Copyright is owned by the Author of the thesis. Permission is given for a copy to be downloaded by an individual for the purpose of research and private study only. The thesis may not be reproduced elsewhere without the permission of the Author.
THE HUMANITARIAN AND THE SOLDIER:
 PARTNERS FOR PEACE?

A STUDY OF US AND NEW ZEALAND
MILITARY-NGO RELATIONS

A thesis presented in fulfilment of the requirement for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy
in
Defence Studies

at Massey University, Manawatu, Palmerston North,
New Zealand.

Laura M. Jacobs-Garrod
2010
Abstract

Over the past two decades, military forces and aid workers have found themselves co-existing time and time again on unconventional battlefields. While efforts have been made to coordinate their respective missions, the relationship between the military and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) remains *ad hoc*. This improvisational approach to military-NGO relations yields uneven and, often, inefficient results in responses to complex emergencies.

To gain a better understanding of the military-NGO relationship and its implications for international interventions, this study identifies the strengths and weaknesses, comparative advantages, and gaps in capabilities of the military-NGO relationship using the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) and United States Military experiences. This study addresses three key questions. These are:

- Does a lack of cooperation in military-NGO relations exist and, if it does, how does it inhibit the efficacious response to complex emergencies?

- What impact do the structures and philosophies of both military and humanitarian organisations have on the military-NGO relationship?

- Using the strategic, operational and tactical levels to evaluate the case studies, what has, and has not, worked within the military-NGO relationship and how can those successes and failures contribute to building a model for the military-NGO relationship?

While not a key question, there is a fourth area which this study briefly addresses in order to compare and contrast the military-NGO relationship of two different countries: Does the US military or the New Zealand Defence Force have a comparative advantage in the military-NGO relationship?
Many lessons are drawn from military-NGO experiences in the four case studies of this research: Somalia, Bosnia, East Timor, and Afghanistan. The military-NGO relationship was a hot button issue in 1991 to 1993 after operations in Northern Iraq and Somalia, and it has re-emerged as a critical issue today as the international community continues to engage in complex emergencies in countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan. As Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan enters its ninth year, militaries and aid agencies are continuing to debate their interplay in many of the same terms they did in 1993. This study examines the collective experiences- both positive and negative- of military-NGO relations and seeks practical strategies for a cooperative relationship.
Preface

As I write, there is another complex emergency unfolding in the world—precipitated by a natural disaster. The earthquake in Haiti has further devastated a nation which has been struggling to exist for decades. I am struck by the poignancy of all of the information I have been collecting over the past six years and the question I have been seeking to answer: how can we, the international community, improve our response to complex emergencies? The answer is not an easy one; in fact, it is as complex as the emergencies themselves. We have witnessed the scenario time and again over the past two decades: absence of law and order, complete breakdown in civil administration, judicial, infrastructure, and economic systems; a critical lack of basic human needs: clean water, food, shelter, medical care and security. I am both heartened and incensed by the response of my neighbours, country, and the world’s citizens: individuals are clamoring for flights to Haiti to “help” and, while their intentions may be honorable, I realize that they are clogging an already over-populated and often misappropriated response system. My concerns remain: Are the experts equipped to tackle this? Are they speaking to one another? Do they have a plan? I fear the answer is no, but they are doing the best they can.

Complex emergencies may have had different locations, different scenarios, and different actors over the past two decades; they may have been caused by people or nature, but the collective experiences have been strikingly similar. There has traditionally been a “come as you are” approach to complex emergencies; an “any help is good” outlook. But why aren’t we expecting and demanding more? If we truly want to help a country and its
people get back on their feet or, in some cases, have any semblance of a chance to exist, why wouldn’t we, and shouldn’t we, ask ourselves how we can improve our response?

The military-NGO relationship is just one aspect of our response system to complex emergencies, but I would argue it is the most critical. The extent to which military and NGO personnel coordinate their work will set the stage for intervention planning and response. The pages that follow examine this relationship and its impact on complex emergencies. There are simple lessons, such as communication, which have remained elusive in the military-NGO relationship. When we are talking about so many different organisations, such as NGOs and various militaries, New Zealand and the United States to name a few, there are bound to be challenges in improving relations both amongst and between actors. However, as this study demonstrates, our experiences are far more similar than they are different and there are pragmatic ways we can improve the response to complex emergencies. It is my hope that the experiences in this study provide a basis for the improvement of the military-NGO relationship and, in turn, the international response to complex emergencies. We can do better, and we should do better.
Acknowledgements

This dissertation would not have been possible without the contributions of many people. First, my primary supervisor, Professor Glyn Harper, provided unwavering support, guidance, and enthusiasm toward my research. While writing a dissertation can be a lonely and isolating experience, Glyn promoted interaction with the Centre for Defence Studies and provided countless opportunities for me to engage with the Centre and his many contacts. Next, I wish to thank my secondary supervisor, Dr. Beth Greener for her constant support, candid explanations of the PhD process, and determination to get me to the finish line. I could not have wished for better supervisors than Glyn and Beth. Somehow they knew when to be patient with me and knew when I needed a push. Above all, they gave me the creative license to present my study in, what I believe to be, a compelling way.

The entire staff of the Centre for Defence Studies was enormously helpful throughout this process. I would like to especially thank Brigadier General Roger Mortlock (NZDF, retired) and Major General Piers Reid (NZDF, retired) for their support and advocacy of my research, as well as the numerous teaching opportunities they provided to me. Tania Lasenby and Pam Dolman also went above and beyond to support me in the completion of this study.

I would also like to thank the trustees of the Peace and Disarmament Education Trust and Rotary International for their scholarships and generous financial support of this research. As a Rotary International Ambassadorial Scholar, I came to New Zealand to pursue my
master’s degree in international relations under the supervision of Ray Goldstein at Victoria University of Wellington. Ray always went out of his way to provide assistance to me and, along with my secondary supervisor at Victoria, David Capie, helped me form the basis of the thesis that was to become my doctoral dissertation.

This research would not have been possible without the generous support from my many informants. I wish to thank all of the individuals who took time out of their busy schedules to speak with me regarding the military-NGO relationship. Their willingness to speak openly is reflected in these pages and is the reason that this study offers practical solutions to improving the military-NGO relationship. I would also like to thank the staffs of the NZDF Library System and the Grey Research Library at Quantico for their professionalism and assistance with this study.

This dissertation would certainly not have been possible without the support of my parents, who instilled in me an appreciation for life-long learning, a curiosity about the world around me, and the value of working for a greater good. My father, Roger, a retired US Marine Corps officer, helped me to develop my interest in this critical topic, continually challenged my thinking, and provided me with renewed insight in those inevitable moments of writer’s block. My mother, Karen, a consummate volunteer for non-profit organisations, acted as a sounding board for new ideas and, using her grammatical expertise, reviewed all of my final drafts. Both of my parents gave me what will no doubt be a life-long appreciation for the value of public service in its many forms.
Last, but certainly not least, I thank my husband, Paul, who has endured all of the many ups and downs that are part and parcel with a dissertation. Despite having to make countless sacrifices, Paul has always encouraged me to do the best I can, challenge myself, and reach my goals. His support came in many forms--too numerous to list. He is a true partner and friend.

It does not escape me that I am very fortunate to have so many individuals in my life, all of whom were incredibly supportive throughout this process. I must emphasize, however, that I alone bear full responsibility for any errors in this dissertation.

Laura M. Jacobs-Garrod
# Table of Contents

Abstract .......................................................................................................................... i
Preface ........................................................................................................................... iii
Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................ v
List of Tables .................................................................................................................. x
List of Figures ................................................................................................................ x
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms ........................................................................... xi
Introduction .................................................................................................................. 1

## Chapter 1: Overview of Military-NGO Relations .................................................. 10
   An Introduction to Military-NGO Relations .............................................................. 10
   Issues that Impact the Military-NGO Relationship ............................................... 15
   The Military in Complex Emergencies .................................................................... 20
   Introduction to the Military ..................................................................................... 20
   The Military and the United Nations ....................................................................... 25
   The Mission and Culture of the Military ................................................................. 27
   Structure .................................................................................................................. 33
   Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs) in Complex Emergencies .................... 36
   What Are NGOs? ...................................................................................................... 36
   NGOs and the United Nations ............................................................................... 45
   The Mission and Culture of NGOs ........................................................................ 46
   Structure of NGOs ................................................................................................. 52
   Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 55

## Chapter 2: The Military-NGO Cooperation Debate .............................................. 60
   Literature Review .................................................................................................... 60
   Comparing Military and NGO Capabilities in Complex Emergencies .................... 76
   Strengths and Weaknesses ...................................................................................... 76
   Different Mandates .................................................................................................. 79
   Common Goals ......................................................................................................... 81
   Debates Within ........................................................................................................ 83
   The Military’s View of NGOs .................................................................................. 83
   NGOs’ View of the Military ..................................................................................... 87
   “C” Words ............................................................................................................... 90
   Collaboration ........................................................................................................... 90
   Coordination ........................................................................................................... 90
   Coexistence ............................................................................................................ 91
   Cooperation ............................................................................................................ 92
   Applying Cooperation to the Military-NGO Relationship ....................................... 92
   Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 95

## Chapter 3: Somalia Case Study .......................................................................... 98
   Background of Somalia ............................................................................................ 100
   Operations Overview: UN and US Intervention in Somalia .................................... 104
   The US Military-NGO Relationship during Operation *Restore Hope* .................. 108
   Limited Mandate ..................................................................................................... 111
   Structure and Organisation .................................................................................... 128
   Disarmament .......................................................................................................... 145
List of Tables

Table 1: Strengths and Weaknesses of the Military and NGOs in Complex Emergencies ............................................................................................................................................................................. 77
Table 2: Different Mandates .......................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 79
Table 3: Common Goals .............................................................................................................................................................................................................. 82
Table 4: Number of Humanitarian Agencies in Somalia ............................................................................................................................................ 124
Table 5: Structure of a Humanitarian Operations Centre (HOC) .......................................................................................................................................... 134
Table 6: Humanitarian Agency Locations in Somalia ............................................................................................................................................. 139

List of Figures

Figure 1: Map of Somalia ........................................................................................................................................................................................................... 99
Figure 2: Map of Operation Restore Hope ........................................................................................................................................................................... 118
Figure 3: UNITAF Area of Operations Map ................................................................................................................................................................. 133
Figure 4: Map of Western Balkans .......................................................................................................................................................................................... 164
Figure 5: Map of Bosnia and Herzegovina ............................................................................................................................................................................. 165
Figure 6: Map of NATO's three Multinational Divisions in Bosnia ........................................................................................................................................ 204
Figure 7: Map of East Timor ................................................................................................................................................................................................. 236
Figure 8: Map of the Cova Lima District ................................................................................................................................................................................ 244
Figure 9: Map of Afghanistan .................................................................................................................................................................................................. 302
Figure 10: Map of PRT Locations and ISAF Regional Commands in Afghanistan ...................................................................................................... 310
Figure 11: Map of the Bamyan Province ................................................................................................................................................................................. 337
### List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1MEF</td>
<td>First Marine Expeditionary Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACBAR</td>
<td>Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADRA</td>
<td>Adventist Development and Assistance Agency International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANA</td>
<td>Afghan National Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANCB</td>
<td>Afghan NGOs Coordination Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANP</td>
<td>Afghan National Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AO</td>
<td>Area of Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APEC</td>
<td>Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARRC</td>
<td>Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>Civil Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARE</td>
<td>Cooperative for American Remittances to Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>United States Central Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>Civil-Military Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJCIMIC</td>
<td>Combined Joint Civil Military Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJCMOTF</td>
<td>Combined Joint Civil Military Operations Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMA</td>
<td>Civil-Military Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMOC</td>
<td>Civil-Military Operations Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Commanding Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRS</td>
<td>Catholic Relief Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CWS</td>
<td>Church World Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DART</td>
<td>Disaster Assistance Response Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>United States Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOSOC</td>
<td>United Nations Economic and Social Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLOC</td>
<td>New Zealand Future Land Operating Concept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOME</td>
<td>Focus of Main Effort</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRETILIN</td>
<td>Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAA</td>
<td>German Agro Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GFAP</td>
<td>General Framework for Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GO</td>
<td>Governmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPA</td>
<td>Governance and Public Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAC</td>
<td>Humanitarian Affairs Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAER</td>
<td>Humanitarian Assistance and Emergency Rehabilitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HCIC</td>
<td>Humanitarian Coordination Information Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOC</td>
<td>Humanitarian Operations Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR</td>
<td>High Representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRO</td>
<td>Humanitarian Relief Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRS</td>
<td>Humanitarian Relief Sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IASC</td>
<td>Inter-Agency Standing Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee for the Red Cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICTY</td>
<td>International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICVA</td>
<td>International Council of Voluntary Agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFOR</td>
<td>Implementation Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFRC</td>
<td>International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERFET</td>
<td>International Force East Timor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IO</td>
<td>International organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organisation for Migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRC</td>
<td>International Refugee Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF</td>
<td>Joint Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LO</td>
<td>Liaison Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARFOR</td>
<td>Marine Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCG</td>
<td>Maori Cultural Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDM</td>
<td>Médecins du Monde</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFAT</td>
<td>New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MND</td>
<td>Multinational Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoD</td>
<td>United Kingdom Ministry of Defence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
MOOTW Military Operations Other than War
MSF Médecins Sans Frontières (aka Doctors Without Borders)
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NCCNI NGO Coordinating Committee for Northern Iraq
NCO Non-Commissioned Officer
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
NZAID New Zealand Agency for International Development
NZDF New Zealand Defence Force
NZFOREM New Zealand Forces in East Timor
O&M Operations and Maintenance
OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OEF Operation Enduring Freedom
OFDA Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
OHR Office of the High Representative
OP Observation Post
OPLAN Operation Plans
OSCE Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
OSOCC On-Site Operations Coordination Centre
OXFAM Oxford Committee for Famine Relief
PKF Peacekeeping Force
PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team
PSYOPS Psychological Operations
PVO Private Voluntary Organisation
ROE Rules of Engagement
SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SAS New Zealand Special Air Service
SCHR Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response
SFOR Stabilisation Force
SHAPE Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SNM Somalia National Movement
SOF Special Operations Forces
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SOP</td>
<td>Standard Operating Procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSDF</td>
<td>Somali Salvation Democratic Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TF</td>
<td>Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TNI</td>
<td>Indonesian Military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDT</td>
<td>Timorese Democratic Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMA</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMET</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission in East Timor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHABITAT</td>
<td>United Nations Settlements Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHOC</td>
<td>United Nations Humanitarian Operations Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITAF</td>
<td>United Nations Task Force Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIBH</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMISET</td>
<td>United Nations Mission of Support to East Timor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOSOM</td>
<td>United Nations Operations in Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPROFOR</td>
<td>United Nations Protection Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council Resolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAET</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTSO</td>
<td>United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USC</td>
<td>United Somali Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USIP</td>
<td>United States Institute for Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USLO</td>
<td>United States Liaison Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>United States Marine Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WV</td>
<td>World Vision</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Introduction

With the proliferation of humanitarian response missions, the strengthening of human rights standards, and the emergence of more state and non-state actors, humanitarian crises have become increasingly complex. High civilian casualties, indistinguishable combatants, ubiquitous media coverage, and the absence or abuse of internal political authority are just a few issues that often serve to cause and/or complicate complex emergencies.\(^1\) These conflicts have required military and non-governmental organisation (NGO) actors to coexist, interact, and even work together as they carry out their missions.

To gain a better understanding of the military-NGO relationship and its implications for international interventions, this study identifies the strengths and weaknesses, comparative advantages, and gaps in capabilities of the military-NGO relationship using the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) and United States Military experiences. This study addresses the following three key questions:

- Does a lack of cooperation in military-NGO relations exist and, if it does, how does it inhibit the efficacious response to complex emergencies?

- What impact do the structures and philosophies of both military and humanitarian organisations have on the military-NGO relationship?

- Using the strategic, operational and tactical levels to evaluate the case studies, what has, and has not, worked within the military-NGO relationship and how can those successes and failures contribute to building a model for the military-NGO relationship?

---

While not a key question, there is a fourth area which this study briefly addresses in order to compare and contrast the military-NGO relationship of two different countries: Does the US military or the New Zealand Defence Force have a comparative advantage in the military-NGO relationship? While both are western militaries, this question was raised to determine whether a comparative advantage exists in the military-NGO relationship between militaries of different sizes, capabilities, and resources.

This research utilizes a case-study approach to critically examine the interaction and effectiveness of military-NGO relations in real-world emergencies. Specifically examined are the experiences of the New Zealand Defence Force and the United States military as they interacted with humanitarian agencies in four distinct emergencies. An analysis of New Zealand and United States military-NGO relationships reveals the various approaches and comparative advantages of two countries with different capabilities, resources, and political strategies. In addition, this research will examine four very different complex emergencies: Somalia, Bosnia, East Timor, and Afghanistan. By examining the military-NGO relationships that these two countries have developed, this study will devise strategies and recommendations that may be applicable to more than just a single military force.

Each case study is evaluated in three phases: the strategic, operational, and tactical levels by which the military defines its operations. In this context, however, these phases will generally correspond to the national policy level, the theatre specific planning and execution, and the on-the-ground coordination and execution where aid is actually
delivered and security attained. This enables us to examine the successes and failures in each phase of an operation. That is, what is the state of relations during times without crises? What programmes or doctrine exist (strategic)? What level of cooperation exists in the relationship during the planning and organisational stages (operational)? And finally, how does the relationship unfold on the ground (tactical)?

While each case study is evaluated by the three phases of operations (strategic, operational, tactical), a thematic approach is utilized to emphasize the commonalties and differences in the military-NGO relationships throughout the case studies. Each case study highlights three to four major factors which impacted military-NGO relations during the three phases of operations, such as political will, organisational structures, and perception.

This dissertation is comprised of an introduction, six chapters, and a conclusion. The 
Introduction outlines the research questions, significance and methodology of the study. Chapter One, Overview of the Military-NGO Relationship, provides critical information regarding the relationship, as well as the actors: the military and NGOs. Chapter One begins with a brief introduction to the military-NGO relationship and an overview of the issues that impact the relationship. In two separate sections: The Military in Complex Emergencies and NGOs in Complex Emergencies, Chapter One examines the backgrounds, relations with the United Nations, missions and cultures, and organisational structures of the military and humanitarian agencies.
Chapter Two, *The Military-NGO Relations Debate*, critically examines the viewpoints and issues surrounding the military-NGO relationship. Chapter Two begins with a literature review, which outlines historic and current writings on the military-NGO relationship. Next, Chapter Two assesses the military-NGO relationship debate by comparing military and NGO capabilities in complex emergencies, as well as outlining their strengths and weaknesses, different mandates, common goals, and internal debates. The latter part of Chapter Two provides an overview of the common stereotypes and views both the military and NGOs have of the other. Chapter Two concludes by outlining the “C” words (collaboration, coordination, coexistence, and cooperation), which are commonly applied to the military-NGO relationship.

Chapters Three through Six provide four case studies, which analyse the US military and NZDF relationships with NGOs during different operations. The case studies are ordered chronologically and were selected from various time periods (Somalia 1992-1993; Bosnia, 1992-1995; East Timor 1999-2002; and Afghanistan 2001-present) to determine whether and/or how the military-NGO relationship has evolved over the past 18 years.

Chapter Three, *Somalia Case Study*, analyses the US military-NGO relationship during United Nations Task Force Somalia (UNITAF), a US-led operation. UNITAF in Somalia was selected to examine the military-NGO relationship during an operation in which the US had a leading role. Chapter Four, *Bosnia Case Study*, allows for an examination of the military-NGO relationships in which both the US and New Zealand were involved in different operations within the same country with different mandates and tasks. The
Bosnia case study is presented in two parts: Part I covers the NZDF in United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and Part II covers the US military in International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Chapter Five, *East Timor Case Study*, examines the NZDF-NGO relationship during United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), in which New Zealand had a key role.

Chapter Six, *Afghanistan Case Study*, was selected so the dissertation could compare the military-NGO relationship in which both nations shared a common mandate. The Afghanistan case study analyses the military-NGO relationship during Operation *Enduring Freedom* (OEF) and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operations (2001-present). The Afghanistan case study is presented in two parts: Part I examines the military-NGO relationships in the (26) US Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) and Part II examines New Zealand’s PRT in Bamyan Province. Finally, *Conclusion*, presents the research findings of this dissertation. The findings are organised by the strategic, operational and tactical levels and the chapter concludes by addressing the study’s key questions.

While considerable literature exists describing the chronology of events in each of these emergencies, the case studies within this dissertation are further informed by the gathering of opinions and experiences from relevant participants in the operations. These opinions and experiences were obtained by the author through primary data collection in the form of key informant interviews and/or questionnaires. Interviews were conducted with key informants from the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF), US Military, NGOs,
the ICRC, government agencies, and academia. The interviews provided first-hand experiences from participants directly involved in the military-NGO relationship case studies. The snowball methodology was employed throughout the research phase of this dissertation, in which key informants referred the author to other case study participants. In addition, the authors of articles and books on the topic of the military-NGO relationship were contacted to gain personal accounts of participants’ experiences in the case studies. The vast majority of participants contacted within the military, NGO, and government communities were open to discussing their experiences with the relationship. While the informant interviews are the opinions and perceptions of the participants, it is these opinions and perceptions that frame the military-NGO relationship as a whole, making them critical in the analysis of this study.

Secondary data also greatly informed this research and has been obtained through a comprehensive literature review of journals, articles, books, NGO practice guides, military Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), official documents, and issue papers. Existing guidelines for military-NGO cooperation both from the NGO and military communities served as necessary resources in developing new strategies for military-NGO cooperation. The research methodology also identified and took into account the primary factors which impact military-NGO relations (e.g.: mission, cultures, structures, perception, etc) and these are presented in Chapter One. Using the primary factors, this study evaluates the success and/or failures of the military-NGO relationships.
There have, of course, been limitations on this investigation and it is, by no means, a comprehensive examination of complex emergencies or the political, military, and social ramifications of intervention. Each intervention is unique in that it occurs in different countries, at a specific time, with different military force mixes, different NGOs, different political imperatives and, regrettably, different outcomes. There seem to have been few comparable studies to examine this relationship and, of course, in some instances, military information is guarded by security classification.

This study does, however, provide a comprehensive analysis of the US and New Zealand military-NGO relationships during the aforementioned operations. By investigating the experiences of different military-NGO relationships, this research will expose many of the strengths and weaknesses in military-NGO relations and how the relationship impacts the response to international crises.

While military forces and humanitarian organisations have found themselves coexisting on battlefields since the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was established in the nineteenth century, their individual roles were more clearly defined on the conventional interstate battlefield. In recent years, however, almost all the efforts to coordinate military and humanitarian responses to complex emergencies have been ad hoc or improvisational. Despite conferences, workshops, and doctrine reflecting the need


for improved military-NGO cooperation, most of these emergencies have been met with a “come as you are” approach.

Complex emergencies are intricate political, social, economic, and military events that can involve a myriad of state and non-state actors and require a multi-faceted, multi-agency response.\(^4\) Military forces have engaged in humanitarian aid work in an effort to fill gaps in capabilities of other agencies, including NGOs, at various times throughout history. However, since the end of the Cold War, the military’s role has continued to evolve and increase with regards to humanitarian assistance. Concurrently, humanitarian agencies have proliferated, become increasingly politicized (whether in reality or by perception), and subjected to unprecedented violence perpetrated against them. Since the attacks of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent War on Terrorism, many authors, particularly those in the NGO community, have asserted that the military is deliberately blurring the line between soldier and aid worker in an effort to “win hearts and minds”.\(^5\)

The outcomes of international interventions into complex emergencies have been mixed, with most failing to address the root issues that plague a given nation. With ongoing operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Darfur no issue has more relevance to today’s international scene. With current economic crises potentially aggravating conditions in states on the brink of failure, no issue has more significance than our future ability to

---


execute successful international interventions to relieve human suffering. Better understanding the relationships, roles, organisational cultures, and training of both the military and NGO actors should assist national and international planners as they look to more effectively shape their response to complex emergencies with the appropriate structures and policies. At the operational and tactical levels, increased understanding of each other’s roles, capabilities, and limitations should assist on-the-scene participants to more effectively integrate, or at least de-conflict, their efforts to accomplish the missions of their respective organisations.
Chapter 1: Overview of Military-NGO Relations

To fully comprehend the military-NGO relationship in complex emergencies, it is critical to understand the background, issues, and actors in this context. This chapter begins by providing the history of the military-NGO relationship and examines the factors which impact upon the relationship. Next, the chapter examines both actors in two separate sections: The Military in Complex Emergencies and NGOs in Complex Emergencies. These two sections explore the background, relationship with the United Nations, missions, cultures, and structures of the military and NGOs.

An Introduction to Military-NGO Relations

“For the last 100 years, militarism and humanitarianism have represented two sides of the same coin—humankind’s inability to manage conflict peacefully.”

Most authors agree that the military-NGO relationship is not a new phenomenon. Indeed, soldiers and humanitarians have long co-existed in conflicts. As Catriona Gourlay points out, the birthplace of modern humanitarianism was the battlefield of Solferino in 1864, when five Swiss colleagues witnessed the horrors of war and established the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to assist in alleviating human suffering caused by conflict. Even when militaries began taking on peacekeeping roles under the United Nations in 1948, the separate roles of military forces and humanitarians were fairly well-defined and remained so until the end of the Cold War in 1991. However, the

---

2 Gourlay, p.33.
relationship between soldiers and humanitarians, and their roles in regard to conflict, changed dramatically after the end of the Cold War.

The post-Cold War period witnessed a dramatic rise in intra-state conflicts and the international community responded to these crises in an unprecedented way. Freed from the bipolar power struggle that had inhibited collective security efforts since its founding, the UN intervened in more conflicts in the past 15 years, than in its first 45 years of existence. Unlike conflicts in the past, these crises have elicited military, humanitarian, and political responses from a vast array of actors. Andrew Natsios has identified the following four characteristics that all complex emergencies share:

1. Reappearance of nationalistic, territorial, religious, or ethnic ambitions or frictions.
2. Mass population movements as people are internally displaced or become refugees in another country while searching for security, food, water, and other essentials.
3. Severe disruption of the economic system and destruction of vital infrastructure.
4. General decline in food security resulting from political decisions, discriminatory policies, food shortages, disruption of agriculture, droughts, floods, inflation, and lack of finances.

However, it is not the conflicts themselves that have necessarily become more complex, but the responses many now believe are needed to restore order, sustain the population, and maintain or create a stable government.

---


In addition, a number of factors have contributed to the proliferation of conflict intervention in the past fifteen years, one of which is the ‘CNN Factor’. While the news media had delivered war coverage and galvanized public reaction to conflict since the Vietnam War, the CNN Factor, which emerged in the 1980s, had a profound effect on international interventions. The 24 hour news programmes brought the live devastation of war, famine, and health crises home to millions of television sets around the world. This resulted in public outrage over human tragedies, spawned the emergence of thousands of new NGOs, and led to a steady increase of government aid funding to complex emergencies. In addition, this public outcry to ‘do something’ compelled many governments to deploy their military forces as a sign of quick and decisive action, as the forces were available in large numbers, trained, and no longer occupied with the power struggle and proxy wars that dominated the Cold War era.8

Indeed, less than a year after the Iron Curtain fell, Operation Provide Hope in Northern Iraq in 1991 marked the first time governmental agencies, NGOs, and the military found themselves operating closely together toward often interdependent goals.9 Over the past two decades, the co-existence and co-mingling of the military and NGOs have become increasingly prevalent. Meanwhile, military and humanitarian scholars and practitioners, academics and others interested in international politics have debated the practicality, security implications, and other various aspects of the military-NGO relationship.

8 Thornberry, p. 1.
Among the most prolific authors in the field of military-NGO relations, Hugo Slim, Francis Abiew, Thomas Weiss, Pamela Aall, and Daniel Byman all contend that military forces and NGO employees are increasingly finding themselves co-existing in complex emergencies throughout the world and this is unlikely to change in the near future.\textsuperscript{10} They may not want to work together and they may not understand each other, but their mandates and missions often require at least a degree of cooperation and understanding.

There is ample evidence that suggests the military and NGOs are a mismatched pair.\textsuperscript{11} In theory, the missions and mandates of these two actors are in many ways in direct contrast with one another. However, the military-NGO relationship is an inescapable reality. During a complex emergency, the security situation may require NGOs to evacuate the area. During this period, it is the military which is tasked with providing humanitarian assistance to the local people. The military’s primary mission is often to secure and stabilize the environment so that the humanitarian workers can re-enter. Once the humanitarian organisations are in an area they may require additional security, which may be provided by the military. To maintain a secure environment, military forces must know what is happening in their area of operations (AOs). This may require NGOs to notify the military of their location and what projects they are undertaking. In addition, military forces may attempt to elicit information from NGO staff for security purposes,


which may or may not be in accordance with the operating guidelines of individual NGOs. The military may be required to provide logistical assistance to NGOs by transporting aid personnel, equipment, or supplies. Finally, the military may provide direct assistance to the locals through the delivery of humanitarian aid or reconstruction efforts.¹²

In all of these circumstances, the military and NGOs operate interdependently and their cooperation directly impacts the effectiveness of the operation itself. As a March 2003 report from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) stated:

Recent conflicts have shown that coordination between humanitarian and military actors, particularly in the early phase of a conflict, can be essential for the timely and effective delivery of humanitarian assistance and to help ensure the protection of civilians.¹³

Militaries and humanitarian organisations can be found co-existing in every phase of peace operations. The military has three possible roles it may undertake in relation to NGOs. These are: Provide security for NGOs and other humanitarian organisations to operate; assist and support the work of NGOs and other agencies through logistical and protection services; and provide direct assistance to the local populations, in parallel with NGOs (e.g.: reconstruction assistance, delivering humanitarian aid, conducting needs assessments).¹⁴

¹⁴ Barry and Jefferys, pp.1-30.
Increasingly, militaries are engaging in the third role—providing direct assistance alongside NGOs. This has proven the most controversial aspect of the military-NGO relationship. Many NGOs believe that militaries are, by their very creation, politically motivated and only under extreme circumstances, where NGOs or other humanitarian agencies are unable to deliver aid, should the military engage in the direct provision of aid. Others believe that under no circumstances should this occur, and still others are more accepting of the military’s ability to carry out these roles.\textsuperscript{15} Thus, cooperation between civilian agencies and the military in complex emergencies is regarded by many as essential, yet fraught with difficulty.

\textbf{Issues that Impact the Military-NGO Relationship}

Cooperation between the military and NGOs does not mean an abandonment of the principles of humanitarianism. The relationship between military forces and NGO employees must be clearly defined and cooperative efforts must take into account the need for role differentiation. As an OCHA guidance report states:

While the interaction between civil and military actors on the ground is both a reality and a necessity, it is important to emphasize the constraints and limitations of civilian organisations in this respect. A perception of adherence to key humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, and impartiality is of immediate practical relevance to humanitarian workers on the ground, e.g., in ensuring safe and secure operations, obtaining access across combat lines, and being able to guarantee equitable aid distribution to all vulnerable populations.\textsuperscript{16}


Militaries are designed to pursue political goals and are, therefore, never impartial.\(^{17}\) This alone makes it absolutely critical that, while the military and NGOs may cooperate, they must never be perceived as being a single entity. Yet, as the military increasingly engages in direct provisions of humanitarian aid and reconstruction, the line between military forces and humanitarian workers has become unarguably blurred.

In addition, NGOs cover a broad spectrum of ideologies and missions. Over the past two decades, the apolitical nature of NGOs has been muddied, as some organisations, which call themselves NGOs may be terrorist groups, government sponsored, religiously motivated, or formed to carry out particular political or religious agendas. While these groups remain a minority amongst NGOs, the fact remains that the term ‘non-governmental organisation’ is no longer synonymous with the words neutral, apolitical, or independent. Undoubtedly, the status and perception of NGOs within the international community also has a great impact on the military-NGO relationship.

There are a myriad of factors which serve to influence the military-NGO relationship. In assessing the literature, however, this study has identified and grouped these many factors into six primary factors which directly impact the military-NGO relationship and determine the degree to which cooperation may be achieved. These six factors are: Missions; Cultures; Structures; Comparative Advantage; Perception; and Level of Conflict. These factors are used to measure the level of military-NGO cooperation in each of the case studies. An explanation of each of these factors is provided below.

\(^{17}\) While militaries may be tasked with traditional peacekeeping roles, which sometimes require impartiality or neutrality, militaries as organizations are arms of their respective governments and, therefore, political in nature.
**Missions:** Militaries are government instruments used to pursue political goals, whereas NGOs, as illustrated by their title, non-governmental organisations, have traditionally attempted to be perceived as apolitical in their delivery of aid. However, over the past two decades, the missions of militaries and NGOs have continually evolved and neither group is monolithic. Military missions have at times included the direct provision of assistance. NGO missions are not strictly apolitical or neutral, and, while still a minority, some NGOs have overtly political or religious missions in a complex emergency.

**Cultures:** While both the military and NGOs employ people of diverse cultural, linguistic, and religious backgrounds, there are fundamental differences in the organisations’ cultures. Military forces are trained war-fighters, while NGO personnel generally share a belief in the principle of non-violence. However, there are various cultural differences and similarities which serve to influence the military-NGO relationship, such as the: motivations, agendas, employment status, educational, political and religious backgrounds of military and NGO personnel.

**Structures:** Most NGOs have decentralized, horizontal organisational structures. They emphasize consensus, flexibility, and independence. The military has a hierarchical, top-down command structure, which emphasizes authority, conformity, and discipline. Again, these are generalizations, as there are many NGOs, particularly the larger NGOs, which have hierarchical organisational structures and may be more bureaucratic. These varied organisational structures impact on the military-NGO relationship in many ways, including the ability of military and NGOs to: communicate amongst themselves and with each other; authorize actions in the field; build credible and
influential relationships; employ flexibility in their operations; and make decisions related to the operation.

Comparative Advantage: NGOs are generally able to operate at a grassroots level, engaging with locals and earning their trust. This enables many NGOs to reach into more areas of the population than their international organisation (IO) or military counterparts. NGOs are also often longer-term players in complex emergencies. Often they have been in an area before a conflict began and will be there years after the military departs. This gives NGOs a unique knowledge of the culture and history of an environment. The military’s comparative advantage lies in its ability to provide security and large-scale logistical support. When diplomacy fails, it is the military which is relied upon to restore order. The military has the training, workforce, and equipment to deploy rapidly to complex emergencies. When humanitarian capabilities are insufficient to deal with complex emergencies, the task often falls to military forces.

Perception: The local and international perception of NGOs is critical. Negative perceptions of NGO actions or organisations can endanger NGO employees, derail aid programmes, and lead to a loss of funding. Likewise, the perception of military forces by locals has a great affect on the security environment, as well as the military-NGO relationship. When the intervening military forces have the consent of the locals, the military-NGO relationship is improved, whereas an unpopular military force’s involvement in humanitarian aid and reconstruction causes controversy with the locals and strains the military-NGO relationship.

Level of Conflict: The level of violence and danger present in a given conflict has a tremendous impact on the military-NGO relationship. When a conflict is more
dangerous and the risk of death and injury is greater, the military-NGO relationship may improve. In instances where the interdependence between the two actors is the greatest, the NGOs may rely on the military forces for protection and tend to be more willing to share information with the military. Likewise, the military may actively engage with the NGOs to determine their whereabouts and gather intelligence so that they can provide a higher degree of security in the region. Conversely, when the security in an area is relatively stable, the relationship may begin to deteriorate, as the NGOs do not need the military for protection and the military does not rely primarily on information provided by the humanitarian community. There are certainly exceptions to this assertion as the case studies will demonstrate. However, undoubtedly, the level of conflict has an impact on the relationship.

These six primary factors and assertions will be tested further in the four case studies, but to better understand the military-NGO relationship and the obstacles to cooperation, one must first become familiar with the military and NGOs. The following sections provide an overview of the military and NGOs, their relationships with the United Nations, and their missions, cultures, and structures.
The Military in Complex Emergencies

While militaries have been tasked with humanitarian-type operations in the past, the last 18 years have witnessed a dramatic rise in the military’s involvement in these unconventional operations. The military’s involvement in the humanitarian arena is fiercely debated and remains a contentious issue, both within and without the military community. This section begins with an introduction to the military. It then outlines the history of military peacekeeping operations by the United Nations. Finally, the military’s culture, organisation, and structure are examined.

Introduction to the Military

Militaries have been raised throughout history to defend or conquer land and resources. They are designed to pursue and achieve national or collective political goals set forth by governments. The primary business of militaries is to act as an armed, trained, and combat-ready force to deter, defend, and engage in conflict.18 Contrary to popular belief, the provision of aid by military forces is not a new phenomenon. Many are surprised to learn that military forces have been involved in providing aid during conflicts and domestic emergencies for centuries. Even before the time of Alexander the Great, militaries carried out humanitarian-type tasks on numerous occasions and have continued to do so through the Napoleonic Wars, the World Wars of the Twentieth Century,


The military has resources, capabilities, and training that are not readily found elsewhere. Their medical, logistical, and engineering capabilities make militaries the obvious choice to respond rapidly to crises. Thus, when disasters occur, whether natural or man-made, governments often call on the military to respond.20 However, in the past two decades more military forces have been involved with the provision of aid than ever before. As the end of the Cold War failed to usher in a new era of peace and stability and instead witnessed a dramatic rise in intra-state conflicts, militaries found themselves increasingly engaging in conflict prevention, defence diplomacy, humanitarian emergencies, and disaster relief operations. Under the umbrella of peace support operations, forces have carried out humanitarian-type activities in the Congo, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Sudan, Iraq, the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Mozambique, East Timor, and Afghanistan, to name only a few.

Peace support operations (or peace operations) is the “generic term used to describe the deployment of external military personnel in a region of conflict to promote the maintenance of order and security.” 21 Peace support operations encompass a variety of military objectives. As Damian Lilly has noted:

---

At one end of the spectrum is military training that is concerned with building the capacity and improving the democratic accountability of recipient forces. In the middle is traditional peacekeeping (evoked under Chapter VI of the UN Charter), which involves the monitoring of cease-fires on a consensual basis (where monitors are often unarmed or if armed restricted to work within the terms of reference of a specific mandate where the use of force can only be permitted in self defence), and peace enforcement operations (evoked under Chapter VII of the UN Charter) which involves ensuring respect for a peace agreement. At the far end of spectrum are combat operations where the intervening becomes a party to the conflict to enforce a military outcome.

When discussing ‘the military’ or ‘armed forces’, this thesis is referring to international peacekeeping forces under the auspices of the UN or NATO, international coalitions, regional military forces, and other national forces involved in complex emergencies. Private security companies and non-state actors (ie: rebel forces/militias) are not included in this paper, although their increasing involvement in complex emergencies warrants further examination elsewhere. In addition, this thesis does not examine the military-NGO relationship in natural disasters. While the military-NGO relationship in natural disasters is also an important area of inquiry, the nature of the relationship in complex emergencies has the added political, military, economic, and other complexities which are the focus of this research.

Like their NGO counterparts, military forces are not monolithic. Military forces range in size, capability, professionalism, perspectives, cultures, and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). These differences present obstacles in the creation of multi-national

---

22 Lilly, p.4. Under Chapter VI or Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has the ability to mandate a military intervention. Chapter VI operations are typically peacekeeping operations in which troops monitor compliance with a consensual cease-fire by two or more warring parties. Under Chapter VI troops are entitled to use force only in self-defense. Chapter VII operations, however, are typically peace enforcement or combat operations, in which UN troops Under the auspices of the United Nation’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO), the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) is tasked with overseeing the humanitarian and military aspects of peacekeeping operations.
forces, as well as to military cooperation with UN agencies, international organisations (IO), and, of course, NGOs, all of whom the military is increasingly working alongside.

Before the Cold War ended, the role of military forces in conflicts was clearly defined: they were trained and armed war-fighters. Even during the peacekeeping missions of the Cold War era, the roles of peacekeepers could be clearly identified: they were deployed to observe a peace agreement or process between states; their deployment required the full support of the Security Council, consent of the warring parties, and a guarantee of impartiality and minimum use of force. After stabilizing the area, the peacekeepers’ presence was largely symbolic. As MacKinlay notes, “Peacekeepers did not have to establish the conditions for their own success—they were part of an accepted process that had been initiated before their arrival.”

In contrast, the complex emergencies of the past 18 years have typically involved a high rate of civilian casualties, indistinguishable combatants, and absence or abuse of internal political authority. These emergencies have elicited political, civil, humanitarian, and military responses from national governments and international organisations. Globally, per capita defence spending declined by one-third since 1985, while force deployments to complex emergencies have continued to grow. The roles of international militaries in conflicts have reflected these changes, as complex emergencies have entailed more

---

25 Easterbrook, pp.18-21.
peacemaking and peace building than conventional war-fighting roles. These roles include: the enforcement of peace agreements; undertaking operations to establish a secure environment and restore order; protecting relief supplies and aid workers; the creation and protection of camps for refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs); implementing return and resettlement programmes; training local military and police forces; disposing of weapons and mines; educating about democratic elections; and, most controversially, delivering humanitarian aid and providing reconstruction assistance.

To improve efficiency and define their role in complex emergencies, many militaries have been testing various strategies to stabilize areas through involvement in humanitarian aid and reconstruction, as well as developing new training and doctrine for civil-military affairs. Particularly since the attacks of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent War on Terrorism, the new security environment has witnessed an increase in military involvement in the humanitarian arena, as well as a rise in tensions between the military and NGOs in complex emergencies. Much of this tension stems from the debate surrounding the military’s role in complex emergencies and whether or not the military should be providing direct humanitarian assistance.

---

26 Gourlay, p.33
The Military and the United Nations

“Peacekeeping is not a job for soldiers, but only soldiers can do it.”

Since its formation in 1945 through the end of the Cold War, the United Nations existed in an international environment of a bipolar power struggle, which rendered the collective security system it embodied largely ineffective. The organisation has intervened in more conflicts in the past 18 years than it did in its first 45 years of existence. While the veto-ridden Security Council denied collective intervention in most conflicts during the Cold War period, the UN under Dag Hammarskjold developed several conflict control and resolution mechanisms, including peacekeeping.

The term ‘peacekeeping’ is nowhere to be found in the UN Charter. It was first used to describe the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation’s (UNTSO) mission to the Middle East in 1948. However, since then the term peacekeeping has become synonymous with the UN. In its first 45 years of existence, the organisation only authorized 13 peacekeeping operations, which were mostly intended to de-escalate regional tensions that threatened superpower confrontation. These missions were limited to the provisions laid out in the UN Charter-- they respected state sovereignty, required host state consent, and guaranteed minimum use of force and an impartial approach.

After the Cold War ended, the international organisation was freed from the constraints of the bipolar power struggle and finally able to employ its mandate for collective security. However, the organisation was faced with larger, more complex, multi-task, and multi-component operations. These operations deviated from the norms of the UN’s previous peacekeeping experiences, as most were intra-state conflicts, entailed complete or partial breakdown of central authority, and presented humanitarian crises of epic proportions.

During the 1990s the international community was faced with what Vaclav Havel called, “a lava of post-communist surprises”. Mapmakers struggled to keep up as multinational states disintegrated. Elsewhere in the world, nations disintegrated from within. From Cambodia to Somalia, Haiti to Bosnia, anarchy and violence ensued. For its part, the United Nations, under Chapter VI and Chapter VII of the UN Charter, authorized peacekeeping operations in Haiti, Cyprus, the Western Sahara, Liberia, Bosnia, and East Timor, among others.

The UN peacekeeping missions have had mixed results and many, in fact, have failed. While interventions in countries like El Salvador and East Timor are considered examples of successful missions, critics argue that the UN peacekeeping missions have consistently lacked mandates equal to the mission at the hand. As MacKinlay noted, “Under-resourced peacekeepers found themselves with ambitious mandates for

---

supporting peace processes that had little chance of success.”31 The peacekeeping missions in Angola, Cambodia, Bosnia, and Somalia, are commonly cited cases of operations in which the UN mandates lacked both the will and capability to succeed.32 The required response to complex emergencies often has to be as multi-faceted as the emergency itself. The UN has consistently recognized the need for a large, disciplined, logistically competent force in international peacekeeping. However, the organisation’s mandates and capabilities are only as strong as the UN Security Council (UNSC) authorizes them to be. Past experiences have demonstrated that international will to respond to complex emergencies in a robust way (or to respond at all in some cases) has been undoubtedly lacking. As the UN-military relationship continues to evolve, both actors are attempting to learn from past interventions to shape their future interaction and involvement in complex emergencies.

The Mission and Culture of the Military

While the traditional roles of military forces have changed in response to complex emergencies, their overall mission in these conflicts remains the same: to stabilize the security environment. The military’s mission is often to create a security situation in which international organisations, NGOs, and the local population can provide and access relief, as well as work toward rebuilding civil and political infrastructure.33 However, the military forces which are sent are not always equal to the task of providing both logistic

---

support and protecting themselves and the aid workers, often being lightly armed and politically constrained, as was seen in the former Yugoslavia.  

Military operations in complex emergencies are influenced by political agendas of various governments, national interests, domestic opinion, and bureaucratic red tape. Governments may be reluctant, or even averse, to committing their troops to complex emergencies that do not directly threaten their nation’s political or economic interests. In addition, policymakers are pressured by their domestic constituencies to demonstrate that a deployment of forces is necessary, effective, and, increasingly, without great risk. Just as public support is short-lived, the military’s mission is conducted with short-term, quick impact goals to secure the area and hand over responsibility. Militaries are often task-focused and they employ practical solutions to “get the job done”. The military also seeks to avoid what it calls ‘mission creep’, a phrase coined by military commanders during Operation Joint Endeavor in Bosnia in 1995, which refers to being tasked with, or taking on, roles that are outside its direct operational mission. However, in the age of complex emergencies, the military’s capabilities are often needed in unconventional ways.

Militaries have considerable expertise and professionalism in undertaking logistically challenging roles. They have the ability to rapidly deploy large, well-equipped, task-focused units, in a manner that has not been matched by their civilian counterparts. However, the military’s deployable infrastructure is designed to survive in combat. It is

---

34 Doel, pp.26-32.
rapidly assembled, but expensive to operate. Despite this, militaries have been called upon repeatedly to engage in tasks outside their conventional roles. Not only are other actors, such as NGOs and international organisations, concerned about the military’s changing status in complex emergencies, debate surrounding the military’s involvement rages within national and international military organisations.

Within individual nations’ defence forces, as well as the larger military community, there exist mixed views on the extent to which soldiers should be trained in peace support operations. Christopher Bellamy explains:

Many professional soldiers and professional armies have taken to the peace-support operation conducted over the past decade with enthusiasm and flexibility. Others remain reluctant to engage in them and still more are reluctant to throw themselves into working closely with other agencies and the local populations, believing that soldiers must be warriors, exclusively, and that, ‘peacekeeping is for wimps’.  

Some argue that non-Clausewitzian (or non-combat) training of the armed forces diminishes soldiers’ war-fighting capabilities. This presents a unique challenge to the military as they prepare and train soldiers to participate in high intensity conventional operations on the one hand, while preparing and training them to participate in peace support, humanitarian aid and disaster relief operations, where the measure of success will be the number of lives saved as opposed to taking objectives and eliminating the enemy as a fighting force. General John Shalikashvili, chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1993 to 1997, described a prevalent view when he said that many senior

military officers believe that, "Real men don't do MOOTW [Military Operations other than War]."38 Others argue that the skills required for peace support operations can be taught without detracting from soldiers’ combat readiness.39 As Bellamy notes, “some of the hardest, toughest fighting soldiers in the world excel in peace support operations.”40

These differences of opinion have manifested themselves in the doctrine and strategies of various nations. Peace support operations have led some forces to incorporate civil-military affairs programmes, as well as increasingly sophisticated civil-military affairs (CMA) doctrine. While CMA is not a new concept in military operations, its application has changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War.41 The Canadian armed forces, well renowned for their diplomatic and negotiation skills, have adopted extensive training and doctrine that outlines their interaction with civilians in complex emergencies.42 Likewise, Britain, by virtue of their long history of colonization and experience in low-intensity conflicts, has gained a strong reputation for effective civil-military affairs capabilities.43 While any of these western militaries could have been included in this study, the U.S. and New Zealand militaries were selected to illustrate two western militaries with vastly different resources. While this is true of most all western militaries

38 Priest, p.105. Shalikashvili has described himself as pro-MOOTW, but said he was talking about other senior officers.
40 Bellamy, pp. 9-12.
41 Pollick, p.61.
42 Canada Department of National Defence, “Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC)”, Chapter 11 from DDIO, Ottawa, ON: DND Canada, Fall 2005, p.11.
43 Gourlay, p.36.
when compared to the U.S., no other major western military underscored this difference more than New Zealand.

There are a variety of motivations militaries may have for engaging in civil-military affairs and humanitarian activities. By improving their relations with civilians, militaries are able to gather intelligence to assist the security environment or parallel operations. Also, the military is often motivated to undertake humanitarian and reconstruction efforts to “win hearts and minds” as part of an overall security stabilization effort. As MacKinlay notes, “Re-establishment of local schools is not a manifestation of military interest in restoring education, but an effort to keep children from roaming the street and to improve local attitudes toward military peacekeepers in general.”

By earning the trust and respect of the local people, the military is contributing to force protection. Militaries may also see humanitarian action as a strategy for improving their public image and increasing public support for defence spending. Military forces’ motivations may also be altruistic in simply responding to a need that exists in complex emergencies. As Colonel Martin Dransfield of the NZDF said, “We could sit back in our OPs [observation posts] and do nothing, but we choose to help. We have the personnel and capabilities to assist and refuse to sit back and watch.”

Additionally, militaries use their involvement in humanitarian crises as a recruiting technique. Many militaries’ television and print recruiting advertisements feature

---

44 MacKinlay, p.53.
45 Colonel Martin Dransfield, interview, 28 November 2004.
military personnel conducting humanitarian-type activities. Military commanders also often use civil affairs activities to occupy soldiers’ time in an effort to improve morale and discipline. Finally, governments may deploy military forces with humanitarian mandates or to peace support operations for the publicity and recognition that comes along with taking part in interventions.

As noted above, the military is not monolithic and the individuals who make up the world’s professional military forces come from many different countries and cultures, speak different languages, and have a variety of perspectives. Even though many militaries are now open to women, they remain male-dominated organisations. This has led many in the humanitarian community to assert that the military’s male-dominated culture puts them at odds with the gender needs that are central to complex emergency response.46 Military personnel also tend to come from lower to middle class economic backgrounds.47 This can present difficulties in the military-NGO relationship, as many NGO employees are from middle to upper class backgrounds. Military forces are also tied to engrained systems of uniformity, tradition, and are typically more conservative than their NGO counterparts.48

Many military personnel are highly trained specialists in their areas of expertise. Military personnel may also be characterized as courageous, willing to encounter hazardous conditions, and idealistic. Just as aid workers believe that their work is contributing to a greater good, so, too, do many military personnel. Indeed, it is often the desire to perform a public service that is cited by personnel as their main motivation in joining the military. Military personnel may have other motivations for joining the armed forces. These range from family tradition, unequalled experience and training, to educational benefits and discipline.

**Structure**

The military has a vertical (top down) hierarchical organisational structure with a clearly defined chain of command. The organisation emphasizes authority and discipline. Dating back to the Roman Legions, the military has used formalized ranking systems to designate command. Most modern militaries have three broad categories for rank: Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers, and Soldiers.

Commissioned Officers are members of the armed forces that derive direct authority from a sovereign power (a nation’s ruler or head of state). Non-commissioned Officers (NCOs) are enlisted personnel who supervise other soldiers or have significant administrative responsibilities. Soldiers are further separated into two categories:

---

49 To become a commissioned officer, one usually must graduate from a military university or a recognized officer training course. Commissioned officers are authorized to use deadly force to carry out the lawful orders of their government, either directly or through orders to non-commissioned officers or soldiers.  
50 NCOs are considered the backbone of the military. However, even the most senior NCO officially ranks beneath the most junior commissioned officer, though in many organisations a senior NCO will have formal responsibility and informal respect beyond that of a junior officer.
specialists and privates. Specialists are soldiers trained in a specific trade, whereas privates are generalists and the lowest ranking military personnel.\textsuperscript{51}

Additional ranks within these categories distinguish the command structure. In addition to their rank status, many modern militaries have both full-time and part-time soldiers. Part-time soldiers may be referred to as reservists or territorial forces. These are military personnel who are employed by the civilian workforce, but work and train for the military during a set period of time throughout the year. They are also required to be deployable to military operations worldwide. It is within the territorial and reserve contingents that many militaries conduct training in civil-military affairs. For example, most of the US military’s civil-military affairs capabilities are in the reserves and only US civil-military affairs officials are trained to work with NGOs in the field.\textsuperscript{52} As Cahlink points out, “More than 90 percent of the [US] Army’s nearly 6,000 civil affairs soldiers are either in the Army Reserve or the National Guard.”\textsuperscript{53}

“Civil affairs are the military’s version of social workers,” notes Cahlink, “They don’t fight battles, but rather seek to win over civilian populations by providing humanitarian assistance.”\textsuperscript{54} The reserve or territorial forces are predominately chosen to carry out civil-military affairs operations for several reasons. First, reservists or territorial forces bring firsthand civilian experience with them to their part-time military roles. Unlike their full-time military counterparts, part-time soldiers engage with civilians on a daily

\textsuperscript{51} These soldiers are led by NCOs and officers and commanded to carry out a variety of tasks.
\textsuperscript{52} Byman, pp.97-114.
\textsuperscript{54} Cahlink, p.53
basis in a “real world” environment. Thus, they are often able to relate to locals, NGOs, and the media more than regular forces. Second, when commanding officers are putting together a force for deployment, they often select reservists or territorial forces for non-combat roles, as the part-time soldiers often lack the training that full-time soldiers have.

However, there are difficulties in relying so heavily on the part-time soldiers for civil-military affairs. Reservists that specialize in civil-military affairs are increasingly being called upon to deploy to complex emergencies. In the US military, 85 percent of civil-military affairs reservists are deployed, compared to only 17 percent of non-CMA reservists. This has led many to resign as the frequent and lengthy disruptions to their civilian lives (both professional and personal) are beyond anything they had anticipated when joining the part-time forces. In addition, part-time soldiers are often viewed with suspicion by their full-time military counterparts. Full-time forces often dismiss reservists as “poorly trained weekend warriors”. As one soldier acknowledged, “Ask any active duty soldier who they’d want to serve with: an active or reservist, and it is a no-brainer. Do you want to go to war with someone who has been training day in and day out, or someone that may just have learned to fire a weapon?” Add to this the misunderstanding of civil-affairs within the armed forces and you have part-time civil-military affairs soldiers fighting an uphill battle for respect in the military.

There is an inherent lack of understanding within the military regarding the need and capabilities of civil-military affairs. In an organisation that is built on war-fighting

---

55 Cahlink, p.52.
56 Cahlink, p.56.
capabilities, strategies employed to win hearts and minds are often disregarded. As Cahlink points out, “[Civil-affairs soldiers] are struggling for respect inside and outside the Army.” As A.J. Duncan notes, “Operations Other Than War and Peace Support Operations (especially humanitarian aid operations) are often not taken very seriously by the military, which are reluctant to view it as proper soldiering.” However, Bellamy argues that, “It is possible to combine combat readiness with compassion, and that is the challenge for many armed forces in the first quarter of the 21st century.”

Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs) in Complex Emergencies

NGOs have grown exponentially in both numbers and importance over the past two decades. However, there remains some uncertainty about what NGOs are. NGOs can be critical actors in complex emergencies, delivering aid and assistance to millions of people worldwide. First, this chapter attempts to explain this enormously diverse group of organisations, the history of NGOs, and briefly looks at the major international NGOs. Next, the NGO-United Nations relationship is outlined. Finally, the mission, culture, and structure of NGOs are examined.

What Are NGOs?

The diversity of NGOs strains any simple definition. They include many groups and institutions that are entirely or largely independent of government and that have primarily humanitarian or cooperative rather than commercial objectives. They are private agencies in industrial countries that support international development; indigenous groups organized regionally or nationally; and member-

58 Cahlink, p.52.
59 A.J. Duncan, “Is the Use of the Military in Complex Humanitarian Aid Operations a Political Quick Fix or can it be the Cornerstone that Leads to Long Term Solutions?”, MA Thesis in Military Studies, Cranfield University, RMCS, Shrivenham, 1998.
60 Bellamy, pp. 9-12.
groups in villages. NGOs include charitable and religious associations that mobilize private funds for development, distribute food and family planning services and promote community organisation. They also include independent cooperatives, community associations, water-user societies, women's groups and pastoral associations. Citizen Groups that raise awareness and influence policy are also NGOs.  

It may be indicative of their ambiguity that non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are named for what they are not, rather than what they are. Their name implies that they have not been established by governments or agreements among governments, yet leaves one with little indication of what NGOs are. This umbrella term is used to describe a plethora of organisations, which may have little else in common other than their non-governmental status. Due to the vague definition of what constitutes a NGO, the term has been applied to liberation movements, political parties, and, more controversially, terrorist organisations. However, Peter Willetts argues that, "a commitment to non-violence is the best respected of the principles defining a NGO." In fact, for a NGO to receive consultative status with the United Nations, it must verify that it is both not-for-profit and dedicated to non-violent humanitarian principles and international laws.

NGOs are incredibly diverse and numerous. In the past two decades the number and importance of NGOs has grown exponentially. Today there are over 30,000 NGOs, which can be found at the local, national, and international levels. As Carolyn

---

Stephenson points out, one must look only to the number of acronyms that have been created to group the vast array of NGOs:

People speak of NGOs, INGOs (international NGOs), BINGOs (business international NGOs), RINGOs (religious international NGOs), ENGOs (environmental NGOs), GONGOs (government-operated NGOs -- which may have been set up by governments to look like NGOs in order to qualify for outside aid), QUANGOs (quasi-nongovernmental organisations -- i.e. those that are at least partially created or supported by states), and many others.\(^\text{64}\)

The umbrella term, “NGO” covers a myriad of organisations that are not monolithic. In fact, NGOs can have very specific religious, political, business, national or other agendas. As noted above, some are state-sponsored, despite their NGO status; even some terrorist organisations qualify under the very loose terms of what constitutes a NGO. Therefore, it is critical to be able to differentiate these disparate organisations. In a complex emergency, many NGOs will descend upon a region to carry out their work. Throughout the history of NGOs, small and large organisations have been created to address various issues which stem from natural disasters and conflict.

As two of the largest and most influential humanitarian organisations, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Save the Children International have long histories in aid work. It was witnessing the devastation on the battlefields of Solferino in 1864 that inspired Henri Dunant and four Swiss colleagues to found the ICRC. The ICRC is credited with inspiring the movement of modern humanitarianism and holds a unique position as an international organisation (IO), due to its adherence to the Geneva

Conventions. Save the Children International was the first multi-national NGO to be established. During World War I Save the Children was formed to alleviate the suffering of children across occupied Europe.  

Several more NGOs were formed during World War II and many were created in response to wars and disasters in the 1960s and 1970s. However, it wasn’t until the Cold War ended that NGOs began to take on the importance that they have today. Over the past two decades, there has been a proliferation of NGOs, particularly in the fields of conflict resolution, human rights, development, and humanitarian assistance. The growing number of NGOs is largely attributed to their ability to deliver aid more cost effectively than their counterparts in the government and IOs, their ties to local communities, and, of course, the increasing number of interventions in complex humanitarian emergencies.

With a collective annual budget of roughly $7 billion, the NGO community has considerable influence in the arena of complex emergencies. Within the NGO community, there are several major NGOs that receive the majority of aid funding. As Andrew Natsios points out that, “Although there are 1500 NGOs registered with the UN system as having observer status, only 400 are registered with USAID, a process necessary for them to receive US government grants.” Indeed, the number of NGOs actually operating in an area can be deceiving. Many NGOs operate in an area for only a

---

65 Gourlay, p.33.
66 Abiew and Keating, p.46.
few months and others deliver aid to NGOs that are already in the afflicted country. As Natsios noted:

There are perhaps 20 [NGOs] in the USA and another 20 in Europe that work in complex emergencies. This work is sustained, technically sound, and widespread enough to have an impact on the situation on the ground. Of these 40 NGOs, perhaps 10 US and another 10 European NGOs receive 75% of all public funds spent by NGOs in complex emergencies.\(^{68}\) The following major international NGOs, or ‘super NGOs’, can be found operating in almost every complex humanitarian emergency and include: International Save the Children Alliance, Oxfam, CARE International, World Vision International, and Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF).\(^ {69}\) Brief overviews of the organisations’ capabilities are provided below:

**International Save the Children Alliance:** Save the Children is the oldest of the ‘super NGOs’ and the world’s largest independent global movement for children. The organisation was launched in the United Kingdom (UK) in 1919 in a response to the aftermath of WWI and the Russian Revolution. Save the Children has undergone many changes in the past 86 years, yet it has not strayed from its original mission: to improve the lives of children throughout the world. In over 100 countries, Save the Children advocates for children’s rights, provides humanitarian relief in disasters and emergencies, and implements a number of development programmes for children.\(^ {70}\)

**Oxfam:** Founded as the Oxford Committee for Famine Relief in the UK in 1942, Oxfam’s mission was to feed the citizens of Nazi-occupied Greece. Oxfam International

---

\(^{68}\) Natsios, “NGOs and the UN System”, p.406.


\(^{70}\) Save the Children International website, retrieved 5 May 2005, http://www.savethechildren.net/alliance/about_us/index_byyears.html#1920s.
was formed in 1995 and continues to provide relief for people in famine-stricken regions, as well as implementing water, sanitation, and development programmes. Oxfam currently operates in over 100 countries.  

Care International: Originally known as The Cooperative for American Remittances to Europe, CARE was formed in the United States in 1945. To assist those affected by World War II, CARE sent basic food and aid supplies to Europe. These ‘CARE packages’ contained items that were unavailable to Europeans or heavily rationed. The first “CARE packages’ delivered were to US troops serving in the Pacific during WWII. These packages were known as, “10-in-1”, which contained one meal for 10 soldiers. Over the last 60 years, CARE has shifted its focus to working in developing nations and countries affected by conflict or other disasters. With a primarily indigenous staff of 12,000 working in 70 different countries, CARE has improved its efforts to provide long-term development programmes that, “work to create lasting solutions to the root causes of poverty.” CARE’s programmes range from providing healthcare, shelter, and food to people suffering the effects of natural disasters, wars, and conflicts, to development programmes that provide sustainable agriculture, medical, and financial training.  

World Vision International: World Vision was founded in the US in 1950 to assist children orphaned during the Korean War. Today it is the largest privately funded Christian relief organisation in the world. World Vision’s primary mission is to improve the lives of children throughout the world, as well as the communities in which they live.

---

The organisation implements education, food, and healthcare programmes in 103 countries.\textsuperscript{73}

\textit{Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF):} The youngest of the ‘super NGOs’, MSF was founded in 1971 by a group of French doctors. Specializing in healthcare and medical training, MSF provides services to over 80 countries. They have a 2,000-strong staff of volunteer medical doctors, nurses, and administrators. Compared to their fellow NGOs, MSF is an extremely vocal critic of government policies and actions that potentially endanger humanitarian objectives.\textsuperscript{74} In 2004, MSF suspended its operations in Afghanistan after five of its employees were brutally murdered.\textsuperscript{75}

\textit{International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC):} It is important to note that many individuals, particularly in the military community, mistakenly include the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) under the umbrella term “NGO”. Due to the ICRC’s mandate under the Geneva Conventions, it is bound by international law and considered an international organisation (IO). With an annual budget of approximately $1 billion ($300 million of which is spent on humanitarian projects), the ICRC wields great influence in the humanitarian arena and will be included in this thesis, as their participation in complex humanitarian emergencies is too great to exclude. “The [ICRC]

is the oldest, most disciplined, and best organized of the three set of actors [the UN, NGOs, and ICRC) of the international relief response system.”

The Red Cross is made up of two separate international organisations: the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC). The ICRC adheres strictly to the principle of neutrality, assisting all sides of conflicts. It also protects prisoners of war and works to unite families separated by conflict. The ICRC is the most fervent protector of its autonomy and principles, which can at times alienate it from other actors in the NGO and UN communities. The ICRC is reluctant to engage in any efforts to coordinate with other agencies and takes an extremely cautious approach to information sharing. The IFRC is made up of 178 national Red Cross or Red Crescent Society affiliates which respond to local, national, and international crises, as well as working with military personnel and their families and offering various training courses. While the ICRC is included in this study, it is necessary to recognize that the following cultural, organisational, and personal characteristics that are applied to NGOs and their personnel, are not necessarily applicable to the ICRC.

NGOs represent almost every aspect of society. There are hundreds of faith-based NGOs, such as Catholic Relief Services (CRS), Church World Services (CWS), World Vision (WV) and Adventist Development and Assistance Agency International (ADRA). Some NGOs are country, or even community, specific. Memberships of NGOs can

---

range from very small, “comprising little more than a man, a dog, a van, and a good cause” to the very large whose budgets, “rival those of small nations.” However, most of the major humanitarian NGOs belong to one of the two international umbrella organisations: the International Council of Voluntary Agencies (Europe) and the Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response. These organisations work to coordinate NGO activities, general standards, management, and programme implementation.

The International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) is a consortium of human rights, humanitarian, and development NGOs which engages in advocacy and information sharing. The Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response’s (SCHR) membership is made up of nine humanitarian organisations: WCC, CARE, Caritas, IFRC, ICRC, LWF, MSF, Oxfam International, and Save the Children Alliance. These organisations have worked together since 1997 when the Sphere Project was launched by a group of NGOs and the IFRC to set universal minimum standards in core areas of disaster response. NGO consortia increasingly yield great influence in complex emergencies, which has been recognized by national governments and the United Nations through various consultative processes.

NGOs and the United Nations

When its charter was written in 1944-1945, the UN included only a brief reference to NGOs under Chapter X/article 71, which stated:

The Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organisations, which are concerned with matters within its competence. Such arrangements may be made with international organisations and, where appropriate, with national organisations after consultation with the Member of the United Nations concerned.82

However, after the Cold War ended, the organisation soon recognized the ability of NGOs to affect public policy and to act as vital contributors to humanitarian emergencies. They began to be referred to increasingly in UN resolutions, and some even began to meet informally with members of the UN Security Council to coordinate actions in emergency situations.

In 1948 there were only 41 NGOs with UN consultative status and in 1995 there were 1,068.83 When the 49th plenary meeting of ECOSOC met in July 1996, they approved Resolution 1996/31, which updated the arrangements for NGO consultative status with the UN. As Stephenson notes, Resolution 1996/31:

Provided for general consultative status (organisations concerned with most of the activities of the Council and broadly representative of populations in a large number of countries), special consultative status (internationally known organisations with special competence in a few of the fields of activity of the Council), and roster status (other useful organisations), and allocated different rights to them in attending meetings, speaking, and receiving documents, among others.84

Non-governmental organisations have used their consultative status at the UN to affect intractable conflict in many ways. They have organized to get the General Assembly and other UN organs to pass resolutions on disarmament, development, and human rights. They have helped to develop new UN institutions and treaties. The success of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines is but one example of the growing importance and influence of NGOs.

As complex humanitarian emergencies continued to dominate UN policies in the 1990s, the NGO Working Group on the Security Council was established in 1995 in an effort to coordinate NGO-UN activities. They have met increasingly, privately and off-the-record, with members of the Security Council, providing field information to members of the Council from crisis areas, as well as providing a link to the public. Today there are over 1,500 NGOs with UN consultative status. The UN and its numerous organisations are also looking for new and innovative ways to coordinate their efforts with NGOs in complex emergencies.

The Mission and Culture of NGOs

Each NGO determines its mission and principles, creating great differences among the various organisations. As noted above, NGOs come in a wide array of sizes, capacities, and structures and typically have defined areas of specialisation. Trying to coordinate NGOs can be, as Bellamy noted, “Likened to herding cats.” As Slim points out:

---

85 Natsios, “NGOs and the UN System”, p.102.
86 Natsios, “NGOs and the UN System”, p.103.
Any consensus across the NGO sector about a mission and mandate will often be variable and cast in the broadest terms. It can seldom be assumed that every NGO will be singing the same song in a given situation. Such independence has important consequences for the civil-military relationship and may make NGOs unpredictable and even tempestuous partners."\(^{87}\)

However, despite their many differences, most NGOs adhere to the Red Cross/NGO Code of Conduct, which states:

1. The humanitarian imperative comes first. The prime motivation of our response to disaster is to alleviate human suffering.
2. Aid is given regardless of race, creed, or nationality of the recipients and without adverse distinction of any kind. Aid priorities are calculated solely on the basis of need.
3. Aid will not be used to further a particular political or religious standpoint.
4. Humanitarian Aid Organisations (HAOs) shall endeavour not to act as instruments of government foreign policy. In order to protect our independence, HAOs will seek to avoid dependence upon a single funding source.
5. HAOs shall respect culture and custom.
6. HAOs shall attempt to build disaster response on local capacities. Where possible, HAOs will strengthen these capacities by employing local staff, purchasing local materials, and trading with local companies.
7. Ways shall be found to involve programme beneficiaries in the management of assistance aid. Effective assistance and lasting rehabilitation can best be achieved where the intended beneficiaries are involved in the design, management, and implementation of the assistance programme.
8. Assistance aid must strive to reduce further vulnerabilities to disaster as well as meeting basic needs.
9. HAOs hold themselves accountable to both those they seek to assist and those from whom they accept resources.
10. In our information, publicity, and advertising activities, we shall recognize disaster victims as dignified human, not hopeless objects.\(^{88}\)

In short, most NGOs are based on the basic humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, and impartiality. These principles are the basis of humanitarianism and enable

\(^{87}\) Slim, p.128.
NGOs to access vulnerable populations to whom governmental organisations and military forces may be denied. This ability to gain access is central to NGOs’ operational independence. Independence allows NGOs freedom of movement and the ability to carry out independent needs assessments. Perhaps most importantly, in the context of civil-military relations, independence provides a vital form of security for humanitarian organisations. 89 Kevin Henry of CARE explains the importance that operational independence has for NGOs:

Conflict is a primary cause of human misery worldwide, and aid workers seek to provide life-saving assistance in many dangerous places. Unlike soldiers, we are unarmed and must rely for our safety on the good will of the communities we serve. While we take all possible practical precautions, our only real defence is our reputation for operating independently of military and political actors and providing aid impartially to those in need. 90

Aid agencies are increasingly perceived by locals to be politically motivated and are often not viewed by locals as being separate and distinct entities from military and other governmental actors in the field. Thus, while it is becoming increasingly difficult, it is important for their ability to operate that NGOs are perceived to be separate from other politically motivated organisations.

Unlike any other actor in complex humanitarian emergencies, NGOs have a unique ability to work at the grassroots level. Often NGOs have been working in an affected country for years before a complex emergency occurs. They often speak local languages, have a deep understanding of local culture, and have earned the trust of the people.

When the security situation in a country is relatively stable, NGOs implement education, health, and agricultural programmes to improve living standards, but as a complex emergency develops, NGOs shift their focus to relief programmes. While some NGO personnel, mostly national NGO staff, remain in country during conflicts, most evacuate the country until the intervening military forces (whether it be unilateral, coalition, or UN-sponsored force) secure the area. During the evacuation period, most NGOs relocate to border areas to assist with what is usually a large influx of refugees. Upon re-entering the country, NGOs provide water, food, shelter, and medical assistance to locals. During this period NGOs commonly come into contact with military forces. However, as the security situation improves, the military eventually departs, while many NGOs and other aid organisations remain to assist in the country’s development.

It is important to note that the UN and regional coalitions only intervene in a very small portion of complex emergencies. At present nearly one third of the world’s countries are mired in conflict, yet the international media covers only a very small number of these conflicts and the international community deploys forces to even fewer. These complex emergencies are referred to as ‘forgotten conflicts’ and NGOs have led the battle in increasing public awareness by advocating for assistance in these conflicts. Pamela Aall from the United States Institute for Peace (USIP) notes NGOs’ role in ‘forgotten conflicts’:

In the case of the forgotten conflicts, the one that no one is paying any attention to. Or that if they are paying attention to them they are so far down on the list of priorities they might send out a delegation maybe once every five years and say how is the conflict going. But they are not putting any resources to this. And there are lots of these forgotten conflicts around the world and the role that NGOs can play in that, because they are often engaged, these are often the conflicts that
NGOs get engaged in because they can get entry, is to put them on the map. To make sure they are not forgotten anymore and to bring some of this outside experience into that conflict zone.\textsuperscript{91}

NGOs are involved in everything from conflict resolution and mediation to election monitoring and human rights advocacy and, of course, the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Their actions can have both positive and negative effects on the locals, the conflict, or long-term development. Historically aid has been provided to alleviate suffering, not to create a solution to protracted conflict. However, with the recent proliferation of development-focused agencies and doctrine, there has been a significant shift in the relief to development paradigm. This has been in part due to the criticism that NGOs have received in the past two decades over their role in prolonging conflict. Most notably in Graham Hancock’s book, “Lords of Poverty”, the aid community has been accused of being part of a business to exploit the poor, lacking purely humanitarian motivations, and actually worsening crises.\textsuperscript{92}

While aspects of NGO assistance may exacerbate conflicts, much of the work NGOs carry out has a positive effect on the lives of millions of people throughout the world. Today most NGOs spend more time in ensuring their relief efforts also build on the future development of the area. In an effort to assist the local population to become self-sufficient, most agencies have adopted Mary Anderson’s call to “first, do no harm”.\textsuperscript{93}

Through implementing a variety of work programmes for locals, conducting needs assessments, and focusing on the development of agriculture, healthcare, and business programmes, NGOs are increasingly assisting local populations to sustain themselves in the longer term.\textsuperscript{94}

NGO personnel are as diverse as the many organisations which employ them. While there are an abundance of highly trained medical, technical, and scientific professionals employed by NGOs, there is also “a colourful collection of Woodstock grads, former Merry Pranksters, and other assorted acid-head, eco-freaks, save-the-whalers, doomsday mystics, poets, and other hangers-on.”\textsuperscript{95} NGOs come in all ages, but Cedric Thornberry has found that particularly in recent missions, “aid workers tend to be much younger than their military counterparts, and this can reinforce differences of approach.”\textsuperscript{96}

Perhaps the one characteristic that most NGO personnel share is their adherence to the principle of non-violence. This common characteristic among NGO personnel often puts them at odds with military forces who are trained war-fighters. However, NGO employees do share some important characteristics with many of their military counterparts. They are idealistic, have an international perspective, are courageous, and willing to take risks to get a mission accomplished.\textsuperscript{97} NGOs work in many of the most dangerous areas in the world, where they are continually confronted with the risk of violence and disease. Their motivations for taking these risks and carrying out

\textsuperscript{94} Natsios, “NGOs and the UN System”, p.105.
\textsuperscript{95} Wade Rowland, \textit{The Plot to Save the World}, Toronto: Clarke, Irwin & Co.: 1973, p.1.
\textsuperscript{96} Thornberry, p.3.
\textsuperscript{97} Bellamy, p.34.
humanitarian objectives are varied. Some NGO personnel are adventure seekers, revelling in the danger and excitement of being in a conflict zone. Many are idealistic visionaries, hoping to contribute to a better, more peaceful world. Others are more pragmatic and work to assist those suffering from the effects of war and violence. Most NGO personnel have a combination of these motivations.

Structure of NGOs

NGOs generally have a horizontal, decentralized organisational structure. Natsios identifies the four different organisational models which NGOs use:

1. First, all began and some remain with one headquarters based entirely in one country, even though they work internationally in others, for example the International Rescue Committee and the International Medical Corps.
2. Some have many autonomous national chapters with independent field organisations, each reporting back to the home offices. This means several offices may work independently of each other in the same country, for example Save the Children and Oxfam.
3. Some have chosen to create many national fund-raising offices that pool their collective funds and spend them through a single worldwide field organisation, which is indigenously staffed and managed, such as World Vision International and the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. A variation of this is a hybrid of the second and third models, in which each national headquarters has its own field organisation but is assigned specific emergencies in which to work by a central international organisation to avoid competition in the same country (e.g. CARE).
4. Others only work through indigenous local NGOs that are not part of their organisational structure; they have no independent operational capacity in the field outside such indigenous partner agencies as the Church World Service, Oxfam/US, and Christian Children’s Fund.98

Due to their different organisational models, the flexibility, operational speed, and decision-making processes of NGOs vary. NGOs may also differ from one another based on the requirements and expectations of their donor constituency.

98 Natsios, “NGOs and the UN System”, p.408.
One cannot discuss the organisational structure of NGOs without discussing funding. NGOs cannot operate without funding and are accountable to their donors. These donors are both private (corporations and individuals) and public (national governments). Private funding is raised mostly through mass appeals via television and mail. Public funding comes from governments, usually administered through government aid agencies (e.g.: USAID and NZAID). Some NGOs choose not to accept government donations, while others receive 60%-70% or more of their income from the public sector.99 NGOs are directly impacted by the perceptions of their donors and beneficiaries. As Natsios notes, “[NGOs] must design their field programmes around the interests of their constituency or they may not survive.” 100

There is a noticeable difference in US and European NGO funding. US NGOs receive much more government funding than their European counterparts. Both CARE and Save the Children US receive almost 50% of their funding from the US government, while Oxfam receives 75% of its funding from private sources and 25% from the UK government. MSF adheres to a strict funding policy which stipulates that the vast majority of the organisation’s funds must come from private donors.101 These funding differences seemingly impact the operational policies of NGOs. US-based NGOs are much more amenable to cooperation with government agencies and policies, whereas, European NGOs tend to be more adverse to cooperating with governments and more willing to openly criticize their policies.

100 Natsios, “NGOs and the UN System”, p.408.
101 Barry and Jefferys, pp.1-30.
NGOs are constantly seeking new sources of funding. Both in the private and public sectors, NGOs compete for funding. Their ability to fundraise is one of the ways in which successful NGOs are measured. This need to find donors and raise money often results in a distortion of NGO aid. That is, because of the constant demand to be seen ‘doing something’ for additional funding, NGOs often focus their efforts on the world’s most publicized emergencies. As Natsios notes:

Fundraising around highly visible humanitarian crises raises more money at a lower cost than any other form of advertising or publicity. Certain NGOs have been attacked for what some critics call ‘relief pornography’—raising money by showing scenes of starving children that wrench the donor’s heart and portray a sense of helplessness. This distorts an organisation’s judgment on where to work and when, but it is not an easily addressed problem since without funding they cannot work at all.\(^{102}\)

Another direct result of the importance of funding on NGOs is the competitive environment this creates within the humanitarian community. Aside from their inherent organisational differences, NGOs are also competitors for donors and funding. This creates great obstacles to inter-agency coordination, and in turn, NGO cooperation with other potential funding competitors: the military, private contractors, UN agencies, and governments.

Over the past two decades, more and more governments are spending their aid money bilaterally, through NGOs. While this shift has seen an increase in funding to NGOs, it has also presented potential difficulties. Donors are increasingly demanding greater accountability; however, the very nature of NGO work provides very little in the way of

\(^{102}\) Natsios, “NGOs and the UN System”, p.409.
tangible returns. This increase in direct funding also has the potential to create an aid environment in which donors have a say in every aspect of NGO activities. A Humanitarian Network Practice (HPN) report states that this also impacts the perception of NGOs:

This deepening donor involvement in the design and management of aid projects has raised the prospect of NGOs becoming—or being seen as—little more than ‘government contractors’. This will have obvious implications for perceptions of NGOs’ neutrality on the ground.¹⁰³

Recently, an increasing trend of government involvement in the funding and delivery of humanitarian and development aid has led many to postulate that we are entering an era of ‘politicized aid’. While NGOs cannot operate without adequate funding, it is imperative to their principles that NGOs do not become politicized. Treading this line between neutral, government aid recipients and pawns of governments’ foreign policies will continue to challenge NGOs.

**Conclusion**

The military and NGOs continually find themselves co-existing in complex emergencies, with often interdependent missions and tasks. Six primary factors which serve to impact the military-NGO relationship have been identified in this study and these factors will be used to assess the effectiveness of the relationship in the case studies. In addition to providing an introduction to the military-NGO relationship in complex emergencies, this chapter examined the background, relationship with the United Nations, missions, cultures, and structures of the military and NGOs.

¹⁰³ Barry and Jefferys, p.30.
The military has been tasked for centuries with providing assistance in both natural and human-made emergencies. Militaries not only have extensive training and capabilities in everything from logistics to engineering, but they also have the ability to rapidly deploy large units of personnel to operations. With the end of the Cold War, military forces have been increasingly tasked with providing humanitarian assistance and other roles that are outside their conventional training. This has led many militaries to adopt civil-military affairs programmes or alter their existing CMA strategies. The discussion of the military’s involvement in complex emergencies began in the mid-1990s and continues to cause contentious debate within militaries, NGOs, IOs, and academia. Within the military community there exists disagreement over the extent to which, if at all, soldiers should be trained in skills that are specific to peace operations. Some have argued that training soldiers in civil-military affairs diminishes their war-fighting capabilities. Others argue that the military is simply adapting to the emergence of complex emergencies and can maintain its combat capabilities while improving its strategies in civil-military affairs. Thus, many militaries have opted to build their civil-military affairs capabilities in the reserves or part-time forces.

While part-time soldiers seem the obvious choice for a non-combat, civilian-oriented role, there are obstacles to CMA success in the reserves. First, reservists have seen their overseas deployments rise rapidly, particularly in contrast to their fellow part-time soldiers. This has resulted in major disruptions to their personal and professional lives. Secondly, part-time soldiers struggle to gain respect from their full-time counterparts, as
many full-time soldiers refer to part-time soldiers as, “poorly trained weekend warriors”. Finally, the importance of civil-military affairs is poorly understood within the military forces. However, the perspectives do not end there. Many NGOs refuse to work with the military as it is always tied to government policies and therefore, never impartial. This has led many in the NGO community to condemn the military’s involvement in the humanitarian arena and request that the military maintain a security focus. The culmination of these factors leaves the military’s civil-military affairs programmes fighting an uphill battle for recognition, funding, and respect.

As international interventions in complex emergencies have dramatically increased since the end of the Cold War, so too have the number of NGOs that operate in the field of humanitarian relief and development. NGOs are as diverse as they are numerous. With various organisational and cultural structures, coupled with constant competition for funding, coordinating NGOs has been “likened to herding cats”.\textsuperscript{104} Natsios points out however, that the number of NGOs operating in a complex humanitarian emergency can be deceiving and, in actuality, less than a dozen NGOs control 75\% of all humanitarian aid.\textsuperscript{105} These ‘super NGOs’ are found in almost every complex humanitarian emergency and are all members of one of the three NGO umbrella organisations.

Most of the NGOs involved in humanitarian relief and development adhere to the principles of humanity, neutrality, and impartiality. These principles set NGOs and other humanitarian organisations apart from their political counterparts and provide operational

\textsuperscript{104} Bellamy, pp. 9-12.
\textsuperscript{105} Natsios, “NGOs and the UN System”, p.409.
independence, which enables NGOs to reach populations in need. The characteristics of aid workers greatly vary. NGO employees may be characterized as idealistic, willing to take risks, and eager to assist those in need. Just as their characteristics vary, so too do aid workers’ motivations. Some may be seeking an adrenalin rush from working in a conflict zone or looking for personal fulfilment by accomplishing tangible assistance; others may be motivated by an altruistic sensibility to help those less fortunate, and still others’ motivations may draw from more than one of above.

Whatever motivations aid workers may have, it is the funding that enables their work. NGOs are constantly seeking new donors and competing for funding with one another, as well as with other actors in the relief and development arena. While it is imperative that NGOs raise money to operate, this emphasis on fundraising can have negative effects on cooperation in complex emergencies. To raise money, NGOs need to be seen ‘doing something’, as the media is the most effective form of advertising for NGOs. This has led to what some critics call “relief pornography”\(^\text{106}\), in which NGOs focus more on gaining media attention rather than addressing the most critical needs. Critics point to clusters of NGOs in areas (usually main cities) where media can be found as the primary example of this issue.

Recently, government donors are increasingly channelling aid bilaterally, providing more aid directly to NGOs. While the aid money is welcomed by most NGOs, there may prove to be strings attached as donors seek more accountability from, and oversight of, NGOs. As complex emergencies and the aid environment continue to evolve, NGOs will be

\(^{106}\) Natsios, “NGOs and the UN System”, p.409.
confronted with mounting challenges to their basic humanitarian principles. It is imperative that the role of NGOs in complex emergencies is understood and respected, both within the NGO community and without.

While debate over the roles of military and NGOs in complex emergencies rages on, the fact of the matter remains that the military-NGO relationship is an inescapable reality. Thus, it is critical to examine the successes and failures of the military-NGO relationship; what has worked on the strategic, operational and tactical levels, and what has not. What impact does the military-NGO relationship have on the effectiveness of interventions? Neither the military or NGOs are monolithic actors. By analysing the experiences of two countries’ militaries, the United States and New Zealand, and their interactions with a myriad of NGOs from around the world, this study aims to highlight historical examples and common threads of the military-NGO relationship, and its impact on the response to complex emergencies. Chapter Two, *The Military-NGO Cooperation Debate*, presents a literature review of military-NGO relations, the comparative advantages of the military and NGOs in complex emergencies, and further elaborates on the commonalities and differences between and among these actors.
Chapter 2: The Military-NGO Cooperation Debate

Now that an understanding of militaries and NGOs has been established, the military-NGO relations debate can be further examined. What have other authors identified as barriers to military-NGO cooperation? What does each actor bring to the table in complex emergencies? What roles have they traditionally played in interventions and how do they perceive one another? Analyzing these questions is critical to comprehending the myriad of issues that surround the military-NGO relationship.

To determine the effectiveness of the military-NGO relationship in complex emergencies, a literature review of military-NGO doctrine, academic studies, books, journal articles, and specific case studies was conducted and is the starting point of this chapter. Next, military and NGO capabilities, strengths and weaknesses, different mandates, and common goals are examined. Finally, the various military and NGO perspectives on cooperation are outlined and an overview of the military-NGO cooperation debate is provided.

Literature Review

There is a great deal of literature on the general military-NGO relationship, and for the purpose of clarity, it is organized in two broad categories within this section: the military-NGO relationship during the 1990s with operations including Northern Iraq, Somalia, Bosnia, and East Timor; and the military-NGO relationship from 2001 to present, stemming from the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.
After the military-NGO interactions in the early 1990s with Northern Iraq, Haiti, Somalia, and Bosnia, many publications emerged regarding the military-NGO relationship. In fact, it should be noted that debate over the military’s role in humanitarian emergencies began in earnest at a conference organised by the Refugee Studies Programme in Oxford in 1995.¹ Fuelled by the operations in Croatia and Bosnia, the failure of the Somalia mission, and the inaction in Rwanda, the military and humanitarian communities were re-evaluating their interplay.² Since the debate began, Military-NGO cooperation has become the topic of various books, articles, workshops, doctrines, and guidelines.

Among the most prolific authors on the subject of civil-military relations is Thomas Weiss. Weiss’ extensive works on civil-military interactions were integral to this study. Most notably: *Humanitarian Action in Times of War: A Handbook for Practitioners* (co-author, 1993)³ and *NGOs, the UN, and Global Governance* (co-editor, 1996)⁴ provided an excellent introduction to the complex environment in which military forces and civilians interact.

---

⁴ Thomas G. Weiss and Leon Gordenker (Eds.), *NGOs, the UN and Global Governance*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1996.
Larry Minear, who co-authored Humanitarian Action in Times of War: A Handbook for Practitioners, among many other publications with Weiss, has also produced a great deal of literature on this subject. In particular, Soldiers to the Rescue: Humanitarian Lessons from Rwanda\(^5\) and The Humanitarian Enterprise: Dilemmas and Discoveries offer instructive analyses of the roles military forces and humanitarian workers play in complex emergencies.\(^6\)

Pamela Aall, Chester A. Crocker, and Fen Osler Hampson collaborated to produce: Herding Cats: Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World\(^7\) and Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict\(^8\), which both outline the challenges of complex emergencies and the impact that a poor military-NGO relationship has on the ability to achieve an endurable peace.

Hugo Slim’s article, “The Stretcher and the Drum: Civil-Military Relations in Peace Support Operations”, in International Peacekeeping\(^9\) provided an excellent overview of the military-NGO relationships experienced in the early 1990s and lessons that both military forces and NGOs could learn from these experiences.


The *ad hoc* relationship between militaries and NGOs has been called many names which serve to indicate the reluctance and unofficial nature of the two actors’ approaches to cooperation, including: *Strange Bedfellows*¹⁰; *A Shotgun Marriage of Convenience*¹¹; *Uncertain Partners*¹²; *Partners Apart*¹³; and *Unintended Alliances*.¹⁴ Most authors writing about the military-NGO relationship during the 1990s focused on the differences between the cultures and structures of NGOs and militaries as the main obstacles to cooperation, as well as the increasingly interdependent roles of the two actors in complex emergencies.

Some authors, however, looked at the military-NGO relationship in the broader context of its implications for international interventions. John MacKinlay and Andrew Natsios, for instance, explored many of the challenges that were continually confronting the military-NGO relationship throughout the operations in the 1990s, such as insecurity, limited mandates, and lack of understanding between organisations.¹⁵ In addition, Natsios and MacKinlay contended that the relationship had improved in the mid-late 1990s, noting that experiences in operations such as Somalia and Bosnia had served to

---


improve understanding, tolerance and cooperation between NGOs and the military. While there is evidence to support this view, the sharp decline in international interest to intervene in complex emergencies after the failure of the United Nations Operation Somalia II (UNOSOM II), led to a decrease in military-NGO interaction and understanding.


Kevin M. Kennedy provided a firsthand account of the military-NGO relationship from the military point of view in, “The Relationship Between the Military and Humanitarian Organisations in Operation Restore Hope” in *Learning From Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention*. John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley wrote extensively on the operation in Somalia and, more specifically, the military-NGO relationship from a diplomatic and political point of view in, *Somalia and Operation*

Bosnia was also the focus of numerous publications. Many authors covered various aspects of the UNPROFOR operation, however, most focused on the misappropriated UNPROFOR mandate. Mark Duffield provided an analysis of NGO work in Bosnia in his paper, “An Account of Relief Operations in Bosnia.” Specific works outlining the military-NGO relationship included George J. Joulwan and Christopher C. Shoemaker’s report, *Civilian-Military Cooperation in the Prevention of Deadly Conflict: Implementing Agreements in Bosnia and Beyond* and John MacKinlay’s, *A Guide to Peace Support Operations*.

Few written accounts of the NZDF-NGO relationship in Bosnia have been produced. Two books that did provide more specific, yet brief, information on the New Zealand Defence Forces’ experience in Bosnia were John Crawford’s, *In the Field For Peace*:

---

New Zealand’s Contribution to International Peace-Support Operations 1950-1995\textsuperscript{25} and Gary Brandon’s, \textit{Kiwi Under Fire}.\textsuperscript{26}

Literature regarding the US military-NGO relationship during the International Force (IFOR) operation in Bosnia was provided by Larry K. Wentz in his book, \textit{Lessons from Bosnia: the IFOR experience}\textsuperscript{27} and numerous articles written by US Civil Affairs personnel, such as Lieutenant Colonel Pamela Brady in her article, “Civil Affairs and Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW): Four Balkan Sketches” included detailed accounts of the roles and viewpoints of civil affairs units operating in Bosnia.\textsuperscript{28} Psychologist Laura Miller provided great insight into the perceptions and cultural misunderstandings within the military-NGO relationship in, “From Adversaries to Allies: Relief Workers’ Attitudes Toward the US Military.”\textsuperscript{29}

The military-NGO relationship in East Timor was examined by Michael Elmquist in his paper titled, \textit{CIMIC in East Timor: An account of civil-military cooperation, coordination and collaboration in the early phases of the East Timor relief operation}.\textsuperscript{30} Bob Breen provided an account of the relationship between civilian agencies and the Australian and New Zealand Defence Forces, as well the details of the operational mission in his book,

\textsuperscript{28} Pamela Brady, “Civil Affairs and MOOTW: Four Balkan Sketches”, \textit{Joint Forces Quarterly}, Summer 1997.
\textsuperscript{29} Laura Miller, “From Adversaries to Allies: Relief Workers' Attitudes Toward the US Military”, \textit{Qualitative Sociology}, Volume 22, Number 3, 1999.

Specific New Zealand accounts of the operation in East Timor and the military-NGO relationship were found in several publications. John Crawford and Glyn Harper’s book, *Operation East Timor: The NZDF in East Timor 1999-2001*\(^\text{32}\), provided an in-depth analysis of New Zealand’s key role in East Timor. The Lessons Learned Cell of the New Zealand Defence Force issued a paper called, *Observations From New Zealand Forces in East Timor September 1999- March 2003*, which summarized the challenges with the NZDF-NGO relationship, amongst other aspects of the intervention.\(^\text{33}\) Colonel Antony Hayward examined the military view of the operation in East Timor in his paper, “East Timor: A Case Study in Humanitarian Intervention”\(^\text{34}\) and Michael Hull also conducted firsthand research on the NZDF’s role in providing aid and reconstruction assistance in his MA thesis, *The New Zealand Defence Force as an Agent of Development*.\(^\text{35}\)

After the military and NGOs had interacted in several complex emergencies in the early 1990s, doctrine and policies were published reflecting the lessons learned. In 1994, The US Army Field Manual provided guidelines for military personnel undertaking roles in


peace operations and working alongside civilian agencies.\textsuperscript{36} In December 1994, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) published a “Handbook for the Military on Humanitarian Operations”, which outlined humanitarian principles, the roles and responsibilities of various civilian organisations, and the impact of military involvement in humanitarian assistance.\textsuperscript{37}

In response to the growing military involvement in humanitarian assistance and growing literature, many NGOs were re-evaluating their approaches to cooperation. In 1996, the ICRC published the Code of Conduct for The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief, which was agreed to by all of the major international NGOs. The Code of Conduct provided general provisions for humanitarian agencies operating in complex emergencies. In the late 1990s, many organisations, including World Vision International in 1999, went further and produced policies specifying the extent to which their employees should interact with military forces in complex emergencies.\textsuperscript{38} In the same year Mary Anderson took a comprehensive look at the positive and negative impacts of humanitarian aid in her book, \textit{Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace—Or War}.\textsuperscript{39}

The literature which emerged from the military-NGO experiences in the 1990s provided excellent examinations of the issues surrounding the uneasy relationship between aid


workers and military forces. While much of the focus tended to be on one or two of the impediments to military-NGO cooperation, usually the different missions and cultures, some authors examined how the military-NGO relationship impacted the success or failure of the overall response to a complex emergency.40

There was a great deal of interest regarding the military-NGO relationship and general responses to complex emergencies in the early 1990s. Universities, military colleges, aid organisations, think tanks, and policymakers produced a great deal of literature on the subject. However, when the term ‘nation building’ fell out of favour with the international community and general interest in responding to complex emergencies waned in the mid to late 1990s, few authors continued to examine the military-NGO relationship. More importantly, the practitioners within militaries and NGOs were not interacting with one another with the frequency they had in the early 1990s, and the importance of improving the military-NGO relationship was no longer a primary focus. Any familiarity and understanding that had been gained, was quickly lost.

Then when Operation *Enduring Freedom* began in 2001, complex emergencies were once again thrust centre-stage. The initial interactions between militaries and NGOs in Afghanistan were reminiscent of their initial encounters in the 1990s: frustrating, ad hoc, and personality driven. Yet again, the military-NGO relationship became a topic of great debate and the subject of numerous publications.


Nongovernmental Organisations in Afghanistan⁴⁶ provided interesting analyses on the effectiveness of PRTs and the impact on the military-NGO relationship.

A more specific look at the direct implications of the military’s role in the provision of aid and reconstruction from civilian viewpoints were provided in the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) report, OCHA’s Evaluation of the OCHA and UNOCHA Response and Coordination Services During the Emergency in Afghanistan: July 2001 to July 2002⁴⁷; CARE’s, Priority Issues in the Aftermath of the Taliban Retreat: CARE policy Analysis and Advocacy Options⁴⁸; Dominic Nutt’s, “Afghanistan: Caught in the Crossfire”⁴⁹; and Save the Children, Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Humanitarian-Military Relations in Afghanistan⁵⁰.

Assessments of the NZDF’s interaction with civilian organisations included, Bryan Dorn’s, “New Zealand Civil-Military Affairs Experience in Afghanistan,”⁵¹ and Joanna

---

Nathan’s article, “After the Taliban: On Patrol with the New Zealand Troops in Bamiyan, Afghanistan”\textsuperscript{52}

More general analysis of the military-NGO relationship in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century was produced by military personnel, civilian agency personnel and academics. Eric James’ analysis of the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan indicated a reversal of progress in improved military-NGO relations.\textsuperscript{53} The Humanitarian Practice Network (HPN) published many articles discussing the perceived negative implications that the military’s role in aid and reconstruction had created for the operability of aid workers. Jane Berry and Anna Jefferys provide one such analysis in their HPN article, “A Bridge Too Far: Aid Agencies and the Military in Humanitarian Response”\textsuperscript{54}, which emphasized, what they believed to be, the enormous strain that the military’s involvement in humanitarian activities had placed on the relationship and the security and perceptions of NGOs. Francis Abiew’s paper titled, \textit{From Civil Strife to Civil Society: NGO-Military Cooperation in Peace Operations}\textsuperscript{55}, provided an in-depth discussion of the military-NGO relationship and the differences that lead to a breakdown in cooperation.

The *Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations*, published in 2001, is one of the key documents which governs and provides doctrinal basis for military involvement in interagency operations with NGOs.\(^{56}\) In addition, the Australia Britain Canada Australia (ABCA) Coalition Operations Handbook was published in 2001 and provided joint guidelines for military forces operating alongside NGOs and other civilian agencies.\(^{57}\) Other publications provided guidance on how military personnel should assist NGOs, such as OCHA’s, *Armed Escorts Guidelines of the Use of Military or Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys*.\(^{58}\)

After the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq revealed many issues with the coordination of military and NGO assistance to local populations, OCHA issued the *Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies* in 2003\(^{59}\); its complementing document, further elaborating on the role of military forces and civilians in complex emergencies, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Reference Paper, *Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies*, was issued in 2004. In 2005, the United Nations issued its own civil-military coordination concept, which was based on experiences from the field in Iraq and Afghanistan.\(^{60}\) In 2007, the United States Institute for Peace (USIP), InterAction, and the US Department of Defense (DoD) collaborated to create the


publication, *Guidelines for Relations Between US Armed Forces and NGHOs in Hostile or Potentially Hostile Environments*.\(^{61}\) Most recently, the UN issued the *Civil-Military Guidelines and Reference for Complex Emergencies* in 2008.\(^{62}\)

There are striking similarities between the accounts of military-NGO interactions in the early 1990s and those from 2001 to the present. Unfortunately, many of the lessons which were presented in publications regarding the military-NGO relationship in the 1990s were not well understood and were certainly not heeded when the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq began. Most of the authors, even today, tend to focus on the cultural and organisational differences between militaries and NGOs. Very few authors have examined all of the major factors which impact the military-NGO relationship and, more critically, few authors have examined the military-NGO relationship in the context of its broader implications for effective interventions.

Much of the literature that has been produced on the military-NGO relationship takes a single vantage point, for instance, one nation’s or organisation’s experiences with the military-NGO relationship. Few publications have examined and contrasted different nations’ military-NGO relationships. With the various militaries and organisations which may be involved in a complex emergency, a critical analysis of various national and organisational approaches to the military-NGO relationship has been lacking. Each government and NGO has largely been working in a vacuum when it comes to their

---


approaches to the military-NGO relationship and overall responses to complex emergencies. Thus, an analysis of two countries’ military-NGO relationships in past and ongoing complex emergencies is critical to understanding the implications these relationships have on international interventions. This thesis examines different national approaches to the military-NGO relationship, using the New Zealand Defence Force and US Military experiences. In addition, the case studies selected allow for an analysis of the military-NGO relationship over the past two decades, in different theatres of operation, with different personnel and with varied mandates. Thus, the data extrapolated from the examination of these case studies will reveal lessons which will be applicable to more than one nation or NGO.

The literature outlining the military-NGO relationship in complex emergencies came in two distinct waves. First, in the 1990s after interventions in Haiti, Somalia, and Bosnia had exposed the pitfalls of poor agency coordination in response to humanitarian crises. While there was an initial surge to incorporate lessons learned from the interventions of the early 1990s, the international community soon grew wary of involvement in complex emergencies and the political will to intervene waned in the late 1990s.

The second wave of literature emerged after the onset of Operation *Enduring Freedom* in Afghanistan in 2001. Yet again, the coordination efforts of the actors involved in complex emergencies were the focus of many articles and the extent to which militaries and aid agencies should interact in their response to crises was the source of great debate. For the past nine years, there have been renewed calls for improving the response efforts
to complex emergencies. Just as in the 1990s, the relationship between military personnel and aid workers has been repeatedly identified as critical to the success of an intervention. What has been lacking, however, is a comprehensive examination of the military-NGO relationship through an analysis of two countries’ approaches to complex emergencies. The past two decades of military-NGO relations have been rife with instructive experiences, which when extrapolated, should contribute to an improved understanding of the relationship and its impact on interventions. The ultimate aim of this thesis is to identify practical recommendations to improve the military-NGO relationship and, in turn, the international response to complex emergencies.

Comparing Military and NGO Capabilities in Complex Emergencies

Militaries and NGOs bring critical capabilities to complex emergencies. In recent years, particularly as militaries have become increasingly involved in the direct provision of ‘humanitarian’ assistance, there has been a proliferation of literature analyzing the comparative advantages of these diverse organisations. There are many factors to consider when assessing the advantages and skills that each organisation brings to the table in complex emergencies. As we set out to define the roles of the military and NGOs, it is important to recognize their strengths and weaknesses, their different mandates, and, of course, their common goals.

Strengths and Weaknesses

As discussed in the previous sections, “The Military in Complex Emergencies” and “NGOs in Complex Emergencies,” militaries and NGOs have different missions,
cultures, and organisational structures. However, they also share some common traits and goals. Table 1 outlines the strengths and weaknesses of the military and NGOs in complex emergencies. These are general characteristics of both organisations that serve to illustrate what each party brings to, or detracts from, their involvement in complex emergencies. Certainly, not all organisations (military or NGO) share these characteristics, but they are the general strengths and weaknesses of the two actors.

Table 1: Strengths and Weaknesses of the Military and NGOs in Complex Emergencies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strengths</th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>NGOs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Logistically Advanced</td>
<td>Independent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Highly Trained</td>
<td>Flexible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Well disciplined</td>
<td>Neutral/Impartial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Security Focused</td>
<td>Apolitical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Organized</td>
<td>Grassroots Reach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Large Workforce</td>
<td>Local Knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Equipment</td>
<td>Long Term Perspective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mobile</td>
<td>Less Bureaucratic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Technical Superiority</td>
<td>Innovative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Well disciplined</td>
<td>Trust of Locals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Task Focused</td>
<td>Highly Committed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Well Financed</td>
<td>Field Level Control</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weaknesses</th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>NGOs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Short term Focus</td>
<td>Lack of Accountability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political- (Government Controlled)</td>
<td>Uneven Quality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Limited Mandates</td>
<td>Number of NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Expensive</td>
<td>Limited Perspective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hierarchical</td>
<td>Territorial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gender Biased</td>
<td>Competitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lack of Local Knowledge</td>
<td>Donor Focused</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Overestimated Self-Importance</td>
<td>Media Driven</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lack of Knowledge about NGOs</td>
<td>Unpredictable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Varying Standards/Quality of militaries</td>
<td>Overestimated Self-Importance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lack of Knowledge about Military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lack of Coordination</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As shown, the military’s primary strengths lie in its large, logistically advanced, highly trained and organized operational structure. Military forces are highly mobile and task focused; they have the security apparatus that enables them to go to areas that are rendered unsafe for civilians. In contrast, NGOs’ strengths include their independence and flexibility due to a horizontal organisational structure. One of their greatest strengths is inherent in their principles of humanitarianism—their long-term perspective. Some NGOs will be on the ground in a troubled region long before political forces put together military operations to assist and many will remain long after the world’s attention wanes.

Both the military and NGOs have strengths the other lacks and each has skills the other can take advantage of. For instance, when there is a heightened security risk, NGOs often rely upon the military for their protection and equipment. Likewise, the military can learn a great deal from NGO personnel who are willing to share their (non-sensitive) grassroots knowledge and use that information to provide a more secure environment. However, information sharing is not always appropriate, as the military is a political instrument and, therefore, any perceived violation of trust on behalf of the locals toward the NGOs would be detrimental to their own security and local relationship.

The political control of the military is only one weakness it brings to complex emergencies. Others include its expensive, bureaucratic system. In short, it takes longer to get things done and, when it is done, it typically costs a great deal more than NGO operations. Military personnel also have much shorter rotations than their NGO counterparts, spending on average only 6-8 months on a deployment. This exposes the
military to gaps in learning and limits their relationship-building capacity with NGOs and locals. The sheer number and varying standards of NGOs operating in complex emergencies are often cited as their greatest weakness. The large numbers of organisations competing for funding to support their operations have rendered many NGOs extremely competitive and media-driven. This weakness can often lead NGOs away from the areas in most need and instead into city centres with high visibility where they can be seen to be “doing something” for their donors.

Different Mandates

It is important to understand each organisation’s mandates when analyzing the military-NGO relationship. It is these mandates that often put the two actors at odds and, at the same time, it is also these mandates that require their interdependence. While each individual mission will have specific mandates, all of the mandates listed below have been undertaken by the individual organisations.

Table 2: Different Mandates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Military</th>
<th>NGOs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>Distribute Aid in an impartial and neutral manner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disarm Belligerents</td>
<td>Implement Projects in specialty areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protect Aid and Aid Workers</td>
<td>Uphold Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protect Innocent Civilians</td>
<td>Do No Harm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restore Public Order</td>
<td>Uphold the Principle of non-violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilitate Democratic Voting Processes</td>
<td>Assess area of need and respond accordingly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Set the security stage for State self-reliance</td>
<td>Provide feedback to donors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Devise an Exit Strategy</td>
<td>Some NGOs fulfil specific time limited projects and then depart others have long-term projects which may last decades</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribute to the rebuilding/ reconstruction of the State</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Build and Train the local military force</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gather Intelligence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>directly deliver aid</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

64 Adapted from information in Peggy Teagle, Whose Job Is It? Policy Development and the Roles for NGOs and the Military in Complex Emergencies, Canadian Council for International Cooperation, 26 March, 1996, as well as interviews with NZDF, US military, and NGOs.
The military’s primary mandate in complex emergencies is to provide security and enable aid to be distributed. For NGOs, the primary mandate is to distribute aid in a non-partisan, impartial, and neutral manner. It is not difficult to see where there may be disagreement and conflict in their mandates. While the military’s primary role is always security, as any military officer can attest, there is more to securing an area than merely being a presence of force. Security requires a population that is living free of fear and desperation; that is a population that has enough to eat, a place to sleep, and hope for a future. Thus, it is natural that the military is interested in engaging in restoring normative conditions to a state. This motivation to improve civil order by the military, however, does not necessarily carry with it the principles inherent in humanitarianism. Militaries are not neutral or apolitical. Therefore, when militaries engage in aid and reconstruction efforts it is as a secondary mandate and typically where aid agencies cannot, or are not, addressing the full breadth of needs.

NGOs, on the other hand, are in regions primarily to assist people in need—regardless of their religious or political affiliation. Their priority is the delivery of aid and the security of a region is a far lesser priority, insofar as they are still able to deliver that aid. While many in the NGO community appreciate the fact that civil order contributes to improved security, most are adamant that the humanitarian community should be the sole providers of the assistance that contributes to that civil order. In other words, the military should refrain from undertaking aid and reconstruction efforts, except in areas where the security situation is too dangerous for the humanitarian community to operate.
While the specific mandates of the military and NGOs may be different, their end goal is much the same. As Koenraad Van Brabant noted, “agencies have to recognize that the underlying humanitarian mandate is the same: save lives, reduce suffering, and try to restore local capacities. The work of different agencies is therefore inherently complementary.” These common goals are the foundation on which an improved relationship may be built.

Common Goals

Why do nations send their troops to complex emergencies? Why do NGOs work in the most dangerous and poverty-stricken regions of the world? While their motivations for working in complex emergencies vary, the military and NGO communities share many important common goals. As we have seen, the two actors have very different cultures, organisations, and mandates. However, what they do have in common should not be underestimated. These common goals are the reason they coexist in complex emergencies and the reason why their work continually impacts on the other. Nations may send their troops to a complex emergency to end or contain violence, negotiate peace, and/or to protect civilians. NGOs may operate in a region to deliver aid, education, or other assistance to those in need. Generally, the goal of both of these organisations is similar—to sustain and/or improve the lives of innocent civilians. Whether their means of doing so is through security or aid, their end goals are much the same. While not all militaries or NGOs have these goals in every complex emergency,

the following table outlines common goals that have been pursued by both parties in a crisis.

**Table 3: Common Goals**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Common Goals</th>
<th>Military and NGOs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ending of Conflict</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stabilization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilians Free from Fear</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilians free from Starvation, War Crimes, and Disease</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimate Government</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Functioning Legal System</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Functioning Educational System</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Controlled and Incorrupt Government</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From Failed State to Developing State</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Particularly with the proliferation of development-focused NGOs and expanded military mandates, these goals are increasingly shared by the military and NGO communities. After many failed peace operations in the past 18 years, in which the international community has had to return to a state after exiting prematurely, there have been calls from the humanitarian, political, military, and academic communities to take a much broader approach to complex emergencies. That is, critics argue, that complex emergencies require multi-faceted and comprehensive responses, which include addressing the root causes of the failed state.67

---


The response should not merely attempt to cease the conflict and temporarily feed and protect civilians, rather it should address the underlying political, economic, humanitarian, and military issues that have created an unstable environment. This has seen military forces become increasingly tasked with assessing local needs, providing army and police training, engaging in electoral and other governmental processes, and, of course, reconstruction efforts, all of which put them in closer and more regular contact with NGOs. While this increased contact has gone some way in breaking down stereotypes, misunderstandings, and preconceptions, it has also been met with contention and disagreement over military and humanitarian roles. The following section provides some insight into how each actor views the other.

**Debates Within**

Stemming from mutual misunderstanding and lack of trust, both the military and NGO communities view the other with preconceived notions and suspicion. Below are some of the most frequently cited stereotypes that contribute to a breakdown in the military-NGO relationship, as well as the facts behind these misconceptions.

**The Military’s View of NGOs**

For the most part military leaders have refrained from being publicly critical of NGOs. They have tended to limit their remarks regarding the military-NGO relationship to

---

diplomatic words illustrating differences in culture or organisation. However, many military personnel are not shy to express their opinions on NGOs in the course of a conversation, as this author, among others can attest. Research conducted through Cranfield University in the United Kingdom found that: “Many military personnel who have had direct dealing with civilian humanitarians will espouse a litany of damning and unflattering accounts and anecdotal evidence of poor NGO performance and general unprofessional conduct.”69 The following list includes the most common stereotypes military forces have expressed of aid workers.

**The Stereotypes:**

“*They’re hippies left over from the 1960s.*” 70 It is not uncommon for military forces to stereotype NGO personnel as “tree-huggers” and “bleeding heart liberals.” As noted earlier, military forces tend to be much more conservative than their NGO counterparts. As trained warfighters, they often consider NGO personnel as overly idealistic, unrealistic, and even ignorant in their anti-war and anti-military views. In reality, NGO personnel come from a variety of backgrounds and cultures and not all espouse anti-military views.

“*NGOs are there for all the wrong reasons.*”71 Much has been written about the “aid business” and whether it is as noble as many think it to be. *Lords of Poverty*, a scathing

---

70 Adapted from interviews with the NZDF and US military personnel.
book about the humanitarian community, has been read by many in the military community, further reinforcing negative stereotypes. While there are a few in the aid business that seek personal and financial gain by exploiting those they are professing to help, they are certainly not representative of the humanitarian community as a whole. Military forces also tend to perceive NGOs’ unwillingness to cooperate with them as the aid workers not doing everything they can to assist the locals. It is the military’s lack of understanding regarding NGO principles that often lead them to draw this conclusion.

“They’re disorganized and uncoordinated.” 72 Many NGOs do not have the clear, authoritative command structure that the military values. This often leads military personnel to believe that NGOs have no organisational structure whatsoever. However, without the horizontal organisational structure that most NGOs embrace, they would not have their much cherished independence and flexibility in the field. Coordinating NGOs has frequently been referred to as, “herding cats”. 73 Indeed, there are many NGOs with different objectives, missions, and philosophies. While the community has several organized coordinating bodies, many NGOs do not wish to be coordinated. However, coordination amongst NGOs continues to be discussed and efforts to further interagency cooperation continue to be developed.

*NGOs are obsessed with money and media.* 74 One of the most frequently cited complaints the military forces have about NGOs is their seemingly constant quest for money and media attention. Military personnel often complain that most NGOs could be

72 Tomlinson, p.88.
73 Bellamy, pp.9-12.
74 Adapted from interviews from NZDF and US military personnel.
found near large cities, when it was the poorer rural areas that required the most assistance. Ask most military personnel why they believed NGOs congregated in cities and the response was swift-- because they love the spotlight. What many in the military community don’t fully understand is the funding structure of the NGOs. As discussed, NGOs are dependent on their donors for funding and donors give funding to NGOs which are seen to be “doing something”. Without the media and subsequent funding, NGOs would be out of a job. While this has led to much criticism including accusations of ‘relief pornography’, even from within the aid community, funding continues to be the driving force of the aid business.

“They love us when they need us and hate us when they don’t.”75 Military operations have been the objects of a loud chorus of criticism or mixed messages from parts of the NGO community--some calling for military intervention one day and then castigating it the next. The military community realizes that their relationship with NGOs tends to improve in times of heightened risk and insecurity. It has been the objective of many military commanders to improve the level of cooperation with NGOs in more stable security situations (including the planning and execution phases of complex emergencies) to the level the relationship achieves during times of insecurity. Again, however, military forces often lack the understanding that the NGO community’s emphasis on impartiality and neutrality is central to their security and ability to reach those in need.

75 Adapted from interviews from NZDF and US military personnel.
NGOs’ View of the Military

The NGO community has always been more openly critical of the military’s motives and strategies when it comes to their involvement in complex emergencies. Much of this criticism stems from a lack of understanding and negative stereotypes that strained relations have served to reinforce. The following are stereotypes most commonly expressed by aid workers toward military forces.

*Stereotypes:

“They’re macho machine-gun-toting cowboys.” ⁷⁶ Often the very nature of the military—trained warfighters—is a foreign concept to NGO personnel who tend to view themselves as nonviolent people. Many have not had experience with military personnel and do not understand the psyche of someone who would voluntarily (under most western military systems) engage in the training or employment of lethal conduct. Aid workers also tend to be more idealistic in their thinking and may dislike the nature of warfare—whether initiated or defensive. ⁷⁷ Often what knowledge the aid workers do have of the military comes from perceptions and pre-conceived notions formulated by watching Hollywood movies. While there are some “military morons”, as they are known in the forces, the fact is that military personnel are not ‘mindless, robotic killers’ as they are sometimes portrayed—they are fathers, mothers, husbands, wives, daughters, and sons who share many of the same concerns and aspirations as their NGO counterparts.

⁷⁷ Beauregard, p.33.
The Military wants to control us. Many NGOs have long suspected that military interests in cooperation and coordination are merely attempts at controlling the aid community. It certainly did not help the military cause when former US Secretary of State Colin Powell referred to NGOs as, ‘force multipliers’ in the War on Terrorism. It is no secret that the military appreciates order and control, but their goal in coordinating and cooperating with NGOs stems more from a desire to organize and work together in an effort to improve efficiency in complex emergencies. The military is based on a system of training and improvement and military forces generally harbour no delusions about controlling NGOs.

“They cannot be humanitarian.” With the increased involvement of the military in the aid and reconstruction efforts of complex emergencies, the NGO community has been outraged over the use of terms such as, “military humanitarianism” or statements which refer to the delivery of humanitarian aid by military forces. NGOs believe these terms serve to further blur the line between the humanitarian and military communities. But can the military be humanitarian? It is true that they cannot be impartial or apolitical, but whether or not they can, or should be, humanitarian is a topic of great debate. Certainly they can deliver humanitarian aid and have done so many times. Whether they should do so is covered in the following chapters.

---

78 LeRiche, p.104.
79 Quote from Colin Powell, DOS briefing on the War on Terrorism, 2003.
80 Adapted from interviews with NGO personnel.
The Military is Rigid and Authoritative.\textsuperscript{82} This is true—the military prides itself on its discipline and order, a sharp contrast to the more free and flexible world of NGOs. However, this fact is often exaggerated. The organisational structure of the military is clear and concise, but this is not to say that all military personnel are rigid and authoritative. The structure of the military itself can also be intimidating and off-putting to many NGO personnel, but after engaging with their military counterparts, most aid workers find that the officers in the field are willing, and able, to do what it takes to get a job done.

The Military is trying to carve out a new niche for itself with aid.\textsuperscript{83} Many in the aid community have speculated that the military’s increased role in the delivery of aid and reconstruction is an effort to redefine itself in the post-Cold War era. They are adamant that the military is competition for resources and respect in the delivery of assistance.\textsuperscript{84} However, while the military has been increasingly tasked with assisting in complex emergencies, its primary role (dictated by national governments) will always be to defend and secure its country’s national interests. While the military will no doubt attempt to train and improve upon the skills that they bring to complex emergencies, their first responsibility is to train soldiers to fight and win wars—a strange dichotomy from their much secondary role as peacekeepers.

\textsuperscript{82} Adapted from interviews with NGO personnel and articles; see: Barry and Jefferys, pp.1-30.
\textsuperscript{83} Adapted from interviews with NGO personnel.
\textsuperscript{84} Byman, pp.97-114.
“C” Words

From collaboration to coordination and co-existence to cooperation, many “C” words have been used to describe the military-NGO relationship in complex emergencies. The importance of semantics in the context of civil-military affairs is indicative of a relationship that both the military and NGO communities struggle to define. How do these “C” words differ and how do their meanings affect the military-NGO relationship? The definitions are as follows:

Collaboration: to work with others on a joint project.
Coordination: to integrate diverse elements in a harmonious operation.
Coexistence: to exist together (peacefully) at the same time or place
Cooperation: promoting assistance or willingness to assist.  

Collaboration

Collaboration has often been used to describe the military-NGO relationship, particularly in the military community. However, because a given operation cannot always be classified as a “joint project” or one in which both parties agree on, collaboration can be applied only to certain aspects of the relationship, not the relationship as a whole.

Coordination

Coordination is very commonly applied to describe the military-NGO relationship. The military prefer to use the term coordination in their own doctrine because it is viewed as, “a more assertive verb that is directive and leads to unquestionable unity of purpose and command towards a single, unambiguous military objective.”

86 Tomlinson, p.112.
The term ‘coordination’ was not embraced by the NGO community early on in the military-NGO relations debate, however, the past several years have witnessed a rise in its application to NGO literature. In June 2004, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee endorsed a paper which included this definition:

Civil-Military Coordination: The essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies that is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency, and when appropriate pursue common goals. Basic strategies range from coexistence to cooperation. Coordination is a shared responsibility facilitated by liaison and common training.”  

However, this is assuming that coordination is used as a continuum that begins with co-existence and ends with cooperation. Many NGOs have been wary of the term coordination when it is employed by the military for fear they are being controlled. As Slim notes, “The general rule in such cooperation seems to be that humanitarian agencies don’t mind coordinating with the military, but they don’t like being coordinated by the military.”

Coexistence

Coexisting is what the military and NGOs have been doing all along. This is the nature of their relationship, regardless of what efforts are made to improve the relationship the very fact that these two diverse organisations are located in the same place at the same time is an inescapable reality. Thus, coexistence is a constant when discussing the military-NGO relationship.

88 Slim, pp.64-72.
Cooperation

As it infers a ‘willingness’ to engage, cooperation is used to describe the voluntary actions undertaken in the relationship. This is very important, as neither the military nor NGO community would take kindly to a coerced relationship. As Slim notes, “the challenge in the relationship seems to be cooperation without co-option.”89 In a change of approach, some militaries have adopted the term cooperation for use in their doctrine, perhaps in an effort to appease NGOs’ fears of military control. Likewise, many in the NGO community prefer to use the term cooperation, as it implies a less official relationship.

This study focuses on potential ways to increase and improve voluntary actions by both parties to achieve common goals while maintaining each organisation’s independence. Thus, cooperation will be the most frequently applied term to describe the military-NGO relationship in this study.

Applying Cooperation to the Military-NGO Relationship

Operation *Provide Comfort* in 1991, the mission to provide humanitarian relief to the Kurds of Northern Iraq, witnessed the beginning of the military-NGO relationship in complex emergencies. For the first time the military and NGOs, along with other governmental agencies in the international community, found themselves working closer together. Since the operation in Iraq, complex emergencies from Somalia to Iraq, have required some degree of military-NGO cooperation. These cooperative measures have

89 Slim, p.65.
taken many forms; from military and NGO workshops and training to doctrine and guidelines.\textsuperscript{90}

Attempts to bolster cooperation between the military and NGOs have had elicited mixed results. In every mission since Operation Provide Relief in Somalia, a variety of organisational structures has been created to facilitate coordination between government agencies, NGOs, and the military. The UN has predominately taken the lead role in coordinating international responses to complex emergencies. Other coordinating initiatives, undertaken by the actors themselves, have been established since the operation in Northern Iraq.

The first coordinating body to be established was the Humanitarian Operations Centre (HOC) in Somalia, followed by the On-Site Operation Coordination Centre (OSOCC) in Rwanda, and a Humanitarian Affairs Centre (HAC) in Haiti. Overseen by civilian UN staff members from the designated lead agency for a crisis, these coordinating bodies have had a variety of names and forms, yet all act to facilitate cooperation between the actors in a complex emergency. More recent missions continue to include deviations in the titles of their organisational structures, yet their functions are much the same and include: developing and overseeing the humanitarian assistance strategy; coordinating logistical support for various aid agencies; arranging military support; and providing a communication network for the various agencies.\textsuperscript{91}

\textsuperscript{90} Davidson, Daly Hayes, and Landon, p.13.
\textsuperscript{91} Davidson, Daly Hayes, and Landon, p.9.
Within the NGO community, coordination has been necessary to provide a single, or even several, points of contact to engage with the other actors in complex emergencies. Beginning with the operation in Northern Iraq, NGOs established the NGO Coordinating Committee for Northern Iraq (NCCNI) to act as a representative of the NGO community. Since that time, each complex emergency has had one or more NGO coordinating bodies. Another initiative to improve inter-agency cooperation came in Kosovo, with the establishment of the Humanitarian Coordination Information Centre (HCIC). The HCIC’s purpose was to facilitate information sharing within, and between, the various agencies and organisations. These databases have proved extremely effective in improving the level of communication, information-sharing, and planning capabilities of the agencies.  

The military community has also been actively engaged in coordination and cooperation efforts to improve its relationships with NGOs and other agencies. The Civil Military Operation Centre (CMOC) was introduced in Northern Iraq and has now become developed as military doctrine. The CMOC and similar coordinating mechanisms provide the primary interface between the military and all other actors involved in a complex emergency. Their functions include: monitoring military support throughout the area of operations (AO); and responding to UN, NGO, and IO logistic, security, and/or technical support requirements as tasked to the military in the mission/mandate for each specific operation.

---

92 Davidson, Daly Hayes, and Landon, p.16.
Many nations’ militaries have taken measures to expand their pre-deployment training to include lessons on military-NGO relations, humanitarian principles, and cultural sensitivities that are likely to be encountered. It is also standard practice for militaries to attach liaison officers to NGOs, UN agencies, and other governmental organisations in an effort to improve communication and build relationships.

**Conclusion**

Debate over the military’s role in humanitarian emergencies began in earnest at a conference organized by the Refugee Studies Programme in Oxford in 1995. Since the debate began, military-NGO cooperation has become the topic of various workshops, doctrines, and guidelines. Both actors have debated the issue internally and their policies continue to reflect the reality that the military-NGO relationship impacts many aspects of complex emergencies and cannot be ignored. Much literature has emerged outlining the differences in the missions and cultures of militaries and NGOs. Many authors have identified these differences as the major causes of the friction and misunderstanding that gives way to limited military-NGO cooperation.

Literature on the military-NGO relationship came in two distinct waves: the first in the early 1990s after initial military-NGO encounters in complex emergencies; and the second after the start of Operation *Enduring Freedom* in Afghanistan. Many of the lessons that continue to emerge from the experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq had already been identified by authors in the 1990s. However, these lessons were not institutionalized and, as a result, most of the findings from case studies on the military-
NGO relationship in the 1990s had to be re-learned a decade later. Increasingly, many authors have asserted that the proliferation of aid agencies with varying ideologies and ties to governments and special interests has politicized the humanitarian community. Others argue that the military’s encroachment on ‘humanitarian space’ has politicized aid.93

Much of the literature of the 1990s was focused primarily on the emergence of the military-NGO relationship and the differences between the actors. Since 2001 and the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, however, more authors are focusing on the implications of a poor military-NGO relationship and its effects on the response to complex emergencies. Most of the authors have tended to examine the military-NGO relationship through the lens of one nation or one organisation, so very little literature exists which outlines and contrasts more than one military’s or NGO’s approach to both the relationship and complex emergencies in general. In addition, a gap in the literature exists where no author has examined all of the various factors listed in this study which impact the military-NGO relationship.

While cooperative efforts have been underway since the military-NGO relationship emerged in 1991, progress has been limited. Harnessing cooperation over a longer period and building on the relationship that necessity has created requires much more effort. Cooperation is dependent upon many factors, including an understanding of each

organisation’s mission, culture, structure, and goals, along with open lines of communication and a mutual respect of one another’s viewpoints. The following US and New Zealand military-NGO cases studies will assist us in assessing the degree to which cooperation has been reached between the military and NGOs and whether there has been a pattern of learning over the past two decades.
Chapter 3: Somalia Case Study
The US Military-NGO Relationship during Operation Restore Hope

*Operation Restore Hope was the largest attempt at a combined military humanitarian effort ever undertaken. It was especially important because it involved so many countries working together to use their forces, not to fight a territorial battle, but to save human lives. This pointed to a new role for armed forces around the world in the future.*

Somalia represented the first time a major military humanitarian intervention was undertaken in the post-Cold War environment. While smaller humanitarian interventions had taken place in both Iraq and Bangladesh, never before had an operation of this type and size been attempted in such a complex political and humanitarian environment. The various UN and US operations in Somalia were arguably the most controversial, expensive, and publicized interventions in history. Immortalized in books and film, most notably *Black Hawk Down*, the operation in Somalia is widely known for the failed US Army Ranger mission in October 1993 during UNOSOM II. Many lessons have been drawn from UN and US involvement in Somalia and its widely perceived failure led to an almost complete shutdown of UN or US led humanitarian interventions in the mid-1990s. The humanitarian intervention in Somalia was mandated in three phases: The United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM); the US-led United Task Force (UNITAF); and the United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II). This case study examines the US-led UNITAF operation, code named Operation *Restore Hope*, from December 1992 through May 1993.

---

This chapter begins with a brief historical overview of Somalia. Next, it outlines the pivotal events that led to the humanitarian intervention, as well as the three UN mandated phases of the operation. Then, it provides a critical analysis of the US military-NGO relationship in Somalia during the UNITAF operation. This chapter concludes by summarizing the lessons learned from the military-NGO relationship in Somalia.

Figure 1: Map of Somalia

Background of Somalia

Located on the northeast coast of Africa, Somalia together with Ethiopia and Djibouti comprise what is commonly referred to as the Horn of Africa. The Somali people are homogenous and have a strong cultural identity that stems from their clan-based societal structure.\(^4\) There are three major Somali clan families: the Saab, the Irir, and the Darod.\(^5\) These clan families are made up of many subfamilies, which are determined along patrilineal lines. The five main clans are: Darod, Isaaq, Hawiye, Dir and Rahanweyn.\(^6\)

Prior to European colonialism, Somalia was a pastoral and nomadic society, which settled disputes and conflicts along clan lines.\(^7\) When Arabic traders arrived in Somalia in the 8th Century, they introduced Islam to the Somalis, a religion which served to reinforce and strengthen the fraternal values of Somali society.\(^8\) Somalia was colonized first by Britain, which demonstrated interest in the region as early as 1839. In 1886, Britain signed agreements with various kin groups and declared northern Somalia as a British protectorate. The French were also interested in staking a claim in the Horn of Africa and claimed French Somaliland, which is now known as Djibouti.\(^9\)

The Italians arrived in the 1890s and established their own colony in southern Somalia in 1893. Ethiopia laid claims to the Ogaden region of Somalia in the late 1800s, followed

\(^6\) Lewis, p.52.
\(^8\) Lewis, p.83.
\(^9\) Lewis, p.73.
by Britain’s territorial claims in north-eastern Kenya, a further extension of its claims in the region. Thus, the Somali people, though culturally homogenous, were colonized into five separate states.\textsuperscript{10} The effects of colonialism on Somali society were profound and lasting. Their once decentralized and culturally bound moral order, was dismantled and in its place were artificial borders and an alien state.\textsuperscript{11}

Somalia gained its independence in 1960, but colonialism had created divisions and complications that the new nation state was ill-equipped to overcome. The north and south of Somalia had inherited two separate languages, cultures and governing structures from their Italian and British colonists. In the vacuum of a national consensus on the way ahead for Somalia, a struggle for power between various Somali factions ensued.\textsuperscript{12} In 1969, a police officer assassinated President Abdirashiid Ali Shermaarke and six days later the armed forces, led by General Siad Barre, staged a coup, which ushered in Barre’s twenty-one year reign as leader of Somalia’s military dictatorship.\textsuperscript{13} Initially, Barre’s policies were broadly supported, particularly his attempts to outlaw clan-ism and create a new national identity for the Somali state. His government selected the long awaited official orthography for the development of a Somali national language\textsuperscript{14}, initiated a large-scale adult literacy campaign, and rejected the continued teaching of the colonial languages of Italian and English.\textsuperscript{15}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Lyons and Samatar, p.11.
\item I. M. Lewis, p.81.
\item Hirsch and Oakley, p.5.
\item Hirsch and Oakley, p.5.
\item Lyons and Samatar, p.14
\item Lewis, p.91.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
In the mid-1960s Somalia began relying on the Soviet Union for arms and, several years later, military training. Barre used his Soviet alliance to finance the military campaign he planned to wage in an effort to regain the Ogaden territory, which was now occupied by neighbouring Ethiopia. However, Barre grossly miscalculated both his Soviet support and Somalia’s military capabilities. In October 1977, Barre attempted to invade the Ogaden, but the Soviets turned their support to Ethiopia, destroying Somalia’s chances of regaining the territory and ending the Somali-Soviet alliance.\(^{16}\)

Barre turned to the West at the same time the US and its allies were facing growing concern over Soviet expansion and Islamic extremism. Perceived by Washington as an extension of the Cold War in Africa, the conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia took on a new strategic importance. This led the US to support Somalia during the 1980s through economic assistance and a limited military programme.\(^{17}\)

Throughout the 1970s and 80s, the Somalis saw through Barre’s promises of a united Somalia. Instead of a return to democracy, the authoritarian nature of Barre’s leadership only increased with ‘discipline’ actions carried out against any of his detractors. Ironically, Barre’s policies to outlaw clan-ism and unify the nation were contrary to his implemented tactics of divide and rule. In an effort to maintain and consolidate his power, Barre pitted clans against one another and manipulated them for his own purposes.\(^{18}\) The Somali political scientist Hussein Adam noted that:

\(^{16}\) Lewis, p.127.
\(^{17}\) Lewis, p.201.
\(^{18}\) Lyons and Samatar, p.14.
The worst damage Siad Barre did to Somali culture was to politicize clan relations by encouraging conflict at every level of the five clan families. By openly pitting his Darod clan family against the others, he dropped all pretense of promoting socialist ideology and engaged in a raw power struggle that ultimately led to the collapse not only of his regime but of the state.\(^{19}\)

By the late 1980s, Barre’s authority rested solely on his ability to employ tactics of terror and manipulation to exploit clan rivalries. Clan movements to overthrow Barre were violently opposed by the national army, but as more areas of the country disintegrated into lawlessness and inter-clan civil wars, the army eventually separated along clan lines. By 1990, Barre controlled only a small portion of Mogadishu and his reign as Somalia’s dictator finally came to an end on 27 January 1991 when the Hawiya Clan’s United Somali Congress (USC) drove him out of the country.\(^{20}\)

In Barre’s absence, the Hawiyas installed Ali Mahdi Mohammed as interim president. However, two other major clan groups, the Isaaq Somalia National Movement (SNM) and the Majeerteen Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), rejected the Hawiyas’ claims to the presidency and the clans began to fight bitterly for control over Somalia’s territory. By late 1991, civil wars were raging throughout the country, particularly in Mogadishu. Warlords controlled gangs of armed youths, who, armed with their Land Rovers known as “technicals”, terrorized civilians. In the four months between November 1991 and February 1992, fighting between General Mohamed Farah Aideed


\(^{20}\) Lyons and Samatar, p.16.
and Ali Mahdi cost the lives of an estimated 25,000 civilians. The state had collapsed into complete anarchy.\textsuperscript{21}

"Technical"\textsuperscript{22}

**Operations Overview: UN and US Intervention in Somalia**

The catastrophe that occurred in Somalia did not happen overnight. Observers had documented and analyzed the growing debilitation of political institutions in Somalia during the late 1980s and early 1990s in great detail.\textsuperscript{23} While the Somali crisis was known about as early as November 1991, the UN responded with ineffective measures for over a year. By 1992, an estimated 4.5 million Somalis were at risk of starvation and disease, 300,000 people had died, and an estimated 2 million people were displaced from their homes.\textsuperscript{24} Several humanitarian agencies, as well as the ICRC, UNICEF and the WFP, were active in Somalia, but the UN was noticeably absent. According to Makinda, “the organisation started to consider Somalia seriously only after Boutros Ghali became

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{21} Bradbury, p.15.
\item \textsuperscript{22} Photo retrieved 6 August 2007, www.psywarrior.com/Technical02.jpg
\item \textsuperscript{24} Bradbury, p.15.
\end{itemize}
Secretary General in January 1992. As a former Egyptian minister of state for foreign affairs, he has had a long-standing interest in the Horn of Africa.”

The UN’s absence can largely be attributed to the countries of the Security Council, which were very reluctant to respond to the crisis in Somalia because of their preoccupation with existing and emerging crises in the Middle East, Eastern Europe and the former Yugoslavia. Also, because the issues of warlordism and the absence of any government were so pervasive in Somalia, it was believed that the delivery of humanitarian relief would be all but impossible.

In January 1992, the UN Security Council (UNSC) unanimously adopted Security Council Resolution (SCR) 733 under Chapter VII of the Charter, imposing a general and complete arms embargo on Somalia. This, however, did little to quell the violence. On 24 April 1992, the Security Council adopted resolution 751, authorizing the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), comprising 50 military observers to monitor the cease-fire, and a 500-strong infantry unit to provide United Nations convoys of relief supplies with a sufficiently strong military escort to deter attack. Five hundred Pakistani peacekeepers operating under Chapter VI of the UN Charter were supposed to secure the port, safeguard food shipments to and from the airport, and escort food convoys to feeding stations in Mogadishu. The Pakistani battalion, however, was unable to carry out these missions due to their strict rules of engagement (ROE) and remained

26 Makinda, p.61.
28 Hilaire, p.302.
encamped at the airport allowed to shoot only in rigidly defined cases of self-defence and
to move only when granted permission.\textsuperscript{29}

Meanwhile, the fighting continued and the UN stood by, unable to quell the violence.
Without adequate levels of relief getting to the population, Somalis continued to starve
and the situation rapidly deteriorated. The problems in Somalia led the UNSC to amend
the SCR and allow for four battalions to provide security for relief convoys. However, by
mid-October the limited rules of engagement and lack of follow-through by troop
contributing nations left UNOSOM barely functioning and unable to carry out its
mandate.\textsuperscript{30}

During this period, the militias’ focus changed and armed looting of food aid began to
replace the bitter inter-clan violence. At its height, an estimated 1,000 Somalis were
dying from the famine every day in the south. Security measures taken by humanitarian
agencies were extreme to try to get some relief to the people. The cost of local armed
protection for relief supplies was equivalent to the cost of the food being delivered by
humanitarian agencies.\textsuperscript{31} As Edward Ricciuti noted:

The gangs waged war on the relief organisations, taking food and medical
supplies from their trucks and warehouses at gunpoint. Fighting between gangs
made it impossible to unload supplies from the ships and supplies that did land
were frequently stolen at the dockside. Some officials estimated that 80 per cent
of food arriving in Somalia ended up in the hands of the gangs.\textsuperscript{32}

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{30} Clarke and Herbst (Eds.), p.157.
\footnote{31} Ricciuti, p.34.
\footnote{32} Ricciuti, p.34.
\end{footnotes}
Much of what was looted was sold for high prices to whoever could pay. In December 1991, a Red Cross worker was fatally shot as he tried to hand out food in Mogadishu. Shortly afterwards, 60 tons of food were looted from a Red Cross warehouse and other agencies suffered similar losses. In July 1992, aid agencies estimated that there were 5,000 people dying every day of starvation, 1.5 million on the brink of death and 4.5 million near starvation.33

Without adequate security, the relief effort had fallen apart. CARE, which had evacuated Somalia on 13 October, returned to the country on 29 October. On 11 November the organisation sent a convoy of 34 trucks loaded with wheat from Mogadishu to Baidoa when armed bandits attacked and killed four of the Somalis who had been hired as guards and drivers.34 While most of the trucks made it back to Mogadishu, only one truck made it to Baidoa. The people of Baidoa were dying at a rate of 300 per day.35 According to John Hirsch and Robert Oakley, “This was typical of the situation in Somalia, some food was finally arriving in Mogadishu, but it was not getting to the starving people. Experts predicted that unless it did, two million people would die within a few weeks.”36 The ad hoc approach to the delivery of aid in Somalia was not working.

The inability of the UN troops to control the ports and secure the aid supplies, coupled with sustained pressure from humanitarian agencies, the media, and the public finally led

---

33 Ricciuti, pp.34-35.
35 Hirsch and Oakley, p.19.
36 Hirsch and Oakley, p.19.
the UN Security Council to endorse resolution 794 which authorized an offer by outgoing US president George Bush to deploy 30,000 US troops in Somalia. Code named Operation Restore Hope, the limited objective of the US-led UN International Task Force (UNITAF) was to “create a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian relief” throughout the country.”

The US Military-NGO Relationship during Operation Restore Hope

On 9 December 1992, Operation Restore Hope began in the full glare of television cameras. Navy and marine commandos secured the beach and 1,800 marines soon followed to secure the harbour and airport. They then moved into the city and set up their headquarters in the abandoned US embassy. In the days that followed more marine and army troops landed. UNITAF forces reached their peak in January when coalition forces numbered more than 38,301. 25,426 were US forces and 12,875 were from over a dozen other countries. The troop contributing nations were: Australia, Belgium, Botswana,

38 Bradbury, p.27.
40 Ricciuti, p.43.
Canada, Egypt, France, India, Italy, Kuwait, Morocco, New Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, the United States, and Zimbabwe.\textsuperscript{41}

The UNITAF operation in Somalia represented the first time that humanitarian agencies and military forces would work together during an operation of this unprecedented size and scope. This was new territory for both the military and NGOs. As Jonathan Dworken noted:

\begin{quote}
   The average US military officer does not have to deal with humanitarian relief organisations (HROs). Operation Restore Hope… was a significant military operation that coincided with a massive relief effort. The military and HROs had to cooperate.\textsuperscript{42}
\end{quote}

During the short duration of UNITAF, the military-NGO relationship was successful in that both actors accomplished their respective missions. While the relationship was strained in various respects, considering the lack of experience the two actors had both working with one another and working in such a complex political and humanitarian environment, military-NGO relations in Somalia were relatively good.

Most commentators on the intervention in Somalia focus on the ultimate withdrawal of US and UN forces, but the operation was not in vain. During the December 2002 to May 2003 deployment of the US-led United Task Force or Operation Restore Hope, an

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{41} Hirsch and Oakley, p.64.  
estimated 100,000 Somali lives were saved in what Jonathan Moore called a “well coordinated military-humanitarian operation.”

The US military had only been involved in two other humanitarian interventions, in Northern Iraq and Bangladesh. However, as Chris Seiple notes:

In contrast to northern Iraq and Bangladesh, the military’s mission statement [for Somalia] was not left to a simple humanitarian intent. Instead, the mission statement slowly evolved from a humanitarian effort supported by military forces to something that came forth after three military concerns. Indeed, what had been initially implied as a mutually supporting use of comparative advantage became an artificially delineated separation between military and humanitarian efforts. The unintended result was that a mission statement narrowly defined in the interest of a clear and achievable end-state ultimately confused everyone, including the military.

It was the confusion over the mandate that served to create the most friction between the military and humanitarian communities. Operation Restore Hope served to illustrate the intrinsic link between the political and humanitarian responses required to complex emergencies. As both actors soon learned, intervening to save lives in a war-torn nation with no semblance of law and order is not as simple as delivering food to the starving. Military forces and humanitarian personnel run the constant risk of being swept up in the political sphere of the country, even if their mandate is strictly humanitarian. Further, the operation made it clear that the military will always prioritize military concerns (e.g. force protection, force capability, security) over humanitarian concerns. This of course is

---

not, as some aid agencies assert, a deliberately anti-humanitarian policy, it is simply necessary to ensure the military force can achieve their mission.\textsuperscript{45}

Somalia was groundbreaking in various ways for the military-NGO relationship. Many relationships were formed between the two communities that still exist today. Somalia, more than any other intervention in post-Cold War history, led to the cross-pollination of US military and aid communities.\textsuperscript{46} Invaluable field experience was gained. Both actors learned firsthand more about what they could expect of the one another—both limitations and strengths were revealed. Overall, the military-NGO relationship during the UNITAF operation was “good enough”, according to Jonathan Dworken, as it “was sufficient for the military to accomplish its mission of improving security and the HROs to accomplish theirs of providing relief.” \textsuperscript{47} However, it did have several serious and unresolved issues.\textsuperscript{48} Many of the problems first encountered in Somalia remain unaddressed today. Thus, a careful examination of the lessons from the military-NGO relationship in Somalia will serve to identify the extent to which learning has taken place, as well as the problems that remain unresolved in the military-NGO relationship.

**Limited Mandate**

UNITAF or Operation *Restore Hope* was a new direction in international engagement for the US and its allies. As Hirsch notes UNITAF was, “neither a traditional peacekeeping

\textsuperscript{46} General Anthony Zinni, interview, 30 April 2009.
\textsuperscript{47} Dworken, p.27.
\textsuperscript{48} Chris Seiple, interview, 19 June 2009.
mission nor a textbook military undertaking, it sought to combine elements of both.”49 The UN Security Council Resolution 794, which authorized the intervention of the US-led UN International Task Force in Somalia, provided forces with the limited mandate to create a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian relief. However, Oxfam’s Mark Bradbury notes that, “critical assessments of Operation Restore Hope have argued that, while food delivery was improved, the operation failed to address wider problems in the country.”50 Disagreement within the international community over what role UNITAF should have played, as well as confusion over its limited mandate, created a great deal of friction among the UN, US military and humanitarian communities.51 This section examines the implications of the UNITAF mandate on the military-NGO relationship in Somalia.

The military-NGO relationship in Somalia had been established prior to the UNITAF mission. US troops and officials worked with NGOs during Operation Provide Relief, which began in August 1992. During that operation, soldiers from the 2nd Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) deployed with ten Air Force C-130s and 400 people to Mombasa, Kenya and airlifted aid to remote areas in Somalia to reduce reliance on truck convoys. The C-130s delivered 48,000 tons of food and medical supplies in six months to international humanitarian organisations, trying to help the over three million starving people in the country. Good relations were reported between Operation Provide Relief

49 Hirsch and Oakley, p.49.
50 Bradbury, p.22.
51 Dworken, p.30.
and NGOs due to “a clearly defined collaborative relationship.”\textsuperscript{52} The mission, however, was inadequate in providing the necessary humanitarian assistance to the population, as looting of food aid continued.\textsuperscript{53}

One lesson that the US military learned through their participation in Operation \textit{Provide Relief} was the importance of establishing a cooperative relationship with humanitarian agencies. According to Jonathan Dworken, “Early in Operation \textit{Provide Relief} the US military staff had problems coordinating relief efforts with the humanitarian relief organisations.”\textsuperscript{54} After being inundated with requests for assistance from the humanitarian agencies, the military force in Operation \textit{Provide Relief} established a Humanitarian Operation Centre (HOC). The HOC was staffed with military officers, USAID representatives, NGO workers, and UN staff and was a vital coordinating mechanism for relief activities.

At the same time Operation \textit{Provide Relief} was underway, back in Washington several major international NGOs lobbied for increased US military involvement in Somalia. Pressure from the humanitarian relief community came from representatives of US NGOs including CARE, IMC, and Save the Children. The NGO representatives met regularly with officials from the State Department and the Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) to report on conditions and make suggestions about what needed to be done. They met as well with members of congress to press for greater protection for their

\textsuperscript{52} Kennedy, p.107.
\textsuperscript{53} Bradbury, p.22.
\textsuperscript{54} Dworken, p.17.
personnel and operations. The major non-US NGOs, especially the ICRC, also urged the UN to do more to end the crisis.\textsuperscript{55}

However, according to Hirsch and Oakley, there was a sharp disconnect between field representatives and their counterparts in the NGO headquarters: “Some field representatives argued that the dispatch of US forces was unnecessary or even counterproductive; this was not the view of the senior executives of the relief agencies.”\textsuperscript{56} According to William Garvelink of OFDA, by early autumn, virtually every field representative suggested a multilateral armed intervention although some did not want a unilateral US intervention.\textsuperscript{57} Chris Seiple described the difficult decision that NGOs faced in Somalia:

They were reluctant, cautious and begrudging partners, but they knew they were in a situation that was beyond their control. They knew they had hired guards and they wanted the military to come in to help them. Many of them did write the letter in 1992 requesting the intervention. They knew they were making a Faustian deal; they were violating their principles of being apolitical, but they thought this is what had to be done and would be a onetime case. But they didn’t know it was a harbinger of the future of relief and development forever.\textsuperscript{58}

Pressure to intervene in Somalia also came from the media. News coverage put pressure on world leaders as graphic images of starving Somali women and children compelled a massive public outcry to “do something”.\textsuperscript{59} The figures were staggering: In 1992, at the height of the conflict and famine, the situation in Somalia was described as the worst humanitarian crisis faced by any people in the world. Certainly four years of civil war

\textsuperscript{55} Hirsch and Oakley, p.36.
\textsuperscript{56} Hirsch and Oakley, p.40.
\textsuperscript{58} Seiple, interview.
\textsuperscript{59} Ricciuti, p.40.
and famine had been catastrophic. At the end of 1992, it was estimated that over 400,000 people had died and 1.5 million had fled from the country seeking refuge abroad.60

Boutros Ghali publicly accused the Security Council of, “fighting a rich man’s war in Yugoslavia while not lifting a finger to save Somalia from disintegration.”61

While pressure mounted on the Bush Administration to act, the situation on the ground rapidly deteriorated. The remaining NGOs in Somalia carried out their programmes at great personal risk while attempting to deal with mounting starvation, disease, and death. The ICRC took the lead in food distribution providing feeding centres and kitchens, as well as emergency medical assistance and distributing farm supplies.62 However, the aid agencies were helpless to overcome the security problems that served to severely limit their relief distribution. As Hirsch points out, “By far the greatest part of the subsequent terrible starvation and malnutrition in Somalia during that period resulted from the interruption of relief activity by looting, stealing, and extortion, not from the lack of food and medicine.”63 It had become clear to all actors: military personnel, government leaders, humanitarian personnel and the media that the ad hoc approach to the delivery of relief supplies could not work.64 A military operation would be required.

United States Central Command (CENTCOM) had recently developed new plans for humanitarian assistance operations in cooperation with OFDA, and had conducted an exercise to test them in early 1992 with the First Marine Expeditionary Force (IMEF).

60 Bradbury, p.16.
62 Hirsch and Oakley, p.19.
63 Hirsch and Oakley, p.19.
64 Seiple, interview.
This made CENTCOM’s planning easier for both Operation *Provide Relief* and Operation *Restore Hope*.\(^{65}\)

CENTCOM worked with the Joint Chiefs to develop an operational plan, including defining an appropriate force structure and rules of engagement. Due to the lawless and chaotic environment that they would be entering, General Hoar proposed authorizing an unprecedented Chapter VII operation for peace enforcement “by all necessary means.” This would “allow the on-scene commander maximum flexibility to determine what constituted a threat and what response was appropriate, including the use of deadly force.”\(^{66}\)

The UN Security Council did authorize the troops to use force, if necessary, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, though this authorization had enormous implications. The rules of engagement (ROE), equipping of the force, mission statements, and force structure and composition were all complicated by the employment of a Chapter VII mandate. There were differences of opinion on how force should be used: The US felt it should only be used in self defence, Germany and the Scandinavian countries wanted them to act only in self defence when relief supplies were attacked. However, Boutros Ghali wanted the troops to pacify the country.\(^{67}\)

---

\(^{65}\) Hirsch and Oakley, p.42.


\(^{67}\) Ricciuti, p.42. The American proposition completely changed the nature of the mission. UNOSOM had been approved under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. The US offer could only be sanctioned under Chapter VII. Under Article VI, troops would be permitted to use deadly force only for self-protection, whereas under Chapter VII, troops would be sanctioned to use force to impose peace.
Shortly after the president’s announcement of Operation Restore Hope, Andrew Natsios, who was appointed as the US’ humanitarian representative, accompanied a delegation of US NGO representatives to CENTCOM HQ in Tampa, where General Freeman, deputy commander, briefed them on outlines of an operational plan. The NGOs welcomed the president’s decision, agreed with the focus on providing security for humanitarian relief operations, and described where their operations were taking place and where protection was most needed. According to Hirsch:

> The contributions of the knowledgeable NGO personnel were invaluable for correctly assessing the state of affairs in Somalia, helping with a sort of triage to identify the most urgent humanitarian tasks, and planning the logistical approaches to them.  

While steps to coordinate military and NGO operations were taking place at the more senior levels of planning, this was not the case at the more junior operational levels. According to Kennedy, there wasn’t any contact between 1 MEF and the humanitarian agencies working in Somalia during planning for the deployment and that: “what parties the MEF would be working with, their expectations and the scope of their requirements were largely unknown to the military forces charged with carrying out the humanitarian intervention.”

1 MEF made up the core of UNITAF and was supplemented by Army forces from the Tenth Mountain Division, as well as Air Force and Navy assets. Operation Restore Hope had the following objectives: “Secure major air and sea ports, as well as food

---

68 Hirsch and Oakley, p.40.
69 Kennedy, p.100.
70 Dworken, p.10.
distribution points; ensure the passage of relief supplies; and assist with UN and [humanitarian agencies].”

The operation was laid out in four stages: First, the Marines would land in Mogadishu, establish control of the port, harbour facilities, and airfields. Next, US Army and allied forces would join the Marines in securing areas inland. Third, the forces would extend operations south to Kismayo. Finally, phase four would see the handoff from UNITAF to UNOSOM II.

Figure 2: Map of Operation Restore Hope

On 4 December when President Bush announced that the US and other forces would soon land in Somalia, Operation Restore Hope was defined as a short-term operation in which coalition forces would provide security for relief operations. After a few months, the US

---

71 Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense Mission Statement quoted in Dworken, p. 10.
72 Clarke and Herbst (Eds.), p.44.
would hand over to a UN force.\textsuperscript{74} The Security Council authorized this short-term mission without publicly acknowledging the implications this temporary plan had for Somalia’s political problems.\textsuperscript{75}

On 6 December the troops arrived in Mogadishu and most Somalis welcomed them, even cheering them as they entered the streets.\textsuperscript{76} However, the gangs were resentful of their presence, as the intervention would effectively end their looting spree. Due to UNITAF’s limited mandate, there was confusion over what to expect from Operation \textit{Restore Hope}. The Somalis had various expectations of what the operation may mean for their country.\textsuperscript{77} Dr. Ken Menkhaus noted, “evidence suggests that in the first phase of the intervention there was widespread Somali popular support for, and the expectation of, a move to marginalize the militias, provided it was done even-handedly so as not to expose one clan to attack by another.”\textsuperscript{78}

On 9 December 1992, Dr. Said Samatar stated, “there seems to be high expectations among the people that with the coming of the Americans, good days are here again. I fear that if the economic situation does not improve, there might be a feeling of letdown.”\textsuperscript{79} Seiple further emphasized these high expectations, noting, “Like it or not, the arrival of the world’s mightiest army was going to create economic and political expectations. To think that it was possible to isolate the humanitarian effort from these

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{74} Zinni, interview.
\bibitem{75} Hirsch and Oakley, p.45.
\bibitem{77} Seiple, p.131.
\bibitem{79} Menkhaus, p.307.
\end{thebibliography}
concerns was a mistake, especially in a failed state like Somalia, where everything was political.”\textsuperscript{80}

It was well understood that UNITAF’s mandate to enable the delivery of humanitarian relief was a short-term solution to Somalia’s famine and would not address the wider issues of the failed state. To adequately respond to the problems Somalia was grappling with would require diplomatic, political, military, humanitarian, and economic initiatives to assist in the national reconciliation and rebuilding of institutions. Even though those involved in the decision-making processes of the international intervention knew that long term solutions would necessitate addressing the root causes of the famine and violence, the political climate at the time led many leaders to contend that nation-building tasks should be readily avoided.\textsuperscript{81} Lieutenant Colonel Tom O’Leary, commander of the first Marine Battalion to land in Somalia in December 1992, illustrated the understanding that the mission represented an “immediate change for their lives; they will have the highest expectations; if they are not met, the relationship [between helper and helped] will become disenchanted and then it will go sour… you can provide security and food, but how long will they be satisfied?”\textsuperscript{82}

\textsuperscript{80} Seiple, p.131.
\textsuperscript{81} Seiple, interview.
\textsuperscript{82} Colonel Tom O’Leary quoted in Seiple, p.132.
The Somalis weren’t the only ones confused over what to expect from the military forces. The NGO community was also uncertain what to expect from the military forces. As Kevin Kennedy explained:

The general attitude displayed by the humanitarian community at the beginning of Operation Restore Hope can best be characterized as wary but hopeful. Most of the humanitarian workers had little experience with the military, and some were very vocal in their opposition to the UNITAF intervention, harbouring a basic dislike toward the whole concept of military force, particularly in the context of humanitarian assistance. The intervention was occasionally characterized as a public relations exercise that came too late and would not address the long-term needs of Somalia.83

General Anthony Zinni also noted the confusion that surrounded the military’s mandate and the impact this had on the military-NGO relationship in Somalia:

The military intervention was in many ways misunderstood and resented on the part of the NGOs. The military mission was not humanitarian, it was to provide security so that the humanitarian efforts could go on, but the military sometimes got involved in humanitarian efforts when on the ground and the NGO community that had been there for a long time through the worst parts felt that the military might be taking credit or stealing the limelight. The NGOs had been through all the tough times and even suffered casualties and, really in their minds,

83 Kennedy, p. 105.
had turned the humanitarian situation. That misunderstanding created a tougher relationship.  

Simultaneously, many of the humanitarian organisations had high expectations of UNITAF and what its presence could mean for their relief programmes. The humanitarians initially issued urgent calls for an immediate UNITAF presence throughout all of central and southern Somalia and beyond. The relief workers were frustrated over UNITAF’s operational plan that would take several weeks for the troops to secure the inland areas of Somalia. Due primarily to the commanders’ need to achieve troop levels capable of meeting any possible threat, UNITAF had planned to take three weeks or more to expand beyond Mogadishu. The humanitarian workers were concerned that bandits might use the time before troops arrived to loot the relief supplies before retreating into the countryside. Ultimately, UNITAF accelerated its deployment schedule and had forces in place in all principal relief sites by 26 December 1992.

The coordination that took place between UNITAF forces and humanitarian workers was met with relative success in Somalia. As Dworken noted, “In general, the military greatly assisted the HROs in their operations.” The security the military provided enabled the relief organisations to get assistance to the people of Somalia. The first relief ship to anchor in Somalia for two months arrived on 14 December 1992 and was unloaded under marine guard. By late December, Mogadishu had become the busiest port in Africa, with military ships unloading streams of vehicles and other support and

---

84 Zinni, interview.
85 Bradbury, p.35.
86 Kennedy, p.105.
87 Dworken, p.15.
civilian ships unloading relief supplies.\footnote{Ricciuti, p.50.} The difference that the improved security environment made in the delivery of aid was evident. For example, while only ten relief ships entered the Mogadishu port between May and December 1992, in the one month from December 1992 to January 1993, 43 ships were able to deliver relief supplies.\footnote{Dworken, p.15.} By January 1993, deaths were decreasing—the death rate in Bardera had dropped by 75 percent. In a few areas, repair and rebuilding had already begun.\footnote{Ricciuti, p.50.} There were no serious security problems, although representatives of some NGOs expressed dismay that relief supplies sometimes were held back to allow military equipment to be offloaded first.\footnote{Hirsch and Oakley, p.59.}

The military also provided convoy escorts to the relief organisations, helped to repair Somalia’s roads, and contributed to a decrease in the violence and looting that had plagued the relief efforts for so long. According to Dworken:

\begin{quote}
The ability of the military to escort HRO relief convoys to distant parts of Somalia greatly decreased the HROs’ costs of transportation, because they no longer had to airlift supplies. The escorts also allowed the World Food Programme (WFP) to bring its fleet of trucks to Somalia, which increased its ability to transport food and lowered the price of Somali trucking by 30 percent due to the increased supply of trucking in the competitive market.\footnote{Dworken, p.22.}
\end{quote}

In mid-December 1992, the humanitarian community in Mogadishu consisted of twenty-one international NGOS, six UN agencies, the ICRC, and the IFRC. The ICRC and a handful of NGOs had remained in Somalia throughout the civil war and ensuing

\begin{footnotesize}
\footnote{Ricciuti, p.50.}
\footnote{Dworken, p.15.}
\footnote{Ricciuti, p.50.}
\footnote{Hirsch and Oakley, p.59.}
\footnote{Dworken, p.22.}
\end{footnotesize}
conflicts; many of these organisations not only conducted relief operations in the greater Mogadishu area, but also functioned (with a few exceptions) as the country headquarters for their respective operations throughout Somalia. As Kennedy explained, “Mogadishu thus represented the nerve centre for relief operations and the principal location for coordination between the military and humanitarian organisations”.

After the military intervention began in December 1992, the number of NGOs operating in Somalia grew steadily. The number of NGOs and other humanitarian agencies operating in the country almost doubled between December 1992 and March 1993, as demonstrated in Table 4 below. As the number of humanitarian agencies grew with the improved security in the country, so too did the size of their programmes, the geographic areas they responded to, and the effectiveness of their relief initiatives.

| Table 4: Number of Humanitarian Agencies in Somalia |
|-------------------------------------|---------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
|                                     | Intern   | Local  | UN    | Red   | Total |
|                                     | al NGOs  | NGOs   | Agencies | Cross |       |
| December 1992                     | 21       | 2      | 6      | 2     | 31    |
| March 1993                        | 44       | 8      | 6      | 2     | 60    |

According to several observers of the military-NGO relationship in Somalia, most humanitarian workers acknowledged the importance that the military presence had on the security of the country and their ability to carry out their relief programmes.

The military-NGO relationship in Somalia revealed organisational differences which military forces were largely unaware of. First, the competition for funding, media

---

93 Kennedy, p.105.
95 Bradbury, 21.
attention, and programme areas amongst the various NGOs was surprising to many military personnel. As Dworken observed, “There was a great deal of antagonism and competition among different HROs.” Also, military personnel noted the high turnover rate of NGO workers, as well as others who “came and left Somalia quickly”.  

In addition to organisational differences, both members of the military and humanitarian communities were uncertain what role military forces should play in the provision of relief assistance. During Operation Restore Hope, military forces not only provided assistance to the humanitarian agencies, but they also directly provided assistance to the locals of Somalia. The ambiguous nature of the military’s mandated involvement in the direct provision of aid, left the forces on the ground to determine how, and if, they would carry out relief activities. In some instances the military forces would respond to a request from humanitarian agencies for assistance and, in others, the forces would provide relief on their own initiative. General Zinni identified three main reasons why the military forces chose to provide assistance during Operation Restore Hope:

I think the military got involved in humanitarian work sometimes out of necessity, sometimes because they just saw the need, and some thought it was part of their mission. There was a misunderstanding that our mission was humanitarian when it wasn’t.  

Military forces providing assistance directly to the people was a source of controversy of several reasons. First, there were legal issues surrounding the employment of Humanitarian and Civil Affairs programmes during Joint Chiefs of Staff-led operations. Such programmes are outlined in Title 10 of the US Code, which states that civil affairs

---

97 Zinni, interview.
activities carried out by military forces must be authorized. However, section 401 of Title 10 allows for a small amount of Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funds for humanitarian and civil affairs activities under several conditions (e.g. direct support of a mission or to ensure the security of US forces).\(^98\)

It was on these conditions (force protection/mission support) that the military commanders and forces, which chose to carry out relief activities, claimed that their assistance was supporting the overall mission. According to Dworken, “They contended that humanitarian activities that made the Somalis more accepting of US forces assisted the military mission.”\(^99\)

Because the military’s role in humanitarian assistance was unclear and largely open for interpretation, the assistance they provided was \textit{ad hoc} and uncoordinated. Instead of conducting studies and assessing the overall needs of an area, the soldiers would see a gap or need for assistance and respond to it—unaware if they were doubling an already existing effort, or if there was more immediate needs elsewhere where their assistance could be used.\(^100\)

The ambiguous and uncoordinated nature of the military’s assistance was difficult for humanitarian agencies, which often didn’t know what the military was capable of, or what they would be willing to do. This led to an \textit{ad hoc} cooperative relationship between the humanitarian and military organisations, which was dependent upon the personalities

\(^{98}\) Section 401, US Code, Title 10.  
\(^{99}\) Dworken, p.27.  
\(^{100}\) Dworken, p.27.
on the ground. Those in both communities who were willing to cooperate, participate together in projects, and communicate with one another were able to achieve great results and outputs for the local community. Others, who were unable or unwilling to cooperate, or stifled by the confusing guidance they received from their superiors, were less successful in coordinating relations and carrying out projects.

The problematic nature of the military-NGO relationship was also not lost on observers of the humanitarian intervention in Somalia. In an article for the New York Times, Jane Perlez noted, “The American led intervention in Somalia demands something unusual—the cooperation of a big armed force drilled with precise operational instructions with a couple dozen philanthropic agencies, some of which have questioned the value of the troops, considering them an intrusion.”

For the first time in history a military operation of this size and scale was authorized to enable humanitarian relief activities. Military involvement in a humanitarian operation of this size was new territory to all parties involved and thus exposed many differences in the cultures, missions, and expectations of military forces and humanitarian agencies. The limited mandate and short duration of the UNITAF operation was met with criticism by many in the UN and NGO communities and was, at times, not clearly articulated by US officials. The locals, UN agencies, and NGOs had high expectations of what the military operation could accomplish, yet the military’s limited mandate made fulfilling these expectations impossible.

UNITAF’s aim was to provide immediate assistance that would enable humanitarian relief activities to continue. It was not a long term solution and, given the entrenched military and government view of the time—to avoid mission creep and nation building, it was unlikely to have been co-opted into such a mission. The differences of opinion over what role the military should have played created tensions among the military, NGO, and UN communities which still exist today.

**Structure and Organisation**

Despite their limited experience in working with NGOs, the military successfully implemented military-NGO cooperation strategies during UNITAF that had worked in both northern Iraq and Bangladesh. The operation in Somalia witnessed groundbreaking cooperation among UNITAF, US government agencies, and international NGOs. There were also many missed opportunities that present lessons for future interventions. This section examines the structure, organisation, and cooperative initiatives employed by both the military and NGO communities during UNITAF.

Organisationally, UNITAF was made up of US and allied troops under the command of Lieutenant General Robert Johnston\textsuperscript{102}, who in turn reported to General Joseph P. Hoar, Commander in Chief of CENTCOM, and then directly up the military hierarchy through the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the president.\textsuperscript{103}

\textsuperscript{102} Johnston was chief of staff to General Norman Schwarzkopf during Operation Desert Storm.
\textsuperscript{103} Zinni, interview.
During planning for Operation *Restore Hope*, President Bush appointed Robert Oakley, who had served as ambassador to Somalia between 1982 and 1984, as his special envoy to Somalia.\(^{104}\) Within his role, Oakley had access to the Department of Defense, National Security Council as well as the State Department, which set up a special Somalia Interagency Task Force to coordinate civilian planning and operations with those of the military.\(^{105}\)

With the goal of coordinating military and humanitarian operations, as well as establishing a positive working relationship between the two communities, UNITAF’s commander Robert Johnston and Robert Oakley had UNITAF work with OFDA to establish a Civilian-Military Operations Centre (CMOC). The CMOC was located at UNOSOM headquarters, given the UN’s more long term role in Somalia. USMC Colonels Kevin Kennedy and Robert MacPherson led the CMOC, both of whom had been part of Operation *Provide Relief*. The civilian representatives of the CMOC were Jim Kunder and Bill Garvelink and later Kate Farnsworth all of OFDA. CARE President Philip Johnston, who was acting as UNOSOM’s coordinator of humanitarian operations, was also heavily involved with the CMOC.\(^{106}\) In fact, Philip Johnston had arrived in Mogadishu on 25 October, and he immediately set the goal of improving UNOSOM’s relations with the NGO community by establishing the base for what later became the CMOC.\(^{107}\)

\(^{104}\) Hirsch and Oakley, p.49.
\(^{105}\) Hirsch and Oakley, p.50.
\(^{106}\) Hirsch and Oakley, p.67.
\(^{107}\) Hirsch and Oakley, p.29.
To coordinate their planning and activities Lieutenant General Robert Johnston and Robert Oakley met regularly with one another as well as Marine Brigadier General Anthony Zinni, who was Johnston’s deputy for operations; and John Hirsch, Oakley’s deputy and Johnston’s political advisor. Hirsch had been Oakley’s deputy in Mogadishu in 1984, where he remained as deputy chief of mission and charge d’affaires until 1986. He and other staff members were handpicked for their proven knowledge of Somalia. Zinni was involved in the combined military-humanitarian Operation *Provide Comfort* for the Kurds in northern Iraq. UNITAF had, both in the civilian and military communities, a great deal of expertise on Somalia and humanitarian interventions and, according to General Zinni, this experience made an enormous difference during UNITAF:

> The experience of the personnel on the ground in CMA was critical. Bob Oakley and Phil Johnston; their unique experiences and personalities really worked well and not just at that level, but we had Kevin Kennedy and Bob Macpherson in the CMOC and they were lieutenant colonels and colonels, who after they retired, went to work for the United Nations and the NGO CARE and other organisations. They made a second career out of humanitarian work; were very much interested and very much connected. So, we had a network of experience and interests and some of the right personalities helped us as we evolved. I don’t want to say it was perfect, but I think that as we ran into problems and issues there was a strong desire on both sides to figure out how to resolve this as much as possible at the senior leadership level.

Each morning members of the military, humanitarian and political communities in Somalia would attend coordination meetings to make plans for the day’s humanitarian and political activities. Personnel working on UNITAF’s daily Somali-language newspaper and radio station, both called Rajo, which means “Hope” in Somali, would

---

108 Hirsch and Oakley, p.72.
109 Zinni, interview.
110 Zinni, interview.
also attend and report on developments.\textsuperscript{111} According to General Zinni, the communication among the military, political, and humanitarian components in Somalia contributed to a very effective relationship:

Phil Johnson, Bob Oakley and Lieutenant General Bob Johnston met frequently and so there was communication on that level, sort of like an executive committee discussion. I was director of operations and heard a lot from the NGOs. Our officers like Kevin Kennedy and others that were over at the CMOC brought many of the NGOs over to express their views.\textsuperscript{112}

\begin{center}
\textbf{Rajo “Hope” Newspaper}
\end{center}

\textit{116 editions of UNITAF’s Rajo “Hope” Newspaper were published during Operation Restore Hope.}\textsuperscript{113}

After consultation among UNITAF, OFDA and several NGOs, UNITAF’s operation plan divided southern Somalia into eight humanitarian relief sectors (HRSs) in the areas where relief was needed most. These areas, which can be seen in Figure 3 on page 132,

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{112} Zinni, interview.
\end{itemize}
included the regions of the Juba and Shebelle river valleys, as well as the area stretching from the Indian Ocean on the east to the border with Ethiopia on the west. The southern demarcation line ran from Kismayo to Bardera, and the northern line from Mogadishu to Belet Weyne. The eight zones and their primary command countries were Mogadishu (US), Baledogle (Morocco), Kismayo (US and Belgium), Baidoa (US), Bardera (US), Oddur (France) Belet Weyne (Canada) and Jalalaqsi (Italy). Later, Merca became the ninth HRS under the US Army’s Tenth Mountain Division.\textsuperscript{114}

From December onward the CMOC held a daily briefing session attended by nearly 100 participants from the UN agencies, NGOs, the ICRC, as well as representatives from UNITAF headquarters and the military commands responsible for each of the HRSs. The objective was to share information on the latest security developments; explain UNITAF ground rules and operational plans; coordinate humanitarian assistance activities, especially the protection for food convoys within Mogadishu and moving into the interior; and provide an opportunity for information exchange, coordination, and cooperation on humanitarian operations generally.\textsuperscript{115}

\textsuperscript{114} Hirsch and Oakley, p.65.
\textsuperscript{115} Seiple, interview.
Dworken noted that there were five areas that required military-NGO interaction in Somalia. They were:

1. Escorting HRO convoys to protect them from looting by Somali factions and bandits.
2. Providing security for HRO compounds, offices, and warehouses,
3. Assisting the HROs with humanitarian and civic affairs projects;
4. Providing technical assistance in the form of studies to HROs considering projects;
5. Confiscating Somalis’ weapons.  

\[116\] Dworken, p.2.
As noted earlier, the military drew on its prior experience with NGOs in northern Iraq and Bangladesh and carried out various strategies that had proven successful in coordinating with humanitarian agencies. Two organisations were central to military-NGO relations in Operation Restore Hope: the Humanitarian Operations Centre (HOC) and the Civil-Military Operations Centre (CMOC). The HOC had representatives from the military, NGOs, and the UN. It tried to plan, support, and monitor the delivery of relief supplies. To do so, the HOC staff developed an overall relief strategy, coordinated humanitarian agency logistics and arranged for US military support to the NGOs and UN agencies. The HOC had a UN director and civilian and military deputy directors. There were mini-HOCs in each major town in Southern Somalia. Philip Johnston, the UN’s Humanitarian Coordinator, was the HOC’s director with two deputy directors, Bill Garvelink of OFDA and Colonel Kennedy.

Table 5: Structure of a Humanitarian Operations Centre (HOC)

The CMOC was a group of officers and soldiers that served as the military’s presence at the HOC, as well as the military liaison to the humanitarian community. The CMOC

117 Seiple, interview.  
118 Dworken, p.1.
director was also the HOC’s deputy director. Oakley and other US government staff gave periodic briefings on political developments. By developing personal relationships with NGO workers and others, UNITAF and OFDA were able to more effectively address the concerns and anxieties of the relief community. Both sides were thus encouraged to seek pragmatic solutions to their difficulties. General Zinni noted, however, that there were divergent opinions on how to execute the organisational roles of the CMOC:

There was a school of thought in the military that the CMOC ought to be a stand alone organisation on the military side just reporting to the commanding general, but General Johnston wanted the military side to be under control of the Director of Operations, which I was. That caused a little friction between myself and the head of the CMOC. But [General Johnston] felt that it was critical to coordinate operations with the humanitarian efforts so that we aren’t doing security or military tasks independent of humanitarian efforts. The military side wanted more independence, but it was my view and General Johnston’s view that this had to all be part of operations. It was our whole reason for being there; you couldn’t separate it from the operational side and it was important for the humanitarian workers to know and understand what we were doing and it was important for us on the operational side to know what they were doing.

One issue that served to complicate military-NGO relations during UNITAF’s mission was the organisation and security situation in Mogadishu. While there were HOCs in each of the nine HRSs, the Mogadishu HOC was both the national HOC and the local HOC for the Mogadishu HRS. This had enormous implications for coordination, as the UNITAF officers who were operating in the Mogadishu HRS, the Marine Forces, were

---

119 Dworken, , p.2
120 Hirsch and Oakley, p.68.
121 Zinni, interview.
not present at the Mogadishu HOC. Instead, it was UNITAF’s CMOC officers who represented the military at the Mogadishu HOC.\(^\text{122}\)

In addition, the Mogadishu HOC was co-located with the UN Headquarters in Mogadishu, not UNITAF. The decision to co-locate the Mogadishu HOC with the UN was born out of several practicalities, which included security, access, and UN oversight and perception issues.\(^\text{123}\) The HOC’s location was a ten minute drive from UNITAF headquarters, so the UNITAF CMOC was co-located with the HOC to ensure adequate UNITAF representation and assistance with coordinating the military and humanitarian communities.\(^\text{124}\) According to Chris Seiple, “locating the CMOC with the HOC was, in a sense, the military reaching out to the humanitarian community.”\(^\text{125}\) However, despite the best efforts of the military and civilian communities to coordinate activities, the Mogadishu HRS’ organisational structure was too disconnected to provide an adequate level of communication and cooperation. As Seiple noted:

> The Mogadishu HOC/CMOC was twice removed from reality. Not only did the CMOC have to coordinate with local Marine forces in Mogadishu through the UNITAF staff; decisions made about NGO security were removed away from the NGOs to a faceless chain-of-command.\(^\text{126}\)

Because there wasn’t a humanitarian official co-located with UNITAF headquarters, the NGOs dealt with the CMOC’s leadership, Colonels Kevin Kennedy and Bob

\(^{122}\) Seiple, p.118.  
\(^{123}\) Dworken, pp.17-18.  
\(^{124}\) Seiple, p.114.  
\(^{125}\) Seiple, interview.  
\(^{126}\) Seiple, p.118.
MacPherson. Jim Kunder of OFDA explains that the humanitarian community came to think that, “discussions with Kevin Kennedy were discussions with the military.”

This contributed to the impression held by humanitarian representatives that all military personnel would behave and think like Kennedy and MacPherson. Due to the disconnect among the NGOs, the Mogadishu CMOC/HOC and the Marine forces on the ground, the humanitarian workers became confused when the military attitudes at the higher levels did not reflect the military attitudes of the soldiers on the ground.

The Marine forces (MARFOR), which had responsibility for the Mogadishu HRS, were not as amenable to working with the humanitarian agencies when compared to their counterparts from the Army and foreign contingents in other HRSs. This has been attributed to a combination of the Marine Corps’ warfighting mentality, lack of appreciation of civil-military affairs, as well as the security issues that plagued the city of Mogadishu.

Mark Biser, an infantry officer with the USMC, expressed a common perspective held by the Marines deployed to Somalia during Operation Restore Hope:

CMOC? What’s that? Who knows? Who cares? Those guys are over there living under UN rules with air-conditioning. They’re skating. Who wants to be in a CMOC? Nobody wants to be in a CMOC. That’s like asking ten brand new Second Lieutenant infantry officers just out of The Basic School if they want to be the adjutant [an administrative position with little command opportunity]. Ten out of ten would say no. They are warfighters and they want to practice their craft.

---

127 Zinni, interview.
128 Seiple, p.119.
129 Seiple, p.119.
130 Seiple, interview.
131 Mark Biser quoted in Seiple, p.119.
However, Biser acknowledged that in a humanitarian operation, while security should be the primary focus for the military initially, the CMOC, “must eventually become the FOME [focus of main effort].”

The CMOC never became the primary focus for the Marine forces in Mogadishu due to the fact that security issues remained a problem throughout the duration of UNITAF’s mission. Although key locations were secured early, Mogadishu proved the most difficult sector for UNITAF. The capital’s population was ten times that of any other city, and the forces of Ali Mahdi and Aideed, as well as smaller militias and hundreds of bandits, were heavily armed with huge hidden stockpiles of arms and ammunition. The economic and political significance of Mogadishu for all Somalis, and its symbolism for national leadership, made it especially important for the national factions and a primary focus for their rivalry.

The concentration of journalists, UN and NGO headquarters staffs, and other foreigners, along with warehouses containing relief supplies offered many opportunities for robbery and looting by individuals and militias in Mogadishu. Northern Mogadishu, distant from UNITAF headquarters in the south, was very dangerous and rife with criminal activities.

UNITAF’s ability to provide security to the humanitarian agencies operating in Mogadishu was complicated by the disconnectedness of UNITAF headquarters and the

---

132 Mark Biser quoted in Seiple, p.119.
133 Hirsch and Oakley, p.61.
134 Hirsch and Oakley, p.61.
Mogadishu CMOC/HOC, as well as the decentralized and widespread areas where the humanitarian organisations were located throughout the city. If a humanitarian agency required immediate military security assistance, the agency would have to contact the CMOC. The military officer who received the humanitarian’s call would then have to contact UNITAF operations centre, thus creating a delay that a direct humanitarian line to UNITAF headquarters would have solved. In addition, as shown in table 6 below, there were a total of 585 humanitarian facilities that could require military security at any time. The military forces were unable to provide a high level of security for so many facilities throughout the Mogadishu area.135

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Offices</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residences</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warehouses</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feeding Centres</td>
<td>356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Clinics</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>585</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The military offered to provide all humanitarian organisations with security details on the condition that they would consolidate the 585 facilities in Mogadishu into a much more manageable number and live in compact facilities with more rigorous security procedures. However, General Zinni noted that many NGOs had a different view on military security:

The NGOS saw our role as maybe providing security to each NGO individually, with no constraints, they would basically have their own squad of marines and that couldn’t happen by the sheer numbers and they weren’t willing to do things that made security more efficient like consolidate. If they got security they wanted to use it for their own purposes, social events and everything else, even to

135 Zinni, interview.
the point to attending parties with each other in Mogadishu. Obviously the military couldn’t accommodate that and we said we don’t provide marines to provide security for parties. And so we had this friction.\textsuperscript{136}

The NGOs in Mogadishu refused to consolidate and the military in turn refused to provide protection. According to Andrew Natsios, although security did not improve for many NGOs in Mogadishu after the military intervention, this lack of improvement was to a great degree a function of their own inability to change their working arrangements and lifestyles.\textsuperscript{137}

However, the security arrangements offered by the military forces sometimes ran counter to the operational principles ascribed to by many humanitarian agencies. MSF France for instance, an organisation which strictly adheres to the principles of independence and neutrality and which views any association with military forces as a violation of those principles, withdrew from Somalia in May 1993 because all of its relief operations were dependent upon military security. Due to the fact that MSF was not able to operate independently of military security because of the risk of violence in Somalia, their choice was clear: accept military security and violate their principles, or withdraw from the country and accept that their programmes would not be carried out.\textsuperscript{138}

Other NGOs were much more amenable to working with, and accepting, assistance from the military forces in Somalia. In fact, in stark contrast to the security issues and lack of centralized coordination in Mogadishu, the military and humanitarian communities in the

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{136} Zinni, interview. \\
\textsuperscript{137} Andrew S. Natsios, “Humanitarian Relief Intervention in Somalia”, in Clarke and Herbst, p.92. \\
\textsuperscript{138} Seiple, p.124.
\end{flushleft}
other HRSs were able to achieve a high level of cooperation. Of note was the cooperation between civilian organisations and the military forces with humanitarian action capabilities, such as the Seabees and the Army Corps of Engineers. UNITAF units of Army engineers and Seabees built or repaired 2,500 kilometres of roads, nine airfields able to handle C-130s, 85 helicopter pads, and more. They dug wells and, in cooperation with NGOS, rehabilitated schools and clinics and provided direct medical assistance to thousands of Somalis, partly through a UNICEF-coordinated inoculation programme.\textsuperscript{139}

UNITAF concentrated its efforts in January and February on stabilizing the security situation in the nine HRSs in preparation for the handoff to UNOSOM II. While criminal activities were still problems in Kismayo and Mogadishu, the rest of UNITAF’s area of operations were witnessing great improvement in security of convoys and relief supplies and overall security.

Taking weapons out of circulation, rather than a total disarmament programme, was the primary goal of UNITAF. Complete disarmament would have necessitated an even larger troop deployment, and would, undoubtedly, caused increased resentment and strain with the militias, as well as the country’s populace. UNITAF’s aim to ban visible weapons was intended to complement the NGOs’ activities of relief and institution building.\textsuperscript{140}

\textsuperscript{139} Hirsch and Oakley, p.67.
\textsuperscript{140} Seiple, interview.
In a number of HRSs, such as Baidoa, Merca Belet Weyne, and Oddur, the presence of civilian political officers, UNITAF, and relief workers significantly altered the local security and political environment. The most successful HRS in reinstituting a traditional independent municipal council was Baidoa, which worked on security with UNITAF and on relief and humanitarian issues with UNITAF, the UN, and the NGOs. The local communities were normally very willing to cooperate and work with the UN and NGOs to develop plans for the delivery of food and medical aid.\textsuperscript{141}

According to Oakley and Hirsch, prior to the Marine force arriving in Baidoa on 16 December, “NGO workers were briefed on what to expect when the Marines arrived, and there was a general air of relief, even among some who had earlier been concerned about the ramifications of a military-led relief operation.”\textsuperscript{142} To bring together the military, humanitarian, and local communities in Baidoa, General Greg Newbold instituted a series of Somali-style “town meetings”, where participation grew to over 200 people after a short time. Various security and humanitarian issues facing the HRS were openly discussed at these meetings.\textsuperscript{143}

Within just a few weeks of the Marine force’s arrival in Baidoa, the situation began to improve. Fewer criminal acts and violence were taking place and with the reopening of markets and a general improvement in the security environment, a sense of stability began to permeate the area.\textsuperscript{144} Military forces, UN agencies, and the ICRC and NGOs

\textsuperscript{141} Lt. General Gregory Newbold, USMC, interview, 8 July 2005.
\textsuperscript{142} Hirsch and Oakley, p.84.
\textsuperscript{143} Newbold, interview.
\textsuperscript{144} Newbold, interview.
were providing food, medicine, and healthcare; repairing clinics and schools; and building roads and digging wells. One Marine reserve officer in Baidoa organized the collection of clothing, books, and toys from families of military forces, which helped over 1,500 orphans throughout the Baidoa region. The Marines, NGOs and Somalis worked together to rebuild orphanages, schools and clinics. Similar activities took place in all the HRS centres. A large school in Mogadishu was rebuilt by the combined action of a marine contingent and the NGO Irish Concern.

The Baidoa HRS became a model for UNITAF forces in the other HRSs. UNITAF and civilian staff encouraged local leaders to form regional councils. The vast majority of locals welcomed UNITAF and the NGOs, the food situation improved steadily, and child mortality rates dropped in all HRSs.

The Baidoa model worked better in some HRSs than in others; Bardera and Kismayo were more difficult as locals there feared retaliation from the warlords. Yet, even in such a difficult town as Bardera, the death rate fell from more than 300 a day in November to five or fewer in February. According to Hirsch and Oakley, “The relief workers welcomed the enhanced security, humanitarian help, and logistics support provided by UNITAF forces.” A concern shared by relief workers and Somalis alike, however, was that improvements would be only temporary; they feared that the departure of UNITAF

145 Newbold, interview.
146 Hirsch and Oakley, p.70.
147 Newbold, interview.
148 Hirsch and Oakley, p.72.
forces and assumption of responsibility by the UN would be followed by the return of intimidation and violence from the factions and militias.

The structure and organisational setup of the military-NGO relationship was groundbreaking in several ways. Without clear structural guidelines, as well as only limited past experience in smaller humanitarian operations, UNITAF, civilian US government, UN, and NGO staff did remarkably well in coordinating their activities. The employment and further development of the military’s CMOC organisation and the civilian HOC served to facilitate a great deal of information exchange and two-way communication between the actors. In Somalia, cooperation was born out of necessity and the coordination process was made easier and more effective with the transparent organisational structure. However, security, organisation and communication problems plagued the Mogadishu HRS and exposed major issues in the military-humanitarian relationship that would remain unresolved during the UNITAF operation. In the other HRSs, however, a new respect emerged, particularly between military units with practical skills, such as engineers, and NGO workers. In addition, the implementation of CMOC and HOC organisational structures was a great asset to the military-NGO relationship. The success that the military-NGO relationship in Somalia did achieve can be largely attributed to the excellent senior level military, political, and humanitarian staffs which were present. However, despite their best efforts to coordinate and employ organisational structures, the military and humanitarian communities were unable to overcome the most pervasive issue of the operation: disarmament.
**Disarmament**

The most contentious area of military-NGO relations was the weapons confiscation policy. The different interpretations of UNITAF’s role in disarmament were a source of great conflict among the NGOs, UN agencies, and UNITAF troops in Somalia. UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali wanted UNITAF troops to disarm all gunmen and put down violence of any sort, the US on the other hand, said the troops were not a police force and should fire only if they or relief supplies were threatened. What actually happened was something in between.\(^{149}\) As UNITAF began to adopt a limited disarmament role, NGO operations began to be affected when their local security personnel were subjected to weapons confiscation policies. Despite efforts to resolve the conflict, the controversial issue of disarmament plagued the military-NGO relationship throughout UNITAF’s deployment. This section provides an overview of the problem of weapons in Somalia, as well as the impact the various views of disarmament had on the military-NGO relationship in Somalia.

The arms problem in Somalia was not fully appreciated by the international community during the UN and US interventions in Somalia. The Marxist Ethiopian regime had maintained the second largest military force in sub-Saharan Africa until its defeat by the Eritrean and Tigrayan rebel movements in spring 1991.\(^{150}\) When this massive force collapsed, Ethiopian merchants purchased the huge remaining arsenals, both ammunition and weapons, and began selling them to the Somali warlords, moving shipments easily across the un-patrolled border between the two countries. Most NGOs, as well as the US

\(^{149}\) Ricciuti, p.45.
\(^{150}\) Andrew S. Natsios in Clarke and Herbst, p.85.
government, never realized how massive and organized this arms trading would become during the course of the chaos. All elements were there for major weapons and ammunition trafficking: demand created by the warlords for their private armies and by the NGOs for their guard forces, supply from the Ethiopian merchants, cash generated by the large-scale looting of food stocks and infrastructure, and protection rackets run by the warlords.  

Young men with guns were the principal source of most of the violence in Somalia; they had no jobs and could find cheap weapons in local markets. The best way to make up for the absence of a job was a weapon, a traditional symbol of manhood in nomadic culture and now a source of income as well. The relief agencies— the UN, the ICRC, and the NGOs— increased the market for weapons and ammunition because they hired large armies to protect their convoys and distribution sites. The ICRC was reported to have 15,000 to 20,000 armed guards on staff at the height of the anarchy. This exaggerated demand drew ever more weapons and ammunition from other areas of the Horn of Africa into Somalia. The economics of weapons trade that made Somalia an armed camp has not been widely studied yet had a profound effect on the security situation. As Andrew Natsios noted:

It is indeed very ironic that the very humanitarian organisations demanding so vocally that US and later UN peacekeeping forces disarm Somalia inadvertently fuelled a good deal of the Somali appetite for weapons both by hiring guards and by agreeing to the warlord’s diversion of food resources in order to gain their protection and purchase more weapons.  

---

151 Seiple, interview.
152 Andrew S. Natsios in Clarke and Herbst, p.85.
153 Andrew S. Natsios in Clarke and Herbst, pp.84-85.
These conditions created the chaotic situation that the relief agencies faced as events unfolded. With no formal court system or police force, relief agencies had no way of protecting themselves from abuse: Unrestrained looting of convoys and warehouses, kidnapping of NGO staff for ransom, demands for higher wages by Somali staff who used their weapons as negotiating tools against their NGO and ICRC employers, checkpoints on every road where protection money was demanded, and warlord demands for a share of the food stocks going into their areas all contributed to the problem. NGOs were simply not prepared for the extortion, looting and protection rackets they faced at every turn.154 These private NGO armies created a demand for weapons and ammunition, driving their price up higher than they would have been if only the civil conflict were affecting weapons. These higher prices in turn attracted more weapons from across the Ethiopian border. The NGOs created a premium for armed men who did little all day but hold their weapons and who received high wages when there was generally massive unemployment.155 When it was agreed that troops would be deployed, the UN and US government were at odds over how to deal with this enormous weapons problem in Somalia.156

Within a week of UNITAF’s arrival in Mogadishu, there was a disagreement between the UN Secretary General and UNITAF’s commander regarding the disarming of Somali gunmen. Security Council Resolution 794 did not require UNITAF to disarm Somalis, but Boutros Ghali subsequently argued that he had had an understanding with the White House that the force would disarm the Somali gunmen. In fact, Ghali argued that the

---

154 Seiple, interview.
155 Zinni, interview.
156 Seiple, interview.
creation of a “secure environment” presupposed disarming the gunmen. In a letter to President Bush on 8 December 1992, Boutros Ghali argued that UNITAF should ensure, before it withdrew, that the heavy weapons of the organized factions be “neutralized and brought under international control” and that the irregular forces and gangs be disarmed.”\textsuperscript{157} He firmly believed that without this action, it would be impossible to establish a secure environment for humanitarian operations or to create conditions for the promotion of national reconciliation. The Secretary General also wanted UNITAF not only to confiscate the weapons of the gangs but to destroy them before its departure. Ghali argued that he would be in a position to recommend to the SC the transition to UNOSOM II only after a secure environment for humanitarian operations and for the promotion of a political settlement had been established.\textsuperscript{158}

President Bush stated the US policy:

First, we will create a secure environment in the hardest hit parts of Somalia so that food can move from ships overland to the people in the countryside now devastated by starvation. And second, once we have created that secure environment, we will withdraw our troops, handing the security mission back to a regular UN peacekeeping force.\textsuperscript{159}

The Secretary General however felt that this approach was insufficient. Boutros Ghali said that a disarmament programme must ensure “that the heavy weapons of the organised factions are neutralized and that the irregular forces and gangs are disarmed.” To do so would require establishing or consolidating cease-fire agreements with the

\textsuperscript{157}Makinda, p.71.  
\textsuperscript{158}Makinda, p.71.  
\textsuperscript{159}Hirsch and Oakley, pp.103-104.
leader of all organized factions and disarming lawless gangs. UNITAF and any successor, “should do all (it) can to induce individuals to hand in their weapons.”

US officials at all levels explained repeatedly that this kind of programme was not in UNITAF’s mandate. Lawrence Eagleburger, at that time Secretary of State, told the Secretary General bluntly that only the US would decide how to use its forces and when to bring them home, but publicly the administration played down its irritation with the UN. The US commander argued that disarming the Somalis was not part of his mission.

UNITAF forces communicated that it would seize arms caches reported or discovered in their area of operations and do its best to see that weapons were not carried or used where its forces were present. But it would not conduct systematic searches of houses or every car on the road. In an interview at the time, Oakley noted that even in counties with functioning legal and penal systems, it is extremely difficult to control the availability of weapons. How, he asked, could disarmament of this magnitude “house to house, hut to hut searches” be carried out in the lawless conditions prevailing in Somalia?

General Zinni also defended UNITAF’s approach to disarmament, noting:

We had a very active programme for disarming in Somalia, but there were all sorts of stupid ideas that came out, like what had worked in El Salvador was to buy weapons. Well buying weapons in Somalia would have broken the US Treasury. I mean there were so many weapons on the ground and the borders

---

160 Hirsch and Oakley, p.104.
161 Hirsch and Oakley, p.104.
162 Zinni, interview.
163 Hirsch and Oakley, p.105.
were so porous that trying to buy weapons away was not a good idea so we had to discourage that.164

This US position was that any UNITAF disarmament programme was to be limited and specific. The Oakley and Johnston strategy of seeking cooperation from the faction leaders included obtaining their agreement to the cantonment of heavy weapons, especially the technicals—and then enforcing it, as well as ensuring that there was no armed interference with humanitarian operations.165 This policy, extended throughout the HRSs in conjunction with UNITAF troop deployments, had three short-term benefits. It reduced the level of confrontation with the faction leaders and minimized the risk of causalities, it put heavy weapons out of circulation, and it quickly broke through obstacles to the delivery of food and medicine in south-central Somalia, allowing humanitarian operations to proceed. Had UNITAF pursued a policy of full-scale disarmament, it would have needed a much greater force for the mission and would almost certainly have become embroiled in a series of local clashes, both small-scale and with large militias.166

The UNITAF command felt strongly that it was vital to avoid serving as a police force. They wanted to avoid unnecessary confrontation between the military and civilians and to take a gradual approach to arms control and weakening the forces of the faction leaders. As for the deployment to the centre and the north, the US position remained unyielding: This would be the function of UNOSOM II. If UNOSOM II commanders arrived

164 Zinni, interview.
165 Seiple, interview.
166 Hirsch and Oakley, p.104.
prepared to undertake a well-planned disarmament programme, US and other UNITAF forces would assist. Although this stance was made clear to UN representatives in Mogadishu and UNITAF was actually doing the contingency planning for the possibility, it appears that this point was not fully grasped at UN headquarters. They continued to believe the US would accept no role in any disarmament activity once UNOSOM II came into being. If UN pressure on the US were kept up, UNITAF might eventually agree to the job.\textsuperscript{167} This misapprehension seems to have been an important factor behind the delay in planning. Until late April, Boutros Ghali continued to argue that it was premature and dangerous for a UN peacekeeping operation to take over as long as UNITAF’s mission (as he defined it) had not been carried out.\textsuperscript{168}

The most serious unresolved problem was the extremely complicated, dangerous one of protection for NGO, UN Agency, and ICRC personnel and facilities. A particularly vexing dilemma was what to do with the heavily armed private guards retained by most of the relief organisations before UNITAF’s arrival. On the one hand, UNITAF believed it could not allow these guards to continue to carry their weapons in public, especially since most were members of one military faction or another, and a number moonlighted as bandits.\textsuperscript{169} This created enormous complications for the security environment in Somalia. As Chris Seiple noted:

\begin{quote}
When it came to hiring local guards, the NGOs knew they were damned if they did, damned if they didn’t. They felt that had to do it which is interesting, because being NGOs they’re going to be there before the military and they’re going to be there after the military leaves, so it impacts the security environment and violates their own principle of remaining apolitical. But they’re doing it to
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{168} Hirsch and Oakley, p.105.
\textsuperscript{169} Seiple, interview.
serve the people; but by hiring guards and feeding the people you’re actually creating more space for the militias to loot and stay in power, so people are saved but you are actually contributing to the continuation of the conflict.\(^{170}\)

General Zinni noted that the military attempted to share information on the guards with NGOs:

\[
\text{We tried to caution the NGOs on some of these guards that we knew through our intelligence were bad guys who did rob them and, in some cases, there were actually some deaths. But they ignored us and instead wanted green cards for their guards’ passage.}^{171}\]

Relief agencies felt that their guards provided them extra protection, or were afraid to fire the guards lest there be reprisals. This very real risk greatly concerned relief workers. The amount of money earned by Somali guards working for humanitarian agencies, including the ICRC, was enormous in a country whether there were no other jobs to be had. The guards usually belonged to whatever military leader was dominant in the area where the agency was operating and were paid very high wages. One well-known international NGO in Kismayo was paying some seventy guards almost $2,000 each per month plus food. This did not buy loyalty. When word spread that Mohammed Said Hersi Morgan, the son in-law of Barre, and his military were attacking the town in late February, the guards all fled, looting the agency compound, taking agency vehicles and firing at US and Belgian Forces as they left town.\(^{172}\)

Earlier, also in Kismayo, the highly respected UNICEF representative Sean Devereaux had been assassinated by a Somali he had fired. In Baidoa, an ICRC representative was

\(^{170}\) Seiple, interview.
\(^{171}\) Zinni, interview.
\(^{172}\) Hirsch and Oakley, p. 68.
killed during a payroll robbery carried out by former employees. General Zinni also noted that the ICRC and NGO offices had chosen not to accept the UNITAF offer to all NGOs and UN agencies to guard their premises and payrolls or to use UNITAF Headquarters to keep their funds safe.\textsuperscript{173} After a review by higher-level ICRC officials, the organisation began to rely more on UNITAF for protection. Even so, during April and May, ICRC offices in Mogadishu again elected to ignore the UNITAF offer to hold payrolls for protection, with the result that two major payroll robberies were perpetrated in cooperation with employees and the ICRC offices were closed.\textsuperscript{174}

The US military intervention did provide security for food warehouses and distribution centres, food convoys by relief agencies, and port and airport facilities, ending protection rackets and massive food diversions. The private armies of guards were no longer as necessary, and many were laid off by the relief agencies. This, to some extent, lessened the power of the warlords to loot food and relief equipment, but many of the issues surrounding disarmament remained unresolved.\textsuperscript{175}

At first, US commanders informed gunmen in Mogadishu that they could continue to carry their light automatic weapons, but ordered everyone carrying heavy weapons off the streets. The weapons very quickly disappeared, but they were merely moved to other towns or buried in the countryside for later use. Mogadishu grew quiet as the fighting subsided, but General Aideed’s forces moved to Baidoa and went on a looting and killing

\textsuperscript{173} Zinni, interview.
\textsuperscript{174} Hirsch and Oakley, p. 69.
\textsuperscript{175} Seiple, interview.
spree that displaced thousands of people. The relief effort there had to be stopped until conditions improved.176

The humanitarian agencies needed to rent vehicles from Somalis to deliver relief supplies. Most vehicles came with drivers armed to protect them from bandits. The aid agencies needed to bring these vehicles into areas controlled by UNITAF (such as the port and airfields) to receive relief supplies. To deliver supplies, they needed to cross HRS borders and pass through military checkpoints. At the same time, however, UNITAF was trying to disarm the warlords, bandits, and much of the population. Some soldiers had difficulty telling bandits from the Somali aid agency drivers, and therefore confiscated any weapon they saw, including those belonging to aid agency drivers. Other soldiers, convinced that Somali aid agency drivers took their weapons home in the evening and became bandits, wanted to confiscate aid agency drivers’ weapons.177

UNITAF’s first solution to this problem was to issue pink identification cards to aid agency drivers in Mogadishu in late December. But there were several problems with this policy. Because the cards had no pictures, fraud was common. Moreover, UNITAF did not fully disseminate the rules about the cards, and there was confusion over the weapon confiscation policy in general. Furthermore, there was no country-wide policy—it differed by HRS.178

176 Ricciuti, p.45.
177 Dworken, p.29.
178 Dworken, p.29.
UNITAF knew it needed a new approach in late January. In February UNITAF decided to issue blue photo identification cards. It started to issue them in late February. Aid agencies vouched for Somalis that they needed as drivers and these Somalis would get their cards at the CMOC or local HOC. With the cards, they could enter ports and airfields, cross HRSs, pass through daylight roadblocks, and carry a limited number of authorized weapons. The number of weapons in a vehicle could not be greater than the number of people in it. And the drivers could only possess those types of weapons listed on the backs of their cards. UNITAF disseminated these rules widely.\textsuperscript{179}

At the same time, Marine Force (MARFOR) was initiating a new disarmament policy in Mogadishu. The first disarmament policy allowed the military to confiscate weapons only in a few situations. UNITAF Commander’s Policy Guidance #1 Weapon Collection Procedure outlined that weapons confiscation policy allowed soldiers to confiscate weapons only after a conflict, under the ROE, or if weapons were unattended.\textsuperscript{180} The second policy allowed the military to confiscate almost any weapon. One element of the second policy was the rule that soldiers could confiscate any “visible” weapon. MARFOR enforced these rules vigorously.\textsuperscript{181}

There was a disagreement over the meaning of “visible” in the second policy. When aid agency vehicles approached checkpoints and roadblocks, MARFOR soldiers often looked inside the cars, saw weapons on the Somali guards’ laps, stopped the vehicles, and confiscated the weapons. The aid agency drivers kept the weapons on their laps because

\textsuperscript{179} Dworken, p.30.  
\textsuperscript{180} Seiple, interview.  
\textsuperscript{181} Dworken, p.30.
if there were problems they needed to use them quickly; keeping them on the floor or in the trunk would not have allowed them to defend their vehicles against bandits.

Despite the issuance of blue ID cards, MARFOR confiscated many aid agency weapons. This analysis suggests a painful proposition: The more sides in a conflict, the more uncontrollable and undisciplined the actors in a conflict, the more dangerous humanitarian interventions may be absent an outside military force to protect relief agencies. It may be that in the future, humanitarian relief agencies should consider not intervening in a conflict without military security to protect them unless the sides to the conflict exercise enough control over their own forces to ensure that relief can be provided to non-combatants without furthering the combatants’ ends. Saving lives over the short term may increase deaths over the longer term and increase the damage to civil society.\footnote{Andrew S. Natsios, in Clarke and Herbst, p.93.}

Similarly, the soup kitchens of the ICRC created a massive movement of people to one area, thus eroding the agricultural economy as farmers left rural areas to come to food kitchen centres. This disastrous consequence of food kitchens was exacerbated by the manner in which the US troops entered Somalia.—Mogadishu first and then gradually the other cities; they established little presence in the rural areas. Large population movements took place toward each successive area the US military controlled. According to Fred Cuny’s reports, there was a 25 percent increase in the number of soup kitchens in the immediate aftermath of the military intervention, at a time when dependence on the kitchens should have been diminishing. This insidious effect began
subsiding in the spring of 1993 as the ICRC began reducing its use of soup kitchens: Between January and June 1993 ICRC food distributions through all mechanisms declined from 17,000 metric tons a month to 3,000. Finally, the soup kitchens had the catastrophic health consequences that result when large groups of people are crowded into small areas. Given the unfortunate consequences of soup kitchens however it must be remembered that they did save perhaps a million lives, a not insignificant accomplishment in chaotic circumstances.\(^{183}\) During this same period, NGOs began moving food distributions and health services to the remote villages, thus slowing the disastrous migration of people from their home villages to the cities and camps for displaced persons. Had there been more security in the rural areas, this decentralization of the relief effort could have started earlier and covered a much wider area.\(^{184}\)

Despite a great deal of dialogue and study, UNITAF and the relief agencies could not find an overall solution to this problem of protection, one that UNOSOM II also was not able to resolve. The closest UNITAF came to a solution was in banning all armed guards from Kismayo, providing radio contact for emergencies and some direct military protection for humanitarian agencies, and starting local Somali police forces which helped protect relief installations.\(^{185}\) The various conflicting views on weapons confiscation, coupled with the limited mandate of UNITAF, served to create the most strain on the military-NGO relationship. Although various approaches were taken to disarmament over the course of the UNITAF operation, there was little hope of a resolution that would be militarily feasible and would not create increased danger for the

\(^{183}\) Andrew S. Natsios, in Clarke and Herbst, pp.88-89.
\(^{184}\) Andrew S. Natsios in Clarke and Herbst, p.89.
\(^{185}\) Hirsch and Oakley, p.69.
relief workers. In the end, the issues of disarmament and warlordism proved too difficult for the international community.

Conclusions

The military-humanitarian relationship in Somalia was new territory to both communities. Presented with unprecedented challenges, military forces and relief personnel were thrown into an environment where their ability to bring about change required them not only to co-exist, but to work together. The military forces were tasked with providing enough security to enable the humanitarian agencies to carry out their relief efforts, which required the cooperation of the aid agencies. Similarly, the humanitarian agencies needed the military forces to ensure enough security so that they could carry out their assistance programmes. The military’s limited mandate was a source of controversy, as many in the international community feared that it was only a temporary solution and would not address the long term security issues of the country.

The anti-nation building climate during which the operation in Somalia emerged, exposed the internal struggle of the US military: to what extent should warfighters engage in humanitarian assistance operations? This question is still as hotly debated today as it was during the 1992-1993 operation in Somalia. However, US engagement in Somalia revealed many lessons about the military-NGO relationship. First, the limited mandate given to the military forces in Somalia served to complicate the military-NGO relationship. The mandate was intended to be limited due to the US administration’s plan, that US forces would be on the ground for a short period of time (few months) and
then pass along responsibilities to a UN force. The UN effectively resisted a handover from US forces and took over only reluctantly and ill-prepared in May 1993. In addition, the limited mandate was a source of controversy and confusion both within and among UNITAF, the UN, NGOs, and the international community at large. The UN wanted the US forces to commit to a longer mission; one in which disarmament and country-wide security would be top priorities. Many of the NGOs also wanted UNITAF to not only provide enough security to allow them to work under military protection, but enough security to enable the relief workers to continue their operations independent of military protection.

The US, however, believed that the larger roles of long term security should be dealt with by a traditional UN peacekeeping force. Within the US military the limited mandate was left open for interpretation. Some soldiers believed their role was to provide security, which would enable the humanitarians to operate. Others believed that their mandate called for military forces to assist the humanitarians in their operations.

The humanitarian workers often found this situation confusing, because they did not know what to expect from the military forces. What role the military should take in humanitarian operations needs to be made clear- both to the military forces and the humanitarian community. Both actors in Somalia held negative perceptions, but through improved education, training, and liaison, these misperceptions could have been lessened. Somalia also revealed that consultation among the military, NGOs, and UN agencies during the planning and execution phases of the operation is invaluable. In the future,
more should be done to include expert civilian planners in the military operation arrangements. It was experts from the military and humanitarian community who were able to overcome many obstacles that would have served to derail many aspects of military-NGO cooperation. By employing civilian and military experts on Somalia and humanitarian operations, as well as tapping into the wealth of knowledge that had been gained from northern Iraq and Bangladesh, UNITAF was able to achieve a degree of success that otherwise would not have been possible.

Next, the operation in Somalia clearly demonstrated the critical importance of CMOCs and HOCs to the military-NGO relationship. While the Mogadishu CMOC/HOC experienced difficulties due to its location, HOCs in the other HRSs proved enormously successful in coordinating relations. In future operations, HOCs and CMOCs should be co-located with military headquarters when possible to achieve maximum coordination. The value of civil-military affairs should be underscored to soldiers and CMA should be elevated to a higher priority within military forces. When placed in the context of overall mission effort, CMA in humanitarian operations is critical to the mission’s success. Failure to appreciate this fact will undoubtedly result in the continued failure of military interventions in complex humanitarian emergencies. Finding ways to impart CMA wisdom on soldiers, while maintaining the warfighting capabilities, is a challenge to all militaries in the current international environment. However, we have seen that certain models can work. For instance, in Baidoa military involvement in security also entailed efforts which brought all sides into the decision-making process: locals, NGOs, and the military. Initiatives to address the root causes of violence and starvation will assist in
creating a secure environment upon which locals can build and the international community will be less likely to be called on again to respond to crises. Military involvement in these nation-building initiatives, within force capabilities, does not need to be viewed as mission creep. It is clarifying the roles which military forces are willing and capable of playing in international interventions that will assist in creating realistic expectations amongst all actors. Somalia revealed that NGOs will have unrealistic expectations of the military forces at times. The Mogadishu humanitarian community’s refusal to consolidate facilities, yet simultaneous security demands of the military demonstrated that NGOs also need to clarify their principles and expectations as they pertain to security and cooperating with the military.

While the organisational structures used to coordinate the two communities are vital, the importance of having expert, well-trained, flexible, communicative staff working within both the military and civilian communities during an operation should not be underestimated. The use of excellent and highly efficient organisational structures will assist in the creation of cooperative relations, but at the end of the day, it will be the personalities on the ground which have the ability to make the military-NGO relationship a cooperative one.

Finally, some problems that create friction in the military-NGO relationship are outside the scope of either community to affect. Both the limited mandate and the issue of disarmament were issues that the actors in the military and humanitarian communities were unable to change. However, both actors should understand that in complex
emergencies, no events occur in isolation. The military, humanitarian, diplomatic, economic, and political arenas all overlap and impact one another. The NGOs hiring local guards had enormous and long term implications for disarmament and the overall security situation in Somalia. On the other hand, the lack of international political will to intervene earlier in Somalia, served to create an environment where NGOs had little choice of hiring local guards, as the alternative would be absolutely no assistance to the country. Considering the inherent issues associated with such actions will no doubt create more controversy; as there are no black and white solutions in the area of failed states and complex emergencies. Somalia demonstrated that there is no one-size-fits-all solution to the military-NGO relationship or to the international response to complex emergencies. There will continue to be issues, such as disarmament in Somalia, which will remain unresolved during an operation. These problems are inevitable and should not be a deterrent in finding improved ways to respond to complex emergencies and implanting lessons learned in the military-NGO relationship.
Chapter 4 (Part I): Bosnia Case Study
The NZDF-NGO Relationship during United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR)

Few of the major conflict prevention operations are more illustrative of the demands for effective civilian and military implementation than Bosnia and Herzegovina.1

Characterized by mass casualties, ethnic cleansing, and genocide, the Bosnian War raged on for over three years, from March 1992 to November 1995. The war resulted in over 100,000 deaths, many more wounded, and the mass displacement of over half of Bosnia’s 4.2 million population. The international community responded to this crisis with largely ineffective measures, authorizing a UN peacekeeping operation in 1992, in lieu of a peace enforcement operation, at a time when there was no peace to keep. In March 1994, after much domestic debate, the New Zealand Government committed 250 combat troops to the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia.2 This deployment was significant for New Zealand in several ways. First, this was New Zealand’s largest ever contribution to a UN operation. Second, it marked New Zealand’s first deployment of combat troops since the Vietnam War. Finally, it marks the beginning of NZDF-NGO relations in the post-Cold War era.3

This chapter begins with a brief history and background of Bosnia. Next, the UN’s intervention and New Zealand’s involvement in Bosnia are outlined. Then, a critical

analysis of the NZDF-NGO relationship in Bosnia is provided. Finally, the lessons learned from the NZDF-NGO relationship in Bosnia are outlined.

**Figure 4: Map of Western Balkans**

![Map of Western Balkans](http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/bosnia/slovenia_croatia_bosnia.jpg)

**History and Background of Bosnia**

Bosnia’s past is rife with controversy and complexity; many aspects of its history remain unknown, disputed and misinterpreted. Located in Eastern Europe, partially bordering the Adriatic Sea, Bosnia is made up of three distinct ethnic groups: Muslims or Bosniaks

---

(48%), Serb (38%), and Croat (14%).\textsuperscript{5} Ethnic superiority and nationalist ideology, which are at the very root of the Bosnian conflict, have plagued the Balkans for centuries.

**Figure 5: Map of Bosnia and Herzegovina\textsuperscript{6}**

Bosnia has a long and unsettled past. It was once part of the Roman Empire and settled by Slavs in the 6\textsuperscript{th} Century.\textsuperscript{7} In the 9\textsuperscript{th} Century Serbia and Croatia shared control of Bosnia, but only until the 11\textsuperscript{th} and 12\textsuperscript{th} Centuries when Hungary gained control.\textsuperscript{8} In 1463 the Ottoman Turks conquered Bosnia and continued to rule until 1878 when Bosnia was given to Austro-Hungary as a colony. Nationalism and anarchy are not new to Bosnia, it

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{5} Current 2008 ethnic group representations from the CIA World Factbook retrieved 6 November 2008, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bk.html
  \item \textsuperscript{8} Eric Micheletti and Yves Debay, *War in the Balkans: 600 Days of Conflict in War-torn Yugoslavia*, Histoire et Collections, Dorset, UK, 1994, p.4.
\end{itemize}
was a Bosnian Serb, Gavrilo Princip, who assassinated Archduke Ferdinand in Sarajevo and triggered World War I.  

Bosnia became part of the South Slav State of Yugoslavia in 1918, however, in World War II it was given to Croatia.  

In 1950 Bosnia was part of the established Communist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia under Marshal Josip Broz Tito, who kept a firm hand over the diverse population for the next 40 years.  

In the early 1990s, with the power vacuum left by the death of Tito, coupled with the rise in ethnic tensions and nationalistic ambitions, the Republic of Yugoslavia began to disintegrate.  

The long-suffering people of Bosnia sensed opportunity and, in incident after incident, targeted both their oppressors and one another as their ethnic and nationalist aspirations were aroused. The resultant violence, unleashed by the Bosnian Muslim, Serb, and Croatian ethnic groups in an attempt to establish their independent cultural, social, and political identities, lasted for three years (1992-1995). Centuries, not decades, of economic exploitation, cultural suppression, and externally-imposed boundaries left this area raw and angry with little economic or political power.  

**UN Intervention in Bosnia and New Zealand’s Contribution**  

While the Security Council decided whether or not to intervene in Bosnia, the problem escalated, creating a larger conflict to settle rather than heading off signs of the

---

10 Micheleiti and Debay, p.4.  
13 Mazower, p.143.
beginnings of genocidal conflicts. The domino effect in the Balkans began with Slovenia, the first to declare its independence from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In June 1991 Slovenia effectively quelled the efforts of the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) to retake it.\textsuperscript{14} Croatia followed by declaring its independence that same month and a civil war between the Croatian government and the JNA supported Croatian Serbs ensued. Over the next seven months the JNA and Croatian Serb forces managed to take roughly a third of Croatia.\textsuperscript{15}

Next, in mid-1991 the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina began to disintegrate when the JNA backed Serb population declared its autonomy. After the Serb parties had withdrawn, the Bosnian government passed a resolution declaring the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina a sovereign state. The Serb population then declared their own republic and fighting between the Serb forces and the Bosnian government forces began unabated.\textsuperscript{16} After a cease-fire was established in Croatia, the UN authorized the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), a peacekeeping force, to supervise the withdrawal of JNA forces from Croatia.\textsuperscript{17} New Zealand contributed four military observers to the 150-strong UN deployment of military observers in March of 1992. In August two more New Zealand military observers were deployed to the region.\textsuperscript{18}

The UN decided to respond to the war in Bosnia with an arms embargo, humanitarian aid

\textsuperscript{14} Micheletti and Debay, pp. 6-7.
\textsuperscript{16} Mazower, p.14.
\textsuperscript{17} Micheletti and Debay, pp. 6-7.
and the deployment of a peacekeeping force. However, these efforts lacked the strong enforcement that the situation required. The arms embargo not only maintained the Serbian stronghold on the military power of the region, but also served to strip Bosnia-Herzegovina of the right to self-defence, guaranteed by its UN membership. While an arms embargo is a plausible anti-force strategy by the UN, some viable protection should have been afforded the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In June of 1992 UNPROFOR troops were sent to Bosnia to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian relief.

In the midst of the chaotic and hazardous environment, in which there was no peace to keep, the UN peacekeepers worked to restore utilities to the civilian population and assist in the delivery of humanitarian aid. It was the first 60 days of the war, before UNPROFOR had any significant presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina, that Serbia had gained the majority of its territory. In this short time period one million people were displaced from their homes and several tens of thousands of people (most of them Bosnian Muslims) were killed. Humanitarian aid would never resolve the conflicts that plagued the country. The country was in desperate need of a military and political response from the international community. The imminent danger of Serbian aggression was a matter that required much more immediacy than any humanitarian aid could

---

19 Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly resolution 53/35: The Fall of Srebrenica, UN Document, A/54/549, 15 November 1999, paragraph 490.
provide.\textsuperscript{24} Not one of the conditions for peacekeeping operations had been met in the region when UNPROFOR arrived. There was no peace agreement, no ceasefire, no identified will for peace or consent by the belligerents.\textsuperscript{25} Yet, the Security Council deployed peacekeeping forces, perhaps to appear proactive.

In mid-1993, when intense fighting broke out between Bosnian Croat forces and Bosnian Government forces (BiH) in central Bosnia, the UN Security Council had finally authorized the use of force in UNPROFOR’s efforts to protect the civilian population. However, it wasn’t until February 1994 that a cease-fire between the BiH and Bosnian Croat forces was agreed upon.\textsuperscript{26} In March the presidents of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina signed an accord establishing separate federations of the Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Government.\textsuperscript{27} UNPROFOR’s mission now was to monitor compliance with the new agreement, establish buffer zones between the former warring factions, assist with the restoration of the civil infrastructure in central Bosnia, and facilitate the freedom of movement of civilians in the area.\textsuperscript{28}

When the UN sent New Zealand an informal request on 8 March 1994 for a contingent of combat troops to support the new mission in Bosnia, there were strong reactions within the government and the public arenas.\textsuperscript{29} While governments are often reluctant to offer their military soldiers to fight in any sort of confrontation in which their government and

\textsuperscript{24}Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?”, \textit{Foreign Affairs}, vol. 72, no. 3, Summer 1993, p. 33.
\textsuperscript{25}Thornberry, p. 46.
\textsuperscript{28}US Government Accounting Office (GAO), \textit{Peace Operations: Update on the Situation in the Former Yugoslavia}, Briefing Report, 05/08/95, GAO/NSIAD-95-148BR.
\textsuperscript{29}Crawford, p.62.
people do not feel threatened, New Zealand decided to expand its contribution to Bosnia and committed an infantry-company group of 250 NZDF personnel.\(^{30}\)

**New Zealand Camp in Vitez Pocket\(^{31}\)**

**The New Zealand Defence Force’s Role and Relations with NGOs**

By mid-1994 more than 38,000 military and civilian personnel were working for UNPROFOR. The New Zealand government, agreed to send a 250-strong reinforced infantry company, known as “Kiwi Company” (7% of its Army at that time), in May 1994.\(^{32}\) All Kiwi Companies deployed to Bosnia (I through III) were attached to a British Battalion.\(^{33}\) The companies were headquartered in Santici Camp near the town of Vitez, located in central Bosnia, 60 kilometres north-west of Sarajevo.\(^{34}\)

The three main factors which served to define the NZDF-NGO relationship in Bosnia


\(^{32}\) Crawford, p.62.

\(^{33}\) Crawford, p.62.

were: The misappropriated mandate for peacekeeping in Bosnia when there was no peace to keep; the lack of NZDF experience in civil-military affairs and the international peacekeeping arena; and the number of NGOs in NZDF’s area of operations. The following sections: Mandate; Inexperience Working with NGOs; and Number of NGOs examine these factors in greater detail.

**Mandate: No Peace to Keep**

“If you understand anarchy then you start to get an idea of what Bosnia was like.”

Media coverage of the conflict and humanitarian crisis drew great international attention to Bosnia. Many parallels were drawn to the humanitarian crises, genocidal warfare and instability of World War II. However, instead of responding to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia with a firm military mandate to enforce peace, the international community planned a humanitarian relief operation. While the relief did save many lives, the violence and ethnic cleansing continued. The UN mandate failed to address the root causes of the violence and lacked the political will to confront those causes. The peacekeeping mandate given to UNPROFOR at a time when there was no peace to keep, created a situation of great confusion, insecurity, and strain for the NZDF-NGO relationship in Bosnia. The very nature of UNPROFOR’s mandate, to support the distribution of relief supplies, required the forces to establish a degree of cooperation

---

with humanitarian personnel. However, this relationship was further complicated by the fact that UNPROFOR was viewed by many as a belligerent force, with whom the NGOs were reluctant to be aligned. This section examines the impact that UNPROFOR’s mandate had on the NZDF-NGO relationship in Bosnia.

Despite the knowledge gained from the wars in Slovenia and Croatia, members of the international community were at odds on how to address the deteriorating situation in Bosnia. After the violence escalated, the UN Security Council decided to expand its current UNPROFOR mission in Croatia to include Bosnia. Before its conclusion, UNPROFOR had reach 38,000 troops from 37 countries, but the limited mandate rendered it largely ineffective.

The military’s role was to support and sustain the humanitarian operation, which was led by UNHCR. According to Alex Cunliffe and Michael Pugh, “The humanitarian relief effort was also seen as an alibi and excuse for the international community, allowing it to be seen as doing something without actually having to confront those carrying out ethnic cleansing.” Both NGO and military personnel were frustrated by their inability to provide the security and relief that the situation in Bosnia required. As one aid worker with German Agro Action stated, “We could not do our job—many areas that were in desperate need [of relief] were left abandoned because we could not reach them—it was

not safe.” Many of the military personnel deployed to UNPROFOR expressed their frustration as well. Colonel Antony “Lofty” Hayward, commander of Kiwi Company III, sums up the view many military personnel shared in Bosnia:

We go to these places presumably to do some good, otherwise why do we go there? And so to do some good you want to optimize your effort, I would have thought, otherwise you’re just going through the motions. And I kind of thought Bosnia was going through the motions because there was a no-win mandate; it was just such a mess.

Due to the violence which continued to plague Bosnia, the UN mandated six safe areas to be created for the protection of Bosnian Muslims and secured by UNPROFOR. However, without robust rules of engagement (ROE) that would allow the troops to enforce security, the UN forces were oftentimes unable to keep the areas secure from Serbian attacks. In addition, Muslim forces used the safe areas to launch their own attacks on the Serbs and Croats. Many ceasefires were signed and in all the UN authorized 46 resolutions on the conflict in Bosnia, yet almost all of these initiatives were violated by the various faction groups. One of the most blatant violations of the UN resolutions and safe area agreements was the attack on Srebrenica in 1995 by Serb forces when at least 7,000 men and boys were murdered while the UNPROFOR troops were forced to stand by and watch.

---

41 Wulf, questionnaire.
42 Hayward, interview.
43 Mazower, p.17.
44 Thornberry, p.46.
Major General F.R. Dannatt (UK) summed up the attack on Srebrenica and the ineffective UNPROFOR mandate by stating:

I would contend that the tragic massacre of thousands of Muslim men at Srebrenica in 1995 was the woeful conclusion of a process that started in the Security Council in New York, via the fateful stepping stones of a ‘safe areas’ policy without the teeth or perhaps the will to enforce it. Even the fact that thousands, probably tens of thousands of other civilians in Bosnia did not die of hunger and deprivation in the winters of 1992-94 probably owes more to the initiative and bravery of UNPROFOR soldiers than the Security Council Resolutions that sent them there.\(^{46}\)

International frustration over the ineffective measures used by the UN to address the problems in Bosnia continued to mount, as all sides in the conflict engaged in a war that UNPROFOR troops could only stand by and observe. As Mark Duffield noted in 1994, “Despite extraordinary exposure and recording of illegal acts, rather than redressing the situation, the UN appears to be in retreat. This is a political failure of historical consequence.”\(^{47}\)

However, despite public outcries to end the conflict, the UN persisted with its resolutions and humanitarian agenda, as the member countries lacked the will to fully acknowledge and address the war in Bosnia.\(^ {48}\) Peacekeeping and military enforcement are two independent operations that should not be confused with one another. Peacekeeping can only be successful when there is peace to keep. Deploying troops without a ceasefire or in the absence of peaceful intentions, endangers the lives of UN peacekeepers and aid


workers, as well as undermining the faith in, and authority of, the UN.\textsuperscript{49} While non-violent assistance has been utilized by the UN in the past, this was not the solution to the crisis in Bosnia. Hayward offered this description of the situation the Kiwi Companies encountered in Bosnia:

We were just trying to ensure a free-flow of aid. If you understand anarchy than you start to get an idea of what the place was like (Bosnia)—it was just a shithole. People had been conditioned by violence and they were quite happy to kill each other. There were horrible things going on conventional war fighting going on; artillery pieces and soldiers running across fields. A lot of talk and probably more talk than there was action.\textsuperscript{50}

As a result of the ineffective mandate, both peacekeeping forces and humanitarian personnel in Bosnia were often unable to carry out their individual tasks. While the security situation in Vitez Pocket had improved by the time the Kiwis arrived, it was far from stable.\textsuperscript{51} The Kiwi Company’s tasks included monitoring compliance with agreements, manning checkpoints, and improving the freedom of movement and quality of life in the area. In an effort to improve relations between the Croat and Muslim populations in Vitez pocket, the Kiwi Companies spent a great deal of time liaising with local civilian and military authorities. It also devoted much time to humanitarian roles including running medical clinics for locals, assisting in the rebuilding of schools in the area, and implementing a mine awareness programme for children that was exported throughout Bosnia during UNPROFOR missions.\textsuperscript{52}

\textsuperscript{50} Hayward, interview.
\textsuperscript{51} Hayward, interview.
\textsuperscript{52} Crawford, pp.63-64.
UNPROFOR was tasked with providing security for the delivery of humanitarian relief supplies. UNHCR worked to negotiate access for its relief convoys and then liaised with UNPROFOR to work out the precise timings of the security for the convoys. Because UNPROFOR was unable to use direct force (except in cases of self defence), the relief convoys were extremely limited as to their safety and the routes which they could travel. UNHCR personnel reported that, as a consequence of the insecure environment, they were only able to deliver roughly 20% of the required relief.\(^{53}\)

Constrained by the complete lack of security in the operating environment, and limited means to address areas of insecurity, the UNPROFOR forces in Bosnia tended to take on unconventional roles, such as information operations, needs assessments, and infrastructure repair.\(^{54}\) In addition, the media’s presence underscored the need to present UNPROFOR’s role in the best light. This led to increased civil affairs activities, which the UN hoped would be viewed by the international community as a legitimate role for the peacekeeping troops. Individual commanders also tended to give a higher priority to civil affairs tasks than in the past, recognizing that the civil affairs activities would improve the relations between the forces and the local civilians, including the warring factions.\(^{55}\)

As Colonel David Gawn, Commander of Kiwi Company I, noted:

> We were thrown into that environment. I remember arriving in Santici, our operational base, and looking at my officers and thinking, ‘what the hell are we doing here, and, more importantly, what the hell is it that we have to do?’ I was

\(^{53}\) Duffield, p.17.
\(^{54}\) Badsey and Latawski (eds.), p.186.
\(^{55}\) See: Thornberry, p.187 and Badsey and Latawski (eds.), p.186.
very fortunate because General John McColl, who was the Deputy Commander in Iraq until recently, and Sir Michael Rose arrived on our doorstep and they provided me with my mission. And a good military mission it was: They said - ‘We want you to go out there and further the peace.’ That was it no how, no why, nothing else just ‘Go out and further the peace’.56

By the time Kiwi Company III arrived in September 1995, UNPROFOR was still operating under the same mandate, to facilitate the delivery of aid to locals, but because the security situation was so tense, Kiwi Company III itself was involved in very little of the actual delivery of aid. As Hayward recalls:

We weren’t in the stage of the game of doing too much civil-aid stuff ourselves; I didn’t have time to do civil-aid stuff. We were bringing in stuff from New Zealand and there was quite a bit of stuff coming in and we were distributing that. But we weren’t rebuilding schools, whereas NGOs were and we needed to know where they were because some of these guys didn’t understand that by doing a Croat school, what affect that was having on the Muslims. And then all of a sudden you have a roadblock go up and then everyone starts rubbing their hands and getting unhappy. You have to provide equal help.57

Providing equal help was almost impossible in Bosnia, where it was inevitable that all three warring factions would perceive the UN and humanitarian assistance as biased to one side or another. As Stuart Gordon noted, “The UNPROFOR forces were confronted with a range of UN and humanitarian NGOs in the context of a mandate that, while humanitarian in principle, was increasingly incoherent and contained enforcement elements that placed a supposedly impartial UN force in the position of a belligerent.”58

57 Hayward, interview.
The UN force was increasingly viewed as a belligerent force by all three factions, which seriously jeopardized their safety and the safety of all of the humanitarian organisations operating in the conflict. Small issues could snowball quickly in such a highly volatile situation and because UNPROFOR’s mandate largely relied on the consent of all parties, any of the three factions could violate the terms without great fear of retribution. As one NGO employee noted, “If they [the members of the factions] wanted to stop aid from being delivered or stop our convoys from crossing [into their territory], they could—and we were helpless to stop them.”

Hayward describes one such experience the Kiwi Company had in Bosnia:

We had a situation where the Muslims were blocking all the roads and not allowing any of the aid convoys to go through, which theoretically were providing support to them, but they were stopping all the convoys because the French had had a couple of their OPs overrun in Sarajevo and a couple of the French vehicles had been taken by the Serbs who were then using them—the Muslims were saying that the French were supporting the Serbs and everything just stopped.

The security situation had a profound influence on the NZDF-NGO relationship. The NGOs tended to cooperate more with the military compelled, not by a desire to improve relations, but by the innate desire for survival. There was a commonly held view in Bosnia that the UN civilian, UNPROFOR forces, and humanitarian agencies were closely aligned. This, according to Mark Duffield, did not, “help the work of the humanitarian

61 Hayward, interview.
organisations. Even small NGOs [found] it difficult to cross checkpoints.”

Humanitarian agencies in Bosnia faced a very difficult choice, to suspend their operations due to insecurity, to accept the security assistance of UNPROFOR, or to operate independently (at a very high risk) in carrying out their operations. Most chose to accept some degree of assistance from UNPROFOR, even if this was just the security briefings. Many, however, openly demonstrated their reluctance to cooperate with the military and preferred not to be seen operating or travelling along side UNPROFOR forces whenever possible.63

However, many military personnel noted that, while they understand the aid workers’ need to be perceived separately from the military forces, they were frustrated over what they perceived to be a double standard. According to one NZDF soldier, “They don’t acknowledge the assistance you give them and don’t want to be seen with the military, but as soon as they get in trouble, they expect you to drop everything and assist them.”64

The most important lesson that should be understood regarding the UNPROFOR-NGO relationship in Bosnia is the fact that peacekeeping and military enforcement are two distinct operations. When determining whether a situation requires peacekeeping forces or military forces the UN must be clear in their mandate, communicative with the ground

62 Duffield, p.17.
forces, and consistent in their policies and enforcement of those policies. Without rules of engagement that are equal to the task at hand, the military will be unable to provide the security that is required to enable civilians to deliver assistance. Finally, placing military forces in a situation where they are likely to be viewed as belligerents, regardless of intentions, will also place considerable strain on the military-NGO relationship by endangering the humanitarian organisations working in their area of operations.

**Inexperience Working With NGOs**

“In Bosnia we had no civil-military affairs doctrine at all, so Bosnia was groundbreaking for us. It was the first time we went off into the international peacekeeping scene...we were a long way from home. We had no real national interests from what we could see...it was a very foreign environment in terms of the hatred.”

While the New Zealand forces had operated alongside various civilian groups in peace support missions after the end of the Cold War, including Bougainville, Angola, and Cambodia, when the NZDF deployed to Bosnia in September 1994 they had not been involved in a humanitarian mission of this size and scale in modern times. Their civil-military experience was very limited when they arrived in the field, but they demonstrated great flexibility and creativity in their approach to CMA. Their attitudes toward cooperating with NGOs were generally positive and they used their own initiative to develop programmes that would help foster stability in their area of operations. This section provides an overview of the impact that the NZDF’s inexperience with NGOs had on the military-NGO relationship in Bosnia.

The New Zealand Defence Force did not have any civil-military affairs doctrine during

---

65 Hayward, interview.
their deployment to Bosnia. In the early and mid-1990s, terms such as Civil-Military Affairs and Civil-Military Cooperation were not parts of the common NZDF military vernacular, or of many other western nations. During the deployment to Bosnia the commanders generally relied on British and Danish Civil-Military Affairs doctrine. Kiwi Company commanders also tailored their approach to CMA based on the conditions on the ground. Bosnia was groundbreaking for the NZDF’s CMA approach. In 1997, Colonel Gawn noted, “[In Bosnia] we didn’t have much real idea of what was required. Our doctrine and our thinking and pretty much everything else about us as an Army are far more mature now.”

The NZDF’s involvement in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) in 1979-1980 was the last time the Kiwis had been exposed to an operational environment similar to the one in the former Yugoslavia. With vague directives to help further the peace and lack of experience to draw on, the NZDF commanders in Bosnia were forced to devise their own form of civil-military affairs. Even during pre-deployment training, the military began to train for peace support operations in new ways. Lectures were given on the situation in Bosnia, as well as giving the forces an introduction to the country’s history and language. The commanders required the troops to use their creativity in responding to the hostile environment they would soon encounter. Gary Brandon, a NZDF soldier, who served as a driver and bodyguard for Kiwi Company III’s liaison officer, described his training in


67 Gawn, interview.


New Zealand prior to his deployment to Bosnia, “During pre-deployment training an exercise with the “enemy party” was simulated. There was no shooting. Not even blanks. We had to go out and sort it out with a lot of talking. That’s how you do peacekeeping.”

In training and during their deployment, the NZ commanders emphasized the need to use communication skills rather than firepower to bring about a peaceful environment. However, even with their pre-deployment training, the NZDF forces were surprised by the dangerous situation they encountered on the ground in Bosnia. Colonel Graeme Williams, NZDF’s Senior National Officer during UNPROFOR, noted, “Bosnia was a bit of an unknown when we arrived.” The troops found themselves in an environment of violence that they had difficulty coming to terms with. As the Dominion Post’s defence writer, Cathie Bell, reported in 1995:

> It’s [the] devastation and destruction, by people against people who used to be their neighbours, that most New Zealand soldiers find it difficult to understand. Unlike the British peacekeepers in Bosnia-Herzegovina- all of whom have served in Northern Ireland- the New Zealand soldiers have not seen anything like this before.

The NZDF commanders structured their CMA approach after the British, assigning liaison officers and holding coordination meetings to improve the civil-military relationships in their AO. Every Monday in Vitez Pocket there was a security meeting for the military and NGOs working in the area, which was run by Kiwi Company for

---

security purposes. After the Monday security briefings, Kiwi Company I co-chaired, along with UNHCR, a senior NGO coordinating conference where NGOs and IOs in the area could discuss projects that were underway and those that were being proposed. Gawn says, “That was to coordinate some of the effort, so it wasn’t so counter-productive… [and so aid wouldn’t] go into a single village that was being rebuilt from start to finish when the village over here was getting nothing.”

According to NZDF personnel, the UNHCR attempts to coordinate aid activities during the Monday NGO coordination conferences were usually unproductive. Colonel Hayward described the meetings as lasting roughly three hours and:

The military would be down the back sitting quietly waiting to see what we could do to help, but the types of people that are attracted to a lot of these NGOs are wonderfully intentioned people; instead of talking strategic issues or what their game plan was they would want to talk about their truck breaking down yesterday or we need to move this to there. And they all looked at each other and expected someone else to help.

Military personnel frequently cite frustration with what they see as the NGOs’ lack of focus and inability to coordinate their activities. At various times, NZDF personnel attempted to offer unsolicited advice at the meetings and they were often met with negative responses. Colonel Hayward recalls the NGOs would respond to any advice offered with, “very condescending attitudes, ‘what do you know you’re just a military person?’ , ‘Besides you don’t care anyway.’ We always try to extend help to them, but quite a few don’t want it.”

---

73 Gawn, interview.
74 Hayward, interview.
75 Hayward, interview.
While the NZDF based their CMA structure on the British system, the Kiwis’ approach to CMA was uniquely a New Zealand one. Three overarching themes serve to define the NZDF’s CMA development in Bosnia: Cultural Awareness, Cooperation, and Child-Focused. To carry out their mission successfully, the NZDF commanders directed the troops to focus their efforts on understanding the issues underlying the war, identifying the most influential players in the region, and uncovering the motives each group had in either continuing or ending the violence.\(^76\) The importance placed upon the cultural awareness of the troops was integral to the NZDF’s ability to carry out CMA activities in their AO. Although the cultural training and education was by no means advanced, it provided the troops with a greater appreciation of the complex issues they were encountering on a daily basis in Bosnia.\(^77\)

The New Zealand forces were not only responsible for coordinating with the NGOs in their AO, but also with the Canadian and Dutch units in their British-led Battalion, warring factions, and locals.\(^78\) Adding to the complexity of their operating environment, a New Zealand armoured personnel carrier accidentally struck and killed two children shortly after the arrival of Kiwi Company II. Also, during this time, the Kiwi contingent’s AO was greatly expanded. What was once the responsibility of over a thousand troops was now the responsibility of the 250 New Zealanders.\(^79\)


\(^78\) Gawn, interview.

\(^79\) Hayward, interview.
The British forces had handed over this area to the NZDF and security was tenuous at best. Deviating from the more aggressive British approach to security, which had included fire fights with the warring factions (particularly the Serbs), the Kiwis utilized soft power in placating the factions. As Hayward noted, “Trading on the Kiwi mentality, we didn’t have to fire too many shots. No one ever shot at us, so if they didn’t shoot at us we didn’t shoot back—we had different ways of getting around things and the Kiwis were prepared to talk if we needed to.”  

It was this approach to CMA activities that set the NZDF apart from the other troop contributing nations in Bosnia. While many countries deliberately target the hearts and minds of children to win the support of the local population, the Kiwi Companies often took risks that other nations were not prepared to take. For instance, the NZDF developed Maori Cultural Groups (MCGs) to go to schools in areas that most units would not send their forces. This was a strategic CMA effort to lessen the tension in Vitez Pocket. As Gawn explains:

What kids do is provide you with a direct conduit to the parents, because that’s what they talk about at home. If they go home and say, hey those Kiwis are pretty good guys, those sorts of things and it works. It worked in Bosnia something phenomenal actually.  

Kiwi Company I also developed a mine awareness programme targeted toward educating children on the dangers of land mines. This was intended to save lives, but also served to improve Croat-Muslim relations in the Vitez Pocket. An average of nine people (both

---

80 Hayward, interview.
81 Gawn, interview.
children and adults) were being killed by mines per week in Vitez Pocket. The NZDF organized Croat and Muslim soldiers to present these programmes at both Croat and Muslim schools and, because it was a problem that affected both groups, the NZDF was able to assist in bridging the gap between the two groups.

The initiatives that NZDF employed to contribute to a peaceful environment, as well as their soft power approach, garnered a great deal of respect from the humanitarian and local communities. NGOs in Bosnia were more amenable to working alongside NZDF. Aid personnel viewed the NZDF as less aggressive and political than their British counterparts. However, this must be tempered with the fact that the NGOs in Vitez Pocket still regarded the NZDF as military forces, with whom they were reluctant to be perceived as operating alongside.

Despite their lack of CMA experience, the NZDF was relatively successful in developing positive working relations with NGOs in Bosnia. Compared to the other nations’ military-NGO relations during UNPROFOR, the NZDF’s experience in Vitez Pocket was relatively good. The operational environment into which the NZDF deployed was extremely hostile, rendering their mandate to promote peace a daunting task. Without any CMA doctrine of their own to rely on, the NZDF based their CMA structure on the British system, but developed and executed their own CMA initiatives with a distinctively Kiwi approach. Fusing flexibility and communication, the NZDF

---

83 Anonymous, NGO worker in Bosnia, questionnaire, 4 June 2007.
84 Anonymous, NGO worker in Bosnia, questionnaire, 4 June 2007.
implemented mine and cultural awareness programmes that were favourably received by the locals. In addition, they were able to set themselves apart from their military counterparts and earn the respect of many of the NGO personnel in their AO. Bosnia presented the NZDF with many challenges, not the least of which was the requirement to work alongside a plethora of NGOs in an enormously complex environment.

**Number of NGOs**

“The need for [civil-military] coordination becomes particularly apparent as the number of humanitarian agencies and NGOs increases and the overall complexity of the operation grows.”

When the New Zealand Defence Force deployed as part of UNPROFOR they had not had previous experience with international NGOs on the size and scale that they experienced in Bosnia. The intervention occurred at a time when the number of NGOs involved in humanitarian relief and development worldwide nearly doubled. The large number of NGOs working in the NZDF’s AO, Vitez Pocket, served to complicate the NZDF-NGO relationship in several ways. The aid agencies varied greatly in their size, quality, purpose, and impartiality. Bosnia marked New Zealand’s introduction to “briefcase NGOs”, which is the term used to describe the various NGOs which are created with very particular missions (e.g. to deliver eyeglasses to Bosnia Muslims) and often enter and exit a country quite quickly. During the operation in Bosnia, the UN attempted to facilitate the coordination of these varied and numerous aid agencies through the appointment of UNHCR as the “lead agency”. This section examines the impact the large number of aid

---

85 Joulwan and Shoemaker, p.16.
86 Abiew and Keating, p.23.
agencies operating within Bosnia during UNPROFOR’s mission had on the NZDF-NGO relationship in Vitez Pocket.

The operation in Bosnia occurred at a time when many governments worldwide were opting to channel more of their aid through civilian agencies. This shift witnessed the number of registered NGOs in the 30 member countries of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) almost double from 1,600 in 1980 to 2,970 in 1993. The number of NGOs in Bosnia during UNPROFOR (1992-1995), varies from several hundred to several thousands of organisations. A survey conducted by the International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) found that there were a total of 6,528 civic associations and 70 foundations in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This number, however, only includes registered NGOs, which includes everything from trade unions to development agencies, and does not account for the fact that many of these organisations would not have been present throughout the entire duration of UNPROFOR’s operation in Bosnia, as the agencies are not required to notify anyone of their cessation of activities in the country.

There were approximately 140 aid agencies operating in the NZDF’s AO. All NZDF personnel interviewed cited the large number of NGOs as a dilemma in attempting to coordinate activities and achieve security in their AO. Without a doubt, the wide range of capabilities of local and international NGOs, government agencies, and international

---

89 Hayward, interview.
organisations presented a great challenge to the military when it came to coordination of activities. In particular, NZDF personnel found that the numerous, smaller NGOs were more difficult to work alongside. Indeed, many small NGOs may have a superior knowledge of the local environment, yet some lack the organisational capacity to administer funds and designate personnel.

The NZDF encountered many small “briefcase” NGOs, which would fly into the country to deliver their very specific aid projects and then leave. Colonel Gawn describes one NGO which he felt typified the smaller, poorly organized, self-interested NGOs:

[It was] a Danish women’s group who were building a women’s refuge centre and it was just in one little town and a lot of money was spent doing this, which in reality providing additional shelter or something like that, which would have been far more beneficial to the community at large. But, their charter was to build this refuge centre and that’s what they were going to do.

The impression these NGOs left on the NZDF personnel was not a favourable one. As Colonel Hayward describes, many of the NZDF personnel shared the view that, rather than an impartial, well-thought out distribution of aid, many aid agencies seemed to be saying to the locals “Here’s our aid, be damned, we’re giving it to you”. However, accusing civilian agencies of a short term focus is a sensitive topic for the military, whose forces typically deploy for six to nine month tours to complex emergencies. The short

---

90 Eisenhour and Marks, p.86.
91 Gawn, interview.
94 Gawn, interview.
95 Hayward, interview.
term duration of the military deployments has consistently caused friction with the NGOs, as many civilian personnel will be the first and last to enter the crisis area. As Michael Williams notes:

> Once familiarized with local conditions, [military] officers have little time left to establish solid working relationships with their civilian counterparts, or acclimatize themselves to local values, culture and politics… By contrast, it is unusual for civilians to serve for less than 12 months… It was not unusual for civilians with UNPROFOR to be in their post for three years.96

Despite the fact that many civilian agencies do have long term, highly qualified staffs, the impressions formed by NZDF personnel of the less competent agencies, tends to colour their perception of all NGOs.97 The NZDF personnel in Bosnia were often reluctant to engage in cooperative relationships with NGOs due to what the forces perceived as the organisations’ lack of structure and hierarchical systems. Militaries are clearly structured, whereas NGOs are typically decentralized or horizontal organisations.98 Not surprisingly, the NZDF personnel had more favourable views of NGOs which mimicked their own structure, hierarchy, and mission. For instance, Colonel Hayward noted that Feed the Children, a large NGO which has worked in 118 countries99, was easy to work with.100 Feed the Children had an ex-British officer leading the organisation in Vitez Pocket, providing common ground on which the NZDF could communicate and build a working relationship.

97Pollick, p. 59.
98Byman, p. 110.
100Hayward, interview.
While the military values coordination, many of the NGOs do not wish to coordinate with other civilian aid agencies, much less military forces.\textsuperscript{101} Due to the fact that the term NGO encompasses so many disparate groups, civilian coordination is not likely to be a given in any operation. While the military’s expectations are often that civilian agencies share the same goals and should work in unison, this is never the reality.\textsuperscript{102} In fact, due to competition for funding and influence, as well as differing principles and missions, many organisations lack the will, or even the ability, to coordinate their actions with other organisations—civilian or military.

In the mid-1990s, the sharp increase in the number of NGOs created more competition for the available funding.\textsuperscript{103} NGOs in Bosnia were not only competing among one another for funding, but were also competing with IOs (UN agencies), government agencies (NZAID), and the military (UNPROFOR).\textsuperscript{104} In addition to their funding requirements, the aid agencies also compete for influence in complex emergencies. To achieve visibility and gain influence in an area, as well as to secure their operating principles, many NGOs vehemently oppose being associated with other organisations.\textsuperscript{105} The strong independence streak that many NGOs share makes coordinating humanitarian organisations a daunting task.

\textsuperscript{101} Natsios, “NGOs and the UN System”, p.36.
\textsuperscript{102} Abiew, p.11.
\textsuperscript{103} Joulwan and Shoemaker, p.55.
In an effort to improve coordination of humanitarian activities in Bosnia, however, the UN appointed UNHCR as the “lead agency” to coordinate relief. In a number of conflicts since the 1980s the system of a "lead agency" has been used for coordinating civilian operations.\textsuperscript{106} However, the UNHCR experienced trouble coordinating civilian activities, as many of the organisations were reluctant to cede any authority or leadership to an "equal". In addition, any authority and leadership role bestowed upon UNHCR was ambiguous, as it was unclear to all what responsibilities and authorities were contained in the role of "lead agency".\textsuperscript{107}

Due to the unclear nature of its “lead agency” status, UNHCR struggled to coordinate civilian operations. In fact, throughout UNPROFOR little cooperation was achieved between UNHCR and UNPROFOR, and many NGOs chose to operate independently of these two bodies.\textsuperscript{108} Without a clear grasp of the various competitive and independence struggles at play here, many military personnel were left to assume that civil organisations were somehow incapable of coordinating their activities. As one NZDF soldier joked, in military vernacular NGO is the acronym for "non-guided organisations".\textsuperscript{109}

In addition to the internal coordination issues, the lack of clear guidance at a strategic or operational level outlining the roles of the various civilian and governmental organisations, the actors in Bosnia were left with poor impressions of the other’s capabilities.\textsuperscript{110} There is a lack of familiarity between the two actors. During UNPROFOR military knowledge of NGOs was extremely limited and the impressions (both positive and negative) made during the NZDF’s deployment continues to colour their perception of aid agencies to this day.\textsuperscript{111}

As was the case in Somalia, the NGOs were confronted with a difficult decision: accept military protection to continue operating in Bosnia or withdraw altogether. Many aid agencies chose to continue operating in the country, but attempted to limit their interaction with UNPROFOR forces.\textsuperscript{112} The emphasis many aid agencies place on neutrality and independence is often misunderstood and unappreciated by military forces. Many NZDF personnel noted that they had a humanitarian mandate in UNPROFOR and expressed frustration that the aid agencies did not understand their position.\textsuperscript{113} Indeed, humanitarian agencies oftentimes wish to avoid systematic planning with military forces or information sharing, for fear of what the information will be used for and do not want to risk losing trust of the local population.\textsuperscript{114} Many aid agency personnel view information sharing with the military as one sided. On the one hand, military orders and capabilities are often classified and security information is shared with NGOs at the military’s discretion. On the other hand, military forces often want to gather information

\textsuperscript{110} Baumann, Gawrych, and Kretchik, p.10.
\textsuperscript{111} Gawn, interview.
\textsuperscript{112} Hillen, p.38.
\textsuperscript{113} Joulwan and Shoemaker, p.29.
\textsuperscript{114} Abiew and Keating, p. 5.
from NGO personnel and are frustrated when humanitarian agencies will not share their information.\textsuperscript{115}

Analysts and officials of humanitarian agencies have also argued that the “humanitarian space” in which they operate is becoming violated by the intrusion and blurring of lines with military personnel operating in complex emergencies. However, as John Mackinlay noted:

This [argument] seemed to ignore that an increasing proportion of relief funding was also politically tainted, coming directly from national treasuries, accompanied by the veiled accusation that governments were attempting to become more genuinely committed at a national level.\textsuperscript{116}

The impressions that the aid agencies left on the NZDF personnel working in Bosnia were not of neutral and impartial organisations. As one NZDF noted, “When they give help to the Muslims and not the Serbs, they get to decide who the bad guys are—supposedly that’s what they are accusing us of, taking sides—but giving food to one ethnic group over another seems like taking sides to me too.”\textsuperscript{117}

With the proliferation of complex emergencies during this time, many NGOs were forced to create a more practical approach to their delivery of aid. It was evident to many that, with Somalia, Bosnia, and other interventions, aid was no longer impartial. These supplies often helped sustain warring factions, perhaps even prolonging a conflict.\textsuperscript{118} In an insecure environment, aid organisations would no longer be guaranteed safety due to

\textsuperscript{115} Wulf, questionnaire.
\textsuperscript{116} MacKinlay, p.53.
\textsuperscript{117} Anonymous, NZDF soldier interview 25 January 2008.
\textsuperscript{118} MacKinlay, p.50.
their apolitical status. As Michael Pugh notes, “Experience from Bosnia has demonstrated that humanitarian organisations cannot do their jobs effectively in an insecure environment without the assistance of military or police forces.”

Similarly, many NZDF personnel in Bosnia acknowledged that they could not carry out their mandate without the NGOs. As Colonel Gawn noted “We can’t do it without them [NGOs]”. Bosnia exposed the need for coordination of all agencies involved during UNPROFOR. As Daniel Sewer, the US State Department envoy to Bosnia, noted “it was clearly impossible for me to what needed to be done without enlisting the cooperation and combined efforts of many others. Before Dayton, the other key players were the UNHCR, the civil affairs officers of UNPROFOR, and the World Bank.”

The large number of NGOs operating in Bosnia during the NZDF’s deployment to UNPROFOR, undoubtedly further complicated an already complex environment. Aid was difficult to coordinate amongst the military and humanitarian organisations, due to the insecure environment, as well as the lack of coordination amongst the various agencies. Due to a controversial and weak UN mandate, the NGOs in Bosnia were faced with a difficult choice: to accept military protection, to operate independently, or to cease working in the country altogether. The NZDF learned a great deal from their first exposure to working alongside a large number of civilian agencies and they were left with mixed perceptions regarding NGO capabilities. The NZDF’s civil-military relations

---

120 Gawn, interview.
experience in Bosnia has played a large part in shaping their approach to peace support operations.

**Conclusions**

The NZDF-NGO relationship in Vitez Pocket was borne out of the necessity. The NZDF needed the aid agencies to deliver aid in order to help restore a peaceful society and the aid agencies needed the supply routes to be secured by the military forces. Bosnia presented many lessons for the military-NGO relationship. First, and most importantly, the mandate given to UN peacekeeping troops *must* be robust enough to enable the forces to carry out their primary mission: security. When safe areas are designated or security provisions specified, it is critical that the UN is able to fulfil promises made. When the UN (or other military coalitions) uses the threat of force as a means to provide security, that threat must be backed up by a legitimately armed and equipped force. In addition, aid agency security and perception *must* be considered when a mandate is created. In many interventions since the end of the Cold War humanitarian organisations have been faced with an unenviable decision: to operate alongside a military which is viewed as a belligerent, to work without military protection in an insecure environment, or to suspend their operations altogether and refrain from delivering aid. These limited choices continue to erode the legitimacy of aid agencies around the globe. If a mandate is presupposing a ‘humanitarian’ purpose, then the security of those humanitarians should be made an immediate priority.
The NZDF-NGO relationship also revealed that when the military employs flexibility in their operations and a willingness to work with civilian agencies, the military-NGO relationship will likely improve. The NZDF used soft power and creativity to set itself apart from its British counterparts in Bosnia. This resulted in fewer casualties, as well as a higher level of respect and trust between the NZDF and NGOs in Vitez Pocket. The NZDF’s experience in Bosnia also demonstrated that much of the tension that arises in the military-NGO relationship stems from a lack of understanding regarding the two actors’ organisational structures and missions. Improved understanding should be actively promoted within and between the military and humanitarian communities.

Next, aid agencies should continue to seek new ways to coordinate their activities, both amongst themselves and with the military. However, the NZDF and other military forces must be cognizant of the varied missions, cultures, and competing interests at play within the aid community and gain a better appreciation of the problems inherent in NGO coordination. Military forces would be far more successful in cooperating with the aid community if they simply accepted that military-style organisation is unlikely to be adopted by all, or even many, NGOs. Understanding the structures that do exist rather than those which many military personnel wish did exist will prove more beneficial in improving military-NGO relations.

Finally, Bosnia clearly demonstrated that aid is not impartial. One group or another always benefit from the distribution of aid. Whether it sustains the violence or fuels it, the delivery of humanitarian aid to a complex emergency will indirectly or directly affect the conflict itself. Humanitarian organisations and militaries should work to limit the
negative impact that aid distribution may have on the locals, as well as the conflict itself. Through improved coordination between, and among, the military and humanitarian communities, many of the problems encountered in Bosnia can be avoided in future operations. Some of the issues encountered during UNPROFOR were avoided during NATO’s subsequent International Force (IFOR) deployment to Bosnia.
Chapter 4 (Part II): Bosnia Case Study
The United States Military-NGO Relationship during the NATO led Implementation Force (IFOR) Operation Joint Endeavour

“UN peacekeepers were present when there was no peace to keep, and NATO war fighters arrived when there was no war to fight.”¹

The relative success of missions to northern Iraq and UNITAF in Somalia led many in the international community to believe that the relationship between military forces and their civilian counterparts, as well as the overall approach to interventions, may be improving. However, the response to the crisis in Bosnia dashed any optimism that may have existed.² Unlike the operations in northern Iraq, Somalia, and Haiti, the US resisted sending troops to Bosnia until a peace had been established. After the tenuous and highly ambitious Dayton Peace Accords had been signed in December 1995, the US agreed to send 28,000 troops to the 60,000 force, 36-nation, NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) operation.³ The Dayton Accords called for rebuilding the country’s government, electoral and legal systems, which required unprecedented cooperation among IFOR military forces, civilian authorities, and aid agencies. Despite having worked alongside NGOs in Iraq, Somalia, and Haiti, the US military was relatively slow to implement civil affairs initiatives in Bosnia, due in great part to their reluctance to engage in nation-building tasks.

² Weiss, Military-Civilian Interactions, p.97.
³ Wentz, p.3.
This chapter begins with a brief outline of the shift from the UNPROFOR operation to the IFOR operation, with a particular focus on the United States’ involvement in Bosnia. Then, a critical analysis of the US military-NGO relationship in Bosnia is presented, which examines the impact of the ambitious military and civil mandate; the first application of CIMIC under NATO; and the US military’s aversion to mission creep on the US military-NGO relationship in Bosnia. This chapter concludes with a summary of lessons learned and a comparison to the NZDF experience in UNPROFOR.

Background of Intervention: From UNPROFOR to IFOR

By 1995, the UN as an organisation, was thought to be inept and incapable of mounting a successful intervention.⁴ The UNPROFOR operation had been a disaster, with UN forces being taken hostage and so-called “safe areas” overrun and civilians murdered. Remarkably, UNPROFOR troops and aid agencies were able to transport much aid to the locals; however, the fighting continued unabated and threatened the lives of UN forces, aid workers, and locals. UNPROFOR was described by one UN official as an “armour-plated meals on wheels service.”⁵

From the beginning of the Bosnian conflict, the US administrations of both George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton did not want to deploy American ground troops in Bosnia.⁶ Despite humanitarian rhetoric and outrage over Serb actions, American interests in

---

Bosnia were seen as insufficient to justify risking a political and military quagmire. It was thought that Bosnia was too difficult a problem and that any attempts to reach a peace agreement would be fruitless. As Bush’s Secretary of State James Baker quipped, “We don’t have a dog in that fight.”

American forces did, however, participate in a long lasting air lift to Sarajevo and elsewhere in Bosnia. They also helped enforce a no-fly zone over Bosnia and a regional arms embargo. In March 1994, American mediators convinced the Bosnian Muslims and Croats to form a loose federation, which enabled both parties to focus their efforts on fighting the Serbs. NATO airpower was used in 1994 several times usually in response to Serb actions near safe havens or in no fly zones.

In early July 1995, Srebrenica was overrun by the Serbs who took several hundred Dutch peacekeepers hostage killing as many as 8,000 men, women, and children. On 28 August 1995 a shell exploded in a Sarajevo marketplace killing more than 30 people and

---

injuring many more, providing the impetus for the US to become involved.\textsuperscript{11} Clinton reversed his policy and facilitated a negotiated agreement among the warring parties via a combination of military and diplomatic coercion.\textsuperscript{12}

The Clinton administration’s decision to intervene in 1995 came about largely because of the prolonged conflict in Bosnia which was resulting in high political risks and costs if the administration continued to stand idly by, as well as the realization that the crisis in Bosnia may not be resolved without US leadership. NATO air strikes were initiated on 30 August 1995 on Serb positions. The combination of NATO bombing and the joint Muslim-Croat loose alliance against the Serbs turned the tide of the battle to the negotiating table.\textsuperscript{13} The US-led diplomatic initiative resulted in the General Framework for Peace (GFAP) at Dayton. The GFAP outlined the separation of Bosnia into two entities with limited common institutions, provided for a peace-building process and a cease-fire.\textsuperscript{14} The GFAP or Dayton Accords was formally signed on 14 December, 1995.

\textsuperscript{11} Rose, p.45.
\textsuperscript{12} DiPrizio, p.117.
\textsuperscript{14} Hanson, pp.88-89.
and called for the active participation of both military and civilian agencies to implement the peace agreement and nation building agenda.

Once the agreement had been met, the US agreed to send 28,000 American forces to Bosnia under NATO. The NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) was made of 60,000 troops from 36 nations. IFOR was code named Operation *Joint Endeavour* and began on 16 December 1995. Most of the nations contributing troops to IFOR had been part of UNPROFOR, most notably the British and the French. \(^\text{15}\) IFOR was deployed throughout Bosnia in three separate multinational divisions (MND), as illustrated in Figure 6 on the following page. The largest MND was the US-led MND North, which was headquartered in Tuzla and included American forces, as well as brigades from Russia, Turkey, and a third non-US brigade referred to as NORDPol with forces from Finland, Sweden, Norway and Poland. The next largest MND was the British-led MND Southwest (SW) headquartered in Banja Luka with troops from Canada, the Netherlands and Denmark. The third MND was the French-led MND Southeast (SE) headquartered in Mostar with troops from France, Italy, and Portugal. \(^\text{16}\)

---


IFOR was unique in several ways. It was the first ever ground operation for NATO; the organisation’s first ever deployment out of its designated area of interest; the first time NATO forces would operate jointly with Partnership for Peace partners and non-NATO counties (most notably, Russia). It was also the first time US Army Europe Forces (USAREUR) were deployed in support of a ground operation and the first time the French would operate in a NATO-led operation.18

18 Wentz, p.xxiii.
US-NGO Relations in Bosnia

Most of the 28,000 US troops were deployed from US bases in Germany. 18,000 of these troops made up the Multinational Division North (MND N). The other 10,000 US troops were deployed elsewhere in Bosnia, Hungary, and Croatia as the NATO support elements for Operation Joint Endeavour. Along with comprehensive military security tasks, the Dayton Accords called for creating political and constitutional institutions, fostering economic reconstruction and rehabilitation of infrastructure, promoting respect for human rights, encouraging the return of displaced persons and refugees, continuing humanitarian aid for as long as necessary, and assisting with both free and fair elections. Achieving these aims required IFOR and the hundreds of civilian agencies in their AO to cooperate and work together.

When the US forces arrived in MND N, they discovered that working alongside aid agencies would not be easy. Many of the aid agencies had been working in the area for years and had preconceived notions of how the military would operate. Certainly, the past four years of disagreements between UNPROFOR and aid agencies over what role each actor should play in Bosnia, coupled with the tension between military forces and aid agencies since the end of the Cold War, created many obstacles to the civil-military relationship during IFOR’s intervention.

While many factors impacted the US Military-NGO relationship in Bosnia, the three main factors were: the focus on the robust IFOR mandate and lack of strategy for civilian implementation of the GFAP; the introduction of CIMIC units; and the US military’s aversion to mission creep. The following sections: Mandate; CIMIC; and Mission Creep analyse the impact these factors had on the US military-NGO relationship in Bosnia.

**Mandate**

“Unlike UNPROFOR, the NATO led Implementation Force was a military success and helped to bring stability to the region and to provide an ‘environment for hope’ in which a nation can be reborn.”

IFOR’s mandate garnered much more support and agreement between the various contributing governments than UNPROFOR’s had. With the fighting stopped, and all sides willing to cooperate with the peace agreement, contributing states were willing to arm IFOR with a strong mandate to provide a secure environment. Due to the robust mandate, IFOR was able to enforce a more secure environment relatively quickly. As the security improved, both aid agencies and military forces were able to undertake humanitarian projects. The Dayton Accords, like the UNPROFOR mandate, left many aspects of the military’s involvement in civil activities open for interpretation. While careful attention was paid to arming IFOR with a strong mandate, the plan for civilian implementation of the Dayton Accords lacked necessary coordination and enforcement mechanisms. This section examines how the Dayton Accords and IFOR’s mandate impacted the US military-NGO relationship in Bosnia.

---

21 Wentz, p.xix.
On 14 December 1995 the General Framework for Peace (GFAP) or the Dayton Agreement was signed by the leaders of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. On 21 December 1995 the United Nations Security Council authorized Resolution 1035 which established the United Nations International Police Task Force (IPTF) and a United Nations Civilian Office in Bosnia. The Dayton Accords General Framework for Peace (GFAP) outlined the political, economic, and institutional reforms that all parties should work toward in Bosnia. These included: free and fair elections, creating a constitution for Bosnia, human rights, the return of refugees and displaced persons, and apprehension of persons indicted for war crimes.

These activities required the involvement of a wide range of international actors. Military implementation was provided by IFOR. Civilian implementation was led by a High Representative (HR) with specific roles for: the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) (elections); the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) (police and judiciary); UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (return of refugees); International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the Hague (trials for those accused of war crimes).

The Dayton Accords mandated the most comprehensive intervention that had ever taken place. As the UN’s High Representative (HR) in Bosnia, Carl Bildt, noted:

---

23 The Police Task Force and the UN Civilian Office were initially authorized for the period of one year following transfer of authority from the United Nations Protection Force UNPROFOR.
24 Full text of Dayton Accords General Framework for Peace in Bosnia available at: http://www.oscebih.org/overview/gfap/eng/
The peace agreement for Bosnia is the most ambitious document of its kind in modern history, perhaps in history as a whole. A traditional peace treaty aims at ending a war between nations and coalitions of nations, while here it is a question of setting up a state on the basis of little more than the ruins and rivalries of a bitter war.²⁶

US Ambassador and the principal representative at the Dayton Peace negotiations, Richard Holbrooke, acknowledged the hardship of implementing such a comprehensive agreement:

On paper, Dayton was a good agreement; it ended the war and established a single, multi-ethnic country. But countless peace agreements have survived only in history books as case studies in failed expectations. The results of the international effort to implement Dayton would determine its true place in history.²⁷

IFOR faced a situation not unlike the aftermath of World War II; however, in Bosnia they were not given the authority to govern the country, nor the ability to restore basic services. These tasks were mandated to the civilian agencies operating in the country. The military’s mandate was to stabilize the country by separating and disarming the warring factions, as well as to provide security and limited assistance within force capabilities to aid agencies operating in Bosnia.²⁸ The civilian agencies in Bosnia required security to carry out their operations. The security provided by the military enabled locals, NGOs, IOs, and other civilians to begin the path toward the rebuilding and normalcy of Bosnia. However, due to the enormity of the various tasks required for restoring Bosnia’s civil and governmental services, the civilian organisations were overwhelmed and the military began actively participating in nation building initiatives.

²⁷ Richard Holbrooke, To End a War, New York, 1998.p.335
²⁸ Sloan, p.84.
NATO and UN leadership contended that the successful achievement of the GFAP aims depended upon progress being made by both the military and civilians: the resumption of the conflict could only be suppressed if the civil mandate was accomplished, and the opportunity to create and sustain institutions and normality was only possible in the absence of conflict.  

NATO established clear and effective ROE and tasks for IFOR. Military tasks were very specific and IFOR created an operation plan (OPLAN) 10405, which covered the range of tasks for which they were responsible. Senior NATO military leaders stayed in constant communication with the Dayton negotiators to ensure that what was agreed to at Dayton would be executable on the ground in Bosnia. Under the GFAP, IFOR had the

---

29 MacKinlay, p.51.
30 IFOR Soldiers speaking to a boy in Bosnia, retrieved 6 April 2007, www.nato.int/pictures/review/9801/b0700002.jpg
32 Joulwan and Shoemaker, p.30.
principal assigned tasks of: the establishment of a durable cessation of hostilities; the establishment of legal authorization for IFOR to take required actions to ensure compliance with the agreement; the force’s own protection; and the establishment of lasting security and arms control measures which aim to promote a permanent reconciliation and to facilitate the achievement of all political arrangements agreed to in the GFAP.\textsuperscript{33} In addition, IFOR tasks were: To help create secure conditions for the conduct by others of additional tasks associated with the peace settlement; to assist the movement of organisations in the accomplishment of humanitarian missions; and to assist the UN agencies and other international organisations in their humanitarian missions.\textsuperscript{34}

The accords offered much less definition to the role of civil agencies. On the civilian side, the London Conference of the Peace Implementation Council established the Office of the High Representative (OHR) headed by former Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt. The HR was to “facilitate the Parties’ own efforts and to mobilize and, as appropriate, coordinate the activities of the organisations and agencies involved in the civilian aspects of the peace settlement by carrying out... the civilian tasks.”\textsuperscript{35} However, the OHR was not formally established with any directive control. The OHR’s authority did not extend over the myriad of autonomous organisations which were intended to cooperate in fulfilling the civil tasks. No authority was given to demand the integration of the

\textsuperscript{33} Wentz, p.120.
\textsuperscript{34} Full text of Dayton Accords General Framework for Peace in Bosnia available at: http://www.oscebih.org/overview/gfap/eng/.
\textsuperscript{35} Full text of Dayton Accords General Framework for Peace in Bosnia available at: http://www.oscebih.org/overview/gfap/eng/.
activities of the host of civilian agencies which would become involved in various aspects of Bosnia peace and stability.  

More significantly, the High Representative had little formal authority over other UN agencies such as the IMF, World Bank, UNHCR, and none over the OSCE and the NGOs. While the establishment of strategic level coordination initiatives such as the Peace Implementation Council and the Principals’ Group had a positive effect on promoting communication between, and amongst, the military and civilian channels, there was no coordinating body which had the authority or clout to bring about genuine unity of effort. According to Supreme Allied Commander (SACEUR) George Joulwan, “Given no clear tasks, objectives, or milestones, civilian organisations were left to operate at their own speed and had no way of measuring their success.”

In addition, no coordination structures existed to organize the two chains of NATO and OHR. No formal coordination process- only a loose framework for cooperation without a unified policy. Neither the Dayton Accords nor the UN mandate established a coordination plan for the integration of these two entities. The military and civilian management structures were encouraged to cooperate with each other, but they were not required to do so. The coordination and integration that did take place was due to personalities, not structure.

---

36 Joulwan and Shoemaker, p.33.
37 Joulwan and Shoemaker, p.32.
38 Daniel Byman, Strengthening the Partnership, Improving Military Coordination with Relief Agencies and Allies in Humanitarian Operations, RAND Corporation, 2000, p.95.
NGOs and IOs were already involved when IFOR arrived. There were an estimated 530 NGOs in theatre when US forces arrived. Many of the civilian agencies working in Bosnia had been there for years and had expert knowledge of the country and its people. Although many of the organisations were already on the ground in Bosnia, OHR was expected to be delayed in their implementation of civilian activities under the GFAP due to the enormous task of setting up previously non-existent coordination structures. However, the great amount of time it took the civil structure to become operational was not anticipated. Therefore, according to James Landon, early on in the operation and in the absence of functioning civil implementation institutions, “IFOR received public pressure to take a larger role in implementing GFAP civilian tasks.”

An aid worker provides medical assistance to a local woman.

---

The delay in civil implementation resulted in an increased role of IFOR civil affairs tasks. Even once the OHR was established in theatre, many civilian agencies still expected IFOR to take the lead on projects such as providing gas, electricity, and water. The competence and ability of the CIMIC units, coupled with a noticeable lack of activity in these areas by civil agencies, further perpetuated the idea that IFOR forces would take a lead role in civil activities.\textsuperscript{43}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{9602/9602-2b.jpg}
\caption{Supreme Allied Commander George Joulwan briefs the media on the IFOR operation\textsuperscript{44}}
\end{figure}

IFOR’s role in civil affairs activities was, however, limited in the first six months of the operation. The primary focus during this initial period was on separating the warring factions, disarming and securing heavy weapons, providing a secure environment, and policing zones of separation. As Chris DePrater of the US Army Signals Corps noted,

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{44} NATO, George Joulwan media brief, retrieved 6 November 2007, www.nato.int/pictures/review/9602/9602-2b.jpg
\end{flushright}
“When we arrived in Bosnia, we were told to secure the AO, there was no talk early on [about] taking on a larger role in terms of assistance.”45 Half way through its operation, however, IFOR command began to look at ways to extricate itself from Bosnia before its one year mandate expired. According to Supreme Allied Commander George Joulwan, “In the absence of an effective plan of structure for implementing the civilian aspects of the operation, it became apparent that the conditions for IFOR withdrawal could not be met.”46

In an effort to create the conditions for a withdrawal, IFOR forces were assisting in civil-military relation building and nation building efforts with greater frequency. Indeed, as security improved, the need for a coordinated response to rebuild civilian livelihoods, systems, and the overall infrastructure of the country became readily apparent. Although CIMIC was not explicitly mandated to participate in “nation building”, IFOR policy allowed troops to undertake assistance initiatives with civilian agencies, so long as these activities could be carried out within the current operating budget and without losing sight of the primary role of security.47

Operations to improve the mobility and security of IFOR military forces such as reconstruction, rebuilding, and demining, also improved the ability of humanitarian agencies to reach local populations and improved the overall infrastructure of the

46 Joulwan and Shoemaker, p.34.
country.\textsuperscript{48} IFOR’s mandate did enable the force to successfully end the violence in Bosnia and protect civilian efforts in the country. As Lieutenant Colonel Pamela Brady, a CIMIC officer during Joint Endeavour, noted, “The conditions for regional security created by IFOR significantly increased and facilitated humanitarian assistance throughout the country. Hundreds of NGOs, PVOs, and IOs were able to dispense aid on a larger scale because of the security and enhanced freedom of movement provided by the military.”\textsuperscript{49}

However, aid agencies still required heavy military security to cross checkpoints and carry out their relief projects and many felt that the military should have maintained a security focus rather than becoming increasingly involved in relief and reconstruction projects. As Smigle Bairic of the Austrian NGO, Helfen Bauren, noted, “We relied on the military’s information for security and they often provided us with transportation to areas that were considered insecure. But, their attention should have stayed on security, not [aid projects].”\textsuperscript{50}

Annette Wulf of German Agro Action explains a commonly expressed view of military involvement in aid and reconstruction, “While we acknowledge that reconstruction and development has immediate security benefits, as a prerequisite, we think that the military has its special domain and task to ensure security for the population.”\textsuperscript{51} Other NGOs and civilian agencies openly worked alongside the US Military in carrying out

\textsuperscript{48} Steve Charles, Restoring Peace in Bosnia, Wabash Magazine, Fall 1997, p.53.
\textsuperscript{49} Brady, p.46.
\textsuperscript{50} Smigle Bairic, Austrian NGO Helfen Bauren, questionnaire submitted, 15 August 2008.
\textsuperscript{51} Wulf, questionnaire.
reconstruction projects. Laura Miller found that, alarmed by the overwhelming task of rebuilding a nation, some civilian agencies even called for military forces to become more involved in the civilian tasks of the GFAP.\footnote{Miller, p.189.}

The ambitious Dayton Accords and subsequent IFOR and UN mandates tasked military and civilian organisations with a plethora of nation-building tasks. In areas such as the establishment of essential services, medical assistance, judiciary and electoral system reestablishment, and infrastructure development, the military and many aid agencies worked together. While IFOR’s robust mandate to enforce security was clear and well planned, the civilian mandate and structure in Bosnia was unclear and difficult to implement. Recognizing that the Dayton Accords would not be realized without an increase of IFOR’s role in civil objectives, NATO leadership allowed for an increase in the military’s civil affairs tasks and deployed civil-military cooperation units (CIMIC) to facilitate, coordinate, monitor, and report on civil-military projects.\footnote{Badsey and Latawski, p.189.}

\textbf{Structure/Organisation}

“\textit{CIMIC was the vital link between military and civilian organisations in theatre.}”\footnote{James Landon quoted in Larry K. Wentz (Ed.), \textit{Lessons from Bosnia : the IFOR experience}, Vienna, VA: CCRP, 1997, p.120.}

By 1995, while the US had gained experience with civil-military affairs through operations in northern Iraq, Somalia, and Haiti. NATO, as an organisation, had not. Bosnia represented the first attempt the Alliance organisation would have in both nation-
building and civil-military affairs activities. Prior to the IFOR deployment, NATO was unfamiliar with what the capabilities, limitations, and missions of Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) units would be. While NATO had developed CIMIC doctrine, it had yet to be tested. It was IFOR’s experience in Bosnia which served as the testing ground for NATO CIMIC operations and it was during this operation that the utility of CIMIC was realized. This section explores the impact CIMIC operations had on the US military-NGO relationship during IFOR.

NATO CIMIC offered more formal structure than that of UNPROFOR. The IFOR commander formed a principal staff directorate known as Combined Joint Civil Military Cooperation (CJCIMIC) which was located at IFOR headquarters and served to facilitate the coordination of CIMIC activities among IFOR, NGOs and IOs. Based on the GFAP, NATO Commanders created a CIMIC Campaign Plan outlining the primary and supporting military objectives, which was to serve as a guide for civil-military activities during the IFOR deployment. It provided the following objectives for CIMIC personnel:

- Conducting civil military operations in support of the military implementation of the GFAP;
- Promoting cooperation with the civilian populace, various agencies, and national governments;
- Leveraging capabilities of NGOS, IOS, and national governments;
- Creating a parallel unified civilian effort in support of the GFAP implementation; and
- Being prepared to assist governmental, international, and non-governmental humanitarian, public safety, and health contingencies.

56 Wentz, p.121.
NATO authorized CIMIC centres at the local level to complement reconstruction and improvement plans. These centres operated in each of the three multinational divisions (MNDs) and enabled the coordination of the military and civilian communities.\(^{58}\) While these structures were intended to create a comprehensive CIMIC plan, it was still up to the individual commanders how their personnel would engage in civil-military affairs. Landon notes, “As a new type of operation, IFOR commanders and staff had to incorporate civil-military tasks into their overall operations based upon the varying perspectives of their personal knowledge and experience.”\(^{59}\)

Early in the IFOR deployment, different nations, and even units from the same nation, conducted individual surveys and assessments of required tasks. There was no central planning or coordination of data collection.\(^{60}\) This led to uneven quality in CIMIC activities, false expectations amongst locals and aid agencies, and the impression that Operation “\textit{Joint Endeavour}” was not as joint as the name would have one believe.

The US Military CIMIC structure was made up of personnel from the 353\(^{7}\)th Civil Affairs Command of the Army Reserve and 96\(^{th}\) Civil Affairs Battalion (active duty unit) based at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.\(^{61}\) Civil affairs soldiers had capabilities that greatly enhanced their ability to implement projects and to engage with the civilian agencies, as well as with the local population. Civil affairs officers were highly skilled in areas such as negotiation and language capabilities. They also had been specially trained in

\(^{58}\) Zaalberg, p.400.
\(^{59}\) James Landon quoted in Wentz, p.125.
\(^{60}\) Baumann, Gawrych, and Kretchik, p.192.
\(^{61}\) Brady, p.45.
understanding the complexities of the conflict as well as the country’s cultural dynamics and issues facing the locals.62

Many of the civil affairs (CA) staff had unique expertise in engineering and they were able to apply their expertise to infrastructure projects. They also frequently accompanied government officials and industrial specialists on assessments to formulate action plans and build consensus among the concerned parties.64 The civil affairs unit also included reserve personnel who were lawyers in their civilian professions. They identified gaps and issues in the judicial system and made recommendations to rebuild the legal

62 Brady, p.45.
infrastructure of the country. According to John Tuozzolo, a member of the 353rd Civil Affairs Command:

It was Civil Affairs officers, not the framers of the Dayton agreement nor the NGOs in Bosnia, that recognized the need for assistance in repairing the country’s judicial system. They worked with locals and international civilian staff to increase the availability of law texts, computers, and other equipment, as well as the more security-focused issues of assisting in the enforcement of jurisdiction transfers, at a time where various sections of the country were still too dangerous for local officials to go alone.65

While some civilian agencies were supportive of IFOR’s increased role in assisting with the implementation of the local infrastructure, the vast majority of NGOs and IOs contended that IFOR should focus more of its efforts on the security related issues that plagued the country, such as apprehending suspected war criminals.66 Apprehension of war criminals was deliberately left out of IFOR’s mandate due to concerns, particularly from the Pentagon, that IFOR involvement may elicit retaliatory attacks. However, due to calls from the NGO community to increase IFOR involvement in this area, NATO began taking a more proactive role in apprehending indicted and suspected war criminals. As Jim Hooper noted, “The NGOs aroused public concern and mobilized congressional opinion in the US to remind the administration of the threats to US policy posed by war criminals remaining at large.”67

It was in the area of security that the US military and the NGOs in MND N found most of their common ground. Through both military security briefs and information sharing

---

65 Tuozzolo, p.56.
initiatives, the military and NGOs were very cooperative. As Pamela Brady noted, “Security briefs and assessments were critical to working relations. Without security reinforcement, NGOs would probably reduce their risks by minimizing efforts. In addition to security information, CIMIC provided the NGO community with mine maps and awareness training.”

Information sharing in Bosnia was quite successful between the military and civilian agencies. Largely due to the level of security in the country, more NGOs were amenable to sharing information regarding their programmes and whereabouts to IFOR forces.

Early on in the operation, an information sharing programme facilitated civil affairs staff to also use their expertise in information technology, communications, banking, economics, and law enforcement to assist the civilian agencies and locals of Bosnia.

While it was beginning to be employed and many achievements were certainly made, CIMIC did not reach its full potential during IFOR. There were numerous planning, implementation, and coordination errors which undermined the goals of CIMIC. US civil affairs assets were deployed late to theatre due to poor planning. As UNPROFOR forces withdrew or transferred into IFOR, valuable CIMIC turnover opportunities were lost. Lacking any advanced information, the NGOs assumed that IFOR would continue, if not increase, the same type of support that UNPROFOR provided to them. IFOR was much different than UNPROFOR in their philosophy toward the operation. IFOR refused to provide the NGO community with support which they believed the NGOs could provide

---

68 Brady, p.45.
69 Zaalberg, p.423.
70 Tuozzolo, p.55.
for themselves. In the main, the military’s aim in refusing this assistance was to avoid civil agency dependency on IFOR for essential aspects of support.\textsuperscript{71} IFOR did send personnel in early to brief the NGOs on what to expect, educate them on what IFOR troops would be doing, but the briefing was only given in Sarajevo and not in the field where a majority of the NGOs were located.\textsuperscript{72}

In addition, France and the UK did not require US civil affairs support, though those forces were deployed to theatre. Instead the civil affairs forces were absorbed by the US CIMIC structure and created an increase of CIMIC forces by two to three times. Excess staff began to get involved in functions that are normally assumed at lower levels of command. In all, 353 CIMIC personnel deployed to Bosnia from the US, compared with 40 from France and 50 from all other nations.\textsuperscript{73}

CIMIC also suffered from duplication of effort internally due to CJCIMIC and Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Force (ARRC) CIMIC being located in Sarajevo. Just as was the case with UNITAF in Somalia, IFOR had two organisations responsible for civil-military activities in the same area. There was a lack of communication and coordination amongst these two CIMIC organisations, which led to overlap, miscommunications with aid agencies, and a general lack of unity of effort.\textsuperscript{74}

\textsuperscript{72} Wentz, p.135.
\textsuperscript{74} Zaalberg, p.277.
In MND N the CIMIC centre was located inside the gate at Tuzla Main, whereas most of the NGOs were 20 minutes away in downtown Tuzla. Due to security access restrictions, the CIMIC centre’s utility was limited. Force protection regulations also hampered CIMIC personnel abilities to carry out their civil affairs projects. CIMIC personnel were required to have four vehicles to leave the camp and when they were able to get those, the appearance of overwhelming security provisions gave locals the perception that the security environment was not as safe as forces would have them believe.\textsuperscript{75} The US military’s focus on force protection was often cited by NGO employees as an obstacle to cooperation. The US military often behaved as though force protection constituted the mission, rather than being a means by which the mission could be accomplished. As Robert Dunham of MSF noted, “The military comes out with guns blazing and says to the people, ‘don’t worry you’re safe’; what are they to believe: the words they hear, or the guns they see? ...And this then impacts [the relief workers] who may appear to be friendly with these guys.”\textsuperscript{76}

Force protection is not the only thing the military and NGOs tend to disagree on. The military's standards and preferred way of completing its tasks, often do not mesh with the NGO approach. The US military tends to take on short duration, quick impact projects; whereas many NGOs tend to take on long term projects if they can employ, teach, and give control to members of the local community. The US military often sees NGOs and other humanitarian agencies as force multipliers, but many NGOs take a different view, wishing instead to remain independent of military operations. As the USAID director in

\textsuperscript{75} Wentz, p.135.
\textsuperscript{76} Robert Dunham, MSF, questionnaire received, 12 September 2008.
Bosnia, observed, "[The US military] had a tendency to want to take over, so we had to stop that, I have to teach the military each time not to run things." 77

The military, including many CIMIC officers, did not often consider the importance of consultation with the locals and aid groups in Bosnia. This signified a lack of understanding regarding development, as well as a disrespect for aid agencies. Many officers did not consider the full impact of their projects and did not seek advice from aid workers, whom they regarded as poorly organised. 78 This attitude also stemmed from the fact that NATO armies were trained to the highest possible standard using urban training areas to simulate a real-time complex emergency, whereas NGO workers were not afforded these opportunities due mainly to a lack of funding. In addition, many young officers serving in Bosnia had already served in a complex emergency. 79 As a result, IFOR forces were highly trained and confident in their approach to complex emergencies. Thus, when they arrived in the field, as Jonathan Dworken explained, “Officers simply did not see women in their late twenties with Birkenstock sandals and ‘save the whales’ t-shirts as experts worthy of consultation.” 80

The lack of consultation and coordination among the various actors at work in Bosnia led to an overlap of efforts among the IFOR, UN agencies, and humanitarian organisations. 81 While both the humanitarian and military personnel had access to computer discs with

77 Miller, p.192.
79 Patrick Hollen, Pre-Planning and Post-Conflict CMOC/CIMIC Challenges, Joint Forces Staff College, Joint and Combined Warfighting School, 5 September 2003, p.38.
80 Dworken, pp.19-20.
81 Byman, p.102.
spreadsheets that outlined the organisations, their locations, and various projects they were working on, incidences of multiple organisations overlapping in their assistance did occur. For example, the Dutch military in Bosnia built a hospital only to find out after the project was finished that three NGOs had financed the hospital, each paying for the hospital without knowing the other NGOs had financed it.\textsuperscript{82}

While there were certainly faults in its implementation, NATO’s first CIMIC operation was successful in many ways. The CIMIC units were much more adept at building cooperative relations with aid agencies and locals than their non-CIMIC IFOR counterparts. The US CIMIC team arrived in theatre with a good understanding of the operational behaviour of NGOs. Due to their knowledge and understanding of the civilian community, the CIMIC personnel were able to organize assistance in a way that other units lack. While CIMIC did not reach its full potential during IFOR’s deployment, it did solidify the need for expert civil-military affairs staff in complex emergencies.

**US Military Reluctance to Engage in CMA: Mission Creep**

"Military officials, particularly in the US, fear that by improving their [civil-military] capabilities they will be called on to carry out these missions rather than being able to devote themselves to what they consider their primary mission: warfighting."\textsuperscript{83}

Within the US Military there was a great reluctance to take on nation building roles in Bosnia. The great hesitancy to engage the US military in Bosnia in the first place stemmed largely from the fear of mission creep. Colonel Peter Dausen noted, “Bosnia


\textsuperscript{83} Byman, p.98.
was a tar baby, once in, you do not get out.”

The fear of mission creep led to the creation of IFOR’s limited tasks and short term involvement. The US military was reluctant to engage in activities that extended beyond traditional military tasks in Bosnia and focused on quick exit rather than long term goals. This section examines how the fear of mission creep impacted US military-NGO relations in Bosnia.

In 1995, during the deployment to Bosnia, the prevailing view amongst US military commanders was that training for peacekeeping would erode the warfighting capabilities of soldiers. US analysts maintained that powerful land armies were debilitated by peace support operations, and required expensive retraining to return to combat-ready standards. Unlike smaller nations such as Denmark, which did train its soldiers for peace support operations, the US military actively sought to avoid training for, and engaging in, peace support tasks.

This opposition to peace support training was reflected in the US military’s planning, structure and implementation of tasks during IFOR. Only one CIMIC affairs officer was assigned to assist NATO’s Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) in the planning of the IFOR deployment. The campaign plan not only inadequately identified military tasks for CIMIC, but also negatively affected CIMIC deployment, manning, and logistics.

---

84 Colonel Peter Dausen quoted in Johnsen, p.3.
requirements. In addition, as Wentz observed, “The IFOR deployment has illuminated the fact that many traditional ground combat commanders have little knowledge of civil affairs or of CIMIC activities.” While, overall, commanders did encourage troops to undertake medical, education, governance, election and other nation building initiatives, the civil affairs projects and the CIMIC structures were often undervalued.

Little effort has been made to retain the knowledge gained from the US military’s various deployments alongside NGOs. One problem in institutionalizing the CMA information stems from the US military’s employment of civil affairs units which are almost exclusively made up of reservists. In fact, 96 percent of US Civil Affairs structure is comprised of reservists. Therefore, obtaining knowledge before a crisis, when the reserves are less likely to be deployed, is difficult.

Due to the lack of respect unconventional peace support operations had within the US military during the operation in Bosnia, CIMIC did not play the role that it should have played. Instead, the US forces were focused on short term, quick impact projects. Supreme Allied Commander George Joulwan noted, “From the beginning of the operation, the United States made it clear that its commitment to Bosnia and Herzegovina was neither open-ended nor permanent, and the rest of the players in Bosnia and Herzegovina took their lead from the US position.” As in Somalia, there was confusion over the military’s mandate. While IFOR was reluctant to engage in longer term security

---

88 Wentz, p.129.
89 Wentz, p.129.
90 Byman, p.106.
91 George Joulwan quoted in Joulwan and Shoemaker, p.35.
and nation building initiatives, such as actively working to stop inter-ethnic violence, apprehend war criminals, or assist in refugee repatriation, many aid agencies thought that was part of the military’s role in Bosnia.\(^\text{92}\)

The divergence of goals often tends to separate military and humanitarian personnel. The military typically assists in reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts, not altruistically, but to win hearts and minds or to carry out aims that will satisfy military security or force protection requirements. Certainly in the early stages of a conflict, when security concerns prevail, the military’s focus is typically, exclusively: security. When security begins to improve, military forces are often motivated to assist to create a suitable end-state for military withdrawal. This focus on end-states and withdrawal is a factor that tends to alienate NGO personnel from their military counterparts. As Gideon Rose of the US Council on Foreign Relations noted, “Exit strategies, such as the original one-year timeline for IFOR, are misguided in theory and unhelpful in practice. Instead of obsessing about the exit, planners should concentrate on the strategy.”\(^\text{93}\)

Indeed, as security improved, military forces increasingly became involved in humanitarian, reconstruction, and nation building roles. The military engaged in more direct and routine assistance to civilians. IFOR was increasingly being drawn into the nation building efforts by virtue of their size, capabilities, and presence in the country, which is often the case in complex emergencies. Military forces also work outside of


their mandate when they see a need to fill. During the IFOR operation, political representatives noticed a disparity in what the military had achieved in terms of security and what the civilians had achieved in terms of the civilian infrastructure and development of Bosnia. As a result, IFOR’s predecessor, SFOR, was expanded to allow for increased military participation in reconstruction assistance. It had become clear at that stage that improved military-civilian coordination would be necessary for Bosnia’s ability to govern and grow itself without ongoing international assistance.

Over the course of the 12 month IFOR operation, many commanders came to appreciate the value and utility of CIMIC. As Lieutenant Colonel Pamela Brady noted, “While some may regard this [the reconstruction programmes of IFOR] as mission creep, civil and military leaders came to understand that exclusive oversight of the military provisions of the peace agreement would only postpone re-establishing normalcy and could prolong the need for an outside military presence.” 94

During the IFOR operation, the US was much more reluctant to engage in nation building activities than it was during SFOR and subsequent operations. IFOR served to illustrate the importance of building strong CIMIC units and structures. As Wentz observed, many US military officials realized that, “Peacekeeping is a soldier-intensive business in which the quality of the troops matters as much as the quantity.” 95 This was reflected in SFOR’s mandate, which called for a decrease in the number of combat troops and an increase in troops with engineering, governmental, economic, and developmental

94 Brady, p.45.
95 Wentz, p.xix.
experience. The Commander of IFOR, Admiral Leighton Smith, summed up the changed view of civil-affairs during the deployment to Bosnia, “In November 1995, we had never heard of CIMIC, we had no idea what you did… Now (1996) we can’t live without you.”

The NATO operation in Bosnia allowed the US to re-examine its internal procedures for civil-military planning and nation-building roles. It was clear that these roles would necessitate improved military-NGO relations in the future. The operations in Bosnia revealed the importance of CIMIC and the need to further develop this capability. Throughout the missions a series of trial and error initiatives were employed that enabled the US military to evaluate, by default, what worked and what didn’t in terms of civil-military cooperation strategies. While not ideal during IFOR, the employment of CIMIC helped to ease the internal military fear regarding mission creep and served to strengthen the position of civil-military activities in complex emergencies. Lieutenant Colonel Pamela Brady noted of her experience in Bosnia, “The future is promising because combat arms and civil affairs complement each other’s efforts in order to ‘secure the victory’.”

Conclusions

By the time US forces entered Bosnia, the nation was in tatters and the people were weary from four years of protracted conflict. With a strong mandate to enforce the

---

97 Brady, p.47.
Dayton Peace Accords, IFOR was able to achieve a more secure environment and enable the relief and reconstruction of the country’s infrastructure to begin. The Dayton Accords called for IFOR and the various civilian agencies under OHR to work together in the rebuilding of Bosnia. However, little attention was paid to how this coordination could, or would, be facilitated. Without clear guidance, yet again, military forces and aid workers operated alongside one another in a complex environment and attempted to carry out their respective mandates. The US’ involvement with NGOs during the IFOR operation in Bosnia demonstrated many lessons for future operations.

First, civilian agencies must have clear guidelines and support in implementing their mandate. While the OHR was tasked with coordinating the civilian response, the office was powerless to establish any cooperation whatsoever from the participating agencies. A coordinating body must be given authority to oversee the civilian aspects of an operation. Without a timeline, means to measure success, or coordinate activities, any civilian authority will be undermined and the mandate unfulfilled. The accomplishment of these aims may require participating civilian agencies to cede some of their authority to a civilian coordinating body. However, without the means to successfully coordinate a civilian operation, civilian organisations will continue to witness an increase in military participation in reconstruction activities.

Second, while IFOR’s mandate was more robust and clear than other past military mandates, implementation of the civil-military aspects of the mandate was still left to the discretion of individual commanders. Within and between nations, this led to an uneven
approach to CIMIC in Bosnia. While NATO and the US military have established CIMIC or CMA doctrine, the specific tasks and implications of military involvement in civil affairs is ambiguous. NATO, the US military, and other military organisations should continue their efforts to build an international consensus on civil-military affairs. In addition, when deploying with a multi-national force, only one doctrine should guide civil-military affairs in complex emergencies. This is in an effort to increase jointness and unity of effort, while minimizing uneven approaches within a given operation.

Third, relying so heavily on reservists as civil affairs officers limits operational effectiveness in complex emergencies. While reservists are certainly highly capable of civil affairs roles in the US military, having 95% of all CMA capability in the reserves\textsuperscript{98} provides several obstacles to improved civil-military relations. Reservists cannot be mobilized as quickly as their active duty counterparts; information sharing between part-time soldiers is limited and affects the institutionalization of civil affairs knowledge; and CMA is in such high demand that more full time units should be established.

Next, the deployment of civil affairs staff should be a priority and never delayed, as it was in Bosnia. The early deployment of Civil Affairs personnel in the theatre of operations is essential to setting the stage for the introduction of follow-on forces into an environment that has benefited from specialized interaction with the local population.

Fifth, the security roles for the military should be made clear to all agencies involved. Many aid agencies believed that IFOR would apprehend suspected and indicted war criminals; however, this was left open ended in IFOR’s mandate. The fact that this was not made clear to civilians created resentment once aid workers witnessed military forces taking on reconstruction tasks in the absence of a secure environment. In addition, security should always remain the primary focus of military forces.

In addition to communicating over their mandates, military forces should consult aid agencies and locals prior to undertaking CMA projects. In an effort to build positive working relationships and garner respect, forces must communicate with aid workers and the local population. Providing assistance in the absence of this communication may be worse than providing no assistance at all.

Finally, CMA has, and will, continue to be a critical element in complex emergencies. An aversion to mission creep will not change the fact that in Bosnia, as well as in future conflicts, civil affairs requirements are likely to be more dominant than tactical elements. The US military must enhance its CMA capabilities if it is to be prepared for future complex emergencies.

The US military’s involvement during IFOR in Bosnia served to demonstrate more of what would be required in the future, rather than a case study in the how-tos of CIMIC. While it did accomplish a great deal, particularly with its CIMIC detachment, civil affairs was still struggling for respect within the US military during IFOR. In addition, the
relationship between the US military and NGOs in MND N was complicated by many outside factors, including mandates, history, and coordination. Both the military and NGOs in Bosnia were presented with many obstacles to their own internal coordination. The US military-NGO relationship in Bosnia proved yet again that civil affairs had great utility, but that its roles must be clarified in future missions.
Chapter 5: East Timor Case Study
The NZDF in the Cova Lima District

If anyone ever wanted the perfect scenario for a CIMIC exercise, it would be hard to find anything better than the situation in East Timor. The relatively simple political and geographical backdrop, the limited number of key players, and the imperative need to make civil-military relations work, are all ideal elements in a test case for CIMIC.¹

Following the widely perceived failures of peacekeeping missions in Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda, the late 1990s witnessed a sharp decline in international support for UN peacekeeping operations.² In 1999, however, the world’s attention focused on the most unlikely of places. Largely ignored and sidelined as an Indonesian issue for two decades, the tiny former Portuguese territory of East Timor was thrust centre stage in global affairs. The UN’s involvement in East Timor has been mandated in four phases: The United Nations Assistance Mission in East Timor (UNAMET); International Force East Timor (INTERFET); the United Nations Transitional Authority in East Timor (UNTAET); and the United Nations Mission to East Timor (UNMISET). This examination will review the New Zealand Defence Force’s relationship with NGOs during the UNTAET phase of the East Timor intervention.

---

This chapter begins with a brief summary of East Timor’s history and the events that led to conflict, followed by an overview of the UNAMET and INTERFET operations. Next, the overriding factors that impacted the NZDF-NGO relationship in the Cova Lima region during the UNTAET operation are examined. This chapter concludes by assessing the strengths and weaknesses of the NZDF-NGO relationship in the Cova Lima region and the degree to which cooperation was achieved between the two actors.

**Background of East Timor**

![Map of East Timor](image)

Located at the eastern corner of the Indonesian archipelago, only 620 kilometres north of Australia, the small island of Timor has been divided into east and west for centuries. The first recorded European settlement on the island began in 1566 with the Portuguese, who would colonize the east, followed closely by the Dutch, who would claim the west. Today, the population of East Timor is roughly 800,000. Throughout its history, East Timor has seen waves of predominately Malay, Melanesian, Arab, Chinese, and African

---

migrants culminating into a diverse population. There are 57 dialects and languages with Portuguese, Tetum, Indonesian, and English being the most widely used.⁴

After the Dutch withdrew from West Timor in 1949, the former colony became part of the federation of Indonesia. In 1974, after a Lisbon coup toppled Portugal’s authoritarian regime, the Portuguese suddenly withdrew from East Timor.⁵ As part of the decolonisation process, the Portuguese gave the East Timorese three options for their future: continued ties with Portugal, transference into the federation of Indonesia, or independence. During this period a number of independence movements gained strength, the Timorese Democratic Union (UDT), which supported a conservative move towards independence that included retaining close ties to Portugal⁶ and the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (Fretilin), which advocated outright independence.⁷ Indonesia was also eyeing the soon-to-be former Portuguese colony for itself and began to stir up unrest by spreading propaganda and supplying money and arms to pro-Indonesian militants.⁸ Negotiations to settle the status of East Timor followed, but in August 1975 talks between Indonesia and Portugal failed. Civil war broke out between UDT and Fretilin, and many refugees fled into West Timor.⁹ In November, Fretilin declared East Timor’s independence and appealed to the UN and neighbouring countries

---

⁶ Jolliffe, p.30.
⁷ Jolliffe, p.33.
for assistance, but no help was forthcoming. Despite this declaration and continuing negotiations between all parties, Indonesian forces invaded East Timor in December.\textsuperscript{10}

In July 1976 East Timor became the 27\textsuperscript{th} province of Indonesia.\textsuperscript{11} The annexation was only recognized by Australia\textsuperscript{12}, while the United Nations condemned the occupation as illegal and stated that until decolonisation took place, East Timor was still under Portuguese authority. The Falintil resistance to the Indonesian invasion remained strong and the TNI, although able to cause significant damage, were never able to completely eliminate their opposition. The loss of life incurred by the East Timorese during their resistance to the TNI invasion is estimated to be 200,000, approximately 30\% of the entire population. The TNI losses are thought to be around 10,000.\textsuperscript{13}

For more than 20 years, the Indonesians ruled East Timor with military force. Through pro-Indonesian economic, educational, and immigration policies, Jakarta asserted its complete control over the East Timorese.\textsuperscript{14} When Indonesia’s President Suharto was forced from office in 1999, his successor, President Bacharuddin Jusuf (B.J.) Habibie made a dramatic change in Jakarta’s position toward East Timor. The new Indonesian president succumbed to international pressure and agreed to allow the East Timorese to

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{10} United States Department of State, Background Note on History of Timor Leste, retrieved 30 October 2007, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35878.htm#history.
\textsuperscript{11} Crawford and Harper, p.17.
\textsuperscript{13} Crawford and Harper, p.11. See also: Sian Powell, “UN verdict on East Timor” The Australian, January 19, 2006 and Lansell Taudevin, East Timor: Too Little Too Late, Australia: Duffy and Snellgrove, 1999, p. 55.
\end{flushleft}
vote in a referendum that would determine whether or not they wanted to be an autonomous province of Indonesia.\textsuperscript{15} If they declined this option, he would consider granting East Timor its independence.\textsuperscript{16} The referendum, it was agreed, would be overseen by the United Nations.

\textbf{Operations Overview: UN Intervention in East Timor}

The United Nations Assistance Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) was established in June 1999 to carry out the referendum.\textsuperscript{17} The security situation in East Timor in the days leading up to the referendum was unstable, with pro-Indonesian militants attempting to intimidate pro-independence voters through violence. Due to the dismal security situation, the referendum, originally scheduled for 8 August, was rescheduled for 30 August. Despite the militants’ attempts to disrupt the referendum, the voters registered in droves. On 30 August 1999, nearly 439,000 of the 452,000 of registered East Timorese turned out to vote in the election. And their vote was decisive: 78.5 per cent voted against being an autonomous part of Indonesia.\textsuperscript{18}

The result set off a new wave of Pro-Indonesian militant attacks that spiralled out of control, terrorizing the local population, endangering the lives of the remaining UNAMET representatives, and eliminating any semblance of law and order in East Timor.

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{17} UNAMET was authorized by Security Council Resolution 1246 of 11 June, 1999.
\end{itemize}
The TNI, tasked with the security provisions for East Timor and the UN representatives in it, often did not even attempt to quell the violence and, in some instances, played a role in it. The militia attempted to intimidate the UN personnel by firing on their compounds. Their goal was obvious: they wanted to drive the international representatives out of the country to deal with local pro-independence supporters without being in view of the world community. The militia continued their rampage of widespread killing, assaults, and looting. Hundreds of East Timorese were killed. More than 500,000 people were displaced and another 250,000 were forced into West Timor. The capital, Dili, was destroyed by fires and looters, as were cities and villages throughout East Timor. The government systems collapsed with the departure of the Indonesian authorities, creating a vacuum in East Timor. By 10 September all non-essential UN staff had been evacuated and the remaining personnel were using only one of their original installations, their headquarters in Dili.

The atrocities being committed against the East Timorese could not be ignored and the world community decided to react. The international community was willing to intervene on East Timor’s behalf, but would not do so without Indonesia’s consent. With

---


20 In November the Indonesian Commission Investigating Human Rights Violations in East Timor discovered a mass grave containing the bodies of 26 victims of the Suai killings, and the commission concluded that TNI personnel were directly and indirectly involved in this and other extrajudicial killings carried out following the consultation vote. There was evidence that many key militia members were, in fact, TNI intelligence personnel. See: US Department of State, Indonesia: “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 1999”, Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, February 23, 2000, retrieved 1 October 2006 at: http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2001/eap/8314.htm.


sharp diplomatic pressure from Australia, the United States, the UN, many Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) countries, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, Indonesia reluctantly agreed to a Chapter VII UN-mandated, Australian-led intervention. With sustained international pressure, President Habibie agreed to allow a United Nations peacekeeping force and the United Nations authorized, under Chapter VII of the UN charter, the deployment of the International Force East Timor (INTERFET).

On 20 September the International Force East Timor (INTERFET), which was tasked with creating a secure environment, along with the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) deployed to Dili. The first objective of the INTERFET mission was security, the second was to support UN operations, and the third was to provide and support the delivery of humanitarian aid.

The situation in East Timor required a coordinated humanitarian response. Over sixty humanitarian agencies, which included twenty-three UN Agencies, were preparing to

---


24 INTERFET was mandated by Security Council Resolution 1264 on 15 September, 1999.


provide assistance to the people of East Timor in September 1999. The UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) established a UN Humanitarian Operations Centre (UNHOC) and sought to coordinate the activities of the various organisations, as well as to facilitate liaison between the military forces and the humanitarian agencies. While INTERFET’s primary responsibility was to secure and stabilise the area, the UN mandate also called on the military force to, “facilitate humanitarian assistance operations within force capabilities.”

Australian forces did not have significant expertise in civil-military affairs, but General Peter Cosgrove, the commander of INTERFET, understood the need for close cooperation with humanitarian agencies in East Timor, just as CMA had been required during Australia’s mission to Somalia in 1992. He requested the creation of a Civil-Military Operations Centre (CMOC), which was supported by a US Army Civil Affairs detachment. The CMOC worked in conjunction with UNAMET and OCHA to coordinate INTERFET’s support of humanitarian assistance.

On 25 October, the United Nations authorized the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) under Chapter VII, which was mandated to

28 Elmquist, p.9.
30 Smith, p.51. For more on General Cosgrove’s planning and leadership during the INTERFET operation see: General Peter Cosgrove, My Story, Sydney: Harper Collins, 2006.
facilitate East Timor’s transition into independent statehood.32 UNTAET would replace INTERFET as soon as the security situation allowed for a smooth transition. Part of UNTAET’s mandate for all personnel, whether military or civil, was to support nation-building efforts. As a peace-building operation, the military was fully engaged, not only in a security capacity, but also in the reconstruction and aid efforts in East Timor.33

According to Security Council resolution 1272 of 25 October 1999, UNTAET had overall responsibility for the administration of East Timor and was empowered to exercise all legislative and executive authority, including the administration of justice.34 In what became the most extensive involvement in peace operations the UN had undertaken in Asia and the Pacific, UNTAET deployed as the de facto authority in East Timor and remained so for nearly three years.35

---

35 The UNTAET operation was mandated from October 1999 to May 2002. Subsequent UN operations were: the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET) authorized under SCR 1410, which lasted from May 2002 to May 2005; the United Nations Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL), which assisted the new nation state from May 2005 to August 2006; and the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT), an operation that is still on-going as of November 2007. For more details on the mandates of these operations see: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unmit/background.html

243
From 1999 to 2002 the New Zealand Defence Force organized its largest peacekeeping deployment to date in the country of East Timor.\textsuperscript{36} Cova Lima is the south-westernmost district of East Timor, sharing a long border with West Timor, where the risk of resistance from the western portion of the island was among the greatest\textsuperscript{37} and it would be the NZDF’s responsibility throughout the duration of the mission. The district has an area of roughly 1700 square kilometres\textsuperscript{38}, is one of the two poorest districts in the country,\textsuperscript{39} and has a very diverse terrain, oppressive heat, and heavy rainfall.\textsuperscript{40} The

\textsuperscript{36} The New Zealand deployment to East Timor was the largest operational deployment of New Zealand Forces since the Korean War. Crawford and Harper, p. 168.
\textsuperscript{37} Crawford and Harper, p.112.
\textsuperscript{39} Oxfam New Zealand, ―Taking Charge of Development‖, Where We Work - Cova Lima, East Timor, retrieved 5 November 2007 at: http://www.oxfam.org.nz/whatwedo.asp?sl=What%20we%20do&s2=Where%20we%20work&s3=Asia&s4=East%20Timor&s5=Covalima
capital of the district, Suai, served as the base of operations for NZDF forces in Cova Lima and was connected to the capital of East Timor, Dili, only by a long, rough and winding road, which took roughly eight hours to drive.\textsuperscript{41} The district was largely undeveloped, with poor infrastructure, limited roading and communications, and it had suffered considerable damage from the militias.\textsuperscript{42} With an estimated 250,000 refugees having fled into West Timor and 95\% of the infrastructure of the district of Cova Lima destroyed\textsuperscript{43} the relief effort faced major challenges. With the establishment of physical security by INTERFET, the UNTAET operation got underway in late October 1999. The relief agencies were able to access the district\textsuperscript{44} and the NZDF and NGOs found themselves co-existing and often working together in the years preceding East Timor’s independence.

The NZDF-NGO relationship in Cova Lima was comparatively good. The NZDF’s only other major deployment in which they had to manage an area of operations in which a large number of aid agencies were present was during their 1995 company-sized deployment to Bosnia.\textsuperscript{45} Their experience there had provided many of New Zealand’s UNTAET battalion commanders, officers, and soldiers with a greater understanding of, and appreciation for, humanitarian organisations and civil-military operations.\textsuperscript{46} Unlike Bosnia, however, the security environment in East Timor enabled the New Zealand

\textsuperscript{40}Gawn, interview.
\textsuperscript{41}Gawn, interview.
\textsuperscript{42}Brady, \textit{Deployment to East Timor}, p.21.
\textsuperscript{43}UN, Cova Lima District Profile, UNTAET, April 2002.
\textsuperscript{45}For more information on the NZDF deployment to Bosnia and the NZDF-NGO relationship during UNPROFOR, see chapter 4.
\textsuperscript{46}Hayward, interview; Gawn, interview.
troops to take more of an active role in civil-military affairs. In addition, East Timor’s population overwhelmingly welcomed the international UN intervention and the assistance from all the actors present—UN agencies, NGOs, and the peacekeeping forces.47

The New Zealand and other UN forces operating in the Cova Lima region did experience some resistance from militias early on in the operation. During the New Zealand Battalion 2’s deployment to East Timor, on 24 July 2000, New Zealand soldiers were attacked by a militia force and Private Leonard Manning was killed and his body mutilated. On 10 August 2000, a Nepalese soldier under NZDF command, Private Devrim Jaisey, was also killed in a militia attack.48 In September 2000, the UNHCR compound in West Timor was attacked and three of its aid personnel were brutally murdered, leading to the withdrawal of UNHCR staff and termination of its repatriation programme.49 However, despite these fatal incidents, the NZDF was able to extend its focus to non-combat operations, such as information operations and community assistance work.

The aid agencies in Cova Lima were also more amenable to working with the NZDF than the humanitarian personnel operating in Bosnia had been.50 This, again, is due in large part to the security environment and local perceptions, as in East Timor the peacekeeping

50 Monshipouri, p. 111.
forces were well received and the intervention was not as controversial as the intervention in Bosnia had been. All of these factors boded well for the NZDF-NGO relationship in Cova Lima and, indeed, overall the relationship was generally positive and effective in assisting the East Timorese of Cova Lima. There were, however, several overriding factors that served to undermine the relationship between the NZDF and aid agencies in the district.

First, UNTAET’s broad mandate allowed for a wide interpretation of the peacekeeping force’s role in humanitarian relief, reconstruction, and developmental assistance. Both the peacekeeping force and the aid agencies were working toward similar ends, however, the means by which they were carrying out their missions were often at odds. When security allowed, the NZDF was taking an active role in humanitarian assistance, but while many aspects of the NZDF and NGOs’ missions in Cova Lima were compatible, the extent to which the military should have engaged in humanitarian assistance was a constant and controversial issue for the humanitarian community in the district.

Second, due to a lack of doctrine, standard operating procedures (SOPs), or expertise in civil-military affairs (CMA), the NZDF’s humanitarian efforts in Cova Lima were ad hoc. The experience in Cova Lima demonstrated the need for reliable doctrine and protocols to guide the NZDF’s involvement in CMA. Based on their experiences in Bosnia and general understanding of the aid community, the NZDF took a common sense

---

51 New Zealand Defence Force, Lessons Learned Cell, p.17.
52 Gawn, interview; Dransfield, interview, and Hayward, interview.
53 This requirement was evident in this author’s study, as well by the NZDF Lessons Learned Cell. See New Zealand Defence Force, Lessons Learned Cell, p. 22.
approach to their CMA activities, which often underestimated the importance of humanitarian principles and at times alienated their NGO counterparts.\textsuperscript{54}

Next, preconceived notions and stereotypes served to strain the NZDF-NGO relations in Cova Lima. Many NZDF personnel continued to have negative perceptions of their NGO counterparts, despite having some civil-military affairs pre-deployment training.\textsuperscript{55} Many of the NGO personnel also cited negative views of the military and frustration with its rigid structures.\textsuperscript{56} Misunderstandings between the NZDF and the aid agencies in Cova Lima continued to impact the relationship, exposing the personality-driven nature of this relationship.

Finally, the small number of aid agencies operating in Cova Lima greatly impacted the NZDF-NGO relationship in the district.\textsuperscript{57} While many NZDF personnel noted that the smaller number of NGOs were easier to coordinate with, they were also critical of the lack of assistance the district received. This lack of assistance from the aid community further perpetuated the military’s belief that the NGOs were interested in being ‘where the money and media are’.\textsuperscript{58} While the NGOs cite the isolation and security situation in

\textsuperscript{54} General view of interviewees from NGOs and the NZDF operating in Cova Lima from 1999-2002.
\textsuperscript{55} The negative perceptions held by NZDF personnel toward their NGO counterparts stemmed largely from misunderstandings and stereotypes, as well as some past experiences working with aid personnel. These views were expressed through interviews with NZDF personnel and are detailed in the ‘Personality Driven’ section of this chapter.
\textsuperscript{56} Interviews with NGO personnel in dealing with the hierarchical structure of militaries. See also: Michael Hull, “New Zealand Defence Force as an Agent of Change”, Occasional Paper Series, No. 8, New Zealand Army Military Studies Institute, May 2005.
\textsuperscript{57} In 2001, there were a recorded 214 NGOs in East Timor and there were 12 in the district of Cova Lima.
\textsuperscript{58} For more on a commonly cited view held by NZDF and other military personnel, see: Graham Hancock, Lords of Poverty, London: Mandarin, 1991.
Cova Lima as reasons why there wasn’t a larger presence\textsuperscript{59}, the lack of increased assistance to the district as the security environment improved resulted in severe gaps in aid services that could only be filled by the NZDF peacekeeping force.

The following four sections: A Broad Mandate; \textit{Ad hoc} Civil-Military Affairs; Preconceived Notions and Stereotypes; and Lack of Aid to Cova Lima, examine these factors in greater detail.

\textbf{A Broad Mandate}

UNTAET’s broad mandate called for peacekeeping forces, UN civilians, and NGO personnel to share responsibility for the development of East Timor.\textsuperscript{60} In the district of Cova Lima, the peacekeeping force was primarily responsible for security and aid agencies were responsible for humanitarian assistance. Yet both actors implemented strategies in the district that contributed to the security, humanitarian, and governance of East Timor. While the NZDF’s primary role was to maintain security, they also carried out CMA activities to support aid agencies and locals, and contributed directly to the development efforts in Cova Lima. This section examines the overlapping mandates of the NZDF and aid agencies and the debate surrounding the NZDF’s involvement in humanitarian assistance.

\textsuperscript{59} Interviews with personnel from the ICRC, AusCARE, World Vision, and Oxfam.

The operation in East Timor came at a time when peacekeeping was undergoing a rapid transformation. In the early 1990s when the international community began to intervene in complex emergencies caused by intrastate warfare, the majority of actors engaged in peace operations believed that there was an inherent distinction between humanitarian mandates (which aim to be apolitical) and security mandates (which are political). However, in 1992, the UN’s Agenda for Peace asserted that it was not possible to separate humanitarian issues from the security problems faced by complex emergencies.

In 1996, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) further supported this view by stating:

> Given the interrelated cause and consequences of complex emergencies, humanitarian action cannot be fully effective unless it is related to a comprehensive strategy for peace and security, human rights and social and economic development as proposed within the framework of the Agenda for Peace.

Thus, by the time the operation in East Timor was undertaken, complex emergencies were being viewed as requiring a comprehensive and coordinated humanitarian, military, political, and economic response system. UN initiatives to coordinate the activities of the various actors in an effort to implement a holistic approach to complex emergencies were being implemented. The past experiences of interventions had given way to the idea that

---


the success of each actor is intrinsically linked to and dependent on the success of the other actors.\textsuperscript{64}

The operation in East Timor was unlike other UN operations in the past. UNTAET's mandate consisted of the following elements:

To provide security and maintain law and order throughout the territory of East Timor; To establish an effective administration; To assist in the development of civil and social services; To ensure the coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation and development assistance; To support capacity-building for self-government; and to assist in the establishment of conditions for sustainable development.\textsuperscript{65}

UNTAET was organized into three pillars: Military, Humanitarian Assistance and Emergency Rehabilitation (HAER), and Governance and Public Administration (GPA). The military pillar was the largest with roughly 8,000 personnel and was tasked with securing East Timor and assisting with the delivery of humanitarian aid.\textsuperscript{66} The HAER pillar worked through the OCHA created UNHOC, with the various humanitarian organisations, and with the East Timorese to coordinate humanitarian assistance and determine relief priorities. The third pillar, GPA, had the daunting tasks of restoring governance at the central and district levels, reinstalling public utilities, establishing the rule of law, and regulating investment in the private sector. With the departure of the Indonesians, who held the overwhelming majority of positions in East Timor’s administrative systems, and very few indigenous East Timorese qualified to fill these roles, the GPA personnel had enormous challenges.\textsuperscript{67}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{64} Curtis, p.11.
\item \textsuperscript{65} UN, UNTAET Mandate 1272, retrieved, 1 November 2007, www.un.org/peace/etimor/UntaetM.htm
\item \textsuperscript{66} Smith, p.62.
\item \textsuperscript{67} Smith, p.63.
\end{itemize}
The UN was the de facto administration of the territory until the East Timorese were prepared to administer their own state. The civilian and military actors in the territory were therefore responsible for building a state by providing security, emergency assistance, basic services and repairing infrastructure while they also worked to prepare the nation for independence. This involved developing legal and political systems and finding and training the civil servants, teachers, police officers, and military forces who would keep the newly independent country afloat.

The UN had never in its history approved a mandate of this scope, as Kofi Annan noted:

The mandate given by the Security Council... to establish a national civil administration, assist in the development of the civil and social services and support capacity-building for self-government was unprecedented.68

Given this broad mandate, there is little surprise that the military and civilian actors in East Timor would be tasked with overlapping missions. It is also evident that military involvement in supporting humanitarian assistance and nation-building was part of the peacekeeping force’s mandate under UNTAET. To what extent they were to be involved in humanitarian assistance was left open for interpretation by the UN mandate. This was not the first time the UN had authorized an ambiguous mandate in relation to the military’s role. As Meinrad Studer of the ICRC states regarding military involvement in humanitarian assistance, “In some cases, [the] blurring of responsibilities have been

compounded by the fact that the political objectives of the peace-keeping/peace-enforcement operations have been unclear and their mandates ill-defined.\textsuperscript{69}

The aid agencies working in Cova Lima often viewed the NZDF as stepping outside its mandate in its CMA efforts.\textsuperscript{70} Many NGO personnel felt that the military’s role should be to provide security and to support humanitarian efforts when requested by the civilian agencies. Oftentimes, however, the aid agencies cited examples of ways in which the NZDF attempted to control and conduct humanitarian activities instead of playing a supporting role.\textsuperscript{71}

The first NGOs to arrive in Cova Lima were not new to the area. Oxfam, CARE, and Medecin de Monde (MDM) had all been worked in the region prior to the post-referendum evacuation.\textsuperscript{72} German Agro Action (GAA), UNHCR, TimorAID, and a local East Timorese NGO, Bia Hula, were the other organisations working in Cova Lima during this period.\textsuperscript{73} These were the main organisations which the NZDF worked alongside during their deployment from 1999-2002. While their missions looked largely compatible and the UN mandate created overlapping tasks for the two actors, the way they carried out their activities in the district were sometimes at odds and left the


\textsuperscript{70} Michael Richard Hull, \textit{The NZDF as an Agent of Development: The Case of East Timor}, MA Thesis, Massey University, 2003, p.162.

\textsuperscript{71} Hull, p.163. The author spent a period of time in Cova Lima for his research and interviewed aid agency personnel who had worked with the NZDF.

\textsuperscript{72} Michael Elmquist, \textit{CIMIC in East Timor: An account of civil-military cooperation, coordination and collaboration in the early phases of the East Timor relief operation}, OCHA Briefing Paper, Geneva, 1999, p.9.

\textsuperscript{73} Cova Lima District Administration, Cova Lima Development Plan (2002), Suai: Cova Lima District Administration.
humanitarian community concerned about the NZDF’s role in humanitarian and development assistance.

According to the United Nations Training Module which outlines participation for peacekeeping forces in operations, the following were ways which the PKF was told to support other agencies and locals:

- The peacekeeping force will normally not use 100% of its own transport capability because it would have been deployed with some excess capacity in anticipation of any unforeseen developments. It can provide this unused capacity or access cargo space to others in its aircraft, ships and or vehicles, This is one of the most used and useful support activities that take place within a UN mission.
- The PKF usually also have an engineering capability with some capacity factored in for the same reasons. Again, this capacity can be used under certain conditions to assist with the emergency provision of maintenance of roads, water, and electricity or construction services.
- Although PKF medical units are deployed in support of the PKF, medical personnel often find it possible to assist the local population with some basic medical care or with education and assessments. Security, transport, engineering, roads, water, reconstruction, electricity, medical care, assessments, training, communication, specialist.
- Confidence building: Civil-Military Coordination Patrols that specifically include in their objectives the gathering of information for humanitarian purposes and the establishing of good relations with local populations through disseminating information about the UN mission.
- The PKF can also organize cultural or social activities. In East Timor, for example, various PKF battalions organised sporting events, beach clean up, and other environmental events and trained local farmers in agricultural techniques such as how to better utilise their water buffalos for preparing rice paddies.

The UN training module also outlines the role of the peacekeeper by explaining:

Civilian, military and police peacekeepers can support each other and the local community in many ways. For instance, some of the most common ways in which a soldier can expect to become involved in support to humanitarian efforts,

---

are by: Providing security, gathering information; escorting convoys; transport; construction; water; and manpower.\textsuperscript{75}

In addition, the direction given by the Peacekeeping Force Commander in East Timor was for the military forces to assist all other actors in creating a stable and developing state.\textsuperscript{76} Thus, while these directives outline some of the ways the NZDF and other UN forces could engage with the civilian community in East Timor, they were not limited to these directives.

The NZDF took a “holistic view of security”\textsuperscript{77} to their deployment in Cova Lima. While they emphasized that their primary role would continue to be security they were also instructed and prepared to assist in both the humanitarian and governance pillars within their force capabilities. Colonel Martin Dransfield describes the military’s involvement in humanitarian assistance as:

> A policy decision and it was accepted at the UN by Sergio de Mello. So it was quite important. We weren’t just purely there fat, dumb, and happy in sitting in our Observation Posts (OPs). We were actually out there patrolling and keeping security but at the same time assisting in the nation-building efforts of the NGOs and the United Nations.\textsuperscript{78}

Humanitarian assistance and civil-military affairs initiatives were seen by the NZDF to be directly linked to the security and stability of the district. According to Colonel Hayward:

\textsuperscript{77} Hayward, p.11.
\textsuperscript{78} Dransfield, interview.
Security operations in the form of constant patrolling along the border and its immediate environs continued but were run in conjunction with a comprehensive information operations campaign designed to reach into and influence the population centres. Civil-military affairs (CMA) operations that served as a bridge to support the community and supported both the military and information aspects of the campaign. The underlying premise of the Battalion’s concept was that the current security environment was relatively benign but contained within it were the seeds of long-term instability.\(^79\)

It was left to an individual commander’s discretion to determine the extent of involvement his personnel would undertake in the humanitarian and governance pillars. Dransfield emphasises the fact that, when the security environment allowed, he commanded the NZ battalion to take on a variety of other roles to assist the people of East Timor, “Yes, it is (involvement in humanitarian assistance) at the Commander’s discretion. I’m not sure whether or not other defence forces would have done the same.”\(^80\)

Dransfield noted that each country had their own ideas of how they wanted to help and at times this would lead to both practical and impractical assistance:

For example, I went over and visited the Portuguese. They actually put together a guesthouse, beautiful guesthouse, ridiculously beautiful to be honest. They invested a lot of their own money from their original funds and it was well intentioned, whether or not it was the right thing, their intention was to construct a quality guesthouse which they could then pass on to the Timorese to attract tourists.\(^81\)

The Portuguese devoted much of their efforts to building roads and posting signs and placards crediting the units that had built the roads. While Dransfield acknowledged the

---

\(^79\) Hayward, p.11.
\(^80\) Dransfield, interview.
\(^81\) Dransfield, interview.
efforts and assistance of the Portuguese battalion, he referred to their postings as, “A bit showy and a bit nationalistic I suppose, as plugs saying this was built by whomever. It’s probably not the way you would do it, you would just do the job.”

According to Dransfield, the Thai battalion also had a strong focus on civil-military affairs, because no security threat existed in their area of operations. They were developing crops and training the locals to cultivate the land:

> Because that’s what they do in Thailand and they actually have their own farms within the defence force because their budget isn’t big enough for them to actually give enough salaries, so they actually have to have their own farms to feed their own troops. So that’s what they were passing on. And every nation would bring its own flavor. Each country was trying to do the best they could and there was a big push for civil-military affairs in Timor.

Each New Zealand commander had his own views on the military’s involvement in humanitarian assistance and this was reflected in the emphasis their battalion placed on CMA activities. All NZDF personnel spoken with contended that the NZDF’s goal in humanitarian relief and reconstruction efforts was to create a sense of security and fill any gaps where there was a need in the district. In their efforts they attempted to engage local and NGO assistance, avoid duplication, and to handover responsibility for maintenance to the public. During the deployments of New Zealand Battalions under UNTAET, the NZDF carried out projects including conducting needs assessments, repatriation, refurbishing schools and medical clinics, setting up administrative structures, monitoring elections, and restoring infrastructure. Of these tasks that the NZDF carried out, the needs assessment were met with the most criticism by NGO personnel.

---

82 Dransfield, interview.
83 Dransfield, interview.
The aid agencies cited resentment when NZDF personnel would try to advise them on the district’s needs.\(^8^4\) One NGO representative suggested that the NZDF was out of line by conducting their needs assessments by asking locals in various communities in the district what they required and then informing the locals that they would notify a NGO of these requirements, as if to say help was on its way. She notes that, “this raises community expectation and then puts pressure on us to respond.”\(^8^5\)

The NZDF did carry out a variety of needs assessments as part of their information operations, which was one of their outlined directives as part of UNTAET. NZ Battalion 2’s CMA platoon commander developed a CMA database, which contained information gathered regarding the demographics of the area. The database incorporated information obtained about local villages from both the military and NGOs such as: population, leaders, schools, medical issues, and names of returning locals from West Timor. NZ BATT 3 also expanded the database with continued intelligence gathering. NZ BATT 3’s unofficial motto was, “Better 100,000 pairs of eyes than just our 700.”\(^8^6\) In addition, NZ BATT 5’s commander, Colonel Hayward, acknowledged there was a great deal left to do for East Timor to cross over into statehood. So, following the British example of the 1950s in Malaya, Hayward and his staff created a document known as “Realization Issues” that summarized the needs of the region and how they could be addressed to facilitate a successful transition to independent statehood.\(^8^7\)

---

\(^8^4\) Hull, p.163.
\(^8^5\) NGO employee quoted in Hull, p.165.
\(^8^6\) Major David Hingston quoted in Crawford and Harper, p.143.
He assigned his liaison officers (LOs) a particular area, ranging from agriculture to law, and instructed them to research what the region had, what was lacking, and what could be done by the NZDF or others to assist. He was attempting to attract more NGO and UN assistance to Cova Lima to remedy these problems that would present obstacles to further security and development within an independent East Timor.\(^88\)

The NGO personnel were often suspicious of the military’s motives for carrying out these needs assessments and they were cautious not to give the NZDF too much information about the locals, as they did not want the locals to perceive them as working with the defence force. As a representative of the NGO AustCARE states, “The military will crave information intelligence to fulfill their security tasks, but humanitarians will not want to betray any confidences that may risk their neutrality or cause harm to anyone.”\(^89\)

While most aid workers agreed that there were times that the military’s assistance was needed in an effort to fill gaps in the district, they also felt that too much involvement and an attempt on the military’s part to control humanitarian activities was encroaching on their humanitarian space. A great concern was the military’s involvement in roles outside their primary task of maintaining security in the district. As a representative of the ICRC notes, “Involvement in humanitarian activities may divert the military from their principal objective—there is a real danger of soldiers being used to treat the symptoms

\(^{88}\) Hayward, interview.

rather than the disease itself.\textsuperscript{90} Most NGO staff contended that the military’s comparative advantage was in its ability to provide security and repair infrastructure and that it was these two areas where the NZDF should be focussing their efforts. The view held by most NGOs in East Timor was that, “the main focus of military forces is to provide and guarantee security, to assist with the protection of civilian communities, and to enable freedom of movement so that civil society can be re-established.”\textsuperscript{91}

However, in East Timor the benign security environment coupled with UNTAET’s mandate called upon NZDF and other forces to engage in more than security patrols. To what extent then would the involvement of the NZDF in humanitarian assistance meet with the approval of the aid agencies? This posed a dilemma for the humanitarian community, as some NGOs were more amenable to working alongside, and even with, the military than others. Most NGOs in Cova Lima shared the view that:

In a post-conflict situation the “humanitarian” role of the military should be looked upon with fewer reservations. In situations where peace has been restored or is in the process of being restored, the provision of direct aid by the military poses fewer problems since there is no risk of soldiers being identified or confused with this of that party to the conflict. However, it should be pointed out that even in these situations, humanitarian action associated too closely with military action risks projecting an image which may cause problems if hostilities are renewed.\textsuperscript{92}

As James Addis of World Vision New Zealand, who worked in East Timor during the UNTAET operation, noted:

It is when the military’s involvement in humanitarian aid gets confused in people’s minds that causes problems, because NGOs may be become targeted. It

\textsuperscript{90} Struder, p.374.
\textsuperscript{91} Austcare, p.14.
\textsuperscript{92} Struder, p.386.
is best to realize roles and engage when necessary but maintain a distance that is recognized and understood by the local population.\textsuperscript{93}

The NZDF did undertake CMA activities in which they were directly responsible for the planning and implementation of humanitarian assistance, at times without the knowledge of the aid agencies in the district. The NZDF argues that these projects were carried out based on the needs of the locals and in areas where the aid agencies were unable to respond.\textsuperscript{94} When asked whether part of their mandate was to deliver humanitarian aid in East Timor, Colonel Gawn replied, “Not to deliver it, but certainly to provide an environment in which it could be delivered.”\textsuperscript{95}

Colonel Dransfield felt that the military’s role in humanitarian assistance was in filling the gaps in areas that the aid agencies were unable to respond. He recognized the need to clarify the roles of both parties, but clarification should not impede each actor’s flexibility to respond to the needs of the locals. As he notes:

They (the aid agencies) have some clear roles: facilitating the movement of refugees across the border, making sure they’re then moved on somewhere safe, giving something to enable them to sustain themselves, and that they’re married up with the villages that they come from. They’ve got a role obviously to go into those parts of the area and make sure that the waters clean and there are programmes to build houses and schools.\textsuperscript{96}

Dransfield also observed that the military wanted to avoid encroaching on humanitarian space, but that the main areas he thought the military could assist in the district were the information, intelligence and needs assessments to, “enable them to do their work”; logistics support, manpower and vehicles; and , “in some areas we’ve got assets that the

\textsuperscript{93} James Addis, World Vision New Zealand Representative, interview, 16 December, 2004.
\textsuperscript{94} Hayward, interview.
\textsuperscript{95} Gawn, interview.
\textsuperscript{96} Dransfield, interview.
NGOs haven’t got.” Dransfield recalls Battalion 2’s medical capabilities, “in (Cova Lima) we had a surgery, so we became the surgical capacity, so when a kid fell out of a tree and took out half his brain, we were there to do that cause nobody else could do that and we have a helicopter with which to do it quickly.”

Many aid agency employees agreed that the NZDF had capabilities that they lacked.

The military have significant assets that can assist in the humanitarian effort of peacekeeping operations, but they are not and can never be humanitarian workers. The military can assist with logistics, infrastructure, transport and immediate life-saving support, but they are not development agencies and should not purport to be so.

As one NGO representative stated in support of this view, “It is not inconceivable that in certain situations the military may be in a better position than the [aid agencies] to carry out certain humanitarian tasks. Their military role in the humanitarian domain should, however, always be subsidiary in nature.”

The New Zealand battalion commanders spoken with also held the view that the military’s role in humanitarian assistance was secondary to the provision of security. However, they did interpret their role in humanitarian assistance as essential to creating the necessary structures on which the East Timorese could build. They sought to carry out this role by filling the gaps in the district and in accordance with their mandate. Thus, without clear directives from the UN, the onus was on the aid agencies and military

---

97 Dransfield, interview.
98 Dransfield, interview.
100 Struder, p.386.
forces in Cova Lima to communicate with one another to determine what roles each should play in assisting the local population. With varying interpretations of the mandate and roles for the military in humanitarian assistance, the NZDF-NGO relationship in Cova Lima was in a sense set up to be strained. The overlapping mandates in Cova Lima have confirmed the need for the NZDF to be cautious in identifying the gaps they will fill and establish with the aid agencies if it is appropriate for military involvement. Dransfield sums up the NZDF’s involvement in humanitarian assistance in Cova Lima:

I think we fill in the gaps its based on communication and understanding and if you’re constantly talking and saying, we are here to help if required, then surely there’s nothing wrong with that. But I don’t want them to see us as encroaching on their space, so if they’ve got space, that’s their space and as long as we’ve communicated to know what that space is and wherever the gaps are we’ll fill them in, if we can. That’s probably the best way to do it, and I think it works.101

While the NZDF engaged in relief support operations within their capabilities and without sacrificing their primary role of security, Michael Smith notes, “As a general rule, East Timor confirmed the preference for the military to provide support for rather than manage relief operations, but obviously this depends on the degree of security and freedom of movement of the relief organisations.”102

The operation in East Timor has demonstrated the need for improved clarification of the roles and mandates of the military and humanitarian communities. The humanitarian agencies and peacekeeping forces were brought under the umbrella of UNTAET’s broad mandate and their missions directly overlapped. While the military was exclusively responsible for providing security, they were also tasked with assisting in the

101 Dransfield, interview.
102 Smith, p.118.
humanitarian and governance pillars of the UN operation. The aid agencies were critical of the NZDF’s involvement in some aspects of assistance to the district, but the NZDF personnel contended that their actions were motivated by a desire to promote a secure environment and fill critical gaps in capabilities. Due to the various interpretations that personnel within both the humanitarian and military communities had regarding the military’s involvement in humanitarian assistance, the need for the NZDF to establish guidelines outlining what roles it should take in supporting and implementing humanitarian assistance is clear.

**Ad hoc Relations**

While the NZDF’s experience in Bosnia provided a stronger appreciation of CMA, the lack of CMA doctrine, well-developed protocols, and understanding of NGOs and development principles served to undermine their CMA efforts. The majority of NZDF personnel involved in CMA took a common sense approach to their relations with aid agencies and locals, which from the NGO perspective, oversimplified the development process and oftentimes ignored humanitarian principles. In this section, the structure, organisation, and approach of the NZDF’s CMA operations in Cova Lima are examined.

UNTAET’s civil-military affairs structure followed along from INTERFET. This included a CMA branch at force headquarters in Dili and a CMOC in Suai to organise requests from humanitarian agencies.\(^{103}\) Like their Australian counterparts and most of the other nations’ contributing forces, the NZDF did not deploy to East Timor with

\(^{103}\) Smith, p.73.
specialist CMA staff. The lack of importance placed on having established CMA doctrine or units was reflected throughout East Timor:

In retrospect, it is fair to assess that the importance of CMA was underrated in initial planning by the Secretariat, reflecting a lack of experience in the DPKO and by most of the contributing nations. Few defence forces have this capability embedded permanently within their force structures or have well-developed doctrine.

Most of the NZDF commanders relied upon the America Britain Canada Australia (ABCA) civil affairs doctrine, as well as their own experience with CMA in Bosnia to determine the battalion’s CMA structure. When asked if any doctrine was used to base his CMA efforts on, Colonel Dransfield replied, “No, not really. We sort of made it up as we went along. There is a bit of civil-military affairs doctrine, but I wouldn’t be able to quote it. That’s one of the things we said we really needed.”

While each successive rotation was able to devote more time to CMA, their coordination structure was similar in each of the six battalions. Each battalion had a CMA platoon and several LOs who would liaise with the NGOs, locals, and UN agencies. Most appointed a lead LO so they would, “be the single point of contact between NGOs and the UN,” according to Colonel David Gawn. He also notes this single point of contact, “kept it tidy so people weren’t following their own agendas, as all NGOs tend to, and

104 Gawn, interview.
105 Smith, p.74.
106 Dransfield, interview.
107 Gawn, interview.
making promises they were never going to keep or both making promises for the same thing.”

According to Dransfield, the CMA platoon was made up of about 30 soldiers and an additional 12 soldiers served as LOs at headquarters and throughout the district. They also had a CMA structure that was part of the CMOC directive handed down by the UN. It provided a mission statement, a series of tasks which they were to be involved in, and a CMA structure. The LOs also were responsible for creating daily and weekly reports on their various activities.

Most battalion commanders selected their CMA officers from the territorial forces. There are two main reasons commanders tend to place territorial forces in CMA roles. As Colonel Gawn explains the first reason is from a security and training standpoint:

I think we drew them from the TF because they feel more comfortable when they are not put into the position of commanding soldiers in a situation that may lead to conflict because they don’t have the amount of experience. And from a risk mitigation perspective, it’s easier to put them into a position that most should be able to do, the LOs are only responsible for themselves.

The New Zealand Lessons Learned Cell supports this view by stating, “TF personnel may be less suited to employment in Combat Service Support appointments because of the increasing specialisation in these trades.” Due to the fact that territorial forces receive

---

108 Gawn, interview.
109 Dransfield, interview.
110 Gawn, interview.
111 New Zealand Defence Force, Lessons Learned Cell, p.23.
far less training in combat readiness than their regular force counterparts, their skills are seen as better suited to non-combat peacekeeping duties.

The second reason territorial forces are often employed in CMA roles is their perceived ability to relate better to civilians than the regular force personnel. Major Blanchard explains that territorial forces, “have balance between civilian knowledge and military knowledge so they have potential to make liaison easier.”

The territorial forces are employed in civilian occupations and, thus, have day-to-day contact with civilians. The regular force personnel are perceived to be more engrained in the military system and, therefore, at times it is thought that they may be unable to relate as well to their civilian counterparts. Colonel Dransfield illustrates the view that the territorial forces are:

Very good at [CMA]. They tend to be a bit older, these officers were, and they could sit down and chat with local civilians. Whereas our younger officers, I was one once and probably still am in terms of the way I speak, are very military oriented and find it more difficult to communicate with an NGO or a local.

Many officers in the NZDF see the territorial forces taking the lead in CMA operations, supported by the regular force. Certainly within the territorial force, there is a strong push for a more legitimized territorial force role in CMA. Major Russell Keetley notes that CMA was a territorial focus throughout the deployment to East Timor and that the NZDF is currently evaluating whether to have a CMA cell in the territorial forces:

I can see it fitting in quite comfortably into our organisation. We have an intelligence cell, beside that cell we could develop the CMA role. A number of our TF soldiers are in political studies and at universities studying things along

---

113 Dransfield, interview.
the lines of civil-military studies. We have a number of senior police officers, people who are involved with civil defence, on local councils; stuff that fits into a CMA organisation.

During the deployment of New Zealand Battalions 2-6 to East Timor, 10-14% of the force strength was drawn from the territorial forces. Embedding the entire CMA capacity within the territorial forces, however, has many implications for future deployments, as territorial forces are not typically called upon with the frequency of their regular force counterparts, nor do they typically deploy to combat zones where CMA efforts may be required to occur alongside intense conflict.

Apart from their preference to place territorial force personnel in CMA roles, many New Zealand commanders in East Timor also chose female officers as their LOs. Colonel Gawn describes his rationale for selecting a female LO because, “they generally have a better relationship with NGOs, they are less threatening to NGOs.” NZDF personnel with trade skills were also often tasked with CMA roles. While those selected were not trained specialists in CMA, they were selected on the basis of their perceived abilities to relate to locals and act as efficient liaisons.

CMA operations were largely viewed as “residual” or “redundant” efforts and, as is the case in most military forces, the lack of understanding of the importance of CMA led to a blasé view of both the operations and the personnel. CMA was generally regarded

115 Major Russell Keetley, Senior Liaison Officer, NZ Battalion 2, interview, 3 April 2005.
116 New Zealand Defence Force, Lessons Learned Cell, p.23.
117 Gawn, interview.
118 Gattsche, interview.
throughout the ranks of the NZDF as a job that, “anyone could do”. Michael Hull found that while the NZDF CMA officers in East Timor understood the need for CMA operations in complex emergencies, the majority of the battalion personnel viewed CMA as, “nice to have rather than necessity” and that in general, “junior staff from the regular force [had] a general ignorance regarding the role of CMA and some indifference toward the work.”

Many personnel viewed peacekeeping and CMA as second nature to the defence force, not something that required training or education. In fact, most NZDF personnel interviewed were of the opinion that the New Zealand Defence Force does have a natural advantage over other nations’ militaries when it comes to peacekeeping operations. Particularly in East Timor and elsewhere in the Pacific, Colonel Hayward notes of the NZDF:

> We are well respected. [We Have] less baggage than most, especially the Australians, they come across rather brash and lack empathy. [They are] quite often well intentioned, but don’t appreciate the local culture… By and large Kiwis are able to fit in.

Major Blanchard elaborates on this view:

> I think it’s more the general Kiwi soldier’s attitude, the fact that he traditionally gets on well with everyone. He is not condescending. He can sit down and establish a rapport based on mutual respect if you like, and I think that’s our strength.

---

120 Hull, Agent of Change, p.22.
121 Hayward, interview.
122 Blanchard , interview with Glyn Harper.
Hayward encapsulates this as the, “the Kiwi Way” or “Kia Ora Bro” approach.\footnote{123} Keetley also supported this view by stating that, “As a smaller nation we are exposed to more cultures and accepting more cultures. We are able to forge those relationships quickly.”\footnote{124}

The ability to forge relationships is certainly a strong component of CMA operations and the flexible approach to peacekeeping operations is an asset to the NZDF. A greater understanding of the aid agencies, principles of humanitarianism, and the impact of the military’s role in reconstruction and development will serve to build on these basic strengths. However, more emphasis must be placed upon the value of CMA operations to achieve these ends. Hull notes, “Almost without exception those involved in CMA activities felt that the pre-deployment training had left them particularly unprepared for the nature of the work.”\footnote{125} While some training had been given to all soldiers deploying for East Timor, this consisted primarily of a short briefing on the role of aid agencies in the field. As Keetley noted:

\begin{quote}
We actually had CARE come and talk to us before we deployed to East Timor. These were Kiwis, but it wasn’t actually an advantage because when you get into theatre, the people you’re working with are probably from an international organisation.\footnote{126}
\end{quote}

It was this lack of specific CMA training that led personnel in East Timor to take a common sense approach to their CMA operations. Many of these approaches worked out very well for the battalions and many projects and relationships were built on the basis of

\footnotesize
\begin{flushleft}
123 Hayward, interview. \\
124 Keetley, interview. \\
125 Hull, Agent of Change, p.24. \\
126 Keetley, interview.
\end{flushleft}
this common sense approach. Two of the practical ways in which the NZDF sought to engage with aid agencies are outlined below.

First, each battalion made an effort to engage with the NGO and UN staff by inviting the aid personnel to attend various meetings to coordinate activities and keep the lines of communication open. According to Colonel Gawn, the NGO and UN staff members were allowed to attend their daily Orders Groups, which were held every evening at 6pm. The NZDF battalions would also run security briefings when the security risk was heightened. Gawn notes, “We used to run a security briefing when it was hot every morning for those that needed it and if they wanted to, they could come in and register their group, their timings, and location.”

Throughout the NZDF deployment, the attendance of aid agency personnel attended at these meetings fluctuated. It was pointed out by several NZDF officers that the aid agency personnel were really interested in coordinating during times of insecurity. During the New Zealand Battalion 2’s deployment, Major Russell Keetley recalls a high aid agency turnout:

When [Private Leonard] Manning was killed and there was the worst monsoon the district had seen in 25 years, the security situation became more risky and the roads were eroded on a daily basis. They were coming into us on a daily basis because we set up an engineering road compound where they were updated daily as to which roads were passable. So they would come in and see if they could make it there and back. We would offer them assistance, if there was anything we could do.

---

127 Gawn, interview.
128 Keetley, interview; Dransfield, interview; Gawn, interview.
129 Keetley, interview.
When asked whether many NGO or UN staff took them up on their offer to attend the meetings of New Zealand Battalion 3, Colonel Gawn replied, “No, only when they thought it was a bit dicey they’d come in.”

Second, as mentioned in the “A Broad Mandate” section, another way in which the NZDF sought to coordinate their various CMA activities in the district was with the database that was created during Battalion 2’s deployment. The database continued to grow with the successive battalions and the NZDF found it useful as an intelligence tool which allowed the force to understand the area of operations to a greater extent. The NZDF also shared their information with many of the NGOs in the district. UNHCR also had a refugee database at the border, but they were reluctant to share that information. If they deemed it necessary for the NZDF to know certain information or if it wouldn’t negatively impact the refugees, UNHCR would allow the NZDF to access the information.

While many NZDF personnel, particularly the battalion commanders, understood the need for humanitarian agencies to safeguard their information, Katsumi Ishizuka noted that some NGOs were considered: “‘too neutral’; they expressed extreme reluctance to cooperate with the military sector, for example information sharing; they were even reluctant to be seen with military personnel because of their strict policies of non-violence.

---

130 Gawn, interview.
131 Dransfield, interview; Keetley, interview.
NZDF intelligence gathering initiatives such as databases and liaison programmes were met with relative success, however, the lack of language capabilities was a detriment to their ability to gather intelligence and build relationships with the local people and aid agencies. As Brigadier Martyn Dunne noted, “Our language ability is appalling. It’s something we have to address with urgency.”\textsuperscript{133} Major Greg Allnutt supported this view by outlining the critical need for a language capacity:

> When they’re going to be used in CMA type taskings, it helps to establish that rapport very quickly, and especially when gathering information through an interpreter at least you can double check to a degree what that information is being passed on and received.\textsuperscript{134}

When asked whether there were problems with the language barrier, New Zealand’s Battalion 2’s senior liaison officer, Major Russell Keetley responded that, “Yes… We had lessons when we first arrived and we tried to pick up as much as we could. I still need an interpreter; I can’t talk [to the locals].”\textsuperscript{135} The need for language capabilities was also identified by the Lessons Learned Cell of New Zealand Joint Forces, “NZDF specialist linguists would have enhanced NZFOREM [New Zealand Forces in East Timor] intelligence operations.”\textsuperscript{136}

During pre-deployment training Major Keetley noted, “language [training] was given the pretty cursory one hour a week… it wasn’t suitable. We could have had more language

\textsuperscript{133} Brigadier Martyn Dunne, interview with Glyn Harper, November 1999, Kippenberger Military Archive and Research Library (KMARL), Waiouru.
\textsuperscript{134} Major Greg Allnutt, OC Reconnaissance Company Suai 3, interview with Glyn Harper, July 2000, Kippenberger Military Archive and Research Library (KMARL), Waiouru.
\textsuperscript{135} Major Russell Keetley, Senior Liaison Officer NZ Battalion 2, interview with Glyn Harper, 22 June 2000, Kippenberger Military Archive and Research Library (KMARL), Waiouru.
\textsuperscript{136} New Zealand Defence Force, Lessons Learned Cell, p.34.
However, the pre-deployment training was more focused on getting the troops to an operational deployment level. As Major Nigel Gattsche, who was involved in training New Zealand Battalions 2-6, notes, “We sometimes have three months to bring them up to the operational level and we might not always have that time. I had to go up to that level in 10 days.” Major Lyndon Blanchard also explains the focus of the pre-deployment training for East Timor:

We have not operated as a battalion regularly for quite a long period of time. We spend a lot of our build-up training focusing on our basic procedures. And, as it turned out, that training was ideal and when we came over here and straight into a pretty intense period once we took over, we actually didn’t drop too many balls, so the training we did do got us up to standard.

The time that might be devoted to more specific language, culture, and CMA training was a much secondary concern to the basic training requirements necessary for a military deployment. Captain Mike Duncan expresses a view commonly held by military personnel on training:

[We’ve got] to train to the highest threat level. It would be no good for us to train just for peacekeeping operations. The reason for that is, as you can see, all around the world peacekeeping can change from a fairly benign atmosphere to a high threat level overnight. Our people have got to have that training to be able to handle that sort of situation, otherwise we are going to lose a lot of people out there.

Again, this reinforces the general view amongst NZDF personnel and most other military forces that CMA training and operations come in a far second to the security concerns of

---

137 Keetley, interview with Glyn Harper.
138 Gattsche, interview.
139 Blanchard, interview with Glyn Harper.
140 Captain Mike Duncan, S3 of NZ Battalion 2, interview with Glyn Harper, 26 June 2000, Kippenberger Military Archive and Research Library (KMARL), Waiouru.
conventional military forces. As Captain Warren Park explains of the CMA efforts of his engineer detachment, “[CMA] is a residual effort. It’s not what we are here primarily to do. It does give the battalion a lot of kudos and it puts them in a position to get support from [humanitarian agencies] as well. So the commanding officer (CO) is happy for a residual effort to go towards this.”

However, as Rudolph Barnes demonstrates the difference between CMA operations in war and those in peacekeeping operations:

In wartime, civil-military relations are secondary to defeating the enemy with overwhelming force. But in peacetime, when public support for political objectives both at home and in the area of operations is more important than defeating an ambiguous enemy, civil-military relations become the primary focus of legitimacy.

This was not the view shared by most within the NZDF during the deployment to East Timor. As discussed in Chapter 2, within military forces a debate regarding the emphasis that should be placed on training for CMA operations continues. During the operation in East Timor a variety of different views on how the NZDF should train for peace operations emerged. Major Nigel Gattsche noted that the experience in East Timor demonstrated for him that:

We need to do more training, but I don’t think it needs to be at the soldier level, it’s more a captain, major, staff sergeant role. Because the soldier at the end of the day is the doer; it’s the people who need to liaise and talk with civilians that need to have that extra training. We could do so much more, but again it’s that balance, we’ve got so much to teach them. Where do we draw the line? I think

---

everyone should have a basic level, even if it’s an introduction. Then you’ll have the selected individuals who you know are going to be dealing with NGOs on a regular basis.  

Major Keetley agreed that all soldiers should have a basic understanding and appreciation for CMA, but that, “You’ll have certain officers and certain people who will be involved in [CMA] more so than others. They should get the more in depth knowledge.” Most senior officers involved in CMA in East Timor recognized the need for improved training, understanding, and appreciation throughout the defence force of the importance of CMA operations. The Lessons Learned Cell acknowledged too that the emphasis on CMA in East Timor needed to be expanded upon:

CMA doctrine, including principles, likely tasks... command and control arrangements should be integrated throughout all levels of NZDF training as this functional output becomes increasingly significant in modern peacekeeping operations.

The importance of training in CMA is evident when we examine the varying degrees of success throughout the battalion rotations. The NZDF received no development training and their efforts were based solely on a common sense approach. As a NGO worker describes, the NZDF’s involvement amounts to, “laymen’s development, where they believe they are doing the right thing... a sort of common sense approach that takes problems at face value.”

143 Gattsche, interview.
144 Keetley, interview.
145 New Zealand Defence Force, Lessons Learned Cell, p.22.
146 Hull, Agent of Development, p.165.
As one battalion in Cova Lima found, aid is a tricky business. You have to be careful to whom, when, why, and where you are distributing it. Upon their departure from Cova Lima, some NZ Battalion 2 personnel gave bicycles to their kitchen hands, which were viewed as status symbols in East Timor, and led all of the villagers to want and expect bicycles from Battalion 3 when they arrived. As Gawn noted, “You have to be careful and give it in the structure that’s accepted by the people. So we ended up giving them (the bicycles) to the village leaders for them to distribute, because that’s acceptable to the people.”

Many aid agencies were wary of the military’s desire to approach and complete projects rapidly without fully considering the impact of their work. One aid worker noted her concern with the NZDF’s tendency to “bypass the appropriate channels” to implement quick-impact projects. “A lot of research goes in to deciding what projects should be done where, these guys (the NZDF) would just start projects on their own accord, without consulting anyone.”

However, NZDF personnel overwhelmingly expressed frustration at the time it took for aid agencies to get projects underway and then completed. Much of the NZDF effort that went in to rebuilding and aid initiatives in the district was driven by a desire to help the locals improve their lives and communities. The time that it took for the aid workers to deliberate and then make decisions regarding their projects was a factor that many NZDF

---

147 Gawn, interview.
personnel felt difficult to understand. Major Keetley describes his frustration with trying to help the people of Cova Lima but at times being unable to:

Sometimes the Army needs a fast decision on something, they won’t make a decision, they revert to someone else like a committee to deal. That’s a downside. Things I know that we can fix, but we can’t because we can’t get involved, we’re a stand-back organisation. We are providing residual assistance and technical advice basically on most things, and you know that we can jump in and in five minutes would fix it, and you know we can’t. We’ve got to go and get someone to go and fix it for us, so it’s pretty much a stand back, get them to do it themselves, that’s a downside too. We all came here with good intentions of helping people, and you can get pretty much frustrated—we could do it, but we can’t.  

Due to the lengthy process of consultation with the aid agencies, many CMA officers consulted directly and exclusively with the district administrator regarding projects where the NZDF could assist. There is an engrained mentality within most military forces to get the job done and produce outcomes, which was often at odds with the aid agency approach to assistance and development. One CMA officer describes the general NZDF view that, “you’ve got to get moving quickly and you might not be right every time, but you’ve got to be implementers.” The battalions did carry out many projects within their deployments and their work, while met with some criticism from the aid community, did assist the people of Cova Lima. Time and funding, however, were cited as the two main issues that impacted the NZDF’s ability to carry out additional projects. The deployments of each battalion to East Timor were six months in duration and this was the driving factor behind quick-impact projects that the military could carry out.

---

149 Keetley, interview with Glyn Harper.
150 Gattsche, interview.
151 Unidentified CMA officer quoted in Hull, Agent of Change, p.25.
Funding was a huge constraint on the NZDF’s ability to implement reconstruction and development projects in Cova Lima. Generally, the defence force does not receive direct funding for aid projects and any projects carried out were done with spare money available through the normal operational expense allocation. Thus, the funding the NZDF did receive varied from battalion to battalion and, for the most part, was the result of soliciting money from various government agencies, most notably New Zealand, the US, and the UK.

CMA operations require continuity and guidelines which military personnel can adhere to throughout the operational deployments. During New Zealand Battalion 2’s deployment to East Timor, troops were assigned to live in the village with the locals to gain local trust and build relationships. They wore uniforms and were armed, clearly demonstrating their role as military personnel to the locals. However, during New Zealand Battalion 5’s deployment, troops living amongst the locals wore civilian clothing. While this was not met with criticism at the time, most likely because it was not well known among the small aid community in Cova Lima, military personnel conducting CMA operations in civilian clothing became a highly controversial issue in 2001 in Afghanistan. When US soldiers were carrying out humanitarian activities in civilian clothing shortly after Operation Enduring Freedom began, their actions were highly criticized by the

---

153 Hayward, interview; Gawn, interview.
154 Dransfield, interview.
international aid community for blurring the line between aid worker and soldier in the eyes of the locals.\textsuperscript{155}

Michael Smith notes, “The Peacekeeping Force learned a great deal about CMA and made a number of adjustments. With knowledge gained through experience, CMA training courses were implemented and contingents enhanced their capabilities in successive force rotations.”\textsuperscript{156} While many of their CMA capabilities were enhanced throughout the battalion deployments to East Timor and the NZDF battalions were able to devote more time and effort to their CMA activities as the security situation improved on the border, they still lacked an institutional knowledge throughout their deployment to East Timor. This led to varied quality of CMA operations from one battalion to the next, as each sought to implement their own \textit{ad hoc} strategies. There is no doubt that their involvement in CMA enabled them to gain a better sense of their environment through liaising with the locals and aid agencies, which in turn assisted in the overall security strategy. The realisation that a holistic approach to security included well constructed CMA operations created, among most senior officers, an understanding of the need for improved CMA operations in the future.


\textsuperscript{156} Smith, p.59.
Personality Driven

Both actors in Cova Lima arrived with preconceived notions and stereotypes of the other. Some of these perceptions were based on past experiences, while others were borne out of misunderstanding. What little training that was offered to the NGO and NZDF personnel was quickly overshadowed by the personality driven nature of this relationship. This section explores the stereotypes and personalities that impacted the NZDF-NGO relationship in Cova Lima.

Many military and NGO personnel in Cova Lima cited negative feelings toward the other prior to entering the district.\textsuperscript{157} Much of this ill-feeling was more indicative of a lack of understanding of the aims and culture of the other actor than it was an opinion based on past experiences.\textsuperscript{158} However, those NZDF personnel who had served in Bosnia generally cited negative views of aid agencies upon deploying to East Timor. Their experiences with NGOs in Cova Lima were reportedly a vast improvement over their relations with aid agencies in Bosnia.\textsuperscript{159} According to several officers who had served in both Bosnia and East Timor, the aid agencies operating in Cova Lima were much easier to work with than those in present in Bosnia. Many personnel stated this was due in large part to the small number of NGOs in Cova Lima as compared to Bosnia.\textsuperscript{160}

\textsuperscript{157} Most of the interviewees spoken with reported having preconceived notions before entering the district.
\textsuperscript{158} Few NGO personnel serving in Cova Lima had worked alongside military forces in the past. Similarly, most NZDF personnel had not deployed into areas with NGO workers, apart from several of the senior officers having served in Bosnia.
\textsuperscript{159} Gawn, interview.
\textsuperscript{160} According to Gawn, “It was far easier [working with NGOs] in East Timor, there were less of them, but also we had more experience than we did in Bosnia.” Gawn, interview.
There were other factors that contributed to an improved relationship in Cova Lima. Many of the aid agency personnel in Cova Lima were Australians and there were also a few New Zealanders.\(^{161}\) This cultural link made it easier to build positive military-NGO relations. In addition, the representative for CARE in Cova Lima was an ex-warrant officer from the Australian Defence Force, which also served to provide common ground on which the NZDF could build relationships.\(^{162}\) Also, the NGO personnel working in Cova Lima garnered respect from many of their NZDF counterparts for coming to the impoverished district when other aid agency employees were in Dili.\(^{163}\) Due to the dismal infrastructure in the area, Dransfield said the NGOs in Cova Lima tended to be, “the tougher, harder one in our area of operations, where you had malaria, it rained a lot, and it was bloody hot and oppressive.”\(^{164}\) Major Blanchard described the aid agency personnel in Cova Lima as, “Very proactive, they’re very experienced as a rule and they are very keen on getting something done here, which is a contrast to the Maliano region, there aren’t so many self-starters there.”\(^{165}\)

Military forces typically have more respect for aid organisations with structures and values similar to their own. Thus, in addition to the aforementioned qualities, NZDF personnel also cited the size, structure and organisational abilities of certain aid agencies as points against which they could measure their effectiveness. The larger organisations were more respected than the smaller aid agencies in Cova Lima. As Gawn explains:

\(^{161}\) Hayward, interview.  
\(^{162}\) Dransfield, interview.  
\(^{163}\) Schmid, interview.  
\(^{164}\) Dransfield, interview.  
\(^{165}\) Blanchard, interview with Glyn Harper.
UNHCR is very organized, very good. But they want to get in there and they always do, they get in there early and they provide the initial shelter and normally only up until the time when the other NGOs can come in and start. So, they’re very organized but they have a very tight charter. MSF is also a very good and strong organisation; Red Cross is very strong within their area. So those ones are actually very good. It some of the others, especially the smaller ones, that are more difficult. Less organized, that are not overly concerned often times about what the impact of what they’re doing, I’d say a lot of them are just there for their own feel good factor. Which is kind of sad, but it’s reality.  

Another attribute of the aid agencies that NZDF personnel mentioned was the willingness to take risks to deliver aid and connect with the grassroots community. Keetley singled out Timor Aid as an organisation that, “Went places that others refused to go.”

While the military personnel based some of their general assessments of aid agencies on these characteristics, they recognized that regardless of the structure or size of a given organisation, the military-NGO relationship would be driven by individual personalities. As Major Keetley explains, “The relationship depends on the personalities there—you never know how its going to work until you get there. Every new deployment will be different from the previous one.” There are many examples of the personality driven nature of the NZDF-NGO relationship in Cova Lima. For instance, two battalion commanders had opposing views toward the same organisation. During New Zealand Battalion 3’s deployment, Colonel Gawn singled out MDM as a NGO with which the battalion had a very good relationship, noting, “They were able to see that we were both  

166 Gawn, interview.  
167 Keetley, interview.  
168 Keetley, interview.
trying to achieve the same thing in terms of a health system within the area.”\textsuperscript{169} While just a few months earlier, during New Zealand Battalion 2’s deployment, Colonel Dransfield described MDM as having, “very defined space…and they don’t like anyone encroaching on that…I found it hard to find some sort of mutual understanding where we could assist.”\textsuperscript{170}

The senior medical officer in Cova Lima, Major Andrew Dunne, described his relationship with MDM by noting, “On a patient by patient basis there is a fantastic working relationship and they do their best and then we do our best and we recognize that. We talk on a regular basis.” However, Dunne also noted that he had attempted to offer NZDF assistance to MDM to boost the medical community’s response in Cova Lima and when MDM declined Dunne’s offer, he was frustrated that the organisation was being too cavalier in their actions, “MDM have got that vision but their vision is a long way down the track and something needs to be done now.”\textsuperscript{171}

Similarly, the NZDF’s relationship with Oxfam, another well respected and large international NGO, was based very much on personalities. While Oxfam is widely known to be averse to working with military forces, Major Keetley noted that the Oxfam representative in Cova Lima was not only willing to work alongside the NZDF, but also made additional requests of the military forces:

The lady that was running the programme would come down and try to get us to do things that were her job. She would bat the eyelids and all that sort of thing. They’re quick to exclude us from things that they don’t want us to do, but when

\textsuperscript{169} Gawn, interview. \\
\textsuperscript{170} Dransfield, interview. \\
\textsuperscript{171} Dunne, interview with Glyn Harper.
they want us to do something...[She would ask for] transportation, equipment... things that she knew we had but that they should have provided themselves. One thing that I did was I read their constitutions, so I knew what I was entitled to help them with and what I wasn’t.172

Keetley noted that in his experience with aid agencies it is not uncommon for NGO personnel to request and expect too much assistance from the military. “They can pull the wool over your eyes. I encountered a number of these organisations who said you’re supposed to this and that... then I referred to their constitutions and found that no we aren’t.” He emphasized the fact that too few military personnel know exactly what the role of each organisation is and this can lead to problems, “They think they can squeeze something out of us, that’s human nature. But we need to know how their organisations work, what they’re supposed to be supplying, because they are being paid by somebody to do this and if they’re asking us to do it for them...”173

Even as the NZDF’s battalion rotations continued and the military personnel had gained more CMA education in pre-deployment training, the military personnel still cited generally negative attitudes toward NGOs.174 Despite recognizing some positive qualities in the NGOs, many military personnel still believed that the NZDF was much better equipped, organized, disciplined, and capable than their aid agency counterparts in Cova Lima. Colonel Hayward, commander of New Zealand’s fifth Battalion, articulated a common view amongst NZDF personnel:

Most of the NGOs don’t know how to spend their money, they still don’t know what to do. The best people who are going to have the knowledge of the area are

172 Keetley, interview.
173 Keetley, interview.
174 Hayward, interview.
going to be the military. They will have better communications, better transport, and more people on the ground. Theoretically, we shouldn’t do it because we’re the military and that’s not our job, we’re there to kill bad guys, but there are all sorts of levels of dependency too.\textsuperscript{175}

The aid agencies’ lack of coordinating structures and disciplined scheduling were also cited as major sources of frustration by the military. Major Keetley describes this from his experience as the senior liaison officer with agencies in Cova Lima:

You’re dealing with NGOs and the UN. They don’t do things in army time, they do in very slow time. The NGOs have no concept of time—if you make a meeting time, they’ll be an hour late or five minutes early. They’ve got no ideas of punctuality and yet when you’re dealing with lots of people your day is pretty compressed and they show up half an hour late and it throws the whole day out. And we can’t pick up a telephone and make arrangements, if I want to see someone I physically have to drive 7 kilometres to see each person tell them a short message then go somewhere else so it’s very frustrating and the UN people don’t move fast at all, because it’s not in their interests to do that, they get big money so they move in slow time.\textsuperscript{176}

The military also recognized that it was not only the characteristics of the aid agencies that served to strain NZDF-NGO relations in Cova Lima. Many NZDF personnel also acknowledged the impact that their six-month battalion rotations had on their ability to forge relationship with aid agency personnel. As Keetley noted, “It’s hard for NGOs—they’ve probably been there 12 months and they see people coming and going every three or four months so they had to deal with some new guy.”\textsuperscript{177} The aid agency personnel did cite the relatively short duration of the military deployment, coupled with their adherence to humanitarian principles of independence and neutrality, as contributing to their

\textsuperscript{175} Hayward, interview.
\textsuperscript{176} Keetley, interview with Glyn Harper.
\textsuperscript{177} Keetley, interview.
reluctance to engage in any organized coordination with the NZDF. Keetley described the hardest part of his job in CMA as “Making relationships... we had three weeks to make relationships that had been forged for seven months [with the first New Zealand Battalion]. It was a big ask for people to trust us in three weeks.”

The aid agency personnel in Cova Lima were also largely inexperienced at working alongside military forces. Each major organisation had approximately two to three international staff in Cova Lima and they would hire local staff to assist in project implementation. As many of the international aid agency staff were from Australia and New Zealand, they had not been as readily deployed into conflict zones alongside military forces as their European and American counterparts in the northern hemisphere. Therefore, many of the aid personnel knew little of what to expect of the military forces.

While this inexperience with military forces did have some negative aspects, such as not having agreed upon protocols regarding working with military forces, it also had several positive impacts on the relationship. Their lack of experience working with military forces made them less likely to arrive in Cova Lima harbouring resentment over any past interactions with foreign military forces. They also arrived to work alongside mainly Australian and, in Cova Lima, New Zealand troops, with whom they share a cultural affinity. In Cova Lima the European representatives of the various aid organisations were less likely to cooperate with the NZDF than the southern hemisphere

---

178 Interviews with NGO personnel from the ICRC, Austcare, World Vision.
179 Keetley, interview.
180 Addis, interview.
181 Austcare, p.20.
representatives.\textsuperscript{182} While many NGO personnel did have some negative perceptions about the military in Cova Lima, they were generally more amenable to working alongside and coordinating with the NZDF.

Particularly in the southern hemisphere, very little training occurs in the NGO sector in relation to interacting with the military. According to James Addis, who worked for World Vision in East Timor, training programmes are available, such as the civil-military courses with the US Marine Corps in Hawaii. However, the selection processes for these courses are very political in the NGO organisations and oftentimes the wrong people, such as those who will not be working on the ground, are selected to attend.\textsuperscript{183} Only after the intervention in East Timor did Australian and New Zealand NGOs begin to re-evaluate their training and protocols in relation to working alongside military forces.

There is still much work to be done in both the military and humanitarian communities in terms of training on military-NGO relations. As Major Keetley found, “After the deployment I was involved with the Red Cross to give a talk there. They are as naive about our structure as we are about theirs.”\textsuperscript{184} In 2004 New Zealand’s Centre for International Development hosted a meeting that brought military, NGO, and government representatives together to discuss the military-humanitarian relationship.\textsuperscript{185} Similar strategies have been employed for some time across the Tasman, as Australian NGOs

\textsuperscript{182} NGO and NZDF personnel, interviews: Hayward, interview.; Interviews with NGO personnel from the ICRC, Austcare, World Vision.
\textsuperscript{183} Addis, interview.
\textsuperscript{184} Keetley, interview.
\textsuperscript{185} The CID workshop was the first time representatives from the aid, military and NZ government were brought together to establish a cooperative relationship.
prepare their staff for inevitable future encounters alongside military forces. Thus, East Timor marked the beginning of the involvement of many southern hemisphere NGOs with military forces in complex emergencies.

The NZDF-NGO relationship in Cova Lima was new territory to many personnel in both the aid and military communities. Both actors arrived in the district with preconceived notions and stereotypes and these served to create barriers to the military-NGO relationship. As in other instances where the military and aid agencies find themselves working together, the relationship in Cova Lima was personality driven. This fact, coupled with a lack of doctrinal guidance or training, resulted in the relationship’s success being determined by individuals from both the military and aid agency communities.

The Lack of Aid in Cova Lima

The relatively small number of aid agencies operating in Cova Lima impacted the NZDF-NGO relationship in several ways. Many NZDF personnel felt that the NGOs in the district were easier to collaborate with, as there were fewer of them. However, the NZDF was highly critical of the lack of assistance to Cova Lima from the aid community, especially as the security environment improved. Throughout their UNTAET deployment the NZDF was the largest organisation in the district and, due to the small presence of aid agencies, the task of filling gaps in aid and development assistance fell to the military personnel. This section examines the effects of the relative lack of assistance to Cova Lima on the military-NGO relationship.
Throughout East Timor, CMA staff wished to limit their relations to the larger, more professional NGOs, with whom they found it easier to collaborate. However, East Timor witnessed the proliferation of NGOs, small and large. During the UNTAET operation there were 214 registered NGOs in East Timor. The locals welcomed the NGOs, as they provided much needed employment opportunities and development assistance. The numerous agencies, however, were difficult and in some cases impossible to coordinate through the official UN channels.

Some of the NGOs in East Timor were considered unprofessional and untrained. Smaller NGOs lacked communication and coordination even within their own organisations. According to Mads Flornes, deputy director of Civil Military Affairs for UNTAET, assistance activities were often derailed due to the disorganisation of these NGOs.

In the district of Cova Lima, however, there were very few NGOs. While there were over 200 registered NGOs in East Timor, only 12-14 were present in the district of Cova Lima. While acknowledging that the sheer numbers made the organisational aspect

---

186 Elmquist, p.10.
190 Ishizuka, p.52.
much easier, this lack of assistance has been met by much criticism from the military community, as the impoverished district received comparatively very little outside assistance. The areas around Dili received a great deal of aid, thus further eroding the principle of impartiality in aid from the military’s perspective. When asked the names and numbers of NGOs in Cova Lima during his command of NZ Battalion 2, Colonel Dransfield replied, “We were in a shitty part of East Timor, so we didn’t have all the sexy ones, which they had in Dili and toward the east.”

A commonly cited complaint on behalf of the military is that NGOs tend to flood the more secure and stable areas with aid, creating an even greater distortion of wealth amongst the people. In East Timor, the money and media were in the capital, Dili, and the aid community did receive scathing criticism both from the international and local communities for flooding the capital with their vehicles, aid, and money when the poorer districts were still in need of attention. Dransfield noted, “if you look at a lot of UN missions around the world, you find the cities or the mass centres of populations that there are a whole lot of NGOs sitting there, but it’s the outlying areas that are the problems.”

Cova Lima and the Oecussi enclave were the two poorest districts in the country, but received very little assistance in comparison to Dili and its surrounding areas. Many of

192 Dransfield, interview.
193 For more on this see: Graham Hancock’s Lords of Poverty, London: Mandarin, 1989.
195 Dransfield, interview.
the NZDF personnel interviewed were highly critical of the amount of aid agencies which were located in and around Dili, while the district of Cova Lima and others received comparatively little assistance. “It makes it difficult from a security standpoint.” Gawn explains, “The locals can see a small portion of the population getting all this aid that they need just as much.”

Dransfield noted that, “the ones (NGOs) we had in our area flitted in and out”, were very few in number, and had small workforces. He recalls Oxfam was there, “that was only a couple people, two Oxfam people, both Brits with a vehicle and they were basically going around and doing water pumps and cleaning those out.” Timor Aid was also there during NZ Battalion 2’s deployment, “those were two guys, one was an ex-pat, an Australian and they were there as local staff and to get building contracts and distribute food.” Dransfield said that MDM was also operating in the district, but he had mixed feeling as to their effectiveness and dedication to the medical response in Cova Lima:

They occupied the hospital up the road, and they were a combination they had some good guys, they had a lot of very attractive young women who were just tourists they were just doing their quick month and took as many photographs as they could and then they went back to their rich lives back in Paris. And that’s fair enough; at least they did a month. But, they had those and they had some good people as well. The medical profession has very defined space I suppose, and they don’t like anything encroaching on that, so that was very hard nut to crack, I found it hard to find some sort of mutual understanding where we could assist and we succeeded to some extent in terms of inoculation programmes, they were happy for us to provide transport and security for their doctors.

197 Gawn, interview.
198 Dransfield, interview.
199 Dransfield, interview.
200 Dransfield, interview.
201 Dransfield, interview.
Similar perspectives of the organisations were shared by the NZDF personnel in subsequent battalion rotations. When Colonel Gawn was asked what reasons he cited for the small NGO presence in the district, he noted, “It was a long way away, it’s not Europe, it wasn’t flavor of the month when you’ve got things like Kosovo on and other bigger more important ones, it’s more regional. The other fact was that where we were was isolated.”

The NZDF weren’t alone in their criticisms of the UN and NGO agencies in East Timor. In the months following their deployment, UNTAET was met with local and international criticism. The reconstruction efforts were perceived to be progressing too slowly, local UN personnel were resentful of the inequities in their pay when compared to their international UN counterparts, and the UN and NGOs were accused of creating a false local economy by flooding the capital Dili with their vehicles and staff. All this, critics argued, while unemployment levels were soaring and the East Timorese were not being afforded the opportunities to actively engage in the decisions that were determining their future as an independent nation.

Colonel Gawn suggests that the amount of money and resources that the foreign UN and NGO personnel bring to an intervention does create a false economy, as well as a great deal of resentment from the local community.

You see a change, when you first arrive you see it in every environment. If you’re in early enough, when you are the kings you are the lords and everybody needs your help, but when they get back on their feet and they see just how much

---

202 Gawn, interview.
203 Chopra, pp.27-40.
204 Smith, p.64.
money is thrown around and wasted, they start to turn and the people start to turn because they’re never going to have as much as the NGOs and they’re never going to have as much as the UN, and they do, they live the life of the Lord. And the attitudes change toward them they start to become harder.  

“The other thing is that these NGOs have come in and promised the earth and have delivered, in reality, very little in terms of what they promise” he explains.

So you go through the process of being seen as the savior, being a great guy and everybody wants you, through to a hardening attitude, and then almost a turning certainly against the NGOs, the UN, even the soldiers, in some respects. So unless you can actually gain that empathy with the population and share in their hurt and everything else then it almost becomes a division of them and us and you see that in every operation.

From the military’s perspective, the small number of NGOs in Cova Lima contributed to the improved manageability of the area of operations and allowed the military a more hands-on approach to the nation-building mandate. However, the informants agreed that these factors had both their advantages and disadvantages. While fewer NGOs made it easier to maintain the security situation, organize projects, and gather information, it also meant the battalions had to pick up many of the humanitarian tasks that would normally be reserved for NGOs.

When asked for the NZDF’s general perception of aid agencies in East Timor, Gawn replied:

You can’t do it without them; it’s as simple as that. You can’t do it without them. You have to learn to live with them. But, the reality is they are the organisation that provides the aid and the loose structures to deliver that aid. It actually improves the security situation because people start to realize what they’ve lost and they start to gain things that they don’t want to rellose. So, without them the

205 Gawn, interview.
206 Gawn, interview.
207 Gawn, interview.
security situation never actually improves. It’s just a security situation that’s going downhill. So, you can’t do it without them.\textsuperscript{208}

The imperative to create a secure environment through the reestablishment of vital infrastructure and basic needs in the district was viewed by many NZDF personnel as a top priority. Another senior officer from a later battalion suggested that civil assistance work was a legitimate, even necessary role for the NZDF to play and asked “if we don’t do it who will?”\textsuperscript{209}

The New Zealand Defence Force was the largest organisation in Cova Lima and was often approached by locals, UN civilians, and NGO employees for assistance. Dransfield illustrates the disparity between the military and NGO workforces in the district:

\begin{quote}
When I was in Timor we had 1150 troops out on the ground and the NGOs, let’s say CARE, there was one Aussie and he had about 5 local guys helping him. Because of his small workforce he was trying to coordinate getting the food from Australia getting on the port, getting on the trucks getting it across the hill and then identifying where he was going to distribute it to. Whereas we had all of these guys out on the hill that provided all of the information to say well, this village here have got real problems, there crops haven’t turned up this year or whatever. So that we can we can provide the information to enable his efforts to be focused to the areas [in need].\textsuperscript{210}
\end{quote}

When the NZDF initially deployed to the district they were the only medical capacity in the district until MDM could re-enter. Even during the second battalion’s deployment to Cova Lima, the district was still heavily reliant upon the NZDF medical staff. As the Senior Medical Officer, Major Andrew Dunne, noted:

\textsuperscript{208} Gawn, interview.
\textsuperscript{209} Hull, “Agent of Change”, p.22.
\textsuperscript{210} Dransfield, interview.
The only surgical facility or high level hospital care available is the New Zealand Military hospital here in Upham Lines and so we have actually got a mandate or a memorandum of understanding to do up to 20 surgical procedures a month on locals. In addition we do virtually all the blood tests and x-rays as well. Now on the ground at the moment health-wise is MDM. They run the Suai GP Hospital and Obstetrics. Whenever they have any difficulties, problems or surgical or other emergencies, they refer them to us in a similar way as that you refer someone to Christchurch Public Hospital. That has been in some ways because the workload of the PKF surgically and medically has been relatively low. We have done in excess of 120 surgical procedures on locals since we arrived in theatre. ²¹¹

Captain Warren Park, the operational commander of the Engineer detachment, outlined other ways in which the NZDF provided assistance to NGOs in Cova Lima:

A lot of NGOs do not have tradesmen within their organisations and require a technical support if they are going to establish a new house that going to be their headquarters and its missing a roof, etc. then we’ll provide carpenters to do a bill of materials and a quantity survey and we’ll provide that to them and then they go about procuring it. We have re-roofed a school in conjunction with Timor Aid which is their mission to do that.²¹²

Many of the NZDF personnel were cognizant of the need to manage expectations placed upon the battalions. As Colonel Hayward explains, “The society was used to being dependent on the TNI [the Indonesian military]. So we had to be very careful that we weren’t just replacing TNI. They would come to us for everything and we would have to say no, we’re not here for that.”²¹³

²¹¹ Dunne, interview with Glyn Harper.
²¹² Park, interview with Glyn Harper.
²¹³ Hayward, interview.
As the battalion rotations continued, more NGOs arrived in the district. However, early on in the operation, security concerns prevented many NGOs from entering the district. Gawn explains:

It wasn’t easy [to get NGOs to come to the district] because it classed up on the border as a chapter 7 operation, aid agencies generally don’t come in until it gets downgraded to a chapter 6. So we were always in a battle to get it downgraded, whereas our higher [authorities]…felt that it should remain at a chapter 7, but it was nothing in comparison to Bosnia. There was nothing in terms of the threat of violence that was found in Bosnia.  

After Private Manning and the three UNHCR workers were killed in separate attacks, many in the NGO community were wary of working in the district. While the NZDF feared that many of the aid workers would leave the district after the attacks, the NZDF East Timor Situation Report noted:

While the current security situation is causing some concern with the NGO community, particularly in Dili, for the most part NGOs in Suai are reacting well and have not taken any serious steps to leave the area. As long as they are kept well informed and feel they can trust NZ Batt/UNTAET info they should remain in the Cova Lima area distributing aid.

While more NGOs entered the district as the security environment improved, there were still only a dozen aid agencies working in Cova Lima at any given time throughout the NZDF’s 1999-2002 deployment. This lack of aid to the district was sharply criticized by NZDF personnel, as well as other actors in the international community. While the NZDF found that fewer NGOs were easier to coordinate with, they were also faced with a lack of assistance to their area of operations. It was the NZDF’s relative size and

---

214 Keetley, interview.  
215 Gawn, interview.  
capabilities, coupled with the small NGO presence in Cova Lima, which witnessed the military’s increased involvement in humanitarian and development assistance in the district.

**Conclusions**

During the deployment of NZDF to the district of Cova Lima from 1999 to 2002, the military forces and the NGOs found themselves co-existing and working together to assist the people of East Timor transition into a new era of independence. Their relationship was characterized by a joint UN mandate to support and restore the civil-society in Cova Lima, however, this mandate left many aid agency personnel concerned about the military’s role in humanitarian assistance. The relationship was also impacted by the lack of doctrine, training, and protocols on civil-military relations. Although the NZDF’s approach to CMA, based on their past experiences and common sense, did have some positive outcomes and learning was established between battalion rotations, the continuance of *ad hoc* relations between the aid agencies and NZDF was susceptible to misunderstandings and stereotypes. Finally, the small number of aid agencies operating in the district served to create more humanitarian gaps for the NZDF to fill, as well as perpetuating many negative stereotypes the NZDF has of NGOs.

While the NZDF-NGO relationship in Cova Lima had a number of improvements over other missions, it was still plagued by many of the same problems, which served to undermine past military-NGO relationships. Several lessons can be drawn from this case study. First, the UN mandate must clearly outline what role the military should play in
the provision of humanitarian and reconstruction assistance. Ambiguous mandates or rules of engagement for the military forces only serve to complicate the military-NGO relationship on the ground. Scenarios which define when the military should engage in the direct provision of aid and to what extent should be created and disseminated to all actors involved in operations. It is crucial that civilian leadership of relief activities be maintained throughout an intervention in which both the NZDF and aid agencies are engaged. The NZDF must transition authority of various roles to civilian authorities as the security situation permits and where there is adequate civilian capability. Under no circumstances should the NZDF attempt to control the aid agencies. The NZDF needs to be aware of the impact their involvement in humanitarian assistance has on both the safety and perception of NGOs. The NZDF should continue to communicate with the NGOs in an effort to determine what roles they should play in an operation.

Next, better CMA planning is required prior to an operation and the importance of CMA should not be undervalued by the NZDF. A lead agency such as OCHA should facilitate civil-military coordination and should employ experienced CMA staff. CMA doctrine should be created by the NZDF. This doctrine should clearly define the NZDF’s CMA goals, but should be flexible in outlining the ways in which CMA activities may be carried out in various operations. The NZDF should create a specialist CMA unit or ensure the training of designated CMA personnel within force capabilities. This unit and/or individual should be embedded with the NZDF during a deployment to ensure a high level of expertise. Decisions relating to CMA should not be entirely *ad hoc* and at
the discretion of each commander. CMA is crucial to situational awareness and enhanced security and better training in relation to CMA must be conducted prior to a deployment.

Finally, humanitarian relief should be coordinated more effectively to ensure that aid is distributed more equally throughout the effected region. Better direction by the UN in East Timor as well as improved communication between aid agencies would have contributed to a more effective humanitarian operation. Without a more efficacious system of delivering much needed aid, not only to major cities and towns but also to the outer lying areas, the humanitarian community runs the risk of being negatively stereotyped by the military, local, and international communities as ineffective and partial. Furthermore, without an adequate level of civilian assistance, such as in Cova Lima, the humanitarian community will most likely continue to witness an increase in the military’s involvement in aid and development.
Chapter 6 (Part I): Afghanistan Case Study
The United States Military-NGO Relationship during the US-led Operation *Enduring Freedom* and the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)

After the attacks of September 11, 2001, the impoverished country of Afghanistan, where al Qaeda was operating under the fundamentalist Taliban regime, was thrust centre stage in world affairs. While it only took the US-led Coalition forces and Afghanistan’s Northern Alliance a few months to topple the Taliban, security in the country was far from stable. In lieu of expanding the security force outside of Kabul, the US military created lightly armed Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) to expand the authority of the central government.¹ From May 2002 to today, the PRT concept has evolved, created controversy, and been heralded as a model of successful intervention. Currently, there is a renewed interest in the stabilization and reconstruction of Afghanistan. Thus, it is timely that this case study examines the impact that PRTs have had on the US military-NGO relationship in Afghanistan over the past eight years.

This chapter begins with a brief history of Afghanistan. Next, the background of the intervention in Afghanistan is presented. Then an analysis of the US military-NGO relationship in Afghanistan is provided. The chapter concludes with a brief outline of the lessons learned.

Brief History of Afghanistan

A mountainous country of approximately 652,000 square kilometres, Afghanistan is a land-locked nation that shares a border with China, Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and a sector of the disputed Pakistan-rulled territory of Jammu and Kashmir.\(^2\) The area of Afghanistan has endured a long history (5,000 years) of

warfare and conquest by varying groups such as the Persians, Greeks, and Mongols.³ It has been plagued by civil wars and foreign invasions throughout its history. The current borders of Afghanistan were finally agreed upon in the late nineteenth century as a result of the “great game” rivalry between Russia and Britain.⁴ The British tried to gain control of Afghan territory in the three Anglo-Afghan wars from 1838 to 1919.⁵ Other than the forty-year rule of Mohammad Zahir Shah from 1933 to 1973, when Afghanistan experienced relative liberalization, the country has been under control of various ethnic warlords.⁶ The ethnic groups of Afghanistan include the Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara, Aimaks, Turkmen, Baloch, and Uzbek, all of whom have control or are fighting for control over various territories throughout the country.⁷ The majority Sunni Muslim groups also fight with the minority Shi’a Muslim groups and many ethnic or religious warlords create alliances with similar groups in neighbouring foreign countries. During the Marxist Revolt in 1978, Islamic traditionalists and ethnic leaders staged an armed revolt against the government, which was followed by the invasion of Soviet troops in 1979.⁸

By the end of 1980, several Afghan groups had united to resist Soviet presence and the Soviet-supported Afghan army. Intense fighting between the resistance fighters known as the mujahideen, which received US backing, and the Soviet-Afghan army went on for

³ George Bruce Malleson, History of Afghanistan, from the Earliest Period to the Outbreak of the War of 1878, London: Adamant Media Corporation, 2005, p.239.
almost 9 years, culminating in the deaths of roughly thirty-thousand Soviet soldiers and over one million Afghans.\textsuperscript{9} The mujahideen fighters were drawn mainly from farming and herding communities within Afghanistan. They surprised many, and certainly the Soviets, with their fierce fighting skills and determination. The mujahideen was made up of different ethnic, language, and Muslim religious groups, which led to inter-group violence. However, despite internal conflicts, they managed to gain control of Afghanistan’s mountain regions, as well as the border with Pakistan by the late 1980s. The Soviet-backed Afghan government attempted to bolster support for the Soviet presence from 1985 to 1989, but their efforts were fruitless.\textsuperscript{10} By the mid-1980s the national economy had been utterly devastated, the school system was almost completely destroyed, industrialization was severely restricted, and irrigation projects were badly damaged.

Finally, in 1987 Afghanistan, Pakistan, the USSR, and the United States signed a series of UN-sponsored agreements that provided an end to foreign intervention in Afghanistan and resulted in the withdrawal of Soviet forces from mid-1988 to 1989. However, the mujahideen rejected the UN agreements due to their exclusion from the negotiations and civil war continued. After years of continued attacks on Kabul, the mujahideen took the capital in 1992, proclaiming the new government the Islamic State of Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{11}

\textsuperscript{9} Nojumi, p.85.
\textsuperscript{10} Goodson, p.65.
During the same period, in Pakistan, a group of Pashtu Islamic students living in exile organized a new faction called the Taliban. The members of the Taliban were Islamic fundamentalists that wanted to establish a society based on what they viewed as the purest interpretation of Islam, governed by Islamic leaders, and strictly enforced laws of behaviour. Many of the mujahideen, still plagued by internal conflict, were attracted to the Taliban and joined the organisation, bringing with them their fierce fighting skills and weapons. The Taliban grew rapidly, swept through Afghanistan, and captured Kabul in September 1996. They wasted no time enforcing their strict Islamic rule on the Afghan people, severely limiting their freedoms and denying them basic human rights. Women and ethnic minorities, in particular, suffered under the Taliban’s rule. Many Afghans were opposed to the Taliban and the remaining members of the mujahideen formed the Northern Alliance, which led an opposition to the Taliban that continued throughout the 1990s and early 21st century.

In the late 1990s, the United States threatened to use military force against the Taliban for harbouring suspected terrorist Osama bin Laden, who they believed was responsible for the 1993 attack on the World Trade Centre and the 1998 bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. After the Taliban refused to handover bin Laden, the US fired cruise missiles at suspected al Qaeda training camps from warships in the Arabian Sea.

---

13 Rashid, p.29.
By the end of 2000, the Taliban controlled 95 percent of Afghanistan, but the fighting continued and the US imposed severe economic sanctions on the country.\textsuperscript{16}

On 9 September 2001 Ahmad Shah Massoud, a well-respected leader of the mujahideen’s Taliban opposition force, was assassinated, leading many to believe the resistance movement against the Taliban might be over.\textsuperscript{17} Just two days later, in the largest terrorist attacks ever to occur on US soil, four commercial airplanes, with passengers aboard, were hijacked. Two of the planes were flown into the World Trade Centre’s twin towers in New York City. The third plane was flown into the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., and the fourth plane crashed in a field in Pennsylvania.\textsuperscript{18}

American intelligence agencies believed Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda were responsible for these attacks. When US President George W. Bush demanded that the Taliban extradite bin Laden from Afghanistan, Mullah Mohammed Omar, the leader of the Taliban, refused. In October 2001, US and British forces initiated air strikes on Afghanistan, marking the beginning to the War on Terrorism.

\textsuperscript{17} Matthew J. Morgan, \textit{A Democracy is Born: An Insider’s Account of the Battle Against Terrorism in Afghanistan}, London: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2007, p.75.
Background of Intervention

Operation *Enduring Freedom*, the US-led military operation against Taliban-held positions, was launched on 7 October 2001. Over the next two months, British and American forces continued their air strikes and, with only a few hundred Special Forces troops on the ground, they supported the advance of anti-Taliban Northern Alliance forces. By the end of November, the Alliance had taken the country’s two major cities, Mazar-e-Sharif and Kabul. Seventeen other nations including Britain, Norway, Canada, Afghanistan, Australia, and New Zealand, contributed Special Operation Forces (SOF) to the mission.

During the operation, humanitarian aid operations were evacuated and moved to Pakistan and Iran, where many people sought refuge, joining the 3.5 million Afghan refugees who had already fled the country from earlier conflicts. Throughout the military operation, the coalition ran a “humanitarian” campaign, in which they were seeking to avert a major humanitarian crisis, but also win hearts and minds. The campaign came under enormous international criticism, particularly when the US military dropped yellow aid packages that dangerously resembled unexploded BLU-92 cluster bombs.

---

20 Clements, p.329.
When aid organisations re-entered the country in late November 2001, they were faced with a humanitarian crisis of epic proportions. The culmination of years of suffering from a fundamentalist regime, internal conflicts, drought, and earthquakes had left Afghanistan devastated. From 1999 to 2002, Afghanistan suffered its worst drought in 30 years. The water shortage contributed to public health problems and dramatically affected agricultural output.\textsuperscript{24}

On 27 November 2001 an Afghan Summit Conference began in Bonn, Germany to create a transitional administration for the country. Arranged by the UN Special Envoy to Afghanistan, Francesc Vendrell, the conference invited roughly 30 Afghan leaders. The Bonn agreement laid out an ambitious agenda for change, the reform process it outlined was intended to provide the foundation for the establishment and maintenance of peace and stability, and it was agreed that national elections would be held by June 2004. In December, Hamid Karzai, a relative of the popular former Afghan king Mohammed Zahir Shah, was sworn in as leader to the new transitional government.\textsuperscript{25}

From the beginning of the Coalition’s intervention, promises were made by western leaders, most notably by British Prime Minister Tony Blair, that the international community would “not walk away” from its responsibilities regarding the country’s


rehabilitation and future stability. However, there were conflicting views regarding the Coalition’s aims and methods.\textsuperscript{26}

\textbf{Introduction to US Military-NGO Relations in Afghanistan}

Operation \textit{Enduring Freedom} marked the first military operation conducted under the auspice of the War on Terrorism. Combat operations proceeded rapidly. By mid-March the Coalition had removed the Taliban from power and destroyed or reduced the al Qaeda networks operating in the country. In November of 2002, the US Department of Defense (DoD) initiated the deployment of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), originally called Joint Regional teams, to expand the authority of the central government. The PRTs were also intended to facilitate reconstruction activities, establish favourable working conditions for humanitarian aid workers, and build a foundation for sustainable post-conflict security.\textsuperscript{27}

Three main factors served to define the US military-NGO relationship in Afghanistan. First, the PRT concept itself was not clearly defined and was implemented in various forms within the separate US PRTs. Second, the military security operation was not extended outside of Kabul and the NGOs argued that the PRTs were not a sufficient response to the dismal security situation in much of the country. In fact, many NGOs contended that the PRTs actually made the security environment worse. Third, the military viewed NGOs as “force multipliers” and the PRTs as a model approach to


\textsuperscript{27} Scott R. Peck, \textit{PRTs: Improving or Undermining the Security for NGOs and PVOs in Afghanistan?}, US Naval War College, Newport, RI, 17 May 2004, p.2.
military interventions in complex emergencies. Many NGOs rejected this view and voiced their concern over the blurring of lines between soldiers and humanitarian workers, as well as what they perceived to be, the increasing politicization of aid. The following sections: PRT Concept; Security; and “Force Multipliers” analyses these factors in greater detail.

Figure 10: Map of PRT Locations and ISAF Regional Commands in Afghanistan
PRT: An Evolving Concept

On 21 November 2002, the US-led Coalition forces created the first PRT in Gardez.\(^\text{28}\) Today there are 26 PRTs in Afghanistan; twelve of those are headed by the US. The PRTs are intended to assist in the stabilization of the country, however, from their creation, they were met with criticism from the humanitarian community.\(^\text{29}\) This section examines the mandate, structure, and roles of the PRTs and how the PRT concept and implementation impacted the US military-NGO relationship in Afghanistan.

US PRTs fall under the direct command and control of the Coalition Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force (CJCMOTF), headquartered in Kabul.\(^\text{30}\) The PRTs are comprised of a military section, which facilitates the development of Afghan security forces, monitors the security situation, and assists in the stabilization of local security; a civilian unit, which facilitates the delivery of humanitarian aid, reconstruction and development projects by international organisations and NGOs; and a headquarters section which is comprised of both military and civilian personnel and provides logistics, intelligence, force protection, and linguistic support.\(^\text{31}\)

While the US-led PRTs differ in each province, they generally consist of between 50 and 100 civilian and military personnel. The military unit is the largest component of the PRT and has typically been made up of civil affairs, Special Operations Forces, and US Army security and combat support personnel. The focus of each PRT has been altered depending upon the security requirements. PRTs in areas of insecurity have more security personnel, whereas those in more benign security areas focus more on reconstruction efforts. \(^3\)

Each PRT has a Civil-Military Operations Centre (CMOC), usually staffed by a six person civil affairs (CA) team. The CMOC usually operates away from the PRT compounds, to enable successful coordination between civilians and military personnel. A US Civil Affairs officer describes the CMOC’s roles, “We respond to locals’ concerns, coordinate the response to requests for assistance from locals and aid agencies; and conduct needs assessments to prioritize our assistance priorities.” \(^3\) The CMOC communicates with Afghan government officials, the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA), other UN agencies, NGOs and local nationals to share information and to coordinate PRT reconstruction projects with the aid community’s projects.

PRTs are made up of military personnel, diplomats, and civilian assistance specialists from the following organisations: US State Department, US Agency for International Development (USAID), Psychological Operations Teams, Military Security Observer

\(3\) Robert Smith, interview, 13 August 2008.
Team, and headquarters support personnel. Several PRTs have additionally incorporated representatives from the US Department of Agriculture, Afghan Interior Ministry, US Justice Department police trainers and Drug Enforcement Agency representatives for counter-narcotics efforts.\textsuperscript{34}

In the three US-led pilot PRTs in Gardez, Bamyan, and Konduz, US CIMIC personnel conducted several operations in civilian clothing, which from the NGO perspective added to the confusion the locals would have distinguishing between military and civilian personnel. The NGOs viewed this as a very dangerous precedent and voiced concerns to international partners that in an uncertain future, any involvement with the Coalition-led PRTs would expose them as targets. NGOs working through InterAction, wrote to US National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, expressing on 2 April 2002 “concern over US military personnel conducting humanitarian activity wearing civilian clothes” and placing aid workers in harm’s way.\textsuperscript{35} CENTCOM then announced on 19 April that military personnel would have to be clearly identifiable and would wear at least some easily seen component of their uniform.\textsuperscript{36} The issue of military personnel conducting operations in civilian clothing created a great deal of resentment and led to a long-term distrust of military forces by many in the aid community. NGO workers continue to cite


this as a great source of disrespect and ignorance of humanitarian principles by military forces.\textsuperscript{37}

The Coalition met this criticism by defending the PRT strategy as an, “evolving concept”.\textsuperscript{38} In a statement responding to international concerns the Coalition invited: “Concerns, criticisms, and recommendations of all actors involved in assistance and reconstruction activities in Afghanistan in the interests of improving PRT operations.”\textsuperscript{39} However, the Coalition noted that this invitation of constructive engagement has not been taken up by many NGOs, many of whom declined to share constructive criticism, yet launched attacks on the PRTs after the fact. Though it did allow NGOs to share their concerns, the NGOs were reluctant to be involved in a consultation process with the military, and believed that the PRT process was going to go along, with or without their consent.\textsuperscript{40}

In an effort to integrate military-NGO activities in Afghanistan, the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) was established in March 2002. Amongst other things, UNAMA’s mandate included: “managing all UN humanitarian, relief, recovery and reconstruction activities in Afghanistan in coordination with the Afghan administration”.\textsuperscript{41} As the facilitator of military-NGO relations, UNAMA’s task would

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Shauna Brooks, ICRC Field Coordinator, interview, 19 July 2008.
\item CJCMOTF, Provincial Reconstruction Teams: First Lessons Learned In Initial Implementation, Coalition/Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force (CJCMOTF), May 2003, p. 3.
\item CJCMOTF, p. 3.
\item Mark Sedra, Civil-Military Relations in Afghanistan: The Provincial Reconstruction Team Debate, Policy Research Division of Foreign Affairs, Canada, 2005, p.3.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
not be easy. In the months after the combat operation, the military-NGO relationship began to deteriorate at a rapid pace, particularly over the creation of PRTs.\textsuperscript{42}

UNAMA carved out a mediating role between NGOs and the Coalition and developed a number of mechanisms at the sub-national and national level to facilitate, monitor and guide the activities of the pilot PRTs. UNAMA also sought to prevent any duplication of activities already being carried out by NGOs. Concurrently, the assistance community continued to voice concerns regarding PRT involvement in humanitarian-type activities, including the conducting of needs assessments. According to an USAID assessment:

Initially, some PRTs constructed schools and clinics without paying enough attention to whether the Afghan government could afford to equip them with teachers, books, doctors, or medical supplies. While many PRTs have taken steps to redress this issue, the NGO and donor community remains concerned about the nature and scope of PRT programmes.\textsuperscript{43}

UNAMA, in ongoing consultations with the Coalition and NGOs identified priority areas where the PRTs could maximize their comparative advantage (namely in areas where the NGOs could not tread):

The rehabilitation or provision of key administrative structures at both the provincial and district level, for example, local government administrative buildings, Governors’ offices, and revenue collection offices; Heavy infrastructure projects where the assistance community lacks the capacity or funds (e.g. bridges, culverts, dams, and roads); Fire and police stations; law courts and other judicial buildings; communications and installations (e.g. national radio network, military barracks for the new Afghan National Army units).\textsuperscript{44}


\textsuperscript{44} Sedra, p.6.
UNAMA’s role as coordinator between PRTs and the international assistance community and facilitator of relations, was further complicated when Coalition forces made plans to deploy more PRTs.

The British Ministry of Defence (MoD) began to set up a fourth PRT in early 2003 and they were able to apply the lessons learned from the US pilot PRTs and NGO criticism. The MoD emphasized their role as assistance facilitators and stabilizers, which was a more acceptable role from the aid community’s vantage point. Their first two projects in the area were to rebuild a fire station and courthouse, which indicated their intention to focus on government-focused reconstruction assistance. In 2003, the New Zealand government agreed to deploy the fifth PRT in Afghanistan, taking over from the US PRT in the Bamyan province.

Today, there are 26 PRTs, twelve are headed by the United States and two by Germany. Other nations that have adopted a PRT are: Britain, Canada, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, the Netherlands and Turkey.\(^{45}\) Without clear guidelines, the PRT concept has evolved over the past six years to reflect various national approaches. Three distinct PRT models have emerged: the US, UK, and German models. The US model is focused on force protection and quick-impact projects. The UK model focuses on government security sector reform and diffusing confrontations between warlords. The German model has over three times

more personnel than the American PRT and has an aggressive civil sector reconstruction focus. These differing models have led to confusion regarding PRTs.\textsuperscript{46}

In addition to the various national approaches to the PRT concept, the PRTs lacked clear guidelines and roles. Dominic Nutt of Christian Aid poses questions that have confounded aid workers and locals over the past eight years:

Are they combat troops? Are they peacekeepers? Are they reconstruction workers? The disturbing answer is that to locals they can appear to be all three. On any given day they could be theoretically shooting at people in the morning then distributing aid in the same area that afternoon. The teams can even call in coalition airstrikes if a local situation deteriorates.\textsuperscript{47}

Due to the fact that the US military saw PRTs as an evolving concept, they struggled to define what roles a PRT would undertake. Many of the definitions used to describe PRTs were open-ended and wide open for interpretation. The Centre for Humanitarian Cooperation Summary Report explained, “PRTs seek ways to resolve rather than just to manage conflict by providing a multidimensional workforce with the skills to interact with the local population and provide a wide range of services and capabilities.”\textsuperscript{48}

Captain Scott Peck summarizes the roles of PRTs:

In short, PRTs are an attempt to attack the enemy’s (terrorists and anti-government groups) strategic centre of gravity—the allegiance of the Afghan people. By simultaneously providing the Afghan people with tangible humanitarian, reconstruction, and security benefits, PRTs build goodwill, trust, credibility and cooperation among the people, the Afghan central government, and the Coalition Forces.\textsuperscript{49}

\textsuperscript{49} Peck, p.3.
While a concrete definition of what the PRTs actually were often eluded the Department of Defense, that was in large part their intention. PRTs needed flexibility in their implementation. Over the past eight years, the US PRTs and the PRT concept as a whole has been modified, *ad hoc*, and an evolutionary process of trial and error to accomplish the seemingly fleeting goal of stabilizing of Afghanistan. However, the lack of a concrete role for PRTs greatly concerned many in the aid community. The military, many NGOs noted, should focus on their comparative advantage of security, of which the country remains in great need.

**Security**

After the Coalition military operation that toppled the Taliban regime, the aid community was hopeful that the international community would address the dismal security situation. However, the UN refused to extend ISAF’s mandate beyond Kabul and Coalition forces devised a PRT strategy of lightly armed troops sent to spread the influence of the central government by winning the hearts and minds of locals. The NGOs grew extremely concerned about the insecurity that continued to plague Afghanistan and the lack of political will to address it. From the beginning of the US-led pilot PRTs, the NGO community viewed the strategy as, not only failing to provide a secure environment, but as a hazardous precedent of the military’s involvement in the business of humanitarian aid and reconstruction. This section examines the impact that security issues had on the US military-NGO relationship.
Following the conference, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), a multilateral peacekeeping operation authorized by UNSC resolution 1386 under Chapter VII of the UN Charter deployed to Afghanistan. ISAF’s mandate was to help the Afghan Transitional Authority in the maintenance of the security in Kabul and its surrounding areas. NGOs and IOs argued that the security challenges extended far beyond the city of Kabul and serious security challenges remained throughout the country. Afghanistan continued to suffer from lawlessness, inter-tribal ethnic, inter-factional and inter-governmental conflicts. However, ISAF’s mandate was not immediately expanded beyond the vicinity of Kabul. Barbara Stapleton notes, “The decision by the UN Security Council not to expand the mandate revolves only partly around the commitment of stretched resources. The failure to address security primarily amounts to a question of political will.” The NGO community was continually calling for improved security in the country, so they could reach areas of the population which were in greatest need. However, their concerns went largely unanswered, even after attacks on Coalition forces by neo-Taliban groups.

From the NGO perspective, the PRTs not only lacked the necessary security measures Afghanistan required, but also set a dangerous precedent of military involvement in aid and reconstruction. When the NGO community returned to the country after their evacuation and the Coalition military operation in November of 2001, they implemented

---

52 Nancy Hachebeck, USAID, interview, 10 December 2008.
a variety of assistance programmes within a still dismal security environment. More than 1,500 national and 300 international NGOs, including 160 US based private relief, development, and refugee assistance NGOs were operating in Afghanistan.\footnote{American Council for Voluntary International Action, “Humanitarian Crisis in Afghanistan,” Disaster Response, 22 March 2004, retrieved 6 November 2007, http://www.interaction.org/afghanistan/index.html}

According to an OCHA report, “Despite the difficulties of operating under war conditions, the humanitarian community endeavoured to meet the challenge.”\footnote{Faubert, Carol and L. Clifford, Humayun Hamidzada and Colin Reynolds. Evaluation of the OCHA and UNOCHA Response and Coordination Services During the Emergency in Afghanistan: July 2001 to July 2002, OCHA, November 2002, retrieved 30 November 2007, http://ochaonline.un.org/OchaLinkClick.aspx?link=ocha&DocId=100397} However, the NGOs and IOs were waiting for improved security from Coalition forces and were angered when the Coalition turned their attention to the rebuilding of the country instead of addressing its immediate security issues. Perhaps the only major coordinated effort amongst the aid community at that time came in the form of condemnation of the Coalition’s PRTs.\footnote{James Edmonton, Christian Aid representative, interview, 6 August 2008.}

From the NGO perspective, the PRT was a second best option to the expansion of ISAF but also amounted to a relatively cheap means of keeping a lid on the situation in Afghanistan, while Coalition focus and resources moved to Iraq. The NGO community criticized the Coalition for failing to define the PRTs’ mandate, as well as its focus on assistance activities instead of improving security. They were also confronted with a highly volatile security situation and a Coalition military occupation which seemed more interested in rebuilding infrastructure than their more traditional security role.
From the NGO perspective, the relationship was destined to be highly problematic given the PRTs inextricable links to the Coalition rather than to a UN mandated peacekeeping force. NGO criticism has continued to focus on the failure of the Coalition clearly to define PRTs’ mandate and unwillingness to adequately address the security situation. As one NGO staffer noted, “We knew the relationship was going to be rocky from the start with the forces coming as a coalition, rather than a UN peacekeeping force.”

The NGO community called on the PRTs to focus on the provision of security, something for which the military has an obvious comparative advantage. The NGO community reiterated their belief that the Coalition’s comparative advantage lies in the provision of security through traditional military and police means and the military’s direct involvement in the aid and reconstruction of Afghanistan endangers the aid community and shifts the military focus away from where it should be—on securing the country.

The US military-NGO relationship throughout the country deteriorated further from 2003 to mid-2004 when eighteen aid workers were murdered by neo-Taliban forces. In June 2003, MSF, who had been working in Afghanistan for 24 years, including throughout Taliban rule, were shocked when five of their workers were brutally killed. The organisation suspended its operations in December after their repeated calls for improved security continued to prove fruitless. MSF argued that they suspended operations in large part out of protest to the PRT encroachment on humanitarian space which resulted in the

---

57 Edmonton, interview.
58 Sedra, p.4.
deaths of their employees and continued to risk the lives of aid workers. The organisation argued that the PRT strategy not only served to heighten the risk to aid workers, but to the Afghan population at large.

After the killing of aid workers and rise in neo-Taliban attacks, CARE and several other NGOs signed a petition to the international community requesting a commitment to stabilizing Afghanistan. On 17 June 2003 in a document titled, “Afghanistan: A call for security”, CARE and dozens of other NGOs requested the expansion of ISAF. They also stated that the PRTs are, “deployed to a few locations, are each comprised of between 50-100 personnel and lack the resources to really address the security threats posed by warlords and other armed spoilers.”

Between February and March 2003, 11 Afghan aid workers were murdered. Five of them worked for a Christian Aid partner organisation. Three surviving staff members said that their Taliban attackers had accused them of being US agents. In April 2004, one third of Afghanistan was still too insecure for NGOs to operate. During the first four months of 2004, 13 humanitarian workers were killed in the country, already equalling the

---

62 Nutt, p.52.
number killed in 2003. In March 2004, only half the country was regarded as fully ‘permissive’ while the other half of the country was either only accessible with an armed escort or was fully out of bounds. In south-eastern Afghanistan, military forces and NGOs still confront threats to their safety, as insecurity continues to plague the country.

Despite the importance of securing the country, the US PRTs’ mandate was limited to force protection in Afghanistan. US PRTs are not responsible for the protection of locals, aid workers, or UN representatives in the country. This caused a great deal of confusion, as most aid workers and locals had the expectation that military forces in the country would provide security in the face of threats to stabilization. However, the PRTs would often withdraw into their compounds in the face of threats, as the more robust security role was the responsibility of the Afghan security forces or Coalition combat units.

The PRTs’ small size also limited their security capabilities. During the early stages of the PRT deployments, a single PRT was responsible for a group of neighbouring provinces, which meant that PRT units could send only small teams of soldiers on visits to distant parts of the area of operation. When more PRTs were deployed, their area of

---


64 Nutt, p.46.

65 Perito, p.7.
operations became smaller and more controllable. The security of the PRT also depended greatly upon the combat units that were assigned to them.

The US military tended to train and deploy combat units separately from PRTs, so the relationship was not established until the forces were in theatre. Differences in the attitude and behaviour of troops assigned to PRTs and those serving in combat units created problems between some co-located units. Troops assigned to PRTs tended to be better aware of the cultural implications of their actions than those in combat units. Establishing a cooperative relationship between the combat troops and the PRT was a constant issue for US forces. As one US PRT commander noted, communication between the various US government and military organisations was crucial in Afghanistan, “We do not want the State Department representative to meet with a tribal leader in the morning and have that person arrested by an Army Special Forces Team in the afternoon.” Relations between PRTs and combat units were personality driven. There were reports of combat units regarding PRT military personnel and the civil affairs work they undertake as not real soldiering because they required protection.

The US PRTs’ role in security was focused primarily on force protection. Without the expansion of the ISAF security force beyond Kabul, Afghanistan experienced enormous security issues and rendered many areas of the country inaccessible to aid workers.

---

66 Dr. Amin Tarzi, Director of Middle East Studies, Marine Corps University, lecture at the Commanding General Marine Corps Combat Development Command: A Panel Discussion on Afghanistan, 28 January 2008.


When aid workers began to be deliberately targeted by opposition groups, their calls for increased security provisions became louder, yet seemed to fall on deaf ears. The PRT combat attachment was sometimes at odds with the civil affairs personnel. The PRTs’ limited security role and focus on the reconstruction activities led aid workers to be increasingly alarmed over the apparent blurring of roles between soldier and humanitarian.

**Force Multipliers**

From the beginning of the intervention in Afghanistan, the US government began to refer to the humanitarian community as a partner in the War on Terrorism. While the military, political, and diplomatic arms of the government viewed the PRTs as a successful approach to peace and stability operations, the aid community grew increasingly alarmed over the military’s increasing role in humanitarian and reconstruction activities. The perception of local Afghans, the Afghan government, and the anti-government factions in the country was generally that aid workers and military personnel were one in the same. The line between soldier and humanitarian was blurred. This section examines the impact that local and international perception had on the US military-NGO relationship.

The US government’s language used to describe NGOs’ involvement in the War on Terror increasingly concerned many aid workers. On 26 October 2001, Colin Powell, the US Secretary of State stated, “I am serious about making sure we have the best relationship with the NGOs who are such a force multiplier for us, such an important part
of our combat team.” On 21 May 2003 Andrew Natsios, the director of USAID stated, “NGOs are an arm of the US government.”

These words greatly alarmed many members of the humanitarian community. Naomi Klein contended that these statements, “mark the emergence of a new Bush doctrine: NGOs should be nothing more than the good-hearted charity wing of the military, silently mopping up after wars and famines.” Christian Aid’s Dominic Nutt reiterated the concerns of many aid workers, stating:

Bush and Blair have assimilated the humanitarian agenda. It has become part of the political drive to stabilise and pacify Afghanistan—humanitarianism has become part of the War on Terror. Thus, the Taliban and other elements hostile to the US see it as legitimate to attack anyone who is carrying out humanitarian work, whether they are coalition forces or independent aid workers.

The heart of the matter for most NGOs is a fear that because PRTs take part in security and aid delivery, they have placed NGOs at risk by blurring the line between military activities and impartial or neutral humanitarian action. Many NGOs believe that PRTs represent the politicization of aid. As James Edmonton notes, “The primary objective of the PRTs is to expand the authority of the central government and with opposition groups--most notably the Taliban--trying to attack the authority of the central

---

72 Nutt, p.45.
73 Brooks, interview.
government, it is particularly important that military objectives and humanitarian objectives are seen to be separate.\textsuperscript{74}

NGO concerns over the PRTs and their implications for the aid community were expressed from the early stages of the PRT deployments. Roger Riddell, Christian Aid’s international director, wrote to Jack Straw, British Foreign Secretary regarding concerns over the Provincial Reconstruction Teams on 20 December 2002:

Direct contact and collaboration with military forces jeopardizes existing long-standing relationships with local communities and Christian Aid’s neutrality... the [PRTs] are part of the ongoing conflict and military operations. The use of the military in any developmental context endangers the work of Christian Aid and the relationships it has built up with the local communities. The [PRTs] ...will therefore compromise not only our position and standing with local communities but our security, as people find it difficult to differentiate between military humanitarian projects and solely humanitarian projects.\textsuperscript{75}

Parallel NGO arguments against the PRTs are that they are taking on humanitarian work that should be the domain of NGOs. As Hannah Krenfeld of World Vision notes, “[PRTs] focus on reconstruction instead of security and end up doing neither very well.”\textsuperscript{76} Many NGOs are concerned with military forces’ lack of expertise when conducting needs assessments and carrying out relief work. As Dominic Nutt notes:

Often, of course, the local communities are pleased with the quick results. But PRTs do not undertake the work as part of any long-term strategy. Building a random school here and a road there with no master plan and no commitment to sustaining the projects can lead to quick decay and deterioration. Communities are not involved and therefore have little control. It does not work.\textsuperscript{77}

\textsuperscript{74} Edmonton, interview.  
\textsuperscript{75} Nutt, p.46.  
\textsuperscript{76} Hannah Krenfeld, World Vision, interview, 16 August 2008.  
\textsuperscript{77} Nutt, p. 46.
NGOs were also concerned that by blurring the line between aid workers and soldiers, PRTs put their staff at risk. Rafael Robillard of aid coordinating body Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR) stated, “They have come with the best of intentions; they really want to do good, but it is creating a lot of confusion in the minds of people.” At the same time, debate on PRTs was fuelled internationally by the possibility that this may be the military model for future interventions. The NGO community was outraged by the Coalition’s unwillingness to maintain the necessary distance that would allow the aid community to operate under their principles of neutrality and impartiality.

Maintaining their impartiality and neutrality was the core concern of international NGOs in Afghanistan. They feared that these principles would be eroded if Afghans were to view them in direct contact with the PRTs. The involvement of the PRTs in aid and reconstruction shaped the relationship from the beginning, and continues to do so today. As one NGO employee noted, “No matter how many times you say that the military is there to facilitate humanitarian assistance, people do not want to hear that; they get nervous about the blurring of lines.” A fear is that “anyone who is associated with these PRTs in any way, shape or form would be a legitimate target” for armed opposition groups.

---

79 Jakobsen, p.6.
According to Jim Lobe, “Afghanistan insurgents now make no distinction between military combatants and civilian NGO aid workers, viewing both as Western usurpers and extensions of US political and military agendas.” 81 A faxed message from the Taliban to the Associated Press in September 2003 read, “Our government has always respected the people who are working in NGOs that really want to build Afghanistan. But there is another kind of NGO, which only uses the name NGO but is actually working and spying for the US. We advise Taliban all over the country to attack them and extradite them from Afghanistan.”82

Due to security concerns, many NGOs have chosen to limit or disengage their involvement with PRTs and advocate them only for security purposes.83 Some NGOs have taken actions on their own or in conjunction with other NGOs to improve their field security in Afghanistan. InterAction member agencies, for instance, sponsor their own Field Security Adviser to assist member NGOs with security planning, training and assistance.84

The Coalition military operation that toppled the Taliban altered the NGOs’ role in Afghanistan in a number of ways. NGOs had a presence in Afghanistan for decades and, in the absence of a functioning government, the population was heavily dependent on the assistance community to provide the country’s critical needs. After the Coalition’s

83 Brooks, interview.
84 Peck, p.44.
intervention, the NGOs had to adapt to the new government authority in Afghanistan. According to an OCHA assessment, many NGOs struggled to come to terms with the fact that after the intervention and the creation of a new central government “they were no longer the most important speaking voice for the Afghans and Afghanistan”.85 The Afghanistan-specific NGOs in particular were cited as having extreme difficulty accepting this reality even one year later. The report goes on to say that this may have caused “the misgivings about the role of NGOs in some government quarters”.86 Also, a growing NGO and IO population increased competition for funding and significantly reduced coordination.

The proliferation of NGOs also gave way to feelings of suspicion and distrust from the local population. Several government officials publicly questioned the intentions of aid agencies and demanded that some leave Afghanistan.87 Likewise, many locals have expressed anger toward the aid community when improvement doesn’t arrive as quickly as many expect. As one Afghan local describes, “Many NGOs are here, complete with massive pay checks and fancy cars. One NGO is known to spend 18,000 USD per month for rent, where Afghan housing is 100 USD per month.”88

invasion and subsequent desertion, Afghans were highly suspicious of the outsiders’ intentions.

The Afghan government has expressed its concern over the size of the UN and NGO presence in the country, as well as the fact that the UN has in large part been operating as a parallel administration in the country.\(^{89}\) According to Peter Marsden, “This has meant, for example that the government has needed to respond to requests for assistance from the population by going begging the UN, ICRC, or NGOs rather than drawing on resources at its disposal.”\(^{90}\) With over 600 international staff working for the UN and many more employed by the ICRC and NGOs, international personnel are tending to dominate policy and decision making process both within agencies and at inter-agency meetings. This has resulted in government reviews regarding what constitutes an aid agency and to limit those which can enter the country.\(^{91}\) In addition, the effectiveness of inter-agency meetings has also been undermined by the large number of agencies needing to coordinate their efforts. As a consequence, agency staffs have tended to stay away from coordination meetings because they are seen to go nowhere. This has further distanced international staff from the reality around them, and encouraged a more limited focus, rather than the bigger picture of the problems facing the country.\(^{92}\)

\(^{90}\) Marsden, p.95.
\(^{92}\) Marsden, p.97.
The operation in Afghanistan witnessed the emergence of a new US government attitude toward NGOs. Aid agencies were referred to as ‘partners’ in the War on Terrorism. These remarks were met with great concern by the aid community, as the line between soldier and humanitarian workers continued to be blurred. NGOs were increasingly targets of violence in Afghanistan, as their independent and neutral status eroded. In addition to the military’s role in reconstruction, status of NGOs was undermined by the Afghan government, which was concerned over the large number and budgets of NGOs operating in the country. The Afghan population had also been historically suspicious of foreigners in operating in their country, which served to further alienate NGOs from the population as a whole. The roles of the military forces and aid workers in Afghanistan were constantly being redefined and open to wide array of perceptions. Most would agree, however, that the line between soldier and humanitarian had been undoubtaly blurred.

**Conclusions**

The deployments of PRTs in Afghanistan have been a source of continued debate in the international intervention community. The PRTs were created to have a light footprint in the country and to spread the authority of the central government by winning hearts and minds. The PRT personnel carried out civil affairs roles to promote security throughout their area of operations. However, lacking clearly defined roles and acknowledged as “an evolving concept”, the PRTs greatly differed between various units and nations. Three models emerged: the US, UK, and German models. The US model was heavily focused on force protection and had limited security roles. The aid community in Afghanistan
was deeply concerned over the military’s involvement in relief and reconstruction activities, in lieu of a security role. Much of the country is still too insecure for NGOs to operate, yet instead of a more robust military security role, PRTs were seen by the US DoD as the best approach to stabilization.

NGOs called on the military to focus on their primary role of security, however, their calls seemed to go unanswered. Even after a Taliban resurgence and the murders of dozens of aid workers, enormous security issues in Afghanistan remained largely unaddressed. Some NGOs, most notably MSF, withdrew or suspended their operations in Afghanistan, while others greatly modified their programmes to provide their own security. The lack of response that the aid community received from the US government regarding their concerns over the PRTs continued to strain the military-NGO relationship.

From the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom, NGOs were referred to as “force multipliers” and partners in the War on Terrorism. From the military’s perspective, the PRTs were a model approach to intervention; however, the US military encountered its own internal coordination issues between combat units and the PRTs. In addition, NGOs were often viewed with suspicion and sometimes contempt by Afghan locals and government officials. This alienation often led NGOs to avoid cooperative initiatives with the intervention forces or Afghan government officials. In general, NGOs and military forces operating in Afghanistan were viewed in the same light: as members of the foreign intervention. Undoubtedly, over the past eight years of PRT deployments, the
aid communities’ fears have been realized: there has been a blurring of lines between humanitarians and soldiers.
Chapter 6 (Part II): Afghanistan Case Study
The New Zealand Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT)-NGO Relationship in Bamyan Province

When the New Zealand Defence Force deployed its own PRT in 2003 to take over from the Americans in Bamyan Province, the NZ PRT-NGO relationship was greatly defined by the controversy surrounding the role of PRTs. The province of Bamyan is a comparatively safe and stable area of the country, which enabled the NZDF personnel to undertake more reconstruction and development initiatives, in accordance with their mandate.

This chapter begins with the background of New Zealand’s involvement in Afghanistan. Then, a critical analysis of the NZ PRT-NGO relations in presented, which examines the impact that the PRT controversy, relative security of Bamyan province, and the support for NZDF’s involvement in civil affairs activities had on the military-NGO relationship.

Background to New Zealand’s Involvement in Afghanistan
Despite heated domestic debate as to whether the New Zealand forces should be deployed to Afghanistan as part of the War on Terrorism, the government committed Special Air Service (SAS) troops shortly after the operation began in 2001.93 In addition to their SAS contribution, members of the New Zealand Defence Force have been deployed to Afghanistan in a number of different capacities over the past nine years.

NZDF liaison personnel serve in the headquarters of ISAF, as well as with UNAMA. Several officers are assisting to train the Afghan National Army in Kabul and three NZ Police officers are helping to train Afghan National Police officers at the Regional Police Training Centre in Bamyan. 

According to the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT), “Since 2002, New Zealand has contributed more than NZ$160 million to Afghanistan in the form of military assistance and development support.”

New Zealand’s largest contribution (measured both by the number of personnel and the amount of money spent) to Afghanistan has been its deployment of a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Bamyan Province. The NZ PRT deployment began in 2003 and the New Zealand government is currently committed to maintaining the PRT until September 2010. From 2003-2006 the NZ PRT was part of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), and since November 2006, the PRT has come under the command of NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). The NZ PRT is comprised of roughly 120 defence personnel from the New Zealand Army, Royal New Zealand Air Force, and Royal New Zealand Navy. Just as the other PRTs in the country, the NZ PRT’s mission is to extend the authority of the Afghan government. It is the relationship

---

between the NGOs and the NZ PRT in Bamyan Province which is the focus of this analysis.

Figure 11: Map of the Bamyan Province

The NZDF-NGO Relationship in Afghanistan

Located in the Central Highlands region of Afghanistan, the Bamyan Province is a poor, but relatively safe area of the country. Bamyan City, the administrative capital, is located at an altitude of approximately 2500 metres.\textsuperscript{99} In 1995, Bamyan was exposed to heavy fighting during the conflict between the Hezb-E-Whadat party and Tajiks and from 1998 to 2001 during fighting between the Hezb-Whadat and Taliban.\textsuperscript{100} These conflicts


\textsuperscript{100} UN, UNHCR Sub-Office Profile Central Region, District Profile, Bamyan, 18 September 2002.
resulted in widespread destruction throughout the province. Famous for its Buddha statues, which were destroyed during Taliban rule, Bamyan lacked very basic infrastructure when Coalition forces arrived in 2001. Since 2003, the NZ PRT and over a dozen aid agencies have worked to repair, rebuild, and assist in the development of the province.

The Buddha Statues in Bamyan were built in the 6th century and destroyed by the Taliban in 2001.\textsuperscript{101}

The NZDF-NGO relationship in Bamyan was shaped to a great extent before the NZDF even arrived in the province. First, due to the controversial PRT strategy and its impact on the security and perception of NGOs, the NZ PRT-NGO relationship was tense from the outset. Second, the relative security of the Bamyan province impacted the

---

\textsuperscript{101} The Buddha Statues, retrieved 9 September 2008, raqueem.org.
relationship by allowing a greater focus on aid and reconstruction by the NZDF and NGOs. Finally, the culmination of the NZDF’s past experiences in international interventions and their mission in Afghanistan had led to an increase in the civil affairs roles undertaken by the NZ forces. The following sections: Climate of Controversy; Relative Security; and Increased CMA examine these factors in greater detail.

**Climate of Controversy**

In September 2003 New Zealand troops, led by Colonel Neville Reilly, deployed to Bamyan Province, taking over from the US-led PRT.\(^{102}\) The New Zealand PRT was entering the country in the midst of the ongoing debate over the PRT strategy. The troops were tasked with assisting the local population through security, reconstruction, and development. The New Zealand Defence Force had been involved in the delivery and facilitation of aid and reconstruction in the past and many of the commanders were aware of the inherent controversy surrounding the military’s involvement in nation-building activities.\(^{103}\) However, many defence personnel had difficulty understanding how reconstruction activities could be construed as the military overstepping its boundaries.\(^{104}\) This section analyses the impact the PRT concept had on the NZ PRT-NGO relationship in Bamyan and the NZDF approach to coordinating with aid agencies.

---

When the New Zealand Forces arrived to take over from their American counterparts, they were met with a NGO community which preferred to maintain a distance from the Coalition forces. It wasn’t the NZDF in particular that the NGOs were resentful toward, it was the PRT concept as a whole they objected. As New Zealand reporter Joanna Nathan found while travelling to Bamyan during the first PRT’s deployment, there were mixed perceptions of the NZ PRT from the aid community. Most of the NGO personnel shared their concerns over the roles of the PRT. One NGO worker told her, “They should be out doing patrols everywhere so that NGOs can venture anywhere, but they shouldn’t be digging drains and whatever.”

On the advanced party to Afghanistan to assess the area and prepare for the PRT handover from US forces, Major Nigel Gattsche observed the military-NGO relationship in Bamyan, “There was real hostility [from the NGOs]; They were saying, ‘Hey these guys [the military] are doing our jobs.” The American PRT had been undertaking various reconstruction projects in the province prior to NZDF’s arrival. During the handover to the NZ PRT, Major Gattsche noted that the advanced party was acutely aware that these reconstruction projects were causing strain on the military-NGO relationship. Many NGO workers in the province were angry that USAID was giving the military funding to carry out these projects. As one aid worker noted, “[The military]
should not be given [money] for reconstruction when [NGOs] are available, more experienced, and neutral.’

When the New Zealand force first arrived it was given $26,000 from USAID for projects. Major Gattsche notes that he made a point to engage the aid community in deciding how this money should be allocated, so that it didn’t continue to strain the relationship:

[I]went to one of these meetings we had set up with the NGOs and UN representatives and I said, ‘Look, based on the current relationship we have, perhaps we just better table this funding.’ It was only about $26,000, quite a lot of money locally, but I’ll talk to [the NGOs and UN reps] and see what they think about it. Should we give them the money? Should we give the money back to USAID? So, I was trying to approach it to say, hey, we don’t want to step on your toes, what are your opinions here, how should we deal with this? Should we give you the money? The [NGOs and UN reps] got offside just like that. ‘Oh, the military interfering again, why don’t you get out of our damn business?’ We were going to do wells and I gave them an opportunity to tell us what to do with the money. And I said to them, “Look, at the end of the day if we don’t do the wells, the only people who miss out are the people we’re actually here for.”

Throughout the past eight years of the NZDF’s deployment to Bamyan, many military personnel have cited their frustration over what they view as the “territorial” nature of some NGOs who are “just whinging” about the military’s involvement in civil affairs activities. One NZDF officer offers what he believes to be the root of the strained military-NGO relationship:

The military has taken a part [in aid and development] over the past decade, yes, we have. Do they [the NGOs] stop and wonder why? Maybe we have great skills to offer that can help some people. They always profess to be in it for all the good reasons. Well, if they really cared, don’t you think they’d be glad to have some help from anyone that can offer it? No, because it puts them out of some work and may make them work a bit harder for their funding and they don’t like that one bit.

110 Gattsche, interview.
111 Schmid, interview.
Another NZDF officer points out the high number of military engineers in the field in Bamyan, “People with technical skills that may far exceed those of the aid agencies. There are obvious areas where we can contribute and we should be able to do that. We are there, we have the skills, and these people are in need, they don’t care where it comes from.”

While all NZDF personnel interviewed acknowledge NGO concerns regarding the military’s involvement in reconstruction work, most contend that the re-building of the nation and assisting the locals outweigh these concerns. Colonel Reilly said he understood the NGOs’ point of view. “We are completely biased. We are supporting the central government. I fully respect what [the NGOs] are doing and understand the need for them to be neutral and impartial.” However, Colonel Reilly did express his personal exasperation over having to take a slower approach to the province’s reconstruction due to NGO concerns.

Most of the commanding officers of the NZ PRT consulted regularly with members of the aid community, the UN, and the local government in Bamyan and developed positive working relations. The NZ PRT was also made up of four liaison teams assigned to separate regions of the province. Each liaison team was made up of infantry, engineers, staff officers, communications, and logistics staff. The liaison teams were also staffed with a civil affairs team who carried out patrols in every community in an effort to gain

113 Captain Scott Monteiro, questionnaire received, 1 March 2008.
114 NZDF Commanders from Bosnia, East Timor, and Afghanistan, interviews.
the trust of locals, worked to create relationships with local leaders, and gathered information about security and what may be needed from the local population. The teams also work to facilitate aid distribution, implement disarmament programmes, and assist in the reconstruction of Afghan institutions, such as educational and medical facilities. Engineers with the NZ PRT carry out reconstruction projects and, most often, employ Afghan locals to conduct the reconstruction projects.¹¹⁷

 Afghan President Hamid Karzai with members of the NZ PRT.

The liaison teams also attended meetings with Afghan officials, NZAID, USAID, UNAMA, and NGO personnel on a regular basis.¹¹⁸ To maintain their security and to avoid duplication, most NGOs notified the NZDF of their location and projects. There

¹¹⁸ Monteiro, questionnaire.
was a relatively high level of information sharing among the UNAMA, the NGOs and the NZPRT in Bamyan. The military found NGO information about the populace to be invaluable, as Captain Scott Monteiro noted:

The NGOs in Bamyan have generally been operating for a longer period of time, some international staff being in Bamyan for over six years in the case of Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO)... Due to NZDF development staff being rotated every six months, there was limited time to build up a development picture in the country.

When it comes to working in the field, both the military personnel and NGO employees tend to leave much of the debate over military-NGO relations to their colleagues in headquarters. While the Bamyan NGOs did maintain a distance from the NZ PRT for the most part, they also cooperated to an extent out of necessity. Major Gattsche mentioned a Red Cross employee in Bamyan from Sydney who was, “more than happy to cooperate and assist the NZDF in their projects.”

According to one aid worker, “We must uphold our principles of neutrality and impartiality, but we must also be flexible in our approach. While we prefer to limit our interaction with military forces, we also have a job to do and sometimes you do what you have to do to get the job done… That is not always a popular view, but it is honest.”

120 Monteiro, questionnaire.
122 Gattsche, interview.
123 Megan Edwards, Save the Children, interview, 10 September 2008.
In direct contrast to this view, Justin Mason, a NGO worker in Bamyan, stated, “While the Kiwis were less confrontational than most, when it comes to the military, we [aid workers] have to be careful not to be perceived as part of the operation. I made it a point to keep my distance so that no misperceptions would be created.”

The New Zealand Defence Force deployed to Bamyan province in 2003 during a time of heated debate over the role of military PRTs. Over the past six years, the controversy over the military’s involvement in reconstruction and development in Afghanistan has strained the NZ PRT-NGO relationship. Many NZDF personnel expressed frustration over the aid community’s reluctance to cooperate or condone military-sponsored reconstruction projects. Despite the controversy surrounding the mission of the NZ PRT, the military-NGO relationship was relatively good. Some NGOs chose to work with the military, while most preferred to limit their interaction to information exchange. The NZ PRT-NGO relationship was also impacted greatly by the relative security of Bamyan Province.

**Relative Security**

Unlike many other areas of the country, in which attacks were a daily occurrence, in 2003 Bamyan had entered a phase in which it was ready for reconstruction. Due to the ethnic makeup of the province, the majority of locals were supportive of both the NGOs’ and the NZDF’s presence in Bamyan. The NGOs in the province had more flexibility due to improved security and access to all areas. Security and reconstruction were symbiotic.

---

124 Justin Mason, NGO employee, interview, 6 November 2008.
roles for the NZ PRT. The benign environment allowed the NZ PRT to place a greater emphasis on coordination and reconstruction efforts. This section examines the various effects the security environment had on the NZ PRT-NGO relationship.

Bamyan was one of the first areas where humanitarian agencies could resume their work at the end of November 2001. Humanitarian agencies provided immediate assistance to recent returnees, IDPs, and vulnerable people in the area. There have been well over a dozen NGOs working in Bamyan Province, including: CARE, MSF, IMC, Oxfam, Solidarites, Shuhada, DHSA, FOCUS, Lepco, ICRC, CCA, CHF, AWCP, and Save the Children Japan. Some NGOs have been in the country for decades, through ethnic wars, the Soviet invasion, even during the anti-aid Taliban regime.

Due to Bamyan’s relative security, the NGOs could operate in most areas of the province. The security situation is much better in Bamyan than other provinces in the country. This is largely because of the 350,000 people that live in Bamyan province, 78% are Hazara, 20% Tajik, and 2% Pashtun. The Hazara had been persecuted by the Pashtun-dominated Taliban, and have therefore been more supportive of the US and NATO military forces than other ethnic groups in the country. The NGOs in Bamyan

---

127 UN, UNHCR Sub-Office Profile Central Region; District Profile, Bamyan. 18 September 2002.
acknowledged that the province was much safer than other areas of Afghanistan. One aid worker said, “This place [Bamyan] is a PRT’s dream, but [when disapproving of the PRTs] you have to be general.”¹²⁹ The Organisation for Migration’s (IOM) Philippe Branchat had been working in the province for almost two years and noted the vast improvement in the security, which he partially attributed to the presence of the PRTs. “You can work everywhere, there are no ‘no go’ areas…”¹³⁰

Bamyan’s comparative stability enabled the NZDF to spend more time working with local leadership, training local police and army forces, and reconstruction than their American and British counterparts in other areas of the country. In a report back home, Lieutenant Commander Woodhead describes Bamyan’s relative security, “This country is

littered with the machinery of war. Its people are living memorials to its effects, and the war continues around us on a daily basis—thankfully distant from most of our activities.”

While the benign security environment allows for more rapid implementation of development programmes, the widespread physical destruction and loss of skilled locals, has complicated reconstruction and development efforts.

The greatest obstacle to the aid and reconstruction in Bamyan comes in the form of weather. Every winter many areas of the province were cut off from aid and reconstruction due to the freezing snow, which rendered many roads unusable. Many areas of the province are inaccessible for the most of the year due to the bad road conditions and snow. Greg Crewley, the New Zealand Red Cross International Programmes Coordinator, describes getting aid to the central highlands region as an enormous undertaking, “There are a lot of towns and villages that are cut off even in times of stable security, let alone when there is a conflict going on.”

During extreme weather conditions, the aid community depended on the military to deliver the aid to isolated communities, where NGOs had neither the manpower nor the equipment to go. This dependence improved cooperation between the NZ PRT and the NGOs, as the two actors had to cooperate to accomplish their missions. The extreme climatic conditions in Afghanistan meant some NZ PRT deployments were limited in

---

132 UN, UNHCR Sub-Office Profile Central Region; District Profile, Bamyan, 18 September 2002.
135 Gattsche, interview.
what development projects could be implemented. In Bamyan, the NZ PRT developed a project management system, which accounted for the current state of projects and then prepared the projects to be undertaken in the warmer season.\textsuperscript{136}

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{image.png}
\caption{A Kiwi Liaison team from the NZ PRT hands out blankets during a patrol.}
\end{figure}

All projects were approved by the NZ PRT in consultation with the local government, UN, and aid agencies in the province. Through the Provincial Task Force, chaired by Bamyan’s governor and made up of representatives from the NZ PRT, NGOs, UN, and local population, outlined the strategic direction for development in Bamyan. Any request

\textsuperscript{136} Gattsche, interview.
for development assistance had to be approved by the local shura, District Sub Governor and Provincial Government.\textsuperscript{137}

The NZ PRT successfully established good relations with many cultural and government leaders in the province. Regular meetings were held with local government shura to discuss the provision of water, the reconstruction of schools, and criminal activity. Meetings were also held with government officials to ensure support for various aspects of the province’s infrastructure.

Many of the NZDF’s civil affairs accomplishments in Afghanistan and in other interventions have been attributed to the, “Kiwi Way”.\textsuperscript{138} That is the ability of many New Zealand soldiers to quickly and effectively win over the local population. The NZDF personnel are more likely to sacrifice abundant force protection measures to live and travel in smaller groups amongst the local population.\textsuperscript{139} This has also contributed to an improved NZDF-NGO relationship. Generally, respect and trust are improved when military forces are perceived to be sharing in the same security risks as the locals and aid workers.\textsuperscript{140} This is in direct contrast to many of the NZDF’s counterparts, most notably the US and UK forces. In addition, the large number of women in the NZDF served to improve the NZ PRT’s relations with locals and NGOs in Bamyan.\textsuperscript{141}

\textsuperscript{137} Monteiro, questionnaire.
\textsuperscript{138} Hayward, interview.
\textsuperscript{139} Gattsche, interview.
\textsuperscript{140} Flavin, , p.33.
\textsuperscript{141} Tihi, interview.
Bryan Dorn notes that, “The ability of the New Zealand soldier to establish good relations with the local population and mitigate many issues has brought the NZPRT significant praise.”142 The Commander of US forces in Bagram, Colonel David Garza, observed that, “The NZ PRT is a good model. They have won the hearts and minds of the people.”143 While the operational environment in Bamyan is benign, Dorn notes that, “From all accounts it is believed the New Zealanders would have been equally successful when operating in a more hostile environment, albeit with a higher risk of casualties and demanding a larger security force contribution.”144

The relative security environment of Bamyan was a double-edged sword for the NZ PRT-NGO relationship. On one hand, it allowed NGOs to re-enter the province quickly and enabled them to conduct work in most areas with little military security support. On the other hand, it allowed the NZ PRT to place a greater emphasis on reconstruction activities, which was a source of controversy for the aid community. The province’s culture and climate also impacted the relationship. The local population was more welcoming of the NZ PRT and NGOs than locals elsewhere in Afghanistan. In addition, the extreme climate of the province afforded it some safety through isolation, yet made it difficult for relief and personnel to access. The NZ PRT and NGOs had to work together to overcome the limitations imposed by the roads and weather in Bamyan. The coordination work that the NZ forces carried out, in particular the relationship and trust building, contributed to an improved NZDF-NGO relationship. Through their work in

142 Dorn, p.170.
143 Colonel David Garza, USMC, interview, 8 September, 2006.
144 Dorn, p. 170.
the PRT, the New Zealand forces were creating a niche for themselves in the area of civil affairs.

**Increased CMA**

Since the NZ PRT’s initial deployment to Afghanistan, there has been an effort within the NZDF to improve the current planning and training for unconventional operations. The internal NZDF coordination during joint operations, as well as the overall New Zealand government inter-agency approach to complex emergencies, requires improvement. Without more than a superficial understanding of civil affairs activities and their impact on the operational environment, the NZDF-NGO relationship will continue to be strained. This section examines the civil affairs coordination and training limitations of the NZDF and their impact on the NZ PRT-NGO relationship.

The NZ PRT was a joint operation, consisting of forces from the Army, Navy and Air Force, as well as a combination of territorial and regular forces. Many personnel did not have previous land operations experience, such as members of the Navy and Air Force. While some personnel have had previous deployments to complex emergencies, experience with interventions was not a pre-requisite for the PRT deployment.\(^{145}\) The NZDF does not have a CMA unit or designated CMA personnel. Instead, specialists, such as engineers, were designated as liaison officers to coordinate reconstruction activities.\(^{146}\) Limited training was given to the liaison officers in advance of their deployment. In fact, Captain Scott Monteiro, NZ PRT liaison officer to NZAID, noted,

\(^{145}\) Tihi, interview.

\(^{146}\) Major General Lou Gardiner, interview, 23 May 2005.
“[There was] limited training on civil-military activities. Information was only given about NGOs that were operating in the area and two scenarios involving holding a meeting with NGOs and locals.”  

During the NZ PRT pre-deployment training, primary emphasis was placed on weapons training, while cultural and language training was limited. However, the training did include very important information about the local environment and people, very basic language skills and an overview of organisations operating in the province. The training was improved with each successive deployment and more emphasis was paid to the critical civil affairs skills that would be necessary in Bamyan. Afghan role players were used to simulate the area of operations and NZDF personnel were engaged in brief exercise where they negotiated with locals, coordinated assistance with NGOs, and facilitated reconstruction projects.  

Once in theatre, however, the NZDF personnel were faced with scenarios for which they had not been trained. One of the issues confronting the NZ PRT was the inter-agency approach to reconstruction and development. While the funding and approval for many projects had to be made by NZAID, there was not a representative from the organisation in Bamyan on a regular basis. Instead, the NZ PRT Liaison Officer was tasked with overseeing and coordinating all reconstruction projects.

---

147 Monteiro, questionnaire.  
148 Gattsche, interview.  
149 Tihi, interview.
According to Bryan Dorn:

During the seventh NZPRT deployment it was calculated that the Bamyan Province was missing out on 50 per cent of US Commander’s Emergency Response Programme (CERP) funding that other provinces received. This was attributed to the fact the New Zealand Engineer Officer was too preoccupied with NZAID projects to devote time to CERP initiatives.  

While NZAID and the NZDF did have a Memorandum of Understanding outlining guidance and cooperation, some conflict continued to emerge. Some NZAID representatives cite the NZDF’s lack of attention to long term development and instead, “focus solely on short-term projects without putting them in context of overall needs.” According to one NZAID official, “There was not enough coordination between the NZPRT and NZAID; the projects needed to be overseen by a development professional and, unfortunately, this was not done.”

The requirement for an improved inter-agency response to unconventional operations is starting to gain steam amongst New Zealand government agencies. In 2004 initiatives got underway to create cooperative and coordinated relationships among NZAID, NZDF, the Centre for International Development (CID) and various New Zealand-based NGOs.

As complex emergencies are likely to continue emerging, the NZDF’s Future Land Operating Concept (FLOC), outlining NZDF’s operational objectives to 2020, has called

---

150 Dorn, p.168.
151 Anonymous, NZAID representative, interview, 8 May 2009.
152 Rae Julian, Centre for International Development Director, interview, 26 May 2004. A civil-military workshop was sponsored in 2004 by CID for NZDF, NZAID, and the NGO communities to work on relationship building.
for improved civil affairs capabilities and an inter-agency approach to operations.\textsuperscript{153} Cultural and language skills, as well as an understanding of humanitarian and development principles will serve as critical assets to the NZDF. Major General Lou Gardiner, New Zealand’s Chief of Army, acknowledged that, “We are looking into creating a Civil Affairs capability.”\textsuperscript{154} However, there is no confirmation as to when this may occur or what shape it may take.

Dedicated civil affairs specialists are necessary to accomplish future missions in complex emergencies. While the NZDF has done remarkably well conducting civil affairs activities with little to no advanced expertise, the creation of regional and cultural civil affairs specialists will solidify the NZDF’s role in unconventional operations. The soft power employed by the NZDF has been largely \textit{ad hoc} and the experiences in Bosnia, East Timor, Afghanistan and elsewhere have revealed the uneven quality of the current approach.

The NZ PRT experience in Afghanistan has revealed a critical lack of inter-agency coordination amongst New Zealand government agencies, as well as civil affairs expertise in the NZDF. While the NZDF’s \textit{ad hoc} approach has been met with many successes thus far, the NZDF’s success in future civil affairs operations will depend upon its ability to launch a well planned and coordinated mission, coupled with highly trained civil affairs personnel. Failure to implement changes to the inter-agency and civil affairs

\textsuperscript{153} NZDF, \textit{NZDF’s Future Land Operating Concept (FLOC)}, Capability Staff, Army General Staff 12 June 2007.
\textsuperscript{154} Gardiner, interview.
approach will undoubtedly continue to strain the military-NGO relationship in Afghanistan and beyond.

**Conclusions**

The case of the NZ PRT-NGO relationship in Bamyan demonstrates more than ever the need for defining the roles of both the militaries and NGOs involved in complex humanitarian emergencies. The controversial PRT strategy created great strain on the overall military-NGO relationship in Afghanistan, as NGOs were increasingly alarmed over the military's role in reconstruction and development activities. The NZDF took steps to mitigate NGO concerns, however, most aid workers preferred to operate separately of the military forces and avoid interaction. Many NZDF personnel found this difficult to understand, as their mission in Bamyan was to improve the security of the province through support to civil institutions.

The NZ PRT-NGO relationship benefited in many ways from the isolation and extreme weather conditions of the province. Forced to cooperate due to limited access and weather conditions, the NZ PRT and NGOs worked together more than in many other provinces. Due to the relative security of the province, NGOs were able to operate freely and without military protection in most cases. The NZ PRT achieved comparatively good military-NGO relations.

Over the past six years the NZ PRT has highlighted the need to train soldiers in civil affairs capabilities. Language skills, regional expertise, and an understanding of the
principles behind development and reconstruction will arm the NZDF to undertake unconventional operations. Throughout the NZDF’s involvement in international interventions, they have applied a largely *ad hoc* approach to civil affairs and, while this has been met with many successes, it has also contributed to uneven and inconsistent outcomes. The institutionalization of CMA capabilities will go a long way in solidifying NZDF’s role as a successful ‘soft power’ force.
Conclusion

An analysis of the case-study interactions in Somalia, Bosnia, East Timor, and Afghanistan between either the US military or the New Zealand Defence Force and NGOs reveals that the effectiveness of the response to complex emergencies was, in every case, impacted by the quality of the military/NGO relationship. To be sure, there have been successes as well as failures. The introduction to this study raised three key questions as part of this research. Using the findings from the case studies, this chapter addresses these three key questions, as well as a fourth area, which, while not a key question, allows for a comparison of US and New Zealand approaches to the military-NGO relationship. This chapter is organised into the following four sections, which address these questions. First, does a lack of cooperation in military-NGO relations exist and, if it does, how does it inhibit the efficacious response to complex emergencies? Second, what impact do the structures and philosophies of both military and humanitarian organisations have on the military-NGO relationship? Third, using the strategic, operational and tactical levels to evaluate the case studies, what has, and has not, worked within the military-NGO relationship and how can those successes and failures contribute to building a model for the military-NGO relationship? Fourth, does the US military or the New Zealand Defence Force have a comparative advantage in the military-NGO relationship?

Taken collectively, these questions offer a better understanding of how the military-NGO relationship impacts international interventions; what affects the relationship; if there could be a model for the relationship; and whether certain countries may excel in various
aspects of military-NGO relations. Above all, the analysis of these case studies provides firsthand examples of what has, and has not, worked in the military-NGO relationship and offers lessons, which, if heeded, may instruct future interactions between military and NGO personnel and, in turn, improve the international response to complex emergencies.

Does a lack of cooperation in military-NGO relations exist and, if it does, how does it inhibit the efficacious response to complex emergencies?

Each case study clearly demonstrated that there is a critical lack of well-defined and sustained procedures or initiatives to achieve a coordinated military-NGO response to complex emergencies. The evidence amassed from the case studies suggests that the absence of a cooperative military-NGO relationship and a documented process or policy for responding to these emergencies is detrimental to the ability of both actors to carry out their missions and results in the response being neither as robust nor as effective as it could and should be.

In the interviews and literature that cover the emergencies examined in this study, no term appears more frequently, or more accurately captures the nature of the various international responses, than ad hoc. At the strategic level, the mix of forces, international and domestic organisations, their missions/mandates, the timing of their arrival in the impacted area are all unknown variables until a specific crisis erupts. By the very nature of these crises much of the initial response does, indeed, have to be initiated in a short period of time. However, as the case studies revealed, the last minute
assembly of international interventions is compounded by the largely uncoordinated, uncommunicative, and uncooperative military-NGO relationship.

While some efforts have been made to improve the cooperation between militaries and NGOs over the past two decades, the relationship is by no means of even quality and is very much dependent upon the six primary factors identified in Chapter One: missions, cultures, structures, comparative advantage, perception, and level of conflict. Without a doubt, the relationship suffers from aspects of interventions that are outside of the actors’ control (e.g. mandates, political will, level of instability) and those within the actors’ control (e.g. structures, procedures, communication). Above all else, the case study findings have revealed that, due to a lack of codified coordination processes, the military-NGO relationship is personality driven and improvisational.

In each of the case studies, regardless of the cooperative measures taken, misunderstanding, frustration, and antagonism were present in the military-NGO relationship. The strained relationship has resulted in duplication of efforts, uneven delivery of assistance, lack of a coordinated and well-planned military-NGO operation, and limited information sharing. Prior to an intervention and during each phase of the mission, the military-NGO relationship has lacked clear lines of communication and coordination.

In Somalia, the intervention was hampered by an untenable security environment and the unwillingness of NGOs to consolidate their facilities. Somalia’s intervention also
suffered from the confusion surrounding UNITAF’s mandate and unmanaged local and NGO expectations of what the US-led military operation would provide. In Bosnia during UNPROFOR, the military lacked a mandate sufficient to the task at hand and NGOs were reluctant to share information with the military. During the subsequent operation, IFOR, the military was equipped with a stronger mandate and ended up being the de facto administration in the country, filling gaps in civilian capabilities. Throughout both the UNPROFOR and IFOR operations in Bosnia, there were countless instances of duplicative efforts between military forces and civilian agencies, which can be attributed to a lack of information sharing and processes.

In East Timor, the NZDF filled gaps in NGO capabilities, taking on a broader interpretation of their role in the intervention. Once again, there were duplication of efforts and, without a plan to address the country’s enormous challenges in a cohesive way, the aid and development to East Timor was uneven. In Afghanistan, as in other complex emergencies, each province, or area of operations, received varying levels of support from the military and civilian communities. Within both the military and civilian communities, the case studies reveal there are no codified approaches to complex emergencies, much less to the military-NGO relationship.

The case studies clearly demonstrate that a lack of cooperation does exist in the military-NGO relationship and the inability of these two actors to coordinate activities and cooperate effectively has negatively impacted the overall response to complex emergencies. While recognizing that each actor must maintain operational independence,
the systemic lack of cooperation in the military-NGO relationship has an immeasurable impact on the collective response and creates uneven responses to complex emergencies. Due to the absence of a coordinated response, some areas receive duplicative efforts, while others are left with no assistance. Without a detailed military-NGO approach and agreed upon plan to provide aid and assistance in a complex emergency, the response will never be as effective as it could be.

*What impact do the structures and philosophies of both military and humanitarian organisations have on the military-NGO relationship?*

The various structures and philosophies of the myriad of military and humanitarian organisations impacted the military-NGO relationship in each of the case studies. Chapter One provided a general explanation of the structures and philosophies of both the military and NGOs. However, as noted in the case studies, neither the military nor NGOs are a monolithic group. The case studies revealed that the NZDF and US military differ in their organisational structures and the manner in which they approach complex emergencies. Amongst the plethora of NGOs, there is an enormous spectrum of capabilities, organisational approaches, and ideologies. The case studies explored the various approaches of the US military, NZDF and NGOs to international interventions and it is evident that the structures and philosophies of all the organisations involved impact the military-NGO relationship.

Both the US and New Zealand militaries are structured and based on the philosophy that they are warfighters first, and that all other roles are secondary to their ability to defeat an enemy. Due largely to their training, skills, and logistical capabilities, governments task
militaries to respond to complex emergencies. It is increasingly evident that security and aid tasks are not mutually exclusive and the role of humanitarian and soldier has become blurred. The US military and NZDF’s philosophies are slowly evolving to meet the requirements of asymmetric or irregular warfare, where winning the respect of the local population often has greater strategic value than winning a fire fight.

Individual NGO philosophies are widely varied on infinite topics, one of which being their willingness to cooperate with military forces. Some NGOs work openly alongside military forces, the International Medical Corps for example. Some work only when it is absolutely necessary, such as World Vision. And others’ policies require a complete separation from military forces, such as MSF. Structures can range from flat to hierarchical and, as the case studies reveal, the coordination amongst NGOs is sorely lacking, even with umbrella organisations such as Interaction.

While it has been noted that most NGOs share a belief in the principle of non-violence, it may be argued that NGOs, and the aid they deliver, cannot be considered apolitical. As the case studies have demonstrated, aid always impacts or benefits one side of a conflict or the other. Regardless of the intention or altruism behind aid and development (which in itself can be argued), aid impacts the complex emergency immeasurably, sometimes prolonging the conflict. Many NGOs which decline to accept military security, or in instances where military forces may not be present, may seek security provisions for their personnel from mercenaries, local (possibly corrupt) police, and other forms of private security personnel. As evidenced in the Somalia case study, the decision to accept local
security has enormous impact on the complex emergency and empowers one group or another, often culminating in prolonged warfare and crises.

Just as military forces are directed by governments, NGOs are often directed by their donors, who may have political, religious, economic or other motivations for providing assistance. With the large number of NGOs and their various ideologies, the aid community does not wholly agree on any one issue. As the case studies demonstrated, the enormous growth of the aid community over the past two decades has also contributed to the disorganisation of the humanitarian community.

Military organisations have a hierarchical structure and serve as an arm of national governments, whereas aid agencies tend to have flat organisational structure and, as noted above, range in their motivations to provide assistance. However, this study has highlighted that the friction between military forces and NGOs’ philosophies and structures stems more from an adherence to principles and structures that may no longer apply to modern complex emergencies. The case studies clearly demonstrated that the apolitical principles of many NGOs are great in theory, yet are often unrealistic in complex emergencies, where aid undoubtedly impacts one or multiple sides in a conflict. In some instance it was, again, evident that aid even served to prolong conflict. Similarly, the military’s rigid hierarchical structure is often impractical in complex emergencies, in which a corporal is forced to make decisions which can have strategic implications. In these ways, among others, it was readily apparent that the differences in
the organisational approaches and philosophies of aid agencies and militaries impacted the military-NGO relationship in each of the four case studies.

Using the strategic, operational and tactical levels to evaluate the case studies, what has and has not worked within the military-NGO relationship and how can those successes and failures contribute to building a model for the military-NGO relationship?

As indicated earlier, this examination uses the strategic, operational, and tactical levels that typically characterize military operations to summarize and analyze the findings from the US military and NZDF relationships with NGOs in the Somalia, Bosnia, East Timor, and Afghanistan case studies. The strategic findings are those that are addressed at the national or international policy level and have overarching implications for the military-NGO relationship in both general terms and in specific emergency responses. At this highest level, the impacts of the political will, the policies, and the mandates which frame the military-NGO relationship are examined. The operational level, characterized in these cases as the emergency or theatre-specific issues are examined and summarized, outlining the case study-specific planning, roles, and coordination initiatives which impacted the military-NGO relationship. Finally, at the tactical level, where aid and security are delivered and hearts, minds, and lives are won or lost, the impacts and implications of mission interpretation, expectations, and stereotypes are revealed.

**Strategic Findings**

The military-NGO relationship has evolved dramatically over the past two decades. In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War and the first Iraq War (Desert Storm), the
interventions in northern Iraq, Haiti, and the early stages of the crisis in Somalia spawned a flurry of interest in military-NGO cooperation. Increased coordination and its impact on operational effectiveness were the topics of many publications and workshops in staff colleges and research institutes. However, after the disastrous UNOSOM II mission to Somalia and UNPROFOR mission to Bosnia, a backlash against nation-building military missions emerged, particularly in the US, which served to derail the limited military-NGO cooperation progress that had been achieved. While the operations in Bougainville, Bosnia, and East Timor found New Zealand taking on an increasing role in peacekeeping activities, the US’ interest in these operations waned until the events of 11 September brought about the dramatic re-emergence of failed-state operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Once again, civil-military affairs have become topical and finding ways to improve military-NGO cooperation is the purpose of workshops, doctrine, policies, and studies.

This section examines the strategic (policy and doctrine) findings of the military-NGO relationship. It is critical to bear in mind that it is the strategic decisions that serve to shape the relationships between the military and NGO communities on the operational and tactical levels.

**Political Will**

The domestic and international politics of individual nations is beyond the scope of this study, but it should be noted that all of the strategic, operational, and tactical planning and cooperation that could potentially be achieved by militaries and NGOs can be rendered ineffective by ill-timed political decisions to commit or withdraw resources.
from an international emergency. Multi-lateral action, while admirable, and even necessary, is also extremely complex to orchestrate with each nation entering into the fray with different capabilities and expectations. Dependent upon the nature and location of the emergency, nations weigh their strategic and political options before determining if, when, and how they might participate in resolving the crisis. For the purposes of this study, there is little to recommend or conclude about this issue, but, nonetheless, it must be acknowledged as “the elephant in the room.” Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda and Darfur are all tragic examples of political indecision influencing the outcome of intervention.

Mandates

In each of the case studies, the clarity and appropriateness of the mandates greatly impacted the military-NGO relationship. More often than not, the mandates (whether military or civilian) were poorly crafted and were not adequately communicated to military personnel, aid workers, locals, and the international community at large. The most striking example of an inappropriate mandate was the UNPROFOR operation in Bosnia.

During UNPROFOR, the mandate was not sufficient for the military to create a secure environment for humanitarian forces to operate. The articulated mission was so limited and the forces were so poorly equipped and constrained by their rules of engagement, that the military forces were powerless to enforce the protection of UN-mandated “safe areas”. Without the authorization and assets to provide the security that would enable the widespread distribution of aid and the stabilization of society, both military and aid
personnel were unable to carry out their missions. UNPROFOR was a clear and unambiguous example of the terrible consequences of a weak and ineffectual mandate.

In Somalia, the UNITAF mandate was also a source of controversy, as many in the international community feared that it was only a temporary solution and would not address the long term security issues of the country. Differing interpretations and expectations of the mandate served to complicate the military-NGO relationship in Somalia. The UN wanted the US forces to commit to a longer mission; one in which disarmament and country-wide security would be top priorities. Many of the NGOs also wanted UNITAF to not only provide enough security to allow them to work under military protection, but enough security to enable the relief workers to continue their operations independent of military protection. The US, however, believed that the larger roles of long term security should be dealt with by a traditional UN peacekeeping force and declined taking on a larger role in the country. These various views translated into tension between the military and NGOs, as the mandate for UNITAF was not clearly communicated or, in some instances, was resisted by civilian agencies.

The case studies reveal that inappropriate or poorly communicated mandates impact the military-NGO relationship on the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. The mandates set the stage for the intervention and largely determine whether the military and aid personnel will be able to operate effectively. Prior to receiving the mandates, of course, the extent to which the military and NGOs are trained also has a critical impact on the success of a complex emergency.
Training

Training is addressed in the strategic section because it is an outcome dictated by national policy. As an instrument of the state, a military is trained to undertake its nation’s missions in the international arena. The determination of training priorities in any military is dictated by the policies that underpin the strategic vision that nation has for itself.

Despite the fact that the US and New Zealand forces have been regularly deploying to operational environments which have required various aspects of nation-building over the past two decades, there still exist mixed views on the extent to which soldiers should be trained for peace support operations.

The case studies demonstrate the different national approaches to civil military affairs training. The US military has developed civil-military affairs units, as well as fairly comprehensive CMA doctrine. However, over the past two decades, outside of the specialist CMA personnel (95% of whom are in the US Army Reserves or National Guard), the average US soldier or marine did not receive training for peacekeeping operations. This trend has changed over the years, with US forces deploying to Afghanistan and Iraq currently receiving more CMA training when compared to the forces deployed to Somalia in 1992. The current training for peace operations continues

to be limited for non-CMA personnel and has not been institutionalised in the US military.

New Zealand forces, on the other hand, have more rapidly embraced training for peacekeeping roles. However, while the NZDF has been more open to training for peacekeeping roles than the US military, they have not institutionalized their training initiatives, nor have they developed their own civil affairs doctrine. While commitments over the past six years in the NZ PRT (Afghanistan) have highlighted the need to train soldiers in language skills, regional expertise, and an understanding of the principles behind development and reconstruction, there remains a lack of formalized civil affairs capabilities.

As the case studies demonstrate, the NZDF has applied a largely ad hoc approach to civil affairs and their overall involvement in international interventions. In spite of the ad hoc approach, the NZDF’s civil military capabilities have improved since their involvement in UNPROFOR (Bosnia). As a small fighting force, the NZDF tends to train soldiers to be more versatile and well-rounded than their US counterparts. However, without consistent and institutionalized policies, doctrine, training, and education, the quality of the NZDF’s civil affairs initiatives remains uneven.

While the US military and NZDF train their soldiers to various degrees for peace operations, this study demonstrates that the development and implementation of civil-military affairs doctrine, training protocols, and career field development is necessary to
ensure that complex emergencies are not always met with *ad hoc* responses. Regardless of their varying degrees of willingness to implement civil-military affairs programmes, the US military and NZDF are increasingly engaging with humanitarian organisations in every phase of peace operations. Experiences from Somalia to Afghanistan have revealed that, when placed in the context of overall mission effort, formalized civil affairs procedures in complex emergency operations are critical to the mission’s success.

**Politization of Aid**

Each of the case studies revealed that, in complex emergencies, no events occur in isolation. The military, humanitarian, diplomatic, economic, and political arenas all overlap and impact one another. While many NGOs contend that they are apolitical, the actions of all actors, regardless of intentions, impact the political, diplomatic, economic, and military environments in a complex emergency. In fact, as noted above, many NGOs are directed or heavily influenced by their donors, who may have various motivations for providing assistance. The Somalia and Bosnia case studies highlight the political and economic effects of aid distribution.

In Somalia, the NGOs hiring local guards had enormous and long term implications for disarmament and the overall security situation. Prior to UNITAF, NGOs had the unenviable choice of hiring of local guards for security or to refrain from operating and providing assistance to the country. However, many NGOs continued to employ local guards during the UNITAF operation, which continued to result in attacks on NGO
personnel and the theft of large amounts of aid, benefiting the warlords and contributing to sustained conflict in Somalia.

Similarly, Bosnia also demonstrated that aid is not impartial. Again, the warring factions confiscated and wielded aid as a pawn in their conflicts, which strengthened the factions and sustained the violence. In addition, when some NGOs geared their aid programmes toward the Muslims and not the Serbs, they clearly demonstrated that aid could be an open demonstration of support for one side of a conflict over another.

One group or another always benefits from the distribution of aid. Whether it sustains the violence, or fuels it, the delivery of humanitarian aid to a complex emergency will indirectly or directly affect the conflict itself. Over the past two decades, NGOs have become increasingly politicized, more by virtue of their presence in complex emergencies than their intentions. To deliver aid in failed states, many NGOs have had to make (or have chosen to make) concessions, such as hiring local guards or accepting the theft of large portions of their aid, which have served to erode the perception of their impartiality.

**Operational Findings**

While each operation is different, there were several recurrent factors which served to impact military-NGO relations at an operational (theatre specific) level. This section examines the impact that organisational roles, NGO coordination, and civil-military planning had on the military-NGO relationship during the Somalia, Bosnia, East Timor, and Afghanistan case studies.
Organisational Roles

Each of the case studies revealed that both the military and NGOs have a primary role in complex emergencies. It is these roles that often put the two actors at odds and, at the same time, it is also these roles which require their interdependence. Understanding these roles and the motivation behind the roles is instructive in comprehending the friction between military forces and NGO personnel.

The military’s primary role in complex emergencies is to provide security and enable aid to be distributed. While the military’s primary role is always security, as any military officer can attest, there is more to securing an area than merely being a presence of force. Security requires a population which is living free of fear and desperation; that is, a population that has enough to eat, a place to sleep, and hope for a future. Thus, it is natural that the military is interested in restoring normative conditions to a state. This motivation to improve civil order by the military, however, does not carry with it the principles inherent in humanitarianism. Militaries are not neutral or apolitical. Therefore, when coalition militaries engage in aid and reconstruction efforts, it is normally a secondary mandate that is undertaken when aid agencies cannot, or will not, participate.

NGOs, on the other hand, are in regions primarily to assist people in need—often regardless of their religious or political affiliation. Their priority is the delivery of aid and the security of a region is a far lesser priority, insofar as they are still able to deliver that aid. While many in the NGO community appreciate the fact that civil order
contributes to improved security, most are adamant that the humanitarian community should be the sole providers of the assistance that contributes to that civil order.

The PRTs in Afghanistan are the latest example of the increasing trend of military involvement in humanitarian assistance. NGOs have repeatedly expressed their concern over the military’s involvement in aid and relief activities. However, both the US and New Zealand, along with other national governments, contend that a holistic approach to complex emergencies is necessary to create a sustainable peace. The past two decades have witnessed an increase in the use of military forces for the full spectrum of nation-building initiatives and, in turn, confusion and friction over the roles of military and NGO personnel.

**NGO Coordination**

Given the myriad of NGOs involved in complex emergencies, it is not surprising that the lack of NGO coordination was an issue in each of the case studies. One of the problems that this lack of coordination presents in complex emergencies was particularly evident in East Timor, where NGOs were heavily concentrated in Dili, despite a relatively secure environment elsewhere in the more rural and poorer areas of the country. Without an adequate level of NGO coordination, gaps and duplication of aid efforts were inevitable and a recurring theme in every case study.

There have been repeated attempts to coordinate NGO activities during complex emergencies. In Bosnia, the UNHCR was designated as the lead agency and charged with
coordinating the humanitarian response. However, the organisation was powerless to enforce any cooperation whatsoever from the participating agencies and relied solely on NGOs’ willingness to cooperate and coordinate. While there have been instances of NGO coordination, this has been the exception rather than the rule.

Without a coordinated response to complex emergencies, and by concentrating activities in major cities and towns rather than outer lying areas, the humanitarian community runs the risk of continuing to be negatively stereotyped by the military, local, and international communities as ineffective and partial. Furthermore, without an adequate level of civilian assistance in more rural areas, whether due to security or environmental conditions, the humanitarian community is likely to continue to witness an increase in the military’s involvement in aid and development.

**Civil-Military Planning**

All four case studies revealed that consultation between the military and NGOs during the planning and execution phases of the operation, as well as deploying experienced military and civilian practitioners to a complex emergency, is invaluable. In addition, the civil-military structures set up to facilitate the military-NGO relationship are integral to achieving a high level of cooperation and communication.

The importance of having expert, well-trained, flexible, communicative staff working within both the military and civilian communities during an operation should not be underestimated. In Somalia, experts from the military and humanitarian community were
able to overcome many obstacles that may have served to derail many aspects of military-NGO cooperation, such as confusion over UNITAF’s mandate and NGO security concerns. In addition, Bosnia demonstrated that when the deployment of civil affairs staff is delayed, key opportunities, which come from specialized interaction with the local population, are lost.

Equal to the importance of experts on the ground in a complex emergency are the organisational structures which facilitate military-NGO cooperation. The operation in Somalia clearly demonstrated the critical importance of Civil-Military Operations Centres (CMOCs) and Humanitarian Operations Centres (HOCs) to the military-NGO relationship. While the Mogadishu CMOC/HOC experienced difficulties due to its location, HOCs in the other HRSs proved enormously successful in coordinating relations. Somalia demonstrated that in future operations, HOCs and CMOCs should be a top priority and should be co-located with military headquarters, when possible, to achieve maximum coordination between the military and NGOs.

**Tactical Findings**

The tactical situation in every complex emergency is largely dictated by the decisions and actions carried out (or not carried out) on the strategic and operational levels. In this section, the tactical (on the ground) findings are presented.
Unrealistic Expectations

All of the case studies clearly demonstrated that the military, NGOs, and the local population often have unrealistic expectations of one another in complex emergencies. Both the US military and NZDF personnel consistently cited frustration over what they perceived to be the ineffectiveness of NGOs. When the military was more cognizant of the various missions, cultures, and competing interests at play within the aid community, the military-NGO cooperation was improved. Similarly, when NGOs and locals had realistic expectations of the security capabilities of the military forces, relations were improved.

During UNPROFOR in Bosnia, the NZDF made concerted efforts to work with the civilian agencies despite their differences and used soft power to set itself apart from its British counterparts. This resulted in fewer casualties, as well as a higher level of respect and trust between the NZDF and NGOs.

During the US military’s deployment to IFOR in Bosnia, the civil affairs units carefully communicated the military’s role to locals and NGOs and were consistent in reinforcing these roles. When the military forces were very clear about what they would or would not provide, the expectations of NGOs and locals were more realistic.

In Somalia, the Mogadishu humanitarian community’s refusal to consolidate facilities and simultaneous security demands of the military demonstrated that many NGOs had unrealistic expectations due to a lack of understanding regarding military security
capabilities. A compromise was never reached, and many NGOs in Mogadishu accepted a less secure environment to keep their various facilities throughout the city.

**Mission Interpretation**

The military’s role in humanitarian assistance was not made clear to the military forces or the humanitarian community in each of the case studies. During the Somalia UNITAF operation, the mandate was left open for interpretation. Some soldiers believed their role was to provide security, which would enable the humanitarians to operate. Others believed that their mandate called for military forces to assist the humanitarians in their operations. The humanitarian workers often found this situation confusing, as they did not know what to expect from the military forces.

In Bosnia, many aid agencies believed that IFOR would apprehend suspected and indicted war criminals. However, this was left open ended in IFOR’s mandate. The fact that this was not made clear to civilians created resentment once aid workers witnessed military forces taking on reconstruction tasks in the absence of a secure environment.

The controversial PRT strategy created great strain on the overall military-NGO relationship in Afghanistan, as NGOs were increasingly alarmed over the military’s role in reconstruction and development activities. The NZDF took steps to mitigate NGO concerns, however, most aid workers preferred to operate separately of the military forces and avoid interaction. Many NZDF personnel found this difficult to understand, as their
mission in Bamyan was to improve the security of the province through support to civil institutions.

The case studies clearly illustrated that some military-NGO cooperation initiatives were successful, while others failed, but almost all initiatives were *ad hoc*. Moreover, when cooperation did result it was typically based on the personalities involved, rather than on a particular process applied. On the strategic, operational, and tactical levels the military-NGO relationship has a wealth of experience to draw on. A model for the military-NGO relationship is certainly possible given the evidence that has emerged from this study and the “best practices” which are identified in the case studies. Indeed, the greatest challenge remains institutionalizing the successful initiatives and formalizing various aspects of the civil-military interface so that these lessons do not need to be continually re-learned.

*Does the US military or the New Zealand Defence Force have a comparative advantage in the military-NGO relationship?*

The Somalia, Bosnia, East Timor and Afghanistan case studies were specifically chosen to compare and contrast two countries’ military-NGO relationships, the US and New Zealand. While each complex emergency is unique and brings different challenges, actors, and tasks, there are many common threads that were experienced by both the US military and NZDF. There were differences and similarities in both militaries’ responses to complex emergencies and their relations with civilian agencies. While both are western militaries, this question was raised to determine whether a comparative
advantage exists in the military-NGO relationship between militaries of different sizes, capabilities, and resources. This section analyses the findings of the case studies to ascertain whether the US military or NZDF has a comparative advantage in the military-NGO relationship.

The case studies revealed that the US has, perhaps more than any other country, the ability to influence the decision to intervene in a complex emergency, the effort to coordinate that intervention, and the willingness to address the myriad of issues that may be encountered in a given complex emergency. The impact of this strategic and operational level influence indicates that the US has the capability to lead the way in the response to interventions, including the military-NGO relationship. This is not to say that other countries do not share the ability to affect international interventions, but the strategic influence that the US has is evident and is certainly a comparative advantage in the military-NGO relationship.

New Zealand, on the other hand, has a limited ability to strategically influence international intervention responses. However, a comparative advantage for the NZDF in the military-NGO relationship is the fact that, in contrast to the US, New Zealand is viewed as a smaller, less politically aligned player on the international stage.

As the case studies demonstrated, New Zealand tends to deploy its forces in areas where peacekeeping roles, not active combat, are required. Over the past 18 years, the New Zealand government has increased its support of peacekeeping operations and, thus, the
NZDF has been tasked with training, budgeting, and deploying for non-conventional operations, which focus more heavily on communicating with aid agencies and locals. Generally, the New Zealand government has been more inclined to deploy New Zealand forces to more benign areas, where soft power is applicable. There are certainly exceptions to this, Cova Lima in East Timor, for instance, was not a benign district. However, the focus on more soft power missions has allowed the NZDF to cultivate a peacekeeping culture amongst the ranks in which improvisational civil affairs capabilities are lauded.

The US is frequently called upon to respond to complex emergencies due to the country’s military resources. The US military has combat and logistical capabilities that can be deployed rapidly and, thus, are frequently sent to complex emergencies. Due to the size of the US military, there are resources available to have specialist CMA units and specialists trained in CMA.

As the case studies reveal, the importance of having a codified doctrine to apply to civil affairs activities made a tremendous difference in the military-NGO relationship. Establishing CMOCs and HOCs in each of their deployments, the US military’s CMA detachments were well-trained and had a framework for how to engage in military-NGO relations. During IFOR, the US military’s CMA units were integral in rebuilding Bosnia’s shattered administration, judicial, voting, infrastructure, and economic systems. By tasking experts in these areas to address the country’s issues, IFOR created a more rapid and thorough response than would otherwise have been possible.
New Zealand, on the other hand, lacks formalized doctrine and units, which puts it at a disadvantage in the relationship. This disadvantage has been somewhat offset by the versatility and unofficial training focus of the NZDF on peacekeeping operations. Due largely to a lack of resources, NZDF personnel have demonstrated a creative approach to CMA. In Bosnia and East Timor, the NZDF personnel set themselves apart from many other nations’ militaries by implementing projects with limited resources, engaging local leadership, and forming partnerships with civilian agencies. In addition, due to the small number of personnel within the NZDF, an appreciation of CMA has been able to permeate throughout the officer and enlisted ranks.

Due, again, to its smaller size, limited resources and more benign operating environments, the NZDF tended to demonstrate more of a willingness to engage the local population and civilian agencies. This is in direct contrast to the US military, which, as the case studies revealed, often took more of a “behind the wire” approach to complex emergencies, which heavily focused on force protection. This approach limited its ability to engage and cooperate with the aid agencies and locals. While force protection is absolutely vital to missions, it is worth noting that this did create a barrier to cooperation between the US military and civilian agencies.

Finally, both the US military and NZDF have the overwhelming majority of their CMA capabilities in the reserves or territorial forces. For both the countries’ militaries, this has created numerous obstacles to military-NGO cooperation in recent years, as there have
not been enough reserve forces to meet the high demand for CMA capabilities in Afghanistan and Iraq.

As the case studies reveal, neither the US military nor the NZDF have institutionalized an integrated and effective response to the military-NGO relationship or to complex emergencies as a whole. While both countries had certain advantages and disadvantages in particular aspects of military-NGO cooperation, overall, neither country has demonstrated a clear advantage in the military-NGO relationship.

**Conclusion**

Clearly the study has established that a relationship between the military and aid-providing NGOs exists and that it is critically important to success in responding to complex emergencies. This is a relationship that cannot be wholly replicated by either party in the absence of the other and, therefore, requires both to acknowledge the role of the other; working for enhanced cooperation where there is common interest. From the examination of the case studies it is evident that there are actions that could be undertaken by international bodies, national governments, and NGOs (both individually and collectively) that would better prepare all the potential actors to respond to a particular crisis. Training, doctrine, policies and procedures, and between-crises communications would all inform and enhance any given response. Similarly, at the operational and tactical levels, where operators and practitioners frequently meet for the first time in difficult and dangerous circumstances, policies, procedures, and common training could all contribute to more efficient delivery of both security and aid.
The military and NGOs will continue to find themselves operating in complex emergencies, working toward the stabilization and development of fledgling states. The question now remains whether they will incorporate the critical lessons identified from the past two decades of the military-NGO relationship and work more effectively together to create a better environment for the local inhabitants of the countries to which they deploy.

The New Zealand and US case studies have provided specific examples of successes and failures in military-NGO relationships. These instructive examples will only be lessons learned if they are heeded and changes are made to the status quo. The military-NGO relationship is an inescapable reality and to enhance the international response to complex emergencies, this relationship must be improved. Improvement will come in many forms; differences between and amongst militaries and NGOs will remain, yet denying the reality of the military-NGO relationship is no longer an option. In complex emergencies, humanitarians and soldiers have interdependent roles; the success of one depends upon the success of the other. They are inextricably linked; and, like it or not, they are, and will likely remain, partners for peace.
Bibliography

Interviews


Anonymous, NGO worker in Bosnia, interview, 4 June 2007, via telephone.

Anonymous, NGO employee, interview, 8 September 2007, Washington, D.C.

Anonymous, NGO employee, interview, 18 July 2008, via e-mail.


Duncan, Mike, S3 of NZ Battalion 2, interview with Glyn Harper, 26 June 2000, Kippenberger Military Archive and Research Library (KMARL), Waiouru.

Dunne, Andrew, Senior Medical Officer NZ Battalion 2, interview with Glyn Harper, 4 July 2000, Kippenberger Military Archive and Research Library (KMARL), Waiouru.


Edmonton, James, Christian Aid, interview, 6 August 2008, via telephone.

Edwards, Megan, Save the Children, interview, 10 September 2008, Washington, D.C.


Garza, David, USMC, interview, 8 September, 2006, Quantico, Virginia.


Hacbeck, Nancy, USAID, interview, 10 December 2008, Washington, D.C.

Hayward, Antony, NZDF, interview, 23 November 2004, Wellington.

Julian, Rae, Centre for International Development Director, interview, 26 May 2004, Wellington.

Keetley, Russell, NZDF, interview, 3 April 2005, Christchurch.

Keetley, Russell, Senior Liaison Officer NZ Battalion 2, interview with Glyn Harper, 22 June 2000, Kippenberger Military Archive and Research Library (KMARL), Waiouru.

Krenfeld, Hannah, World Vision, interview, 16 August 2008, Seattle, WA.

Mason, Justin, NGO employee, interview, 6 November 2008, via email.

Newbold, Gregory, USMC, interview, Washington, DC, 8 July 2005, Washington, DC.


Schmid, Marc, NZDF, interview, 5 September 2007, Napier.

Seiple, Chris, USMC, interview, 19 June 2009.


Tihi, Matt, NZDF, interview, 9 July 2007, Wellington.

Williams, Roy, OFDA, interview 5 June 2009.

Zinni, Anthony, USMC, interview, 30 April 2009.

**Questionnaires**

Anonymous, German Agro Action, questionnaire, 5 August 2005.

Anonymous, NGO worker in Bosnia, questionnaire, 18 April 2006.


Dunham, Robert, MSF, questionnaire, 12 September 2008.

Monteiro, Scott, NZDF, questionnaire, 1 March 2008.

Wulf, Annette, German Agro Action, questionnaire, 2 October 2005.
Government Documents, Official Reports, and Issue Papers


Austcare, Austcare’s Submission to the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade: Inquiry into Australia’s Involvement in Peacekeeping Operations, March 2007.


United States Institute for Peace (USIP): Unfinished Business in Afghanistan: Warlordism, Reconstruction, and Ethnic Harmony, Special Report 105:


Books and Chapters


Weiss, Thomas G. and Leon Gordenker (eds.), *NGOs, the UN and Global Governance*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1996.


*Journal Articles/ Newspaper Reports*


McNerney, Michael J., “Stabilization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Are PRTs a Model or a Muddle?” Parameters, Winter 2005-06.

Miller, Laura, “From Adversaries to Allies: Relief Workers' Attitudes Toward the US Military”, Qualitative Sociology, Volume 22, Number 3, 1999.


Powell, Sian, “UN verdict on East Timor” The Australian, 19 January 2006


Slevin, Peter, “US Troops Working Relief to Modify Clothing,” Republican Post, 21 April, 2002.


Online Sources


Save the Children International website, retrieved 5 May 2005, http://www.savethechildren.net/alliance/about_us/index_byyears.html#1920s.


*Theses*


