Copyright is owned by the Author of the thesis. Permission is given for a copy to be downloaded by an individual for the purpose of research and private study only. The thesis may not be reproduced elsewhere without the permission of the Author.
NEW ZEALAND’S RESPONSE TO THE CRISES IN AFRICA.

LOVE MNGOHOL CHILE
M.Sc. B.Sc. (Hons) Dip. Ed.

A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.
Massey University Albany, Auckland. New Zealand.

1996
NEW ZEALAND'S RESPONSE TO THE CRISSES IN AFRICA

Abstract

The thesis seeks to explain the motivation for New Zealand's response to the sociopolitical and economic crises in Africa. New Zealand's response is conceptualised to include 'foreign aid' as well as the non-traditional forms of international assistance such as peacekeeping and monitoring, political and moral support on issues such as apartheid.

Qualitative research methodology is used to critically examine both the official bilateral response and the response of the non-governmental organisations (NGOs). In the context of existing theory, New Zealand's response to the crises in Africa has significant elements of both the functional utility approach (McKinley and Little 1977) and the conventionalist framework (Gordenker 1976). Official policy espouses both, although the balance between the pursuit of foreign policy interests and altruistic response to the crises is difficult to attain.

The thesis concludes that while New Zealand's political and moral response was an important factor in the resolution of the crisis of apartheid, the overall official response to the socioeconomic and developmental crises is ineffective. Development partnership between New Zealand NGOs and local NGOs and communities in Africa has been a more effective response to the developmental crises. International development partnership with African countries and communities based on longer term commitment to processes which enhance sustainable socioeconomic progress and social justice is recommended as a strategy for maximising the effectiveness of international response to the crises in Africa.
DEDICATION

To

Joseph Terkula CHILE

My Dear Brother,

My success meant so much to you. Although you did not live to see the completion of this work, your spirit is written in every page. I thank God that you are rested with our ancestors in the full knowledge that we have both arrived. You will always be our hero because of the record of achievements of your 45 years of a very fulfilled life.

"The tragedy of life is not death, but what we let die inside of us while we live"

Ph. D Thesis

Love M. Chile
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

An important academic experience such as this could never be accomplished without the partnership of a number of people. Those who give everything to ensure you attain your goals, and those who lend a helping hand when you are on the edge. To all these people I say THANK YOU.

I must mention specifically my wonderful family. My wife, Rebecca Awuese, her confidence in me and encouragement to keep pushing ahead. Our young children: Love Junior, Love-Ese and Denen, who endured my long working hours and uneventful school holidays. I Hope to deliver on ‘next year will be easier’ this time.

My supervisors Dr. Mike O’Brien and Dr. ‘Okusitino Mahina. Over the years Mike has provided invaluable academic support and outstanding supervision. One could not ask for a better supervisor. I have also valued the complementary perspective that Okusi has provided from his anthropological, Tongan and Pacific Island heritage and experiences.

Thank you Dr. Rukmani Gounder for critical comments particularly on the theory and literature. Dr. Phil Amos my ‘guinea pig’, on whom theories on the crises in Africa were tested, who helped to sharpen my interest and critical insight into the nature of African and New Zealand society and politics.

The most valuable of all, are my respondents. You gave me the evidence to substantiate the theory. I thank you for sharing your time and experiences so that my understanding and that of the readers is extended and enriched.
# NEW ZEALAND'S RESPONSE TO THE CRISES IN AFRICA

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dedication</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgments</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Tables</td>
<td>xi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of figures and maps</td>
<td>xi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of photographs</td>
<td>xii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Abbreviations and Acronyms</td>
<td>xiii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION</strong></td>
<td>1-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 Scope and Limitations of the Study</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3 The Structure of the Thesis</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER TWO: THEORETICAL CONCEPTUALISATION OF NEW ZEALAND'S RESPONSE TO THE CRISES IN AFRICA</strong></td>
<td>14-35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1 Introduction</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 What is the Crises in Africa?</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3 What Constitutes New Zealand's Response?</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4 Assessing the Effectiveness of International Development Assistance</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41 International assistance has no positive effects</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42 International assistance as an effective response to</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5 Conclusion</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ph. D Thesis

Love M. Chile
CHAPTER THREE  WHY COUNTRIES GIVE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

3.1 Introduction 36

11 Why international assistance: The modernisation-dependency debate 37

3.2 Two Approaches to Donor Motivation 41

21 The Conventionalist Approach 42

22 The Functional Utility Approach 48

3.3 Conclusion 58

CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

4.1 Introduction 60

4.2 The Contextual Models 61

21 1: Donor Interests models 62

22 2: Recipient Needs models 65

4.3 The Methodology 69

31 1: Empathic Ethnography 69

32 2: The conceptual framework 74

4.4 Sources of Data 75

41 1: The Procedure 75

42 2: Elite Interviews 77

43 3: Official documents and file data 80

44 4: Site Visits 81

4.5 Conclusion 82

Ph. D Thesis vi

Love M. Chile
CHAPTER FIVE: THEORETICAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE CAUSES
OF THE CRISES IN AFRICA 84-147

5.1 The Crises of Political Instability: The Nature and the Causes 84
   11 Legacy of colonialism: Creation of nation-states 86
   12 2 Heritage of one-party rule 92
   13 3 Weak political structures 96

5.2 Crises of Apartheid in South Africa 101
   21 Apartheid and the crises of political instability in Southern Africa 105

5.3 Africa's Economic Crises: The Nature and the Causes 109
   31 Droughts, famines and food shortages: The nature of the crisis 113
   32 2 The causes of 114
   33 3 Environmental context 120
   34 4 The impact of wars 122

5.4 Africa's Debt Crisis: The Extent of the Crisis 123
   41 The causes 124
   42 The legitimacy of 130

5.5 The Refugee Crisis 133

5.6 The Crisis of the AIDS Pandemic 139

5.7 Conclusions 143

CHAPTER SIX: NEW ZEALAND'S ODA TO AFRICA 148-183

6.1 Introduction 148

6.2 Historical Overview of NZODA Programme 149
   21 The Colombo Plan 1950 151
   22 Geopolitical motivation of the Colombo Plan and BAAP 153

Ph. D Thesis vii

Love M. Chile
CHAPTER SEVEN: NEW ZEALAND’S OFFICIAL RESPONSE TO THE CRISES IN AFRICA

7.1 Introduction 184
7.2 Why New Zealand Needs to Respond 185
7.3 New Zealand’s Response to the Crisis of Apartheid 190
   31 The problematic of sports boycott 191
   32 Sports boycott and the ending of apartheid 199
   33 Diplomatic Representation in Africa 204
   34 The role of the Harare High Commission in ending apartheid 207
7.4 Official Response to Political Crises in Africa 209
   41 The position prior to 1984 211
   42 Contribution to peacekeeping and monitoring 216
   43 Commonwealth good government programme 224
7.5 Other Responses 229
   51 Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) 229
   52 Models of economic reform 231
7.6 Summary and Conclusion 238
CHAPTER EIGHT: NEW ZEALAND’S IDENTIFIABLE FOREIGN POLICY INTERESTS IN AFRICA 239-267

8.1 Introduction 239

8.2 New Zealand’s Identifiable Interests in Africa 240
21 Establishing goodwill 244
22 Constituency building 247
23 Auckland Commonwealth games 1990 251
24 Building capacity at the UN for UNSC seat 1992 254
25 Generating trade and commercial opportunities 259

8.3 Discussion and Conclusion 261

CHAPTER NINE: NEW ZEALAND’S RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS IN AFRICA: THE ROLE OF THE NGOS. 268-334

9.1 Introduction 268

9.2 Types of NGO Response 268
21 Emergency and disaster relief 268
22 Longer-term development partnerships 272

9.3 Selection Process for Development Partnerships 275
31 Choosing between Africa and other developing regions 280
32 Criteria for selecting between African countries 283

9.4 Selecting partner communities within African countries 288
41 Development needs criteria 288
42 Equity considerations 293

9.5 Two Case Studies: South Africa and Zimbabwe 296
51 The Rural Women’s Movement (RWM) South Africa 298
CHAPTER TEN: NEW ZEALAND’S RESPONSE TO THE CRISES IN AFRICA:
A PARTNERSHIP PROPOSAL

10.1 Introduction

10.2 Reconceptualising the Paradigm of International Assistance

10.3 Testing the Partnership model: New Zealand’s response to apartheid

31 Benefits of New Zealand’s response to the partnership

10.4 Creating Bilateral International development partnerships

41 Level One: Official bilateral level

42 The role of the UN and the OAU

43 Development Partnership as a framework for peace and stability

10.5 Level Two-to-Three: Partnerships between NGOs and Communities

10.6 Conclusion

APPENDICES

Appendix One Interview Schedules

Appendix Two Consent form and information sheet

Appendix Three List of Respondents

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Unpublished Official Documents

Ph. D Thesis x

Love M. Chile
List of Tables

5.1 Africa’s Debt 1980-1994 127
5.2 Pattern of Refugees Crisis in Africa 1984-5 and 1993-94 134
5.3 Global Pattern of adult HIV infections 1994 141
6.1 Official Development Assistance from OECD countries 165

List of Figures and Maps

Figure 01 New Zealand and Africa xvii
Figure 4.1 Understanding New Zealand’s Response to the Crises in Africa 75
Figure 5.1 Countries of Africa 1996 85
Figure 5.2 Geographical extent of Africa’s drought crisis 115
Figure 5.3 Refugee Movements in Sub-Saharan Africa 1984-1994 137
Figure 5.4 Trends in HIV prevalence among adult populations, by region 139
Figure 6.1 Volume and Growth of NZODA 1973-1995 163
Figure 6.2 Geographical pattern of NZODA 1972/73-1994/95 169
Figure 6.3 Volume of NZODA to Africa 1972/73-1994/95 173
Figure 6.4 Countries of accreditation for the NZ High Commission Harare 175
Figure 6.5 Forms of NZODA to Africa 176
Figure 9.1 Sources of Funding for New Zealand NGOs 271
Figure 9.2 Continuum NZ NGOs’ response to developmental crisis in Africa 275
Figure 9.3 Areas covered by the RWM South Africa 299
Figure 10.1 Partnership Model New Zealand’s response to apartheid crisis 349
Figure 10.2 Creating a ‘perfect’ partnership 354
List of Photographs

Photo 1  The Genesis Mental Health Centre ‘block’, Beestekraal, South Africa  310
Photo 2  ‘Kitchen’ facility at Genesis Mental Health Centre, Beestekraal, S. Africa  310
Photo 3  Inside the classroom/ dining/restroom/kitchen at Genesis  311
Photo 4  The great team at Genesis Mental Health Centre, Beestekraal, S. Africa  311
Photo 5  Classroom at the Lethabong Daycare Centre, Hastebeesfontain, S. Africa  313
Photo 6  The team at Lethabong Daycare Centre, Hastebeesfontain, S. Africa  313
Photo 7  At the Grinding mill Chirariro, Zimbabwe  322
Photo 8  Blaire Toilet  324
Photo 9  Blaire Toilets in the context of homesteads, Chirariro Zimbabwe  324
Photo 10 Members of the Women’s cooperative in Harare, Zimbabwe  328
Photo 11 Footwear shop in one of the informal settlements in Harare, Zimbabwe  328
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADB</td>
<td>Asia Development Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADP</td>
<td>Area Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>agpacs</td>
<td>agricultural packs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>Africa Information Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIDS</td>
<td>Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of South East Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUD</td>
<td>Australian Dollars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAAP</td>
<td>Bilateral Aid - Asia and the Pacific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAA</td>
<td>Community Aid Abroad (Australia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCF</td>
<td>Christian Child Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCM</td>
<td>Chama Cha Mapinduzi (Revolutionary Party of Tanzania)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CES</td>
<td>Commonwealth Education Scheme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFTC</td>
<td>Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHOGM</td>
<td>Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNN</td>
<td>Cable News Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CORSO</td>
<td>Council of Organisations for Relief Services Overseas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee (of the OECD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESAP</td>
<td>Economic Structural Adjustment Programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FNLA</td>
<td>Frente Nacionale de Libertacao de Angola (Angolan National Liberation Front)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRELIMO</td>
<td>Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique (Front For the liberation of Mozambique)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GATT</td>
<td>General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNP</td>
<td>Gross National Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSP</td>
<td>Generalised System of Preferences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDI</td>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIV</td>
<td>Human Immunodeficiency Virus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOMF</td>
<td>Head Of Mission Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRD</td>
<td>Human Resource Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross (and Red Crescent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDA</td>
<td>International Development Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDAF</td>
<td>International Defence and Aid Fund (for South Africa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISCA</td>
<td>International Save the Children Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDC</td>
<td>Less Developed Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNR</td>
<td>Mozambique National Resistance Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPLA</td>
<td>Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non Government Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NNPC</td>
<td>Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZ</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZD</td>
<td>New Zealand Dollars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZODA</td>
<td>New Zealand's Official Development Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZRFU</td>
<td>New Zealand Rugby Football Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZSCF</td>
<td>New Zealand Save the Children’s Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPEC</td>
<td>Organisation of Oil Exporting Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxfam</td>
<td>Oxford Committee for Famine Relief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAC</td>
<td>Partnership Africa-Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PANA</td>
<td>Pan African News Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PQLI</td>
<td>Physical Quality of Life Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RENAMO</td>
<td>Resistencia Nationale Mocambicana (National Resistance Movement of Mozambique)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RNZAF</td>
<td>Royal New Zealand Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RWM</td>
<td>Rural Women's Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADCC</td>
<td>Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCAAP</td>
<td>Special Commonwealth Africa Assistance Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCF</td>
<td>Save the Children Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWAPO</td>
<td>South West African People's Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TANU</td>
<td>Tanganyika African National Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TNC</td>
<td>Trans National Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRAC</td>
<td>Transvaal Rural Action Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMIR</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAR</td>
<td>National Rwandese Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAVEM</td>
<td>United Nations Angola Verification Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCTAD</td>
<td>United Nations Conference on Trade and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commission for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITA</td>
<td>Uniao Nacionale para a Independencia Total de Angola (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITAF</td>
<td>United Nations Authorised Unified Task Force (in Somalia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITAG</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Assistance Group (in Namibia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOMOSA</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Mission to South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOMOZ</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Mission on Mozambique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOSOM</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Mission to Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USD</td>
<td>United States Dollars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VASS</td>
<td>Voluntary Agency Support Scheme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VSA</td>
<td>Volunteer Service Abroad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organisation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ph. D Thesis  xvi  Love M. Chile
ERRATA

Page 25 line 18 'that' should read 'the'
page 41 line 1 'motivates' should read 'motives'
page 59 line 1 'Maizeals' should read 'Maizels'
page 65 line 11 record' should read 'records'
page 70 line 2 'studied' should read 'studies'
page 74 line 13 'positive correlation' should read 'negative correlation'
page 87 line 23 'was' should read 'were'
page 91 line 19 'Belgium' should read 'Belgian'
page 92 line 18 'Ake' should read '(Ake' (note bracket)
page 93 line 23 'at the age 74' should read 'at the age of 74'
page 102 line 11 'Afrikaaner' should read 'Afrikaner'
page 125 line 15 'eighteen' should read 'Eighteen'
page 128 line 14 'debt' should read 'the debt'
page 131 line 20 'of the economic environment' should read 'on the economic environment'

Page 136 line 4 'is' should read 'are'
page 136 line 15 'share' should read 'sheer'
page 142 source for the quote 'Discussions with Dr. Adeyemi February 1996'
page 164 line 10 'for the 1983/84' should read 'for the 1983/84 fiscal year'
page 170 line 23 'are not necessarily' should read 'are not countries necessarily'
page 197 line 14 'Butterworth 1990' should read 'Butterworth 1991'
page 229 line 8 'this' should read 'This'
page 331 line 3 'things areas as' should read 'areas such as'
page 347 line 23 'complimentary' should read 'complementary'
page 348 line 20 'sells' should read 'sales'
page 348 last line complimentary should read 'complementary'
page 351 line 21 'South' should read 'South Africa'
page 360 line 4 'other' should read 'other than'
page 365 line 3 'income' should read 'income" (note quotation mark)
page 372 line 17 'However, it' should read 'However, it is'

Beyond New Zealand: The Foreign Policy of a Small State. Methuen. Auckland.
New Zealand and Africa
CHAPTER ONE:

INTRODUCTION

"The major justification for a research enterprise is that we have the time and the skill to develop approximations of the truth that have a firmer warrant than common sense."
Firestone 1990, p123.

Africa is so far away from New Zealand both geographically and psychologically that it hardly features in the consciousness of the average New Zealander. Thus, New Zealand’s relationship with Africa prior to the mid-1980s was essentially based on historical and cultural links with ‘white South Africa’. These links date back to the 19th century, and relate essentially to the historical heritage of the ‘white dominions’ namely: Australia, Britain, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa. The first Governor General of New Zealand, Sir George Grey (1812-1898), served as Governor of Cape Colony, South Africa, from 1854-1859 between his two terms as Governor of New Zealand in 1845-1853 and 1861-1868. New Zealand was also involved in the Anglo-Boer wars of the 19th century. In the first half of the 20th Century, New Zealand maintained close cultural, sporting and trade relations with South Africa and Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe). It was those close cultural and sporting relations with white South Africa that became problematic for New Zealand’s relations with the rest of Africa and the Commonwealth from the 1960s to the mid-1980s. Links with the rest of Africa were more tenuous, although the common heritage of the British Commonwealth provided a forum for interaction with some African countries.
Africa outside of South Africa, became increasingly important to New Zealand from the mid-1970s following the African-led mass boycott of the Montreal Olympic games in 1976 in protest against the All Black rugby tour of South Africa. This mass boycott precipitated a crisis in New Zealand’s international relations, as its refusal to implement UN resolutions on apartheid South Africa threatened further boycott of international sporting events in which New Zealand participated. With about 30 per cent of the membership of the United Nations and also the Commonwealth, Africa’s substantial vote and influence at the international arena became increasingly recognised by New Zealand. Contacts within the Commonwealth and changes in government policy response to the crises in Africa, were exploited by New Zealand from the mid-1980s to extricate itself from the international isolation imposed in the mid-1970s. This study examines how New Zealand’s response to the crises in Africa provided the means for extricating itself from international estrangement resulting from its sporting relations with apartheid South Africa between 1976 and 1981, while at the same time responding to the crises in Africa. The task therefore involves first of all understanding what constitutes the crises in Africa, and also what is the nature of New Zealand’s response.

The term ‘crisis’ is defined in the post-modernist conceptualisation, as a chronic state of disruption to a system with no clear prospects for resolution. This suggests that the crises in Africa defy the traditional presumptions that crises can be overcome by rational, logical dialogue and discourse, and that crises are an integral part of the process of social change. The weight of the strain on the ‘Africa system’, on the socioeconomic, political and the physical environment, created by the complex crises has produced consequences that threaten the survival of the system itself. Eight
principal crises are identified, namely: the inhumanity imposed on the Black Africans by the laws of apartheid and racial discrimination in South Africa; the political instability in many African countries which has led to incessant civil wars and the break down of civil society; economic disintegration, poverty and underdevelopment; droughts, famines and food shortages. Then there are also the crises of the debt burden, environmental degradation, refugees and the AIDS pandemic.

Having defined what constitutes the crises in Africa, I employ structural analysis to examine what are the causes of the crises. The structural analysis approach suggests that Africa's crises are socially and structurally constructed. I contend that the root causes of the crises are to be found primarily in the legacy of exploitative colonialism and the way in which Africa was thrust into the global economy, unprepared, uncouth and on unequal terms with the rest of the world. After independence, the poverty of the political institutions inherited from the colonial administration resulted in the poor management of post-independence nation-states, and the subsequent collapse of civil society and the national economies. Because of the fragile economic base, and the marginalisation of the poor, of rural areas, of women, of the primary food producer groups, and of minorities, disruptions to the system such as droughts often result in crises which the countries are not able to cope with independently.

New Zealand's response is defined as the actions taken by the New Zealand governments between 1973 and 1995, the Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and individual New Zealanders in response to the various natural, political and developmental crises affecting Africa. The theoretical issue of what constitutes New Zealand's response to the crises in Africa is analysed within the context of New
Zealand's international development assistance (IDA). Two main theoretical strands are identified in the literature, the one which examines the motivation for giving international development assistance, and the other which looks at the effectiveness of development assistance. The literature on motivation is grouped under two broad theoretical perspectives, namely the 'Functional Utility' approach, which argues that IDA is principally an instrument for advancing donors' foreign policy and trade interests (Griffin 1991; McKinlay and Little 1978A), and the 'Conventionalist Approach' which maintains that development assistance should be seen as a means for enhancing the socioeconomic development of the recipients as well as a means for creating international co-operation (Gordenker 1976; Riddell 1987). New Zealand's response to the crises in Africa is analysed in the context of both the functional utility and the conventionalist approach.

New Zealand's response however, is defined so that it encompasses more than just the traditional understanding of international development assistance as 'official bilateral aid' (Gounder 1995, pp. 5-6). It is conceptualised to include contributions of financial and other resources from both official bilateral and multilateral channels, as well as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), for the purposes of creating a conducive environment which enhances socioeconomic and political progress in the recipient African communities. These range from food and commodity assistance to supplement stock in recipient countries or communities during periods of extreme food shortages, to accepting African refugees into New Zealand on humanitarian grounds. It also includes project and programme assistance that provide specific assets or technical assistance to the recipient country or communities, or sectors of the economy, and human resource development programmes which enable individuals and groups from
recipient countries to acquire knowledge, skills and training to enable them to function more productively and adequately in the recipient society (Cassen 1986, chapter 4; Clark 1993, p6). It also includes peacekeeping contributions during crises of social and political instability (Rowley 1991, p10), as well as political actions by the New Zealand government in support of Africa during the crisis of apartheid; and good government programmes aimed at creating and enhancing the democratic process in African countries.

The methodology for this particular study is derived from the theoretical framework which examines the issues of the crises in Africa and that of international response to crises in developing countries through international development assistance. Although many quantitative studies have used a range of different theoretical approaches most have tended to focus on the uni-directional donor-to-recipient flow of funds, and only limited attention has been given to the counter flow of benefits to the donor. Their analytical procedures also tend to overlook the non-traditional, less tangible forms of assistance, such as peacekeeping and political support which this study has identified and incorporated in its analysis. They use quantitative econometric methods such as regression and correlation analysis to test for evidence of motivation for giving IDA (Gounder 1994; McKinley and Little 1979, 1978A). Some of these studies treat the two theoretical perspectives as exclusive, as if development assistance is given either in pursuit of the donor’s self interest, or to meet recipient’s need (McKinley and Little 1979, p239; 1978A, p323; Tsoutsoplades 1991, p648).

The research style adopted for this study departs from the existing ones. It conceptualises New Zealand’s response to the crises in Africa as a form of interaction between New Zealand and the recipient African countries, from which both partners derive benefits. It examines New Zealand’s response to the crises in Africa from the
perspective of the meaning and value both partners ascribe to the relationship. This approach is termed ‘empathic ethnography’ (Morgan 1983), also called ‘sympathetic introspection’ (Sarantakos 1993, p49). It is an attempt to get inside a relationship being studied and to reconstruct it from the members’ perspective, through an open ended, inductive approach. This is with the realisation that we can never fully understand the consequences of international assistance activity in a complex and interdependent social system until we analyse it from the perspective of the both the recipient and the giver (Ruttan 1989, p421). This is done through interviews and the study of official documents, to enable an understanding of the shared divergent patterns of meaning that underlie the relationship that has evolved from the interactions. New Zealand’s response to the crises in Africa is therefore conceptualised as a process of interactions designed to build a mutually beneficial relationship between the ‘donor’ and the ‘recipient’, a process in which no one is too poor to give nor too rich to receive. The benefits of the exchange are not necessarily material and tangible, but both the tangible and the non-material benefits are equally important.

1.2 Scope and Limitations of the Study

The present study covers the period 1972/73 to 1994/95, a period of twenty two years. In May 1973 New Zealand joined the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and development (OECD), and on November 14 of that year became a member of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC). It was subsequently obliged to submit to the principles of the DAC which includes working towards attaining the target of 0.7 per cent of GNP devoted to international development assistance. Membership of the DAC also required it to submit annual reports on official development assistance.
(ODA) to the DAC. Consequently the first official report of the New Zealand official development assistance programme (NZODA) was submitted to the DAC in 1974. Therefore, in terms of availability of comprehensive data, the year 1972/73 is the most convenient starting point. Also the change in government in 1972 which brought the Labour party to power led to a substantial increase in the volume of development assistance. The Labour Party’s election Manifesto committed it to substantially increase NZODA to a full one per cent of GNP (Debreceny 1979, p39). Consequently, NZODA broke through the NZD 20 million for the first time in the 1972/73 financial year (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1974). This was accompanied by a significant shift in New Zealand’s foreign policy in 1973, when the Labour government set a new agenda for the relationship between New Zealand and Africa. The Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Norman Kirk stated that:

"in looking anew at New Zealand's position in the world and her relationship with other countries, the belief that Africa is a distant continent of which we need to know little about, seems to me to be no longer tenable"


For the first time New Zealand clearly defined its policy towards Africa and affirmed it commitment to improving and expanding contacts with Africa outside of the Republic of South Africa. This provided a fresh new attitude which marked an important shift in New Zealand’s relationship with Africa.

The beginning of the crises in Africa is usually associated with two important events in 1973. First is the global oil crisis which brought about a dramatic increase in the price of crude oil by the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). As most African countries are net oil importers, their fragile economies were drastically affected by the hike in oil prices, which also coincided with the fall in commodity
prices on the international market. Thus not only was the value of their exports reduced because of the price crash, but the increase in oil prices meant that the commodity producers, most of whom were dependent on one major export crop, had their foreign earnings halved. Second, it was in 1973 that the cumulative effect of years of inadequate rainfall resulting in widespread drought, massive crop failure and food shortages in Africa was recognised as a crisis by the international community. These three important events, the effects of the global oil crisis, the commodity price crash and the drought, makes 1973 a major turning point in the fortunes of the African continent, which further justifies the choice of that year as the starting point for this study.

As in 1973, 1993/94 represents another turning point for Africa in a number of ways. For the first time in the past three decades, real prospects for peace and economic stability seems a possibility for the continent. The dismantling of the apartheid system in South Africa was completed with the election of a genuine multiracial government in the Republic headed by Nelson Mandela as President. The relative peace that followed the transition has a positive flow on effect on the neighbouring countries in the region. Multi-party elections were held in Mozambique with the opposition National Resistance Movement (RENAMO) accepting the results of the election victory by the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) governing party. A government of national unity formed following the 1994 elections seems to be working. In Angola the governing Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), has signed a peace accord with the opposition guerrilla movement, National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola (UNITA), of Roberto Savimbi. In the Horn of Africa, the 33 year conflict in Ethiopia ended when the Dergue and its leadership
headed by Halie Mangistu Mariam was overthrown and the new administration headed by civilians gave the Eritreans the opportunity of voting for self-determination and independence in 1993. Over the rest of Africa there is optimism for positive political and economic prospects in many parts of the continent.

In New Zealand 1993 is important in its relationship with Africa in a number of ways. For the first time since 1966, New Zealand took a seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in 1993. (New Zealand had served on the UNSC only twice before, in 1955-56 and 1965-1966). During the most recent term in 1993-1994, New Zealand played a leading role in the search for peace and reconciliation in the war ravaged parts of Africa, from Somalia to South Africa, and from Liberia to Rwanda. The choice of the study period 1972/73 to 1994/95 is therefore significant in the understanding of the evolution of the crises in Africa and New Zealand's response it.

The focus of this study is East and Southern Africa, particularly the countries to which the New Zealand High Commission in Harare is accredited. However, the crises in Africa can only be fully understood when cast in the historical and geopolitical context of the whole sub-Saharan Africa. Therefore, although reference is made consistently to Africa as a geopolitical unit, this must not be misconstrued as implying the intention to undertake a comprehensive study of the entire Africa continent. Such a task is beyond the resources of this present study and its worth is also doubtful.

This study is first and foremost an attempt to re-examine the traditional concepts of 'donor interest' and 'recipient need' in the traditional development assistance literature in the context of New Zealand's international assistance to Africa. It provides an
alternative analytical framework to the traditional definition which conceptualises international assistance narrowly as ‘the flow of capital to less developed countries’ (Gounder 1995, p6). It also challenges the monopoly of traditional quantitative econometric analysis which aims to find one or the other of the motivations for giving international development assistance. The first contribution of this study therefore is in the reconceptualisation of international assistance and also the use of qualitative methodology for analysis of international assistance. This research is also the first comprehensive study of New Zealand’s international assistance to Africa, and how that assistance has been directed at responding to specific crises. The detailed and comprehensive reporting and analysis of primary and secondary qualitative data therefore, provides an invaluable information base for students of New Zealand-Africa relations. It is hoped that the study would engender interest, debate and further research into some of the issues raised. But most of all it is hoped that the study would contribute to the knowledge and better understanding of the crises in Africa amongst the New Zealand community.

1.3 The Structure of the Study

The thesis is reported in ten chapters. The chapters fall generally into three main groups: the introduction, the theoretical and conceptual issues, and the analysis and presentation of empirical data. Chapter One provides a brief overview of the thesis, introduces the topic and establishes the debate that the rest of the thesis examines. It also outlines the scope and justification for the study. Theoretical and conceptual issues are the concern of Chapters Two through to Five. Chapter Two critically examines the theoretical question of what constitutes the ‘crises in Africa’ and what
makes up ‘New Zealand’s response’ to the crises in Africa. It also examines the aspect of the debate in the international literature which focuses on the issue of the effectiveness of international assistance as a response to the crisis of poverty and underdevelopment. Two main strands to the debate are discussed: the one which suggests that international assistance is not effective in responding to poverty and underdevelopment, and the second which maintains that international assistance is not only effective but is also an important component of the international development process. The former focuses on the nature of, and the motivation for giving international assistance and the endogenous factors in the recipient community, and also employs multiple correlation analysis to augment its case. The second strand which maintains that international assistance is important and effective in enhancing development in recipient countries criticises the arguments and conclusions which are based on the results of statistically significant correlation. This debate is followed in Chapter Three by an examination of the international literature on what motivates countries to give international assistance. Once again two dominant theoretical positions to the debate are identified in the literature, classified as the ‘functional utility approach’ and the ‘conventionalist theorists’. New Zealand does not feature in this international literature which focuses essentially on the ‘major donors’: Britain, France, Germany, Japan and the US, although Australia has received attention in the most recent studies by Gounder (1995, 1994) and McGillivray (1989). Chapter Four expounds the methodology used in the study. It critically reviews the analytical procedures adopted by previous studies of international development assistance namely donor interests and recipient needs models. It is noted that the donor interests-recipient needs approach has been popular in the quantitative literature where there is only limited level of integration between the models. In fact where significant elements of both are present, this creates a problematic for the model (Gounder 1995).
Furthermore, although some studies incorporate qualitative techniques (for example Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985; McGillivray and Oczkowski 1991), the models are primarily quantitative. They examine mainly the actual amount of money disbursed, and donor interests are not demonstrated or derived from qualitative sources as is done in this thesis. The rest of the chapter explains the approach adopted for the research on which this thesis is based and explains the sources of data and methods of data collection.

Chapter Five returns to the issue of the crises in Africa, and provides evidence to support why the eight elements identified in Chapter Two constitute ‘crises’. It also examines the causes of the identified crises, and suggests that the fundamental causes can only be found in the historical context of exploitative colonialism which created structural constraints for the development of the post-independent nation-states, thus perpetuating the development of underdevelopment.

The next four chapters report the findings of the thesis. Chapter Six is the bridge between the theoretical and empirical parts of the thesis. It analyses New Zealand’s response to the crises in Africa in the overall context of NZODA to the developing countries. It starts with a critical exposition of the historical origins of New Zealand ODA through its colonial responsibilities in the South West Pacific Island nations from the beginning of the 20th century, through to the Colombo Plan of 1950. The geographical concentration of the programme is examined in the context of the New Zealand’s foreign policy motivations, security and trade and commercial interests. Chapter Seven examines official response to the crises in Africa. It focuses on New Zealand’s response to the crisis of apartheid in South Africa and the political instability in Eastern and Southern Africa, although the response to the developmental crises is
also examined. Chapter Eight follows in the heels of Chapter Seven, and critically analyses what were New Zealand's identifiable foreign policy interests in responding to the crises in Africa. The concept of a dual purpose in New Zealand's official response expounded in official policy documents is critically examined.

Previous studies are concerned only with official development assistance, but this thesis goes beyond that. So in Chapter Nine the role of the New Zealand NGOs in responding to the crises in Africa is analysed. The various forms of NGO response and also the criteria for allocating international development assistance resources between Africa and other developing regions of the world, between countries in Africa and also between communities and local NGOs in African countries are critically examined. The concept of partnership between New Zealand NGOs and local NGOs in Africa is found to be very strong. Two case studies of the NGOs response through development partnership are examined. The concept of international development partnership introduced in Chapter Nine is developed in Chapter Ten, the final chapter. The issue of the effectiveness of international assistance in fulfilling the dual purpose of responding to developmental crises and fulfilling foreign policy objectives is recast in the context of the general literature. The paradigm of international development assistance is reconceptualised as a process of international co-operation between donor and recipient partners for their mutual benefit. Although official policy espouses this philosophy, New Zealand's international development assistance to Africa in its present form is found to be ineffective in fulfilling the dual purpose of 'promoting sustainable economic and social progress and justice' in the recipient countries, and at the same time fulfilling 'New Zealand's external relations and trade objectives'. A partnership model is recommended to enhance the efficiency of the delivery of international development assistance. This recommendation is consistent with the theoretical position of the conventionalist framework and in line with the changing role of the UN.
CHAPTER TWO:

THEORETICAL CONCEPTUALISATION OF NEW ZEALAND’S RESPONSE
TO THE CRISES IN AFRICA

“...The development of knowledge depends not on increasing the quantities of data, but upon explanation made possible by the development of theory. A subject without theory is all fact, because facts, or observations are then only what is believed to be correct. The factual burden of a discipline, then ought to vary inversely with its maturity.”
Bracken 1980, p112.

2.1 Introduction

In the age of instantaneous information transfer, the average New Zealander’s (and in fact Western) perception and knowledge of Africa is firmly grounded in the grisly events that we hear about on the radio, read in our daily newspapers and watch on the television news. These include the horrible famines, the bloody civil wars, the detestable military regimes that have no respect for human rights, the dreadful genocide and the whole web of the intractable cycle of crises that suffocate Africa’s socioeconomic progress.

Western responses to these crises in Africa are guided by the news reports more than by the fundamental humanitarian needs. Timberlake observes that:

“...in 1985, 30 million Africans were hungry because of drought. In a ‘normal’ year 100 million Africans are malnourished and severely hungry. So when do we declare a
famine? Do not the 100 million severely hungry people make a famine. There is the temptation on the part of the politician, and indeed everyone else, to separate the problems of ‘normal’ times from the problems and pressures of ‘disaster’. There is a ‘disaster response’, a pouring in of food and money. There is no logical reason for starting or stopping the response at any particular time. Ethiopia’s drought began in 1981 but there was no spasm of relief until 1984. Chad has suffered drought for 10 years, Cape Verde for about 15. But the disaster response starts and stops, the timing based more on news reports than on human needs. For Africa’s hungry in 1985, the drought was not a ‘different’ struggle. It was just a time when many more than usual accepted defeat in their long, exhausting struggle to feed themselves. Many surrendered to death, many abandoned their land.”

Timberlake 1985, pp. 16-17.

Timberlake’s observation on the drought and famine crisis in Africa could in fact be extrapolated to the socioeconomic and political crises in Africa. For example the 1970s were characterised as a decade of coups and political instability in Africa. The situation was not drastically different in the 1980s or even in the 1990s. The drought and famine disasters of the mid-1980s, the coups and political instability of the 1970s and 1980s were not resolved by the ‘spasms of western responses’. Rather more deadly crises have been added, such as the debt crisis and the AIDS pandemic. So what distinguishes the ‘normal struggle’ against socioeconomic problems from a crisis situation? What does ‘crisis’ mean, and what do we mean by the ‘crises in Africa’?

The objective of this chapter is to define the crises in Africa and also to establish what constitutes ‘New Zealand’s response’ to the crises in Africa. The chapter is divided into three main sections. Section one examines the concept of the ‘crises in Africa’ and establishes a working definition for this thesis. In section two New Zealand’s response to the crises in Africa is defined. Section three provides a review of the debate
surrounding the effectiveness of international development assistance as a response to developmental crises in the developing countries. A short conclusion wraps up the chapter.

2.2. What is the ‘crises in Africa’?

The term ‘crisis’ has been used by a number of authors in describing the problems of Africa. Gavshon’s very popular book ‘Crisis in Africa’ is an exposition of the great power rivalry in Africa and how it turned the continent into a ‘battleground for east and west’ (Gavshon 1981), while Timberlake’s ‘Africa in Crisis’ focuses on the sociopolitical and environmental causes of the famines in Africa (Timberlake 1985). Other topical books and articles on Africa’s crises examine the causes and effects of the ‘Debt crisis’ (Kiss 1991), ‘Food crisis’ (Jaegar 1992), ‘Women in crisis’ (Wara 1994) and the ‘Economic crisis’ (Ravenhill 1986). While most people are familiar with the term ‘crisis’ in the context of Africa’s problems, none of these authors actually attempt a definition of the term ‘crisis’.

For this work it is sufficient to note that although the general understanding of the idea of crisis is that of a turning point in the course of a system, two general definitions of the concept ‘crisis’ in the social sciences are found to be the most commonly applied. In the area of international relations, the most commonly cited definition is that by Holsti who defines crisis as:

“a sudden eruption of unexpected events caused by previous conflict, characterised by unanticipated actions by the opponent perceived as a great threat with disastrous consequences”.

Quoted in Cole 1984, p118,
while in the general social sciences, the Macmillan dictionary of Anthropology defines crisis as:

"a moment in the development or functioning of a system in which the contradictions generated internally within itself and/or between it and its environment, reach a point at which they place intolerable strain on the system itself. The ensuing crisis will precipitate either the destruction of the system or radical changes".  
Seymor-Smith 1986, p57.

Both definitions have an underlying presupposition that the crisis situation although unexpected is not necessarily incomprehensible and that through rational dialogue and discourse the situation would be resolved. It is within the context of this presumption of comprehensibility and even the perception of crisis as a necessary agent for social change that the crises in Africa are conceptualised and examined in this thesis. The ‘African system’ has generated so many contradictions both internally and in its relations with the external environment that there is hardly any doubt that the entire system is heading for disaster. The weight of the strain exerted on the socioeconomic, political and the physical environment has created serious cracks that are almost fatal.

Africa's crises are long term, multi-sectoral and self enforcing defying a single definition. The United Nations department of information, recognises the complexity of Africa’s crisis when it observes that:

"It was first characterised as a financial crisis - a temporary cash-flow squeeze that could be dealt with by short-term loans to bridge the funds gap. Then when the balance of payment problems persisted for several years, it became an economic crisis - one that could be cured by a major revamp of the debtors' economies. Long-term structural adjustment lending began to dominate the landscape. As many developing countries' economies remained stagnant and as the debt burden grew virtually unabated, the problem has begun to be viewed as a political crisis - one threatening political and social
stability in a large number of countries and requiring concerted, comprehensive action by the international community as a whole".

UN Department of Information 1990, p18.

The continuing adjustment of the definition of what constitutes the crises in Africa shows that the problem is rather difficult to comprehend and therefore defies rational, logical dialogue for its resolution.

Harrison sees Africa’s crises as multi-dimensional rather than the progression from one crisis to another. He identifies four major areas of crises in Africa:

“Africa’s crisis is fourfold. First there is the food crisis: the gradual decline of food production and cash crop per person, with no compensating rise in non-agricultural output that could finance food imports. This has been paralleled by the poverty crisis: a gradual and inexorable increase in the numbers of people suffering from absolute poverty and malnutrition. Africa's exports have fallen in value while the cost of import of manufactures and (until 1986), of oil rose. This has led to the debt crisis, a crippling burden which places in jeopardy all conventional development efforts. Finally, overshadowing all the rest, there is the environmental crisis. Africa's soils and vegetation are being degraded and impoverished at an accelerating rate. If these processes continue unabated, Africa's future will be grimmer even than her recent past.”

Harrison 1987, p19.

Other issues have also been identified as constituent elements that provide an even more comprehensive understanding of the total picture of the overall crises in Africa beyond the four issues identified in Harrison’s definition. For example, Gavshon argues that the actual dimension of the crises in Africa could be best understood in the context of the super-power rivalry, how the Soviet Union and the United States created proxies to help them as the leading contestants in the struggle for position, presence and power in Africa (Gavshon 1981, p15):
Moscow and Washington consistently acted as though successive crisis in Africa were simply the extension of their geo-political struggles. Both tended to regard the contest in zero-sum terms with a gain for one perceived automatically as a loss for the other. Captives of their ideologies, each perpetrated a series of blunders in their efforts to win the support of the 440 million Africans. Ideologues in the Kremlin, convinced that history had a red tie around its neck, favoured the judicious injection of guns, and sometimes combatants, into Africa's flashpoint regions. Occupants of the White House, guilt ridden by association with the west's colonial past and neo-colonial present, preferred to seek out African governments ready to hide behind the shield of American security and provide them with arms, liberally coated with dashes of anti-communism.


The crises in Africa must therefore, also be analysed from the stand point of the rivalries generated and sustained by super-power confrontation that turned Africa into an ideological battle ground of East and West.

Rodney provides a structural analytical framework which maintains that the contemporary situation in Africa characterised by unstable political systems torn by wars and the break down of civil society must be understood essentially in the context of colonialism and imperialism. Years of colonial misrule destroyed the established stable order of the traditional pre-colonial African society based on centuries of tried and tested political and social organisation and replaced it with a completely foreign system of bureaucracy unsuited to the realities of African society (Rodney 1982, pp. 224-228). Africa's crisis of political instability must therefore be understood within the framework of its colonial heritage. Even the most contentious and problematic crisis in the body politic of Africa in the 20th century, the crisis of apartheid and racial discrimination in Southern Africa must be analysed in the context of colonialism, imperialism and super-power rivalry (Gavshon 1981, p97; Mandaza 1987).
system of instituionalised domination by one minority racial group over the basic structures of the South African society and the creation of those relations which bred exploitation and human misery for the majority of the population was constructed by colonialism and imperialism, and sustained by global capitalist interests (Mandaza 1987, p102).

The 'crises in Africa' is therefore defined in the post-modernist conceptualisation, not just as an extraordinary turning point in a line of development, but as a chronic state of affairs without clear prospects of resolution. This suggests that the two presumptions of the traditional concept of crisis namely, that it can be comprehended and overcome by rational means, and secondly that there are vital social forces and agents that are able to direct the process of social change and thus take society forward towards a more healthy and sane future may be missing in the context of Africa. The complexity of the crises is such that the people are trapped in the present by contingency and randomness. They cannot really understand why their circumstances have changed so drastically because they are not part of the decision making process. Many are afraid to begin the future because for many of them there seems to be no future.

The 'crises in Africa' is classified under four broad headings, namely socio-political crisis, economic crisis, drought and famine crisis and the aids pandemic. Within the framework of these four broad classes, eight elements are identified: the crisis of political instability in many African countries which has led to incessant civil wars and the break down of civil society; the crisis of apartheid, the inhumanity imposed on black Africans by state instituted racial discrimination in South Africa. Three principal
elements are identified which constitute the economic crisis, economic disintegration, poverty and underdevelopment; drought, famine and food shortages; and the debt crisis. Integral to the economic crisis is the crisis of environmental degradation. These six elements generate the refugee crisis both in terms of internally displaced people and cross-border movements. Then there is the crisis of the AIDS pandemic which threatens to wipe Africa off the face of the earth, as an estimated 25 million Africans become infected by the HIV virus by the year 2000 (Weeks 1992, p208).

2.3 What constitutes New Zealand’s Response to the Crises in Africa

New Zealand’s response to the crises in Africa is conceptualised in the context of international development assistance. International development assistance has been defined as the flow of official financial and other resources between developed and developing countries (Gounder 1995, pp. 5-6). This may comprise both ‘bilateral’ direct government to government transfer and ‘multilateral’ flows. The multilateral channels include specialist agencies such as of those of the United Nations, regional organisations and international non governmental organisations (NGOs). These together constitute what is generally referred to as ‘foreign aid’.

According to the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), for any transfer to fit the criteria of development assistance it must have all the following three main characteristics: it must be given by official agencies, its main objective must be to promote development and prevent economic decline, and it must be given on concessionary terms with a ‘grant’ element of at least 25 per cent (OECD 1985, p171). This definition excludes all
transactions undertaken on commercial terms with profit as the primary motive.

According to Bhagwati, for any transaction to qualify as development assistance:

"first, its objectives should be non-commercial from the view of the donor and second, it should be characterized by 'concessional' terms, i.e. the interest rate and repayment period for borrowed capital should be 'softer' than commercial terms".

Bhagwati 1972, pp. 72-73.

This excludes capital flows in the form of loans at interest rates higher than the rate of return on investment in the lending country (Healey 1971), and also refinance credit that enables commercial export credit repayments (Streeten 1972, p59). This is because both forms of transfer benefit the donor commercially more than the recipient. Critics of the World Bank and the IMF have also suggested that capital flows from these two institutions should not be regarded as development assistance because the concessionary element in them is only minimal. Moreover, World Bank and IMF loans actually constitute investment in the recipient countries as potential markets in which the institutions have trading interests (see Hayter and Watson 1985; Kiss 1991; Rowley 1983 and 1992).

For this study New Zealand's response to the crises in Africa is conceptualised as all forms of contribution made for the purposes of creating a conducive environment which enhances socioeconomic and political progress in recipient African countries or communities. These may be financial as well as non financial resources. They may be official bilateral, multilateral or from the NGOs. Such transfer could comprise of one or all of the following forms of transfer: food and commodity assistance whose objective is to supplement the food stock of a recipient country or community to alleviate urgent extreme shortages. It may be in the form of project assistance that provides specific assets or technical assistance to the recipient country or community;
or programme assistance given for the entire recipient economy or a sector of the economy, usually preceded by policy discussions to implement structural changes to the recipient economy. There is also technical assistance which provides individuals or groups from the recipient countries with the knowledge, skills and training to enable them to function more productively and adequately in the recipient society (Cassen 1986, chapter 4; Clark 1993, p6). The education and training programmes may be in the donor country, recipient country or a third country. Development assistance also includes donor countries' peacekeeping contributions during crises of social and political instability in recipient countries (Rowley 1991, p10). It also includes the less tangible but nonetheless effective non-traditional forms of international assistance such as political action by New Zealand at international forums like the United Nations and its agencies, the Commonwealth and other organisations, as part of the international effort to resolve Africa's crises. These range from support at the United Nations on resolutions against the apartheid regime in South Africa, as well as the boycott of cultural and sporting contacts in solidarity with the African countries as a means of bringing about political change and an end to the apartheid crisis in South Africa. It includes response to the crises of political instability in many African countries by participating in United Nations peacekeeping forces, such as in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia and Somalia, as well as programmes of 'good government' aimed at creating and enhancing the democratic process.

The concept of New Zealand's response used in this study is therefore, more encompassing than the traditional concept of 'foreign aid' which refers essentially to bilateral and multilateral transfers. In the case of New Zealand's response to the crises in Africa, traditional official bilateral assistance is only a very small part. When
conceptualised beyond the traditional boundaries of 'foreign aid', New Zealand’s overall response to the crises in Africa is quite substantial and important. Thus the concept of 'New Zealand's foreign aid to Africa' in the traditional sense is inadequate for the purposes of this study due to its limited conceptualisation. Moreover the term 'foreign aid' has rather negative historical connotations associated with it. It has been criticised for failing to enhance development of poorer countries, and being used mainly as a tool for advancing donor's foreign policy objectives (Bauer 1984; Griffin 1991). This traditional conceptualisation is therefore restrictive in the context of the 1990s. The remainder of this chapter focuses on the debate relating to the effectiveness of international assistance in enhancing the development process in developing countries, with specific reference to Africa.

2.4 Asssessing the effectiveness of international development assistance as a response to the crises of poverty and underdevelopment

Two main strands are found in the literature which examines the effectiveness of international development assistance. There is the group which argues that international development assistance has no positive effect and that in some cases it is even harmful to economic growth and the efforts of recipient countries to reduce or overcome poverty (Bauer 1984, p44; Friedman 1970; p78, Krauss 1983, p157). Then there is the other group which maintains that development assistance is an effective means to enable recipient countries to develop technical and managerial resources and helps to create an appropriate environment to improve the socioeconomic conditions of the recipient community (Black 1991, p21; Mosley 1987, p624; Younger 1992, p1587). The following sections examine both sides of the debate.
2.41 International development assistance has no positive effect on developmental crises in recipient countries and communities

Five main issues are identified which form the main frame of the evidence provided to support the argument that international development assistance is not effective in reducing poverty and promoting economic development in recipient countries. These are summarised below. Firstly, it is argued that international assistance is seen to obstruct progress towards lessening the development gap by supporting repressive governments and the local elite, rather than contributing to the solution of complex national and international issues (Griffin and Enos 1970; Griffin 1991). Moreover, that capital transfers to poorer countries tend to draw resources away from the poor, either to the local elite in the recipient countries or to donor countries or groups within them (Griffin 1991, p676; Hayter 1971). This process tends to widen the gap between the poor and the rich in the recipient countries. The third issue raised is that international assistance increases unproductive consumption expenditure and also reduces the drive by national governments to raise capital locally through taxation and public savings (Griffin 1991; Khan and Hoshino 1992; Mosley 1987). Furthermore, the content of international development assistance: food, technology, tertiary training and large scale capital projects encourages and perpetuates particular forms of dependence, including 'brain drain' (Griffin 1991, p663). These issues conflict with national development priorities in the recipient countries, and reduce the possibility of interdependent or self-reliant development. Servicing development projects draws domestic resources away from locally defined long term development priorities. Finally, tied assistance reduces the demand for exports from poor countries and contributes to a worsened trade imbalance by increasing the international debt burden.
Bauer argues that international development assistance is harmful to economic development because it tends to obstruct development rather than promote it (Bauer 1984, p44; 1971, p97). He maintains that economic development is best achieved by extending and expanding the influence of market forces which widen the range of choices for the people as consumers and producers in a free open market economy:

"in which firms and individuals largely determine what is produced and consumed, where they will work, how they will save and how they will invest their savings. Aid has made it possible for governments to pursue such policies as subsidized import substitution, forced collectivization, price policies that inhibit agricultural production, inflationary financial policies and the maintenance of over-valued exchange rate".

Bauer 1984, p43.

He suggests that such policies constitute an hindrance rather than assistance to economic growth and the poor rate of economic growth in the Third World countries is directly the result of interference through international assistance. Griffin also suggests that one further reason for the negative impact is that international assistance is not usually invested in the productive sectors of the economy, but rather wasted on public expenditure such as financing higher salaries for civil servants (Griffin 1991, p664). The enlarged bureaucracy chokes an upward-thrusting private sector entrepreneurial class and distorts the economy. The solution is to create:

"an atmosphere of freedom, of maximum opportunity for individuals to experiment in a vigorous free capitalist market"

Friedman 1970, p71

which provides a range of choices for individual initiative to flourish unhindered by state bureaucracy (Bauer 1984, p22; Mosley et al 1990B, p224). The argument that
development can only take place in the free market of the private sector is not supported by recent history. African countries existed under a laissez-faire capitalist economic system imposed by hundreds of years of exploitative colonialism, where the rich paid no taxes and were not restricted by administrative controls. The result was not necessarily the emergence of rich capitalist systems, but the creation of slums of poverty, ignorance, disease and misery all over the continent. Submission to free market forces is not the solution to the crises in Africa, but a major cause, particularly of the economic and developmental crises as shall be demonstrated in Chapter Five of this thesis.

There is no doubt that the commercial and political motivations for giving development assistance may affect the effectiveness of development assistance in enhancing socioeconomic development and the reduction of poverty. The issue of ‘tied assistance’ where the purchase of commodities and expertise from firms in donor countries is a requirement for disbursement of development assistance hinders development in a number of cases. Example of such cases include the case of British development assistance to Zambia, where:

“commercial decisions taken in Britain resulted in contracts being awarded to British firms to supply buses and lorries. Whitehall likes this as it gives employment to firms in Britain. In the mid-1980s, against the advice of ODA representatives in Zambia, buses were supplied from a Midlands firm to the Zambian government. Within 12 months all the buses had fallen to pieces or were useless, as they were unsuitable for the road conditions in Zambia. 2 million pounds of British foreign aid had been spent to benefit a British manufacturer and Zambia had ended up with scrap.”
Sallnow 1990, p33.

In this case the inappropriateness of the form of development assistance is the result of a lack of awareness, or disregard, of the local conditions because of the strict
adherence to commercial motivations. Such assistance would no doubt have negative impact on the recipient economy. Inappropriate assistance is also reported in other countries such as in Kenya where although 73 per cent of energy demand comes from fuelwood, charcoal and crop waste, only 7 per cent of total development assistance allocated to the energy sector is committed to generating energy from these sources (Duncan and Mosley 1984, p117).

International development assistance is also criticised on the grounds that it is given and often used for ‘nefarious ends’ in recipient countries. Cases cited are of assistance being diverted to the purchase of military equipment, and donor support for the political status quo in recipient countries. Such assistance, it is maintained, favours the local elite who have a monopoly on political and economic power and control the allocation of domestic resources (Griffin 1991, p652). This control enables them to ‘switch’ incoming assistance resources to sectors which benefit them more than the poorer masses (Griffin and Enos 1970, p323; Landau 1990, p565). The easy availability of international financial assistance also reduces the incentive to mobilise local resources such as through taxes. The overall effect is that international assistance enhances the position of privilege and socio-political dominance of the local elite without addressing the important question of development and the reduction of poverty (Griffin 1974, p6). Statistical analyses employed to test the contribution of international assistance to rates of economic growth in recipient countries largely support the thesis that international development assistance has no positive effect on economic growth and the reduction of poverty. Riddell observes that:

"the results of these tests provide a far from reassuring picture. Many studies record a negative relationship between aid and domestic savings, some reveal an inverse relationship between aid flows and current-account deficits on the balance of payments,"
while others fail to provide a statistically significant and positive relationship between aid inflows and economic growth”.

Riddell 1987, p104.

Their conclusions are best summarised in two studies by Mosley which together cover the period 1960-1983. His analysis of international assistance to 83 Less Developed Countries (LDCs) for the period 1969-1977 found that there is only ‘a weak and insignificant but negative correlation between aid and growth’ (Mosley 1980, p82). A follow-up study in 1987 for a similar sample showed only a weak relationship, and led to the same conclusion as in the previous study, that ‘aid in the aggregate has no demonstrable effect on economic growth in recipient countries’ (Mosley et al 1987, p631). While these arguments are compelling, there are a large number of cases where international assistance has generated, or enhanced positive socioeconomic change in recipient communities. These are examined in the following sections.

2.42 International development assistance as an effective response to the developmental crises in recipient countries and communities

The results of the statistical analyses together with the theoretical arguments presented by the studies examined in the preceding section are contested by those who argue that international development assistance is an effective means for enhancing socioeconomic development in the recipient communities. One of the criticisms of the statistical evidence presented by the preceding arguments is that correlations do not necessarily imply causality. As Riddell suggests, in many of these studies:

“correlation and causality were muddled up, the fact that aid was related to a fall in domestic saving does not have to mean that it is the only or dominant cause of the savings decline. In many studies it has been included with other capital inflows or the
deficit on current account so that its particular effect is not isolated and hence conclusions about its specific influence cannot be deducted”.

Riddell 1987, p104.

Development is a complex exercise and the effect of international assistance upon it may not be easily determined by looking at the rise and fall of the GNP. The fact that the growth of the economic indicator of GNP is less than the expected increase cannot always be directly attributed to the negative impact of international assistance. For this to be verified, such studies would need to show the alternative proposition that the recipient economy would have necessarily performed better without the international assistance. There are in fact numerous studies which have demonstrated the positive impact of international assistance on recipient economies. Young’s study of the impact of international assistance in Tanzania points to the positive impact that it had in raising investment levels (Young 1983, p33). The suggestion that international assistance inhibits the raising of local resources for development is not collaborated in Hewitt and Kydd (1986) for Malawi. Their study supports the alternative proposition that the provision of international assistance in fact encourages governments to raise tax levels and mobilise internal resources for economic and social development (Hewitt and Kydd 1986, p10).

The other issue raised to explain why international assistance is a burden rather than a blessing for the recipient countries, is that it invariably leads to increased consumption, a fall in domestic savings and expenditure blow out without encouraging commensurate investment in the domestic economy (Krauss 1983, pp. 156-158). These assertions are contested by Pack and Pack (1990) and Synder (1990) who find very little negative impact of international assistance on domestic savings.
Pack and Pack do not find any demonstrable negative impact on economic growth, public expenditure or evidence of switching. In fact they observe that:

"foreign aid did not displace development expenditures, on the contrary it stimulated total public expenditure. Equally important, and surprising given the literature, most categorical aid was spent on the purpose for which it was intended by donors. No evidence of diversion to other categories of development expenditures, nor from development purposes to current expenditures is found. Nor does aid lead to a reduction in domestic revenue raising".


They further suggest that it must not be assumed that increased consumption necessarily leads to social inequality in society, arguing that when appropriately channelled it actually enhances social harmony and economic development in the community. These conclusions are in line with Papanek's finding of 'positive and significant influence of development assistance on economic growth in recipient countries' (Papanek 1973). Papanek argues that while the results of some studies may show a negative correlation between international assistance and economic growth it would be unjustified to rely on small negative correlation between international assistance and savings to substantiate the conclusion that assistance does not contribute to economic growth (Papanek 1983, p171). The impact of international assistance on the recipient economy is more significant than just savings gains(Papanek 1973, p129).

In the case of Africa which is the subject of this thesis, there is anecdotal evidence to substantiate the positive impact of international assistance in many African countries. Mosley et al's analysis for the period 1970-1980 show that Mali, Egypt, Malawi and Lesotho experienced high growth because of the substantial international development assistance received (see p624 table 2 Mosley et al 1987), despite what the regression results show for the entire data for the 80 LDC group. In Malawi for example, there is
clear positive impact through increased investment to GDP ratio, from 14 per cent in 1965 to 38 per cent in 1979. This accounts for the faster growth in private sector investment during the period (see Hewitt and Kydd 1986, p112). Younger has demonstrated statistically, that in Ghana, international development assistance has helped to turn economic decline into an economic miracle. From gross domestic investment of minus (-5) percent in the 1970-1982 period, a steady application of international assistance over a ten year period (1982-1992), has created a miracle economy:

"Ghana experienced a sharp recovery after 1986 as donors climbed on board the ERP (Economic Recovery Programme) bandwagon to support what they correctly perceived to be an important about-face in Ghana’s economic policy. Thus aid flows increased from about 3 per cent of GDP before the ERP began to 7 per cent of GDP in 1987 four years later. The results of these policy changes have been impressive in several dimensions. Growth of GDP and exports is strong despite adverse terms of trade changes; inflation has fallen; the balance of payments is in surplus and an economy that had basically ceased to function is now vibrant".


Ghana’s GDP in the period 1984-1988 shows a growth rate of 2.5 per cent while gross domestic investment rose by 18.3 per cent (Younger 1992, see table 1 p1588). There are a few countries such as Kenya where international assistance does not live up to expectations (Riddell 1987, p247). But there are other factors such as political and social instability, which could better account for the poor return on international development assistance, than the mere fact that assistance is provided.
The task in this chapter has been to provide a working definition for what constitutes the crises in Africa, and what is regarded as New Zealand's response. The concept of 'the crises in Africa' is defined in the post-modernist construction. It is conceived as a complex set of chronic contradictions without clear prospects for resolution. It is multi-dimensional and pervades the core of Africa's socioeconomic and political structure. New Zealand's response has been defined in the context of its international assistance to African countries. However, international assistance has been conceptualised beyond the traditional boundaries of 'foreign aid'. It includes both the material and moral support given for the purpose of alleviating individual or group suffering and calamity during periods of natural or human disasters. It also includes material, moral and political assistance and support both from official bilateral and multilateral contributions, the NGOs, individuals and community groups. This assistance includes emergency assistance and longer term commitment to address fundamental crises such as underlying poverty, underdevelopment and political instability.

Having defined what constitutes the 'crises in Africa' and 'New Zealand's response', the chapter examines the fundamental question of whether such response is effective. Two broad perspectives are identified in the literature on the effectiveness of international development assistance. The first perspective argues both from a theoretical base and also is supported by statistical analysis, that international assistance 'can do nothing for development or relief of poverty'. Using evidence from multiple regression analysis it maintains that there is no significant positive correlation.
between international assistance and economic growth. It suggests that in some cases the relationship is in fact negative. The second perspective argues that the interpretation of the correlation results is spurious, that ‘correlation does not necessarily or always mean causality’. It provides demonstrable evidence that there is both theoretical and empirical support for positive impact of international assistance on recipient countries.

It must also be recognised that the mere provision of international development assistance is not sufficient by itself to produce a cumulative process of growth. Appropriate social conditions need to be created which are conducive to growth, such as basic infrastructure in food and agricultural resources, capacity building in the rural sector to augment cottage and small scale productions with greater local linkages and community participation (Robinson 1990, pp. 1017-1021). The necessary conditions such as housing, education, health and human resource development cannot always be attained through locally generated internal resources and international assistance, therefore, becomes important. Social spending in these areas may not always impact immediately on the recipient’s GNP because of their longer gestation period. However, they focus on the structural problems of the crisis of poverty in the rural areas and villages where the level of poverty is the highest. In such circumstance there is no doubt that appropriate investment of development assistance resources would make a difference. Where such investment is appropriately targeted returns are likely to provide spread effects as it generates complementary and supporting activities (Streeten 1972, p67). But by measuring the effectiveness of international assistance essentially from its impact on the recipient’s GNP without
accounting for its impact on the socio-cultural and the environment, statistical analyses negate those impacts which Black refers to as:

"nurturing, liberating and energizing to the unaffluent and unpowerful, the productive and creative capacity, self reliance and the capacity to interact effectively with one's physical and social environment".


When this empowering aspect of international development assistance is combined with the positive, albeit, small impacts, it becomes more appropriate to accept the conclusion of those studies which show that international assistance is an important response to developmental crises. The fact that the impact is small does not necessarily make it inconsequential and least of all an hindrance to development. It is in the context of this positive role of international assistance as a response to developmental crises that New Zealand’s response to the crises in Africa is examined in this thesis. In the next chapter the broader question of the motivation for giving international assistance is examined in the context of existing theory and literature.
CHAPTER THREE:

WHY COUNTRIES GIVE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

"The fact that one is a citizen of a particular state should not prevent anybody from being a member of the human family as a whole, nor from having citizenship in the world community".

Pope John Paul XXIII.

3.1 Introduction

The idea of international development assistance started in the wake of the process of decolonization. Mosely argues that:

"Since the 19th century it has been a common practice for governments to transfer money on concessional terms to the governments of their colonies under the label of 'grant in aid', 'budgetary subsidy' or some such term".


In the 1950s international development assistance as a transaction between sovereign states became widespread because of the overwhelming shortage in domestic capital and foreign exchange earnings which limited economic growth in many developing countries (Dickenson et al 1983). An analysis of the reasons for the lack of capital in the African countries is provided in Chapter Four. This chapter considers the issues surrounding the debate on the motivation for giving international development assistance. The debate is conducted mainly around the two principal theoretical
strands, namely the ‘functional utility approach’ and the ‘conventionalist perspective’. These two principal theoretical strands are examined to see if New Zealand’s response to the crises in Africa could be placed within the framework of any one of these theoretical strands. The chapter begins with a brief analysis of why Africa in particular needs international development assistance in the first place. This is accomplished through a critical examination of the causes of poverty and underdevelopment in the context of the modernisation and dependency theories.

3.11 Why does Africa need international development assistance:

The modernisation and dependency debate.

Modernization theorists point to a number of factors within the African countries, such as cultural and religious values, political and economic forms of organisation, which are deemed to be 'backward' and therefore an hindrance to the spread of 'modernity' (Apter 1965; Lerner 1962). They conceptualise development as a transition from a 'traditional' rural economy based on 'primitive' methods of production to a 'sophisticated modern' urban manufacturing base (Rostow 1971) with higher export potential. They argue that the 'backwardness' of African countries would be overcome only if attitudes and social and political institutions as well as work ethics based on mass production, technology and capital are infused into the economy. Such conventional explanation of the causes of poverty and underdevelopment in Africa led modernisation theorists to suggest that international development assistance should be focused on enhancing the skills, values and attitudes in order to remove some of the constraints on capital formation and growth in these countries (Apter 1965; Brandt
The provision of 'development capital' therefore, became the new social and economic frontier in the process of transferring resources to the African countries to help with the modernization process.

The modernization approach is discredited as being rather mechanical (Amin 1978; Arndt 1978; Frank 1981; Hayter 1982; Mabogunje 1980; Myrdal 1970). It equates capital growth with development, and largely ignores the qualitative human elements such as value systems and human responses to finance stimuli and institutional changes. ‘Development planners’ of the modernization school assume that development and economic growth are synonymous. This view is repudiated as reductionist; that development should be defined more multi-dimensionally to include not just economic gains but the sociopolitical, cultural, spiritual and environmental needs of the people (Perez 1990).

Dependency theorists on the other hand contend that underdevelopment is the result of the unequal transfer of real and potential surpluses from the core to the centre. This refers to a global economic and political structure within which the developing countries constitute the periphery and the western capitalist countries the centre (see Frank 1981; Myrdal 1968 and 1970. At the individual country level the capital cities and major urban centres are the ‘sub-centres’ while the rural areas constitute the national periphery). In the process of unequal transfer, resources are expropriated from the peripheral states to the hegemonic centres. This lopsided development is not just a basic characteristic but also a basic cause of global capitalist development and underdevelopment. Colonialism exploited Africa by transferring the surpluses from
Africa to Europe and America, the surplus that would otherwise constitute the basis of what Marx referred to as ‘constant capital’ (Marx 1967) for Africa’s development. In the post-colonial period, the lopsided exploitative relationship continues in the form of exorbitant interest charged on loans from Euromarkets and other international finance institutions, and the deteriorating terms of trade for primary products from Africa.

This exploitative relationship is further accentuated by the transfer of monopoly profits obtained from the exploitation of the natural resources and the labour of workers and farmers from capitalist investments in Africa. Poverty in the African countries is therefore created by forces at the global level, but also assisted by the local elite at the local and national level. This provides a three tiered poverty trap. At the global level the effects of 18th and 19th century colonization are accentuated by the policies and activities of the transnational corporations. These combine with the oppressive debt burdens, high interest rates and falling export prices to devastate national economies in Africa. These are reinforced at the national level by innumerable policies such as oppressive tax laws and development policies that discriminate against, or at best neglect the poor. Simultaneously, at the local level the poor have to cope with the skewed pattern of land distribution and the lack of access to national assets which have been mortgaged to international finance, big business and commercial farmers. Combined with their physical weakness caused by high prevalence of disease and hunger, and the corrupt institutions and inept officials, mass poverty continues to be created by the accumulation of wealth and power by the local elite, actively supported by western transnational corporations.

Dependency theory extends the exploitative relationship at the global level to the national level, and sees the poverty of the individual and that of the state as
intrinsically linked. Dependency theorists therefore, argue that the need for international development assistance arises from the failures and neglect of the contributing governments and their private organisations in a previous phase of the history of their relations with Africa. The provision of development assistance by the metropolitan ex-colonial powers therefore, derives from a sense of guilt feeling (Bauer 1981), and a belated attempt to ameliorate the failures of the colonial era. In many cases this simply perpetuates neo-colonialism (Sallnow 1990) as imperialist exploitation of Africa's resources and cheap labour continues through conspiratorial ties of vested interest with local national political and economic elites (Hayter 1971; Amin 1976).

Dependency theorists further argue that inappropriate development assistance has also led Africa into a sort of a 'technological fix', where poor African countries depend on highly sophisticated imported western technology. This dependence is created not by the basic needs of the recipient country, but the needs created in the minds of profligate public authorities by western contractors and sales people who use international development assistance to dump unwanted equipment. Such equipment does not meet the economic or social needs of the recipient communities, and is neither technically nor economically sustainable (Little 1964, p8). Its primary purpose is to create and sustain a dependency relationship between the donor and the recipient. The element of charity and paternalism in most forms of development assistance, even those in the form of loans at high interest, foster attitudes of dependence on the part of the recipient and of self-righteousness on the part of the donor when assistance is in fact not given out of selfless interest (Linear 1985, p4). It is the motivation for giving international development assistance that the rest of this chapter is devoted to. It
examines the two main strands of theory developed to explain the motivates for donors giving development assistance to other countries namely, the conventionalist theory and the functional utility theory.

3.2 Humanitarianism or Instrumental utility: Two approaches to explain the motivation for donors giving international development assistance

Two principal theoretical strands dominate the analysis of the motivation for donors giving international development assistance. These are the 'conventionalist approach' and 'functional utility'. These are also referred to as the 'Humanitarian' and 'Instrumental Utility' perspectives, respectively, (McKinlay and Little 1977, p59) and 'Universal' and 'Particular' justifications (Mosley 1987, p12). The conventionalist approach is based on the ethical and moral responsibility of the developed countries towards the less developed countries, while the functionalist perspective sees the motivation for providing international development assistance from the commercial and strategic interests of the donor country.
3.21 The Conventionalist Approach: International Development Assistance as redistribution and social justice.

The conventionalist approach argues that the principal objective of international development assistance is the general welfare, including economic development and social change in the recipient country. There are three main sets of arguments in this strand. The first contends that international development assistance fulfills the objective of redistributing resources for economic development and is capable of enhancing international co-operation among governments (Gordenker 1976). It argues that the creation of international socioeconomic justice through international development assistance will bring about co-operative behaviour among nations. Co-operation in development assistance would pave the way for co-operation in other areas between governments. As the co-operative attitude grows, it would bind nations together, and spill over from the economic sector to other sectors until at last even the intractable decisions affecting peace and security among nations would come under the dominant influence of international institutions. This will pave the way for peaceful outcomes in politics, economics and social change (Gordenker 1976, p104).

International development assistance should also be seen as a form of international social security system which is necessary not only from the increasing interdependence of all countries, but also the development of the international social conscience (Singer, et al 1987). People, organisations and governments in the developed countries are obliged to devote part of their national wealth to international development assistance not just out of self interest, but principally out of a moral obligation to foster
international solidarity (Riddell 1987, p268). Development assistance must therefore, be conceived as an international programme for the transfer of wealth from the richer countries to the poorer countries. This is analogous to the income redistribution process which the social welfare system aims to achieve at the national level within developed countries. International development assistance constitutes an extension of the international fiscal system through which the more wealthy members of the world community act sensibly and in their own interests (Brandt 1980, p77) to meet their obligations towards the poorer members of the global community. Idealistically international development assistance would become ‘a true international social service given as a right’ (Balough 1974, p221), as ‘a public good’, the provision of things for the pleasure, happiness and comfort of the general population which might otherwise not exist if left to the free market. The second principle of the Rawlsian ‘compensatory principle’ is drawn upon to support this contention. This states that:

"social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle, income and wealth and the bases of self-respect are to be distributed equally".


In more strict economic terms international development assistance is also a redistributive mechanism, a mechanism for correcting misallocations in the international flow of capital due to market imperfections. It should be used to stabilise world aggregate demand by boosting the purchasing power of the lower income developing countries (Healey 1971).

The third strand of the conventionalist approach, also based on the ‘compensatory argument’, suggests that there should be compensation by the richer countries to the
poorer countries for past injustices arising from the political domination and economic exploitation during the period of colonization and imperialism (see Singer 1977; Tucker 1977). It derives from the analytical framework of the dependency theory which conceptualises the development of global inequality as the result of exploitative colonialism (see Frank 1981; Kiss 1991; Riddell 1992; Rodney 1982). It maintains that the productive structures of the developing countries (and particularly African countries) were made inherently degenerate through the systematic destruction of established indigenous structures, replaced by those externally imposed by colonialism for the exploitation of the natural resources and labour of the colonised societies. These externally imposed structures are culturally inappropriate to the development of Africa, and are largely responsible for the creation of the crises of poverty and underdevelopment. This has perpetuated the unequal exchange between Africa and global economy, both in terms of the economic resources and political power sharing. International development assistance is therefore the legal and moral responsibility of the ex-colonies as a means to address the global wealth imbalance (Sieghart 1983, p98).

The compensatory argument further suggests that the uneven distribution of global resources means that there must be global redistribution of development resources in order to achieve international social justice. Since we were all part of the global heritage, the areas favourably endowed should be obliged to share with those not so favoured (Beitz 1979, pp. 137-138) in order to create a just and humane global community. The Rawlsian 'difference principle' which suggests that in a just society the distribution of resources should ensure equal access by citizens, is employed as the central point of this argument. It maintains that a state promoting endogenous
development within its available resources is entitled to the support of other states in the implementation of its policies (Sieghart 1983, p98). It is therefore binding on the members of the global human family to assist those less privileged to attain the basic minimum standard of living.

The conventionalist explanation of the motivation for giving international development assistance is criticised on a number of grounds. The conception of international development assistance as a tool for international co-operation is dismissed as too simplistic and optimistic. Griffin and Enos suggest that by accepting the assistance of the powerful nations, the less powerful countries unwittingly take the side of the donor and invariably accept its animosities (Griffin and Enos 1970, p317). These animosities are more long lasting and pervasive than co-operative behaviour. McKinlay and Little suggest that development assistance creates a dependency relationship, a position of 'unreciprocated reliance' (McKinlay and Little 1977, p63). Since the recipient is the main beneficiary in the relationship the receipt of assistance invariably obliges the recipient to support the donor's position in international relations. Thus rather than create mutual co-operation, development assistance actually creates opportunities for the donor to interfere in the development policies of the recipient. The relationship is not one of equal partnership, but weighted in favour of the donor. In theory member nations in bilateral and multilateral relationships are independent and have the same opportunity to shape and influence policies affecting their mutual co-operation. But in practice, the less powerful could actually be manipulated, rewarded and/or punished in the process of allocating international assistance amongst competing recipients. Therefore, rather than providing the basis for co-operation, international development assistance is actually a method for the strong to
control the weak (Griffin and Enos 1970, p317; McKinlay and Little 1977, p59), a form of payments to allies to keep them faithful and also to neutrals and/or opponents in the hope of winning them over. Moreover, effective influence requires equal contribution and the application of expertise, both of which are often the subject of development assistance in the first place. The recipient, therefore, invariably operates in a subordinate or dependent position (McKinlay and Little 1977, p62) and is incapable of exerting reciprocal influence on the donor.

The compensatory arguments of the conventionalist approach are also attacked as weak extrapolations of the differential principle from the individuals and families within national boundaries for which it is originally postulated, to the international global context (Cooper 1977, pp. 358-360). They ignore the impediments of national boundaries and the inevitable tensions and conflicts resulting from allocating international development assistance between nations of different ideologies. However, as Ruttan suggests:

"the growth of global political interdependence implies a decline in the significance of national boundaries. Since boundaries are not coextensive with the scope of economic and political interdependence, they do not mark the limits of social obligation in the sharing of benefits and burdens associated with interdependence. The ethical foundation for a system of development assistance rests on the premise that the emergence of international economic and political interdependence has extended the moral basis for social or distributive justice from the national to the international sphere".

Ruttan 1989, p419.

The ethical foundation for a system of development assistance therefore transcends international boundaries and the theoretical extension of the moral basis of the
Rawlsian principle to the international context is consequently inevitable. Brandt suggests that the alternative is the perpetuation of global poverty and underdevelopment which will continue to cause war and global instability:

"History has taught us that wars produce hunger, but we are less aware that mass poverty can lead to war or end in chaos. While hunger rules peace cannot prevail. He who wants to ban war must also ban mass poverty."

Brandt 1980, p16.

The acceptance of international responsibility for the prevention of war and global instability means that nations must work towards the elimination of poverty and underdevelopment, and international development assistance is part of that process.

The most potent criticism of the conventionalist approach, however, is that it portrays international development assistance in a language of altruism, and thus tends to obscure the instrumental and self-serving motivations of the donor. This position contends that international development assistance is a major element of the foreign policy of donor countries. By providing or withholding assistance, donors are invariably pushing the message that their self-interests are either served or not significant in the countries that receive or are denied assistance. International development assistance therefore leads to social and political neo-colonialism as well as economic and military imperialism. It perpetuates colonial relationships in a post-colonial world by creating ‘spheres of influence’ for competing donors. Consequently the pattern of assistance spreads and perpetuates the animosities that motivate super power rivalry (Griffin and Enos 1970, p317). This strand of the argument that donors give development assistance because they are motivated by self-interests rather than altruism is examined in the following section.
3.22 The Functional utility approach: International Development Assistance as a means for advancing donor political interests

The functionalist approach or the 'instrumental utility' perspective argues that international development assistance is given principally to advance the donor's foreign policy objectives. The larger part of the huge volume of literature on the question of donor motivation tends to conform with Griffin's conclusion that "the sine qua non of foreign aid is political motivation" (Griffin 1991, p647). It does not serve the humanitarian need of economic assistance, but rather it has:

"a foreign policy utility. The foreign policy utility of aid derives from the capacity of aid to provide a means of commitment and leverage which the donor can use in the pursuit of its general foreign policy objectives".

McKinlay 1978, p237.

Thus the World Bank report for 1990, for example, suggests that the most important reason for the bilateral donors for giving international development assistance is their political, strategic and commercial interests, and the reduction of poverty is only one motive, but far from the most important (World Bank 1990, p4).

The US was the first Western country to use international development assistance specifically to advance its foreign policy objectives, beginning with the 'Marshall Plan', and then followed by its activities in East Asia: Taiwan, Korea and Vietnam. After the Korean war in 1951, the US government felt rather uncertain about its ability to contain communism in Asia, unless it demonstrated that the capitalist economy worked
better than the centrally planned economy. It therefore transferred large amounts of concessional funds to revitalise the economies of South Korea, South Vietnam and Thailand, which were regarded as sitting on the 'communist periphery' (Griffin 1991; Mosley 1987). Griffin argues that the origins of international development assistance starting with the Marshall Plan, were not necessarily built on the altruistic desire to assist poorer countries to develop their economies, but rather grounded in donors' foreign policy motivation:

"The political motivation of the Marshall Plan was to prevent the spread of communism to France and Italy (where the Communist Party was strong), to stabilize conditions in West Germany (and create an alternative to the socio-economic system imposed in East Germany) and reduce the appeal of socialist policies in the UK (where the Labour Party enjoyed considerable popularity). The Marshall Plan was followed by President Truman's 'Point Four Programme', named after the fourth point in his inaugural address, which was a technical and economic programme for Greece and Turkey, two poor countries bordering on the communist world and thought to be in danger. The third phase was a response to the disintegration of the old European empires and the proliferation of newly independent countries first in Asia and later in Africa. Freedom from colonial rule led to a contest for the 'hearts and minds' of the people throughout what came to be known as the Third World. Foreign aid was one weapon in this contest".


The rapid decolonization of the British and French colonies in Africa in the 1950s and 1960s and the consequent formation of the Non-Aligned group of nations at Bandung (Indonesia) in 1955, had wider implications for the power politics and cold war relation of the super-powers. The USSR and the US recognised that the World could no longer be rigidly divided into pro-Communist and anti-Communist governments. The Non-Aligned countries were to the super-powers what floating votes are for competing


diplomatic isolation. The Kennedy administration's 'alliance for progress', an international development assistance programme for Latin American countries, was aimed at keeping these countries away from the Cuban experiment (Griffin 1991, p647; McKinlay and Mughan 1984, pp. 31-34). US security and ideological interests became mutually interrelated with its economic co-operation programme and, together, they constituted an integral part of US foreign policy (Ruttan 1989, p413). The use of international development assistance as an instrument of the Cold War lasted for over three decades, peaking at 30.6 per cent of bilateral aid disbursement from the Soviet Union in 1961 (Mosely 1984, p29).

The evidence of the relationship between power-politics and ideology, and the distribution of international development assistance is further expounded by a number of analysts. McKinley and Little (1979' 1978a, 1978b' and 1977) demonstrate that for the period 1960 to 1970 the most statistically significant determinant of US, British and French bilateral development assistance disbursement was the 'foreign policy interests' of the donor as measured by the presence (or not) of donor military bases and the size of the communist party in the recipient country (ibid. 1977, p76). They group the interest of donors into five broad categories namely: the maintenance of spheres of interest, discouraging associations with communist leanings, power politics, economic development and performance, and political stability and democracy (ibid. 1977, pp. 68-71) with some variations for each of the four major donors. For the US they find "that power-political and security interests structure the pattern of commitment and dependency established through US aid" (ibid. 1977, p80), "rewarding countries with US strategic ties and penalizing countries displaying internal and external communist sympathy" (ibid. 1979, p245). As for the British and the French, McKinlay and Little
conclude that foreign policy interpretation provides the best explanation for all three countries' motivation for giving international assistance (ibid. 1978a, p330), although for the French "the two major themes characterising the allocation process are the promotion of trade and the maintenance of a sphere of influence" (ibid. 1978b, p471). The most influential for the British "are trade, former colonial links and security ties, the attempts to maintain a sphere of influence through the distribution of absolute commitment" (ibid. 1978a, p323. See also McGillivray and Oczkowski 1992, p1319; Sallnow 1990, p31). Germany, on the other hand, is not attracted by power-political considerations and strategic and military interest in its international assistance. The "clearest and most important are trading, or more specifically, export" (McKinlay and Little 1978, p250), because:

"exports represent the more salient dimension of the German trade relationship with low income countries, and it is precisely this dimension which has the critical influence on the pattern of the distribution of German aid".

McKinley and Little 1978, p247.

This suggests that foreign policy motivation rather than the development needs of the recipients is the primary purpose for these major foreign donors.

Using similar methodology, Wittkopf produces a fourfold grouping of the interest of donor countries: political importance of recipient to donor, cold war considerations, recipient's economic performance and availability of alternative sources of assistance (Wittkopf 1972). Two of these groups of interests dominate donor motivation for the US, France and Britain, namely, the political importance of the recipient country and cold war considerations (Wittkopf 1972, pp. 41-42). He concludes that some of the
development assistance programmes have very little, or at best tenuous connection with development. This is confirmed by Edstorm and Hatashima, who find that for the period 1986-1988 poverty is "less of a concern in allocating British aid than for example trade interest or colonial ties" (Edstorm and Hatashima 1993, p8). US development assistance to Israel and Egypt alone accounts for 49 per cent of the US bilateral programme (Clarke 1991, p834), not because these two countries are necessarily the poorest or neediest countries, (in fact they are in the upper quartile of the top per capita income nations of developing countries), but because of their strategic and political importance to the US. This finding further confirms the strong correlation established by McKinlay and Little, between security and strategic interest and bilateral development assistance (McKinlay and Little 1979, pp. 244-245). Gaddis, in fact, asserts that international development assistance under the Kennedy and Johnson administration was one of the weapons of the cold war, prior to resorting to nuclear war (Gaddis 1982, p215).

Other political motives apart from purely ideological confrontation, also play a role in the patterns of disbursement of international development assistance. Diplomatic considerations such as mobilising support at the UN General Assembly and the retention of influence in ex-colonial territories in the post-independence period is particularly relevant for French and British assistance (McGillivray and Oczkowski 1992; McKinley and Little 1979). Frey's analysis of the voting coincidence between donor countries and recipients at the UN confirms that all the major donor countries use international development assistance to entice recipient countries to back donors' political position at the UN (Frey 1984, pp. 89-90). US policy at the UN in the period 1984-1988 stated explicitly that "voting behaviour (of recipient countries) should be
one of the criteria we employ in deciding whether we will provide assistance" (Kegley and Hook 1991, p296). Kegley and Hook also report an increase in voting coincidence between the US and recipients of US development assistance, rising from 21 per cent of cases in 1984 to 23.7 percent of cases in 1986. Although the pattern reversed slightly after the US signaled publicly its intention to reward those states that voted with it on key UN issues and punish those who opposed (Kegley and Hook 1991, pp. 299-306), the drop in the voting coincidence is not necessarily evidence that the US no longer uses development assistance as a 'stick and carrot', it could just be that the recipients resent such blatant use of international development assistance to torpedo their independence.

It has also become quite common for Western bilateral donors, including the Word Bank and the IMF, to intervene in the policies of recipient countries to achieve political objectives. For example, by explicitly stating that development assistance would be given only where recipients imbibe private enterprise and give it sufficient scope (Sartorius and Ruttan 1989, p338), these organisations are clearly pushing political and economic ideology. The World Bank, in alliance with the IMF the most powerful financial organisations at the top of the hierarchy of the international development assistance industry, imposes the so called 'economic structural adjustment programmes' as a conditionality for World Bank and IMF loans. The programme of structural adjustments involves trade liberalisation in terms of lifting import controls and foreign investment restrictions, currency devaluation, cost recovery in public services such as health and education, and privatisation of state parastatals (World Bank 1984, p44). The argument is that such adjustments foster the development of pluralistic structures, encourage social change and more effective distribution of
political and economic influence through the democratic process. Thus they enhance economic growth by cleaning up those economic policies that constitute an hindrance to growth (World Bank 1993, p52).

The reality is that structural adjustment programmes are driven more by political and ideological motivations than development objectives. They are designed to steer recipients away from public ownership and towards free-market capitalism (Hayter and Watson 1985, chapter 7) by reducing the role of the state in the economy. The fallacy is that there is no strict evidence that it is necessary for governments to completely relinquish control over public enterprise for economic growth to occur. The strict measures of the ESAP result invariably in increased poverty for the masses of the recipient countries’ population rather than release them from poverty. Structural adjustment conditionalities for international assistance from the IMF and the World Bank cannot, therefore, be divorced from capitalist political and economic ideology, and its manipulation of the economies of recipient African countries must be viewed with the same horror and distaste as the ideological manipulations of the cold war era.

An analysis of the pattern of the distribution of international development assistance from the largest international donors shows that it is skewed against the poorest countries in favour of the high-to-middle income countries. In 1988 for example, international official bilateral development assistance amounted to over USD 51 billion globally (World Bank 1990, p127), of which about 41 per cent was directed to the middle-to-high income countries (Ayer 1990, p9). Commitment to the poorest regions of the world, particularly to Africa, was drastically reduced. Defined in terms of
disbursements to low income countries only, development assistance from the DAC member countries reached only 0.31 per cent of GNP in 1990 (Love 1993 p93). Disbursement to Africa, by far the poorest region and the only region in the world to experience an increase in absolute poverty (World Bank 1993, p30), has been reduced by an average of about USD 1 billion since June 1992. What is left of the assistance given to African countries does not necessarily address the reduction of poverty either. Only a tiny share, less than 10 per cent, goes directly to activities that help the poor namely: primary health care, clean water, basic literacy and education for women and girls, and family planning (The Economist Sept. 25 1993, pp. 49-50). The inability of donors to direct assistance to the most needy recipients, as well as the areas that directly address the reduction of poverty, suggests that development assistance is being used as a new form of economic re-colonisation:

"Foreign aid workers are often like modern-day colonial administrators. They live in elegant bungalows where they can host cocktail parties for other aid workers. They have servants to cook and clean and tend their gardens and it is hard to escape the conclusion that aid, particularly from governments, is a method of continuing colonial influence".

Sallnow 1990, p34.

It is therefore not surprising that after four decades of international development assistance, over 50 per cent of sub-Saharan Africa's population still lives below the poverty line (World Bank 1995, pp. 13-16).

The self interest argument of the functional utility approach is criticised for not demonstrating in the budgets of the donor countries the presumed foreign policy benefits from giving development assistance:
"The security rationale has not been subject to nearly as vigorous a theoretical or empirical analysis. The single background paper on the effectiveness of military assistance prepared for the Caulicci Commission asserted a positive linkage between US security assistance expenditure and security interest, while admitting that the evidence to support the assertion was elusive. Little convincing evidence has appeared in the development literature".

Ruttan 1989, p414.

It is further argued that the international development assistance patterns are much more sophisticated and affected by many more diverse factors than simple correlation analysis would provide. Also, as the number of donors grew so did the relative share of the super-powers in the total allocation of international assistance diminish (Griffin 1991, pp. 655-656). It must still be recognised that the relative sophistication of the development assistance allocation patterns does not necessarily diminish its political and ideological utility. Even if there are no conscious donor government policies directed at influencing the recipient countries' domestic political struggles or foreign policy orientation, the executing experts could hardly fail to express the ideology of the contributing country (Mosley 1987, p206). The relentless ideological struggle between the super-powers and the consequent intolerance of suspected deviations from strict ideological orthodoxy on the part of the executants of those governments and organisations, means that even the most experienced civil servants cannot recommend policies which run counter to the orthodoxy of the day. Unless positively instructed to do so, even though they might perceive the futility of some aspects of assistance policy, the political and ideological conditionalities of international assistance are religiously executed.
3.3 Conclusion

This chapter has focused on the theory dealing with the motivation for giving international development assistance. Two broad theoretical approaches that examine the motivations for giving international development assistance are identified, namely, the conventionalist and the functional utility approaches. The conventionalist theory considers what the objective of development assistance should be. It argues that the richer members of the global family are obliged to support the poorer weaker countries to attain a desirable minimum level of socioeconomic development. This moral obligation stems from the principles of social and redistributive justice as well as the mutual benefits that such co-operative partnership would bring. The functional utility framework, on the other hand, examines what is the current practice, rather than what ought to be.

This thesis examines how New Zealand’s response to the crises in Africa fits into this dual theoretical framework. Does it fall into the general conclusion suggested by those studies of the major donors, that the primary motivation for giving international development assistance is the pursuit of self interest, particularly in developing spheres of influence and commercial interests? Is New Zealand’s response to the crises in Africa simply a matter of using international development assistance as an instrument of international power-politics, whose intentions are masked by development rhetoric, or does it follow the alternative theoretical proposition? It is suggested that it would be reasonable to expect that because the departments of foreign relations and trade control international development assistance budgets, both of these motivations are bound to feature in international development assistance allocation decisions. The balance between the needs of the recipient and the foreign policy objectives of the
donor, suggested by Maizeals and Nissanke (1984, p880) is the area that theory should seek to expand and extend. This thesis seeks to explore the policies that extend this area of congruence. It suggests that the fact that the motivation for giving international development assistance may be political does not necessarily mean that such development assistance could not have a beneficial impact on the socioeconomic development of recipient communities. As Griffin has suggested 'good things follow from suspect motives' (Griffin 1991, p649). However, for international development assistance to effectively address the fundamental causes of poverty and underdevelopment in the recipient African countries, basic structural reforms to the programme are needed. I return to address these required changes in Chapter Ten, but the next chapter expounds the methodology adopted for this research.
CHAPTER FOUR:

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

“No amount of evidence can prove me right, and any amount of evidence can prove me wrong”. Einstein.

4.1 Introduction

In the literature on international development assistance considerable attention is given to various aspects of allocation. Much of this attention centres on the motivation for giving international assistance, and the distribution of international assistance among developing countries. Two models have come to dominate the analysis of the allocation and the motivations for giving international development assistance. These are the ‘Donor interest’ and ‘recipient needs’ models. According to Tsoutsopides:

“the dual model approach reflects the dichotomy that underlies donor motivation; the donor interests models examine the degree to which geographical allocation of a donor’s aid follows the pattern dictated by ‘particularistic’ motives (while) the recipient needs models examine the degree to which it conforms to ‘universal’ aid allocation criteria, as these relate to the developmental requirements of the recipients.”


Other variations within this dual model framework look at other wider aspects of the debate. They include the ‘stages in the allocation models’ which examine how recipients are selected, and the ‘model of the supply and demand’, which considers international assistance as a private good consumed by citizens of the donor country. The demand for the ‘product’ will depend on the perceived value and also on market forces. It is not
possible to examine all aspects of the methodologies in the literature in this area, because as Gounder (1995, p9) observes, the volume of literature on international development assistance is huge. But it is important to note that the methodological procedures in most of the existing work has been essentially quantitative and econometric. This thesis departs from this tradition by employing qualitative methodology in its analysis. The objective of this chapter therefore, is to explain the research approach adopted for this study and why it has been used. The chapter is divided into three main sections. The first section is a descriptive analysis of the methodological approaches adopted by previous researchers in the area of international development assistance. It focuses mainly on the two dominant models, namely: the ‘donor interest’ and the ‘recipient need’ models. The following review is undertaken primarily to demonstrate where and why my present research departs from previous studies. Section two describes the general approach followed in this study. It explains the ‘methodology’, examined as a conceptual approach for conducting research rather than just ‘methods’, while section three explains the sources of data and the methods of data collection.

4.2 The Contextual Models

There is a close relationship between the analytical models examined in the following sections and the theoretical perspectives examined in the preceding chapter. The donor interests and the recipient needs models may, in fact, be considered to as the analytical extensions of the functional utility and the conventionalist theoretical strands respectively. This is quite clear in the case of the functional utility - donor interests relationship where both rely heavily on multiple regression as their principal analytical tool. The relationship between the conventionalist theory and the recipient needs model
is less apparent because of the lack of a common tool that links them. However, like the conventionalist theory, recipient needs models analyse international development assistance from the position of the recipient's 'economic and welfare needs (McKinlay and Little 1979, p239). The relationship between the two theoretical perspectives and the dual models may be summarised thus:

"The donor interests model incorporates proxies for the interests of the donor country that are hypothesized to be served by the instrumental use of the aid allocation. The recipient needs model consists of proxies that measure the legitimacy of the recipient's claim to development assistance".


The discussion of donor interests and recipient needs models that follows must therefore be understood as being closely linked to the theoretical perspectives analysed in Chapter Three.

4.21 Donor Interests Models

McKinlay and Little's work (1979, 1978A, 1978B) is usually cited as the starting point of the donor interests models. Gounder observes that their studies "mark a turning point in the literature, as they create some order out of the chaos" (Gounder 1994, p100) by conceptualising the two broad alternative models of 'donor interests' and 'recipient needs'. However, the derivation of what has come to be termed the donor interests variables must be credited to Wittkopf (1972). In his study of official financial flows from the four major Western donors: Britain, France, Germany and the United States for 1961, 1964 and 1967, Wittkopf identifies four broad groups of potentially significant factors which he suggests 'could be expected' to influence the allocation of international development assistance. These are the political importance of the recipient to the donor,
cold war considerations, the recipients' need and performance, and the alternative sources of assistance (Wittkopf 1972, pp. 39-42). Of these factors Wittkopf finds that cold war considerations and the political importance are the most significant considerations for the major donors (Wittkopf 1972, p42).

Donor interests models have subsequently developed around these concepts. They are built around the premise that donors of international development assistance are motivated by the selfish pursuit of their foreign policy objectives. Consequently, the geographical distribution of a donor's international assistance reflects the geographical pattern of its security, trade and political objectives and interests. Donor interests models, therefore, incorporate proxies representing the functional utility that international development assistance allocation serves for the donor. McKinlay and Little group donor interests into five categories: overseas economic interest, security interest, power-political interest, development interest, and political stability and democracy interest (McKinlay and Little 1979, p240). The model is detailed and comprehensive as they use multiple linear regression analysis to measure the relative importance of each interest for the four major donors of the 1960s and 1970s namely Britain, France, Germany and the US. Their conclusion is the same for all the four major donors, that "the rationale underlying the distribution of aid is (the) attempt by the donor to promote and protect a variety of its interests" (McKinlay and Little 1978A, p328).

Since McKinlay and Little's studies in the late-1970s, a number of other studies have applied the donor interests model using similar proxies. Maizels and Nissanke derive three groups of interest for their analysis of the underlying principles for the allocation of international assistance to 80 developing countries over two periods, 1969-1970 and
1978-1980. Their proxies are political and security interest, represented by the existence of defense treaties or military co-operation agreements between donor and recipient countries; investment interest in the recipient country, measured in terms of the stock of private investment and number of transnational corporation (TNC) subsidiaries and affiliates from the donor country; and trade interest, where the recipient country is a source of raw materials or a potential market for the export of the donor country (Maizels and Nissanke 1984, pp. 884-885). Using multiple linear regression analysis, they find that:

"the variables representing political and economic interest dominated the results, spheres of interest variable (also) showing significant relationships. Trade interests, in terms of aid flows to countries exporting strategic materials showed a positive coefficient. The aid investment hypothesis is (also) borne out."

Maizels and Nissanke 1984, p885.

The results are similar for all five major donors: France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom and the US. They are also consistent with those by McKinlay and Little. Gounder employs Maizels and Nissanke's procedure to test for similar evidence in Australia. She concludes that the:

"donor interests model provides a good fit for each of the years analyzed. All coefficients have the expected positive sign. The main conclusion is that there is empirical support for the donor interests model."


Another foreign policy interest that has entered the donor motivation model is human rights practices of recipient countries. Cingranelli and Pasquarello identify a two-stage allocation decision process for US international assistance where:

"in the initial stage US policy makers performed a function analogous to 'gate keeping', some countries were systematically excluded from the recipient pool, while others were
passed on to the second stage of the decision making process. In the second stage, policy
makers interacted to decide the level of assistance to be provided."

Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985, p540.

The most important consideration in both stages is the human rights performance of the
prospective recipient countries. The decision at each stage is determined by the
performance of a prospective recipient on an ‘index of national rights practices’ based on
"internationally recognized rights to be free from government violations of the integrity
of the person and the rights to enjoy civil and political liberties" (Cingranelli and
Pasquarello 1985, p540). They suggest that at the gate keeping stage the economic and
political interests of the donor are dominant, while in the second stage human rights
practices of the recipient country become more important. They also distinguish
between military and economic assistance. Their results show that about 50 per cent of
the nations with poor human rights record receive some economic assistance, although
these were not large amounts. However, only 10 per cent of the nations with poor
human rights record receive any military assistance (Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985,
p555. See also Trumball and Wall 1994, p879). The human rights performance of
recipients is an important consideration especially because of the political crises in
Africa, and would fit better within the recipient needs model than the donor interests
model discussed below. Its conceptualisation as a recipient need has greater significance
in the case of Africa where international assistance is needed in enhancing and
protecting individual and community rights from abuse by a corrupt ruling elite.

4. 22 Recipient Needs Models

The recipient needs models on the otherhand, argue that the primary motive for giving
international development assistance is to meet the needs of the recipient countries. The
amount of international assistance allocated to a given country is proportional to the recipient’s economic and welfare needs (McKinlay and Little 1979, p239). The geographical pattern of a country’s international assistance would therefore, not necessarily reflect its distribution of interests.

The needs of the recipient countries are assessed in a number of ways. McKinlay and Little identify seven variables that make up the recipient needs model. These are: per capita aid, per capita GNP, per capita consumption, number of doctors per hundred thousand population, size of international liquidity holdings as percentage of imports, rate of growth of real per capita GDP, and gross domestic fixed capital formation as percentage of GDP (McKinlay and Little 1979, p239). They test the model using multiple regression and correlation analysis. In theory if the explanatory variables have negative coefficients then that would be the proof of recipient needs being the primary determinant in assistance allocation. They “could not find any evidence to indicate the aid programme is explicitly modeled on humanitarian criteria” (McKinlay and Little 1978A, p323). Therefore, the logical explanation is that recipient needs are not the primary motivating factor for the allocation of international development assistance. The variables of the recipient needs model in successive models have varied as the concept of development need has changed. Thus Maizels and Nissanke use GNP per capita, the physical quality of life index (PQLI) representing the shortfalls in basic social requirements, growth rate of GNP, balance of payment deficit and population size (Maizels and Nissanke 1984, p882). Using regression and correlation analysis they estimate the allocation of international assistance to 79 recipient countries over two periods 1969-70 and 1978-80. Their results are similar to McKinley and Little’s, namely that there is not sufficient explanation of international assistance in the recipient
needs model. A much fuller discussion of these models is provided by Rilli and Reiss (1992), but the most recent development in the analysis has been Gounder's work on Australia. She tests the hypothesis for Australia using Maizels and Nissanke's methodology, and finds support for both the donor interests and the recipient needs models. This leads her to conclude that Australia's international development assistance programme is atypical (Gounder 1994, p109). A possible explanation for this is that, unlike the super-powers that have been analysed in previous studies, Australia's international assistance is more benevolent because it is a smaller country, and therefore its foreign policy objectives are less aggressive than the larger donors'. Furthermore, the fact that the geographical focus of Australia's foreign policy is also the domain of some of the poorest nations may also be significant. While it's international assistance programme is partially motivated by foreign policy interests, it is concentrated in the small Pacific Island states and South Asian nations which are also among the most needy nations. So it is that the principal recipients of Australia's international assistance (measured by recipient needs criteria) also lie in the geographical region of Australia's trade and foreign policy interests (measured by donor interests). Australia's international assistance programmes to Papua New Guinea and Indonesia are a good example (Spindler 1985). Both are poor countries but are also important in Australia's foreign policy, Papua New Guinea as a former colony and a source of raw materials, and Indonesia in terms of defence, commerce and trade.

This explanation becomes even more relevant when McGillivray's performance index is introduced into the equation. McGillivray constructs a performance index which measures the level of performance of donor countries by comparing how much a donor ranks on a performance continuum. The Index is based on the recipient country's
income, by defining a needy country as one that "is poor and highly populated" (McGillivray 1989, p566). He postulates that the lower a country's per capita income the greater its need for international development assistance. Thus the more a donor's assistance reflects the needs of the recipients, the greater is the donor's performance. The high performers on this index are mostly the less powerful countries: Belgium, Finland, Denmark and Holland. The super-powers are among the lowest ranked on the index, the highest ranking amongst them being the United Kingdom, at 10th out of the 17 donors studied. This is significant because smaller donors such as Australia and the Scandinavian countries, may have less aggressive foreign policy interests. Although their international assistance may be used to achieve foreign policy objectives, these may not be in areas that require the use of development assistance to achieve it.

From this brief review of methodologies in this section, it is clear that the previous analyses of international development assistance concentrate largely on testing for dominance of one or the other of donor interests or recipient need. In some cases where significant elements of both the donor interests and recipient needs models exist, this creates a problematic for the methodology. For example, when Gounder finds significant elements of both models in Australia's international assistance, she seeks explanation for her results by testing for a non-nested hypothesis (Gounder 1995, Chapter 8). This is the point at which this particular study departs from those reviewed in the preceding section. The research style adopted for this study examines international development assistance from the perspective of both the donor and the recipient. It examines how maximum benefit can be derived from the international development assistance partnership, both for the donor and the recipient. It departs from the conventional quantitative, econometric analysis, and adopts qualitative methodology. The next section explains the general approach of this methodology.
This study adopts a pluralistic approach incorporating aspects of the positivist approach into qualitative methodology. Positivism seeks to test correlation between variables using quantitative analysis, while qualitative research is more concerned with observation and description and generating hypothesis. (For a full discussion of these methodological approaches see Miles and Huberman 1994; Rubin and Babbie 1993; Sarantakos 1993).

From the positivistic approach the study starts with a hypothesis based on the literature and theory of the contextual models discussed in the preceding section on the relationship between development assistance and the national interests of the donor countries. This provides the theoretical basis for the study in terms of the deductive process. The hypothesis deduced from the theoretical framework is that:

‘There is a dual objective for countries giving international assistance: to advance their foreign policy interests and also to respond to the developmental crises in the recipient country or community’.

This hypothesis is further refined and stated to relate specifically to New Zealand’s response to the crises in Africa, thus:

‘That there is a dual objective for New Zealand’s response to the crises in Africa: to advance New Zealand’s foreign policy interests and also to help resolve the crises in Africa’.

This hypothesis is tested using the data collected on New Zealand’s response to the crises in Africa. This process is in line with the hypothetico-deductive approach to theory building, namely understanding the theory, formulating a hypothesis from the theory and testing these against the data.
After the initial analysis of both the qualitative and quantitative data, it became increasingly clear that the previous studies have tended to overlook important aspects of the international development assistance process. International assistance is a partnership relationship. The relationship between the ‘donor’ and the ‘recipient’ is more than the uni-directional flow implied in the contextual models. There are streams of interactions between the donor and the recipient. And there is increasing acceptance by both parties in the partnership that there are mutual benefits to both partners. Therefore, the analytical methods that look only at the uni-directional flow of funds from donor-to-recipient, invariably ignore the larger context of the partnership, including the non-material, non-quantifiable inputs and outcomes of the international assistance process. It is therefore more useful to adopt a methodological approach that is more empathetic. The procedure adopted in this thesis is referred to as ‘Empathic Ethnography’.

Empathic ethnography used in this research incorporates aspects of ethnographic methods and positivism. The elements of ethnography used in the study include the process of discovery, qualitative descriptions and induction. These elements of ethnography enrich the positivist approach, and provide a better understanding of the interactions that go into the process of international development assistance. It gives us a better understanding of the development assistance process, both from the perspective of the donor and that of the recipients. Ethnographic research, or ethnography, studies a culture from the point of view of the people who inhabit that culture (Rubin and Babbie 1993, p361). However, because this is not a study of the entire culture of international development assistance, but only of a small aspect of the process, it would be intrinsically
wrong to refer to the entire study as ethnographic. The style of ‘empathic ethnography’ research is where:

"an attempt is made to get inside the situation being studied and to reconstruct it from the members’ perspective. This calls for open ended, inductive approach to the research where the researcher consciously adopts the role of learner and attempts through interviews and examination of documentary evidence to understand the shared divergent patterns of meaning that underlie interactions."


This has also been referred to as ‘sympathetic introspection’ (Saratakos 1993, p49). In this particular study therefore the major focus is on the understanding of the interactions between New Zealand and Africa from the perspective of both New Zealand and the African countries, understanding the meanings and value that both partners ascribe to the international assistance relationship.

In the context of the style of the research approach, therefore, it would be rather less productive to reduce the complex interactions between the partners into a set of simple operational variables for purposes of determining cause-effect relationships. The concern is not with specifying cause and effect relationships, but rather to understand the stream of evolving relationships between symbolic form, an understanding and elaboration of the wider context of the interaction between the donor and the recipient (Smircich 1983, p164). Moreover as there is no direct evidence in the literature that the provision and acceptance of international development assistance necessarily leads to certain actions by the donor or the recipient (Kegley and Hook 1991), it would be inappropriate and also misleading to reduce this complex interaction into a set of simple operational variables for regression analysis to ascertain cause-effect relationship. As Ruttan points out “we can never fully understand the consequences of any assistance
activity or intervention into a complex and interdependent social system” (Ruttan 1989, p421) except we study it from the partners’ perspective. A direct cause-effect relationship could not always be established with absolute certainty.

This study therefore examines New Zealand’s response to the crises in Africa from the context of interaction between donor and recipient partnership. The actions of the donor and the recipient partners depend on their shared meanings, what Dudley and Montmarquette refer to as the perceived impact of development assistance on both partners. This being:

“that the recipient nation will behave more favourably toward their country, lending support to their national political interests. They may expect that the recipient country will confer economic benefits on their country, for example by buying more of the products they export. They may expect some indication that they have had a favourable impact on the residents of the recipient country; perhaps some expression of gratitude, or simply the evidence that the lives of the people have been changed by their charity.”

Dudley and Montmarquette 1976, p133.

The perceived benefits of the partnership to the recipient country, community or organisation includes enhanced development of their community, but also the fact that the act of giving itself enriches the relationship between the donor and the recipient partners. As Max Chigwida, the director of World Vision Zimbabwe observes, the concept of unilateral donor-recipient beneficiary flow is archaic:

We are also moving away from this thing of donor-recipient beneficiary, and seeing ourselves as partners and this is expressed in the language of our organisation today. There is no one who is too poor to give and no one too rich to receive. So there is a mutual affirmation where some people may have more material things than others but that does not mean that they don’t need something else from other people. So we see ourselves, whether it is New Zealanders or Zimbabweans, we see ourselves in that light. That those who are benefiting from the funds that are given are both the donors and the recipients.

Max Chigwida in an interview with the author, February 1996.
It is this perception of an evolving relationship between partner countries, communities and organisations that has guided the adoption of empathic ethnography as a methodological approach for this study. Thus, rather than the researcher ascribing meaning to the actions of the partners in the exchange process, this study seeks to understand the 'meaning' the partners give to their actions. In this way the study hopes to illuminate the dynamics of the New Zealand-Africa relationship developed through the partnership of international development assistance. As Russell Marshall observes on the issue of African refugees in New Zealand, it is not just the refugees and their families that benefit, but also the entire New Zealand community which increasingly acquires a better understanding of Africans, Africa and African aspirations:

As more African people come into this country, Somalis are the major ones coming at the moment, that will gradually develop a connection. The accessibility of information about Africans is going to help New Zealanders gradually become more aware. We have been on an upward curve. We were on a downward curve for a long time. Up until 1981, I think, it bottomed out. And in 1984 it moved up and it has gone up since then. And our reputation is actually not bad in Africa.


The pertinent questions that need to be asked before adopting a particular methodological path are: How well does the approach capture the experience of the groups studied, in this case New Zealand and Africa being the main partners in the interaction? How well does it attempt to empathise with the meanings, shared values and the perceived impact on the partners? Every time these questions are posed the answer lies beyond the theoretical modeling provided by the contextual models. There is more evidence in the conceptualisation of development assistance as a partnership and a form of mutual exchange between the giver and the receiver. It has become clear therefore, that the most appropriate approach is to study New Zealand's response to the
crones In Africa from the perspective of partnership, a form of cooperative action between participating groups.

4.32 The Methodology: 2 The Conceptual Framework

The framework developed from the methodology outlined above is therefore conceptualised as shown in the diagram in figure 4.1 below. In the context of the existing literature and theory of international development assistance, New Zealand’s response to the crises in Africa would be analysed from New Zealand’s donor interests and Africa’s needs. The donor interests model would focus on where New Zealand’s foreign policy interests are best served, area [B] on the diagram in figure 4.1. The model would seek evidence that explores the pattern of New Zealand’s response to those interests. The recipient needs model on the other hand would define what constitutes Africa’s needs and the neediest countries in terms of GNP per capita, HDI, etcetera, and regress these against the pattern of New Zealand’s response. If there is no positive correlation then the recipient need model is not collaborated.

In the particular framework adopted for this thesis research, New Zealand’s interests are determined by intensive interviews with officials, and by examining official policy documents. ‘Donor interests’ are not ascribed by the researcher. Africa’s crises are also determined from the perspective of the both the African leaders and New Zealand officials rather than the researcher’s perception. Unlike the traditional models, this framework seeks to find areas of congruence of donor interests and recipient needs. This is area [D] in figure 4.1. This is the most desirable situation for a ‘perfect partnership’ which is an optimum impact position. At this point the self-interest motivation for
international development assistance may not necessarily clash with the recipient needs, they would in fact be complementary (Tsoutsoplikes 1991). This provides a picture of a true partnership where both partners in the relationship benefit from the giving and the receiving, co-operative interaction. The challenge for an effective partnership therefore would be to maximize the area [D] in the model in order to create as near perfect partnership as possible, and to maximise mutual benefits. In Chapter Ten this model is
tested using New Zealand’s response to the crisis of apartheid in South Africa. Its focus at this stage is to provide a framework within which the interaction between the partner countries in the international development assistance process are better understood from the perspectives of both partners.

4. 4.1 Sources of Data: I The Procedure

Qualitative data has been collected in a variety of ways including ‘Elite Interviews’, document study and personal observations during site visits. I use survey research to understand policy and motivation using interpretivist methodology. This is the empathic understanding of socially constructed interaction, interpreted subjectively on the basis of the actors’ definition (Sarantakos, 1993 pp. 34-35). The task of understanding New Zealand’s responses to the crises in Africa therefore, is not simply to find the rationale for New Zealand giving development assistance to Africa, but an attempt to understand and interpret the meanings both partners ascribe to the interaction and the social and political context of the relationship.

Data collected is largely descriptive and not easily amenable for handling by statistical procedures. The research questions are not framed by operationalising variables, rather they are formulated to investigate the topic in all its context. Unlike the pure grounded qualitative research, this study starts with a hypothesis derived from literature. (For discussion of grounded theory see Glaser and Strauss 1970; Strauss 1987). The collection and the initial analysis of data occurs simultaneously. The first part of the research is the document study which is undertaken to develop and direct the formulation of theoretical concepts and direct the construction of interview schedules.
and help with the choice of respondents. On-going analysis during the data collection period also helps to provide direction and help focus the research questions.

Respondents are primarily past and present policy makers, responsible for the allocation of New Zealand international development assistance and relations with Africa. These are Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Trade, staff of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and Chief Executives of the Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in New Zealand. Two African countries with very close relationship with New Zealand, South Africa and Zimbabwe, are selected as case studies. Four partner organisations in these countries and seven projects are studied. Chief Executives of the selected partner organisations in Africa are interviewed. Project staff and local community leaders in the project areas are also interviewed. The interviews are semi-structured, allowing respondents to express their ideas, feelings and experiences fully. The audio taped interviews are fully transcribed for analysis. This data is reported through direct quotations from participants, photographs and descriptive statistics. New Zealand interviews are done first to help identify areas for further investigation in Africa.

4.42 Sources of Data: 2 Elite Interviews

Elite interviews are directed at respondents who have particular experience or knowledge about the subject being discussed. For this reason the respondents are well known personalities, prominent and influential people who occupy special position in New Zealand's international development assistance decision making structures. (See Sarantakos 1993, p187 for further discussion of elite interviews.) The objective of the interview is not the collection of information for statistical analysis from a large
number of respondents, but rather to probe views of a small number of elite individuals who had been or are still actively involved in the policy development and implementation of New Zealand's response to the crises in Africa. The interviews themselves are a learning process in which the respondents pass on their personal and conceptual perspectives on the events, policies and processes of New Zealand's relationship with Africa. All interviews are conducted by the author.

An interview schedule is prepared for each respondent to take account of the peculiarities of each respondent and their role in the development of New Zealand foreign policy regarding Africa (see Appendix One). A standard consent form is prepared and sent out to each respondent seeking their participation in the study (see Appendix Two). When their consent is obtained a copy of the interview schedule is posted to them at least two weeks prior to the date of the interview. This is important to give them sufficient time to reflect on the issues to be discussed and ask further questions if need be. It is also important because many of the questions are mental questions, that is questions that seek to tease out the intentions of policy from an historical perspective. Some of the respondents discuss issues that they had taken decisions on in the 1970s, 20 years ago. It was necessary to give them sufficient warning to assemble material and put their thoughts together if we were to explore the details of the issues successfully.

The interviews range from 45 minutes to 105 minutes depending on the position of the respondent in the policy making hierarchy and how close they are to the issues being discussed. Each question is put to the respondent and they are free to express their feelings and thoughts on the issue. To ensure that each respondent's perspective and
personal experience are captured accurately each interview is tape-recorded and then transcribed.

Altogether 26 interviews are done (see Appendix Three), 12 in New Zealand and 14 in Africa. Of the New Zealand interviews six are with the policy formulators and politicians who were in government during the study period. The other six New Zealand respondents are Chief Executives of six of the top ten largest Non-government Organisations (NGOs) with substantial development assistance in African partner countries. The Africa interviews are essentially with the Chief Executives of the partner NGO recipients of the development assistance from the New Zealand partner agencies, the Chief executives of the local councils in Zimbabwe and South Africa, the local community leaders in the project areas and some local project staff. The local community leaders are interviewed in groups rather than individuals because of the shared leadership structure.

The choice of NGOs over the government officials in the recipient countries in Africa was made on three main grounds. After the initial analysis of the New Zealand interviews it became clear that the larger part of New Zealand's response to the crises in Africa in the form of international development assistance, both from the NZODA and the NGOs, went to community level NGOs in the partner African countries. Even the Head of Mission Funds (HOMF) which is administered by the New Zealand High Commission in Harare, Zimbabwe, goes directly to the local NGOs in the partner countries and not through government agencies. It is only the education and training scholarships and study fellowships programme of the NZODA that comes through the official government channels. In the case of South Africa, even this had been done
essentially by the NGOs because of the nature of the relationship between New Zealand and the apartheid regime in South Africa prior to 1994.

4.43 Sources of Data: 3 Official document study and file data

These are memos, notes made to files of official policy decisions, country strategy papers prepared by officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. It also includes policy briefs prepared for the Minister, telex and fax communications with the New Zealand High Commission in Harare. From the Harare office documents on projects undertaken by the New Zealand High Commission in various African countries, allocation of HOMF to various African countries are collected and analysed. The official statistics on NZODA is compiled from the programme profiles published by the Development Cooperation Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. The data is used to analyse trends and the changing policy emphasis of New Zealand development assistance to Africa and also to provide an historical and conceptual context for the programme.

The NGO documents are principally those in the public domain such as annual reports which show income and expenditure by regions and by sectors. Policy documents stating the purpose, philosophy and charter of the organisation, strategic plans and some advertising material and newsletters were drawn on. This material is useful in providing the official perspective on programmes and policy as the organisations want the public to see them, and the value and meaning they ascribed to their activities.

Much of the quantitative data on levels of allocation and forms of international development assistance both from the NZODA and NGOs are essentially descriptive
statistics. They are collected, analysed and evaluated to provide a set of systematic procedures for producing qualitative data for development, modification and expansion of the process of inquiry into New Zealand's international development assistance policies, programmes and practices in Africa. This is empiricist but not necessarily empirical. Empiricism here refers to the production of data which is generalised, but which is not an end itself (Bulmer 1982, p31). The data and explanations provide further insight into the basis for policy making process in New Zealand and the recipient partner countries.

4.44 Sources of Data: 4 Site Visits

These are visits to field projects in the partner countries, supported by the NZODA programme and New Zealand NGOs. This provides the opportunity to speak with the recipients at the community level, and to assess both the real and the perceived impact of the programme on the recipient communities and organisations. It is an opportunity to observe what the donor and the recipients could not or would not verbalize during the interviews and that which would be best inferred from the researcher's personal observation and contact. Altogether seven project sites were visited in the African partner organisations, three in Zimbabwe and four in South Africa. The impact of the projects on the local communities was observed, interviews with the local people at the project sites were undertaken and photographs and other material were collected.
4.5 Conclusion

This chapter has introduced an alternative analytical framework which sees international development assistance as a partnership relationship. It re-examines the traditional concept of donor interests and recipient needs as two exclusive models for the analysis of the motivation for giving international assistance, and suggests that this dualistic approach which seeks to find one or the other of donor interests or recipient needs is limited because it ignores the presence of significant elements of both models in the international assistance policy of donor countries and agencies.

Qualitative methodology used in this research extends the analytical framework and provides a better understanding of donor motivation through intensive interviews of principal officials from donor governments and agencies and recipient communities. Donor interests and recipient needs are therefore not ascribed by the researcher, but derived from the perspective of both the donor and the recipient. This is a significant contribution that has not been undertaken by previous studies.

Furthermore, the analytical model adopted for this research emphasises the area of congruence of donor interests and recipient needs. In the particular case of New Zealand’s response to the crises in Africa, the model explores how New Zealand’s response has been directed so that it addresses the needs of identified crises while at the same time meeting New Zealand’s foreign policy objectives in Africa.

The last three chapters have examined the conceptual, theoretical and methodological issues relating to international response to developmental crises. This has set the stage to
now examine the specific case of New Zealand's response to the crises in Africa, and the motivation for that response. This is done in Chapters Six, Seven and Eight. However, the next chapter takes on the task of critically analysing the nature and the causes of the crises in Africa to provide the basis for a clearer understanding of the effectiveness of New Zealand's (and the international community's) response.
CHAPTER FIVE:

A THEORETICAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE CAUSES OF THE CRISSES IN AFRICA

"Africa is dying. The economy of our continent is lying in ruins. Our ancient continent is now on the brink of disaster".

Edem Kodjo OAU Under Secretary 1978.

Chapter two conceptualised the crises in Africa in the context of the disastrous circumstances of Africa's socioeconomic and political malaise. It argued that Africa's crises are more complex than the ordinary everyday conceptualisation of the term crisis suggests. In this chapter the causes of the crises in Africa are critically analysed. It is argued that the causes of the crises are rooted in Africa's colonial past, and only through an exposition of the structure of the colonial exploitation of Africa will the root causes of the crises be understood. The crises in Africa are grouped into four broad areas: sociopolitical, economic, the environment-drought-famine nexus and the AIDS pandemic.

5.1 The Crisis of Political Instability: The Nature and Causes of The Crisis

Political instability is the norm rather than the exception in modern Africa. Only a very small minority of governments have been replaced by peaceful transition and only a few leaders have relinquished power voluntarily. It is estimated that in the first 25 years of independence, more than seventy leaders in 29 African countries were
Sub-Saharan Africa is made up of 46 African countries, that is Africa minus Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Namibia and South Africa.

Figure 5.1 Countries of Africa 1996.
forcibly removed from office (Winchester 1987, p302), and by 1980 only five of the 29 leaders who had signed the charter setting up the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963 were still in office. Seventeen had been overthrown in military coups, another three killed in bloody military coups, and four died of ‘natural causes’ (Gavshon 1981, p64). Apart from these there are the hundreds, and possibly thousands, of coup attempts that failed, secessionist wars, cross-border conflicts and inter-ethnic conflicts and genocide. This section examines the social and historical context of the crisis of political instability in Africa. It looks at the effects of colonialism and analyses both the endogenous causes and the global context of the economic and political linkages between Africa and the metropolitan colonial and imperial powers. The examples discussed are mainly from Southern Africa and the Horn of Africa in line with the overall scope of the thesis.

5.11 The Legacy of Colonialism: 1 The Creation of Nation States

European colonisation of Africa bequeathed an explosive legacy on the African continent and its peoples. The arbitrary, often illogical partitioning of the continent into chunks and bits between the colonial powers split peoples and concentrated diverse and often hostile tribal groups into territories which ultimately became sovereign states, thus making internal and trans-border strife almost inevitable. Colonial boundaries were set by extending the hinterland of the trade posts established by the commercial establishments from the colonising country, such as the British Royal Niger Company, either by military conquest or mutual agreement between the colonising powers.
The re-organisation of the mosaic of the ethnic nationalities into single territorial and institutional framework of nation-states created the recipe for the crisis of political instability in the post-independence period. As Gavshon observes:

“any map showing the major ethnic, language and kinship groupings in Africa today illustrates the insensitivities and absurdities displayed by the colonisers who, beyond the rhetoric of their ‘civilising missions’, in reality made sure that 20th century Africa would become a setting for conflict. The contrasts shouted their messages of inequity and iniquity”.


The inter-ethnic strife in African countries must therefore be understood in the context of the creation of colonial entities to service European colonial territorial ambitions. That these entities have survived intact for four decades after independence is a remarkable achievement.

The pre-colonial political arrangement of Africa was characterised by decentralised disparate independent tribal authorities. This indigenous structure of legitimate power and authority was destroyed by centralisation of power through the amalgamation of disparate groups essentially for colonial administrative convenience. After independence the ethnic groupings became the basis for political organisation because there were no other reference groups such as social classes or ideology. Ethnicity or tribalism became the primary source of conflict over national resource allocation, rekindling historic animosities with devastating consequences such as the genocide in Rwanda and the civil war in Nigeria. While in Angola the roots of indigenous conflict was the division between the Bakongo who constituted the power base for the FNLA, the Ovimbundu in the southern and eastern plateau region who supported Sivimbi’s UNITA and the Mbundu, the power base of the MPLA (Gavshon 1981, chapter 10).
On top of these divisions a system of social stratification was superimposed on the Angolan society, where the *mulattos* (children of cross-cultural marriages, between white and black), were higher than the ordinary black, and then the black population was again categorised into *assimilados* and the ordinary folk. (An assimilado is a person who behaves like a white person. To be considered an assimilado a black must have some basic education, have a job, pay their taxes and be law abiding). Thus, apart from being divided on tribal and ethnic lines, Portuguese colonialism imposed a system of colour, class and social distinction which discouraged the development of a national consciousness and inter-ethnic co-operation between the rival ethnic, linguistic and cultural groups. At the time of the struggle for independence these cultural, ethnic and social distinctions were assiduously perpetrated by the Portuguese colonialists in the system of divide and rule which fractured the independence movement and disabled the post-independent nation crippled by twenty years of civil war in the post-independence period.

Similarly, the scramble for positions in the 'Horn of Africa' was to take advantage of its strategic position. Located at the junction of two continents, Asia and Africa, the Horn is a prized possession. It has port facilities in the gulf of Aden and access to the Indian Ocean. The colonial powers thus parceled out chunks of territory amongst themselves to satisfy their territorial and strategic ambitions. This partition entrenched indigenous and imported animosities of the tribal groups in the countries of the Horn, and set off a process of change and frontier fixing that continues in the 1990s. Before the colonial era a loose alliance of Somali tribes and clans wandered freely in search of pastures and water for their herd. The British were the first to arrive, and their initial desire was to secure posts for regular supplies to their garrisons in the Middle East.
They were closely followed by the French who, unable to convince the British to share facilities at Aden, set themselves up at Djibouti. The Italian dream of an empire in Africa brought them into direct conflict with the British and the French, but their bid to overrun Ethiopia resulted in crushing defeat and rebuff at Adowa in 1896 (Davidson 1994, p183). But the seed of political crisis and regional instability had been planted as distinct, often rival, tribal groups were amalgamated to form territorial units, or culturally homogenous and distinct tribal groups were split up between two, three or in some cases even four different countries, as in the case of the Somali (Nzongola-Ntalaja 1987, pp. 65-66). In the post-colonial period, the importance of the Horn, particularly its proximity to key sea routes linking the oil producing countries of the Middle East with the US and Europe, meant that political crisis there inevitably had super-power involvement. Hence, as Chege suggests, the crisis of political instability in the region must also be understood in the context of the activities of super-power rivalry:

“Conflict in the Horn of Africa must be seen as a confluence of two forces: local and international. The local input is the violence arising from attempts by states in the region to forge nations within boundaries which are incompatible with the existing mosaic of nationalities in the region. The international input is the super-power rivalry, essentially in the quest of national self interest. The Soviet Union promotes its credibility as a super-power by arming clients while paying little more than rhetorical attention to their socialist content. The United States camouflages its control of energy resources in the greater region in terms of promoting regional stability (that is opposing revolutionary changes) and counteracting Soviet military threats in the Gulf, Horn of Africa and the Indian Ocean. The dialectic of internal causes and international intervention is one in which alterations in one induce changes in the other. The social and economic costs to the people of the Horn of Africa have been tremendous.”

Chege 1987, pp. 95-96.
In the post-colonial and post-cold war period, the super-power element of conflict has been withdrawn. However, the local causes that Chege refers to are still very much present. This is the insurgence of irredentist minority groups in the various countries, such as the Tigreans and the Oromo in Ethiopia and their struggle for self determination, and Somalia’s claim over the Ogaden region of Ethiopia. These are minority ethnic groups which were put under single territorial frameworks without consideration for their peculiar socio-cultural associations. The result is their common historical experience of political and administrative neglect and cultural oppression in their respective countries. The explosion of long bottled-up feelings of powerlessness by minority groups in the nation-states has resulted in long drawn civil wars that dominate the political landscape of post-independent Africa.

Not only did colonialism fetter disparate groups into unholy marriages, cantankerous divorce was invariably written in the marriage contracts through colonial policies that entrenched animosities between regional and ethnic groups within countries. In the Sudan for example, the physical and socioeconomic differences between the north and the south were entrenched by British colonial policies of divide and rule. The north, made up predominantly of Muslim Arabic-speaking tribes, dominated the south which was largely Christian and non-Arabic black Africans. To control the emergence and spread of anti-British nationalism from the south to the north, the British made the south a 'closed district' in the 1920s. This meant that trade, cultural and social exchange such as marriage between the northerners and the southerners was strictly forbidden and illegal. Coupled with this the exploitative disposition of colonialism created a dualistic economy. North Sudan was economically developed while south Sudan was neglected because the colonial political economy was implemented in such
a way that only those regions which were economically useful received socioeconomic infrastructure. North Sudan's historical and economic links with Egypt were useful to British imperialism. It was developed and administered by the elite Sudan Service, while the South was run by military officers with little investment in social and economic infrastructure. In blatant disregard for post-independence national harmony, the British made Arabic the national language and Islam the state religion in the post-independence unitary state system. Because of the economic and educational backwardness of the south, Arab civil servants were generally the only ones qualified to occupy the higher ranks in the administration of the south. The south naturally resented this because it was effectively Arab colonialism. At independence in 1956, Sudan was therefore fatally divided. Although independence was attained without the bloodshed such as experienced in Algeria, the two groups in the country raised as mutually antagonistic, divided by language and religion and a dual economy could not realistically be expected to bury their differences and animosities of the past and work together. The long civil war that started even before independence continues today.

The most brutal and perhaps the most vivid in our consciousness, is the genocide and the reprisal killings in Rwanda in 1993 and 1994, and the ethnic conflict in Burundi. Both are the direct result of colonial policies in the two countries. In Rwanda, German colonisation followed by Belgium administration under United Nations mandate, maintained a political structure that encouraged the minority Tutsi ethnic group to dominate the majority Hutu. The Belgian administration discriminated against the majority Hutu in education, participation in the administration and the armed forces, in favour of the Tutsi (John 1986, pp. 69-70). In the period leading up to independence in 1962, the Belgians shifted their support from the Tutsi minority to
the Hutu majority in retaliation for the rise of Tutsi nationalism against the Belgian colonial administration. The formation of the National Rwandese Union (UNAR) and the revolutionary political agitation demanding immediate disengagement of Belgian colonial control in Rwanda brought the Tutsi in direct conflict with the colonial authorities. The ensuing political conflict degenerated into ethnic killings between 1959 and 1962 as the colonial administration attempted to manipulate tribal tensions and conflict to its advantage. The Hutu-led post-independence government did not last and the social and ethnic tension continued to fester until the explosion of 1993-1994.

The sequence of events described above is repeated in most African countries, East, West, North and South. The consequences have been devastating both in terms of human lives and economic disintegration. Virtually every one of Africa's 53 countries has been affected by some form of internal civil strife in the post-independence period, ranging from secessionist wars to cross border conflicts, all these set against a rather promising background when it is remembered that 40 of the 53 African countries achieved independence without violence.

5.12 The Legacy of Colonialism: 2 The Heritage of One-Party Rule

It has been argued that Africa’s crisis of political instability is also the direct result of the colonial legacy of suppressing opposition movements (Ake 1993; Gavshon 1981). Despite claims of the civilising mission of colonialism and the established multi-party system in the metropolitan countries, the political structure of the colonial system in fact embodied single party arrangements (Gavshon 1981, p36). Colonial administration did not actually implement the refined democratic practices of the
metropolitan parliaments in the administration of the African colonies. Instead they imposed rigid frameworks which precluded political opposition which fell outside the guidelines drawn by the colonial administration. Those African nationalists who operated outside the boundaries set by colonialism, who gave voice to nationalism, risked imprisonment or even exile. There was, therefore, no established basis for broad popular participation in the political process or public policy. As Gavshon observes, the legacy of the colonial heritage was such that in the years leading up to independence:

"it became almost a precondition for aspiring African nationalist leaders to spend part of their apprenticeship behind bars or banishment. Ben Bella of Algeria, Habib Bourrgiba of Tunisia and Morocco's Sultan Mohammed the V, were all locked up or exiled by the French. The British did the same with Ghana's Kwame Nkruma, Jomo Kenyata of Kenya and Zambia's Kenneth Kaunda before each became president of their country. Patrice Lumumba, first Prime Minister of Congo, was released from prison in order to attend the constitutional conference that preceded independence in 1960".


Much more recently Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe, the latter the Prime Minister of Zimbabwe, and Nelson Mandela, the President of South Africa experienced a similar fate. They were all exiled from their respective countries and forced into the bush in order to undertake independence struggle. In the case of Mandela, he was put away for 27 years, incarcerated on Robben Island for life before being released at the age of 70 years to lead his country to multi racial reconciliation and majority rule, becoming the President of a democratic South Africa at the age 74 years in April 1994.

Political opposition under colonial rule was therefore, an illegal act, and the colonial administrative system inherited at independence was set up to subjugate and not to serve the citizenry (Harden 1990, p226). The heirs to the seat of power at
independence naturally assumed that this is the norm of democratic practice. Winchester reports that at the end of the first decade of independence only the Gambia and Somalia had multi-party political systems (Winchester 1986, p300). In 1983 only 29 per cent of African countries had multi-party political systems, although there would be serious questions about the methodology used in defining multi-partyism. It would be hardly appropriate for example to regard the apartheid system in South Africa at that time as a plural-party system when opposition was rigorously suppressed with military force. The relevant point however, is the fact that the political tradition of distrust for opposition and leaning towards single-party dictatorships was established by colonial administration and persists in the post-independence period.

Having tried the Westminster parliamentary system of multi-party democracy and failed, the majority of African nations have moved to adopt a system of uni-party presidential system of government. They contend that the single-party system suits better the basic African traditional form of government by which decisions are reached through consensus, a system where all groups are involved in government and no one stands out formally in 'opposition' to the 'government' of the community. In the traditional African system of government debates lead to decision making revolved around issues not personalities. Uni-partism or the 'single-party' system is therefore more responsive to the question of social solidarity and its ideology and enables social integration to be accomplished in a manner which optimises popular participation and stability. Winchester summarises the arguments thus:

"Sensitive to external criticism in particular, one-party regimes have gone to great lengths to justify the elimination of competitive party politics. They have pointed out, for example, that in most cases the nationalist party that led their countries to independence became the majority party or ruling party when power was transferred, and it has been
argued that they therefore truly represent the will of the people. One-party regimes further argued that the crises of poverty, illiteracy and underdevelopment facing African countries at independence are analogous to crisis situations which other countries have had to face and which have prompted even western democracies to circumscribe democratic practices and civil liberties for a time. African leaders are cognizant of precedents established in the recent past by the United States, Canada, France, and others in invoking emergency powers or War Powers Act to combat what they perceived as either an external or internal threat. African leaders have demanded no less in combating the crisis which they presently face. They maintain that a disciplined, one-party system allows the limited pool of expertise and resources, typically in short supply in developing countries, to be directed to solving problems whereas multiple parties are seen as divisive forces which waste time, resources and manpower. The risks of disintegration attached to multi-party systems were seen to be further increased where party loyalties or voting patterns were reinforced by ethnic, religious and regional divisions. Since almost every African state has experienced first-hand the divisive effects of extreme ethnic competition and a majority have also had to cope with religious pluralism and regionalism as well, many chose to create consensus through more authoritarian instrumentalities, that is through the creation of a single-party state."

Winchester 1986, pp. 299-300

The problem with these arguments consists not in their plausibility, but with the processes and the practical application of the one-party system. In many countries the implementation and the running of national governments under single-party systems is completely at variance with the ideals espoused. The process of creating uniparty states through coercion ultimately leads to even greater internal divisions. The identification of the party with the state means that disagreement with policy is seen as going against the state. Leadership often degenerates into autocracy and despotic tyranny, with freedom of speech and the press muzzled and the opposition stifled, leading to even greater crisis of political instability as the political leadership becomes preoccupied with establishing its legitimacy rather than achieving real political and social progress.
The failure (or inability) to develop stable political institutions that promote civil order is not limited to single-party political systems. The collapse of the elaborate multi-party political system in Nigeria in 1966 and again in 1983 are rather painful examples of how western style democratic governments fit rather uneasily with African countries. Harden argues that if modern style democratic system should work in any African country, it should be in Nigeria because the country has both the human and economic resources that surpass even some of the smaller democracies in Europe. It has a large middle class which is highly educated and economically secure, and their dogged determination to participate democratically in the political process is demonstrated in the fact that:

"although they have badly botched it up when they achieve democratic rule, Nigerians refuse to settle for anything less. It is the measure of the contrary, contradictory, mule-headed nature of the people that after thirty years of independence civilians have been in power for nine years, generals for twenty-one, and the national consensus is that only democracy works. Nigerians refuse to commit a corrosive crime common to most Black Africa, passive acceptance of tyranny. It is no accident that half of the continent's newspapers, half its journalists, one quarter of its published books, a Nobel laureate in literature and a growing number of world-class novelists and poets are Nigerian. There are an estimated 2 million university trained professionals. They constitute the largest, best trained, most acquisitive Black elite on the continent.

Harden 1990, pp. 276-277.

That political instability persists in Nigeria suggests that there must be structural factors that constrain the development of stable political culture in African countries. Africa's crisis of political instability must therefore lie in the weakness of the political
institutions left by colonialism and the lack of resources to establish and maintain them (Ake 1993, p244).

Keller suggests that the political and administrative institutions inherited at independence were ‘generally weak and fragile, incapable of ensuring citizen compliance to state policies’ (Keller 1986, p152). They have little in common with African experience prior to colonisation. Institutional practices such as parliamentary democracy developed over centuries in Europe are at variance with the local traditional African practices of decision making. The subtleties of constitutional legalities that enshrine the privileges of the well groomed elite were at best understood only by those who inherited the authority once exercised by the colonial administrators, but to the mass of Africans these were meaningless. The lack of viable institutional framework combined with the poverty of the political class that took over at independence meant that the running of post-independent Africa went to heirs ready and willing to settle for the shadow rather than the substance of true independence. Rodney suggests that, their rhetoric notwithstanding, and whatever their ideology, the narrow elite that run the majority of African countries, devoid of relevant local traditions or proven institutions to build on, drift along with the ship of state administration (Rodney 1982, pp. 225-226), guarded only by the character and leadership quality of the person at the helm at the particular point in time. Hence Ungar observes that:

“many states function on the basis of an ad hoc, easily manipulated and perilously fragile political structure. The stability of a nation’s daily life may depend largely or even entirely on the personality and skill of the individual leader. If they are ruthless and cruel like Amin (of Uganda), greedy like Mobutu (of Zaire) or utterly unable to plan ahead like Haile Selassie (of Ethiopia), their countries automatically, if not immediately,
face the consequences. If the leadership changes often as it has in Ghana and Burkina Faso, among other places, then national policy and priorities may shift so unpredictably as to rob a political system of any clear, recognisable character”.

Ungar 1985, p441.

The basis of a sustainable political fabric to emerge could not be established by the post-independence political leadership, as there was no identifiable national political culture. The crisis of chronic political instability is therefore inevitable as the new nation-states dabble into hitherto untried systems such as military administrations. While there are many and varied explanations for military coups in Africa (it is beyond the scope of this work to examine these, see Loyd 1973), the suppression of political opposition encourages the political elite that cannot access power through the electoral process to seek military intervention as a means to political leadership. Consequently many African countries:

“have established the coup as the most predictable mechanism for regime change. In the first twenty-five years of independence, more than seventy-five leaders in twenty-nine African nations have been overthrown. In addition it is estimated that as many as several hundred coup attempts failed during the same period”

Winchester 1986, p302.


The weakness of the political institutions must also be analysed in the context of the human resources required to run the political and administrative system. In most African countries the human resources to manage the state infrastructure are critically lacking. Western style democratic system of political practice demands a literate electorate which has a grasp over the basic economic and political principles and the
workings of the electoral system. This basic prerequisite was not met in most African states at independence. For example, how were the majority of the people expected to comprehend and implement sophisticated and exotic documents and institutions such as constitutional practices and complex legal systems, given the abysmally low levels of literacy. As Lamb has argued:

“throughout the five hundred years of European domination of Africa, dating back to the early Portuguese settlement of Angola and Mozambique, the whites governed as though colonialism would last forever. It was not until the final years of Africa’s subjugation that Europe took any serious steps to prepare the continent for nationhood. By then it was too late. The new countries inherited economies and government infrastructures and sophisticated jobs that were designed by European society to meet the needs of a European society. The untrained African could not cope. Twenty-five years ago they did not drive cars, let alone fly airplanes. They did not dream of becoming bank managers or corporate directors - positions that only whites filled - and the highest advancement an African could expect to make during the colonial era was to the level of senior civil servant, a job that would be closely supervised by a more senior white civil servant”.


Suddenly at independence Africans were expected to take over and effectively manage the complex economic, political and administrative bureaucracy without the human resources required for the task. The quality of the human resources in many African countries at independence was so pathetic that it was almost impossible to manage a single department, least of all to run an entire national political and administrative system. For example, when Zambia attained independence in 1964, a country with a population of nearly four million had only 24 African university graduates, while Zaire had only a dozen university graduates among its population of 25 million (Lamb 1982, p138). Tanzania had only 4,000 pupils in secondary schools and less than a hundred university graduates at independence in 1961 (Loyd 1973, p193), while in
the whole of what was British Nyasaland (now Malawi), there were less than ten African sixth formers (Worsely 1975, p149). In some countries such as Ethiopia, literacy rate was at a low 5 per cent, while in Djibouti at independence in 1977, there were:

"fewer than a hundred high school graduates. The population of 320,000 Afar and Issa tribesmen included three university graduates, no doctors. The president to be, Hassan Gouled Aptidon, had been hand picked by France. He was a sixty-one year old former nomad and a camel herder with a sixth grade education".


How could these countries run a complex bureaucracy requiring thousands of senior administrators with such a low level of literacy? No wonder that as late as 1994 a New Zealand diplomat commenting on Zambia's poor prospects at attracting foreign investment observed that:

"the country is almost unworkable. There is next to no management expertise in either the public or private sector. Nobody in their right mind would invest in Zambia in the present circumstances".


Where independence was not achieved through peaceful negotiation but after a protracted civil war such as in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia and Zimbabwe, the basic socioeconomic infrastructure was inevitably destroyed in the process. For example when the civil war erupted in Angola in 1975 most of the Portuguese settlers simply cut off and ran from Angola paralysing the country's administration. In the process of colonial disengagement the country was pillaged as the colonial administrators rampaged offices:

"taking just about everything movable, more than 20,000 trucks used for internal food distribution, consumer goods from stores, medicines, drugs, office equipment all were
shipped back to metropolitan Portugal at state expense. The departing settlers also burned government records, ripped out telephone wires in key public offices and generally pillaged the land”.


The plundering both during the colonial period and in the months preceding colonial withdrawal, combined with the lack of human resources to take over from the colonial administration, was a deliberate and conscious policy of colonialism. The aim was to plant seeds of failure and create conditions that would satisfy what most racists have come to believe, that Africans are incapable of running a sophisticated modern society.

5.2 The crisis of apartheid and Racial Discrimination in South Africa

The system of apartheid in South Africa was established through colonial conquest beginning with the Dutch East Indian company trading posts at the cape (now Cape Town) in 1652. While the history of South Africa precedes this period, this date marks the beginning of the history of racial domination and oppression later enshrined in apartheid laws. During the period of the establishment of colonial settlements the black Africans who inhabited the Cape Peninsula, the Khoikhoi and Sansan (whom the whites called 'Bushmen' and 'Hottentots') were annihilated in the wars of conquest and enslavement. From the first recorded battle of resistance by the Khoi in defence of their land in 1659, through to 1806 when the British annexed the Cape, and the Anglo-Boer wars of 1880-1881 and 1899-1902, the black African became increasingly marginalised as the white settlers, through superior military force, took over all productive land and reduced the native inhabitants to tenants, labourers and 'squatters'.

Chapter Five

101

Love M. Chile
After the British victory in the Anglo-Boer war the rare opportunity existed for the African to be brought back into the main stream of South Africa power arrangement. That the British chose to hand over the governance and administration of the colony exclusively to the local white minority by the Act of Union in 1910, marks the turning point for the black African, and the origin of the crisis of apartheid. When the British colonial administration withdrew the rights of non-whites to sit in the South African parliament in 1909 and enshrined in the treaty of Vereeniging the denial of the franchise to black Africans (Ungar 1985, p221), they effectively created apartheid. The ultimate marginalisation of the black African, sacrificed in the process of reconciliation between Britain and its white kith and kin in South Africa, came in 1948. With the election of the Afrikaner dominated National Party and the ascendancy of apartheid, racism and racial discrimination were institutionalised in South Africa.

In practice apartheid meant the subjugation of the black African, who constitute the majority population, for the benefit of the white minority. It removed the black African from the consciousness of both the government and the minority white population. The black African was:

"not a citizen of his land. He was its hostage. In Soweto and other townships adjoining white cities, he is not allowed to buy property. He cannot enter Johannesburg without a pass and cannot stay in the city after nightfall without permission. He has no vote or say in the all-white parliament. If he is over sixteen years of age, he must carry a pass book listing his tribe, his employer and his tax payment. If he wants to use a restroom in Johannesburg he has a choice of 161 public toilets. All the others are reserved for whites. His is the only country in the world where racism is institutionalised - the government operates one television channel for whites, another for blacks - and every aspect of life is dictated by South Africa’s 300-plus discriminatory laws. They determine
whom he can love, kiss, marry and have sex with, where he can live, eat, travel and go
to school, what he can do for his vocation and avocation”.


The fundamental basis of apartheid was that a person’s skin colour determined their identity and human worth. Government expenditure on social services and the wage structure were established on the basis of skin colour rather than skill level and need. Thus in 1980 the government spent USD 677 a year to educate each white child compared to USD 66 for a black child. White miners earned an average USD 16,650 a year and received a rent-free family home while his black counterpart’s average wage was USD 2,500 and they slept in crowded dormitories for single people and their family was not allowed to visit. A white construction worker received five times the wages of a black worker. The white population that constitutes less than 15 per cent of the total population lived, farmed and controlled 87 per cent of the land, while the majority black population was relegated to the scrublands and deserts of the bantustans (IDAF 1983, chapters 2-4).

Black African resistance to apartheid evolved from the political processes with the formation of the African National Congress (ANC) in 1912, through the peaceful protests of the 1940s and 1950s, and then to violent militant struggle when all forms of black African protests were declared illegal and banned (Davidson 1994, p167). As Mandela declared in 1964:

“We believe that as a result of government policy, violence by the African people had become inevitable, and that unless responsible leadership was given to canalise and control the feelings of our people, there would be outbreaks of terrorism which would produce an intensity of bitterness and hostility between various races of this country which is not produced even by war. Secondly we felt that without violence there would be no way open to the African people to succeed in their struggle against the principle of
white supremacy. All lawful modes of expressing opposition to this principle had been closed by legislation, we were placed in a position in which we had either to accept a permanent state of inferiority, or to defy the government. We chose to defy the law. We first broke the law in a way which avoided any recourse to violence; when this form was legislated against, and then the government resorted to a show of force to crush opposition to its policies, only then did we decide to answer violence with violence. But the violence which we chose to adopt was not terrorism. We who formed Umkhonto were all members of the African National Congress, and had behind us the ANC tradition of non-violence and negotiation as a means of solving political disputes. We believe that South Africa belongs to all the people who live in it, and not one group, be it black or white. We did not want an inter-racial war, we tried to avoid it to the last minute”.


The violence which the apartheid system unleashed on the black African was manifest most graphically in the Sharpville and Soweto massacres of 1960 and 1976 respectively. On March 21, 1960 the apartheid police killed 67 people and wounded another 200 during a non-violent campaign against pass laws. Another 2000 people were rounded up and detained. Again in 1976 in a massive show of brutal force against peaceful street demonstration by Soweto school children against the use of Afrikaans as the language of instruction in schools, the apartheid police shot and killed over 360 people, most of them children (IDAF 1983, chapter 10). Between 1974 and 1979, 946 people were killed by the apartheid police and a further 2558 wounded (IDAF 1983, p63). The violence of the apartheid system and the increasing human rights abuse through banishments, imprisonment, torture, hangings and assassination combined with the civil unrest in the country and the international pressure of the liberation organisations and the African countries brought the crisis of apartheid to a climax.
5.21 Apartheid crisis and the crisis of political instability in Southern Africa

The apartheid system in South Africa established and maintained institutions and laws which limited the rights and opportunities of the black South African. But it was not just the violence of the apartheid system against the Black Africans in South Africa that made the apartheid crisis an element of the political instability in Africa, but the overall regional implication and the activities of the apartheid regime in Southern Africa. The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) declared that apartheid in South Africa was Africa’s ‘Enemy Number One’ because it destabilised the political and economic systems of the neighbouring Front Line states and diverted development resources in those states to security and defence. Apartheid also represented the most visible form of imperialism on the continent as western interest, implicitly and explicitly identified with the white supremacist apartheid government in South Africa. While publicly professing abhorrence for apartheid, the west nevertheless effectively supported the status quo through business dealings, massive investment and protective diplomacy that staved off effective international action through trade boycotts and trade embargoes. The United Nations sanctions and embargo on the supply of arms to South Africa was not respected by western countries. They continued to invest and collaborate with the apartheid governments in South Africa thus helping its discriminatory racist policies that oppressed and suppressed the non-white Africans. This double standard of condemning the racist policies of apartheid in public but at the same time colluding with the system through business deals and arms trade was the most apparent contradiction of imperialist policy in Africa. Caught between the economic interests and moral responsibility the west found that:

“in pursuit of its regional economic and strategic interests, it is invariably supportive of South African apartheid state and the struggle of the people of Namibia and South Africa
for national independence and economic self reliance. Imperialism finds itself unable to reconcile its economic and strategic interests in Namibia and South Africa with the need to condemn apartheid which although morally indefensible, is nevertheless inextricably bound up with imperialist interests and the need for a strong South African state to support its global struggle against the Soviet Union and its socialist allies.


The destruction of apartheid threatened international capital and imperialist strategy in Southern Africa because the western countries, particularly Britain and the United States, calculated that fundamental changes that would bring about democracy and majority rule in South Africa were more likely to be the outcome of nationalist struggle supported by the Soviet Union. And since it could not convince the apartheid regime in South Africa to engage in a process of peaceful transition it cynically supported apartheid. Once again Africa became a battleground for east and west.

The collusion and cynical neglect by the western powers helped to transform South Africa into a major military force, which not only served to entrench the illegal system of apartheid but also fueled the armed conflict and prolonged the resolution of the fundamental problem of the crisis created by apartheid and racism in Southern Africa. It also created political and socioeconomic instability in the whole sub-region by South Africa’s consistent cross-border military incursions into the Front Line states, thus forcing those states to divert scarce development resources to security and defence spending. South Africa also armed and supported dissident and insurgent military activities in the Front Line states, particularly in Mozambique and Angola, making the resolution of internal conflicts in those countries quite difficult.

“As the All Africa Council of Churches explained, in South Africa itself and illegally occupied Namibia, official repression and intolerance have led to imprisonment, injury and death of many men, women and children. In Mozambique, South Africa has
sponsored the brutal bandits of Renamo, which according to a recent US State Department report, have been responsible for up to 100,000 murders as well as systematic forced portering, beatings, rape, looting, burning of villages, abduction and mutilations. And as Angolan Social Affairs Minister Rodeth Samos told the conference, South African support for Unita rebels, and its direct military intervention in the south of the country, have proved enormously destructive in terms of human life and economic resources”.


South Africa’s military forces conducted air raids and invaded and occupied parts of Angola as in ‘Operation Savannah’ in October 1975 designed to overthrow the MPLA government, ‘Operation Cobra’ of September 1977 against Angola’s oil fields in Cabinda and the invasion and occupation of the southern parts of Angola in ‘operation Protea’ in 1981 (Mandaza 1987, p109), and ‘Operation Askari’ in 1983-84. In Mozambique, apart from murderous cross-border invasions, the activities of the South Africa backed Mozambique National Resistance (RENA M O) disrupted agricultural activities as well as relief efforts, and created over 12,000 refugees in 1985 alone (Timberlake 1987, p187). South Africa’s armed forces intelligence also sabotaged the efforts of the Nkomati accord, a deal that required RENAMO to recognise the FRELIMO government in Maputo, create a government of national unity in March 1984 and thus effectively end the civil war. In 1986 Mozambican President Samora Machel and thirty other people were murdered by South African intelligence when the plane they were traveling in was led astray by a decoy radio beacon (Minter 1994, p47). The other Front Line states were not spared either, as South Africa’s military forces invaded Zambia, Tanzania, Zimbabwe and Swaziland on the pretext of ‘hunting down ANC guerrillas’. In fact Minter suggests that South Africa’s grand plan was to:

“create a Southern Africa region in which all the states accepted South Africa’s legitimacy and hegemony, and co-operated actively in policing opposition to the
apartheid regime. More specific maximalist objectives included installing Unita in Luanda and Renamo in Maputo”.

Minter 1994, p43.

Although these failed, the activities of apartheid South Africa created and enhanced the crisis of political instability in the region, giving the impression that those countries could not effectively run their affairs. The significance of this is better appreciated when it is recognised that the democratisation of South Africa has had a domino effect by creating a peaceful environment in the region and enhanced the resolution of the political crisis particularly in Angola and Mozambique.

It probably was more or less by historic inevitability that the most cataclysmic racial war in world history was averted in South Africa. The catastrophic consequences of the impending conflict between the two opposing streams of African nationalism, the one extreme and ultra-revolutionary stream centered around the slogan 'Africa for the Africans hurl the white man into the sea', and the other stream which supported negotiating the country's way through apartheid to inter-racial peace and progress (Mandela 1990, p19), were thus avoided. The role of New Zealand's official response to the impending cataclysm is examined in Chapters Seven and Eight. At this point it is sufficient to note that New Zealand's official response to the crisis of apartheid was an important component of the overall international response to the crisis of apartheid in South Africa. In the context of the theoretical framework of the functional utility it may be argued that New Zealand's response was motivation by its desire to extricate itself from international isolation imposed by its sporting relations with apartheid South Africa. The evidence for this is examined later in the thesis, but the next section analyses the causes of Africa's economic crises.
5.3 Africa’s Economic Crisis: The Nature and the Root Causes of the Crisis

The objective of European colonisation of Africa was essentially economic exploitation of the colonies for the benefit of Europe. They were looking for slaves, ivory, raw materials, bunkering ports, new markets for European goods, and in some cases (notably Portugal) a dumping ground for thousands (estimated at possibly over a million) of unwanted, often criminal citizens (Gavshon 1981). There were no pretensions of the desire for the advancement of Africa economically, politically or technologically, if that advancement was not profitable to Europe. Thus for all of Africa’s cultural, political, economic and natural diversity the common string that most identifies the continent is its underdevelopment and poverty. From the tiny island nations such as Sao Tome and Principe with populations of less than 500,000, to the large resource-rich countries such as Nigeria with population of nearly 100 million, Africa’s poverty does not reflect the varied geophysical characteristics nor the socioeconomic potentials of the continent. Although the 46 countries that make up what constitutes sub-Saharan Africa are amongst the poorest countries of the world, some of these countries are richly endowed with natural and human resources that should form the basis for strong national economies. Some of them such as Angola, Cameroon, Congo, Gabon and Nigeria have large mineral and agricultural resources, and only about 20 per cent of the entire population of sub-Saharan Africa live in poor semi-arid and difficult natural environment (Catholic Institute for International Relations 1985, pp. 4-6).

The nature of the crises in Africa is such that of the 36 countries identified by the United Nations as least developed (that is with a per capita gross national product of
USD 350 or less) in 1988, 29 of them were African, while 28 of the lowest 35 countries on the UNDP human development index (HDI) in 1996 are African (UNDP 1996). Eight of the ten countries with the lowest potential calorie consumption per head in the world are African. Not one African country is classified as ‘newly industrializing’, (except South Africa which is often classed as developed, but it is more a case of ‘first world’ white enclaves in the major urban areas and ‘third world’ Soweto-type settlements and the rural sector). For most African countries manufacturing contributes no more than 10 per cent of GNP while agriculture accounts for the livelihood of at least 75 per cent of the population (The Economist 1990). Because of the fragile nature of the economic base any disruptions to the system create a crisis situation which makes it almost impossible for the people to cope independently without external assistance. It is in the context of these statistics and the uniformity of the poverty, economic and development crisis in Africa that this thesis argues that the causes of the economic crises must be understood within the framework of the legacy of exploitative colonialism. The elements of the economic crisis are defined as poverty and underdevelopment, the famines and food shortages resulting from the crisis in the agricultural sector, and the debt burden.

The present socioeconomic crisis and the crisis of underdevelopment are rooted in the history of exploitation and external domination of over 500 years. Having imposed a ‘state structure’ on the erstwhile prosperous empires, colonialism set about dismantling Africa’s traditional economic structures by establishing the terms by which the newly created African states would participate in the international economy. The emphasis on export-based economy meant that Africa supplied industrial raw material to Europe and was in turn supplied with goods manufactured from the exported raw materials,
and in the process indigenous African manufacturing industry was effectively destroyed. The emphasis on producing cash crops for export also drew productive resources away from food production and created a system of mono-product economy in many countries. While food production fell, cash crop production grew, but at the same time the return on cash crops fell so that more was produced but less value was realised from it.

The introduction of cash crops by the colonial powers to feed the industrial revolution in Europe and the subsequent establishment of mono crop economies based on such commodities as cocoa in Ghana, peanuts in Senegal, tobacco in Malawi, coffee and tea in Kenya and tea and sisal in Tanzania, marked the tying of the umbilical cord between the economies of baby Africa and mother Europe that neither fed Africa nor reduced its dependence on Europe. The origins of Africa’s current economic malaise is, therefore, best understood in the context of the legacy of the integration of Africa into the world economic system. Rodney (1982) argues that the way in which Africa was thrust onto the global capitalist system, unprepared and essentially on western terms, did not enhance Africa’s economic or political development. The principle of exchange wherein Africa exported primary products and in turn received manufactured material from Europe was essentially inequitable. It created a system of colonial exploitation and an international economic system which ensured that Africa continued to be disadvantaged in its exchange with the rest of the world. It is within the context of the unequal exchange that Africa’s economic crisis must be analysed.

Colonialism also exploited Africa for slaves, cheap labour and raw materials. During this period minerals and cash crops constituted the only source of foreign exchange
and government revenue. As the economies of the colonies were systematically exploited, surpluses were transferred from Africa to the hegemonic centres of the metropolitan countries. No efforts were made to establish plants for processing the local raw materials for local industries. Even the traditional rural industries such as weaving, pottery and metal working were systematically undermined and destroyed by cheap mass produced imports from the metropolitan industries. This was colonial dependency. It sustained the underdevelopment of Africa on the one hand and the development of Europe and America on the other. Exploitation and dependency have been maintained in the post-colonial period. The deteriorating terms of trade for the primary products of Africa, the transfer of monopoly profits obtained from the exploitation of Africa’s natural resources and labour, and the excessive interest charged for international development finance have ensured the dependency of post-independence African states.
5.31 Drought, Famine and Food Shortages: The nature of the crisis

The cycle of drought and famines has become the hallmark of the development crisis in Africa in the period 1973-1995. Three major droughts have caused human catastrophe over most of sub-Saharan Africa affecting over 100 million people in 24 countries. This cycle began with the 1968-1974 drought, the most devastating in the 20th century, which inflicted death among both people and livestock. Over 200,000 people died and a further six million were trapped in malnutrition (Timberlake 1985). Over 3.5 million cattle also died in the six countries of the Sahel region - Mauritania, Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad. Other neighbouring countries were also seriously affected, including the countries of eastern and north-east Africa where in Ethiopia alone an estimated 100,000 people starved to death in 1974-75 (Gavshon 1981, p34).

No sooner had the first rains arrived in late 1978-79 than the next drought set in in 1982-1985, affecting the economy and food situation in 30 of Africa's 53 countries simultaneously (Harrison 1987, p17). Once again the countries most affected were those that were only recovering from the effects of the 1968-74 drought. For example just in Ethiopia, almost 8 million people were affected and more than 3 million people depended on emergency food supplies for their survival in 1983 alone (Africa Emergency December 1985, p1), and at least 1000 people died every day as a result of the drought (Africa Emergency June 1985, p3).

By mid 1985 at the peak of the crisis an estimated 30 million people were threatened by starvation, 10 million of them were forced to flee their homes in search of food
The environment and economies of the countries along the southern edge of the Sahara desert were damaged, some permanently. The map in figure 4.2 shows the areas most severely affected by drought in 1984-85. Some countries experienced their driest condition in living memory. For example in the Sudan, the lowest Nile floods in four centuries were recorded as the most productive lands of the Nile valley dried up, while in Niger the land was stripped bare by the harmattan winds blowing from the Sahara desert. For the first time in living memory the River Niger from which the country derives its name, flowing through the capital Niamey, dried up into pools of cracking mud walls (Harrison 1987). Over 3 million people, about half the country's total population were affected, and a third of the country's herds killed (Africa Emergency July 1985, p9).

In 1991 the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa estimated that 29 million people in 26 sub-Saharan African countries faced starvation from the third drought in 25 years. They included refugees and those affected by war, as well as the 27 million people directly affected by drought (Africa Recovery April 1992, p3).

5.32 Drought, Famine and Food Shortages: The Causes of the crisis

The onset of drought conditions, the meteorological condition characterised by severely deficient rainfall in large areas over an extended period of time, is the most commonly recognised cause of famine and food shortages. This is because the immediate effects of droughts are often widespread crop failure, shortage of pasture for livestock and dwindled sources of water supply for both people and livestock. The geographic location of Africa astride the equator with the Tropics of Cancer and Capricorn
Atlantic Ocean

Figure 5.2: Geographical extent of Africa's drought, famine and food crisis.

running almost mid-way through the middle of the upper and lower halves of the continent respectively, has created ideal geographic conditions for the cycle of droughts that have affected Africa in the past thirty years. It is not mere coincidence that the areas most affected by droughts are in the Sahel region which lies just to the south of the Tropic of Cancer and the Sahara desert; and in southern Africa in the region of Botswana, Zimbabwe and Namibia astride the Tropic of Capricorn. The El Nino effects which are associated with wind movement around the tropics have been correlated with droughts in Africa and in Australia (Rind et al 1989). Because the most recent famines and severe food shortages in Africa in the last thirty years are directly associated with droughts, climatic variations resulting in droughts have been advanced as one of the most immediate causes of the famine and food crisis in Africa.

While droughts and unfavourable weather conditions may contribute to famine, even in periods of normal rainfall and food production, many sub-Saharan African countries experience severe food shortages. In Ethiopia for example, an average of about 500 children died every day from malnutrition and related diseases between 1975 and 1985 (Catholic Institute for International Relations 1985, p21). Famines are therefore only the most visible dimension of a more widespread problem of food crisis. To understand the famine and food crisis in Africa we must understand the inter-play of a complex number of factors, what Psychas and Malaska refer to as the ‘problematique of famine in Africa’:

"the causes of famine can be arrayed in an imaginary spectrum, from those which are least accessible to human intervention, such as climate, across to those causes for which humans are most responsible, including government policies. Between these two poles are found all the economic, social and political problems, all of the constraints of agriculture and the ecological imbalances that make African societies vulnerable to famines when droughts strike".

Psychas and Malaska 1989, p81.
Their very comprehensive analysis of the famine crisis centres on two principal elements, the poverty and marginalisation of the rural areas, and the poor food production and distribution systems. They produce a series of descriptive explanatory models of the mechanisms which contribute to Africa’s vulnerability to famine, such as the debt burden, the legacy of colonial economic policies, rural-urban relations, ecological imbalances inherent in Africa’s environment and the lack of human resources in agricultural development and management.

While the food crisis may not be tied only to droughts and famines, the cycle of drought, famines and food shortages is directly related to the long term neglect of the rural sector in Africa. The greater proportion of Africa’s population reside and earn their living in the rural areas on agriculture. In the colonial and also the post-colonial period the rural sector has been increasingly marginalised and consequently those responsible for food production have lost their capacity to produce enough to feed themselves, least of all feed their respective countries. Malaska and Psychas identify six principal factors that have contributed to the marginalisation of the rural sector in Africa and, consequently, the small-scale food producer. These are:

“disincentives to food production. Farmers are reluctant to invest extra time and expense to produce food for more than their own needs. A familiar roster of pro-urban, pro-industrial economic policies places severe disincentives on food production. They include artificially low prices, distorted exchange rates that favour imports of food and discourage exports. Flight to urban areas. Human capital follows financial capital. Rural people gravitate towards the jobs and opportunities in urban areas. The women’s burden. 70 per cent of Africa’s food producing farmers are women. Their increased burdens of fetching wood and water for the household under conditions of scarcity jeopardise the food supply. Destruction of good farming and grazing land. Much of productive land is threatened by over-cultivation, over-grazing, poor irrigation and
erosion. Loss of access to good land and water. Food producers are often pushed aside to make the best acreage available for cash crop production. Inability to raise, store and sell food, even with good land.”


From this perspective therefore, Africa's famine and food crisis must be explained from the failure of the overall national and international development policies. The emphasis on cash crop production for export, for instance, means that the most productive land and incentives are diverted away from food crop production. Cash crop production for example receives better credit, advice, and government assistance than food producers. They also benefit more from research such as drought resistant, pest and disease resistant varieties. Cash crop producers who are mainly urban-based middle class have access to government administration structures and international finance. The focus of the early post-independence agricultural loan schemes and land reforms also work in their favour. Although Harrison argues that there is no ‘Africa-wide evidence’ that cash crop production is responsible for Africa’s food crisis (Harrison 1987, p21) there could be no doubt that it contributes significantly to the crisis. As the international commodity prices fall and the export value of cash crops decline, governments that depend on the commodity exports are increasingly pushed to place greater emphasis on improving both the quality and quantity of cash crop production. And as Timberlake argues:

“African governments feel the need to grow more cash crops in much the same way African peasants feel the need to have more children. If children are dying, more not less are needed. And if crop prices are falling, more not less cash crops are needed. Today nine African countries are dependent on just one crop for over 70 per cent of their income. Another seven rely on one cash crop for over 50 per cent of their income. Timberlake 1985, p70.
This is illustrated very vividly by the fact that although drought hit the Sahel region in 1983 affecting food production (particularly in Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Chad) which led to the import of nearly two million tones of cereal in 1984, these countries together produced a record 154 million tons of cotton in 1983-84 (Timberlake 1985, p19). It is rather curious that droughts affect food crops but cotton is resistant to the dry conditions! There is no doubt that this was the direct result of misplaced agricultural policies rather than the selective effects of weather conditions.

Agricultural policies in western countries have also affected the capacity of African countries to produce food, as Africa Emergency declares:

"yet another villain has been added to the causes of low food production in poor countries: food subsidies paid to farmers in Europe and North America. These large subsidies encourage farmers to over produce, significantly lowering food prices internationally. Low prices in turn deter poor countries from investing in food since they can buy it much cheaper from abroad"

Africa Emergency September-October 1985, p16.

The low prices of food on the international market make it difficult to boost food production especially in the face of steep competition from cash crops, and also when the market price for domestically produced food is adjusted downwards to compete with cheaper imported foods to which taste and demand are increasingly being shifted (Jaegar 1992, p1638). Furthermore, I argued in the earlier sections of this chapter that the crisis of political instability is partly the result of the weak political structure, particularly the lack of human resources to manage the complex bureaucracy in the post-independence nation-states. A similar case could be made for the management of Africa's agriculture, particularly considering the fact that agriculture is the main stay of the continent's economy. In the entire Francophone Africa made up of 17 countries
(excluding Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco), there were only four African graduates of agriculture between 1952 and 1963. In the case of Commonwealth East Africa there were only three African scientists working in the agricultural research stations in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda in 1964 (Eicher 1986, p157). Self sufficiency in agricultural production, especially food production, was not a priority for the colonial administration. However, it was in the area of land tenure and environmental policy that the legacy of colonial administration had the greatest impact on agricultural production.

5.33 Drought, Famine and Food Shortages: The Environmental Context

Underlying the crisis of drought, famine and food shortages is the environmental crisis, which threatens both food production and the habitat itself. It is estimated that over 3.7 million hectares of Africa's forests and woodlands disappear every year, and a total 742 million hectares of land have been rendered unproductive because of desertification (Harrison 1987, p141). Population growth and extensive agriculture and settlement threatens Africa as a habitat, as vegetation and soils thin out exposing the land to the elements, invariably accelerating soil erosion through increased human activity, wind and rain.

Traditional African forms of agriculture consist of shifting cultivation and rotational bush fallowing, where parcels of farmed land are rested for a generation (25-30 years) after three-to-five years of cultivation. This allows the land to regenerate naturally and to restore itself. Where population pressure reduces the fallow period, mixed-cropping is adopted as a form of erosion control and nutrient fixation. Mixed-
cropping, (also called inter-cropping) is a system where two or more crops are grown concurrently on the same patch. The crops usually have complementary requirements, such as climbers, e.g. beans and yams inter-cropped with shrubs such as cassava. Sometimes the crops have different maturity periods so that the soil is covered for longer periods thus reducing the risk of erosion. Mixed cropping also increases production per area thus reducing the need to use more land.

Colonial agricultural policies changed all these 'backward, feckless and irresponsible' practices, as one author described them, 'primitive and chaotic systems of cultivation' requiring an infusion of 'order and discipline' (Timberlake 1987, p130). The introduction of cash crop economies turned fallow lands, forests and seasonal pastures into plantations. Colonial laws also created protected lands, forests and pastures exclusive to the settlers, where Africans were not permitted except by prior arrangement with the new owners or as labourers. The village farmer and the nomadic pastoralists became disenfranchised and an outlaw on their land. The dispossession of the majority of the people of their land, together with the acquisition of large parcels of land for commercial cash crop farming, led to a drastic rise in the population density on available arable land, far beyond its carrying capacity. People, cattle and plants now compete to scratch for a living on expanses of eroded land and desert, so that when droughts come the traditional mechanisms for food security are no longer there to fall back on. The result is that crops, livestock and people die in their thousands as millions more starve.

The drive to expand cash crop production also requires that 'pests' and 'weed' be cleared. The most problematic of these 'pests' is the tsetse fly, the primary carrier of
cattle disease trypanomiasis and sleeping sickness in humans. Linear argues that the massive programme embarked on by the colonial authorities to eliminate tsetse fly from Africa compounded the problem of desertification and reduced the productivity of the land (Linear 1985, chapter 4). The obsession with 'pest control' of what to most Africans would be small irritants which are part of the natural order of things (Linear 1985, p205) has destroyed forests and water sources thereby increasing soil exposure to the elements of erosion and ultimately overall human suffering, clearly illustrating the fallacy of colonial agricultural policies.

5.34 Drought, Famine and Food Shortages: The Impact of War

The absence of a peaceful environment is also a primary factor in the famine and food crisis in many Africa countries. One clear illustration of this is the fact that of the six African countries classified as most affected by hunger by the United Nations in 1984-85, five of them were also torn apart by civil wars (Curtis 1988, pp. 26-67): Angola, Chad, Ethiopia, Mozambique and Sudan. At that time, although severely affected by famine, Somalia still enjoyed relative peace. The greatest indictment of imperialist conspiracy with corrupt African regimes to perpetrate the suffering of the masses of the people, is the fact that during the most critical period of the 1983-85 drought and famine crisis in most African countries, arms import into Africa was nearly twice as much as the import of food (Timberlake 1987, p187). Not only is this a gross misplacement of priorities, but it also shows that international financial reserves that should have been used to alleviate the suffering of the victims of disaster were diverted into enhancing the escalating armed conflicts. Not only does war prevent investment of productive capacity in food production, it also creates refugees who need to be fed
from ever dwindling food reserves. Similarly, the effects of the 1992-93 drought in Angola were exacerbated by the break-down of the peace environment and the resumption of war in the wake of UNITA’s rejection of the September 1992 election results. An estimated 100 people died every day from the famine, and programmes of agricultural rehabilitation in southern Angola were also suspended because of the war (UNHCR 1994, p7). The situation in Somalia also bears testimony to the direct relationship between the break down of civil society and famines, although the relationship between war and famine is much more complex than a simple cause-effect relationship. The political instability together with the droughts and famines lead to the complex problem of the refugee crisis which affects nearly every African country, creating serious socioeconomic and political consequences for both the recipients and the source countries of refugees.

5.4 Africa’s Debt Crisis: The Extent of the Crisis

Sub-Saharan Africa has the greatest debt burden among the regions of the world. At USD 210.7 billion in 1994, the ratio of debt to GDP is 82.8 per cent compared to 78 for South-East Asia and 63 for Latin America (World Bank 1995). Africa’s ratio of debt to export of goods and services was 254.5 in 1994, up from 93.6 in 1980, compared with less than 200 for South-East Asia and Latin America for the same period. On the World Bank’s list of severely indebted low income countries, 28 are African (Africa Recovery May 1996, p7). African nations are caught in an intractable debt trap wherein the cumulative compound growth of external debt servicing absorbs an increasing proportion of national incomes. This section examines how Africa fell into this trap and the extent of the crisis.
Africa’s debt crisis is an integral part of the overall economic decline which has come about as a result of a number of factors, both internal and external. The internal factors are usually associated with the failure of government policies, corruption and economic mismanagement, while the external factors are found in the legacy of the integration of Africa into the international economy on unequal terms, colonial exploitation and the structure of the global economy which sustains the unequal terms of exchange between Africa and the rest of the world. The internal factors are so entangled into the external factors that the best way to understand them is to treat them together. For example the failure of national government policies on agriculture is tied very much to the external factors of trade and international development assistance and the irresponsible lending practices of the western banks of the ‘petrodollars’ in the 1970s. The dependence of African countries on the export of primary products is linked to fluctuations of international commodity prices and how that relates to the deteriorating balance of trade. In the globalised market Africa’s economy depends upon the goodwill of international financial institutions to lend money, transnational corporations to invest and the commodity markets to fix the price of exports. Even the freedom of national governments to make economic policy decisions is constrained by ‘conditionalities’. It is therefore analytically impossible to separate the external factors from the endogenous factors.

5.41 Africa’s debt crisis: The real causes

The real causes of Africa’s debt crisis are found primarily in the structure of the international economy and the inequity of terms of exchange against Africa, set against the exploitative nature of the extractive colonial economy inherited at independence.
African countries inherited colonial economies which were over-dependent on one or two primary export commodities, such as tobacco for Malawi, cotton for Sudan, cocoa for Ghana, coffee for Tanzania and copper for Zambia. These commodities account, as in the case of Zambia, for as much as 90 per cent of the country’s external earnings. Diversification in the post-independence period has been painfully difficult. As commodity prices boomed in the early post-independence period up to the early 1970s, foreign exchange and government revenues for some of the countries soared. Then came the bust of the mid 1970s, which resulted in the most dramatic fall in commodity prices during the 1980s. The capital projects and consumption patterns established on the basis of the boom could not be maintained on the reduced national incomes and, therefore, large borrowings were encouraged by the international financial institutions to boost consumer expenditure (Taylor et al 1987).

In the larger commodity producing countries, the switch back fluctuation of commodity prices upset budgets and long term planning of the economies. Eighteen primary commodity exports from Africa surveyed by the UNCTAD in 1984 showed that the prices in constant dollars had fallen by an average 4 per cent a year in the period 1973 to 1982. Some commodity prices for example fluctuated an average 36 per cent above or below the trend. The decline in the net barter terms of trade for Africa’s primary producers was 14.5 per cent between 1970 and 1979. An even more precipitous fall of 18.7 per cent per annum was reported for copper and iron during the same period (Ravenhill 1986, p4). Between 1980 and 1988 the real price of tin fell by 57 per cent, crude oil by 53 per cent, sugar by 64 per cent, coffee by 32 per cent and cotton by 32 per cent (United Nations Department of Information 1990,
Zambia, which relies on copper for 90 per cent of its external earnings, was unable to adjust to the deteriorating terms of trade and borrowed extensively to become one of the most indebted countries in Africa (Africa Recovery 1988, p6). Meanwhile, the terms of trade continue to worsen. The purchasing power of their exports in relation to the cost of imports, especially manufactured goods, continues to plummet, while the cost of manufactured imports rises steeply:

“For example Ethiopia, Somalia, Benin and Sierra Leone all lost one-third of their purchasing power; Mauritania and Liberia over 40 per cent, Zaire and Zambia over 50 per cent. Between 1980 and 1982 alone, deterioration in the terms of trade cost sub-Saharan Africa 1.2 per cent of its total Gross Domestic product (GDP): for low-income countries the figure was 2.4 per cent, for the middle-income oil-importers, 3.0 per cent”.


The cost of imports that are required for national development has skyrocketed, for example the barter trade cost of buying a tractor jumped from only two tons of sugar in 1980 to seven tons in 1985 (UN Department of Information 1990, p14).

The open slather borrowing of the 1970s led to an exponential growth in the countries’ debt. Between 1976 and 1980 the total debt of the 27 poorest African countries soared from USD 17.8 billion to USD 43.6 billion. In the period between 1973 and 1983, Africa's debt increased by about 22 per cent per year, greatly exceeding the growth of output or export. By 1984 the total debt of the 27 poorest countries of Africa had climbed to over USD 80 billion. Meanwhile total African debt increased from about USD 14.8 billion in 1974 to about USD 183.4 billion in 1992, about 110 per cent of Africa’s total GNP, or equivalent to 350 per cent of total exports (Callaghy 1994, p32-33). The table below shows the growth in sub-Saharan Africa’s external debt from 1980-1994. The ratio of net present value debt-to-exports is above 200 per cent. In fact nine of sub-Saharan Africa’s most severely indebted low-to-
middle income countries have a ratio of 200-300 per cent, and another 19 above 300 per cent (Africa Recovery June 1995, p12).

Table 5.1: Sub-Saharan Africa’s external debt 1980-1994.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total debt in billion USD</th>
<th>Ratio of debt to GDP (%)</th>
<th>Ratio of debt to exports (%)</th>
<th>Ratio of debt service to exports (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>57.5</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>93.6</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>68.1</td>
<td>43.1</td>
<td>137.4</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>80.2</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>189.8</td>
<td>18.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>90.6</td>
<td>51.8</td>
<td>226.5</td>
<td>20.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>93.4</td>
<td>54.9</td>
<td>215.9</td>
<td>23.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>106.6</td>
<td>61.4</td>
<td>248.4</td>
<td>25.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>122.6</td>
<td>72.4</td>
<td>325.0</td>
<td>28.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>137.8</td>
<td>99.8</td>
<td>359.6</td>
<td>21.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>145.9</td>
<td>98.1</td>
<td>361.2</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>154.8</td>
<td>103.5</td>
<td>381.9</td>
<td>21.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>192.2</td>
<td>111.1</td>
<td>329.5</td>
<td>19.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>196.3</td>
<td>106.1</td>
<td>340.8</td>
<td>20.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>195.4</td>
<td>71.8</td>
<td>239.2</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>200.4</td>
<td>73.3</td>
<td>253.6</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>210.7</td>
<td>82.8</td>
<td>254.5</td>
<td>17.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The 'debt service' ratio measures the share of export earnings that is used to make the contractual debt payments of interest and payment of principal before foreign exchange can purchase imports. It is also the indicator of the state of health of a country’s balance of payment. Debt service ratio for Sub-Saharan Africa rose from 4.6 per cent in 1974 to 20.3 per cent in 1983 (Singer et al 1987, p 41). The cost of debt servicing eroded the already declining export earnings, taking an average 33 per cent of some countries’ GNP. Zambia described as ‘pathologically poor’, with one of the most miserable standards of living in the world almost completely dependent on international donors’ goodwill, accumulated an external debt of USD 7.3 billion, almost
350 per cent the country’s GDP in 1993. The former Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda commented that ‘if the Zambian people were to give each penny they earned to their nation’s financiers beginning January 1 1990, they would not eat again until May 1993 (Durning 1989, p35). As much as 52 per cent of Zambia’s external earnings in 1993 went to debt servicing. Most of Africa is in the same quagmire. By the late-1980s the situation had deteriorated to the point that:

“in 1988 interest payments on external debts of the low income countries of Sub-Saharan Africa (including Nigeria) totaled about USD 2.9 billion. This represented about 27 per cent of net disbursement of all official development assistance (ODA) to these countries in that year. The ratio of interest payments to pure grants was even more substantial, it was 47 per cent in Kenya, 52 per cent in Ghana, 50 per cent in Madagascar, 73 per cent in Togo and 57 per cent in Zaire.


In 1986 debt service ratio for all Africa averaged 28.35 per cent with some countries showing much higher rates. The ratio for Uganda for example, was 80 per cent. Psychas and Malaska report that in 1986-87, following the 1983-85 drought, while Africans were dying because of famine and food shortages:

“Africa paid roughly 15 billion dollars to service debt, while recovering 18 billion from development assistance and private lending. With losses from decreased commodity revenues running at 19 billion dollars per year, the continent was left 16 billion dollars short of funds per year - just to maintain the standards of 1985. To the poor and vulnerable groups just recovering from the drought and famines of 1984-85, this deadly arithmetic translated into greater poverty and vulnerability as continental living standards slipped even lower. On the world stage, this meant a brutal paradox: the neediest continent cast in the role of financier, transferring to the rest of the global economy more than it received. The amoral realities of the external environment were that even the International Monetary Fund, much to its embarrassment, was a net recipient of African finance”

Psychas and Malaska 1989, pp. 124-125. (Emphasis added)
The IMF could not have been really embarrassed because it has done nothing to remedy the situation. Debt repayment obligations continue to draw development resources away from poor African countries, and in fact net financial transfers between Africa and the international community continue to favour the latter, as Dorwood reports:

"Sub-Saharan African countries paid over USD 28 billion in debt servicing into the IMF and the World Bank during 1993-1994, over USD 9 billion more than they received in new loans from those institutions. During the same period, it paid over USD 149 billion in debt servicing, USD 15 billion more than it received in new loans from all sources. International development assistance (IDA) has increasingly been absorbed in debt servicing at a time when global aid to Sub-Saharan Africa has been shrinking".


Thus while the international community continues to focus on Latin America on the issue of debt, Africa sinks further and further into the abyss of the debt crisis.

As the poor African countries founder, the IMF promotes 'economic structural adjustment programmes' as shock therapy for the debtor countries. The sole aim of the ESAP is to eliminate 'inefficiencies in the debtors economy' so that growth and, of course, debt payments, could be kept up-to-date. The instruments of ESAP include currency devaluation, export promotion, import reduction, sale of state owned enterprises and government budget cuts, especially in the education, health and social services sectors. These measures hurt the poorest, the most vulnerable members of the community, the hardest. For example, privatisation and the severe down-sizing of the public sector creates massive unemployment and reduces real wages, particularly for the lower wage earners, while the elimination or sharp reduction in agricultural
subsidies and special services drastically affect food production and the quality of life. In Tanzania for example:

"the phasing out of fertilizer subsidies under the SAP, combined with devaluation of the Tanzanian shilling, has led to dramatic decline in the use of fertilizer and agricultural productivity. Costs of farm inputs have increased by between 275 and 716 per cent in the past two years. Combined with drought, it has led to a fall of 41 per cent in the production of maize, the staple crop. At the same time, wage employees have seen their real income collapse. Wages equivalent to USD 200 in 1986 are worth USD 10 today, in an African nation not riven by war or the collapse of civil society" 


The combined effect of falling commodity prices, high debt service ratio, structural adjustments and the net deficit in financial transactions between Africa and the global economy is the compounding of the debt burden and severe economic stress. There is no hope to resurrect the productive capacity of the economies under conditions of falling export prices and lower currency value, or expect the economy to recover in the face of continuing disinvestment. The international financial institutions have probably conveniently forgotten that the poorer a country is, the lower its ability to attract capital, and the less its ability to pay for it, and consequently the greater its need for it, especially to invest in the social services sectors. African countries thus continue to languish in the vicious trap of international debt with no hope of a breakthrough.

5.42 Africa’s debt crisis: The legitimacy of Africa’s Debt Burden

In 1986 the then President of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere posed the question: "must we starve our children to pay our debts?". This raises the question of the legitimacy of Africa’s debt, particularly given that the real causes of the crisis lie outside the control of ordinary African people. Taylor et al argue that many African countries were
enticed into borrowing by aggressive advertising bordering almost on unfair advertising, because the financial institutions were awash with deposits from oil producing countries in the wake of the oil boom of the mid-1970s (Taylor et al. 1987). These loans were initially dressed as official development assistance, as Hayter and Watson explain:

“In reality the distinction between what is called aid and what are merely commercial and banking transactions remain unclear. Export credits often include a ‘soft’ or aid component as an added inducement to the borrowing country to obtain supplies from that particular source”

Hayter and Watson 1985, p7.

The reporting of development assistance to Third World countries also included non-concessional flows which were made up of both official and private bank loans and export credits from donor countries. This was the basis of the bilateral debts for most African countries. Not many of them borrowed from the ‘Euro-markets’ which focused then on the ‘newly industrialising countries’ in Central and South America and the ‘Asian Tigers’. The World Bank and the IMF loans were particularly attractive to the poorer Africa countries because the Bank was mandated to administer the loans ‘with due regard to the effects of international investment on the business conditions in its members’ territories’ (Hayter and Watson 1985, p67). This meant that the adverse effects of external borrowing of the economic environment of the recipient countries were to be monitored by the Bank.

The other important point to note is that most of the loans, particularly from the World Bank, went to infrastructural ‘development’ projects, such as dams, model farms, power generation plants, roads, capital intensive agricultural and mining operations to supply foreign industrial establishments, and military hardware to suppress the
masses. The majority of these projects did not target the reduction of poverty or the basic needs of the masses of the people. Although some people may have argued that it was the national governments of those countries who chose and managed the projects, the question still is ‘were these governments really the representative authority to make decisions on behalf of the people’? Is it legitimate to expect children and the poor masses of Africa to pay with their lives the cost of experimental models undertaken by illegitimate dictators with the connivance of their fellow international conspirators who banked their 10 per cent kick backs in Swiss bank accounts? Must the children of Africa starve to pay the interest on the debts incurred by the tyrants who murder their parents?

It seems that the answer from the IMF and the World Bank is a resounding "YES", and as the UNICEF report on the state of the world's children shows, millions of children have paid with their lives the interest on their countries' debts, and many more are paying and will continue to pay with their lives and malnourished bodies, minds and spirits. Hence Africa Recovery reported in 1988 that:

"infant and child deaths in Africa are increasing yearly, and projected by UNICEF to total 50 million in the period 1985-2000. In every other world region, child mortality is rapidly declining, and in the world's next most impoverished region, South Asia, overall mortality rates will decline by 30 per cent by the end of the century"


As structural adjustment programmes sap the crippled countries and the debt crisis deepens, the international community has abandoned Africa to the IMF and the World Bank. It seems to have resigned Africa's fate to the international financial institutions 'if their salvage efforts work, fine otherwise the world economy will hardly notice' (Callaghy 1994, p32). The World Bank and the IMF on the other hand, driven by the
ideology of the free-market, have established themselves as the new ‘colonial masters’ dictating economic and social policy and creating heirs to guard over their investment with little regard to reducing poverty and hunger. Macroeconomic issues have once again taken precedence over poverty reduction and equity in development. Recovery and structural change have been relegated to the back seat. The irony is that the stability which the international capitalist institutions crave so much is being compromised as vigorous strains appear in the stability of the internal politics, seriously affecting the viability of the already fragile political structure.

5.5 The Refugee Crisis in Africa

Africa is the most severely affected continent in terms of international (cross-border) refugees as well as internally displaced people. In 1994 Africa had over 6 million refugees and a further 15 million internally displaced people (UNHCR 1994, p4). This is more than five times the number of refugees in Europe and three times that in Asia. When it is recognised that there were less than one million refugees in all of Africa in 1960 and only about three million in the drought and famine crisis of 1984-85 the significance of this figure becomes very apparent. This constitutes more than a twenty-fold growth in one generation! In Ethiopia alone an estimated 2.5 million people crossed the border into or out of the country between 1990 and 1994 (UNCHR 1994, p26), and over 1.7 Rwandans were refugees outside their country. “Globally, only Afghanistan surpassed Rwanda last year (1995) in the number of refugees and displaced people” (Africa Recovery May 1996, p18).
Table 5.2: Pattern of Refugee Crisis in Africa 1984-85 and 1993-94.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number in 1984/85</th>
<th>Number in 1993/94</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>284,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>55,000</td>
<td>389,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>108,000</td>
<td>211,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>1.5 million</td>
<td>not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>not available</td>
<td>795,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>120,000</td>
<td>234,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>185,000</td>
<td>2,257,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>not available</td>
<td>275,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>700,000</td>
<td>1,536,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>2.5 million</td>
<td>not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>1.8 million</td>
<td>690,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The causes of the refugee problem are essentially the socioeconomic and political factors discussed in the preceding sections, the effects of colonial boundary creations, the impacts of unplanned and ineffective processes during the period of colonial disengagement, the failure of democratic processes in the post-independence nation-states, droughts and famines. In 1985 for example, at the peak of the drought and famine crisis, there were over 10 million refugees all over Africa from the effects of both the drought and famines but also from the numerous civil wars and political crisis (see table 5.2).

The complexity of the refugee crisis is such that it is almost impossible to distinguish who is fleeing from droughts and famines from who is fleeing from the civil wars and political instability. In Ethiopia in 1984-85 the complexity of the causes made it virtually impossible to tell who was fleeing from the civil war, the separatist movements and the famine. This is equally true for Somalia’s over one million refugees
In 1992-1994, the picture was much clearer in the case of South African refugees who were predominantly political exiles who had fled from their country because the laws of apartheid made it impossible for them to lead a normal life. Most of the exiled refugees were hunted by the 'security police' because of their activities in connection with the liberation struggles or their relationship with the ANC or its military wing the Umkhonto we Sizwe. The creation of Bantustans also created both political and economic refugees, as well as internally displaced peoples as those who refused to move to the 'hometowns' effectively became displaced from their homes.

Another aspect of the complex nature of the refugee crisis is the fact that many of the major generating countries for refugees are also host countries with large refugee influx (see map in figure 5.3). This is particularly the case in the Horn of Africa (Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan), and also in the Great Lakes region (Burundi, Rwanda and Zaire). In the Horn of Africa for example, the complex mixture of civil wars, droughts and famines created a situation whereby between 1980 and 1990 there were an estimated 800,000 Ethiopian refugees in Somalia, 500,000 Ethiopian refugees in Sudan, and 115,000 Ethiopian refugees in Djibouti. At the same time Ethiopia received 385,00 refugees from Somalia, 300,000 from Sudan and 10,000 from Djibouti (UNHCR 1994, p27). The ethnic conflicts in Burundi and Rwanda has also generated large refugee flows in both directions between 1990 and 1996.

The refugee crisis is intrinsically linked to the socioeconomic and political crises both in their causes and effects. It has devastating effects both for the countries of origin as well as the receiving countries. For the sending countries the exodus of young able-bodied people away from the rural areas invariably takes away the human capital necessary for rural production, thus accentuating the decline in agricultural
production. The ‘urban refugees’, the more educated, usually professional people, who make up about 15 per cent of the refugee population (John 1986, p91) are a drain on the sending country’s human resources, a loss which most of these countries can ill afford. The effects on the receiving countries is just as devastating. Most African refugees settle in another Africa country (UNHCR 1994, p22). In 1994 for example Ethiopia hosted over 375,000 refugees from Somalia and Sudan while Sudan accommodated over 840,000. In the Sudan at the same time, the on-going civil war and famine generated nearly 400,000 refugees to Zaire, Ethiopia, Central Africa Republic and Kenya. The host countries are trying to assist large numbers of refugees while at the same time attempting to pursue their own economic recovery and development efforts with limited resources.

Refugees have contributed to the deteriorating conditions of social services in many host countries. The health costs associated with rehabilitating wounded, traumatised, malnourished refugees comprising mainly women, children and the elderly are very demanding. In some countries the share numbers alone change the demographic structure of the towns and cities. In Djibouti for example an estimated 57 percent of the country’s 42,000 refugees live in the capital city, while 14 percent of Port Sudan’s estimated 300,000 citizens are refugees (John 1986, p91). During times of economic downturn, rising unemployment and political instability when the host countries are struggling to provide for their own, the added pressure of hosting large numbers of refugees is very demanding on the host countries. In Zaire, for example:
Figure 5.3: Refugee movements in Sub-Saharan Africa 1984 to 1994
“ever since a massive flow of Rwandan refugees poured into Zaire in July 1994, eastern Zaire has experienced an economic, environmental, public health and political nightmare. Barely two years later, the continual refugee presence has severely aggravated long simmering ethnic tensions among Zairians. Local unemployment has jumped because Rwandan refugees, who receive free food rations, can afford to work for less. Prices of food, clothing and other basic goods rose sharply, making life difficult for local residents on fixed wages. Epidemics of cholera and other diseases brought by the refugees have claimed the lives of many Zairians. Towns and countryside have been stripped of trees steadily as refugees search for firewood”


There have been reports of elements from the Rwandan Hutu military units implicated in the 1994 genocide who have joined their ethnic kin in attacking local Hunde villagers in the Goma region of Zaire, thus escalating the ethnic tension in Zaire and exacerbating political tensions in the host country.

The UNCHR estimates that about 1,600 hectares of forest are cleared every year in Uganda alone to provide fuelwood for 30,000 Sudanese refugees, while in Malawi there is a 60 per cent increase in traffic brought about by increased demand for food and supplies to refugee camps (UNCHR 1994, p23). The effects are environmental deterioration through land degradation and the reduction of productive land, apart from the increased cost of road maintenance and the cost of transporting products to the market for the Malawi.
Of all the crises that Africa is grappling with, AIDS has become the most frightful and literally, the most deadly. It is estimated that by the year 2000, 25 million Africans would be infected by HIV, the virus that causes AIDS (Weeks 1992, p208). This represents five out of every eight global infections. The World Health Organisation (WHO) estimated that 14 million people in sub-Saharan Africa were infected by the aids virus in 1995 (World Vision 1995, p17), representing three in every five infections world-wide. Although AIDS is a medical condition the primary explanation

Figure 5.4: Trends in HIV Prevalence among adult populations, by region 1980-1995.
for its rapid spread in Africa, and also in South-East Asia, is poverty. The global pattern of trends in HIV infections shows that Africa is by far the most affected region. The graph in figure 5.4 shows more than 25 million HIV infected in Africa’s 480 million population in 1995. At the current rate of spread, the figure would exceed 30 million by the year 2000.

In most western countries AIDS is largely contracted through blood transfusions, shared needles between drug addicts and also unprotected sexual intercourse. It is more common amongst the male population than females. In North America, for example where there were an estimated one million aids cases in 1995, the ratio of male to female was 5:1. The ratio in both Eastern and Western Europe, East Asia and Australasia was also 5:1 while Latin America and North Africa and the Middle East had a ratio of 4:1. In Africa and South East Asia the ratio between the sexes was quite different, with South East Asia at 2:1 and Africa at 4:5 (see table 5.3).

These figures suggest a relationship between levels of economic well-being and the level of risk for the women population. Sub-Saharan Africa and South East Asia are the poorest regions of the world with similar socioeconomic conditions characterised by high levels of illiteracy, high unemployment and rising cost of living. The high unemployment rate in the urban areas, especially amongst the women forces them to turn to prostitution to earn a living. HIV infection rates amongst prostitutes is estimated at more than 70 per cent (Anderson 1994, p13). The poor living conditions for most of these prostitutes in the urban areas, characterised by inadequate shelter and over-crowding in squatter settlements and low income residential areas with poor sanitation, water and other urban services accentuate the risk of the spread of disease.
Table 5.3: Global pattern of adult HIV infections 1994.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Total adult infections</th>
<th>Male : Female ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australasia</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>5:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia and the Pacific</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>5:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe and Central Asia</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>5:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
<td>2 million</td>
<td>4:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Africa and the Middle East</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>4:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>1.02 million</td>
<td>5:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South and South-East Asia</td>
<td>2.5 million</td>
<td>2:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>10 million</td>
<td>8:10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Europe</td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td>5:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global total / Average</td>
<td>16.25 million</td>
<td>5:2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The situation becomes even more critical when it is recognised that the incidence of drug abuse is most critical in the poorest, over-crowded parts of the urban areas. It is in these areas that the sharing of needles amongst drug users combined with high levels of prostitution, creates the most at risk groups for the spread of HIV. Furthermore poor access to education and health services means that preventive measures such as safe sex campaigns and the use of condoms are either inaccessible because of high illiteracy levels or not available because of the low levels of investment in public health facilities. It was estimated that average health-care expenditure in Sub-Saharan Africa in 1992-93 was USD 2 per person per year (Weeks 1992, p210).

To contain the HIV-AIDS crisis there has to be a functioning health care and education system. These are part of the social services that have fallen into disrepair because of
the ESAP. Basic supplies such as essential drugs, contraceptives and condoms are not accessible to the masses of the population. A Nigerian doctor reports on the effects of ESAP on medical services in that country:

"Health services that used to be free to the general population have become inaccessible to the greater proportion of the people in the process of structural adjustment. User-pay ideology has gone to the point where patients have to bring their own or pay for cotton wool, bandages and even water to take the pills at public hospitals. The consequence is the return to traditional forms of healing with the result that diseases that were hitherto eradicated such as measles and TB have reappeared as dreadful killers".

In such dire circumstances the most marginalised groups in society, the rural and urban poor, women, refugees, migrants, street people and children are sacrificed. The spread of HIV-AIDS in Africa is therefore intrinsically linked with the overall crises in Africa, caused by political instability and civil wars, collapsing economies and the debt burden. As refugees and displaced people move across communities and countries, the lightest baggage, but the most deadly, that they carry with them is the HIV infection. This is spread around in the over-crowded refugee camps and the urban centres where the refugees integrate with the local population. WHO estimates that by the year 2000 there would be over 10 million aids orphans in Africa (Africa Recovery June 1991, p6). The picture is even grimmer when individual country figures are examined. For example in Zimbabwe alone there would be an estimated one million HIV infected people and 600,000 AIDS orphans. In Uganda there were already in 1995 an estimated 500,000 aids orphans (World Vision 1995, p17) the most seriously affected country on the continent. Although the actual extent of the crisis of the aids pandemic has not yet been researched and fully documented, it would not be an exaggeration to suggest that it constitutes the greatest threat to the continent's survival.
4.7 Conclusions

The objective of this chapter has been to examine the causes of the crises in Africa. It argues that structural constraints imposed by years of exploitative colonialism created not only political and socioeconomic crises, but also a system of dependency relationships that has trapped Africa into a cycle of crisis. Decolonisation did not necessarily bring about true independence, because the colonial powers neither surrendered their investments, nor transferred their expertise to the local people, nor loosened their tight control of the commanding heights of national economies. They preserved their ability to make and break governments, hurt or help incumbent rulers, manoeuvre and manipulate to protect their interests, and perpetuate their economic dominance by direct and indirect means. Where such interest was threatened there was massive disinvestment and capital flight from the colonies before independence, as in the case of the Portuguese territories and Algeria.

Furthermore, the way in which Africa was thrust onto the global capitalist system, unprepared and essentially on western terms, has not enabled African political or economic development. Capitalism could not succeed in Africa because the industrial skills required by the workers or the funds necessary for investment were not available to the newly independent states. On a continent which the most common binding feature is the lack of capital, the whole politico-economic ideology of capitalism is nothing but a farce. As Rodney most accurately observes:

"Capitalism as a system within the metropoles or epicentres had two dominant classes: firstly the capitalist or bourgeoisie who owned the factories and banks (the major means for producing and distributing wealth) and secondly the workers or the proletariat who worked in the factories of the said bourgeoisie. Colonialism did not create a capital
owning or factory-owning class among Africans or even inside Africa, nor did it create an urbanized proletariat of any significance (particularly outside South Africa). In other words, capitalism in the form of colonialism failed to perform in Africa the task which it had performed in Europe in changing social relations and liberating the forces of production”.
Rodney 1982, p216.

Released onto the global capitalist market uncouth, Africa has been preyed upon by international capital, contributing to the ‘development of underdevelopment’ of the entire continent. Although politically independent, Africa depends on international capital and rich capitalist states who exploit and maintain economic and political dominance over it. The failure of the capitalist economy to deliver to the people has inevitably led to internal tensions exhibited in ethnic conflicts, civil strife and the break down of civil society.

International attempts to help find solutions to the crises in Africa are also eurocentric. It is widely believed that Africa’s crises would be resolved within the context of the global economic relations, that Africa will trade itself out of economic problems once the world economic growth problems are resolved and a free-trade environment is created. However, global economic buoyancy alone cannot re-float African economies that are essentially mono-product based, and the price movement of those products is outside the control of the producers. The World Bank and the IMF and the rest of the international financial institutions have consequently imposed an ideology of the free market on debtor countries to transfer state enterprises to private ownership as a panacea for creating a capital-generating economy. What these institutions probably know but refuse to accept, is that while privatisation may work in the western industrial economies where there are established traditions, laws and
bureaucracy to enforce fair competition, such traditions, laws and bureaucracy do not necessarily exist in Africa. Furthermore, capital accumulation internally within the recipient countries to the extent which will enhance sustainable investment in the economies of the debtor countries is virtually impossible under conditions of sustained cumulative debt burden. International development assistance to plug the gap between income and expenditure is a drop in the bucket which is soaked up by debt repayment commitments, resulting in the poorest continent on earth being a net financier to the global economy. Meanwhile the structural adjustment programmes imposed to create necessary conditions for guaranteed debt repayments increasingly put the power of national decision making into the hands of the international finance institutions. The masses of the people that are already deeply disenfranchised have become marginalised even further as decisions regarding their health, whether or not their children could go to school, how much a litre of kerosene costs and the like are determined by the World Bank and the IMF through structural adjustment programmes. As health services collapse the most devastating crisis, the AIDS pandemic, threatens to wipe the remaining Africans that survive genocide, famines and debt off the face of the earth. What has the international community done in response to these crises? What have individual countries done to help resolve these problems?

African governments have often been chastised for mismanaging their economies by western governments and finance institutions whose own policies have contributed to the creation and sustenance of Africa’s failure. Many of the failed policies and projects being condemned by outside agencies were introduced on the advice of those very governments and organisations. For example, some of the current reforms such as the
liberalisation of Africa’s economic relations with the world economy through economic structural adjustments and free trade have not been adequately costed in terms of their socioeconomic, cultural and political costs in the future. The emphasis on liberalising Africa’s domestic markets and privatising economic functions and social services also raises serious questions. Neither privatisation nor state ownership may necessarily be the panacea, only a country-by-country approach is able to establish the relative strengths of the private and public sectors in each country’s economy. There are large differences between countries in areas such as the capacity of indigenous managerial class capable of taking over these functions. It is also doubtful if substantial foreign capital will flow in considering the high risk level of such investment, particularly when short-term commercial profits may be very low. Moreover, how relevant are market forces to the food shortages and malnutrition amongst Africa’s poor and marginalised groups, if investment to raise food production is beyond their means? Responding to food shortages and poverty and underdevelopment of the rural sector needs substantial international development assistance with little expectation of short-to-medium term financial returns. This is not the domain of profit a maximising private sector.

International donor governments and organisations have not shown sufficient willingness to respond more flexibly and appropriately with international development assistance. The tendency has been for international assistance to be tied more closely to the commercial and other foreign policy objectives of donors. Donor countries and organisations have the power and the means to respond to the crises in Africa. What has been lacking is the will for a more coordinated and effective response. An effective response to the crises in Africa demands sustained, coordinated international action
from both the bilateral donors and the NGOs. Such coordinated international response must be undertaken within the framework of the partnership model provided in Chapter Four and further developed in Chapter Ten. This means that it must give greater priority to responding to the crises over and above the selfish pursuit of the foreign policy objectives of individual donors. This is the task for the rest of the thesis, to examine New Zealand’s response to the crises in Africa in order to provide the basis for proposals for a more effective international response to the crises in Africa.
CHAPTER SIX:
NEW ZEALAND’S OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

“You cannot bring about prosperity by discouraging thrift, you cannot strengthen the weak by weakening the strong. You cannot help [people] permanently by doing for them what they could do for themselves”. Abraham Lincoln.

6.1 Introduction

The literature review in chapter three suggests that for most of the larger donor countries overseas development assistance is essentially a means for advancing their political, strategic and trade interests (Griffin 1991; McKinlay 1976; McKinlay and Little 1978, 1978A, 1979). This is in line with the theoretical stand of the instrumental utility school. Hoadley suggests that New Zealand, like other ‘small states’, differs from the general behaviour of the larger states. He argues that New Zealand’s Official Development Assistance (NZODA) is given essentially to meet the humanitarian needs of the recipients and not necessarily to promote New Zealand’s self-interests (Hoadley 1980, p117). If this is correct then NZODA would correspond with Gounder’s alternative proposition for Terra Australis, which suggests that official development assistance is given essentially on humanitarian grounds to meet the developmental needs of the recipient communities and political gains by the donor are incidental (Gounder 1994). This would suggest that it accords with the conventionalist theoretical strand.
In this chapter I critically analyse New Zealand’s official development assistance policy in the light of the two theoretical strands, namely ‘instrumental utility’ and the ‘conventionalist approach’. I attempt to identify the donor interests that New Zealand pursues through its official development assistance programmes to the developing countries. The chapter is divided into three main parts. The first part provides a brief historical review of New Zealand’s Official Development Assistance (NZODA). It traces NZODA to the burden of New Zealand’s colonial responsibilities in the South Pacific island nations. It also examines the principles guiding the allocation of New Zealand’s official development assistance. Part two analyses the volume and geographical pattern of NZODA between 1972 and 1995, while part three examines NZODA to Africa.

6.2 A brief historical overview of New Zealand’s Official Development Assistance programme

New Zealand’s official development assistance programme dates back to the beginning of the 20th century with the annexation of the Cook Islands and the islands of Niue in 1901. Following the outbreak of World War I in 1914, New Zealand occupied what was then German Samoa and controlled it until it became mandated territory to New Zealand in 1918. In 1925 the Tokelau island group was also annexed as part of New Zealand’s 19th century political leaders’ ambition to build a British Pacific Empire centered on New Zealand. Although the quest for empire failed, the burden of nurturing the small island states to independence set the stage for the beginning of a century of providing official development assistance to these nations. Between 1905 and 1950 the major part of New Zealand’s international development assistance
programme was in the form of administrative support and manpower development to the dependent territories. The objective was to prepare them for self rule. Western Samoa became independent in 1962, while the Cook Islands and Niue became self-governing in 1965 and 1974 respectively. They both maintain a charter of 'free association with New Zealand' which gives them the right to New Zealand citizenship. The programme of administrative support and infrastructure development in the Pacific Island states therefore constitutes the beginning of New Zealand's international development assistance.

NZODA to other developing countries prior to 1950 was ad hoc and responsive only to emergencies such as floods, famines and earthquakes. It also focused almost exclusively on the Pacific Island territories where New Zealand had direct colonial administrative responsibility. New Zealand also participated in multilateral institutions including the League of Nations and subsequently the United Nations. The multilateral component of the NZODA started when the various agencies of the United Nations were set up in the 1940s and 1950s. New Zealand's financial obligations to these agencies such as contributions to the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO), United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), World Health Organisation (WHO) and the International Refugee Organisation (later renamed the United Nations High Commission for Refugees UNCHR), constituted the beginning of multilateral ODA. At the regional level, New Zealand was co-founder of the South Pacific Commission in 1947, and also participated in the work of the UN Economic and Social Council, and the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East. However, a formal system of bilateral development assistance programme covering a larger geographical area was
instituted only with the establishment of the Colombo Plan in 1950. The Plan covered a programme of development assistance to the developing countries in South and South-East Asia.

6.21 The Colombo Plan 1950

The Colombo Plan was a programme of international co-operation designed to assist the socioeconomic development of South and South-East Asian countries. The original members of the plan were Australia, Britain, Canada, India, New Zealand, Pakistan and Sri Lanka (then Ceylon). They constituted at that time what was the core group that later became the British Commonwealth. Some non-commonwealth countries such as the United States, Germany, Thailand and Japan were also invited to participate. Altogether 22 countries were involved, 15 developing countries in Asia as the recipients, plus the seven donor countries: Australia, Britain, Canada, Germany, Japan, New Zealand and the United States.

The programme was made up principally of capital grants and skills development for the recipient countries. The capital grants were essentially loans or credit given for specific projects, with only very few conditions. In fact the only condition was that the funds be applied to the agreed projects in the recipient countries. Such projects were the identified priority areas for the socioeconomic development of the recipient countries. They included projects such as the development of drainage system in Burma (now Myanmar) and industrial developments such as the Zealpak cement industry in Pakistan, and land development in Malaysia. (For a detailed list of New Zealand supported projects under the plan between 1951 and 1966 see Thompson
The skills development assistance programme consisted of scholarships and training programmes for students from recipient countries for study in New Zealand. It also included sending New Zealand professional people to advise on technical aspects of projects, thereby transferring their expertise and experience to the local people who worked with them. In some cases expert trainers developed training programmes for teaching at local colleges and schools. Between 1951 and 1966 over 2000 students trained in various disciplines in New Zealand under the Colombo Plan (Thompson 1967, p36). By 1972/73 New Zealand had expended about NZD 50 million under the Colombo Plan, while the entire expenditure on NZODA between 1945 and 1972/73 amounted to about NZD 180 million (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1974A, pp. 6-8).

In 1971/72 the geographical area of the Colombo Plan was extended to bring in the South Pacific Island nations. The name of the programme was also changed to reflect its new focus. Between 1971 and 1973 it was called ‘Bilateral Aid-Asia and the Pacific’ (BAAP). The programme was further refined in 1973 and re-named New Zealand Official Development Assistance to Developing Countries (NZODA). At the same time the proportion of development assistance going to Asia was reduced. It dropped to about 44 per cent in 1973 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1974A, p39). The proportion going to the South Pacific states climbed quickly from about 34 per cent in 1971 to 53 per cent in 1974. Both the change in geographical focus and the regional pattern of disbursement was a reflection of the changing geo-political emphasis in New Zealand’s interests. These changes were set down in the 1973 policy framework in accordance with the election manifesto of the Kirk Labour government. The four main pillars of the new policy were to seek to attain the 0.7 per cent of GNP target by
1975/76, and at the same time to shift the balance between bilateral and multilateral assistance to 70:30 ratio. The geographical focus of NZODA was to be further concentrated in the South Pacific, while at the same time extending the programme to African and Latin American countries (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1974A, p12).

6.22 The Geo-political motivations of the Colombo Plan and BAAP

The Colombo Plan reflected the global political environment of the 1950s, the early period of the ideological battles between East and West. Combined with New Zealand’s colonial status in the South Pacific, this global bipolarity came into play in NZODA initiatives. Thus Hoadley has suggested that the origins of New Zealand’s official development assistance was “a mix of honourable discharge of colonial responsibilities under international supervision and enlightened self-interest” (Hoadley 1991, p198). The colonial responsibilities resulted from the failed colonial quest for a Pacific Empire, while the self-interest derived from New Zealand’s pursuit of security and defence, as well as political and ideological maneuvering in the South Pacific. In fact Hoadley argues that development assistance projects in the South Pacific Island states prior to the Colombo Plan were motivated more by donor interests than by purely altruistic considerations. It was a means for New Zealand to ward off rival claims by other colonial powers:

“Law and order had to be established to deter claims by rival colonial powers in the South Pacific such as France, Germany and the United States. Pursuit of order, security, and in the 1930s defence against Japan, motivated military construction and recruitment and training of local police, militia and specialized labour. The growing flow of people to and from the island dependencies for tourism, business and settlement dictated upgrading transportation and communication infrastructures and raising standards of
health and education out of mutual interest. Reformist and religious leaders supported
Island improvements for humanitarian and spiritual reasons”.


The role of political ideology was a particularly strong influence in the early
programmes of New Zealand international development assistance. The rationale for
its participation in the Colombo Plan, for example was justified in Parliament on
grounds of political interest, the need to combat the threats posed by the spread of
Communism in South-East Asia and the Pacific. The then Minister of Foreign Affairs,
FW Doidge, argued that in order ‘to checkmate Communist threat’ to New Zealand’s
interests in the region, it was not only pertinent to improve the standard of living of
the people in the region, but it was also necessary to increase the capacity of the
countries to ‘cope with pestilence and hunger which are prevalent throughout that
vast area’:

“So at Colombo those who were assembled there, representing the Commonwealth
countries, realised that the use of force was not the answer to these problems. What we
needed were constructive methods, and we realised that in order to checkmate
communism it would be necessary to lift the standard of living of the people, to fill the
empty rice bowls, and to cope with that pestilence and hunger which are prevalent
throughout that vast area. We decided at Colombo that the best way to achieve that
purpose would be to use the method of technical and economic assistance”.


This was in accord with the objectives of similar programmes by the western allies in
the post-war period. The ‘Point Four Programme’ under which the United States
poured large volumes of development assistance into Greece and Turkey to counter the
spread of communism in southern Europe is discussed in Chapter Three. The political
and ideological interests of the ex-colonial powers of the Commonwealth in the Asia-
Pacific region, namely the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand were clearly important considerations in the establishment of the Colombo plan. The invitation of the US and Germany to participate further demonstrates the desire of the allies to act together to counter the threat of ‘Soviet expansionism’. Moreover, the US and Britain had already poured hundreds of millions of pounds into South-East Asia to fight communism. Britain alone had spent about six hundred million pounds in the five years following the end of World War II, over fifty million pounds going into Burma alone to fight communism. Thus in the context of the theoretical literature on the motivation for giving international development assistance, both the Colombo Plan and BAAP correspond to the functional utility approach.

The change of government in 1972 brought about a major shift in New Zealand’s foreign policy orientation, which was also reflected in international development assistance. The 1973 NZODA policy articulated altruistic motivation for giving international assistance. The government saw international development assistance as:

"a moral and humanitarian obligation to seek to reduce poverty, disease and insecurity throughout the underdeveloped world and in particular to attempt to promote the social and economic betterment of near neighbours in the Pacific and South-East Asia".


Despite the altruistic and moral principles of policy, geo-political and ideological motivations which had permeated the NZODA policy in the previous two decades were still apparent. Concern about Soviet diplomatic and commercial inroads into the Asia-Pacific region was a constant worry to successive New Zealand governments. There were continual references to security and political threats from communist interests by Ministers seeking to justify increases in international assistance to the Asia-Pacific region. In 1974, for example, Prime Minister Bill Rowling advised Australia and the
United States that development assistance to the Pacific Island nations was both a moral and political obligation if Soviet threat in the region was to be contained (Alley 1984, p144). In the 1976 budget the same theme was pushed by Prime Minister, Robert Muldoon, who argued that New Zealand could not afford to reduce its international development assistance obligation to the Pacific Island states and risk the creation of 'satellites of communist superpowers' in the region (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1976, pp. 7-8). There was the constant worry that if the international assistance was not forthcoming from New Zealand, this would compel the Pacific Island nations to ‘seek new and possibly dangerous sources of help’ in other parts of the world, a direct reference to the Soviet Union and China. The government argued that:

“that is why successive New Zealand governments have encouraged political development in the South Pacific countries so that people would not feel that their only course was to abandon those links of continuing value and seek doubtful companions elsewhere in the world”.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1976, p36.

This obsession with Soviet threat actually masked the real threat to peace and security in the region which was much closer to home. There was greater risk of regional conflict arising from the French nuclear weapons testing programme in the Pacific than Soviet or Chinese commercial interest in the region posed. However it was not politically convenient to antagonise the French at that time. There was not much political capital to be made by taking on the French ally during the period of ideological cold war, especially given the leanings of the New Zealand government in the mid-1970s-to-early-1980s. The sinking of the Rainbow Warrior, the Greenpeace ship, in Auckland harbour in 1985 was a testimony to where the real threat to New Zealand and security in the South Pacific lay.
The policy framework for NZODA evolved steadily from the Colombo plan, through the BAAP in 1971/72. The most important change came in 1973 when the Kirk government put a moral stamp on the overall policy objective, and also pushed the programme to new heights both in the actual amount of money disbursed as well as in the geographical spread. In the same year New Zealand was admitted to the membership of the DAC. For the first time disbursements were in excess of NZD 20 million, and clear guidelines and targets for ODA were set. The 1973 criteria were replaced by a set of principles and guidelines in 1981. These principles and guidelines set out the regional priorities and also explained the premise for support of in-country NZODA programmes. The regional focus on the South Pacific Island states and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries was once again emphasised. The criteria for supporting country programmes focused on projects which could be completed in short time periods, had popular participation and targeted vulnerable groups such as women and rural dwellers (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1981, p1). The changes embodied in the 1981 principles and guidelines reflected the new trends in development thinking. Development assistance moved away from the idea of charitable handout to a form of a ‘hand-up’ approach where the donor assisted the recipient country in the task of nation building. The notion of the donor determining the areas for development assistance was replaced with the recipients identifying their priorities and the donor responding to those priorities. The emerging areas of gender equity and the balance between rural and urban areas also received attention.
The next phase in the evolution of NZODA policy came in 1992. This is an attempt to respond to the changing conceptualisation of development in the late 1980s and early 1990s. It provides a comprehensive policy for NZODA which places people at the centre of all development activity:

"Development is about people. Human development is a process of enlarging people's choices. It encourages and enables people to take part actively in decisions influencing their lives, and to maximise opportunities to realise their own potential and the potential of their society."


The centrality of people in the development process is evident in all the nine principles, but is most clearly stated in Principle Two which emphasises the role of NZODA in promoting human dignity through ‘social progress and justice’. By placing people at the centre of the development process, the policy framework in what it refers to as ‘cross-cutting issues’ in the development process, considers all aspects of human development. The policy addresses in a comprehensive way the issues of gender and development, cultural development, environmental management and sustainable development and the empowerment of marginalised groups. This is the culmination of the incremental policy developments between 1981 and 1992. These continue to be refined in line with new changes in development theory.

The most significant aspect of the 1992 policy, in terms of understanding the motivation for New Zealand giving assistance to developing countries, is that the policy clearly outlines the benefits New Zealand expects from the ODA process. While still maintaining that the principal objective of NZODA is to ‘help promote sustainable economic and social progress in the recipient countries’, the benefits that New Zealand expects to derive from the process are not glossed over. Thus Principle One suggests
that an effective ODA programme is one that meets the ‘long term political and economic needs of all partners involved, including New Zealand’, while Principle Five recommends that whereas NZODA is not tied, ‘New Zealand goods and services should be used wherever practicable’. The donor interests are framed in universalistic terms thus:

"The programme helps to strengthen the links between New Zealand and the peoples of developing nations, and serves to foster a mutually beneficial relationship. It also contributes to the achievement of New Zealand’s own external relations and trade policies by helping to advance international economic prosperity, maintain peace, security and stability, and protect the global environment. The programme is an investment in the regional and global future we share with other nations”.


The policy recognises and accepts that NZODA is effectively an instrument of foreign and trade policy, and is not given purely on altruistic grounds. These are expressed in terms of the perceived returns in diplomatic, political, trade and commercial as well as security and strategic outcomes. With regard to diplomacy, development assistance is expected to engender goodwill towards New Zealand among recipient countries and provide a capacity to influence recipient governments. This enables New Zealand to build a constituency in the recipient country which is sympathetic to and supportive of New Zealand both within the recipient country and at the international level. Politically, NZODA is also expected to create a favourable image for New Zealand as well as engendering a better understanding and perception of New Zealand’s policies and stand on international issues. It is argued that this would provide the right atmosphere for New Zealand’s voice to be heard and listened to at international forums. New Zealand’s trade and commercial interests are also expected to be fostered through New Zealand firms gaining contracts for the supply of materials, goods and
services where New Zealand’s development assistance is directed, thus creating a niche for New Zealand companies and firms in the international market and opening opportunities for New Zealand exporters and consultants.

An evaluation of New Zealand’s performance in achieving these objectives shows that it has done very well. The Appraisal, Evaluation and Analytical Support Unit of the Development Cooperation Unit of the Ministry of Foreign Affair and Trade reports that:

“Over 1993 and 1994, NZD 249 million of contributions to the bilateral ODA programme generated business in New Zealand worth NZD 127 million. For every NZD 100 contributed to international agencies, more than NZD 200 was spent on New Zealand goods and services by those agencies. For every NZD 100 spent on the total NZODA programme (bilateral and multilateral) at least NZD 77 worth of direct business is generated for New Zealand organisations”.


The business generated includes orders for products and services used overseas by the development agencies. These may be equipment bought in New Zealand or through New Zealand firms, New Zealand professional people employed to provide the services required overseas, or consultancy contracts for New Zealand firms and professional people both to undertake tasks resulting directly from the assistance programme or through contacts established with former students and colleagues.

Study scholarships in New Zealand provide perhaps one of the greatest returns on ‘NZODA investment’. In 1992/93 for example, NZODA expenditure on training and study awards in New Zealand for Africa, Asia and Latin America alone was about NZD 12 million (Clark 1993, p11). When awards to the Pacific and other areas are taken into account, the expenditure on training and study awards per year amounts to over
NZD 25 million. The greater part of this is transferred to training institutions in New Zealand to pay for tuition, accommodation and study related fees. Business is generated for the airlines that provide transport between the recipient countries and New Zealand. The good news of the reputable New Zealand education system brings in foreign fee-paying students. On their return home after study these students rise rapidly in their jobs to reach decision making positions. Their training period in New Zealand provides long term contacts for New Zealand in the business, political and bureaucracy of the recipient countries. This affords New Zealand access to the political and community and business leadership in these countries. In this way NZODA is capable of providing political and strategic influence for the government as well as creating business opportunities for the private sector and the universities.

The preceding discussion has demonstrated that NZODA policy has been firmly grounded in the instrumental utility theoretical framework. During the period of colonisation prior to 1945, development assistance was given to ward off rival colonial powers in the Pacific. Perceived communist threats to peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region dominated NZODA motivation after World War II and up to the mid-1970s. In the last twenty years trade and commercial interests have become the dominant motivation. NZODA is given not only out of a sense of compassion, but to advance New Zealand’s interests, to build a ‘stable, peaceful and consumer world’ for New Zealand products and firms. NZODA aids this process by helping economic growth in the developing countries, thereby enhancing the expansion of world trade on which New Zealand as a trading country so overwhelmingly depends. The next section examines the volume and geographic pattern of NZODA.
New Zealand's official development assistance has changed significantly both in volume and geographical pattern in the period 1973-to-1995. From about 21 million dollars in the 1972/73 financial year, NZODA has grown to NZD 254.79 million dollars in 1994/95. Figure 6.1 shows the volume of NZODA for the study period. Three measures are used in the graph to demonstrate the real value as well as the actual volume of NZODA during the period. These are the nominal amounts of ODA, the total ODA deflated by the consumer price index (CPI), and ODA expressed as percentage of GNP.

In terms of relating international development assistance to GNP, NZODA peaked at 0.55 per cent in 1975/76. This compares very favourably with other OECD countries, and is only a few points below the UN 0.7 per cent target. There has been a gradual decline since then, reaching the lowest level of 0.20 in 1993/94. This decline has been explained in terms of both the performance of the domestic economy and the mounting budget deficits. Because New Zealand's domestic economy is closely linked to external markets and down turns in global economy, the world economic recession which was triggered by the oil crisis of 1973 and continued through the commodity prices crash in the mid 1980s had serious impact on New Zealand's economy. The country's GNP declined and the current account deficit rose sharply. Between 1981 and 1982 for example, the current account deficit rose from USD 830 million to USD 1,387 million. At the same time external borrowing by government reached a record high USD 1,290 million. Internal deficit was equivalent to 7 per cent of GDP, and inflation was at its highest at 15.3 per cent in 1986/87, significantly higher than most
OECD countries. The pressure was on the government to reduce spending. Overseas development assistance became one of the casualties. Russell Marshall, Minister of Foreign Affairs 1987-1990, explains the dilemma that the 1984-1990 Labour government faced in dealing with the deficit and its moral responsibility to international development assistance:

You are against the fact that when we were in government there was a belated recognition that we were living beyond our means. That we had to curtail government expenditure considerably. And so sadly, very sadly against all of my own principles, there was an occasion once when the Minister of Finance was told by Treasury that they were out by something like two billion dollars for that particular year, an extraordinary amount. And we were faced in the cabinet room with this sudden crisis. And we put through all these votes including mine. Which meant that we put through overseas aid as well. So the vote was actually cut a little bit in my time against all the
things I believed in. So the vote that was already very low when we came in, had a brief rise in about 1985 but had a dip later on. So we were not in a position to say here is some new money.


The decline has been inevitable despite government commitment in principle to adhere to the 0.7 per cent ODA/GNP target endorsed in 1973. It has been even further away from Prime Minister Kirk’s ambition to raise it to one full per cent by the end of the 1970s. At 0.26 in 1992/93, it is well below the OECD average of 0.33, as shown in table 6.1. By 1994/95 this had fallen further to 0.20 per cent, well behind the majority of the other OECD countries. A review of New Zealand’s development assistance performance by the DAC for the 1983/84 noted with concern its continuing decline of the ODA-to-GNP ratio in the post-1975/76 peak. While recognising the economic difficulties New Zealand faced, it noted that international assistance has accounted for only 0.75 per cent of government budget, less than half of the average for other DAC members (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1985). Countries with populations and economy comparable to that of New Zealand performed consistently better. Denmark, Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden for example, all exceeded 0.7 per cent. It has not been only the ODA-to-GNP ratio that has declined. Although the nominal amount increased steadily during the study period, when this is deflated against the consumer price index, a dramatic decline from the 1975/1976 peak is clearly evident. The real value of NZODA has therefore, relatively stabilised since 1978, at the 1972/73 level as shown in the graph in figure 6.1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Million USD</td>
<td>as % of GNP</td>
<td>Million USD</td>
<td>as % of GNP</td>
<td>Million USD</td>
<td>as % of GNP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>804</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>627</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>974</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>556</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>475</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>687</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>865</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1417</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>1885</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>2515</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>859</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>1392</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>435</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>644</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>2995</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>5250</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>8270</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>3037</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>4391</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>7572</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>926</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>2615</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>4122</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>3701</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>7342</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>11151</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1312</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2094</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>2753</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>561</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>890</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>1273</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>1518</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>827</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>1375</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>2460</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>547</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>1139</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>1613</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>1871</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>3217</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>8331</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>9115</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>11709</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total DAC</td>
<td>27310</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>40589</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>60420</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Love 1993, Tables V-1 p82; V-2 p84; 5 p160.
6.5 Geographical pattern of New Zealand International Development Assistance

The geographic spread of the New Zealand’s development assistance reflects the political, strategic and trade interests of New Zealand. While the stated objective is that NZODA is designed to work in the “long-term political and economic interest of all the partner countries involved, including New Zealand” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 1995A, p4), there is no pretence that it is completely altruistic. New Zealand:

“make(s) no pretence that the two (development assistance and foreign policy interests) can be divorced. They simply cannot be divorced. There is a clear link between aid and foreign policy”.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1975A, p36.

Thus the principal recipients of NZODA are the small island countries of the South Pacific and ASEAN countries. These two groups together receive over 90 per cent of NZODA (see figure 6.2). The South West Pacific Island nations alone receive an average 70 per cent of NZODA. The Pacific Island nations also receive the highest per capita allocation of NZODA. The reasons for this are geographical, historical, strategic and humanitarian.

Geographically, New Zealand is located in the South Pacific, and therefore logically its responsibility lies within its home region, as Don McKinnon, the Minister of Foreign Affairs argues:

They are never going to move away geographically from where they are and we are not going to move geographically. They are going to be with us for the next thousand years. So to me it is highly appropriate we have a good relationship with them. And it will be inappropriate for us to watch them go through a series of difficulties without doing anything at all.

Don McKinnon, in an interview with the author, June 1995.
Proximity with the Pacific Island nations also means that, as a comparatively small donor, the concentration of New Zealand’s assistance to a small number of recipients increases its efficiency and effectiveness. The cost of establishing infrastructure in far away countries is reduced.

The geographical proximity also ties in with security and strategic considerations. These have been discussed in the earlier sections of this chapter. The fact that political instability in the region has direct consequences for New Zealand has been compelling reason for the concentration of international assistance to the South Pacific region. This is further reinforced by colonial history and cultural ties. Colonial responsibilities in the Cook Islands, Niue, Tokelau and Western Samoa has meant that these countries receive the highest amount of NZODA. Thus the Cook Islands has consistently received the highest allocation for any single country since 1973, except in 1975 when extended trade credit to Indonesia pushed that country to the top. Since 1989/90 the top six recipients of NZODA have been South Pacific nations (Cook Islands, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Tokelau, Tonga, and Western Samoa). New Zealand’s colonial administrative and legislative responsibility for all of these nations, except Papua New Guinea, has provided a constitutional responsibility for New Zealand, which invariably translates into international development assistance. As Sir Guy Powles, former New Zealand high commissioner to Western Samoa explains:

"we were responsible for the creation of economically nonviable states, so we have a long-run responsibility to support their economically nonviable independence”.

Alley 1984, p139.

Culturally, New Zealand particularly through the Maori heritage, is closely linked with the Pacific Island nations. There is therefore, the feeling that there is a certain
inevitability about the concentration of NZODA in the South Pacific because they are ‘our closest neighbours and also our relatives’ (Nottingham 1987, p6).

The humanitarian needs argument for the concentration of NZODA to the South Pacific is less convincing. The Pacific Island nations receive a higher per capita assistance than any other region in the world. In 1988 the total international assistance to the South West Pacific region amounted to over NZD 1.2 billion per year (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1987, p5). This excludes contributions through voluntary agencies, the NGOs and military assistance (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1987, p63). So on purely humanitarian considerations, the South Pacific Island nations do not command first priority on NZODA. However, as Don McKinnon explains New Zealand has a:

vested interest in assisting the people in the South Pacific towards a standard of living that New Zealand expects. After all many people in the Pacific Islands would like to come and live in New Zealand anyway. And it is important that if they come to New Zealand they come with a reasonable level of education and skills, a reasonable level of health standards.

Don McKinnon, in an interview with the author, June 1995.

The concentration of NZODA in the South Pacific Island nations is therefore, more because of the pursuit of foreign policy interests rather than for purely humanitarian reasons. Despite the high concentration of NZODA in the South Pacific, the overall geographical pattern is becoming more diversified. While the concentration on the South Pacific nations continues, relations with other countries has also become important. One of these changes is the re-evaluation of ODA policy towards Asia, and particularly to the ASEAN nations.
Henderson et al suggest that the concentration of NZODA on the small island countries of the South Pacific is parochial and confirms New Zealand's status as a small state. One of the characteristics of small states is that their international relations are determined primarily by economic issues and regional organisation arrangements (Henderson et al 1987). New Zealand's international assistance must reflect its desire to be an important player in international affairs. The Third Labour government (1972-1975) recognised this in its attempt to extend New Zealand's foreign relations from a purely trade and regional orientation to internationalism and global responsibility. The diversification of NZODA to Africa, China and South America must be seen in the perspective of moving away from the small state status to a wider recognition of New Zealand's potential for an enhanced contribution to World affairs.
The Lange Labour government pushed this process further, particularly in Africa and South Asia, both by the use of NZODA and other political means. (See Henderson et al 1984 and Kennaway and Henderson 1991, for detailed discussion of foreign policy under Lange; and Hoadley 1991 for arguments for the geographical shifts in NZODA). The greater geographical diversification of NZODA under the Lange Labour government saw the bilateral ODA allocation to the South Pacific region decline gradually from about 83 per cent in 1982/83, to about 57.4 per cent in 1989/90 as the geographical area of NZODA widened (see figure 6.2).

The geographical shift in NZODA to Asia is significant in a number of ways. Under the Colombo Plan 1950, Asia was the focus of New Zealand's international assistance. This declined significantly from the 1970s as most of the countries graduated from the international assistance programme because of their levels of economic development. Furthermore, New Zealand's foreign policy focus shifted from Asia towards the South Pacific. Since 1990 there has been a renewed emphasis on NZODA to Asian countries. This time, however, what New Zealand stands to benefit from the relationship is more clearly defined in terms of trade and commerce, rather than the confused objectives of strategic interests and altruism of the Colombo Plan and BAAP. The rapid economic growth of the ASEAN countries, and the perception of the new trading partnership between New Zealand and these countries has led to a revitalisation of the international assistance relationship with these countries. It is clear that on the basis of development needs of the recipient alone, the ASEAN countries, namely: Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, are not necessarily most in need of New Zealand's development assistance. It is therefore accurate for
the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Don McKinnon, to describe NZODA to these countries as 'very much a win-win investment' for New Zealand, because:

"at a time when the overseas aid budget is growing, it is encouraging to note that it is also an investment in New Zealand's expertise, technology and institutions. New Zealanders are able to develop linkages with the regional and global economy from which will come mutually beneficial commercial returns".


Commercial and trading interests are therefore a primary consideration in the re-focusing of NZODA to the ASEAN countries.

The increasing number of refugees from other Asian countries in New Zealand, especially from Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam in the late 1970s and early 1980s is also an important consideration in the expansion of NZODA to these countries. Influential groups and associations, such as the New Zealand-Cambodia Trust, have emerged amongst the resident communities in New Zealand that successfully lobby governments to extend international assistance in their home countries. Also quite significantly, some of these countries, such as Vietnam and Korea, constitute part of the evolving industrialised nations of regional Asia outside the 'Asian Tigers'. The linkages provided by the generation of refugees from these countries who have become part of the New Zealand society, is seen as providing opportunities for extending the potential market and trading partnership for New Zealand.
New Zealand's official development assistance to Africa is small by international standards. It constitutes less than two per cent of the overall NZODA. Historically, it has targeted mainly the commonwealth countries of Eastern and Southern Africa, particularly Botswana, Kenya, Malawi, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe:

It developed with the setting up of the High Commission in Harare, Zimbabwe. Prior to that it was done through multilateral agencies and through the NGOs. When Harare was set up the political decision was taken that our ODA will be limited to the countries that we were accredited to.


Official development assistance to these countries consists of cash grants, material supplies and technical assistance, study awards and scholarships. It is also extended to other countries outside those to which the Harare High Commission is accredited, particularly those affected by emergency crises such as droughts, famines, civil wars and refugee influx. This is done through contributions to regional organizations such as the Southern Africa Development Cooperation Conference (SADCC) and multilateral institutions such as WFP, FAO, UNHCR and UNDP. These come under the multilateral schedule rather than bilateral programmes.
Figure 6.3: Volume of NZODA to Africa 1972/73-1994/95

Source: Compiled from Project Profiles 1972/73-1994/95.

The amount of money involved in New Zealand’s bilateral ODA to Africa is quite small. It ranges from NZD 93,500 in 1972/73 to about NZD 2.12 million in 1994/95. This is a drop in the bucket compared to contributions from the larger donors. For example, Australia’s ODA to Africa in 1990/91 was over AUD 150 million; while Kenya alone received over USD 900 million from the US in 1990 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 1994, File No. 118/13/118/1 700 HAR 09 June 1994). Bilateral ODA to Africa is constituted in three broad areas, namely: project assistance, human resource development and emergency and disaster relief. Each of these broad areas are examined below.
NZODA project development assistance to Africa started in 1974 following the President of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere's visit to New Zealand that year. New Zealand undertook to build a milk treatment station at Tanga, Tanzania, at a total cost of about NZD 500,000. At the same time New Zealand offered to provide 750 yearling cattle and 35 yearling bulls to start off the project. The government also offered to provide technical advisers to run a dairy training course at Tengeru, and to build and run the plant at Kitulo (Ministry of Foreign Affairs File No. 118/13/118/1 1981). Project development assistance constituted the largest form of New Zealand's bilateral ODA to Africa until the mid 1980s when more development assistance funds were directed to human resource development.

Between 1974 and 1995 an annual average budget of about NZD 538,000 has been directed to project assistance. Programmes range from the supply of building materials to support for rural primary schools. Large scale projects include the Kenya Forest Plantation inventory Management and Planning programme 1989-1993, which cost over NZD 1.8 million. These are funded centrally from Wellington. Smaller projects are funded by the New Zealand High Commission in Harare Zimbabwe, through the HOMF. Small projects funding is usually directed at local NGOs and community development activities in the countries to which the High Commission is accredited.
Figure 6.4: Countries to which the New Zealand High Commission Harare is accredited
The objective of the HOMF small projects fund is to enable the mission to identify and support small grassroots projects which would otherwise be unable to attract official development assistance due to the complexity of the ODA funding process or the remoteness of the project. The levels of assistance range from small community projects such as NZD 21 dollars for the purchase of 800 tree seeds for a reforestation programme in west Mashonaland, Zimbabwe in 1988, to larger community projects such as NZD 14,274 to a secondary school in Mashonaland, Zimbabwe in 1988 (New Zealand High Commission Harare, Africa ODA HOMF Reports 1986-1995). In considering projects for approval, priority is given to those that "generate income, increase employment opportunities and improve living conditions, especially among the rural poor" (Ministry of External Relations and Trade 1991, p5).
This is New Zealand's response to the manpower requirements and the crisis in the education sector in many African countries. The importance of this form of assistance is underpinned by what the New Zealand High Commission in Harare refers to as the crises in management expertise in both the public and private sectors and:

"New Zealand's conviction that increasing literacy and learning are fundamental to closing the gap between the developed and developing world, and that effective study and training makes friends abroad for New Zealand".

Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 1993, p12.

The objective of human resource development assistance to Africa, therefore, is to provide the level of education which may not be available in the partner country, but which the government of that partner country accepts may help transfer required skills and technology to assist in the social and economic development of the country. There are two main strategies in human resource development namely, the strengthening of the learning and educational institutions within the partner countries, and study and training awards in New Zealand or third countries.

The programme of New Zealand ODA in human resource development in Africa started in 1961 with the establishment of the Special Commonwealth Africa Assistance Programme (SCAAP) and the Commonwealth Education Scheme (CES). This involves study in New Zealand by selected recipients nominated by their countries to undertake courses and training programmes identified as priority areas in the recipient countries. Although CES is not directed exclusively to Africa, but also to the commonwealth countries in the South Pacific, Asia and the Caribbean, both the SCAAP and the CES have developed steadily. By the end of 1972 (which is the start of this particular
study) the cumulative expenditure on SCAAP alone was about NZD 1.5 million, with 266 students completing various courses in New Zealand (Ministry of Foreign Affairs briefing paper to the Minister on “Visiting Aid Mission to Africa” File No. 118/13/118/1 1976). Awards for SCAAP and CES are offered in disciplines which reflect bilateral development strategies agreed to between New Zealand and the partner African government. Between 1973 and 1995 over 400 students have undertaken courses in a wide range of professional areas including agriculture, law, engineering, geothermal studies, science, social sciences, management and the humanities. Other forms of human resource development apart from the SCAAP and CES are training awards for short-term practical work experience and employment attachments. Very few of these are awarded to African countries, and Mozambique and South Africa are the main beneficiaries. There is also the student tuition fees scholarships under which students from eligible countries are given scholarships to cover tuition and post graduate fees to the educational institution, while their home governments meet other related costs such as admission, travel and accommodation.

An average of more than 50 per cent of New Zealand’s bilateral ODA resources to Africa are directed to human resource development. In 1972/73 for example it was at an all time high of 94 per cent (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1974A, p46). This has leved at 75 per cent. The sharp rise in the cost of tertiary education in New Zealand following the tertiary education funding reform in 1991/92 has escalated the cost of human resources development assistance to Africa. The full fees component of overseas student tuition which had hitherto been drawn from the education budget, and thus a non-cost to the ODA programme, is now cost as part of the NZODA. This change and the subsequent cost of the scholarship programme has drawn resources away from
other forms of New Zealand bilateral ODA to Africa, particularly project assistance. The rising cost of tertiary scholarships has led to changes in the focus of the human resource development assistance programme. The whole value of New Zealand based study awards has been re-evaluated with a view to ‘getting better value for money’ both for New Zealand and the recipient partner communities. The basic question being asked is: are the social benefits of education as measured in the economic rate of return from long term study awards of two-to-four years commensurate with the investment of limited ODA resources, compared to short term courses of less than twelve months and also in-country training? This has led to the suggestion that the most appropriate use of the human resource development funds is to gradually move them away from long term study in New Zealand, to upgrading education and training facilities in the partner countries (Clark 1993, pp. 21-25).

6.7 Emergency and Disaster Relief

Historically New Zealand’s response to the developmental crisis and the crisis of political instability in Africa has focused primarily on emergency and disaster relief whereby funds are made available for prompt assistance to countries seriously affected by natural and human disasters. These funds are channeled through non governmental and multilateral agencies to support the work of NGOs in various African countries. The emphasis is on humanitarian assistance, and humanitarian needs are the primary considerations in the allocation process. It is disbursed in two ways, firstly by way of grants to the NGOs through voluntary agency support schemes (VASS) which subsidise approved projects undertaken in the African countries by New Zealand based voluntary agency groups and service and welfare organisations. These
range from food assistance for drought affected areas, and relief for refugees through the UNHCR. It also includes contributions to NGOs for specific work in particular areas affected by disaster, such as donations to Oxfam New Zealand and the New Zealand Red Cross for support for Rwandan refugees in Zaire, Tanzania, Uganda and Burundi after the Rwanda genocide in 1994. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Don McKinnon, explains:

When we face a Rwanda or Somalia type disaster and we have funds available, I usually say to my people it is easier to give half a million to the Red Cross, Save The Children, UNESCO, World Vision the NGOs, because they can probably do better with it than we can. If say the Red Cross is working in Mogadishu and they make a call for funds and we can give them one million dollars, to me most of that million dollars is going to be used in Mogadishu. In other words we are prepared to place a high level of credibility on those international agencies, rather than say send someone there, make contacts, develop linkages, sight how much is needed, then try to get the money through. That is beyond us.

Don McKinnon in an interview with the author, July 1995.

The government also sets aside funds in the international development assistance budget to complement the fund-raising efforts of the NGOs and community organizations, where the community responds enthusiastically and generously to appeals mounted by church organizations, voluntary agencies and non government development organizations such as World Vision, Oxfam, Save the Children Fund, etcetera. The objective is to encourage public participation. The government also matches dollar for dollar, public donations to NGO appeals following such appeals.

Another aspect of emergency and disaster relief response is the donation of food during periods of severe food shortages, such as in 1983/84 when drought devastated agriculture and livestock production in most of sub-Saharan Africa, resulting in a food crisis in 24 African countries. During such times, New Zealand responds with cash
donations channelled through the WFP as part of the international response to the food emergency. In 1985 this relief amounted to over NZD 3 million, directed through UN agencies and the International Red Cross. It was also used to support private relief efforts by New Zealand voluntary agencies in response to the famine crisis. The government also set up ‘Food Task Force’ in 1985, made up of nutrition experts, to advise it and other donors on the most appropriate and acceptable forms of food donations that met the needs of recipients (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 1986). In this way the government ensured that its material and food response was both nutritionally and culturally appropriate to the recipient partners.

6.7 Conclusion.

The objective of this chapter has been to critically examine New Zealand’s bilateral ODA in the light of the two theoretical strands identified in the literature. The evidence gathered suggests that the basic philosophy guiding New Zealand’s international development assistance is that the programme aims to meet the dual purpose of enhancing economic and social justice in the recipient countries, but at the same time fulfill New Zealand’s foreign policy and trade objectives, thus creating mutual benefits for both partners in the relationship. Thus from the theory and literature of motivation for giving international assistance, New Zealand’s official policy has not identified exclusively with either the conventionalist approach nor instrumental utility. Policy has tended to espouse both recipient needs and the benefits of international assistance partnership to New Zealand. For the recipient partners, NZODA aims to work towards overcoming the underlying causes of human suffering and deprivation and national economic underdevelopment in the recipient developing
countries. Since 1981 NZODA policy has become more explicit in the perceived benefits of the partnership to New Zealand in terms of trade, commerce and constituency building. New Zealand’s bilateral ODA has therefore been conceptualised as a programme of investment in the regional and global future of both the donor and the recipient countries.

Successive New Zealand governments since the 1950s have sold the idea of international development assistance to the general public on the justification that it is a means of strengthening the links between New Zealand and the peoples of developing nations, links that foster mutual benefit between the partner countries. NZODA contributes to the achievement of New Zealand’s foreign policy and strategic objectives. Because of geographical and historical inevitability NZODA is concentrated in the South Pacific region. This derives from the political and constitutional links especially with the Cook Islands, Niue, Tokelau and Western Samoa. These have been further strengthened by long standing sociocultural and economic linkages, as well as the free flow of people between the island nations and New Zealand. In Asia trade and commercial interests in the 1980s and 1990s have replaced the strategic considerations of the 1950s-to-1970s, during the cold war period. NZODA in these countries has become an investment, in which returns are found in trade and commercial benefits for New Zealand. The geographical pattern of NZODA, therefore, is a close reflection of these policy objectives. There is a bias towards the Pacific Island nations who receive about 70 per cent of NZODA, followed by ASEAN and other Asian countries who together receive about 25 per cent. The rest of the developing countries that are ‘remote’ and less economically, politically or strategically important to New Zealand together, share the remaining 5 per cent. It is to this last group that Africa
belongs, its share being about 1.8 per cent. The 1.8 per cent of NZODA to Africa by itself alone, may seem insignificant for independent analysis. However, it is the reconceptualisation of international assistance as the overall response to the crises in Africa that makes New Zealand's international assistance to Africa a significant subject. This response is made up of the combined New Zealand ODA composed of both the bilateral and multilateral schedules, assistance from the NGOs, together with the peacekeeping and other forms of emergency response. These are examined in the next three chapters.
“Poverty is material, but also spiritual. It consists of the absence of hope, boredom, solitude which is not sought but endured. It is also to a large extent, subjective, that is to say, it is experienced by the human being who is the ‘victim’ of poverty. A poor person is not only one who is hungry but also one who is oppressed, humiliated and manipulated. Reducing poverty means not only reducing inequalities and improving standards of living, but also protecting and celebrating the significance of the planet, and adding beauty to it. More materialism is no answer to the problem of poverty. The ethic of egotism must be replaced by an ethic of kindness and care for others”.


7.1 Introduction

The previous chapter examined New Zealand’s development assistance policy to the developing countries, and noted that NZODA policy aims to create a partnership which benefits both New Zealand and the recipient countries. Geographical and historical factors have combined to concentrate NZODA in the Asia-Pacific region and only a very small portion goes to Africa. The focus of NZODA in Africa is principally the Eastern and Southern African countries, the commonwealth countries to which the Harare High Commission is accredited. Although Africa’s share of New Zealand’s bilateral ODA is small, the overall New Zealand involvement in Africa made up of the
combined contributions through multilateral agencies and NGOs, and the political and diplomatic assistance both at the international level and bilateral level, the overall value of New Zealand's response to the crises in Africa is quite significant.

This chapter examines New Zealand's response to the crises in Africa from the framework established in the methodology and the reconceptualisation of development assistance as partnership that is mutually beneficial both to the 'donor' and to the 'recipient'. The chapter is divided into two main parts. The first part is a brief statement of the official perception by the New Zealand government of what constitutes the crises in Africa. It recapitulates the main features of the crises in Africa analysed in Chapter Five. The objective is to provide the basis from which the question 'why does New Zealand need to respond to the crises in Africa?' will be answered. A brief summary of some of the data used in Chapter Five to define what constitutes the crises in Africa is repeated here in order to help substantiate the case for why New Zealand needs to respond. Part two examines the various forms of New Zealand official responses to the crises in Africa between 1973 and 1995, both in individual African countries as well as at the larger continental level.

7.2 Why does New Zealand need to respond to the crises in Africa?

In a ministerial briefing paper prepared for the Prime Minister of New Zealand for his visit to Kenya in 1991, the Ministry of External Relations and Trade defined the crises in Africa thus:

"The magnitude of the disaster afflicting a number of African countries is almost overwhelming. As many as 27 million people in Africa are facing severe food shortages. The worst affected countries are those in the Horn of Africa namely, Sudan, Ethiopia and
Somalia, but there are other nations on the African continent which are in crisis. The causes of the crisis are a mixture of severe droughts, civil wars and economic disintegration. In many instances natural disasters have been compounded by political and ethnic conflict. The results are a tragedy for those most at risk: children, mothers and the elderly”.


These disasters and conflicts lead to other complex refugee and emergency crises. According to the Australian International Development Assistance Bureau (AIDAB), while this may not be the exclusive preserve of the African continent:

"in terms of severity of emergencies, Africa has the greatest need with over 50 per cent of the total number of people killed in emergencies in the period 1967 to 1991 coming from that continent"

AIDAB 1994, p3.

Hence a meeting of Africa’s Ministers of Heath in Tunis, Tunisia, reported that about 4.5 million children in Africa die each year because of poor health care, malnutrition and social and political conflicts (The Sunday Star-Times January 15 1995 p A9). Coupled with this are the other crises of debt, disease, negligible economic growth, poverty, environmental degradation and the AIDS pandemic. It is estimated that by the year 2005 child death due to the HIV AIDS will rise from 145.5 per 1,000 in 1995 to 218.7 per 1,000, while population growth rate will decline by 1.4 per cent due to AIDS related mortality (Bongaarts 1995, pp. 20-25).

As for the debt burden, while in 1974 total Africa’s debt was about USD 14.8 billion, by 1992 total debt reached an estimated USD 183.4 billion, about 109 per cent of Africa’s total GNP (Callaghy 1994, p32). Poverty is endemic and spreading. Per capita income levels and growth continue to decline, and GDP growth is the lowest of all the regions of the world, averaging only 2 per cent per annum between 1982 and 1992
These factors combined give a forecast of about 50 per cent rise in the number of poor people in Africa, from around 200 million in 1992 to over 300 million by 2002, making Africa the only region in the world with an overall increase in poverty (Callaghy 1994, p31).

At the individual country level, Zambia for example is described as 'pathologically poor'. With an external debt of USD 7.3 billion in 1990 (which is about 334 per cent of GNP), the country spends about 53 per cent of its external earnings on debt servicing. Sixty five per cent of Zambians are considered to be living in absolute poverty, and between 15-20 per cent of the adult population is infected with the HIV virus (Weeks 1992, P210). The administrative and political bottlenecks almost run the country to the ground, making it 'almost unworkable'. A New Zealand diplomat's report after an official visit to Lusaka observes that the country is:

"pathologically poor. Even the miserable standard of living it currently enjoys is almost completely dependent on international donors' goodwill. The country is almost unworkable, there is next to no management expertise in either the public or private sector. The country has no infrastructure, no administrative system, no legal system you can rely upon and is ridden with corruption. --- Nobody in their right mind would invest in Zambia in the present circumstances".


The result is that the country cannot attract overseas investment nor effectively administer its internal resources. Ninety per cent of its foreign earnings come from copper, an industry which itself is burdened with nearly USD 1 billion foreign debt.

"Infant mortality rate rose from 80 to 108 per 1,000 live births between 1983 and 1993, while 40 per cent of children under five were chronically malnourished in 1993. From 1991 to 1993, per capita GNP fell from USD 420 to 320. Currently 50 per cent of the country's population live in towns where they face increasing poverty and
unemployment. Malnutrition has risen sharply, with per capita daily calorie intake declining from 2,227 in 1980 to 1,887 in 1991, well below the recommended daily minimum of 2,400 calories”


Poverty and underdevelopment has therefore continued to deepen in Zambia as in other sub-Saharan African countries.

At the continental level, Africa has the largest proportion of the world’s poorest people. In 1990 for example 29 of the world’s 36 poorest countries were African, (classified as ‘least developed’ countries by the United Nations). The 1996 UNDP ranking of countries on the basis of the human development index (HDI) has 28 African countries among the lowest 36 countries. Of the lowest 20 countries on the HDI classification only Afghanistan, Bhutan and Cambodia are not African (UNDP 1996). Many of these countries face unusual geographic and climatic handicaps in addition to their ‘normal’ problems of economic development. African countries are also the most affected by famine and disease in the world. Only a few African countries, mainly the North African countries namely: Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria and Egypt, as well as South Africa and Nigeria have relatively sophisticated economies. They benefit from having easy geographic access to the European markets and they also have substantial natural resources and (except for Nigeria) relatively small populations. Algeria, Egypt, Libya and Nigeria have petroleum and natural gas, and Morocco, large phosphate deposits. Algeria, Egypt and Tunisia also receive substantial development assistance from Western Europe, the United States and the oil rich Islamic nations of the Middle East.

However the majority of the sub-Saharan African countries are plagued by droughts, famine, political instability and chronic poverty and are further crippled by external
debt burden. Poor world commodity prices have diminished their external earning capabilities so that the basic infrastructure that provides the foundation for economic growth has collapsed. Apartheid in South Africa reduced the majority Black population to internal serfdom, while destabilising the political and economic environment of the neighbouring Front Line African states through military incursions. Africa is therefore gripped by crises which have severely affected the socio-economic and political infrastructure of the entire continent. Recovery is slow. Life for many is sad and hopeless. Sickness and death are widespread. Pessimism is persistent. As early as 1974 the Associate Minister of Foreign Affairs, JA Walding responding to the appeal by the United Nations Secretary General regarding the drought situation in the Sahelian region of Africa, commented on New Zealand’s attitude to the crises in Africa that:

Some people ask whether we should seek to do something about this situation. They ask isn’t the situation hopeless. The answer is that we must help if we are to regard ourselves as civilized people. New Zealand more than many other countries has sought to create a nation based on democracy, equality and social justice. The welfare state in which we take justifiable pride rests on the recognition of the obligations of the rich and powerful within the community to assist the poor and weak. For us not to apply these simple principles in the international community would be to deny our national goals”.


This was the Minister’s attempt to extend the Rawlsian compensatory principle from the national level to the international level, as argued by the conventional approach examined in Chapter Three. From a purely humanitarian point of view, Africa requires international development assistance. New Zealand recognises its position as a ‘world citizen’ and has responded ‘in a show of solidarity and a sense of common humanity’ through co-operation and support. The moral imperative demands that New Zealand must respond to the problems of Africa. It is this moral obligation that
moves New Zealand to respond to the humanitarian and emergency disasters as well as the developmental crises in Africa. The rest of this chapter examines the various forms of New Zealand’s official response to the crises in Africa, beginning with the crisis of apartheid.

7.3 New Zealand’s official response to the crisis of apartheid in South Africa

1973 marks an important turning point in New Zealand’s response to the crises in Africa in a number of ways. The new government in New Zealand brought Africa into the focus of New Zealand’s foreign policy for the first time when the Prime Minister declared to Parliament that:

“in looking anew at New Zealand’s position in the world, and our relationship with other countries, the belief that Africa is a distant continent of which we need to know little seems to me to be no longer tenable. Exchanges are proposed in order to improve and expand New Zealand’s contacts with that vast continent”.


This was a radical change in New Zealand’s foreign relations which were hitherto focused almost exclusively on Europe and the Asia Pacific regions, both because of historical linkages and for purposes of regional security and trade. The new initiatives introduced by the 1972-1975 government aimed to broaden New Zealand’s international focus. New Zealand’s relationship with the rest of the world was no longer to be based only on self interest, but tempered with morality. The Prime Minister maintained that the government was:

“determined to find and hold a firm moral basis for its foreign policy. It may be said that the only basis for a sound foreign policy is the national interest. I see no contradiction. I believe that to base foreign policy on moral principles is the most enlightened form of self
interest. What is morally right is likely to be politically right. What appears in the short term to be the path of expediency is all too likely to lead into a blind alley”.


Kirk contended that a foreign policy based on sound moral grounds was "sensitive and responsive to the needs and aspirations of other peoples, especially those in the developing countries of the Pacific, Asia and Africa" (Kirk 1973B, p7). Because of the imbalance of the economic means within the human family, one of the ways of responding to the needs of these people is to share in their desire to attain levels of economic and political development that improves and sustains their standards of living by sharing New Zealand's economic growth through development assistance. Kirk argued that the objective of New Zealand's foreign policy must not simply be the attainment of selfish, narrow national interests, but rather a means for advancing the welfare of the human family. It was this moral principle that directed the 1972-1975 government response to the crisis of apartheid in South Africa. And it was the lack of moral principle by the government between 1975 and 1984 that created the problematic of New Zealand's response to apartheid.

7.31 Sports boycott: The Problematic of New Zealand's Response to the Crisis of Apartheid in South Africa

One of New Zealand's earliest official responses to the crisis of apartheid was at the United Nations. New Zealand co-sponsored with ten other countries, a United Nations resolution condemning the failure of the South African government to comply with repeated requests by the Assembly and the Secretary General for the release of all persons imprisoned because of their opposition to apartheid (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1973, pp. 33-34). The resolution was an attempt by the New Zealand
government to distance itself from the racial policies of the South African government because of the close sporting and cultural contacts between the two countries. However, it was the sporting relationship with apartheid South Africa that made New Zealand’s response a problematic.

New Zealand public interest in sporting relations with South Africa is an important part of the New Zealand-South Africa relations. It is even more especially so for the white South Africans. The most significant of these sporting contacts, and the country which they value most highly in this regard, is New Zealand. For South Africa then to play rugby against New Zealand is something ‘religious’. It is in the light of this ‘religious devotion’ that the sporting contact between New Zealand and South Africa became problematic when the United Nations, the Commonwealth and the international community asked that South Africa be isolated in the area of sport by New Zealand. Outside the realm of sports New Zealand’s response to the crisis of apartheid could only be mostly moral, political and psychological. This was the position taken by the Kirk government, 1972-1975, when it cancelled the planned Springbok tour of 1973. The Prime Minister justified the decision to cancel the tour on moral grounds, although the alternative decision would have been more expedient:

“it would have been the popular decision with many rugby-loving New Zealanders. When the government had access to all the relevant information and advice, however, it was quickly evident that it would not be in the larger interest of New Zealand for the tour to take place with the South African team selected on a discriminatory basis”.


The government considered the wider implications of New Zealand as a ‘good world citizen’ and acted above the narrow self interest of local politics and relations with one particular country where New Zealand had vested interest and historical relations.
The problematic is that this action had implications both for the internal politics of New Zealand as well as New Zealand’s international standing in the Commonwealth and the United Nations. At the local level in New Zealand, Russell Marshall who was a member of the 1972-75 Labour caucus and later became Minister of Foreign Affairs (1987-1990) suggests that this decision was an important influence on the outcome of the 1975 election:

One reason why we lost the election in 1975 was because Muldoon made a feast out of our canceling the Springbok tour. And a lot of traditional Labour supporters were more interested in rugby than they were in Africa. And that did not do us a great deal of good.


The subsequent change in government in 1975 led to the adoption of a more laissez faire approach to the crisis of apartheid and the contention that government should not interfere in the affairs of sports bodies and organisations. The new government (1975-1984) argued that sporting relations between countries should not become a foreign policy issue. The new Prime Minister, Robert Muldoon, maintained that:

“the question of sporting contacts with other countries is primarily a domestic one. It is particularly important in our way of life. The government's position, that sporting bodies should be free to decide for themselves who to compete with, does not reflect on our attitude towards any other country or group of countries”.


This had broader implications on New Zealand-Africa relationship. Contrary to the United Nations resolutions in 1971, 1973 and 1975 on sporting, cultural and trade boycott of South Africa, and the fact that there was already a 90 per cent effective international boycott of sporting contacts with South Africa (Trainor 1980, p135), the government allowed the national team, the All Blacks, to tour South Africa in 1976 amidst the massacre in Soweto of Black African school children.
The international community as well as a large section of the New Zealand community did not accept the position of the New Zealand government. Trainor suggests that:

"The government policy as viewed from abroad was deliberately provocative. It officially welcomed a South African softball team and farewelled the New Zealand rugby team to tour South Africa. There was a wide ranging diplomatic and sporting campaign to change the government’s policy. United Nations and Commonwealth spokesmen, Afro-Asian governmental and sporting representatives all made approaches. The requests made would seem to have been quite moderate. It was not a question of withholding passports or even necessarily preventing the tours, it was rather a question of making clear the government’s opposition to it. The government’s reaction on the one side was to belittle the international opposition."


The 1976 All Black rugby tour of South Africa resulted in a massive boycott of the 1976 Olympic games, by the majority of African and Caribbean countries, in protest against New Zealand’s participation at the games. It created a perception in the international community that New Zealand was determined to antagonise the Commonwealth and the entire international community. Russell Marshall observes that the African and Caribbean boycott of the Montreal Olympics had serious effects on New Zealand’s international standing:

New Zealand became a focus of anger at the Montreal Olympic games. In the aftermath of the Montreal games we were (New Zealand) clearly seen not just in Africa but internationally as a kind of pariah. And the same thing happened at the Commonwealth.


The overwhelming boycott of the 1976 Olympic games and the impending threat to the Commonwealth games in Edmonton, Canada in 1978 in the light of New Zealand’s participation angered the international sporting community. To help resolve the
situation the ‘Gleneagles agreement’ was signed by the Commonwealth countries in 1977 urging all governments to take urgent and responsible action:

“to combat the evil of apartheid by withholding any form of support for, and by taking every practical step to discourage contact or participation by their nationals with sporting organisations, teams or sportsmen from South Africa or from any other country where sports are organized on the basis of race, colour or ethnic origin”.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1977 p40.

Although the agreement required, unequivocally, all commonwealth governments to do everything within their powers to limit sporting activities with apartheid South Africa in order to continue to isolate the republic in the international arena, some analysts suggest that New Zealand signed the Gleneagles agreement merely as a public relations gesture. The Muldoon administration was considered not to believe in or respect the agreement, as its later actions demonstrated (Trainor 1980).

The lack of commitment on the part of the government, and the subsequent Springbok tour of New Zealand in 1981, enraged the African countries and further damaged sporting relationships and harmed New Zealand’s international standing. As Chris Laidlaw, a former Under Secretary at the Commonwealth Secretariat, and the first resident New Zealand High Commissioner to Africa, explains:

The Commonwealth view was that Muldoon had got it seriously wrong, and I think that history has shown that. But that was not apparent in this country at that point in time. Not many people knew what was actually happening. And the political dimension of it was played up very sharply once the question of boycotting the Olympic games became the norm. And of course New Zealand suffered very badly when in the eyes of the sporting world it was the cause of the Africans boycotting the games. And I think the African sporting community and the political people
decided that if the 1981 tour went ahead then in the Commonwealth context then New Zealand ought to be penalised.


And the surest way to punish New Zealand was to exclude it from all international sporting events, particularly the 1982 Commonwealth games in Brisbane. For a sport loving nation as New Zealand this would hurt New Zealanders quite deeply. There were also threats to censure New Zealand at the United Nations Special Committee on apartheid and perhaps even at the General Assembly.

At the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, (CHOGM) in Melbourne in 1981, the New Zealand government attempted to explain its official position on the Gleneagles agreement following the Springbok tour. Prime Minister Muldoon, as had become his normal practice, was prepared for a showdown over the 1982 Commonwealth games. However, the depth of feelings expressed by the massive demonstrations that accompanied every single game of the Springbok tour, convinced the African leaders that the majority of New Zealanders sympathised with Africa on the issue of apartheid. As McKinnon observes:

"By the end of the tour 54 per cent of those polled thought the Springbok should not have come, up 11 per cent from May. Possibly only this shift in public opinion stopped the foreign policy crisis deepening. At the Melbourne Commonwealth meeting, Muldoon reiterated the official New Zealand interpretation of Gleneagles. He was not challenged: African leaders and others were impressed by the scale and sincerity of the protests in New Zealand and took that rather than the government's position as the true measure of New Zealand's hostility to apartheid".

New Zealand’s response to the crisis of apartheid in South Africa in the 1970s and early 1980s was therefore equivocal, and divided the New Zealand community and polarised opinions. The 1972-75 government’s official response was to take strong action against the racist regime in Pretoria and actively discouraged sporting contact in line with international agreements. However, between 1975-1984, the government’s official position was a laissez faire policy, and in some cases even tacit encouragement where it served its political interests. The New Zealand community was also deeply divided in their response during the 1970s and early 1980s. While masses of people demonstrated against the Springbok tour of 1981, a section of the New Zealand community was represented by what Butterworth describes as the:

"older, male and provincial New Zealand, which was governed by ageing barons, strict constructionists and purveyors of a myth system in which their sport symbolised the nation".


This group resented being punished by virtue of the sins of another country, and consequently expressed their anger at those who thought and acted otherwise. In three parliamentary elections in 1975, 1978 and 1981 this anger was expressed with their votes, a demonstration that they ‘were more interested in rugby than they were in Africa’. David Lange explains:

We may well have won the election in 1981 were it not for Muldoon and the Springbok tour. Because he knew his constituency. He knew the pluses of having divided the country. He knew the sentiments of the provinces would be different from the sentiments in the city. He knew he had to get a hold of the rugby playing thresholds. And the Springbok tour was a perfect way of making the Labour party and the Opposition look wimps.


What the average New Zealander did not realize was the level of anger and frustration that the Black Africans felt at the attitude of the New Zealand government. The good
relations that Prime Minister Norman Kirk had fostered with Africa, between 1973 and 1975, was virtually destroyed by the insensitivity of the Muldoon government. John Luxton comments that, when he went to Tanzania in 1975 as a UNDP/FAO staff member, he was warmly welcomed, especially because he was from New Zealand. Things changed after the 1976 All Black tour of South Africa. What had hitherto been kind reception turned into a hostile repulsive environment for the New Zealander:

I was in Tanzania during the Montreal Olympic games and I had been very proud to have a New Zealand sticker at the back of my car. But because the national press portrayed New Zealand as a racist country I had to take the New Zealand sticker off my car or I will not have a car at the end of the day. New Zealand had very negative images because of the Springbok tour and the Montreal games.


If this happened in Tanzania, the African country with the closest relations with New Zealand due of the personal friendship between Norman Kirk and Nyerere, it was an indication of the indignation that most Africans felt at New Zealand. Although Kirk died in 1974, the good name that he made for New Zealand in Africa lived on with most African leaders. Muldoon virtually destroyed this with his antagonism against African leaders. His treatment of African opinion leaders further accentuated the resentment of African leaders. The personal insult and the humiliation meted out to Abraham Ordia, the president of the Supreme Council for Sports in Africa, during his visit to New Zealand in 1976 infuriated not just the African leaders but also many people in New Zealand and the Commonwealth.
The turning point: The role of New Zealand sports boycott in ending the apartheid crisis

Paradoxically it is New Zealand’s response to the sporting boycott of South Africa that ultimately helped to resolve the crisis of apartheid. The suspension of the limited trade exchange between New Zealand and South Africa, and the political and cultural exchange did not hurt South Africa very much. It could always manoeuvre its way through trade and diplomatic sanctions. But international sports isolation, especially in the sports that the primary support base of apartheid regime worshipped hurt deeply. So that in the end it was the moral and psychological impact of the sporting boycott that was the most important part of New Zealand’s response to the crisis of apartheid. Russell Marshall and Chris Laidlaw explain:

I have got no doubt that it was primarily in the area of sports and the most important sport to white South Africans. I would not like to exaggerate our role in the apartheid area except to say that for white South Africans the most significant sporting contact they had was rugby. The contact which they valued the most was rugby and the country which they valued most highly in this regard was New Zealand. So for them to play rugby against New Zealand was something which was about on a par with God in a very religious country for Afrikaners in particular, but also for the English speaking South Africans. So when it gradually became clear that there was a growing hostility towards playing with apartheid and when people saw on their screens in 1981 the depth of New Zealand opposition, I am sure it was a factor. It may not have been a large factor but it was a statement to South Africans of the international awareness of things in their country. A lot of white South Africans were not aware of what was going on in their own country, not aware of how the rest of the world saw them. And I visited a distant relative on the outskirts of Johannesburg last year. And he told me that it was not until he got up in the early morning to watch rugby in New Zealand that he began to understand how much we knew about his country, in some ways we knew more about his country than he did. And that forced an awareness on the part of the sport administrators that they started to put pressure on the political
administrators to change. Tommy Bedford for instance, who was South Africa’s rugby captain, was one of the liberal whites in South Africa who started to lobby effectively for change and who started to talk to the ANC. So it was in the end being rejected by a country which had been seen as a friend which in some small way I think was helpful.


This view is endorsed by Chris Laidlaw:

I have only recently been to South Africa and talked to some of those people, de Klerk as well, about the impact that that did have. It had a huge impact. The white government really realised that if they did not do a deal with the ANC they were going to miss out on many aspects of international life. That there was a bottom line. That the ANC will set the agenda. They asked us if there was time. Dannie Craven asked me if there was a possibility of international rugby links with South Africa if they do not do a political deal with the ANC. Of course the answer was NO.

So he went home and started to push the government. Which is precisely what we wanted, sports entering politics.


So as was the case in 1975, New Zealand’s response to the crisis of apartheid took a new direction following the change in government after the July election in 1984. The new administration adopted a position similar to its predecessor, the 1972-75 Labour government, as Prime Minister David Lange explained to President Nyerere of Tanzania:

“Your good friend Norman Kirk, my predecessor as Labour Prime Minister, who so much wanted to visit Africa, died before he had the chance to do so. I am here to begin where Norman Kirk left off, to re-establish that relationship and, together with your government and people, to nurture it in the years ahead. We are separated by oceans, that is true. But we are bound in other ways by remarkable commonality of experience and of outlook”.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1985, p5.
Part of that common outlook was abhorrence of apartheid and support for the political
goal of the achievement of freedom and justice for the Black people of South Africa.
Hence on coming to office the government promised to abide by the provisions of the
Gleneagles agreement and to introduce new policies that sought to discourage
sporting, cultural and political contacts with the apartheid regime, to withhold visas
from South African sports teams and individuals wishing to compete in New Zealand
and to discourage New Zealand sports people and teams from competing in South
Africa. The new Prime Minister declared that:

“For far too long New Zealand’s relations with Africa have been bedeviled by a narrow
and short sighted concentration on sporting contacts with South Africa. If New
Zealand’s voice is to be heard in the world, we can no longer stand back from Africa.
Nor can we espouse ambiguous policies towards apartheid, against which all Africans
are united and which denies the very values on which our own society is founded”.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1986, pp. 15-16.

To correct these anomalies of the 1975-1984 period the new government set about
‘mending fences and strengthening bonds’. The first steps were espousing a clear
policy on sporting contacts with South Africa, increasing technical cooperation
through development assistance and the establishment of diplomatic representation on
the Africa continent (Lange 1985, p34). It also shut down the South African consulate
in Wellington which had been involved in propagating apartheid and the racist
policies of the South Africa government. At the United Nations New Zealand co­
sponsored for the first time since 1973, in 1984 and again in 1985, wide ranging
resolutions on international action against apartheid. In conformity with the accord
on South Africa agreed at Nassau, the Bahamas by the CHOGM, the New Zealand
government in November 1985 introduced economic measures against South Africa
and announced its intention to adopt additional sanctions if South Africa did not begin
to dismantle apartheid.
In April 1985 the Prime Minister undertook a five nation tour of Africa. The objectives of the tour were:

“to meet the leaders of the five countries and hear from them at first hand about developments in their countries and the region; to explain to them the government’s policies on the issues of greatest interest to them, particularly in relation to Africa (including sporting contacts with South Africa) and to clear up any misunderstandings that they (African leaders) might have about them; and to lay a foundation for better understanding in the future”.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1985, p3.

During the visit the Prime Minister took time and effort to explain New Zealand’s position on the issues of apartheid, and to assure his hosts that New Zealand was not a friend of the apartheid regime in South Africa. He stated clearly that New Zealand stood on common ground with Africa on the issue of apartheid, pointing out that:

“Southern Africa’s greatest challenge, the greatest threat to its stability and development and the most profound affront to its common humanity is the persistence of institutionalised racial discrimination in South Africa. New Zealanders know instinctively that it is wrong (and) are determined to stand against it. My government rejects it unreservedly”.


Referring to the common objectives of New Zealand and Africa on the apartheid crisis, Mr. Lange emphasised that:

“New Zealand condemns the immorality of racism. We made it illegal to discriminate. We have set out to build a harmonious multiracial society in our own land, based on freedom, justice and consent. The apartheid system denies all the values we are determined to uphold. We reject that system, as the world does”.

The African countries were convinced. They accepted and appreciated New Zealand’s positive response to the crisis of apartheid. President Daniel Arap Moi of Kenya, summed up the position of Africa when he told Mr. Lange that:

“Today, Mr. Prime Minister, the entire continent is rejoicing over your government’s policy to sever all connections with the racist regime of South Africa, including sporting contacts. Kenya, and indeed the whole of Africa, appreciates New Zealand’s new policy of total opposition to the whole policies of South Africa, and Wellington’s unequivocal denunciation of apartheid and the repressive policies of the South Africa government. In advocating the closure of the South Africa consulate in New Zealand, the government and the people of New Zealand clearly demonstrate their determination to defend human dignity and social justice in South Africa”.


The diplomatic initiatives together with the government’s proactive stance on Africa had important implication for the rest of the Commonwealth particularly, but also at the United Nations. For the first time in over a decade the Commonwealth could speak with one voice on the issue of apartheid, the only exception being the dissenting voice of the British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. Russell Marshall comments that:

When we took office David Lange was not that outspoken in the Commonwealth, but Thatcher was finally absolutely on her own. At the Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) which I attended in Kuala Lumpur in 1989, some one in an interview asked her what does it feel like being one against 49. And she said, ‘I am sorry for the 49’.


At that CHOGM New Zealand once again reaffirmed its abhorrence of the apartheid system and joined with the rest of the Commonwealth and the international community to urge the South African government to bring the system of apartheid to a peaceful end. The Minister of Foreign Affairs made repeated visits to African countries...
and hosted visits by African Ministers and diplomats, discussed the crisis of apartheid and its impact on the Southern Africa region.

Thus New Zealand’s response to the crisis of apartheid in South Africa in the post-Muldoon period was characterised by strong opposition to the policies of racism and discrimination, and the allocation of privilege on the basis of race, skin colour and ethnic origin. Government policies demonstrated to the African leaders that New Zealand backed all international policies aimed at resolving the apartheid crisis and bringing about transition to democratic government and social justice in South Africa. The stage was set for the diplomatic push to make New Zealand’s response more effective and also to demonstrate further its commitment to Africa.

7.33 Diplomatic Representation: Planting New Zealand’s feet on the ground and keeping an eye on South Africa

In 1986 the first New Zealand resident diplomatic mission in Africa was opened in Harare Zimbabwe with cross accreditation to Botswana, Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia. These new initiatives crystallised New Zealand’s response to the crisis of apartheid and set the stage for new diplomatic relations with Africa. New Zealand had its first consular representation in Africa in the 1960s when a trade mission was established in Accra, Ghana to serve the West Africa region. This mission closed in 1968 because the small amount of trade between African countries and New Zealand was not sufficient to warrant a permanent post (New Zealand International Review 1981, p30). New Zealand did not have diplomatic representation on the African continent after that. Although the 1972-1975 Labour government explored the possibility of opening a
mission in Kenya and went as far as lining up two people for the job, this did not materialise because of the sudden death of Prime Minister Norman Kirk in 1974, and the change of government in 1975. The government however, set up the position of 'New Zealand Aid administration officer' in Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, to oversee the implementation of New Zealand development assistance to that country. This was the implementation of the dairy farming projects at Tanga, with 750 yearling cattle and 35 yearling bulls donated to Tanzania following President Nyerere's visit to New Zealand in March 1974.

The establishment of the High Commission in Harare in 1986 was the culmination of past false starts, and marked the beginning of a more proactive response to the other crises affecting the African continent. It was important for New Zealand to re-establish good relations with the key African leaders, and to convince them that New Zealand was serious about good relations with Africa. But even more significantly, one of the major functions of the mission was to monitor more closely the events in apartheid South Africa, and how they impacted on the Front Line States. The choice of Harare as the location for the post was therefore, in line with this objective. Chris Laidlaw explains:

The Foreign Ministry wanted us to establish in Nairobi, Kenya. And my own feeling, very strong feeling, was that it ought to be much closer to South Africa, because inevitably it was going to be a visibility exercise. We had to be associated in some way with the Front Line states, --- the political dimension of being seen to be in the Front Line states”.


In 1986 Laidlaw had argued along similar lines suggesting that:

“It is important that New Zealand’s position vis-à-vis apartheid in South Africa is made abundantly clear as South Africa enters what seems certain to be a decisive phase in its history - a phase which must, if history is any indication, give rise to a new era based on
majority rule, and if circumstances permit, a new relationship with the outside world. The High Commission will both in the short and long term have a watching brief on developments in South Africa and the implications of those developments both for Southern Africa and the international community more widely”.


These objectives are further reiterated by the other key players during that period, Prime Minister David Lange and Russell Marshall, Foreign Minister 1987-1990. Although the Ministry officials favoured Kenya, and the 1972-75 government had considered it, Nairobi was probably too remote and it was more desirable to locate somewhere more proximate to South Africa, in the Front Line states:

We did not have any post on the African continent. And one of the jobs I had was to try and see first hand where it was most suitable for the post. And incidentally if you forget Nairobi on the grounds of remoteness and wanted something proximate to South Africa which was in the Front Line states argument, then I thought that Botswana was a real beauty place. So I went to look at the place, and even the oranges came from South Africa. So we put that also on the back burner.


So that proximity to South Africa was a very important consideration. Russell Marshall also confirms this, but suggests that the setting up of an African post in 1986 must also be seen in the broader context of the ideology of the Labour government and the Labour party, that of being a good world citizen:

I suppose in the context of the politics of the region and in terms of New Zealand’s traditional interests, it made more sense to come further south. Kenya was in a sense to the north of where our real interests lie and where our future interests were more likely to be. I suppose part of it was also a recognition that we need to be a world citizen, that you cannot claim to be a reputable world citizen and have not one significant diplomatic representation on the whole of the African continent. Secondly that simply having someone there would be a statement of recognition of New Zealand’s small but nevertheless serious commitment to the good relationship with Africa. Thirdly and probably most significant was the recognition that we really wanted to move, to say
to Africa we have passed this behind us, we are not supporters of apartheid. We are committed to the liberation of South Africa. And then we want to build a relationship between ourselves and Africa.


So the location of the High Commission in Harare was very much a political statement, both to South Africa and the rest of Africa, that New Zealand’s relationship with Black Africa was to be taken seriously and that New Zealand was committed to standing firmly with Africa to eliminate the crisis of apartheid.

7.34 The role of the High Commission in resolving the crisis of apartheid

As soon as its feet were on the ground, the High Commission set about working to undermine the apartheid regime in South Africa through clandestine meetings with the ANC and other Black African organizations as well as liberal white South Africans.

Chris Laidlaw explains his role as the High Commissioner during those years:

I concentrated on my relationship with the ANC as well as the efforts that we made to develop some kind of contact building that I thought was New Zealand’s best function. So I spent a lot of time bringing South Africans, inviting South Africans to come to Zimbabwe, in association with some Zimbabwe government officials, and getting them to meet the ANC people who come down from Zambia. This process rolled on. And we had some notable successes. The Dakar group, some people went to Dakar and came back. A range of those people came in. We got them to meet with the ANC and also with the Zimbabweans. We exposed to younger Zimbabweans businessmen, and one or two of them cabinet Ministers, to talk to them (young South Africans) about majority rule.


The discussions centered around some of the basic fears of the young white South Africans, things such as the allegations that the ANC was going to shoot all the white
people and drive them out of the country into the sea. Some of the businessmen had their first experience meeting with the Black South Africans and realised that these were confident, very well organized and articulate people. Most of them were young Black businessmen or politician. For the first time they were able to talk to them one-on-one. Continues Laidlaw:

That is all that was really needed for some of them. They did not realise it could happen. So I concentrated on that. I spent a lot of time. I saw that as a role that New Zealand could play very effectively. And I think we did a good job. And towards the end of my term, we tried to bring the ANC together with some of the sports bodies. Through my own contacts in the rugby world, Dannie Craven and Luis Luyt, to organise the rugby personalities in South Africa to come and meet the ANC in Zimbabwe. Even though the government was not very sure about that. They discouraged me from doing that. So I said I will keep it in the background. But I was convinced that it had to happen. There was a big need there.


These meetings brought the ANC and white young business people and politicians together for the first time. The sports bodies and organisations met with the ANC and other Black African liberation organisations. This was going on while Nelson Mandela was also holding meetings with the government officials while still in prison (Mandela 1995). There was no doubt about the effectiveness of these meetings. Laidlaw reports that in his discussions with the officials during a recent visit to South Africa in 1995, many of the people involved in these initial contacts, including former President de Klerk, recognised that those clandestine meetings and the talks that went on behind the scenes had great impact. The apartheid government realised that if they did not make the ANC partners in the political transformation of South Africa through peaceful and democratic processes, then the South African government would miss out on many aspects of international life. The bottom line was that the ANC would set the agenda,
and most probably a very violent agenda, as President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia had cautioned:

“We have consistently warned of the explosion that is bound to erupt if the apartheid system is not abolished through peaceful means. What is taking place now is a sign that the explosion is imminent. That explosion can be avoided if the white leaders in South Africa have regard for human life. The way to avoid this explosion is by these leaders opening up a dialogue with genuine African leaders, such as Nelson Mandela, on the political changes that must take place in South Africa. Clearly there are two ways of solving the problem of apartheid in South Africa. One is through peaceful means and the other is through a violent armed struggle”.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1985, pp. 5-6.

It was against this background of strong response from New Zealand to the crisis of apartheid both diplomatically and morally and psychologically, through cultural and sporting boycott in supportive association with Africa and the international community, that the government in South Africa embarked on a process of transition to multiracial democracy starting with the release of Nelson Mandela in February 1990 and leading up to the April 1994 elections. New Zealand's official response, particularly the proactive leadership from 1984, through sports and cultural boycott and the diplomatic push, was instrumental in the resolution of the crisis of apartheid.

7.4 New Zealand's Official response to the political and social crisis in Africa

The crisis of political instability, civil wars and the abuse of basic human and civil rights is endemic in Africa, from the never ending wars in Angola and Mozambique to the genocide in Rwanda, through to the forty year war in the Sudan and the breakdown of civil society in Somalia. The social and economic development of the African countries is hampered by incessant internal strife. The crisis of political instability
reached a turning point from the late 1970s to the early 1980s, when the wars of independence in many African countries intensified. At the same time the newly independent states were crippled by insurgent guerrilla activities by the opposition forces (such as UNITA in Angola and REMANO in Mozambique). In the Horn of Africa the civil wars in Sudan and Ethiopia intensified and the Eritrean war of independence against Ethiopia reached its zenith. Namibia was struggling under the yoke of apartheid, and the Front Line states were constantly harassed and destabilised by incursions from the apartheid regime in South Africa. Burundi and Rwanda were rumbling because of ethnic tensions. Neither the UN nor the OAU had the mechanism to deal with any of these.

While the absence of a peaceful environment and the factors that have created the political instability are analysed in Chapter Four, it is particularly important to note at this point that, probably the most important of these factors is the lack of both political accountability and economic justice. The absence of these factors leads to the gradual alienation of the majority of the population from effective participation in the political and the economic processes of their countries. It is this alienation which is the principal cause of the disintegration of the feeble democratic systems left by the colonial system. Ake suggests that the root of the political crisis in Africa is essentially in the structural constraints, the poverty and the narrowness of the social base for the post colonial political and democratic institutions:

“Although the elite have an exceptionally high profile in African democracy movement and largely dominates its leadership, they do not constitute its social base. Poor leadership and structural constraints have turned the high expectations of the independence movements into painful disappointments, forcing many African leaders to rely more on coercion which deepened alienation. But the coercion and alienation have worsened the prospects of development, leading to yet more alienation and coercion.”

Chapter Seven

210

Love M. Chile
The tragic consequences of this vicious circle are (that) the physical as well as the social infrastructures have collapsed, economies are mired in chronic crisis, poverty has greatly intensified and the people are in revolt.”
Ake 1993, p240.

The result is the break down of civil society as ordinary people demand the transfer of power from the small but brutally repressive minority elite, who have enjoyed the monopoly of power and yet failed most miserably in terms of responsible exercise of authority and management of the economy. The inextricable relationship between political and civil rights and economic progress has not yet been recognised by Africa’s political elite. They have not recognised that political democratisation and economic development and social well being go hand in hand, that social and economic development are better served by a political process which engages the energy and commitment of the ordinary people through their effective participation and ownership of the process. It is New Zealand’s response to this political crisis that the analysis in the following section is devoted.

7.41 New Zealand’s Official Response to the Crisis of political Instability in Africa: The position prior to 1984

New Zealand’s response to the political regression in Africa prior to 1984 was limited essentially to the crisis of apartheid. There are a number of reasons for this. The most obvious is the considerable physical and psychological distance between New Zealand and Africa. Africa is so far away that it hardly features in the consciousness of the average New Zealander. Apart from links with ‘white South Africa’ because of cultural, sporting and trade relations derived from the common heritage of the ‘white dominions’, New Zealand’s links with the rest of Africa were very tenuous. Although
the common heritage of the British Commonwealth provided a forum for interaction with some African countries, this was betrayed by the unsavory sporting relationship of the All Black-Springbok rugby tours in defiance of UN resolutions and the yearnings of Black Africa.

Furthermore, during the 1970s, New Zealand was also rather preoccupied with the decolonisation processes and the Soviet threat in its own home region. Its locus of interest was therefore, the South Pacific. This made Africa's political crisis a distant issue for both the New Zealand government, the NGOs and the ordinary New Zealander. In fact as late as 1987 the Minister of Foreign Affairs was advised by a senior Ministry staff that he (the staff) felt that the New Zealand government was mistaken to spend so much attention on Africa:

There was a core of people in the Ministry who were not even sympathetic to the interests that our government had in Africa. There was very considerable ignorance about Africa in the whole of the diplomatic corps. It was never seen as an issue which New Zealand could make any front running. We were still recovering from being a kind of an international pariah at the United Nations. We were more concerned with the politics of the South Pacific, where Jacques Chirac was causing the problem with nuclear testing, with New Caledonia, with the Rainbow Warrior and so on. And those were our preoccupation at that time. There was limited enthusiasm for Africa.


The feeling was that, the few interests that New Zealand had in Africa were absorbing a disproportionate amount of time and energy at the Foreign Affairs Ministry, and actually distracting attention from issues that were of greater importance to New Zealand (Thompson 1991, p95).
The lack of enthusiasm for Africa from the diplomatic corps was almost equally matched by the general lack of understanding of Africa in the community. Trevor Richards, the Chairperson of the Africa Information Centre Board of Trustees, and the Africa Programmes Manager for the Volunteer Service Abroad (VSA) explains:

The first time I went to Africa was in 1974. I went to Tanzania and Zimbabwe. I came back from there and I spoke at meetings around the country. What I found was that among a very large number of New Zealanders there was very little understanding of the geography of Africa at all. People will say have you been to South Africa you obviously saw all these things. They seem to think that South Africa was the African continent. So there was not a great deal of understanding about Africa outside of South Africa. The attitudes of most New Zealanders towards Africa were the coups and the famines and that sort of thing. I think that today it’s a bit more sophisticated than that, although I am uncertain as to how much more sophisticated it is than that.

Trevor Richards in an interview with the author, May 1995.

Even amongst the educated liberal middle class, the overriding interest was with South Africa. The rest of Africa was too remote and therefore, too removed from their consciousness, or may be Black Africa did not present them with the same sentiments as did South Africa, as Thompson suggests:

“New Zealanders knew very little about Africa. They were bound by ties of history, kinship and culture to all that was most British and least African on that continent; the white English-speaking settler population of Rhodesia and South Africa. These ties extending to white South Africa as a whole, were strengthened by the sporting rivalry that developed between New Zealand and South Africa following an early exchange of rugby tours”

Thompson 1991, p95.

The rest of Africa was neither ‘people who like rugby’ nor ‘descendants of the white settlers’, and the shared values and aspirations of Black Africa were not in the consciousness of the average New Zealander. McKinnon observes that:
There was much less interest in or ability to comprehend intra-African issues that were just as important to Africans themselves - the prospects for democracy in Black Africa, the debt crisis, even famine except when it was dramatised and sentimentalised by the western media.

McKinnon M. 1993, p250.

The media did not help to provide an understanding of Africa either. A former Editor of the New Zealand Herald commented that, the ‘New Zealand Herald does not run stories on Africa because every time you do you have to run a map of the continent as well’ (Ian Johnstone 1996). Where African stories were run, the New Zealand media’s portrayal of Africa was essentially negative and depressing. This lack of understanding of Africa meant that it was difficult for New Zealand to empathise with the desires and aspirations of Africa and Africans. At the official level it hamstrung the government’s response to the political and even the developmental crisis in Africa.

All respondents in the elite interviews agree that the average New Zealander does not have a good understanding of Africa or the crises in Africa. For example, John Bowis of SCF describes New Zealanders’ understanding of Africa as ‘a sort of a far away land that hardly anyone goes there from New Zealand so they know very little about it’. Thus, much of their perception and understanding is shaped by the images of what they get from the media, the media which David Lange describes as ‘very poor, very transient, with no understanding of history and incapable of understanding issues’. The lack of understanding of issues is not just restricted to those issues relating to Africa, but the rest of the world, as Martin Small of CORSO suggests:

It’s not just Africa, there is no analysis that is encouraged of the wider world in this country, certainly not the media. And it is difficult to get things to that sort of level with the population. New Zealand has never had something of a straight geographical awareness. But I think there is a lot of misconceptions and a lack of awareness generally within New Zealanders and generally I
would say also at the governmental level. But you know I think there is also a ‘why bother’ attitude ‘why bother with Africa’? And that’s not something that will ever be stated but one gets that feeling. At the governmental level on the question of debt and those sorts of things, there will be no awareness of the levels of massive inequities that arise through debt and the fact that there are far far more outgoing from Africa in terms of the financial transactions, the complete imbalance, there will be no awareness of some of those basic issues. There may be say one or two at the governmental level and I think one of them is the Foreign Minister, McKinnon I think he is, I don’t really have a lot of time for him, but in terms of understanding he seems to demonstrate some form of understanding of foreign matters including Africa.

Martin Small in an interview with the author, May 1995.

John Luxton explains that he became involved in the setting up of the Africa Information Centre (AIC) in Wellington in 1978 because of these same problems that the other respondents have talked about:

It was a recognition of two things: It was a recognition of how little New Zealanders knew about a continent that has over fifty independent countries many of which are larger in size and population than New Zealand. I felt there was a story that needed to be told and it was supported by the government, I was very keen to have my name in there. Not that I will share the belief of some of the other members of the committee, but hopefully I will provide another perspective. The second thing was that I have a great admiration and respect for the people I worked with. And to me as a minority person in a wonderful country I had a wonderful time. And I really respect the people that I worked with. I enjoyed working with them and to me that is something I will treasure. I hope that I came away with a bit of affinity. Even though it was only two years it was two years of my life. And with the impression our media gives New Zealanders of Africa is very pessimistic and very negative. And to me that is not the Africa I know. And that is an unfortunate image that is been perpetuated by the world media. There are many good things happening right through the continent. Very good headlines. The media has a tendency to portray Africa as only in terms of the crises, problems in Rwanda and Burundi and things like that which in no way gives a correct picture of a continent with over fifty countries going about
their normal business. So basically ensuring that our judgment is based on understanding and being a good world citizen.


But to be fair it is not just in New Zealand that there is the lack of awareness or the misrepresentation of Africa in the media. The average person in New Zealand or anywhere else would not have much understanding of Africa or the crises in Africa apart from maybe South Africa. So there would be that awareness but it would be very sectoral and partial awareness. International affairs are generally far from the top of people's attention in their daily lives. As a small country with limited diplomatic resources and no representation on the African continent prior to 1986, the infrastructure for effective response to the political crisis was not there. In the period 1975-1984 New Zealand was more or less a political and diplomatic outcast in the international community because of its sporting contacts with South Africa. The change of government in 1984 brought about New Zealand's engagement through the United Nations peacekeeping activities and the Commonwealth monitoring forces in response to the crisis of political instability in Africa.

7.42 New Zealand’s Official Response to the Crisis of Political Instability in Africa: Contribution to Peacekeeping and Monitoring

New Zealand's response to the crisis of political instability in Africa has been essentially through contributions to international peacekeeping and the monitoring of cease-fire accords and elections. Speaking at the opening of a public seminar on Africa at Massey University in 1993, the Minister of External Relations and Trade, Don McKinnon stated that:
"The United Nations Security Council and the United Nations specialised agencies have an important role in responding to the challenges of Africa. No fewer than eight African issues are currently on the Security Council agenda. New Zealand cannot ignore what is happening in Africa. Africa is a continent racked by civil war, tribal conflict, drought and starvation. According to the United Nations estimate, 30 million Africans may die of starvation this year. A further 180 million face serious malnutrition. New Zealand's membership of the Security Council gives us the opportunity to be more directly involved in security and political issues facing Africa. We are playing our part in different ways including humanitarian assistance and through peacekeeping activities in Somalia and Angola".

Ministry of External Relations and Trade 1993, p56.

New Zealand's peacekeeping involvement in Africa began in 1980 when it joined the Commonwealth observer mission to Zimbabwe and Uganda. In support of Zimbabwe's political transition to independence, New Zealand contributed 74 military personnel to the Commonwealth cease-fire monitoring force in Zimbabwe between 1979 and 1980. It also sent a group of election specialists to observe the actual conduct of the elections (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1980). In Uganda, even though it was not invited directly by the Commonwealth or the United Nations to participate in the monitoring, New Zealand made a contribution of NZD 30,000 towards the cost of sending a Commonwealth team to observe the general election in that country after the overthrow of the dictatorship of Idi Amin. The contribution was a demonstration of New Zealand's:

"effort to assist Uganda in the re-establishment of an elected government, and an expression of support for the role of the Commonwealth in these elections and of our hope that the elections will pave the way to a period of stability and economic growth in Uganda".

From 1989 and into the 1990s, New Zealand's participation in the United Nations and Commonwealth peacekeeping activities in response to the political and social crises in Africa became particularly important as the number of conflicts increased and their severity intensified. The first major response was to a United Nations request for Peacekeeping forces in Namibia:

We were asked to be involved in Namibia. And initially the cabinet declined my request for us to send 40 Police Officers. Then I said can I buy time, can I go away and think about it. Then we cut the numbers from 40 to 32. So in the end I got through against an earlier cabinet decision, and 32 people were established in Namibia. And gradually we began. And let me be honest about it, I think there has been a greater preparedness on the part of this government than there was by my colleagues to be committed to UN forces. But it was early days. But we did get involved and gradually in Angola and some of the troubled areas of Southern and Eastern Africa.


The 32 police officers and 14 army engineers in Namibia were part of the United Nations Transitional Assistance Group (UNITAG), which helped to locate and dispose of mines and munitions left over from the period of fighting. They also monitored the country's constituent assembly elections (Ministry of External Relations and Trade 1991).

By the end of 1992 there were over 120 New Zealand personnel serving in various United Nations peacekeeping forces. Of these some were serving with the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM I), to monitor the cease-fire between UNITA and the Angolan government forces of the UMPLA. Their task also included the promotion of political reconciliation and national reconstruction as agreed under the terms of the Lusaka Protocol. In 1992 the terms of the mission (UNAVEM II) were extended to monitor the withdrawal of foreign forces (mainly Cuban), and also to monitor the election under the terms of an agreement signed in Lisbon between the
two warring parties. The New Zealand troops stayed on, reinforced by a group of twelve de-mining experts whose primary responsibility was to create a national mine clearance capacity. This was in response to the serious safety problems created by an estimated 9-15 million land mines (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 1995B), that infest the entire country after over 30 years of civil war. New Zealand’s response to the political crisis in Mozambique was similar to that in Angola and Namibia. As in the previous cases, New Zealand contributed eight instructors and one senior officer to the United Nations Observer Mission on Mozambique (UNOMOZ). They worked at the Mine Clearance Training Centre at Beira as instructors and trainers. This was in addition to New Zealand’s contribution to the monitoring of the political transition which culminated in the October 1994 election (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 1995C, p39). The de-mining experts were retained in Mozambique by the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs.

New Zealand also participated in both the two United Nations Observer Missions to Somalia (UNOSOM I&II). In 1992 following the outbreak of street fighting in Mogadishu, and the consequent slaying of the Pakistani peace keeping forces, New Zealand contributed another 28 troops to the UN forces to Somalia as part of the United Nations programme of logistical support and assistance for humanitarian relief in that country, under UNOSOM. In the course of the response to the tragedy of the starvation and malnutrition brought about by the factional fighting, the United Nations authorised, (United States led) Unified Task Force (UNITAF) was set up to rectify the internal security problem which had overwhelmed UNOSOM I. Their mandate was to promote political reconciliation and establish a secure environment for the re-establishment of political and legal structures in the country. New Zealand offered an
air transport force involving the Royal New Zealand Air Force (RNZAF), together with three Andover aircraft and logistical support to the United Nations humanitarian emergency relief operations in that country, tagged ‘Operation Restore Hope’. This was additional to its contribution to UNOSOM, the international military intervention force in Somalia. The Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade explains:

I decided that we should send troops. My Ministry opposed the decision. They felt it was outside our area of interest. My view was look these soldiers are not doing anything else. They are in New Zealand just training. We are diminishing our role in Cambodia. We have got people who can do it. Let us make an offer to the UN. So we offered the UN three different components, and they took one or two. And to me that was a good exercise for us politically because we should have been engaged. We had the capacity to be engaged. We had the people who were trained to be engaged. And of course it is obviously good experience for these people. We were saying there is a problem and we want to help do something about it. And we allowed ourselves to be engaged. Of course it was not the most successful UN operation the world has ever seen. It probably may be described as a disaster. We got through it anyway. Despite all criticism a whole lot of people got fed for a long period of time considering the level of political instability.

Don McKinnon in an interview with the author, July 1995.

The level of New Zealand’s commitment to peacekeeping in response to the crises of political instability in Africa has been quite large. The UNOSOM II operation in Somalia alone cost over NZD 7 million. The combined budget of New Zealand’s peacekeeping responses is estimated at an average NZD 12 million annually between 1991 and 1994 (McKinnon D. 1993, p9). At the end of 1994 there were about 300 New Zealand personnel serving in peacekeeping operations around the world. About half of these were on various duties in Africa (Ministry of External Relations and Trade 1995B).
While New Zealand has accepted the challenges and duties of responsible world citizenship in its peacekeeping response, peacekeeping as an international response to crises in its present makeup is rather hamstrung. As Thakur accurately observes “peacekeeping has become a circuit breaker in a spiraling cycle of political and social violence” (Thakur 1995, p62). It served only as a form of a band aid approach in responding to the crisis of political instability. Far too often it comes after deep seated political and social differences are ignored by the international community, and minority groups become completely alienated and disenfranchised. In many countries the social structures and systems, as well as government policies, tend to marginalise certain groups within the society to a point where differences become deep seated and almost intractable. In the case of Rwanda, for example the situation that brought about the escalation of the political crisis leading to the tragic genocide in 1994 is that the country was ravaged by three years of civil war between the mainly Tutsi minority and the majority Hutu. The war was the culmination of over 20 years of tribal violence which had plagued the country even prior to independence in 1962. Peace was restored only in August 1993 and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) was established to help a transitional government prepare for elections for November 1995. The genocidal killings and human rights crisis that followed the assassination of the President Habyarimana and his Burundi counterpart, President Ntaryarima in April 1994, illustrates the inadequacy of the peacekeeping philosophy in dealing with the fundamental causes of social and political crisis. The UNAMIR was there in Rwanda when the killings broke out. But it could not do anything to stop it or help the victims because it did not have the mandate or the resources. Thus while the genocide broke out right under its nose, the UN’s preoccupation was the safe withdrawal of the peacekeeping and monitoring forces.
The break down of civil order in Somalia similarly escalated in the face of UNISOM and UNITAF and engulfed the UN peacekeepers and monitors. This underlies the need for the international community to establish a framework for building peace and peace environment before social, political and ethnic differences deteriorate to the Rwanda and Somalia type crises. It emphasises the need to identify and enhance the structures which promote the inclusion of all groups in the economic and political process of their country, and to ensure their effective participation.

New Zealand’s membership of the UNSC in 1993-1994 gave it the opportunity to become involved, even more closely, in a wide range of Africa’s political crises. New Zealand led the Security Council Mission to Somalia in 1994, and participated in the Security Council mission to Mozambique. The peacekeeping role it undertook is a demonstration of its belief in the importance of the role of the international community through the United Nations in responding to social and political crises in Africa. The Minister of Foreign Affairs And Trade, Don McKinnon argues that:

“We were conscious of the changing role of the United Nations and the Security Council before we launched our bid for a seat on the Council. We knew that the United Nations would be moving beyond the traditional peacekeeping role to the more difficult and dangerous task of peacemaking and peacebuilding. The conflicts the world is facing today demand new responses. We must respond collectively to the complex challenge of preventing fighting, dealing with humanitarian emergencies and creating conditions in which law and order and stable governments can be established”.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 1993A, p34.

And as the Prime Minister, Jim Bolger, said in his address to the United Nations in 1992, this response should not be limited only to certain parts of the world. Africa is an important part of this arrangement:
"New Zealand believes it is vital the United Nations respond to situations which threaten the peace or cry out for global action, wherever in the world they may occur. We cannot, we must not, allow parts of the world to be marginalised or thought less important than others. The tragedy in Somalia is different but of equal horror to that in what was Yugoslavia”.


New Zealand’s two year term on the Security Council was an important watershed in its response to the political and social crisis in Africa. It was a critical point in the political transition in many African countries. The peace process in Angola and Namibia reached critical points in 1992, and New Zealand personnel were helping the process along in both countries. During New Zealand’s presidency of the Security Council in March 1993, 15 resolutions were decided on in 35 sessions of the council.

Five of the eleven topics on which the resolutions were passed were African issues dealing with Angola, Liberia, Rwanda, Somalia and Western Sahara (McKinnon D. 1993, p9). The social crisis in Rwanda and the reprisal killings of the Tutsi by the Hutu tribe and the resulting complex crises of refugees, internally displaced people, starvation and disease brought a new dimension to Africa’s crises. Moving significantly in the opposite direction, South Africa was entering the most critical stage in its political transition process.

Throughout its term New Zealand took an independent line and had creative approaches in shaping the international response to these crises. In the case of Rwanda it supported the idea of an expanded United Nations presence and played a leading role in dealing with the concerns of the UNAMIR troop contributing nations, and together with the secretariat argued for its expansion and deployment. It also sponsored (with the United States) the resolution that established the international tribunal to deal with the genocide, and liaised with the permanent Security Council
members on the necessary amendments to the draft resolution to ensure the cooperation of the Rwanda government (Brown 1995, p55). In the case of Somalia New Zealand resisted the efforts by the Council to close down UNOSOM, and successfully lobbied the Council to maintain a viable operation after the withdrawal of the American forces. UNOSOM II was established under New Zealand’s presidency, the first ever enforcement operation under the United Nations command and control, and led a mission to Somalia. It played a very constructive role which combined with its vigour and independence earned it a lot of respect (Brown 1995, p54). It recognised the shortcomings of the peacekeeping process and sought to introduce appropriate reform processes. In terms of enhancing the democratic process and thus prevent the cycle of political and social crises in Africa, the government recognises the need for assisting the countries in the process of political transition. It is this recognition that has led to new initiatives such as the ‘Commonwealth Good Government programme’.

7.43 New Zealand’s Official Response to the Crisis of Political Instability in Africa: Commonwealth Good Government Programme.

New Zealand’s response to the crisis of political instability in Africa is based on the understanding that ‘social and strategic peace’ are important in the economic transformation of African countries. Its response is aimed at encouraging countries to move towards democracy and thereby attain political and social stability. A democratic society with more developed transfer of power is more likely to develop political stability and social harmony. Conflict and insecurity inevitably leads to social and economic regression as there is an intrinsic relationship between political democracy
and economic democracy. The ‘Commonwealth good government programme’ established to mark New Zealand hosting of the CHOGM in Auckland in 1995, is an acknowledgment of this. The fund is to support projects in areas such as civil service reform, public sector enterprise restructuring, resource management and legal and electoral systems, to enhance democratic processes and institutions as well as to promote socioeconomic development. It recognises that where there is political regression the most vulnerable groups, the minorities and the underprivileged, are denied basic civil and human rights. Therefore, there is the need to create the political infrastructure on which true democratic principles are built. The programme consists of New Zealand providing facilities and the opportunity within the framework of the Commonwealth for:

“enhancing the capacity to provide advice, training and other forms of technical assistance to governments in constitutional and legal matters, including programmes of democratization, assisting in the electoral field, including the establishment and strengthening of electoral machinery, civic and voter education and assisting with voter education and registration. Observation of elections, including by-elections or local elections where appropriate and at the request of the member government concerned. Strengthening the rule of law and promoting the independence of the judiciary through the promotion of exchanges among, and the training of, the judiciary. Assistance in providing the necessary administrative support machinery for good governance, particularly in the area of public reform. Other activities in association with the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association and other bodies, to strengthen the democratic culture and effective parliamentary practice”.


The programme consolidates the ad hoc responses in the form of contributions to election monitoring and short term training programmes for Southern and East Africa.
It is part of the process of reforming the official development assistance programme, as John Luxton explains:

Many of the old approaches to aid and development assistance to me are being hamstrung by the more basic one which is political infrastructure. And it seems to me that there is possibly more potential for New Zealand to be looking at ways in which we can help develop the political infrastructure and transform the bureaucracy which will be less of a burden on the economy for existing resources to be better used. Which is a big skill that New Zealand has acquired through some reasonable degree of pain over the last decade. But what we have found is that we can actually every year deliver more for less real dollars. But once again one has to be careful about the sensitivities and how that can be translated and transferred to some of the economies in Africa. Alternatively you continue in the field of education.


The initiative recognises the importance of social and economic development in enhancing political participation.

This process began in 1992 to complement United Nations and Commonwealth peacekeeping and monitoring activities, to demonstrate New Zealand's commitment to 'fostering democracy and democratic institutions in Africa countries'. It started with New Zealand's participation in the political transition in South Africa. Russell Marshall, who was a member of the Commonwealth Observer Mission to South Africa, explains that their group was one of four set up to help resolve the violence that preceded the election of 1994:

Now what happened was that after Mandela was released and the process of negotiation began, violence escalated. There is not much doubt in my mind that the violence was organised largely by elements inside the Police force and that is borne out by the information that is still coming out, with some officers coming out of the woodwork to declare their role in what they were doing, setting up Black-to-Black violence to make it look as if it was Black-on-Black. But it was largely orchestrated by elements in the Police, to some extent by the Military but largely by the
Police, some of them of very senior level. The cause of this was not known at the time and was not really understood internationally, but the problem was there.

So in 1992 the Secretary General of the Commonwealth went in to South Africa. He became concerned that the Commonwealth should do something about it. In August 1992 the UNSC passed resolution 772 which asked for four international forces to go in there. The OAU, European Union, the UN themselves and the Commonwealth, to help in defusing the violence. So the Commonwealth in October 1992 sent a team, a small team largely army, police and diplomats to work with the political parties and groups about training them in terms of how to organise rallies, how to avoid confrontation and so on. We were in a team of no more than twenty, and all the teams were quite small. And that team continued right up to May 1994. There were four stages we went through and I was the last chairman of the group in January until May 1994. And in my time, not because of my presence but just coincidentally, the Commonwealth took on a variety of other roles. We were already training with police officers from Zimbabwe and Britain, training various political groups right through the political spectrum in organisation of themselves at rallies, training marshals particularly. We then got army military and police people trying to integrate elements of the various police and army in South Africa, Blacks and white. This was not a success. But we came in and at least learnt from the mistakes and we helped to train the national peace keeping force which was later abandoned. We brought in 57 electoral specialists from around the Commonwealth to help, to advise on organising the elections. Frankly we very often organised the election especially in the rural areas. We brought media people in to help them too, for the media to work in a non sensitive environment for the first time. We had nine police officers working in the nine provinces with the Goldstone Commission of Inquiry into Violence. And then at the end there was a team that came in under Michael Mende from Jamaica just for the elections themselves and we joined forces with that team. And I stayed on until the end of May, a month after the elections.


The responsibility of the Mission was to help ease the transition process, initially by acting as a moderating influence in the violent clashes. They also established contacts
with leaders of the community groups and worked in liaison with the South African National Peace Secretariat formed in 1992 under the all party National Peace Accord. The first New Zealand representative was Emmett Mitten a former Assistant Commissioner of Police (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 1992, p52). Another group of three New Zealanders: Sir Paul Reeves, Sue Wood and Hugh Templeton, were part of the Commonwealth observer team that observed the actual election. In addition there was another group of 14 New Zealanders who worked as part of the United Nations Observer Mission to South Africa (UNOMOSA) (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 1994A, p48). They were posted to different parts of South Africa to observe polling booth activities and generally to act as constraint and constructive influence in the election process. The New Zealand government also contributed NZD 100,000 to the special voluntary fund established by the Commonwealth Secretary General for the Commonwealth observer group (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 1994A, p38). The New Zealand VSA also posted a group of volunteers to help in the voter education programme particularly in the East Cape Province. In other parts of Africa, New Zealand had representatives on the Commonwealth Observer Mission to Ghana for the Presidential (November) and parliamentary (December) elections in 1992. And in 1995 financial assistance was given to Sierra Leone to support its democratisation process after four years of civil war (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 1995B, p34). The Commonwealth Good Government programme, therefore, has been designed to get New Zealand involved in the political restructuring processes in African countries. It is an attempt to address the problem of political instability from its root cause, rather than waiting until the situation deteriorates into civil unrest and the collapse of civil society. It is a process of sharing New Zealand's political and democratic experience with the African countries.
Other Forms of New Zealand’s Official Response: 1 Duty-Free Trade Access

Because of New Zealand’s distance and the size of its economy, its official response to the economic crises in Africa has been mainly through advice and goodwill gestures such as enabling access to New Zealand market for imports from African countries, and offering New Zealand’s experience in economic management and reforms to African countries. New Zealand-Africa trade exchange is very small, amounting to only slightly over NZD 62.5 million in exports and NZD 80.6 million in imports in 1985 (Holland 1987, p250), this has grown, albeit minimally, to NZD 254 million and NZD 136 million respectively, in 1995 (Geard 1996). To encourage trade exchange with African countries the government in 1984 extended the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) to African countries. This allows duty free access to a range of products from Zimbabwe and the SADCC countries. The GSP is seen as a goodwill gesture, an expression of support and New Zealand’s belief in the role of international free trade in the development process. Laidlaw argues that this is an example that the EC and the US should follow:

In terms of access particularly for Africa to European markets free of tariffs and being able to move beyond the stage where the Lome Agreement provides for quota system and certain amount of duty free access. Moving beyond that to recognising that many of these countries can produce goods better than Europe and at a lower cost than anybody else, and if they are allowed to compete without artificial barriers being placed by them (the EC and the US), they (African countries) win. Why shouldn't there be the benefits in that advantage. That has always been our platform.


Trade is not an end in itself, but a means to growth and development. Although the expansion of trade does not necessarily guarantee rising standards of living, by contributing to the expansion of income earning possibilities for individuals and
countries, it can help break the constraints imposed by trade deficits and poor balance of external payments. Trade can also contribute to rising standards of living by enabling countries to raise their incomes through better utilisation of their comparative strengths and better allocation of their production resources. The extension of the GSP programme to African countries is thus aimed at responding to the trade crisis, as the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade suggests:

I am certainly a great advocate of free trade. Africa has enormous resources for that. Africans can produce a lot of good food and if allowed to be freely traded people can freely choose and their fortunes can change accordingly. It really is a question of capitalising on those resources, and for western countries to allow those resources, those products to be freely traded around the world.

Don McKinnon in an interview with the author, July 1995.

As international development assistance resources continue to decline and remain low due to the limits on government finances and budgetary constraints, trade is increasingly seen as a more effective mechanism for the transfer of resources to least developed countries. Free trade access is therefore, just as important as financial assistance. Countries with poor access to external markets find it difficult to effectively utilise their internal production capacity. Therefore, international development assistance and free trade access must be seen as intrinsically complementary. The link between protectionist policies and economic underdevelopment should be recognised in development assistance policies of the developed countries.

However, this must be approached with caution, especially in terms of the overall global free trade that opens up the fragile economies of the African countries for dumping cheaper mass produced consumer goods from the advanced capitalist economies, and thus killing their industrialisation efforts. Trade must be seen as
complementary to other forms of international development assistance rather than mutually exclusive options applied to different countries. Although in theory trade should encourage expansion in the export capacity and enable the recipient partner country to build up capacity for development, free trade tends to favour those who have established infrastructure for both production and distribution. This creates inequality of access for those that are already disadvantaged both at the international as well as the national level. An increase in trade may not necessarily bring about improved quality of life for the masses of the population who do not own the means of production (land, capital etc.). In fact it may actually increase economic disparity by taking land from subsistence producers and concentrating it in the hands of export producers. This may lead to further dispossession of the poor small land holders, the marginalisation of the small producers, and aggravate social tension. Care must be taken in the formulation of national development policies, so that the mistakes of the 1970s dependence on primary export are not repeated. The commodity prices crash that led to the balance of payment crisis must not be forgotten. Export production must also not be allowed to erode food production for internal consumption. These are some of the issue that need to be considered in the operations and practical application of the GATT agreement.

7.52 Other Forms of Official Responses: 2 Exporting New Zealand’s model of a market economy

An interesting result from the study which was not anticipated at the conception of the research is the debate on the most appropriate form of New Zealand’s response to the economic crises in Africa. It reflects the on going debate on the economic
restructuring in New Zealand. It surrounds the attempt to get the African countries to test the economic experiments that New Zealand has undertaken since the 1980s.

Chris Laidlaw explains:

We wanted to establish a presence which will enable us to develop relationships with those countries and through those countries other African countries in terms of pursuing our anti-nuclear objectives, enlarging our capacity at the UN, getting our point of view across about a variety of other issues, human rights and economic management too. That you can be a government which stands for certain issues and major principles and at the same time be relatively free market in orientation. That was our strategic interest in getting that point across, and I think we succeeded. Maybe we went a little too far on the issue of economic liberalisation but history is going to judge that. So that was our major strategic interest.

Chris Laidlaw in an interview with the author, July 1995. (Emphasis added)

It is interesting that Africa could become a testing ground for New Zealand’s economic experiments. This is being pursued with great vigor especially with the East African and Southern African countries. Chris Laidlaw argues that the broader focus of the process of enhancing ‘good government’ should include the development of the techniques of management of the economy especially in terms of economic liberalisation:

The notion that you can strike a balance between market forces in the economy and what you want to retain by way of cohesion of society through government, even if it is a single party government, for reasons of containment of tribal animosities and some of those very complex pressures. I think you can strike that balance. That you open up the economy, you deregulate. Zimbabwe is moving towards this now. It means that more people get ripped off. And there are some few people who skim the cream off. But that is the price that has to be paid for a free market system. Some people prosper enormously and initially it may appear not to benefit the people at the bottom end. But at least it brings in more money to a government which is committed to spending on social programmes.

While New Zealand adopted these new approaches to reforming government structures and processes, it would be quite difficult to transplant many of these techniques to the African environment without further substantially creating serious social and economic alienation of the less privileged. For example, in terms of the techniques of management of the economy, some of the institutional changes, such as State owned enterprise approach are quite radical legislation that have changed the fundamental structure of the New Zealand society. While a mix of public and private ownership and the checks and balances brought in probably have something to offer, those aspects of liberalising the economy, opening it up to international competition, in a predominately rural economy, may not work in the traditional African context.

The effects of the IMF and World Bank structural adjustment programmes on the economies of many African countries is still fresh in our memory and on the ground in many African countries. Even the South African economy which may be more advanced than most other African economies, may require a couple of years of careful nurturing to absorb the shocks brought on by such landmark changes.

With the political changes in South Africa since 1994, this model has gained even stronger advocacy. The new South African leadership has been invited to understudy the ‘New Zealand model’ from local government reform to state owned enterprises. New Zealand’s contribution to the transformation of South Africa is seen as being principally in this new direction. Continues Laidlaw:

In terms of the techniques of management of the economy, some of the institutional techniques some of which are the world’s first in this country. The State owned enterprise approach, a mix of public and private ownership, the checks and balances brought in, some of which have been very successful, some less so, but overall the model is better than anything else. So that kind of example of parastatal organisations. South Africa is heavily bureaucratised and heavily regulated
system with a lot of bureaucrats most of which is made up of Afrikaner civil servants who are deeply conservative who won't want to change in a hurry. Those aspects need liberalising and economic opening. I think New Zealand has an awful lot to offer probably more than any other country, any other Western country. And it is those kinds of assistance. For instance when the South African Minister Kader Asmal was here he asked me if I could send him a copy of the 1988 State Sector Act which governs the relationship between the state sector employees and the government and the virtual privatisation of many of the functions within the public service. This is a radical legislation, nothing like it anywhere else in the world. He is very interested in that and very interested in seeing to what extent that can be worked through the South African system. A huge task but they are going to have to do it. And a lot of other African countries are doing so too. So in those terms we probably have something quite a lot to offer.


The New Zealand government has bought this argument and in fact, incorporated the structural adjustment of recipient African partner countries as an aspect of ‘good government’. One of the first programmes which has been supported from the good government fund was a ten-day seminar on ‘Public Service Reform’ for senior public servants from six Southern and Eastern African countries. Commenting on the significance of the seminar, which covered issues such as financial management reforms, privatisation and commercialisation of government functions, and public service labour market reforms, the Deputy Manager of the State Sector Division with the State Services Commission, Alex Mathenson said:

“Every country is thinking about government reform and is looking at New Zealand because we did it so quickly and we were so principled about it”


The economies of many African countries need restructuring to make them more efficient. However, the effects of imposing structures modeled on western capitalist industrial system on traditional communal African society spells disaster, judging from
the effects of the structural adjustment programmes imposed by the IMF and the World Bank. Deregulation and privatisation of the economy also means that ownership of public enterprises would simply move from public control (albeit by the bureaucracy), to control by shareholders none of whom would be in the lower socioeconomic classes. National assets would be bought over by international finance and transnational corporations, in collaboration with the local elite. The price of efficiency will be massive unemployment in societies that have no social security net to cushion the impact on the casualties of deregulation. The poor lower socioeconomic groups, the rural dwellers, women and the minority groups would be further marginalised. They will have no part in the national economy. One can only imagine what would happen if the Nigerian government were to sell off the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) to the international oil companies. What would become of the minorities in the oils producing areas? What would become of the environment?

Other respondents oppose this type of a market approach response to Africa’s developmental crises. It could be that it is essentially a matter of political-ideological inclination of the respondents. For example, Martin Small of CORSO argues that even the trade agreements are an imposition on the indigenous populations, and provide no visible benefits to the lower socioeconomic classes and the working people. Trevor Richards goes further to suggest that even the idea of democratisation must be reviewed critically:

I think that African governments make mistakes just like other governments in the rest of the world make mistakes. I see that there needs to be changes inside and outside of Africa. I think that one of the fascinating things going on at the moment within Africa is related to the question of multi-partyism. I have been going to Tanzania since 1974. Tanzania was what we call in the West a one-party state, TANU now CCM. But now Tanzania is multi-party. Why is Tanzania...
multi-party? Is it multi-party because Tanzanians want it a multi-party state, or is it multi-party because the international community wants it a multi-party state? And I don't think there is any doubt it is because of the latter. Most Tanzanians would have criticisms of CCM, the ruling party, but in all the time I have been going to Tanzania, and I must have been there 15 times in the last 20 years, I never saw any sort of ground swell towards multi-partyism. Now I think we have this idea in the West that the best form of government is the Westminster style democracy. Maybe the Westminster has worked well for us, I don't know, but it does not necessarily mean that it is going to work quite well for other kinds of communities. There are changes even in New Zealand. Yes, that's right. And so I think that's one of the fascinating debates that are going to go on and on. It will be in this context that Africans themselves will examine what form of government they are going to have themselves. Now I don't think that military governments are sort of regarded by those who live under them as the solution. I don't think that one-party states have necessarily performed well, and I don't think that multi-party systems are necessarily going to perform well either. And I think that Africa needs to go back to its roots and rediscover where it came from and in the process, what form of system of government is going to be best for it.

Trevor Richards in an interview with the author, May 1995.

Russell Marshall agrees, arguing that the western countries must stop trying to impose their value systems on Africa. He cautions against the 'headlong rush to world free trade', economic reforms through structural adjustment programmes, and 'putting the finger in too vigorously on human rights':

Free trade I am still cynical about it. Who benefits from free trade? Pacific Islanders don't. Third World countries don't I don't think. The jury is still out, well in my view the jury is but from my knowledge of the international effects of free trade I suspect that further down the line people will belatedly find that there are winners and losers. And the losers will be people who have been for generations losers. (And) I think that western countries such as New Zealand need to be a bit cautious about criticising the human rights and political systems in Africa for two reasons. Firstly on the issue of the political systems. We have been brought up with the idea that the Westminster confrontational system of government is the best. But it is not all that flawless in my view. Which is why New Zealand is moving away towards another system. But it is also culturally
inappropriate adversary system of politics. So I think we have got to be less judgmental. People like the British Conservative Party may say we will help you once you bring about democracy, preferably in our way. And I think we need to re-evaluate and have a more flexible approach on that. Secondly, on the issue of human rights, the western people, New Zealanders included, tend to think of human rights in individual terms. That is not the Third World way, it is not the Pacific way, it is not the African way of looking at human rights issues. People think of themselves in other parts of the world primarily as part of the community. And individual rights come second. And frankly I think that we have it back to front. So I would like to see a more sympathetic understanding of other cultures ways of doing things. So that you don’t put the finger in too vigorously on your perception of human rights. Which is not to say that individual human rights are unimportant. Nor should you put your finger in too vigorously when you see them as one-party states as you think that and have a preconceived idea of what that is all about.


This is an interesting debate on the direction that the transformation of the political economy should take. Undoubtedly, heavily bureaucratised systems are a burden on the economy as demonstrated by Tanzania’s case where the drive towards full employment in the post-independence period led to the civil service being enlarged to unmanageable limits supported by external borrowing. To move from one extreme to the other, by trimming government expenditure to the bone in order to satisfy the economic ideology of the neo-liberal international finance institutions would be inviting further social and political crises.
New Zealand's official response to the crises in Africa has focused on international cooperation in finding solutions to the political and civil crises. Successive governments have identified with the socioeconomic and political disasters affecting Africa, particularly the countries in eastern and southern Africa. However, official response during the period 1975-1984 over apartheid was equivocal. Constructive engagement with Africa and the international community from 1984 through cultural, political and sporting boycotts provided the moral and diplomatic impact by isolating the apartheid regime and enabling the peaceful resolution of the apartheid crisis. New Zealand has also contributed to the international response to the crisis of political instability in Africa through participation in peacekeeping and monitoring in countries in crisis. Because of geographical distance and the size of its economy, New Zealand's official response to the economic crises has been mainly symbolic such as the GSP and advice on economic reforms to eastern and southern African countries. Chapter Nine examines the role of NGOs in New Zealand's response to the crises in Africa, but the next chapter re-examines New Zealand's official response in the context of the theory and literature in order to identify New Zealand's motivation for responding to the crises in Africa.
CHAPTER EIGHT

NEW ZEALAND’S IDENTIFIABLE FOREIGN POLICY INTERESTS IN RESPONDING TO THE CRISSES IN AFRICA?

“Economic development and political stability are built on shifting sands if they are achieved at the price of glaring inequalities and injustices among [people]”. David Morse, Former Director General of the International Labour Office, Geneva.

8.1 Introduction

Chapter Seven examined New Zealand’s specific response to identified crises in Africa. In this chapter New Zealand’s official response to the crises in Africa is recast within the framework of the theory and literature of the motivation for giving international assistance. It identifies New Zealand’s interests in Africa and examines how New Zealand’s response to the crises in Africa enhanced the pursuit of these interests. The conclusion critically examines how the dual purpose of responding to the crises and achieving New Zealand’s foreign policy interests has been balanced.
8.2 What are New Zealand's identifiable foreign policy interests in Africa?

New Zealand's response to the crises in Africa is a mixture of altruistic considerations and the pursuit of foreign policy interests. This was tested through intensive interviews and also the review of official policy documents. All 12 New Zealand respondents in the elite interviews were asked if New Zealand's political, commercial and/or strategic interests were considerations in the allocation process in New Zealand's international assistance to Africa. All the seven respondents associated with the government's official international assistance programme answer in the affirmative. John Luxton, the Minister of Maori Affairs and Minister of Police and also the Associate Minister of Education, who served as a specialist with the UNDP/FAO programme in Tanzania in 1975-1977 states that:

Politically there is a significant interest. Many members are part of the Commonwealth. And to me that binds people together. And as part of the UN once again having the support of Africa as a group of countries. And being seen by them as a clear and reasonably impartial voice is good credentials for New Zealand to have. So that politically it is important to have that contact with Africa. Economically the contact is not so great, but there is tourism. A significant amount of trade to countries that can afford it. The north African countries, Egypt, Algeria in particular, then there is Nigeria and Southern Africa. There is significant trade. Not high but now there is better prospect of increasing that trade. Security wise, I think that really ties into the political one, ensuring that we have good relations and have respect for the respective countries. And our judgment is based on understanding and being good citizens. And that means we work on that too.

This position is confirmed by the Development Assistance Division of the Ministry of External Relations and Trade, in a Country Strategy Paper: Africa, in which the Director, Jim Howell, argues that:

“Africa, in particular sub-Saharan Africa, is of marginal importance to New Zealand’s essential interests. It is not in our area of direct strategic concern and there is little likelihood of conflict in that region which could seriously endanger international peace and security, particularly in the South West Pacific. Africa however does have other claims to our attention, with 51 votes in the United Nations and 14 of 48 Commonwealth countries are Black African nations. African nations thus represent an important influential group in the international arena. New Zealand’s credentials as a responsible member of the international community is judged by the policies it adopts on South Africa, especially by Black African countries. Recognising the need to position itself now to be able to establish good relations with Namibia and South Africa after independence, and markets for New Zealand goods and service”.

File No. 118/13/118/1 22 September 1989.

The observation that Black African countries are not strategically relevant to New Zealand because there is only limited possibility of conflict in that region seriously endangering international peace and security is quite naive. In the period of the cold war Africa was essentially an ideological battleground for East and West as the case in Somalia and Ethiopia clearly showed (see Gavshon 1981, chapter 11; Chege 1987). Moreover, many of the internal civil crises in African countries such as in Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe at that time were essentially ideological conflicts between emerging political groups trying to determine the political and economic direction for the newly independent states. African conflicts therefore had the potential of escalating into international conflict which could directly and indirectly draw in New Zealand.
The director's other observations were very much in line with the thinking in official circles both at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and the parliament. Consequently, the decision making process for international development assistance allocation focused on these interests in determining regional priorities. The respondents from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade suggest that:

the process is driven by the priorities of the government. There are a range of considerations on which programmes to increase allocation are based. Sometimes there may be a bit of political element found. These are broad. Broader political interests, broader regional interests. If we go beyond the South Pacific, well what countries are within our sights in terms of our broader economic and trade interests, that we can make a difference. What countries are New Zealand private sector after? Which countries have closer or more distant relationships? The political division will talk to the development co-operation division, we will look at the other aspects. We consider whether New Zealand should play a part in this area. Have all the factors been considered. And money may then be allocated within the aid budget. Initially the government of course decides these areas, particularly in South Asia and the areas of involvement. So those decisions are the government decisions that are being made on the areas that aid may go, and even with the individual countries concerned that is determined by the government to a large extent.


In terms of the theory and and the contextual models, this fits into the functional utility approach and the donor interests model. It focuses on how to achieve broad political objectives through New Zealand's response to the crises in Africa. The following documents further illustrate and confirm the functional utility leaning of the official response. A memo by the development assistance liaison officer on the subject of African allocation of study awards suggests that:
"underlying any humanitarian or altruistic motives of the aid program, is the desire to generate goodwill, trade opportunities and political awareness of New Zealand. Our past record has, I believe, failed to do any of these things in African countries, Tanzania excepted. I would suggest that in future we concentrate our limited resources on a small number of countries, with a small number of awards offered to Namibia for political reasons for the publicity that such humanitarian assistance brings to New Zealand through the United Nations and the CFTC, and Tanzania in the interest of keeping alive the goodwill and image that New Zealand's past assistance has built".

File No. 118/13/118/1 October 1979.

Similarly, a cable from Harare in 1988 argues that:

"It is highly doubtful whether we can hope to fulfill one of our key objectives in Africa: to maintain a capacity to influence host governments through development cooperation. That incapacity may also have damaging effects on other activities which are supported by a visible New Zealand profile on the aid front. The major inhibitor for us is halving the Africa aid allocation".

File No. 118/13/118/1 11 October 1988.

Those ‘other activities’ that the Harare Mission was concerned about are what it referred to as the ‘opportunities for enhancing this post’s political objectives’. These included, at that time, the Commonwealth games issues, and the need to:

"position ourselves now in dealing with African liberation movements so as to establish good relationships with the new Black leadership that will emerge in Namibia and South Africa".

File No. 118/13/118/1 22 September 1989.

The objective was to achieve political and diplomatic profile for New Zealand in the recipient partner countries so that New Zealand’s interests were appropriately served. There were four main groups of foreign policy objectives that New Zealand pursued in Africa during this period, namely establishing goodwill and building a New Zealand
constituency, building New Zealand’s capacity at the United Nations and the Commonwealth, securing the 1990 Commonwealth games, and establishing possible trade and commercial outlets for New Zealand firms, goods and services. These are examined in turn in the following sections.

8.21 Establishing goodwill and political relationships in Africa

The Harare Mission lamented in 1991 that New Zealand’s profile in the Southern Africa region was so poor that its future foreign policy interests in the region were at risk:

“It is a sad fact of life that New Zealand’s past political support for the anti-apartheid cause will in the future not earn us much more than a vague goodwill from the ANC in the new South Africa. New Zealand is never going to be a major donor, but we will need to lift our profile a bit if we want to engage the attention of the ANC and the new leadership in South Africa and develop a constructive relationship. Support for the various multilateral programmes in South Africa is not likely to help establish good access to policy makers. I should note that on this visit I was not able to see any of the top four ANC officials - Mandela, Sisulu, Nzo or Mbeki”

File No. 118/13/118/1 HAR. 240 22/14292 LT. HAR. 22 May 1991.

It argues that the southern Africa region, and especially South Africa, is important for New Zealand’s commercial and trade interests, and a strong presence on the ground in terms of a development assistance programme would be a valuable strategic position for New Zealand in the future:

“There are also strong strategic reasons as to why New Zealand should have aid programmes in Southern Africa. South Africa is one of the most developed economies in the Southern Hemisphere. Because it has an industrialised economy, South Africa has the greatest trading potential for this country than many other African countries as
demonstrated by our trade figures. It is also the dominant economy of Southern Africa which will become a powerful trading block in the future. New Zealand needs to place itself strategically to take advantage of the trading possibilities post apartheid South Africa will offer”.

File No. 118/13/118/1 May 14 August 1990.

New Zealand’s response to the nationalist struggle in the region was therefore partly driven especially by its foreign policy motivation to establish links with the emerging Black leadership in Southern Africa that will enable New Zealand access to both the political and business elite in the post-apartheid South Africa.

The New Zealand community also recognises that foreign policy interests are an important aspects of New Zealand’s international assistance programme, not just to Africa but to all developing countries. A survey in 1987, of public perception of New Zealand’s international assistance, shows that 63 per cent of the population agreed that New Zealand’s assistance helps prevent political instability overseas. 70 per cent said it helps New Zealand make friends overseas, and 81 per cent said it is aimed at establishing developing countries on a strong developmental path (Hoadley 1991, p202). Also, in a survey of Maori attitude to New Zealand’s international assistance programme, Nottingham reports that there is the:

“understanding that manaaki to overseas countries was necessary as we need friends out there. Several groups mentioned that as the world was so small, all countries needed to become equally developed or there would be trouble. They also saw benefits in trade with these underdeveloped countries when they were developed and could afford our produce”

New Zealand’s political interest in terms of creating a better world for New Zealanders is therefore, an important motivation not just for the government but also for the individual groups in the New Zealand community. Doug Graham, the current New Zealand Minister for Disarmament, puts it in more plain economic but less diplomatic terms when he suggests that:

“both individual New Zealanders and the government support assistance to poor nations not only out of a sense of compassion but in our own interest to build a stable, peaceful and consumer world”.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1985, p.11.

In the case of Africa, building good relations with the African countries was important for New Zealand during the period of New Zealand’s international isolation because of its sporting relations with South Africa, discussed in the previous chapter. Laidlaw argues that his brief in this regard between 1986 and 1989, as High Commissioner was:

- to establish good relationships with the Front Line states and the key leaders in those countries, and to convince those people that New Zealand was serious after many years of being seen to be if anything on the side of the minority government in South Africa, that New Zealand was not like that.


New Zealand’s response to the apartheid crisis was therefore also aimed at re-establishing the relationship between New Zealand and Africa that had developed under the Kirk administration, but suffered during the period of Muldoon administration. It was important to develop goodwill that enabled New Zealand to regain access and the political relationship with Africa’s political leadership.
To maintain and sustain the established goodwill in Africa, the next objective was to build a ‘constituency’ amongst Africans which was sympathetic to New Zealand’s cause. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the aim is to create a positive image for New Zealand by giving the ordinary Africans a better picture of New Zealand and its policies. Within the recipient partner countries, this constituency will enable New Zealand to win approval and thus build up sympathy and support for New Zealand from the general population. Clark defines constituency building in the context of education and training awards as follows:

“In the past, limited consideration has been given to defining constituency building and thinking about how it might be measured. A commonsense understanding would suggest that if a student enjoys his/her stay in New Zealand, returning home, takes up a position which uses the skills obtained, maintains contact with lecturers, fellow students and colleagues in New Zealand and eventually reaches a decision making position in his/her work place, then this might benefit New Zealand in some way”.


The importance of this motivation is emphasised by the fact that it is identified as one of the indicators for measuring the effectiveness of New Zealand’s international development assistance programme. It has been incorporated as part of the guiding principles for NZODA, and states explicitly that:

“NZODA education and training objectives include the development among people in the recipient country (especially those who are or will be community leaders), familiarity with and favourable disposition towards New Zealand”

To best achieve this objective, scholarships and awards for study in New Zealand are preferred and encouraged over in-country training, although the later provides better return to the recipient country, as the following memo observes:

“We have always been aware that there was a real need in the primary education area (especially for girls), but in the past the post and regional division had strongly favoured the case of constituency building (i.e. political) rather than purely humanitarian assistance as the principle focus for ODA assistance in Africa. Hence the funding of African tertiary students in New Zealand.

File No. 118/13/118/1 01 September 1994, p3 and p6 (Emphasis added).

The expectation is that the individual recipients will transmit their positive experience and image of New Zealand within the recipient community on their return to their country, thereby giving the ordinary Africans a better picture of New Zealand. And if these individual recipients, who are potentially community leaders, advance into the political and national administration they will be sympathetic, supportive and more accepting of New Zealand’s policies and views on international issues.

In areas other than education and study in New Zealand, New Zealand’s response to developmental crises in Africa through community project assistance is made in circumstances which give New Zealand maximum political mileage. For example contributions to projects must be seen to be coming directly from New Zealand rather than through multilateral agencies and the NGOs. Development assistance projects that achieve the constituency building objective, suggests the High Commission in Harare are:

“high impact, high profile, low cost community based projects which are ideal in meeting political and development objectives. Such schemes provide scope for undertaking a greater geographical spread of ODA and securing wider contact with
Ministers, MPs, and senior public servants. Given the tribal nature of the politics of Africa, effective use of influence obliges us to target a range of ministers or their tribal areas.

File No. 118/13/118/1 HAR. 088 02/15402 LT. 02 November 1989.

Large scale multilateral projects are discouraged because New Zealand's profile in such programmes is lost. The following argument is advanced in the case of the Kenya forestry programme:

“Our experience with the Kenya forestry inventory scheme shows that we have been held captive by inflexible and time consuming administrative procedures of multilateral partners, and the New Zealand input tends to be overshadowed by the roles of other donors and there has been little direct spin off in terms of our political objectives or enhanced access to key officials and Ministers. We consider that we get better development and practical returns from New Zealand 'stand alone' schemes.”

File No. 118/13/118/1 64/256/2 08 March 1990.

To show how high political profile could be obtained from small low cost, high impact projects, Chris Laidlaw provides the following illustration:

When you are a small donor you get greater benefit if you direct your assistance straight to the community. So we came down to that level. And I give you an example of how you get credit for something quite small. One of the houses that had been used in Harare for refugees from South Africa was blown up and a couple of people killed in it. The whole house was more or less demolished. We undertook to provide funding and equipment, local equipment, local hand tools and so on, to get a bunch of volunteers and pay them a basic wage to rebuild it and have the Zimbabwean government set it aside for humanitarian purposes. We paid a couple of thousand dollars and the staff. And we had a sort of a starting day where all the people turned out to help rebuild this house. And we got a picture on the front page of the newspaper with a headline "New Zealand helps where others cannot" and a lot of publicity for that. And the same day the American ambassador announced the funding of a huge infrastructure project, something like 15
or 16 million dollars, and they got a small two inch column on page four. And he said to me, he said there is something wrong with the world when that happens. But that is an example of how locally focused aid can not only work better but can be seen to be more popular.


The dual purpose of attending to the humanitarian need of recipient communities in the official response as well as meeting New Zealand’s foreign policy objective is noted, although the balance between the two principles is difficult to attain as the following memo illustrates:

“As we understand the case to be, our basic aim is to meet humanitarian needs and to provide a high profile for New Zealand’s wider political concerns. ---- Our current large scale scheme in Kenya has clearly not succeeded in securing a high profile for New Zealand. In our view the amounts allocated, coupled with the constraints of being yoked to the UNDP and FAO are just not enough to make us a noticeable player alongside the major donors.”


Despite good intentions and the official position that multilateral agencies have a global reach which New Zealand could not attain because of its limited representation and delivery capacity, political expediency prevails in many cases. It would sound like a rather cynical interpretation that in order to manipulate the international development assistance programme to meet New Zealand’s foreign policy objectives, the divisive issue of the tribal nature of African politics is exploited. This illustrates the limitations of current policy and practice in fulfilling the dual purpose of providing economic progress and social justice in recipient communities and at the same time meeting New Zealand’s foreign policy objectives. The policy objective to build a New Zealand constituency clearly fits the functional utility approach.
The Commonwealth games had been plagued by boycotts and threats of boycott by African countries because of New Zealand’s sporting relations with South Africa. As early as 1973 this had been the concern of the government and was largely responsible for the decision by Prime Minister Norman Kirk to cancel the proposed Springbok tour of 1973. As Russell Marshall explains:

There was to be the Commonwealth Games coming up in Christchurch in 1974. And in the end it became very controversial. Norman Kirk decided that the tour should not go ahead. So there was a very positive step in that direction. And Julius Nyerere came around about that time. So Nyerere and Kirk got on quite well. They had very good personal relationship. Kirk went to the Commonwealth Heads of Governments Meeting (CHOGM) in Ottawa in 1973 and had a great impression on the African leaders. He was seen as much more of a Commonwealth Statesman than the previous National government had been. So that is where it began.


Although the ‘culture’ of boycotting Commonwealth and Olympic games in protest against New Zealand’s sporting relations with South Africa was not yet established in 1973, and the Christchurch Commonwealth games were secured, the government was concerned at the implications of the Springbok tour coming so close to the games. The tour also sat uneasy with the government’s moral stand on African and international issues, and the apparent contradictions would not have been missed by the African countries at the games.

The Labour government lost the 1975 election, and in the nine years between 1975 and 1984 New Zealand identified very closely with South Africa in sports. The All Blacks tour of South Africa in 1976 led to the mass boycott of the Montreal Olympics.
and of the Edmonton Commonwealth games in 1978. The return tour by the Springbok in 1981 threatened the 1982 Brisbane Commonwealth games and the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics. New Zealand's bid to host the 1990 Commonwealth games, was also threatened. As former Prime Minister David Lange explains, it was important for New Zealand to drastically change its relationship with South Africa and to be seen by the rest of Africa to have done so, for it to stand any chance at all to host the 1990 games:

In July-August 1984 we were dealing in all sorts of fronts on all sorts of things. But there were two major things that came up where Africa was concerned. First of all the expectations from our supporters that we will put an end to the South Africa post in New Zealand. Secondly we were planning to have the 1990 Commonwealth games in Auckland. And indeed before I was sworn in as Prime Minister I went to the airport to see off the delegation going off to Los Angeles where they were having the Olympic games, to lobby for the games. And I had to give them some assurances that it did not matter where you are from you will be welcome. We had to work hard to ensure full participation in the Commonwealth games. It was of course an issue which we wanted to put to bed quickly. The die-hard rugby people had gone and left us behind and we had therefore to make our position quite clear. It was a very difficult time for New Zealand. Because rugby once again came to the fore. And in 1984 we knew there were preparations afoot for the NZRFU to go to South Africa. That was an excruciatingly hard problem for me because I had no problem with the Springbok coming to New Zealand. I just could not give them a visa. But as far as it goes, they were going out of New Zealand. The policy of the New Zealand government, my policy and a deeply held conviction, is that one had the right to ingress and egress their own country. I was not going to seize the passports from New Zealanders walking out of the airport. A factor which was not completely understood by many of the African leaders. It was a very difficult time. So we decided to make a very symbolic and practical move and it was a very difficult move. We wanted to have the Commonwealth games. I was not going to tell the African leaders that I was not going to stop the All Blacks playing in South Africa, or tell them that I did not want the Springbok to receive them in South Africa. I knew that if they went to South Africa our chances of the 1990 Commonwealth games would be very severely impeded. And I wanted
to tell New Zealanders what the commonwealth was about, not just a club between Australia, New Zealand Canada and the United Kingdom.


After the games were secured for Auckland, the government was determined to avoid further links between New Zealand and the apartheid regime in South Africa that would threaten the games. This was reflected in the stand that even the High Commission in Harare took on issues of international assistance. For example, it expressed serious reservation at proposed cuts in the development assistance allocation to Africa in 1989/90:

“It is most disappointing to learn that African development assistance is unlikely to reach proposed levels of NZD 1.5 million for 1989/90. It had seemed that this higher level would have been most helpful in increasing opportunities for enhancing this post’s political objectives, particularly the commonwealth games”.

File No. 118/13/118/1 HAR. 777 12 July 1989.

It feared that this could be misconstrued by the recipient partner countries as a lack of commitment to the development crisis particularly in the Front Line states. It was especially important that the Front Line states whose economies were constantly threatened by South Africa’s military incursions did not perceive the reduction in assistance as a lack of concern for their plight. Such cuts if associated with New Zealand’s sympathies with South Africa could create a situation which threatened the Auckland games. The foreign policy objective therefore, was to minimize the threat of boycott of the Commonwealth games, as Russell Marshall explains:

We were more driven frankly in my time by an absolute determination that although the Commonwealth games have been disrupted by this issue, that was not going to happen here. We were hosting the 1990 Commonwealth games and part of what I was doing in 1988/89 was to
make sure that people realised that we have turned our backs forever on support for apartheid. And that in a sense by boycotting, yet again sports events, will be playing into the hands of the people promoting apartheid. I remember having a very long, very frank discussion for several hours in Canberra in 1989 with the Commonwealth Foreign Ministers' Committee on South Africa which included foreign Ministers of Zambia, Zimbabwe, Tanzania and Nigeria, the Commonwealth secretary General and his deputy, the Australian, Canadian and Indian Ministers. At the end of that meeting it was resolved that there will be no Commonwealth boycott. There was Nke Wachukwu from Nigeria, Abraham Chumayere from Tanzania, Luke Wanjukwo from Zambia and Ben Nkapa from Tanzania. It was also in a sense the Commonwealth games that I used as a vehicle for shifting New Zealand's foreign policy to establish our credibility internationally. And I think once and for all after that we dispensed of the notion that New Zealand was a pro apartheid country.


The success of the Auckland Commonwealth games was therefore an identifiable foreign policy interest between 1984 and 1990. The success of the games was an important statement from the government to the international sporting community that New Zealand had turned its back on sporting contact with apartheid South Africa forever. The full attendance at the games was also an atonement for past wrongs, the 1976 Olympics and 1978 Edmonton games boycott.

8.24 Building New Zealand's capacity at the United Nations: UNSC seat 1992

As significant as the Commonwealth games success was for New Zealand, it was still haunted by the ghost of apartheid and the poor showing at the bid for a UN Security Council seat in 1982. Sporting relations with South Africa had seriously damaged
New Zealand’s international image, especially amongst the African, Caribbean and Arab nations. The most serious diplomatic rebuff was its failed attempt for a UNSC seat in 1982. This failure has been ascribed to the hostility generated by sporting relations with South Africa (Brown 1995, Harland 1992). Russell Marshall suggests that although it was not publicised at that time:

New Zealand ran for Security Council or wanted to run for the Security Council in 1982. And we just got nowhere, because Africa I think almost unanimously turned against us. There was never much publicity about that here. But we were clearly seen not just in Africa but internationally as a kind of pariah. And the same thing happened in the Commonwealth.


New Zealand’s failure to get onto the UNSC in 1982 was probably blocked, not just by the African countries, but by other members of the Non Aligned nations as well. Following the massive African and Caribbean boycott of the 1976 Montreal Olympic games and of the 1978 Edmonton Commonwealth games, New Zealand was not seen in favourable terms at the international level. But more specifically at the United Nations General Assembly, African countries were an important pressure group consisting of nearly one-fifth of the membership of the General Assembly, one-third the membership of the Commonwealth and about one-half the membership of the Non Aligned group of nations and the Arab League. The African group at the United Nations was in a position to call on these groups to influence voting patterns against New Zealand. It was in the light of this isolation that New Zealand moved to distance itself from the apartheid regime in South Africa in order to establish good relations with Africa as a means of ‘building New Zealand’s capacity at the United Nations’. It is in the context of this international isolation and the failure to get elected onto the UNSC that New Zealand’s foreign policy objective in relation to building its capacity at the UN must be understood.
The importance of the Africa lobby at the UN means that New Zealand had to get Africa on side for its bid for the UNSC seat in 1992 to succeed. New Zealand’s response to the crises in Africa was therefore, geared also to address this foreign policy objective. Laidlaw observes that part of the brief for the Harare High Commission during his term as the High Commissioner, was to lobby the political leadership in Africa to support New Zealand for the UNSC seat:

And another aspect of my brief within the measure of that was whether or not the African countries especially the front-line states, would vote for New Zealand as a member of the UN Security Council in 1992. And they did so, very solidly. And as far as I am concerned that was a proof of the pudding.


The Minister of Foreign Affairs Don McKinnon, confirms that New Zealand’s constructive engagement with the Commonwealth on the crisis of apartheid helped to deliver Africa and to ensure the exceptional results:

There is no doubt that commitment from the African countries to support us for example in getting on to the UN Security Council was partly related to the commonwealth linkages. And Commonwealth countries by and large, not all of them voted for New Zealand on the Security Council. Some of them were made just about cash offers by our European competitors, but only one of them succumbed to it. So I think the support we have had from Africa has been from our desire and determination to be appropriately engaged. I think we tempered our programme of activity with South Africa and I think we were seen in much better light.

Don McKinnon in an interview with the author, July 1995.

This argument is endorsed by Brown who suggests that:

“New Zealand’s support for sanctions against the apartheid regime in South Africa, particularly in the Commonwealth context, and its changed attitude to the sports boycott,
undoubtedly alleviated the suspicion and antipathy that had earlier been manifested by the African states”.


Seven of the twelve respondents in the elite interviews commented that New Zealand’s election to the United Nations Security Council was facilitated by support from African countries. The five NGO executives with no direct input into such policy issues were not asked to comment on the topic. Trevor Richards suggests that although there may be no such thing as friends in foreign relations, just interests, and Africa may provide few enduring interests for New Zealand:

I think that New Zealand got on the United Nations Security Council partly because of the support that we got from the African continent, which was a surprise in a sense given that the country that got knocked off was Sweden, whose donor record is far greater than New Zealand’s. And I would judge there is a quid pro quo. In the international arena there have been times when New Zealand required African support in order to be elected, in this case to the UN Security Council. Well I think the quid pro quo for that is that if New Zealand wants to continue to have a good chance of getting African support for things like this then it has to deliver on some things. And I see development assistance as one of those ways.

Trevor Richards in an interview with the author, May 1995.

There is no doubt that this sort of argument was on the minds of the policy people at the Harare Mission when they pleaded with Wellington that NZODA budget to Africa should at least be held constant until after the 1992 UNSC election. Even questionable areas such as assistance to the SADCC, were to be maintained ‘for political reasons’:

“As indicated in our file notes we are rather dissatisfied with the SADCC’s administration of New Zealand’s contribution. [The] funding is of questionable actual value but should be maintained for political reasons at least for the next financial year or two. Given the political significance of our contribution, particularly at the time of our UN Security Council candidature, we would be reluctant to suggest that we should terminate our support”.

File No. 118/13/118/1 HAR. 482/11/12132 LT. HAR. 07 August 1991.
The head office in Wellington concords:

“We agree that decision on 1992 contribution to SADCC be deferred in the meantime, pending developments including progress on the Security Council candidature. If it is judged there is a requirement for funding the possible levels of $50,000 or $100,000 can be looked at then”.

File No. 118/13/118/18/0232 Z WN JHC

New Zealand’s foreign policy objective of getting a seat on the UN Security Council was therefore an important consideration in its response to the developmental needs of the SADCC countries. The international assistance allocation decision was structured to create a favourable inclination among the SADCC countries towards New Zealand’s foreign policy objective. This fact was borne out by the solid support given to New Zealand’s candidature to the UNSC seat by the African countries in 1992. Although the actual amounts of money involved were quite small and it would be an insult for any one to suggest that that alone ensured the support of the African countries for New Zealand, it was used selectively to develop relationships within the partner countries. Having established a presence in few selected countries, that relationship was extended to other African countries to help get the message across to African leaders that New Zealand was sympathetic to Africa’s problems. New Zealand’s improved reputation in Africa gave it Africa’s support at the UN for both the Security Council seat in 1992 and the governing board of UNESCO in 1995 and ongoing co-operation at international forums. On New Zealand’s part the message was that the African countries could count on its political support in the context of their struggle to resolve Africa’s crises.
Commercial and trade interest are also important motivations for New Zealand’s response to the crises in Africa. Although New Zealand-Africa trade is very small, international assistance has been able to enhance commercial and trade prospects for New Zealand, particularly in the Southern and East Africa regions. John Luxton a former UNDP/FAO specialist in Tanzania suggests that:

I think that there is certain element of truth in that. As somebody coming from New Zealand one thing that worried me when I first got there was the very strong European bias in their form of farming. They were implementing very intensive forms of dairying, requiring large inputs of machinery and capital which to my mind were not necessary in that environment. New Zealand did sell a few cattle to Tanzania but we really did not have a major stake in selling specific capital items apart from livestock into that part of the world. But certainly the Swiss, the Dutch and the Danes were very into I thought how it would benefit their firms. I was independent and I was actually employed by FAO/UNDP. So I was not attached to my country's aid programme. But without doubt there was certainly the intent behind much of the aid, particularly out of Europe trying to tie it back to their countries either politically or economically back to their country with their aid.


As the following memo illustrates, New Zealand’s assistance programme is not exempt from being used for trade and commercial objectives. Assistance to Kenya and Zimbabwe for example, has been used to establish the basis for trade and commercial prospects:

"Kenya: we need to use our money here to seed commercial prospects especially in the energy sector. We are starting out a little later in Kenya and hope to provide a better picture shortly. Zimbabwe: likewise with an eye to commercial opportunities prospects are appearing in energy and perhaps also in forestry. We would also flag the point that"
you should be prepared to consider countries to which we are not accredited if a project with a good commercial angle arises”.

File No. 118/13/118/1 HAR. 794 09/1600 LT. 026455 1987 no date.

Project assistance, although only small, is still targeted specifically to areas that are relevant to trade and commercial interests:

“The aid we can offer will continue to be small. I agree that it should as far as possible be used in ways that will further our political interests and open up opportunities for New Zealand exporters and consultants. This will have to be achieved through careful targeting more than by increase in the amount allocated”.

File No. 118/13/118/1 14 January 1987.

Human resource development assistance also provides benefits related to New Zealand’s trade and commercial interest. Students who return home after their courses in New Zealand rise quickly into positions of decision making. The benefit to New Zealand is realised through commercial contracts to New Zealand firms in the students’ home countries. In the area of geothermal energy for example:

“the geothermal institute review concluded that there have been significant commercial contracts gained as a result of study in New Zealand by students who returned to decision making positions”


This includes geothermal projects in East Africa, particularly, Kenya (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 1995D, p13).

New Zealand’s commercial and trade interests were therefore prominent in its response to the crises in Africa, securing markets in the areas where New Zealand businesses and firms would benefit. The benefits to the recipient African partner
countries include project investments in various sectors of the economy, the supply of inputs of fertilizers, seeds, machinery, and human resource development. Also closely related to New Zealand’s trade and commercial interests in Africa was its commitment to the successful conclusion of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Uruguay Round, and the need to get African countries’ support. Laidlaw explains:

We badly needed Africa and other developing countries to support our position on the GATT. And I spent quite a lot of time talking to governments about the need for the reform processes, particularly in the primary producers' interest and in many respects New Zealand was at one with the Third World. And that community of interests in the context of the negotiation was a big issue for us. We depend totally on external trade in this country and therefore the GATT agreement was a major foreign policy plank, the major foreign policy plank, getting a new GATT agreement which we now have, although quite a number of countries are not respecting it, but that is another story.


Establishing direct access to the political leadership of the African countries provided the opportunity to convince them that New Zealand and Africa both had something to gain from a successfully concluded GATT.

8.3 Discussion and Conclusion

The preceding descriptive analysis provides evidence which shows that the popular assertion that ‘New Zealand is one of the few countries traditionally who have attached few strings to development assistance’ is rather simplistic. Official development assistance clearly has the dual objectives of meeting New Zealand’s foreign policy
objectives as well as enhancing socioeconomic progress and social justice in the recipient African countries. This has also been demonstrated in Chapter Six for NZODA to all the recipient developing countries. There is therefore, clear evidence of donor interest motivations in New Zealand's response to the various crises in Africa. The clear mandate for New Zealand's official response to the crises in Africa is therefore a combination of 'self interest, altruism and political objectives' rather than a purely humanitarian response. New Zealand's foreign policy interests in Africa, in the context of its response to the crises in Africa derived initially from New Zealand's diplomatic and political isolation because of its close relationship with apartheid South Africa in the 1970s, particularly in the area of sports. To break out of this isolation, New Zealand needed the goodwill of Africa. Its response to the crises in Africa provided opportunities to build up sympathy and support for New Zealand, as a vehicle for creating a New Zealand constituency in Africa which is favourably disposed towards New Zealand. This means that while the overall volume of assistance is low its allocation is targeted to those areas and 'circumstances which give New Zealand maximum political mileage' and help in 'building up goodwill'. Thus, though the allocation criteria states that:

"in approving which request to respond to, government will give particular attention to the way in which its assistance helps the partner country to improve the living conditions and welfare especially of people on lower incomes and in rural areas"

Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 1995c, p5

foreign policy objectives also enter the decision making process in the allocation of international assistance. Balancing these objectives with true altruism has been difficult. For example, the real needs for human resource development in Africa is at the primary school level, particularly in the rural areas. The Ministry of Foreign
Affairs knows this from their own reading of what is happening in Africa and the evolution of development theory. The Harare High Commission has recommended it, because ‘the rural schools are crying out for books, they are crying out for better education. Primary education is the basis of a country’s development, as it became obvious to us that there was a need there’ (Lynn de Silva et al in an interview with the author, May 1995). The following memo illustrates, the difficulty of balancing foreign policy objective of ‘constituency building’ with the altruistic motivation of creating socioeconomic justice:

“We have always been aware that there was a real need in the primary education area (especially for girls), but in the past the post and regional division had strongly favoured the case of constituency building (i.e. political) rather than purely humanitarian assistance as the principle focus for ODA assistance in Africa. Hence the funding of African tertiary students in New Zealand. The strategic goal for New Zealand ODA to Africa therefore should be reshaped into one that is to contribute to the sustainable development of African countries’ human resources and capacity building programmes and their humanitarian effort”.

File No. 118/13/118/1 01 September 1994, p3 and p6

The guiding principles for NZODA programme also recognise the importance of equity considerations in New Zealand’s response to developmental crises in recipient African countries. It states very clearly that equal access to resources, services and training for girls and women is more than just an equity issue, it is an economic and social one which lies at the heart of sustainable development:

“In any development activity the likelihood of success is enhanced if women are taken into account. New Zealand recognises that integrating women into development activities is more than an equity issue. It is also an economic issue. Failure to consider women’s roles, their contribution to the economy and the constraints (and opportunities) on their time and activity reduces the chances of sustainability. New Zealand also
recognises that specific interventions that target women as the prime actors and beneficiaries in a project or programme are necessary”.


There is no doubt that the primary education sector provides greater capacity and is much more sustainable, given the small amount of money available vis-à-vis the enormous human resource needs of the recipient countries. Considering equity issues also, overseas tertiary training of mainly the middle socioeconomic class, the majority of whom were young, urban professional males, neglects the basic needs of girls and women as well as the rural sector. Primary education and in-country training with equivalent funds meet the human resource needs of the recipient countries more equitably. The political interest of constituency building needs to be delicately balanced against the human resource needs of the recipient countries to allow for the allocation of development resources to ensure gender and spatial equity in the recipient partner communities.

The difficulty of obtaining a fair balance between foreign policy objectives and humanitarian needs of the recipients creates dilemmas also at the ‘gate keeping stage’ (Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985, p540). Who should be excluded from the recipient pool and which country should be passed on to the next stage for assistance? The following small example further illustrates this dilemma for New Zealand. In 1983 at the peak of the drought and famine crisis in Ethiopia a request for assistance from an Ethiopian bee keeper to support a honey harvesting project met with a cynical reply as follows:

“New Zealand's bilateral aid programme is concentrated primarily on the South Pacific region, but also towards the ASEAN member countries. This is a reflection of New
Zealand’s growing awareness of the political, social and economic importance of our Pacific neighbours. For this reason we are unable to respond positively to your request for assistance”.

File No. 118/13/118/1 20 July 1983.

New Zealand was ‘unable to respond positively’ because Ethiopia is not politically, socially or economically important to its interests. No mention is made of the difficulty of administering the request on the grounds of distance or lack of funds. Never mind the fact that only a few months later CORSO food aid shipment to Ethiopia contained substantial quantities of New Zealand honey.

The international development assistance partnership must find ways of creating a balance between the attainment of ‘donor interests’ and responding to the ‘humanitarian needs’ of recipient African partner countries. New Zealand’s foreign policy objectives in Africa have been substantially attained. New Zealand’s response to the crises in Africa must now be refocused to take greater account of the recipient partners’ humanitarian needs. The Harare High Commission’s evaluation of New Zealand’s development assistance to Africa in the post-apartheid period supports this position. It argues that:

“now that South Africa has entered the community of nations and relations with that country are absorbing an increasing proportion of the time of this post, it is perhaps timely to offer some thoughts about the shape of our programme of development assistance to Africa and the way we administer that programme. It would be unrealistic, given the size of our programme, to expect any significant political or economic returns from it. Southern Africa is not the South Pacific where small outlays of money can sometimes have disproportionate political impact. There are 130 million people in our countries of accreditation and aid flows from a variety of aid donors are massive. Kenya
for example receives aid amounting to some USD 900 million each year. Against such sums our contribution of two or three hundred thousand New Zealand dollars tends to be largely invisible. Equally the expectation that Africans who study in New Zealand will return and help form a New Zealand constituency are easily exaggerated. Again the numbers are against it. In our view therefore the principal justification for our development assistance programme in Africa has to be that it serves humanitarian purposes.

File No. 118/13/118/1 LT 700 HAR C00933/HAR 09 June 1994 (Emphasis added).

This is not an easy task, and represents what a former Secretary of Foreign Affairs describes as the position of ‘those who believe in international idealism’, as side comments on the margin attached to the report suggests. One such comment suggests that the need to reshape the Africa assistance programme should still provide opportunity for attaining the dual objectives ‘through proper delivery and implementation’:

“It makes good sense that when moving towards in-country education assistance in Africa that we focus on primary education as this is one of their greatest needs. However, in funding primary education we must ensure that targeted and quality assistance is provided, not only to maximize our humanitarian impact but also to increase the likelihood of a positive political impact”.

File No. 118/13/118/1 WAPPDP3 816/11 01 September 1994 (Emphasis added).

New Zealand’s official response to the crises in Africa has clear foreign policy objectives. Five main groups of interests are identified for the period 1984-1995 namely: New Zealand’s desire to establish goodwill and political relationships with African countries, and to build New Zealand’s profile amongst Black Africa’s political
leadership and with the African people generally. New Zealand needed to extend its capacity at the United Nations to enable it gain a UNSC seat in 1992. Fourth, the bid for the 1990 Commonwealth games in Auckland, and hosting it without the threat of boycott which had plagued earlier games formed a critical part of New Zealand’s motivation. Then there are trade and commercial interests which also include getting African countries to support the GATT agreement. The official programmes of New Zealand’s response to the crises in Africa are implemented with the full appreciation of the need to address both the objectives of helping to resolve the crises in Africa and also meeting New Zealand’s foreign policy objectives. There is no pretence that foreign policy interests are divorced from humanitarianism. The difficult task has been in balancing the pursuit of foreign policy objectives and responding to the needs of the recipient communities. As major foreign policy objectives are met official response must gradually be refocused to target and help resolve specific crisis. How this can be done more effectively is discussed in Chapter Ten, but the next chapter examines the role of NGOs in New Zealand’s response to the crises in Africa.
CHAPTER NINE:
NEW ZEALAND'S RESPONSES TO THE CRISIS IN AFRICA: THE ROLE OF NEW ZEALAND NON GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (NGOS)

"Give me your tired, your poor, your huddled masses yearning to be free, the wretched refuse of your teeming shore. Send these, the homeless, tempest-tossed. I lift my lamp besides the golden door".
The Statue of Liberty.

9.1 Introduction

New Zealand NGOs have been involved in Africa since the 1950s. The Christian Blind Mission for example had missionaries in Ethiopia as early as 1954, while the Leprosy Mission had people on the ground in Nigeria prior to independence in 1960. These early responses were in association with the parent organisations in Europe and the United Kingdom, and were basically an extension of the evangelical work of the Christian missionary activities. The earliest independent response to the crises in Africa from New Zealand NGOs was relief supplies from CORSO, the Red Cross and the National Council of Churches to support war victims after the Nigerian civil war of 1967-1970. However, large scale concerted response from the New Zealand NGOs to the crises in Africa began only with the 1983-85 famine and food emergency crisis that affected 24 African countries, particularly in East Africa and the Horn of Africa. The combined NGO response in 1984/85 was estimated at over NZD 7 million in cash,
food, and materials. In 1984, for example, when the full scale of the drought and famine in the Horn of Africa became apparent, the combined churches appeal collected NZD 1.4 million. In the same year ‘Operation Hope’ raised about NZD 2 million in cash, food and materials which was sent to Ethiopia and Sudan in 1985. ‘Live Aid’ the international musical concert organized by Bob Geldorf in 1985 also raised another NZD 4 million locally for famine relief in Ethiopia. This chapter examines the role of the NGOs in New Zealand’s response to the crises in Africa. Part one examines the criteria for selecting recipient partners both at the regional and community levels, while part two evaluates the effectiveness of this response with two case studies, one each in South Africa and Zimbabwe.

9.21 Types of Non Government Organization responses:

1: emergency and disaster relief.

Historically the NGOs’ response to the crises in Africa have centered essentially on emergency and disaster relief. There are three main reasons for this. Firstly, most of the NGOs were born out of the need for emergency assistance during periods of crises. For example Save the Children Fund (SCF) New Zealand is part of the International Save the Children Alliance (ISCA) founded in 1919 to help refugees and displaced people in Europe after World War I (ISCA 1994, p2). World Vision New Zealand is part of World Vision International founded in 1950 to provide emergency care for orphans in Korea after the Korean war. Council of Organisations for Relief Services Overseas (CORSO), the first indigenous New Zealand organisation formed in 1944, came from the emergency requirements of Europe after World War II when New Zealand soldiers who had returned from the war wanted to do something to help the
hardship that Europe had suffered during the war. Although a new comer to the New Zealand NGO scene, Oxfam New Zealand is part of the international Oxfam family founded in 1942 as the Oxford Committee for Famine Relief (OXFAM), a United Kingdom based campaign against the suffering of civilians in nazi-occupied Europe. Consequently most of the work by New Zealand NGOs is in the area of emergency relief and rehabilitation.

Another reason for the dominance of emergency relief in the NGOs' response to the crises in Africa is what may be described as the 'CNN factor', the fact that one could not help but notice the disasters that grip communities on the other side of the world because of the instantaneous and graphic news coverage of those events. Such coverage touches people's conscience and moves them emotionally, generating immediate response. The fallacy of the CNN factor is that a disaster that is 'top of the pops' today disappears from the headlines tomorrow as other disasters go to the top and the 'old' one is no longer 'news'. Moreover, emergency and disaster relief is considered to be 'exciting', 'quick fix' and popular with the public. It gives the agencies profile in the public's eye because they are seen as 'doing good' responding to other people's immediate needs. Thus according to Greg Clewley of New Zealand Red Cross:

We are heavily involved in emergency and disaster relief because we work on the basis of maintaining the existence of life in order that the quality of life can improve. And once there is life there is hope. The success I suppose is where you may say the difference is this person is alive and the other person is dead. (Many) have lived and have been given another chance at life.


The importance of emergency and disaster relief is further demonstrated by the fact that it raises almost a quarter of the revenue of some of the NGOs. In 1992/93 for example, 31 per cent of SCF, 14 per cent of Oxfam and 24 per cent of World Vision
funds were raised through emergency appeals. The graph in figure 9.1 which shows the proportion of funds by the combined NGOs in New Zealand by source of income for the periods 1984-85, 1989-90 and 1993-94 demonstrates clearly the importance of this source of income to the NGOs.

Figure 9.1: Sources of funding for New Zealand NGOs 1984/85; 1989/90; 1993/94

The effect of current disasters on the revenue of the NGOs is further demonstrated by the fact that in 1992/93 for example, NZD 1.6 million (about 30 per cent) of New Zealand SCF total income of NZD 5.42 million came from one appeal, the publicity for SCF work in Somalia. In 1994 Oxfam raised NZD 3.2 million in a special appeal for Rwanda, and in the same year the Red Cross raised another NZD 2.2 million for the same purpose, the third highest amount of money raised for Rwanda by the International Committee of the Red Cross. New Zealand Red Cross was placed third after the US and Germany in public funds raised for the Rwanda appeal (Greg Clewley in an interview with the author, May 1995). Considering New Zealand's small
population it would not be unlikely that its per capita contribution was higher than both the US and Germany.

9.22 Types of Non Government Organization responses:

2: Longer term development assistance partnership

For many NGOs emergency and disaster relief is only one aspect of their overall response to the development crisis in Africa. In most cases their commitment goes beyond relief work into rehabilitation and longer term development, as Alan Bell of World Vision explains:

only a small part of our funding and only a small part of our energy and resources goes into relief work. We don't want to just go in and save lives out of some sort of disastrous situation and then leave them alone no better off. So you've got to actually prepare people, disaster preparedness is part of development. You have got to create an environment which resists that. Where we do go into relief work we always follow it up with rehabilitation and development. But most of all our effort, most of our energy and resources and certainly our commitment and interest is in the terms of development.

Alan Bell in an interview with the author, May 1995.

The NGOs believe that saving life is only the first step which must be followed by increasing the victims' capacity to rehabilitate themselves and their community to enable them to overcome the suffering, distress and poverty, and to prevent long term dependence on relief and assistance. It is the recognition that it is not so much what they do while they are in the community that is important, but what they leave behind. As Alan Bell of World Vision explains, this means that their response to the development crises in any community has to take a 'totally holistic approach' in order to change the context and the understanding of development assistance:
We are working on the mind set and understanding and the transfer of skills of people rather than physical activity where we are seen to be doing things. We are facilitating a lot more than we are actually doing. You have to change the paradigm, the understanding of the people, so that there is nothing built into their minds that leads to dependence, and everything is built into the minds of the people that leads to independence and being complete. You cannot have one without the other. If they are complete they are not dependent because they are a contradiction.

Alan Bell in interview with the author, May 1995.

This is referred to as ‘transformational development’, the empowering of the people and their communities by giving them skills which prepare them to prevent, as far as possible, those situations that lead the victims to depend on emergency relief. Transformational development also enables the recipient to respond to disaster and emergency situations when they occur with minimum external assistance. It is sustainable because it equips the people and their communities to alleviate their suffering from poverty, natural disasters and social injustice. Alan Bell continues:

We believe that the most effective way to do this is to empower local communities to manage their own resources and take control over their lives. When you do that you are creating an infrastructure and building their vision. So we are saying to the people plan your world so that you look at a large geographic area in the poorest area of your country. And look at an area that is defined either by geographic boundaries, social boundaries, political boundaries. And it might be an area that might cover say a corridor of may be 60 or 70 kilometres long and maybe 70 or 80 kilometres wide to give you an idea. So in this new concept of community we are looking at a whole geographic location. And within the first year when we get into a project activity we start with some project say in one part of the country, two or three projects, and the next year we involve two or three more communities, and the year after that two or three communities and in the following year --- And so gradually through micro projects we are developing macro impact. And every year we put more projects which are all interweaving with one another. So that the effect ripples right through that whole area. When you do that you are creating an infrastructure. And each of those communities has got a committee and each of those committees is feeding into a central committee all of the local people facilitated by World Vision staff. Then you are giving
them the voice and the skills and the access to local resources. And we are finding that they are now representing themselves through local bodies. Now they are getting access to water and education and health and so on that was there all the time but they did not have the power to access it. So our input is being multiplied and diffused through the whole community and ultimately that is where sustainability comes from. And that is the way local participation also comes in. And that is where the sustainability of the project is really put to the test. And that is when you discover whether you have really made people independent of what you have been able to offer. Because quite a lot of aid projects have got dependence rather than release people from dependence. And the success of any project we believe in terms of development is what happens in the community after you have withdrawn your funding and your involvement.

Alan Bell in interview with the author, May 1995.

The two types of response by the NGOs to the developmental crisis in Africa, emergency and disaster relief and long term development assistance, are integrated. In many cases the emergency and disaster relief work leads into rehabilitation and longer term development by organisations such as World Vision and Oxfam who have longer term development resources. The response of other organisations such as the Red Cross and SCF is limited essentially to emergency and disaster relief, with only a small part of their resources committed to longer term transforming development.

In 1985/86 New Zealand NGOs had 32 development projects in four east Africa countries of Botswana, Kenya, Tanzania and Zimbabwe (File No. 118/13.118/1 #6 03 August 1988). These ranged from providing facilities at local secondary schools for disabled students in Zimbabwe, re-forestation programmes including tree husbandry and soil conservation in Kenya, developing agricultural and health services, water supply and training programmes for farmers and health workers in Tanzania. The total expenditure by the New Zealand NGOs in these four countries amounted to NZD 1.5 million dollars. By 1993/94 this commitment had expanded dramatically. For
example, World Vision alone funded 46 projects in 13 African countries in 1993 to the value of NZD 4.575 million. This represented about 46 per cent of World Vision’s total development assistance funding for that year (Alan Bell in an interview with the author, May 1995). The New Zealand SCF also committed about NZD 2 million during the same period to its work in Somalia (SCF Annual report 1994 p 14), while the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) directed nearly half its emergency and development resources to Africa (ICRC Report 1992, p2). The combined response of the New Zealand NGOs to the developmental crisis in Africa in 1994/95 was NZD 18 million (Webster 1996), compared to the official development assistance of NZD 2.12 million (Programme Profiles 1994/95).

9.31 New Zealand NGO response to the developmental crisis in Africa: the selection process for emergency and disaster relief response and long-term development assistance

The primary consideration for emergency and disaster relief response is the presence of an emergency. There are three principal positions on the continuum of response to the developmental crisis in Africa by New Zealand NGOs (see figure 9.2 below).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Essentially emergency relief response.</th>
<th>Emergency and disaster relief leading to rehabilitation and development response.</th>
<th>Largely longer-term development.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[A]</td>
<td>[B]</td>
<td>[C]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 9.2 Continuum of New Zealand NGO response to the developmental crisis in Africa.
Some NGOs respond to emergency situations following a disaster by contributing personnel, money and materials during the emergency situation but pull out after the life threatening situation has passed (position [A) in figure 9.2). This is the case especially with those organisations which do not have independent New Zealand programmes in Africa but work through European or United Kingdom partners, such as the SCF and the Red Cross. The Red Cross for example see themselves as ‘the fire brigade among the development assistance agencies’. When there is an emergency they are called in and when the ‘fire’ is put out their job is done. It is left to the police and the forensic scientists to find the causes of the fire, and for the insurance companies to rehabilitate the victims. In fact the Red Cross states explicitly that it is not a development agency, ‘that is the task of other organizations’ (ICRC 1992, p57).

SCF moves further to the centre from position [A) on the continuum. As its charter states, SCF objective is:

"to provide improved quality of life for the underprivileged children around the world by providing financial and other support to specific overseas projects, including disasters and emergencies, managed by other SCF or in-country community organizations".


And as John Bowis of the New Zealand SCF explains:

New Zealand Save the Children Fund is one of the 25 members of the international Save the Children Fund Alliance (ISCA). While we are one of the larger agencies in New Zealand we are one of the smaller agencies in the Save the Children Alliance. We don't implement projects of our own in Africa, we generally support Save the Children UK's programmes with both money and staff. We provide New Zealand staff to those programmes. They will provide us with either requests or with proposals for us to choose from. We respond of course to the donors' wishes, that is of prime importance to us. So if the donor wants the money to go to Zimbabwe or to a water well somewhere or to an emergency programme, well obviously that's where it goes.

In such cases involvement in emergency and disaster response does not necessarily mean that the organization becomes involved in longer term development work in that country or community. However if their partner organisation is involved in development programmes in that country, then the New Zealand organisation may contribute personnel and money to that partner organisation’s programme. For example in 1994/95 New Zealand SCF responded to the crisis in Rwanda by contributing NZD 1.09 million (NZSCF Annual Report 1995, p7) although there was no commitment to a longer term development programme in that country. At the same time funds were committed to education sponsorships through SCF United Kingdom to Uganda, Swaziland, Kenya and Lesotho as well as other projects in Ethiopia, Mali and Burkina Faso which were not emergency relief cases in that year.

Other organisations simply refuse to ‘run to the ambulances’, and respond to the development crises only where they have longer term development commitment (position C on the continuum) with local communities and organisations. CORSO for example argues that:

*We really reject that notion of aid following the latest disaster because that's not the way to try and build a new society. We have a firm policy of only providing support in those emergency situations where we know the organisations on the ground and where we have a link. So we didn't raise any money for Rwanda last year and the year before because we don't have any links with the people in Rwanda and not because we don't believe that they require help and assistance because there was obviously a disaster situation there. Because the basis on which we work has been sorted out as being a political base because we know basically that the people we are working with overseas are working at grassroots level but they are also working to achieve political change and are committed to long term development. And so one of our most long standing relationships in Africa has been in the Horn of Africa where we supported the Eritreans and Tigreans particularly in their struggle to get rid of the Soviet backed regime of Mengistu.*
And that support was monetary and it was local where we did quite a bit of work in trying to generate an awareness and you know it was quite hard to do but there was quite a bit of energy put into supporting the political struggles that those people found themselves in as well of course support the straight survival struggles as well. So CORSO took a lead in organising campaigns. For example we organised a campaign called 'Operation Hope' which saw a number of agencies in New Zealand come together and basically prepare a shipment of goods to land in Ethiopia. A massive fund raising and raising of goods that could be used over there in partnership with a number of other agencies such as the Seafarers Union. So we kept up with those sort of relief aspects of work in Eritrea and Tigre where it has been necessary. At those times we will try our best to drum up money and send over there but also where possible we try to provide them with political support for their struggle as well.

Martin Small in interview with the author, May 1995 (Emphasis added).

CORSO's response to the development crisis is therefore entrenched in the philosophy that the crises in Africa could not be understood or resolved without looking at the overall picture of the political, socioeconomic and developmental crises. Part of that overall picture is the political dimension, that development and underdevelopment could not be understood simply in the context of one's ability to produce enough food to feed their family because the causes of poverty go beyond just the drought, the famines and the civil unrest. They permeate the political and internal structure of the society. In South Africa for example the Black South Africans suffered poverty and deprivation under the system of apartheid, not necessarily because the country of South Africa is poor. It is because the political system under apartheid was organised in such a way that the Black Africans were marginalised from the mainstream social, political and economic systems of production. They obviously helped to create the wealth but were excluded from the benefits through the political system. Therefore, the political environment must be recognised as an intrinsic part of the process of transforming, sustainable development.
The third position is the middle ground (position [B] on the continuum) between the extremes exemplified by SCF on the one hand and CORSO on the other respectively. Here the NGO response to emergency and disaster crises leads to commitment to longer term development. Those who adopt this position maintain that there is no point to 'just go in and save lives out of some disastrous situation and then leave them alone no better off'. This is best illustrated by World Vision's work:

When we went into Rwanda at the very raw end of it we were helping to collect and dispose of dead bodies. We were digging trenches, we were transporting food and we were helping set up refugee camps. We were taking medicines. So it was pure survival at that stage, just relief. And then we moved into the rehabilitation phase which is getting people out of the refugee camps settled back. As part of the rehabilitation giving people what we call 'agpacs' (agricultural packs), trying to reunite families with unaccompanied children's programme. Not all the children caught up in the Rwanda crisis are orphans, some of them have got parents but only that they have been torn apart. So moving away from that then is a matter of stabilising as much as we can. And the communities where we are working in stabilising the situation is also being prepared for development. So we are out of that life saving part and now we are setting the scene for rehabilitation for people to move in. That is getting them back onto the land, getting the system working again, rebuilding the infrastructure, getting things ready for development. Setting up for instance an unaccompanied children's centre and health clinics, working on getting families back together, agpacs, getting people back on the land. The agpacs contain implements, seeds, fertilizer and the things that are necessary to get the people back on to the land looking after themselves so that they become independent again. Because that is where they were before. And then after that, moving into development which is then moving into better ways of production, better methods of income generation maybe new ideas about economic enterprise, you know a more comprehensive water supply, improved educational facilities. So you have moved not just getting people back to where they were before the disaster but now we are moving on. In other words we have now got to a development start point.

Alan Bell in interview with the author, May 1995 (Emphasis added).
From meeting the emergency relief needs of the people such as shelter for refugee families, clothing, life saving food and medicines as well as trauma therapy, the process moves into re-building people's confidence as well as community infrastructure. A partnership is then established on the basis of which longer term development is initiated.

However, not all development programmes start from emergency and disaster relief response. There are many cases where development partnerships commence where there is no emergency and the criteria for entering into such partnerships are negotiated. It is to these criteria that we turn in the next section.

9.32 Responding to the crises in Africa: criteria for choosing between Africa and other developing regions of the world

The overriding motivation for negotiating development partnerships between New Zealand NGOs and communities in Africa is the humanitarian needs of the recipient partner communities. The decision to respond to the crises in Africa and the level of commitment of resources is based on the perceived comparative needs of the regions in which the respective NGOs operate. Although all the responding NGOs agree that the crises in Africa makes it the most needy continent, not all of them make the 'humanitarian needs' of the regions the primary consideration in the regional allocation procedure. As in the case of the official bilateral development assistance, NGOs are also motivated by a number of other considerations such as historical and cultural links, regional interests as well as government influences. World Vision and Red Cross are the 'most humanitarian' organisations in terms of motivation. Alan Bell
of World Vision suggests that World Vision responds to the developmental crises wherever they occur in the developing world. However, World Vision's programmes are weighted towards Africa because of its overwhelming humanitarian needs:

We work in the South Pacific, we work in Asia, Africa and Latin America from New Zealand as part of the global partnership. From New Zealand we have weighted our aid towards Africa believing that that is the most needy continent. And I think that at the moment the funding is something like 46 percent of our development funding goes to Africa compared to I think 25 percent may be to Asia and about 23 percent to Latin America and the balance to the Pacific. In terms of relief aid probably 90 percent of our relief aid goes to Africa.

Alan Bell in interview with the author, May 1995.

Similarly the Red Cross reports that:

"The reason Africa accounted for almost half of our expenditure in the 1980s as well as the first two years of this decade, is simply that the need here is the greatest. For it is Africans more than any other peoples in our time who bear the brunt of the suffering caused by war and internal conflict. And it is the poorest among them, those whom life even in peacetime is a struggle for survival, who suffer the most."


However there are other interests which tend to affect the humanitarian considerations of other NGOs' regional allocation. The VSA's priority list for development assistance for example, put Africa third out of the three regions in which the VSA operates. The reasons as Trevor Richards explains, are that:

until recently the priority has sort of been Pacific one, Asia two and Africa three. And that has been based on a number of factors including what sort of a country we judge New Zealand to be in terms of its place in the world. And New Zealand is a Pacific nation and therefore Pacific countries, Pacific Island States and countries in the Pacific rim are seen as being in our backyard if you like. And that I think concentrating in those two areas is something which has in the past slotted quite comfortably with government priorities as well.

Trevor Richards in interview with the author, May 1995.
These regional priorities reflect the bias of the official government policy, because about 70 per cent of VSA funding comes from the government through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. The funding of the other NGOs is largely independent of government apart from contributions to fund-raising during emergency response and participation in the voluntary agency support scheme (VASS) where the government makes special grants to NGO schemes that focus on women and rural areas (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 1995E, p7). 30 per cent of the NZD 3.5 million in 1994/95 VASS funding allocation went to projects in Africa (Webster 1996).

While the other agencies are largely independent of government funding and therefore the constraints of government priorities, there are other factors which influence their regional biases. These include aspects of historical linkages and the interests of the donor communities within New Zealand. Oxfam for example argues that:

there is a regionalism quite explicit in our programme policies and we seek to develop a balanced, a geographical balanced programme and I am talking about our development programme. And we recognise that we are a small organisation in a small country. We know that as an organisation our supporters want us to have a broad global reach, they are interested in what is happening in Guatemala, they want to know and feel part of and contribute to the social changes in central America in supporting what is happening there. They are interested in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos because of the history of the Vietnam war and New Zealand's association with that part of the world and they are on our back door step. The Pacific is very important to New Zealanders for example, because if you like they are part of our community. And South Asia is also something that people have strong connections with because they travel there, and so are interested in what is happening there. That is where Oxfam New Zealand will be managing, leading its own programme of development. And in other parts of the world including Africa we will be continuing work through the other Oxfams.

Phil Twyford in interview with the author, July 1995 (Emphasis added).
'Donor interests' or what SCF refers to as 'donor wishes' thus tend to tamper with the humanitarian needs in the regional allocation. While the VSA response is in keeping with the overall framework of official government priorities, Oxfam is more inclined to work within the areas of interest of its supporters. As for the SCF 'if the donor wants the money to go Zimbabwe or to a water well somewhere or to an emergency programme, well that's where it goes'.
instance in Africa we have decided that there are so many countries within that continent that we
can’t, even within our wildest hope we can’t help everybody. So there has to be a selection
process. And the selection process that we use was that the main factor was the United Nations
poverty indicator which ranks countries in terms of poverty using infant mortality, malnutrition
and those sorts of things as indexes. Now that plus some other factors limited by World Vision’s
development work made possible by communities and so on. In other words some country
preferences as well. And that has made us currently to be working predominantly in Tanzania,
Mali, Malawi, Uganda and Zambia. And we hope to have other projects in some other countries.
But gradually we are concentrating in to those ones that I have just mentioned.

Alan Bell in interview with the author, May 1995.

These countries are among the poorest 23 on the UNDP human deprivation index
(UNDP 1996). Alan Bell argues that even though World Vision’s objective is to
respond to the most needy countries, sometimes it is impossible to work in some
countries though they might be poorer than some of those on his list because of the
problems of security and accessibility. In Angola and Mozambique, for example, many
NGOs’ response is limited only to emergency relief and rehabilitation where possible
because of the war situation in those countries. Similarly the anarchy in Somalia
makes it difficult to move from relief and rehabilitation to building a longer term
development partnership.

The VSA is another NGO which uses the ‘scientific’ method of matrix and combines it
with ‘other questions’ in its selection process. Trevor Richards explains:

About five years ago we got down and tried to work out on a more rational basis where we
should be. And so what we did was to draw up a list of those countries in Africa that I thought
we should look at. And you had to make a lot of decisions as to who you are involved with. You
could not put down 50 countries. And so North Africa, West Africa, Central Africa and the
Central Africa Republic and Zaire, those countries we did not consider. And so we looked at
South Africa, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Kenya, Uganda, Malawi, Zambia, Mozambique, Namibia,
most of the East and Southern African states. And we drew up a matrix which looked at how much need there was in a country, whether it was practical and easy or extremely difficult for VSA to establish a programme there. Whether there was a history of volunteers from anywhere having been there, so the whole culture and concept of volunteering was understood by the local governments and local communities. And there were a number of questions under those different headings and we sort of ascribed marks to each of them. And at the end of the day Tanzania came out as number one Zimbabwe two and South Africa three. This was in 1990 or something like that. We sat down with this matrix and looked through it all. And you can argue that it was convenient that it happened to be the two countries we were in that happened to come out on top.

Trevor Richards in interview with the author, May 1995.

It is rather curious that the countries that VSA and the New Zealand government were already historically associated with came out on top of the matrix. For example Tanzania already had bilateral development assistance programme since 1974 while South Africa and Zimbabwe had the historical and cultural connection with New Zealand, what Russell Marshall describes as ‘white connections’. This indicates that there are those ‘other questions under the different headings’ which are probably given greater weighting in the matrix. Those other questions relate to historical and commonwealth linkages as well as the priorities of government policy. Prime Minister David Lange had made an historic visit to East and Southern Africa and so it could not have been a coincidence that he visited Botswana, Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe, and VSA’s response followed in three of those countries. Trevor Richards continues:

We did not sit down with every African country and do an assessment as to where we should go. I think the reason why we went to Botswana or Zimbabwe and Tanzania is because they were Commonwealth countries, and there had been a history of involvement in those countries or contacts between New Zealand and those countries. With the exception of Botswana they were all needy countries. Tanzania was patently poor and Zimbabwe I think had recently won its
independence in 1980 and I think that there had been sort of support for the decolonisation of Africa within the VSA. And in terms of Zimbabwe and Botswana for an organisation like VSA which doesn't have a lot of resources to commit in terms of building up field officers and things like that we needed to be operating in countries as far away as Africa in the first instance where it was going to be possible for things to function. Which meant that there had to be an infrastructure which worked reasonably well otherwise you would have logistical problems.

(But) I think there were two things as I understand it, that were probably more responsible than anything else for us getting involved in Africa. One was Prime Minister David Lange visited Africa in 1985. He was the first New Zealand Prime Minister to do so. And I think he came back enthusiastic about the possibility of supporting African development. And VSA was an obvious vehicle through which this could be done. And at the same time VSA was getting requests from people out there in the community who wanted to volunteer and work in Africa. And so the two things went hand in hand. I think there was the time, place and opportunity and that sort of thing really. We went into Zimbabwe, Botswana and then the next year to Tanzania.

Trevor Richards in interview with the author, May 1995 (Emphasis added).

Also in 1990 following the release of Nelson Mandela from prison in February and the anticipated thaw in relations between the two countries, South Africa suddenly came into the top three of the ‘matrix’. There is no doubt, therefore, that the VSA works very closely to the government’s agenda.

Other organisations do not bother with ‘scientific methods’, but prefer to work through established links with local organisations in Africa or through partner NGOs in third countries. Oxfam for example works through other Oxfams and depends largely on their ‘hunches’:

Within our own programme strategy and our overall budget we identify certain priorities. We have a prohibition on spreading our programme any more thinly. So at the moment in Africa as I have already described to you we focus on South Africa for special historical and cultural reasons. Mozambique I think is a country which for the extreme needs of Mozambique the fact
that the country is coming out of a period of conflict makes it particularly interesting and we also have the capacity to deliver effectively because of the Australian Oxfam who has a well established programme. In Ethiopia and Eritrea there is a long standing historical association which New Zealanders had with the liberation movements there. And also to a large extent I think that for so long in the western consciousness Ethiopia has been synonymous with famine and suffering, it is historical going back to Haile Selassie for example. So the reason that the focus is on Eritrea and Tigre is really because of the historical association with the liberation movements. And combined with the need to focus as sharply as possible. It's not to say that we wouldn't consider funding projects in Ethiopia but at the moment the focus has been primarily on Tigre and Eritrea and primarily on Tigre. And the primary relationship is with the Relief Society of Tigre which we see as being a very powerful example of a grassroots NGO. In South Africa we have a commitment to ongoing support for South Africa and our constituency and our supporters are the people who were marching in 1981 and much earlier and who have had in many cases a lifetime commitment to the anti apartheid struggle. So South Africa has a very special place in the hearts of our supporters and of our organisation. So that the fall of apartheid has been a historical and momentous occasion for us.

Phil Twyford in interview with the author, May 1995.

Similarly, CORSO has selected to focus on one or two countries only, because their partnership is negotiated as a longer term association to resolve an identified crisis, but also because of their perception of what is the most important crisis to respond to.

Martin Small explains:

Basically the process by which we allocate is based on our view of what is happening in the world at that time and what sort of the key areas of the world are. We have started to give weighting to what we perceive as being the most important things that are happening in the world. So we see the Horn of Africa as being a really exciting place at the moment just through the emergency situation in Eritrea and the federalism that is emerging there. We do see fundamentally that there is no point being involved in this country if you are not supporting basic rights to freedom and development.

The criteria for selecting partner countries in Africa therefore rests essentially with how the New Zealand NGOs defines 'developmental crises'. Some see it largely in economic terms, hence the use of 'poverty indexes' and 'matrices'. Others define it in more broad terms to include the 'fundamental basis of development' such as 'conscientising' and 'sovereignty issues', 'raising awareness' and 'empowering' the people. Some define development to even include cultural awareness, so that to them development also means 'celebrating and reclaiming the cultures of the indigenous peoples'. These issues become the focus in selecting communities within countries with whom to work. It is to these that we turn in the next section.

9.41 Criteria for selecting partner communities within Africa by NZ NGOs:

1: Development needs criteria

The expectation is that because the dominant motivation for NGO response to the developmental crises in Africa is humanitarian the criteria for selecting partner communities would be the 'developmental needs' of the communities. However, as demonstrated in the previous sections, there is not a commonly accepted definition of 'developmental need' by the NGOs. This invariably affects the response to the developmental crises. For example CORSO argues that to define developmental need in narrow terms such as water, food and such material requirements is not the correct response to the fundamental causes of the developmental crises. The fundamental issues of development and underdevelopment are, they argue, best understood in the power structure and the distribution of power between groups in the community. CORSO's criteria for selecting development partner communities is therefore diametrically different from SCF development programmes, which center on support
for disadvantaged children in different communities, a response which CORSO considers to be a palliative band aid response to the development crises.

In the greater number of cases the most important criterion stated in the selection process is ‘developing a partnership’. As in the selection of partner countries, World Vision once again has the most sophisticated procedure, as Alan Bell explains:

Once we have established which are the poor countries, then we have got to say can we work there? And then we have asked the people themselves would you like to work in partnership with us. So that it is their choice if they wish to be in partnership with us. Then we start a dialogue that explores the needs and locations and then we take it from there.

After we have finished the dialogue phase of the partnership and we agree that we are going to work together, we ask the partner to identify the poorest parts of the country. In other words we really want to be working with the poorest of the poor. So we already selected some of the poorest countries, now we are asking those countries to identify where the greatest needs are within their own country. So they will work on that. When we have identified that and quantified it, we will give them some funding that is not designated. That is funding that is then purely to enable them to carry out surveys, a base line survey, feasibility studies and needs analysis. So that from that survey which might take one or two or even three years depending on the level of funding, we are able to ascertain what are the agencies working there, what is the government doing there, what are the needs there, how can we be most effective in the long term programme. And arising out of that a project will be designed over maybe 15 or 20 years that will introduce a funding base to meet the need. So they will start off by identifying the needs, they will identify the solutions to the needs, they will then cost those solutions and come up with a budget. They will then give us the budget and then we will say that is something that we can manage, or no that is too high and we can't manage the funding. So there will be that sort of dialogue going on. And then after a period of time, and as I have said this may take a year or two to come to this point, we will say yes we are ready to go ahead, the community is prepared, there has been a certain amount of socialisation, World Vision has been introduced, the people have indicated that they are willing to work with the community and there is leadership available and there is an
infrastructure that is willing to come alongside us as partners and be our partner agency in the communities. And then they will start working on those goals and budgets. And we will fund according to that agreement. We actually sign off at that point that we want to work with one another, these are the values and the parameters that we will work within while we are in this relationship. So that we do not have any misunderstandings or expectations that are not going to be met. We try and get it right at the beginning.

Alan Bell in interview with the author, May 1995 (Emphasis added).

So the partnership in the case of World Vision is selected essentially on the basis of developmental need identified by the recipient partner community and agreed to by both partners. It is also important that the partnership has a long term focus for the development process to be sustainable. The care taken in the selection procedure indicates the importance of the relationship to the organisations and the communities.

The VSA’s procedure is similar to World Vision’s though their selection process is less objective and their relationship is not as clearly defined. Although they consider the development needs of the communities, because of the special nature of VSA, the community understanding of the role of volunteers and the presence of local organisations with which the volunteers would be attached are important factors. Trevor Richards explains the procedure in the case of Zimbabwe:

Our field representative presented us with a report which they recommended that we should concentrate on the north-east part of the country, sort of near the Mozambique border, and in the south-west of the country in southern Matabeleland. And the reasons for this were one because they were two of the poorest parts of the country, two because in the north you have the Shona and in the south you have the Ndebele, so that you were not going to be sort of supporting only one of the tribal groupings. And if you did that in Zimbabwe you will probably have got a lot of criticism from one of the Shonas or Ndebele. And thirdly we went to those areas because in the process of carrying out this exercise we identified organisations with whom we spoke to at the same time that we were doing this exercise that we thought hey this is a good organisation we...
would like to work with. And so the report came back that we should work in those areas and in particular in the north-east we should work with the Mudzi district council which was a district council which had been, as with all district councils in Zimbabwe they are required to perform a number of functions under statute but they receive insufficient funds from the government so they have to raise their own money in order to carry out their statutory obligations. And this was a particularly innovative district council. The chief executive was someone with a lot of initiative who understood the role that volunteers could play, who was not interested in saying give me give me but help us to pull ourselves up.

So what we have done in Mudzi is to say okay we are going to make a commitment to the district council here. We will send in the people with the professional skills and qualifications in the areas you need for a period of time. It's open we haven't set what the period of time it will be yet we will assess it each year we are with them. If we think that a dependency relationship is starting to develop with them we will say hey look we are not here for that. We don't want to just support the Mudzi district council in the north-east, we want to support lots of district councils, and maybe other NGOs, and other communities. But at the moment we thought if we can establish ourselves in one area and over a period of maybe say six years it can be seen that the presence of VSA volunteers in that area actually made a quantifiable difference.

Trevor Richards in interview with the author, May 1995.

The special nature of the VSA is that it has very little in the way of project funding in its response to the developmental crisis. The volunteers give their professional skills and help to set the direction which the recipient partner communities want to move in. This could be in the area of environmental resource development, as in the case of the Mudzi rural district council in Zimbabwe, where they have established a commercial ostrich farm, developed forestry, gold panning and tourism. The VSA also works with poor rural farming communities in developing local skills and small income generating schemes.
In some cases the organisations are not necessarily constrained by the consideration to reach the poorest communities. As Trevor Richards explains, sometimes it is not possible to work with the poorest people in the target community or even the poorest communities because of infrastructural constraints:

I think that it is probably fair to say that the people with whom we work may not necessarily be the poorest, they may not be that bottom 20 per cent but the 20 per cent up from there. And I think that quite often it is difficult to work with the very poorest because they are so far behind that it is difficult even for the volunteers to sort of be able to do the things that they are supposed to be able to do. The farmers we are working with in Arusha region (Tanzania) are the poorest farmers in Arusha region there is no question about that. It is just that there are probably farmers 600 kilometres away in another region that are poorer. But for us to work in a region 600 kilometres away which is much poorer it is much more difficult for us because of the infrastructure of the country, which in Tanzania is very bad as you probably know. It is more expensive, it is much more isolated it is more difficult.

Trevor Richards in an interview with the author, May 1995.

John Bowis of SCF suggests that it would be naive to expect that the poorest groups in the recipient communities would always necessarily be selected for assistance:

Clearly our objective is to work with the poorest in the communities but I think you've got to be realistic that that is not always possible for a whole variety of reasons. Let's face it within the communities that Save the Children is working they are all relatively poor. And that's our target, the poorest of the poor. But we are realist. We realise that it won't always be the poorest, but that certainly the poor communities are the beneficiaries. The community as a whole. So within the community you may have some that are better off than other, but it is the community that we are probably targeting more than the individual.


Moreover, as Greg Clewley of Red Cross points out, there may be different needs within the community that the NGOs need to respond to other than just aiming at the poorest in the community, needs such as addressing the balance between urban and
rural areas, gender issues and the like. It is to these that we turn in the next section as we examine equity considerations.

9.42 Criteria for selecting partner communities within Africa countries by New Zealand NGOs: 2 Equity considerations

Apart from the developmental needs in terms of the absolute poverty of the individuals and the communities, New Zealand NGOs also consider issues of the equitable distribution of development resources within the recipient partner communities in the selection of partners. Equity considerations include issues of ethnicity, rural-urban balance, gender issues and the role of women in development, as well as the poverty levels in the community. All responding NGOs mention that issues of gender are important considerations in their allocation procedure. Some make it a primary consideration in their selection process, as Phil Twyford of Oxfam explains:

Most of the NGOs that Oxfam supports are part of the wider social movements. We very strongly put emphasis on social development and empowerment and awareness raising and manpower development projects with women's organisations and rural women's projects which are aimed at having a gender approach structured into the very heart of it. So in South Africa we work with the rural women's movement the organisations that were explicitly set up by the women in those communities to give them a voice at every level of the community. In Sudan we have been supporting a number of things through the programmes of the Australian Oxfam and we've been funding a couple of groups, one is a committee to eradicate harmful traditional practices based in Khartoum and the focus of their work is the eradication of genital mutilation. There is also another women's group called 'Women's fist' and they are a women's group working in the rural areas on economic development and we funded those projects which are providing small technological inputs to women's co-operatives and isolated villages. So they have a sort of an economic development approach, income generation and so on, community management but a sort of hands on social development, empowerment philosophy. And we believe they have found a
very innovative way of working in one of the most repressive and socially conservative countries in Africa, with the presently very explicitly anti women regime currently.

Phil Twyford in interview with the author, May 1995.

CORSO also emphasises gender considerations but also insists that its recipient partner communities and organisation must meet very strict criteria:

We support organisations that are working on the ground that we know are committed to long term development and that they are committed to the needs of women in development and to the fundamental basis of development. And so we have a series of criteria on which we develop relationships and they are that we support only secular organisations and we don't work with churches at all. We support women organisations and organisations where women play a leading role and the focus of the work is on women. And we support those organisations which have a combination of working at the grassroots and working at conscientising or trying to develop those links in the communities and to raise awareness.


While World Vision has a 'non discriminatory approach' in line with its philosophy of 'holistic development', the most vulnerable groups in the community are identified so that their 'immediate needs' are met in the context of the overall long-term development plan. Alan Bell explains:

In terms of involving the whole cross section of the community, it is not selective. We want it to be integrated right through the community. When we get to the point of bringing more funding in after the first planning, social workers are appointed who go right through the community to identify where the problems are. Which families and which children need more help to bring them up to a base line. And those people will feature in the communication, in fund raising as a window as a focus into the whole community. They may even get some special benefits to bring them up to the level of most people in the community where they are the worst off. So within that we have got the women in development as an important feature. Child health and welfare of children is always central in what we do. And if there is tension in the process, when you look at sustainable development, you can look at food production in terms of agricultural production methods, water supply and those sorts of things. When you look at income generation it is tied
up in economic enterprises and those sorts of things. And the risk is when you get involved in these things you look at aforestation, water and soil conservation, when you get into the big picture the risk is that you lose sight of the individual. So what we are starting to do is recognise that while all these processes develop there are immediate needs which need to be met. Some of the people who are poorer, who have less power in the community and they will often include women and children. So their needs are to be met. But at the same time we need to be giving those people, children an education and health, women literacy and income generation and adult education and so on. So that when that environment does start to improve they have a place in it and they are not left behind in crisis. So we try and take care of all aspects, the wider community.

Alan Bell in interview with the author, May 1995.

New Zealand NGOs respond in two principal ways to the development crises in Africa. All of them respond with emergency and disaster relief, although some, such as CORSO usually respond where they have established partners, and where their response is based on longer term transformational development rather than short-term relief based on the CNN factor. Short term relief is considered by some to be transient and ineffective. The NGOs have also responded by forming long term development partnerships with recipient communities aimed at creating sustainable development which transforms the structure of the recipient partner communities. The procedures adopted for selecting recipient partners at the regional, national and local level vary between the NGOs in their degree of sophistication. The larger more established organisations, such as World Vision, go through elaborate selection procedure involving feasibility studies, building rapport and establishing dialogue. Others such as Oxfam work through partner organisation in African countries and are not as systematic and precise in their criteria. There is no doubt however that the most important motivation for the NGOs response to the crisis in Africa is humanitarian
considerations. Other factors such as historical and cultural connections as well as the interests of the donor communities in New Zealand also influence the degree of commitment to some regions, some countries and some communities more than others, but these are only secondary. Thus in terms of the theoretical framework the motivation for New Zealand NGOs' response to the crises in Africa falls more within the conventionalist theory rather than the functional utility approach. Their dominant mandate is to work towards enhancing human dignity and social justice in the recipient partner communities. It is in this context that the final part of this chapter examines the two case studies of the development partnership between New Zealand NGOs and recipient African communities. It evaluates the role of the partnership in responding to the developmental crisis in the respective recipient partner communities.

9.5 New Zealand NGOs partnership with local NGOs in Africa:

Two case studies

New Zealand NGOs work more directly with the recipient communities than the official bilateral development agents do. This means that the recipient partner communities identify more closely with the partner NGOs than with the official bilateral partners. In examining the role of New Zealand NGOs in responding to the crises in Africa I chose two partnership programmes as case studies, one each in Zimbabwe and South Africa. In South Africa the Rural Women’s Movement (RWM) working mainly with women in the rural areas of Transvaal in partnership with Oxfam New Zealand is selected. Both are young organisation and the partnership is still evolving, and Oxfam is one of eleven organisations in partnership with the RWM.
While the apartheid policies which the RWM was set up specifically to resist have been largely resolved, the crises affecting the rural women in the post apartheid period constitute the new challenge for the RWM. Although the crisis that led to the formation of the RWM centred around apartheid, the philosophy of the organisation is relevant to all the mothers and women in many other parts of Africa, whose lives are hard, and who are marginalised in both the socioeconomic and political processes.

In Zimbabwe the partnership between World Vision Zimbabwe and World Vision New Zealand is chosen for a number of reasons. Firstly, World Vision New Zealand and World Vision Zimbabwe are both members of World Vision International and their partnership is relatively more established. Their more established partnership contrasts with the young partnership between Oxfam New Zealand and the RWM and provides an opportunity to examine how this affects the effectiveness of partnership in responding to the developmental crises. Secondly, World Vision New Zealand invests larger resources in its partner communities in Zimbabwe than Oxfam does in South Africa. There are greater and more regular flows of both material and non material exchanges between World Vision New Zealand and World Vision Zimbabwe in terms of visit by staff and exchange of ideas and resources. This provides an opportunity to examine both the material and the non-material aspects of support for the partner organisations. World Vision works both in the rural and urban areas in Zimbabwe and therefore provides another perspective in the response to the crises of the urban poor. Furthermore, World Vision's partnerships encompass the entire community rather than being gender specific as in the case of the RWM. These two organizations therefore provide two perspectives and are fairly representative of the range of New Zealand NGOs' response to the development crises in African countries.
The Rural Women’s Movement (RWM) and the crisis of rural women in the Transvaal region, South Africa

The RWM is a network of about 50 rural women’s group in the northern provinces of South Africa (see map showing areas covered by RWM in figure 9.3). It is a child of the Transvaal Rural Action Committee (TRAC) established in 1983 in direct response to the apartheid policy of ‘bantustans’ or ‘homelands’. Bantustans were the racially selective homelands created by the apartheid regime between 1963 and 1982. The stated objective of South Africa’s apartheid government for setting up the bantustans scheme was ‘the promotion of Bantu self government’. In practice however, they were merely reservations for poor Black African labourers. The social and economic environment in the homelands was desperately poor and overcrowded and their resource base was highly marginal as most of their land was highly degraded by erosion and desertification. It was in the context of the bantustans policy that TRAC was set up in 1983 to provide legal, advocacy and organisation-building support for the communities to resist forced removals and incorporation into the bantustans.

The RWM was set up in 1986 when MamLydia Kompe was employed by TRAC as a field worker with a specific brief to mobilise the rural women and to articulate the problems facing them at the community level. The rural women were ultimately the people most affected by the bantustans and other apartheid policies, because in most cases the men were either in prison, detention, exile or working in the towns and mines and the women were left caring for the children in the rural areas. The RWM was therefore formed essentially in response to what one of the founders, MaBeauty
Figure 9.3: Areas covered by RWM South Africa.

Mkhize refers to as ‘our shared history of suffering because of apartheid land policies, forced removals and incorporation’ (TRAC 1994, p7). Its objectives developed around the strong determination to:

“fight with all the means at our disposal the evil system of apartheid which we perceive at this point in our history as being the main cause of our problems. It divides people and communities along racial and ethnic lines and weakens us. It has disrupted our family life and deprived us economically. In particular we categorically reject and will fight against the bantustan system which has caused untold misery with its forced removals, incorporations and evictions of our people from their ancestral rightly held land. Bantu education which is inferior: we demand equal education and equal facilities for all South Africans. Discrimination at work: we demand equal pay for equal work without regard to race or sex. Freedom of residence - the hostel system has torn apart our families. We demand its abolition. Mines and other places of work must have family accommodation. We therefore demand: the right to acquire land freely in South Africa; the Group Areas, Land and Squatting Acts must go; that women be equally represented with men in a future elected South African parliament; that small business be protected from intimidation by large business and monopolies.”

TRAC 1994, pp. 7-8.

From being an organisation which mobilised women against removal and incorporation into the bantustans, the RWM also reaches out to all sections of South Africa and demands the rights of women in all aspects of the post-apartheid South Africa. To attain these objectives the RWM has set about:

acknowledging gender issues and strengthening the right to speak amongst the rural women;
empowering women to be able to stand up and speak about their rights, linking rural women with other women’s organisations to share experiences and to expose the women to different conferences concerning their rights so as to build their confidence in themselves; and training rural women in leadership skills, organisation and different projects.

Lebogong Matsaabebe in an interview with the author, January 1996.
Although all the mothers and women of Africa are disenfranchised, their living conditions are hard, and they are marginalised in the socioeconomic and political processes of their communities, the crises created by apartheid in South Africa made the lives of the women particularly harsh. The RWM describes the crises affecting their lives as follows:

"Rural women are engaged in a daily battle for survival. Upon her marriage a woman becomes responsible for the well-being of her husband, his family, and any offspring and the household which may or may not involve agriculture. In the majority of cases the husband works in a city. He will be absent at a minimum all weekdays and often for months at a time. The normal division of labour in a household crumbles and the wife must take over responsibility for all aspects of the home."

TRAC 1994, p12.

In performing these functions the women spend all their day collecting water and fuelwood, cooking and tending livestock if they have them. Water and fuelwood collection alone takes about half of the day. Because water supply is so inadequate women spend hours each day waiting in queues to fill their drums from slow-dripping taps or waiting for the wind to drive the windmill for the borehole from where they collect water. And there are not many taps or wind-driven borehole in the communities either. The process is slow and tedious. Collecting fuelwood is even more demanding. With dwindling wood supply women have to rise up in the early hours of the morning to make a return trip to the nearest collection point to ensure that they get back home before it is too hot. Mrs. Mohlamonyane describes her daily schedule as follows:

"This is my daily work: to go long distances to fetch water and another long distance to fetch wood. By the time you arrive home it's late. I start to cook supper. I always eat supper after 9 p.m. never at 6 or 7 o'clock. My children eat their supper in the morning because they sleep before it is ready at night. When my children come back from school..."
they find that I have already made a second trip from where we fetch water. I find life very difficult.


The women have no helpers because the husbands are away in town working, or under apartheid, in detention and the children are at school. Their existence is quite isolating and this affects their self esteem and social status. Their psychological isolation is further accentuated by the fact that in many rural communities where witchcraft is common women cannot trust each other. They are afraid of discussing their problems with other women for fear of being bewitched should their weaknesses be exposed. Individual problems are considered personal and private.

“The dominant ethos was self-preservation and fear of disclosure. Women experience great shame about personal problems in their lives. (They) are very secretive about their reproductive capacity. There is a taboo on discussing or even commenting on women’s pregnancy. Information like due date of baby is a closely guarded secret. In the village of Semenyane in Lebowa, MamLydia relates a story of a woman who gave birth on her own because she was too fearful of calling neighbours to assist her.”


The women are further marginalised by being alienated from the decision making structures of the community. Despite being the group most affected by the apartheid policies they were almost always excluded from the meetings and deliberations about the struggle. TRAC reports that:

“When TRAC field officers first went to Mogopa in Western Transvaal in 1986, women sat separately from men in the community meetings called to discuss the impending forced removals. They knitted or toyed with tufts of grass, never raising their heads or taking active part in the debates. The meetings were conducted between the TRAC field workers and the men. Women were observers, responding only monosyllabically when directly asked to. No opinions were forthcoming.”

This is because in the traditional cultural setting it is impolite for women to respond in the presence of their husbands. As Lebogong Matsaabebe, the Administrative Officer for the RWM explains, in some regions there is this issue of culture where women feel that when they speak out and demand their rights the chiefs would consider them as having no respect for themselves or their husbands. In this case their husband’s standing in the community (their mana) is eroded (Lebogong Matsaabebe in an interview with the author, January 1996).

The picture of the crises of the rural women is one characterised by huge responsibility for maintaining the household, a task which is very demanding physically but with very little status in the community. The women undertake this task with little or no social or emotional support from the community which is oppressive and repressive. It is in this context that the RWM set out to challenge the structural constraints which oppress the women and to build solidarity among the rural women so that they recognise the common basis of their problem. MamLydia further explains:

“When we started working there (in Mathopestad) women were not participating in anyway. I encouraged them to collect money that can be used in crisis, for instance when their children are shot and need to be taken to the hospital. They formed stokvels. But they still worked separately. It is interesting to note that men do approach them to borrow money when there is a crisis. In Bralaagate as well when we started working there no women’s structures existed. They collected R2,000 which they collected by getting 20 cents a week per member. They then have stokvels where they use the money to buy food which they resell at a profit. In 1989 the women’s money was used to bail out the people arrested during a Bophuthatswana crackdown. This cash empowers women’s position in these communities. The money is also a psychological boost, the women feel more powerful. They realised that if the women hadn’t come together for instance those youths couldn’t have been bailed out.”

TRAC 1994, pp. 16-17.
In the early 1990s when it became obvious that political change was beginning to be possible the RWM slowly moved its focus from anti-removals and anti-apartheid to the empowering of women to effectively participate in rural development and land reform process. Within that it has set up appropriate structures, capacity building, and institutional development especially at the rural local government level, leadership skills training, rural enterprise and income generation programmes for the rural women.

9.52 Oxfam New Zealand's partnership with the Rural Women's Movement

The partnership between Oxfam New Zealand and the RWM started in 1992. According to Phil Twyford the Executive Director of Oxfam New Zealand, the RWM is an organisation that fits the ideals of Oxfam especially in terms of its emphasis on gender and social justice:

Oxfam's objective is the alleviation of suffering from poverty and natural disasters and social injustice and we believe that the most effective way to do that is to empower local communities to manage their own resources and take control over their lives. So that if you look at Oxfam's programme we very strongly put emphasis on social development and empowerment and awareness raising and manpower development projects with women's organisations and rural women's projects which are aimed at having a gender approach structured into the very heart of it. So in South Africa we work with the Rural Women's Movement the organisations that were explicitly set up by the women in those communities to give them a voice at every level of the community.

Phil Twyford in an interview with the author, July 1995.

Oxfam supports the programmes of the RWM through its Australian partners, Community Aid Abroad (CAA). This section examines the role of this partnership in
responding to the crises of the rural women in the Transvaal region where the RWM’s activities are focused.

Oxfam’s response to the rural women’s crisis has been essentially through financial support for the work of the RWM. It is one of eleven international organizations which supports the work of TRAC, the mother organisation which RWM is part of. The combined Oxfam-and-CAA financial contribution to TRAC amounted to about 234,000 Rand (about NZD 93,000) in the period 1992-1994 (TRAC 1995), an average of 7 per cent of grants received by TRAC during that period. Oxfam is therefore, only a small, but nonetheless very important member of the partnership. The financial support goes into a variety of projects ranging from small diesel-powered grinding mills to a rural radio network. The grinding mills support women who were hitherto walking to other communities and paying to mill their grain. This provides time savings so that the time that is otherwise expended travelling to the grinding mills is put to other more productive activities. The rural radio network provides a medium of communication in communities where transport and telecommunication is highly underdeveloped. It caries RWM message to the rural women, and is an effective means of public education. In the case of the grinding mills the small charge for using the grinding mill provides profits which are reinvested in other income generating projects which benefit the entire community economically. These projects also elevate the socioeconomic and political profile of the movement and subsequently, the position of the women in the community.

The RWM also focuses on empowering rural women through skills training in leadership and participation in decision making processes:
Often the courses run over three to four weeks and take sometimes up to 50 women. And we bring women from different regions to undertake these courses. And we also hold workshops on all the issues affecting women. If there is an issue that affects women say a new policy is being initiated we often go to the Minister in charge of the particular policy and ask them to come and explain the new policy to the women. And we organise this on a regional basis so that the women are addressed directly by the Minister in charge and not just through their representatives. And also sometimes we go the women themselves and ask them about the issues they are concerned about and then we identify what organisation is best positioned to address such issues. Also the empowering that we are offering includes getting the women involved in the various committees in the villages so that they are there when decisions are made and they are part of the decision making process.

Lebogong Matsaabebe in an interview with the author, January 1996.

The funding for these courses and other RWM programmes comes from Oxfam New Zealand through CAA Australia. Through these programmes the RWM has become the main voice of the rural women in South Africa, as Ms Matsaabebe further explains:

the work of the RWM has not only improved the rural women's lives, (but) the growth of the organisation has led to the admission of women in to the decision making organs at various levels in the society where it was not possible in the past. The RWM has also become the main organisation in the country to address the problems of the rural women and get the authorities to take them seriously.

Lebogong Matsaabebe in an interview with the author, January 1996.

The RWM has been instrumental in getting rural women to participate more effectively in the transition process in South Africa and the post apartheid political processes. In the period leading up to the April 1994 elections it organised workshops on local government elections and also set up training programmes on the conduct of elections through voter educators who worked with local communities. It got women to stand in the local government elections and many women were elected onto the council in many areas:

Rural Women's Movement members have in a number of local government councils been elected as councillors and in one area one member of the organisation has been elected as deputy Mayor.
Also nationally we do have RWM members as members of parliament. In the North West we have Elizabeth Mazubuko who is a councilor, in Ajax we have Ethel Lutheluze. There is also a councilor in the North West, and in Moutse we have Martha Matala who is the deputy mayor. In parliament we have MamLydia Kompe who is the founder member of the movement and at the provincial assembly we have MaBeuty Mkihize who is also a founding member of the movement.

Lebogong Matsaabebe in an interview with the author, January 1996.

There is very little understanding in rural South Africa of the functions of local government because under the apartheid regime local governments were run by people who were appointed by the central government and they ruled rather than governed. So the concept of electing representatives is new to the majority of rural people in South Africa and the RWM has been quite effective in educating the women on the functions of the local governments, and on ways of gaining access to the decision making structures within the community.

At the less political level, but no less important to the lives of the rural women, the RWM has enabled the women to gain control over some of the most important resources that affect their daily lives, water and land. Ms Matsaabebe explains:

In different regions because there is a general problem with water supply there are committees set up to look at the issue of water supply which often involves the building of dams and bore holes. It used to be mainly men sitting on these committees and not many of them understood the problems of water. For example a male dominated water committee may decide to locate a dam in a particular area because of male dominated reasons without taking into consideration the needs of women for washing, cooking and the like. But when women are on the committee they can influence the location of such facilities. And it is because of the RWM that the women have been able to get on to such committees. It may be the water committee here and electricity committee there. In certain regions a group of women can now go to the chief to ask the chief for a piece of land to work and their request is taken seriously and responded to. This was not the case in the past because women could not even dare to go to the chief to ask for anything or even to come in his presence. Even in terms of inheritance a married woman did not have access to her husband's land after his death. It was usually inherited by the first born if it was a son. If
the woman did not have a son then the husband's property was inherited by his brother or next of kin. The woman did not have access to any of the husband's inheritance. But remember that in most cases the husband was probably away working in the city all his life while the woman was in the village looking after the land and the house and all their property but at the end of the day she has nothing. And single women had no access to land and property at all. Things have changed now.

Lebogong Matsaabebe in an interview with the author, January 1996.

The women are therefore gaining better and greater access to land and other rural and community resources because of the work of the RWM. This enhances their emphasis on income generation, not just to provide the rural women with a bit of discretionary income which they could then use in whatever areas they deemed appropriate, but because in doing that they become more effective. It enhances their ability to participate more effectively in the life of the community. Two such income generating projects operated by the RWM with financial support from Oxfam New Zealand through CAA Australia, are the Genesis mental health centre and the Lethabong daycare centre both in Beestekraal, north west Transvaal.

9.53 RWM income generating projects: the genesis mental health centre and Lethabong daycare centre

Established in 1992 the genesis mental health centre is an ambitious project by a charismatic woman whose experience in raising a mentally handicapped child moved her to find a way of dealing with what seemed an insurmountable problem in the district. She explains:

the problem was this my son failed several time when he was at school. And then after that the TRAC organisation asked psychologists to come and assess the children who had mental health problems. All the children were assessed and my son was found to be a moderate case. After that I made a house to house visit to find out the cases of children who were in a similar situation as
my son. I also visited several schools where I met a number of mentally disabled children. I therefore organised a meeting at a local clinic. I combined the number of children from the schools, the clinic and the township and came to about 55 mentally handicapped children in the area. I started with 38 children between three of us working under the auspices of the RWM. We consequently made contact with Pretoria mental health that is helping us with professional advice. We also have access to physiotherapists and social workers on a limited basis. And then we had a basic course in mental health. Now we are a team of five people, two teachers including me making three, then we have two ladies that help with the cooking and looking after the children. So myself and Sarah Matala through the RWM attended a course at the university in the care and rehabilitation of mentally disabled children. Since the course we have been better equipped to help the children. Also Emily Sono is a very keen woman she has worked with disabled children before and she should be attending the course soon.

Norah Lebotse in an interview with the author, January 1996.

All the teachers are professionally trained and qualified. Although they operate in very difficult conditions, the project is a testimony to the work of the RWM amongst the rural women in South Africa, and the need for greater input from contributing partners such as Oxfam New Zealand. The centre has very limited accommodation with the 38 children, three teachers and two cooks housed in a private house of two small blocks of two rooms each (see photos 1-4). The classroom double as dining hall and a rest place for the children who require regular rest in the afternoons. There is one pit toilet at the back of the main block for the family and the children. There is no indoor kitchen. Food is prepared on an open log-fire between the two blocks of houses (Photo 2). When it rains the kitchen moves into the dining/class room/rest room, which is only about 12 square metres (Photo 3). The school hours are from 8 O’clock in the morning to 3 O’clock in the afternoon. The children’s ages range from 6 years to 22 years with levels of disability ranging from mild-to-moderate through to profound and severe. Most of them require individual attention.
Photo 1: The Genesis Mental Health Centre Block Beestekraal, South Africa.

Photo 2: The 'kitchen' facility at the Genesis Mental Health Centre, Beestekraal.
Photo 3: Inside the classroom/dining room/restroom/kitchen at the Genesis Mental Health Centre Beestekraal, South Africa. Maria Montsha in charge at the end of day.

Photo 4: The Great Team at the Genesis Mental Centre Beestekraal, South Africa.
Like the Genesis mental health centre, the daycare center operates in extremely difficult circumstances. The project started in March 1985 as an attempt to provide support for the women who needed to go outside their community to work. Because of the poor support infrastructure in the rural areas most women would take their children with them, and the older girl-children who should otherwise be at school, would go with their mothers to look after the younger ones while mother worked. This created a vicious cycle of deprivation for the women in the community. The RWM saw that the only way to break this cycle was to provide a facility where the women felt secure enough to leave their children. When I visited in January 1996, there were 48 children attending regularly. The teachers are all trained and qualified kindergarten teachers, but work as volunteers. The centre cannot get funding from the central government so it relies on contributions from parents who pay 35 Rand (about NZD 12) per month per child. The classrooms are three old buses donated by a local transport operator, the TARI bus company (see photo 5-6). The children sit on the floor of the bus for their lessons and also use one of the buses as a rest room.

Both projects are supported by RWM members through volunteers as well as financial support for basic administration of the facilities. The RWM regional organiser visits the centres about twice a month to discuss problems and encourage the volunteers. The regional organiser has no telephone or private transport, she depends on public transport for these visits which take her into the region every day of the week in most cases. During my visit my hosts were delayed in Johannesburg so that we set off about two hours late. Because there was no means of communicating with the regional organiser, she waited at the pre-arranged meeting point for about four hours before we got there. She had to leave early by bus from her small town because the public
Photo 5: The Classrooms at the Lethabong Daycare Centre Hastebeesfontain, S. Africa.

Photo 6: The Team at the Lethabong Daycare Centre Hastebeesfontain, South Africa.
transport system is unreliable. And we were late because of the delayed start in Johannesburg. She spent half the day waiting. If we had to cancel we would have had to wait another week to get the message to her through the field officer who travels through the region every week. She had already gone for the week!

These projects are income generation but they also serve two other principal functions. They provide support for the rural women through childcare and give them the required break in their task of running the household. This affords them the opportunity to attend meetings with the other women in the community, undertake literacy courses, learn new skills and generally have a life outside the home. Through these courses, they are able to acquire skills which enable them to participate more effectively in the social and economic life of the community. The meetings and the courses open avenues for them to establish contacts and support networks. The income generation programmes also encourage the women to get jobs outside the home to give them the opportunity to discuss their problems and establish a better relationship among themselves by building trust and understanding. There is also an emphasis on rural infrastructure in the hope that the women would be able to take up jobs that would provide them with the income to run their families. Apart from the traditional areas such as sewing and knitting the women are trained and qualified in various professional areas. Many of them acquire the skills that would enable them to move into the towns and get jobs in a number of areas. But most significantly the work of the RWM has brought about fundamental changes in the structure of the rural communities, as TRAC reports:

"In many community meetings nowadays in Mogopa the women are extremely vocal. They often heckle speakers if they do not agree, or break into song to drown an unpopular speaker. Old men try to reassert their power: (by saying) 'in our tradition
women are never seen in meetings'. The women challenge such assertions, boldly saying that the traditions are outdated; they have participated in the struggle and have earned their right to have a voice. During 1993 there were ongoing discussions about a draft constitution for the re-establishment of Mogopa. The women were very active in the process and even put forward a constitution which they had drawn up. Their proposal specifies the rights (in particular to residential plots) of divorced women, sons-in-law, unmarried adult women, children of non-residents, and bachelors. In general it proposes that women have independent rights to residential plots, not only through their husbands or fathers. In terms of local authority, this constitution proposes a mix of democratic and tribal tradition, there should be an Executive Committee (rather than a traditional kgotla), but it should be based on the traditional kgoros or wards. Unpopular leaders can be removed from office, though the mechanism to do so is not specified. The constitution does not stipulate whether women would be able to be on the Executive Committee, though in practice this right has been won. The women have been an integral part of the leadership structure of Mogopa for the past two years, and this probably lead to an assumption that women would be included in the committee”.


The RWM was a strong and effective vehicle in uniting and empowering rural women during the apartheid period. In the post-apartheid period its agenda has also evolved in line with the political changes taking place in the country. The resistance and anti-removal and anti-racist campaigns have been turned into fighting for social justice and equity in land reform policies and rural development which focuses on the needs of rural women. The objective is to ensure that women are part of, and are represented on, community structures and decision making forums such as water committees, education and health. In the area of political empowerment the RWM works with women in the communities to make sure that they are part of the community decision making processes and structures. A 50-50 representation on those structures has been
accepted by the ANC national government as a political and moral principle for power sharing from the national government to the local community level. The RWM has made sure of that. With material and moral response from partner organisations such as Oxfam New Zealand and CAA Australia the crises affecting the rural communities, particularly the rural women, are being addressed by the local NGOs.

The importance of the role of Oxfam's partnership with the RWM lies not just in what it has been able to achieve in the short term, but in the recognition of the role of women in the resolution of the crises in Africa. It must be recognised that the effective response to the crises in Africa hinges largely on the extent to which gender relations in African communities are re-shaped. International response through partnership with local communities and organisations in Africa must enhance the full participation of women at all levels and in all forms of the socioeconomic, political and cultural functions of the society. Women (and children) are usually the primary victims of political and economic crises. Their voices must not only be listened to, but solicited if coherent efforts at peacemaking and socioeconomic transformation are to be attained. Organisations such as the RWM work in the rural sector which is dominated by women, and which is the primary base for food security in African countries. International response must give priority to the transformation of the rural sector, gender equity, human rights and the political participation of women and the protection of the rights of women and children.
9.6 World Vision New Zealand's partnership with communities in Zimbabwe: responding to longer term development needs

World Vision New Zealand supports partner communities in Zimbabwe through World Vision Zimbabwe. According to Max Chigwida, the Director of World Vision Zimbabwe, the partnership aims:

- to work towards a transformed Zimbabwe, socio-economically, physically and spiritually. And the experiences we have had from working in these communities on community development projects is that even where we don't achieve the desired impact we try to achieve sustainable development and to give people the base that they can carry on from to develop. So the lesson we have learnt we are trying to apply in terms of our facilitation.

Max Chigwida in an interview with the author, February 1996.

To examine the effectiveness of World Vision's response to the developmental crises in its partner communities in Zimbabwe, two projects were studied: the Chirariro Rural Development Project and the Urban Field Ministries.

9.61 Chirariro Rural Development Project

Chirariro is a depressed poor rural community in Mashonaland West about 250 kilometers northwest of Harare. Like many other rural areas in Zimbabwe its fragile economic base has been devastated by two droughts in the six-year period between 1988 and 1994. It is a community of about 850 homesteads. In rural Zimbabwe a homestead is made up of about three-to-four huts which accommodate an average family of 10-12 people. Chirariro community would therefore have a population of between 8,500 and 10,000 people.
The partnership between World Vision and the Chirariro community was established in 1989 and evolved initially around water supply projects and child sponsorship. This has expanded and extended as World Vision’s philosophy of community development changed from investment in single purpose projects to the Area Development Programme (ADP). The ADP consists of a cluster of projects which address the roots of poverty in the community through development projects that target multiple sectors of the community rather than the single-sectoral approach which focuses on single-issue projects like water supply or sanitation. The ADPs are designed to create an environment which addresses the social and economic sectors of the community by creating income generation as well as social and economic stability. The projects that World Vision has programmed for the community are in education, water supply, health and sanitation, adult literacy and skills training, income generation and community infrastructure. These projects are implemented incrementally, as Alan Bell of World Vision New Zealand explains:

Within the first year when we get into a project activity we start with two or three projects, and the next year we implement two or three more projects, and the year after that two or three and so on. And so gradually through micro projects we are developing macro impact. And year after year we are putting more and more projects and they are all interweaving with one another. So that the effect ripples right through that whole area. So that is the way that we are going and we are finding that to be very very effective because we believe that development does not happen in a hurry and if we start then we are going to be involved for probably 15 to 20 years, and we are saying to them we are prepared to fund this whole range of projects.

Alan Bell in an interview with the author, May 1995.

In Chirariro community the programme identified the most urgent needs of the community at that time to be a community hall where the community could meet for the planning sessions and the dialogue that goes on in the process of establishing the partnership. At the same time the water situation was critical because the area is located in the low rainfall region, and the situation was further accentuated by two
successive droughts. So there was the urgent need for sustainable water supply for the community. The community school was also in a desperate state with about 700 pupils accommodated in two classroom blocks of eight rooms. Most of the junior classes were conducted ‘under tree shades’. The 22 teachers were crowded in one room which they shared with the principal and the administrative staff. There were no toilet facilities at the school. Accommodation and classroom space at the community school were therefore urgent requirements. World Vision responded to these most urgent needs first, as the chairman of the Chirariro Community Development Committee, Gracia Chakaipa explains:

World Vision started to assist Chirariro in 1989 October. In that year we constructed a combined multipurpose hall and a deep tank. Before the deep tank we were going to Marere which is 25 kilometers from this school to get drinking water. During the second year we constructed one teachers’ house and so far we have constructed three of them. And we drilled 10 bore holes, three were dry and seven are functioning. We constructed one times three classroom block and two hundred Blaire toilets in the community. Before World Vision came to Chirariro the whole school was made up of two blocks of classrooms, one staff room for 22 teachers, no toilet facilities and a small administrative block that looks like a one room apartment. Now the work that World Vision has done in this area includes the following: they have built three blocks of teacher’s quarters, each block made up of five bedrooms, kitchen facilities and each with its own separate Blaire toilet. They also built a block of 12 toilets for the staff and children at the school. They have provided paint for renovation work on the old blocks that were build before World Vision got involved. The classroom blocks that were built did not have windows so World Vision provided all the windows for the old blocks. World Vision also sponsors 350 children within the school community, all of which go to this school. The school has a roll of just over 900 pupils. For these 350 children sponsored by World Vision, World Vision provides them with two sets of school uniform every year. World Vision has also supported the school’s sporting activities by providing two sets of sports uniform for the boys and one set for the girls for all the sports that the boys and girls participate in. It has also provided an administrative block for the principal and the other administrative staff of the school.

Gracia Chakaipa in an interview with the author, February 1996.
The school has seen tremendous improvements as a result of the partnership. The progress within the community and especially the school brought the community to national attention when the community school won the Secretary of Education’s merit award in 1994 for its efforts in ‘creating an environment suitable for learning’, as the Zimbabwe Secretary for Education, Francis Mukurazhizha put it (World Vision 1994A, p18). The community hall which is housed on the school premises has made the schools a hub of community social activities. The school’s profile within the community has gone up so high that this has led to roll growth as more parents aspire to send their children to the school. This has greatly increased school enrollment in the region even though schooling is not compulsory in the country. The principal commented that the children are now coming from as far away as 15 kilometers, and attending regularly. The school’s roll rose from about 700 pupils in 1989 to over 800 in 1994. In 1996 this jumped to over 900 pupils (figures given by the school’s principal in a discussion with the author, February 1996).

The ADP programme also includes a number of income generation projects, particularly those that focus on the rural women. One of these is the sewing co-operative for which World Vision purchased six sewing machines and advanced seeding money to enable the co-operative to buy cloth and other material to get the group started. The sewing co-operative has since been contracted by World Vision to provide school uniforms for the 350 pupils that World Vision supports at the school under the child sponsorship programme. The sewing co-operative became self supporting within three years of its formation. It also runs sewing skills training sessions for other women in the community.
The success of the sewing co-operative has encouraged the women’s co-operative to expand and diversify its activities. With the assistance of World Vision it purchased and installed a grinding mill which became self sustaining within four-to-five years. Not only has the mill reduced travel time for the women who would otherwise travel some 15 to 17 kilometers to grinding mills in neighbouring communities, it is also an income generation venture. Furthermore, it has also reduced the pressure on the women who would otherwise have to use a grinding stone to make their flour, a tedious process which takes two-to-three hours to provide flour for each day’s meal. With the grinding mill the women are now able to organise enough flour for a week’s meal with only one trip to the mill. Together with the easier accessibility of water from the wells and boreholes, this has released an enormous amount of productive time for the women and the children. The time saved can then be put to other things such as skills training, craft or other social and economic activities. Income generation projects therefore enhance the qualitative well being of the community. They also have the potential to facilitate an important shift in the social status of women who are increasingly taking charge of important community economic resources through the co-operatives and community committees.
Photo 7: At the Grinding Mill in Chirairo, Zimbabwe.

The economy of the community is further boosted by the way the development programmes are managed. For example, all the materials used in the construction of the community hall, the classrooms and teachers’ houses are bought locally. At the same time the labour that is not voluntary is recruited within the local community so that there are very few leakages in the resources that World Vision brings into the community. This provides income for otherwise unemployed people especially during the time that the land is unproductive because of the drought. Furthermore, under the ADP philosophy World Vision staff who hitherto lived in Harare and commuted to the project areas are being encouraged to decentralise and live amongst the project communities. This has the potential of injecting further income into the local communities’ economy as staff salaries are spent locally in the purchase of local services and goods.
As the economy of the community improves through the income generation programmes, its attention is then directed to the other aspects of well-being. One of these is health and sanitation. Within the overall framework of the health and sanitation programme, World Vision has introduced and supported the simple technology of the ‘Blaire toilets’ (see photo 8). These are toilets designed by Dr. Blaire which have a specific design feature which allows air circulation within the toilet facility and also prevents the concentration of flies inside the toilet. It has a vent (or a chimney as they call it in Zimbabwe) through which much of the gas that would otherwise build up in the toilet escapes. And on top of the chimney there is a wire netting which prevents flies from coming in to the toilets. World Vision built a set of 15 toilets at the community school and a few within the community such as at the grinding mill and the periodic market. Other demonstration toilets are located in the vicinity of the two community boreholes that are not particularly close to homesteads. The adoption of this technology is quite wide spread, estimated at about 80 to 85 per cent of the homesteads in this community. The use of the open bush as toilet has almost completely ceased. The improved access to clean water for household use from the bore holes, and sanitation facilities has raised the general standard of health in the community.

To ensure the sustainability of the partnership programme, community participation is paramount through all the stages of the programme. Max Chigwida explains:
Photo 8: Blair Toilet.

Photo 9: Blaire toilet in the context of the village environment. In this particular case the two homesteads in the foreground share the facility. Chirariro, Zimbabwe.
It is not World Vision getting the community involved, it is rather the community getting World Vision involved because the responsibility is theirs, it is their responsibility to transform their community. We don't want to do it for the community but together with them for us to make a contribution where we can make a contribution. They may not have the money to contribute, but say if you are looking at a classroom block they may not have the money to buy some of the goods and materials say roofing materials and that kind of thing. But actually what they will do is mobilise themselves through maybe a school committee and all parents will be involved and they will say we need bricks and each family will go and mould bricks and that is quite a lot of hard work. They will mould bricks in their thousands to build the classroom block and they will also provide things like water because sometimes it has to be fetched from afar and carried to the school where they might build a tank to hold the water. And if we find that it's a little strenuous for them to bring the bricks or water to the site because they don't have means of transportation what we do is we can look around for transportation, but they do the work of loading and unloading. So they do quite a lot in terms of contribution. And also even things like building of Blaire toilets they do quite a bit, they have to mould the bricks they have to dig the pit. Then they are provided with may be some bags of cement because that is what they cannot afford. But what they can afford with their hands what they can do with their labour they will work, and they work very hard.

Max Chigwida in an interview with the author, February 1996.

This ensures that the community has ownership of the programme. It also enhances its impact and effectiveness and ensures the sustainability of the development initiatives. Apart from these high profile projects there are projects in the agricultural sector such as vegetable gardens used not only as income generation projects, but integral to the food security and employment stabilisation objectives of the ADP. The health and sanitation programme also incorporate family planning, nutrition, child and mothers' health and the status of children. A pre-school programme set up by the women's co-operative serves as a childcare service as well as a preparatory school for the young children. It also constitutes an income generation project in itself. The women
supervisors at the pre-school centre are paid a monthly allowance from the proceeds of the various co-operative income generation ventures. The produce from the vegetable gardens is used to prepare meals for the pre-school centre. The economic base of community as a whole is on the path to being very well established and secure because of the vertical and lateral social and economic linkages of the programmes within the community.

9.62 The Urban Field Ministries: World Vision’s partnership with the street (homeless) people of Harare

In 1990 the National Director of World Vision Zimbabwe observed that the growth of the urban poor in Zimbabwe was one of the greatest challenges that faced the young country:

“World Vision has spent most of its efforts in the last 10 years working in rural areas, because that is where the majority of our poor live. However, there is now a growing realisation that urban poverty is often far much worse than rural poverty. Thousands of people move from rural to urban areas every year in search of employment and better life. These dreams are never realised for the majority. More and more children are being born in the urban areas whose dreams are never realised either. The inability of the economy to absorb all these people has marginalised them and now they experience severe forms of destitution, vagrancy and the ‘street kids’ syndrome. Our major towns are increasingly affected by this new disease of destitution and urban poverty. World Vision therefore can no longer be a spectator in these matters but has decided to get involved”.


An analysis of the causes of this ‘new disease’ identified five principal groups of factors, namely increased rural-urban migration; job losses resulting from the
economic structural adjustment programmes (ESAP), and older people who retire on such small incomes, and sometimes without pension or any form of income, that they do not have enough resources to support themselves. There are also large numbers of divorced and widowed women who are forced onto the street because of changed circumstances; increasing numbers of children born of destitute street parentage who grow up in the ‘culture of poverty and destitution’ on the street. The final group, mostly children, constitute those described as ‘victims of the liberation struggle which ravaged their homes and left them parentless and homeless scratching a living on the urban streets’ (World Vision News 1990A, pp. 1-2). World Vision’s response to this ‘new disease’ has been to set up an ‘urban advance programme’ under which it provides material and social support for the street people, giving them emergency food relief and also skills training and also helping in their resettlement:

The programme has been designed for skills training under which the people are given literacy training through informal education. World Vision meets the cost of the material used in the training and the trainers. Some of the people needed rehabilitation so we appointed social workers and worked with medical people to help them.

Tonie Mariba in an interview with the author, February 1996.

The skills training focuses primarily on income generating skills which would enable those who acquire them to set up co-operative business ventures so that they become independent and self-supporting. Some of these skills are in mending and making new footwear, carpentry and joinery, metal work, soap making, bicycle repairs and cooking. Many of these people who complete the training are supporting by World Vision to set up co-operatives and establish shops in different parts of Harare (see photos 10-11).
Photo 10: A trained woman bicycle repairer in her workshop at the market in one of the 'informal settlements' in Harare. Supporting her in the photo are members of the cooperative: from the left: the chairperson of the cooperative, the adult literacy teacher, the daycare centre teacher, and the cooking team.

Photo 11: Footwear shop in one of the informal settlements in Harare, Zimbabwe.
However, because of the enormity of the problem destitution and vagrancy by the urban poor continues. The problem came to a head when the Zimbabwe government together with the Harare City council rounded up thousands of these people and deposited them 33 kilometers outside the city, in a clean up exercise in preparation for the Harare CHOGM of 1991. Toniel Mariba, World Vision’s Area Co-ordinator of the Urban Field Ministries, explains:

In 1991 the Queen of England was going to come in the country for a meeting. That was a state leadership meeting which was called CHOGM, the Commonwealth leadership meeting. And when she was coming there was some preparation before she could land in the country, about six months or eight months preparations. During those preparations the Zimbabwe government thought it wise to sweep some of its dirt under the carpet. And part of its dirt was the people who were homeless who had nowhere to stay, who were roaming about in the city and they were staying at the peripheries of the city, like at the main bus terminal which is in Mbare. Mbare is the location for the poor people who live only about two kilometres from the city center. And people have mushroomed around there because it is a transit center for the people coming from the rural areas to the city to the urban life. And you will find that a lot of them stay at this transit center for a long time before they get into some form of city accommodation. So a lot of people have mushroomed around the city staying in cardboard boxes in the townships and sometimes in the plastic makeshifts. And because of these preparations for the Queen of England coming down they were all rounded up. This included people from Mbare as well as from other parts of the city, people in the north and in the west near the western suburbs. So many of these were also rounded up and taken to a central place which was called a transit center for the homeless people who would then be moved to somewhere else where they would be resettled. And this transit center was supposed to be there only for three months but it took more than three months. The Queen of England came into the country in October 1991 and went away at the beginning of November. And when she went away people thought this transit center was going to be dismantled but it never was dismantled. It was only meant for sweeping these people from the city to a bit far away place which is 33 kilometers from the city. So this is where we are going. It is called Porta Farms squatter camp because it is a farm where the city council is cleaning the...
water which comes from the city, recycling the water. The water goes into the reservoir which is our lake and it is recycled and cleaned through this plant before it is pumped back. So it is in this farm that the city council was throwing its sludge from the water and all the refuse from the city’s water was thrown in this farm. A fence was put around the farm and the people were dumped in there. They were given plastic bags and plastic paper to make their shelter. And people have been living under the plastic shades since 1991 until today.

Toniel Mariba in an interview with the author, February 1996.

The camp has no basic infrastructure or services, no water, no electricity, no paths and no school. The destitute people were simply dumped there with no means of sustenance. Word Vision reports that there were 2201 families at Porta Farm camp in 1994 (World Vision News 1994B, p8). At a conservative estimate of five members per family, that would be over 11,000 people at Porta Farm camp in 1994.

Prior to these people being dumped at the sewerage farm, World Vision worked amongst them on the streets and the squatter settlements around the city. It followed them to Porta Farm camp, assisted with emergency food relief, skills training and the provision of basic facilities and services. It petitioned the city council to extend the city’s water supply to the camp through piped water system. It also provided a satellite dispensary where council health workers from the city attended to the people at the camp on limited hours during the week. World Vision supported them to build toilet facilities to improve the sanitation at the camp such as pit and trench toilets. World Vision also supported them to start a school which has now been registered as a ‘non-formal education’ institution with the Department of Education. The school runs a morning shift for the primary school age children and an afternoon session for the adults. World Vision provides the basic teaching and learning resources for the school. A strong leadership structure has been established in the community through
leadership skills training with the assistance of World Vision. The various aspects of the community are managed by a management committee, which is in charge of things areas as health, education, social and economic activities, political and social activities, law and order. The Porta Farm camp community management system is impressive, with clear reporting structures and a clear hierarchy of authority. They are able to work through their problems through the management structure and function as an effective community without any government assistance or help.

The best testimony of the Porta Farm camp community leadership is their successful resistance of the combined attempt by the central government and the Harare City Council to remove the community and flatten the camp. In 1994 the community was served with an eviction order by the courts in Harare. The community mobilised resources and successfully petitioned the High Court and got an injunction forbidding the authorities from ejecting them. World Vision supported the community in its struggle through the courts system to obtain legal title to the farm and formalise the camp as a legal settlement. The case was still at the High Court in 1996. But as World Vision's national Director for Zimbabwe argues, there is a socioeconomic and political machinery which breeds poverty and destitution, and no amount of evictions or rounding up and squatter camps would dismantle that machinery. The solution would only be found in providing socioeconomic justice for these people:

"The eviction by the authorities of the urban poor will never solve the problem. No harassment of the urban poor will produce desired result. When the destitute are evicted they only change sites. In our view, therefore, the only solution is to create alternatives to the squatting and destitution. We must bring hope and a future to these people. Our aim is to create legitimacy for these people as people, not as squatters."

The partnership between World Vision and the destitute and street people of Harare has given many of them that legitimacy and hope through the development programmes amongst the informal settlements. The skills training provides income generation opportunities to many whose network extends through a number of cooperatives in the Harare urban area. The struggle by the Porta Farm camp community for legal title to the land on which they were dumped in 1991 is driven by the desire to provide an economic basis for the destitute settlers. A legal title to the land means that they can cultivate the land without the harassment of the local authorities who presently have title to the land. Attempts by the ‘settlers’ to set up projects such as vegetable gardens, small scale livestock and poultry farms have all been frustrated by the local authorities. It is the establishment of these self-help income generation projects that pushed the local authorities to seek to eject them and dismantle the community. It seems there is a conspiracy to keep the community poor, as one of the community leaders suggested. The community was ignored as long as they did not aspire to better themselves, but as soon as they secured the support that laid the foundation for social and economic stability the authorities came in to destroy it. Toniel Marimba suggests that dismantling the community only creates a situation where:

the people are made to lead a nomadic life where they lose everything in the process of moving.

The community structure that has been established, the simple things that they have been able to achieve such as stability for their family, opportunity for education for the children, and some basic infrastructure. The government has not taken account of what the community has been able to achieve in the past five years. Moving the people from here will only create other Porta Farms. Everything we have been able to achieve with the community will be lost.

Toniel Marimba in an interview with the author, February 1996.
By destroying the community, the authorities are effectively destroying their dream, their hope and their future. It is not too much for a community of over 11,000 citizens to demand legitimacy over 5 hectares of land which would give them economic independence. Much of what has been accomplished so far has been with the partnership of World Vision New Zealand and the communities in New Zealand who support the work of World Vision Zimbabwe in these communities.

9.7 Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated the role of New Zealand NGOs in responding to the crises in Africa. Their motivation is primarily to bring the benefits of development activities to the poorest groups and communities and to enable the poor to improve their circumstances, and over the longer term to participate more effectively in the development process in their communities. They therefore aim to work in the most deprived areas and with the most deprived population groups. The development partnership between New Zealand NGOs and local NGOs and communities in Africa has focused on strengthening the capacity of the partner local NGOs and communities. Their mandate is strongly rooted in the conventionalist theoretical perspective where their role is to enhance cooperative interaction between the donor communities in New Zealand and the recipient partner communities in Africa. It also includes advocacy on development and social justice issues and raising awareness for global interdependence, what Phil Twyford of Oxfam refers to as ‘a sense of solidarity and a sense of common humanity’ (Phil Twyford in an interview with the author, July 1995). In Africa their role has been to support local partner NGOs and communities on poverty alleviation programmes and on operational and policy issues. Their partnership activities help to empower and mobilise the people, with direct consequences for the power structures at the local and national levels.
The two case studies of partnership between New Zealand NGOs and local NGOs and communities in South Africa and Zimbabwe are clear illustrations of the role of cooperative partnership in responding to the crises in Africa. The partnership between Oxfam and the RWM has provided funds and technical support for the organisational structure of the RWM to reach and empower the rural women of the Transvaal in South Africa. Exchanges between Oxfam and the RWM including visits by officials of the two organisations, such as that in August 1996 by MamLydia Kompe, a founding member of the RWM and current member of the national Parliament, enhance the links and cooperation between New Zealand and South Africa.

World Vision partnership with communities in Zimbabwe has stimulated self-help programmes within the recipient partner communities. Recipient local communities have organised themselves, created supporting institutions such as cooperatives which have facilitated their access to formal institutions, as the case of the Porta Farm camp shows. These cooperatives should gradually create a network of local organisations that control the process of socioeconomic and political change in their communities.

The NGOs have therefore, played a critical and complementary role to New Zealand's official response to the crises in Africa. Whereas the official response focus primarily on the functional utility of New Zealand's response to its foreign policy interests, the NGOs have been more active in seeking opportunities for cooperative partnership. Chapter Ten discusses how these partnerships can be best rationalised, and suggests ways of enhancing the effectiveness of international development assistance as a response to the crises in Africa.
CHAPTER TEN:
NEW ZEALAND'S RESPONSE TO THE CRISES IN AFRICA:
A PARTNERSHIP PROPOSAL

“We encourage the great powers to relinquish power and seek justice, better relationships, and peace and co-operation through a common community dedicated to the advancement of the human family. There are those who say that this is idealistic. But if there are no ideals then there is no hope. If there is no hope then we enter into a period of unparalleled destruction.”

10.1 Introduction

The existing literature and methodological procedures examine international assistance from the position of the dualistic models of ‘donor interests’ and ‘recipient needs’. The overwhelming conclusion from these studies is that the overriding reason for giving international assistance is the donor’s foreign policy motivation, although humanitarian considerations may be used as the sweetener. In the case of New Zealand’s response to the crises in Africa, the foreign policy interest motivation has been demonstrated in Chapter Eight. Five main groups of interests were identified for the period 1984-1995 namely: establishing goodwill and political relationships with African countries; building New Zealand’s profile amongst Black African political leadership and with the African people generally, expanding New Zealand’s capacity at the United Nations and gaining a UNSC seat in 1992, securing the bid for the 1990 Commonwealth games in Auckland, and hosting it without the threat of boycott which
had plagued earlier games. Then there are trade and commercial interests which also include getting African countries to support the GATT agreement. These foreign policy objectives were achieved. There was clearly improved access to the political leadership in many African countries to put things right and to establish new relationships. New Zealand secured the bid and hosted the 1990 Commonwealth games in Auckland without any boycotts. It was also elected to the UNSC seat and served a very successful and effective two year term 1993-1994. In terms of New Zealand’s economic, trading and commercial interest in Africa there has not been much in terms of economic exchange, but as Chris Laidlaw suggests a few business connections were made especially between South Africa and New Zealand, such as the South Africa-New Zealand business council. In some respects that could yield results such as expanding the range of New Zealand business contacts which could lead to investment in some parts of Africa. It may not to be spectacular because of the old colonial relationships African countries have with Europe and the United Kingdom, and also because of the psychological and geographical distance between New Zealand and Africa.

The prospects exist for tourism but they are not particularly high. With the changes in South Africa and the return of a peaceful environment in many African countries this is set to increase. This may only be nominal to other African countries given the fact that there are overwhelming geophysical and historical reasons why South Africa would be more important. The fact that a good proportion of the African population in New Zealand is South African, especially white South African, and they have historical and family ties there suggests that South Africa is the most likely destination. South Africa also is English-speaking and so the psychological and language barrier is essentially not existent. Moreover, trade relations already exist between New Zealand
and South Africa, albeit small. This is set to increase as communications and air
transport links are developed and extended. Most important of all is the re-
establishment of sporting relations especially in cricket and rugby. The tri-nation
rugby trials between New Zealand, South Africa and Australia, the Super-12 rugby
competition between Australian, New Zealand and South African teams and the
traditional rugby rivalry between New Zealand and South Africa are all set to boost
tourism and travel between the two countries. New Zealand’s response to the crisis of
apartheid stated clearly that South Africa is where New Zealand’s ‘future interests
were more likely to be’. In that respect therefore this objective was also clearly
achieved.

The extent to which the giving of development assistance per se is responsible for the
achievement of these foreign policy objectives is rather questionable. As Don
McKinnon, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade suggests, if development assistance is
responsible, then:

> it would be very lucky because it is not very much. I think the support we have had from Africa
> has been less from any aid commitment and more from a desire and a determination to be
> appropriately engaged. For the amount of money going into aid it will be an insult to expect them
to say that we will now support you for those sorts of things.

Don McKinnon in an interview with the author, July 1995 (Emphasis added).

This chapter therefore starts from the premise that New Zealand’s response to the
crises in Africa provides an opportunity for building a partnership between New
Zealand communities and African communities. The chapter proposes and tests the
model of development partnerships proposed within the framework established in
Chapter Five for the analysis of New Zealand’s response to the crises in Africa. It is
divided into three sections: the first section examines the changing paradigm in
international development assistance and reconstructs development assistance from the perspective of the interaction in which both the donor and recipient partners receive mutual benefits. It also examines the shared pattern of meaning and the perceived impact of development assistance by both partners. The second section recasts New Zealand's response to the crises in Africa in the context of the model of partnership, and uses the case of New Zealand's response to the crisis of apartheid to demonstrate how the model works. Section three argues the case for applying the model at the three different levels: official bilateral level, New Zealand NGOs to local NGOs and communities in Africa, and community-to-community between New Zealand and African communities.

10.2 A reconceptualisation of the paradigm of international assistance

In the literature on the motivation for giving international assistance the 'conventionalist approach' argues that international assistance should be used to enhance international co-operation among national governments. This perspective suggests that co-operation in development assistance should be expanded and extended to include co-operation in other areas such as decisions affecting peace and security among nations (Gordenker 1976). Although this point of view has been criticised as being too optimistic and idealistic, as the opening quote to this chapter suggests, there is no hope for positive social change if we are devoid of ideals. In the case of NZODA, the concept of international assistance as a co-operative partnership is not just a conceptual ideal, it is actually already written in the principles of official development assistance. It enhances the basis on which international assistance is reconceptualised.
in this chapter as a co-operative partnership for the mutual benefit of both the donor and the recipient.

The guiding principles for New Zealand's international assistance state that:

"The primary purpose of NZODA is to help promote sustainable economic and social progress and justice in the developing countries. The programme is an important part of New Zealand's external relations and trade effort. It helps to advance international economic prosperity, to maintain peace, security and stability, and to protect the global environment. In a world where one-fifth of the population earn only one-seventieth of its income, there are urgent, basic humanitarian needs to be addressed. The Official Development Assistance programme is an important means of demonstrating New Zealand's willingness to assist. As a trading nation, New Zealand wants to see the world trade expand, which requires economic growth in the developing countries".

Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 1994B, p3 (Emphasis added).

The two opening sentences show clearly the dual purpose of NZODA. While the programme recognises the need to respond to the humanitarian needs of the recipient partner countries, the foreign policy interests of New Zealand are not taken for granted either. The ideals of the programme are spelt out explicitly in the preamble which states clearly that:

"New Zealand's Official Development Assistance (ODA) is a co-operative process, a partnership between peoples and countries".


The programme therefore expects mutual benefits from the co-operative partnership established through international assistance. This is declared in Principle One thus:

"New Zealand recognises that an effective and appropriate ODA programme is in the long term political and economic interests of all partner countries involved, including New Zealand, and contributes to stability and harmony in the international community".

Therefore, from the official position of New Zealand as a donor partner, there is the clear recognition and understanding that international assistance has the dual purpose, of enhancing socioeconomic change in the recipient partner countries and also fulfilling New Zealand’s foreign policy interests. From the perspective of the recipient partners, the perceived benefits of international assistance flow both ways. Thus, Max Chigwida, the Executive Director of World Vision Zimbabwe, observes that:

We are also moving away from this thing of donor-recipient beneficiary, and seeing ourselves as partners and this is expressed in the language of our organisation today. There is no one who is too poor to give and no one too rich to receive. So there is a mutual affirmation where some people may have more material things than others but that does not mean that they don’t need something else from other people. So we see ourselves, whether it is New Zealanders or Zimbabweans, we see ourselves in that light. That those who are benefiting from the funds that are given are both the donors and the recipients.

Max Chigwida in an interview with the author January 1996 (Emphasis added).

The mutual benefits to both the donor and the recipient are therefore, recognised by both the donor and the recipients. It is important to note Max Chigwida’s reference to the fact that the benefits derived from the partnership are not necessarily material benefits. So that while the donor may contribute material input into the partnership, what they get from it may not necessarily be tangible or material. That is not to say that the non-material benefits are in any way inferior to the more material benefits. This point becomes even more important when we return to the analysis of the benefits to New Zealand of its response to the crisis of apartheid in South Africa later in this chapter.

The question of the conceptualisation of New Zealand’s response to the crises in Africa as a partnership is not derived only from official policy. All 12 respondents in the elite
interviews, recognise the donor utility to New Zealand of its response to the crises in Africa. However, there is also the genuine desire by New Zealand and New Zealanders to participate in redressing some of the global development imbalances against Africa. This is the quid pro quo of the partnership. Thus Trevor Richards for example, argues that:

The reason I became involved in African issues is because I think that the rest of the world owes it to Africa. I think that the West has ripped off Africa for a couple of centuries plus and I think that therefore the West owes it to Africa to come to the party on a whole lot of these issues, like the economic relationship between Africa and the rest of the world. Now I know that quite a lot of people don't see it like that but I personally see it that way. I think that a lot of the situations in which Africa finds itself in, if we talk in generalities like that, are situations which are the responsibility of governments and organisations and interests outside of Africa. I am not saying that everything that is wrong with Africa is the responsibility of people outside of Africa. I think that African governments make mistakes just like other governments in the rest of the world make mistakes. But I think that the balance needs to be redressed and supporting Africa in things like debt relief, providing development assistance are ways of helping to redress that imbalance.

Trevor Richards in an interview with the Author, May 1995 (Emphasis added).

Trevor Richard's argument for the international assistance partnership is based on the compensatory principles of the conventionalist approach. Martin Small of CORSO on the otherhand, suggests that the political and economic problems such as the massive poverty that New Zealanders (and for that matter lower income people in other developed countries) face, are in fact intrinsically linked to the political and economic crises that plague Africa and other developing countries:

There are a whole lot of factors which draw this country and the people of this country together with people elsewhere. The people who are struggling around trying to get a minimum wage in this country have the same sorts of problems as the people in Africa, in Asia and in Latin America. They might live in a better house, they might even own a car, but the basic structural processes of debt, of trade, of control by financial markets is doing us over just as much at a proportional level
as they are doing over other countries. And the whole growing imbalance between the rich and the poor. And it is not just in straight economic terms, as well there is this whole thing of sovereignty, the indigenous issues in New Zealand are being highlighted here but they are the same struggles which are being fought in lots of other places in the world. The issues of trampling on indigenous rights and now the most dangerous things, the subjugation of those indigenous rights, to the international trade deals that are being signed up every day, the North America free trade agreement up there and APEC here and GATT there and all those things. And so we are all linked into this issue of indigenous rights and of all these major international economic processes.

Martin Small in an interview with the author, May 1995 (Emphasis added).

Thus there is a clear recognition that the crises in Africa are not only an ‘African issue’ but a global responsibility. Hence Phil Twyford of Oxfam argues that his response to those who criticise the development agencies for bothering with Africa when there are large needs in New Zealand is that, New Zealanders needs to respond to Africa’s problems because of a ‘sense of solidarity and a sense of common humanity’:

If you look at Oxfam’s supporters I would think that they are the kind of people who are particularly well informed, the people who read the Guardian weekly, may be watch CNN. They take a particular interest in politics and social events and so on. But primarily their motivation is humanitarian. But it is also an informed humanitarianism and the sense of solidarity and particularly with the whole history of the anti apartheid movement in New Zealand. I think that New Zealanders had a very very good understanding of the political situation, obviously not the subtleties but quite a good understanding and experience over a long period of time. And I think New Zealanders give support in a sense of solidarity and a sense of common humanity that’s how I see it. I don’t know, but I suspect there will be very few New Zealanders who have a sense that Africa is economically significant to New Zealand. Our message is basically that we are living in one world and that problems in Africa are the same problems experienced in other parts of the world and they are just manifested differently in the style. The problems of ethnic diversity and intolerance which we have seen in Rwanda and Burundi over the past year are the same thing in Yugoslavia. To my mind during the cold war the single defining idea that imprinted on the world

Chapter ten

342

Love M. Chile
politics was the struggle between East and West. And in the post cold war era I believe the defining idea is tolerance, where the different communities, religious or ethnic or social can live side by side. Can we respect and tolerate each other and live side by side? And that is everywhere in the world, everywhere you look. That to me is one of the major challenges in Africa today. But also on our own streets in the suburbs of New Zealand to me the biggest issue we face is equity, social and economic equity. Issues of refugees, of HIV aids, of environmental destruction, crime. These are kind of universal the things that Africans are struggling with, exactly the same as you see in New York, in New Zealand, in Bangkok or anywhere else.

Phil Twyford in an interview with the author, July 1995 (Emphasis added).

The universality of the problems which constitute the crises in Africa means that the rest of the world has a responsibility to help relieve Africa’s crises because responding to the crises in Africa invariably impacts on the socioeconomic problems of New Zealand also. For example, the apartheid crisis in South Africa was not just a human rights issue, it created a major international relations problem for New Zealand because of its sporting relationship with South Africa. The resolution of that crisis has impacted positively both on Africa and New Zealand. Therefore, for New Zealanders to withdraw into a false sense of security because we live in ‘God’s own country’ will be burying our heads in the sand. Moreover, as Alan Bell of World Vision suggests, certain individuals should not be denied the opportunity to attain a reasonable standard of living simply because by the accident of birth they happen to be living in a different environment. New Zealand has a responsibility to Africa:

There are a lot of things that have contributed to the poverty in Africa. In fact you could have been me and I could have been you living in Africa. And so in that sense in terms of equality, philosophically we ought to be committed to bringing about the release from poverty and an equal distribution of what wealth in terms of food and resources that there are in the world. So I will come to you from that angle. You talk about trade and foreign policy, politics and foreign debt and all those sorts of things, but I actually believe it goes deeper than that, and I believe that it is recognising the intrinsic value of every individual. And from a Christian point of view if you
believe that God created people, He created them equal and people have destroyed the balance and people ought to put it back together. Every individual is valuable, and there is no more special value on any one person than there is on another. And because we have been so fortunate as to be born in New Zealand we do not deserve any better lifestyle than anybody born in Africa. We have got one, but there is no justification for it really, and almost by accident of birth.

Alan Bell in an interview with the author, May 1995 (Emphasis added).

This is a point Russell Marshall makes more explicitly when he suggests that the international community must accept responsibility for the social and economic crises in Africa and act more consistently to redress the imbalances created by past injustices to Africa such as:

the way in which Africa was brought into the world economy. The way in which structural adjustment programmes are operating. The way in which people were encouraged to grow crops which would serve western markets. The way in which commodity price agreements fell so you produce more and you get less. The way in which women became marginalised in the europeanization of African traditions. There is a whole lot of ways in which Europe underdeveloped Africa. And then on the question of debt again. Since the collapse of Communism and the disintegration of Eastern Europe, America and Western European attention and financial support has been much more preoccupied with the recovery of Eastern Europe than it has been for Africa. And if you have read the article I wrote about debt you will know that these days more money is going out of Africa in debt repayments than it is coming in form of aid. I don't think many people realise that. But secondly that situation has got worse as the World Bank and other development agencies have concentrated on the recovery of the white people in Eastern Europe to the detriment of South America and of Africa. And I don't think it is necessarily unique with New Zealand, I think it is just a widespread western lack of awareness about Africa.


The creation of partnership between New Zealand and African communities through New Zealand's response to the crises in Africa enhances the raising of awareness about Africa which Russell Marshall refers to. This is an important benefit, though non-
material, of the partnership. For example, in justifying the VSA programme to Africa, in reply to a letter by a constituent, the Director of the Development Co-operation Unit of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, advised the Minister that by 1990:

"some 1600 returned volunteers have gained experiences, understanding and insights of countries throughout the Pacific, South-East Asia and Africa. Many New Zealanders have attitudes towards Africa which is probably ill-informed and sometimes rather prejudiced. Volunteers returning from Africa can help these stereotypes and misconceptions on which much of this prejudice is based".

File No. 118/13/118/1 64/246/2 14 August 1990.

Thus, the technical assistance through VSA assistance to African communities does not only benefit the recipient communities, but also New Zealand. Similarly, New Zealand's response to the political crises in Africa including the crisis of apartheid both through peacekeeping and monitoring activities, and the admission of refugees in New Zealand, mutually benefits both partners. For the countries in crises the resolution of the crisis is the objective, but for New Zealand the benefits include raising awareness, as Russell Marshall explains:

the fact that we had teams in the UN forces in various parts of Africa has led the way. We have seminars. These days you have a seminar on Africa and you get the military along. And I took part in a seminar which Don McKinnon organised at Massey two or three years ago and one of the best contributions was from the UN Commander who had been in Angola, one of the New Zealand army officers. We were meeting on Somalia once so the army people came along and talked very knowledgeably about all that. So by New Zealand military involvement, the officers and their families and the wider New Zealand community is gradually becoming more aware.

Don McKinnon has been several times to various African countries. It may have been for military reasons. But it does not matter. We are still getting people there and contacts are being made. We have many more contacts and policies in Africa than we have ever had before. So I think that is gradually happening. And I would like to see that continue.

Similarly, the apartheid crisis and the contradictions that brought to the New Zealand communities is not unrelated to the huge amount of ignorance about Africa as a whole. The establishment of the Africa Information Centre in Wellington, was a direct response to the contradictions arising from the level of ignorance. Russell Marshall explains further:

> what we sought to do was to establish an office which will have as its principal purpose to educate New Zealanders about Africa. In the earlier years up to about five years ago we had quite an extensive schools programme and we still provide resources for teachers in schools and students coming here with projects that they are doing. These days we do a fair amount of travel and consular advice. But it was basically just lifting the awareness as it were of New Zealanders about the realities of Africa, hosting people who came here and so on, and just getting a better media profile of Africa.


The acceptance of African refugees and the increased migration of African people will also bring Africa home to New Zealand, and gradually make information about Africa more accessible and create more awareness. The better understanding of Africa does not only benefit New Zealand, also benefits Africa because it provides opportunity for better dialogue between Africa and New Zealand. New Zealand’s response to the crises in Africa therefore, provides opportunities for establishing partnerships between New Zealand and African communities. These partnerships are both at the official bilateral level and also at community-to-community level, as well as between New Zealand NGOs and local NGOs in African countries. These partnerships mutually benefit both New Zealand and the participating African countries and communities. The next section illustrates the mutual benefits of the partnership model by re-examining New Zealand’s response to the crisis of apartheid in South Africa within the framework of this partnership model.
10.3 New Zealand’s Response to the Crisis of apartheid: Testing the Partnership Model

The framework presented in Chapter Four suggests that the most appropriate way of understanding international development assistance is to conceptualise it as a partnership in which the donor and recipient partners interact cooperatively for the mutual benefit of both partners. This model seeks to find and extend the area where donor interests and recipient needs congrue in the contextual models, (area [D] in figure 10.1), since both motivations for giving international assistance are present in most allocation decisions.

The theoretical basis for this model derives from Maizels and Nissanke (1984) and Tsoutsopilides (1991). Maizels and Nissanke suggest that international development assistance given because of its functional utility to the donor may:

“in fact be used to accelerate the development process, but from the point of view of motivation this is an incidental effect. By contrast, aid given primarily for humanitarian or altruistic reasons, may - or may not - contribute to the foreign policy objectives of the donor, but this again would be an incidental effect”.

Maizels and Nissanke 1984, p880.

Tsoutsopilides goes further to suggest that international assistance given for donor interests or recipient needs motives can in fact be complimentary:

“self-interested reasons for aid allocation may not necessarily clash with developmental criteria illustrated in the recipient needs model. As a matter of fact, it may often be the case that the two are complementary”

Tsoutsopilides 1991, p653.

The case of New Zealand's response to the Crisis of apartheid in South Africa is used here to test how the model operates in practice.
The model is conceptualised as three rings made up of the two partners represented as 'crisis' and 'response'. The partnership is formed to respond to identified crises. On the diagram the ring ‘AFRCRIS’ represents the crisis of apartheid, and ‘NZRESPS’ represents New Zealand’s response. The third ring represents the perceived benefits to both partners represented by ‘IMPACT/EFFECTIVENESS’. In the case of apartheid there was an international response which New Zealand was part of. New Zealand’s response [B] directed at the apartheid crisis [A] had the potential of impacting directly on the apartheid crisis [B], [C], and [D]. In [D] New Zealand’s response helps towards the resolution of the crisis and also benefits New Zealand.

In the context of NZODA policy therefore, area [D] represents the optimum point where ODA helps to promote sustainable economic and social progress and justice in the recipient communities and also enhances the fulfillment of New Zealand’s external relations objectives. Sports boycott of South Africa would be a good example of response in [D]. [C] is New Zealand’s response to apartheid which impacts both on apartheid and New Zealand but is not effective in resolving the crisis, although New Zealand may benefit from it, for example, the All Black-Springbok rugby tours. They had political significance to the National Party and the rugby fraternity, but only encouraged the intransigent minority government in South Africa. While [B] is New Zealand actions in Africa that are not directed at apartheid, have no effect on apartheid but benefit New Zealand, such as lamb sells to Algeria and Egypt. For an effective partnership with maximum benefits to both partners, area [D] is the most significant, and would need to be expanded and extended (see figure 10.2). Theoretically this is where the two motivations congrue and may be complimentary.
Figure 10.1  Partnership model: New Zealand's Response to the apartheid crisis.

KEY

AFRCRIS === The crisis of apartheid Africa.
NZRESPS === New Zealand's response to the apartheid crisis.
IMPACT  === The impact and effectiveness of the response on both New Zealand and the crisis affecting the recipient African partner(s). Effective impact means that the crisis has been resolved. Impact alone means that something has been done about the crisis without necessarily resolving it.
New Zealand responded to the crisis of apartheid in three principal ways, namely diplomatic support for Africa at international forums; boycott of South Africa as required by the United Nations and the Commonwealth; and human resource development for the ANC. Diplomatic support came through four main channels, at the UN, within the Commonwealth, in Africa, and in New Zealand. At the UN, New Zealand sided with the rest of Africa on issues of apartheid. An analysis of the UN General Assembly resolutions on South Africa shows that prior to 1984, New Zealand either abstained (8 times) or voted against (6 times) UN resolutions condemning South Africa over apartheid or imposing sanctions against it. However, between 1984 and 1992 New Zealand’s position changed radically. New Zealand, in fact, co-sponsored five UN resolutions on apartheid, voted in favour on 14 and abstained only on 5 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade various reports). New Zealand also took the side of Africa on the issue of apartheid at the Commonwealth. It imposed sanctions on South Africa as required by the UN, the OAU and the Commonwealth. This gave the Commonwealth a united front in dealing with apartheid. Thus from 1984 the British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, was completely isolated within the Commonwealth, left on her own ‘feeling sorry for the rest of the Commonwealth’ as she told a journalist at Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia in 1989.

In Africa the diplomatic push was enhanced by Prime Minister David Lange’s tour of East Africa in 1985 to explain New Zealand’s new position. This was followed by a series of visits to African countries by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and other key Ministries. New Zealand also invited and hosted a number of African Ministers and opinion leaders. The first New Zealand resident diplomatic post on the African continent was established in Harare, Zimbabwe in 1986. The government also
recognised the ANC as a legitimate partner in the struggle for the democratic transition in South Africa. Prior to 1984 the ANC was considered a terrorist organisation. To enhance the management capacity of the ANC in preparation for a democratic South Africa, a series of scholarships and training programmes for members of the ANC was instituted both in New Zealand and in third countries. In New Zealand the closure of the South Africa Consulate in Wellington in 1984 was a signal to both South Africa and the rest of Africa that New Zealand was serious about good relations with Black Africa. Also by condemning apartheid both at home and overseas, and showing that it had good race relations in New Zealand between the tangata whenua and the pakeha, the government demonstrated that it was non-racist both at home and abroad. The setting up of the Africa Information Centre in Wellington was also a means of improving New Zealand officials' knowledge of the sociocultural and political processes in Africa, and to demonstrate to Africans that New Zealand was sensitive to the concerns of Africa.

10.31 Benefits from New Zealand's partnership with Africa in the response to the crisis of apartheid

New Zealand's sporting and cultural relations with South Africa made it a pariah in the international community. In the aftermath of the massive African and Caribbean boycott of the Montreal Olympics in 1976, and the threat to the Edmonton Commonwealth games in 1978, the international community was angry at the impact New Zealand's sporting contacts with South had on international sports. This affected New Zealand in an number of ways. New Zealand's participation at international sports meetings was under threat; its chances of hosting the 1990 Commonwealth
games in Auckland, were threatened, and after the bid to host the games was secured there was the threat of boycott. New Zealand lost the election to a seat on the UN Security Council in 1982, and also faced censure at the UN Special Committee on apartheid as well as the General Assembly. It was generally marginalised in the international community. New Zealand’s foreign policy objective in responding to the apartheid crisis therefore, was to break out of the diplomatic isolation.

The direct benefits to New Zealand of its response to the crisis of apartheid include establishing goodwill with Black Africa, and thereby gaining access to the political leadership in African countries. Through this new relationship it won the bid for the 1990 Commonwealth games in Auckland, and the games were successfully held without boycott. The established goodwill and access to the political leadership in Africa also created a constituency for New Zealand’s successful bid for the UNSC seat in 1992, and also enabled it to successfully lobby African leaders to vote in favour of the GATT agreement. Its support for the ANC and the contacts established through training and development programmes, put New Zealand in a strategic position in dealing with the Black leadership that has emerged in the post-apartheid South Africa.

The effectiveness of the partnership on the crisis of apartheid is that, the common objective of the elimination of apartheid has been achieved. The moral and psychological impact of New Zealand’s sports boycott must not be underestimated because, for white South Africa, especially the Afrikaners, the most significant international contact they had during those dark years of apartheid was sport. And the most important sport to them, almost at par with religion, was rugby and playing rugby with New Zealand, the country that they regarded as the best rugby country in
the world. When it became clear that there was no going back on New Zealand’s cultural and sporting boycott of South Africa, there was sustained pressure on the political leadership to find a way out of the impasse. This was probably, the single most important factor that forced a change of attitude from the Afrikaners. They could evade the diplomatic, military and trade embargo. But they could not bear the sustained isolation from international and bilateral contact in sports. The concentration of New Zealand’s response on the crisis of apartheid helped to resolve the crisis. This response benefited both partners in the relationship between New Zealand and Africa. This is position [D] in the model. To optimise the impact of response to a crisis, it is suggested that area [D] be expanded to make the response most effective to the resolution of identified crisis. This is illustrated in figure 10.2.

In the case of the crisis of apartheid, the elimination of apartheid in South Africa has created a peaceful environment in the Southern Africa sub-region. This has impacted on the crisis of political instability in the Front Line states by eliminating the support base for the opposition armies of UNITA in Angola and the RENAMO in Mozambique. This has enhanced the successful political reconciliation and transition in Mozambique leading up to the elections in 1994. The cease-fire between the Luanda government and the UNITA rebels in Angola continued to be largely respected up to mid 1996. The return of a peaceful environment in the sub-region also has flow-on effects on the economic crises in the whole of Southern Africa. Scarce resources that were hitherto diverted to defence and security to counter South Africa’s military incursions can now be invested in socioeconomic development. The elimination of apartheid also impacts on the refugee crisis in the Front Line states. Apartheid displaced over 2.5 million people from South Africa who took refuge in surrounding Southern African countries.
[A] to [F] are the same as in figure 10.1 above.

Notice how much New Zealand’s response is directed at the identified crisis, and also how much the impact extends beyond the area of the identified crisis.

Figure 10.2: Creating a ‘perfect’ partnership by extending the area of effective impact.

South Africa’s insurgent destabilising activities in the region created a further 2.0-to-2.5 million refugees and internally displaced people in the Front Line states. The elimination of apartheid and the return of a peaceful environment has encouraged voluntary repatriation of refugees in the region. New Zealand’s partnership in responding to the crisis of apartheid therefore had mutual benefits to both partners. New Zealand achieved its foreign policy objective of breaking out of international
isolation, and Africa’s objective of eliminating apartheid has been achieved. In the context of current literature and theory therefore, New Zealand’s response to the crisis of apartheid has significant elements of both the functional utility approach and the conventionalist framework. The practical outcome of the perceived impact of the international assistance of New Zealand’s response to the crisis of apartheid both by the ‘donor’ (New Zealand) and the recipient’ (African countries, particularly South Africa) corresponds with the theoretical suggestion that:

“the recipient nation will behave more favourably towards their country, lending support to national political interests; the recipient country will confer economic benefits on their country, for example by buying more of the products they export. They may expect some indication that they have had a favourable impact on the residents of the recipient country, perhaps some expression of gratitude, or simply the evidence that the lives of these people have changed.”

Dudley and Montmarquette 1976, p133.

African countries have behaved very favourably towards New Zealand’s national interests as demonstrated above. Nelson Mandela also came to New Zealand to personally express appreciation and gratitude for New Zealand’s response to the crisis of apartheid. And there is no doubt of the evidence that the lives of the people of South Africa particularly, and the Front Line states generally, have improved because of New Zealand’s response.

The case of New Zealand’s response to the apartheid crisis in South Africa illustrates the significance of focusing on one identified crisis, and how effective response to the identified crisis can help the resolution of other crises. It also demonstrates the mutual benefits of cooperative partnership and how the two broad motivations for giving international assistance can in fact be complementary. The success of New Zealand’s
response to the economic and developmental crises has however, been less than spectacular in their impact on the recipient communities. And the evidence on the ground in African communities together with the persistence of the socioeconomic crises as demonstrated in this thesis, despite four decades of international development assistance, demands that new approaches be explored to make international response more effective in resolving the socioeconomic crises in Africa. It to this that the final sections of this thesis seeks to make a contribution.

10.4 Creating Development Partnerships at the International level

New Zealand's partnership with Africa in response to the crisis of apartheid was effective in resolving the crisis because both New Zealand and African partners pooled resources and focused on the identified crisis. This section argues that the current system of New Zealand's official development assistance to Africa is largely ineffective in meeting the needs of the dual purpose of international assistance in a balanced form. As demonstrated in Chapter Eight, despite the good intentions of the official donor partner, the balance between foreign policy objectives consistently overshadows the needs for resolving the development crises in the recipient countries. The spread of small international assistance resources thinly amongst a large number of recipients is ineffective particularly to the recipient partners. For example, the combined New Zealand official development assistance to Africa, both bilateral and multilateral, does not exceed NZD 10 million in any one year. But this is spread thinly among an average of ten countries. During one of its most generous years in 1990/91 for example, about NZD 3.7 million was spread over the twelve different countries, plus SADCC and UN and Commonwealth programmes in Africa (File No. 118/13/118/1 02 May 1990). This is ineffective both to the donor and the recipient partners in
terms of meeting development objectives. It is in the light of this that the following proposal is made to reduce the cost to both partners, and to increase the effectiveness of international response to developmental crises in Africa. New Zealand is used as a primary case but the proposal is intended to apply at the broader level for an internationally more co-ordinated development assistance partnership with the least developed countries of Africa.

10.41 Level One: Bilateral international development partnership

This is a system of development assistance whereby international organisations and the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) member countries adopt an African country as a development partner. The proposal is in line with the objectives of the UN Special Initiative on Africa, which seeks to encourage release of development resources to Africa in a

"more coordinated and synergistic fashion through the combination of action and advocacy involving African and donor countries and institutions and the UN system itself".


The bilateral international development partnership enhances the coordination of international development assistance both at the individual crisis level, community and national level, as well as the international level. It reduces the competition between African countries seeking development assistance from DAC countries and international organisations. The combined expertise of the donor and recipient partner countries and organisations are co-ordinated in the execution of development assistance programmes. The recipient partner country's administrative structure is less burdened with processing and balancing demands from diverse donor groups of
countries and international organisations with different philosophies and agenda. The structure of the programme would also be better co-ordinated and less fragmented than it is at present. The different sectors of the recipient's economy, such as education, health, agriculture and the administration and management skills will be reformed and upgraded in a uniform manner based on a common model, rather than the conflicting models from different donors.

The political and administrative reforms in the recipient country would be stabilised through the positive influence of the donor country and organisation. In many African countries proceeding with structural adjustments and democratisation programmes, democratisation and economic liberalisation sometimes induce social unrest, and hinder the absorption of development programmes due to the resulting inefficiency of government administrative structures. The donor partner country and organisations would provide direct support to the recipient partner to overcome the difficulties inherent in the democratisation process, based on their experience and understanding of the local social, political and economic environment. When situations which run counter to the trend towards democratisation, or which constitute grave human rights violation in the recipient partner country arise, the donor partner's presence is more likely to act as a moderating influence to discourage such situations from worsening. If the partnership is effective in securing popular support, it is also able to provide and promote support for intra-national harmony to mitigate inter-regional and inter-tribal rivalries that are likely to deteriorate into civil strife and genocide such as those in Burundi and Rwanda.
The partnership programme would also limit the level of arms purchase and military aid, a situation which tends to aggravate local conflicts. By limiting military expenditure the partnership programme is in a better position to help prevent the escalation of local tensions. The resources otherwise used in the procurement of arms from competing donor suppliers would be invested in productive infrastructure for socioeconomic development and poverty reduction programmes, and thus further contribute to the maintenance of peace and order. The energies and resources of the communities would be directed more at productive endeavours when there is peace and stability and respect for human dignity. While it may be true that 'a full belly does not exorcise the temptation for violence', it is also equally true that empty bellies and idle minds are the devils workshop, to quote African proverbs.

The rationale and philosophy of this proposal derives from the fact that similar programmes already exist. Though informal and small, they are quite effective. Canada has the 'Partnership Africa Canada' (PAC), which is a network of grassroots voluntary organisations in Canada and Africa working in partnership for balanced international co-operation and understanding. World Vision International also has programmes whereby communities and organisations in donor countries adopt communities and organisations in Africa and work co-operatively towards the transformation of both the recipient and donor partner communities. At the more individual level, the SCF, Christian Child Foundation (CCF) and World Vision child sponsorship are partnership programmes between individuals and families for the mutual benefit of the partners. These programmes are non-exploitative and benefit both the partners in the relationship.
Furthermore, the current situation is that the parties in the international assistance process are made up of faceless contributor-donors and faceless recipient-beneficiaries. The majority of the contributing citizens hardly know anything at all about the country or community they are supporting other the media blitz on the evening news and advertisements in response to particular public appeals. They know nothing about the demographic profile or the socioeconomic and political structure of the recipient community. It is the same for the recipient countries and communities, who are unlikely to locate the contributing country on the world map. They may know nothing about their motivation for giving, their contributors’ perceptions and ideas about global issues and what they expect to happen as a result of their contribution. The partnership programme would lift the international assistance programme from the position of faceless donor-contributors and passive recipients-beneficiaries to a systematic process of true international partnership in the development process, where the donor and the recipient partners are responsive and responsible to the needs and aspirations of each other.

This recommendation may be criticised on a number of grounds. The most potent is that it is a rebirth of colonialism and that it is resurrecting old solutions to new problems. It may suggest that this constitutes neo-colonialism as the recipient partner country would have to surrender its sovereignty and independence to the donor partner country. There are three points that must be stated against the neo-colonialism argument. Firstly, it must be understood that the conventional concepts of national sovereignty were established during an era in which nation states were substantially self contained fortresses. What a nation state decided to do within its borders was considered to be its exclusive concern as long as it did not intrude on
neighbouring states. It is a different world today, in which a great deal of what goes on within the borders of most states is of considerable and rightful concern to other states and their citizens. The international flow of trade and monetary policies affects the global economy and the viability of international systems. Political suppression and economic inequality create political and economic refugees which affect other countries. Social and environmental problems resulting from internal policies of sovereign nations, such as the greenhouse effect, ozone layer depletion, drug trade and trafficking, are international problems which transcend national boundaries. The new international order has led to the evolution of 'global citizenry'. This increasingly affects the ways in which people perceive their world, relate to one another as individuals and nations. There is a new global consciousness which encourages policy change, constituency building and rational new initiatives. This proposal seeks to contribute to these new initiatives. The sovereignty and independence of these countries to a large extent has effectively been mortgaged to the IMF and the World Bank, with debt repayments of nearly 50 percent of total national incomes. How much more dependent could they be? The development partnership within the context of the UN system would actually enhance the political and socioeconomic stability of the recipient partner countries and subsequently enable them to regain their true sovereignty.

Moreover, the current situation is that donor countries alone determine the terms and conditions of international assistance. The input from the recipient countries is minimal and highly limited despite pretences to the contrary. A development partnership programme would bring the two partner countries together, concentrate limited resources in identified geographic areas, reduce the competition between
recipients that leads to the present draconian conditionalities that countries have to agree to to get international assistance finance. By reducing the number of recipient competitors from individual donors, the premise and conditionalities for international assistance would invariably change and this would undoubtedly enhance the development process in the recipient partner countries. It would also increase dialogue and co-operation between countries as it would provide the opportunity for more significant input into the international assistance policy from the recipient partner country. The example of World Vision’s pre-investment dialogue discussed in Chapter Nine would help identify development priorities and objectives that both partners agree on. These priorities and objectives would also provide the basis to measure the progress and the effectiveness of international assistance. At the same time donor partners would be in a better position to monitor the investment and implementation of international assistance programmes more effectively. In an increasingly shrinking global village one of the most important attributes of village life in the African context must be called upon to support the partnership proposal. Citizens must start to look after and support each other, particularly the weak. It takes the whole village to educate a child, and the siblings of a deceased member of the family are usually adopted and cared for by relations or even friends of the family. The African economy and sociopolitical stability is deceased. The international good neighbour, friends and relations must act now to prevent the orphan child becoming vagabond. This is in accord with the position of conventionalist theory, which extends the Rawlsian principle from the national to the international level to cover Africa. This extension is based on moral grounds as well as in the interest of international stability and security as argued in Chapter Three.
A further possible difficulty with the development partnership programme would be the difference between ‘larger’ donor countries and the ‘smaller’ donor countries. It may be suggested that recipient partners of the larger donors would be better placed than those in partnership with the smaller partner countries. More research would require to be done into the technical and practical applications of the programme and how such problems could be resolved. However the ‘smaller donors’ could be encouraged to form partnerships with smaller recipient countries, for example partnership could be formed on the basis of compatibility in demographic and physical characteristics, size of the population and economy. Partnerships with a smaller resource base could be complemented by international organisation with larger resources, thereby balancing up the level of resource transfer. In any case, by the current levels of international development assistance, the most generous donors are not necessarily the largest countries or organisations, but some of the smallest countries, particularly the Nordic countries (see table 6.1).

There could also be complications arising from past historical factors such as colonial relations, past international assistance relations created by historical alliances and colonial ties. This is where the political and strategic interests of the donor countries would be challenged. The partnership programme must transcend historical and strategic alliances. Its primary objective must be to provide international assistance partnership that is direct, effective and purposeful. It must aim at sustainable transformation of the recipient partner’s socioeconomic circumstances. It must challenge the traditional notions of international assistance, by breaking the boundaries that separate the needs of the recipients and the interests of the donors. The old relationships perpetuated by cold war ideologies must give way to new
relationships based on international co-operation. Foreign policy interests centred on creating ideological and military strategic spheres of influence and markets, have no real value or meaning in the post-cold war free trade world. The programme must provide an atmosphere of trust, where both partners accept and believe that the partnership works in both their interests and contributes towards global stability and harmony. The current hangover of donor interests must be challenged. In the new regime of international free trade, development partnerships would further dissolve international trade boundaries, remove tariff requirement for trade and other forms of resource transfer between the partner countries. The massive transnational movement of human resources from African countries leading to brain drain would be substantially reduced, thereby enhancing the human resource base for national development.

Bilateral international development partnerships will not only benefit the partner countries but the entire international community. Effective bilateral partnerships will contribute to peace and stability in Africa by promoting socioeconomic and political development (see section 10.43 below). This will reduce the number of social and political conflicts and, consequently, the cycle of humanitarian emergencies which require the humanitarian and military intervention from the international community, which invariably lead to loss of lives as in the case of American and Pakistani soldiers in Somalia in 1992.

For the international creditor nations and finance institutions, the return of peace and stability will lead to investment in productive activities and the creation of wealth, and accompanying rise in national and individual disposable incomes in the longer term.
This would enhance an effective consumer society which translates into a thriving market for international trade. For a world where “one-fifth of the population earn less than one-seventieth of its income (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1994B, p3) stability and economic prosperity in Africa is actually in the interest of international capitalism and trade which are the foreign policy objectives of the western world.

10.42 The Role of the United Nations and the Organisation of African Unity

In March 1996, the UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali launched the ‘UN Special Initiative on Africa’. This is a multi-billion dollar, decade-long programme to maximise support for the resolution of Africa’s development crises:

“The initiative commits the UN and its agencies together with the Brenton Woods institutions to working together in a coordinated and synergistic fashion behind Africa’s priorities”


The UN initiative incorporates education, health care as well as the promotion of peace and good governance. It also aims to tackle the issues of food security, information technology and Africa’s international competitiveness. There is therefore, the commitment from the international community to address the cycle of crises in Africa. The partnership programme, therefore, solicits the support and backing of the UN and the OAU. It must work within the framework of the UN and the OAU. In must be a development partnership that is not exploitative.

The role of the UN is changing. It is no longer a passive organisation that picks up the pieces after conflicts. It is actively promoting a peace and development agenda that aims at peacemaking and preventive diplomacy. Annan Kofi, the UN Under Secretary
for peacekeeping, has suggested that ways must be found to ensure that resources for alleviating the humanitarian tragedies which trigger peacekeeping efforts are contained (Africa Recovery, June 1993, pp. 17-19). This is not simply because of the enormous cost of peacekeeping which is outrageously high. For example, in 1993 the UN spent USD 3 on peacekeeping for every USD 1 spent on development assistance. In Somalia alone the UN spent over USD 1 billion on the military intervention which in the end came to nothing but frustration. Compare this enormous waste of resource on military intervention to the paltry USD 166.5 million contribution to humanitarian relief and reconstruction work in the same country (Africa Recovery June 1993, p17).
The development partnership in the context of the UN would be in line with the concept of 'preventive diplomacy'. It would reduce the financial burden on the UN brought about by the perpetual commitment of forces to peacekeeping. But more important it would release the UN's financial resources from military intervention for socioeconomic development programmes.

With the development partnership programme the UN will be placed in a stronger position to act swiftly and decisively in preventing disasters such as those in Somalia in 1992, Rwanda in 1994 and Ethiopia in the famine crisis of 1983-85. Through the UN and the OAU, the partnership would be in a position to influence initial policies that otherwise precipitate murderous conflicts that end up in genocidal civil wars and the breakdown of civil society. The support of the UN and the OAU to the partnership would provide an international ear on the ground, and provide the opportunity to bring concerted international action to bear on regimes in partner countries at a much earlier stage than is possible in the current laissez faire environment. Presently international action is delayed because partner countries, organisations, the OAU and
the UN have a non-interventionist policy. The genocide in Rwanda in 1994, the break
down of civil society in Somalia in 1992, civil war in Liberia, the murderous regimes
of Idi Amin in Uganda and Bokassa in Central Africa Republic, and the cycle of human
rights abuse and the perpetuation of military dictatorships in many countries reach the
stage they do because the international community is apathetic to the crises in Africa.
An effective partnership programme would break the vicious cycle of political
instability through preventive diplomacy.

The changing role of the UN would not be limited only to the reorganisation of the
Security Council and the General Assembly. UN agencies such as UNESCO, WHO and
the ILO would also be empowered to deal more actively in the issues affecting poverty
and underdevelopment in Africa. For example the UNESCO could be given the role of
monitoring the activities of the IMF and the World Bank as they impact on the
socioeconomic conditions of recipient countries, while the UNEP does the same for the
impact on the physical and cultural environment. How do programmes such as
economic structural adjustment impact on education and the development of science
and technology in recipient countries? UNESCO and the UNEP could be required to
report to the UN General Assembly on the impact of free trade and GATT on the
environment and culture and the rights of indigenous peoples. Are these programmes
for example enhancing socioeconomic progress or are they creating poverty and
underdevelopment? What are their effects on indigenous cultures and the
environment? International development partnerships supported by the UN would
also constitute an international support base for the recipient partner country in
dealings with international finance institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF on
issues of economic development. The political stability of the donor partner country
and the international organisation would provide a basis for transfer of expertise and experience between the partners. This would enable stability in the administrative framework for the recipient partner country.

10.43 The role of development partnership in providing a framework for peace and stability

Peace and political instability are essential pre-conditions for socioeconomic development. In the case of Africa the converse is even more appropriate. Because of the structural poverty on the continent, economic stability is a prerequisite for a stable polity and the establishment of sustainable democratic process. Current international efforts have concentrated essentially on resolving the crises of political instability by addressing the political factor without giving adequate cognisance to the economic factor. This is probably the principal reason for the failure of negotiated peace programmes in Africa. Political and civil conflicts in Africa must also be understood from the perspective of the struggle for the control of development resources, which is rooted in the poverty and deprivation of the masses of the population. Even the apartheid crisis in South Africa was as much an economic struggle as it was a struggle for the political and civil rights of the majority Black Africans. The relegation of the majority Black Africans to menial jobs and shanty towns was as despicable as denying them the political right to vote and fair representation. That is why the present ANC leadership is making desperate moves to improve the economic status of the Black Africans in the ghettos and rural areas of South Africa without which their political freedom is meaningless.
The civil wars in Angola, Ethiopia, Liberia, Mozambique and Somalia among others are not simply tribal and ideological conflicts, they are struggles to control the decision making apparatus of the state which allocates economic resources among competing interests. This struggle escalates because the social and economic tensions which are inherent in the poverty and underdevelopment of the minority groups reaches breaking point after years of coercive and corrupt state policies. The discriminatory allocation of resources between interest groups, be they regional or ethnic groupings, that support the political leadership or the educated élite against the rural working peasants, creates and/or widens the gap between the economically advantaged and the masses of the poor deprived. Whatever these interest groups are, their struggles revolve around the different economic activities and privileges established by colonial rule and perpetuated by the post-independence national administrations along lines of regional and ethnic distinctions as in Angola, Ethiopia and Sudan. Poverty and underdevelopment enhanced by skewed resource allocation policies accentuates and perpetuates these ethnic and regional differences. The resolution of the political and civil crises must therefore address the fundamental issue of poverty and underdevelopment. This must be part of the preventive diplomacy which goes beyond traditional peacekeeping and traditional international development assistance. The UN and regional groups such as the OAU and Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS) have failed principally because the economic component of the peace accord is always taken for granted. Nowhere has the peacekeeping mandate incorporated a broad economic strategy, rather than ad hoc relief operations made up of few bags of rice, milk powder and butter that palliate the refugees’ food needs for a few weeks but do nothing to address the structural economic problems that led to the conflict in the first place. While political bargaining to achieve political peace
settlements is conducted by a few privileged individuals at the top of the hierarchy of the parties in conflict, it always leaves the economic and social questions unresolved. The few people involved in the negotiations get pieces of the power-political cake and run, leaving the masses to continue to struggle under the yoke of poverty. The economic issues which fester conflict remain unresolved, often compounded. Thus no sooner would the flames of conflict have seemed to die down, than the embers of the fire of discontent are rekindled among the new emergent leadership. For example, peace may be negotiated among leaders of the warring factions, the terms of which usually include demobilisation on a large scale. Most of the demobilised soldiers are young, uneducated and unskilled. They are often not given productive post-demobilisation engagement, or integrated into the civilian economy because the economy is unable to absorb them. They are simply added to the mob of the unemployed created by economic structural adjustment programmes. Thus, as Annan Kofi correctly observes:

"even if we are able to disarm combatants, restore order and help reconcile the warring parties, there remains the challenge of helping re-establish collapsed infrastructure, including the basic institutions of a nation, such as the police force, the judiciary and the civil service".


The collapsed economy must be reconstructed so that it is inclusive of the hitherto marginalised groups and the crowd of unemployed. The question is where would the resources for that restoration come from? How can the local economy devastated by war gather the resources for such a huge task? That is where the partnership programme comes in.
In the first place the billions of dollars that the UN pours into peacekeeping should be used to support the development partnership programme through public works mobilised by a new corps of ‘peacekeepers’. This is an ‘army of economic technicians’ from the partner country, supported by the UN and international organisations, brought in to negotiate and implement a programme of economic peace. They would perform functions similar to the America peace corps or the New Zealand VSA. The emphasis would be on restoring the productive sectors, particularly in the rural areas. But they would be spread throughout the recipient partner’s economy, for example to help in restoring the basic administrative infrastructure and framework within which an independent judiciary and civil service would be established. There is a large pool of volunteers with years of valuable experience in New Zealand who apply for VSA positions every year but are unable to be taken on because of VSA’s limited budget. If New Zealand ODA annual budget to Africa of about two million dollars is invested in one partner country (say Rwanda) over five years in a partnership programme, it will be amazing what would be achieved with such resources, as meagre as they may seem.

The UN spent over USD 1.5 billion on the Rwanda peacekeeping mission between 1993 and 1995. (PANA 14 October 1996). This has not reflected in any significant way on the socioeconomic development of the country. The money went to arms and military equipment purchase and the maintenance of the UN forces. It is effectively a waste of essential development resources. If this money was directed to the productive sectors of the economy prior to the genocide in 1993, imagine the difference to Rwanda’s economy of investing an additional estimated USD 1.5 billion of the UN peacekeeping budget into the economy over five-to-ten years! Not only would the transfer of human resources and technology create an effective civil service and
national administrative structure in the conflict-torn country, but the victims of genocide would feel protected by the presence of an international group working side-by-side to reform the structures that oppress them. The presence of the international group would have a defusing effect on the tensions. A properly constituted partnership programme would reduce intra-national conflicts and thereby release resources that are otherwise tied up in emergency relief, to more productive longer term poverty reduction development initiatives which are the cause of the internal political and racial conflicts in the first place.

10.5 International development Partnership between NGOs and Communities

The entire philosophy on which the international development partnership model is based derives its inspiration from the success of the NGOs partnership programmes, some of which are reported in Chapter Nine. The NGOs therefore, provide a model of what can be achieved with appropriately constituted partnerships. Although the greater part of the discussion in this section has centred on the international bilateral partnership, this has been done to highlight the issues that the model must address at the broader international level. It is at the bilateral level that the partnership proposal would be most problematic. However, it at the local NGO and community level that the partnership programme derives its philosophy and inspiration. Existing partnerships at this level have been very effective in bringing socioeconomic transformation to the poorest communities and people, as demonstrated in Chapter Nine. However, their effectiveness would be greatly enhanced if their activities are better organised and rationalised. It is in this context that the following proposals for their restructuring and coordination are made. These would need to be implemented.
together with the proposed system of enhanced international bilateral partnership in order to reform international development assistance and make it more effective in responding to the crises in Africa.

New Zealand NGOs are very valuable agents of international development assistance to Africa. However, their effectiveness is hamstrung by the multiplicity of partnerships in numerous countries. The effect is that, as in the case of NZODA, small amounts of resources are spread thinly in an attempt to reach a large constituency. In 1994/95 for example New Zealand SCF spread about NZD 2.6 million among 17 different countries covering at least 25 different projects. (NZSCF 1995), which included NZD 1.09 million special funds raised for emergency relief in Rwanda. This means that NZD 1.5 million was spread over 16 countries. Support for projects ranged from NZD 10,000 in Lesotho to NZD 150,000 on displaced people’s education projects in Khartoum, Sudan. These are all worthwhile projects, but the lack of focus creates too many leakages in funding and hamstrings the effectiveness of scarce development resources.

For international development assistance to be effective in the recipient communities they would need to be rationalised by focusing on a fewer number of partnerships. NGOs such as Oxfam, SCF, World Vision, etcetera, that are part of international partnerships are already well placed for this rationalisation. NZSCF for example could focus on say Rwanda and concentrate resources in the communities in Rwanda rather than spread them as it is the current practice. The New Zealand VSA is already moving in this direction. Rather than spread 20 volunteers in a dozen African countries, it has rationalised its operations by concentrating on South Africa, Tanzania and Zimbabwe.
In South Africa it has focused on the East Cape province, and formed a development partnership of approximately six years, with the option to renew. Similarly, World Vision partnership are moving in the same direction, focusing on longer term partnerships that address the fundamental causes of poverty and underdevelopment, rather than ad hoc sectoral projects. Other organisations must also move in this direction.

The rationalisation of development assistance must be a priority for both the official bilateral international assistance and the New Zealand NGOs. This must not be done unilaterally. It must be co-ordinated action by all parties including the NGO lobby. It must also be co-ordinated at the international level, especially for the larger international partnership organisations. SCF New Zealand, for example, could concentrate its Africa programmes in Rwanda while SCF Australia focuses on Burundi. That way scarce international development assistance resources are not wasted on the administration of small projects in a vast number of countries. By focusing on building development partnerships in one or two countries, the NGOs are also able to offer the donor communities the opportunity to identify more closely with the recipient partner communities. This enhances the opportunity for both partners to take greater interest in the well being and aspirations of each partner community and NGO. It also provides the opportunity for the partner communities to enhance their knowledge and better understanding of their partner communities.

The partnership between NGOs and communities must involve the NGOs working as catalysts rather than just service providers. The NGOs would develop relationships within the partner communities which will help establish their credibility within the
partner communities and give them access to key players in the system. Over time this would allow them to intervene in the complex local and national institutional system by working with major national agencies to help them reorient their policies. This will be coordinated through international bilateral partnership so that local community policies and development priorities are integrated laterally and horizontally. Lateral integration means that economic and social policies are environmentally sustainable and integrated with political change. Also the geographical areas are integrated so that social and political boundaries do not constitute artificial boundaries for socioeconomic inequity. Vertical integration means that community development priorities are in accord with the overall framework of national development policy to create sustainable development that is based on social justice and social and spatial equity between groups in the rural and urban areas.

Through effective public education, public awareness of the need and the potential for the transformation of critical local community and national and international institutions will be built in both the recipient and donor partner countries and communities. The elevation of development education as part of the international development partnership gives donor communities and individuals a better understanding of the nature and the causes of the crises in Africa and greater empathy with African aspirations. World Vision has done this quite brilliantly by extending child sponsorship from a faceless donor contributor - passive recipient level, to a new concept of community sponsorship where a community in New Zealand supports an assisted community in Africa. In addition to contributing money and other material forms of assistance, the donor partner community undertakes a systematic study of the causes of poverty in the recipient partner community. Exchanges of visits between representatives of the partner communities encourages both communities to learn

Chapter ten 375 Love M. Chile
about and empathise more with each other. The understanding and empathy generated enhances co-operation at the local level, which would invariably filter upwards into national and international co-operation and understanding, thus building a truly stable and harmonious local, and national and international community where there is sustainable economic and social progress and justice. This will spill over to the international trade and political and social stability.

10.6 Conclusion

This thesis has challenged the traditional boundaries of the conceptualisation of international development assistance on a number of fronts. Firstly, is the traditional definition of international development assistance, which sees assistance simply in terms of the uni-directional transfer 'of real resources from a developed to a developing country' (Gounder 1995, p6). This thesis conceptualises international development assistance as a form of interaction between partners, so that the flow of benefits is in both directions and both partners derive mutual benefits. International assistance is not just the 'explicit transfer of real resources', which implies that only tangible and quantifiable resources constitute development assistance. Rather, this thesis defines international development assistance as consisting of both material and non material elements, a system of interaction through which ideas, information, materials, moral and political support among other things are exchanged between partners. When development is understood in its holistic context as the sustainable transformation of society (Black 1991), and not simply as economic growth, then international development assistance must be understood in the context of all forms of international response whose aim is to create a conducive environment which enhances socioeconomic and political progress in the recipient partner country or community. That is where peacekeeping response, good government programmes and
international sanctions against repressive genocidal regimes become important forms of international assistance.

The second area in which this thesis has pushed the current conceptualisation of international development assistance is the traditional assumptions concerning the motivation for giving international assistance. Traditional theory and analytical models have concentrated principally on testing for one or the other of donor interests or recipient needs in the allocation process. Evidence of significant elements of both models is seen as problematic (Gounder 1995). The model adopted in this thesis has focused on this area where donor interests and recipient needs overlap. By focusing on this area of congruence this thesis hopes to have contributed to existing theory, through which policies could be developed for extending the complementary elements of both models. The model also provides a direct link between the theories of the motivation for giving international assistance, namely the functional utility (McKinlay and Little 1978A) and the conventionalist theories (Gordenker 1976), and the analytical models of donor interests and recipient needs (Maizels and Nissanka 1984).

Thirdly, the thesis has departed from the traditional quantitative econometric analysis and adopted qualitative methodology in examining the motivation for giving international assistance. Through intensive interviews of policy makers and the critical examination of official policy documents, qualitative methodology provides a better understanding of the complex and interdependent system of international assistance (Ruttan 1989). The motivation for giving international development assistance is understood from the perspective of the partner countries and communities rather than being ascribed by the researcher. It is in these areas that the thesis has contributed to theory and methodology.
In examining the motivation for New Zealand’s official response to the crises in Africa, the study found strong elements of both functional utility and conventionalist theories. Although the primary motivation was the foreign policy objective of extricating itself from international alienation resulting from its sporting and cultural relationship with apartheid South Africa, there were also elements of altruism embraced by official policy where the objective was to relieve the suffering of victims of disaster and contribute to the development of African countries through the promotion of sustainable economic progress and social justice. Although the balance between these two often tilted towards donor motivation objectives (Maizels and Nissanke 1984), the theoretical model adopted in this thesis suggests that the self-interest objectives should not necessarily clash with the development criteria (Tsoutsopilides 1991). Appropriate policies can be developed which enhance the effectiveness of international assistance in responding to the developmental needs of the crises in Africa and also meeting donor partner objectives. The role of NGOs in New Zealand’s response to the crises in Africa is substantial and complementary. Their response is motivated mostly by humanitarian considerations and in seeking opportunities for cooperative partnership with recipient partner communities.

The thesis’ proposal of international development partnerships is one policy framework for developing effective international policies for responding to the crises in Africa that enhance the capacity of international development assistance to Africa. This reduces intra-national and international tensions and hostilities that threaten security and harmony and the international economic order, elements that are pivotal to western political and economic interests.

An international development partnership proposal, however, has practical obstacles that require further study to make it politically acceptable. The most demanding is
overcoming the complications created by colonial historical ties. International
development assistance is a strong instrument for obtaining and maintaining
commitment and dependency for the ex-colonial powers (McKinley and Little 1978A
p471). Finding appropriate policies that are politically acceptable to the major powers
would enhance the effectiveness of the international development partnership
programme.

The role of both local and the international NGOs is pivotal to the success of the
international development partnership. However, as in the case of the bilateral
international partnership, the rationalisation of international partnerships is highly
political. Although the role of the NGOs is often seen as complementary, many NGOs
perceive their role as distinct or even alternative to the official bilateral assistance,
because their activities which aim at giving people and marginalised groups a say in
their societies may invariably conflict with existing power structures in the bilateral
recipient partner country. Appropriate policies for reducing areas of conflict and
enhancing cooperative partnership need to be explored further.

“We are all part of one human family. Some of us
welcome this and some of us may not. But the plain
fact is that all of us have no choice but to adjust
ourselves to this central fact of human existence.”
Norman Kirk at the UN General Assembly 1973.
APPENDICES

APPENDIX ONE: INTERVIEW SCHEDULES

(A) Discussion with the Honourable David Lange: Prime Minister 1984-1989 (also Minister of Foreign Affairs 1984-1987).

You were the Prime Minister as well as the Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1984 to 1987. Right from its inception, your government had the unenviable task of patching up the wounds created by the tumultuous years of the Springbok tours and the unfortunate perception by African countries of New Zealand as an ally of the apartheid regime in South Africa. Furthermore, when your government came to power in 1984, Africa was at the zenith of its worst drought and famine that devastated 27 countries, the catastrophic effects on the people and the economies from which many of the countries have not recovered.

The objective of this interview is to explore the underlying principles which drove your government's African policy.


1 You were sworn in as Prime Minister in July 1984. In March/April 1985, less than one year in office, you toured Africa. This was the first official visit by a New Zealand Prime Minister to Africa.

(a) Why was it necessary to make the trip so early in your tenure? What were your main motivations in undertaking this trip?  
(b) How would you assess the outcome of your tour?

2 Martin Holland, reviewing your government's foreign policy towards Africa identified four main strands:
   (i) political considerations,  
   (ii) aid and trade considerations,  
   (iii) international aspirations, and  
   (iv) the problem of South Africa.

(a) Would you agree that these were the main objectives of your government's Africa policy?
(b) If you were to put these in order of importance, how would they rank, 1 being the first priority and 4 being the last?

c) What would you say is your understanding of what Holland meant by "international ambition"?

3 Martin Holland has also described Labour's African policy during your term as Prime Minister as motivated by "inherent guilt complex" (Holland 1986). How do you respond?

4 The same author has further suggested that your strong moral commitment to African development and personal moral opposition to apartheid provided the direction for foreign policy during your term as Prime Minister.

To what extent would you say your personal value system shaped the African policy under the Fourth Labour government?

5 In a 1984 paper ('Trade and Foreign Policy: A Labour Perspective' New Zealand International Review No. 9 Vol. 2 pp. 2-4), you suggested that "trade must be the first objective of diplomacy" (p2). This is what Jackson (1980, p225) suggested in his review of the global pattern of New Zealand's diplomatic posts. Yet as soon as you were sworn in, your government chose a high profile for Africa where New Zealand had very little trade.

What made you and your government, change this criterion for Africa?

Diplomatic Representation in Africa

6 Your government shut down the South African Consulate in Wellington on 01 August 1984, less than one month after taking office, an action you were reported as commenting was "very satisfactory". What did you mean by this?

7 It has been suggested that at the inception of the Labour Government in July 1984, two diplomatic posts were proposed to be opened simultaneously in different parts of Africa. However, only one was opened, the one in Harare, Zimbabwe.

(a) Why Harare? Why did you choose Harare over other East African cities,

Apendices 381 Love M. Chile
especially those that had a more established political and economic link with New Zealand, such as Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania?

(b) Where did you propose to establish the second post, and what were the major considerations?

(c) Why was the second post shelved?

8 Jackson (1980 p225) has suggested that a direct correlation exists between New Zealand's overseas representation and her bilateral trading patterns. Considering the relatively low level of economic exchange between New Zealand and Africa (In 1984 total New Zealand imports from Africa was only NZD 62.517 million and total New Zealand export to Africa was only NZD 80.648 million of which South Africa accounted for over 60 per cent and 47 per cent of these respectively). Would you agree with Jackson that the poor trade links between New Zealand and Africa was the main consideration for the abandonment of the plans for direct representation in other parts of Africa?

New Zealand's Development Assistance to Africa

9 When you came to office you made a concerted effort to lift the level of New Zealand's development assistance to Africa. Analysts of foreign aid have argued that it is used mainly as a means for attaining political objectives in foreign policy rather than a genuine humanitarian assistance.

a) Would you agree that the objective of your government's aid policy to Africa was political rather than humanitarian?

b) To what extent would you say that development assistance to Africa was used as a means for achieving your government's foreign policy objectives in Africa?

10 The level of government development assistance to Africa has not changed very much from where your government left it in 1989. In real terms it has actually declined to the point where one may be tempted to suggest that ODA allocation to Africa has become more out of a sense of obligation, only as a means of gaining the international goodwill of the African states where New Zealand's interests are at stake. How do you comment?
New Zealand - Africa Relations since 1989

11 How would you assess New Zealand's policy towards Africa since 1990?

12 Why do you think New Zealand - African relations have continued to occupy such an obscure position in government despite your bold efforts during your term as Prime Minister?

13 What direction would you suggest for the present and future governments to follow on African policy?

14 If the Labour party were to lead the next government, what would you advise them to do in order to revitalise the Africa policy?

15 What should be the priorities and what definite strategies should be employed?

16 During the tempestuous period of 1976-1984 many African countries saw New Zealand as an ally of the apartheid regime in South Africa, mainly because of the Springbok / All Black rugby tours between 1976 and 1981. Would you please explain to us how New Zealand was able to negotiate its way and regain the confidence of African countries.

(a) What was the catch?

(b) What would you say New Zealand has learnt from it all?
You have a long association with Africa, starting with your time at the Commonwealth secretariat through the stormy years of the All Black - Springbok tours of the mid 1970s to 1981. You were in the forefront of the Fourth Labour government's Africa initiative, culminating in your appointment as the first High Commissioner to Africa in Harare, Zimbabwe.

The primary objective of this interview is to explore the underlying principles that guided the government's African policy, the role of the Harare Mission in coordinating New Zealand's response to the crises in Africa.

**Political and Economic Objectives of Labour's Africa initiative**

1. What would you say was your brief as the High Commissioner to Harare in 1986?

2. The Labour government that appointed you as High Commissioner to Africa worked very hard to bring Africa within the focus of New Zealand foreign policy. How would you describe the dominant principles that drove the government's policy towards Africa?

3. If we were to group the objectives of your mission into four, namely: to reinforce New Zealand's political and ideological interests, stimulate her commercial and trade ties, to administer aid as a means to implement policies to reduce poverty, and to widen her strategic and military interests, how would you rank them in terms of importance, 1 being the most important and 4 the least important?

4. What would you consider to have been New Zealand's political, strategic and economic interests in Africa during the 1980s?

5. Considering the relatively low level of economic exchange between New Zealand and Africa (In 1984 total New Zealand imports from Africa was only NZD 62.517 million and total New Zealand export to Africa was only NZD 80.648 million of which South Africa accounted for over 60 per cent and 47 per cent of these respectively), how did your mission accomplish the economic objective during your tenure as High Commissioner?
(b) How was New Zealand's economic interest in Africa compromised because of its stand on South Africa, considering the fact that there was a United Nations trade embargo on South Africa, and there was not much trade flow with other African countries?

**Keeping an eye on the apartheid regime in South Africa**

6 The High Commission in Harare was established in 1986 less than two years after the South African Consulate in Wellington was closed down on 01 August 1984.

How did you see the role of the High Commission in Southern Africa, especially given the close proximity to the Apartheid regime in the Republic of South Africa?

7 In what ways would you say that the High Commission's objective of monitoring the situation in South Africa was fulfilled, especially considering that this was a primary motive for the establishment of the Harare mission in 1986?

8 What would you say has been New Zealand's major contributions to the ending of apartheid in South Africa?

**New Zealand's Development Assistance to Africa**

There are two strands of argument about the objectives of development assistance. One view is that aid is a means of promoting political agenda and achieving strategic objectives of the donor. The second view is that aid disbursement to the Third World countries comes from a genuine belief that it is beneficial to the poor.

9 How important were development objectives in the countries of your accreditation, such as the reduction of poverty, feature in the overall function of your brief as High Commissioner?

10 How did you pursue these policy objectives in the countries you were accredited to?
11 Would you say your term as High Commissioner in Harare made a significant difference to the crises in Africa, especially the crises of political instability, apartheid and poverty and deprivation?

12 As the High Commissioner in Harare, you were responsible for administering the New Zealand external aid programme as well as allocating the Head of Mission Funds (HOMF) for projects in Africa.

Would you please explain what the main considerations were for the geographical allocation of these funds? For example, what determined the level of allocation to the various countries, communities and projects?

13 Authorities on overseas aid argue that aid donors' primary motivation is the pursuit of foreign policy objectives, that the level of interest which a donor country expresses in another state is reflected in the amount of aid allocated to the recipient. You must have been part of the decision making process in the allocation of aid to Africa beyond HOMF.

Would you consider the above statement as a fair description of New Zealand's aid policy to Africa?

14 How would you rate the priority that the government placed on Africa for ODA funding allocation? Would you describe this as a fair reflection of New Zealand's political and economic interests in Africa?

15 Would you say the aid policy towards Africa was predominantly political or essentially altruistic?

Harare: establishing New Zealand's presence in Africa, the diplomatic initiative

15 You described the choice of Harare for the location of New Zealand's diplomatic post in Africa as "the natural, logical choice".

a) What did you mean by this?

b) Could Lusaka (Zambia) not have been a more logical choice, especially given that Zimbabwe was only a 'new born state' at that time and the high profile of the Zambian

Apendices 386

Love M. Chile
President, Kenneth Kaunda, in Africa? Or even Dar Es Salaam in Tanzania at that time, given the level of New Zealand investment in that country then? Or even Nigeria given its political status and influence in Africa?

16 In 1984 it was suggested that two diplomatic posts be opened simultaneously in Africa. Only the one in Harare was established. Why was the idea of a second African mission abandoned?

b) If New Zealand were to establish a second post in Africa, outside South Africa, where would you suggest this should be located?

17 How would you rate the outcomes of your term as High Commissioner in terms of the over all objectives and performance in accomplishing New Zealand's foreign policy objectives in Africa?

18 Would you say these interests which drove New Zealand's foreign policy in Africa were achieved with the establishment of the Harare mission?

New Zealand Africa Relations in the 1990s

19 Would you say New Zealand's interests in Africa have changed in the 1990s.

20 Would you say these interests are being pursued as vigorously now as when you were the High Commissioner?

21 What role do you think New Zealand should play in Africa in the 1990s?
You have a long association with Africa. You served as a Volunteer Service Abroad (VSA) representative in Tanzania in the 1970s. This association has continued back in New Zealand with the Africa Information Centre and other African associations. Your Africa experience no doubt gives you a better insight into Africa's problems than many of your parliamentary colleagues. In this interview I wish to explore the impact that New Zealand VSA has on the crises in Africa, within the context of the understanding that the solution to these crises lie not only in the transfer of resources and technology to Africa, but also in the good will towards Africa and an empathic understanding of Africa's development problems by the policy makers in the more developed countries such as New Zealand.

**Personal Objectives in VSA to Africa**

You spent some time in Tanzania on VSA as a 'Young Farmer', under the auspices of the New Zealand Federated Farmers.

1. Would you please explain to me your personal objectives as VSA in Tanzania?

2. How would you evaluate the success in meeting these objectives?

3. What would you say were your corporate objectives? That is as a member of the Federated Farmers.

4. Where would you draw the line between your personal and corporate objectives?

5. If you were to rank your overall objectives as VSA in Tanzania, that is both your corporate and personal objectives combined, which would you say aroused your interest the most and spurred you to go to Africa.

6. An analysis of New Zealand’s project aid to Africa shows a predominance of agricultural projects, especially in Kenya, Tanzania, Malawi and Zambia. Critics of aid suggest that economic considerations of the donor country are the primary objectives.
for giving aid. That aid is used to build up a system under which the Third World countries are opened up as markets for the major firms in the more developed countries. For example projects in agriculture are used to support the powerful agro business firms which supply the inputs of fertilizers, improved seeds, machinery to the Third World countries. It is also perceived as a means of helping secure continued supplies of agricultural commodities for consumption in the West.

You went to Tanzania under the auspices of the New Zealand Farmers' federation. How do you comment on these sorts of criticisms?

7 Do you think you still have a role to play in developments in Africa now (both corporate and personal)?

Perceptions of Africa's crises

8 Many young people from the more developed countries, including those from New Zealand, who have visited Third World Countries have commented that the striking thing about these countries is the level of poverty.

Reflecting on your experience as a young New Zealander in Africa, what would you say were your most lasting impressions of Tanzania?

9 For many people involved in development assistance activities such as the VSA, concerns about poverty in the Third World countries is the main reason for their involvement and they genuinely believe that their activities are beneficial to the poor.

Would you say that you made a significant difference, as a VSA, in the community in which you were involved, in the alleviation of poverty?

10 Do you believe programmes such as VSA do make a difference in the development process in Africa?

11 Would you say the New Zealand public understand the extent of Africa's crisis?

12 Do you think that the average New Zealander sees Africa as having any significant importance to New Zealand?

Apendices 389 Love M. Chile
New Zealand policies towards Africa

13 Let us evaluate New Zealand's policy towards Africa. Would you say it is adequate and relevant?

14 How has your experience in Africa influenced your understanding of New Zealand's policies on Africa and Third World countries generally, first as a member of the public and secondly as a politician?

15 In what ways do you expect the New Zealand Government and the public could respond to the crisis in Africa? I am referring here specifically to the crisis of political instability and the crisis of poverty and deprivation.

16 If you were appointed Minister for external affairs and trade in the National government, how would your African experience influence your policy objectives towards
   (a) the reduction of poverty in Africa;
   (b) Overseas Development Aid; and
   (c) educating the average New Zealander about Africa?
You were the Minister of External Relations (succeeding Mr. Lange in the second term) of the reformist Labour government of 1984-1990 under whose direction New Zealand's relationship with Africa was established and prospered. Your strong association with Africa and African affairs of course goes beyond the three years you served as Foreign Minister between 1987-1990. What I wish to explore with you in this interview are the underlying principles that directed the government's policy towards Africa during those years.


1. How would you describe the dominant principles that drove the government's policy towards Africa?

2. What would you consider to have been New Zealand's political, strategic and economic interests in Africa during the 1980s?

3. Would you say these interests which drove New Zealand's foreign policy in Africa were achieved?

4. Would you say these interests have changed in the 1990s.

5. Would you say these interests are being pursued as vigorously now as when you were in government?

6. Given the proactive stand of the Fourth Labour government on African issues in the 1980s, how would you describe New Zealand's role in Africa in the 1990s?

7. You toured Africa in 1988, visiting Nigeria, Zambia and Zimbabwe. In all three capitals the discussions centred on the issue of apartheid in South Africa. Given the tempestuous years of the Springbok / All Black rugby tours between 1976 and 1981 when African countries saw New Zealand as an ally of the apartheid regime in South Africa, the Fourth Labour government worked very hard to bring Africa within the
focus of New Zealand foreign policy and to turn the negative perception of New Zealand around.

(a) How did you do it?

(b) Did you at any time feel that there were more pressing issues for Africa (such as poverty and underdevelopment) than the problem of apartheid?

8 How much would you say your personal views and convictions on the question of apartheid helped the resolution of the impasse created by the laissez faire attitude of your predecessors, the National administration of the late Sir Robert Muldoon (1975-1984)?

New Zealand's Development Assistance to Africa

9 As a former Minister of external relations, and the minister responsible for external aid, would you explain to us what the main considerations were in the geographical allocation of aid? For example, what determined the level of allocation to Africa, relative to say Asia, the Pacific and Latin America?

10 Authorities on overseas aid argue that aid donors' primary motivation is the pursuit of foreign policy objectives, that the level of interest which a donor country expresses in another state is reflected in the amount of aid allocated to the recipient. Would you consider this a fair description of New Zealand's aid allocation to Africa?

11 New Zealand's development assistance has been described as a means of advancing the country's foreign policy objectives. When you were the Minister for External Relations, in what specific ways would you say this was achieved in the context of Africa?

12 Would you say that as the Minister of External Relations from 1987-1990, who was also in charge of overseas aid, that the primary objective of development assistance to Africa was the attainment of the foreign policy objectives of the Labour government?

13 If you were to assess the principles of overseas development assistance to Africa, which of these would you rank as the dominant, political or humanitarian objectives?
New Zealand Response to the crises in Africa

14 Africa's crises seem to be multiplying and getting ever more complex. There is the never ending drought, the enduring political instability and the incessant civil wars resulting from them. The most problematic of them all, the crisis of apartheid in South Africa, seems to have been resolved. What would you say were New Zealand's specific contributions to the ending of this particular crisis?

15 Even before you entered parliament your personal interest in Africa kept you in the forefront of the fight against apartheid, which you continued while you were in parliament and have continued after you left the parliament. You saw your dream of a non-racial South Africa fulfilled when you personally observed the transition process which culminated in the April 1994 election. Would you explain New Zealand's role as an observer at the election?

16 What are your thoughts on the crises of poverty and underdevelopment, political instability, debt and the aids pandemic?

17 Given the success of New Zealand's active stand against apartheid and the successful disestablishment of the abhorrent system, do you think similar action would work in the other areas, particularly the debt burden and repressive governments? Would you recommend similar action that was taken against apartheid to be transferred towards overcoming these other crises in Africa?

Public understanding of Africa's crises and the role of the Africa Information Centre

18 Do you think the New Zealand public understand the extent of Africa's crisis?

19 Your interest in Africa has not waned despite your retiring from parliament. You have continued your association with Africa and have an active part in the Africa Information Centre.
(a) Would you explain to us the primary objectives of the Centre.
(b) Does the centre have political and commercial interests in Africa? Please explain.
(c) How does the Centre in carrying out these primary objectives educate the average New Zealander about Africa's crises?
New Zealand has provided development assistance to Africa for nearly half a century, since the establishment of the Colombo Plan in 1950. The level of assistance has increased substantially since the 1970s. The objective of this interview is to explore the policy issues relating to the allocation of New Zealand overseas development assistance to Africa, as well as the relationship between development aid and foreign policy objectives.

Objectives of New Zealand Overseas Development Assistance (NZODA)

1. It has been suggested that "New Zealand's aid policy is an element of New Zealand foreign policy" (Hoadley 1991, p206), that the primary objective of development aid is to promote the political, strategic and commercial interest of New Zealand overseas.
   Would you agree with this assertion?

2. What would you consider to be New Zealand's primary political, economic and strategic interests in Africa?

3. Would you say that these political, economic and strategic considerations come into the aid allocation decision making process?

4. Would you describe your Division's development assistance programme to Africa as "an element of New Zealand's foreign policy" or a purely humanitarian gesture?

5. To what extent would the needs of the recipient influence the level of aid allocation to particular regions?

6. To what extent do humanitarian considerations come into the aid allocation decision making process?

7. There is no doubt that the human and environmental needs of Africa are very large, one may say far greater than any other region in the world. Yet Africa receives
the lowest priority in New Zealand's aid allocation (except for Latin America). Is this a concern to the Division? For example, do you see a conflict in the humanitarian needs of Africa and New Zealand's interests which are better served elsewhere?

The aid allocation process: Stages in the allocation process.

8 Would you please explain the processes involved in aid allocation. That is to say, how are recipient countries selected from the pool of potential recipients?

9 What are the criteria applied at the selection stage to determine who goes further for consideration?

10 After countries have been selected from the pool, how does the specific allocation process operate. For example, what criteria determine who gets how much?

11 What determines how a recipient country remains on the aid programme and also maintain its level of allocation?

12 Do these criteria change from year to year or are they set in concrete, so to speak?

13 To what extent would you say that the level of aid a particular recipient gets from other donors influence the level of your aid to that country?

14 New Zealand's aid has been described as "small but effective and high quality" (Hoadley 1991). What would you say makes New Zealand's aid stand out among the DAC countries?

15 How does the Division ensure that the aid given has a maximum impact on the recipient?

Aid allocation process: policy consultation process

16 From the official reports (Programme Profiles) of the Ministry, New Zealand does not try to impose its development priorities on recipient countries. Therefore, aid is allocated only on the basis of projects submitted by the recipient communities or...
countries. However, recent documents indicate a shift in priorities in development assistance to Africa, particularly in the education sector.

Some people may be tempted to say that the policy shifts are an imposition of donor priorities and expectations on the recipient countries. Would this be a fair comment?

17 Would you explain the basis of these policy shifts and how they are expected to improve the development initiatives in the recipient countries?

18 How does the Division develop its Africa policy? What is the level of input from interest groups? How is this incorporated in the policy and priorities of the government's official development assistance?

19 The United Nations has suggested that for Africa to break out of its current development crisis, five approaches must be taken, namely:
(i) The creation and sustenance of peace and stability.
(ii) The building of human capacity to manage growth and development through human resource development.
(iii) The establishment of an effective regional economic integration.
(iv) The transformation of infrastructural facilities for reducing vulnerability to droughts and effective food security and self-sufficiency.
(v) Mobility of financial resources both within and outside Africa.

Would you please explain how the Division has taken these new initiatives on board in formulating its aid policy to Africa for the 1990s?

Overseas development assistance as a response to Africa's crises

20 The crisis in Africa has ranged from political instability, through famine and illiteracy to crippling debt burdens and the aids pandemic. Would you please explain how your Division has responded to each of these crises and how your response has made a difference?
(a) Drought and Famine (b) Political instability (c) Debt burden
(d) Human Resource Development (e) Aids pandemic (f) Women in development
21 The crisis of apartheid in South Africa seems to have been overcome with the transition to democracy leading up to the April 1994 multi-party election based on universal adult suffrage.

(a) Would you explain the role the Division played in the transition process.

(b) What is the Division's role in post apartheid South Africa?

(c) To what extent would the focus on the new South Africa affect New Zealand's interests and development assistance to the rest of Africa?
New Zealand has provided development assistance to Africa for nearly half a century, since the establishment of the Colombo Plan in 1950. The level of assistance increased steadily in the 1970s and 1980s. The objective of this interview is to explore the policy issues relating to the allocation of New Zealand overseas development assistance to Africa, as well as the relationship between development aid and foreign policy objectives.

The National Government's Policy Objectives in Africa

1. Would you please explain to me the dominant principles that have driven the National government's policy towards Africa since 1990?

2. Would you consider Africa to be of any political, strategic or economic interest to New Zealand? What would these be?

3. Would you say that these political, economic and strategic considerations come into the aid allocation decision making process?

4. It has been suggested that "New Zealand's aid policy is an element of New Zealand foreign policy" (Hoadley 1991, p206), that the primary objective of development assistance is to promote the political, strategic and commercial interest of New Zealand overseas. To what extent would you describe New Zealand's development assistance programme to Africa as "an element of New Zealand's foreign policy"?

5. Authorities on overseas aid argue that aid donors' primary motivation is the pursuit of foreign policy objectives, that the level of interest which a donor country expresses in another state is reflected in the amount of aid allocated to the recipient. Would you consider this a fair description of New Zealand's aid allocation to Africa?
6 What are the main considerations in the geographical allocation of aid? For example, what determined the level of allocation to Africa, relative to say Asia, the Pacific and Latin America?

7 Within these regions, how are recipient countries selected from the pool of potential recipients? What are the criteria applied at the selection stage to determine who goes further for consideration?

8 After countries have been selected from the pool, how does the specific allocation process operate. For example, what criteria determine who gets how much?

9 What determines how a recipient country remains on the aid programme and also maintain its level of allocation?

10 Do these criteria change from year to year or are they set in concrete, so to speak?

11 To what extent would you say that the level of aid a particular recipient gets from other donors influence the level of New Zealand aid to that country?

12 New Zealand's aid has been described as "small but effective and high quality" (Hoadley 1991). What would you say makes New Zealand's aid stand out among the DAC countries?

13 How does the Ministry develop its Africa policy? What is the level of input from interest groups? How is this incorporated in the policy and priorities of the government's official development assistance?

14 To what extent do the needs of the recipient countries influence the level of aid allocation to particular regions?
To what extent do humanitarian considerations come into the aid allocation decision making process?

There is no doubt that the human and environmental needs of Africa are very large, one may say far greater than any other region in the world. Yet Africa receives the lowest priority in New Zealand's aid allocation (except for Latin America). Is this a concern to you personally, and also as the Minister in charge development assistance? For example, do you see a conflict in the humanitarian needs of Africa and New Zealand's interests which are better served elsewhere?

From the official reports (Programme Profiles) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, New Zealand does not try to impose its development priorities on recipient countries. Therefore, aid is allocated only on the basis of projects submitted by the recipient communities or countries. However, recent documents indicate a shift in priorities in development assistance to Africa, particularly in the education sector.

Some people may be tempted to say that the policy shifts are an imposition of donor priorities and expectations on the recipient countries. Would this be a fair comment?

Would you explain the basis of these policy shifts and how they are expected to improve the development initiatives in the recipient countries?

The United Nations has suggested that for Africa to break out of its current development crisis, five approaches must be taken, namely:

(i) The creation and sustenance of peace and stability.

(ii) The building of human capacity to manage growth and development through human resource development.

(iii) The establishment of an effective regional economic integration.

(iv) The transformation of infrastructural facilities for reducing vulnerability to droughts and effective food security and self-sufficiency.

(v) Mobility of financial resources both within and outside Africa.

Would you please explain how New Zealand has taken these new initiatives on board in formulating its aid policy to Africa for the 1990s?
Overseas development assistance as a direct response to Africa's crises

20 The crisis in Africa has ranged from political instability, through famine and illiteracy to crippling debt burdens and the aids pandemic. Would you please explain how your Division has responded to each of these crises and how your response has made a difference?
(a) Drought and Famine (b) Political instability (c) Debt burden
(d) Human resource development (e) Aids pandemic (f) Women in development

21 The crisis of apartheid in South Africa seems to have been overcome with the transition to democracy leading up to the April 1994 multi-party election based on universal adult suffrage.
(a) How would you describe New Zealand's role in the transition process.
(b) What is New Zealand's role in the post apartheid South Africa?
(c) To what extent would the focus on the new South Africa affect New Zealand's interests and development assistance to the rest of Africa?

22 The level of government development assistance to Africa has not changed very much since 1990. In real terms it has actually declined to the point where one may be tempted to suggest that ODA allocation to Africa has become more out of a sense of obligation, only as a means of gaining the international goodwill of the African states where New Zealand's interests are at stake. How do you comment?
The Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) have been in the forefront of the fight against famine, hunger, poverty, deprivation and underdevelopment in Africa. The objective of this interview is to explore the policy issues relating to the aid allocation process, as well as the impact of aid projects and programmes on the recipient communities in Africa.

**The aid allocation process**

1. Would you please explain the processes involved in how your aid is allocated to respective recipients, that is to say, how are recipient communities selected from the pool of potential recipients?

2. What are the criteria applied at the selection stage to determine who goes further for consideration?

3. After communities have been selected from the pool, how does the specific allocation process operate. For example, what criteria determine who gets how much?

4. What determines how a recipient community remains on the aid programme and also maintain its level of allocation?

5. Do these criteria change from year to year or are they set in concrete, so to speak?

6. Does the aid received from other donors affect a prospective recipient community's chances of getting aid from you?

**The impact of aid on the recipient community**

Critics of aid suggest that aid tends to finance projects which are essential for the profitable operation of foreign investors and the local elite, and that consequently aid does not reach the poorest members of the community.

7. What policies and strategies are employed to ensure that the greater part of the VSA aid allocation reaches the poorest members of the community receiving aid?
8 What evidence is available to show that aid does actually make a difference in the lives of the poorest people in the communities in receipt of your assistance?

9 What are the different ways in which aid is allocated to ensure it reaches the poorest members of that community?

10 Which of the strategies above would you suggest have been the most effective in reducing poverty in the recipient community?

11 What would you say are the obvious signs in the recipient community that poverty has been reduced?

12 What would you consider as the most important means of sustaining this reduction in poverty in the community receiving aid?

13 How are the non material aspects of the community development assessed by your organisation, that is to say, the non economic aspects of the community such as culture expressed in art, music and literature.

14 What methods does your organisation use in evaluating the effectiveness of development assistance?

15 The problems of development in Africa go beyond economic development. They include the environment, the political processes which inhibit popular participation in the democratic process by women and minorities. What strategies does your organisation use to create and ensure the overall development process in the aid recipient community?

16 It has been suggested that for many people engaged in overseas development assistance, concerns about poverty in the Third World countries is the main reason for their involvement, and they genuinely believe that their activities are beneficial to the poor.

Do you personally believe that the activities of the individual people who work with your organisation on projects in Africa make a real difference to the poorest members of the community your aid goes to?
17 Critics of aid argue that aid does not help the poor because it creates in them a sense of dependency.
(a) Have you found evidence of this in your experience particularly in Africa?
(b) Where this attitude of dependency exists, what strategies are usually employed to deal with it?

The New Zealand public's understanding of the crises in Africa

18 Would you say that the average New Zealander thinks Africa has any significance to New Zealand?

19 Do you think the New Zealand public understand the extent of Africa's crises?

20 What does your organisation do to communicate to the New Zealand public about Africa's crises? Would you say this is effective?

21 How would you rate the priority that the government places on Africa for ODA funding allocation? Would you describe this as a fair reflection of New Zealand's political and economic interests in Africa?

22 Would you say the government and other NGOs are doing enough to communicate to the average New Zealander about Africa and the extent of Africa's crises?
Discussions with Chief Executives of partner local NGOs and Local governments in South Africa and Zimbabwe on the impact of development assistance programmes on recipient partners communities.

(A commons interview schedule was drawn, with variations to suit individual circumstances and needs).

1. Would you please explain briefly the work of your organisation?

2. How large is the area covered by the work of your organisation?

3. Does your organisation work in other areas of South Africa/Zimbabwe?

4. How long has your organisation been working in these areas?

5. What relationship does your organisation have with other NGOs working in these areas?

6. What relationship does your organisation have with the local councils, regional authority and the central government in Pretoria/Harare. How would you describe this relationship?

7. How is your relationship with the principal funder (donor) partners of the projects that your organisation undertakes?

8. In what specific ways would you say that the work of your organisation has been effective in improving the lives of the people in the project area?

9. What would you say are the most important ways of sustaining the positive gains made by the programmes of your organisation?

10. Apart from the material aspects such as improved food production and income generation how do the programmes of your organisation help to sustain, or the cases

Apendices 405 Love M. Chile
where there have been some erosion, restore the non-material, non-economic aspects of the community such as culture expressed in art, music and craft?

11 How would you assess the effectiveness of the programmes that your organisation undertakes in empowering the women in the rural areas that you work in, that is giving women the opportunity to participate more effectively in the political process in South Africa/Zimbabwe both at the local and at the national level?

12 To what extent does the funding from New Zealand partners influence the choice of programmes that your organisation undertakes?

13 Do you receive funding from other organisations either within South Africa/Zimbabwe or overseas for these same programmes?

14 To what extent do your programmes depend on funding from New Zealand partner organisations.

15 How long would you expect it will take you to become self sufficient and self funding?

16 Are there any major achievements of your programmes that you would like to be reported back to the New Zealand partner organisation and their contributors?

17 If New Zealand partner organisations were planning to undertake similar projects in other parts of South Africa/Zimbabwe or other African countries:
(a) what are some of your experiences that you may suggest could be useful in other parts of South Africa/Zimbabwe or other African countries?
(b) what problems would you advice them to watch out for and avoid?
Appendix Two: Consent form and information Sheet.

CONSENT FORM

Title of Project: "New Zealand's Response to the Crises in Africa".

I have read the Information Sheet for this study and have had the details of the study explained to me. My questions about the study have been answered to my satisfaction, and I understand that I may ask further questions at any time.

I also understand that I am free to withdraw from the study at any time, or to decline to answer any particular questions in the study. I agree to provide information to the researcher on the understanding that it is completely confidential.

I consent to the taping of the interview.

The tapes of the interview should be returned to me / retained by the researcher / lodged with a library of my choice after the researcher has completed his study.

I wish to participate in this study under the conditions set out on the information sheet.

Signed: ________________________________

Name: ________________________________

Date: ________________________________
INFORMATION SHEET

Title of Project: "New Zealand's Response to the Crises in Africa".

The Researchers: Love M. Chile (Doctoral Student)

Contact Address and Phone:
Love M. Chile: 2 - 6 Gladstone Road, Parnell, Auckland.
Phone: 3570149 (H) 5759129 (W) Fax 5754460.

Mike O'Brien: Dr. Mike O'Brien (Chief Supervisor)
Department of Social Work and Social Policy
Massey University, Albany.
Phone: (09) 4439765 Fax: (09) 4439767

What is the study about?
The study examines the crises that have gripped Africa in the past twenty five years, including droughts, famines and food shortages; poverty and underdevelopment; apartheid and racial discrimination and the political instability leading to incessant civil wars; economic disintegration, refugee and food emergency. Coupled with these are also the crises of the debt burden, environmental degradation and the aids pandemic.

The study analyses the political and humanitarian actions taken by New Zealand governments, the Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) as well as individual New Zealanders in providing development assistance to Africa during the periods of crisis.

What are the participants required to do?
The participants who are selected on the basis of their level of involvement with Africa during the period 1972/73 to 1993/94, will be asked to participate in an interview. The interviews explore the policy issues associated with the aid allocation process, and New Zealand - Africa relations during this period.

The participants' consent for the interview to be taped will be requested, and if granted the interviews will be taped so that their views are recorded accurately.

How much time will be involved?
Between 45 minutes and 75 minutes.

What can the participant expect from the researcher?
If you take part in the study, you have the right to:

* refuse to answer any particular questions, and to withdraw from the study at any time.
* ask any further questions about the study that occur to you during your participation.
* provide information on the understanding that it will be used only for academic purposes and that the information is confidential to the researcher.
* be given access to a summary of the findings from the study when it is concluded.
Appendix Three: List of Respondents

(A) New Zealand:


9. Martin Small: International Programmes Manager CORSO.

10. Alan Bell: Operations Director World Vision New Zealand.

11. Phil Twyford: Executive Director Oxfam New Zealand.

12. John Bowis: Executive Secretary New Zealand Save the Children Fund.
(B) South Africa:

13 Lebogong Maatsabebe: Administrative Officer Rural Women’s Movement South Africa.

14 Norah Lebotse: Founder Director The Genesis Mental Health Centre, Beestekraal South Africa.

15 Maxia Mofamere and Joyce Moshishi: RWM volunteer teachers Lethabong Community Day care Centre Hastsebeesfontain, South Africa.

16 Sue Middleton: Coordinator Border Rural Committee East London, South Africa.

17 Saundra McIntyre: Urban Regional Planner VSA Border Rural Committee East London, South Africa.

18 Matthew Sheppard: VSA Civil Engineer Buffalo Flats Community Development Trust East London, South Africa.

19 Carol Jones: VSA Education resource developer Rural Support Services East London, South Africa.

(C) Zimbabwe:

20 Max Chigwida: Executive Director World Vision Zimbabwe.

21 Chirariro Rural Development Committee: Chairperson Gracia Chakaipa.


23 Godffrey Makwembere: Chief Executive Officer Mudzi Rural District Council Mudzi, Zimbabwe.
24 Maree Drury: VSA Resource Planner Mudzi Rural District Council Mudzi, Zimbabwe

25 Graeme Evans: VSA Ostrich Farm Manager Mudzi Rural District Council Mudzi, Zimbabwe.

26 Kraal Heads: Mudzi Rural District Council Mudzi, Zimbabwe (Interpreted by Fredrick Manyangarirwa Games scout).
BIBLIOGRAPHIES

Adedeji, A. (1993)

Africa Emergency

Africa Recovery

"The Unique Case of African Democracy". International Affairs. Vol. 69 No. 2 pp. 239-244.

Alley, R.

Amin, S.


Apter, D (1965)
The Politics of Modernization. University of Chicago Press. IL

Arndt, HW (1978)
The Rise and Fall of Economic Growth. Longman. Cheshire

Atkinson, A. (1977)

Australian Development Assistance Bureau (AIDAB) 1994
Review of Humanitarian Relief Programs. AIDAB. Canberra.

Ayers, R. L. (1990)


Black, J. K. (1991)

Blaiki, N (1993)
Approaches to Social Enquiry. Polity Press Cambridge. UK.

Boston, J. and Holland, M. (eds.) (1987)

Bracken, I (1980)


Bulmer, M. (1982)


Callaghy, T. M. (1994)

Cassen, R. (1986)

Catholic Institute for International Relations (1985)

Chan, S. (1986)

Bibliographies
(1985C) "Lusaka or Harare?" New Zealand International Review. Vol. X No. 4 pp. 7-11.

Bibliographies 415 Love M. Chile


Debreacy, RS (1984)


Dickenson, J. (1983)


Durning, AB (1989)


“Facing up to Africa’s Food Crisis” pp. 149-180 in Ravenhill, J (ed.) Africa In Economic Crisis. Macmillan London

Elkan W. (1973)


Emmanuel, A. (1972)

Fanon, F. (1967)
   The Wretched of the Earth. Penguin.

Firesone, WA (1990)


Fosu, AK (1992)

Frank, AG (1981)
   Crisis In the Third World. Heinemann Education.

Frey, BS (1984)

Friedman, M. (1970)

Gaddis, J. (1982)


   Crisis In Africa: Battle ground of the East and West. Penguin.

Geard, K (1996)

George, S. (1979)
   Feeding the Few: Corporate Control of Food. Institute of Policy Studies London.
George, S. and Sabelli, F (1994)

George, V. and Haword, I. (1991)


Gold, H. (ed.)
New Directions in New Zealand Foreign Policy. Benton Ross. Auckland.

Gordenker, L. (1976)

Overseas Aid motivations: The Economics of Australia’s Bilateral Aid. Avebury.

Green, RH (1992)

Griffin, K. (1991)

Griffin, K. and Enos, J. (1970)

“EC Aid to Associated Countries: Distribution and Determinants” Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv Vol. 128 No. 2, pp. 202-220.

Gupta, K. (1975)
"Foreign Capital Inflows, Dependency Burden and Savings Rates in Developing Countries: A Simultaneous Equation Model". Kyklos. No. 28.

Gupta, K. and Islam, MA (1983)
Harden, B. (1990)

Harland, B (1992)

Harrison, P. (1987)

London.

Hayter, T. and Watson, C. (1985)

Healey J M. (1971)


Hoadley, S. (1992)

Holland, M. (1987)
Hull, RW (1991)


Hymer, S. (1975)

International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa (1983)
Apartheid: The facts. IDAF publications London

International Save the Children Alliance (1994)
Annual Report SCF. Geneva Switzerland.

Isenman, P. (1976)

Jackson, K. (1980)

Jaeger, WK (1992)


'The Role of the Media in New Zealand-Africa Relations: Mapping the Road Ahead'. Unpublished comments during a panel discussion on Conference on New Zealand-Africa Relations: Mapping the Road Ahead'. Africa Information Centre. Wellington.

Kegley, CW. and Hook, SW (1991)

Kennaway, R. (1991)


Kirk, N. (1973A)

Kiss, J. (1991)

Development and underdevelopment in historical perspective. Methuen. London.

Korten, DC (1990)


Laidlaw, C. (1986A)

Lall, S. (1975)

The Africans: Encounters from the Sudan to the Cape. Bodley Head. London.

Lange, D. (1985) 

Aid as Obstacle: Twenty Questions About Foreign Aid and the Hungry Institute for Food and Development Policy. San Francisco.

Lean, G.(1978) 

Legum, C.; Zartem, WI; Langdon, S. and Mykelka, LK (1979) 

Lele, U. (1992) 

Lerner, M. (1962) 


Linear, M. (1985) 

Little, IMD (1964) 

Love, AR (1993) 

Loyd, PC (1973) 

Mabogunje, AL (1980) 

“Motivation for Aid to Developing Countries” World Development. Vol. 12 No. 9 pp. 879 -900.
"Famine as Human Folly: Urban Bias and Rural Neglect in Sub-Saharan Africa"

Mandaza, I. (1987)


"A Two-Part Sample Selection Model of British Bilateral Foreign Aid Allocation"

McKinley, RD (1978)

McKinley, RD and Little, R. (1979)
Aid and Arms to the Third World: An Analysis of the Distribution and Impact of

"Foreign Policy Making: 50 Years on" New Zealand International Review Vol. XVIII
No. 4 July/August 1993 pp. 7-12.

Independence and Foreign Policy: New Zealand in the World Since 1935. Auckland
University Press.

Miles, MB and Huberman, AM (1994)

Good Aid: A Study of Quality in Small Projects. SIDA.

Ministry of External Relations and Trade:

Ministry of Foreign Affairs:
Wellington.
(1974C) Foreign Affairs Review Vol. 24 No. 5 May 1974

Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade:
(1995C) New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade Record Vol. 2 No. 9
(1994A) New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade Record Vol. 4 No. 6 Nov. 1994.
(1993A) New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade Record Vol. 1 No. 2 July 1993.
(1993B) New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade Record Vol. 1 No. 7 January 1993.
(1993C) Refocusing NZODA to education and training in the South Pacific: A discussion Paper. Wellington

Apartheid Contras: An Inquiry into the Roots of War in Angola and Mozambique.

Morgan, G. (1983)

Mosley, P. (1987)
Foreign aid its defence and reform. The university press of Kentucky, Lexington.

Mosley, P. Hudson, J. and Horrell, S. (1990)


Myrdal, G. (1970)

Bibliographies 425

Love M. Chile

Neuman, WL (1991)


New Zealand House of Representatives (1950)

New Zealand Save the Children Fund NZSCF (1995)

Norton, GW; Ortiz, J. and Pardey, PG (1992)

Nottingham, I. (1987)


Nzongola-Ntalaja (1987)


Organization For Economic Co-operation and Development (1985)


Palma, G. (1978)
"Dependency: A Formal Theory of Underdevelopment or a Methodology for the Analysis of Concrete Situations". World Development. Vol. 6-7/8 pp. 881-924.

Afrinet Dakar Senegal. 14 October 1996.

Papaneck, GF (1983)

Patton, MQ (1990)


Perez, CA (1990)


Pietrobelli, C. and Scarpa, C. (1992)

Plank, DN (1993)

Poe, SC (1990)


Bibliographies Love M. Chile
Radice, H. (1975)  
International Firms and Modern Imperialism. Penguin.


Ravenhill, J. (1986)  

Rawls, J. (1971)  


Rhodes, RI (ed.) (1970)  

Riddell, JB (1992)  

Riddell, RC (1987)  


Robinson, B. (1990)  


Rostow, WW (1971)  


Bibliographies 428 Love M. Chile


Sallnow, J. (1990)
"Is it Aid or Neo-colonialism?" Geographical Magazine. No. 63 pp. 30-35.


Scheyvens, R and Overton, J (1996)

Seabrook, J. (1993)

Seaman, JH; Rivers, J. and Murlis, J. (1973)

Sexton, EA and Decker, TN (1992)

Seymore-Smith (1986)

Shepherd, J. (1975)


Sieghart, P. (1983)


Singer, P. (1977)

Bibliographies 429 Love M. Chile
Sivard, RL (1983)
World Military and Social Expenditures. World Priorities. Washington DC.

Smircich, L. (1983)

Spindler, K. (1985)

Spitz, P. (1978)
"Silent Violence and Inequality". International Social Science Journal 30 No. 4.

Strauss, AL (1987)

Streeter, P. (1972)

Stevens, C. (1979)

Stoneman, C. (1975)


Tandon, Y (1987)


Bibliographies

430

Love M. Chile
The Economist:


(1993C) "If You are Good: West Makes Aid Dependent on Democracy and Human Rights". *Vol. 327* May 29. 1993 p46.


The Hunger Project (1985)


Thomas, S. (1985)


Thompson, GJ (1967)

New Zealand's International Aid. New Zealand Institute of International Affairs. Wellington.

Thompson, R. (1991)


Timberlake, L. (1985)

*Africa in Crisis: The Causes, the Cures of Environmental Bankruptcy*. Earthscan. Notthingham UK.

Trainor, L. (1980)


Transvaal Rural Action Committee TRAC (1995)


Treasury Papers


Trumball, WN and Wall, HJ (1994)


Turker, R. (1977)

UI Haq (1976)

UNDP (1996)

UNICEF (1989)

United Nations Department of Information (1990)
Debt: A Crisis for Development. UN Department of Information. New York.

UNHCR (1994)

US Committee for Refugees (1993)

Wara, R (1994)


Watson, R. L. (1985)

Webster, P. (1996)

Bibliographies 432

Love M. Chile
Weisskopf, T. E. (1972)

Weeks, D. C. (1992)

White, H. (1992A)


White, N. D. (1994)
"UN Peacekeeping: Development or Destruction?". *International Relations Vol. XII No. 1* April 1994 pp. 129-158.

Winchester, N. B. (1986)

Wittkopf, L. P. (1972)

Woodroffe, J. (1990)

World Bank:

(1986B) Poverty and Hunger: Issues and Options for Food Security in Developing Countries. Washington DC.

Bibliographies 433 Love M. Chile
World Health Organisation (1994)
Geneva.

World Vision Zimbabwe:

Worsley, P. (1975)

Young, R. (1983)
Canadian Development Assistance to Tanzania. North-South Institute Ottawa.

Younger, S. D. (1992)

UNPUBLISHED OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS

The official files on New Zealand bilateral assistance to Africa from 1976-1995 were reviewed at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Those listed here are only those that have been directly quoted or referred to in the thesis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>File Number</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>118/13/118/1</td>
<td>01 September 1994</td>
<td>ODA to Africa: Reshaping the ODA Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>118/13/118/1</td>
<td>09 June 1994</td>
<td>The shape of New Zealand ODA to Africa in the Post-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>apartheid Africa'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>118/13/118/1</td>
<td>27 September 1991</td>
<td>Commonwealth Heads of Governments Meeting:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Harare: Functional Cooperation: NZODA to Africa An overview.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>118/13/118/1 18/0232 Z WN JHC</td>
<td>09 August 1991</td>
<td>NONE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>118/13/118/1 1 HAR. 482/11/12132 LT.</td>
<td>07 August 1991</td>
<td>NONE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>118/13/118/1 1 HAR 22/14292 LT. HAR</td>
<td>22 May 1991</td>
<td>NONE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>118/13/118/1</td>
<td>14 August 1990</td>
<td>NONE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>118/13/118/1</td>
<td>02 May 1990</td>
<td>ODA to Africa 1990/91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>118/13/118/1 1 64/256/2</td>
<td>08 March 1990</td>
<td>NONE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>118/13/118/1 1 HAR. 008 02/15 402 LT.</td>
<td>02 November 1989</td>
<td>NONE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Bibliographies 434 Love M. Chile
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12 July 1989</td>
<td>NONE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 October 1988</td>
<td>NONE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 January 1987</td>
<td>NONE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 November 1985</td>
<td>Aid/Trade Mission to Southern Africa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1985</td>
<td>Prime Minister's Visit to Africa. New Zealand Assistance to Africa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01 October 1979</td>
<td>Africa allocation of awards 1980/81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 November 1976</td>
<td>Letter to Mr. RK Eunson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 November 1976</td>
<td>Letter to Rev. WA Best</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 July 1975</td>
<td>Letter from President of Tanzania to Prime Minister RE Rowling.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Bibliographies 435

Love M. Chile