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NEGOTIATING BICULTURALISM
deconstructing pākehā subjectivity

A thesis
presented in partial fulfilment
of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy in Psychology

at Massey University, Turitea Campus,
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bronwyn margaret campbell
2005
Tiriti o Waitangi 1840

Ko Wikitoria te Kuini o Ingarani i tana mahara atawai ki ngā Rangatira me ngā Hapū o Nu Tirani i tana hiahia hoki kia tohungia ki a rātou ē rātou rangatiratanga me tō rātou wenua, ā kia mau tonu hoki te Rongo ki a rātou me te Ātano ho hoki kua wakaaro ia he mea tika kia tukua mai tētahi Rangatira - hei kai wakarite ki ngā Tāngata māori o Nu Tirani - kia wakaetia e ngā Rangatira māori te Kāwanatanga o te Kuini ki ngā wāhi katoa o te Wenua nei me ngā Motu - nā te mea hoki he tokomaha kē ngā tāngata o tōnaIwi Kua noho ki tēnei wenua, ā e haere mai nei. Nā ko te Kuini e hiahia ana kia wakaritea te Kāwanatanga kia kaua ai ngā kino e puta mai ki te tangata Māori ki te Pākehā e noho ture kore ana. Nā, kua pai te Kuini kia tukua a hau a Wiremu Hopihona he Kapitana i te Roiara Nawi hei Kāwana mō ngā wāhi katoa o Nu Tirani e tukua āianei, amua atu ki te Kuini, e mea atu ana ia ki ngā Rangatira o te wakaminenga o ngā hapū o Nu Tirani me ērā Rangatira atu ēnei ture ka kōrerotia nei.

Ko te Tuatahi

Ko ngā Rangatira o te wakaminenga me ngā Rangatira katoa hoki kī hai i uru ki taua wakaminenga ka tuku ratua atu kī te Kuini o Ingarani āke tonu atu - te Kāwanatanga katoa ē rātou wenua.
Ko te Tuarua

Ko te Kuini o Ingarani ka wakarite ka wakaee ki ngā Rangatira ki ngā hapū -
ki ngā tāngata katoa o Nu Tirani te tino rangatiratanga o ō rātou wenua ō
rātou kāinga me ō rātou taonga katoa. Otiia ko ngā Rangatira o te
wakaminenga me ngā Rangatira katoa atu ka tuku ki te Kuini te hokonga o
era wāhi wenua e pai ai te tangata nōna te Wenua - ki te ritenga o te utu e
wakaritea ai e rātou ko te kai hoko e meatia nei e te Kuini hei kai hoko mōna.

Ko te Tuatoru

Hei wakaritenga mai hoki tēnei mō te wakaee tangata ki te Kāwanatanga o te
Kuini - Ka tiakina e te Kuini o Ingarani ngā tāngata māori katoa o Nu Tirani
ka tukua ki a rātou ngā tikanga katoa rite tahi ki ana mea ki ngā tāngata o
Ingarani.

(signed) W. Hobson Consul & Lieutenant Governor

Nā ko mātou ko ngā Rangatira o te Wakaminenga o ngā hapū o Nu Tirani ka
huihui nei ki Waitangi ko mātou hoki ko ngā Rangatira o Nu Tirani ka kite
nei i te ritenga o ēnei kupu, ka tangohia ka wakaee tangata e mātou, koia
ka tohungia ai ō mātou ingoa ō mātou tohu. Ka meatia tenei ki Waitangi i te
ono o ngā rā o Pēpērei i te tau kotahi mano, e waru rau e wā te kau o tō tātou
Ariki.
abstract

This thesis engages social constructionist epistemology, deconstruction and discourse analysis to constitute a reading of bicultural relations between māori and pākehā in Aotearoa/New Zealand. In the opening chapters, the theoretical and political framework of the project is developed and a critique of race/ethnicity/culture unfolds psychology as replete with eurocentrism. Practices of biculturalism become increasingly challenging for mental health professionals (psychologists) in this context. For the most part, bicultural dialogue struggles to have an audience with pākehā. In Royal’s (1998) terms, this implies that the meeting house for biculturalism is empty. pākehā mental health practitioners who were considered to be engaging in bicultural practices were interviewed about cultural identity, the meanings and practices of biculturalism, and their personal experiences of engaging in bicultural practices. The texts of these conversations were read through deconstructive discourse analysis to articulate the implications of their accounts for the future of bicultural practice in psychology. These readings consider how the kaikōrero negotiate being pākehā both within available pākehā (colonial) positions and beyond into new (postcolonial) subject positions. Taking up a postcolonial subject position puts kaikōrero in the uncomfortable and unfamiliar place of acknowledging their power. Negotiating pākehā subjectivity with a colonial past, a contemporary (pākehā) mainstream, and exploring new relationships with māori is a difficult and complicated process. In recognising the privileges of being pākehā the marginalisation of māori is mutually constructed. Some of the kaikōrero used the repertoire/metaphor of a journey when they talked of their bicultural development. Others talked of a distinct/discrete transformation of subjective experience/understanding. Discontent with the present state of biculturalism was mediated by positive aspirations for future relationships that were consultative, collaborative and collegial.
There have been many weavers and many patterns which have been incorporated into this work.

The kaikōrero who generously gifted their time and kōrero to this project, without you it would not have been possible. Thank you.

To all the people who have contributed to the creation of my thesis: whānau/family, supervisors, friends, doctors, flat mates, ultimate buddies, class mates, rugby mates, coffee mates, church mates, children, mentors, teachers, listeners, and critics. I/i offer my humble thanks for your support and advice, love, guidance, patience, coffees, prayers, money, time, effort, tennis, Hemis, stuffing, photos, concern, interest, laughs, kai, korero, tautoko, and aroha. Without you this thesis would not have been completed. My condolences to the people who will now have to address me as ‘Dr B.’ You knew it was coming, but then, so was Christmas. And yes, I’ll still be your friend.

To those that have sought out this thesis to read, thank you.
prologue

Tuia ki a Ranginui e tu iho
Tuia ki a Papatūānuku e takato nei
Tuia te here tangata

Ka rongo te pō, ka rongo te ao,

Tihei Mauriora

Ko Hikurangi te maunga
Ko Waiapu te awa
Ko Ngāti Porou te iwi
Ko Bronwyn Campbell ahau

Ka nui te mihi ki a koutou katoa

This thesis was prepared by weaving together the various kōrero of written sources (references/citations) and of kaikōrero (personal communications).

There is knowledge included in this thesis that is taken for granted. This is a necessary part of any text. Mātauranga māori is frequently centralised through this/my text. Here, I/i have chosen to centralise my/our mātauranga māori and assume the reader has a similar knowledge. Where an unfamiliar

---

1 This is the opening karakia. See Appendix A for English translation.
2 This is my pepeha. See Appendix A for English translation.
3 kaikōrero were the participants in the present research: they spoke/gifted the kōrero.
term first appears an English translation/transformation is provided in the margins. Local culture is found in the vernacular that would be nonsense to an outsider: what might a Texan make of "verandahs, fish and chips, and footie on a Saturday afternoon" (Phillips, 2001, p. 334)? Such banal signs of culture often pass undetected.

Translations/Transformations are a necessary part of communicating in two languages. In order to engage in dialogue, common understandings are necessary (Hoskins, 2000). Where Māori words are first introduced, a translation is included as a footnote. Thereafter they are not translated. There are two reasons for this practice of footnoting. Some concepts are more accurately and appropriately referred to using Māori terminology, for in translation their meaning is changed (for example, tino rangatiratanga). And secondly, as a Māori woman researcher I am working to privilege Māori voice, or more importantly to disrupt the 'invisible' pākehā centre. The seamless integration of te reo Māori throughout this text works to problematise monolingualism when communicating about two cultures that speak different languages. This works to highlight the hegemony of common sense knowledge and to remind the reader of the multiplicity of texts.

The difficulty and disruption this creates for the monolingual English reader is entirely intentional. Without acknowledging the different epistemologies of each culture/language (for language is culture), bicultural practice is limited. Some work from the reader is required (Hoskins, 2001).

There are a number of theoretical and grammatical challenges I have included in this thesis. While I feel comfortable signifying "myself" through a lower case i and Māori/pākehā, I feel somewhat apprehensive applying the same rule elsewhere, for example, the Tiriti/Treaty, or other marginalised cultural groups. I do not wish to impose a different system simply because I feel theoretically righteous. Each convention privileged in this work has theoretical explanations. They are commonly used to disrupt the 'real world' in

4 Where word-for-word/literal translations (italicised) are inadequate they are supplemented with a contextual definition (non-italicised).
order to acknowledge the world constructed through dialogue (Coombes, 2000). The disruptions to the norm function to remind the reader of that which usually remains unquestioned/taken for granted.

Occasionally my conventions compromised other conventions, such as that of grammar. For instance, politically intentional decapitalisation could be masked when beginning a sentence. Usually the grammatical convention would be privileged. I/i have chosen to privilege the lower case form. The preceding period is sufficient indication of the end of a sentence.

Further semantic difficulties/differences included in the text disrupt smooth reading. These inclusions, while cumbersome, are used here to remind the reader of multiplicities of texts. For example, “I/i” is a reminder to the reader of the multiplicities of self. Multiplicity is recognised through the use of the lowercase “i” (Minh-ha, 1989). This concept is consistent with māori constructions of the self: “‘Ahau’, ‘I’ then, does not represent an internally unified autonomous self but a permeable, open self, constituted in dynamic and multiple relationships” (Hoskins, 2001, p. 24). Mention of I/i indicates multiplicity and authority. This tends to make reading complex/difficult: The inconvenience is intentional.

We all take on different faces at different times: rather than having one identity, each of us have many. I/i am constituted in many ways, as māori, as woman, as psychologist. As a student I/i was sometimes identified as māori and offered space to speak on māori issues; positioned as an ‘expert’ of sorts. I/i often felt obliged to supplement the knowledge that was being offered but frequently offered a disclaimer: my voice was only one of many māori voices. Constitution as a serviceable other (Minh-ha, 1989) limits the positions available for me to take up. What would the response have been if I/i reported back in te reo māori? Was there space for us to enter into dialogue, or was my involvement constrained to intelligibility within a (monolingual) model of psychological discourse. Donna Matahaere-Atariki (1998) speaks of a similar discomfort: “I am not to be seen as representative. Whenever I have had the opportunity to speak, to intervene in popular knowledges about Māori women,
it is precisely when the audience appears to agree, to become comfortable that I feel I have failed’ (p. 72).

One of the things I noticed early on was my inability to articulate thoughts on the dominance of a western world view using psychological language. Seldom is hegemony mentioned, cultural privilege is silenced through talking instead about the need for cultural sensitivity, cultural awareness, cultural competency and cultural safety. Without the historical and political complex of intercultural relations it is easy to remain unaware of the culturally bounded/restricted abilities of the language of psychology. I now understand the cultural neutrality of science and psychology as a ruse for continuing relationships of domination.

Ruwhiu (1999) reflects on the constraints of being māori and working within western empirical conventions. As I worked through this project, my emotional response was tangi for the history of a people, my people, who were colonised. Colonisation is such a clinical term for a profound history and generational experiences of losses and...

The philosophical orientation, social constructionist inquiry, is relevant to all who seek an interpretation of life through words. Social constructionism disrupts the illusion of the ‘real’ world pulled over our eyes to blind us from our/my ‘truth/s.’ Ironically, one of the critiques of such approaches is that the texts orientate to those metanarratives of academia and are largely unavailable for the mainstream/layperson (hooks, 1990; Misra, 1993). The challenge for social constructionist researchers is to be accountable and intelligible to the general population (Kanpol, 1994; Potter & Wetherell, 1987).

Through social constructionism I quickly became familiar with a new vocabulary for constructing the world. Critique at the level of epistemology/ontology was enabled and the history and politics of particular positions and relationships, even my own, were legitimately included.

Both social constructionism and cultural pluralism occupy a marginalised/compromised position in relation to mainstream psychology. Both observe the person in a social/political/cultural context, rejecting
individualism, objectivity and neutrality. Both launch a critical evaluation of mainstream assertions of ethno/eurocentrism and highlight the importance of language in such interactions. Constructionism and cultural pluralism require a radical epistemological shift (Gill, 1996; Ivey, Ivey & Simek-Morgan, 1996). The collaboration of indigenous voices with constructionism, for example, can produce formidable, albeit marginalised, critique. However, one should be careful to avoid unreflexively assuming that poststructuralist social constructionist approaches are relevant or helpful to kaupapa māori approaches. Although some writers suggest this could be a useful alliance (see for example, Hoskins, 2000) further discussion/development between tohunga and those familiar with constructionism is necessary.

In/Through exploring issues of biculturalism, the Tiriti o Waitangi/Treaty of Waitangi is necessary. As the fabric of our ‘bicultural’ society in Aotearoa/New Zealand, and as a covenant that always speaks, I/i assumed a position for the document that encompasses the whole work: inside the front and back covers of this thesis. I/i understand the spirit of the Tiriti/Treaty speaks a philosophy of partnership, authority, and obligations for māori and pākehā.

The ‘Tiriti /Treaty’ and ‘Aotearoa/New Zealand’ are examples of what Jacques Derrida has called “simultaneous presence” (Derrida, 1996/1998). Derrida utilises the plurality of texts to play with meanings and to problematise the epistemological assumptions of western ways of knowing. He challenges the western tendency to dichotomise. So, rather than indicating an ‘either/or’ situation, the slash separating the two terms challenges the dichotomy encompassing the possibility of either/or and also both/neither. The slash suggests difference and also affinity (Meredith, 1999).

Some time ago I/i naively enquired about the place of language in māori epistemology and received a whakapapa stretching back to te po. Partnering social constructionist with māori epistemologies is included here only in a very superficial way. More than this is beyond the scope of the present study.
As the writer of a text I/i cannot anticipate or control reader's interpretations. However, through presenting disruptive written forms I/i hope to remind the reader of the multiplicity/plurality of meaning contained within familiar language, and pose a challenge to largely unquestioned dominant understandings. 'Scare quotes' are used to highlight particular contested terms. Derrida (1978/1988) talked of these as marking out a precaution, a problematic sign/process of signification, perhaps a hazy sign.

My research journey began with wawata\(^5\) of the partnership of the Tiriti/Treaty and a belief in the political necessity of biculturalism. The journey carried with it a researcher who was of the binary: divided in two by mainstream bicultural discourses but with aspirations for wholeness. She/we was to find partiality, multiplicity, and mutuality instead.

\(^5\) wawata: aspirations, goals
## table of contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>abstract</td>
<td>i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>acknowledgements</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prologue</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>table of contents</td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Chapter**

**I STICKS AND STONES OF LANGUAGE**

- the constitutive power of language                                   3
- privilege and marginalisation: relations of power                    13
- contextualising inexorably subjective knowledge                      30

**II BY ANY OTHER NAME LANGUAGE SPEAKS CULTURE**

- scientific racism: the way the truth and the light                   39
- cultural deficit model                                               45
- race/ethnicity/culture                                               50
- unbearable whiteness of being                                        63

**III PSYCHOLOGY AS CULTURAL PRACTICE**

**BICULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY**

- titled history: in their own words, so to speak                     67
- models of biculturalism                                             75
- (inadequately) disclaiming eurocentrism                              79
- ethical intentions                                                  84
- training limitations                                                97
- workforce development: pākehā deficit                               100
  
  **the partner that is not one**                                       104
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IV</th>
<th>GETTING TO DECONSTRUCTION</th>
<th>106</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>what am I/i?</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>encounter: relatedness</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>kaikōrero &amp; kōrero</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>collecting/making kōrero</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>coding</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>discursive possibilities</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>deconstructing dichotomies and power</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| V  | READING PĀKEHĀ SUBJECTIVITY: A PRELUDE | 120 |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VI</th>
<th>CLAIMING PĀKEHĀ PRIVILEGE</th>
<th>128</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>claiming pākehā culture</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>pākehā privilege/power</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>knowing/owning pākehā power</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VII</th>
<th>PĀKEHĀ PRIVILEGE MARGINALISES MĀORI</th>
<th>144</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>disrupting power: transforming (into) 'other'</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| VIII | HEART SUBJECTIVITY | 164 |

| IX  | RELATIONSHIP PRACTICE | 181 |

| X   | WHIRIWHIRI KŌRERO: DIALOGUE/POST-SCRIPT | 193 |

REFERENCES | 199 |

APPENDICES

Appendix A: HE WHAKAMĀRAMA | 232
Appendix B: INFORMATION SHEET | 234
Appendix C: CONSENT FORM | 236
Appendix D: TRANSCRIPTION NOTES | 237
The first chapter introduces social constructionism as a critical and discursive approach to language. This position is used to constitute a reading of bicultural relations in Aotearoa/New Zealand between māori and pākehā. The texts of the Tiriti/Treaty are analysed for meaning.
Chapter I: sticks and stones of language

The saying that inspired the title of this chapter speaks of the evaluative distinction between the privileged world of physical matter such as "sticks and stones" and the 'secondary' world constituted by "words": Sticks and stones may break my bones, but words will never hurt me. The moral is that words cannot hurt as much as sticks and stones. Through this thesis this claim is disputed. Take for example the words of a court judge who says "guilty." The truth that is constituted through this word may not break bones, but what about the spirit/wairua?

The world constituted by language is subjected to the interpretations of the individual. Language provides the substance of understanding (Jackson, 1992). This alternative position is more aligned with the philosophical foundations of the present study. The power of language to define, supplement and limit/negate the potentials of perception and reality are basic tenets of a social constructionist position. This first chapter discusses the claims of this position in more detail using the Tiriti/Treaty of Waitangi as an example.

For social psychologists the workings of discourses are observed through language use. Rather than discourses being abstracted and theorised about independently of social action, social psychological discourse analysis looks at language and discourses in action (Wetherell & Potter, 1992). It is through discourses that truth/reality is constituted/spoken into existence (Hoskins, 2000). This first chapter examines the Tiriti/Treaty as an example of language/text in action, linked to a political context for understanding biculturalism in Aotearoa/New Zealand.

There are considerable complexities in discussing ontological/epistemological divergences from that which is taken to be common sense knowledge. This requires a critique of the mainstream philosophical assumptions to justify taking up an alternative position.

Disciplines that have embraced critical thinking have subjected their research processes to a number of difficult and critical questions regarding normally taken for granted assumptions of reality and knowledge. For example, what are the assumptions regarding what can exist (ontological assumptions)?
How can we know of this existence (epistemological assumptions)? When we collect data, to whom does the knowledge belong? The funders of the research? The producers/constructers of the research? Or the population from whom the information was collected in the first place?

Ngahuia Te Awekotuku (1991) speaks of her completed doctorate as important for her people, not because of the qualification that it bestows upon herself, but because the story of the research was woven by her people the ‘author’ claims only to have written the pieces together.

The assumptions of science contain pervasive power for commonsense production of ‘truth’ (Lawson-Te Aho, 1993; Raine, 2001). It is difficult to achieve critical distance from these assumptions because they are accepted as normal, natural and inevitable qualities of truth (Parker, 1990a). In suggesting an alternative approach to knowledge and reality, critique of the assumptions of western mainstream knowledge traditions disrupt “pervasive naturalization” (Gergen, 2001, p. ix) of western concepts and allow the space for alternative voices to be heard (Durie, A., 1999).

What will become clear through such processes of critique is that the predominance of one truth can be replaced with a negotiation of truth’s multiplicity. This poses a very serious challenge for dominant western worldviews (Sampson, 1993a) by moving away from asserting a singular reality and towards looking at the consequences of taking a particular ontological/epistemological position (Gergen, 1985). So “the focus is not on the dancers but the dance” (Gergen, 2001, p. 177). Positioning is a process achieved through discourses, not a product (Tan & Moghaddam, 1999).

The introductory chapters have three common themes that are woven throughout this work: the constitutive power of language; privilege/marginalisation and pluralism; and inexorable subjectivity. Explication of these three themes provides the basic structure for this chapter.

**the constitutive power of language**

Language is a vital part of the way in which we explain ourselves and make sense of the world around us. Language is “simply the most basic and
pervasive form of interaction between people” (Wetherell & Potter, 1987, p. 9). Language is not considered a transparent way in which we access and can faithfully represent reality, but a system which is manipulated and used to perform and actively produce reality (Weedon, 1997; Bell, 2004). We create our worlds not within ourselves but in the social space between us, through language. Knowledge is understood as existing “interactionally, conversationally and relationally” (Tuffin & Howard, 2001, p. 200). The world becomes a “reality in process” (Friere, 1970/1972, p. 56).

For māori this would include the notion of unknowability: knowledge that can only be accessed and understood by a few who know how to handle its tapu, Te reo māori is a taonga that has been (and continues to be) passed on through generations. Te reo is considered a taonga: a gift worthy of great respect. Te reo is linked with māori wairua (that of the language and that of the people). Without the language māori are incomplete: “when you teach [māori] their language you give them their wairua back” (Haig, 1997, p. 44). Te reo has also been identified as a constituent part of being healthy (Te Puni Kokiri, 1994b). Te reo has long been considered a quality of health: without te reo māori, someone cannot be a ‘real’ māori (Gibson, 1999a). Without te reo, authentic māori subjectivity was deferred.

For social constructionism the individual is not the unit of study. Instead we are interested in the shared matrix of social and cultural understanding (Marshall & Wetherell, 1989). The speaker is seen as one who collectively reproduces discourses, rather than one that individually creates discourses. Social constructionists believe that reality is shared in dialogues that happen between people. It is through this collective understanding that the common sense of words are created, maintained, and altered.

Realism comes from a “words can’t hurt me” position. This asserts the “real is not articulated, it is” (Potter & Wetherell, 1987). Description is treated as ‘natural’ and does not require further explanation: it is just accepted (Wetherell & Potter, 1992). Realism assumes that there is a singular ‘natural,’ ‘correct’ perception of reality. There may be competing perspectives of reality, but these
should ultimately converge to a singular truth. Language is thought to unproblematically reflect this reality, rather than be actively involved in the production of reality (Weedon, 1997). Language can seem such a natural reflection of reality it can be difficult to conceive of it being anything but real (Parker, 1990b). The constructive use of language is often taken-for-granted and referred to as ‘mere rhetoric’ (Billig, 1990; Gill, 1996). There is power in the words we chose to describe the world. To assume that language is “transparent and true” (Weedon, 1997, p. 74) is a naïve assumption.

Social constructionists dispute the distinction between rhetoric and reality/word and the world: both/all are intimately linked. As reality is negotiated from person to person, through generations constructed through language, it cannot be independent of language (Burr, 1995; Grace, G., 1987): the “sticks and stones” are language. This claim challenges common sense assumptions of language (Burr, 1995; Gergen, 1985). It is counter-intuitive for language to provide more than a neutral description of the world. Common sense assumes that language represents reality. Constructionism asserts that representation is reality (Gubrium & Holstein, 1997). It is through language and power that social order is created and maintained (McCreanor, 1997).

Social constructionist perspectives are multidisciplinary, and emerge from poststructuralist, phenomenological and ethnomethodological traditions, among others (Potter and Wetherell, 1987; Wetherell & Potter, 1992). Social psychologists such as Margaret Wetherell, Jonathan Potter, Kenneth Gergen, Ian Parker and John Shotter have shaped constructionism to more specifically address psychological needs. The focus for social psychologists in particular is to “gain a better understanding of social life and social interaction from our study of social texts” (Potter & Wetherell, 1987, p. 7).

There are four key assumptions of social constructionism: the traditional way of looking at the world needs to be challenged; the world is understood as culturally and temporally positioned; knowledge is created and maintained by social processes; and that knowledge and social action are integrally connected (Gergen, 1985).
A defining and powerful feature of constructionism is its anti-realist (counter-hegemonic) position (Potter, 1996; Gergen, 1985; 1994). Realist ontologies assume the ‘real world’ exists independently of the speaker and through perception and articulation we can have (mostly) unproblematic access to that world (Grace, G., 1987). Through this position words are granted ontological status, as if they unproblematically represent the real and concrete world. For constructionism, language as representation is subordinated to language as action (Edwards & Potter, 1992). Experience is understood and expressed in language therefore reality is constituted through language (Phillips & Hardy, 2002; Gavey, 1989). Language as representation assumes a complete and stable reality, but our messy approximation through language is incomplete and imperfect (Gutting, 2001). Poststructuralism challenges language as representation and accepts that constructions of realities are inevitably partial and dynamic (Whitford, 1991; Geertz, 1973). This challenge has been traced back as far as the work of Ferdinand de Saussure in the late 19th and early 20th centuries who himself suggested that a study of language should form part of social psychology (de Saussure, 1915/1988).

Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913) was a Swiss linguist, often cited as the founder of modern linguistics (Easthope, 1990). He theorised a distinction between the spoken word (signifier) and the object being referred to (signified). When the signifier and the signified are brought together they create the sign. Saussure coined the ‘arbitrariness of the sign’ to reveal the learned convention of connecting the signifier and signified (de Saussure, 1915/1988). There is nothing in the word sound that naturally evokes the particular signified object (Potter & Wetherell, 1987). If there were traces of the signifieds in the signifiers, then communication across cultures and across languages would not be problematic: there would be a natural, essential connection that would assist translation of a ‘univerally-shared’ world (Grace, G., 1987). However, visitors to a foreign country can only hear the signifiers, they cannot make the link between the signifier and the signified naturally. These links are created
through the conventions of language and continually ratified by collective agreement (Easthope, 1990; de Saussure, 1915/1988).

Further, meaning is linked to a system of signs that allow the same word to be interpreted in different ways in different contexts. A short story by Patricia Grace (1987) called “Butterflies” simply illustrates this concept. The story is about a young girl who writes a story about her killing all the butterflies. Her school teacher admonishes her for destroying such beautiful creatures that “visit all the pretty flowers ... lay their eggs and then they die” (p. 234). When the girl tells her grandparents about her teacher not liking her story, her grandfather thoughtfully responds with “your teacher, she buy all her cabbages from the supermarket” (p. 234)? The signifier (“butterfly”) here is associated with two signifieds: the teacher’s ‘beautiful creature’ and the grandfather’s ‘vegetable garden pest.’ From a more contemporary poststructuralist point of view, it is possible to construct these two creatures as the objects of different discourses, different ways of speaking or different knowledges and ways of knowing. Meaning is dependent upon these “local and broader discursive systems in which the utterance is embedded” (Wetherell & Potter, 1988, p. 53). What counts as knowledge may be asserted by individuals, but depends on the availability of different stories that are enabled through different discourses (Parker, 1989b; Hoskins, 2000).

French philosopher Jacques Derrida (1930-2004) developed a poststructuralist approach to de Saussure’s initial work. In his theoretical and practical approach to texts he problematised realist assumptions, preferring instead to play with the multiplicity of interpretations. “[T]he position that, making language a transparent medium or extrinsic accident, makes the linguistic secondary is also, paradoxically, a logocentrist position” (Derrida, 2002, p. 104). Derrida enjoys the play in language. Here he constructs a paradox of realist ontology by claiming that language creates the (singular) reality and therefore reality is centred on language. The singular, essential, universal truth/reality is believed to be represented through language, and the word also assumes these stable, essential, universal qualities: monologism. Logocentrism
is a necessary mistake that enables us to talk with each other about the world. Logocentrism assumes the world of the real is represented unproblematically by the word of the real, therefore in assuming that the word can hold all truth, the real world is cemented in language.

If there was an essential, universal quality of a signifier then two discrepant signifieds could be distilled into a single truth, and a hierarchy of truth would be self evident. However, the notion of a centre or original meaning that transcends different contexts homogenises a diverse and dynamic reality (Derrida, 1978/1988; de Saussure, 1915/1988; Davies & Harré, 1990; Stark & Watson, 1999).

In the absence of a centre or origin, everything became discourse-provided we can agree on this word—that is to say, a system in which the central signified the original or transcendental signified, is never absolutely present outside a system of differences. The absence of the transcendental signified extends the domain and the play of signification infinitely (Derrida, 1978/1988, p. 100).

Asserting the existence of a transcendental signified or centre assumes words are naturally complete signs where the signifier and signified are already joined (Easthope, 1990). Assuming an origin for meaning ratifies a metaphysical presence, an essence that exists independently of language (Derrida, 1974/1997). This claim limits the play of signification and constrains the possibility of multiple interpretations (Derrida, 1978/1988).

Instead, Derrida understood meaning as present within a 'system of differences' where rereading and reinterpretation is always open (Weedon, 1997). Signs are constantly being negotiated because signifiers do not always refer to the same signified: A text always has several possibilities of readings (Derrida, 1974/1997). Différance is a neologism created by Derrida to mean differentiation, differing and deferral (Gutting, 2001; Howells, 1999). That is, différance involves active suppression of other possible meanings for if we cannot apprehend 'what is' we are limited to understanding that which it is not (Gutting, 2001; Easthope, 1990). Because meanings are not cemented around a
centre (acentric), this works as “destabilization of the metaphysics of presence” (Howells, 1999, p. 50). This is not to assume an absence of full presence, but rather that there is no origin, a constant referral. Meaning cannot be understood independently of the context of a relationship in which it is constituted (Abrams & Hogg, 1990).

It is difficult to accept the plurality of truth when knowledge has been presented as systematic and unitary for so long (Bhavnani, 1990). If negotiating meaning is never complete or absolute, but open to multiple interpretations, privileging one meaning over another becomes a social process/action. The free agency of the individual in this process is mediated through the availability of discourses (Gavey, 1989; Parker, 1989b). Discourses can be seen as oppressive (Potter & Wetherell, 1987). Different discourses enable particular interpretations, while others constrain/marginalise (Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Easthope, 1990; Weedon, 1997; Parker, 1990b; Parker & Shotter, 1990; Davies & Harré, 1990). The issue of power, while not always acknowledged, is always a feature of the equation (Parker, 1989a).

Deconstruction is a process of critique and, as the name implies, it works to reveal the processes of construction. Deconstruction involves critically reading the taken-for-granted and revealing the hidden social and political processes and consequences of texts/discourses (Parker & Shotter, 1990; White, 1991; Howells, 1999). It is involved in the deconstruction of oppositions themselves (such as māori/pākehā) and also implicates systems that have been built upon such opposition (Derrida, 2002, p. 53).

Meaning does not originate with the speaker, nor can a speaker control the meaning of a text. The poststructuralist assertion of the ‘death of the author’ is a reminder of this. The meaning of an utterance is never finalised, complete, or essential: it is always open to further interpretation (Barthes, 1977/1988; Barthes, 1970/1974). The ‘original’ intention of the author does not restrict interpretation to a single ‘true’ meaning (Mulhausler & Harre, 1990; Weedon, 1997; Shotter, 1981). Rather, the text is interpreted and re-interpreted by different audiences in different contexts (Easthope, 1990; Gavey, 1989).
According to Burr (1995) a “discourse refers to a set of meanings, metaphors, representations, images, stories, statements and so on that in some way produce a particular version of events” (p. 48). Through common usage, meanings are produced and understood dynamically and supported through the education, health and political institutions of society (Wetherell & Potter, 1992; Parker, 1990c; Burr, 1995). The meanings enabled through discourses are not essential. Specific interpretations are always open to further signification (Gergen, 2001; Whitford, 1991; Phillips & Hardy, 2002) and have elusive, contradictory, and dynamic qualities (Hoskins, 2000). A Derridean term, supplementation, provides the opportunity to negotiate meaning (Shotter, 1990). It has a dual meaning: to supply something that is missing and also to supply something that is additional (Derrida, 1978/1988). The process of supplementation is a mutual process: “supplements operate to determine the meaning of actions, while actions create and constrain the possibility of supplementation” (Gergen, 1994, p. 266). The speaker does not create unique discourses (Harre, 1989). As the opening whakatauki claimed, interpretation is delimited by the words/discourse we have available to constitute knowledge. The meanings promoted through discourses favour particular ways of thinking that pre-date an individual’s use of language (Barthes, 1977/1988; Weedon, 1997). Although discourse can appear transparent because it is so familiar (Burr, 1995; Potter & Wetherell, 1987) this does not diminish its constitutive power nor the intended or unintended political consequences of particular language constructions such as positioning (Parker, 1990b; Sampson, 1993a; Gergen, 2001). Positioning is the process by which people negotiate the accounts that make up their identities and themselves as persons (Burr, 1995).

An individual produces and is produced by discourses (Harré & van Langenhove, 1999; Harré & Gillett, 1994; Bhavnani, 1990). “The language user, in speaking, defines and redefines the world and self and is in turn positioned by discourse” (Taylor & Wetherell, 1995, p. 72). The speaking subject becomes an agent of discourse through assuming the positions that are enabled by discourse. Individual agency in this situation is gained through becoming
aware of our own subjectivities (White, 1991). In the process our sense of self as a unitary, autonomous entity is seriously challenged (Davies & Harré, 1990) and replaced with subjectivities that are fluid, flexible and fragmentary (Gavey, 1989). Constructionism poses a challenge to “psychology’s conception of the individual as an isolated and discrete phenomenon existing in its own right, to be explained without reference to anything external to itself. Notice also that [this] challenge[s] the everyday beliefs of members of the Western world” (Nightengale & Neilands, 1997).

Meaning is not determined by the process of writing/speaking, but is negotiated also with readers/listeners through discourses that invite interpretations that speak and hear in the same way (Pocock, 2001; Wetherell & Maybin, 1996; Carbaugh, 1999; Gill, 1996; White, 1991). Barthes (1970/1974) calls these processes the ‘writerly’ and the ‘readerly.’ In and of themselves they also do not constitute absolute meaning: between both the reader and the writer there is further negotiation, or supplementation of the text (Bhavnani, 1990). Rather than communication being a pure transfer of meaning from one individual to another, communication may be constructed as a spiral: changing and evolving to encompass ever-expanding new readings and meanings (Bishop, 1996). New audiences can interpret information in ways never intended by the original speaker (Easthope, 1990; Wetherell & Potter, 1988). Derrida talks of the presence of traces of meanings that are constantly reiterated: flexing in the dynamics of meaning, bearing traces of (inaccessible) origins, and changing through speaking/understanding (Derrida, 1974/1997). The challenge for social constructionists is to appreciate each interpretation as a valid reading rather than attempting to authenticate one version over others, and to analyse the consequences of particular constructions (Geertz, 1973).

Sharing the same view as that of common sense, and thus supporting the status quo, communicates a powerful position through which these

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6 trace: this is a term specific to Derrida. The trace disrupts the clear and consistent repetition (or re-iteration) of meaning. The context (therefore iteration) is always and inevitably different.
interpretations have the privilege of being centralised knowledge. This means such knowledge is commonly shared, treated as natural and normal, therefore taken-for-granted (Billig, Condor, Edwards, Gane, Middleton & Radley, 1988; Bell, 1996); it is not subject to the same critique as marginalised knowledges. Dominant discourses appear natural, deny their own partiality, and gain their authority through appeals to common sense (Gavey, 1989). A consequence of assuming that hegemony represents ‘natural’ truth is to disguise the function of power to assert truth. However, through deconstructive discourse analysis such unseen power can come into view and thereby become questioned (Foucault, 1980; Fox & Prilleltensky, 1997; Gubrium & Holstein, 1997; Rabinow, 1984, Parker & Shotter, 1990).

Social constructionism questions the ‘natural’ assumptions of scientific enquiry. When critique is extended to the ontological and epistemological level of inquiry the privilege of science can be culturally located, and therefore recognised as eurocentric, that is, centralising western approaches (McCreanor, 1993a; Gergen, 2001; Potter, 1996). Critical traditions and the ‘qualitative revolution’ became more vocal and visible the 1970s (McGarty & Haslam, 1997; Wetherell & Potter, 1987; Gergen, 1973, 2001).

Ethnocentrism is also a term that refers to using one form of cultural knowledge as the standard for evaluating the positions of other cultural groups (Cross, 1995; Derrida, 1974/1997). Social constructionist philosophy has the potential to provide strong theoretical and practical support for privileging the voices of the marginalised groups in society through alliance with a pluralist philosophy (Ruwhiu, 1999; Sampson, 1993a). Rather than there being only one thread of truth, there are many threads, although different, that are entitled to legitimacy and worthy of respect (Raine, 2001).

Language is social process and social action rather than a natural or transparent description of reality (Gergen, 1989; Potter & Reicher, 1987). Language has the power to provide a voice for experience/reality, it has the power to name (Freeman, 1999; Reclaiming Our Stories, 1995) and therefore bring phenomena into existence through discourse. When this connection
between language and reality is recognised as socially constructed then the ability of language to communicate culture is realised and the assumptions of a transcultural truth existing can be undermined (Augoustinos, Lecouteur, & Soyland, 2002; Gavey, 1989; Gergen, 1985; Edwards & Potter, 1992; Shi-xu, 1997; Bishop, 1996). Hegemony is the cultural privilege that exists when a particular culture is reflected and reinforced through the systems, symbols and truths of society (Pearson, 1991). Hegemony presents the discourses of the dominant culture as if they are natural, inevitable and eternal: hegemony is a name for cultural dominance (O'Sullivan, Hartley, Saunders, Montgomery, & Fiske, 1994). Through hegemonic practices, norms are reaffirmed, and a eurocentric view of the world is promoted as commonsense (Weedon, 1997). It is difficult for those of the majority to respond to assertions for cultural justice when they must also challenge their very own identity and privilege (Wilson & Yeatman, 1995; Mills, 1997).

Through social constructionism multiple interpretations of reality are recognised and space is created for legitimising positions previously marginalised (Shotter & Gergen, 1989). Not all groups have equal ability to voice their perspectives: some are privileged while others are marginalised or silenced. Negotiating conflicting truths becomes a cultural and political activity (Levy, 1999; Cassidy, 1996; Gergen, 1989; Mills, 1997). International pressure to honour cultural pluralism commonly includes an understanding of politics (hooks, 1990; Sampson, 1993b). Cultural diversity and cultural pluralism are not synonymous, the former can exist without the latter (Robinson, 1997).

privilege & marginalisation: relations of power
Discursive analysis requires analysis of language and of power as the wider social context of/in the production of truth/knowledge. The epistemological requirements of constructionism reject the ethnocentric universalistic assumption of a singular truth in favour of multiple perspectives (Burr, 1995; Bishop, 1996; Gergen, 1994). Words never exist in isolation from the social and political contexts of society (Bell, 1996). Not all discourses are created equal, some are privileged as truth, while others are relegated to myth. The
assertion of truth is associated with power (Riley, 2001; Lupton, 1992; Parker, 1989b). The combination of power and language produces truth, in such a way that the silence of the disenfranchised is sometimes heard/told as myth.

Understanding the social relations implicated in discourse enables transformations of power relations (Morawski, 1990; Fox & Prilleltensky, 1997; Weedon, 1997). As such, here in Aotearoa/New Zealand language provides frameworks for constituting and reconstituting māori-pākehā relations (McCreanor, 1997). Nowhere else in the history of biculturalism in Aotearoa/New Zealand is the negotiation of two texts more poignant than in the example of the Tiriti/Treaty of Waitangi (Liu, Wilson, McClure & Higgins, 1999). The Tiriti/Treaty was the first formal acknowledgement of both māori and pākehā as significant residents in Aotearoa/New Zealand: māori as the indigenous people and British immigrants as first settlers. There are a number of different institutions involved in re-producing a reading of the Tiriti/Treaty. For example, Government created ‘the Three P’s: partnership, protection, and participation (Ministry of Health, 2001) as a privileged interpretation within public services.

Relationships with māori have been articulated through a discourse of partnership but “totalising and unlimited” presence of the government “repeatedly kills the possibility of a [Tiriti/]Treaty partnership between two authoritative partners by its suffocation of mana Māori spaces, of ahi ka, while at the same time denying all charges. This ‘war without war’ is the context within which “[Tiriti/]Treaty partnerships are being articulated by government and its agencies” (Potter, H., 2003, p. 243).

The language that is used to talk about the Tiriti/Treaty uses discourse to position the speaker in relation to Tiriti/Treaty politics. For example, talk of “te Tiriti” (rather than “the Treaty”) usually indicates a political and moral position aligned with the māori text of the Tiriti/Treaty (see for example, Huygens, 1999; Hēnare, 1988; Nairn, 1993). Throughout this text “Tiriti/Treaty” is used to problematise the privileging of one text over the other, and to suggest negotiation involving both as multiple texts.
The Tiriti/Treaty had largely been discarded, ignored or selectively referenced by the Government and settlers (Ward, 1999; Orange, 1987) until late in the twentieth century. Māori have always recognised the Tiriti/Treaty as a kawenata/covenant (Hēnare & Douglas, 1988; Ramsden, 1990a). It was not until 1975 that the Government officially acknowledged the Tiriti/Treaty as a constitutionally significant document [Treaty of Waitangi Act, 1975]. In the mid-1980s the Tiriti/Treaty became part of the "political psyche" (Ruwhiu, 1999, p. 255) and has become a framework for the formulation of policy, especially that supporting bicultural practice (Munford & Walsh-Tapiata, 1999; Mental Health Commission, 2001).

The Tiriti/Treaty is often described as having only two versions: (Māori and English) and three articles. The presence of an additional fourth oral article at Waitangi brings into question the idea of a singular essential version of the Tiriti/Treaty. The Tiriti/Treaty has been called a "morally dubious document" (Walker, 1996b, p. 52) for its inaccurate and misleading translations. The Treaty was hastily composed in English; the overnight translation into Māori was completed by two 'tauiwi' missionaries without consultation with Māori (Orange, 1987). Important concepts were inadequately represented by transliterations that carried little meaning independently of an appreciation of the original English concept (Patterson, 1989). For example, they used the transliteration "nu Tireni" (New Zealand) rather than the Māori term "Aotearoa." Ngata (1922) offers a suggestion "the Maori version clearly explained the main provisions of the Treaty, therefore, let the Maori version of

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7 In public opinion, the "Treaty" is only considered important by fifty percent of all "New Zealanders," seventy percent also believe that current Māori problems have nothing to do with colonisation (Revington, 2000). The history of colonisation has not been systematically addressed by the public at large, regardless of Government initiatives.

8 The reading of the Tiriti/Treaty offered here can only be partial, not complete. As a fragment I/i have privileged particular aspects while ignoring others, this is consistent with the fluid, dynamic and partial qualities of knowledge production.

9 'tauiwi' signifies an immigrant person: someone who has settled in Aotearoa/New Zealand.
the Treaty explain itself” (p. 3). Those unwilling/unable to comprehend a solely māori version of the Tiriti/Treaty, may not appreciate the difficulty inherent in the process of translation, or as Derrida calls it, transformation:

In the limits to which it is possible, or at least appears possible, translation practices the difference between signified and signifier. But if this difference is never pure, no more so is translation, and for the notion of translation we would have to substitute a notion of transformation: a regulated transformation of one language by another, of one text by another. We will never have, and in fact have never had, to do with some “transport” of pure signifieds from one language to another, or within one and the same language, that the signifying instrument would leave virgin and untouched (Derrida, 1972/1981, p. 20).

The process of translation assumes that there is a “transcendental signified” that can be accurately and purely communicated between two languages. This claim does not withstand analysis (Derrida, 1972/1981). Identifying this process as transformation makes sense in the context of discursive systems enabling meaning. When transporting a concept from one system of signification to another, there invariably have to be changes in meaning. To speak/write a text is to transform. The integrity of the ‘original’ is shaped by the interpretations of the speaker/writer. It is always never the same.

The relationship between the discourses of the Tiriti/Treaty was embedded in the imposition of an imperialist discourse with unbending intent to colonise. No scope was provided in negotiation for the oral traditions of māori discourse and decision making processes (Orange, 1987; Te Roopu Awhina o Tokanui, 1987). Precedence was given to not only the written word (Durie, M., 1985), but the written english word despite over 90% of māori signatories10 signing the māori version11 (McCreanor, 1989). According to international law the condition of

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10 Also at issue is the silence of those rangatira that did not sign. The current position of those hapū, now covered by the Tiriti/Treaty, but whose ancestors never agreed to sign remains problematic.

11 Only 39 out of 512 rangatira signed the english version (Orange, 1987).
contra proferentum applies when two incompatible versions of a treaty exist. Interpretations must give precedence to the people who did not write the document (Waldegrave, 1990). In Aotearoa/New Zealand this has never been the case. The appropriation of language occurs through translation where māori words are allowed no space other than that provided by eurocentric language (During, 1985).

The first article of the English text recognised the sovereignty of the chiefs of Aotearoa/New Zealand and stated that those chiefs would surrender "absolutely and without reservation all [those] rights and powers of sovereignty" to the Queen. For the British, Article One was the instrument of cession of māori sovereignty.

"Kawanatanga" was the inadequate translation for sovereignty: a transliteration that was understood better as governorship. It is likely that māori understood they would retain their original ruling power and that the Crown would have a more abstract and distant form of governing (Walker, 1996a; Orange, 1987). Sovereignty could have been more appropriately communicated as "mana." This concept was used five years earlier in the Declaration of Independence as a translation for sovereignty (Orange, 1987). Had "mana" been used instead of "kawanatanga" the Crown's intentions, and its meaning within English traditions could have been clearer (Walker, 1996b; Waldegrave, 1990). It has been posited that māori may not have signed if this had been understood (Jackson, 1999; Durie, E., 1996; Potter, H., 2003). From within a māori worldview it is impossible for rangatira\(^{12}\) to sign away mana, either their own or that of their people (Jackson, 1992).

In the second article of the Māori version, rangatira were guaranteed ""te tino rangatiratanga o ratou w[en]ua o ratou kainga me o ratou taonga katoa": tino rangatiratanga over their own lands, homes, and taonga. In the English version māori were guaranteed the "full exclusive and undisturbed possession" of

\(^{12}\) Rangatira: Chief.
their Lands and Estates Forests Fisheries and other properties” for as long as māori wished to have them, protected further by a promise of pre-emption.

The māori transformation/translation of “full exclusive and undisturbed possession” produced “tino rangatiratanga.” A more appropriate translation of tino rangatiratanga would be “full chieftainship” (Walker, 1996b). While māori might have understood they were to maintain their rangatiratanga, pākehā understood/validated/supported only sovereign colonial ‘right.’ This was the work of the colonial discourse/ideology within which the Tiriti/Treaty was signed. For the colonial government of Aotearoa/New Zealand at the turn of the 20th century, a ‘fair’ relationship with māori was four seats in the (pākehā) House of Representatives [Māori Representation Act 1867]. Had the māori representation been based upon the same population ratio as pākehā, there should have been fourteen or fifteen seats (Durie, M., 1998a). Māori likened these māori Members of Parliament to ‘tame parrots’ (Walker, 1994). This seriously compromised māori authority and engagement with this pākehā system of power (Pearson, 1984). The number of māori seats in parliament remained four until 1993 when it increased to five seats (Durie, M., 1998a).

Tino rangatiratanga/sovereignty is the key issue of the Tiriti/Treaty (Awatere-Huata, 1993) and continues to be an issue for current māori development (Te Puni Kokiri, 1994a). māori understood the partnership that was offered (rescinded before actualised!) to contain space for māori and pākehā to exist, and not as requiring māori autonomy to be compromised (Durie, E., 1996). Up until 1900 māori expected to be treated as political equals (Kawharu, 2003). Government attempts to honour tino rangatiratanga (such as processes of devolution through the Iwi Transition Agency) have largely meant that power and the allocation of resources have remained ultimately in the control of the government (Fleras, 1991). The extent of power sharing is therefore invariably controlled by one partner, and engaged only insofar as the government allows.

Tino rangatiratanga remains a clear goal for māori communities (Te Puni Kokiri, 1994b). “māori control and māori management of māori resources” (p.
7) or more simply: by māori, for māori. māori aspirations are firmly focused on māori solutions for social and economic development (Durie, M., 1994a). māori have become discontent with being defined by European preferences (Panoho, 1996). Across disciplines māori are privileging their own voices and their own means of authentication of things māori (for example, toi iho certification as a sign of māori art). A return to and strong preference for kaupapa māori methodology for practice, research and process, education has indicated māori cultural preferences.

Te reo māori is synonymous with te reo rangatira. If te reo were treated as a rangatira it would be a voice that is heard and respected. A ‘rangatira’ is a weaver of the people, representing the past/present/future of the people to whom they are accountable. Undisturbed māori autonomy is implicit (in the term). For example, te reo māori was made an official language of Aotearoa/New Zealand because it is considered a taonga (Waitangi Tribunal, 1986), not because it was a possession. Research and the knowledge it produces can also be considered taonga (Bevan-Brown, 1999; Cunningham, 1999). Rangatiratanga implies autonomy, independence, right to an identity and the right to the expression of that identity (Nikora, 2001).

The third article referred to the notion of rite tahi13/equality: The equal treatment of all (māori) people under the British law/government. The voice of educated māori spoke of the ‘equal chance’ offered to māori children where ‘equal’ means “the same chance that Pākehā students get” (Marks, 1984). The cultural specificity of the (pākehā) system remains cloaked and is assumed to provide a culturally neutral service/education. The ‘equality’ of native schooling required māori children to (only) speak the (english) voice of education. The concept of equity has come to replace that of equality to ensure the same outcomes rather than equivalent treatment. The universalism of English versions of ‘equality’ or ‘outcome’ assumes the terms are culturally neutral, and

\[\text{13 rite tahi: the same}\]
belie the cultural exclusion and marginalisation of māori through the discourse of egalitarianism (Johnston, 1998).

It is the right of all peoples to dream dreams for themselves, believe in them and make them a reality. This is the right we reclaim in reinforcing the separate reality of our tipuna and making it our own. To do this is to take the first step toward Māori sovereignty (Awatere, 1984, p. 107).

The Tiriti/Treaty was a document of the 1840s but continues to have relevance in the contemporary environment. The terminology of ‘sovereignty’, while pivotal and appropriate for the concerns of 1840, may require some transformation to effectively engage with māori in the current environment. Eddie Durie (1996) suggests “State responsibility” (p. 8) as a contemporary transformation. In terms of māori sovereignty Durie prefers the term “aboriginal autonomy” for it “enables us to talk of the problem without playing power games” (p. 8). Tino rangatiratanga as a symbol of autonomous māori sovereignty has become a key term in Tiriti/Treaty politics, without which ideas of biculturalism and principles of the Tiriti/Treaty constrain māori contributions (Pakeha Treaty Action, 1997). Tino rangatiratanga was not created by the Tiriti/Treaty: These rights existed before such a document was drafted (Hoskins, 2001). The authority of māori was never dependent upon pākehā ratification/reification.

Discourses as action are evidenced in the processes around the negotiation of the Tiriti/Treaty. Historically, interpretation was only in british terms that silenced the māori voice, and then came to silence the Tiriti/Treaty itself, subordinated to the imperialist ideology that inferiorised natives and superiorised colonisers. Imperialist discourses are unable to conceive of māori as equals or partners (Hoskins, 2001; Fleras & Spoonley, 1999).

Dissonant understandings of kawanatanga/sovereignty continue to be an issue of contention negotiated/contested among government, pākehā, and māori (Praat, 1998). māori maintained that they had never signed away their mana through te Tiriti, and the colonial government asserted their legislative authority to proscribe tino rangatiratanga. Neither side was prepared to
compromise. This was to result in civil war and civil unrest. The New Zealand Wars were based on land, but more importantly they were an attempt to assert sovereignty. māori fought for the right to retain possession of those lands unjustly taken by the Crown, and the Crown fought to bring māori under the authority of the Crown (Belich, 1986). The government offensive was not only in terms of warfare, but also ‘colonisation by the pen’ through unjust legislation that stripped māori of their rightful lands (Waitangi Tribunal, 1996; Legislative Violations, 2001). The impact of the land confiscations/stealing of the 1860s are still present in current generations (Keenan, 2000, December 2).

Prior to the articles themselves, the Tiriti/Treaty introduced the Queen’s motives in offering a treaty: to “protect [the] just rights and property [of the native chiefs and tribes of New Zealand] and to secure to them the enjoyment of peace and good order.” The Tiriti/Treaty was deemed necessary to control the growing numbers of unruly British subjects in Aotearoa/New Zealand through the establishment of a civil government.

The Crown acted unilaterally and was oblivious to the subtle and overt hapū14 rejection of the Tiriti/Treaty (Walker, 1996b). After signing the Crown representative shook hands with each of the rangatira and said: ‘He iwi tahi tātou,’ ‘We are one people’: a foreshadowing of British imperialism and māori subjugation to cultural genocide (Meredith, 1999; Pearson, 1991; Jackson, 1992; Renwick, 1993). Colonial/imperialist discourse used biologically determined status (race) to rationalise delusions/assumptions of white superiority (Bell, 1996; Thomas & Nikora, 1996a). It was their imperialist moral obligation to ‘civilise’ the ‘natives’ by providing intellectual and social/technological advancement and thereby ‘enriching’ their lives (Ballara, 1986). This was not a universal consensus: there were voices of dissent before the turn of last century (see Vagiolli, 1896/2000).

14 Contemporary constructions of māori partners focus on iwi. Within the Tiriti/Treaty itself, there is only mention of hapū. Does this represent contemporary māori adaptation or government imposition of a definition of legitimate māori partners?
Imperialist discourse constrained the possibilities of bicultural relations with indigenous “native” peoples in spite of promises from the Tiriti/Treaty. The imperial narrative sanitised the oppressive relationship between the indigenous peoples and the settlers to present a ‘natural,’ ‘inevitable’ and ‘necessary’ civilisation/colonisation (Bodley, 1990). More contemporary interpretations have promoted a new evaluation of colonisation as a “story of conflicting interests, power relations and exploitation ... [using] the rhetoric of annexation, conquest and oppression” (Wetherell & Potter, 1992, p. 137).

History is an important foundation upon which contemporary understandings of the present and the future are built (Ruwhiu, 1999; MacKay, 1995; Billig, 1982; McCreanor, 1997; Sue, S., 1983; Burr, 1995; Durie, M., 1999b, 2001; Michael, 1990). While contemporary mainstream pākehā may cry ‘stop living in the past’, for māori, knowing the past informs understandings of the present and gives voice to māori marginalisation (Wetherell & Potter, 1992). Building a sense of history is always a retrospective act that transforms the ‘truths’ of the past into concepts that are sensible for contemporary understandings/discourses (Tau, 2001). Ignoring the past serves a political agenda that supports racist ideology by masking (or remaining ignorant to) processes of marginalisation still present in contemporary society (Gilroy, 1987). Part of the process of liberating the oppressed is achieved through telling the histories of their oppression (Friere, 1970; hooks, 1992).

Knowing history to be socially constructed can enable issues of power to be addressed (Parker, 1990b; Rose, 1990). The “bad ‘popular’ histories” (Belich, 1991, p. 123) of Aotearoa/New Zealand, with their colonial overtones, uncritically position pākehā as the colonial superiors and consequently marginalise/silence/speak for māori epistemologies/histories/voices. Hence, the ‘history of New Zealand’ has been commonly presented as the history according to pākehā people. While there have been some pākehā for whom the colonial pattern of interaction with māori has become objectionable/illegitimated (Jenkins, 2000; Liu et al., 1999), the majority have remained unmoved.
Underlying British interpretations of the Tiriti/Treaty are epistemological assumptions of universalism and essentialism which reduce the possibility of truth to one (imperial/white) voice. These assumptions are/were complicit with colonisation. In turn, colonisation takes place within a complex and sophisticated set of race relationships between groups that produces sociological and psychological oppression (Smith, L., 1999). Colonisation as an inevitable progression for the ‘natives’ into the civilisation of the modern world has been reframed as a “violent destruction of difference” (Bell, 1996) and more contentiously, a “holocaust” (Turia, 2000). Such constructions work to communicate the violence of colonisation and the ethnocide of a people marginalised by the hands of a colonial government.

The colonial agenda was clear: acquire māori land, establish unequivocal sovereignty over the whole country as nation, and quash māori uprising/sovereignty, by any means possible, even at the expense of the Tiriti/Treaty. The only English Tiriti/Treaty provisions the government honoured unconditionally were those that advanced colonisation: namely, assuming the mandate for the establishment of the colonial government (absolute sovereignty); and requiring all māori people to come within the compass of British rule.

Te Tiriti held the promise of a bicultural and equal relationship between māori and pākehā: A colonial government would establish control and authority over the settler population (kawanatanga), and māori would retain their traditional tino rangatiratanga. The colonial government were not just unwilling, but unable to conceptualise māori as equals (Gibbons, 1986). Within colonial discourse indigenous people were constructed as primitive, lacking intelligence and biologically inferior (McCreanor, 1997; Bell, 2004). Implicit within this definition was a comparison with the ‘superior’ colonisers (Sampson, 1993a).

The Tiriti/Treaty is not commonly regarded as a constitutional document upon which the current colonial government gained their authority.
(Wilson & Yeatman, 1995). Rather, the Tiriti/Treaty is seen as an instrument over which the government bends to the whims of māori radicals.

Māori began interactions with the Crown/Government as hapū/iwi. There have been several attempts to achieve kotahitanga from māori diversity (for example, Te Kauhanganui, Te Kingitanga [Walker, 1994] Nga Tamatoa [Awatere-Huata, 1993]). The well recognised ‘whakatauaki’/slogan from Sir James Carroll: “Tātou, tātou” represents inter-iwi interdependence and kotahitanga (Sorrenson, 1986). The Tiriti/Treaty has the potential to facilitate unity (Vercoe, 1993) even among the 20% of māori that do not know their iwi (Durie, Fitzgerald, Kingi, McKinley, & Stevenson, 2002). Through the systematic dislocation of people from their hapū/iwi connections and a history of estranged relationships between hapu/iwi, the government have obscured māori potential. However, as the strength of māori consolidates, the resistance to pākehā hegemony also grows (Bishop, 1999). Present pākehā privilege built on systematic colonial denial of the jurisdiction of the Tiriti/Treaty speaks injustice (McCreanor, 1989; Wilson, 1995). Appeals to justice require a re-reading of history and appreciation of eurocentrism and rights of indigenous peoples to their own self-determination (Te Puni Kokiri, 1994a). Policies of assimilation, amalgamation, and ‘integration’ came in many guises, but all with the underlying principle of defining māori in terms acceptable to pākehā (Pool, 1991; Tregear, 1885/1995; Fleras, 1985; Belich, 1986; Thomas & Nikora, 1996). māori sovereignty was a threat to British rule and was systematically subjected to strong government assaults (Waitangi Tribunal, 1996). The māori race neared extinction at the turn of the twentieth century, and, from then, the māori crisis was (and remains) one of identity and purpose (Kawharu, 2003).

In this historical context, biculturalism becomes a dualistic and antagonistic relationship between māori and pākehā. Constructionist understandings of language, truth, and reality have the potential to challenge this relationship and assert notions of multiple subject positions, affinity between māori and pākehā, and differences in relating that are constantly changing over time (Meredith, 1999). These constructionist assumptions that
challenge essentialism and the singularity of ‘truth’ open up possibilities for understanding the tiriti/treaty as a living document, whose interpretation obliges both partners to engage in negotiation.

However, the discursive effects of colonising histories have included positioning maori peoples within, and subjected to, the imperialist discourses within which their voices have been silenced. Within the processes of discursive positioning, silence can function in different ways. There are some that choose to remain silent for safety or as a form of resistance to subjectivities offered; others are silenced because they articulate inappropriately, or because their perspective is invalidated (Morgan & Coombes, 2001; Freeman, 1999; hooks, 1990). Silence can also indicate disuse, a space where the word is no longer practiced: “Confined and abandoned then to this silence of memory, the name will resonate all by itself, reduced to the state of a term in disuse. The thing it names today will no longer be” (Derrida, 1985, p. 291).

Constructionism has the potential to allow those silenced the space to have their own voice (Shotter, 1993; Gergen, Guelrce, Lock & Misra, 1996). The ways in which a discourse is used to fulfil particular political functions is not fixed. Subject positions are inhered within a relation of power within a particular discourse (Urwin, 1984). If language “is the first line of defence and the cutting edge of change in the ideological fabric of societies” (McCreanor, 1993b, p. 45) then what could the effect of prohibiting te reo māori in school have done for the māori soul/psyche of those children? māori contributions were excluded from the system of education, even in the so-called ‘native schools’ and required children “to suppress not only one’s language but also one’s identity as a Maori and surrender one’s birthright” (Walker, 1987, p. 165). Through this process of illegitimising te reo māori, the education system ensured that the schooling of māori children would incontrovertibly be through the language of the coloniser. This cultural imperialism forced european values, beliefs, and assumptions on indigenous people (Jordan & Weedon, 1995) and provided māori subjectivities that fitted with the colonising plan. “[A] country is colonised; her indigenous people made to live on the periphery and are
enforced to ape the ‘civilisation’ of the dominant culture. They are told they will never make the grade anyway. Their histories, distorted/erased/dismissed, are left untold” (Tamasese & Waldegrave, 1994).

The ethnocentrism of the western world has only recently become able to hear the indigenous voice. Bell (2004) calls this the silenced pākehā ear: māori voices have always been speaking, but the silenced pākehā ear was/is unable to hear/comprehend them. The silenced pakeha ear was well supported by government strategies to prohibit te reo māori.

From the turn of the century through into mid 1920s and 1930s te reo māori was actively and aggressively attacked (Walker, 1996a). School became the site of domination, resistance, and struggle (Walker, 1996a; Durie, A., 1997; Benton, 1991; Jenkins, 2000). Overtly, it was claimed that māori people could learn english more effectively if māori language was not spoken. Covertly this functioned to undermine māori epistemologies and was part of the larger assault on māori tino rangatiratanga (Walker, 1989, 1996a; Puketapu-Andrews, 1997) otherwise known as “the political ideology of assimilation” (Walker, 1994, p. 11).

By the time three generations had passed through these schools, the māori graduates themselves became teachers. Their experiences of that education system are sobering: “the education system has invited you to be a mourner at the tangihanga of your culture, your language -and yourself” (Marks, 1984, p. 13). Injustices of generations past can be carried actively with the present generation and have real impacts upon their lives (Reclaiming Our Stories, 1995).

Indigenous peoples have been silenced through colonial discourse to “have voice when one is required to speak in the forms allowed by the dominant discourse is still not to have voice” (Sampson, 1993b, p. 1227). Such dominant discourses were/are enabled through monolingualism/linguistic imperialism. “I remember the history of my people that is now beginning to be written, but I am sad to say it is written by Pakehas, so that when my tupuna speaks he speaks in immaculate English. He spoke in Māori. Why don’t you
quote him in Māori?’ (Vercoe, 1993, p. 84). There is evidence that one of the greatest needs for the current māori mental health workers is the need for te reo (Hirini & Durie, 2003).

The effects on māori of colonial discourse and suppression of te reo are constituted by the hegemonic society, and become internalised racism when they are present in the discourses indigenous people use for themselves (hooks, 1992; Jackson, 1999). At least the form it takes could become self doubt and at most, self hate (Puketapu-Andrews, 1997). Discourses constituting te reo māori as unnecessary in a modern world, and unscientific so therefore inappropriate for education of māori youth were supported by ‘colonised’ māori elders/leaders (Sharples, 1993). Similar institutions of linguistic imperialism were common across other indigenous populations (Choney, Berryhill-Paapke & Robbins, 1995; Iseke-Barnes, 2003; Bodley, 1990). The processes of re-gaining te reo for māori can be an emotional connection because it brings the history that required māori silence to come to light, along with the racist practices that reside within our talk. “[W]hen I started learning the language everyday I stood up to say anything in Māori I’d start crying ... I suppose it must have been an immense grief from way back that was overwhelming me” (Garner, 1993, p. 29).

Within a māori epistemology, the links between te reo and māori people/subjectivities are connected through mauri, atua, tupuna and histories (Durie, M., 1998a). This implies there is some spiritual connection between the words and the language; this is a dimension that goes beyond social constructionist assumptions. “As children [Taranaki māori] learnt the Taranaki double talk; that taranaki maunga was Mount Egmont as though the past was no longer theirs, and that ‘Māori reserved lands’ means ‘lands for Pākehā’, for the future was not theirs either” (Waitangi Tribunal, 1996, p. 310). The plurality of meaning and subject positioning in/through particular political agendas are present in different discourses. The māori signifier, “taranaki maunga,” signifies a link for māori with the whenua/maunga that stretches from the past to the future. The english signifier, “Mount Egmont” constitutes the imposition
imperialism through the monolinguisum of colonial discourse. Te reo has been described as giving life essence and intimately linked to a sense of mana: “Ko te reo te mauri o te mana māori” (Sir James Hēnare, cited in Ministry of Health, 1994b, p.37). The imposition of profoundly oppressive texts/signifiers/discourses upon children is reprehensible as they become innocent heirs of such systems.

For māori, the negative effects of being denied access to te reo have been felt across generations (Durie, A., 1997). Understanding māori epistemologies is limited by not having an understanding of māori language (Pere, 1988; Patterson, 1989; Ministry of Health, 1994b; Tau, 2001). The ability to incorporate māori epistemologies is limited through choosing to present this thesis in the english language. There are systems of signification in te reo māori that are lost in translation/ transformation into english. This constitutes a limitation of this work that is also a necessity of the historical trajectory that devalues te reo: more properly a thesis addressing biculturalism would incorporate bilingualism. This is not commonly viable within the political landscape of mainstream tertiary education in Aotearoa/New Zealand.

Te reo māori is vital for the realisation of a māori identity in māori terms (Durie, A, 1997; Tau, 2001; Sorrenson, 1986). Without this particular system of signification the integrity of matauranga māori is compromised (Sorrenson, 1986) and replaced with inadequate approximations as translations/transformations. “A subjectivity is produced in discourse as the self is subjected to discourse” [emphasis in original] (Parker, 1989b, p. 64). When their own language is replaced with a coloniser’s tongue, versions of māoritanga are formed from a strange language (Sampson, 1993b). Through only having access to the english language, māori became constructed as the english speaker/language desires, orientated to the needs of the privileged (white) who have power to voice. In colonial discourses the indigenous peoples were often constituted as ‘savage natives’. This subject position communicated inherent qualities and also a relationship with the colonisers. While māori were essentialised as primitive and their authenticity depended on retaining a native
purity, pākehā were constituted as elusive and adaptable (Bell, 2004). These primitivist/nativist discourses serve political agendas that are undermined by māori discourses (Pocock, 2001). For example, the use of “tangata whenua” and “iwi/hapū/whānau” work to privilege indigenous constructions of subjectivity (Spoonley, 1995a). The signifier “tangata whenua” links māori back to the beginning of the species, Hine Ahu One: the first “life shape” formed by Tāne Mahuta 15 (Kahukiwa & Grace, 1984, p. 22). In te reo māori “tangata whenua” means people that are of the land and people that are the land (Hēnare, 1988). The connection with Papatūānuku 16 is reinforced through the burying of the whenua (placenta) in the whenua (land), the whenua/whenua that is/becomes Papatūānuku. The English translation of “people of the land” is an inadequate transformation/translation, although not as woeful as that of the Code of Ethics for Psychologists (2002) where tangata whenua are translated/transformed as “those who are māori” (p. 3). The Native Land Courts were called “Kooti Tango Whenua 17” because of the outcomes (Williams, 1999) that effectively stole māori land. What does this say of the colonial government’s understandings of the rights, duties, and privileges of tangata whenua? That they were a resource: owners of land? The possibilities for partnership when māori are constituted and treated as tangata whenua (without translation/transformation) are profound. And what do ‘tangata whenua’ become when they lose their mana whenua? What does it mean when the courts established by the colonial government (incidentally validated by the Tiriti/Treaty) legislate land stealing/seizure? When such blatant disregard for constitutional principles and indigenous rights (explicitly protected through that same Tiriti/Treaty) occur, how does the discourse enabling disregard constrain the possibilities of relationships of integrity and equality?

Since the 1900s there have been various groups of māori who have asserted their tino rangatiratanga/māori sovereignty independently of a

15 Tāne Mahuta: guardian/atau of the forest flora and fauna.
16 Papatūānuku: ‘earth mother’
17 Kooti Tango Whenua: Land Taking Court
relationship with the government (Awatere, 1984). In 1981 the Kohanga Reo movement began from the concerted efforts of māori leaders/parents (Walker, 1996a) to address mainstream inadequacies in teaching māori children (Bishop, 1996; Thomas & Nikora, 1996a; Walker, 1996a). This also served to spearhead a new political awakening/revival/recovery for māori in terms of centralising kaupapa māori within education (Pere, 1988; Sharples, 1993; Walker, 1996a) and assisting with the survival of māori culture (Chaplow, Chaplow & Maniapoto, 1993). Further development into Kura Kaupapa Māori worked to claim “the right to name our own world, to reclaim our ways of knowing, our language, our rangatiratanga over our learning” (Smith, L., 1998, p. 100-101). Te Wananga o Raukawa (tertiary level education) was the first of contemporary wananga, founded also in 1981 (Durie, A., 1999). Only three generations separate contemporary māori youth schooled in te reo from their grandparents who were punished for using te reo in ‘Native School’ grounds. Revitalising te reo māori among māori also helped to enhance māori cultural identity (Durie, A., 1997).

Ellsworth (1989) recognises the need for language to be used as “words spoken for survival” that exist as valid in their own arena of proof (p. 302). Within social constructionism language takes on a complexity and sophistication of which one should be wary. Interpretations of words such as “kawanatanga” and “tino rangatiratanga” do not easily translate into tangible, essential and fixed terms. The processes of negotiating valid interpretations of the Tiriti/Treaty necessarily involve the negotiation of a relationship achieved through dialogue and the privileging of particular discourses. Engaging in dialogue about the Tiriti/Treaty, in the context of a history of māori language suppression, is a complex and ongoing process but is necessary to construct an understanding of contemporary bicultural relationships. This thesis is directed towards such an understanding.

contextualising inexorably subjective knowledge

Subjectivity can be easily described as the experience we have of ourselves (Parker, 1989a). The term ‘identity’ is an inadequate uni-modal form
of subjectivity (Smith, L., 1992) as transliteration of subjectivity into a discourse that tends to constitute human subjects as individuals with essential qualities. Concepts such as ‘personality’, ‘attitudes’ and the ‘unique self’ that is thought to reside in the physically contained individual, lack sensibility outside of the (pakeha dominated/white social) contexts that give them meaning.

“The self, after all, is not a thing; it is not a substance, a material entity that we can somehow grab hold of and place before our very eyes” (Freeman, 1990, p. 8). The self is understood rather as a speaking subject (Lupton, 1992) not a silent object. Further, the speaking subject is recognised as the site of the production of knowledge (Stark & Watson, 1999). Subjectivity is implicit in empirical science but outlawed in the practice of writing: referring to ‘the researcher’ as “I” is prohibited. Explicitly legitimating subjectivity in knowledge production can be a novel and uncomfortable situation.

One of the assumptions of western epistemology is that it is possible to achieve objectivity through separation of the knower and known (Raine, 2001; Bishop, 1999). Through achieving such distance, word/language is assumed to more closely map on to world/reality (Gubrium & Holstein, 1997; Freeman, 1990). “The value of scientific statement, its truth, is in effect determined as “objectivity.” Objectivity is interpreted as the “ethical,” that is, lucid and free relation to what must therefore have the form, place, status, identity, and the visible, reliable, available, and calculable stability of the object” (Derrida, 2002, p. 64). It also inheres a “magical reification” (Derrida, 1998, p. 92) of a unified, stable entity. Through the process of focusing on methodology as measurement and procedure (Smith, L., 1999; Morawski, 1990) the fallible human element inexorably involved in producing the scientific work can be concealed (Walker, M., 1998). In relation to this thesis, as Sorrenson (1979/1993) notes, “the analysis of culture must be influenced by the contemporary environment - as much in the observer as in the observed” (p. 81).

Objectivity assumes it is possible to achieve a neutral, apolitical, ahistorical, acultural perspective on the world; as such it is the antithesis of the ‘unscientific’ and ‘arbitrary’ problematic of subjectivity (Freeman, 1990). Social
constructionism asserts there can be no knowledge that is beyond subjectivity, because without our systems of knowing the world (cultural understandings) we would be unable to articulate or conceptualise meanings (Harré & Krausz, 1996; Bishop, 1999). For social constructionism, inconsistencies apparent in discourse (and life) do not invalidate fluid social constructions because a universal, singular truth is not assumed (Foucault, 1972; Wetherell & Potter, 1988). Qualities of the subject are not essential, but negotiated through relationship with others (Whitford, 1991; Gergen, 2001). “We behave think and feel differently depending on whom we are with, what we are doing and why” (Burr, 1995, p. 25). Discourses themselves are not complete, static systems of meanings that have particular essential political consequences. Words can be appropriated and meanings transformed through their contextualised use. For example, there are a number of māori words that have become part of common local (and sometimes international) discourse: kiwi, haka, paua, marae and whānau (Hirsh, 1989; Metge, 1986/1989; 1995; Cryer, 2002). māori culture has been a source of national identity and national pride (Metge, 1976). Although these words may be recognised as māori words, through being placed in a predominantly english setting their system of signification is changed, therefore the meaning they held in māori discourse may be transformed. Whether this use of the terms can be “appreciation without appropriation” is contentious (Metge, 1995, p. 309). If the māori culture is to contribute to the culture of Aotearoa/New Zealand such transformations in meaning should be anticipated.

In accepting that subjectivity is not an essential quality, but an experience of the self in relation to others, we are compelled to recognise that subjectivities of the self have an impact on others. The example of “pākehā” as a subject position for nonmāori is one such example, in that it implies a particular position in relation to māori that is unappealing to many nonmāori. Similarly, essentialising māori subjectivity can function to place a hierarchy on the various expressions of māoritanga: authenticating some while marginalising others. The discourses available to construct subjectivities influence what subject positions
are available. Foucault has a clear vision of the power of discourse. Weedon (1997) summarises:

Power is a relation. It inheres in difference and is a dynamic of control, compliance and lack of control between discourses and the subjects constituted by discourses, who are their agents. Power is exercised within discourses in the ways in which they constitute and govern individual subjects (p. 110).

Power is also associated with the strength of different discourses and their ability to be heard. Asking questions such as “[w]ho works and what works, for whom, and to what end?” (Gilmore, 1993, p. 25). “What is spoken, and who may speak, are issues of power” (Parker, 1989b, p. 61). Particular power relations are supported, negated or challenged through the positions we assume and those we offer to others.

Subjectivity provides various agencies, that is, abilities to perform in different ways, to mobilise and share specific meanings. Not all subject positions are equally available; some are silenced, while others are promoted (Burr, 1995; Weedon, 1997). The subject positions available within mainstream discourse may not be consistent with preferred subject positions. For example the primitivist discourses originating from early colonial times have promoted indigenous peoples’ subject positions that were/are acceptable and consistent with colonial assumptions. Positioning emphasises individual agency, mediated by available subjective histories (Davies & Harré, 1990; Kanpol, 1994). Indigenous peoples were restricted within mainstream discourse to the subjectivity provided by someone else (Whitford, 1991; Sampson, 1993a) and in the process denied the right to their own voice (Parker & Shotter, 1990).

Subject positions provide the place from which to experience subjectivity. For any subject position there are associated rights, duties and obligations (Davies & Harré, 1990; Harré & Langenhove, 1999).
Our sense of who we are and what it is therefore possible and not possible for us to do, what it is right and appropriate for us to do, and what it is wrong and inappropriate for us to do thus all derive from our occupation of subject positions within discourse (Burr, 1995, p. 145-6).

Claiming the ‘personal is political’ makes sense within an understanding of how available subject positions enable or silence particular subjectivities. “Where there is a space between the position of subject offered by a discourse and individual interest, a resistance to that subject position is produced” (Weedon, 1997, p. 109). Resistance, though, may take many forms, including a refusal to engage that may be interpreted as silence.

The researcher is not exempt from the partiality of the discourses through which they are positioned (Billig, 1991). As researchers, “when we attempt to describe the world to which discourse could be linked, we again enter the corridors of discourse” (Gergen, 2001, p. 94) and fashion our own interpretation or scholarly artifice (Geertz, 1973). It is not often that researchers allow their presence in the production of research to be recognised in scientific writing processes (Hoskins, 2000). Social constructionist discourse offers a concept of reflexivity to enable researchers to acknowledge their inherent subjectivities and be aware of the ways they may impact on the process and product of research (Strauss, 1987; Lupton, 1992; Morawski, 1990; Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Hoskins, 2000). Derrida (1998) talks of reflexivity as present in work “that is related” and that “relates me” (p. 71).

Constructionism posits that the researcher cannot uncover the truth. The research should be treated as one of many readings and open to other equally valid readings (Howells, 1999; Burr, 1995). Having such a clear and strong focus on language requires being careful about language use and remaining self-reflexive and critical about terminology that is privileged. “Social constructionism is a two-edged sword in the political arena, potentially as damaging to the wielding hand as to the opposition” (Gergen, 2001, p. 174). Reflexivity requires researchers to be explicit about their particular political stance (Praat, 1998). Self-reflection becomes a necessary part of the research
Chapter I: sticks and stones of language

process (Gergen, 2001). The researcher is required to explore their subjectivities and divulge how they impact upon the research practice. “It requires the researcher to stay with the complexity, to trust the process, and to believe that new knowledges and selves can be created” (Hoskins, 2000, p. 60)

I/i position myself in a number of subject positions in relation to this project. Through my education at Massey University I/i have taken up a position within psychology; as a woman and as a māori. My position in relation to the Tiriti/Treaty is to recognise the significance of the document and the implications it holds for Aotearoa/New Zealand.

Telling my story through social constructionism not only allows me to position myself, but requires it. It is through this process that the research is validated by the reader: the voice achieves truth/voice/understanding. Qualitative research privileges a relationship with texts and allows the speakers of those texts to be present (Stark & Watson, 1999; Ruwhiu, 1999), thereby also exposing the myth of neutrality.

Social constructionism offers legitimacy for a counter-hegemonic position with a solid and congruous theoretical base. My responsibility in this research is to produce a useful account of biculturalism. I/i am able to take up multiple positions within this work: as psychologist, as māori, as woman, as student, as objectified, as objectifier and objecting to māori marginalisation through challenging pākehā privilege. These positions each offer different insights for the diverse voices.

Reality is not something which is sitting there, just waiting to be captured and described in a neutral and objective polity making process. It is something which is socially constructed through our beliefs and values, and our beliefs and values are influenced by our cultural, historical and social positions (Levy, 1999, p. 14).

The inadequacies of the dichotomy of biculturalism restrict the possibilities that are above and beyond imaginaries (Pieterse & Parekh, 1995), beyond the ability to comprehend. Perception does not completely apprehend an essential reality. My intention through this work is to primarily disrupt the
dichotomy often present in discourses of biculturalism. Interpretations of the Tiriti/Treaty should similarly not be constrained by dichotomous thinking: not or but rather, both/and.

In the following chapters, the constitutive power of language is taken up as an enabling possibility for reading texts of psychological discourse from a marginalised subjective position as a māori woman researcher, privileged by education and access to the pākehā epistemologies that legitimate research practices. The next chapter offers a reading of white culture and how it functions in psychology to marginalise/centralise while simultaneously ignoring its own partiality/eurocentrism.
II

BY ANY OTHER NAME
LANGUAGE SPEAKS CULTURE

TÔKU REO, TÔKU OHOOOHO

A critique of race/ethnicity/culture unfolds psychology as replete with eurocentrism. Racist practice is present in scientific epistemologies despite recent changes to methodologies and terminologies/taxonomy. Word substitutions alone provide superficial and ineffectual forms of change: tokenism and appropriation. Race/ethnicity/culture have become synonymous. If race persists as a category in contemporary sensibilities, let it remain. Ethnicity should not be used as a shadow in which race hides. Currently race is scared to speak its name, hides in the shadows (but not in the margins), disguised and never “dares to say its name and to present itself for what it is” (Derrida, 1985, p. 292). If race is to be used, let it be explicit and applied equally to all races: let white privilege have voice within race/ethnicity discrimination. “A rose by any other name” (Shakespeare, 1974, p. 752) may have more thorns than petals. Monologism/racism remains epistemologically unchallenged, and maintains the same old racial system of signification/evaluation.
Culture is communicated and constituted through language (Geertz, 1973; Sue, Ivey & Pedersen, 1996; Grace, G., 1987; Pere, 1988; Tau, 2001). The particular language medium privileged here is text on the page. Rather than being a neutral communication medium, written text has been privileged over the spoken and sung knowledges of the indigenous.

The sanitised and standardised stories of colonisation can forget the blood that is inherited and the blood spilt/spent in acquiring land to settle on. Unsanitised new terms for a fluid, multiply unfolding and storied form of knowing human subjectivity are not orthodox practices in academic writings. In the ‘neutrality’ there is something of the emotion and pain that is lost. Terence Trent D’Arby sings “the flowers weep and they lean away/from the blood-stained soil beneath my feet/the thorns outnumber the petals on the rose/and the darkness amplifies the sound/of printer’s ink on propaganda page/that will rule your life and fuel my rage” (D’Arby, 1987, track 10).

There is nothing in the written text to bind the interpretation to a single truth. Words as signs within a particular discourse have a specific ideological orientation (Parker, 1990b).

While I invite you into existence as a bearer of meaning (an ‘intentional agent’), I also act so as to negate your potential. From the enormous array of possibilities, I thus create direction and temporarily narrow the possibilities of your identity and agency (Gergen, 1994, p. 266).

There are limitations placed upon cultural distinctiveness and the ratification of particular identities/subjectivities through scientific discourse. Discourses currently available to constitute culture have largely come from a colonising research history that has produced race/ethnicity/culture as individual qualities of non-white peoples (Cardona, Wampler & Busby, 2005). Constructionism provides a position from which it is possible to critique such eurocentrism of western science and deconstruct white privilege.

Reality, knowledge and psychological practices (including research, education and mental health interventions) are constituted through language/discourse as is “virtually the entirety of anyone’s understanding of
the social world” (Potter & Wetherell, 1987, p. 174). Science has a distinctive culture and particular practices are constituted through a specifically scientific gaze (Harré, 1985; Gubrium & Holstein, 1997). Scientific discourse centralises those aspects of knowledge and reality that western society values and uses such criteria to marginalise/ illegitimate alternative knowledges and realities. Scientific and psychological practice has also been used to ‘prove’ the ‘inherent inferior intellectual capacity’ of non-whites (Ogden & McFarlane-Nathan, 1997; Stewart, 1997; Paewai, 1997), “as though Māori were cardboard figures with blank minds awaiting intelligence” (Durie, E., 1998, p. 62). The subject is constituted through the scientific/ psychological gaze. Psychological texts formed through scientific discourses privilege a particular way of being in the world. The discipline of psychology acts as an agent of social management and control for society (Strupp & Hadley, 1977; Parker, 1989b; Gergen, 2001; Sue, Ivey & Pedersen, 1996; Sampson, 1990; Sue & Sue, 2003). The work of this chapter is to constitute the inevitable (and eurocentric) partiality of scientific truth and to acknowledge the power relationship this assumes with other voices of truth/ epistemologies.

scientific racism: the way the truth and the light

The discipline of psychology is aligned with social and physical sciences and supports the status quo of western society (Kitzinger, 1989; Sue & Sue, 2003). Scientific research has perpetuated and legitimated the continued oppression of culturally marginalised groups through ‘objective’ scholarship that has reified a system of evaluation that disparages ‘other’ knowledges while claiming a cultural, political and social ‘neutrality’ that belies its history (Michael, 1990; Gergen, 1973; 1991; Misra, 1993; Sue, D. W., 1990; Gergen, Guelrce, Lock & Misra, 1996; Lee, 2005; Mills, 1997). For indigenous/non-white peoples, research has therefore been associated with western imperialism and colonialism (Smith, L., 1999) and criticised for privileging a monocultural gaze (Johnston, 1998). The centralising of colonial culture exceeds self-contained ethnocentrism to impose eurocentrism upon others through oppressive, violent,
and unrelenting processes of colonisation/imperialism. The righteousness of imposing the eurocentric gaze through colonial practices upon those for whom it is not relevant, helpful, or intelligible is dubious. Practices of scientific empiricism and colonisation are both complicit with western epistemologies inhering dominance:

colonisation is about creating a suspension of disbelief which requires that those from whom power is to be taken have to suspend their own faith, their own worth, their own goodness, their own sense of value, and their own sense of knowledge (Jackson, 1999, p. 71).

The power relations of science construct inferior positions for western and indigenous epistemologies and peoples. Through scientific discourse “indigenous languages, knowledges, and cultures have been silenced or misrepresented, ridiculed or condemned in academic and popular discourses” (Smith, L., 1999, p. 20). Their ‘truthfulness’ has been judged from a eurocentric position, and thus relegated to the lesser position of ‘myth’ ‘magic’ and/or ‘superstition’ (Stewart, 1997; Raine, 2001). Each of these signifiers contains an inferior evaluation of the validity of a truth claim. Historically, brief glances from the ‘superior’ colonisers were enough to ‘know’ a ‘primitive’ people. More indepth gazing through science –such as filling skulls with millet to assess the capacity for intelligence - worked to reinforce primitivist assumptions of ‘natural’ white dominance (Smith, L., 1999).

Psychology in Aotearoa/New Zealand developed at a time when ethnic minorities were excluded from contributing to the practice of psychology and the development of psychological theory (Hirini & Nairn, 1996; Stewart, 1997). Positivist empiricism was the favoured epistemological position.

Positivist empiricism values objectivity and quantification. For positivist empiricist science, access to knowledge is enabled through observation and measurement of discrete entities (Nightingale & Neilands, 1997). Through this gaze, counting is more reliable than conversation because numbers have more credibility than words (Hoskins, 2000). The discourse of the scientific gaze has enjoyed a largely unchallenged hegemonic ontological/epistemological status.
constructed through the common sense of western societies (Marsella, 1998; Morawski, 1990; Gergen, 1985; Smith, L., 1996), yet it has been incapable of recognising cultural specificity. Psychological epistemologies and practices are eurocentric - having been shaped largely from the United States, the United Kingdom and Europe (Hirini & Nairn, 1996; Paewai, 1997; Jackson, 1995; Sue, Bernier, Durran, Feinberg, Pedersen, Smith, & Vasquez-Nuttal, 1982). This eurocentric view has specific philosophical assumptions about the nature of reality (ontology), the means by which this reality may be represented through knowledge (epistemology), and the processes by which this reality may be explored, through research (methodology). Within scientific discourse the subject positions of researcher (or 'scientist') and researched (or 'subject', 'participant' or 'lay person'), assume the researchers have greater claim to truth than the researched (Burr, 1995). The 'invisibility' of eurocentrism has enabled these universalising assumptions of western science to remain centralised as common sense, and become naturalised, unquestioned and beyond reproach. “We have come to esteem a form of knowledge that denies its parentage: that is, knowledge that is anonymous, has no name, no heritage, no parents, applying everywhere and to everyone” (Sampson, 1993a). This esteemed ‘common sense’ assumes ahistorical, apolitical, acultural qualities because it appears, itself, as ‘natural truth.’

Naturalizing always, very nearly at any rate, amounts to neutralizing. By naturalizing, by affecting to consider as natural what is not and has never been natural, one neutralizes. One neutralizes what? One conceals, rather, in an effect of neutrality, the active intervention of a force and a machinery (Derrida, 2002, p. 69).

The natural and neutral ‘common sense’ status of scientific knowledge has enabled the marginalisation of non-white knowledges through the machinery and force of colonisation (Smith, L., 1999; Durie, A., 1997; Bishop, 1996; 1999; Cunningham, 1999) and the violence of racist practices.

Racism manifests a political judgement (Parker, 1989b) that is complicit with the social organisation of colonisation. This judgement is constituted
through discursive commitment to the inherent superiority of one ‘race’ over others. Racism legitimises that group’s hegemony (Dominelli, 1989) and validates knowledge through a culturally specific system of knowledge. Through this eurocentric process, others are denied the privilege of speaking the truth of their own lives (Shotter, 1990). This process is further offensive, not only through its power to define others, but also through a self-proclaimed ‘objectivity’/impartiality that is particularly resistant to critique. In as much as the invisibility of eurocentrism in scientific discourse operates to obscure the political judgement of superior western scientific epistemology, western science is privileged through racism.

Scientific racism is the naming of processes of colonisation enabled through/by scientific inquiry including the subversion of indigenous knowledges and practices (Sue & Sue, 2003; Banks, 1996; Herbert, 1998; Pākehā Treaty Action, 1997; Parker, 1990a; McCleanor, 1993a; Kaptchuk, 1983; Choney, Berryhill-Paapke & Robbins, 1995; Walker, 1998; Pieterse & Parekh, 1995). When research/knowledge/reality is required to conform to scientific standards of validation to achieve legitimacy (McLaren, 1998), non-western/indigenous knowledges are relegated to the margins (McCleanor, 1993a; Walker, 1998; Raine, 2001). Discussion is limited to eurocentric intelligibilities of the scientific gaze and non-western/indigenous research has been acceptable only on condition that it recognise the ‘superiority’ of the white centre.

Presenting subjective information in processes that have long been honoured in māori epistemologies, requires creating conversations to transmit information/knowledge. Innovation in the presentation/validation of culturally relevant information in scientific/psychological practice has included poetic elements, visual devices and kōrero pūrakau/story-telling (see for example, Te Roopu Awhina a Tokanui, 1987; Broughton, 1999; Iseke-Barnes, 2003; Cherrington, 1999; Fenton & Te Koutua, 2000). For māori, to be researched is to be colonised (Smith, L., 1999). Indigenous/Marginalised populations have not benefited from scientific processes that have systematically and unreflexively appropriated knowledge (Hohepa & McNaughton, 1993; Walker,
Chapter II: Language Speaks Culture

Māori have systematically been excluded from the production of science — a systematic exclusion has meant that less than 1% of the professional science community are Māori (Walker, M., 1998). The relationship between the researched and the researcher has seldom been mutually beneficial: research on Māori has seldom worked for Māori. “Is it any wonder then that Māori communities are wary and weary of Pākehā researchers?” (Cram, 1997, p. 45).

It is not scientific truth in and of itself that is racist, but the universalist assumptions that impose eurocentric scientific monologism (Sampson, 1993a; Stewart, 1997; Sue, Ivey & Pedersen, 1996) supplanting opportunities for engaging in dialogue with peoples who have alternative truths (Grace, G., 1987; Paewai, 1997). For any truth that we chose to privilege we should be aware of the construction and the consequences (Gutting, 2001; Marshall & Wetherell, 1989; Phillips & Hardy, 2002). If this process is recognised to not be a ‘natural’ apprehension of the truth, but a particular discursive approach to truth, space is opened up for alternative approaches to produce valid knowledge. When language as a clear and unproblematic reflection of reality is questioned, the truth of science is de-stabilised (Misra, 1993).

Deconstruction is a useful process for unpacking the eurocentrisms of science. Empirical science not only enacts western values, but is also assumed to be a ‘universal language’ and renders ‘scientific theory’ as objective fact rather than a subjective reading and culturally specific construction (Harré, 1989; Nairn, 1997; Jackson, 1992; Sampson, 1993b; Gergen, 1985; Strupp & Hadley, 1977). Although empiricism is not a cause for concern for some ‘minority’ researchers (see for example Adair, Puhan & Vohra, 1993), others are highly suspicious of scientific practices, referring to white researchers as ‘raping’ the minority group through the process of research (Mio & Iwamasa, 1993). The violence of science constructs scientific truths as a partial reading that simplifies a multiplicity of truths into a monologue/univocal truth.

A constructionist approach to truth inevitably enables multiplicity and the potential for achieving ‘the singular/universal/real truth’ is surrendered.
Truth thereby becomes less stable and definitive and the processes of knowledge construction and the production of truth effects become invariably politicised. Multiplicity of truth also allows those who are usually marginalised in the research process to have a space to assert their truths. The processes of enabling multiple truths and opening spaces for marginalised knowledges challenge the racist functions of scientific monologism.

In recent times racism has become socially unacceptable in as much as discrimination and overt racism violate human rights legislation. For some, racism becomes an embarrassment, and now assumes more covert, though still discriminatory, forms (Wetherell & Potter, 1992; Sue & Sue, 2003; Lee, 2005; Swim, Aikin, Hall & Hunter, 1995). Racism and covert discrimination constituted through everyday language have been made more explicit through the ‘political correctness’ movement. This movement has emerged from identity politics to support the self determination of marginalised groups in/through popular discourse (Sampson, 1993b; Gergen, 2001; Dyer, 1997). It has informed an uncomfortable consciousness of the political consequences of constituting others through talk (for example, problematising signifiers such as ‘hori’ or ‘nigger’).

Where racism is understood as an inherent quality of racist terms, it has been argued that addressing racism requires suppression of these ‘racist’ terms. As a consequence, particular terminology has been politicised and, for some, illegitimated. For example where the term ‘race’ has been regarded as essentially evoking a racial inferiority/superiority, other terms have been advocated as substitutes: ethnicity and culture in particular. Yet assumptions based on cultural ‘difference’ can still function as racist discrimination (Cameron & Wycoff, 1998; Sue & Sue, 2003). For example, racist remarks claiming “māori are lazy workers” may no longer be acceptable in the workplace, but referring to being on “māori time” legitimates discrimination on the grounds of ‘cultural’ difference. So racial and cultural terms can signify and function in equally offensive ways (Billig, 1987; Tilbury, 1998).
Chapter 11: Language Speaks Culture

cultural deficit model

In terms of scientific practice, race/ethnicity/culture has commonly been used to measure/explain/theorise inequalities in health. In Aotearoa/New Zealand comparing the differences in health status between māori and pākehā has long been a popular practice through which māori health/illness has been evaluated (cf., Hunn Report, 1961; Pomare, Keefe-Ormsby, Ormsby, Pearce, Reid, Robson, & Wātene-Haydon, 1995). The contemporary government policy of 'Closing the Gaps' continues this practice and has measured the success of māori health advancement as evident by a reduction in the 'gap' between māori and pākehā health status (Ministry of Health, 2001). Anticipated reductions in the health 'gap' between māori and pākehā have not been forthcoming (Te Puni Kōkiri, 1998, 2000; Mental Health Commission, 1999). 'Closing the Gaps' remains a common approach to the 'understanding' of cultural inequalities, particularly for māori health. An area of special concern is māori mental health (Mental Health Commission, 1998; National Mental Health Workforce Development Coordinating Committee, 1999; Horwood & Fergusson, 1998). While a comparison model may appear to be a sensible approach to ensuring equitable health outcomes, eurocentric foundations and the evaluative assumptions made about māori and pākehā through this process are problematic.

Using comparisons between white and non-white racial/ethnic groups to make sense of health differences enables a 'deficit' model in which the 'deficient' group is identified through race/ethnicity and constituted in comparison to a presumed normal/control group that is unspecified (Sue & Sue, 2003). In Aotearoa/New Zealand this has been called a cultural deficit model (Durie, M., 2001; Ruwhiu, 1999; Lawson-Te Aho, 1994; Cunningham, 1999).

Comparing māori and pākehā assumes that māori are a homogenous group in terms of health status and health concerns (Durie, M., 1995c; Durie, A, 1997; Tau, 2001) and that diverse māori experiences can be adequately
represented through a univocal truth of Māori\textsuperscript{18}. This representation undermines the heterogeneity within the group (Ponterotto, 1988; Levine, 1997; Choney, Berryhill-Paapke & Robbins, 1995; Hohepa & McNaughton, 1993; Aguirre, Bermudez, Cardona, Zamora & Reyes, 2005; Billig, 1991; Sue, Ivey & Pedersen, 1996). The assertion of a univocal truth risks undermining the rich potentials of the heterogeneity of cultural life (Misra, 1993).

Despite the assumption that empirical epistemologies support comparisons between groups, empirical research has produced evidence that variation (or difference) \textit{within} individuals of the same ‘race’ is greater than that \textit{between} individuals of different ‘races’ (Aguirre et al, 2005). The finding has been repeated for māori and non-māori ‘groups’ (Chapple, 2000). The validity and reliability of race/ethnicity/culture as a phenotypical variable with discriminating power is empirically contested.

The deficit model also suggests an analysis of racial/ethnic differences that privileges a western view of health (Thomas, 1988; Hoskins, 2001). From under the guise of ‘equality’ māori are unreflexively judged according to pākehā standards. Such a universalist assumption focuses on the deficit of the ‘cultural other’ relative to a hypothetical (white) norm and interprets deviation from the white norm as cultural inferiority (Sue, S., 1983; Cram, 1997; Choney, Berryhill-Paapke & Robbins, 1995; Nairn, 1997; McCreanor, 1997; de Anda, 1984; Glynn & Bishop, 1995). In this instance the white group is the ‘control group.’ The duality of this term is useful to name the assumed quality of a ‘neutral’ comparison group, and also the control of imposing white understandings of ‘essential’ difference on ‘other’ populations.

The deficit model further suggests cultural differences alone sufficiently explain the health differences between the groups (Thomas, 1988). Such assumptions have been labelled “overculturalizing” (Ponterotto, 1988, p. 416) and have long been criticised for promoting inaccuracies (Yamamoto, Acosta & Evans, 1982; Sue, S., 1983, 1988; Thomas, 1986, 1988; Pool, 1991; Axelson, 1993).

\textsuperscript{18} The capitalising of ‘māori’ here is intentional. It constructs maori as a homogenous singular identity.
Multiple dimensions of identification more salient to health outcomes/process can easily be confounded with racial/ethnic variables (Durie, Black, Christensen, Durie, Fitzgerald, Taiapa, Tinirau, & Apatu, 1996). Ethnic identification is not the only subjectivity available to an individual, and in some instances other demographic subject positions have a greater impact upon health (Durie, M., 2001; Durie, M., et al., 2002), such as low socio-economic status (Thomas, 1986).

By assuming that racial/ethnic distinctions are relevant, and through dichotomising heterogeneous information, white racial/cultural superiority is assumed. Interestingly enough, in spite of the salience of racial/ethnic explanations for non-white groups, racial/ethnic privilege is not considered relevant for the white population: “white people are not racially seen and named, they/we function as a human norm. Other people are race, we are just people” (Dyer, 1997, p. 1). The deficit model has been used by western science to subject other cultural groups to scrutiny, while remaining blind to western culture and the associated privilege (Huygens, 1999; Nakayama & Krizek, 1999; Littlewood, 1992; Bell, 1996). The category of pākehā is conveniently and apolitically accepted as an appropriate comparison group for māori (Metge, 1995). This process has also been called the “persistent Pākehā error” (King, 1993, p. 231). It measures māori by pākehā standards and then blames māori for the difference. Deficit models explain the ‘gap’ between māori and pākehā health ‘outcomes’ as indications of poor māori adaptation (Durie, M., 2001). Māori difference from the norm indicates abnormality from the benchmark of pākehā norms (Johnston, 1998; Durie, A., 1999). Through these processes māori are constructed as failing in health, education and income. Homogenised as a social category, māori “feature in the ‘bottom of the heap’ scenarios but whose scenarios are they and how did we get to be the main act?” (Smith, L., 1992, p. 59).

The concepts of race/ethnicity/culture are constructions used as determinants for health status and work to support the ideology of colonisation. The role of the researcher in this process is recognised to be constructive:
imposing positions/categories on populations to link race/ethnicity/culture with (western ideals of) health (Sue, D. W., et al, 1982). Existing measurements of health outcomes are constrained by assumptions of what ideal health outcomes might be (Kingi & Durie, 1997).

Deficit models have provided few relevant suggestions for māori development (Durie, A., 1999; Bishop, 1994). Such models fail to recognise the benefit of culturally specific processes (such as marae encounters) and the cultural integrity of māoritanga for māori achieving good health.

More complex research methodologies could develop more sophisticated and productive theories of the impact of race/ethnicity/culture on health; for example, researching within-group variations in terms of acculturation, identity formation, and generational status (Ponterotto, 1988).

There are also epistemological challenges for science if research is to be relevant for matauranga māori. Understanding māori health requires a holistic approach to health, where biological, cultural, social, economic, lifestyle and political factors are considered altogether (Durie, M., 2001). The bio-medical measurement of health as illness is not producing particularly interesting, constructive, or helpful health information for māori. The omnipresent dimension of wairua has consistently been identified as pivotal in understanding health (Ministry of Health, 1995a, 1995b; Waldegrave, 1990; Hēnare, 1988) however health is persistently measured without considering wairua. Wairua has qualities that are diverse and often contradictory and therefore inconsistent with qualities of empirical measurement (Benland, 1988). Honouring epistemological/ontological difference may require measurement on different parameters (Chaplow, Chaplow & Maniapoto, 1993).

Comparing māori and non-māori through a deficit model also facilitates an overwhelming focus on negative health statistics, while effectively ignoring dynamic and adaptive qualities of māori society and within group changes in health status (Durie, M., 1999a, 2003; Walker, 1994; Jenkins, 2000). Changing the orientation of research to focus on strengths in an area of difficulty can
Alternatively produce rich and positive constructions of māori peoples and processes (see for example Herbert, 2001; Ponterotto, 1988; Durie, M., 2003).

Assuming that the experiences of health/ill-health can be measured and sensibly interpreted for māori and pākehā without taking account of cultural specificity is problematic. It assumes that both groups have the same aspirations for health. What of social/political/cultural marginalisation/discrimination within/through the systems of health? How does marginalisation/privilege feature in the deficit model where one culture is visibly ‘cultural’ and the other is invisibly ‘normal’? Determinants of health seldom include a measurement of cultural consciousness, experiences of colonisation/marginalisation, social connectedness/community cohesion, or the impact of wairua on health. It is interesting to consider how white/pākehā individuals might fare if compared on these dimensions and found to be deficient?

If the Other19 is a primary vehicle for coming to understand our [white] selves, then changing how we come to know the Other (and revealing the power which controls that knowing) becomes one of the most important projects for all comparative research (Lucas & Barrett, 1995, p. 317).

It is plausible to use the signifier ‘māori’ to refer to a racial, ethnic, or cultural designation. However, if all of these assume an essential quality that is obtusely used as an explanation for racial/ethnic/cultural ‘deficit’ then regardless of the category/terminology, the function remains the same: to individualise qualities constituted through scientific practices and constrained by western epistemologies. Facilitating obtuse negative stereotypes of māori

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19 The ‘Other’ refers to a marginalised ethnic ‘minority.’ This terminology is commonly used in political theorising and cultural studies. ‘Other’ is omitted from common use in this thesis for its tendency to essentialise non-white as ‘Other’: it is not often used to refer to the white majority. The preferred alternative here -marginalised- more appropriately describes the position and can be used equally sensibly to refer to positioning of the white majority.
peoples as ‘the Māori burden’ that are costing taxpayers huge sums of money (McLoughlin, 1993) can hardly be good for Māori health.

The point is not that acts of racial violence are only words but rather that they have to have a word. Even though it offers the excuse of blood, color, birth ... it outlines space in order to assign forced residence or to close off borders. It does not discern, it discriminates (Derrida, 1985, p. 292).

Populations are dichotomised (as above) or divided into groups according to race/ethnicity/culture. As Derrida suggests, such divisions do not discern individuals on the basis of neutral or natural qualities, but produce, and are produced by political agendas that serve to discriminate. The hierarchy of race facilitates racialising the non-white while ignoring white supremacy as the unmarked race.

A deconstruction/reading of race, ethnicity, and culture serve to make political agendas more explicit while suggesting how white race/ethnicity/culture remains elusive. This reading is undertaken from a position that resists the colonialist implications of these terms for constituting Māori and Pākehā.

race/ethnicity/culture

Race, ethnicity, and culture are inter-related and over-lapping concepts, multi-disciplinary in use and interchangable in application (Domenech-Rodríguez & Wieling, 2005). Despite their theorised differences, they are all similarly measured in simplistic ways suggesting categories of subjectivity that are essentialist, reified, and closed/stable (Caglar, 1997). These categories apparently identify groups of individuals on the basis of qualities that are inherent/internal to individuals. Race/ethnicity/culture are all measured as qualities of the de-contextualised individual: a self understood independently of social, political and historical relationships. In spite of being theorised as significant collective qualities of the group, they are measured and understood to be qualities of (non-white) individuals (Dyer, 1997).
For concepts/categories that assume essential qualities, consensus on definition is surprisingly difficult (O’Sullivan et al., 1994). For example, race can be confounded with ethnicity, culture and social class by uncritically assuming that biological inheritance is sufficient criteria for inclusion (Jones, 1992). The fluid interpretations of race/ethnicity/culture are used in various ways to serve particular social, political, and ideological agendas (Novitz, 1989; Lyon, 1997; Spoonley, 1991b; Nakayama & Krizek, 1999). When treated as essential qualities of an individual ‘identity’ and assumed to provide meaningful information about the individual, they can – and often do - function to render a complex, contextualised and multiply related person into a simplistic and stereotyped understanding of a de-contextualised individual.

The concept of race assumes racial qualities are directly attributed to biological or genetic inheritance and can therefore be constructed as ‘natural’ and ‘real’ (Wetherell & Potter, 1992). ‘Racial’ qualities are assumed to have been present prior to and independently of scientific intervention. Somewhat antiquated concepts of ‘races’ as biologically focused, approximated by phenotype, and assumed to relay a valid indication of biological inheritance have been found to be resistant to empirical verification (Reid & Robson, 1999; Thomas, 1988; Cameron & Wycoff, 1998). As contemporary explanations, ‘racial qualities’ continue to enable the construction of a genetically determined deficiency/quality of the individual removed from a privileged/marginalised position in terms of institutionalised social power relations (systems of society).

Race has recently been problematised as simplistic and unhelpful, linking physical characteristics (such as skin colour) to intellectual, behavioural, and moral qualities (Cameron & Wycoff, 1998; Sodowsky, Kwann & Pannu, 1995; Helms, 1995; Thomas & Nikora, 1996a). It has increasingly come to be recognised as a socially constructed category (Domenech-Rodriguez & Wieling, 2005) that has functioned to justify genocide/ethnocide. Race as a biological determinant became part of the social organisation of superiority (Billig et al., 1988) supporting and produced by the ideologies of white supremacy (Wetherell & Potter, 1992; Gilroy, 1987). As an essential physical difference
between peoples, race enables “a hierarchical segregation between groups that is founded on unequal power relations” (Caglar, 1997, p. 173). Alleged ‘racial’ differences were/are used to organise groups hierarchically: the white group invariably positioning themselves on the top (Pearson, 1990) as the ultimate ‘control group.’

Using blood lines\textsuperscript{20} as a means to ‘protect’ the purity of full-blood indigenous peoples has worked to assimilate and marginalise those of ‘mixed race’ or those who are ‘half-blood’ (Crow Dog, 1990). In Aotearoa/New Zealand the equivalent term was/is ‘half-caste’ (Pool, 1991). The dual discrimination experienced by these ‘half-bloods’ is seldom acknowledged, for example, the complexities of negotiating a māori subjectivity when identified by others as pākehā (Gibson, 1999a; Bevan-Brown, 1999). Such ‘hybridity’\textsuperscript{21} disrupts a clean dichotomising of māori and pākehā. Many māori authors have assumed a position of resistance in relation to pākehā assuming that being pākehā inevitably compromises the quality of being māori (Tau, 2001). The ‘half’ qualities of being māori and pākehā suggests ‘half-castes’ are less than complete cultural beings: they are ‘half’ pākehā and ‘half’ māori rather than full pākehā and full māori, incomplete.

With the essentialism of race problematised, ethnicity has been proposed as an alternative construct for the categorisation of peoples. Ethnicity/culture has increasingly become more attractive measures of what has predominantly remained race (Lonner & Malpass, 1994). Theories of ethnicity have extended ethnic criteria/components to include not only blood, but also language, sense of community, common geographical area (Pearson, 1990). As largely self-defined measures these new constructs are assumed to be a more valid and

\textsuperscript{20}This ‘blood’ metaphor is useful for its dual reading: inherited blood that runs through veins/blood spilt through colonial civil and international warfare where māori and pākehā fought against each other and on the same side against an other.

\textsuperscript{21}While used here to refer to individuals of māori and pākehā ancestry, the term ‘hybridity’ is problematic in as much as it assumes a genetic inheritance from a dichotomy of racial/ethnic groups (Caglar, 1997).
accurate measurement of identity (Cardona, Wampler & Busby, 2005, Te Puni Kökiri, 1998). However, there are still serious limitations in the positions available to subjects and while the broader set of criteria is identified they remain secondary to claims of ancestry/blood/race (Reid & Robson, 1999). Both the New Zealand Census and the Māori Electoral Roll claim to measure ethnicity, but additionally require a racial link to ratify self-identification as ‘māori.’

Race and ethnicity continue to share signification within biological systems. While ethnicity has adopted more socially acceptable terms for racial inheritance, such as ‘descent’ or ‘ancestry,’ the salience of ‘blood inheritance’ remains a common and recognisable validation of ethnicity/culture, as does skin colour/phenotype. Although theories of ethnicity/culture have become more complex, the measurement of ethnicity remains overly-simplistic, communicating little of this added sophistication and treating ethnicity as genetic inheritance. So ethnicity continues to function to privilege racial distinctions/discriminations (Levine, 1997; Cram, 1999; Durie, M., 2001; Wetherell & Potter, 1992). Racist constructions of ‘ethnic’ differences are still available through medical discourses assuming māori ‘predisposition’ to mental ill health is explained by biological/genetic inheritance (Johnstone & Read, 2000). Such an account may be justified as merely describing a ‘fact’. However this ‘fact’ is understood as an individual quality without regard for the social and institutional practices that may support over-diagnosis of (western) disorder in culturally ‘different’ populations while remaining blind to concomitant colonial privilege. The ‘fact’ is information about a de-contextualised individual and works to position the blame/responsibility with the individual, not with the systems that perpetuate racial/ethnic/cultural inequalities.

“Ethnicity is important, but what is more important is its meaning” (Sue, S., 1988, p. 307) and its ability to construct a sufficiently dynamic sense of people’s experience (Durie, E., 1998). Ethnicity continues to create boundaries (Lyon, 1997) and racially discriminate while contributing little more than its
predecessor - race - in terms of understanding the impact of race/ethnicity on the individual, or making positive developments to mediate racial/ethnic/cultural deficits. Race/ethnicity is understood to be "the naturalised marker of an immutable cultural difference" (Caglar, 1997, p. 175). The category used in this way constitutes causality. This association is naturalised through racial inheritance and assumed to be stable, immutable, and natural: one cannot change their racial ancestry/inheritance.

Ethnicity can work as an inaccurate proxy for 'cultural status' (Chaplow, Chaplow & Maniapoto, 1993; Pearson, 1996). Culture is applied in a number of different ways in different contexts, depending on the particular focus/function of practice. Unlike race/ethnicity, the meaning ascribed by culture can be understood as learned experience rather than inherited or essential characteristics. In this, and other respects, culture can enable more fluid, flexible and partial readings than race/ethnicity. Where race/ethnicity limits dialogue, culture can disrupt dichotomies and connect peoples within and across the boundaries imposed by racial/ethnic categories. Derrida wrote of the violence of the word as imposing a single, essential meaning upon a multiplicity of experience.

Every monolingualism or monologism restores mastery or magistrality. It is by treating each language differently, by grafting languages onto one another, by playing on the multiplicity of languages and on the multiplicity of codes within every linguistic corpus that we can struggle at once against colonization in general, against the colonizing principle in general (and you know that it exerts itself well beyond the zones said to be subjected to colonization), against the domination of language or domination by language (Derrida, 2002, p. 104-105).

In privileging the constitutional power of language everyday life may be politicised (Parker, 1990b; Sampson, 1993a) and the universal, essential, logocentric assumptions of language challenged. These impositions of language can function not only between the coloniser and colonised, but also within these groups. For example, a universal essential ideal of traditional, authentic māori
subjectivity can enable a hierarchy of māori subjectivities to further marginalise māori who have already been marginalised through lack of access to mātauranga māori (for example, te reo, social connectedness).

In 1991 the New Zealand Census allowed people to indicate more than one ethnic group for the first time. This enabled diversity to add another layer of understanding to the theories around race/ethnicity/culture and health. Unfortunately, the possibilities for diversity remained unrealised because the ‘sole māori’ group - those who indicated māori as their sole ethnic group - was re-formed as the māori ‘bottom rung’ in the same old comparison model (Reid & Robson, 1999). The diversity of health experiences among māori is effectively ignored. While dramatic differences in health status between māori and non-māori that resulted from these categorisations and comparisons has assisted in the promotion for changes to health systems, the question of the personal/collective/cultural cost of using these constructions has barely been raised.

Even within the category of ethnicity, race remains a social category that constitutes a particular social status associated with psychological effects that have mental health consequences for individuals/groups and practitioners (Jones, 1992). Rather than explaining these consequences through a biological determinant (race), they could be explained as effects of discrimination on the basis of physical appearance (racial discrimination). Additionally the imposition of white standards and the psychological/spiritual damage of assimilation/acculturation is excluded where racial categorisation is used to explain mental health consequences (Awatere-Huata, 1993).

The act of scientific observation ... makes the individual stable through constructing a perceptual system, a way of rendering the mobile and confusing manifold of the sensible into a cognizable field (Rose, 1989, p. 124).

If identity-bound constructions of race and ethnicity were attempts to normalise/neutralise a stable, eurocentric understanding of the individual, they were successful. Assuming that essentialised racial/ethnic understandings of
identity can 'objectively' communicate relevant information about the experiences of individuals imposes a single voice upon the multiple contexts and relationships that dynamically construct fluid, flexible, and partial subjectivities for each individual (Sodowsky, Kwan & Robbins, 1995; Davies & Harré, 1990). 'Identity' and 'self' have become concepts/constructs that constrain the dynamic and diverse expression of subjectivity and the multiple ways the self (and others) can be positioned (Caglar, 1997).

For western epistemologies identity is a key concept in understanding the individual. Common-sense knowledge enables a discourse of the self as a unitary subject with a stable identity. 'Identity' offers an understanding of an individual that is removed from the social, political and historical contexts that inform/create/constitute their realities (Domenech-Rodríguez & Wieling, 2005; Ruwhiu, 1999; Kaptchuk, 1983; Hoskins, 2000) favouring instead those positions repeatedly produced as hegemonic constructions of cultural 'others' (Kitzinger, 1989).

Kitzinger (1996) talks of construction of culture as a tokenistic inclusion when provided "in a carefully defined and contained space such that our 'inclusion' can be pointed to as justification for our systematic exclusion ... overall" (p. 120). While there is a space provided for race/ethnicity/culture to be included in (western/’neutral’) psychological practice it is assumed that cultural difference is being attended to.

Decontextualised knowledge produced through scientific research appropriates the object of its gaze (Waldegrave, 1990; Durie, M., 1997a; Morawski, 1990). The constructions of race/ethnicity/culture for those who are non-white have been imposed through criteria set by pākehā academics (Nikora & Evans, 1999). Such generalised, simplistic, and eurocentric assumptions of identity cohere around a western understanding of how an individual is constituted and subvert the expression of diverse and dynamic subjectivities

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22 Unitary self is also constructed as the liberal humanist, democratic, autonomous, rational being. All these ways of being similarly privilege a eurocentric construction of the autonomous individual self.
Chapter II: language speaks culture

(Parker, Moore & Neimeyer, 1998; Hirini, 1997; Burr, 1995; Sampson, 1990; Durie, et al, 2002). Donna Matahaere-Atariki (1998) describes this as “ethnic spectatorship” where māori women are positioned through current discourses and are “caught between the gaze that represents her and an image that is supposed to be her” (p. 74). The limitations of a monologism of truth and the political agendas privileged through silencing (resistant/counter) discourse, and how these processes function to effectively silence the voices of others, is well documented (Irigaray, 1985; Minh-ha, 1989).

Common sense texts/discourses of identity have reinforced assumptions of the subject as cohesive autonomous and unitary (Harré, 1989; Parker, 1989a, 1990a). In western mental health practice an individualistic perspective is privileged in as much as “dependency is always bad, freedom of choice is always constructive, dual relationships are unethical, privacy is universally valued, and the welfare of each individual is always more important than the welfare of the group to which that individual belongs” (Pedersen & Leong, 1997, p. 119). However, privileging the individual as the primary site for investigation often leaves the social/political/historical contexts marginalised or ignored (Littlewood, 1992; Durie, et al, 2002).

Culture-based categorisation can be so broad, flexible, and dynamic that it fails to discriminate peoples into groups/dichotomies: distinctions based on culture change as the context and culture changes. In this way, cultural measurements/understandings can disrupt the stability, salience and availability of racial/ethnic stereotypes, enabling more partial subjectivities of the self to emerge (Lee, 2005; Harré & Krausz, 1996). It can be particularly difficult to acknowledge cultural specificity when unaware of difference.

Waldegrave (1993) reflects the culturally specific sentiments of one of his samoan co-workers when asked the ‘simple’ question, ‘what do you think?’ The co-worker replies:

It’s so hard for me to answer that question. I have to think, what does my mother think, what does my grandmother think, what does my father
think, what does my uncle think, what does my sister think, what is the consensus of those thoughts—ah, that must be what I think (p. 4)

From a samoa perspective, the ontological assumptions of autonomous individuality are constructed as uncomfortable and foreign. A question which pākehā may think is quite innocuous can be interpreted by non-pākehā as unnatural and intrusive. For māori, the concept of collective responsibility can displace individualistic responsibility (Patterson, 1992). A domination of language through the imposition of a singular truth not only centralises a specific perspective, but also marginalises and illegitimises that of others (Gergen, 1994). Monologism is privileged over dialogue.

What if individuals are constituted by fragmentary conflicting subjectivities rather than a consistent and singular identity (Pihama, 1997; Morawski, 1990)? Perhaps in the context of whānau, individuals are positioned in multiple ways (not just one) and to appropriately understand the individual, these multiple positions require attention.

In the widest sense of the word, culture can represent any social grouping of people that share “intelligible forms of action and identity” (Carbaugh, 1999, p. 160). Culture includes groups based on gender, social class, sexual orientation, age, and ethnicity or location. Culture allows a single individual to take up equally valid and multiple cultural positions in different contexts (Taylor & Wetherell, 1995; Durie, et al, 2002; Carbaugh, 1999; Carbaugh, 1999). It is within a cultural group that a common sense and meaning/understanding can be shared (O’Sullivan et al, 1994; Sampson, 1993a).

“While colonialism involves the construction of Māori identity in terms of a primitivised and racialised difference, it seeks to destroy the autonomous cultural differences and distinct epistemologies of the colonised world” (Bell, 2004, p. 122). The tino rangatiratanga of māori is constituted here as undermined by unreflexive ratification of scientific epistemologies in researching race/ethnicity/culture. While māori continue to occupy only positions offered by pākehā, their tino rangatiratanga is compromised: “research on what is best for māori carried out by pākehā can only provide
solutions that remain skewed by pâkehā cultural perceptions” (Ogden & McFarlane, 1997, p. 3).

The epistemologies and methodologies of science have not easily incorporated māori views and experiences (Cunningham, 1999). Psychology and western scientific epistemologies have marginalised non-white and indigenous peoples’ world-wide (Adair, Puhan & Vohra, 1993; Lee & Armstrong, 1995; Sue & Sue, 2003; Tau, 2001; Royal, 1998; Stewart, 1997; Johnston, 1999; Durie, M., 1997a; Sampson, 1993a; Pearson, 1990).

If current constructions of race/ethnicity/culture are serving a white agenda and destroying/limiting autonomous cultural difference, how might race/ethnicity/culture be constituted differently when working to support/centralise an indigenous agenda? Ethnicity or even ‘culture’ may not be a sensible or preferable construct of māori subjectivity. Self-definition as māori, iwi, hapū, or tangata whenua may have preferable social, political, and constitutional consequences (Pool, 1991). The privileged “are blissfully unaware of the implications of what they say, of the damage that they are capable of causing” (Mikaere, 1998, p. 12).

“Māori invoke a dynamic, rather than static, cultural ‘essence’ as the basis for their claims to autonomous difference and that this ‘substantive’ difference is crucial to their assertion of full human agency” (Bell, 2004, p. 119). Privileging subjectivity means accepting “individual fragmentation, diversity, incoherence and flexibility” (Marshall & Wetherell, 1989, p. 110) and problematising the self as a unitary and complete subject (Parker, 1989b). Subjectivity is a social achievement that is constantly changing in response to changing dynamics of society and never complete/finished (Freeman, 1999; Novitz, 1989).

The deconstruction of culture involves critique, but also requires “affirmative, audacious, extensive, and intensive transformation” (Derrida, 2002, p. 74). Constructing ‘against culture’ researches the qualities and subjectivities of individuals within cultural groups to highlight the multiplicity and diversity within a distinctive cultural group (Caglar, 1997). Rather than
simplifying comparisons, ‘cultural difference’ research within culture allows the transformation of culture to enable heterogeneous and diverse subjectivities. Culturally autonomous research practices, such as those of kaupapa māori research are consistent with this approach to psychological research practice.

Māori have long been included as subjects/participants in research but have only been involved in the researching and theorising of psychology since the early 1980s (cf., Awatere, 1982). There is an absence of epistemological critique (or even acknowledgement) within empirical studies that might undermine the integrity of eurocentric constructions of other cultural understandings/epistemologies, such as that of mātāuranga māori. Including māori researchers in mainstream research can position those māori as accessories to non-reflexive eurocentric research practices and does not constitute māori research practice, nor does it necessarily enable the inclusion of alternative knowledges (Atkinson, 1993; Nikora & Evans, 1999; Cunningham, 1999). Within autonomous structures that allow the cultural, social, economic, and political integrity of indigenous processes, development can be attended to without being required to meet white needs, or be subordinated to pākehā systems of evaluation (Thomas, 1996; Stewart, 1993; Jenkins & Pihama, 2001).

Kaupapa māori research has centralised a māori cultural framework for/of research: “it must stem from a Māori world view, be based on Māori epistemology and incorporate Māori concepts, knowledge, skills, experiences, attitudes, processes, practices, customs, reo, values and beliefs” (Bevan-Brown, 1999, p. 231). This approach is not a stable, essential list of prescriptions for research, rather it enables a set of principles that are dynamically interpreted in different ways in specific research practices; kaupapa māori research is being used “to name our pain, speak out our differences and seek out our truths” (Johnston, 1999, p. 10).

Kaupapa māori research makes a political statement that enables centralisation of māori ontologies, epistemologies, and methodologies (Bishop, 1999; Hohepa & McNaughton, 1993; Sharples, 1993). This approach creates space for māori to ‘search again’ (re-search) ways of understanding that are
commensurate with a māori worldview (Jackson, 1999). As a response from the increasing number of māori people in the discipline of psychology, kaupapa māori has provided an appropriate/ethical, legitimate and productive/beneficial model for exploring māori psychology and affirming tino rangatiratanga for māori subjectivities and health aspirations (Stewart, 1997; Walker, 1996; Hoskins, 2001; Bishop, 1994; Bevan-Brown, 1999; Hohepa & McNaughton, 1993). Re-centring māori and concomitantly challenging colonial power relations, kaupapa māori practices work as counter-hegemonic and transformative practices (Hoskins, 2001; Huygens, 1999).

Māori culture is nothing if not adaptive and dynamic (Durie, E., 1998): a reference the dramatic changes in māori society in the last 150 years (Kawharu, 2003). Te Hoe Nuku Roa [THNR] is an excellent example of writing against culture and appreciating the diversity within/among māori. THNR is a longitudinal study (1993-2013) of 700 randomly selected māori households involving 1,600 māori adults and children. The study measured cultural identity as: self-identification; whakapapa; marae participation; extended whānau; whenua tipu; contacts with māori people and te reo māori (Durie, Black, Christensen, Durie, Fitzgerald, Taiapa, Tinirau & Apatu, 1996). THNR aims to quantify cultural identity, producing four different categories of identity (secure, positive, notional, and compromised) as well as exploring other generic (not māori-specific) social indicators of wellbeing (Durie, M. et al., 2002). This approach allows an exploration and depth of knowledge that is glossed over in deficit model research where māori realities were measured in terms of social, cultural, and economic indicators of health (Durie, M. et al., 1996). Components of māori identity are measured not as qualities of the self, but contextually, for example, as access to cultural, physical and social resources (Durie, M., 2001). The depth and value of information that has come out of this project not only helps to diversify understandings of being māori, but also allows theorising and greater understanding about the impact of culture upon health. For example, a secure māori identity is associated with good health outcomes, suggesting it may provide some protection from ill-
health (Durie, M. et al., 1996; Durie, M., 2001) and assist in mental health recovery (Fenton & Te Koutua, 2000). Such results may provide helpful understandings of the impact of culture on health for other ethnic/cultural groups (Sue & Sue, 2003). Unlike ‘racial identity models’ developed from American experiences of cultural difference (Cross, 1995; Helms, 1995), in THNR hierarchical organisation of the different positions is absent.

Through this process my intention has been to destabilise the power of race/ethnicity as providing a sensible explanation for inequalities present in society. Alternatively, cultural research should take care to ensure the concept/construct of culture retains enough fluidity, flexibility and partiality to enable multiple, heterogeneous interpretations of cultural identity/subjectivity. This process of deconstruction has also constructed a name for unspoken white privilege. In spite of the alleged explanatory power of race/ethnicity for the ‘cultural deficiency’ of non-white peoples, a simultaneous and equivalent appreciation of the cultural privilege of white race/ethnicity is glaringly absent. Through eurocentric definitions designed for ‘other’ cultures, white subjectivity has conveniently and neatly been silenced/ignored.

Deconstruction attends to what is constituted but also what is not. Deconstruction requires the reader/writer to question the unquestioned. While not remaining particularly unquestioned here, a significant ‘blind spot’ of research of race/ethnicity/culture is white culture and its associated privilege. Derrida suggests that the silenced margins of race/ethnicity/culture lie in the shadows of white privilege:

Derrida is a scrupulous, meticulous, patient reader, determined to disentangle what has been conflated, to bring to light what has been concealed, and to pay scrupulous attention to marginalia and footnotes, in the expectation that what has been relegated to the margins may prove paradoxically central to a less parochial understanding of the text (Howells, 1999, p. 2).
The power of the centre/hegemony is reinforced through ignoring their power/privilege and focusing on the margins (Lee, 2005). In turning the light to the margins, the focus comes to rest on the centre.

Unbearable Whiteness of Being

In spite of being on the research agenda since the mid-1980s (Johnson, 1999), the invisibility/naturalness of white culture remains pervasive. It is rare for a discussion of culture and psychology to address either the culturally specific nature of the discipline of psychology, or white (individual) privilege of western society itself. Western representations of culture would have us believe that while everyone has a culture, those of the western world have no culture (Thomas, 1993), at least not in the same way that minorities have a culture. While white people continue denying their cultural partiality, discussion around culture remains focused on the margins and white privilege is “unnamable to mutually intelligible discussion” (Shotter, 1993, p. 7).

Through remaining ignorant of the cultural differences of peoples, individuals also remain ignorant of the ways in which the structures and systems of (western) society privilege the culturally dominant (white) group. Assumptions of natural and neutral positions reinforce the invisibility of white systems in the institutions and practices of society (Sue & Sue, 2003). Processes of science naturalise scientific epistemologies and claim an apolitical position. Friere (1970/1972) spoke of the importance of conscientisation for the oppressed to understand their subordination. This process enables the majority to gain an appreciation of their power/political privilege.

A critique of racist practices requires analysis of the power relations enabled through particular language/discourse. It is necessary for these power relations to be recognised and understood before they can be changed (Parker, 1989a; Kitzinger, 1990; Sue & Sue, 2003; Nakayama & Krizek, 1999; Morawski, 1990; Wilson & Yeatman, 1995; Ivey, 1995; Evans & Paewai, 1999). While power is not the only expression of pākehā culture, it should remain in the “centre of the picture where it belongs” (Pocock, 2001, p. 50).
Racism is not just a white problem; it is a particular way of interacting that positions perpetrators and victims in unattractive and uncomfortable ways. Therapists (non-white included) may be confronted with racism in practice and be inadequately prepared to deal with it (Lee, 2005). The struggle to liberate people from this relationship involves both the oppressed and the oppressor (Friere, 1970/1972).

Where the racist voice is absent space can be created to recognise cultural diversity (Bhavnani, 1990). Equally, where there is racist voice there is restricted access to cultural diversity. For without addressing racist practice, attempts to achieve cultural pluralism will be merely cosmetic. The fluidity of racism requires attention both to function and form and necessitates fluidity in terms of forms of resistance (Ellsworth, 1989).

The language that we privilege constitutes our realities. So, if race/ethnicity/culture is considered linguistic constructions that produce a truth of race/ethnicity/culture, how might these constructions be different if dialogue around the applicability and relevance of such terms was enabled? If subjectivities are influenced by power relations (Parker, 1989b) and if the current power relations do not allow an equal dialogue around race/ethnicity/culture, how might dialogue be enabled?

The qualities of race/ethnicity/culture as qualities of the individual are understood through a eurocentric construction of the individual. This particular approach to understanding the self requires further analysis to articulate its constitution and also to understand how this type of self is imposed on non-western individuals. The following chapter provides a reading of some ways psychological discourse specifically reproduces scientific racism in/through texts that legitimate psychological practices/knowledges.
The practice of biculturalism has been a challenge for mental health professionals in Aotearoa/New Zealand for decades. International literature requires cultural safety - or at the very least sensitivity - to achieve cultural pluralism: practice that recognises and responds to cultural diversity/specificity. Bicultural dialogue for the most part struggles to have an audience with pākehā. In Royal's terms, the bicultural house is empty. Each house is being set in order. Tiriti/Treaty workshops and ‘bicultural practice’ have diverse outcomes. The potentials of biculturalism remain a lofty ideal that is seldom realised or even entertained, by many pākehā.
Chapter III: psychology as cultural practice

When individuals are unaware of their own culture and oblivious to the systems and symbols of society that reflect that culture, it is difficult to comprehend the marginalisation of others and also to foresee how things could be different. Hegemony has the privilege to disguise its power as natural, normal and inevitable (Sampson, 1993a).

The previous chapter constructed a racist scientific practice and critiqued the positioning of the white (normal) self and (different) cultural ‘other’ through scientific discourse. The work of this chapter is to analyse psychological discourse around culture primarily through two main texts: the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders [DSM] (Text Revision) (American Psychiatric Association [APA], 2000) and Code of Ethics for Psychologists Working in Aotearoa/New Zealand [Code of Ethics/Ethics] (2002). These texts inform mental health practitioners of their rights, duties, and responsibilities in regard to culture.

This chapter is written with mental health practice in mind and contains principles applicable across disciplines, including the work of psychologists, social workers, nurses, community health workers, counsellors, therapists, psychotherapists, psychiatrists, and mental health workers. In this chapter ‘practitioners’ is the preferred term for individual subjects positioned as professionals through psychological discourse because it is cross-disciplinary and explicitly orientates to practice.

The sense of unity among indigenous populations worldwide has increased through common experiences of exile, oppression, struggle, and adaptation (hooks, 1990; Smith, L., 1999). In common with other indigenous peoples, māori are “located within nation states that have formed out of their dispossession and internal colonisation” (Pearson, 1991, p. 198). The Tiriti/Treaty has been the focal point around which māori claim injustice in terms of not being treated as partners and largely through loss of whenua.

International movements, such as the American Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s, have assisted in asserting the rights of oppressed groups and have had an important impact on support for social and cultural justice and the
liberation of oppressed peoples/communities (Ruwhiu, 1999; Huygens, 2001a; Awatere, 1984). Although issues pertinent to marginalised peoples have long been identified as research needs, they remain inadequately addressed in practice (Aguirre et al., 2005). Mainstream attempts at multiculturalism have largely sustained a majority monologue (Hall, 1997).

In Aotearoa/New Zealand respect for cultural identity is legislated (see for example Mental Health [Compulsory Assessment and Treatment Act], 1992) Practitioners of the court and mental health are required to have “proper respect for the patient’s cultural and ethnic identity, language, and religious or ethical beliefs” including acknowledgement of the significance of “family, whanau, hapu, iwi .. and the contribution those ties make to the patient’s well-being” (Mental Health Act, 1992, section 5). While this legislation provides strong support for the tino rangatiratanga of peoples, it raises some important questions. What is ‘proper respect’? What is the cost for not having/getting/giving enough? The overtones of power and position are not hard to find. How common is language diversity among practitioners? Perhaps the law is “vocally active but vocationally ineffectual” (McGinnis, 1994, p. 16). Practitioners have diverse aspirations for bicultural development. There are a variety of goals for bicultural practice ranging from increasing cultural knowledge to engaging in joint ventures with māori, supporting māori staff and their experiences within mental health practice, and/or addressing the bicultural issues (Durie, M., 1995b; 1998b). However, few of these goals have been widely realised. Bicultural rhetoric/talk has masked the lack of practical support for a bicultural kaupapa. Attention to the token inclusions of māori culture have, to a certain extent, absolved pākehā of the responsibilities for more sophisticated engagement in bicultural practice. Knowing the individualising, decontextualising tendencies of the scientific view, the lack of cultural consciousness is not surprising.

**titled history: in their own words, so to speak**

This section of the chapter is provided is to construct a (partial) history of bicultural developments within Aotearoa/New Zealand centring myself as a
māori woman. Through providing a māori reading of biculturalism the focal point for the production of knowledge is changed and enables the unchallenged/silenced colonial privilege to be disrupted.

The history of bicultural relations precedes the signing of the Tiriti/Treaty in 1840 and is influenced by political, social, and academic movements: māori protest. It is difficult, if not impossible, to adequately identify all of the influences, however a light taste of the evidence provided by relevant writings is offered through using the titles of published works. Although this is inevitably partial it does provide a flavour of the diverse and influential movements of the last century for Aotearoa/New Zealand.

Early pākehā books spoke of *Maori Origins And Migrations* (Sorrenson, 1979/1993). While māori were considered indigenous, they/we were also positioned as settlers who had themselves ‘colonised’ others (King, 2003). The gendered *Māori As He Was* (Best, 1924) also supported the purity and sanctity of a traditional and essential māori culture. In more recent times looking *Behind the Tattooed Face* (Cooper, 1997) has found *Nga Matatini Māori*23 (Durie, M., 1995c). Theorising around *Māori Ethnicity* (Greenland, 1991) through *Definitions and Application* (Mako, 1999), *Voice, Authenticity and … Representation* (Matahaere-Atariki, 1998) of being māori has begun. The expressions of māoritanga have necessarily (although not completely) been exploded to encompass the diverse māori realities of society while also retaining aspirations for *Kotahitanga*24 (Cox, 1993) as *Te Iwi Māori* (Pool, 1991). *Hauora*25 (Pomare et al, 1995) remains a key theme of contemporary *Whaiora* (Durie, M., 1998) for māori who are *Dying To Be Counted* (Reid & Robson, 1999). Recent understandings of māori subjectivity have included a *Whānau Identity* (Moeke-Pickering, 1996) as a vital element of *Rapuora*26 (Murchie, 1984) in *Te Puawaitanga* (Ruwhiu, 1999) into *Te Ao Marama*27 (Royal, 1998).

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23 *Nga Matatini Māori: Diverse Māori Realities*
24 *Kotahitanga: Unity*
25 *Hauora: Health*
26 *Rapuora: Search For Health*
Biculturalism complemented ethnic equity as a political concern in the 1980s (Spoonley, 1991b). The Treaty became a focus for this political development as māori radicals provided a critique of the racism of pākehā/’New Zealand’ society (Greenland, 1991). *Recalling Aotearoa* (Fleras & Spoonley, 1999) from the *Shadows Over New Zealand* (McDonald, 1985) revealed racist practice and *Pākehā Capture* (Smith, G., 1990) of Māori Culture (Barlow, 1991/1993). *Ngā Tau Tohetohe*28 (Walker, 1987), *Ka Whawhai Tonu Mātou Ake Ake Ake*29 (Walker, 1990), and *Conflict and Compromise* (Kawharu, 2003) all spoke of māori discontent with Māori/Pākehā Relations (Tilbury, 1998) with regard to the Tiriti/Treaty and a history of colonisation. Demonstrations, protests, occupations, and marches had high-profile media coverage that was only too willing to portray aggression and impatience in māori dissidents, unfortunately devoid of the historical context that gave voice to māori and Tiriti/Treaty injustices.


The 1980s were a time for the acknowledgement of the Tiriti/Treaty: māori continued to challenge the taken-for-granted practices of ethnocentric dominance (Phillips, 2001; Belich, 2001a). The late eighties were in the shadow of the 1990 sesqui-centennial ‘celebration’ of the signing of the Tiriti/Treaty. māori protest at Waitangi on the annual ‘celebrations’ of the signing of the Tiriti/Treaty had long been problematic (Orange, 1987). Celebrating a Tiriti/Treaty systematically marginalised by a monocultural state/government

27 *Te Ao Mārama: The World of Light*
28 *Ngā Tau Tohetohe: Years of Struggle*
29 *Ka Whawhai Tonu Mātou Ake Ake Ake: Struggle Without End*
30 *Ngā Take: The Issues*
screamed tokenism and many māori (and some pākehā) were not going to be silenced on this issue of justice. Sampson (1993a) describes this as a “dialogic turn” where the monologues of the dominant group are disrupted by the voices of the previously silenced.

A number of publications have been written by pākehā for pākehā, many dealing with the challenges of the Tiriti/Treaty, pākehā cultural identity, racism, and prejudice (Yensen, Hague, & McCleanor, 1989; King, 1991b, 1999; Older, 1978; Ballara, 1986; Black, 2000; Treaty of Waitangi and/or Bicultural Issues, 1993). The Shaping of History (Binney, 2001) through telling Histories [of] Power and Loss (Sharp & McHugh, 2001) provided contexts for Mapping The Language of Racism (Wetherell & Potter, 1992) in the Land Of The Wrong White Crowd (Johnson, 2002). Understandings of history that gave voice to the Racism and Ethnicity (Spoonley, 1995b) required negotiation to claim a Pākehā Ethnicity (Spoonley, 1991b). Being Pakeha (King, 1985), became sometimes confused with a National Identity (Thomas & Nikora, 1996b). Belonging To The Land (Oliver, 1991) and the pākehā Quest For Identity (King; 1991a) contentiously culminated (for some) in claiming the status of White Native (King, 1999).

Justice and Identity (Wilson & Yeatman, 1995) were high on the agenda, not only for māori but also for Tauiwi (Spoonley, Macpherson, Pearson & Sedgwick, 1984). The 1980s were a watershed for pākehā understanding of themselves historically and culturally as pākehā (Spoonley, 1995c; Bedggood, 1997). Journeys Away From Dominance (Huygens, 2001b) and moving towards Becoming Bicultural (Ritchie, 1992) were pākehā responses to the Challenge of Postcolonialism (Spoonley, 1995a) and a re-negotiation of Justice (Sharp, 1997) in the light of An Unsettled History (Ward, 1999). Although Ngā Patai (Spoonley, Pearson & Macpherson, 1996) were being discussed, the Challenges of Culture To Psychology (Waldegrave, 1993) inevitably involved Contestation of Power And Knowledge (Walker, 1996a). The wider society had reached a point where the interested and learned public became a willing audience for a re-telling of a previously ‘laundered history’ (Phillips, 2001; Reilly, 1996). Honouring the Treaty
in the present requires reparation for the injustices of the past (Ward, 1999; Wilson & Yeatman, 1995; Pakeha Treaty Action, 1997).


The Colonisation Of Māori Knowledge (Jackson, 1999), the Abnormalisation Of Māori (Lawson-Te Aho, 1993), and Cultural Bias (McFarlane-Nathan, 1992) Inside Pākehā Psychology (Lawson-Te Aho, 1994) were enabled through the assimilationist policies of the 1960s (Herbert, 1998). It was not until 1974 that the first māori graduated with a post-graduate degree in psychology; through the 1980s māori enrolled in increasing numbers in under-graduate courses in psychology (Stewart, 1997). Increased educational achievement has enabled māori to develop their own Indigenous Psychologies (Stewart, 1995) through Kaupapa Māori Psychology (Glover & Robertson, 1997) using Mātauranga Māori As An Epistemology (Tau, 2001). māori academics Striving To Fulfil The Bicultural Commitment (Mikaere, 1998) had to work through Barriers To Research (Mutu, 1998) by Decolonising Methodologies (Smith, L., 1999) and developing the Māori Mental Health Workforce (Ponga, Maxwell-Crawford, Ihimaera & Emery, 2004) producing institutions such as A Māori and Psychology Research Unit (Nikora & Evans, 1999).

Throughout the 1980s and 1990s māori organised their own hui34 (Hēnare, 1988) and during the Decade of Māori Development (1984-1994) focus

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31 Mauriora: Dynamic Health
32 Haere Tahi Tāua: Journey of us (two) together
33 Kōkiri Ngātahi: Living Relationships
34 Such as Hui Taumata (Durie, M., 2001), Te Ara Ahu Whakamua, 1994 (Te Puni Kōkiri, 1994b); Hui Whakapumau, 1994, Te Oru Rangahau, 1999 (Te Pūmanawa Hauora, 1999), Hui Whakaoranga.
was on māori solutions for māori problems (Durie, M., 2001). Clinical mental health practice and the government health legislation developed to the point where it is possible for service provision to be underpinned by indigenous values and concepts of healing (Ponga, Maxwell-Crawford, Ihimaera & Emery, 2004). Kaupapa māori services developed significantly during this time and concomitant efforts to increase the efficacy of mainstream services have continued (Mental Health Commission, 2001).

Legislative and political movements provided guidance for bicultural developments in terms of the Tiriti/Treaty. The Labour government responded through 1984-1990 by institutionalising biculturalism and placing māori concerns “firmly on the policy agenda” (Wilson & Yeatman, 1995, p. xv). This was a watershed in terms of political support: the Tiriti/Treaty was ratified through legislation in ways never previously realised. In 1975 the Treaty of Waitangi Act created the Waitangi Tribunal. This provided māori with a forum to address transgressions of the Treaty (Wilson, 1995), and more broadly to question the New Zealand Government in regard to Tiriti/Treaty issues (Pearson, 1995). An amendment to the original act in 1984 allowed the claims to be dated back to 1840. Aspirations of equal partnership, although well represented in the Waitangi Tribunal itself, are not manifest in the government legislated processes that restrict the outcomes of Tiriti/Treaty settlements to recommendations that are not legally binding. The Tribunal has been described as an ‘illusion of partnership’ and “a body without teeth” (Poata-Smith, 1996, p. 108) because the government retains the right to veto recommendations made (Johnson, 2002).

The Tribunal facilitated a large increase in common sense Tiriti/Treaty awareness (Binney, 2001; Ballara, 1986): prior to claims being brought before the Tribunal pākehā were largely unaware of Tiriti/Treaty injustices/grievances (Renwick, 1993). Highly publicised Tribunal findings/reports did much to increase the awareness of the general public to Tiriti/Treaty issues legitimising the rights of māori and assisted in ‘shaming’ the state into action (Mulgan, 1989).
Making grievance the focus for Tiriti/Treaty issues sidelines the more potent discussion around sovereignty/tino rangatiratanga (McCreanor, 1993b). The history of the 'Treaty' has been largely constructed as a māori issue of little relevance to pākehā - except where they are involved in the ownership of 'māori land.' In 1988 the Royal Commission on Social Policy expanded the relevance of the Treaty to include social policies as well (Durie, M., 1994a; Pearson, 1990). In policy this assertion has enabled the legitimacy of pākehā dominance to be questioned, and for equivalent māori rights to tino rangatiratanga to be asserted. John Tamihere (Māori Member of Parliament) has suggested the masses are suffering from 'Treaty fatigue' (Butcher, 2003). Cementing Tiriti/Treaty issues as an attempt by māori to (re)claim resources (such as land, foreshore and seabed) has done little to increase appreciation of the Tiriti/Treaty as a constitutionally significant document relevant not only for pākehā and māori but all peoples of Aotearoa/New Zealand.

Collective understanding of Aotearoa/New Zealand as egalitarian and having the best race relations in the world, was disrupted by Springbok Tour protests in 1981 (Liu et al., 1999): “The irony of pākehā protesting about the racism of another country in the absence of any similar protest about racism in Aotearoa was obvious” (Spoonley, 1995c, p. 100) and offensive to māori. This fuelled a political/social/educational movement initially addressed through anti-racism education borrowed from America (Guy, 1986; Landermine & McAtee, 1983a, 1983b). Anti-racism education is a process of political education, commonly producing rhetoric to chastise the (white) target for being unjust, oppressive, producing responses usually of hostility, defence and counter-charge (Gergen, 2001). An increased awareness of racial issues in Aotearoa/New Zealand from both māori and pākehā and support for transforming such racist practices through educational workshops (Rankine, 1985; Thomas & Nikora, 1996; Poata-Smith, 1996) has somewhat normalised the processes of addressing these issues. Anti-racist work was replete with ‘high’ morality, righteousness, hostility and inspired racist guilt (Guy, 1986). The development in Aotearoa/New Zealand from anti-racism training/education to
'Treaty education' was a move to indigenise the information: to make it relevant to the distinct ethnic challenges of reconciling māori and pākehā in the local political dynamic.

These education processes increased the conscientisation of pākehā in response to the Tiriti/Treaty (Huygens, 2001b; Friere, 1970/1972). Anti-racism required pākehā to stand up to their colonial past, challenge/oppose the hegemony of contemporary Aotearoa/New Zealand, and bring racism into consciousness (Johnson, 2002). pākehā were challenged to view themselves as cultural beings, resulting in awkward questions and difficult uncomfortable positions (Phillips, 2001). Increasing numbers of pākehā have become aware of the injustice of Treaty transgressions, a history of colonisation, and an imposed pākehā monologue (Keene, 1988). These processes of education were understood to be a responsibility of pākehā for pākehā (King, 1999). A critique of colonisation provided the ammunition to question the continued oppression of marginalised people world-wide, and in Aotearoa/New Zealand. The content of these workshops included retelling history to legitimise māori perspectives and inspire a sense of collective responsibility to addressing racism (Huygens, 2001b) and understanding colonisation (Smith, L., 1998). Deconstructing colonial discourse was part of the move towards undermining and un-doing colonisation (Johnson, 2002). The processes of decolonisation require increased mainstream responsiveness (Levy, 1999; hooks, 1992). Aotearoa/New Zealand is unique in that “a treaty that was the instrument of colonisation has become the instrument of decolonisation” (Renwick, 1993, p. 51). “Treaty workshops” and decolonisation training opportunities have become a common and expected part of mental health practice moving towards being bicultural (Mataira, 1995).

pākehā groups were formed through commitment to a Tiriti/Treaty relationship with māori; these included the Auckland Committee on Racism and Discrimination [ACORD] (Nairn, M., 1989), Project Waitangi (Bedggood, 1997), New Perspectives on Race, and Pakeha Treaty Action (Huygens, 2001b).
Chapter III: psychology as cultural practice

models of biculturalism

By the 1990s addressing ethnic disadvantage was clearly on the government’s agenda (Spoonley, 1995c). The requirement of health services to be more responsive to māori needs culminated in a variety of bicultural structural arrangements. These displayed various levels of commitment to partnership, not all of which were/are consistent with māori aspirations of biculturalism (Durie, M., 1998b).

Mason Durie (1998b) identifies five types of structural arrangements that facilitate/resist bicultural imperatives: unmodified mainstream institution; a māori perspective; active māori involvement; parallel māori institutions; and independent māori institutions. To a large extent māori remain marginalised through these structural arrangements despite an overt commitment to bicultural agendas.

Effective māori power and influence may not be achievable from within mainstream structures therefore structural change may be required to disrupt the status quo (Smith, G., 1990; Orange, 2001). The inclusion of māori can be seriously constrained by the over-riding structures and the requirements of knowledge/practice to fit within particular boundaries. The increased awareness of colonising processes inspired māori who had previously been assimilated into western psychiatric processes to develop ‘cultural units’ within mainstream services (Chaplow, Chaplow & Maniapoto, 1993).

A marginalised māori contribution is commonly termed having a taaha māori component in the service. ‘Biculturalism’ of this type is seriously criticised (Health Funding Authority, 1999) for the lack of integration of māori services into the workings of the service and these changes having little impact on the everyday functioning of the service (Durie, M., 1997b; Pākehā Treaty Action, 1997). Incorporating tikanga māori and mātauranga māori into a service is a popular way of responding to māori health needs. The control over information

35 tikanga māori: māori protocol.
36 mātauranga māori: māori knowledge
Chapter III: psychology as cultural practice

included in taha māori should remain with māori (Huygens, 1999; Smith, G., 1990).

The sobering example of Anna Penn, a nursing student, ‘failing a hui’ and therefore failing her course is “an urban myth tailored and promoted by media to satisfy a widely held prejudice” (Frewen, 1993, August 13, p. 35). It spoke loudly and clearly of the prejudice towards mandatory cultural content in training. The cultural content of Anna Penn’s nursing course has been calculated to be only 1% of the whole course (Walker, 1996a) and does not comprise a unitary discrete part of the course: cultural information was distributed throughout the paper (Frewen, 1993, August 13). Yet the (misinformed) public outcry claimed ‘taha māori’ was being “rammed down your throat” (Fonoti, 1988, p. 8). The violence and aggression of the white backlash for only 1% taha māori is a sad indictment on a nation that claims ‘harmonious race relations’! The politics of pākehā resistance/backlash to māori tino rangatiratanga will be discussed in the prelude to the analysis.

Active māori involvement incorporates a māori perspective by having māori practitioners working within the service. This can put pressure on those few māori people who are expected to represent bicultural practice for the whole (monocultural) service, exposing themselves to racism and being culturally compromised on a daily basis (Mikaere, 1998). If the foundational (pākehā) assumptions are inflexible, māori may be compromised in their ability to provide a culturally safe service; māori perspectives may be acknowledged, but are not fully integrated into the service.

Without acknowledging power dynamics, biculturalism may continue to be defined by the dominant group to suit their own needs, while claiming to respond to the needs of the marginalised (Kelsey, 1991; Sampson, 1993a; Novitz, 1989; Huygens, 1999). Bicultural rhetoric in the context of unmodified mainstream services can work to maintain the dominant social order while appearing to be committed to the aspirations of biculturalism (Jackson, 1992). In some instances the appropriation of māori culture served to placate a critical
Strategies that are additional to the general service have been called 'add-on' strategies (Abbott, 1987; Thomas, 1993). These types of changes continue to serve the interests of the dominant group, rather than becoming integrated into the service as a whole and becoming genuinely transformative (Abbott, 1987). For example, including māori consultation at the final draft stage of a project limits māori influence to commenting on the detail rather than having an opportunity at an earlier stage of influencing the scope and direction of the project (Lammers & Nairn, 1999). Although it may be claimed māori were 'consulted' their involvement remains marginalised (Mikaere, 1998; Metge, 1995).

Token gestures are not capable, nor orientated, to making change (Johnston, 1999). Such policies do not address issues of power, and preserve (rather than challenge) the power of pākehā (MacKay, 1995). One partner (the government) controls the resources (government funds) and that partner also controls legitimate versions of biculturalism.

Parallel māori institutions have the same overall aims as their equivalent mainstream services, but employ different means to achieve those ends (Durie, M., 1998b). For example, in 1986 the Women's Refuge created two parallel streams of their organisation (Huygens, 2001a) allowing māori a certain degree of autonomy in their processes.

While māori integrity and strength can be consolidated through separatism, at a structural level the separation of the two services (either physically or philosophically) does not completely guarantee māori autonomy over practice. If the māori 'stream' is subsumed within a larger mainstream service, the basic procedures and lines of accountability may remain eurocentric and constrain māori practice. Hence these types of services should not uncritically be assumed to represent autonomous māori desires (Orange, 2001).

Independent māori institutions are services that are independent of other mainstream services, they have more autonomy, independence from the
paternalism of the state and are able to centralise māori cultural practices (Smith, G., 1990). They are commonly also called ‘kaupapa māori services’ a definition that may be applied to a variety of services; in its simplest form it means “by māori for māori” (Ruwhiu, 1999). These types of services exist independently of equivalent pākehā services. They receive their funding directly from the Government and generally have a kaupapa māori foundation. This approach was pioneered in the mid-1980s (Durie, M., 1994a; Rankine, 1986) and has been strongly supported by māori. māori sovereigntists, such as Ngā Tamatoa, “emphasised the goal of Māori self-determination, or the capacity for Māori to define their own goals and to develop their own separate organisations and institutions” (Poata-Smith, 1996, p. 102).

These types of services can provide a safe environment for exploring issues of culture without requiring justification (Nikora & Robertson, 1995). They offer an alternative to that of mainstream, but in and of themselves they do not require the transformation of mainstream services. The epistemological challenges offered by māori remain unanswered by the mainstream. Within kaupapa māori models pākehā/non-māori may work collaboratively with māori within a kaupapa māori framework (Nikora & Evans, 1999).

‘Kaupapa Māori’ as a political movement developed as autonomous ventures, where the integrity of kaupapa māori processes could not be compromised by pākehā systems and processes. Since 1993 there has been marked increase in the number of māori mental health service providers. In 1989 there were no māori services independent of the Area Health Boards, by 1995 there were twenty-three kaupapa māori services, four years later there were approximately ninety-five māori mental health services (National Mental Health Workforce Development Coordinating Committee [NMHWDCCC], 1999) and by the year 2000 another 30 providers had been contracted to provide māori mental health services (Mental Health Commission, 2001). The practices of mental health, whether māori services or mainstream, are guided/defined by the international/American model that is universally applied to diverse cultural populations, otherwise known as the DSM.
The DSM is widely used in the mental health services of Aotearoa/New Zealand as a standardised diagnostic tool (Ministry of Health, 1995a). The DSM is a pre-eminent source of mental health/disorder knowledge used internationally and applied to peoples of many cultures. It is useful to attend to the constructions of culture that are held within the DSM to question how they enable or constrain possibilities for biculturalism within psychological practice in Aotearoa/New Zealand.

(inadequately) disclaiming eurocentrism

There are a number of ways that cultural considerations are ‘included’ in the fourth (text revised) edition of the DSM (APA, 2000); the cultural specificity of the practitioner/practice/science/epistemology is not one of them. The realism of the western medical model includes/excludes cultural pluralism, especially in terms of wairua.

Mason Durie’s Te Whare Tapawha model of health was popularised in the 1980s and has remained a common and obliging representation of the cultural difference of māori. Even health that is explicitly wholistic is not safe from western reduction/appropriation. The focus of discussion turns to one of the dimensions, the omnipresent force: wairua.

The western medical model is not able to measure, observe, standardise, and control wairua. Wairua is largely ignored or included only in the margins. Wairua could be understood as life force, similar to the greek word ‘psyche’ meaning life force/soul/being. Ironically the psyche of psychology is largely neglected.

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37 Te Whare Tapawha: the four-sided house
38 Te Whare Tapawha was published at the same time as another model of health: the marae model. The former is commonly reduced to four discrete dimensions. The latter is more resistant to being dismantled/reduced to ‘measurable’ components.
39 The alternative term, holistic, is avoided here for the focus is on the whole rather than the holy (see Cunningham, 1999).
40 Psyche is the root word for psychology.
Psychological disciplines, such as clinical psychology, “remains very much a white science and profession” (Myers, 1993, p. 45-46). In the six years between the last two editions of the DSM (APA, 1994; 2000) there have been no cultural changes to the text: the information is the same, word for word. This suggests a cultural complacency that is not warranted given the DSM’s current (poor) representation of culture.

Cultural beliefs have an impact on diagnosis (Ministry of Health, 1997a; Sachdev, 1990b). Diagnosis and treatment must include the context and environment of the ‘affected individual’ to ensure cultural accuracy (Jovanovski, 1995). The introduction of the DSM clearly identifies the importance of understanding culture as a normalising “frame of reference” for the behaviour of culturally different clients41 (APA, 2000, p. xxxiv). The potent question, ‘culturally different from whom?’ remains unaddressed and white practitioners are supported in thinking of ‘culture’ as a quality of those who are not white.

Within the main text the prevalence and incidence rates for the various disorders are provided for the ‘different’/indigenous/non-white cultural groups. The cultural formulation for the presenting problem is missing information that could be useful to accurately assess and promote appropriate treatment, effectively marginalising relevant information.

A brief outline for ‘cultural formulation’ is included in the ninth appendix. If a practitioner were to assess a culturally difficult/’different’ person presenting with psychotic symptoms that appear to be schizophrenia, the criteria for schizophrenia does not warn the practitioner to check the ninth appendix to divert potential misdiagnoses.

Also included in the ninth appendix is a list of “culturally-bound syndromes” that contain a paragraph description each. The notion of culture-bound infers conditions that are specific to a particular culture. These ‘syndromes’ are specific to nations not cultures.

41 While ‘client’ is not a preferred term, it is used throughout this section to maintain consistency with DSM conventions.
“Acculturation Problem” is included under “Additional Conditions that may be a Focus of Clinical Attention” and has a one sentence explanation: “This category can be used when the focus of clinical attention is a problem involving adjustment to a different culture (e.g., following migration)” (APA, 2000, p. 741). Certainly an appreciation of acculturative stress would avoid culturally adaptive behaviour being diagnosed as pathological (Choney, Berryhill-Paapke, & Robbins, 1995). However, the ‘problem’ (of culture/acculturation) is included in the margins and cross-referencing with other diagnoses is absent. Racism as a disorder is conspicuously absent in the various diagnoses (Lee, 2005).

The cultural inclusions/disclaimers of the DSM are proposed to enhance the applicability of the DSM across culturally plural populations (Sodowsky, Kwan & Pannu, 1995). They contain no recommendations for assessment, no list of presenting features, no prognosis or treatment options (western or otherwise). This is concerning because it delimits the scope of inclusion, degrades the quality of cultural information and continues masking eurocentrims within the main text of the DSM.

The culturally-bound information is not cited/referenced and therefore not attributed to any group/person/evidence, and not associated with empirically sound academic knowledge accessed through research. Who formulated these ‘syndromes’ and upon what knowledge/s were they based? Do they comprise a sensible ‘disorder’ in their reference culture? Are these syndromes empirically supported through western research? Perhaps these ‘culturally bound’ syndromes are white appropriations (Panikkar, 2005). It raises the question of how syndromes/problems come to be included or excluded from the DSM.

Culturally bound syndromes are defined through a western epistemology of mental illness/disorder and fail to consider the economic, social, political, and spiritual dimensions of illness situations (Koss-Chioino & Canive, 1993; Campinha-Bacote, 1992). Restricted dimensions of health

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42 There are also issues of cultural intellectual property rights, noted here but not discussed in detail.
facilitate, abnormalise, pathologise, and ineffectively treat culturally ‘normal’ behaviour. Western treatments could also be inappropriate and ineffective (Koss-Chioino & Canive, 1993; Campinha-Bacote, 1992), in the worst case scenario leading to death (for example voodoo death, Campinha-Bacote, 1992). Within the medical model there are only confined spaces provided for other/non-white/different peoples and these spaces effectively subvert other epistemologies, and marginalise other peoples.

The ‘Mexican-American’ concept of verguenza is excluded, despite being long recognised as a culturally specific concern (Domínguez-Ybarra & Garrison, 1977). There have been contentious suggestions that ‘Post-Colonial Traumatic Stress Disorder’ should also be included (Turia, 2000). The criteria for being included on the list of culturally bound syndromes or being considered a fully fledged ‘disorder’ is not transparent. It does not appear to be a priority to develop the cultural knowledge since there have been no changes to cultural inclusions in the six years since the previous edition (APA, 1994).

There is a lack of integration of culturally specific material with the main text, a lack of empirical validation for application to culturally diverse populations, an assumption of universal and primary application of western epistemology in terms of clinical formulation, highly limited understandings of culturally specific ‘syndromes’/‘problems’ and lack of acknowledgement of eurocentrism throughout theory and practice. There is little information within the diagnostic criteria for addressing cultural difference in presentation. One should be cautious to avoid “seeing Western diagnostic categories as value-free patterns to be sought in non-Western societies, rather than as explanatory models specific to a Western context” (Lucas & Barrett, 1995, p. 316).

Schizophrenia as a disorder with claimed universal relevance has not been empirically demonstrated (Thakker & Ward, 1998). For māori, schizophrenia can be a mis-diagnosis of mate māori43, pathologising a normal experience (Te Puni Kokiri, 1996; Sachdev, 1989b; Ramsden, 1990b;

43 Mate māori: health concerns generally of a spiritual quality requiring the interventions of tohunga/traditional healers.
Cherrington, 1994; Mason, Johnston & Crowe, 1996; Durie, M., 2001; Stewart, 1997; Ministry of Health, 1995a).

What people call mental illness is what we call wairangi or poorangi, which means existing in another worldly way. A psychiatrist from Switzerland will believe I'm hearing voices and have schizophrenic tendencies, but to a Māori I'm hearing my tupuna talk to me (Fenton & Te Koutua, 2000, p. 15).

Western knowledges have produced these disorders and have defined wairua in terms sensible to western systems (Lawson-Te Aho, 1993) that are afflicted with "academic myopia and monocultural smugness" (Jackson, 1988, p. 45).

It is possible that diagnoses of universal/transcultural relevance exist. However, according to the DSM itself, the "utility and credibility of DSM-IV require that it ... be supported by an extensive empirical foundation" (APA, 2000, p. xxiii). The application of the DSM and other western psychological measurements to a culturally pluralistic population is not supported by empirical evidence (Thakker & Ward, 1998; Padilla & Medina, 1996; Ogden & McFarlane-Nathan, 1997).

While there have been significant developments in North America the cultural, political, social and national relationships are very distinct from Aotearoa/New Zealand. At the very least, North Americans are not subjects of the Tiriti/Treaty of Waitangi. Although there are historical commonalities across indigenous populations that have been colonised, it is important to privilege the specific history/politics/relationship in Aotearoa/New Zealand with their own stories (McFarlane-Nathan, 1992). At this point, while acknowledging the contribution of American writers on 'people of color' the focus returns to the cultural specifics of Aotearoa/New Zealand and the local ethical code.
Ethics provide powerful discursive resources for constructing the moral, social and cultural values of society (Te Rōpu Rangahau Hauora Māori O Ngai Tahu, 1999). The Code of Ethics for Psychologists Working in Aotearoa/New Zealand (2002) provides principles to guide psychologists’ practice. Moral and legal standards such as ethics are not immune to cultural biases: they can be ethnocentric/culturally encapsulated (Huygens, 1999; Durie, A., 1999). Through documents such as these, the implicit moral standards of society are made explicit. Explicit assumptions can be examined with regard to relevance for other cultures (Pedersen & Leong, 1997). They are intended to unify/standardise the ethicality of the profession, and (whether intended or not, they function to) reinforce hegemonic presence (Pedersen, 1997). “Moral values are not only discursively produced, they play a more or less direct role in legitimating or challenging institutional and other social practices” (Jordan & Weedon, 1995, p. 550).

Ethics provide principles and codes that can guide the practice and development of psychologists. Ethical principles and values are more flexible than ‘rules’ and can be more fluidly interpreted for each specific case (Durie, E., 1998). Ethical principles are broad and raise numerous questions regarding interpretation of concepts and implications for practice. Although codes of ethics require particular consistency and highlight universal principles, there must also be scope for the unique cultural differences among (as well as between) groups (Hall, 1997). Principles can be so general as to have no meaning, functioning to avoid controversy rather than providing sound guidance for practice (Pedersen, 1995).

The Code of Ethics organises information into four levels: ethical principles; value statements; practice implications; and comments. While information included at the ‘lower’ two levels is not comprehensive, it does promote a particular interpretation of the principles and values at the level of pragmatics. A ‘Declaration’ in the preamble of the Code of Ethics briefly suggests an overall directive: Psychologists should give “due regard for New...
Zealand's cultural diversity and in particular for the provisions of, and the spirit and intent of, the Treaty of Waitangi" [emphasis added] (Ethics, 2002, p. 2).

The Declaration constructs the relevance of the Tiriti/Treaty as appreciation of cultural diversity: this disregards its constitutional importance and excludes critique of bicultural relationships that fall short of equal partnership.

'Due regard' for the Tiriti/Treaty can be understood provisionally, spiritually and/or intentionally. Each of these understandings can produce radically different principles for practice. The provisions of the Tiriti/Treaty require knowledge of the texts of the Tiriti/Treaty and talk of tino rangatiratanga, taonga, and oritetanga. The spirit of the Tiriti/Treaty suggests partnership and mutual respect. The intention of the Tiriti/Treaty differs depending on whether you mean the intentions of colonial forebears; that of rangatira; or contemporary intentions as tangata tiriti. 'Due regard' to all of these interpretations can lead to confusion, inaction, or ignorance, depending on the level of familiarity with the document and available discourses enabling particular discussions. The Code talks about the "Treaty" as "the basis for respect" (Ethics, 2002, p. 3), as "a framework for responsible caring" (p. 12), "a framework for integrity in relationships" (p. 19) and a "foundation document of social justice" (p. 22). Such broad principles, while open to multiple interpretations, provide inadequate discussion of issues relevant for pragmatic ethical practice.

Consider also that the Tiriti/Treaty is represented throughout the entire document as "the Treaty of Waitangi" yet it is claimed that "Te Tiriti o Waitangi is given priority as the text that was offered and signed by the majority of the Maori signatories" (Ethics, 2002, p. 4). "Te Tiriti" is mentioned at the level of 'comments' while the three higher levels - 'principles,' 'value statements' and 'practice implications' - and the opening 'declaration'
exclusively refer to “the Treaty of Waitangi.” There is no mention of the versions or texts, nor any discussion around ambiguities/inconsistencies.

The only (english) words or rather ‘principles’ used to interpret the Tiriti/Treaty are not of either text: “the principles of protection, participation, and partnership” (Ethics, 2002, p. 4). The construction of these principles has been a careful process of government appropriation of the Tiriti/Treaty without dialogue with a partner, and negotiation of these principles has not included māori, protection of māori language/constructs/meanings, or a significant commitment to partnership beyond paternalistic ‘protection.’ What type of ‘regard’ claims the māori text is prioritised while failing to give voice/words in the text of the ethics to those self same provisions?

As long as the Tiriti/Treaty continues to be silenced in this way the processes of māori inclusion will continue to fall short of māori expectations (Te Rōpu Rangahau Hauora Māori O Ngai Tahu, 1999). Further development of the Tiriti/Treaty ethics is required to avoid tokenism. Tokenism is practice that might be seen to be responding to cultural diversity at face value, but ostensibly works to strengthen the hegemony of pākehā ideology (Waldegrave, T., 1996). Culturally responsive services should be explicitly aware of their impact on māori, and should reflect the principles of the Tiriti/Treaty (Sorrenson, 1996). Prior to, and regardless of Treaty provisions, māori have a right to be māori (Durie, M., 1997a).

‘Due regard’ for cultural diversity is also problematic. The code talks of “recognition that there are differences among persons associated with their culture, nationality, ethnicity, colour, race, religion, gender, marital status, sexual orientation...Such differences are an integral part of the person” [emphasis added] (Ethics, 2002, p. 3). It appears that the “longer the list the more culturally sensitive the standard” (Pedersen, 1995, p. 44). These integral parts of a person are surprisingly a smaller list when it comes to the cultural specificity of the practitioner. It has long been recognised that what is normal in one culture may be deemed abnormal in other and that western ideals may be
mistaken for universal ideals through eurocentric practice (cf., Wittkower & Fried, 1959).

Although ‘pākehā’ is not widely accepted as a culture or an ethnicity, it is difficult to deny it as a colour (white) or a race (Aryan/Anglo-Saxon). In spite of being the largest cultural/ethnic/coloured/racial group in Aotearoa/New Zealand, pākehā/white peoples are not specifically mentioned at all throughout the whole document. In terms of recognising the potential for discrimination, of vital importance is enabling the majority to recognise their own cultural distinctiveness.

The Code only recognises “the two peoples, tangata whenua (those who are Māori) and those who are not Māori” [emphasis added] (Ethics, 2002, p. 12). This binary is blatant and unrepentant: while I must admire that such dichotomising language is not disguised or cloaked, and that the primacy of māori as indigenous “tangata whenua” is mentioned first I am also concerned about how this construction disguises and cloaks pākehā privilege within the category of ‘other’. While this dichotomy does inhere a (mutually exclusive) identity of māori and pākehā, the ‘not-māori’ category does not constitute a group or a community (Pearson, 1989) and therefore cannot be used to explore pākehā cultural specificity. We have not yet reached a point where “being white” is just another culture category: white remains privileged even when its privilege is unspoken (Dyer, 1997).

Leaving the majority un-named does not address pākehā power: it remains disguised as ‘normal’/’natural’. While these cultural specificities may be apparent for those of white denomination, for those of difference, the ‘subaltern’ being ‘normal’ means something different. Disempowerment of pākehā is likely to be ineffectual without adequate cultural analysis of structures and practices.

Rather than appreciating diversity, dichotomies suggest assimilation of difference. While the conditions of the Tiriti/Treaty for a multicultural society (not just māori and pākehā) require serious, thoughtful, and sustained
discussion, there is nothing in the Tiriti/Treaty (provisions, intent, or spirit) to require such dichotomising.

This cultural dichotomy also obscures/obfuscates the distinctiveness, importance, and relevance of pākehā subjectivity, and ignores the rights, duties and obligations of pākehā as a specific collection of peoples in Aotearoa/New Zealand.

This appears to contravene the value of cultural distinctiveness: “Psychologists seek to maintain an awareness of how their own experiences, attitudes, culture, [nationality, ethnicity, colour, race, religion, gender,] beliefs, values, social context, individual differences and stresses, influence their interactions with others, and integrate this awareness into all aspects of their work” (Ethics, 2002, p. 16).

One implication of the value of cultural distinctiveness is that pākehā are required to have a critical appreciation of their own beliefs and values, including multiple and various practices that support racism (Rankine, 1985; Roger & White, 1997; Soong, 1993). Self-awareness is a pre-requisite for increasing the effectiveness of cross-cultural work (Sue, Ivey & Pedersen, 1996). Cultural awareness that remains focused on others ignoring the self is amenable to racist practice. For pākehā, to recognise their cultural specificity is a minimal requirement (Hirini & Nairn, 1996). Cultural training must extend beyond the circumspect provision of cultural knowledge and incorporate the student intimately (Parker, Moore & Neimeyer, 1998; Soong, 1993).

It seems contradictory for a code that is non-reflexive and disengaged with discussions of eurocentrism, to require cultural consciousness from practitioners. Cultural pluralism requires white cultural consciousness to be present both in individual practice and in the wider systems of the discipline of psychology (Cayleff, 1986; Pedersen, 1997). “For any ethical standard to work, the basic underlying philosophical assumptions must be identified, challenged, and clarified so that counselors will be more intentional in their ethical decisions” (Pedersen, 1995, p. 47). This transparency is lacking in the Code, instead requiring critique from culturally enmeshed/embedded practitioners.
Acknowledging māori as the “indigenous people” (Ethics, 2002, p. 3) has the veneer of respecting the rights, duties, and obligations of indigenous peoples. There have been dramatic advancements among indigenous peoples worldwide, for example the assertion of indigenous intellectual property rights, some of which may be relevant for ethical practice, but none of which are given voice through this document. Racism thrives in the silence of guilt. The dignity/integrity of indigenous peoples may be honoured through acknowledging self claimed rights such as those in the Mataatua Declaration on Cultural and Intellectual Property Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Sub-commission of Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 1993). The various international and local governments have come to acknowledge the intellectual property rights of indigenous peoples (Te Puni Kokiri, 1994a; Durie, M., 2003). The ethics are likely to disregard/misunderstand ‘indigenous’ positions without knowledge of indigenous rights.

While māori are acknowledged as the indigenous peoples of Aotearoa/New Zealand, te reo māori is not included where appropriate, and so the acknowledgement lacks the substance of the language that speaks culture. For example, in talking about “the dignity of persons and peoples” (Ethics, 2002, p. 3) and also incorporating safety and mutuality of relationships, an appropriate alternative/supplement could be the māori concept of mana tangata (cf., Durie, A., 1999). If the indigenous peoples of Aotearoa/New Zealand are honoured, should not also their language be spoken/written?

“Non-discrimination” requires that practitioners “seek to avoid, or refuse to participate in, practises that are disrespectful of the cultural, legal, civil, or moral rights of others and/or practises with any form of discrimination” (Ethics, 2002, p. 4). Fenton and Te Koutua (2000), advocate for zero tolerance of discrimination within mental health practices in Aotearoa/New Zealand. If this includes zero tolerance for the impact of colonisation as spiritual deprivation (Glover, 1993), why are these concerns not discussed in detail, or even in general? The issues of unintentional racism/discrimination are not mentioned explicitly (Pedersen, 1995) but should
Chapter III: psychology as cultural practice

at least be brought to the attention of unsuspecting practitioners. There are no warnings against stereotyping and the negative impact these have on the dignity of the person (Casas, Ponterotto & Guiterrez, 1986). These forms of discrimination can lie beneath the level of awareness for practitioners and for tangata whaiora. Naming the processes is an important and potent step in addressing these relationships of oppression (Smith, L., 1999). The ultimate goal is cultural understanding and respect (Ritchie, 1993). Moving culture to the centre of the client’s case conceptualisation offers healthy liberation and help for tangata whaiora (Cardona, Wampler & Busby, 2005). Using the client’s language is important (Evans & Paewai, 1999). Language that translates/transforms racism into discrimination silences the screams of racism.

Does the application of a psychological test that fails to attend to the linguistic and cultural distinctiveness of the individual fall under this ethical obligation? Bias has been recognised for non-white americans in the application of psychological tests (Padilla & Medina, 1996). I/i imagine the same critique could be supported not only for māori, but also for pākehā in this respect. While the immense task of standardising tests for an Aotearoa/New Zealand context may be beyond the influence of a single practitioner, this does not preclude a thorough discussion of the issues and limitations of psychological testing, including making a decision regarding the appropriateness of using such assessment tools (Padilla & Medina, 1996). Cultural assessment procedures and māori specific mental health outcomes have been developed (Kingi & Durie, 1997; Mental Health Commission, 2001). While these may attend to the māori specific elements of concern, they do not challenge the epistemological imperialism of psychology.

In spite of therapist responsibility for prejudice being noted over two decades ago (Acosta, Yamamoto, Evans & Wilcox, 1982) prejudice and racism remain painfully absent from explicit reference in the psychologist’s code of conduct and attention to cultural difference and racism remains poor (Te Whaiti, 1997; Lee, 2005).
Intervention in non-discrimination includes addressing "structures or policies of society" that compromise "the principles of respect for the dignity of peoples, responsible, caring and integrity in relationships. Where these inconsistencies are identified, psychologists advocate for change in these structures and policies" (Ethics, 2002, p. 23). When tokenism is present in board meetings, when cultural information is appropriated, when cultural advisors are exploited, when psychological testing norms/evaluates māori according to american data, advocacy from psychologists is expected.

What if the systems that are oppressive reside within the practitioner? What if respecting the cultural reality of another requires of a white practitioner a suspension of white cultural judgement/power (Medland, 1988). In therapy, commitment to open dialogue and surrendering the 'therapist-as-expert' position can practically illustrate to the client the therapist’s desire to value and respect the client over their self-interest in feeling secure and competent (Aguirre, Bermúdez, Cardona, Zamora & Reyes, 2005). Some have claimed that dialogue is impossible until partners are of equal status, and while the society remains unjust, there can be no hope of dialogue (Ellsworth, 1989).

Affirmative action toward social justice may require further explanation in order to be understood in terms of implications for practice especially when training/education does not adequately prepare practitioners for such interventions (Ibrahim & Arrendondo, 1986). The relationship of the colonial with the post-colonial infers a change in processes and challenges the legitimacy of the colonial view (Liu et al., 1999; During, 1985; Johnson, 2002). The first step in this process is the naming of the phenomenon. While the government have acknowledged the negative impact of colonisation on contemporary māori society (Ministry of Health, 1995a), the processes, and impacts of colonisation remain silenced through the more generic reference to 'discrimination.'

The principle of social justice and responsibility to society is "about addressing and challenging unjust societal norms and behaviours that disempower people at all levels of interaction" (Ethics, 2002, p. 22).
Does this include the power of the clinician in the therapy situation? Ethically the therapist is constructed as having more power and influence on the therapeutic relationship (Acosta et al., 1982; Ivey, 1995), the onus remains with the professional (Berman, 1979). For example,

A person’s cultural esteem and mental well-being are linked and are in turn affected by the wider social perceptions of that culture’s worth. Entrenched ideas of cultural superiority may deliberately or unwittingly demean another culture and hence a person’s perception of his or her worth and the worth of his or her heritage (Jackson, 1988, p. 47).

How are psychologists expected to respond to this challenge when their training does not provide the skills to address these macro-level interactions? This requires pākehā to be able to recognise the limitations of their own practice and the appropriateness of engaging the assistance of māori professionals (Roger & White, 1997) and with māori healing modalities (Ministry of Health, 1995b). The development of skills and practices is necessary but not sufficient to achieve cultural safety.

Psychologists are required to provide only those services for which they have competence “based on their education, training, supervised experience, or appropriate professional experience” relying on “scientifically and professionally derived knowledge” to justify their professional practice “in the light of current psychological knowledge and standards of practice” (Ethics, 2002, p. 15). These systems of knowledge are predominantly eurocentric and seldom critiqued by pākehā. The eurocentrism of science and psychology is not cautioned against, neither is the practitioner warned of the dearth of scientific information for nonwhite populations. Where do indigenous knowledges that defy scientific ratification fit within this notion of competence? Would ‘professionally derived knowledge’ include consultation with kaumatua or knowledge of poetry, songs, legends, proverbs, idioms, and forms of speech making (Durie, E., 1999)? Who judges the level of competence of the practitioner? How does one question ‘competence’ when education, training, experience, and scientific and professional knowledges inadequately
address/teach/realise cultural safety? Practitioners should be active and self-critical (Monk & Drewery, 1994). For those of the mainstream this means being aware of the need to address cultural diversity, to examine the culture of the self, and to increase knowledge of other (Roger & White, 1997). Practitioners should know the limitations of their training and skills (Robertson, Futterman-Collier, Selman, Adamson, Todd, Deering & Huriwai, 2001).

Culturally responsive practice is a complex negotiation (Sodowsky, Kwan & Pannu, 1995). There is a need for clinicians to not only improve their skills in different areas of expertise, but also to appreciate the social and political context of those interactions and to be sensitive to the impacts upon māori (Metge, 1995). Psychological practice remains politicised whether people are aware of the social power relations or not.

The knowledge and skills to respond appropriately to/in a specific culture, and flexibility of response, is necessary to ensure cultural safety. Sue and Sue (2003) provide three aspirations for culturally competent therapists: becoming aware of own cultural assumptions; actively attempting to increase knowledge about the worldview of culturally different clients; and actively developing intervention strategies and skills for working with culturally different clients.

Those who fail to provide culturally safe or culturally competent practice are not conforming to accepted standards of practice. If māori assessments of health were indeed incorporated into practice, the ‘mental’ could not be engaged with independently of the ‘spiritual.’ Therefore, interventions that addressed the mental state, while ignoring the spiritual could be thought of as not achieving the goal of cultural safety, in spite of western ‘mental’/‘physical’ measures suggesting success (Durie, M., 2003).

Knowledge of the other is insufficient alone. Various writers have called for training to cover racist practices, cultural self consciousness, direct experience of and respect for cultural difference, and achievement of cultural competence in practice (Sue, 1990; Glynn & Bishop, 1995; Hirini, 1997; Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Weinrach & Thomas, 1998; Cardona, Wampler, & Busby, 2005).
The development of active skills and attention to culturally different expressions is also critical (Berman, 1979). "If psychology is to fulfil its avowed role of benefiting humankind, the doors should be opened to multiplicity in perspective. Rather than singing the same old refrain decade after decade (albeit in different words), a premium should be placed on new songs" (Gergen, 1989, p. 79-80). Legitimate psychological practice must enable legitimacy for the diversity of voices present in society (Sampson, 1993b).

While I/i abhor the limitations of prescription to reify essential cultural 'difference' I/i also think it is useful at this point to consider how cultural 'difference' may be constructed through pākehā practice. In looking to māori scholars for partial and incomplete suggestions, the scope of cultural interventions very quickly becomes boundless.

Cultural intentionality refers to the agency of the individual in acknowledging the cultural specificity of the self and others (Nejedlo, 1993), encompassing conscious awareness and also the impact of individual agency in these relationships. Without adequate communication collaborative dialogue could be compromised as practitioners mis-understand, mis-diagnose and mis-treat. McFarlane-Nathan (1994) calls this "contextual illiteracy" (p. 16). For professionals, having knowledge of some fundamental māori concepts such as Ranginui and Papatūānuku, Io-matua-kore, whakapapa, wairua, mauri, pūrakau can assist in working with māori (Ministry of Health, 1995b). These concepts are not easily learnt through western education methods (Ohlson, 1993). The knowledges to which these terms are connected, are of the heart and of the spirit, experienced through relationships and life while remaining resistant to intellectual/mind understanding (Iseke-Barnes, 2003; Crow Dog, 1990). Marae-based hui have become a more common part of cultural safety programs and provide valuable knowledge and tacit experiences in engaging with māori culture, useful for enhancing cultural competence with māori (Everts, 1988). White privilege seldom acknowledges unknowability (Ellsworth, 1989). māori epistemology assumes that not all knowledge is publicly accessible (Cram, 1997; Smith, L., 1999; Jones, A., 2001; Durie, E., 1999; Bevan-Brown,
Some knowledges contain such awesome and dangerous mana that only a restricted group know about, let alone gain safe access to them (Mikaere, 1998; Metge, 1995). The relationship of this knowledge with the holders is one of kaitiakitanga and such information is not generalised beyond or applied to that which is irrelevant (Metge, 1995). In therapy, the inclusion of the dominant language of bilingual individuals allows access to a deeper level of emotion (Aguirre, Bermúdez, Cardona, Zamora & Reyes, 2005). It can also indicate privileging māori epistemologies (Bishop, 1999). Consider the difference for a māori client when they are legitimised in using their own language to describe their experience, for example wairua, mauri, whakama. Talking of mate māori or mauri in their English equivalents/approximations is problematic: it assumes western interpretations are adequate, and does not privilege nor even acknowledge understanding of māori epistemologies (Durie, M., 1998a; 2001; Ramsden, 1990b). Irigaray (1985) describes the limitations of monolingual discourse as “their words, the gag on our lips” (p. 212).

If the production of knowledge for/about māori people’s is considered a taonga and guaranteed protection by the Tiriti/Treaty (Cunningham, 1999), and the imposition of scientific ratification is recognised as compromising māori knowledge, what could a scientifically trained psychologist do? If the construction of the other is inevitably linked to the construction of the self what does it say when the construction of the other is separate and distinct from the (un-)construction of the self?

Responsible care in relation with māori extends beyond the dyad of therapy into the peoples of society, and beyond:

Māori collective responsibility extends beyond the family, beyond the tribe, beyond the Māori race, beyond the human race: it extends to all living things, it extends to the lands and the waters of the earth, it extends to Earth and Sky themselves. When we begin to understand this, we begin to understand Māori ethics (Patterson, 1992, p. 24).

Research ethics now require any research on māori communities, or with māori individuals to have accountability to māori participants and
communities (Johnston, 1998). This may require different/modified ethical standards for kaupapa māori services.

Recognising “vulnerability” requires provision of “responsible care to individuals and groups who may be disadvantaged and/or oppressed” in recognising this vulnerability psychologists take “appropriate action in relation to this” (Ethics, 2002, p. 16). How do psychologists provide “responsible care”? Responsible to whom? Responsible for what? Is paternalism responsible care? Does this cover paternalistic care of white therapist with/for/on their ‘native’ patient? Mental health practitioners need to ensure that those services are helpful, but also that those services are safe.

Acknowledging the power of the pākehā practitioner assists in moving towards a relationship with māori that includes “transformative accountability” that is, requiring pākehā practitioners to be accountable to māori authorities (Huygens, 1999).

How might psychologists respond to “groups” that might be “disadvantaged and/or oppressed” when their training does not provide the tools to address societal issues? How can this ethical value be supported when the discipline itself is implicated in oppressive and colonising processes?

Through “sensitivity to diversity” (Ethics, 2002, p. 5) is perhaps the strongest example of cultural responsiveness in the Code: “Psychologists seek to be responsive to cultural and social diversity and, as a consequence, obtain training, experience, and advice to ensure competent and culturally safe service or research” (Ethics, 2002, p. 5). What are the implications of reacting ‘responsibly’ to māori experiences of wairua when they contradict psychological norms? In these situations is the responsibility of the clinician to māori cultural integrity (with little scientific validation), or to the integrity of psychological epistemology (with much scientific protection)? And how would one negotiate between the two?

Although ethics clearly require cultural intentionality from the health practitioner, how this might be negotiated and constructed in the context of the therapeutic relationship remains the responsibility and initiative of the
individual practitioner (Arredondo-Doowd & Gonsalves, 1980). While the Ethics code clearly promotes cultural sensitivities, the actualisation of these ideals remains individualistic. The training has diversified somewhat, but remains silent (as does the DSM and Ethics) on issues of racism, how racist practice presents, and what to do in addressing it. Ineffectual responses to racist practice in therapy can work to align the (non-white) therapist with the perpetrator of racism (client) for the ‘neutrality’ of no response, positions the practitioner in “silent collusion” and they feel the “weight of carrying this pain” (Lee, 2005, p. 92). Therapists are inadequately prepared through their training to address this painful silence (Ali, Flojo, Chronister, Hayashino, Smiling, Torres, & McWhirter, 2005).

**training limitations**

Training for mental health professionals has long been criticised for being monocultural (Durie, M., 1985; Abbott & Durie, 1987; Māori Health Advisory Committee, 1988; Thomas, 1993). Although there have been significant changes since the 1990s, monoculturalism persists (Paewai, 1997) and cultural dialogue remains a monologue. There remain few relevant and helpful training opportunities, even for ethnic minority therapists (Aguirre, Bermúdez, Cardona, Zamora & Reyes, 2005).

Earlier responses required engagement with the cultural other while remaining ignorant to the cultural boundedness of the self, responsiveness eventually came to include realising eurocentrisms of the western self (Hirini & Nairn, 1996) and committing to services that are helpful and relevant for the target group (Walker, 1990; MacKay, 1995). This increased reflexiveness also required a level of self-awareness that had not been addressed earlier. However, they are not without allegations of tokenism, appropriation of knowledge and merely availing cosmetic changes (Turia, 2000; Johnstone & Read, 2000; Johnston, 1998).

Cultural training and Tiriti/Treaty awareness is no longer optional (Ritchie, 1993). However, the majority of graduates in psychiatry remain
unresponsive to māori needs (Johnstone & Read, 2000). It is an indictment upon an education/training system that does not have the capacity to deal with a matauranga māori knowledge base that is of Aotearoa/New Zealand (Stanley, 1993).

In Aotearoa/New Zealand cultural education has included information on the Treaty, pākehātanga, colonising history, and decolonisation training (Ramsden, 1992). Anti-racism and Treaty education was the first systematic attempt by pākehā to address the challenges of racism and ethnocentrism. What have come to be known as ‘Treaty workshops’ require a critical and self-reflective response to biculturalism: “both a rationale for what you are doing, and a plan to acquire the mindset and practical skills needed are requirements for an adequate response by clinical psychologists to the challenge of honouring the Treaty” (Pakeha Treaty Action, 1997, p. 157). In advancing bicultural understanding māori and pākehā should be prepared to ask difficult questions and to give honest answers (Simpson & Tapsell, 2002).

Decolonisation training also works to re-formulate the self/subjectivity and requires an analysis of the process of colonisation and consequences for the past, present and future. Decolonisation training has become common practice in government services in Aotearoa/New Zealand.

We need to attend to the internal struggles, to the ways in which negative and inferiorising discourses have come to inhabit the consciousnesses, emotions and the very flesh of our beings. How we understand, theorise and engage this terrain, it is suggested is critical to the transformative potential of decolonising processes and thus to achieving substantive change (Hoskins, 2001, p. viii).

Becoming aware of the processes and consequences of colonisation enables current political positions to be understood.

The inclusion of māori information into education/training has been primarily for the benefit of non-māori (Stewart, 1993; Stanley, 1993; Smith, G., 1990) and has required ‘others’ (such as māori) to share indigenous knowledge to increase the knowledge base of white people (Jones, A., 2001).
Simultaneously, clinical training opportunities for ethnic minority students do not adequately prepare them for their bicultural practice (Aguirre, Bermúdez, Cardona, Zamora & Reyes, 2005). In this sense, training interventions have continued to privilege/benefit non-māori.

Cultural awareness and cultural sensitivity emerged in the late 1980s and early 1990s but came to be considered a soft option: perception is necessary but not sufficient (Ramsden, 1992; Smith, L., 1989; Heylan Research Centre, 1988; Sue, Ivey & Pedersen, 1996) to achieve ‘bicural wisdom’ (Mataira, 1995) or to achieve cultural intentionality. Aspiration to culturally responsive practice required motivation from professionals to acquire relevant knowledge, skills and experience (Sue, S., 1983; Jones, A., 2001; Hirini, 1997; Mental Health Commission, 1998; Evans & Paewai, 1999). Increasing contact with culturally diverse colleagues can increase awareness and provide useful learning situations (Pedersen & Leong, 1997). The measure of culturally appropriate behaviours could be a more relevant measurement of competency (Sue, 1988). Cultural safety was developed through the workings of nursing (cf., Ramsden, 1992). “Cultural safety for Māori means that providers will be sufficiently familiar with Māori culture, beliefs and values to eliminate the risk of inappropriate practices which cause offence or marginalise participation on cultural grounds’’ (Durie, M., 1994b, p. 15).

Where there are fluid, fragmentary bodies of knowledge and systems of relating to others, how does a mental health professional engage with cultural diversity? When information can not be contained in a weekend workshop or seminal body of publications, how does one engage with such amorphous knowledges?

Training is required to achieve competency, experience is necessary to mature skills, there is no easy process of osmosis from knowing to doing. Through practice and experience can come safety, this state should be evaluated by the tangata whaiora, not the professional. The movement towards cultural safety requires the outcomes of cultural knowledge to be shown in benefits for
tangata whaiora, not in the tangible skills or intangible intentions of the therapist.

workforce development: pākehā deficit

Within mental health practice a common response to challenges/requirements for cultural safety is for cultural matching of practitioner and tangata whaiora/client to facilitate communication and to ensure cultural needs are met (Ministry of Health, 1995a, 1995b; Ziguras, Kimidis, Lewis & Stuart, 2003; Williams, 1999; Hirini & Nairn, 1996; Sachdev, 1989a). This is known in Aotearoa/New Zealand as 'referring on' (Pakeha Treaty Action, 1997). Rather than being assessed in terms of cultural understanding/knowledge/skill/ability, privileging "ethnically similar dyads" (Atkinson, 1983, p. 79) is a poor/inadequate/gross marker of 'cultural compatibility' (Sue, S., 1988). It should also not be an unsophisticated or tokenistic response (Robertson et al., 2001), for example, where all māori clients are automatically referred to māori practitioners (Nikora & Robertson, 1995). If the tangata whaiora/client chooses, they should be able to access mainstream services without simultaneously (and unconsciously) relinquishing their right to culturally responsive services. Recalling the critique of race/ethnicity/culture in the previous chapter, an essentialising approach to culture reinforces the (false) dichotomy of māori and pākehā, reifying cultural 'deficits' while ignoring the deficit of white culture enabled through the (imposed) monologue of science. At best, this process may require the establishment of a relationship between the mainstream and the māori service (Robertson et al., 2001) but it should not be the only culturally responsive practice of the mainstream service.

Health inequalities have been constructed as māori deficit not only in terms of ill-health, but also in terms of inadequate workforce development (Brady, 1992; NMHWDC, 1999; Levy, 2002; Nikora, 2001; Mental Health Commission, 1998; Health Funding Authority, 2000; Hirini & Durie, 2003). Working within the deficit model is likely to undermine a commitment from
pākehā to be bicultural. Referring on has been called a ‘strategy of avoidance’ (Smith, L., 1989) for as long as māori provide a bicultural aspect of the service, there may be little pressure for the pākehā practitioner to become more culturally responsive (Te Puni Kokiri, 1997).

Ethnic matching also works to compartmentalise concerns of culture: māori work with māori and pākehā work with pākehā. This assumption is problematic for two (and more) reasons. Firstly, linking cultural skills to race/ethnicity assumes cultural competence of the practitioner (Sue, S., 1988). Pākehā (and māori) should not be judged on the basis of race/ethnicity alone (Durie, E., 1999). pākehā contributors should be assessed on the content of their character not on the colour of their skin, as Martin Luther King suggested in a somewhat broader context in the late 1960s (King, 1968). In using race/ethnicity to categorise practitioners, there is an implicit assumption of the immutability of cultural skill levels (Sue, 1988).

These previous models of biculturalism, may be limited in their application because they do not question the structure directly, only the position of māori within them (Mulgan, 1989). They may even constitute ‘institutional assimilation’ (Fleras, 1991). Bicultural initiatives consistent with mainstream legitimisation are more likely to be supported (Waldegrave, T., 1996) through western understandings of accountability.

Dichotomous categories preclude the mutuality of presence and being in Aotearoa/New Zealand. The challenges of multiculturalism require concerns of culture to be concerns for all cultures. Similarly the challenges of biculturalism are challenges for both māori and pākehā to commit to meeting together in the Tiriti/Treaty house.

While the theoretical debates rage, māori people are still being admitted to (monocultural) mainstream services and served by nonmāori practitioners (of all health disciplines) who are inadequately equipped to deal with māori realities (Ministry of Health, 1997a; McFarlane-Nathan, 1994; Pakeha Treaty Action, 1997). The call for mainstream services to develop their bicultural services is strong (Ministry of Health, 1997a).
This is not to assume the māori workforce development should be constrained. To the contrary, if the disproportionately small māori workforce is to attend to the gross abundance of māori clients in the mental health system (Levy, 2002; Nikora & Evans, 1999; Simpson & Tapsell, 2002), it requires a mass of māori psychologists/mental health professionals proportional to the client base not the population (Nikora, 2001). While the māori mental health workforce has developed significantly in the past fifteen years (Paewai, 1997; Nikora, Levy, Henry, & Whangapirita, 2002; National Advisory Committee on Health and Disability, 2002) further development of the māori workforce remains an important focus (Thomas, 1993; Durie, M., 1999b; 2003).

Pākehā have also asked questions regarding the adequacy of cultural responsiveness from pākehā practitioners (Sawrey, 1990). Richard Sawrey’s research lent further strength to the claims of inadequate training and experience of the pākehā professionals who inevitably came into contact with māori in a system where they are often grossly over-represented (Sawrey, 1990). Perhaps his positioning as pākehā talking about these issues lent further weight to the claim for inadequate cultural responsiveness from the system: māori critiques had long fallen on un-hearing ears.

Many māori will continue to be served by pākehā professionals (Evans & Paewai, 1999), and therefore the advent of māori health services should not be seen as a replacement of those services but a supplement to existing practice (Pomare, 1986). Practitioners should not automatically assume that a traditional māori perspective is equally appropriate for all māori individuals. There are young urban generations of māori who have been removed from their tūrangawaewae for three or more generations (Durie, 1995c), 20% of whom are unable to name their iwi connections (Durie et al, 2002). Their goals and aspirations could well be different from those of ‘traditional’ māori (Maori Asthma Review Team, 1991). A standardised and unresponsive approach to the needs of diverse māori individuals would be counter-productive (Levy, 2002; Durie, 2003). All māori realities should be regarded as legitimate (Ramsden, 1993). For those with a compromised cultural identity, being confronted with a
kaupapa māori service could be as marginalising as being confronted with unmodified mainstream services where it assumes all māori seek a ‘traditional māori identity’ and implicitly denigrates ‘non-traditional’ māori (Durie, 1995c).

Mental health services need to be flexible and responsive to the diverse needs of the māori population (Ministry of Health, 2001; NMHWDC, National Mental Health Workforce Development Coordinating Committee, 1999; Mental Health Commission, 2001; Ramsden, 1992). Services required to address cultural diversity should not be limited to a single type of service, whether that be mainstream or kaupapa māori services. Appreciating cultural diversity should be supported (Gibson, 1999a) and promoted through equivalent diversity in service provision. By 2005 the government aims to have kaupapa māori and mainstream services as viable service options for 50% of māori (Ministry of Health, 1997b). Although most health providers are aware of the different needs of māori consumers, provision of services is still at different levels and abilities in regards to addressing those needs (Ministry of Health, 1995b; Evans & Paewai, 1999).

These ‘bicultural’ models continue to rely on a dichotomising of māori/pākehā, both in terms of population and in terms of epistemologies. Bicultural changes should be well planned and adequately resourced to ensure lasting impacts evident in policies, procedures and management (Wilson & Yeatman, 1995) with māori involvement at all levels of planning, development, and delivery of mental health services (Ministry of Health, 1997). The mutuality of māori/pākehā has scarcely been voiced - the synergy of collaborative mutual ventures remains un-tapped. As a complement of both clinical and cultural elements contributes to better treatment results for māori (Huriwai, Ram, Deering & Sellman, 1997; Kingi & Durie, 1997) so too would an explosion of bicultural services more adequately meet the diverse and dynamic needs of māori (and pākehā).

Charles Royal (1998) uses a model of three houses to represent a “Partnership-Two Cultures Model” (p. 5): The ‘Tikanga Māori House,’ the
‘Tikanga Pākehā House’ and the ‘Treaty House.’\textsuperscript{45} This model demands autonomous developments of the partners, but also a commitment to unity through partnership (Huygens, 2001a). Liberal principles of equality and egalitarianism frequently interpret the acknowledgement of differences as disrupting unity. For this model the Tiriti/Treaty house is placed between the māori and pākehā houses symbolising a space where both come together to engage in dialogue. This ensures the mana of each partner remains intact (Jenkins, 2000) and enables māori experiences to be normalised (Jenkins & Pihama, 2001). Further, each partner is responsible for all three houses, the mana of one house interconnected with the mana of the other and both committed to encounter each other in the Treaty House (Royal, 1998). This model therefore speaks to the responsibilities, privileges and rights of the Tiriti/Treaty being shared (Tau, 2001) and also the vital involvement of pākehā in addressing the re-balancing of power (Nikora, 2001).

A wharenui can represent the human body: kōruru\textsuperscript{46} at the front, forming an apex with the maihi\textsuperscript{47} flanked by the amo.\textsuperscript{48} Inside the person/whare the tahuhu\textsuperscript{49} joins the ribs that link all walls of the person/whare. The western medical propensity to dissect/deduct/reduce destroys the whole. The wairua holds it all together. The health and wellbeing of the whole is present in/through/of wairua, including the wairua of the other.

\textit{the partner that is not one}

pākehā have not yet entered the place for partnership: the Tiriti/Treaty house. pākehā house occupancy that calls to māori to come and meet us in our

\textsuperscript{45} While Royal uses capitalised terms to refer to these concepts, in subsequent references they will be de-capitalised. Similarly, the ‘Treaty house’ will be referred to as the ‘tiriti/treaty house.’ This is to maintain the integrity of the present theoretical orientation

\textsuperscript{46} kōruru: face
\textsuperscript{47} maihi: arms
\textsuperscript{48} amo: thighs
\textsuperscript{49} tahuhu: spine/central roof beam
house is not bicultural. māori have become ‘bicultural’/assimilated through a social and political necessity of living in a society built on the foundations of colonisation (Orange, 1987; Stewart, 1993; Evans & Paewai, 1999; Metge, 1976; Walker, 1987; Mataira, 1995). The engagement of māori with models of biculturalism is assumed as a normal and natural part of life. The reverse cannot be said of pākehā. Not all of pākehā would have even encountered the māori marae knowledge.

The focus and attention of this current research is on the pākehā partner (Older, 1978). “For many māori the treaty is a symbol of hope, an historical agreement which may yet be honourably acknowledged by a partner who has singularly failed to meet its obligations” (Pearson, 1990, p. 229). The māori experience of (pākehā) ‘partnership’ has been as a monolinguisum that constitutes essential māori subjectivities. māori subjects pair with pākehā subjects who, through this logic, also remain essentially bound to a relationship of dominance.

This obligation has not commonly been fulfilled. The pākehā partner can be the crown, the government, pākehā systems, and/or nonmāori individuals. In spite of biculturalism being firmly on the political agenda for over twenty years, there has been a disturbing lack of action from pākehā practitioners (Pearson, 1991; Wilson & Yeatman, 1995; Mikaere, 1998; Robertson et al., 2001). māori support for bicultural aspirations has waned (Durie, M., 1994a). Debate concerned with the ‘why’ and ‘what’ of biculturalism lacks an understanding of the practical implications of ‘how.’ How pakeha practitioners might take up positions as culturally specific partners in bicultural relationships is not elaborated by incorporating ‘cultural considerations’ into the DSM, or attention to the Tiriti/Treaty within the ethical code for practitioners in Aotearoa/New Zealand. The question of how pākehā who are acknowledged by māori as bicultural practitioners negotiate their positions becomes the focus of attention for the analytic work of this thesis. This analysis is contextualised by the methodology chapter and prelude which follows.
What were the research questions that initially guided the research process?

How might these questions be answered using the methodology of discourse analysis?

Using the ‘methodology’ of deconstruction? What was the process of this research?
The whakatauki reminds us of the multiplicity of voices that are heard in the forest and the requirement that all are entitled to speak their own voice. The multiplicity of interpretations is appreciated and recognised to be a necessary and beautiful diversity. Multiple subject positions of the researcher include: psychologist; critical researcher; ‘noble savage’/ ‘civilised.’ These various subjectivities have enabled me to: speak from marginalised and privileged positions; privilege the marginalised; and marginalise the privileged. The sanitised neutral writer of academic texts is replaced by the subjectivities of ‘the writer’ (me) and my partial voice and eyes.

what am I /i?

The researcher is always present in the research regardless of whether such partiality is specified in the research. This subjectivity becomes reflexivity when the inter-relationships between the researcher and the research are recognised. Ruwhiu (1999) calls this turning “the inside of people outwards” (p. 54). Explicating the researcher’s partiality/subjectivity allows the reader to take account of it (Lupton, 1992). Researchers must also submit their own practices to a critical analysis. “[O]ur own discourse as discourse analysts is no less constructed, occasioned and action oriented than the discourse that we are studying” (Gill, 1996, p. 147). My reading of the data is particular to my subjectivities and the various discourses available to me (Gavey, 1989).

Acknowledging subjectivity should not be an excuse for the researcher to continue with their work uncritical of the politics of their various positions. In order to be reflexive, all foundations must be open to the plurality of critique (Michael, 1990).

An account of my own subjectivity was initially provided in the prologue. Throughout the research there are signs of the māori influence on this work, like the whakatauki at the beginning of the introductory chapters and māori terminology (such as “kaikōrero”) integrated into the rest of the text.

I/i have encountered eurocentric psychological texts with a keen eye for how these texts subalternate māori. I/i have engaged with the text through
naming, questioning, arguing, problematising, and discussing, with the intention of remaining conscious of my own specificity and the political implications of my research.

As a māori researcher I/i make a political statement in choosing to research pākehā biculturalism. This privileges research relationships in the Tiriti/Treaty house in order to become bicultural. This research approach centralises mātauranga māori and enables pākehā to become historically and culturally visible. This position comes with benefits, but also significant costs: I/i have come under attack from other māori researchers frustrated with māori resources (such as myself) being ‘wasted’ on ‘pākehā research’; funders allocating money for ‘māori research’ did not consider my research project māori enough.

This methodology begins as my story, then becomes our story as validation implicates the reader in the collaborative re-productions of texts (re-iteration50) (Burr, 1995).

The journey of this research is oriented to research aims, questions, and expectations (Gill, 1996; McGee & Miell, 1998; Wetherell, 1998). Initially this was: How do pākehā become bicultural? What does ‘being pākehā’ mean to those who accept that label? How is this term negotiated? Who is it negotiated with? What positions are thereby available to pākehā? What types of relationships are available with māori? How are māori positioned in this new system? What constitutes bicultural practice for pākehā? How are these practices enhanced/inspired/supported?

Initially, naively, I/i thought answering these questions would primarily be a matter of talking with pakeha practitioners about their experience. Encountering social constructionism and discourse analysis had turned my attention to how pākehā practitioners construct their sense of identity. The construction and function of the research questions evolved as the research

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50 Derrida understands iterations to be incomplete and constantly changing reproductions of a text, re-contextualised with each new utterance.
process progressed. The binary of māori/pākehā that emerged through discourse analysis positioned the ‘partners’ as hierarchically opposed.

The descriptions of the construction, variation, and function of discourse insufficiently theorised a dichotomy of māori/pākehā that had emerged from the kōrero. Discursive analysis was not able to adequately disrupt the dichotomy of māori and pākehā, reflexivity, and power relationships while simultaneously enabling a transformative potential. Deconstruction was used to construct pākehā subjectivity in relation to māori subjectivity.

The journey of the research/methodology has been divided here into three parts: the research encounter; the language of discourse; and the power of deconstruction.

**encounter: relatedness**

At all levels of the research encounter relationships were constituted: the relationship between you and me/the reader and the researcher; between myself and my research/writer and text; between the researcher and the researched/māori and pākehā.

For the most part throughout the interviewing I/i was not attending to my subjectivity as māori. There was a notable exception caught on tape. One of the kaikōrero assumed that I/i was pākehā.

Kōrero 5.01

Well, to begin with, I didn’t realise you had a māori focus on it, I thought you were pākehā. That’s even better for me, yes that’s better for me [mary/277-280]

My introductory processes (via phone and email) had not implicitly positioned myself as māori. I/i had used the appropriate/appropriated figures of speech, such as “kia ora” and “ka pai.” I/i had included my pepeha on the Information Sheet (see Appendix C), but had neglected to verbally identify myself as māori.
mary quickly claims my being māori was “better” for her. I/i assumed at the time that she could safely assume that I/i knew māori words, was familiar with basic processes of cultural interaction, and did not take offence.

She constructed her mistaken assumption as potentially causing cultural offence. The previous part of her kōrero was a longer apology for the inappropriate manner in which I/i was (not) offered a (māori) welcome. In māori terms it could have been considered offensive, but in pākehā terms it was pleasant enough. This situation brought an interesting thought to me: If I/i was indeed a pākehā coming to research bicultural pākehā, should not that kaupapa alone qualify me for a ‘proper’ (māori) welcome? Discrimination on the basis of race (not kaupapa) provided two scenarios: As a pākehā I/i was not ‘entitled’ to a shared welcome; as a māori it was rude not to provide it.

I/i have experienced māori welcome as a moment of enveloping manaakitanga. Derrida’s account of powhiri/welcome is an “absolutely unforgettable” heart experience of “what hospitality is or should be” (Simmons, Worth, & Smith, 2001, p. 27).

As a ‘pākehā’ and as a ‘māori-thought-to-be-a-pākehā’ I/i was denied this honour, appropriate apology notwithstanding. At the time I/i was more concerned about the recording equipment working properly than I/i was aware of my political position in relation to the kaikōrero. I/i have since come to uncomfortably realise that essentialising assumptions do not only constrain māori, but also pākehā.

51 The first encounter on a marae is significant because visitors are constituted as waewae tapu. Through a ritual of encounter manuhiri become connected to the marae.
52 manaakitanga: hospitality
kaikōrero & kōrero

The kaikōrero (interviewees) were selected from among pākehā mental health professionals, who had made a commitment to bicultural principles in their practice. Māori mental health professionals were invited to nominate those pākehā mental health professionals who, in their opinion, contributed in a positive way to bicultural practice. These ‘nominators’ were approached by phone or email as less direct methods were unfruitful. I/i had placed a small advertisement in the New Zealand Psychological Society’s monthly newsletter. This newsletter goes out to all members of the Society, and so had the potential to canvas a large number of māori psychologists – or so I/i thought. Needless to say, I/i was disappointed with zero responses. My research was also advertised through māori mental health emailing networks. This brought more, but still very few, responses.

The method of eliciting nominations that was by far superior to either the group email advertising or the printed advertisement was contacting people personally and having a more personable and personal connection. Right from the beginning of the research the relationship was important.

Clinical psychologists, social workers, psychologists, lecturers and researchers, made up the twelve-strong kaikōrero group that spoke for 810 minutes producing 190 pages of text/kōrero. For studies of qualitative methodology, 10-15 participants provide ample data to analyse and increasing the sample size does not extend the text: saturation of ideas can be achieved with a small sample (Gill, 1996; Potter & Wetherell, 1987).

There was no attempt before the interviews to define the terms “pākehā” or “bicultural practice.” These were the concepts of study, so imposing

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53 Data is signified here as ‘kōrero’ rather than ‘text’ or ‘data.’ This more accurately portrays relationships within the data and refers to both spoken and written texts. ‘Kaikōrero’ denotes the people/interviewees who provided the talk. These changes centralise māori systems of signification and were also attempts to position the research outside of empirical, positivist research: To empower the kaikōrero as sources of the data, rather than passive ‘subjects’ or ‘participants’ sterilised by the language/discourse of science.
definitions of these concepts at this stage was actively avoided since it would have been theoretically inconsistent. Occasionally (although not often) the māori nominators sought clarification by asking “What do you mean by bicultural practice?” I/i replied with “I mean that they practice in a way that you consider to be bicultural.” No-one then replied with “I don’t know what a bicultural practice is.” At the point of nomination, contact details were collected from the māori nominators. The pākehā nominees were then contacted by phone and made aware of their nomination as pākehā practising biculturalism. Brief introductions of the researcher and the study preceded an invitation to participate in the study. Mostly, nominees’ responses were immediate and affirmative. If unsure, the nominee was given a week to think about it and an information sheet was posted or emailed out to them, and they were contacted again at the end of the week to make a decision. None of the nominees declined to participate in the research and none challenged being positioned as pākehā and/or as bicultural practitioners.

A time and place convenient to the nominee were organised for the interview. Thirty to sixty minutes was the expected duration of the interviews. I/i stopped most of the taping after forty-five minutes, but sometimes continued talking with the kaikōrero off tape. Although this korero was not included in the analysis it enabled the relationship of the kaikōrero/researcher to encompass more than just the interview/collection of data: We were not just making korero for the sake of research, but actually genuinely interested in discussing biculturalism together.

collecting/making korero

Each interview began with a mihi/introduction from myself. This covered my personal and academic background and my intentions for the research. The kaikōrero were then given the opportunity to reply.

The interview often included the life experiences that had enabled personal and important relationships with māori or with others. I/i questioned the significance of the Tiriti/Treaty, bicultural practice, being pākehā, the
process of them becoming bicultural: including life experiences; training opportunities; personal epiphanies; working environments; political/social movements; and influential people. How had these changes happened? What were the consequences?

The structure of the interview was very loose and our kōrero was broad and diverse. I/i was careful not to constrain the research by having a fully structured interview, preferring a more ordinary conversation between myself and the kaikōrero.

Although the kaikōrero had essentially gifted their kōrero to me through the consent form, and had allowed me to tape our interview, it was important that they retained ownership of the kōrero. After the interviews were transcribed they were returned to the kaikōrero for review, at which point the kaikōrero were free to exclude or make changes to any part of their kōrero.

In order to honour the confidentiality of the participants identifying information was excluded from the transcripts (for example countries travelled to, or the names of organisations or people). Where relevant the proper nouns have been replaced with an anonymous description such as “[māori work colleague]” or “[professional organisation].” Demographics and personal details (such as town/city of residence) that could compromise confidentiality have been excluded from the analysis.

Verbatim transcripts are very different from the script of a play (Wetherell & Maybin, 1996). There are interruptions, unfinished sentences, and repeated words. Some of the kaikōrero apologised for the incoherent text of their coherent talk. The ability to create sentence sense of musings or unfinished wonderings was suggested through pauses and faltering constructions. These were qualities of the spoken words that are retained in the written kōrero.

coding

A profound engagement with the kōrero produces a good transcript and facilitates analysis (Potter, 1996; Potter & Wetherell, 1992; Praat, 1998). The transcription laboriously transforms speech/korero to written text. There’s
nothing like a few hundred hours of transcribing and coding interviews to become familiar/enmeshed with the texts! There are a variety of ways of transcribing; the transcription conventions used in the present research are included as an appendix (see Appendix E).

Kōrero was categorised largely on the basis of content. For example, if the kaikōrero was talking about the difficulty of biculturalism that section would be included in the “biculturalism as difficult” code. The process of coding was conducted using the computer program: Non-numerical Unstructured Data Indexing Searching and Theorising [NUD*IST]. The NUD*IST program enables multiple codings for the same piece of kōrero, for each code to have description, amalgamation of codes, the creation (and manipulation) of mindmaps to organise codes, and the addition of new coding categories at any point. At the initial coding stage almost seventy categories had been created!

Codes were created during transcription and throughout the whole process of analysis. I/i was required to surrender some of my preconceived notions/codes of bicultural pākehā. This is a necessary process for progressing through coding practice (Tuffin & Howard, 2001). For example, I/i had assumed there would be kōrero regarding animosity from pākehā and from māori who challenged the legitimacy and motivations of the (pākehā) kaikōrero wanting to align themselves with biculturalism. While pākehā animosity was present, the kōrero did not support māori animosity.

**discursive possibilities**

“Social constructionist inquiry is principally concerned with explicating the processes by which people come to describe, explain, or otherwise account for the world (including themselves) in which they live” (Gergen, 1985, p. 265). Following coding, the discourse analyst theorises the function of patterns of discourse (Tuffin & Howard, 2001). At this point coded data appears to make sense and it may seem there is nothing to research. This illusion is quickly shattered as apparently sensible and ordered kōrero seriously and quickly
becomes much more intimately time-consuming and disturbingly chaotic. Discourse analysis requires poring over the minutiae looking for links between descriptors/constructions/metaphors, looking for alternative ways of constructing the events, the implications of certain words, different uses for the same linguistic constructions: _everything_ is noticed and questioned.

Self reflexive questions that I/i found helpful were “Why am I/i reading the passage in this way? What features produce this reading?” (Potter & Wetherell, 1987, p. 168). It is a curious process when every evaluation, assumption, reading, and interpretation is questioned. Information that was taken for granted comes into question. This creates a surreal uncertainty: “the cautious, stumbling manner of this text: at every turn, it stands back, measures up what is before it, gropes towards its limits, stumbles against what it does not mean, and digs pits to mark out its own path” (Foucault, 1972, p. 17).

Potter, Wetherell, Gill and Edwards (1990) identify three themes that distinguish a social psychological orientation to discourse analysis: language as a medium of action (action orientation of language); discourse as constructed out of pre-existing linguistic resources; variation as central to analysis (to indicate functional orientation).

Discourse analysis uses the description, explanation, and evaluation of _accounts_ within the text to reveal discourses. By understanding such accounts as active constructions of reality, the analyst can then observe the consequences of these accounts and make hypotheses about function. Analysis is assisted if the researcher has an awareness of the contexts relevant to the discourse (Gill, 1996). The speaker may use a variety of constructions to achieve a purpose, but there are also consequences, both intended and unintended (Wetherell & Potter, 1988). Hypotheses about function should cover purpose, but also consequences (Freeman, 1999). For example, the construction of pākehā culture as a misnomer functioned to deny cultural privilege.

Construction relates to the words associated with an object; the signifying properties of language, and observing how words and texts are put together (Wetherell & Potter, 1992). In discourse analysis, rather than validating
a particular construction, we look to identify how the account is constructed to serve its purpose (Potter & Wetherell, 1987).

Accounts vary according to purpose and the audience. Words are not randomly selected, but actively chosen from available linguistic resources to present information in a certain way (Potter & Reicher, 1987; Wetherell & Potter, 1988). People manipulate their use of language to serve a specific function (Freeman, 1999). Such variation is expected and utilised to validate the interpretation of function. Through linking inconsistency with function, hypotheses about the function of the discourse can be explored (Potter & Wetherell, 1987). For example, if ignoring pākehā culture is theorised to create a universal standard for society, in the instances where pākehā culture is recognised, how do the kaikōrero orientate their kōrero?

Interpretative repertoires are socially available linguistic resources that provide a particular way of interpreting and evaluating information (Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Madigan & Law, 1992; McGhee & Miell, 1998). Interpretative repertoires are organised around the use of metaphor (Potter, 1996). The words used to describe the qualities and actions of a repertoire help to orientate the reader to a certain interpretation of a piece of text. Interpretative repertoires allow the content of the kōrero to be understood from a contextual point of view (Wetherell & Potter, 1992). Interpretative repertoires can be used in a variety of contrasting ways (Wetherell & Potter, 1992). For example, the interpretative repertoire of colonisation has different evaluations depending on whether it is through postcolonial or colonial discourse. Postcolonial discourses constituting processes of colonisation negatively evaluate those processes as ethically questionable, perpetuating inequalities, and legitimising the subordination of the indigenous people. Through colonial discourses colonisation can be evaluated more favourably as providing a means for the moral and technical advancement of natives. Colonisers speak from the same discourse but use different evaluations from a multiplicity of interpretative repertoires. The associated describing words indicate the evaluative element. The attention is on the collection of words and images used to describe
phenomena and how these can be collectively used to facilitate particular interpretations. The definition and identification of interpretative repertoires and analysis of uses and functions should also account for the "problems thrown up by their existence" (Potter & Wetherell, 1987, p. 149). The interpretative repertoire is further examined for the finer details of rhetorical devices employed for specific purposes (Augoustinos, Lecouteur & Soyland, 2002; Wetherell & Potter, 1988).

While there are potentially infinite reiterations of an idea, the time and space allocated to the 'results' section of a thesis is discrete. The many coded branches of the kōrero could not all be included. The research questions provided the rationale for inclusion/exclusion. I/i also prioritised analysis that was politically insightful enabling a transformation of understandings of pākehā biculturalism, primarily for pākehā, but sometimes also for māori. Branches of kōrero/analysis that were painfully pruned from this section are re-grown/included as suggestions for further research in the 'discussion.'

The collective kōrero of each code was then scrutinised for similarities and differences in construction, observing the said/unsaid context and meaning for the utterances. Analysis was also prioritised for political potency, including kōrero that was counter-common sense. The analysis could not include all kōrero in the code. The examples of kōrero included were those that most clearly portrayed the ideas of that category/code.

Discourse analysis enabled me/we to explore the construction of pākehā, the construction of māori, the ways the same discourses were engaged for different effects, and the functions of these particular constructions provided useful insights. At this point in the analysis various dichotomous relationships between different groups become apparent and the issues of power required further analysis.

deconstructing dichotomies and power

Weaving deconstruction into the analysis was a progression from a point at which dichotomies of power had emerged. Throughout the project I/i had
been interested in the politics of biculturalism and the power ‘inversion’ of bicultural pākehā positioned through the Tiriti/Treaty. Through Derrida’s deconstruction I/i came to understand the global power and function of (racist) scientific monolingualism. I/i used to speak/write ‘the’ without a second thought, and always/only spoke through the authority of ‘I.’ Similar to Derrida, I/i came to also question both the ‘definite’ article and the authority of a unitary researching subject.

Before encountering deconstruction I/i would unintentionally think dichotomously. The ontological assumptions of western science promote binaries: one of two. When māori and pākehā are discursively constructed as mutually exclusive, where might māori/pākehā be positioned? What is missing from the construction of this question was the relationship between the two. I/i had tended to dichotomise māori and pākehā, while positioning myself an unhappy ‘hybridity’ and marginalised through this process.

Deconstruction is commonly associated with the destruction of an account. However, while it may disrupt particular constructions, it can also offer alternative constructions to enrich and diversify available traditions (Gergen, 2001; Burr, 1995; Gergen, Guelrce, Lock & Misra, 1996).

Deconstruction is not meant to assail the lived reality that our concepts are trying to catch. It is rather directed against our complacency in thinking that the understanding these concepts provide of the reality is adequate, that they can in effect replace – without leaving a trace unaccounted for- the reality (Gutting, 2001).

Deconstruction does not aim to destroy truth, rather, to explore its prejudices and preconceptions and by revealing the constitution of truth, may also work to disrupt normative processes (Lupton, 1992; Parker, 1990a; 1989a; Gill, 1996; Michael, 1990; Burr, 1996; Parker & Shotter, 1990).

Deconstruction enables a dynamic and fluid interpretation to texts. The disruption of power is achieved by inverting and exploding the dichotomy into multiplicity. Deconstruction approaches the kōrero from a perspective that
Chapter IV: getting to deconstruction

requires politics to be unpacked and has approached that can dismantle/disrupt hegemony.

These principles are used to respond to text, to disrupt essentialism. Deconstruction disrupts the ‘natural’ hierarchy of terms by examining definitions, highlighting inconsistencies and providing differentiation, counter-terms, and simultaneously opposing terms (Michael, 1990; Weedon, 1997; Billig et al., 1988; Parker, 1990a).

Assumptions of inevitable and inherited white privilege/dominance have been disrupted through previous chapters. The category of ‘white’ has been named, problematising its invisible norm and highlighting marginalising practices. Scientific inquiry and the categories of race/ethnicity/culture have also been critiqued and shown complicity between assumptions of natural white dominance and colonisation. This thesis, although written predominantly in english does contain numerous references of/to te reo māori. This is an overt reminder of the underlying assumptions upon which this work is based: centering a māori reading of biculturalism.

Part of the work of this project is to analyse the language/discourse of pākehā practitioners of biculturalism to analyse how pākehā subject positions that enable partnership are constituted. The process of coming back to discourse analysis with deconstructive strategies/tendencies enabled me to analyse more easily. The fluidity, partiality, and multiplicity of the constructs of pākehā positions/subjectivity and bicultural practice allowed through deconstruction fitted with my personal understandings of the kōrero. Constructing analysis around a blend of discourse and deconstruction enabled a discussion of positions, power, and relationships while acknowledging the contexts of reading practices.

In the following prelude to the analysis, my reading of the political context which enables contemporary pākehā subjectivity provides a starting place for weaving of deconstructive analysis of the final chapters.
V

READING PĀKEHĀ

SUBJECTIVITY: A PRELUDE

KO AU KO KOE, KO KOE KO AU

As an introduction to the following analysis this prelude provides a reading of the political context in which the meanings of 'pākehā' resource possibilities for constituting pākehā subjectivity.

Here begins a weaving of the pattern of the following analysis in a wholistic fashion. The patterns of a kowhaiwhai⁵⁴ are used to remind the reader of iteration, reiteration, and connectedness/mutuality.

⁵⁴ *kowhaiwhai* is a non-figurative visual representation of maori narrative that communicates the interactive experience and complexities of maori culture and its environment (Taepa, 2002). kowhaiwhai take the form of repeated patterns joined together as a continuous whole. An example of kowhaiwhai is laid through the titles of the following analysis chapters.
Since first they met, māori and pākehā have been negotiating their relationship. These relationships have included colonisation, assimilation, integration, biculturalism, and practicing tokenism. pākehā subjectivities have evolved from paternalistic (pākehā) destruction of difference, through what some have (contentiously) likened to ‘the Holocaust’ (Turia, 2002; Ramsden, 1990a). The political pressure for pākehā to become bicultural is now written into legislation, ethical guidelines, codes of practice, and has been variously advocated as part of the social moral order of Aotearoa/New Zealand. pākehā biculturalism has been erratically responsive over the last four decades and being pākehā is recognised as an ambiguous ideological production (Spoonley, 1995c). These processes have not been without disidents/dissonance - a backlash that has been politically important.

In the 1960s and 1970s the assertion of the rights of indigenous people worldwide and issues of cultural pluralism fuelled political discussion in Aotearoa/New Zealand (Pearson, 1995). This era was labelled a “māori cultural revival” (Greenland, 1991) where māori became politicised, educated (in western ways); voiced their protest in ways that mainstream society could no longer ignore; and asserted their position as ‘tangata whenua’ (Walker, 1970, 1987; Wilson & Yeatman, 1995; Spoonley, 1995c). māori began to make their own voices heard (Ramsden, 1992) and took the right to “dream dreams for themselves, believe in them and make them a reality” (Awatere, 1984, p. 107).

There were disgruntled responses from pākehā who reject “efforts to Maorify everything” and prefer to be called “Kiwi” (Jamieson, 1996), ‘anglo’ (Thomas, 1988), “European” (Belich, 2001), or “White New Zealander, not a pākehā” (Cable, 1988, December 24, p. 8). Many who would rather not be signified as “pākehā” claim it is an offensive term (King, 1985; Oliver, 2004, March 18; Jamieson, 1996; Tilbury, 2001; Nairn, 1986; Cryer, 2002; Pearson & Sissons, 1997). Such etymological resistance works to undermine the legitimacy of the signifier through questioning the system of signification. By refuting the meaning of a sign, the signified remains elusive (Tilbury, 2001).
Derrida claims attention to the origin of terms promotes a universalising monologue of meaning that shuts down discussion (Derrida, 1985). To disrupt the possibility of a universalising monologue, multiple meanings of the term pākehā are available in/through the iteration and reiteration of the concept through/-out tellings of the history of māori/pākehā relationships. The ‘original meaning’ of pākehā is diffused by asserting the absence of an ‘offensive’ origin.

According to some accounts, the term pākehā emerged in the early 1800s as a term to distinguish the visiting whalers and sealers from the ‘natives’ (Baker, 1945; Hēnare, 1988). “Pakeha” was recorded in English writings as early as 1815 (Wilson, 1963). For māori this was a new relationship, not based on kinship ties of iwi, hapū and whānau (Hēnare, 1988). māori did not use this as a blanket term to refer to everyone who was not māori. By the end of the nineteenth century it referred more specifically to a “New Zealand born white” [italics added] (Baker, 1945, p. 223; Metge, 1995).

According to other accounts, it is most likely that ‘pākehā’ was derived from ‘pakepakeha’ or ‘pekehakeha’ which were ‘imaginary pale-skinned beings’ (Nahe, 1893a; Orsman, 1997; Baker, 1945; Anderson, 1946; King, 1991; 2003). The fair skin was common to both fairies and the unusual fair skin of these foreigners and unusual to māori. Similar connections to limestone, white clay and white turnip all have a common ‘whiteness’ (Metge, 1995).

Some people assume that ‘pākehā’ is a māori insult (Belich, 2001b). For instance: keha; pa kehakeha - perhaps simultaneously referring to european settlers as/having ‘parasites’ (Metge, 1995); kehakeha - another pejorative (Metge, 1995). Wilson (1963) quotes the benign meaning of the term as ‘white man’.

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55 Also patupaiarehe or pokepokewai -a spiritual being of the sea.
56 keha: white flea
57 pa kehakeha: flea ridden
58 kehakeha: smelly
Another inference of the signification that renders the term unattractive is its mimicry of a common expression among seamen: "Bugger yer!" The assumed associations of ‘pākehā’ with ‘base’ working classes sanctioned the impropriety of the term. Lack of use of pākehā before the 1930s could have been to avoid association with a “bugger yer” transliteration. It did not easily fit with the colonial view of themselves as advanced. These derogatory origins have been variously dismissed as false or merely humourous (Metge, 1995).

According to other accounts, ‘pākehā’ was created to indicate something/someone foreign (Metge, 1995) as distinct from someone normal/‘māori.’ In this way māori and pākehā share an ethnogenesis, that is, their identities developed from mutual contact (Pearson, 1989; Belich, 2001a; Kawhia, 1945; Anderson, 1946). There was no collective national māori identity before pākehā arrived (Walker, 1996b; Pool, 1991; Spoonley, 1991b). Prior to this point māori identified themselves through iwi/hapū/whānau affiliations not as a collective/singular people/state (Marsden, 1975; Māori Synod of the Presbyterian Church of New Zealand, 1961; Thomas, 1988; Durie, A., 1997).

pākehā ‘defectors’ who oriented themselves to a māori way of life were called Pākehā Māori (Bentley, 1999), otherwise described as europeans ‘gone native’ (Vagiolli, 1896/2000). pākehā seldom position themselves in this way, those who do are politically significant for they chose to orientate themselves to a māori centre/marginalising themselves as pākehā (Metge, 1995).

pākehā were (literally) born of ‘displaced Briton emigrants’ (Fleras & Spoonley, 1999). An ethnic identity based in ‘Mother England’ was strong through to the 1890s. Primary identification with England was replaced with a sense of belonging to Aotearoa/New Zealand as successive family generations of pākehā born here created an identity which reflects an affinity and culture based in Aotearoa/New Zealand (King, 1991a; Orsman, 1997). Immigrants fled from the inevitable and restrictive class structure of England for a more egalitarian future in Aotearoa/New Zealand. pākehā were no longer “Britons” or even “Europeans” (Spoonley, 1991a). pākehā identity changed from being foreign, to indicating an ‘intimate other’ in relation to māori (Bell, 1996).
The multiple meanings of the term ‘pākehā’ changed as the social and political environment has changed, such that origins can only be traces of memories/understandings. Current interpretations of pākehā subjectivity can be explored in relation to the political implications of various signifiers/positions.

The 1980s were one of the most active and radical times for māori protesting against the government (Karetu, 1991; Pearson, 1984). A māori identity gained more salience as the political situation changed (Durie, M., 2001). This coincided with a movement for increased self determination of indigenous peoples internationally (Pearson, 1984). Amplified māori voice invited a culturally self aware response from pākehā (Pearson, 1984; Jesson, 1986; Awatere-Huata, 1993; O'Regan, 1983). Formidable social protests brought the attention of the media as māori challenged the Government in regard to their Tiriti/Treaty obligations (Pearson, 1990; Spoonley, 1995a). māori were ill-served by these “insidious influences of mass media selective representation” (Durie, A., 1997, p. 156). The mass media spoke a white backlash.

Different treatment for māori has been interpreted by mainstream pākehā as unfair to non māori (Armstrong & Young, 2004). kaupapa māori autonomy has been associated with structures of separatism (Brady, 1992), and at times called apartheid/racism (Rankine, 1986; Sharp, 1997; Spoonley, 1995a; Ballara, 1986). This claim is sufficiently offensive to deserve explanation. Apartheid was a state policy that has been called “the most racist of racisms” (Derrida, 1985, p. 291). māori seeking autonomy as protection from monoculturalism can hardly be ‘rationally’ judged racist. None-the-less initial government support for kaupapa māori autonomy fell by the wayside when the extent of this resistance was realised.

Change to the status quo may feel ‘oppressive’ for the oppressors (Friere, 1970/1972). When oppressed groups gain partial voice they have necessarily resolved the imbalance of power or compromised the integrity of the majority. Rather, the oppressors become constrained in their ‘natural’ (assumed) privilege to speak with universal voice for all peoples. Many pākehā remain
oblivious to their privilege (Thomas & Nikora, 1996). When white/pākehā voice becomes one of many, the resultant lack of omniscience does not constitute a ‘marginalised’ position. *Discomfort* does not constitute *oppression*. The reconstructions of white backlash work to silence claims of racism and may be seen to evoke victimisation (hooks, 1992) and to construct māori voice as having “a tyrannical demeanour - thus violating their [white] rights to tradition and voice” (Gergen, 2001, p. 173). Such constructions appropriate the position of victim by claiming that pākehā are victims. They have been labelled “me-too-ism” (Dyer, 1997, p. 10). “[I]n crude form, [there] is a prevalent belief that Maori are getting too uppity, that they’re taking advantage of Pakeha guilt to make unreasonable cultural and economic gains” (Frewen, 1993, August 13, p. 35).

This is the hostile/resistant political context from/in which contemporary meanings of pākehā emerge. King’s (1999) interpretation of pākehā as a ‘white native’ and the contested possibility of a ‘second indigenous culture’ has undertones of commonality with māori.

Spoonley (1995b) offers yet another interpretation of ‘pākehā’:

New Zealanders of a European background, whose cultural values and behaviours have been primarily formed from the experiences of being a member of the dominant group of New Zealand. The label excludes those who continue to practice a minority group ethnicity: The Chinese, Indian, Samoan, Tongan groups etc., and those European groups which retain a strong affiliation to a homeland elsewhere and which reproduce this ethnicity in New Zealand (p. 57).

While both these contemporary meanings implicate māori, they do not explicitly evoke a partnership/relationship with māori. The dominant are not well disposed to consider themselves just an ‘other’ (Sampson, 1993a), especially not as an *indigenous* ‘other’ (Pearson, 1990) - not well practiced in being labelled (therefore defined) by another/an ‘other’ in another language (King, 1991a). However, some pākehā accept “pākehā” even if, or sometimes *because* it is a māori term (Pearson, 1990). Being pākehā becomes a political statement that communicates active support for māori tino rangatiratanga and
honours equity in terms of biculturalism (Spoonley, 1995c). This opens the possibility to take up a position as manuhiri, in relation to māori as tangata whenua (Nairn, R., 1986).

Those who take up this new politicised pākehā position accept a cultural consciousness in relation to māori. They also accepted that “curing monoculturalism is not a māori responsibility” (MacKay, 1995, p. 160). Tiriti/Treaty, anti-racism, and decolonisation workshops have engaged pākehā autonomy of process and encourage pākehā responsibility for dismantling white privilege “by and on behalf of all pākehā” (Spoonley, 1991b, p. 160).

The concept of ‘Tiriti/Treaty partner’ has been suggested as a meaning for pākehā that would be more appropriate in terms of what is required of tangata tiriti (King, 2004). In this meaning the relationship that binds the two groups is privileged as significant. This suggests an understanding and bond between māori and pākehā that simultaneously evokes togetherness, separateness, and mutual respect (Spoonley, 1991b; Belich, 2001a; Ramsden, 1993; Johnson, 2002).

Of all of the contested resources that make being pākehā meaningful in the contemporary context, I/i privilege the concept of Tiriti/Treaty partners as a māori writer reading bicultural pākehā kōrero. This provides an uncompromising orientation to the Tiriti/Treaty and an unyielding commitment to a relationship/partnership with māori.

Constructionism’s privileging of a ‘self in context’ or ‘person in relation’ emphasises the interaction of the individual with culture and history (Ivey, 1995; Gergen, 2001; Shotter, 1993; Misra, 1993) and is consistent with privileging relationship in constituting pākehā ‘being’/identity/subjectivity.

We are slowly beginning to realize that we are constituents of relationships, embedded within and defined by relationships. There is no separating self from relatedness. Whatever I call “myself,” however I conceptualize myself, is already part of a set of relationships (Misra, 1993, p. 406).
Within the context of the following analysis the webs of relatedness that have already been specified include relationships among texts and partners of the Tiriti/Treaty; past and present (and future); knowledges, peoples, languages; psychological practices and cultural specificities; privileges and marginalisations; voices and silences. Within these webs are relationships of researcher and kaikōrero, relationships negotiated through sanctioned epistemologies, and heterogeneous relationships constituting the subjectivities of the researcher, herself.

The complexities of/from these relational inter-dependences constitute a problematic for the traditions of linear argument and the production of discrete unified analysis. Although the following chapters are presented as four discrete entities, they are sensible only in relation with/to each other. There are always/already many threads running through the kōrero. The Tiriti/Treaty is woven into the fabric of the work, always/already present through the kōrero. The patterns of the many threads constitute a kowhaiwhai which speaks to the interactive complexities of iteration, reiteration, and connectedness/mutuality. They are woven into each of the following analysis chapters and carry traces/shadows of each other: they are mutually interdependent. How these patterns are interpreted is part of what you (the reader) bring to the analysis; what you bring to/as your reading of this text is honoured and appreciated. The following chapter begins the analytic weave with threads that constitute the critical importance of pākehā cultural specificity as subjective awareness.

59 To enable cross-referencing throughout the analysis each of the kōrero are numbered. For example, kōrero 8.01 would be the first kōrero in chapter eight.
VI

CLAIMING PĀKEHĀ PRIVILEGE

RERE ANA TE WAI O TE AWA KI TE MOANA, KA NGARO

The kaikōrero orient to two positions in exploring pākehā subjectivity: those that know pākehā cultural specificity (postcolonial) and those that are unknowing (colonial). The latter group are self-claimed acultural but are also constructed here as apolitical and ahistorical. Consequences of constructing a sense of self independently of a cultural identity can be understood as the privilege of the powerful. A postcolonial60 subject position alternatively puts kaikōrero in the uncomfortable and unfamiliar place of acknowledging their power.

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60 postcolonial should not assume the colonial era has been supplanted (Pihama, 1997; Spoonley, 1995a; Smith, L., 1999; Matahaere-Atariki, 1998; Bell, 2004; Jackson, 1998). postcolonial does displace previous complacency with/of colonial pākehā privilege.
Identity and a sense of self are effects of a unitary, stable, and complete self. Constructionism offers positioning and subjectivities as fluid, fragmentary, and partial expressions of self. This chapter constructs pākehā as cultural and recognises pākehā privilege. A sense of stable identity and coherent self are effects of individualistic, culturally specific discourse constituting subjectivity.

For pākehā, constructing their own subjectivity includes achieving consciousness for white cultural privilege (Sue & Sue, 2003). The multiple, many, and dynamic constructions of self offered through available subjectivities and positions are explored here in relation to white cultural privilege, constituted (by a māori woman) as a colonial position. Within the context of Aotearoa/New Zealand the positions of māori and pākehā are unequally divided in two, or dichotomised. This power asymmetry enables certain relationships and constrains other relationships. Relationships of māori/pākehā have been likened to a partnership of the kahawai and the mako respectively (Durie, A., 1997; Metge, 1976). The inevitable/’natural’ predatorial (pākehā) consumption of (māori) prey is a familiar māori understanding of current (assimilatory) Tiriti/Treaty relationships (Potter, H., 2003). Such an understanding of biculturalism is enabled through a pākehā tendency to remain blind to their own cultural specificity.

This section of the analysis explores the ways that the kaikōrero come to position themselves as culturally pākehā and also theorises how this may reconstitute māori/pākehā relationships. This analysis offers a reading of these opportunities in order to encounter personal agency. When we are aware of the positions available to ourselves and to others, and we are cognisant of the ability to take up, negate, or supplement those positions for ourselves, the ‘real’ world becomes the constructed world and we may achieve personal agency through language. Through recognising the discursive positions available, pākehā may achieve ‘consciousness’ for white cultural privilege.

At this point it is helpful to remind the reader (again) of the inevitable partiality of this analysis. The subjectivities of these pākehā positions are read through māori eyes (I/i) and should not be interpreted as the way of
understanding pākehā, but one of many ways. The writer (me/we) at this point discourages the reader from taking an essentialising or universalising reading of the following analysis. I/i have neither the authority to construct the pākehā house, nor the inclination to impose such a full, final, and violent definition of pākehā realities/culture.

claiming pākehā culture

pākehā culture often is constructed (unintentionally) below the level of consciousness: it functions (as argued earlier) as a control group for the whole population and functions to make pākehā experience normal and invisible. Deconstruction challenges the status quo and requires a justification for taken-for-granted mainstream assumptions that were previously unquestioned (Billig, 1987). Through this process the (unquestioned) status of assumption/knowledge is therefore altered and may become open to a change in understanding (Billig, 1987). In being prepared to label/change their position as the privileged majority, pākehā show a “need for an identity granted not in terms of the colonial power, but in terms of themselves” (During, 1985, p. 369). When members of a dominant group accept they are racially and ethnically privileged within a specific context of relations they are demonstrating a preparedness to give up privilege as the unmarked group (Spoonley, 1995c). While a noble cause, this process is not always in pākehā self-interests (Spoonley, 1991b).

Some of the kaikōrero had been Treaty educators and were well practiced in the articulation of a politicised reading of culture, history, and privilege. Several of the korero are accounts of interactions with students, sometimes as a dialogue, or as a teacher’s reflections on students’ processes.

From a dominant and privileged position pākehā have the ability to remain oblivious to their cultural specificity and power. Being pākehā means firstly accepting that such a construction is sensible. The Tiriti/Treaty educators asked their students critical questions regarding pākehā culture and its meaning.
I think [having an understanding of pākehā culture is] absolutely crucial. That’s one of the first questions. That’s— the first tough thing that we get people to wrestle with is, Who are they? Where have they come from? [mike/516-518]

For many pākehā, -like the students mike constitutes in his talk—Tiriti/Treaty education processes may be their first opportunity to be confronted with understanding pākehā culture. The metaphor of struggle in negotiating answers to these questions is clear: “that’s the first tough thing that we get people to wrestle with.” These are novel questions, and this type of challenge is constituted as difficult. It appears that negotiating pākehā culture is not something familiar and comfortable. As “one of the first things” this is the beginning of a process of education, something new and previously unexplored. Perhaps it poses difficult questions and makes uncomfortable new positions possible (Phillips, 2001).

Understandings of pākehā culture are constituted through subjectivity (“Who are they?”) and having a sense of origin (“Where have they come from?”). These (unanswered) questions elicit some important information about pākehā culture. By directing the questions at individuals the educators assume an understanding of pākehā culture is situated within the individual. In this way, subjectivities that are promoted remain contextualised to the individual and do not support universal/essential/authentic understanding of being pākehā.

In terms of origin, pākehā culture may be communicated through location, either in relation to geography or in relation to a particular history. Physically/Geographically, pākehā could claim an association with a particular local region or province (such as Taitokerau/Northland) or with another country (such as England). This is consistent with māori processes of pepeha or
tūrangawaewae\textsuperscript{61} that locate people in relation to the living entity of a region (whenua) or geographical feature (such as a mountain or river). The similarity suggests a sharing/understanding of māori identification processes. This could be understood as an example the potential for common difference between māori and pākehā.

In a more global sense, locating an individual (and/or their ancestors) in relation to “where they have come from” could imply dislocation from a place/nation of origin. Shadows of inheritance claimed through knowing a whakapapa of migration problematises constructions of pākehā indigeneity. The intricacies of pākehā claiming an indigenous position in Aotearoa/New Zealand will be returned to, and analysed further in kōrero 7.10.

“Origins” may also/alternatively include the socio-political history that has enabled contemporary pākehā privilege. pākehā may more confidently claim their Aotearoa/New Zealand connections through knowing their own history of settlement/colonisation\textsuperscript{62} but this often requires knowledge of the impacts of settlement/colonisation on māori. Constituting relationships with māori may provide a context to speak of this privilege/marginalisation.

In this kōrero mike makes two different positions available for pākehā: \textit{we} (pākehā educators) who present the challenging questions and \textit{they} (pākehā students) who have to grapple with them. The educators achieve distance/difference from the students through these dichotomous pronouns. This allows a glimpse of a collective belonging shared between the educators and the students. The use of pronouns to achieve distance/intimacy is returned to throughout the analysis.

\textsuperscript{61} Turangawaewae: Place to stand; this provides a strong/confident position that stands with confidence and belonging (to the whenua).

\textsuperscript{62} Settlement could be understood as the work of government/societies, colonisation can also be understood as the work of individuals/families. The government buying māori land cheap and selling to willing, albeit ignorant of colonisation, pākehā families/individuals. In this way, settlement/colonisation implicates colonial government and pakeha families/individuals.
pākehā culture can alternatively be constructed from an antiquated definition of culture as represented by literary works or art icons:

**kōrero 5.02**

You ask pākehā people ‘What’s your culture?’ and they look at you like you’re stupid and start talking about, y’know, European icons in Europe ... the great artistic creations of Europe, as though those things are culture. Or they say, ‘What do you mean culture? We haven’t got a culture’ [mike/519-525]

The question (“what’s your culture?”) assumes it is sensible to talk of such as thing as culture with pākehā people. The question invites the students to construct/constitute themselves as having a culture. The students supplement mike’s assumptions in three ways. The first response is to “look at you like you’re stupid.” Perhaps this is a sarcastic response because the question is ridiculously/offensively elementary. Alternatively this response could be read as interpreting the concept of culture as not making sense (hence the ‘stupid’ look). This latter response problematises mike’s question because it disputes the presence of culture in Aotearoa/New Zealand. The cultural symbols of pākehā are perceived as national symbols and indistinguishable from that which is normal (Pearson, 1990; Evans & Paewai, 1999). Denying cultural specificity serves to maintain the (invisible) hegemony of the dominant class (Novitz, 1989).

In the second response the students “start talking.” This description of their verbal response implies a meandering of dialogue rather than a coherent and well-rehearsed script. They talk about “European icons in Europe” and “great artistic creations of Europe” as “pākehā culture.” pākehā culture could be understood here to be “high art” (Wetherell & Potter, 1992, p. 136). mike provides his own supplementation by saying: “as though those things are culture.” His sarcasm negates the students’ construction of pākehā culture as “European icons” and infers that such a response indicates a misunderstanding of what constitutes pākehā culture. Locating pākehā culture in Europe is
consistent with identification with an ancestral country of origin (as suggested in kōrero 5.01) and European icons may well communicate traces of pākehā culture, but with no corresponding mention of local icons pākehā culture lacks connection with Aotearoa/New Zealand.

The substance of culture as physical, distant artefacts displaces a localised, contextualised construction of pākehā culture. The relationships of pākehā with history, with māori, with other pākehā, with privilege, with cultural consciousness alternatively constitute an understanding of pākehā culture as embedded within practices.

The third response overtly disputes the concept of pākehā culture, and again negates the premise of mike’s initial question. The students’ reply, “What do you mean culture? We haven’t got a culture.” mike earlier identified the respondents as “pākehā people” therefore his comment could be understood as ‘pākehā have not got a culture.’ From mike’s point of view it appears difficult for these students to construct sense around issues of pākehā power because they are unconnected to culture; they can be dismissed as nonsense. Armed with the language to construct ideas it is easier to engage in deconstruction of this power.

Here the student-educator interaction is presented as a dialogue of supplementation/negotiation of meaning. Supplementary signification involves a negotiation of texts between peoples (Gergen, 1994). The educator’s claim of pākehā culture is disputed in various ways by the student’s responses. The student position on pākehā culture is that there is no such thing. They are unable to make sense of mike’s questions and are unable to perceive pākehā culture. This is a politically important position that functions to normalise pākehā culture by resisting being identified as a distinct culture. One of the consequences of this position is that pākehā privilege can be ignored and therefore sustained.

Argumentation produces diametrically opposed sets of values that are constantly being negotiated and used to assert a particular position, and also to criticise and negate the counter-position (Billig, 1991; Potter, 1996). Here mike
pākehā privilege/power

pākehā privilege is not commonly, nor easily recognised. pākehā have great difficulty acknowledging their position of privilege. Evading conscious awareness allows power to remain cloaked/disguised as natural and normal, not cultural.

kōrero 5.03

Therefore ‘this is not pākehā culture, this is New Zealand as it operates and the culture is somewhere else, and basically we don’t have much of that.’ Again, it’s the power of invisibilising the ‘how we do it’ so that it becomes ‘the way things are done’ [ross/164-168]

There are two positions that ross speaks from in this kōrero. The first disclaims pākehā culture by locating it “somewhere else” perhaps in another country of origin (as in kōrero 5.02) or it could be a more generic attempt to evade localising/identifying pākehā culture. Locating pākehā culture outside Aotearoa/New Zealand de-politicises the local context for the social, cultural, and political realities of māori marginalisation and local colonisation are...
Chapter VI: privilege

removed from the discussion. pākehā culture is additionally constructed as inconsequential: “we don’t have much of that.” Again, this works to defuse interrogations into pākehā culture instead assuming a practice that that is not specific to culture. It also enables pākehā to remain blind to their position of dominance (Huygens, 1999; McCleanor, 1997). This non-claiming of culture also constitutes a lack of solidarity/‘sense of us’ (Pearson, 1989).

“How we do it” locates the way of ‘doing things’ with the (pākehā) speakers. This becomes “the way things are done” in which the actors are rendered invisible. In the second construction the workings of society are not specific to pākehā: they are normalised and generalised as “how New Zealand operates.” This effectively negates any claims of cultural privilege and functions to ignore a pākehā power that the first construction implies does operate. In this kōrero pākehā culture is not understood as overseas icons and artefacts but encompasses local social practices and realities of everyday interactions.

Through recognising and labelling the pākehā control group, “the power of invisibilising” pākehā culture is de-naturalised and implicitly challenged. pākehā may be liberated from being eternally bound to identification as the coloniser and consequent feelings of guilt and shame associated with such historical oppression. The associated feelings of discomfort, incompetence, resistance, and hostility can be normalised (Rankine, 1985; Lee, 2005). Subjectivities allow the multiplicity of self to emerge; this de-essentialises the qualities of the coloniser and understands them as a practice and a position that is always/already partial.

If the concept of différence were acknowledged in the process of constructing pākehā subjectivity then the absence of a centre would require looking to an other (māori/pākehā) for an understanding of the self. In the context of a colonising history the self that is reflected back through a colonising history is not particularly alluring. A more common response is “a desire to avoid the [Who am I?] question altogether” (Tilbury, 2001, p. 214).

In the next kōrero jeff repositions himself in relation to the mainstream and in relation to māori marginalisation.
I think up till then I probably thought that if it was māori children and māori families in pākehā schools then in a way we could just do the same things because it was- the school was the same. I don’t think that’s true now, but I did then [jeff/200-204]

In this kōrero jeff positions himself in two ways. The first is conceptualised here as a colonial pākehā position. This colonial position is unaware of the marginalising consequences of the mainstream system. Those who are content and comfortable with the status quo are oblivious to/of the cultural specificity of their practice: “we could just do the same things” because the environment of “the school was the same.” This resounds/reiterates the cultural invisibility of mainstream pākehā noticed in earlier kōrero. The colonial position commonly universalises cultural experience, rendering cultural specificity null and void or silent. Apathy and silence work to maintain hegemony/status quo (Edwards & Potter, 1992; Sampson, 1993b; Spoonley, 1995b).

jeff reaches a transitional point (“up till then”) where his assumptions of cultural neutrality are disrupted. Doing “the same” things becomes doing things in a pākehā way. This second position, the postcolonial pākehā position, attends to cultural specificity: “māori children and māori families” in “pākehā schools.” jeff assigns specific (and different) cultures to the school and students, thereby disrupting previous constructions of cultural impartiality. Postcolonial pākehā have a critical appreciation of the colonial history of Aotearoa/New Zealand, most significantly, they have a critical understanding of the position of the colonised (Fleras & Spoonley, 1999; Bell, 1996).

All of these previous kōrero tell stories. For constructionism “the anecdote becomes a fragment of autobiography” (Davies & Harré, 1990, p. 48). While the story may not have content of the speaker’s subjectivity, the words they use to describe/construct the story do speak of/from particular
understandings/subjectivities. These subjectivities construct knowledge of pākehā power, and constitute a sense of privilege/power.

In the process of becoming aware of the cultural difference of others, jeff disrupts the false unity of (acultural) Aotearoa/New Zealand society, and the false universality of pākehā culture.

Mistaking cultural specificity for a transcultural state of normal, silences marginalisation/privilege and is a privilege of the privileged. In Aotearoa/New Zealand pākehā claim “We’re all New Zealanders” and confuse nationality with ethnicity (Pool, 1991), assuming the pākehā norm is relevant for all.

The most common, powerful and insidious expression of unity is in the claim ‘We’re all Kiwi’s’ or ‘We’re all New Zealanders.’ This is also called the togetherness repertoire (Wetherell & Potter, 1992) and similar to the ‘melting pot’. These sentiments have remained part of common-sense for the past thirty years (Nightengale, 1973; Jesson, 1986; Armstrong & Young, 2004). They offer the seemingly harmless idea of a unified nation as ‘one people.’ Recent understandings of power and politics have reinterpreted such statements as support for pākehā hegemony: a one ‘New Zealand’; homogenising the population; unifying; equalising racial interactions; subsuming māoritanga (and cultural pluralism) within the monologue (Johnson, 2002). “The ideology of unity and one-ness of māori and pākehā was used to deny the other-ness of the māori” (Walker, 1989, p. 42). Belief in the possibility of such uniformity is consistent with a liberal belief in universal subjectivity (hooks, 1992). The assertion of the principle of “one nation” is supported also through the national ideology of egalitarianism as providing equal treatment for all (Pearson, 1990; King, 1999; Consedine, 1989). There is no need to distinguish between cultures that have equal opportunities.

63 The melting pot symbolises unity through assimilation: differences are minimised and similarities accentuated, all people become the same ‘mixed’ colour (Sue & Sue, 1990; Cardona, Wampler & Busby, 2005; de Anda, 1984; Mio & Iwamasa, 1993).
Identification with the nation transcends/assimilates/minimises cultural differences in favour of a 'national'/mainstream/hegemonic monologue. It comes in many forms and threatens to subsume the subjectivities of māori and/or pākehā within a universal/national identity that refuses to acknowledge any form of difference; including race/ethnicity/culture. While this appeals to a sense of unity, it comes at a cost. For pākehā, “their ethnic symbols are frequently national symbols, because they are ‘the nation’ in their own eyes” (Pearson, 1989, p. 67). It appears pākehā have an affliction of partial blindness to their own power. māori might diagnose those pākehā eyes with monocultural myopia (Jackson, 1988). The ideal(istic) notion of unity without difference is a misnomer that obscures power and privilege (and simultaneous marginalisation).

**Knowing/owning pākehā power**

The more one can acknowledge the culture of the self, the more one can be aware of differences in others (Axelson, 1993). Western privilege is not difficult for people outside of the majority to recognise - they are reminded of it every day in each way the mainstream systems/structures/society clash and compromise their own cultural values (Waldegrave, T., 1996). The challenge for pākehā is to develop “the ability to be fully aware of and to tolerate what you represent” (Lee, 2005, p. 97). Representations/Practices of oppression/colonisation must be directly addressed to make mental health professionals accountable (Sue, Ivey & Pedersen, 1996). While these processes are considered necessary in order to achieve cultural agency, pākehā privilege is neither commonly nor easily recognised by the majority of pakeha.

Mike describes Tiriti/Treaty education as revealing alternative, counter-hegemonic accounts of history. He voices the students’ responses to this process:
Once you’d told people the relatively straightforward and simple story, decolonising story ... most people are saying ‘Shit, I didn’t know this. What can I do?’ ... and quite often a little bit angry y’know, um like angry in the sense of betrayed: A sense of betrayal by the systems that have delivered the receipt story to them. And a bit cross- sometimes a bit cross with us that we’re shattering the illusion [mike/1061-1082]

Tiriti/Treaty education provides a distinctive and alternative vocabulary for constructing different versions of reality (Wetherell & Potter, 1992). The highly politicised educational environment enables construction of (pākehā) privilege and (māori) marginalisation. History provides a key focus for this re-education.

Here mike presents two conflictual accounts of the “story”/history of Aotearoa/New Zealand. He calls them the decolonising story and the receipt story. This binary has parallels with the colonial/postcolonial positions described earlier. If the illusion provided and concealed certain realities, shattering of the illusion was an epiphany. Two positions of power for the pākehā students become available.

The “receipt story” has been produced by “the systems” and creates a particular “illusion.” A “receipt story” could indicate a manufactured version of reality accepted at face value by passive, unquestioning recipients. In terms of history and story telling, this univocal account is sometimes referred to as an imperialist narrative (Augoustinos, Lecouteur & Soyland, 2002). The monologism of the receipt story silences other versions of history, for the “uncomfortable areas that many Pakeha believed were[/are] easier to ignore than face up to. History was relegated to the past64” (Johnson, 2002, p. 160).

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64 This is a pākehā-specific orientation to time.
Through ignorance history is amputated from the present/future and assumed to have no relevance.

The comment “stop living in the past” could be an alternative iteration of history being relegated to the past. It infers a preoccupation with irrelevant information that has/is passed/past and assumes (finite) attention on the present/future. Māori orientation to time negates such positioning for the past can be known/seen (is in front of us) the future is unknown (behind). Orientation to the past is assumed to be ‘backwards’ in that assumes ignorance for/of the present/future.

The “decolonising story” is described as “relatively straightforward and simple.” The complicity of the students with the “receipt story” is revealed, but also negated. Firstly they proclaim their ignorance: “Shit, I didn’t know this.” This helps to assert their innocence and divorce themselves of responsibility for creating the story. The anonymous entity of “the systems” is made responsible for delivering and perhaps creating the deception.

The students are also “a bit cross” and “a little bit angry” because of a “sense of betrayal by the system.” This implies that a relationship of trust or allegiance had existed between the students and the system.

Knowing history and having a strong reaction is presented here as an inevitable outcome. pākehā may be ignorant but are still implicated in continuing colonisation: “people cannot be blamed for what they did not know. They can, perhaps, be blamed for what they don’t know today, if their ignorance of the nature and history is [Aotearoa/New Zealand] society is wilful and results in a perpetuation of inequalities and injustices” (King, 1985, p. 13). While intentions are somewhat important, they do not influence the outcomes/function of the kōrero.

Upon revealing the deception, the students’ reaction is not ambivalence or resistance, but a strong motivation to act. The students question how their protest may become manifest: “What can i do?” This kōrero acknowledges the personal agency of the students and their ability and willingness to (counter-)act.
The “shattering of the illusion” also constructs pākehā subjectivity as a dichotomy of the earlier positions of postcolonial/colonial. The colonial subjectivity supports the status quo/pākehā hegemony. The postcolonial requires a knowledge of colonisation (Parker, 1990a; Pocock, 2001), and positions the self/speaker in distant opposition to colonial complicity.

The majority of pākehā have not heard māori versions of history (Henare & Douglas, 1988; Bell 2004). The various contemporary expressions of māori resistance and protest are conveniently removed from their historical context of colonisation and dispossession, and pākehā thus commonly divorce themselves from colonial responsibility/privilege (Bell, 2004). A revisionist version of history provides a re-telling of history and changes the subjects of that history, and also the available subjectivities of the colonisers/colonised. Knowing history to be ideologically constructed helps to recognise particular moral and political sensitivities (Gergen, 2001; Binney, 2001). A ‘revisionist history’ has become known as a reading of history that deconstructs the popular (pākehā) reading of history, disrupting the myth of harmonious race relations and reconstructing history in terms that acknowledge māori marginalisation (Johnson, 2002; Sharp, 1997). A postcolonial assessment of colonisation has created space for māori experience of marginalised ‘other’ to be given voice and disrupt the imperialist univocal narratives of colonial history (Binney, 2001; Pocock, 2001; Sharp, 2001). A revisionist perspective has also been criticised as “hypercritical,” selectively viewing only the negative aspects of pākehā culture and not the positive (Pocock, 2001). Is it any wonder being pākehā is so unpopular when the cultural inheritance becomes colonising guilt? (Gibson, 1999b). In order to build an alternative history, the familiar history must first be understood (Parker, 1989a).

This is not an easy process: reactions include puzzlement, disconcertment, and perplexity. It is difficult/new sense/uncomfortable for pākehā to talk about themselves as cultural beings (Wetherell & Potter, 1992, p. 127). It also moves and shifts in form through time and context to flex and
change with inevitable partiality. This process through cultural safety should not be aborted through being too hard or too confronting (Williams, R., 1999).

The postcolonial position acknowledges the marginalisation of Māori through knowledge of colonisation (revisionist history). Pākehā privilege/hegemony is disrupted through the kaikōrero’s orientation to a Māori understanding of history/marginalisation. Naming these positions was neither ‘natural’ nor ‘neutral’ but constituted to promote a particular way of understanding these two positions and their dichotomous relationship.

The gift that the other gives us is our own selfhood. Yet when the other declines our offer to roll over and play dead, this is a gift we may not want to receive. As long as the others quietly submitted to our own determination of who they were, we would gladly accept the gift of our selfhood that they provided ... It is when the other’s gift forces us to take a second look at ourselves, however, that many balk at the selfhood they are now asked to consider (Sampson, 1993a, p. 155).

A self in relation to colonisation is an inheritance of privilege borne on the back of an exploited, disenfranchised, marginalised, other. Marginalisation of the other is simultaneously present through/with Pākehā privilege. The processes of recognising these privileges result in different viewpoints/subjectivity of those positions. Through politicisation the comfortable bliss is replaced with difficulty reconciling the self to a history/present/future of privilege. How the kaikōrero negotiate their position in relation to privilege and marginalisation is threaded through the following chapter.
PĀKEHĀ PRIVILEGE MARGINALISES MĀORI

E KORE E PIRI TE UKU KI TE RINO

In recognising the power of pākehā the marginalisation of māori is mutually constructed. The way that being pākehā is constituted through this colonial relationship raises issues of acceptance, comfort, and belonging. Negotiating subjectivity with a colonial past, a contemporary (pākehā) mainstream, and exploring new relationships with māori is a difficult and complicated process.

This chapter explores how the kaikōrero negotiate being pākehā both within available pākehā (colonial) positions and beyond into new (postcolonial) subject positions. These positions are negotiated in relation to māori and pākehā others.
Chapter VII: marginalises

The relationships between pākehā and māori are understood on a number of levels. Biculturalism has the qualities of fluid, fragmentary, and flexible interplays of qualities/contexts. The focus of this chapter is the relationship of privilege/marginalisation articulated through the kōrero.

This is enabled through understanding the cultural specificity of the self/other. This understanding becomes a point/place of transformation of the self through acknowledging pākehā power. The shattering of the illusion of cultural neutrality is a catalyst for recognising the marginalisation of māori and thereby allowing a re-positioning of self, temporally, politically, and contextually. Pronouns are used throughout this chapter to constitute understandings of the self. The various affiliations and distinctions/discriminations present in constructions of us/we, them, and you enable the self to similarly be positioned. These affiliations and distinctions position the pakeha self in terms of practice and relationships with peoples and knowledges.

There are various practices that are labelled ‘bicultural.’ The integrity of these bicultural/’bicultural’ relationships is constituted by talk of criteria, intentions, and practices of biculturalism.

Kōrero 6.01

The bit for me about biculturalism is the fact that people use words that they don’t really know what they mean [morgan/601-603]

The rhetoric of biculturalism is not exclusively available only to those who are committed to the kaupapa: it has become part of commonsense language. Meanings have become appropriated in the process. The kaikōrero were therefore careful in the use of appropriated terms of biculturalism.

morgan insinuates the re-definition compromises their former meaning such that speakers “don’t really know what they mean.” For morgan, bicultural terminology provides a particular interpretation. By her evaluation some people use the word inappropriately. As a practice of using words, this implicates not only mental health practice, but all articulations.

145
For some of the kaikōrero this results in the creation of a dichotomy where being ‘bicultural’ means tokenism (which is not real/genuine biculturalism). Tokenism as creating a serviceable other so that hegemonic practices are not challenged/noticed/named might also be constituted as ‘biculturalism’ in the pākehā house. Māori are not full or equal partners, but appropriated and constrained in ways that pākehā control/define.

The principle specifically being referred to here is that of biculturalism. Throughout the rest of this chapter I/i will use “kaupapa” to refer to the principles/practice/privileging of biculturalism. This convention will allow the reader to evoke these multiple concepts easily throughout the analysis chapters, while avoiding confusing kaupapa of biculturalism with other principles, practices, or privileges.

The construction of a continuum of biculturalism is overlaid with understandings of pākehā specificity. Pākehā power/privilege is contextualised by (marginalised) positions offered to māori:

kōrero 6.02

Things being like on the [institution] letterhead, y’know, an institution with a māori name -that sort of first, introductory level of biculturalism- and go towards a place where values of the two cultures can really genuinely be reflected in the practices of the place [marlane/37-41]

Biculturalism is understood as a “continuum” beginning with the “first, introductory level of biculturalism” (“an institution with a māori name”) and moving towards aspirations for the future where “the values of the two cultures can really genuinely be reflected in the practices of the place.” This allows both these types of practice to be named bicultural but there is a hierarchy imposed through talking about a scale that begins with “introductory level biculturalism” and moves towards genuine reflection of two cultures in practices. What is described as an introductory level could alternatively be understood as a token effort. As the former there is orientation to a
journey/progression where there are levels of change; biculturalism does not happen instantaneously.

Marlane uses a metaphor of reflection to indicate biculturalism. Bicultural practice reflects/mirrors (or distorts) a genuine form. The ultimate goal for biculturalism is constructed here as one of genuine reflection. While introductory level ‘biculturalism’ in and of itself is not sufficient, it does orientate towards a genuine aspiration of cultural inclusion. Assuming biculturalism does exist and can be ‘reflected’ in practice supports an ontological assertion of a ‘true’ and ‘pure’ biculturalism that is inconsistent with the ontological assumptions of this thesis. If the metaphor of illusion mirrors a reflection, the unstable metaphysical presence of linguistic constructions might be recognised. By relying on transient reflections, dynamic representation can be recognised. While it does not challenge the ontological presence of a complete, pure, and authentic (therefore attainable?) biculturalism, it does enable multiple versions of bicultural practice. These constructions carry particular assumptions of validity, authenticity, and adequacy.

Marlane does not speak of pākehā power but the relationship with Māori knowledge she describes insinuates a powerful position for pākehā. The future orientation of genuine sharing of culture speaks of a current relationship in which culture is not understood with reciprocity of value: there is an imbalance of power. Aspirations for ‘genuine’ biculturalism are oriented to the future: “go towards a place.” This aspiration for the future implies that place has not yet been arrived at.

Similarly, Ross constructs temporal transformation of positioning (biculturalism/bicultural practice) through questioning:

kōrero 6.03

How do you move from this position of a founding document that the rats were chewing on, to— [laughter] to something that actually is a major pillar of the way we structure our society, the way we sort out
As incredible as it sounds, ross' comment on the "founding document" as something "that the rats were chewing on" is recorded as historical fact. Not only was the Tiriti/Treaty fodder for rats, but also damaged by water and almost lost to fire (Orange, 1987). The lack of care for the physical document speaks volumes of the contempt for the sacred document from (pākehā) guardians of the day. Metaphorically and literally this story communicates neglect for the material document, and corresponding negligence for its principles. Surely if the Tiriti/Treaty was indeed considered a sacred document it would have been treasured and protected from destructive elements.

The juxtaposition of a rat-eaten document with a major pillar/foundation for institutions and services speaks of the magnitude of change that is still required. ross describes the Tiriti/Treaty as a "founding document" and "something that actually is a major pillar of the way we structure our society." His question insinuates contemporary achievements are insufficient. Similar to the previous kōrero he suggests an aspiration/principle for the future rather than a current practice. This construction is consistent with the repertoire of a journey: a negotiation of position.

This negotiation does not reside within the individual, but is contextualised in relationships of systems:

kōrero 6.04

I don’t think biculturalism works because I can’t find it working anywhere. I can’t find any concrete examples of it.

B: What about you?

No, I’m one pākehā. There are a thousand or more employees here.

B: Do you think biculturalism is only when it’s fifty-fifty?
No I just—well, I suppose I do really. I think the word biculturalism is a dangerous word now because it means tokenism really [mary/797-811]

When I/i first heard mary’s opening comment I/i was surprised. Here is someone who is identified as working in a bicultural fashion who says: “I don’t think biculturalism works.” She clarifies her position by identifying biculturalism as representing “tokenism.”

She says “biculturalism” is a “dangerous word now.” Assuming tokenism adequately represents biculturalism is an indictment not only of the complacency of the service, but also of a term (bicultural) that can so easily/uncritically become appropriated. mary reiterates: token practice inadequately represents institutional bicultural practice.

Tokenism is an inclusion of cultural elements (knowledge or peoples) that is offensive in that pākehā retain the power to choose what is appropriate to appropriate. Such co-option of processes and content of bicultural interactions undermines a commitment to partnership (Rangihau, 1988; Johnston, 1998; Jackson, 1992). In tokenism, māori processes are re-interpreted in pākehā terms without māori consent or authority (Stewart, 1997; Metge, 1995).

mary emphasises the “concrete examples” where she might “find biculturalism working.” She does not say that biculturalism is impossible, nor that it is a mistaken ideology (although both may be implied), but focuses on practice being where biculturalism might be found. It is constructed as a process rather than an essential quality.

She identifies no other pākehā in a population of “a thousand employees or more” who also support a bicultural kaupapa in their practice. In her particular situation, being “one [bicultural] person” falls far short of a “fifty-fifty” commitment to partnership in her service. For mary, an individual cannot represent biculturalism for all pākehā nor for a whole service. Therefore her individual contribution, albeit genuine, in the context of a system that is otherwise unresponsive to challenges of biculturalism becomes a token: a
plastic/cosmetic representation of a bicultural commitment. As one pākehā in the whole service, Mary also speaks of the aloneness of this position. Further discussion of this quality of isolation is included in korero 7.05.

In naming pākehā power Mary implicitly challenges the appropriateness of this position. She distances herself from such arrogant practice through her disparaging tone. In another point she also overtly questions the right of pākehā to speak for māori (see korero 6.10).

Mike emphasises the reciprocity required in order to achieve “viable biculturalism”:

kōrero 6.05

If we’re to have a viable biculturalism, it’ll be one in which both parties are real strong, but we’re respecting each other’s strength instead of one looking down on the other and there being ‘you’re this, you’re that; you need this, you need that’

[mike/1278-1282]

Mike uses “viable” to question biculturalism in the present, and positions it as an aspiration for the future. He presents this hypothetically: “If there were to be a viable biculturalism, it [will] be.” This is similar to the future aspirations of “genuine” biculturalism talked about earlier (see korero 6.01).

Obscuring the parties involved in ‘looking down on the other’ that operates in the second half of the kōrero is not difficult to decipher. In disguising the ascription of position, blame, and disenfranchisement cannot are not specifically located with either partner. This may not have been his intent, but it works to move beyond the paralysis of guilt common in guilt-inducing modes of essentialist education.

A fundamental representation of position is achieved through pronouns (Tan & Modhaddam, 1999; Harré & van Langenhove, 1999). Pronouns are a social practice that provide a concept of self/other, they require contextual and relational knowledge of the self/other, and also speak of intimate/distant relationships between us and them or with you (Mulhausler & Harre, 1990). The
shift in pronoun use was of particular interest when a pākehā ‘us’ became a pākehā ‘they’ (Tan & Moghaddam, 1999).

mike uses a “we” that includes māori: tātou. The requirement to have a relationship with māori in bicultural ventures is apparent in this construction.

Biculturalism is when “both parties are real strong”, although he avoids an interpretation of this as a conflict of power by adding “respecting each other’s strength.” This orientates the reader to a relationship of reciprocity.

He insinuates the previous power relationship was imbalanced, “one looking down on the other.” One says “you’re this, you’re that” to the other. The position of one partner cannot be considered in isolation from the position of the other. This acknowledges the power relations while avoiding the attribution of colonial guilt to pākehā.

Power relations between māori and pākehā specify the type of relationship that can qualify as bicultural. Relationships provide positions for the self and other. mary speaks of relationships between pākehā and māori:

kōrero 6.06

The time when pākehā speak for māori has long since gone, although they still do it [mary/729-730]

mary implies there was a time when it was acceptable for “pākehā [to] speak for māori.” Such actions are now considered inappropriate, although this does not appear to bother pākehā who “still do it.”

The implications of pākehā speaking for māori are that the pākehā voice silences/subverts the voice of māori. If the voices of māori and pākehā sounded the same, this process would not be offensive. However, offence is given since pākehā voices do not (even) harmonise with māori voices. mary inequivocally understands ‘speaking for’ as paternalism that is antiquated: its time “has long since gone.”

The use of pronouns provides interesting positions of différence. mary talks of paternalistic pākehā as “they.” While mary and the pākehā subject of her kōrero may share the same race/ethnicity/culture, mary indicates they are distinct in terms of assuming the right/privilege/power to speak for māori (see
also kōrero 6.08). The time when pākehā (intellectuals/civilised) spoke for māori (native/savage) was supported by a colonial discourse that created a subaltern māori. Having a clear understanding of pākehā power and a (only ever) partial knowledge of māori marginalisation may result in disruption to privilege as pākehā re-orientate to a māori centre.

**disrupting power: transforming (into) ‘other’**

The previous chapter spoke of the transformation from an acultural self to a self that was culturally located. By de-centring pākehā and privileging a māori centre, new postcolonial possibilities/positions are enabled. This process was a difficult and challenging journey that ‘other’-ed pākehā and recognised pākehā cultural specificity through différance. The construction of the other simultaneously constructs the self. Knowing différance allows the normality of the self to be known. Previously pākehā may have simply not acknowledged their culture because they had not been confronted with situations that make them cognisant of their cultural position/privilege/difference (Mulgan, 1985; Pearson, 1990; Taylor & Wetherell, 1995). Cultural specificity is frequently only realised upon leaving Aotearoa/New Zealand to become a visitor in another country. Upon return pākehā may have a stronger sense of being a ‘New Zealander’ (King, 1999; Jamieson, 1996; Evans & Paewai, 1999).

A culture of contrast was commonly achieved through overseas travel and immersion in a completely different culture: as a foreigner the acultural/hegemonic self becomes culturally located and othered/sublateraln.
I was able to look at colonisation when I went to [another country] more easily than I was able to see it when I was in New Zealand—and then coming back. That was an incredibly uncomfortable experience because then I had to think of myself as part of the colonising group ... if I didn’t have to [look at the power that I hold] somehow it would be much more comfortable and easier, in a way, to kind of live in my little bubble [alice/614-623]

alice opens her kōrero with a past/prior inability to see colonisation. This colonial view blinds the privileged to their privilege and also to the marginalisation of other. Familiarity with home/normal processes naturalise colonising processes. alice comes to use the context of colonisation to position herself as postcolonial pākehā. She was able to “look at colonisation” more easily in another country than when she “was in New Zealand.” Overseas colonisation does not implicate pākehā as coloniser. As a visitor alice is not directly associated with, nor responsible for, the colonisation of another country. However, having seen colonisation elsewhere enables alice to ‘see’ colonisation on return to Aotearoa/New Zealand compelling her “to think of [her]self as part of the colonising group.” As a pākehā individual she recognises the power and privilege of her position. Similar to the decolonising (his)story, this telling of travel and return provides a different account of colonisation, power and privilege and of herself.

A challenging question is asked of the pakeha self: “Why would I want to put myself in the very uncomfortable place of having to look at that?” The individual authority/agency alice has exercises the agency required in choosing the uncomfortable place. The metaphor she uses to describe the difference between these two positions constructs post-ing65 as inevitable. Being “in my

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65 The ‘post’ generally indicates a position that comes after: dislodging and replacing what was before (Parker, 1990a).
little bubble” indicates a position separated from reality, where the self is in the centre, subjectivity reigns, and the (pākehā) self is protected from “having to look at [the colonising power of pākehā].” It is inevitable that the bubble will burst just as the illusion has shattered (kōrero 5.05) to incontrovertibly acknowledge pākehā hegemony.

alice comes to recognise the power that she as a pākehā individual holds. Her kōrero uses the singular, authority of “I”: I looked at colonisation overseas, I saw it in New Zealand, I thought of myself as colonising, I positioned myself in this uncomfortable place. The authority and agency of the individual self also speaks aloneness: there are insufficient numbers for “we,” leaving only “I.”

alice constructs her colonial/acultural self as familiar and comfortable and her postcolonial self as incredibly uncomfortable. alice reflects fondly upon the ignorant bliss of the colonial self. She formulates this lament as though it is impossible to achieve now, even for her. The postcolonial self is compelled to address/name/disrupt pākehā privilege through alternative accounts of history and orientation to pākehā power and undermines pākehā agency in the process. As colonial pakeha there is little pride in assuming a position of privilege (Tilbury, 2001). The subjectivity that once easily justified privilege as individual agency becomes politicised and changed forever.

There is a price to pay for the transformation of pākehā subjectivity: what was once easy and simple (see kōrero 5.05) become difficult and uncomfortable. This is facilitated by re-orientation to a māori centre. alice obscures/negates her complicity with the systems of colonisation by describing the process as an “incredibly uncomfortable experience.” From her new vantage point she re-negotiates her position in the world: counter-/post-colonial. This revelation/epiphany provides another lens with which to view the world; an alternative subject position, and a changed subjectivity. Such that taking up previous positions of privilege, postcolonial understandings/subjectivity displaces/transforms colonial bliss. The new politicisation disrupts the natural/neutral ignorance of this position.
Friere (1970/1972) talks of a profound rebirth where oppressors are able to reflect upon the relationship of oppression. It is also common for there to be a commitment to action. Opportunities for pākehā to experience cultural dislocation in Aotearoa/New Zealand were available, but not common. In the next kōrero jeff feels marginalised as a pākehā lecturer teaching an immersion māori class:

In a way, the tables were turned and y’know I was coming into the dominant culture of the group from a min- in a sense from a minority position ... I mean it’s still easy because I can go out of the door and be back in mine ... But for that time and in that topic I was on the receiving end of it and fair enough too

jeff tentatively positions himself as “a minority” coming into a “dominant [māori] culture” where “the tables were turned” on the normal order of things. This disrupts ‘normal’ pākehā hegemony: in the immersion class māori are the “majority” therefore jeff becomes part of a (pākehā) minority.

Seldom are people of the dominant group made to feel culturally marginalised in their country of birth. jeff uses words that describe the experience of being a minority, but he puts careful boundaries around his ‘minority’ position: the walls of the classroom. Although in the environment of the classroom he might experience discomfort, in the environment around the classroom he retains his position of privilege.

jeff actively avoids being read as a monocultural pākehā wanting to uncritically claim a position of natural dominance. For a pākehā to be on “the receiving end of it” he judges as “fair enough too.” This implies that normally pākehā are not on the receiving end of it, but when the tables are turned it is fair enough.
jeff is cautious about positioning his (pākehā) self as a minority and does a lot of work to acknowledge his experience as exceptional. Jeff’s position in the māori context of the classroom was “from a min-in a sense from a minority position.” Jeff stutters and then uses disclaimers (“in a way” and “in a sense”) in anticipation of challenge. To strengthen his statement he assigns careful parameters to his claim: māori privilege existed only within the bounds of the class where Jeff suspended his pākehā privilege. However when the class is finished he has the privilege of returning to a position of dominance. Jeff’s ‘minority status’ therefore is temporary, self-imposed, and easily reversed.

david also recognises this choice as a privilege:

I had a choice to live in that culture for three months. I could come back and be comfortable again [david/158-160]

Jeff exercised a choice to be positioned in “a minority position.” When he chooses, he can end the experience and “come back” (return) to his position of privilege. Johnson (2002) calls this “mimesis of alterity” (p. 161). Although it does not unproblematically equate with marginalisation, it does illustrate an appreciation for positions of power and acknowledgement of the privilege of choice.

One of the difficulties bicultural pākehā experience is how those taking up a counter-hegemonic position are discredited, suppressed, and undermined/pressured by the privileged they are challenging.

The position of resistance mike constructs here positions himself as pākehā in a marginalised position, but there is the addition of the powerful, privileged, resistant pākehā to negotiate with as well.

mike adopts a stream metaphor to construct his position of resistance:

I remember [a māori colleague] ... saying that going outside the marae gates was like- felt like going upstream, being a stone and the current’s flowing the
other way, it's just really hard to push against. Well, it's actually a bit like that for pākehā people too, when we dare to actually step out there and say 'well, I actually stand for something different here. I want to do things differently here' y'know? There is- there is that pressure and that sort of sense of betrayal and um irresponsibility and all that kind of stuff y'know 'where are you coming from? This is good for you, why the hell are you kicking up about, making a fuss about?' [mike/344-356]

Staying “within the marae gates” indicates the protection of a māori environment. Upon “going outside the marae gates” and “going upstream” the subject enters the domain of the mainstream/“stream,” as “a stone” and feels strong pressure to conform from the current that is “flowing the other way.”

The “stream” remains anonymous throughout the kōrero, mike speaks of “there being that pressure” and of “standing up to that.” Rather than being a conscious act by someone, it is a pressure that just exists. This may function to reinforce the strength of this pressure: such vagueness also makes it difficult to counter-act (Edwards & Potter, 1992). The stream here is interpreted as the ‘mainstream.’

Moving in the same direction as the stream makes it difficult to assess how swift and strong the current is. Unreflective subjects of colonialism are therefore often oblivious to the power of mainstream, unaware of different worldviews, and assume the ‘stream’ is as comfortable and normal for all people as it is for them. This is consistent with the earlier ideas of pākehā culture being invisible (see Kōrero 5.08). Resistance works to challenge the status quo by naming the privilege and illustrating the choice that the privileged.

pākehā who “dare to . . . step out” are in direct opposition to mainstream pākehā. In order to challenge the pākehā system, mike uses resources outside of mainstream commonsense to make a sensible argument. He borrows the stream metaphor from a māori colleague. mike and his struggle are affiliated with
similar struggles of māori. When applying this māori experience to pākehā, mike is careful: “it’s just really hard to push against . . . it’s actually a bit like that for pākehā people too.” The use of the word ‘actually’ works to emphasise the information that follows, to guard it against anticipated dissent (Tilbury, 1998). mike’s caution carries traces of previous tentative constructions around disrupting pākehā power. This stream metaphor constructs the position of pākehā as marginalised and challenges common and accepted constructions of pākehā as powerful and comfortable. Aligning pākehā with māori may imply equality of experience. Although there are elements that are similar, the magnitude and the degree of difficulty are incomparable. To compare the marginalisation of māori people over generations to pākehā pressure to conform could work to minimise māori experience of colonisation.

pākehā difficulty is also communicated in the description of their actions, these people don’t just step out; they dare to step out. To “dare” to stand for something is a conscious act of defiance. To “dare” also carries a sense of courage and boldness in providing a challenge to the mainstream.

There is “a sense of betrayal” when “pākehā people” “make a stand” against the mainstream group. Similar to an earlier example (see kōrero 5.05) a relationship of trust and allegiance between the mainstream and the (now) dissidents has been broken. In this interpretation making a stand is treated as an affront.

mike is held accountable to the group and its interests (Edwards & Potter, 1992). The first comment “Where are you coming from?” illustrates a lack of understanding or an attempt to undermine the sensibility of the challenge.

To be “kicking up” and “making a fuss” constructs resistance as an irrational reaction, and reinforces the dissident’s “irresponsibility.” Mainstream pākehā question how sensible it is to resist a system that is “good for you.” This assumes a belief in the universal “good” of the system. The unspoken context is: “good for you as pākehā.” “[New Zealanders] are uneasy about burgeoning pluralism, partly because no-one has explained to them that it was the old
homogeneity and conformism that was artificial, and not the ‘coming out’ of
difference” (Belich, 2001b, p. 549). pākehā support for change is usually
overwhelmed by pākehā resistance, the risks and requirements of accepting the
challenges to scientific ideology are too great (McCreanor, 1993a).

Resisting the silencing of difference came to include the voices of pākehā
who were committed to a pluralistic future, disrupting the position of
monocultural mainstream pākehā. But also in the process sharing the
experience of māori as ‘other-ed’ by the majority (Johnson, 2002). Rather than
being othered by māori, mike takes up a position that is subjected to the same
pressures māori face. The tātou of māori/pākehā does not include the pākehā
other that is privileged, powerful, and highly resistant to change. This
metaphor of stream communicates the difficulty of challenging the hegemony
for very little change in (im-)balance of power (Weedon, 1997).

mary is also clear about particular positions for pākehā in respect to
māori knowledge:

ko rero 6.10

Other pākehā, other mainstream managers … get in touch
with me and ask ‘Is this right? Is this pronunciation
right?’ And I say, ‘Well don’t ask me I have private
lessons but I’m a raw beginner.’ I’m not that, and you
should never ask pākehā, ask tangata whenua [mary/754-
759]

mary is unequivocal in positioning herself in relation to “other pākehā”
and in relation to “tangata whenua.” Other pākehā ask mary questions about
their māori language pronunciation. Their position as “mainstream managers”
indicates their position of power within the pākehā system, but also their lack
of proficiency in terms of (māori) pronunciation. mary is approached because
she is recognised to have some māori language proficiency, and therefore
granted authority to judge another’s pākehā’s pronunciation. mary overtly
rejects such positioning by claiming she is “a raw beginner.”
She is probably being overly careful in the way she positions herself here. Surely someone who takes “private lessons” would have easily progressed past the level of “raw beginner” to be sufficiently qualified to offer basic advice on pronunciation. It is likely her overt resistance carries implications beyond this specific situation guided by an underlying moral: pākehā who seek consultation on māori issues “should never ask pākehā, ask tangata whenua.”

To position herself as an authority on māori knowledge is untenable for it carries implications that mary is careful to avoid: pākehā (even bicultural pākehā such as mary) should never speak for māori. This is consistent with māori understandings (Stewart, 1993). You may recall mary making this statement earlier (kōrero 6.05). mary is consistently careful in defining contemporary relations between mainstream managers and tangata whenua as centralising māori control over their own systems of knowledge.

By signifying māori as “tangata whenua” mary alludes to the tino rangatiratanga of local iwi in a way the more generic term (māori) does not. This also disputes her “raw beginner” position and challenges her colonial position of power and complacency/complicity with māori marginalisation. Mary is able to challenge the dynamics of power by taking up a counter-position in relation to the powerful pākehā mainstream. In the process she disrupts the potential mastery of, and entitlement to, all knowledge that pākehā assume is a natural right (Jones, A., 2001). By pākehā assuming the authority to speak on māori matters, the authority of māori to speak on these issues is undermined (Lammers & Nairn, 1999).

pākehā counter-positioned in relation to the mainstream challenged pākehā power and implicated taking up a marginalised position. ross describes this as a political position:

kōrero 6.11

To claim the title pākehā is actually to claim a political position which says: “we came to ‘māori-
Chapter VII: marginalises

(.66)-land’’ - it’s interesting that’s not a term that’s used in New Zealand a lot- but “we came to your place and in doing so it is perfectly appropriate for us to be designated in this, in a(n) indigenous term” ... if that was how māori were designating pākehā as ‘other’ then that’s appropriate. I mean, It’s-your-place-not-ours kind of stuff and then it becomes a matter of us giving sense to that [ross/146-151; 156-158]

ross recognises that owning the title ‘pākehā’ is an action, not an imposition or inheritance: it is asserted by pākehā and to “claim a political position.” Accepting “an indigenous term” to describe the self is constructed here as a reasonable extension of māori sovereignty as “indigenous.”

pākehā deference to māori protocol is made even more explicit through “designating pākehā as other.” This is constructed as “perfectly appropriate” because pākehā “came to māori land.” Interesting in this example that a postcolonial pākehā articulates “māori land” and a trace/pause (normal for a colonial pākehā) still disrupts: The silence/pause speaks of the discomfort of this signification.

He pauses in making the designation of māori land and immediately reflects in an aside: “that’s not a term that’s used in New Zealand a lot.” It is interesting that even for bicultural pākehā, signification that privileges māori are unfamiliar enough to warrant silent consideration and an aside. This speaks to the novelty of such articulation. A novel partial intelligibility of a familiar situation marks a change in subjectivity (Davies & Harré, 1990). How might such a signifier be uncomfortable?

Referring to Aotearoa/New Zealand as “māori land” acknowledges the sovereignty of māori as of full and complete prior owners of the land. ross works to honour māori sovereignty in spite of contemporary pākehā status: ‘we [pākehā] came to your [māori] place and in doing so it is perfectly appropriate

66 this designates a significant pause.
for us to be designated in... an indigenous term.' pākehā disempowerment in
these contexts was seen as justified and fair consequence. ross decentralises
pākehā power and positions māori as indigenous and with primary rights to
define. Talking of māori as a nation prior to pākehā settlement, calls into
question pākehā colonisation and the usurping of māori sovereignty (Wetherell
& Potter, 1992). This 'site of resistance' challenges pākehā power by the pākehā
individual.

ross creates a new position for himself by consciously defining himself in
māori terms. māori do not impose such positioning upon pākehā, the onus for
change rests with pākehā: "it becomes a matter of us giving sense to that." This
way of constituting the process in terms of intelligibility provides a glimpse of
subjectivity and subject positions and the need for intelligibility/common
understandings.

For the kaikōrero, negotiating being pākehā requires a critique of pākehā
systems of domination, positioning the self in relation to their colonial heritage,
challenging the old system and thereby creating a counter-position of a
postcolonial self. This position allows pākehā to engage in a relationship with
māori that supports māori centrality and disrupts/questions pākehā privilege.
This position allows postcolonial pākehā to distance themselves from a colonial
position through recognising the plurality of culture and challenging pākehā
hegemony. By orientating to a māori centre ross challenges the status quo and
deconstructs pākehā domination.

Throughout this chapter the positioning of pākehā has been presented as
a movement/journey from a colonial position of cultural ignorance,
unaware/uncritical of pākehā power, unconsciously supporting assumptions of
universality to realising pākehā privilege and māori marginalisation. This
process, while a privilege of the privileged was difficult and challenging. It
included wrestling with tough, painful, and complicated questions that created
dilemmas. The personal changes create tension between the kaikōrero and the
mainstream. The (pākehā) system is seen to legitimise pākehā dominance (and
māori marginalisation). Upon realising this situation the kaikōrero position
themselves counter to colonial positions. The positioning of the self in relation to the mainstream becomes oppositional: counter-mainstream. Mike discusses this position in more depth in kōrero 6.09 using the metaphor of a stream/mainstream.

Creating an ‘other’ space for pākehā works as a site of resistance to pākehā colonial domination and deconstructs pākehā as powerful and invisible. The kaikōrero use these linguistic resources to enter into innovative and new relationships with māori.

There are pre-emptive traces of bicultural practice as a fluid, fragmentary, and flexible construction of process. Rather than biculturalism being understood as an essential part of a person, it is understood as a position that becomes negotiated with self and others. But understanding is not only a matter of conscious awareness of cultural specificity and the effects of privilege and colonisation. The following chapter weaves the more subjective experiences of the heart into/through this process of negotiating pākehā bicultural positions.
Chapter VIII: Heart

HEART SUBJECTIVITY

HE KOKONGA WHARE E KITEA
HE KOKONGA NGĀKAU E KORE E KITEA

Being pākehā raises questions of acceptance, comfort and belonging. The postcolonial and colonial positions introduced in previous chapters are simultaneously present within the individual who has subjective experience of both these positions. Both positions have a colonial past, contemporary (pākehā) privilege, and orientate to a transformed future relationship with māori of partnership. The heart changes that are inevitably involved in personal changes such as these continue the theme of discomfort and challenge. They also introduce the need for a sense of belonging.
Subjectivity includes the experience of practice, personal change, political commitments, difficult encounters, and Tiriti/Treaty obligations. Talking only of subject positions and associated rights, duties, and obligations sterilises the affect/emotional experience of subjectivity. Subjectivity allows the multiple positions available to the individual to cohere and have impact on the individual. The different positions available to a person are not discrete, autonomous elements, but woven together through/into the experience of the individual.

Powerful prerequisites for cultural consciousness have been identified as gaining affective knowledge and skills. Subjectivity as heart change is similarly constructed as having personal, emotional, and profound impact through processes that are uncomfortable, difficult, and challenging.

Personal agency is acknowledged through this chapter as the power and influence of the individual. Although particular discourses and positions are privileged, the individual has the choice to accept, supplement, or negate/resist particular positions. Positioning the (postcolonial) self in opposition to other (colonial) pākehā worked here to disrupt pākehā power. This also occurred through orientation to a māori centre.

A personal engagement with biculturalism was one of the criteria used to distinguish the tokenism constructed in the previous chapter from ‘genuine’ biculturalism. Throughout this section the kōrero orientated toward contested meanings and attempted to assert a particular interpretation of biculturalism that was based on practice, relationship, and aspirations for the future. The necessity for deep, personal participation is also acknowledged:
The [Tiriti/] Treaty underpins the policy, and then the policy requires the government staff to be knowledgeable and probably skilful (laugh) working cross-culturally. Because I just still struggle with a bicultural construct for a pākehā unless I think they’ve really acknowledged a willingness to participate quite sortof deeply in māori culture [jeff/1003-1009]

For jeff, the Tiriti/Treaty provides the foundations for biculturalism that feed into the policy (principles) which in turn dictates a certain level of competency for staff in “working cross-culturally” (practice). There is a tension between the principle provided by the policy and the practice.

The practice is described at two levels: being “knowledgeable” and being “skilful.” The “knowledgeable” component is presented without qualification. But jeff scoffs at the “skilful” component, qualifying it with “probably” and following it with a laugh that effectively questions the skill.

He warrants his “struggle” reconciling pākehā to a “bicultural construct” by virtue of their personal commitment to the kaupapa: pākehā should have “acknowledged a willingness to participate quite sortof deeply in māori culture.” jeff infers that biculturalism is not just an accumulation of skills and extension of knowledge, but a personal commitment to the kaupapa. The Treaty exerts an influence not only at the level of policy, but also for the individual. jeff implies that without acknowledgement, willingness, and deep participation with māori culture, bicultural practice will be compromised.

Crossing the threshold produces a duality of pākehā subjective experience: postcolonial/colonial. These two positions are constituted as opposing pairs negotiating position in relation to each other (Billig, 1991). The experience of the colonial is challenged by the existence of the postcolonial. A repertoire of difficulty and struggle was used by the kaikōrero to describe this process.
The dissonance within the self is played out with intimate (colonial) others and the oppositional (postcolonial) self. Managing a colonial past involves commitment to a postcolonial future and dissonance that provides a site for argumentation.

Pronouns were useful in analysing the position of the self in relation to others. The most significant of these pronoun groupings are those that distance pākehā from other pākehā, particularly in relation to commitment to the kaupapa of biculturalism. Mary talks about her involvement with māori and consequent discord with her family:

It’s been a painful journey sort of thing. And it has been quite painful to me, cause I’ve had to shift sort of attitudes and values and things and I’m not the person that I was ... the person they’re looking for isn’t there any more. And that’s how I feel really. That often in my family, I have to make huge concessions to them because they think I’m into the māori thing, which makes me feel like punching their lights out really [mary/322-326; 343-348]

Mary constructs a transition or “journey” that emphasises the process of change and change of position: “I’m not the person that I was.”

She speaks of a shift in her “attitudes and values” and experiences dissonance with “her family.” The family expect her to be “the person they’re looking for.” The familiar (prior) ‘Mary’ is not slightly modified: “the person they’re looking for isn’t there anymore.” This transition is not natural or anticipated by her family because they are still “looking for” the person she was. Rather than being a family of “we” (including Mary) the family is constituted as “they” or “them.” This distinction of pronouns communicates distance between Mary and her family. Mary’s positions could be thought of as a ‘post-’ relationship: Mary and post-Mary.
The relationship between post-mary and her family is discordant for she has to make "huge concessions" because "they think [she's] into the māori thing." Being "into" something is like being in a phase of development that will be grown out of. By labelling mary's interest "the māori thing" the family is portrayed as having a vague and unsophisticated knowledge of māori and a disrespectful and dismissive appreciation of mary's position. The cause of tension is also recognised to be relevant to post-mary’s relationship with māori. Her transition is a “painful journey” perhaps because it creates an uncomfortable and unfamiliar distance between post-mary and her intimate others. The implication is that such tensions were not present for mary.

Her defiance being positioning thus is registered unequivocally: she feels like “punching their lights out.” This formulation shows seriously aggressive supplementation suggesting antagonism/hostility between post-mary and her family.

The simultaneous presence of postcolonial and colonial commonly carries uncomfortable dissonance and may polarise the self and the family:

kōrero 7.02a

I couldn’t bring my other part of family into it, y’know what I mean? ... It’s complicated. It’s a dilemma (laugh) Mmm I’m still reckoning [bubba/198-200]

The “dilemma” of the relationship between bubba and her “other part of family” is “complicated” and irreconcilably so: “I couldn’t bring my other part of family into it.” By virtue of one part of family being involved in māori culture, it does not logically follow that the “other part of family” is also “into it.” This constructs bubba’s position as a polemic of opposition: counter to that of her family. The discomfort of this position in relation to their families is signified through anxious laughter. Relinquishing comfort and taking up a position of difference again involves challenge and struggle.
In the first part of his kōrero mike speaks in the voice of students who are also dismayed with intimate others:

\[ \text{kōrero 7.03} \]

'Ve go back to our families, we go back to our flats, and every conversation is now loaded, y'know. We can't sit on the fence any more, every conversation is loaded. That—there's no neutral ground any more, we have to now do the thing of either ... hearing it and shutting off, or actioning it.' They've still got the choice between those things, but they can't not hear it anymore [mike/362-369]

The situation presented here for the students is similar to the previous accounts of mary and bubba. Relationships with “families” and “flats” that used to be easy have become oppositional: “every conversation is loaded.” Loaded conversations carry threats of explosions/argumentation. mike's subsequent references to such conflict remain opaque: he talks about “those things” and “it.”

The “loaded conversations” provide two options: “hearing it and shutting it off” or “actioning it.” This does not become an automatic decision rather a “choice” negotiated with “every conversation.”

Changes in positioning that are enabled (for some) through challenges to pākehā privilege are not restricted to the classroom or the workplace: there are profound consequences in the personal lives of these students. Personal life is fettered by changes in a professional/work life. The ability to keep changes to the self separate is impossible: The choice to “not hear it anymore” is no longer available. For what might be considered the colonial self, it was possible to ignore these loaded conversations by sitting on the fence. Being “neutral” on an issue of power protects the status quo from challenges. For the postcolonial self “there’s no neutral ground”: perhaps because inaction then becomes a choice.

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67 The voice of the student is indicated by inverted commas.
that indirectly supports the status quo (Edwards & Potter, 1992; Billig et al., 1988).

Consistent with the previous kōrero, bicultural practice is constructed independently of bicultural principles. For some this represents an ‘appropriation of bicultural rhetoric’. The practice (talk/words) of biculturalism should be interpreted in the context of the service and in respect of the kaupapa they are required to represent.

marlane talks of her personal agency as a practitioner:

You are your own tool in the job and that’s you personally are the primary tool at work and that therefore your work is um sortof defined in its scope and limitations by the limitations of yourself

The individual is the “primary tool in the job.” marlane likens herself to an instrument emphasising her agency in practice. The work of the individual is dependent on the resources of the individual. Because “you are your own tool” the personal agency of practice is clear. marlane does not talk about the larger systemic influences (such as policies or service constraints), but draws attention to the personal agency of the individual in regard to the “limitations” of “your work” as limitations of the self. The individual is the site for the principle to be made manifest in practice.

The following kōrero is similar in that there is clear focus on three qualities of which two are located in the individual. ross introduces the influence of the institution on individual practice:
For some people, following 'the rules' is where they start. The head and the heart may follow, particularly if they’re supported and encouraged and not kinda left to run aground. But there are others where 'the rules' are the last thing that come in play.

He talks of three aspects of change: “the rules” the “head and the heart.” The rules restrict/define the practices of the service/institution and may provide impetus for change. 'The rules' place the individual as an actor in the context of a society/institution/service that controls practice. The rules are pressures extraneous to the individual that may challenge the comfort/privilege of pākehā independently of head/heart changes. For some, the head and the heart may resonate with these rules, while for others, changes of ‘the head’ or ‘the heart’ may precede ‘the rules’ coming into play.

Personal change is optimal in an environment where people are “supported and encouraged.” Being “left to run aground” indicates being isolated, losing momentum/direction, and becoming stuck. Support is constructed as something needed throughout this journey. The earlier subjective constructions of isolation and individuation (using pronoun “I”) construct a position that is neither supported nor encouraged, even intimate others are oppositional! morgan constructs resistance also from managers:

it was about heart it wasn’t about your head. Go into a meeting and say you’re speaking from here [points to heart] some managers think you’ve gone la-la [morgan/434-436]

morgan is more definite about the need to privilege the heart work. There is still mention of the “head” but “it was about heart.” The marginalised position of heart knowledge/process is acknowledged through her anticipation/previous experience of disparaging remarks from her peers. When
they think of the heart workers as having “gone la-la” morgan acknowledges
that ‘heart talk’ threatens the normality of the meeting. Privileging the (feeling)
heart over the (reasoning) head undermines the integrity and impact of
morgan’s contribution should it become an experience/knowledge of heart.
‘Head’ and ‘heart’ are qualities significantly located within the individual and
function to indicate a profound and deep subjective change within a person.

The political context in which ‘heart’ work is subordinated to ‘head’
work can not afford to be ignored (Domenech-Rodriguez & Wieling, 2005).
Neither can the political context of practicing cultural ‘sensitivity’ without
political savvy:

kōrero 7.07

You have to be very careful. I mean, wandering in
there and talking to a young māori bloke in māori may
be one of the most depowering things you can do.
‘Cause you’ve had access to māori language courses and
he hasn’t [ross/761-764]

The warning to be “very careful” suggests that culturally responsive
practice cannot be a matter of simply and unreflexively following ‘rules’. For
example, greeting a māori person through hongi68, a mihi or even assuming te
reo māori is appropriate (as ross suggests) may be actively harmful.
Responsiveness is subject to context, and that which is culturally sensitive on
one occasion, may cause political/cultural/personal offence on another.

Cultural competency cannot be assessed by the colour of skin:
ethnic/race identity does not equate to cultural knowledge (Thomas, 1988;
Brady, 1992; Sue, 1988). pākehā access to māori cultural knowledge perpetuates
colonial processes for māori who have not had access to māori taonga, such as
teo (Puketapu-Andrews, 1997). Using te reo indiscriminately can highlight
that pākehā have had access to resources which have not been available to
māori, and therefore increase the feeling of powerlessness (Māori Asthma

68 hongi: hongi is a touching of noses (and sometimes also foreheads) allowing
the two people to become joined through sharing the same breath.
Review Team, 1991; Ramsden, 1992; Tipene-Leach, 1981). Careless political insensitivity increase feelings of powerlessness nad are complicit with assaults on māori cultural integrity (language, identity, tino rangatiratanga) that have had serious negative health impacts on māori people (Pakeha Treaty Action, 1997).

For māori, strength of belonging is communicated through/as tūrangawaewae. For the kaikōrero, a sense of belonging was negotiated as an individual in a political context of society and of the service.

I got the goose pimples .. when I heard the music, when I heard the stories that mum had told me that her mum had told her. It was like a belonging that I couldn’t explain. Y’know it wasn’t- how did I know that I belonged there? I don’t know, it was a heart thing and that- I think that stabilised who I was [tina/172-178]

The sense of “belonging” is difficult for tina to explain except as “a heart thing .. that stabilised who I was.” She infers that prior to this point she experienced instability. The process of exploring “belonging” is personalised and felt profoundly as evidenced by the “goose pimples.” Through “music” and “stories” that were passed down from grandmother to mother to daughter. Again, the primacy of personal and individual agency is emphasised through the use of “I.”

MacKay (1995) talks of the need to have some consistency in work and non-work life regarding bicultural commitment, such that “living and working and doing are not separate things” (p. vii). Some have suggested cultural intentionality requires ‘heart’ changes (Walker, 1996b; Piddington, 1980, March 29). Professional development cannot be enabled without personal involvement (Lee, 2005).
Underlying any desire to become more culturally sensitive there has to be an understanding that this will be a process of change not just for the target culture but for you as well—your being, your beliefs, your theories, your practice (Smith, L., 1989, p. 52).

The personal impact of this type of development requires an investment of the self to achieve the change required of personal practice.

The cost of negotiating a new type of relationship with Māori is similarly constructed as personal and professional, perhaps even having an impact on the soul (Nikora, 2001; Turia, 2000; Durie, M., 2001). Relatedness is understood as a personal commitment that goes beyond professional demands and becomes a lifelong commitment to learning (Aguirre, Bermúdez, Cardona, Zamora & Reyes, 2005; Ritchie, 1993).

Alice talks of the consequences of accepting a colonising story and the subject positions available for Pākehā within that discourse:

kōrero 7.09

I was born and brought up here but in another sense I think I still struggle with that kinda feeling of being an outsider of being sort of someone who isn’t necessarily seen as welcome in this country. Yeah, so there’s a bit of ‘Can I claim that [this is my country too]? Can I strongly claim that without being seen as an oppressor as a coloniser and as perpetuating that?’ [Alice/239-244]

Alice positions herself as someone who questions her entitlement to “claim” Aotearoa/New Zealand as homeland. To be able to make such a claim is not an unreasonable expectation for someone “born and brought up here.” It becomes apparent that nationality, residency, or citizenship are insufficient to challenge the “feeling of being an outsider.”

Alice co-articulates an apparent contradiction: She was “born and brought up here” but claims to be “not seen as welcome” and feels like “an outsider.” The contradiction is softened by her tentative construction. She is
careful and faltering in her kōrero, inserting multiple qualifying articulations: “in another sense” “I think” “kinda feeling” “being sortof” who “isn’t necessarily.”

She wants to “strongly claim” a place in/of Aotearoa/New Zealand “without being seen as an oppressor or coloniser.” She personifies the tension between colonial and postcolonial positions. Inheriting a colonial position, while privileged, does not disrupt a sense of being an outsider.

The cultural position of pākehā as oppressor and coloniser is traced to the present through practices that continue to reproduce colonial relationships. This is blithely ignored by the majority of pākehā, for those few who do recognise the privilege there is a similar (now familiar) dichotomy of choice. Waldegrave speaks in the first person about his understanding of colonisation:

I was not alive when my ancestors and others colonised New Zealand. As a result of it, however, I have grown up with access to resources and other privileges denied to many Maori people. I now have the choice of working with my own to stop this collusion, or to continue benefiting from it (Tamasese & Waldegrave, 1994, p. 58).

The positions available to alice to make sense of her life and the lives of others do not provide the sense of belonging she seeks. alice seeks a position outside of those provided by essentialising colonial discourse. While her personal agency and sense of entitlement to “claim” a position are still apparent, they appear mediated by a (negative) social understanding of pākehā. Jonathan questions whether the “whole cultural framework” of pākehā subjectivity might be transformed in/through time.
Urn I guess [pākehā culture] is, by definition, something now that has developed in this land, but it’s still— it’s not indigenous … five hundred years time, who knows? -the whole cultural framework might be different. But at the moment, I think it has to be seen as separate and foreign [jonathan/215-221]

jonathan constructs a careful version of the status of pākehā culture with a particular orientation to time. Jonathan describes the genesis of pākehā culture as “something now that has developed in this land.” The dynamic and adaptive qualities suggested promote a contextual/relational understanding.

He implies that this status has changed somewhat since the first British settlers arrived (it has “developed”), and will continue to change: in another “five hundred years” power relations may transform. “At the moment” he refutes positioning pākehā as indigenous.

He does not claim that pākehā culture is separate and foreign, but that it “has to be seen as separate and foreign.” jonathan is compelled to place pākehā as excluded from an indigenous position. Positioning pākehā thus works to disrupt assumptions of natural (pākehā) dominance.

However, if pākehā were considered indigenous, their current position of privilege and power could be easily legitimised as a right of belonging in relation to the land. The claim of having an indigenous pākehā relationship with the land of Aotearoa/New Zealand would assert an equal (though different) right to that claimed by māori as indigenous peoples. Such an assertion would undermine the legitimacy that a postcolonial pakeha position might recognise as belonging exclusively with maori indigeneity.

Being born in Aotearoa/New Zealand and therefore looking to claim an indigenous identity as pākehā is a politically contentious issue (King, 1991; Pearson, 1989, 1990). “[W]e became indigenous at the point where our focus of identity and commitment shifted to this country and away from our countries
and cultures of origin ... a major and influential part of that transforming interaction was with māori” (King, 1999, p. 235).

‘white native’ is not equivalent in appropriating/assuming an ‘indigenous’ position. ‘native’ comes from the primitivist discourses of the past. A foreign culture claiming such a position of legitimacy in Aotearoa/New Zealand is easily challenged. As foreigners, pākehā might be positioned as an immigrant group with a status equal to that of other settlers.

In one sense the de-legitimation of pākehā claims to indigeneity undermines pākehā authority. But at the same time, an assertion of similarity between pakeha and ‘other settlers’, fails to address pākehā as a colonising foreign force. What are the implications of failing to include the specificity of these relationships here?

ross conceptualises the sense of discomfort in a simple word: strangeness. He proposes a number of terms69 for consideration:

kōrero 7.11

the problem with tauiwi70 of course is that it has this sense of strangeness .. [māori say,] ‘.. you are ‘other’ but- so tangata kē71 but not totally strange: we have lived together’ .. we tried manuhiri at some stage and of course there’s an enormously powerful moral element if we claim to be manuhiri. But it’s a claim that our ancestors particularly never lived up to .. so we tried manuhiri and decided no, we couldn’t earn that at the moment. So I mean, the struggle goes on. [ross/116-128]

The “strangeness” that ross talks of is consistent with the previous kōrero, but links the negotiation of a pākehā subjectivity with māori. He

69 These terms are in bold in the following korero.
70 tauiwi referred to people/s who had come to settle/stay in Aotearoa/New Zealand (Henare, 1988), perhaps synonymous with immigrant. Also interpreted as non-māori (Cram & McCreanor, 1993), but generally excluding pacific islands peoples.
71 tangata kē: different peoples
signifies pākehā as ‘other.’ This is familiar to previous kōrero and offers māori signification of difference/‘other.’ The relationship that is implied through co-habitation (“we have lived together”) apparently qualifies (“not totally”) the “strangeness” inhering in such a relationship.

Another alternative is “manuhiri”. This signifier comes complete with “an enormously powerful moral element.” While he does talk of inability in having “lived up to” or not being able to “earn” being manuhiri: rights, duties, and obligations were not achieved by either “our ancestors” or the current generation.

To understand the enormously powerful morality Ross speaks of, familiarity with the marae encounter of manuhiri and tangata whenua is necessary. The physical distance between the two enables evaluation of the integrity of the hosts/visitors. Rituals to enable closeness must be completed before the manuhiri can be joined with the tangata whenua (Durie, M., 2001). The morality of being a visitor and assuming colonial rights and benevolent duties to colonise/oppress/marginalise those who are tangata whenua contravenes the morality of being hosted and acting with appropriate deference to the hosts. The rhetoric of the magnitude of the “moral element” associated with the position of manuhiri (“enormously powerful”) suggests a moral responsibility that is proportionate to the enormity of the colonial ‘sin’ committed by those who “couldn’t earn [the privilege of manuhiri].” The orientation/ideal/aspiration to the future remains a feature: “the struggle goes on.”

Unspoken in the previous kōrero is how māori are positioned through these various relationships. Would pākehā be considered foreign if it were not for indigenous māori? How could being a coloniser be unappealing if there were no colonised? Would being manuhiri be possible if there were not tangata whenua? I/i offer a question/fragment: would ‘being pākehā’ be a struggle and uncomfortable if it weren’t for māori?

These questions intimate a relationship between māori and pākehā. Wholistic and profound relationships require compassion, awareness, respect,

In looking for a more comfortable belonging/tūrangawāwae, the kaikōrero position themselves counter-pākehā and therefore postcolonial. This privileges a māori/pākehā relationship that is transformative, dynamic, and largely future-orientated. The expression of personal agency is created through the practice of the present. While the history provides a particular version of history/self/other, the present and the future are amenable to the intervention of individuals. The aspirations for biculturalism were not yet realised/actualised, but remained ideal values for a hopeful future. The path to this future is not always easy:

kōrero 7.11

you can get disheartened- so the thing is to track your progress and see where you’re heading and celebrate the small victories [david/183-186]

Aspirations for the future again emerge to mediate getting “disheartened.” Through orientation to future aspirations the inadequacy of the present position is managed. The focus on self progress allows a sense of achievement in an environment where the “small victories” need to be celebrated in order to avoid becoming “disheartened.”

david advises “you” to “track your progress and see where you’re heading.” The metaphor of a journey is consistent with david’s orientation to a transformation/change. The use of the term ‘disheartened’ has resonances of the importance of ‘heart’ to the movement towards transformed relationships.

Reading the ways in which kaikōrero speak of the processes through which they move from cultural awareness, to recognition of privilege and marginalisation involves also attending to the heart of their subjective
experiences: the personal struggles, tensions, and questions that are difficult to resolve. However, these difficulties are also enabling, for they provide resources for opening their hearts to bicultural relationships. How the ‘heart relationship’ enables greater ease and hope for pākehā practitioners is explored in the final analytic chapter.
The kaikōrero often used the repertoire/metaphor of a journey when they talked of their bicultural development. Others talked of a distinct/discrete transformation of subjective experience/understanding. A postcolonial knowledge of self has implied a relationship with māori. Discontent with the present state of biculturalism was mediated by positive aspirations for future relationships that were collaborative and included consultation.
A colonial position and its associated privilege, comfort and power are actively challenged/changed through relationships enabled through postcolonial discourses. The discomfort/displacement of being pākehā may be reconciled through negotiating transformed relationships. Kaikōrero orientation to a future partnership of equality and participation is practiced as tātou: māori/pākehā.

This (tātou) relationship requires the positions of privilege to be disrupted: “the task and challenge will require giving up much of that power and entering into a different alliance with the people we serve” (Sampson, 1993b, p. 1228). The postcolonial position works to disrupt the power and privilege of pākehā through providing “new ways of seeing and being that will deepen our understanding and appreciation for each other” (Johnson, 1999, p. 5).

Throughout the analysis so far kaupapa biculturalism has been discussed in terms of what it is not: not tokenism; not available without acknowledging pākehā culture; not able to be legislated/imposed; not independent of relationships with māori. This chapter reiterates patterns of previous chapters and brings them together to constitute the primacy of relationships with māori as consistent with kaupapa biculturalism. It culminates where the kaikōrero identify principles of collaboration and consultation that provide a framework/model/ideal for meaningful dialogue between māori and pākehā.

jack talks of his sense of being pākehā, and how that is supplemented through/by his relationships with māori:
So, my life in one sense has been trying to keep a balance between knowing I’m a pākehā and quite proud to be that – I’ve not got any doubts about that and I know my ancestry and all about that – and being able to interconnect with the māori community and the special relationship in [Aotearoa/] New Zealand between pākehā and māori has been of great importance [jack/623-629]

jack describes his “life in one sense” as “trying to keep a balance” between being pākehā and “proud,” and “being able to interconnect with the māori community.” jack uses “in a sense” to co-articulate a potentially contradictory statement: being a proud pākehā, and knowing/doing a relationship with māori. He acknowledges the conflict as managing “a balance.” There is a process of negotiation at play.

In his assertions of pākehā pride he has “[no] doubts.” In anticipation of challenges from others, he adds “I know my ancestry and all about that.” In knowing a colonial heritage jack remains indubitably proud of his pākehā heritage. Previous constructions of a colonising history informing a sense of being pākehā have not been associated with “pride” (see kōrero 6.07). jack talks about this negotiation as part of his “life.” He has constructed a particular position in this history that is not constrained to identification as a powerful coloniser, therefore nothing questions his pride.

This suggests the function of the other side of jack’s articulation of “balance”: “being able to interconnect” with “the māori community” becomes “special” and “of great importance.” Developing a relationship with māori is perhaps how jack is able to counterbalance a colonising history with postcolonial subjectivity. He describes the relationship as symbiotic: māori and pākehā do not just connect, but “interconnect.”

jack’s reconciliation of pride in being pākehā with acknowledging his pākehā past is relatively uncommon. Mulgan (1989) says that “the recent revisionist history of nineteenth century New Zealand, which has grown out of
the anti-colonial critique, has done much to strengthen Māori self-awareness and self-confidence. But at the same time it has deprived the pākehā of a past to be proud of” (p. 57). jack’s positive assertion of pride questions the inevitability of revisionist histories constituting pākehā as ‘deprived.’

In the following kōrero, jeff engages a specifically pākehā position to question the limits of understanding bicultural practice.

kōrero 8.02

Um, to actually be drawn in, again as a pākehā, into activities and programs that had to reflect māori values and beliefs ... not because of this issue around bicultural -I don’t know that it was moving to be bicultural [jeff/541-546]

jeff positions himself “as a pākehā” in the context of a pākehā institution where “activities and programs” were mandated so as to “reflect māori values and beliefs.” It is interesting in this situation jeff does not see the “reflect[ion]” as supporting a kaupapa of biculturalism. This is also unusual. According to the notion that bicultural practices form along a continuum (see kōrero 6.02) the practices of which jeff speaks could be considered bicultural. Through questioning this possibility (“I don’t know that it was moving to be bicultural”) he insinuates, but does not articulate, an alternative understanding of being bicultural. From this, I/i read two possibilities: either mandating practices that reflect māori values and beliefs does not constitute being bicultural, or reflecting māori values and beliefs in the absence of a relationship with māori people does not constitute being bicultural. Perhaps on the basis of including māori knowledge but excluding māori people, the initiative fails to address biculturalism adequately.

The involvement of peoples in the negotiation of biculturalism is apparent in the next kōrero:
Chapter IX: relationship

kōrero 8.03

Knowledge didn’t exist kinda out there to be appropriated, knowledge exists in relationships and if you don’t have the relationship you don’t have the knowledge. You don’t have shit [ross/808-811]

Ross acknowledges that the appropriation of Māori knowledges is a possibility. Colonial assumptions of epistemology construct “Māori culture as a source of ideas and inspiration” [emphasis added] (Metge, 1995, p. 312). Māori ‘culture’ as a ‘source’ assumes Māori knowledge (not people) is a reservoir from which Pākehā can take/appropriate knowledge. Ross understands knowledge in a different sense that requires no reading between the lines: knowledge without relationship is less than shit/waste.

Historically, Māori symbols have been co-opted independently of their ‘living owners’ (Belich, 2001a) and have become incorporated into the national culture in ways that do not challenge western control (Patterson, 1989; Johnson, 2002): “we are trotted out for exhibition as the mood suits the dominant culture” (Iseke-Barnes, 2003, p. 232). For example, the Air New Zealand koru, and the All Black haka, have become a source of national pride that appropriates Māori practice for mainstream purposes (Shannon, 1986).

Ross’ construction of valuable knowledge is consistent with theories of knowledge as contextual. Without relationships you don’t have knowledge. Understanding knowledge as existing without relationship enables appropriation to be politically neutralised and de-politicises Pākehā positions of privilege.

In the context of constituting bicultural practice, the political positioning of partners is crucial to negotiating their relationship.
It’s trying to get your head around the fact that a democracy, bicultural democracy may be a more complicated place than a simple set of terms, procedural rules for running a meeting (ross/577-580)

ross articulates biculturalism as more than just practices imposed by rules. He implies a distinction between “bicultural democracy” conceptualised in “a simple set of terms, procedural rules” and “get[ting] your head around” biculturalism as “a more complicated place.”

Following rules may be an unreflexive and uncritical practice that allows a practitioner to remain disengaged with, or even unaware of guiding principles. Prescribed practices may constitute static/stable tokenism to the extent that they do not require engagement with guiding principles. Engaging with principles requires differential sensitivity to diverse contexts and political savvy (see körero 7.07). A bicultural democracy exceeds the kind of hegemonic dominance that promotes a façade of representativeness where majority rules (and voices of ‘minorities’ are silenced).

jack talks of how engaging with principles of biculturalism has influenced his community:

That battle has been extremely painful and a big struggle … it set out on what’s called … ‘the bicultural journey’ and that was to change the structures of [the organisation] to allow for a genuine separation, a genuine opportunity for joint decision making, for equality to be reached and so on (jack/558-563)

jack constructs an explicit goal of the “bicultural journey” as “chang[ing] the structures of [the organisation].” The metaphor of journey is commonly used for constructing an account of a process of development/transformation. It emphasises that the changes do not happen instantaneously or accidentally.
It’s trying to get your head around the fact that a democracy, bicultural democracy may be a more complicated place than a simple set of terms, procedural rules for running a meeting [ross/577-580]

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Progress is gradual and the journey proceeds by conscious decision and active commitment.

The repertoire of struggle is also used to describe this development. This metaphor constitutes a "battle" that has been "extremely painful." It resonates with the challenges of resisting the mainstream that Mike spoke of earlier (kōrero 6.09). Rather than being at a societal level, this challenge is present at an organisational level. The words that were used to describe how the challenges were with intimate others (see kōrero 7.02) are similar to those used here: "extremely painful," "battle" and "struggle." While this may be engaged to constitute change at the level of the institution, the profound impact these changes have on the person/personal is also implicated.

Jack’s community undertook journey/struggle “to allow for a genuine separation, a genuine opportunity for joint decision making.” Jack’s emphasis on “genuine” implies there is ‘bicultural’ practice that is not authentic/tokenistic (see kōrero 6.02, 6.04, 6.05). In the context of genuine biculturalism Jack talks of “joint decision making” in the same breath as “separation.” The co-articulation of these practices affirms the mutual dependence of separateness/autonomy and coming together/relationship.

Jack constitutes the goal of genuine biculturalism as reaching “equality.” This could be understood also as reciprocity: a relationship of mutual respect, sharing, and honouring each other’s mana. In relation to the goal of equality, “separation” may work to respect the autonomy of Māori decision making. It does not proscribe working in partnership with Pākehā. This is consistent with the autonomy and partnership present in the Tiriti/Treaty houses model (Royal, 1998).

Tina is more apprehensive about separation where it constitutes a dichotomy that inhibits a sense of belonging:
Chapter IX: relationship

kōrero 8.06

you don’t belong in the māori world and you don’t quite belong in the pākehā world either and it can get a bit lonely because you’re not one or the other. You don’t want to join in the ‘them and us’ discussion at either side of that [tina/980-983]

tina uses “you” as an invitation to share in a first person account of displacement. Readers/Listeners are personally involved or invested in her account of displacement. This rhetorical strategy disrupts the potential of the account to dichotomise the speaker and listener and construct a “them and us” opposition that tina does wish to not privilege.

She speaks of not belonging in the māori world and not _quite_ belonging in the pākehā world. Dichotomising pronouns (“them and us”) are used to constitute mutually exclusive positions for māori and pākehā. This separateness creates a “lonel[iness]” for tina/“you” because “you’re not one or the other” and so the dichotomy fails to encompass everyone: tina and her listener fall between the gaps of two.

The aloneness of earlier kōrero (see kōrero 6.04, 6.07) is reiterated here in relation to a sense of ill fit: “not one or the other.” The choices of position are inadequate for allaying her sense of displacement. She constitutes a sense of longing for belonging that is like the concept of unrequited love: a longing that is not resolved/answered. This reiterates unease regarding pākehā belonging and feeling welcome (kōrero 7.09).

Renegotiating a comfortable position is achieved through tātou/working together:
If we’re going to find a way forward in this country we have to do it together: māori and pākehā. Um, so there would be times when I would be looking to māori allies to show me the way and there would be other times where that kind of work needs to be done by pākehā with pākehā [alice/333-337]

alice constructs a unified “we” of māori and pākehā in the same “country” looking to “find a way forward.” Although the history and the present have been sites of opposition and struggle, orientation to the future carries an ideal of māori/pākehā alliance. In a similar way to jack (see kōrero 8.01) autonomy and partnership are simultaneously present.

Sometimes she “would be looking to māori allies” and “other times ... work needs to be done by pākehā with pākehā.” alice does not constitute māori and pākehā working separately as inhibiting partnership. The autonomy of māori is ensured through this process as is the autonomy of pākehā.

The autonomy of pākehā to engage in producing cultural knowledge that includes a critique of systems, politics, positions, and monologism is crucial to avoid implicating māori in resolving pākehā problems.

Because I am māori, pākehā power is my problem. The fact that the monocultural education system has failed to inform pākehā about the brutality of colonisation becomes my problem, for it is left to me to tell them. However, I cannot accept that their guilt at finding these things out is also my problem. While I do not deny the reality of the guilt that they may feel, pākehā guilt is a pākehā problem (Mikaere, 1998, p. 9).

alice’s kōrero constructs māori and pākehā as having joint but separate responsibilities for supporting the kaupapa. It is not solely a māori responsibility to direct and control “the way forward.” māori are constituted as “allies” in this account. This term is consistent with a battle metaphor that appears frequently in the kōrero.
the battles I’ve had to fight in terms of having māori culture involved in [work place] are stupid [tina/386-388]

tina takes the position of the antagonist and constructs herself as an ally of māori engaged in countering the marginalisation of māori culture in the work place. The power asymmetry between māori and pākehā is implicated by the absence of māori partners engaged in the struggle. Being required to fight to secure space for māori is evaluated as “stupid.” This can be read as commenting on the ‘elementary quality’ of practices that include māori culture in the work place: this battle should have/has already been won.

tina does not constitute herself as a ‘voluntary soldier,’ she just “had to fight.” She is constructing a position for herself where it is mandatory to fight on behalf of māori if they have been excluded.

Where battle metaphors construct māori and pākehā as allies against colonial institutions and practices of marginalisation and exclusion, metaphors of collegiality offer an alternative construction of the relationship between māori and (bicultural) pākehā.

The collegial metaphor is engaged below to construct a model of bicultural practice that is firmly orientated to political critique and practical implementation.
You can begin to see the reality of legislation that’s undermining or sidelining the [Tiriti/Treaty]. And you can then begin to say, ‘OK, that’s the general picture what are the implications for this organisation, or for this group, or for the practice of [mental health] or whatever it is?’ So it’s a much more collegial model.

The common understanding of colleagues is evoked through an alliance of resistance to “undermining and sidelining” the Tiriti/Treaty. Armed with the same interpretation of the kaupapa it becomes possible to negotiate the implications that are manifest at the level of organisation, collective, discipline, or “whatever.”

The “collegial model” implicates an active commitment to partnership. It is predicated on transforming the status quo/current processes and developing practical bicultural alternatives through pākehā working together with māori.

A collaborative consultative framework in which people’s own knowledge is recognised as expertise as really really significant and important. Um, and then sortof sharing, joining those knowledges together to sortof build shared understandings and I guess common agreed purposes and sortof directions.

jeff constitutes knowledges coming together as creating a collective purpose and direction. The type of partnership is constituted through a “collaborative consultative framework” to “build shared understandings.” “[C]ommon agreed purposes and sortof directions” construct bicultural practice as mutual commitment. Joining knowledges intimates a sense of the innovative and creative qualities of symbiosis.
In constituting “people’s own knowledge” he references the autonomy of the partners mentioned earlier (kōrero 6.10) and orientates towards a relationship of reciprocity/mutual respect, where the contribution of both partners is valued and appreciated. In the past, pākehā have enacted colonial aspirations that maintain power asymmetries between Tiriti/Treaty ‘partners.’ A postcolonial partnership assumes equality in the relationship and participation from both partners.

The promise of a continually negotiated future is opened through reconstituting the relationship of partners as an ongoing collaboration. While the past ties partners to an embattled alliance, the never completed journey of biculturalism imagines a time beyond the battle metaphor, and unrequited longing for a belonging that is already.
This final chapter brings the threads of the analysis together in reflections from my own position. The work of the past, present, and future lie in negotiations that open our relationship to listening/speaking together.
The journey/struggle of this research began with an orientation to questions of how pākehā become bicultural; what it means to be pākehā and how the term is negotiated. Through various transformations enabled by encounters with the theoretical work of social constructionism, discourse analysis, and deconstruction, this orientation turned towards questions concerning discursive positions available to pākehā, and in particular those positions that might be read deconstructively: to challenge the hegemonic, invisible and ‘natural’ power of white racist colonisation.

In the process of discursively analysing the kōrero that emerged in my conversations with bicultural pākehā practitioners, it became apparent to me that our talk was thoroughly saturated with constructions of dichotomies. These dichotomies worked to distance bicultural pākehā from other pākehā, from māori, from their own histories, families, and friends. The journey of ‘becoming bicultural’ was fraught with the significance of struggle and battle; loss, displacement and discomfort. The positions available to bicultural pākehā appeared as problematic, difficult to negotiate and perpetually resistant in relation to the mainstream of their own cultural hegemony.

In reading these positions deconstructively, the dichotomous constructions of bicultural discourse were reconstituted as fluid, partial, and multiple possibilities for bicultural pākehā subjectivities and relationships.

The metaphor of a bicultural journey was engaged to constitute movement through recognising pākehā cultural specificity and destablising the taken-for-granted normality of pākehā privilege. The recognition enabled an uncomfortable subjective experience of the once-familiar position constituted as colonial pākehā identity. This discomfort enabled a distance that spanned the ‘old’ colonial sense of self and a newer, more tenuous postcolonial possibility. In spanning the distance of these two pākehā positions, the kaikōrero struggled with the problematics of locating themselves as both bicultural and pākehā. They understood biculturalism as exceeding rules, or gestures, or tokens of relationships with māori. They were concerned with the appropriation of māori knowledges as artefacts in the absence of relationships with māori. They were...
cautious about occupying positions that might undermine the entitlements of māori. Biculturalism appeared as an unrealised, longed for possibility and they were reluctant to locate their own practices as bicultural when the monocultural pākehā majority continued to reproduce relationships with māori that support colonial hegemony. Displaced from the comforts of colonial pākehā privilege, by choice, and excluded from the entitlements of māori (even the entitlement to claim marginalisation), the kaikōrero occupied an unstable place, always already between the violent oppositional positions of essentialised racism. The kaikōrero articulated the subjective experience of this unstable location through metaphors of struggle and battle that evoke images of violence. Their choice to accept unstable, embattled subjective positions was supported by a commitment to transform their complicity with pākehā privilege and open possibilities for relationships of reciprocity with māori. They spoke of this commitment through constituting a form of genuine biculturalism that was heart-felt. This heart-felt form of biculturalism is constituted as enabling transformation of pākehā relationships with māori towards reciprocal respect and mutual understanding. The bicultural pākehā journey operates as a vision that guides the practice of the present towards an open future in which the realisation of reciprocal relationships involves ongoing negotiation among autonomous partners.

At this moment, I/i offer a māori reading of the implications of this constitution of pākehā biculturalism so as to explore the various possibilities of relationships enabled by/through the analysis. The context of my/our māori reading practices emerges through privileging the Tiriti/Treaty as a textual framework constituting a commitment to relationships of mutual respect. I/i understand this as a relationship that requires both peoples to come together in a respectful encounter.

The possibilities for realising this relationship are constrained by the historical conditions through which biculturalism struggles to emerge. Backgrounding the pākehā privilege which bicultural pākehā practitioners recognised as their personal subjective inheritance, are colonial discourses,
scientific racism, and the constitution of māori as inferior: formidable oppositional resources. In the context of international movements to challenge white hegemony and the marginalisation of indigenous people, māori voiced their fundamental right to constitute themselves on/in their own terms without regard for positions of the subaltern/serviceable other that colonial discourse enables. māori voices also called to pākehā for a response to māori constitutions of historical injustices perpetrated by colonisation. Among the responses were various attempts to reconstitute the Tiriti/Treaty as a significant constitutional document. This enabled a contestable respect for hearing/acknowledging/redressing māori accounts of cultural genocide.

māori accounts of cultural genocide open up the possibility for pākehā to recognise and acknowledge the violences on which their comfortable privileges depend. Yet this is not necessarily an invitation to guilt and self-recrimination. Awatere (1984) suggests another interpretation where white culture (not people) is constituted as violent and oppressive:

All white people are captives of their own culture. And don’t know they’re captive. They therefore ignore the door of the cage we hold open for them. Whether they will ever see the door we cannot say. All we can do is to continue to hold it open (p. 9).

The implication of an ‘open door’ is that alternative positioning becomes available through seeing both the door and the cage: the view of white culture that māori discourse enables presents pākehā with a vision of themselves and their own cultural constraints. Through hearing māori voices, pākehā are thus able to engage in dialogue on the effects of pākehā privilege and a respectful encounter becomes a realisable hope for the future.

As 1/i consider my reading/telling of the accounts of biculturalism provided by the kaikōrero, the critical importance of the distinction between genuine and token biculturalism is brought into play with the distinction between hearing māori partners’ voices so as to engage in dialogue and responding to māori voices by imposing new pākehā rules and guidelines. The
kaikōrero are insistent that genuine biculturalism cannot be fashioned from gestures that mandate responsiveness. A mandated response lacks the commitment to listening and engaging that is at the heart of a reciprocal relationship. A bicultural journey cannot be undertaken under duress, legislated, or controlled since it requires a heart-felt response that affirms the value of ongoing negotiation and dialogue in relationships of mutual respect.

The distinction between a dialogic response and a legislative monologic response poses a problematic not only for bicultural pākehā practitioners of mental health, but also for the discipline of psychology. Challenged and invited into a relationship with māori through Tiriti/Treaty obligations, how has psychology in Aotearoa/New Zealand responded?

Apparently we do nothing and hope it will go away. And when it doesn’t we give too little too late, begrudgingly and count and proclaim ourselves overgenerous and Māori ‘privileged.’ We ignore the advice we don’t like the sound of and consult with others who are more comforting to our divide and rule. We evoke bureaucratic procedures and cry poverty. And if Māori initiative trips on the steep, slippery path we allow it, we attack, criticise, and reject (McCreanor, 1993a, p. 29).

What kind of partner gives too little too late? Who creates a steep, slippery path that positions a partner as vulnerable to attack? (an ally?) Who are the ‘we’ who hope it will all go away?

This ‘we’ is of the pākehā colonial position that the kaikōrero work to move away from through their commitment to a relationship of reciprocity and respect. They speak of moving towards relationships involving ongoing negotiation among autonomous partners: relationships that constitute pākehā responsiveness through practices of listening as māori voices speak. In opening up the possibilities of moving towards these practices, I/i conclude my reading of the implications of pākehā biculturalism with fragmentary resonances of voices that have informed by own understanding of the necessity for engaging in relationships that honour the mana of both partners.
An open letter to pākehā psychologists considering a bicultural journey:

Dear colleagues

My analysis of psychological discourses constituting culture through the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders and the Code of Ethics for Psychologists Working in Aotearoa/New Zealand, demonstrated the limitations of treating culture as something to be ‘added into’ our discourses. These texts inform mental health practitioners of their rights, duties, and responsibilities in regard to culture, and as such, the practice of unreflexively adding in references to “othered” peoples needs to be understood critically by those pākehā considering a bicultural journey.

Psychology participates in continuing colonising practices wherever and whenever the enculturation of its ethical guidelines or categories of professional classification is unacknowledged. We need to be critically reflexive of the cultural assumptions we “take for granted”, so as to resist the perpetuation of colonisation through psychology: especially when these assumptions are embedded in our ethical guidelines. Adherence to regulatory principles does not constitute a living relationship among partners. And i/I look forward to a living bicultural relationship with my colleagues.

Kia kaha, kia maia, kia manawanui
Sincerely,
bronwyn campbell
sticks and stones / wielding words / speaking subjects / killing authors / violence of words / absolute definitive / différance / space / weaving threads / tracing patterns / tiriti / treaty / transformations / control / dream dreams / touching tipuna / autonomously / together different / imperial sanctions / exploiting stories / marginalising truths / bad popular histories / sovereign / living document / immaculate complete / overwhelming / double talk / mauri / savage natives / crying / lifeshape / caught in the gaze / so to speak / silencing / gagging / speaking for / deaf to tangata whenua / tangata tiriti / spoken for survival / power / sense / suspension of disbelief / gazing through / cohesion / connectedness / treating / grafting / playing / multiplicity / belonging / agendas / mutually intelligible / flavour / synergy / negotiation / willing / striving working / reclaiming / transformative / partial / fluid / flesh / that which is not one / trust / new / potential / possibilities


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APPENDIX A

HE WHAKAMĀRAMA

This appendix/margin explains the māori texts that are privileged as normal in the text of this thesis.

opening karakia

A karakia is offered to acknowledge our connection with the origins of the world and our earth/sky parents. The space is blessed with peace and the vitality of life recognised.

pepeha

The second paragraph is pepeha. As part of a welcoming process it positions the speaker in relation to significant connections. This enables others to know where you are from and where you belong. Part of this process is revealing whakapapa to allow (and provide) connection with other people through sharing whānau links. For māori, this process of introduction reinforces subjectivity in relation to others (Hoskins, 2001). These connectors are not limited to bloodlines; they also encompass shared knowledge of peoples or places.

My pepeha acknowledges my ancestors and the place they provide for me. This pepeha situates me under a maunga (mountain), beside an awa (river) and with iwi (bones/peoples). At the broadest level, this positions me as a māori person.

whakatauki

The knowledges of whakatauki are passed from tangata to tangata. They provide discourses familiar to māori. Whakatauki begin each chapter to provide another level of signification. A contextual reading is also usually provided
within the text of each chapter. The roman numerals represent the respective chapters.

I: Ko te kai a te rangatira he korero: Oratory is the food of rangatira.
II: Tōku reo, tōku ohooho: My language, my inspiration.
III: Hohonu kaki, papaki uaua: profound words, light on action.
IV: Ko au ko koe, ko koe ko au: i am you and you are me.
V: Ka tangi te tītī, ka tangi te kākā, ka tangi hoki ahau: The tītī sings, the kākā sings, i also sing.
VI: Rere ana te wai o te awa ki te moana, ka ngaro: The waters of the river flow into the sea and are lost.
VII: E kore e piri te uku ki re rino: Clay does not stick to metal.
VIII: He kokonga whare e kitea, he kokonga ngākau e kore e kitea: Corners of the house may be see, but not the corners of the heart.

IX: Ma te huruhuru, te manu ka rere: By feathers a bird may fly.

X: Whaia te pae tawhiti, kia whakatata. Whaia te pae tata, whakamaua kia tina: reach for those distant horizons/aspirations, that they might be closer. Pursue those closer goals, that they may be achieved.
APPENDIX B

INFORMATION SHEET

Kia Ora, He mihi mahana ki a koe he keimahi i te wahi havora tangata.

The Researcher

My name is Bronwyn Campbell, I am a PhD student studying in the School of Psychology at Massey University under the supervision of Dr. Keith Tuffin and Dr. Mandy Morgan. I am interested in further exploring biculturalism in Pakeha mental health workers.

What is this study about?

This research is stimulated by the need to further explore the ways that Pakeha in the mental health field can effectively contribute to culturally safe practice in Aotearoa. The Treaty of Waitangi and various health policy documents outline the need for health professionals to act in a culturally safe way, however there are still a majority of non-Maori health professionals who have not made the moves towards biculturalism/culturally safe practice. You have been identified as having demonstrated a commitment to biculturalism in your practice. I am interested in the ways in which you conceptualise biculturalism as a Pakeha, the challenges you have faced, and to further explore the issues which someone like yourself may have to come up against.

What do you have to do?

Although your participation would be valued, you are under no obligation to take part in the study. If at any point in the research process you wish to withdraw from the study or do not wish to answer any particular question, you are free to do so. You are also encouraged to ask any questions about the study at any time during participation.

After finding out more about the study and agreeing to take part you will have to complete a consent form and an interview time will be organised with you. You will then be interviewed by myself at a time and place convenient for you. The interview will be 30-60 minutes in length, it will be audiotaped and then transcribed by myself.

The initial transcription of the audiotaped interview will be sent to you for any amendments or omissions. You will be given a copy of the interpretation of results for your comments or reactions, and if you wish, may receive a copy of the final research report.

Te Kunenga ki Pūrehuoa

Inception to Infinity: Massey University’s commitment to learning as a life-long journey
Anonymity/Confidentiality

At all times your identity will be kept confidential. All identifying information will be removed from the transcripts and the final research report. You may, if you wish to, choose the pseudonym you will be referred to in the transcripts and final research report.

All information gathered in the study will be kept confidential to the research and any publications resulting from it. Remember: you have final control over what information of yours will be included in the study.

Following the interview the audiotapes will be coded and kept in a secure place for the duration of the study. After the study you may choose what to do with your tape. The tape can be retained by you, destroyed, or stored in a research archive for future research purposes.

How to contact the researcher/supervisor(s)

If at any stage of the research you wish to contact either myself or my supervisors for further information about the study, postal details areas above, Email or phone contact as below:

Bronwyn Campbell
Phone: (06) 350 5799 ext. 7678
E-Mail: Bronwyn.Campbell.2@uni.massey.ac.nz

Dr. Keith Tuffin
Phone: (06) 350 5799 ext. 2072
E-mail: K.Tuffin@massey.ac.nz

Dr. Mandy Morgan
Phone: (06) 350 5799 ext 2063
E-Mail: C.A.Morgan@massey.ac.nz

Thank you for your time.

Naku noa,

Bronwyn Campbell
APPENDIX C

CONSENT FORM

I have read the Information Sheet and have had the details of the study explained to me. My questions have been answered to my satisfaction, and I understand that I may ask further questions at any time.

I understand I have the right to withdraw from the study at any time and to decline to answer any particular questions.

I agree to provide information to the researchers on the understanding that my name will not be used without my permission.

I agree/do not agree for the interview to be audio taped.

I understand that I have the right to ask for the audio tape to be turned off at any time during the interview.

I agree to participate in this study under the conditions set out in the Information Sheet.

SIGNED: __________________________________________

DATE: __________________

NAME: __________________________________________
APPENDIX D

TRANSCRIPTION NOTES

Each of the transcripts were coded through the NUD*IST program. Upon import the lines of the transcripts were numbered. These are the numbers that follow the pseudonym of the kaikōrero following each kōrero. For example, [morgan/2-6] denotes text of the second to sixth lines.

The interviews largely took the form of a natural conversation. Throughout the kōrero the “inbetween talk” was retained. For example, “Biculturalism and um about the ah- the sortof, it being a continuum” [emphasis added] [Marlane/35-36]. There were other transcription idiosyncrasies included for ease of reading. Instances where the kaikōrero used figures of speech that could be mistaken for their literal meaning were distinguished through the colloquialised spelling. For example, the colloquialised “y’know” “sortof” “kinda” are spelt as they sound.

The transcripts were transcribed verbatim including the ‘ums’ and ‘ahs’ that are characteristic of informal talk (Wetherell & Potter, 1992). Transcription conventions are as follows: [x] inaudible; (.) pause; . . . section missed out; (laugh) inclusion of a laugh; (Mmm) murmur from the kaikōrero.

The process of transcription includes interpretation. For example, the use of scare quotes when the kaikōrero were speaking ‘in the voice’ of an/other pākehā. There were also instances where single words were enclosed in single quotation marks. This was indicated in the interview with the visual cue of ‘scare quotes’ in the air. In the absence of visual cues, a contemptuous tone of voice also indicated these ‘scare quotes.’

Speech that is emphasised is underlined. For example “What was our role?”
Tiriti o Waitangi 1840

Ko Wikitoria te Kuini o Ingarani i tana mahara atawai ki ngā Rangatira me ngā Hapū o Nu Tirani i tana hiahia hoki kia tohungia ki a rātou ō rātou rangatiratanga me tō rātou wenua, ā kia mau tonu hoki te Rongo ki a rātou me te Ātānoho hoki kua wakaaro ia he mea tika kia tukua mai tētahi Rangatira - hei kai wakarite ki ngā Tāngata māori o Nu Tirani - kia wakaaretia e ngā Rangatira māori te Kāwanatanga o te Kuini ki ngā wāhi katoa o te Wenua nei me ngā Motu - nā te mea hoki he tokomaha kē ngā tāngata o tōnaIwi Kua noho ki tēnei wenua, ā e haere mai nei.

Nā ko te Kuini e hiahia ana kia wakaritea te Kāwanatanga kia kaua ai ngā kino e puta mai ki te tangata Māori ki te Pākehā e noho ture kore ana. Nā, kua pai te Kuini kia tukua a hau a Wiremu Hopihona he Kapitana i te Roiara Nawi hei Kāwana mō ngā wāhi katoa o Nu Tirani e tukua āiane, amua atu ki te Kuini, e mea atu ana ia ki ngā Rangatira o te wakaminenga o ngā hapū o Nu Tirani me ērā Rangatira atu ēnei ture ka kōrerotia nei.

Ko te Tuatahi

Ko ngā Rangatira o te wakaminenga me ngā Rangatira katoa hoki ki hai i uru ki taua wakaminenga ka tuku rawa atu ki te Kuini o Ingarani ake tonu atu - te Kāwanatanga katoa ō rātou wenua.
Ko te Tuarua

Ko te Kuini o Ingarani ka wakarite ka wakaae ki ngā Rangatira ki ngā hapū - ki ngā tāngata katoa o Nu Tirani te tino rangatiratanga o ō rātou wenua ō rātou kainga me ō rātou taonga katoa. Otiā ko ngā Rangatira o te wakaminenga me ngā Rangatira katoa atu ka tuku ki te Kuini te hokonga o era wāhi wenua e pai ai te tangata nōna te Wenua - ki te ritenga o te utu e wakaritea ai e rātou ko te kai hoko e meatia nei e te Kuini hei kai hoko mōna.

Ko te Tuatoru

Hei wakaritenga mai hoki tēnei mō te wakaaetanga ki te Kāwanatanga o te Kuini - Ka tiakina e te Kuini o Ingarani ngā tāngata māori katoa o Nu Tirani ka tukua ki a rātou ngā tikanga katoa rite tahi ki ana mea ki ngā tāngata o Ingarani.

(signed) W. Hobson Consul & Lieutenant Governor

Nā ko mātou ko ngā Rangatira o te Wakaminenga o ngā hapū o Nu Tirani ka huihui nei ki Waitangi ko mātou hoki ko ngā Rangatira o Nu Tirani ka kite nei i te ritenga o ēnei kupu, ka tangohia ka wakaaetia katoatia e mātou, koia ka tohungia ai ō mātou ingoa ō mātou tohu. Ka meatia tenei ki Waitangi i te ono o ngā rā o Pēpueri i te tau kotahi mano, e waru rau e wā te kau o tō tātou Ariki.