

<sup>33</sup> Wei Bin Zhang, *Taiwan’s Modernization: Americanization and Modernizing Confucian Manifestations*, World Scientific Publishing, London, 2003, p21

<sup>34</sup> Hung Chien-Chao, *A History of Taiwan*, Il Cerchio Iniziative Editorial, Gambalunga, ISBN 88-86583-80-X, 2000,p13

W.G. Goddard argued that China's administration over Taiwan Island was loose and he said: 'inspectors visited Taiwan from time to time, but Beijing concluded that as long as officials and troops were stationed in the Pescadores, Taiwan could look after itself...the island was quite secure as long as the Pescadores were held'.<sup>35</sup> In 1368 the Yuan Dynasty was replaced by the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644).

For various reasons, which are not issues of this thesis, the Ming Dynasty implemented a seaward-prohibition policy. 'In 1387, the emperor abolished the office of the Penghu sub-district magistrate, which had been established by the Mongols. All settlers on Penghu were ordered to move back to their native Ch'uan-Chou'.<sup>36</sup> (Ch'uan-Chou, in Chinese written as "泉州", is one prefecture under the jurisdiction of the Fukien Province opposite to Taiwan Island) In 1597, the Ming Dynasty stationed a permanent garrison on Penghu again. 'This garrison, under the command of a colonel, also had duties to patrol the coast of Taiwan'.<sup>37</sup> In 1623, 'the Ming court ordered a blockade, prohibiting Chinese ships from going to Penghu and Taiwan'.<sup>38</sup>

As a contrast to the official prohibition, the non-official flow to the Taiwan-Penghu area was not totally terminated. 'Strangely enough, the first large-scale migration of Chinese from the Mainland to Taiwan was sponsored by pirates'.<sup>39</sup> In such an isolated condition, it probably would not be too risky to assume: at that time, people dwelling on Taiwan Island, as "natural beings" without outside contrast, could hardly develop a sense of self-identity. Such condition changed when 'Taiwan's relative isolation

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<sup>35</sup> Goddard G.W., *The Makers of Taiwan: Lectures to Student Groups in Britain 1963*, China Publishing Company, Taipei, 1963, p1-2

<sup>36</sup> Hung Chien-Chao, *A History of Taiwan*, Il Cerchio Iniziative Editorial, Gambalunga, 2000, p14

<sup>37</sup> *ibid*, p15

<sup>38</sup> *ibid*, p16

<sup>39</sup> *ibid*, p16

began to decay only with the sixteenth-century expansion of maritime commerce and piracy in East Asia'.<sup>40</sup> Wei Bin-zhang argued:

the first Europeans to reach Taiwan were Portuguese navigators. They arrived off the coast of Taiwan and named the island "Ilha Formosa" (beautiful land). The Portuguese attempted to make Taiwan a trade centre in the early 1600s. They departed soon after establishing a settlement in the north. The Dutch supplanted the Portuguese. To penetrate China by sea, the Dutch occupied Taiwan from 1642 to 1662 as a foothold in the China market. Dutch rule was indirect. The Dutch government's chartered agent, the Dutch East India Company, first colonized the south-western part of the island in 1624. The Company appointed a colonial governor and had full powers of taxation and control over people in Taiwan. ...It was estimated that when the Dutch arrived in Taiwan in 1624, the Chinese population was 25,000. In the 1650s, the Chinese population increased to 100,000. Many Chinese moved to Taiwan during the Dutch period, during which China was experiencing the dynastic change from the Ming (1368-1644) to the Ch'ing (1644-1911).<sup>41</sup>

The Ch'ing Dynasty was founded by the Manchu, who were originally nomadic people of northeast Asia.

The Manchu were tribesmen who lived by hunting and gathering. But in southern part of the Manchu ruling area which bordered on the territory of the Ming Dynasty, the Manchu had adopted agriculture and lived a more settled life. They were strongly influenced by Chinese culture; in the late Ming Dynasty period, they adopted the Chinese social organization. The Manchu formed a number of tribal states and had a tribute relationship to the Ming emperors. 'After having united several tribes under his personal rule, in 1616 Nuer Ha-chi (1559-1626) proclaimed himself emperor of north Manchuria and set up his capital at Mukden (nowadays Shenyang). When he died in 1626, he had laid the foundations of Manchu power. His immediate successor, his ninth son, Abahai, proclaimed the "Great Pure" (Ch'ing ) dynasty in 1636'.<sup>42</sup> In 1644, the Manchu troops drove south and occupied Beijing, but the Ming Dynasty's strength was not totally wiped out.

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<sup>40</sup> Shepherd Robert John, *Statecraft and Political Economy on the Taiwan Frontier 1600-1800*, Stanford University Press, California, 1993, p7

<sup>41</sup> Wei Bin Zhang, *Taiwan's Modernization: Americanization and Modernizing Confucian Manifestations*, World Scientific Publishing, London, 2003, p21

<sup>42</sup> *ibid*, p23

One branch of the Ming Dynasty's followers was headed by Cheng Ch'eng-kung (1624-1662), also well known as "Goxinga". Cheng Ch'eng-kung still claimed his loyalty to the collapsing Ming Dynasty. At the early stage of the Ch'ing Dynasty, the forces which held the banner of "resisting Ch'ing and resuming Ming" were still strong, and the situation on the Chinese Mainland was not stable. In 1661, Cheng decided to utilize Taiwan Island as a base to fulfil such mission. 'Early in June 1661, Cheng set up a civil administration on the Chinese model, appointing officials to head one prefecture and two counties [of Taiwan]'.<sup>43</sup> On February 1, 1662, the Dutch on the Taiwan Island surrendered to Cheng, who secured his regime on Taiwan Island. 'Cheng's (regime) was the regional government of Ming China, which was still at war with the Ch'ing who had conquered all but the whole of the Chinese Mainland'.<sup>44</sup> In normal Chinese perspective, scaled by territory and population, the regime on Taiwan Island normally would be called as a small court (小朝廷), and the Ch'ing Dynasty as Ch'ing Court. Cheng Ch'eng-kung died on June 23, 1662, and his eldest son, Cheng Jing (born in 1642), was his successor to rule the small court. In all, Taiwan Island was under the influence of the Cheng family for four generations.

Cheng Ch'eng-kung's father, as the chief of one most powerful pirate group, began the flow of emigration from the Chinese Mainland to Taiwan Island. Cheng Ch'eng-kung himself brought the Chinese form of government to the island, while his son, turned Taiwan into a Chinese society. 'There were large numbers of Han'<sup>45</sup> men who

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<sup>43</sup> Shepherd Robert John, *Statecraft and Political Economy on the Taiwan Frontier 1600-1800*, Stanford University Press, California, 1993, p93

<sup>44</sup> Hung Chien-Chao, *A History of Taiwan*, Il Cerchio Iniziative Editorial, Gambalunga, ISBN 88-86583-80-X, 2000, p56

<sup>45</sup> The biggest ethnic group in China, accounting for the absolute majority of Chinese

migrated to south-western Taiwan in the seventeenth century. Many of these men married local women-aborigine women or women of mixed Han-Aborigine parentage'.<sup>46</sup> Some academicians counter argued that Taiwan's affiliation to China is less of significance. For example, Zhao Sui-sheng argued: 'like Europeans who went to America, their ancestors left China centuries ago with little or no desires to return to China. Almost all came from southern China and few had any ties with the government located in northern China'.<sup>47</sup> It was true that at the initial stage, the Ch'ing Dynast's jurisdiction did not effectively reach the southern China. In 1661, Emperor K'ang-hsi (1654-1722) came to the throne of the Ch'ing Dynasty, and he was only 8 years old and four regents ruled the Court in his name. With the Ming Dynasty fleeing regime stationed beyond her southeast area, the Ch'ing Court would not feel at ease.

The Ch'ing Court intended to wipe out the fleeing forces of the Ming Dynasty. The Dutch, defeated by Cheng Ch'eng-kung, was ambitious to get back Taiwan Island. 'In October 1663, the two sides (the Ch'ing Court and the Dutch) reached an agreement: after conquering Quemoy (金門) and Amoy (廈門) (two front holds for Taiwan Island), the coalition force should march to Taiwan Island. Given the Taiwan Island conquered, the Ch'ing Court should promise all forts to the Dutch for their living. On November 18, 1663, the coalition force of the Ch'ing Court and the Dutch engaged with the small court in Quemoy'.<sup>48</sup>[the author's translation] The coalition force was lost in this battle, and the agreement between the Ch'ing Court and the Dutch was

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<sup>46</sup> Brown J. Melissa, *Is Taiwan Chinese? The Impact of Culture, Power, and Migration on Changing Identities*, University of California Press, Los Angeles, 2004, p15

<sup>47</sup> Zhao Suisheng, *Across the Taiwan Strait: Mainland China, Taiwan, and the 1995-1996 Crisis*, Routledge, New York, 1999, p53

<sup>48</sup> 倪健中, *台湾祸福: 梳理大陆与大洋之间的历史流变*, 中国社会出版社, 北京, 1996, p381

aborted as well. In April 1664, the small court lost its last landholding in the Chinese Mainland.

The Ch'ing Court once was trying to win the small court's surrender by offering favourable terms. Forth and back negotiations were undergoing between the two courts. But all negotiations were in vain to reach a final agreement, because the messy situation on both sides across the Taiwan Strait. In 1674, three southern provinces on the Chinese Mainland took revolts against the Ch'ing Court. The small court regarded it as a good chance to subvert the Ch'ing Court, and it could benefit more from the chaotic situation on the Chinese Mainland. Cheng Jing even said 'Taiwan was already a prosperous state, compared with the devastation along the Fukien coast'.<sup>49</sup> When the Ch'ing Court quelled the three revolts, the negotiation was resumed. The Ch'ing Court wanted the small court to meet four conditions of peace: calling itself a "minister" of the Ch'ing Court (称臣, showing its submissiveness to the Ch'ing Court), shearing hairs and wearing queues (this was an important symbol of being subjects of the Ch'ing Court), sending in tribute and dispatching sons to Beijing as hostages. The major rift between the two was: the small court intended to position Taiwan Island as a tributary country like Korea at that time and maintain the status of de facto independence. '[Emperor] K'ang-hsi [of the Ch'ing Court] allowed Cheng Jing (on Taiwan Island) to stay on Taiwan but pointed out the precedents of Korea, which was a foreign country, could not be followed by Cheng, who was a Chinese...but Cheng Jing did not waver, claiming that Korea was founded by Chi-tzu,

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<sup>49</sup> Hung Chien-Chao, *A History of Taiwan*, Il Cerchio Iniziative Editorial, Gambalunga, p95

who also a Chinese, and was therefore not a truly foreign state'.<sup>50</sup> The negotiation came to a stalemate.

Cheng Jing died in 1681 and his son Cheng Ke-shuang took over the throne. Emperor K'ang-hsi regarded the death of Cheng Jing was a great chance to stage a deadly blow to the small court and appointed Shih Lang, a pro-war admiral, to prepare the over-taking Taiwan mission. In 1683, Shih Lang had trained a force of 20,000 men and had gathered about 300 war junks. On June 30, 1683, Shih Lang led his fleet arrived off Penghu, and engaged with the forces of Cheng Jing. 'Both sides suffered heavy casualties in the fierce fighting, which ended in a Ch'ing victory. More than 12, 000 [Cheng Jing's] casualties were reported, while 165 officers and 4,853 men surrendered to the Ch'ing Court. Altogether 134 Cheng's ships were sunk or burned in the engagement off Penghu'.<sup>51</sup> On September 7, 1683, the small court surrendered to the Ch'ing Court unconditionally. Cheng Ke-shuang was given the title of duke in the Chinese plain yellow banner (a Manchu title). 'As the Chinese population doubled that of the natives, Taiwan in 1683 was part of China ethnically, socially, culturally and institutionally, although the son of heaven in Beijing was an alien Manchu'.<sup>52</sup> The unification was fulfilled by the Ch'ing Court, although its initial motivation was not for the unification sake.

It seemed there was no strategic importance and material benefits affiliated to the small island. For a long time, Taiwan Island was regarded as a barren island and epidemical diseases were rampant there. If not for the sake of wiping out the fleeing

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<sup>50</sup> *ibid*, p96

<sup>51</sup> Hung Chien-Chao, *A History of Taiwan*, Il Cerchio Iniziative Editorial, Gambalunga, ISBN 88-86583-80-X, 2000, p118

<sup>52</sup> *ibid*, p125

Ming Dynasty forces, probably the island would be ignored by the Ch'ing Court. Even after the taking over of Taiwan Island, there was a debate about its future status. Many officials of the Ch'ing Court favoured abandoning the island for 'such a tiny place like a clay ball, even could not expand the territory of China in a significant sense [海外泥丸, 不足为中国加广]'.<sup>53</sup> On February 2, 1684, Shih Lang submitted a report to Emperor K'ang-hsi for the status of Taiwan Island. Shih Lang argued that to give up the island was tantamount to invite the Dutch to reoccupy it. He said: 'the Dutch are a wily and artful people and are good at influencing men to serve their interests. ...If in case this rich island of several thousand miles fell into their hands, so that their ships and men would have a base for operations, they would be in a position to rally allies and supported from all sides, in order to peep at our shores from the advantages position of a nearby base. It would be then be sowing the seeds of trouble and our coastal provinces would have no moment of peace in the future'.<sup>54</sup> Emperor K'ang-hsi adopted Shih Lang's proposal for the consideration of the strategic importance of Taiwan Island. Meanwhile, as one of the ablest emperors of China, K'ang-hsi clearly understood that the people on Taiwan Island were migrants from Chinese Fukien Province and Guangdong Province, and he liked to be recognized as the emperor of all Chinese. Emperor K'ang-hsi set a benchmark for his follow-up rulers.

In the Chinese culture, losing property or business passed from forefathers, is a great humiliation. For ruling regimes, the territorial integrity, established by fore generations, is of vital importance. For example, in January 1982, there was an inner-

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<sup>53</sup> 林天人等, 时报文化编辑委员会, *珍藏 20 世纪台湾(My Century of Taiwan)*, 台北, 2000, p9

<sup>54</sup> Hung Chien-Chao, *A History of Taiwan*, Il Cerchio Iniziative Editorial, Gambalunga, ISBN 88-86583-80-X, 2000,p127

circle meeting held to discuss the resumption sovereignty over Hong Kong by the Chinese government. The then Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Zhang Wen-jing said: ‘if the sovereignty over Hong Kong cannot be resumed by China, we cannot let the spirits of our forefathers feel at ease, cannot answer the next generations’ accusation of losing our soil, and have no faces to confront with the 1 billion Chinese people’.<sup>55</sup> Deng Xiao-ping, the former paramount leader of China, in September 1982 when he talked with the visiting Margaret Thatcher about Hong Kong, stated: ‘on the question of sovereignty, China has no room to manoeuvre’.<sup>56</sup> In the Chinese context, an able ruler or a glorious regime is the one who can maintains its territory, within which the well-being of people prospers; while villains allow it to break up or remain in pieces. Emperor K’ang-hsi did set an example for following generations to be very cautious about giving up sovereignty over Taiwan Island.

On May 27, 1684, Taiwan prefecture was established. Taiwan Island was further sinicized. According to Shepherd Robert John’s research, ‘the [Ch’ing] Court awarded generous examination quotas to the new island-prefecture of Taiwan with an eye to cultivating a local elite that would foster cultural orthodoxy and social control. The standard educational bureaucracy was created as part of the establishment of civil administration following the surrender of the (Ming court) Cheng regime, and in 1686 the Ch’ing assigned candidate quotas for officers’ post to Taiwan’.<sup>57</sup> On November 12, 1885, Taiwan was proclaimed as a province of China. Unfortunately, ten years later, the Ch’ing Dynasty ceded Taiwan Island to Japan.

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<sup>55</sup> Wong Man Fong, *China’s Resumption of Sovereignty over Hong Kong*, Hong Kong Baptist University, Hong Kong, 1998, p13

<sup>56</sup> Carlson Allen, *Unifying China, Integrating with the World: Securing Chinese Sovereignty in the Reform Era*, Stanford University Press, California, 2005, p108

<sup>57</sup> Shepherd Robert John, *Statecraft and Political Economy on the Taiwan Frontier 1600-1800*, Stanford University Press, California, 1993, p211

The Sino-Japanese conflict was related to Korea. 'Korea had long been China's most important vassal state, but its strategic location opposite the Japanese islands and its natural resources of coal and iron attracted Japan's interest'.<sup>58</sup> China was defeated by Japan in the war of competing for the supremacy in Korea. The Chinese fleet was annihilated in the battle of the Yellow Sea on September 17, 1894. On April 17, 1895, China and Japan inked the treaty of Shimonoseki, which ceded Taiwan Island to Japan which ruled the island for 50 years.

The period of Japanese colonization was the starting point of the Taiwan question. After hearing the signature of the treaty, 'all the Taiwanese, no matter male or female, young or old, felt desperate and did not want to be excluded from China'.<sup>59</sup> Holding a sense of being "abandoned" by their motherland which had no enough strength to protect her own child, the Taiwanese had to defend themselves. Once felt being abandoned or oppressed, human beings will naturally seek self-salvation means.

On April 17, 1895, Taiwan Republic was declared. On May 23, 1895, Taiwan Republic declared her independence. This was the first time for, probably the very beginning of, the "independence complexion", although the independence was only for the sake of self salvation rather for separating from the motherland. Tang Jing-song, the Governor of Taiwan under the Ch'ing Court was others-supported and self-claimed as the President of Taiwan Republic. The motivation behind the declaration was to independently seek the sympathy as well as support of the European powers,

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<sup>58</sup> Hung Chien-Chao, *A History of Taiwan*, Il Cerchio Iniziative Editorial, Gambalunga, ISBN 88-86583-80-X, 2000,p158

<sup>59</sup> 林天人 等, 时报文化编辑委员会, *珍藏 20 世纪台湾(My Century of Taiwan)*, 台北, 2000, p40

including Russian, Germany and France, which had forced Japan to quit its take-over of Shang Dong Province from China in 1895. Taiwan Republic hoped these powers could directly lend supports to her. “President” Tang stated: ‘the Republic is loyal to the Ch’ing Court, and provided situation favoured, she will return her motherland. My title, the “President of Republic Taiwan”, will be adopted only in files dealing with foreign affairs; whereas in files reporting to the Ch’ing court, the title of “Governor of Taiwan” will be maintained as ever’.<sup>60</sup> Taiwan Republic only lasted 10 days under the invasion and crackdown of Japan, but the military resistance of Taiwan people did not cease until 1915. One report, delivered by the Japanese General Governor of Taiwan to the Congress, stated: ‘from 1896 to 1903, more than 5,300 persons were punished in the name of bandits, and 3,480 persons were executed. The people regarded as bandits being executed were 10,000 in all’.<sup>61</sup> Japan stole Taiwan Island from China by brutal military forces and political craftiness. Here, an example module---the “mother with a lost son” module---will be brought in.

Normally, to most Chinese, the cession of Taiwan Island is described as a lost child whose mother was bullied by outsiders and eventually lost her child. The 50-year-long time spanned at least two generations for the people of Taiwan. The new born Chinese, from 1895 to 1945, on the island could hold an ambivalent or ambiguous altitude towards Japanese colonization. In the 1920s, China was in chaos inflicted by warlords. Under the ruling of Japan, Taiwan was relatively a peace land. In reality, Japan’s economic and political reform was implemented not only within its mother soil, but also brought to its colony. ‘In April 1947, a secret ROC report made by an official of the censorate (Yang Liang-kung) not only, noted that the Taiwanese all

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<sup>60</sup>ibid, p42

<sup>61</sup>林天人 等, 时报文化编辑委员会, *珍藏 20 世纪台湾(My Century of Taiwan)*, 台北, 2000, p64

praised the efficiency and integrity of Japan's civil and military personnel in Taiwan but also itself expressed great admiration for Japan's economic and administration methods there, regarding them as a model useful for all of China'.<sup>62</sup> On the other hand, Taiwan's national memory, as a part of China, was stripped of under the colonization of Japan. For example, at that time, people on Taiwan Island even lost the right to give names in a Chinese way. Lai Tse-Han, Myers H. Ramon and Wei Wou argued: 'it is true that we lack sufficient data about the Taiwanese response to Japanese efforts to assimilate them. We do know, however, that perhaps 100,000 Taiwanese-with their families, perhaps 10 percent of the population-adopted Japanese surnames'.<sup>63</sup> The sequence of Chinese naming system is to put the surname first and it is an embodiment of respect to the family or ancestor. To change the surnames is a profane action in Chinese culture. Japan forced the promotion of Japanese language in Taiwan as well. As a common sense, language is the most important vehicle of national memory. The foreign culture invasion damaged, or at least confused Taiwan's identification cultivated by the 200-year-long Ch'in Dynasty.

What could be the self-identification of the lost child? Identification is an attribute recognizing each other as fellows. It is hard to deny the two generations' ambivalence to Japanese colonization increased the ambiguity of national identity of the Chinese living on Taiwan Island. Shall the lost child still be identified Chinese? In international legal terms, the lost child still belongs to the mother. In November 1943, the Cairo Declaration jointly declared by China, the United States and the Great Britain read as follows: 'the several military missions have agreed upon future

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<sup>62</sup> Lai Tse-Han, Myers H. Ramon and Wei Wou, *A Tragic Beginning: The Taiwan Uprising of February 28, 1947*, Stanford University Press, California, 1991, p45

<sup>63</sup> Lai Tse-Han, Myers H. Ramon and Wei Wou, *A Tragic Beginning: The Taiwan Uprising of February 28, 1947*, Stanford University Press, California, 1991, p45

military operations against Japan. They covet no gain for themselves and have not thought of territorial expansion. It is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China'.<sup>64</sup> In the Potsdam Declaration, inked on July 26, 1945, emphasized that the terms of the Cairo Declaration should be carried out.

Meanwhile, in terms of national kinship and affection, the Taiwanese was also eager to return to the embrace of motherland. 'The initial response of many Taiwanese to the restoration of Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan was high-spirited. For most citizens of Taiwan, China was their ancestral home and source of culture. Most of them did not enjoy strict Japanese colonial control, even though they might have respected the efficiency of Japan's bureaucracy and security forces'.<sup>65</sup> At the same time, another perspective also should be noticed. 'There are many in the Taiwanese nationalist movement who argued that the ending of Japanese colonialism in Taiwan in 1945 should have led to the people of Taiwan being consulted about what they wanted rather than outside powers giving the island to the Chinese government'.<sup>66</sup> It probably was a pity, short of meticulous consideration, although there were no specific signs indicating the "Taiwan son" refused to return the embrace of its "China mother" who lost her "guardian" right for 50 years. The "Taiwan son", since being stolen by military force, and its return is self-justified; this probably is the common

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<sup>64</sup> Hung Chien-Chao, *A History of Taiwan*, Il Cerchio Iniziative Editorial, Gambalunga, ISBN 88-86583-80-X, 2000,p245

<sup>65</sup> Wei Bin Zhang, *Taiwan's Modernization: Americanization and Modernizing Confucian Manifestations*, World Scientific Publishing, London, 2003, p49

<sup>66</sup> Maguire Keith, *the Rise of Modern Taiwan*, Ashgate Publishing Limited, England, 1998, p103

psychology of human beings. To accuse Taiwan's return to China without the consent of the Taiwan people is after-effect wisdom.

Anyway, on October 25, 1945, the Japanese surrender ceremony was held in Taipei city. Chen Yi, the new Governor of Taiwan Province, appointed by the GMT government of the Republic of China, declared: 'on this October 25, 1945, at 10:00 a.m., in the public auditorium of Taipei city, we hold this ceremony for the surrender and return of Taiwan to the Republic of China. As the procedures have been completed, from today onward Taiwan and the Pescadores are formally part of China. Therefore, all the land and people, and all administrative matters will be under the authority of the government of the Republic of China'.<sup>67</sup> The first group of soldiers dispatched by the GMT government arrived in Ji-long (基隆) on October 16, 1945.

Nearly 60,000 troops disembarked on Taiwan Island to accept the Japanese surrender on October 25, 1945. The GMT leadership believed that the Taiwan's return to China would be warmly welcomed by the Taiwanese. As the successful outcome of the eight-year anti-Japanese war, the reunification, as an icon of national aspiration, was indeed welcomed by the majority of Chinese. For the people living on Taiwan Island, their welcomes of returning to China were sincere. Unfortunately, nobody foresaw the undercurrent rift created by the history of fifty-year without contacts across the Taiwan Strait.

The potential rift was looming near. For the people living on Taiwan Island, 'their historical experience under the Japanese had given them an especially strong sense of

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<sup>67</sup> Lai Tse-Han, Myers H. Ramon and Wei Wou, *A Tragic Beginning: The Taiwan Uprising of February 28, 1947*, Stanford University Press, California, 1991, p63

being a clearly bounded “we-group” facing outsiders, as well as reasons for feeling superior to these outsiders’.<sup>68</sup> During the Second World War, Taiwan Island was utilized as a resource base to support Japanese aggressive war, and less resistance was staged by Taiwanese to Japan. People on the Chinese Mainland (hereinafter referred as “Chinese Mainlander”) could easily regard the people on Taiwan Island (hereinafter referred as “Chinese Taiwanese”) were lined with Japan and betrayed the Chinese national interests. To certain extend, the people on the Chinese Mainland would categorise themselves “we-group” too, facing the “other-group” ---the people on Taiwan Island. As a common psychology of human beings, the Chinese Mainlander, especially the group sent to Taiwan Island to receive the Japanese surrender, would take the advantage to gain something to “compensate” what they had lost in the war. ‘In the context of such political, economic, and emotional upheaval, the Mainlanders kept coming. Between 1945 and 1949, an estimated one to two million Mainlanders, roughly half of them soldiers, came to Taiwan fleeing the Communist unification of China’.<sup>69</sup> Such a large number of newcomers would inevitably have certain huge impacts to Taiwan Island, so tiny.

The majority of Chinese Mainlanders, posted to Taiwan Island, had the spirit of performing public service. They wanted to strive for the reconstruction of Taiwan and they sympathized with their island brothers who had suffered the oppression of some fifty years of Japanese imperialism. Unfortunately, their efforts were destroyed by another ill-willed group. ‘Some Mainland officials and their relatives seized Japanese property illegally for personal gain, a practice that become so widespread that even

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<sup>68</sup> *ibid*, p173

<sup>69</sup> Brown J. Melissa, *Is Taiwan Chinese? The Impact of Culture, Power, and Migration on Changing Identities*, University of California Press, Los Angeles, 2004, p60

the government-backed newspaper T'ai-wan bsin-sheng-pao complained, "there have been cases where an individual occupied many homes and buildings, using the illustrious name of some association as a pretext for owning that real estate".<sup>70</sup> Such nasty action, only for the sake of personal gains, sowed a resentment seed in the hearts of the Chinese Taiwanese. They were left an impression: the "other-grouped" Chinese government sent a group of "bandits" to loot rather help the "we-grouped" Chinese Taiwanese. 'In December 1945, only months after the retrocession of Taiwan, a United States Consulate report noted that the "disillusionment after one month is apparent and, though there is an atmosphere of watchful waiting, a deep ground swell of resentment and reaction is developing".<sup>71</sup> The situation became worsen after the civil war happened on the Chinese Mainland between the GMT and the CPC. The Taiwan Island was further converted as a material source for the GMT, which dominated the governmental institution. Besides the Chinese civil war, other factors as well could create further misunderstandings between the Chinese Mainlander and the Chinese Taiwanese. For example, one factor was the inefficient language communication skill. 'Because few Taiwanese people spoke Mandarin and few of the GMT officials and soldiers spoke Taiwanese, communication between the Taiwanese and Mainlander was difficult'.<sup>72</sup> And another factor was the "Chinese Mainlander" rather than the "Chinese Taiwanese" took over most official positions of Taiwan Province. The potential conflict was fomenting in such a complex situation.

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<sup>70</sup> Lai Tse-Han, Myers H. Ramon and Wei Wou, *A Tragic Beginning: The Taiwan Uprising of February 28, 1947*, Stanford University Press, California, 1991, p71

<sup>71</sup> Lai Tse-Han, Myers H. Ramon and Wei Wou, *A Tragic Beginning: The Taiwan Uprising of February 28, 1947*, Stanford University Press, California, 1991, p93

<sup>72</sup> Wei Bin Zhang, *Taiwan's Modernization: Americanization and Modernizing Confucian Manifestations*, World Scientific Publishing, London, 2003, p49

The explosion ignited on February 28, 1947. An unintentional shooting, by a government agent of a bystander present at the arrest of a street vendor, triggered a demonstration in Taipei, which led to a violent island-wide uprising. Residents of Taiwan Island lashed out against the GMT as well as other immigrants from the Chinese Mainland. This outbreak of hostilities was brought under suppression by the hard line policy of the GMT government. ‘Perhaps as many as 8,000 Mainlanders and Taiwanese were killed in the Uprising, a slaughter largely due, we find, to brutality or lack of discipline in the field rather than to orders given from above’.<sup>73</sup> This incident is well known as “the February 28 Incident”, which leads to a deep mutual distrust and animosity between the Chinese Taiwanese and the Mainlander. The Chinese Taiwanese, although their forefathers came from the Chinese Mainland, would position the GMT government which brutally treat them, as another outside invader like Japan exactly. ‘Many dissidents wanted to end GMD rule and set up a government that, whether ultimately sovereign or not, would be run by Taiwanese largely unconstrained by a Chinese central government. In other words, a significant part of Taiwan’s urban minority wanted to take over the government of Taiwan’.<sup>74</sup> The incident on February 28, 1947, was a spontaneous response to GMT’s political suppression. At that time, it was not the first but the strongest catalyst for Taiwan Island’s alienation from its Chinese identification, echoed with the “independence complexion” aforementioned. The alienation, caused by the “February 28 Incident”, was then enhanced by the aftermath of the Chinese civil war with the GMT’s defeat. Adams Charles argued: ‘civil war is a war that breaks out in a nation between

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<sup>73</sup> Lai Tse-Han, Myers H. Ramon and Wei Wou, *A Tragic Beginning: The Taiwan Uprising of February 28, 1947*, Stanford University Press, California, 1991, p9

<sup>74</sup> Lai Tse-Han, Myers H. Ramon and Wei Wou, *A Tragic Beginning: The Taiwan Uprising of February 28, 1947*, Stanford University Press, California, 1991, p7

opposing groups for control of the state'.<sup>75</sup> Before discussing the further alienation, for the chronological reason, another historical issue of the late stage of the civil war, should be mentioned here. The issue was the “two Chinas” scenario, which was equally unaccepted in terms of national unity.

The “two Chinas” scenario originated from the civil war circumstances. From September 1948 to January 1949, the GMT and the CPC were engaged in three major campaigns. They eventually led to the CPC’s domination over the northern part of China. The remained GMT armed forces retreated to the southern China with the Yangtze River as the military dividing line. The GMT government was in an illusion to rule the southern China with the Yangtze River as the political dividing line as well. The scenario, taking some resemblances to the one between the Ch’ing regime and the fleeing Ming regime in 1683, seemed to appear again between the CPC and the GMT. In its long history, China was, for several times, split up between two regimes by a strip of water, such as the Yangtze River and the Taiwan Strait.

The GMD government’s strategy was not only supported by the United States, but also not denied by the former Soviet Union. Ideologically and geographically, the former Soviet Union was more close to the CPC (its forces mainly stationed in northwest of China) than the GMD. On the other side, in the Second World War, China and the United States were allied countries, and the aid from the United States was naturally passed to the GMD government which was the legal representative of China at that time. The curtain of Cold War had not fully opened yet and overshadowed by the Second World War. The two future superpowers respectively

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<sup>75</sup> Adams Charles, *When in the Course of Human Events: Arguing the Case for Southern Secession*, Rowman&Littlefield Publishers, Oxford, 2000, p196

hoped that they could have more influences on China, whose dividend status could serve their strategic goals better. If the CPC, after the Second World War, showed submissiveness to the will of two superpowers, the unification of China would be more difficult and postponed for a long time. In the CPC's perspective, unification is a great cause for all Chinese.

On April 1, 1949, the negotiation between the CPC and the GMT was held in Beijing. The motivations of two sides were different. The GMT intended to resist the CPC's Yangtze River-crossing campaign, revitalize its forces, secure the southern China, realize the scenario of "ruling divided by the river" and create a de facto scenario of "two Chinas". The CPC, for the sake of reducing casualties to two sides who are both Chinese, intended to unify China in more peaceful means and urged the GMP to give up resistance. The sharp difference between the two was uncompromised. The final version of agreement files was refused by the GMT government on April 20, 1949. General Zhang Zhi-zhong, the chief negotiator of the GMT government, said in his final wrapping-up as follows:

the civil war between the CPC and the GMT is like a dispute arising from brothers. Who gain or who lose is not a serious matter, because we are both Chinese and share the same nationality. If the older brother cannot handle the family affairs well, the younger brother can take the administrative power in shift. The shift does not matter, because all gains are within the same family. If the younger brother is more able to shoulder the obligation of the family, the older brother should feel happy, pay respect and be of help to the younger brother to make the family booming and will not be looked down upon by neighbours. The whole family, including the older brother, will feel proud of the younger brother.<sup>76</sup>

It will not be difficult for the Chinese people to accept General Zhang's metaphor.

The metaphor could roughly be described as a "brotherhood relations within a family" module by this thesis for further analysis. Here, China, as a political as well as

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<sup>76</sup> Yu Zhanbang, *Memorandum of the Past*, Beijing, 2004, p36  
<http://www.doww.net/cc83329c0b4539744d04b2f5ce5bd915/index.html>, viewed on April 27, 2008,

cultural image, may be regarded as the token of the whole family or the mother. The GMT was the then older brother, because it was founded in 1911 and ruled China until 1949. The CPC was the younger brother, because it was founded in 1921 and did not take the rule power over China until 1949. Older or younger, is not a fixed definition, referred not only metaphorically to the historical length of two parties, but also to their strengths, decided by the amount of people who support them and the scale of the territory each can influence. The power balance within the Chinese family would not always be stable and it reached its turning point in 1949.

A family falling apart is never strong. On April 21 1949, the CPC's armed forces drove from north to south. They crossed the Yangtze River and eventually conquered strongholds on the southern bank, which raised the curtain of unite the southern part of the Chinese Mainland. On April 23, 1949, the CPC armed forces conquered Nanking City, the capital city of the GMD government. Until September 1949, the Chinese Mainland was under the control of the CPC.

On October 1, 1949, the People's Republic of China was founded in Beijing which is the capital city. 'Losing no time, the Soviet Union had recognised Mao's Republic on the 2<sup>nd</sup> (October 1949), and on the 3<sup>rd</sup> the GMT government---still in Guangdong---had broken diplomatic relations with Moscow'.<sup>77</sup> On December 10, 1949, Chiang Kai-shek left the Chinese Mainland by aircraft for Taiwan Island where was his last refuge. Two days before his leaving, on December 8, the Executive Yuan (the administrative branch of the GMT's Nanking government) in an emergency session voted to remove the capital to Taipei city, which is the provincial capital of Taiwan

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<sup>77</sup> Crozier Brian with the collaboration of Chou Eric, *The Man Who Lost China: the First Full Biography of Chiang Kai-shek*, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1976, p343

Province as well. Although the political dividing line was retreat from the Yangtze River to the Taiwan Strait, without fundamental difference, China was not unified as a whole. The GMD had to utilize the only territory---Taiwan Island---as a base to prepare its future reclamation sovereignty over the whole China. This strategy countered to ordinary Taiwanese demands. ‘Many Taiwanese felt that because they had long suffered under Japanese control, the returning Nationalists (the GMT) should put the highest priority on satisfying their economic and political demands, not on mobilizing Taiwan’s resources to prosecute the war against Mao Tse-tung (the then Chairman of the CPC, hereinafter referred as Mao)’.<sup>78</sup> Such mindset was not rather than a bond but a centrifugal force which further alienated the Chinese Taiwanese from China.

At that time, Mao Tse-tung was preparing to end the civil war by taking over the Chinese Mainland’s afflicted islands (including Taiwan Island), of which some were still held by Chiang Kai-shek (the then Chairman of the GMT, hereinafter referred as Chiang). Mao highlighted the importance of taking over Taiwan Island, and he argued: “if Taiwan is not liberated and the GMT’s naval and air bases not destroyed, Shanghai and other coastal areas will be menaced from time to time. If Taiwan is not liberated, we will not be able to seize hundreds of thousands of tons of vessels [still controlled by the GMT]’.<sup>79</sup> The security consideration was not eased even when Beijing and Washington held open talks in 1973. According to the original Memorandum of Conversation, the Chinese then Premier Zhou En-lai said to Henry A. Kissinger: ‘...you are going to build or assist Chiang Kai-shek to build fighters on Taiwan’. Kissinger, the then American Secretary of State, defended: ‘...these planes cannot

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<sup>78</sup> Lai Tse-Han, Myers H. Ramon and Wei Wou, *A Tragic Beginning: The Taiwan Uprising of February 28, 1947*, Stanford University Press, California, 1991, p6

<sup>79</sup> Ryan A. Mark, Finkelstein M. David, and McDevitt A. Michael, *Chinese Warfighting: the PLA Experience since 1949*, An East Gate Book, New York, 2003, p74

reach the [Chinese] mainland'. Zhou then said: 'they might be able to come but they won't be able to go back'. Kissinger reinforced: 'no, they don't have the reach to come'. Zhou emphasized: 'if they don't want to go back they can come here!'<sup>80</sup> The extract of the 1973-year conversation is a strong evidence to convince that the security issue is an important factor for Beijing to consider the across-Taiwan-Strait relations. In 1949, Mao's stance was oriented to the Chinese Mainland's strategic security and diplomatic concerns as well. This first campaign on taking over Taiwan's affiliated islands was failed in October 1949, with 8,000 casualties on the CPC side. The second attempted was disrupted by the presence of American fleet in the Taiwan Strait, due to the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950. The unification of China was postponed. This could be regarded as the factual beginning of the Taiwan question in the contemporary era.

History cannot be reshaped, but people may draw conclusions from certain scenarios which possibly could have happened in the past. If the GMT secured the Yangtze River in 1949, there could be a "North China" and a "South China" (with its affiliated islands, including the Taiwan Island) with the Yangtze River as the dividing line. This is exactly another model of North Korea and South Korea. Regarding to the Korean scenario, although there are two political entities existing on the peninsula, the sovereignty of Korea is not terminated. In line with the same logic, the hypothetical South China could not end the sovereignty of China. If so, how can the hypothetical South China's affiliated island, such as Taiwan Island, end the sovereignty of China as a whole? The Taiwan question, as a matter of fact, is about the ownership of sovereignty which closely linked with self-identification. In order to clarify the

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<sup>80</sup> *Foreign Relation*, 1969-1976, Volume XVIII, issued by the U.S.A., p28

Taiwan question in a simple way and avoid being trapped in the circular reasoning of abstract sovereignty, this thesis recalls one model aforementioned.

It is the “brotherhood relations within one family” model. It is common for the Chinese to describe political as well as cultural relations metaphorically in terms of family membership. The metaphor may go as follows: due to political disagreements, a civil dispute happens between two brothers within a family, which is composed of a main room and its affiliated rooms. In this regard, if the model of “brotherhood relations within one family” applies to Beijing and Taipei in terms of administration, and then, normally, the Chinese Mainland is regarded as the older brother, and Taiwan Island as the younger brother (in terms of population and territory, the Chinese Mainland is weighty than Taiwan Island). In 1949, the GMT government retreated to Taiwan Island, and the PRC with the CCP at the core ruled over the Chinese Mainland up to now. The “brotherhood relations within a family” model is metaphorically overlapped, because it is referred not only to territories but also to political parties. The two brothers respectively hold (or represent) different parts of the same family’s property. Affairs within “one family” are within the sole sovereignty.

Regardless of the relatively-simplifying application, the “brotherhood relations within one family” model may serve as a simple way for people to understand the complex situation across the Taiwan Strait. Unfortunately, the sovereignty issue cannot be dealt with in or resolved by such a simplified model, otherwise there may be no the Taiwan question and the world could probably be less conflicted. ‘Relations between sovereign entities may be regarded as forming what might be called a sovereignty

system, which is substantially unregulated but by no means merely contingent'.<sup>81</sup> The Taiwan question is not a purely empirical question described by one simple model and something on the theoretical level should be discussed. The debate over sovereignty issue cannot be probed only through empirical means, because there is no such an empirical mechanism, like the registration authorities which could effectively issue "sovereignty ownership certificate". For the sake of theoretical probing of the sovereignty question, academic research on the sovereignty theory cannot be bypassed.

## Chapter Two: Theoretical Issues

"Sovereignty" may be the word, used most frequently, in the context addressing the across-Taiwan-Strait relationship. Theories of sovereignty are legion. Tracing the originality of the word "sovereignty", Wang Hu-ning, the current political assistant to Chinese President Hu Jing-tao, argues: 'the word of sovereignty is originated from the Latin word "supremitas" or "supremapotestas", and then evolved into French word "souverainet"'.<sup>82</sup> [the author's English translation] Scruton Roger finds out that there is no universally-applied definition to "sovereignty" and he asserts: 'it is now unclear what is meant by sovereignty, and the concept seems to focus disputes in political science and philosophy which no dictionary article could possibly resolve'.<sup>83</sup> Dent J.

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<sup>81</sup> Kurtulus Kurtulus N. Ersun, *State Sovereignty: Concept, Phenomenon and Ramifications*, Palgrave, New York, 2005, p45

<sup>82</sup> Beijing University official website, <http://www.iolaw.org.cn/shownews.asp?id=16299>, written by Wang Hu-ning, viewed on May 19, 2008 (in Chinese)

<sup>83</sup> Scruton Roger, *A Dictionary of Political Thought*, Pan Books Ltd, Great Britain, 1983, p441

Martin, in his works, demonstrates how diverse views on sovereignty may be and he summarises:

Biersteker and Weber for instance, in this book *State Sovereignty as Social Construct*, define that sovereignty “as a political entity’s externally recognised right to exercise final authority over its affairs”. F.H. Hinsley in the classic study of sovereignty writes of a “final and absolute political authority in the community”. Hedley Bull describes internal sovereignty as meaning “supremacy over all other authorities within that territory or population”. Roxanne Doty writes “when it is no longer clear who makes up a nation, a state’s internal sovereignty and the existence of the state itself is threatened”.<sup>84</sup>

It seemed that there is no shared definition to the connotation of sovereignty. In grammar, sovereignty was generated from the word “sovereign”, which specifically means ‘the person who, under a monarchy, exercises the function associated with the head of state’.<sup>85</sup> In short and general, sovereignty means ‘supremacy in respect of power, domination, or rank’.<sup>86</sup> In literal terms, sovereignty is simply equal to supreme power; if the meaning of the word “sovereignty” is a one-layered story, it makes itself no great difference with other political terms. For example, the term imperial power, in ancient times of China, also represented the supreme power as well. Only when the word “sovereignty” is combined with other words, richer and multi-layered connotations can then be lead in.

Generally speaking, there are two methodologies of combination of the word “sovereignty” with other supplements. One is by the functional “adjectives”. Sovereignty may convey various connotations by the delineation of additional “adjectives”, such as external or internal sovereignty, positive or passive sovereignty, ruler or popular sovereignty, limited or absolute sovereignty, and so on. Due to different academic perspectives as well as political needs, the concept of sovereignty

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<sup>84</sup> Dent J. Martin, *Identity Politics Filling the Gap Between Federalism and Independence*, Ashgate Publishing Limited, England, 2004, p4

<sup>85</sup> Scruton Roger, *A Dictionary of Political Thought*, Pan Books, Great Britain, 1983, p440

<sup>86</sup> *The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary*, Volume II, Oxford University Press, 1973, p2059

enjoys a tremendous variety which strongly implies its complexity. This type of sovereignty can be phrased as “adjective” sovereignty.

Another method of defining sovereignty is by the sequence of time. The concept of sovereignty has its own evolution process. It may not be too risky to roughly delineate the concept in three stages: the pre-sovereignty or sovereignty-similar time (since in an “embryonic” stage, it is may be a messy situation), the classical sovereignty time and the contemporary sovereignty time. For each stage, the connotation, manifested and enriched by the “adjectives”, is varied due to different circumstance. The subtle connotation of various “adjective sovereignty” will not be touched here, but will be discussed on situational way if context required. As a matter of fact, the “adjective” word, attached to “sovereignty”, is a by-product of the long time. The time line for the three stages, in the West and the East, is not synchronized.

For the West, in the sense of semantics, it is not hard to assume that the concept of sovereignty is the aftermath of the formation of the concept of sovereign. But it is difficult to fix the specific concept-establishing date of the word sovereign; because tribal leaders in primitive era, which was hard to trace back, could be regarded as “sovereigns” as well if they enjoyed certain absolute or authoritative powers. The starting point of the concept of sovereignty seems unclear. Fortunately, the probing of the originality of the term sovereignty is not in need of this thesis’s further logical and empirical explication. One important point clear here is---before and in the Middle Ages in Europe---the classical concept of sovereignty was not established. John Bowle argued: ‘this conception of sovereign power, still so much taken for granted,

was new in the sixteenth century'.<sup>87</sup> In the Middle Ages, 'the ideal of hierarchy under God, in which clerical and lay power harmoniously pursued their proper ends, implied no definition of sovereignty in the modern sense'.<sup>88</sup> In Medieval period and the Renaissance, 'jurists rarely wrote systematically about sovereignty. When they referred to the loci classici of the prince's authority, the glosses and commentaries on these texts did expound a coherent doctrine. But not a coherent work which could be entitled "On Sovereignty"'.<sup>89</sup> The situation changed, when Jean Bodin (1530-1596, French political philosopher) tried to write a systematic tract describing sovereignty, which was one of his main contributions to political thought of the world. According to Kenneth Pennington's understanding, 'Quentin Skinner has summarized sovereignty in Bodin's *De republica* as "high, absolute, and perpetual power over citizens"'.<sup>90</sup> Daniel Engster clarified Bodin arguments on sovereignty as follows: 'God had delegated to the sovereign authority the responsibility for imposing a divine and natural order upon human affairs. ... His theory of sovereignty was so successful precisely because it provided a new universal foundation of divine and natural law. He portrayed the sovereign prince as the new source of transcendent legal norms within a contingent and diverse temporal world'.<sup>91</sup> In these arguments, the new foundation for power was based on princes as well as their kingdoms. 'Given that the authority of Rome is dead, that the Holy Roman Empire has failed, that the order of

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<sup>87</sup> Bowle John, *Western Political Thought: from the Origin to Rousseau*, University Paperbacks, Great Britain, 1947, p293

<sup>88</sup> *ibid*, p191

<sup>89</sup> Pennington Kenneth, *the Prince and the Law, 1200-1600: Sovereignty and Rights in the Western Legal Tradition*, University of California Press, California, 1993, p283

<sup>90</sup> Pennington Kenneth, *the Prince and the Law, 1200-1600: Sovereignty and Rights in the Western Legal Tradition*, University of California Press, California, 1993, p276

<sup>91</sup> Engster Daniel, *Divine Sovereignty: The Origins of Modern State Power*, Northern Illinois University Press, Illinois, 2001, p79

Christendom is disrupted, the new sovereign state is the only focus of power'.<sup>92</sup> Since then, princes seemed to make up the vacuum left by the decline of the Church.

Before (and in) the Middle Ages, no supreme power had been established. The picture was not changed until the signature of the Treaty of Westphalia which ushered in a new period. 'What Westphalia superseded was the Europe of the Middle Ages, at the peak of which no ruler enjoyed supremacy with a territory, no ruler enjoyed sovereignty'.<sup>93</sup> Indeed, the Treaty of Westphalia treaty was a watershed in the evolution of modern concept of sovereignty. 'The settlement consisted of three treaties, ending three separate conflicts in the Thirty Years' War. ...What is strange to modern observers is that such these diverse authorities conceived of themselves as members of a common society, Christendom. The delegates called themselves the "senate of the Christian world".<sup>94</sup> Before the signature of the Treaty, the European continent was in a messy situation. 'The European "period of the warring states", borrow a phrase coined by historians of China, has its beginning in the sixteenth century'.<sup>95</sup> If in belligerent situation for whatever reasons, fighting-in-war would be a common means for kingdoms to resolve disputes. For example, 'the collapse of the Augsburg Constitution invited the carnage of the Thirty Year's War, which might be thought of as a civil war within the young society of states'.<sup>96</sup> Consequently, the Augsburg settlement had given sovereign princes the right to determine the religion of their subjects according to each prince's religion. In such period, for religious reasons,

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<sup>92</sup> Bowle John, *Western Political Thought: from the Origin to Rousseau*, University Paperbacks, Great Britain, 1947, p304

<sup>93</sup> Philpott Daniel, *Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 2001, p30

<sup>94</sup> Philpott Daniel, *Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 2001, p82

<sup>95</sup> Bowle John, *Western Political Thought: from the Origins to Rousseau*, University Paperbacks, Great Britain, 1961, p290

<sup>96</sup> Bobbitt Philip, *The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace and the Course of History*, Penguin, p501

prince states intervened with each other without rules to abide by. The boundary of each kingdom was not fixed but depending upon the outcome of the brutal war-fighting. Nobody had a strong sense of security since the invaders might break into one's big room---the kingdom---whenever they thought fit.

For the sake of self-security, a shared spirit implemented by certain mechanism within a big community was demanded. The Treaty of Westphalia was in line with the spirit at that time, which could be shortly paraphrased as: supreme authority within a mutual-recognized territory which is inviolable by outsiders. The Treaty of Westphalia could be regarded as a compromise or mutual tolerance, but only granted to players of the gentlemen's agreement which was subject to power. Who has power, has status. The term of gentlemen's agreement used here has an implication that the Treaty of Westphalia could be broken easily. Its fragility was underlined by the wars after the treaty. Meanwhile, if other outsiders could not meet the gentlemen's standard, their sovereignty would not be fully secured. 'Colonies, by definition, did not practice such de facto sovereign powers. Over the three centuries following Westphalia, European powers continued to swell, rendering the rest of the globe in one manner or another less than sovereign: partitioned, divided into spheres of influence, colonized, or otherwise restricted in authority. Some colonies---the United States, Canada---did become respected as full sovereign states, but these were exceptions'.<sup>97</sup> The concept of sovereignty, once created, served the interests of the creator, rather than outsiders. In this sense, the sovereignty is a double standard weapon, especially in the prevailing era of colonialism and imperialism.

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<sup>97</sup> Philpott Daniel, *Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 200, p153

The universal recognition of sovereignty was not secured until the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Even ‘after [the Treaty of] Westphalia, the Church continued to regard the absolutely sovereign state as a heresy. As late as the end of the nineteenth century, it still banned the writings of Hugo Grotius, one of the earliest articulations of the sovereign state system, and condemned international law as a “Protestant science”’.<sup>98</sup> The two World Wars, taking place in the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, indicated that sovereignty could be severely violated as well. The concept of sovereignty did not prevail until the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century with the anti-colonialism wave as a symbol. Daniel Philpott argues: ‘it was Westphalia, and then colonial independence around 1960, that introduced and globalized the system of sovereign states’.<sup>99</sup> This trend does not necessarily mean that there is no violation of sovereignty.

A current issue gives a good example to prove the unreliability of the system of sovereign states. On February 18, 2008, the United States acknowledged the independence of Kosovo from Serbia, and Russia did exactly on the opposite way. On August 26, 2008, Russia acknowledged the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia from Georgia. On the same day, George W. Bush said: ‘ I call on Russia's leadership to meet its commitments and not recognize these separatist regions...The United States will continue to stand with the people of Georgia and their democracy and to support its sovereignty and territorial integrity’.<sup>100</sup> These examples indicate that the concept of sovereignty is still just a tool utilized only for practical purpose in the current world. If there is no sharp conflict in interests among countries, sovereignty of them, no matter the size of the country, could be respected. If a rift on

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<sup>98</sup> *ibid*, p261

<sup>99</sup> *ibid*, p29

<sup>100</sup> [http://english.china.com/zh\\_cn/news/international/11020308/20080826/15051741.html](http://english.china.com/zh_cn/news/international/11020308/20080826/15051741.html), viewed on August 27,2008

strategic interests occurred, however, sovereignty could be pushed aside, which indicates a double standard. Carlson Allen argued:

sovereignty is not only constructed by words, it is also made through actions. Indeed, it is the broader national security and foreign policy behaviour of states that lends substance to what their representatives say about sovereignty...sovereignty is largely an empty vessel (it is meaningful only with reference to related legitimatizing principles), and dominant understandings of what ideational substance has filled such a container have historically varied, so too has sovereignty's role in international politics.<sup>101</sup>

Carlson Allen's point---sovereignty was made through actions---is tantamount to address the importance of power which can essentially secure sovereignty. 'Policy flows from might',<sup>102</sup> and so does sovereignty as well. No qualified power, no consolidated sovereignty.

Such an assumption may be proved by China's experience. China's sovereignty was violated by Western powers in the one century of shame period, starting from the middle 19<sup>th</sup> century, although the concept of sovereignty (or its equivalent) was not new to China. In ancient times, the Chinese created a tangible token, similarly representing sovereignty. From the first unified Dynasty –Qin Dynasty (221-206 B.C.)-on, the seal, made of high quality jade, for emperor's usage, had a special and exclusive name, in Chinese,玺(pronounced as "she"). The "xi" had many types, for example, the "xi" for inking the letter, for issuing verdict and so on.

There was a most important seal, named "传国玉玺" (literally translated as "the jade seal for entitling the sovereign power of the kingdom) was made under the order of Emperor Qin Shihuang. From dynasties to dynasties, the special seal was chased by

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<sup>101</sup> Carlson Allen, *Unifying China, Integrating with the World: Securing Chinese Sovereignty in the Reform Era*, Stanford University Press, California, 2005, p23, p29

<sup>102</sup> Brenk John, *The Cultural Contradictions of Democracy: Political Thought Since September 11*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2007, p5

all warlords and local rulers. For them, obtaining the original “sovereign-entitling seal” is equally to obtain the endorsement from Heaven of their ruling legitimacies. In their eyes, sovereignty was seemed to be a tangible “thing” like the mace, and could be touched. Although the original “sovereign-entitling seal” was lost in the fog of history and war, rulers’ longings for it had never been faded away, because ruling power is the ultimate goal of every ruler. To the Chinese, in ancient times, the concept of sovereignty was not exactly defined as in the modern West, but the essential connotation of the legitimated supremacy and exclusive power was shared. In the ancient China, the only challenge to the supremacy was either foreign invasions or domestic rebellions. ‘In the late of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the modern concept of “sovereignty” was introduced into China’.<sup>103</sup> (the author’s English translation) The 19<sup>th</sup> century was just the beginning of the one century of shame to China, which left a legacy for China to attach great importance of national independence as well as territorial integrity to the concept of sovereignty.

Territorial integrity, manifested by boundary-respecting concept, had already brought to the state-to-state relation in Chinese history hundreds of years ago. There was a famous poem, written by Wang Wei in Tang Dynasty (618-907), and it read as follows: ‘the casualty of battles should be limited and every state has its own boundary; should the invasion can be curbed, the significance of battle does not count on how many has been killed.’<sup>104</sup> [the author’s English translation] Although the Tang Dynasty was one of most powerful periods of China, it neither established the concept of sovereignty with Chinese mindset at the centre, nor promoted its

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<sup>103</sup> Beijing University official website, <http://www.iolaw.org.cn/shownews.asp?id=16299>, written by Wang Huning (the current political assistant to Chinese President Hu Jing-tao), viewed on May 19, 2008

<sup>104</sup> <http://book.5ilog.com/cgi-bin/mz/poetry/v.aspx/shi25618.htm>, viewed on March 10, 2008

“sovereignty-like” concept to other ancient countries. One possible reason was that the Chinese culture was not outward-oriented in nature. Another probable reason is that the ancient world, with the underdevelopment of technology, was less interdependent than nowadays. Ancient powers did not expand influences across ocean until the exploring of the New Continent. The land-based expansion was also constrained by the less advanced supply capabilities. Ancient China’s influence, in ancient times, was also largely limited in its own territory, or expanded to neighbouring countries in terms of patronage.

In long history of China, there were three exceptions which had significant impact beyond China’s borders. Namely, they are: the Silk Road started from the Tang Dynasty, the Mongolian Conquest in the Yuan Dynasty and the ocean-going missions in the Ming Dynasty. The Mongolian Conquest was a nomadic style adventure or exploration, and it was not line with, but countered to the ancient Chinese agricultural culture which originated from the Yellow River and Yangtze River areas. Although sometimes being offset by the nasty statecraft adopted by cruel politicians in ancient times, China’s homemade culture, such as Confucianism and Taoism, including the imported Buddhism, is harmonious and least offensive in nature. Guo Hong-ji, a Chinese academician argues that: ‘in most part of China’s history, it did not establish aggressive regimes. ...Indeed, China had conquered others, but almost all the area it annexed was unexplored area. China seldom imposed her own ideology upon to the conquered nation by forces. On the other hand, China committed herself to assimilate the conquered with her advanced culture’.<sup>105</sup> That was why, even at most prosperous times, the Silk Road and the ocean-going missions were not for territorial expansion

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<sup>105</sup>郭洪纪, *台湾意识与中国情结* (*Taiwan Consciousness and Middle Kingdom Complex*), 慧明文化事业有限公司, 2002, p420, original in Chinese

as well as colonization, but for transporting commodities as well as showcasing the Chinese civilization. While the Mongolian expansion was about conquest, the Silk Road and the ocean-going missions were about trade and influence.

Menzies Gavin argues: ‘the (ancient) Chinese preferred to pursue their aims by trade, influence...rather than by open conflict and direct colonization’.<sup>106</sup> Menzies Gavin’s argument is line with a famous Chinese saying: ‘I will not impose to others with what I myself do not wish to be imposed upon’. (己所不欲, 勿施于人) Before the middle of 19<sup>th</sup> century, China was a powerful country, at least in East Asia. China did not impose its powers to others. ‘The number and boundaries of countries in East Asian have remained essentially the same since AD 1200. In contrast, the independent European states, numbering some 500 in the year 1500, were reduced in number to 20 by 1900’.<sup>107</sup> Unfortunately, accompanying by the West’s expansion, the relative stable situation in East Asia was changed.

For China, her declining power failed her in the defence of sovereignty from the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century. The modernized Western powers did not respect Chinese sovereignty, because only a powerful country can enjoy the right of sovereignty. Kurtulus Kurtulus N. Ersun argues: ‘violations of Westphalian sovereignty may be the consequence of “coercive actions” and “interventions” on the part of external actors’.<sup>108</sup> If the tangible power of one country is strong enough, it needs no intangible concept to safeguard its sovereignty in reality. For weak countries, the concept of sovereignty

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<sup>106</sup> Menzies Gavin, *1421: the Year China Discovered the World*, Bantam Books, Great Britain, 2003, p60

<sup>107</sup> Bin Yu, *China’s Rise and the West’s Bias*, p166, [http://nbr.org/publications/asia\\_policy/AP6/AP6\\_BRRT\\_ChinaRising.pdf](http://nbr.org/publications/asia_policy/AP6/AP6_BRRT_ChinaRising.pdf), viewed on August 22, 2008

<sup>108</sup> Kurtulus Kurtulus N. Ersun, *State Sovereignty: Concept, Phenomenon and Ramifications*, Palgrave, New York, 2005, p132

may fail to function because the national independence as well as territorial integrity should tangibly be defended by something visible rather than abstract, especially when confronting with vicious powers in reality.

The intrusion of Western powers into east Asia shattered the traditional Chinese idea of a world order based on the Middle Kingdom. Western powers brought the idea of nation-state to China, but they were not prepared to recognize China as a sovereign State. As Theodore Friend contended: “in the tradition of Renaissance diplomacy, the Western imperial powers treated each other as legal equals; but in the tradition of social Darwinism they treated Asian polities as legal and moral inferiors unless counterforce proved otherwise (1988:54)”.<sup>109</sup>

Bin Yu, the senior fellow of the Shanghai Institute of American Studies and Director of East Asian Studies at Wittenberg University, shared the same stance and he argued: ‘there is a key different between the East Asian and Western system: the East Asian system of yesteryear consisted of formal hierarchy and informal equality (with neighbouring states enjoying de facto autonomy), whereas the Western system has established formal equality but informal hierarchy based on power, balance of power, or hegemony. With a strong China in East Asia (in ancient times), other nations in the region did not wish to challenge China, and China had no need to fight. A system that for millennia had served the interests of all in East Asia was swiftly displaced in the nineteenth century by a Western system of equality or sovereignty in name ---a survival-of-the-fittest system in reality’.<sup>110</sup> Following the end of the first Opium War in 1840s, China was a victim rather a beneficiary of the sovereignty mechanism.

China was not dominated or colonized by one power but many. ‘By 1898, 13 of China’s 18 provinces had been declared foreign “spheres of influence”’.<sup>111</sup> At that time, China’s monarchy continued, but its sovereignty was weakened. That is why

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<sup>109</sup> Zheng Yongnian, *Discovering Chinese Nationalism in China: Modernization, Identity, and International Relations*, Cambridge University Press, U.K. 1999, p23

<sup>110</sup> Bin Yu, *China’s Rise and the West’s Bias*, p166,

[http://nbr.org/publications/asia\\_policy/AP6/AP6\\_BRRT\\_ChinaRising.pdf](http://nbr.org/publications/asia_policy/AP6/AP6_BRRT_ChinaRising.pdf), viewed on August 22, 2008

<sup>111</sup> Clayre Alasdair, *The Heart of the Dragon*, Harvill Press, London, 1984, p21

Chinese historians sum up the one-century-long-shame period as the one featured as a semi-colonial and semi-feudal society. China needed a strong state to protect its people from suffering humiliations. 'Throughout the twentieth century, it might be said that the Chinese people have time and again placed greater value on collective goals, such as national liberation and state independence, than on personal independence and individual freedom'.<sup>112</sup>

Logically, after she had healed the wounds of the one-century-long humiliation, China will defend anything related to its national independence and territorial integrity. As a historical legacy, 'Chinese academicians and politicians, as well as those who study Chinese foreign policy typically hold that key factors of national interests defined in terms of territorial security, national reunification, and modernization are undoubtedly what China aims to accomplish in the post-Cold War era'.<sup>113</sup> Human beings defend tangible interests such as property as well as something intangible such as self-dignity. In this context, sovereignty is the combination of the two. The Canada-based International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty points out: 'a sovereign state is empowered in international law to exercise exclusive and total jurisdiction within its territorial borders. Other states have the corresponding duty not to intervene in the internal affairs of a sovereign state. If that duty is violated, the victim state has the further right to defend its territorial integrity and political independence'.<sup>114</sup> To China, territorial sovereignty (including territorial integrity and territorial security) is the tangible composition of the sovereignty, which can be physically violated, for example by foreign aircraft incursions. The national

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<sup>112</sup> Wang ChaoHua, *One China Many Paths*, Verso, New York, 2003, p257

<sup>113</sup> Shih Chih-yu, *Navigating Sovereignty: World Politics Lost in China*, Palgrave Macmillan, England, 2003, p25

<sup>114</sup> *The Responsibility to Protect*, Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, Canada, 2001, p12

unification and the non-interference of internal affairs are the intangible and not the least important component parts of the sovereignty. The boundary-reinforcement is one of interpretations of sovereignty to China specifically.

China's sovereignty was resumed after the Second World War, largely in name, partly in reality. The sovereignty of China was rather mitigated than enforced by the messy international situation after the war. Logically, the territorial integrity violated by Nazi Germany and Japan should be reconstructed and respected in the new world order. Unfortunately, the after-Second-World-War world was far from expectations, even worsening to certain degrees. For China, she resumed her stolen soil, for example, the Taiwan Island and the Manchuria Area; but she lost her another piece of land---Outer Mongolia--- under the coercion of the Soviet Union. For Soviet Union, the Outer Mongolia was a perfect buffer zone to screen any possible threat in the future. The former Soviet Union's calculation was revealed in Chiang Ching-kuo's memorandum (Chiang was a member of the delegation of the GMT government to the Soviet Union, for the negotiation of the Sino-Soviet Union Friendship Treaty in 1945).

Stalin said: "we demand the independence of Outer Mongolia, for the sake of our military strategy. We'll not raise this demand if you can expel Japan on your own strength. If a military power stages attacks from Outer Mongolian area and cut off the West Siberian railway, the Soviet Union was doomed. If Japan rises after the war, no one can assure that Japan will not occupy Outer Mongolia and threaten us again. Even Japan and China had no strength to attack the Soviet Union, the possibility of invasion from another third party will not be denied". When the Chinese negotiator asked: "who do you mean the third party, the United States?" Stalin said: "of course".<sup>115</sup> [the author's translation]

On the formal note-exchanging document issued by the GMT government to the Soviet Union on October 14, 1945, it stated that 'based on the willing of the people of Outer Mongolia, the Chinese government states that, after the defeat of Japan, provided the willing was confirmed by the referendum of the Outer Mongolian people,

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<sup>115</sup> [http://news.ifeng.com/history/1/jishi/200805/0527\\_2663\\_563748.shtml](http://news.ifeng.com/history/1/jishi/200805/0527_2663_563748.shtml), *Monologue by Chiang Ching-kuo*, viewed by on May 31, 2008

the Chinese government will acknowledge the independence of Outer Mongolia and maintain the current boundary as status quo'.<sup>116</sup> After the GMT retreated to Taiwan Island in 1949, the CPC Beijing should decide its own attitude on the status of Outer Mongolia. On February 14, 1950, according to the newly signed Sino-Soviet Union Friendship Alliance and Mutual Assistance Treaty, the CPC Beijing made the Sino-Soviet Union Friendship Treaty invalid, but confirmed the independence of the Outer Mongolia.

The CPC Beijing's stance was not debate-free. Cheng Jia-gen, one member of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, objected the recognition of Outer Mongolia's independence and hoped to take it back in the future, because he regarded Outer Mongolia still was a part of China. Chen Bo-da (the then secretary assistant to Mao Tse-tung) replied to Cheng Jia-gen: 'it is not so easy to handle this issue now. Outer Mongolia was independent before the establishment of the PRC, and the old government had recognized it. According to the international customs, it is hard for us to deny it'.<sup>117</sup> Both the GMT and the CPC, for the sake of realpolitik, had to accept the manipulation of the former Soviet Union. But both of them did not want to see the same story happen again to Taiwan Island.

From 1949 to late 1970s, the GMT and the CPC mutually intended to remove the other from power. Both of them intended to represent the sole sovereignty of the whole China rather than to recognize the other side's sovereignty over the de facto-controlled area. In the GMT Nanking's view at that time, the Communist "bandits" were insurgent forces. The point should be highlighted here was: "bandits" insurgence

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<sup>116</sup> <http://www.yourblog.org/Data/2004/14301.html>, viewed on May 31, 2008

<sup>117</sup> Chen Xiao-nong, *the Last Oral Memorandum Delivered by Chen Boda*, Thinkers Publishing Limited, Hong Kong, 2006, p113

was an internal affair within a state. Or in other words, the territorial sovereignty of one state is remained as ever, although the insurgency is present. On April 18, 1948, the first session of the First National Assembly (the then top legislature of China, dominated by the GMT) approved the “Counter-Insurgency Law”, as the legal base to suppress the Communist forces. The GMT Nanking government was entitled to take any possible measures to suppress the insurgency. The entitlement was first in the name of a provisional clause to the Constitution, and the clause’s legal duration was two years and a half. After the GMT Nanking government retreated to Taiwan Island, the second session of the First National Assembly, on February 16, 1954, decided the provisional clause to be continued. Upon the endorsement of prolonging, the provisional clause was not ceased until 1991. In the perspective of GMT, China’s sovereignty was never split but harassed by the Communist insurgency.

In the CPC Beijing’s perspective, the GMT Taipei was a threat to the newly established regime: the PRC. The threat was especially intimidating because Taiwan Island was under the protection of the United States which was behind the scene. ‘Taiwan provided the KMT with a base for continuing opposition to the CCP, and an opening for American military forces along China’s coasts’.<sup>118</sup> As a matter of fact, the involvement of the United States is the major factor which makes the Taiwan question prolonged and complex. The United States’ alignment with the GMT authorities was not constant. After the outbreak of the Pacific War, the GMT government became the allied forces of the United States. Due to the GMT government’s corruption, the United States adopted a GMT-abandoning policy at the end of the Chinese civil war. On January 5, 1950 President Truman officially stated at a press conference that:

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<sup>118</sup> Carlson Allen, *Unifying China, Integrating with the World: Securing Chinese Sovereignty in the Reform Era*, Stanford University Press, California, 2005, p40

The United States has no predatory designs on Formosa or any other Chinese territory. The United States has no desire to obtain special rights or privileges or to establish military bases on Formosa at this time. Nor does it have any intention utilizing its armed forces to interfere in the present situation ... Similarly the United States government will not provide military aid or advice to the Chinese forces on Formosa.<sup>119</sup>

It seemed Taiwan Island was fading away from the American vision.

The scenario changed because of the Korean War, which was the first explicit conflict between the Communist bloc and the Democratic bloc. Taiwan Island was placed in a more prominent position, as a base to deter the Communist expansion.

President Truman interpreted the Korea War as the omen of the first step of the Third World War triggered by the former Soviet Union. ... If at the same time the Chinese mainland occupied the Taiwan Island, Japan could not be secured. Eventually, the defensive ring of the United States in the west Pacific would possibly collapse. Although the strategic importance of the United States lies in European, the possible loss of Asia would damage to American global strategic balance.<sup>120</sup> [the author's English translation]

Based on Truman's interpretation, in June 1950, the Seventh Fleet of the United States entered the Taiwan Strait. To make its intervention sound legal, under the manipulation of the United States, on September 8, 1951 (effective on April 28, 1952), the San Francisco Peace Treaty was signed by 49 countries. According this treaty, 'Japan abandoned "...all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores...". However, due to the political complexities and sensitivities of the immediate post-war period, no stipulation was made in the treaty concerning the question of the state or authority to which the rights and the title to territory so abandoned to were to be transferred'.<sup>121</sup> One point should be highlighted that the Peace Treaty was signed between Japan and the 48 Allied Powers, such as the United States, the Great Britain,

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<sup>119</sup> Hung Chien-Chao, *A History of Taiwan*, il Cerchio, 2000, p264

<sup>120</sup> Li Songlin, *Chiang Kai-shek in His Later Years*, JiuZhou Publisher, Beijing, 2000, p23 (in Chinese)

<sup>121</sup> Kurtulus N. Ersun, *State Sovereignty: Concept, Phenomenon and Ramifications*, Palgrave, New York, 2005, p108

Canada and Australia, with the exception of the China, represented either by the CPC Beijing or the GMT Taipei.<sup>122</sup>

On April 28, 1952, Japan and the GMT Taipei signed a bilateral peace treaty. ‘Japan insisted that the San Francisco Peace Treaty should be refereed as a blue-print. Facing a disadvantaged position after retreating from the Chinese mainland to the Taiwan Island, the ROC government had to compromise. In such case, the Sino (Taipei)-Japanese treaty did not specify that the Taiwan Island as well as its affiliated islands had returned and belonged to China’.<sup>123</sup> [the author’s English translation] This argument is counter-argued by Beijing and one example is the Sino-U.S. Joint Communique signed on February 27, 1972. Beijing stated: “Taiwan is a province of China which has long been returned to the motherland; the liberation of Taiwan is China's internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere’.<sup>124</sup> However, for the sake of realpolitik, the so-called undecided status of Taiwan Island was manipulated by the United States. It was once a “legal” basis for the United States to intervene the across-Taiwan Strait affairs.

The “undecided” sovereignty theory argued that Taiwan’s seizure by Japan was imperialistic. But when Japan renounced sovereignty, the status of Taiwan’s sovereignty has been ambiguous ever since. For example, Maguire Keith argued: ‘countries have diplomatic relations with Beijing while not necessarily supporting its claim for jurisdiction over Taiwan; this situation leaves the door open for discussing

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<sup>122</sup> The main body of the Treaty refers to [http://www.uni-erfurt.de/ostasiatische\\_geschichte/texte/japan/dokumente/19/19510908\\_treaty.htm](http://www.uni-erfurt.de/ostasiatische_geschichte/texte/japan/dokumente/19/19510908_treaty.htm), viewed on March 2008

<sup>123</sup> Lv Xiulian, *Taiwan: the Past and the Future*, Knowledge Publisher, Taipei, 2003, p68

<sup>124</sup> <http://tr.hjenglish.com/page/14207/?page=1>, viewed on April 4, 2008

the future of Taiwan as well as settling Taiwan's sovereignty in the future'.<sup>125</sup> In a narrow sense, the theory was particularly coined and utilized by the West. Theories coined for practical actions, may not be necessarily originally invented by the United States, but she was the best practitioner benefited from the academic pool as well as the best player to utilize them; because after the Second World War, the United States was the dominator who had the strength to put theories into practice. Besides the undecided sovereignty theory, there is also a generally-applied "new" concept challenging to traditional sovereignty.

In the West academic world, the sovereignty theory, in one perspective, can be categorized as absolute sovereignty and relative sovereignty.

On one hand, analysis may describe sovereignty as an absolute right that grants the state the highest power in a given territory, asserting that such a right is a constant and unchanging aspect of international relations. On the other hand, analysis may be marked by a more flexible interpretation of the norm, one that accepts the possibility that the division between internal and external affairs may be undermined by the development of economic and political integration. The former type of analysis treats sovereignty as an essential and unbending principle of international politics. The latter explicitly, or at the very least, implicitly, accepts the possibility of sovereign change'.<sup>126</sup>

It is not deniable that the relative school is a challenging trend to the traditional concept of sovereignty, which upholds the supremacy of sovereignty. For example, with member countries of the European Union, their sovereignty is, more or less, constrained by the Europeanization mechanism. 'European Union's sovereignty, though, is limited to the areas that it governs-trade, money, the market, and others, but not defence or education or health care. Both its sovereignty and the sovereignty of its member state are less than absolute'.<sup>127</sup> According to Allen Carlson's argument,

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<sup>125</sup> Maguire Keith, *the Rise of Modern Taiwan*, Ashgate Publishing Limited, England, 1998, p108

<sup>126</sup> Carlson Allen, *Unifying China, Integrating with the World: Securing Chinese Sovereignty in the Reform Era*, Stanford University Press, California, 2005, p25

<sup>127</sup> Philpott Daniel, *Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 2001, p40

China holds different stance from the European Union and he argues: ‘China’s position on sovereignty has been relatively static and unyielding since the founding of the PRC’.<sup>128</sup> Actually, the territorial sovereignty of membership countries of the European Union is static as well and inviolable, although the European Union is a quasi-confederacy.

The constraint over sovereignty is largely in economic field via the globalization wave. ‘In order to bring about the reality of economic coordination the European Union has been necessary to pool sovereignty into a greater regional unit’.<sup>129</sup> For the political field, the European Parliament is a coordinated institution to shape the same voice, rather a super body to intervene its members’ internal affairs. The territorial sovereignty of membership countries of the European Union is inviolable. China had had some resemblance to the European Union centuries ago, and the only difference was: as sub-bodies of the central government of China, provinces had no sovereignty. If the “static” sovereignty framework which holds China together is broken, a Yugoslavian-style disintegration situation of the 1990s could be the catastrophe that would befall China.

What China needs now is not disintegration but rather integration. As a large country, strong coordination is a must, and should be strengthened by integration. In May 2008, the Chinese Mainland was confronted with a most disastrous earthquake scaled as magnitude eight by the Richter standard. If no centralized command available, the mobilization of massive rescue materials as well human labour is impossible. For the after-quake reconstruction, the Chinese central government has designated other

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<sup>128</sup> Carlson Allen, *Unifying China, Integrating with the World: Securing Chinese Sovereignty in the Reform Era*, Stanford University Press, California, 2005, p30

<sup>129</sup> Maguire Keith, *the Rise of Modern Taiwan*, Ashgate Publishing Limited, England, 1998, p126

quake-free provinces to pair with of quake-affected counties and support them. Even in disaster-free normal time, for balancing the uneven economic development in China, an integrated mechanism is needed as well. Economic coordination within China is conducted by the central government and its provincial branches.

Meanwhile, people should bear in mind that China's territory is as large as the whole Europe. China's unity was accomplished in 221B.C. and has been maintained to now, although her territory was expanded or reduced as circumstance varied. As mentioned in the first part of the thesis, as a national legacy, a large number of Chinese people cherish the bond within the fifty-six-people country and secession movements are unfavourably regarded in China. Some outsiders may also underestimate the Chinese people's determination to maintaining their national unity and territorial sovereignty. As Bedford Olwen and Hwang Kwang-Kuo argued, 'China would not hesitate to use force against Taiwan if the island declared independence, even at the risk of ruining its plans to host the 2008 Olympics or pushing its economy back into recession, decreasing foreign investment, worsening foreign relations, or even if it meant casualties of the PLA'.<sup>130</sup> Indeed, any proposals designed for resolving problems relevant to China, such as the Taiwan question, should fit China's situation. Unfortunately, some members of the international community may fail to understand China's situation. 'Even reform-minded [Chinese] academics often find that [international] NGOs lack an adequate understanding of the situation in China, and that their proposals for reform are out of touch with the existing norms or simply infeasible given China's current conditions'.<sup>131</sup> In China's perspective, she has no

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<sup>130</sup> Bedford Olwen and Hwang Kwang-Kuo, *Taiwanese Identity and Democracy: the Social Psychology of Taiwan's 2004 Elections*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2006, p46

<sup>131</sup> Peerenboom Randall, *China Modernizes: Threat to the West or Model for the Rest?* Oxford University Press, New York, 2007, p165

intentions to expand or absorb foreign territories, but to unite with Taiwan and maintain its territorial integrity. The intention is not only challenged by so-called theories over sovereignty, but also particularly irritated by provocations in reality.

The most challenging irritation may be from the United States. Under the pretext of suppressing the spread of Communist, the United States, after the outbreak of the Korean War, dispatched the Seventh Fleet along the Taiwan Strait to disrupt China's unity. Later on, in 1950s and 1960s, the American reconnaissance aircraft several times, flew into the Chinese Mainland for collecting information. This is an obvious violation of China's sovereignty, no matter how either Beijing or Taipei represents it. It was for the sake of the Cold War, or other word, to meet the strategic interests of the United States. This type of violation can be grouped as obvious irritation to China's sovereignty.

Another type is a double-dealing one. In the 1970s, because of the hegemonic expansion of the former Soviet Union, the United States needed to talk with Beijing. 'Nixon and his national security adviser Henry Kissinger saw an opportunity to serve larger strategic interests by playing the "China card" against the Soviet Union'.<sup>132</sup> On February 27, 1972, the Sino-China Joint Communiqué confirmed that 'the United States side declared: the United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese them-

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<sup>132</sup> Tucker Bernkopf Nancy, *China Confidential: American Diplomats and Sino-American Relations, 1945-1996*, Columbia University Press, New York, 2001, p219

selves'.<sup>133</sup> In 1979, the Sino-America Joint Communiqué was signed to establish the diplomatic relations and the Communiqué states: 'the United States of America recognizes the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China. Within this context, the people of the United States will maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan'.<sup>134</sup> The Sino-American Joint Communiqué signed on August 17, 1982 states: 'respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity and non-interference each other's internal affairs constitute the fundamental principles guiding United States-China relations'.<sup>135</sup> America utilized her "one China" principle in a less sincere but tricky way for its own strategic manoeuvre, sometimes even irritated China by action.

Countries with recognized sovereignty cannot tolerate outsiders to sell arms to one of its provinces. For example, on September 2, 1992, George Bush administration allowed that it planned to sell 150 F-16 jet fighters to Taiwan for \$5.8 billion. Since the United States holds the "one China" policy, how can it sell arms to one part of China? 'In April 2001 George W. Bush had said that he would do whatever it takes to defend Taiwan'.<sup>136</sup> The Chinese may ask: why the United States will defend one part of China? Can China sell arms to or defend some parts of the United States in the future? On December 21, 2007, Russian News Network reported:

a delegation of Lakota leaders delivered a message to the State Department on Monday, announcing they were unilaterally withdrawing from treaties they signed with the federal government of the United States, some of them more than 150 years old. They also visited the Bolivian, Chilean, South African and Venezuelan embassies, and will continue on their diplomatic mission and take it overseas in the coming weeks and months, they told the news conference. Lakota country includes parts of the states of Nebraska, South Dakota, North Dakota, Montana and Wyoming. The new country would issue its own passports and driving

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<sup>133</sup> <http://tr.hjenglish.com/page/14207/?page=1>, viewed on March 20, 2008

<sup>134</sup> *ibid*

<sup>135</sup> *ibid*

<sup>136</sup> Bedford Olwen and Hwang Kwang-Kuo, *Taiwanese Identity and Democracy: the Social Psychology of Taiwan's 2004 Elections*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2006, p47

licences, and living there would be tax-free -- provided residents renounce their US citizenship.<sup>137</sup>

Obviously, the United States will feel annoyed if China sells arms to the “Lakota country”, although China has not diplomatic ties with it.

The F-16 sell in 1992 also eats back the America’s own words. In the 1982 Sino-American Joint Communique, the United States promised that ‘its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level of those supplies in recent years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China’.<sup>138</sup> The background of the 1982 Sino-American Joint Communique was---‘Taiwan had been asking the United States to sell it F-16 since early 1980s’.<sup>139</sup> On April 23, 2001, President George W. Bush decided to offer Taiwan the largest arms package since the 1992 sales of 150 F-16 fighters, including 8 submarines and 12 P-3C Orion anti-submarine patrol aircraft.<sup>140</sup> Such word-eating actions had various reasons, the then Defence Secretary Dick Cheney believed that ‘the sale would help keep the American defence industrial base going and aid aircraft parts suppliers, which might otherwise suffers as the US defence budget shrank’.<sup>141</sup> On October 3, 2008, the Bush administration permitted a US\$6.5 billion arms sale to Taiwan. On the surface, the United States positions herself as the balancer of the two sides across the Taiwan Strait. As the behind-scene motivation, the double-dealing policy enables the Unites States can benefit from both sides across the Taiwan Strait.

In line with Ching Cheong’s argument, ‘as long as the US-led western world is

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<sup>137</sup> <http://news.wenxuecity.com/messages/200712/news-gb2312-497371.html>, viewed on December 22, 2007

<sup>138</sup> <http://tr.hjenglish.com/page/14207/?page=1>, viewed on March 20, 2008

<sup>139</sup> Yang Jian, *Congress and US China Policy 1989-1999*, Nova Science Publishers, Huntington NY, 2000, p177

<sup>140</sup> data is from: Sheng Lijun, *China and Taiwan: Cross-Strait Relations under Chen Shui-bian*, Zed Books, New York, 2002, p97-98

<sup>141</sup> Yang Jian, *Congress and US China Policy 1989-1999*, Nova Science Publishers, Huntington NY, 2000, p181

unclear of what to expect from a growing China, the Taiwan card remains the most effective means to slow down its growth or even to thwart it, for it is the most likely way to draw China into a major war and thereby weaken it'.<sup>142</sup> The United States' interest is worldwide and it has an ambitious presence in the western Pacific region.

In order to make the realism-oriented motivation less aggressive, theoretical pretext are in great demand to make the action justifiable. The theory of "human rights are superior to sovereignty" was created and it argues that 'human rights trumps state sovereignty...sovereignty implies a dual responsibility: externally---to respect the sovereignty of other state, and internally, to respect dignity and basic rights of all the people within the state'.<sup>143</sup> This is especially important to the United States. The Taiwan question, in China's perspective, is its internal affairs which cannot be intervened according the sovereignty-respect norms. For the United States, the 'human rights superior to sovereignty' theory seemingly enables itself to intervene the Taiwan question. In the United States' perspective, China's military coercion will violate Taiwan people's human rights as well as their self-determination rights. On the contrary, it is less difficult for Chinese people to assume that---to prevent the Chinese Mainland from reunifying with Taiwan Island, in whatever rhetoric, is a scheme of the United States which does not want China to develop and become an equal player in the international community. The West countries, not necessarily all of them, may have exaggerated the connotation of the "human rights superior to sovereignty" theory. The theory actually emphasizes 'on the duty to protect communities from mass killing, women from systematic rape and children from

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<sup>142</sup> Ching Cheong, *Will Taiwan Break Away? The Rise of Taiwanese Nationalism*, World Scientific, Singapore, 2001, px

<sup>143</sup> *The Responsibility to Protect*, Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, Canada, 2001, p2 and p8

starvation’,<sup>144</sup> rather than on resolving political confrontation. In the West’s stance, Beijing’s intention to unite Taiwan Island, even at the cost of war, was a forced term imposed upon as well as a potential armed threat to the Taiwan people’s human rights symbolized as self-determination right. The self-determination theory argues that the fate of Taiwan should be decided by the 23-million people on Taiwan Island, rather than by the CPC Beijing with 1.3-billion people. Due to geographical features, islands are more likely to favour the secession mindset. ‘The separate identity of island populations is a common phenomenon in the world’.<sup>145</sup> Self-determination, based on human rights, is the main theoretical weapon to counter the unification intention of the Chinese Mainland and to realize the gradual or de facto independence of the island. However, the concept of human rights has its own course of evolution. ‘Historians have traced the origins of a doctrine that granted natural rights to all human beings either to John Locke in the seventeenth century or to William Ockham in the late Middle Ages’.<sup>146</sup> Hunt Lynn argued:

during the eighteenth century, in English and in French, “human rights”, “rights of mankind”, and “rights of humanity” all proved to be too general to be of direct political use. They referred to what distinguished humans from the divine on one end of the scale and from animals on the other, rather than to politically relevant rights such as freedom of speech or the right to participate in politics. ...When the language of human rights emerged in the second half of the eighteenth century, there was at first little explicit definition of those rights.<sup>147</sup>

Marina Svensson argued: ‘human rights received little attention in the West in the beginning of the twentieth century and played hardly any role in international politics up to the Second World War’.<sup>148</sup> Human beings are born equally as well as theoretically in modern terms, but in reality, with shackles in terms of unfairness

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<sup>144</sup> *ibid.*, p17

<sup>145</sup> Dent J. Martin, *Identity Politics Filling the Gap Between Federalism and Independence*, Ashgate Publishing Limited, England, 2004, p174

<sup>146</sup> Pennington Kenneth, *the Prince and the Law, 1200-1600: Sovereignty and Rights in the Western Legal Tradition*, University of California Press, California, 1993, p5

<sup>147</sup> Hunt Lynn, *Inventing Human Rights*, W.W. Norton & Company, New York, 2007, p23-25

<sup>148</sup> Svensson Marina, *Debating Human Rights in China: A Conceptual and Political History*, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, U.S.A., 2002, p25

imposed upon physically, mentally and (or) politically. The concept, no matter either human rights or sovereignty, in essence, is created for countering unfairness imposed upon human beings. The two concepts, as aspirations of human beings' self-emancipation, have not been fully achieved.

Between the two concepts, certain connections could be established. Because prevailing players of the current world are various states, collective human rights are closely connected with country whose external sovereignty should be respected rather than violated by outsiders, provided the country's administrator is legitimized by internal sovereignty, in which individual human rights should be protected as the minimum benchmark. Human rights and sovereignty are two parallel concepts sharing the same function and being prerequisites to each other: without sovereignty, the basic human rights cannot be safeguarded, at least not at the own hands of the country itself but at the mercy of others; without human rights, the state sovereignty is less legitimized. Consider the relation between human rights and sovereignty, either side should not be superior to or take the precedence of the other.

The violation on sovereignty is not less serious than that on human rights but in a synchronized term. For example, if the airspace sovereignty of one country is violated by foreign aircraft incursion, at the same time, the security as well as the dignity of the country is violated as well, no matter how least ideal the human rights situation in the state. The country's people may feel losing face because their country is unable to safeguard themselves. That is the why the new Iraq government, after the collapse of Saddam Hussein, will resume the total administration over its territory once the reconstruction consolidated, rather than retain the United States' forces forever to

safeguard Iraq's own security. According to the source of *the Dominion Post*, 'the United States appeared to bow to demands by Baghdad about the future status of its troops in Iraq yesterday, apparently agreeing that they must leave the country in three years and could face prosecution in an Iraqi court if they broke the law'.<sup>149</sup> In Allen Carlson's view, 'the U.S. war against Iraq, and the reported human rights abuses by American troops within Iraq that occurred...increased Chinese scepticism about the role of human rights within international politics'.<sup>150</sup> Indeed, the American human rights abuse scandal could remind the Chinese what they experienced of Western style human rights during the one-century-shame period.

The Qing Dynasty (1636-1911) was a monarchy which passed the ruling power by hereditary system. At that time, human rights situation in China were bad. But the violation on the Chinese sovereignty, by means of establishing the West powers' influence spheres in China from the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, was obviously not a precedent option to protect human rights of China. The establishment of influence sphere violated China's sovereignty as well as Chinese human rights as a collective. 'Chinese jurists expressed grave concerns over the dangers that an extension of the human rights regime posed for China'.<sup>151</sup> Nowadays,

Chinese citizens are particularly sensitive about infringements on China's national sovereignty in part because of bullying by foreign imperial powers. But many also feel that China today is being held to a different standard than other countries. The United States and other Western powers sit idly by while gross violations of human rights occur in Burundi, Colombia, Nigeria, Uganda, India, Saudi Arabia, and countless other countries, and yet are quick to criticize China even though most Chinese enjoy more extensive freedoms and a better standard of living than ever before....Chinese leaders for their part will have to resist the tendency to dismiss every criticism of human rights violations or expression of concern

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<sup>149</sup> *The Dominion Post*, B3 World, October 17, 2008, Wellington, New Zealand

<sup>150</sup> Carlson Allen, *Unifying China, Integrating with the World: Securing Chinese Sovereignty in the Reform Era*, Stanford University Press, California, 2005, p183

<sup>151</sup> Carlson Allen, *Unifying China, Integrating with the World: Securing Chinese Sovereignty in the Reform Era*, Stanford University Press, California, 2005, p42

for Taiwan as an infringement on its sovereignty and an insult to the dignity of the Chinese people.<sup>152</sup>

This thesis has no intention to deny that ‘the right of people and nations to self-determination is a prerequisite to the full enjoyment of all fundamental human rights’.<sup>153</sup> But one point should be borne in mind, the ultimate realization of human rights to all people across the Taiwan Strait is not necessarily at the expense of China’s sovereignty as well as her national unity.

The mindset of sovereignty held by God or monarch is obsolete in the modern world. Sovereignty is legitimated by the popular consent. The ground of legislative sovereignty had been transferred from divine and natural law to popular consent in the period of the Hobbes and Locke.<sup>154</sup> The dominant voice of Washington and Taipei, in the last phase of the Cold War, urged Beijing to commit itself to Taiwan’s consent, or in other words, to respect the self-determination right of the Taiwan people. For example, ‘though unwittingly at times, the [American] media supported Taiwan’s independence and separation from China, refuting Beijing’s claim to Taiwan because it contradicted the right for self-determination and Taiwan’s right to choose’.<sup>155</sup> The West is regardless of the demand of national unification from the people on the Chinese Mainland. The right of national self-determination is granted by the resolution of United Nations in 1952 to non-self-governing and trust territories, and later by the resolution of United Nations in 1960 to the colonized countries of the world. Before being ceded to Japan in 1895, Taiwan Island was one of provinces of China.

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<sup>152</sup> Peerenboom Randall, *China Modernizes: Threat to the West or Model for the Rest?* Oxford University Press, New York, 2007, p164 and p277

<sup>153</sup> *The U.N. Resolution 637*, passed by the 403<sup>rd</sup> Plenary Meeting in 1952

<sup>154</sup> paraphrased from: Engster Daniel, *Divine Sovereignty: The Origins of Modern State Power*, Northern Illinois University Press, Illinois, 2001, p80

<sup>155</sup> Hung Chien-Chao, *A History of Taiwan*, Il Cerchio Iniziative Editorial, Gambalunga, 2000, p319

In 1945, the GMT Nanking government resumed China's sovereignty over Taiwan Island. The colonized status of Taiwan Island was offset by the sovereignty resumption. On December 9, 1941, China declared war with Japan. The Declaration stated 'all treaties as well as agreements signed between ROC and Japan before December 9, 1941, are ceased and invalid due to the war'.<sup>156</sup> So far, Taiwan Island has never been in the status as non-self-governing and trust territories, or as an independent country, either colonized or non-colonized. The Provisional Decree of the Republic of China, passed in 1912, stated: 'the territory of the ROC includes twenty two provinces as well as inner and outer Mongolia, Tibet and Qinghai'.<sup>157</sup> The Constitution of the Republic of China, passed in 1947, stated: 'the territory of the ROC is accorded to the territory she has already had and should be maintained. Excepted on the approval of the National Assembly, no alternation should be applied to it'.<sup>158</sup> As commonsense, besides China, all countries in the world would not tolerate the independence of their sub-units. Likewise, on June 6, 2008, Japanese parliament unanimously approved a resolution recognising the Ainu as an indigenous people (traditionally nature-worshipping community), whose number is estimated to 70,000. 'Japan voted for the declaration, but said it would not accept any moves by indigenous people for independence or unilateral demands for property rights'.<sup>159</sup> Obviously, the Japanese government caps the independence possibility through self-determination.

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<sup>156</sup> Lv Xiulian, *Taiwan: the Past and the Future*, Knowledge Publisher, Taipei, 2003, p70

<sup>157</sup> <http://baike.baidu.com/view/113288.htm>, viewed on May 11, 2008

<sup>158</sup> <http://zh.wikisource.org/wiki>, viewed on May 11, 2008

<sup>159</sup> AFP, Section B of *The Dominion Post*, June 7, 2008

The self-determination right should be implemented in a narrow and explicitly defined context. Otherwise, the improper use of the right will bring not only the independence in name, but also internal conflict. 'In Africa, for instance, it would mean seeking to give independent statehood to every tribal group which sought for secession from the independent country of which they form a part. This would elevate tribalism to the role of the badge of citizenship. Furthermore, it would tear apart the existing states, which have almost all accepted the territorial boundaries'.<sup>160</sup>

One point should be highlighted that the word "self-determination" should not counter the territorial sovereignty of one nation because of the self-contradiction of self-determination. If Taiwan obtained the status of independence based on self-determination, and then theoretically and logically, the sub-unit of Taiwan Island, for example the Taipei city, can be independent from Taiwan as well. The practical example is the independence of Kosovo. Like the Kosovo's independence from Serbia, the Serbs, intensely living in the northern part of Kosovo, could declare their independence from Kosovo as well. 'The approach to self-determination inherently negates the possibility of negotiations with others who might have equally valid claims for sovereignty within a shared territory'.<sup>161</sup> A cap should be placed to the utilization of self-determination. 'Nations have no international right to secede from larger states unless they hold the status of a colony'.<sup>162</sup> As a matter of fact, Taiwan Island has never formed an independent nation, but being a component of the Chinese nation. Although Taiwan Island has never been an independent country, her political

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<sup>160</sup> Dent J. Martin, *Identity Politics Filling the Gap Between Federalism and Independence*, Ashgate Publishing Limited, England, 2004, p15

<sup>161</sup> Sellers Mortimer, *the New World Order: Sovereignty, Human Rights, and the Self-Determination of Peoples*, Berg, Washington, 1996, p104

<sup>162</sup> Philpott Daniel, *Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 2001, p21

status is not debate-free, otherwise, there is no question so-called the Taiwan question. To prevent the Taiwan question developing into a crisis, a full-length understanding of the nature of it should be highlighted. As what Richard Bush has pointed out, ‘if one wanted to prevent this from becoming a crisis, what’s going on here that you have to know about? Because if you don’t understand the nature of the problem, at some point, you’re going to screw it up’.<sup>163</sup> The political status of Taiwan Island is formed by the complex history. Only the understanding of the evolution of the Taiwan question, especially the policies held by various players, the political nature of Taiwan could be more clearly delineated.

### **Chapter Three: Policy Approaches**

Colours in Chinese culture have different indications. For example, in China’s feudal era, the colour of bright yellow could be used by emperors exclusively. Before building up this chapter, several descriptive and colourful terms should be addressed at the beginning. The Chinese people describe themselves as “yellow people” (the word “yellow” is literally translated because this is the colour the Chinese believe their physical complexion or skin colour is, although the word may not so accurately descriptive). In this thesis, the Yellow colour will be utilized as a cultural and historical perspective which sometimes conveys political token as well; this

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<sup>163</sup> Richard Bush, *Untying the Knot: Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait*, Miller Reporting Co., Inc. Washington, 2005, p3

perspective fundamentally recognizes the unity and blood-link of the Chinese nation as a whole.

The Red colour will be applied to the Communist Party of China as well as Beijing, because the party's flag as well as the state's flag is a red-background colour. The Red is consistently in line with the principle of national unification across the Taiwan Strait, although within different circumstance the colour is fine tuned accordingly. Likewise, the Guo Min Tang (the Nationalist Party) is Blue and the Democratic Progressive Party is Green, within such there is a difference between deep Blue or light Blue as well as deep Green or light Green to demonstrate the position of spectrum each belongs to, in terms of the extreme or the moderate political stance. Specifically, the deep Blue is more enthusiastically seeking for the reunification between the Chinese Mainland and the Taiwan Island than the light Blue, although both Blues recognize the Yellow. On the country, the deep Green is more fanatically seeking for the independence of Taiwan Island than the light green. The difference between the Red and the Blue largely is ideological difference regarding the other side as the "enemy", especially in the Chinese civil war period as well as its aftermath period. Although the coloured terms are kinds of "labels", it is a fairly simple way to describe the complex situation of the Taiwan question. With the colours as general references, the post-1949 events, in terms of the surnames of administrative leaders across the Taiwan Strait, can be roughly categorized into five periods; namely, the first was Mao-Chiang<sup>164</sup> (senior) period; the second was Deng-Chiang (junior)<sup>165</sup>

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<sup>164</sup> Mao refers to Mao Tse-tung (1893-1976), the former Chairman of the CPC; Chiang refers to Chiang Kei-shek (1887-1975), the former Chairman of the GMT

<sup>165</sup> Deng refers to Deng Xiao-ping (1940-1997), the former paramount leader of China; Chiang (junior) refers to Chiang Ching-kuo (1910-1988), the son as well as the successor of Chiang Kei-shek

period; the third was Jiang-Lee<sup>166</sup> period; the fourth was Hu-Chen<sup>167</sup> period; and the most current one is Hu-Ma<sup>168</sup> period. Two points should be highlighted here: during the fourth period, the ruling party on Taiwan Island was not the GMT but shifted to the DPP; in the interval of the two-Chiang period, Yen Chia-kan was just a leader in name, because the true power was in the hands of Chiang (junior).

In the Mao-Chiang (senior) period, from 1949-1975, the “one China” principle was not changed, either for the CPC Beijing or for the GMT Taipei. ‘The confrontation between the government in Taiwan and that of the mainland of China originated as part of a civil war fought for the control the whole of China. The KMT government was defeated in 1949 by the Chinese Communists and retreated to the island of Taiwan, protected by naval and air forces of the United States from invasion of that island. Both the victorious Communists and the KMT government in exile in Taiwan believed in one China, and both of them wished to govern it’.<sup>169</sup> On its founding day, October 1, 1949, the People’s Republic of China or the CPC Beijing claimed itself the only sole representative of China. Mao and Chiang accused each other as the “bandit”. Such an accusation, in name or rhetoric, ruled out the legitimacy of the opposite side. From the CPC’s perspective, the sovereignty of Taiwan was stolen by the Japanese from China, and that it was returned to China in 1945. When the GMT lost the Chinese civil war, it lost its legitimacy over the whole China. Taiwan Island is part of China, and the sovereignty of Taiwan now belongs to the PRC which represents the whole China. Taiwan Island is just a renegade province of China rather than an

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<sup>166</sup> Jiang refers to Jiang Ze-min (1926-), the former General Secretary of the CPC; Lee refers to Lee Teng-hui (1923-), the former Chairman of the GMT

<sup>167</sup> Hu refers to Hu Jin-tao (1942-), the current General Secretary of the CPC as well as the President of PRC; Chen refers to Chen Sui-bian (1951-), the former leader of Taiwan Island

<sup>168</sup> Ma refers to Ma Ying-jeou (1950-), the current leader of Taiwan Island

<sup>169</sup> Dent J. Martin, *Identity Politics Filling the Gap Between Federalism and Independence*, Ashgate Publishing Limited, England, 2004, p174

independent political entity, although the island is unredeemed and Beijing has not had direct administration and political control over the island due to military and largely political factors.

In Chiang Kei-shek as well as his son's perspective, Taiwan was still a part of China represented by Taipei after 1949. 'Taiwan under both Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo had held a consistent position that both mainland China and Taiwan are Chinese territory and there is only one China, and this China is the ROC, not the PRC'.<sup>170</sup> As discussed in the first chapter, China's jurisdiction over Taiwan Island was broken in 1840. In that year, by military coercion, Japan forced China to sign the Treaty of Shimonoseki and cede Taiwan Island to Japan. In 1945, Japan's defeat saw the reversion of Taiwan Island to China, namely the then Republic of China. On October 25, 1945, Chiang Kei-shek appointed Chen Yi as the governor of Taiwan Province which resumed its status as one part of China. After retreating to Taiwan Island, the GMT Taipei still regarded itself as the legitimate government of China as a whole and hence sovereignty resided with it: the Republic of China. Beijing and Taipei were competing for *de jure* sovereignty.

The most important action for Beijing as well as Taipei was for obtaining external sovereignty of China. 'In the ideal state of affairs, the emergence of a territorial entity that aspires to statehood and its recognition as a state by other states would be a gradual process. Every phase in the development of the entity as a fact would coincide with a new step in the kind of recognition that it receives from other states'.<sup>171</sup> The

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<sup>170</sup> Sheng Lijun, *China and Taiwan: Cross-Strait Relations Under Chen Shui-bian*, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2002, p16

<sup>171</sup> Kurtulus N. Ersun, *State Sovereignty: Concept, Phenomenon and Ramifications*, Palgrave, New York, 2005, p113

most prominent token of being recognised as a sovereign state probably is to become the member of the United Nations.

During the Mao-Chiang (senior) period, the two sides were engaged in competing for the seat in the United Nations which is regarded as international recognition for political entities. The U.N. resolution No. 2758 passed on October 25, 1971, states:

recognizing that the representatives of the Government of the People's Republic of China are the only lawful representatives of China to the United Nations and that the People's Republic of China is one of the five permanent members of the Security Council. Decides to restore all its rights to the People's Republic of China and to recognize the representatives of its Government as the only legitimate representatives of China to the United Nations, and to expel forthwith the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek from the place which they unlawfully occupy at the United Nations and in all the organizations related to it.<sup>172</sup>

Before 1971, it was the People's Republic of China which sought for the seat in the U.N. and her wish was denied by the U.N. Any proposals to exclude the representatives of the Government of the Republic of China or to seat representatives of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China' were either decided to be postponed or not to be considered.<sup>173</sup> Hypothetically, if the seat in the U.N. was one benchmark to gauge whether a country was a sovereign state or not, and then, before October 1971, Beijing was not a sovereign state, although Beijing established diplomatic relations with a quite number of countries, such as the Former Soviet Union in 1949 and the Great Britain on January 6, 1950. This same format, if applies to Taipei after October 1971, and then Taipei is not a sovereign state. In such context, the United Nations' recognition is not all-encompassing. One point should be highlighted here that 'writing just after the Second World War, one prominent jurist on the subject points out the unsatisfactory nature of the prevailing situation and "the dual position of the recognizing State as an organ administering international law and

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<sup>172</sup> <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/327/74/IMG/NR032774.pdf?OpenElement>, viewed on May 23, 2008, the official website of the U.N.

<sup>173</sup> refers to U.N. General Assembly's resolution No.800, No.990, No.1108, No.1351, and No.1668

as a guardian of its own interests”; a position that opens up the way for utilizing “the weapon of recognition for the purpose of achieving political advantages’.<sup>174</sup>

With the Cold War and the political or practical calculations as backgrounds, states’ sovereignty status was largely respected in delineated blocs ideologically. The different ideology between Beijing and Taipei, although sharply contrasting to each other, gave weight to “民族大义” (literally translated as “the national great cause”, which conveys a strong symbolic as well as affectionate meaning from a Chinese perspective. Maintaining the territorial sovereignty of the Chinese nation is the fundamental prerequisite of the “national great cause”. ) In orthodox Chinese terms, betraying the “national great cause” is an unforgivable sin as well as a serious stigma. Chiang (senior) was a traditional Chinese, so he had no intention to challenge the “national great cause”, even for the sake of practical calculations.

While competing with the CPC Beijing, Chiang also maintained channels to negotiate. ‘There is no doubt that the two sides did have such contacts, which was confirmed in December 1995 by Qiao Shi, then chairman of the Standing Committee of China’s National People’s Congress. Interviews by this writer in China and the latest Chinese official publications also confirm this point; at least, the secret channel by Hong Kong-based correspondent Cao Ju-ren is not in doubt’.<sup>175</sup> Actually, in the 1960s, Beijing, although still mainly basing its Taiwan policy on the liberation through force, started to propose negotiations with Taipei. Beijing put forward a plan: one principle and four points, for negotiation with Taipei on reunification.

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<sup>174</sup> Kurtulus N. Ersun, *State Sovereignty: Concept, Phenomenon and Ramifications*, Palgrave, New York, 2005, p119

<sup>175</sup> Sheng Lijun, *China and Taiwan: Cross-Strait Relations under Chen Shui-bian*, Zed Books, New York, 2002, p21

The principle was that Taiwan must return to China. The four points were: firstly, after Taiwan's return, Chiang Kai-shek would retain all the rights over the organization of key local government and military personnel, except diplomatic rights which would be handed over to the central government in Beijing. Secondly, the central government would provide financial support in case of budget shortfalls for the armed forces, the government, and the economy in Taiwan. Thirdly, social reform in Taiwan would not be carried out immediately, but would wait for the right condition with respect to Chiang's view, and after consultations with Chiang. Fourthly, each side would refrain from any behaviour that would be harmful to the unity of the other side.<sup>176</sup>

The information was passed from Beijing to Taipei very cautiously through secret channels, and the unification was put on a practical track. The Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) on the Chinese mainland ended the contacts between the two sides. Worse enough, the Red Guard (a radical group in the Cultural Revolution) even destroyed the outer decorations of the tomb of Chiang Kai-shek's mother, a tremendous insult to him. But in maintaining the "one China" principle, the across-Strait two sides had no suspicions towards each other.

In the 1950s, the United States delivered "Taiwan question" proposals to the United Nations. Taipei and Beijing 'both stated that the status of Taiwan has already been maintained by Cairo Declaration as well as Potsdam Declaration. The U.N. has no right to discuss it'.<sup>177</sup> When a possible military assault seemed to be about to be launched from the Chinese Mainland to the Taiwan Island in 1954-1955, 'Britain and New Zealand attempted to refer the issue to the UN Security Council. This strategy was opposed by Chiang Kai-shek on the grounds that it was a prelude to opening the door for PRC membership of the UN',<sup>178</sup> for such a scenario could create "two Chinas". In 1971, the United States intended to maintain Taipei's membership while Beijing became a new member and took over the permanent seat of the Security Council. 'On August 2, 1971, Secretary of State William P. Rogers announced that the

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<sup>176</sup> *ibid*, p22

<sup>177</sup> Lu Hsiu-lien, *Taiwan: the Past and the Future*, Knowledge Publisher, Taipei, 2003, p73

<sup>178</sup> Maguire Keith, *The Rise of Modern Taiwan*, Ashgate, England, 1998, p105

United States would support Beijing's admission to the United Nations but it would also oppose any effort to deprive the Republic of China of its membership'.<sup>179</sup> Both sides across the Taiwan Strait, although competing for the representative status of China, did not want any schemes to create a "two-China" scenario. Chiang (senior) adhered to the principle of "incompatibility between orthodoxy and heterodoxy". As a matter of fact, prior to the passing of U.N. resolution No. 2758, for the sake of avoiding creating two Chinas as well as losing face, the GMT Taipei withdrew from the United Nations.

Chiang (senior) died in 1975, and his son took Chiang Kai-shek's position three years later. Chiang (junior) upheld his father's main policy, intending to reclaim sovereignty over the Chinese mainland. 'He believes that he will reach the one great goal: victory over Chinese Communist tyranny and liberation of the 800 million people of the mainland'.<sup>180</sup> Ash Robert and Greene J. Megan argued: 'at a time, Taiwan's political life was entirely shaped by the GMT's efforts to recover the mainland and to represent the whole of China'.<sup>181</sup> The GMT, after 1949, was based on Taiwan Island rather than on the Chinese Mainland. The de facto tiny island was not strongly enough to qualify itself to enjoy the legitimacy over the whole China. Although claiming as ever to retake the Chinese Mainland, Chiang Ching-kuo knew it was rhetoric which cannot be achieved by him as well as his father.

On the other hand, Chiang Ching-kuo, as his father, was the iron figure and big man on Taiwan Island. If Chiang (junior) could be persuaded by the Chinese Mainland, he

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<sup>179</sup> Hung Chien-Chao, *A History of Taiwan*, Il Cerchio Iniziative Editorial, Gambalunga, ISBN 88-86583-80-X, 2000, p293

<sup>180</sup> *President C.K. Chiang: Man of the People*, China Publishing Company, Taipei, 1978, p11

<sup>181</sup> Ash Robert and Greene J. Megan, *Taiwan in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: Aspects and Limitations of a Development Model*, Routledge, New York, 2007, p240

could make the decision on Taiwan Island's unification with the Chinese Mainland. After Mao, Beijing, under Deng Xiao-ping's leadership, launched wave after wave of initiatives towards Taipei for a peaceful reunification.

In the PRC's new Constitution of 1982, a special provision was added. Provision 31 stipulates that it allows the setting of a special administrative region, for which a special new law would be passed. This was targeted at both Taiwan and Hong Kong.

On 26 June 1983, Deng proposed to "have talks on an equal footing and the third co-operation between the two parties (the Chinese Communist Party and the KMT). We will not raise it as talks between the central government and a local government'. He also noted that after reunification, the two different systems could be practised respectively on the Chinese Mainland and Taiwan Island. 'On 22 February 1984, Deng officially announced the "one country, two systems" formula for reunification.<sup>182</sup>

The "one country, two systems" policy was tailored to Chiang Ching-kuo. According to Qiao Shi's (the former top legislator of PRC) disclosure, Beijing and Taipei had discussed ways to reunify when Chiang Ching-kuo was still alive. But the negotiation yielded no results. If the "one country, two systems" scenario is implemented, the *de jure* sovereignty over the whole China will be owned by the CPC Beijing, meanwhile the GMT Taipei will enjoy the *de facto* ruling power.

The "one country, two systems" policy has been implemented in the resumption of sovereignty over Hong Kong and Macao. 'A decade after its return to China in 1997, Hong Kong is more vibrant and spectacular than ever'.<sup>183</sup> But problems do exist. In 2002, Beijing began to call for the implementation of the long delayed anti-subversion legislation provided for in Article 23 of the Hong Kong Basic Law. People of Hong Kong worried about that they could lose the freedom such as speech as well as media.

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<sup>182</sup> Sheng Lijun, *China and Taiwan: Cross-Strait Relations Under Chen Shui-bian*, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2002, p7

<sup>183</sup> Zoher Abdoolcarim, *Time*, June 18, 2007, p39

‘The scope of discontent in Hong Kong was then dramatically underscored on July 1, 2003, when approximately 500,000 demonstrators publicly protested against the measure...within a week of the protests Tung Chee-hwa (the then CEO of Hong Kong) announced he would temporarily postpone the second reading of the controversial bill (which was subsequently withdrawn)’.<sup>184</sup> Nowadays, this is one example which Taipei may use as an evidence to prove the “unsuccessful” of the “one country, two systems”.

Taipei is afraid of its rights being potentially violated by Beijing in the Hong Kong way. Two decades ago, Taipei’s suspicion towards Beijing might be different. Sheng Lijun argued: ‘the reason for Chiang Ching-kuo’s refusal to agree with Deng’s “one country, two systems” proposal was because of “loss of face”---because the ROC government would be relegated to a local government after reunification’.<sup>185</sup> In such a context, Chiang (junior) implemented a “three no” policy, namely: no contact, no negotiation and no compromise. During Chiang Ching-kuo’s ruling period, Beijing was focusing on its own rehabilitation after the Cultural Revolution and did not push too hard to reunite Taiwan Island. At that time, Chiang Ching-kuo’s challenges arose not from external side but from the internal side. Within Taiwan Island, Chiang (junior) faced more challenges than his father.

The situation on Taiwan Island was very complex. The people living on Taiwan Island are basically divided into three categories. The first one is aborigine, ‘who comprise about 375, 000 people, divided into nine tribes and living mostly in the

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<sup>184</sup> Carlson Allen, *Unifying China, Integrating with the World: Securing Chinese Sovereignty in the Reform Era*, Stanford University Press, California, 2005, p144

<sup>185</sup> Sheng Lijun, *China and Taiwan: Cross-Strait Relations Under Chen Shui-bian*, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2002, p24

remote valleys and along the rugged slopes of central range of Taiwan'.<sup>186</sup> The second is the Hakka (from Kwang Tong Province of China 中国广东省) and Hokkien people (from Fukien Province of China 中国福建省) who migrated from the Chinese Mainland during the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) and the Ch'ing Dynasty (1636-1911). They call themselves “本地人” (pronounced as “ben di ren” and literally translated as “local natives”). The third categorized people are from other provinces of China, being called ‘外省人’ (pronounced as “wai sheng ren” and literally translated as “people from other provinces”) by the local natives. Most “people from other provinces” had come to Taiwan Island after the GMT lost the civil war in 1949. The term “people from other provinces” was adopted to differentiate the local natives from the new comers, because the local natives had established a sense that they were people of Taiwan Province. The identification of people on Taiwan Island is diverse. There were three “us-other” scenarios with potential conflicts lurking. Contrasted with the Chinese Mainland, people living on Taiwan Island as a whole, positioned themselves the “us” side, and the Chinese Mainland was the “other” side or the ruthless communism regime for a long time. ‘It may be that people who are separated from others by natural boundaries---like those who live on an island---sense a kinship with those who share the same territory and alienation from others who do not’.<sup>187</sup> This thesis names the contrast as the big “us-other” scenario.

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<sup>186</sup> Lee Khoon Choy, *Pioneers of Modern China: Understanding the Inscrutable Chinese*, World Scientific, Singapore, 2005, p444

<sup>187</sup> Rubinstein A. Murray, *The Other Taiwan: 1945 to the Present*, An East Gate Book, New York, 1994, p43

Within Taiwan Island, the offspring of the Chinese who emigrated from the Chinese Mainland in 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> century, regarded themselves as the local Taiwanese (the “us” Taiwanese). The people who entered Taiwan Island in as well after the Chinese civil war (1946-1949), were regarded by the local Taiwanese as Mainlanders (the “other” Taiwanese). For convenience, this thesis names the contrast as the middle “us-other” scenario. One KMT legislator once complained such middle “us-other” scenario and he said: ‘I was born in Taiwan and love Taiwan, but I still carry the “original sin” that I am a Mainlander. We are still not trusted, just like James Soong<sup>188</sup>. No matter how hard Mr. Soong works, his love for Taiwan is still being questioned. This is unfair to Mainlander’.<sup>189</sup> The aborigine whose forefathers settled down on Taiwan Island thousands years ago, differentiate themselves from the local Taiwanese as well as Mainlanders. This thesis names the contrast as the small “us-other” scenario.

In the middle and small “us-other” scenarios, Mainlanders (Taiwanese) were eager to get back to the Chinese Mainland, or in other words, they are pro-unification. For the local and aboriginal Taiwanese, a mentality of independence of Taiwan was favoured. There is a sharp difference between those for whom Taiwanese is an ethnic category within the Chinese nation and those who consider Taiwan as their state. ‘The Taiwanese has lived on the island for a long time. Many Taiwanese do not look to a land across the ocean as their home. Even the so-called “mainlanders in Taiwan” who came only after 1949 have lived on the island for over half a century. They have set down roots on the island and have children on the island. They have already taken Taiwan as their own country and have treated Mainland China as another part of the

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<sup>188</sup> James Soong refers to Soon Chu-yu, the former Chairman of People First Party on Taiwan Island

<sup>189</sup> Bedford Olwen and Hwang Kwang-Kuo, *Taiwanese Identity and Democracy: the Social Psychology of Taiwan's 2004 Elections*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2006, p103

world'.<sup>190</sup> The independent mentality argues that, prior to 1895, the exercise of Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan Island is irrelevant, because Chinese was an empire and Taiwan was treated as a colony of that empire. Likewise, the Japanese occupation merely transferred Taiwan from the hand of one empire to another. What was important was the ending of Japanese rule and what the people of Taiwan wanted at that time. They were not asked and the island was handed over to the occupying forces of another “foreign” power. From this perspective, the sovereignty of Taiwan belongs first and foremost to the people of Taiwan, not to outsiders whether they are the GMT or the CPC from the Chinese Mainland. Under the suppression of Chiang Kai-shek for three decades, although the independence mindset was not popular, it had a massive appeal for locals, especially combined with the localization and democratization campaign on Taiwan Island.

This first trigger of localization was the reform of the National Assembly. The procedure of electing the President of ROC in 1946 was through the National Assembly, which composed of members from the whole China. After retreating to Taiwan Island in 1949, the successive term of the National Assembly could not be generated from the whole China. There came the dilemma: the sovereignty right over the whole China claimed by the ROC should be legitimated on the approval of the whole Chinese rather than just the people living on Taiwan Island. But at that time, what the ROC could control was only the island in a de facto situation. To avoid losing the sovereignty over the whole China, the National Assembly was ruled by itself to last from term to term. In other words, members of the National Assembly obtained the life-long term. After Chiang Kai-shek's death, the National Assembly

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<sup>190</sup> Wei Bin Zhang, *Taiwan's Modernization: Americanization and Modernizing Confucian Manifestations*, World Scientific Publishing, London, 2003, p187

came to its end by the natural law, because a quite number of senior members of the National Assembly were too old to hold positions. Some demonstrations even happened to protest the life-long assembly. As the successor of his father, Chiang Ching-kuo had to make some amendments. For the case of life-long National Assembly, some local Taiwanese were recruited as a make-up and changed the life-long dominance. 'In 1972, six out of a total of 23 cabinet members were Taiwanese....It was not until the 13<sup>th</sup> congress in 1988 that Taiwanese outnumbered mainlanders'.<sup>191</sup> The Taiwan localization was a have-to-do step, meanwhile serving to erase the conflict within the middle "us-other" scenario. Chiang Ching-kuo on July 26, 1987 stated that 'I have lived on Taiwan Island for four decades, I am Taiwanese, and of course Chinese'.<sup>192</sup> The localization was also paired with democratization.

Chiang Ching-kuo was more liberal than his father and saw the mainstream-liberty and democracy-should be addressed positively rather than ostrich-hidden.

Chiang Ching-kuo was gradually convinced that democratic reforms were needed to ensure the continuity of the regime after his death. If he was not determined to speed up democratization, Taiwan's political reform could hardly be so rapid because there were enough conservative-minded figures in the top ranks of the KMT. He attempted to create an independent political identity for Taiwan.<sup>193</sup>

On September 28, 1986, the Democratic Progressive Party was established and such was tolerated by Chiang Ching-kuo. Prior to the creation of the DPP, Taiwan had maintained a one-party system for almost four decades. In Chiang Ching-kuo's last years, martial law was abrogated in 1987, allowing other political parties to be formed and to compete in election. The other instruments of dictatorial control were also soon

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<sup>191</sup> Ash Robert and Greene J. Megan, *Taiwan in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: Aspects and Limitations of a Development Model*, Routledge, New York, 2007, p243

<sup>192</sup> 林天人等, 时报文化编辑委员会, *珍藏20世纪台湾(My Century of Taiwan)*, 台北, 2000, p215

<sup>193</sup> Wei Bin Zhang, *Taiwan's Modernization: Americanization and Modernizing Confucian Manifestations*, World Scientific Publishing, London, 2003, p63

lifted, allowing freedom of assembly, association, and press. The political exiles who had demanded freedom and independence returned from abroad or were released from detention. 'A significant change from the late 1980s was the gradual democratization of Taiwan. This reinforced sentiment on the island in favour of an independent Taiwan, while at the same time, claims to represent the whole of China was abandoned'.<sup>194</sup> Chiang Ching-kuo's reform was a double-edge sword.

Taiwan Island's individuality was more prominent and differentiated itself from the Chinese Mainland. The localization and the democratization triggered the mindset of Taiwan independence. Chiang Ching-kuo uplifted the ban over press freedom and tolerated the different voices, although some voices favoured the independence of Taiwan Island. Chiang Ching-kuo died in 1987, and his baton was passed to Lee Teng-hui. Lee was a watershed for the relationship between the Chinese Mainland and Taiwan Island.

Lee Teng-hui was a native Taiwanese, born in a village outside Taipei in 1923. He joined the KMT only in 1972. He was educated in Taiwan, Japan, and the United States with has no Chinese Mainland experience. Unlike his predecessor who had a strong Chinese identification, Lee identified himself as Japanese before he was 22. After Chiang Ching-kuo's death in 1987, as his deputy, Lee was sworn in as the leader of Taiwan Island. At the Thirteen KMT Congress in July 1988, Lee was elected as Chairman of the KMT, the first local Taiwanese to hold that position. A new Central Standing Committee was also elected, with sixteen local Taiwanese and fifteen Mainlander Taiwanese. As the successor of Chiang Ching-kuo, to show his

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<sup>194</sup> McDougall Derek, *Asia Pacific in World Politics*, Lynne Rienner Publisher, London, 2007, p163

loyalty to his mentor, Lee at the very beginning had to carry on Chiang's policy; otherwise, it would be regarded as a betrayal. One point should be highlighted here---Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo were counter-Red but deep Yellow and deep Blue as well. In other words, the two Chiangs, were anti-Communist but not anti-national unity. In this context, 'in the late 1980s, Lee Teng-hui said: "one China is the supreme principle". On 23 February 1988, shortly after he assumed office as President, he insisted on the "one China policy, not two Chinas policy"'.<sup>195</sup> On hindsight, Lee was a man of Green who favours pro-Taiwan-Independence but in Blue disguise.

Lee was a double-dealer. 'He was able to hide his sentiment from GMT leaders, particularly Chiang Ching-kuo, who was responsible for grooming him. He was a real survivor who knew when to act and when not to act. His chance came when he became the President of Taiwan. With power in hand, he began to expose his long-suppressed aims and wishes'.<sup>196</sup> Lee adopted a strategy which would attain his political goal gradually by his sophisticated calculation; sometimes, he would even deliver big principles, generally accepted by Beijing, but his true motivation was hidden in ambiguous or less challenging articulation attached behind. In 1990, Lee raised the notion of "one China, two governments". He said: 'one country, two governments. This is a fact'.<sup>197</sup> Although Lee mentioned "one China" or "one country", his true intention was to make the other central government of China---the Taipei authority---*de jure*. This stance challenged Beijing's stance that the government of PRC is the solemn representative of China. In its "Guidelines of

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<sup>195</sup> Sheng Lijun, *China and Taiwan: Cross-Strait Relations Under Chen Shui-bian*, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2002, p16

<sup>196</sup> Lee Khoon Choy, *Pioneers of Modern China: Understanding the Inscrutable Chinese*, World Scientific, Singapore, 2005, p447-9

<sup>197</sup> Sheng Lijun, *China and Taiwan: Cross-Strait Relations under Chen Shui-bian*, Zed Books, New York, 2002, p99

National Unification” of February 1991, Taipei held that “there is only one China”, but for the first time, it used the notion of “one China, two equal political entities’. After 1991, Taipei began to emphasize that Taiwan and the Mainland are both parts of China and PRC is not equivalent to China. ‘In July 1994, a *White Paper on Cross-Strait Relations* stated that Taipei would no longer compete with Beijing for the right to represent China in the international arena’.<sup>198</sup> Rather, it began to emphasize that the two parts of China should have the right to participate alongside each other in the international community as equals prior to unification. Although Beijing did not recognize Taipei as another central government of China, she did not want to press Lee to extreme end, and still intended to enlarge the shared principles between the two sides. On Lee’s side, he needed time to strengthen his power in the GMT which was embroiled by faction conflicts. As a political manoeuvre, Lee Teng-hui did not shut off back channels for discussion with Beijing.

Taipei agreed to negotiate cross-strait affairs, not officially but through a semi-official organization---the Strait Exchange Foundation (SEF)---commissioned on March 9, 1991. Beijing accepted this informal arrangement and set up its own counterpart on December 16, 1991, the Association for Relations across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS). The two bodies at the very beginning were set for resolving practical issues, for example: mutual enquiry for lost letters, mutual-recognition of notarized documents and so on. During the handling of practical issues, what principle should be applied for became a focus of debates. The ARATS upheld that all was a practical issue within one country; the SEF insisted that inter-country principle should be referred. To resolve the conflict, the two sides held talks in Hong Kong in 1992 from October

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<sup>198</sup> Zhao Suisheng, *Across the Taiwan Strait: Mainland China, Taiwan, and the 1995-1996 Crisis*, Routledge, New York, 1999, p114

27 to 29. During the talks, ‘the ARATS delivered five proposals and the SEF delivered eight proposals (five in written form, three in verbal form) for discussion. The eighth proposal of the SEF states as follows: “in the process of seeking national unification for both sides of the Strait, the two sides upholds the ‘one China’ principle; as to the connotation of the “one China”, they have different understanding’.<sup>199</sup> After the talk, relating to the “one China” affair, on November 1, 1992, the SEF proposed that ‘in the mutually-accepted sense, clarify respective stance in verbal forms’.<sup>200</sup> The ARATS responded in a two-fold point:

the spirit, included in the eight proposal of the SEF, embodied the connotation of seeking unification and sticking to “one China” principle; although the SEF had different understanding about the “one China”, it did not touch the specific meanings of the “one China”. This spirit was line with the stance, held always by the ARATS, as to in handling practical affairs, provided the “one China” principle being held, the political connotation of the “one China” could not be addressed.<sup>201</sup> [the author’s English translation]

The ARATS’ response was delivered via letters to the SEF which did not deny the ARATS’ statements. This is the evolution of the famous “1992 Consensus” agreed upon by the two sides across the Taiwan Strait.

Based on the consent, Wang Dao-han, the Chairman of ARATS and Gu Zhen-fu, the President of SEF met in Singapore on April 27, 1993, such was the first “Wang-Gu” meeting.

However, on hindsight, Lee’s push for the Wang-Koo meeting was a well-designed tactic to mislead Beijing into the belief that Lee was interested in reunification, and that the increasing tendency towards independence in Taiwan was not something that Lee agreed to, but something he was not able to stop. Lee’s tactics worked well, at least in making Beijing hesitate to put its weight behind Hau Pei-tsun<sup>202</sup> in the power struggle between Lee and Hau for the KMT’s leadership in 1993.<sup>203</sup>

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<sup>199</sup> [http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/lasht/stgs.htm?last\\_m\\_id=100](http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/lasht/stgs.htm?last_m_id=100), Official Website of the PRC, viewed in March, 2008

<sup>200</sup> *ibid*

<sup>201</sup> *ibid*

<sup>202</sup> Hau Pei-tsun (1919-), Yellow as well as Blue, in Chiang Ching-kuo’s era, was the Chief Staff of Armed Forces on Taiwan Island and he was once the major rival of Lee Teng-hui

<sup>203</sup> Sheng Lijun, *China and Taiwan: Cross-Strait Relations Under Chen Shui-bian*, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2002, p26

Lee made the consent unclear-cut, to tap the potential whenever beneficial to him. In such case, he can increase his stake in bargaining with Beijing and avoid to be challenged by his opponent in the GMT party. He covered his true motivation by not touching the meaning of “one China”; the appropriate time for Lee to deliver his explanation was according to specific circumstance. Lee interpreted the “1992 Consensus” as Beijing had accepted his ends---the content of Taipei’s different understanding, which was not specifically clarified at that time by the SEF. But in Beijing’s perspective, Beijing only acknowledged the fact that the SEF did not address the political connotation of the “one China”, rather than acknowledge Lee’s ends. Lee’s true motivation was to enhance Taipei’s Green colour by making use of the Blue colour which is in Beijing’s favour.

From 1993, Lee used democracy to combat China’s policy of unification under “one country, two systems”. Lee set democratization against reunification (listing democracy in China as one precondition for reunification talks), used indigenization against national identification with “one China”, and exploited cross-strait tensions for internal politics. ‘In his trip to Latin America in May 1994, Lee said (Zhongguo Shibao, May 7, 1994): “the Chinese Communist regime says China’s sovereignty is in its hands. I say, sorry, China’s sovereignty is in the hands of all the Chinese people, including people in Taiwan. Since democratization, Taiwan’s sovereignty has been in the hands of the Taiwanese people, not the PRC. The PRC is not qualified to declare Taiwan’s sovereignty’.<sup>204</sup> His argument excluded China’s sovereignty over Taiwan

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<sup>204</sup> Wei Bin Zhang, *Taiwan’s Modernization: Americanization and Modernizing Confucian Manifestations*, World Scientific Publishing, London, 2003, p77

Island. According to Lee's viewpoint, the China represented by the CPC Beijing, was not China.

On 1 August 1994, the National Assembly approved the reform to Taiwan Island's institutions---the direct election of its leader. Such decision, on one side is a sign of democratization, on the other side indicates that the focus of the Taipei authorities is shifted to the territory it effectively controls, rather than the whole China which Taipei once intended to represent. In July 1997, the National Assembly decided that the election of the governor of Taiwan Province and the provincial assembly would be suspended from December 1998. This motion was interpreted by Beijing as a radical step to change the status of Taiwan as a province of China. On 9 July 1999, in an interview with a German radio station, Lee Teng-hui, for the first time openly defined the relationship between the Chinese Mainland and Taiwan Island as 'between two countries [国家], at least special relations between two countries'.<sup>205</sup> With this definition, Lee went further than his previous position of China and Taiwan being "two equal political entities", but actually equal to "two countries". Up to then, this equality had changed to sovereign equality, not even in the sense of two central governments representing one country, but in two separate countries. 'Lee has publicly stated: "what the Republic of China needs the most is an international affirmation of its sovereignty"'.<sup>206</sup> It called this a necessary step to prepared Taiwan for talks on unification, and offered to agree to China's demand of holding some form of political dialogue, if China accepted Taiwan's new status. Lee said that he made the "two country" claim so that Taiwan would be treated as China's equal in future

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<sup>205</sup> Sheng Lijun, *China and Taiwan: Cross-Strait Relations Under Chen Shui-bian*, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2002, p11

<sup>206</sup> Brown J. Melissa, *Is Taiwan Chinese? The Impact of Culture, Power, and Migration on Changing Identities*, University of California Press, Los Angeles, 2004, p4

talks on unification. In the past, Taiwan had insisted on two equal political entities rather than an independent state existing across the Strait.

Since the 1990s, the leadership in Taipei had actively nurtured a distinct Taiwan identity and was more willing to influence the American political system to serve its perceived interests. In June 1995, the Clinton Administration, under significant pressure from Congress, broke an earlier promise to Beijing by granting Lee a visa. The Chinese Mainland, a rapidly rising regional economic and military power, perceived Taiwan as slowly but surely drifting away, and was becoming increasingly resolute in its belief that military force may be necessary to resolve the Taiwan issue. Commencing July 21-25, 1995, the People's Liberation Army launched a series of surface-to-surface ballistic missiles tests in the East China Sea, just 150 kilometres off the tip of northern Taiwan. On August 12-25, 1995, Beijing conducted a second series of military exercises, including three days of guided missile, cannon, and other military tests in the sea 136 kilometres north of Taiwan. In November, PLA marines and tanks make a beachhead landing exercise in Fukien Province from amphibious landing craft, backed by jet fighters and naval vessels. In March 1996, before Taiwan's direct presidential election, Beijing conducted a new wave of military exercises. 'Beijing declared: "if the United States anti-China forces, along with Lee Teng-hui and his like, are perverse and collude with each other in pursuing two Chinas, or one China one Taiwan, China has the methods, strength, and confidence to smash their plot"' .<sup>207</sup>

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<sup>207</sup> Kang Yanwen, "Anti-China Forces in the United States Should Not Imagine that They Can Play the Taiwan Card", *Ta Kung Pao*, 18 June 1995, pA2, referred to Suisheng Zhao, *Across the Taiwan Strait: Mainland China, Taiwan, and the 1995-1996 Crisis*, Routledge, New York, 1999, p102

Such was a sign that Beijing eventually interpreted Lee's policy as on the gradual track of splitting one China into two political entities, eventually into two Chinas. Jiang Ze-min, the then Chinese President, stated: 'the struggle against Mr Lee is not one over differences in ideology or political systems, but one of defending China's sovereignty and territorial integrity'.<sup>208</sup> In Beijing's stance, 'during Mr Lee's 12-year rule, he repealed all the relevant laws barring independence and as a result, separatism became a very vibrant movement'.<sup>209</sup> This was strongly countered to Beijing's "one China" policy.

The 1999- "two countries" theory, propped by Lee, was not the toughest challenge to Beijing, because Lee was just a hidden pro-independence figure. What really challenged Beijing was that Lee utilized his influence to propel the pro-Taiwan-independence DPP, rather than his own party, the GMT, to gain the power on Taiwan Island. 'His own vision makes him more akin ideologically to the DPP than the KMT. It also explains why he adopted many of the proposals put forward by the DPP. Political gossip has it that Mr Lee is KMT chairman during the day and DPP chairman at night'.<sup>210</sup> For various reasons, besides Lee's subversion, the GMT lost the election held on Taiwan Island in 1999, and Chen Sui-bian, the candidate of the DPP, became the new leader of this island. 'KMT members, furious to see the party's power transferred to a pro-independence DPP, accused Mr Lee of double-dealing'.<sup>211</sup> On September 26, 2001, the GMT stripped Lee of membership. On the other hand, Lee is still regarded by some people as a hero who has given a separate identity to the

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<sup>208</sup> Ching Cheong, *Will Taiwan Break Away? The Rise of Taiwanese Nationalism*, World Scientific, Singapore, 2001, p137

<sup>209</sup> *ibid*, p68

<sup>210</sup> *ibid*, p61

<sup>211</sup> Ching Cheong, *Will Taiwan Break Away? The Rise of Taiwanese Nationalism*, World Scientific, Singapore, 2001, p72

Taiwanese and helped to transfer the top political power from “others” sources to indigenous ones. Like his GMT predecessor, Chen Sui-bian adopted the same strategy as secured positions first as an apparent neutral colour, and then marched towards his real Green goal gradually.

At his inauguration, Chen announced the “five not’s” principle. They were: not to declare independence of Taiwan, not to change the national title, not to push forth the inclusion of the “two countries” description in the Constitution of ROC, not to promote a referendum to change the status quo with regard to the question of independence or unification, and not to abolish the National Unification Council and the Guidelines for National Unification. For the “five not’s” principle, Beijing had to adopt a “wait and see” policy, but Chen Sui-bian would never let Beijing feel at ease. Chen then step by step reversed his own words.

Chen performed not so well in improving the economy of Taiwan Island, but he was really good at manipulating politics to divert people’s attention. The legislature branch with the GMT as the majority party was a big constraint to Chen’s administration. In order to take the upper hand of political struggle, Chen always created something sensational within Taiwan Island or be provocative to the Chinese Mainland. On November 27, 2003, the Referendum Law was passed.

A number of Taiwan’s allies voiced concern over President Chen’s proposed defensive referendum...Japan’s de facto embassy in Taiwan conveyed a message to the Presidential Office saying Japan does not favour Taiwan’s holding of a defensive referendum...a U.S. State Department spokesman issued a new warning: “clearly we have said that we oppose any unilateral measures that affects the current status including this referendum”. To some it seemed that President Chen Sui-bian had severely misjudged international opposition and fallen into diplomatic isolation.<sup>212</sup>

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<sup>212</sup> Bedford Olwen and Hwang Kwang-Kuo, *Taiwanese Identity and Democracy: the Social Psychology of Taiwan’s 2004 Elections*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2006, p49

Although Chen was extremely displeased with the failure to include a clause that would have allowed for referendums to change the name and the flag of Taiwan Island, he was entitled to initiate a referendum on “national security” issues whenever the external threat loomed. Chen called for a defensive referendum in the face of the missile threat, on the day of the “presidential” election in March 2004. Chen also argued that “one China” was still an issue, not a principle.

The United States was outraged by the provocative action. James Moriarty, the White House NSC senior official, ‘acting as President Bush’s representative, delivered a one page, three paragraph letter to President Chen, essentially asking him to drop the idea of a referendum on election day’.<sup>213</sup> The worst thing during Chen’s term was: Taiwan Island was split into two political blocs, and there was a strong tension within the middle “us-others” scenario as well as the Blue-Green confrontation.

Critics also argue that the greens have combined the issue of Taiwan’s independence with loving Taiwan to produce a moral absolute that can not be questioned, which has led to an atmosphere in which it is not possible to discuss ideas that contravene the prevailing ideology---if you discuss them then you do not love Taiwan. Thus, the issue of Taiwan’s independence has become merged with loving Taiwan.<sup>214</sup>

Chen manipulated the Taiwan question, not for the sake of ease tension, but for partisanship. For securing his position, Chen even did some hooligan-like things. The 2003 election is still a big suspect case in the island. During Chen’s campaign for election, one bullet, hitting his belly mysteriously and only leaving him a scar, really created sensational effect to arouse the sympathy of the voters, especially riders on fence, to Chen. Chen was the one who benefited from the shooting most. ‘Even close observers of Taiwanese politics---used to, as they are, fisticuffs and chair-throwing by

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<sup>213</sup> Shih Erich, *the Conduct of U.S.-Taiwan Relations 2000-2004*, the Brookings Institution, Washington, 2004, p11

<sup>214</sup> Bedford Olwen and Hwang Kwang-Kuo, *Taiwanese Identity and Democracy: the Social Psychology of Taiwan’s 2004 Elections*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2006, p98

members of the legislature---were shocked by the dirty politics in which the KMT compared Chen to Hitler, and then the bizarre shooting of the president and vice-president by a slow-moving bullet on the day before election'.<sup>215</sup> Although people could have reasons to doubt that the shooting incident may be a manipulation masterminded by Chen or his supporters, so far, there is no official conclusion to the incident. The fact was that Chen did get re-elected by a very marginal advantage in the 2003 election.

Under Chen's rule, Taiwan Island was de-sinicized. He tried to change textbooks in schools with a view to indoctrinating future generations with Taiwan consciousness at the expense of Chinese national consciousness. 'The new textbooks even regarded Dr. Sun Yat Sen as a "foreigner". The aim was to make the future generation knowledgable only of Taiwan history and groom them as Taiwanese instead of Chinese'.<sup>216</sup> So far, on Taiwan Island, although people with Chinese blood account for the majority of the total number, they may not recognize themselves as "中国人" (a citizen of the Chinese political entity with the same Chinese culture and kinship origin). According to a questionnaire, conducted jointly by Hong Kong University and Taiwan Politic University from in 2007, 53% of the questioned regard themselves as "Taiwanese", 3.1% regards themselves as "Chinese", and 40% regard themselves "Taiwanese as well as Chinese".<sup>217</sup> New holidays were proclaimed, parks and streets were renamed and so on, to separate Taiwan's identification from China.

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<sup>215</sup> Peerenboom Randall, *China Modernizes: Threat to the West or Model for the Rest?* Oxford University Press, New York, 2007, p234

<sup>216</sup> Lee Khoo Choy, *Pioneers of Modern China: Understanding the Inscrutable Chinese*, World Scientific, Singapore, 2005, p458

<sup>217</sup> Paraphrased from <http://blog.ifeng.com/article/1623051.html>, p8, viewed on August 4, 2008

In early of January 2006, Chen restated the timetable for legal independence of Taiwan. On January 29, 2006, Chen proposed to abrogate the Guideline of Unification and he achieved his goal on February 27, 2006. Chen's motivation was to disconnect Taiwan from Chinese history. 'Ironically, the PRC was more comfortable when Taiwan's government claimed legal authority over China, because at least then there was no questioning of whether Taiwan belonged within the Chinese nation'.<sup>218</sup> During Chen's term, the unofficial dialogue across the Taiwan Strait was suspended, or in other words, put in the freezer. The corruption scandal relating to him as well his relatives triggered a million-people strong protest to urge him step down in May 2006. Chen's DPP lost the election held in March 2008, and Ma Ying-jeou, the candidate of the GMT, took over the power. People hope new changes will happen to the cross-Strait relations to erase the eight-year-long tension. The Chinese Mainland also intends to bring the Taiwan Island closer to the motherland. In what way, however, will the Taiwan question be resolved?

## **Chapter Four: the Present and the Future**

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<sup>218</sup> Brown J. Melissa, *Is Taiwan Chinese? The Impact of Culture, Power, and Migration on Changing Identities*, University of California Press, Los Angeles, 2004, p2

Secession movements are a worldwide phenomenon. In his book, *Identity Politics Filling the Gap between Federalism and Independence*, Dent J. Martin presented fifteen case studies, such as the Basque Provinces in Spain, Chechnya in the Russian Republic, Irian Jaya and Northern Sumatra in Indonesian and so on. He pointed out that:

of the fifteen cases which we examine, all but one result from a dissident minority area, with its own unique national identity and political culture. The only exception is the case of Taiwan in its relation with the mainland government of the People's Republic of China, which is examined in detail in due course. In that case, the roots of the separate identity go back both to the history of Chinese settlement in the island under the Ming Dynasty and to the victory of the Communist forces over the Kuomintang in 1949 and the flight of the latter to Taiwan Island, where they survived with the aid of American protection. In due course, together with the native Taiwanese, who also originated from earlier migrations of Chinese people from the mainland, they built up a successful capitalist economy and a democratic state. Both sides in the conflict regard themselves as Chinese, and both look to traditional Chinese culture as well as to their contending modern political ideologies. Both believe in one China, but differ strongly as to who should rule it.<sup>219</sup>

Indeed, as mentioned in previous chapters, the Taiwan question, like a conundrum, is left by history and complexed by reality. Although Martin touches less on the DPP's pro-Taiwan-independence stance, he grasps the uniqueness of the Taiwan question: it is an issue within the Chinese community.

In the international arena, these examples do not constitute precedents that must be followed, due to various circumstances. For instance, the recent demise of the monarchy in Nepal surely will not lead to the end of the monarchy in Britain. The Taiwan question, as an issue of the Chinese, mostly likely can have a unique Chinese way of resolution, differently to other cases. Although there may only be one ultimate answer in the end, a thorough consideration of all possible alternatives is needed.

Generally as well as theoretically speaking, there are three ways to solve the "either secession or unity" problem. These are by peace, by war, or remaining a limbo

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<sup>219</sup> Dent J. Martin, *Identity Politics Filling the Gap Between Federalism and Independence*, Ashgate Publishing Limited, England, 2004

situation. Actually, a limbo situation is just a temporary stage which will definitely lead to either secession or unity in the longer or shorter future. The article, *U.S.-China Relations after Resolution of Taiwan's Status*, written in 2007, by Roger Cliff and David A. Shlapak, delivered their perspective with their scenarios for resolving the Taiwan question. These ten scenarios are in line with the three-way categorization.<sup>220</sup> By peaceful means, they assume there are three possibilities: peaceful unification, peaceful independence and a compromise resolution. By the use of force, they set out four scenarios: violent unification with or without United States' intervention, violent independence with or without United States' intervention. By a limbo situation, they assume a continuation of the current unresolved status quo or a violent irresolution with or without United States' intervention. It is said, across the Taiwan Strait, peace or war will be triggered by Taiwan; how the war will unfold is determined by the Chinese Mainland; how long the war will last is referred to the depth which the United States intends to get involved. For the Chinese Mainland, the secession movement, provoked by the DPP, if eventually leading to the independence of Taiwan Island, will be the worst-case scenario. The American Civil War is an example on how to end secession movement.

The 1860s saw the Civil War fought for more than four years to end the unity-or-secession limbo situation in the United States. Adams Charles argued:

the War of Rebellion, as the war was called in the North, was really a war for Southern independence. The Southern states had withdrawn from the Union by democratic process---the same process they had followed to join the Union initially. The Northern federation went to war to prevent their secession from the Union just as Britain went to war in 1766 to prevent the colonies from seceding from the British nation.<sup>221</sup>

Staudenraus regarded the South's secession movement unacceptable and he argued:

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<sup>220</sup> [http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND\\_MG567.pdf](http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG567.pdf), viewed on 28 November 2007

<sup>221</sup> Adams Charles, *When in the Course of Human Events: Arguing the Case for Southern Secession*, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Oxford, 2000, p196

any state, whenever this shall be its sovereign will and pleasure, may secede from the Union in accordance with the Constitution and without any violation of the constitutional rights of the other members of the Confederacy; that as each became parties to the Union by the vote of its own people assembled in convention, so any one of them may retire from the Union in a similar manner by the vote of such a convention... the right of the people of a single State to absolve themselves at will and without the consent of the other States from their most solemn obligations, and hazard the liberties and happiness of the millions composing this Union, can not be acknowledged.<sup>222</sup>

Eventually, the North won the war and the federation as a unified nation was maintained. As McPherson argued, the motivation for the North to fight the war is: 'Lincoln was not willing to "let the erring sisters depart in peace". To accept disunion would set a fatal precedent whereby a disaffected minority could leave the Union whenever it lost a presidential election'.<sup>223</sup> Lincoln attached great importance to maintaining the unity of the nation. Lincoln said 'my paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union and is not either to save or destroy slavery... If I could save the Union without freeing any slave, I would do it. If I could save it by freeing all the slaves, I would do it. And if I could save it by freeing some and leaving others alone, I would also do that'.<sup>224</sup> Lincoln's legacy is reinforced by the United States' other cases. For example, in 1869, 'in its ruling on the case of Texas versus White, the Supreme Court explicitly condemned the demand made by Texas that it be allowed to secede from the United States as unconstitutional'.<sup>225</sup> A large portion of American people appreciate the effort to maintain their national unity, even at the cost of war. In such context, why does the United States nowadays urge the Chinese Mainland to eliminate the possibility of resolving the Taiwan question by force? Ironically, the United States is the one power that most frequently resolves issues relating to her interests by military means.

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<sup>222</sup> Staudenraus J.P., *The Secession Crisis, 1860-1861*, Rand McNally & Company, U.S.A., 1964,p42-43

<sup>223</sup> McPherson M. James, *Images of the Civil War*, Gramercy Books, New York, 1992, p25

<sup>224</sup> Kurlansky Mark, *Nonviolence: Twenty-Five Lessons from the History of A Dangerous Idea*, the Modern Library, New York, 2006, p103

<sup>225</sup> Wang Chao-hua, *One China Many Paths*, Verso, New York, 2003, p272

Although the war is the last resort, Beijing will not give up resolving the Taiwan question through war. Beijing's stance always arouses the suspicion by the West as well as Taipei to doubt the sincerity of Beijing's peaceful intentions. Theoretically, although the peaceful scenario has a number of variants such as those presented by Roger Cliff and David A. Shlapak, some of them are excluded from Beijing's list. For example, the peaceful independence scenario, so far, will not be accepted by Beijing. In reality, East Timor's secession from Indonesia was through a peaceful way based upon a referendum. This case could not be applied to the Taiwan question; if so, it is another Outer Mongolian case (as discussed earlier) for China. However, Beijing's elimination of the peaceful independence possibility, as one possible ways to resolve the Taiwan question, does not end the road leading to peace. In 2008, after the GMT took the administration of Taiwan Island, it proclaimed a "no independence, no unification and no war" policy. In such a context, the possibility of resolving the Taiwan question by the use of force, triggered by provocative pro-independence statement of the DPP, has been reduced. The possibility of peaceful resolution is increased with the return of a GMT administration.

Currently, the GMT's policy is with spirit of reducing confrontation and improving common grounds. On 20 May 2008, the newly-elected leader of Taiwan Island, Ma Yingjiu, in his sworn-in speech, he reversed his predecessor's policy with least cooperative spirit. The former leader, Chen did not recognize the "1992 Consensus" or regarded it as an agreement to disagree. Ma said: 'in 1992, the two sides (across the Strait) reached a consensus on "one China, respective interpretations". ...I want to reiterate that, based on the "1992 Consensus," negotiations should resume at the

earliest time possible'.<sup>226</sup> The Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council of PRC commented Ma's sworn-in speech 'an important and positive change happen on Taiwan Island'.<sup>227</sup>

The good-will interaction lays the foundation for further thawing. On May 26, 2008, a delegation headed by Wu Bo-xiong (the present chairman of the KMT party) visited the Chinese mainland. Upon his arrival in Nanking, the former capital city of ROC, Wu mentioned the massive earthquake struck the Chinese Mainland on May 12, 2008 and said: '(after the quake) what happened in Taiwan is a great care as well as a massive donation, which is spontaneous and overwhelming. It confirms one point that both sides across the Taiwan Strait belong to the Chinese nation, and the spontaneous affection is a very natural thing based on kinship [the author's English translation, and the original Chinese version is as follows: 证明一点, 海峡两岸同属中华民族, 这种血缘的感情是非常自然的]'.<sup>228</sup> Wu's statement can explain why the monetary

donations, from Taiwan Island to the Chinese Mainland, exceed two-billion Taiwan dollars.<sup>229</sup> On 12 June 2008, the communication between the Strait Exchange Foundation (the SEF) and the Association for Relations across the Taiwan Strait (the ARATS) got resumed. The two bodies are semi-official institutions authorized by respective authorities across the Taiwan Strait. The resumed meetings, not only sends a strong signal that the across-Strait relationship is on the ice-melting track, but also resulted in a concrete agreement. On 13 June 2008, in Beijing, the SEF and the ARATS signed a landmark deal to launch regular flights across the Taiwan Strait,

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<sup>226</sup> <http://english.www.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=19033&ctNode=1673&mp=10>, viewed on May 21, 2008

<sup>227</sup> <http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2008-05-22/085113909199s.shtml>, viewed on May 22, 2008

<sup>228</sup> <http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2008-05-26/183815622032.shtml>, viewed on May 27, 2008

<sup>229</sup> Data is from <http://news.wenxuecity.com/messages/200805/news-gb2312-596457.html>, viewed on May 15, 2008

though the flights will be limited to weekend charters via Hong Kong. ‘Taiwanese media said the flights would start on July 4, and that Chinese tour groups would arrive from July 18’.<sup>230</sup> In each other’s location, the SEF and the ARATS will set up permanent offices which ensure the direct communication channels across the Strait. The reciprocal actions were hailed by the public. According an online survey conducted by the Hong Kong Phoenix Media, by 17 June 2008, 64.9% of the surveyed out of 51,084 people regards that since the two semi-official organizations resumed communication, in the future, the trend of across-Strait relations will develop from economy to politics, from folk level to official level.<sup>231</sup> This is the exact strategy adopted by the CPC and the GMT which established the economic communication platform in 2004. The GMT beat the DPP as the ruling party on the Taiwan Island in March 2008. So far, the picture across the Taiwan Strait is more optimistic.

It is very encouraging to see both sides across the Taiwan Strait try to find cooperative grounds rather than exaggerate differences. Ma’s deputy, Vincent Siew Wan-chang, before swearing in, on 12 April 2008, in the name of the head of a Taiwanese folk organization, attended the Bo-ao Asian Forum held in Chinese Hainan Island. On the Forum, he held talks with Chinese President Hu Jin-tao. Xiao proposed that let’s ‘face reality, pioneer a new future, shelve controversies and pursue a win-win solution’.<sup>232</sup> [the author’s English translation] “Facing reality”, from Taipei’s perspective, normally is interpreted as acknowledging the reality of Taiwan’s de facto presence. Beijing never denies the period from 1911 to 1949, during which, the ROC was the sole government of China; but Beijing avoids discussing whether the continuation of the ROC after 1949 is available or not. From Taipei’s perspective, the

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<sup>230</sup> *The Dominion Post*, B2, June 14, 2008

<sup>231</sup> <http://news.ifeng.com/taiwan/>, viewed on June 17, 2008

<sup>232</sup> [http://www.gov.cn/ldhd/2008-04/12/content\\_943267.htm](http://www.gov.cn/ldhd/2008-04/12/content_943267.htm), viewed on 14 April 2008

continuation as well as the existence of ROC is a fact which cannot be denied, although its geography shrank after 1949. From Beijing's perspective, "facing reality" means acknowledging the argument that the bond across the Taiwan Strait should not be severed. Taipei once, especially in the Chen's administration period, tried to cut off the bond with the Chinese Mainland. After the twists and turns for decades, both sides advocate facing reality. The reality-facing advocacy is not only a reminder to each side's own stance, but also a reciprocal consideration of other side's stance.

Taipei's approach was positively echoed by Beijing. On 29 April 2008, Chinese President Hu Jin-tao called for 'building mutual trust, shelving controversies, finding commonalities despite differences, and creating together a win-win solution' across the Taiwan Strait. Ma Ying-jeou responded in his swearing-in speech that 'his [Hu Jin-tao] views are very much in line with ours'.<sup>233</sup> Because both sides share certain common grounds, they'd like to take the most practical steps which may change the long-term course. Although what the new factor looks like is unclear now, communication, no matter how trivial it might be, is much better than confrontation. Both sides across the Taiwan Strait have shown no doubts to the urgency of reopening talks; it means that talking fits the mainstream quite well. On 27 June 2008, according to a questionnaire conducted by the official Reviewing Committee on Taiwan Island, 79.7% of those interviewed Taiwanese show their appreciation on the performance of the Taiwan administrative authorities, in terms of improving the relations across the Taiwan Strait.<sup>234</sup> Both sides across the Taiwan Strait currently adopt the same strategy: do something practical as well as less difficult, and then do something political in new circumstances which will be natural outcomes of the already-done. The economic

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<sup>233</sup> [http://www.china.com.cn/overseas/txt/2008-05/05/content\\_14277410.htm](http://www.china.com.cn/overseas/txt/2008-05/05/content_14277410.htm), viewed on May 6, 2008

<sup>234</sup> [http://news.ifeng.com/taiwan/1/200806/0627\\_351\\_620399.shtml](http://news.ifeng.com/taiwan/1/200806/0627_351_620399.shtml), viewed on June 28, 2008

reciprocity seems more easily to establish than the political mutual-trust. All gestures demonstrate that both sides are likely to talk. The good-will and mutual-beneficial things such as routine charter flights, two-way tourism, will definitely yield a good harvest rather than hatred in the future. Although the relationship across the Taiwan Strait is getting warmer, it is just the first step of a long journey.

The shelved controversies will not disappear automatically as time goes on. The political issue across the Taiwan Strait is not like a huge block can be divided in to a number of small blocks, or can be resolved one by one. A “small” or technical political issue, if not being handled wisely, could trigger a “big” or strategic issue. In such context, a micro issue, in essence, is tantamount to a macro issue. The significance of minor issues demonstrates just how difficult the Taiwan question is. For example, if Hu Jin-tao meets Ma Ying-jeou, how should the two figures address each other? Although seemed like a small and simple question of how to address each other, it conveys the subtle political connotation. If the two gentlemen address each other as Mr. Hu or Mr. Ma, this is an ambiguous way to avoid touch something sensitive. If the addressing as “President” is adopted for each other, such means that Beijing and Taipei have recognized each other as independent states. If as expected by Wu Bo-xiong (the current Chairman of the GMT), Ma Ying-jeou will replace him as the next Chairman of the GMT, and then in such context, Ma and Hu can address each other with the title as the Chairman of the GMT party as well as the Chairman of the CPC party. On 23 June, Ma expressed he had no interest in acting as the Chairman of the GMT<sup>235</sup>. [the author’s English translation]

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<sup>235</sup> [http://news.ifeng.com/taiwan/1/200806/0623\\_351\\_612507.shtml](http://news.ifeng.com/taiwan/1/200806/0623_351_612507.shtml), viewed on 24 June 2008

The “Chairman” addressing would imply that the talking would be a party-to-party dialogue, and the sovereignty debate would be shelved. But the “Chairman addressing” scenario will be regarded as a dwarfing action to deliberately invalidate the title of “President of ROC” and will not be accepted in the Taiwan political arena, especially by the main opposition party. When Wu Bo-xiong (the current chairman of the GMT who visited the Chinese Mainland on 20 May 2008) mentioned the newly elected leader of the Taiwan Island, he used the title “Mr. Ma” rather than “President Ma”. The Green DPP accused him of dwarfing the status of “ROC President”. Likewise, many more similar “how-to-name” questions will be raised. The phenomenon is not a linguistic word-playing game, but can be interpreted as a signal passing some political connotations. “Mr.” is a neutral title which can be utilized universally to any males and “Mr. Ma” himself also accepts the neutral “Mr.” title. On 18 June 2008, Ma Ying-jeou expressed, if meeting with Chen Yun-lin (the chairman of the Mainland-based ARATS, which is a de facto position commanded by Beijing), ‘I will address him as Mr. Chen, and he will address me Mr. Ma. I think this is the best way’.<sup>236</sup> After the GMT took over the leadership of Taiwan Island, in June 2008, the “Mainland Affairs Committee” proposed to address the Chinese Mainland as “Chinese Mainland” rather than “China”. Such proposal is also in line with the 1991 version of Taipei’s Constitution which describes the Taiwan Island as the “free areas” of the ROC, at the same time chooses the term “mainland areas” referring to the Chinese Mainland. “Addressing China as China” was preferred by the former DPP’s leadership. If the Chinese Mainland is addressed as “China” by Taiwan, it implies that there are one China, and one Taiwan; this scenario will not be accepted by Beijing.

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<sup>236</sup> [http://news.ifeng.com/taiwan/3/200806/0618\\_353\\_603045.shtml](http://news.ifeng.com/taiwan/3/200806/0618_353_603045.shtml), viewed on June 18, 2008

The term “Chinese Mainland” (technically it is a geographic term), adopted by the new leadership on Taiwan Island, is to avoid touching sensitive controversies. If the time is not mature enough to resolve political differences in a full picture, it is unwise to touch the political topic, no matter big or small, which will trigger a ripple effect. The special selection of “Mr.” title implies the GMT does not hope practical issues being harassed by dwelling on debate of titles, although titles are important issues which should be resolved in the future rather than now. The current resolution, for Taiwan’s participation in the Asian Bank, the Asian Sports Games, as well as Olympic Games, is adoption of the title “Chinese Taipei”. The same English alphabets have two respectively-adopted Chinese versions---中国台北 (preferred by the Chinese Mainland, pronounced as “Zhong Guo Taipei, literally means “Taiwan of the Chinese who share the same country”) and 中华台北 (preferred by the Taiwan Island, pronounced as “Zhong Hua Taipei”, literally means “Taiwan of the Chinese who share the same kinship”). Anyway, no matter how differently the term-“Chinese Taiwan”-will be interpreted by various observers, at least, both political authorities as well as common people across the Taiwan Strait appreciate the flexible cohesiveness which on one hand, ensures the political rhetoric sound acceptable to both sides, and on the other side, enables themselves more room to manoeuvre within respective political mechanisms as well as cooperation in the future. If the flexibility “crosses” the line, the situation may become complexion. On 16 July 2008, *New China* (the Beijing-based news agency) called the baseball team from the Taiwan Island as “Zhong Guo Taipei (中国台北) baseball team”, rather than “Zhong Hua Taiwan (中华台北) baseball team”. On 18 July 2008, Wu Dun-yi, the secretary of the GMT,

stated that ‘if the Chinese mainland name the Taiwan delegation (for the Beijing Olympic Games) as “Zhong Hua Taiwan (中华台北)”, the chairman of the GMT will attend the opening ceremony of the Olympic Games and watch the baseball match between Taiwan and the Dutch; if being named as “Zhong Guo Taipei [中国台北], we’ll not attend the Beijing Olympic Games’.<sup>237</sup> Although seemingly like word-playing game in semantic terms, it conveys the basic political mindset, to which both side across the Taiwan Strait are sensitive about. Up to now, no matter what is the title Taipei may use, it feels unsatisfied to the status quo in regarding to her “international space”.

Actually, Taipei is not just content with economic prosperity. In his swearing-in speech on May 20, 2008, Ma Ying-jeou said: ‘we will also enter consultations with mainland China over Taiwan’s international space and a possible cross-strait peace accord. It wants dignity. Only when Taiwan is not longer being isolated in the international area can cross-strait relations move forward with confidence’.<sup>238</sup> Ma is in an embarrassing situation. Ma regards himself as the “President of the Republic of China”, but why should the “international space” of “the Republic of China” be linked to “the People’s Republic of China”? The phenomenon has already implied both sides across the Taiwan Strait sharing important bond: the same China, otherwise, the consultations seemed ridiculous as well as needless. For example, it is irrational for Taiwan to discuss her “international space” with another third party, for example Japan. Ma did not clarify the connotation of “Taiwan’s international space”, and he as well did not specify what the dignity-loss has happened to the island. One point is

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<sup>237</sup> [http://news.ifeng.com/taiwan/3/200807/0718\\_353\\_661656.shtml](http://news.ifeng.com/taiwan/3/200807/0718_353_661656.shtml), viewed on July 19, 2008

<sup>238</sup> <http://english.www.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=19033&ctNode=1673&mp=10>, viewed on May 21, 2008

sure that the “international space” mentioned by Ma is in a rather wider perspective than the economy, because Taiwan has already played a vibrant role in the global economic field. From Taiwan’s perspective, ‘Taiwan had become completely democratic and had legitimate claims for greater participation in the international community. ...Taiwan had been treated unfairly on the world stage, where the PRC was suffocating it in every sense of the word’.<sup>239</sup> In terms of international space, Taipei is least satisfied.

In the past, either Taipei or Beijing was competing (by various means such as economic aid) to increase its number of diplomatic partners and reduce the number that the other side had. The diplomacy-competing situation is a zero-sum game. ‘It means it has the impact of undermining any trust that is built up in negotiations. Negotiation is an effort of build win-win solutions. But that is very difficult if both sides have a zero-sum game going on at the same time’.<sup>240</sup> Taipei is less likely to compete for more diplomatic recognition, but surely will not give up the one it already has. On 18 June 2008, in his interview with *New York Times*, Ma Ying-jeou said: ‘the Chinese Mainland’s expanding of diplomatic partnership to one “new” country means the losing of an “old” diplomatic partner correspondingly for Taiwan. The significance of expanding one-partnership is marginalized to the Chinese mainland, because it has established diplomatic relations with 171 countries. For Taiwan, maintaining relations with our current 23 diplomatic countries are vital

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<sup>239</sup> Shih Erich, *the Conduct of U.S.-Taiwan Relations 2000-2004*, the Brookings Institution, Washington, 2004, p15

<sup>240</sup> Richard Bush, *Untying the Knot: Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait*, Miller Reporting Co., Inc. Washington, 2005, p6

important for our dignity’.<sup>241</sup> Ma Ying-jeou’s statement indicated that Taiwan will spare no efforts to maintain the diplomatic relations she has already established.

An example exemplifies the difficulties of Ma Ying-jeou’s position. The official website of New Zealand Immigration office, on the page relating to “Taiwan passports”, reads as follows: ‘the New Zealand Government recognises the Government of the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal government of China, and consequently New Zealand has no official contacts with the present authorities in Taiwan. However, under an agreement with the People’s Republic of China, New Zealand may allow the entry bona fide private applicants from Taiwan’.<sup>242</sup> The outbound visit by people from Taiwan Island should be referred to the agreement between PRC (rather than Taiwan) and New Zealand. Will this case be interpreted as a kind of “losing dignity” to Taipei?

There is another case relating to Taipei’s dignity. Currently, in the international sports arena, Taipei hoists a specially designed white-colour-background flag: a centred plum blossom with the Olympic five rings as well as a white radiating sun surrounded by a blue round pie inside (hereinafter abbreviated as the WP flag). The formal flag for the Taiwan Island is a “white sun in blue sky” flag (hereinafter abbreviated as the WB flag, which flew on the Chinese Mainland from 1911 to 1949 and flew on Taiwan Island since it was resumed from Japan in 1945); the formal flag for the Chinese Mainland is a “five yellow stars in red background” flag (hereinafter abbreviated as the YR flag, which flew on the Chinese mainland since 1949). For Taipei, the ideal scenario is to hoist her WB flag if her athletes get the gold medal in 2008 Beijing

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<sup>241</sup> <http://news.wenxuecity.com/messages/200806/news-gb2312-634254.html>, viewed on June 20, 2008

<sup>242</sup> [http://www.immigration.govt.nz/nzis/operations\\_manual/2137.htm](http://www.immigration.govt.nz/nzis/operations_manual/2137.htm), viewed on May 30, 2008

Olympic Game; for Beijing, the ideal scenario is to host her YR flag for athletes from the Chinese Mainland as well as from Taiwan Island. The de facto situation is: Taipei hoists the WP flag rather than the WB flag for athletes only from Taiwan Island; Beijing hoists the YR flag only for athletes from the Chinese Mainland. Nobody knows whether the special WP flag is a sign of loss of dignity for Taipei, or whether the situation of “one China shares two flags” is a sign of non-unification to Beijing. Currently, it is rather a compromised status quo than a win-win scenario.

The status quo needs to be changed because some possible embarrassment or confusion may happen in international sports as well as other arenas. For example, if athletes from Chinese Mainland and Taiwan Island broke the world record for swimming at the same score in the Beijing Olympic Game, there will be a “two flags hoisting” scenario. (In hindsight, this scenario did not happen in the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games, but could be possible in the future.) Chinese people’s feeling would be very complicated and subtle. Beijing sticks to the principle of “in the context of one China, any issues can be discussed”. Obviously the unified formal flag representing the “one China” is included. The WB flag and the YR flag have already swung respectively for near six decades. People have got used to the two flags. To create a new flag accepted, as well as shared, by both sides is not an easy task. Fortunately, it is not an impossible mission.

People’s mindsets can be changed and their tolerances to the previously-unacceptable could be increased. After the earthquake happened on the Chinese Mainland on 12 May 2008, rescue and medical teams from Taiwan were sent to the disaster-affected areas. One photo revealed that one tent of Taiwan rescue and medical team was

marked with characters of “the Republic of Taiwan.”<sup>243</sup> The local citizens around the Taiwan medical team deployed showed tolerance to that, because they knew the title of ROC was a part of Chinese history. After the opening of the Beijing Olympic Games on 8 August 2008, some people in Taiwan Island also held the YR flag as well as the WB flag to celebrate; banners bore on their trucks read: ‘I am a Taiwanese and I am a Chinese too; same kinship, same hearts to welcome the Olympic Games.’<sup>244</sup>[the author’s English translation, and the original Chinese version is : 群族同心,迎接奥运;我是台湾人,也是中国人] It is not too risky to assume that a mutually-accepted flag could fly on the Chinese Mainland as well as on Taiwan Island in the future, provided the mass accepts it. As an assumption, the flag may be a double-faced one: one side is the YR flag, and the other side is the WB flag, although seemingly ridiculous so far; or alternatively, adding the sixth star which representing Taiwan Island to the YR flag or the WB flag changed its background colour from blue to red.

Flag-changing or flag sharing is a technical matter for politicians to deal with. For common people across the Taiwan Strait, it is a matter of psychological adjustment which needs time. As a symbolic image, if the in-name unification is needed, the flag issue can be resolved at the first stage, or at the last stage after all practical issues as well as political difficulties resolved. The in-name unification may be achieved through political rhetoric or even just through a ‘flag-changing’ ceremony.

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<sup>243</sup> <http://news.wenxuecity.com/messages/200805/news-gb2312-606957.html>, viewed on May 22, 2008

<sup>244</sup> <http://news.wenxuecity.com/messages/200808/news-gb2312-674204.html>, viewed on May 13, 2008

This has happened in Chinese history. On 29 December 1928, Zhan Xue-liang, the warlord who occupied Northeast China (famously known as “Manchuria” to the English-speaking people), proclaimed: the formal flag of his controlled area would be changed into the same as the one of ROC. At least, in name, from 29 December 1928, the Northeast China was not controlled by non-ROC administration. In 1937, the GMT Nanking government granted legality to the “Liberation Area” (the area was liberated from the invasion of Japan by the CPC in northwest China and then controlled by the CPC), although Nanking had no direct influence to the area. The outcome was, from 1937 to 1945, largely in name and sometimes in fact, all armed forces in China were coordinated to counter the invasion of Japan under the unified administration. So far, the in-name reunification, in short term, is not an urgent issue for Taiwan. ‘Reunification under even the most generous self-determination framework would require relinquishment of de facto sovereignty in many areas, and would not likely be supported by the majority in Taiwan unless the costs in decreased sovereignty were outweighed by significant benefits’.<sup>245</sup> Taipei intends to see the status quo maintained, provided its economy increased and its “international space” expanded.

The most urgent benefits which Taiwan Island intends to obtain from the Chinese Mainland are more economic favours to boost her sluggish economy. In his election campaign, Ma Ying-jeou highlighted his economic aspiration for Taiwan: the annual economic growth rate is 6 %, the annual per capital income reaches \$ 30,000 U.S., and the unemployment rate is under 3%. Taiwan Island will be closer than ever to the Chinese Mainland who is the first business partner of Taiwan, for the sake of

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<sup>245</sup> Peerenboom Randall, *China Modernizes: Threat to the West or Model for the Rest?* Oxford University Press, New York, 2007, p276

economical development. Some academics even argued that the Taiwan question can be easily resolved. ‘The main reason is the convergence that’s going on economically. Since the mid-1980s there’s been a significant growing interdependence between Taiwan and the mainland as Taiwan’s internationalized companies see the Chinese Mainland as their answer to remaining globally competitive’.<sup>246</sup> The “economy-propel-reunification” scenario is over simplified. The booming economic interdependence, maintaining as well as increasing for two decades since the Chinese Mainland implement an “open to the outside world” policy in 1980s, have not yet yielded the reunification. Taipei is more than sure that the economic dimension will not bring about the reunification which is not marked as the ultimate goal to Taipei. But reunification is Beijing’s ultimate goal.

Beijing’s vision covers a wider range. The seventh clause of *the Anti-Secession Law* passed on the Chinese Mainland in 2005, clarified the political issues it would like to discuss with Taiwan, not only ‘officially ending the state of hostility between the two sides’, but also including ‘steps and arrangements for peaceful national reunification’. Positioning the reunification across the Taiwan Strait as the ultimate goal is the fundamental point of difference between Beijing and Taipei. But presently, Beijing is more likely to welcome the in-name reunification, such as “flag-changing in Taipei” model, than to meet “reunification terms” proposed by Taipei. Taipei put a pre-condition to the reunification. On April 14, 2006, the Mainland Affairs Committee of Taiwan issued a report and stated:

China’s democratization is a key to the normalization of cross-strait relations and has been a focus of international attention. With regard to this, Taiwan’s successful experience of becoming a democracy, which has met the expectations of the world community, can serve as a model for China in the future. The international community should work with Taiwan to

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<sup>246</sup> Richard Bush, *Untying the Knot: Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait*, Miller Reporting Co., Inc. Washington, 2005, p3

help accelerate China's democratization so that new progress in cross-strait relations can be made.<sup>247</sup>

In this statement, Taipei raises the threshold for "new progress" rather than mention the reunification across the Taiwan Strait.

Taipei believes her democracy is more "advanced" than the Chinese Mainland. In his sworn-in speech, Ma Ying-jeou stated: 'Taiwan is the sole ethnic Chinese society to complete a second democratic turnover of power. Ethnic Chinese communities around the world have laid their hopes on this crucial political experiment. By succeeding, we can make unparalleled contributions to the democratic development of all ethnic Chinese communities'.<sup>248</sup> Fareed Zakaria categorizes Taiwan's democracy as the so-called East Asian Model---'capitalism and the rule of law first, and then democracy. South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and Malaysia were all governed for decades by military juntas or a single-party system. These regimes liberalize the economy, the legal system, and the rights of worship and travel, and then, decades later, held free elections'.<sup>249</sup> Although no one should deny Taiwan's democratic development, obviously, Taiwan overestimates herself. The democratization is an ongoing process for all communities in the world, because no one is perfect. Fareed Zakaria also argues: 'across the globe, democratically elected regimes...are routinely ignoring constitutional limits on their power and depriving their citizens of basic rights'.<sup>250</sup> Indeed, 'although democracies have wonderful merits and achievements, democracy itself needs be demythologized. It is merely an instrument of governance and its efficacy is conditional---on rule of law and certain social settings derived from

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<sup>247</sup> <http://www.mac.gov.tw/english/english/macpolicy/d950414.pdf>, viewed on June 19, 2008

<sup>248</sup> <http://english.www.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=19033&ctNode=1673&mp=10>, viewed on May 22, 2008

<sup>249</sup> Fareed Zakaria, *The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad*, Norton, New York, 2003, p55, referring to Brenk John, *The Cultural Contradictions of Democracy: Political Thought Since September 11*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2007

<sup>250</sup> *ibid*, p17

historical accidents'.<sup>251</sup> If Taiwan cannot have a clear understanding of the current social settings and political mechanism on the Chinese mainland or what the people on the Chinese Mainland need, Taiwan's "democratization precedents reunification" scenario is aimlessly empty. Rana Mitter, professor of Chinese politics at Oxford University argued: 'we all understand democracy as a multi-party system, but in China there has been a definition of democracy since Mao's time as popular participation, but not necessarily with the right to change the government'.<sup>252</sup> The political mechanism on the Chinese Mainland is different from Taiwan and fits its own situation.

The hierarchical sequence in China is a five-level administrative structure. From top to bottom, the levels are: the central government, the province as well as its equivalent, city or prefecture, county and town. Officials at these five levels are appointed by the People's Congress at various levels accordingly. The fifth clause of *the Organization Law for People's Congress* of the PRC, states: 'representatives of People's Congress at county and town level are voted directly by local people; representatives of People's Congress above the county level are voted from and by the one-level lower People's Congress'.<sup>253</sup> The clause means the election mechanism running on the Chinese Mainland is a combination of direct election and indirect election. One point should be highlighted here: the subordinate unit under the town in rural area is the village, and in urban area is the district; due to their small scale, there is no People's Congress. How could the daily governance at such a level be achieved? 'In 1987 the National People's Congress established the *Organic Law of Villagers' Committees*,

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<sup>251</sup> Suisheng Zhao, *Debating Political Reform in China: Rule of Law vs. Democratization*, An East Gate Book, New York, 2006, p4

<sup>252</sup> Malcolm Moore, *A Year of Great Expectations, the Dominion Post*, B2, *World*, October 16, 2008, extract from Telegraph Group

<sup>253</sup> <http://www.china.com.cn/chinese/law/690791.htm>, viewed on August 30, 2008

which effectively gave adult villagers the right to vote, stand for election and run committees of self-governance'.<sup>254</sup> In such context, the Village Committee actually is not a governmental establishment but an autonomous organization by villagers and for villagers. In 1998, *the Organization Law of Village Committee* was implemented to enable the direct election on the Chinese mainland, although limited in rural villages which are components of towns. The Law was to ensure the self-administration of citizens living in rural village. Its fourth clause reads: 'the town government can guide, support and help the village committee [directly elected by villagers], but it cannot intervene with the village committee's affairs designated by law'.<sup>255</sup> According to the law, discussion on fee-collecting, deposing of village leader and other affairs closely related to the life of all villagers should be subject to the village committee; the most important affairs should be referred to all villagers. In other words, according related laws, although the town is composed of villages, the main affairs of each village are not subject to the town government. But the current situation of direct election, on the village level, is not optimistically secured.

The intervention to the village committee is not rare in China. For example, there are one million people living in the Qian Jiang City of Huibei Province of China, with ten towns under its jurisdiction. 'According a report by *South Weekend* on October, 2002, 187 village leaders had been deposed by the Qian Jiang City government within 3 years'.<sup>256</sup> According to Ian Jeffries, 'township governments, which are responsible for several villages, believe that whoever is in charge should be subordinate to them'.<sup>257</sup>

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<sup>254</sup> Guthrie Doug, *China and Globalization: The Social, Economic and Political Transformation of Chinese Society*, Routledge, London, 2006, p291

<sup>255</sup> <http://www.jincao.com/fa/01/law01.32.htm>, viewed on June 4, 2008

<sup>256</sup> Zhu Ling, *The Story of a People's Representative*, Mirror Publisher, Hong Kong, 2005, p154

<sup>257</sup> Jeffries Ian, *China: A Guide to Economic and Political Developments*, Routledge, New York, 2006, p236

It strongly indicates that the situation of ensuring basic rights of villagers at grassroots is not satisfactory. For the urban area, the situation for direct election is lagging even behind the rural area. 'Since 1999 the central government has approved cautious experiments with direct elections in a few urban areas, albeit only at the level of the neighbourhood committee. These committees, like their counterparts in the villages, are not a formal branch of government'.<sup>258</sup> At this writing, on September 3, 2008, officials from the Civil Affairs Department of PRC stated that the coverage rate of direct election in urban area on sub-district level will reach 50% before 2010.<sup>259</sup> China's progress on direct election is at the initial stage and has a relatively long way to go.

Compared with Taiwan Island, direct election on the Chinese mainland is "lagging" behind. On Taiwan Island, the direct election of "President" was implemented in 1996. Democratization is relatively easy to be achieved on a small scale, for example, the ancient Athens city state. 'Taiwan has successfully completed the transition from authoritarian to democratic rule...the process has been rather slow and cautious'.<sup>260</sup> It is worthwhile to mention that 'in fact, a gradual and measured political transformation has been underway in China for well over a decade'.<sup>261</sup> As a big territory with a 1.3-billion population, it is rational to see the Chinese mainland adopt a different, as well as a gradual, way to realize democratization, which should fit its own characteristics. 'The most basic premise of China's approach is that reforms must be pragmatic and

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<sup>258</sup> Jeffries Ian, *China: A Guide to Economic and Political Developments*, Routledge, New York, 2006, p237

<sup>259</sup> <http://www.chinaelections.com/newsinfo.asp?newsid=132260>, viewed on September 4, 2008

<sup>260</sup> Svensson Marina, *Debating Human Rights in China: A Conceptual and Political History*, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, U.S.A., 2002, p300

<sup>261</sup> Guthrie Doug, *China and Globalization: The Social, Economic and Political Transformation of Chinese Society*, Routledge, London, 2006, p258

build on local circumstances'.<sup>262</sup> It will be very dangerous to put the Chinese Mainland into drastic political changes; no matter how "wonderful" they may be in other places, it is not a wise idea to make China an experimental arena. The different picture does not necessarily mean the Chinese Mainland is not on the way towards democratization. The direct election for village committee is of great significance and should not be ignored. 'The village elections are revolutionary in that they introduce villagers to the concept of democracy, and to the supervision of leaders by the electorate, including how money is spent'.<sup>263</sup> The great significance of the direct election for village leaders is: the institutional construction of the direct election on the Chinese Mainland is on track. 'We typically define democracy as the right to freely elect political leaders within a multiparty system, but the institutions that support democracy are significantly more complex than this simplistic democratic ideal'.<sup>264</sup> The village-level direct election is also a pre-trial to assess how far the direct election should go in order to fit characteristics on the Chinese mainland best. 'Today, village elections occur in some 700,000 villages across China, reaching 75 percent of the nation's 1.3 billion people'.<sup>265</sup> The direct election, whether on a provincial level or national level, is not a fixed benchmark to judge democratization or non-democratization.

The direct election for President will not necessarily generate a qualified leader. Taken the United States as an example, 'less than a quarter of Americans think President George Bush is doing a good job, the worst marks of his two-term

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<sup>262</sup> Peerenboom Randall, *China Modernizes: Threat to the West or Model for the Rest?* Oxford University Press, New York, 2007, p295

<sup>263</sup> Jeffries Ian, *China: A Guide to Economic and Political Developments*, Routledge, New York, 2006, p233

<sup>264</sup> Guthrie Doug, *China and Globalization: The Social, Economic and Political Transformation of Chinese Society*, Routledge, London, 2006, p258

<sup>265</sup> *ibid*, p291

presidency, a poll showed yesterday. Eighty per cent also believe the United States is on the wrong track....Vice-president Dick Cheney fared even worse than the president, just 18 per cent of Americans saying he was doing a good job'.<sup>266</sup> The direct election for choosing a President may not produce a satisfactory leader. If the election system is not set up to choose a qualified leader, what is the alternative function it can bear?

People can have other reasons to doubt the American style election.

Leading many (American) people's (complaining) lists is the dominance of money in elections. Parties are dependent on interest groups for financing---groups that take advantage of numerous loopholes in porous campaign finance regulations to funnel money to their preferred candidates, often in the guise of non-partisan infomercials that conceal the group's true identity and party affiliation. ....Also high on many people's list of complaints is the diminishment in the quality of civil discourse. Rather than the Habermasian utopia where citizens meet on equal terms to reason out their differences in a spirit of compromise, the public sphere is now dominated by demagogues competing to see who can shout the loudest and ideologues spouting prep-packaged sound bites.<sup>267</sup>

Alternatives, differently from the direct election for President, to choose national leader should be respected.

On the Chinese Mainland, the top leader is chosen in a unique way. Either the Chinese President or the Prime Minister, is not directly elected by popular voters but through the National People's Congress (the top legislator) which is composed of "people's representatives" nationwide. On the Taiwan Island, the top administrative leader is elected by citizens' direct voting since 1996. Can this two election method be mingled in a reunified China? Up to now, the Beijing-based National People's Congress does integrate "Taiwan representatives". In March 2008, thirteen members representing Taiwan attended the 11<sup>th</sup> session of the National People's Congress in Beijing. One point should be mentioned, the thirteen members are not based from Taiwan Island, but from the Chinese Mainland. According to the information issued

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<sup>266</sup> *the Dominion Post*, B2, *World*, New Zealand, June 19, 2008

<sup>267</sup> Peerenboom Randall, *China Modernizes: Threat to the West or Model for the Rest?* Oxford University Press, New York, 2007, p253-254

by the official website of the NPC, the above-mentioned ‘thirteen representatives are largely the second generation of Taiwan compatriots born on the Chinese Mainland’.<sup>268</sup> In order to elect the “people’s representatives” who representing Taiwan Island in the NPC, a unique way is adopted. Before the opening of the NPC, a consultation meeting, composed of Taiwan compatriots, will be convened. To elect the “people’s representatives” who representing Taiwan Island for the 11<sup>th</sup> NPC in 2008, according to the decision of the Standing Committee of the 10<sup>th</sup> NPC, ‘the consultation meeting is composed of 122 Taiwan compatriots and ...the election should be accomplished before December 2007’.<sup>269</sup> The 122 Taiwan compatriots are living in different provinces of the Chinese Mainland, but they “represent” the people living on Taiwan Island. In this context, although their legitimacies may be subtly embarrassing, so far, there is no alternative mechanism on the Chinese Mainland.

On the contrary, a parallel and de facto effective election system is available in Taiwan Island. The people living on Taiwan Island will elect their “legislative members” every four years in different election district. Likewise, administrative leaders such as the county chief or mayor are elected through direct voting on the Taiwan Island. On the Chinese Mainland, so far, the direct election of administrative leader is limited on the village level. Taiwan Island, as a province of China, is ceased to function by Taipei, but still fits the mindset of Beijing. Can the Taiwan model of direct election be promoted to other provinces of China? In the unified China, what is the legal status of the Taiwan-based “legislative members”? The possible option is that the Taiwan-based “legislative members” can be granted the membership of the “people’s representatives” in the NPC automatically by Beijing. The current NPC is

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<sup>268</sup> [http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/syxw/2008-01/14/content\\_1389363.htm](http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/syxw/2008-01/14/content_1389363.htm), viewed on June 13, 2008

<sup>269</sup> [http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2007-04/27/content\\_6036609.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2007-04/27/content_6036609.htm), viewed on June 12, 2008

composed of 2987. The figure of the Taiwan-based “legislative members” is 225. The ratio of the NPC is distributed proportionally to the population of each province of China. For example, the updated population in 2008 so far, for the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region, is 23.7 million. There are 58 “people’s representatives” of Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region for the 11<sup>th</sup> NPC in 2008. Taiwan Island shares the similar population with Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region; in the context of population proportional system, obviously 225 (legislative member) outnumbers 58 (people’s representative). The automatic membership-granting scenario for the Taiwan-based “legislative members” to dually hold the NPC membership is too ideal to be achieved. In order to connect the two political voting systems, a mechanism should be created. At least, Beijing and Taipei should discuss on the ratio issue, provided Taiwan accepts the NPC module. Even so, ‘many people in Taiwan are also fearful that gargantuan China will end up absorbing their tiny island if ties become too close’.<sup>270</sup> Although possible, it seemed less likely so far to use the dual-membership module to bridge the Taiwan Island into the Chinese Mainland.

Alternatively, a confederation or a federation mechanism is proposed to resolve the reunification issue between Beijing and Taipei. Richard Bush argues: ‘now, obviously, there have been examples of national unions composed of sovereign entities. That’s how the United States started out. That’s what the European Union is. These are not easy entities to construct. They’re very difficult to maintain. But they do exist’.<sup>271</sup> The mindset of Taiwan Island as a province of China is deeply rooted in the Chinese Mainland; the central government is hierarchically superior to component provinces. Any fine tuning, challenging the already-made mindset, will trigger not only the

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<sup>270</sup> Schuman, Michael, *Time*, May 12, 2008, p39

<sup>271</sup> Richard Bush, *Untying the Knot: Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait*, Miller Reporting Co., Inc. Washington, 2005, p4

national identification crisis but also political uncertainty on the Chinese Mainland. From the perspective of the Chinese Mainland, Taiwan's status is exactly the same as other Provinces. If the confederate system is applied to integrate both sides across the Taiwan Strait as a confederation, the Taiwan Province's status will be upgraded to an "independent state"; such is contrary to the long-holding "one China" policy by the Chinese Mainland. Likewise, the federal mechanism will not be effective as well. For many analysts, 'federalization is the best hope for China in holding the country together while coping with the many tensions generated by the vast size and enormous diversity of the country, by the de facto existence of Taiwan'.<sup>272</sup> The 28 provinces (as sub-governments under the Central Government) on the Chinese Mainland cannot, together with Taiwan Province (unfortunately, Taiwan Province, as a political entity, was suspended and ceased to function by Taipei unilaterally in 2001), act as respective independent "states" like the American states, to create a new Federation. 'Incongruities between the legal and the actual status of a territorial entity, in the context of the relationship between recognition as a government and recognition as a state, may produce problematic borderline cases as regards *de jure* sovereignty'.<sup>273</sup> Relating to sovereignty, the reunification across the Taiwan Strait cannot be realized in the state-equal footing (unilaterally favoured by Taipei) or the province-equal footing (unilaterally favoured by Beijing), except if a pivotal change will happen to both, in legal terms (probably on constitutional level) as well as with mindsets. The possibility of adopting a confederation system or federal system to resolve the Taiwan question is not the option for Beijing as a political scenario it would seem.

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<sup>272</sup> Chung Ho Jae, *Charting China's Future: Political, Social and International Dimensions*, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, UK, 2006, p81

<sup>273</sup> Kurtulus N. Ersun, *State Sovereignty: Concept, Phenomenon and Ramifications*, Palgrave, New York, 2005, p118

No updated information shows such possibility available so far.

The recent fashion for discussions of confederation, federation or provincial decentralization in a sense reflect a bafflement at China's size, leading to a conviction that the country must be divided into autonomous regional entities before it can become really democratic. Such proposals in effect revert to the old Chinese opposition pitting feudatories against bureaucrats, and if put into practice, their most probable result would be to plunge the country back into the traditional cycle of Chinese history, continually swinging between central autocracies and provincial oligarchies...to imagine changing the national structure of China from a unitary to a confederate or federal state, merely out of a good intention to solve the problem of unification, would be recklessly light-minded. The result could only be the opposite of what is intended---not only failing to assist unification, but also slowing down its democratization.<sup>274</sup>

The danger of break-up is always an ever-present consideration from China's past, and explains why the Taiwan status issue is so sensitive, quite apart from political preferences either side of the Taiwan Strait.

In 1985, Hu Yao-bang, the then General Secretary of the CPC, met a Hong Kong-based correspondent. Hu clarified why the confederation system did not apply to the Taiwan question and his remarks revealed the common stance held by the Chinese people, even up to now. Hu said: 'that is because a confederation would actually mean two Chinas, or one China and one Taiwan. As for adopting the form of a special administrative region for Taiwan, we can give it even more favoured treatment than we give Hong Kong. By favoured treatment, I mean that Taiwan can keep its local armed forces, without any change for several decades. That would be allowable'.<sup>275</sup>

The term, "a special administrative region (hereinafter referred as SAR) for Taiwan", is the reflection of the Beijing-proposed "one country, two systems" scenario. The direct sub-unit of the central government of the "one country", no matter "Province" or "SAR" it may be addressed, does not enjoy the sovereignty status. For example, Si-Chuan Province, located in southwest China, does not enjoy the right to establish

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<sup>274</sup> Wang ChaoHua, *One China Many Paths*, Verso, New York, 2003, p264, P273

<sup>275</sup> Lu Keng, *An Interview with Hu Yaobang*, Sino Daily Express, New York, 1985, p11

diplomatic relations with other countries; the Si-Chuan provincial government has no right to give orders to armed forces stationed within Si-Chuan or purchase arms from foreign countries. Except the diplomatic and military right as well as other rights belonging to the central government, Chinese province-level entities (including Provinces, Special Administrative Regions, Ethnic Autonomous Areas and Municipality directly under the Central Government) enjoy wide ranges of administrative rights. The setting-up of SAR is subject to the National People's Congress, the top legislature of China. Special terms will be tailored to SAR to settle unique problems left by history.

Some commentators doubt the possibility of solving the Taiwan question through the Hong Kong model. Wong Man-fong, the former member of the policy task force which studied the issue of the resumption of China's sovereignty over Hong Kong, argued:

the act of resuming sovereignty over Hong Kong cannot be duplicated in Taiwan, for in Hong Kong the British government must withdraw, but in Taiwan, sovereignty is a non-issue. There is no central government in Hong Kong, but there is one in Taiwan (though Beijing does not admit it, the central government of Taiwan does exist). Therefore the model of resuming sovereignty over Hong Kong can hardly reapplied directly in Taiwan.<sup>276</sup>

The ambiguity would seem to be between the terms "government" and "administration". Wong's argument triggers people to ask whether there is a central government on Taiwan Island. In other words, the legal character or status of the Taiwan authorities, before reunification, should be clarified. Essentially, it is a matter of sovereignty. For example, whether there could be a national reunification mechanism that preserves Taipei's claim of being a sovereign entity; whether the reunified China could be with a dual sovereignty.

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<sup>276</sup> Wong Man Fong, *China's Resumption of Sovereignty over Hong Kong*, Hong Kong Baptist University, Hong Kong, 1998, p43

Nowadays, it is vital important for both sides across the Taiwan Strait to find a mutual-acceptable answer. Needless to say how to resolve the Taiwan question, even to describe the situation across the Taiwan Strait is not an easy task. Ersun N. Kurtulus offers an interesting version which creates a concise description to delineate the current status quo across the Taiwan Strait and his description highlights the core of the problem. He regards the current status across the Taiwan Strait is 'where a territorial entity is recognized de jure as a government over a more extensive territory than it in fact controls instead of being recognized as a state within the more limited territory that it actually controls. Such an incongruity marks, for instance, the situation of the People's Republic of China after 1971 and Taiwan before that same date'.<sup>277</sup> Meanwhile, the reality is pressing people to address the sovereignty question which cannot be bypassed.

The recent Taiwan-Japan ship collision issue triggers people to think in another dimension about the sovereignty issue across the Taiwan Strait. On June 12, 2008, "Union" (a fishing ship from the Taiwan Island) was damaged and sunk by a Japanese patrolling ship, near the disputed the Fishing Island (also known as Senkaku Island). Taiwan people were furiously angry with the incident, which they believed was done deliberately made Japan. On 15 June 2008, the leader Maritime Security Branch of the 11<sup>th</sup> Management Area of Japan, in a press conference said: 'the (Japanese) patrolling ship was approaching to confirm the hull name of the (Taiwan fishing ship), and this action was a right conduct. But the way it approached was with mistakes available. We feel sorry for the sinking of the fishing ship and the injuries of the

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<sup>277</sup> Kurtulus N. Ersun, *State Sovereignty: Concept, Phenomenon and Ramifications*, Palgrave, New York, 2005,p118

Captain'.<sup>278</sup> He also said that Japan will consider the compensation if Taiwan delivers a demand. On 16 June 2008, "*Full Families Happy*" (a fishing ship from Taiwan) under the escort of warships, approached the Senkaku Island to show the presence of sovereignty. The closest distance to the Senkaku Island, approached by the "*Full Families Happy*", is 0.4 nautical miles (741 meters). The Japanese patrolling ship demanded the "*Full Families Happy*" to leave the "Japanese maritime territory". Huang Hansong, the leader of the Maritime Patrolling Team of Jilong City of Taiwan, responded: '[Japanese] Maritime Security Bureau patrolling ships! Here is the maritime territory of the Republic of China. Our ship has the navigation right. Please do not harass her navigation'.<sup>279</sup> On June 17, 2008, in Beijing, the spokeswoman of the Foreign Ministry of the People's Republic of China said: 'we'd like to emphasize again that the Fishing Island as well as its affiliated islands are the innate territories of China. China has the indisputable sovereignty over them. We demand Japan stop her misconduct adjacent to the Fishing Island and prevent similar issues happening again'.<sup>280</sup> One point should be highlighted here that the spokeswoman of PRC, in her articulation, chose the general word "China" rather than the specific word "PRC".

It can be interpreted as an indication that China's sovereignty can be jointly shared as well defended by the two sides across the Taiwan Strait, no matter what name each side self-claims. On the same day, Ma Ying-jeou said to the media: 'the Fishing Island is the territory of Republic of China, and it is the affiliated island of Taiwan as well'.<sup>281</sup> Ma also expressed that all "international" disputes should be resolved in a peaceful way. If all peaceful ways have failed, the non-peaceful means may be

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<sup>278</sup> <http://news.qq.com/a/20080616/001558.htm>, viewed on June 18, 2008

<sup>279</sup> <http://news.qq.com/a/20080618/000085.htm>, viewed on June 18, 2008

<sup>280</sup> <http://news.qq.com/a/20080617/002924.htm>, viewed on June 18, 2008

<sup>281</sup> <http://news.qq.com/a/20080617/002919.htm>, viewed on June 18, 2008

resorted to. On June 20, official representatives from Japan visited the home of the victimized Captain of *Union*, and forwarded an apologizing letter. Although the collision issue was resolved in a peaceful way, no one can exclude the possibility that such conflict may escalate into non-peaceful confrontation. If the worst-case scenario came true and the non-peaceful means was inevitable, would Taipei accept Beijing's assistance, if offered by Beijing? If the Chinese Mainland is in an armed dispute with other countries, what is the stance of Taipei will hold? Will Taipei come to defend the sovereignty of China? Because the territory claimed by the respective Constitution of Beijing and Taipei is overlapping, the people on the Chinese Mainland as well as on Taiwan Island should together shoulder the same responsibility to defend it. The "sovereignty co-defended" scenario may touch a sensitive chord of either side across the Taiwan Strait who has not been prepared how to behave in such "international arena" to confront together with the third party, for example Japan. At the time of writing, Qiu Jin-yin, the former Deputy Chairman of the Strait Exchange Foundation, on September 5, 2008, proposed that 'two sides across the Taiwan Strait should act as a joint to safeguard the Chinese territorial sovereignty under each side's administration and cooperate to counter a third party'.<sup>282</sup> [the author's English translation] Interesting enough, such co-defence of China's sovereignty did take place, at least in folk arena by people from both sides of the Taiwan Strait. In March 2008, after the riot took place in Tibet, the overseas torch-relay for the Beijing Olympics was disrupted by some pro-Tibet-independence activists. One photo revealed<sup>283</sup>, in France, students from the Chinese Mainland as well as from the Taiwan Island, stood shoulder by shoulder and held the WB flag as well as the YR

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<sup>282</sup> <http://www.chinareviewnews.com/doc/1007/3/9/7/100739757.html?coluid=1&kindid=0&docid=100739757&mdate=0906005218>, viewed on September 6, 2008

<sup>283</sup> <http://web.wenxuecity.com/BBSView.php?SubID=taiwan&MsgID=346771>, viewed on April 20, 2008

flag, to protest the pro-Tibet-independence action. This is an example of co-defending China's sovereignty. It passes a signal that there is something more important than political rift within one national family.

Unfortunately, the "co-defending sovereignty" scenario in military context, although most important, is more difficult. So far, there is no mechanism available to coordinate the armed forces across the Taiwan Strait at the initial mutual-trust-building stage warmed up just in May 2008. The mindset regarding to the relationship between armed forces and the state, for both sides across the Taiwan Strait, is sharply different. The Chinese Mainland upholds the principle of "Party commands the gun"; while on the Taiwan Island, the civil administration rather than the DPP or GMT commands the armed forces. The difference will trigger people to think, in the reunified China, what is the way to command the armed forces? Beijing states: Taiwan may maintain its own armed forces, provided no threat could be formed towards the Mainland. Taipei states: no peace will be achieved under the missile threat from Beijing. Taiwan may favours that the Chief of the Nanjing Military Command (the Command lying geographically opposite to Taiwan Island) should be appointed upon the advice of the Taiwan side. The feeling of insecurity is seemingly from weapons; in fact it comes from the non-confidence to the people who control the weapons.

For securing peace, to erase the suspicion between people will be more effective than to eradicate weapons. For the sake of counter future military threats (not necessarily generating across the Taiwan Strait) as well as self-defence, it is impossible to eliminate arsenals either for Beijing or Taipei. The possible way is to build up the

mutual-trust mechanism. For decades, both sides across the Taiwan Strait were suspicious of each other. ‘The core of the mistrust problem is that each side is so suspicious of the other that, even if you could have the perfect substantive solution, one side is going to so suspect that the other will cheat, that it’s not going to be willing to make the concessions in order to get the substantive deal. It will fear that it’s going to be exploited and put in even a worse position’.<sup>284</sup> If the mutual-trust is established, Taipei may think it is less likely to become the target of missiles available on the Chinese Mainland. Surely, Taipei is more likely to see her security is not only ensured by the economic reciprocity, but also by the political reliability on the Chinese Mainland.

The political mechanism running on the Chinese Mainland is different from that on Taiwan Island. Taiwan regards the Chinese-Mainland-model political system is less reliable. This is the root for Taiwan’s lacking of confidence for the Chinese Mainland. As the ruling party, the CPC still enjoys legitimacy of administration. Actually, ‘China’s authoritarian system is not stagnant; instead, its resiliency-its constant ability to adjust to new environments and its introduction of some legal, administrative, social, and political reforms-may actually make the system sustainable. This is what Andrew Nathan characterizes as “China’s resilient authoritarianism”’.<sup>285</sup> There is no clear signal that Beijing would change its currently-running political system in a dramatic way. ‘In 2002, former (Chinese) President Jiang Ze-min vowed that China would reform but would “never copy any models of the political system of the

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<sup>284</sup> Richard Bush, *Untying the Knot: Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait*, Miller Reporting Co., Inc. Washington, 2005, p7

<sup>285</sup> Cheng Li, “China in the Year 2020: Three Political Scenarios”, *Asia Policy*, July 2007, p28

West”’.<sup>286</sup> On March 19, 2008, Wu Bang-guo, the top legislator of China (the number two politician in the CPC), on the first session of the Standing Committee of the 11<sup>th</sup> NPC highly praised the mechanism of “People’s Congress” which is the best power-utilizing mechanism fits China. Wu said: ‘we will proactively learn from great achievements of human beings’ civilization, including political achievements. We will never copy what the West has done, never implement the mechanism of administrating by multi-party in rotation, never allow “three branch powers” set up in a isolated way, and never put in action of the system of upper and lower House’.<sup>287</sup> [the author’s English translation] The current political centralized mechanism of the Chinese Mainland, although far from perfect and different from the Western style democracy, so far so well fits the Chinese features. Likewise, with a New Zealand local government issue, in 2007, a Royal Commission was set up by New Zealand Government to examine and report on what local and regional governance is needed for the Auckland region. ‘Most submissions [to the commission] are strongly in favour of a single authority to replace the eight territorial authorities’.<sup>288</sup> Alex Swney (former mayoral candidate and Heart of the City lobby group head), ‘echoed the views of many in saying the current regime was fragmented, duplicated, obstructive and costly’.<sup>289</sup>

Wang Chao-hua argues: ‘historically, however, centralized power has not invariably been authoritarian, and provincially divided power has by no means always been democratic. A famous remark by Tocqueville comes to mind: “for my part, I cannot conceive that a nation can live or above all prosper without strong governmental

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<sup>286</sup> Malcolm Moore, *A Year of Great Expectations*, *the Dominion Post*, B2, *World*, October 16, 2008, extract from Telegraph Group

<sup>287</sup> <http://news.qq.com/a/20080416/002728.htm>, viewed on April 17, 2008

<sup>288</sup> Kim Ruscoe, *The Dominion Post*, June 25, 2008, A4

<sup>289</sup> *ibid*, A4

centralization”<sup>290</sup> Considering Auckland’s quest for “one clear voice”, there is no much difficult to understand why China, the 1.3- billion-population country, needs a cohesive leadership, a central route and a common view. ‘The way to build a democracy in a big country is not to divide the large into small, but on the contrary to place value on the large as such’.<sup>291</sup> Cheng Li concludes that ‘in the eyes of many, an authoritarian, stable, and prosperous China can be a credible political alternative to Western models of democracy’.<sup>292</sup> In Malcolm Moore’s perspective, ‘many Chinese commentators favour a “guided democracy”, similar to Singapore, where ostensibly free elections have always resulted in victory for the ruling People’s Action Party’.<sup>293</sup> Currently, the Chinese Mainland maintains a momentum of prosperity as well as stability.

A dramatic shift in the political system is less likely to take place on the Chinese Mainland. A gradual and fine-tuned political improvement is better than a drastic experimental change, regarding China as a country with huge territory as well as population. Zhou Tian-yong<sup>294</sup> said that “by 2020, China will basically finish its political and institutional reforms...we have a 12-year plan to establish a democratic platform...there will be public democratic involvement at all government levels...the transition to democracy is essential for relations with Taiwan and a possible peaceful reunification”.<sup>295</sup> Meanwhile, Taipei cannot demand Beijing to transplant the Taiwan-model political system, because there is no elixir for all. As a matter of fact,

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<sup>290</sup> Wang ChaoHua, *One China Many Paths*, Verso, New York, 2003, p263

<sup>291</sup> *ibid*, p263

<sup>292</sup> Cheng Li, “China in the Year 2020: Three Political Scenarios”, *Asia Policy*, July 2007, p28

<sup>293</sup> Malcolm Moore, *A Year of Great Expectations, the Dominion Post*, B2, *World*, October 16, 2008, extract from Telegraph Group

<sup>294</sup> Zhou Tian-yong is the deputy head of research at the Central Party School, the most important institution for training senior Chinese leaders, and he is also an adviser to the CPC’s central committee. Zhou received a PhD in economics from Dongbei University of Finance in China.

<sup>295</sup> *China to Be Democracy by 2020, the Dominion Post*, B2, *World*, October 16, 2008, extract from Telegraph Group

the political mechanism running on Taiwan Island is not the mechanical copy of the West as well. Regarding Taiwan's political system, there are five bodies sharing powers. The Executive House is headed by the Executive Chief, and is the executive body of the "President" who is directly elected by people every four years since 1996. The Legislative House is the top legislator. The Judiciary guarantees the rule of law and protects human rights. Different from the America-style three-branch system, there were another two Houses in Taiwan. The Examination House makes the civil services sound. The Control House redresses mistakes by the government and censures malfeasance by civil servants. Since there are no universal norms to abide by, Taiwan's insistence on a political mechanism-changing on the Chinese Mainland may find no foot-holds to put feet on.

Taipei cannot demand Beijing to copy its own political model. The political reliability of the Chinese Mainland, upon which the Taipei's security relies, would not necessarily need to be guaranteed by the Taipei-model mechanism, but by the incremental political improvements on the Chinese Mainland. To achieve so, the best option, for Taipei, is to act as Beijing's de facto opposition party with propelling power, but not in a provocative way, such as the pro-Taiwan-independence movement. Taipei's security cannot be achieved through any provocative ways.

The pro-independence policy did create an immediate problem for Beijing to deal with, especially from 2000 to 2008. At the same time, the provocative DPP did a favour to Beijing whose "unification surpasses other issues" policy is largely enhanced and accepted by people in order to safeguard the national unity. If such provocative actions on Taiwan Island developed into the extreme option of independence, the choice for Beijing will be relatively simple, once Taipei declares

independence through whatever means. For example, if Taipei changes its formal title from “Republic of China” to “Republic of Taiwan”, Beijing will have no space to make concessions but reunify Taiwan Island through the use of armed force.

After the armed conflict, apart from war trauma, there are two possible outcomes. The first scenario is: the political setting on the Chinese Mainland will be maintained as ever, and most likely will be transplanted to Taiwan Island which would have no choice, on the assumption of being defeated by the Chinese Mainland, and vice versa. In recent years, the military situation across the Taiwan Strait is more favourably leaning to the Chinese Mainland. Short of strategic depth as well as an isolated island, Taipei, without third party strong support, is less likely to defend a large scale military attack from the Chinese Mainland. Michael McDevitt (Real Admiral, retired), the Vice President and Director of the Centre for Naval Analyses at the CAN Corporation, argues: ‘the PLA’s (the abbreviation of the armed forces of Beijing) ballistic missile force provides China with a military capability for which there are still no proven defence; Beijing today has the ability to punish Taiwan immediately should the island declare independence. The Patriot PAC-3 missile defence system has been fielded and shows potential, but has yet to prove itself against a large number of incoming missiles’.<sup>296</sup> Fortunately, according to McDevitt, ‘Beijing’s policy has changed focus from promoting reunification to simply preventing Taiwanese independence...Beijing has only emphasized forcible alternatives because Taipei would otherwise choose independence. By implication, this suggests that Beijing would back away from

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<sup>296</sup> McDevitt Michael, *Taiwan: The Tail That Wags Dogs*, <http://nbr.org/publications/asia-policy/pdf/ap/-mcdevitt.pdf>, p85, viewed on August 15, 2008

forcible alternatives if Taipei would refrain from initiatives that make Beijing worry about de jure independence'.<sup>297</sup>

The other possible outcome is that: neither side can secure an absolute victory at the cost they have consumed. A long-time agonizing stalemate would be maintained. Such scenario will be a huge setback to the current situation as well as a catastrophe to the people across the Taiwan Strait. It is not a nice picture but a double-lose situation. Fortunately, the GMT is less provocative but more practical and it has retaken power on Taiwan. In his swearing-in speech, Ma Ying-jeou said: 'we care about the welfare of the 1.3 billion people of mainland China, and hope that mainland China will continue to move toward freedom, democracy and prosperity for all the people. This would pave the way for the long-term peaceful development of cross-strait relations'. If Ma really cares the welfare of the 1.3 billion as well as Taiwan's own security, he should get himself as well as his policy closer to the Chinese Mainland rather than sitting still. Ma's predecessor, Chen Sui-bian, on the extreme, focused too much on the political leverage to secure his presidency, and unwisely in a provocative way to challenge the Chinese Mainland. Ma takes a shift and focuses on something practical in economic arena. Hopefully, his vision will not be limited within economy. Pushing the improvement of the political system on the Chinese Mainland can be coincided with the appealing of the people which is one of important leverages on the Chinese Mainland, if Ma deals with it in an artful and less provocative way. 'Last year's protests (2007) by thousands of citizens in the coastal city of Xiamen against plans to build a billion-dollar chemical factory ultimately forced the cancellation of the project'.<sup>298</sup> It is an example that the Chinese people take

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<sup>297</sup> McDevitt Michael, *Taiwan: The Tail That Wags Dogs*, <http://nbr.org/publications/asia-policy/pdf/ap/-mcdevitt.pdf>, p82-84, viewed on August 15, 2008

<sup>298</sup> Elegant Simon, *Time*, September 8, 2008, p45

matters into their own hands. So far, the people on the Chinese Mainland have two aspirations: the national reunification and improvement in democracy.

Unfortunately, Taipei, for a long time, has put reunification in the sequence after Chinese mainland's democratization. The "democratization-first" model, held by politicians on Taiwan Island, normally will be regarded by the people on the Chinese Mainland, as a pretext to write off reunification, or a least sincere sign. This is a fundamental mistrust between the two sides. Taipei, self-claimed as a successful democracy, likes to act, in a high profile, as a lecturer to teach Beijing a democratic lesson for how to behave well, such action is another seed which may ferment rift. Although admiring the democracy achieved on Taiwan Island which is mirror of reflection for all, the people on the Chinese Mainland regard that the Taiwan-style democracy itself is far from perfect and cannot be set as a model for others to copy. Chinese people are more likely to accept such proposal: after the reunification, people on both sides of Taiwan Strait, work as a whole to improve democracy. In short, it is a "reunification first and then reunification propels democratization" scenario. This scenario does matter especially the scandal of Chen Sui-bian"(served from 2000-2008), the former leader of Taiwan Island, has been exposed recently. On 14 August, in a press conference, Chen acknowledged that a sum of money, as a so-called left-by fund raised for previous "President" campaigns, had been transferred to an overseas secret bank account, but he did not mention the specific number and did not answer any questions. Chen said: "my conscience tells me that I cannot keep on cheating myself as well as others".<sup>299</sup> On the next day, Chen withdrew from the Democratic Progressive Party. His former deputy, Lu Hsiu-lien (the then "Vice President" of the

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<sup>299</sup> <http://news.wenxuecity.com/messages/200808/news-gb2312-677081.html>, viewed on August 15, 2008

ROC) disclosed on August 16, 2008: ‘in a telephone conversation at the night before yesterday, Chen acknowledged that a 200-million USD sum had been remitted to overseas. ...How impossible it is! How stupid it is! How greedy it is! I do believe this issue really needs a thorough review and sincere reflection. I feel so ashamed!’<sup>300</sup> On 13 November 2008, a court on Taiwan Island ordered the detention of Chen on corruption charges. ‘His questioning by a special team of prosecutors focused on allegations he laundered money and made illegal use of the special presidential fund during his eight years in office which ended in May’.<sup>301</sup> Although the outcome of judicial investigation has not been produced, the people on Taiwan Island feel that they have been fooled by Chen Sui-bian for eight years.

To the Chinese Mainland, this scandal reduces the credibility of the self-claimed Taiwan style democratic model as well as the democratization-first scenario. The “reunification first and then reunification propels democratization” scenario will have more appeal among the people on the Chinese Mainland, who, like other people of the world, are keen to improve their democratic rights as well, but do not welcome the intention threatening their national unity. Ma got this point very well, so he said: ‘I know what the Chinese people objects is the independence of Taiwan in nominal sense’.<sup>302</sup> [the author’s English translation, and the original Chinese version is: 中国人反对名义上的台湾独立] Ma should know more about the situation on the Chinese Mainland, because Taiwan Island’s future is closely related to the Chinese Mainland. ‘Today, there are millions of Taiwanese residing in mainland China. In Shanghai alone, there are over half a million. These Taiwanese realize that Taiwan

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<sup>300</sup> <http://news.wenxuecity.com/messages/200808/news-gb2312-679347.html>, viewed on August 17, 2008

<sup>301</sup> AP, *the New Zealand Herald*, Auckland, November 13, 2008, A13

<sup>302</sup> <http://news.wenxuecity.com/messages/200805/news-gb2312-597977.html>, viewed on May 10, 2008

cannot survive without the Chinese mainland'.<sup>303</sup> The cultural and economic relationship across the Taiwan Strait has been on a stable track for three decades and could not be changed.

What may be changed are the political circumstances. Although since the GMT retook power on Taiwan Island and the political tension was relived, basic differences remain untouched. Although both sides agree to shelf controversies, Taiwan Island still believe a more democratic Chinese Mainland can maintain the cross-Strait situation safer for a long time. Cheng Li, a senior fellow of the Brookings Institution, outlined three possibilities for China in his paper *China in the Year 2020: Three Political Scenarios*: the emergence of a democratic China, prolonged chaos and a resilient, authoritarian China.<sup>304</sup> The chaos scenario is not likely to happen, except a big political crisis.

Chinese history teaches us that no regime has collapsed there (in both imperial and republican eras) until: 1. it “lost the mandate of heaven”, or rule by consent of the people; 2. the “dynastic cycle” ended; it became soft and corrupted beyond hope of redemption or fulfilment of traditional expectations of virtuous rule; and 3. internal contradictions reached a crisis of disunity, faced by armed rebellion or foreign invasion beyond the capability of the regime to resolve.<sup>305</sup>

It is hard to deny that currently within the Chinese Mainland, a number of problems, such as unemployment, corruption, uneven development, and so on, are emerging; but at the same time, resolutions are also delivered to tackle them. The pressure is mounting while depressurization is employed.

It is an interaction which has been balanced and handled relatively well so far. If there is no large explosion, the Chinese Mainland will not find itself in a chaotic,

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<sup>303</sup> Lee Khoo Choy, *Pioneers of Modern China: Understanding the Inscrutable Chinese*, World Scientific, Singapore, 2005, p471

<sup>304</sup> [http://nbr.org/publications/asia\\_policy/AP4/AP4%20China%20RT.pdf](http://nbr.org/publications/asia_policy/AP4/AP4%20China%20RT.pdf), viewed on August 3, 2008

<sup>305</sup> Snow Edgar, *Read China Today*, A Pelican Book, UK, 1974, p34

unmanageable situation. ‘State legitimacy is largely performance based...the majority of [Chinese] citizens want strong leaders who can deliver the goods, and are willing to given them great leeway in pursuing their goals’.<sup>306</sup> It is said, if there are no massive protests on national level as happened in 1989 with Tiananmen Square and there are no big setbacks in economy, the legitimacy of the current political arrangement on the Chinese Mainland will not be dramatically challenged. This thesis believes that only the corruption or political scandal of core leaders on Chinese Mainland, if it is exists, is proved and then disclosed, can trigger the explosion, because the people will have a strong sense of being fooled; otherwise, the fundamental political setting on the Chinese Mainland will not be changed.

Another explosion, as a catalyst for political reform as well as democratic improvement, is the new input Taipei may offer. The offer is that Taipei is likely to return to China and the demands the right of being one real member of China. For example, a political figure from Taiwan Island, as a citizen of China if he or she self-identifies, is deserved the right to campaign on the Chinese Mainland for the post of the Chinese President. If he or she really cares the welfare of the 1.3 billion people on the Chinese Mainland, he or she should be prepared to handle a brand-new situation different from Taiwan Island. If such political a figure emerged on Taipei, Beijing has no reason to refuse “reunification first and then reunification propels democratization” scenario.

The democratization on the Chinese Mainland relies on the empowerment of the liberal strength among the CPC which needs the support of the people at the grass-roots level. Zhang Bo-shu, an assistant research fellow at the Chinese Academy of

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<sup>306</sup> Peerenboom Randall, *China Modernizes: Threat to the West or Model for the Rest?* Oxford University Press, New York, 2007, p245

Social Sciences argues that ‘China’s biggest challenge is to figure out a way to change its one-party system without revolution. Reformers, intellectuals, and ordinary people need to work together to change the system’.<sup>307</sup> Putting reunification first by Taipei, as an important political gesture, although it is different from the actual reunification which needs more detailed arrangements by both sides across the Taiwan Strait, will get enormous appeals from the people on the Chinese Mainland and consequently lend propelling strength to the liberal figures among the CPC. Although the diversity (which is a precondition for democratization) has been emerging in the Chinese political arena, it still needs a pushing force.

Historically, when (the CPC) party elites have gotten too close to explicitly supporting political reform, the rest of the elite circle has closed ranks on them, immediately purging them from their positions and stripping them of any political power whatsoever...certain reform-minded elites have brought about significant political change without ever mentioning political change directly.<sup>308</sup>

This implies the political reform on the Chinese Mainland still need impetus to bring it from the behind. Cheng Li, in his article *China’s Fifth Generation: Is Diversity a Source of Strength or Weakness*, emphasizes: ‘given the absence of well-established institutions for facilitating public participation in the political system, fifth generation leaders [normally will take the ruling power on the Chinese Mainland in 2012] may find it challenging to resolve instances of policy deadlock without appealing to mass public opinion’.<sup>309</sup> Zhou Tian-yong<sup>310</sup> argues ‘[Chinese] citizens’ steadily rising democratic consciousness...make it increasingly urgent to press ahead with demands

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<sup>307</sup> Doyle Randall, *America and China: Asia-Pacific Rim Hegemony in the Twenty-first Century*, Lexington Books, New York, 2007, p181

<sup>308</sup> Guthrie Doug, *China and Globalization: The Social, Economic and Political Transformation of Chinese Society*, Routledge, London, 2006, p295-296

<sup>309</sup> [http://www.nbr.org/publications/asia\\_policy/AP6/AP6\\_D\\_Li.pdf](http://www.nbr.org/publications/asia_policy/AP6/AP6_D_Li.pdf), viewed on August 17, 2008, p92

<sup>310</sup> Zhou Tian-yong is the deputy head of research at the Central Party School, the most important institution for training senior Chinese leaders, and he is also an adviser to the CPC’s central committee. Zhou received a PhD in economics from Dongbei University of Finance in China.

for political system reform...China's tiny grassroots movements could play a larger role'.<sup>311</sup>

Actually, top leaders of the PRC attach great importance to establish channels between them and the masses. On 20 June 2008, Chinese President Hu Jin-tao, logged on the People's Network and had an on-line communication with netizens. By February 2008, the number of netizens on the Chinese Mainland had reached 221 millions.<sup>312</sup>[the author's English translation] The Chinese top leader understands the significance of people's support. On 4 September 2008, the People's Network (sponsored and recognized by the CPC) opened a website<sup>313</sup> for fans of the Chinese President Hu Jin-tao and Premier Wen Jiao-bao. On the front page, there is a special "support click" button, and within four days since its opening there are more than 300,000 people click the button to show their appreciations to the two top leaders of China....more than 40,000 netizens are registered as fans of Hu-Wen and the figure of registered fans group is increasing in the speed of 2 thousand per hour.<sup>314</sup> This thesis argues the clicking action is not an enforced one, because the author himself is voluntarily one of the 300,000. New technology is beginning to provide an increased direct means of communication between the leadership and larger number of ordinary people.

Taipei should not ignore the power of the people on the Chinese Mainland or underestimate her role, and she should act as a pushing force rather than an outsider.

Getting appeals from the people on the Chinese Mainland could become the leverage

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<sup>311</sup> Malcolm Moore, *A Year of Great Expectations, the Dominion Post*, B2, *World*, October 16, 2008, extract from Telegraph Group

<sup>312</sup> <http://news.qq.com/a/20080423/003953.htm>, viewed on April 25, 2008

<sup>313</sup> the address for the website is : <http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/8198/132796/index.html>

<sup>314</sup> Paraphrased from <http://news.wenxuecity.com/messages/200809/news-gb2312-695938.html>, viewed on September 8, 2008

point as well as a stepping stone between the liberal CPC and the constructive GMT. The “reunification first and then reunification propels democratization” scenario, if possible, being agreed upon by ruling parties across the Taiwan Strait, will be an ideal option for both parties as well as people. If the conservative strength of the ruling party on the Chinese Mainland takes the upper hand and declines the proposal, it will lose points in hearts of the people; in such context, Taipei should unilaterally present the proposal. It will change the strategic political setting across the Taiwan Strait. Currently, such potential candidate who has weight on both sides across the Taiwan Strait may be Mr. Ma Ying-jeou. On 14 August 2008, Soong Chu-yu (or James Soong, the Chairman of the People First Party on Taiwan Island) received an interview of Hong Kong-based Phoenix TV station, revealed his conversation with Mr. Ma Ying-jeou after his taking office. Soong told Ma: ‘what you have received from your predecessor is an unfavourable legacy. To deal with a difficult situation, lots of things are not in your control, for example the surging petroleum price and the gloomy world economy. But there is one thing, on which, you can play influential impact---the situation across the Taiwan Strait, and this is in your hands’.<sup>315</sup> [the author’s English translation]

The permanent peace across the Taiwan Strait, in essence, relies on mutually-beneficial negotiation. While maintaining one’s fundamental interest, and the same time meeting the other side’s demand, in such context, a negotiation could most possibly be sealed. Maybe! The political calculation is not different from the business bargain and engaged parties will consider what they can offer and be offered. So far, what Taipei can offer is not the scandal-bound Taiwan-style democracy but the reunification across the Taiwan Strait, no matter it is a nominal reunification in the

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<sup>315</sup> <http://blog.ifeng.com/article/1679455.htm>, viewed on September 1, 2008

short term or a promise in the future. At least it should do it right now. This bold action may, at the very beginning, face opposition on Taiwan Island, especially from the deep Green bloc, but since it will win the hearts of most people on the Chinese Mainland and then politicians on the Chinese Mainland can never again find grounds to stage military action towards Taiwan Island. The people's voice on the Chinese Mainland could become the most reliable guarantee for the peace across the Taiwan Strait. Ma should understand it is the time for him to step in to act as a catalyst and lending leverage to the liberal strength in the CPC. Is Mr. Ma prepared?

Probably, Mr. Ma is relatively short of such politic vision and boldness. Ma, the current leader on Taiwan Island, regards himself more as outsider of the whole Chinese nation, although he claims that he cares the people on the Chinese Mainland. On May 15, 2008, Ma said in his life time, he could not see the reunification.<sup>316</sup> This probably implies---first, the reunification scenario is too hard to accomplish and second, he himself may be unable to carry forward the task or he has no interest as well as vision to realize it. Wang Zuo-rong (90 years old, the most senior alive member of the GMT) was the former President of the Supervision House of Taipei. Wang made some critical comments on Ma's policy and vision. Wang argued:

Ma is not a politician with great vision and strategy. He is not a figure who can make a leading role in developing the across-Strait policy. The policy, namely "no reunification, no independence and no war", held by Ma, is a dragging-on policy, because this policy does not resolve the real problem across the Taiwan Strait and does not offer a visionary plan for Taiwan. A great politician with vision should have short term policies as well as long term ones; Ma is not such a great person. His vision is just within his possible 8-year term and who knows whether he can secure his second term (in 2012)?<sup>317</sup> [the author's English translation]

On August 26, Ma received an interview by Mario Vazquez Rana, the Board Chairman of the *Sun* Newspaper (Mexico), and stated: 'the relation between two sides

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<sup>316</sup> <http://news.wenxuecity.com/messages/200805/news-gb2312-597977.html>, viewed on May, 17,2008

<sup>317</sup> [http://news.ifeng.com/taiwan/3/200808/0802\\_353\\_690448.shtml](http://news.ifeng.com/taiwan/3/200808/0802_353_690448.shtml), viewed on August 4, 2008

across the Taiwan Strait is a special one but not on a country-to-country one'.<sup>318</sup> [the author's English translation] People sometimes may not know "what it is", but they definitely know "what it is not". This is Ma's bold-but-less-enough step with ambiguity. Even so, Lee Teng-hui, the former leader of the Taiwan Island who created the "two-country" theory in 1990s, regards Ma as going too far. On 6 April 2008, Lee commented: 'currently, what the Ma's administration has done, in terms of politics as well as economy, is towards "ultimate unification"'.<sup>319</sup> [the author's English translation]

Ma's stepping in, if possible, can propel the change on the Chinese Mainland. Although, to wish Ma to play more proactive role with vision is less optimistic, the situation on the Chinese Mainland is on the way of change. 'Many scholars and analysts say that Chinese society has reached a point where maintaining the societal status quo is no longer an option'.<sup>320</sup> On 18 June 2008, Wang Qi-shan, the visiting Chinese Vice-Premier, on the Sino-American Economic Strategic Dialogue, addressed:

in the perspective of history, the one who closes up itself will become the one lagging behind. China had been the fore-runner, but after the fore-running period, protectionism was prevailing for one millennium. The closed-door was forced open by the gunfire of the U.K. and then China found that she was lagged behind. Nowadays, China is on the phase of drastic changes. This is due to China's reflection to her previous isolation. Since opening to the outside world thirty years ago, China has been checking out her short points and then reforms them.<sup>321</sup>

With such reflection, China will engage herself with the world in a more open-minded way. The more open-minded China, in the future as soon as possible, should acknowledge their Taiwan compatriots' democratic achievements. This is, at least a

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<sup>318</sup> [http://news.ifeng.com/taiwan/3/200809/0903\\_353\\_761431.shtml](http://news.ifeng.com/taiwan/3/200809/0903_353_761431.shtml), viewed on September 4, 2008

<sup>319</sup> <http://news.wenxuecity.com/messages/200809/news-gb2312-695614.html>, viewed on September 7, 2008

<sup>320</sup> Elegant Simon, *Time*, September 8, 2008, p45

<sup>321</sup> [http://news.ifeng.com/mainland/200806/0620\\_17\\_607731.shtml](http://news.ifeng.com/mainland/200806/0620_17_607731.shtml), viewed on June 20, 2008

political gesture which could be precipitated by Beijing unilaterally to win the hearts of the people on the Taiwan Island.

For the people living on Taiwan Island, they have three aspirations: the economy should be developed, their safety should be ensured and their democratic achievements should be respected. Although Chen Sui-bian's overseas-deposit scandal has raised certain doubts about the Taiwan-style democracy, people of Taiwan Island do have the right to supervise the power delegated to the politician, and this is one of achievements of the Taiwan-style democracy. Beijing should signal signs to show its appreciation towards Taipei's democratic achievements, and such action may also encourage Taipei to initiate the "reunification first" scenario. If Taipei presents the "reunification first and improve democracy together" scenario, Beijing will have no other alternative but to correspondingly declare to give up the military means to resolve the Taiwan question, because the question will be undone by Taipei's recognition of "being a part of China". Such scenario, if ideally achieved, needs politicians' vision and leadership; at the same time, people's willing across the Taiwan Strait, as a vital strength to maintain peace, promote democracy as well as a constraint to avoid derailment, should not be ignored.

The situation across the Taiwan Strait is an ongoing process and any prediction should be cautious. If the momentum, co-created by the CPC Beijing and the GMT Taipei, is maintained, this thesis argues that the future of the across-Taiwan-Strait relations may continue to be improved. On 3 November 2008, Chen Yun-lin, the Chairman of Beijing-authorized ARATS, visited Taiwan Island and held talks with his counterpart Chiang Pin-kung , the Chairman of Taipei-authorized SEF. The two

sides 'signed deals on their first direct air and sea cargo links...agreed to hold high-level talks every six months alternatively in Taipei and Beijing'.<sup>322</sup> As one of achievements of this visit, two giant pandas, as a gift from Beijing to Taipei, will settle down on Taiwan Island, hopefully in early December 2008.

The name of the two giant pandas, Tuan Tuan (团团) and Yuan Yuan (圆圆), if read together, means "reunion" in Chinese language. The two cute animals will arouse Taiwan people to think more, rather than merely watching them. For example, one most likely scenario is---visiting kids may ask their parents "what is the meaning of Tuan Tuan and Yuan Yuan", because the Chinese custom goes in the way---given names generally will convey some special meanings. Will the two cute giant pandas bring the next generation of Taiwan Island closer to their motherland after "Tuan Tuan Yuan Yuan" is explained?

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<sup>322</sup> *the Dominion Post*, Wellington, 5 November 2008, B4

## Conclusion

To understand the relationship between the Chinese Mainland and Taiwan Island is not an easy task. Two points, if not being born in mind, may fail people to have a full picture of the relationship. The first one is China's long history which evolves into national legacies cherished by the Chinese people. The first chapter of this thesis briefly outlined the development of China's centralized political structure with the Qin Dynasty (221-206 B.C.) as the beginning, which unified the ancient China in terms of territory, the benchmark of weight and measurement, language and so on. In the following two millenniums to come after the collapse of the Qin Dynasty, on Chinese territory, one Dynasty replaced another with different ruling time, in terms of decades or hundreds of years.<sup>323</sup> As a shared memory to Chinese people, the most prosperous time was when China was united as one. "Unity yielding prosperity", accumulated by the long history, generally speaking, has become one of national legacies for China.<sup>324</sup> Chinese people regard any actions, either to destroy their national unity or threat their territorial integrity, unacceptable.

During the one-century-long shame period (started from middle of 19<sup>th</sup> century), China's political as well as legal jurisdiction was severely diluted in the "influence sphere" established by West colonialism. Nowadays, the political issues arising from the cross Taiwan Strait-relations, normally would be regarded by China as a problem within a family, rather than an issue open to outside intervention. China will never accept her territory to be separated again by any means. Outside intervention in China's internal affairs will be regarded by the Chinese people as a reminder of

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<sup>323</sup> In all, there were twenty five Dynasties in China's history

<sup>324</sup> There were cycles in China's history ,beginning with a strong central government and then fell part

military invasion and sovereignty violation in the past, as well as the political arrogance in reality from the West. This is the second significant point to understand China's strong stance on Taiwan Island which is relevant to China's national unity as well as territorial sovereignty. China's policy over Taiwan Island is based on the sovereignty-centric value as well as her strategic consideration. For further building up on the argument of China's sovereignty over Taiwan Island, the first chapter highlights Taiwan Island's bond with the Chinese Mainland since the late of 17<sup>th</sup> century.

Taiwan Island's geographical proximity to the Chinese Mainland determines that there are interactions over the course of history between the two. This point was especially true in the time with underdeveloped technology, because the nearest territory would most likely be visited than others. People from the Chinese Mainland can be regarded as the earliest new comers, if not the only one, to step feet on Taiwan Island. No authentic literature indicates where Taiwan Island's aboriginal people came from, but it is hard to claim they are the only legitimate owners of Taiwan. Human beings' history is the one of interaction.

In the modern era of the world, one country, composed with various peoples, is a common phenomenon. People's identification is formed as well as significant through interacting with others and such interaction may establish a new identification. The new identification may last for a long time and be "permanent", or be situational for a short period and then be replaced by another "new" identification. The identification of Taiwan Island is very complexion, due to the change of ruling power as well as occasional unfortunate issues on the island.

Starting from around 1350, administrative institutions, responsible for Taiwan Island, were set up by the Chinese consecutive dynasties, namely the Yuan Dynasty (1271-1368) and the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644). The Chinese rule over Taiwan Island was not continuous but disrupted by the Ming Dynasty's abandonment policy and then the Dutch intervention from 1620s to 1660s. Before its total integration to the Ch'ing Dynasty, Taiwan Island was once occupied by the fleeing Ming Dynasty's forces from 1662. Emperor K'ang-hsi of the Ch'ing Dynasty used war to end his rival's rule on Taiwan Island in 1683. This thesis argues that the contemporary situation across the Taiwan Strait has a certain resemblance to the one between the Ch'ing Dynasty on the Chinese Mainland and the remnants of the Ming Dynasty on Taiwan Island. Emperor K'ang-hsi set an example for following generations to be very cautious about giving up sovereignty over Taiwan Island. Taiwan's integration with China, as a sub-unit of Fukien Province and then a Province of China, was thoroughly accomplished, as well as reinforced in the late 17<sup>th</sup> century, and lasted to the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, within the Chinese Ch'ing Dynasty's ruling span (1636-1911). Unfortunately, China's national unity was violated by the expansion of the West's colonialism in the middle of 19<sup>th</sup> century.

In the 1840s, the self-sustainable and "inwards-looking" China was firstly forced by Great Britain's gunboat policy to open its door. This was the beginning of one-century-long shame for China, whose territorial integrity, as an indispensable component of sovereignty, was violated. The second chapter of this thesis considers the modern concept of sovereignty that arose from the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648.

The Treaty established the principle of sovereignty: the supreme authority, within a multilaterally-recognized territory, is inviolable by outsider powers.

The second chapter also takes note of some new developments which may alter the traditional concept of sovereignty, for example: the school of relative sovereignty challenges the school of absolute sovereignty. The modern concept of sovereignty was globalized in the colonial independence stream around the 1960s. At the time of writing, Kosovo's independence from Serbia and South Ossetia's independence from Georgia, together with the sharply different stance held by the United States and Russia respectively, indicates that sovereignty is not a "thing" to be fully respected but a tool to be ultimately utilized according to various strategic motivations, especially the motivations of powers involved in the conflict. In the world of realpolitik, power is still the decisive factor behind sovereignty.

Speaking of China, as an Empire with a history of thousands of years, her sovereignty was violated during her one-century-shame period. After 1840, due to her declining power, China failed to defend her sovereignty. In the late 19th century, China was subject to the expansion of Western colonialism and the greed of imperialism. For example, at that time in China, people with the nationality of Great Britain enjoyed the right of extraterritoriality. The Chinese island of Taiwan was one of victims of them, in that it was ceded to Japan, the then rising power in Asia, through the Shimonoseki Treaty in 1895, following China's defeat in the war with Japan. Under the control of Japan for sixty years, a sense of alienation for Taiwan to distance itself from China was formed. That is, a certain proportion of people on Taiwan regarded themselves as Japanese. Such alienation did not disappear automatically after China resumed its sovereignty over the Island at the end of the Second World War in 1945.

The rift was expanded in 1947, through the “228 Tragedy” (a massacre by military police forces which were despatched from the Chinese Mainland to Taiwan Island). In 1949, after defeat by the CPC forces in the Chinese civil war (1946-1949), the GMT forces fled from the Chinese Mainland to Taiwan Island. The CPC forces’ second attempted military occupation over Taiwan Island was prevented by United States’ intervention in 1950. At the favour of Western bloc led by the United States, Taiwan Island became a base for countering communism dominant on the Chinese Mainland. Under the context of the Cold War, the sovereignty recognition issue was utilized as a tool to form ideological as well as military allies, at the cost of China’s territorial integrity from Beijing’s point of view. A hostile confrontation, as a leftover from the Chinese civil war, was created and then reinforced by the Cold War. This was the beginning of the Taiwan question. So far, although China is emerging as a potential power, her sovereignty is still irritated and troubled by outside powers which sell arms to what Beijing considers to be the one province of China outside its jurisdiction. China’s claim of her sovereignty over Taiwan Island is also challenged by the “self-determination” theory and the “human rights superior to sovereignty” theory. Such theories argue that Taiwan’s future should be determined by people on the island, and this is a human rights matter and has nothing to do with the Chinese Mainland. The thesis argues: the self-determination should be applied in a very strictly-defined context and cannot run against a country’s sovereignty. The relation between human rights and sovereignty is rather parallel than superior or inferior. The ultimate realization of human rights to all people across the Taiwan Strait is not necessarily at the expense of China’s sovereignty as well as her national unity.

The third chapter demonstrates major policies held by Beijing and Taipei within six decades after 1949. Their policy underwent roughly six phases. In the first phase, each side claimed itself the legitimate regime representing the whole of China and determined to use military means to liberate the territory at the other side's control. The second phase roughly began at the time when Beijing established diplomatic ties with Washington. Beijing offered preferable proposals for the sake of a peaceful reunification across the Taiwan Strait. Taipei's worry about the communism on the Chinese Mainland was not erased and offered back a "three-no" policy (no contact, no negotiation and no compromise) to Beijing. Due to pragmatism, Taipei's "no contact" policy was changed in the early 1990s, such was the third phase. During the third phase, non-official communication channels were established between, as well as endorsed by, Beijing and Taipei. As a highlight, in 1992, Beijing and Taipei agreed upon the "one China" principle abbreviated as the "92 Consensus". Such good momentum was not maintained for long, due to Taipei's "two state" theory, which argued that the relationship between the two sides across the Taiwan Strait is a state-to-state one. The fourth phase started from the middle 1990s, and culminated in Beijing's military exercise in 1996, due to the increasing mistrust between Beijing and Taipei. In 2000, the DPP took power in Taiwan and favoured a pro-Taiwan-independence policy in a provocative way.

In such a context, Beijing's focus was shifted from propelling for reunification to deterring Taiwan independence. As the lowest point, the fifth phase was characterised as a stagnation period lasting for eight years. After getting back into power in Taiwan in March 2008, the KMT reiterated its acknowledgement of the "92 Consensus" and adopted a more rational as well as practical way. Taipei's new change was positively

responded to by Beijing, which offered a more economic preferential policy as well as political flexibility, and this is the ongoing sixth phase of the relationship across the Taiwan Strait.

The third chapter also highlights two points to demonstrate why Taiwan cultivated a sense of independence. The first point is: after Chiang Kai-shek's death, the GMT's localization as well as the democratization movement propelled Taiwan on the way of forming a new identification and drifting itself away from China. The second point is: Lee Teng-hui's disguised double-dealing technique, intending to cut off Taiwan Island's bond with the Chinese Mainland, was a prelude to the DPP's provocative policy.

The fourth chapter discusses possible ways to resolve the Taiwan question and highlights the main obstacles. Theoretically, there are three ways to resolve the "either unity or secession" situation: by peace or by war, or let it remain in a limbo situation. This thesis argues that means of war is the last resort to deter Taiwan's possible secession, and to realize China's reunification. Proposals for urging China to give up the last resort are pointless. The fourth chapter, at the beginning, takes the American Civil War as an example to indicate that people can and will fight for the defence of national unity. Abraham Lincoln is respected as a heroic icon rather than blamed as a war monger in the American history. Lincoln's legacy is tantamount to indicate that a large portion of American people appreciate the effort to maintain their national unity, even at the cost of war. Likewise, the Chinese Mainland's determination of defending national unity should not be denounced or miscalculated. The fourth chapter pinpoints the updated optimistic picture across the Taiwan Strait and regards the possibility of

peaceful resolution is increasing. To consolidate the peaceful ends, political negotiations as well as consecutive arrangements should serve as the means.

Political arrangements, although available in theory as well as in practice, are not the cure-all medicine for the Taiwan question. Beijing's "one country, two systems" policy, to a certain extent as a nominal reunification, is not accepted by Taipei. Taipei is afraid of its freedom may be violated by Beijing. The confederation scenario may not be accepted by Beijing, because such scenario is tantamount to endorse Taiwan Island as a state with sovereignty rather than an unredeemed province of China. Two other factors--- Taipei's pro-independence movement and omission of the reunification as the ultimate goal---will reduce the possibility of confederation scenario to the least. After reviewing the different political structures as well as the different level of democratization of both sides across the Taiwan Strait, this thesis finds that it is most unlikely that a fast track to glue the two sides together can be found.

The picture is not optimistic when turning to "tactical" questions. For example, how to address leaders of each side and how to deal with the official flag of each side could have different political interpretations. Such "tactical" issues cannot be resolved in a case-by-case model, because anything which may touch the sensitive chord for both sides across the Taiwan Strait, no matter now "technical" they are, needs a strategic political breakthrough. Unfortunately, the bottleneck of the Taiwan question lies in the political arena. In reality, facing the recent ship collision near the Senkaku Islands, both sides across the Taiwan Strait, short of political agreement, have no access to co-defend the territory of the "one China" which is in dispute with an third

party (in this particular case, Japan). This embarrassment indicates various contingencies may highlight the need to realize a political arrangement across the Taiwan Strait.

Unfortunately, although economic ties have been enhanced for three decades, negotiations, relating to political arrangements between Beijing and Taipei, have not taken place. After the GMT retook power over Taiwan Island in March 2008, it constructively reached consensus with the CPC on the Chinese Mainland to shelve controversies and create together a win-win solution. The shelved controversies will not however disappear automatically as the time goes on. There appears to be a need for both sides to change mindsets. This thesis argues that the mindset held by Taipei, which sets democratization on the Chinese Mainland as a precondition for reunification, is not convincing and creates a fundamental obstacle for reaching a political arrangement for both sides, because democracy may take various forms as well as different procedures to be achieved.

The democratic improvement on the Chinese Mainland is on a gradual track which fits the situation. This thesis argues that democracy cannot be copied mechanically and China cannot afford to take democratic trials which may not fit the Chinese situation. This thesis considers the direct election at the Chinese village level as an example to demonstrate that democratic arrangement on the Chinese Mainland has been consolidated in detail from down to up. A gradual and fine-tuned democratic improvement is better than a drastic experimental change, given China as a country with huge territory as well as huge population. The recently revealed scandal of Chen

Sui-bian has reduced the credibility of the Taiwan-style democracy and enables people to think more about the essence of democracy and how to realize it.

Meanwhile, Taipei's "democratization first" scenario will largely be regarded by the people on the Chinese Mainland as a pretext of refusal for reunification. Losing the hearts of the people on the Chinese Mainland may be a fundamental miscalculation of Taipei. This thesis argues that Taipei should replace its "democratization first" scenario by the "reunification first and then co-develop democracy" scenario to win appeals of the people on the Chinese Mainland which is the most reliable factor to secure Taipei's goals. According the same logic, Beijing should also win hearts of the people on Taiwan Island. To strengthen economic ties across the Taiwan Strait is not enough to bring Taipei closer and the acknowledgement at the democratic achievement of Taipei, although itself is not flawless, should be included on Beijing's calendar.

The relationship between the Chinese Mainland and Taiwan Island is an ongoing process. Although it will be imprudent to predict the future situation across the Taiwan Strait, the temporary limbo condition cannot last forever and this thesis argues that political negotiation as well as subsequent arrangements cannot be bypassed. Such consequences may not be stopped, and politicians' vision can propel it to materialise earlier.

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