Relating Maori and Pakeha: 
the politics of indigenous and settler identities

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Settler colonisation produced particular colonial subjects: indigene and settler. The specificity of the relationship between these subjects lies in the act of settlement; an act of colonial violence by which the settler physically and symbolically displaces the indigene, but never totally. While indigenes may be physically displaced from their territories, they continue to occupy a marginal location within the settler nation-state. Symbolically, as settlers set out to distinguish themselves from the metropolitan ‘motherlands’, indigenous cultures become a rich, ‘native’ source of cultural authenticity to ground settler nationalisms. The result is a complex of conflictual and ambivalent relations between settler and indigene.

This thesis investigates the ongoing impact of this colonial relation on the contemporary identities and relations of Maori (indigene) and Pakeha (settlers) in Aotearoa New Zealand. It centres on the operation of discursive strategies used by both Maori and Pakeha in constructing their identities and the relationship between them. I analyse ‘found’ texts - non-fiction books, media and academic texts - to identify discourse ‘at work’, as New Zealanders make and reflect on their identity claims. This investigation has two aims. Firstly, I map the terrain of discursive strategies that bear the traces of colonial domination and resistance. Secondly, I seek to explore the possibilities for replacing colonial relations with non-dominating forms of relationship between Maori and Pakeha.

The thesis is in two parts. Part I focuses on theories of identity, centring on essentialism and hybridity. I argue that both modes of theorising bear the traces of colonial relations and neither offers the means to ‘escape’ colonial relations. Part II focuses on theories of intersubjectivity, bringing relationality to the fore. I argue that epistemological relations
(including identity relations) always involve a degree of violence and exclusion and that, consequently, these necessary relations must be held in tension with an awareness of the ethical dimension of intersubjective engagement. Utilising the ethics of Emmanuel Lévinas, I argue that a combination of an ethical orientation towards the other and a ‘disappointed’ orientation towards politics and epistemology, offers the means to developing non-dominating relations with the cultural other.
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Chapter One

Introduction

There is now no Native past without the Stranger, no Stranger without the Native. No one can hope to be mediator or interlocutor in that opposition of Native and Stranger, because no one is gazing at it untouched by the power that is in it. Nor can anyone speak just for the one, just for the other. There is no escape from the politics of our knowledge, but that politics is not in the past. That politics is in the present (Dening, 1999:xiii).

Each of these [identity] tags has a meaning, a penalty and a responsibility (Achebe, cited in Appiah, 1995:103).

Introduction

This morning before I sat down to begin this Introduction, I read the letters to the editor in the New Zealand Listener. A number of the letters referred to two previous articles: one by eminent Maori academic, Professor Ranginui Walker (NZ Listener, 4/10/03, p34-5), the other a reply to Walker by eminent Pakeha poet, Brian Turner (NZ Listener, 29/11/03, p34-5). Professor Walker wrote his article in the form of an open letter to the Crown, as a contribution to current debate within Aotearoa New Zealand over ‘ownership’ of the country’s foreshore and seabed, that is, the land below the high tide mark. Walker’s letter set out the historical relationship between his tribe, Whakatohea, and their territory and the changes that occurred with the coming of European settlers. Briefly, Whakatohea is one of a number of tribes who have a claim against the New Zealand government for wrongful confiscations of land in the nineteenth century. Today
that claim remains unsettled and, as Walker points out, Whakatohea currently own only
4.7 kilometres of coastline. Over this land Walker asserts his tribe’s ongoing customary
rights. He also states that Whakatohea will continue to allow other New Zealanders to
enjoy the beach and collect seafood, and rejects the current Government proposal to
legislate ownership of the foreshore and seabed to the ‘public domain’.

Turner’s response to Walker is typical of Pakeha responses to Maori claims for
recognition of specific Maori rights. He ignores the bulk of Walker’s letter which
recounts the history and contemporary situation of Whakatohea and focuses on
Walker’s opening remarks: ‘I [Whakatohea] have been here a thousand years. You
[Pakeha] arrived only yesterday’ (Walker, NZ Listener, 4/10/03, p34). Turner dismisses
the implicit assumption in this claim that Maori attachment to the landscape and Maori
belonging involves a greater depth of feeling and ‘is more authentic and valuable’ than
that of Pakeha (Turner, NZ Listener, 29/11/03, p34). Against this view, he argues,

I am indigenous. I say, stop the bigotry whereby one culture or another claims
greater moral virtue and/or spiritual sensitivity. Recognise the worth and
strength - and the reality - of hybridisation. Isn’t this what just about all of us
are, hybrids? (Turner, NZ Listener, 29/11/03, p34).

Turner argues that Maori attempts to retain control of this coastal land is ‘patronising
and unacceptable’ and insists that ‘the seas and rivers and coastlines and lakes are part
of our common heritage’ (Turner, NZ Listener, 29/11/03, p35).

I do not intend to analyse this exchange in any detail here, since the arguments and
issues resurface later in the thesis, but I point to it as indicative of the dilemmas of
belonging and of the assertions and counter-assertions of sameness and difference,
‘purity’ and hybridity, that afflict Maori-Pakeha interaction. While Maori seek to assert
their specificity and retain a distinct and historical relationship to place, Pakeha
repeatedly respond by arguing that these claims have no basis, that they are divisive and
unacceptable and that we all share a common heritage and common rights as New
Zealanders. One sides seeks difference, the other sameness and unity. And, as Turner
rightly notes, woven through these exchanges are also assertions of morality and ‘sin’,
righteousness and guilt, authenticity and inauthenticity. This dynamic evident in the
exchange between Walker and Turner is, however, only one of a number that structure Maori-Pakeha interaction. As much as Maori seek difference, they also seek sameness, for example, in terms of substantive political and socio-economic equality and self-determination. Pakeha, on the other hand, also insist on Maori difference. The discursive strategies that express these conflictual political aims are the subject of this thesis.

My focus in this thesis is on the use of the terms ‘Maori’ and ‘Pakeha’ to identify, unite and distinguish two significant groups of New Zealanders: the indigenous peoples and the colonising settlers respectively. The thesis ‘relates’ Maori and Pakeha identities in three ways. Simply, it is ‘about’ them. More specifically, it is concerned with the ‘telling’ or ‘speaking’ of these identities; with what ‘makes up’ these identity claims and the strategies used in the process. Most importantly, it is about the relationship between them and the problems of that relationship, as suggested by the exchange between Walker and Turner. I am interested, firstly, in the ways in which that relationship remains shaped by the sedimented dynamics of colonialism and, secondly, in the possibilities of overcoming those dynamics. My research is then guided by two questions:

· How do contemporary representations of Maori and Pakeha continue to bear traces of the colonial relationship and what are the political effects of these traces?
· How might these colonial modes of relating be superceded with non-dominating and non-assimilatory modes of relation?

To address these questions I analyse identity claims about ‘Maori’ and ‘Pakeha’ in relation to a range of theories of identity and intersubjectivity. Consequently, the thesis also involves an evaluation of the theories themselves for their analytic power in addressing my research questions.

The asymmetrical relationality of Maori and Pakeha

I originally intended to write a thesis about Pakeha identity but it seemed impossible to do so without discussing the relationship between Pakeha and Maori and, in truth, it is
this relationship that most interests me. The idea that Maori and Pakeha are constitutively related terms was first brought to my attention in the work of Ranginui Walker (1990:94). Both terms, which come from the Maori language, only come into use to name and distinguish groups of people following contact between the hap_1 and iwi of Aotearoa and the European, Australian and American explorers, whalers, missionaries, traders, colonial administrators, military and settlers who began arriving following Captain James Cook’s voyage of 1769. Prior to that, Maori were identified in terms of their wh_nau, hap_ and iwi relationships and the immigrants were identified by their countries of origin - predominantly England, Scotland, Wales and Ireland. As identities then, Maori and Pakeha are constituted in relation to each other, developing over time to distinguish the indigenous inhabitants of Aotearoa2 from the European immigrant settlers.3

When I argue that Maori and Pakeha are constituted in relation to each other, I do not mean that this relationality captures all there is to ‘know’ about the peoples identified by these terms. Maori and Pakeha transcend this relationality in two important ways. Firstly, the identities and cultures of these peoples draw on their pre-contact histories and cultural traditions and on the ongoing transformations of those pre-contact sources during the time of Maori-Pakeha contact. In other words, while the relationship between Maori and Pakeha has been hugely influential in shaping these identities, it is not all that ‘makes them up’. Secondly, no identity label ‘captures’ the totality of an individual or a collectivity. In this way too, Maori and Pakeha, individually and collectively, transcend whatever I or others might say about ‘Maori’ and ‘Pakeha’ as signifiers of collective

1 Definitions of Maori words are given in a Glossary at the back of this thesis.

2 This is a Maori name for New Zealand which seems to have come into use only following colonial contact, but is now used to both refer to the pre-colonial territory and to represent the existence of a Maori homeland existing in parallel to ‘New Zealand’ (see McCreanor, 1997:43, nt1).

3 The Europeans originally called the local inhabitants ‘New Zealanders’ and only much later took on this terminology to refer to themselves. ‘Maori’ originally meant ‘normal’ or ‘ordinary’, in contrast to the new arrivals ‘strangeness’. The etymology of ‘Pakeha’ is subject to dispute (see Biggs, 1988). Its current usage is also diverse. Maori, for example, use it variously to refer to the colonisers, White people in general, all non-Maori and the descendants of the British signatories of the Treaty of Waitangi (see Mead, 1996:147, nt1).
Most crucially for my thesis, the relationship that constitutes Maori and Pakeha is a colonial one, a relationship between the colonised (Maori) and the coloniser (Pakeha). I now know that the general point about the mutual constitution of colonised and coloniser identities, indigene and settler, appears before Ranginui Walker in the work of Frantz Fanon (for example, 1967:28). It is these conflictual, combative pairs - colonised/coloniser, indigene/settler, and also native/stranger, primitive/civilised, Black/White - that are the centre of my concern. My interest in ‘Maori’ and ‘Pakeha’ as terms is primarily an interest in the influence of these pairings on their relationship and their practices of identity construction. It is important to note in this regard that, while these pairs are oppositional and one of the tasks of this thesis is to explore the impacts of this oppositionality, I do not consider the relationship between Maori and Pakeha to be simply one of opposition (see Hall, 1996:247; Mead, 1996:85). Rather, oppositionality is a strategy of domination which needs to be deconstructed and replaced with other conceptualisations of the relationship between Maori and Pakeha identity and difference.

Fundamentally the oppositional relationship between colonised and coloniser, indigene and settler, involves related asymmetries which are reflected in this thesis. Colonialism is a relationship of domination and, particularly in the case of settler colonialism, of displacement. The settler seeks primarily to displace the indigene and take their land. In doing so relations of domination are established between the two. The primary asymmetry then is one of power, with all the material and symbolic inequalities that flow from that. It is these symbolic or representational asymmetries that are my concern in this thesis. Simply, it is within this unequal power relationship that the identities of indigene and settler come into being. As Fanon (1967:28) says, ‘it is the settler who has brought the native into existence and who perpetuates his existence’.  

While I acknowledge the bias in the use of masculine pronouns, in this thesis I will not repeatedly draw attention to each instance as it appears in works I quote. While such bias often does extend beyond the terminology to inflect the conceptualisation of ideas, I also acknowledge that in many instances the universal categories these writers invoke do similarly impact on women as well as men.
political power of settler and indigene translates into unequal representational power. The settler ‘brings the native into existence’ within colonial and racial systems of representation. Thus the settler talks a lot about the indigene, as will become apparent throughout this thesis. What the indigene has to say about the settler is less heard in the public domain. Not only is the ‘substance’ of representations shaped by the interests of colonial domination, but who gets to speak and who is talked about is also evidence of this power imbalance.

This asymmetry is reflected in this thesis. I originally planned a highly symmetrical discussion of Maori and Pakeha in each chapter of the thesis. However, the more ‘lopsided’ result reflects the reality of Maori-Pakeha representational asymmetry. Of all the chapters of the thesis, only Chapter Four follows a formal symmetry in its discussion of Maori and Pakeha identities. For the rest there is a gradual shift from a greater concern with operations on and of Maori identity in Part I to issues of Pakeha responsiveness to Maori in Part II. Throughout, while some attention is given to the ‘substance’ of Pakeha identity claims in themselves, Pakeha remains a fairly empty category. While Malcolm MacLean (1996) has characterised Pakeha as a ‘silent centre’, my aim is primarily the pursuit of its ‘de-centring’, of a changed relation between Maori and Pakeha, rather than the pursuit of a particular definition of either.

While the discursive relation between Maori and Pakeha is asymmetrical, it is not as one-sided as Fanon’s statement above might suggest. The coloniser/settler may ‘bring the native into existence’, but that practice is not met with passive acceptance on the part of the colonised/indigene. A range of strategies of resistance and assertions of autonomous indigenous difference answer the strategies of domination. My reference to operations on and of Maori identity is intended to capture this mix of representations of Maori by Pakeha (operations on Maori) and Maori self-representations (operations of Maori). Further, in ‘bringing the native into existence’, the settlers also bring themselves into existence, as Edward Said’s (1978) analysis of orientalism has indicated. Finally, the construction of settler identity is also influenced by the real presence of the indigene and their practices of resistance. The relation is asymmetrical, but it is a relation, with influences operating in both directions.
A ‘white woman’s project’: good intentions and responsibility

As Linda Tuhiwai Mead (1996:299) notes, ‘there is a tension between the projects of white women and those of Maori women’. While Mead invokes gender and I write as a feminist, gender is not the focus of my research. I have chosen to focus on the constructions and relations of cultural identities. I understand that women and men are positioned differently in relation to ‘Maori’ and ‘Pakeha’, but to do justice to those gendered positionings would require another thesis - or three! Similarly I have ignored the very powerful ways in which class politics and cultures inflect the dynamics of Maori and Pakeha identities and relations. However, my interests and concerns as a White/Pakeha have had a clear influence on the structure of my thesis questions, on my practices of investigation and on my arguments.

As a Pakeha my interest is primarily to identify and expose the discursive practices of Pakeha domination and to explore the possible bases for different, non-dominating, relations between Pakeha and Maori. This interest gives a particular slant to my investigations. I look at the ways in which colonial and racist power works to ‘produce’ particular Maori identities and particular sets of Maori-Pakeha relations. I link these dynamics of domination to the subjective problems and insecurities or, in other words, the alienation, of Pakeha identity. I look at Maori resistance in asserting an autonomous, decolonised sense of Maori identity and at Pakeha responses to that resistance. I do not seek to define either people. Nor do I seek to continue the practices of Pakeha representational domination of Maori in my own work, or instruct Maori on what their representational politics should be. These are my ‘good intentions’.

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5 The use of bold and italics in this quote is Mead’s. Throughout this thesis I reproduce quotes in the style of the original authors. Where I have added italics for emphasis, this will be noted in the citation.
I acknowledge that these intentions are not enough to ensure my work meets all these aims. Since speaking/writing about Maori has been a practice of colonial domination, in continuing to talk about Maori in this thesis I risk continuing rather than disrupting colonialism. However, silence or non-engagement is not the answer to this dilemma. A failure to engage with the politics of representation of Maori and Pakeha identities is a failure to address the complicity of Pakeha in the politics and practice of colonialism. Speech and silence are not simple opposites, signifying respectively power and powerlessness, combat and acquiescence. They are also respectively markers of concern and disinterest. In this thesis I combine speech on some issues and silence on others in my attempts to negotiate these relational dynamics of antagonism and interest. Hence I do not seek to speak about who Maori are. And ultimately I argue that a form of Pakeha silence is crucial to the project of moving ‘beyond’ colonial relations. These aims, in themselves, however, do not guarantee the effects of my ‘good intentions’.

Jane Haggis and Susanne Schech (2000) have outlined and critiqued a range of ‘good intentions’ exhibited in the work of White feminists in relation to the indigenous, Black or Third World other. Their list of strategies that claim to establish a ‘helpful’ or morally ‘good’ and absolved relation with the indigenous other is a sobering warning of the pitfalls for White academics both of engaging with and ignoring indigenous difference and political projects. I will not rehearse these dangers here, but a number of them appear in my analysis throughout the thesis. Further, as Emmanuel Lévinas (1996:4) says, ‘we are ... responsible beyond our intentions’. Unconscious desires, sedimented ways of being and seeing, and unintended effects, can all thwart our conscious intent but do not absolve us of responsibility for their impacts. Despite these dangers, as the opening epigram from Greg Dening (1999:xiii) suggests, there is no neutral position outside of colonial relations from which to develop an analysis.

Writing this thesis has been a process of working through these issues in relation to my shifting sense of self as a Pakeha. The current conclusion to the thesis is a second attempt to reach an endpoint. The first, rejected by my supervisor, I have come to see as representative of the Pakeha desire for redemption that I now critique. This sense of a shifting Pakeha project and a shifting sense of Pakeha self reminds me of Alistair
Bonnett’s (1993) discussion of forms of reflexivity. Bonnett identifies ‘social self-consciousness’ as the most politically useful form of reflexivity because it is ‘characterized by a willingness to consider one’s own social location as an issue to be brought into debate’ (Bonnett, 1993:166). Bonnett distinguishes further between two approaches to social self-consciousness. One invokes a fixed identity location from which the subject speaks, for example, ‘the White woman’. The other identifies, and identifies with, a social process rather than location (Bonnett, 1993:167). While Bonnett prefers the latter, as the former reifies the categories it invokes, I am caught between these two. I do not want to repeat the privileges of Whiteness, but speak from within them. I seek to shift, rather than reify, Pakeha identity. But it will be up to the reader to judge the extent to which I have straddled the tension between engagement and interference and have managed to pursue my Pakeha project, without undermining the projects of Maori.

Colonialism and post-colonialism

While I refer repeatedly to colonialism, colonisation and colonial relations, this thesis is located within the context of the theoretical debates and politics of post-colonialism. My referrals to colonialism primarily mark the ongoing presence and effects of colonial practices and relations. They also distance my project from any easy celebration of the post-colonial as an historical period after the break with colonialism. Briefly, and drawing heavily on Stuart Hall’s (1996c) discussion of important criticisms of post-colonialism, here I position my own work in relation to this field.

The concept of post-colonialism has been criticised for being overly general, for failing to distinguish between coloniser and colonised, for continuing to serve Western interests, if not colonialism itself, and for prematurely marking the epistemological and historical demise of colonialism (see Hall, 1996c). Taking each of these criticisms in turn - it is certainly the case that both colonialism and post-colonialism differ from place to place and time to time. To speak of post-coloniality in relation to indigenous/settler societies such as Aotearoa New Zealand is distinctly different from its invocation in relation to ex-colonies where the temporal shift from a colonial to post-
colonial regime is marked by the achievement of political independence (whatever the continuing impact of neo-colonial geo-politics and imperial/global capitalism). Different cultural and political contexts are not post-colonial ‘in the same way’ (Frankenberg and Mani, 1993, cited in Hall, 1996c:245). In indigenous/settler societies, one distinguishing feature of the workings of colonialism and post-colonialism is that the colonisers never left. Hence political independence does not mark the end of colonialism in any clear temporal sense. A second, equally crucial, distinguishing feature is that the indigenes never left either. In these respects the resulting politics and concerns of post-colonialism in such societies are quite distinct from those in now politically independent ex-colonies and those in the old metropolitan centres responding to the presence of migrant communities from these ex-colonies.

Hall (1996c:244) characterises the critique of post-colonialism’s failure to distinguish between the coloniser and colonised as a nostalgia for clear-cut binaries and their accompanying political simplicity. Certainly, the post-colonial project does involve the deconstruction of the opposition between coloniser and colonised. Such a deconstruction is central to the dismantling of colonial relations. The success of such a process, however, cannot be marked by an outcome which fails to distinguish between the ex-coloniser and the ex-colonised. That failure, within indigenous/settler societies at least, would be considered to signify the success of the colonial project to assimilate indigenous people and eliminate their difference. Counter to this, as Hall (1996c:242) suggests in opening his paper, the post-colonial is also the ‘time of difference’.

Consequently, it cannot be accepted that the descendants of settlers and indigenes are post-colonial in the same way. Simon During attempted to maintain the distinction between these two by coining the terms ‘postcolonising’ and ‘postcolonised’:

The former fits those communities and individuals who profit from and identify themselves as heirs to the work of colonising. The latter fits those who have been dispossessed by that work and who identify with themselves as heirs to a more or less undone culture (During, 1985:369-370).

While this clearly delineates the different relations of each group to the practices of colonisation, I am uneasy about the way in which this terminology echoes the
subject/object split of colonialism. Indigenous peoples continue to be rendered passive by a construction that labels them the object of an operation of post-colonisation, the ‘postcolonised’. It continues to sound like something done to them, rather than an active project in which they are engaged. Indigenous people more often refer, in preference to post-colonialism, to their projects of decolonisation (see, for example, Smith, 1999). A parallel ‘postcolonising’ settler process might be termed ‘unsettlement’ (see for example, O’Neill, 1993; Stasiulis and Yuval-Davis, 1995; Turner, 1999). Throughout this thesis I continue to use the colonial terminology of indigene and settler to mark the ongoing impact of colonialism and in the absence of any satisfactory ‘postcolonising’ alternatives. While ‘Maori’ and ‘Pakeha’ similarly have colonial origins, I also consider these terms will continue to be relevant to social life in Aotearoa New Zealand ‘after’ colonialism. Thus my usage of them straddles both my desire to analyse the colonial relation and to move ‘beyond’ it.

Frankenberg and Mani’s argument that post-colonial critique often continues to serve the West’s agenda is also noted by Hall. According to this view, post-colonialism works ‘as a critique of western philosophical discourse, which ... is like “merely [taking] a detour to return to the position of the Other as a resource for rethinking the Western Self”’ (Hall, 1996c:248-9, quote from Frankenberg and Mani, 1993). My research can be accused of doing precisely this in that, as outlined above, my Pakeha interest is not only in the general ‘undoing’ of colonial relations between Maori and Pakeha, but specifically in how Pakeha can contribute to this undoing. I am arguably concerned with the ‘Western Self’. What this argument neglects, however, is that ‘the colonial “moment” ... is a transaction of forces, a relationship - unequal, certainly, but a relationship nonetheless’ (Lawson, 1995:22). My primary focus is on colonialism as a relation. It is this relation that structures Maori and Pakeha identities as colonised and coloniser, indigene and settler. Hence changes to that relation that move ‘beyond’ or ‘undo’ colonialism would be positive for Maori at least as much as for Pakeha. Consequently, it is my view that the ‘rethinking of the Western Self’ cannot help but impact also on the indigenous Self. What is critical is that the rethinking of the colonial relation works to disrupt, rather than continue, the practices of domination.
Finally, Hall (1996c:253-4) reflects on what the ‘post-’ of post-colonialism signifies: ‘going beyond’ the epistemology of colonialism and/or a time period ‘after’ colonialism? His own position is that the ‘post-’ of post-colonialism refers to both these dimensions of colonialism, the epistemic and the temporal. To attempt to dissociate the two would be to reject the relationship between power and knowledge, he argues, when the critique of colonialism crucially involves understanding their interaction. Following Hulme, Hall argues that the tension between the epistemological and temporal registers of post-colonialism can be productive:

“After” means in the moment which follows that moment (the colonial) in which the colonial relation was dominant. It does not mean ... that what we have called the “after-effects” of colonial rule have somehow been suspended. It certainly does not mean that we have passed from a regime of power-knowledge to some powerless and conflict-free time zone. Nevertheless, it does also stake its claim in terms of the fact that some other, related but as yet “emergent” new configurations of power-knowledge relations are beginning to exert their distinctive and specific effects (Hall, 1996c:254).

This thesis seeks to serve the movement towards the ‘after’ of colonialism by analysing the political effects of its epistemological regime and by identifying ways to disrupt them.

**Indigene and settler, Maori and Pakeha**

In choosing to centre on the concepts of indigene and settler, I am invoking particular understandings of these terms. While defining the latter is reasonably straightforward, the former is less so. The concept of indigeneity is commonly used in two quite distinct, if overlapping ways: to refer to ‘natives’ and to ‘First Peoples’. On one level, an indigenous person is ‘native’ to a place, that is someone who was born there, rather than an immigrant. Brian Turner’s usage, at the beginning of this chapter, is in line with this definition. He, and Pakeha generally, are indigenous in this sense. They, and commonly a number of generations before them, were born in New Zealand and identify themselves as New Zealanders. This usage also appears in academic literature (for example, Pearson, 1989; 2000; 2002; Williams, 1997), often in the form of the concept
of ‘indigenisation’ in reference to the process by which White New Zealanders came to see New Zealand, rather than the ‘mother country’ (Britain), as ‘home’.

Secondly, indigeneity is used to refer to ‘First Peoples’. Here indigeneity invokes the particular status of peoples who retain historical, often tribally articulated, connections to place, which have since been threatened, if not completely usurped, by later colonising arrivals. This usage carries three meanings simultaneously. It distinguishes those who came first from those who came later, as does Walker in his letter to the Crown. In addition, it articulates the specific sense of identity and belonging of these peoples, in contrast to that of the ‘second’ colonising peoples. Finally, a rather implicit, but for me significant, aspect of this definition of indigeneity is the link between indigenous status and colonisation. While the relationship to place of ‘First Peoples’ is not attributable to colonisation, the need to assert this belonging in the relative language of ‘first-ness’ points to the centrality of colonisation in claims to indigeneity. This relationship between indigeneity and colonisation is highlighted by Linda Tuhiwai Smith in her definition of the term. Indigeneity, she argues,

> is a term that internationalizes the experiences, the issues and the struggles of some of the world’s colonized peoples ... They share experiences as peoples who have been subjected to the colonization of their lands and cultures, and the denial of their sovereignty, by a colonizing society that has come to dominate and determine the shape and quality of their lives, even after it has formally pulled out (Smith, 1999:7).

It is this second usage of indigeneity that I adopt in this thesis. In the colonial relation, it is the ‘First Peoples’ who are indigenous. Claims to the ‘indigeneity’ of the ‘Second Peoples’, in contrast, work to ignore the colonial relation. While my particular interest is in emphasizing the relationship between indigeneity and colonisation, I also acknowledge that this linkage is not a simple one-to-one mapping of colonialism onto

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6 In fairness to both David Pearson and Mark Williams whose work I cited as referring to Pakeha indigenisation, neither of these authors seeks to ignore colonisation. Pearson (2000; 2002) continues to distinguish the status of Maori through the terminology of aboriginality. Williams (1997) relates Pakeha indigenisation precisely to the need for Pakeha to establish their claims to belonging in relation to those of Maori.
Indigeneity invokes both the specificity of indigenous identities and belonging ‘outside’ of colonialism as well as the constitutive relationship between indigenous status and colonialism. As Clifford notes,

[w]hen a community has been living on an island for more than a thousand years, it’s not enough to say that it’s members’ claims to identity with a place are strategies of opposition or coalition in struggles with neighbors, or reactions to colonizing or world-systemic forces. It may be true and useful to say these things. But it’s not enough. People aren’t, of course, always attached to a habitat in the same old ways, consistent over the centuries. Communities change. The land alters ... And yet ..., this historical sense of entangled, changing places doesn’t capture the identity of ancestors with a mountain, for as long as anyone remembers and plausibly far beyond that. Old myths and genealogies change, connect and reach out, but always in relation to an enduring spatial nexus. This is the indigenous longue durée, the pre-colonial that tends to be lost in post-colonial projections. Thus indigenous claims always transcend colonial disruptions (including the posts and the neos) (Clifford, 2001, p16 of 26).

This double reference of indigeneity accounts for indigenous suspicion of post-colonial theorising and debates. Not only have the colonisers never left, so that their experience is certainly not one after colonialism, but indigenous peoples reject any theorisation of their identities which represents them as ‘captured’ by colonialism.

In my choice of terminology I reject both Pearson’s choice of ‘aboriginality’ and the label ‘First Peoples’ in preference to indigeneity. I favour indigeneity over ‘aboriginality’ because of its now established usage to refer to the international political struggles of indigenous peoples. Within the bodies of the United Nations the terminology of indigeneity is used to refer to contemporary tribal and/or colonised peoples. For example, while the Draft UN Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 1993 (Te Puni Kokiri, 1994) fails to define indigeneity, the colonised status of indigenous peoples is implicitly recognised in the opening section.7 While this failure to

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7 One relevant phrase reads: ‘Concerned that indigenous peoples have been deprived of their human rights and fundamental freedoms, resulting, inter alia, in their colonisation and dispossession of their lands, territories and resources, thus preventing them from exercising, in particular, their right to development in accordance with their own needs and interests’ (Te Puni Kokiri, 1994:19).
explicitly define indigeneity seems common in UN declarations, the *ILO Convention 169* defines indigenous peoples as

peoples in independent countries who ... on account of their descent from the populations which inhabited the country or geographical region to which the country belongs, at the time of conquest or colonisation or the establishment of present state boundaries and who, irrespective of their legal status, retain some of all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions (Te Puni Kokiri, 1994:45).

These international political bodies respond to the world movement of indigenous peoples to which Smith (1999:7) refers.\(^8\)

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\(^{8}\) See Bodley (1990) for an overview of this world movement and the texts of some of its (and the UN’s) declarations of indigenous rights.
Finally, I favour indigeneity over ‘First Peoples’ for two reasons. In the first instance, this latter terminology often invokes a problematic romanticisation of the relationship between people and place (see Smith, 1999:6 for this same argument). Secondly, I am uncomfortable with the problems and banality of the assumption of a hierarchy of arrival, suggested in the ordering of first, second, third, and so on. It is not the order of arrival that is significant to the claims of indigenous people, so much as their experience of colonisation by those who came after.

I use the term ‘settlers’ to invoke the specific location and role within the colonial relation of these peoples ‘who came after’. The specificity of settler peoples points to the limitations of any universalised understanding of colonisation involving only two distinct groups, ‘the West and the rest’. The settler occupies a particular location between the culture and politics of the imperial centre and those of the colonised. Meaghan Morris (1992:471) has dubbed settlers ‘human hinges’, ‘accustomed to being the objects as well as the subjects of experiment’ in global relations. Alan Lawson points to their ‘doubled’ nature: ‘suspended between “mother” and “other”, simultaneously colonized and colonizing’ (Lawson, 1995:25). David Pearson (1990:72) expresses this same idea in his argument that the ‘symbolic order [of Pakeha culture] was caught between the twin strengths of other cultures, aboriginal and metropolitan’.

Settlers are the bearers of colonial power in the colony, its agents as such. But they are also colonials, at a remove from the culture and power of the imperial centre, and subject also to that power, if in exponentially different forms than those experienced by indigenes. This doubled location is the source of both the dominance and problems of settler identity which will be canvassed in this thesis.

I need also to briefly explain my usage of the terms ‘Maori’ and ‘Pakeha’ themselves. I use these terms here to refer to the contemporary descendants of the peoples who were colonised and the peoples who colonised them. In this sense my usage exceeds the self-identifications of contemporary New Zealanders. While a large majority of descendants of the colonised t_ngata whenua who identify themselves as indigenous people do identify with the term ‘Maori’, this is not universally true. Exceptions and arguments for them will be discussed later in the thesis. On the other hand, it is very common for the
‘descendants’ of the colonisers to reject the term ‘Pakeha’ to identify themselves, in favour of other terms such as ‘European’ or just ‘New Zealander’ (see for example, Department of Statistics 1993; Pearson and Sissons, 1997).

I problematise the notion of descent in characterising the relation between contemporary Pakeha and the nineteenth-century colonisers. While the argument of descent has a clear familial foundation in the case of Maori identity, this is not so in relation to Pakeha. Many contemporary Pakeha families arrived in later waves of migration, after the initial establishment of colonial domination. I use Pakeha to refer to all of these majority culture, White, ‘political descendants’ of the group who colonised Aotearoa. The terminology of ‘political descendants’ follows that of Australian philosopher, Raimond Gaita, who argues that the colonisers are the ‘political ancestors’ of contemporary White Australians (Gaita, 2002:87, 98). In doing so, Gaita points to the fact that contemporary White Australians, and in my argument contemporary White New Zealanders, inherit the political (and material and symbolic) privileges ‘secured’ by the practices of colonisation. An understanding that colonisation was not an isolated historical event is also implicit in this argument. Rather, colonisation is the establishment of a system that has continued to operate since the originary ‘event’. In this sense, all White New Zealanders inherit a colonial relationality to Maori.

Methodological note

This thesis is largely theoretically driven. I sought at the outset to test the applicability of a range of theories of identity to the analysis of ‘Maori’ and ‘Pakeha’. In doing so, I also sought to interrogate claims within the international literature as to the political value of these theories in seeking the ‘beyond’ of colonialism. I aimed to map a terrain of identity dynamics that are in operation within public discourse in Aotearoa New Zealand. Thus I followed a deductive method, ‘imposing’ my theoretical frame on the examples of identity statements I collected. Having decided to explore theories of essentialism and hybridity, for example, I looked for evidence of these understandings of identity at work in statements about ‘Maori’ and ‘Pakeha’. Further, I was interested in mapping the diversity of strategies used in the construction of Maori and Pakeha
identities, but not in quantifying that diversity. I did not set out to investigate how frequently essentialist or hybrid identity strategies occur, just that they do.

My original plan was to draw my empirical examples from published, non-fiction texts, largely the print media, but also books published for a general readership. My method here was to read the daily newspapers of my region (there is no national newspaper in Aotearoa New Zealand) and others as they came my way or a particular issue prompted me to seek them out. From the very large database of articles I clipped as a result, only a very few are referred to in the final thesis. As my research progressed, these were supplemented with transcriptions of radio journalism, speeches made by politicians and public servants and academic literature. It is probably unsurprising that the most complex and reflexive accounts of Maori and Pakeha identities and their relations are to be found in the latter. Thus while examples of essentialism and ontological hybridity can be found in newspapers, performative hybridity, for example, is more readily found in academic texts. Hence, while my original rationale was to identify discursive strategies of identity production that are widely available to New Zealanders within the public domain, the reliance in some sections of the thesis on academic discussion represents a modification of that rationale. I justify this modification in the interests of accessing some of the more complex and interesting reflections on these issues within the New Zealand community.

There is a further asymmetry in my choice of sources, in that the journalistic media in Aotearoa New Zealand are dominated by Pakeha voices, individuals and interests (see for example, Fox, 1988; Spoonley and Hirsh, 1990; McGregor and Comrie, 1995; Abel, 1997). Maori have long expressed their discontent with reportage in the ‘mainstream’ media and have struggled to establish an independent Maori print media, a Maori radio network and television channel (the latter has yet to be launched). This bias, it is important to note, does not mean that the mainstream press ignores Maori issues completely. Maori political and economic developments are widely covered, but within the framework of Pakeha news values and the biases towards immediacy and negativity that those news values entail (McGregor and Comrie, 1995). Further, the Pakeha-dominated media draw on established stereotypes of Maori identity in their reportage.
and discussion (see for example, McCreanor, 1993; Wall, 1995; 1997). On the other hand, there is little identification of ‘Pakeha’ news. Pakeha news is the mainstream and ‘Pakeha’ are generally only identified as such in discussions that involve distinctions between Maori and Pakeha. It is these kinds of discussions from which I have largely drawn my print media examples. In defence of my reliance on these Pakeha-dominated sources, I argue that this is the terrain of asymmetrical Maori-Pakeha interaction in which I am interested.

A final issue arising from my reliance on existing/‘found’ texts rather than interviews is that it means I am not always able to determine the cultural identity of the people I cite. While a Maori name can be generally assumed to indicate an individual of Maori descent, that would not be universally correct. Nor does it mean the individual concerned identifies as Maori. A European name is even less likely to necessarily identify a Pakeha individual, since many Maori also have names of European origin. This does not mean that I have never been able to ascertain the cultural identity of individuals I cite however. In a small country such as New Zealand the cultural identity of many individuals reported and writing in the media, and in academia, is widely known. Further, in some articles and letters the writers identify themselves. For the rest, my primary aim is to identify strategies in operation. While who deploys them is certainly relevant to the politics of discursive strategies of identity construction, it is not the only determinant of those politics, and it is the politics of identity with which I am primarily interested.

‘Found’ texts also have their own intrinsic merit. These texts represent discourse ‘at work’, as people engage in their social and political environment to narrate experiences, make claims and dispute or support those of others. In addition, written and published texts have a particular status as statements that have been thought through and by which their authors are prepared to stand publicly. These characteristics make such sources of specific interest in illuminating the dynamics of interaction between Maori and Pakeha as collectivities, in contrast to the relations between individuals that take place in New Zealanders’ private lives.
Linguistic conventions

Increasing numbers of Maori words are commonly used within English, a practice itself suggesting something about the extent of cultural interaction between Maori and Pakeha. In this thesis I treat ‘Maori’, ‘Pakeha’ and ‘Aotearoa New Zealand’ as proper nouns which have become incorporated within New Zealand English. Otherwise I follow the practice for incorporation of words from other languages in English texts, italicising Maori words (apart from the proper nouns which name individuals, tribes, places and organisations). I do this as a gesture of non-assimilatory engagement and as a mark of the multiple and distinct meanings that Maori words carry, often not directly translatable into English. Simple translations, which provide meanings that allow readers to make sense of my text, have been drawn from dictionaries and the works of other authors and appear in a glossary of Maori words at the end of the thesis.

This style of presentation of Maori words is used throughout the thesis except in quotations from other sources and in the bibliography. In these cases I have reproduced the stylistic conventions of the original authors. It is worth noting in this regard that particular newspapers have editorial policies regarding the use of Maori words that are somewhat at odds with current conventions. The Dominion, for example, insisted on adding ‘-s’ to signify the plural in their use of Maori words. The Maori language has no ‘-s’ but the Dominion argued that its use of these words was in English and should thus follow the rules of English grammar. The Dominion consequently referred to ‘Maoris’ rather than ‘Maori’, a style which jarred to the ear of many New Zealanders. This issue sparked debate in the ‘Letters’ column in early 1998 and illustrates a linguistic dimension to the struggle over cultural appropriation. Another example of discrepancy from common usage was the Evening Post’s policy of not capitalising the term ‘pakeha’. This policy was to signify that, unlike ‘Maori’, ‘pakeha’ did not refer to ‘a race of people’ but simply to ‘a white person’ (S. Moffatt, personal communication, 16/1/04).

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9 I write in the past tense here since the two daily newspapers in Wellington, the Dominion and the Evening Post, were merged in 2002 to become the Dominion Post.
Thesis overview

This thesis is in two parts: the first dealing with theories of identity, the second with theories of intersubjectivity. The first chapter in each part deals directly with the discursive strategies of colonial domination. The movement through each part is, then, a movement in search of the ‘beyond’ of colonialism. Part I of the thesis consists of four chapters, two each dealing with versions of essentialist and hybrid theorising. I distinguish between primitivist and ‘strategic’ theories of essentialism and ontological and performative theories of hybridity. Part II, in turning to theories of intersubjectivity, brings issues of relationality to the fore. This Part consists of three chapters, beginning with a chapter on Hegel’s master-slave dialectic, followed by one each on the politics of recognition and Lévinasian ethics.

I bring the international literature on identity and intersubjectivity together with ‘talk’ about Maori and Pakeha to interrogate both. In terms of the order in which theories of identity and intersubjectivity are dealt with, the structure of this thesis follows a linear progression. It is however better visualised as a spiralling, rather than a straight, line. Chapters Two and Six each represent the starting point of a new cycle in the spiral. The discussion of Maori and Pakeha that takes place in each chapter is less linear and, at times, themes and issues recur. The working of a kaleidoscope provides a useful metaphor for the way in which theories and ‘cases’ are brought together in this thesis. Each chapter represents a turn of the kaleidoscope, allowing a different (theoretical) view of the coloured pieces which ‘make up’ (Hacking, 1986) Maori and Pakeha. Each turn rearranges these same pieces into new patterns, leading to new insights into their relationship.

In Chapter Two, ‘Essentialism and colonial domination’, I explore the impact of essentialist approaches to identity construction on settler/indigene relations. I identify the discourses of primitivism and race as the major forms of essentialism that have influenced Western representations of indigenous peoples. These discourses of the Other are also shown to produce the Western/White Self as modern and dynamic. I briefly trace the histories of primitivism and race and identify their influence in early
European representations of Maori, before turning to their ongoing presence in contemporary representations of Maori and Pakeha. I argue that the contemporary effect of these discourses is to produce the Pakeha subject in terms of lack and the Maori subject in terms of versions of primitivist and/or racist essence. Pakeha strategies of equalisation and indigenisation are presented as responses to this situation. These are analysed for their impact on Maori. It is argued that their continued reliance on primitivism and racism works against Maori political interests in asserting a dynamic Maori difference. Moreover, binary oppositions work to divide Maori into ‘authentic’ (i.e. essentialist) and ‘inauthentic’ groups and simultaneously fail to secure Pakeha identity.

Chapter Three, ‘Ontological hybridities’, centres on accounts of hybrid identity in which hybridity is conceived in terms of the ‘substance’ of an identity. In these instances, hybridisation refers to the offspring of cross-cultural sexual relations and to cross-cultural ‘mixtures’ that result from migration. Two types of ontological hybridity are identified and the chapter is divided into discussion of each. ‘Doubled’ hybridities are those in which the two components remain distinct. Such hybrid identifications are rare in Aotearoa New Zealand and I argue that resistance to them is linked to the politics of biculturalism and to the perceived continuity between hybridisation and the colonial project of assimilation. However, expressions of this hybridity of ‘mixed descent’ do exist. Their proponents seek to express their sense of a dual identity and also argue that their ‘both/and’ location allows them to act as mediators between the Maori and Pakeha communities. Some also see this doubled hybridity as positive in disrupting the binary opposition between Maori and Pakeha. On the other hand, the dangers of assimilation remain and individuals of ‘mixed descent’ are encouraged to identify as Maori as an act of resistance to assimilation.

‘Syncretic’ hybridities are those in which a new singular identity label results from hybridisation. Here I analyse ‘Maori’ and ‘Pakeha’ as the outcome of such processes. Looking at the internal hybridity of Maori identity highlights the tensions between tradition and dynamism, between an authentic essence defining ‘real’ Maori and the embrace of Maori diversity and processes of ‘becoming’ Maori. While I consider that
these tensions register the ongoing impact of colonisation, I also argue that it is the ongoing presence of this diversity which best secures Maori identity against colonial domination. Although Pakeha is clearly a hybridised identity on the basis of both mixtures of descent and migrant origin, little attention to this substance of Pakeha identity is apparent within the culture. I argue this is because of the lack of a political project other than the continued securing of Pakeha domination. In this project, Pakeha access to any substance of identity is blocked by a desire to avoid attending to the legacy of colonial history. As a result, Pakeha culture is ahistorical and can develop no ‘substance’. In conclusion, I argue that ontological hybridity and essentialism remain linked and that hybridity can no more be guaranteed to further the disruption of colonial relations, than can essentialism. Further, both Maori and Pakeha demonstrate a desire to ignore or ‘forget’ the impact of colonisation on their identities: Maori as a means of resistance to that impact, Pakeha to avoid the inevitable challenge to the morality of their identity. The effect of this desire for avoidance is to reinforce the bifurcation of these identities by denying the point at which they meet, thus keeping them locked in conflictual relations.

In Chapter Four, ‘Performative hybridity and the unhomely’, I explore the politics of Homi Bhabha’s theory of hybridity and its usefulness to the reconstruction of Maori/Pakeha relations. I outline Bhabha’s conception of hybridity primarily through discussion of his analysis of colonial mimicry and his utilisation of the concept of the unhomely. Bhabha argues that hybridity founds a resistant agency, offers a means to disrupt the discursive strategies that support colonial relations and evidences a desire for cross-cultural solidarity. In subsequent sections I discuss analyses of Maori and Pakeha identities that either apply, or are compatible with, Bhabha’s approach. I argue that performative hybridity does offer a powerful critical tool for the deconstruction of colonial discourse and for the analysis of the dynamics of settler and indigenous identities under colonialism, but cannot be mapped directly onto the analysis of these identities. I argue that Pakeha, as colonising subjects, utilise colonial mimicry in the service of domination, in a reversal of Bhabha’s argument that hybridity/mimicry serves resistance. However, when the resistant potentiality of hybridity is turned inward, against Pakeha identity projects, it can facilitate a politically constructive confrontation
with colonial history. For Maori, in contrast, while Bhabha’s hybridity offers the same insights into the workings of colonialism and of Maori identity under colonialism, as a mode of identity to be embraced, it is more problematic. For an indigenous people whose identities have been disrupted by colonialism, adherence to further disruption via performativity is seen as compatible with colonialism, rather than disruptive of it. Some ‘substantialist’ basis to identity is necessary to the pursuit of a politics that can resist the continuance of colonial domination.

While Chapter Two canvassed the workings of essentialism in the service of colonial domination, in Chapter Five, ‘Strategic essentialism and indigenous difference’, I look at arguments that assert the politically strategic importance of essentialism for oppressed peoples, with particular reference to the work of Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. Like Bhabha, Spivak is more of a deconstructionist than an essentialist, but she concedes the political necessity of essentialism. Her deconstructionist commitments remain to the fore however, in that she does not address the political role that might be played by indigenous knowledges in the assertion of indigenous agency. In contrast, I distinguish between the play of strategic essentialism as ‘reverse discourse’, which continues to operate on the terrain of the dominating discourse, and the assertion of autonomous cultural difference. Rather than slipping back into a primitivist stasis, these latter claims are based on a dynamic account of a continuing pre-colonial ‘substance’, or alternative epistemology. With reference to the work of Maori feminist academics, I argue that, without the assertion of autonomous difference no indigenous politics of recovery is possible. Rather, the indigenous project remains reduced to one of resistance, lacking any ‘positivity’. I briefly discuss issues of biology, arguing that descent works as a ‘minimalist essence’, providing a necessary, if not sufficient, ground for indigenous identity claims. In conclusion, I argue that identity claims continue to rely on the interweaving of essentialism and dynamism. For colonised people in particular, recognition and acceptance of the need for both components is the only guard against the assimilatory and exclusionary dangers of both. Finally, I argue that acceptance of the validity of epistemological plurality is crucial to overcoming the ongoing universalisation/domination of Western epistemologies. This acceptance depends on modes of interaction that can account for the ‘facticity’ of difference.
Part II of the thesis shifts attention from theories of subjectivity to theories of intersubjectivity, bringing relations between self and other, and their constitutive role in the construction of identities, to the fore. In Chapter Six, ‘The master-slave dialectic and relations of domination’, I revisit the identity dynamics of colonisation (introduced in Chapter Two) from an intersubjective perspective. I outline Hegel’s analysis of the master-slave relation, linking its dynamics to colonisation through the work of Frantz Fanon, and to speech interactions through the work of Zali Gurevitch. I use Gurevitch’s categorisations of ‘repressive silence’ and the ‘conversation through things’ to explore a range of interactional dynamics between Maori and Pakeha. I argue that these dominating dynamics account for the constitution of Maori and Pakeha as the slave/colonised and master/colonising subjects of the colonial relation. In conclusion, I consider Fanon’s attempts to find a resolution to the master-slave dialectic through a turn to négritude and the espousal of revolutionary violence. I argue that neither offers a way towards a new form of intersubjective relations, but that Fanon’s strength in highlighting the psycho-social harms of ‘misrecognition’ suggests a shift of attention to the possibilities of recognition theory.

Chapter Seven, ‘Recognition and cultural difference’, explores Charles Taylor’s theory of recognition. Taylor distinguishes between two forms of recognition - the expansion of the category of equal dignity and the recognition of cultural difference through judgments of cultural worth. I argue that Taylor’s expansion of equal dignity offers a powerful justification for the assertion of the self-determining autonomy of cultural minorities and for resourced support for the exercise of that autonomy. In contrast, I consider Taylor’s argument for the recognition of cultural difference to be more problematic. I juxtapose this argument with that made by Tariana Turia in a speech to the New Zealand Psychological Society, in which she seeks both the recognition of colonial harm and the recognition of Maori cultural difference. I critique Taylor’s theory of the recognition of difference in relation to Turia’s argument and the critique of Western epistemological domination established earlier in the thesis. I argue that Taylor’s theory ultimately works to secure the centrality of the Western subject, rather than ‘decentring’ that subject, and is wrong in adhering to an singular, epistemological
response to the ‘facticity’ of cultural difference. Against this, Turia’s argument implicitly points to the modification of epistemological relations through the establishment of an ethical relation between self and other.

Chapter Eight, ‘Ethical proximity and the politics of disappointment’, centres on the ethical relation as outlined in the philosophy of Emmanuel Lévinas. I begin by outlining Bhabha’s turn to Lévinas in search of a non-dominating basis to relations between self and other. I outline Lévinas’ conception of the ethical relation and discuss criticisms of its ‘saintliness’ and lack of relevance to political life. Here I centre in particular on the work of Rosalyn Diprose who, while sympathetic to Lévinas’ project, rejects key aspects of his theorisation in an attempt to bring ethics and politics into a closer relation. I reject Diprose’s revised formulation and argue that Lévinas offers us a better, if indeterminate, guide to political practice in our relationships with others. I exemplify my argument with reference to instances of Maori-Pakeha relations. I conclude that Alison Jones’ espousal of a ‘politics of disappointment’, which involves a ‘disappointed’ orientation towards our utopian political aims, and Lévinas’ ethical orientation to the Other, together provide a basis for reformulating the Pakeha political and epistemological relationship to Maori difference.

In Chapter Nine, ‘Conclusion’, I briefly present my final conclusions and observations. I argue that, while identities are necessary to politics, the key to moving ‘beyond’ colonialism is not to be found in a particular theorisation of identity. In my investigation of theories of intersubjectivity, it has become clear that epistemological relations generally, including political and identity-centred interactions, always involve a degree of violence against others. While such relations are necessary to social life, I have argued that they need to be held in tension with an ethical intersubjective relation as espoused by Lévinas. Straddling this tension requires the maintenance of a ‘disappointed’ orientation to our political and epistemological commitments, including our identity claims.
Culture never stands alone but always participates in a conflictual economy acting out the tension between sameness and difference, comparison and differentiation, unity and diversity, cohesion and dispersion, containment and subversion (Young, 1995:53).

The focus of Part I of this thesis is what ‘makes up’ (Hacking, 1986) the identities of ‘Maori’ and ‘Pakeha’. In focussing on the ‘what’ of these identities, I am focussing on claims made about what constitutes Maori and Pakeha identities. Thus I am interested in the claims made for ‘Maori’ and ‘Pakeha’ as collective categories which unite and differentiate particular New Zealanders. Typically, given that these are cultural categories, these claims are made up of assertions of commonality and difference in terms of the significance of shared descent, common practices and values, specific relations to place (as indicated in the opening of Chapter One) and shared historical experience. However, I am not interested here in the anthropological particularities of culture, such as rituals, arts, belief systems and practices. Rather, I am interested in the claims made about the nature of the ‘substance’ of Maori and Pakeha. In other words, I am interested in the everyday theories and philosophies that underpin the identity claims

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Richard Handler (1994:28) distinguishes between three aspects of human experience to which the concept of identity refers: to the individual, to the collective and to the relationship between the individual and collective. While my focus is the second of these, inevitably, given that it is individuals who bring collectivities into being and maintain them in their speech and action, the relationship between the individual and the collective appears here also.
made by New Zealanders as they make sense of their own cultural location and those of their neighbours. Specifically I look at whether or not they conceive of ‘Maori’ and ‘Pakeha’ in essentialist or constructionist terms.

The debates over the place of essentialism and constructionism in the theorisation of identity seem to have reached a state of intellectual exhaustion. Constructionism was originally seen as a means to escape the problems of determinism associated with essentialism. Gradually, however, constructionism has also come to be seen to have its limits and the ‘strategic’ value of essentialism has been reasserted (see for example, Calhoun 1994; Hall, 1996a). Why retrace this now familiar ground? I do so here for a number of related reasons. Firstly, I want to bring these debates to bear on the identities of Maori and Pakeha. Secondly, in doing so, I am interested in the political effects of these modes of theorising in relation to the specific identities of indigene and settler. In this sense I am interested in the particularities of identity politics in the indigene-settler relation. Finally, I am interested in exposing the ongoing traces of colonial dynamics in these assertions of identity and in uncovering any potential offered within these modes of theorising to escape those dynamics. Relevant to this aim is Stuart Hall’s argument that identity, despite the problems of its oscillation between essentialism and constructionism, is still central to questions of ‘agency and politics’ (Hall, 1996a:2). In both these senses identity claims are crucial to the practices of resistance and assertions of autonomy of peoples who have been, and continue to be, oppressed by a range of categorical identities. As such, identity claims remain an important site to investigate the possibilities of moving ‘beyond’ colonial identities and modes of relating.

My discussion of constructionist accounts of identity centres on the concept of hybridity, as the other of essentialism. Robert Young, for example, argues that ‘[h]ybridity ... is a key term in that wherever it emerges it suggests the impossibility of essentialism’ (Young, 1995:27). For a number of reasons, discussions of constructionism in relation to cultural identities utilise this concept. To begin with, both terms arise in association with conceptions of nature and the organic. Raymond Williams (1983:87-93) has traced the early associations of ‘culture’ with the cultivation of crops and animals. Hybridity, similarly, arises originally in the natural sciences to refer to the cross-breeding of plants and animals. This scientific origin led easily to the
use of hybridity within scientific racism to refer to ‘racial mixtures’ and, from there, to its use in contemporary cultural theory (Young, 1995:5-6). Broadly, within this body of theory hybridity has come to signify movement and combination, against essentialism’s stasis and purity. While, in general, the focus of the following chapters, including the discussion of hybridity, is on claims regarding the ‘substance’ of identities as stated above, there is one exception. Hybridity, as developed in the work of Homi Bhabha, refers to identity as process, to movement itself, in an attempt to make a radical break with the idea of identities having ‘substance’ at all.

The structure of this part of the thesis traces the theoretical movement from essentialism, through versions of hybridity, and back to (strategic) essentialism again. In doing so, it parallels what Brian Stross (1999) has termed the ‘hybridity cycle’. This term refers to a diachronic process by which mixtures of ‘pure’ cultural forms create new ‘hybrid’ ones, which eventually themselves become new ‘pure’ forms, and the cycle begins again. Similarly here I follow the diachronic trajectory of identity theorising in academic debate from essentialism, through hybridity, and back to a new version of essentialism. While the discussion of strategic essentialism might suggest a return to the essentialism of Chapter Two, I argue that it is a significantly different, ‘new’ form. These chapters also represent a cycle in that they move from consideration of the substance of identities (essence or hybrid) to consideration of the process of identity construction (performative hybridity) and back to issues of substance again.
Chapter Two

Essentialism and colonial domination

The white Canadian looks at the Indian. The Indian is Other and therefore alien. But the Indian is indigenous and therefore cannot be alien. So the Canadian must be alien. But how can the Canadian be alien in Canada? (Goldie, 1989:13)

I am as much tangata whenua - I was born here - as anyone else and I will never give that up because I can’t (Bolger, in ‘This land is ...’, New Zealand Herald, 8/2/95, s1, p1).11

Introduction

11 Where newspaper articles cited in this thesis have no named author, they will be listed in the bibliography by title. The first words of the title will be given in citations (as above) to allow the references to be identified.
The particular tension in the relationship between settler and indigene lies in the fact that both claim ‘native’ status. Central to the identity discourses of each is the claim to be the people ‘belonging to’ a particular territorial space. For indigenous peoples this claim is based on their occupation prior to the arrival of the colonising settlers and hence their status as ‘first people’. For settlers, this claim is based on their (counter)assertion of nationality, itself territorially grounded in national geographical imaginings. These two claims are distinguished temporally and morally, both dimensions favouring the indigene. In temporal terms, indigenous peoples are simply ‘first peoples’. Settlers then can never be better than ‘second’. In moral terms, indigenous peoples are the injured and wronged party, exploited and dominated throughout colonial histories and relationships. Settlers, on the other hand, are party to that injury. They may not be responsible for its entirety but were, and are, its chief instruments (and continue to be colonisation’s major ‘beneficiaries’). Hence, as Richard Handler (1990:8) has succinctly expressed it, despite their nationalist narratives of identity, settlers ‘are not the natives of choice’.

In addition to competing claims of territorial belonging, settler and indigenous identity narratives are based in the typical characteristics - genealogical/biological and cultural distinctiveness - that mark all national and ‘racial’ claims to peoplehood. The substance of the identity discourses of indigenes and settlers then are woven from three strands, genealogical/biological, cultural and territorial. Conflict around all three types of claim is apparent in much of the disagreement experienced between Maori and Pakeha within New Zealand society.

In this chapter, essentialist renditions of these claims are outlined and analysed. I first trace the colonial and modern history of essentialist thinking in relation to cultural identities. This history centres on ‘authenticity’ as a major trope of essentialism in romantic, and later racist, thought. While my primary concern is with Maori and Pakeha within Aotearoa New Zealand, this history illustrates that these modes of thought do not originate with them. Rather, these two peoples make use of philosophies and discourses that developed out of the intersection of modernity and colonialism generally. I then briefly outline and analyse the deployment of essentialist orientations towards identity.
in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Maori-Pakeha relations. Finally, I provide examples of their ongoing influence on contemporary representations of Maori and Pakeha. I argue throughout the chapter that essentialism has been, and continues to be, deployed primarily in the service of domination and can ultimately operate in the interests of neither Maori nor Pakeha.

**Defining essentialism and authenticity**

Diana Fuss (1989:xii) argues that ‘there is no essence to essentialism’. Rather, ‘essence’ is itself a sign (Fuss, 1989:20). Thus it is important to clarify my usage in this thesis. The broadest definition of essentialism suggests that all identities are, by definition, essentialist. Toril Moi expresses this position when she argues that ‘to define “woman” is necessarily to essentialize her’ (cited in Fuss, 1989:56). From this perspective then, any attempt to define the human self or human groups is an exercise in essentialism, because to define someone as an $x$ and not a $y$ logically seems to depend on the existence of determining and distinctive (often exclusive) characteristics. To argue this is to claim that only by doing away with definitions and categories altogether can we escape essentialism. Since we can neither think nor act without them, the position is that essentialism is inescapable. In this thesis I refer to the process alluded to by Moi as *reductionism* and distinguish this from my usage of essentialism. While I agree that all identities are inevitably reductionist in that they centre on some characteristic(s) of an individual or a group at the neglect of others, I prefer to reserve the term ‘essentialism’ for particular forms of such reduction. This has the advantage of allowing analytical distinctions to be made between different forms of identity claims.

Essentialism, in this thesis, refers to a particular *orientation* to the substance of identity claims. Essentialist accounts of identity are those that work according to the logics of *determinism* and *exclusivity*. The claim that an essential characteristic (or set of characteristics) *determines* a person’s identity is problematic in its reductionism. Such thinking acts to reduce all other attributes of the person or group concerned to mere manifestations of this essence. The ‘hardest’ form of determinism is that in which the determining essence is considered to be a-historical, *static* or fixed. Thus, the essentialist
characteristic is not open to change or modification without the loss of identity or selfhood itself. Groups so defined are thus condemned to a less than human condition in which they are denied the full exercise of human agency. Exclusivity refers to the way in which defining essences are considered to be the property of only one group of people. While this mode of thought works to make it easy to categorise people and maintain boundaries between groups, that is also its problem. Arguments of exclusivity have the unfortunate effect of overemphasizing the differences between individuals and groups at the expense of ignoring, or even denying, what unites them or what they share. Assumptions of exclusivity are also problematically linked to notions of purity. Since characteristics are considered the exclusive properties of the respective groups, they should also exist in a pure state. Mixtures are devalued as ‘impurities’ and as a threat to the identity of the group.

Authenticity is also a complex concept with diverse meanings. The most commonsense definition of authenticity is ‘genuine-ness’. In relation to identities, authenticity carries this connotation in the sense that it suggests that an expression of identity, a cultural practice, and so on, are ‘genuine’ to a person/people, that is that they belong to, or originate with, them. To be authentic then is to ‘be yourself’, to be ‘original’, or ‘self-made’. This, of course, raises more questions than it answers. The issue of the creation or the ‘making’ of human selves, and hence of human authenticity, is a complex subject about which many theories have been proposed. Two diametrically opposed strands of such theorising are those that argue that selves are given and those that argue that selves must be developed. From the former perspective, ‘being yourself’, or being authentic, requires the discovery of what is already there, what determines the distinctiveness of the person or collectivity. From the latter perspective, ‘being yourself’ or being authentic requires a process of becoming, a process of ‘self-realization’. It is the former conception of a given authenticity that resonates with the essentialist valuations of determinism and exclusivity. If a particular characteristic determines an identity, then to fail to display this characteristic (when you are ‘really’ an x) is to be ‘inauthentic’. Likewise, to be ‘authentic’ means to display/express the characteristic(s) exclusive to

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12 See Taylor (1991) and Ferrara (1998) for extensive theorisations of this formulation of authenticity.
your collectivity. Originality, then, is equated with purity, a lack of ‘taint’.

In the history that follows I trace the development and deployment of essentialised authenticity in romantic and, subsequently, racist thought and their impact on settler/European representations of Maori. In romanticism, authenticity is equated primarily with adherence to traditional cultural practices and values connoting the primitive, a valuation which also became linked to an equation of people and place. In racism, in contrast, authenticity is equated with a valuation of purity of biological descent.

**Authenticity and modernity**

Concern over authenticity is linked to the dawning of modernity and the sense Europeans had during the Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment that their societies were undergoing a qualitative change. The shift in focus from religious to secular concerns meant a new philosophical, and increasingly scientific, interest in humanity. What might constitute defining human characteristics, the relationship between the human and the natural world, what humans shared and how their differences were to be accounted for, the origins of humanity and what its fate was to be - all these humanist questions and concerns were central to Enlightenment philosophy and have defined the human sciences since. This debate signifies that in modernity the nature of the self and humanity became a problem, a source of uncertainty. Broadly speaking, the early moderns can be divided between those who viewed this uncertainty positively, as a sign of human potentiality for improvement, and those who reacted against this view with a pessimistic sense of modernity as the loss of an earlier certainty and innocence.

Both camps deployed authenticity in their quest to define the human in the midst of the ‘civilisatory pain’ (Bendix, 1997:47) of modernity. Thus diverse understandings of the authentic developed out of different valuations made of the relationship between the human and time and the human and nature. The conception of ‘human nature’ encapsulates the complex and ambiguous relation argued to exist between humanity and nature. ‘Nature’ was often, but not always, conceived of as a source of ‘human nature’
and both nature and human nature were variously thought of as the source of vice (Enlightenment) or of virtue (Romanticism) (Soper, 1995:25-34).\textsuperscript{13} The Enlightenment philosophers were primarily optimistic that human change through time represented a progression from a base nature to a state of civilised culture, as human potentiality was gradually developed. For these European thinkers, their own societies and philosophies represented the highest state of development from a purported ‘state of nature’ and headed towards an emancipated and ‘civilised’ future. The romantics, in contrast, reacted against the first flush of modernist enthusiasm. They viewed nature in paradisical terms and equated the ‘state of nature’ with a ‘lost’ human authenticity. Thus, for the romantics, the pursuit of authenticity was a means to ‘recover’ a pre-modern virtue.

The idea that the past was the repository for a ‘lost’ authenticity collided with the belief that many co-existent peoples were actually living exemplars of that past, effectively living on the other side of the nature-culture divide, or at some lower point in the human development of culture.\textsuperscript{14} Authenticity, then, became something that the European masculine and bourgeois subject assigned to his Others, in particular to non-European peoples and to the European peasantry.\textsuperscript{15} The authenticity of ‘primitive’, non-European peoples was encapsulated in the figure of the Noble Savage, that of the peasantry in the figure of the ‘Folk’.

\textsuperscript{13} For detailed discussion of these opposed views of the human/nature relation see Taylor (1989:305-493) and Soper (1995).

\textsuperscript{14} While the development of evolutionary theory is generally associated with Darwin and the nineteenth century, these earlier discourses on human nature and change also invoked evolutionary thinking, albeit without Darwin’s scientific emphasis. Maurice Cranston (1984:29), for example, argues that Rousseau developed a theory of evolution which prefigured Darwin. Certainly, these earlier modernist accounts of non-European peoples translated spatial distance into a distance across time.

\textsuperscript{15} It is intriguing that while women were also relegated to the other side of the nature-culture divide, their idealisation (as moral source) differed from that of the primitive other. My sense is that this difference is linked to the dependence on spatial distance to maintain the valuation of the primitive (to be discussed below) - a form of distance that could not be maintained between men and women.
From the outset, the modern concern over authenticity connects the construction of the ‘primitive’ and ‘n/Native’ other and the construction of the European ‘national’ self. The primitivism of the Noble Savage and of the Folk was not inherent in these peoples themselves, nor was it purely about defining them. Rather, the construction of these figures of primitivism was always about the definition and concerns of modern man himself. The Noble Savage acted primarily as a figure of critique of the state of modern ‘civilisation’. In this sense, the Savage acted as a source for replenishment of the ‘losses’ of modernity. The Folk likewise acted as a cultural source for the development of romantic nationalist movements. Both these primitivist figures were also shadowed by their opposites, the ‘Ignoble Savage’ and the ‘rabble’, figures of inauthenticity that justified the domination and exploitation of the non-European other and the European working class.

The following three sections of this chapter outline the chronological development of the figures of the Noble Savage and the Folk, and the subsequent development of scientific racism with its refiguring of authenticity in terms of ‘racial purity’. Throughout, I illustrate this history with examples from European representations of Maori. These modes of thought clearly influenced the developing relation between indigene and settler in Aotearoa New Zealand. In addition, European experiences of Maori, and study of Maori language and culture, contributed to the knowledge base which informed the discourses of primitivism and racism themselves. It was a two-way exchange.

The chronologies of the development of primitivist and racist discourses and of their deployment in the representation of Maori are not exactly parallel however. The Noble Savage developed from the early sixteenth century, the Folk from the late eighteenth century. Thus at the time of earliest European contact with Maori in 1642 and still at the time of Cook’s voyages in the 1700s, the discourses of savagery were in wide circulation and their influences are apparent in the writings of the early European explorers. In the middle and later nineteenth century, the concept of primitivism became

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16 The capitalised ‘Native’ distinguishes the ‘native’ of the nation from the figure of the ‘Native’, synonymous with the Noble Savage (see Goldberg, 1993:79).
interwoven with the ‘scientific’ development of racial theory. While romantic thought continued to exert an effect, in the late nineteenth century the language of scientific racism predominated. This language can also be identified in European and settler representations of Maori from this period. The romanticisation of the primitive reappeared in the early twentieth century; in the case of New Zealand, the belief that Maori were a ‘dying race’ providing the nostalgic sense of regret and loss that provokes such romanticism. I also argue that, in twentieth century settler/Pakeha representations of Maori, the figure of the Noble Savage shades into the figure of the Folk, in the sense that once Pakeha New Zealanders begin to conceive of their own identity in nationalist terms, Maori primitivism increasingly becomes a cultural source for the fledgling nation.

The Savage and modern man

The savagery or wildness of the Other is a trope that has a long history in European thought (see White, 1978). Out of this history the figure of the Noble Savage developed following the ‘discovery’ of the ‘New World’. These human others were viewed through the lens of primitivism or savagery, the Europeans unable to acknowledge ‘a human substance truly other’ (Todorov, 1984:42). The difference of the others of the ‘New World’ was interpreted either as absolute, a marker of non-human status, or, more paradoxically, as a sign of their basic human sameness in relation to their European conquerors. Either way, difference was linked to a belief in European superiority and used to justify practices of domination. According to Tzvetan Todorov’s (1984) study of texts dating from the Spanish arrival in Central America, from Columbus onwards the idea of absolute difference, an irredeemable otherness often signified as ignoble savagery, was used to justify genocide and enslavement (in the Americas and later Africa). The belief in equal humanity, on the other hand, led to assimilationist practices, in particular via Christian conversion. In the latter case, the difference of the indigenous inhabitants of the ‘New World’ was understood as indicative of their ‘lower’ level of development in relation to European societies. From this perspective the natives were seen as capable of development and ‘salvation’. It is this view, which sees a basic
human goodness in the primitive other, which held the germ of the figure of the Noble Savage.

Both ignoble and noble responses to Maori difference were apparent in early reports of the European explorers. Abel Tasman was the first European to make contact with Maori in 1642. The interactions between Tasman’s crew and Maori they met were at times friendly, but at others resulted in conflict and death. Despite this violent contact, Anne Salmond (1997:22-3) cites the account of Dirk van Nierop in 1674 to argue that the Dutch explorers of this period describe Maori in fairly non-judgmental terms. However, she reports that seventy years later accounts of the same events had taken on a far more judgmental and moral tone. In 1746 Prévost, for example, describes the Maori involved as ‘barbarians’ and ‘savages’, guilty of ‘dark treachery’ (cited in Salmond, 1997:23).

This early account of Maori ‘ignoble savagery’ was influential in shaping the attitudes of later visitors. Salmond (1997:24) cites the visit of Surville in 1769 where, in advance of actual contact, the sailors described Maori as ‘savages of bad repute’. Cook, on the other hand, accompanied by both van Nierop’s and Prévost’s accounts, along with the Earl of Morton’s ‘Hints’ which argued that ‘natives’ were equal humans with rights to their own lands, did not, according to Salmond, engage in such pre-judgments.17 It appears that Cook and a number of the influential individuals who travelled with him, such as Joseph Banks and George Forster, generally had a positive regard for the Maori they came into contact with (for example, Salmond, 1997: 25, 94-6). These positive judgments were, however, framed by a secure belief in the superiority of European civilization (Salmond, 1997:27). This attitude is apparent in Benjamin Franklin’s (1771) argument in support of a Royal Society expedition to New Zealand:18

The inhabitants of those countries, our fellow men, have canoes only. Not knowing iron, they cannot build ships. They have little astronomy, and no

17 Salmond’s (1997:24) citation from Morton’s ‘Hints’ includes such classic examples of the Noble Savage as the following: ‘Conquest over such people can give no just title; because they could never be the Agressors [sic]’.

18 Note the tendency to describe Maori society in terms of lack.
knowledge of the compass to guide them. They cannot therefore come to us, or obtain any of our advantages ... a voyage is now proposed to visit a distant people on the other side of the Globe; not to cheat them, not to rob them, not to seize their lands, or enslave their persons; but merely to do them good, and enable them as far as in our power lies, to live as comfortably as ourselves...

From these circumstances, does not some duty seem to arise from us to them? (quoted in Salmond, 1997:37-8).

Maori, whether denigrated as ‘desperate, fearless, ferocious cannibals’ (Bosun Elliott, quoted in Salmond, 1997:84) or admired as ‘brave, war-like people, with sentiments devoid of treachery’ (Cook, quoted in Salmond, 1997:25) were clearly seen as occupying a place of inferiority to the ‘white man’.

These figures of the Noble and Ignoble Savage continued to structure the new arrivals’ responses to Maori. Tim McCreanor (1997), for example, finds both prevalent in the 1839 pamphlet Information Relative to New Zealand, which was published by the New Zealand Company to entice prospective colonists. As McCreanor (1997:38) argues, their use in this context would have been influential in predetermining the views of early colonists prior to their ever meeting Maori.

According to Hayden White (1978:176) by as early as the mid-1500s the savage was being used as a figure of ‘intracultural criticism’. White cites the well-known example from this period of Michel de Montaigne’s essay ‘Of Cannibals’, which compared the barbarity of cannibals to the greater barbarity of Montaigne’s European contemporaries. While the former may engage in barbaric acts such as cannibalism, Montaigne argued, this was only following nature. The savagery of the Europeans, on the other hand, was the result of culture and hence far worse (White, 1978:176; see also Cocchiara, 1981:16). Thus Montaigne managed to combine a positive evaluation of natives with a belief in the higher (albeit flawed) development of European society. This seeming paradox depended on a particular interpretation of the nature-culture divide. The ‘savage’ was considered to live a ‘natural’ life. European ‘cultured’ life, on the other hand, was an ‘advance’ on the life of nature, but any specific form of European life and belief could be interpreted as having taken a wrong turn into alienation and
greater barbarity.¹⁹

¹⁹ Two key features of the Noble Savage were apparent even earlier in the writings of Spanish missionary Bartolomé de Las Casas (1474-1566) who firstly saw the Americans as ‘wild’ Christians, effectively identifying them with his own ‘ego ideal’ (Todorov, 1984:165). Thus, from this earliest contact, the positive valuation of the non-European other was linked to a lack of any real interest in their cultural difference, in favour of a projection of European desires and concerns onto them. Secondly, like Montaigne, Las Casas made comparative judgments between European and American in favour of the latter (Todorov, 1984:163-7).
This tradition of the figure of the ‘natural’ and ‘noble’ Savage being used to critique the cultured and debased European continued throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Hence, by the eighteenth century and the time of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, the Noble Savage already had a lengthy history on which he drew. It is in this period that the concept is considered to have reached its apogee and Rousseau is credited as having been the most significant figure in popularising it (Cocchiara, 1981:116; Jimack, 1988:28). Rousseau is also considered to have been pre-eminent in articulating modern concerns over authenticity (Berman, 1970:76; Taylor, 1991:27, 1994:29; Bendix, 1997:16; Ferrara, 1998:8). His work then brought together the figure of the Noble Savage and ideal of authenticity in a relation which was to be hugely influential. Rousseau’s comparative account of the Noble Savage (or ‘Natural Man’ in his terminology) and modern man continued the tradition begun by Montaigne of valuing nature over what Europeans had made of ‘culture’. Rousseau was scathing in his condemnation of the civilised society of his day, with its preoccupation with the accumulation of wealth and the marked inequalities consequently produced. Against this problematic civilisation, Natural Man provided an exemplar of qualities humanity should aspire to.

While Rousseau (1984:68) acknowledged that his Natural Man was an ideal type that ‘perhaps never existed’, he did draw on accounts of existing peoples in developing his philosophy. While he drew on the accounts of explorers, they in turn drew on his

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20 Maurice Cranston (1986:101), although subsequently entitling the second volume of his biography of Rousseau, The Noble Savage (1991), argues that Rousseau’s ‘Natural Man’ bears less likeness to the idealised figure of the Noble Savage than does Diderot’s, the primary difference being that Rousseau’s natural man is solitary while Diderot theorised an original sociability.

21 An exemplar defined in terms of lack, the savage defined as ‘without work, without speech, without a home, without war and without relationships’ (Rousseau, 1984:104). He did not, unsurprisingly given the lack of sociality in his image of Natural Man, suggest this as the ideal to which humanity should strive to return (see for example, Taylor, 1989:358-9; Soper, 1995:29). Rather, he understood a simple return was not possible, nor even desirable. On the contrary, he felt that the human capacity for self-improvement could be developed and in A Discourse on Inequality, and Emile in particular, set out his prescription for this modern pursuit of authenticity.

22 See for example, discussion of the Hottentots and the ‘savages of the West Indies’ in Rousseau (1984:144-5). But see also his observation that in the accounts of travels in the New World ‘we have come to know no other men except Europeans’ (Rousseau, 1984:159).
Theories of primitivism. Salmond (1991:309) reports that Rousseau’s and Montaigne’s idealisations of the Noble Savage were influential in shaping Marion du Fresne’s approach to Maori in the Bay of Islands in 1772. According to Salmond (1991:384-395), du Fresne’s adherence to the image of the Noble Savage contributed to the series of events which led to his being killed and eaten by local tribesmen, an event which, to complete the circle, was later reported back to Rousseau by one of du Fresne’s companions, Julien Crozet (Salmond, 1997:114).

The role of the figure of the Savage in the practice of ‘intracultural criticism’ is illustrated in the account of Cook’s naturalist, George Forster, in an echo of Montaigne:

Though we are too much polished to be canibals [sic], we do not find it unnaturally and savagely cruel to take the field, and to cut one another’s throats by thousands, without a single motive, besides the ambition of a prince, or the caprice of his mistress! ... A New Zeelander, who kills and eats his enemy, is a very different being from a European, who, for his amusement, tears an infant from the mother’s breast, in cool blood, and throws it on the earth to feed his hounds (quoted in Salmond, 1997:95).

This primitive ‘innocence’ of the Maori was to be preserved, Forster felt, at the cost of the cessation of contact with Europeans:

It were indeed sincerely to be wished, that intercourse which has lately subsisted between Europeans and the natives of the South Sea islands may be broken off in time, before the corruption of manners which unhappily characterises civilized regions, may reach that innocent race of men, who live here fortunate in their ignorance and simplicity (Forster, quoted in Howe, 1977:138).

The figure of the Noble Savage, from Montaigne to Rousseau, depended on an interpretation of the nature-culture distinction that valued an idealised nature over what European societies had achieved in culture. Existing non-European peoples were equated with a hypothesized human (read ‘European’) past, when people lived peacefully and innocently in harmony with nature. Following Rousseau, the Noble Savage and authenticity became entwined in an idealisation of an original state of
human nature that had been ‘lost’ in the impact of ‘civilisation’. While the non-European ‘savage’ became one important site for the projections of this lost authenticity, the European peasantry became another.

The Folk and the European nation

Both the non-European and European primitive were treated as ‘historical documents’ and had been linked as representations of the primitive as far back as Montaigne (Cocchiara, 1981:15). The peasantry, like the Savages of the New World, were considered to live a ‘natural’ life in contrast to the enlightened citizenry of the metropolis. While their primitivism may ultimately have been cast as ‘higher’ in the evolutionary order (see for example, Coombes, 1991:205-7), their location in the past allowed them to be imbued with a similar original authenticity, ‘unspoilt’ by civilisation.

The combination of the Folk, custom and national cultural authenticity was developed most influentially by Johann Gottfried von Herder (1744-1803). He believed that each nation had a distinctive and original ‘spirit’ and that the songs and poetry of the rural peasantry were the purest sources of that spirit. Further, he assumed ‘the oldest, most original forms of poetry would also be the most perfect’ (Bendix, 1997:37; see also, Taylor, 1989:377). The pre-modern Folk were ‘the most genuine and unblemished part of the nation and therefore should be the authentic interpreter of the national spirit’ (Herder, cited in Cocchiara, 1981:174).

With Herder, the conception of an original authenticity begins to develop a clearly essentialist form. He considered the national ‘spirit’ to be a pre-existing substance and is responsible for ‘fleshing out’ much of the content of this cultural essence. Language and its artefacts, poetry and song, are the means by which humans are called on to express their pre-existing human essence. And, while there may be only one human essence, there are many ways of expressing it. He believed that each nation had their own

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23 While this discussion centres on Herder’s construction of the Folk, note that he also invoked the Savage as a figure of critique of European modernity (see for example, Berlin, 1976:178).
original way of being human, expressing their common humanity through cultural distinctiveness. Cultural diversity is thus not only natural, but also good and necessary to authenticity. To be authentic, Herder called upon individuals to pursue their own culture, via their national or tribal (that is, collective) traditions. Consequently, progress for Herder meant the adherence to that culture through history, the pursuit of an authentic national ‘destiny’ through whatever advances and setbacks that might entail (Berlin, 1976:189-90). Further, his belief that cultures are incommensurable assumes that boundaries exist between them and should not be overstepped. Thus Herder posited a pure, original and exclusive cultural essence, the cultivation of which, he argued, was the proper route to development/progress.

The past for Herder was a source, but not a prison. His ‘spirit’ is determining in the sense that he argued it controlled a people’s destiny. It was not, however, a fixed and ahistorical essence, but provided the basis for development, albeit by remaining ‘true’ to the past. The contradiction in this position lies in the implicit requirement for the original authenticity, in the form of the peasantry in this case, to continue to exist as a wellspring for these moderns. In other words, the idea of an original authenticity as source for some depended on it being a prison for others. This role as (primitive) cultural source relies once again on the translation of distance into time. The authentic Folk reside far from the dwelling places of modernity. Those closer at hand are a debased form of peasant: ‘Volk does not mean the rabble in the alleys; that group never sings or rhymes, it only screams and truncates’ (Herder, quoted in Bendix, 1997:40). Thus the authenticity of the Folk depends on their ‘incarceration’ (Appadurai, 1988:37-8) in a static rural and traditional lifestyle. A second indication of the power imbalance involved in this role of cultural source is that the folklorists subjected the songs and poetry of the peasantry to a ‘salvage and cleansing operation’ (Bendix, 1997:40) to reinstate what the ‘experts’ considered was/should be their original form. Thus, even geographical incarceration could not guarantee their cultural purity and the modern Europeans remained the arbiters of their authenticity.

Herder is frequently credited as the founder of romantic nationalism and ‘nationalism’
itself is his term (Berlin, 1976:181; Cocchiara, 1981:182).\footnote{I do not have the scope here to debate Herder’s relationship to the excesses of romantic nationalism, but note that Berlin (1976:157-61, 207-12) defends him against this charge.} His contribution to the subsequent development of nationalism centres on the way in which he extended and fleshed out the idea of a ‘people’ in moral and cultural terms. Culture in Herder’s theory is reified into an entity - the essence of a people - and hence, central to their authenticity. Further, authentic culture in his theory is self-generated in the link between people and place through time. With this move it becomes possible to think of culture as ‘pure’ or not and purity is equated with the maintenance of \textit{territorial} and \textit{cultural} boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’, self and other. Via his theory of cultural authenticity, Herder offered modern Europeans a basis for the development of cultural nationalisms through which they could project an original authenticity onto their own histories. It is also important to note that while these human differences are ‘rooted in ... being and past’ (Taylor, 1989:415) they are not, for Herder, rooted in race or a biological essence (Cocchiara, 1981:181; Young, 1995:38; Malik, 1996:79; Banton, 1998:22-3). Human difference was linked to geography (including climate) and history, to territorial and cultural belonging, rather than to biology. He believed that as people should cleave to their culture, so they could only thrive in their homeland (Berlin, 1976:177, 197).

\textbf{Scientific racism and ‘purity’}

Robert Young (1995:121) records that from the 1840s the biological approaches of race theory began to merge with the cultural studies of philology. The study of comparative anatomy led to the development of racial theories centred on ‘\textit{biological} and \textit{natural} difference which was inherent and unalterable’ (Miles, 1989:31). With this development, the earlier cultural relativism of Herder gave way to increasingly hierarchical valuations of language and culture. Biology and culture were brought together to provide explanations for human diversity that extended and hardened ideas of the immutability of difference. Biology came to be seen to determine cultural achievement. As Young (1995:121-2) cites Philip Curtin, ‘where earlier writers held that race was an important influence on human culture, the new generation saw race as
the crucial determinant, not only of culture but of human character and of all history’.

The history of race has been even more thoroughly documented than that of the Noble Savage.25 From this history what is of interest here, in terms of the general ‘hardening’ and extension of biological determinism, is the development of notions of racial purity. Nineteenth-century notions of racial purity can be linked back to the thinking about cultural nations initiated by Herder. The theory of discrete racial origins (polygenism), which underpins concerns over racial purity, parallels Herder’s conception of autonomous cultural development out of the interaction of people and place (Young, 1995:38-40). In addition, scientific racism adopted the notion of an individual and collective essence which united (and divided) human groups. What Herder conceived of as a cultural volkgeist that accounted for a people’s unity became, in scientific racism, a biologically-based essence. ‘Race’, which had been previously used to refer to family lineage (Banton, 1998:17-8), came to encapsulate whole populations, while retaining its traditional language of ‘descent’ and ‘blood’ to construct arguments of purity and miscegenation.

Young credits Joseph Gobineau (1816-1882) with shifting the emphasis of ‘blood’ from referring to human equality (one blood) to associations of family and race. He combined the implications of the older and newer uses of the word ‘race’, linking the older meaning of lineage/stock to the nineteenth-century meaning of nation, so that he distinguished nations/races in terms of their ‘breeding’ and ‘blood’ (Young, 1995:105). In addition to conceptions of purity expressed in the metaphor of blood, and linked to these, were ideas of a racial hierarchy (Spoonley, 1988:2-3; Goldberg, 1993:49-51; Miles and Brown, 2003:40). This hierarchy depended on acceptance that there were discrete races. Thus its continued existence could only be guaranteed by maintaining racial purity against the threats of miscegenation (Young, 1995:95).

Race theory constructed immensely influential ideas of biological essence in its association of ‘blood’ and purity. From this viewpoint to be ‘authentic’, to be ‘self-

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25 See for example, Spoonley (1988); Goldberg (1993); Young (1995); Banton (1998); Miles and Brown (2003).
made’, meant to be of ‘pure’ racial origins. While in the Enlightenment human authenticity was conceived of in social terms, racist thought reduced the defining characteristics of humanity to biology. Change through time remained conceivable, however, in another Herderian echo, with the concept of racial rather than cultural ‘destiny’. In race theory, destiny was linked to the maintenance of racial purity rather than cultural authenticity, particularly for the White race whose destiny it was to ‘civilise’ the ‘lower races’. For these, in contrast, destiny was considered to take the form of enslavement or dying out in the face of White superiority.

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26 In effect the story of racial theory is more complex than this suggests. Young points to the way in which racial thinking is both incoherent and contradictory and will transform itself rather than accept its own false premises: ‘[R]ace theory possesses its own oneiric logic that allows it to survive despite its contradictions, to reverse itself at every refutation, to adapt and transform itself at every denial’ (Young, 1995:94). Thus, for example, Gobineau managed to maintain a contradictory attitude towards the hybrid mixing of races. On the one hand, the mixture of White and other races accounted for all of the civilisations of the world. Non-white peoples on their own remained ‘immersed in a profound inertia’ (Gobineau, cited in Young, 1995:99). On the other, too much intermingling led to the degeneration of a people (Young, 1995:104). Operating throughout this contradictory and self-serving theory, however, is a consistency in terms of the unassailable superiority and essence of Whiteness and a determination to maintain racial distinctions and hierarchy.
While racial purity was imbued with moral virtue, the possibilities of cross-race sexual relationships and ‘hybrid’ offspring were abhorred. Sex became central in the debates between polygenists and monogenists, with the argument of the former hinging on a belief that such racial hybrids would be infertile (Young, 1995:101). As evidence to the contrary mounted however, rather than abandon their theory, the polygenists shifted focus to equating miscegenation with degeneration (Young, 1995:102). Thus, while racial ‘mixing’ was clearly biologically possible, it was held to be morally reprehensible and the road to individual and collective degeneration.

Throughout the 1800s, as colonisation in New Zealand progressed, primitivist representations of Maori were increasingly combined with more truly racial thinking. Attitudes to Maori remained underpinned by a general belief in the superiority of European civilisation and while contradictory arguments were mounted at times, the unification of the discourses of savagery and race were utilised in ways to provide ideological support for the colonising enterprise. This combination is exemplified in the ‘dual settlement’ and ‘Aryan Maori’ theories of Maori origins and in the ‘fatal impact’ theory of their demise.

Claudia Geiringer (1999) traces the development of the dual settlement theory, starting with the accounts of early explorers who considered there to be distinct types among Maori, and culminating in the myth of the Moriori as first settlers. According to Geiringer (1999:17-8), this theory allowed Europeans to explain the combination of ‘ignoble’ and ‘noble’ characteristics they judged amongst Maori as the result of two waves of settlement by two distinct peoples - sometimes characterised as Melanesian and Polynesian. The ‘darker’ and more ‘primitive’ Melanesians were considered to have arrived first. The equation of darker skin with inferiority indicates a shift away from environmentalist explanations of such physical differences to evolutionary ones, heralding the development of scientific racism during the nineteenth century. Geiringer (1999:22-30) goes on to outline the influence of racial thinking in the late nineteenth century.

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27 Geiringer (1999:17) records that Julien Crozet (a mere decade earlier) considered the ‘lighter’ inhabitants as the first arrivals, suggesting the embryonic status of the link between colour and evolutionary theory at this time.
century, with the postulation of a distinct race of ‘moa-hunters’ and, finally, of the Moriori (or Maruiwi) as the first wave of settlers. She says that Maori subjugation of Moriori in the Chathams in the early 1800s was considered to demonstrate what had previously happened on mainland New Zealand, in keeping with Darwinian ideas of the ‘survival of the fittest’. The Moriori myth served a number of ideological functions for the colonizers - and continues to, as will be discussed later in this chapter. Geiringer (1999:25-30) suggests this myth provided evidence of the ‘superior’ nature of Maori and the ‘inferior’ nature of Moriori, legitimising their fate, while simultaneously legitimising European colonization as a ‘third wave’ of the same evolutionary process of settlement and conquest.

While not denying the role of Maori in the decimation of the Moriori, the latest research into their history suggests Maori do not bear total responsibility. The Moriori were already in decline as a result of the impact of European-introduced diseases on the islands (see Geiringer, 1999:189-90, nt41).
In the late nineteenth century when the Maori population was visibly in decline, any sense of guilt or responsibility the settlers may have had for this was assuaged by recourse to the evolutionary theory of ‘fatal impact’. Geiringer (1999:19) mentions A.H. Thomson, who during the mid-1800s worried about the decline in Maori population being the fault of European colonisation. However he was converted to Darwin’s theory of ‘survival of the fittest’ by which it was understood that the role of the European colonisers in Maori decline was only as agents of the ‘law of nature’. Interestingly, she says also that Darwin himself, who visited New Zealand for ten days in 1835, maintained the decline of Maori supported his theory of the extinction of ‘inferior’ races in the face of ‘superior’ (Geiringer, 1999:20). Clayworth (1999:146) reports that A.S. Atkinson, while in many respects admiring of Maori, considered fighting and killing them in the Taranaki wars ‘a sort of scientific duty’.29 Atkinson was also clear that Maori decline had set in prior to the arrival of Europeans, arguing ‘they think it is our presence that has caused the evil which it has only made visible’ (Atkinson, quoted in Clayworth, 1999:145).30

As the nineteenth century progressed however, the complacent and self-congratulatory view of Maori decline as the working out of the ‘law of nature’ increasingly gave way to a romantic nostalgia for the ‘loss’ of the savage. The discourse of the Maori as a ‘dying race’ was fertile ground for the nostalgic refiguring of the Noble Savage. ‘The Maori as he was’ became the focus of romantic idealisation and ethnographic salvage operations. Elsdon Best’s work of this name exemplifies the idealisation of the ‘dying Maori’31 and the salvaging operations carried out by ethnologists and collectors in their efforts to ‘preserve’ pre-contact Maori culture in their writings and in the form of material artefacts. Much of this work resulted in textual and graphic descriptions of

29 ‘[T]he Natives as a whole are happier than we are ... They have fewer interests [and] therefore fewer griefs. They have not our highest pleasures nor our deepest woes. But in an exact comparison I doubt whether we should have the advantage in every particular - though in most[.] Their contentment with little is a lesson to us ... I know this that going among [them] commonly makes me want to help in saving them - but it is not possible (A.S. Atkinson, 1862, quoted in Clayworth, 1999:144).

30 Also see Howe (1977:144) for examples of this line of argument more recently in the 1920s.

31 According to Byrnes (1990:100), rather than ‘the Maori as he was’, Best’s work represented ‘the Maori as he wished’ them to be.
traditional Maori culture, or in museological collections.\textsuperscript{32}

\textsuperscript{32} For discussion of August Hamilton’s ‘salvaging’ practice in the erection of a traditional village for the 1906-7 International Exhibition in Christchurch see for example, Dibley (1996:37-9, 1997:8-12). For a discussion of nineteenth century diversity in Maori architectural practice and the role of the Pakeha desire to preserve an authentic tradition in the museological presentation of the wharenui, see McKay (2002). And for discussion of a contemporary example of salvage in the 1984 Te M\_ori and Taonga M\_ori exhibitions, and critique of the limitations of this type of analysis, see Thomas (1994:184-9).
Edward Treagar argued that Maori were of Aryan origin on the basis of the philological study of their language and mythology. Once again, this local theorising was linked to the work of European thinkers, in this case the German folklorists and orientalists who followed Herder in the study of language and poetry (see Howe, 1991:45-50). Treagar combined this cultural theory of origin with the view that Maori society was static, primitive and dying out. While Maori were of the same family as Europeans,33 ‘in their religion, their language, their customs, they seem simply not to have advanced, but among them we stand as we should have stood among our own ancestors in the age of polished stone weapons, the Neolithic period’ (Treagar, cited in Howe, 1991:53).

Further, Treagar’s ‘salvage’ operation, like that of Best, was motivated by the belief that Maori were ‘passing away’ and the preservation of their cultural knowledge was dependent on those such as himself (Howe, 1991:65).

The discourse of ‘fatal impact’ provided an alternative conceptualisation of the noble/ignoble pair to that involved in dual settlement theory. Under ‘fatal impact’ theory, elderly/traditional Maori became equated with a ‘dying nobility’, while the younger and ‘hybridised’ generations of Maori were accorded the burden of ‘ignobility’. Interestingly, this romanticisation seems to have reached its zenith in the early twentieth century, at a time when few, in fact, continued to believe that Maori were dying out (Byrnes, 1990:27). What was clear, however, was the dynamism of Maori culture in the face of a century of colonial contact. Thus the ‘passing’ of a race became reconfigured as the ‘passing’ of a culture. In this move, the noble/ignoble dichotomy no longer equates to co-existing types at different evolutionary stages, but becomes imbued with romantic notions of the loss of purity and the degradation of hybridity. As Giselle Byrnes (1990:30) suggests, “the Maori as he was” also revealed a distaste for the “Maori as he is”. There existed a vast gulf between the idealised Maori of the past, and the perception of contemporary Maori’. She goes on to quote Tregear in Aryan Maori (1885) noting that the ‘degraded Maori who hang about our towns have little of the appearance or the character of the true Maori’ (in Byrnes, 1990:31).

33 ‘[M]en whose fathers were brothers on the other side of those gulfs of distance and of time meet each other, when the Aryan of the West greets the Aryan of the Eastern Seas’ (Treagar, quoted in Howe, 1991:44).
This Herderian echo raises my final point regarding Treagar’s theory. In his biography of Treagar, Kerry Howe (1991:9) argues he ‘epitomises the development of New Zealand nationalism’ and it is interesting to think of his familial identification with Maori in this light. Not only does Treagar pursue the philological interests of the European folklorists, but arguably his interests in the preservation of Maori culture parallels that of the folklorists in the preservation of European folk culture. Treagar can easily be read as positioning his ‘brother’ Maori as cultural source for the subsequent development of the nation, an argument to which I will return below.

The three strands of essentialist authenticity

To recap the different essentialist versions of authenticity that arise out of the history above, these can be distinguished in terms of the three strands of cultural identity construction: relation to place, biology and culture. In each strand a dichotomy between authenticity and inauthenticity occurs in essentialist thought. Herder gave the link between people and place a moral connotation, and his territorial determinism, which claims an authentic relation between people and place, was carried forward into modern nationalism. The inverse of this theory of the moral virtue of ‘rootedness’ in place is the idea that for people to move from their homeland is the road to degeneracy. Pagden (1995:141) traces this line of thought in the work of Diderot and Herder who both considered such travel as a source of moral corruption. But while this led Diderot to see European colonisers as a powerful menace who ‘decomposed’ to become ‘new barbarians’ (Pagden, 1995:132-5), Herder considered they would ultimately collapse and fail, transplanted from their ‘true’ environment (Pagden, 1995:141, also see Berlin, 1976:177). The biological emphasis of racial theory translates the authentic/inauthentic dichotomy into the language of purity and hybridity. The same moral connotations are retained, the ‘pure blood’ possessing a virtue from which the hybrid ‘degenerates’. Finally, romantic - and later racial - thought divided peoples into the moderns and the

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See Malkki (1992) for an interesting discussion of the impact on contemporary refugees of ‘sedentarist’ thinking about nationhood and culture and for an argument that identities should encompass both ‘roots’ and change.
traditional. Paradoxically, while moderns were ‘condemned’ to development and change, they sought to condemn traditional ‘others’ to a static existence outside history, an atemporal location from which they could act as an authentic source for the romantic imagination. What counts as the inauthentic in this romantic view is, in contrast, less stable. On the one hand, Herder’s ‘rabble’ connotes an inauthentic peasantry, debased by its contact with modernity. On the other, the critics of modern ‘civilisation’ focussed on inauthenticity in their own culture, while retaining a commitment to the potential of modern society to achieve authenticity through social change. In racial thinking, the idea of a static, ahistorical other also appears, exemplified by Gobineau’s racial theory of history, which posited the White race as the ‘motor of history’ (Young, 1995:100).

From Herder to scientific racism we can discern the threads of various strands of essentialist explanations of human nature and human diversity which, as I will demonstrate in the remainder of this chapter, continue to impact on our understanding of cultural identities today. By the end of the nineteenth century racial thinking was widespread and commonplace. Central to this mode of thought were ideas of a biologically based ‘essence’ determining the nature of human groups and explaining their differences. Race theory was accompanied by moral arguments for the maintenance of these differences, in defence of racial purity and racial destiny and against civilisational and moral degeneracy. Alongside race theory, romantic valorisations of the Savage and the Folk were no longer in the ascendancy, but did not disappear altogether. Rather, aspects of romantic thinking can be discerned again in the early twentieth-century modernist interest in the primitive and in the mid-century rise of Fascism. Under the impact of racial and romantic thought, notions of human authenticity, which had been framed in the Enlightenment and Post-Enlightenment in terms of the social constitution of the individual and of humanism, were reduced to connotations of biological, cultural and/or territorial exclusivity, purity and fixity.

I have briefly illustrated how this mix of romantic and racist thought was brought to bear on early colonial representations of Maori. Simultaneously, and against this primitivised and racialised other, the colonists constructed themselves as modern, dynamic and civilised. However, the transition to identifying themselves as nationals
rather than citizens of empire involved a repositioning of Maori from Savage to Folk, as cultural source for the settler nation. The rhetoric of national identity has also highlighted the dilemmas of the Pakeha/settler subject, whose belonging cannot match that of the indigene. While contemporary representations of Maori and Pakeha are still inflected by the old logics of primitivism and race, these have taken on particular forms to meet these new conditions. In the remainder of this chapter I briefly outline a number of these and discuss their political effects.
Pakeha: the ‘new barbarians’

Historically Pakeha attempted to resolve the dilemmas of their migrant origins by identifying with everything British and denigrating settler culture itself as a debased hybrid. Thus, for example, on meeting with English tourists in New Zealand in 1908, Katherine Mansfield wrote in her journal: ‘It is splendid to see once again real English people. I am so sick and tired of the third-rate article. Give me the Maori and the tourist, but nothing in between’ (quoted in Pearson, 1958:223).35 But as the romance of Empire receded during the twentieth century, Pakeha have turned to nationalism to ground their claims to identity and belonging, a discourse which, following its romantic origins, still depends on the construction of an authentic relation between people and place producing a distinctive culture. This does not resolve the dilemma of Pakeha identity but recasts it, replacing an orientation towards the ‘mother country’ and the English with one towards New Zealand and Maori. This turn is also linked to the critique of racism (Sissons, 1997:31) and of colonialism, and to the need to then secure alternative, ‘post-colonial’ bases for settler state legitimacy.36 While the problematics of this turn are the overall topic of this thesis and will keep recurring throughout, here I want to briefly illustrate the insecurity, or sense of lack, that remains present in contemporary attempts to define Pakeha.

35 Pearson (ibid) also reports on Mansfield’s disappointment and lack of interest in Maori she met who dressed and spoke like Pakeha.

36 Also see Pearson (1989:68-70) for an overview of a range of factors he considers account for late twentieth-century interest in Pakeha identity.
In 1987 Hamish Keith wrote an article on the ‘search for Pakeha identity’, in which he claimed the embryonic existence of a Pakeha culture. He argued that Pakeha needed to secure a sense of cultural identity to enable them to accept responsibility for redressing the injustices of colonisation, and declared, ‘[i]t is not a bad start to recognise that being pakeha is being something and not just an amorphous catch phrase to describe everything that is not Maori’ (Keith, 1987:76). The difficulty of working out what that ‘something’, the substance of Pakeha identity, might be, is clear two paragraphs later when Keith states that Pakeha ‘exists in no other place to describe no other thing than those New Zealanders who are not tangata whenua, but whose contemporary culture exists nowhere else’. The string of negatives Keith resorts to in this definition clearly indicate the lack of positivity, the lack of ‘substance’ in any easily distinguishable sense, of Pakeha identity. Instead Pakeha are ‘not there’ and ‘not them’, defined in purely relational terms.37

The same negatives reappear twelve years in the autobiography of Michael King, influential New Zealand historian, biographer and writer on Pakeha identity. In Being Pakeha Now, King explained, that:

[for me, then, to be Pakeha on the cusp of the twenty-first century is not to be European; it is not to be an alien or a stranger in my own country. It is to be a non-Maori New Zealander who is aware of and proud of my antecedents, but who identifies as intimately with this land, as intensively and as strongly, as anybody Maori (King, 1999:239).

The only ‘positives’ here are again relational, the double identification with (presumably European) ‘antecedents’ and with the New Zealand territory. A final, tongue-in-cheek, example appeared in an interview with comedian Ewen Gilmore in an article about ‘bogans’:38

My family has been in New Zealand for 150 years, on both sides of the family. I have no claims to anything in Britain, and there has been no Maori blood in the

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37 As David Pearson remarked two years later, Pakeha distinctiveness ‘has proved somewhat elusive’, while any idea of Pakeha uniqueness ‘remains unattainable’ (Pearson, 1989:66).

38 ‘Bogan’ is a slang term, ironically (in the context it appears here) of Australian origin, for a working class suburbanite.
family, so I have no identity. Maybe being a bogan is asserting my own identity. Maybe it's just a cry for help (in Bain, *Dominion*, 18/5/00, p11).

This lack of any sense of positive identity is a commonly expressed sentiment throughout the period in which Pakeha have sought to assert an identity via nationalism. Rather than attend to the 'silent centre' (MacLean, 1996) of Pakeha identity, much attention has been given to proclamations of a national identity which depends largely on the representation of Maori culture and of a pristine natural landscape, increasingly represented as an adventure tourism playground.

The remaining sections of this chapter centre on essentialist discursive strategies that arise out of Pakeha anxiety over their identity and belonging. I look firstly at attempts to construct an equal status to Maori in terms of territorial belonging and, secondly, at the workings of the appropriation of Maori culture as a cultural source for a Pakeha-dominated national identity. Given this focus on responses to Pakeha ontological anxiety, I have not set out to illustrate the continuing existence of all of the strategies outlined in the history above. Biologically-based racist arguments, in particular, play a minor role in my account, but do continue to operate in popular discourse (see for example, Wetherell and Potter, 1992:120-8). I argue that ultimately these strategies remain problematic, depending on a zero-sum struggle over the ascription of authenticity and inauthenticity which are inevitably divisive and exclusionary.

‘We’re all migrants’: ‘de-authenticating’ Maori

One strategy for claiming an equal sense of belonging to that of Maori is the argument that Maori too are immigrants. The denial of indigenous status to Maori is based on the simple assertion of their immigrant status, or on the argument that they were not only immigrants, but colonisers. The latter strategy relies on arguing that Maori displaced the Moriori. Although this explanation for the migration of the Moriori to the Chatham

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39 A 1994 survey of New Zealanders' attitudes towards culture, for example, found that 72 per cent agreed that 'most New Zealanders don’t have a strong sense of New Zealand’s cultural identity' (Ministry of Cultural Affairs, 1997:7).
Islands has been refuted throughout the twentieth century (for current views on this issue, see King, 2000), the myth of the Moriori continues as a means to discredit Maori claims to authentic belonging as the original inhabitants of the country. Not only are Maori thus rendered inauthentic in this sense but they, like the settlers, are construed as colonisers, and hence equally culpable in moral terms. The argument is quite explicit in the following letter, which was published under the heading ‘Maoris not indigenous’:

The term “tangata whenua” has now become fashionable and somehow has been misconstrued to mean “first people of the land” together with the word “indigenous”. These two labels are being incorrectly used at present to describe the circumstances and the Anglo/Maori race in general. I have in my possession a letter dated December 1, 1995 from the then race relations conciliator, John H. Clarke, in which he states officially that the Morioris preceded the Maoris by some 400 years. The terms “tangata whenua” and “indigenous” cannot be applied to describe the Maoris in any way. The designation “tangata whenua” should be the sole prerogative of the Morioris. The label “indigenous” does not apply to either race (Hastie, Dominion, 25/9/97, p6).

This letter also illustrates the simple version of this strategy, which depends on the fact that Maori, like the settlers after them, migrated to New Zealand from elsewhere. Hence, as Hastie argues, neither Maori nor Moriori can claim the status of indigene, since both were migrants. This migratory origin may, of course, be strictly true as far as the evidence of the identity narratives of most iwi are concerned, and according to the current archaeological evidence, but is problematic when used to elide Maori political claims to redress for colonial injustices and for recognition of their status as a people. The explicit use of this argument to undermine Maori political claims is apparent in this response to the announcement of DNA analysis linking Maori to tribal peoples in Taiwan:

I am delighted with this discovery. Presumably we will hear no more that we European New Zealanders are manuhiri who should return from whence we came if we don't like the idea of Maori sovereignty. Or do Maoris now intend to return to Taiwan and attempt to take possession of their former rohe? We are all immigrants. We all belong here. The Maori are no more “people of the land” than we are. The sooner everyone realises and accepts that, the better (Garrett, Dominion, 25/8/98, p6).

40 Although I am not discussing racial essences in this section, here I note the way in which further doubt about Maori authenticity is implied by the designation of hybrid/mixed origins.
In equalising Pakeha and Maori identities by denying the specificity of Maori status as ‘first people’, Garrett attacks Maori sovereignty claims and renders both Maori and Pakeha equally ‘inauthentic’ in this sense. In sum, this strategy attempts to universalise the ontological dilemma of Pakeha rather than to resolve it.

**Pakeha authenticity: ‘another kind of indigenous New Zealander’**

The opposite process of claiming a parallel indigenous status for the settler culture has been termed *indigenisation* by Terry Goldie (1989) and has been discussed in academic work primarily in the context of the establishment of national literatures within settler societies (see for example, Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin, 1989). As Goldie (1989:13) expresses it, indigenisation ‘suggests the impossible necessity of becoming indigenous’. Michael King has remained committed to this line of argument since he wrote *Being Pakeha* in 1985, reiterating it in the updated *Being Pakeha Now*: ‘For me, then, to be Pakeha on the cusp of the twenty-first century ... is to be, as I have already argued, another kind of indigenous New Zealander’ (King, 1999:239).

The desire to express a Pakeha sense of belonging is understandable and King is careful here to claim a parallel, rather than identical, belonging to Maori. Others, however, are not so careful and, as discussed above, use this claim to Pakeha indigeneity to once again undermine any Maori claims to specificity and to redress for injustice. For example, a newspaper editorial noted that the law setting out Maori fishing rights ‘uses that rather hazy term “tangata whenua” - which a good many Pakeha might consider themselves as well’ (‘First catch your ...’, *New Zealand Herald*, 26/4/97, pA16). Here the claim of Pakeha indigeneity is used to raise doubt about the validity of Maori having particular culturally-based rights. A similar aim is apparent in the following excerpt from an interview with then Prime Minister, Jim Bolger, immediately following the

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In a bizarre twist to this strategy members of settler cultures have been known to produce creative works under indigenous pseudonyms. Two cases of this amongst white Australians reported in New Zealand in the 1990s were an ‘autobiography’ of an aboriginal woman called Wanda Koolmatrie, written by a white man (Leon Carmen) and a painting, ostensibly that of an aboriginal man called Eddie Burrup, but in fact painted by a white woman called Elizabeth Durack (‘Author’s real identity ...’, *Dominion*, 14/3/97, p4). Intriguingly, both these cases involve cross-gender, as well as cross-cultural, aliases.
Waitangi Day\(^{42}\) commemorations in 1995, where the actions of some Maori activists had been particularly challenging and sparked considerable controversy. Again, Bolger is clearly trying to deny the validity of the activists’ claims to autonomy by equalising his status as settler with theirs as indigenes:

\(^{42}\) The anniversary of the 1840 signing of the Treaty of Waitangi, which marked a major step in the establishment of British sovereignty in Aotearoa New Zealand. Each year since 1934, the local iwi, Ngapuhi, have hosted commemorative events at Te Tii marae at Waitangi. Since the 1940s the Crown has usually attended these events and the anniversary of the signing became a national holiday in 1973. Alongside this commemorative tradition is an equally longstanding tradition of using these ceremonies as a focal point for protest to bring public attention to a range of historical and contemporary Maori grievances.
I am as much tangata whenua - I was born here - as anyone else and I will never
give that up because I can’t. You can’t be born twice. We love the land with the
same intensity and the same emotions (Bolger, in ‘This land is …’, *New Zealand
Herald*, 8/2/95, s1, p1).

In sum, as with the ‘we’re all immigrants’ strategy, this works to equalise the status of
Maori and Pakeha, this time by resolving the dilemma of Pakeha ontological anxiety
through the claim to indigeneity. What is fundamentally problematic about both
strategies is their use to undermine any challenging Maori political voice.

**Settler nationalism and the appropriation of indigenous authenticity**

A 1997 survey investigating New Zealanders’ attitudes towards, and participation in,
cultural activities found that 83 per cent of those surveyed (just under 1000 in total)
believed Maori culture is an important part of New Zealand national identity (Ministry
provides some markers of distinctiveness to a (derivative) settler nationalism. Hence the
practice of a Maori welcome to greet overseas dignitaries and to open major public
events, the use of Maori-influenced symbolism by almost all New Zealand organisations
aimed at the international and national spheres, the incorporation of Maori carvings, or
other art works, in almost all government buildings, and so on.

This is a marked shift from the rhetoric of the ignoble savage and a racialised
primitivism doomed to extinction. Ben Dibley’s (1996, 1997) argument regarding the
representation of Maori at the 1906-7 International Exhibition in Christchurch suggests
this was a transitional moment in a move away from the figure of the Noble Savage to
the use of Maori culture as a Folk cultural source for the fledgling nation. Dibley (1997)
argues that the Exhibition represented Maori according to two different temporal
registers - ahistorical and historicised - in both cases as a foil for the representation of
‘New Zealand’. Dibley argues that August Hamilton’s model traditional Maori village
situated Maori within an ahistorical temporal register. This was juxtaposed to the
construction of ‘New Zealand’ as modern. In contrast, the incorporation of Maori within
a ‘proto-nationalist discourse which invents, for New Zealand, a tradition of great
seafarers, warriors and colonisers’ (Dibley, 1997:12) historicised Maori to locate them
within an embryonic national tradition.43 Dibley follows Annie Coombes (1991) in
arguing that these distinct temporalities constitute different registers of primitivism, and
it is easy to see the connections between the role of the Noble Savage and that of the
Folk in the history above.

Following this trajectory, contemporary representations of the nation that utilise Maori
cultural symbolism and practice continue to bear the mark of an essentialised
authenticity - the pure and traditional cultural expression of the first/original New
Zealanders.44 Postcard images of ‘New Zealanders’, for example, are of Maori in
traditional dress, not Maori in suits, or non-Maori New Zealanders. Maori symbolism
and cultural artefacts are widely used in corporate branding and as national signifiers in
advertising campaigns. A prominent example which illustrates both the gap at the centre
of New Zealand national identity, and the way Maori culture is used to fill it, is the
international ‘100% pure New Zealand’ branding campaign launched by the New
Zealand Tourism Board in 1999. The cover and inside cover of the booklet launching
the campaign shows one of the campaign advertisements, ‘100% pure welcome’, in
which an elderly Maori man with full facial moko and a young Maori girl greet each
other with a hongi. Both wear traditional cloaks (see Figure 1, p58). This traditional
Maori welcome is New Zealand’s welcome, as the small print at the bottom of the
advertisement testifies, offering ‘peace, friendship and hospitality’. Here, settler New
Zealand positions itself in unity with Maori tradition; settler and Maori are one in the
national imaginary.

43 Interestingly, Dibley (1997:13) argues this second strategy was quite unique to New Zealand of
all the settler societies. He cites an explicit comparison between Maori and Celt from James
Cowan and gets support for his argument of the uniqueness of this strategy from Donald Denoon
(Dibley, 1997:14). This strategy is exemplified in the narratives of Maori migration and
settlement and in the search for the European origins of Maori and was crucially about locating
Maori further up the evolutionary scale than other primitives (ibid).

44 While my attention is focussed on the link between indigenous authenticity and the construction
of the nation, see Thomas (1994:174-183) and Howe (1999) for analyses of contemporary
idealisations of indigenous authenticity which continue the tradition of critique of western
modernity.
Figure 1: ‘100% pure welcome’, New Zealand Tourism Board advertisement, 1999
Interestingly, the campaign slogan also points to the lack at the heart of the settler nation. The campaign advertisements are linked by the representations of New Zealand as ‘100% pure’. Apart from images of Maori traditionalism, there are no other claims to any cultural ‘substance’. Rather, the nation is represented as a natural landscape, in which people, dwarfed by the natural grandeur, figure as actors engaged in sport and leisure activities. National authenticity can only be rendered by the signification of (‘pure’) authenticity itself.

As Patrick Wolfe argues, writing about similar appropriations of Aboriginal symbolism in Australian nationalism,

[w]hen authentic Aboriginality is imported back into [settler nationalist] discourse, it loses not only its history but its territorial specificity as well, surrendering both to the homogenous space/time continuum of the nation-state. In the process it yields a distinctive national narrative that is simultaneously both European and autochthonous, both invasive and native (Wolfe, 1994:127).

Wolfe points to the ‘disembedding’ of indigenous tradition which can be at least one of the costs of its appropriation within settler nationalism. Similarly, the Maori individuals and traditional practice and ornament in the ‘100% pure welcome’ advertisement signify a generalised, authentic ‘Maoriness’, detached from any specific tribal traditions. Rather, this authenticity is presented against a ‘pure’, white backdrop, signifying the ‘homogenous space/time continuum of the nation-state’. Jeff Sissons (1993) likewise points to state practices of appropriation of Maori tradition in the name of biculturalism, which fragment and objectify particulars of Maori culture to present a generalised ‘Maoriness’.

A number of cultural critics have pointed to how this process works to further settler interests, ‘indigenising’ settler society through the appropriation of ‘native’ authenticity in a parallel dynamic to that of Pakeha indigeneity as discussed above. In the process, the settler nation ‘goes native’ and claims its own belonging.45 Nicholas Thomas argues

45 According to Marianna Torgovnick (1990:185), primitivist discourses are marked by ‘the metaphor of finding a home, of being at home’ and ‘“going primitive” is inescapably a metaphor for the return to origins’. 
further that, through the appropriation of indigenous authenticity, settlers seek to
distance themselves from the historical violence of settlement, by ‘substituting integrity
and an identification with the land for the discredited expansionist narratives of
conquest and environmental destruction’ (Thomas, 1994:182). And, in an argument
which echoes the critique of the split between the Folk and the European nation, Ruth
Brown (1989:253-4) argues that the ‘cultural ventriloquism’ that projects an authentic
spirituality onto Maori, for example, leaves ‘everyday “non-spiritual” Western
entrepreneurial practices unimpaired’. She concludes:

Western culture’s search for authenticity transforms that authenticity into a
simulacrum. The world remains a monocultural nightmare, but with another
marketable item added - a recording of Maori (or Aboriginal) spirituality
(Brown, 1989:257).

These practices of settler indigenisation have a number of effects on contemporary
indigenes themselves. While indigenous peoples have managed to utilise these
valorisations of the primitive in their own political projects (which will be discussed in
Chapter Five), these practices also have their detrimental side for contemporary
indigenes. In the remainder of this chapter I examine the negative effects for Maori of
this process of essentialising and idealising, following Wolfe’s (1994) argument about
the ways in which ‘repressive authenticity’ works to control Aboriginal people in
Australia.

**Indigenes and repressive authenticity**

Wolfe (1994:110) argues that the authentic indigene is spatially separated - in the New
Zealand case on the marae, for instance, rather than in the courtroom. Their authenticity
depends on this spatial separation. As soon as they become suburban neighbours they
become ‘lovely people’ ‘just like us’, or problematic deviants and recipients of welfare.
Difference either disappears or becomes demonised. Indigenous difference continues to
be positively evaluated only so long as it is ‘somewhere else’ in a direct continuation of
the logics of the Noble Savage and the Folk.
Not only does ‘repressive authenticity’ rely on spatial incarceration, but Wolfe (1994:93) argues it follows a ‘logic of elimination’ which ‘seeks to replace indigenous society with that imported by the colonisers’. Thus, while producing and appropriating authentic indigeneity, repressive authenticity also involves ‘the positive production of genetic or cultural inauthenticity’ (Wolfe, 1994:113, emphasis added). In other words, any aboriginal person (or community) that does not ‘embody’ the construction of repressive authenticity is thus rendered inauthentic (Wolfe, 1994:111), or corpus nullius as he eloquently expresses it (Wolfe, 1994:113). Over time, with ‘miscegenation’ and cultural assimilation, the authentic is to be gradually eliminated: ‘[A]uthentic Aboriginality is constructed as a pristine essence, a quantity of such radical historical instability that its primary effect is to provide a formula for disqualification’ (Wolfe, 1994:123-4). The distinction Wolfe makes here between genetic and cultural inauthenticity is important. The authentic indigene imported into settler nationalism represents cultural authenticity via the symbolism of traditionalism. Genetic authenticity, on the other hand, is constructed in the language of blood and descent. As Wolfe suggests, the effect of these divide and rule strategies is to simultaneously produce and discredit ‘inauthentic’ indigenes, a practice also apparent in New Zealand. A distinction must be drawn here between the Australian and New Zealand cases, however. While Wolfe’s focus in relation to a genetic ‘logic of elimination’ refers to the ‘stolen generations’ of abducted Aboriginal children raised as White, New Zealand has no comparable history. 46 Further, contemporary official definitions of Maori identity, which rely on whakapapa, work in the opposite direction to make any degree of Maori ancestry authenticate a claim to Maori identity. Arguably this definition operates by a ‘logic of indigenisation’ over time. However, Wolfe’s analysis is still useful to identify a logic which, although not officially sanctioned, continues to operate in popular discourse as will be illustrated in the following examples, which deal in turn with the production and discrediting of genetic inauthenticity, cultural inauthenticity and the implications of the dichotomisation of tradition and modernity involved in the construction of ‘repressive authenticity’.

46 Sissons (1997:31-3) disputes Wolfe’s assertion of a historically continuous ‘logic of elimination’ in Australia and points to the differences of the New Zealand history of policies of ‘amalgamation’ and ‘integration’.
Maori ‘racial’/‘genetic’ authenticity is frequently questioned in public discourse in New Zealand. Phrases such as the reference to the ‘Anglo/Maori race’ cited earlier in the chapter, are commonly used to discredit a range of Maori claims to a separate identity or to specific rights. Such references are also made in relation to particular individuals, as in ‘a Mr N. Tangaroa, who has some Maori ancestry’, used in a letter criticising activist Niko Tangaroa’s politics (Pittaway, Dominion, 15/4/97, p8). Such imputations that an individual is not a ‘real’ (authentic) Maori because of their mixed descent are often utilised to discredit political activists or commentators and to suggest instead that those concerned are merely ‘trouble makers’.

The argument that to ‘truly’ be Maori means one must have at least 50 per cent Maori ‘blood’ is also not uncommon in public discourse in Aotearoa New Zealand. Here again it is used to discredit the politics of prominent Maori, in this instance a Maori Member of Parliament (MP):

Sooner rather than later this country must determine what constitutes a Maori ... If this issue is resolved, then the pontifications of Tau Henare and others claiming to be Maoris, or claiming to speak for them, can be evaluated and accorded proper relevance. They have no relevance at present. To be politically correct, a true Maori must have 50 percent or more of Maori blood. Claiming to be a Maori with any lesser amount denies one’s true origins and is a distortion of the truth (Nightingale, Dominion, 2/10/97, p10).

The following examples of the questioning of Maori authenticity - the first two, at least, by other Maori - clearly utilise culturally based criteria. In each case the biological descent of the impugned individual is accepted, but politically motivated desires to discredit them result in their claim to be Maori being questioned. Rather, they are accused of being too much like Pakeha. Ngai Tahu leader, Sir Tipene O’Regan, reports of being accused of cultural inauthenticity: ‘I was told to butt out on the basis that I wasn’t a Maori. I was nothing but a Pakeha with whakapapa’ (quoted in Melbourne, 1995:156). Similarly, MP, Allamein Kopu, attacked her ex-leader and fellow MP, Sandra Lee:

She doesn’t know what being a real Maori is all about because she was brought up in the city. I don’t agree with the way she is handling Maori issues and things she is saying. She thinks like a Pakeha (quoted in Young, New Zealand Herald,
In this case the ‘contamination’ with Pakeha modes of thought is linked to geographical location, an argument which illustrates the continuing need for authentic indigenes to be spatially separated. Its use as a divisive tactic by Pakeha New Zealanders has also been previously noted, by Wetherell and Potter (1992:130) for example, in their study of racist discourse in New Zealand. The linkage between repressive authenticity and the dichotomisation of tradition and modernity is clear here. The city as the site of western modernity is clearly not the place for ‘real’ Maori who must maintain a distinct way of life within a ‘traditional’ rural setting.

My final example involves the production of both Maori genetic and cultural inauthenticity. While the name of the author of this letter to the editor is European, I cannot be sure of their ethnic identification. In claiming ‘we are one people’, Roy Challis argues against the Treaty settlement process. His argument for Maori-Pakeha unity depends on the de-authentification of Maori:

> The Polynesian tribes no longer exist except in diluted form. The loudest voices on the Polynesian side are those who are less than half Polynesian; it is their very colonial instinct that makes them so loud. They pay tribute to their European ancestry in their very demeanour (Challis, *Dominion Post*, 12/7/03, pA12).

The source of Maori inauthenticity here is located in ‘inter-breeding’ (ibid), resulting in the ‘dilution’ of Maori culture also. ‘True’ Maori, for Challis, are clearly quiet and passive, rather than loud and argumentative. Thus Maori political activists are discredited for not being Maori enough.

Finally, the dichotomisation of tradition and modernity involved in ‘repressive authenticity’ results in indigeneity being reduced to a ‘pristine essence’ (Wolfe, 1994:124), which works to disqualify contemporary Maori from accessing traditional rights while retaining the trappings of modernity. According to this logic, if they want to ‘be Maori’ they must be traditional, and particularly if they seek claim to special rights. On the other hand, to be modern, means effectively to be the same as Pakeha, as the following examples imply:
If Maori claims on various parts of New Zealand’s land, waterways and related flora and fauna are successful, will they relinquish rights to transport, communications, utilities, education, technology, and anything else which the unassuming European may have burdened them with? (Chadwick-Smith, Dominion, 27/3/97, p8).
So Maoris are to be afforded ‘customary fishing rights’, whatever that may mean. How about insisting that they exercise that right in a ‘customary’ way? In other words, let them adze-hack a canoe from a kauri, manhandle the thing to the ocean, then dangle bone hooks from lengths of plaited flax (Morley, *Dominion*, 14/1/98, p6).

This is the bind in which adherence to essentialist accounts of identities, with their sharp bifurcation between authenticity and inauthenticity, results. That it is a bind to which only indigenous peoples, and non-White peoples more generally, are subjected is shown in responses to such letters which apply the same logic to Pakeha. Tony Simpson, for example, argued that the logic above makes as much sense as insisting that landowners (whose title also ultimately derives from cession to the Crown under the same Treaty) should be allowed to cultivate their land only by use of horse-drawn ploughs. In other words, it makes no sense at all (Simpson, *Dominion*, 29/1/98, p8).

Margaret Jolly summarizes the differential impact of this dichotomisation on indigenous and European peoples:

If [indigenous peoples] are no longer doing ‘it’ they are no longer themselves, whereas if colonisers are no longer doing what they were doing two decades ago, this is a comforting instance of Western progress. Diversity and change in one case connote inauthenticity, in the other the hallmarks of true Western civilisation (Jolly, 1992:57).

The incarceration of the primitive is not only spatial but temporal, resulting in a denial of full human agency (‘loudness’, protest, autonomy) to those relegated to the status of representing tradition. According the logic of the tradition/modern binary, for these peoples, to change is to become ‘inauthentic’.

Interestingly, if something of an aside, European traditions, as well as European modernity, are exempted from the scrutiny applied to those of Maori. G.G. Oliver (*Dominion*, 24/3/00, p10), writing to complain about the incorporation of a *haka* at an International Arts Festival event in Wellington featuring the Edinburgh Tattoo, failed to acknowledge the fundamental similarity between these two military traditions. While
the Tattoo was a ‘splendid spectacle’, the *haka* was deemed ‘inappropriate’, ‘outdated and certainly unappreciated’ as a representation of New Zealand culture. While Oliver could appreciate the European military tradition as a traditional ‘spectacle’, the Maori military tradition for him/her connoted an ‘inappropriate’ savagery. In contrast, Maori women, Oliver argued, offered a suitable representation of Maori culture, the ‘grace and artistry of the *poi* dancers and action songs never fail[ing] to charm’. Oliver’s argument is a final reminder also of the way in which pristine authenticity continues to be subject to processes of ‘salvage’ that seek to differentiate between ‘noble’ and ‘ignoble’ expressions of the primitive.

**Conclusion**

This discussion of the operations of essentialism in relation to indigenous and settler identities indicates something of the specificities and complexities of these identities. While essentialism here, as elsewhere, works to ‘fix’ identities and provides powerful logics of exclusion, these do not work identically to cases of gender and sexuality essentialisation, for example. In the construction of indigenous and settler identities, essentialism takes a biological form in racial discourse, but also cultural form in primitivist discourse. Contemporary representations of the primitive continue to fulfil the functions evident in their earlier usage. The primitive still serves as a figure of critique of western modernity and, as has been my focus here, as a cultural source. Thomas (1994:182) also points to the way, in settler societies, this latter function involves the added twist of working to distance the settler from the status of coloniser. However, this project of indigenisation is, as Goldie (1989:13) suggests, impossible, depending on the simultaneous (discursive) presence and (political and physical) absence of the figure of the indigene in a process which can never be finally secured.

Certainly, the connection between these essentialised identities and the discursive practices of colonisation are clear. Further, the dilemmas they constitute for any project of Pakeha identity illustrates something of the specificity of settler identities and of the settler-indigene relation. Settlers can never meet the ‘standards’ of essentialist identities and their attempts to do so have been shown to be politically problematic in eliding their
historical antecedence as a colonising people and in the effects their operations of ‘repressive authenticity’ have on Maori. For Maori, the bifurcation of authentic tradition and inauthentic modernity, as described here, offers no basis for an autonomous indigenous identity outside the logics of colonial discourse. Finally, in terms of the settler-indigene relation itself, the deployment of essentialist authenticities and their inauthentic opposites takes the form of a zero-sum struggle which is always conflictual and in which ‘winning’ for some must come at the cost of ‘losing’ for others.

If essentialism has been shown to perpetuate the logics of colonial domination, we need to look elsewhere for a means to conceptualise identities that can disrupt those logics, allow for cultural dynamism and facilitate non-colonial modes of relation between Maori and Pakeha. Hence I turn now to theories of hybridity as versions of the general social constructionist move in understanding identities. Potentially, for Maori hybridity offers a means to disrupt the bifurcating logic of tradition and modernity, while for Pakeha its constructionist logic may provide a language to encompass their migratory ‘arrival’ and subsequent development in relation to New Zealand and Maori.
Chapter Three

Ontological hybridities

At the broadest level of conceptual debate there seems to be a consensus over the utility of hybridity as an antidote to essentialist subjectivity (Papastergiadis, 2000:189).

[‘Half-castes’ have] the advantage of intentionally straddling both cultures with the ability to lubricate, that is, to translate, negotiate and mediate affinities and differences in a dynamic of exchange and inclusion (Meredith, 1999a:24).

Introduction

While essentialist accounts of Pakeha and Maori identities are common, they have been shown to be problematic for both peoples. The valorisation of essence is accompanied by the denigration of its lack as a mark of inauthenticity. The social dynamics of an essentialist economy of identity then are divisive with claims and counter-claims of essentialist authenticity by each group, and within groups, at the expense of the other. Essentialism seems a zero-sum game which no side can ‘win’. In the search for a way out of this impasse, the most common argument within cultural theory is for the rejection of essentialism in favour of an acknowledgment of the hybrid nature of identities.\(^{47}\) Within the post-colonial and cultural studies literatures, hybridity marks

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47 Hybridity, as will become clear in what follows, is a highly complex and diverse concept. Further, it is only one amongst a number which lie within the same general theoretical field. Related concepts include creolisation and *mestizaje* (particularly used in discussions of South American societies), translation, transculturation, diaspora and border. I have chosen to centre my discussion on hybridity because of its broad application throughout this field of theorising.
mixture over purity and, at its best, dynamism over fixity, multiple causality over determinism. The quintessential figure of the hybrid is the migrant but, more generally, the ontological condition of the migrant, following colonial contact, is argued to be the condition of us all. No culture is ‘pure’ and no identity self-originating. Rather than seek territorial rootedness we must remember our histories of migration. Rather than assert ‘racial’ and cultural purity, we must acknowledge our mixed ancestry and cultural syncretism. Rather than hybridity being conceived as a problem, threatening a loss of identity, the answer is to embrace and celebrate the hybrid nature of all identities.

It must be noted at the outset that the origins of hybridity lie in the natural sciences and, in relation to humanity, in nineteenth-century race theory. According to Robert Young (1995:20-1), the concept entered the domain of culture via the linguistic theory of Russian critic, Mikhail Bakhtin. For Bakhtin, language, rather than representing a singular and unified worldview as romanticism had it, always speaks with a ‘double-voice’. Language is always hybrid, its meaning always doubled and fluid. Further, Bakhtin distinguished between two forms of linguistic hybridity. His concept of ‘intentional’ hybridity referred to a process of consciously bringing together two disparate elements, as in irony. Intentional hybridity is a process of resistance by which, via the conscious use of ‘double-accented’ language, an internal dialogue sets one view against another, simultaneously combining and maintaining the difference between them. ‘Organic’ hybridity, in contrast, refers to the unconscious mixing of language from which new world views emerge. Rather than a process of resistance, organic hybridity identifies a process of mixture and fusion. In terms of the constituents ‘brought together’ in Bakhtin’s linguistic hybridity, the first process works by keeping the two original elements discrete, while the second works by creating something new out of the combination of those elements.48

(see for example, Grossberg, 1996:91; Kraniauskas, 2000:239).

48 Young (1995:6-19) also outlines how these two alternative hybridities existed in racial theory. There they are captured in the opposition of arguments of incommensurability (the infertility or ultimate reversion to ‘type’ of the hybrid) and arguments of mixture (amalgamation or degeneration, depending on whether such hybridisation was positively valued or not).

As an interesting aside, colonisation in New Zealand is brought into Young’s discussion as an example of a site of an ‘amalgamating’ project. Young argues that this term preceded the use of ‘miscegenation’ which first appeared in 1864. In full the quote from the anonymously authored
‘The new system of colonization - Australia and New Zealand’ (1838) reads:

It may be deemed a cold and mercenary calculation; but we must say, that instead of attempting an amalgamation of the two races, - Europeans and Zealanders, - as is recommended by some persons, the wiser course would be, to let the native race gradually retire before settlers, and ultimately become extinct (quoted in Young, 1995:9).

While the ‘Zealanders’ stubbornly refused to acquiesce to the laws of ‘survival of the fittest’ favoured in this paper, the concept of ‘amalgamation’ underwrote much colonial practice throughout the nineteenth century and beyond (see for example, Ward, 1995).
Hybridity then, as Young (1995:21) says, has always itself been hybrid, referring to a number of processes that bring discrete elements together to produce a range of outcomes. In the contemporary post-colonial and cultural studies literatures, hybridity continues to be used in diverse ways that cut across the processes outlined by Bakhtin, but in which the themes of resistance and combination, maintenance of difference and fusion, remain. Importantly, hybridity represents a break from the determinism of essentialism. My brief overview of Bakhtin, with its references to intention and conscious mixing, has already introduced the element of choice that hybridity can represent.

This chapter centres on the most commonsense forms of hybridity, which I term ontological to point to the way these forms describe and categorise modes of being.49 Ontological hybridities are marked by a focus on the ‘substance’ of identity claims, based on parentage and identifications with culture and place. Thus, ontological hybridity refers to the existence of ‘racial’ mixtures,50 and to instances of cultural combination that arise out of these or from the culture contact that follows migration. These hybridities arise historically out of the combination (‘racial’ or cultural) of elements whose essentialist bases themselves often remain unquestioned. It is the existence of more than one ‘racial’ or cultural ‘substance’ that provides the (limited) choice to assert a hybrid identity. In terms of ontological theorisations of hybridity, the hybrid self has a choice of identifications, within the limits of the ontological ‘substances’ of their parentage and cultural milieu. Ontologically hybrid theories of identity are then constructionist in two senses: they point to historical processes by which identities come into being and they point to an element of human agency in constructing/choosing a particular identity.

While the historicised origin of ontological hybridities point to a degree of dynamism, the achievement of a new identity label also represents a moment of stability. Out of processes of cultural mixture, hyphenated or doubled identities (for example, ‘African-

49 Some of the argument and examples used in the chapter appear in Bell (2004b, forthcoming).
50 For analyses of hybridity, sexuality and race, see for example, Young (1995) and Stoler (2000).
American’) or new ‘fused’ identity labels (for example, ‘British’) are formed, the latter
a process by which all singular identities are formed according to social constructionist
theories and Stross’ (1999) invocation of the ‘hybridity cycle’. The doubled or
hyphenated forms foreground and maintain the distinctions between their origins, while
with fused hybridities the distinct ‘parents’ of the new identity are less easy to trace.
These hybridities are sometimes termed ‘synthetic’ (for example, Allon, 2000) or
‘syncretic’ (for example, Mohanram, 1999:95).

The discussion in this chapter is divided between these two modes of ontological
hybridity, firstly ‘doubled’ and then ‘syncretic’. I open the discussion of each with a
survey of recent work in the international literature, paying particular attention to the
political claims that are made for these forms of hybridity and to the cultural-political
contexts in which these claims arise. I then discuss Maori and Pakeha examples of each
mode and reflect on their political workings in the local context. Doubled hybridities are
championed as a reflection of the lived experience of individuals and groups otherwise
excluded by assertions of singular identities. Further, doubled hybridities are seen to
work to deconstruct the familiar binary oppositions of western colonialism. Within the
context of Aotearoa New Zealand, it is also argued that individuals who identify as both
Maori and Pakeha play an important political role as ‘cultural lubricants’, mediating the
relationship between Maori and Pakeha. On the other hand, suspicions that hybridity is
a form of assimilation, continuing the logic of ‘amalgamation’ that was to eliminate
Maori difference, remain. Syncretism is argued to be a positive move away from
essentialist claims to purity in ‘opening up’ identities to increased diversity. Syncretic
identities also act as a reminder of the impact of colonial experience and its traumatic
disruption of previously settled identities. As with doubled accounts, syncretism is
viewed ambivalently by Maori, its positive value in facilitating greater inclusivity being
countered by the suspicions of assimilationism mentioned above. Pakeha, in contrast,
pay little attention to their ontologically hybrid origins. This further evidence of Pakeha
ontological lack is linked to their desire to ‘forget’ the colonial history of their hybrid
origin and to their settler nationalist project which, similarly, seeks to ‘forget’ their
migration in the interests of nationalist ‘home-making’.
Doubled hybridities

In New Zealand, although many people are of ‘mixed’ Maori and Pakeha descent, hybrid identifications are uncommon. Rather, individuals are encouraged to identify as either Maori or Pakeha. Hence the doubled or hyphenated identities found elsewhere are not used in relation to Maori and Pakeha New Zealanders, although they may be for other ethnic groups such as ‘Chinese New Zealander’, ‘Samoan New Zealander’, and so on. The terms ‘Pakeha New Zealander’ or ‘Maori New Zealander’ are rarely used. This, I assume, is because the doubling of either ‘Maori’ or ‘Pakeha’ with ‘New Zealander’ is a redundancy, since to identify as Maori or as Pakeha is also, by definition, to be a New Zealander. Similarly, the doubling of ‘Maori Pakeha’ or ‘Pakeha Maori’ is also uncommon in contemporary usage, although the term ‘Pakeha Maori’ was used to describe those settlers in the nineteenth century who ‘went native’ and lived as and with Maori (see Bentley, 1999).

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51 Between 5-6 per cent of the population identified with both ‘European’ and Maori ethnic groups in the 2001 census. However, the numbers of individuals with this dual heritage is considerably greater. Maori descent was recorded by 17 per cent of the population, while slightly less (81 per cent of these, or 13-14 per cent of the total population) identified with Maori ethnicity. Of those who recorded Maori descent, 51 per cent (or approximately 8-9 per cent of the total population) identified with European ethnicity (figures extrapolated from ‘Table 39: Ethnic group - up to three responses’, Statistics New Zealand, 2002).

52 This statement only holds within New Zealand which, after all, is my focus. Once Maori or Pakeha move outside the country, it is common for Pakeha to use the term ‘New Zealander’ rather than Pakeha. Maori may use both or either (see Taylor, 1996:203-8). In the case of Maori in Australia however, given their residence there over generations, it is likely that many consider themselves ‘Maori Australians’ and do not identify with ‘New Zealand’ at all. They may, however, retain tribal links to a t_rangawaewae within New Zealand.
While at that time this doubling referred to Pakeha hybridisation, today Maori/Pakeha hybridity is seen as a derivation of Maori identity. Each of the examples discussed below, despite their assertion of hybridity, work in various ways to subsume these identities as operations on ‘Maori-ness’. Paul Meredith seeks to address a Maori audience through publishing in a Maori magazine. Heeni Collins (1999) and Kelly Bevan (2000) favour the assertion of a Maori identity over a dual identity and Tess Moeke-Maxwell (2003) signifies a Maori emphasis in her thesis title which signals that her topic is the identities of ‘bi/multi racial Maori women’. Beyond issues of individual subjective experience and choice, there are complex political reasons why hybridities of ‘mixed descent’ work as an operation on Maori rather than Pakeha identity. On the one hand, for Maori, hybridity is a problem. As the outcome of a history of assimilation, it is a very real existential force in Maori lives but one regarded with suspicion. Consequently, ‘racially’ hybrid individuals are encouraged to identify as Maori as an act of resistance. Equally as significant, hybridity is a Maori problem as a result of the colonial representation of Maori identity in terms of primitivist authenticity. Pakeha/colonial denigration of hybrid Maori individuals as ‘inauthentic’ makes hybridity a problem for Maori. On the other hand, to identify as Pakeha while claiming Maori descent is not an issue that sparks discussion. Rather, such a combination represents the success of assimilationism. Further, Pakeha as White and Western constitute themselves as dynamic and pliable. As Sara Ahmed (2000:189, nt4) argues, hybridisation is not a problem for such a construction of Whiteness but a mark of this dynamism and pliability.

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53 I was only able to access Moeke-Maxwell’s thesis as I was involved in making final changes to my own. Hence I have not been able to read and incorporate her analysis fully in this thesis. Nor did I want to ignore its existence. Consequently, I have only touched on her complex and interesting arguments here and direct readers to her theoretical and empirical exploration of Maori women and hybridity.
A further major factor working against the hybridisation of Maori and Pakeha identities is the state espousal of biculturalism. Paul Spoonley (1995) argues this development is a response to Maori political activism from the 1970s onwards, as Maori challenges to Pakeha racism and assimilationary practices led to the demand for separation between the two peoples. Biculturalism, the idea of Maori and Pakeha being two parallel and equal cultures, grew out of this politics and became institutionalised in the 1980s (Spoonley, 1995:106, see also Sissons, 1993:106-7). The result has been a separation and ‘turning inwards’ on the part of both Maori and Pakeha (Spoonley, 1995:100-1), which works against the establishment of identities and cultural practices that make connections between them. The mixing that hybridity represents cannot easily fit within the bicultural frame.

Despite this strong tendency towards bifurcation, the issue of Maori/Pakeha hybridity, biological and cultural, has recently become a subject for discussion. In 2000, Radio New Zealand ran a six-part series, Tohu P_keh_, ‘the influence of the Pakeha’, featuring interviews with Pakeha regarding their involvement in Te Ao M_ori_, ‘the Maori world’. A second six-part series, Tipuna P_keh_, ‘Pakeha ancestors’, involved interviews with prominent Maori individuals in which the focus was on their experience of having Pakeha ancestors/parents. Both of these series aimed to explore contact and interconnections between the two peoples, and the stories told highlight both resistance to, as well as celebration of, cultural hybridity in this country. In addition to these series, there are other signs of utilisation of and responses to Maori/Pakeha identity claims which will be discussed in the following two sections.

‘Lived experience’ and the politics of ‘cultural lubrication’

Ontological conceptions of hybridity commonly appear as most apposite to capture the lived experience of minority, migrant and diasporic individuals and groups. Here hybridity encapsulates the strategies of negotiation and points of tension that are involved by such ‘cross-cutting’ identities. Both Barker (1997) and Dwyer (2000), for

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54 For some recent examples see Kolar-Panov (1996), Barker (1997), Kraidy (1999) and Dwyer (2000).
example, have analysed the discourse of British Asian women to explore the ways in which they negotiate their location ‘both in and out of British society and Asian culture’ (Barker, 1997:611). For these women their hybrid cultural resources necessitate complex negotiations and particular dilemmas that the researchers explore. Similarly, Kraidy (1999) explores the strategies employed by Maronite youth in Lebanon as they negotiate their location between the western and Arab worlds. Such accounts seek to validate hybridised identities as reflective of the lived experience of minority groups and the tensions they face.

Alternatively, hybridised identities are deemed positive on the grounds that they disrupt the binary opposition between Western and ‘native’ subjects, or coloniser and colonised. Jodi Lundgren (1995), for example, argues that the recognition of the Canadian Metis’ claim to a distinctive, hybrid identity is necessary to undermine the binary essentialism of the White/Indian opposition, which offers no place to these biological and cultural ‘halfbreeds’. Metis identity, Lundgren argues, both unsettles the binarism of settler/indigene and recognises the lived experience of people who straddle this divide. In similar vein, Lila Abu-Lughod (1991:137) argues that the practice of feminist and ‘halfie’55 anthropologists ‘unsettles the boundary between [anthropological] self and [researched] other’.

A local example which fits broadly within this frame of celebrating ontological hybridity is Paul Meredith’s recent resurfacing of the term ‘half-caste’.56 Meredith (1999a:24) argues ‘when I say, being “half-caste”, what I am really expressing is not being part Maori or part Pakeha but being both Maori and Pakeha’. While he rejects the racial connotations of ‘half-caste’, he does base his identification with the term on his parentage:

55 That is, those ‘whose national or cultural identity is mixed by virtue of migration, overseas education or parentage’ (ibid).

56 This term was commonly used to designate individuals of mixed Maori/Pakeha descent, but fell from favour with the critique of racial thinking post-WWII. This shift in thinking is apparent in legal definitions of Maori identity. For example, under the 1956 Electoral Act a Maori was defined as including ‘a half-caste and a person intermediate in blood between half-castes and persons of pure descent from the race’. (Note that anyone of less than 50 per cent Maori ‘blood’ was deemed European.) In 1975 this definition was replaced with one based on self-identification.
I am not alleging that I am biologically constituted 50/50 per cent Maori/Pakeha. I am not and I quite frankly do not subscribe to an identity based on quantification of blood. What I do mean though is that my father is a Pakeha and my mother is of Ngati Kaputuhi, Maniapoto (ibid).

Meredith goes on to consolidate his claim by outlining the presence of both families, both heritages, both sets of everyday cultural practice, in his upbringing, moving from its basis in his parentage to his lived cultural experience. In this way Meredith’s argument to authenticate his hybrid identity parallels the examples in the literature which focus on the everyday reality of living ‘between two worlds’.

The rarity of Meredith’s stance is highlighted when he explains that his article is a response to having been told he was experiencing an ‘identity crisis’ and being called a ‘cultural schizo’, both statements expressing the view that hybridity is a pathology. In contrast, Meredith argues for the validity as well as the political value of such hybrid identities/individuals as ‘cultural lubricants’, helping build relationships between Maori and Pakeha. Meredith acknowledges the differences between the two peoples but argues that there has been too much focus on them resulting in a tendency for their exaggeration. He argues,

[i]t is imperative that we spend time examining affinities, which along with those differences will help us understand and construct relationships between Maori and Pakeha as well as other ethnic groups who constitute our New Zealand identity. Here I believe self-proclaimed ‘half-castes’ or ‘cultural lubricants’ have the potential to make an important contribution. S/he has the advantage of intentionally straddling both cultures with the ability to lubricate, that is, to translate, negotiate and mediate affinities and differences in a dynamic of exchange and inclusion (Meredith, 1999a:24).

Meredith’s focus is the relationship between Maori and Pakeha and he sees hybrid/bicultural individuals as perfectly placed to act as negotiators and mediators of that relationship. Here it is significant that his version of post-colonialism is not of the now famous ‘What? Have they left?’ variety, but he says (Meredith, 1999b:14): “‘they’ are here to stay, indeed some of “us” are them, and therefore [there is] the consequential

57 The basis of such thought in racial theories of miscegenation and degeneracy should be obvious.
The imperative of *relationship negotiation*. Meredith’s post-colonial vision is not of a new singularity, either ‘them’ leaving, nor, as with Lundgren and Abu-Lughod, of deconstructing the two identities. Rather he seeks to re-construct the relationship between them.  

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58 Moeke-Maxwell (2003) has explored the politics surrounding Maori women’s ontological hybridity in depth. Like Meredith she points to the assertion of hybridity as reflecting these women’s lived experience and the possibilities of ‘interpreting, translating, negotiating and mediating’ (Moeke-Maxwell, 2003:225) between Maori and Pakeha. In more complex deconstructive mode, she also points to the ways in which such positioning works to both disrupt and secure the Maori/Pakeha binary, an issue that will be taken up in the next chapter.
Michael King’s description of Sir Tipene O’Regan as ‘probably the country’s most effective cultural middle-man’ (quoted in Diamond, Tipuna P_keh_, 5/11/00) follows the same line of reasoning as Meredith’s assertion. Like Meredith, Sir Tipene views his dual heritage in positive terms. In his Tipuna P_keh_ interview (Diamond, Tipuna P_keh_, 5/11/00) Sir Tipene likens being of mixed descent to multiplication and division. He argues that just as these two mathematical operations are related, mixed heritage can be seen in terms of being divided, or in terms of your cultural potential being doubled or tripled. His personal choice, he says, is the latter.

Hybridities of ‘mixed descent’ and the politics of assimilation

There is, however, a counter view of the politics of these ‘substantive’, ontological hybridities. Much of this critical work points to the usage of hybridity by dominant cultural groups in the name of a hegemonic nationalism or, in the case of settler peoples, to ‘indigenise’ their identities and/or to undermine those of the indigene. From these critical perspectives, in arguments strongly parallelling the critique of ‘repressive authenticity’ in Chapter Two, hybridity is shown to further the project of domination via assimilation and exclusion. Joel Streicker (1997), for example, in his analysis of the assertion of a hybrid Caribbean identity in Cartagena, Columbia, argues that while purporting to create a more inclusive Cartagenan identity, Caribbean hybridity in Colombia serves to separate positively valued characteristics associated with Black-ness from those negatively valued, a process which parallels the salvage of indigenous authenticity in the service of nationalism described in Chapter Two. Streicker is critical of the way this process works to undermine the potential for progressive political organisation around Black identity and masks ongoing racial inequalities in Cartagenan society beneath the celebration of hybridity.

Charles Hale’s (1999) critical analysis of the contemporary politics of ladino and Mayan identities in Guatemala tells a parallel tale. Hale points to the aim of increasing inclusivity in the adoption of mestizo/a identity by liberal ladinos and in the growing use of the concept of mestizaje to refer to the nation itself. However, Hale (1999, p10-11 of 15) also warns that such an account of mestizaje works to make ‘Maya and ladino
“intolerance” [essentialism] equally oppressive’. Hale, like Streicker, points to the way in which the discourse of hybridity can be used to divide subordinate peoples and exclude the ‘troublesome’ amongst them (especially the political activists) from the new hybridised hegemony. The tendency then is for mestizaje to delegitimate indigenous Mayan identity claims themselves. Hale (1999, p11 of 15) concludes that,

[although mestizaje could theoretically be used as a means to probe ‘purisms’ in both ladino-centric discourse of national identity and Maya cultural activism, in the hands of the provincial ladino elite the effect is to delegitimate political claims in the name of Maya cultural difference and to make a thinly veiled call for outright assimilation.59

His paper is thus framed as a ‘travel warning’ (in reference to Saïd’s (1983) concept of travelling theory) against ‘any attempt to presume the meaning of terms like hybridity without careful, contextual, political analysis’ (Hale, 1999, p2 of 15).

Suvendrini Perera (1994; 1996) is also critical of the use of hybridity in dominant group discourses, in her case, the celebration of settler hybridity in Australian nationalist narratives. In her analysis of David Malouf’s novel, Remembering Babylon, she criticises Malouf’s representation of a settler hybridity that posits a future in which the settler effectively ‘goes native’, learning the land’s ‘secrets’ via Aboriginal interlocutors. Malouf’s text enacts the settler desire for an indigeneity conceived of in romanticised, primitivist terms, a primitivism Malouf’s settler characters then appropriate for themselves. Thus, as discussed in Chapter Two, the (primitivised) indigene acts as a metaphor for home/origins and as a figure of redemption for the settler. Perera (1994:19) argues,

[w]ith its reliance on the willed combination of two prior, given components, hybridity seems an easy answer to the troubled questions of identity posed by settler societies, and one that erases the complexities of the process for its indigenous subjects.

59 Similarly, Anne Maxwell (1995:203), in her analysis of colonial exhibitions in imperial centres and photographic tourism in settler societies (Australia and New Zealand), points to a tendency for settler representations of indigeneity to emphasize transculturation and hybridity, which she reads as an assimilatory act.
In contrast, Perera insists on remembering the racial past of hybridity. The complexity of hybridity for indigenes, to which she refers, lies in the history of ‘geneticist practices and discourses of racial purity, genocide and assimilation’ (Perera, 1996:400). This history, she argues, is erased by the ‘happy hybridisation’ (Perera, 1994:17) of the settler. Perera’s analysis parallels Patrick Wolfe’s of the operations of ‘repressive authenticity’. However, whereas Wolfe focuses on the representation of an essentialised indigeneity, Perera’s attention, like Striecker’s and Hale’s, is directed towards the resultant representation of settler nationalist hybridity. Together their work highlights the interaction of hybridity and essentialism in such settler nationalist discourses, where settler hybridity is constructed via the appropriation of a romanticised indigenous essence.

Heeni Collins (1999) reflects this suspicion of hybridity in her work on Maori-Pakeha hybridity in which she promotes the term *nga t_ ngata awarua*, literally ‘people of two rivers’. She rejects ‘half-caste’ for its racial connotations and for the implication that ‘we are less than whole’ (Collins, 1999:5). *Nga t_ngata awarua*, as she explains it, expresses a more complex understanding of the experience of cultural hybridity: ‘Awarua can mean either the flowing of two rivers, a corridor or passage. Hence it includes meanings of dual heritage, possible discomfort/alienation of being in-between, and the concept of transition’ (ibid). Collins’ concept incorporates the positive possibilities of drawing on a dual heritage, the idea that identity may change over time, the possibility of difficulties in the experience of being ‘in-between’ and, hence, the possibility also of shifting from one cultural identification to the other, rather than *occupying* an ‘in-between’ position. In contrast to Meredith, Collins acknowledges, even emphasizes, the difficulties and tensions experienced by the individuals she has interviewed as they negotiate their identities between the Maori and Pakeha worlds. In fact, the possibility of retaining a dual Maori and Pakeha identity is downplayed in her discussion in favour of the experience of those who make a transition from a Pakeha to a Maori identity. Whereas Meredith emphasizes the positive dimensions of acting as ‘cultural lubricant’, Collins (1999:3) quotes poet Jacquie Baxter casting this experience as a tiring one of trying to please two, often conflicting, groups.60

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60 Baxter’s solution to this tension is to emphasize her identity as a writer over her cultural
identities: ‘In the end you get so that all you really want to do is be yourself, and for me the only time I’ve felt I could really be myself is when I’m writing (or thinking about writing)’ (Baxter, quoted in Collins, 1999:3).
This sense of being a site of conflict is also reported in the following letter to the editor, written in response to an earlier article which reported that, ‘[i]wi leader Ken Mair said yesterday that Maoris were deeply upset at the removal of the [Moutua Gardens] memorial’ (Morgan, *Dominion*, 16/3/99, p1). R. Paul took umbrage at this report, writing,

I really wish Ken Mair would stop thinking he has the right to speak for all “Maoris”. I am Maori, and Pakeha, as all “Maoris” are - there are no full-blooded Maoris left in New Zealand, and despite the fact that Mr Mair’s skin is as “white” as mine, I choose to acknowledge both sides of my ancestry. I empathise with and even understand their position over Moutua Gardens. However, I am educating myself to be able to raise awareness of the pain of Maori history from within the system, rather than pitch a tent in public gardens. Does Mr Mair really believe his actions encourage positive reaction? People like him make me feel torn in two. I would never turn my back on my Maori history, but not on my Pakeha history, either (Paul, *Dominion*, 25/3/99, p8).

Paul insists on the hybrid descent of all Maori to question Ken Mair’s politics, in ways analogous to those discussed in Chapter Two. However, my main interest in this statement here is in the subjective experience reported of feeling ‘torn in two’ as a result of identification with two, politically opposed, heritages. In contrast to Collins’ report of Jacquie Baxter, Paul insists on his/her choice of dual identification and has, like Meredith, a clear desire for reconciliation between Maori and Pakeha.

While Meredith (see 1999b) highlights the positive potentialities of hybridity, Collins’ strikes a cautionary note regarding the difficulties of the lived experience of hybridity, arguing that: ‘Straddling both worlds is not always a comfortable position, especially if neither foot is firmly placed’ (Collins, 1999:1). It is no surprise that securely hybrid individuals such as Meredith and Sir Tipene O’Regan are situated in the intellectual middle-class of New Zealand society. This is not to denigrate their positive acknowledgement of their dual heritage, but merely to point out that this location offers choices, and the critical and political knowledge to make such choices, which less privileged members of society often lack. For the majority of New Zealanders of Maori descent, situated in the less privileged, even dispossessed, strata of our society, these modes of ‘talking back’ to stereotypic representations of who they are (or are not) are less likely to be available.
The defensiveness of Meredith’s and Paul’s assertions of a Maori/Pakeha hybrid identity indicates the general environment in New Zealand society where such hybridity is seen, by Maori, as an act of settler assimilation and domination rather than inclusion. This is unsurprising in a society with a history of explicit policies of racial ‘amalgamation’ and ‘integration’ which continues into the present day. Kenneth Minogue, for example, demonstrates the continuing dangers of, and Pakeha desires for, assimilation when he uses Maori diversity to suggest that Maori traditionalism is archaic, while the future is that of a new, national hybridity:

Maori come in all shapes, sizes and situations. Some are tribal, others urban, and many have made their way, often very successfully, in the modern New Zealand economy and abroad. Indeed, it’s often hard to know where Maori ends and Pakeha begins. Some visionaries see in this merging the beginnings in the next century of a distinct new nation, two (or more) streams of New Zealand people creating something quite new. As a vision, this is deeply repellent to some people, especially some Maoris. But we can drop the talk of “vision” because what we are actually talking about it is reality. Many New Zealanders have chosen to live that vision. Yet some Maoris want to block that intercourse by setting up artificial barriers. They want to get a lot of old practices out of the museum and on to the streets (Minogue, in *Dominion*, 27/3/98, p12).

Minogue utilises the tradition/modernity dichotomy to position (Maori) traditionalism as negative and regressive. While it is suitable for settler nationalism to utilise this tradition, the arguments of Pakeha individuals like Minogue seek to ‘detach’ Maori tradition from actual Maori people (cf. Wolfe, 1994:114). Those people, in contrast, are to be modern, Western, ‘like us’.

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61 See Margaret Stewart-Harawira (1993:29-30) for an overview of some of the impacts of ‘deculturalisation’ on Maori in the first half of the twentieth century with the result that, for many, access to Maori identity is made difficult by the inability to trace their genealogy, the lack of contacts within Maori society and the lack of the language and cultural knowledge. See Judith Simon (1989:26) on the shift from assimilation to integration in official policy.
As a result of these assimilatory pressures, the maintenance of a clear demarcation between Maori and Pakeha is seen as crucial for the survival of Maori as a distinct people. In this sense, the situation of indigenous peoples differs markedly from that of migrant minorities who can, at least potentially, sustain a connection to a homeland elsewhere as a cultural source.\(^6\) The dangers of hybridity to Maori survival is clear in the arguments about the inauthenticity of ‘mixed blood’ Maori that were canvassed in the previous chapter. And, as Linda Tuhiwai Smith (1999:97) expresses it,

> [w]hile the West might be experiencing fragmentation, the process of fragmentation known under its older guise as colonization is well known to indigenous peoples. We can talk about the fragmentation of lands and cultures. We know what it is like to have our identities regulated by laws and our languages and customs removed from our lives. Fragmentation is not an indigenous project, it is something we are recovering from. While shifts are occurring in the ways in which indigenous peoples put ourselves back together again, the greater project is about recentring indigenous identities on a larger scale.

The difficulties of ‘being Maori’ are apparent, for example, in a newspaper article about the growing Maori population in Otaki, a town which offers education in Maori language from pre-school to tertiary level. One of the Maori women interviewed for the article is reported to say ‘she liked Otaki because she could walk down the street speaking Maori and nobody would give her a second look’ (in Powley, *Dominion Post*, 2/8/03, pA3). It is sad, and telling, that being able to speak Maori without stigmatisation is news. In this highly politicised environment where to be Maori is a struggle, individuals are exhorted to make a stand. Kelly Bevan (2000:66, 92), for example, researching the identities of ‘white Maori women’ (women who identify as Maori but ‘look’ White), takes the position that such women *should* identify as Maori to reverse the effects of assimilation. In this context, being ‘both/and’ is also a difficult choice. To

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\(^6\) I do not wish here to underplay the very real difficulties of maintaining cultural links for the vast numbers of economically disadvantaged immigrants, not to mention refugees and political exiles whose access to their homeland is blocked. However, my point is that the situation of indigenous people differs significantly from that of such groups. Indigenous cultures and ways of life are under threat *in* their homelands, rather than elsewhere.
give another example, following a recent case of accusations of racism in a tertiary education course, for example, a former student reported,

[we] were told we could not sit on the fence. I told them I was happy sitting on the fence, that my different Maori and Pakeha ancestry hadn’t bothered me. But they insisted I decide whether I was Maori or Pakeha (in Morgan, Dominion, 4/9/99, p7).

Thus the desire of Meredith and others for a hybrid Maori and Pakeha identity is countered by the strategic demand for a singular indigenous identity in the interests of survival and political empowerment, which will be discussed further in Chapter Five.
Syncretic hybridities, the politics of inclusion and the colonial ‘break’

Both Nicholas Thomas (1996:15), discussing Aboriginal culture, and Nira Wickramasinghe (1997:85), discussing Kandy culture in Sri Lanka, have observed that what tends to get counted as hybridity is only the mixing of cultural influence between ‘the West and the rest’. The cultural contact and influence between different Aboriginal clans (Thomas) and the linkages between Kandy and South Indian culture (Wickramasinghe) are overlooked in the evaluation of the cultural authenticity/essentialism of each in relation to the West. Thomas’s suggestion, that ‘internal’ cultural dynamism and influence receive attention as a form of hybridity, resonates with the critique of the representation of indigeneity in terms of primitivist stasis.

A specifically political argument for the espousal of syncretic hybridity is that it offers the means to construct a more inclusive identity. Tamara Dukes (1999), for example, uses the concept of hybridity to capture the ways in which ‘Cuban identity and culture are multiple, fluid and fragmented’ across geographical locations, but also ‘across’ other differences such as religion and sexuality. Such hybridising aims to build community across differences that may otherwise divide and implicitly challenges essentialist accounts of what it might mean to be Cuban. A different argument in favour of syncretism is made by Stuart Hall (1990:225-6). Speaking specifically about Caribbean identity, Hall argues for the importance of hybridised identities because their incorporation of history (identity as a ‘becoming’ rather than just a ‘being’) records the ‘traumatic character of the “colonial experience”’ (Hall, 1990:226). Rather than seek to ‘forget’ colonisation by a turn to essence, hybridity acts as an important reminder of the colonial ‘break’ in the historical trajectory of identity. In this section I focus on the ‘internal’ hybridity of Maori and Pakeha identities, keeping in mind Hall’s argument that, as identities constructed out of the ‘break’ of colonialism, these are always-already hybrid.
Maori: ‘real’ Maori and ‘becoming’ Maori

As an identity, ‘Maori’ came into existence under colonialism to represent the commonality of the diverse hap_ and iwi of New Zealand in opposition to the colonising settlers. This commonality is, however, riven by its own histories of hierarchies, domination and assimilation. Some of the attitudes of North Island Maori towards Ngai Tahu, reported by Hana O’Regan (1995; 1999), perhaps most easily exemplify this. The ‘whiteness’ of Ngai Tahu, their lack of Maori language,\(^{63}\) and their lack of carved meeting houses, which O’Regan (1999:196) argues is traditional to them given their historically migratory lifestyle, have all been pointed to as evidence of their lack of authenticity. Ngai Tahu have been considered to be not t_turu M_ori, or ‘genuine Maori’ (O’Regan, 1999:201), not authentically Maori in the essentialist sense.\(^{64}\)

Maori identity is also challenged by some as being too homogenising and too tainted by its colonial origins. Those who reject the term favour tribal identities as markers of continuity with pre-colonial indigenous society. Most famously, John Rangihau argued the term Maori was an attempt to homogenise and dominate the t_ngata whenua:

I have a faint suspicion that Maoritanga is a term coined by the pakeha to bring the tribes together. Because if you cannot divide and rule, then for tribal people all you can do is unite them and rule, because then they lose everything by losing their tribal histories and traditions that give them their identity (Rangihau, 1992:190).

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\(^{63}\) As O’Regan (1995:57) points out, a situation not so different from that of North Island Maori.

\(^{64}\) See also Matahaere (1995:16) and Matahaere-Atariki (1997:62-3) for discussion of the difference of Ngai Tahu. Also see discussion in King (1999:151). Other Maori are not alone in passing a judgment of ‘inauthenticity’ on Ngai Tahu. Economic historian, John Gould, calls Ngai Tahu the ‘least Maori’ tribe or the ‘white tribe’ and, consequently, questions their right to Treaty settlements (see for example, Gould, in Dominion, 27/7/93, p6, 24/10/96, p9).
Rangihau’s argument continues to be repeated in critiques of the politics of Pakeha definitions of Maori (see for example, Graham, 1995 and Rika-Heke, 1997) and as an insistence on the continuity of pre-colonial, tribal sources of identity. A slightly different act of resistance is evidenced by Sir Tipene O’Regan’s story, referred to in Chapter Two, of being accused by Ngati Porou and Te Arawa colleagues that he was ‘just a Pakeha with whakapapa’. Sir Tipene describes having ‘a flash of revelation’ that he was not Maori, but Ngai Tahu (in Melbourne, 1995:156).

Others, rather than reject Maori identity, seek to open it up to diversity, in resistance to the idea that to be Maori is to be traditional and tribal. Witi Ihimaera’s edited collection, *Growing Up M_\text{ori} (1998)*, for example, suggests Maori diversity in its tripartite structure. The ‘Prologue’ includes two historical pieces - a report by Te Horeta Te Taniwha of contact with Cook and his crew in 1769, and an extract from Makereti’s ethnology, over a century later. These pieces position the arrival of the Europeans as the moment of a radical break, remembering colonisation and registering its impact. As Ihimaera (1998:30) states: ‘When the goblins came, growing up was no longer the same for M_\text{ori}’. Part One of the book is entitled ‘M_\text{ori} born, P_\text{keh}\_\text{World}’ and records the stories of those who grew up identifying as Maori, while Part Two, ‘Post-Modern M_\text{ori}’ registers stories of ‘becoming’ Maori. In his ‘Introduction’ Ihimaera critiques the idea of Maori identity that depends on primitivist or traditionalist assumptions:

To be frank, although this collection *is* entitled *Growing Up M_\text{ori}* , that very notion is problematic. It frames M_\text{ori} identity the same way as the opening shot of the film adaptation of Alan Duff’s novel, *Once Were Warriors*. In the film we

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65 Even so, Graham (1995) continues to use the term ‘Maori’ in her paper and to talk of the situation of tribes other than her own and Rika-Heke (1997:171) says that she will use it as a ‘general definition to describe the various nations which are indigenous to the islands of Aotearoa’. Both examples, despite their critique, point to the unifying function served by the term, as Hall notes, to record the shared experience of colonisation.

66 Makereti was a Te Arawa woman who, in the early 1900s, went to Oxford University and wrote an ethnology of Maori, *The Old Time Maori* (1938).

67 Te Horeta Te Taniwha (in Ihimaera, 1998:30) records the initial interpretation that the Europeans were goblins: ‘their eyes are at the back of their heads; they pull on shore with their backs to the land to which they are going’.
see a M_ori meeting house in a rural landscape. Then the director, Lee Tamahori, cunningly has the camera pull back from the meeting house - and we see that it is only a billboard above an Auckland motorway and, in the background, is the reality of South Auckland. In many respects the title is like that billboard. But rather than change it, the decision was made to retain it as an ironic context, an iconic representation of reader expectations that they will find stories that show that the way M_ori were is still the way M_ori are. Well, sorry, folks, but things are not as simple as that (Ihimaera, 1998:12-13).

Ihimaera resists any assumption of essence to Maori identity other than the minimalist one of descent as a necessary basis which allows individuals to choose to ‘be’ Maori for a mix of personal and/or political reasons:

The notion of M_ori identity is, in fact, problematic. There is no racial or full-blood definition, and many of the contributors in Growing Up M_ori can claim as much P_keh_ ancestry as they can M_ori ancestry or, at least, P_keh_ influence in their years of growing up. Much of our identity has to do with whakapapa, with memory based not only on the bloodlines and physical landscapes we live in but also the emotional landscapes constructed by loving grandparents or wh_nau with aroha, manaakitanga and whanaungatanga.

So, another caution, and this has to do with any wish to look for answers to the question of what exactly defines a M_ori and M_ori identity. There’s no one answer to that question ...

What is more to the point is that all the contributors are here because they identify themselves as being M_ori. All have made a sovereignty choice, based on genealogy, belonging, upbringing, pride, politics or downright stubbornness that links them with the mana of our M_ori forbears (Ihimaera, 1998:14).

Ihimaera’s stance is one of inclusivity and diversity, celebrating the many ways of ‘being’ and ‘becoming’ Maori. In contrast to this acceptance of a broad definition of Maori identity are the increasing numbers of articles and theses about the difficulties of being accepted as Maori when perceived as ‘white’ (see for example, Stewart-Harawira, 1993; Cram, 1994; Warren, 1994; Bevan, 2000; Moeke-Maxwell, 2003).

In addition to the tension between narrow and broad definitions of Maori identity, there is a further line of tension between tribal and ‘urban’ Maori identities. There is a
tendency to view ‘urban Maori’ as completely distinct from *iwi M_ōri*, particularly as a result of struggles over Treaty settlements, most famously the fisheries settlement which names both *iwi* and ‘all Maori’ as its beneficiaries, resulting in a struggle between Urban Maori Authorities (UMAs) and tribal *r_nanga* over whether the former should receive a share of the settlement. However, the relationship between *iwi* and urban is not a simple matter of either/or, as evidenced in journalist Peter Calder’s profile of Nick Pataka in relation to his affiliation with UMA, Waipareira Trust:

Nick Pataka can reel off his whakapapa (genealogy) with the best of them: he’s a son of the Hineuru hapu of Tuwharetoa, Te Arawa was his waka and Te Haroto his home marae. Titiokura is his mountain and his tribal waters flow down the bed of the mighty Mohaka. “But I never knew any of that stuff till I came here [Waipareira]” he says ... For all his awareness of his roots, he belongs proudly to an urban *iwi* and the Government’s plan to give recognition to the West Auckland Waipareira Trust legitimises what has been his reality for a long time. It began the day a kaumatua embraced him. The sensation was unfamiliar and magic, and said, “You’re going to be all right, boy”. “I felt like I belonged”, he says. “That’s where the climb back up began”. The freckles across his Maori features betray Mr Pataka’s Scottish and Irish blood - “I call myself the consummate Kiwi,” he says with a big smile - but his identity transcends his bloodline. “I’m proud of being an urban Maori. It made me what I am today.” (Calder, in *New Zealand Herald*, 13/5/99, pA3)

Calder’s profile of Pataka carefully pulls together Pataka’s *whakapapa*, urban identity and European ancestry to draw a picture of a complex contemporary Maori identity in which all of these strands can be accommodated. Further, Pataka’s account records Smith’s (1999:97) process of ‘putting ourselves back together again’ after the experiences of fragmentation and domination of the colonial break.

Another story incorporating the recognition of Pakeha ancestry within a Maori identity is told by Pa Henare Tate, Maori Catholic priest, in his *Tipuna P_keh_ interview*. In this instance Pakeha ancestors appear at the ‘heart’ of what is considered to represent Maori tradition, the carved meeting house. Pa Tate reports the discussion that took place in planning the building of a carved *wharenuī* at his *t_rangawaewae*, Motuti, in Northland:
I put the question to them: ‘Shall we have representation of Pakeha in our \textit{whare}?’ and they answered: ‘Oh, \textit{k\_hore}. [No.] They’d spoil the look of the place.’ Then I asked them the question: ‘Put your hands up all those who do not have Pakeha blood.’ Two black hands went up and I said: ‘\textit{Ae. Whaka\_e an\_a au.} [Yes. I agree.] Leave your hands up though if your children do not have Pakeha blood.’ Both hands went down. ‘Is this \textit{whare} the \textit{whare} that preserves and tells us about our history and about the - all angles of our \textit{whakapapa}?’. ‘\textit{e}.’ ‘Do you think we’ll get another chance to build a \textit{whare}?’ They answered: ‘\textit{Kahore,} and we wouldn’t want a second chance.’ ‘In that case then should we tell the full story of this generation by including a Pakeha in the \textit{whare}?’ And they answered: ‘\textit{e}’. So in the \textit{whare} stands the \textit{poupou} telling the story about the arrival of Pakeha, about the timber industry in those early years and... other aspects... that the Pakeha brought with them (Tate, in Diamond, \textit{Tipuna P\_keh\_}, 26/11/00).

The reluctance to acknowledge Pakeha ancestry is apparent here and is linked to the way in which, as non-Maori, they do not ‘fit’ within a representation (‘would spoil the look’) of Maori identity. In the face of this reluctance, Pa Tate appeals to their adherence to \textit{whakapapa} (rather than any desire to record the ‘break’ of colonisation) to insist their house tell the ‘full story’ of who the people of Motuti are. In so doing, this \textit{whare} is indicative of the dynamism of Maori cultural expression, even in this remote area so closely associated with the idea of Maori tradition.

The multiplicities which constitute Maori identity are sites of struggle between those suspicious of the colonial origins of the term and those who acknowledge its unifying power, between those who seek to order Maori diversity in the name of a normative (‘authentic’) definition of Maori identity and those who seek to emphasize the differences amongst Maori. These tensions between singularity and diversity are made fraught in the context of colonisation, where the dangers of assimilation provoke a protectionist reaction against the recognition of diversity. There is little evidence in these accounts of Maori syncretism of Hall’s valuation of hybridity as a means to remember the trauma of colonisation. The identity projects of Maori discussed here are oriented to recovery from, rather than remembering the impact of, colonialism.
Despite these tensions, the assertion of Maori diversity can also be seen as ‘talking back’ to Pakeha attempts to confine Maori to a singular, traditionalist image. Contemporary Maori are diverse, as are their cultural expressions in the full range of traditional and ‘Western’ art forms. I agree with Nicholas Thomas when he argues that the fact that traditional and hybrid forms of aboriginal culture coexist ‘marks both the survival and dynamism of indigenous cultures as well as an indigenous refusal to be excluded from the projects of modernity and cultural critique’ (Thomas, 1996:12). The other side of this argument is that if only one of these two alternatives existed it would indicate the success of colonialism, either in relegating the indigenous to primitivism or in assimilating them (ibid). The very real difficulties of survival as an indigenous minority culture are not to be glossed over. Thomas points to the way that the two poles of diversity and essentialism, whatever the contradictions involved, must be held in tension.

**Pakeha: from ‘goblins’ to ‘silent centre’**

Looking at the ‘internal’ hybridity of Pakeha raises distinct issues from those facing Maori. The source of Pakeha hybridity lies, firstly, in the fact that Pakeha are a people made up of distinct national origins. Pakeha are consequently internally hybrid in a cultural sense. Added to this is a second source of Pakeha hybridity, in their migratory history which links them to two places, both the ‘old world’ and New Zealand. Finally, their co-existence with Maori provides a third source of Pakeha cultural hybridity through the mixing of their European and Maori cultural values and practices. In brief, Pakeha can be seen as not just hybrid in terms of ‘mixed descent’, but also in terms of their migratory origins and post-migration culture contact. Despite these multiple sources of hybridising influences, the notion of Pakeha as a hybrid identity, in any of these senses, receives little attention in Pakeha society.

Pakeha are ontological hybrids of largely, but not exclusively, ‘British’ origin. However, the focus of discussions about Pakeha identity rarely centres on the mixture of European cultures that constitute contemporary Pakeha, despite the fact that ‘European’
is a popular choice of identity for many White New Zealanders who do not like the word ‘Pakeha’. Rather than focus on their diverse ‘roots’, the project of constructing a national (Pakeha) identity has led to the gradual effacement of earlier identifications as distinct Scots, English, or Irish identities, an homogenisation of difference which Mark Williams (1997:22) links to the focus on Maori as the primary source of difference in relation to which Pakeha identity is defined. The exceptions are only to be found amongst the Irish Catholic communities, Yugoslav/Croatian communities and the smaller communities of European descent, such as the Dutch, Danish, Greek and Italian, only some of whom would identify with the notion of being ‘Pakeha’ at all.

In fact, as David Pearson (1989) has noted, the term ‘Pakeha’ does not represent a community/group. Rather, it refers to an identity category only, with which individuals may choose to identify or not. There are no real distinctions between what might count as markers of Pakeha culture and the national culture more broadly which, apart from identifiably (traditional) Maori elements, is dominated by Pakeha/European expressions. Hence Pakeha identify nationally, rather than ethnically. Consequently, without clear boundaries marking Pakeha culture apart from ‘New Zealand’ culture, ironically the question of internal diversity or hybridity is a moot one. Further, according to Malcolm MacLean (1996:117), since Pakeha are the dominant culture within this society, there is no need for them to ever develop an ethnic awareness.

MacLean (1996) has dubbed Pakeha the ‘silent centre’ and ‘empty alterity’ of biculturalism. What this ‘emptiness’ means is suggested in the observations of

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68 These include a prevalence of images of sublime landscapes in which solitary human activity is dwarfed, in a clear echo of the pioneering past, but with Maori removed from the picture.

69 Claudia Bell, in *Inventing New Zealand: Everyday Myths of Pakeha Identity* (1996), overtly acknowledges the slippage between ‘Pakeha’ and ‘New Zealand’ in her title and when she says in the book (1996:193) while it may be almost impossible to sum up what constitutes Pakeha culture, or articulate the essence of this, for Pakeha themselves there is obviously strong awareness of their own cultural distinctiveness. This anthropological - sociological notion is stated in such phrases as ‘people like us’, ‘real New Zealanders’ or ‘kiwis’.

Also see my discussion of this slippage (A. Bell, 1996).

70 While there are growing attempts to recognise multicultural diversity within the representation of the national culture, this does not include locating Pakeha as one of the cultural groups within this diversity. Rather, Pakeha remain the unmarked cultural mainstream of the nation. See for
Michael Duncan who, as a sociology student at Massey University working on an assignment collecting and analysing examples of nationalist discourse, made the following comments on the representation of Maori and Pakeha in the print media:

As I read the *New Zealand Herald* on the 23rd [July, 1997] I was absolutely amazed at the number of articles on specifically Maori-related events, incidents and decisions. Under the article headings I read that: ‘Maori were challenging ...’, ‘Maori were winning ...’, ‘Maori were advising ...’, ‘Maori were speaking in Maori ...’. And to be honest, I found myself being somewhat envious of Maori. Here it seemed were a people of definition - something as a ‘Pakeha’ I somehow lack. In these articles Maori were acting subjects writing their own history ... Maori have a collective name, a common myth of descent, a shared history, a distinctive shared culture, an association with a specific territory and a sense of solidarity. They are the people with definition and as such can act out of their identity ...

But I also found myself envious on another front. Maori are defining themselves in a ‘situationist’ or ‘conflict’ context. They are a people of struggle in a struggle. It has been my observation that much good can come of this. But what of us Pakeha?

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example, Jane Roscoe’s analysis of the first four episodes in the *Immigrant Nation* television series. These episodes included two on European New Zealanders - the Irish and the Italian. Neither were identified as ‘Pakeha’ and Roscoe discusses how the discourse of the series worked to locate these groups on the margins within the nation, but outside an (ex-nominated) mainstream ‘New Zealand’ (Roscoe, 1997:89).
Are we a people of struggle or satisfaction? Surely the latter - which does not bode well for us - whoever ‘we’, the ‘us’ are! (Duncan, 1997).

Duncan reflects on Pakeha lack of definition in contrast to Maori positivity and, interestingly, agency. Maori stand ‘for’ various things and this stance empowers their action. Pakeha, on the other hand, have no shared political project other than maintaining hegemony, hence only re-act: ‘Whereas I found Maori acting out of their collective identity, affirming things and being known for what they were for; in contrast, Pakeha came across as reactionary and being known only for what they were against’ (Duncan, 1997). As hegemonic subjects, Pakeha have no need to assert their specificity. In fact, this lack of specificity seems to work in complex ways to serve the maintenance of their hegemonic status.

One way in which this works is through the lack of attention to Pakeha history. While this has been identified as the major block to the development of a sense of Pakeha identity, it is also instrumental in securing Pakeha dominance. MacLean (1996:118), for example, argues that the means for Pakeha to develop a sense of ‘ethnic awareness’ is to ‘confront colonial relationships and a colonialist legacy’. Stephen Turner (1999) likewise calls for attention to be given to colonial history to give greater ‘substance’ to Pakeha culture. Turner identifies repression of colonisation as the reason for the ahistorical nature of Pakeha culture. This historical repression is simultaneously repression of the hybrid (migrant) origins of Pakeha identity. The fact that Pakeha are territorial hybrids, a culture descended from migrants from ‘elsewhere’, is arguably the most significant (that is, formative and politically resonant) marker of ‘internal’ Pakeha hybridity. However, as the mode of Pakeha migration was one of colonisation, the instigation or ‘origin’ of Pakeha identity is marked as a moment of ‘original sin’ (Lamb, 1986:352). Hence the possibility of a ‘happy hybridity’ (Perera, 1994) for Pakeha, as for Maori, is disturbed by the histories of colonisation. A further factor accounting for the ‘forgetting’ of Pakeha migratory hybridity is their status as settlers, seeking a new (national) ‘home’. Consequently, as mentioned in Chapter Two, Pakeha seek to claim the status of ‘native’ New Zealanders, rather than remember their migration.

While Turner calls for attention to be paid to colonial history to ‘flesh out’ Pakeha
identity, Simon Upton, Minister of Cultural Affairs in the National Government of 1996-9, developed an argument for the importance of acknowledgement of European roots for the majority culture of New Zealand. Unlike MacLean and Turner, Upton seems to consider a desire to identify with the Asia-Pacific (arguably another indigenising strategy), rather than to avoid the history of colonisation, as the motivation for this historical lack. Versions of Upton’s argument appeared in opinion columns in daily newspapers:

I am not Polynesian. And I’m certainly not Asian. I’m European. It doesn’t, of course, mean a culture that resides exclusively in Europe. It has transported itself to the Americas as well as here. But its myths, symbols and intellectual cross-currents are rooted in the experience of the peoples of Europe over, say, 2500 years ... It is the unconscious embrace of ways of thinking, speaking, visualising and making music. If, as a European New Zealander, you want to understand why you think or speak as you do, your search will lead you back to European roots. No one is obliged to genuflect in the direction of Europe, but it is rather bizarre to deny it. Yet many do ...

New Zealand’s people are not young. They are steeped in the history and experience of two very different (but converging) hemispheres. Maturity would suggest a fluent and easy grasp of these cultural roots rather than a self-conscious desire to demonstrate our New Zealandness. That will come. Slowly. Over generations. But we shouldn’t be trying to deny who we are or where we are from.

With that in mind, we might approach some of the debates about our future with more sensitivity (and a little less embarrassment) about our past (Upton, *Dominion*, 29/1/96, p8).71

The ‘embarrassment’ Upton is concerned with stems from a sense of the ‘youth’ of Pakeha culture in comparison with the metropolitan centre (discussed earlier in his article), rather than from the history of colonisation. However, despite his desire to add depth to Pakeha identity, the vague identification with ‘Europe’ adds to the sense of Pakeha being a rather ‘empty’ category. ‘Europe’ is a very generalised origin, rather than any specific nation or region. Unlike many migrant populations, contemporary Pakeha identify with no particular ‘motherland(s)’, but have switched allegiance to the settler nation itself.

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71 While Upton is more concerned with Pakeha European heritage than with the history of colonisation, his historical consciousness does extend to a position that requires Pakeha to recognise Maori specificity and address past injustices. In a later article (Upton, *Dominion*, 23/6/97, p8) he appeals again to Pakeha European heritage to argue that, having asserted their right to settlement in legal terms, Pakeha must likewise assent to Maori rights to seek legal redress.
What, finally, of Maori-Pakeha cultural hybridity within Pakeha society? The relationship between these two peoples is sometimes pointed to, as a source of Pakeha practices of hospitality, for example. Significantly, ‘Pakeha’ is itself a Maori word, suggesting a degree of hybridising cross-cultural interaction. However, it is more common, in keeping with biculturalism and also in harmony with earlier colonial attitudes, for attention to be given to differences from Maori. Further, as inheritors of primitivist and racist discourses, there is a strong tendency for Pakeha to believe that the cross-cultural traffic between the two peoples should be one-way, Maori ‘learning from’ and assimilating to their ways, rather than vice versa. Those who are considered to esteem any Maori values and practices over those of European origin are likely to be dismissed as ‘try hards’ (Roger, Evening Post, 23/2/98, p4).

The idea of a Pakeha culture and of a Pakeha community is clearly problematic. MacLean, Turner and Upton, in different ways, all point to the ontological ‘thin-ness’ of Pakeha identity. Further, all see a greater confrontation with the histories of Pakeha forbears, or attention to their hybrid origins, as a necessary step to give Pakeha more ‘substance’. This step, however, requires Pakeha to ‘face up to’ and learn about colonial history, an unpalatable suggestion to many. Further, it would require an adjustment to the national imaginary to accommodate the narratives of migration. Thus, it seems that not only do Pakeha lack an ‘essence’, but also that their ontological hybridity is blocked from providing a source of identity ‘substance’ given their political location as hegemonic, settler nationalists.

**Conclusion**

From this overview it is clear that conceptualising identities as ontological hybridities can be a powerful means of ‘opening’ them up to embrace greater diversity. Thinking of identities in ontologically hybrid terms does offer individuals a limited degree of choice in how they identify themselves. However, it is equally clear that there are powerful social influences that work to ‘determine’ the choices individuals make. The ‘opening up’ of identities has also been shown to have its problematic features. For a colonised
and marginalised people, such as Maori, ‘opening up’ carries the dangers of assimilation and ultimate loss of identity.

Further, it is clear that ontological hybridities do not ‘escape’ essentialism. Ontological hybridities rely on the combination, rather than dismissal, of essence. In addition, as soon as a singular term is used to name a culture/identity, this can be thought of in either essentialist or hybrid/syncretic terms, in keeping with Stross’ (1999) observations about the ‘hybridity cycle’. Hybridity and essence, in the end, remain inextricably linked (Coombes, 1994:90, 92, 93).

Against the idea that ontological hybridity might represent a clear advance over essentialism, Hale argues that the theorisation of cultural identities must be ‘grounded ... in an active involvement with the politics of a particular place, time and people’ (Hale, 1999, p1 of 15) and our attention must be directed ‘well beyond their allegedly “hybrid” or “essentialist” characters [to ask] who deploys them, from what specific location, with what effects?’ (Hale, 1999, p13 of 15). In following Hale’s directive to analyse specific identities and their politics, this chapter has shown that, politically speaking, both essentialism and hybridity can be used in the service of colonial domination or in resistance to it. For Maori, essentialism, despite the dangers of primitivist stasis, can be used to resist assimilation. And Pakeha have been shown to use assertions of Maori hybridity in the service of domination and the ‘elimination’ of Maori specificity.

The specificity of settler and indigenous identities in relation to the problematics of both hybridity and colonialism are also apparent. Should colonialism be marked by the assertion of hybridity? Or should it be ignored as an act of resistance (Maori) or an act of domination (Pakeha)? Colonial relations clearly block acknowledgement of the many forms of hybridity that arguably constitute the field of settler/indigene identities in Aotearoa New Zealand. Consequently, while hybridity remains more denied than accepted in contemporary New Zealand society, analysing Pakeha and Maori identities from this perspective provides further evidence of the centrality of colonisation to their conflictual and ambivalent relationship. Tracing the hybrid histories of these identities, in addition, at least muddies the claims of essentialisms and identifies the shared
cultural sources and entwined histories as a ground for political engagement. A more radical approach to deconstructing the essentialised oppositions of indigene/settler and colonised/coloniser is explored in the next chapter in terms of the concept of performative hybridity.
Chapter Four

Performative hybridity and the unhomely

[C]olonialism structures the system that we all inhabit. No one is outside or untainted (Mataheare-Atariki, 1998:69).

Perhaps when Atareta Poananga calls [Pakeha] riffraff she has entered a discourse about origins which serves [Pakeha] purposes more than hers (Lamb, 1986:358).

Introduction

Homi Bhabha’s theorisation of hybridity represents the most thoroughgoing alternative to the ontological versions discussed in Chapter Three. Bhabha’s performative hybridity\textsuperscript{72} represents the extreme shift away from essentialist accounts of identity within the post-colonial literature. From the perspective of performative hybridity, no identity has an originary essence. Rather, all are derivative, constituted in and through difference. Here hybridity refers to the necessary instability and impurity of all identities, the figure of migration operating to signify movement itself, conceptualising identities as forever in process, unstable, dynamic and ‘uprooted’.\textsuperscript{73} Rather than attend

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\item \textsuperscript{72} I use the notion of the performative in ways analogous to Judith Butler’s (1993) formulation. Bhabha’s theory of hybridity is closely aligned to this deconstructionist theorisation of subjectivity and agency.
\item \textsuperscript{73} While I refer to the trope of migration, note that Deleuze and Guattari, for instance, prefer the figure of the nomad to capture this shift from ontology to performativity. For them, [t]he nomad is not at all the same as the migrant; for the migrant goes principally from one point to another, even if the second point is uncertain, unforeseen and not very well
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to the substance (hybridised or essentialised, ‘open’ or exclusionary) of identity claims, Bhabha’s focus is the process by which identities are uttered, reiterated, performed and, in particular, the potential in this process for resistance to the binary oppositions of the identities of coloniser and colonised.

In the first section of this chapter, I outline Bhabha’s theory of performative hybridity, paying particular attention to his analysis of the hybridising and displacing role of mimicry in the colonial relation and to his argument for a resistant hybrid agency. In the second section, I outline Bhabha’s utilisation of the unhomely to describe the experience of colonial displacement, an experience which, he argues, is also indicative of a desire for solidarity. The following three sections explore the usefulness of Bhabha’s theory in thinking through the politics of firstly, Pakeha, then Maori identity. Subsequently, in the conclusion of the chapter, I summarise the strengths and limitations of Bhabha’s theory. I argue that while his deconstructive approach to identity provides a powerful mode of critique that both exposes and disrupts the workings of colonial discursive domination, it is limited in terms of offering a way to move beyond colonial relations. While Bhabha refers to performative hybridity allowing ‘newness to enter the world’ (1994:212ff) and links it to the possibility of cross-cultural solidarity, his rejection of all ‘substantialist’ assertions of identity offers no grounds on which to base a political project other than resistance. Further, his discursive focus is limited to the analysis of the relation between self and discourse, offering no guidance on how to reconstruct progressive social relations between self and other.

**Performative hybridity**

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localized. But the nomad only goes from point to point as a consequence and as a factual necessity; in principle, points for him are relays along a trajectory (Deleuze and Guattari, 1986:50, quoted in Kraidy, 1999:12).
Bhabha’s focus is the act of representation itself. He seeks to shift attention from culture as substance to culture as practice, from ‘culture as epistemology’ to ‘culture as enunciation’ (Bhabha, 1994:177). Culture, he argues, only becomes a problem and hence a focus of attention ‘at the point at which there is a loss of meaning in the contestation and articulation of everyday life, between classes, genders, races, nations’ (Bhabha, 1994:34). As Kraniauskas (2000:241) explains, for Bhabha, culture is ‘an enunciative practice that emerges in a context marked by conflictual difference’. In this context, the work of culture is to negotiate or disguise the conflict through appeals to community that work to exclude some and marginalise others (ibid). It is this dominating operation of culture that Bhabha seeks to expose and undo.

Bhabha interrogates the structuralist recognition of the ‘gap’ between signifier and signified to emphasize the undecidability of identity as representation. This space, opened up by the enunciative act, the performance of identity, he terms the space of hybridity, or the Third Space:

> It is only when we understand that all cultural statements and systems are constructed in this contradictory and ambivalent space of enunciation, that we begin to understand why hierarchical claims to the inherent originality or ‘purity’ of cultures are untenable, even before we resort to empirical historical instances that demonstrate their hybridity ... It is that Third Space, though unrepresentable in itself, which constitutes the discursive conditions of enunciation that ensure that the meaning and symbols of culture have no primordial unity or fixity; that even the same signs can be appropriated, translated, rehistoricized and read anew (Bhabha, 1994:37).

Bhabha talks of this disjunction within the practice of representation in temporal as well as spatial terms.74 Each reiteration/representation of identity differs from each previous iteration. Identity is performed and changes in its performance.75 He thus draws

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74 According to Kraniauskas (2000:240), by the time Bhabha wrote the later essays collected in *Location of Culture* (1994), his conceptualisation of hybridity became ‘increasingly rethought from the point of view of time’.

75 Spivak (1996:86-7) makes fundamentally the same argument when she says that [o]ne of the corollaries of the structure of alterity, which is the revised version of the structure of identity, is that every repetition is an alteration ... Iterability is the name of this corollary: Every repetition is an alteration (iteration). But repetition is the basis of
attention to the inherent instability and lack of foundation in all acts and expressions of identity. All subjects are migratory - in motion, contingent, moving between past representations of identity and performance in the present.

identification. Thus, if repetition alters, it has to be faced that alteration identifies and identity is always impure.
Bhabha is however particularly concerned with the experience of the colonised subject. The performative instability of cultural identities, Bhabha argues, provides for the possibility of subaltern resistance to colonial discourses. It is the space of undecidability itself that offers the possibility of subaltern agency:

In the seizure of the sign ... there is a contestation of the given symbols of authority that shift the terrains of antagonism. The synchronicity in the social ordering of symbols is challenged within its own terms, but the grounds of engagement have been displaced in a supplementary movement that exceeds those terms. This is the historical movement of hybridity as camouflage, as a contesting, antagonistic agency functioning in the time lag of sign/symbol, which is a space in-between the rules of engagement (Bhabha, 1994:193).

Utilising this Third Space, colonial subjects are ‘free to negotiate and translate their cultural identities in a discontinuous intertextual temporality of cultural difference’ (Bhabha, 1994:38). Because every iteration of identity is a translation, a hybridising act, this moment offers the possibility of developing something new:

[F]or me the importance of hybridity is not to be able to trace two original moments from which the third emerges, rather hybridity to me is the ‘third space’ which enables other positions to emerge. This third space displaces the histories that constitute it, and sets up new structures of authority, new political initiatives, which are inadequately understood through received wisdom (Bhabha, 1990b:211).

And:
What is theoretically innovative, and politically crucial, is the need to think beyond narratives of originary and initial subjectivities and to focus on those moments or processes that are produced in the articulation of cultural differences. These ‘in-between’ spaces provide the terrain for elaborating strategies of selfhood - singular or communal - that initiate new signs of identity, and innovative sites of collaboration and contestation, in the act of defining the idea of society itself (Bhabha, 1994:1-2).

In his analysis of the colonial relation, Bhabha’s performative approach centres on the operations of mimicry. The practice of colonisation as ‘civilising mission’ constructs the colonised as ‘almost the same, but not quite’ through a complex and ambivalent incitation to mimicry:

[C]olonial mimicry is the desire for a reformed, recognizable Other, as a subject of a difference that is almost the same, but not quite. Which is to say, that the discourse of mimicry is constructed around an ambivalence; in order to be
effective, mimicry must continually produce its slippage, its excess, its difference. The authority of that mode of colonial discourse that I have called mimicry is therefore stricken by an indeterminacy: mimicry emerges as the representation of a difference that is itself a process of disavowal (Bhabha, 1994:86).

Mimicry involves a process of doubling in which the English, for example, are repeated as the Anglicised, ‘almost the same, but not quite’. Sameness and difference are simultaneously produced in a contradictory and ambivalent operation which seeks to both disavow and produce the difference of the colonised other. The resulting ‘mimic men’ are ‘at once resemblance and menace’, the practice of mimicry not easily interpretable as respectful or ironic, as mimicry or mockery, thus creating a sense of unease for the coloniser (ibid). Mimicry is also camouflage (Lacan, in Bhabha, 1994:85), disrupting the coloniser/colonised distinction and calling colonial authority into question: ’[T]he ambivalence of mimicry (almost the same, but not quite) does not merely ‘rupture’ [colonial] discourse, but becomes transformed into an uncertainty which fixes the colonial subject as a ‘partial’ presence’ (Bhabha, 1994:86). Thus, attempts to ‘settle’ by ‘repeating’ colonial culture (i.e. insisting on indigenous mimicry) are themselves intrinsically ‘unsettling’.

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76 John Rangihau (1992:189) illustrates this demand when he observes, when Pakeha say we are all one people, they seem to mean that you’re brown and a unique feature of the indigenous scene. But they want you to act as a European provided you can still retain the ability to poke out your tongue, gesticulate and do Maori dances. That is Maori culture. The other part says to me, we want you to become part of us and lose all your institutions and all those things which are peculiarly Maori.

77 Both the link between colonial mimicry and ongoing relations of colonial dependence, and between mimicry as resemblance and menace, are beautifully captured in the quote from Sir Edward Cust with which Bhabha opens ‘Of mimicry and man’:
It is out of season to question at this time of day, the original policy of a conferring on every colony of the British Empire a mimic representation of the British Constitution. But if the creature so endowed has sometimes forgotten its real significance and under the fancied importance of speakers and maces, and all the paraphernalia and ceremonies of the imperial legislature, has dared to defy the mother country, she has to thank herself for the folly of conferring such privileges on a condition of society that has no earthly claim to so exalted a position. A fundamental principle appears to have been forgotten or overlooked in our system of colonial policy - that of colonial dependence. To give a colony the forms of independence is a mockery; she would not be a colony for a single hour if she could maintain an independent station (quoted in Bhabha, 1994:85).
The ‘unsettling’ character of mimicry thus suggests a further dimension to the operation of the hybridising strategy as resistance, the undermining of the originary essence of colonising identity itself. The mimic undermines the colonial ‘original’ by imitating an original in such a way that the priority of the original is not reinforced but by the very fact that it can be simulated, copied, transferred, transformed, made into a simulacrum and so on: the ‘original’ is never finished or complete in itself. The ‘originary’ is always open to translation so that it can never be said to have a totalised prior moment of being or meaning - an essence (Bhabha, 1990b:210).

Thus Bhabha links the civilising (but not quite) mission of colonialism to the deconstructionist recognition that every act of representation betrays its lack of identical-ness. Rather than originating in any autonomous source, the identities of coloniser and colonised are shown to be unstable and partial, lacking in plenitude and origin. Within this interplay of reiteration of identity and difference, Bhabha locates a resistant discursive agency which, through repetition, can disrupt colonial authority and these opposed colonial identities.

**The unhomely**

Bhabha captures the existential experience of this colonial relation by the use of the Freudian concept of the *unheimlich*, linking the Freudian unhomely or uncanny to the experience of migration, of being displaced or ‘out of place’, away from home, ‘in-between’. Freud uses the *unheimlich* to describe a particular form of ambivalent anxiety which he traces back to the way the meaning of the word *heimlich* shades into its opposite, *unheimlich* (Freud, 1955:222-6). Consequently, the *unheimlich* encompasses both ‘homeliness’ and its absence, referring to those instances in which the familiar or ‘homely’ becomes other, alienated, estranged. For Bhabha the unhomely/uncanny captures the unease produced by the representation and disavowal of difference:

Despite my use of the term “cultural difference”, I am not attempting to unify a body of theory, nor to suggest the mastery of a sovereign form of “difference”. I am attempting some speculative fieldnotes on that intermittent time, and interstitial space, that emerges as a structure of undecidability at the frontiers of
cultural hybridity. My interest lies only in that movement of meaning that occurs in the writing of cultures articulated in difference. I am attempting to discover the uncanny moment of cultural difference that emerges in the process of enunciation (Bhabha, 1990a:312).

Unhomeliness, Bhabha (1994:9) argues, is ‘a paradigmatic colonial and post-colonial condition’. The ‘uncanny moment’ marks the disruption and unsettling of binary logics and systems of discursive domination. The experience of unhomeliness is then to be embraced for its insights into the workings of dominating power and as a disruption of that power, through bringing to light what has been disavowed (Bhabha, 1994:10).

Further, the moment of unhomeliness is also an expression of a desire for solidarity: ‘To live in the unhomely world, to find its ambivalences and ambiguities enacted in the house of fiction, or its sundering and splitting performed in the work of art, is also to affirm a profound desire for social solidarity’ (Bhabha, 1994:18). In this seemingly odd connection between unhomeliness and the possibility of solidarity, Bhabha echoes the link between the unhomely and the homely itself. By disrupting the violent oppositions of colonising and colonised identities, he suggests the antagonistic relations between peoples thus labelled might also be shifted.

The ‘tripled dreams’ of the unhomely Pakeha

Bhabha insists on the inherent ambivalence and ‘unhomeliness’ of colonial subjectivities. Ultimately colonialism fails to make the coloniser feel ‘at home’ in the colony, or the settler ‘at home’ in settler society. Settlers may be White, but they are ‘not right’, they are ‘out of place’. Certainly the description of the unhomely has a resonance for the settler subject, albeit they are not the focus of Bhabha’s concern. His influence is apparent, however, in the work of a number of writers on settler subjectivities.

Alan Lawson (1991, 1995) utilises Bhabha’s work in analyses of the specificity of the settler subject and settler literature. He argues that identifying the specificity of the settler subject is both ethically and hermeneutically important. To ignore this specificity is ‘to engage in a strategic disavowal of the actual processes of colonization, a self-
serving forgetting of the entangled agency of one’s history as a subject with that of the displaced Native/colonized subject’ (Lawson, 1995:20). Lawson (1991:68) refers to settler cultures as the ‘Second World’ and argues they are characterised by a double-ness. They are effectively the very figure of the unhomely, at once colonising and colonised, colonising and other. As such, ‘[t]he settler subject is, in a sense, the very type of the nonunified subject and the very distillation of colonial power, the place where the operations of colonial power as negotiation are most intensely visible’ (Lawson, 1995:24).

Lawson characterises the empirium and the indigene, between which the settler is caught, in terms of two sets of contending authenticities and authorities. He details the settler location in relation to them in terms of Bhabha’s theorisation of the colonial desires and disavowals of mimicry:

I deploy Bhabha’s observation that “the colonial text occupies that space of double inscription” in a particular way within the frame of the Second World to refer to the endlessly problematic double inscription within the Second World subject of authority and authenticity. If we put that double inscription of authority and authenticity together with the notion that the cultures of the Second World are both colonizing and colonized, we can see that there are always two kinds of authority and always two kinds of authenticity that the settler subject is con/signed to desire and disavow. The settler subject enunciates the authority that is in colonial discourse on behalf of the imperial enterprise that he - and sometimes she - represents. The settler subject represents, but also mimics, the authentic imperial culture from which he - and more problematically, she - is separated. This is mimicry in Bhabha’s special sense since the authority is enunciated on behalf of, but never quite as, the imperium: that authority is always incomplete ... In Western art, popular culture, history, fiction, and even postcolonial theory, mimicry seems always to be in the pathetic or scandalous performance of the colonized. However, I argue that in settler cultures, mimicry is a necessary and unavoidable part of the repertoire of the settler. The settler subject also exercises authority over the Indigene and the land
while translating his (but rarely her) desire for the Indigene and the land into a desire for Native authenticity in a long series of narratives of psychic encounter and indigenization. And in reacting to that subordinacy, that incompleteness, that sign of something less, the settler mimics, appropriates and desires the authority of the Indigene: the menacing “not quite” is here more dangerous. This time it is not resistance but oppression or - worse - effacement (Lawson, 1995:25-6).

Both empirium and indigene are figures of authenticity in the romantic sense outlined in Chapter Two. In addition, both represent forms of moral authority, the authority of ‘civilisation’ in the case of the former, and of belonging in the case of the latter. Between these contending positivities, the settler is the figure of inauthenticity and moral lack, a mimic subject in a double sense, mimicking both the authenticity of the empire and the authority of the indigene. In his analysis of settler subjectivity, Lawson extends and translates Bhabha’s theorisation of colonial mimicry. Settlers, also, are shown to be mimic subjects and, in a significant reversal of Bhabha’s theory, their mimicry of indigenous authority is argued to work to serve domination rather than resistance.78

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78 See Dyson (1995) for an analysis of The Piano, which discusses instances of both indigenous and settler mimicry in the film.
Focussing in on this indigene-settler relation, Lawson (1995:26-8) argues that the ambivalent location of the settler manifests in the ‘old tripled dreams’ of the coloniser, which work to efface indigenous authority and appropriate indigenous authenticity. The first is the dream of effacement of the indigene and evacuation of the land (*terra nullius* and the ‘dying race’), which in the analysis that follows I will call the *dream of settlement*. The second is the now familiar dream of continuing authentic indigeneity, which denies that colonisation occurred - the *dream of redemption*. The third is the dream of inheriting the indigene’s authority or rights to the land, which Lawson (1995:27) links to the ‘sentimentalization of the mixed-race figure who enacts the slippage between the white desire and the Native right’ - the *dream of hybridisation*. But the settler’s simultaneous denial of, and dependence on, the presence of the indigene means that these dreams of replacing the indigene can never be fulfilled:

The need, then, is to *displace* the other rather than to *replace* him; but the other must remain to signify the boundary of the self, to confirm the subjectivity of the invader-settler. The other, as a consequence of this “almost but not quite” move, is therefore always in some sense present, ready (like Freud’s uncanny) for its return (Lawson, 1995:28).

Recognition of this ‘unhomely’ and doubled nature of the settler subject is utilised in a number of critical analyses of Pakeha appropriative and effacing strategies. Here I relate four examples to Lawson’s ‘tripled dreams’.79 Radhika Mohanram’s (1999) analysis of the links between the nineteenth century British imperialist project and Victorian domestic ideology in New Zealand and Australia works, for example, to expose the dream of settlement and its displacement of Maori. Mohanram begins by recounting the desire of the colonists to construct an English home, arguing that at one level this represents the imperial enterprise - renaming and remaking the colonised world - while at another it is an attempt to make the alien homely:

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79 Also see Wetherell and Potter (1992:142-3) for a description of Pakeha mimicry of Britain and their ‘chiding, petulant’ response to Maori refusals to mimic ‘good capitalist habits’.
The alien and unfamiliar must be domesticated, must become familiar. Home and nation must be evoked. New Zealand must function as Britain, yet Britain as a tabula rasa - a blank page - for her people in the diaspora to inscribe their lives upon. If there is a reworlding of New Zealand, it offers the settlers the opportunity of rebirthing and living their lives anew, though always in the image of Britain (Mohanram, 1999:150).

‘Home’ is not merely the space of domesticity, but Britain inscribed in the alien territory of the colony. She analyses the correspondence of Charlotte Godley during her years in Canterbury. Included in that correspondence is a report of a visit to a Mrs Brittan and her admiration of Mrs Brittan’s English furnishings. Mrs Brittan’s house, argues Mohanram, is London displaced. This displacement functions in two ways: first, by reconstructing a “London” villa in Christchurch, the privileged term “London” is maintained in the Antipodes; it becomes a marker of imperialism and imperialist aesthetics. Simultaneously, however, this reconstruction of the London villa functions to underscore the fact that Christchurch is not London, nor is New Zealand Britain. Mrs Brittan is not in Britain. London is privileged in opposition to what it is not. Its privilege is only ever retroactive in that it must first be lost. This particular scene is saturated with loss and desire for London. Secondly, remembering London in Christchurch simultaneously underscores, for the postcolonial reader, that the coherence of home and the safety it represents is purchased by excluding specific histories that saturate a place, in this instance, Maori histories. The sedimentation of extant history in geographical space must be occluded for the construction of London and the homesickness that suffuses Mrs Brittan to become visible (Mohanram, 1999:160-1).

Mohanram highlights the mimicry of British authenticity that secures settler identity, but ‘not quite’. In doing so she illustrates the interdependence of identity and difference; London only gains its privilege from its opposition to colonial space. She also exposes how this dream of settlement, the project of colonial ‘home-making’, relies on the displacement of Maori, as Lawson (1995) suggests.

Jonathan Lamb’s (1986) analysis of the Penguin Book of New Zealand Verse (Wedde
and MacQueen, 1985) illustrates the workings and effects of the Pakeha dreams of redemption and hybridisation. In his ‘Introduction’ to the Penguin volume, Ian Wedde (1985:23-9) argues that English language poetry in New Zealand is now original to this place. That is, he asserts that Pakeha have now ‘arrived’ (Lamb, 1986:355) or are ‘at home’, mimicking Maori authority as ‘natives’. By the time of the Penguin’s publication in the mid-1980s, the notion of New Zealand as a bicultural nation with two founding peoples, Maori and Pakeha, was becoming hegemonic. As such, Wedde’s assertion of Pakeha home-coming is in keeping with the bicultural dream of a hybrid nation, which depends on there being two origins, two homes, two authenticities. Lamb’s concern is with the way the Maori origin is positioned to secure this Pakeha ‘home-coming’. Poetry that was written in te reo M_\text{ori} appears in the Penguin volume in Maori and then translated into English. Lamb’s argument centres on this issue of translation. He cites two particular phrases from a talk Wedde gave about the process of editing the collection, to exemplify his concern. Firstly, in expressing his love of the English language, Wedde (1984:55, cited in Lamb, 1986:356) adds ‘as I hear that language, I am going also to be hearing the present echo of another’. Secondly, discussing the difficulties of positioning Maori poetry within the context of a national anthology without being seen to be assimilationist, Wedde (1984:52, cited in Lamb, 1986:357) acknowledges that ‘[m]oving a largely oral and usually sung or performed poetry to the passive and literary context of an anthology seemed potentially absurd’.

80 A version of this discussion of Lamb appears in Bell (2004a, forthcoming).
Lamb’s (1986:356) argument is that Wedde’s representation of Maori has ‘all the
hallmarks of binary innocence in being oral, ageless, demotic’. The unassailable purity
of te reo M_ ori means that it can only be accessed in translation, as a copy or ‘echo’ of
its pure authenticity. Effectively, what the Penguin illustrates for Lamb is that in the
desire to secure Pakeha nationalist origins, the Maori origin is debased and muted,
becoming, Lamb (1986:357) argues, the ‘imperfect other of “the upwelling vigour of
original [New Zealand English] language”’. This seems to suggest that the assertion of
two equal origins is impossible. What happens is a double appropriation. Firstly, Maori
authenticity is appropriated to the Pakeha-dominated nationalist project and, secondly,
the authority of Maori originality itself is appropriated by Pakeha. Further, in the
process that originality is reduced to something lesser, an ‘echo’, effectively reversing
the binary opposition to one of Pakeha ‘originality’ and Maori ‘translation’. Thus Lamb
points to the impossibility of the bicultural vision, the cost to Maori of this centring of
Pakeha culture and the politics of the Pakeha desire for innocence and home-coming.
What Lamb doesn’t spell out but is an implicit part of the logic he exposes, is that, if
Maori culture still exists in some authentic ‘unsullied’ form, the violence of colonisation
can be denied. Maori culture is not in fact ‘harmed’ but continues to exist and find a
place within the national imaginary in the figure of Maori authenticity. If this is so,
there can be no place for Pakeha guilt. Both Maori and Pakeha can be ‘innocent’. Thus
the Pakeha desire for redemption is expressed in the fantasy of Maori cultural purity.

Michael King’s (1999) claim that Pakeha are ‘a second indigenous people’ or ‘white
natives’, briefly touched on in Chapter Two, offers a further example of the settler
dreams of settlement and hybridisation. To begin with, the figure of the ‘white native’
clearly parallels Lawson’s (1995:27) ‘mixed-race figure who enacts the slippage
between white desire and Native right’. King (1999:235-6) explains Pakeha indigeneity
as follows:

   My own people, descendants in the main of displaced Irish, had as much moral
and legal right to be here as Maori. Like the ancestors of Maori they came as
immigrants; like Maori too, we became indigenous at the point where our focus

81 A version of this analysis of King appears in Bell (2004b, forthcoming).
of identity and commitment shifted to this country and away from our countries 
of origin ... With my own background here, and with as strong a spiritual 
association with the land and its history as anyone I know, I have sometimes 
been angered by misrepresentations of my position ... It is simply not valid to 
make sweeping judgements that identify Pakeha as rapacious exploiters of 
natural resources and Maori as kaitiaki committed to protect them.

King claims Pakeha belonging is equal to ‘Native right’, enacting a ‘slippage between 
Maori and Pakeha identification with place. He has nothing to say in this book about 
how this identification was achieved through the alienation of Maori land through war, 
confiscations and the Native Land Court system. Effectively, King locates Pakeha 
geographically by claiming an identification with the landscape, but ignores the history 
that made that identification possible. He does not deny colonisation, but dismisses its 
relevance to contemporary Pakeha. This is clear when King later equates the historical 
wrongs committed by the ancestors of Pakeha with those committed by the ancestors of 
Maori: ‘The truth is that we all, Maori and Pakeha, have skeletons ... in our respective 
historical closets’ (King, 1999:237). Rather than pursuing Lawson’s dream of 
redemption by denying colonisation, King makes redemption irrelevant by dismissing 
ideas of any greater Maori moral authority.

King believes it is time for Maori to acknowledge Pakeha belonging, as he told Paul 
Diamond in an interview in the Tohu P_keh_ series:

MK: Pakeha have done a lot in the last twenty years. Not completely, but 
significantly. Maori need to also respect my culture and traditions. Maori need 
the partnership with Pakeha. The Pakeha side of the equation needs more 
acknowledgment.

PD: But you also acknowledge that a lot of Pakeha still have a long way to go 
before they “learn the trick of standing upright here”?82

MK: Some have. Many have. But many have learnt that trick - that is, the ones

82 This line comes from a poem by New Zealand poet, Allen Curnow (see Wedde & MacQueen, 
1985:199), based on his reflections on viewing the skeleton of an extinct New Zealand bird in a 
provincial museum. Mark Williams (1997:24) explains, 
in this poem about adaption and failure to adapt, about the amount of time it takes for 
an organic national culture to take shape after the brutal wrench of transplantation, New 
Zealanders are seen as crippled by geography. Distance has rendered them ill-fitted for 
survival, like the extinct bird propped up with wires in the provincial museum. The 
“trick” of self-sufficiency has yet to be fully mastered.
for whom the lakes, rivers, mountains and so on, are just as important a source of their spirituality and connectedness as they are for Maori (in Diamond, *Tohu P_keh_, 9/7/00).

The ‘trick’ to Pakeha belonging lies in a relation to place, rather than to Maori. In keeping with his use of the terms ‘native’ and ‘indigenous’ to refer to Pakeha, King never acknowledges the difference in kind of Maori and Pakeha belonging. Rather, he continues the practice of asserting Pakeha identity and belonging at the expense of acknowledgement of Maori difference, and in a way that sidesteps colonial history and the colonial relation. King’s indigenising move thus *continues* colonial relations via its effacement of Maori specificity and patent desire to ‘stand in for’ the indigene (see Lawson, 1995:27-8), his ‘white native’ performing an act of appropriation of Maori authority, in Lawson’s terms.

Finally, Phillip O’Neill (1993), in his analysis of the novels of Henry Lawson, Janet Frame and Keri Hulme, does not exemplify the dream of hybridsation so much as the impossibility of this dream of securing indigenous authority or the right to belong. O’Neill focuses on the ‘unsettled’ nature of settler subjectivities. He argues that the role of the indigene for settler identity is both as the figure of being ‘at home’ (the first inhabitants) but also the uncanny, or unhomely. In both ways the indigene blocks the settler from occupying the country in a ‘full, homely manner’ (O’Neill, 1993:285-6). Thus, according to O’Neill (1993:287-8), ‘the figure of the indigene serves as both block or anchor’, suggesting the impossibility of the project of ‘happy hybridisation’ (Perera, 1994:17), which remains trapped in a fetishisation of the indigene.

The concept of ‘unhomeliness’ then, has significant explanatory power in relation to the ontological status of the settler subject. However, in a significant reversal of Bhabha’s linkage of hybridity with resistant agency, settler hybridity is shown to serve domination. Thus, we have seen that performative hybridity (like essentialism and ontological hybridity) can serve either resistance or domination. However, the question remains whether or not the exploration of settler unhomeliness can ‘deconstruct’ domination, hence serving the progressive purposes of founding a new, non-colonial relation.
O’Neill suggests a possible theoretical translation of Bhabha’s hybridity for the consideration of settler subjectivities. He situates his work within what he calls ‘settler theory’ which focuses on the possibility of a ‘subjectivity that does not claim to be hegemonic, nor desire hegemony. It is a strategy to consider the other as an other, and not reduce them to a degraded or minor or mimicking and static version of oneself’ (O’Neill, 1993:27). Central to settler theory is ‘a critique of modern and mono-cultural settler nationalism, a nationalism that rationalizes and commodifies identity’ (O’Neill, 1993:34). Following Lamb, I would add to this prescription that settler theory’s critique must be extended to bicultural nationalism also. O’Neill’s aim is thus in accord with Bhabha’s in seeking the disruption of domination. However, for the settler subject, as exemplified in the analyses above, the utilisation of the sense of ‘unhomely’ hybridity is turned inward, onto the self as the ‘bearer’ of colonial authority. O’Neill’s (1993:255-278) argument that the way forward for settler subjects is via mourning indicates this self-reflexive focus and suggests a new form of settler agency as self-critique. In addition, mourning involves attention to the past, the site of loss, creating the possibility of new ‘versions of historic memory’ (Bhabha, 1996:58). Stephen Turner sets essentially the same prescription, arguing that,

[unable to remember the past or properly to conceive a future, the melancholy condition of the white New Zealander knows no object. There is a need for national mourning, to grieve for the loss entailed in settlement in order to embrace the difference of place] (Turner, 1999:23).

Via this mournful confrontation with their colonial history, Turner (1999:22) argues, ‘it is possible to open up the cultural body, to recover the feeling of encounter and exchange with a new place and other peoples’, a process that offers self-knowledge for the settler and a more ‘fully alive’ experience of place.

If it is accepted that ‘unhomeliness’ is the defining characteristic of settler identity, then acknowledging and coming to terms with Pakeha unhomeliness is an advance on the assertion of authenticity and authority via the appropriation and effacement of Maori. Further, by bringing to light the dynamics of settler mimicry and loss, unhomeliness can work to disrupt colonising strategies. As Lamb argues,

[p]erhaps when Europeans, Americans and Canadians are learning to love
displacement, decentering and discontinuity it is time for Aotearoans to sit in the cultural seawrack at the margin of the world grateful for the fragments they behold, and to put by the project of self-collection. The thirties poets seem much clearer-headed about this: “what your bewilderment gave you/that is your knowledge. Take and bear it.” Perhaps when Atareta Poananga calls us riffraff she has entered a discourse about origins which serves our purposes more than hers. Finally, perhaps there is, or ought to be, a Maori proverb: Beware of Pakeha baring guilt (Lamb, 1986:357-8).

Lamb’s closing warning implies that it is the return of guilt, repressed alongside the acknowledgment of colonial history, that fuels the problematic relationship of Pakeha with Maori. Guilt is itself problematic, representing, for Lamb (1986:354), the desire for innocence and redemption. MacLean (1996:117) also warns of the problems of guilt, arguing that ‘while Pakeha ethnicity is framed as a means of atonement and gaining absolution, there will never be a move towards a biculturalism based on power sharing’. According to this argument, abandonment of the narcissistic obsessions of guilt is necessary to enable a ‘mournful’ confrontation with history and with the unhomeliness and loss of Pakeha experience, thus allowing new ‘versions of historic memory’ (Bhabha, 1994:58) to surface.

**Maori and the unhomely**

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83 I discuss this dimension of Lamb’s argument, and of Pakeha politics generally, more extensively in Bell (2004a, forthcoming).
For Maori, Bhabha’s performative hybridity offers a means to deconstruct the position of essentialised authenticity offered within settler colonial discourse, at the same time ‘unsettling’ the ground of settler subjectivity. However, for indigenous peoples Bhabha’s theory is problematic at the very point of its strength in relation to the settler - in the correlation of hybridity and the ‘unhomely’. To the extent that Bhabha’s theory is grounded in the conditions of enunciation, no one is ‘at home’. In a context in which a fractured and destabilised identity is understood as the outcome of colonisation, the idea that this is a condition to be embraced is difficult to reconcile. Rather, indigenous peoples, as Smith (1999:97) points out, are in the process of ‘recovery’ and ‘home-making’ rather than their opposites.

The concept of ‘unhomeliness’ does however illuminate the experience of indigenous peoples living under colonisation. To live in a social context of domination by another culture, language and worldview is to have repeated experiences of displacement and disorientation. O’Neill (1993:282), for example, identifies ‘unhomeliness’ within the characterisation of Maori in Hulme’s fiction. More extensively, Matahaere-Atariki (see 1997, in particular) has utilised the homely/unhomely pair in her critique of decolonisation strategies that rely on essentialist representations of Maori authenticity. Authentic indigeneity, she argues, reproduces the violence of colonialism by repeating the ‘pure native subject’ which is integral to the colonial project (Matahaere-Atariki, 1997:15). Biculturalism, similarly, works to reduce Maori identity to a set of characteristics ‘different from’ and thus also supporting Pakeha identity (Matahaere, 1995:16-7). Matahaere-Atariki identifies the cost of adherence to Maori authenticity in terms of the now familiar problems of the authentic/inauthentic divide and the resulting exclusions of many from the status of ‘real’ Maori.84 Thus, she argues, the valorisation of Maori authenticity both colludes with and ignores the history of colonialism (Matahaere-Atariki, 1997:44-57). Matahaere-Atariki’s analysis suggests that Maori adherence to authentic tradition represents a redemption fantasy that parallels that of Pakeha. For both peoples the continuing existence of Maori authenticity can work as evidence that colonisation didn’t happen or, at least, did no harm.

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84 Matahaere-Atariki (see for example, 1997:62-4) is particularly concerned to bring to light the existence of the ‘authentically inauthentic’ ‘southern Tahu women’ who remain landless without having migrated to the cities and who cannot identify with authentic Maori identity.
Matahaere-Atariki asserts a post-colonial and poststructuralist theorisation of identity in preference to an essentialist authenticity which assumes that all we need to do is shake off the trappings of colonialism and [Maori woman] will be there in all her former natural/experiential glory. The truth is we have never always just been. Meanings around Woman are contestable, psychically, culturally and politically (Matahaere-Atariki, 1997:6-7).

It is this type of constructionist theorisation which she pursues to answer her question: ‘What strategies can be put in place to resist the easy sliding together of identity and culture that reproduce the violence of colonialism?’ (Matahaere-Atariki, 1997:9). It is in her post-colonial/poststructural turn that she makes use of the concept of the unhomely:

[E]ffective programmes for decolonisation need to reject the notion that there is a “home” that we can inhabit that will protect us from the continuing effects of colonisation. This for me is simply a romantic myth that is especially offensive given the realisation that this conceals the very real effects of colonisation. It also reminds me that I do not have a home to return to that was not inhabited years ago (Matahaere-Atariki, 1997:29).

Viewing contemporary Maori identities in terms of their unhomeliness works to expose and remember the impact of colonialism and makes space for the inclusion of the Maori ‘self-as-survivor under colonialism’ (Matahaere-Atariki, 1997:49). This self, for Matahaere-Atariki (1998:74), is exemplified by Southern Tahu women caught between the gaze that represents her and an image that is supposed to be her ... She cannot feel nostalgia for an image that was never her and is wary of an official discourse that continues to falsify and reinvent her reality as M_ ori woman.

Clea Te Kawehau Hoskins makes the same point when she says, I have used the term “insider” myself in self description as a way of defining my politics and loyalties as a Maori woman ... However I am always critically conscious that as a Maori woman in a “post”-colonial environment I am an “outsider” too. Colonisation has meant that I “necessarily look in from the outside while also looking out from the inside. Not quite the same, not quite the
other ... in that undetermined threshold place where she constantly drifts in and out”. What is required for our reconstructive work as Maori is the development of and engagement with notions of identity which acknowledge and provide space for our multiplicity, our contradictions, and our difference as people, while at the same time affirming and encouraging our sameness (Te Kawehau Hoskins, 1997:30, quote from Trinh T. Minh-ha).

While Te Kawehau Hoskins asserts the hybridity and ‘between-ness’ of Maori, she is also committed to a project of ‘reconstruction’, albeit one that does justice rather than violence to that diversity.

The reconstruction in multiplicity that Te Kawehau Hoskins calls for is widely evident in Maori society as discussed in Chapter Three. To recap how this multiplicity might remember as well as recover from colonisation - the existence of urban marae and urban Maori organisations, for example, are arguably testimony to the disruptions and dislocations of colonisation, but also to Maori desire and need for new ‘home-building’ in the present. Here a return to Peter Calder’s profile of Nick Pataka illustrates this development and the link between the pre-colonial and post-colonial in contemporary Maori identities:

Nick Pataka can reel off his whakapapa (genealogy) with the best of them ... “But I never knew any of that stuff till I came here [Waipareira]” he says ... His story is an achingly familiar one: he hit Auckland as a provincial teenager “with seven ounces of dope in my pocket and thought I was going to make my fortune ... [M]y life was using people and hurting people and I’ve spent 10 years balancing the ledger.” For all his awareness of his roots, he belongs proudly to an urban iwi and the Government’s plan to give recognition to the West Auckland Waipareira Trust legitimises what has been his reality for a long time. It began the day a kaumatua embraced him. The sensation was unfamiliar and magic, and said, “You’re going to be all right, boy”. “I felt like I belonged”, he says. “That’s where the climb back up began”. The freckles across his Maori features betray Mr Pataka’s Scottish and Irish blood - “I call myself the consummate Kiwi,” he says with a big smile - but his identity transcends his bloodline. “I’m proud of being an urban Maori. It made me what I am today”
Pataka’s story reflects the experience of the dislocating effects of colonisation as well as common teenage difficulties, but the references to ‘belonging’ and ‘climbing back up’ indicate also a rejection of Bhabha’s assertion of the value of ‘homelessness’ in favour of the possibility and desirability of building new ‘homes’ in and for the present. Further, it is via this new ‘home’, within an urban Maori community, that Pataka has been facilitated in learning also about the tribal origins that link him to a pre-colonial Maori world. Such accounts indicate that the ‘traditional’ and the ‘modern’ can both contribute to the individual’s sense of cultural identity.

While colonisation has displaced indigenous peoples from their pre-colonial homes, there are clearly problems with aspects of Bhabha’s ‘unhomely hybridity’ for indigenous peoples. Firstly, as there is no originary enunciation of identity, neither do cultures have origins. Bhabha is not interested in origins because he considers that origins become claims to exclusivity and essence. Secondly, while Bhabha emphasises unhomeliness as a temporal experience, the ‘uncanny moment’ (Bhabha, 1990a:312), the ‘unhomely’ is also a spatial metaphor (cf. Mohanram’s analysis above) linking the instability of identity claims to the spatialised experience of the migrant being ‘out of place’. While this resonates with Matahaere-Atariki’s (1997:29) assertion that she has no home ‘that was not inhabited years ago’, it does not resonate with the experience of all Maori, nor with Maori desires for ‘recovery’. In contrast, for example, the representation of Pataka’s identity is clearly located in multiple places, or ‘homes’, and with a clear history of origins and transformations; his whakapapa is briefly given with his home marae, maunga and awa, his identification with Waipareira is emphasized, and his national identity as a ‘Kiwi’ is acknowledged.

Further, the relationship to place is central to Maori identity and political claims. The Maori term which captures their status as indigenous peoples is t_ngata whenua,
literally, ‘people of the land’ and ‘home’ is conceptualised as _rangawaewae_, ‘a place to stand’. To the extent that the concept of ‘unhomeliness’ denies or ignores this, it is problematic, even dangerous. The central colonising practice of settler societies such as New Zealand was/is the alienation of land from the indigenes. This is the ‘original sin’ of the settlers (see Lamb, 1986), in New Zealand’s case in direct contravention to the contract established in Article Two of the Treaty of Waitangi, which guaranteed the Maori signatories’ rights to their property. Hence, struggling for acknowledgement of that breach of contract and to reclaim land are major planks of Maori politics of decolonisation, or of resistant Maori agency. In this context ‘unhomeliness’ does not offer a way forward, although its ‘origins’ in colonisation and its effects on contemporary Maori can illuminate the costs of colonisation.

Bhabha’s theory also seems to call for a ‘presentist’ sense of identity. It is too simple to say that it is ahistorical, since he considers that hybridity and unhomeliness can disrupt dominating historical narratives and bring to light new versions of history. However, identity as performative and resistant is always in a relation to the past that is disruptive rather than continuous. Bhabha would seek to interrogate, rather than to ‘affirm’ history:

_The implication of this enunciative split for cultural analysis that I especially want to emphasize is its temporal dimension. The splitting of the subject of enunciation destroys the logics of synchronicity and evolution which traditionally authorize the subject of cultural knowledge ... The intervention of the Third Space of enunciation, which makes the structure of meaning and reference an ambivalent process, destroys this mirror of representation in which cultural knowledge is customarily revealed as an integrated, open, expanding code. Such an intervention quite properly challenges our sense of the historical identity of culture as a homogenizing, unifying force, authenticated by the originary Past, kept alive in the national tradition of the People (Bhabha, 1994:36-7)._}

In contrast, for Maori, holding onto a cultural past prior to colonisation is crucial to surviving as a people in the present, to having a distinctive cultural identity. Maori identity depends on at least a degree of continuity with a pre-colonial past. It is arguably the colonial relationship of domination that leads to the idealisation and essentialisation
of that past, rather than the practice of remembering and the practice of tradition themselves. Against Bhabha, it may be possible for claims to historical continuity and the histories of colonial trauma and displacement to be combined, as Pataka’s autobiography suggests.

**Conclusion**

Colonisation is a process of displacement for both colonisers and colonised and the traces of this displacement are still apparent in the identity constructions of Maori and Pakeha. It is in bringing this sense of displacement to the fore that Bhabha’s performative and unhomely conception of hybridity is most productive in the settler/indigene context. Framed in terms of ‘unhomeliness’ and ‘unsettlement’, Bhabha’s performative hybridity highlights the disruptions of colonisation and its ultimate failure to re-place the indigenous world with a settler one. Rather, both co-exist in partialised and truncated fashion. Bhabha’s attack on essentialist accounts of cultural identities points theoretically and textually beyond colonising hierarchies of essence and unpacks the ways in which identity is constructed through difference. As Nikos Papastergiadis (2000:170) says,

> [t]he positive feature of hybridity is that it invariably acknowledges that identity is constructed through a negotiation of difference, and that the presence of fissures, gaps and contradictions is not necessarily a sign of failure. In its most radical form, the concept also stresses that identity is not the combination, accumulation, fusion or synthesis of various components, but an energy field of different forces. Hybridity is not confined to a cataloguing of difference. Its ‘unity’ is not found in the sum of its parts, but emerges from the process of opening what Homi Bhabha has called, a ‘third space’, within which other elements encounter and transform each other.

It is in outlining that discursive ‘energy field of different forces’ that Bhabha is at his best.

However, while Bhabha’s critical, performative approach offers a powerful mode of deconstructive analysis, it is lacking as a prescription for an alternative form of cross-
cultural relation between coloniser and colonised. While Bhabha invokes the image of cross-cultural solidarity, it is difficult to see how solidarity might arise from this theory of identity. His theorisation of ‘a radical heterogeneity, discontinuity, the permanent revolution of forms’ (Young, 1995:25), takes discursive resistance to its limits, but offers little insight into a ‘positive’ alternative mode of interaction. In this regard, Bhabha’s discursive focus is relevant. He has been criticised for limiting his analysis to the workings of colonial discourse and consequently ignoring the very real material impacts of colonisation (see for example, Parry, 1994b:11; Rose, 1995:371-2). While this is true of Bhabha’s work (and also mine in this thesis), I agree with Young (1995:163) that this criticism involves ‘a form of category mistake’. 86 Both discursive and material analyses are valid and can complement each other. However, what Bhabha’s discursive orientation does mean is a focus on the relations between self and discourse, rather than self and other. In this sense, for all his desire to replace the conception of ‘culture as epistemology’ for one of ‘culture as enunciation’ (Bhabha, 1994:177), Bhabha’s work continues to operate on the epistemological terrain. His theory of enunciative/performative hybridity refers to the repetition/iteration of epistemology as a strategy of ‘unsettlement’ but does not shift from the realm of epistemology per se. Further, discourse for Bhabha is always a site of power to be resisted. Given both the focus on the relation between the self and discourse and the emphasis on resistance as the mode of that relation, it is difficult to discern how a non-colonial, solidaristic relation might be formed.

In sum, Bhabha’s rejection of essentialism extends to a rejection of all ‘positivity’ or ‘substance’ in identity claims. 87 As Gillian Rose (1995:371) says, ‘[t]his is politics as

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86 ‘The investigation of the discursive construction of colonialism does not seek to replace or exclude other forms of analysis, whether they be historical, geographical, economic, military or political ... the contribution of colonial-discourse analysis is that it provides a significant framework for that other work by emphasizing that all perspectives on colonialism share and have to deal with a common discursive medium which was also that of colonialism itself: the language used to enact, enforce, describe or analyse colonialism is not transparent, innocent, ahistorical or simply instrumental. Colonial-discourse analysis can therefore ... emphasize the ways in which colonialism involved not just a military or economic activity, but permeated forms of knowledge, which, if unchallenged, may continue to be the very ones through which we try to understand colonialism itself’ (Young, 1995:163).

87 As Norris (1993:24, cited in Parry, 1994b:14) argues, his processual orientation leaves no room for the ‘stubborn facticity’ of difference. In this sense, his theory threatens to collapse into
process, as performance, committed to no essential thing, no pregiven object, no absolute cause but the pursuit of displacement’. As a critical intervention into hegemonic politics, this may work as a powerful strategy to undermine dominant authority. It is in this sense that it can serve both Maori and Pakeha post-colonial critics. However, while performative hybridity is compatible with the post-colonising Pakeha project of disrupting settlement and ‘put[ting] by the project of self-collection’ (Lamb, 1986:357), as discussed above, it serves Maori post-colonising projects less well. The prohibition on positivity allows for no ‘settled’ relation to place and no continuist relation to history. For Maori, as indigenes, performative hybridity seems to continue the disruption of colonisation, rather than represent a constructive response to it. Ultimately, given Bhabha’s focus on the structures of colonial discourse and subjectivities, his argument doesn’t move beyond the bounds of colonial discourse. Rather than offer a way out, the major value of his work lies in showing colonialism’s discursive limits.

incoherence, in that, it is the differences of coloniser and colonised, like the differences of iteration and reiteration, that account for the ‘between’, or the disjunctions, of the hybrid moment. Arguably, despite his radical indeterminacy, substance, the content of difference, slips back in.
Finally, without some sense of substantive identity/difference there seems no basis for cultural politics at all. While Bhabha deconstructs discourse, we continue even so to speak, to construct, to represent ourselves and others in discourse. As Spivak (1990:109, 1996:6) argues, the pursuit of a political programme depends on the representation of identities, rather than their deconstruction. These processes of representation and, more importantly, the intersubjective relations they mediate, cannot be ignored or viewed purely in terms of domination and resistance. For Maori in particular, a basis for identity politics is crucial. The discussion of this thesis to this point leaves Maori in a ‘Catch-22’ situation, in which all of the theories of identity discussed so far have the potential to be complicit with colonialism. A final avenue that remains to be explored in the theorisation of identity is that espoused by Spivak, the strategic deployment of essentialist claims, an argument to which I now turn.
Chapter Five

Strategic essentialism
and indigenous difference

There is something disturbing about the self-confidence of some white academics who have assumed the role of offering critical advice to Aborigines about what sort of identity they should be producing (Lattas, 1993:244).

[Indigenous spirituality] is one of the few parts of ourselves which the West cannot decipher, cannot understand and cannot control ... yet (Smith, 1999:74).

Introduction

The issue of strategic essentialism brings the discussion of theories of identity back to the ‘substance’ of identity claims, completing the ‘hybridity cycle’ (Stross, 1999). It is important to note however, that, in keeping with Stross’ argument, this completion of the theoretical ‘cycle’ between essentialism and hybridity is not a ‘return’ as such. Rather, Stross’ conception holds that each turn of the cycle represents the development of something new. Hence, in this chapter the theoretical ‘return’ to essentialism is to a new understanding of this concept. Strategic essentialism appears on the academic horizon as a qualified acceptance of the need for substantive identity claims, within a context which is theoretically anti-essentialist. This context is set, in the first instance, by the constructionist analyses of representation as constitutive, rather than a mimetic reflection of an already existing reality. In the second instance, postmodernist analyses have pointed to the violence involved in practices of representation, which inevitably
reduce and exclude and hence involve forms of domination. Thus, ‘essentialism’ within the conceptualisation of strategic essentialism refers to what, in Chapter Two, I termed reductionism.

The rise of constructionism and anti-essentialism, Stuart Hall argues, has ushered in a new phase of concern with the politics of representational strategies, which impacts on Black (and I would add, indigenous) representations of culture and identity, marking ‘what I can only call “the end of innocence”, or the end of the innocent notion of the essential black subject’ (Hall, 1996b:443). As such, the encounter with anti-essentialism is ‘dangerous’ to Black politics (ibid), a danger stemming from anti-essentialism’s threat to the acceptability of any ‘ground’ for identity construction. Arguments for the strategic use of (theoretically incorrect) essentialisms have been developed to accommodate the continuing use of identity strategies in the politics of subordinated groups.

The subject of this chapter is the encounter between this theoretical anti-essentialism and its espousal of strategic essentialism and assertions of an ‘essential’ difference as the basis of Maori identity. The politics of Pakeha identity claims do not appear in this discussion. In the following section, I present Spivak’s argument for strategic essentialism and point to its limitations in accounting for the identity claims made in indigenous politics. As a deconstructionist, Spivak does not address the political role that might be played by alternative, indigenous epistemologies. Rather, she is concerned only with the strategic construction of the subaltern as a political agent. The subsequent section looks at the impact of the anti-essentialist approach in comparison with assertions of a dynamic indigenous ‘essence’. This is followed by an exploration of the claims made for this autonomous Maori ‘essence’ and a brief argument in favour of a minimalist essence in the form of a requirement for descent in claiming an indigenous identity. Overall, I argue that Maori invoke a dynamic, rather than static, cultural ‘essence’ as the basis for their claims to autonomous difference and that this ‘substantive’ difference is crucial to their assertion of full human agency. As such, the claim to Maori autonomous difference, I argue, represents a first step towards shifting Maori and Pakeha relations ‘beyond’ colonialism. That ‘beyond’ must be a site of
epistemological pluralism, in which indigenous epistemologies are accepted as equally valid as those of the West.

**Strategic essentialism, deconstruction and indigenous epistemologies**

Spivak, unlike Bhabha, is highly suspicious of the celebration of hybridity. For Spivak, hybridisation is always a process of domination. As cultural hybridity is instantiated in the colonial encounter, it thus signifies the end of an aboriginal ‘dominant’ and the entry into modernity (Spivak, 1999:26-9, nt32). Hybridity in the present continues the domination of the colonial past. In the contemporary order, Spivak (1999:318-9, nt10, see also 361, 399) associates hybridity with a celebration of global cultural diversity/multiculturalism, itself ‘the benign rusing face’ of the dominance of American/global capital.

While Spivak is one of the foremost postcolonial deconstructionists, she differs from Bhabha once again in acknowledging that ‘deconstruction cannot found a political program of any kind. Yet in its suggestion that masterwords like “the worker” or “the woman” have no literal referents, deconstruction is a political safeguard’ (Spivak, 1996:6). For Spivak, such anti-essentialist critique is the role of deconstruction in a world where we cannot avoid essentialising:

> Deconstruction does not say there is no subject, there is no truth, there is no history. It simply questions the privileging of identity so that someone is believed to have the truth. It is not the exposure of error. It is constantly and persistently looking into how truths are produced. That’s why deconstruction doesn’t say logocentrism is a pathology, or metaphysical enclosures are something you can escape. Deconstruction, if one wants a formula, is, among other things, a persistent critique of what one cannot not want (Spivak, 1996:27-8).

The anti-essentialism of deconstruction sits alongside the need to continue to use essence, because without essence there can be no politics: ‘There is no Vertretung without Darstellung’ (Landry and MacLean, 1996:6; also see Spivak, 1990:108-9). In other words, there can be no political representation (Vertretung) without the discursive
representations (*Darstellung*) that (incorrectly) claim essence - ‘the worker’, ‘the woman’, or ‘the colonised’. Essentialism is then ‘a strategy for our times’ (Spivak, 1987:207), necessary to the pursuit of resistant and deconstructive politics.

Spivak’s discussions of the strategic uses of essentialism centre on the political aspect of representation. She is concerned with the construction of a subaltern *agency* through strategic recourse to the humanist subject (see Spivak, 1987:197-221). In this chapter, I am also interested in the ‘substance’ of discursive identity construction, utilised in the assertion of colonised agency, that is, in the practice of *Darstellung* as well as *Vertretung*. Spivak’s deconstructive orientation means she does not address the role of knowledge production in the politics of oppressed peoples. Rather, she is concerned with politics in the service of the deconstruction of dominating systems of knowledge. In contrast, here I will address the role of indigenous epistemologies (in other words, the ‘facticity’ of indigenous difference or the persistence of what was the ‘Aboriginal dominant’) as central to the construction of Maori agency.

For Spivak, the ‘good’ use of essentialism can only be in the pursuit of a deconstructive project, a political project whose aim is to overcome the very terms it invokes. 88 She gives the example of Marx’s invocation of class consciousness to fight capital in the ultimate interest of overcoming class altogether:

> Class-consciousness on the *descriptive* level is itself a strategic and artificial rallying awareness which, on the *transformative* level, seeks to destroy the mechanics which come to construct the outlines of the very class of which a collective consciousness has been situationally developed (Spivak, 1987:205).

And, as Samira Kawash summarises her position in relation to the strategic deployment of the humanist subject,

> [t]he strategic use that Spivak describes is not the positing of an essential subaltern identity that would explicitly stand in opposition to a dominant identity but rather the strategic recourse to an idea of the subaltern subject *that is irreducibly and unavoidably essentializing* precisely in order to critique the

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88 The argument that essentialism can be used ‘as part of a “good” strategy as well as a “bad” strategy’ (Spivak, 1990:109) is central to Spivak’s espousal of strategic essentialism.
notion of the humanist (and essentialist) notion of the subject that constitutively excludes the subaltern (Kawash, 1997:32).

As with Bhabha, the result remains more a resistant, rather than a constructive or positive, sense of agency. Agency, in Spivak’s accounts of strategic essentialism, is linked to the deconstruction of systems of domination. Since all epistemological and political systems involve domination, the deconstructionist focus cannot encompass an interest in replacing one system with another. There are problems for indigenous politics with this omission, however. The suggestion that a ‘good’ politics seeks to deconstruct the very terms it invokes, would mean that Maori, for instance, in invoking ‘Maori’ identity to combat colonialism, should seek a ‘post-Maori’ political environment in their pursuit of post-colonialism. But, as we have seen, the elimination of Maori difference would signal the success, rather than defeat, of the colonial project of assimilation. In contrast, indigenous politics, in resisting assimilation, involves both resistance to colonialism and the assertion of an autonomous indigenous difference, or the ongoing existence of indigenous epistemologies from the era of the ‘Aboriginal dominant’. While, as noted at the beginning of this section, the aboriginal ceased to be dominant with the colonising entry to modernity, Smith (1999:97) notes that it continues to exist in fragments. Hence a crucial part of the indigenous project is not only the destruction of colonialism but the ‘recovery’ of those fragments of indigenous epistemologies. It is important to note that what might then count as post-colonial ‘Maori’ would not be synonymous with the ‘Maori’ of colonial discourse. While colonialism involves the construction of Maori identity in terms of a primitivised and racialised difference, it seeks to destroy the autonomous cultural differences and distinct epistemologies of the colonised world.

Hence, Spivak’s support for the use of essentialism in a deconstructionist project does not translate exactly to the situation of indigenous identity politics. Leonie Pihama illustrates this point in relation to her Maori identity:

[W]ould I be a post Maori in a post colonial era? The answer is, very definitely - no. However, the reasons for that are complex indeed. The term Maori is one that was utilised by early colonists as a way of collectivising what was clearly a tribally based society. John Rangihau proposed that it was a means to unite and rule. It instigated a process of assimilation that
was aimed at the loss of *iwi* stories and traditions within which identity was couched. The term Maori therefore, originated in colonial discourse, which over the past 150 or so years has shifted in the ways it has been used. Contemporary identification as Maori can be read as a means of providing unification in light of what may be perceived as having a common oppressor, it can be read as a means of finding strength in numbers in a struggle for the survival of cultural frameworks, it can also be read in terms of genealogical connections. A Maori woman from a different *iwi* to myself once said to me, “We’re whanau” to which I, in typical *iwi*-centric fashion stated “but I’m not Ngati Porou” to which she answered, “is Papatuanuku your mother?” In this sense I will remain very much a Maori in both a colonised and decolonised Aotearoa (Pihama, 1993:35).

While Pihama acknowledges the problematic homogenising and hence colonial histories of Maori identity, she also understands that the flipside of this homogenisation is the construction of a Maori unity based on both the experience of, and struggle against, colonial oppression and on shared pre-colonial cultural frameworks. Thus, while her project is deconstructive in the sense of seeking to deconstruct and overcome the ongoing impact of colonisation on contemporary Maori, the success of this project depends on the survival of an autonomous Maori *difference* into the post-colonial era.

To put this in more abstract terms, if agency lies in being a producer of epistemology (being in a subject rather than object relation to knowledge), then a *positive* agency, one that does more than simply resist, must involve the production of *different* knowledges. More concretely, the discourses of primitivism and racism utilised in colonial domination, construct Maori in terms that deny them full human agency. It seems logical then that part of the struggle to claim agency involves the ability to construct different/autonomous knowledges. The alternative to this is that the agency of the people in struggle remains limited to operations ‘on’ colonial discourse itself or Western discourses more generally (e.g. humanism). This view reduces indigenous agency once again to resistance only. In the next section I investigate the difference between conceptualisations of indigenous agency in terms of resistance and indigenous agency in terms of autonomous difference.

**Anti-essentialism and autonomous difference**

The problems of the conceptualisation of agency simply as resistance are apparent in
Anne Maxwell’s (1994) critique of Ngahuia Te Awekotuku’s essays on ‘Makereti Papakura’, or ‘Guide Maggie’. Makereti was a tourist guide in Rotorua in the late 1800s and early 1900s. She later moved to England and, while a student at Oxford, wrote an ethnography, *The Old Time Maori* (1938), recounting the traditional Maori way of life of her own childhood and as taught to her by her grandparents and other Te Arawa elders. Te Awekotuku recounts how Makereti performed/mimicked indigenous authenticity in her role as tourist guide. For example,

[the tour party] paused by the bubbling, gentle fountains of the dainty geyser, Papakura ... Hearing their guide’s name was Maggie - and even more incongruous (to them), Thom - they demanded that she tell them her “real” name, her “native” name, surely she had one. Unabashed, she contemplated the energetic little spring, and replied, “My name is Papakura. Maggie Papakura.” And so the story goes - she renamed herself; and gradually renamed her family (Te Awekotuku, 1986:vi).

Maxwell outlines Te Awekotuku’s own project as a reframing of Makereti’s assumption of authentic indigenous identity, from an act of compliance with colonial discourse, to one of resistance to ‘the appropriative gaze of the West’ (Maxwell, 1994:323). Further, Maxwell argues that Te Awekotuku claims to represent the ‘true’ Makereti in her account (Maxwell, 1994:322), a claim motivated by her own strategic political interest in making visible the role of Maori women in the historical struggle against colonialism and thus ‘gendering Maori nationalism’ (Maxwell, 1994:325). In this sense, Te Awakotuku’s strategy is compatible with Spivak’s (1987:197-221) analysis of the strategic use of essentialism to recover a subaltern agency. Te Awekotuku creates or claims an essential Makereti as a double political strategy, both against Pakeha domination and against the domination of Maori political struggles by Maori men.

89 ‘We are told so much about the activities of the Young Maori Party and men such as Pomare, Buck, and Ngata. They are forever described as well-meaning, earnest, philanthropic Maori men with a vision. Maggie is portrayed only as someone with a beautiful face and a glittering personality. Where is the equity in that? Whom can we as Maori women look back to, when we are shown one image of ourselves and men are shown another of themselves?’ (Te Awekotuku, 1991:148).
Despite her sympathy with Te Awekotuku’s politics, Maxwell is critical of her claim to represent the ‘truth’ of Makereti. In contrast, her own account of Makereti’s agency registers its ambiguity, at once seemingly complicit with colonialism and resistant to it but, either way, operating on its terms, her resistance an act of ‘reversing’ the political operations of colonial discourse. Although early in her paper Maxwell asserts, ‘[i]t is my premise that, far from being powerless victims, some indigenous women have been able to use their position within colonialist discourses to preserve the different cultural values of their own native communities’ (Maxwell, 1994:319, emphasis added), there is no evidence in the remainder of her paper of the political force of these ‘different cultural values’. She concludes that

[a]s a Pakeha feminist concerned with disrupting the way women’s views generally have been left out of dominant accounts of the New Zealand nation, I am interested in Te Awekotuku’s effort to improve the position of Maori women within their own communities by emphasizing the political dimension of their involvement in tourism over and above the sexual dimension. I find in her account of the tourist guide evidence of the indigenous woman’s agency. But where her strategy has been to present a narrative that uncovers the true or authentic thoughts of the Maori women who worked in the industry, mine is to show that these women’s subjectivities can only ever emerge from historical analysis as contested sites of the competing discourses of colonialists, Maori nationalists and indigenous feminists. According to this view, Te Awekotuku’s account has no more claim to truth status than the colonialist and nationalist accounts that preceded it (Maxwell, 1994:325).

Te Awekotuku certainly does use the language of truth and authenticity and indulges in romantic idealisation of Makereti’s Maori identity, but these are the tools of cultural politics. If Pakeha nationalists can use them, Maori nationalists can hardly be denied

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90 ‘I think we can bring her back to life as she truly was, as she truly felt, as she talked, as she wrote’ (Te Awekotuku, 1991:153-4).

91 For example, in describing Makereti’s burial place in England, Te Awekotuku (1991:154) states, in an argument we cannot be sure is her own or Makereti’s, that ‘[i]ntriguingly, it was a church that for many centuries before the arrival of Christianity had become a tribal focus for the Celtic goddess activity of the region and it was at that place she claimed that she felt most at home. The Mauri was there.’
them. The fact of epistemological contestation in understanding Makereti is not, in itself, an argument against Te Awekotuku’s account.

Maxwell’s own position

has been determined by the view that the Pakeha feminist’s attributing of authentic identity to the colonized serves to preserve her own privilege. Not only does it deny the damage that was done to Maori women in the historical phase of colonialism, but it denies the colonialism of the present. As long as Maori women suffer social injustices whose origins can be traced to the advent of European imperialism, then it behoves the Pakeha feminist to dismantle subjectivity. On the other hand, the critique of subjectivity should not be used as an excuse to ignore the views of Maori women (Maxwell, 1994:325-6).

While she does not ignore Te Awekotuku’s view, its juxtaposition alongside her own account of indigenous women’s subjectivity works to conflate their political projects. Both seek to ‘deconstruct’ colonialism, but Maxwell fails to acknowledge that this goal requires different political projects on the part of Maori and Pakeha. In her own work Maxwell is not engaged in deconstructing Pakeha women’s subjectivity, but Maori women’s subjectivity. Her message is that the deconstruction of subjectivity is universally ‘correct’.

In her critique of Te Awekotuku’s claim to truth, Maxwell ignores the complexity of Te Awekotuku’s Makereti. She does note that the Makereti of Te Awekotuku’s account is ‘politically tireless’ (Maxwell,1994:322-3), including in asserting the place of Maori women in her ethnographic account of traditional Maori life, but this does not register in her argument. Effectively, in Te Awekotuku’s account, there are two, intertwining aspects to Makereti’s agency. Makereti is seen to engage in essentialism as reverse discourse, performing the desired indigenous authenticity, using it to her own and her people’s advantage - making a living, then securing recognition in the Pakeha world and using that position to then write her own account of Maori culture, correcting the “outrageous untruths” of “ignorant” [European] writers’ (Te Awekotuku, 1986:ix). In addition to her utilisation of a primitivist authenticity, Makereti is shown, firstly, as an active agent whose own life is one of Maori/Pakeha hybridisation and, secondly, as
drawing on autonomous Maori sources in writing her ethnography. She uses the difference/distance established by the colonial desire for a distinct and pure indigenous authenticity to protect an autonomous space in which Maori epistemologies can be developed. However, within that space Maori difference does not remain reducible to the characterisations of colonial fantasy. Finally, in addition to the image of Makereti’s dynamism and hybridity, Te Awekotuku says of contemporary Maori difference, ‘we are living at a time, now, where we are having to determine and define exactly what tradition is, retrospectively’ (Te Awekotuku, 1991:144). This is not an image of unadulterated and static originality.

Effectively, Maxwell’s anti-essentialist orientation means she only registers the play of indigenous agency in terms of resistance to domination, but cannot register the workings of indigenous agency as recovery. Thus, Maxwell exposes herself to some of the criticisms of anti-essentialist analyses. Benita Parry (1994a:177) for one, argues that the critique of nativist essentialism relies on a binarism of its own ‘where the coloniser is dynamic donor and the colonised is docile recipient’. In brief, the argument of reverse discourse assumes a singular (Western) epistemological terrain. The possibility of autonomous non-Western epistemologies is discounted, or at best ignored, and the resistant indigene reduced to purely operating on the terrain that has been imposed upon them. This critique parallels the criticism made of Bhabha for only being able to account for agency in terms of resistance. Andrew Lattas (1993), similarly, argues against the ‘Aboriginality-as-resistance’ model of indigenous identity, in favour of ‘Aboriginality-as-persistence’. Lattas argues that to deny Aboriginal Australians an autonomous otherness is to continue the colonial denial of Aboriginal agency:

The demand that Aborigines produce their popular consciousness along the lines of a social theory of identity is a request that they become conscious of themselves as purely relational identities; they are to be resisters without producing an essence for themselves. They are to situate themselves in opposition to Whites without fetishising themselves. They are to become a pure system of difference, an oppositional form that does not stabilise itself except through the subversion of the other. There is no positivity and content to this form of Aboriginality, it is a relationship of opposition responding to the terms
This is an important criticism of anti-essentialism, which highlights the way in which the genealogical tracing of native essentialism back to Western sources, such as I carried out in Chapter Two, works to universalise Western discourse while failing to recognise any autonomous indigenous difference. In other words, if indigenous essence is shown to be derivative of the West, the West remains the universal, its own claims to essence intact: ‘If resistance to the West is another move in the inventory of the West, the West can have no limits’ (Sayyid, 2000:263). Sayyid argues that this ‘logic of mirroring’ denies the unequal power relations between the dominant West and subordinate other, replacing them with a formal symmetry. S/he summarises the effects of this logic as follows:

First, it constructs the subordinate subject as an inversion of the dominant subject position. This obscures the possibility of any autonomy of the subordinate. The subaltern exists only as an effect of the hegemonic discourse ... the status of subalternity exhausts the subjectivity of the subordinated subject. Second, it erases the dimension of power from any relationship. A relationship of power is a relationship of unevenness. Symmetry, obviously, denies hierarchy or oppression. The logic of mirroring is based on the assumption that ... those who resist the hegemonic can do so only in the terms of that hegemony (Sayyid, 2000:263).

Makereti and Te Awekotuku are not unusual among Maori in combining the strategies of essentialism as reverse discourse and essentialism as autonomous difference. As Hauraki Greenland’s analysis of the development of Maori identity politics in the 1960s and 1970s suggests, the utilisation of reverse discourse involved the stereotyping of Pakeha as morally lacking (Greenland, 1984:89) and as ‘hedonistic, aggressive and materialist’ (Greenland, 1984:92). This operation of ‘reverse stereotyping’ provides insights into the limitations of reverse discourse as a basis for progressive cross-cultural relations. However, as has been discussed, it marked out a discursive space of Pakeha exclusion within which Maori ‘regeneration through autonomy’ (Greenland, 1984:96) could take place. Simultaneously then, Maori unity was also constructed on the basis of
both pre-colonial cultural sources and the shared experience of colonisation (Greenland, 1984:89).

Linda Tuhiwai Smith (1999:73) acknowledges the idealisation involved in assertions of indigenous cultural authenticity, but argues that they remain politically crucial. Her own description of this cultural authenticity combines assertions of autonomy and difference, continuity and change:

[I]t does appeal to an idealised past when there was no colonizer, to our strength in surviving thus far, to our language as an uninterrupted link to our histories, to the ownership of our lands, to our abilities to create and control our own life and death, to a sense of balance among ourselves and with the environment, to our authentic selves as a people (Smith, 1999:73).

Smith and other Maori feminists have been integrally involved in the project of cultural regeneration and are clear in their assertion of a distinct and autonomous source/‘essence’ of Maori identity. Smith (1999:74), for instance, talking about indigenous people in general, argues that their conceptions of spirituality, which link them to the physical world, constitute an indigenous essence that is quite distinct from the individualist conceptions of essence within Western thought. As she concludes, these systems of thought stand outside the frame of Western thought, and as such:

are critical sites of resistance for indigenous peoples. The values, attitudes, concepts and language embedded in beliefs about spirituality represent, in many cases, the clearest contrast and mark of difference between indigenous peoples and the West. It is one of the few parts of ourselves which the West cannot decipher, cannot understand and cannot control ... yet (Smith, 1999:74).

Leonie Pihama outlines a dual project of deconstruction of colonial discourses (Pihama, 1994:39-40) and the development of indigenous Kaupapa M_“ori theories which rearticulate ‘many notions that have been a part of Maori epistemologies over thousands of years’ (Pihama, 1994:37). Patricia Johnson and Pihama (1995) also set out a framework for autonomous Maori difference. Johnson and Pihama distinguish between what, in Pakeha terms, ‘counts as difference’ and ‘what differences count’ for them as Maori women. For Pakeha, they argue, what has counted as Maori difference has been
only those things, culture and biology, that distinguish the two peoples and that have been used in the service of Pakeha domination (Johnson and Pihama, 1995:80). For them as Maori women however, the differences that count are the inequalities in power between Maori and Pakeha and the ‘particular underlying essences’ of Maori identity - *mana whenua*, *mana wairua*, *whakapapa* and *mana t_ngata* - which express the webs of relationships to land, spirituality and people, within which Maori individuals stand (Johnson and Pihama, 1995:84-5).

The strategic deployment of essentialised authenticity as reverse discourse is a powerful and important strategy of resistance but, on its own, not enough to ground a positive political project of cultural survival and recovery. That project requires the combination of the workings of reverse discourse with the assertion of an autonomous cultural source. In the next section I investigate the conception of that autonomous cultural source within contemporary Maori assertions of identity, in relation to the essentialist problematics of purity and stasis on the one hand and hybridity and dynamism on the other.

**Cultural autonomy and indigenous persistence**

Stuart Hall (1990:223) acknowledges the significance of essentialist invocations of ‘one shared culture’ and ‘stable, unchanging and continuous frames of reference and meaning’ in unifying post-colonial resistance. He refers, in particular, to the espousal of *négritude* on the part of early twentieth-century Black poets, such as Aimée Cesaire and Leopold Senghor, and in the work of Frantz Fanon. In citing Fanon (1963:170, in Hall, 1990:223) on the ‘passionate research ... directed by the secret hope of discovering ... some very beautiful era whose existence rehabilitates us’, Hall points to the question this research project raises:

Is it only a matter of unearthing that which the colonial experience buried and overlaid, bringing to light the hidden continuities it suppressed? Or is a quite different practice entailed - not the rediscovery but the *production* of identity. Not an identity grounded in the archaeology, but in the *re-telling* of the past? (Hall, 1990:224).
Hall’s own position is to take the constructionist approach. In terms of Black identities, he (1990:231) argues, Africa in any original sense ‘is no longer there. It too has been transformed. History, is in that sense, irreversible’. To take the archaeological position is to ‘collude with the West which, precisely, normalises and appropriates Africa by freezing it into some timeless zone of the primitive, unchanging past’ (ibid). Further, as discussed in Chapter Four, a constructionist approach to identity registers the break of colonisation. Only such a view, with its emphasis on ‘becoming as well as being’, can acknowledge the ‘ruptures and discontinuities’ which themselves constitute the contemporary Caribbean identity (Hall, 1990:225, emphasis added). Thus Hall argues for the importance of both moments of essentialisation of a singular Black identity and moments of awareness of the constructedness and hybridity of Black experience: ‘[T]hey are two phases of the same movement, which constantly overlap and interweave’ (Hall, 1996b:441). Benita Parry also defends ‘nativism’ on the grounds of its unifying power and takes a clear position against the possibility of return to an untouched essence:

I would argue that the task is to address the empowering effects of constructing a coherent identity or of cherishing and defending against calumniation altered and mutable indigenous forms. Which is not the same as the hopeless attempt to locate and revive pristine pre-colonial cultures (Parry, 1994a:179).

Linda Tuhiwai Smith (1999:74) notes the way in which dynamism, diversity and contradiction have been the preserve of the West, a privilege from which the (Western) definition of indigeneity as other has excluded indigenous peoples. Against this discursive incarceration, she and her colleagues assert a dynamic Maori ‘essence’, what in another context Paul Gilroy (1993:101) has termed ‘the changing same’. 92 As Tariq Modood (1998:381-2) also argues, ‘change implies the continuation of something that has undergone change’. 93 In keeping with these understandings, Smith (1999:116) is

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92 I note that Gilroy coined this term to refer to the identity of the Black diaspora. Indigenes, in contrast, as Clifford (2001, p10-11 of 26) notes, have ‘roots’ as well as ‘routes’.

93 Modood likens this to our acceptance of the continuous-ness of a person through a lifetime, or of a language over centuries and argues that ‘in individuating cultures and people, our most basic and helpful guide is not the idea of an essence, but the possibility of making historical connections, of being able to see change and resemblance’ (Modood:1998:382). He acknowledges Wittgenstein as an influence on his thought and says his key point is that ‘one did
clear that the indigenous project of recovery involves the ‘recognition that indigenous cultures have changed inexorably’. Given this recognition, recovery is a ‘selective process’ and also inevitably reactive since indigenous peoples remain subordinated: ‘In reality this means that specific lands and designated areas become a priority because the bulldozers are due to start destruction any day now’ (Smith, 1999:116). Thus, the project of recovery of an indigenous tradition is not the reassertion of a whole and untainted origin, but a process bound by choices made to suit contemporary conditions and within a context of ongoing struggle against colonising constraints. Clea Te Kawehau Hoskins (1997:28) makes the same point when she argues that ‘an “authentic” reconstruction’ is both impossible and undesirable, and that ‘our reconstructive work can draw on the obvious integrity of our value base’, in addition to acknowledging the impact of historical change during the era of colonial contact.

While continuing to use the term ‘essence’, Johnson and Pihama (1995) explain the relational, and hence social and dynamic, nature of the ‘essence’ of Maori identity in contrast to Western accounts of essentialism:

Each of these aspects of tikanga M_ori ... originate from historical and cultural sources that both precede and succeed us. The complexities of such relationships extend into wh_nau, hap_ and iwi, so no single expression is the “one”; all of them may, and do, find a range of expressions. Hence, what may be viewed as an essence in cultural terms does not, in our terms, equate to essentialism. Rather, it expresses the historical and social construction of cultural relationships (Johnson and Pihama, 1995:84-5).

not need an idea of essence in order to believe that some ways of thinking and acting had a coherence; and so the undermining of the ideas of essence did not necessarily damage the assumption of coherence or the actual use of a language [or identity]’ (ibid).
Further, Matahaere-Atariki, despite the major emphasis on deconstruction in her work, also suggests that the key to avoiding the reproduction of colonial versions of Maori identity lies in attention to the historical cultural dynamism exhibited in memories and traditions. She neatly encapsulates her argument by emphasizing the difference between cultural *products* and the *practice* of cultural production: ‘Yet precisely because culture and the traditions they enable are productions rather than product, what we must guarantee for future generations is not the preservation of tradition as unassailable products, but the capacity for cultural productions’ (Matahaere-Atariki, 1997:74). In emphasizing that culture is a matter of active practice, Matahaere-Atariki asserts the need for an autonomous Maori agency to *create*, rather than purely the ability to *conserve*, ‘tradition’ as underpinning Maori cultural survival.

The primary importance of autonomy is asserted throughout the work of these Maori feminists. Johnson and Pihama (1995:86), for example, argue that it is the prerogative of Maori women to define their identities. Central to the achievement of autonomy to do that is a distancing from Pakeha and Pakeha systems of knowledge:

The outcome for M_{ori} women of much theorising about difference is a distancing from P_{keh} feminist discourses. This distancing has enabled us to explore the specificities of our differences, to challenge negative constructions of these differences, and to centre ourselves and reclaim/redefine which differences count ... Although feminist discussions of difference can include M_{ori} women, these discussions cannot account for us. The prerogative of exploring difference, of reclaiming our identities, of becoming visible in positive ways, lies clearly with M_{ori} women themselves (Johnson, 1998:29).

Thus, although these writers all stress the dynamism of Maori cultural difference, this is an autonomous dynamism, depending on distinctly Maori sources which lie outside of the Western systems of Pakeha knowledge.

**Descent as a minimalist essence**

Such a dynamic traditionalism as suggested by Johnson and Pihama’s (1995) account may, however, still be difficult to achieve for some individuals of Maori descent. The
‘underlying essences’ of *mana whenua* and *whakapapa*, depending on how these are interpreted, may work to exclude individuals whose links to tribal origins and *t_rangawaewae* have been lost, as suggested, for example, in Matahaere-Atariki’s references to landless southern Tahu women. While it is the position of, at least some, tribal authorities that all individuals of Maori descent can recover their *whakapapa*,\(^9^4\) in cases in which elders have died, or refuse to pass on the necessary knowledge, this may well be an impossible struggle (see for example, Stewart-Harawira, 1993:33). These difficulties of researching an uncertain or unknown *whakapapa* parallel those of occupying the hybrid Maori/Pakeha position discussed in Chapter Three. In both cases only strong and well-supported individuals will achieve their goal. For the rest, beyond the relational essences listed by Johnson and Pihama (1995), there is a case for a minimally essentialist definition of Maori in terms of descent itself.

A descent-based essentialism, as previously discussed in relation to Ihimaera (1998), is the minimum requirement to creating the distance from Pakeha which allows Maori autonomous development. Margery Fee (1989), in her discussion of Keri Hulme’s status as a Maori writer, argues that the demand for a biological basis to a Maori identity provides a minimal defence against assimilation. Fee writes in response to C.K. Stead’s (1985) attack on Keri Hulme’s achievement of an award for a Maori writer. Stead’s now familiar argument is that Hulme lacks both biological and cultural authenticity as a Maori:

> Of Keri Hulme’s eight great-grandparents one only was Maori. Hulme was not brought up speaking Maori, though like many Pakeha New Zealanders she has acquired some in adult life. She claims to identify with the Maori part of her inheritance - not a disadvantageous identification at the present time - but it seems to me that some essential Maori elements in her novel are unconvincing. Her uses of Maori language and mythology strike me as willed, self-conscious, not inevitable, not entirely authentic (Stead, 1985:103-4).

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\(^{94}\) This argument was made in resistance to the struggle of Urban Maori Authorities (UMAs) to gain a share of the fisheries settlement. The tribal position that everyone can *whakapapa* undermines the basis of UMAs as representatives of Maori who identify with their urban base (whether or not they know their tribal origin).
Fee (1989:11-2) does not reject Stead’s critique outright as ‘anti-Maori’, because she argues that this is too easy and would mean failing to learn from his points. She agrees that the assertion of indigenous identity can be ‘dubious’ both racially and culturally, given the history of colonial appropriation and exploitation of the figure of the indigene (Fee, 1989:12) - to which I would add, given the history of assimilation also. Consequently, Fee (ibid) argues, ‘we must be highly suspicious of the motive behind texts that use indigenous themes and characters’. Unlike Stead however, Fee (1989:16) acknowledges that colonisation itself is responsible for this state of affairs and the partialised nature of Maori identity. Rather than Maori being blamed for their lack of ‘purity’, this historical causation must be remembered. And while indigenous ancestry is no guarantee of a Maori identity or cultural knowledge, descent can at least be ‘measured’ in a way that identification and socialisation cannot. Hence the requirement that an individual claiming to write as an indigene is at least of indigenous descent provides some safeguard against the ‘frequent facile exploitation of indigenous material by White writers’ (Fee, 1989:14-5).

In the context of a colonised minority people such as Maori, it seems that some form of ‘essence’ underpinning and safeguarding collective cultural identity is crucial to survival. The requirement of descent acts as a necessary, if not sufficient, basis for Maori identity claims. Beyond that, ‘tradition’, both pre-contact and colonial in origin, is a crucial source for forms of expression of that identity, an expression in which both contemporary and changing cultural forms are necessary to represent a ‘living’ culture and to guard against primitivist containment.

**Conclusion**

As a theoretical approach, strategic essentialism offers no more definitive solution to the problems of identity construction than do any of the other approaches discussed in earlier chapters. Further, I have argued that the equation of anti-essentialism with anti-substantivism is problematic in undercutting any possible ground for an autonomous politics of difference. As Modood (1998:380) argues, ‘surfing on the waves of deconstruction’ can be taken too far, resulting in a ‘post-self rather than [a] multi-self’.
Certainly, identity claims rely on the articulation of some ‘substance’, some positive content, and the conflation of all such claims as equally essentialist is of little political or analytic assistance. The historicised and constructionist approach to identity espoused by Hall (amongst others) and the Maori feminist academics discussed here, at least avoids the assertion of essence in terms of fixity and purity, allowing for the interweaving of elements of continuity and change. In the case of indigenous peoples, anything less than a dynamic construction of identity that accounts for indigenous ‘persistence’ (Lattas, 1993), or the longue durée of the indigene in Clifford’s (2001, p16 of 23) terms, fails to provide the basis for the agency Western peoples assume for themselves. It is clearly not a matter however of such historicised approaches offering any easy ‘truth’ to the substance of identity claims. This is precisely one of the gains of constructionism over assertions of purity and stasis. The narratives of history are always subject to revision and remain sites of contestation.

Finally, Modood (1998:381) also argues that the deconstructionist approach is based on the wrong kind of anti-essentialism, a sentiment echoed by Sayyid. Sayyid (2000:266-8) distinguishes between a universalist anti-essentialism which, as discussed above, critiques the essentialist claims of ‘others’ as purely derivative of the (universalist) West; and an anti-universalist anti-essentialism which, s/he argues, is necessary to undercut Western hegemony. Simply, only when attacks on one group’s essentialism are combined with a recognition of the ‘facticity’ of difference, or the plurality of epistemologies, can the universalising of the West be avoided. Western epistemologies and values must be seen as one set of particularities among many. This, Sayyid argues, requires taking the logic of multiculturalism seriously:

This logic should not be confused with recent debate regarding “clash of civilizations”. Multiculturalism does not mean simply the recognition that there are many cultures, nor that cultures are inherently locked in mortal combat with each other. Nor should “multicultural” be seen as a post-Holocaust euphemism for “race” or “nation”. The logic of multiculturalism is based on consequences arising out of the decentring of the West, in other words it is not an attempt to close the gap between the West and the centre; rather it is an attempt to explore the possibilities of widening the interval between the West and the idea of centre.
... The cost of making a multicultural move is the abandonment of any investment in the uncontested universality of the western project (Sayyid, 2000:268).

Likewise, Clifford’s (1994:328) evocation of the possibility of ‘recovering non-Western, or not-only-Western, models for cosmopolitan life ... [as] resources for a fraught coexistence’ points in a similar direction.

In sum, the constructionist and historical approach to identity suggested here represents a return to the ‘substance’ of identity claims, with their problems of reductionism as noted in Chapter Two, but not to essentialism per se. I am convinced by the arguments canvassed in this thesis so far, that hold continuity and change, roots and routes, tradition and modernity in tension as the best means of asserting autonomy against domination from others. With this conclusion, my traverse of theories of identity comes to an end. I consider the assertion of a ‘persistent’ Maori identity to be a first step in moving ‘beyond’ colonialism. However, given the relational nature of colonialism, that first step requires a response from Pakeha that can affirm Maori autonomy. The issue of a non-colonial form of relation between Maori and Pakeha remains to be explored. With the aim of centring more directly on issues of relationality per se, in Part II of this thesis I explore theories of intersubjectivity.
Part II

Theories of intersubjectivity

There is still an arrow of time, but it no longer goes from slavery to freedom, it goes from entanglement to more entanglement (Latour, 1998, cited in Bauman, 2001:137).

Part I of this thesis focussed on essentialising and hybridising strategies used to construct Maori and Pakeha identities. While the diachronic image of the ‘hybridity cycle’ captures the trajectory of academic theorising, the everyday theorising and practice of people constructing ‘Maori’ and ‘Pakeha’ points, in contrast, to the simultaneous interweaving of essence and hybridity. All of the strategies discussed in this thesis so far have been identified in contemporary constructions of Maori and Pakeha identities. Thus, rather than following a temporal trajectory from essence, through hybridity and back to essence, practices of identity construction utilise both essentialism and hybridity to serve the requirements of particular contexts and interests.

In the case of Maori and Pakeha identities, these interweavings of essence and hybridity have been shown to bear clear traces of the colonial dynamics of domination and resistance. Pakeha seek to construct ‘authentic’ Maori in terms of a primitivist essence, which is then available to be appropriated to serve Pakeha’s own indigenising identity strategies. That the radical purity of this construction excludes most Maori from being identified as ‘authentic’, allows Pakeha to simultaneously dismiss the dynamism of contemporary Maori identities as the mark of an ‘inauthentic’ hybridity. Both of these
Pakeha strategies of representation of Maori work as practices of domination, either incarcerating or disallowing a specifically Maori subjectivity. Further, the assertion of indigenous Pakeha identity is itself a strategy of domination, and I have argued that the lack of ‘substance’ in assertions of Pakeha identity is linked to the lack of any Pakeha political project beyond domination. Maori, in contrast, do have a clear political project of ‘recovery’ and ‘recentring’ (Smith, 1999:97) from colonialism. I have argued that, in addition to practices of resistance, the assertion of an autonomous Maori cultural difference/‘substance’ is central to that project. This ‘substance’, following the arguments of identity theory, draws on a pre-colonial past, but is not trapped in a static primitivist conception of essence. Rather, the past is a source for ongoing and dynamic constructions of Maori identity which combine tradition and change in the present.

To speak of essentialism and hybridity as ‘strategies’ is, it seems, to point to the inherently political nature of practices of identity construction. In Part I of this thesis, both essentialism and hybridity have been shown to be useful to a range of dominating, resistant and autonomous identity projects. Neither essentialism nor hybridity, despite the rhetoric of authenticity, has a monopoly on morality and neither offers a clear path ‘beyond’ colonial dynamics. Arguably, assertions of an autonomous Maori difference do ‘escape’ the colonial relation in their turn to the pre-colonial past. While these assertions are themselves motivated and shaped by the need to respond to the oppressions of colonialism, they offer the most encouraging signs as to what is required to move ‘beyond’ the dynamics of the colonial relation, in that they point to a positive, non-colonial Maori identity. They represent a beginning, but not the complete blueprint, for a move beyond colonialism. If colonialism is a relation, as stated at the outset of this thesis, movement ‘beyond’ it must require a ‘changed’ relation. In other words, Maori cannot achieve the status of ‘post-colonial’ alone. This achievement requires a response from Pakeha; a response which shifts relations with Maori from those of domination and denial to a relational mode that affirms Maori autonomous personhood.

Part I of this thesis has provided insights into the ways the relational dynamics of domination and resistance are played out in the construction of Maori and Pakeha identities. To begin a shift in focus to relationality per se, in search of non-dominating
modes of interaction, I want to briefly recap what else we have learnt so far of Maori-Pakeha relationality. Other significant issues of relationality that have been touched on in Part I are, firstly, the desire of both Maori and Pakeha for there to be no relation and, secondly, Bhabha’s assertion of the possibilities of solidaristic relations across cultural difference.

Each of the chapters of this thesis so far has pinpointed a dynamic of distancing or ‘non-relationality’ between Maori and Pakeha. Distance has been shown to serve forms of domination in that the maintenance of spatial distance is required to maintain the primitivist image of Maori traditionalism, which itself supports a Pakeha fantasy that colonisation did no harm. On the other hand, distance has also been shown to serve Maori resistance to assimilation and the creation of a space of cultural autonomy. 

Lawson (1995:27) argues that the settler desire for, and disavowal of, indigeneity means it ‘must be approached but never touched ... produc[ing] in the settler an anxiety of proximity’. Matahaere-Atariki (1997:55) likewise talks of the assertion of authentic Maori identity securing a ‘longed for “non-encounter”’ between Maori women and White feminists; a longing she ascribes to both Maori and Pakeha. Against these bifurcatory desires, both Lawson and Matahaere-Atariki want to bring indigene and settler into relation with each other. Lawson (1995:20) argues for a settler confrontation with ‘the entangled agency of [their] history ... with that of the displaced Native/colonized subject’, while Matahaere-Atariki (1997:55) calls on Maori women to engage with White women to challenge them to this confrontation. Also standing against this desire for ‘non-relation’, are the very real ‘entanglements’ of Maori and Pakeha shared histories and daily interactions in collective and individual contemporary life, which fail to sediment into any expression of cultural relation.

95 She links this desire to Pakeha interests as follows: ‘Strategies in feminist theory that support native women’s desire for a “place of our own” inevitably maintain status quo politics and ultimately relieve the stress that our difference suggests. The cloak of sanctity that smothers Maori women’s voice in feminist texts here in New Zealand will never provide Maori women with the emancipation we seek. Instead it permits non-Maori women to avoid the necessity of an “encounter” that even today is being denied’ (Matahaere-Atariki, 1997:87).
The tension between Maori-Pakeha relationality and non-relationality is evidenced in the structure of biculturalism. While biculturalism is superficially an expression of an equal Maori-Pakeha relation, its reality suggests otherwise. In practice, biculturalism is a lopsided structure of Maori-Pakeha separation, in which Pakeha remain the ‘silent centre’ (MacLean, 1996). A biculturalism that met Sayyid’s prescription for multiculturalism would, in contrast, ‘decentre’ Pakeha. This argument suggests that the ‘decentring’ of Pakeha is a further necessary step to reconstructing the Maori-Pakeha relation. What that might entail and how it might be achieved remain unclear at this point.

The suggestion of the need to ‘decentre’ Pakeha raises again the place of Bhabha’s deconstructive theory of hybridity and his assertion of the possibilities of solidarity. It is clearly Pakeha, as the dominating subjects in the indigene-settler relation, whose identity assertions require deconstruction to expose the practices of domination. Further, the notion of ‘decentring’ Pakeha calls to mind Bhabha’s argument that the alienation of the self is necessary to the construction of ‘forms of solidarity’ (Bhabha, 1990b:213). In this regard Bhabha hints at a link between decentring and new possibilities for social relations. These suggestive comments from Bhabha are left largely undeveloped. We can be sure that, given his distrust of ‘culture as epistemology’ and of substantive accounts of identity, his vision is not of the ‘conventional solidarity’ (Dean, 1996:18-9) of a community of shared interests built around narratives of shared tradition and values. Bhabha talks of ‘solidarity between ethnicities that meet in the tryst of colonial history’ and of an ‘“interstitial” community’ (Bhabha, 1994:231). Although he offers little guidance as to how the experience of unsettlement and unhomeliness might lead to this new and non-conventional solidarity, it is clear that he is referring to a relation across difference, rather than to a community of shared tradition.

Each of these issues - the need for a Pakeha response to Maori assertions of autonomous difference, the need for both peoples to accept the relational interdependence which is their inheritance from colonialism, the possibility of ‘decentring’ Pakeha, and the possibility held out by Bhabha for cross-cultural solidarity - points to the need to give attention to alternative bases for the Maori-Pakeha relation than those established by
colonialism. The focus on identity theory in Part I meant a focus purely on assertions of identity. No other aspect of relational dynamics and interaction is encompassed within its frame. To shift attention more directly onto relationships between self and other, in Part II of this thesis, I turn to theories of intersubjectivity. This focus brings two closely related themes to the fore. In the first instance, intersubjective theories highlight the crucial role of social relations in processes of identity construction. Identities are seen as constituted through social relations, rather than as having an a priori existence. As such, this type of theorising offers a decisive break with essentialist accounts, while still focussing on the construction rather than deconstruction of identities. Secondly, intersubjective theories foreground relations between self and other. A range of possible self/other relations are outlined and evaluated by theorists of intersubjectivity. Taken together, these emphases in intersubjective theorising highlight the interdependence or mutual constitutiveness of self-identity and the relation with others. Who we are depends intrinsically on who our others are, how we represent and relate to them and how they represent and relate to us. These two themes of the social, inter-subjective constitution of identities, and the possible relationships between self and other, are the themes of the following chapters.

As is clear from Part I of this thesis, epistemological relations constitute a major mode of intersubjective interaction. The operations of epistemology continue to figure in this part of the thesis as I explore the intersubjective grounds for an epistemological pluralism that can accommodate Maori difference. This focus is complemented, and ultimately replaced, by attention to ethical relations as another crucial mode of intersubjectivity. Very broadly at this point, ethics can be defined as:

the arena in which the claims of otherness - the moral law, the human other, cultural norms, the Good-in-itself, etc - are articulated and negotiated. In the domain of ethics, “selfish” or “narrow” considerations are subjected to cancellation, negation, crossing by principles represented as “deeper”, “higher”, or “more fundamental” (Harpham, 1995:395).

In contrast to Part I of this thesis, each of the following chapters will draw repeatedly on three particular cases of Maori-Pakeha interaction and discussion. One of these is the
reporting and analysis of a pedagogical experiment in a university classroom (Jones, 1999, 2001), in which Pakeha and Maori feminist educators, Alison Jones and Kuni Jenkins, split their undergraduate class into two ethnically-based streams, one of Maori and Pacific Island students, one of largely Pakeha and a number of other ethnicities. Jones and Jenkins’ pedagogical experiment allows for further, intersubjective, exploration of Maori moves to achieve distance from Pakeha. The other two, in contrast, involve calls for Pakeha engagement with Maori. These two are, firstly, a prolonged debate that took place over the final four months of 2000 in response to a speech given by a Government Minister, the Hon. Tariana Turia, and secondly, a discussion which followed a speech by Joris de Bres, the Race Relations Commissioner, in December 2002.

Each of these three instances offers extended tracts of discourse for analysis. Such prolonged bodies of discussion are essential for the exploration of intersubjective theories that focus on the dynamics and effects of interaction. Thus the repeated reference to the same three instances of cross-cultural interaction and speech allows the development of a more detailed analysis of different modes of intersubjective relation, their implications for the constitution of identities and their possibilities for moving ‘beyond’ colonial relations.

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96 Jones (1999:301, nt8) reported there were 19 self-identified ethnicities amongst this group. While these ranged from Iranian to Japanese to Irish, the majority were White New Zealanders, although few used Pakeha to describe themselves. Her discussions of this experiment centre solely on the responses of these White, Pakeha students.

97 These two represent both Maori and Pakeha calls for Pakeha engagement with Maori. Turia identifies as t_ngata whenua in preference to Maori, a term she associates with colonialism (Thomson, NZ Herald, 8/8/03, pA1). I do not know how de Bres identifies ethnically, but he is a White New Zealander of Dutch descent.
Chapter Six

The master-slave dialectic
and relations of domination

Man is human only to the extent to which he tries to impose his existence on
another man in order to be recognized by him. As long as he has not been
effectively recognized by the other, that other will remain the theme of his
actions (Fanon, 1986:216-7).

The holocaust suffered by many Maori tribes during the Land Wars needs to be
acknowledged. Only then will the healing for Maori occur (Turia, 29/8/00, p3 of
4).

Introduction

Theories of intersubjectivity have a long history. For my purposes I intend to explore
the tradition of theorising that stems from Hegel’s theory of recognition.98 Hegel
directly addresses the role of intersubjective relations in the development of self-
consciousness, or self-identity. In addition, the theorisation of struggles for recognition,

98 See Crossley (1996) for a recent account which aims ‘to provide a comprehensive map of
intersubjectivity’ (Crossley, 1996:viii). Crossley develops a two-part map, tracing the
development of ‘egological intersubjectivity’ from Husserl and ‘radical intersubjectivity’ from
Buber. In introducing this two-part approach he briefly mentions Hegel who he positions apart
from these two, and whose theory he does not pursue (Crossley, 1996:16-23). This is a curious
choice given Hegel’s founding influence on all subsequent thought in this area, including that of
Husserl and Buber. Theories of recognition do not ‘start’ with Hegel, as such (see Buck-Morss,
2000:843 for a discussion of his possible sources). However, it is Hegel whose theorisation of
intersubjective recognition has proved an influential and fruitful source for subsequent scholars.
which stems from Hegel, has been influential in the analysis of the colonial relation (beginning with the work of Frantz Fanon) and remains a major theme of contemporary philosophical debates over relations of cultural difference. For both these reasons, the Hegelian trajectory is a rich vein to explore in terms of the possibilities of reconstituting the Maori-Pakeha relation and with it, these identities.

Hegel’s dialectic of lordship and bondage⁹⁹ is outlined in the first section of this chapter. The second section introduces Zali Gurevitch’s (2001) theorisation of forms of speech associated with this relation and briefly outlines Fanon’s identification of the ways in which this relation objectifies and fragments the identity of the colonised other. Gurevitch’s focus on linguistic interaction between self and other gives a discursive cast to the Hegelian theorisation that is extremely useful for a project centring on spoken and written accounts of identity constitution and cross-cultural interaction. The third and fourth sections use Gurevitch’s conceptualisations to analyse the three case studies used in this part of the thesis. While the empirical material referred to here is new, in effect this analysis retraces the ground of colonial relations covered in Chapter Two. While there I investigated those relations through the lens of essentialism, here I do so through the intersubjective lens of Gurevitch’s speech-centred account of the struggle between master and slave. I argue that this analysis illustrates how the essentialised and conflictual identities of coloniser and colonised are relationally constituted. Finally, I consider the work of Fanon and his attempts to find a route beyond the antagonism of the colonial relation either through or against Hegel. I argue that, rather than offering us any clear guidance, Fanon’s argument remained caught between two alternative visions of the means to changing the colonial relation.

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⁹⁹ English translations of the *Phenomenology* use the feudal language of lordship and bondage and Kojève, in translating Hegel into French for the first time in the 1930s, is credited with changing this terminology for the colonial terms of master and slave (Butler, 1987; Lynch, 2001:33). In this discussion I use the feudal terminology when referring to texts that do so. Otherwise I use the colonial terms.
The struggle for recognition in the dialectic of lordship and bondage

For Hegel the development of self-consciousness arises within an intersubjective struggle for recognition of the self by the other. His early account of recognition appeared in his ‘Jena writings’. However, it is the theory of recognition which appears in *The Phenomenology of Spirit* (1977) that has been most influential. Here Hegel outlines various levels in the development of consciousness generally, including the development of self-consciousness. In the chapter that deals with self-consciousness, the section on the relationship between lordship and bondage is the primary source for most theorists of intersubjective recognition. Having shown how consciousness develops in relation to objects in the material world, here Hegel explains the development of self-consciousness in relation to another consciousness. This development follows a number of dialectical steps. Firstly, the self sees the other as a being like itself: ‘[T]hey are for one another like ordinary objects, independent shapes, individuals submerged in the being [or immediacy] of Life’ (Hegel, 1977:113, ¶186). Secondly, consciousness is decentred, or alienated from itself, as it sees itself for the first time as an object in the experience of the other. Thirdly, it is only the recognition of the other, that is the other’s acknowledgment of the self as another consciousness, that will ‘return’ consciousness to itself, thus securing a sense of self-consciousness. In other words, the development of self-consciousness depends on this recognition from another. As Hegel (1977:111, ¶178) famously opens his discussion of lordship and bondage, ‘[s]elf-consciousness exists in and for itself when, and by the fact that, it so exists for another; that is, it exists only in being acknowledged’.

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100 See Honneth (1995:183, nt2) for a complete list of these writings and the publications in which they appear. Note also that Honneth is alone amongst contemporary recognition theorists in focussing on these early works.
The third moment in this dialectical relation, which results in the achievement of self-consciousness, involves a conflict that Hegel characterises as a ‘life-and-death struggle’ in which ‘each seeks the death of the other’ and must also be prepared to stake their own life (Hegel, 1977:113-4, ¶187). The willingness to face death is necessary to the achievement of autonomy or self-determination: ‘In order to discover itself as a negative or self-surpassing being, self-consciousness must do more than merely live; it must transcend the immediacy of pure life’ (Butler, 1987:51). The preparedness to risk life is necessary because to have self-consciousness means to already be, in a sense, ‘beyond’ mere life:

[Self-consciousness is both a living being and somewhat more; somewhat more because it does not just undergo the life-process unconsciously, but is already beyond it in thought. In the attempt then to win recognition of themselves as self-consciousness men [sic] prove that they are beyond mere life by showing that they are not attached to this particular living thing which is themselves, that their recognition as “beings for themselves” (Fürsichsein) is more important, that they will risk their lives for it (Taylor, 1975:153).

The struggle for the death of the other stops short of literal death to achieve this recognition, resulting instead in reduction/objectification (social death). The relation of lord and bondsman in the Phenomenology represents this outcome to the struggle. One individual is not prepared to stake their life, and thus submits to the will of the other, recognising them as a self-consciousness without receiving reciprocal recognition. Effectively, the individual who submits becomes a bondsman, enslaved to the other. The other achieves recognition as lord and subordinates ‘life’. The material reality that ‘life’ represents, acts as a third term in the subsequent relationship between lord and bondsman (Taylor, 1975:154). The physical needs of the lord are catered to by the bondsman, so that the lord no longer has to work to live. Rather, ‘things’ are presented already prepared for the lord’s consumption and the lord’s relationship to material reality is mediated by the bondsman. The bondsman, on the other hand, works on the material world, thus retaining direct experience of it. Consequently, rather than relate to each other directly, their relationship is mediated through ‘things’.
For Hegel, the relationship of lord and bondsman is one stage in the dialectical development of consciousness and the unfolding of an historical teleology. In contrast, twentieth and twenty-first century theorists, having given up on the purposeful unfolding of history, view the relation of lord and bondsman as a distorted and unsatisfactory relationship of domination and subjection. What follows in the next three sections of this chapter, is the identification and then analysis of the speech interactions that create and maintain this relation, seen from this more contemporary viewpoint of its distorted nature.

‘Repressive silence’ in the master-slave dialectic

The struggle between master and slave\textsuperscript{101} is characterised by Zali Gurevitch (2001:89) as ‘speech fights against another speech, voice against voice, to the point of I or Thou’.\textsuperscript{102} Consequently, he argues, the slave loses the right to speech and their silence is the mark of their recognition of the master (Gurevitch, 2001:90). This is not to say that the two no longer speak however, but that their conversation is distorted and ‘broken’. One mark of this distortion is that the slave is forced to speak as dictated by the master (Gurevitch, 2001:91). The notion of dictated speech can be detailed by reference to Fanon’s analysis of the colonial relation. Fanon suggests two forms of dictated speech. The colonised are met with contradictory demands to both assimilate to Western culture and to be completely different, a difference which itself reduces them to objects via the logics of primitivism and racism. Applying this to Gurevitch’s dialogical model of the struggle, these contradictory demands can be seen to lead to two forms of dictated speech: the demand to speak ‘sameness’, to mimic the colonial master, and the demand

\textsuperscript{101} Osborne (1995:72) notes that the translation to colonial terminology has led to the ‘revitalisation’ of Hegel’s text within the context of decolonisation struggles since WWI, but also argues that it has led to major misunderstandings of Hegel’s philosophy. Also see, however, Buck-Morss (2000:846, nt79) who argues that Hegel used the terms for bondsman (\textit{Knecht}) and slave (\textit{Sklave}) interchangeably in the \textit{Phenomenology}. Buck-Morss argues that the development of Hegel’s master-slave dialectic was influenced from the outset by the colonial relation, and particularly the slave rebellion and establishment of a Black republic in Haiti in the late 1700s/early 1800s.

\textsuperscript{102} The invocation of ‘I’ and ‘Thou’ is a reference to Martin Buber’s \textit{I and Thou} (1958) in which Buber distinguishes between ‘I-It’ and ‘I-Thou’ relations with otherness. In ‘I-It’ interactions, the other is related to as an object, in ‘I-Thou’ relations, as another subject (see for example, Crossley, 1996:11). Gurevitch is pointing to the struggle for domination in which only one protagonist can be recognised as a subject.
to speak/mimic (a primitivised and racialised) ‘otherness’.

Fanon explores the harms inflicted by these forms of misrecognition on the colonised and racialised other. If Black people are to be recognised as human beings, it is always a conditional recognition and relational to Whiteness (Fanon, 1986:110). Blackness is always a qualifier on their humanity:

“Oh, I want you to meet my black friend ... Aimé Césaire, a black man and a university graduate ... Marian Anderson, the finest of Negro singers ... Dr Cobb, who invented white blood, is a Negro ... Here, say hello to my friend from Martinique (be careful, he’s extremely sensitive) ...”

Shame. Shame and self-contempt. Nausea. When people like me they tell me it is in spite of my color. When they dislike me, they point out that it is not because of my color. Either way, I am locked into the infernal circle (Fanon, 1986:116).

Thus the granting of ‘equality’ is always conditional. The ‘Black man’ is only like a man, and only if they behave according to the rules of White society, a mimicry which can never guarantee their status. Against any claim to humanity ‘the fact of Blackness’ weighs them down. In the famous story of his response to the White child in the street whose voice hails him, ‘Look, a Negro!’, Fanon outlines the impact of racist misrecognition, which carries with it the whole sedimented weight of racist history:

I could no longer laugh, because I already knew that there were legends, stories, histories and above all historicity ... Then, assailed at various points, the corporeal schema crumbled, its place taken by a racial epidermal schema ... I was responsible at the same time for my body, for my race, for my ancestors. I subjected myself to an objective examination, I discovered my blackness, my ethnic characteristics; and I was battered down by tom-toms, cannibalism, intellectual deficiency, fetishism, racial defects, slave-ships, and above all else, above all: “Sho’ good eatin’.”

On that day, completely dislocated, unable to be abroad with the other, the white man, who unmercifully imprisoned me, I took myself far off from my own presence, far indeed, and made myself an object. What else could it be for me but an amputation, an excision, a haemorrhage that spattered my whole body with black blood (Fanon, 1986:112).

Josefson (undated, p10 of 12) explains the inclusion of this phrase in terms of Fanon’s desire to emphasize the crucial role of language in securing the colonial relation. It is through the language of the coloniser that the Black self internalises the image of the primitivised and racialised other. Hence this phrase epitomises the splitting of the Black subject in colonialism, who sees themselves (and their dialect) through the ‘eyes’ of the White coloniser.
Against the web of racist history and logic, internalised from the milieu in which they live, the self-identity of the ‘Black man’ cannot hold together, but fragments and is made an object. Real psychological harm is done to the Black sense of self as a result of the misrecognition of the White, colonising society.

A second mark of the distorted speech between master and slave is that it takes the form of ‘a conversation through things which for the master are a nuisance and for the slave are blood, sweat and tears’ (Gurevitch, 2001:91-2). This conversation is marked by repression and ‘repressive silence’. It is not that the slave never tries to speak independently, but that their speech is confronted with prohibitions, repression and the refusal of the master to listen, which Gurevitch (2001:93) terms ‘the silenced ear’. Thus, following the logic of repression, the master’s silencing strategies are never fully successful and the repressed speech of the slave continues to ‘haunt’ them. The result of the master-slave interaction then is an impossible bind or ‘neurotic’ relation (Sartre, 1967:18-9), in which the master wishes to be rid of the voice of the slave, but at the same time depends upon it for the dictated speech that ‘secures’ their identity in domination. As Fanon (1986:216-7) expresses it, ‘[a]s long as he has not been effectively recognized by the other, that other will remain the theme of his actions’.

Gurevitch’s analysis of the dialogical processes of domination offers a dynamic account of the ongoing practices of interaction that secure the master-slave relation and with it these identities. In effect, these speech distortions mark the fact that this is a relation which constantly undermines itself. There are no subject-to-subject engagements here. Such a possibility is blocked by repressive silence, the silenced ear and the ability to only interact through ‘things’. In this distorted relation of domination and subjection the identities of master and slave are constituted. The master is constituted as the universal subject, whose demands that the slave both mimic sameness and difference effectively state ‘I am the only subject. Be like me/Be Other’. The identity of the slave, in contrast, is reduced to mimicry, both of an impossible sameness that can never be recognised as such, and of a primitivised and racialised difference. While the dissatisfactions of such a situation for the slave are clear, those of the master need more explanation. According to the logic of recognition, the master remains dissatisfied, despite material comfort,
because his identity can never really be secured in relation to a being he himself does not recognise as his equal. Bhabha’s (1990b:210-11) analysis of the way the practice of mimicry undermines the identity of the master/coloniser provides further insight into these dissatisfactions. While the master claims subjectivity, this claim is constantly undermined by the distorted relation with the slave, which itself ensures the dominant position of the master. Thus the tragedy of the master and slave is shown to be this simultaneous dependence on, and denial of, the intersubjective relation.

This overview of the dynamics of the struggle for recognition and its unstable and unsatisfactory ‘settlement’ in the relation of master and slave, or coloniser and colonised, offers a new lens with which to reinterpret the Maori-Pakeha dynamics of essentialised identity claims as discussed in Chapter Two. Essentialist identities are shown to be relationally constituted in the zero-sum, binarised struggle between self and other, the struggle of ‘I or Thou’ (Gurevitch, 2001:89). The Pakeha demand for recognition from Maori is expressed in contradictory injunctions to sameness (‘we are all immigrants’, ‘we are both indigenous’) and to a primitivised Maori difference. This difference is appropriated in the Pakeha nationalist project, in an attempt to secure Pakeha identity. As outlined in Wolfe’s analysis of repressive authenticity, between these two demands, Maori identities that fail to perform primitivised difference are discounted and ‘silenced’, existing ‘at the vanishing point of subjectivity’ (Fuss, 1995:146). Thus Maori are exhorted to various forms of dictated speech and to otherwise remain silent. A return to the examples used in Chapter Two to highlight the dynamics of repressive authenticity will show that it is the ‘haunting’ and critical speech of Maori politicians and activists, who seek to speak of the violence and injustice of the colonial relation, that is silenced in this way. In the following two sections, I develop the linkage between master and slave and Pakeha and Maori identities further, using Gurevitch’s models of ‘repressive silence’ and the ‘conversation through things’. This analysis highlights the ways in which practices of repression and silencing create and maintain the coloniser-colonised relation.

**The silenced Pakeha ear**

In the interaction described by Gurevitch (2001:93), the slave’s attempts at independent
speech are met by the ‘silenced ear’ of the master. Jones’ (2001) account of the hostile responses of her Pakeha students to the autonomous voice of the Maori teacher provides a demonstration of this ‘silenced ear’. As a Pakeha and Maori lecturing team, Jones and Jenkins decided to split their class into two ethnically-distinct streams when their initial bicultural approach of teaching together to the unified group of students seemed not to be furthering their liberatory pedagogical aims to maximise the opportunities for all students to speak, and to engage with the content of our course on feminist perspectives in education. We recognized that we had been only partially successful, and had had critical feedback from some Maori students who said that the words, assumptions, and interests of the Pakeha students and lecturer continued to dominate, despite genuine attempts to encourage an open and democratic classroom (Jones, 1999:300, emphasis added).

In conjunction with this feedback and the contemporary emphasis on separate kaupapa Maori educational settings, the decision was made to trial streaming the class by ethnicity. In 1997, the year on which Jones reports, the class was separated into two streams for three-quarters of their sessions. The remaining classes were held together. Each stream received an identical curriculum with Jones, Jenkins, and a Tongan lecturer also teaching on the course, moving between the two groups.

Jones (2001) reflects on the responses of Pakeha students to being taught by ‘the other’ under this new regime. She reports that

> [d]espite their espoused interest in difference and in the cultural other, many Pakeha students ... expressed a bitter and active resistance to their Maori and Pacific Islands teachers’ expressions of their cultural identities and interests (Jones, 2001:281).

The students kept a journal reflecting on their experience of the course, and the following excerpts from these appear in Jones’ paper:

\[104\] Kaupapa M_ori refers to ‘Maori-centred’ approaches, hence in the educational context to educational structures and practices based on Maori cultural values and philosophy. The development of kaupapa M_ori education within tertiary institutions follows the development of parallel Maori pre-school (K_hanga Reo) and primary school (Kura Kaupapa) institutions.
The introduction to the lecture was in Maori, which even though it was obviously appropriate, was disappointing as I could not understand it ... I was brought up to believe that speaking a language your guests or audience could not understand was rude, and as I do not know of any Maori who do not speak English, this seemed unnecessary. This is I know a cultural difference, but my reaction was that perhaps I should just leave the class now and let everyone else get on with it (Maree, cited in Jones, 2001:279, emphasis added).

The lecture was interesting also in the way that [the Tongan lecturer] conducted it. It felt to me like she was talking to the Maori and Pacific Island students and the rest of us were just there to listen ... I know our cultures are different, but I found this really disrespectful for the rest of the class and it made me feel personally that I wasn’t part of the lecture (Karen, cited in Jones, 2001:281, emphasis added).

I found [a Maori lecturer’s] use of the term ‘tauiwi women’ disconcerting as I understand it to mean ‘visitor’ or ‘foreigner’ and the use of this term in describing Pakeha is an offensive one. I don’t know that [the lecturer’s] use of the word was in the same vein as that of the Maori radicals, but I was uncomfortable with it. It seemed insulting and put me off listening to her (Virginia, cited in Jones, 2001: 281-2, emphasis added).

The activity ... made me feel extremely uncomfortable and stupid. I thought it served to emphasise rather than diminish my status as an ‘outsider’. The activity assumed a prior knowledge which I did not have ... I left shortly after the end of this activity, having decided that I had been told in a subtle way I did not belong. I have difficulty in seeing the relevance of this visit [to the meeting house] (Barbara, cited in Jones, 2001:282, emphasis added).

These students express a sense of ‘discomfort’ and ‘insult’ in response to the authoritative voice of the Maori and Tongan teachers and the centring of their knowledge and interests. They practice the ‘silenced Pakeha ear’ in response to this voice, being ‘put off listening’, wanting to leave and, in Barbara’s case, actually leaving the class to avoid that voice. Their expression of alienation is a response to the extremely novel experience (for Pakeha) of being positioned by the Maori voice as ‘not knowing’. Jones argues that it is not Maori knowledge or knowledge of Maori per se that these students resist. They profess their desire to learn about cultural difference (Jones, 1999). Rather, they resist knowledge ‘about the limits of knowing. If they are

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105 Jones (2001:290, nt4) reports ‘This activity, supervised by the Maori lecturer, required the Pakeha and Maori students (in mixed groups) to talk collectively to the class in any way they wanted about their shared reactions to and knowledge about any carving in a Maori meeting house’.
not “present” to find out that they cannot know, then it becomes possible to maintain the illusion of being able to know’ (Jones, 2001:286). She argues that this resistance and the illusion they seek to maintain arise out of ‘the (White) fantasy of absolute knowledge’ (Jones, 2001:284).\textsuperscript{106}

\textsuperscript{106} In support of her argument that this is a White problem, Jones (2001:285-6) cites (from the international pedagogical literature) other instances of White students’ resistance to the voice of teachers ‘marked by race or ethnicity’.
The experience of ‘not belonging’, which these students report in the face of this assertive Maori speech, demonstrates their familiarity and ease with a dominant position in which they are the ones being ‘talked to’ by the teacher and whose existing knowledge forms the taken-for-granted backdrop of pedagogy. The White fantasy of mastery is sedimented into the practices and attitudes of these students, unconsciously reproducing relations of unequal power. Jones points out that with such a history, ‘hearing’ the subaltern voice is not easy and cites Narayan’s observations that members of disadvantaged groups cannot fail to be aware of the fact that the presence of goodwill on the part of members of advantaged groups is not enough to overcome assumptions and attitudes born out of centuries of power and privilege (Narayan, 1988:35; in Jones, 1999:308).

The Pakeha students seem only to want, and to be able, to hear the ventriloquised or dictated voice of the cultural other, the voice that speaks only what they expect to hear and are comfortable with. They are literally ‘unable to hear’ the autonomous Maori voice.

This pedagogical instance highlights a number of important dimensions of the master-slave relation and the practice of the ‘silenced ear’. Here I centre on the sedimented and epistemological nature of this relation of domination. While Fanon has given us insight into the impact of the sedimented, historical weight of colonial misrecognition on the colonised, the Pakeha students’ demonstration of their unconscious ease with the position of master provides insight into its workings in relation to the coloniser. Jones’ analysis suggests that the master, like the slave, is weighed down by this history that is not easy to escape. Integral components of this history, emphasised by both Fanon and Jones, are what might be termed the epistemologies of domination. Fanon highlights the burden of racist thought and its violent effects in denying agency to the (colonised) ‘objects’ of its knowledge. Jones highlights the well-policed limits to her Pakeha students’ desire to ‘know’ Maori. The knowledge these students seek is an accumulation of facts and insights into cultural otherness that they can ‘add’ to their existing stores of knowledge. But they refuse knowledge of Maori that challenges their own central position as ‘knowing subjects’, knowledge that involves the decentring of their
'unfettered access to subjectivity' (Fuss, 1995:142) and mastery. Together, Fanon and Jones demonstrate the epistemological politics that structures the master-slave relation. Further, Jones’ analysis of her students’ resistance to ‘decentring’ provides an interactional demonstration of Sayyid’s (2000) critique of the universalising desires of Western discourse and its subject-bearers.

Jones’ story also highlights the Maori strategy of taking distance from Pakeha. The Maori students and lecturer refuse to be ‘known’ in the way the Pakeha students seek. After repeated experiences of the dominating Pakeha voice and silenced Pakeha ear, the desire for separation on the part of the colonised subject is a further sedimented effect of the history of misrecognition. If Pakeha will not ‘hear’ their autonomous speech, Maori in this instance choose separation and autonomous space in which to address their own concerns. However, the outcome of this strategy, in this instance at least, is only a partial success. While the Maori students expressed their pleasure in the separate streams (Jones, 1999:301), the Pakeha students’ hostility and resentment to the experience of the limits of their epistemological mastery, indicates, as suggested in the Conclusion to Chapter Five, that, in itself the assertion of Maori autonomy is not enough to move Maori-Pakeha relations beyond colonial logics.

Maori and Pakeha and the ‘conversation through things’

While the previous section focussed on relational structures which silence and refuse the speech of the colonised, as Gurevitch argues, the two do continue to talk, predominantly through ‘things’. Given the neurotic structure of this relation, the ‘conversation through things’ obsessively recurs. Here I centre on the difficult topic of colonial history as one of the major ‘things’ through which Maori and Pakeha continue to speak. Remembering this history is for Pakeha a ‘nuisance’, while for Maori it represents ‘blood, sweat and tears’ (Gurevitch, 2001:91-2). Through discussion of history, Maori seek to uncover the violence of colonisation, which lies at the heart of establishing the coloniser/colonised (master/slave) relation. The colonising Pakeha, on the other hand, do not want to ‘hear’ this Maori voice and wish to understand this relation in other terms, to deflect the moral
judgment of colonial violence. Thus discussions of colonial history offer an important site for the analysis of repressive and repressed conversation.

Two notable reminders of colonial history that led to extended discussion and debate in the mass media during the time in which I wrote this thesis, exemplify the silencing and blocking of Maori speech in ways that match Gurevitch’s description of the conversation between master and slave. They also continue my exploration of epistemological issues in the relation between self and other, in that both speakers who initiated these debates called for greater knowledge of colonial history and of Maori cultural difference, as key to improving cross-cultural relations. In the analysis that follows I give examples from these debates to illustrate a number of the aspects of blocking and silencing speech. The major emphasis in both instances, in this analysis and in the public debates at the time, centres on the choice of comparisons each speaker used in an effort to engage their audiences to ‘take the position of the other’, or to empathise with the Maori experience. Thus these debates offer useful insights into a further theme that will resurface later in this exploration of the possibilities of intersubjective relations, the possibilities of empathy, or sympathetic engagement with the suffering of another.107

The first of these debates was prompted when, on 29 August 2000, the Hon. Tariana Turia, a Minister in the Labour-led Government of the time, gave a speech to the New Zealand Psychological Society Conference. In this speech, and two subsequent speeches to similar audiences, she challenged the psychological and psychiatric professions to become more knowledgeable about the ‘Maori psyche’ and tikanga M_**ori to enable them to better treat their Maori patients.108 While the repeated invitations she received

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107 Note that empathy marks the initial introduction of ethical concerns in this discussion. Empathy involves a mix of epistemological and ethical modes of intersubjectivity. Appeals to empathy involve establishing an epistemological relation to provoke an ethical concern for the experience of an-other. Empathy begins from the empathiser’s own knowledge (from subjective experience or knowledge of other instances) of suffering. The appeal of empathy is to project this knowledge onto the experience of the suffering other, to elicit concern for that suffering.

108 The audiences and dates of the other two speeches were: the Royal Australia and New Zealand College of Psychiatrists, 5 October, 2000; and the Schizophrenia Fellowship of New Zealand, 8 November, 2000.
suggest professional interest in her argument, the first speech in particular sparked protracted, and often negative, public debate. What distinguished this speech was Turia’s assertion that the ongoing damage of colonisation is a major cause of the problems of Maori mental health. Her descriptions of the harm to Maori identity and self-worth echo Fanon’s analysis of the damage done to the colonised subject:

A consequence of colonial oppression has been the internalisation by Maori of the images the oppressor has of them ... I know the psychological consequences of the internalisation of negative images is for people to take for themselves the illusion of the oppressors’ power while they are in a situation of helplessness and despair, a despair leading to self-hatred, and for many, suicide. The externalisation of the self-hatred on the other hand, is seen with the number of Maori who are convicted of crimes of violence and the very high numbers of Maori women and children who are the victims of violence (Turia, 29/8/00, p2-3 of 4).

In making her case, Turia compared Maori experience of colonisation to a number of events widely understood by Pakeha society as violent, harmful, even genocidal. She likened the invasion of homelands to ‘home invasions’, expanded ‘post traumatic stress disorder’ to ‘post colonial traumatic stress disorder’, and, repeating the language of the Waitangi Tribunal’s *Taranaki Report* (1996), referred to ‘the holocaust suffered by indigenous people including Maori as a result of colonial contact and behaviour’. In making these comparisons, Turia was very clear that she wished the same acknowledgment and concern to be extended to Maori:

What I have difficulty in reconciling is how “home invasions” emits such outpourings of concern for the victims and an intense despising of the invaders

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109 This term has been prevalent in the New Zealand media since 1998, being used to refer to household break-ins involving violence against, and sometimes murder of, householders.

110 The Waitangi Tribunal (see [www.waitangi-tribunal.govt.nz](http://www.waitangi-tribunal.govt.nz)) is a Government body made up of Maori and non-Maori individuals, set up in 1975 to investigate and adjudicate on Maori grievances over breaches to the Treaty of Waitangi. In 1984 its powers were extended to include historical claims, opening the way to a multitude of claims relating to nineteenth century breaches. The Tribunal generally only has the power to make recommendations to Government for ‘Treaty settlements’. The two biggest of these to date have resulted in the return of land, assets and money to the value of $170 million each to two major tribal groups.
while the invasions of the “home lands” of Maori does not engender the same level of emotion and concern for the Maori victims (Turia, 29/8/00, p1-2 of 4, emphasis added).

Here Turia appealed to shared knowledge of other instances of suffering to elicit an ethical concern for the plight of Maori. She stated that, in making the comparison with the Jewish Holocaust, she did not wish to enter an ‘our holocaust was worse than your holocaust’ debate. However, despite this caveat, the Holocaust comparison became the central focus of much of the negative response to Turia’s speech.

The second debate was sparked when, on 4 December 2002, Joris de Bres, as Race Relations Commissioner, gave a speech to mark the United Nations Day of Cultural Heritage. In this speech he suggested that New Zealanders should reflect on the ‘cultural vandalism’ inflicted on Maori in colonial history. What he called for, in particular, was that such reflection lead to the adoption of a more respectful and protective relationship to Maori culture in the present. Like Turia, de Bres made a comparison to emphasise his point, in this instance about the value of cultural diversity and preservation. Since the United Nations Year of Cultural Heritage had been inaugurated as a response to the Taliban’s destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas in Afghanistan in 2001, de Bres used this event as his comparative example:

This was an appalling example of people of one culture wielding their power to destroy a site that was special to people of another. The world was outraged. But while we rightfully shake our heads in incomprehension and condemnation, the destruction of the Buddhas also challenges us to think of our own country and to examine our own record. The colonisation of New Zealand was a sorry litany of cultural vandalism (de Bres, 4/12/02, p1 of 4).

De Bres’ comparative appeal contrasts with Turia’s in that he does not ask his audience to empathise with Maori subjective suffering. Rather he seeks, through the Taliban comparison, to provoke Pakeha to reflect on the damage inflicted by the violent colonial orientation towards cultural difference. Again, it was this comparison with the actions of the Taliban which became the topic for many of those responding to de Bres’ speech, rather than his argument itself. More generally, response was also stimulated by the calls to address the wrongs of colonialism and to reflect on contemporary relations in
light of what we can learn from that past.

Many of the dynamics of repression that Gurevitch (2001:92-4) points to were present in subsequent debates over both these speeches, as Pakeha sought to deflect the call to attend to colonial harms inflicted on Maori. Here I address these dynamics utilising three general frames to structure my discussion - prohibitions on speech, ‘shrouding’ with incessant speech and the neurotic nature of the ‘conversation through things’. The issue of prohibitions on speech is a further form of the ‘silenced ear’ of the master, who refuses to listen to what the slave has to say. The focus here is on manifestations of this refusal in direct prohibitions to speech - ‘Don’t say that!’ or ‘You can’t say that!’ - or in the dismissal of speech as inappropriate - ‘You are out of line’. Both Turia and de Bres were met with furious refusals to ‘hear’ what they had to say. The most vehement and impassioned turned to denigration to ‘drown out’ these critical voices. For example, Turia’s speech was dubbed ‘off the planet’ by an Opposition MP\textsuperscript{111} (Sowry, quoted in Venter, \textit{Dominion}, 30/8/00, p1), she was entitled ‘Tariana in Wonderland’ (Calvert, \textit{Evening Post}, 1/9/00, p4) and judged ‘disturbed’ (Cross, \textit{Evening Post}, 1/9/00, p1). De Bres was attacked by a number of Opposition politicians, being called a ‘handwringing white liberal’ and ‘a self-appointed zealot’(Peters, quoted by Robinson and Plunkett, \textit{Morning Report}, 5/12/02) and his speech dubbed ‘offensive’ (English, with Clark, \textit{Nine to Noon}, 4/12/02; McCully, in Venter, \textit{Christchurch Press}, 7/12/02, pA12). Finally, historian Michael King was quoted as calling his speech ‘stupid and provocative’ (in Watkins, \textit{Christchurch Press}, 7/12/02, pA4).

Many refusals centred on the inappropriateness of the speeches themselves. Turia and de Bres were either ‘out of line’ given their official capacities, or their comparisons were inappropriate. Turia’s political colleagues used far milder tones than those above, but similarly deflected attention from what she had to say. A spokesperson for the Prime Minister was reported (in an article headlined ‘Turia in for a telling-off by PM’), as saying,

\textsuperscript{111} All members of the New Zealand parliament who are not in Government are called Members of the Opposition. Hence the Opposition is made up of MPs from a number of different political parties.
the tone and flavour of Mrs Turia’s arguments were not “terribly helpful” ... “She doesn’t enjoy the same sort of freedoms as she might as a backbench MP. She’s now a minister of the Crown and that carries with it certain responsibilities” (Venter, Dominion, 30/8/00, p1).

This sentiment was echoed by other political colleagues and in newspaper editorials (for example, ‘Tariana Turia and ...’, Evening Post, 7/9/00, p4). De Bres likewise, was challenged for speaking ‘out of line’ as a Race Relations Conciliator. Thus, by their angry rejections and assertions of inappropriateness, these responses sought both to silence this critical speech and refused to ‘hear’ it.

The second frame I use to structure this discussion of the ‘conversation through things’ is the practice of ‘shrouding’ Turia’s and de Bres’ arguments in incessant speech. Paradoxically, I argue this is a form of the ‘repressive silence’ the master uses to refuse to engage with the slave’s speech. While silence itself is difficult to access in this type of research which centres on what is written and said, what is apparent, particularly following Tariana Turia’s speech in August 2000, is the incessant speech of Pakeha, often seeking to ‘drown out’ and to dismiss her voice. In the same way that Gurevitch suggests the silence of the slave does not mean the actual absence of speech but the repression of ‘free’ speech, so the silence of the master may not mean the absence of speech either. Rather, the silence of the master can be achieved through speech ‘by asserting avoidance and a voiding of hearing and of acknowledging’ (Gurevitch, 2001:93). This incessant speech ‘shrouds’ (Felman, 1992:183; cited in Gurevitch, 2001:93) the topics raised by the slave, avoiding rather than addressing them.

The dynamics of ‘shrouding’ in incessant speech have been detailed by Dori Laub (1992:72-3), who lists defences used to avoid ‘hearing’ traumatic testimonies. Two of these are of particular relevance to the analysis of responses to Turia and de Bres. Firstly, ‘shrouding’ takes the form of expressions of anger, which Laub argues reflect a sense of inadequacy about being able to respond properly or a desire to restrict responsibility for the problem to those experiencing the suffering. Secondly, speech can be ‘shrouded’ in ‘an obsession with factfinding’, which works to foreclose discussion via the assertion of already ‘having the facts’. Both of these strategies work to avert
attention from the claim to suffering, thus rejecting any appeal to empathic engagement.\textsuperscript{112}

\textsuperscript{112} These are only two of Laub’s list of six defensive responses. Two of the others - paralysis and withdrawal - involve no expression in speech. The remaining two are responses which superficially seem supportive - ‘endowing the survivor with a kind of sanctity ... [by which they are kept] at a distance, to avoid the intimacy entailed in knowing’ and ‘hyperemotionally [sic] which superficially looks like compassion and caring ... [but means that the speech of the testifier] is simply flooded, drowned and lost in the listener’s defensive affectivity’ (Laub, 1992:72-3).
The most incessant speech involved rejections of Turia’s and de Bres’ chosen comparisons. These were seized upon as a topic for discussion in itself, once again to avoid ‘hearing’ the substance of the arguments being made. The debate over Turia’s comparison between the Jewish Holocaust and Maori experience of colonisation was the most extensive, continuing in the print media from late August into December 2000. Many of those who rejected the use of the term ‘holocaust’ to describe Pakeha colonisation of Maori, used a strategy of reversal, arguing that any ‘real’ holocaust in New Zealand history was perpetrated by Maori, against other Maori and/or against the Moriori. This extremely common line of argument demonstrates the defensive ‘obsession with factfinding’ as these examples indicate:

Mrs Turia may speak about the “holocaust” that followed European colonisation, but history records that is was Hika who practised what amounted to genocidal warfare against Ngati Paoa, Ngati Maru and Ngati Whatua. (Nowhere in the history of Maori-European military conflict are more than 1000 casualties recorded from a single engagement.) In fact, the only indisputable “holocaust” to blight New Zealand history was the mass enslavement and murder of the Moriori people of the Chatham Islands by Te Atiawa during the 1830s and 40s (Trotter, *Dominion*, 1/9/00, p8, emphasis added).

Tariana Turia has got it right - except she has quoted the wrong time period and the wrong perpetrators of the Maori holocaust. The holocaust which did occur happened between 1806 and 1845 - the period when Maoris obtained muskets and proceeded to slaughter other Maoris. Maori killed their own, not in hundreds, but in tens of thousands. The unfortunate losers were deprived of their lands, enslaved or eaten. The Treaty indeed “protected” Maoris at that time from their own depravity. The fact is, if Mrs Turia and her supporters are suffering from traumatic stress disorder, it is arguably pre-colonisation, not post-colonisation, which is the cause. It is estimated that in this period, the total population of Maoris, between 100,000 and 150,000, declined by 50,000 as a result of internecine barbarism and killing (Crosby, *The Musket Wars*, 1999). The 1860s were minor in comparison (Devlin, *Dominion*, 2/9/00, p30).

The real Maori holocaust occurred when Te Rauparaha, and other chiefs, armed with guns, ravaged other tribes with great slaughter before the Treaty of Waitangi was signed. In 1823 a Waikato tribe virtually depopulated Taranaki. The survivors fled to Kapiti and the Sounds, and returned after the British pioneers settled in New Plymouth. The Treaty brought law and order to New Zealand, and Maori no longer lived in dread of attack from some more war-like neighbour. Should not Maori be grateful for this, and not be making false claims

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113 A number of respondents expressed unease with Turia’s holocaust comparison out of a desire to acknowledge the specificity of the Jewish experience, while also being careful to acknowledge Maori suffering. These responses will be discussed briefly in Chapter Eight.
on the descendants of those who set them free from their former terror, and who
brought them the benefits of civilisation? (Salt, *Evening Post*, 21/9/00, p4).

Such ‘fact-finding’ accounts, with their recitation of numbers and dates to reinforce
their historical veracity, work, as Laub suggests, to avert attention from the emotional
and subjective experience of suffering that Turia described. Further, the reversal
strategy used by these writers illustrates the zero-sum nature of the struggle between
coloniser and colonised, or master and slave. As Gurevitch says, it is ‘voice against
voice ... I or Thou’, either ‘barbarism’ or ‘civilisation’, either ‘we’ were holocaust
perpetrators, or ‘you’ were. These writers constitute Maori as the ‘depraved’ barbarians,
the primitive other. Finally, once again echoing Laub, such arguments also seek to
allocate responsibility for Maori suffering to Maori themselves, at least as much as, if
not more than, to Pakeha. This suggestion was raised explicitly by Nicholas Scott who,
having outlined the holocausts against the Moriori and by Te Rauparaha, concluded that

[i]t was a harsh, cruel society then, in the Maori as well as the Pakeha way of
life. At least we tried to stamp out intertribal wars and cannibalism. Could not
some of today’s abuse stem from old memories of parents and siblings being
killed in intertribal wars as well as being killed in the land wars? (Scott, *NZ
Listener*, 23/9/00, p9).

What all of these responses remain silent on - and silence - is Turia’s emphasis on the
ongoing effect of the colonial relation, with its internalisation of ‘the images of the
oppressor’ and range of structured practices of cultural destruction:

Since first colonial contact, much effort has been invested in attempts at
individualising Maori with the introduction of numerous assimilationist policies
and laws to alienate Maori from their social structures which were linked to the
guardianship and occupation of land (Turia, 29/8/00, p2 of 4).

In the case of de Bres’ speech, the rejections of his comparison took a number of
different forms. It was argued that the Taliban comparison was invalid because the
context was too different. Specifically, acts should be judged by the standard of the time
in which they were committed, and the standards of the nineteenth century were
markedly different from those of the twentieth and twenty-first. Note the universalisation of a Western standard that this argument relies on. Thus the nineteenth century Western acts of colonisation should be judged by their own standards, while the Taliban’s twentieth/twenty-first century acts should be judged by the West’s standards.

114 Radio New Zealand journalist, Geoff Robinson, interviewing Professor Ranginui Walker on the issue (Robinson and Plunkett, *Morning Report*, 5/12/02), asked,
surely the Taliban were making an informed and malevolent decision to destroy iconic statues of world heritage status, against a whole chorus of protest from around the world, whereas what you describe is cultural vandalism certainly, but occurring in a historical context of colonialism?

This line of reasoning was repeated later in the morning by another Radio New Zealand journalist, Linda Clark (Nine to Noon, 5/12/02), again interviewing Professor Walker:

I think people get upset about it because of the context. I mean, if we think about the Taliban for instance, the reason that we have been collectively appalled by the actions of the Taliban - and the destruction of the Buddhas is the most pressing example I suppose, but their treatment of women is another - is that their actions occurred in the year 2001 when the rest ... other cultures and other people had moved on and when there’s greater freedom of expression and there’s higher expectations, I suppose, of how we treat one another. Whereas, the colonial behaviours and whatever terrible things that the pioneers, the European pioneers, did to the Maori who they found here, happened in a different time and a different place and the context consequently is different.

Once again, argument over the validity of de Bres’ comparison worked to avoid the discussion he sought to begin.

In an interview with de Bres on the morning of his address, Linda Clark also exemplified the full range of speech strategies that have been discussed in this chapter. She attacked de Bres for the inappropriateness of his speech, engaged in incessant ‘factfinding’ and, finally, also demonstrated the third frame of this discussion, the neurotic nature of the ‘conversation through things’ that can neither address colonial history nor let it go. The following is an extended extract from that interview:

LC: Our colonial forbears might well have dominated Maori, they may well have done things which we would all regret, they certainly subjugated Maori, but they didn’t wipe them out. There is no comparison with the Taliban.

JdB: No. I’m talking about what the Taliban did to the Buddha statues in Afghanistan. I’m not comparing the New Zealand Government or any previous Government in New Zealand to the Taliban in their general politics.

LC: Nonetheless though, in the current climate where the Taliban - there has just been a war with the Taliban, they have just been defeated - for a whole lot of reasons, given that context, it was an unnecessarily provocative comparison wasn’t it?

JdB: Well, it’s because today particularly commemorates the world’s horror at
that event - and that’s the cultural heritage issue. I thought it was worthwhile using that opportunity to look at what - how we deal with special sites and how we deal with the cultural heritage of Maori in New Zealand.

LC: But you must not - It must have occurred to you that such a comparison would cause offence?
JdB: I hope it won’t cause offence. What I’ve looked at in the rest of the speech is ... contemporary issues ... Treaty legislation that has sought to provide protection for Maori cultural heritage. So the speech is really an attempt to look in a positive way about how we can respect other cultures.
LC: But let’s look in a positive way at what our colonial forbears actually achieved. For all the crimes they committed they left Maori in a far better position than colonials left the Native Americans or Australian colonials left the Aborigines.
JdB: Yes. It was pretty touch and go for a while, but there’s been a major Maori cultural renaissance. But what I’m talking about here is the respect for Maori culture and Maori belief. And that’s the issue which I’m saying is something we still have to come to grips with.
LC: But if you want people to come to grips with that issue and respect Maori cultural beliefs, then denigrating their - another culture’s forefathers is probably not the most constructive way to achieve that.
JdB: Well, I also talked about environmental issues in my speech, and what I’m saying is, it took us a long time to begin to look at environmental sustainability, but over the last few decades we have realised the importance of sustaining the environment into the future. And what I’m saying is we are now going through a similar process on cultural heritage. And that is a process we’re struggling with, there’s been a lot of debate about and I think we’re making progress with, but what I was trying to say this morning is there’s still some way to go in recognising the importance of Maori cultural heritage and the importance of respecting it. And that doesn’t mean to me that, for example, you or I have to believe in taniwha, or have some spiritual objection to the shifting of sand from one beach to another, or have some spiritual association with a wahi tapu on a mountain in Welcome Bay, but it means we should respect people having those beliefs and try and find a way of negotiating and compromise rather than dismissal and derisory comments.
LC: But then when you use phrases like cultural vandalism - it’s impossible to use expressions like that without somehow being associated with fault and I think, for a lot of New Zealanders, they’re tired of being told that they did something wrong and they certainly are sick of feeling guilty about it.
JdB: Well, I’m saying that historically things were done wrong ... LC: Yes, but the Treaty negotiation process is an acknowledgment of that. We all acknowledge that, but isn’t it now the time to try to move forward and stop beating ourselves up over things that, you know, great-great-grandfather might have done to some people who belonged to the Tainui tribe?
JdB: Well, I only devoted about two or three paragraphs of my speech to the past. It’s mostly directed to the present and how we are trying to come to terms with the importance of cultural heritage and the contemporary relevance of the Treaty.
LC: But, as the Treaty negotiation process underscores, people are extremely sensitive about how the past is seen.
JdB: Yes. And I think that’s partly because it - the Treaty settlement process and the stories before the Waitangi Tribunal - have revealed to us things about our past that we didn’t want to know.
LC: But we know them now, so why do you want to remind us of them again? (Clark, *Nine to Noon*, 4/12/02).

In the first exchange above, Clark argues, not for the disjunction in historical period as a reason to dismiss the Taliban comparison (as did Robinson), but instead insists on the ‘facts’ that Maori have not been completely annihilated. This somewhat incoherent argument construes the Taliban’s actions as a total physical genocide, rather than the destruction of ancient statues. This false interpretation is then used to reject the comparison with the colonisation of Maori. When de Bres points this distinction out, Clark changes tack, arguing that de Bres had been unnecessarily provocative in making the comparison. Thus, he had inappropriately caused offence to Pakeha New Zealand. This suggestion that de Bres wittingly set out to offend Pakeha works as a similar reversal to the argument that Maori were the real holocaust perpetrators. The argument about the infliction of harm is turned back upon the ‘accuser’, again insisting on binarising the issues to argue for either ‘I or Thou’. This becomes clear when later in the same interview Clark (ibid) made the accusation more directly:

LC: But, that’s the whole - You’re accusing Europeans of cultural vandalism and that is the sense, isn’t it? If we’re really going to understand each other, if we’re really going to be tolerant of one another, isn’t it time that we stopped trying to blame one side?

This reversal of the accusation was complete when a few days later Opposition MP, Murray McCully laid a complaint against de Bres with the Human Rights Commission, arguing it was ‘scarcely possible to imagine a more offensive, abusive or insulting point of comparison than the Taleban regime which harboured al-Qaeda’ (McCully, quoted in Venter, *Christchurch Press*, 7/12/02, pA12). Thus, having compared European colonisation with the Taliban’s destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas, de Bres stood accused as himself guilty of cultural denigration.

Returning to the exchange between de Bres and Clark, while the Race Relations...
Commissioner continues to reiterate the emphasis in his speech on cross-cultural respect and accommodation in the present, Clark returns again to the idea of an impugned insult to Pakeha, exposing the repressed anxiety which this shrouds - that Pakeha are the guilty inheritors of an historical moral wrong. She suggests Pakeha are ‘tired’ of being blamed for historical wrongs and want to ‘move forward’, while refusing to respond to de Bres’ desire to discuss the present.\footnote{One of Jones’ students also reported this sense of fatigue with its accompanying desire to avoid discussing implications for present social relations:

I felt marginalised in this class ... it seems that I am merely a small fish in a big pond. As a Pakeha, I get tired of reading and hearing about how we assimilated the Maori. It is as if they want to keep making us feel guilty out of payment back. What can I as one person do now? (Suzie, cited in Jones, 2001:281, emphasis added).} Again, de Bres attempts to focus the discussion on the present and Clark resists, until finally he acquiesces to her desire to talk about the past. As soon as he does so however, she repeats her fatigue with this topic, asking ‘why do you want to remind us of them again?’

This exchange is particularly intriguing in its clear exemplification of the impasse that is established within the master-slave/coloniser-colonised relation. Clark is unable to give up this conversation ‘through’ colonial history, despite her expressed desire to do just that. Having insisted that de Bres discuss history with her, Clark resorts to Laub’s strategy of ‘already having the facts’ to avoid discussing it further. Clark wants to ‘forget’ the past because she knows about it already. While de Bres, in his speech and in this dialogue, used historical wrongs as a starting point, his main point is that Pakeha need to think about their relationship to Maori people and culture \textit{in the present}. Clark, while arguing that we know about the past and should now put it behind us, refuses to talk about the present. When de Bres raises it, she returns (neurotically) to the past, to the site of the (haunting) ‘nuisance’ which Pakeha seek to forget but cannot let go.
In sum, through these speech relations of ‘repressive silence’ and the ‘conversation through things’ (and their material counterparts) the identities of master and slave, coloniser and colonised are constructed and maintained. Critical or ‘haunting’ speech is met by a refusal to engage with its topic, and an insistence on dichotomisation. The accusations that Maori are trying to ‘blame one side’ or that the ‘real’ holocaust perpetrators were Maori, or that Joris de Bres is guilty of cultural denigration, work in this zero-sum fashion, insisting on a totalising of virtue and blame. Through these dichotomising strategies, Pakeha are constructed as the universal subject, the bearers of civilisation and the law, and Maori as a reduced, essentialised and primitivised other. Viewing the dichotomized identities of Maori and Pakeha from this intersubjective perspective illustrates how such essentialised identities are a social and relational achievement, the effects of social relations, rather than having an a priori existence.

**The dilemmas of Fanon**

The intersubjective constitution of the identities of master and slave, or coloniser and colonised, deepens the analysis of the problems of the zero-sum standoff outlined in Chapter Two. However, the question still remains: What are the possibilities for escaping these pathological and violent relations of domination? I begin addressing this question in this final section, by looking at the possibilities canvassed in the work of Fanon. As stated at the beginning of this chapter, Fanon is responsible for bringing Hegel’s dialectic of lordship and bondage to bear on the colonial relation and his analysis has been hugely influential on subsequent theorists of that relation. For both these reasons, his work is a useful point of departure in further investigating the possibilities of intersubjective relationality.

Fanon gives two answers to the seeming impasse of the colonial relation: the turn to négritude and the espousal of revolutionary violence. Given the inability of the White man to recognise the Black, Fanon argues for a turn to Black cultural sources as a basis for the development of a positive Black self-identity, free from the racism of the White perspective. If the colonial relation established a binary opposition between White and
Black, *négritude* could exploit and reverse their valuation.\(^{116}\)

From the opposite end of the white world a magical Negro culture was hailing me, Negro sculpture! I began to flush with pride. Was this our salvation?

I had rationalised the world and the world had rejected me on the basis of color prejudice. Since no agreement was possible on the level of reason, I threw myself back toward unreason ... here I am at home; I am made of the irrational; I wade in the irrational. Up to the neck in the irrational. And how my voice vibrates! (Fanon, 1986:123).

\(^{116}\) Cf. discussion in Chapter Five.
Despite the invocation of reverse discourse in the embrace of the ‘irrational’ in this quote, Fanon’s vision of négritude was not a simplistic belief in the recovery of a Black essence. Rather, he sought to combine African cultural sources with a re-valuing of the essential characteristics projected on the Black man by the White, in an act of resistance and assertion of autonomous human agency.

However, Fanon’s final position on négritude is unclear, as he oscillates between affirmation and rejection.117 Within pages of the quote above, his espousal of négritude is undermined by a reading of Sartre’s dialectical argument (in Black Orpheus) that négritude represented the moment of antithesis to White supremacy’s thesis. Thus, Sartre (1948:xl, cited in Fanon, 1967:133) concludes: ‘négritude is the root of its own destruction, it is a transition and not a conclusion, a means and not an ultimate end’. Fanon responds,

[e]very hand was a losing hand for me ... I wanted to be typically Negro - it was no longer possible. I wanted to be white - that was a joke. And, when I tried, on the level of ideas and intellectual activity, to reclaim my negritude, it was snatched away from me. Proof was presented that my effort was only a term in the dialectic ... When I read that page [in Sartre], I felt I had been robbed of my last chance (Fanon, 1986:132-3).

117 Parry (1994a) reaches this conclusion having traced these oscillations through a number of his last works. Fanon’s work is notoriously contradictory and thus impossible to finally ‘pin down’ in general. See Gates (1991) on his contradictions and for a detailed argument of the many and diverse readings of Fanon in the post-colonial literature.
If the discourses and practices of White domination denied Black agency and *négritude* was just the antithesis in a dialectic, a moment of transition to an ultimate synthesis, Fanon came to consider the answer was the assertion of agency through violence: ‘At the level of individuals, violence is a cleansing force. It frees the native from his inferiority complex and from his despair and inaction; it makes him fearless and restores his self-respect’ (Fanon, 1967:74). Writing during the Algerian war of independence, he saw the aim of the revolution as the establishment of Black nation-states. The settlers would have to be killed or expelled since, Fanon (1967:35) argues, they have no desire to co-exist anyway unless under colonial conditions. Not only would the settlers be physically removed from the new nation, so too would their epistemology and values. As he famously argues in the ‘Conclusion’ to *Wretched of the Earth*: ‘Leave this Europe where they are never done talking of Man, yet murder men wherever they find them’ (Fanon, 1967:251).

The relationship between his wavering support for *négritude* and his espousal of revolutionary violence is unclear. Josefson (undated, p11 of 12), for example, argues for the dialectical relation between these two, that is, that the revolutionary struggle should be understood in Hegelian terms as the necessary movement to gain recognition for the new Black identity. There is certainly support for this interpretation in his distinction between the fate of the Negro in the French colonies, who has been *granted* freedom, and that of the American Black, who has to *struggle* for their freedom. Fanon considered struggle to be necessary for real freedom:

The former [French] slave, who can find in his memory no trace of the struggle for liberty or of that anguish of liberty of which Kierkegaard speaks, sits unmoved before the young white man singing and dancing on the tightrope of existence.

When it does happen that the Negro looks fiercely at the white man, the white man tells him: “Brother, there is no difference between us.” And yet the Negro *knows* that there is a difference. He *wants* it. He wants the white man to turn on him and shout: “Damn nigger.” Then he would have that unique chance - to “show them ...”

But most often there is nothing - nothing but indifference, or a paternalistic curiosity.

The former slave needs a challenge to his humanity, he wants a conflict, a riot. The French Negro is doomed to bite himself and just to bite (Fanon, 1986:221).
However, in his extended discussion of the need for revolutionary violence in *The Wretched of the Earth* (Fanon, 1967:27-84), this Hegelian dialectic is replaced by a non-dialectical view of the division between coloniser and colonised and the argument that the colonising side of this relation is superfluous and must be destroyed. Speaking of the geographical zones of the colonial city, Fanon (1967:31) argues,

> [t]o break up the colonial world does not mean that after the frontiers have been abolished lines of communication will be set up between the two zones. The destruction of the colonial world is no more and no less than the abolition of one zone, its burial in the depths of the earth or its expulsion from the country.

Bhabha (1994:61) argues that this observation about the geography of the colonial relation reflected Fanon’s view of its psychic structure also. Thus, Fanon is acknowledging that ‘[n]o conciliation is possible ... for of the two terms one is superfluous’ (Bhabha, 1994:62). Beatrice Hanssen similarly argues that, in the call to violence, Fanon came to see the opposition between settler and native as a violation of Aristotle’s principle of noncontradiction:

> Ruled by an Aristotelean, not Hegelian (or dialectical) logic of contradiction in which mediation was still possible, colonialism now proved governed by a ruthless antagonism, in which adversaries sustained themselves by a fierce desire for substitution, without the aspiration for reciprocal recognition (Hanssen, 2000:150).

Overall, given the oscillations and tensions within his work, it is impossible to come to a final conclusion regarding Fanon’s position on the possibilities of the Hegelian dynamic of recognition. Two possible positions arise from this brief discussion. Either Fanon saw the master-slave relation of domination and subjection as the final word on recognition, and revolution as the rejection of the dialectical logic altogether in favour of the assertion of Black nationalism and the destruction of the settler. Alternatively, he saw revolutionary action as the next move in a dialectical development towards a more genuinely universal humanism, in which relations of recognition across difference could be possible.\(^\text{118}\) Even if Fanon retained hope for reciprocal relations of recognition across

\(^{118}\) See the conclusion of *Wretched of the Earth* and discussion of his continuing espousal of humanism in, for example, Parry (1994a), Alessandrini (2000) and Hanssen (2000).
difference arising out of the revolutionary struggle, how that violence was to bring about this expanded recognition remains unaccounted for. Gates (1991:469) suggests he envisaged decolonisation creating a ‘kind of tabula rasa’; Hanssen (2000:150) refers to ‘obliterating violence’. The idea that violence might bring about a new beginning seems a rather utopian view of the powers and aftermath of violence to say the least, particularly coming from one who so eloquently described its destructive and distorting force in his analysis of the coloniser-colonised relation. Finally then, the enduring power of Fanon’s work is in this detailing of the psycho-social impact of the master-slave relation. The unresolved tensions he exhibits may best be seen as further evidence of the agonistic bind created by this relation, which he illuminated so clearly for his readers.
Conclusion

In this chapter, through the analysis of the speech dynamics of the ‘silenced ear’ and the ‘conversation through things’, I have demonstrated how Pakeha speech and interaction with Maori leads to the relational constitution of Maori and Pakeha as coloniser and colonised.

Thus, the conflictual speech between coloniser and colonised constructs identities in an oppositional relation in which Pakeha speakers seek to dominate via their silenced ear and incessant speech about things they can neither properly confront nor let go. Despite the assertion that colonisation wasn’t all bad, or was in fact beneficial, there can be no settlement in this relation. Rather, as Gurevitch (2001:91) says, ‘[t]he desire to free oneself of the forced hearing of the Other’s voice, only repeats that voice, albeit in “misreading” and variation’. The neurotic nature of this relation illuminates the difficulties Jones reports in attempts to overcome it. Even good intentions cannot in themselves overcome the sedimented practices and attitudes of history or the desires the neurosis arouses.

Knowledge has a key role in this interaction. In their repressive ‘conversation’ Pakeha wield knowledge as a weapon. ‘Counter facts’ are used to defend against the comparative appeal between Maori suffering and those of others; and facts operate as an offensive weapon in the resort to reductive representations of Maori as other. Specifically, Turia and de Bres are subject to personal insults and the primitivist language of cannibalism and barbarism is resorted to as the explanation for the Maori plight. By recourse to these strategies the appeals to cross-cultural respect and empathic engagement are avoided. Thus, these dynamics of the ‘conversation through things’ indicate how, even when Maori do call for Pakeha to support their project of recovery, (many) Pakeha continue to refuse to ‘hear’. This refusal suggests a ‘no-win’ situation for Maori, who are greeted with hostility and resentment whether they seek separation or engagement.

Interpretations and evaluations of the struggle for recognition between master and slave, and of the possibilities for overcoming these dynamics, differ widely. The ‘pessimistic’
or anti-Hegelian view is that the relationship of master and slave describes the final outcome of the struggle for recognition. In other words, the end point of the struggle for recognition is a relation of domination and subjection. From this viewpoint, the only possible alternative to any particular relation of domination is its reversal, the slave via violent struggle taking the place of the master, as in Fanon’s espousal of revolution. The ‘optimistic’ or neo-Hegelian view is that this relation outlines a stage which can be superceded by relations of reciprocal recognition of self and other as equals. This view relies on the assumption that the relation of lord and bondsman is ultimately satisfactory for neither. The bondsman is not granted recognition and is reduced to a sub-human status. The lord, on the other hand, is recognised by the bondsman as a self-consciousness, but the forced recognition of an enslaved being is not ultimately satisfying.

Fanon, as we have seen, remained caught between these two visions. Ultimately, he cannot give us a clear direction on the future possibilities of struggles for recognition. However, from the ‘optimistic’ viewpoint his work can be read as highlighting the effects of failures of recognition, failures attributable to the imposition of representations of otherness that have provided powerful justifications for relations of domination and practices of exclusion. Hence the harms of misrecognition, or nonrecognition, arise out of the internalisation of these images by the other, as Fanon detailed, but also out of the material relations of domination justified by these practices of discursive misrecognition.

Read in this way, the ideal of recognition across difference depends on struggles to change these representations and the social relations they support and justify. Thus, calls for greater understanding and knowledge of the other (that is, knowledge that ‘fits’ with their cultural self-representation) made by individuals such as Turia and de Bres, seek to address the issue of changing representations of the excluded, marginalised other. Turia and de Bres clearly consider there is a relationship between this extension of knowledge of Maori on the part of non-Maori New Zealanders, and the wider aim of reconstituting social relations to be more inclusive and respectful of the cultural differences and values of Maori. From this ‘optimistic’, neo-Hegelian viewpoint it must be that, as in the case
of the struggle that leads to the constitution of master and slave, the struggle to achieve a more ‘congruent’ recognition of cultural difference is one which does not lead to the annihilation of one party. Rather than a literal interpretation of Fanon’s (1967:73) assertion that: ‘[f]or the native, life can only spring up again out of the rotting corpse of the settler’, recognition of the dominated requires a symbolic and material displacement/decentring of the dominating settler subject. Even without recourse to Hegel’s dialectical logic, the pursuit of the possibility of respectful recognition of cultural differences is a sociological and political necessity. In the contemporary context of dynamic, multi-ethnic polities continually adapting to new migratory movements, the vision of ‘ethnically-cleansed’ national homelands seems neither a likely nor a desirable solution. It is in acknowledgment of this contemporary cultural-political context that Charles Taylor (1994) seeks to develop a theory of recognition applicable to liberal Western societies.
To experience difference in equality is easier said than done (Todorov, 1984:249).

We might recognise the possibilities for different views of reality, but it isn’t possible to see anyone else’s with the same assurance of knowledge that we bring to our own. In recognition of this, we must therefore question the notion of any uniform criteria for ability or intelligence within a pluralist society (Turia, 5/10/00, p2 of 4).

**Introduction**

While knowledge of the other has been linked to the practice of domination throughout this thesis, Turia and de Bres hold out the hope that greater and more ‘accurate’ knowledge of the self-representations of Maori, can lead to greater Pakeha understanding of, and respect for, Maori cultural difference. This is a view also held within recognition theory. Here I focus on the theory of Charles Taylor, one of the pre-eminent recognition ‘optimists’. There are two reasons why I have chosen to focus this discussion on the work of Taylor, rather than on that of the other pre-eminent recognition theorist, Axel Honneth.\(^\text{119}\) Firstly, Taylor’s theorisation of recognition

\(^{119}\) For Honneth’s theory of recognition see Honneth (1995), Fraser and Honneth (2003), the *Theory, Culture and Society* (Featherstone and Lash, 2001) special issue on ‘Recognition and
directly addresses the issue of the struggles for, and possibilities of, recognition of cultural difference. Honneth, in contrast, presents a theory of the expansion of rights in general, without focussing on particular groups involved in rights’ struggles. Taylor is concerned with how liberalism, with its privileging of issues of individual rights and freedoms, can accommodate the demands for recognition of collective forms of difference. Secondly, Taylor acknowledges the need to find ways to engage across substantively different cultural value commitments. In the debates within political philosophy over the necessary foundations of a pluralist liberal polity, Taylor is labelled a communitarian, critical of the opposing proceduralist view that abstracted, universal procedures can secure justice for all in the pluralist society. Against this, communitarians argue that standards of justice differ from culture to culture and that this difference must be respected. Hence, Taylor’s work is interesting in the context of the need to find a mode of interaction between self and other that can accommodate epistemological pluralism (the ‘facticity’ of Maori difference). This is what Taylor seeks in developing his theory of recognition - a means for the Western liberal polity to respond to the substantive cultural difference of minority groups within its borders. Within the context of that inquiry, Taylor himself is committed to the values/culture of liberalism. In other words, the values of Western liberalism are the ‘substantive’ values he himself seeks to defend within the context of the engagement with difference. He espouses liberalism as ‘a fighting creed’ (Taylor, 1994:62), which he seeks to defend by expanding and modifying its parameters to engage with cultural difference ‘without compromising our basic political principles’ (Taylor, 1994:63). In doing so, Taylor develops key distinctions between various forms of recognition and explores the compatibility of demands for recognition with liberalism’s own value commitments.

In this chapter, I discuss the two distinct forms of recognition that comprise Taylor’s theory. The following section deals with his argument for the expansion of the category of equal dignity to include collective cultural rights. I argue that this is a useful expansion of liberalism towards an accommodation of cultural difference. I then turn to his argument for the recognition of cultural difference, which is the focus of the following three sections. In the first of these I outline Taylor’s theory; the second turns to Tariana Turia’s argument for recognition of Maori difference as a point of comparison to Taylor’s view; and in the third I present my critique of Taylor. I argue that in Taylor’s theory for the recognition of cultural difference, the liberal self remains dominant. Rather than working to recognise epistemological pluralism, I argue its effect is the homogenisation and consumption of difference. Further, his theorisation of intersubjectivity is not radical enough, but posits relations between already (autonomously) constituted subjects. While Taylor seeks the resolution to relations of domination solely within the terrain of epistemology through reciprocal recognition, Turia, in contrast, underpins her appeal for a ‘better’ (and pluralist) epistemological relation by invoking an ethical relation of concern for Maori on the part of Pakeha. Exploring this ethical turn will be the subject of the next chapter.

**Equal dignity and collective cultural rights**

Taylor’s (1994:37) discussion differentiates at the outset between two forms of recognition that operate within public life - the recognition of equal dignity and the recognition of difference.\(^{120}\) He argues that both these forms are relevant to meeting the demands for recognition of collectively held cultural differences, not just the second, as the terminology might suggest. The politics of equal dignity is based on the idea that all humans are equally worthy of respect in that they are capable of self-determining autonomy (Taylor, 1994:41). It has thus been central to arguments for the universalisation and equalisation of rights and entitlements associated with liberal

\(^{120}\) This distinction between the recognition of equality and difference is common within the recognition literature. A variation appears in Honneth’s (1995) theory, in his conceptualisation of the categories of equal respect and (differentiated) social esteem. Almost all of the contemporary recognition debates depend on either Taylor’s or Honneth’s models. Maria Pia Lara (1998) is the exception here, as she also draws on Paul Ricoeur’s (1992) *Oneself as Another.*
citizenship. These rights can be seen to encompass civil and political rights only or, following T.H. Marshall (1973), can be extended to socioeconomic rights which are argued to be necessary to the exercise of full citizenship status.

Taylor argues that a Kantian model of the politics of equal dignity can be extended further to include collective cultural rights. He uses the case of the recognition of Franco-phone cultural rights within Quebec to exemplify this argument (Taylor, 1994:51-61). In particular, he refers to policies which support the survival of a French-speaking community. Taylor acknowledges that such policies involve restrictions on individual freedoms and can be construed as discriminatory, as all are not treated alike. However, he argues they are justifiable within a liberal framework on the grounds of the collective goal of survival of the cultural community - ‘a good [that] requires that it be sought in common’ (Taylor, 1994:59) and cannot be left to individual (self-determining) choice. Consequently, Taylor concludes that liberalism can be ‘difference-friendly’ in respect of the collective goals of cultural survival, with the importance of individual freedoms and collective goals being weighed against each other in specific cases. Thus, against some versions of liberalism Taylor is prepared to put the collective before the individual, in line with his communitarian belief in that the individual is not a self-sufficient monad, but requires a community in which to flourish.

This extension of the categories of rights associated with the concept of equal dignity provides a welcome accommodation of political projects of cultural survival, providing a powerful basis within liberal political philosophy from which to continue these struggles for forms of autonomous cultural provision. As such, the development of this kind of extension of the category of equal dignity provides an important support for the ‘recovery’ projects of groups such as Maori, whose ways of life are threatened within contexts in which they are minorities.

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121 Specifically, he lists the requirements that: 1. Franco-phone and immigrant families send their children to French-language, rather than English-language, schools; 2. businesses with more than 50 employees be run in French; and 3. all commercial signage be in French (Taylor, 1994:52-3).
This assertion of recognition theory is, however, criticised for its favouring of collective over individual rights and also on the grounds that the practices of defining group identities, as required to carry out such policies, constitute an unacceptable ‘rigidification’ of culture. Nancy Fraser, for example, argues that the recognition of difference risks leading to ‘repressive forms of communitarianism’ (Fraser, 2001:24). While Taylor is comfortable with the rights of the collective overriding those of the individual in the interests of survival, Anthony Appiah (1994:156) for example, is less sure on this score. His concern is that the demands of the politics of recognition constrain the identity choices of those ‘identifiably’ within the collectivity. They are expected to wish to publicly identify as Black, or Maori, or to raise their children speaking French:

The politics of recognition requires that one’s skin color, one’s sexual body, should be acknowledged politically in ways that make it hard for those who want to treat their skin and their sexual body as personal dimensions of the self. And personal means not secret, but not too tightly scripted (Appiah, 1994:63).

A possible mode of accommodation of Appiah’s concerns could be for forms of institutional support for cultural survival to be available as a matter of choice, rather than the compulsion of Taylor’s example of Franco-phone Quebec. This is the situation that currently exists in Aotearoa New Zealand, where individuals/families can ‘choose’ to send their children to kaupapa M_ori schools, or to attend Maori-centred health centres and so on, but there is no compulsion to do so. However, the reality of this favouring of individual choice over collective rights is that ‘choice’ is in fact limited. Without explicit state recognition of Maori rights to a Maori-centred social life, access to these services remain limited and their provision sites of struggle. Consequently, Taylor’s preparedness to embrace individual compulsion in the interests of collective survival is an important form of recognition to protect the ‘facticity’ of the cultural differences of minorities.

The second point of critique of the recognition of collective cultural rights, centres on the necessary ‘rigidification’, or ‘scriptedness’ in Appiah’s terms, of definitions of culture involved in the institutionalisation of cultural practices. As the discussion in Chapter Five suggested, some categorisation of ‘substance’ is necessary to the assertion
of cultural autonomy and the rejection of assimilation. But ‘substantialism’ per se is not the same as the rigid imposition of essentialist definitions of culture. Any tendencies towards rigidity in the institutionalisation of culture can be minimised by the utilisation of diverse and broad definitions of identity. The minimalist descent-based definition of Maori identity discussed in Chapter Five, and widely used within Aotearoa New Zealand as the basis for provision to affirmative action programmes for example, leaves the expression of Maori identity open to whatever articulation of tradition and change Maori individuals and groups create, while without recognition of Maori difference, Maori have markedly less choice of self-expression. Furthermore, while a degree of ‘scriptedness’ is an unavoidable aspect of the politics of recognition, we must also remember that ‘scriptedness’ is not simply a function of the politics of recognition. It is clear from the analysis of Part I of this thesis that, as a colonised people, Maori are subject to demands from Pakeha for a high degree of ‘scriptedness’. Where the ‘scriptedness’ of recognition theory differs, and represents an advance, is in turning to the identity ‘scripts’ that subordinated groups seek to claim for themselves, that is to their self-representations, rather than those imposed by others.

In sum, in keeping with my argument for the ‘facticity’ of difference, I favour Taylor’s position on the expansion of equal dignity to include collective cultural rights over the critics of recognition theory. Taylor’s expansion of equal dignity is integral to this project of accommodating difference, his recognition of the collective self-determining autonomy of the cultural other being fundamental to the survival of cultural difference. This form of recognition enables the production and reproduction of cultural difference by justifying a range of economic, political and institutional supports for these practices of culture. To consider how the resulting ‘facticity’ of difference should be recognised/related to, I turn now to Taylor’s argument for the recognition of cultural difference.

**Difference, respect and equal cultural worth**

Taylor (1994:39) argues that the need for the second form of recognition, the recognition of difference, arises out of the first. His expanded version of equal dignity
encompasses recognition of the self-determining autonomy of collectivities. It follows from that, that each collective will make something unique out of that capacity, for which they will then seek further recognition, that is, the recognition of their cultural difference itself. Taylor (1994:42) argues that this demand for the recognition of difference involves two distinct claims. The first is that each collective should be recognised as having a *universally shared potential* to develop a unique identity. The second, which Taylor argues has arisen more recently in intercultural contexts, is the claim that ‘actually evolved cultures’ be accorded *equal respect*.

In terms of this second form of recognition of difference, Taylor presents a more complex picture of what is required to meet the demands of culturally different collectivities. He argues that, in this regard, there are limits to the extension of recognition from the liberal viewpoint (Taylor, 1994:62). In keeping with his communitarian commitments and against the view that liberalism is culturally neutral, he acknowledges the limits to its compatibility with other cultural frameworks. Thus, some forms of difference will not be able to be recognised within the liberal polity. However, he acknowledges also that, in the culturally complex societies of today, the demand that cultural differences be recognised as of equal worth cannot be easily dismissed. In exploring this demand, Taylor focuses on the North American debate over the extension of the literary ‘canon’ to include the work of women and non-White authors. He argues that calls for the extension of the canon are based on the view, arising out of recognition theory, that the focus on ‘dead White males’ works to demean the self-image of female and non-White students, thus inflicting a harm of misrecognition (Taylor, 1994:65).

The associated critique of the canon, he argues, is that the current judgments of worth which guide inclusion are wrong, ‘marred by narrowness or insensitivity, or even worse, a desire to downgrade the excluded’ (Taylor, 1994:66). Thus, the call for greater

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122 Here he notes the critique of Western liberalism’s links to colonial domination as well as the general issue of the importance (from a neo-Hegelian perspective) of public recognition. He refers to Fanon as influential in exemplifying both these points (Taylor, 1994:63-5).
inclusivity in the canon is also a call for changes to be made to the criteria for judgment or for the abandonment of judgment. Taylor (1994:70) dismisses the latter option as patronising, and therefore lacking in the respect that is precisely what is sought in relations of recognition. He characterises this position as sourced in ‘subjectivist, half-baked neo-Nietzschean theories’ which, he argues, hope to escape the charge of condescension by turning the entire issue into one of power and counterpower. Then the question is no more one of respect, but of taking sides, of solidarity. But this is hardly a satisfactory solution, because in taking sides they miss the driving force of this kind of politics, which is precisely the search for recognition and respect (Taylor, 1994:70).

Thus Taylor (1994:69) argues strongly that the demand for recognition of difference is precisely a demand for judgment and, as such, must be ‘independent of our own wills and desires, it cannot be dictated by a principle of ethics’.

In terms of calls for changes to the grounds for cultural judgment, Taylor argues that such calls amount to the demand for the recognition of equal worth. Precipitate acquiescence to this demand, he argues, would result in ethnocentric judgments, as liberal Westerners ‘implicitly and unconsciously will cram the others into our categories’ (Taylor, 1994:71). Rather, what is needed prior to granting recognition of equal worth is the long study of the culture(s) in question and judgment being made of their contribution to human society. Thus, for Taylor, relations of recognition are epistemological, rather than ethical. They are constituted in learning about each other. In this process, in keeping with the communitarian commitment to the validity of different cultural frameworks, each side must be open to the possibility that they may learn something from the other. Taylor (1994:69) acknowledges that debate rages over the possibility of making objective judgments over competing values, but asserts that appropriate criteria for such judgment of cultural difference must be attainable. While he does not outline his argument on this in ‘The Politics of Recognition’, he refers readers to an earlier work (Taylor, 1989, Part I). These kinds of judgments, he argues, suppose ‘a fused horizon of standards ... they suppose that we have been transformed by the study of the other, so that we are not simply judging by our original familiar
standards’ (Taylor, 1994:70, emphasis added). Thus Taylor’s judgment of worth depends on an epistemological relation, but one construed as mutual and reciprocal, rather than dominating and reductive, one in which the epistemological frameworks of both parties are transformed and their horizons ‘fused’.

While this lengthy study is going on, Taylor argues, there has to be a mid-way point between what he terms the ‘homogenising demand’ for recognition of equal worth and a refusal to engage across cultural difference at all. That midway is the ‘presumption of equal worth’, which we owe others as a logical extension of the politics of equal dignity: ‘withholding the presumption is tantamount to a denial of equality’ (Taylor, 1994:68). This presumption, he argues, is the ‘stance we take as we embark on the study of the other’, grounded in the assumption that cultures that have provided the horizon of meaning for large numbers of human beings, of diverse characters and temperaments, over a long period of time ... are almost certain to have something that deserves our admiration and respect, even if it is accompanied by much that we have to abhor and reject (Taylor, 1994:72-3).

In sum, for Taylor the recognition of cultural difference is fundamentally epistemological in form and involves judgments of the worth of the ‘facticity’ of difference. That is, respect for the worth of the culture of the other can only be granted after the study of the epistemological ‘substance’ of the culture concerned. This ‘worth’ is to be established by a process of objective judgment which also involves the transformation of the judging (Western) self. Arguments that respect be granted as an expression of solidarity and/or on the basis of ethical commitments, rather than within this epistemological relation, are dismissed as patronising and disrespectful. Thus Taylor rejects ethics as irrelevant to the practice of recognition which is to underpin the multicultural polity.

**Recognition of colonial harm and ethical and epistemological relations**
Tariana Turia’s speech to the New Zealand Psychological Society conference provides a useful case to compare with Taylor’s prescription for the recognition of cultural difference. Turia, in the three speeches she gave to psychological and psychiatric audiences in 2000, does assert a claim for the recognition of Maori cultural difference as relevant to these professions. She argues that these professionals need to learn about Maori psychological models to treat their Maori clients in culturally appropriate ways. While the nature of Maori cultural difference is more detailed in the second and third speeches, the first speech is interesting because it is here that Turia presents her case as to why non-Maori psychologists should engage with this difference. Fundamental to her reasoning is a call for recognition of the suffering caused by colonisation and recognition of the link between that history of suffering and contemporary Maori mental health problems.

In her outline of colonial harm, Turia points both to acts of physical violence and displacement and to acts of epistemological violence, the ‘internalisation by Maori of the images the oppressor has of them’ (Turia, 29/8/00, p2 of 4). While I critique Taylor’s theory in more detail in the following section, here I note that even though he does acknowledge the harms of misrecognition, he gives no attention to the need for ‘correction’ to those harms in his theory. Taylor’s arguments as to why liberal Westerners should recognise cultural difference are philosophical and pragmatic. Philosophically, he argues that such demands are a logical extension of the liberal politics of equal dignity and thus, liberals owe it to themselves to take this next step. Pragmatically, he points to the need to recognise cultural difference in a world of multicultural societies. In contrast, Turia argues for this recognition as a form of ‘healing’ of harm, invoking an ethical obligation of concern for the other. She cites an indigenous psychologist:

Native American Psychologist Eduardo Duran suggests in referring to Native Americans that the colonial oppression suffered by indigenous people inevitably wounds the soul. He also says that for any effective therapy to take place the historical context of generations of oppression since colonial contact needs to be articulated, acknowledged and understood (Turia, 29/8/00, p2 of 4).

Later Turia repeats this point on her own behalf in relation to the Maori experience:
‘The holocaust suffered by many Maori tribes during the Land Wars needs to be acknowledged. Only then will the healing for Maori occur’ (Turia, 29/8/00, p3 of 4). This societal issue of recognition of colonial harm is also linked directly to the practice of psychology:

   The challenge I put to you is - do you seriously believe that you, with the training you get, are able to nurture the Maori psyche, are you able to see in to the soul of the people and attend to the wounded spirit? Do you consider for example the effects of the trauma of colonisation? (Turia, 29/8/00, p2 of 4).

In Chapter Six, I outlined how Turia appealed to her audience to acknowledge that history of suffering by acts of cultural translation, making comparisons to other instances of suffering she knew they would acknowledge. In doing so she attempted to extend an existing shared understanding of suffering to include the colonial suffering of Maori. Turia also made a second form of appeal to her audience through directly invoking commonality between Maori and other New Zealanders - commonality based on the invocation of a shared identity as New Zealanders and, with it, the shared colonial history of New Zealand:

   I just want us to consider our history as a country and consider how this history has affected the indigenous people, how this history has impacted on Maori whanau, hapu and iwi. I really do believe that mature, intelligent New Zealanders of all races are capable of the analysis of the trauma of one group of people suffering from the behaviour of another (Turia, 29/8/00, p1 of 4).

Thus, in calling for the recognition of colonial harm, Turia appeals to a solidarity she invokes on the basis of the shared history of Maori and Pakeha. Effectively, she asserts that Maori and Pakeha are ‘entangled’ and their respective fates consequently concern one another, Pakeha should be concerned with Maori suffering because of their close relation with Maori. In sum, and in clear contrast to Taylor’s rejection of ethics and solidarity, she invokes an ethical relation of concern for the (Maori) other as the foundation to her appeal for the recognition of colonial harm.

\[123\] I take this term from Saïd (1993:36), who writes of the overlapping and intertwined nature of the cultures constituted in colonisation. Also see Reilly (1996).
Briefly, there are three steps to Turia’s argument. Enumerating these shows how they work to combine ethical and epistemological relations. Firstly, she argues that her non-Maori audience need to recognise and to learn about (to study, as Taylor says) Maori (epistemological) differences.

Does your training and education address issues like the nature of the Maori kai tiaki, the spiritual guardian all Maori have? What if I told you I have been visited a number of times by my kai tiaki and had carried out a conversation? What if I said to you that my kai tiaki had cautioned me about a particular action? What for example is mate Maori? (Maori sickness) What is makutu? What is the nature of the rau kotahi; the multiple self? (Turia, 29/8/00, p4 of 4).

Secondly, she seeks to convince them of the need for this knowledge by arguing that to fail to acquire it is to inflict a form of harm on Maori. Here she invokes an ethical concern for the fate of the other and seeks to elicit their empathic engagement through her comparative examples of suffering. Thirdly, she argues that Maori suffering concerns them as New Zealanders who share the legacy of the history of colonisation. Again, in this argument she invokes an ethical concern, this time on the basis of a solidaristic appeal to commonality.

This challenge to the psychological and psychiatric professions to learn more about Maori cultural beliefs and to engage with Maori models of psychological health is developed in more detail in the subsequent two speeches Turia gave to such audiences in 2000. However, I am particularly interested here in the relative positioning and combination of the ethical and epistemological relations in Turia’s argument, in comparison to the singular epistemological relation we find in Taylor. Turia certainly asks her non-Maori audience to recognise Maori cultural difference. She does not, however, submit the categories of Maori mental health and Maori psychology to these experts for judgment. She simply asserts their equal validity (to Western models) and expects her audience to accept it. That is, recognition of difference in her account is

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124 In her speech to the Royal Australia and New Zealand College of Psychiatrists (Turia, 5/10/00) Turia discusses the need for recognition of Maori difference and diversity and outlines aspects of kaupapa Maori psychiatric treatment. In her speech to the Schizophrenia Fellowship of New Zealand (Turia, 8/11/00) she centres on the importance of wh_nau in the treatment of Maori mental health patients.
recognition of the equal \textit{validity} of difference. Nor does she seek a ‘fusion of horizons’ when she calls on these mental health professionals to learn about Maori psychology. Rather, she calls for a \textit{pluralisation} of models. She does not argue that Maori psychological models should be ‘fused’ with those of Western psychology, but that they are appropriate \textit{for} Maori. Finally, unlike Taylor, Turia appeals to solidarity and ethics as the foundation to the practice of recognition. She effectively says to her audience ‘because our fate concerns you, you should acknowledge the validity of our cultural difference and engage with it’.

\textbf{Assessing Taylor’s recognition of cultural difference}

There is much of value in Taylor’s careful staging and delineation of relations of recognition across difference. His expansion of the category of recognition of equal dignity to include collective cultural rights and the presumption of equal worth of cultural difference, that is, an orientation of respect for cultural differences, goes a long way towards meeting the demands for recognition by cultural groups. Taylor is also to be acknowledged for his honest espousal of the view that liberalism is a ‘fighting creed’ (Taylor, 1994:62) with its own value commitments. Consequently, he accepts that there is a limit to cultural commensurability. I have, however, two questions about the possible limitations of Taylor’s theory of the second form of recognition, the recognition of difference. Firstly, does his argument for the judgment of cultural difference replace relations of domination with relations of reciprocity as he suggests? Secondly, following from the discussion of Turia above, is a judgment of equal worth actually what cultural others seek when they appeal for recognition of their cultural difference?

For all his careful expansion of categories of recognition in search of forms of cross-cultural respect, Taylor’s argument for the judgment of equal worth remains open to the charges of ethnocentrism and homogenisation that he seeks to attribute to less nuanced positions than his own. There are a number of aspects of Taylor’s argument that are highly problematic from the viewpoint of those concerned with the historical violence the West has inflicted upon its others. These can be grouped under three headings: 1)
the practice of judgment he espouses; 2) the nature of the intersubjective relation between self and other upon which the argument is predicated; and 3) the conception of culture implicit in his argument.

Taylor’s description of the process of judgment of equal worth is worrying on a number of counts. Despite his assertions of mutual transformation and reciprocity, the culture of the liberal subject appears less vulnerable to judgment than the culture of the other, given their already ‘centred’ location within the liberal polity. While he talks of a ‘willingness to be open to comparative cultural study of the kind that must displace our horizons in the resulting fusions’ (Taylor, 1994:73, emphasis added), and although he does not expressly say so, if a point of incommensurability arises it will be the other who is expected to give way, or go away. The liberal self and its cultural other do not meet on neutral terrain and on equal terms. Consequently, the liberal subject is likely to be pleasurably expanded, rather than discomforted, by the process of cultural study, judgment and fusion, a relation between the West and its others that uncomfortably parallels colonial relations of domination and appropriation. In this sense, Taylor’s willingness to engage with otherness seems to parallel that expressed by Jones’ students, who sought to ‘know’ Maori difference, but only on terms which did not threaten their own secure centrality. This point about the imbalance, rather than equality, in Taylor’s argument is reinforced by Bhabha’s (1997:449) view that Taylor’s process of judgment assumes a (liberal, Western) ‘dialogic subject of culture’.
Further, there are problems with the constitution of the intersubjective relation which underpins Taylor’s theory. The first of these is related to the point above about the continuing centring of the liberal subject. For all his talk of the need for ‘reciprocal recognition among equals’ there is no suggestion that the liberal subject seeks or needs recognition from the other, as is implied by the argument that in the master-slave relation the master remains dissatisfied with the forced recognition of the slave (Yar, 2001:67). This means also, that although Taylor eloquently acknowledges the harm inflicted by misrecognition, this issue of harm or distortion of self-identity is applied only to the other:

The thesis is that our identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by the misrecognition of others, and so a person or group of people can suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves. Nonrecognition or misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being (Taylor, 1994:25-6).

The bias in his argument is implicit here in the suggestion that it is those in the minority, only those misrecognised by ‘the people or society around them’ whose identities are distorted. There is no acknowledgment that the dominating self is also a distorted self, whose identity will also be brought into question and subject to change in relations of genuine recognition. This reinforces the argument that Taylor’s espousal of a ‘fusion of horizons’ and ‘transformation’ suggests a less troublesome change, expanding and affirming the liberal self, rather than any possibility of the ‘decentring’ or discomforting of that self.

Taylor’s conceptualisation of the intersubjective relation is problematic in a second way also. Self and other are entirely separate and autonomously constituted in Taylor’s account. Despite his acknowledgment of Fanon, of the problems of Western colonial violence and the resulting harms of misrecognition, the liberal self and its others meet as if for the first time in Taylor’s account. It is telling that he turns to the multicultural debates over the canon in this instance, debates which tend to cohere around the rights of immigrant and Black communities. While all cultural ‘others’ have histories of harm
in relation to the West, these others, exemplified by immigrant communities, to Taylor’s mind at least, ‘arrive’ fully formed from ‘outside’ the liberal polity. By avoiding discussion of the rights and demands of indigenous communities, Taylor has made it easier for himself to slide over the already existing relations of domination through which both Western self and cultural other are constituted. This avoidance of the struggles of indigenous Canadians is an interesting choice for a Canadian philosopher discussing the politics of recognition. The consequence is that, when he talks about the reciprocity of recognition, he is concerned with the parameters and dynamics of a ‘new’ relationship, a relationship without history.

The assumption of the ‘wholeness’ of cultures that appears in Taylor’s arguments for judgment is problematic also (see Bhabha, 1997:450-1). In his argument for judgment of cultural worth, it is interesting that he slides from the specific example of the judgment of value of literary works, to an argument that what is being demanded is the equal valuing of whole cultures in toto. Whether or not this is actually a demand that is made and can be usefully addressed is one issue. Another is that the process he calls for assumes the knowability of cultural difference in a totalising sense. Taylor takes it for granted that, with enough time and study, difference can be known and judged in some final way which will then ground the granting or withholding of this final form of respect. These assumptions of ‘wholeness’ and knowability certainly depend on an overly simplistic image of cultural practice, which Taylor seems to use here to delay the day on which the liberal self must accommodate the difference of the other. I argue in contrast, that the need for judgments of value, and legitimation of cultural practices and values, occur on more particular and concrete terms, within specific spheres - education, justice, welfare practice and so on. Again, Taylor’s position on the knowability of the other is one that raises alarm bells from the viewpoint of the critiques of Western practices of domination. It is arguably such a concern with epistemological violence that underpins the neo-Nietzschean distrust of judgments of equal worth.

I want to turn now to my second question, of whether or not cultural others actually do seek a judgment of the worth of their difference as a mark of cross-cultural respect. Here again, Taylor’s lack of attention to the demands of indigenous peoples seems
apposite. Taylor suggests that, when it comes to the issue of recognition of substantive cultural differences, what is sought is a judgment of equal worth, a judgment he argues will result in a fusion of horizons transforming both parties. I am not convinced the West’s cultural others seek such judgments as he characterises them, or seek further ‘transformations’ in relation to the values of the West. Taylor’s theory relies on a spatial metaphor which sees struggles for recognition in terms of the excluded and marginalised seeking inclusion. In terms of the recognition of substantive differences, Taylor sees inclusion occurring through a fusion which brings the other into the centre.

However, indigenous peoples, and all who have experienced colonial domination, are wary of any argument on the part of the colonising West that may result in the reduction and assimilation of their distinctive cultural identities. Inclusion in the centre from this perspective looks suspiciously like assimilation. While Taylor (1994:70) asserts that cross-cultural relations cannot be an issue of ‘power and counterpower’ it is precisely power which has led to the centring of liberal culture and values in the first place. Consequently, what such peoples seek is not fusion, but the pluralisation of centres. Turia asserts as much. While she calls on Pakeha to learn about Maori cultural worldviews and psychological frameworks, she does not seek a resulting fusion of psychological practice. Rather she calls for the pluralisation of psychological models to accommodate Maori difference:

We might recognise the possibilities for different views of reality, but it isn’t possible to see anyone else’s with the same assurance of knowledge that we bring to our own. In recognition of this, we must therefore question the notion of any uniform criteria for ability or intelligence within a pluralist society. The ability of the psychiatry profession to respond in an appropriate and effective manner to a diversity of cultures and worldviews is required. For us in Aotearoa, this involves recognition and understanding of the diversity of world-

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125 I have borrowed this analysis of the spatial problematics of the rhetoric of inclusion and marginalisation from Jones (1999:306-7) who uses it to critique radical pedagogy.

126 The issue of power is apparent in Taylor’s acknowledgment that cultural survival requires some protection as a collective good. ‘Special’ protections, such as legislated educational provision in first languages, is necessary only because these cultural groups are in the position of political minorities. The English-speaking liberal majority does not need to define and legislate for their cultural practices and preferences.
views within whanau, hap_ and iwi (Turia, 5/10/00, p2 of 4).
Turia makes two points that contrast with Taylor’s argument here. To begin with, she questions the ability to ‘know’ the views of an-other, against Taylor’s confidence in the processes of study and judgment. Consequently, she does not present an image of ‘fusion’
arising out of such successful study, but of the pluralisation of socially valid forms of knowledge.

**Conclusion**

Taylor’s theorisation of the expansion of equal dignity to include collective cultural rights is a powerful justification for the assertion of the self-determining autonomy of cultural minorities. However, his theory of the recognition of *difference* ultimately shows its limits in terms of the failure of both his visions of reciprocity and of intersubjectivity. His ‘reciprocity’ is in fact asymmetrical, raising again all the problems of the dominating relation towards the other which reduces the other’s difference. The ‘facticity’ of difference is bound to undergo a degree of ‘homogenisation’ (Bhabha, 1997:450) in the process of ‘fusion of horizons’. Further, his version of the intersubjective relation has no history, but is to begin now. Against Taylor’s view of the distinct, already autonomously constituted self and other, as Turia argues we are faced with a situation of selves and others already mutually constituted through histories of misrecognition. In ignoring these histories, Taylor also fails to address the pressing issue of recognition of *harm*. As Margaret Urban Walker (2001:112-3) argues, while philosophers tend to seek answers to the question “What ought I to do?”, which implies a set of choices on a fresh page’, the question we are actually faced with is ‘What ought I (or we) do *now*?’ when harm has already been inflicted. A significant component of the answer to that question, from the viewpoint of those who have been harmed, is, as Turia’s speech exemplifies, an acknowledgment of those histories of harm as well as attention to their repair. The recognition of harm is a recognition that we are already intersubjectively connected.

Questions remain to be answered about what is required of that intersubjective connection in the shift from relations of domination to relations of coexistence. What mix of epistemological and ethical relations might underpin such a shift? How can Pakeha affirm/respond to Maori demands for an acceptance of epistemological pluralism? What are the implications of such a response for Pakeha identity itself? What does it mean, in practice, to talk of the ‘decentring’ of the Pakeha subject? While these
questions will be the subject of discussion in Chapter Eight, here I recap the discussion so far of epistemological and ethical relations.

Part I of this thesis investigated the epistemological politics of identity, ending with the assertion of epistemological pluralism in the form of Maori assertions of autonomous cultural difference. In Chapter Six (and throughout Part I) we saw how epistemology has been used in the service of domination. Taylor seeks to overcome those relations of domination, but argues strenuously that the resolution must be found on the terrain of epistemology itself. Intersubjective respect is an epistemological category for him. Turia likewise sees the epistemological relation as part of the solution to the problem of relations of domination. Pakeha colonial representational practices of misrecognition certainly need to be replaced with ‘better’ representations of Maori. Unlike Taylor, however, Turia seeks Pakeha acknowledgement of distinct Maori epistemologies and does not seek their fusion with Western systems of knowledge.

At the same time, against Taylor’s assumption of the ‘knowability’ of the other, Turia (5/10/00, p2 of 4) points to the difficulties in doing so. In this regard, it is significant that both Turia and de Bres resort to comparisons with ‘other others’ (the Taliban, the Holocaust) in their appeals to Pakeha understanding of Maori suffering. While Jones (1999) points to dangers in the link between the desire to ‘know’ and domination, Turia’s and de Bres’ use of comparisons points to the limits to the ability to ‘know’ the experience of the other. In the face of these difficulties, Turia and de Bres appeal to the experience of third parties and other instances of harm. Rather than detailing the Maori experience itself, Turia and de Bres compare it to the Jewish experience of the Holocaust and the experience of the victims of the Taliban. If the experience of the other is ultimately unknowable, they at least suggest some understanding is possible in the appeal that ‘It is like this’. In combination with the clear dangers of epistemological violence, this resort to comparisons is another reminder of the problems of epistemological engagement as a foundation for coexistence.

Indeed, as discussed above, epistemology is not the foundation for the relation between Maori and Pakeha implicit in Turia’s speech. While the trajectory of recognition in
Taylor is from epistemology to respect, Turia’s argument suggests a trajectory from *ethics* to an epistemologically pluralist engagement, *informed by the ethical concern*. In other words, Turia calls for a (new) epistemological relation, which responds to an understanding of the historical problems of epistemological violence in Pakeha relations to Maori. Interestingly, the turn to ethics is Bhabha’s (1997, 1998) response to the problems of both Taylor’s and Fanon’s prescriptions regarding relations of reciprocal recognition. He cites Lévinas’ argument that ethics comes into play precisely ‘where subjects are united *neither by a synthetic understanding nor by a subject-object relation* but where one subject concerns or is meaningful to the other’ (Lévinas, 1987:116; in Bhabha, 1998:38, emphasis added). At this stage in this thesis, we have reached this point of rejection of a ‘synthetic understanding’ (Taylor’s ‘fusion of horizons’) and of the subject-object relation (the master-slave/coloniser-colonised relation). To turn to ethics and relations of concern between self and other, seems then a useful avenue that remains to be explored. In doing so I seek to extend the theorisation of intersubjectivity ‘all the way down’, counter to Taylor’s assumption of already constituted subjects meeting as if for the first time. I also seek to explore the relationship between ethics and epistemology in the characterisation of intersubjective relations that can underpin non-dominating coexistence.
Chapter Eight

Ethical relations
and the politics of disappointment

The relationship with the other is not an idyllic and harmonious relationship of communion, or a sympathy through which we put ourselves in the other’s place; we recognize the other as resembling us, but exterior to us; the relationship with the other is a relationship with a Mystery (Lévinas, 1989:43).

Faced with the seemingly inevitable entanglement of benevolence, desire, and colonization, liberal and radical Pakeha have little choice but to engage in the hard work of learning about their own and our own histories and social privileges in relation to ethnic others, and to embrace positively a “politics of disappointment” that includes a productive acceptance of ignorance of the other (Jones, 1999:315).

Introduction

I have argued that Tariana Turia’s appeals to her psychological audience are founded on the assertion of an ethical relationship between Pakeha and Maori. To begin the exploration of the ethical relation with which this chapter is concerned, I return in the first instance to the work of Homi Bhabha. As outlined in Chapter Four, Bhabha’s argument that identity has no substance but relies on performance is the most radically social theorisation of the constitution of identity canvassed in Part I. However, I argued that Bhabha’s characterisation of performative hybridity is problematic in centring
purely on resistance to (epistemological) identity claims. In short, while critical of the violence of epistemological relations, this theory offers no insights into the possibilities of any other mode of intersubjective relation. Bhabha does, however, and particularly in more recent work, turn to Lévinasian ethics in his invocations of the possibility of solidarity and a non-dominating intersubjective relation, operating ‘outside’ epistemology. He also responds to Taylor’s theory of recognition. This recent work of Bhabha’s then, provides a useful hinge between identity theory, recognition and ethics.

Bhabha rejects Taylor’s recognition theory as both dominating and homogenising, but argues that ‘freedom and cultural survival’ can be sought in the midst of ‘wars of recognition’ (Bhabha, 1998:39). Thus the dynamics of, and desires and struggles for, recognition still find a place in his account. This is a modified understanding of recognition however, based on the rejection of the Hegelian dialectic. In construing self and other in terms of thesis and antithesis, the Hegelian dialectic is too binary for Bhabha. We have seen the violence and reduction of binary oppositions at work in the constitution of master and slave. What is required to move beyond relations of domination is to break out of this binarism which denies the mutual constitutiveness of its poles. Further, the oppositional assumptions of the dialectic cannot account for the intertwined similarity and difference of self and other. In contrast, dialectical logic posits discrete entities, brought together in synthesis, a moment which Bhabha (1997:449-50) also rejects.

Against this theory of recognition, Bhabha (1997, 1998) argues for a theorisation of proximity as the basis for the development of an ethical relation between self and other, a relation of care and responsibility, a relation of entanglement. He outlines the basics of his position in a key passage where he discusses the colonial relation in Fanon:

[I]n the performative process of revolution as action and agency - the search for equality and freedom - natives discover that their life, breath, and beating hearts are the same as those of settlers: “The Negro is not. Any more than the white man”. This ethical-political proximity is antagonistic to the Manichean compartments of the racial divide and sets the scene for the ethics of revolution. In Fanon’s revolutionary creed, “the thing which has been colonized becomes
man during the same process by which it frees itself”. However, this “thing” is not simply the colonizer and the colonized. It is the historical relationality, the interstitial in-between that defines and divides them into antagonistic subjects ... The “thing” represents the taking up of a position, as Emmanuel Lévinas would say, beyond the ontological consciousness of difference, in relation to the anxiety of a liberatory history whose object remains to be fulfilled. As Fanon explains, decolonization starts for the native with a blank page on which is inscribed the complete disorder of the desire for decolonization and the continuities of historical transformation of which it is a part. For the colonizer, the possibility of change is also experienced as a terrifying future. The anxious struggle for the historical consciousness of freedom that eschews transcendence - or a higher unity - derives from violence an ethics that takes responsibility for the other in the transformation of the “thing” (Bhabha, 1998:38).

This is a difficult and dense passage which I cannot fully elaborate in brief. Rather this elaboration is one of the major aims of this chapter. Immediately however, there are a number of key points to note. Firstly, the concept of proximity is situated within attempts, both within and following the phenomenological tradition, to theorise pre-reflective, or pre-epistemological modes of being and interaction. Thus, whenever Bhabha seeks to explain the proximate encounter between self and other his reference is to embodiment - ‘breath, and beating hearts’ (see also Bhabha, 1998:39). At this level there is an immediate (non-epistemological) recognition of sameness that, he argues, undercuts the binarism of the master-slave relation (and the Hegelian dialectic). Secondly, the focus of the struggle for freedom, from this perspective, is not the colonised and coloniser per se, but the ‘thing’, the relationality ‘that defines and divides them’. In a fully intersubjective account of the constitution of identities, it is this interstitial relation that is prior to identity, and that must first then be changed. Thirdly, the route to this change, that Bhabha suggests here, is via the establishment of an ethical relation with the other, a relation in which the self ‘takes responsibility for the other’. This suggestion offers an alternative interpretation of the violent life-and-death struggle in Hegel: ‘The anxious struggle for the historical consciousness of freedom that eschews transcendence - or a higher unity - derives from violence an ethics that takes
responsibility for the other in the transformation of the “thing” (Bhabha, 1998:38, emphasis added). Bhabha (ibid) argues that the turn to violence ‘does not represent Fanon’s final position or his sense of ethical reparation’. He argues instead that Fanon ultimately posits a proximate relation between coloniser and colonised in which, in their struggle for freedom, the colonised ‘must therefore weigh as heavily as [they] can upon the body of [their] torturer in order that his soul, lost in some byway, may find itself once more’ (Fanon, 1967; cited in Bhabha, 1998:39). This derivation of ethics from violence suggests that, rather than seeking the death or negation of the other in a struggle for domination, as in the master-slave relation, violence also offers the possibility of a relation which prioritises responsibility and concern for the other.

In brief, Bhabha suggests, against Taylor and recognition theory, that it is possible to seek an ethics that can found a non-dominating relation between self and other through a turn away from the epistemological to theories of pre-reflective interaction. While the phenomenological theorisation of pre-reflective modes of being encompasses the work of many philosophers, including Heidegger, Buber and Merleau-Ponty, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to provide a history of this tradition here. Rather, like Bhabha, I will centre on the work of Lévinas, touching on these others who influenced his work only as and when necessary to elucidate his sources and/or the specificity of his own contribution.

In the following section I briefly outline Lévinas’ theory of the ethical relation. Lévinas’ philosophy is particularly relevant to the issue of finding a basis to intersubjective relations ‘other than epistemology’, since at its core is a rejection of epistemological relations as inevitably acts of violence towards the other. Lévinas thus seeks a pre-epistemological foundation for the ethical relation. This radically anti-epistemological position has led to his ethics being criticised as too ‘saintly’ and of no practical use in the organisation of political life, which, by definition, involves epistemology - dialogue, reason, decision-making. In the second section of the chapter I explore these critiques, centring in particular on the work of feminist philosopher, Rosalyn Diprose. Diprose is sympathetic to much of Lévinas’ project, but rejects the ‘break’ between ethics and politics in his philosophy. Against Diprose, in the third section of the chapter I argue
that this break between ethics and politics is a point of strength in Lévinas’ philosophy and does not mean it offers no guidance to the conduct of political life. To exemplify how Lévinasian ethics might inform our political life, and to return to my concern with Maori and Pakeha relations, the chapter concludes with three sections dealing with specific examples of Maori-Pakeha interaction. These sections explore the tension between ethics and politics, seeing this tension in ‘generative’ terms. I look respectively at the ethics of greeting as an initiation to political engagement; at the (unethical) limits of epistemological engagement; and at the ‘politics of disappointment’ (Jones, 1999:315) as offering an orientation to politics, which, complemented by the Lévinasian ethical obligation, offers a way beyond colonial relations.

**Lévinas: proximity and the ethical relation**

Lévinas’ philosophy developed primarily in response to, and in reaction against, the work of Husserl and Heidegger, who are ‘always present’ in his writing (Peperzak, 1996:34). Through the phenomenological focus on experience and worldliness he sought to shift philosophy from the valorisation of abstract thought to a more human(e) enterprise centring on the historically and socially embedded nature of the human condition. In doing so, he continued the search, shared by Buber, Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger, for a basis to the intersubjective relation other than the egological constituting consciousness of Husserl’s philosophy. In Husserl the intersubjective relation remains a product of individual consciousness, in which the other can only be understood in terms of the (epistemological) categories of the self (see Dallmayr, 1981:42-8; Crossley, 1996:1-10), a problem which can be traced back to Hegel’s phenomenology of consciousness:

Since Hegel we are accustomed to thinking that philosophy exceeds the framework of anthropology. The ontological event accomplished by philosophy consists in suppressing or transmuting the alterity of all that is Other, in universalizing the immanence of the Same (*le Même*) or of Freedom, in effacing the boundaries, and in expelling the violence of Being (*Être*). The knowing I is the melting pot of such a transmutation. It is the Same par excellence. When the Other enters into the horizon of knowledge, it already renounces alterity (Lévinas, 1996:11-2).
Lévinas’ critique of Heidegger also arose from his concern with ethics, which he considered Heidegger’s ontology subordinated. Heidegger’s ontology, he argued, represented an advance in extending comprehension beyond intellectual engagement to encompass the whole of ‘intentional life - emotional, practical, theoretical - through which we relate to the Being of various beings’ (Critchley, 1996:1). However, Lévinas (1996:5) argued that Heidegger subordinated the relation with the human other to this more general/universal relation to Being. Despite Heidegger’s expansion of comprehension then, the other remains within a ‘comprehensible’ horizon and hence, for Lévinas (1996:60), reduced in their otherness.

In contrast, Lévinas insists on the singularity of each human other, beginning his philosophy with the assertion that this singularity is ‘beyond’ or ‘interrupts’ the horizon of being\textsuperscript{127} and is hence beyond any totalising comprehension:

Our relation with the other (autrui) certainly consists in wanting to comprehend him, but this relation overflows comprehension. Not only because knowledge of the other (autrui) requires, outside of all curiosity, also sympathy and love, ways of being distinct from impassible contemplation, but because in our relation with the other (autrui), he does not affect us in terms of a concept. He is a being (l’étant) and counts as such (Lévinas, 1996:6).

Lévinas terms this ‘beyond being’ of the human other alterity as distinct from otherness. While otherness, according to the binary logic of epistemology, is subject to the violent reduction to sameness, alterity, which is beyond comprehension and the ‘refusal to enter into a theme’ (Lévinas, 1996:12), is ‘outside’ of this logic. To concretise the alterity of the other, Levinas uses the terms ‘nakedness’ and ‘face’. It is in the nakedness/face of the other that the trace of the beyond being is signified\textsuperscript{128}.

\textsuperscript{127} It also ‘interrupts’ phenomenology (Lévinas, 1996:61).

\textsuperscript{128} This is a particular use of the notion of signification distinct from the usual sense. The trace is ‘exceptional with respect to other signs in that it signifies outside of every intention of signaling and outside of every project of which it would be the aim’ (Lévinas, 1996:61).
For Lévinas it is the alteration of the other that makes a non-violent relation between people possible: ‘The face signifies otherwise [from beyond being]. In it the infinite resistance of a being to our power affirms itself precisely against the murderous will that it defies; because, completely naked ... the face signifies itself’ (Lévinas, 1996:10). This argument is the source of Bhabha’s assertion of the derivation of ethics from violence. What ‘weighs ... upon the body of [the] torturer’ is the nakedness/face of the colonised. It is the face which signifies resistance to the schemes and intentionality of the coloniser. The nakedness of the face also signifies distress and the need for care (Lévinas, 1996:54). In the face we see both humility and ‘height’,¹²⁹ both an appeal to our care and a challenge to our existing horizon of being. The human other ‘arrives’ at the juncture between horizontal and vertical planes, as a corporeal being such as ourselves (the same ‘life, breath, and beating hearts’) and also absolutely other, from ‘beyond being’ in their alterity and non-totalisability.

This arrival of the face marks for Lévinas the primordial encounter between self and other. The appeal of the face is against murder and domination (including the violence of epistemological reduction) and for responsibility and care. Lévinas uses the concept of proximity to characterise the embodied co-presence which grounds this ethical relation, prior to the intrusion of conscious thought:

In starting with touching, interpreted not as palpation but as caress, and language, interpreted not as the traffic of information but as contact, we have tried to describe proximity as irreducible to consciousness and thematization. Proximity is a relationship with what cannot be resolved into “images” and exposed. It is a relationship not with what is inordinate with respect to a theme but with what is incommensurable with it; with what cannot be identified in the kerygmatic logos, frustrating any schematism (Lévinas, 1996:80).

¹²⁹ The term ‘height’ must be understood in relation to ‘horizon’. The horizontal plane refers to our existing modes of being and comprehension, which the vertical plane interrupts:

The Other (l’Autre) thus presents itself as a human Other (Autrui); it shows a face and opens the dimension of height, that is to say, it infinitely overflows the bounds of knowledge. Positively, this means that the Other puts in question the freedom which attempts to invest it; the Other lays him- or herself bare to the total negation of murder but forbids it through the original language of his defenceless eyes (Lévinas, 1996:12).
Lévinas argues that the human being, characterised by the embodied face, is the being we cannot encounter without greeting, and greeting is prior to comprehension/epistemology: ‘to comprehend a person is already to speak with him’ (Lévinas, 1996:6). He distinguishes between the Saying and the Said of our response to the other.\(^{130}\) The Saying refers to language as ‘contact’ and ‘touching’, while the Said refers to the realm of epistemology and comprehension, ‘the traffic of information’ in our speech. In pointing to the precedence of the Saying over the Said, Lévinas asserts the primacy of proximity in human encounters over relations of domination and also over reasoned, dialogical exchange.

\(^{130}\) For a detailed discussion of these concepts see Lévinas (1996:112-7).
In this linguistic theorisation of pre-reflective proximity between self and other, Lévinas draws on Buber’s (1958) ‘I-Thou’ relation, stating that his aim is to highlight its ‘ethical structure’ (Lévinas, 1996:20). He agrees with Buber that the ‘I’ is not a substance, but comes into existence in relation, and that the ‘I-Thou’ precedes the ‘I-It’ relation (Hand, 1989:59). However, he rejects Buber’s conception of the symmetry and reciprocity of this intersubjective relation (Hand, 1989:59, see also Lévinas, 1996:119). In contrast, the ethical encounter, in avoiding the epistemological reduction, must be characterised by ‘a movement of the Same toward the Other which never returns to the Same’, a movement of ‘radical generosity’ (Lévinas, 1996:49). Any movement of return is either the movement of the Hegelian negation or reduces the relation to the logic of exchange, and hence, intentionality. Thus the ethical relation is asymmetrical and non-reciprocal.

Lévinas outlines the asymmetry of the ethical encounter in terms of the obligation of the self to respond to, and in this sense to take responsibility for, the other. The other is the being to whom we cannot be indifferent and to whom we must make a response. The alterity of the other puts the self into question (Lévinas, 1996:16). ‘A face imposes itself upon me without my being able to be deaf to its call or to forget it, that is, without my being able to suspend my responsibility for its distress. Consciousness loses its first place’ (Lévinas, 1996:54). The self is unsettled in a way that can never be resolved, resolution meaning a return of the self to the Same, and the self ‘settling down in its good conscience’ (Lévinas, 1996:17). Again resisting the binarisms of epistemology, Lévinas (1996:20) argues that the welcome to the other, which is also a putting into question of the self, is neither a negation of the self nor an abject submission to the other. Such a submission he considers remains self-seeking, representing a self ‘proud of its virtue’ (Lévinas, 1996:56). In contrast, ethical responsiveness is a ‘positive movement’ of accepting responsibility in which the self retains its dignity, but a response that is outside of any intentionality, any project of the self; it is the movement of a self who doesn’t ‘have time’ for self-concern (ibid). In relation to the responsibility for the other then, the self is ‘passive’ (Lévinas, 1996:81-2) in that this responsibility is not chosen and in that responsiveness is outside of intentionality. Further, it is this command from the other that founds subjectivity itself. Subjectivity, the singularity of the self, against Hegel, does not arise out of the return of consciousness to itself, but in
the response to the demand of the other - ‘Here I am’ (Lévinas, 1996:106). The I is ‘for the other’:

To be an I means then not to be able to escape responsibility, as though the whole edifice of creation rested on my shoulders. But the responsibility that empties the I of its imperialism and its egoism, even the egoism of salvation, does not transform it into a moment of the universal order; it confirms the uniqueness of the I. The uniqueness of the I is in the fact that no one can answer for me (Lévinas, 1996:55).

Finally, the questioning of the self in responsibility for the other also points to the limits of the freedom and autonomy of the individual (Lévinas, 1996:167). Lévinas seeks to unseat the autonomous individual of liberal philosophy, replacing it with an individualism founded in responsibility for the other.

In sum, Lévinas outlines a primordial face-to-face encounter which founds the ethical obligation of the self to the other. In this relation, the alterity of the other challenges the self to resist the violence of epistemology and domination, and commands instead a responsibility for the other from which the self can never be absolved. The avoidance of the possibility of return and the reduction of otherness to sameness demands that this relation be non-reciprocal, a relation of ‘radical generosity’.

The ‘hiatus’ between ethics and politics

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131 “‘Here I am’ signifies me in the name of God, in the service of men, without my having anything by which to identify myself, save the sound of my voice or the movement of my gestures - the saying itself. A recurrence that is not a reflection on oneself. It is just the opposite of the return to self, of self-consciousness. Recurrence is sincerity, effusion of the self, ‘extradition’ of the self to the neighbor’ (Lévinas, 1996:106).

132 As Hand (1989:88) asserts, in this way Lévinas replaces Heidegger’s ontological conception of ‘being-toward-death’ with ‘being toward alterity’ as the basis of the ‘openness’ or uncertainty of the self.
The nature of the ethical demand in Lévinas is extreme: ‘It is a responsibility toward those whom we do not even know’ (Lévinas, 1996:81) and ‘a responsibility that is justified by no other commitment’ (Lévinas, 1996:82). The existence of the other is in itself the source of the ethical obligation. According to Sean Hand (1989:1), the ‘challenge [of Lévinasian ethics] is an excessive one’. Similarly, Peter Beilharz (2000:103) argues that Lévinas is ‘the most saintly of theorists’. Further, this ethical relation, in its refusal to reduce the other to any epistemological categories, would seem to preclude the engagements of politics. Politics requires epistemology and judgment between competing demands. Politics is the sphere of dialogical engagement around substantive issues where agreement is sought via reasoning. Further, politics is an engagement between ‘the many’; it means moving beyond the ‘moral party of two’ (Bauman, 1993, 1997). On the arrival of ‘the third’, comparison between others becomes both possible and necessary:

The third party is other than the neighbor but also another neighbor, and also a neighbor of the other, and not simply their fellow. What am I to do? What have they already done to one another? Who passes before the other in my responsibility? What, then, are the other and the third party with respect to one another. Birth of the question.

The first question in the interhuman is the question of justice. Henceforth it is necessary to know, to become conscious. Comparison is superimposed on my relation with the unique and the incomparable, and, in view of equity and equality, a weighing, a thinking, a calculation, the comparison of incomparables, and consequently, the neutrality - presence or representation - of being, the thematization and the visibility of the face in some way de-faced as the simple individuation of an individual; the burden of ownership and exchange; the necessity of thinking together under a synthetic theme the multiplicity and the unity of the world; and, through this, the promotion in thought of intentionality, of the intelligibility of the relation, and of the final signifyingness of being; and through this, finally, the extreme importance in human multiplicity of the political structure of society, subject to laws and thereby to institutions where the for-the-other of subjectivity - or the ego - enters with the dignity of a citizen into the perfect reciprocity of political laws which are essentially egalitarian or
held to be so (Lévinas, 1996:168).\footnote{A very succinct quote along these lines: ‘Justice is the way I respond to the fact that I am not alone in the world with the other’ (Lévinas, quoted in Bernstein, 2002:254).}
Identity politics such as those I am concerned with in this thesis, depend precisely on the categorisation of identities, on processes of representation which always involve epistemological reduction. The ethical encounter, as prereflexive, is outside of such categorisations. Thus, in the face-to-face encounter, any individual self or other exceeds the categories of ‘Maori’ and ‘Pakeha’, for example. The introduction of these identity categories is the introduction of the third party, of society, the collective. Hence, as soon as these terms come into play we have already ‘left’ the ethical moment and are engaged in politics and epistemological reductions of difference. Similarly, as soon as we consider the histories that connect Maori and Pakeha, we have entered the realm of epistemology and politics. Thus the history of colonial harm, counter to Turia’s argument, does not itself found, but follows, the ethical relation.

Is it then possible to link this ‘saintly’ ethics of ‘radical generosity’ and unending responsibility for the other, to political values and actions? The ‘hiatus’ (Critchley, 1999:274-6) between Lévinasian ethics and politics has led some to reject Lévinas’s ethics as offering nothing to the practice of politics. Crossley (1996:156), for example, argues that, as soon as we leave the face-to-face, Lévinasian ethics cannot offer us any guidance in developing theories of citizenship. Scott Lash, while wishing to preserve the dimension of ‘a singular subjectivity respectful of and responsible to the radical difference of the other’ (Lash, 1996:102-3), argues that Lévinas’s ethics is too abstract and hence apolitical, an ‘ethics without a world’ (Lash, 1996:100).

Rosalyn Diprose (2002) takes a generally positive position on Lévinas, while rejecting the hiatus between ethics and politics. This general endorsement in combination with her criticism of the ethics/politics hiatus, and the detailed nature of her discussion of his ethics, makes Diprose’s position worthy of close attention. Like Lash, Diprose wishes to retain the respect and responsibility for difference of Lévinasian ethics and the ‘important idea that nonindifference toward others is the basis of sociality’ (Diprose, 2002:185). However, Diprose (2002:180) argues that acceptance of the break between ethics and politics means that all political possibilities are equally unethical, since all political responses inevitably involve a reduction of difference. In this vein, she interprets Lévinas’ references to the passivity of the ethical self to indicate the ethically
problematic nature of all actions (Diprose, 2002:184). Consequently the idea of political transformation in the direction of justice and openness to difference would seem impossible, she argues. In addition, she rejects the radical, or unconditional, nature of Lévinas’ generosity. Unconditional generosity is impossible, she says. Even if it were possible, it would be problematic in requiring an obligation to all others, irrespective of who they are or what they have done (Diprose, 2002:180).

Against the hiatus between ethics and politics in Lévinas, Diprose’s argument has two major planks. Firstly, she refutes his model of the primordial ethical relation by recourse to Merleau-Ponty’s theory of perception. Secondly, she argues that, on the basis of this theory of perception, ethical politics are possible and offer the route to living with difference without domination. Her argument is thus the obverse of Taylor’s. While he argues the epistemological relation is primary to working through relations across difference, Diprose argues the opposite, that the success of such relations depends on the primacy of ethics and politics.

Diprose retains the distinction between (unknowable) alterity and (knowable) otherness, but takes her conception of alterity from Merleau-Ponty, who bases it in the ambiguous and undecidable status of the human. This is Merleau-Ponty’s solution to the problem of the egological consciousness of Husserl. He argued that consciousness is situated, embodied, intertwined with and open to the world, rather than apart from it (Dallmayr, 1981:99). The primary intersubjective relation (prior to the epistemological level of perception) is likewise one of intertwining in a tripartite system of indistinction ‘between my own body as it feels to me, its visual or objectified image, and the body of the other’ (Diprose, 2002:69). In this primary ‘syncretic sociability’ bodies share ‘socially coded movements and gestures’ (ibid) and are neither entirely different, nor entirely the same. Thus, the identity of both self and other remains ambiguous and open. As well as ‘joining’ self and other, this experience of the other decentres the self (Mullen, 1999:68). This lack of purity or positivity, on either side, founds respect for human alterity for Merleau-Ponty (Dallmayr, 1981:106-7).134

134 Note that alterity means different things for Merleau-Ponty and Lévinas. While Lévinas seeks to ‘locate’ alterity ‘outside’ of the binary operations of epistemology by locating it outside ontology, Merleau-Ponty seeks to undermine these binaries by insisting on the ambiguity of the

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human in their (ontological) corporeality.
The situated nature of consciousness also leads Merleau-Ponty to argue that perception is always contextual. The self does not perceive an objectively existing world, but a world in which meaning is already given within a cultural horizon. This is because, as a result of the intertwining of consciousness and world, perception is a double process of both receptivity to the world and an act of expression that produces the world (Lévinas, 1996:40-1). The world thus produced is always already cultural because the perceiving self is always already situated within a cultural context. This cultural perception is built up during an individual’s lifetime through a process of ‘sedimentation’ as particular acts are repeated, resulting in a habituated ‘carnal style’ which, against the general openness of the self to the world, results in limits to the possibilities of the self (Diprose, 2002:71-2).

On the basis of this theory of perception Diprose (2002:166) rejects the break between ethics and politics in Lévinas, arguing that, if perception is always cultural it is also always political. Thus she extends the operations of politics to the level of unconscious, prerreflective engagement. Our response to the other is always already political, she argues because, even though this is a pre-epistemological level of perception, our perception of them is always already culturally inflected. Thus the substantive otherness of the other will affect our pre-epistemological perception of them and the spheres of ethics and politics are joined from the outset:

Justice, and therefore politics, is called for from the first in the ethical openness to the other, not just because nonindifference to difference is a precondition to justice (in being the condition of, inseparable from but not reducible to, every act whether “good” or “bad”), but because the ineradicable difference that calls me to the other is inseparable from the other’s cultural baggage as I feel it being felt. I will feel the indeterminable difference, the disorientation, accordingly. So it is no accident that Lévinas (and Lingis) do not include the white, middle-class businessman, the philosopher, or the high court judge in their list of concrete others who are most likely to signify this alterity that calls me to the other. These others do not rate a mention, not because they do not move me (for they do, if I encounter them at all), but because the expressivity of their sensible being contests less, benefits more from, and has more in common with corporeal and
institutionalized expressions of existing social imaginaries (including my own) than the “Aztec,” “nomad,” “guerilla,” “refugee,” or “orphan.” (Diprose, 2002:186, emphasis added).\textsuperscript{135}

So, while we are ‘nonindifferent’ to all others, as Lévinas argues, for Diprose our response will be affected by the ‘degree’ of substantive difference between the other and the sedimented carnal style of the self:

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{135} Against this charge that it is always the substantively different other - for example, the ‘Aztec’ - that Lévinas chooses to exemplify the other, note that he changed his metaphoric terminology from ‘stranger’ to ‘neighbour’ (see Bernasconi’s Introduction to ‘Enigma and Phenomenon’ in Lévinas, 1996:65). Introducing this term in ‘Enigma and Phenomenon’ Lévinas adds a note explaining his choice in terms of the \textit{proximity} of the neighbour as ‘the first one to come along’ (Lévinas, 1996:178-9, nt10).
\end{footnotesize}
it makes a difference to the gesture that necessarily expresses or accompanies that nonindifference if the other, presenting herself for a job in philosophy or for native title in court, is someone who is already felt to be out of place within a philosophical imaginary or within the law of the land. And the cultural-political-historical makeup of those sitting on the selection panel or on the high court makes a difference to whether they will be “led by the flow” of the other’s discourse, to whether they remain open to the other or effect an ontological closure (Diprose, 2002:187).

Diprose argues that the explanation for closure against difference offered by Merleau-Ponty’s theorisation of sedimented carnal style represents an advance on Lévinas. Not only has she outlined a collapse between the spheres of ethics and politics, but in addition, this explanation for closure indicates the impossibility of Lévinas’ radical generosity. In contrast, our ability to be generous to the other is conditioned by our sedimented cultural and political life histories. In short, the alterity of the other makes generosity possible, while sedimentation makes it conditional. Thus, against Lévinas, Diprose (2002:182) argues for a ‘corporeal generosity’ which lies in resisting closure against difference and maintaining openness to the alterity of the other. The politics of this relation lies in the possibility of the resulting disruption of ‘culturally informed habits of perception and judgment that would perpetuate injustice by shoring up body integrity, singular identity, and their distinctions between inside and outside, culture and nature, self and other’ (Diprose, 2002:190). Further, against the implications of the notion of a sedimented carnal style, Diprose (2002:184-6) argues that it is the substantively different other, the other who most disturbs our existing social imaginaries, who is consequently most likely to provoke the ethical response and make change possible.

While ethical politics is firstly this retention of openness, Diprose also comments on the possibility of ethical political acts. At this juncture her position reconnects with that of Lévinas in that she argues that in the sphere of action, politics involves choices of one thing over another, and thus closure as well as openness to difference. In speaking of the issue of engagement across cultural difference, she points to this inevitable closure:
There is no witness to cultural difference, no apology as responsibility, without the said, without the act of apology that would betray it. In other words, there is no unconditional generosity, no being-given to the other that is not also caught in cultural self-expressions (Diprose, 2002:166).

While this argument for a degree of closure/violence in political action is completely in line with Lévinas, Diprose presents it as a critique of Lévinas’ injunction to unconditional generosity. The impossibility of ethical political action, she argues, provides further evidence of the impossibility of radical generosity.

Diprose’s modification of Lévinasian ethics is, at first glance, appealing from a sociological perspective. The extension of politics and the cultural to the level of unconscious perception and the sedimentation of carnal style parallel sociological conceptualisations, such as habitus, which seek to explain the unconscious processes of social reproduction. However, her argument that this pre-reflective political influence allows for the possibility of ethical political action does not seem borne out by her acknowledgment that such action involves a degree of closure towards difference. Despite the insistence on the pre-reflective impact of politics, political action remains within the sphere of consciousness, epistemology, the Said, a sphere in which she accepts Lévinas’ position on the limits of ethical action. In fact, the result of her emphasis on the impact of politics at the pre-reflective level is to suggest political transformation is less, rather than more, possible. Her insistence on the limits to ethical responsiveness set by sedimented carnal style seems to provide a justification for responses to the other that ignore the ethical obligation. From this viewpoint such responses are both understandable and unavoidable (because pre-reflective) in the interaction between selves with certain incompatible carnal styles. In trying to combine politics and ethics across both unconscious and conscious levels of responsiveness, Diprose would seem to have set unconscious political self-interest against the possibility of transformatory political action, making such action less rather than more likely.

**Ethics in excess of politics**

Ultimately Diprose’s formulation of the ethical relation fails to offer more substantive
guidance to political action than does that of Lévinas. In fact, I argue that Lévinasian ethics offers a more rigorous grounding for the possibility of a politics hospitable to difference. In the first instance, Lévinas’ theorisation of the primordial ethical relation between self and other founds an obligation towards the other from which nobody is excused. Secondly, his injunction for an extreme passivity in response to the other provides an indeterminate, but nevertheless stringent, guide to political engagement. I expand on these points below, but first outline Lévinas’ response to Merleau-Ponty’s theory of perception.

In ‘Meaning and Sense’ Lévinas (1996:46-7) responds to Merleau-Ponty’s theory of perception, insisting on a ‘sense’ or ‘orientation’ prior to cultural perception. He argues that Merleau-Ponty’s model of intersubjectivity still depends on the idea of a ‘shared’ knowledge which the individual embodies, hence his ‘sociality does not break the order of consciousness any more than does knowledge [savoir], which, cleaving to the known [su], immediately coincides with whatever might be foreign to it’ (Lévinas, 1993:101). To take Merleau-Ponty’s position, he argues, is to abandon any possibility of a unifying universality. He argues that the existence of an orientation towards the other prior to culture is necessary to explain why people might ‘prefer speech to war’ (Lévinas, 1996:46).

136 Lévinas then remains a universalist. I will return to this point in my Conclusion to distinguish his universalism from the epistemologically reductive universalism critiqued in Chapter Five.

137 ‘We are told: the unity of being at any moment would only consist in the fact that men understand one another, in the penetrability of cultures by one another. This penetrability could not come about through the mediation of a common tongue ... the penetration takes place - according to Merleau-Ponty’s expression - laterally. For a Frenchman there does exist the possibility of learning Chinese and passing from one culture into another, without the intermediary of an Esperanto that would falsify both tongues which it mediated. Yet what has not been taken into consideration in this case is that an orientation is needed to have the Frenchman take up learning Chinese instead of declaring it to be barbarian ... and to prefer speech to war’ (Lévinas, 1996:46).
[h]as a third dimension not been forgotten; the direction toward the Other (Autrui) who is not only the collaborator and the neighbor of our cultural work of expression or the client of our artistic production, but the interlocutor, he to whom expression expresses, for whom celebration celebrates, both term of an orientation and primary signification? In other words, expression, before being a celebration of being, is a relationship with him to whom I express the expression and whose presence is already required for my cultural gesture of expression to be produced. The Other (Autrui) who faces me is not included in the totality of being expressed. He arises behind every assembling of being as he to whom I express what I express. I find myself facing the Other (Autrui). He is neither a cultural signification nor a simple given. He is sense primordially, for he gives sense to expression itself, for it is only by him that a phenomenon as a meaning is, of itself, introduced into being (Lévinas, 1996:52).

Lévinas insists on a primordial intersubjective encounter stripped of everything but the concrete presence of the other (singular) human. In this encounter, the other’s ‘nakedness’ calls or ‘commands’ the self to respond. This pre-cultural ‘sense’ or orientation announced by the arrival of the other, Lévinas argues, is the foundation of sociality, prior to any cultural meaning, even that which is unconsciously embodied. Without this primordial orientation towards the other, meaning and culture cannot develop. The disturbance caused by the other’s alterity disrupts self-certainty, initiating reflection and change: ‘The relationship with the Other (Autrui) puts me into question, empties me of myself and empties me without end, showing me ever new resources’ (Lévinas, 1996:52). The entire creation of human societies only takes place following this primordial relation between self and other. Thus the ethical obligation is an unpayable debt to the other from which no one can be excused, a debt for sociality itself. This argument has its own sociological appeal, reminding us of the pre-cultural and very concrete foundation of sociality in the intersubjective encounter, of why we might ‘prefer speech to war’ (Lévinas, 1996:46). What Lévinas insists on reminding us is that this primordial social relation continues to operate, in excess of and as the foundation of, whatever social and cultural contexts are always already in play.
Against Diprose, I argue that this prescription for the ethical response to alterity does offer principled guidance to political action. Firstly, if the possibility of justice arises from the ethical injunction to radical generosity or care for the other, then acts of domination and intentionality (that is, acting towards the other to serve one’s own ends) must be ‘worse’ than acts of care, even if the latter, as acts, do inevitably involve some closure against difference. It is this status of the ethical obligation as non-reciprocal and outside of intentionality that Lévinas seeks to express when he states that the ethical response involves a passivity of the self. It is not that the response is a non-response, an inaction, but that it is not in pursuit of any egoistic designs. While this prescription may sound extreme and ‘saintly’, it is also, as Lévinas (for example, 1996:23, 52) himself notes, a description of ‘the most ordinary social experience’ of our relations with others. Michael Gardiner (1996:132) likewise argues that Lévinasian ethics is ‘worldly’ rather than saintly, founded in the ‘face-to-face bonds of everyday sociality’. Secondly, if ‘[h]omogeneity, in society as well as in philosophy, is an index of domination’ (Gardiner, 1996:133), obversely, heterogeneity must be an index of non-domination, or ethics. It is not that all differences are equally ‘good’, but that care for alterity translates into care for the other person, with all their substantive differences, against the dominant social imaginaries, as Diprose argues. Thirdly, Lévinas insists on the self-questioning stance. It is not just that we approach the other without intention, but that we approach the other in awareness of the violence our own being inflicts and in fear for their right to be:

Language is born in responsibility. One has to speak, to say I, to be in the first person, precisely to be me (moi). But, from that point, in affirming this me being, one has to respond to one’s right to be. It is necessary to think through to this point Pascal’s phrase, “the I (mon) is hateful”. One has to respond to one’s right to be, not by referring to some abstract and anonymous law, or judicial entity, but because of one’s fear for the Other. My being-in-the-world or my “place in the sun”, my being at home, have these not also been the usurpation of spaces belonging to the other man whom I have already oppressed or starved, or driven out into a third world; are they not acts of repulsing, excluding, exiling, stripping, killing? Pascal’s “my place in the sun” marks the beginning of the image of the usurpation of the whole earth. A fear for all the violence and murder my existing might generate, in spite of its conscious and intentional innocence. A fear which reaches back past my “self-
consciousness” in spite of whatever moves are made towards a bonne conscience by a pure perseverance in being. It is the fear of occupying someone else’s place with the Da of my Dasein; it is the inability to occupy a place, a profound utopia (Lévinas, 1989:82).

While Lévinas is talking about all subjects here, there is a clear resonance for the settler subject in the fear of ‘occupying someone else’s place’ and the idea of the ethical response being an ‘inability to occupy a place’. This utopia is, literally, ‘no-place’, suggesting a subject ‘occupying’ a position of uncertainty driven by care for the other. Fourthly, and finally, the ‘hiatus’ between ethics and politics in Lévinas should not be seen as representing an opposition between them, but as representing their underdetermined interdependence. There can be no Saying without the Said, as Diprose seeks to remind us. What Lévinas seeks to remind us is that there can be no Said without the Saying, that this ethical relation is the foundation of, and in excess of, the substance of our social and political engagements. Thus care for all human others is a primary obligation of being human(e), irrespective of who they are and what they have done, as Diprose points out. It is not that no other is held responsible for their actions in the systems of law and politics that human societies create, but that we must always remember that these systems offer only approximations of justice and must therefore always be open to question.

These aspects of Lévinas’s philosophy offer a better guide to politics as openness and self-questioning than does Diprose’s position. All that can be taken from her account is the need for an openness in our political engagements and readiness to defy dominant political/social imaginaries. She offers little to explain why we might be prepared to act in this way. In her turn to the substantive otherness of the other to base her argument, Diprose loses sight of the foundational importance of alterity in ethical relations. Lévinas, in contrast, provides an explanation in terms of the dependence of sociality on

\[138\] This is the interpretation of Lévinas made by Bernasconi (1999:77) when he argues that the political and the ethical coexist in tension with each other, each with the capacity to question the other. The face to face would serve as a corrective to the socio-political order, even when the latter is based on equality, whereas the presence of the third party in the face of the Other would serve to correct the partiality of a relation to the Other that would otherwise have no reason not to ignore the demands of other Others.
the alterity of the other and hence our responsibility towards alterity. Diprose (2002:186) argues that ‘unconditional generosity, of the kind Lévinas envisages is at the basis of sociality, is never present in any pure form’. While Lévinas outlines this form in the primordial ethical encounter, it is precisely the loss of this purity to which the break between ethics and politics points:

Certainly ... my responsibility for everyone can manifest itself while also limiting itself. The ego may be called, in the name of this unlimited responsibility, to be concerned also with itself. The fact that the other, my neighbor, is also a third in relation to another, likewise a neighbor, is the birth of thought, of consciousness, of justice, and of philosophy. The unlimited and initial responsibility that justifies this concern for justice, for the self, and for philosophy can be forgotten. In this forgetfulness, consciousness is pure egoism. But the egoism is neither first nor last (Lévinas, 1996:95, emphasis added).

With the arrival of the third, systems of justice, law and knowledge become necessary in the name of equity and equality. However these same systems are also the source of conflicts and violence. Thus, he argues, against the forgetfulness mentioned above, we need to remember that ethics is the foundation of them all and that ethics requires an ongoing vigilance against the potential for injustice in any system of laws:

[I]t seemed to us important to recall peace and justice as their justification, and measure; to recall that this justice, which can legitimate them ethically - that is, preserve for the human its proper sense of dis-inter-estedness under the weight of being - is not a natural and anonymous legality governing the human masses, from which is derived a technique of social equilibrium, placing in harmony the antagonistic forces through transitory cruelties and violence, a State delivered over to its own necessities that it is impossible to justify. Nothing would be able to withdraw itself from the control of the responsibility of the “one for the other,” which delineates the limit of the State and does not cease to appeal to the vigilance of persons who would not be satisfied with the simple subsumption of cases under a general rule, of which a computer is capable (Lévinas, 1996:168-9).

The disinterestedness of the ethical self, and the nonindifference to the other’s
difference of the ethical moment, is what founds justice. Justice becomes necessary in the order of society, which interrupts the ethical face-to-face, but it is the singularity of that relation which offers a guide to justice. Justice is ‘for the other’. It cannot be simply the application of a universal moral code (see Gardiner, 1996:132). Hence, in the ‘comparison between incomparables’ (Lévinas, 1996:122), what politics is required in the name of justice cannot be universally prescribed, but must be decided in each particular case.

This indecidability of politics, rather than a reason to dismiss Lévinasian ethics, is precisely the source of its strength, his supporters argue. It is the lack of prescription that provides the guard against totalisation and domination. Political action is, in this view, risky and underdetermined; it is its undecidability that keeps our political responses ‘unfinished’. As Simon Critchley summarises Derrida’s position on this,

> if there is no deduction from ethics to politics, then this can be both ethically and politically welcome. On the one hand, ethics is left defined as the infinite responsibility of unconditional hospitality. Whilst, on the other hand, the political can be defined as the taking of a decision without any determinate transcendental guarantees (Critchley, 1999:275).

The hiatus between ethics and politics means that politics must be self-reflexive, each decision remaining open to further challenge on the basis of ethics:

> The ethical interrupts the political, not to direct it in the sense of determining what must be done, but to challenge its sense that it embodies the ultimate wisdom of “the bottom line”. Lévinas’s thought cannot be assimilated to what conventionally passes as political philosophy, but it was never intended to do so and that is its strength (Bernasconi, 1999:86). 139

The remainder of this chapter is concerned with what it might mean to remember the excess of sociality that underpins our political relations. How might the demands of ethics and politics serve to interrupt each other, as Bernasconi suggests? To remember the link between ethics and politics in this way would seem to require a critical stance towards all epistemological positions, including, and especially, your own. But it does

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139 See also Llewelyn (1995:140-1).
not mean their abandonment. Rather it means holding them in ‘generative tension’ (Clifford, 2000:95) with the ethical commitment to justice. In using this conception Clifford himself refers to Calhoun’s (1994:29) observation of the tensions involved in identity projects that can never fully realise our ‘ideals and moral aspirations’. Similarly here, the notion of ‘generative tension’ points to the limitations of all our political attempts to secure justice and of all our epistemological schemas. What is then required, while pursuing knowledge and justice, is an ongoing vigilance, reflexivity and openness to the dangers of violence inflicted on the other, all others. The remaining sections of this chapter examine particular instances of political engagement between Maori and Pakeha in search of evidence of this tension between ethics and politics at work and to consider the gains on offer in terms of cross-cultural relations.

The ethical foundation of political engagement: greeting

While the debate over the hiatus between ethics and politics has tended to focus on the ‘what’ of politics, Iris Marion Young (1999) has brought Lévinasian ethics to bear on the ‘how’. Young’s argument is that the form political communication takes is fundamental to political inclusion. Political inclusion, she argues, is not guaranteed by voting rights, by the inclusion of the points of view of the marginalised, nor by the presence of representatives of such groups (Young, 1999:103). Speaking of the place of lower income single mothers in the debates over welfare reform in the USA in the 1990s, she argues (ibid) that their political exclusion is evidenced in the fact that they were rarely addressed in these debates, but spoken about as part of the problem to be solved.140 Turning to Lévinas, Young argues that greeting is necessary to initiate political engagement. Lévinas’ philosophy provides ‘an understanding of the function of greeting in an ethical theory of everyday communication’ (Young, 1999:104), which points to the importance of opening political conversation with an acknowledgment of those involved in their particularity (Young, 1999:107). Such greeting is an act of exposure, of ‘making the first move’, of opening to the other, an act without which communication cannot take place (there is no Said without the Saying). Thus greeting is

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140 A point which parallels that made in Chapter Six regarding the incessant speech of Pakeha about Maori.
an act of *recognition* of the other in their particularity, which is also the taking on of responsibility for the other:

To recognize another person is to find oneself already claimed by the other person’s potential neediness. The sensual, material proximity of the other person in his or her bodily need and possibility for suffering makes an unavoidable claim on me, to which I am hostage. Often a person turns her back on or is indifferent to this claim that the other makes upon her. Sometimes she may react with selfish greed or cruelty to the claim. But when she acknowledges the other, she responds to the other and acknowledges an ethical relation of responsibility for the other person: “It is through the condition of being hostage that there can be in the world compassion, parody, and proximity - even the little that there is, even the simple, ‘After you, sir.’ The unconditionality of being hostage is not the limit case of solidarity, but the condition of all solidarity.” (Young, 1999:107-8, quote from Lévinas, 1981:117).

These references to recognition and solidarity recall Taylor’s (1994:70) argument that the demand for recognition is not a matter of solidarity, of ‘taking sides’, but a matter of respect. Taylor insists that knowledge is necessary to ground respect. Solidarity assumed on any other grounds is ‘insufferably patronising’ (ibid) since it is not based on any real understanding of the person/culture concerned. In contrast, Lévinas insists that respect for the other person comes first (as a response to their alterity) and founds the possibility of solidarity. Knowledge of the other, on the other hand, is always to be subject to question.

Against Taylor’s pursuit of recognition as an *endpoint* of justice, Young argues (1999:110-1) that recognition is a *starting point*, which makes the pursuit of justice possible by opening political engagement:

This meaning of recognition is considerably thinner than the meaning that Taylor gives to the term. Political greetings name the others with whom one is discussing issues in their situated specificity. It acknowledges the legitimacy of their situated and differentiated points of view. This is far from the affirmation of cultural understanding and independence that Taylor gives to the term
Here Young’s ‘thinning’ of the concept of recognition minimises the epistemological weight it carries. In the first instance, the knowledge Young is concerned with relates to situated social identity categories and the political viewpoints that accompany them, rather than the knowledge of a cultural totality as in Taylor. Secondly, this epistemological framework of the other, in Young’s account, is not exhaustively understood, judged and accepted or dismissed, but is acknowledged, a limited epistemological engagement which means to accept its validity as a view, prior to any engagement over the substance of competing views. Recognition thus becomes a category of respect for the validity of difference.

The argument that political conversation needs to begin with greeting seems somewhat trite and obvious at first glance. Surely all political discussions open with some ritual of greeting and involve acknowledgment that there are a range of views on the issue at hand? However, Young is pointing to two common limitations to political engagement: firstly, limits to who is greeted and welcomed into the political discussion; and secondly, limitations in the practices of greeting, which, she argues, are often ‘pro forma and superficial’ (Young, 1999:111), lacking attention to the particularities of those involved and consequently leaving participants feeling unacknowledged and disrespected.

In speaking of greeting others in their particularity however, Young is clearly dealing with political engagement, rather than with ethics. The particularity of the ‘lower income single mother’ is a social and political identity, an epistemological category, not the singularity of the other as bearer of alterity in relations of proximity. Her argument appears to collapse ethics back into politics. Certainly, in this brief paper she does not set out any distinction between the ethical and political dimensions of greeting which keeps the tension between ethics and politics in play. My argument is that we cannot think of the ethical and the political as separate ‘spheres’ of human interaction. Such a characterisation does not capture Lévinas’ position that the ethical encounter is an excess which occurs in every (embodied) encounter with others; there is no Said without a Saying. Hence, it is possible to recuperate the ethical ‘moment’ of welcome to
the other as an-other human, one who affects us as a being rather than a concept (Lévinas, 1996:6), ‘accompanying’, or as the excess of, the welcome to the particular social identity they bring to the political engagement. It is possible to respond to ‘the human face dissimulated beneath the identities of citizens’ (Lévinas, 1998:196).

As in Diprose’s argument, here alterity and substantive difference are brought together in shaping our responsiveness to the other. While Diprose (2002:186-7) claims that it is the substantive difference of the other that alerts us to their ‘ineradicable difference’ or alterity, I am arguing the reverse. It is the alterity of the other, respect for the irreducibility of the other human, that motivates acknowledgment of their substantive differences from us. In the context of political engagement, such an ethical orientation to the other thus involves a welcome that recognises the substantive differences that bring them to the political table. It is important to be clear that this is not to argue for the fixed one-to-one correspondence of social identity with the self who is its bearer. Lévinas reminds us that the human other exceeds all such categorisations. Rather, it is to argue for a situated response to the social identity of the other. The person one meets representing ‘single mothers’ at a political meeting will, in another context, be encountered as a trustee on a School Board or a worker in a voluntary organisation. The welcome to the other must respond to what each brings to the engagement, not to fixed identity categories based on what we ‘see’ – gender, ethnicity and so on. As Lévinas argues, without this orientation or ‘sense’ it is difficult to know why we might prefer speech to war.

Summing up what is gained in this consideration of the practices of greeting that initiate political engagement, firstly, Young’s ‘thin’ concept of recognition is useful in disengaging respect for the other from knowledge of them. This accords with Lévinas’ insistence that respect for the other person is prior to knowledge and prohibits their reduction to systems of knowledge. Secondly, the practice of recognition as welcome opens political engagement to epistemological plurality. This is what politics is supposed to do, but Young’s point is that the practice of politics often begins with closure against a range of views/others. A Lévinasian practice of welcome can serve political engagement that aims for inclusivity and openness rather than domination.
Finally, it is in such practices of welcome that the ethical orientation of responsibility for the other is apparent. As Young (1999:110) expresses it:

We must be responsive to you, who have this claim on us, listen seriously to you, even though we may perceive that our interests conflict fundamentally, or else [that] we may come from different ways of life with little mutual understanding.

To meet this demand of welcome to the other is not as simple as the synonym of ‘greeting’ may first suggest. For example, as I write this, the New Zealand government has recently finished a round of ‘consultation hui’ with Maori around the country over their plan to legislate ownership of the country’s foreshore and seabed to the ‘public domain’. The latter concept is an attempt to sidestep the complex of issues surrounding debate over whether this territory is open to claims of ‘ownership’ by Maori communities. The Government response to Maori claims to the foreshore and seabed offers an object lesson in how politics can be founded on a response to the other that ignores the ethical obligation. As soon as the Court of Appeal sent down a decision which facilitated Maori taking claims to the foreshore and seabed to the Maori Land Court, the Government announced it would legislate to ensure public ownership and access. This statement was made without any discussion with Maori. In the face of united Maori opposition to the proposal, the concept of ‘public domain’ was developed and the ‘consultation hui’ embarked upon. The concept of ‘consultation’ itself indicates the inequality of participants in these political engagements. Certainly, in this instance the Crown is talking to Maori, not just about them. But it is talk constrained already by the Crown having independently made its plans, not with Maori, who are relegated to the unequal status of offering advice and feedback on a Crown-formulated plan. Further, these hui have taken place despite expressed Maori dissatisfaction with the tight timeframe of eleven four-hour hui over a six week period; a timeframe which severely limited preparation of responses to the proposal and the amount of discussion that could take place. In brief, the framework for ‘consultation’ has been forced by Government,

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141 This term itself does epistemological violence to Maori conceptions of the relation between themselves and their land, which do not equate with Western ideas of private property and are better reflected in the concept of ‘t_puna title’ (Jackson, 2003:40).
despite the *hui* taking place on *marae*. Maori have hosted the *hui* on the Crown’s terms. The entire process of engagement in this instance is not founded on an ethics of greeting which would have welcomed Maori into the discussion from the outset, but on Crown domination of the terms of debate and engagement.

In contrast, to greet Maori in ‘their situated specificity [acknowledging] the legitimacy of their situated and differentiated points of view’ (Young, 1999:111) would mean to acknowledge, *at the outset*, their position that customary title to the foreshore and seabed is intact as it has, until now, never been legislatively extinguished. The ethics of greeting would make this recognition a basis on which conversation could then begin. It would not mean adopting the Maori view. According to Young (1999:110), this process is *most* necessary where there are differences of opinion. But it would mean acknowledging the Maori view *prior to*, and as a *condition of*, entering the political process of negotiation to resolve the issue of ownership of and rights to this territory, as an act of welcome. Such a process initiates a political engagement that encompasses epistemological plurality. This is not a simple matter of etiquette, but, certainly in the case of a settler government engaging with an indigenous people, a major shift in orientation which would ‘unsettle’ the position of the Crown as the singular sovereign power. To acknowledge the validity of the view of other participants at the outset of political engagement is to relativise your own. This is a powerful shift in the terms of engagement, placing all participants on an equal footing. And it is the failure to ‘greet’ Maori in this debate in this way that led to the impasse in the ‘consultation’ where the Government’s proposal was rejected outright at every *hui*.

**Negotiating the tension between ethics and politics**

Young’s argument offers some insight into what a Lévinasian ethics might offer the practice of initiating political engagement, but what about once engagement is under way? Can Lévinasian ethics offer anything of use to the way we think about, or practice, politics around substantive issues? Can the break between ethics and politics ‘work’ to the benefit of political practice? Once epistemological plurality is engaged, how might politics proceed? Can politics work to retain this plurality? In the final sections of this
chapter I explore these questions by again referring to empirical examples of cross-cultural debate and engagement. While those involved in these instances do not set out to utilise Lévinas’ insights in their politics, my aim is to analyse these engagements from the viewpoint of Lévinasian ethics to explore the questions above. I return, firstly, to the debate surrounding Tariana Turia’s ‘holocaust speech’. My interest here is in analysing the claims made in this debate about the possibilities of epistemological engagement. In this light, I look at Turia’s use of the holocaust comparison and at responses from Pakeha who take on the orientation of responsibility to address her concerns. Finally, I return to Jones and Jenkins’ pedagogical experiment of splitting the feminist education class. Jones’ critical analysis of Pakeha epistemological desires leads her to develop the concept of a ‘politics of disappointment’. This concept describes a particular orientation to politics, rather than a substantive politics per se. I conclude by arguing that for such an orientation to politics to succeed it needs to be complemented by a Lévinasian ethics that reminds us of our obligation to the other.

Responsibility for, and responding to, the suffering of the other

For Lévinas the ethical obligation exceeds any historical relationship of harm inflicted on the other. He insists that the other’s existence alone founds this obligation. Ethics, for Lévinas, is responsibility for the suffering of the other. This responsibility does not arise from being causally connected to that suffering, but as a matter of proximity to the other who is suffering. This ethical responsibility calls us to a response. To respond to the suffering of the other is firstly to acknowledge it. Not to acknowledge suffering is to allow it to continue, as Turia argues. But Lévinas warns against trying to understand suffering, to give it meaning, as another form of incorporation which diminishes suffering and/or results in it ‘making sense’, or being justified (Bell, 2001:163). Nor should we seek to ‘share’ the suffering of the other via practices of empathy which also result in its reduction (ibid). Rather, he argues, suffering should be precisely

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See Megan Boler (1997) on the ‘risks of empathy’. Boler refers to Lévinas in this paper and, like him, asserts the reductive problems of empathic engagement. She is critical of the consumptive tendencies of the ‘easy identification’ with the other, of the way empathy involves a process of judgment of the suffering of the other (is it worthy of empathy?), and, finally, of the passivity of empathy, which does not force the empathiser to question their own complicity with, and responsibility for, the other’s suffering, and hence, does not lead to justice (Boler, 1997:255-9).
‘useless’, it is ‘for nothing’ (ibid). Again this is a difficult call, by which we are enjoined to respond to suffering compassionately, but without reducing it to any ‘schematization’. Only in such a resistance to understanding does suffering retain its enormity.

However, as Vikki Bell notes (of feminist politics, but the point is general), attempts to ‘understand’ suffering are precisely the stuff of politics: ‘In the political, interested concerns of feminism there is of necessity the temptation to totalize in one form of incorporation or another, a temptation to understand, to attempt to share, or to contextualize gender inequalities and women’s suffering’ (Bell, 2001:165). In linking Maori suffering to ‘colonial harm’, Turia is, likewise, contextualising, seeking to understand its cause in the interests of its alleviation:

I just want us to consider our history as a country and how this history has affected the indigenous people, how this history has impacted on Maori whanau, hapu and iwi. I really do believe that mature, intelligent New Zealanders of all races are capable of the analysis of the trauma of one group of people suffering from the behaviour of another (Turia, 29/8/00, p1 of 4).

As an alternative to empathy, Boler develops a concept of ‘testimonial reading’ that involves a sense of responsibility as the witness of the testimony of suffering, acceptance of the limits of the possibilities of knowing the experience of the other, and a practice of self-critique of the self’s affective responses to the suffering of the other (Boler, 1997:263-9).
This appeal to understanding is the motivation for her acts of cultural translation, describing colonisation as a ‘holocaust’ and a ‘homeland invasion’, resulting in ‘postcolonial traumatic stress disorder’. Arguably, however, the use of the holocaust comparison backfired, resulting in a tangential debate over the analogy itself and general neglect of Turia’s broader argument. While she received some support for her analogy, it also generated widespread unease amongst individuals who wished to acknowledge both Maori and Jewish suffering without equating the two.\textsuperscript{143} It was apparent that for a number of Jewish people the comparison inflicted a form of harm itself, by negating the specificity of the Jewish experience. One newspaper reported,

Rabbi Shmuel Zajac, of the Wellington Hebrew Congregation, said “holocaust” meant systematic, wholesale genocide of a people. In no way did Maori suffer to the same degree as the Jewish people in the Second World War. He did not want to diminish any Maori discomfort and heartbreak about 19th century colonisation “but don’t call it Holocaust”. “It is certainly painful for the survivors (of the death camps) that do live in New Zealand to hear such things, because it brings back all sorts of terrible memories.” (Peters, \textit{Evening Post}, 31/8/00, p2).

Although Rabbi Zajac can be accused here of the same ‘crime’ of comparison/contextualisation, I cite the report of his statements to illustrate Lévinas’ general point that these epistemological judgments involve an inevitable reduction and closure against difference, or in other words, to exemplify the tension between ethics and politics. In this case Turia, in using the term ‘holocaust’ to make her appeal for understanding of Maori suffering, ‘reduces’ that of the European Jews and inflicts further suffering on them (an act for which she later apologised in a statement in Parliament).\textsuperscript{144} As discussed at the close of Chapter Seven, the comparisons used by Turia (and de Bres) suggest something of the impossibility of any direct access to the

\textsuperscript{143} Amongst others, the Prime Minister expressed this view (in Edwards, \textit{Evening Post}, 4/9/00, p1), as did an \textit{Evening Post} editorial (‘Tariana Turia and ...’, \textit{Evening Post}, 7/9/00, p4) and well-known commentator, Chris Laidlaw (\textit{Evening Post}, 11/9/00, p5).

\textsuperscript{144} ‘I did not, in my speech mean to belittle survivors of the World War Two holocaust, or those whose houses have been invaded, nor do I intend to. As a member of a group that has been marginalised, I would never deliberately belittle the horrific experiences suffered by other people. I sincerely apologise to all those whom I have offended by these comments’ (Turia, 5/9/00, p1 of 2).
suffering of others. This issue of the further harm that can be caused by comparison adds another dimension to our understanding of the problems of attempts at epistemological settlement over the meaning of suffering. While Turia’s appeals to understanding are politically necessary, the holocaust comparison, despite its use in the Taranaki Report (1996), is ethically problematic.

Pursuing the political necessity of making suffering meaningful, I want to briefly consider the issue of Pakeha responsiveness to Turia’s appeal. The range of epistemological, material and psychological colonial harms invoked by Turia was acknowledged in a number of contributions to the debate. The need for increased dialogue between Maori and Pakeha and greater understanding of Maori on the part of Pakeha, was also mentioned as a way forward. In addition, some letter writers raised critical questions about Pakeha resistance to this type of cross-cultural responsiveness, pointing to Pakeha material interests and to the nature of Western systems of knowledge. The following letter by Brendan Tuohy exemplifies much of the tone of this correspondence. Tuohy begins his letter by noting that the response to Turia’s ‘holocaust speech’ had largely taken the form of expressing offence that the Minister should say such things, then continues,

[n]obody is tactless enough to point out that the colonial State actually did launch a genocidal war against Maori. Cynically ignoring the Treaty and the rights of Maori as citizens, British settlers set out to drive them from their lands and to take those lands for themselves. Just as they did in other colonies, the settlers justified their conquest with a racist ideology of white superiority, a legacy that remains with us today. After defeating Maori military resistance, the State confiscated a lot more land and set up a crooked Land Court system to peacefully destroy remaining Maori land ownership. The Maori language was banned in schools and traditional Maori leaders were suppressed. By 1900 almost all Maori land was taken. Today, crimes like these are unambiguously described in Article 2 of the Convention on the Prohibition of Genocide, but no one was brought to justice in our country for the colonial crimes against humanity.

Now we can see why the genocidal past is a taboo subject: follow the money. The stolen resources were kept by pakeha settlers, resources worth billions of dollars today. There are a lot of important, well-off pakeha people who now own the land and resources, and their tender feelings could be hurt if they learned that their wealth had been stolen from others. Facing up to history could also lead to embarrassing demands that the wrongs be put right. Full and final settlements could look less than generous if everyone knew that they amount to only a few cents in the dollar on what was taken.
But we will never close the gaps between Maori and pakeha until the facts of the
colonial crime against Maori are faced by all, because right action can never
flow from ignorance and bigotry (Tuohy, *Evening Post*, 11/9/00, p4).

Tuohy characterises the combination of material and epistemological harms inflicted on
Maori as offences against their humanity. He also points to their ongoing practice in the
present. Thus he pinpoints the ongoing Pakeha self-interest in continuing to ignore that
history, as, to do so requires Pakeha to give something up. Finally, and most importantly
for my argument, he highlights the need for understanding by Pakeha (or arguably ‘all’
New Zealanders) of the Maori experience, as the starting point to improving the present
disadvantages under which Maori suffer. Such calls for dialogue and understanding
accord with Taylor’s espousal of dialogical engagement and cross-cultural
understanding as the way forward. Tuohy, Turia and De Bres all express this desire for
greater understanding and cross-cultural sympathy. There are pointers towards the
difficulties of such engagement in Tuohy’s reference to what Pakeha stand to lose. But
there is no sense here of the possible limitations of this kind of engagement, no sense
that there can be a limit point beyond which we cannot know each other, no sense of the
possibility of irreconcilable views, or that the attempts to understand can themselves be
problematic. Rather, such calls to dialogue and understanding represent a utopian desire
for resolution and unity based on epistemological unanimity.

The only hints at limits to the possibilities of epistemological unanimity came from
Turia herself. In the first instance, the use of comparisons (‘our suffering was like this’),
as discussed in Chapter Seven, suggests limits to epistemological access to the
experience of an-other. Secondly, as mentioned in Chapter Seven, in one of her
speeches Turia explicitly noted the limits to knowing the view of the other, but only to
immediately call for such knowledge anyway:

> We might recognise the possibilities for different views of reality, but it isn’t
> possible to see anyone else’s with the same assurance of knowledge that we
> bring to our own. In recognition of this, we must therefore question the notion of
> any uniform criteria for ability or intelligence within a pluralist society.
> The ability of the psychiatry profession to respond in an appropriate and
effective manner to a diversity of cultures and worldviews is required. For us in
>Aotearoa, this involves recognition and understanding of the diversity of world-
>views within whanau, hap_ and iwi (Turia, 5/10/00, p2 of 4).
This somewhat contradictory statement indicates an impasse in a politics which seeks epistemological unanimity. Turia wants a pluralisation of valid worldviews within New Zealand society and seeks that pluralisation via cross-cultural understanding. Despite her sense of the limits of such understanding she can offer no alternative vision for political engagement. As a follow-on to the political space made for plurality by Young’s practice of recognition as ethical welcome, the politics pursued by Turia seeks the maintenance of plurality via a process of epistemological reconciliation. From the viewpoint of the critique of Taylor’s call for a ‘fusion of horizons’, this is a problematic and impossible project that will work to reduce rather than maintain plurality. Jones, in contrast, on the basis of such an epistemological critique, develops an alternative political vision, with which I want to complete this investigation. While she, like Turia and de Bres, does not use or refer to Lévinas in her argument, I argue that her conception of a ‘politics of disappointment’ suggests an orientation to politics which, tempered with a Lévinasian ethics, can work to maintain epistemological plurality.

**Pakeha self-questioning: the limits of epistemology**

Jones and her colleague Jenkins initially organised their class according to the dialogical theory that talking together is the route to greater cross-cultural understanding and the creation of ‘a multivoiced and equitable culturally diverse society’ (Jones, 1999:299). In doing so, they responded to the same desires evidenced by Turia, de Bres and Taylor. However, the Maori students remained dissatisfied and continued to give feedback about the dominance of Pakeha voices, assumptions and interests in this multicultural classroom (Jones, 1999:300). This dissatisfaction coincided with the calls of Maori educators for separate *kaupapa Maori* educational settings which, as Jones quotes Graham Smith, aim to separate Maori students from the ‘contaminating influences of Pakeha social and cultural reproduction processes’ (Smith, 1990:81, cited in Jones, 1999:300).

Thus Jones was presented with a challenge to her political commitment to dialogue in the name of emancipation. While the quote from Smith suggests a desire for an impossible purity in the pedagogical setting, and one which also seems politically problematic in its practice of exclusion, Jones does not ‘turn her back’ on this Maori
desire as simply wrongheaded separatism, but ‘hears’ it and responds to it. She and Jenkins decide to try a modified version of the *kaupapa Maori* educational model, splitting the class for three-quarters of their sessions. The experiment is not an unalloyed success, but results in a reversal of the expressed dissatisfaction amongst the students. Where before the Maori students were not happy with their educational experience, now it is the Pakeha who are not. Again there is a challenge to Jones’ political agenda, this time coming from the Pakeha students. And once again, Jones ‘hears’ and responds to this challenge in the form of the extended critical reflections which result in the two articles I draw on here (we do not know from either article how this Pakeha dissatisfaction impacted on Jones and Jenkins’ pedagogical model in subsequent years).

While the dissatisfaction expressed by the Pakeha students is evidence that the experiment has failed in some sense (Jones, 2001:282), Jones uses this failure as an opening to think further about the desires behind, and limitations of, the dialogical model of cross-cultural relations. As she says (ibid), this ‘sourly delicious problem’ represents ‘work to be done’ in the pursuit of a liberatory pedagogy. The ‘ethical productivity’ of her analysis arises out of her critical reflections on this failure. These reflections result in ‘a recognition of the limitations of [Pakeha’s] own perceptions’ (Meffan and Worthington, 2001:145). Jones does not simply choose one of the political demands she faces as correct and dismiss the other as wrong, but uses the disjunction to embark on a process of reflection. It is this refusal to choose one politics and dismiss the other that allows ethical concerns to ‘surface’.

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145 I take the term ‘ethical productivity’ from Meffan and Worthington (2001), who use it in relation to the issue of the inability to imagine the other’s experience. Both that issue, and the failure Jones experiences in attempting to meet the needs of the Maori and Pakeha students, point to limits in the possibilities of epistemological synthesis. Meffan and Worthington’s (2001:145) quote in full reads: ‘But it is precisely this failure, this necessary failure of the imaginative attempt, that may be ethically productive, for it issues in self-critique a recognition of the limitations of [one’s] own perceptions’.

146 In this sense Jones’ position parallels Meffan and Worthington’s (2001) Lévinasian argument that the ethical commitments of novelist J.M. Coetzee lies in his refusal to offer the reader any easy point of identification or any easy moral certainties. Also see Eagleton (2001) for a similar reading of Coetzee’s ethics.
Aligning herself with the Pakeha students in expressing her own sense of ‘confusion and disappointment’ and ‘grief and loss’ in response to her Maori colleagues leaving to set up their own university department (Jones, 1999:303), Jones sets out on a process of (self-) critique of Pakeha desires for dialogical engagement. A traverse of, and reflection on, the literature surrounding the dialogical model of pedagogy leads Jones to a number of conclusions. She traces the work of the metaphor of space underling the dialogical model, which seeks to bring the marginalised/excluded other into the space of dialogue to hear their/give them voice (Jones, 1999:306-7). Thus, the dialogical model, she argues, reflects the desire of the dominant group to ‘hear’ the voice of the other:

[T]he real exclusion here is not that of the subordinate at all. It is the dominant group’s exclusion from - their inability to hear - the voice of the marginalized.

This silence in the ears of the powerful is misrecognized as the silence of the subaltern, and it reproduces the exclusion of the subaltern (Jones, 1999:307).

In thinking through why this call to dialogue does not seem to lead to satisfactory exchange, Jones concludes, as discussed in Chapter Six, that the White desire for dialogue with the other is a consumptive, imperialistic desire for access to the other, a desire that they ‘open up their territory’ to be ‘mined’ by the dominant group (Jones, 1999:308) for the pleasurable expansion of their (limitless) ability to know. Thus Jones’ Pakeha students are thwarted in their desire to know the other on their own terms by this pedagogical experiment. Instead, in the classes taken by the Maori teacher, Maori knowledge is ‘centred’ and the limits of their ability to know (to master) are made apparent (Jones, 2001).

Jones (1999:310) concludes that the desire for dialogue with the other involves a powerful colonising romance of unity with the colonised other. Where this desire is threatened, as in the case of this pedagogical experiment, the underlying desire for mastery and unfettered access to the other is exposed. ‘Unity’ it turns out, means consumption, the reduction of difference, epistemological violence, in short, domination. Further, this desire to be taught by the Maori other, a desire for ‘pedagogy by the oppressed’ (Jones, 1999:312), is a desire for redemption from the morally culpable position of the dominating coloniser:

Such a stance seeks sympathetic and helpful attention from the other,
reassurance from the comfort of being taught and learning, that the violence of colonization and privilege happens only “over there” or “back then”, or among other people - not us, not here and now, where we are all implicated, where there is mud on all our boots. The angry and thwarted “desire to know” expressed in the words of the Pakeha students reflects a desire to be told “it is all right,” “you are okay” by their Maori friends and acquaintances. The very act of “knowing,” of “being taught” becomes, most significantly, not an act of logic or an accumulation of information or even a call to action, but an experience of redemption (Jones, 1999:313).

This analysis of the desire for dialogue and unity can be applied to the calls of Pakeha responding to Turia’s speech and to many other similar instances. Jones’ analysis is a critical intervention into the unconscious motivations which may accompany good intentions (Jones, 1999:308) as Pakeha engage in dialogue with Maori. However, as we have seen, it is not only Pakeha who express the desire for dialogue. Maori do so too. While the desires that motivate Pakeha and Maori calls for dialogue may differ to a degree, both seek a resolution which Jones suggests may be impossible.
The politics of disappointment

Having exposed the imperialism behind the students’ dialogical desires, against the colonising romances of unity and redemption, Jones (1999:315) argues for the pursuit of self-knowledge and the adoption of a ‘politics of disappointment’. It is here that the ethical productivity of her analysis comes to fruition. In addition to her critical reflections on the limits and dangers of the desire to know, Jones presents an alternative orientation towards Maori for post-colonising Pakeha. She says she is still committed to the pursuit of cross-cultural understanding, not to seek to know the other, but in the interests of ‘a deeper understanding of one’s own culture, society, and history, and their political relation to those of others, [which] is crucial to any desirable future, and any just structural change’ (Jones, 1999:314). Further, she argues that this understanding and the development of ‘ears that hear’ need not be pursued in the dialogical classroom, but through educational practices that do not require the embodied presence of the other. Finally, she argues, Maori resistance to Pakeha access offers opportunities for Pakeha to learn that: ‘[t]he world is not accessible through plain speaking, just as the other is not simply accessible through dialogue’ (Jones, 1999:315). This opportunity is to ‘embrace positively a “politics of disappointment” that includes a productive ignorance of the other’ (ibid, emphasis added).

The ‘politics of disappointment’ is a politics which accepts the failure of utopian political aims. Jones (1999:315, nt48) cites McWilliams (1995) as the source of this term, saying he uses it to ‘describe what he sees as the failure of the hopes of the [American] civil rights movement’. Jones (ibid) argues, ‘[t]his same “politics” might be said to characterize the “loss” of the Enlightenment dream and of the “losses” to dominant ethnic groups as we move into a “postcolonial” era’. This is not a politics as such, but an orientation of ‘disappointment’ to the utopian hopes of politics. From the viewpoint of this orientation, failures and ignorance are considered productive. The ‘productivity of ignorance’ lies firstly, in an orientation of being in process without seeking to ‘arrive’. Here Jones (1999:314-5) cites Patti Lather’s (1996) distinction between ‘coming clear’ as a process of knowing, but never ‘being clear’, which is a posture of ‘dogma and stasis’. Secondly, commitment to the stance of ignorance or
disappointment is “a strategic act of interruption of the methodological will to certainty and clarity of vision” and the colonising impulses that attend it’ (Jones, 1999:315, quote from Stronach and MacLure, 1997:4-5).

The notion of the productivity of ignorance interrupts the usual pairing of ignorance with prejudice, a pairing which is apparent in calls such as Tuohy’s (Evening Post, 11/9/00, p4): ‘right action can never flow from ignorance and bigotry’. It is this pairing which also underpins the calls of Turia and de Bres for Pakeha to pursue greater understanding of Maori. Jones would not have us give up the pursuit of knowing, but would have us temper its ‘colonizing impulses’ (Jones, 1999:315) via a commitment to disappointment in its possibilities and the possibilities of our politics. The ‘ignorance’ Jones would have us embrace is not one based on a lack of knowledge or the certainty of knowledge that constitutes bigotry, but refers to a processual and self-reflexive relation to knowledge, a relation in which the status of existing knowledge is always provisional. This is ignorance as an act of responsibility for the other, rather than ignorance (or knowledge) as domination.

To carry out politics with such an orientation would, for instance, cut across the desire expressed by many Pakeha for Treaty settlement processes to one day ‘finish’, for relations between Maori and Pakeha to be ‘settled’ once and for all. Jones’ journey without arrival, like Lévinas’ insistence on the unending nature of our obligation to the other, would suggest otherwise. Such an orientation would not have us abandon the Treaty process, but would have us question the problematic sources of the desire for its final end. It would also result in greater importance being given to the process and to Maori-Pakeha relations generally, as ends in themselves, rather than the current tendency for Pakeha complaints of ‘Treaty fatigue’ and expression of desires for it to be over. A politics of disappointment applies similarly to Maori political aims. Maori have long since been used to the disappointments of politics and continue to demonstrate their generosity in this sense in their willingness to settle Treaty claims for a small proportion of the value of what was stolen from them. There is however, inevitably, a utopian desire for a fully autonomous existence, which lies behind some Maori politics. As with Pakeha, a politics of disappointment suggests a tempering of this desire.
Further, to embrace disappointment for Maori would ultimately mean the abandonment of the politics of ressentiment, fuelled by the desire for revenge for wrongs that have been suffered (Brown, 1995:68).^{147} 

In the conception of the politics of disappointment then, Jones suggests that politics, in itself, cannot offer us the means to co-exist with others in non-dominating relations. In giving up on the Enlightenment dream and entering a post-colonial era, politics alone will not serve. If we are to preserve epistemological and political multiplicity, we cannot seek any simple unity with our neighbours, nor to resolve all our differences in unanimity. It is worth quoting Lévinas again here:

In this whole priority of the relationship with the other, there is a break with a great traditional idea of the excellence of unity. The relation would already be a deprivation of this unity ... My idea consists in conceiving sociality as independent of the “lost” unity (Lévinas, 1998:112).

In invoking non-unified sociality, I am reminded of an exchange during the discussion following a public address in Wellington (23/9/03) on the foreshore and seabed issue. Maori lawyer, Moana Jackson, who gave the address, was asked how t_puna title would be compatible with private property rights if t_puna rights were recognised by the courts. His answer was that it would not be and that one of our problems was in thinking that everything should be able to fit together. This exchange highlights both the simplicity and complexity of human alterity. Simply speaking, why should two different types of relation between people and land not co-exist? On the other hand, the practice of this co-existence obviously requires complex political, legal and practical negotiations at the level of particular instances. But it is this kind of situated and detailed negotiation that is required to retain multiplicity as a condition of co-existence with others. We need to give up seeking agreement at the level of principle and seek situated, local agreements over particular issues, where the different groups involved may come to agreement for completely different reasons, but agree on the particular at

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^{147} As Brown argues, the images of freedom involved in such politics ‘perform mirror reversals of suffering without transforming the organization of the activity through which suffering is produced and without addressing the subject constitution that domination effects’ (Brown, 1995:7).
Here I am paraphrasing Appiah’s (2003:210) argument that there was something wrong with the original picture of how dialogue should be grounded. It was based on the idea that we must find points of agreement at the level of principle: here is human nature, here is what human nature dictates. What we learn from travel, but also from reading novels or watching films from other places, is that we can identify points of agreement that are much more local and contingent than this. We can agree, in fact, with many moments of judgement, even if we do not share the framework within which those judgements are made, even if we cannot identify a framework, even if there are no principles articulated at all.
Disappointment and ethics

The question that remains however, and that Jones does not address, is what will support such a situated, ‘disappointed’ politics. If politics itself is not enough to ground human co-existence, what is needed to motivate people to make the effort to ‘prefer speech to war’ (Lévinas, 1996:46)? It is here that Lévinas’ ethical insights into the foundations of everyday sociality offer a complement to the politics of disappointment. The only thing that can stop ignorance sliding into bigotry and politics sliding into domination, is the practice of co-existence which remembers the face-to-face ethical encounter and treats all the others met within social and political life as the other of the face-to-face, if not our other, then the other of our neighbour. The accusation that Lévinas is ‘saintly’ is linked to his invocation of ‘kindness’ and ‘love’ in our relations with others. But in turning to these affective modes of human relating to exemplify his ethical orientation, he is insisting on the everyday, concrete foundation of ethics. It is not a matter of being a saint, but a matter of all humans being capable of acts of (unmotivated) kindness and thus of an ethical orientation to others. It is remembering rather than forgetting this human responsibility in our political and social practice, that can underpin and maintain co-existence in conditions of political and epistemological disappointment. It is ‘fear for the other’ resulting from remembering that ‘Pascal’s “my place in the sun” marks the beginning of the image of the usurpation of the whole earth’ (Lévinas, 1989:82) that provides the motivation to make this effort at co-existence with alterity.

149 In one interview Lévinas aligns the ethical relation with ‘love without Eros, charity, love in which the ethical aspect dominates the passionate aspect, love without concupiscence’. At the same time he also expresses his dissatisfaction with the term love as ‘worn-out and debased’ (Lévinas, 1998:103). In another interview he argues that the ethical relationship is one of openness, better defined as friendship than as love:

[I]t is much wider in scope than love. Love is exclusive, selective. However, love is ambiguous. We must distinguish between the one person who is one’s “love” and love of mankind. Only by loving can one realize what it is to be a human being... but love is not a sufficient basis for ethics. Love’s selectivity is only overwon in friendship, which is truly universal (Lévinas, in Vetlesen & Jodalen, 1997:54).
A parallel to the politics of disappointment is offered when Lévinas (1998:229) speaks of the ‘ceaseless deep remorse of justice’ which arises out of the knowledge that justice is never finished. This sense of remorse, he argues,

attests to an ethical excellence and its origin in kindness from which, however [justice] is distanced - always a bit less perhaps - by the necessary calculations imposed by a multiple sociality, calculations constantly starting over again ... [Justice] knows it is not as just as the kindness that instigates it is good. But when it *forgets* that, it risks sinking into a totalitarian and Stalinist regime, and losing, in ideological deductions, the gift of inventing new forms of human coexistence (Lévinas, 1998:230, emphasis added).

Lévinasian ethics offers a means to recentre the foundational sociality of human interaction in our intersubjective engagements. Politics must still get done, but in its pursuit we must always be ready to ‘undo’ it and modify our stance in the face of new challenges and injustices. Politics practised while remembering the ethical obligation of self to other, will be politics practised in the knowledge that the closest we get to our ideals of justice and equality is in their pursuit, rather than their achievement. It is in this pursuit that we have the opportunity to practice an ethics of proximity which maintains, rather than assimilates, human multiplicity.

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150 Also see Bauman (1997:69-70) for this argument, informed by Lévinas’ influence on his thought.
Chapter Nine

Conclusion

[T]he other remains to be discovered ... Each of us must begin [the discovery of the other] over again in turn; the previous experiments do not relieve us of our responsibility, but they can teach us of the effects of misreading the facts (Todorov, 1984:247).

[I]n 1840, tangata whenua around Aotearoa made a bold decision. They decided not to fight British settlement, not to keep exclusively for themselves the resources that they owned. Instead they opened their hearts and homes to strangers, believing partnership and sharing could be the basis for a better future. By signing the Treaty of Waitangi, tangata whenua embraced the world, expanded their horizons, opened themselves up to possibilities. This was a tremendous leap of faith for our tupuna ... I think the time is right for New Zealanders to take the same leap of faith that our ancestors did in 1840. Let us all open ourselves up to the possibility that sharing and partnership is a sound basis for a better future. That means accepting that unfamiliar ways of doing things might have something to offer (Turia, 15/12/03, p2 and 3 of 3).

Identity, ethics and ‘beyond’ colonialism

Hall (1996a:2) argues that identity is crucial to the establishment of a sense of agency and to politics. Certainly, at this moment in history, we do not seem to be able to do without claims to rather abstract, mass-scale, collective identities. Politically speaking, it seems likely that ‘Maori’ and ‘Pakeha’ will continue to have currency for some time
yet, despite their colonial origins. Further, whatever the disquiet over these labels because of those origins, the maintenance of some distinction between the *tīngata whenua* of *Aotearoa* and the New Zealanders who came later, seems crucial to the rejection of colonialism. This immediately raises the issue of distinctive relations to place, which has recurred throughout this thesis. Recognition of the *longue durée* of the indigene (Clifford, 2001, p16 of 26) requires that Pakeha assert their own relationship to New Zealand in a language that marks, rather than denies, Maori difference. What that language might be remains a subject for future research.

In this thesis I have pointed to the limitations of identity politics, as well as to their benefits. My analyses in Chapters Two-Six identified the traces of the colonial relation in assertions of Maori and Pakeha identities and offered insights into how these traces inflect contemporary Maori-Pakeha relations. In brief, relations between these two peoples continue to be dogged by defensiveness, mutual suspicion, denials and conflicts that betray their colonial origins. I offer this analysis as a corrective to the popular view that colonisation was a singular ‘event’ that occurred in the past. Against such a view, this analysis illustrates the ongoing nature of colonisation and its significance in structuring contemporary Maori-Pakeha relations. In doing so, I argue that it is clear that Aotearoa New Zealand is not yet post-colonial in any temporal sense.

I have argued that the issues that confront Maori and Pakeha identities are markedly distinct. Maori is an identity with ‘substance’. The challenges Maori face are in balancing the tensions between the ‘rigidification’ of that ‘substance’ in essentialisms and the embrace of dynamism and diversity. Pakeha identity, in contrast, has little ‘substance’. Pakeha have been shown to pursue ‘substance’ via settler nationalism, problematically asserting their ‘native’ status as New Zealanders. An approach to Pakeha identity more conducive to moving ‘beyond’ colonial relations would involve the refiguring of the settler nationalist imaginary to ‘remember’ migration and settlement and the ‘remembering’ of the role of colonial history. Only through a confrontation with settler/colonial history can Pakeha hope to learn more about themselves.
At the same time, as Chinua Achebe has said, identity carries ‘a penalty and a responsibility’ (in Appiah, 1995:103). The penalty lies in the necessary exclusions involved: of individuals, and of forms of ‘substance’ and ways of being, left ‘outside’ their boundaries. Achebe’s reference to the responsibility of identity can be linked to Lévinas’ (1989:82) discussion of Pascal’s ‘place in the sun’. Our identity claims are claims to a ‘place in the sun’ and, as Lévinas reminds us, come at a cost to others; a cost for which we bear responsibility. I have argued in this thesis that our responsibilities require a guarded and ‘disappointed’ commitment to politics and epistemology, including to our identity claims. Thus, we must always be ready to revise and revisit settled identities and systems of social life. Ethically, our responsibilities demand we fear for the rights of the other to their own ‘place in the sun’.

I have also argued that identities are intersubjectively constituted. As such, the claims we make to identity require affirmation from others. Hence, despite our claims to autonomous personhood, whether we be Maori, Pakeha or something else, this autonomy is itself a relational achievement. This is one of the key insights of intersubjective theorising. In terms of exploring the nature of intersubjective relations, in this thesis I have investigated both epistemological and ethical modes. While recognition theory conceives of the intersubjective relation in epistemological terms, I have argued that responsiveness to the existence and claims of the other cannot solely operate on the terrain of epistemology. The inverse of harmful forms of misrecognition is not to be sought in a perfect practice of recognition. ‘Disappointment’ means abandoning the belief that knowledge is perfectible and embracing ‘the productivity of ignorance’. Further, while Taylor’s recognition theory holds that we must first ‘know’ the other to be able to grant them respect, I have argued, following Lévinas, that the proper responsiveness to the other is, firstly, one of concern. Concern means the acknowledgment of, and respect for, the other’s unknowability; respect for their epistemological mystery. Our relations with others do not stop there of course, but the ethical dimension acts to temper and moderate the epistemological and political.

In terms of the link between identity and agency, this thesis suggests a modification to Hall’s (1996a:2) claim that identity is crucial to agency. Identity claims have been
linked to particular forms of political agency; to assertions of self as a means to claim rights (sometimes at the expense of those of others) and as acts of resistance against domination. Lévinas’ portrayal of the ethical obligation suggests a further form of agency, an agency founded in the demand of the other that calls on the (unique) self to respond. This is an agency which precedes and exceeds those founded in identity claims. In addition, it is one that points to the fact that while ‘Maori’ and ‘Pakeha’ remain important labels for ‘making up people’ (Hacking, 1986), the relationships between these peoples exceeds the assertions and responses of these identities.

Thus, in my search for modes of relation that supercede colonial relations, I have ultimately moved away from a focus on identity, and epistemological relations generally, and have turned to ethics. I argued in Chapter Eight that to re-structure Maori-Pakeha relations in non-colonial, non-dominating ways, Pakeha need to guard against, and curb, their desires for epistemological mastery, for any simple unity with Maori and for any permanent resolution or settlement to that relationship. Basically, Pakeha need to accept that their relationship with Maori is a relationship with an (equal, different, human) other. I have hopefully also shown something of how this seemingly obvious point is not what always, or even often, happens in practice. Nor is it as simple a demand as the recitation of the phrase ‘equal, human, different’ might suggest. If the relationship between Maori and Pakeha is not to be an antagonistic relationship of domination and resistance, I have argued that it is necessary to stop seeking the solution in purely epistemological forms of intersubjective relation and to turn to the bases of our ethical relations with others. This means adopting a ‘disappointed’ orientation to the possibilities of epistemology generally, and of politics, as a primarily epistemological mode of engagement. In his book on the ‘conquest of America’ Tzetvan Todorov (1984:185-6) distinguishes between three ‘elementary forms of conduct’ in our relations with others - conquest, knowledge and love. We have seen some of the problems of the relationship between the first two of these forms. The turn to the ethical basis of social relations is a turn to the latter, in its broadest sense. If our identities (not to mention lives) are socially constituted, as social constructionist theory has long had it, then the other concerns us in fundamental ways.
Identity, alienation and solidarity

It is commonplace to think of identities as ‘given’, their existence needing no explanation. But, in fact, the existence of ‘Maori’ and ‘Pakeha’ as identity labels arises out of a social history. As outlined in Chapter Three, these terms mark the ‘solidification’ of new identities out of their hybrid constituents. While following Stross’ (1999) conceptualisation of the ‘hybridity cycle’ suggests the development of new ‘essences’, I hesitate to adopt this terminology for either identity, albeit for different reasons. As an identity ‘Maori’ has developed a substantive solidity out of both a mix of pre-colonial and modern forms and practices and the solidaristic relations between Maori established in resistance to colonial domination and through traditional Maori forms such as whakapapa. This solidity is, however, best seen as constituted out of an ongoing process of ‘persistence’ and change. ‘Pakeha’, in contrast, has little solidity beyond the existence of the term itself. It remains largely relational, brought into use where an other to ‘Maori’ needs to be called into play.

This can, but need not, be a problem. Rather than seek to give ‘flesh’ to Pakeha identity, Pakeha might be better served by accepting that alienation/estrangement precisely defines who they are. This means to follow Lévinas, rather than Hegel: for Pakeha to see the alienation of the self as an advance, the basis for social and ethical engagement, rather than as a problem to be resolved through struggle and return/domination. Following Turia’s observations in the epigram at the opening of this chapter, it means to be open to new possibilities. Such an acceptance of an alienated subjectivity does not mean Pakeha continue to operate as an ex-nominated ‘silent centre’, retaining the privileges of the universal subject. Acceptance of, rather than warding off, a sense of alienation, is an act of ‘de-centring’. Acceptance of Pakeha alienation would mean a number of things. It would mean acknowledging estrangement from their European ‘origins’ and acceptance of the losses that entails. This process of geographical and cultural estrangement might offer a new point of departure for reconstructing the Pakeha relationship to place in New Zealand. Acceptance of their alienation, following Lévinas, also involves attention to the demands of, and obligations to, the Maori other as other: ‘The anxious struggle for the historical consciousness of freedom that eschews
transcendence - or a higher unity - derives from [the] violence [of alienation] an ethics that takes responsibility for the other in the transformation of the “thing”’ (Bhabha, 1998:38). It is in this ethical orientation of ‘taking responsibility’ that the possibility for solidarity across difference arises. The abandonment of the search for a ‘higher unity’ suggests no easy or settled resolution. As Pnina Werbner (1997:239) says, ‘solidarities are not givens but achievements, usually ephemeral’. The relation between self and other that remembers the ethical obligation is more readily characterised by Clifford’s (1994:328) terminology of ‘fraught co-existence’, than any image of harmony and unanimity. But it is, crucially, a relationship between (human) subjects.

I acknowledge that I have focussed, both here and in Chapter Eight, on the ethical obligation in relation to Pakeha rather than Maori. Lévinas’ ethics is universalist in its scope, hence relevant to all. But this thesis is located in a particular political and historical time and inflected by these interests, in addition to the commitments of ethics. At this particular conjuncture, I consider the onus is on Pakeha to respond to Maori attempts to ‘recover’ from the harms inflicted on them by our/Pakeha political ancestors, and continued within contemporary Maori-Pakeha relations. Further, I take support for the asymmetry of this discussion from Lévinas himself. If the ethical obligation is non-reciprocal, whatever Maori might do is irrelevant to the ethical obligation of Pakeha. This exists even so, and in my ‘White woman’s project’, as stated at the outset, I am particularly concerned with the responsibilities of Pakeha in shifting the colonial relation in Aotearoa New Zealand. Finally, I cannot speak for Maori, but from observation of New Zealand history, and the statements of individuals such as Tariana Turia, I consider the generosity and humanity of Maori are characteristics Pakeha have little reason to doubt.

Proximity and distance in intersubjective relations

The structure of the ethical concern in relation to notions of proximity and distance needs some final clarification. I argued in the Introduction to Part II that both Maori and Pakeha desired to maintain a distance from each other. I pointed to the contradictory operations of this distance, which both serves Pakeha domination, as the necessary
condition for the proliferation of the fantasies of idealised primitivism, and simultaneously provides an autonomous space within which Maori can exercise a degree (at least) of self-determination in their projects of ‘re-centring’. Lévinas’ concept of proximity, on the other hand, seems to invoke a necessary closeness. However, proximity and distance are not simple opposites. Proximity is not a recipe for assimilation and the disruption of Maori autonomy. Lévinas is clear that proximity is not a spatial category. It is ‘different from some “short distance” measured in geometrical space separating the one from the others’ (Lévinas, 1996:166). Its spatial connotations, along with those suggested by the terminology of ‘face’, ‘nakedness’ and ‘neighbour’, are metaphoric rather than literal.

Proximity refers to an ethical, rather than spatial, dimension in the relationship between self and other. It represents the ethical concern for the alterity of the other. Thus, when Jones accepts the desire of Maori for autonomous pedagogical and institutional spaces, she is not severing her relationship with Maori, or ‘washing her hands’ of any concern for them. Rather, that spatial - and crucially, epistemological - distancing is compatible with the notion of ethical proximity. Respect for the alterity of the other, which is the characteristic of relations of proximity, involves an epistemological ‘distancing’. Foundational to it is the unknowability of alterity. Hence relations of proximity can balance the tensions of distancing and relationality outlined in the Introduction to Part II. On the one hand, they preserve the epistemological distance necessary for Maori autonomy and disrupt the categories of Pakeha epistemological domination. On the other, they ground a relationship of ethical concern for the other. Proximity thus combines a form of ‘distance’ (epistemological) with a form of ‘closeness’ (concern).

The epistemological ‘distance’ of proximity is not, however, a matter of a pure epistemological schism. The maintenance of epistemological pluralism need not depend on a complete lack of contact and interaction. Turia and de Bres are not simply wrongheaded to call for forms of cross-cultural epistemological engagement. What proximity does mean, as discussed in Chapter Eight in relation to the notion of the ‘productivity of ignorance’, is the adoption of a processual, ‘coming clear’ orientation towards our knowledge of the other, and the abandonment of the desire for
epistemological closure or ‘settlement’ in our social relations.

**Ethical universalism and epistemological pluralism**

In Chapter Five, I presented Sayyid’s (2000) argument that universalism is synonymous with Western domination. Against this universalism, Sayyid (2000:268) argues that a genuine multiculturalism requires the decentring of Western epistemologies and the embrace of epistemological pluralism. Thus, it is clear that the universalism Sayyid is concerned with is epistemological universalism, a universalisation of Western values and ideas. In seeming contrast to this position, in Chapter Eight I outlined Lévinas’ commitment to universalism, which he considers necessary to account for why people might ‘prefer speech to war’ (Lévinas, 1996:46). Despite the seeming incompatibility of the rejection of universalism on the one hand, and its embrace on the other, these two are, in fact, compatible.

Lévinas’ philosophy is based on the critique of epistemological domination. His ethical universalism depends on epistemological plurality and on moral ambivalence. He argues for a universal obligation to responsiveness to the other, where the content of that responsiveness cannot be prescribed. In asserting the unknowability of the human other, Lévinasian ethics supports the proliferation of epistemologies and difference. But, for Lévinas, the possibility of this proliferation depends precisely on a primordial, ethical, and universal orientation to alterity. It is only this orientation, which can account for the practice of everyday human sociality, and the preference for speech over war:

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151 As Bauman (1998:22) argues, ‘[a]mbivalence is the only soil in which morality can grow and the only territory in which the moral self can act on its responsibility or hear the voice of the unspoken demand’.

152 Thus, while he retains a sense of humanism also, he argues that ‘Man - par excellence - the source of humanity - is perhaps the Other’ (Lévinas, 1996:14). John Llewelyn calls Lévinas’ humanism an ‘alter-humanism’ (Llewelyn, 1995:178) and ‘a humanism of the other man’ (ibid, 145). The definition of humanity for Lévinas, lies in responsibility for the other, rather than any ‘human nature’.
Must we not then distinguish the meanings, in their cultural pluralism, from the sense, orientation, and unity of being - a primordial event in which all the other steps of thought and the whole historical life of being are situated? Do the cultural meanings arise as random wholes in the dispersion of the given? Do they not take on meaning in a dialogue maintained with that which signifies of itself - with the other (autrui)? (Lévinas, 1996:46-7).

Place and possibilities

I began this thesis with the exchange between Ranginui Walker and Brian Turner over issues of Maori and Pakeha belonging. This recurring issue of relationship to place is another of the significant ‘things’ through which Maori and Pakeha speak. Now, as I complete this Conclusion and the country heads into its summer holidays, the foreshore and seabed debate continues to rage. The Government has presented a detailed proposal on what it intends to do and many Maori remain unhappy with the restrictions to their customary rights they consider the proposal entails. Tariana Turia is once again in the news regarding a speech in which, defending Maori customary rights to the foreshore and seabed, she said, ‘we do not expect that we should have to abandon our tikanga, just because they are not familiar to immigrant communities’ (Turia, 15/12/03, p2 of 3). This statement was widely reported immediately following her speech. The implication that Turia was referring to Pakeha as immigrants caused an outcry in the media, once again illustrating Pakeha touchiness at any challenge to their claims to native status. What did not make the news headlines, but appeared when an abridged version of Turia’s speech was published (see for example, Turia, Dominion Post, 17/12/03, pB5), were the comments with which I have started this Conclusion. Turia’s appeal to partnership and sharing was clearly not considered as newsworthy as the possibility of a slight against Pakeha. Despite the partnership rhetoric of the Treaty of Waitangi and biculturalism, there seems to be a lack of interest in discussing its possibilities, or crediting a Maori ‘radical’ with adherence to such values. In contrast, the Pakeha media would prefer to keep talking ‘through things’.

To pursue Turia’s invocation of partnership and sharing a little further - while ‘going to
the beach’ this summer might involve meeting up with Maori protesting the Government’s foreshore and seabed proposal, ‘going to the beach’ is also a cultural activity that unites Maori and Pakeha. Some Maori leaders have been quoted in the media calling on protestors not to disrupt holiday makers at the beach, and hence to risk alienating the sympathies of the Pakeha public. This is an interesting development in itself since, most often in the political struggles between Maori and the Government, Pakeha as a people receive little or no attention. In this instance, Maori are clear they do not wish to challenge Pakeha rights to the beach. ‘Going to the beach’ is a practice both Maori and Pakeha treasure. And while the relationship of *iwi M_Ori* to their coastline involves particular meanings, rights and responsibilities, there is a high degree of overlap between what Maori and Pakeha do ‘at the beach’. It will be an interesting summer, not least because the beach is a place at which Maori and Pakeha meet more readily than in many others. In talking of ‘meeting’ I am not referring to spatial closeness so much, which happens at many sites in the lives of New Zealanders - within workplaces, families, neighbourhoods, government agencies, schools, sports, leisure and arts organisations and events. I am referring to a form of cultural closeness, a point of wide agreement between Maori and Pakeha as to the importance of the beach and of rights to the beach, despite the beach having distinct meanings within both cultural frameworks (cf. Appiah, 2003:210). In the foreshore and seabed debate, the beach, this significant point of cultural contact, is becoming a point of conflict. Thus the dynamics of colonial relationality are repeated yet again; contact becomes conflict. Against these dynamics, Turia, in a terminology which echoes Lévinas, calls for New Zealanders to make a different type of contact, based on openness and sharing.
This Glossary gives simple meanings to aid comprehension of Maori words used in the thesis. Many of these terms have multi-layered and complex meanings not given here. This list excludes more technical terms (such as \textit{nga t\_ngata awarua}) whose meaning has been given in the text. No translations are given for the proper names of tribes, places, individuals and organisations, but a list of tribes and sub-tribes referred to in this thesis is given at the conclusion of the Glossary.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Maori Word</th>
<th>English Translation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aotearoa</td>
<td>North Island, whole of New Zealand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aroha</td>
<td>love</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>awa</td>
<td>river, channel</td>
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<tr>
<td>haka</td>
<td>fierce dance with chant</td>
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<tr>
<td>hap_</td>
<td>sub-tribe</td>
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<tr>
<td>hongi</td>
<td>greeting, press noses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hui</td>
<td>gathering(s), meeting(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kaitiaki</td>
<td>guardian</td>
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<tr>
<td>kaum_tua</td>
<td>elder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kaupapa M_ori</td>
<td>Maori philosophy, plan, programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kauri</td>
<td>an endemic New Zealand tree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K_hanga Reo</td>
<td>Maori pre-school, language nest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kura Kaupapa M_ori</td>
<td>Maori primary school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iwi</td>
<td>tribe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m_kutu</td>
<td>bewitched, black magic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mana</td>
<td>integrity, charisma, prestige</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mana t_ngata</td>
<td>human rights, integrity,status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mana whenua</td>
<td>trusteeship of land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mana wairua</td>
<td>spiritual authority, spiritual integrity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>manaakitanga</td>
<td>hospitality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>manuhiri</td>
<td>visitor(s), guest(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M_oritanga</td>
<td>Maori culture, Maori perspective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>marae</td>
<td>open space in front of meeting house or in centre of village, the complex of buildings around this space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mate</td>
<td>sickness, death, unconscious</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>maunga</td>
<td>mountain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mauri</td>
<td>life force, life essence, special character</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>moa</td>
<td>an extinct New Zealand bird</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>moko</td>
<td>tattoo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papat_nuku</td>
<td>Earth parent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>poi</td>
<td>ball, performance with a ball on a string</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>poupou</td>
<td>carved post, ancestor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reo</td>
<td>language</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rohe</td>
<td>region, territory, boundary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>r_nanga</td>
<td>council, assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>t_ngata whenua</td>
<td>people of the land, local people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>taonga</td>
<td>treasure(s), gift(s), property</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>taniwha</td>
<td>water monster</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tauiwi</td>
<td>stranger(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Te Ao M_ori</td>
<td>the Maori world</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tikanga</td>
<td>lores, customs, obligations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tipuna/t_puna</td>
<td>ancestors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>t_rangawaewae</td>
<td>place to stand, home</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>t_turu</td>
<td>genuine, authentic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>w_hi tapu</td>
<td>sacred place, cemetery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>waka</td>
<td>canoe</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
whakapapa  genealogy
wh_nau     extended family
whanaungatanga  relationships, relations
whare  house
wharenui  meeting house, large house

**Tribes and sub-tribes referred to**

Hineuru hap_ of Tuwharetoa
Ngai Tahu
Ngati Kaputuhi hap_ of Maniapoto
Ngati Maru
Ngati Paoa
Ngati Porou
Ngati Whatua
Ngapuhi
Tainui
Te Arawa
Te Atiawa
Whakatohea
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